Globalization and International Law
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Globalization and International Law
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Gl ob a l i z at ion a n d I n t e r nat iona l L aw
David J. B ederman
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Copyright © David J. Bederman, 2008. All rights reserved. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–312–29491–5 (hardcover) ISBN-10: 0–312–29491–3 (hardcover) ISBN-13: 978–0–312–29478–6 (paperback) ISBN-10: 0–312–29478–6 (paperback) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bederman, David J. Globalization and international law / David J. Bederman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–29478–6—ISBN 0–312–29491–3 1. International law. 2. Globalization. I. Title. KZ3410.B425 2008 341—dc22 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
2007048028
For Frank J. Cuzze, Jr., who lived a century of progress with the wisdom and faith of the ages
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C on t e n t s
Preface
ix
Abbreviations
xv
Part 1
A Short History of World Law
1 Empire 2
3
Belief
11
3 Conflict
19
4 Commerce
27
5 Dignity
35
6 Universalism
43
Part 2 Today’s Globalism 7
Movement
55
8
Commons
71
9 Disciplines
87
10
Crime
103
11
Culture
119
12
Technology
131
Part 3 Challenges for Globalism and World Law 13
Diversity
147
14
Permeability
159
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C on t e n t s
15 Legitimacy
171
16 Exceptionalism
181 Part 4 Values for World Law
Conclusion
191
Notes
203
Index
235
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T
his book questions conventional wisdom about globalization and the development of a new world legal order. Although one might expect that the two topics linked together in the title of this volume—globalization and international law—would be the subject of countless studies and reflections that has actually not been the case.1 Indeed, one of the peculiarities of contemporary globalization research is the extent to which it segregates what are perceived to be the “realities” or “empirics” of globalizing developments from any analysis of the jurisprudential, legal, and regulatory ordering of this new aspect of international life. This book will remedy this gap in scholarship by offering both an historical and pragmatic account of the relationship between globalization and international law. Conflicting definitions and paradigms of the phrase “globalization” have been perennially debated in academic literature and public discourse. Indeed, it has come to mean all things to all people, describing “a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age.”2 Globalization is often referred to, in David Held’s and Anthony McGrew’s famous formulation, as a sociological process, “embod[ying] a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activities, interactions, and the exercise of power.”3 But one vitally important theme of this book is that globalization is not just about the international dynamics of society and culture, or even of economics (which it is most often associated with), but also has definitive historical, political, and, yes, legal, aspects that need to be fully explored if a complete picture of contemporary international relations is to be appreciated. The concept of international law—the norms, rules, and institutions that govern the relations among States and the conduct of actors, transactions, and relationships across national borders—is more conventional (and less contested), even though probably less acknowledged in current debates about international affairs. Although my approach to globalization is from the perspective of both an international historian and academic international lawyer, this book is by no means a conventional treatise on the law of nations. Quite the contrary, this volume attempts to chart the routes to, and boundaries of, a terra incognitae: a newly emerging body of global rules of political, social, and economic interaction that can be rightly called “world law.”
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Let me be clear here: this book carries no brief for the idea that contemporary globalization should lead inevitably and invariably to some form of world government. Instead, I see the concept of world law as an evolution of previous versions of transnational governance—whether called the “law of nations,” “international law,” or “transnational law.” Such writers as Harold J. Berman and Wilfrid Jenks have made a sustained case for a developing “world law” underpinning global civil society along the lines of a common law of mankind or a new ius gentium, or “law of peoples.”4 Berman’s definition of world law is sweeping and inclusive: the body of law that “combines inter-state law with the common law of humanity, on the one hand, and the customary law of various world communities, on the other.”5 If anything, however, I am deeply skeptical about the validity of three central tenets for the legal bases of globalization. The first two propositions are historical in character. It has been consistently contended that the current period of globalization we are experiencing is utterly unique and unprecedented, and, therefore, previous approaches to world legal order can have no relevance to present times. This is altogether fallacious. As discussed in great depth in this volume (especially in the first part), human history has seen at least three extraordinary epochs of globalization before this contemporary period. Each of these earlier eras of globalization featured significant bodies of world law, as manifested in attempts to structure international relations along predictable and uniform lines. In short, globalization is not a new concept. Some of its current manifestations may be novel (and many of these will be reviewed in part two of the volume), but that does not make contemporary globalization legally unprecedented. The second major fallacy in much of globalization scholarship today is that the globalizing trends and phenomena we are experiencing are inevitable and inexorable. Yet, it becomes clear from any historical narrative of globalization and the evolution of the rule of law in international relations that globalization has proceeded through a series of historical cycles. Within those periods of globalizing activity, distinctive trends toward world legal order occurred. But it is also true that human history has witnessed as many (if not more) periods of de-globalization, of a definitive reversal of fortunes for these trends and patterns. So, if globalization has been a cyclical phenomenon, it also follows that it is not inevitable, and also quite reversible. This has vitally important implications for designing and structuring international legal systems and regimes that are the product of (or at least associated with) globalizing moves. That leaves the third, and final, postulate of contemporary globalization, widely held by many international law scholars: that globalizing trends invariably result in positive changes for the world legal order. As the world becomes more closely knit together, so this theory holds, the legal relationships among international actors will become more clearly defined and regulated. I question this assertion throughout much of this book (especially in its third part). I do so not because I believe that law is “epiphenomenal” or irrelevant for international relations (as many so-called “realists” believe). Rather, I am
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concerned that the institutions and process of international law are not keeping pace with changes in the international community. As the intensely positivist and rationalist, nineteenth- and twentieth-century vision of international law is giving way to a new paradigm of world law, one can legitimately wonder what will be the central legal values and principles for the next era of globalization (something that will be considered in the final part of this volume). In short, I believe that international law has a special, but limited, role to play in many of the key policy debates about the impacts of globalization today. Keeping these three assertions in mind—that globalization is not new; that it is cyclical and reversible; and that world law plays a special, but limited, role in its progress—this book’s exposition will unfold in a series of discrete steps. Part 1, somewhat immodestly titled “A Short History of World Law,” teases out what I think are six defining historical features of globalization, and relates them to correlate legal and political developments. Whether one considers this an intellectual history of globalization and international law, or simply a broader historical conspectus of international relations, does not matter. Although it sounds clichéd, history really does matter in any understanding of where we are in regard to today’s globalizing trends, especially in recognizing that (in many respects) they are fragile and ephemeral. Part 2 is the heart of this book. It examines the distinctive features of today’s globalism through a series of six themes. This section of the book was deliberately not written as a hornbook or treatise on international law. Rather, I have selected a number of vignettes that take a current topic of globalization and deliberately placed them in an international legal and policy context. I have tried to choose examples of globalizing trends and problems that are diverse, relevant, and provocative. My selections range across the doctrinal spectrum of international law; topics are chosen from international environmental and economic law, the law of global “common spaces,” intellectual property and trade issues, human rights and international security problems. If any criteria guided my choices, it was that the globalizations problems presented here should fairly reflect the concerns and attitudes of all actors and participants in the international community (and not just those of people living in postindustrial, developed, and powerful countries in Europe, North America, and the northern Pacific). Part 3 integrates the historical and legal frameworks of the book’s earlier parts and explores the primary critiques of international law in today’s globalizing processes. There are many challenges to the role of international institutions and regimes in global society. The discussion offered here is intended to provide a broad analytic framework for rethinking the essential assumptions of today’s international legal order and possible reforms to that system. Insofar as we assume that globalizing trends will continue (and that may be a heroic assumption), it is also worth considering how international law will continue to evolve into world law over the coming years, and what
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the legitimate limits of legal and regulatory institutions will be in managing global order. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the entire international legal order turns on the selection of the values and principles we care most to protect and preserve in the face of globalizing developments. These will be discussed in the final part of the book, where we can take stock of the objects that are being pursued by globalization, and to what end. In short, this volume takes a hard look at the connections between globalization and world order, challenges conventional wisdom, and charts a course not only for further study but also for the practical realization of a just world under law. *
*
*
As is usual, I incurred many debts in writing this book. This project was conceived just after the millennium, and has undergone a variety of transformations over the past eight years. I am grateful to colleagues at Emory University (my home institution), as well as Georgetown’s and the University of Illinois’ law faculties, for allowing me the opportunity to work-shop portions of the draft. I appreciate the patience and encouragement of my editors at Palgrave Macmillan who lent support for this project even during fallow times. I am immensely grateful for the positively superb research assistance of Dr. Lara Michaela Pair, graduate of Emory University School of Law and now of the Vischer law firm in Zurich, Switzerland. The staff of Emory’s Law Library, particularly Will Haines, were magnificent with their research support. Lastly, as always, I acknowledge the love, kindness, and support of my family over the years in which this book was planned, researched, and drafted. We have experienced together many changes and passings over this time. This book is dedicated to the memory of my father-in-law who inspired me to complete this project.
Notes 1. But see such works as Globalisation and the rule of law (Spencer Zifcak, ed.; New York: Routledge, 2005); The third world and international order: law, politics, and globalization (Antony Anghie, ed.; Leiden, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003); Björn Hettne, International law, in The global transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate (David Held & Anthony McGrew, eds.; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 CJTL 485 (2005); Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 International Legal Theory 9 (2005); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 NYUJILP 567 (2000); Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 CJTL 209 (2002). 2. Manfred B. Steger, Globalization: a very short introduction 7 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
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3. David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization, in Oxford companion to politics of the world 324 (Joel Krieger, ed.; Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001). 4. See Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FILJ 1617 (1995); C. Wilfred Jenks, The common law of mankind (New York: Praeger, 1958). 5. Berman, supra note 4, at 1622.
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A bbr e v i at ions
ABMs AIDS AJIL Ann Dig ASEAN ASOC ATCA ATCMs ATCPs ATS BIS BITs BYBIL CDC CDEM CEDAW CITES CJIL CJTL CMI CR AMR A CRC DEA DNA ECHR EFT EIA EJIL Eng Rep EPA EU EUROPOL
Antiballistic Missile Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome American Journal of International Law Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases Association of Southeast Asian Nations Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Alien Tort Claims Act Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties Antarctic Treaty System Bank for International Settlements Bilateral Investment Treaties British Year Book of International Law Centers for Disease Control Construction, Design, Equipment and Manning Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species Chicago Journal of International Law Columbia Journal of Transnational Law Comité Maritime International Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Convention on the Rights of the Child Drug Enforcement Agency Deoxyribonucleic Acid European Convention of Human Rights Electronic Funds Transfers Environmental Impact Assessments European Journal of International Law Reports of English Cases (1094–1873) Environmental Protection Agency European Union European Police Office
xvi
FAO FATF FCN FCPA FDI FGM FILJ F Cas F2d & F3d F Supp G-8 GATT GDP GIELR GMOs GPS GWILR HILJ HIV IAEA IBRD IACAC ICANN ICAO ICC ICCPR ICESCR ICJ ICLQ ICRC ICSID IEEPA IETF IHR ILC ILM ILO ILR. IMF IMO
A bbr e v i at ions
Food and Agricultural Organization Financial Action Task Force Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Foreign Direct Investment Female Genital Mutilation Fordham International Law Journal Federal Cases (U.S.) (1789–1880) Federal Reporter (U.S. Appeals) (1880–) Federal Supplement (U.S. Districts) (1932–) Group of Eight General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Products Georgetown International Environmental Law Review Genetically Modified Organisms Global Positioning System George Washington International Law Review Harvard International Law Journal Human Immunodeficiency Virus International Atomic Energy Agency International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank Inter-American Convention Against Corruption Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers International Civil Aviation Organization International Criminal Court/International Chamber of Commerce International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International and Comparative Law Quarterly International Committee of the Red Cross International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes International Emergency Economic Powers Act Internet Engineering Task Force International Health Regulations UN International Law Commission International Legal Materials International Labor Organization International Law Reports International Monetary Fund International Maritime Organization
A bbr e v i at ions
IMT INTERPOL INCP IP IR A IRTF ISBA ISP ISS ITO ITU League LOST LPIB LNTS. MAI MARPOL MFN MJIL MLATs NAFTA NGO NIEO NYUJILP
xvii
International Military Tribunal International Criminal Police Organization International Network for Cultural Policies Intellectual Property Irish Republican Army Internet Research Task Force International Sea Bed Authority Internet Service Providers International Space Station International Trade Organization International Telecommunications Union League of Nations Law of the Sea Treaty Law and Policy in International Business League of Nations Treaty Series Multilateral Agreement on Investment Treaty on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships Most Favored Nation Michigan Journal of International Law Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties North American Free Trade Agreement Nongovernmental Organization New International Economic Order New York University Journal of International Law and Policy OAS Organization of American States ODC Ozone Depleting Chemicals OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration PCIJ Permanent Court for International Justice PoW Prisoners of War PTO U.S. Patent and Trademark Office RCADI Recueils des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International de la Haye RIAA UN Reports of International Arbitration Awards RUF Revolutionary United Front SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SDRs Special Drawing Rights SEC Securities and Exchange Commission Soc & Legal Stud. Social and Legal Studies SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stat. U.S. Statues at Large
xviii
TNCs Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Problems UCH UN UN Doc UN GA Res UNCLOS UNCITR AL UNESCO
A bbr e v i at ions
Transnational Corporations
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems Underwater Cultural Heritage United Nations United Nations Document UN General Assembly Resolution UN Convention on the Law of the Sea UN Conference on International Trade Law United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNTS United Nations Treaty Series U.S. S. Ct. United States Supreme Court Reporter (when used in the Notes) USC United States Code VCCR Vienna Convention on Consular Relations VJIL Virginia Journal of International Law VJTL Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law WDC World Diamond Council WHO World Heath Organization WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization WMO World Meteorological Organization WTO World Trade Organization YJIL Yale Journal of International Law YB Int’l L Comm’n Yearbook of the UN International Law Commission
1
A Short H istory of Wor l d L aw
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1
Empire
T
his first portion of the volume will examine, in an historical perspective, international law’s role in response to globalizing trends. The exposition will not necessarily be chronological in presentation, but, rather, will focus on a few essential themes that arise in world order studies. The first of these is how we conceive of, and how we construct, a global legal order, and the essential actors in that process. For almost all of human history, the essential motivating force for the creation of rules of transnational behavior have been political aggregations. That is not to say that individuals, business associations, religious polities, and other groups have not been influential players in the process of fashioning world law. Nevertheless, it has been primarily political bodies that have been decisive in the creation, implementation, and enforcement of international legal norms. Whether we call these entities States, nations, coalitions, alliances, organizations, or empires, really does not matter. What is of concern is how these bodies have behaved and interacted throughout history to create authentic international communities. I take as my working definition of a State system Professor Hedley Bull’s formulation in The Anarchical Society: A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations to one another, and share in the working of common institutions.1
Implicit in this definition is that political entities are organized and think of themselves as States, and that it is possible to discern “common interests and . . . values” in deciding whether those States deal with each other on a “conscious” basis. Both inquiries—the existence of States and the identification of conscious value systems—are essential in the context of understanding the historical processes of globalization. The reason that this is significant is that humanity has gone through a number of historic ages of globalization. The first of these was in classical antiquity, in which not only Mediterranean and Near Eastern societies coalesced into State systems, but also interacted with equally large and
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sophisticated polities on the Indian subcontinent and China. The prevailing trend in legal literature has been to sharply dismiss the existence of authentic State systems in ancient times. One consistent point made by these writers is that ancient States lived in a perpetual condition of war and conflict, incapable of sharing any sense of international community. Michael Rostovtseff made this observation: The fundamental conceptions of international relations in the ancient and in the modern world are utterly different. The modern world considers the natural condition of life in our society to be the state of peace. War is nothing but a temporary suspending of this natural condition and is regarded as an abnormal state. Free intercourse between different nations is normal; restrictions and limitations of the rights of foreigners are abnormal and require serious reasons. . . . But in the ancient world, generally, the natural attitude of one state towards another was that of potential and actual enmity.2
Although this view has been criticized as being ahistorical and unrealistic,3 its persistence is notable, particularly in the continuing debate about the nature of balance-of-power politics in the ancient world.4 David Hume acknowledged that this ordering principle of international relations could be dated to antiquity,5 and Rostovsteff said as much when he noted that “periods of the balance of power [in antiquity] were great creative periods in all domains, including the domain of international relations and international law.”6 The critique of the notion of State systems in antiquity has taken a different turn of late. Some legal writers, largely influenced by Sir Henry Maine’s work on ancient law,7 have looked closely at issues of ethnic, religious, and social particularism found in ancient States and wondered whether such openly atavistic polities could ever have achieved a level of cooperation with their diverse neighbors. Professor Nawaz made the point nicely when he wrote that “[ancient] societies lived in isolation from each other, separated by geographical factors and racial considerations. Besides, common international interests of the modern type did not exist in the past to unify them.”8 These factors of cultural particularism, especially as they manifested themselves in cultural identities and religious differences, were quite important in conditioning the ancient State’s response to the demands of international relations. But many scholars believe that ancient States were able to overcome this obstacle. The point that is most often made in the literature is that an ancient State, once it had “become aware of its own corporate existence, found itself by the necessities of international intercourse obliged to accord recognition to the same quality in other communities.”9 Most recently, Vilho Harle has powerfully argued that ancient States were sovereign and territorial, and they embraced community as the basis of a peaceful, international social order.10 But the primary impulse for globalization in the ancient world was the thrust for empire. Ancient States sought to expand their reach politically, economically, socially, and religiously by conquest, absorption, and co-optation of peoples of various ethnicities, languages, and beliefs. For
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many of these ancient empires, the goal was nothing less than a universal order, which sought to impose rule on humanity, or at least as much of it as was nearby and available for subjugation. Beginning with the polities of ancient Mesopotamia and Sumeria, and replicated in the cultural cradles of the Indus, Ganges, and Yangtze river basins, polities began to expand their reach through a process combining conquest, trade, coalitions, and diplomacy. This dynamic of empire-building was advanced on an even larger scale by the Egyptians, Persians, Hittites, Macedonians, and Han Chinese, as well (in the Western Hemisphere) by the Olmecs, Mayans, Aztecs, and Incas. For many of these cultures, even though there was often a dominant ethnic, social, and cultural elite, the empires sought to rule over diverse, polyglot, and heterogeneous populations, and often succeeded in imposing their rule for many centuries.11 Empires, along the lines of these ancient Near and Far East models, were authoritarian, coercive, and unilateralist, even as they aspired to universal dominion. Globalization was seem as both a process and instrument of social control, and obviously reflected the relative power of State and imperial institutions. Control of the instruments of power, the conduits of trade, the temples of worship, and the daily interactions of peoples were all seen as a necessary aspect of State-ship and imperial dominion in ancient times. There was, of course, an alternate model in antiquity for a kinder, gentler form of globalizing trends. Although not truly seen through the lens of imperial design, it was no less powerful in its influence. Developed with the dynamic, multipolar, and fractious political life of the Greek city-States of antiquity (especially from 500 to 350 BCE12), a culture of personal autonomy and freedom, rich artistic and intellectual life, and wide-ranging economic and trade opportunities flourished in the eastern Mediterranean basin for many centuries. Not only was Greece able to withstand the onslaughts of its imperialist neighbor, Persia, but it was also able—by virtue of population migrations, trading networks, and transmission of cultural values—to remake the ancient conception of globalization. Greek culture ultimately became the standard and iconic set of values for the ancient Near East (owing to Alexander the Great’s conquests) and much of Europe (because of the adoption of Greek attitudes by Roman proponents).13 This is not to suggest that the Greek approach to globalization lacked elements of coercion, force, and power, for it surely possessed these aspects as well. But in its construction of a global legal order, the Greek conception of hegemony—the idea that, in any international community, there was one leading polity that exercised substantial control over its neighbors—was certainly contrasted with an imperial sensibility of outright dominance. Athenian hegemony was based on its prodigious trading presence and active tributary system. Yet, as with all hegemonic systems, the balance of power could radically shift in a matter of years, as occurred with Athens’ conflict with Sparta during the Peloponnesian War.14 For modern Western civilization, seated in Europe, the Greek approach to globalization had its most profound impact through the institutions and
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laws of the Roman Republic and Empire, which came to dominate the Mediterranean littoral and European hinterland for many centuries (from 100 BCE to 500 CE), in an era known as the Pax Romana. The Roman Empire was a multilingual and multiethnic entity, held in rein not only by a fairly strong centralized government (with the emperor in Rome), but also with autonomous provincial regimes. Trade and commerce knitted the empire together, such that it was possible for commodities from Egypt and Asia Minor to be routinely traded to the populations of Britain and Gaul, and vice versa. Military protection from incursions by forces outside the empire (whether the Germanic peoples of Northern Europe, the Huns from Central Asia, or the Parthian Empire of Persia) was provided by Roman legionary formations, typically recruited from the regions they were assigned to secure.15 Most significant of all in ensuring the longevity of the Roman Empire was the extension of the rights of citizenship to most of the peoples included within its domain. With Roman citizenship came access to some degree of social mobility, to participatory markets and trade, and to military security. All of this was in exchange for notional allegiance to the regime, military service, and the payment of taxes. But Roman citizenship conferred an additional benefit: rights under Roman law, including due process in criminal and civil proceedings and the guarantee of property rights. The Romans developed what was called the ius gentium, literally the “laws of peoples,” which was intended to govern the relations between Roman citizens and noncitizens. Created initially during the earlier Roman republican period (500–50 BCE), the ius gentium was an instrument to foster peaceful, predictable relations between Rome and its neighbors. It was later conceived as a prototypical world law, pulling together as elements legal principles that were seen as common to those practiced by all civilized peoples. The ius gentium covered subjects as various as shipping and commerce, rights of inheritance and contracting, and the status of individuals in both war and peace. Principles of decisions applying the ius gentium were recorded in juristic writings and imperial edicts, which were later compiled in the Emperor Justinian’s Digest, a document that would come to have enormous influence on the evolution of the law in the West.16 Other ancient societies emulated the notion of a Roman ius gentium, or fashioned similar concepts in an act of parallel development. Vedic and postVedic Indian States accomplished many of the same objectives of regional control and power as the Roman Empire, as well as transmitting cultural values and trade relations far beyond its boundaries. But probably the most sustained effort of ancient globalization was by the various Chinese imperial dynasties. Beginning with the political consolidation of China by the Chin dynasty after 221 BCE, the successive Han, Sui, and T’ang regimes extended Chinese diplomatic, economic, and cultural influence across all of Asia, and (occasionally) into Africa, the Near East, and the Pacific. Extraordinary technological innovation, agricultural productivity, trade promotion, and administrative sophistication characterized the Chinese imperial domain
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and its far-flung influence. The Chinese development of the Silk Road—a trade route that stretched from the Chinese coast to Europe—was the paradigmatic example of a truly global exchange of visitors, commodities, and ideas. Chinese codifications of laws—especially as bearing on commerce, trade, immigration, and tribute—dominated the world law practiced by peoples of much of the globe until the early Modern period.17 The first great age of globalizing empires of antiquity ended in the West around 500 CE and in Asia shortly afterward. That is not to suggest that there were no attempts at global empire during the European “dark” and Middle Ages, and during comparable periods in Asia and the Americas. The Crusades of the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE were one (albeit shortlived) example. The Mongol invasions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE managed to actually subjugate, under one political sovereign, Asian, Near Eastern, and European territories. But as essentially nomadic peoples, the Mongols made relatively few contributions to globalizing trends. It was only with the emergence of modern nation-States in Europe, that new imperial patterns in globalization emerged. The second great era of globalization coincided with both European and Chinese impulses for exploration, trade, and colonization, beginning around the year 1450 CE. The “age of exploration,” as it was known in Europe, featured Portuguese, Spanish, French, and English expeditions to open trade and colonial opportunities along the coasts of Africa, the Americas, the East Indies, and the Pacific. Within two centuries, much of the American coastline (and parts of the interior) was part of a vast network of European imperial and colonial domains. In Africa, European trading posts inaugurated the transatlantic slave trade, perhaps the greatest forced migration of peoples ever in human history, one which would have immense consequences for the settlement of the New World. In Asia and the East Indies, European traders encountered sophisticated political regimes (especially in India, the Spice Islands, China, and Japan) which effectively resisted political domination, but which were open to commerce and conversion. Finally, in the Americas, much of the continent was conquered by European powers (with France and England dominant in North America, and Spain and Portugal prevailing in the rest of the hemisphere) bent on colonization, and the extraction of raw materials for shipment to Europe (particularly gold and silver from Central and South American mines).18 By the mid-eighteenth century, European colonial and trade networks extended around the globe. The Indian subcontinent and the Spice Islands were being placed under European political dominance (particularly through the Dutch and English East India Companies). China and Japan, along with other Asian polities, remained politically independent, but often at the cost of diplomatic and economic isolation, even as Asian trade goods (especially spices, ceramics, and fabrics) were exchanged globally. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European competition for access to colonial territories and markets began to be marked increasingly by conflict. This trend culminated in the Seven Years War (1754–1763), also known as the Great War for
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Empire, which saw theaters of conflict not only in Europe, but also in India, the Pacific, Africa, the Caribbean, and North America.19 Trends in world law during this second period of imperial globalization emphasized an amalgamation of European and Asian forms. Even successful European colonial powers were required to treat with foreign polities (such as the Ottoman Turk, Indian Mughal, Japanese, and Ming Chinese empires) on the basis of equality and mutual sovereign respect. Especially in the Indian subcontinent and East Indies, European trade and military incursions were still conditioned by an international legal system that demanded the observance of local forms and usages.20 While the indigenous polities of the Americas and Africa were often forcibly overthrown (the Iroquois and Cherokee Confederacies were the last effective native American polities), that was the exception and not the rule for this first phase of European-led imperial globalization. The third phase of imperial globalization was also European-dominated, but also featured the political and diplomatic emergence and expansion of Russia, Japan, and the United States. A true “age of empire” subsisted from 1850 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. With its apogee at the Berlin Conference of 1878, the European powers (especially Britain, France, and Germany) sought to colonize vast swathes of territory in the African hinterland and Indian subcontinent, to wrest key portions of the Near East away from the tottering Ottoman Empire, to create trading establishments throughout the Pacific Rim, and to directly confront the last remaining Asiatic nations (particularly China). Conflict was rife among the colonial powers, with competition reaching a fevered pitch in the last years of the nineteenth century. The Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars at the turn of the century were defining moments for this era of imperial globalization, insofar as non-European States confronted—and defeated—established European powers.21 This last age of imperial globalization featured striking economic and financial interdependence around the world. Trade goods moved (consistent with then-extant tariff regimes and other barriers) with relative ease. Foreign direct investment (FDI), flowing out of European markets and directed to North and South America, to India, China, and Japan, and (to a lesser degree) to the African colonies, was a mainstay of the global economy. It was only by the year 1900 that the United States became a net-creditor country, with its investments abroad exceeding those of foreign nations in the American economy. Perhaps most extraordinary of all, the last decades of the nineteenth century saw the largest voluntary migrations of peoples in human history, with the vast expansion of cities and the settlement of empty regions in the Americas, Africa, Australia, and the Pacific Rim. Unlike the previous round of globalization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the emerging world law of this age of empire was assuredly Eurocentric in focus. Despite the addition of the United States, Latin American republics, and Japan to the family of “civilized nations” (more on which is in chapter 6), the content of international law from this period was largely dictated by European
Empir e
9
State practice, by European treaty settlements, and by the intellectual weight of European legal writers. International legal doctrine was heavily protective of the colonial prerogatives of European nations, of freedom of navigation and commerce, and the unfettered ability of colonial powers to project force against recalcitrant indigenous peoples. In their inter-European relations, the international law of this period emphasized the sanctity of treaty commitments (what was called the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda) and the territorial sovereignty of nation-States.22 World War I (1914–1918) spelled the doom of the imperial period of globalization. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires actually perished in the charnel house that was that global conflict. The remaining imperial structures—for Great Britain and France—were severely compromised, and events were set in train that would inevitably see the dismantling of those empires after World War II (1939–1945) and the period of decolonization that would follow. The Japanese Empire that emerged after World War I was also consumed in the subsequent global conflict. What remained in 1945 was a new world order, featuring two global hegemons: the United States and the Soviet Union. Each of these polities relied on a system of alliances and coalitions (some more coercive than others), as well as proxy-actors that could initiate conflicts and provocations around the world, all designed to challenge and stretch the other hegemon’s resources past the breaking point. Most of the cold war period (1945–1989) was not really characterized as a period of political globalization, although other globalizing trends (considered especially in chapters 4, 5, and 6) were prevalent.23 Ultimately, of course, the United States and its coalition of liberal, parliamentary democracies prevailed in its conflict with totalitarian (both fascist and communist) forces. The contemporary period of globalization has been characterized by many political, economic, social, cultural, and legal trends, which are considered together in parts 2 and 3 of this volume. But an imperial trope—the drive for a unifying world law under the authority or control of a single polity aspiring to universal control—is not one of these. Although the United States has been declared the last remaining superpower (or the hyper-power in French parlance), it is by no means clear that imperial dominance is the prevailing mode of political globalization today. Although the United States has, over the past fifty years, exhibited some behavior that would suggest it is prepared to serve as the world’s ultimate enforcer of the values of democracy, human rights, and free trade, that role has not gone unchallenged in many circles (both within the United States and abroad). If anything, it appears that we are moving toward a truly multipolar world (for more on which see chapter 13), in which the traditional institutions of nation-States and of empires are seemingly less relevant. If anything is obvious from the foregoing discussion, it is that empire is rarely a long-lived answer to global order, just as hegemony has not often led to a proper assertion of legal power and authority. The periods of imperial globalization considered here—from classical antiquity (500 BCE–500 CE),
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the age of exploration and colonization (1500–1770 CE), and the age of imperialism (1850–1914)24 —were premised on inchoate and imperfect models of world law. Not even the all-embracing and highly influential idea of a ius gentium had much substantive content apart from a Roman imperial context. Nor, for that matter, did parallel Chinese conceptions. For a more complete picture of the historical dynamics of globalization we must look away from the domain of politics—and of the elusive goal of imperium and hegemony—and focus as well on traditions and trends in the realms of faith, of commerce, and of ideas.
2
Belief
R
eligious traditions and institutions, as well as ideological movements, have been decisive in fashioning a global order. Quite often, this has manifested itself through the development of legal regimes and constructs. Indeed, the role of faith (whether based in religion or other models of human sentience and transcendence) has been even more pervasive for the processes of globalization than has the political thrust for empire. Belief has been a powerful force in the development of international law, especially insofar as it has implicated natural law principles. The ius naturae was ultimately derived from a combination of divine and reasoned sources.1 Religion, morality, and ideology have always exercised an important influence on the development of international law. The Roman law vision of ius gentium (a law of peoples), discussed in the previous chapter, supplied a significant historical pedigree for the notion that there were common principles of conduct for all peoples in all places at all times. Religious values have been drawn from many faith-based traditions, 2 although Christianity (and a peculiarly Thomist vision of natural law) has tended to dominate in Eurocentric international law. Finally, contemporary political and social ideologies—as diverse as socialism, liberation theology, sexual and reproductive freedom, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and globalism— have come also to exercise important influences on the formation of naturalist rules. As a consequence, natural law has been properly seen as a surrogate for “some more concrete conception such as reason, justice, utility, the general interests of the international community, necessity, and religious dictates.”3 Nevertheless, naturalism in international law has suffered from an association of the law of nature with platitudes and assumptions that “were so vague as to become practically meaningless.”4 And natural law as applied to the law of nations has always been an attractive target for positivists who assert that rights and duties presuppose the existence of a legal system established by direct human volition and law-making.5 Much of natural law as a value-system for international law was developed during the formative years of the Roman Catholic Church during the early Middle Ages, and especially in light of its confrontation with another great religious tradition, Islam. The writings of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and the canonist Gratian were significant for their understandings
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of the doctrine of just war, holding that a conflict can meet the criteria of philosophical, religious, or political justice, provided it follows certain conditions. The notion of just war has its foundations in ancient Greek society and was first developed in the Christian tradition by Augustine in Civitas Dei, The City of God, in reaction to the absolutist pacifist strain of Christian ethics. It was later elaborated by Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica, and by Gratian, who sought to addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum) and what is acceptable in using such force (the scope of the jus in bello).6 While just war theory will be further discussed in the next chapter in the context of globalizing trends in the management of conflict, it is important to recognize here that religions often found themselves in a position of conflict with other faith traditions. In ancient India, this was a consistent theme of Vedic and post-Vedic writings. Both ancient Buddhist and Hindu texts were preoccupied with the morality of war. But that was not their only concern. The tenets of righteous living and devotion extended to matters of charity, of commerce, and of submission to secular authority. Confucian, Taoist, and Shinto religious traditions—although less pervasive in their globalizing influence in Asia than Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam—nonetheless conveyed powerful ethical and spiritual values that promoted harmonious living between peoples of various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. For much of human history, religious traditions were the social and cultural glue that kept many imperial regimes in a sustained and coherent position of authority. It was, however, during the first period of European transoceanic expansion, the age of exploration and colonization (c. 1500–1770 CE), that the religious implications of globalization were primarily felt in the arena of world law. As European powers competed with each other for control and dominance over colonial areas (in Africa, the East Indies, and the New World), they often sought religious justifications for the assertion of sovereignty over indigenous peoples and polities. This became a central ethical and moral problem for the Roman Catholic Church, which was a motive force for both proselytization and conquest outside of Europe. In order to justify such conduct, which would normally be at variance with just war principles, the Church developed, during the late Middle Ages and Renaissance, responses to alien and heretical polities. After the caustic and unsuccessful experience of the Crusades in the Holy Lands (1095–1291 CE), when Catholicism sought to directly confront Islam as a battle of spiritual traditions, the Church turned pragmatic. Especially with the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, European powers had to face a powerful Islamic force within its own region. And, indeed, the Ottomans were skillful in periodically aligning themselves with European States (particularly France) in order to tip the balance of power in their favor. All of this meant that the Roman Catholic Church—and those States that relied on Church teachings as the basis of their relations with Islamic and other religious traditions (namely Spain, Portugal, France, and the Holy
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Roman Empire in Central Europe)—had to make some distinctive shifts in thinking about the legal aspects of their international relations.7 The first age of colonial globalization was thus fraught with legal problems. Spain and Portugal, the two European powers that were most aggressive about transoceanic expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, concluded an agreement—brokered by the Church—to quite literally divide the globe between them. The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) divided the newly discovered lands outside Europe into an exclusive duopoly between the Spanish and the Portuguese along a north-south meridian 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (off the west coast of Africa). This was about halfway between those Portuguese possessions and the islands discovered by Christopher Columbus on his first voyage in 1482 (claimed for Spain). The lands to the east would belong to Portugal and the lands to the west to Spain. The other side of the world would be divided a few decades later by the Treaty of Zaragoza, signed on April 22, 1529, which specified the antimeridian to the line of demarcation specified in the Treaty of Tordesillas. That line ran just west of the Philippines.8 The upshot of this development was a legal regime that purported to allocate all lands outside of Europe (except for those occupied by Christian powers as of Christmas Day 1492) to either Spain or Portugal. Aside from the fact that other European powers were excluded from this arrangement (including the French, English, and (later) the Dutch), it also produced disputes between Spain and Portugal themselves. At first, the conflicts were localized and involved the status of the Canary Islands (just off the coast of Africa), but later were extended to Portugal’s claims over Brazil (or those parts of South America east of the demarcation line), and on the other side of the world to the East Indies. It was thus during this period that globalization acquired a distinctive geographical and geopolitical focus. Only after the circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan’s fleet, in 1519–1522 CE, was it truly possible for people to conceive of globalizing trends in a fully coherent manner. The legal disputes between Spain and Portugal widened to an even greater political and commercial set of problems, ones that defined international affairs at the modern advent of international law. The Portuguese and Spanish crowns could agree on one thing: that at least within their undisputed areas of control (as granted by the Treaty of Tordesillas) they could exclude other merchant fleets and colonial expansions. One upstart commercial power, the Dutch Republic, took strong exception to this and began advocating a rule of freedom of navigation. In a famous set of debates in the early 1600’s, pitting Hugo de Groot (Grotius) from Holland and John Selden from England, the Dutch position of mare liberum (freedom of the seas) was vindicated for the following four centuries.9 What was significant about this disputation on freedom of trade and navigation (more on which is in chapter 4) was the emphasis on natural law principles derived from both religious and ethical values. Many of these we would recognize today as central tenets of contemporary globalization.
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Among these are the freedom to travel, to explore the world, to engage in commerce, and to exchange ideas with other cultures. Yet it was a singular aspect of the intellectual history of early-modern Europe that these values of globalization were respected and embraced. Far more controversial, however, was that the international law from this period served as a moral justification for the conquest and subjugation of peoples in the New World and the transatlantic slave trade. In early-modern writings of international law this was a central question, beginning with the writings of such scholastic authors as Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Vitoria especially confronted and criticized the brutality of the Spanish conquistadors in the New World and openly questioned whether the forcible conversion of native peoples was justified under Church teachings. He did, however, ultimately conclude that European colonization of regions not under the sovereignty of recognizable polities was permissible under then-prevailing notions of international law. What defined an inchoate or “uncivilized” political aggregation of native peoples was left uncertain, but the clear message was that those non-European entities (whether in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific) that could successfully resist colonial encroachment would be recognized as sovereign (although at a lower status than Christian nations), while those lands that could be absorbed would be treated as a res nullius, open to occupation and conquest.10 The role of belief in the formation of international law rules began to fundamentally shift from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. In large measure this was a product of the European Enlightenment, and a corresponding change in the role of religion in the political life of European polities. And, to the extent (as already discussed in the previous chapter) that European colonial and imperial designs and European-led patterns of globalization were fashioning a new world legal order, it would be natural to expect that the intellectual bases for these developments would also be premised on European fashions. We are confronted today with the dual legacy of beliefs in creating our contemporary global order. The first is the continuing inequality (partially traced to colonialism and imperialism) of global resources. The second is that while many of the world’s peoples remain profoundly faithful, the intellectual foundations of world law have substituted religion in favor of whatever the current ideological fad of the moment might be. One way that the role of belief in making international law can be seen to evolve is in the changing ideological conceptions of natural law. The exogenous character of natural law rules has always posed difficult problems for identifying a basis of international obligation. Social contract theorists (such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Roscoe Pound, H. Krabbe, and Leon Duguit11), who were able to fashion credible (if not entirely coherent) theories of obligation and law-observance in domestic legal systems, were not able to replicate the feat for the law of nations. Although some early publicists emphasized the “necessity of law” as an adjunct of any community (drawing from the maxim, ubi societas, ibi jus),12 the difficulty is characterizing international
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life as an authentic society, with the requisite elements of civil community and social solidarity. The British “International Society” School and the new American international relations approach of constructivism attempt such an argument,13 but it still founders on the supposition that a real “social bond” or “social contract” can really exist as between autonomous and sovereign States, much less other kinds of transnational actors. Closely related to social contract theories, but now largely discredited, is the notion that every nation, by virtue of its statehood and capacity as a member of the international community is endowed with certain essential, inherent or natural rights. The fundamental rights of States doctrine thus locates a naturalist basis of obligation for international law in the idea that polities are really like individuals, endowed with certain inalienable dignities and prerogatives. These fundamental rights are exogenous in the sense that they are antecedent to other sources of international law; they pre-existed and conditioned the international legal system itself.14 The notion of fundamental rights has, however, been transformed into the idea of fundamental duties of States. These are the jus cogens obligations (such as prohibition against genocide) which nations are not free to contract-out of. The obvious difficulty with this fundamental rights approach is its strong Statist bias. To the extent that States are no longer the only kind of entity that can bear international rights and duties, and thus no longer the sole subjects of international law, this theory cannot really account for reasons why other types of actors obey international law rules. Quite apart from that, this conjecture lumps different kinds of States, with potentially divergent political, social, and legal cultures, into one monolithic category. It also reflects an overweening atavism and sense of individualism among States. That international polities are in a proverbial “state of nature” seems almost to be a negation of the sense of community argued by other natural law theorists.15 Likewise, the naturalist conception that States are restricted in their actions by fundamental obligations, particularly in a human rights context, can be attacked as vague and incoherent. Natural law theories of international obligation seem to be internally conflicted as to whether States (and other transnational actors) are more like atomistic individuals or participants in a community. Two of the most influential ideological movements of the past centuries have squared-off on precisely this question. The first is derived from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s 1795 publication, Project for a Perpetual Peace. In his essay, Kant described his proposed peace program as comprising two phases. He first offered a set of “Preliminary Articles,” steps that countries could adopt immediately, or with all deliberate speed. These included rules about the construction of peace treaties, cession of territories, abolition of standing armies, contracting of external debt, prohibitions on interference in the internal affairs of neighbors, and the conduct of hostilities. These subjects essentially defined the field of public international law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Kant also imagined a second set of principles—what he called “Definitive Articles”—that would provide not merely a cessation of
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hostilities, but a foundation on which to build an everlasting peace. These included the notions that “the civil constitution of every State should be republican,” that “the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free States,” and that “the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.”16 Kant’s program established not only a rejection of European particularism and the adoption of universalist principles for international law (more on which is in chapter 6), but also drafted the blueprint for most contemporary projects of world government. Essential to Kant’s vision was that all States that were members of the international community would be constituted as republics, or at least as representative democracies, and that international institutions (what he called “federation[s] of free States”) would enforce the rules of international law and enforce international peace and security. Kant’s cosmopolitan insights into world law would thus prove immensely influential in directing the course of international legal rules and institutions over the following centuries, even though his goal for an end of war and a recognition of “world citizenship” have not been achieved, nor are likely ever to be. The counterpoint to Kant’s program of perpetual peace has been, for much of the twentieth century, Marxist-Leninist theories of socialist solidarity amongst worker polities and the struggle against global capitalism. As modern ideologies go, communism had a fervent core of adherents, almost verging on its own belief system (which is ironic given its strongly antireligious stance). Socialist visions of international law were predicated not on a nation-State system constituted as a federation of representative democracies, but as proletarian-led, party-controlled, and command-driven societies. As with other totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century (and, in this regard, Soviet Russia shared much in common with Nazi Germany), international law had no moral content apart from advancing a particular ideological agenda. Kantian elements of an ideal international law (the sanctity of treaties, the possibility of peace, regulation of the global economy, and the control of conflict) were all subordinated, in the socialist version of international law, to a global legal regime that sought—through the extension of an ideological system—global hegemony. In this sense, belief as an engine of change in globalization merged with previous patterns of imperium.17 The best example of this was what was known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, named for the Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982. The essence of the principle was that “[w]hen forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.” In practice, this meant that “limited sovereignty” of communist parties was allowed, but no country would be allowed to leave the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet military alliance in Eastern Europe), disturb a nation’s communist party’s monopoly on power, or in any way compromise the strength of the Eastern bloc. Implicit in this doctrine was that the leadership of the Soviet Union reserved, for itself, the right to define the competing world orders of “socialism” and “capitalism.” The doctrine was used to justify
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the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of the non–Warsaw Pact nation of Afghanistan in 1979. Application of this principle for justifying the unbridled application of force in pursuance of protecting the ideological character of regimes in the international system, thus led to the loss of legitimacy of global socialism and the political unraveling of the Soviet Union itself in 1989.18 Belief—whether expressed through religious or ideological convictions— has been a central force for international law. The natural law tradition has been just one form of expression for many essential concepts of world law: the creation of a community of nations, the control of conflict, and the embrace of the freedoms of travel, trade, and communication. One should not lose sight that some belief traditions have been hostile to the creation of a world legal order. And, indeed, we may now find ourselves in a period of a renewed “clash of civilizations.” This one is not characterized by ideological differences (as was the cold war) but, rather, one that harkens back to earlier periods of globalization and religious conflicts. How international law can persevere under such conditions of social and cultural stresses within the international community is an important question for the years to come.
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3
Confl ict
World law has played an essential role in managing conflict between
warring polities for millennia. Indeed, it is surprising the extent to which a human behavior that, in all of its manifestations, would appear to be inimical to order and justice has nonetheless been conditioned by legal restraint. This has been the case with decisions made about the conditions for recourse to war (what is known as the ius ad bellum), as well as disciplines on the actual conduct of hostilities (the ius in bello). As was considered in the previous chapter, the natural law tradition gave form to many aspects of just war theory—that armed conflict should not be resorted to except in exceptional circumstances characterized by righteous conduct. Even in antiquity—whether in Vedic and post-Vedic India or in the classical Mediterranean worlds of Greece and Rome—there were highly developed codes of values through which polities decided whether it was right and proper to go to war. Many of these were expressed through faith traditions. Ancient Hindu thought was transformed into a version of realpolitik by the statesmen Kautilya (also known as Chanakya) (c. 350–283 BCE), chief advisor to the first Mauryan emperor Chandragupta. In his volume, the Arthashastra, Kautilya outlined both the moral and political grounds upon which a ruler should be able to use force against an enemy or neighbor.1 Such ideas were replicated in both Jewish and Roman law through the decisions of the sanhedrin and fetials, sacerdotal colleges of priests and jurists, who decided on the legality of planned declarations of war. The essential point for ancient peoples was that a polity should never be regarded as an aggressor in a conflict, and that inevitable victory would come to the party that properly observed the rituals and legalities for initiating conflict.2 Just war theory was transmitted from ancient practices into the faith traditions of both Christianity and Islam, as mentioned in the last chapter. Significantly, from the first ancient period of globalization came the sense that war needed to be controlled, or else its awful consequences would destroy the political integrity, social cohesiveness, and belief systems of the parties that initiated it. Total, unrestrained conflicts in antiquity were the exception, although such conflicts as the Peloponnesian War (between Athens and Sparta), the Punic Wars (between Carthage and Rome), and some campaigns involving the ancient Egyptians, Hittites, and Israelites set
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high standards for cruelty and destruction. Nevertheless, ancient peoples did establish benchmarks of behavior during hostilities, especially with such matters as the protection of civilians during war, preventing the destruction of crops and temples, the proper conduct of sieges, the declaration of truces, and the respect shown to the bodies of fallen warriors. Of course, many of these practices were observed out of a sense of self-preservation and reciprocity, but those were not the only motivations for ameliorating the most atavistic and egregious aspects of ancient warfare.3 During the European Middle Ages, significant advances were made in establishing a common law of warfare. The medieval practices and customs of chivalry were made possible by a common religious tradition throughout most of Western Europe (Roman Catholicism), as well as the distinctive socioeconomic aspects of warfare during that period. With the rise of feudal Europe and the need to ensure order against both external threats (marauding barbarians and Moslem invaders), as well as internal challenges (peasant revolts, famines, and schismatic insurrections), European nobility and landed aristocracy exhibited many common traits, whatever their location. Warfare was conducted with heavily armed mounted knights, who drew their support from feudal landholdings and owed their fealty to higher lords and kings. State sovereignty, as we understand it today, did not exist (and would not really until the sixteenth century). The medieval international system featured crosscutting (not vertical) loyalty and obedience structures, with a variety of political players (including many non-State actors, such as the Church).4 The international law of chivalric conduct emerged from this environment and was obviously designed to support and sustain the power structure of the time. Chivalry emphasized notions of honor, justice, loyalty, obedience, and belief in higher values. (In this respect, medieval European knightly chivalry was little different from other warrior codes during human history, such as the Japanese samurai notion of bushido, Chinese martial arts virtues of xiá, or Islamic standards of behavior for jihadists.) Chivalry also supported a social and political elite that acquired its power at the expense of land-bound peasants, and generally disdained the values that came to be associated with medieval cities: commerce, knowledge, and multiculturalism. Chivalric codes of conduct were meant to perpetuate the control that landed warriors exercised over civil society, even as these elites tried to kill each other in conflicts over territory, autonomy, and honor.5 The international law of chivalry in warfare concentrated on issues of the proper comportment for combat, the display of heraldic devices, the treatment of prisoners (and the rules for ransoming), as well as some rudimentary principles for the protection of noncombatants. Christianity had a modifying influence on the virtues of chivalry. The Peace and Truce of God, announced by the Church in the tenth century CE, was one such example, with limits placed on knights to protect and honor the weaker members of society and also to help the Church maintain peace. At the same time the Church became more tolerant of war in the defense of faith, espousing theories of the just
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war; and liturgies were introduced that blessed a knight’s sword, and a bath of chivalric purification. In the eleventh century CE, the concept of a “knight of Christ” (miles Christi) gained currency in France, Spain, and Italy. These concepts of “religious chivalry” were further elaborated in the era of the Crusades, with the Crusades themselves often being seen as a chivalrous enterprise.6 The Crusades—along with the Mongol invasions across Asia and Europe in the thirteenth century CE, and the Black Death of 1347–1351 CE—were among the few transnational galvanizing events that occurred between the first two great eras of globalization (classical antiquity and the age of exploration). Chivalric codes as an aspect of world law had significant doctrinal and legal limitations, as illustrated by the Crusades. Chivalric institutions were usually auto-limited to those of the same social, economic, religious, and cultural affiliations. They simply did not apply beyond particular regions or culture-zones.7 The Crusades set a pattern of cross-cultural military confrontation that would become the template for European colonization and imperialism in the next two great waves of globalization. As the law of nations evolved in the period of formation of early-Modern nation-States, the subject was traditionally divided into two branches—those rules governing nations in their peaceful relations and those norms used in warfare. Grotius’s famous tract, De jure belli ac pacis, first published in 1625, was organized in this fashion, as were many of the writings of contemporary publicists.8 The laws of war, the ius in bello, were a significant aspect of late medieval, Renaissance, Reformation, and early-modern State relations. Chivalry and restraint gradually gave way to the horrors of “modern” conflict, featuring total warfare, the involvement of large civilian populations, and the emergence of new, and ever deadlier, means of killing. In Europe, at least, this transformation of limited conflict into total war reached its apogee during what was called the Thirty Years War (1618–1648 CE), a bloody religious conflict that engulfed nearly the entirety of Western and Central Europe and killed nearly a third of the population of what is today Germany.9 The Thirty Years War deflected European attentions from colonial expansion and globalization for much of the seventeenth century, and had a significant impact on changes of attitudes toward the laws of war. Although notions of just war were largely forgotten or jettisoned by Europeans even before the age of exploration, there was a renewed sense by many European nations of the need to restore principles and values associated with limited warfare. One such area of success was in the regulation of many aspects of naval conflict. Given the trans-marine scope of many European empires (particularly those of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and Britain), and the levels of contact they had with non-European polities (see the previous chapters), this was an incredibly significant move in the evolution of world law. Beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international law developed an elaborate set of rules regarding the conduct of naval warfare, and, particularly, the conditions under which the vessels of enemy or neutral
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nations could be subject to capture, or what was known as “prize.” The law of naval captures was administered by the prize courts of maritime Powers (such as Britain, France, and Holland) and was extraordinarily uniform and consistent in application. These prize courts applied virtually the same rules in determining the enemy character of ships and cargoes found at sea during hostilities, the status of certain kinds of products as contraband (and thus subject to seizure), and the circumstances in which a blockade could be effectively enforced against an enemy coastline.10 The body of prize law jurisprudence was staggeringly large, and exceedingly well documented in the admiralty decisions of all maritime Powers (including that of the fledgling United States). One of the leading figures in the creation of this body of world law was Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell) who was the judge of the British High Court of Admiralty for nearly a thirty-year period corresponding with Britain’s fight against France (and its allies, including the United States) in the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic campaigns (1789–1815 CE). Like the earlier Seven Years War, this was a period of global conflict with theaters of conflict in Europe, the Americas, Africa, India, and the East Indies. Scott’s jurisprudence on such issues as what defined a neutral ship and cargo, the proper conduct of naval blockaders and captors, the humane treatment of noncombatants, and other legal aspects of naval warfare was widely followed, even by the admiralty courts of countries that were at war with Britain (such as the U.S. Supreme Court, then led by Chief Justice John Marshall). Judge Scott thus managed to fashion an international common law of naval prize that borrowed from the practices, rules, and customs of all naval Powers (not just Britain), and managed to produce a lawful and humane set of principles that ameliorated the worst aspects and features of naval conflict at that time.11 In addition to customary law sources, the norms of naval captures of neutral ships and cargoes were the subject of the first modern treaty on the laws of war, the 1856 Paris Declaration. In contrast to naval warfare, little effort had been made to systematize or codify rules of combat on land. The first such effort was the 1863 Code of Francis Lieber, an advisor to the Union Armies during the Civil War.12 That document galvanized subsequent international negotiations to develop a treaty for the laws of war on land, first at Brussels in 1874 and then at the First Hague Peace Conference, held in 1899. The Hague Peace Conference was the first major multilateral meeting devoted to a broad range of international issues. Convened by Tsar Nicholas II in order to advance his agenda of global disarmament and demilitarization (especially for Russia’s rivals, Germany and Japan), the conference also created new dispute-settlement institutions and codification of the laws of war.13 The result of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference was a package of no less than six instruments on the ius in bello. Some of these treaties were dedicated to abolishing the use of certain forms of dangerous weapons (such as expanding bullets or poison gases), of certain means of warfare (such as dropping bombs from balloons). In addition, the delegates were able to
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conclude a general codification of the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The 1899 meeting was so successful that the delegates enthusiastically endorsed a follow-up session in 1907, the Second Hague Peace Conference. Many more delegates, representing most of the nations in the world at that time, attended. This meeting adopted even more agreements, some of which reiterated in form and substance the 1899 Conference’s achievements. In addition, some arms control conventions were concluded (on the use of automatic submarine contact mines and naval bombardments) and also full codifications on land and naval warfare (as well as specific treaties on neutrality and the formalities for the opening of hostilities).14 The combined work-product of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences on the laws of war is known simply as the “Hague Law.” The primary thrust of this body of conventional law was to regularize expectations by belligerent States as to how their enemies would conduct hostilities, treat prisoners of war (PoWs), and hospital facilities, and also to build confidence that certain kinds of weapons or tactics would not be employed in wartime. The critical underlying principles of the Hague Law were that unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate killing would be avoided in military conflicts (achieved through the abolition of certain kinds of munitions and delivery-systems), and, moreover, that military necessity was the benchmark for determining the proper restraints on hostilities. Lastly, and most importantly, the delegates at the Hague Peace Conferences recognized that the laws of war were just at the beginning of a process of codification and clarification, and that customary international law norms remained significant. Included in each of the Hague treaties was the Martens Clause (named after the Russian international lawyer who proposed it), incorporating customary norms into the treaty regimes.15 The treaties negotiated at the Hague Peace Conferences were widely ratified, but as for whether they were successful in controlling the worst excesses of war, one simple, ironic fact can be noted. The Third Hague Peace Conference had been scheduled for the year 1915, but had to be canceled owing to the outbreak of World War I. In many respects, World War I was the bloodiest conflict in human history (military casualties exceeded those even in World War II). The war featured wholesale slaughters on the battlefield, indiscriminate sinkings of ships by submarines, and even the use of chemical weapons. On the basis of this evidence, the treaties concluded at the Hague Peace Conferences cannot be regarded as a complete success. One legacy of the Hague Law, following the Nuremberg trials at the conclusion of World War II (for more on which see chapter 5), was a very different emphasis in the laws of war for protection of civilians, PoWs, and other individuals who are noncombatants (hors de combat). After the total conflict of World War II—where civilian populations were targeted for destruction (if not annihilation) by belligerent forces and were particularly vulnerable to air bombardment, occupation, and enslavement—efforts began to negotiate a new approach for the laws of war. Led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss nongovernmental organization (NGO) that had been
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earlier recognized as the principal agency for the protection of noncombatants in wartime, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims were negotiated. The four agreements included instruments on wounded and sick soldiers in the field, wounded, sick, and shipwrecked sailors at sea, PoWs, and civilians. The four conventions contained a series of common articles (including a form of Martens Clause on custom), as well as very detailed rules and protections for the different classes of noncombatants.16 Together the Geneva Conventions are known as the “Geneva Law,” or, more descriptively, international humanitarian law. Although the Geneva Conventions have been widely ratified (and the United States is a party to all four), serious concerns have arisen as to their application in certain kinds of situations (as with the detainees of suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantánamo Bay). For example, it has remained unclear whether the protections of the Geneva Conventions applied only to individuals involved in international conflicts, as opposed to civil wars. In reality, civilians tend to be brutalized more in internal conflicts. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions attempted to extend the reach of the treaties to civil wars, and this was later acknowledged by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case.17 In a further development in 1977, two Additional Protocols were negotiated for the Geneva Conventions, and they applied its protections to most internal conflicts and wars of national liberation (although not to situations of “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”).18 Efforts by global civil society to control and manage aspects of international conflict have become a central feature of international discourse today. Non-State actors and NGOs banded together to lobby for the outlaw of the use of antipersonnel landmines, culminating in a 1997 treaty to that effect. Even more astonishingly, there have been attempts to ban the employment of the ultimate weapon of mass destruction (WMD): nuclear arms. In a 1996 advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that threats or uses of nuclear weapons were governed by the same background rules for control of international conflict as any other use of force. But, when asked to opine as to whether nuclear weapons could be used under any circumstances (even in legitimate self-defense), the court deadlocked. In a split decision (the court’s president casting the deciding vote), the ICJ ruled that while the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international armed conflict, . . . in view of the current state of international law . . . the Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
Thus, in one of the most controversial opinions ever asked of it, the World Court essentially declared a non-liquet, a deliberate gap in the substance of international law.19
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This result was emblematic of much of the evolution of world law for the management of conflict. Although such initiatives have often been associated with periods of intense political globalization, there have been profound limitations on the effectiveness of these efforts to control recourse to conflict or to ameliorate the worst aspects of human suffering associated with warfare. Nevertheless, it has been a singular feature of international relations that for many epochs of human history war has been made the subject of legal controls. This is particularly ironic because warfare has often triggered (along with global pandemics and economic depressions) a series of deglobalizing trends: the interruption of communications and commerce between peoples; the replacement of atavistic nationalistic and patriotic objectives in preference to cosmopolitan virtues; and the degradation of values of universalism and human dignity. These will all be considered in the remaining chapters of this part.
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4
Commerce
F
or millennia, commerce has been the solvent of sovereignty. Throughout all epochs of globalization—including classical antiquity, the age of exploration, the period of imperialism, and today’s contemporary developments— international trade and all of its attendant phenomena and consequences have been signal contributors to the processes of political, social, and cultural change around the world. Indeed, we tend to regard globalization as, first and foremost, a set of economic processes that bind international actors (States, individuals, corporations, and other polities) together in a web of mutual interdependence. The reality, as we have explored in earlier chapters, is that globalization has other aspects as well, but it seems appropriate now to turn to its legal and institutional features that are primarily focused on facilitating economic interactions between peoples of different nations, cultures, and traditions.1 Commerce is subversive of established State and political orders precisely because it allows for the free communication and transport of people, goods, services, and information across recognized national boundaries and cultural zones of influence. Throughout much of human history, the peoples of radically different cultures, ethnicities, religious traditions, and imperial regimes have nonetheless sought to trade with each other and to prosper from the consequent economic benefits that accrue from such economic interactions. Even in early history, trade tended to raise incomes and qualities of life for its participants, to increase and spread wealth. This is not to say, of course, that trade and international commerce was ever immune from State regulation. It was often the subject of extensive restrictions, typically in the service of State treasuries and fiscal apparatus, and, in extreme situations (as occurred in China and Japan after their first experiences with aggressive European commercialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries CE) could be banned altogether. But, if anything has been demonstrated during the many periods of globalization, those polities that cut themselves off from international trade were often left behind as the forces of globalization marched on. What is also significant about the evolution of world law in the areas of economic globalization and international trade was the extent to which these aspects of international law were fashioned not by States or political actors,
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but, rather, by the merchants and traders who actually participated in these forms of transnational relationships. This pattern was first set in classical antiquity. In the Mediterranean littoral, ocean merchants developed (around 500 BCE) the first codified set of rules for international trade. Known as the Rhodian Sea Law (named for the merchants on the Greek isle of Rhodes), it covered virtually all aspects of trade over water and was adopted by the Phoenecians, Egyptians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and (later) the Romans. It was expressly adopted in the Emperor Justinian’s Digest of Roman laws and juristic writings, issued in 533 CE. It was so influential that during the Middle Ages it remained the essential source of the lex maritima in the Western world, adopted within the successor kingdoms of the Roman and Byzantine empires as well as by Moslem traders who flourished in the Mediterranean and Middle East after the rise of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries CE.2 The development of a world law for commerce seemed to thrive precisely at times when there was no assertion of imperial power or aggrandizement by a hegemon. One example of this would be the medieval European ius commune. The ius commune was, in many senses, Roman law’s legacy to medieval Europe. With the rediscovery of Roman legal thought (especially the corpus of Justinian’s Digest) at the emerging centers of learning at Bologna, Padua, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Roman law began to imprint itself on the various national laws of the time.3 Especially when Roman law was amalgamated with elements of the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, the ius commune came to exert an extraordinary influence over those aspects of domestic legal systems that inherently had transnational elements, especially mercantile and commercial practices, the laws of war and chivalry, and to a lesser degree, the more localized customs of feudal and manorial law.4 The emergence of a common commercial law in medieval Europe can also trace its lineage back to the ancient models of ius gentium.5 The maritime elements of such commercial law was premised on such codes as the Rolls of Oléron, the Consolato del Mare, and the Visby and Amalfi Tables, and were all in pedigree with the Rhodian Sea Law. Admiralty practices in the Middle Ages were obviously driven by the needs of a community of sea merchants that depended on a body of consistent rules, universally recognized and enforced. Likewise, land-based commerce—especially in regularly held trade fairs— depended on these principles of universal rules, predictable results, orderly enforcement, and transparent procedures. It was thus no accident that England’s Magna Carta of 1215 provided that “All merchants shall have safe conduct to go and come out of England by land and water for purposes of buying and selling, free of legal tolls, in accordance with ancient and just customs.”6 Centuries later, English Chancery Courts (which, along with Courts of Admiralty, were the most likely to apply a ius commune) would recognize a universal lex mercatoria.7 Italian cities (especially Genoa, Pisa, and Milan) came to adopt commercial codes in the early Middle Ages.8 Specialized commercial courts were inaugurated by
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medieval monarchs and princes, and they were deliberately structured to be insulated from the provincialism or biases of local tribunals applying local law, by allowing appointed panels of merchants to decide cases among themselves. These courts were also intended to offer speedy and efficient justice, an innovation that was derived from the summary procedures of canon law tribunals.9 The universality of the law merchant was not only a benefit to individual traders and financiers, but also to national economies. Just as the ius gentium had a public international law aspect, so did the lex mercatoria, to the extent that medieval polities concluded most-favored-nation (MFN) agreements. The development of a European common law of commerce revolutionized the process of reducing transaction costs for exchanges across borders, extending large amounts of credit and finance, and developing the instruments and structures for business enterprises.10 All in all, these initiatives made possible the rise of a commercial middle class in late medieval Europe, the economic revolutions of the Renaissance and early-Modern period, and, indeed, laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution and today’s global economy. Medieval Europe’s ius commune, especially in its manifestation as a transnational system of commercial law through the law merchant and lex maritima, illustrates the possibilities of a nonhierarchal, but still coherent and universal system of international law. Unlike the hegemony of Rome’s ius gentium, there was no dominant domestic legal system at work with the ius commune. Through an extraordinary process of legal transplantation (to use Alan Watson’s concept11), or, at a minimum, a parallel evolution in disparate legal systems,12 Roman law concepts managed to merge with a functional necessity of universality in many material realms of medieval life, including commerce, martial law, and feudal relations—areas combining both private and public aspects. The development of the ius commune was a watershed event in historical jurisprudence.13 During the first age of exploration, the evolution of a world law for commerce continued at an increasing tempo. As already considered in chapter 2, competition between the great maritime and commercial empires of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and Britain led to a bitter debate over the opening of the oceans to freedom of navigation and trade. The vindication of the principle of mare liberum would set an important legal precedent for the next 400 years, and would make possible a set of globalizing trends that would create a truly global economy starting in the seventeenth century CE. Gold and silver was mined in the Americas, and fiscally supported European economies (often with the effect of causing ruinous inflation) for centuries. The East Indies and China produced a dazzling array of consumer goods (spices, ceramics, and fabrics) that were popular throughout the world. Cash crops (such as indigo, cotton, and tobacco) were staples of the New World plantation economies, supported by the forced enslavement and transportation of Africans.14 The truly global reach of trade, achieved in this period, demanded increased sophistication in the ways and means of commerce. This, in turn,
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required that the world law of international commercial transactions evolve in ways that promoted the efficiency and security of business arrangements that could span oceans, involve dozens of parties, and encumber large amounts of financing. One aspect of this evolution was the increased employment of commercial courts, offering speedy justice and applying a standardized set of rules for business transactions without regard to the national identity of the parties. In Britain, the High Court of Admiralty (mentioned in the last chapter) as well as common law courts were available, and similar institutions existed in Holland, in France, and in the United States. Sir William Blackstone, in his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in 1769, devoted a good bit of attention to what he called the ius gentium. But his conception of that term was somewhat different from that embraced by the Romans and by the medieval ius commune. Blackstone essentially saw the ius gentium as the embodiment of the new lex maritima and law merchant, a body of law to be uniformly applied by all commercial courts in the world.15 Another significant development for the creation of a world commercial law was the fashioning of rules governing the financing of trade, the documents necessary to effectuate those deals, and the security that came with insuring those transactions against unexpected hazards. Thus was born an extensive body of law dealing with letters of credit (the financing instrument for many transactions, even today), of bills of lading (which documented an international shipment of cargo), and of marine insurance (which protected it against risk). In addition, in the realm of maritime commerce there grew up rules for the mortgaging of ships (in order to effectuate repairs or secure necessary supplies), the treatment and payment of mariners, and the security and bonding of vessels and their masters. In order for international commerce to operate effectively, there had to be a high degree of trust between the participants, even if they resided in various countries, spoke unfamiliar languages, professed incompatible religious beliefs, or were subject to divergent domestic laws and regulations. The common law of commerce provided that necessary level of predictability.16 This second major epoch of globalization brought about one other major development for a world law of commerce: the rise of the transnational corporation. Beginning with the East India Companies of Britain and Holland, business enterprises began to organize themselves in a way which allowed them to operate and compete around the globe. This dynamic was aided with the creation of what was known as the limited liability corporation, an entity that was financed by the subscriptions of investors (shareholders), whose exposure to liability was limited to the extent of their investment, but who delegated the operations of the company to experienced businessmen (management). This model offered flexibility in the financing of business operations (which had previously tended to be operated as partnerships or by extensive governmental subsidies), opened-up economic opportunities to new middle classes in many countries, and allowed for the quick expansion of operations overseas. Of course, the very flexibility and versatility of the
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limited liability company in the deployment of global capital could cause its own set of problems. Economic downturns, financial panics, investor unrest, speculative transactions, and business scandals and misdeeds—which hitherto had been limited in impact to one commercial center or country—could now affect the entire globe.17 These aspects of global commercial law—the harmonization of transnational business practices and customs, the rise of the limited liability corporation, and the global deployment of capital—were signal features of the third great epoch of globalization, the age of imperialism, which subsisted from about the mid-nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. What was significant about this period of human history was the extent to which investment and capital flows impelled transnational events. The traditional maritime and colonial empires of Europe (France and Britain) were joined by new imperial polities, most notably Germany. Russia’s transcontinental empire was completed with economic inroads into central Asia and the far East. Lastly, this period saw the emergence of two new powers: Japan and the United States. The Spanish-American War (1898) and RussoJapanese War (1904–1905) saw the displacement of older imperial structures with a new, aggressive form of the projection of economic power. The European monopoly over the acquisition of colonies, the creation of regional economic and trading zones, and the use of investment as an instrument of imperial coercion was a critical event in the evolution of both the political and economic aspects of globalization.18 Disputes over investments and capital flows to host countries (usually in the developing world) quickly acquired a diplomatic, political, and (even) military dimension that have come to characterize many aspects of globalization, not only for the age of imperialism but also for our contemporary period of globalism. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, European, American, and Japanese investments and economic penetrations (whether in Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia) were often enforced by military might. So, when in the 1870s and 1880s the Government of Egypt defaulted on loan obligations, Britain quickly retaliated by taking effective control of the country, including the Suez Canal (what would later become a strategic waterway). Essentially the same dynamic occurred with the United States in Panama. When Venezuela, in the early 1900s foreswore debts to a variety of European investors, and began expropriating foreign property, it resulted in an actual military intervention in the country. Indeed, this period saw a variety of muscular assertions of economic imperialism (often called “gunboat diplomacy”), leading to situations where those parts of the world that were not under colonial control by metropoles (such as Latin America and China) were nonetheless subjected to substantial economic pressures to open their economies to foreign trade, investment, and dominance.19 Developing a consistent set of rules for investor protection and free flows of capital has been a key project for globalization in the past century. This body of law—known as State Responsibility for injury to aliens—is beset by a fundamental contradiction. It is a paradox that has challenged the
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legitimacy of this area of international law and greatly hampered its evolution. An individual who lives in a foreign country is expected to abide by the laws of the host State, yet, when that person is injured by the host government, she is free to seek diplomatic protection from her State of nationality. Foreigners thus appear to have the “best of both worlds.” They expect to travel and conduct business in other countries on conditions of equality, but when adverse events occur, they are free to seek their own nation’s protection. This sense of unfair advantage to persons living in another country is why the international law of State Responsibility has been criticized as an instrument of coercion in the hands of nations engaging in new forms of economic imperialism.20 Central to this debate are two competing visions of how a nation should treat foreigners living in its midst. One view is that a host government should, within recognized limits, treat aliens in the same way as it would treat its own nationals. This is the principle of equality. The other view is that there is an international minimum standard of treatment, a threshold below which no “civilized” nation should drop. These two ideals have collided in spectacular fashion. Consider the simple, if sad, case of Harry Roberts. Roberts was a U.S. citizen who was arrested in Mexico in the 1920s on charges of armed robbery. He was thrown into a Mexican jail for eighteen months awaiting trial. Roberts was confined in a small cell with approximately thirty-five other prisoners. The United States argued before a special claims commission, established to resolve disputes with Mexico, that the conditions of Roberts’ incarceration violated Mexico’s international responsibilities. Mexico rejoined that Roberts was entitled to the treatment afforded Mexican nationals; Mexican jails were overcrowded, but Roberts had not been singled-out for bad treatment. The General Claims Commission rejected this argument, holding that Mexico had violated the international law of State Responsibility. Roberts’ treatment was depressingly substandard and the commission articulated a universal test of “whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of civilization.”21 In another example, involving U.S.-Mexican economic relations in the 1930s, the United States protested Mexico’s nationalization of privately owned farmland, including tracts owned by Americans. In the famous Hull-Hay diplomatic correspondence, the Mexican foreign minister defended the expropriations on the theory that the government takings affected Mexican nationals and foreigners equally. There was no illegal discrimination. Moreover, Minister Hay wrote that “the foreigner who voluntarily moves to a country which is not his own, in search of a personal benefit, accepts in advance, together with the advantages he is going to enjoy, the risks to which he may find himself exposed. It would be unjust that he should aspire to a privileged position.”22 Secretary of State Cordell Hull responded, however, that U.S. citizens were still entitled to prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for their confiscated property, even if Mexican nationals were not so permitted. The dialectic between parity for
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foreigners and international minimum standards has yet to be resolved, and of late it has been transformed into a more subtle polemic about the relevant and appropriate sources for the international law of State Responsibility. One can read the decisions of international claims tribunals that date back as far as the 1790s (the Jay Treaty, concluded between the United States and Britain after the American Revolution, provided for two such claims commissions). Typically, international claims tribunals were instituted in conditions of political, military, and economic inequality. Latin American nations (Mexico and Venezuela particularly) were often required to submit disputes with foreign residents to such tribunals. Taken together, this compendium of case law evolved by 1950 into a fairly comprehensive body of customary international law on diplomatic protection for aliens. It was precisely because of the long association of State Responsibility law with colonial and imperial politics that it came under withering attack during the period of decolonization in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Newly independent former colonies asserted that the then-existing customary international law of State Responsibility was not of their making, and they assertively bid to change it. The primary vehicle chosen for this transformation was a series of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. These were collectively known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and were an attempt at remaking the landscape of international economic relationships and their legal bases. The 1973 UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the 1974 Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States were drafted in order to propound new rules of customary international law. The key features of these resolutions were provisions allowing the expropriating State to establish the “appropriate” compensation to be paid and also (in case of a challenge by the foreign owner of the property) to have the disputes resolved only in domestic courts. Needless to say, these alterations to the prevailing customary international law rules were opposed by economically developed, capital-exporting nations.23 The NIEO initiative coincided with a time of rising commodity prices and wholesale expropriations of foreign businesses in the developing world (particularly in such extractive industries as mining and petroleum products). The pendulum, however, was bound to swing again, and, by the 1980s, commodity prices collapsed, and developing nations in South America, Africa, and Asia were once again hungering for foreign investment. Having been once “burned” by host government expropriations of foreign properties, capitalexporting nations insisted on placing the law of State Responsibility toward aliens on a firmer footing. Since that time, capital-exporting countries have negotiated bilateral Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties with developing States, including specific provisions on the rights of foreign nationals to live and work in those countries. In addition, a new form of international agreement, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), have been created to address very particular issues of investment protection, including detailed
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rules for compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalization, as well as valuation of certain kinds of business assets (most notably, intellectual properties).24 Instruments like FCNs and BITs have, to some degree, supplemented the traditional customary international law of protection of foreigners. They certainly have swept aside any contention that the NIEO-era resolutions of the General Assembly are a valid statement of the relevant international law rules on this subject. Curiously, attempts to fashion a multilateral treaty on State Responsibility in general, and protection of foreign investment in particular, have had prodigious difficulties. The UN International Law Commission (ILC) articles on State Responsibility were finally adopted after forty years of effort, but only partially address these questions. An effort to create a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was a spectacular failure, the negotiation disintegrating in diplomatic rancor and public outrage.25 The struggle to manage and tame the flows of global capital and investment will remain a central feature of the legal aspects of world law for decades to come. It is important to realize that these contemporary issues are part of an historical pattern of developments that can trace its lineage back to classical antiquity, and certainly has its direct roots in earlier epochs of globalization. International commercial law has had a quite decisive role in fashioning many features of today’s globalization that we have come to take for granted: the almost frictionless movement of products, services, and capital across borders, and the goal of even greater liberalization of economic potentials. These will be considered in subsequent passages in this book’s second part (especially chapters 7, 9, and 11). It would be a mistake, however, to view the ongoing processes of economic globalization as an unalloyed public good, a progress narrative with no adverse consequences for the human condition. The story of international life has witnessed many extraordinary periods of deglobalizing trends that can largely be attributed to economic factors (the Great Depression of the 1930s is certainly one of these), as well as the prevalence of conflict and imperial ambition. So it is important to consider the central role of human dignity and universalist ideals in the historical contours of globalization. That is the goal of the two next chapters.
5
Dignity
T
he search for the place of human dignity in world law has been a dynamic process, as was previously considered in the context of the role of belief systems in the transmission of globalizing values. While this may have been a relatively remote consideration for classical antiquity (with the exception of attempts to ameliorate the horrors of war, as discussed in chapter 3), it was certainly a matter that was discussed and considered in the second epoch of globalization, the age of exploration of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries CE. Indeed, one of the great developments vindicating human decency and the rule of law occurred at the end of that period with the abolition of the slave trade. It is ironic that the great legal campaign (led by English human rights advocates, such as William Wilberforce (1759–1833)) to end the slave trade began in a very inauspicious way. As discussed in chapter 2, the collision between positivist and naturalist approaches to international law came in the early 1800s and was waged over exactly this issue. The practical problem for international lawyers of that time was whether a small group of States (Great Britain and the United States) could unilaterally seek to suppress the international traffic in slaves. That question turned on whether the slave trade violated international law. For those who believed in natural law principles—that State conduct was subordinated to moral values—then the answer was easy: slavery was an abomination. Indeed, a handful of judges so ruled. Justice Joseph Story of the U.S. Supreme Court, in his 1822 decision in La Jeune Eugénie, observed that it may be unequivocally affirmed, that every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations; and unless it be relaxed or waived by the consent of nations, which may be evidenced by their general practice and customs, it may be enforced by a court of justice, whenever it arises in judgment. And I may go farther and say, that no practice whatsoever can obliterate the fundamental distinction between right and wrong, and that every nation is at liberty to apply to another the correct principle, whenever both nations by their public acts recede from such practice, and admits the injustice or cruelty of it.1
Under Story’s reasoning, States and other international actors (including the slave traders at issue in that case) were subject to a natural overlaw, unless there had been some manifest repudiation by contrary State practice.
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For positivists, who embraced State sovereignty and the necessity of ascertaining State consent for new rules of international conduct, the issue was more difficult. Ultimately, in a series of cases decided by English and U.S. courts, the positivist view prevailed that slavery and the slave trade could only be suppressed if States explicitly agreed that their nationals could not legally engage in it. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1825, in a pointed riposte to his friend and colleague, Joseph Story: The Christian and civilized nations of the world with whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in it [the slave trade]. However abhorrent this traffic may be to a mind whose original feelings are not blunted by familiarity with the practice, it has been sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all nations who possess distant colonies, each of whom has engaged in it as a common commercial business which no other could rightfully interrupt. It has claimed all the sanction which could be derived from long usage, and general acquiescence.2
Indeed, Marshall had earlier observed: This argument [advancing a particular rule of international custom] must assume for its basis the position that modern usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This position is not allowed. This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded.3
Decisions such as this—and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision was replicated in this period by the English High Court of Admiralty4 —sounded the death-knell for the effective application of natural law principles to derive concrete international legal rules. So international law proceeded to validate the values of human dignity by positive means, leading to world law’s first achievement of a humanitarian goal. This was the legalized suppression of slavery and the slave trade by the 1850s. This would not have been possible without international law having first made subtle doctrinal changes in the law of the sea and high seas freedoms (as discussed in chapters 2 and 4). The active suppression of piracy in the eighteenth century was certainly a significant precursor, although the prime objective of that initiative was the protection of colonial and mercantile systems of dominance, without interference by marauders. The British colonial and imperial apparatus—pursuing both enlightened self-interest and human rights objectives—used the power of the Royal Navy (later with the cooperation of French and U.S. maritime power) to effectively suppress the slave trade.5 The abolition of the slave trade illustrated some vitally important features of progressivism in international law. Many of the signal achievements in international law have been made at the behest of just one country, or a small
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group of countries, often (it seems) against the implacable opposition of the remainder of the international community. Great Britain’s campaign against the slave trade in the early 1800s, although partly impelled by domestic politics and a flexing of naval might, was certainly one of the most altruistic human rights initiatives of all time. As a great progressive leap forward, it was also accompanied by a jump in doctrinal sophistication for international law. Today’s notion of universal jurisdiction over certain human rights violations (discussed below) can trace its intellectual lineage to that period. Though as just mentioned, the unilateral application by English and American courts of universal jurisdiction over French and Spanish slavers was blocked by positivist scruples, the victory was consummated with treaty undertakings by all maritime States to suppress the slave trade.6 The abolition of the slave trade reflects a paradigmatic structure for all international law “revolutions.”7 Forceful leadership is taken by a handful of prominent States that care deeply about an issue and are prepared to stake much in bidding a new rule of international conduct. Then a significant advance is made in an international law doctrine, without which political and diplomatic change would be impossible. It may be that an old rule is swept aside, or, more typically, subtly altered to accommodate new conditions. Often this is accompanied by a significant addition of new values of international legal regulation or new structures and processes to support preexisting objectives. The last stage of the process is the move to consensus, a slow and inexorable change by international actors to recognize the new paradigm. The traditional attitude of international law was utterly indifferent as to how nations treated their own citizens. Under this view, so long as a government did not interfere with the rights of neighboring countries (or of foreign nationals living within its territory), it could abuse its citizens in any way it wanted and never run afoul of international law strictures. It was certainly in this sense that individuals were regarded as “mere” objects of international legal rules, the playthings of sovereign neglect (or worse).8 Examples of State practice indicating a contrary rule appeared in the late 1800s and typically arose in the context of European imperialism and colonialism. For example, the European “Great Powers” were much concerned with the manner in which the Ottoman Turkish Empire in the Balkans and Near East treated its Christian minority populations. Through a combination of diplomatic pressure, specific treaty provisions, and periodic military interventions, the Turks were compelled to moderate their internal policies toward these minority groups, including liberalization of rules that allowed these groups to maintain their ethnic and linguistic identity, as well as maintain a measure of political autonomy. In the same way, the European and American legal abolition of slavery and the slave trade affected the domestic practices of African and Middle Eastern polities.9 The first authentic human rights regime was established by the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I in 1919. Under the treaty, the boundaries of Europe were extensively redrawn and substantial minority populations were displaced or found themselves under unfamiliar sovereigns. For
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example, the re-creation of the State of Poland left millions of ethnic Germans residing in its territory. New States created in the Balkans (including Yugoslavia and Hungary) also had substantial populations of people who did not share linguistic or ethnic identity with the dominant group. At the same time, it was recognized that a government’s mistreatment of minorities could result in strife and be a potential cause for war.10 Needless to say, the minorities situation was a recipe for disaster. The solution adopted in the Treaty of Versailles, and then subsequently enforced by the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), was a series of guarantees entered into by States in Central and Eastern Europe to protect the rights of minority groups resident in their countries. Poland, Lithuania, and Romania were particularly required to respect the rights of their German and Hungarian minority populations.11 In a broad sense, these agreements recognized and validated human rights, but only as exercised through groups and collectives. The rights guaranteed were those to educate minority children in special schools, or to continue to use the minority language, or to exercise special forms of political autonomy.12 Predictably, these were incredibly contentious issues during the Interwar years, as “majority” groups chafed at what were perceived to be special rights granted to economically affluent minorities. At the same time, Germany aggressively sought to protect the rights of its “diaspora” peoples. Nearly a third of all the litigation before the PCIJ between 1920 and 1939 involved some aspect of the protection of minority rights in Europe, with Germany suing Poland nearly a dozen times.13 Yet, despite the concern and involvement of the international community, the minorities issue was, of course, the ultimate ground cited by Nazi Germany for its invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939—the event that sparked World War II in Europe. As already discussed, World War II marked the ultimate transition of international law from a system dedicated to State sovereignty to one also devoted to the protection of human dignity. This new paradigm was recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, signed by the victorious Allied powers in 1945. For the first time, an international agreement linked human rights with world order. Charter Article 55(c) called for “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” The following article vested the United Nations (UN) with the power to “take joint and separate action” to accomplish that objective.14 This galvanized the entire body of international human rights law, as administered not only by UN bodies but also through regional organizations and other entities. This will be a major theme of the following parts of this volume (see especially chapters 8, 9, 11, and 14). World War II thus brought a real revolution in international law over the status of human dignity as a fundamental value of world order. One way this was achieved was through international legal doctrine. As already observed, before this time, individuals were regarded as the “objects” of international legal action, not as “subjects”—or holders—of international rights. This assertion was conclusively challenged by the International Court of Justice
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(ICJ) in a 1949 advisory opinion rather remarkably entitled, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.15 The “injuries” alluded to in the title of the opinion referred to one of the most extraordinary incidents in modern diplomatic history, and represented one of the gravest challenges to the fledgling institution of the UN (created in 1945). Just after World War II, the new United Nations Organization dispatched a well-respected Swedish diplomat, Count Folke Bernadotte, to mediate between Jewish and Arab groups in Palestine. But radicals on both sides did not want a negotiated settlement, and Jewish extremists assassinated Bernadotte as he was visiting the region in 1948.16 A threshold question for the World Court to consider was whether the UN even had legal standing to bring a claim for the assassination of one of its envoys. The ICJ was thus asked whether the UN had sufficient capacity to bring an international claim against Israel for Bernadotte’s death. Or, in other words, did the UN have “international legal personality”—was it a subject of international law? The answer from the ICJ was a resounding “yes.” In a key passage, the ICJ addressed the question of whether States were the only subjects of international law: The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to actions upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States.
With these words, in 1949, the ICJ declared an end to a conception of international law as merely a “law of nations,” in which States were the only actors or players. Nevertheless, if individuals have rights cognizable under world law, it follows that they also have duties. The key moment for the confirmation of this rule was at the Nuremberg trials of the top political and military leadership of the German Third Reich, held after the conclusion of World War II in 1945. This was not, despite popular belief, the first instance of trials of individuals charged with violations of the laws of war. Peter Hagenbach, a Burgundian knight was so tried in 1482, as was Captain Henry Wirtz, the notorious commandant of the Andersonville prison camp during the U.S. Civil War (and the only Confederate officer who was executed by the victorious Union). German submarine captains also had been prosecuted, but only lightly punished, at the Leipzig trials held after Germany’s defeat in World War I.17 The critical distinction of the Nuremberg trials was the legal order and regularity of the proceedings, something insisted upon by the victorious United States. A general indictment was issued by the Allied powers in 1942, known as the London Charter. The charter specified a number of particular international crimes subject to the jurisdiction of any subsequently created International Military Tribunal (IMT). The international offenses covered included crimes against peace (planning, preparation,
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initiation or waging a war of aggression), war crimes (violations of the laws or customs of war), and crimes against humanity (inhumane acts committed against any civilian population). After the complete victory of the Allies in Europe in 1944, specific indictments were handed-down for twenty-four of the top German government, Nazi Party, and military leadership. The trials were conducted before a bench consisting of judges from the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.18 The German defendants raised a number of substantive defenses to the charges, both at the Nuremberg trials themselves, as well as the subsequent prosecutions in the U.S.-occupied sector of Germany (these trials involved the financial, industrial, and judicial leadership of the Third Reich). The first such defense was the contention that every action taken by the defendants was an “act of State,” and the individuals were, therefore, immune under international law. The IMT made short work of this contention, as the London Charter had specifically provided that “The official position of the Defendants, whether as heads of State, or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as relieving them from responsibility, or mitigating punishment.” In short, the IMT vindicated the notion of individual responsibility under international law. Actually the most credible defense raised by the Nuremberg defendants concerned the ex post facto criminalization of one kind of conduct in international affairs. Recall that the London Charter specified the offense of “crimes against peace,” or the initiation of aggressive war. It was doubtful whether this had been regarded, either in treaties or customary international law, as an international crime that could be committed by individuals prior to 1939 (the outbreak of World War II in Europe). Those defendants indicted on that count raised the ex post facto (or nullum crimen sine lege) defense, but it was rejected by the IMT on the theory that there had been sufficient notice given to the German defendants that waging aggressive war would be punished. Indeed, U.S.-occupation courts in Germany ruled that international law might not even care whether particular conduct was previously recognized as criminal. Nevertheless, in the parallel set of trials that were held in Tokyo for the Japanese war crimes defendants, one of the judges dissented on this point.19 The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials have been criticized as “victor’s justice,” but they set an important precedent in demanding individual responsibility for violations of international norms. The trials were followed by the conclusion of the 1948 Genocide Convention, specifying the crime of targeting and destroying particular populations based on their ethnicity or religion, as the Nazis had done in the Holocaust. Elaboration of the Nuremberg precedent was also provided in Israel’s prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, one of the architects of Hitler’s Final Solution.20 Later attempts at defining the international crime of aggression, or of compiling a complete Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, were less successful, although as will be considered later (in chapter 10) the recent creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) is a significant move in elevating human rights and dignity to the center of values for world law.
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That leaves one last major contemporary development to be noted in the context of a new world legal order of human dignity. This has been the linking of issues of human rights with the demand for economic growth and stability, especially in the developing world. This is not just the matter of “first generation” human rights (such as civil and political rights) giving way to a “second generation” of economic, social, and cultural rights that reflect a set of entitlements that persons might expect of their government or of international civil society at large. Putting aside the practicality of enforcing such rights as a matter of international law, there is also the question of how this connects with other features of globalization, particularly the role of commerce, investment, and capital in the processes of global development. What came to be known as the “Washington Consensus” (a term coined by economist John Williamson) has become the lightning rod of criticism for much that has been faulted with contemporary globalization and its impacts on the developing world. Enforced by Washington-based institutions (the World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF], and U.S. fiscal and aid agencies), the “consensus” was supposedly made in regards to a package of ten economic policy prescriptions intended to induce fiscal stability and discipline, and to promote growth, in the developing world. As construed more broadly, the Washington Consensus has been associated with neoliberal and aggressively market-based solutions to development, which have tended to place it at odds with certain aspects of both civil and political rights (insofar as regimes that can enforce such discipline are inclined to be authoritarian) and economic and social rights (inasmuch as these entitlements tend to be derogated in the rush to privatize economic institutions and activities within the host State). In addition, as was suggested in the previous chapter, Washington Consensus policies also are bound to promote external investment as the engine for economic growth, leading to charges that we are simply entering a new era of economic imperialism by the developed North over the developing South.21 Whatever the merits or problems of Washington Consensus policies—and these will be considered throughout this book—they have become a central counterpoint to the tropes of dignity and rights in modern discourse about the human dimensions of globalization. And, in this sense, we see a combination of the themes already mentioned in this part of the book. Imperial ambitions (although today cloaked in the mantle of the projection of economic power) merge with a set of core beliefs about the nature of humanity and world order, which then have strong components of commercial interest and human rights aspirations embedded within them. The legal dimensions of globalization not only have historic durability—many of these same conflicts have been played out over centuries—but also have a multivalent character in which many strands of argumentation and discourse are woven together into a single skein of a vision of world order.
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6
Univers alism
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that globalization, even in the
context we understand it today, is hardly a novel phenomenon or new concept. The current manifestations of globalism might be unique or singular (and the legal aspects of these will be considered in depth in the next part of the book), but human societies have previously encountered globalizing trends and have responded to them through mechanisms of legal order. It is also important to recognize that globalization is not always a narrative about progress. Not only are many elements of globalization deeply problematic, but also throughout the long currents of human history there have been as many (if not more) episodes of deglobalization as there have been of advancement in international integration. This final chapter of this part explores the international legal bases of universalism in world order, and the countervailing trends and cycles of deglobalization. Reverses and disintegrations in globalizing trends occur for a number of reasons. In the distant past, this was largely the product of the breakdowns of existing imperial or hegemonic orders. The first era of globalization during classical antiquity was brought to an end by the successive conclusions of the Mauryan Empire in India in the second century BCE, the Han dynasty in China in the third century CE, and the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE. The early medieval period (c. 500–1200 CE), colloquially called the “Dark Ages,” did see the extraordinary rise of Islam as a globalizing force in the Near East and littoral Mediterranean, but, generally speaking, the tempo of the key metrics of globalization—the movement of peoples, the volume of international trade, the transmission of ideas, cultures, and beliefs—was vastly reduced in this period.1 And in the following 300 years (the later middle ages and early Renaissance in Europe) saw further deglobalizing events brought about by pestilence (including the Black Death) and the Mongol invasions. Nevertheless, certain indicators of globalizing activity (especially in South Asia, China, and the indigenous empires of the Americas) were accelerating, so that there was a spectacular confluence of events with Europe’s age of exploration, beginning around 1450 CE. It is clear that the first two great epochs of globalization were separated by nearly a thousand years. If the demise of empires is one catalyst for deglobalization, so, too, are interruptions in international communications. Some periods of human history
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have been punctuated by pandemics. Indeed, the ready transmission of human pathogenic diseases around the planet is often a negative feature of globalization (as will be further considered in chapter 7). The bubonic plague (of which there were serious global outbreaks in 430 BCE, 540–588 CE, 1347–1351 CE, and most recently in 1855–1889 CE) was often transmitted through shipping and trade routes. The pandemic influenza of 1918–1920 (often called the Spanish Flu), called the “greatest medical holocaust in history” with estimates of mortality upward to 50 million people worldwide, was facilitated in its lethality by populations mobilized and then weakened by global conflict.2 There is one other major cause of deglobalization, and that is a relatively modern phenomenon: cyclical downturns in the global economy. What was called the “Long Depression” of 1873–1896, which was initiated by a global cascade of financial market panics, was contemporary with the Second Industrial Revolution. It had notable impacts in Western Europe and North America, but this is in part because reliable data from the period is most readily available in those parts of the world. Great Britain was considered to have been the hardest hit by the Long Depression, and during this period it lost much of its large industrial lead over the economies of continental Europe. The Long Depression is usually believed to have ended by 1897, and the global economy grew at an impressive rate from that year to the start of World War I. The Long Depression was notable because it occurred in the middle of the third great epoch of globalization, and had the effect of slowing some globalization trends during that period.3 There is also a marked gap between the last phase of globalization (the age of imperialism, which ended in 1914) and today’s contemporary developments (which commenced in the 1980s). The Spanish influenza pandemic bookended the beginning of this period, but the Great Depression of the 1930s was probably the most significant event of this era. Affecting virtually every national economy on earth (with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, founded in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and which was largely isolated from many international trade and market trends), the Great Depression transformed the landscape of global integration. It had devastating effects in both the industrialized countries and those that exported raw materials. International trade declined sharply, as did personal incomes, tax revenues, prices, and profits. Cities all around the world were hit hard, especially those dependent on heavy industry. Construction and industry were virtually halted in many countries. Farming and rural areas suffered as crop prices fell by 40–60 percent. Mining and logging areas felt perhaps the most striking blow because the demand fell sharply and there were few employment alternatives.4 The majority of countries responded to the Great Depression by establishing relief programs and structural reforms, and continuing the pace of trade protectionism and isolationism (which, ironically enough, was one of the causes of the downturn in the first place). Most countries underwent some sort of political upheaval, pushing them to political extremes (whether to the Left or Right). Liberal democracy was weakened and on the defensive, as dictators such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Benito Mussolini made major gains,
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which helped set the stage for World War II in 1939. The Great Depression, combined with the “Long War” of the twentieth century—featuring the struggle of parliamentary democracies first against autocratic empires (in World War I), then against fascist regimes (in World War II), and finally against global communism (in the cold war)—essentially brought most of the processes of globalization to a halt for many decades.5 In the face of these deglobalizing forces, international law sought to inculcate values of universalism and international solidarity. The first challenge was, at the beginning of the twentieth century and following World War I, to reinvigorate the legitimacy of an international legal order that had come to be inevitably associated (in the preceding periods of globalization) with the colonial and imperial prerogatives of the European Great Powers. One way this was accomplished was through the creation of truly universal international institutions. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences (discussed in chapter 3) were amongst the first forums that all recognized nations were invited to participate, including all Latin American countries and those independent nations of Africa and Asia. Proposals for the creation of a global adjudicatory body were first made in earnest at these meetings. In spite of the relative allure of international arbitration, many States believed that international law could not truly be effectively followed and enforced until there was a permanent institution for settling inter-State disputes. Plans for the creation of such a court foundered in 1907 when some nations objected to a tribunal with a limited number of judges (these States wanted a judge appointed for every member nation, making for an unwieldy bench), and Germany generally opposed a tribunal with anything but optional jurisdiction. While the peace conferences did create a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), it was a middling consolation prize—it was merely a facilitation center for arbitration, not a permanent judicial body.6 The dream of a universal international organization, one that would aspire to garner global membership and to address a wide range of international problems, was only achieved with the creation of the League of Nations (League) in 1919, after World War I. The League was unquestionably the brainchild of Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. president and former professor of government, and was intended to serve as a forum to resolve all international disputes. Its record in carrying out its primary task—protecting international peace through a system of collective security—was severely compromised by a lack of political will in the face of serious acts of aggression by Japan, Italy, and Germany. Nonetheless, the League was otherwise successful in addressing such issues as protection of the rights of minority populations in Central and Eastern Europe, adjusting disputes between smaller nations (especially in the Balkans and Latin America), advancing social services around the world (this despite the onset of the Depression in the 1930s), and codifying international law.7 Moreover, the very institutional structure of the League was to provide the model for virtually every subsequent international organization. The
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League “organs” included an Assembly, where each member of the organization had one vote, and which set the general policies of the institution, adopted budgets, and was assigned specific tasks for debating issues of disarmament and economic cooperation. Counterpoised with the Assembly was the League Council, a much smaller body in which the Great Powers had permanent representation, along with rotating membership by other, smaller (but no less responsible) nations. This balance between “Great Power” realpolitik and a proto-“World Parliament” was significant. In addition to these organs was also the creation of a permanent staff for the League, led by the Secretariat. The idea for this was that the institution could rely on a professional, international civil service that owed its primary loyalty to the League, not to individual countries of nationality. Lastly, a judicial entity, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), was established in association with the League (although, technically speaking, a separate institution), that would provide neutral decisions on legal disputes.8 When plans were made to launch a new international organization after World War II—the United Nations (UN)—the template and institutional design were already made. And, indeed, the UN’s organs closely tracked those of the League: a General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, and International Court of Justice (ICJ) (along with an Economic and Social Council and Trusteeship Council [the latter now defunct]). The UN’s ability to manage conflict through its collective security mechanisms and prohibitions on aggressive war has produced a very mixed record, especially during the cold war and in the face of ethnic and religious conflicts in the 1990s. As with the League, the UN’s real successes have been in areas such as promoting human rights, spurring decolonization, facilitating aid and development, negotiating disarmament and arms control, and generally encouraging the rule of law in international relations. It should also be recalled here that the UN stands in the center of a vast network of international institutions today. Known generically as “specialized agencies,” these are the continuations of functional bureaus and commissions created in the 1800s. For virtually every realm of human interaction— economic, social, and scientific—there is a specialized agency established (along the same plan of organs as the League and UN) to manage cooperation, prepare new treaties, and draft needed regulations. In the area of international banking and finance, the “Bretton Woods” institutions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) occupy a central position. In international transportation, such agencies as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) make possible safe shipments of crude oil by sea or smooth flight connections (see chapter 7). Institutions like the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and World Heath Organization (WHO) coordinate vital weathermonitoring and disease-prevention initiatives. All of this is a veritable “alphabetsoup” of international cooperation across the broadest spectrum imaginable of global problems.9
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The other universalist impulse for world law in the twentieth century was the diversification and democratization of the sources for international legal obligation. Because identifying the actual sources of international law is such a crucial exercise for the legitimacy and credibility of this legal system, elaborate thought has been dedicated to the effort. Serious consideration of international law sources dates back to such publicists as Grotius and Pufendorf, who both had in their writings long passages concerning the formation of unwritten customary rules between nations and also of the methods of treaty interpretation. During the period of “high positivism” that has been narrated in this part, jurisprudential discourse was obviously focused on sources of law that had strong consensual credentials, and it likewise rejected anything with a naturalist or inchoate flavor.10 One of the difficulties in considering the basic structure of the sources of international law today is that it has been codified, or even “constitutionalized,” in one of the key documents of world order: the UN Charter, which includes as a constituent part the Statute of the International Court of Justice, or World Court. The relevant language of the statute is nearly verbatim to that of the ICJ’s predecessor, the PCIJ, and derives from a provision drafted by a League Commission of Jurists in 1920. In other words, what is regarded today as the most reliable guide to the sources of international law was conceived by lawyers and diplomats whose mindset and attitudes reflected the high positivism of nearly a century ago. The ICJ Statute’s articulation of sources thus may not be entirely authoritative or relevant today. Article 38, paragraph 1 of the statute indicates that, in disputes submitted to the ICJ, the law the ICJ will apply will be: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.11
One favorable aspect of this provision is its clear sentiment that it is enunciating legal sources of norms in resolving disputes between States (the only parties that can appear before the World Court). Another clause of Article 38 bars the ICJ from deciding cases “ex aequo et bono [what is just and good]” unless the parties expressly agree to that. This suggests to many international law scholars and practitioners that the ICJ is a judicial institution and is thus bound to decide controversies on the basis of respect for a rule of law. By implication, this is supposed to confer also on the sources mentioned in Article 38 the unalloyed status of international law. Substantial methodological confusion continues to surround even the basic structure of international law sources. Except in one (admittedly important) respect, there is no hierarchy established among the sources. Indeed, in
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reading Article 38 one might believe that the sources mentioned may not even have an obvious interrelationship; they are separate and distinct, hermetically sealed in practical application. The one caveat is the distinction made in reference to the last category of materials—judicial decisions and publicist writings—as being a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” These subsidiary means are often called “evidences” of international legal rules, as distinct from the primary “sources.” The list of secondary evidences of international law in Article 38(1)(d) appears to be woefully inadequate, perhaps reflecting the relative lack of richness of such materials in 1920. The last curious aspect to the statement of international law sources in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute is that they are revealed in precisely the opposite order in which one might intuitively expect. International conventions (treaties), “establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states,” are detailed first. This may be the product of the high positivism that produced this formulation or (just as likely) a recognition that international tribunals will first consult any written agreements between “contesting” nations in a litigation before having recourse to other sources. As a wider assertion of how international law is formed, this seems wrong. Not all norms of international conduct are made through express, written agreements. Indeed, many rules begin in any legal system as unwritten practices, perceived to be binding as law. This is called custom. Even before the customary practices of international actors begin a process of establishing legal rules, it is possible to imagine certain norms that figure in almost all legal systems and are thus coalesced into international law either at its very inception, or are later incorporated to fill gaps in practice or agreements. These are known as general principles. There is a strong correlation between general principles (whether derived from municipal legal systems or other sources) and a naturalist vision of international obligation. Lord Asquith, in a 1951 arbitral decision, had occasion to regard this as “the application of principles rooted in good sense and common practice of the generality of civilised nations—a sort of ‘modern law of nature.’ ”12 Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the ICJ Statute refers to “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” It does not say “general principles of international law.” These are not, as some commentators have suggested,13 metaphysical “first principles” of international legal order. Rather, the emphasis is on general principles of domestic law (sometimes called “municipal law”), as recognized in the legal systems of “civilized nations.” The point here is that the international legal system remains primitive and unformed, and that often recourse must be had to “borrowing” legal rules from domestic law. General principles of law are the ultimate seedbed and gap-filler of international law rules. How does a legal rule become a general principle? The process by which a principle is “elevated” from domestic law to the realm of international law is subtle and complex. The very language of Article 38 is suggestive that a principle would have to be “recognized” not just in one legal system, but, rather,
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in most of the world’s legal cultures. So when Article 38 problematically speaks of “civilized nations”—a residuum of nineteenth-century legal and cultural chauvinism14 —it should today eclectically be taken as referring to jurisdictions embracing the common law tradition, the civil law, significant religious legal cultures (including Islamic law), and ideological legal systems (including socialist law as practiced in China and elsewhere). There is also a bit of a paradox in the incorporation of general principles as international legal rules. The more abstract the principle, the greater consensus of legal systems, but also the less useful the rule. Some general principles of this sort include a rule of good faith in international obligations (known as pacta sunt servanda) and the doctrines of necessity and self-defense. These are expedient doctrines, typically deduced by analogizing States to juristic persons and imagining certain “fundamental” rights of such entities. Yet, these general principles are short on specifics. The less abstract (and more concrete) the principle, the greater meaning it has, but also the more difficult it is to find a consensus among domestic legal systems. Nevertheless, general principles continue to exert a strong influence on the sources of international law, even as the international legal system has grown and matured.15 They constitute not only international law’s link with its naturalist bases of obligation, but also serve a significant function as both gap-filler and paradigm-shifter. If international tribunals and institutions have sought to be eclectic in their selection of sources of international legal obligation—and not to privilege those bases relied upon exclusively by the Great Powers—they have also sought to ensure that the “family of nations” does not become too fractious, at least in their legal quarrels. One way this has been achieved is to ensure the homogenous and universal application of international legal norms, and (in most instances) suppressing regional customs and practices. The ICJ has, for example, developed some definitive methods for identifying an emerging custom under conditions of conflict and competition. This occurred in the Asylum Case,16 which implicated a most peculiar custom. The case arose when a Peruvian military leader, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, took refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima after leading an unsuccessful coup attempt. Elsewhere in the world, this would have resulted in a very long stay for Haya de la Torre, for while all nations respect the inviolability of foreign embassy premises, there is certainly no rule requiring a host State to allow a political refugee safe passage out of the embassy, out of the country, and to the asylum State. Nowhere, that is, except Latin America, where evolved a regional custom of diplomatic asylum.17 The most significant aspect of this case was the ICJ’s treatment of a State’s reaction as proof of its opposition to the formation of a custom and its discounting of regional custom as a source of international law. What the ICJ ruled was that where a regional (as distinct from a global) custom was concerned, silence on the part of the State in the face of an emerging practice meant that that State objected or protested to the rule. In short, a silent or ambiguous response meant rejection. This was contrary to the general
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presumption that States are obliged to protest loud and often if they wish to avoid being bound by a rule of emerging global custom. The World Court changed the calculus of consent for regional custom in the Asylum Case and one can only conclude that it wished to suppress regional custom. There is no more effective way to do so than to declare a presumption that fundamentally disrupts the formation of such regional practices. Although the ICJ has no qualms about applying rules derived from regional (or at least nonglobal) treaties, it was concerned that development of distinctive bodies of regional rules—not just for Latin America, but perhaps also for Europe, Africa, and Asia—might unduly interfere with the universal aspirations of international law. More pertinently, the allowance of easy-tomake regional customs might also challenge the institutional role of the World Court as a place for authoritative pronouncements on international legal rules. The importance of treaties and international agreements as a source of international obligation among States is certainly beyond cavil, and not even the most ardent positivist follower of John Austin today can seriously challenge that.18 The sources and methods of public international law today combine both positivist and natural law elements. The era of high positivism and overweening State sovereignty is long past, and natural law (especially with its emphasis on human dignity and human rights) has retaken its rightful place at the center of international law discourse and obligation. In this way, the construct of world law presented in this book shares some common features with John Rawls’s argument in his The Law of Peoples.19 There is a substantial agreement about the universal thrust of these projects—whether Rawls’s “law of peoples,”20 or Harold J. Berman’s concept of “world law.” Although Rawls’s construct proceeds from Rousseau’s “social contract” jurisprudence, 21 while Berman’s is more influenced by shared religious and moral values among peoples, both scholars certainly envision a system of international relations in which States may end up mattering less than hitherto supposed.22 Rawls sees “liberal peoples” as the agent of change in international relations, in much the same manner as Berman understands the growing power and influence of the many facets of global civil society— whether of merchants, sports fans, advocates, humanitarians, and scholars. There also appears to be substantial agreement about the irreducible fundamental canons of this new world legal order. Consider Rawls’s eight principles of his law of peoples: (1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. (2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. (3) Peoples are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them. (4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. (5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. (6) Peoples are to honor human rights. (7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in their conduct of war. (8) Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.23
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In formulating these postulates, Rawls acknowledges his debt to other scholars of international law and relations, 24 just as Berman recognizes that his essential doctrinal features of world law are derived from historic fact and from historical jurisprudence. And, in that observation, lies the difference between the pure naturalism of Rawls’s law of peoples, and the integrative aspects of Berman’s “world law.” Rawls must ultimately account for the problem that his “law of peoples” is pure theory—indeed, one that has both ideal and nonideal features.25 By contrast, Berman’s vision of an emerging “world law” is supported by facts and institutions on the ground. Indeed, this volume proceeds on the assumption that the major features of world law and globalization can be seen through the immense variety of human interactions across borders, across a broad spectrum of activities, and across a continuum of cooperative relations. In short, the permissible realm of international legal regulation is the ambit of globalization. Much of the discussion in the next part will consider the inherent tensions between the goals of universalism and uniformity in international law-making, counterpoised with the objective of preserving distinctive elements of national and local autonomy (even when that can be manifested as parochial or discriminatory behavior). What this short history of world law should certainly convey is that not only is globalization a dynamic process, but it is also a fickle one. Many factors contribute both to globalizing and deglobalizing trends. Globalism has occurred through a series of historical cycles. Its progression has been nonlinear and subject to spectacular reverses. The following part will examine the special role that international legal actors, institutions, rules, and processes have in shaping the contours of contemporary globalization.
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7
Movement
The crucial characteristic of globalization, throughout the centuries, has
been the widespread movement of people, ideas, money, goods, and services across political frontiers, across oceans and other physical barriers, and across linguistic, ethnic, and social divides. Mobility has always been the hallmark of a global society. The free movement of individuals—as both autonomous beings and as economic actors—while bringing the greatest benefits of globalization, has also posed the greatest challenges for the international legal system. So in any consideration of the legal aspects of today’s globalism, a good place to begin is with how world law has addressed such concerns as the regulation of transport, including the two modes most normally associated with modern mobility: ocean shipping and air travel. In addition, one must also confront the unexpected dangers arising from the largely unhindered movement of people and capital across borders, whether it is in the propagation of animals and plants outside their normal range, the transmission of diseases, or the exacerbation of financial crises by the unregulated flow of money and credit. Understanding how international law has managed the exuberant and unprecedented movement of people in these more practical contexts, will also help to explain legal aspects of globalization that involve trade (see chapter 9), the prevention and punishment of transnational crime (chapter 10), and the advancement and preservation of our shared cultural heritage (chapter 11).
Regulation of Ocean and Air Transport As has already been discussed in chapter 4, one of the crucial impulses for the creation of both public international law (a body of rules that primarily govern the relations of nation-States) and world law (a common or uniform law that binds all transnational actors) were the demands of commerce, especially in the management of ocean trade. It should come as no surprise that ocean shipping was—and remains—a difficult, risky, and immensely significant undertaking. Over two-thirds of all goods in international transport are moved by sea, whether that is calculated by bulk (higher-volume,
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lower-value goods are often moved by sea), or by value (think about crude oil shipments).1 Aside from the problems of moving people and goods across long distances, there are all of the perils of the sea to contend with. Moreover, the inherent nature of the enterprise requires a coordination of laws and regulations in a variety of countries, not just the points of origin and destination of the passengers or cargo in transit.2 Ocean shipping is very sensitive to regulation. Profit margins are relatively low, and so any added increment of regulation usually results in increased costs for ocean shippers, and decreased profits. To repeat a voice heard from chapter 3, as Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell) wrote, “ships were made to plough the ocean, and not to rot by the wall.”3 Profit margins for air transport, in contrast, tend to be higher. Most passengers in individual commerce and tourism are moved by air, and the products shipped by air are of smaller bulk and higher value. And while the safety records of aircraft in international commerce are superlative (fewer aircrafts than ships are lost to accidents in any year),4 if anything, air transport is more heavily regulated than ocean shipping. There is a very significant historical reason for this difference in treatment between ocean and air shipping, one that is premised on a distinction made in international law.5 The law of ocean shipping is part of the law of the sea, a body of rules made by States for the use of oceans as the world’s largest common area (for more on the global commonage, see the next chapter). When public international law was emerging at the same time as the modern nation-State system (in the 1500s and 1600s), a vigorous debate occurred between proponents of free trade and open oceans (mare liberum in Latin, as many commentators of that time wrote) and those who supported trade restrictions and the claims of coastal States over ocean areas (a theory known as closed oceans, mare clausum). Freedom of the seas, as advocated by the Dutch jurist and writer Hugo de Groot (Grotius), prevailed, as this was the theory most consistent with the mercantilist and commercial policies of the great maritime powers of that time: Britain, Holland, France, Spain, and Portugal. Freedom of the seas, and its correlate notion of minimal coastal State restrictions of navigation, was the guiding principle of ocean law until the twentieth century. By way of contrast, the invention of aircraft was at the beginning of the twentieth century (with the advent of commercial aviation a decade after that), and the technology came of age at a most impropitious time: World War I. The legal status of air space was thus bound up with national sovereignty (especially during wartime), and the prevailing idiom of regulation for air transport was aer clausum, or “closed skies.” There is simply no analogy of freedom of the seas to national airspace or to commercial aviation, and all rights of air commerce have to be negotiated with a host State. There is thus a higher degree of unilateral regulation expected for air transport, than for ocean shipping. As a consequence, there is an even greater need for international coordination of policies and regulation, harmonization that must be achieved through the mechanisms of world law and institutions.
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The increased volume of trade makes cooperation necessary because it is too burdensome for these transit flows in a globalizing world to make a shipper or carrier (whether by sea or by air) comply with the regulations and laws of all nations that might have some connection to a transaction, especially in the event those rules are contradictory.6 The globalization of mobility has thus brought about one of the signal developments of modern international law: the creation of functional international organizations or institutions, the primary purpose of which is to unify the laws of various nations in order to standardize best practices and to prescribe at least a minimum level of regulation. This standard-setting function of international organizations is particularly important in the face of the regulatory phenomenon known as “the race to the bottom.” In highly competitive industries, businesses will be known to incorporate or do business in jurisdictions with the least amount of regulation. Remember: fewer regulations means greater profits. A race to the bottom occurs when different countries compete with each other to offer less and less regulation and supervision. For ocean and air transport, this phenomenon is played out insofar as ships or aircrafts can be registered in any country, what is known as the “flag State.” At least in ocean shipping, a whole cottage industry of “flags of convenience,” or (more neutrally) “open registries,” have developed over the past fifty years to enable ship-owners to find the least-regulated jurisdiction in which to conduct their operations.7 Registering a ship in Liberia, Panama, or The Bahamas, allows vessels to operate at a substantial cost-reduction from U.S.-flagged ships. This is the reason, of course, that while over half of the world’s ocean-going shipping tonnage is beneficially owned by U.S. corporations, barely 5 percent is registered in the United States. Of course, this race to the bottom imposes real costs and externalities on other market participants and countries. Liberia may reap the benefits of ship registration fees (while spending virtually nothing for vessel inspections and safety enforcement), while Liberian rust buckets ply the oceans, posing a danger to their crews or to other ships or to the marine environment (in the event they spill oil or cause other damage). This is where functional international organizations come into play. No single nation, or even a group of countries, can unilaterally raise standards, because ship owners will simply “escape” to more lax locales. International institutions “level the playing field,” so to speak, by decelerating races to the bottom. Through collective pressure and negotiations, a floor of regulation is established, which no country is permitted to drop below. Although this often results in “lowest common denominator” regulations—the absolute minimum level of rules that the most lax jurisdiction wants to adopt—it is still preferable to having no floor at all. And, over time, the tendency is to raise standards, having the effect (no pun intended) of raising all ships on the tide of better regulations. For ocean shipping, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations (UN) specialized agency based in London, remains the key regulator.8 Originally founded in 1949 as the Intergovernmental Marine Consultative Organization, IMO was really just a “ship owners’ club,”
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ensuring only the barest level of international regulation. But the foundering of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon off the coast of Britain in 1967, the stranding of the Argo Merchant off Nantucket in 1976, and the grounding of the Amoco Cadiz off the coast of France in 1978, changed all of that.9 Each of these three vessels was registered under a flag of convenience, and there were inevitable charges that, in each incident, navigational errors were attributable to poor crew training or to substandard equipment, which would have been rectified had flag State regulation been more effective. The IMO thus gradually transformed itself into an organization devoted not only to the standardization of shipping rules, but also to environmental protection and maritime worker safety. Today, IMO has more than 150 member countries, and has adopted more than forty international conventions and other treaty instruments governing maritime safety, environmental protection, liability and compensation regimes (in the event of environmental incidents), coordination of marine search and rescue operations, technical assistance, and facilitation of international shipping. The IMO also adopts treaties dealing with the unification of the “private” international law of ocean shipping, a codification of the old law merchant and maritime (discussed in chapter 4), on such subjects as carriage of goods by sea, passenger contracts, limitation of liability, and salvage of distressed ships. It often takes decades for these IMO treaties to enter into force with the requisite number of countries signing on. But once they become binding international law, these conventions enjoy a high degree of compliance. To take one example of the delicate process of maritime standard-setting, consider international rules for preventing oil pollution from tankers. These regulations would be paradigmatic vessel construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) rules, exactly the kind of laws that need to be standardized because, after all, no vessel could be expected to sail around the world and comply with each individual nation’s (perhaps) eccentric rules about ship configuration. One practical way to prevent spills from gigantic oil tankers (which sometimes exceed two football fields in length) is to require that they have double-hulls, so that in the event the outer hull is breached, an inner hull will contain the crude oil carried in bulk. When the Exxon Valdez went aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in March 1989, causing the single largest environmental disaster in the country’s experience, the United States legislated a new double-hull requirement for all oil tankers visiting U.S. waters or entering U.S. ports after an initial phase-in period.10 But, obviously, this unilateral national legislation was ineffective until the IMO could implement it as part of its Treaty on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (also known as “MARPOL”).11 So even though there may be structural resistance to deepening regulation for certain global activities, countries can take the lead to improve best practices, and initiate a process of building consensus to raise the bar of regulation. What nations or political subdivisions of countries cannot do is to peremptorily dictate standards to the entire international community, and no less an authority than the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that such unilateral declarations would
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violate the United States’ treaty obligation of standardized regulations for ocean shipping.12 The framework for a global regulatory system for air transport is substantially similar to that for ocean shipping. Serving a similar role as the IMO, is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in Montreal. Created by the 1944 Chicago Convention,13 ICAO regulates virtually every aspect of civil aviation between countries, to a greater degree and higher level of detail than IMO accomplishes for ocean shipping. The reason for this greater institutional intensity and competence is related, once again, to the different nature of oceans and airspace as international common areas, and the historically different treatment they have each been given under international law. Operating through a vast array of treaty instruments, annexes, protocols, and technical regulations, ICAO rules are updated in response to new challenges to international civil aviation. This updating process, known more formally as “tacit amendment,” is reminiscent more of how a modern regulatory agency operates (think of the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] or Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]), with panels of experts and industry representatives collaborating on the establishment of best practices, rather than a more ossified and sclerotic diplomatic body made up exclusively of State representatives.14 The ICAO literally micromanages operations aboard aircraft used in international commerce. In operating an aircraft in foreign airspace, the risks of miscommunication between a flight crew and air traffic controllers can spell catastrophe. Truly global activities demand truly global regulation, and ICAO goes so far as to prescribe a common language for all cockpit communications, to be used for all international flights.15 Much to the chagrin of the French government, that language is English. That means that at least two members of the flight crew of all aircraft on international flights, and all air traffic controllers handling such flights, must be fluent in English. The establishment of best practices for global regulation in such international economic sectors as air transit can thus have widespread effects on the development of culture and technology (considered in chapters 11 and 12 below). The world law aspects of international civil aviation extend beyond harmonization and standardization of operating practices. As with ocean shipping, concerns have been raised about the relationship between the transit of passengers and cargo, and free trade (see chapter 9 for more on trade disciplines). Because the control of national airspace has often been linked to concerns of national sovereignty, it is no surprise that deregulation of civil aviation has been only a recent development.16 Because of the principle of aer clausum, States are assumed to reserve the transport of passengers and cargo between points in their national territory to their own citizens and flag carriers, a practice known as cabotage. The monopolies enjoyed by national carriers (such as Air France or El Al) are only now being fully dismantled in Europe, and assailed in other parts of the world. Airline deregulation has become an important bellwether for the liberalization in the trade of services around the world.
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Lastly, there is a private law aspect to the globalizing effects of greater mobility in today’s world. International civil aviation was born in the 1920s, and was regarded as an “infant industry” that required protection if it was to fully realize its potential as perhaps the most significant technological innovation of the twentieth century with the greatest practical impact on modern living. Part of this process of protection was giving international airlines the benefits of limited liability in the event of an accident or crash causing bodily injury or death. Thus was born the 1929 Warsaw Convention,17 which capped the damages that an airline would have to pay in the event of an air disaster to less than $10,000 per passenger (that limit has now been raised to about $100,000, and in many circumstances has been waived altogether). The Warsaw Convention, aside from being the most-litigated treaty in the United States, establishes a broad international framework for settling liability questions involving international civil aviation. It is true that many have questioned whether a system of limited liability remains appropriate for a “mature” industry that has become more of a common carrier than an epic enterprise. Nonetheless, the basic elements of regulation for this sector— global harmonization of operating rules, progressive liberalization of trade restrictions, and private law protections—have been discussed for other emerging technologies and industries.
Mobility Pollutes: The Problem of Exotic Species As in some bad horror film, the alien invasion began at night, and the zebra mussel infestation in the Great Lakes has slowly but inexorably been traced back to one source. We do not know the ship’s name, but scientists believe that the vessel entered Lake Erie in late 1985 or early 1986 and released its ballast water in Lake St. Clair, not far from Detroit. The zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) is a bivalve of one-inch diameter with distinctive black and white bands on its shell, hence its name. It was first found in the Black and Caspian Seas and its range quickly spread to include most European waters. The zebra mussel is a notorious biofouler, able to attach itself to almost anything. It is also amazingly prolific. If left unchecked the zebra mussel can propagate at the rate of at least one order of magnitude each year.18 Not surprisingly, in the decades after its introduction the zebra mussel has wreaked havoc in U.S. waters. The zebra mussel has no effective natural predators in the Great Lakes, vastly complicating the effort to limit its spread. In addition, the zebra mussel invasion interferes with human use of the Great Lakes. In particular, zebra mussels clog coastal structures. The cost of unfouling intakes and outfalls of power stations and water treatment plants has run in excess of $5 billion over the past decade. In the meantime, zebra mussel infestations have resulted in interruptions of power and water service to coastal communities and have resulted in other substantial economic costs.
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The zebra mussel infestation also may have a severe impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem, although these effects are not even now fully understood and appreciated. Zebra mussels have overrun the spawning reefs of the native walleye, the major sport fish of the Great Lakes. Like most mollusks, zebra mussels have an ability to clarify water and purify it of contaminants. This, too, may have an impact on the Great Lakes environment, although it is too early to tell whether the effect would be positive or negative. More distressing are the prospects for the future spread of the zebra mussel. Because the Great Lakes are connected to nearly all of the major American river systems east of the Rockies, it is expected that this infestation soon will extend throughout most of the United States. The zebra mussel infestation demonstrates that the introduction of an exotic species is usually permanent, often expensive, and potentially devastating to the ecosystem. The phenomenon of the spread of exotic species has been called the biological “homogenization of the planet—a process both inevitable and inexorable, as species after species casts itself abroad.”19 The problem of exotic species is, in essence, a form of biological pollution.20 What makes a species “exotic” or “alien” is simply the fact that it has spread beyond its traditional range. Sometimes it is difficult to know whether the appearance of a new species is the result of normal propagation and transportation. Not all exotic species survive, but a few thrive in their new surroundings. Those that do survive have benefited from an absence of natural predators in adopted environments. This process devastates the biological diversity of ecosystems, producing areas called monocultures in which only one type of vegetation or one kind of animal prospers. Many, but by no means all, of these introductions of marine organisms have been traced to the same “vector,” or pathway: introduction via the ballast water of oceangoing vessels. Ballast water is pumped on board a ship, prior to sailing, to permit the ship to float at its proper height and to provide added stability for the ship during its voyage. Several tons of ballast water are usually required to trim the vessel correctly. Initially, ballast water is pumped from the estuary or port where the vessel is at rest. It is pumped back out when the ship reaches its destination and begins the process of offloading its cargo. The intake of ballast is a routine for ship operators around the globe and is considered absolutely essential to the safe operation of oceangoing vessels. Other vectors for the introduction of exotic species can include deliberate importations of plants and animals (think of kudzu in the American South or rabbits in Australia), or, even more recently, the deliberate planting or production of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) such as improved fish, food, or seed varieties (GMOs will be considered further in chapter 12).21 The problem of exotic species is directly linked to the modalities of trade, whether by land, sea, or air. And while it would be tempting to regard its solution as lying in the realm of shipping regulation, this would undoubtedly be a mistake. National efforts to deal with unwanted plant and animal invasions have tended to focus on a particularly hostile species, and to fashion plans to eradicate that target.22 This has typically focused on vaguely comic
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plans to use one plant or animal to predate on another, in a weird, human-engineered example of survival of the fittest. These kinds of eradication efforts are doomed to failure because, without addressing the vectors by which alien species are introduced into new habitats and ranges, they will constantly reemerge as threats. Where international law can play a role is by formalizing international cooperation around national responses in preventing the introduction of exotic species through known vectors. An essential part of the process of developing world law to address any matter is to define the problem, itself. Although this sounds simple, the challenge of exotic species illustrated an important semantic dynamic: how to define pollution in such a way as to include living species. Normally, we consider effluents (such as oil pollution), dangerous substances, and energy as pollutants, but not biological agents that happen to be out of place. But beginning with the 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, 23 a habitat protection treaty for Africa, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),24 which expressly considered exotic species as an aspect of marine pollution, international legal recognition was given to this problem. That still leaves response mechanisms. International law has developed a few strategies, and these are often replicated in a variety of international environmental regimes. The first is to simply regulate the harmful human activity that gives rise to the environmental challenge. For many introductions of exotic species into oceans, estuaries, and lakes, that would be through the ballast water carried on board vessels. Technical regulation in this area has taken the form of an Annex to MARPOL, the treaty developed by IMO to deal with oil-pollution incidents. The vessels of contracting States to this Annex will be required to perform ballast water management, meaning that ballast will either need to be dumped out on the high seas, away from land (which poses less of a risk of contamination or infestation), or, if the safety of a vessel is threatened by doing so in the open ocean, by pumping ballast water into specially constructed reception facilities at ports (which will be more costly).25 For agricultural or horticultural exports, another popular vector by which weeds, bugs, and critters move around the world, new inspection and testing regimes have been proposed.26 But regulation of harmful activities—blocking the vectors for introductions of nonindigenous species—does not always work. So other alternatives need to be considered. One of these is exclusion, attempting to keep exotic species out of particular conservation areas in order to maintain their integrity as natural habitats. This is the equivalent of establishing national parks or international nature reserves or monuments, designed to maintain a “status quo” of natural conservation and heritage.27 Another approach is a broader protection model, designed to benefit all habitats, not just selected reserves. This would tend to give preeminence to regulatory systems that would guide decision making on the intentional introduction of nonindigenous plants and animals. The 1979 Bonn Convention on Migratory Species28 and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention 29 emphasize this approach.
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As with other international environmental protection regimes, the control of exotic species has often turned on procedural mechanisms designed to improve cooperation between autonomous States. One of these is a simple duty for nations to inform and consult with each other when they are contemplating an introduction of a nonindigenous species or when they learn of such an occurrence. Some bilateral, regional, and global treaties demand that nations take a “precautionary approach” to environmental planning, requiring that environmental impact assessments (EIA) be conducted in order to ascertain whether a planned activity (such as an introduction of an exotic species, or, perhaps, a response to one already in a habitat) is supported by best practices and the best scientific data available. When certain human activities might have cross-border or transnational effects (as many invariably will), some international treaties require a form or “prior informed consent” by affected countries. Lastly, there is always a place for post-hoc private law liability regimes that will allocate responsibility for improper actions and channel compensation to innocent actors affected by, for example, an improper release of an alien species into a pristine ecosystem.
Mobility Impoverishes: Capital Flows and the Asian “Flu” The problem of exotic species reflects only one externality of global mobility. It is not just goods and products that move between nations, after all; it is also such inchoate items as money and financial services. A crucial aspect of globalization (whether ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary—see above, chapter 4) has been periods of increasingly free movement of capital and investment across political frontiers and between economic systems of strikingly diverse levels of development. To a degree that is admittedly unprecedented in human history, today’s globalism features a striking integration of financial markets that has fundamentally altered expectations as to how money is valued and how flows of capital are controlled. Consider the following not-so-hypothetical vignette.30 What started as the lending spree of the last decade became the debt crisis of the next. The moment that marked the transition between the two nearly went unnoticed at the time. It could have been that last ill-advised foreign loan by a bank desperate to salvage its balance sheet. Or perhaps it was the gentle downturn in the leading indicators of prosperity: declining productivity, shrinking credit, rising prices, lost jobs. New barriers to the international trade in goods and services were, no doubt, also a factor. Enormous sovereign debt, having long accrued by the necessity of reconstruction and development, was undoubtedly the most visible cause of the critical situation. In addition, the rapidity by which foreign investment and capital could be withdrawn from debt-stricken nations, and the volatility of exchange rates (which sent the currencies of those countries dropping in value), further exacerbated the situation. This could be a memoir of 1929 (at the beginning of the Great Depression)—or of 1981 (and the sovereign debt collapse of that year)—or of
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1997 (at the outset of the Asian economic crisis). Like the broader patterns of globalism, worldwide economic crises have been found by economic historians to come in cyclical patterns.31 Indeed, the years 1981 and 1997 bracket a period of spectacular global growth in trade, foreign investment, per capita incomes, and gross domestic products (GDP) by most nations. At least some of this growth was fueled by capital from Japanese, North American, and European investors looking for high (some might say, speculative) rates of return, in a never-ending round of what Susan Strange has called “casino capitalism.”32 But what occurred from 1997 to 2000 among Asian economies (particularly South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) was a most disturbing trend. A fast-moving economic virus moved through these nations, resulting in a massive flight of foreign investment and capital from these countries and plummeting currency exchange rates, leaving economic devastation in its wake—business failures, massive unemployment, and repudiated debts. No wonder this was called the “Asian economic flu,” although the effects of this economic crisis were global, with shockwaves felt in Latin America (particularly Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina), and Africa. What was all the more passing strange about this last economic crisis is that it had no apparent etiology or direct cause. While the Asian economies in question had structural deficiencies—including too-fast growth over the past decade, high corporate debt loads, and great income inequalities across population segments—none of these should have, at least according to economists, triggered the economic death spiral. Instead, what appeared to have occurred was a vicious feedback loop between these economic problems and overseas investor fear.33 The Asian economic flu was, at its essence, a crisis in confidence made possible by the quick transmission of adverse economic news that led, in turn, to the almost frictionless withdrawal of foreign investment from the affected countries.34 What torpedoed these Asian economies was two aspects of what we now take for granted in the new, mobile global economy: low costs in gathering economic information from around the world and low barriers to the movement of capital, free from the interference of meddlesome or protectionist governments. In short, the very best features of globalization directly contributed to a climate of financial fear and panic. The Asian economic flu thus illustrates, in perhaps an even more immediate way than the challenge posed by exotic species, the interconnectedness and interdependence that today’s global mobility brings. With an integrated system of world monetary and capital flows, one country can hardly remain aloof from economic developments. That accounts for the “spread” of the capital “influenza” that moved from one Asian economy to the next, as foreign investors and capital fled the entire region, and then retreated back to their financial bastions in the most developed nations. Indeed, with the exception of truly hermit States (think of the Soviet Union during the Great Depression or North Korea today), adhering to rigid communist precepts and eschewing any foreign direct investment (FDI) or
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aid, every country—whether fully developed or developing—could well be affected by these sorts of crises in the future. To address this extraordinarily negative side-effect of globalization, and to prevent new economic crises from occurring, two sets of legal responses have been proposed. The first is a form of national economic retrenchment, which means that in addition to dealing with the root structural causes of domestic economic problems (poor financial and banking infrastructure, high debt loads, volatile interest and exchange rates, and income inequality), countries will also seek greater autonomy and flexibility of economic decision-making, uninfluenced by global markets. This is a polite way of referring to restrictions on movements of capital and investment in and out of a country. This is nothing more than a “deglobalizing” move. Asian countries, most notably Malaysia, have reasserted a right to prevent capital from fleeing their country on the first whispers of financial adversity. In these circumstances, FDI could be kept hostage to the government’s efforts to shore-up the economy in times of crisis. In addition, a government may seek to control exchange rate fluctuations by artificial, nonmarket methods. What all of this means is that what was before a frictionless flow of capital between nations could become restricted by such legal expedients as repatriation limitations and artificial exchange rates. If carried to a logical extreme, this form of domestic retrenchment could lead to national expropriations of foreign investment and trade protectionism, the leading causes of global economic downturns and depressions. The second bundle of legal responses to the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, the one supported (not surprisingly) by the leading capitalexporting nations and the most-developed nations, proceeds in exactly the opposite direction. This would be to improve the global economic and financial architecture through international institutions monitoring and adjusting monetary and capital flows. Part of the larger doctrine of global economic development known as the “Washington Consensus” (already introduced in chapter 5), and the global trading regime that will be considered in chapter 9, this functional approach is largely effectuated through such organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS was founded during the Great Depression and now serves as a clearing-house for national central banks (or in the United States, the Federal Reserve Board). The IMF and World Bank—collectively known as the “Bretton Woods” institutions, named for the New Hampshire conference where they were created—are today, along with the World Trade Organization (WTO), the troika of key international economic institutions. And while the World Bank is in the business of sovereign lending (typically for infrastructure projects), the IMF is charged with the task of providing a multilateral system of payments between member nations and to eliminate currency controls and exchange rate regulations. 35 The IMF is supposed to ensure monetary liquidity for countries by accounting for their available
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reserves, expressed in an artificial unit of currency known as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). In short, IMF’s raison d’etre is to support a central pillar of today’s economic globalism: the free trade in national currencies and the frictionless movement of money and capital across borders. To achieve this goal, IMF can deploy resources and tools that other UN specialized agencies (such as IMO and ICAO) cannot. Among these are bridging loans, currency rate facilities, and other means to tide national economies over an economic crisis. But these benefits come with substantial strings attached—conditions— that the recipient State must abide by. These conditionalities may include devaluing the local currency, raising interest rates, selling off governmentdominated sectors, and making other market reforms. The IMF conditionalties have become progressively more stringent as economic crises have deepened in severity.36 Currency exchange rate fluctuations are more volatile today—largely because market forces control those rates, and not some international rate-setting body (a function which the IMF tried to accomplish, but abandoned the effort in the 1970s). All of this means that the conditions for renewed regional or global economic crises are inherent structural defects in the international “architecture” of banking, development, investment, and finance. It is important to recognize that while policy debates about, and practical responses to, global financial crises are often framed in the idiom of economics, there is a strong component of legal regulation at work here. The architecture of the international economy is undergirded by a structure of treaty obligations and customary international law understandings as to the free flow of money and capital. Without these public international law underpinnings, particularly the rules against exchange rate restrictions in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF,37 the Washington “Consensus” of liberal, market-oriented growth and the free movement of capital, would be impossible.38 The extent to which this consensus is now under attack—and the degree to which this aspect of globalization has been the subject of a withering critique—is something that will be considered in the balance of this volume.
Mobility Kills: HIV, Ebola, SARS, and Other Infectious Diseases As if further proof was needed about the challenges posed by today’s mobile globalism, it is worth ending this chapter by reflecting on the potential for a worldwide epidemic or pandemic caused by infectious diseases. Although by no means the only global public health problem that implicates globalization and world law (others will be discussed in chapters 8, 9, and 12), the threat of spreading infectious diseases remains the most serious in terms of potential lives lost and disruptions to established international avenues of transportation, and everything that depends on the physical movement of people across boundaries and around the world. Like international economic downturns, global pandemics can arise with frightening regularity
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and frequency.39 Indeed, aside from the Black Death (bubonic plague) of the 1300s and frightening recurrences of smallpox (probably the greatest pestilence in human history), the worst global health crisis of the past century was undoubtedly the influenza outbreak of 1918–1920, killing nearly 10 percent of all people infected, or about 50 million people worldwide.40 The monitoring and containment of the movement of infectious diseases across borders was recognized as a legitimate topic of regulation by international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.41 International sanitary commissions were created to establish procedures for medical testing and observation of individuals, especially immigrants from parts of the world where certain highly infectious diseases (such as plague, cholera, and tuberculosis) were pervasive. Quarantine standards were established, along with the principles of exchanging pubic health information and disease treatments between nations. To the extent that another vector for the transmission of infectious diseases is through the global trading system in commodities, the normal disciplines of free trade (more on which in chapter 9) contain an exception for measures that States may wish to unilaterally impose to contain the spread of certain diseases, provided that such actions are supported by both public necessity and the best scientific evidence available.42 But this traditional system of global infectious disease control—really a relic of nineteenth-century globalization—has come under increasing pressure to respond to new threats, and, in many respects, has proven itself unequal to the task. Perhaps this was inevitable. As already noted, the sheer volume of human movement today is probably about the same (or less) than it was in 1800 or 1900, with the depopulation of Africa through the slave trade in the 1600s and 1700s or the large emigration flows out of Europe that occurred in the nineteenth century. What has changed remarkably is the phenomenon of occasional travel not connected to emigration: business travel and tourism, especially. When combined with the rapidity of air transport, the ability of people to move to and from distant parts of the globe, the incubation and transmission zones offered by aircraft and airports, we have all of the makings of potentially deadly outbreaks of highly infectious diseases. The current international disease monitoring and response system has been sorely tested by such newly emerging highly infectious agents as the Ebola virus and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Because these agents are quite communicable, highly deadly (with mortality rates between 20 and 80 percent, depending on the strain), and have moderate incubation periods (making it possible for asymptomatic individuals to travel while highly infectious), there is a great likelihood of a local epidemic spreading simultaneously to many other locations. No longer is it possible for these infectious diseases to be confined to the traditional “reservoirs” of disease—Central Africa for hemorrhagic fevers and Southeast Asia for avian influenza. As witnessed with the SARS outbreak of 2002–2003, local “hot zones” in South China were quickly replicated in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and as far away as France and Toronto, Canada—all made possible by the infrastructure of modern mobility: commercial aviation and tourist hotels.
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The SARS outbreak clearly revealed failings in the health surveillance systems of many nations. At the beginning of the epidemic, the Chinese government inadvertently or deliberately undercounted the number of affected patients, was not adequately quarantining those who had possibly been exposed to the SARS virus, and was unable to respond with effective treatments to the disease, allowing it to spread even further to health workers and their families. The World Health Organization (WHO), yet another UN specialized agency based in Geneva, Switzerland, was called upon not so much to “legislate” uniform regulations for disease monitoring and response, but, rather, to provide technical assistance and coordination among national communicable disease agencies (think of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of doctors, nurses, and public health workers. Indeed, the SARS outbreak was probably the first epidemic addressed most effectively by a transnational network of “epistemic communities” of technical experts.43 To put it another way, when the officials and bureaucrats of nation-States proved ill-equipped or too slow-moving to respond to the growing epidemic, these more informal transnational networks stepped-in to provide upgraded surveillance systems (to track possible infected individuals), better quarantine and observation methods, and superior drug treatments to hospitalized patients. While Ebola, SARS, or other newly emerging diseases (such as new strains of avian flu) capture the headlines and raise the biblical specter of a modern scourge of pestilence, it is the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic that has, of course, accounted for the most death, suffering, and social and economic disruptions in countries around the world. Insofar as HIV/AIDS has a variety of infectious vectors (although most notably though blood products and sexual activity), has no known cure or preventive vaccine, and that treatment for the disease is currently dependent on a relatively expensive regimen of drug therapy, it is no wonder that it presents the single greatest public health challenge in many parts of the globe. With the HIV infection rate in certain southern African nations approaching 25 percent, AIDS has reached the stage of either becoming endemic to parts of the world’s population, or, almost paradoxically, resulting in the decimation of an entire generation of adult populations in certain countries.44 The international law response to HIV/AIDS has been accomplished on a number of fronts. The WHO has preferred to work through more informal, nonbinding recommendations and technical standards, as opposed to issuing amendments to its International Health Regulations (IHR). To some degree WHO has sought to harmonize national legislation dealing directly with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The key features of WHO’s standardized legislation on this subject include centralizing public health powers in a particular government authority (usually a health ministry), accurate reporting requirements for HIV infections, protecting the integrity of blood and organ donor systems, promotion of education about HIV/AIDS prevention, and additional funding and support for AIDS treatments. One policy response
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that WHO does not advocate, but which has, nonetheless, been adopted by a number of countries is mandatory HIV testing for certain classes of immigrants or tourists and the exclusion of such afflicted individuals from the national territory of the testing State.45 Lastly, WHO and national governments have turned their attention to a sociological element that has been found to greatly contribute to the transmission of HIV/AIDS: the international trafficking of women and girls for prostitution and the movement of men to certain locales for sexual tourism. In David Fidler’s evocative phrase of “microbialpolitik”46 we have all of the ambivalence of the mobility aspects of current globalization. Germs are as indifferent to border formalities as are exotic species or even capital investment. They move with their own logic, whether it is the presence of host organisms, or a transport vector through ballast water, or the demands of a global marketplace. The phenomenon of fast-paced, far-flung, nearly instantaneous movement around the globe is assuredly a central feature of globalization, and, perhaps, the one that confers the greatest economic and social benefits as well as personal pleasures. This culture of global mobility is now so taken for granted that when movement is interdicted by events—or restricted by legal necessity—it is seen as something unexpected and even catastrophic, a return of international society to an earlier, less advanced, less progressive, perhaps even less civilized, time. If this chapter has meant to convey any idea it is that while international law has made significant advances in the management of challenges associated with mobility, far more needs to be done. Although the development of functional specialized international agencies (such as IMO, ICAO, and WHO) can do much to harmonize potentially divergent national policies, it still remains that the diplomacy at these organizations verges on lowest common denominator politics. Whether it is a regulatory “race to the bottom” or the maintenance of favorable conditions for international capital and investment, there are very real limits on the legal effectiveness of formal international institutions. That is why it may become increasingly common, as seen in the context of exotic species and infectious disease control, that non-State actors, operating through transnational networks of technicians and experts, may come to play a crucial role in the management of these problems. As described here, these epistemic communities reflect the benign and sophisticated face of new international governance structures, even as they confront the dark and unpredictable effects of our highly mobile globalism.
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losely related to, but analytically distinct from, the phenomenon of movement in contemporary globalization is how the international community has come to manage the “global commonage,” those areas and resources held in common by international actors. Because the free movement of people, commodities, and capital across borders is a kind of international public good, it is easy to think of global mobility as a kind of commonage. But the global commons presents challenges to world public order that are different in kind and extent from those posed by mobility across political frontiers. Common resources lead to management challenges, precisely because the assets are held in common. Known as the “tragedy of the commons,” this is the observation that things owned by everybody (say, a village green or mutual fishery) are conserved by nobody.1 No single actor has an incentive to foreswear adding extra sheep to graze on the green (and thus conserve the grass) or to halt overfishing. Under this theory, common resources are inevitably degraded and destroyed over time. There appear to be only two alternatives to this tragedy: divide the resources (and thus grant individual property interests in the asset) or depend on explicit institutions and rules to manage it. International law has relied on variants of partition and management strategies for many international common resources. Sometimes these approaches are mutually contradictory and incoherent. Rationality in managing a common resource can thus conflict with fundamental fairness or equality.
Conservation on Ice: Antarctic Ecotourism A first vignette for understanding the legal aspects of management of the international commons is an extension of the new global mobility. Human beings are simply traveling to places they have never been before, and in numbers that are unprecedented. And, as already considered in the last chapter, while tourism seems to be an unalloyed international public good, it has its problematic aspects (such as travel for sexual exploitation). These are starting to raise concerns over the management of truly international common spaces—whether international rivers, the high seas, or even outer space. One of these paradigmatic areas of global commonage is Antarctica. In the twentieth century, human beings finally explored the Polar Regions of
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the Arctic (North Pole) and Antarctic (South Pole). The Polar Regions are significant not only as a platform for science, but also for geostrategic reasons. Beginning in the 1910s and 1920s, States that bordered the Arctic Ocean (including Canada, Norway, and the Soviet Union), as well as those nations that had ambitious scientific expeditions to the Antarctic, began to make actual territorial claims to these Polar Regions. These claims depended on assertions of discovery or more spurious notions of contiguity with national territories, but they were certainly not supported by any credible evidence of effective occupation. Indeed, aside from indigenous populations of Inuit, there are few permanent settlements in the high Arctic, and none at all on the Southern Continent (the number of scientists and tourists in Antarctica rarely exceeds 25,000 at any one time). The way in which States have purported to perfect territorial claims in Polar Regions has a comic aspect. The Chilean and Argentine governments have flown pregnant women to Antarctica, had them deliver babies there, and then record in the children’s passports the place of birth as their “Antarctic Territories!” The United States and Britain actually engaged in a 1934 diplomatic correspondence over the propriety of issuing postage stamps and operating a radio station in the Antarctic.2 Canada has aggressively asserted its right to legislate antipollution restrictions in its claimed sector of the Arctic. Russia has recently staked claims to the Arctic seabed’s rich oil and gas resources. The practical solution for competing Antarctic claims was developed in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty that, for all intents and purposes, “froze” national claims to sectors on the Southern Continent.3 As long as that treaty remains in force, no nation can assert a territorial claim to Antarctica. At the same time, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) demilitarized the region and established a unique regime to manage activities and resources there. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) meet regularly at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) to develop regulations for the safe and friendly use of the continent. These have included regimes for the management of fishing resources in the Southern Ocean, as well as a comprehensive environmental protection protocol (signed at Madrid in 1991).4 Similar forms of international cooperation are being developed for the Arctic region. The international legal mechanism chosen to manage Antarctica can be likened to a condominium. Those ATCPs that have asserted territorial claims to parts of the Antarctic continent have agreed (at least for the moment) to sublimate their territorial desires to a collective regime in which all nations that have scientific interests in Antarctica have a role in fashioning regulations for the use of the collective resource. Make no mistake, though, the ATCM is still an exclusive club. Not every country is admitted to its councils; only those that have a demonstrated commitment (such as establishing a scientific base or program involving polar science) are allowed to participate.5 But, having gained admission, these ATCPs can determine many technical aspects of the use of the Antarctic continent: including the creation of protected areas, rules for inspection of bases and facilities, responses to emergencies, and other forms of logistical and scientific cooperation.
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As an epistemic community, the government officials and Antarctic science program managers that gather at the ATCMs are a remarkably cohesive group. Even during the height of the cold war, U.S. and Soviet delegates were often in agreement that Antarctica ought to remain a neutralized, weaponsfree zone, dedicated to science. If the ATCPs could agree on anything it was that they were in a superior position to manage the uses of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, especially in comparison to the international community at large. That is why the ATCPs vigorously rejected calls by the United Nations (UN) and other bodies to have Antarctica declared the “common heritage of mankind.” This principle was regarded by the ATCPs (and other developed countries) as merely a thinly veiled attempt to transfer control of resources as varied as deep seabed manganese nodules, the moon and celestial bodies, and forms of intellectual property rights to the developing world.6 The ATCPs were able to maintain the moral high ground of their neutral and technical condominium regime in Antarctica only for so long as they have avoided resource conflicts. They nearly discredited their authority by drafting a treaty in the 1980s on mineral resource activities (known by the rather unappealing acronym, “CR AMR A” [Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities]).7 The ATS’s legitimacy was directly implicated by CR AMR A and was to focus the entire debate on a conservation ethic for the continent. No matter how the ATCPs dressed CR AMR A up, it was viewed fundamentally as antithetical to environmental values. It was this factor, when placed in combination with the antipathy and envy that certain non-ATCPs held toward the ATS, that proved to be CR AMR A’s downfall. However, the wider international community was not the catalyst for the regime change that resulted in the rejection of CR AMR A and its substitution by the Madrid Protocol. Nor was it the ATCPs themselves, which appeared blithely prepared to continue on the road to self-destruction. Instead, in one of the great untold stories in modern conference diplomacy, it was the work of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, including the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition [ASOC]) that proved crucial to this revolutionary regime change.8 The ASOC had two things going for it. The first was grassroots organization. The ASOC was formed as a coalition of many different national and international environmental groups. Although these groups had many divergent agendas, the Coalition was able to remain single-mindedly focused on Antarctica. Of course, the drafting and signing of CR AMR A in 1988 gave just the impetus that was required to mobilize public opinion in various countries. The ASOC was also able to balance the views of its various constituents. For example, Greenpeace International was an ASOC member even as it pursued its direct action strategy by establishing its own scientific base in Antarctica, conducting inspections, and staging protests. The Coalition soon gained clout within the ATS. The ASOC members began to serve on national delegations to ATCPs in the 1980s. In 1990, it won consultative status as an invited expert at the ATCMs.
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The ASOC’s second strength was that it had an idea big and bold enough to counter CR AMR A. As with most revolutionary notions, it was really quite simple. Mining would be banned and the Southern Continent would be proclaimed as “World Park Antarctica.” At least rhetorically, the concept presented precisely the opposite image of CR AMR A as a resource regime. The stake through CR AMR A’s heart came when ASOC and its affiliates mobilized public opinion and focused a relentless campaign in those countries that were perceived as likely to defect (for whatever reason) from the treaty. Ultimately, CR AMR A was defeated when France and Australia indicated that, though they had signed the instrument, they would not ratify it. This is the first, and probably only, time that an international regime was defeated through NGO action after negotiation and signature. Today, the major threat to the cohesion and legitimacy of the ATS comes from what would ostensibly be regarded as an utterly benign activity: ecotourism.9 Nonscientific visitors to the Southern Continent have been rapidly increasing over the past decade, from approximately 5,000 for the Antarctic summer of 1990, to about 20,000 today. Most of the tourists come by cruise ships, making landfalls at the same islands or bays, greeting the same flocks of penguins and pods of seals, and raising the risk of a vessel collision or oilspill incident. Even more adventurous people visit Antarctica, engaging in such “extreme” activities as skydiving over the South Pole, kayaking in the frigid waters offshore, or trekking inland. Ecotourism in the Antarctica obviously confers many benefits, not the least of which is that privileged people get to witness the harsh beauty and wilderness of the Southern Continent for themselves. With escalating numbers and the increased intensity of these nongovernmental and tourist activities, the environmental impacts are, as yet, unknown.10 With Antarctic ecotourism, as with many things in life, there may be too much of a good thing. In another development that shows the complex dynamic of epistemic communities and the “technical” regulation of common resources, ASOC as an environmental NGO for Antarctica has been challenged for moral legitimacy and policy supremacy within the ATS by a group of Antarctic tour operators. These companies have a direct stake in the use of Antarctic resources for tourism, which ASOC lacks as there is no personal constituency for this area (remember, there is no permanent population in Antarctica). Following a model for trade associations, the Antarctic tour operators have attempted to assert their right to self-regulation (through the promulgation of “best practices” directives), to win the adoption of favorable rules by the ATCPs, and to suppress any commercial competitors for access to Antarctic tourist sites. In addition, they have generally rejected ASOC’s call for managing Antarctic tourism by capping tourist numbers, to impose direct government regulation of those activities that have the biggest environmental impacts, and provide for more extensive inspections of existing tour operators. The most damaging effect that ecotourism may well have on the ATS is by subverting the ATCPs own agreed understandings as to the elimination of claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, the legal lynchpin for the
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whole condominium regime. Some ATCPs are currently positioning themselves to build runways and tourist reception centers in order to accommodate tourists flying in by air. (Such tourist flights were suspended in 1979, when a New Zealand craft crashed in Antarctica, killing all seventy-two on board.11) There is even talk of permanent lodges and hotels being established in Antarctica. All of this raises the specter of ATCPs literally competing for tourist revenue, rather like the way that some Caribbean Islands bid for port calls by cruise ships. The ATS thus presents a complex picture of what has been hailed as a model regime for the international management of a piece of the global commonage. But as with any domestic administrative or regulatory system, interest-group politics and commercial considerations can never be removed from the calculus.12 Just as government regulators can be influenced or “captured” by competing interest groups and trade associations, so, too, can international administrators. Far from being neutral or technical agencies, the regulatory model of international common resource management presents its own issues of legitimacy. This is especially so when the system has to weigh competing demands by different stakeholders in the resource.
The Zimbabwe Paradox: African Elephants and CITES No better cautionary tale can be told about the limits of international law than the sad story of efforts to protect the African black elephant from extinction.13 Once abundant throughout its range in all of central and southern Africa, the black elephant (a slightly different species than that found on the Indian subcontinent) has faced many pressures. Chief among these has been the loss of habitat to development, cyclical droughts, and predation by other animals. By far and away the greatest cause of the deaths of African black elephants has been a seemingly never-ending cycle of poaching by humans. The elephant’s ivory tusks have been valued by traders and consumers (especially in Europe, North America, and Asia) for centuries, in the fashioning of durable household items, jewelry, or artwork. The tusks of a male African black elephant can grow to five or six feet, and a pair can weight as much as several hundred pounds. The income generated by the sale of those tusks on an international market can represent the annual income of an African village or windfall profits for poachers and smugglers. Mentioned in passing in the previous chapter, conserving stocks of African elephants became a legitimate topic of international legal regulation in the 1930s, with the adoption of a treaty on the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in Their Natural State. This convention regime essentially adopted a “keep out” strategy for common resources such as migratory species ranging over the vast interiors of the African continent. A system of game reserves was established in signatory countries with the object of insulating certain animals from hunting by local populations, preferring, instead, to keep such stocks available to European hunters and visitors.14 Habitat protection in this
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protozoan legal regime was thus premised on the political and economic illegitimacy of colonialism and imperialism. It is no surprise, then, that when African countries became independent in the 1960s and 1970s that the existing game preserve system was subject to substantial alteration. Instead of private preserves, national parks were created—catering to affluent big-game hunting expeditions or photo-safaris bringing and spending hard currency in these impoverished nations, the forerunners of the “ecotourists” of today. The benefits of big-game habitats were supposed to be shared among the populations at large. In this sense, the national park systems in central and southern African countries reflected a true “commonage.” In some instances, these national parks were actually established so as to straddle international frontiers, allowing animals to range in a way that was indifferent to political realities. As with any tragedy of the commons, a resource that is owned by no one is not truly protected by anyone. Poaching of African elephants became endemic in the 1970s and 1980s. It is estimated that the population of African elephants was slashed by nearly three-quarters during that period, largely because of uncontrolled poaching of herds.15 In Zimbabwe and Kenya, two countries that inherited from their previous British colonial administrations the game preserve/national park model, the poaching rates were spectacularly high. The reason for this is that local villagers and tribes were complicit in the raiding of herds and taking of elephants. After all, there has always been an uneasy relationship between elephant herds and human agriculturalists. Far from being the benign creatures as portrayed in films and books, African black elephant herds are known to systematically trample crops, to prey on livestock, and even to mount systematic attacks against villages. Put simply, there was no love lost between local villagers in Zimbabwe and Kenya and the free-ranging elephant herds that only occasionally kept within their preserves. To address the problem of uncontrolled poaching by locals, Zimbabwe and Kenya adopted strikingly different approaches. In Kenya, the national park system was “hardened” by hiring more game wardens, better arming them, and increasing the criminal penalties for the unlawful taking of wildlife. Nevertheless, poaching continued unabated, largely because of the low salaries and benefits offered to game wardens made them easy targets for bribery by well-organized cartels of poachers and smugglers. Indeed, in Kenya it was found that the most successful groups of poachers were either retired or active game wardens. Zimbabwe, by contrast, adopted a far more radical approach.16 It essentially “partitioned” the resource of elephant herds by giving “ownership” over the animals to the villages most closely proximate to the range of the herds. The bargain struck by the Zimbabwe government with these villages was elegant in its simplicity. In exchange for the villagers’ promise not to poach the elephants, the villages would receive a substantial share of any revenue from tourism at nearby “observation stations,” and, when an elephant died of old age or other natural causes, the proceeds of the “harvest”
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of ivory when sold on the international market. Not surprisingly, poaching was virtually eradicated in Zimbabwe. Local tribes no longer had an incentive to participate in the unlawful taking of elephants, and the villagers became extraordinarily protective of their “property,” often going so far as to move human settlements away from the paths of herds. Needless to say, outsiders caught poaching in a tribe’s territory were treated harshly by the villager-owners—often by having parts of their body amputated or being summarily executed. In a matter of years from the institution of this system, elephant herds in Zimbabwe rebounded. It is at this juncture of the story that international law intrudes, illustrating that rationality and cooperation can come into bitter conflict as first principles of world legal order. At the outset, international law’s involvement in the protection of endangered species appeared salutary. This came about through the recognition that the most potent tool for protection of the entire environment is linking enforcement mechanisms to the global trading order. The first, pathbreaking, international instrument to do this was the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).17 CITES’ solution to the problem of rampant poaching of endangered animals and harvesting of rare plants was also economic—remove incentives for profit by eliminating the trade in these items. CITES works through governments which place endangered flora and fauna on different treaty “schedules” or lists. A CITES Schedule III listing means merely that a species is subject to regulation in at least one State Party, so that other treaty-members must provide information on the trade in that species. A Schedule II listing means that a species is potentially endangered, triggering a whole set of export and import regulations, including a requirement that any shipment of products made from that species has to be accompanied by a government certificate. A Schedule I listing is a categorical ban on any trade in products made from that species, except for expressly allowed scientific study, ex situ preservation (at zoos or botanical gardens), or other emergency situations.18 In 1989 it was Kenya, supported by Western European nations (and the United States), which succeeded in persuading the CITES convention body to list the African black elephant on Schedule I, virtually halting all trade in ivory. Indeed, the entire object of the listing was to end the trade completely, and to admit of no exceptions, for fear of opening loopholes by which unscrupulous poachers, smugglers and marketers would renew pressure on African elephant herds. With the trade in ivory (irrespective of source) ended, poaching was curtailed. The treaty was thus hailed as an international law success story. But what about the villagers in Zimbabwe? Tribes that had been conserving elephant herds, and expecting the proceeds from sales of ivory harvested from those animals, were bitterly disappointed. No revenue-sharing was forthcoming because the international trade in ivory was banned. A technological solution—something that would distinguish ivory legitimately harvested in Zimbabwe, as opposed to illegally poached in Kenya—was deemed
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by the CITES treaty body as being impossible, impractical, or worse, the thin edge of the wedge to resume a wholesale ivory trade. Zimbabwe’s repeated requests to CITES to de-list the African elephant from Schedule I, or (at a minimum) move it to Schedule II, were denied, although very occasional sales of stockpiled ivory were permitted.19 With the economic incentives for the careful and responsible husbandry of elephants largely eliminated by CITES, poaching resumed in Zimbabwe, even before the current political and economic troubles in that country accelerated. In any event, CITES’ trade strategy for environmental protection has been replicated in a vast network of agreements, ranging in subjects from sales of tropical timber to high seas fish stocks. But this parable of Zimbabwean elephants shows that a “one size fits all” approach to species conservation and environmental protection is intensely problematic.20 Although sustainable use of resources has become a catch-phrase of sorts in contemporary globalization discourse, 21 the Zimbabwe model of community involvement, stakeholding, and economic incentives should have been treated more favorably by CITES. Indeed, it appears that Zimbabwe’s advocacy of a “bottom-up,” private property, partitioning approach to a common resource—and not a “top-down,” command and regulation model—was a source of international criticism, not praise. In this respect, international law’s engagement with the global commonage is as much about philosophical differences as with technical details.
Medicine Man: Rainforest Drugs and Stories as Property In the 1992 motion picture, Medicine Man, a romantic vision of scientists discovering flowers with medicinal purposes in the rainforest is offered in the form of Dr. Robert Campbell, played by Sean Connery.22 In an isolated part of the rainforest, the gruff and misanthropic Dr. Campbell befriends an indigenous tribe of peoples, long undisturbed by modern civilization. But that is about to change. Government infrastructure projects, avaricious gold miners and oil drillers, as well as public indifference are about to doom forever the way of life of these peoples. The uncontrolled degradation of the rainforest environment is symbolized by a road being hacked out of the pristine forest, literally in the path of the tribe’s settlement and foraging grounds. Campbell seeks to prevent the construction of the road leading through a grove of trees bearing a peculiar plant with unique properties, known only to the indigenous tribe through generations of oral tradition. He is unsuccessful. The road is built, and the grove is destroyed. In this parable of progress, man’s best hope for a cure for one of its gravest ills—cancer—is literally paved over. The tribe is dispersed, along with its traditional knowledge of rainforest medicines. Dr. Campbell’s tale involves some of the most basic archetypes of the global commonage. Tropical rainforests used to occupy much of the equatorial belt of the planet and such countries as Brazil, Congo, Indonesia, and
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Malaysia account for the largest tracts of these forests (some 35.1 million square kilometers). They are among the most highly biodiverse ecosystems on the planet. That means that there is a greater abundance and diversity of plants and animal species in a cubic yard of tropical rainforest than in a square kilometer of arable farmland in the United States or France, or in the vast tundra of Canada or outback of Australia. Tropical plants and animal parts often have medicinal properties, and, indeed, some of the great pharmaceutical discoveries of modern times have been derived from these sources.23 Aspirin—made from the bark of a tree found originally in the Amazon—is truly the wonder drug that works wonders. (One quarter of all prescription drugs in the United States contain active ingredients derived from native plants, and sales of these drugs exceeded $23 billion in 2000. 24) And, as if all of this was not enough, the concentration of plants and trees means also that tropical rainforests make large net contributions to the planet’s oxygen supply. The rainforests are also home to the largest groupings of preliterate, Neolithic peoples in the world. Physically isolated from the outside world and unconnected by linkages of migration or trade, these indigenous tribes of the Amazon, Congo Basin, Borneo, and New Guinea have been left undisturbed by the modern processes of globalization. Until now. Tropical rainforests represent a unique form of global commonage. Because they are situated within established nation-States, there is no option of internationalizing the resource (such as has been attempted with the high seas, Antarctica, or outer space). No country, of course, will willingly agree to divest itself of sovereignty over ostensibly valuable natural resources. But how, then, can the international community promote the rational use of a unique resource that could be essential to the health of the entire planet— whether as a supply of oxygen and sink for global warming carbon dioxide emissions, or as a source for disease-fighting drugs? For the international community at large, the most rational use of the tropical rainforest and its resources would be in situ preservation. This would mean creating forest preserves, programs for studying indigenous flora and fauna, banning extractive industries and lumbering in the forests, and strict protections for indigenous peoples living in the rainforest. This all sounds wonderful in principle. The problem is that the most rational course for tropical rainforest nations, in terms of immediate economic development and to address mass poverty in these countries, may well be to clear-cut the forests to make way for farms and ranches and new communities. With the robust global markets for tropical crops and livestock raised in former forest lands (think of coffee, cotton, and beef), it is not surprising that tropical countries would regard this as “highest and best use” for this land. Indigenous tribal peoples—often regarded as unproductive and violent—will, under this model of development, be relegated to the equivalent of reservations and prevented from free-ranging over wide tracts of forest. In short, for countries like Brazil, Congo, and Indonesia, the rainforests are simply a repository of resources—land, lumber, and minerals—to
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be emptied at will. That is why tropical deforestation has proceeded at such an alarming rate, with almost 50 hectares of forest being destroyed around the world on average, every hour, or nearly 100,000 square kilometers annually. Nearly 30 percent of all tropical rainforests have been cleared since 1950.25 Tropical deforestation thus illustrates that the calculus of rationality in resource management can lead to widely divergent outcomes, depending on who makes an economic, legal, or moral claim to the resource. Or, putting it another way, tropical rainforests are regarded by host countries as a kind of “anti-commons,”26 a resource that is owned by one party or entity, but which has no present incentive to sustainably or responsibly manage it. The net effect is the same as Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”: the resource is progressively degraded and destroyed over time. What can international law possibly do to address this unexpected sideeffect of globalization? Rationality—as a surrogate for progress in the development of international law norms—can thus be seen to conflict with principles of cooperation, which tend to promote lowest-common-denominator diplomacy and “race to the bottom” economics.27 The trade/environment conflict is one reflection of this paradox. Likewise, rational outcomes are not necessarily fair ones. Questions of global distributive justice may well be on a collision course with other international law objectives. Indeed, some UN bodies have already observed that treaty protections granted for intellectual property rights (such as patents on seed varietals or copyrights on folklore produced by indigenous peoples) are in direct conflict with human rights to food, health, cultural identity, and scientific progress.28 The development of intellectual property (IP) rights is a new trend in the international law of the global commonage. But it is premised on one of the central tenets or strategies for managing common resources. To give actors the necessary stake or interest in sustainably managing such public goods, it is necessary to privatize or partition the asset. In order to encourage tropical countries to responsibly preserve their rainforests, one approach would be to vest in these countries some sort of property right in any drugs or innovations developed from native plant or animal species, found only in those forests. Armed with such rights, rainforest States can then sell licenses to, or enter into joint ventures with, pharmaceutical or high tech companies from industrialized nations that might be interested in “bioprospecting” activities in those countries. So, if a cure for cancer or AIDS is derived from a little-known orchid or tree frog from the rainforest, the vast proceeds will be shared between the host country which allowed the harvest of that flora or fauna and the pharmaceutical company that develops the drug. Just as with Zimbabwe’s approach to “privatizing” elephant herds and granting a property interest to native peoples, granting IP rights to in situ countries for native plants and animals has proven quite controversial. The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity29 was the first international instrument to offer recognition of a host State’s right to regulate and license its
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own plant and animal resources. But major pharmaceutical companies in the United States, Europe, and Japan objected to these provisions because they felt that they gave too much of an advantage to tropical rainforest States in licensing, bioprospecting, and joint venture negotiations.30 That is why, for example, the United States has not fully ratified and implemented into domestic law the Biodiversity Treaty. This attitude was reflective of what has come to be regarded as a peculiarly “Northern” view of IP rights. In this iteration of the North-South dialogue or the tension between developed and developing worlds, IP rights are something that only an innovator can lay moral claim to—the pharmaceutical company that spends decades and millions of dollars in researching a new drug. In this vision, the in situ State of the plant or animal resources that may make such a discovery possible is really no different from the country that just happens to have large natural gas or oil reserves. The host State pretty much has to accept the offers of outsiders to exploit and manage their resources. Indeed, with bioprospecting, companies and governments from the developed world have often preferred to illegally export a valuable piece of flora and fauna, rather than subject what could be a valuable asset to control by the host State. (In the early twentieth century, British and American officials smuggled native rubber plants out of Brazil in order to gain a national security advantage in the manufacture of rubber products, including tires for cars and tanks.) So while a “Northern” view of IP rights would seem to preclude the patenting of a valuable biological resource found in a plant or animal—as distinct from a drug or product made from a species—“Southern” attitudes have led to a rethinking of the international system of protection for innovation.31 The lynchpin of the “Northern” system of IP rights is the 1883 Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property,32 which enshrines the principle that States Parties should establish patent systems and then give reciprocal recognition and enforcement to patents issued in other nations. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1994 agreement on intellectual property rights,33 allowed for member States to exclude from patentability plants, animals and certain biological processes. That allowed tropical rainforest countries to refuse to give recognition to northern patents that purported to grant IP rights in flora and fauna native to their countries. This tactic would essentially nullify assertions of “Northern” property rights over these resources. An alternative strategy has been proposed by some rainforest and biodiverse countries, a proverbial “fighting fire with fire.” That would be to use a “Northern” conception of IP rights and to issue patents in order to protect the knowledge and techniques of indigenous peoples and their uses of native plants and animals.34 A 1989 International Labor Organization (ILO) treaty purports to give indigenous peoples access to the legal means to protect their native knowledge.35 The key to the legitimacy of this approach is that what is being patented is not the biodiversity itself, but, rather, the human applications of those genetic resources—the very essence
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of innovation and “northern” patent systems. After all, if Amazonian tribes or African pygmies have used native substances for medicinal remedies for decades or centuries, why should avaricious drug companies be allowed to “free ride” off that innovation simply by appropriating that technology and mass-producing it? The battle over rainforest resources is thus as much about the interconnections between trade regulation and environmental protection (something already considered with African elephants), as it is about widely divergent conceptions of property rights and innovation. To some degree, the debate is about privileging forms of culture. Who is really more worthy of reward: the village shaman who preserves an ancient folk-way of healing, or a scientist (such as Dr. Campbell) who explains, refines, and mass produces a drug for global consumption? And while issues of globalization and culture will be considered further in chapter 11, it is worth considering here the implications of this question in the management and conservation of the global commonage.
Lost and Found in Cyberspace The next big thing with the global commons is certainly not a place, and it may not even be a thing. If aviation was the defining technology of the early and middle twentieth century, and the biotech revolution and human genome was the crucial technology of the late 1900s, then surely the Internet will be regarded as the defining innovation of globalization in the early twenty-first century. And, make no mistake, the Internet may well be regarded as the signal feature of an interconnected and interdependent world, one where commerce is as much based on an information economy than on the production of goods or the marketing of services. From its inception in the 1970s (as part of a U.S. military research project), the Internet has morphed into the World Wide Web and other forms and applications. Some of these are, at once, pedestrian and revolutionary— such as e-mail. Web sites can communicate information, advocate policies, and make markets. While Internet access remains limited in some nations, especially in the developing world, the “digital divide” between North and South, rich and poor (in almost all countries on the planet) may well be narrowing. In short, the Internet provides the ultimate cachet of a mobile global society (considered in the last chapter): the nearly instantaneous and reliable movement of data and ideas across borders.36 The Internet is also assuredly a global commons. In fact, it may be the paradigmatic shared resource that is both a res nullius and res communis, for both nobody and everybody owns the Internet. Governments, corporations, and individuals control the computers upon which the Internet resides through Web sites and servers. Telecommunication companies may own the hardware “backbone” of the Internet—the switchers, routers, and fiber optical cable upon which data moves through various systems. Intellectual property regimes may dictate the use of domain names, search
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engines, e-commerce, and other attributes of the World Wide Web. When taken altogether, no individual country, company, or person can lay claim to even the smallest part of the global architecture of the Internet.37 Cyberspace, by virtue of its very inchoate nature, is an inexhaustible resource (whereas tropical rainforests and elephants are not). Even so, cyberspace has to be tamed. For these reasons, it has become popular to describe cyberspace as the equivalent of some metaphorical “Wild West,” where no law can command obedience, and only coercion prevails. But that would be a profound mistake. It may well be more accurate to consider the Internet in terms of the analogies to other forms of global commonage. Maybe the condominium regime of Antarctica is an attractive model, what with the shared responsibilities and prerogatives of the States most closely connected with managing the resource. Cyberspace, unlike Antarctica, is an intensely private place, in the sense that individuals and commercial activities, and not governments, predominate. Likewise, while outer space (including such celestial bodies as the moon, asteroids, and planets) is supposed to be a true res communis—the common heritage of mankind—we are not yet at the stage of seeing private, commercial exploitation of that common resource, as distinct from government-sponsored research and exploration. Perhaps the most apt global commonage analogy to cyberspace is also the oldest and largest: the high seas. States have never enjoyed a monopoly on power over navigation and exploitation of ocean resources. Private vessels have always plied the oceans, although ostensibly under the regulation of a flag State. Commercial navigation remains the leading use of ocean resources, followed closely by offshore oil and gas production. In the same way, commercial and private uses of the Internet are likely to be dominant. But with freedom of the high seas, as with freedom of both publicity and anonymity in cyberspace, comes the terrible risks of lawlessness. Piracy has always been the scourge of the oceans, and as anachronistic as it may sound, it remains a problem to this day. The hackers, spammers, child pornographers, copyright violators, and fraudsters that inhabit cyberspace are the modern equivalent of the pirates of old. As with many things in life, with great freedom comes great responsibility, and perhaps the greatest challenge for any global commons is the balancing of individual autonomy and creativity (which, in large measure, give the resource its value) with the international community’s security. For these reasons, jurisdiction in cyberspace has created doctrinal difficulties for international law. International law rules have always attempted to demarcate the outer limits of a State’s ability to prescribe rules, adjudicate disputes and enforce rights in regards to matters of interest to it. These justifications—or bases—for jurisdiction have enjoyed a remarkable recognition and observance as customary international law for over two centuries, but they have recently undergone some significant changes. In the face of such a phenomenon as the Internet, they will assuredly be challenged even more.
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For example, the two crucial grounds under which a country has exercised jurisdiction are territory and nationality. One of the fundamental tenets of State sovereignty is the idea that a nation may exercise jurisdiction over persons, transactions and events occurring within its territory. As Chief Justice John Marshall noted in 1812, “The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”38 Under this reasoning, only the territorial sovereign can decide to exercise jurisdiction over a matter arising within its borders. Consistent with international law, virtually every nation exercises nearly complete jurisdictional competence on the basis of territoriality. This territorial conception of both sovereignty and jurisdiction has little relevance to cyberspace.39 Where, after all, does a Web site reside? Should it be deemed to be present on a computer server, subject to the jurisdiction of the country where it is located? Alternatively, from whence should a defamatory e-mail be found to have issued? The very nature of the architecture of the Internet and Web make it often impossible to trace bad acts to particular localities. Likewise, the second principal basis of jurisdiction recognized in international law—a State’s control over its own nationals— only allows for certain kinds of enforcement actions against conduct detrimental to the good order of cybersociety. The ability of “netizens” to make anonymous postings of content on the Internet, to hack computers from remote sites, or to create nasty computer viruses in the comfort of their own den often militate against the apprehension and prosecution of malefactors.40 Indeed, some assertions of national jurisdiction over the Internet seem to be contrary to the very values and aspirations of the resource. Cyberspace has been modeled on uniquely American attitudes about the constitutional protection of free and robust speech, values that are not often shared in other polities. British defamation law places the burden of proof on the speaker to prove that their statement is true, in order to avoid a libel prosecution. Is it possible that a statement appearing in a local Peoria, Illinois newspaper, but available to be read on the Web, can be actionable in the United Kingdom? Germany has laws against fascist propaganda. Should that mean that Germany can prosecute Americans who mount a neo-Nazi Web site in Idaho, viewable in Germany? France has laws against making commercial solicitations in languages other than French. Does that allow French officials to prosecute a parallel Web site maintained by a U.S. university (in English only) that happens to reside on as server in Paris? China has laws against political dissent. Can that permit the Chinese government to censor Falun Gong agitators, Tibetan nationalists, and pro-democracy intellectuals who are operating in Hong Kong, Taiwan, London, or San Francisco?41 Many countries have purported to exercise both criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonnationals engaged in Internet conduct, even outside their boundaries. Although this may be consistent with the truly global reach of this new medium, such assertions of jurisdiction are tantamount to the
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declaration of a new species of “universal offense” analogous to that exercised over pirates, war criminals, and those who commit genocide. But persisting in such claims of control over Internet offenses may well be naive and dangerous. In a kind of inversion of the “tragedy of the commons” that has been discussed in this chapter, this sort of regulatory “capture” of cyberspace by all governments, would have very much the effect of every port State asserting its rights to impose construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) rules on visiting vessels. Ocean shipping would grind to a halt. In the same way, a “race to the top” with regulation of the Internet would kill the utility of the resource. A more promising avenue for managing cyberspace is to focus on what has come to be called Internet governance. “Governance” is not the same thing as “government,” and for cyberspace what has been discussed is a system of self-regulation through voluntary codes of conduct entered into by the private entities that can best control the resource: Internet service providers (ISPs), domain name registrars, and the quasi-administrative task forces that control cyberspace, including the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The Internet Engineering and Research Task Forces (IETF and IRTF), provide governance for the technical and engineering aspects of cyberspace. This has proven important as the Internet has been “internationalized” from its beginning as a project of the U.S. Department of Defense, and there have been concerns raised that this valuable global public utility’s infrastructure should not be controlled by one nation.42 Governance in cyberspace has also reached to the settlement of conflicts between Internet actors. Most significant have been domain name disputes, where one entity has attempted to lay claim to a Web address featuring a commercially valuable trademark. These questions have arisen because each toplevel domain name (such as “.com” or “.uk” or “.org”) can register its own addresses, and each will be equally accessible on the Web. There is thus keen competition between domain name registrars. Unscrupulous parties—known as “cybersquatters”—will register domain names with famous trademarks or symbols (think of “www.cocacola.us” or “www.whitehouse.com”), in order to exact payments from the rightful owner or to deceive unwitting Web browsers and consumers. Cybersquatting has been addressed with a very successful system of dispute settlement panels sponsored by ICANN and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), yet another UN specialized agency.43 These panels offer speedy resolution of conflicting claims to domain names. The disputants and lawyers never even see each other; all proceedings are online! Cyberspace is thus the next frontier of the global commonage, and likely to be much more commercially relevant and lucrative, and so much harder to manage, than such “physical” places as the deep seabed (more on which in the next chapter) or outer space (see chapter 12). The central dilemma for international lawyers and for policy-makers in dealing with these resources and opportunities is to avert the “tragedy of the commons,” while, at the
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same time, obviating the extremes of overregulation and overpartition (each of which can also destroy the practical use of the commons). The central utility of today’s globalization—whether it be the pleasures of ecotourism, or the availability of breakthrough drugs, or instantaneous communication through the Internet—will depend on world law’s success with these and other, as yet unrecognized, issues.
9
Disciplines
I
n considering the legal controls on planetary mobility and of the global commonage, the broad contours of contemporary world law start to take shape. There are distinct approaches to international regulation over conduct that transcends national frontiers. Depending on the policies and incentives that undergird the activities being controlled, the international community can seek to lightly or heavily regulate, and the body of rules that control that conduct can either be thick or thin. Likewise, regulation can be delegated to national or sub-State actors, to private or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or to international institutions. In short, international law has developed many ways to fashion effective regimes to regulate transnational affairs. This chapter examines one particular “style” of international regulation: when the international community imposes limits on what otherwise would be the wide discretion of domestic entities to control transnational conduct. Known colloquially as “disciplines,” these controls act as a way for national leaders to accept international standards and to try to avoid countervailing domestic political pressures.1 Many of these disciplines are trade-related, but others are found in the fields of environmental protection, labor rights, and resource exploitation. These will be considered in turn. The common thread that runs through them all is that unpopular political or economic initiatives can be “elevated” to the international realm for determination by transnational processes and institutions, thereby avoiding the patch-work quilt of regulation that would occur if independent and atavistic States were to attempt to control the same conduct.
Where’s the Beef? As has already been mentioned, at the center of the current global trade network is the World Trade Organization (WTO). After the experience of that singular deglobalizing event of the last century—the global Depression of the 1930s, which was brought on in large measure by rampant trade protectionism in Europe and the United States—plans were made at the conclusion of World War II to create a new global trading regime. The original idea was to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) that would serve as a central clearinghouse for the liberalization of import rules; that is, reduction of tariffs and quotas and other nontariff trade barriers. But this ambitious plan
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was a political nonstarter in 1945. Instead, an interim trade agreement was contemplated, which later came to be known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT regime persisted for more than fifty years, until 1994, when (at long last) the institutional framework originally contemplated for international trade regulation was achieved with the creation of the WTO. The reality is that the substantive trade rules of the new WTO are largely identical to those of the earlier GATT regime. That is why the world trade order is sometimes referred to as “GATT/WTO.” The heart of the GATT system was simply a multilateral version of the U.S. most-favored nation (MFN) clause—States are obliged to extend the same trade preferences to all countries that they give to their most-favored trading partners. All GATT signatories thus got the advantage of the low tariffs and other rules concluded at the successive sets, or “Rounds,” of negotiations. With the establishment of the WTO, these negotiations to reduce tariffs, quotas, subsidies, dumping, other trade barriers, and abusive practices are now held on a regular basis. The key elements of GATT/WTO are substantive trade equality and dispute settlement mechanisms. The MFN requirement of GATT Article I ensured a level-playing field for parties. At the same time, GATT/WTO featured very precise rules on other subjects. Quantitative restrictions on imports (quotas) were banned under Article XI, although there were always lingering restrictions on products in the agriculture, textile, and national defense sectors. The ultimate feature of GATT/WTO is its ability to fairly resolve trade disputes. This had been a constant criticism of the old GATT system, as trade abusers were often able to avoid sanctions. Indeed, to the extent that GATT attempted to avoid unilateral trade retaliations and sanctions, it was often unsuccessful. The new WTO has some institutional machinery to resolve this problem. Dispute settlement panels are available for expeditious trade litigation, with an appellate review process. The panel decisions are now self-executing and do not require political approval by the ministerial conference (where, previously, the trade malefactor could simply veto sanctions against itself). There are a few areas, however, where GATT/WTO does not purport to regulate. For example, nothing in the global trade regime is contrary to commodity agreements, where importer and exporter nations for a particular product consult and influence prices and supplies. Also, Article XX of GATT/ WTO allows trading nations some exercise of discretion for trade restrictions in certain areas or in accordance with special sorts of domestic legislation. The global trade regime has been bitterly criticized by environmental advocates who maintain that it unnecessarily punishes the unilateral acts of environmentally progressive nations. When the United States charged import restrictions on tuna caught by foreign fishermen with insufficient regard for the safety of dolphins (which swim with tuna and are often killed when nets are thrown), the affected nations sought relief before the institutions of the GATT and, later, the WTO. Article XX was invoked by the United States in
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support of its environmental legislation affecting tuna and shrimp imports