God Pro Nobis: On Non-metaphysical Realism and the Philosophy of Religion

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

GOD PRO NOBIS ON NON-METAPHYSICAL REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by KARIN JOHANNESSON

PEETERS LEUVEN - PARIS - DUDLEY, MA 2007

A CIP record for this book is availablefromthe Library of Congress

This work was originally published in Swedish by Bokforlaget Thales and defended as a doctoral dissertation, supervised by professor Eberhard Herrmann, at Uppsala University. It has been translated by Marie Taqvist, lecturer in English Studies at Karlstad University. A grant from the Swedish Research Council has supported the translation. © Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. D. 2007/0602/14 ISBN 978-90-429-1856-6 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy and Human Life Human Anxiety and Philosophical Reflection The Aims of this Book

1

1 . 5 8

CHAPTER 1: METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM

13

Two Forms of Philosophy of Religion Metaphysical Philosophy of Religion Metaphysical Realism Metaphysical Realism and Metaphysical Philosophy of Religion . Realism and Religion

13 18 22 27 36

CHAPTER 2: METAPHYSICAL REALISM

43

'Gavagai!' Analytical Hypotheses The Inscrutability of Reference Ontological Relativity Two Central Problem Areas Brains in a Vat Twin Earth Cats and Cherries Just More Theory Putnam and Quine

43 45 50 53 55 58 66 72 75 82

CHAPTER 3: ALETHIC REALISM

89

Alethic Realism and Metaphysical Realism Minimal and Neutral? Realist versus Epistemic Criticism of the Criticism Alston's Presuppositions

89 94 98 103 110

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Metaphysical Realism? Alston and Evidence-Transcendence Theology and Philosophy CHAPTER 4: INTERNAL REALISM

Fact and Value Eudaemonia Fact, Value and Conceptual Scheme Putnam and Truth Sufficiently Good Conditions for Justification Alston's Criticism Putnam and Evidence-Transcendence Evidence-Transcendent Truths Putnam, God and Evidence-Transcendent Truths Truth and Semantics CHAPTER 5: ANTI-REALISM

Dummett and the Meaning-Theoretic Assumptions The Principle of Bivalence Undecidable Sentences Two Forms of Realism The Manifestability Requirement Holism and the Concept of Meaning Verification and Evidence-Transcendence Dummett and Putnam Semantic Realism and Evidence-Transcendence Semantic Realism and Ontology

117 121 123 131

131 135 138 143 147 151 155 160 162 168 171

171 176 180 183 186 188 191 195 198 202

CHAPTER 6: NON-METAPHYSICAL REALISM

205

Davidson, Dummett and Putnam Davidson and Quine Davidson and Tarski Radical Interpretation Conceptual Schemes Kantian or Quinean? Interpretation and Conceptual Schemes Interpretation and Conceptual Differences

205 208 210 213 217 220 222 224

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Kantian - Not Quinean One Single Conceptual Scheme - or Several? Re-interpreting Realism A Shared Independent Reality Non-Metaphysical Realism and Religious Belief A Swedish Debate CONCLUDING REMARKS

Philosophical Thinking about Religion - Once Again Turning to Linguistic Behavior Criticism and Construction WORKS CITED

227 229 231 233 237 241 245

245 248 250 253

INTRODUCTION ... to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about Stanley Cavell Philosophy and Human Life There are some questions that we think of as an unavoidable part of human existence, as questions to which every human being must relate somehow or other. Why do we exist? Is there a meaning to life? Is there a God who has created us and who cares for us? If God exists, why is our life on earth far from perfect? Why must so many be afflicted by starvation, disease and natural disasters? If God exists, why does God not do something about all this misery? If God exists, can God prevent what is happening or has everything been predestined since long before we were even born? What really happens when we die? Do we live on in another dimension or are we reborn, in another shape, here on earth? When we die, will we get to meet our loved ones, or is life extinguished forever with our last breath? We call such questions 'existential questions' and we often conceive of them as something that human beings in different cultures and different time periods or circumstances have in common. We like to describe these questions as the constant companions of humankind; however, this does not imply that we disregard the fact that the historical and cultural situations in which we find ourselves affect both the exact formulation of these questions and the various approaches to them that we can take. The values, knowledge, conceptions and insights to which we have access thus characterize both our formulation of and our approach to these questions. That our existential questions are an unavoidable part of human life does not imply that all people, in all situations, always formulate them in the same way, nor does it imply that these questions are unsolvable in the sense that we cannot compare or evaluate our different approaches to them. Perhaps we will never be able to dispose of these existential questions, never be able to rid ourselves of them by answering them once and for all. However, what we can do is reflect on the various approaches to these questions that are open to us. We can consider the relative advantages and

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disadvantages of these approaches. We can think about how they relate to our knowledge of reality, to our values and to alternative conceptions. Philosophy is one vehicle of many suitable for such reflections. Stanley Cavell emphasizes that philosophy relates to the great and, in a sense, unsolvable questions that so often are an unavoidable part of our human life. The philosopher's task is not so much to solve individual philosophical problems as to examine and attempt to address the basic questions that every human being asks sooner or later. Thus, what the philosopher can contribute is not primarily answers, but rather different ways to think. Cavell sees philosophy as |...| a willingness to think not about something other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape |... | Such thoughts are instances of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy, and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers; philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions (...], there are, so to speak, directions to answers, ways to think, that are worth the time of your life to discover. 1

Cavell stresses that the fact that such questions cannot be answered once and for all does not imply that philosophers should stop searching for answers. It does not imply that philosophy should be a purely descriptive discipline and that its practitioners should devote all their energy to describing the questions and the various alternative answers that are on offer. In every age, humans need help in dealing with the great and basic questions. In every age, philosophers need to formulate and recommend various ways to think about these unavoidable questions, various directions to answers. Hilary Putnam declares that the search for answers need not be meaningless just because the philosophical questions often prove to be unsolvable. 'Of course philosophical problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked, "there are better and worse ways of thinking about them.'" There are better and worse approaches to the great and basic questions even when there are no final answers. It is the philosopher's task to investigate what 'better' and 'worse' might signify 2

1 2

Cavell 1984: 9 Putnam 1990: 19

INTRODUCTION

3

in this respect, and to recommend the better alternatives. This is an important task, since the way we approach the great and basic questions has an immense impact on the way we live our lives. Putnam states that the post-Cavellian philosopher can be described as an educator, someone who helps people discern and choose the better approaches. 'Philosophers are, ideally, educators — not just educators of youth, but of themselves and their peers. Stanley Cavell once suggested that as the definition of philosophy — "education for grown-ups". I think that is the definition I like best.' Putnam maintains that philosophy should be seen 'as a reflection on how human beings can resolve the various sorts of "problematical situations" that they encounter, whether in science, in ethics, in politics, in education or wherever'. The problematical situations that philosophers can help us human beings analyze and resolve in a constructive way are situations that relate to our existential questions and to the ways in which we approach them. Many people rightly consider these existential questions to be the special interest area of philosophy. Michael Dummett writes: 3

4

The layman or non-professional expects philosophers to answer deep questions of great import for an understanding of the world. Do we have free will? Can the soul, or the mind, exist apart from the body? How can we tell what is right and what is wrong? Is there any right and wrong, or do we just make it up? Could we know the future or affect the past? Is there a God? And the layman is quite right: if philosophy does not aim at answering such questions, it is worth nothing. 5

Although our existential questions may be eternal in the sense that they cannot be answered once and for all, we must nevertheless address the problematical situations in which we find ourselves as a result of our need to relate to these questions. Philosophers can analyze and help us deal with problems that we face, problems that relate to the unavoidable questions of human life, by explaining what constitutes these problems and by suggesting possible ways in which we can approach them. What problems arise depends on the situation we are in. The questions with which we human beings must engage today are not necessarily the questions that faced people living in previous centuries. Similarly, our possibilities of solving the problems that we face are also affected by our

3 4 5

Pyle 1999: 52 Putnam 1992a: 2-3 Dummett 1991: 1

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way of life. Our experiences, our knowledge and our values provide the possibilities we have of approaching the difficulties that we encounter. Problems caused by our need to relate to our existential questions are no exception. The problems and questions discussed by philosophers are partly the product of a certain situation and they change and develop as time goes by. In present-day society, problems may arise when, for example, our approach to the existential questions encounters modern scientific discoveries. Whether or not we are aware of the fact, most of us have a conception of the world which is largely shaped by science. In addition, due to the rising level of education in society, more and more people receive some sort of scientific training/' Problems may arise as a result of the encounter between certain scientific claims to knowledge and our existential questions, and we humans may need philosophy to help us relate to these problems. As a result of the globalization process, alternative formulations of, and approaches to, the existential questions meet and clash with everincreasing frequency. When people whose approaches to our existential questions differ co-exist in society, problematical situations may arise, situations that philosophers can help us explain and deal with. Secularization and the New Age are other phenomena that generate a need for philosophical reflection in present-day society. Contemporary Swedish society can hardly be described as a Christian monoculture where the Church provides the context in which the existential questions are found and expressed. Instead, the society in which we live is a pluralistic one, and the Church is no longer given interpretive priority. As a result of this development, the problems we face due to the existential questions that we pose and due to our need to relate to these questions have also changed. Thus, our need for philosophical reflection today is different from that of previous generations. The change our society has undergone in the last few decades has been described as a development from the Age of Enlightenment to the Age of Experience. We do not so much strive to reason well as to live a rich and exciting life. Questions as to whether our approach to the existential questions is rational, compatible with scientific discoveries and justifiable have to an increasing extent been accorded second place. Instead, we 7

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Herrmann 1995: 18 Cf. Wikstrom 1997: 9 Wadensjo 1998: 8

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INTRODUCTION

focus on the experiences that certain practices give us. It is becoming increasingly rare to think of religious belief as some form of description of reality. It is far more common to see it as a spiritual spa treatment, designed to make us humans feel good. My interest in philosophy stems from a conviction that there is a need, even in our age of experience, or perhaps I should say especially in our age of experience, for intellectual reflection on the problems that are brought to the fore by our need to relate to our existential questions. It is imperative that philosophical discussions should be held in today's society, a society which is largely characterized by plurality and science. I am aware that intellectual considerations are not the only factors affecting our approach to the existential questions. However, our approaches do touch upon our conception of reality and they do affect our actions. This implies, among other things, that we must consider how our approaches to the existential questions relate to the conceptions of reality which science provides. Thus, we who live in our increasingly pluralistic society must reflect on issues such as our possibilities of critically examining various approaches to our existential questions and to the actions to which they give rise.

Human Anxiety and Philosophical Reflection 'When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there', Ludwig Wittgenstein once stated. Thinking about existential questions is often associated with anxiety to a greater or lesser extent. The existential questions have a tendency to become acute at times of crisis, when we are forced to lift our eyes and look beyond our ordinary every-day existence. The fact that existential questions cannot easily be answered once and for all is often felt to be a source of anxiety, a stress factor which makes us seek to avoid the difficulties caused by our need to relate to these questions. The fact that philosophy relates to our existential questions implies that people's first encounter with philosophy is often felt to be an anxiety-ridden and uncomfortable experience. In a sense, philosophical reflection is especially worrying for people who have adopted a certain 9

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9 10

Wittgenstein 1980: 65e Cf. Pattison 2001: 8

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approach to our existential questions." Whether this approach is religious or non-religious, the fact that philosophers examine and evaluate it can be perceived as disturbing or even offensive. This is because philosophers do not take for granted the standpoints that are made in relation to the existential questions, positions which, if taken for granted, often imply that one does not have to deal with the anxiety that is associated with a closer examination. Instead, philosophers call these standpoints into question, thereby paving the way for some of the anxiety that is associated with our existential questions. 'Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity', Wittgenstein writes. In carrying out this philosophical activity, we deepen and address our existential questions and our need to relate to them in relation to a certain relevant set of problems that the philosopher has chosen to discuss, a set of problems that she wants to help people approach. The philosopher's choice of problems to address is influenced by the kind of person she is, her experiences and her interests. '[T]he questions of philosophy are questions that [...] necessarily concern who we ourselves are, and what our quest for knowledge means for us as concrete, existing historical beings', George Pattison has pointed out. It is therefore necessary to conceive of philosophers as 'embodied voices, whose philosophizing must be incorporated into those further dimensions of their lives that lie outside philosophy in the narrow sense'. To philosophize is not so much to reflect on the question of 'who has already said this' as to search for 'the kind of orientation in thought appropriate to contemporary [...] reflection, i.e. thinking out of our contemporary situation rather than engaging in a literary exchange'. Naturally, the study of what other thinkers have written is an integral part of philosophy. However, philosophy can never be completely reduced to the interpretation of texts. Thomas Nagel reminds us that the raw material of philosophy comes directly from the world and the way in which we relate to it, rather than from old writings. Philosophical problems always relate to difficulties outside of philosophy, difficulties which people find it hard to approach without help. 12

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11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Cf. Pattison 2001: 12 Wittgenstein 1961: §4.112 Pattison 2001: 23 The quotation is from Pattison 2001: 22 Pattison 2001: 2 Nagel 1987: 4. Cf. Putnam 1992b: 398 Cf. Popper, qtd. in Herrmann 1995: 15

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INTRODUCTION

In contemporary philosophical reflection, questions touching upon how language relates to reality are often central. Putnam stresses that a philosophical approach to language-philosophical problems is an expression of a renewed philosophical interest in the questions that are an unavoidable part of human life. He writes: If philosophers have become very interested in language in the past fifty years it is not because they have become cfainterested in the Great Questions of philosophy, but precisely because they are still interested in the Great Questions and because they have come to believe that language holds the key to resolve (or in some way satisfactorily dispose of) the Great Questions. 18

My own work relates to this contemporary philosophical interest in language-philosophical questions and how they affect philosophical reflection. I will formulate and address a problem pertaining to the philosophy of religion, a problem that arises when a certain interpretation of utterances made in religious contexts is related to contemporary philosophical descriptions of the relation between language and reality. The problem 1 have chosen to focus on affects our possibilities of philosophizing about our religious approaches to the existential questions. An essential philosophical task is that of clarifying the presuppositions, frequently hidden, that affect our standpoints on various issues. It is imperative that the philosopher should not only examine the presuppositions on which non-philosophical arguments and standpoints are based, but that she should also question and develop the presuppositions underlying philosophical activities. Pattison emphasizes that philosophy cannot 'put its own assumptions and foundations beyond the reach of any possible critique. On the contrary — philosophy is most itself when it is most attentive to the questionableness of its own aims and methods'. In the light of this context, I will formulate a philosophical critique of certain presuppositions common to reflections on religion, theology and the philosophy of religion. I will reject these presuppositions, arguing that they are philosophically untenable. I will address and develop our possibilities of replacing these presuppositions with other, philosophically tenable, ones and I will show how my reflections and standpoints can enable philosophers of religion to discuss contemporary and previously unaddressed questions, generated by religious approaches to our existential questions. 19

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18 19 2 0

Putnam 1975: 1 Cf. Pattison 2001: 7, 103 Pattison 2001: 122

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The Aims of this Book John Hick argues that the philosophy of religion is a 'philosophical thinking about religion'. On this view, the task facing the philosopher of religion is that of addressing problems generated by religious approaches to our existential questions, using philosophical methods. There are various ways in which we can describe and delimit both the phenomenon of religion and philosophical reflection on it. Thereby, we are paving the way for different definitions of what the philosophy of religion is all about. The philosophy of religion is a discipline that focuses largely on those existential questions that concern the existence and the properties of God. 1 will show that the way in which philosophers of religion address such questions often rests on a specific philosophical conception of how language relates to reality, a conception which is also known as metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism implies that the discussions about the existence and properties of God that philosophers of religion carry out concern a God that can best be described as God-in-Godself. I will argue that metaphysical realism is a philosophically untenable position and an unacceptable starting point for philosophical reflection on religion. Philosophers of religion must therefore reject metaphysical realism. The greater part of my work will be devoted to a philosophical critique of metaphysical realism and a formulation of non-metaphysical realism. Non-metaphysical realism is one philosophically tenable presupposition of many, which philosophers of religion can adopt. The philosopher of religion who presupposes a non-metaphysical starting point for a discussion on questions concerning the existence and properties of God will conceive of discussions about God-in-Godself as meaningless. The only God whom we can discuss in a meaningful way is Godfor-us. God-for-us is God as God is perceived in relation to our experiences and conceptual resources. The metaphysical realist description of God-in-Godself that I criticize is presupposed not only in the discussions carried out by philosophers of religion, but also in theological and religious contexts. Theologians and religious people sometimes imagine God against the background of the presupposition that it is possible for us to talk about God-in-Godself in a meaningful way. I will argue that metaphysical realism must be rejected by theologians and religious people as well as by philosophers of religion. 21

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Hick 1963: 1

INTRODUCTION

9

The metaphysical realist description of the existence and properties of God is related to our wish to conceive of utterances about God as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be unverifiable truths. I will call such truths evidence-transcendent truths. Some people see a rejection of metaphysical realism as a rejection of our possibilities of conceiving of and using religious utterances as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidencetranscendent truths. I will examine whether a rejection of metaphysical realism entails a rejection of our possibilities of conceiving of religious utterances as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. Against the background of non-metaphysical realism, 1 will show that this is not the case. Even if we reject metaphysical realism, we can still conceive of religious utterances as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. This affects the way in which philosophers of religion can reflect on the existence and properties of God. The delimitations and standpoints that I formulate in developing non-metaphysical realism also enable us to include philosophical problems that have not previously been discussed, problems that are generated by the phenomenon of religion as it is today, in the discussion. In chapter one, I will distinguish between two forms of philosophy of religion. I will describe the two forms and I will show that one of these forms, namely metaphysical philosophy of religion, sometimes presupposes metaphysical realism or at least an uncritical approach to it. I will explain what metaphysical realism entails and I will show that it is not the only realist position of consequence in the realism debates. I will argue that it is possible to be a metaphysical, an epistemological, and/or a semantic realist or anti-realist. Furthermore, I will discuss the fact that religious belief is often associated with some form of realism. In the light of this context, I will clarify the distinction between God-in-Godself and God-for-us. In chapter two, I will criticize metaphysical realism. Against the background of W. V. Quine's philosophical reflections, I will reconstruct Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, and I will show in what sense metaphysical realism is an untenable philosophical position. My rejection of metaphysical realism will then be the foundation on which I will build the rest of my argument. William Alston has criticized Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. In chapter three, I will discuss Alston's reasoning. I will

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explain his presuppositions and I will analyze the relation between metaphysical realism and the alethic realism that Alston himself formulates and advocates. It is essential to Alston that we should be able to conceive of religious utterances as evidence-transcendent truths. I will conclude that the question as to whether or not a rejection of metaphysical realism implies that we cannot conceive of religious utterances as evidence-transcendent truths is a question that merits further discussion. In chapter four, I will analyze the relation between Alston's criticism and Putnam's philosophical reflections. 1 will reconstruct and discuss the internal realism that Putnam formulates and offers as an alternative to metaphysical realism. I will show in what sense the internal realist can assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. I will conclude that questions concerning our possibilities of assuming that there are evidencetranscendent truths are related to language-philosophical considerations and standpoints. In chapter five, I will analyze the relation between language-philosophical questions and our possibilities of assuming that there are evidencetranscendent truths. Against the background of Dummett's philosophical reflections, I will discuss what is required for us to be entitled to conceive of an utterance as a statement, that is, an utterance that can be either true or false. I will point out and emphasize the function of our manifested verbal behavior in learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true. In chapter six, I will examine our possibilities of basing our interpretation of people's utterances on their behavior. My starting point will be Donald Davidson's reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation and his arguments against the existence of conceptual schemes. I will clarify in what sense we can conceive of utterances, including utterances made in religious contexts, as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. I will explain what non-metaphysical realism is and what it entails, and I will describe the non-metaphysical realist approach to utterances made in religious contexts. In my concluding remarks, I will describe how my reconstructions and reflections affect philosophers of religion in their work. I will argue that the philosophy of religion that my delimitations and standpoints enable us to pursue is a combination of the two forms of philosophy of religion outlined in chapter one. I will stress that extensive interpretive work in the field of philosophy of religion must underlie such reflections. I will conclude that it is possible, but not necessary, for philosophers of religion

INTRODUCTION

11

to pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. Given my delimitations and standpoints, philosophers of religion are able to address problems outside the narrow confines of metaphysical philosophy of religion. They can reflect on religious questions that are contemporary and that have not yet been addressed in a philosophical context.

CHAPTER ONE

METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM

There is no universally accepted definition of the philosophy of religion. In this chapter, I will distinguish between two forms of philosophy of religion, and I will attempt to define them. I have chosen to call the first of the two forms 'metaphysical philosophy of religion', and to exemplify the second form with the help of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. Many metaphysical philosophers of religion explicitly presuppose metaphysical realism in their work or, at any rate, do not give much thought to the matter. 1 will clarify what metaphysical realism is and how it affects the form of philosophy of religion that I call metaphysical philosophy of religion. I will argue that metaphysical realism is not the only form of realism there is. I argue that it is possible to be a metaphysical, epistemological, and/or semantic realist or anti-realist. Questioning the tenability of the metaphysical realist position is often seen as a criticism of realism in general. If we presuppose the view that the philosopher of religion must base her work on a realist description of religious faith, and if we presuppose the supposition that metaphysical realism is the only form of realism there is, any attempt to reject the validity of metaphysical realism will, to the philosopher of religion, appear to be problematical. In my work, I will show how we can reject metaphysical realism without having to reject all other forms of realism, as well, and without having to renounce our possibilities of pursuing philosophy of religion. I will formulate a non-metaphysical realist position, one which is philosophically tenable and which can be a useful presupposition for the philosopher of religion in her work.

Two Forms of Philosophy of Religion Filosofilexikonet, a Swedish dictionary of philosophical terminology, makes a distinction between two forms of philosophy of religion. On 1

1

.Filosofilexikonet 1988: 468 ('religionsfilosofi')

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the one hand, the term can denote philosophical considerations regarding that which is central to religion — a philosophical investigation into questions touching upon the existence and properties of God. It is this form which is often called metaphysical philosophy of religion. Metaphysical philosophy of religion can relate to religion in a positive way, it can attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for religious statements, or it can facilitate a critical evaluation of religion and religious belief in general. On the other hand, the term 'philosophy of religion' can denote philosophical considerations regarding the phenomenon of religion as an existing human — psychological, social, historical — reality, as a human form of expression. On this view, it is the philosopher's task to outline what religion is and what religious phenomena mean. Metaphysical philosophy of religion is a discipline that is both truthoriented and object-oriented. The metaphysical philosopher of religion is primarily interested in whether or not the statements about reality that religion is supposed to express are reasonable and/or true. Insofar as the philosophy of religion is a discipline which discusses religion as an existing human reality, it is both meaning-oriented and contextual. Meaningoriented philosophers of religion are primarily interested in what religious belief is and what it means to various people and groups of people. Tage Kurten points out that both forms of philosophy of religion are connected to various conceptions regarding the ways in which language relates to reality. The supporters of the two forms of philosophy of religion disagree on how best to describe the functions of language. Kurten writes: Truth-oriented philosophy of religion, it appears, is in line with the theories of meaning that [...] emphasize the representing function of language and represent the ideal of the neutral observer who is able to understand and test what is said in language. This form of philosophy of religion can also be called object-oriented philosophy of religion, since it seems primarily to focus on what is talked about in religious language, whereupon the question 'Is it true?' or 'Is it reasonable?' is asked. Meaning-oriented philosophy of religion [...] emphasizes the constitutive and articulating functions of language. This approach could also be called contextual or context-oriented philosophy of religion, since it emphasizes the fact that it is in relation to the role language plays in concrete human contexts that it is understood. [...] [Thereby], the idea of a neutral observer is called into question, since an understanding of human contexts and the role of language in such contexts presupposes that the philosopher somehow relates the language in question to his/her own position as a human being. 2

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Translated from the Swedish original as it appears in Kurten 1987: 26-7

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METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Questions touching upon the relation between language and reality are discussed within the framework of the realism debates in which philosophers of religion as well as philosophers working within other philosophical areas engage. There is a connection between our stance in the philosophical realism debates and the way in which we conceive of the nature and task of the philosophy of religion. I will examine this connection by discussing our possibilities of pursuing metaphysical philosophy of religion. Peter Vardy states that, to the philosopher of religion, the realism debates are about what it implies to say that God exists and to talk of God as existing. He shows that the various positions we take in the realism debates affect how we think of, and possibly how we work out, arguments concerning the existence and the properties of God. Supporters of various realist, anti-realist, or non-realist positions within the field of philosophy of religion interpret the statement 'God exists' in different ways. The realist, anti-realist, or non-realist position that we philosophers of religion presuppose in our work determines in what sense we can conceive of God as existing. On the basis of our description of God's (possible) existence, we can indicate if and how we can argue for or against the existence of God and what properties we can attribute to God in a meaningful way. Thus, our position in the realism debates will determine our possibilities of pursuing metaphysical philosophy of religion. Metaphysical philosophy of religion is a discipline that has been the subject of much criticism. D. Z. Phillips, one of the most well-known supporters of meaning-oriented philosophy of religion, stresses that it is not the philosophers' task, but rather that of the theologians, to examine the question of what should, and what should not, be said about God. The philosophers' task is instead to describe how we talk of for example God and, while doing so, to 'leave the ragged scene ragged'. The problem with metaphysical philosophy of religion, Phillips suggests, is that it is based on a misunderstanding. Religious belief cannot be, and does not have to be, defended with the help of non-religious arguments. The act of defending religious belief with the help of non-religious arguments is an expression of a non-religious approach to religious belief, an approach which does not allow religious belief to produce its own 3

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Vardy 1995 Phillips 1988: 215 Cf. Phillips 1988: 223

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reflections based on its own premises, and which makes it impossible to describe religious belief in a correct way. Metaphysical philosophers of religion, then, try to evaluate religious belief using non-religious criteria. Instead, they should study and describe the criteria which are already being used within religious contexts. Only by making actual belief the focal point can the philosopher of religion gain insight into the phenomenon of religion. Phillips goes on to suggest that a philosopher of religion who carefully investigates religious practices will discover that religious belief does not work in the way that metaphysical philosophy of religion assumes that it does. People who have a mature belief are not tentative in their approach to belief in God, and the debate between belief and non-belief is not a debate where probability and proof are weighed within the framework of a common system. Religious belief is not about rational reflections on whether or not God exists, and it is not about hypothetical arguments on what doctrines should be accepted. Thus, Phillips argues, metaphysical philosophy of religion rests on an erroneous understanding of religious belief. In discussing our possibilities of pursuing metaphysical philosophy of religion, I will refer to Phillips' criticism and to meaning-oriented philosophy of religion. However, I will not draw the conclusion that metaphysical philosophy of religion cannot, or should not, be pursued. Instead, I will argue that, as a consequence of the positions that I propose we should take in the realism debates, we must change the way in which we pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. I will also argue that there are issues and problems that are not part of metaphysical philosophy of religion, but that nonetheless can be interesting and fruitful areas for the philosopher of religion to investigate. Thus, the metaphysical philosophy of religion that we can pursue is only part of the wider discipline of philosophy of religion. The term 'metaphysical philosophy of religion' can provoke a certain degree of suspicion; there is a tendency today to question the meaningfulness of metaphysical reflections. Metaphysics deals with questions concerning what exists, and it is sometimes described as a discipline which examines problems that cannot be answered with the help of the empirical research methods that are commonly used in the natural sciences. This connection to that which is non-empirical and non-scientific 6

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Phillips 1988: 49, 80 Cf. Evans 1994: 165

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is often mentioned in various descriptions of metaphysics. Against the background of this understanding of the concept of metaphysics, scholars who would argue that it is only in relation to our empirical methods of verification that questions concerning what exists can be asked and answered in a meaningful way would hold that metaphysical reflections are meaningless. By the term 'metaphysics' I do not mean reflections relating to that which is non-scientific and non-empirical, nor do I conceive of metaphysical philosophy of religion as metaphysical in the sense that it presupposes our ability to ask and answer questions about what exists without relating these questions to our empirical methods. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the terminological distinction between general and special metaphysics was introduced. General metaphysics was seen as a general discipline relating to the basic structures, the essential characteristics, of all that exists or can exist. Special metaphysics, by contrast, was seen as an account of the specific main forms in which something might exist. Questions about the existence and properties of God would thereby fall under the heading of special metaphysics. This distinction between general and special metaphysics is not universally accepted in contemporary philosophical debates, but it does live on to some extent in the distinction that is made between metaphysics and ontology. That which was previously termed general metaphysics, namely, ideas about what exists and about criteria for existence, is today often called ontology, whereas the term 'metaphysics' has to an increasing degree come to be used for what was previously seen as subcategories of special metaphysics. I would argue that metaphysical philosophy of religion is metaphysical in the sense that it aims to answer ontological questions. It is also metaphysical because it is part of what was previously termed special metaphysics. Ontological questions are not necessarily associated with that which is non-empirical or non-scientific; on the contrary, we often reflect on ontological questions in relation to our empirical methods and our perceptions of reality. Not all metaphysical philosophers of religion attempt to answer questions concerning what exists without relating them to our perceptions of reality. Metaphysical philosophy of religion is often linked to a wider interest in empirical research methods and findings. For 8

9

E.g. in Filosofilexikonet 1988: 368 ('metafysik') and The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995: 489 ('metaphysics') Filosofilexikonet 1988: 367 ('metafysik') 8

9

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this reason, metaphysical philosophers of religion often give special attention to empirical research methods and findings thought to be particularly important in relation to our standpoints on basic questions of religion. Metaphysical Philosophy of Religion I have indicated that metaphysical philosophers of religion examine basic questions of religion, such as questions relating to the existence and properties of God. This description of metaphysical philosophy of religion gives the impression that philosophy of religion is a discipline that can be delimited and defined relatively easily; however, this is not the case. William Abraham stresses that philosophy of religion is not so easily defined. He writes: How are we to define philosophy of religion? Definitions of philosophy in general and philosophy of religion in particular are notoriously difficult to formulate. The reason for lack of consensus at this point is simple. Part of the lask of philosophy is to determine what philosophy is; therefore any account of that tusk calls for extended discussion in its own right. As the task of philosophy is a matter of some dispute, this essentially contested issue will be reflected in any definition one might offer. This does not mean that there is no room for definitions, but their place is perhaps at the end rather than at the beginning. 10

There is no neutral way to describe philosophy of religion. All we can do is delimit and explain the work done in the field, against the background of certain standpoints. Philip Quinn, for example, describes philosophy of religion in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. According to Quinn, philosophy of religion is the subfield of philosophy devoted to the study of religious phenomena. Although religions are typically complex systems of theory and practice, including both myths and rituals, philosophers tend to concentrate on evaluating religious truth claims. In the major theistic traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the most important of these claims concern the existence, nature, and activities of God. Such traditions commonly understand God to be something like a person who is disembodied, eternal, free, all-powerful, all-knowing, the creator and sustainer of the universe, and the proper object of human obedience and worship. One important question is whether this conception of the object of human religious activity is coherent; another is whether such a being actually exists. Philosophers of religion have sought rational answers to both questions. 11

Abraham 1985: 7 ' The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995: 607 ('philosophy of religion')

10 1

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Quinn points out that the focal point in this philosophical work is often what has been described by philosophers of religion as the theistic concept of God. He defines philosophy of religion as metaphysical philosophy of religion. Attempting to answer the question as to whether conceptions of God that occur in religious contexts are coherent and whether the properties that are attributed to God are mutually compatible is to pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. Attempting to answer the question as to whether God exists is also to pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. It is not my intention to criticize Quinn's understanding of philosophy of religion; indeed, many significant and frequently discussed areas of contemporary philosophy of religion can be termed metaphysical philosophy of religion. One does not need to study the history of the discipline very carefully to conclude that many philosophers of religion have thought about questions concerning the existence and properties of God. To many philosophers, reflection on such issues is the pursuit of philosophy of religion. It is possible to think of philosophy of religion as a discipline whose task it is to provide us with knowledge about the existence of God and, should God exist, with knowledge about what God is like. There are also certain forms of theology from which metaphysical philosophy of religion cannot easily be delimited and distinguished. The term 'theology' can be used in many different ways. In its original meaning, it is a discipline relating to the study of God. Both metaphysical philosophy of religion and certain forms of theology are intellectual disciplines whose task it is to provide doctrines about God. For this reason, the metaphysical philosophers of religion who defend certain religious beliefs sometimes describe themselves as theologians. Because it is so difficult to make a clear distinction between theology and metaphysical philosophy of religion, some philosophers of religion see their discipline as one which is closely connected to theology and apologetics. The classical arguments for and against the existence of God constitute an important component of metaphysical philosophy of religion, and they are often essential ingredients in a basic education in the philosophy of religion. These arguments are constantly being developed and reformulated by contemporary philosophers of religion who relate them to 12

13

14

15

16

12 13 14 15 16

Cf. Peterson et al 1991: 9 Cf. Jeffner 1982: 11 E.g. Hick 1993: 162 Cf. Peterson et al 1991: 9; Abraham 1985: 8; Jeffner 1982: 11 Cf. Peterson et al 1991 and Hick 1963

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recent scientific research. Empirical findings are significant in this respect. For example, present-day metaphysical philosophers of religion argue that the existence of God is proven by the fact that the distance between the Earth and the sun, the composition of the atmosphere, and the rotation speed of the Earth are such that the necessary conditions for life on Earth are met. It would seem entirely reasonable to conclude, therefore, that there is a higher power that has brought about these perfect conditions for life on Earth. The argumentation and the conclusions drawn are thus based on empirical findings. Another topic which is also of current interest in metaphysical philosophy of religion is that of God's properties. Some metaphysical philosophers of religion try to formulate a coherent concept of God. Central to this idea is the supposition that a God whose nature can only be formulated with the help of contradictions cannot possibly exist. An incoherent concept of God, or a self-contradictory doctrine, cannot express truth-claims. The term 'coherence' can be used in various ways. It can indicate consistency, that is, freedom from logical contradiction. Moreover, it can also indicate some form of system or perspective whose parts we humans can perceive as fitting together. Many philosophers of religion approach the coherence of the concept of God from the point of view that coherence entails consistency, freedom from logical contradiction. They aim to show, either that the properties attributed to God are inconsistent, or that they are not. Quinn gives a few examples of questions concerned with the logical consistency of the concept of God. He writes: 17

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20

Consider the traditional affirmation that God is all-powerful (omnipotent). Reflection on this doctrine raises a famous question: Can God make a stone so heavy that even God cannot lift it? No matter how this is answered, it seems that there is at least one thing that even God cannot do, i.e., make such a stone or lift such a stone, and so it appears that even God cannot be allpowerful. Such puzzles stimulate attempts by philosophers to analyze the concept of omnipotence in a way that specifies more precisely the scope of the powers coherently attributable to an omnipotent being. To the extent that such attempts succeed, they foster a deeper understanding of the con, cept of God and, if God exists, of the divine nature. Another sort of puzzle concerns the consistency of attributing two or more properties to God. Consider the claim that God is both immutable and omniscient. An immutable 17 18 19 20

The example is based on Peterson et al 1991: 82 Peterson et al 1991: 49 Cf. Nielsen 1971: 135 Filosofilexikonet 1988: 298 ('koherens')

METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

21 -

being is one that cannot undergo internal change, and an omniscient being knows all truths, and believes no falsehoods. If God is omniscient, it seems that God must first know and hence believe that it is now Tuesday and not believe that it is now Wednesday and later know and hence believe that it is now Wednesday and not believe that it is now Tuesday. If so, God's beliefs change, and since change of belief is an internal change, God is not immutable. So it appears that God is not immutable if God is omniscient. A resolution of this puzzle would further contribute to enriching the philosophical understanding of the concept of God. 21

The coherence of the concept of God can be seen as an issue touching upon the logical consistency of the concept of God; another way to look at it is to understand coherence as some form of system or perspective whose parts we humans can perceive as fitting together. A philosopher of religion who focuses on coherence in this sense focuses on the question of what properties we can meaningfully ascribe to God if we are to perceive the properties we ascribe to God as fitting together. Philosophical discussions on the problem of suffering can help to clarify this distinction between the view that coherence is logical consistency and the view that coherence relates to some form of system of perspective whose parts we can perceive as fitting together. In some such discussions, the question of suffering is seen as a question concerning whether or not the properties attributed to God contradict one another or what we know about reality. By contrast, theodicy discussions have tended to treat the problem of suffering as a question concerning how, given the fact that suffering does exist, we can formulate a coherent conception of reality and attitude to life which express a belief in the existence of God. Thus, formulations of the theodicy problem strive for coherence in the sense of 'some form of system or perspective whose parts we humans can perceive as fitting together', whereas logical formulations of the problem of suffering strive for coherence in the sense of 'consistency'. Metaphysical philosophy of religion is about analyzing and critically evaluating religious beliefs. The metaphysical philosopher of religion sees religious beliefs as statements that are held to be true by religious believers, statements that express truth-claims. Religious beliefs are described as beliefs about some kind of absolute reality. Richard Swinburne explains: 'By a man's religious beliefs I understand, very roughly, his beliefs about transcendent reality, including his belief about whether or not there is a God, and his beliefs about what properties God has (what 22

21 2 2

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995: 608 ('philosophy of religion') Cf. Peterson et al 1991: 4-5, 8

22

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God is like), and what actions he has performed'. Since, according to this view, '[n]onbelief in religion [in fact always is] the reverse side of some set of positive beliefs that regulate the non-believer's life', metaphysical philosophy of religion also treats atheist perspectives as standpoints on the basic questions of religion. The metaphysical philosopher of religion aims to take a definite stance on the question as to whether various religious beliefs are coherent, probable, true. She aims to describe God and to answer the question as to whether or not God exists. In a sense, what she strives for is 'a complete philosophical perspective on God'. Some metaphysical philosophers of religion presuppose a form of realism that can be described as metaphysical realism; this form of realism has been much debated and criticized. In the following, I will outline metaphysical realism. I will then show how metaphysical realism is often presupposed by metaphysical philosophers of religion. 23

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Metaphysical Realism In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Panayot Butchvarov defines metaphysical realism as: in the widest sense, the view that (a) there are real objects (usually the view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist independently of our experience or our knowledge of them, and (c) they have properties and enter into relations independently of the concepts with which we understand them or of the language with which we describe them. [...] Metaphysical realism, in all of its three parts, is shared by common sense, the sciences, and most philosophers. 26

Butchvarov's summary of metaphysical realism shows how difficult it is to give a brief and yet comprehensive definition of a philosophical position. If we presuppose his definition of metaphysical realism, it would seem highly unlikely that sensible people could possibly be anything other than metaphysical realists. Who, today, would argue that there are no spatiotemporal objects, for any reason other than attention-seeking? Who, today, would deny that seas and trees exist independently of our experience of them? Butchvarov's definition gives the impression that a 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6

Swinburne 1981: 55 Quotation from Gutting 1982: 2 Quotation from Morris 1991: 34 The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1995: 488 ('metaphysical realism')

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23

philosopher who rejects metaphysical realism would argue, either that the flowers would cease to exist if we, or possibly God, no longer perceive them, or that there are no spatiotemporal objects in the first place. Butchvarov calls all positions that reject one or more of his three theses anti-realism; thereby, metaphysical realism is seen as the only form of realism. He observes that the main objection to metaphysical realism is the simple fact that we cannot imagine real objects without presupposing our concepts. However, in Butchvarov's view, this objection would either lead one to reach the absurd conclusion that there are no real objects, or it would imply that we have to re-define the concepts of 'reality', 'truth' and 'knowledge', an impossible task in his opinion. Possibly, Butchvarov thinks, the objection could be reduced to a self-evident statement, one which communicates nothing of substance: we can only know and understand reality when we can know and understand it. The problem with Butchvarov's definition is that it lacks nuances. It regards far too many philosophical positions as metaphysical realism. In fact, all realists are seen as metaphysical realists and an anti-realist is defined as someone who rejects any of Butchvarov's three theses. However, it can be questioned whether all proponents of various forms of anti-realism would really reject Butchvarov's three theses. A philosopher who calls herself an anti-realist, or who is regarded by others as an antirealist, can accept all three theses on the basis of an interpretation of them which is different from the interpretation that the metaphysical realist would use. Butchvarov fails to recognize, both that not all realists are metaphysical realists, and that anti-realists do not always deny the very things that metaphysical realists affirm. The sticking point here is how we choose to interpret the concepts that Butchvarov uses in his definition — what does it imply to say that something is real, true and independent? It is entirely possible for metaphysical and non-metaphysical realists alike to accept all three of Butchvarov's theses. However, metaphysical and non-metaphysical realists do not use the concepts 'reality', 'truth' and 'independence' in the same way. Furthermore, some anti-realists would also concur with the three theses, albeit against the background of yet other possible interpretations of the concepts. What characterizes the realism debates is that opponents do not always accept or reject one and the same position. Instead, the position that is being defended will always influence the description of what the discussion is all about; thus, no description or definition is entirely neutral. I will use the concept of 'metaphysical realism' to indicate a set of conceptions about what it implies to say that something is real, true and

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independent. Putnam calls metaphysical realism a philosophical perspective. He summarizes the metaphysical realist perspective as follows: On this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mindindependent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things. I shall call this perspective the externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a God's Eye point of view. 27

Putnam's description of metaphysical realism comprises three central components. Firstly, the metaphysical realist would argue that reality consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects, and that it is this fixed totality of mind-independent objects that constitutes reality-in-itself. The metaphysical realist would argue that there may be objects or states of affairs in reality-in-itself which we cannot experience or describe. Secondly, the metaphysical realist would argue that there is only one true and complete description of reality. She need not hold that we have access to this one true description; the fact that her 'God's-Eye point of view' is an externalist perspective in relation to us humans and to our possibilities may well imply that it is impossible for us humans to formulate the one true and complete description of reality. However, this one true and complete description of reality can nevertheless exist, and it can consist of, for example, all true propositions. Thirdly, the metaphysical realist would argue that we speak the truth insofar as our utterances correspond in some way to the states of affairs of this independent reality. Different metaphysical realists describe this correspondence in different ways but what they all agree on is that it is entirely possible that we do not know, and cannot know, that a true utterance is in fact true. We may not have any verification methods with the help of which we can find out if the utterance in question is true or false and we may never be able to access such methods. It may be that it is in principle impossible for us to know any such truths, but the utterance in question can nevertheless be true as long as it corresponds to the states of affairs of independent reality. 'The most important consequence of metaphysical realism', Putnam writes, 'is that truth is supposed to be radically non-epistemic''. The metaphysical realist would argue that what is true is independent of our abilities to find out whether it is true. What is true is independent of 28

2 7 2 8

Putnam 1981: 49 E.g. Putnam 1978: 125

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our practice of seeking knowledge and of our criteria for when something can be said to be true. The metaphysical realist holds that it is entirely possible that an utterance can meet the criteria for truth that we presuppose in our practice of seeking knowledge but that the utterance may nevertheless be false. What is true is not determined by us, from an internal linguistic perspective, but rather by reality-in-itself, from an external perspective. Metaphysical realism is not the only realist position expressed in the realism debates, and not all realists are metaphysical realists. The current debate on realism examines a number of different realist positions. As a result, a number of different forms of anti-realism emerge, positions which reject realism in some form. This variety implies that realism and anti-realism cannot be described as two clearly defined positions, two theories or isms, which one can argue for or against. It has quite often been argued that it is possible to be a realist in relation to one particular context or situation and an anti-realist in relation to another. 'One could for instance be an antirealist about morality and a realist about tables and chairs, or an antirealist about the latter but a realist about subatomic particles. There would certainly be no contradiction about being a realist in science and an antirealist in religion.' However, it is observed with much less frequency that not only do contexts and situations vary, but the actual meaning of the concept of 'realism' also varies. Realists do not agree amongst themselves about what is involved in being a realist. Sometimes the meaning of the concept varies with different contexts and different discussions and sometimes it varies within one and the same context or discussion. It cannot be assumed that everyone who calls themselves a realist actually defends the same view. It is therefore important to specify in each individual case in what sense the philosopher in question is a realist or an anti-realist. In the following, I will assume that there are three different dimensions to the concepts of 'realism' or 'anti-realism', respectively. It is possible to be a metaphysical realist or a metaphysical anti-realist. It is possible to be an epistemological realist or an epistemological anti-realist. It is possible to be a semantic realist or a semantic anti-realist. A realist can be, but does not have to be, a metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic 29

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Cf. Herrmann 1999: 52 Trigg 1997: 213. See also Hick 1993: 4 In the following, I am partly indebted to Herrmann 1996 and Horwich 1982

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realist at the same time. It is, I will argue, possible to be a semantic or an epistemological realist and still reject metaphysical realism. In the same way that it is possible to be a realist in relation to some contexts or situations and not in relation to others, it is also possible to be a realist in relation to certain interpretations of the concept of 'realism' and not in relation to others. In the same way that one might be a realist about morality and an anti-realist about religion, one might be a realist about semantics and an anti-realist about epistemology. I am not arguing that all possible combinations are coherent or indeed even possible. What I am trying to do in my work is to clarify the connections between metaphysical, epistemological and semantic realist and anti-realist positions. I will not limit my discussion to the relation between realism and anti-realism within metaphysics, epistemology and semantics, respectively. (How does semantic realism relate to semantic anti-realism?) I will also examine the connections between metaphysical, epistemological and semantic realist and anti-realist positions. (How does semantic realism relate to epistemological realism? How does metaphysical realism relate to semantic anti-realism?) Metaphysical realism is not only about metaphysics/ontology; it is also about semantics and epistemology. Thereby, it relates to the debate on epistemological and semantic forms of realism. The metaphysical realist is also an epistemological and a semantic realist. She argues that it is possible for us to talk about an independent reality-in-itself in a meaningful way and that propositions about reality can be true or false even if we cannot formulate them and even if we cannot verify or falsify such truths. She is an epistemological realist inasmuch as she assumes that there are evidence-transcendent truths and she is a semantic realist with respect to the utterances that she conceives of as statements. I would argue that a denial of the suppositions that pertain to a certain realist position is an expression of a certain anti-realist position. A philosopher who denies the theses accepted by the metaphysical realist supports metaphysical anti-realism. Eberhard Herrmann describes metaphysical anti-realism as follows: 'This view claims first, that there is nothing independent of us but only theories, texts and stories, and secondly that truth is determined entirely inside of these.' The metaphysical anti-realist holds that reality does not consist of a fixed totality of mind-independent objects, that there is not one true and complete description of reality and that truth does not 32

3 2

Herrmann 1996: 9

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27

involve some sort of correspondence relation to the states of affairs of independent reality. Metaphysical anti-realism presupposes metaphysical realism in this way; if the latter perspective is unintelligible to us, then we cannot possibly understand the metaphysical anti-realist's denial of its three theses. The metaphysical anti-realist assumes that we can talk about independent reality in the metaphysical realist sense, while she rejects the idea that such a reality exists. Therefore, my criticism of metaphysical realism affects metaphysical anti-realism, as well. I do not primarily conceive of metaphysical realism as an ism, a theory that one can argue for or against. Rather, metaphysical realism is a set of ideas presupposed in certain philosophical questions, arguments and conclusions, and this set of ideas plays a role which is both central and crucial in relation to certain reflections and arguments pertaining to the philosophy of religion. Sometimes, all three theses are presupposed, and sometimes, only one or two of them can be perceived in such reflections. Some philosophers of religion are more or less explicit in their support of metaphysical realism whereas others seem to presuppose it on a more or less unconscious level. With the help of a few examples, I will describe how metaphysical realism affects metaphysical philosophy of religion. 33

Metaphysical Realism and Metaphysical Philosophy of Religion Many philosophers of religion, in discussing questions of realism and anti-realism, use a type of language which presupposes or contains the concept of 'reality-in-itself, a reality consisting of things-in-themselves. Joseph Runzo, to name but one, argues that there is quite a lot to support the idea of a God-in-Godself when he writes: At least two mutually reinforcing considerations argue for the notion of a noumenal God. Regarding the very idea of the noumenal, it seems to me that there could be no argument, except the crassest verificationism, which shows that there could not be things-in-themselves. How could we know this to be the case? Second, it is precisely the existence of things-in-themselves 'behind' the phenomenal world which would explain why there is a shared sense of the bruteness of the world and shared limitations at the core of our experiences. It would explain why different perceivers under similar conditions cannot perceive just anything, no matter what their socio-historical » Cf. Putnam 1992b: 365

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world-view, why the world seems to press itself upon us whatever our own concepts and past experiences. 34

Runzo's idea of a noumenal God, God-in-Godself, presupposes metaphysical realism. The noumenal world is a reality which is independent of us in the metaphysical realist sense. Runzo imagines that we can refer to reality-in-itself and rightly state that it exists even if we cannot possibly verify this statement. Many metaphysical realists consider states of affairs in the noumenal world to be of critical importance as a yardstick against which we test our claims to knowledge. Our utterances about reality are true insofar as they correspond to such states of affairs in reality-in-itself in an adequate way. In this sense, truth involves a correspondence relation between language and reality. However, the metaphysical realist is not required to deny the fact that different languages describe reality in different ways and subdivide it into different categories. For example, some languages make distinctions between various types of snow, distinctions other languages do not make. The metaphysical realist does not have to ignore such conceptual differences between languages. On the contrary, she may well imagine that various conceptual schemes subdivide reality in different ways. However, in order to remain a metaphysical realist, what she does have to hold is that different languages are all related to one and the same reality. She must hold that there is exactly one shared reality common to us all that we can subdivide in different ways. She must support the view that 'at least one Category — the ancient Category of Object or Substance — has an absolute interpretation'. John Hick assumes that there is a shared reality-in-itself, a reality-initself which can be described in different ways by different languages and traditions. He talks of 'the Real', a reality he sees as 35

an ultimate ineffable Reality which is the source and ground of everything, and which is such that in so far as the religious traditions are in soteriological alignment with it they are contexts of salvation/liberation. These traditions involve different human conceptions of the Real, with correspondingly different forms of experience of the Real, and correspondingly different forms of life in response to the Real. But why suppose that the Real in itself is ineffable? By 'ineffable' I mean [...] having a nature that is beyond the scope of our networks of human concepts. Thus the Real in itself cannot properly be said to be personal or impersonal, purposive or non-purposive,

3 4 35

Runzo 1993: 171 Putnam 1988: 114

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good or evil, substance or process, even one or many. However, in denying, for example, that the Real is personal one is not thereby saying that it is impersonal, but rather that this conceptual polarity or dualism does not apply. And the same with the other dualisms. This does not, however, mean that the Real is to be postulated as nothing, or a blank, but rather as a reality lying outside the scope of our human conceptual systems. 36

Hick clarifies his position by referring to Kant: In modern times it was Immanuel Kant who has argued most influentially that perception is not a passive registering of what is there but is always an active process of selecting, grouping, relating, extrapolating, and endowing with meaning by means of our human concepts. This led him to distinguish between the noumenal world, the world as it exists unperceived, and the phenomenal world, that same world as humanly perceived, with all the difference that the act of perception makes. 1 am suggesting applying this insight to our awareness of the Real, by distinguishing between the noumenal Real, the Real an sich, and the Real as humanly perceived in different ways as a range of divine phenomena. 37

Here, Hick expresses a metaphysical realist view. Reality, with a capital R, is out of reach of our human concepts. It is outside of our conceptual systems. We cannot describe what reality is like in itself but we can refer to this reality-in-itself. We can assert that it exists. Although Hick uses Kantian terms and concepts to outline his idea of metaphysical realism, it is by no means obvious that Kant himself was a metaphysical realist. 1 will not examine Kant's stance on metaphysical realism but I will focus on the ways in which Kant's distinction between reality-in-itself and reality as humanly perceived has been and is understood or presupposed by many philosophers of religion in their reflections. Hick stresses that we must distinguish between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. Reality-in-itself, he argues, is one and the same for everyone, but it can be perceived in different ways by different people and within different cultures. Perception is never a passive registering, but it is always a highly active process, a process which can progress in a number of different ways and give a number of different results. Our perceptions are influenced by for example our conceptual schemes; since our conceptual schemes vary, our perceptions vary. Some people perceive the Real as something personal, others as something impersonal. It is not that the nature of reality itself varies, since the Real is neither personal 38

3 6 3 7 3 8

Hick 1995: 27-8 Hick 1995: 29 See for example Baldner 1996 and van Kirk 1984

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nor impersonal; rather, the users of different conceptual schemes prefer to use different concepts in thinking of and talking about perceptions of the Real. Thus, it is possible both for perceptions of the Real as something personal and for perceptions of the Real as something impersonal to be perceptions of reality. Hick clarifies what he means by recounting the story of the three blind men and the elephant: An elephant was brought to a group of blind men who had never encountered such an animal before. One felt a leg and reported that an elephant is a great living pillar. Another felt the trunk and reported that an elephant is a great snake. Another felt a tusk and reported that an elephant is like a sharp ploughshare. And so on. And then they all quarrelled together, each claiming that his own account was the truth and therefore all the others false. In fact of course they were all true, but each referring only to one aspect of the total reality and all expressed in very imperfect analogies. 39

The three blind men describe the elephant in very different ways but they all perceive one and the same elephant. This story, Hick argues, is a good analogy of religious pluralism. According to this view, people within different religious traditions describe their perceptions of the Real in different ways. These descriptions may seem to contradict each other, but the seeming contradiction can be an illusion. Perhaps the different religious traditions have simply tapped into different aspects of the Real so that, in a sense, they have caught hold of different parts of the elephant. Hick suggests that this is often the case. He also assumes that traditions relating in some way to the Real, that is, traditions that have caught hold of some part of the elephant, are good contexts for salvation or liberation. Thus, by examining whether a certain religious tradition is a good context for salvation or liberation, we can test its connection to the Real. Such an examination, it seems to me, is an example of how we can take a stance on basic questions of religion and, in so doing, presuppose metaphysical realism. Hick's position in relation to basic questions of religion is influenced by his metaphysical realist stance, a stance which relates to his Kantian description of reality. For example, Hick suggests that Christians should conceive of the doctrine of incarnation as a metaphor, a suggestion which has its roots in the view that a number of different religions all relate to one and the same reality-in-itself. Thus, Hick's interpretation of the doctrine of incarnation presupposes a metaphysical realist description of reality. 40

39 40

Hick 1973: 140 See for example Hick 1993: 144, 162

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It is possible to conceive of Hick's position as an example of a theological work presupposing metaphysical realism, rather than as an example of metaphysical philosophy of religion. At times, Hick calls himself a Christian theologian, and he occasionally takes care to point out that he is speaking to fellow Christians. However, it is his philosophically influenced conception of reality that has motivated his suggestion that the Christian doctrine of the incarnation should be conceived of as a metaphor. Because Hick motivates his standpoints on basic questions of religion with philosophical arguments, I would call him a metaphysical philosopher of religion. Hick's approach to metaphysical philosophy of religion is related to a clear and conscious acceptance of metaphysical realism but there are other metaphysical philosophers of religion who fail to consider, or even to notice, the relation between metaphysical realism and philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, they presuppose metaphysical realism in their philosophical reflections, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by uncritically accepting and presupposing the idea that there is a reality-in-itself. Richard Swinburne is, I suggest, a philosopher of religion whose approach to metaphysical realism is uncritical and perhaps unconscious in precisely this way. Swinburne is a metaphysical philosopher of religion. He discusses and answers questions concerning the coherence of the theistic concept of God and the existence of God. In so doing, Swinburne takes care to specify what he means by the term 'God'. 'By a "God" [a theist] understands something like a "person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe".' By contrast, Swinburne fails to discuss what he means by the term 'exist' in the present context, that is, in what sense we can talk about the existence of God in a meaningful way. He does point out, however, that his understanding of the way in which language relates to reality is largely the same as that of I. M. Crombie. Crombie assumes that we can refer to God even if we can neither imagine God nor specify what it would mean to say that the nature of God corresponds to our descriptions of God. We can refer to God, since we have access to 'the hint of a 41

42

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4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 5

See for example Hick 1993: 162 Cf. Putnam 1983: xiii Swinburne 1991 and 1993 Swinburne 1993: 1 Swinburne 1993: 86

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possibility of something we cannot conceive, but which lies outside the range of possible conception in a determinate direction'.* That 'something' assumed by both Swinburne and Crombie can be conceived of as a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself. We cannot describe this reality-initself, but we can hold that it exists, that 'something' exists 'in a determinate direction', perhaps as 'a strange reality beyond ordinary experience'. Our statements about reality can be conceived of as true insofar as they are adequately related to states of affairs in reality-in-itself. Don Cupitt is another philosopher of religion whose approach to metaphysical realism is not entirely clear. His work is largely based on the thesis that religious belief is not connected to '[a] realist or metaphysical view of God'. Cupitt suggests that there are no sufficiently convincing reasons for us to assume that God, as conceived of by the metaphysical realists, exists. He also suggests that God as conceived of by the metaphysical realists is a threat to the spiritual and moral autonomy of us humans. For this reason, Cupitt argues, God should not be described in a metaphysical realist way. Cupitt stresses that we cannot possibly talk about 'things as they are absolutely and apart from experience'. We can only talk about reality and states of affairs in reality as humanly perceived. We can only talk about God as we experience God, 'for we know God only as he enters into our experience. Talk about God is talk about human experiences, understood as dealings with God or as being effects of God'. God is commonly thought to exist on a metaphysical realist level and Cupitt aims to help people reach what he considers to be a more appropriate and tenable conception of God's existence. The philosophers' task, he suggests, is to criticize and to change languages and world-views that do not serve their purpose. Realism is not a religiously adequate position and this is because it cannot liberate people spiritually. Cupitt maintains that '[n]o external object can bring about my inner spiritual liberation'. It is 'spiritual vulgarity and immaturity to demand an extra-religious reality of God'. He criticizes the fact that believers 6

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4 6 4 7 4 8 4 9 5 0 51 5 2 53 5 4

Swinburne 1993: 85; Crombie 1971: 45 Swinburne 1993: 74 Cupitt 1980: 84 Cupitt 1980: 37 Cupitt 1980: 38 Cf. Cupitt 1993a: 118 Cf. Cupitt 1980: 45, 94 and Cupitt 1993b: 54 Cupitt 1980: 164 Cupitt 1980: 10

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METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

who are also realists often flee the shared human world in which we live and seek a super-human dimension instead. This, he argues, is not desirable. If realism becomes a doctrine of faith, the Christian Church will most probably die out as a result. Cupitt argues that, insofar as realism is part of the modern Christian world-view, it ought to be rejected, since it has religious consequences that are not desirable. A realist understanding of the religious language we use does not allow religious belief to serve its real purpose. However, Cupitt's critique of realist conceptions of reality and of God is not always clear; it is not always possible to discern all the various aspects of his arguments and the ways in which they interrelate. Firstly, Cupitt takes care to point out that the idea of a reality-in-itself is unintelligible to us. We must 'take leave of the God of metaphysical theism' since we cannot possibly make sense of the idea of a metaphysical realist God. Secondly, Cupitt maintains that he is an agnostic as regards the existence of a metaphysical realist God. He argues that we do not at present have sufficiently good reasons either to affirm or deny the existence of a God-in-Godself. However, he does argue that it is possible that the God of 'objective theism' somehow exists as a transcendental mystery 'beyond the God of religion'. I would argue that this statement indicates that Cupitt does, after all, assume that we may be able to talk about the existence of a God-in-Godself and that we may, in future, get access to sufficiently good reasons to conclude that such a God does exist. My third point, however, is that Cupitt occasionally seems to deny the existence of a God as described in metaphysical realism. This only serves to complicate any attempt to describe his position even further. For example, Cupitt writes: 'God is not an actually-existing individual person. God is a humanly-needed way of speaking generated by the impact of the religious demand and ideal upon u s ' . He stresses that the existence of God is not a 'real' existence: 'God does not exist in a real or a posteriori sense. [...] Metaphysically, God's existence is a priori, like the existence of a principle. It is not "real" existence'. 55

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5 5 5 6 5 7 5 8 5 9 6 0 61 6 2 6 3

Cupitt 1993c: 82 Cupitt 1993d: 150 See for example Cupitt See for example Cupitt See for example Cupitt Cupitt 1980: 96 See for example Cupitt Cupitt 1980: 133 Cupitt 1980: 113

1980: 70-1, 166 1980: 74, 78-9 1980: 93, 124, 126, 164 1980: 68, 91. Cf. Hick 1989: 200-1

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Cupitt's reflections can be seen as an expression of metaphysical antirealism. The metaphysical anti-realist denies the existence of a reality-initself, and in so doing, she presupposes that we can talk about reality-initself in a meaningful way. The metaphysical anti-realist is trying to argue, from a God's-Eye point of view, that there is no God's-Eye point of view. Herrmann conceives of Cupitt as a proponent of metaphysical anti-realism. He writes: 64

According to an anti-realist like Don Cupitt, the denial that religious beliefs are truth claims amounts to rejecting the claim that our religious beliefs are about an independent transcendent divine reality. They are merely symbols for our human hopes, efforts and ideals [...] This means that we are responsible for them and the use we make of them. Therefore, we can be held responsible for adopting sexist and anti-Semitic ideas as these are found for instance within Christianity. If this position is combined with the denial of the existence of an independent transcendent divine reality, we have religious metaphysical anti-realism. Primarily for epistemic reasons, this position cannot be justified. Since we do not know whether or not there is such a reality, we cannot categorically assert that there is none. 65

Cupitt's reflections on religious beliefs have a certain appeal; however, metaphysical anti-realism is a problematical position. If the metaphysical anti-realist is right when she maintains that we can never reach outside the boundaries of our language, then she cannot assert that a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself does not exist. She cannot reach outside the boundaries of her own language and make pronouncements on what does not exist independently of language. My present work is largely based on the fact that many philosophers of religion presuppose metaphysical realism, consciously or not, in the work that they produce. However, the philosophical tenability of metaphysical realism is to an increasing extent being questioned in today's philosophical discussions; as a result, it is no longer obvious that we can pursue a metaphysical philosophy of religion, which presupposes metaphysical realism, in a philosophically tenable way. I will argue that metaphysical realism is a philosophically untenable position, one that should be abandoned by philosophers of religion. I will formulate a non-metaphysical realism which consists of a rejection (though not an anti-realist denial) of metaphysical realism combined with an epistemological and a semantic realism. It is my contention that nonmetaphysical realism can be a fruitful as well as a philosophically tenable 6 4 6 5

Cf. Donovan 1994: 1 Herrmann 1996: 14

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presupposition for the philosopher of religion to make. It enables us to conceive of utterances which occur in religious contexts as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidencetranscendent truths. My reflections and standpoints do not prevent us from pursuing metaphysical philosophy of religion but they will affect the way in which philosophy of religion is practiced. As a consequence, we may find that philosophy of religion as a discipline will expand and include as yet unexplored philosophical issues and questions born out of the phenomenon of religion. I will not argue that non-metaphysical realism is the only philosophically tenable realist position that the philosopher of religion can presuppose. Nor will I argue that philosophy of religion must necessarily be tied to some form of realism. I imagine that we can, within philosophy of religion as well as within other disciplines, make use of various philosophically tenable realist, anti-realist and non-realist positions to answer the questions we choose to examine. Different philosophically tenable positions can be useful in relation to different issues and problems. Alexander George highlights the need to investigate and develop a number of different positions on the issues discussed in the realism debates, and he draws his reader's attention to our capacity to switch from one perspective to another. He writes: Presently, it seems, insight will not follow from attempts to establish that this or that (or yet some other) is 'the correct (true, intelligible) perspective.' Should this last be a well-formulated project, and it is not clear that it is, then we certainly do not at this stage have an understanding of how to approach it which is deep enough to lead us far, if anywhere. That the best available arguments persuade only insofar as one is already persuaded signals this. Rather, a more promising project at present is the study of these perspectives with a view to learning more about the human mind. Insight is more likely to develop from an inquiry into the characteristics of these orientations, the manner in which they take root and unfold, and our very capacity to switch from one to the other. 66

Philosophy of religion is often thought of as being intimately connected to a realist conception of the way in which language relates to reality. The same can be said for religious belief; consequently, some philosophers may regard my criticism of metaphysical realism as criticism of religious belief. In order to avoid such misunderstandings, I would like to clarify from the beginning how I view the relation between religious belief and realism. 66

George 1993: 72

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Realism and Religion It is often unclear what the relation is between religious belief and realism in the realism debate of the philosophy of religion. Existing positions are sometimes specified by attaching the label 'religious' to them. A quotation from Hick will serve to exemplify this practice. Hick writes that a critical religious realism affirms the transcendent divine reality which the theistic religions refer to as God; but is conscious that this reality is always thought of and experienced by us in ways which are shaped and coloured by human concepts and images. We see the Real always and only through the spectacles of our religious categories; and these, as we are acutely aware today, vary significantly from one culture to another. Thus critical religious realism differs importantly both from the naive religious realism which assumes that the divine reality is just as spoken about in the language of some tradition, and from the religious non- or anti-realism which rejects the idea of a transcendent divine reality existing in addition to and independently of we human beings. 67

In this passage, Hick discusses critical religious realism, naive religious realism and religious non- or anti-realism. It is not clear what the term 'religious' implies when coupled with various realist, nonrealist or anti-realist conceptions. Must religious realists assume that God exists? Must religious non- or anti-realists deny God's existence? Is religious realism a phenomenon in the context of religion, or is it a phenomenon in the context of philosophy of religion? Are religious realists ordinary religious people, or are they philosophers of religion who recommend a certain analytical position based on some form of realism? In the realism debate of the philosophy of religion, being religious is often a merit. Both realist and anti-realist positions alike are defended by supporters who argue that these are religiously adequate positions. Consequently, I argue, the realism debates reflect the religious standpoints of the participants to a far greater extent than what is helpful. My work, it is hoped, will help to make the realism debate in the philosophy of religion more philosophically oriented. The fact that the religious adequacy of a certain philosophical position is frequently thought to be an argument in favor of that position stems, I argue, from a tendency on the part of many philosophers of religion to

67

Hick 1993: 7

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take a stance on the basic questions of religion. That metaphysical philosophy of religion is often taken for granted implies, among other things, that the difference between standpoints in religion and standpoints in the philosophy of religion is not always properly discussed. Consequently, 'religious realism' becomes, on occasion, a term used in connection with people who are both religious and realists. If you must be a realist to be religious, then anti-realist positions will be described as anti-religious ones. It is unfortunate that the term 'religious' should be used by philosophers of religion in the realism debates. Firstly, religious realism is portrayed as a position which is different from other realist positions. Thus, there is seldom a discussion of the connections which exist between positions relating to the realism debate of the philosophy of religion, on the one hand, and positions relating to the realism debate of other philosophical contexts, on the other. Secondly, realism is portrayed as a requirement for religious belief; by definition, it then becomes impossible to be religious without also being a realist. Thirdly, if the realism of philosophy of religion is confused with religious realism, it then becomes very difficult to categorize atheists who conceive of religious belief in a realist way. It would seem strange to call such atheists 'religious realists'. I examine the realist positions discussed in the realism debate of the philosophy of religion, and I relate them to the realist positions that are discussed in the realism debates in other philosophical contexts. It is my contention that religious belief does not require a realist approach. Antirealist positions are not necessarily anti-religious ones. Philosophers of religion who presuppose a certain realist position are, I argue, proponents of a common perspective, whether they believe that God exists or that God does not exist. There are philosophers of religion who are realists about the phenomenon of religion. There are also theologians and religious people who conceive of and describe religious belief in a realist way. Some of them are metaphysical realists. My philosophically oriented critique of metaphysical realism affects metaphysical realists in religious and theological contexts, as well. In this limited sense, my critique is a form of critique of religion and/or of theology. My reflections on realism and related issues will not have universal appeal. Philosophers of religion may choose to reject my proposed perspective, since 'the radicalness of this posture, this attitude, disturbs philosophy, especially philosophy of religion, for if we should dare to follow [it] we would have to start anew to describe and understand what

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takes place in human life'. Given my delimitations and standpoints, that which we commonly call philosophy of religion, and the standard procedures and positions in the field, will need to be re-evaluated, re-worked and, in some instances, abandoned altogether. It may be necessary to formulate entirely new descriptions of what constitutes religious belief and what role religion can play in human life. This call to re-evaluation and development can seem both pointless and laborious to those who are happy with the philosophy of religion as it is commonly practiced. Quite possibly, many theologians and religious people will expect my rejection of metaphysical realism to strike a discordant note in relation to their religious beliefs since Christian theology, for example, often rests on realist presuppositions. These realist presuppositions are often metaphysical realist presuppositions. Metaphysical realism often finds its expression in certain theological problems and in some Christian believers' descriptions of what they believe. Philosophical reflections that question or re-formulate our possibilities of talking about Christianity as an absolute and universally true description of reality-in-itself are sometimes rejected with the motivation that Christianity cannot be given a meaningful content on the basis of such philosophical presuppositions. Religious belief is often connected to assumptions and conceptions expressing some form of realism. If metaphysical realism is regarded as the only form of realism there is, then a rejection of it will be perceived as a rejection of realism in general. In the context of religious belief, a rejection of realism can be perceived as a rejection of the belief that God exists independently of us human beings. In some contexts of theology, religion and the philosophy of religion, the will to talk about the existence of God as a question relating to independent reality, and the assumption that metaphysical realism is the only form of realism, lead philosophers to accept metaphysical realism. Peter Donovan warns us not to be too hasty in drawing the conclusion that a rejection of metaphysical realism leads to a rejection of all forms of realism, ultimately leading to the conclusion that God does not exist. True, a rejection of metaphysical realism implies that we cannot talk about or imagine God-in-Godself. As a result, we cannot meaningfully 68

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The quotation is from High 1990: 115, where it refers to Wittgenstein's philosophical reflections Marshall 1995: 93 See for example McLeod 1993: 79 Cf. McFadyen 1993 Donovan 1994: 2, 4, 8 68

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either assert or deny that God-in-Godself exists. However, we can still talk meaningfully about whether the God we can describe and (possibly) experience as existing; in other words, we can talk about whether or not there is a God-for-us. In formulating non-metaphysical realism, I will show that we can reject metaphysical realism without rejecting the possibility that our utterances about God-for-us can be statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. Philosophers maintaining that it is vitally important that we should be able to conceive of utterances about God as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths, need not accept metaphysical realism. The distinction between the idea of God-in-Godself and the idea of God-for-us can be found both in discussions on the philosophy of religion, and in discussions on theology and religion. Hick distinguishes between a religious reality-in-itself and a religious reality that we can experience and describe, and he argues that such a distinction is central to the world religions. He explains this distinction with the help of a few examples: The Taoist scripture, the Tao Te Ching, begins by affirming that 'The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao'. In the West the Jewish thinker Maimonides distinguished between the essence and the manifestations of God [...] and the Kabbalist mystics distinguished between En Soph, the absolute divine reality beyond human description, and the God of the Bible. In Islam it is proclaimed that Allah transcends human experience and yet is manifested to human awareness: in a haunting Qur'anic phrase, 'The eyes attain Him not, but He attains the eyes' [...] And among the Sufis, Al Haq, the Real, is the abyss of Godhead underlying the self-revealed Allah. The Christian mystic Meister Eckhart distinguished between the Godhead (Gottheitldeltas) and God (Gottldeus). Again, Paul Tillich has spoken of 'the God above the God of theism' [...] And Gordon Kaufman has recently distinguished between the 'real God' and the 'available God', the former being an 'utterly unknowable X' and the latter 'essentially a mental or imaginative construction' [...] Again, Ninian Smart speaks of 'the noumenal Focus of religion which so to say lies beyond the phenomenal Foci of religious experience and practice' [...] A more traditional Christian form of the distinction is that between God a se in God's infinite self-existent being, beyond the grasp of the human mind, and God pro nobis, revealed in relation to humankind as creator and redeemer. 73

It seems to many that the distinction (in some form of it), between Godin-Godself (God a se or God in se) and God-for-us (God pro nobis) is important to religious life and significantly affects our possibilities of 73

Hick 1989: 237

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describing religious beliefs in an adequate way. In rejecting metaphysical realism we can, but we do not have to, abandon the ideas expressed in this distinction. I will argue that it is possible to preserve the functions that this distinction has in various contexts of theology, religion or the philosophy of religion even if we abandon metaphysical realism. We normally talk about God in se to emphasize that God is transcendent in relation to us human beings. God's transcendence implies that we cannot fully describe or experience God. We talk about God pro nobis to make the point that, despite our limited perspective and conceptual resources, we can still come to know God and talk about God. Even if metaphysical realism is rejected, God can still be conceived of and described as transcendent in relation to us human beings. '[I]n ridding ourselves of metaphysical conceptions of transcendence we do not rid ourselves of religious conceptions of transcendence', Phillips points out. We can, against the background of non-metaphysical realism, conceive of and describe God pro nobis as transcendent in relation to us human beings. Martin Luther and his understanding of the distinction between the hidden God, deus absconditus, and the revealed God, deus revelatus, will serve to illustrate our ability in this respect. Ingolf Dalferth has described Luther's position as follows: 74

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The dialectics of divine activity at the cross led Luther to affirm the difference-in-unity between the deus absconditus and the deus revelatus to be the irreducible mark of every adequate conception of God. This is not the contrast between God as he is in himself and God as related to us, but a difference in God's relation to his creation. 76

The distinction between deus absconditus and deus revelatus is not, Dalferth maintains, a distinction between God in se and God pro nobis. Instead, it is a distinction between two different descriptions of the way in which God relates to us human beings. Similarly, I would argue that we can imagine a distinction between a God pro nobis who is transcendent in relation to us human beings and a God pro nobis whom we can describe and experience. Such a distinction does not presuppose metaphysical realism. Consequently, the philosopher who wants to defend and make use of the distinction between a transcendent God and a God who can be described and experienced need not support metaphysical realism.

7 4 7 5 7 6

Cf. Hick 1989: 238 Phillips 1988: 152 Dalferth 1988: 85

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Metaphysical realism is not a sine qua non in theology, religion or the philosophy of religion. We can describe the (possible) existence of God as something that is independent of us human beings even if we reject metaphysical realism. Against the background of non-metaphysical realism, we can associate religious belief with a form of realism without having to portray religious people as supporters of a philosophically untenable position. I believe that metaphysical realism is a philosophically untenable position. However, as this chapter has indicated, this is not obvious to everyone. I will therefore, in chapter two, explain in what sense metaphysical realism, in my view, is a philosophically untenable position. I will examine Quine's philosophical reflections and, against the background of these reflections, I will reconstruct and develop Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Moreover, Alston criticizes Putnam's arguments; I will discuss his criticism and his alethic realism in chapter three.

CHAPTER TWO

METAPHYSICAL REALISM

Putnam has criticized metaphysical realism in a number of publications. His criticism of metaphysical realism relates to Quine's philosophical reflections. In this chapter, I will give a brief account of some of Quine's most disputed ideas and I will examine the ways in which these ideas relate to Putnam's criticism. I will describe what, in Quine's view, constitutes the indeterminacy of meaning, the inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity. On the basis of Quine's reflections, I will reconstruct and develop Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism. In so doing I will base my arguments on some of Putnam's most well-known examples as well as on his disputed justmore-theory objection. I will show in what sense metaphysical realism is a philosophically untenable position. In the following chapters I will then explore our possibilities of formulating a non-metaphysical realist position. Putnam's main argument against metaphysical realism is that it leads to ontological relativity and, he argues, there can be no such thing as ontological relativity. If there was, we would not be able to communicate with one another. However, we are able to communicate with one another, Putnam points out, and we must therefore reject all philosophical positions that lead to ontological relativity.

'Gavagai!' Quine's 'gavagai' example is one of the most well-known examples in the history of philosophy, and it is the obvious starting point in any attempt to explain his central theses. The 'gavagai' example touches upon that which Quine calls radical translation, that is, the translation of a previously untranslated language. He gives the example of a field linguist, a man in Quine's example, who visits a people speaking a previously untranslated language. The field linguist's task is, quite simply, to translate it. How does he go about this task? How does he work and how certain can he be that his conclusions are correct?

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Quine suggests that the field linguist is likely to start out by attempting to translate utterances made in connection with discernible events taking place. A rabbit scampers past and some of the source language speakers point at it and exclaim: 'Gavagai!'. Most probably, the field linguist now makes a working translation of 'gavagai' as 'rabbit'. He then tests this working translation in his further dealings with the source language speakers. Suppose that yet another rabbit scampers past; the field linguist points at it, says 'gavagai' and observes that the source language speakers appear to think that his utterance is completely natural. The field linguist might also utter 'gavagai' in an inquiring tone of voice when he sees somebody boil a rabbit. He might whisper 'gavagai' when he sees some hunters stalking a rabbit. He might point at a picture of a rabbit and say 'gavagai'. If the source language speakers seem to consider his use of 'gavagai' as an entirely correct one in all test situations, the field linguist is encouraged to take 'gavagai' to mean 'rabbit'. Thus, the translation becomes less and less of a working translation, and more and more of a confirmed one. How can the field linguist know that the source language speakers consider his use of 'gavagai' to be correct? How can he know that their response means 'yes' when he points at a rabbit and asks 'gavagai?'? After all, he cannot understand their language. Quine points out that the field linguist cannot rely on gestures, as gestures vary between cultures. Instead, he must test various working translations for 'yes' and 'no' as well, just as he is doing for 'gavagai' and other utterances. Quine explains: What he must do is guess from observation and then see how well his guesses work. Thus suppose that in asking 'Gavagai?' and the like, in the conspicuous presence of rabbits and the like, he has elicited the responses 'Evet' and 'Yok' often enough to surmise that they may correspond to 'Yes' and 'No', but has no notion which is which. Then he tries the experiment of echoing the native's own volunteered pronouncements. If thereby he regularly elicits 'Evet' rather than 'Yok', he is encouraged to take 'Evet' as 'Yes'. Also he tries responding with 'Evet' and 'Yok' to the native's remarks; the one that is the more serene in its effect is the better candidate for 'Yes'. However inconclusive these methods, they generate a working hypothesis. 1

The field linguist formulates and tests working translation hypotheses about 'yes' and 'no' as well as about 'gavagai' and other utterances.

1

Quine 1960: 29-30

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If the tests seem to bear out his hypotheses, these hypotheses will become less and less tentative. The field linguist begink to treat them as correct, and he uses them to test translation hypotheses for other words and expressions. In this way he creates a translation manual for the previously untranslated language. He creates a dictionary which indicates the meaning of the source language words in a language with which he is already familiar. The source language is no logger untranslated. Quine's aim in formulating this example is not to describe the practical work of a field linguist. Rather, it is to formulate and defend his thesis about the indeterminacy of meaning, a thesis which implies that 'manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another'. By way of explaining this idea, let us suppose that two field linguists are trying to translate one and the same previously untranslated language and that they are wording independently of one another. Quine's thesis is that, if each field linguist creates his own translation manual, it is entirely possible for both manuals to be excellent tools for communication with the source language speakers and yet be incompatible with one another. Perhaps one of the manuals states that 'gavagai' means 'rabbit' and the other one that it means 'rabbit part'. The fact that two mutually incompatible translation manuals of one and the same language can nevertheless be compatible with the totality of the speakers' linguistic behavior can be explained with reference to what Quine calls the translator's analytical hypotheses. 2

Analytical Hypotheses All translation is based on analytical hypotheses. In formulating analytical hypotheses, the translator makes certain assumptions about how the source language speakers think of identity, parts and wholes, singularity and plurality. That is, in formulating analytical hypotheses, the translator makes assumptions about how the source language speakers divide the world into objects. In a sense, the analytical hypotheses are tentative standpoints on how the ontology adopted by the source language speakers is shaped; these tentative standpoints are tested in communication with the source language speakers and in various translation suggestions.

2

Quine 1960: 27

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Quine describes how the field linguist formulates his analytical hypotheses. He develops a system for translating our pluralizations, pronouns, numerals, identity and related devices contextually into the native idiom. He develops such a system by abstraction and hypothesis. He abstracts native particles and constructions from observed native sentences and tries associating these variously with English particles and constructions. Insofar as the native sentences and the thus associated English ones seem to match up in respect of appropriate occasions of use, the linguist feels confirmed in these hypotheses of translation — what I call analytical hypotheses. 3

The field linguist translates the source language into his own language, but that is not all that he does. At the same time he translates his own language and all its pluralizations and identity conditions into the source language with which he is working. He identifies linguistic items appearing to be pluralizations and identity conditions in the source language and he relates them to similar phenomena in his own language. Most probably, the field linguist would start out by supposing that the source language speakers conceive of identity, wholes and parts, singularity and plurality, in the same way that the field linguist himself conceives of them. However, it may eventually become necessary to modify this hypothesis. The field linguist may discover that communication with the source language speakers is easier if it is based on another conception of, say, identity than the one presupposed in his own mother tongue. Since analytical hypotheses are unavoidable, it seems reasonable to conclude that a radical translator guesses at least as much as he discovers in the source language. In formulating his analytical hypotheses, he favors a certain perspective and understanding of the way in which the source language speakers divide the world into objects. According to Quine's thesis on the indeterminacy of meaning, the field linguist could always have made another choice. There are several possible sets of analytical hypotheses, several possible ways to translate our pluralizations and identity conditions into the source language, and they may be in equal harmony with the linguistic behavior of the source language speakers and yet generate different and mutually incompatible translations of their words and expressions. We cannot argue that one set of analytical hypotheses is better than any other because it is better at capturing the meaning of the pluralizations and identity conditions used by the source language speakers. In fact, in order to understand these linguistic items 3

Quine 1969a: 33

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at all, we must translate them, and all translation requires analytical hypotheses. It all becomes a circular argument. The only independent authority against which our analytical hypotheses can be tested is the speakers' behavior. Quine argues that the speakers' behavior can confirm a number of different sets of analytical hypotheses, sets which generate different and incompatible translations of one and the same word or expression. Quine uses the term 'speech behavior', a term that I understand as synonymous with the term 'linguistic behavior' which I will use here as I find it easier to associate this term not only with spoken behavior but also with other kinds of linguistic behavior, such as written messages. I do believe that it is not only in relation to our verbal behavior that our translation manuals are tested; they are also tested against non-verbal behavior, a point that I will elaborate further in chapter six. I call attention to this terminological difference between Quine and myself already in the present context because Quine uses the term 'speech behavior' as he states his thesis. Quine writes: 'There can be no doubt that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fit the totality of speech behavior to perfection, and can fit the totality of dispositions to speech behavior as well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences insusceptible of independent control.' A field linguist can translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit' on the basis of a certain system of analytical hypotheses; he can translate the utterance as 'rabbit part' on the basis of another such system; and he can translate it as 'rabbithood' on the basis of yet another system; and so on. What Quine is arguing is that we can make rival translations harmonize with the source language speakers' linguistic behavior by adapting our translation of their identity conditions and their utterances about wholes and parts to our translation of 'gavagai'. Thus, our translation of 'gavagai' and our analytical hypotheses work together. Our translation choices and our choice of analytical hypotheses are under-determined by the speakers' linguistic behavior. Their behavior allows for the fact that several different alternatives can be in equal harmony with the speakers' linguistic behavior and yet give rise to mutually incompatible translations. Quine imagines that the field linguist formulates analytical hypotheses while testing different and mutually incompatible working translations of various words or expressions. He does not formulate various analytical hypotheses first and then, based on these, make a number of different 4

4

Quine 1960: 72

48

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working translations which he tests one by one. Instead, he works with several different words and expressions, various translation suggestions, and the formulation of analytical hypotheses all at the same time. Quine is a holist, which implies, in the present context, that he considers it to be the totality of analytical hypotheses, various translation suggestions, and various translations that is tested against the speakers' linguistic behavior. If this linguistic behavior is not in harmony with the totality which is being tested, then the field linguist can modify either his analytical hypotheses or his translation suggestions. There are several possible modification options for the field linguist to choose from with respect to the analytical hypotheses employed as well as the translation suggestions formulated; these modifications all bring the totality in line with the speakers' linguistic behavior. Quine's holism serves to explain how different field linguists translating one and the same language can arrive at mutually incompatible translation manuals all in equal harmony with the speakers' linguistic behavior: when the totality is not in harmony with the speakers' linguistic behavior, the field linguists can choose to make various modifications in their analytical hypotheses and translation suggestions. The fact that several different translations of one and the same word or expression can be equally good implies that the meaning of our words and expressions is, in a sense, indeterminate, Quine argues. He assumes that meaning is that which a word or expression has in common with its translation. Thus, it is pointless to talk about meaning without relating it to a translation manual; asking what an expression means is the same thing as asking for a translation of the expression in question. The meaning of a word or expression becomes visible in its translation, and not in any other way. The indeterminacy of meaning does not imply that there is no adequate translation of any given word or expression; instead, it implies that there are several. Since several different translations of, for example, 'gavagai' can be equally good, the meaning of 'gavagai' is indeterminate insofar as there is not one correct translation or meaning of the word, but several. The meaning of 'gavagai' can be specified in various ways by means of various translations. Thus, Quine argues, there is no one determinate meaning inextricably linked to the word or expression itself. 5

6

7

5 6 7

Quine 1960: 32 Cf. Quine 1978: 1 Quine 1987: 9

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Quine takes care to point out that the meaning of foreign language words and expressions is not the only meaning we conceive of as indeterminate. The meaning of words and expressions of our own language is also indeterminate. Thus, Quine's example of the field linguist is not only meant to illustrate the conditions of radical interpretation. It also aims to explore aspects of our own linguistic usage: it aims to help us better understand that which is closer to home. Quine argues that we often translate words and expressions used by speakers of our own language by stating that they mean the same thing that they mean when we use them. For example, we translate 'sweating' by stating that 'sweating' means sweating. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes we can explain a speaker's use of a certain word or expression by stating that it does not mean the same thing that it means when we use the word or expression in question. If we choose to categorize what we are doing as 'translation', we could describe it as translating a speaker's use of a word or expression by stating that it means the same thing as what another word or expression means when we use it. We can, for example, translate a speaker's use of the verb 'accept' by stating that it means the same thing that the verb 'respect' means when we use it. We can choose this translation because we find that it is in harmony with the totality of linguistic behavior demonstrated by the speaker in question. Quine argues that we can make choices of translation in relation to words and expressions used by speakers of our own language as well as in relation to those used by foreign language speakers. We can produce a number of different translations on the basis of various analytical hypotheses, translations which are all in equal harmony with the totality of linguistic behavior demonstrated by the speakers. What the words and expressions of our own language mean can be specified in a number of ways, all correct, and it is in this sense that the meaning of our own words and expressions is as indeterminate as the meaning of foreign language words and expressions. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning is relevant to my work in that it affects the way in which we conceive of reality, an area of particular interest to the debate on metaphysical realism. This thesis is connected with Quine's thesis of the inscrutability of reference and his reflections on ontological relativity. I have chosen to describe the thesis of the 8

' Quine 1969a: 46

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inscrutability of reference as a continuation of Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning. The thesis of the inscrutability of reference leads, in turn, to the thesis of ontological relativity. 9

The Inscrutability of Reference Quine suggests that not only the meaning but also the reference of our words and expressions is indeterminate. Quine calls this the inscrutability of reference, but he points out that he could have chosen a better term for it: 'the indeterminacy of reference' would have been more appropriate. I agree that it would indeed have been more helpful to talk about both meaning and reference in terms of indeterminacy: the connection between his two theses would then have been more readily apparent and perhaps some misunderstandings could have been avoided. However, although I consider the term 'inscrutability of reference' to be an unfortunate choice, it is nevertheless the term most commonly used and I will follow standard practice in this respect. That the reference of our words is inscrutable implies that they are affected by the same under-determination that affects our translations. Our words have several possible references, references which may be in equal harmony with our linguistic behavior but which are mutually incompatible. In this sense, the reference of our words is underdetermined by the totality of our linguistic behavior: our linguistic behavior can verify a number of different mutually incompatible hypotheses about the reference of our words. The thesis about the inscrutability of reference can be illustrated with the help of Quine's own 'gavagai' example. If the field linguist chooses to translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit', then 'gavagai' refers to rabbits. If he chooses to translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit part', then 'gavagai' refers to rabbit parts. If he chooses to translate 'gavagai' as 'temporal section of a rabbit', then 'gavagai' refers to temporal sections of rabbits. If the field linguist makes adequate modifications to his analytical hypotheses, it is possible for different translation alternatives to be brought in line with the linguistic behavior demonstrated by the source language speakers. Thus, several different translations can be correct. However, the different translations of 'gavagai' generate different conceptions of 10

9 10

Cf. Davidson 1993: 54 Quine 1992a: 50

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51

the reference of the term and these conceptions are not necessarily mutually compatible. We have no neutral and independent way of determining which reference is the correct one. We can only conclude that 'gavagai' has a certain reference, against the background of a certain translation manual, based on certain analytical hypotheses. However, the reference could have been another one, against the background of another manual. This is the core of Quine's thesis on the inscrutability of reference. It should be noted that the thesis of the inscrutability of reference does not imply that we are always unsure of the reference of words, nor does it imply that we should constantly question whether we are really referring to what we think we are referring to. Just as the meaning of 'gavagai' is not indeterminate once we have formulated a translation manual, the reference of 'gavagai' is not inscrutable once we know what 'gavagai' means. If 'gavagai' means 'rabbit', then we know what 'gavagai' refers to: 'gavagai' refers to rabbits. Neither meaning nor reference remains indeterminate once we have translated 'gavagai' as 'rabbit'. In a sense, Quine argues, the reference of the words in our mother tongue is also inscrutable. A long quote will serve to illustrate his point. Quine urges his readers to imagine that we master our mother tongue, and he describes our mother tongue as a network. This network of terms and predicates and auxiliary devices is, in relativity jargon, our frame of reference, or coordinate system. Relative to it we can and do talk meaningfully and distinctively of rabbits and parts, numbers and formulas. Next [...] we contemplate alternative denotations for our familiar terms. We begin to appreciate that a grand and ingenious permutation of these denotations, along with compensatory adjustments in the interpretations of the auxiliary particles, might still accommodate all existing speech dispositions. This was the inscrutability of reference, applied to ourselves; and it made nonsense of reference. Fair enough; reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system. [...] It is meaningless to ask whether, in general, our terms 'rabbit,' 'rabbit part,' 'number,' etc., really refer respectively to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc., rather than to some ingeniously permuted denotations. It is meaningless to ask this absolutely; we can meaningfully ask it only relative to some background language. When we ask, 'Does "rabbit" really refer to rabbits?' someone can counter with the question: 'Refer to rabbits in what sense of "rabbits"?' thus launching a regress; and we need a background language to regress into. The background language gives the query sense, if only relative sense; sense relative in turn to it, this background language. Querying reference in any more absolute way would be like asking absolute position, or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a given frame of reference. [...]

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We need a background language, I said, to regress into. Are we involved now in an infinite regress? If questions of reference of the sort we are considering make sense only relative to a background language, then evidently questions of reference for the background language make sense in turn only relative to a further background language. [...] In practice [...] we end the regress of coordinate systems by something like pointing. And in practice we end the regress of background languages, in discussions of reference, by acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking its words at face value." Here, Quine is talking about our language as a network, a coordinate system. When the language is being formed, different phenomena in the outer world are given different positions in the coordinate system, thus creating a frame of reference. Once this frame of reference, this coordinate system, has been constructed, we can use it to refer to various items and events in the outer world. When referring to something, we indicate its position in the coordinate system and our listener can seek the place out and find that to which we are referring. When a field linguist translates a previously untranslated language, there are several possible coordinate systems he can develop and use, coordinate systems which do equal justice to the speakers' linguistic behavior. There are several different possible frames of reference that can be used in the communication between the field linguist and the source language speakers. Similarly, we can imagine different frames of reference for our own language, frames of reference which are in equal harmony with our linguistic behavior but which are mutually incompatible. Consequently, we can question the reference of our own language. Does 'rabbit' refer to rabbits or to rabbit parts? What frame of reference should we use? The answer to these and similar questions depends partly on what we mean by 'rabbit'. Meaning, Quine suggests, can only be arrived at through translation. Similarly, Quine argues, the question as to whether 'rabbit' refers to rabbits or to rabbit parts can be meaningfully asked and answered only relative to a language other than that of which the term 'rabbit' is part. Questions concerning how our coordinate system is constructed or which coordinate system we should choose to operate by are meaningful only relative to another coordinate system. We can never get ourselves into a position outside of all existing coordinate systems and all languages, and describe and choose coordinate systems from that perspective. Apart from looking at each individual language in itself as a network, Quine also looks at the relation between different languages as a network.

11

Quine 1969a: 48-9

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It is possible to use another language to ask and answer questions about what the words in any given language means; in such a case, the other language works as a background language to the first language. We can then ask and answer questions about what the words in the background language mean, using yet another language as a background language to the first background language — and thus we end up in a regress. This regress may be perceived as infinite, but it does not have to be perceived in this way. We can reach a terminus, and we often do so in practice, simply by taking our mother tongue and the frame of reference that we think of as natural for granted. We can, quite simply, refrain from asking any further questions about what our words refer to. Quine's philosophy implies a Wittgensteinian terminus, consisting of that which we do not question in our daily lives. This is where we run out of meaningful questions to ask. Given Quine's reflections on the inscrutability of reference, it is possible that speakers of one and the same language use different frames of reference without being aware of the fact. However, the question as to whether this is so can be asked and answered only in relation to a background language. As long as we use one single language, we can only take for granted that speakers of our language usually refer to the same things we refer to when they use the same words we use. 12

Ontological Relativity Quine sometimes talks about the inscrutability of reference in terms of ontological relativity. On this view, the ontology that is attributed to the speakers of a language is made explicit in the frame of reference used by a translator of that language. Not only reference, but also ontology, is relative to a translation manual. If we translate 'gavagai' as 'rabbit', then 'gavagai' refers to rabbits and what we in fact indicate is that the source language speakers assume rabbits to be possible objects, that is to say, that it is possible that rabbits exist or that they do not exist. Rabbits are part of their ontology. Due to the link between reference and ontology, Quine argues, it is true to say that questions about reality, that is, questions about what exists and what does not exist, is yet another category of questions that can 13

12 13

Cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §217 E.g. Quine 1994a: 181

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only be asked relative to a certain language, a certain coordinate system. To ask what reality is like absolutely, apart from all languages, is meaningless. In order to be able to ask questions about what exists and what things are real, we must always operate within a certain language, a language which can indicate to us what 'exist' means, and what 'thing' and 'reality' refers to. Quine writes: 'The very terms "thing" and "exist" and "real", after all, make no sense apart from human conceptualization. Asking after the thing in itself, apart from human conceptualization, is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from our parochial miles or kilometers.' The only way in which ontological questions can be examined in a meaningful way is relative to a certain language and its frame of reference. Reference, Quine suggests, is always inscrutable, that is, there are always several different frames of reference that can be attributed to the speakers and do equal justice to their respective linguistic behavior. Moreover, on this view, there are always several different ontologies that can be attributed to the speakers, ontologies which are in equal harmony with the speakers' linguistic behavior, but which are nevertheless mutually incompatible. If we presuppose a certain ontology — one based on a certain frame of reference —, a certain object can be thought of as existing. If we presuppose another ontology — one based on another frame of reference —, the same object cannot be thought of as existing: perhaps its existence cannot even be discussed. Here, we touch upon the third most important of Quine's theses; this is an idea that is closely connected to his thoughts on the indeterminacy of meaning and the inscrutability of reference. Quine argues that our scientific theories are under-determined by empirical facts. Thus, there will always be several different alternative scientific theories, all supported to an equal degree by what we can observe but nevertheless mutually incompatible. Quine's under-determination thesis concerning scientific theories is an important part of his thinking on ontological relativity. There are various ways in which the relation between Quine's three central theses can be described. Dummett, to give but one example, considers the under-determination thesis concerning scientific theories to be what Quine bases his thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning on. By contrast, I look at the same under-determination thesis as a consequence of Quine's approach to questions of meaning and reference. I conceive 14

15

14 15

Quine 1993: 113 Dummett 1974a: 416

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of ontological relativity as resulting from Quine's reflections on translation. Quine maintains that 'to ask what reality is really like [...] apart from human categories, is selfstultifying'. Ontological questions can be asked and answered only relative to a frame of reference. In translation, we can formulate mutually incompatible frames of reference for one and the same language, frames of reference which are in equal harmony with the speakers' linguistic behavior. Consequently, we can attribute radically different ontologies to the speakers in question, ontologies which are mutually incompatible and which cannot be compared by relating them to a reality-in-itself that is shared by all languages and independent of all languages. 16

Two Central Problem Areas Quine's three central theses, discussed above, are relevant in the present context in that they form a background for two problem areas of considerable importance for my work. These problem areas are frequently discussed when Quine's position is criticized. The first problem area concerns our possibilities of translation. Some philosophers question whether it really is possible that there may be radically different translation manuals, as outlined by Quine. Ken Gemes discusses this issue and concludes that 'purported cases of genuine rival translation manuals, upon which the indeterminacy thesis and the inscrutability-of-reference thesis depend, collapse into cases of merely different translation manuals'. Gemes maintains that the different translation manuals that we can construct in our process of translating from one language to another cannot be described as rival translation manuals. He asks rhetorically: 'How can there be rival manuals that, by Quine's own lights, "express the same proposition" and "mean the same proposition"? Surely, if two manuals express the same proposition, they are not really rival manuals! I will in my work reflect on questions relating to our possibilities of assuming that there are rival and mutually incompatible translation manuals. I will consider questions touching upon the existence of rival translation manuals, especially in connection with my discussion of Donald Davidson's ideas about our possibilities of interpretation. Quine's theses 17

M8

16 17 18

Quine 1992b: 9 Gemes 1991: 103 Gemes 1991: 106

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form a background for Davidson's arguments and conclusions. For this reason, my discussion of Quine and his ideas is relevant not only in relation to my attempts to reconstruct Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, but also in relation to the aspects of Davidson's work which I will explore in chapter six. The second problem area concerns the question as to whether or not we can assume that there is a shared independent reality. Some philosophers point out that Quine, in formulating his three central theses, presupposes our ability to assume that there is something which is independent of the rival translation manuals or theories that he discusses, something which is shared by them all and which they structure in different ways. Davidson states that Quine's article 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' contains 'a version of the distinction between a non-propositional content given in experience and a conceptual scheme, language, or framework which organizes that content'. Some philosophers argue that when Quine describes the existence of rival translation manuals, he does so against the background of the assumption that we can meaningfully indicate what behavior is linguistic behavior without presupposing a certain translation manual. The rival translation manuals, Quine argues, are in equal harmony with the source language speakers' linguistic behavior. The question is whether or not we can indicate what behavior is linguistic behavior without presupposing a translation manual of some sort. If we cannot, then it may be true to say that we cannot give the idea of rival translation manuals, manuals which are in equal harmony with the source language speakers' linguistic behavior, a meaningful content. Similarly, in formulating his thesis concerning the under-determination of scientific theories, Quine assumes that we can, in a sense, imagine empirical facts to be independent of theory. There are a number of different theories, Quine argues, which can be in equal harmony with all empirical facts. Lars Bergstrom summarizes Quine's thesis concerning the under-determination of scientific theories as follows: 'In sum [...] the underdetermination thesis says that our global system of the world (at any given time) has some, probably unknown, empirically equivalent but irreducible rival, which is equally good as our system. This rival system may even be logically incompatible with ours'. On this view, two empirically equivalent theories are in equal harmony with all empirical facts. 19

20

19 2 0

Davidson 1994: 187 Bergstrom 1993: 335

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The question is whether or not we can determine what should be labeled an empirical fact without presupposing any of the rival 'global systems of the world' implied by the thesis concerning the under-determination of scientific theories. If we cannot, then it may be true to say that we cannot give the notion of different and rival theories that are in equal harmony with all empirical facts a meaningful content. Giinter Abel maintains that the indeterminacy thesis follows on from an externalized perspective as regards language, meaning and epistemology. When Quine takes a language for granted, he is suggesting that it is possible to ask and answer questions about meaning, reference and ontology. In so doing, he describes our language and our reality from an internal perspective — internal relative to a linguistic community. By contrast, in formulating the thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning, the thesis of the inscrutability of reference and his thoughts on ontological relativity, he presupposes an external perspective — external relative to all linguistic communities. It has been argued by a number of philosophers that Quine's theses can be correct only if it is possible to view all linguistic communities from an external perspective. Quine's theses could be seen as presupposing our ability to imagine that there is something which is independent of our translation manuals or theories and with which rival translation manuals or theories can therefore be in harmony to an equal degree. However, Quine's theses could also be seen as expressing an internal perspective — internal relative to a certain translation manual or a certain theory. In that case, what Quine argues is that, against the background of the delimitation of linguistic behavior that we base on a certain translation manual, we must allow for the possibility that there may be rival translation manuals that are in equal harmony with the linguistic behavior that we can delimit. Similarly, the under-determination thesis could be taken to imply that, against the background of the delimitation of empirical facts that we base on 'our global system of the world', we must allow for the possibility that there may be rival global systems. If we understand Quine's theses as being formulated relative to an internal perspective, we describe them as being shaped by the possibilities of delimiting linguistic behavior and empirical facts which we humans have, given a certain translation manual or a certain theory. What is of particular interest in the light of this context is the question as to whether or not the theses are correct if we take them to be 21

21

Abel 1994: 403

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formulated relative to an internal perspective. Is meaning really indeterminate and are our theories really under-determined if we presuppose a certain translation manual or a certain theory? My primary interest is not to examine the ways in which Quine's theses can be interpreted. What interests me is our possibilities of talking about something which is shared by all humans regardless of what translation manual or theory we use, something which can possibly be structured in a number of different ways. I will return to the question as to whether or not we are able to imagine a reality which is shared by all humans and which is independent of us and of our language. I will discuss our possibilities of imagining such a reality, and I will relate this discussion to Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism and to my own reflections on the possibility that there may be several different conceptual schemes. The question as to whether or not we can imagine such a reality affects our understanding of the nature and task of the philosophy of religion.

Brains in a Vat Putnam formulates a number of arguments against metaphysical realism, all of which aim to show that the external perspective that the metaphysical realist strives for is, in fact, unattainable. These arguments focus on the metaphysical realist's conception of truth. Putnam writes: In various places I have described metaphysical realism as a bundle of intimately associated philosophical ideas about truth: the ideas that truth is a matter of Correspondence and that it exhibits Independence (of what humans do or could find out), Bivalence, and Uniqueness (there cannot be more than one complete and true description of Reality) [...] 22

Putnam has recently pointed out that his arguments against metaphysical realism aim to show that the metaphysical realist's conception of truth and related conception of reality are, in a sense, incoherent. He writes: 'Notice that I said "incoherent" not inconsistent. What is consistent or not is a matter of pure logic; what is coherent, or intelligible, or makes sense to us, and what is incoherent, or unintelligible, or empty, is something to be determined not by logic but by philosophical argument.' 23

22 2 3

Putnam 1988: 107 Putnam 1994a: 354

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Thus, arguments against metaphysical realism are philosophical arguments. They do not show that metaphysical realism is self-contradictory on a logical level. Instead, these arguments aim to support the idea that metaphysical realism, along with its external 'God's Eye point of view', in fact 'makes no sense', 'that metaphysical realism cannot even be intelligibly stated', and that, therefore, it is an empty idea. Putnam aims to embarrass the metaphysical realist by showing that the external perspective is, in a sense, unattainable. We cannot imagine a perspective which is independent of our own perspective. Reality is always, of necessity, reality as humanly perceived; it is the reality in which we live. It is for this reason, and no other, that we are unable either to state or to deny that there is a reality-in-itself. Putnam writes: 24

25

26

Kant was himself subject to a confusion. The confusion was to suppose that a description which is shaped by our conceptual choices is somehow, for that very reason, not a description of its object 'as it really is'. As soon as we make that mistake, we open the door to the question, 'Well, if our descriptions are only our descriptions, descriptions shaped by our interests and nature, then what is the description of the things as they are in themselves'!' But this 'in themselves' is quite empty — to ask how things are 'in themselves' is, in effect, to ask how the world is to be described in the world's own language, and there is no such thing as the world's own language, there are only the languages that we language users invent for our various purposes. 27

It is important to note that Putnam now argues that his arguments against metaphysical realism are philosophical ones, rather than strictly logical ones. When he first formulated them, Putnam made more of the inconsistencies inherent in metaphysical realism, and he used several concepts pertaining to logic. In my reconstruction and development of Putnam's arguments, I will use material from his early ideas as well as from his more recent ones. The shift that has occurred in Putnam's reasoning should be kept in mind, but it need not cause any problems. His use of logic and concepts pertaining to logic can be seen as a use within an extended philosophical framework where the question of incoherence (not the question of inconsistency) is the focal point. Perhaps Putnam's early attempts to highlight the logical inconsistency of metaphysical realism aim to show that metaphysical realism is a philosophically 24 25 26 27

Putnam 1992b: 353, 368. Cf. Ebbs 1992: 16 Cf. Wright 1994: 217 Cf. Herrmann 1995: 118-9 Putnam 1995: 29

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incoherent doctrine because what is logically inconsistent can never be coherent. I have previously discussed the possibility that coherence may be thought of as some form of system or perspective whose parts we humans can perceive as fitting together. If it is in this sense that Putnam uses the concept of 'coherence', then questions of coherence touch upon what we humans can imagine and presuppose in our reflections in a meaningful way. As I understand Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, they indicate that metaphysical realism is incoherent insofar as it does not constitute any such system or perspective. I would argue that what Putnam aims to emphasize by insisting that his arguments are philosophical rather than logical is that these arguments are meant to show metaphysical realism to be a highly problematical position that we humans cannot imagine or make use of. I do not interpret his conclusion that metaphysical realism is a philosophically untenable position as a conclusion primarily concerning the logical consistency of metaphysical realism. Instead, I understand his conclusion to imply that metaphysical realism cannot be a philosophically acceptable doctrine if we require that it should be possible for us, among other things, to imagine and make use of such doctrines. Putnam's most well-known and debated argument against metaphysical realism is his brains-in-a-vat argument. He writes: [I]magine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person's brain (your brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a superscientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc; but really all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer to the nerve endings. The computer is so clever that if the person tries to raise his hand, the feedback from the computer will cause him to 'see' and 'feel' the hand being raised. Moreover, by varying the program, the evil scientist can cause the victim to 'experience' (or hallucinate) any situation or environment the evil scientist wishes. He can also obliterate the memory of the brain operation, so that the victim will seem to himself to have always been in this environment. It can even seem to the victim that he is sitting and reading these very words about the amusing but quite absurd supposition that there is an evil scientist who removes people's brains from their bodies and places them in a vat of nutrients which keep the brains alive. 28

28

Putnam 1981: 5-6

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The metaphysical realist maintains that it is in fact entirely possible for us to be brains in a vat even if there is nothing in the world that we experience which might indicate that this is the case. The metaphysical realist also holds that it could be true that we are brains in a vat even if we cannot discover that it is true. From an external perspective, a God's-Eye point of view, the one true and complete description of independent reality may well include the utterance 'We are brains in a vat'. Thus, it is possible that we are brains in a vat even if this would imply that we could not possibly discover it. The metaphysical realist would argue that what is true is, in this sense, independent of us and what we can discover. Putnam argues that the metaphysical realist's thesis that we can be brains in a vat is self-contradictory. It is a thesis which, if true, implies its own falsity. We cannot refer to the metaphysical possibility that we may be brains in a vat. Although the brains can think the words 'We are brains in a vat', they cannot, Putnam argues, refer to the same things we refer to when we use the concepts 'brain' and 'vat' (supposing that we are not brains in a vat). For this reason, they can neither think nor say that they are brains in a vat (in independent reality) even if they think or say the words 'We are brains in a vat'. The brain in a vat that thinks or says 'I am a brain in a vat' is wrong in the same sense that a person who is dreaming that she says T am dreaming' is wrong when she (in her dream) is not dreaming that she is dreaming. Why is it that brains in a vat cannot refer to the same things we refer to when we use the concepts 'brain' and 'vat' (supposing that we are not brains in a vat)? Putnam's answer to this question is that there must be some connection between our words and something which is independent of language, if we are to be able to talk about reference. We do not say that a computer which speaks our language, which gives correct answers to all our questions and with which we can have meaningful conversations, just like we can with another human being, actually refers to the same things we refer to even if it uses the same words we use. This, Putnam argues, is because if we were to let two such computers talk to each other, they would continue to talk to each other in the same way, using the same words, even if the rest of the world were to disappear. There is no non-linguistic interaction between their words and the world. The computers would simply continue to talk about apples in the same 29

30

Forbes 1995 describes and discusses Putnam's argumentsfroma metaphysical realist perspective Cf. Wittgenstein 1979: §676 29

30

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way even if all apples would cease to exist. We human beings, by contrast, would not. Putnam argues that this is because '[t]here are "language entry rules" which take us from experiences of apples to such utterances as "I see an apple", and "language exit rules" which take us from decisions expressed in linguistic form ("I am going to buy some apples") to actions other than speaking'. Unless implicit language entry and exit rules are followed, Putnam argues, we cannot call the communication real conversation, conversation which includes reference. The computers would not converse with one another. They would not display linguistic behavior of such a kind that we would say that they refer to apples when uttering the word 'apple'. This is because the computers cannot interact with apples in any way, and would talk about apples in the same way even if there were no apples. Putnam argues that we must interact with that which we are talking about if we are to be able to say that our words refer to that which we are talking about. He states that the brains in the vat cannot refer to trees since 'there is no connection between the word "tree" as used by these brains and actual trees. They would still use the word "tree" just as they do, think just the thoughts they do, have just the images they have, even if there were no actual trees'. In this sense, the brains in the vat resemble the computers discussed above. They would continue to think and talk in the same way even if the outer world would change radically and all trees cease to exist. All that the brains in the vat can possibly refer to is the trees that they perceive via the computer, namely the electronic impulses or that part of the computer program which causes their tree perceptions. What they cannot refer to is actual trees. The fact that the brains in the vat cannot refer to an outer world, outside of the world that they perceive, leads Putnam to conclude that the statement 'We are brains in a vat' can never be true. The metaphysical realist, by contrast, argues that the sentence 'We are brains in a vat' can be true, that it can be part of the one true and complete description of independent reality, even if we can never know this to be the case. Putnam argues that the sentence is necessarily false, not because it is metaphysically impossible for us to be brains in a vat, but because it is philosophically impossible for us to formulate that thesis if indeed we are brains in a vat. It is philosophically impossible because, if we are brains in a vat, we cannot interact with the things we now refer 31

32

31 3 2

Putnam 1981: 11 Putnam 1981: 12

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to when we use the concepts 'brain' and 'vat' (supposing that we are not brains in a vat); consequently, if we are brains in a vat, we cannot refer to the same things we now refer to when we use the concepts 'brain' and 'vat'. Putnam writes: [I]f their 'possible world' is really the actual one, and we are really the brains in a vat, then what we now mean by 'we are brains in a vat' is that we are brains in a vat in the image or something of that kind (if we mean anything at all). But part of the hypothesis that we are brains in a vat is that we aren't brains in a vat in the image (i.e. what we are 'hallucinating' isn't that we are brains in a vat). So, if we are brains in a vat, then the sentence 'We are brains in a vat' says something false (if it says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then 'We are brains in a vat' is false. So it is (necessarily) false. 33

If we are not brains in a vat, then the statement 'We are brains in a vat' is false; so far, Putnam and the metaphysical realist are in agreement. However, they disagree on the question as to whether or not it is possible for the statement to be true. Putnam maintains that if we are brains in a vat, then the statement 'We are brains in a vat' is false or possibly meaningless. If the statement is false both if we are brains in a vat and if we are not brains in a vat, then the statement is necessarily false: it is false in all possible worlds. Putnam argues that the metaphysical realist's thesis that we can be brains in a vat even if nothing in the world that we perceive indicates that this is the case and even if we can never discover this to be the case is a self-contradictory thesis in that, if the statement 'We are brains in a vat' is true (if we really are brains in a vat), then the statement 'We are brains in a vat' is false or possibly meaningless. If we conceive of it as false, rather than meaningless, then it is false because we cannot refer to anything other than brains and vats in the world that we experience. We are not brains in a vat in the world that we experience. Therefore, the statement 'We are brains in a vat' is false. According to Putnam, this self-contradiction necessarily affects the metaphysical realist position. We can never refer to the reality-in-itself that the metaphysical realist refers to; consequently, we can never state that it exists. Statements about what exists from a God's-Eye point of view can never be true, as they cannot be formulated by us human beings in a meaningful way. We cannot refer to the external perspective to which we aim to refer in formulating statements about reality-in-itself. Of necessity, we always refer to the reality that our internal perspective allows us 33

Putnam 1981: 15

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to describe and with which we interact. What determines whether our statements about reality are true or false are states of affairs in the reality that we can describe and with which we interact. By contrast, the metaphysical realist argues that what determines whether our statements about reality are true or false are states of affairs in reality-in-itself. Putnam rejects this idea because we cannot refer to such states of affairs and state that they exist. It is on the basis of this difference of opinion between Putnam, on the one hand, and the metaphysical realist, on the other, that Putnam formulates the self-contradiction that he thinks is characteristic of the metaphysical realist position. If the statement 'There is a reality-in-itself is true (in the metaphysical realist sense) then the statement 'There is a reality-in-itself is false (from our internal perspective). What we refer to when we use the concept of 'reality' is always relative to our interaction with, and our experiences of, reality, he continues. On this view, what we state when we state that there is a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself is that the reality we experience and with which we interact (and to which we refer when we make statements about reality) is a reality we cannot experience and with which we cannot interact. This, Putnam argues, is clearly false. Putnam states that his argument rests primarily on two central premises. One of the premisses of the argument is obvious: that magical theories of reference are wrong, wrong for mental representations and not only for physical ones. The other premiss is that one cannot refer to certain kinds of things, e.g. trees, if one has no causal interaction at all with them, or with things in terms of which they can be described. But why should we accept these premisses? 34

Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism as well as his formulation of the internal realist position that he sees as a philosophically acceptable alternative to metaphysical realism both stem from his reflections on questions of reference and his rejection of magical theories of reference. By magical theories of reference, Putnam means theories of reference which presuppose that there is an intrinsic connection between certain words and certain objects, a connection which implies that certain words necessarily refer to certain objects. If there is such a connection between the concepts 'brain', 'in' and 'vat', on the one hand, and actual brains and vats and spatial containment, on the other, then even brains in a vat would be able to refer to that which we refer to when we use these concepts 35

34 35

Putnam 1981: 16 Cf. Thompson 1991: 215

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(supposing we are not brains in a vat). According to magical theories of reference, the reference lies in the actual concepts and is independent of the brains' perceptions of, and interaction with, the outer world. Putnam writes: //the Brain-in-a-Vatists' word vat refers to what we call 'vats' and the Brainin-a-Vatists' word in refers to spatial containment and the Brain-in-a-Vatists' word brain refers to what we call 'brains,' then the sentence 'We are brains in a vat' has the same truth-condition for a Brain-in-a-Vatist as it would have for one of us (apart from the difference in the reference of the pronoun we). In particular, it is (on this supposition) a true sentence, since the people who think it are, in fact, brains spatially contained in a vat, and its negation, 'We are not brains in a vat,' is a false sentence. But, if there is no intrinsic connection between the word vat and what are called 'vats' [...] why should we not say that what the word vat refers to in Brain-in-a-Vatish is phenomenological appearances of vats and not 'real' vats? 36

The premise of the argument, that is, the thesis that magical theories of reference should be rejected, makes it impossible for the metaphysical realist to maintain that the brains in the vat necessarily refer to the same things that we refer to with the help of the same concepts. The premise that we can only refer to things with which we interact leads to the conclusion that the brains in the vat actually refer to something entirely different than what we refer to (supposing we are not brains in a vat), even if they use the same words we use. A metaphysical realist would reject Putnam's argument simply by rejecting one or both of the central premises of the argument: Why do we have to accept that magical theories of reference are not good alternatives? Why do we have to believe that we can only refer to that with which we can interact? As I understand Putnam, he supports his two premises with the help of three other arguments. He examines three common magical theories of reference, and he shows that they are untenable. They do not help us to fix the reference of our concepts. Instead, they lead to ontological relativity. We can only fix the reference of our concepts by assuming that the only objects to which we can refer are objects with which we can interact. Thus, only by rejecting magical theories of reference can we avoid ontological relativity. Putnam argues that unless we can fix the reference of our concepts, and unless we can avoid ontological relativity, we cannot communicate with one another. However, as we can in fact communicate with one another,

* Putnam 1990: 111

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we should regard all positions which imply ontological relativity as incorrect: they lead to the false conclusion that we cannot communicate with one another. Twin Earth The first magical theory of reference that Putnam discusses maintains that reference is fixed by the meaning of words, and that the meaning of words somehow exists in the speaker's head (mind). The meaning of a word would then be some form of concept or mental representation inside the individual speaker's mind. Putnam uses the words 'concept' and 'mental representation' as synonyms, since a concept is, in this context, taken to be some form of representation in one's mind. The theory maintains that when a certain concept or a certain mental representation is linked to a certain sign, then the concept or mental representation in question will become the meaning of the sign. Putnam states that there is a long history of thinking about meaning and reference in this way, and that it seems natural to many people. We often connect meaning and mind: to mean something is to have that something in one's mind. I have chosen to call this theoretical perspective the mind-dependent theory of reference. Putnam summarizes it as follows: 1. Every word he uses is associated in the mind of the speaker with a certain mental representation. 2. Two words are synonymous (have the same meaning) just in case they are associated with the same mental representation by the speakers who use those words. 3. The mental representation determines what the word refers to, if anything. 37

In his article 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' from 1975, Putnam attempts to show that and why the reference of our words cannot be explained with the help of this mind-dependent theory of reference. He formulates a number of examples with which he tries to demonstrate that meaning is not something that exists inside an individual speaker's head (mind). The most well-known and debated of these examples is about water and Twin Earth. Putnam writes: [W]e shall suppose that somewhere in the galaxy there is a planet we shall call Twin Earth. Twin Earth is very much like Earth; in fact, people on Twin Earth even speak English. In fact, apart from the differences we shall 37

Putnam 1988: 19

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specify in our science-fiction examples, the reader may suppose that Twin Earth is exactly like Earth. He may even suppose that he has a Doppelgdnger — an identical copy — on Twin Earth, if he wishes, although my stories will not depend on this. Although some of the people on Twin Earth (say, the ones who call themselves 'Americans' and the ones who call themselves 'Canadians' and the ones who call themselves 'Englishmen,' etc.) speak English, there are, not surprisingly, a few tiny differences which we will now describe between the dialects of English spoken on Twin Earth and Standard English. These differences themselves depend on some of the peculiarities of Twin Earth. One of the peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called 'water' is not H 0 but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very long and complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ. I shall suppose that XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures. In particular, it tastes like water and it quenches thirst like water. Also, I shall suppose that the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and not water, etc. 2

38

Putnam imagines that if a spaceship with a crew from Earth were to visit Twin Earth, the crew would initially believe that 'water' on Twin Earth, as on Earth, refers to H 0 . However, with the help of modern scientific methods of investigation, they would soon discover that that which the inhabitants on Twin Earth call water in fact has the chemical formula XYZ. They would thereby draw the conclusion that 'water' does not have the same reference on Earth as it does on Twin Earth: 'water' on Earth and 'water' on Twin Earth are two different liquids. Putnam stresses that the word 'water' refers to a different liquid on Earth than it does on Twin Earth even if we are unaware of the fact. To illustrate this notion, he introduces the reader to Oscar, and Oscar who are inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth, respectively, and he rolls the time back to the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, modern chemistry had not yet been invented. Consequently, neither Oscar, nor Oscar knows anything about the chemical formulas of liquids. Putnam writes: 2

2

2

[L]et us roll the time back to about 1750. At that time chemistry was not developed on either Earth or Twin Earth. The typical Earthian speaker of English did not know water consisted of hydrogen and oxygen, and the typical Twin Earthian speaker of English did not know 'water' consisted of XYZ. Let Oscar, be such a typical Earthian English speaker, and let Oscar be his counterpart on Twin Earth. You may suppose that there is no belief that Oscar, had about water that Oscar did not have about 'water.' If you like, you may even suppose that Oscar, and Oscar were exact duplicates in 2

2

2

M

Putnam 1996: 9-10 (re-publication of "The Meaning of "Meaning"')

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appearance, feelings, thoughts, interior monologue, etc. Yet the extension of the term 'water' was just as much H 0 on Earth in 1750 as in 1950; and the extension of the term 'water' was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 1950. 2

39

Putnam argues that Oscar, and Oscar can be exact duplicates in terms of their mental state, that they can have the same mental representations connected with the term 'water', and yet refer to completely different liquids. In fact, they refer to different liquids even if they are not aware of the fact. Putnam draws the conclusion that our mental state, that is, our mental representations, cannot by itself fix the reference of our words. There is no intrinsic connection, no magical link, which joins certain mental representations with a certain reference by means of a linguistic expression. The same mental representations may connect to the same word — and yet, the reference may vary. The word 'water' refers to different liquids on Earth and Twin Earth even if the speakers using the word on the two planets are in the same mental state. 'The reference is different because the stuff is different. The mental state by itself, in isolation from the whole situation, does not fix the reference.' " If the reference is fixed only by our mental representations, as the mind-dependent theory of reference suggests, then we end up with a certain degree of inscrutability with respect to what it is that our words actually refer to; this inscrutability leads to ontological relativity. We cannot determine whether 'water' refers to H 0 or to XYZ only with the help of our mental states. In this sense, if the mind-dependent theory of reference is taken for granted, inscrutability of reference and the ontological relativity that it implies are unavoidable. It could be argued that if Oscar, and Oscar associate the term 'water' with the same mental representations, they refer to the same thing even if the liquids to which they refer are different. It could also be argued that what determines whether or not two speakers refer to the same thing is the degree to which their mental representations correspond. However, Putnam rejects this possibility. He points out that we do not talk about reference in this sense. Even if Oscar, and Oscar are exact duplicates in terms of their mental state in 1750, and even if nobody discovers that they refer to different liquids when using one and the same word, it is nevertheless the case that they do not refer to the same thing. We do not 2

4

2

2

2

3 9 4 0

Putnam 1996: 10-1 Putnam 1981: 23

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say that they use the word 'water' to refer to the same thing until modern chemistry has developed sufficiently to allow their mental states to change and grow in different directions, so that they learn that Earthian water is H 0 and Twin Earthian water is XYZ. We say that Oscar, and Oscar refer to different liquids even back in 1750, although they are not aware of the fact. Modern chemistry does not affect the reference in any way; it just teaches us more about water. Putnam tries to clarify his own position on the question of reference by pointing out two things. Firstly, he underlines that one fundamental aspect of reference is what he calls 'the contribution of the environment'. When using the word 'water', Putnam argues, we intend to refer only to liquid that has the same nature as the liquid that we have learnt to call 'water'. There is an implied criterion of substance identity in the way we refer to things. Putnam writes: 'When we use the word "pencil," we intend to refer to whatever has the same nature as the normal examples of the local pencils in the actual world.' Putnam describes this criterion of substance identity as a form of indexicality. He points out that the criterion is valid even if we do not know the nature of the things we use in our examples. 2

2

41

42

I [...] believe that a community can stipulate that 'water' is to designate whatever has the same chemical structure or whatever has the same chemical behavior as paradigms X, Y, Z [...] even if it doesn't know, at the time it makes this stipulation, exactly what that chemical structure, or exactly what that lawful behavior, is. 43

When Oscar, talks about 'water', he refers to the liquid that on Earth is called 'water', even if he is unaware that this liquid is H 0 . Similarly, when Oscar talks about 'water', he refers to the liquid that on Twin Earth is called 'water', even if he is unaware that this liquid is XYZ. The two Oscars refer to different liquids since the liquids they refer to do not have the same nature as the examples of water that their respective linguistic communities make use of to identify water. That the two liquids referred to do not have the same nature could be discovered in principle, if not in practice, in the eighteenth century. Since the chemical formulas of the two liquids are different, we are not prepared to say that the word 'water' refers to the same thing on Earth as it does on Twin Earth. In fact, what 2

2

4 1 4 2 4 3

E.g. Putnam 1988: 30-7 Putnam 1996: 26 Putnam 1990: 70

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is called 'water' on Twin Earth is not water at all, since it does not have the same nature as the liquid we have learnt to call 'water'. When we refer to things, our environment contributes with paradigmatic examples of that to which we refer; we then conceive of the nature of these examples as normative. We are prepared to assign the name 'water' to all liquids that have the same nature as our paradigmatic examples of water, and to no other liquids. It is because our paradigmatic examples are normative that we say that Oscar, and Oscar refer to different liquids even if their mental states are identical. Secondly, Putnam underlines that there is 'a linguistic division of labor'. For many of us, chemistry is a subject about which we know comparatively little. We cannot tell water (H 0) from liquids which look like water. We do not know what tests to make or how to analyze them, in order to find out. However, there are experts who know much more about chemistry than we do, experts who know how to analyze a liquid to find out whether its chemical formula is the same as that for our paradigmatic examples of water. When a problem of reference occurs, we must trust these experts. When we do not know whether or not 'water' refers to the same thing on Earth as it does on Twin Earth, we must ask these experts to analyze the two liquids. If their chemical formulas differ from one another, then Oscar, and Oscar refer to different liquids when they talk about 'water'. That there is indeed a linguistic division of labor, Putnam suggests, is evidenced by the fact that, in some instances, only a group of experts can determine what has and what does not have the same nature as our paradigmatic example. Furthermore, Putnam argues, the fact that there is such a linguistic division of labor shows that the mental state of the individual speaker often does not fix the reference. Putnam writes: 2

44

2

2

Every linguistic community exemplifies the sort of division of linguistic labor just described: that is, possesses at least some terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets. [...] Whenever a term is subject to the division of linguistic labor, the 'average' speaker who acquires it does not acquire anything that fixes its extension. In particular, his individual psychological state certainly does not fix its extension; it is only the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that fixes the extension. 45

4 4 4 5

E.g. Putnam 1996: 14 Putnam 1996: 14

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I understand 'the sociolinguistic state of the collective linguistic body' to mean the collective linguistic competence of the human linguistic community. Lynn Hankinson Nelson points out that we can talk about knowledge as something which is possessed by a community. I would argue that we can imagine linguistic competence to be something which speakers of a certain language possess as a community. Our ability to refer is part of our linguistic competence. Sociolinguistic competence is linked to other forms of competence. There are circumstances in which only chemists can determine whether or not a certain word refers to a certain liquid; in such cases, our sociolinguistic competence is linked to the competence of our chemistry experts. Who counts as an expert is determined in the collective human community. It is frequently the experts who determine what counts as a good paradigmatic example and what counts as the nature of a paradigmatic example. The reference is partly fixed by our environment and its constitution, but only partly. It is also partly fixed by us and our decisions. We acknowledge certain persons to be experts and the experts designate certain examples as paradigmatic examples. They discuss and determine which aspects of the nature of these examples should be considered vital. There is a certain sense in which the reference may be affected when the experts find out more or focus on other aspects of the paradigmatic examples in describing their nature. It is entirely possible that the experts will draw the conclusion that some of the paradigmatic examples previously used do not have the same nature as other paradigmatic examples. The experts may discover new methods of analysis enabling them to discover that all the things we thought had the same nature as our paradigmatic examples did not have the same nature after all. Putnam stresses that when this happens, we say that we have found out more about the thing to which we refer and that we have realized that we did not always refer to the thing to which we thought we referred. Putnam's extensive reflections on Twin Earth and its water show that we cannot use various types of the mind-dependent theory of reference to fix the reference of our words, since this theory unavoidably leads to ontological relativity. Putnam concludes that it is not by having something particular in mind that we refer to anything. The reference of our words is not dependent upon our mental representations, that is, our intentions or what we are thinking of. To think and to have intentions presupposes 46

E.g. Hankinson Nelson 1990: xi

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that we can refer to things. Instead, the reference of our words is fixed by us human beings and our environment. Putnam's brains-in-a-vat argument rests on two fundamental premises. Firstly, magical theories of reference, such as the mind-dependent theory of reference, are incorrect. Secondly, we cannot refer to things with which we do not interact. Putnam's reflections on Twin Earth show that we can avoid ontological relativity if we assume that we can only refer to things with which we do interact. By emphasizing 'the contribution of the environment' and 'the linguistic division of labor', Putnam points out that the way in which we refer to things is inextricably linked to the way in which we interact with our environment. We, as a collective human community, designate certain examples in our environment as paradigmatic examples the nature of which we analyze and compare with what we encounter and talk about. It is not we as individuals who carry out this selection process, but we as a collective community. We frequently delegate this process of analysis and comparison of our paradigmatic examples to our experts. Thus, our interaction with the environment happens, not on an individual, but on a collective, level. In and through our interaction with the environment, we formulate criteria for when a certain word can be said to refer to a certain object and when two people can be said to refer to the same thing. Our criteria enable us to determine what it is that our words refer to. Our criteria are based on our collective interaction with the environment, rather than on our mental representations. 47

Cats and Cherries The second magical theory of reference that Putnam discusses and rejects is the theory that we can fix the reference of concepts that are part of whole sentences by clarifying the truth-value of those sentences. In his cat-on-the-mat example, Putnam tries to demonstrate that this theory is untenable. He formulates the sentence 'A cat is on a mat'. He interprets the sentence fragment 'is on' as 'is, was, or will be on' and states that the sentence is true in all possible worlds wherein at least some cat is on some mat at some time. He then goes on to show that the sentence can be reinterpreted so that the word 'cat' as we use it in our world instead refers to cherries and the word 'mat' as we use it in 4 7

Putnam 1981: 42-3

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our world instead refers to trees, while the truth-value of the sentence remains unaffected in all possible worlds. In order to show how this is possible, Putnam introduces two new properties, namely the property of being a cat* and the property of being a mat*. He defines the property of being a cat* and the property of being a mat* with the help of three cases. (a) Some cat is on some mat, and some cherry is on some tree. (b) Some cat is on some mat, and no cherry is on any tree. (c) Neither of the foregoing. Here is the definition of the two properties: DEFINITION OF 'CAT*' x is a cat* if and only if case (a) holds and x is a cherry; or case (b) holds and x is a cat; or case (c) holds and x is a cherry. DEFINITION OF 'MAT*' x is a mat* if and only if case (a) holds and x is a tree; or case (b) holds and x is a mat; or case (c) holds and x is a quark. 48

Putnam aims to show that the sentences 'A cat is on a mat' and 'A cat* is on a mat*' are true in the same possible worlds. The same truth-conditions apply to these two sentences. In the possible worlds wherein (a) is realized, both sentences are true. 'A cat is on a mat' expresses the idea that some cat is on some mat at some time. 'A cat* is on a mat*' expresses the idea that some cherry is on some tree at some time. Both statements are true in all possible worlds wherein (a) is realized, and (a) is realized for the actual world in which we live. The two sentences are also true in all possible worlds wherein (b) is realized. In all possible worlds wherein (b) is realized, the sentence 'A cat* is on a mat*' expresses the same idea as the sentence 'A cat is on a mat', namely the idea that some cat is on some mat at some time. It is a true statement in all possible worlds wherein (b) is realized. In all possible worlds wherein (b) is realized, one and the same extension applies to both 'cat' and cat*' and to 'mat' and 'mat*', respectively. However, (b) is not realized in the actual world in which we live. In the actual world in which we live, some cherry is on some tree. In all possible worlds wherein (c) is realized, both sentences are false. In all possible worlds wherein (c) is realized, no cat is on any mat, and the sentence 'A cat* is on a mat*' expresses the idea that some cherry is

* Putnam 1981: 34

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on some quark, something which is impossible: no cherry can ever be on any quark. Putnam summarizes his argument as follows: Summarizing, we see that in every possible world a cat is on a mat if and only if a cat* is on a mat*. Thus, reinterpreting the word 'cat' by assigning to it the intension we just assigned to 'cat*' and simultaneously reinterpreting the word 'mat' by assigning to it the intension we just assigned to 'mat*' would only have the effect of making 'A cat is on a mat' mean what 'A cat* is on a mat*' was defined to mean; and this would be perfectly compatible with the way truth-values are assigned to 'A cat is on a mat' in every possible world. 49

When it comes to the actual world in which we live, Putnam's example shows that we cannot eliminate the possibility that 'cat' refers to cherries and that 'mat' refers to trees by pointing towards the truth-conditions of the sentences that contain the words 'cat' and 'mat'. It is possible to define the property of being a cat* and the property of being a mat* in such a way that the sentence 'A cat* is on a mat*' is true if and only if the sentence 'A cat is on a mat' is true. If 'cat*' refers to cherries and 'mat*' refers to trees, and if the reference is to be fixed by the truth-conditions of the sentences containing these concepts, then the reference of 'cat' and 'mat' in the actual world in which we live becomes inscrutable. If the reference of our words is to be fixed by the truth-conditions of such sentences, then ontological relativity becomes unavoidable. If the reference of our words is to be fixed by the truth-conditions of such sentences, then, in order to avoid ontological relativity, we must plead some form of magic. We must assume that 'cat' in some magical, intrinsic way refers to cats and not to cherries. However, such an assumption presupposes what we aim to prove, namely that and how we can refer. Putnam's cat-on-the-mat example is in agreement with Quine's argument in favor of ontological relativity. Quine argues that we cannot determine what the concepts contained in certain individual sentences refer to by specifying what the truth-conditions of those sentences are. In this sense, the reference is under-determined by the truth-conditions of sentences. Even if we know when the sentence 'Gavagai!' is true, and even if we know when the source language speakers would be prepared to utter this sentence or hold that it would be correct linguistic behavior to utter it, we cannot determine whether 'gavagai' refers to rabbits, rabbit parts 50

4 9 5 0

Putnam 1981: 34-5 Cf. Thompson 1991: 216

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or an example of rabbithood. In the absence of analytical hypotheses and a translation manual, the reference is inscrutable. The difference between Putnam and Quine is that Putnam, unlike Quine, maintains that all theories of reference leading to the conclusion that the reference is inscrutable are incorrect. If the reference of our words were inscrutable, we would not be able to refer. However, we are able to refer. Since the theory suggesting that the reference of our words is fixed by the truth-conditions of the sentences containing them leads to the inscrutability of reference, it follows that this theory must be incorrect. Putnam has explained that the original purpose of the cat-on-the-mat example was 'to argue that the materialist metaphysician lacks the resources to explain why the word "cat" doesn't refer to cats*'. Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism all interconnect and he uses them in a number of different contexts, intending to underline a number of different things. I have made use of his cat-on-the-mat example to discuss whether the reference of our words can be fixed by the truth-conditions of the sentences containing them. In the following, I will discuss Putnam's criticism of the materialist metaphysician's description of our possibilities of referring, and I will relate this criticism to his just-moretheory objection. 51

Just More Theory The third magical theory of reference that Putnam discusses relates to questions tackling reference in empirical causal terms. It should be noted from the outset that what Putnam discusses is not the causal theory of reference, a theory which links in with the idea that the way in which we refer to something by using its name is based on a causal chain linking our use of the name with the bearer of the name. Instead, what Putnam discusses is a theoretical perspective maintained by some philosophers in relation to questions of reference; I will call this perspective the causation-based theory of reference. The proponents of this theory argue that causation is a significant factor in our referencing. Causation, the proponents of this theory argue, somehow fix the reference of our words and we can therefore plead causation to avoid ontological relativity. Causation is somehow 'inherent' in our reality; we can observe it and it enables us to determine whether 'cat' refers to cats or to cherries. 5 1

Putnam 1986: 264

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The causation-based theory of reference can be regarded as a response to Putnam's statement that the reference of our words cannot be fixed by what goes on in our heads. It is something else entirely, namely causation, which enables us to know that 'cat' refers to cats and not to cherries. Putnam writes: The standard 'realist' response to this sort of [model-theoretic] argument is to say that all my argument shows is that what is 'going on within our minds' does not fix the 'right' reference relation, R. ('You know which one that is,' says the metaphysical realist, in effect.) There are constraints built into physical reality (that is, into the external world) that single out the 'right' reference relation. [...] The way out that most materialists (metaphysical realists of the physical persuasion) prefer is to think of causation (understood in a 'non-Humean' way) as the relation that (somehow) does the 'singling out.' Causation — real necessitation — has so much dignity, as it were, that it seems absurd that the existence of admissible relations that map the two-place predicate 'causes' onto relations other than the real relation of causation (the one with all that dignity) should have any philosophical significance at all. The world has, as physicalists are fond of saying, a 'causal structure,' and the reference relation R is singled out from the huge set of admissible relations by that causal structure (somehow). 52

Putnam criticizes the causation-based theory of reference because it fails to explain what actually constitutes causation. However, that is not the most important of his objections. Putnam maintains that even if the nature and function of causation could be explained, this would not enable us to fix the reference of our words. We would only be 'adding more theory'. In trying to explain Putnam's just-more-theory objection, I will make use of David Anderson's summary of Putnam's model-theoretic argument. Anderson points out that Putnam's model-theoretic argument is, in reality, a collection of many different but related arguments, all aiming to confute metaphysical realism with the help of model-theoretic reflections; all these arguments can be collectively summarized as 'the "problem of reference" objection to metaphysical realism. Each of these arguments is intended to show that literally nothing that twentieth-century philosophers believe in could fix the reference of terms of a human language to mind-independent objects'. In a sense, Putnam's brains-in-avat argument, his Twin Earth argument and his cat-on-the-mat argument are all model-theoretic arguments. However, the argument commonly called the model-theoretic argument is something else, namely the argument with which Putnam attempts to expose the unintelhgibility of the 53

52 53

Putnam 1990: 82-4 Anderson 1992: 54

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metaphysical realist's assumption that that which by our standards is an ideal scientific theory can be false. If understood in this, more narrow, sense, the model-theoretic argument is, historically speaking, the earliest argument against metaphysical realism that Putnam has formulated. He first formulated it in 1976. He then concretized it and developed it further in his brains-in-a-vat reflections. To this day, philosophers discuss how best to summarize and explain what Putnam's model-theoretic argument is and what it shows. 'Although its "core" is simple and uncontested, the model-theoretic argument has continued to exercise philosophical minds ever since its first presentation, for it is not so simple to adjudicate how effective it is as an argument against realism."' The sheer amount of literature addressing Putnam's model-theoretic argument is, in the words of Eddy Zemach, copious. However, there is at present no need for a closer investigation of all possible interpretations of this argument. For the purposes of the present study, it will be sufficient to make use of Anderson's summary and Putnam's brains-in-a-vat argument to show why, according to Putnam, the causation-based theory of reference cannot avoid falling into the trap of ontological relativity. Anderson writes: 54

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Ultimately, then, the model-theoretic argument is a reductio. First, the central theses of metaphysical realism are assumed as premises: PI. The world consists of mind-independent objects. P2. Our statements about the world express realist claims about mindindependent reality. To these assumptions are added certain features of what it is to be a model which make it clear (if it was not obvious already) that P3. Operational and theoretical constraints alone are not sufficient to fix a determinate reference relation between the terms of our language and mind-independent reality. Putnam then argues that P4. There exists nothing else in the universe which (in addition to theoretical and operational constraints) could fix a determinate referential relation to mind-independent reality. He concludes that, therefore, C. Our statements are semantically indeterminate. There is no fact of the matter concerning the reference of our terms. (The indeterminacy of 5 4 5 5 5 6 5 7

See, for Douven Douven Zemach

example, Putnam 1978 for this argument 1999: 479-80 1999: 480 1999: 414

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reference.) Putnam finds C absurd and thus the argument to be a reductio of the initial premises (PI and P2). Putnam spends very little time arguing for the absurdity of C. He trusts that most readers will be put off by its radically revisionist and largely counterintuitive consequences. Further, since the argument is directed against the metaphysical realist, he is undoubtedly relying on the fact that C will hold little charm for most realists. 58

By the term 'theoretical constraints', Putnam means to infer the commonly occurring theoretical criteria with the help of which we can determine which one of two rival scientific theories we ought to choose. Such theoretical constraints will include, for example, simplicity, fruitfulness, verifiability and compatibility with established theories. By the term 'operational constraints', he means to infer those constraints upon our choice of theory which are directly caused by methods firmly anchored in empirical considerations. Two examples of operational constraints would be our sensory perceptions and empirical data stemming from measurements and experiments that we can carry out. If we have to choose between two rival scientific theories, we shall, according to established scientific practice, choose the theory that best agrees with both operational and theoretical constraints. The metaphysical realist holds that a theory that meets all the operational and theoretical constraints we can think of, thus being an ideal theory by our standards, can nevertheless be false. The theory that we are not brains in a vat can be verified with the help of our sensory perceptions and by our measurements and experiments. (We cannot discover anything that suggests that we are brains in a vat.) It may well be the simplest, most fruitful and most verifiable theory, as well as the theory that is most compatible with already established theories — and yet be false. We may actually be brains in a vat, after all. Putnam argues that this metaphysical realist thesis is unintelligible since, if indeed we are brains in a vat, we cannot refer to brains and vats as existing in an independent reality. The metaphysical realist who claims that we can refer to brains and vats as existing in an independent reality (and that we can therefore claim that it is possible for us to be brains in a vat even if nothing in the world that we experience indicates that this is so and even if we can never discover this to be so) must show how this is possible. The metaphysical realist might argue that, with the help of our operational and theoretical constraints, we can specify the truth conditions that 5 8

Anderson 1993: 312-3

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apply to our sentences, thus fixing the reference of our words. However, there are two reasons why this is not a viable alternative. First, Putnam's cat-on-the-mat argument shows that we cannot fix the reference of our words by specifying what the truth-conditions are for entire sentences. Second, the metaphysical realist argue that sentences which are true according to our operational and theoretical criteria can nevertheless be false, since these criteria cannot, in themselves, allow us to determine the truth-value of our sentences. On this view, sentences which meet our criteria can be false even if we cannot discover this to be the case. Instead, independent reality is what determines whether or not our sentences are true, hence the third premise in Anderson's summary of the modeltheoretic argument. Therefore, if the metaphysical realist wishes to avoid the conclusion that the reference is inscrutable, the premise she must call into question is the fourth one. She must maintain thai there is something else, besides our operational and theoretical constraints, which can fix the reference of our words. If there is, it may be possible for us to refer to brains in vats that we can neither experience nor interact with, and we can claim that it is possible for us to be brains in a vat although we cannot discover that we are. If the metaphysical realist wants to confute the fourth premise, one possibility is for her to advocate some form of 'semantic supervenience (the thesis that semantic facts supervene on nonsemantic facts)'. Proponents of the causation-based theory of reference maintain that there are non-semantic, causal states of affairs in reality which help us specify which semantic facts constitute the reference of our words. Such philosophers presuppose some form of semantic naturalism. In other words, they conceive of questions about reference as questions related to the constitution of empirical reality. The proponents of the causation-based theory of reference argue that reality contains a causal relation to which we can refer when investigating which one of a number of possible reference relations is the real one. Its proponents argue that this theory avoids ontological relativity. It is against this theory that Putnam formulates his just-more-theory objection. He maintains that the proponents of the causation-based theory of reference have not solved the problem; instead, they merely introduce yet another problematical concept. 59

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van Cleve 1992: 344 Cf. Douven 1999: 479

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The problem with the causation-based theory of reference, Putnam suggests, is that it presupposes that we can use the concept of 'causation' to refer to causation in an unambiguous way. However, we cannot simply assume this to be possible. In fact, the discussion itself is about whether we can refer to anything at all in an unambiguous way. Thus, the proponents of this theory presuppose that which they set out to prove. Putnam asks how we can know that 'causation' refers to causation and not to causation*, that is, some other relation between us and our environment. As demonstrated by his own cat-on-the-mat example, it is, after all, entirely possible to assume 'causation' to refer to causation* without thereby being forced to conclude that the truth-value of sentences containing the term changes. The metaphysical realist cannot plead operational and theoretical constraints since such constraints, as the metaphysical realist herself admits, can be satisfied by a theory of reference that is false. Anderson summarizes the dilemma facing the metaphysical realist. The causal realist, thus, argues that the force of the model-theoretic argument has been broken because a reference fixer has been identified. Putnam's response is: No! You have not provided what the argument demands, you have 'just added more theory.' Certainly we can add to our global theory, T, sentences like: '"Cat" refers to mind-independent cats by virtue of a causal connection of the appropriate type.' But that is just to add more sentences, more words. (T now becomes T-plus-CT.) Since it was the words that were threatened with indeterminacy in the first place, the new words will surely suffer the same fate as the old. 61

According to the metaphysical realist, the ideal theory, that is to say, the theory which meets all our operational and theoretical constraints, can turn out to be false. This thesis leads to the inscrutability of reference since it implies that even what we conceive of as an ideal theory, a theory which states how and to what our words refer, can be false. We may believe that 'cat' refers to cats even if it does not. This implies that all theories of reference, including the causation-based one, are affected by the inscrutability of reference despite all efforts to avoid this. The question of how the proponents of the causation-based theory of reference know that they refer to causation and not to causation* remains. In formulating his Twin Earth example, Putnam aims to show that nothing that goes on in our heads can fix the reference of our words in an 61

Anderson 1993: 314

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unambiguous way. His cat-on-the-mat example aims to show that we cannot unambiguously indicate what the reference of our words is by specifying what truth-conditions apply to the sentences in which the words occur. However, his model-theoretic argument and his just-more-theory objection would have been sufficient. He could have asked proponents of the mind-dependent theory of reference how they know that 'mind' refers to mind and not to mind*. He could have asked proponents of the theory that the truth-conditions of sentences can fix the reference of the words of the sentence in question how they know that 'truth-condition' refers to truth-condition and not to truth-condition*. The problem with all magical theories of reference discussed by Putnam is that they presuppose that we can refer: they presuppose that which they set out to prove. However, does not Putnam himself do the same thing? Does not Putnam, too, presuppose an ability to refer when he formulates his examples and his criticism? Yes, he does; however, this is not a problem for Putnam, since the reference of our words is not inscrutable according to the theoretical basis on which he builds his argument. Unlike the metaphysical realist, Putnam can maintain that we know 'truth-conditions' to refer to truth-conditions and not to truth-conditions*. Consequently, in discussing reference, Putnam can assume that his words refer to that which we normally think they refer to. The reason why the metaphysical realist cannot assume the same thing is that she argues that even that which we conceive of as an ideal theory of reference can be false. Putnam rejects this possibility. He maintains that our operational and theoretical constraints can be used for the purpose of indicating what the reference of our words is in as unambiguous a way as possible. Thereby, Putnam avoids the conclusion that the reference is inscrutable and thereby, he can formulate his own arguments and criticism without being affected by his criticism of magical theories of reference. True, in formulating his arguments, even Putnam must presuppose our ability to refer, but whereas the metaphysical realist, on her own interpretation, presupposes that which she sets out to prove in discussing reference, Putnam, by contrast, shows what we must presuppose, being who and what we are, in order to be able to refer. Putnam's model-theoretic argument is a reductio ad absurdum in that it shows that ontological relativity is unavoidable given the metaphysical realist's own starting point for discussion. Thus, the metaphysical realist cannot formulate her own position in an unambiguous way. However she tries to show how we can know that 'cat' refers to cats and not to cats*, Putnam will be able to raise his just-more-theory objection. Thereby, Putnam shows metaphysical realism to be unintelligible to a certain

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extent: if it is correct, it cannot be formulated. If we are brains in a vat, we cannot say that we are. Given the metaphysical realist approach, we cannot refer to the brains-in-themselves that are us, or to the vat-in-itself in which we are encased, if indeed we are brains in a vat. If we are metaphysical realists, we cannot claim to be metaphysical realists, since we cannot refer to the reality-in-itself that the metaphysical realist believes in. Therefore, we cannot claim that it exists. Putnam avoids falling into the trap of ontological relativity by maintaining that our operational and theoretical constraints help us specify what constitutes an ideal theory. A theory of reference which, by our standards, is ideal contains criteria that enable us to determine whether 'cat' refers to cats or to cats*. Some of these criteria touch upon the contribution of the environment. Some are mastered only by experts and therefore illustrate the so-called linguistic division of labor. What matters to Putnam is that there are criteria we can apply, which enable us to specify in an unambiguous way what the reference of our words is. When existing criteria are insufficient, we must simply formulate new ones, so that we always have access to criteria with the help of which we can specify the reference of our words. According to Putnam, there is no reality beyond the reality to which our operational and theoretical constraints relate. The metaphysical realist, by contrast, assumes that such a reality does exist. This assumption leads to scepticism and to ontological relativity, both of which are absurd positions according to Putnam. Putnam's criticism of Quine's ideas focuses on the absurdity inherent in ontological relativity.

Putnam and Quine Quine and Putnam are in agreement insofar as both of them maintain that questions such as 'How long is the Nile really, independently of all units of length?' are, in a sense, unintelligible. We cannot imagine what a correct answer might be. We can only talk about what exists and what does not exist relative to a certain scheme of reference, a certain ontology, a certain translation manual, a certain language. We can only talk about reality against the background of a description of it. In this sense, both Putnam and Quine challenge the metaphysical realist's conception of an independent reality-in-itself. Neither Quine nor Putnam hold that what goes on in our heads can fix either meaning or reference. Both philosophers formulate model-theoretic

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arguments to show that we cannot fix the reference of our words in an unambiguous way by specifying what truth-conditions apply to the sentences containing the words. Neither philosopher holds that reality contains a relation of causation that can fix the actual reference of our words. Clearly, Quine and Putnam share the same philosophical perspective to a certain extent. They often tend to focus on the same questions and problems, formulate similar arguments and look in the same direction for answers. Nevertheless, there are major differences between their respective philosophical positions. The most fundamental of these differences is that they conceive of the inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity in very different ways. Putnam states that '[wjhere I do not follow Quine is in his doctrine of the almost total indeterminacy of reference (and of meaning even when the context is specified).' He points out that although his own modeltheoretic argument is similar to that of Quine, the two of them nevertheless disagree. 62

In Reason, Truth and History I used an argument similar to Quine's, but drew an opposite conclusion (thus illustrating the well known maxim that one philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens). I argued there that metaphysical realism leaves us with no intelligible way to refute ontological relativity, and concluded that metaphysical realism is wrong. And I still see ontological relativity as a refutation of any philosophical position that leads to it. 63

Quine sees ontological relativity as something natural. Putnam, by contrast, considers the thesis of the inscrutability of reference and the ontological relativity that it necessarily leads to, to be absurd. According to Putnam, since Quine's philosophical position leads to the conclusion that the reference of our words is inscrutable, we ought to reject this philosophical position. But what is it that ought to be rejected? What is it in Quine's philosophical position that leads to the thesis of the inscrutability of reference and to ontological relativity? Rejecting Quine's concept of meaning is one alternative. If we can specify the meaning of our words in an unambiguous way, independently of a translation manual, then we will hopefully be able to specify their reference, as well. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning leads to his thesis of the inscrutability of reference. If the meaning is not indeterminate, then the reference need not be indeterminate, either. 6 2 6 3

Putnam 1990: 301 Putnam 1994a: 280

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However, Putnam has no desire to reject Quine's concept of meaning. He writes: 'My own work has been deeply influenced by Quine's [...] insistence that the notion of "sameness of meaning" that we actually possess is constituted by our actual practice of translation and interpretation'. Instead, Putnam criticizes Quine's problematical approach to the external perspective which is also part of the metaphysical realist position. Quine argues that there are several different translation manuals, several different schemes of reference and several different theories which could be in equal harmony with facts, that is, with our linguistic behavior and with our observations. What is Quine's position in making this claim? From what perspective can we compare different manuals, schemes and theories with facts and conclude that they are all in equal harmony with what we can observe? Is it not true to say that Quine, too, has the ambition to take a God's-Eye point of view in arguing that there is no God's-Eye point of view, that our experience of reality is always dependent on our manuals, schemes and theories? The problem with Quine is that he tries to combine two incompatible perspectives. On the one hand, he argues that, given a certain theory, a certain translation manual or a certain scheme of reference, we can answer questions about facts, meaning or reference in an unambiguous way. What we cannot do is discuss such questions in a meaningful way independently of theories, manuals or schemes. Trying to do so would be tantamount to asking how long the Nile really is, independently of our units of length. On the other hand, Quine himself talks about facts, meaning and reference independently of theories, manuals and schemes when he formulates his theses of the indeterminacy of meaning, the inscrutability of reference and the under-determination of scientific theories. After all, given a certain theory, manual or scheme, the theories are not underdetermined by all facts, the meaning is not indeterminate and the reference is not inscrutable. In a sense, Quine is trying to say that the length of the Nile can vary. The problem is that this statement is incorrect, given our units of length, and we cannot talk about the length of the Nile at all independently of units of length. Putnam makes the point that 'Quine writes as if there were a noumenal reality, and what his model-theoretic argument shows is that our terms have an infinite number of ways of being modeled in it'. According to Putnam, this is the reason why Quine cannot avoid falling into the trap 64

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of ontological relativity. We unavoidably end up in ontological relativity if we try to talk about these issues independently of any perspective. Given a certain translation manual and a certain scheme of reference, the reference is not inscrutable. If the reference is not inscrutable, it is possible for us to fix the reference of our words in an unambiguous way and, by implication, specify what it is that we can meaningfully imagine the existence of. Burton Dreben maintains that Putnam has misunderstood Quine. According to Dreben, what Quine tries to do is 'to combat a very traditional, very seductive, but nevertheless "incoherent" supposition, viz. there is a God's-eye perspective, an Archimedean point, an Olympian position, outside of all theory, whence "reality is to be identified and described", whence truth is to be discerned'. Dreben argues that Putnam's misunderstanding stems partly from 'the frequent difficulty in discerning from whence [Quine] speaks'. Since Quine contends the idea that there is a God's-Eye point of view, Dreben insists that Quine cannot possibly speak from this angle. Putnam would counter this argument by pointing out that Quine cannot defend his theses unless he speaks from a position which is independent of our perspective. If he speaks from our perspective, his theses are false. This is because, from our perspective, the meaning of our words is not indeterminate, and the reference is not inscrutable. By maintaining that we always speak from our perspective, Putnam attempts to show that he himself can avoid falling into the trap of ontological relativity that Quine cannot avoid. Quine himself has formulated similar criticism in respect of the cultural relativist's ideas. 'Truth, says the cultural relativist, is culture-bound. But if it were, then he, within his own culture, ought to see his own culturebound truth as absolute. He cannot proclaim cultural relativism without rising above it, and he cannot rise above it without giving it up.' Quine suggests that he in his naturalism avoids presupposing a noumenal reality. He writes: T in my naturalism forgo the transcendent or God's-eye view and only speak immanently from within our science.' Also, Roger Gibson takes care to point out that we cannot conceive of Quine's reflections as presupposing the existence of a reality-in-itself if we take his 66

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Dreben 1995: 446 Dreben 1992: 294 Quine 1975: 327-8 Quine 1994b: 496

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naturalism seriously. Jennifer Rosner expresses a similar opinion. She argues that Quine is not a proponent of the idea that we can imagine the existence of a noumenal reality in a meaningful way. 'Quine holds, with Kant, that we cannot know the world apart from how we organize it through categories of human understanding', she maintains. Quine underlines the fact that he presupposes a naturalist starting point for his discussion. However, we must still ask ourselves whether his thesis on ontological relativity is correct against the background of such a naturalist starting point. If the thesis of ontological relativity is to be deemed correct, are we not then required to presuppose the existence of a reality-in-itself? If the only way in which we can talk about and imagine reality is against the background of the ontological distinctions that we use, then we can hardly consider the assumption that we can talk about and imagine reality in an equivalent way with the help of alternative ontological distinctions to be correct. The only way by which we can evaluate alternative ontological distinctions is by comparing them to the reality which we, with the help of the ontological distinctions that we use, can imagine and with which we can interact. In relation to that reality, we do not consider alternative ontological distinctions to be as consistent with reality as are our own ontological distinctions. Thus, we conceive of our own ontological distinctions as a better alternative, rather than one of equal value. It is true that Putnam's philosophy is also, to a certain extent, affected by ontological relativity. Ontological relativity affects the way in which Putnam approaches questions concerning our possibilities of assuming that there are various conceptual schemes. Putnam explains what constitutes the ontological relativity that he presupposes: 70

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In my picture, objects are theory-dependent in the sense that theories with incompatible ontologies can both be right. Saying that they are both right is not saying that there are fields 'out there' as entities with extension and (in addition) fields in the sense of logical constructions. It is not saying that there are both absolute space-time points and points which are mere limits. It is saying that various representations, various languages, various theories, are equally good in certain contexts. In the tradition of James and Dewey, it is to say that devices which are functionally equivalent in the context of inquiry for which they are designed are equivalent in every way that we have a 'handle on.' [...] If objects are, at least when you get small enough, or large enough, or theoretical enough, theory-dependent, then the 70 71

Gibson 1992: 21 Rosner 1996: 238. Cf. Hankinson Nelson 1990: 99

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whole idea of truth's being defined or explained in terms of a 'correspondence' between items in a language and items in a fixed theory-independent reality has to be given up. The picture I propose instead is not the picture of Kant's transcendental idealism, but it is certainly related to it. It is the picture that truth comes to no more than idealized rational acceptability. 72

However, the ontological relativity that Putnam talks about is not Quine's global ontological relativity. Putnam is not saying that we can claim that there are global theories, theories about everything that exists, which are equally consistent with all facts. However, he does argue that we sometimes hold that two theories, which describe reality in different ways, can be equally good in every sense that we can get a handle on. One theory can enable us to formulate true statements about reality, statements which, given the second theory, cannot be conceived of as true. For example, we can hold that light can be described as waves or as particles. Both descriptions can be equally correct even if we cannot use them at the same time. Putnam argues that the fact that the theories can be equally correct does not imply that they are equally consistent with a reality-in-itself. What it does imply is that, in the present context, they are rationally acceptable to an equal degree, according to the criteria for rational acceptability that we use. I will come back to this discussion about Putnam's and Quine's reflections on ontological relativity. I will also come back to the two central problem areas that I have identified and discussed, concerning our possibilities of translating and the existence of an independent reality. First, however, I will discuss what it implies to assume, as Putnam does in the above quotation, that 'truth comes to no more than idealized rational acceptability'. I will do this against the background of some critical objections that have been raised against Putnam's assumption. Many scholars have raised objections to Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. I will not give an account of all critical objections that can be, or that have been, raised. Instead, chapter three will focus on the criticism raised by Alston. His ideas help me clarify one of the reasons why philosophers of religion are so prone to presuppose metaphysical realism in their reflections. Philosophers of religion aim to be epistemological realists. They want to be able to assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths and they conceive of metaphysical realism as a perspective guaranteeing their ability to do so.

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Alston formulates and defends what he calls alethic realism. I will describe alethic realism and I will analyze the way in which it relates to metaphysical realism. At the end of the chapter, I will ask whether the Putnamian philosopher must deny the existence of the evidencetranscendent truths that Alston considers central to discussions on religion and philosophy of religion. This question will be the starting point of chapter four.

CHAPTER THREE

ALETHIC REALISM

Throughout much of what he has written in later years, Alston has formulated and defended a realist position that he has labeled 'alethic realism' — a term derived from the Greek word for truth, aletheia. In this chapter, I will describe, analyze and criticize alethic realism and the presuppositions on which it is based. I will clarify how alethic realism relates to metaphysical realism. My clarification will be based on the criticism that Alston has levelled against Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism. I will initiate a discussion on the meaning of epistemological realism and our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths, a discussion I will develop further in the following chapter. Alston seeks to defend our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths. It is considered essential, not least in religious contexts, that we should be able to make such an assumption. I will consider the extent to which Alston's positions on matters touching upon this issue should be understood to be religiously motivated. If Alston's positions are religiously motivated, then they should be described as belonging to the discipline of theology rather than to that of philosophy of religion.

Alethic Realism and Metaphysical Realism Concluding that Alston is a realist is easy. Ascertaining whether the alethic realism that he formulates and defends is a metaphysical, epistemological, and/or semantic kind of realism is more difficult. A large part of the problem is the question as to whether or not Alston is a metaphysical realist. The question cannot be dismissed with a simple 'yes' or 'no'; it requires a more extensive discussion. At times, Alston writes in a way that makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that what he defends is some form of metaphysical realism. In one of his works on the philosophy of religion, he states that: I take it that when someone believes that God created the heavens and earth, then, assuming that the belief is sufficiently determinate, that belief is true

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or false depending on whether things are as asserted. The truth-value doesn't depend on the epistemic status of the believer, on what consensus does or doesn't exist in her social group or culture, on the inward passion involved, or on anything else of the sort. There is a truth of the matter that is independent of us, our 'conceptual schemes', our social institutions and associations, our conventions and values. If the world does exist only because it is God's will that it do so, then the belief just mentioned is true; if not, it is false. And this is so whether or not we have any way of determining which it is. [...] It would seem to be a failing in faith, as well as in reason, to deny that God is what He is and does what He does, whatever we may think or feel about it. [...] Let the reader be forewarned that I take very seriously the idea that there is a truth about these matters, and that I am interested in getting as close to that as possible on the issues I discuss. 1

It is evident from the above quotation that, according to Alston, what is true and what is false is independent of us. What is true is true regardless of how we choose to talk about it, value it or feel about it. Alston strives to formulate as true a description of reality as possible. He suggests that there may be true statements about reality that we can never justify with our defective human methods. It is not necessary for all truths about reality to be available to us; there may be a reality beyond and apart from the reality that we can experience and describe. Is this not a textbook case of metaphysical realism? Alston emphasizes that what is true about reality is independent of our conceptual schemes, our human community and its potential consensus, our values and all such matters. A metaphysical realist reality-in-itself is independent of us in all the ways that Alston enumerates. Does this imply that Alston assumes there is a reality-in-itself to which our utterances about reality can correspond or which they can fail to describe? One reason why I am reluctant to draw the immediate conclusion that Alston is a metaphysical realist is the fact that he himself considers Hick's Kantianism, a Kantianism that I have let illustrate the metaphysical type of realism, to be a form of non-realism. Alston's criticism of Hick makes me suspect that Alston supports another use of the concepts employed in the realism debates than the use on which my reflections are based. Because of these terminological differences, the answer to the question as to whether or not Alston is a metaphysical realist must rest on a relatively extensive analysis of his reflections. 1

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Alston maintains that what is non-realist about Hick's position is the fact that Hick does not consider the potential truth of religious statements to be unambiguously realist. Alston writes: Like Kant [Hickl supposes there to be a noumenal reality, The Real, which appears to us in various ways, but, again like Kant, he denies that we can know anything substantive about it, except for the ways it appears to us, though he goes beyond Kant in denying that any of our concepts can be applied to the Real. It 'transcends human conceptually'. As applied to religion the Kantian scheme becomes relativized. Instead of a single human schematism of the manifold of sensation by a unique set of categories, we have different interpretations of the Real as it appears to people in different religious traditions. [...] We must also note that Hick applies the notion of 'mythical truth' to religious beliefs, distinguishing this from 'literal truth'. 'A statement or set of statements about X is mythologically true if it is not literally true but nevertheless tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to X. [...]' Thus, as far as specific Christian beliefs are concerned (and those of other religions), the assessment for truth-value is not in terms of realist truth, but in terms of whether the content of the beliefs 'evokes an appropriate dispositional attitude'. 2

According to Alston, it would be wrong to maintain that Hick denies that religious statements really are statements or that the realist conception of truth is applicable in religious contexts as well as in philosophical ones. Alston is right not to draw very far-reaching conclusions from this argumentation. I would suggest that perhaps Hick understands mythical truth to be dependent on some form of realist truth. Hick argues that unless the religious belief system as a whole somehow corresponds to the reality that is independent of us, it can hardly evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude. Toward the end of this chapter, I will return to the question as to whether or not Hick is a non-realist. For now, it is important to establish that Alston evidently does not consider the assumption that there is an independent reality to be a sufficient condition for somebody to be labeled a realist. Alston chooses to talk of the debate between realists and antirealists as a debate primarily concerning different conceptions of truth, rather than a debate on different conceptions of the existence of an independent reality. As a result, Alston's alethic realism seems to be primarily an epistemological form of realism; however, it may be a form of epistemological realism that can best be described as metaphysical realism. The metaphysical realist talks of truth in a way that allows for the 3

2 3

Alston 1995: 42-3 Alston 1995: 43

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possibility that evidence-transcendent truths may very well exist. Thereby, she represents an epistemological realist position. Alston has summarized his alethic realism in a number of different works. Although the phraseology may vary, the underlying sense remains the same. It is important that we conceive of truth in realist terms, as a relation between our statements and an independent reality. Conceiving of truth in realist terms means primarily that one considers what is true to be independent of us, our utterances and our views as to whether or not it is true. Some quotations from Alston's works will serve to summarize his position. If there is a reality independent of our thought it obviously behoves us to find out as much about it as possible. This means that our thought and discourse will be (largely) directed to thinking (saying) it like it is. Believing (saying) what is true rather than what is false will be the primary goal of cognition; where we have said what is true iff what we were talking about is as we have said it to be. I shall call this the realistic conception of truth [...] 4

Alethic realism (concerning putative statements, S's, of a body of discourse D) can be more crisply presented as a conjunction of the following three theses. 1. S's are genuine factual statements. 2. S's are true or false in the realist sense of those terms. 3. The facts that make true S's true hold and are what they are independently of human cognition. 5

Alethic realism is made up of two theses. (1) The realist conception of truth is the correct one (for that use of 'true' in which statements, beliefs, and propositions are evaluated as true or false). This conception embodies what it is for a statement [...] to be true. (2) It is important, for a variety of purposes, that statements, beliefs, and so on, be assessed for truth value. Truth is important. 6

We may think of alethic realism as a conjunction of two theses. 1. The senses of 'true' and 'false' in which such items as beliefs, statements, and propositions can be evaluated as true or false are what I will call realist senses of these terms. 2. It is important to determine the truth-value of such items in this sense. [...] Why do I call this a realist conception of truth? It is because what it takes to make a statement true on this conception is the actual obtaining of what is claimed to obtain in making that statement. If what is stated is that grass is green, then it is grass's being green that is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the statement. 7

All four Alston quotations are included here because they reflect an interesting development of thought. In the first quote, from 1980, Alston talks 4 5 6 7

Alston Alston Alston Alston

1980: 780 1995: 39 1996a: 6 1997: 53-4

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about independent reality. If such a reality exists, we want as much information about it as possible. We want our thoughts and statements to conform to reality. When we make a correct statement about independent reality, we consider ourselves to have spoken the truth. It is worth noting that it is only in the first quotation that Alston connects his realism to the thesis that there is an independent reality. In the second quotation, what Alston focuses on as being independent of us is not reality but the conditions of reality, the states of affairs, that make our utterances true or false. Quotations number three and four, however, do not mention independence at all. In the second quotation, from 1995, Alston discusses individual statements, or groups of statements, and the way that the potential truth of these statements ought to be perceived. This quotation would seem to place Alston and his realism within the framework of discussions that concern semantic realism, since the question of what it implies to call a statement a genuine statement of fact is a semantic issue. By contrast, in the third and fourth quotations, deriving from texts published in 1996 and 1997, respectively, the focus lies on our conceptions of truth. In the third and fourth quotations, Alston summarizes alethic realism in two theses; these two theses are of considerable importance for his reflections on the possible existence of evidence-transcendent truths. The epistemological realist and the epistemological anti-realist disagree on the subject of evidence-transcendent truths. The epistemological realist argues that there may be such truths, whereas the epistemological antirealist denies this possibility. In outlining his two theses, Alston places a large part of his discussion within the framework of matters concerning epistemological realism. However, throughout all four quotations as well as throughout Alston's entire corpus of writing, the boundary between metaphysical, epistemological and semantic considerations is a fluid one. It may seem as though Alston's alethic realism is so irrefutable that it is uninteresting. Who would not agree that the statement 'Grass is green' is true if, and only if, grass is green? Does Alston's alethic realism really have any opponents to reckon with? Alston himself tends to depict alethic realism as relatively indisputable. He considers it a minimalist theory in that it does not include very detailed theories about the make-up of truth or about the relation between language and reality. It does not, for example, demand that one should concur with any particular correspondence theory of truth. Alethic realism 8

8

Alston 1997: 59 and 1996a: 39

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is also, Alston argues, basically neutral as regards different metaphysical realist and anti-realist positions. This means that philosophers who formulate the details of their own theories in completely different ways can still agree on the correctness of Alston's alethic realism. Alston presents alethic realism as a form of common-sense realism. It is difficult to imagine sensible people having views that diverge from Alston's position. On a closer look, however, alethic realism appears not to be quite so harmless after all. What determines how alethic realism should be interpreted is the meaning Alston assigns to the concept 'in a realist sense'. 'True' and 'false' are concepts that should be understood in a realist sense. This means, according to Alston, not only that the sentence 'Grass is green' is true if and only if grass is green. It means much more than that. 9

Minimal and Neutral? Alston starts out by declaring that he bases his reasoning on the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-value. Other philosophers consider sentences to be the primary bearers of truth-value. A sentence is a grammatically permitted sequence of words. Some examples of sentences would be 'the snow is white' and 'der Schnee ist weiB'. According to the philosophers who choose to talk about propositions, what these sentences have in common is that they express, in English and German respectively, the same proposition, namely that the snow is white." Philosophers who choose to talk about sentences as the primary bearers of truth-value do not treat all sentences as true or false. Only sentences that are statements can be true or false. In chapter five, I will return to the question of what sentences we are entitled to interpret as statements. However, I want to emphasize early on that the philosophers who consider sentences to be the primary bearers of truth-value are not thereby implying that all sentences have a truth-value. The sentences 'Oops!', 'Close the window!', and 'When is the bus leaving?' are neither true nor false. What lies behind Alston's choice of propositions as the primary bearers of truth-value is primarily the fact that he considers it impossible to specify what it means that a sentence is true without referring to the truthvalue of the proposition expressed by the sentence. I consider this explanation to be insufficient, since a corresponding discussion might indicate 10

9 10 11

Alston 1997: 61 and 1996a: 2 Alston 1996a: 15 Cf. Bjornsson et al 1994: 16

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that sentences are the primary bearers of truth-value; philosophers who see sentences as the primary bearers of truth-value could easily counter Alston's argument by saying that we specify what it means that a proposition is true by referring to the truth-value of the sentence expressing the proposition. Alston describes his choice of primary bearers of truth-value as a choice that is both minimal and neutral. It does not presuppose any specific conception of the nature of propositions. Alston writes: 'Thus my choice of truth-value bearers is completely neutral with respect to the view we adopt on the nature of propositions and of propositional content.' He emphasizes that it is of no consequence to alethic realism how we conceive of the metaphysical status of the propositions. There is no hidden metaphysical realism inherent in the alethic realist's starting point. Nevertheless, Alston points out in a footnote that Quine has chosen to treat sentences as the primary bearers of truth-value. The fact that Quine does this, Alston goes on, allows the alethic realist to ignore Quine's reflections on truth since these are incompatible with the alethic realist's conception of propositions as the primary bearers of truthvalue. On a closer inspection, then, Alston's starting point appears to be less neutral and less minimal than it seemed at first sight. Propositions are not related to human subjects in the same way that sentences are. A sentence is always spoken by a specific person, in a specific situation, often with a specific purpose or intention. A proposition, by contrast, is more independent of a specific context. One and the same proposition can be expressed in a variety of sentences. Alston's choice to treat propositions, rather than sentences, as the primary bearers of truthvalue implies that in his reflections he does not give much attention to questions touching upon where, why and by whom a certain proposition or a certain sentence is expressed. Alston formulates the realist conception of truth by explaining the terms 'true sentences', 'true beliefs' and 'true propositions', though he does so with constant reference to the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-value. He uses the T-schema to summarize his argument. The T-schema, as Alston has formulated it, reads as follows: 'The proposition that p is true iffp. A sentence that is formed by replacing 12

13

14

15

,>6

12 13 14 15 16

Alston Alston Alston Alston Alston

1996a: 22 1996a: 21 1996a: 80 1996a: 44, note 37 1996a: 27

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the p in the T-schema is thus called a T-statement. Based on the Tschema, Alston conceives of a sentence as true on condition that it expresses a true proposition. Alston makes use of the T-schema to specify the realist conception of truth that he advocates. He writes: The suggestion is that if we understand that any T-statement is conceptually, analytically true, true by virtue of the meanings of the terms involved, in particular the term 'true', then we thereby understand what it is for a proposition to be true. Understanding that amounts to recognizing how it is that the content of a proposition, what it is 'a proposition that', determines a (necessarily) necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of that proposition. And once we see that, we grasp what it is for a proposition to be true in a realist sense. This gives us the realist CONCEPT of propositional truth. 17

Like many concepts central to philosophy, the concept of 'semantics' is used in different ways. There is a difference between semantics in the sense of 'the relation between linguistic expressions and that which they are being used for saying something about' and semantics in the sense of 'a study of the meaning-relevant properties of formal languages'. The former type of semantics is part of the more extensive discipline 'theory of meaning', whereas the latter type might best be termed 'formal semantics'. Alston takes an interest in semantics insofar as it is part of the more extensive discipline theory of meaning. What he focuses on is the relation between linguistic expressions and that which they are being used for saying something about, namely reality. The T-schema, however, is not his own invention, but that of Alfred Tarski, one of the most prominent proponents of formal semantics. Tarski's T-schema is connected with his reflections on our possibilities of defining the property of being true. I will discuss Tarski's work in chapter six, where I will develop Davidson's reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation. Nevertheless, it is important in the present context to point out that Alston does not use Tarski's T-schema the same way Tarski uses it. As Alston himself takes care to point out, there are differences. In Tarski's format, the T-schema reads as follows: 'x is a true sentence if and only if p ' . Tarski does not use the same symbol, p, before 18

19

20

17 18 19 20

Alston 1996a: 27 Fitosofilexikonet 1988: 502 ('semantik') Alston 1996a: 30-1 Tarski 1956: 155

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and after the phrase 'if and only if. His choice of symbol indicates that the expression replacing x and the expression replacing p are not the same; they are expressions belonging to different formal languages. When Alston uses the same symbol, p, both before and after the phrase 'if and only if, he does so in order to indicate that there is a relation of correspondence between the proposition and the conditions of reality which are being referred to in a T-statement. Alston and Tarski share their interest in the property of being true; however, they do not work within the same form of semantics. Unlike Alston, Tarski applies the concept of truth to sentences. He deals with formal, intra-linguistic relations rather than with the relation between language and reality. When x and p, respectively, appear in Tarski's T-schema, he replaces the two symbols with linguistic expressions. Alston, by contrast, applies the concept of truth primarily to propositions. When/? in Alston's T-schema occurs after 'if and only if, Alston replaces p by what he calls 'a truth-maker', consisting of some states of affairs. According to Alston's use of the T-schema, what makes a sentence true is states of affairs, rather than formal intralinguistic relations. Alston's approach to metaphysical realism must be analyzed in relation to his treatment of the 'truth-makers' that replace p after the phrase 'if and only if in the T-schema when he formulates T-statements. Alston himself states that there may be 'a minimal sense in which alethic realism carries with it a metaphysical realism concerning the status of truth makers'. The alethic realist considers the truth-makers that decide whether propositions are true or false to be independent of human beings. The alethic realist's conception of the truth-makers that decide whether propositions are true or false may be an expression of metaphysical realism. Alston does not describe alethic realism as an example of metaphysical realism. The relation between Alston's position and metaphysical realism is nevertheless complicated by the fact that Alston considers Putnam's internal realism to be the main alternative to, as well as incompatible with, alethic realism. Putnam's internal realism is to a large extent based on his criticism of metaphysical realism. What Alston criticizes is primarily Putnam's own criticism and secondarily the internal realism that Putnam formulates. 21

22

21 2 2

Tarski 1990: 49, 51 Alston 1996a: 84

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Realist versus Epistemic Alston argues that internal realism, as well as other positions based on ideas that somehow connect issues about truth with issues about the epistemic status of linguistic utterances, is incompatible with alethic realism. This view reveals that Alston imagines the independence he associates with alethic realism to be a certain way. A conflict between alethic realism and the philosophical positions that contain what Alston describes as an epistemic conception of truth arises only if the independence he associates with alethic realism is understood in a certain way. Time and time again, Alston emphasizes that such a conflict does arise. Who could deny that the statement that gold is malleable is true if and only if gold is malleable? And yet those who construe the truth of a statement as consisting of some favorable epistemic status of the statement (being confirmed, rationally acceptable, justified or whatever) are committed to denying this, whether they realize it or not. For they take something to be necessary for the truth of the proposition that gold is malleable other than gold's being malleable. ' 2

It is evident that Alston does not consider his own alethic realism to be harmless enough to be compatible with basically every other philosophical position. Alethic realism, Alston stresses, 'rules out currently fashionable forms of conceptual-ontological relativism'. There is no hesitation about who are Alston's main opponents in this debate. Alston writes: 24

[T]he main alternatives to the realist conception construe truth in epistemic terms. (... J they take the truth of a statement or belief to consist of some positive epistemic status of the statement or belief — its being justified (perhaps in conditions of some idealized sort), or being adequately supported by evidence, or being 'warrantly assertable', or cohering with some system of beliefs. Traditional coherence and pragmatist theories of truth fall under this rubric, as well as some recent views. 25

Alston maintains that Putnam's internal realism contains an epistemic conception of truth. Putnam describes internal realism as an internal perspective, internal in relation to our language and to our established practice of justification. The internal realist rejects the metaphysical realist's external perspective. Putnam writes: 'Truth', in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability — some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other and 23 24 25

Alston 1995: 38 Alston 1995: 39 Alston 1996a: 7

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with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief system — and not correspondence with mind-independent or discourse-independent 'states of affairs'. 26

Alston treats Putnam's description of internal realism as an expression of the idea that truth consists of idealized rational acceptability. He likewise treats other epistemological conceptions of truth as theses establishing that truth consists of a certain epistemic status. It can be questioned whether the positions Alston discusses really are associated with an assumption about what constitutes truth. For example, Putnam's position can be described as the idea that we cannot learn what it means that something is true unless this learning process takes place in relation to our ideas of ideal (or sufficiently good) conditions for justification. Alston discusses Putnam's position and how it relates to alethic realism. On the one hand, Alston states that 'it will hardly come as a shock to Putnam that his epistemic view of truth is incompatible with a realist view'. On the other hand, he points out that it could come as a shock to other philosophers, since 'many philosophers think that epistemic theories of truth are compatible with a minimalist realism about truth, especially in its T-schema based versions. But [...] this is not the case'. Alston stresses that 'the internalist conception of truth as "some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability" is clearly incompatible with even a minimalist form of the realist conception'. What makes it difficult for Alston to indicate in an unequivocal way how Putnam's position relates to alethic realism and to the realist conception of truth which Alston specifies with the help of the T-schema is the fact that the T-schema can be interpreted and used in a number of different ways. In his work, Tarski shows that it is possible to formulate a definition of truth for a formal language if we make use of two languages, namely the formal language whose truth-concept we want to define and a meta-language in which the definition is formulated. The formal language whose truth-concept we want to define is what Tarski calls the object language. Tarski formulates an adequacy criterion, based on his work in the field of formal semantics, which he calls Konvention W (W as in 'Wahrheit'). 27

28

29

2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9

Putnam 1981: 49-50 Alston 1997: 63 Alston 1996a: 37 Alston 1996a: 133

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In English, this criterion is called Convention T (T as in 'Truth'). In Convention T, Tarski formulates a criterion for all formally correct truthdefinitions. Parts of Convention T are important to Alston's analysis of the relation between Putnam's position and realism. Tarski writes: Convention T. A formally correct definition of the symbol 'Tr', formulated in the metalanguage, will be called an adequate definition of truth (/ it has the following consequences: (a) all sentences that are obtained from the expression 'x e Tr if and only if p' by substituting for the symbol 'x' a structural-descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol 'p' the expression which forms the translation of the sentence in the metalanguage [...p°

What Convention T establishes is that a truth-definition is adequate if and only if every statement of the type 'The sentence "(write a sentence here)" is true if and only if "(write the same sentence here)'" can be derived from the definition. Dummett points out that Convention T does not have to be interpreted as a definition, but can be understood as a criterion that has to be met when we state the truth-conditions for the sentences of the object language. Dummett writes: '|W]e can view the requirement that all instances of the (T) schema should hold as being formulated only at some third level, as a criterion for our stating the conditions for the truth of the sentences of the object language correctly'. Putnam treats Convention T as a criterion which must be met by all formally correct truth-definitions, and which can be met by several different truth-definitions. Alston states that Putnam makes use of 'the widely held view that [the T-schema] and its near relations are neutral as between various theories of truth — including epistemic theories'. Putnam clarifies his own position: 'We could [...] keep formal semantics (including 'Tarski-type' truth-definitions); even keep classical logic; and yet shift our notion of 'truth' over to something approximating 'warranted assertability'.' He goes on: 31

32

33

34

I have argued that the formal logic of true and refers is captured by Tarskian semantics, but the concepts of truth and reference are undetermined by their formal logic [...] it is only by examining our theory of the world, and specifically by examining the connections between truth and various kinds of

Tarski 1956: 187-8. 'Tr' stands for the total number of true sentences. ' x e Tr' states that x is an element in the total number of true sentences. Wedberg 1966: 299 Dummett 1991: 68 Alston 1996a: 209 Alston 1996a: 209, citing Putnam 1978: 29. Cf. Putnam 1976: 189 30

31

32

33 34

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provability or warranted assertability as they are drawn within that theory itself, that one can determine whether the notions of truth and reference we employ are realist or idealist, 'classical' or 'intuitionist'. 35

Putnam suggests that the opinions expressing the assumption that our discourse on truth must be seen to relate to our practice of justification can also be compatible with the T-schema. Alston is not willing to concede this. He points out that the philosophers who represent such views 'have simply not thought through the implications of combining the T-schema with an epistemic conception of truth'. Alston's emphasizing the fact that the epistemic conception of truth that he attributes to Putnam is incompatible with the T-schema serves to point out that Alston does not use the T-schema merely as an adequacy criterion which has to be met by all the truth-definitions claiming to be formally correct. Alston understands the realist conception of truth that he has clarified with the help of the Tschema in a very specific way, the most important part of which is his description of the truth-makers that replace p in the schema. Putnam states that 'whatever Tarski's theory may do, it does not provide a relation C (of correspondence) such that a true sentence (in whichever language) is just one that stands in the relation C to certain extra-linguistic facts [...] Nor does it imply or assume that such a relation C exists'. Alston's use of the T-schema, however, presupposes that he sees it as providing a relation of correspondence between our linguistic sentences and extra-linguistic facts. It is possible, on the basis of Tarski's Convention T, to assert that there is, in a sense, only one concept of truth. We can choose to let the term 'concept of truth' denote only the definitions of the concept of 'truth' that meet the requirements of Tarski's Convention T. We can represent the opinion that all truth-definitions meeting Tarski's Convention T express one and the same concept of truth. However, there might be several different conceptions of truth, that is to say, conceptions of what it implies that something is true. Tarski assumes that this is possible. He writes, in relation to the conception of truth in formal semantics, that T hope nothing which is said here will be interpreted as a claim that the semantic conception of truth is the "right" or indeed the "only possible" one.' The possibility that there may be 36

37

38

39

35 36 37 38 39

Alston 1996a: 209, citing Putnam 1978: 46 Alston 1996a: 211 Putnam 1975: 71 Cf. Herrmann 2004: 80, 169 Tarski 1990: 57

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several different conceptions of what it implies that something is true is not necessarily dependent on the existence of several different concepts of truth. Instead, there may be various ways in which we can understand the concept of truth clarified by the truth-definitions that meet Tarski's Convention T. The concept of truth can be related to different ideas about what it implies that something is true and, when this happens, what emerges is not different concepts of truth, but rather what might be called different conceptions of truth. Putnam does not necessarily have to be understood as a proponent of a concept of truth that deviates from the realist concept of truth that Alston advocates. Instead, Putnam can be seen as a proponent of a different conception of truth from that preferred by Alston. It is not apparent how Alston views the relation between the concept of truth and the conception of truth. However, if Tarski's Convention T is seen to be an adequacy criterion, then, provided that both Alston and Putnam follow Tarski's Convention T in the way that they use the concept of truth, they can be seen as proponents of the same concept of truth but different conceptions of truth. That Alston and Putnam do not share the same conception of truth is evident. They have different ideas about what it implies that something is true. They disagree on what can replace p in the T-schema. Alston stresses that/? should be replaced by an expression that clarifies the states of affairs which, according to Alston, constitute the truth-makers. Alston's ideas about these truth-makers make him draw the conclusion that Putnam's ideas about what it implies that something is true are incompatible with the T-schema. Putnam does not assume that it is possible for us to refer to states of affairs of a reality with which we do not interact. According to Putnam, states of affairs of such a reality-in-itself can never be the truth-makers that make our statements true. The truth-makers Putnam has in mind can be states of affairs; however, the states of affairs we can conceive of as being states of affairs of reality must, according to Putnam, be conceptualizable in statements that we can consider to be true on the basis of our ideas about ideal (or sufficiently good) conditions for justification. Alston is not as lucid as Putnam in trying to clarify how the truth-makers that he discusses relate to the supposition that there is a reality with which we do not interact, or to the possibility that there may be states of affairs which we cannot conceptualize. This lack of clarity is of some importance in relation to questions touching upon the relation between alethic and metaphysical realism. Alston emphasizes time and time again

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that states of affairs are what makes our statements true. Putnam does not have to deny this; however, he argues that the question of which states of affairs can be labeled states of affairs of reality can only be answered by specifying which sentences we regard as true in relation to our criteria for rational acceptability. Unlike Putnam, Alston considers this position to constitute a rejection of realism. There is a connection between Alston's reluctance to regard Putnam as a realist and Alston's description of the truth-makers that he attributes to the T-schema. The truth-makers Alston discusses can, in my opinion, consist of states of affairs of reality-in-itself, that is, states of affairs which cannot be conceptualized by us human beings. In order for a position to be considered a realist position, it should, Alston argues, be an expression of, or at least closely related to, metaphysical realism. Nevertheless, the relation between metaphysical and alethic realism cannot be outlined so easily, but has to be clarified further through a more extensive analysis.

Criticism of the Criticism By way of describing and analyzing Alston's alethic realism and how it relates to metaphysical realism, I will examine his criticism of the criticism that Putnam levels against metaphysical realism. My examination will clarify some essential presuppositions on which Alston's work is based, and 1 will attempt to produce an answer to the question as to whether or not Alston is a metaphysical realist. When this question has been answered, I will, in chapter four, focus on the relation between alethic realism and Putnam's internal realism. I will then return to Alston's criticism of what he describes as Putnam's epistemic conception of truth. It is against the background of his own ideas about what characterizes realist positions in general that Alston takes on Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism. Alston specifies what, in his view, constitutes realism: Why do I call the position I defend [...] 'alethic realism''? What is realist ' '••.•!'.' about it? The basic point is this. What it takes to make a statement true on the realist conception is the actual obtaining of what is claimed to obtain in making that statement. If what is stated is that grass is green then it is grass's being green that is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the statement. Nothing else is relevant to its truth value. This is a realist way of thinking of truth in that the truth maker is something that is objective visa-vis the truth bearer. It has to do with what the truth bearer is about, rather than with some 'internal' or 'intrinsic' feature of the truth bearer, such as

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its epistemic status, its place in a system of propositions, or the confidence with which it is held. This is a fundamental sense in which truth has to do with the relation of a potential truth bearer to a REALITY beyond itself. 40

Alston agrees that 'alethic realism can be said to carry a very weak metaphysically realist commitment'. He analyzes Putnam's model-theoretic argument to try to find out how extensive the weak link between alethic and metaphysical realism really is, and he asks himself whether Putnam's model-theoretic argument contradicts not only metaphysical, but also alethic, realism. Alston focuses mainly on 'what Putnam calls "the most important consequence of metaphysical realism", namely, that "truth is supposed to be radically nonepistemic", that "the theory that is 'ideal' from the point of view of operational utility, inner beauty, and elegance, 'plausibility', simplicity, 'conservatism', etc., might be false'" .^ Alston makes primarily three critical objections to Putnam's modeltheoretic argument. Firstly, he establishes that Putnam's argument possibly implies that an ideal theory cannot lack realist truth. It does not indicate that the realist conception of truth should be replaced by an epistemic one. This objection is interesting, but it is hardly something about which Putnam needs to worry. His argument is designed to show precisely that the metaphysical realist cannot, on the basis of the realist conception of truth, claim that the ideal theory could be false. The statement that this might be the case makes no sense. In order for us to be able to talk of truth, and to be able to understand what it implies that something is true, our discourse on truth must be related to our operational and theoretical constraints in such a way that a theory which, according to our criteria, is ideal, cannot be false. Alston's objection is based on the difference that he makes use of between a realist conception of truth, a conception which agrees with Alston's T-schema, and epistemic conceptions of truth, conceptions which relate our discourse on truth to our practice of justification. This distinction between a realist conception of truth and epistemic conceptions of truth cannot be maintained if one models one's reasoning on Putnam's way of thinking. A realist conception of truth cannot be separate from epistemic ones if it is to be intelligible to us, Putnam claims. The fact that 41

42

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40 41 42 43 44

Alston Alston Alston Alston Alston

1996a: 7-8 1996a: 2 1996a: 132 1996a: 134, citing Putnam 1978: 125 " 1996a: 137

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Alston believes it possible to maintain this distinction constitutes a major difference between the ideas of Alston and Putnam. Putnam considers it to be impossible to maintain Alston's distinction between a realist conception of truth and epistemic conceptions of truth. Alston's second objection to Putnam's argument is, according to Alston himself, more important. He writes: A more crucial defect of the [model-theoretic] argument is that the conclusion — it is not the case that an ideal theory might be false, that is an ideal theory must he true — simply doesn't follow from the model-theoretic result — that the operational and theoretic constraints allow an interpretation in which all of its sentences come out true. 45

Alston states that if there is an interpretation of a theory which leads to the conclusion that the theory is true, then there will always be a number of interpretations which lead to the conclusion that it is false. Putnam, in his model-theoretic argument, heavily emphasizes that we can always choose an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that the ideal theory is true. The claim that the ideal theory might be false is thereby weakened. Alston argues that we can just as easily choose an interpretation leading to the conclusion that the ideal theory is false. What Putnam's argument shows, Alston suggests, is that the ideal theory can be either true or false. Alston writes: [The argument] only shows that it is logically possible (logically consistent with the constraints satisfaction of which make the theory ideal) that the theory be true (false). That is, the existence of an interpretation allowed by the constraints that render it true (false) merely shows that the constraints leave open the possibility of truth (falsity). And metaphysical realism, as depicted by Putnam, provides no motivation whatever for denying that. Still less would my alethic realism be moved to deny it. Why should a realist of any stripe deny that it is possible for an ideal theory to be true? 46

It is evident that Putnam's argument and Alston's criticism are based on different presuppositions. It is a matter of course to Putnam that we will, if possible, prefer an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that the theory which is ideal, according to our criteria, is also true. If we do not have this preference, it will, in practice, be impossible for us to learn to make truth-claims and to understand what it implies that something is true. Furthermore, unless ideal theories are true, it will be impossible for us to attribute an intelligible meaning to the property of being ideal, when 45 46

Alston 1996a: 137 Alston 1996a: 138

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this property is ascribed to theories. Alston does not base his reasoning on the same basic assumptions. He does not consider it necessary that our discourse on truth should be related to our operational and theoretical constraints in order for us to be able to learn to make truth-claims and to understand what it implies that something is true. Alston develops his second objection by pointing out that Putnam's argument not only leads to the conclusion that an ideal theory might be true, but that it also leads to the conclusion that unideal theories might be true. 'Since the argument only shows, at most, that it is possible for an ideal theory to be true, it comes as no great surprise that it can also show that it is possible for a variety of unideal theories to be true.' Alston stresses that unideal theories that do not contain false observation sentences can always be interpreted in a way that leads to the conclusion that they are true. Once again, Alston presupposes that we can understand what it implies that a theory is true or false, respectively, independently of our operational and theoretical constraints. If an unideal theory is a theory that should be rejected according to these constraints, then, the Putnamian philosopher argues, it will not be possible for us to understand what it implies that an unideal theory is true. It will only be possible for us to conceive of an unideal theory as true if we can imagine in a meaningful way what it implies that a theory that should be rejected according to our operational and theoretical constraints is true. The Putnamian philosopher argues that we cannot meaningfully imagine what it implies that such a theory is true. Putnam emphasizes that our discourse on truth and our operational and theoretical constraints must be inter-related in such a way that we cannot in a meaningful way understand the supposition that an ideal theory is false. This reasoning implies, by extension, that we cannot in a meaningful way understand the supposition that an unideal theory is true, either. In his third critical objection, Alston approaches what I consider to be the central element in Putnam's argument. Thus, Alston's third critical objection is, in my opinion, the most interesting one. Alston states that Putnam's argument is based on the supposition that interpretations leading to the conclusion that an ideal theory is false or to the conclusion that an unideal theory is true cannot possibly be so intended. Alston focuses on Putnam's claim that '[t]he supposition that even an "ideal" theory (from a pragmatic point of view) might really be false appears to collapse 47

4 7

Alston 1996a: 139

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into unintelligibility', and he concludes that this would appear to presuppose an interpretation of the argument which is different from that used by Alston in earlier objections. He writes: 48

But perhaps, rather than trying to prove that the ideal theory must be true, Putnam is simply throwing down a challenge to the metaphysical realist. 'You say that it is possible for the ideal theory to be false. But show me that it is so intended (i.e., that an interpretation is so intended) as to make this a possibility. I can show you an interpretation (or show you that there is an interpretation) allowed by the operational and theoretical constraints on which it is true. What can you do to show me that this is not the intended interpretation, and that the intended interpretation instead is one on which there is a possibility of falsity? The interpretation that makes it true satisfies all operational and theoretical constraints |... ] What other devices do you have to pick out a model that would leave open the possibility of falsity?' 49

This interpretation of Putnam's argument corresponds well with what Putnam has written. Nevertheless, Alston states: We must recognize that on this understanding of the argument it doesn't do what Putnam said he was setting out to do: refute the supposition that an ideal theory might be false. [...] Suppose that an interpretation that makes the theory true is 'intended'. Does that show that the theory might not (could not) be false? Doesn't it show only that it is true, not that it must be true? [...] And so the challenge to the realist is to show that an interpretation is intended that leaves open the possibility of falsity. 50

What Putnam seems to show, according to this interpretation of his argument, is that the claim that an ideal theory is false is unintelligible. He does not really show that an ideal theory cannot be false; he merely demonstrates that we cannot understand what this would imply. The metaphysical realist, if she wants to confront Putnam's challenge, must show that an interpretation of an ideal theory where the theory is false is the intended interpretation, something which presupposes the possibility that such an interpretation is intelligible to us. Alston also takes a critical approach to Putnam's argument when it is understood to be a challenge levelled against the metaphysical realist. He writes: Putnam is seeking to show that the realist cannot intend an interpretation on which the ideal theory might be false. And even if he could show that the realist cannot show that he can have such an intention, that by no means 48 49 50

Alston 1996a: 140, citing Putnam 1978: 126 Alston 1996a: 140 Alston 1996a: 140-1

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amounts to showing that the realist cannot have such an intention. We can, and do, have all sorts of abilities that we cannot prove we have. 51

Alston's argument that our possibilities of having intentions do not necessarily have to correspond to our possibilities of showing that we have intentions is of considerable importance for his reflections on the metaphysical realist's possibilities of avoiding ontological relativity. Alston observes that Putnam requires the metaphysical realist to somehow be able to 'attach' the terms she uses to things or groups of things in an independent reality, as well as to show that the terms 'attach' to this independent reality. Alston finds it difficult to see the necessity of this: Why should we think that the realist must successfully carry out the Herculean task Putnam has assigned her in order to achieve determinacy of reference? Why should we suppose that the realist must specify the items in the independently existing world that constitute the designata or extensions of the terms of the theory in order that the theory have a definite interpretation? So far from this demand being rooted in the realist position, it runs directly counter to that position.* 2

Alston draws the correct conclusion that the metaphysical realist does not think it necessary for us to be able to specify what we are referring to, in order for us to be successful in referring to it. Such a requirement contradicts metaphysical realism. Alston and the metaphysical realist assume that it is possible for us to refer to things we cannot identify. Putnam, on the other hand, talks about reference from a completely different perspective. It is true that he claims that I, as an individual, can refer to things I cannot identify, that I, who cannot tell the difference between a cockroach and a bark beetle, can nevertheless refer to cockroaches. I can, for example, ask my roommate if she would not mind killing the cockroach that is running around under my bed. However, according to this perspective on reference, we cannot refer to things we cannot, as a human community, identify. If no human being can determine whether or not the animal running around under my bed is a cockroach, then we cannot, either as individuals or as a community, refer to cockroaches. Alston criticizes 'Putnam's conflation of referring to something and showing that one has done so or specifying how one has done so', but he is, in this context, not clear about the distinction between what it takes for me as an individual to be able to refer to something and what it takes

5 1 5 2

Alston 1996a: 142 Alston 1996a: 143-4

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for the human community as a whole to be able to do the same. Putnam does not suggest that every single individual must show that or how she has been able to refer to something in order to succeed in referring; however, we as a collective community cannot maintain the distinction between referring and showing that or how we succeed in referring. If that were possible, we would not be able to learn how to refer or determine what is being referred to; the fact that we are, after all, capable of referring would, in that case, appear to be pure magic. Alston suggests that ft]he constraints relative to which reference is said to be indeterminate do not exhaust the resources available to the metaphysical realist for securing determinate reference'?'* Putnam argues that the metaphysical realist is affected by the inscrutability of reference, an opinion with which Alston disagrees. Is it not the case that the resources that Putnam uses in order to avoid ontological relativity are also available to the metaphysical realist? The metaphysical realist's possibilities of escaping ontological relativity are limited by the fact that the metaphysical realist assumes that there is some kind of reality-in-itself, the nature of which can deviate radically from the description of reality that is supplied by a theory which appears to be ideal by our standards. Putnam, who does not assume that there is a reality-in-itself, is not affected by ontological relativity since, according to him, the reference for the terms that are part of the ideal theory can be fixed with the help of our operational and theoretical constraints. He suggests that the idea of a reality 'behind' or 'beyond' the reality with which we are in contact and which we map out with the help of our theories and our operational and theoretical constraints is unintelligible. In response to this argumentation, Alston raises the objection that if being able to refer to a completely independent reality is a necessary condition for being considered a metaphysical realist, then there will hardly be any metaphysical realists. He writes: 53

The whole discussion hinges on an unwarranted picture of the metaphysical realist vainly struggling to connect his terms with items in a wholly transcendent realm. [...] No living, breathing realist, to my knowledge, takes any such stand. I certainly do not. I don't think of realism as implying that one must, by some supreme metaphysical effort, 'reach outside' our experience, thought, and discourse, to make contact with a transcendent realm. 55

5 3 5 4 5 5

Alston 1996a: 151 Alston 1996a: 152 Alston 1996a: 148

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In Alston's opinion, there are no metaphysical realists if a necessary condition for being one is that one attempts to 'attach' one's words to a wholly transcendent realm. The Putnamian philosopher might easily back Alston up on the point of there not being any metaphysical realists. Metaphysical realism, Putnam stresses, is an unintelligible position, a perspective we cannot take. We cannot talk about a reality-in-itself and therefore, we cannot meaningfully claim that such a reality exists: metaphysical realism 'makes no sense'. Although, in a sense, there can be no metaphysical realists, the Putnamian philosopher can assert that there are philosophical positions that presuppose the meaningfulness and intelligibility of metaphysical realism, regardless of whether or not the proponents of these positions realize it. Some examples of philosophers whose positions come so close to metaphysical realism that they could be termed metaphysical realists are Richard Boyd, Michael Devitt, Hartry Field, Jerry Fodor, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, John Searle and Bernard Williams. The question is if Alston's alethic realism also comes so close to metaphysical realism that it ought to be described as a metaphysical realist position. S6

Alston's Presuppositions When asked 'Does a realist account of truth carry any implications for metaphysical realism or nonrealism?', Alston repeatedly replies that 'alethic realism is almost completely neutral on metaphysical issues, and [...] it does not require what Putnam calls "metaphysical realism'". He does, however, point out in a footnote that his alethic realism might in some way be related to metaphysical realism through the presuppositions on which it is based. It is possible that Alston's work is based on presuppositions that are an expression of metaphysical realism. Richard Rorty emphasizes that Alston does not make use of the same presuppositions as the proponents of the conceptions of truth that Alston labels epistemic. Instead, the presuppositions that Alston makes use of may be metaphysical realist ones. That Alston works with different presuppositions from the ones Putnam works with is evident. I have already 57

58

59

5 6 5 7 5 8 5 9

Cf. Allen 1994: 667 Alston 1996a: 79, 187 Alston 1996a: 81, note 10 Rorty 1997: 158

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pointed out some of those differences. Alston, unlike Putnam, thinks we can tell the difference between a realist conception of truth and an epistemic one. Alston, unlike Putnam, assumes that we can maintain a distinction between referring and showing that or how we refer, a distinction which Alston makes use of in his argumentation, and which he assumes can be upheld for the human community as a whole, as well as for individuals. Alston, unlike Putnam, treats propositions as the primary bearers of truth-value. Moreover, I would like to draw attention to some further central presuppositions on which Alston bases his work and which Putnam rejects. The purpose of my analysis of these presuppositions is to clarify the relation between Alston's position and metaphysical realism. One essential presupposition which underlies Alston's criticism of Putnam's argument against metaphysical realism and which supports Alston's formulation of alethic realism is the position he himself describes as the choice not to treat truth primarily as a semantic notion. In a footnote of considerable importance in this context, Alston writes: Contrary to recent practice, I do not treat truth as primarily or essentially a 'semantic' notion. This point is closely connected with the fact that I do not take sentences to be the primary bearers of truth value. This does not mean that I rule out the possibility that truth should play some role in semantics. [...] In saying that I do not take truth to be primarily or essentially a semantic notion, I mean that in bringing out what truth is we need not advert to any semantic considerations concerning the meaning of linguistic items. 60

Alston does not discuss what the supposition that truth is primarily a semantic notion really means, and he does not discuss the reasons why some philosophers defend the supposition in question. In the present study, I will clarify of what the supposition that truth is a semantic notion might consist. I will clarify what importance the supposition has for our possibilities of learning to talk about what is true, and to interpret each others' utterances. I understand the semantic aspect, in this context, to refer to an interest in the relation between our linguistic expressions and that which they say something about, in the way that that relation is expressed in our ideas about correct linguistic behavior. What Alston seeks to emphasize when he rejects the supposition that truth is a semantic notion is the idea that what makes a certain proposition true is not primarily something semantic, but rather the fact that reality is constituted in a way that corresponds to the proposition in question.

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Alston 1996a: 31, note 27

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Alston disagrees with the philosophers that argue that an acceptable theory of truth must somehow contribute to or facilitate our formulation of an acceptable theory of meaning. To Alston, a theory of meaning and a theory of truth do not necessarily coincide. For this reason, theories of truth are not to be evaluated by means of investigating their ability to contribute to the development of some popular theory of meaning. Alston's rejection of the idea that truth is a semantic notion is related to his treatment of propositions, rather than sentences, as the primary bearers of truth-value. Alston does not relate his reflections on truth to our possibilities of learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true. According to Alston, our actual linguistic practice, a practice which consists of the sentences that we make use of and the rules and conventions that are associated with our use of language, is of no importance when we reflect on what it implies that something is true. In chapters four and five, I will return to the meaning of the supposition that truth is a semantic notion and I will point out that if truth is seen as a semantic notion, then the differentiation between meaning-theoretic reflections and reflections on truth that Alston makes use of cannot be maintained. The fact that Alston does not see truth as a semantic notion explains another important presupposition which underlies his reasoning. Alston suggests that we can use a distinction between concept and property that implies that there may be properties that are not reflected in the concept, not even when the concept in question is the concept of truth. Alston discusses 61

the distinction between concept and property. It is a familiar point nowadays, thanks to the work of Putnam and Kripke, that a property (or a kind) may have features, may have a constitution, that is not reflected in our concept that picks out that property. What heat really is is mean kinetic energy, though our (ordinary) concept of heat is not in those terms at all. The essential nature of water is to be H 0, though our ordinary concept of water is in terms of its observable properties. And so on. In the same way, the property of truth may have various features that are not reflected in our concept of truth. 2

62

According to Alston, it is possible for our concept of truth, as well as for our concepts of 'water' and 'energy', to refer to something the properties of which are not fully reflected in the concept. We can use the concept of 'gold' and say many things about gold, but we are aware of the fact

61 62

Alston 1996a: 60-1 Alston 1996a: 37

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that gold has properties that are not represented in our concept of gold, and which are not being referred to when we refer to gold. Similarly, there may be properties of truth which are not reflected in our concept of truth, according to Alston, something which implies that our possibilities of imagining something as true does not limit our possibilities of correctly stating that it is true. It has been pointed out that there are relevant differences between the concept of truth and concepts such as 'water', 'energy', 'gold' or 'anger', differences that Alston does not acknowledge. Michael Lynch writes: [I]t is worth noting [...] that there is also a distinct dissimilarity between the concept of truth and natural-kind concepts like gold. Gold and anger are clearly subject to empirical a posteriori investigation. It is unclear whether the metaphysical nature of truth could be discovered empirically, and it is surely difficult to distinguish a priori investigations of concepts from a priori investigations of properties. 63

The similarity Alston sees between our concept of truth and our naturalkind concepts is based on his presupposition that truth is not to be seen as a semantic notion. This is so because, if truth is a semantic notion, the distinction between concept and property that Alston makes use of cannot be understood in the way that Alston understands it. If truth is a semantic notion, then all properties that we can meaningfully associate with what is true must be discernable in correct linguistic usage. Alston differentiates between atomistic and holistic conceptions. His work presupposes a marked atomism. In his reflections on what it implies that a proposition is true, he assumes that we can answer that question by studying individual propositions. Alston's atomism is related to the fact that he considers an epistemic conception of truth to be incompatible with a realist one. Epistemic theories of truth often presuppose a marked holism, a holism with which Alston does not agree. A previously cited section from Alston's work clearly illustrates the meaning of his atomism. 64

The basic point is this. What it takes to make a statement true on the realist conception is the actual obtaining of what is claimed to obtain in making that statement. If what is stated is that grass is green then it is grass's being green that is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the statement. Nothing else is relevant to its truth value. [My emphasis.] This is a

63 64

Lynch 1997a: 514 Alston 1980: 794

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realist way of thinking of truth in that the truth maker is something that is objective vis-a-vis the truth bearer. It has to do with what the truth bearer is about, rather than with some 'internal' or 'intrinsic' feature of the truth bearer, such as its epistemic status, its place in a system of propositions, or the confidence with which it is held. 65

Alston stresses that 'nothing else is relevant'. Thereby, he makes it impossible for an alethic realist to maintain that 'Grass is green' is true if and only if grass is green but that the nature of grass is not the only thing that decides whether the statement is true and that other factors may be relevant, as well, such as the epistemic status of the statement or its place in a system of propositions. It is, according to Alston, only the individual proposition and the nature of reality which matters; nothing else is relevant in this context. Unlike Alston, Putnam asserts that the truth of a sentence should be conceived of as a triadic relation between the sentence, other sentences and reality. He writes: '[I]t is very important that a true sentence is not one which bears a certain relation to extra-linguistic facts, but one which bears a certain relation to extra-linguistic facts and to the rest of the language'.^ Because of his own atomism, Alston does not depict Putnam's conception of truth as a realist one. Putnam does not treat truth exclusively as a relation between the individual statement and reality, something which Alston requires that a realist should do. Alston's atomism characterizes the way he describes the debates on realism. He remarks that 'if truth is determined as alethic realism has it, then what determines the truth of almost any true statement, that is, the fact that makes it true, is constitutively independent of that statement'. Some realists would not deny that the states of affairs that determine whether or not a statement is true are independent of that statement but they would underline that what we can meaningfully regard as true is dependent on our conceptual resources. Such a realist cannot, Alston suggests, be considered an alethic realist, since she is of the opinion that, when it comes to the truth of the individual statement, more things are important than merely the individual statement and the nature of reality. Alston's atomism is influenced by his individualism. The individual propositions that he discusses are expressed, insofar as they are expressed at all, by individual persons. His reflections on my possibilities of perceiving something even though I might not have a concept that can be 67

6 5 6 6 6 7

Alston 1996a: 7-8 Putnam 1975: 82 Alston 1996a: 84

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applied to what I perceive, clearly illustrates his individualism and what it implies. Alston writes: To recognize a cardinal is to form the belief that it is a cardinal, and, like all beliefs, this involves using concepts. But this does not show that to be visually aware of a cardinal one must employ that concept. Indeed, it is obvious that one need not employ the concept of a cardinal in order to see a cardinal. I can see a cardinal (i.e., it can be that what I see is a cardinal), even though I do not recognize it as such, and even though I totally lack any such concept. 68

We can perceive things with our senses even if we have no relevant concepts that can be applied to what we perceive. An infant watching a cardinal is 'visually aware of the cardinal even though it does not have access to the concept 'cardinal'. A competent ornithologist with a special interest in cardinals, on the other hand, could hardly be visually aware of a cardinal without applying the concept 'cardinal' to what she sees. She recognizes a cardinal whether she wants to or not. Alston discusses the relation between what we perceive and our concepts on an individual level. The focus is on the way / perceive things with my senses in relation to my linguistic competence. It is not the linguistic competence of the human community as a whole that matters. Alston's focus on the individual is the reason why he fails to notice the possibility that is open not only to the alethic realist but also to Putnam, namely the possibility of admitting that an individual does not have to apply the concept 'cardinal' in order to see a cardinal. On a collective level, we can conceive of our individual possibilities of being visually aware of a cardinal, as well as our individual possibilities of recognizing a cardinal as a cardinal, as related to the concept formation to which the human community as a whole has access. This does not mean that my individual possibilities of being visually aware of a cardinal are conceived of as dependent on my linguistic competence. I can see a cardinal even though I may not have access to the concept 'cardinal', and even though I may not know a thing about cardinals; however, I cannot be said to see a cardinal if the human community as a whole does not have access to the concept 'cardinal', that is, if no conceptual scheme exists wherein cardinals are being distinguished from other species of bird. If the human community as a whole did not have access to the concept 'cardinal', then it would not be possible to form the

68

Alston 1996a: 91

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statement 'She sees a cardinal'. We would not be able to make the meaningful assumption that people who, like me, cannot recognize a cardinal, can still see a cardinal. It is possible, from a Putnamian perspective as well as otherwise, to make the assumption that I can see a cardinal even if I do not have access to the concept 'cardinal' and do not know anything about cardinals. My being able to see a cardinal even if I do not have access to the concept 'cardinal' and do not know anything about cardinals does not mean that I can see a cardinal if the human community as a whole does not have access to the concept 'cardinal', that is, if there is no conceptual scheme wherein cardinals are differentiated from other species of bird. As I have noted above, it is possible to pursue a corresponding discussion regarding Alston's ideas about reference; my individual ability to refer must be distinguished from our collective ability to refer. If we make a distinction between my individual abilities to perceive/refer and our collective abilities to perceive/refer, there will be consequences for the sense in which we are able to conceive of reality as independent of us. Alston stresses that we are in fact able to conceive of reality as independent of us and of our referring. He writes: I will continue to assume that we are capable of conceptualizing, referring to, directing illocutionary acts and propositional attitudes to, and knowing about a realm that exists and is what it is independent of that cognitive activity. If this is a sound assumption, there is no case for the conclusion that the metaphysical realist is saddled with indeterminacy of reference. 69

It is being stated here that reality should be 'independent of that cognitive activity'. This does not necessarily mean that reality should be independent of our conceptual activity. What leads to the inscrutability of reference and to ontological relativity is the fact that the metaphysical realist assumes that there is a reality-in-itself, a reality with which we do not interact, and to which we, for this reason, cannot refer. The Putnamian philosopher, as well, can be of the opinion that what we perceive and refer to exists and is what it is independently of the cognitive activity of perceiving or referring. Alston, if he follows in the footsteps of Putnam, does not have to draw the conclusion that what we perceive and refer to is what it is and exists because of our perceiving or our referring. Alston does not understand the debates on realism to be discussions on the relation of language to reality — primarily discussions concerning

6 9

Alston 1996a: 159

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collective dimensions — but rather as discussions on the relation of thought to reality — discussions which appear to be related more to the individual person than to the collective. He talks about 'the thought-world relationship' and this is, I would argue, one reason why Alston thinks himself capable of maintaining the distinction between referring to something and showing that or how we refer. We can, Alston suggests, think about something or intend something without being able, not even as a collective, to show what it is that we are thinking about or how we manage to intend what we intend, using linguistic or non-linguistic means. Putnam rejects this idea in his argumentation against magical theories of reference. Philosophers who primarily see the debates on realism as debates on how language relates to reality often represent the position that the relation of thought to reality is built upon the relation of language to reality. The act of thinking is a linguistic act, 'talking inside one's head'. Without a language, thinking becomes impossible. Alston does not have to deny this completely; however, what determines his account of the debates on realism is that he chooses to focus on the relation of thought to reality, rather than that of language to reality. Thoughts are not related to our observable behavior in the same way that linguistic competence is. I will return to the relation between our behavior and our possibilities of learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true when I make a more thorough analysis of the meaning and consequences of the supposition that truth is a semantic notion. The fact that Alston talks about the relation of thought, rather than that of language, to reality makes it difficult, however, to determine how Alston really views the relationship between our behavior and our possibilities of learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true. 70

Metaphysical Realism? I have described metaphysical realism as consisting of three central theses. The question is how the presuppositions that Alston's contribution to the debates on realism are based on relate to metaphysical realism. Ought he to be described as a metaphysical realist?

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See Alston 1996a: 52, 151

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According to the metaphysical realist, reality consists of a given totality of mind-independent objects. When Alston stresses that 'the truthmaker is something that is objective vis-a-vis the truth-bearer', his intention seems to be to call attention to the fact that there are states of affairs, that is, objects that exist and that possess certain properties and are related to each other in certain ways, that are independent of us and our language. The states of affairs to which our propositions can correspond, that is, the truth-makers, are independent of our statements about reality, that is, the potential truth-bearers, and of our conceptual resources in the sense that there may be truth-makers about which we cannot form true (or false) propositions. Alston's reflections on cognitively inaccessible aspects of reality clarify his position. He writes: Can we assume that human cognitive powers suffice to envisage any true proposition? There are general considerations that strongly suggest a negative answer. Think of the limitations of our cognitive powers — limitations on our storage and retrieval capacity, on the amount of data we can process simultaneously, on the considerations we can hold together in our minds at one moment, on the complexity of propositions we are capable of grasping. Isn't it highly likely that there are facts that will forever lie beyond us just because of these limitations? And it is not just our finitude; there is also what we might call our 'particularity'. The cognitive design of human beings represents only one of a large multitude of possible designs for cognitive subjects, even for embodied cognitive subjects as finite as we, leaving out of account angels and God. It seems clear that there could be corporeal cognitive subjects with forms of sensory receptivity different from ours — sensitivity to different forms of physical energy. There could be subjects who reason in patterns different from those we employ. Given all this, shouldn't we take seriously the possibility that even if there is something wrong with the idea of facts that are in principle inaccessible to any cognitive subjects whatever (and I don't see any fatal flaw in this idea), it could still be that there are many facts accessible to cognizers with radically different hardware and software but totally inaccessible to us. And if this is the case, the fact that p could not be sufficient for a belief that p's being ideally justifiable. Where p is one of those propositions beyond our powers of envisagement, it could be the case that p without a belief that p being justifiable (by human beings) even in the most ideal epistemic situation. If no human being can entertain the proposition that p, no human being can justifiably believe that p in any situation whatever. 71

Alston has declared that he considers propositions to be the primary bearers of truth-value; however, he does not clarify the relation between cognitively inaccessible facts and true propositions in the discussion cited 71

Alston 1997: 64-5. See also Alston 1996a: 201-2

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above. If it is the case that p and we cannot assert that p, is it nevertheless true that pi If p cannot be true unless we can assert that p, then Alston's reflections do not concern the possible existence of evidencetranscendent truths, but rather the possible existence of evidencetranscendent facts. Whatever the case may be, the quotation clarifies a central difference between Putnam's reflections on truth and those of Alston. If we connect questions about what is true with ideas about what constitutes what, from a human perspective, are conditions for ideal justification, then we cannot, Alston suggests, conclude that there are aspects of reality which are, in principle, cognitively inaccessible to human beings. In that case, it will be impossible to assert, as Nagel does, that the difference between that which exists and that which our nature allows us to think of would mean that that which our nature allows us to think of could be less than that which exists. Alston defends the idea that there may well be aspects of reality which are cognitively inaccessible to humans. This position is connected with his reflections on questions concerning religion. If God exists, then God should be able to know and perceive things which will be forever cognitively inaccessible to beings with a limited perspective such as ours. Alston is here connecting with a central doctrine of the Christian faith, namely the idea that only God can fully know Godself. God's nature is cognitively inaccessible to humans, even in the most ideal of situations. Alston points out that the facts that make our statements true 'hold and are what they are independent of human cognition'. He sees no problem in the supposition that there are facts that must necessarily be inaccessible to human beings and perhaps also to all cognitive subjects. He does not suppose that our conceptual resources have any influence on what objects we can meaningfully assume exist. This brings me to the conclusion that Alston maintains that we can assume, and that we can refer to, a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself, a totality of mind-independent objects about which certain facts are true, regardless of whether we or any other cognitive subjects can be aware of them. We can, Alston suggests, assert that there is a reality-in-itself. Whether Alston, like the metaphysical realist, supposes that there is only one true and complete account of reality is not an easy thing to determine. He concentrates on the relation of thought, rather than language, to reality, and he focuses on the perceptive and linguistic possibilities of 72

7 2

Nagel 1993: 112

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the individual person, rather than that of the human community as a whole. The question as to whether there is one true and complete account of reality is a question that touches upon the relation of language to reality and upon the linguistic possibilities of the human community. Nonetheless, it is important to note the fact that Alston is of the opinion that we can imagine and talk about a God's-Eye point of view in a meaningful way. Alston argues that God exists and that 'the facts of the world constitute "input" for the divine psyche'. Perhaps Alston considers God to possess the only true and complete account of reality. If God is omniscient and infallible, then should God not perceive all the facts of reality in an accurate way? However, it is by no means clear whether the alethic realist can consider God's perspective to be a true and complete account of reality. Alston considers propositions to be the primary bearers of truth-value. I suggest that an account of reality must be considered a linguistic phenomenon. This means that if, within the framework of alethic realism, God is to be considered in possession of the only true and complete account of reality, then God must be thought to express God's own perspective with the help of linguistically formulated propositions. It is by no means obvious, either within the framework of the philosophy of religion or within the framework of our religious traditions, that God can be thought to express God's perspective in this way. Alston claims, as does the metaphysical realist, that we speak the truth insofar as our statements express propositions that correspond to conditions of independent reality. Like the metaphysical realist, he stresses that 'truth is radically non-epistemic'. This implies, he goes on, that the fact that a proposition is true is independent of our possibilities of imagining the implications of its being true. The truth-value of a proposition is determined solely by whether the content of the proposition corresponds to states of affairs. The states of affairs that make a certain proposition true could be inaccessible to humans insofar as we may not be able to imagine what it implies that they exist. In its fully developed form, Alston's alethic realism is a type of metaphysical realism. I would suggest that the main reason why Alston defends metaphysical realism is the fact that it is important to him that we can assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths, that is, that we can be epistemological realists. In Alston's account of alethic realism, he emphasizes our possibilities of talking of evidence-transcendent truths. 73

7 3

Alston 1989: 96

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Metaphysical realism is associated with an extensive epistemological realism; it is this epistemological realism which leads Alston to develop a metaphysical realist position.

Alston and Evidence-Transcendence Alston's defence of alethic realism is to a large extent based on the assumption that possibilities he considers essential would be lost if the realist conception of truth were to be abandoned. Alston emphasizes, for example, that our work on epistemological issues is largely dependent on the realist conception of truth. The realist conception of truth makes it possible for us to pursue a profitable reflection on epistemological issues. Since it is important for us to pursue such a reflection, we should make use of a realist, not an epistemological, conception of truth. Alston writes: We have found not only that epistemology, as commonly practiced, makes heavy use of a realist conception of truth, we have also found that if the epistemologist were either to eschew any consideration of truth or to switch to an epistemic construal of truth, his attempts to make progress on epistemological issues would be greatly worsened. Alternatives to alethic realism have nothing to recommend them in the field of epistemology. 74

Similarly, Alston emphasizes that if we want to remain faithful to the Christian faith, then we should employ a realist, not an epistemic, conception of truth. Alston establishes that 'nonrealism [...] is subversive of the Christian faith' and he goes on: What difference(s) does it make for the Christian life whether we take our beliefs to be subject to assessment as true or false in terms of correspondence with an objective reality or lack thereof? Is something fundamental in the Christian life lost if we abandon realism? My answer is [...] an unequivocal YES [...]" At times, Alston seems to argue in favor of not abandoning the realist conception of truth, since doing so would have negative consequences for the Christian faith. It would no longer be possible, according to Alston, to maintain the traditional Christian understanding of how human beings interact with God. God would no longer appear to be a real presence whose existence is independent of that of humans.

7 4 7 5

Alston 1997: 91 Alston 1995: 45

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The fact that Alston evaluates conceptions of truth on the basis of their use is something that is open to criticism. If a specific conception of truth is philosophically untenable in the sense that we cannot comprehend its implications, then its potential use is of no consequence. If a specific conception of truth is philosophically untenable, then it should be rejected, even if it is useful in some context. However, more important than the criticism that can be levelled against Alston's considerations of usefulness is the question concerning what it is that Alston does not want to give up, what makes him consider the realist conception of truth to be necessary. Alston declares that it is possible to understand evidence-transcendent truths in different ways. He writes: It is important to distinguish two ways in which truth might be evidence transcendent. First there is the possibility of truths (facts) to which we have no cognitive access whatever, of any sort. We cannot entertain them; they lie wholly outside our ken. Realism is definitely committed to this possibility. To abandon it would be a betrayal of its opposition to the 'man is the measure of all things' doctrine. But it is not the sort of evidence transcendence that Putnam takes as supporting his ontological relativity. He focuses on cases in which we can envisage the alternatives clearly enough, but in which we are unable to find sufficient objective grounds for preferring one to the other. Is realism as firmly committed to the possibility of unique facts of the matter in these kinds of cases? I cannot see that it is. 76

Alston relates the second type of evidence-transcendent truths to the thesis that there are, at times, several different conceptual alternatives that could work equally well in a specific context. Alston does not hold that the realist must advocate the theory that, although different conceptual alternatives could work equally well, there must be one correct answer to the question of which alternative, if any, gives a true account of reality. He goes on to say that the realist does not have to suppose that there is only one correct answer to the question as to whether light consists of waves or particles, or to the question 'How many objects are there on the kitchen table?' when we are unsure whether the pen and its lid should be counted as one or two objects. How do Putnamian philosophers relate to the first kind of evidencetranscendent truths, the kind that a realist must not reject, in Alston's view? When discussing evidence-transcendent truths of this type, Alston talks about truths as facts, rather than as true propositions. It is worth noting that Alston, when discussing these truths, talks about 'cognitive

76

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access' rather than 'conceptual access'. This reflects the fact that he focuses on the relation of thought, rather than that of language, to reality. Philosophers belonging to the Putnamian school of thought will easily admit that there are truths to which individual persons do not have cognitive access, which they do not know about, and which they cannot imagine. I suspect, for example, that there are many truths about the universe, its make-up and its origins, to which I have absolutely no cognitive access; furthermore, I would most likely not understand them if somebody were to communicate these truths to me. I would need to take a relatively long and comprehensive astronomy course before I could rightly be deemed to have cognitive access to the truths in question. There are, quite simply, truths about which I, as an individual, do not think, and of whose existence 1 am unaware. Putnamian philosophers do not have to deny this. However, unlike Alston, what these philosophers do emphasize is that we cannot meaningfully imagine the existence of truths to which the human community as a whole does not have conceptual access. Having conceptual access to a truth means being able to formulate it in a statement and knowing when it is correct to use the statement in question. In chapter four, I will develop my reflections on the possibilities Putnamian philosophers have of assuming that there are evidencetranscendent truths. I will suggest that philosophers who reject metaphysical realism can still assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths; it is not necessary for an epistemological realist to support metaphysical realism. Before I develop these ideas, however, I will conclude the present chapter with a discussion on whether Alston's reflections on religion and religious issues belong to the field of theology or to that of philosophy of religion. It is obvious that many philosophers of religion consider Alston's work to be very significant. His ideas are often mentioned in contemporary discussions among philosophers of religion. Nevertheless, it is by no means obvious that his work is best described as belonging to the field of philosophy of religion.

Theology and Philosophy Alston's reflections on religion and religious issues can be regarded as philosophical theology or as metaphysical philosophy of religion. Alston

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himself describes his work both as philosophical and as theological work in relating the following story: When I emerged from graduate school in 1949 I was hired by the University of Michigan to teach, inter alia, philosophy of religion, and a considerable part of my philosophical work in the 1950s was devoted to that subject — not, I now think, to any great effect. When I drifted away from the church in the late 50s my involvement in the philosophy of religion diminished accordingly. Unlike some of my distinguished contemporaries, I have found my philosophical interest in philosophy of religion varying directly with my religious involvement. Hence it was only after I returned to the church in the mid-70s that I turned once again to philosophical theology. I like to think that what 1 had learned in the intervening two decades in philosophy of language, philosophical psychology, and epistemology has put me in a position to tackle the issues of philosophical theology more effectively. 77

Alston seems to use the terms 'philosophy of religion' and 'philosophical theology' as synonyms in this passage. Philosophical theology might possibly be considered a sub-category of the philosophy of religion. Alston evidently considers the two disciplines to be closely related, something which implies that it is hardly worthwhile for Alston to maintain a distinction between the two. Alston sees his own work as an expression of the classical project 'Faith Seeking Understanding'. Alston writes: 'Philosophy always has been, and continues to be, a primary tool in the ongoing attempt to gain a more penetrating grasp of the import of the basic articles of faith: the nature of God, creation, sin, the Incarnation, the atonement, the work of the Spirit, and so on.' Philosophy does not primarily provide tools for convincing those who do not (as yet) believe; instead, it provides possibilities for already existing believers to defend and explain their faith. , Alston makes use of philosophical tools to clarify and expound on the Contents of Christian faith. He emphasizes that: 78

I am a Christian of a relatively conservative cast, by current standards outside evangelical and fundamentalist circles. I am not a fundamentalist about the Bible, and I am alive to the need of each age to rethink the substance of the faith. But I take the Christian tradition very seriously; I don't feel free to ignore it when it doesn't jibe with my own personal predilections. Hence the interest [...] in exploring, partly refashioning, and defending a fairly traditional conception of God and His work in the world, a conception that owes a great deal to medieval philosophical theology. This enterprise involves the use of much up-to-date philosophical equipment. 79

77 78 79

Alston 1989: 1 Alston 1994: 27 Alston 1989: 5

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Alston's philosophical reflections on religious issues are characterized by his ambition to remain faithful to the Christian tradition. His work shows certain apologetic tendencies. He emphasizes that philosophy has an important task in clarifying, systematizing, and defending faith. However, he does not suggest that questioning faith or taking a critical approach to religion might be important tasks for philosophers. Alston approaches certain philosophical positions with theological, as well as philosophical, objections and remarks. He sees, for example, the rejection of the existence of 'stubborn, unyielding facts beyond our thought, experience and discourse' as an expression of original sin; humanity is ever striving to be the measuring rod against which everything else is measured. *' The problem with such a rejection is not purely philosophical; the problem is also that such a rejection is an expression of humanity turning away from God. Alston rejects different forms of anti- and non-realist positions since he thinks that these positions deprive us of our ability to interact with God, an ability which constitutes the essence of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. This illustrates how Alston employs philosophical methods in order to defend the positions on philosophical and religious issues that he thinks we should take, on the basis of the Christian tradition. The fact that he makes thorough use of philosophical tools to sort out problems relating to religious issues could be taken to indicate that what he pursues is philosophy of religion. For my part, however, I would rather label his work 'apologetic theology'. Alston's positions are primarily motivated by his affiliation with a specific Christian tradition, a tradition that he hardly questions. Alston rarely conducts that analysis of presuppositions which is so essential in philosophy. Alston often talks about the Christian faith, but he never stops to ask himself whose Christian faith he has made a universal norm, a question with which I believe the philosopher of religion has to engage before beginning her work. He never calls attention to the fact that there are several different positions on questions about what constitutes Christian faith. Detailing the contents of Christian faith is always done from a specific perspective, and Alston's delimitations are characterized by his own affiliation with a specific tradition, a tradition whose interpretation of 80

1

82

83

8 0 81 8 2 8 3

Alston 1994: 29 Alston 1996a: 264 Cf. Alston 1995: 45 See Alston 1989 for a further illustration of this issue

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Christian faith works as an unquestioned presupposition in Alston's reflections. Even though Alston uses philosophical methods to expound on the Christian faith, a faith which he describes in what is considered to be the acceptable way within the Christian tradition to which he himself belongs, his attempts to demonstrate the coherence of the traditional concept of God, as well as his reflections on sanctification and prayer, are characterized by his ambition to defend and explain the Christian tradition to which he belongs. I see this as illustrating the fact that Alston's work is primarily a theological work. Alston is, according to my interpretation of his reflections, a metaphysical realist and his metaphysical realism is an important foundation for his theological work. On the basis of metaphysical realism, there are a number of questions which Alston does not think it interesting to pose. He does not contemplate questions about where the Christian faith that he discusses can be found, or questions about how the different statements about God that he discusses relate to the contexts in which they occur. The independent reality that the metaphysical realist assumes can, according to her, be discussed and examined independently of reflections on the relation between our conceptual resources and our lives. Alston's metaphysical realism does not only affect what questions he does not take up for discussion. It also affects his reflections on the questions with which he does choose to work. I will illustrate this with the help of Alston's reflections on our literal discourse about God and on our way of understanding what might be perceptions of God. Alston's work on questions concerning religious language and religious experience are considered to be important parts of today's philosophy of religion and can be seen as Alston's main contribution to the discussion on religious issues. Alston's reflections on our literal discourse about God and our perceptions of God seem to imply that it is possible for us to assume that there is a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself to which we can refer. Alston emphasizes that we can talk about God literally and make statements about God that might be true or false independently of whether or not we understand what it implies that what we say is true or false. Alston's alethic realism is an attempt to guarantee that we will have the possibility of imagining God to be independent of all humans, a possibility of which Alston evidently thinks Putnam deprives the believer. 84

85

These attempts are made in Alston 1989 Cf. Peterson et al 1991: 150-1

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Unless God can be conceived of as independent of humans, their relation to God, in prayer, through the work of the Spirit, cannot be conceived of as genuine interaction with God, and unless our relation to God can be conceived of as genuine interaction with God, religious life, according to Alston, will collapse. Metaphysical realism is also a background for Alston's reflections on our possibilities of being aware of God. Alston focuses on what he calls 'direct awareness of God' and leaves out potential awarenesses of God that come through the beauty of nature, the words of the Bible or of some sermon, or other natural phenomena. He stresses that God, if there are direct awarenesses of God, presents Godself in these direct awarenesses. This means, he suggests, that there are aspects of these awarenesses that are independent of our concept formation, our beliefs and our judgements. Alston talks about our direct awarenesses as perceptions. He clarifies this position in the following: 86

87

In saying that a direct awareness that does not essentially involve conceptualization and judgment is at the heart of perception, I am not denying that a person's conceptual scheme, beliefs, cognitive readinesses, and so on, can affect the way an object presents itself to the subject, what it presents itself as. [...J But though my conceptual capacities and tendencies can affect the way objects appear to me, they have no power over what object it is that looks (sounds...) that way. 88

As a result of the distinction Alston makes between the way in which the object presents itself to us and what object it is, he gets stuck in a Kantianism similar to that in which Hick gets stuck. Alston sees Hick's Kantianism as a type of non-realism, a non-realism Alston criticizes. Alston's main problem with Hick's Kantianism, a Kantianism I conceive of as a type of metaphysical realism, seems to be the fact that Hick does not think of our utterances about God as true insofar as they correspond to God in se. Alston is critical of the fact that 'the assessment for truthvalue is not in terms of realist truth, but in terms of whether the content of the beliefs "evokes an appropriate dispositional attitude'". Thus, Alston criticizes Hick for not concurring with the metaphysical realist's assumption that our utterances about reality are true insofar as they correspond to states of affairs in independent reality-in-itself. What causes 89

86 87 88 89

Alston Alston Alston Alston

1989: 101 1996b: 21 1996b: 23 1995: 43

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Alston to conceive of Hick as a non-realist is that which he conceives of as Hick's rejection of metaphysical realism. I suggest that both Hick and Alston are proponents of metaphysical realism. Hick considers an utterance about God to be true insofar as it provokes an adequate dispositional attitude. Hick can be described as a proponent of the idea that only utterances related to the Real can provoke adequate dispositional attitudes. This possibility implies that Hick can be understood to represent the thesis that utterances about God are true insofar as they relate to God in se. Whether or not an utterance is related to God in se can be found out by studying the dispositional attitude that the utterance, or the larger complex of utterances to which it belongs, provokes. Hick's evaluation of the potential truth of religious statements in relation to the dispositional attitude they provoke constitutes, in the aforementioned interpretation of Hick's position, a methodological, rather than an ontological, perspective. The fact that both Hick and Alston, who are two prominent figures in contemporary discussions in the field of philosophy of religion, can be described as metaphysical realists despite the differences between their works shows, if anything, what a strong position metaphysical realism has in contemporary philosophy of religion. Many philosophers of religion seem to regard metaphysical realism as a necessary presupposition for those of us who, like Hick and Alston, want to be able to assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. In the following chapter, I will discuss whether one actually has to be a metaphysical realist in order to be able to understand utterances made in religious contexts as evidence-transcendent truths. I will do this by reconstructing and developing the internal realism that Putnam formulates and advocates. I will look at the criticism Alston levels against internal realism, and I will discuss the internal realist's possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths, and thereby being an epistemological realist. Furthermore, I will relate internal realism to issues concerning religious beliefs, and I will do so on the basis of the assumption that our possibility of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths is essential in religious contexts. Putnam does not share the presuppositions that underlie Alston's criticism and Alston's alethic realism. The main difference between Alston's basic assumptions and those of Putnam is the fact that Putnam, unlike 90

91

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Cf. Hick 1995: 27 Cf. Hick 1995: 51

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Alston, treats truth as a semantic notion. In chapter four, I will explain the idea of truth as a semantic notion. Thereafter, in chapter five, I will discuss semantic realism and semantic anti-realism, respectively. I will then further specify the implications of the supposition that truth is a semantic notion.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNAL REALISM

In this chapter, I will reconstruct the internal realism Putnam formulates as an alternative to metaphysical realism. I will clarify in what sense the internal realist can assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. The possibility of making such an assumption is often considered important in discussions on religion and the philosophy of religion. I will examine whether internal realism is a relativistic position, and I will discuss how it relates to a belief in God's transcendence. The internal realist emphasizes the connections between our values, our criteria of rational acceptability, our concept formation and our conceptions of reality. Unlike Alston, the internal realist treats truth as a semantic notion. This means that she relates our conceptions of truth to our ideas about correct linguistic behavior. I will summarize Alston's criticism of internal realism, hoping thereby to clarify what makes Putnam's position different from that of Alston. In chapter five, I will then further develop the supposition that truth is a semantic notion.

Fact and Value Putnam presents internal realism as a 'third way', a position which is neither a metaphysical realist one, nor an anti-realist one; it is a philosophical position to which the entanglement of truth and rational acceptability is central. Putnam's criticism of metaphysical realism shows that the idea of a reality-in-itself is one we cannot comprehend. We cannot imagine a reality that we can neither experience nor describe. In formulating internal realism, Putnam develops his criticism of metaphysical realism by showing that it is not only an unintelligible philosophical position, but also one for which there is no need. We must resist our desire to try to describe reality from a God's-Eye point of view. It is important to 1

1

a . Buchanan 1999: 556

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underline the fact that we can be realists even if we do not assume that there is a reality-in-itself. In discussing truth, Putnam takes as his starting point the distinction between fact and value. He argues that the idea that there is a sharp distinction between statements about fact and statements expressing our values has become a cultural institution, one which he aims to call into question. Putnam writes: 2

I'm going to rehabilitate a somewhat discredited move in the debate about fact and value, namely the move that consists in arguing that the distinction is at the very least hopelessly fuzzy because factual statements themselves, and the practices of scientific inquiry upon which we rely to decide what is and what is not a fact, presuppose values. 3

For something to be a fact, we must presuppose values, Putnam suggests. '[W]hat counts as the real world depends upon our values.' There are, so to speak, no unconceptualized facts waiting to be discovered. What counts as a fact and what does not is something that we ourselves decide, with the help of our criteria. These criteria are based on our values. If our values had been other than what they are, our criteria and, consequently, what we conceive of as real would also have been different. If so, other states of affairs than the ones we now think of as facts would have counted as facts. We would have had other conceptions of what does and does not exist and about the properties of that which exists. So what are these criteria and values which, according to Putnam, have such an impact on our decisions regarding what is real and what is not? In answering this question, Putnam takes our scientific praxis as an example. Science, more than anything else in our society, seeks to discover facts. We hold that science is the search for truth. If we reject the metaphysical realist idea of a reality-in-itself, this affects our description of what constitutes the scientific search for truth, Putnam argues. He writes: 4

If the notion of comparing our system of beliefs with unconceptualized reality to see if they match makes no sense, then the claim that science seeks to discover the truth can mean no more than that science seeks to construct a world picture which, in the ideal limit, satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability. 5

2 3 4 5

Cf. Putnam 1995: 40 Putnam 1981: 128 Putnam 1981: 137 Putnam 1981: 130

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In science, there are criteria of rational acceptability with the help of which we decide whether a certain theory should be accepted or rejected. If empirical observations verify two or more theories, we should, according to common consensus, choose the simplest theory, the most fruitful one in respect of making new predictions, the easiest one to verify, the easiest one to combine with already accepted theories and the one that has the farthest reach. Our criteria of rational acceptability are based on our values insofar as they reflect that which we value. We prefer simple theories because they are easier to manage. We prefer theories that can be verified, that are fruitful and that have a wide reach because they are conducive to new scientific discoveries and progress. We prefer theories that are compatible with already accepted ones because we strive to avoid contradiction in science and because it is easier to reject a theory which is incompatible with our accepted theories than it is to re-evaluate a theory that we have already accepted as true. If our values had been different, our criteria of rational acceptability might also have been different. If so, perhaps we would have weighed rival theories against each other in a different way and chosen another theory. If we had chosen a different theory, then we would have found ourselves in a world where other states of affairs would have counted as facts. This is because what we count as fact is not independent of theory. Let me illustrate this point. Against the background of a certain theory, a certain conception of what constitutes an object, it may be correct to say that there are twelve objects on my kitchen table. (A book counts as one object, a flower pot with a flower in it counts as one object, a pen with a lid counts as one object and a coffee cup on a saucer counts as two objects, and so on.) Against the background of another theory, related to another conception of what constitutes an object, it may be correct to say that there are 1458 objects on my kitchen table. (Each individual book page counts as one object, each individual flower petal counts as one object, the pen and its lid count as two separate objects and the cup and saucer count as two separate objects, and so on.) In this sense, our choice of theory determines what counts as a fact. Against the background of one particular theory, theory A, the statement 'There are twelve objects on my kitchen table' is true, and against the background of another theory, theory B, the statement 'There are 1458 objects on my kitchen table' is true. What counts as a state of affairs, as a correct description of the mess on my kitchen table, varies with the theory we take as our starting point.

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Given the criteria we use in science when choosing between rival theories, it can be difficult to decide which of two different theories is to be preferred. It is entirely possible for theory A, the one according to which there are twelve objects on my kitchen table, to be, not only very simple, but also compatible with other, already accepted, theories. At the same time, maybe theory B, the one according to which there are 1458 objects on my kitchen table, is more fruitful, easier to verify and has a wider reach. Which of the two theories should we prefer and use? Clearly, we must weigh our various criteria against each other. We must decide what we consider to be most important, what we appreciate the most. The theory we choose to use will affect how we describe reality. This is because theory A and theory B lead to different conceptions of facts, about how things are. It is worth noting that my example of the conflict between theory A and theory B presupposes that the proponents of the two theories agree on what should count as a kitchen table and what should count as a theory. However, in a real conflict situation, it is entirely possible and quite probable that they would not even agree on this. This problem underlines to an even greater extent the fact that we cannot decide what is real and what is true independently of a theory. The theory on which we choose to base our reasoning, and the criteria of rational acceptability that governs our choices, affect our description of reality and our conceptions of what is true. In order for us to be able to think of anything at all as real, we must presuppose some theory, a theory which is connected with some conception of what might constitute an object, and in order for us to be able to weigh two theories against each other, we must use some set of criteria of rational acceptability. Putnam summarizes his position in the one radical statement that, in order for us to have an empirical world at all, we must also have criteria of rational acceptability. I understand Putnam to mean that, unless we have criteria of rational acceptability, we cannot decide which of two incompatible theories we ought to choose. Unless we can decide which of two incompatible theories we ought to choose, we are not entitled to presuppose a certain theory as our starting point. Unless we can presuppose a certain theory, with a certain intelligible conception of what might constitute an object, as our starting point, we cannot talk about an empirical reality in any meaningful sense of the word. 6

6

Putnam 1981: 134

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Whatever applies in science applies in our everyday lives, as well. In our everyday lives, we may not talk about theories or make choices that we are aware of making between different conceptions of how many objects there are on the kitchen table; nevertheless, we always decide what counts as real and true in relation to some conception of what is rationally acceptable. We normally take the conception of what is true and real that we have learnt to think of as rationally acceptable for granted without stopping to consider that perhaps this conception ought to be rejected in favor of another one, either against the background of other criteria of rational acceptability, or because it is possible to weigh different criteria against each other in a different way, thereby acquiring another conception. However, we do sometimes run into conflict and discussion in our everyday lives, as well, even if this does not happen on a regular basis. For example, it is often the case that children and adults do not count objects in the same way, and they do not always agree on where the boundary between the real and the unreal is, or on what is rationally acceptable.

Eudaemonia Putnam argues that our criteria of rational acceptability 'is part of our idea of human cognitive flourishing, and hence part of our idea of total human flourishing, of Eudaemonia'. It is difficult to find a good translation that describes what Eudaemonia really is. Putnam, like Aristotle, uses the word as a term signifying the good or happy human life. However, it should be noted that Eudaemonia does not primarily refer to what we mean by the term la dolce vita. Rather, it is more about what is wholesome than what is enjoyable, though enjoyment is by no means uninteresting in this context. (It is quite often wholesome for us to enjoy life.) In the following, I will use the term 'the good life', in the sense of 'the ideal life', human life when it allows us fully to be human. The good life relates both to what is enjoyable and to what is wholesome. In this sense, the good life is some kind of third way, where life contains enough enjoyment for it to be called good, but not so much that it actually does us harm. The good life is closely linked to the human constitution, both bodily and psychologically. The human constitution is that which we share with 7

8

7 8

Putnam 1981: 134 See Putnam 1990: 291

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all creatures we conceive of as humans. The make-up of the human constitution, what we humans are like, what it is to be a human, are all issues that are open to discussion, like the question regarding how many objects there are on my kitchen table. The human constitution has changed and developed throughout history, as has our descriptions of it. Different conceptions of who counts as a creature in which the human constitution is realized, that is, who counts as a real human, have come and gone. Are women real humans? Are Africans real humans? Are foeti real humans? Questions such as these have been given different answers by different people, and they are still being given different answers. We cannot once and for all give a universally acceptable definition of the human constitution, of who have the right to be thought of as humans and of what constitutes the good life for humans. As always, our description of the way things are is dependent on our criteria of rational acceptability and the compatibility of these criteria to our values and, as already noted, both our values and our criteria of rational acceptability can vary. However, the fact that our values and our criteria of rational acceptability can vary does not mean that we can formulate just any description of the human constitution and of the good life. Just like all conceivable scientific theories cannot be said to be of use to us, so all conceivable conceptions of humans and the good life cannot be said to be of use to us, either. We cannot once and for all specify what is required for a theory or a conception to be of use to us. It is possible that a number of different theories and conceptions may be of use in different situations, to different people or to varying degrees. However, there are certain theories and conceptions that can never be of use to us in any situation or to any degree. If a scientific theory is to be of any use to us, it must make it possible for us to say something true about what is observable. For example, a theory stating that humans can walk through closed doors is not a useful theory. True, what is observable is open to discussion, and the notion that good theories should enable us to say something true about what is observable is also open to discussion; nevertheless, the constitution of empirical reality as we perceive it imposes a limit on what theories we can accept. Independently of a theory, we cannot decide what should count as the outer world, but we cannot accept just any theories about the outer world, either — not if we want our theories to be of any use to us. The same can be said about the human constitution and the values that go hand in hand with it. For a certain conception of the human constitution to be reasonable, it must be compatible with our experiences of ourselves and of other people. True, what counts as a relevant experience in

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the present context is open to discussion, and the notion that reasonable conceptions of the human constitution must be compatible with relevant experiences is also open to discussion; nevertheless, our own constitution imposes a certain limit on our conceptions of that constitution. Independently of all perspectives, we cannot decide what counts as the human constitution, but we cannot accept just any conceptions of ourselves, either — not if we want these conceptions to be of any use to us, and if we want them to enable us to grow in our understanding of ourselves and of other people. The human constitution is associated with certain needs. Our needs cause us to value certain things, things which can satisfy these needs. Our needs have a considerable influence on what we appreciate and they mold our criteria of rational acceptability by causing us to prefer theories and conceptions which are compatible with actions enabling us to satisfy these needs. What counts as the good life is dependent upon our constitution. The good life should be good for creatures that are like us. What counts as the good life is also dependent upon the environment. The good life should be good for creatures living in an environment similar to ours. Putnam conceives of the good life as holistic. He sees it as some form of balance. Such a balance enables us humans to be fully human and to satisfy our needs. Thus, we will have neither too much nor too little of what is good in life. The balance of the good life would be different for humans having a constitution that was radically different from ours, since their needs would be different from our needs. The balance of the good life would also be different for humans living in a radically different environment, since their possibilities of satisfying their needs would be different from our possibilities of satisfying our needs. Our conceptions of what constitutes the balance of the good life relate to the human constitution and to the environment; however, this balance may imply and contain different things, even when a certain conception of the human constitution and a certain description of the environment are taken for granted. The good life for humans can be shaped in a number of different ways, even though there is a limit to what variations are possible. Just as, when there is a conflict of theories, we may have to weigh a theory which is simple and compatible with already accepted theories against a theory which is easier to verify, more fruitful and which has a wider reach, so, too, we may 9

9

Cf. Putnam 1981: 136

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have to weigh different conceptions of the good life against each other, conceptions which differ with respect to what human needs they emphasize. One conception might consider our physical needs to be primary whereas another conception might give greater weight to our social needs. Does this hypothetical plurality with respect to the balance of the good life imply some form of relativism? Does it imply that we must consider every conception of the good life to be equally good as every other conception? Putnam thinks not. He stresses that '[w]e reject ideals of human flourishing as wrong, as infantile, as sick, as one-sided'. We can discuss which description of the good life we should accept, just as, in science, we can discuss which theory should be preferred and which conception of the human constitution applies in a certain situation. This is because we are always born into an already conceptualized reality. In taking our concept formation and our criteria of rational acceptability for granted, we have a starting point which enables us to maintain that certain conceptions of the good life ought to be rejected. This possibility leads Putnam to reject relativism. 10

Fact, Value and Conceptual Scheme As is the case with Quine's reflections on ontological relativity, Putnam's reflections on the distinction between fact and value indicate a certain tension between what is possible in principle and what is possible in practice. In principle, we can imagine that our values could be radically different. In principle, we can imagine that our idea of what counts as a fact could be radically different. In principle, we can toy with the idea that our conceptions of what counts as the good life could be radically different from our actual ones. In principle, we can imagine that our concept formation could be completely different from the one we use at present. In practice, however, our possibilities of using radically different starting points are significantly reduced. We are always born into a human community which takes a certain concept formation, certain facts, certain values and certain conceptions of what counts as the good life for granted. True, these are by no means fixed quantities. They develop throughout the course of history. Thus, they resemble Neurath's ship, which can be 11

10 11

Putnam 1981: 148 Cf. Briimmer 1992: 20

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rebuilt, plank by plank, as it sails across the ocean. However, I as an individual cannot restructure our common bark according to my own design. I must always assume and relate to the concept formation, the facts, the values and the conceptions of the good life that are taken for granted in the human community of which I am part. This tension between what is possible in principle and what is possible in practice is not the only point of contact between Putnam's reflections on fact and value, on the one hand, and Quine's reflections on ontological relativity, on the other. At times, Putnam ties our values, our facts and the theoretical possibilities of choice on which we base our conceptual scheme very closely together. He writes: 'I have argued that the choice of a conceptual scheme necessarily reflects value judgements'. He continues: 12

The position I have defended is that any choice of a conceptual scheme presupposes values, and the choice of a scheme for describing ordinary interpersonal relations and social facts, not to mention thinking about one's own life plan, involves, among other things, one's moral values. One cannot choose a scheme which simply 'copies' the facts, because no conceptual scheme is a mere 'copy' of the world. The notion of truth itself depends for its content on our standards of rational acceptability, and these in turn rest on and presuppose our values. Put schematically and too briefly, I am saying that theory of truth presupposes theory of rationality which in turn presupposes our theory of the good. 13

Putnam imagines that, given other fundamental values, our conceptual resources and our criteria of rational acceptability could both look radically different. A different conceptual scheme and different criteria of rational acceptability would cause other utterances about reality to be regarded as correct and as constituting correct descriptions of reality. Putnam reasons that our choice of conceptual scheme, our values, our criteria of rational acceptability and our conceptions of what counts as facts, as truths, interconnect. Putnam calls the close connection between fact and value that he talks about 'the entanglement of fact and value'. He illustrates this notion with the help of an example about the Nazis. There are considerable differences in moral values between the Nazis and us anti-Nazis. These differences, he suggests, can be discerned in the different criteria of rational acceptability that we and the Nazis make use of; consequently, by our 14

12 13 14

Putnam 1981: 212 Putnam 1981: 215 Putnam 1990: 165

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standards, the Nazis display an irrational conception of reality. (Perhaps they argue that the gas chambers of World War II never existed, that all the evidence of an extensive extermination of the Jewish people are nothing but lies made up by various historians.) Ultimately, then, the conflict between us and the Nazis becomes more than a conflict of different values. It becomes a conflict of fact. Putnam asks the rhetorical question: 'When and where did a Nazi and an anti-Nazi, a communist and a social democrat, a fundamentalist and a liberal, or even a Republican and a Democrat, agree on the facts?' Putnam states that our ability to describe facts correctly depends on what values we have. A culture that rejects our moral values would be unable to describe facts in what we perceive to be a correct way. He writes: 'I argued that a culture which repudiated ordinary moral notions, or substituted notions derived from a different ideology and moral outlook for them, would lose the ability to describe ordinary interpersonal relations, social events and political events adequately and perspicuously by our present lights.'* Putnam emphasizes that the problem with Nazism is not that it is irrational; rather, the problem is the actions that it leads to. However, the evil deeds perpetrated by the Nazis are bound up with irrational conceptions, conceptions which, in turn, derive from the values held by the Nazis. Putnam writes: 15

6

I wish to emphasize that I am not saying that what is had about being a Nazi is that it leads one to have warped and irrational beliefs. What is bad about being a Nazi is what it leads you to do. The Nazi is evil and he also has an irrational view of the world. These two facts about the Nazi are connected and interrelated; but that does not mean the Nazi is evil primarily because he has an irrational view of the world in the sense that the irrationality of his world view constitutes the evil. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which we may speak of goals being rational or irrational here, it seems to me: goals which are such that, if one accepts them and pursues them then one will either be led to offer crazy and false arguments for them (if one accepts the task of justifying them within our normal conceptual scheme), or else one will be led to adopt an alternative scheme for representing ordinary moral-descriptive facts (e.g. that someone is compassionate) which is irrational, have the right to be called 'irrational goals'. There is a connection, after all, between employing a rational conceptual scheme in describing and perceiving morally relevant facts and having certain general types of goals as opposed to others. 17

1 Putnam 1990: 167 Putnam 1981: 212 ' Putnam 1981: 213 5

16

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Putnam reasons that our goals, that is, that for which we strive, can be either rational or irrational. We can reject conceptions of the good life, for example the ones formulated by Nazis, with the explanation that they are irrational, that is, they are not in agreement with our criteria of rational acceptability. Moreover, Putnam suggests that conceptual schemes can also be either rational or irrational. Like our goals, they can be evaluated according to our present criteria of rational acceptability. A conceptual scheme can be regarded as irrational if it can not be used to give what we perceive to be a correct description of reality. Putnam rejects the idea that his conception of our values would reduce them to a matter of opinion. The conflict of value that exists between Nazis and anti-Nazis is not at all the same type of conflict as the one that exists between Jones, who prefers vanilla ice cream, and Smith, who prefers chocolate ice cream. The big difference, Putnam argues, lies in the fact that, unlike our ice cream flavor preferences, our view of the Jewish people is related to our character, that is, to the virtues for which we strive and to the conceptions of right and wrong according to which we live our lives. Some philosophers consider Putnam's position to be too relativistic: Does it not imply that we must regard all imaginable values to be acceptable in the context in which they are expressed? Can Putnam and likeminded philosophers really talk about objective values at all? Is it possible, according to this line of reasoning, to claim that Nazism ought to be rejected by all people, in all places and at all times, without exception? Does Putnam's position not require us to limit our claims, to say that they apply only to certain people, for example the people who subscribe to the conceptual scheme with the help of which the utterance has been formulated, or the people who accept the values to which the rejection is connected? In response, Putnam points out that it is not his ambition to make ethics relativistic. On the contrary, he claims, he is striving in the opposite direction, and it is in working towards this aim that he argues against metaphysical realism and develops his ideas of internal realism. Putnam writes: 18

Today we tend to bee too realistic about physics and too subjectivistic about ethics, and these are connected tendencies. It is because we are too realistic about physics, because we see physics (or some hypothetical future physics) as the One True Theory, and not simply as a rationally acceptable

'» Sec Putnam 1981: 152-3

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description suited for certain problems and purposes, that we tend to be subjectivistic about descriptions we cannot 'reduce' to physics. Becoming less realistic about physics and becoming less subjectivistic about ethics are likewise connected. 19

Putnam points out that '[t]he idea that values are not part of the Furniture of the World and the idea that 'value judgements' are expressions of 'prejudice' are two sides of the same coin'. The philosopher maintaining that our values are not easily incorporated into a completely independent reality would be likely to see these values as no more than a matter of opinion. Internal realism is not a relativistic position with respect to either factual statements or value judgements. The fact that different conceptual schemes enable us to describe reality in various different ways does not imply that the true statements which we formulate with the help of a certain conceptual scheme are less true. It does not mean that we must regard certain statements as true only within the limits of a specific conceptual scheme, and only for the people who use that conceptual scheme. On the contrary, it is entirely possible for us to hold that these statements are true for all people, in all places and at all times, without exception. Similarly, the internal realist argues that we can pronounce certain actions to be wrong for all people, in all places and at all times, without exception, although the very wrongness of these actions presupposes a certain conceptual scheme and values that are connected with that scheme. Just as, against the background of a certain conceptual scheme, we can claim that the Aztec belief about the gods was false, we can, against the background of a certain conceptual scheme, claim that the human sacrifices carried out by the Aztecs ought to be condemned. What applies to our factual statements also applies to our value judgements. Putnam draws a parallel to the example about the Nazis, arguing that 20

the feature of the Aztec way of life that troubles us (the massive human sacrifice) and the belief about the world that conflicts with science were interdependent. If we can say that the Aztec belief about the gods was false, why can we not say that the practice to which it led was wrong (although, to be sure, understandable given the false factual belief)? If we are not allowed to call the practice wrong, why are we allowed to call the belief false? The so-called absolute and the ethical are just as entangled as the 'factual' and the ethical. 21

19 2 0 21

Putnam 1981: 143 Putnam 1981: 215 Putnam 1990: 175

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What we cannot do, Putnam suggests, is to imagine that there is a completely independent reality-in-itself, a reality-in-itself which determines what is an objective fact and what is an objective value. However, what we should do, he goes on, is to emphasize that, given our conceptualized reality, there are objective facts and objective values. He writes: The anthropologist's examples (when they are good ones) show that right and wrong, for example, are relative to circumstances, not that there is no right and wrong at all, even in specified circumstances. [...] Certain things are right — objectively right — in certain circumstances and wrong — objectively wrong — in others, and the culture and the environment constitute relevant circumstances. About this the anthropologist is right. But this is not the same thing as values being 'relative' in the sense of being mere matters of opinion or taste. 22

Although we cannot talk about objectivity in the metaphysical realist sense of the word, in relation to facts or values, this does not mean that we cannot talk about objectivity at all. Putnam occasionally cites John Austin's remark that 'enough is enough, enough isn't everything'. We cannot do all the things the metaphysical realist desires, but we can do enough to be able to talk about objective facts and objective values. Given our conceptual resources and the values to which they connect, we are able to talk about objective facts and objective values. This, Putnam suggests, is enough. \ 23

Putnam and Truth

>

<

Putnam's treatment of the distinction between fact and value is based on Quine's reflections on analytic and synthetic truths. Quine contends the idea that there is 'some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact'. He calls this cleavage, this distinction, between analytic and synthetic truths, the first dogma of empiricism. He writes: 24

It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. [...] Thus one is tempted to suppose in general'that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this supposition, it next seems reasonable that in 2 2 23 2 4

Putnam 1981: 161-2 See, for example, Putnam 1990: 121 Quine 1990: 26

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some statements the factual component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. 23

The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements that Quine talks about is related to the reductionism that he claims is part of empiricism. This reductionism can be clearly discerned in the second dogma of empiricism, that is, in the assumption that there are statements that can be confirmed or confuted independently of other statements. Quine writes: The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information at all. [...] More directly, the one dogma clearly supports the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and information of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic. The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical. 26

Quine's concept of meaning, that is, his thesis that meaning is that which is preserved in translation, as well as his holism, all stem from his criticism of the two dogmas of empiricism. Unlike Quine, Alston assumes, both that a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths can be upheld, and that propositions can be confirmed or confuted in isolation from each other. Putnam, by contrast, bases his reasoning on Quine's ideas. His criticism of the sharp distinction between fact and value is based on Quine's criticism of the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Quine denies that we can discern separate linguistic and factual components in our statements. Putnam also denies this. In addition, Putnam denies that we can discern separate factual and value-related components in our conceptual schemes. Quine argues that the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths presupposes a certain concept of meaning, a concept of meaning that is untenable. Putnam agrees. In addition, Putnam argues that the sharp distinction between fact and value presupposes certain unintelligible conceptions of what it means that something is true. 27

25 26 27

Quine 1990: 34 Quine 1990: 36 Cf. Alston 1996a: 7, 27

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Behind Putnam's reflections on truth lies the idea that a sharp distinction between fact and value is untenable. Our criteria of rational acceptability always relate to our values, and they always have a considerable impact on what we conceive of as fact. Consequently, what we conceive of as fact is always linked to our values. Putnam's clarification of what the assumption that truth is idealized rational acceptability implies is useful in that it helps to explain the relationship that exists between facts and our criteria of rational acceptability. In Representation and Reality, Putnam writes: In Reason, Truth and History I explained the idea thus: 'truth is idealized rational acceptability.' This formulation was taken by many as meaning that 'rational acceptability' (and the notion of 'better and worse epistemic situation,' which 1 also employed) is supposed (by me) to be more basic than 'truth'; that I was offering a reduction of truth to epistemic notions. Nothing was farther from my intention. The suggestion is simply that truth and rational acceptability are interdependent notions. Unfortunately, in Reason, Truth and History I gave examples of only one side of the interdependence: examples of the way truth depends on rational acceptability. But it seems clear to me that the dependence goes both ways: whether an epistemic situation is any good or not typically depends on whether many different statements are true. * 2

Alston has described Putnam's conception of truth as epistemic since it 'identifies] truth with some favorable epistemic status of the truthbearer'. Putnam stresses that it is not his intention to define truth in terms of verification. As I understand Putnam's reflections on truth, they are an expression of the idea that truth and rational acceptability are as closely linked and as indistinguishable as fact and value, and that they should be regarded as such. One can call this relationship 'the entanglement of truth and rational acceptability'. Putnam emphasizes that without criteria of rational acceptability, we would not have any truths and we would not be able to make the belief that something is true intelligible. I, like Alston, call Putnam's conception of truth epistemic; however, what I mean by the term epistemic differs from what Alston means. As I see it, epistemic conceptions of truth rest on the principle that questions and assumptions about what is true must always be understood in relation to something epistemic if the idea that something is true is to be intelligible to us. 29

30

28 29 30

Putnam 1988: 115 Alston 1996a: 188 Putnam 1995: 11

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Putnam argues that his epistemic conception of truth does not imply that what is true is dependent on us, nor that it can vary from person to person, from culture to culture, or throughout the course of history. Instead, he argues that truth is objective — but with a small ' o ' . He explains that 'to say that truth is objective (with a small 'o') is just to say that it is a property of truth that whether a sentence is true is logically independent of whether a majority of the members of the culture believe it to be true'. According to Putnam, what is true is not decided by a majority decision. This means, among other things, that we are right in saying that the Aztec belief about the gods has always been false, even though, at the time, the majority of the Aztecs believed it to be true. This means that we can rightly argue that, for example, 'the belief in the Divine Right of Kings lacks, and always lacked, an adequate rational basis' even though the majority of people in the Middle Ages believed otherwise. Some true statements can only be expressed within the framework of a certain conceptual scheme. This does not mean, however, that the truth of the statements is dependent on this conceptual scheme. Some philosophers argue that only within the framework of metaphysical realism can it be possible to talk about states of affairs in reality as being independent of us and our perspective on reality. However, this is not the case. In developing non-metaphysical realism in chapter six, I will discuss our possibilities of talking about an independent reality. However, it should be pointed out in relation to the present discussion as well, that not only the non-metaphysical but also the internal realist, arguing that 'the real world is "our world" or the "human" world, or a world-as-it-is for us', is able to assume that there are states of affairs in reality that are independent of us and our perspective on reality. We state, for example, that the sky is blue. We consider this statement to be true. This means that, according to us, the sky would have been blue even if our conceptual resources had been radically different and we had had completely different concepts of color, and even if there had been no human beings around to state that the sky is blue. Thus, the color of the sky is not dependent on us. However, the fact that the sky is blue, and the statement that it is blue, cannot exist independently of us and our conceptual resources. Independently of us and our conceptual resources, 31

32

33

34

35

31 3 2 33 34 35

Putnam 1988: 109 Putnam 1981: 157 Cf. Sosa 1993: 621 See, for example, Meynell 1995: 340 Quotation from Blackburn 1994: 12

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the fact that the sky is blue cannot be discerned, and the statement that the sky is blue cannot be formulated. In principle, but not in practice, it is we and the decisions we make that make our statements true or false and determine what counts as a fact. Our conceptual distinctions provide conceptual possibilities for us. These conceptual possibilities, in turn, determine what statements we can formulate. Given that the only things we can conceive of as facts are the things we can conceptualize and formulate statements about, the fact that the sky is blue can, in principle, be described as being dependent on us and our conceptual resources. Independently of us and our conceptual resources, the statement that the sky is blue cannot be formulated. It is meaningless to talk about statements that cannot be formulated. Therefore, we cannot, in a meaningful way, maintain that such statements can be true. 36

Sufficiently Good Conditions for Justification Putnam used to talk about truth and rational acceptability under ideal epistemic conditions as being interdependent ideas. He no longer talks about ideal epistemic conditions, however. Instead, he talks about epistemic conditions or situations as being sufficiently good for justification. This is because the term 'ideal' turned out to cause a number of misconceptions. Putnam explains:

37

When I presented this view in Reason, Truth and History, I employed the fiction of 'ideal epistemic conditions,' but in spite of my warning that this was a fiction, many readers took it literally. For this reason, from then on I have used the notion of 'sufficiently good' epistemic conditions [...] 38

The term 'ideal epistemic conditions' could easily mislead the reader to believe that there is a certain 'ideal' situation in which a certain statement must be justifiable if we are to understand what it implies that it is true. By contrast, the term 'sufficiently good epistemic conditions' draws our attention to the fact that there may well be several different situations in which sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement can be realized. The term also serves to underline the fact that we are the ones to decide what should be conceived of as sufficiently good

36 37 38

This line of reasoning is based on Putnam 1996: 302 See, for example, Putnam 1994b: 462 Putnam 1994c: 289, note 4

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epistemic conditions and, consequently, what content we give to the supposition that a certain statement is true. Despite the concept swap, Putnam has not abandoned the position he aimed to establish when he used the word 'ideal'. Not all utterances conforming to our criteria of rational acceptability are necessarily true. Putnam emphasizes that the rational acceptability he thinks of as being closely related to our conception of truth leads to 'an idealization of justification', something which, in his opinion, constitutes one of the differences between his and Dummett's positions. When we state that a certain utterance is true, we are not only, or even always, saying that it conforms to the criteria of rational acceptability, as far as we can determine at the present time. Instead, what we are saying is that the utterance would be rationally acceptable if the epistemic conditions were sufficiently good for us to be able to decide whether it is true. Ideal conditions, then, are simply conditions that are sufficiently good for us to be able to decide whether an utterance is true, by applying our criteria of rational acceptability. Suppose I were to state that there is a planet orbiting the sun, a planet that is closer to the sun than Mercury is, but that the scientists have not yet discovered. I will call this planet Vulcan. There are no observable phenomena indicating that Vulcan really exists. According to our criteria of rational acceptability, it would in fact be irrational to assume that Vulcan does exist. Planet Vulcan can neither be observed directly, through our telescopes, nor can it be observed indirectly, through other phenomena in space. The fact that it is irrational, according to our criteria of rational acceptability, to state that Vulcan exists does not, however, falsify the statement. (Of course, it does mean that people will think you are quite mad, or at least very eccentric, if you do state that Vulcan exists.) What determines whether the statement that Vulcan exists is true or false is whether or not Vulcan exists. If the planet exists and the statement that it does is consequently true, this means that we human beings would consider it to be rationally acceptable, under sufficiently good conditions, to state that it exists. In this sense, ideal rational acceptability and truth are interlinked ideas. Our ideas about ideal rational acceptability clarify what it implies that something is true. What constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement is open to discussion. Some would argue that we 19

40

39 40

Putnam 1983: 84 This example was inspired by Dummett 1993: 284

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really do have access to sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a statement about the existence of Vulcan — by means of telescope. On this view, since the planet in question cannot be observed through a telescope, it does not exist. Others would argue that we would have access to sufficiently good conditions if we were able to send a spacecraft to orbit the sun just inside of Mercury. We cannot (as yet) do this; therefore, we cannot yet decide whether the statement that Vulcan exists is true. We can only conclude that there is nothing to indicate that it is true. What constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification varies with the type of statement we are dealing with. The sufficiently good conditions for a rational acceptance of the statement 'There is a woodpecker on the telephone pole outside my bedroom window' are completely different from the sufficiently good conditions for a rational acceptance of the statement 'There are black holes'. At times, each and every one of us can get ourselves into a sufficiently good epistemic situation for justification; at other times, expert knowledge is required. In certain cases, we can provide what we consider to be sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement and in other cases we are not yet able to get ourselves into a sufficiently good position, and perhaps we never will be. However, for us to be able to say that we understand what it means that a certain statement is true, it is imperative that we always have an idea of what might constitute sufficiently good conditions for an investigation into whether or not the statement is rationally acceptable. What is believed to be sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement varies across temporal and cultural boundaries. This is one of the reasons why people in different cultures and time periods regard different statements as true. This does not mean, however, that that which is true is only true for the people who consider it to be true. Given our conception of what might constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement, we can maintain that the statement in question is true not only for us but also for people who do not share our conception of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification. However, it is impossible for us to comprehend what it implies that the statement is true independently of all conceptions of what might constitute sufficiently good conditions for justification. Idealized rational acceptability, Putnam argues, is closely related to our conceptual resources insofar as it is linked to ideas about correct linguistic behavior and to the correct usage of our conceptual resources.

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To say that something is rationally acceptable in a situation where sufficiently good conditions for justification are realized is to say that we consider a speaker in that situation to be justified in making the statement in question. In other words, the statement would be a manifestation of correct linguistic behavior. The supposition that truth is a semantic notion implies, I argue, that our conceptions of truth are thought of as being linked to our ideas about correct linguistic behavior. Putnam relates our conceptions of truth to our criteria of rational acceptability and to our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification; these criteria and these ideas are outlined in our conceptions of what constitutes correct linguistic behavior. Putnam, who, unlike Alston, talks about statements rather than propositions, as being true or false, writes: The suggestion I am making, in short, is that a statement is true of a situation just in case it would be correct to use the words of which the statement consists in that way in describing the situation. [...] we can explain what 'correct to use the words of which the statement consists in that way' means by saying that it means nothing more nor less than that a sufficiently well placed speaker who used the words in that way would be fully warranted in counting the statement as true of that situation. 41

I suggest that this link that exists between our conceptual resources, on the one hand, and ideal rational acceptability, on the other, make it possible for the internal realist to imagine truths to be objective by universalizing our current conceptual scheme. In using our conceptual resources to make a statement, we assume that what it implies for our statement to be true is that, when a speaker who finds herself in a situation where sufficiently good conditions for justification are realized, (that is, sufficiently good by our standards and in a way that is appropriate for the statement in question), and who makes the statement we make, would (against the background of our criteria of rational acceptability) be fully warranted in accepting our statement as true. In universalizing our current conceptual scheme, we are universalizing our conceptual resources (and the possibilities and limitations associated with them with respect to making statements) and our values (especially the criteria of rational acceptability and the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification to which they lead). By universalizing our current conceptual scheme, we are able to maintain that, for example, in making the statement that our Planet Earth is the centre of the universe, the astronomers 4 1

Putnam 1988: 115

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of classical antiquity uttered a falsity, regardless of the fact that their conceptual resources were completely different from ours (since their use of the concepts 'universe' and 'planet' differed from our present use of these concepts) and regardless of the fact that their criteria of rational acceptability were completely different from ours. In this sense, truths can be objective given the starting point we currently assume, a starting point that could have been different in the past and that can be different again in future. What Putnam emphasizes is that, for our conceptions of truth to be intelligible to us, they must relate to our current conceptual scheme. It is in this context that his at first sight somewhat odd statement that 'truth does not transcend use' ought to be understood. If we are to understand what it means for truths to be truths, they must never transcend our linguistic ability. Our criteria of rational acceptability and our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification do not transcend our linguistic ability; rather, they are related to it and to the values mirrored in the conceptual scheme we use. Our criteria of rational acceptability and our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification can be discerned in our ideas about correct linguistic behavior. For truths to be truths at all, Putnam asserts, we must regard them as such, namely as truths that we can express with the help of our conceptual resources and that we would conceive of as rationally acceptable if sufficiently good conditions for justification were realized. Truths we cannot express and truths we cannot imagine that we would ever be rationally entitled to accept are truths that we simply cannot understand at all. 42

Alston's Criticism Alston criticizes Putnam's reflections on how truth relates to rational acceptability. In so doing, Alston summarizes Putnam's conception of truth and calls it the 'Ideal Justification Conception (IJC)'. It should be pointed out that what Alston criticizes is primarily Putnam's position as formulated in Reason, Truth and History; consequently, Alston talks about ideal, rather than sufficiently good, conditions for justification. Alston argues that the IJC consists of the following thesis: 'To say of a belief that it is true is to say that it would be justifiable in a situation

4 2

Putnam 1988: 115

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in which all relevant evidence (reasons, considerations) is readily available.' However, I would suggest that Alston's summary falls short in respect of one essential point. What is important here is that we humans are able to justify a true belief if sufficiently good conditions are realized. In summarizing Putnam's IJC, Alston fails to acknowledge the fact that the internal realist emphasizes our human perspective. Alston outlines what he understands to be three considerable difficulties affecting the IJC. First, he points out, it may be the case that there are true propositions that are nevertheless unjustifiable even under ideal conditions; such propositions would disprove the thesis that true propositions are always justified when ideal conditions are realized. Alston imagines that there may be entire dimensions that cannot be reached by human cognition. Propositions pertaining to such dimensions can be true and yet it may be impossible for us humans to justify them, even under ideal conditions. To illustrate his argument, Alston formulates an example about the nature of God. Although philosophers of religion have a great deal to say about God and God's properties, many theologians and, above all, many mystics, have pointed out that God's inner nature is unattainable as far we humans are concerned. The nature of God is and always will be a mystery to us, even when entirely ideal conditions are realized. This objection is an interesting one as it is closely related to Putnam's current reflections on the connection between truth and justification under sufficiently good conditions. Does Putnam think it possible that utterances about the nature of God can be unjustifiable even under sufficiently good conditions — and yet be true? Or is he suggesting that we simply cannot make true statements about the nature of God unless we can imagine what it implies that our statement is true, that is, unless we can imagine sufficiently good conditions for the justification of the statement in question? I will develop the latter argument when I discuss how Putnam's internal realism relates to questions touching upon what we can say about God. Second, Alston declares that Putnam's IJC is a circular argument in that we cannot specify what we mean by an ideal situation without presupposing an understanding of what it implies that something is true. If we are to count a proposition as epistemically justified, it is necessary that we should think it probable for the proposition to be true. If we are to count something as evidence for a proposition, it is necessary that we 43

44

43 44

Alston 1996a: 194 Alston 1996a: 199-211

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should have some knowledge about the evidence put forward. Such knowledge implies, for example, that what we have knowledge about is true. If we are to regard something as relevant evidence, it is necessary that the evidence put forward should increase the probability for the truth of the proposition. Putnam's IJC thus seems to presuppose that we can talk about truth. Alston notes that Putnam is aware of this circularity of the IJC. In his recent work, Putnam makes it clear that truth and justification under sufficiently good conditions are interrelated. He makes no attempt to define truth in terms of ideal justification, something which would be impossible given the circularity of the IJC. Alston concludes, therefore, that Putnam's argumentation is no longer affected by this second objection to the same extent as it used to be. Third, Alston formulates what he calls an intensional argument against Putnam's IJC; in so doing, he aims to show that there are reasons why we should deny that a justification under ideal circumstances would somehow be involved when we talk about truth. Alston declares: On a realist conception of truth the fact that sugar is sweet is both necessary and sufficient for its being true that sugar is sweet. [...] Nothing more is required for its being true that p than just the fact that p; and nothing less will suffice. How then can some epistemic status of the proposition (belief, statement) that p be necessary and sufficient for the truth of/?? It seems clear that the imposition of an epistemic necessary and sufficient condition for truth runs into conflict with the T-schema. 45

As I have noted elsewhere, Alston's observation about the T-schema's conflicting with an epistemic conception of truth presupposes his own formulation and use of the T-schema. Alston takes care to point out that his T-schema differs from Tarski's Convention T. Tarski's Convention T results in extensional biconditionals, biconditionals stating that what stands on the left of the phrase 'if and only if has the same truth-value as what stands on the right of it; by contrast, Alston's T-schema relates to intensionality. Alston emphasizes that the biconditionals that he formulates with the help of his T-schema are conceptually true and therefore necessarily true. It seems to me that Alston's account of the difference between Tarski's biconditionals and the ones Alston formulates himself, with the help of his T-schema, does not treat the Tarskian biconditionals correctly. In fact, 46

4 5 4 6

Alston 1996a: 209 Alston 1996a: 210

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Alston disregards the fact that not only his own but also Tarski's biconditionals relate to intensionality. True, Tarski does not treat the Tsentences that we can form with the help of the T-schema as necessarily true. However, he does argue that the meta-language sentence that should be inserted into the T-schema needs to be a translation of the object language sentence in question. In this sense, both sentences should have the same intension. The fact that the sentence standing on the left and the sentence standing on the right of the phrase 'if and only if have the same extension, that is, are both true, is not enough to convince Tarski that the T-sentence formulated is an adequate T-sentence in accordance with Convention T. In discussing Davidson's work in chapter six, I will discuss the intensional aspect of Tarski's biconditionals and their implications it greater detail. Apart from the three objections summarized above, Alston directs yet further criticism against Putnam's epistemic conception of truth. One of his arguments merits a closer look. This is the argument that Putnam seems to run the risk of ending up in an infinite regress. Alston writes: We can no longer suppose that there is a unique, context-free answer to the question of what is relevant evidence for settling a given question. It is recognized on all hands that this is relative to certain background assumptions. Given the theory of general relativity, what is relevant to determining the age of the universe is radically different from what is relevant to that issue, given Newtonian physics. From a psychoanalytic perspective what is relevant for deciding on the etiology of Jim's obsession is quite different from what is relevant from a behavioristic perspective. Thus there is no unique set of relevant considerations for a given statement. It all depends on the assumptions with which we are working. And how are those assumptions to be chosen for 'ideal epistemic conditions'? They would have to be the assumptions that we are most justified in accepting. But most justified relative to what further background assumptions? An infinite regress looms. 47

The regress Alston describes serves to clarify an important point with respect to Alston's own position, a point which concerns questions about how Alston relates to metaphysical realism. The regress need not trouble those philosophers who are not striving towards one true description of reality. Given certain presuppositions, certain situations are ideal or sufficiently good. Given other presuppositions, other situations are ideal or sufficiently good. A statement can be justified given certain suppositions about what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification and unjustified given other suppositions about what constitutes sufficiently 4 7

Alston 1996a: 198

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good conditions for justification. In Putnam's philosophy, there are no given ideal or sufficiently good conditions for justification. It is in principle possible for us to formulate our criteria of rational acceptability in various ways, thus conceiving of various conditions as sufficiently good for justification. As a result, we may end up with a number of different descriptions of reality, all true. Since Alston is troubled by the regress he finds in Putnam's reasoning, it seems fair to say that what Alston is striving towards is one true description of reality. I argue that Alston's metaphysical realism and his criticism of Putnam's internal realism are symptomatic of his desire to defend epistemological realism. His defence of epistemological realism is, in turn, related to his Christian faith. Alston suspects that a rejection of metaphysical realism necessarily entails a rejection of the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths, a possibility that is often perceived to be essential in discussions on religion and in the philosophy of religion. The question is, is Alston right? Must philosophers belonging to the Putnamian school of thought really reject the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths? It is my intention to demonstrate that this is not the case. The internal realist is no less able to assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths than the metaphysical realist is. She is no less able to be an epistemological realist.

Putnam and Evidence-Transcendence Alston observes in a footnote that, after having published Reason, Truth and History, Putnam has reconsidered the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths. Alston writes: 'Putnam has informed me that he does not now regard justifiability in an ideal situation as a necessary condition of truth.' In recent years, Putnam has developed his ideas about how truth relates to rational acceptability. Although Alston is aware of this fact, he chooses to discuss and criticize Putnam's previous thoughts on how truth relates to rational acceptability. One of the reasons why Alston has made this decision may well be the fact that it is by no means easy to understand what Putnam's current position really is. Some philosophers dislike Putnam's habit of changing positions every so often. Once his readers have begun to understand what he means, he 48

49

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Alston 1996a: 208, note 17 Alston 1996a: 207-8

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suddenly means something else. The humorous book Bluff Your Way in Philosophy has this to say about Putnam: Putnam is [...] perhaps the most distinguished contemporary American philosopher. He is useful to the bluffer because of his engaging habit of completely changing his extremely subtle and complex views on things just as other philosophers are beginning to think that they understand them — about once every ten years or so — outdoing even Wittgenstein. You may thus confidently prefix any claim with the words 'as Putnam says', secure in the knowledge that somewhere, and at some time, he will have done. 50

Although this is an exaggeration, it is certainly true that Putnam has supported a number of different philosophical positions, not least in the realism debates. Giving a chronological summary of his philosophy is not an easy task. His views evolve all the time and it is not always easy to say when the changes happen, or what they imply. However, most philosophers engaging with Putnam and his ideas agree on one thing: that his reasoning can be subdivided into two main periods. During the first period, Putnam supports the metaphysical realism that he then goes on to criticize during the second period. During the second period, he formulates his internal realism. His present concern is that of modifying this internal realist position. These modifications have led him to name his current position common-sense realism or pragmatic realism; this can be described as a third main period in Putnam's philosophical thinking. It should be noted, however, that Putnam's most recent thinking still revolves around the criticism of metaphysical realism which has been his main agenda since the late seventies. What is new to his reasoning is a pronounced interest in the phenomenon of religion. John Passmore has called Putnam 'the history of recent philosophy in outline'. The fact that he has supported and, above all, formulated a number of positions of current interest in the realism debates means that a great deal is required of the philosopher who attempts to describe and analyze the discussions he has been and is involved in. Crispin Wright writes: 'Someone who wants to understand what is essential to the ingredient positions in [Putnam's] progression, and the motives for the moves 51

52

53

54

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5 0 51 5 2 5 3 5 4 55

Hankinson 1996: 41-2 See, for example, Ebbs 1992: 1 Cf. Wright 2000: 335 Wright 2000: 364 Cf. Putnam 1992a: 134-157, Putnam 1997a, Putnam 1997b, Putnam 1997c Passmore, cited in Allen 1994: 665 and Conant 1990: xxxix

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from one position to the next, will need to shoulder a very broad philosophical agenda.' Throughout this book, I repeatedly emphasize that what I aim to do here is not merely to describe Putnam's standpoints and arguments. In addition, I reconstruct his positions and critical reflections. I formulate and support a certain interpretation of his internal realism as well as of his criticism of metaphysical realism. As my main aim is to formulate a nonmetaphysical realist position that can be used by philosophers of religion in their work, I choose to focus and emphasize certain aspects of Putnam's contribution to the realism debates. I discuss those of his reflections which are of use to me as I develop and defend my own standpoints. I personally find Putnam's habit of changing his mind now and then very attractive; it makes me appreciate both Putnam and his philosophical reflections even more than I otherwise would have done. Neither Putnam nor I see the philosopher's task primarily to be to take every chance to proclaim her own conceptions and ideas as the ultimate truth. Instead, philosophy is about maintaining a dialog with others, thereby attempting to formulate philosophical reflections with the help of which we may be able to overcome the problems we encounter. In a dialog, each participant is open to counter-arguments; naturally, this means that it will be necessary to reconsider one's position now and then. As far the entanglement of truth and rational acceptability is concerned, Putnam has reconsidered his position. I would suggest that the main change his views have undergone is that he is no longer convinced that, in embracing the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths, we accept metaphysical realism. Putnam writes: T think we must ask whether it is obvious that commitment to the idea that truth is sometimes recognition-transcendent does really amount to "metaphysical realism.'" He clarifies this change in his reasoning when he writes: 56

57

'Internal realism' is the name that I once gave to a picture of what truth comes to [...] On that picture, a statement is true just in case a competent speaker fully acquainted with the use of the words would be fully rationally warranted in using those words to make the assertion in question, provided she or he were in a sufficiently good epistemic position. Although I no longer accept that picture, I emphasize that this formula was meant to connect the notion of truth to the way in which words are used (including the speech act of assertion) and to the notions of rational acceptability and of sufficiently good epistemic conditions, and I still believe that our understanding of the

;

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Wright 2000: 335 Putnam 1994c: 261

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GOD PRO NOBIS notion of truth is intricately interwoven with our understanding of those notions. But what are 'sufficiently good' epistemic conditions? They are conditions under which one can tell if the assertion in question is true or false! Obviously, if the formula 'an empirical statement is true just in case, etc.' [...] had been intended as a reduction, it would be flagrantly circular. But, as 1 have already said, it was not so intended. The point of the picture was to combine realism with a concession to moderate verificationism (a concession I would no longer make, by the way): the concession was the idea that truth could never be totally recognition-transcendent. 58

What Putnam is currently contesting, it seems to me, is the moderate verificationism that is inherent in internal realism. He is not contesting the fact that truth, correct linguistic behavior and rational acceptability are closely related phenomena. He still emphasizes that we cannot meaningfully imagine the existence of a metaphysical realist reality-in-itself. Putnam writes: A second claim of 'internal realism' — one I have not at all given up; the one I have increasingly emphasized in my writings [...] concerns notions like 'object,' 'entity,' 'property,' and 'existence.' I have argued that it makes no sense to think of the world as dividing itself up into 'objects' (or 'entities') independently of our use of language. It is we who divide up 'the world' — that is, the events, states of affairs, and physical, social, etc., systems that we talk about — into 'objects,' 'properties,' and 'relations,' and we do this in a variety of ways. 'Object,' 'entity,' 'property,' (and 'relation') have not one fixed use but an ever-expanding open family of uses. Because 'exist' and 'entity' are conceptually linked, the same is true of 'exist'. 59

Janet Folina points out that Putnam's internal realism consists of a number of different components, components that cannot easily be combined. She summarizes her understanding of Putnam's reasoning: The important components of the picture Putnam paints are: (i) he rejects realist semantics, and favors some version of an 'assertability conditional' — rather than a 'truth conditional' — account of meaning; (ii) he rejects the realist's metaphysical commitment to the existence of mind-independent reality; (iii) he rejects epistemological skepticism — the acknowledgement of the realist that truth is possibly verification-transcendent. Yet he still wants to call his position 'realism', for (iv) he embraces a concept of truth which is both objective — the belief that there is a gap between what the facts are and what we take them to be — and eternal. 60

58 59 60

Putnam 1994c: 242-3 Putnam 1994c: 243 Folina 1995: 144

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My understanding of how Putnam's description of the entanglement of truth and rational acceptability has changed is that it has become an elaboration of the verificationism indicated in the third item listed by Folina above. I also see Putnam's current position as indicating a rejection of the metaphysical realist's conception of mind-independent reality. However, Putnam now stresses that his rejection of mind-independent reality does not imply a rejection of the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths. As both Putnam and Alston currently hold that there may be evidencetranscendent truths, the most important differences that still exist between their respective positions are the ones outlined in Folina's first item listed above, namely differences with respect to semantic issues. The importance of semantics and how it affects our reflections on truth relates to the supposition that truth is a semantic notion. Putnam relates the question of what it implies that something is true to ideas about correct linguistic behavior. Alston, by contrast, does not. Hence, the two philosophers can be seen to take different approaches to semantics and its impact on our reflections on truth. I will come back to the supposition that truth is a semantic notion. First, however, I would like to call attention to the fact that certain recent pronouncements by Putnam seem to indicate a rejection, on his part, of the third item listed by Folina, namely his criticism of metaphysical realism. At times, Putnam seems to take it for granted that we can make meaningful assumptions about there being a metaphysical realist realityin-itself. The work of Nagel, 'a hard-core metaphysical realist if anyone', has inspired Putnam to argue, among other things, that it would be absurd to suppose that there could not be intelligent beings so much smarter than we that some of their thoughts could not even be understood by us; and surely [...] some of those thoughts could be true. (They could also be warrantedly assertable under good enough epistemic conditions — warrantedly assertable by those beings [...] even if not by us.) Thus, not only can there be truths that are no longer 'accessible to human beings', but also there can (consistently with my 'internal realism') be truths which are true 'in virtue of conditions the obtaining of which may be, in principle, inaccessible to human beings.' 61

Here, Putnam stresses that there may be truths that can be discovered by, for example, God, but not by humans. It seems to me to be difficult, if not impossible, to combine this God's-Eye point of view with the internal realist's rejection of metaphysical realism. In the above quotation, internal realism seems to coincide with, rather than contradict, metaphysical realism. 62

61 62

Putnam 1992b: 364 Cf. Davies 1996: 138

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Wright observes that certain aspects of Putnam's latest version of internal realism are hard to tell apart from metaphysical realism. However, he sees one major difference between metaphysical realism and Putnam's internal realism; this difference concerns 'the evidence transcendence of truth'. The only evidence-transcendent truths assumed by the internal realist are the ones that we can formulate and that we can justify given sufficiently good conditions for justification. The idea that it must be possible to justify true statements if there are sufficiently good conditions for justification still remains a core notion in Putnam's latest version of internal realism. Putnam still rejects the idea 'that we have [...] a notion of truth that totally outruns the possibility of justification'; this idea remains central to internal realism. I would argue that if Putnam's latest version of internal realism does not focus on our human possibilities of justification, given that we are who we are and that we possess the cognitive and conceptual resources that we possess, then it is nothing other than metaphysical realism. However, since Putnam still insists that what he advocates is an alternative to metaphysical realism, I choose to interpret the justification that he talks about as a justification that is a possibility for us humans given sufficiently good conditions for justification. 63

64

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Evidence-Transcendent Truths According to the internal realist, our conceptual resources determine our truths insofar as these truths cannot be construed as truths unless we can express them. The internal realist conceives of sentences as the primary bearers of truth-value. We cannot conceive of sentences we cannot formulate, or sentences for which we cannot imagine sufficiently good conditions for justification, as truths. If we cannot imagine a situation in which we would consider ourselves to be justified in uttering the sentence in question, we cannot say that we understand what it implies for it to be true. However, the internal realist also argues that it is not necessary for us to be able to justify all truths in practice. It is entirely possible that sufficiently good conditions for justification will never actually be realized. 63 64 65

Wright 2000: 335 Wright 2000: 359 Putnam 1995: ix. Cf. Wright 2000: 341 and Davies 1996: 136

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Putnam gives an example of an evidence-transcendent truth whose truth we may never be able to justify, since sufficiently good conditions for justification may never be realized. 'An example whose truth, if it is true, may be totally recognition-transcendent (I would now say) is: "There do not happen to be any intelligent extraterrestrials.'"'''' Putnam is prepared to accept truths which we may never be able to justify as evidence-transcendent truths if we can formulate them and if we can imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of them. Still, there are two types of evidence-transcendent truths that the internal realist cannot accept. The first type consists of evidence-transcendent truths that imply that propositions or statements we cannot formulate might still be true. Putnam writes: Even if we {with our language in place) must say that the sky is blue, and even if we must allow that that fact is (causally and logically) independent of how we talk, we do not have to concede that there would be a thing called 'the proposition that the sky is blue' even if we did not talk that way. It is statements (not abstract entities called 'propositions') that are true or false, and while it is true that the sky would still have been blue even if language users had not evolved, it is not true that true propositions would still have existed. If language users had not evolved, there would still have been a world, but there would not have been any truths. But recognizing that fact -— and it is an important one — does not require us to say that the sky is not blue independently of the way we speak. What it does require us to do [...] is to give up the picture of Nature as having its very own language which it is waiting for us to discover and use. 67

Nothing can be said to be true or false unless it can be expressed in a statement. If there were no language users to state that the sky is blue, the proposition that the sky is blue would simply not exist. This is not because the sky would not be blue. Rather, it is because this particular proposition could not possibly be formulated unless there was a conceptual scheme with the help of which it could be expressed. The world that would exist even if there were no language users to inhabit it contains no descriptions of itself, nor does it contain any propositions. It is we, the language users, who divide up the world into colors and objects with the help of our conceptual resources and it is only in relation to a conceptual scheme that propositions exist. There is no intelligible way in which we can conceive of truths that we cannot formulate as truths. Suppose that a cat were to say: '•x ^j » I T l , a ^ n H H ^ E l B ' (To us, this sounds like the angry hiss ,

66 67

Putnam 1994c: 289, note 5 Putnam 1996: 302. Cf. Putnam 1992c: 433

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of a cat in a cat fight.) Since we cannot formulate the cat's utterance as a statement, it is pointless to maintain that what the cat says is true. (This is not to say that the utterance is meaningless to us or to other cats. Quite frequently, an angry hiss has visible consequences for the behavior of other cats and certain humans; this leads us to conclude that the hiss is intelligible to them.) We cannot give any content to the supposition that what the cat says is true, because we cannot imagine any situation wherein we would consider ourselves to be entitled to express what the cat is expressing. What the cat is expressing is not related to our conceptual resources, nor is it related to our criteria of rational acceptability. The other form of evidence-transcendent truths that the internal realist cannot accept consists of truths the justification of which we cannot imagine. We cannot imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of such statements. Maintaining that a sentence expressing the statement in question is true is meaningless: the supposition that the sentence is true is unintelligible to us. Unless we can imagine a situation in which we would consider ourselves to be entitled to make the statement in question, we cannot understand what it implies that the statement is true. One example of such a statement, a statement the justification of which we cannot imagine, is the statement, refering to a Swedish feast: 'The neighbor's dog is looking forward to Midsummer'. What would constitute sufficiently good conditions for us to decide whether our criteria of rational acceptability entitle us to assume that the statement is true? What does it mean that a dog is looking forward to Midsummer? In what situations can we decide whether the neighbor's dog really is looking forward to Midsummer or just pretending? If we cannot imagine a situation in which we would be entitled to make this statement, we cannot say that we know what it is for the statement to be true. 68

Putnam, God and Evidence-Transcendent Truths I would argue that Putnam's internal realism can be conceived of as an epistemological realist position; however, it should also be noted that the evidence-transcendence Putnam talks about is not necessarily identical to the form of evidence-transcendence Alston claims is an essential part of religious belief. There are two forms of evidence-transcendent truths that I am indebted to Herrmann 1996: 11 for this example

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Putnam cannot allow, as noted above. First, there are evidence-transcendent truths that we cannot formulate with the help of the conceptual resources to which we have access. Second, there are evidence-transcendent truths the justification of which we cannot imagine. Evidence-transcendent truths belonging to either of these two categories are unintelligible to us. We cannot relate them to our criteria of rational acceptability or to our ideas about correct linguistic behavior. We cannot, Putnam suggests, give any content to the supposition that such truths are indeed true. Like Alston, Putnam at times refers to God when he discusses questions touching upon the possibility that there may be evidencetranscendent truths. Putnam writes: An example which is historically important [...] is the ancient dispute about the ontological status of the Euclidean plane. Imagine a Euclidean plane. Think of the points in the plane. Are these parts of the plane, as Leibniz thought? Or are they 'mere limits', as Kant said? If you say, in this case, that these are 'two ways of slicing the same dough', then you must admit that what is part of space, in one version of the facts, is an abstract entity (say, a set of convergent spheres — although there is not, of course, a unique way of constructing points as limits) in the other version. But then you will have to concede that which entities are 'abstract entities' and which are 'concrete objects', at least, is version-relative. Metaphysical realists to this day continue to argue about whether points (space-time points, nowadays, rather than points in the plane or in three-dimensional space) are individuals or properties, particulars or mere limits, etc. My view is that God himself, if he consented to answer the question, 'Do points really exist or are they mere limits?', would say i don't know'; not because His omniscience is limited, but because there is a limit to how far questions make sense. 69

According to Putnam, then, not even God, assuming that God exists, can answer questions about what does or does not exist without presupposing a conceptual scheme. This is not because God's nature is somehow deficient. It is because such questions are never intelligible independently of any conceptual scheme. Quite simply, in order for us or God to be able to ask and answer questions, a conceptual scheme is required. Our human conceptual resources limit the omniscience that we can attribute to God in a meaningful way. Suppose that God has counted the hairs on every single person's head. Einar does not have a lot of hair. In fact, some would call him bald, while others would say that he is balding. Can God answer the question 'Is Einar bald or not?' Hardly. This is not because God does not know exactly how many hairs Einar has.

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Putnam 1987a: 19

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It is because we use the concept 'bald' without being able to stipulate exactly what is required for someone to be considered bald. First, we need to be able to say what constitutes baldness and what does not; only then can God, like ourselves, answer the question about Einar and his state of baldness. Putnam suggests that we cannot meaningfully attribute to God knowledge of truths that we humans cannot know about in principle. In the same way that nothing entitles us to assume that the cat's hiss is a statement, that is, an utterance that is either true or false, nothing entitles us to assume that utterances we cannot formulate can nevertheless be true statements — true statements that cannot be formulated. Such an assumption would be utterly meaningless to us since we cannot relate an utterance we cannot formulate to our conceptions of what would constitute correct usage of the utterance in question. Unless we know when it is correct to use a certain utterance, we have no idea what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the utterance in question, and therefore it cannot be understood as a statement. We cannot meaningfully attribute to God knowledge of truths we cannot formulate, or truths the justification of which we cannot imagine. If we cannot imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance, then we cannot know when it is correct either for God, if God exists, or for us, to use the utterance in question. If so, the assumption that the utterance is true is meaningless to us. This means, among other things, that we cannot claim that God knows whether the hissing cat is saying something that is true, nor can we claim that God knows whether the neighbor's dog is looking forward to Midsummer. It should be noted that it is not because there is a limit to God's omniscience that God, if God exists, cannot be said to know evidence-transcendent truths that we humans cannot know. Instead, it is our human possibilities of talking about God and about God's possible knowledge of evidence-transcendent truths that are limited. True, we can formulate utterances such as 'God knows about things the justification of which we cannot imagine' or 'God knows things we cannot formulate' but if we cannot imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of these utterances, if we cannot discern in what situations it would be correct or incorrect to use these utterances, then the assumption that they are true is unintelligible to us. If so, this is not because the utterances are about God. Instead, it is because we cannot imagine what would constitute knowledge of states of affairs that we cannot formulate

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statements about. That God is omniscient may mean that God knows all truths. However, it is we human beings who must decide what is a truth, and we must relate this decision to our conceptual resources and to our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification. The God's-Eye point of view of reality that we may be able to talk about in a meaningful way when we describe God's omniscience must be described with the help of our conceptual resources and in relation to our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification. The evidence-transcendent truths about which we humans may be able to attribute knowledge to God in a meaningful way are truths we may know in principle, but perhaps never in practice. Such evidencetranscendent truths may include statements about the existence or otherwise of intelligent extraterrestrials. We can formulate such evidencetranscendent truths, and we can imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of them. We can claim to know in what situations it would be correct to express them. The question as to whether we can meaningfully attribute to God knowledge of evidence-transcendent truths that we can know in principle, but perhaps never in practice, is a question that should be addressed within the framework of philosophy of religion. Saying 'There are intelligent extraterrestrials' is one thing; saying 'God knows whether or not there are intelligent extraterrestrials' is quite another. We can imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the utterance 'There are intelligent extraterrestrials' even if such sufficiently good conditions may never be realized. But can we also imagine sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the utterance 'God knows whether there are intelligent extraterrestrials'? Can we imagine sufficiently good conditions for a justification of utterances about God at all? Questions such as these exemplify the kind of philosophy of religion I strive to pursue. What constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance about God? This question is given different answers by different religious people, different atheists, different theologians and different philosophers of religion. It is also given different answers depending on what utterance about God we are-talking about. It is my contention that philosophers of religion ought to analyze relevant differences and specify how these will affect the meaning of the assumption that a certain utterance about God is true. 70

70

Cf. Dummettl991: 318-9

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Two religious people may well agree that the statement 'God exists' is true. However, this does not mean that they agree on what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for a justification of this statement. If they do not agree on what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the statement in question, then they do not agree on what it implies that it is true. As I see it, metaphysical philosophy of religion overlooks conflicts and discussions where the difference of opinion centers, not on the truth of the statement, but on the meaning of the assumption that the statement is true. I will give an example of a difference of opinion of the latter type. Suppose Anna stated 'God spoke to me last night'. She holds this statement to be true and she holds that sufficiently good conditions for a justification of this statement are supplied by our dreams. Anna maintains that, when our dreams give us new perspectives on our waking lives, this is God speaking to us. Malin, by contrast, holds the statement to be false. She maintains that sufficiently good conditions for a justification of this statement are supplied by the voices we hear with our own ears. She has never heard God's voice with her ears, nor has she ever met anyone who has. Therefore, she draws the conclusion that God does not speak to human beings, Anna included. The philosopher of religion is able to discuss and analyze this difference of opinion. Her analysis must take into account the fact that Anna and Malin disagree on what it implies that the statement is true. They disagree on what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the statement that God spoke to me last night. They disagree on when it would be correct to make the statement 'God spoke to me last night'. It should be noted that what is required for religious people to be able to give an intelligible content to the assumption that a certain statement about God is true is not an ability on their part to justify the statement to their own satisfaction or to that of other people. Perhaps the statement is evidence-transcendent in the sense that it cannot, at least not at present, be justified in practice. Instead, what is required is that the people who make statements about God can imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for a justification of these statements. Their idea of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification need not be shared by others; the meaning of the assumption that the statement is true can still be intelligible. However, if we want the assumption that the statement is correct to be intelligible, then the people who make the statement must necessarily have formed some discernible idea of what

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constitutes sufficiently good conditions for its justification. They must have some idea of when it would be correct to make the statement in question. An objection to Putnam's reasoning comes to mind, an objection which is common in discussions on religion and the philosophy of religion, and which is in line with Alston's interpretation of Christian faith. This is the objection that Putnam's arguments reduce or bring to nothing the belief in God's transcendence. Many people would maintain that God is, if God exists, completely different from us human beings, completely other. God can both know and formulate things which we humans cannot even imagine. God can have a God's-Eye point of view of reality even if we humans can never comprehend what such a perspective entails. To assume that God can only have such knowledge as we humans can meaningfully attribute to God is simply an expression of our own human unwillingness to allow God to be greater than us. I would suggest that this objection is based on a misunderstanding of Putnam's position and possibly also on a misunderstanding of belief in God's transcendence. I maintain that we are no less able to express a belief in God's transcendence from a Putnamian perspective than from a metaphysical realist one. Putnam has observed that many people consider God to be indescribable by us humans. He writes that 'it is a part of almost all religious forms of life to say that God, or whatever may be of ultimate concern in the particular religious form of life, is not properly conceptualizable by us'. Putnam maintains, in addition, that only that which we can meaningfully express with the help of our conceptual resources can be said to be true or false. Does this mean that we must either abandon belief in God's indescribability or conclude that there can be no truths about God? I argue that the internal realist is well able to assume that it is true that God is indescribable, thereby expressing belief in God's transcendence, and still maintain that only that which we can express with the help of our conceptual resources can be true or false. This is due to the fact that we can specify sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the statement 'God is indescribable' in relation to our inability to describe God. It is possible to take the assumption that God is indescribable to imply that the God with whom the people who state that God is indescribable consider themselves to be interacting and to whom they consider themselves to be referring, is thought of, by these people, as a God that cannot adequately be described with the help of our conceptual resources. 71

71

Putnam 1997a: 410

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Sufficiently good conditions for justifying the statement that God is indescribable might include the fact that we human beings, no matter how much we try, can never formulate what we consider to be a fully adequate description of God. If religious people can specify when it is correct in their opinion to state that God is indescribable, then we can give an intelligible content to the assumption that it is true that God is indescribable, a content that expresses belief in God's transcendence instead of just presupposing that there is a reality-in-itself which we humans cannot access. The God about whom we can talk and with whom we can conceive ourselves as interacting, given our concepts and conceptual distinctions, can be described as indescribable with the help of our concepts and conceptual distinctions. That God is indescribable can therefore be a true description of God.

Truth and Semantics I would argue that the clash between Putnam's and Alston's philosophical positions does not primarily concern epistemological realism. This is because, like Alston, Putnam is able to assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. Instead, the clash between their respective positions can best be described as a conflict of semantics, a conflict which is most evident in the presuppositions underlying the work of these two philosophers. Putnam maintains that we cannot meaningfully assume that there are truths we cannot formulate or truths the justification of which we cannot imagine. He suggests that unless we know when it is correct to speak the sentence we regard as true, we cannot understand what it implies that it is true. We simply do not know when we are entitled to use sentences we cannot formulate and sentences the justification of which we cannot imagine. Consequently, we cannot comprehend what the assumption that they are true implies. Putnam explains his opinion about the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths: 'Our journey has brought us back to the familiar: truth is sometimes recognition-transcendent because what goes on in the world is sometimes beyond our power to conceive. ' 1 take this to mean that Putnam assumes that there may be truths whose truth we cannot verify in practice. However, he does not assume that there may be 7 2

72

Putnam 1994b: 516

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truths whose truth we cannot recognize should sufficiently good conditions for justification be realized. Alston, by contrast, talks about true propositions that can be 'beyond our power to recognize' as well as 'beyond our power to conceive'. Unlike Putnam, Alston maintains that it is propositions that are true or false and that the truth or falsity of propositions is a factor that is independent of the existence and the linguistic behavior of human beings. It is quite clear that this position greatly affects the divide that exists between the respective standpoints of Alston and Putnam. Alston's view that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-value and the fact that he does not relate his reflections on our conceptions of truth to our linguistic behavior are linked to his rejection of the idea that truth is a semantic notion. Putnam maintains that the ideas we have concerning in what situations we are entitled to make a certain statement in fact serve to highlight what we think of as being sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the statement in question. In other words, we can explain our criteria of rational acceptability with reference to our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification. The situations in which we consider ourselves to be entitled to make a certain statement are what clarify what the assumption that the statement in question is true really means. The fact that Putnam sees a relation between what it means that something is true and our linguistic behavior shows that he considers truth to be a semantic notion. In this chapter, I have reconstructed Putnam's internal realism and shown in what sense the internal realist can assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. I have shown that internal realism is a philosophical position that need not reject the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths. On the contrary, it is possible for the internal realist to be an epistemological realist. I have stressed that internal realism is not a form of relativism and I have argued that internal realism need not entail a denial of belief in God's transcendence. I have discussed these issues against the background of my reflections on the entanglement of our values, our criteria of rational acceptability, our concept formation and our conceptions of reality. I have given special attention to the fact that the internal realist, unlike Alston, relates our conceptions of truth to correct linguistic behavior. Unlike Alston, the internal realist conceives of truth as a semantic notion. In the following chapter, I will discuss Dummett's ideas and, in relation to this, further specify the meaning of the assumption that truth is a semantic notion. I will discuss Dummett's reflections on our possibilities

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of learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true. I will analyze semantic realism as well as semantic anti-realism and I will discuss the interrelation between metaphysical, epistemological and semantic realism. In its semantic form, the realism debate is about which utterances we are entitled to conceive of as statements, that is, as sentences that are true or false. Only sentences that are true or false can be evidence-transcendent truths. Metaphysical realism is often associated with a comprehensive semantic realism, one which Dummett criticizes. He maintains that the only sentences we are entitled to treat as statements are sentences whose truth-value we can decide in a finite time. Dummett's position on the question of what sentences we are entitled to treat as statements affects his possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths. 1 will make use of Dummett's reflections when 1 develop my criticism of metaphysical realism further and when I discuss to what extent it is possible for us to assume that there are evidence-transcendent truths. In the light of this context, I will also show what Alston's rejection of the idea that truth is a semantic notion really means. In chapter six, I will then formulate a non-metaphysical realist position that is able to accept epistemological realism as well as semantic realism without being either a metaphysical realist position or a metaphysical anti-realist position. •M

CHAPTER FIVE

ANTI-REALISM

In this chapter, I aim to acknowledge and draw attention to the semantic dimension of the debate between realists and anti-realists, mainly by making use of Dummett's reflections on, and contributions to, this debate. 1 will present, criticize, and develop the aspects of Dummett's work that affect my attempts to define and discuss what constitutes semantic realism and semantic anti-realism, respectively. I will discuss the ways in which semantic realism relates to epistemological realism and to the assumption that truth is a semantic notion. I will also give an account of the combination of semantic and epistemological realism that is an integral part of non-metaphysical realism. The concept of 'anti-realism' is inextricably linked to Dummett's work and is used by him largely as a way of emphasizing that his reflections ought not to be perceived as expressions of a uniform, philosophical position but rather as critical objections to realism. '[T]he colourless term "anti-realism" is apt as a signal that it denotes not a specific philosophical doctrine but the rejection of a doctrine", Dummett writes. The main problem, Dummett suggests, is not that the realist position is an untenable one, but that it has frequently been defended on the wrong assumptions. Therefore, Dummett wants the current debate to focus on the meaning-theoretic assumptions of realism and anti-realism, respectively. 1

2

Dummett and the Meaning-Theoretic Assumptions 'There is general agreement on only one thing about Dummett's philosophy', Michael Devitt writes, 'it is difficult'. Consequently, I will begin by agreeing with Alston, who says that 3

Dummett is not the easiest philosopher to interpret, and I will unavoidably be enmeshed to some extent in exegetical questions. It is not my aim, however, to deal with the whole of Dummett's philosophy or even the whole 1 2 3

Dummett 1991: 4 Dummett 1978: xxix Devitt 1983: 75

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of his semantic theory. I am concerned only with those aspects of it that might seem to have a bearing on alethic realism. And that does simplify life somewhat. 4

My work is made easier by my interest in precisely those of Dummett's reflections which are useful as I attempt to specify what constitutes semantic realism and semantic anti-realism, respectively. Dummett's reflections on our possibilities of formulating an adequate theory of meaning will be a useful starting point for my examination of the semantic aspect of the debate on realism. The question as to how an adequate theory of meaning can be formulated is of central importance to Dummett's work. On what assumptions must such a theory of meaning rest? According to Dummett, a theory of meaning must describe that which the individual speaker has to be aware of and the knowledge she must be in possession of, if communication is to be at all possible. 'A theory of meaning for Dummett is a theory of what one's understanding a language consists in', as Brian Loar puts it. It is in describing the knowledge possessed by the individual speaker that a theory of meaning explains what it is that we learn when we learn a language and, by extension, what makes a language a language. The manifestability requirement formulated and defended by Dummett has had considerable impact on his reflections in the field of philosophy of language. Dummett requires that the linguistic knowledge that we can meaningfully ascribe to a speaker should be fully manifestable in the speaker's linguistic behavior. This is because '[i]t is useless to discuss what form a correct theory of meaning would take if we do not know what would justify us in judging it to be correct'. If there were no manifestability requirement, it would not be possible to prove or, for that matter, to disprove, any theory of meaning. If only partial manifestability were required, it would be possible to use our linguistic behavior to prove far too many theories of meaning; consequently, we would not be able to relate our theories of meaning to our linguistic behavior, thereby deciding which theory ought to be preferred. Dummett focuses primarily on 'the explanation of an individual speaker's mastery of his language'. What interests him is what the individual speaker, rather than the linguistic community, knows and masters. 5

6

7

8

9

4 5 6 7 8 9

Alston 1996a: 105 Dummett 1991: 145-6,343 Loar 1987: 87 Dummett 1991: 13,91 Dummett 1993: 131 Dummett 1993: 99

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In Dummett's view, a theory of meaning should answer the question: 'What is it that a speaker knows when he knows a language, and what, in particular, does he thereby know about any given sentence of the language?' He goes on: '[S]ince what is being ascribed to a speaker is implicit knowledge, the theory of meaning must specify not merely what it is that the speaker must know, but in what his having that knowledge consists, i.e. what counts as a manifestation of that knowledge.'" Dummett criticizes a number of various theories that have been proposed as theories of meaning. These theories, Dummett asserts, cannot be theories of meaning since they fail to specify both what the individual speaker must know and what counts as a manifestation of the knowledge that she must possess. He writes: 10

It is precisely the failure of certain conceptions of a meaning-theory to take account of the need to say in what the knowledge ascribed to speakers consists, and how it is manifested, that causes descriptions of a meaning-theory based on them to give the impression, on which it may seem hard to put one's finger, of failing to elucidate what they claim to elucidate. 12

One of the forms of theories of meaning of which Dummett is critical is that which rests on a holistic conception of language. Dummett's main argument against such holism is that it seems to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for philosophers of language to formulate an adequate theory of meaning for our linguistic practice. '[T]he acceptance of holism should lead to the conclusion that any systematic theory of meaning is impossible [...] my own preference is, therefore, to assume as a methodological principle that holism is false.' Thus, as holism assumes that rather than explains how language works, it cannot be a useful foundation on which to base reflections on the philosophy of language. Dummett points out that, though there are many proponents of holism, none has formulated a theory of meaning. It may be possible to formulate a theory of meaning based on a holistic conception of language but, he remarks, this would be a very complicated undertaking. It would seem that any meaning-theoretic theory that can be developed on the basis of a holistic conception of language cannot be an adequate theory of meaning. Dummett writes: 13

14

10 11 12 13 14

Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett

1993: 36 1993: 37 1991: 105 1991: 235 1993: 21

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Certainly no one has come anywhere near even a sketch of what such a holistic theory of meaning would be like. [...] Holism is not a doctrine which allows us to abandon the idea that individual words have senses; on the contrary, it is one which, if correct, demands that we regard our words as having senses of a much more complex kind than we have imagined, of a kind, indeed, of which we have as yet formed no clear picture. 15

Dummett suggests that the problem with holism, as understood by philosophers of language, is that it makes it difficult to explain how a speaker can master fragments of a language and not the whole language. Dummett distinguishes between molecular and atomistic theories of rrleaning. An atomistic theory of meaning focuses on the meaning of individual words whereas a molecular one, like Dummett, focuses on the meajiing of sentences. On the other hand, a holistic theory of meaning, Dummett suggests, focuses on the meaning of the entire language. He writes: 16

17

The difference between a molecular and a holistic view of language is not that, on a molecular view, each sentence could, in principle, be understood in isolation, but that, on a holistic view, it is impossible fully to understand any sentence without knowing the entire language, whereas, on a molecular view, there is, for each sentence, a determinate fragment of the language a knowledge of which will suffice for a complete understanding of that sentence. " 1

Alston shares Dummett's critical views on holism. However, the two scholars do not mean the same thing by the term 'atomism'; Alston's atomism is largely synonymous with Dummett's molecular view of language. Thus, Alston's view of language does not focus on individual words (what Dummett calls an atomistic view of language), but rather on individual propositions (what Dummett calls a molecular view of language). Unlike Alston, Dummett bases his reflections on sentences rather than on propositions. However, the two scholars are in agreement insofar as they both focus on the linguistic ability of the individual, rather than on that of the collective. Dummett claims that the proponents of holism fail to see the danger in the circularity of their own argument. In holism, 'the meaning of a sentence is explained in terms of the meanings of other sentences, whose

Dummett 1978: 138 Cf. Dummett 1991: 343 Dummett: 1993: 38 Dummett 1993: 44

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meanings will in turn be explained in terms of those of yet further sentences'. Dummett does not deny that, in order fully to understand a sentence, one must understand more of the language than that one sentence. He does accept a weak form of holism 'in accordance with Wittgenstein's dictum that to understand a sentence is to understand a language' ; what he criticizes is the idea that the strong holism that he ascribes to Quine can form the basis of an adequate theory of meaning. Dummett criticizes not only Quine's holism, but also the fact that Quine treats translation manuals as theories of meaning. A translation manual is not a theory of meaning, Dummett claims. It does not explain what a competent speaker of a language knows and masters. Many speakers master a language without necessarily knowing how to translate it. Quine argues that meaning is that which is preserved in translation whereas Dummett disagrees with this idea and suggests that Quine seems to be fleeing the problem instead of formulating a theory of meaning. Dummett writes: 19

20

\

''•'• If we explain someone's knowledge of a second language as consisting in ;, • his grasp of a scheme of translation between it and his mother tongue, we tacitly presuppose that he understands his mother tongue; it then remains to be explained in what his understanding of his mother tongue consists. [...] in principle, the ability to translate does not involve the ability to understand. 21

A translation manual, Dummett argues, states that two expressions mean the same thing; it does not state what it is that they mean. ;

[A] translation manual is to be contrasted with a theory of meaning, and cannot itself claim to be one. [...] the translation manual tells us only that certain expressions of the one language mean the same as certain expressions of the other, without telling us what, specifically, the expressions of either language mean [...]

,

22

There is a connection between Dummett's criticism of holism and his argument that translation manuals cannot be treated as theories of meaning. Proponents of holism question the distinction between sense and reference. As a result, they are unable to differentiate between theories of reference, theories of meaning and theories of sense. Since the proponents of holism cannot perceive very clearly of what an adequate theory 23

19 20 21 22 23

Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett

1993: 139 1993: 472 1993: 98 1993: 6 1978: 123

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of meaning consists, some of them make the mistake of conceiving of translation manuals as theories of meaning. Dummett follows the lead of Frege in that he thinks of theories of meaning as consisting of three parts. Dummett writes: 'Any theory of meaning [is] falling into three parts: first, the core theory, or theory of reference; secondly, its shell, the theory of sense; and thirdly, the supplementary part of the theory of meaning, the theory of force'. He explains: 24

The theory of reference and the theory of sense together form one part of the theory of meaning: the other, supplementary, part is the theory of force. The theory of force will give an account of the various types of conventional significance which the utterance of a sentence may have, that is, the various kinds of linguistic act which may be affected by such an utterance. 25

Dummett distinguishes between theories of meaning and semantic theories. He argues that a theory of meaning must be based on a semantic theory. Our choice of semantic theory will then affect the way in which we understand and formulate a theory of meaning. A semantic theory consists of 'the principles which state what kind of semantic value an expression [of a certain type] must have'. The semantic value of an expression can be described as 'that feature of it which goes to determine the truth or otherwise of a sentence in which it occurs'. I would suggest that semantic theories as perceived by Dummett can be made up of theories which examine the question concerning which truth-values we can meaningfully ascribe to a certain class of sentences. Dummett describes the debate between semantic realists and semantic anti-realists as a discussion on which truth-values we can meaningfully ascribe to a certain class of sentences. The semantic realist philosopher represents a certain position in this debate; the semantic anti-realist philosopher represents another position, another semantic theory. 26

27

28

29

The Principle of Bivalence Dummett indicates that the opposition between semantic realists and semantic anti-realists mainly concerns the question as to whether a certain given class of sentences (a class of sentences that Dummett calls a 24 25 26 27 28 29

Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett

1993: 84 1993: 40 1991: 157 1991: 148 1991: 139. Cf. Dummett 1991: 151 1991: 138. Cf. Dummett 1991: 24, 61, 146

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class of disputed statements) can meaningfully be perceived as statements, as sentences which are either true or false. Semantic realists would argue that statements in the given class are related to an independent reality in such a way that they can be true or false independently of whether or not we know their truth-value or how to discover it. In this sense, such statements can be evidence-transcendent truths. Dummett writes: 30

It is clear that one can be a realist about one subject-matter, and not about another: [...] there is no coherent philosophical position which consists in being a realist tout court. [...] realism is a view about a certain class of statements [...] we may regard a realistic view as consisting in a certain interpretation of statements in some class, which I shall call 'the given class'. So construed, realism is a semantic thesis, a thesis about what, in general, renders a statement in the given class true when it is true. The very minimum that realism can be held to involve is that statements in the given class relate to some reality that exists independently of our knowledge of it, in such a way that that reality renders each statement in the class determinately true or false, again independently of whether we know, or are even able to discover, its truth-value. Thus realism involves acceptance, for statements of the given class, of the principle of bivalence, the principle that every statement is determinately either true or false. 31

Dummett thinks of the principle of bivalence, the principle that every statement is determinately either true or false, as a semantic principle corresponding to the law of logic called 'the law of excluded middle' (Av-iA). That the principle of bivalence is a semantic principle means that it can be part of a semantic theory. It can be used for the purpose of indicating what semantic values a certain class of sentences can have. If the semantic values consist of truth-values, then semantic principles will indicate what truth-values a certain class of sentences can have. Another semantic principle is 'the principle of tertium non datur'. This principle indicates that 'no statement is neither true nor false'. The principle of tertium non datur corresponds to the law of logic called 'the law of excluded third' (-•-•(Av->A))3 which indicates that the law of excluded middle is not invalid. The law of excluded middle can be derived from the law of excluded third with the help of the double negation rule (two -> cancel each other out). These two semantic principles should not be confused, particularly since Dummett himself takes care to distinguish them from each other; 2

30 31 32

Dummett 1991: 325 Dummett 1993: 230 Dummett 1978: xix

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what he discusses is the principle of bivalence, not the principle of tertium non datur. It should also be noted that it is possible to accept the laws of logic in question without also having to accept the corresponding semantic principles. The question Dummett seeks to answer is the following: '[U]nder what circumstances are we entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for some class of statements?' Dummett examines two alternative answers to this question. The first one is the semantic realist idea that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a given class of statements, independently of whether or not we know the truth-value of every statement in the class. The other alternative answer examined is the semantic anti-realist idea that we are only entitled to assume the principle of bivalence in cases where we are able to determine whether each individual statement in the given class is true or false. Dummett's approach to the anti-realist alternative has its roots in Wittgensteinian philosophical reflections. Wittgenstein points out that the statement 'The sentence is either true or false' really only means that it must be possible to assert or deny it. Dummett questions the realist notion that the statement 'The sentence is either true or false' can be correct even if we are unable either to assert or deny the sentence in question. What leads Dummett to question the realist's general assumption of the principle of bivalence is a philosophical complex of problems which goes all the way back to Aristotle and which concerns issues such as the futura contingentia, that is, future-tense statements about reality. The sentence 'Sweden will be a republic in 2346 CE' is already either true or false, according to the semantic realist approach to statements about the future. If the future is considered to be essentially open, it might seem strange that this sentence can already have a truth-value. Would this not imply that the future is not completely open, then? Something, it would seem, is already determined, namely that the sentence is either true or false. Can we still say that the future is open? Dummett points out that we run into the same complex of problems when we talk about character traits that are never openly shown (counterfactual statements) as well as when we make statements about the past. 33

34

35

36

33 3 4 35 3 6

Dummett 1978: xxxi Dummett 1978: xxxi, 146 Wittgenstein 1979: §200 M&rtensson 1993: 57 and Dummett 1978: 152

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To illustrate his point, Dummett gives the example of Jones, who was a brave man. A imagines Jones to be a man, now dead, who never encountered danger in his life. B retorts that it could still be true that Jones was brave, namely if it is true that if Jones had encountered danger, he would have acted bravely. A agrees with this, but still maintains that it does not need to be the case that either 'Jones was brave' = 'If Jones had encountered danger, he would have acted bravely' nor 'Jones was not brave' = 'If Jones had encountered danger, he would not have acted bravely' is true. For, he argues, it might be the case that however many facts we knew of the kind which we should normally regard as grounds for asserting such counterfactual conditionals, we should still know nothing which would be a ground for asserting either. It is clear that B cannot agree that this is a possibility and yet continue to insist that all the same either 'Jones was brave' or 'Jones was not brave' is true; for he would then be committed to holding that a statement may be true even though there is nothing whatever such that, if we knew of it, we should count it as evidence or as a ground for the truth of the statement, and this is absurd. 37

Dummett sees a corresponding absurdity in some statements about the past. The sentence 'Caesar stepped into the Rubicon with his left foot first', if uttered today, is not necessarily either true or false. It is not necessarily the case that we, in the present day, have any knowledge which entitles us to assume either that it is true or that it is false. A proponent of semantic realism would claim that the sentence is true or false independently of whether or not we know its truth-value. 'What the realist would like to d o ' , Dummett argues, 'is to stand in thought outside the whole temporal process and describe the world from a point which has no temporal position at all, but surveys all temporal positions in a single g l a n c e ' . The problem, on this view, is that we cannot meaningfully ascribe to ourselves the possibility of taking this approach. If there is nothing that would entitle us today to assert either that the sentence is true or that it is false, Dummett argues, then it would be absurd for us to claim that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for that sentence. He explains: 38

Of any statement about the past, we can never rule it out that we might subsequently come upon something which justified asserting or denying it, and therefore we are not entitled to say of any specific such statement that it is neither true nor false: but we are not entitled either to say in advance that it has to be either one or the other, since this would be to invoke notions of 37 38

Dummett 1978: 15 Dummett 1978: 369

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truth and falsity independent of our recognition of truth or falsity, and hence incapable of having been derived from the training we received in the use of these statements. 39

So, wherein lies the absurdity that Dummett sees in the semantic realist's general assumption of the principle of bivalence? Wherein lies the problem? The second half of the above quotation implies what Dummett's answer might be. It shows that Dummett conceives of truth as a semantic notion. The semantic realist's general assumption of the principle of bivalence is not related to our language learning process or to our use of language. If the semantic realist argument were correct in a general sense, then we could not learn to speak our own language. If the semantic realist's general assumption of the principle of bivalence were correct, then it would be impossible for us to learn what it implies that something is true. If language learning is to be at all possible, then our practice when it comes to making truth-claims and talking about what is true must relate issues about what is true to our knowledge about which statements we can verify or falsify and to the methods of verification and falsification that are available to us. Our knowledge of which statements we can verify or falsify can be fully manifested in our linguistic behavior. By contrast, Dummett maintains, it is impossible for our linguistic behavior fully to manifest knowledge of the principle of bivalence as regards, for example, sentences about the past that we can neither verify nor falsify. It is not possible for learners of our language to acquire knowledge that cannot be fully manifested in our linguistic behavior. Knowledge that cannot be acquired cannot be knowledge; it cannot be part of the knowledge that Dummett suggests that we should specify in our meaning-theoretic reflections.

Undecidable Sentences Dummett distinguishes between effectively decidable statements and undecidable statements. In the following discussion, I will, unlike Dummett, talk about undecidable sentences rather than about undecidable statements since I maintain that the class of statements that Dummett labels undecidable are not, strictly speaking, statements. I will discuss 40

Dummett 1978: 364 E.g. in his much debated article from 1976, 'What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', reprinted in Dummett 1993: 34-93 39

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this distinction in further detail later on, as I examine the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths. However, this difference as regards our choice of concepts should be noted in relation to the present context, as well. According to Dummett, effectively decidable sentences are those sentences whose truth-value we can determine in a finite time. We know what constitutes an effective procedure for determining the truth-value of these sentences and we know how to use it. An example of an effectively decidable sentence is the sentence 'The neighbor's dog weighs seven kilos'. By weighing the dog, we can determine whether the sentence is true or false. Undecidable sentences are those sentences for whose truth-value we do not have any effective decision procedure. We can imagine, to the best of our abilities, what might constitute such a procedure but we cannot get ourselves into a position where we would be able to use it, and there are no guarantees that we will ever be able to do so. An example of an undecidable sentence is the sentence 'If the Swedes had not caught a cold, they would have won the World Championship relay race'. Dummett explains that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for effectively decidable sentences. Thus, contrary to common belief, Dummett is not a semantic anti-realist in any general sense of the term. He is a semantic realist about effectively decidable sentences; however, he points out that we are not entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for undecidable sentences: We are entitled to say that a statement P must be either true or false, that there must be something in virtue of which either it is true or it is false, only when P is a statement of such a kind that we could in a finite time bring ourselves into a position in which we were justified either in asserting or in denying P; that is, when P is an effectively decidable statement. 41

Dummett's conclusion that the only sentences for which we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence are effectively decidable ones might seem somewhat odd at first sight. What makes Dummett draw this conclusion is the fact that that which entitles us to say that these sentences have truthconditions which are either satisfied or which are not satisfied is our ability to determine their truth-value. Since we cannot determine the truth-value of undecidable sentences, we are not entitled to say that they have truthconditions which are either satisfied or which are not satisfied, that is, that they are sentences which are either true or false. J0rgen Husted explains: 41

Dummett 1978: 16-7

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The point is [...] that that which entitles us to assume, as far as effectively decidable sentences are concerned, that every such sentence is either true or false — that is, that every sentence has a truth-condition that is either satisfied or that is not satisfied — is their decision procedures. However, as far as effectively undecidable sentences are concerned we are not entitled to make the same assumption since there is, in this case, no decision procedure, nor anything else with an equivalent function. The anti-realist's argument is based on the idea that the knowledge that a speaker has and that constitutes his comprehension of a sentence must be fully manifestable in his linguistic practice. On this basis, we can require that the realist should explain what practical skills entitle us to ascribe to a speaker implicit knowledge of truth-conditions that are either satisfied or that are not satisfied.

/!

42

Dummett's own meaning-theoretic assumptions have been the main influence on the way he thinks of undecidable sentences. Richard Kirkham summarizes Dummett's argument and explains how the latter's meaningtheoretic assumptions affect the formulation of his argument. Kirkham writes: 1. When a statement is decidable, there is a decision procedure which in any circumstance will tell us its truth value, and we can always get ourselves into a position where we know its truth value. 2. Anyone who knows a statement's truth value can manifest this knowledge with his linguistic behaviour. Therefore, 3. If someone knows the decision procedure for a statement, then in every circumstance, he could, by using the procedure, manifest knowledge of the statement's truth value, (from 1 and 2) 4. The only way to manifest fully a knowledge of a statement's truth conditions is to show that one could, no matter what the circumstances, get oneself into a position in which one could manifest in linguistic behaviour a knowledge of the statement's truth value. Therefore,, 5. Demonstrating a mastery of a statement's decision procedure fully manifests a knowledge of that statement's truth conditions, (from 3 and 4) 6. Undecidable statements are those for which we do not have a decision procedure that works in every circumstance. Therefore, 7. For undecidable statements there are circumstances in which we could not determine the truth value of the statement, (from 6) Therefore, 8. There are circumstances in which we could not linguistically manifest a knowledge of an undecidable statement's truth value, (from 7) 42

Translatedfromthe Swedish original as it appears in Husted 1991: 689

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; Therefore, 9. One cannot show that in every circumstance one could get oneself into a position in which one could linguistically manifest a knowledge of an undecidable statement's truth value, (from 8) Therefore, 10. One cannot fully manifest a knowledge of an undecidable statement's truth conditions, (from 4 and 9) 11. An ascription of implicit knowledge to a person is 'meaningful' only if '•' the person is capable of fully manifesting that knowledge. Therefore, 12. One cannot meaningfully ascribe to anyone implicit knowledge of the truth conditions of undecidable statements, (from 10 and l l ) 43

Dummett's reflections and arguments are affected by a number of problems that need to be addressed, mainly concerning what I consider to be his failure to formulate his own independent position in sufficient detail. My critical discussion of Dummett's work aims to explain the relation between semantic realism and epistemological realism. One can only be an epistemological realist in relation to sentences that can be conceived of in a semantic realist way. The ongoing debate between the proponents of semantic realism and the proponents of semantic anti-realism concerns the question as to which sentences we are entitled to say are statements, that is, sentences which are either true or false. Only sentences which are statements can be true. Only sentences that can be true can, if evidencetranscendent, constitute evidence-transcendent truths. Questions concerning semantic realism are of interest in relation to the present discussion exactly because these issues affect our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths.

Two Forms of Realism The central concepts in Dummett's thinking seem unclear, the main problem being the fact that Dummett spends more time and effort criticizing the realist positions proposed by other philosophers than he does formulating an anti-realist position of his own. I will be arguing in favor of a certain interpretation of Dummett's position, an interpretation which I will Kirkham 1989: 216. I have left out two additional conclusions, in which Kirkham points out the unjustifiability of basing theories of meaning on the truth-conditions of sentences. 43

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refer back to in formulating and discussing my non-metaphysical realist position and the way in which it relates to Putnam's internal realism. I base my interpretation of Dummett's position on my views regarding how his position can be reconstructed to ensure that the obscurities in his reflections should not cause the philosopher any problems. As indicated in my summary of Dummett's argument, I have already chosen to understand the central concept of 'realism' in a particular way. Dummett uses the term in a number of different ways, but there seems to be a fundamental problem with the way in which he uses it, a problem which is largely caused by the fact that he sometimes regards realism and antirealism as semantic positions and sometimes as meaning-theoretic positions. Dummett uses the term 'realist' both when he describes the theories of meaning that affirm that the meaning of a sentence consists in its truthconditions and when he describes the semantic theories that presuppose that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a specific given class of sentences. The reason why he criticizes the former is that these theories of meaning do not, in his view, treat a knowledge that can be ascribed to speakers as the knowledge which makes them speakers of a language. Consequently, these theories of meaning cannot explain how the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth-conditions, or what it implies. I will make a distinction between what I call semantic realism — namely, the presupposition that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a given class of sentences — and that which I call meaning-theoretic realism — namely, the idea that the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth-conditions. What interests me most in relation to the present discussion is semantic realism. Dummett's standpoint on the relation between semantic realism and meaning-theoretic realism is not entirely clear, the reason being that he is inconsistent in outlining his position on the relation between an acceptance of the principle of bivalence, on the one hand, and the support of a realist position, on the other. At times, it seems as if Dummett regards an acceptance of the principle of bivalence both as a necessary and as a sufficient condition for somebody to be labeled 'a realist'. In his 1982 article 'Realism', however, he takes care to point out that an acceptance of the principle of bivalence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition in this respect. 44

45

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44 45 46 47

Dummett 1991: 306. Cf. Dummett 1991: 316 Cf. Dummett 1990: 15 Dummett 1993: 56 Dummett 1993: 230

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If somebody is to be labeled 'a realist', he goes on, she must also take a certain approach to the way in which statements in a given class of statements are true or false in relation to the reality to which they relate. The realist must have a certain conception of the manner in which [the statements of the given class are determined as true and false by the reality to which they relate]. This conception consists essentially in the classical two-valued semantics: and this, in turn, embodies an appeal to the notion of reference as an indispensable notion of the semantic theory. * 4

Further down in the same article, Dummett writes that '[r]ealism requires us to hold both that, for statements of the given class, we have a notion of truth under which each statement is determinately either true or false, and also that an understanding of those statements consists in a knowledge of the conditions under which they are true.' Here, Dummett almost seems to defend the idea that somebody who is a realist as regards a given class of sentences must presuppose that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for the given class of sentences, and also that the meaning of these sentences consists in their truth-conditions. Thus, the realist must be both a semantic and a meaning-theoretic realist. Dummett points out that his notion that realism consists of 'acceptance, in all its details, of a classical two-valued semantics and of a truthconditional theory of meaning based on that semantics' is not compatible with every usage of the term 'realism' . Many people consider themselves, or are considered by others, to be realists without necessarily assuming that the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth-conditions. It is important to distinguish between meaning-theoretic realism, the idea that meaning is truth-conditions, and semantic realism, the acceptance of the principle of bivalence. In making this distinction, I aim to make it clear that it is the principle of bivalence which is of interest in relation to the present discussion and that it is possible for semantic realists to hold that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a given class of sentences without thereby also having to hold that the meaning of these sentences consists in their truth-conditions. At times, Dummett seems to assume that a semantic realist must also be a meaning-theoretic realist, but this is a mistaken assumption. Instead, it is possible to be a semantic realist without having to support a theory of meaning which affirms that meaning is truth-conditions. 49

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Dummett 1993: 231 Dummett 1993: 254 Dummett 1993: 263. Cf. Dummett 1991: 325

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As Kirkham rightly points out, Dummett has an unfortunate tendency to confuse ontological, epistemological, and semantic problems and issues in such a way that his position becomes difficult to understand. Thus, Dummett 'sometimes seems to take the ontological doctrine of realism and the doctrine that meaning is truth conditions and Realist theories of truth and the doctrine of bivalence as all being, in effect, different names for the same doctrine'. Of course, semantics, epistemology, and ontology are all interconnected, but Dummett does not always take into account the fact that a realist need not be a realist in all of these senses at the same time. Dummett carefully points out that a realist need not be a realist as regards all sentences. He writes that 'someone may take a realistic view of statements about mental states, but not of mathematical statements, of statements in the future tense, but not of statements of scientific theory'. However, he does not take equal care to differentiate between metaphysical, epistemological, meaning-theoretic, and semantic realist positions. 51

52

The Manifestability Requirement There are a number of difficulties with Dummett's manifestability requirement, mainly concerning the meaning of the assumption that the knowledge possessed by the speaker of a language must be fully manifestable in her linguistic behavior. Gregory Currie asks himself what Dummett really means when he says that the knowledge must be fully manifested. He writes: 'What is it for a speaker's understanding to be manifested; in particular, what is it for understanding to be fully manifested, as Dummett insists the understanding of meaning must b e ? ' It is not easy to determine what Dummett really means by the term 'manifestation': what, according to Dummett, are the requirements for the manifestation of knowledge? Furthermore, it is not clear how he views the relation between knowledge which is manifested and knowledge which can be manifested, nor is it clear why he requires that the knowledge which we, in our meaning-theoretic reflections, can ascribe to the speaker of a language must be fully manifestable. Why is it not enough that it should be manifestable? 53

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Kirkham 1989: 207 Dummett 1995: 202 Currie 1993: 478

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It seems to me to be entirely possible to favor the view that the knowledge which can be ascribed to the speaker of a language must be manifestable in the behavior of that speaker. Moreover, that knowledge must also be fully manifestable in the collective behavior of the community of speakers to which the individual speaker belongs. We need not hold that the knowledge in question can be fully manifested in the behavior of the individual speaker; instead, it is enough that the knowledge in question can be perceived as fully manifestable in the behavior of the speech community. Dummett discusses the knowledge and behavior of the individual speaker rather than the knowledge that can be ascribed to, and the behavior that is demonstrated by, a speech community. As a result, his views on the relation between the knowledge and behavior of the individual speaker on the one hand, and that of the collective speech community on the other, are unclear. Dummett stresses that '[w]e can give no intelligible account of language save as a social practice' but he does not explain how this insight relates to his focus on the individual speaker. He argues that a theory of meaning should explain both what constitutes the knowledge of the individual speaker, and what constitutes the knowledge that can be ascribed to a community of speakers but, as I mentioned above, he does not analyze the relation between these two remarks. There is one further problem with Dummett's argument, one which relates to his focus on the individual speaker's linguistic behavior. It is by no means obvious that the manifestability Dummett requires can only be realized in our linguistic behavior. The knowledge possessed by a speaker can possibly sometimes be manifestable in her non-verbal behavior instead. Therefore, it might be better to perceive the manifestability requirement as being limited to the linguistic behavior of the collective speech community. Another factor which complicates any attempt to understand and interpret Dummett's manifestability requirement is the fact that Dummett does not fully explain what he means by the frequently used expression 'to know'. In his discussion on theories of meaning, Dummett argues that our linguistic competence consists of something we know and that this knowledge should be understood as 'an implicit grasp'. Because our grasp of knowledge is implicit, Dummett suggests, we do not know exactly what 54

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The quotation is from Dummett 1987: 275 Dummett 1991: 122,343 E.g. Dummett 1993: 35, 119

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our knowledge consists of. Instead, he argues, we internalize this implicit grasp in a random and unsystematic way when we learn a language. However, it can, and it should, be made explicit through a theory of meaning. What I call into question is the appropriateness of regarding such an implicit grasp as knowledge before it has been made explicit. Are we really entitled to assume that there is any knowledge that can be made explicit by a theory of meaning unless it has actually been made explicit? What is Dummett's definition of knowledge? Does he not stretch the concept of knowledge a bit too far? More importantly, Dummett does not explain his views on the relation between, on the one hand, the possibility that the knowledge a speaker must possess in order to be able to understand and use a certain sentence (or class of sentences) can be manifested in the speaker's use of the sentence in question (or class of sentences) and, on the other hand, the possibility that the speaker's knowledge can be manifested in her use of the language to which the sentence in question (or class of sentences) belongs. At times, it seems as if Dummett's focus on individual sentences (or individual classes of sentences) implies that the knowledge possessed by the speaker who understands a certain sentence (or class of sentences) must be fully manifestable in her use of that sentence (or class of sentences) rather than in her use of all the sentences she understands. Dummett's rejection of holism is linked to his focus on individual sentences and to his interest in the knowledge possessed by the individual speaker. The fact that he understands meaning and theories of meaning in a non-Quinean way is also significant in this respect. 57

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Holism and the Concept of Meaning Dummett points out that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to formulate an acceptable theory of meaning based on holism. At the same time, Dag Prawitz argues that Dummett's requirement that a theory of meaning should make explicit all the implicit knowledge that we have acquired in learning a language cannot possibly be met. Formulating such a theory of meaning for our natural language, he continues, is a Utopian 57 58 59 60 61

Dummett 1991: 102 Dummett 1991: 103 Dummett 1991: 102, 311 Cf. Dummett 1991: 96 Cf. Dummett 1993: xii-xiii

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project which Dummett stays well away from. In this respect, it seems that the very criticism that Dummett levels against holism also affects his own position. The problem with holism, according to Dummett, is that a holistic view prevents us from ascribing meaning to individual sentences. This conclusion presupposes a concept of meaning that is different from the one used by Quine. Quine suggests that meaning is that which is preserved in the process of translation. The anti-realist, by contrast, would hold that the meaning of a sentence is inextricably linked to that which we perceive as evidence for or against it. Thus, the anti-realist conclusion that holism prevents us from ascribing meaning to individual sentences becomes intelligible: it is not individual sentences but entire linguistic systems, the holist argues, that are linked to our evidence for and against the meaning of a sentence. Consequently, given the concept of meaning implied in Dummett's meaning-theoretic reflections, the holist holds that large linguistic systems are the only linguistic units to which we can ascribe meaning. If it is indeed the case that meaning can only be ascribed to large linguistic systems, Dummett argues, then we cannot explain how it can be possible for a speaker to know only part of a language — sometimes a very limited part. It is not readily apparent what the holism that Dummett rejects consists of. In an interview given in 1996, Dummett claims that the holism he criticizes is that which has abolished 'the distinction between the periphery and the interior'. It can be questioned whether there really are any proponents of the form of holism that he rejects; at any rate, Quine is not one of them. Quine preserves the distinction between periphery and interior in our linguistic systems. In his reflections, our observational sentences — sentences which are directly and firmly linked to our sensory perceptions — are a kind of interior in our linguistic system. They are a starting point for language-learning children and field linguists alike. Moreover, Putnam is another philosopher who does not fit into the definition of holism criticized by Dummett. According to Putnam's reasoning, if we aim to solve a specific problem and, in consequence, feel the need to conceive of something as an interior that can be presupposed in our concept formation process, then it is possible for us to specify what 62

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Prawitz 1995: 7 Dummett 1978: 146 Pataut 1996: 22 Quine 1969a: 89

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constitutes that interior in relation to that specific problem. The interior in question can consist of items such as the values we have, certain notions about the make-up of our human constitution, or certain facts which we can assert with the help of arguments based on our criteria of rational acceptability. If, for example, we treat certain facts as an interior that must necessarily be presupposed in our concept formation, then it is possible for us to solve certain problems. Thus, it is possible to preserve the distinction between interior and periphery in our analysis and treatment of a specific problem or issue. Dummett's reflections on linguistic practice and the way it affects our meaning-theoretic reflections show that his position can be described as holistic in the same sense that Putnam's position is holistic. Dummett frequently returns to Wittgenstein's phrase 'Meaning is use'. However, he criticizes the fact that Wittgenstein, in his opinion, 'placed an unwarranted prohibition upon philosophy's interfering with actual practice'. Dummett stresses that 'practice is not sacrosanct' but that, rather, our work in the field of philosophy of language must necessarily change our linguistic practice. * Dummett's reflections on our use of language and its role as guiding principle are unclear. On the one hand, Dummett takes the fact that certain sentences are treated as unverifiable as a sign that his semantic antirealist interpretation of undecidable sentences is correct. On the other hand, he does not allow our semantic realist treatment of for example sentences about the past to support and verify a semantic realist interpretation of such sentences. We do actually quite often treat sentences about the past as verifiable for the people who lived in the time referred to. Sometimes Dummett regards our actual use of language as the evidence against which various theories pertaining to the philosophy of language are tested, and sometimes he regards it as something which must be changed, given certain standpoints in the philosophy of language. It is difficult to work out what criteria Dummett uses for determining when our linguistic practice should be treated as evidence and when it should be changed. It might be concluded that what Dummett aims for is a balance between our linguistic practice and those of our theories that are part of the philosophy of language. This balance can be reached in a variety of ways. 66

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E.g. Dummett 1993: 38, 91, 116. Cf Wittgenstein 1953: §421 and Wittgenstein 1979: §61 Dummett 1991: 337 The quotation is from Dummett 1993: 162 6 6

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Given certain standpoints in the philosophy of language, certain language revisions are needed. Given the fact that our linguistic practice does not always lend itself very easily to revision, it becomes practically impossible to maintain certain standpoints in the philosophy of language. To think of Dummett's position as a striving for balance is to regard it as holistic in the Putnamian sense. If we aim to solve certain problems, we can perceive our linguistic practice as a kind of interior against which all reflections pertaining to the philosophy of language must be tried. If we aim to solve other problems, we can perceive our standpoints in the philosophy of language as a kind of interior in response to which we revise our linguistic practice. I consider Putnam's internal realism to be holistic in the same sense that Dummett's thinking is holistic; consequently, as I formulate my Putnam-based notion of non-metaphysical realism, there is no need for me to respond to Dummett's criticism of holism. Dummett's criticism of holism does not affect Putnam's position, nor does it affect mine, since neither of us abolishes the distinction between periphery and interior.

Verification and Evidence-Transcendence The verifiability of statements plays an important role in any attempt to distinguish between effectively decidable and undecidable sentences. It is not clear, however, how Dummett thinks of verifiability. Alston examines two problems with the way Dummett understands verifiability. Firstly, Alston argues, Dummett fails properly to take into account the fact that statements are not verified individually: 'what counts as an empirical verification (confirmation) of "Jim is insecure" does not depend on that sentence alone with its meaning. It also depends on the further theoretical context in which it is embedded'. Quine argues that the verification of a sentence always depends on suppositions expressed by sentences other than the one being verified. This makes it difficult to specify exactly which sentences we are able to verify or falsify with the methods that are available to us. As a result, we are unable to distinguish clearly between effectively decidable sentences and undecidable ones. 69

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Alston 1996a: 111 Quine 1992a: 94

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Secondly, Alston argues, 'Dummett does not explain how he thinks of conclusiveness'. Dummett suggests that effectively decidable sentences are those sentences that can be conclusively verified or falsified but it is not clear, Alston argues, how Dummett thinks of the fact that certain sentences can be better described as 'inconclusively verifiable'. Although such sentences cannot be conclusively verified or falsified, they can be partly verified or falsified. Should such sentences be treated as undecidable sentences, or should they be thought of as effectively decidable sentences that are verifiable or falsifiable in principle though not yet in practice? We can interpret Dummett's approach to evidence-transcendent truths in various ways, depending on how we think of his verifiability requirement. Dummett describes sentences whose truth-value we can determine in a finite time as effectively decidable ones. He goes on to argue that we are entitled to be semantic realists about effectively decidable sentences. Effectively decidable sentences can be conceived of as statements, as sentences that can be either true or false. An evidence-transcendent truth is a sentence which is true although we cannot verify it. According to Dummett's reasoning, an evidence-transcendent truth must consist of an effectively decidable sentence which we cannot verify. Does Dummett think that there are any such sentences? As I understand Dummett, it would be possible for him and likeminded philosophers to assume that there are three kinds of evidencetranscendent truths. Firstly, sentences which are only partly verifiable can be thought of as evidence-transcendent truths. This would require us to hold that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for sentences that are not yet conclusively verified/falsified, as well as for the already verified/falsified ones. Dummett holds that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for sentences that we can verify or falsify in a finite time, a view which seems to allow for the possibility that this kind of evidence-transcendent truths might exist. Dummett can conceive of truths which are partly, though not yet conclusively, verified as evidence-transcendent truths. The extent of this finite time therefore determines what sentences can be conceived of as evidence-transcendent truths. If Dummett allows this time period to be a comparatively long one, and if we hold that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for 71

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sentences that can be verified or falsified within that extended interval of finite time, then this would seem to indicate that he seeks to defend the notion that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for sentences we can verify or falsify in principle, though perhaps we can never do so in practice. If so, then there may be evidence-transcendent truths 'independently of whether we actually have any means of knowing them to be true' but not 'independently of our capacity to know [them to be true]'. Dummett does not explain how he thinks of the relation between our capacity to verify or falsify a sentence in principle, and our capacity to do so in practice. However, he does indicate that the anti-realist philosopher would argue that it is absurd to hold that a sentence can be true 'even though there is nothing whatever such that, if we knew of it, we should count it as evidence or as a ground for the truth of the statement'. According to this reasoning, it is possible to hold that we are entitled to interpret a certain sentence in a semantic realist way if there is a connection between it and conditions which, if we knew of them, would enable us to verify or falsify the sentence in question. This argumentation seems to indicate a second type of evidence-transcendent truths compatible with Dummett's school of thought, namely a type of sentences that can be verified in principle. A third type of evidence-transcendent truths implied by Dummett's argument seems to be suggested by his lack of clarity as he reflects on the relation between the principle of bivalence and the principle of tertium non datur. It can be argued that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a given class of sentences even if we are unable to verify or falsify the truth of the sentences in question. We can show that the sentences must be either true or false, so that no sentence in the given class can be neither true nor false, even if we cannot determine that the sentences are true, or that they are false. We can verify that the sentences have truth-conditions which are satisfied, or which are not satisfied, even if we cannot verify their truth-value. Our knowledge that the principle of bivalence applies to the class of sentences in question can be manifestable in our linguistic behavior even if we cannot verify either that the sentences in question are true, or that they are false. Philosophers belonging to Dummett's school of thought can conceive of the sentences for which 73

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Cf. Husted 1991: 680,690 Dummett makes this distinction in Dummett 1991: 335 Alston 1996a: 117 Dummett 1978: 15

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we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence even though we cannot determine their truth-value as possible evidence-transcendent truths. However, Dummett seems to reject this third type of evidencetranscendent truths by emphasizing that the realist's acceptance of the principle of bivalence implies that she holds that each statement in a given class of statements is 'determinately' true or false. Nevertheless, Dummett does not explain how he thinks of the relation between our possibilities of verifying the truth/falsity of a statement and our possibilities of verifying that the principle of bivalence applies to the statement in question. It seems to me to be entirely possible to say that, given our present verification methods, we can draw the conclusion that an utterance is either true or false without being entitled thereby to assert either that it is true or that it is false. In other words, we can verify that the principle of bivalence applies to the utterance in question even if there is nothing to indicate either that the utterance is true or that it is false. That the utterance 'Nebuchadnezzar had a wart on his chin' is either true or false (in other words, that the principle of bivalence applies to this statement) is something that can be verified insofar as we know that nobody both has and does not have a wart on her chin. Everyone either has or does not have a wart on her chin; we can verify this with the help of our verification methods, regardless of whether or not we know anything specifically about Nebuchadnezzar and his warts. We know what the rules are for people, warts and chins, and it is for this reason that we can draw the conclusion that Nebuchadnezzar either had a wart on his chin or did not have a wart on his chin, even if there is nothing to indicate that he did, or that he did not. The sentence 'Condoleezza Rice will be the next President of the United States' can be analyzed in a similar way. What does it mean to say that this sentence must be 'determinately' true or false? The semantic realist may well hold that the sentence is either true or false (in other words, that the principle of bivalence applies) insofar as it is true to say of every human being that, either she will be the next President of the United States, or she will not. This is no less true for the human being Condoleezza Rice. It seems reasonable to say that the semantic realist is not required to hold that the sentence already has a specific truth-value in order to be entitled to conceive of it as a statement; instead, she can 77

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Dummett 1995: 204 The example is taken from Loar 1987: 98 The example is inspired by Dummett 1995: 204

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hold that the sentence will definitely have a specific truth-value at some point in the future.

Dummett and Putnam Gregory Currie writes that Dummett's reflections bear 'interesting but unclear relations to other doctrines that are currently under discussion, notably Putnam's "internal realism'". Putnam and Dummett both base their work on the assumption that, if we are to learn to make truth-claims and to understand what it means that something is true, then our conceptions of what it means that something is true must be connected with our practice of justifying statements. However, the two scholars vary in their descriptions of what is involved in this practice of justifying statements. In Dummett's view, we are only entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a certain sentence if we, in a finite time, are able to get ourselves into a position where we can verify/falsify this sentence. Otherwise, it will not be possible for the linguistic behavior of the individual speaker to manifest our knowledge that the principle of bivalence applies to the sentence in question. Unlike Dummett, Putnam argues that our conceptions of what it means that something is true must be connected to our possibilities of justifying statements if ideal or sufficiently good conditions for justification were realized. These ideal or sufficiently good conditions do not necessarily have to be realized in a finite time and it is not even certain that we will ever be able to get ourselves into a position where they are realized. Putnam writes: 'My own view is that truth is to be identified with idealized justification, rather than with justificationon-present-evidence.' ' On this view, Putnam points out, it is highly significant that '[rjightness goes beyond justification', something which Dummett, according to Putnam, cannot allow. Following on from his argument that we must think of what is true as relating to what we can justify in a finite time by using the verification methods available, Dummett suggests that truth-values may vary throughout the course of history. He writes: 80

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If the present truth or falsity of a future-tense statement depends only on what lies in the present, the possibility is open that such a statement may be 8 0 81 82

Currie 1993: 481 Putnam 1990: 115 Putnam 1990: 114

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true at one time but not at another; or, to speak more precisely, it is possible that some future-tense statement, made at some time, is rightly assessed at that time as not being true then, although, when made at another time, is then rightly assessed as being true at that time. 83

Dummett seems to suggest that a future-tense statement may be true at one point in time, false at another, and true again at a third point in time and that this need not be explained by reference to indexicality (in the ordinary sense of the word; that is to say, it need not be explained by reference to time or personal pronouns in the sentence). Similarly, it may be that Dummett imagines that a past-tense statement can be true at one point in time and false at another. Putnam disagrees with this idea. He argues that 'any theory that makes the truth or falsity of a historical claim depend on whether that claim can be decided in the future is radically misguided'. * We do not imagine that the truth-value of a historical claim varies throughout the course of history, as our ability or inability to verify or falsify the sentence in question changes. We do not imagine that the sentence 'Nebuchadnezzar had a wart on his chin' may have been true at the time when Nebuchadnezzar himself was alive (when it could be verified by everyone who saw him), false in the Middle Ages when the only available evidence indicated that he did not have a wart on his chin and then true again when we find Nebuchadnezzar's mummified body (and can conclude that he did have a wart on his chin, after all). Such an approach to truth-values conflicts with our (realist) intuition and changes the way in which we talk about truth. The Putnamian school of thought can favor another approach to the truth-value of historical claims. The fact that a number of different verification methods have been recognized throughout the course of history does not necessarily require us to assume that there have been a number of sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement. If we presuppose our understanding of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of the statement 'Nebuchadnezzar had a wart on his chin', we can hold that the sentence is either true or false, and that it has always been either true or false. We can hold this even if we cannot verify or falsify the sentence. We can conceive of the sentence as an evidence-transcendent truth in the sense that it can be true even if people today cannot verify it. 1

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The Putnamian school of thought can hold that if Nebuchadnezzar did indeed have a wart on his chin, then the statement that he did not have a wart on his chin was false in the Middle Ages, even if the people living at that time did not believe so. It was the medieval verification methods which were erroneous, since they failed to generate/preserve true statements about reality. It is my contention that we are only entitled to criticize the medieval verification methods if we hold that the truth-value of a certain statement does not vary with the verification methods used, thereby leading to a number of different conclusions about the truth-value of the statement in question. Dummett describes the relation between our verification methods and the truth-value of effectively decidable sentences in a way which seems to me to deprive us of the ability to criticize our own verification methods. It is still possible for the philosopher who belongs to Dummett's school of thought to hold that we can evaluate and criticize other verification methods and that we can do so in relation to present verification methods and the truths that they help us verify. However, this school of thought hardly allows us to conduct any thorough critical investigation of our own verification methods and their truth generating/truth preserving abilities. If what is true corresponds to what we can verify with the help of available verification methods, then the truth generating/truth preserving abilities of these methods cannot be evaluated. Despite the many differences between Dummett's reflections and those of Putnam, Dummett argues that Putnam does not support any form of realism that is affected by Dummett's criticism. Instead, Dummett claims that Putnam rejects realism altogether. He writes: 'To say, with Hilary Putnam, that truth is epistemically constrained, is certainly to repudiate realism'. Dummett makes a distinction between two forms of anti-realism. The first form advances the notion of relativized truth-values. The second form advances the idea that the only sentences of which we are entitled to assume that they have truth-conditions that can either be satisfied or that cannot be satisfied are the sentences whose truth-value we can determine. Dummett writes: 85

One form which an anti-realistic view may take is [...] the replacement of the notion of absolute truth-value by a notion of relativized truth-values. The resultant semantic theory may still be objectivist, in that the (relativized) truth-value of a statement need not depend on our knowledge of it or our 85

Dummett 1995: 210

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capacity to know it [...] there may be many statements that are actually now true even though we do not know that they are and perhaps can never know. Another type of anti-realism, perhaps the most interesting, consists in rejecting an objectivist semantics, even though it may still be allowed that to understand a statement is to know the condition for it to be true. The notion of truth admitted in such a meaning-theory will be one closely linked to our recognition of truth. 86

Putnam seems to support the first form of anti-realism discussed above; however, unlike Dummett, I think of this approach as a form of realism rather than anti-realism. Putnam argues that if we are to comprehend what it is that makes up absolute truth, then such truth must be understood in relation to our conceptual resources and to our possibilities of justifying statements under sufficiently good conditions. Putnam argues that it is entirely possible for a statement to be true even if we will never be able to justify it since sufficiently good conditions will never be realized. However, a statement cannot possibly be true unless we, as the human beings that we are, would be able to justify it if sufficiently good conditions were realized. Dummett supports the other form of anti-realism. According to this view, our possibilities of determining the truth-value of a certain class of sentences limit our possibilities of conceiving of them as statements. We are not entitled to regard sentences whose truth-value we cannot determine in a finite time as statements. I aim to develop Dummett's first form of anti-realism further, a form which I consider to be a form of realism. In so doing, I will relate my observations to Dummett's second form of anti-realism by bearing in mind the importance Dummett gives to manifestability and the ways in which it affects our possibilities of learning to make truth-claims and to understand what it means that something is true. I intend to show that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for a certain sentence if we can imagine what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of that sentence. Sentences of which we can imagine sufficiently good conditions for justification can be conceived of as statements. Statements we can neither verify nor falsify at present might be evidence-transcendent truths. Semantic Realism and Evidence-Transcendence Dummett's reflections make it possible to clarify what it means to see truth as a semantic notion. The philosopher agreeing with Dummett and 8 6

Dummett 1993: 257-8

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Putnam in claiming that truth is a semantic notion assumes that what we can hold true depends upon our possibilities of learning to make truthclaims: we cannot hold anything true which presupposes that we can make truth-claims in a way we cannot learn. Philosophers maintaining that truth is a semantic notion argue that our discussions on what we can hold true demand that we reflect on what is needed for us to learn to make truth-claims. When I use the concept of semantic realism, I base it on the idea that the principle of bivalence applies to one or more given sentences. Consequently, a semantic realist with regard to the sentence/s in question is somebody who assumes the principle of bivalence for that sentence or those sentences. Given that a statement is by definition a sentence which is either true or false, I view arguments for or against semantic realism as arguments concerning which sentences should be treated as statements. If a sentence is neither true nor false, that is, if the principle of bivalence does not apply to that sentence, then it is not a statement. A semantic anti-realist with regard to a certain sentence or certain sentences is somebody who assumes that the principle of bivalence does not apply to the sentence/s in question, that is, that the sentence/s in question is/are not statements. There are a number of different ideas about what sentences can meaningfully be treated as statements. Dummett suggests that only effectively decidable sentences can be treated as statements. Putnam, by contrast, argues that sentences for which we can imagine sufficiently good conditions of justification can also be treated as true or false, even though we cannot verify either that they are true, or that they are false. Putnam writes: 'Consider the proposition, "Caesar had someone shave him on the day he crossed the Rubicon." I believe that this proposition has a determinate truth-value. "Ideal circumstances for determining that truth-value" are not hard to describe'. Even if it is impossible for us today either to verify or to falsify the claim that Caesar had someone shave him on the day he crossed the Rubicon, we can, Putnam suggests, assume that the sentence is either true or false, or in other words, we can assume that it is a statement. Neither Putnam nor Dummett are semantic realists or semantic antirealists in a general sense. Rather, they take a semantic realist position in relation to certain sentences, and a semantic anti-realist position in relation to other sentences; moreover, they sometimes disagree on what position should be taken in relation to a certain class of sentences. Thus, it is 87

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Putnam 1994c: 258

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impossible to categorize either of the two philosophers as a semantic realist or a semantic anti-realist, without also explaining in relation to what sentences their positions are analyzed. The fact that Putnam, unlike Dummett, talks of idealized rational acceptability means that he and like-minded thinkers may well be semantic realists in relation to certain sentences about which Dummett takes a semantic anti-realist position. If sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain sentence can be imagined, then that sentence can be treated as a statement even if we cannot actually specify its truthvalue. My contention is that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for sentences about which we can imagine sufficiently good conditions for justification. I base this conclusion on my position that the manifestability that is required if we are to be able to learn to make truthclaims and to talk of something as true is realized by the sentences that relate to some idea concerning when sufficiently good conditions for justification are realized. In formulating non-metaphysical realism, I treat truth as a semantic notion. By specifying which sentences can be conceived of in a semantic realist way, we identify which sentences we take to be statements, that is, which sentences are statements in our linguistic practice. It is the sentences that are statements in our linguistic practice that we make use of in learning to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true. I am of the opinion that we are entitled to conceive of a certain sentence (or a certain class of sentences) in a semantic realist way if our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for the justification of the sentence/s in question are manifested in the linguistic behavior of the collective linguistic community. Unless our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification are so manifested, we cannot learn what it means to say that the sentence in question is true or that the sentences in question are true. If, however, they are so manifested, then we can, through study or through assimilation into the relevant speech community, learn what it means that the sentence/s in question is/are true, and we can learn how to use the sentence/s to make truth-claims. Thus, the truth-conditions of the sentence/s can be specified in relation to our ideas of what would constitute sufficiently good conditions for its justification. The ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification held by a certain linguistic community can be established by specifying which ideas about correct linguistic behavior prevail in that community. In this way, we can draw the conclusion that certain sentences used in the linguistic community in question can be thought to have truth-conditions which are

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either satisfied or which are not satisfied. If the truth-conditions applying to a certain sentence can be specified, then it can be concluded that the principle of bivalence applies to this sentence; in other words, the linguistic community treats this sentence as a statement. Expert knowledge, perhaps in the field of philosophy, may be required if the process of specifying the ideas about correct linguistic behavior and of sufficiently good conditions for justification held by a certain linguistic community is to be successful; on the other hand, these ideas can always be specified by somebody possessing the required level of competence. It seems to be the case that, on a collective level, if we are to learn to make truth-claims and to talk about what is true, then our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification must not only be manifestable in the linguistic behavior of the collective linguistic community but they must also be manifested in it. By contrast, on the level of the individual, it is not necessary for our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain sentence (or class of sentences) to be actually manifested in the linguistic behavior of the individual speaker in order for us to be able to learn to make truthclaims and to talk about what is true. However, for us to be willing to draw the conclusion that the speaker understands what it means to say that the sentence in question is a statement (or that the class of sentences are statements), what is necessary is that our ideas of sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain sentence (or class of sentences) can be manifested in the behavior, verbal or non-verbal, of the individual speaker. It is not possible to define the term 'linguistic community' once and for all, nor is it possible to specify once and for all which linguistic communities exist. In philosophical discussions, the delimitation of a certain linguistic community should always relate to a certain set of problems and issues. This delimitation does not indicate that non-members of the linguistic community in question cannot understand what is being said within the framework of that linguistic community; what it does indicate, however, is which linguistic practice the philosopher who aims to solve a certain problem must choose to study. There are usually a number of different ideas about what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain sentence. A sentence may be treated as a statement in one linguistic community, whereas another linguistic community does not think it has any truthconditions at all. One linguistic community may hold that the sentence 'The yeti exists' is a statement (in relation to the verification methods

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used by that community) and that the statement is true. Another community may hold that although the sentence is certainly a statement, it is a statement which is false (in relation to other verification methods than those used by the first community). A third community may hold that the utterance is not a statement at all (in relation to their verification methods) but part of a myth (which is neither true nor false; in other words, the principle of bivalence does not apply here). It seems to me an important philosophical task to specify, analyze and criticize the various ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification that occur in various contexts and situations and to work through the problems that arise as a result of these differences. My understanding of semantic realism forms a basis on which I am able to build an idea of what sentences, in religious contexts, we are entitled to conceive of in a semantic realist way. It seems possible for us to take a semantic realist approach to sentences in religious contexts that are related to ideas of sufficiently good conditions for justification, ideas which are manifested in the linguistic behavior of a certain linguistic community and which can be specified through studying the community's ideas about correct linguistic behavior. Since only sentences that can be conceived of in a semantic realist way can be statements, and since only statements can be true, we must conclude that only sentences that can be conceived of as statements can be evidence-transcendent truths. An evidence-transcendent truth is a true statement the truth of which we cannot verify in practice. Certain sentences occurring in religious contexts can, if true, be examples of evidence-transcendent truths. A sentence which occurs in religious contexts and which relates to an idea of sufficiently good conditions for its justification is, if true and if unverified, an evidence-transcendent truth. Semantic Realism and Ontology Our approach to semantic realism affects not only our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths but also our view of the constitution of reality, that which Dummett calls our metaphysical position. Like Putnam, Dummett emphasizes that there is a link between true sentences and facts: the sentences that we hold true indicate what we consider to be the case (facts). 'Our view of the constitution 88

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Cf. Dummett 1991: 326

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of reality — our metaphysical position — depends in part on which are the classes of statements of which we take a realistic view, i.e. for which we assume the principle of bivalence'. Dummett takes care to point out that there is a relation between meaning-theoretic reflections and metaphysics. He writes: 'The relation of truth to the recognition of truth is the fundamental problem of the theory of meaning, or, what is the same thing, of metaphysics'. He points out that meaning-theoretic reflections precede and pave the way for metaphysics since 'the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics'. He considers this insight to be the very core of his contribution to philosophy. Dummett argues that, as a consequence of the relation that exists between our meaning-theoretic reflections and our metaphysical position, we must begin our investigation of metaphysical issues with an analysis of meaning-theoretic questions. Furthermore, he argues, by considering what is required for us to be able to formulate a theory of meaning, and by clarifying exactly what functions we think it should have, we can 'form a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks'. He writes: 89

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My contention is that [...] metaphysical issues turn on questions about the correct meaning-theory for our language. We must not try to resolve the metaphysical questions first, and then construct a meaning-theory in the light of the answers. We should investigate how our language actually functions, and how we can construct a workable systematic description of how it functions; the answers to those questions will then determine the answers to the metaphysical ones. 93

I have chosen to focus on the semantic, rather than on the meaning-theoretic, aspects of Dummett's theories. Moreover, I have chosen to characterize our view of the constitution of reality as an ontological, rather than as a metaphysical, position. This is because I want to stress that what I am examining is general metaphysics, that is, ontological approaches to what exists and what is required for something to exist, and no other form of metaphysics. However, the relation Dummett sees between our meaning-theoretic reflections and metaphysics corresponds to a similar relation in the non-metaphysical realist position that I will outline in chapter six. I argue that our ontological ideas are made explicit when we-specify what sentences we conceive of in a semantic realist way. 89 90 91 92 93

Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett Dummett

1993: 57 1978: 314 1978: xl 1991: 16. Cf. Dummett 1991: 18-9 1991: 338

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Non-metaphysical realism consists of a rejection of metaphysical realism (and of metaphysical anti-realism, as well) and an advancement of the combination of semantic realism and epistemological realism that my discussion of Dummett and his work has yielded. The fact that non-metaphysical realism is non-metaphysical does not indicate a rejection of, or a lack of interest in, our possibilities of reflecting on, and debating, various ontological issues and questions. In using the term 'non-metaphysical', I want to emphasize only that the form of realism I attempt to formulate is not a metaphysical realist position. My understanding of semantic and epistemological realism affects the ways in which the non-metaphysical realist describes and approaches our ontological issues and questions. Michael Luntley suggests that the relation between effectively decidable statements and facts which Dummett's position presupposes implies that the only things that we in Dummett's view can assume exist are 'those things in reality for which we have an effective decision procedure'. In formulating my view of semantic and epistemological realism, I have chosen to focus on idealized, rather than on actual, justification; as a result, I can assume that there are both facts and existing entities whose truth and existence we can verify in principle, but not in practice. This possibility affects the way in which the nonmetaphysical realist describes and relates to ontological issues and questions. In chapter six, I will indicate how non-metaphysical realism relates to ontological issues and questions. I will examine the ways in which the non-metaphysical realist can assume that there is a shared independent reality and I will relate this issue to the metaphysical realist assumption that we can assume that there is a reality-in-itself. In so doing, I will give an outline of non-metaphysical realism. Following on from this discussion, my concluding remarks will indicate of what a philosophy of religion based on my theories and reflections might consist. 94

»• Luntley 1985: 311

CHAPTER SIX

NON-METAPHYSICAL REALISM

This chapter will, in large parts, be based on Davidson's reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation and his arguments against the existence of conceptual schemes. I will discuss the presuppositions which underlie our possibilities of interpretation, and I will investigate in what sense we can conceive of different conceptual schemes in a meaningful way, or assume that we share one and the same scheme. I will explain how the non-metaphysical realist can formulate the idea of a shared independent reality in a philosophically tenable way and I will describe the non-metaphysical realist position and how it relates to utterances made in religious contexts. I aim to explain the non-metaphysical realist attitude to ontological positions and issues, and to emphasize the fact that non-metaphysical realism is not a relativistic position. Non-metaphysical realism does not lead to the conclusion that we cannot discuss ontological issues or criticize ontological positions in a meaningful way, nor does it imply that we cannot comprehend ontological utterances made with the help of concepts and conceptual distinctions that we as, for example, the Swedish speaking community, do not employ. The non-metaphysical realist emphasizes our possibilities of understanding, criticizing and discussing ontological positions and issues. She clarifies what constitutes these possibilities, how they can be preserved and on what presuppositions they are based.

Davidson, Dummett and Putnam Davidson poses the same basic questions as Dummett: What form should an adequate theory of meaning have? What is it that you know when you know a language? Of what does your knowledge consist?' Like Dummett, Davidson is interested in what properties a theory of meaning must have

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in order to explain the fact that we can learn a language. Like Dummett, Davidson asserts that 'a language is learnahle only if there is some finite piece of knowledge the acquisition of which would enable a speaker of that language to assign the appropriate meanings [...] to the infinite number of sentences that constitute that language'. Moreover, like Dummett, Davidson suggests that it must be possible to deduce what our linguistic knowledge is by looking at our behavior. In this sense, he is working with a manifestability criterion. Davidson writes: 'The semantic features of language are public features. What no one can, in the nature of the case, figure out from the totality of the relevant evidence cannot be part of the meaning.' Both Dummett and Davidson argue that semantics can be seen as the foundation on which metaphysics is based. According to both scholars, questions concerning what does and what does not exist must be posed and answered in relation to questions concerning our language. However, despite the similarities between Dummett and Davidson as to what questions they have chosen to discuss, there are nevertheless significant differences between them. Davidson asserts that the linguistic conventions discussed by Dummett are non-existent. He also claims that the theory of meaning for which we strive must enable us to specify, 'in a way that depends effectively and solely on formal considerations, what every sentence means'. Dummett does not work with the same formalization requirement. Davidson's position in the discussion between realists and anti-realists is subject to lively debate. The disunity is apparent. Jack Crumley II argues that Davidson's arguments against the existence of conceptual schemes can be seen as confuting Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism. Richard Rorty, on the other hand, points out that Davidson is very close to Putnam and has been mistakenly labeled a realist by Dummett. Fred Sommers observes that both Putnam and Davidson reject classical realism. Both Putnam and Davidson can be described as defending a form of common-sense realism. 2

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Davidson 1984: 3,9 Matthews 1986: 50 , •:,; Davidson 1984: 235 Davidson 1984: 199,201 Davidson 1984: 112, 270, 274 Davidson 1984: 8 Crumley II 1989 Rorty 1986: 345,351 Sommers 1997: 454 Cf. Thompson 1991: 229

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Jose Zalabardo claims that both Putnam and Davidson are trying to create middle-ground positions that are neither metaphysical realist positions nor anti-realist ones. Putnam is not quite so convinced of the similarity between Davidson's position and his own internal realism. On the contrary, Putnam's criticism of Davidson's arguments against the existence of conceptual schemes shows that Putnam sees significant differences between the internal realist's position and that of Davidson. However, what Putnam fails to observe, his critics object, is that there are similarities between internal realism and Davidson's reflections on conceptual schemes. Like Putnam, Davidson concentrates on the differences between internal realism and Davidson's own reflections. He suspects that the criticism he levels against the idea of conceptual schemes also affects Putnam's internal realism. He emphasizes that he sees himself as a realist but that he aligns himself neither with metaphysical realism nor with internal realism. Davidson writes: 12

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My form of realism seems to be neither Hilary Putnam's internal realism nor his metaphysical realism. It is not internal realism because internal realism makes truth relative to a scheme, and this is an idea I do not think is intelligible. [...] But my realism is certainly not Putnam's metaphysical realism, for it is characterized by being 'radically non-epistemic', which implies that all our best researched and established thoughts and theories may be false.

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Lars Bergstrom points out that Davidson perceives Putnam as a proponent of an epistemic theory of truth. According to Davidson, Putnam's epistemic theory of truth implies that what is true will be relative to the conceptual scheme with which a true statement is formulated. In this chapter, I will develop my ideas of how the non-metaphysical realist can avoid falling into the trap of relativism. Davidson points out that he wants neither to 'humanize truth by making it basically epistemic' nor advocate a correspondence theory of truth. Metaphysical realism is associated with such a correspondence theory of truth. Internal realism implies, Davidson argues, that what is true will be 17

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Zalabardo 2000: 63 Cf. Putnam 1987b Brenner-Golomb and van Brakel 1989 This suspicion is shared by Thompson 1991 ' Davidson 1986: 309. Cf. Thompson 1991: 222 Bergstrom 1994: 421 Davidson 1990: 298

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dependent on us and our conceptual resources. In the light of Putnam's work and Davidson's arguments against the existence of conceptual schemes, I will describe how the non-metaphysical realist can relate the insight that, if truths are to be truths, we must be able to formulate them, to the assumption that what is true is not dependent on us and our conceptual resources. In making this argument, I will base my thinking on the similarities that exist between Putnam's internal realism, on the one hand, and Davidson's reflections, on the other.

Davidson and Quine The issues with which Davidson works, the arguments he formulates and the standpoints he takes must be described in relation to Quine's philosophical reflections. Davidson shares Quine's holistic view of language. Moreover, the two of them also share what Hans-Johann Glock calls 'the thesis of the indispensahility of translation''. Glock writes: 'Quine and Davidson, in spite of their considerable differences, share a fundamental conviction: all linguistic understanding is based on translation or interpretation.' Both Quine and Davidson suggest that when we clarify what a word or an expression means and what it means that they mean something, we must base our reasoning on our practice of translating or interpreting words and expressions. Quine and Davidson disagree on whether the focus should lie on our possibilities of translating, or on our possibilities of interpreting. Whereas Quine discusses the former, it is the latter which is the focus of Davidson's interest. Quine considers the conditions of radical translation, that is, the translation of a language not previously translated. Davidson, rather than discussing the conditions of radical translation, discusses radical interpretation. What he finds interesting is our possibilities of interpreting one another and the speakers of a language not previously interpreted. Unlike Quine, Davidson states that '[i]t cannot be said that [...] knowledge of a language reduces to knowing how to translate it into another', a statement which clearly indicates that Davidson holds that more is required of a theory of meaning than that it should provide a working translation manual. 19

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He argues that an adequate theory of meaning should be able to throw some light on a broader competence than our ability to translate. Davidson shares Quine's concept of meaning insofar as he assumes that '[a] sentence, as uttered by a speaker X at a time t, means what it can successfully be interpreted as meaning'. In this sense, meaning is that which is preserved or clarified through interpretation. However, what Davidson does not share is Quine's idea of what constitutes adequate evidence in that particular situation, what the interpreter should put her trust in, what her starting point should be. Roger Gibson writes: 23

Davidson's radical interpreter relies upon third-person, distal, stimuli, not first-person, proximal, stimuli, in constructing his/her interpretation of the native's desires, beliefs, and meanings. Such distal stimuli are intersubjectively observable and are, by the interpreter's own lights, the ones causally connected with the native's speech dispositions. By relying upon distal stimuli, Davidson's radical interpreter thereby avoids the vulnerability to skepticism which he believes afflicts Quine's radical translator's proximal approach. 24

Quine concentrates on the interpreter's sensory perceptions, for example her visual impressions of a rabbit, sensory perceptions that the interpreter assumes that the speaker, being human, can also have in that particular situation. Davidson chooses instead to discuss the interpreter's possibilities of reconstructing the speaker's wishes and beliefs by taking a third-person perspective. What he finds interesting is the interpreter's possibilities of clarifying what the speaker's utterances mean by observing her behavior. Davidson's main criticism of Quine concerns Quine's thesis of ontological relativity. Davidson argues that Quine, in formulating his thesis of ontological relativity, makes an untenable distinction between 'a nonpropositional content given in experience and a conceptual scheme, language or framework which organizes that content'. Davidson calls the idea that it is possible to maintain a strict distinction between 'scheme' and 'content' 'the third dogma of empiricism'. According to Davidson, Quine must reject this dogma, like he rejects the other two dogmas of empiricism. Hans Penner declares that the fact that Davidson questions the distinction between 'scheme' and 'content' will have consequences for the work of religious studies scholars, since philosophical reflections on religion often presuppose such a distinction. In chapters one and three, 25

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Pagin 1999: 59 Gibson 1994: 457 Davidson 1994: 187 Davidson 1984: 189 Penner 1995: 246

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''

I have described Hick's position and his use of the distinction between scheme (the concept formation of different religions) and content (experiences of the Real). Hick's work is an example of a study in the field of religious studies using the distinction that Davidson calls into question. Hick assumes that there are different conceptual schemes, schemes which structure experiences of the Real in different ways. Thus, Hick's position is affected by Davidson's criticism. In the light of Quine's thesis of ontological relativity, I will discuss Davidson's reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation and his arguments against conceptual schemes. I will explain in what sense these arguments of his do not affect the internal realist and in what sense the nonmetaphysical realist is able to imagine that different conceptual schemes exist without having to advocate a relativistic conception of reality. In this context, manifestability is quite significant, since Davidson, like Dummett and Putnam, gives 'the attitude of holding true or accepting as true' a central role. Our behavior indicates what we hold true, Davidson suggests. In his description of the conditions of radical interpretation, he emphasizes our possibilities of discerning what a speaker holds true before we can interpret her utterances. Davidson's reflections on the relation between holding something true and, in the interpretation, ascribing meaning to the speaker's utterances, are inspired by the work of Tarski. 2s

Davidson and Tarski Tarski's work in the field of formal semantics constitutes an essential part of the basis on which Davidson builds his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation. Tarski takes an interest in formal, rather than natural, languages. A central aspect of his work is his attempt adequately to define the property of being true when it occurs in formal languages that meet certain conditions, conditions that mainly concern how these languages relate to the language we employ in formulating the desired definition of truth. Tarski states that we often hold that 'a true sentence is one which says that the states of affairs is so and so, and the states of affairs is indeed so and so'. Tarski suggests that a specific scheme, namely Tarski's Tschema, can be used to express the thought that lies behind our intuitive 29

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understanding that true utterances are utterances that claim that certain states of affairs prevail when these states of affairs prevail. The T-schema reads as follows: 'x is a true sentence if and only if p ' . Tarski demonstrates in his work that we can give a formal language a consistent truth-definition if we make use of two languages in doing so: the formal language whose truth-predicate we want to define, and a metalanguage that contains all the sentences that the formal language contains but is 'essentially richer' than the formal language. Tarski writes: 30

It is not easy to give a general and precise definition of this notion of 'essential richness'. If we restrict ourselves to languages based on the logical theory of types, the condition for the metalanguage to be 'essentially richer' than the object language is that it contain variables of a higher logical type than those of the object language. 31

Tarski's work shows that we can use the meta-language to give a recursive definition of the property of being true when it occurs in the object language, that is, the language whose truth-predicate we want to define, on the condition that the object language should contain all the sentences of the type specified by the T-schema and treat them as theorems. Kirk Ludwig and Ursula Zeglen summarize Tarski's insight: Tarski observed that a (consistent) recursive definition of a predicate 'is T' for a formal language which had as theorems all sentences of the form (T), (T) 5 is Tiff/? where V is replaced by a structural description of an object language sentence, and 'p' is replaced by a metalanguage sentence that translates it, will be an extensionally adequate definition of a truth predicate for the language. 32

Unlike Tarski, Davidson is mainly interested in natural, rather than formal, languages. His reflections concern our possibilities of formulating theories of meaning for natural languages, and he is, in this sense, interested in semantics insofar as it is part of the more general discipline theory of meaning. However, like Tarski, Davidson tends to focus largely on abstract aspects of the meaning-relevant properties of language, something which is usually associated with formal semantics. I have previously discussed the way in which Alston uses Tarski's reflections, which is different from the way in which Davidson uses them. Whereas, against the background of Tarski's T-schema, Alston tries to clarify the relation between our statements about reality and the states of 30 31 32

Tarski 1956: 155 Tarski 1990: 55 Ludwig and Zeglen 1999: 3

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affairs which make our sentences true or false, Davidson, by contrast, also against the background of Tarski's work, clarifies how we, by taking the existence of true sentences as our starting point, can conceive of ourselves and others as making statements about reality, statements which can be either true or false. What interests Davidson is not how language relates to reality, but rather our possibilities of interpretation. The starting point for Davidson's reflections on the theory of meaning is his insight that Tarski, in order to be able to work out his truth-definition, must, in a sense, presuppose that the predicate 'means' is unproblematic. He must presuppose that we understand what 's means p ' implies. The meta-language sentence which replaces p should, according to Tarski \s Convention T, be a translation of s, that is, the object language sentence. When Tarski formulates the T-schema, he assumes that we can translate a sentence in the object language into the meta-language, thereby stating the meaning of the object language sentence by means of the meta-language. The fact that Tarski must, in a sense, presuppose the concept of meaning is a source of inspiration to Davidson. Davidson's work can be described as being Tarski's project inverted. Putnam writes: In sum, Davidson's idea is to invert Tarski's argument. Instead of taking 'true' as the word whose meaning is to be explained and the object language as understood, Davidson takes the object language as what is to be explained, and 'true' (or whatever the word for truth is in the language in which the explanation is to be given) as what is already understood.' 3

Davidson argues that we are able to 'get at' the meaning of our linguistic expressions by assuming that we know how to use the predicate 'is true'. By supposing that the concept of truth is a primitive concept, and by assuming that we understand what it implies that an utterance is true, we can formulate an adequate theory of meaning for a language taken as an object language. Davidson writes: One thing that only gradually dawned on me was that while Tarski intended to analyse the concept of truth by appealing (in Convention T) to the concept of meaning (in the guise of sameness of meaning, or translation), I have the reverse in mind. I considered truth to be the central primitive concept, and hoped, by detailing truth's structure, to get at meaning. 34

In his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation, Davidson demonstrates how we can interpret the speaker's speech by presupposing 3 3 3 4

Putnam 1983: 80 Davidson 1984: xiv

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that she speaks the truth. In interpreting the speaker's speech, we indicate what her utterances mean. We specify the meaning of her utterances.

Radical Interpretation Davidson suggests that 'interpreting an agent's intentions, his beliefs and his words are part of a single project, no part of which can be assumed to be complete before the rest is'. Thus, an examination of the conditions of interpretation could be described as a research project shared by linguists, psychologists and philosophers alike. When making an interpretation, Davidson asserts, the interpreter must simultaneously attribute a certain meaning to the speaker's expressions and certain beliefs to the speaker. Ian Hacking has described Davidson as a super-holist. Not only does Davidson stress that our interpretation of a certain utterance must agree with our interpretation of other utterances relevant in the present context, but he also points out that, in order for the interpretation to be considered a good one, the meaning that the interpreter attributes to the speaker's utterances, and the beliefs she attributes to the speaker, must agree with one another and with the speaker's behavior. This leads Davidson to draw the following conclusion: 35

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Since we cannot hope to interpret linguistic activity without knowing what a speaker believes, and cannot found a theory of what he means on a prior discovery of his beliefs and intentions, I conclude that in interpreting utterances from scratch — in radical interpretation — we must somehow deliver ., \ simultaneously a theory of belief and a theory of meaning. 38

f

Davidson asks himself how this can be brought about. How can radical interpretation take place? On what presuppositions must it be based? In radical interpretation, Davidson claims, it is possible for us to assume that the speaker holds certain sentences true. It is important to note, however, that what Davidson is not implying is that we should assume that the speaker's utterances are true, that is, that their truthconditions are satisfied. Instead, we are to assume that the speaker holds 39

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Davidson 1984: 127 Davidson 1984: 141-2 Thompson 1991: 228 Davidson 1984: 144 Davidson 1984: 135

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her utterances true, that is, that she means what she says, that is, that the speaker is, in this sense, speaking the truth rather than consistently lying. This means that we should assume that the speaker considers it to be correct, in the circumstances, to utter the utterance in question. Dummett emphasizes: In Davidson's formulation, 'holds S true' is not to be construed as 'holds that S is true', that is, as appealing to an already understood notion of a statement's being true. Rather, it is meant to express a relation between a speaker and a possible utterance, by him or another, which we can grasp before we attain the concept of a statement's being true. 40

According to Davidson, we can discern which utterances the speaker holds true before we can interpret them. We can discern which utterances the speaker holds true before we know either what they mean or what the speaker believes. By assuming that the speaker holds certain utterances true, the interpreter can, as an expression of one and the same interpretation project, begin attributing certain meanings to the speaker's utterances and certain beliefs to the speaker herself. An example will serve to clarify the idea that the interpreter assumes that the speaker holds the uttered statements true. Suppose a rabbit were to scamper past the speaker, and the speaker exclaims 'Gavagai!', pointing to the rabbit. The interpreter will assume that the speaker speaks the truth insofar as she holds it true that what she is pointing to is, indeed, a 'gavagai'. The speaker is not lying, not uttering a word that really means 'truck driver' when pointing to the rabbit. Thus, on the basis of the thesis that the speaker speaks the truth, the interpreter will assume that 'gavagai' means 'rabbit'. True, the interpreter can draw the conclusion that the speaker is lying now and then; however, this conclusion is feasible only when the interpreter is able to interpret what the speaker says. The interpreter cannot, as a methodological principle, assume that the speaker does not mean what she says. If the speaker is always lying, the interpreter will not be able to presuppose a relation between the speaker's behavior, her beliefs and her utterances. Our possibilities of interpretation are based on the assumption that such a relation exists. For this reason, a language whose speakers are always lying could not possibly be interpreted. The interpreter simultaneously attributes a certain meaning to the speaker's utterances and certain beliefs to the speaker. The rabbit example 41

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serves to illustrate the relation between beliefs and meaning, and it also indicates how the assumption that the speaker speaks the truth actually works. Suppose the interpreter has drawn the conclusion that 'gavagai' means rabbit. Now a hare scampers past, and the speaker points to the hare and exclaims 'Gavagai!'. The interpreter now faces several different options of interpretation. First, she can attribute to the speaker the belief that the hare was actually a rabbit, and that the 'Gavagai!' exclamation was a mistake. Second, she can change the translation of the word from rabbit to hare and draw the conclusion that the speaker was mistaken when previously calling the rabbit 'gavagai'. In both these instances, the interpreter would presuppose that the speaker is not lying, a presupposition which does not imply that the speaker's utterance is true. Instead a certain, mistaken, belief is attributed to the speaker, a belief which led her to make a false utterance on one of the two occasions. Third, the interpreter can change the interpretation of 'gavagai' and, against the background of the assumption that the speaker was not mistaken on any of the two occasions, draw the conclusion that 'gavagai' means, for example, 'small scampering furred animals'. These three possible options of interpretation would imply that the interpreter presupposes that the speaker holds the utterance true, and hence that she, in this sense, speaks the truth. Davidson formulates the principle of charity and suggests that this principle is the radical interpreter's best option in limiting the number of acceptable alternatives of interpretation. It is the interpreter's task to minimize the differences of opinion that exist between herself and the speaker being interpreted. This means that the interpreter should attribute such a meaning to the speaker's words and expressions that the beliefs expressed in the sentences that the speaker holds true agree, as far as possible, with what the interpreter holds true. According to the principle of charity, the interpreter should, as far as possible, interpret the speaker's utterances in such a way that, according to the interpreter, the sentences that the speaker holds true are true. Davidson declares that, despite the principle of charity, a certain degree of indeterminacy of interpretation will remain; different options of interpretation might be equally good. However, he points out that the possibilities for variation are relatively limited. Quine, by contrast, sees the indeterminacy of translation as being much more far-reaching. 42

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Davidson 1984: xvii, 27, 169 Davidson 1984: 153 Davidson 1984: 139

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Karsten Stiiber points out that the principle of charity is not an exact method yielding exact results, but rather a condition for the success of radical interpretation. It is the interpreter's task, using the principle of charity as a norm, constantly to keep modifying her interpretation of the speaker's utterances and the beliefs attributed to the speaker, so that the meaning of the speaker's utterances and beliefs agree with one another and with the speaker's behavior. It must be emphasized that the interpreter does not have to presuppose that we can learn to make truthclaims or understand what it means that a certain utterance is true in a way that is unrelated to the conditions that we consider to be sufficiently good for the justification of the utterance in question. Davidson does not make any suggestions about how we learn to talk about truth or how we learn what it implies that something is true; he assumes that we can make truth-claims and that we know what it implies that something is true. In this sense, he uses the truth-predicate as 'a primitive expression'. He neither defines truth, nor reflects on how we learn to talk about truth. It is possible, in the aftermath of Putnam and Dummett, for the radical interpreter to conceive of truth as something that is closely related to our epistemic practice. Davidson does not have to reject the claim made by these two scholars to the effect that, if we are to learn to make truth-claims and to understand what it implies that something is true, then we have to relate our discourse on truth to our methods of verification or to our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification. Nor does he have to reject the idea that our methods of verification, or our ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification, may vary. That which is a suitable method of verification for one type of statements may well be an unsuitable method for another type. Different people may well conceive of different conditions as sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement. The truth-predicate of which Davidson suggests that we must presuppose that it prevails in interpretation may well be epistemic in the sense that we learn to use it through its relation to our practice of justifying statements. The interpreter does not have to assume that the speaker and the interpreter agree on which states of affairs constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance. The two of them may 45

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well disagree on the matter and, consequently, disagree on what it implies that the utterance is true. Nor does the interpreter have to assume that the utterances expressed by the speaker are true, although the principle of charity suggests that the utterances should be interpreted in a way that, as far as possible, leads the interpreter to conclude that they are true. However, what the interpreter must do is assume that the speaker does not consistently lie, but speaks the truth in the sense that she holds the utterances true that she claims to hold true.

Conceptual Schemes Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt and Alexander Ulfig point out that 'there is a continuous thread in Davidson's theory of interpretation which leads from interpretation-enabling principles, like charity, via the holistic character of propositional attitudes, to a more general discussion of the possibility of different conceptual schemes'. Davidson's reflections on our possibilities of interpretation cause him to argue in favor of the notion that we cannot make the idea of different conceptual schemes, as expressed by Quine in his thesis of ontological relativity, intelligible. In chapter two, I described two central problem areas to do with Quine's reflections. I noted that one critical objection that has been levelled against Quine's description of ontological relativity is the fact that his thesis cannot be formulated unless we can take that non-linguistic perspective of which he points out that we can never make it ours. Davidson touches upon the same problem when he writes: 47

The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability. 48

However, what interests me in this context is Davidson's reflections on the second critical objection to Quine's position, namely the claim that we cannot assume that there are rival and mutually incompatible translation manuals. In the following, I will concentrate on and avail myself of Davidson's reflections on our possibilities of imagining that there are

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conceptual schemes. He discusses these possibilities in relation to questions concerning our possibilities of translation. Robert Kraut maintains that Davidson's reflections on the paradox inherent in the idea of conceptual schemes contain several objections constituting a cluster of arguments against the actual idea that there are conceptual schemes. The argument I will discuss here is the one that Nicholas Rescher calls 'the Translation Argument'. Davidson's Translation Argument is closely linked to his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation, and it constitutes a criticism of Quine's thesis of ontological relativity. To start with, Davidson makes it clear that he considers a language to be the same thing as a conceptual scheme; being able to speak a language is to be the user of a conceptual scheme. Different languages can express one and the same conceptual scheme, in which case they are intertranslatable. It follows, from this clarification, that different conceptual schemes are expressed by languages which are not inter-translatable. Davidson does not talk about 'inter-interpretable' languages, something which would have been more natural, given his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation. The fact that he argues against Quine, who discusses translation rather than interpretation, affects his choice of words. In developing his argument, Davidson points out that 'nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behaviour.' We do not conceive of a language that we cannot translate as a language, that is, as linguistic behavior, or, in Davidson's words, as speech behavior. Unless we can translate the language, we cannot know if it expresses a conceptual scheme that is different from ours. If we can translate the language, it expresses the same conceptual scheme as the one expressed by our language. There cannot be alternative conceptual schemes, since some specific behavior that we conceive of as a language is translatable to our language, and thereby is an expression of the same conceptual scheme as ours. In his thesis of ontological relativity, Quine suggests that 'even "at the end of inquiry", there may be several different total systems of the world. What is true relative to one of these may not be true relative to the others'. According to Davidson, this possibility does not exist. 49

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Kraut 1986: 400-3 Rescher 1980: 324 Davidson 1984: 184-5 Davidson 1984: 185 Bergstrom 1994: 423

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Davidson points out that an alternative conceptual scheme is 'largely true but not translatable'. He suggests that we cannot meaningfully either state or deny that such a scheme exists. If an alternative conceptual scheme is true in the sense that we can use it to express true sentences, then it can, first of all, be translated. Before the radical interpreter can translate the sentences that the speaker of the source language holds true, she can, Davidson argues, identify them as sentences that the speaker holds true. According to the principle of charity, the radical interpreter should interpret these sentences in such a way that she holds them true. True sentences that are formulated with the help of the alternative conceptual scheme can be translated as true sentences that the interpreter would, in corresponding situations, be prepared to express. Without this possibility of interpretation, the interpreter would not be able to ascribe a meaning that she would consider intelligible to the assumption that the sentences that are expressed with the help of the alternative conceptual scheme are true. Secondly, unless a conceptual scheme can be translated, we are not justified in conceiving of it as a conceptual scheme, or in conceiving of the sentences that are formulated with the help of the scheme as expressions of a language. Davidson thus concludes that we cannot meaningfully imagine that there are any alternative conceptual schemes. If a scheme can be translated (if we conceive of the sentences that are formulated with the help of the scheme as expressions of a language), then it is not an alternative scheme. If it cannot be translated (if it is an alternative one), then we cannot conceive of it as a conceptual scheme, as part of a language. In discussing Quine's thesis of ontological relativity, Davidson emphasizes that it presupposes two things: firstly, that we can regard behavior that we cannot translate as a language; and secondly, that truth and translation can differ in such a way that a language used for the purpose of expressing true sentences could be untranslatable. Davidson criticizes both these assumptions. Jack Crumley II summarizes Davidson's argument as follows: 54

(1) Different conceptual schemes will be evidenced by different languages. (2) A radically different conceptual scheme will be evidenced by a radically different language, i.e., a wholly untranslatable language. (3) If there were a radically different conceptual scheme, then a significant portion of the sentences comprising the language which embodies such a conceptual scheme will be true, but nonetheless untranslatable. (4) Truth cannot be divorced from translatability. 54

Davidson 1984: 194

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(5) If (4), then (3) does not describe a genuine language, (6) If (3) does not describe a genuine language, then there could be no evidence for a radically different conceptual scheme. (7) If there could be no evidence for a radically different conceptual scheme, then we have no way of individuating genuinely alternative conceptual schemes. (8) If we have no way of individuating alternative conceptual schemes, then the notion of alternative conceptual schemes is unintelligible. (9) Thus, the idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible.

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Davidson has defended the fourth premise, that is, the thesis that truth cannot be divorced from translatability, in his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation. The first premise, however, the thesis that different conceptual schemes will be evidenced by different languages, must be clarified further, the reason being that the term 'conceptual scheme' can be used in different ways.

Kantian or Quinean? Michael Lynch distinguishes between a Kantian and a Quinean notion of what constitutes a conceptual scheme. According to the Kantian model, conceptual schemes are 'frameworks of categorical concepts which are used in cognizing any possible experience'. By contrast, the Quinean model describes a conceptual scheme as 'a network of sentences believed to be true; none of which are intrinsically more central or unrevisable than any other, and which face the "tribunal of experience" as a whole.' Lynch points out that what Davidson intends to criticize is the Quinean model. This means, I would argue, that Davidson's argument is levelled against the existence of networks of true untranslatable sentences, networks which are described by Quine as supplying radically different ontologies. Davidson's argument is not levelled against those who stress that there are different contexts and languages in which we make use of different concepts and conceptual distinctions when we talk to one another and conceptualize our experiences. Putnam talks about alternative conceptual schemes in relation to the existence of different theories, theories which enable us to describe reality in various ways. He argues that, in some cases at least, a sentence 56

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Crumley II 1989: 350-1 Lynch 1997b: 408 Lynch 1997b: 413 Cf. Putnam 1987a: 17-20 and Thompson 1991: 216

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expressed with the help of the concept formation supplied by a certain theory can be 'translated' in the sense that it can be expressed with the help of the concept formation supplied by an alternative theory. Putnam's use of the term 'conceptual scheme' is perhaps Kantian rather than anything else. What he discusses is the fact that we make use of different concepts and conceptual distinctions in different contexts. If he assumes that the sentences that are formulated with the help of one conceptual scheme can be translated into another conceptual scheme, then he will not be affected by Davidson's criticism. Davidson does not deny that different concepts and conceptual distinctions prevail in different languages. His rejection of the idea of conceptual schemes is a rejection of conceptual schemes in the Quinean sense only; he may well accept the idea of conceptual schemes in the Kantian sense. In developing my own thoughts on our possibilities of talking about one or more conceptual schemes, I presuppose a Kantian understanding of the term. In this sense, a conceptual scheme consists of the concepts and conceptual distinctions in our language with the help of which we can talk to one another and conceptualize our experiences. Davidson does not criticize the Kantian model of conceptual schemes. He does not deny that we do make use of different concepts and conceptual distinctions in different contexts and languages. However, he does make it clear that our ability to discover the fact that there are different concepts and different conceptual distinctions depends on our ability to interpret one another. Unless we can interpret one another, we cannot discover and describe the conceptual differences that prevail, nor are we justified in claiming that different concepts and conceptual distinctions prevail within different contexts and languages. The Translation Argument makes Davidson draw the conclusion that it is pointless to state, both that there are different (Quinean) conceptual schemes, and that there is only one. 'For we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one.' Davidson's argument does not show that all uses of the term 'conceptual scheme' must be rejected; it merely shows that a specific way of using the concept, namely the Quinean one, must be rejected. Since Quine's thesis of ontological relativity presupposes the Quinean use of the term 'conceptual scheme', Davidson's argument will have consequences for our possibilities of avoiding the conclusion that ontological relativity prevails. 59

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Interpretation and Conceptual Schemes Both Nicholas Rescher and Dorit Bar-On have pointed out that Davidson may well be talking about interpretation rather than translation when he formulates his argument against the existence of conceptual schemes. We can assume that inter-interpretable languages express the same conceptual scheme. That two languages are inter-interpretable means that we can explain what utterances in the one language mean by interpreting them in the other language. The two languages share the same conceptual scheme if utterances expressed in the one language can be interpreted with the help of the other language. This implies, among other things, that it will always be possible for ontological utterances, that is, statements about what does or does not exist, that are expressed in the one language to be made intelligible in the other language, as long as the two languages are inter-interpretable. David Henderson uses a distinction between 'strict' and 'reconstructive' translation. This distinction calls attention to the fact that there are different degrees of indeterminacy and different degrees of openness to alternative translations in our translation work. In some cases, we can easily translate an expression in a specific language into another language, but in other cases, finding an appropriate translation is more difficult. In translating the Swedish sentence 'Sno ar vit' as 'Snow is white', what we are doing is called strict translation: we 'replace' the Swedish words with their English equivalents. By contrast, in having to supply a more complex explanation in order to make the word or expression intelligible in another language, for example in translating the Russian word 'samochuvstvie', what we are doing is called reconstructive translation: we re-create the Russian word. A reconstructive translation would be when we, in English, state that 'samochuvstvie' means 'an impression of a person's state of being, the combined and observable aspects of a person's mental, physical and emotional state'. All translation is interpretation. Reconstructive translation, though, is such an extensive process of interpretation and explanation that it is hardly meaningful to talk of it as translation at all. The word 'translation' brings to mind our possibilities of 'replacing' a word in one language with one or more words in another language; an extensive explanation of a word is hardly what we think of when hearing the word 61

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Rescher 1980: 326 and Bar-On 1994: 159 Henderson 1994. See also Appelros 2002: 40-5 Cf. Quine 1969b: 312 The example is borrowed from Boukrev and Weston De Walt 1997: 65

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'translation'. For this reason, it would be more appropriate to call reconstructive translation reconstructive interpretation. Erica Appelros has drawn my attention to the fact that there is no sharp distinction between strict translation and reconstructive interpretation; it is more a question of a fluid boundary. The boundary between translation and interpretation is a fluid one, as is the degree of reconstruction inherent in interpretation. The following quotation from Bar-On will exemplify the variation between the different degrees of reconstruction: 65

Mikabari is a word of Malagasi meaning, roughly, to perform a kabary: a special kind of formal speech given only on certain types of ceremonial occasions. Mikabari stands for an element in the social background of the people of Madagascar, absent from that of English-speaking people. To convey the content of mikabari in English, one would have to provide a very detailed explanation, possibly of book length, of certain activities and cultural institutions peculiar to the Malagasi speaker and unfamiliar to the English speaker. Even by the loosest standards, such an explanation would not qualify as a translation of the word. Vietnamese has a single lexical item which means someone (who) leaves to go somewhere and something happens at home so that he has to go back home. In contrast to mikabari, the Vietnamese word stands for something which is present in the life of English speakers, but which English happens not to designate by a single lexical item. It would seem impossible to provide a proper translation into English of, say, a Vietnamese sign or advertisement containing that word. 66

If we are to interpret the Malagasi word 'mikabari', we must perform reconstructive work to a much larger extent than if we are to interpret the Vietnamese word discussed above; there is much more that has to be reconstructed, such as large parts of the Malagasi culture. However, strict translation is impossible in both cases. The expression 'mikabari' and the Vietnamese word for 'someone (who) leaves to go somewhere and something happens at home so that he has to go back home' are thus considered untranslatable by many people. They are, however, interpretable. We can indicate what they mean by reconstructing those parts of the language and the culture that need to be reconstructed in order for us to understand the words. Bar-On has begun such an interpretive process in the quote above, by describing the meaning of the two words under discussion. Interpretation often requires expert knowledge. The requirement that we should be able to interpret other languages into our own does not imply that all speakers of our language should be able to interpret, for example, that of the Hopi Native Americans. It is quite enough that a few 6 5 6 6

Appelros 2002: 43 Bar-On 1994: 152-3

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people can do this, in order for the Hopi language and ours to be interinterpretable. Putnam points out that the knowledge of the experts could be perceived as linguistic competence possessed by the whole linguistic community. What leads us to make the claim that it is possible to interpret Malagasi and Vietnamese into our own language is the store of interpretation possibilities to which our entire linguistic community has access. Rescher calls attention to an interesting difficulty in asking us to imagine translating the sentence 'The congressman appealed to his constituents for understanding regarding his opposition to the economic policies of the administration' into Classical Latin. 1 assume, like Rescher does, that it is practically impossible. It is important to note, however, that the possibility of interpretation that I consider a requirement if English and Latin are to be regarded as expressing the same conceptual scheme, is that we are able to make the contemporary English sentence intelligible to a person in our contemporary society who speaks Classical Latin. Davidson's arguments are based on his reflections on the conditions of radical interpretation. In radical interpretation, the interpreter simultaneously attributes a certain meaning to the speaker's words, and certain beliefs to the speaker. The holistic perspective implies that the speaker's language is not translated sentence by sentence. Thus, in order for Classical Latin and English to be inter-interpretable, the interpreter does not have to perform the heroic task of making the sentence 'The congressman appealed to his constituents for understanding regarding his opposition to the economic policies of the administration' intelligible in Classical Latin. Instead, what is required is that the interpreter should be able to clarify the meaning of the sentence to a contemporary speaker of Classical Latin, a speaker to whom the interpreter can point things out. The behavior of both speaker and interpreter can be used as tools in this process of clarification. 67

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Interpretation and Conceptual Differences Latin, Russian, English, Vietnamese, Malagasi and Swedish are examples of different natural languages. Interpretation does not happen only when translation between different natural languages occur. Interpretation that is more or less reconstructive also takes place when we listen to speakers of the same natural language as the one we speak. Occasionally, we choose 67 68

Rescher 1980: 327 Cf. Putnam 1975: 84

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to conceive of a certain utterance as a slip, a mistake. In such cases, we interpret the utterance in question by translating it as another utterance which puts the speaker's utterance in a better context. Gerald Massey states that: 'People do misspeak themselves, misuse words, and the like, so as translators and interpreters we do not hesitate to put different words into their mouths or even into ours when the canons of interpretation demand it.' At times, we interpret a specific word or expression, when used by a child or by a non-native speaker of the language, by translating it as another word or expression that we consider to be more correct in that particular context. When my seven-year-old playmate from Bangladesh expresses the opinion that it is about time I operate on my car, I am fairly sure he is not suggesting I take the car to the hospital. Today, we are aware of the significant conceptual differences that exist between different languages, conceptual differences which make us to conceive of certain words or expressions as being untranslatable. We are also aware of the fact that significant conceptual differences exist within one and the same natural language, as well. All Swedish speakers do not always and in every conceivable context use the word 'kraft' (force, strength, etc.) in the same way. The word does not, for example, mean the same thing in religious contexts as it does in scientific ones, and it does not mean the same thing in every religious context or in every scientific theory. Furthermore, if I am to explain to a person from the city of Uppsala, up north, what the mid-Sweden dialectal word 'kari' means, I will have to supply an extensive explanation. The word derives from 'karl-aktig' (manly), and is mostly used by women, in a humorous way, to describe men who try very hard to be manly, but do so in an exaggerated fashion. You might say to a man that he is 'kari' if you want to tease him or get him to stop acting. If we were unable to interpret the languages that we describe as being conceptually different, we would also be unable to perceive these conceptual differences. We can establish that Swedish, Shona and Bassa have different ways of dividing up the color chart. We can also establish that Lappish contains a distinction between 'dehkot' (wet snow which sticks to everything) and 'jiemkkit' (dry newly fallen snow which is made so wet by the spring sun that it does not stick to the skis at all). Swedish, by contrast, does not contain the same conceptual distinction. We can discover such conceptual differences between languages due to our interpretive ability. 69

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Davidson's criticism is not levelled against the idea that there are conceptual differences between languages; rather, it is levelled against the idea that there are conceptual schemes that cannot be interpreted with the help of ours. In order to conceive of some specific behavior as a language, we must be able to interpret the words and expressions of that language with the help of our own language. I see Davidson's argument as a parallel to Wittgenstein's private language argument: a language which is, from our perspective, 'private', and which we therefore cannot interpret, is an impossibility, even if it is shared by many. Unless we have conceptual access to another language in the sense that we can interpret it with the help of our own language, we do not conceive of it as a language. Wittgenstein poses the question: 'We do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself. Is that because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul?' My answer to this question is no. The reason why we do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself is because we cannot interpret the dog's sounds with the help of our language. This inability of ours implies that we do not consider the dog to be talking. Sometimes we imagine a dog talking, in which case we conceive of the dog as uttering something which is intelligible to us. We maintain that we are able to interpret the dog's sounds (the dog wants food, the dog wants to go out, the dog welcomes me when I come home), and we thereby imagine the dog to be talking. However, it is hardly likely that we will ever hold that dogs' sounds and our own human language share the same conceptual scheme, so that dogs speak a language which can be interpreted with the help of our own human language. One important reason is that it will probably never be possible to interpret our own human language with the help of dogs' sounds. Wittgenstein points out that if a lion could talk, we would not be able to understand it. I suggest that this is because, as a result of the differences between our constitution and that of the lion, we lack a sufficiently extensive platform of common experiences, needs and abilities which could be used in the interpretation of the lion's utterances. Since people and dogs also have completely different constitutions, dogs' sounds and our own human language are most likely never going to be inter-interpretable. As I pointed out in chapter four, which beings should be considered human is open to discussion. I will put this issue aside for the moment, and instead call attention to the fact that, in the light of the experiences, 73

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needs and abilities that people share with one another, we often think of ourselves as able to interpret human languages even in cases when we are actually (as yet) unable to do so. For instance, we think of ourselves as able to interpret long since forgotten languages, languages that people were at one time able to interpret but that subsequent generations cannot understand; hieroglyphs are a case in point. In Ancient Egypt, people were able to interpret hieroglyphs, but the language was subsequently forgotten, and until Champollion deciphered the code with the help of the Rosetta Stone, people of the nineteenth century could not understand texts written in hieroglyphic writing. Despite the fact that, for example, sixteenth-century people could not interpret hieroglyphic texts, they very probably thought of the texts as part of a language. Rescher points out: 'We knew well from the factual context that cuneiform inscriptions represented writing well before we had decoded them. As any cryptanalyst knows, we can tell that a language is being used, and even a good deal about how it is being used, short of any ability to translate.' Does this mean that we also conceive of languages we cannot interpret as languages? I would suggest that if hieroglyphic texts were thought of as part of a language by sixteenth-century people, then that conception was based on the assumption that we, the people of latter days, would be able to interpret the texts if we acquired the necessary knowledge. We think of something as a language if we are able to interpret it or if we think that we would be able to interpret it if only we could figure out how. When we think that we would be able to interpret a language that we are as yet unable to interpret if only we had the necessary tools, then we are assuming that the language in question has the same conceptual scheme as ours. This assumption is based on observations indicating that what seems to us to be linguistic behavior that we cannot, as yet, interpret, is indeed a language. We regard ourselves as having conceptual access to the language in question in principle, although we may not (as yet) have access to it in practice. 75

Kantian - Not Quinean It might seem like the limited use of the term 'conceptual scheme' that I adopt is an unjustified attempt at excluding certain more interesting 7 5

Rescher 1980: 327

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ways of using the term. Other philosophers evidently use the term in a completely different way. My Kantian idea of a conceptual scheme is that it consists of the concepts and conceptual distinctions that occur in a language. If two languages are inter-interpretable, they share the same conceptual scheme. On the basis of this use of the term 'conceptual scheme', I will, in the following, discuss in what sense we can meaningfully imagine that there is one single independent reality, which is shared by us all, without presupposing metaphysical realism. As Putnam sees it, Quine's thesis of ontological relativity presupposes a reality-in-itself, a noumenal dimension which is shared by us all and which is independent of all humans. Putnam's rejection of ontological relativity is connected with his rejection of metaphysical realism. Davidson describes the ontological relativity thesis in the light of the assumption that different (Quinean) conceptual schemes are not intertranslatable. Different (Quinean) conceptual schemes pave the way, Quine suggests, for radically different ontologies. If different (Quinean) conceptual schemes can exist, then this implies that radically different ontologies, ontologies that are equally acceptable, yet mutually exclusive, can also exist. Ontological statements formulated with the help of a (Quinean) conceptual scheme cannot be translated as anything that makes sense to an outsider. If different (Quinean) conceptual schemes cannot exist, then this implies that we cannot conceive of ontological statements that we cannot interpret, as ontological statements. Davidson's argument concerns the possibility of conceptual inaccessibility, that is, the possibility that there might be (Quinean) conceptual schemes that we cannot interpret. Davidson's conclusion implies that the idea of (Quinean) conceptual schemes makes no sense and that, given the view that different (Quinean) conceptual schemes result in different ontologies, the idea of inaccessible ontologies makes no sense, either. I see Davidson's argument as an expression of the same aim that characterizes Putnam's argument against the metaphysical realist idea of there being a God's-Eye point of view, a perspective that is inaccessible to us humans. Both Davidson and Putnam want the idea of a human-eyes view to be taken seriously. 'It is vain and presumptuous', Dummett writes, 'to attempt to see reality through God's eyes: all we can do is to describe our own practices as we can view them through our own eyes.' We cannot talk about reality 76

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from a God's-Eye point of view. We cannot assume that there is a reality-in-itself, a noumenal dimension with which we do not interact. However, rejection of metaphysical realism does not necessarily entail a rejection of our possibilities of talking about a shared independent reality. I have pointed out elsewhere that a rejection of metaphysical realism does not necessarily imply either a rejection of epistemological realism or a rejection of semantic realism. Similarly, a rejection of metaphysical realism does not imply that we can never give the idea of a shared independent reality any content. We can make use of our language to talk about a shared independent reality. With the help of our conceptual resources, we can state that some states of affairs exist independently of us, in a reality that we share with one another.

One Single Conceptual Scheme — or Several? Davidson argues that we cannot meaningfully imagine, either that there are several different (Quinean) conceptual schemes, or that there is one single (Quinean) conceptual scheme. Furthermore, he criticizes the fact that Quine maintains a sharp distinction between scheme and content, so that, in Quine's opinion, it is possible for us to imagine that different (Quinean) conceptual schemes structure something that is shared by all (Quinean) conceptual schemes in different ways. Against the background of my (Kantian) usage of the term 'conceptual scheme', I will describe how it is possible for us to imagine both the existence of alternative conceptual schemes and something which is independent of our scheme and which different schemes can structure in different ways. Given the concepts and conceptual distinctions to which we have access, we can distinguish between our conceptual scheme and what might be termed its content. Against the background of some distinction between scheme and content, we can imagine the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes. Suppose there are creatures on Mars, creatures who are totally different from us and who speak a language that we cannot interpret. Suppose, furthermore, that these creatures use a conceptual scheme which is different from ours. Their sensory perceptions differ radically from ours, since their constitution is so unlike our own; moreover, they live in an external environment other than that in which we live: the conditions on Mars differ from those on Earth. 78

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If we were to make an attempt at interpreting the utterances of such a Martian, we would fail, the main reason being that the constitution and environment of the Martians differ from our own constitution and environment. However, by making a distinction, in our language, between scheme and content, we can formulate the possibility of Martians' using a conceptual scheme that is different from ours. We can imagine that the Martians are also aware of that which we consider to be independent of our scheme (such as the sun, the moon and the planets) and that they structure and describe these awarenesses in a way that is different from how we do it. For example, we can imagine them conceiving of the sun, not as one single object, but as a million objects we cannot make out, each of which has its own name. In describing the situation in this way, we are toying with the possibility that there might be a conceptual scheme which differs from ours, although, in so doing, we presuppose not only our own language, but also a distinction between scheme and content which we can draw up with the help of our language. In imagining Martians speaking a language that we cannot interpret, what we are in fact doing resembles Lewis Carroll's play with the notion of a partly private language in Through the Looking-Glass. Humpty Dumpty does not ascribe the same meaning as the rest of us to the words that he uses, and so Alice fails to understand what he means. The following dialog takes place: (Humpty Dumpty) '[...] There's glory for you!' 'I don't know what you mean by "glory,"' Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't — till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock down argument for you!'" 'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock down argument,'" Alice objected. 'When / use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be the master — that's all.' 79

Here, Carroll is toying with the possibility of a partly private language. What he sets out to show is not that such a private language can exist — after all, Humpty Dumpty's language is not private. If it were, we would not be able to understand it. It is possible for us to interpret Humpty Dumpty's language; in fact, he interprets it for us, with the help of our language. 7 9

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In toying with the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes, what we are doing is using our own conceptual scheme as an aid to imagining an alternative one. Our thought process is important, as it makes it clear how impossible it is for us to imagine such a conceptual scheme without basing this idea on our own conceptual scheme and the concepts and conceptual distinctions that it contains. Our thought process in imagining an alternative conceptual scheme does not show that such a scheme might exist; what it does show is that, if we were to meet the Martians of the above example, we would not be justified in conceiving of their utterances as a language, since we would not be able to interpret their utterances about the sun, for example.

Re-interpreting Realism The fact that we are able to give the idea of different conceptual schemes a content also enables us to give a content to the idea of a conceptual scheme which is shared by us all. If we were unable to imagine what alternative schemes would consist of, it would hardly be meaningful for us to assert that we all share the same one. However, given our ability to imagine such alternative schemes, we can imagine that all interpretable languages share the same conceptual scheme. If we presuppose our ability to imagine several different conceptual schemes, we can talk about one single scheme, shared by all of us. Evan Thompson suggests that, in a sense, Putnam presupposes that we all share the same conceptual scheme. Thompson writes: Putnam argues along Davidsonian lines that we must employ a principle of charity in interpretation. Success in interpretation requires that the beliefs of others come out intelligible to us. Putnam thinks that this requirement forces us to attribute shared references and concepts to others, though we may attribute different conceptions to them. This point is reminiscent of Davidson's that no partial failure of translation can force us to attribute different concepts instead of merely different beliefs. The point here is that Putnam's invocation of a principle of charity conjoined with his making reference relative to a scheme seems to entail that there must be only one conceptual scheme shared by all those beings whom we regard as persons.*

0

A conceptual scheme, in my Kantian use of the term, consists of the concepts and conceptual distinctions that we use. If a person is conceived of as a rational being and if, in the process of interpretation, we must 80

Thompson 1991: 216. Cf. Caruna 1996: 298

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attribute the same concepts that we use to the interpreted speakers in order for these speakers to appear to be rational (so that they will appear to be persons), in accordance with the principle of charity, then the conclusion will be that all rational beings, that is, all persons that can be conceived of as being users of a conceptual scheme, necessarily share the same one. If we assume that our ontology, that is, our assumptions about what exists, is always relative to our conceptual scheme, then, given the fact that it is possible to conceive of us all as sharing the same conceptual scheme, a possibility opens up for us to conceive of reality as consisting of what is, against the background of our current conceptual scheme, a fixed totality of mind-independent objects. Furthermore, a possibility opens up for us to imagine the existence of what is, in relation to our current conceptual scheme, a true and complete description of reality, a description formulated from our human perspective rather than from a God's-Eye point of view. As a consequence, a possibility opens up for us to imagine an ideal human perspective, 'a god's eye point of view for us'. Putnam describes metaphysical realism as a philosophical perspective consisting of three main theses. Firstly: The world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. Secondly: There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'. Thirdly: Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thoughtsigns and external things and sets of things. It is possible for us to understand all three theses in a non-metaphysical realist way if we presuppose an ability to imagine people sharing a conceptual scheme. Reality can be conceived of as consisting of that totality of mind-independent objects which we, with the help of our current conceptual scheme, can rightly state exists. The fact that we can rightly state that a specific object exists could imply that we think that, given sufficiently good conditions for the justification of such a statement, we would claim that this statement is an expression of correct linguistic behavior. This means that we conceive of this statement as corresponding to reality. The one and only true description of reality could consist of all the statements about what does or does not exist which we, given our current conceptual scheme, can formulate and which we would conceive of as corresponding to reality if sufficiently good conditions for justifying each statement were realized. 81

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The non-metaphysical realist interpretation of the three theses does not refer to the abilities of God or any other superhuman agent. The nonmetaphysical realist interpretation is 'a human kind of realism, a belief that there is a fact of the matter as to what is rightly assertible for us, as opposed to what is rightly assertible from the God's eye view so dear to the classical metaphysical realist'. What we focus upon here are our human possibilities of formulation and justification. The non-metaphysical realist interpretation is an interpretation which does not regard reality as a noumenal reality-in-itself, but rather as a reality that relates to what we humans can state, what we can experience and what we consider to be sufficiently good conditions for justification. In this sense, it is a reality described from a human-eyes view. It should be emphasized that it is hardly likely that we humans will ever be in such complete agreement about what objects we can rightly state exist, what we experience, or what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification, that we will be able to formulate the one and only true and complete description of reality. This description of reality, and its consequent delimitation of the totality of mind-independent objects, is a hypothetical notion; however, unlike the metaphysical realist conception of a reality-initself, it is a hypothetical notion that it is possible for us to understand. However, our possibilities of understanding the conception of a shared independent reality in a non-metaphysical realist way are not governed by our possibilities of talking about one single conceptual scheme that we all share. Even though we may hold that we cannot meaningfully talk either about one or about several conceptual schemes, we can nonetheless assume that there is a shared independent reality. In the light of the assumption that we must be able to interpret a speaker's utterances in order to be justified in considering her to be the speaker of a language, we can avoid the conclusion that there are ontological statements that we cannot understand. Since we can always interpret utterances that might constitute ontological statements, it is possible for us to discuss ontological issues in a meaningful way. 84

A Shared Independent Reality Butchvarov's description of metaphysical realism in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy emphasizes that, for the metaphysical realist, reality is independent of us. Metaphysical realism, he states, is Putnam 1983: xviii

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in the widest sense, the view that (a) there are real objects (usually the view is concerned with spatiotemporal objects), (b) they exist independently of our experience or our knowledge of them, and (c) they have properties and enter into relations independently of the concepts with which we understand them or of the language with which we describe them. 85

Butchvarov's description of metaphysical realism can be understood in a non-metaphysical realist way. The difference between the ways in which the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical realist, respectively, interpret Butchvarov's theses stems from the fact that the metaphysical and the nonmetaphysical realist do not talk about independence and reality in the same sense; in other words, the concepts 'independent' and 'reality' do not mean the same thing to the metaphysical realist as they do to the non-metaphysical realist. Since the metaphysical realist and her critics disagree on the actual meaning of the concepts used in the discussions, the differences that exist between their respective views sometimes appear rather hazy. In the following, I will explain the metaphysical and the nonmetaphysical realists' different ways of using the concepts 'independent' and 'reality'. I intend to show that the non-metaphysical realist does not reject everything that the metaphysical realist embraces. Rather, in the light of the fact that we can never talk about a reality-in-itself, and therefore can never meaningfully claim that such a reality exists, the non-metaphysical realist re-formulates the metaphysical realist position. Non-metaphysical realism can therefore be conceived of as an attempt to express the metaphysical realist's three theses in a philosophically tenable way. The independence and the independent reality that is assumed by the metaphysical realist is a noumenal reality-in-itself. According to the metaphysical realist, there may be objects and states of affairs in reality-initself with which we cannot interact, which we cannot experience and about which we cannot formulate true statements. Furthermore, the metaphysical realist holds that the statements about reality that we can formulate are true insofar as they somehow correspond to states of affairs in reality-in-itself. On this view, a statement about reality might be true even if we as humans would not in any way be able to justify it. Thus, according to the metaphysical realist, 'truth is radically non-epistemic'. The independence and the independent reality assumed by the nonmetaphysical realist is a reality with which we interact and which we experience and describe. The non-metaphysical realist states that, given 86

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our language and given our experiences of what we conceive of and call reality, we talk about certain things as existing independently of us, that is, we assume that they would exist even if we did not. With the help of our language, and in relation to these experiences, we take up the task of investigating what exists independently of us. Our discussions and investigations lead us to draw the conclusion that certain states of affairs in what we conceive of and call reality should reasonably be described as being independent of us. For example, we arrive at the conclusion that the Himalayas would exist even if we did not and that the mountain chain existed before there were any people to name it. The non-metaphysical realist carefully points out that that which exists independently of us and our language in some sense is dependent on us and our language. Our ability to imagine an independent reality depends on our concept formation and our ability to justify statements. We cannot imagine in any meaningful way that there are states of affairs which we cannot express in statements which we, as human beings, would be able to justify, should sufficiently good conditions for justification exist. Thus, the non-metaphysical realist rejects the metaphysical realist use of the terms 'independent' and 'reality'. In talking about and imagining an independent reality, we do so with the help of our language and the concepts 'independent' and 'reality'. However, we do not always and in every context use the concepts in question in the same way. Different contexts harbor different distinctions between independence and dependence, and between reality and what is, in some sense, unreal. It should be noted that the fact that there are different ways of using the concepts 'independent' and 'reality' does not necessarily lead us to draw the conclusion that the idea of a shared independent reality must be rejected. If we presuppose a certain distinction between dependence and independence, we are able to formulate statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be true even though we may not be able to verify them in practice. An example will serve to illustrate this possibility. The concept 'atom' does not mean the same thing according to the theories of contemporary science as it did according to the theories which once launched the concept. We are assuming that contemporary science theories harbor a more correct description of atoms than did earlier theories. The non-metaphysical realist assumes that, given the present-day meaning of the concept 'atom', we are able to assert, both that there would be atoms even if there were no people to use the concept 'atom', and that the classical philosophers, among many others, produced erroneous descriptions of them. The utterances about atoms that were made

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by the classical philosophers would not be justified if what we believe to be sufficiently good conditions for justification for those utterances were realized. When making such statements, we use our current concept 'atom' and our current conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification. We use our language and our conceptions and are thereby able to talk about a shared independent reality. Different concepts and conceptual distinctions, and different conceptions of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification, are used in different contexts to formulate statements about a shared independent reality. We can tell the difference because we can interpret utterances that are formulated with the help of concepts and conceptual distinctions we do not share. By studying the ideas about correct linguistic behavior that occur in a specific context, we can explain the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that can be found in that particular context even when we do not share them. In some cases, in order to discover and make explicit what the differences are, we must devote ourselves largely to reconstructive interpretation. The following example will illustrate the need for such interpretation. Atheists consider the sentence 'God does not exist' to be true, and so do some mystics. The fact that both atheists and mystics consider the same sentence to be true does not, however, mean that they are in agreement. There are significant differences in the way that atheists and mystics use the concept of God and the concept of existence, differences which relate to their conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for the justification of the statement in question and which make it meaningful to talk about their different linguistic behaviors as expressions of different conceptual structures. We can discover and explain the differences that exist between these positions because we can interpret the speech both of the atheists and of the mystics. By making it clear when mystics and atheists, respectively, consider it correct to use the statement in question, we can reconstruct their conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification. It is only through such reconstructive work that we can clarify what it implies to the mystics and to the atheists, respectively, that the statement 'God does not exist' is true. Quite possibly, the atheists would argue that the truth of the sentence is confirmed by the fact that there is so much suffering in the world, whereas the mystics are likely to argue that the truth of the sentence is confirmed by the fact that their encounter with God is not an 87

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encounter with a being who exists in the same sense that other beings or things exist, but rather an encounter with the Primeval Existence itself. Through such reconstructive work, we arrive at the conclusion that the mystics and the atheists are not making the same statement about reality when claiming that God does not exist. On the contrary, they are talking about very different things. However, the conclusion that mystics and atheists are making different statements when uttering the same sentence does not necessarily require us to assume that they are talking about different realities. Their statements could be perceived as statements about a shared independent reality. Although, in order to be able to interpret their speech, we must understand it in relation to their linguistic behavior and in relation to their conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification, it is nevertheless the case that we are not thereby obliged to draw the conclusion that the mystics' statement concerns a different reality than the one talked about by the atheists, or that their statement, if true, is true for the users of the mystical language, only. It is possible for us to understand the mystics' statement to be a statement about a shared independent reality insofar as the statement, if true, is true for us all and was true before any humans had come into existence. I conclude that in fact our possibilities of interpretation require that we consider the mystics' and the atheists' respective statements to be statements about one and the same reality. Unless we are able to suppose that they are talking about the same reality, a mystic will not be able to interpret the statements made by an atheist. The supposition that what is real, or true, varies with the conceptual scheme used is a supposition that makes it impossible for the interpreter to assume that what the speaker holds true is true, and it is upon this supposition that our interpretive work must rest, as Davidson argues. If mystics are unable to interpret the utterances made by atheists, then they are not justified in assuming that the atheists are speaking a language. Likewise, an external interpreter cannot interpret the speech of mystics and atheists, respectively, without first assuming that they are talking about the same reality as the one that the interpreter has in mind.

Non-Metaphysical Realism and Religious Belief It is commonly assumed that two people who disagree on the question as to whether or not God exists do not really disagree unless they use the

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same concept of God. 1 would suggest that there is no need for them to use either the same concept of God or the same concept of existence, in order for us to be able to consider their disagreement to be a real disagreement. We can explain existing conceptual differences against the background of the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that we can discern. It is possible for us to interpret utterances that are formulated with the help of concepts and conceptual distinctions we do not share by studying the ideas about correct linguistic behavior that occur in a specific context where these concepts and conceptual distinctions are being used. The philosopher of religion is therefore faced with the important task of explaining the differences that exist between different uses of concepts and conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification in different contexts where religious belief is expressed or discussed. The purpose of this is to create good opportunities for understanding, for criticism and for constructive discussion on problems generated by the phenomenon of religion. When Yuri Gagarin claimed that God does not exist since God was nowhere to be seen in outer space, he made this claim against the background of a definite idea about which conditions would be sufficiently good for us to be able to draw the conclusion that God exists. Religious people are rarely willing to consider Gagarin's conception of sufficiently good conditions for justification to be an adequate one in this context; in fact, many religious people reject it. Religious people are sometimes perceived as willing to criticize the presuppositions of others, yet unwilling to specify their own. Anthony Flew points out that 'it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God after all" or "God does not really love us then'". It is quite possibly true to say that religious people rarely specify which conditions they conceive of as being sufficiently good conditions for justification where utterances about God are concerned. It is also quite possibly true to say that individual religious persons, when asked, are unable to give an account of which conditions they think are sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement used 88

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E.g. Morris 1991: 29 Cf. Dummett 1974b: 376-7 Flew 1955: 98

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in their religious context. The non-metaphysical realist would state that unless we are able to specify what are sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance in a specific context by studying the ideas about correct linguistic behavior that occur in that particular context, we are not justified in conceiving of that utterance as a statement. It should be noted that it is not the speaker who must specify her own conception of what constitutes such sufficiently good conditions; rather, it is the interpreter's task to reconstruct the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions that exist in that particular context, and to do so against the background of the behavior observed in this context. Oftentimes, expert knowledge, for example in the field of philosophy of religion, is required in order to be able to describe the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that occur in a specific religious context. The study of the different ideas about correct linguistic behavior that occur in religious contexts, and the clarification of the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification to which these ideas are connected, are important tasks for the philosopher of religion. By pursuing such analytical work, the philosopher is able to specify which of the utterances that occur in religious contexts we can rightly perceive as statements. The utterances that we can rightly perceive as statements may, given my delimitations and standpoints, be statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. Alston argues that 'nonrealism, though rampant nowadays even among Christian theologians, is subversive of the Christian faith'. His defence of alethic realism, a realism which is actually, in my opinion, a form of metaphysical realism, is partly motivated by his ambition to draw up a realist position that can do justice to the Christian faith. Alston's criticism of Putnam's arguments against metaphysical realism, and his criticism of the epistemic conception of truth that he attributes to Putnam, can be seen as parts of a larger project the purpose of which is to defend the possibility of perceiving the Christian faith in a realist way. Whether Alston's assertion about non-realism being a reconstruction of Christianity is really a correct description of the way things are is debatable. I do not intend to discuss this issue. Instead, I want to underline the fact that my work demonstrates that Alston can base his work as a 91

" Alston 1995: 37

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philosopher of religion, both on Putnam's rejection of metaphysical realism, and on the insight that the only way in which we can learn to talk about truth is if our discourse on truth is related to our conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification without having to reject the possibility of seeing Christian, or otherwise religious, utterances as statements about a shared independent reality. Nor does Alston have to reject the possibility that there may be evidence-transcendent truths if he assumes a non-metaphysical realist perspective. A rejection of metaphysical realism is not necessarily accompanied by a rejection of the possible philosophical interpretations of religious utterances that Alston, as well as many other philosophers of religion, for various reasons seeks to defend. I have argued that the only way in which it would be possible for us to learn to make truth-claims, and to talk about what is true, is if these truth-claims and this discourse on what is true relate to our conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification. We are only entitled to assume that the utterances about reality whose justification we are able to imagine are statements about reality. This does not mean, however, that we are unable to conceive of religious utterances as statements about reality and as possible evidence-transcendent truths. If, in relation to existing ideas about correct linguistic behavior, we are able to imagine what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain religious utterance, then we will be entitled to treat the utterance as a statement. If the statement cannot be verified or falsified, then we may consider it a possible evidence-transcendent truth. It is possible to formulate religious utterances about reality. Religious utterances about reality do not belong to the category of evidencetranscendent truths that cannot be formulated, whose existence Putnam rejects. Moreover, if we are able to imagine what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain religious utterance, then the utterance in question does not belong to the other category of evidence-transcendent truths rejected by Putnam, either, that is, truths whose justification we cannot imagine. If we can imagine what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance, then we are entitled to treat this utterance as a statement, an utterance that could be either true or false. This entitlement does not hinge on us knowing whether the utterance in question is true or false. If an utterance constitutes a statement and we can neither show that it is true nor show that it is false, then it may be considered an evidence-transcendent truth. We can therefore interpret religious utterances both in a semantic realist

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way and in an epistemological realist way without presupposing metaphysical realism. We use different concepts and conceptual distinctions in different contexts, thereby paving the way for different statements about reality. Moreover, different people have different ideas about what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain statement. Since we must be able to interpret an utterance in order to conceive of it as an expression of linguistic behavior, it will always be possible for us to clarify what constitutes different conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification, and to do so in relation to the ideas about correct linguistic behavior that apply in a specific context. Thereby, we can discover differences of opinion between proponents of different conceptions of the nature of reality and different conceptions of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification. We can understand, debate with and criticize proponents of conceptions we do not share. The fact that there is always a possibility of interpretation open to us implies that the fact that different people use different languages containing different concepts and conceptual distinctions does not necessarily make us assume that utterances made in one specific language are intelligible only to the speakers of that particular language. 92

A Swedish Debate Let me illustrate this point with reference to a certain debate in the philosophy of religion, a debate which is well-known among Swedish philosophers. In the 1950s, the Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius initiated an intense debate between himself, an atheist, and Christian theologians concerning the rationality of Christian faith. He based his reasoning on three basic suppositions, three postulations, and maintained that he could, on the basis of these postulations, show that Christian faith cannot be acceptable to rational — that is, intellectually honest — people. Against the background of the non-metaphysical realism that I have formulated, we can explain Hedenius's postulations and show how religious faith can be described in such a way that the demands specified in these postulations are met. 93

Notably Herrmann draws another conclusion, also based on Putnam's reasoning. Cf. Herrmann 2004: 104 See also Herrmann 2004: 182-5 92

93

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Because of our possibilities of interpretation, that which Hedenius calls the linguistic theory postulation is met insofar as utterances of religious language are communicable so that their meaning can be explained to non-believers as well as to believers. The meaning of a religious utterance can be interpreted and explained, not only to religious people, but also to non-users of the religious language within which the utterance is made, or to people who, having understood the utterance, are unwilling to hold it true. However, interpreting utterances belonging to a religious context, or any other context for that matter, is a task of some magnitude, which often requires large parts of the religious context wherein the utterances occur to be reconstructed. In order for us to be able to understand a speaker's supposition that a certain utterance is true, it may be necessary for us in our interpretive work to reconstruct certain conceptions of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of that utterance according to the speaker and according to the group of speakers that shares her conceptions. In formulating his psychology of religion postulation, Hedenius assumes that the atheist, who denies God's existence, and the believer, who affirms it, disagree on the truth of the sentence 'God exists', but agree on what would constitute a justification of the statement in question. It is in this sense, he implies, that the two of them would be talking about truth in exactly the same sense. Hedenius may be right; however, he is not necessarily right. In the light of Tarski's Convention T, we can assert that there is, in a sense, only one concept of truth. The believer and the atheist can employ the same one, insofar as they hold that true sentences are sentences that correspond to reality. However, the fact that they share the same concept of truth does not necessarily make them agree on what it implies that a certain sentence is true. In order for us to be able to draw the conclusion that the atheist and the believer agree on what it implies that the statement 'God exists' is true, we have to interpret both the atheist's statement that God does not exist and the believer's statement that God does exist. We must ascribe a certain content to their denial/affirmation of the sentence 'God exists' by relating their statements to their ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of this statement. We must approach our interpretive work from a Davidsonian holistic perspective in the sense 94

9S

9 4 9 5

Hedenius 1949: 68 Hedenius 1949: 67-8

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that we must be aware that we must simultaneously ascribe a certain meaning to a speaker's utterances, and certain beliefs to the speaker. We must also adopt a Quinean holistic perspective in the sense that we must be aware that the justifications of different statements are not independent of each other. Holism could imply that in order to describe what would, according to a specific group of speakers, constitute sufficiently good conditions for justification, we must make it clear that the speakers hold some other statements true, given the speakers' conceptions of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the justification of those statements. Different interpreters may well interpret the same speaker in different ways; however, since they can also interpret each other, they will be able to discover and discuss the differences in interpretation that may arise. Also, the fact that we must base our work on the principle of charity limits our options of interpretation; since it should be assumed as far as possible that the speaker holds true what the interpreter holds true, some possible interpretations can be ruled out immediately. Davidson argues that the principle of charity implies that ' [w]e have no choice L...] but to project our own logic on to the language and beliefs of another. This means that it is a constraint on possible interpretations of sentences held true that they are (within reason) logically consistent with one another'. Thus, Davidson suggests that when we interpret, we should assume as far as possible that the speakers meet Hedenius's postulation of logic, which states that two truths cannot contradict one another. It should be emphasized that the interpreter might decide to conclude that two statements held true by a certain speaker are in fact mutually contradictive anyway, but such a conclusion must be based on extensive interpretation of the speaker's language and beliefs, and that process of interpretation must be based on the principle of charity. The conclusion that two or more statements made by the same speaker are mutually contradictive must be based on a reconstruction of what the speaker considers to be sufficiently good conditions for the justification of each individual statement. Furthermore, such reconstructive work might lead us to conclude that a specific statement held true by the speaker contradicts a statement we interpreters hold true. Two statements contradict one another if an affirmation of one of them implies that certain states of affairs do exist that cannot possibly exist given that the sec96

97

9 6 97

Davidson 1990: 320 Hedenius 1949: 75

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ond statement is true. The conclusion that two statements that are both held true contradict one another is based on the assumption that the two statements refer to the same reality. I have shown that the idea of a shared independent reality does not presuppose metaphysical realism. Therefore, even if we base our ideas on nonmetaphysical realism, we can conceive of statements about reality as statements that, if true, are true independently of our conceptions of their truth-value, and as statements that are no less true for those who do not speak the language in which the statements are expressed. We can meaningfully describe affirmations as mutually contradictive, and we can also discuss whether a certain statement whose truth-value is disputed is true or false. Non-metaphysical realism is a philosophical position that can evade the criticism levelled against metaphysical realism, though it denies neither our possibilities of making statements about a shared independent reality nor our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-transcendent truths. Thus, a rejection of metaphysical realism does not have to be associated with the re-interpretation of religious utterances that Alston fears. However, a rejection of metaphysical realism and a defence of non-metaphysical realism will have consequences for the nature and task of the philosophy of religion. The non-metaphysical realist points out that we learn to talk about what is true in relation to conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification, conceptions that we integrate when we learn to use some language in such a way that it is correct in some context. All truths about reality of which we can meaningfully assume that they are truths must be possible for humans to formulate and justify if sufficiently good conditions for justification are realized. The non-metaphysical realist does not use the terms 'true', 'real' and 'independent' in the same sense as the metaphysical realist does. In the light of the non-metaphysical realist's use of these terms, the philosopher of religion can observe and address certain problems, whereas others must be rejected as being meaningless. In my concluding remarks, I will indicate what might constitute a philosophical thinking about religion for those who take my reflections as a starting-point. The fact that the non-metaphysical realist, like the metaphysical realist, can conceive of religious utterances, both as evidence-transcendent truths, and as statements about a shared independent reality, does not imply that my delimitations and standpoints are meaningless in relation to questions about the nature and task of the philosophy of religion. The way in which the non-metaphysical realist understands the terms 'true', 'real' and 'independent' will affect the work done in the field of philosophy of religion.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Philosophical Thinking about Religion — Once Again In this book, I have shown that metaphysical realism is an untenable philosophical position, and that it should consequently be rejected. Metaphysical realism does not provide us with a perspective that we can imagine and it is therefore not useful to us. Consequently, it cannot constitute a foundation on which we can base our philosophical thinking about religion. Instead, such philosophical work must be based on other, more philosophically tenable, positions. I have developed non-metaphysical realism; unlike metaphysical realism, this philosophical position does provide us with a perspective that we can imagine and that is useful to us. Non-metaphysical realism enables us to conceive of religious as well as non-religious utterances as statements about a shared independent reality, statements which may be evidence-transcendent truths. Thus, philosophers of religion need not fear that a rejection of metaphysical realism implies that religious utterances cannot be conceived of as such statements and they need not, as a result of that fear, stick to metaphysical realism no matter what. In my work I have made use of the distinction made in Filosofilexikonet between two different forms of philosophy of religion.' On the one hand, philosophy of religion can be understood as that field of study devoted to philosophical considerations addressing basic questions of religion, such as questions about the existence and properties of God. This form of philosophy of religion may be labeled 'metaphysical philosophy of religion'. On the other hand, philosophy of religion can be described as consisting of philosophical considerations regarding religion as a human — that is, a psychological, social and historical — reality, as a human expression. On this view, philosophy of religion seeks to clarify what religion is and what the meaning and significance of existing religious phenomena is. Filosofilexikonet suggests that it is possible to combine these two forms of philosophy of religion. I argue that the form of philosophy of religion that it is possible for us to pursue if we accept non-metaphysical realism as a starting point is a combination of these two forms of philosophy of ' Filosofilexikonet 1988: 468 ('religionsfilosofi')

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religion; such a philosophy of religion consists partly of philosophical investigations into basic questions of religion such as questions concerning God's existence and properties. Thus, it should be noted that my rejection of metaphysical realism does not entail a rejection of metaphysical philosophy of religion. However, whenever we look into basic questions of religion, we must always relate these questions to ideas about correct linguistic behavior, and these ideas must, in turn, be manifested in the linguistic behavior in some context. This implies that, in order for philosophers of religion to be entitled to conceive of these utterances as statements about states of affairs in a shared independent reality, statements that may be evidence-transcendent truths, the utterances in question must, in the context that the philosopher of religion has chosen to study, be related to ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification of the utterances in question. As a consequence, the philosopher of religion need not only interpret the utterances made in the context that she has chosen to study. In order to be entitled to interpret some specific group of utterances as statements held true by the speakers, she must also show that these utterances in that context are connected to ideas of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification and she must be able to specify what conditions are understood to be sufficiently good for the justification of a certain statement made in that context. For this reason, the philosophy of religion that non-metaphysical realism generates will focus on questions concerning the interpretation of the linguistic behavior in some particular context. This, I believe, sets apart the philosophy of religion that is generated by non-metaphysical realism from metaphysical philosophy of religion as normally pursued. It also enables the philosopher of religion who bases her work on non-metaphysical realism to address, not only problems concerning God's existence and properties, but problems outside the narrow confines of metaphysical philosophy of religion as well. Hick describes the discipline philosophy of religion as 'philosophical thinking about religion'. In my view, the task of the philosopher of religion is to address contemporary problems caused by the phenomenon of religion, using the tools of philosophical reasoning. My understanding of the task of the philosopher of religion is closely related to Putnam's vision of philosophy as expressed in the following words: 2

Instead of seeking a final theory — whether it calls itself an 'absolute conception of the world' or not — that would explain everything, we should see 2

Hick 1963: 1

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philosophy as a reflection on how human beings can resolve the various sorts of 'problematical situations' that they encounter, whether in science, in ethics, in politics, in education, or wherever. 3

I would argue that the task at hand for philosophers of religion is not to formulate a theory about reality, which can resolve, once and for all, the question as to whether or not God exists or other questions pertaining to religion. Instead, the task is to reflect on how people can relate to the problematical situations, caused by religious belief, which they encounter. Such problematical situations may in our contemporary society include, for example, meetings between different religious traditions or meetings between a certain religious tradition and scientific discoveries. Problematical situations may also arise when a certain religious tradition that has developed in a specific society is 'transplanted' into another society. What constitutes a problematical situation is debatable. In choosing to address a certain complex of problems, the philosopher of religion must therefore explain to whom and why this is a problem. It is on the basis of her interest in, and experiences of, the phenomenon of religion that the philosopher of religion chooses what problematical situations to address. It is important to remember that her work in the field is part of the greater whole that is her life. The philosopher of religion is not an incorporeal, rational subject whose philosophizing about religion is unaffected by her personal presuppositions and experiences. Instead, her reflections always relate to her own attitude toward our existential questions and this fact influences what she considers to be an interesting problem to discuss. I will not, at this point, attempt to discuss what might be involved in philosophical reflection. I will only point out that the philosopher of religion is a philosopher, whose task it is to devote herself to philosophical reflection. In the philosophy of religion, as in philosophy in general, there are a number of conceptions regarding what might constitute philosophical reflection. Similarly, in the philosophy of religion, as in the field of religious studies, there are a number of conceptions regarding what might constitute the phenomenon of religion. Against the background of some conception of what constitutes philosophical reflection and against the background of some conception of what constitutes the phenomenon of religion, the philosopher of religion can stake out her field. In relation to this delimitation of the subject area, she can clarify what questions she 4

5

3 4 5

Putnam 1992a: 2-3 Cf. Pattison2001: 22 Cf. Anderson 1998: 127

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would like to address. How the philosopher of religion stakes out her field will constitute a crucial presupposition for her work. Different delimitations of the subject area may be fruitful in relation to different problematical situations. The philosopher of religion will have to motivate her delimitation of the subject area as well as her choice of problems to discuss. Turning to Linguistic Behavior Against the background of some delimitation of the phenomenon of religion, the philosopher of religion addresses questions that arise as a result of our human encounters with problems relating to the phenomenon of religion. In so doing, she has to turn to the collective linguistic behavior manifested in some linguistic community in which the problem that she presently wants to address arises. This is so because it is only in relation to the manifested linguistic behavior in some community that she can ascribe meaning to the utterances that are important for our ability to formulate the problem at hand. With the help of the principle of charity, the philosopher of religion interprets the behavior that predominates in a certain linguistic community, a linguistic community that she delimits in relation to the problem on which she is currently focusing. She interprets those parts of the speakers' linguistic behavior that are relevant to her formulation of the problem at hand. Her interpretive work, like that of other interpreters, must acknowledge the verbal as well as the non-verbal behavior of the speakers. This means that the philosopher of religion may need to reflect on 'forms and aspects of religion that are not limited to the conceptual plane, e.g. the meaning of worship, of sacrifice or prayer, or the role of art or of asceticism in the religious life'. Therefore, it is impossible to sustain a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, those parts of religion that can be described as relating to the intellectual dimension of religious life, parts on which many scholars argue that the philosopher of religion should focus, and, on the other hand, those parts that cannot be so described and which can be left aside by the philosopher of religion. In the interpretive work that she carries out, the philosopher of religion cannot only clarify the meaning of utterances used in a certain context. 6

7

The quotation is from Pattison 2001: 24 Peterson et al 1991 base their reasoning on such a distinction. See Peterson et al 1991: 4-5 6

7

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She can also demarcate what utterances the speakers conceive of as statements, that is, as utterances that connect to some idea about what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification. She can explain which of these statements the speakers think of as true and she can describe what, according to the speakers, constitutes sufficiently good conditions for a justification of the statements in question. She can thereby indicate what it implies that the utterances that the speakers think of as true are true. The fact that there are a number of possible interpretive alternatives implies that, in advocating and using a certain interpretive alternative, the philosopher of religion must motivate her choice, for example by showing how her choice enables her to address her chosen set of problems in a fruitful way. In motivating her choices, the philosopher of religion makes it clear what presuppositions underlie her reflections. She thereby carries out that analysis of presuppositions, including one's own, that is so characteristic of philosophy. There is no general consensus as to what conditions might constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of a certain utterance. Sometimes different conceptions prevail in different contexts and sometimes different conceptions co-exist in one and the same context. This means that the philosopher of religion, in carrying out her interpretive work, must always clarify on what conceptions of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification she intends to base her reasoning. Since there are a number of possible alternatives, she must clarify and motivate the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that she presupposes in her reasoning. She cannot take any of them for granted without explanation. This clarification will constitute an essential part of her discussion of what presuppositions underlie her work. After clarifying what conditions are conceived of as sufficiently good for the justification of a certain utterance in the present context, the philosopher of religion can discuss whether or not that particular conception of sufficiently good conditions of justification is acceptable or not. If she concludes that it is not acceptable, her rejection can lead her to conclude that certain utterances, thought of as true in that particular context, should actually not be conceived of as statements. The philosopher of religion who bases her work on non-metaphysical realism is able to criticize linguistic behavior as well as conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that can be found in some context that the 8

» Cf. Pattison 2001: 7, 21, 122

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philosopher of religion has chosen to study. She can indicate how the linguistic behavior or the conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification that are found in that particular context ought to be changed if the set of problems on which she has chosen to focus is to be resolved. In this sense, the philosopher of religion who bases her work on nonmetaphysical realism can be both critical and constructive in her reflections. Unlike the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion, she is not required to leave everything pertaining to the studied context as it is. On the contrary, she is allowed to argue in favor of a certain solution to the set of problems under discussion. However, she must always be aware of the fact that her solution relates to the interpretive work on which her critical and/or constructive reflections are based and that this interpretive work functions as a presupposition for her solution, a presupposition which it must be possible to evaluate if her work is to be considered part of the philosophy of religion.

Criticism and Construction On the basis of her interpretive work, the philosopher of religion can pursue a critical and/or a constructive philosophical discussion inasmuch as she can criticize and construct various possible approaches to the set of problems that she has chosen to address, in relation to a certain interpretation of the utterances that prevail in the context that she has chosen to study. This critical constructive work may involve addressing questions pertaining to metaphysical philosophy of religion. For example, on the basis of a certain interpretation of the utterance 'God exists' — an interpretation that is associated with a certain conception of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for justification — the philosopher of religion can discuss whether the utterance in question is true or false. She can describe various statements about the existence and properties of God as being mutually incompatible and, on the basis of this interpretation, she can form an opinion about basic questions of religion. It is important to stress that my delimitations and standpoints allow us to pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. My main criticism of metaphysical philosophy of religion as it is normally pursued is that it is based on metaphysical realism, a philosophical perspective that I find untenable, and that it is not related to the linguistic behavior that can be found in some specific context which the philosopher of religion has chosen to

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study. The metaphysical philosophy of religion that non-metaphysical realism enables us to pursue is more comprehensive than the metaphysical philosophy of religion normally pursued. This is because the former also includes a discussion of its own presuppositions in that the philosopher of religion must clarify and motivate her choice of interpretive alternative on which to build her further consideration of basic questions of religion. However, my delimitations and standpoints do not only allow us to pursue metaphysical philosophy of religion. They can also inspire us to focus on questions that have rarely been discussed within the framework of philosophy of religion but for which we now need help in learning to relate. Religion as an existing human reality is constantly changing, as do other psychological, social and historical contexts. Our knowledge of reality is constantly developing, not least as a result of scientific progress; furthermore, we constantly reconsider our values and apply them to new situations, and we expand our concept formation and use it in new ways. Therefore, we cannot once and for all specify what problems arise because of the phenomenon of religion or what questions will interest the philosopher of religion. When new circumstances arise, we may have to address issues that have rarely been addressed before by philosophers of religion, issues that go beyond the narrow confines of metaphysical philosophy of religion, but that people and communities in the world of today nevertheless need help to relate to. In present-day society, conceptual and value-related differences between religious traditions constitute one example of issues that philosophers of religion need to address. Another example is the fact that more and more people see themselves as 'religious in their own way' and fewer and fewer people see themselves as belonging to an established religious tradition. Traditionally, philosophers of religion have focused the discussion on the theistic religions. Today, when more and more people formulate their own personal religious beliefs by combining thoughts and theses from a number of different religious traditions, new sets of problems continually emerge. When the philosopher of religion addresses issues that are unrelated to the established religious traditions, it may be necessary for her to discuss material that has previously been largely ignored within the philosophy of religion. Individual approaches to religion are not always expressed in the same way as the adherents of established religious traditions express their religious beliefs. The philosopher of religion may, for example, need to take an interest in how such individual approaches to religion find expression in fiction, popular music,

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film, and so on, and in so doing she may need to use interpretive approaches that have until now been rarely used in the philosophy of religion. The emergence of new beliefs and approaches to religion is not the only way in which our forms of religious expression develop. Established religious traditions also undergo changes, and these changes bring new issues to the fore, issues that are of interest to the philosopher of religion. For example, the properties ascribed to God by a certain religious tradition are not fixed once and for all and they cannot once and for all be listed in a school textbook. The properties ascribed to God change, and the level to which they are perceived to be significant also changes. For example, the omnipotence or immutability of God is rarely stressed in Christian circles today. Instead, the focus tends to be on the indescribability and transcendence of God. Such descriptions of God cause other problems for the philosopher of religion than those caused by the descriptions of God as omnipotent or immutable. As a result of the continual change that human reality — religion included — undergoes, there will always be new problematical situations for the philosopher of religion to address. My main point in this book is that metaphysical realism is not a tenable perspective; for this reason, it is not a perspective on which work in the field of the philosophy of religion ought to be based. I have outlined non-metaphysical realism as a tenable philosophical perspective that I believe can serve as a startingpoint for a fruitful reflection on present-day problems caused by the phenomenon of religion. In my opinion, addressing such problems is the task of the philosopher of religion. I believe that it is of crucial importance for our society and our human lives that the philosopher of religion should undertake that task — and it ought to be done on the basis of a philosophical perspective that it is possible for us humans to understand and make use of. Non-metaphysical realism, I argue, is such a perspective. It remains to be seen whether other philosophers of religion share this opinion.

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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY, 37 Series editors: Lieven Boeve (Leuven), Willem B. Drees (Leiden), Douglas Hedley (Cambridge) Advisory Board: H.J. Adriaanse (Leiden), V. Briimmer (Utrecht), P. Byrne (London), I.U. Dalferth (Zurich), J. Greisch (Paris), E. Herrmann (Uppsala), M.M. Olivetti (Rome), C. Schwobel (Heidelberg), J. Soskice (Cambridge), C. Stenqvist (Lund). Editorial Profile: Philosophical theology is the study of philosophical problems which arise in reflection upon religion, religious beliefs and theological doctrines. 1 H. de Vries, Theologie im Pianissimo & zwischen Rationalitat und Dekonstruktion, Kampen, 1989 2 S. Breton, La pensee du rien, Kampen, 1992 3 Ch. Schwobel, God: Action and Revelation, Kampen, 1992 4 V. Briimmer (ed.), Interpreting the Universe as Creation, Kampen, 1991 5 L.J. van den Brom, Divine Presence in the World, Kampen, 1993 6 M. Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality, Kampen, 1992 7 G. van den Brink, Almighty God, Kampen 1993 8 P.-C. Lai, Towards a Trinitarian Theology of Religions: A Study of Paul Tillich's Thought, Kampen, 1994 9 L. Velecky, Aquinas' Five Arguments in the Summa Theologiae la 2, 3, Kampen, 1994 10 W. Dupre, Patterns in Meaning. Reflections on Meaning and Truth in Cultural Reality, Religious Traditions, and Dialogical Encounters, Kampen, 1994 11 P.T. Erne, Lebenskunst. Aneignung dsthetischer Erfahrung, Kampen, 1994 12 U. Perone, Trotzldem Subjekt, Leuven, 1998 13 H.J. Adriaanse, Worn Christentum aus: Aufsdtze und Vortrage zur Religionsphilosophie, Kampen, 1995 14 D.A. Pailin, Probing the Foundations: A Study in Theistic Reconstruction, Kampen, 1994 15 M. Potepa, Schleiermachers hermeneutische Dialektik, Kampen, 1996 16 E. Herrmann, Scientific Theory and Religious Belief. An Essay on the Rationality of Views of Life, Kampen, 1995 17 V. Briimmer & M. Sarot (eds.), Happiness, Weil-Being and the Meaning of Life. A Dialogue of Social Science and Religion, Kampen, 1996 18 T.L. Hettema, Reading for Good. Narrative Theology and Ethics in the Joseph Story from the Perspective of Ricoeur's Hermeneutics, Kampen, 1996 19 H. Duringer, Universale Vernunft und partikularer Glaube. Eine theologische Auswertung des Werkes von Jiirgen Habermas, Leuven, 1999 20 E. Dekker, Middle Knowledge, Leuven, 2000 21 T. Ekstrand, Max Weber in a Theological Perspective, Leuven, 2000 22 C. Helmer & K. De Troyer (eds.), Truth: Interdisciplinary Dialogues in a Pluralist Age, Leuven, 2003 23 L. Boeve & L.P. Hemming (eds.), Divinising Experience. Essays in the History of Religious Experience from Origen to Ricceur, Leuven, 2004 24 P.D. Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective, Leuven, 2004 25 S. van Erp, The Art of Theology. Hans Urs von Balthasar's Theological Aesthetics and the Foundations of Faith, Leuven, 2004

26 T.A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God. Divine Action and Scientism, Leuven, 2004 27 R. Re Manning, Theology at the End of Culture. Paul Tillich's Theology of Culture and Art, Leuven, 2004 28 P. Jonkers & R. Welten (eds.), God in France. Eight Contemporary French Thinkers on God, Leuven, 2005 29 D. Grumett, Teilhard de Chardin: Theology, Humanity and Cosmos, Leuven, 2005 30 I.U. Dalferth, Becoming Present. An Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the Presence of God, Leuven, 2006 31 P.F. Bloemendaal, Grammars of Faith. A Critical Evaluation of D.Z. Philips's Philosophy of Religion, Leuven, 2006 32 J.-M. Narbonne & W.J. Hankey, Levinas and the Greek Heritage followed by One Hundred Years of Neoplatonism in France: a Brief Philosophical History, Leuven,2006 33 J.-W. Barbeau (ed.), Coleridge's Assertion of Religion: Essays on the Opus Maximum, Leuven, 2006 34 W. Stoker, Is Faith Rational? A Hermeneutical-Phenomenological Accounting for Faith, Leuven, 2006 35 L. Anckaert, A Critique of Infinity. Rosenzweig and Levinas, Leuven, 2006 36 P. Schaafsma, Reconsidering Evil. Confronting Reflections with Confessions, Leuven, 2006 '

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