Globalization: A Basic Text

This edition first published 2010 © 2010 George Ritzer Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell. Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, P 0 1 9 8SQ, United Kingdom Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, P 0 1 9 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell. The right of George Ritzer to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ritzer, George. Globalization : a basic text / George Ritzer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4051-3271-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Globalization. I. Title. JZ1318.R577 2009 303.48'2-dc22 2009004218 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Set in 10.5/13pt Minion by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed in Singapore 03

2011

To Bodhi Axel for a

Ritzer, With Much Love a n d Great H o p e Better World

in Y o u r Future

List of F i g u r e s

xii

Preface

xiii

1 Globalization I

1

Liquids, Flows, a n d Structures S o m e of t h e Basics

3

F r o m S o l i d s to L i q u i d s (to G a s e s )

4

Flows

7

Does Globalization Hop Rather T h a n Flow?

10

Heavy, Light, Weightless

11

Heavy Structures T h a t Expedite Flows

14

H e a v y S t r u c t u r e s a s Barriers t o F l o w s

18

Subtler Structural Barriers

23

S t r u c t u r e a n d Process

24

O n t h e I n c r e a s i n g U b i q u i t y o f G l o b a l F l o w s ( a n d Processes)

25

a n d Structures T h i n k i n g A b o u t Global Flows a n d Structures

26

Chapter Summary

28

2 Globalization II

33

S o m e Basic Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d Controversies Is T h e r e S u c h a T h i n g as G l o b a l i z a t i o n ?

34

If T h e r e Is S u c h a T h i n g as G l o b a l i z a t i o n , W h e n D i d It B e g i n ?

37

Globalization or Globalizations?

44

W h a t Drives Globalization?

47

If T h e r e Is S u c h a T h i n g as G l o b a l i z a t i o n , Is It I n e x o r a b l e ?

48

D o e s Globaphilia or Globaphobia H a v e t h e U p p e r H a n d ?

50

If G l o b a l i z a t i o n Is N o t I n e x o r a b l e , H a s It G o n e T o o F a r ?

56

What, if Anything, Can be Done A b o u t Globalization?

57

Chapter Summary

59

3 Globalization and Related Processes I Imperialism,

Colonialism,

Development,

63

Westernization,

Easternization Imperialism

64

Colonialism

69

Development

71

Westernization

74

Easternization

75

Comparisons with Globalization

78

Contents

T h e Era o f t h e " P o s t s "

80

Chapter Summary

80

4 Globalization and Related Processes II

85

Americanization and Anti-Americanism Clarifying Americanization

86

S o m e Useful Conceptual Distinctions

91

America's Logistical Technologies

94

A Broader and Deeper V i e w of the Americanization of

95

Consumer Culture An American Empire? Minimizing the Importance of Americanization Anti-Americanism

97 98 100

Post-Americanization

104

Chapter Summary

105

5 Neo-Liberalism

109

Roots, Principles, Criticisms, and Neo-Marxian Alternatives T h e Past, P r e s e n t , a n d F u t u r e o f N e o - L i b e r a l i s m

110

Neo-Liberalism: An E x e m p l a r y S t a t e m e n t a n d t h e Basic Principles

115

Popular Neo-Liberal " T h e o r y " : The Case of T h o m a s Friedman

119

Critiquing Neo-Liberalism

122

Neo-Liberalism as Exception

124

N e o - L i b e r a l i s m : T h e C a s e o f Israel

126

The End of History

127

The Death of Neo-Liberalism?

129

Neo-Marxian Theoretical Alternatives to Neo-Liberalism

130

Chapter Summary

135

6 Global Political Structures and Processes O n Political Processes a n d F l o w s

139 140

T h e Nation-State

141

In D e f e n s e of the Nation-State

146

"Imagined Community"

147

C h a n g e s in Global Nation-State Relations

149

O t h e r G l o b a l Political D e v e l o p m e n t s a n d S t r u c t u r e s

151

R e g i o n a l Political O r g a n i z a t i o n s

155

Global Governance

156

Civil S o c i e t y

158

O t h e r Players

167

Chapter Summary

168

7 Structuring the Global Economy Before Bretton W o o d s

171 172

Bretton W o o d s and the Bretton W o o d s System

174

T h e End of Bretton W o o d s

186

Contents

C h a n g e s i n , a n d C r i t i q u e s of, B r e t t o n - W o o d s - E r a O r g a n i z a t i o n s

187

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( O E C D )

191

European Union ( C o m m o n Market)

192

North A m e r i c a n Free T r a d e A g r e e m e n t ( N A F T A )

195

MERCOSUR

197

OPEC

197

T h e Multinational Corporation (MNC)

198

World Economic Forum

201

T h e Myth of Economic Globalization?

202

Chapter Summary

203

8 Global Economic Flows

207

Production and Consumption Trade

208

Increasing Competition for Commodities

218

T h e Economic Impact of the Flow of Oil

220

Race to the Bottom and Upgrading

224

Outsourcing

226

Financial Globalization

228

Corporations, People, a n d Ideas

231

Consumption

234

Chapter Summary

240

9 Global Culture and Cultural Flows

243

C u l t u r a l D i f f e r e n t i a l ism

245

Cultural Hybridization

255

Cultural Convergence

258

Chapter Summary

274

10 High-Tech Global Flows and Structures Technology,

277

Media, a n d the Internet

Technology

278

Media

284

T h e Internet

289

Chapter Summary

294

11 Global Flows of People

297

V a g a b o n d s and Tourists Migrants

298

Migration

300

Tourists a n d Tourism

322

Chapter Summary

331

12 Global Environmental Flows

335

Differences a m o n g Nation-States

338

Collapse

338

Contents

T h e Leading Environmental Problems

339

Global Responses

352

Chapter Summary

362

13 Negative Global Flows and Processes

365

D a n g e r o u s Imports, Diseases, Crime, Terrorism, W a r D a n g e r o u s Imports

367

Borderless Diseases

370

Crime

377

Corruption

382

Terrorism

384

War

390

T h e Impact of Negative Global Flows on Individuals

396

Chapter Summary

397

14 Global Inequalities I Patterns

of

401

Inequality

Inequality

404

Rural-Urban

415

Chapter Summary

430

15 Global Inequalities II Global

Majority-Minority

433 Relations

Majority-Minority Relations in a Global C o n t e x t

434

Social Definitions

438

Race a n d Ethnicity

441

Ethnicity

442

Race

447

Gender

455

Children

463

S e x u a l Minorities: G a y s a n d L e s b i a n s

466

Responding to a n d Resisting Global Minority Status:

467

The Case of W o m e n Chapter Summary

471

16 Dealing with, Resisting, and the Futures of, Globalization

475

Dealing with Globalization

476

Resisting Globalization

487

T h e Futures of G l o b a l i z a t i o n

499

Chapter Summary

502

Appendix Disciplinary A p p r o a c h e s to

505 Globalization

Anthropology

506

Sociology

507

Political S c i e n c e

507

Contents

Economics

508

Geography

510

Psychology

511

Literary Criticism (Postcolonial)

512

O t h e r Fields

514

Glossary

516

References

526

Index

568

1.1

Transportation routes

15

1.2

Airline passenger volume

16

2.1

Fiber optics

40

3.1

Global English

5.1

China's economic zones

6.1

W o r l d areas of recurrent conflict

159

7.1

World debt

185

76 125

7.2

European supranationalism

194

8.1

Trade flow

209

8.2

F l o w o f oil w o r l d w i d e

219

8.3

N A F S W A oil a n d g a s

221

9.1

T h e domains of the major religions

250

10.1

S p r e a d of computer virus

292

11.1

Global population

299

T h e world divided: core a n d periphery in the early

302

11.2

twenty-first

century

12.1

C o a s t l i n e at 10 m e t e r s

346

12.2

Renewable energy

354

13.1

Malaria

371

13.2

HIV/AIDS

373

14.1

Urban population %

416

14.2

World metro population

420

14.3

Cities p o w e r i n g g l o b a l i z a t i o n

422

14.4

Lagos megacity

428

15.1

S e r b i a a n d its n e i g h b o r s

448

15.2

W o r l d maternal mortality

456

15.3

W o r l d child mortality

465

15.4

W o r l d f e m a l e life e x p e c t a n c y

468

15.5

Enfranchisement of w o m e n

469

15.6

W o m e n in parliament

470

As I revise this preface in March, 2009, I am struck by how much the events of the day both reflect, and are profoundly changing, the process of globalization. I am referring, of course, to the major economic crisis relating to sub-prime mortgages, the credit freeze, the failure of legendary financial firms and banks, the collapse of national economies (e.g. Iceland), and growing political unrest in many parts of the world as the economic crisis deepens and widens. The global recession is already of such a magnitude that I (and others) am calling it the Great Recession. The ways in which these economic processes, largely originating in the US, have, in short order, flowed around the world is breathtaking and, unfortunately, well illustrates this book's major themes. Similarly illustrative of rapid and extensive global flows is the scandal associated with the $50 billion Ponzi scheme run by New York financier Bernard Madoff. Ponzi schemes are historically local in nature involving a process whereby one nearby client is paid off out of the contributions of another neighbor to the fund. The funds are never invested, at least successfully, and the scheme collapses when there are not enough new investments to pay off those seeking to cash in. What was unique about Madoff is that he ran a global Ponzi scheme. As one expert on Ponzi schemes said: "there has been nothing like this, nothing that we could call truly g l o b a l . . . . So this says what we increasingly know to be true about the w o r l d . . . money knows no borders, no limits." At the heart of this book is the idea that it is not just money, but virtually everything else, that knows no (or at least fewer) limits in the global age. 1

This crisis is remaking the globe in ways that will be much clearer by the time this book is published. Already, it is becoming clearer in its economic aspects and components, but as we will see throughout this book (and below), it is of utmost importance not to reduce globalization to economic globalization. Every aspect of globalization discussed throughout this book will be affected and, in many cases, quite dramatically. The result is that at least some of what is discussed in these pages will need to be revisited in light of these changes. However, the basic foci, perspectives, concepts, and theories offered here will apply to whatever changes are occurring in, and are in store for, globalization. Change is nothing new to globalization, indeed it could be argued that change, including cataclysmic events and changes of the kind now occurring (the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1919, the Great Depression, WW II), are an integral part of it. More recently, we have seen a variety of economic crises in, for example, Asia, Russia, and Argentina, that were also part of the process of globalization. Any useful perspective on globalization must be able to handle such occurrences. Writing a general overview of globalization has been, to put it mildly, a daunting task. It is almost literally about everything - every place, every thing, everybody, and virtually every field of study. It also requires a sense of a wide expanse of history

Preface

and of what it is about the present "global age" that differentiates it from epochs that came before it. I have written textbooks before, including one that covers all of classical and contemporary sociological theory, but none has been more challenging than this one. Beyond the sheer magnitude of what needs to be covered, there is the fact that globalization, at least in its present form, is quite new, with the term itself entering the lexicon only three decades ago. As a relatively new phenomenon, it is constantly changing, as are conceptions of it. With few precedents to rely on, I have had to "invent" an approach to globalization (based on major theoretical sources), as well as create a structure for the book that encompasses most of the major topics and issues in globalization today. This is difficult enough, but it is made far more difficult by the fact that global changes (e.g. the price of that all-important commodity, oil; the state of the NATO alliance in Afghanistan) occur constantly. With the global financial crisis in full swing as I was finishing this book, I have been u p dating some parts of the book on a regular basis prior to its publication. This is related to the issue of sources for this book, which includes popular books (e.g. those of Thomas Friedman, although I am highly critical of his work), newspapers, magazines, and web sites. These are atypical sources for a textbook designed to offer an overview of what we know about a field from a scholarly point of view. However, globalization occurs in the real world and continues apace in that world. Such occurrences either do not find their way into academic works or do not do so for years after they have happened. Thus, in order to be up-to-date and it is important that a text on globalization be current - this book relies, in part, on a variety of popular sources. Popular sources also serve the function of providing down-to-earth, real-world examples and case studies of globalization. They serve to make globalization less abstract. However, because it is an academic text, this book relies far more on scholarly work, especially journal articles and academic monographs of various types. It is heavily referenced and the many entries in the References section at the end of the book (as well as suggested readings at the end of each chapter) provide students with an important resource should they wish to learn more about the many topics covered in this book. Another challenge has been to bring together these popular and academic sources in a coherent overview of globalization and what we know about it. A related challenge is the need to write a book that is not only accessible, useful, and of interest to undergraduates (the main audience for this book), but also of use to beginning graduate students and even scholars looking for a book that gives them an overview of the field, its major topics, and key works in the area. I have tried to deal with a good portion of the increasingly voluminous scholarly work on globalization, but in a student-friendly way. I have also sought to use many examples to make the discussion both more interesting and more relevant to the student reader. I have sought to put together a coherent overview of globalization based on a theoretical orientation (increasing liquidity as the core of today's global world) and a conceptual apparatus ("flows," "barriers," etc.) developed in the first chapter. The rest of the book looks at globalization through the lens of that perspective and those concepts. Great emphasis has been placed throughout on key concepts and "thick"

Preface descriptions of important aspects of globalization. I have tried not to get bogged down in the text itself with data and statistics on globalization (which are highly fluid and often open to question), b u t I have included a number of maps designed to summarize, in a highly visual way, important aspects of the data related to globalization. The focus here, as suggested above, is on the flows among and between areas of the world (as well as barriers to t h e m ) . That means that the focus is not on the areas themselves - the global North and South, the nation-states of the world, regions, etc. - but rather that which flows among and between them. Nevertheless, all of those areas come up often in these pages, if for no other reason than that they are often the beginning or end-point of various flows. I have tried to cover many areas of the world and nation-states in these pages, but the US looms large in this discussion for several reasons. First, it is the world leader in being both the source of many global flows and the recipient these days of many more, and much heavier, flows (of oil, goods from China, etc.). Second, we are led by both its historical dominance and contemporary importance to a focus on the role of the US in globalization (although recent significant declines lead to the notion that we are now entering the "post-American" age). Third, the predispositions, and the resources at the disposal, of an American author lead to a focus on the US, albeit one that it is at many points highly critical of it and its role in globalization. Although there is a great deal of attention to the US, the reader's focus should be on the flows and barriers which are found throughout the world and are of general importance globally. Theory plays a prominent role in this analysis, not only in the framework developed in Chapter 1 and used throughout the book, but also in a number of specific chapters. These include theories of imperialism, colonialism, and development in Chapter 3, Americanization (and anti-Americanism) in Chapter 4, neo-liberalism in Chapter 5, theories of cultural differentialism, convergence, and hybridization in Chapter 9, and global inequality in Chapter 14.1 have worked hard to make these theories accessible and to relate them to more down-to-earth examples. While this is a textbook on globalization, there are some key themes that run through the book. One relates, as mentioned above, to the increasing fluidity of the contemporary global age and how much more fluid it is than previous epochs. Related to this is the similarly metaphorical idea that virtually everything in the contemporary world (things, people, ideas, etc.) is "lighter" than it has ever been. In the past, all of those things were quite "heavy" and difficult to move, especially globally, but that is increasingly less the case. Because things are lighter, more fluid, they can move about the globe more easily and much more quickly. However, it is also the case that many past structural barriers remain in place and many others are being created all the time to stem various global flows (e.g. the fence nearing completion between the US and Mexico and the one between Israel and the West Bank). Thus, one of the perspectives I would like the reader to come away with after reading this book is of the ongoing relationship between flows and barriers in the global world. Another key theme is that globalization does not equal economic globalization. All too often there is a tendency to reduce globalization to economic globalization. While economic globalization is important, perhaps even the most important aspect of globalization, there is much more to the latter than its economic aspects. While

Preface

I devote two chapters (7 & 8) to economic globalization, attention is devoted to many other aspects of globalization (e.g., political, cultural, technological, demographic, environmental, criminal, unequal, and so on) throughout the book. In their totality, these other topics receive far more attention t h a n economics (although, to be fair, all of the other topics have economic aspects, causes, and consequences). O n e of the reasons that the multi-dimensionality of globalization is accorded so much emphasis here is frustration over the near-exclusive focus on economic globalization by both scholars and laypeople. Another is my concern when I hear people say that globalization is not good for "us" and we need to stop, or at least contain, it. I always ask them which globalization they want to stop or contain. Do they want to limit or stop the flow of inexpensive imports from China and on offer at Wal-Mart? Of life-saving pharmaceuticals? Of illegal drugs? Of participation in, or the televising of, the Olympics? Of global prohibitions against the use of landmines? Of oil and water? Of online social networking? Of terrorists? Of tourism? Of pollutants? The point is that one might be opposed to some of these (and other) forms of globalization, but no one is, or could be, opposed to all the myriad forms of globalization. A n u m b e r of important concepts are introduced throughout this book. Definitions of those concepts in bold typeface are found n o t only in the text, b u t also in the glossary at the end of the book, as well as often more briefly in boxes in the margins of the text. There are a number of people to thank for their help in the years of work involved in writing this book. First, I would like to thank a n u m b e r of graduate assistants including Nathan Jurgenson, Jillet Sam, and Michelle Smirnova. Michelle was especially helpful in the early stages of the writing of this book, while Nathan and Jillet were of great help in the later stages in assisting me in the fall of 2008 in getting the manuscript to the publisher. In the very last stages in early 2009, Nathan ably handled the inclusion of the many maps and Jillet was invaluable in hunting down missing sources and information. I would also like to thank the graduate students in various seminars on globalization, especially those in the fall 2008 seminar who read a draft of this book and offered n u m e r o u s ideas on improving it. Then there are the four anonymous reviewers who offered very useful comments on this book. The people associated with Wiley-Blackwell, including Louise Spencely and especially developmental editor Claire Cameron, have been extraordinarily helpful. Finally, I would like to thank my long-time editor at Wiley-Blackwell, Justin Vaughan, who has been deeply involved in this project, as well as many others already published or in the works. I owe him much gratitude, including taking me "punting" in Oxford - a truly global and unforgettable experience.

NOTE 1

Cited in Diana B. Henriques. "Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward,

Crossing

Borders." New York

Times, December 20, 2008: A1.

Some of the Basics From Solids to Liquids (to Gases) •

Solids

•

Liquids and gases

Flows •

T y p e s of f l o w s

Does Globalization Hop Rather Than Flow? Heavy, Light, Weightless Heavy Structures That Expedite Flows Heavy Structures as Barriers to Flows Subtler Structural Barriers Structure and Process On the Increasing Ubiquity of Global Flows (and Processes) and Structures Thinking About Global Flows and Structures Chapter Summary

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

G

1

lobalization is increasingly omnipresent. We are living in a - or even the - "global age" (Albrow 1996). Globalization is clearly a very important change; it can even be argued (Bauman 2003) that it is the most important change in human history. This is reflected in many domains, but particularly in social relationships and social structures, especially those that are widely dispersed geographically. "In the era of globalization . . . shared humanity face[s] the most fateful of the many fateful steps" it has made in its long history (Bauman 2003: 156, italics added). 2

3

4

The following is the definition of globalization to be used in this book (note that all of the italicized terms will be discussed in this chapter): Globalization: Transplanetary process(es) involving increasing liquidity and growing multidirectional flows as well as the structures they encounter and create.

Transnationalism: Processes that interconnect individuals and social groups across specific geo-political borders.

globalization is a transplanetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places and information as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows.. . 5

In contrast to many other definitions of globalization, this one does not assume that greater integration is an inevitable component of globalization. That is, globalization can bring with it greater integration (especially when things flow easily), but it can also serve to reduce the level of integration (when structures are erected that successfully block flows). A term that is closely related to globalization is transnationalism (Morawska 2007), or "processes that interconnect individuals and social groups across specific geopolitical borders" (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007b: 62). A related concept is transnationality, or "the rise of new communities and formation of new social identities and relations that cannot be defined through the traditional reference point of nation-states" (William Robinson 2007: 1199-201). Globalization and transnationalism are often used interchangeably, but transnationalism is clearly a more delimited process than globalization. Transnationalism is limited to interconnections that cross geo-political borders, especially those associated with two, or more, nation-states. An example is Mexican immigrants in the US sending remittances h o m e to family members in Mexico. Globalization includes such connections, but is not restricted to them and encompasses a far wider range of transplanetary processes (e.g. direct relationships between people in many places in the world networking via the Internet). Further, geo-political borders are only one of the barriers encountered, and often overcome, by globalization. Some phenomena, labor unions for example, are better thought of as transnational than as global. That is, the relationship between labor unions in, for example, the US and Sweden is more important than are moves toward a global labor movement (see Chapter 16). Transnationalism is most often used in thinking about, and research on, immigrants who move from one country to another, but who continue to be involved in various ways with the country from which they came (Portes 2001b). 6

Transnationality: Rise of new communities and formation of new social identities and relations that cannot be defined as nation-states.

7

8

The case of baseball is useful in clarifying the distinction between globalization and transnationalism (Kelly 2007: 79-93). Baseball is a transnational sport because

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

many of its fundamentals - techniques, strategies, etc. - and players have circulated across the borders of a small n u m b e r of nations, especially Japan, Taiwan, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and, of course, the US. However, it is not global because it has not flowed on a transplanetary basis to a large portion of the world. In contrast, soccer would be m u c h m o r e clearly a global sport because it exists in virtually every area of the world. For example, over 200 of the world's nations are members of a global organization, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Another example of globalization in the realm of sports is the summer (and winter) Olympics sponsored by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in which about the same n u m b e r of nations participate (for m o r e on this see Chapter 9).

In spite of the focus in this book on globalization, there are many scholars who do not accept the idea that we live in a global age (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, this book embraces, and operates from, a "globalist" perspective (Hirst and Thompson 1999) - globalization is a reality. In fact, globalization is of such great importance that the era in which we live should be labeled the "global age." Debates about globalization are one of the reasons that there is undoubtedly no topic today more difficult to get one's head around, let alone to master, than globalization. However, of far greater importance are the sheer magnitude, diversity, and complexity of the process of globalization which involves almost everyone, everything, and every place and each in innumerable ways. (The concept of globality refers to the condition [in this case omnipresence] resulting from the process of globalization [Scholte 2004: 102-10].) For example, this book is being written by an American; my editor and copyeditor are in England; the development editor is in Canada; reviewers are from four continents; the book is printed in Singapore and distributed by the publisher throughout m u c h of the world; and you might be reading it today on a plane en route from Vladivostok to Shanghai. Further, if it follows the pattern of many of my other books, it may well be translated into Russian, Chinese, and many other languages. Amazon.com may make it one of its digital books that can be read via its wireless portable reading device, Kindle. This would make the book highly liquid since it would be possible for it to be downloaded anywhere in the world at any time. Before proceeding to the next section, a note is needed on the use of m e t a p h o r s (Brown 1989), which will occupy a prominent place in the ensuing discussion. A metaphor involves the use of one term to better help us understand another term. Thus in the next section, we will use the metaphor of a "solid" to describe epochs before the era of globalization. Similarly, the global world will be described as being "liquid." The use of such metaphors is designed to give the reader a better and a more vivid sense of the global age and how it differs from prior epochs. 9

Globality: Omnipresence of the process of globalization.

Metaphors: Use of one term to help us better understand another.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

SOLIDS

Solidity: People, things, information, and places " h a r d e n " over time and therefore have limited mobility.

Prior to the current epoch of globalization (and as we will see, to most observers there was a previous global epoch [see Chapter 2], if not many previous epochs, of globalization), it could be argued that one of the things that characterized people, things, information, places, and m u c h else was their greater solidity. That is, all of them tended to be hard or to harden (metaphorically, figuratively, not literally, of course) over time and therefore, among other things, to remain largely in place. As a result, people either did not go anywhere or they did not venture very far from where they were born and raised; their social relationships were restricted to those who were nearby. Much the same could be said of most objects (tools, food, and so on) which tended to be used where they were produced. The solidity of most material manifestations of information - stone tablets, newspapers, magazines, books, and so on - also made t h e m at least somewhat difficult to move very far. Furthermore, since people didn't move very far, neither did information. Places were not only quite solid and immoveable, but they tended to confront solid natural (mountains, rivers, oceans) and humanly constructed (walls, gates) barriers that made it difficult for people and things to exit or to enter. Above all, solidity describes a world in which barriers exist and are erected to prevent the free movement of all sorts of things. It was the nation-state that was most likely to create these "solid" barriers (for example, walls [e.g. the Great Wall of China; the wall between Israel and the West Bank], border gates and guards), and the state itself grew increasingly solid as it resisted change. For much of the twentieth century this was epitomized by the Soviet Union and its satellite states which sought to erect any n u m b e r of barriers in order to keep all sorts of things out and in (especially a disaffected population). With the passage of time, the Soviet Union grew increasingly sclerotic. The best example of this solidity was the erection (beginning in 1961), and maintenance, of the Berlin Wall in order to keep East Berliners in and Western influences out. There was a more fluid relationship between East and West Berlin prior to the erection of the wall, but that fluidity was seen in the East as being disadvantageous, even dangerous. Once the Wall was erected, relations between West and East Berlin were virtually frozen in place - they solidified - and there was comparatively little movement of anything between them. The Wall, to say nothing of East Germany and the Soviet Union, are long gone and with t h e m m a n y of the most extreme forms of solidity brought into existence by the Cold War. Nonetheless, solid structures remain - e.g., the nation-state and its border and customs controls - and there are ever-present calls for the creation of new, and new types, of solid structures. Thus, in m a n y parts of Europe there are demands for more barriers to legal and illegal immigration. This has reached an extreme in the US with concern over illegal Mexican (and other Latin American) immigration leading to the erection of an enormous fence between the two countries. Thus, solidity is far from dead in the contemporary world. It is very often the case

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

that demands for new forms of solidity are the result of increased fluidity. However, a strong case can, and will, be made that it is fluidity that is more characteristic of today's world, especially in terms of globalization. Of course, people were never so solid that they were totally immobile or stuck completely in a given place (a few people were able to escape East Berlin in spite of the Wall and many will be able to enter the US illegally even when the fence on the Mexican border is completed), and this was especially true of the elite members of any society. Elites were (and are) better able to move about and that ability increased with advances in transportation technology. Commodities, especially those created for elites, also could almost always be moved and they, too, grew more moveable as technologies advanced. Information (because it was not solid, although it could be solidified in the form of, for example, a book) could always travel more easily than goods or people (it could be spread by word of mouth over great distances even if the originator of the information could not move very far; it moved even faster as more advanced communication technologies emerged [telegraph, telephone, the Internet]). And as other technologies developed (ships, automobiles, airplanes), people, especially those with the resources, were better able to leave places and get to others. They could even literally move places (or at least parts of them) as, for example, when in the early 1800s Lord Elgin dismantled parts of the Parthenon in Greece and transported them to London, where to this day they can be found in the British Museum. 10

LIQUIDS AND GASES However, at an increasing rate over the last few centuries, and especially in the last several decades, that which once seemed so solid has tended to "melt" and become increasingly liquid. Instead of thinking of people, objects, information, and places as being like solid blocks of ice, they need to be seen as tending, in recent years, to melt and as becoming increasingly liquid. It is, needless to say, far more difficult to move blocks of ice than the water that is produced when those blocks melt. Of course, to extend the metaphor, there continue to exist blocks of ice, even glaciers (although, even these are now literally melting), in the contemporary world that have not melted, at least completely. Solid material realities (people, cargo, newspapers) continue to exist, but because of a wide range of technological developments (in transportation, communication, the Internet, and so on) they can move across the globe far more readily. Everywhere we turn, more things, including ourselves, are becoming increasingly liquefied. Furthermore, as the process continues, those liquids, as is the case in the natural world (e.g. ice to water to water vapor), tend to t u r n into gases of various types. Gases are lighter than liquids and therefore they move even more easily than as liquids. This is most easily seen literally in the case of the global flow of natural gas through lengthy pipelines. More metaphorically, much of the information now available virtually instantly around the world wafts through the air in the form of signals beamed off satellites. Such signals become news bulletins on our television screens or messages from our global positioning systems letting us know the best route to our destination.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

It should be noted, once again, that all of the terms used above - solids, liquids, gases - are metaphors - little of the global world is literally a solid, a liquid, or a gas. They are metaphors designed to communicate a sense of fundamental changes taking place as the process of globalization proceeds. Karl Marx opened the door to this kind of analysis (and to the use of such metaphors) when he famously argued that because of the nature of capitalism as an economic system "everything solid melts into air." That is, many of the solid, material realities that preceded capitalism (e.g. the structures of feudalism) were "melted" by it and were transformed into liquids. To continue the imagery farther than Marx took it, they were ultimately transformed into gases that diffused in the atmosphere. However, while Marx was describing a largely destructive process, the point here is that the new liquids and gases that are being created are inherent parts of the new world and are radically transforming it. In the process, they are having both constructive and destructive effects (Schumpeter 1976). 11

Marx's insight of over a century-and-a-half ago was not only highly prescient, but is far truer today than in Marx's day. In fact, it is far truer than he could have ever imagined. Furthermore, that melting, much like one of the great problems in the global world today - the melting of the ice on and near the North and South poles as a result of global warming (see Chapter 12) - is not only likely to continue in the coming years, but to increase at an exponential rate. Indeed, the melting of the polar icecaps can be seen as another metaphor for the increasing fluidity associated with globalization, especially its problematic aspects. And, make no mistake, the increasing fluidity associated with globalization presents both great opportunities and great dangers.

Liquidity: Increasing ease of movement of people, things, information, and places in the global age. Gaseousness: Hyper-mobility of people, things, information, and places in the global age.

Thus, the perspective on globalization presented here, following the work of Zygmunt Bauman (2000; 2003; 2005; 2006), is that it involves, above all else, increasing liquidity (Lakoff 2008: 277-300) (and gaseousness). Several of Bauman's ideas on liquidity are highly relevant to the perspective on globalization employed here. For example, liquid phenomena do not easily, or for long, hold their shape. Thus, the myriad liquid phenomena associated with globalization are hard-pressed to maintain any particular form and, even if they acquire a form, it is likely to change quite quickly. Liquid phenomena fix neither space nor time. That which is liquid is, by definition, opposed to any kind of fixity, be it spatial or temporal. This means that the spatial and temporal aspects of globalization are in continuous flux. That which is liquid is forever ready to change whatever shape (space) it might take on momentarily. Time (however short) in a liquid world is more important than space. Perhaps the best example of this is global finance where little or nothing (dollars, gold) actually changes its place (at least immediately), but time is of the essence in that the symbolic representations of money move instantaneously and great profits can be made or lost in split-second decisions on financial transactions. 12

Liquid phenomena not only move easily, but once they are on the move they are difficult to stop. This is exemplified in many areas such as foreign trade, investment, and global financial transactions (Polillo and Guillen 2005: 1764-802), the globality of transactions and interactions (e.g., on Facebook, Twitter [Clive

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

Thompson 2008: 42ff.]) on the Internet, and the difficulty in halting the global flow of drugs, pornography, the activities of organized crime, and illegal immigrants. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, that which is liquid tends to melt whatever (especially solids) stands in its path. This is clearest in the case of the much discussed death, or at least decline, of the nation-state and its borders in the era of increasing global flows (see Chapter 6). According to Cartier (2001: 269) the "forces of globalization have rendered many political boundaries more porous to flows of people, money, and things." 13

It is clear that if one wanted to use a single term to think about globalization today, liquidity would be at or near the top of the list. That is not to say that there are no solid structures in the world - after all, we still live in a m o d e r n world, even if it is late modernity, and modernity has long been associated with solidity. And it does not mean that there is not a constant interplay between liquidity and solidity with increases in that which is liquid (e.g., terrorist attacks launched against Israel from the West Bank during the Intifada) leading to counter-reactions involving the erection of new solid forms (e.g. that fence between Israel and the West Bank), but at the m o m e n t and for the foreseeable future, the m o m e n t u m lies with increasing and proliferating global liquidity.

Closely related to the idea of liquidity, and integral to it, is another key concept in thinking about globalization, the idea of flows (Appadurai 1996); after all liquids flow easily, far more easily than solids. In fact, it is the concept of flows that is widely used in the literature on globalization and it is the concept that will inform a good deal of the body of this b o o k . 14

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Because so m u c h of the world has "melted" or is in the process of "melting" and has become liquefied, globalization is increasingly characterized by great flows of increasingly liquid p h e n o m e n a of all types, including people, objects, information, decisions, places, and so o n . For example, foods of all sorts increasingly flow around the world, including sushi globalized from its roots in Japan (Bestor 2005: 13-20), Chilean produce now ubiquitous in the US market (and elsewhere) (Goldfrank 2005: 42-53), Indian food in San Francisco (and throughout m u c h of the world) (Mankekar 2005: 197-214), and so on. In many cases, the flows have become raging floods that are increasingly less likely to be impeded by, among others, place-based barriers of any kind, including the oceans, mountains, and especially the borders of nation-states. This was demonstrated once again in late 2008 in the spread of the American credit and financial crisis to Europe (and elsewhere): "In a global financial system, national borders are porous" (Landler 2008a: C I ) . 16

Looking at a very different kind of flow, m a n y people in many parts of the world believe that they are being swamped by migrants, especially poor illegal migrants (Moses 2006). Whether or not these are actually floods, they have come to be seen in that way by many people, often aided by politicians and media personalities in many countries who have established their reputations by portraying them in that

Flows: Movement of people, things, information, and places due, in part, to the increasing porosity of global barriers.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

way. The best-known examples are two opponents of illegal immigration - the French right-wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen and the American TV newscaster, Lou Dobbs. Le Pen finished second in the 2002 presidential election in France by focusing on immigration problems and Dobbs devotes a good portion of his nightly "newscasts" on CNN (as well as his books) to the dangers posed by the "flood" of illegal immigrants. Undoubtedly because of their immateriality, ideas, images, and information, both legal (blogs) and illegal (e.g. child pornography), flow (virtually) everywhere through interpersonal contact and the media, especially now via the Internet. To take a specific example within the global circulation of ideas, "confidentiality" in the treatment of AIDS patients flowed to India (and elsewhere) because of the efforts of experts and their infrastructure. The arrival of this idea in India made it possible to better manage and treat AIDS patients who were more likely to seek out treatment because of assurances of confidentiality. Confidentiality was very important in this context because of the reticence of many Indians to discuss publicly such matters as sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS (Misra 2008: 4 3 3 - 6 7 ) . 17

Decisions of all sorts flow around the world, as well as over time: "The effect of the [economic] decisions flowed, and would continue to flow, through every possible conduit. Some decisions would be reflected in products rolling off assembly lines, others in prices of securities, and still others in personal interactions. Each decision would cascade around the world and then forward through time" (Altman 2007: 255). At the moment, much of the world is in a deep recession and continues to be adversely affected by a wide array of bad economic decisions m a d e in the previous decade or more, especially in the United States. Even places can be said to be flowing around the world as, for example, immigrants re-create the places from which they came in new locales (e.g. Indian and Pakistani enclaves in London). Furthermore, places (e.g., airports, shopping malls) themselves have become increasingly like flows (for more on this and the transition from "spaces of places" to "spaces of flows" see Castells 1996). Even with all of this increasing fluidity, much of what would have been considered the height of global liquidity only a few decades, or even years, ago now seems increasingly sludge-like. This is especially the case when we focus on the impact of the computer and the Internet on the global flow of all sorts of things. Thus, not long ago we might have been amazed by our ability to order a book from Amazon.com and receive it via an express package delivery system in as little as a day. That method, however, n o w seems to operate at a snail's pace compared to the ability to download that book in minutes on Amazon's Kindle system (a wireless reading device to which books and other reading matter can be downloaded).

TYPES OF FLOWS Interconnected flows: Global flows that interconnect at various points and times.

It is worth differentiating among several different types of flows. One is interconnected flows. The fact is that global flows do not occur in isolation from one another; many different flows interconnect at various points and times. Take the example of the global sex industry (Farr 2005; 2007: 611-29). The sex industry requires the intersection of the flow of people who work in the industry (usually women) with

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

the flow of customers (e.g. sex tourists). Other flows that interconnect with the global sex industry involve money and drugs. Then there are the sexually transmitted diseases that are carried by the participants in that industry and from them branch off into many other disease flows throughout the world. A very different example of interconnected flows is in the global fish industry. That industry is now dominated by the flows of huge industrial ships and the massive amount of frozen fish that they produce and which is distributed throughout the world. In addition, these huge industrial ships are putting many small fishers out of business and some are using their boats for other kinds of flows (e.g. transporting illegal immigrants from Africa to Europe) (LaFraniere 2008: A l , A10). Overfishing by industrial ships has emptied the waters of fish and this has served to drive up their price. This has made the industry attractive to criminals and the result is an increase in the global flow of illegal fish (Rosenthal 2008b: A1-A6). Then there are multi-directional flows. Globalization is not a one-way process as concepts like Westernization and Americanization (see Chapters 3 and 4) seem to imply (Marling 2006). While all sorts of things do flow out of the West and the United States to every part of the world, many more flow into the West and the US from everywhere (e.g., Japanese automobiles, Chinese T-shirts, iPhones m a n u factured in China, Russian sex workers, and so on). Furthermore, all sorts of things flow in every conceivable direction among all other points in the world. Still another layer of complexity is added when we recognize that transplanetary processes not only can complement one another (e.g. the meeting of flows of sex tourists and sex workers), b u t often also conflict with one another (and with much else). In fact, it is usually these conflicting flows that attract the greatest attention. This is most obvious in the case of the ongoing "war" between the United States (and its allies, especially Great Britain) and al-Qaeda. On the one hand, al-Qaeda is clearly trying to maintain, or to increase, its global influence and, undoubtedly, to find other ways of engaging in a range of terrorist activities. For its part, the US is involved in a wide variety of global processes designed to counter that threat, stymie al-Qaeda's ambitions, and ultimately and ideally to contain, if not destroy, it. This involves the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the ongoing warfare there as well as the global flow of military personnel and equipment to those locales and others (e.g. Pakistan); innumerable intelligence efforts to uncover al-Qaeda plots, and counter-terrorism activities designed to find and kill its leaders (especially Osama bin-Laden), ongoing contact with intelligence agencies of other nations in order to share information on al-Qaeda intentions, and so on.

Multidirectional flows: All sorts of things flowing in every conceivable direction among many points in the world.

Conflicting flows: Transplanetary processes that conflict with one another (and with much else).

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Then there are reverse flows. In some cases, processes flowing in one direction act back on their source (and much else). This is what Ulrich Beck (1992) has called the boomerang effect. In Beck's work the boomerang effect takes the form of, for example, pollution that is "exported" to other parts of the world but then returns to affect the point of origin. So, for example, countries may insist that their factories be built with extremely high smokestacks so that the pollution reaches greater heights in the atmosphere and is thereby blown by prevailing winds into other countries and perhaps even around the globe (Ritzer 2008b: 342). While this seems to reduce pollution in the h o m e country, the boomerang effect is manifest

Reverse flows: Processes which, while flowing in one direction, act back on their source.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

when prevailing winds change direction and the pollution is blown back to its source. In addition, nations that are the recipients of another nation's air pollution may find ways of returning the favor by building their own smokestacks even higher than their neighbors.

In spite of occasional conflicts, it can be comforting to conceive of globalization in terms of flows. That is, it seems to suggest a kind of global equality with all parts of the globe being penetrated, at least theoretically, by these flows to more or less the same degree. However, as we all know, the world is characterized by great inequality (see Chapters 14 and 15). Therefore, all flows do not go everywhere in the world and, even when they do, they affect various areas to varying degrees and in very different ways. Below we will discuss various barriers that affect the kinds of flows discussed above. However, it is also possible that the idea of flows communicates the wrong, or at least a distorted, sense of globalization and that another metaphor might be more appropriate, at least for some parts of the world. This is exactly what James Ferguson suggests in his work on Africa. He argues, rather, that at least in the case of Africa (and this idea applies elsewhere, as well), globalization "hops" from place to place rather than flowing evenly through the entire continent: We have grown accustomed to a language of global "flows" in thinking about "globalization," but flow is a particularly poor metaphor for the point-to-point connectivity and networking of enclaves . . . as the contemporary African material shows so vividly, the "global" does not "flow," thereby connecting and watering contiguous spaces; it hops instead, efficiently connecting the enclaved points in the network while excluding (with equal efficiency) the spaces that lie between the points. (Ferguson 2006: 47, italics added)

The idea that globalization hops, rather than flows, at least in some parts of the world (such as Africa), implies that while some areas are strongly, often positively, affected by it, others are not. This relates to the "enclaves" discussed by Ferguson. While some areas - enclaves in Africa (and elsewhere) - are deeply implicated in global processes, those processes simply h o p over most other areas of that continent. Among those enclaves are the national parks that are such highly desirable destinations for well-heeled tourists from the North. (Note: throughout this book the terms "North" and "South" will be used to refer the two major parts of world - the highly developed North [especially the US and the EU] and the less developed South [especially Africa, South America, and some parts of Southeast Asia] ). Highly desirable locales have been partitioned off so that Northern tourists can "hop" into them, experience a highly sanitized bit of Africa, and then hop out. In doing so, the areas may be cordoned off (perhaps with barbed wire) and patrolled by the military or private guards who may operate with "shoot-to-kill" orders if any "poachers" are found in the enclaves. 19

Global Liquids, Flows, a n d Structures

The problem is that many of the so-called "poachers" are, in fact, locals who have been excluded from areas that may be, for example, their traditional hunting grounds. The more general point here is that globalization hops into these enclaves (in the form of tourists and their money) but it jumps over most other areas in Africa, including those in which the "poachers" now live. Not only are the latter not helped by global flows, but they are adversely affected by the barriers that exclude them from areas that were once part of their domain. This all points to a very different image of globalization than the one we are accustomed to: The "global" we see . . . in Africa has sharp, jagged edges; rich and dangerous traffic amid zones of generalized abjection; razor-wired enclaves next to a b a n d o n e d hinterlands. It features entire countries with estimated life expectancies in the mid-thirties and dropping; warfare seemingly without end; and the steepest economic inequalities seen in h u m a n history to date. It is a global where capital flows are at once lightning fast and patchy and incomplete; where the globally networked enclave sits right beside the ungovernable humanitarian disaster zone. It is a global not of planetary communion, but of disconnection, segmentation and segregation - n o t a seamless world without borders, b u t a patchwork of discontinuous and hierarchically ranked spaces, whose edges are carefully delimited, guarded, and enforced. (Ferguson 2006: 4 8 - 9 )

It may well be that we need to think of globalization both in terms of flows and in terms of processes that hop from place to place. As a general rule, globalization flows more easily through the developed world (although even there it flows around many areas dominated by the poor), whereas it bypasses many locales in the less developed world, or even skirts them completely. The metaphors of "flows" and "hops" obviously exist uncomfortably with one another; it is difficult to think of flows as hopping. Rather, to be consistent with the idea of flows, we need to think in terms of some of the "heavy structures" to be discussed shortly, that block those flows, especially in less developed parts of the world. That is, because of those barriers many positive flows are forced to bypass less developed areas.

There is another set of conceptual distinctions, or metaphors, that are useful in thinking about globalization. In addition to the change from solids to liquids (and then gases), we can also think in terms of change that involves movement from that which is heavy to that which is light (this is another distinction traceable to the work of Zygmunt Bauman) and most recently to that which is lighter than light, that which approaches being weightless (the gases mentioned above). The original Gutenberg bible (mid-fifteenth-century Germany) was usually published in two volumes, ran to close to 1,400 pages, and was printed on very heavy paper or vellum. It was in every sense of the term a heavy tome (almost like the one you are now reading), difficult, because of its sheer weight and bulk, to transport. Fast forward to 2006 and a much lighter b o u n d copy of the bible could easily be

i

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

purchased from Amazon.com and transported in days via express mail virtually anywhere in the world. By 2007 that bible had become weightless since it could be downloaded using the Kindle system. More generally, it could be argued that both pre-industrial and industrial societies were quite "heavy," that is, characterized by that which is difficult to move. This applies both to those who labored in them (e.g., peasants, farmers, factory workers), where they labored (plots of land, farms, factories), and what they produced (crops, machines, books, automobiles). Because of their heaviness, workers tended to stay put and what they produced (and what was not consumed locally) could be moved, especially great distances, only with great effort and at great expense. Later advances, especially in technology, made goods, people, and places "lighter," easier to move. These included advances in both transportation and technology that made all sorts of industrial products smaller, lighter, and easier to transport (compare the mini-laptop computer of today to the room-size computer of the mid-twentieth century). Karin Knorr Cetina (2005: 215) has written about what she calls "complex global microstructures," or "structures of connectivity and integration that are global in scope but microsociological in character." She has described financial markets (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002: 905-50) in these terms and, more recently, global terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. We will have more to say about these global microstructures (see Chapter 13), but the key point here is that while Knorr Cetina sees these global microstructures as having several characteristics, of primary importance is their "lightness" in comparison to "heavy" bureaucratic systems. Thus, unlike the armed forces of the United States, al-Qaeda is not a heavy bureaucratic structure, but rather a light "global microstructure." It is al-Qaeda's (as well as the Taliban's in Afghanistan) lightness that gives it many advantages over the extremely cumbersome US military, and the huge bureaucracy of which it is part, and helps account, at least so far, for the latter's inability to suppress al-Qaeda or to catch Osama bin-Laden. It could be argued that we moved from the heavy to the light era in the past century or two. However, by about 1980, we can be said to have moved beyond both of those epochs. We are now in an era that is increasingly defined not just by lightness, but by something approaching weightlessness. That which is weightless, or nearly so, clearly moves far more easily (even globally) than that which is either heavy or light. The big changes here involved the arrival and expansion of cable and satellite television, satellite radio, cell phones, PDAs, and, most importantly, the personal computer and the advent of the Internet (and networking sites such as Twitter). It is with the personal computer and the Internet that globalization reaches new heights in terms of the flow of things and of social relationships in large part because they, and everything else, have approached weightlessness. An excellent example of this can be found in the world of music. Vinyl records were quite heavy and the shift to cassettes and later CDs did not make music much lighter. However, the creation of advanced technologies such as iPods and cell phones allows us to carry around thousands of once very heavy albums in our pockets. We can carry that music with us anywhere in the world and we can exchange music over the Internet with people around the globe.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

To take another example, in the past, if I needed to consult with a medical specialist in Switzerland, I would have had to fly there and take my x-rays and MRI images with me, or else had them snail-mailed. Now, both can be digitized and sent via the Internet; x-ray and MRI results have become weightless. My Swiss physician can view them on her computer screen. I don't even need to go to Switzerland at all (in a sense I have become weightless, as well). I (or my local physician) can confer with my Swiss physician by phone, e-mail, or a video hook-up (e.g. Skype) via the Internet. It is information, rather than things, that is increasingly important in the contemporary world. Information, especially when it is translated into digital, computerized codes (that's what happens to my x-rays and MRI images), is weightless and can be sent around the globe instantly. Of course, there are still many heavy things in our increasingly weightless world. Factories, offices, buildings, large and cumbersome machines (including MRI machines), newspapers, hardback books, and even some people (made "heavy" by, for example, minority status, poverty, a lack of education) continue to exist. All, of course, are nevertheless being globalized to some degree in one way or another, but their weightiness makes that process more cumbersome and difficult for them. For example, the global parcel delivery systems (e.g. FedEx) have become very efficient, but they still need to transport a physical product over great distances. Clearly, that process is still quite weighty, in comparison to, say, the downloading of weightless movies from Netflix (a website that began by allowing members to receive heavier DVDs via snail-mail). In fact, of course, it is increasingly the case that that which is weightless (e.g. iTunes and downloadable music in general, downloadable movies, blogs) is destroying that which is comparatively heavy (e.g. the CD, the DVD, newspapers). The ideas of increasing liquidity and weightlessness being employed here do not require that the world be "flat" or be considered as such (see Chapter 8) (Friedman 2005). Fluids can seep through all sorts of tall and wide structures and, in the case of a flood, those structures can even be washed away (as was the Berlin Wall, for example, and more metaphorically, the Iron Curtain), at least temporarily. Further, that which is weightless can waft over and between the tallest and widest structures. Thus, the world today is increasingly characterized by liquidity and weightlessness, but it is not necessarily any natter than it ever was. Those tall, wide structures continue to be important, especially in impeding (or attempting to), the movement of that which is solid and heavy. It is less clear how successful these structures will be in impeding that which is liquid, light, or weightless. 20

The most obvious of such structures are the borders (Crack 2007: 341-54; Rumford 2007a: 327-39) between nation-states and the fact that in recent years we have witnessed the strengthening (heightening, lengthening, etc.) of many of those borders. Similarly, the Chinese government has sought to restrict the access of its citizens to at least some aspects of the Internet that the government feels is dangerous to its continued rule. The electronic barrier that the government has constructed is known as the "Great Firewall" (French 2008: A l , A6). (A firewall is a barrier on the Internet; the idea of the "Great Firewall" plays off China's Great Wall.) The huge "digital divide" in the world today (Drori and Jang 2003: 144-61), especially between North and South, is another example of a barrier. The relative

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

absence in the South of computers and the supporting infrastructure (telephone and broadband connections) needed for a computerized world creates an enormous barrier between the North and the South. In terms of computerization, the world may be increasingly flat (although certainly not totally flat) among and between the countries in the North, but it has many hills in the South and huge and seemingly insurmountable mountain ranges continue to separate the North from the South.

Economic globalization: Growing economic inkages at the global level.

The history of the social world and social thought and research leads us to the conclusion that people, as well as their representatives in the areas in which they live, have always sought to erect structural barriers to protect and advance themselves, and to adversely affect others, and it seems highly likely that they will continue to do so. Thus, we may live in a more liquefied, more weightless, world, but we do not live in a flat world and are not likely to live in one any time soon, if ever. Even a successful capitalist, George Soros, acknowledges this, using yet another metaphor, in his analysis of economic globalization when he argues: "The global capitalist system has produced a very uneven playing field" (Soros 2000: xix, italics added).

The liquefaction of the social world, as well as its increasing weightlessness, is only part of the story of globalization. As pointed out already, another major part is the fact that many heavy, material, objective structures continue to exist and to be created in the globalized world. Some are holdovers from the pre-global world, but others are actually produced, intentionally or unintentionally, by global forces. In studying globalization we must look at both all of that which flows (or "wafts") with increasing ease, as well as all of the structures that impede or block those flows (see below for more on these), as well as that serve to expedite and channel those flows. To put it another way, we must look at both that which is light and weightless as well as that which is solid and heavy and that greatly affects their flow in both a positive and a negative sense. This is in line with the view of Inda and Rosaldo (2008b: 29): 21

22

we will examine the materiality of the global. This refers to the material practices infrastructure, institutions, regulatory mechanisms, governmental strategies, and so forth - that both produce and preclude movement. The objective here is to suggest that global flows are patently structured and regulated, such that while certain objects and subjects are permitted to travel, others are not. Immobility and exclusion are thus as much a part of globalization as movement. For example, there are various "routes" or "paths" that can be seen as structures that serve to both expedite flows along their length (see Figure 1.1 for major global transportation routes), as well as to limit flows that occur outside their confines. •

23

Intercontinental airlines generally fly a limited n u m b e r of well-defined routes (say between New Delhi and London) rather than flying whatever route the pilots wish and thereby greatly increasing the possibility of mid-air collisions (see Figure 1.2 for some of the major global airline routes).

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

Figure 1.1

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n r o u t e s . N e a r l y all o f t h e w o r l d ' s f r e i g h t h e a d e d f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l

destinations is transported via ships in standardized containers. These sealed metal containers have dramatically altered the f a c e of international f r e i g h t transport. T h e y are d e s i g n e d to be easily transferred from one m o d e of transport to another, for instance, from a ship to a train, thereby increasing efficiency a n d reducing cost. As w i t h passenger airline traffic, maritime f r e i g h t traffic is c o n c e n t r a t e d . T h e l a r g e s t t e n p o r t s , led b y S i n g a p o r e , R o t t e r d a m , S h a n g h a i , H o n g K o n g , a n d S o u t h L o u i s i a n a , h a n d l e m o r e t h a n 5 0 % o f g l o b a l f r e i g h t traffic. B y permission o f National G e o g r a p h i c S o c i e t y , College Atlas of the World ( 2 0 0 7 ) H. J. de Blij a n d R o g e r M. D o w n s . T h e W o r l d , p. 5 9 .

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

F i g u r e 1.2 A i r l i n e p a s s e n g e r v o l u m e . A i r t r a v e l , t h e d o m i n a n t m o d e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p a s s e n g e r transportation, w a s once limited to the wealthy a n d those traveling for business. W i t h increased c o m p e t i t i o n , l o w e r f a r e s , a n d a g r o w i n g g l o b a l e c o n o m y , air t r a v e l h a s b o o m e d o v e r t h e last 30 years. It is expected to steadily increase over t h e next five years, particularly in C h i n a a n d other parts o f A s i a , d e s p i t e e c o n o m i c i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e a i r l i n e i n d u s t r y a n d c o n c e r n s o v e r t e r r o r i s m . Air traffic is concentrated in t h e Northern Hemisphere b e t w e e n E u r o p e a n d North A m e r i c a , w i t h i n c r e a s i n g v o l u m e t o E a s t A s i a . N e a r l y 6 0 0 m i l l i o n p a s s e n g e r s pass t h r o u g h t h e d o o r s o f t h e w o r l d ' s t e n b u s i e s t a i r p o r t s , led b y A t l a n t a , C h i c a g o , L o n d o n , T o k y o , a n d L o s A n g e l e s . B y p e r m i s s i o n o f N a t i o n a l G e o g r a p h i c S o c i e t y , College Atlas of the World (2007) H. J. de Blij a n d R o g e r M. D o w n s . T h e W o r l d , p. 58.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

•

•

•

Illegal immigrants from Mexico have, at least until recently, generally followed a relatively small n u m b e r of well-worn paths into the US. Indeed, they often need to pay smugglers large sums of m o n e y and the smugglers generally follow the routes that have worked for them (and others) in the past. Goods of all sorts are generally involved in rather well-defined "supply chains" (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of this concept) as they are exported from some countries and imported into others. Illegal products - e.g. counterfeit drugs - follow oft-trod paths en route from their point of manufacture (often China), through loosely controlled free-trade zones (e.g. in Dubai), through several intermediate countries, to their ultimate destination, often the US, where they are frequently obtained over the Internet (Bogdanich 2007: A l , A6).]

Then there are an increasing number of formal and informal "bridges" (Anner and Evans 2004: 34-47) which have been created throughout the globe that expedite the flow of all sorts of things. This idea applies perhaps best to the passage of people across borders legally through the process of migration (Sassen 2007b: 788-95). It is clear that in the not-too-distant past there were many structural barriers to the flow of people. There are even a few places in the world today where this remains true - e.g. between the US and Cuba. However, with the end of the Cold War, there are now many bridges for people (and products) to cross openly not only between the countries of the old East and West, but also among and between virtually every country and region of the world. However, illegal migrants are likely to need to be more covert in their movements. All sorts of illegal products are also less likely to move openly across such "bridges" where they would be highly visible to the authorities. Thus, there are also more hidden structures that permit movement of illegal people and products. It is also the case that an increasing n u m b e r of people, perhaps nearly everyone, is involved in, and affected by, global relations and flows and personally participate in global networks (Singh Grewal 2008) of one kind or another (networks of communication and information technology, interpersonal networks involving individuals and groups). While global networks span the globe (e.g. cables under the oceans that permit transoceanic communication [Yuan 2006: A l ] ) , or at least m u c h of it, there are other types of networks including transnational (those that pass through the boundaries of nation-states [Portes 2001b: 181-93]), international (those that involve two or more nation-states), national (those that are bounded by the nation-state), and local (those that exist at the sub-national level) (Mann 2007: 472-96). Networks can expedite the flow of innumerable things, but they are perhaps best-suited to the flow of information (Connell a n d Crawford 2005: 5-26). People involved in networks can communicate all sorts of information to one another in various ways - telephone calls, snail mail, e-mail, blogs, social networking web sites, and so on. These networks have revolutionized and greatly expanded the global flow of information. As with all other structures, such networks can be blocked in various ways (e.g., the "Great Firewall"). 24

All sorts of networks have been made possible by the Internet. The Internet can be seen as being of enormous importance in allowing information of various sorts

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

to flow in innumerable directions. One important example involves the formation of the networks that became and constitute the alter-globalization movement (see Chapter 16). It (as well as its various political actions, most notably the antiW T O [World Trade Organization] protests in Seattle in 1999 [Smith 2001: 1-20]), like much else in the world today (e.g. Barack Obama's successful 2008 presidential campaign), was made possible by the Internet: By significantly enhancing the speed, flexibility, and global reach of information flows, allowing for communication at a distance in real time, digital networks provide the technological infrastructure for the emergence of contemporary network-based social forms . . . allowing communities to sustain interactions across vast d i s t a n c e s . . . . Using the Internet as technological architecture, such m o v e m e n t s operate at local, regional, and global l e v e l s . . . . (Juris 2008: 3 5 3 - 4 )

Finally, it is not only individuals who are increasingly involved in networks. An increasing number of social structures (e.g. states, cities, law) and social institutions (the family, religion, sport) are interconnected on a global basis and these, too, enable and enhance global flows. For example, the international banking system has an infrastructure that facilitates the global movement of funds among a network of banks. Included in that infrastructure are IBANs ([International Bank Account Numbers]), rules, norms, and procedures on how such money transfers are to occur, and a highly sophisticated technical language that allows those in the business to communicate with one another wherever they are in the world. Another example involves global (Sassen 1991) and world cities (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000) (see Chapter 14) that are increasingly interconnected with one another directly rather than through the nation-states in which they happen to exist. The financial markets of the world cities of New York, London, and Tokyo are tightly linked with the result that all sorts of financial products flow among t h e m and at lightning speed. More generally, in this context, we can talk in terms of the "global economy's connectedness" (Altaian 2007: 255). To take another example, there are (or were) seven local, interconnected AIDS INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) and they played a key role in, among other things, improving the treatment of the disease in India (Misra 2008: 433-67). The Indian N G O (Non-Governmental Organization), like others, is, in turn, "operated in a globally and nationally situated web of governmental and extra governmental agencies" (Misra 2008: 441). Once again, however, barriers are erected to limit such interconnections (e.g. the unwillingness of at least some countries to acknowledge AIDS, or at least the full extent of the disease and of its consequences). 25

While there is no question that the world is increasingly characterized by greater liquidity, increased flows, as well as various structures that expedite those flows, we also need to recognize that there are limits and barriers to those flows. The world

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

is not just in process, there are also many material structures (trade agreements, regulatory agencies, borders, customs barriers, standards, and so on) in existence. As Inda and Rosaldo (2008b: 31) argue: "Material infrastructures do not only promote m o b i l i t y . . . . They also hinder and block it." Any thoroughgoing account of globalization needs to look at both flows and structures and, in terms of the latter, the ways in which they both produce and enhance flows as well as alter and even block them. In other words, there is interplay between flows and structures, especially between flows and the structures that are created in an attempt to inhibit or to stop t h e m . As Shamir (2005: 197-217) puts it, globalization is an epoch of increased openness and "simultaneously an era of growing restrictions on movement." Borders, of course, are major points at which movement is blocked. There are many examples of this including the toughening of border controls in France (and elsewhere in Europe) because of growing hostility to refugees (Fassin 2008: 212-34). 26

There are challenges to the idea that all there is to globalization is flows and fluidity (Tsing 2000: 327-60). In examining global flows (some of which have been anticipated above), we also need to consider those agents who "carve" the channels through which things flow, those w h o alter those channels over time, national and regional units that create and battle over flows, and coalitions of claimants for control over channels. A focus on the above kinds of agents and structures, rather than flows, promises a more critical orientation to globalization in terms of the structures themselves, as well as in terms of who creates the structures through which things flow as well as who does and does not control and profit from them. The idea of flows is criticized for other reasons, as well. For example, there is a kind of timelessness to the idea of flows and, as a result, it implies that they are likely to continue well into future and there is little or nothing that could be done to stop them. This implies that everyone - scientists and businesspeople who profit from flows, as well as those at the margins of those flows and perhaps even those hurt by them - are all swept up in the same processes. The focus on flows tends to communicate a kind of enthusiasm for them and the erroneous idea that virtually everyone benefits from flows of all types. 27

28

Also important in this context is what has been called "awkward connections" (Inda and Rosaldo 2008b: 31). While the idea of global flows and fluids c o m m u n icates a sense of total and uniform connectedness, we know that this is simply not the case and that in many places in the world, especially those that are less developed, there are awkward connections (e.g. being restricted to slow and unreliable dial-up connections on the Internet), as well as no connections at all (no Internet service of any kind). To take another example, while the investment banks of Wall Street (at least those that continue to exist in the wake of the "Great Recession" ) purport to be global, in fact they focus on the main markets (New York, London, and Tokyo) and have little more than token presences in many other places in the world (Ho 2008: 137-64). While the global world is increasingly interconnected, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there remain, and are likely to remain, m a n y points of weak, awkward, or even absent interconnectedness. 29

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

A similar idea is "frictions," or the "awkward, unequal, unstable . . . interconnection across difference" (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 4). The main idea is that the global flows that create interconnections do not move about smoothly; they do not move about without creating friction. Friction gets in the way of the smooth operation of global flows. However, friction not only slows flows down, it can also serve to keep them moving and even speed them up. Highways can have this double-edged quality by both limiting where people and vehicles can go while at the same time making movement "easier and more efficient" (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 6). More generally, "global connections [are] made, and muddied, in friction" (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 272). The key point in this context is that flows themselves produce friction that can slow or even stop global flows: "without even trying friction gets in the way of the smooth operation of global power. Difference can disrupt, causing everyday malfunctions as well as unexpected cataclysms. Friction refuses the lie that global power operates as a well-oiled machine. Furthermore, difference sometimes inspires insurrection. Friction can be the fly in the elephant's nose" (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 6). A prime example of this today is the many frictions being produced in many parts of the world by large numbers of legal and illegal immigrants (e.g. the millions of migrants from Zimbabwe who have fled to South Africa eliciting violent reactions from South Africans who feel threatened by, and resent, them) (Economist 2008: May 22). 30

As has already been mentioned, the most important and most obvious barriers to global flows are those constructed by nation-states. There are borders, gates, guards, passport controls, customs agents, health inspectors, and so on, in most countries in the world. (The great exception is the countries that are part of the European Union [EU] where barriers to movement among and between member countries have been greatly reduced, if not eliminated. The EU is a kind of structure that allows people and products to move much more freely and m u c h more quickly. At the same time, it serves to reduce the need to use hidden channels since there is far less need to conceal what is moving among and between EU countries.) Although many people (illegal immigrants) and things (contraband goods) do get through those barriers, some of them are successfully blocked or impeded by the barriers. However, it is far more difficult to erect barriers against many newer phenomena, especially the non-material phenomena associated with cell phones and the Internet. Specific examples of barriers created by the nation-state involve blocking economic transactions that it regards as not in the national interest. For example, in 2006 the US government blocked a deal in which a Dubai company was to purchase an American company involved in the business of running America's ports (Economist 2006: March 10). The government felt that such ownership would be a threat to national security since foreign nationals, perhaps enemies, could acquire information that would allow terrorists easy entrée to the ports. In another example, in early 2008 the US government blocked an effort by a Chinese company to purchase (in conjunction with an American private equity firm) an American company (3Com) that, among other things, manufactured software that prevents hacking into military computers (Weisman 2008: C 1 - C 4 ) . However, many of the barriers created by nation-states that we assume are, or can be, successful do not in fact deal with the flows they are supposed to stem. It

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

remains to be seen whether the new fence between Mexico and the US can reduce the flow of illegal immigrants to the US. Similarly, it is not clear that the wall between Israel and the West Bank will stop the flow of terrorists into Israel if (when?) hostilities in the Middle East flare up yet again. More generally, in a study of the confluence of legal and illegal global imports, Nordstrom found that the global flow of illegal goods is almost impossible to stop. For one thing, the illegal is often shipped with, or even part of, the legal so that stopping one means stopping the other. For another, the global economy would grind to a halt if there really were serious efforts to, for example, search all cargo entering every country in the world. Even holding "up one line of trucks, one train, one ship" ripples through the global supply chain (Nordstrom 2007: 196). Nordstrom estimates the "most sophisticated ports in the world can inspect a maximum of only 5 percent of the cargo passing through customs," but even inspecting that m u c h cargo would tax any port and its authorities beyond the limit of its capacities. Global economic gridlock would occur if 5 percent of cargo was really inspected; a total global economic meltdown would occur if all cargo was inspected. Furthermore, the nature of m o d e r n shipping, especially containerization, makes inspection much more difficult. It is impossible to really know what is in every container and it is possible to inspect only a token n u m b e r of them. Many containers are intentionally or unintentionally mislabeled. Illegal contraband often travels with, and is difficult to separate from, that which is legal. Furthermore, what is legal and what is illegal is not always clear cut. For example, pharmaceuticals are shipped around the world, but which shipments are legal and which are not (i.e., may be counterfeit) may not be clear. In addition, there is no way of controlling ships when they leave harbor. W h e n they are out to sea they can easily and surreptitiously meet up with other ships and offload illegal goods. Nordstrom found that not only do illegal products flow freely across borders, but so do people. She traveled by freighter to and from the US and found that "security does not exist, in fact it cannot exist, in the world today" (Nordstrom 2007: 181). She boarded the freighter and left the US without anyone checking her or stamping her passport and her arrival in Europe was no different: "When I went ashore, I couldn't even find a person to tell me how to get out of port and into town. No customs, no immigration, no one to even ignore me" (2007: 187). On both sides of the Atlantic she moved freely among the containers, some of them open, stored onshore. There are many different kinds of organizations that, while they may expedite flows for some, create all sorts of barriers for others. Nation-states are, in fact, one such organization and they (generally) work to the advantage of their own citizens (and their flows as well as the flows of things important to them) in many different ways while creating many roadblocks for those from other countries. For example, nation-states create protectionist (Reuveny and T h o m p s o n 2001: 229-49) tariff systems that help their own farms, corporations, and so on to succeed by making the products of their foreign competitors more expensive. That is, the tariffs help the flow of products from a nation-state's own farms and manufacturers while inhibiting the flow into the country from its foreign competition. Another example

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

is found in the two-tier system of passport control at international airports where natives usually pass through quickly and easily while foreigners often wait on long lines. Part of the reason for this difference is that there are generally fewer officials, at least proportionally, for visitors than natives and visitors are often asked far more questions before they are allowed to enter. Corporate organizations, say a multinational corporation like Toyota, are devoted to optimizing the flow of their automobiles to all possible markets throughout the world. They also seek to compete with and out-perform other multi-national corporations in the automobile business. If they are successful, and Toyota has been extremely successful (it has supplanted General Motors as the world's largest automobile manufacturer), the flow of automobiles from those corporations is greatly reduced, further advantaging Toyota. Labor unions are also organizations devoted to the flow of some things while working against the flow of others (Bronfenbrenner 2007). Unions often oppose, for example, the flow of illegal immigrants because they are likely to work for lower pay and fewer (if any) benefits (e.g. health insurance) than indigenous, unionized workers. Similarly, they oppose the flow of goods produced in n o n - u n i o n shops in other countries (and their own) since the success of the latter would adversely affect the shops that are unionized and that, in turn, would hurt the union and its members. While organizations of many types, including nation-states, corporations, and labor unions, serve as structures that can operate against global flows, the fact is that there are signs that many organizations are changing and are themselves becoming more fluid and increasingly open. One of the roots of this change is open-sourcing and the Internet. The best-known example of open-sourcing is Linux, a free computer-operating system. Anyone in the world with the needed skills can make changes in, and contributions to, it. (The best-known operating systems are produced by Microsoft [Windows and now Vista]. They cost a great deal and are closed in that only those w h o work for the company can, at least legally, work on and modify them.) In recent years a traditional closed organization - IBM - has embraced not only the Linux system, but opened up more and more of its own operations to outside inputs. The Internet has a n u m b e r of open systems associated with what is known as Web 2.0 (Beer and Burrows 2007). O n e example is the free online dictionary Wikipedia (or wikis more generally ) where again (virtually) anyone, anywhere in the world, can contribute to the definition of terms on it. The contrast here is the traditional (and costly) dictionaries (e.g. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary) and encyclopedias written by selected experts (Encyclopedia Britannica) and closed to contributions from anyone else. 31

However, in spite of this new openness, most organizations and systems remain closed to various flows. This usually benefits (often economically) those in the system and disadvantages those outside the organization. Even with the new open systems, there are structural realities that help some and hinder others. For example, to contribute to Linux or Wikipedia one must have a computer, computer expertise, and access to the Internet (especially high-speed access). Clearly, those without economic advantages - in the lower classes in developed countries or who live in the less developed countries of the South (i.e., those on the other side of the "digital divide")

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

- do not have any, many, or all, of those things. As a result, they are unable to contribute to them or to gain from them to the same degree as those in more privileged positions or areas.

SUBTLER STRUCTURAL BARRIERS This brings us to a series of other structural barriers that also serve to contradict the idea of total global fluidity. These structures are less blatant, more subtle, than the kinds of structures discussed above, but in many ways more powerful and more important from a social point of view. Included here are a variety of structures that serve to differentiate and to subordinate on the basis of social class, race, ethnicity, gender (see Chapters 14 and 15), and region of the world (North-South). In fact, these phenomena tend to be interrelated. Thus in the disadvantaged South, one is more likely to find large numbers of poor people in the lower social classes, disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities, and women who are discriminated against on the basis of gender (Moghadam 2007: 135-51). As a result, various efforts by the North to subordinate the South serve to further disadvantage people there in all of those categories. Furthermore, these categories overlap - a black female who is a member of the Ibo tribe in Africa is likely to be in a lower social class. (And there is a similar overlap among those who are advantaged - for example, white, upper-class, male Anglo-Saxons in Europe and North America.) Thus, the combination of these disadvantaged statuses ("intersectionality" [Hill Collins 2000]) has a disastrous effect on those with these disesteemed characteristics. Those who occupy superordinate positions in these hierarchies tend to erect structures that halt or slow various flows. These restrictions are designed to work to their advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Good examples involve the operations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank (see Chapter 7), which, for example, can serve to restrict flows of badly needed funds into Southern nations unless, for example, those nations engage in restructuring and austerity programs that are designed to slow down their economies (at least in the short run). Such austerity and restructuring programs often involve insistence that welfare programs be cut back or eliminated and the result is that the most disadvantaged members of Southern countries - racial and ethnic minorities, women, those in the lower classes - are hurt the most by these programs. Those in superordinate positions also encourage certain kinds of flows that work to their advantage (and to the disadvantage of subordinates). For example, the so-called "brain drain" (Landler 2007a: A10) (see Chapter 11) is a global phenomenon and it most often takes the form of highly trained people leaving the South and moving to the North. Those in the North actively seek out skilled people in the South and expedite their movement to the North. At the other end of the spectrum, also encouraged, although less these days, is the movement of unskilled workers to the North to occupy poorly paid menial positions such as farm, or household, worker. It is also the case that the prototypical Northern male upper-class white AngloSaxon Protestant has, in the contemporary world, acquired a great deal of fluidity

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

and "lightness" in the form of mobility, and thus is able to move about the globe quite readily and easily. In contrast, the Southern female, lower-class, black, Ibo is far less fluid, much "heavier," and therefore has far less capacity to move about the globe.

Tourists: People who move about the world because they want to; because they are "light."

Vagabonds: Those likely to move because they are forced to.

Zygmunt Bauman (1998: esp. Ch. 4) has illuminated this difference with his conceptual distinction between tourists and vagabonds (for an application of these ideas, see Chapter 11). The Northern prototype would be tourists who move about the world because they want to (and because they are "light"), whereas the Southern prototype would be ("heavy") vagabonds who, if they are able to move at all, are likely to do so because they are compelled to move (e.g. forced to migrate to escape poverty [and to find work], by war, because of discrimination, and the like). Moving about the world voluntarily as a tourist is a m u c h m o r e pleasant and rewarding experience than being forced to move about as a vagabond. Further complicating matters for vagabonds is the fact that they are often forced to move many different times. For example, illegal Mexican immigrants in the US (estimated at 11 million people) are often forced to change jobs and homes frequently, and may also be forced to return to Mexico, perhaps several times (Archibold 2008: A12). Tourists, on the other hand, are forced to do little if anything - they go just about where they want, when they please, and they stay pretty m u c h as long as their visas (and pocketbooks) permit. The vagabonds tend to be those who have one or more (and often all) of the disesteemed statuses mentioned above - they are m o r e likely to be poor, black, a member of a maligned ethnic group, female, and from the South. The tourists, on the other hand, tend to be well-to-do, white, members of a high-status ethnic group, males, and from the North. Of course, there are many exceptions to this - there are tourists from the South and vagabonds from the North - but the general point about the relationship between esteemed/disesteemed characteristics and tourists/vagabonds holds up quite well. While the advantages of those in the North over those in the South remain, the South has been increasingly successful, at least in some instances, at gaining advantages by better controlling flows into and out of that part of the world. For example, Middle Eastern oil used to be largely controlled by Northern corporations (e.g. Shell) which kept the price low and made sure that the more developed North was adequately supplied with comparatively inexpensive oil. This adversely affected oil-producing countries which did not get the price they deserved and furthermore a large proportion of the profits went to the Northern corporations and not the Middle Eastern countries from which the oil came. Now, of course, those countries (through OPEC, see Chapter 7) control the flow of oil and are profiting enormously from it.

Structures: Encompassing sets of processes that may either impede or block flows or serve to expedite and channel them.

In the end, then, globalization involves flows - of liquids, gases and so on - and a wide range of structures that not only expedite, but also impede, and even halt, those flows.

Thus far we have conceptualized globalization using a n u m b e r of very recent ideas - solids-liquids-flows, heavy-light-weightless. However, it is also the case that many

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of these newer ideas are closely related to classic ideas and, in fact, those classic ideas are also useful in illuminating globalization. One of the oldest pairs of ideas in the social sciences, and one that continues to inform them, is structure and process. (It is important to note that these structures and processes can take various forms - e.g. economic, political, religious, cultural, and so on.) These ideas were explicit in the work of some early social theorists (especially Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer), were important to other social thinkers over the years (e.g. Talcott Parsons, Norbert Elias), and continue to be of importance (Ritzer 2008b). There was long a tendency among sociologists to focus on structure rather than process. However, a focus on static structures began to lose favor in mid-twentiethcentury social theory. One response was the development of theories that focused on process instead of structure. The best-known example of this is the "process sociology" of Norbert Elias (1939/1994). Other theories arose in the 1980s that sought to deal more adequately with both structure and change, most notably structuration theory associated with Anthony Giddens (1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977). 32

The ideas of structure and process relate well to globalization, as well as to the variety of more contemporary ideas discussed above. However, following Elias, in thinking about globalization, it is important that we privilege process over structure (just as we have privileged flows over barriers). Globalization is, above all else, a process, or better a very large number of interrelated processes. Thinking about globalization in terms of processes (the fluids, gases, flows, etc. discussed above) gives it the kind of dynamism that we all know it has and that offers profound insights into it and the ways in which it works. Yet, we must not ignore the role of structures (e.g. nation-states, multi-national corporations) in globalization. First, it is often structures that generate globalization processes. Second, structures often emerge out of the process of globalization (e.g. the networks discussed above). Third, as the process of globalization proceeds, structures are often created or emerge to expedite globalization. And finally there are those structures that are created to slow, divert, or even stop the process of globalization. On the one hand, then, globalization is perhaps best defined by a variety of social processes, some of them new and some of t h e m in existence for quite some time, albeit changed and perhaps accelerated in the contemporary era of globalization. These social processes (which can take a wide variety of forms - economic, political, cultural, religious, etc.) will occupy center stage throughout the following discussion of globalization. However, it is also possible to identify and focus on important new structures (these, like social processes, can take a wide range of forms) that are an integral part of globalization. 33

Globalization (especially global flows and structures) is increasingly ubiquitous (Boli and Petrova 2007: 103-24). Indeed, our everyday lives have been profoundly affected by this process.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

Global flows and structures have become an inescapable part of our everyday experience. They are not just flows and structures that are "out there" affecting the world as a whole. It is not just the largest social structures and processes that are affected, but also the most personal and intimate parts of our everyday lives, even our consciousness (Robertson 1992). Furthermore, these flows and structures are not seen by most as being imposed on them against their wills, but rather they are seen as legitimate by most and are even sought out by them. As a result, they are more welcomed than they are seen and treated as unwelcome impositions. Of course, the disadvantaged in the world are the ones who are not likely to welcome global flows and structures. It is the case that one hears increasingly loud voices raised in the North, and especially in the South, against global flows and structures and the problems caused by them. This is true of the poor in the North (and their representatives) and especially of those who live in the global South (the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, is an especially vocal spokesperson for their perspective and grievances). Nevertheless, even the protests and opposition in the North and South add to the sense of the ubiquity of global flows and structures and their impact on daily life. Global flows and structures are increasingly taken-for-granted aspects of the social world. That is, they no longer seem to most to be exotic phenomena or even open to question, doubt, or debate. This is quite remarkable since the ideas of global flows and structures, as well as globalization in general, have only been in general usage since about 1990. Global flows and structures no longer affect mainly societal elites; they have descended to the lowest reaches of society. That is not to say that the latter have benefited equally, or even at all, from the global flows and structures; they may even have been adversely affected by them, but they have been affected by them. The above is, in effect, a more micro-perspective on global flows and structures. However, we must not forget the more macro-level aspects of the ubiquity of globalization. There is, for example, the globalization of social entities, or social structures, especially cultural and organizational forms including the state and the multinational corporation. Then there is the globalization of civil society (see Chapter 6), and of those social institutions (e.g. Intergovernmental Organizations [IGOs] and International Non-Governmental Organizations [INGOs]) that occupy a position between the state and the market and people in society. Finally, there is the globalization of the transcendental, including the planet (in terms of climate, hydrosphere, species migration, and diseases without borders), cosmologies (theories of everything), and religion (e.g. ecumenism, including the World Council of Churches).

Several concepts are useful for thinking about globalization in general, especially the global flows and processes of focal concern here (Held et al. 1999). 1. How extensive are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections? Obviously, such phenomena have existed for centuries, if not millennia, but what

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

is unique today is how much more extensive they have become. They now cover a much greater portion of the globe, involve many more global processes, and will likely grow even more extensive in the future. 2. How intensive are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? While these phenomena may, in the past, have lacked much intensity and, as a result, been more epiphenomenal, they are now much more central and important. This is due, at least in part, to the increasingly frenzied activity associated with these processes, as well as to the similarly intense attention to, and concern about, them. For example, many people today are virtually addicted to such things as e-mail to friends throughout the world and to social networking web sites that include participants from around the globe. 3. What is the velocity of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? It is not just their extensity and the intensity that matters, but also the speed at which they move. It is clear that globalization brings with it, and is characterized by, increasingly rapid movement of virtually everything. Velocity is closely related to many of the concepts discussed above (and thereby closely related to globalization) including liquidity, gaseousness, lightness, and weightlessness. Increases in any and all of these characteristics tend to lead to movement around the globe at greater and greater speed. 4. What is the impact propensity of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? Again, while these processes may have had little likelihood of having a deep and widespread impact in the past, the increasing propensity to have such effects is characteristic of globalization. Think, for example, of the huge global impact of September 11th because of the fact that it was known about, and even viewed, simultaneously throughout m u c h of the world. This same set of ideas can - and should - also be used to think about the various structures that have emerged to both expedite and impede globalization: 1. How extensive are the structures that expedite and impede globalization? It is clear that the structures designed to expedite globalization (for example, exportprocessing zones, see Chapter 5) are far more extensive than they once were and it is likely that they will grow even more extensive in the future. Structures designed to impede globalization (e.g. tariffs, customs restrictions, border controls, etc.) are undergoing something of a renaissance today, especially in light of the Great Recession. 2. H o w intensive are the efforts to construct or destroy, expand, or contract structures that expedite and impede globalization? At the moment, for example, efforts to further lower tariff barriers globally seem to have lost intensity, whereas efforts to create new barriers (e.g. that fence between the US and Mexico) seem to be at a fever pitch. 3. What is the velocity of the efforts to construct structures that expedite and impede globalization? The construction of the US-Mexico fence, for example, is moving

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

along at a rapid pace and it is likely to be completed before the end of 2009 (Blumenthal 2000: 12). 4. What is the impact propensity of the efforts to construct structures that expedite and impede globalization? Specifically, what is the impact of such structures on global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? In terms of that fence between the US and Mexico it is clearly hoped, at least by the American government, that illegal immigration from and through Mexico will be greatly reduced. However, some in the US question its potential impact. The mayor of a border town in Texas said: "You can go over, under and around a f e n c e . . . and it [the fence] can't make an apprehension" (Blumenthal 2000: 12).

Globalization is a transplanetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the growing multi-directional flows of people, objects, places, and information, as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows. Although globalization and transnationalism are often used synonymously, the latter is a more limited process which refers largely to interconnections across two, or more, national borders. The sheer magnitude, diversity, and complexity of the process of globalization today leads to the conceptualization of the current era as the "global age." Globalization can be analyzed through conceptual metaphors such as solids, liquids, gases, flows, structures, heavy, light, and weightless. Prior to the "global age," people, things, information, places, and objects tended to harden over time. Thus their common attribute was "solidity," the characteristic of being limited to one place. Solidity also refers to the persistence of barriers that prevented free movement of people, information, and objects in that era. Although solidity persists, it is "fluidity" that is more characteristic of the "global age." Over the last few decades, that which once seemed solid has tended to "melt" and become increasingly mobile or "liquid." A range of technological developments in transportation and communication have enabled far greater global movement of what was previously solid. The difficulties posed by the fact that many things and people retain some solidity can now also be dealt with more readily. As this process of increased mobility continues, liquids tend to turn into gases. This implies additional attributes of being light and a capacity to flow even faster and with greater ease. The flow of information in the global age closely approximates this characteristic of gaseousness. The new liquids and gases that are being created have both constructive as well as destructive effects. Bauman's ideas on liquidity inform this book's orientation to globalization. Liquid phenomena do not easily, or for long, hold their shape. They are not fixed in either space or time. Most importantly, liquids tend to dissolve obstacles in their path.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

A closely related concept is the idea of "flows." Globalization is increasingly characterized by flows of liquid phenomena including people, objects, decisions, information, and places. Many global flows are interconnected - they do not occur in isolation. Others might be multi-directional flows - all sorts of things flow in every conceivable direction among all points in the world. Conflicting flows add another layer of complexity to the analysis of global processes. Finally, reverse flows often have a boomerang effect. That is, they flow back to their source and often have a negative effect on it. In spite of greater liquidity and ever-more flows of various types, the world is still characterized by great inequality. Flows do not necessarily go everywhere. Even when they do, they affect different places with varying degrees of intensity. Using another metaphor, it could be argued that globalization "hops" from one locale to another, rather than flowing evenly through all locales. While globalization flows more easily through the developed world, it bypasses many locales in the less developed world. Globalization can also be analyzed through metaphors of heavy, light, and weightless. Historically, there has been movement from that which is heavy to that which is light and most recently to that which approaches weightlessness. Preindustrial and industrial societies were "heavy," characterized by that which is difficult to move. Advances in transportation and technology made goods, people, and places lighter. We are currently in an era defined not only by lightness but also increasingly by weightlessness. This does not imply that the world is flat. Some structures continue to be important in impeding the movement of that which is liquid, light, or weightless. Borders between nation-states and the "digital divide" are important examples of such barriers. Other heavy structures expedite flows. "Routes" or "paths" serve to both expedite flows along their length as well as to limit flows that occur outside their confines. There are also formal or informal bridges that expedite flows. More concealed structures facilitate the illegal movement of people and products. An increasing number of people also participate in global networks, involving networks of communication and information technology, as well as interpersonal networks. Further, an increasing number of social structures (states, cities, law) and social institutions (the family, religion, sport) are interconnected through networks and thus enable global flows. The idea of flows communicates the sense that virtually everyone benefits from them. Concepts such as awkward connections (points of weak or no connection) and frictions (difficult, unequal, and unstable connections) facilitate a more nuanced analysis showing that some benefit little from global flows. Nation-states as well as other organizations such as corporations and labor unions may expedite flows for some while creating barriers for others. For instance, protectionist tariff systems aid the flow of products from a nation-state's own farms and manufacturers, while inhibiting similar flows from foreign competitors. There also exist subtler structural barriers which are in many ways more powerful than the material structures such as national borders. These structures serve to

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

differentiate and subordinate on the basis of social class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, and region of the world. These p h e n o m e n a often tend to be interrelated. Those who occupy superordinate positions in these hierarchies tend to erect structures in order to impede flows that are not beneficial to them. They also encourage flows that work to their advantage. Globalization can also be conceptualized through structures and processes. This serves to highlight the dynamism of the globalization process as well as the interconnectedness between structures and processes. Global flows and structures have now become ubiquitous in everyday experience; they have come to be taken-forgranted. There has also been a generalization of global flows and structures, such that their impact spreads across all levels of society. Four directions of enquiry can be pursued in the analysis of structures and flows - extensiveness, intensiveness, velocity, and impact propensity.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.

Examine the dual role of structures as barriers to, and facilitators of, global flows. Are subtler structural barriers more effective than material barriers?

2.

What is the significance of networks in the current age of globalization? Is it possible for networks to act as deterrents or barriers to flows?

3.

Do liquids dissolve structures blocking their path, or do they merely circumnavigate them?

4.

Discuss the impact of increased liquidity and gaseousness on hierarchical social structures.

ADDITIONAL READINGS Zygmunt Arjun

Bauman.

Liquid Modernity.

Appadurai.

Modernity

Cambridge:

at

Large:

Polity,

Cultural

2000.

Dimensions

of

Globalization.

M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a Press, 1996. J o n a t h a n Xavier Inda a n d Renato Rosaldo, " T r a c k i n g Global Flows." In J o n a t h a n Xavier 2

n d

Inda

and

Renato

Rosaldo,

eds.

The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader,

e d n . Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 2008.

Manuel

Castells.

The

Rise

of the

Network Society,

Friction:

An

2

n d

edn.

Maiden,

MA:

Wiley-

Blackwell, 2009. Anna

Lowenhaupt

Tsing.

Ethnography of Global

Connection.

Princeton:

P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 5 . Jan

Aart

Schölte

and

Roland

Robertson,

eds.

Encyclopedia

of Globalization.

New

Y o r k : MTM Publishing, 2007. George

Ritzer,

Blackwell, 2007.

ed.

The

Blackwell

Companion

to

Globalization.

Maiden,

MA:

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

NOTES 1

The French call this mondialization. See, for exam-

and other chains. In some senses, people (e.g. as

ple, Ortiz (2006: 401-3). However, as is clear from

immigrants) moved more easily in the late 1 9 and

th

his book's title, Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) distinguishes

2

3

4

th

early 2 0 century when nation-states had far fewer

between mondialization, defined as the open

restrictions on immigration than they do today (but

creation of the world, and globalization which is

those restrictions have increased greatly recently).

seen as a more closed and integrated process.

However, overall people today are more liquid and

Wolf (2005: ix) is slightly more circumscribed in his

flow more easily globally as, for example, tourists,

judgment saying that globalization "is the great

business travelers, and the like, and even as immi-

event of our time."

grants, at least in some senses (e.g. the flow is much

The term " s o c i a l " here and elsewhere in his book

more multi-directional than it was in that earlier

is used very broadly to encompass social process

epoch). It is even more the case that social r e l a '

in various sectors - political, economic, social, etc.

tionships are more liquid, and flow more easily,

It should be noted that while the concept of

than they did in the past. Fifth, Tomlinson (2007:

globalization, if not this particular definition, is now

352) offers a definition of globalization that has

very familiar to all of us, it is actually of very recent

much of the flavor of the perspective being offered

vintage. Chanda (2007: 246) reviewed an electronic

here: "complex, accelerating, integrating process

database that archives 8,000 sources throughout

of global connectivity . . . rapidly developing and

the world (newspapers, magazines, reports). He

ever-densening

does not find a reference to globalization until 1979

interdependencies that characterize material, social,

and then only in an obscure European adminis-

economic and cultural life in the modern w o r l d " ;

trative document. By 1981 there are still only two

another definition emphasizing flows, intercon-

mentions of the term globalization, but then such

nectedness and also barriers can be found in

references take off reaching over 57,000 in 2001.

Yergin and Stanislaw (1998: 383).

Interestingly the number drops off after that, but

6

it has begun to rise once again. It seems likely that

5

network of interconnections and

Immigrants can be thought of as "transnational" when they are involved in a variety of relationships

the number of references to globalization will soon

(e.g. social, economic, political) that cut across

exceed that of the previous peak in 2001.

the nations of settlement and origin creating a new

This definition requires several amplifications or

transnational field (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc-

clarifications. First, the idea that globalization is

Szanton 1994.). While there are certainly many

transplanetary is derived from Scholte (2005).

immigrants who fit into this category and their

Second, while globalization is transplanetary, lit-

number is likely growing, there has been a tendency

tle traverses the entire planet. The latter is the outer

to overestimate their number and to conflate trans-

limit of globalization, but it is rarely approached.

migrants and immigrants. Thus, Portes (2001a: 183)

Third, the definition as a whole seems to imply a

concludes: "It is more useful to conceptualize trans-

" g r a n d narrative" of increasing globalization, but

nationalism as one form of economic, political

it is recognized that globalization occurred on a

and cultural adaptation that co-exists with other,

far more limited scale at earlier points in history

more traditional forms [e.g. assimilation]."

(see Chapter 2) and that the changes described

usefully limits the idea of transnational activities

here are often uneven and that in some cases

to "those initiated and sustained by non-institutional

(e.g. in the case of immigrants, see below) there

actors, be they organized groups or networks of

He

was greater liquidity, things flowed more easily,

individuals across national borders. Many of these

in earlier epochs. Fourth, it should be pointed out

activities are informal, that is they take place out-

that not all of the phenomena mentioned in this

side the pale of state regulation and control. .. .

definition are equally liquid or flow to the same

they represent goal-oriented initiatives that require

degree. Clearly, communication is the most liquid

coordination across national borders by members

and flows the most easily; places and people are

of civil society. These activities are undertaken on

far less liquid and their flow is much more limited.

their own behalf, rather than on behalf of the state

However, places are much more likely now than in the past to flow around the world as represented by the global presence of many fast food restaurants

or corporate bodies" (Portes 2001a: 186). 7

As globalization accelerates, ever greater portions of the planet will be encompassed by it.

Global Liquids, Flows, and Structures

8 9 10

Others include, for example, the oceans in terms

22

clear that structures are created, run, and staffed

For other metaphors applied to globalization, see

by human agents who direct their operations. This

Kornprobst et al. (2008).

is in line with the general tendency in social theory

This reflects the tensions that always exist in glob-

to be concerned with the relationship between

alization since the Greeks resent this theft. This resentment has grown recently with the building

11

structure and agency. See Ritzer (2008b: 394-420). 23

In fact, such routes, "trade routes," have existed

of a new Acropolis Museum in Athens (part of it

for centuries (e.g. the Silk Road of the thirteenth

opened in 2008) which makes a point of high-

century) and continue to exist, although they have

lighting the missing portions of the Parthenon.

been greatly affected and modified by technolog-

As we will see, capitalism is very much implicated in globalization, but as we will also see throughout

12

While this discussion will focus on structures, it is

of the development of the trans-Pacific cable.

ical advances of all sorts. See Ciolek (2007: 1180-4). 24

Castells (2000); Holton (2007: 867-72); in fact, the

this book, there is much, much more to globaliza-

idea of networks is so important to the study of

tion than capitalism or economics more generally.

globalization that there is even a journal called

A similar point of view is offered by the popular journalist Thomas Friedman with his notion "fluid

Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs. 25

One who emphasizes interconnections is Nayan

networks" which operate in a largely unimpeded

Chanda in Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers,

manner across what he sees as an increasingly "flat

Adventurers,

world"; for more on Friedman's thinking, and a

New Haven: Y a l e University Press, 2007.

critique of the idea of a flat world, see Chapter 5.

26

and

Warriors

Shaped

Globalization.

Meyer and Geschiere (2003) also discuss the "dialec-

13

For a rebuttal to this argument, see Weiss (1998).

14

In addition to "flow" Chanda (2007) uses terms like

are more microscopic than here in the sense that

"flowing," "water," "ripples," and " w a v e s " in dis-

they are concerned with the closure of identity in

tics of flow and closure," although their concerns

cussing globalization. "Tracking Global Flows" is the title of Inda and Rosaido's (2008b) Introduction to

the face of flows of people. 27

an anthology of work in anthropology on global-

. . . He Keeps on Rollin' A l o n g . "

ization, and flows is the organizing principle of that

28

For a similar view, see Ho (2005: 68-96).

book. The five substantive sections of that book

29

The global recession that began in late 2007 and

deal with the flow of capital, people, commodities,

rages into 2009, and likely beyond, will be called

the media, and ideologies. Paul Gilroy (1993: 190)

the "Great Recession" in various places throughout

often uses images of ships and sea voyages in his discussion of global "flows." See also O n g (2006a:

this book. 30

Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005: 6) addresses power here

31

Tapscott and Williams (2006); for a critique of this

499-505). 15

This is in line with one of the two approaches

rather than flows.

outlined by Martin, Metzger, and Pierre (2006: 499-521). That is, that which is truly global is not

see Keen (2007). 32

simply similar changes in many countries. 16

17

18 19

John Urry (2009, forthcoming) sees this as part of

until

the fact that everything these days seems to be

theoretical school in American sociology in the mid-

on the move and, as a result, we need a new

twentieth-century

"mobilities" theory to deal with that reality.

was premised on the idea, clear in its name, that

Although, as we will see, especially in Chapter 14,

the focus should be on structures (as well as their

great global inequality, especially in this case the

functional relationship to one another). However,

"digital divide," prevents large portions of the

structural functionalism always had a theoretical

world from receiving many of these flows.

competitor in the more process-oriented approach

Although it is not likely, contrary to US propaganda,

of symbolic interactionism (see Sandstorm and

we

understood -

structure. structural

The

dominant

functionalism

-

that al-Qaeda had much of a role, if any, in Iraq.

Kleinman [2001: 217-31]). One of the reasons that

On the North-South distinction, see, for example,

structural functionalism lost its dominant position

Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer (2007: 320-34); Persaud

was the fact that it never found a way to deal

George Soros (2000: xix) argues, for example, that global capitalism has "produced a very uneven

21

For example, Talcott Parsons argued that we could not hope to understand process (and social change)

(2007: 891-6). 20

As the song from Showboat says, " O l ' Man River

adequately with process (and change). 33

While we discuss structures and processes as distinct from one another here, we will later discuss

playing field."

(see Chapter 2) how structures can be seen as sets

For a similar point of view, see Shamir (2005:197-217).

of processes related to other processes.

Is There Such a Thing as Globalization? If There Is Such a Thing as Globalization, When Did It Begin? •

Hardwired

•

Cycles

•

Epochs

•

Broader, more recent changes

•

Events

Globalization or Globalizations? •

Economic

•

Political

•

Health and medicine

• •

Cultural Sport

•

•

Religion

•

Science

Education

What Drives Globalization? If There Is Such a Thing as Globalization, Is It Inexorable? Does Globaphilia or Globaphobia Have the Upper Hand? •

Globaphilia

•

Globaphobia

•

Finding a middle ground

If Globalization Is Not Inexorable, Has It Gone Too Far? What, if Anything, Can Be Done About Globalization? • Nothing! • Everything! • Necessary actions are already underway • More, perhaps much more, needs to be done

Chapter Summary

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

C

hapter 1 presents an overarching and integrated perspective on globalization as well as at least some details on a few of its (innumerable) elements. However, we have proceeded to a large extent as if globalization in general, as well as the particular perspective on it offered here with its focus on flows and barriers, processes and structures, is not in dispute. However, the entire field of globalization studies is riddled with differences of opinion and great debates (Guillen 2001). In this chapter we present some of these differences. The goal is to offer a more nuanced sense of globalization.

We begin with an issue that, from the tenor of the discussion in the first chapter, would appear to be a non-issue. That is the question of whether or not there is some set of developments that can legitimately be called globalization. While the prior discussion, as well as the reality of this b o o k and its title, indicates that the answer to that question will, in the end, be in the affirmative, it is worth reviewing the debate over the very existence of globalization.

The "great globalization debate" is between those who are skeptical about the process (the "skeptics") and those who accept it as a reality (the "globalists") (Held and McGrew 2000: 1-50). Globalists: Believe that there is such a thing as globalization and that it encompasses virtually the entire globe.

Skeptics: Contend that there is no such thing as globalization.

Globalists take the position that there is such a thing as globalization and it encompasses virtually the entirety of the globe. The skeptics contend that there is no such thing as globalization because vast portions of the globe, and a significant portion of the world's population, are wholly, or in significant part, outside of, and even actively excluded, from the processes generally associated with it. It is argued that since the term globalization implies a truly global p h e n o m e n o n , the exclusion of such a large proportion of the globe serves to deny the existence of globalization. Furthermore, to the skeptics, there are various barriers, especially those created by the nation-state and regional groups of such states, that greatly restrict, if not prevent, global flows. Globalists respond that just because some parts of the world are relatively uninvolved does not mean that the vast majority of them are not enmeshed, often deeply, in a series of relationships that meet the definition of globalization. The globalists further argue that it is impossible, or at least nearly so, to find any part of the world totally unaffected by globalization. The globalists tend to see a broad process of globalization, but to the skeptics there is no one process of globalization, but rather m a n y globalizations (Therborn 2000: 151-79) (there is a scholarly journal entitled Globalizations). In fact, there are even several different ways of thinking about globalizations including multiple general processes (e.g. economic, political, etc.), as well as differences between globalization as experienced by the haves and have-nots (de Souza Santos 2006: 3 9 3 - 9 ) . Thus, to the skeptics the term globalization is an over-simplification and obscures a wide array of processes that are affecting the world in many different ways.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

The globalists respond by agreeing that there is much to support the argument of multiple globalization processes and hence the use of the term globalizations has much merit. However, in their view, this is simply a terminological difference and both concepts (globalization and globalizations) acknowledge the importance of globalization. Indeed, the use of the term globalization in this book generally covers both a general process as well as a multitude of sub-processes that are encompassed by it (see below). The globalists see globalization as not only in existence today, but as growing ever more powerful and pervasive. In this view, globalization involves a set of processes that led, among many other things, to the supplanting of the nation-state as the preeminent actor in the world. In Yergin and Stanislaw's terms, the nation-state lost (primarily to the market) the "commanding heights" it had, until recently occupied; that loss "marks a great divide between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries" (1998: xiii). Thus, for example, once a structure able to control its borders, the nation-state has been supplanted in importance, at least in this realm, by global flows of all sorts. It is those flows that are of key importance and the nation-state has grown unable (or unwilling) to stop them. While the nation-state has declined in importance in the global age, "this era is not the end of the nation-state, even less the end of government" (1998: 396). To the skeptics, at one time there may have been a process that could have been called globalization, but it is now coming to an end. They argue that in recent years the nation-state has reasserted itself and has regained, or is regaining, its historic role as the key world player. This is reflected, for example, in current US actions involving its Mexican border with increased border patrols, back-up by National Guard units, use of more high-tech surveillance equipment, and the border fence. The globalists tend to see globalization as a relatively new p h e n o m e n o n , but to the skeptics globalization is simply a new term for an old, even ancient, process through which various parts of the world relate to one another. Economically, the globalists emphasize such structures as multinational corporations (MNCs [Dunning 2006: 173-227; 1995: 461-91]), the transnational economy, and the emergence of a new global division of labor. The skeptics argue that within the economy, there are few genuine M N C s - most continue to be based in their original national locations (e.g. Daimler in Germany and Toyota in Japan). Further, as mentioned above, the skeptics retain a focus on the nation-state and national economies. It is regional blocs of nations as well as specific nations - not MNCs - that engage in new forms of economic imperialism. In addition, the nationstate, especially powerful conglomerations of them (G-8, etc.; see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this organization and others), continue to regulate and exert great control over the global economy. The response of the globalists is that while it is true that most MNCs retain their associations with the nation-states from which they emanated originally, that association has grown less important over time. For example, it is conceivable that given its continual decline in the US, and its successes elsewhere (e.g. China), GM (if it survives) may eventually sever all linkages to the US and come to be based, and base its production, elsewhere.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

The globalists also argue that the power or the weakness of the nation-state has nothing to do with the reality of globalization. Indeed, the nation-state, powerful or weak, is a key part of globalization. For example, the ability of the nation-state to control global flows of immigrants - as well as drugs or the sex trade - ebbs and flows, but that has no bearing on the continued existence and reality of globalization or the fact that the nation-state is a player of note in it. The globalists also contend that while the continuing power of nation-states, singly and collectively, is undeniable, their ability to control economic markets is steadily declining and in some markets (e.g. financial markets) their control is already minimal. Politically, the globalists emphasize multilateralism whereas the skeptics continue to focus on inter-governmentalism. That is, the globalists see all sorts of relationships possible in a global world, many of which do not involve governments, while the skeptics argue that the world continues to be dominated by relations among and between national governments. In terms of global order, the skeptics continue to emphasize the role of the international order of nation-states and international governance, while the globalists see a multi-layered global governance involving much more than simply nation-states (e.g. NGOs and INGOs). Further, the globalists see the increasing importance in this domain of the growth of global civil society, a global polity, and a cosmopolitan orientation to the world. All of these, as we will see, serve to reduce the role of nation-states and inter-national governance. Culturally, the globalists give great importance to the rise of a global popular culture, a culture that is c o m m o n to large numbers of people and most, if not all, areas of the world. Skeptics reject the idea of a c o m m o n global popular culture, including and especially one dominated by the US. To them, the whole idea of such a culture has been exaggerated. To whatever extent a c o m m o n global popular culture existed, it has declined in recent years with the reassertion of national and regional cultural independence, and culture in general has grown increasingly varied and is shaped by many different sources with many different effects. For example, the Internet has been nationalized to a large degree and one could speak of a German or a Japanese Internet. In a related point, the globalists emphasize the decline of people who rigidly adhere to fixed political identities. Such a decline leaves people much more open to global popular culture. In contrast, the skeptics point, once again, to the more recent resurgence of nationalism and national identities. This is not only important in itself from the point of view of globalization, but strong national identities would serve to restrict the influence of a global popular culture. We will have occasion to return to many of the issues debated by the globalists and the skeptics in the course of this book. However, it is important to state unequivocally at this point that, in the end, and in spite of the merit of some of the positions and criticisms of the skeptics, we conclude, unsurprisingly, that there is a set of processes and structures that can legitimately be labeled globalization. In that sense, this book, as mentioned in Chapter 1, adopts a globalist position on globalization, albeit one that is not insensitive to at least some of the arguments of the skeptics.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

We will offer in this section five different ways of thinking about what turns out to be a very complex issue - the origin of globalization.

HARDWIRED Nayan Chanda (2007: xiv) argues that "globalization stems, among other things, from a basic h u m a n urge to seek a better and more fulfilling life". This leads him to trace "the initial globalization of the h u m a n species, [to] when in the late Ice Age, a tiny group of our ancestors walked out of Africa in search of better food and security. In fifty thousand years of wandering along ocean coasts and chasing game across Central Asia, they finally settled on all the continents." Chanda's view that globalization is hardwired into humans is not the one accepted here since we argue that we are now living in a distinctive global age. 2

Chanda focuses on four specific aspects of globalization that relate to a basic "urge" for a better life - trade (or commerce), missionary work (religion), adventures and conquest (politics and warfare). All of these are key aspects of globalization, all can be traced to early h u m a n history, and all, as well as much else, will be dealt with in this volume.

CYCLES The second perspective is that globalization is a long-term cyclical process. It is not only difficult in this view to find a single point of origin, but the effort is largely irrelevant since there long have been cycles of globalization and it is those cycles that are of utmost importance, not any particular phase or point of origin (Scholte 2005). This view, like Chanda's, tends to contradict the idea that we live today in a new "global age." Rather, this suggests that there have been other global ages in the past and that what now appears to be a new global age, or the high point of such an age, is destined to contract and disappear in the future. Eventually, it, too, will be replaced by a new cycle in the globalization process.

EPOCHS In an example of the third approach to the beginnings of globalization, Therborn (2000: 151-79) sees six great epochs, or "waves," of globalization, that have occurred sequentially, each with its own point of origin: 1. The fourth to the seventh centuries which witnessed the globalization of religions (e.g. Christianity, Islam). 2. The late fifteenth century highlighted by European colonial conquests.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

3. 4. 5. 6.

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries during which globalization resulted from various intra-European wars. The mid-nineteenth century to 1918; the heyday of European imperialism. The post-World War II period. The post-Cold War period.

From this, Therborn concludes that globalization is not unique to today's world. However, his historical or epochal view also rejects the cyclical view of globalization. Past epochs are not returning, at least in their earlier form, at some point in the future. Robertson (1990: 15-30) offers a very different, and far more recent, set of epochs (or phases). He traces the beginnings of globalization to the early fifteenth century, but he does not see it really taking off until the late 1800s: 1.

The Germinal Phase in Europe (early fifteenth to mid-eighteenth century). Important developments during this period were the sun-centered view of the universe, the beginnings of modern geography, and the spread of the Gregorian calendar.

2.

The Incipient Phase mainly in Europe (mid-1700s to the 1870s). Among the key developments in this period were the "crystallization of conceptions of formalized international relations," a "more concrete conception of humankind," and "[s]harp increases in conventions and agencies concerned with international and transnational regulation and communication" (1990: 26). The Take-Off Phase (1870s to the mid-1920s). Among the key developments in this period were the "[v]ery sharp increase in n u m b e r and speed of global forms of communication. Rise of ecumenical movement. Development of global competitions - e.g. Olympics, Nobel Prizes. Implementation of World Time and near-global adoption of Gregorian calendar. First World war. League of Nations" (1990: 27).

3.

4.

5.

Struggle-for-hegemony phase (1920s to the mid-1960s). This period was characterized by war ( W W II) and disputes (Cold War) over the still fragile globalization process. The UN was formed during this period. The Uncertainty Phase (1960s to the early 1990s ). Many global developments occurred during this period including inclusion of the Third World in the global system, end of the Cold War (and bipolarity), spread of nuclear weapons, world civil society, world citizenship, and global media system consolidation. Robertson saw "crisis tendencies" in the global system in the early 1990s, but, if anything, globalization has accelerated since then (although it may still contain such crisis tendencies). 3

Were Robertson to address this issue again, he might find that yet another epoch began at the turn of the twenty-first century. These epochal views tend to contrast with the focus here on the current global age since they do not see it as particularly unique.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

EVENTS A fourth view is that instead of cycles or great epochs, one can point to much more specific events that can be seen as the origin of globalization. In fact, there are many such possible points of origin of globalization, some of which are: 4

•

the Romans and their far-ranging conquests in the centuries before Christ (Gibbon 1998);

•

the rise and spread of Christianity in the centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire; the spread of Islam in the seventh century and beyond; the travels of the Vikings from Europe to Iceland, Greenland, and briefly to North America in the ninth through the eleventh centuries as examples of, and landmarks, in globalization; trade in the Middle Ages throughout the Mediterranean; the activities of the banks of the twelfth-century Italian city-states; the rampage of the armies of Ghengis Khan into Eastern Europe in the thirteenth century (Economist 2006: January 12); European traders like Marco Polo and his travels later in the thirteenth century along the Silk Road to China. (Interestingly, there is now discussion of the development of an "iron silk road" involving a linked railroad network through a variety of Asian countries that at least evokes the image of the lure of Marco Polo's Silk Road. ); the "discovery of America" by Christopher Columbus in 1492. Other important voyages of discovery during this time involved Vasco Da Gama rounding the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 and the circumnavigation of the globe completed in 1522 by one of Ferdinand Magellan's ships (Joel Rosenthal 2007: 1237-41); European colonialism, especially in the nineteenth century; the early twentieth-century global Spanish flu pandemic; the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century.

• •

• • • •

5

•

• • •

It is also possible to get even more specific about the origin of globalization, especially in recent years. A few rather eclectic recent examples include: •

1956 - the first transatlantic telephone cable (see Figure 2.1 for a more current view of global telephone lines, cell phone networks, and fiber-optic submarine cables); • 1958 - while it was possible to fly across the Atlantic in the 1930s on seaplanes that made several stops along the way, the big revolution in this area was the arrival of transatlantic passenger jet travel with the first being Pan Am's flight from New York to London (with a stopover for refueling required in Newfoundland); • 1962 - the launch of the satellite Telstar and soon thereafter the first transatlantic television broadcasts; • 1966 - the transmission from a satellite of the picture of the earth as single location leading not only to a greater sense of the world as one place (increased global consciousness [Robertson and Inglis 2004: 3 8 ^ 9 ] ) , but also of great importance to the development of the global environmental movement;

and Roger M. Downs. The World, p. 61.

regions of Asia and Africa. By permission of National Geographic Society, College Atlas of the World (2007) H. J. de Blij

technology has extended phone service to parts of the world previously without any land-line service, including rural

networks. Fiber-optic cables allow for lightning-fast transmission of e-mail, data, and voice calls, whereas cellular

Figure 2.1 Fiber optics. The world is increasingly connected by underground and undersea fiber-optic cables and cellular

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

•

•

•

•

1970 - the creation of Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) making possible global electronic (wire) transfers of funds (now $2 trillion a day) among financial institutions; 1977 - the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) came into being making possible more global transfers of funds by individuals; 1988 - the founding of the modern Internet based on Arpanet (which was created in 1969). While it took the Internet several years to take off, this was a turning point in global interconnection for billions of people; 2001 - the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, as well as later terrorist attacks on trains in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005), among others. The following is a specific example in support of the idea that 9/11 can be taken as a point of origin for globalization (at least of higher education): "Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, internationalization has moved high on the agenda at most universities, to prepare students for a globalized world, and to help faculty members stay up-to-date in their disciplines" (Lewin 2008b: 8).

This, of course, brings us very close to the present day and it is possible that other specific events (especially the Great Recession) will almost certainly come to be associated by future observers with the birth, or further development, of globalization. This focus on specific historical events is less general than the approach taken in this book that focuses on the current global age.

BROADER, MORE RECENT CHANGES The fifth view focuses on broader, but still recent, changes. There is a sense in this view that a sea change occurred in the last half of the twentieth century. Three of these m o m e n t o u s changes have been identified by scholars as the point of origin of globalization as it exists today: 1. The emergence of the United States as the global power in the years following WWII. The US not only projected its military power throughout the world (Korea in the early 1950s; disastrously in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s), it extended its reach in the economic realm as it became the dominant industrial power when the war decimated most of its competitors militarily (Germany, Japan) and/or economically (the Axis powers as well as Allies such as France and Great Britain). Many other aspects of America's global reach either accompanied these changes or soon followed. A m o n g them was the diplomatic clout of the US government, the reach of the US media, the power of Hollywood, and so on. Such a view closely aligns globalization with the idea of Americanization (see Chapter 4). 2.

The emergence of multi-national corporations (MNCs). While the world's great corporations can be traced back to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in, for example, Germany, Great Britain, and the United

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

States, they were initially largely associated with their nations of origin and did the vast majority of their business within those countries. However, over time, those corporations did more and more business internationally. In so doing, they were following Marx's dictum that because of stagnant or declining profits capitalism had to expand into international markets or die. As Marx and Engels (1848/2000: 248-9) put it: The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. . . . All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries . . . that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw materials drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, n o t only at h o m e , but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.

For example, the once-great American automobile companies - Ford and General Motors - not only originated in the US, but focused, at least initially, on selling into the American market and most, if not all, of the component parts were produced by them or sub-contractors in the US. Of course, they did import raw materials of various kinds (and they did sell their automobiles overseas, especially in Europe), but in the main, the bulk of their business was done in the US. Furthermore, the vast majority of top executives, employees, and investors were American. However, that began to change over the course of the twentieth century as these corporations exported more of their automobiles to other parts of the world, opened factories in other countries to sell cars under their brand names (or others), targeted their products to the distinctive needs (e.g. for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars) of those countries, and more recently began to move more and more of their automobile production aimed at the US market to other countries, either in factories of their own or in the factories of sub-contractors in those countries. In these and other ways, Ford and General Motors have become multi-national corporations and M N C s are, because of their very nature, inherently part of globalization. Indeed, MNCs are not only involved in globalization but this process is internalized into the organization as all sorts of global flows (parts, people, money) occur within the corporation. The case of the other of the one-time "Big Three" American automobile companies - Chrysler - is even more striking in this regard. Initially, Chrysler followed the same course as Ford and GM and became increasingly multi-national. However, Chrysler has long been the most marginal of the Big Three and, famously, had to be bailed out in 1979 by a controversial loan from the US government. However, that was only of short-term help and in 1998 Chrysler was taken over by the German manufacturer of Mercedes Benz automobiles which changed

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

its name to Daimler-Chrysler AG. This clearly represented the formation of a MNC, although Daimler-Benz itself (as well as Chrysler) was a multi-national corporation before that since, among other things, it actively sold its automobiles in the US as well as in many other parts of the world. However, this marriage was short-lived and Daimler sold off its interest in Chrysler in 2007. While Chrysler now once again struggles to survive on its own, it remains a multi-national, as does Daimler. Of course, American and German automobile companies are no longer the world leaders in that industry. Rather, the leaders are Japanese companies, especially Toyota, Nissan, and H o n d a (with Korean companies [e.g. the manufacturers of Hyundai, Kia] showing global strength, as well). However, these companies are today themselves MNCs as they not only sell cars in the US (and in many other nations), but also produce in factories built in various parts of North America. The case of today's automobile manufacturers is just one example of national corporations that have become M N C s and therefore much more clearly and importantly integral parts of globalization. 3.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. It could be argued that globalization is even more recent and did not truly begin until the fall of the "Iron Curtain" and the Soviet Union in 1991. With those events, the division of the world into mainly "capitalist" and "communist" spheres rapidly eroded as did all sorts of barriers that existed between them. Major parts of the world were opened for the first time since the early twentieth century to all sorts of global flows - immigration, tourism, media, diplomacy, and especially the capitalistic economic transactions of MNCs and other businesses. The global processes that had spread throughout most of the "free" world before 1991 flooded into the now independent states of the old Soviet Union, especially Russia, and most of its allies. Vestiges of communism exist as of this writing, especially in Cuba, North Korea and, at least nominally, in China. Cuba remains, in the main, outside of global capitalism, largely because of the US embargo against trading with Cuba, in force since 1962 and expanded and codified several times since then. However, the embargo itself is a manifestation of globalization - the US setting up barriers in order to limit or halt the flow of trade with Cuba and to inhibit or prevent other nations from around the world from trading with Cuba. China, of course, is becoming a, if not soon, the major force in global capitalism even though the government remains communist, at least in name (Fishman 2006). In any case, China is actively involved in globalization not only economically, but in many other realms as well (the 2008 Olympics in Beijing is a good example). The perspective adopted in this book on the current global age is most in accord with this focus on broader changes in the last half of the twentieth century. While all of the other perspectives deal with global processes, they were far more limited in geographic scope and far less extensive and intensive than the global processes that took off in the late twentieth century. Thus the perspective adopted here is that globalization is a relatively recent development with its major points of origin occurring after the close of WW II.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

GLOBALIZATION OR GLOBALIZATIONS? While we can discuss globalization in general terms, such a discussion obscures the important fact that there are, as pointed out earlier, various types of globalization - various globalizations - that need to be identified and the relationships a m o n g and between them teased out (Hoffman 2002: 104-15). The following are some of the major types of globalization that will be dealt with in this book. 6

ECONOMIC 7

As we've seen, to many observers, economic globalization is globalization. While economic globalization is certainly of great importance, perhaps of greatest importance, there are other important types of globalization (see below).

POLITICAL While heavily influenced by economic globalization, political globalization cannot be reduced to economics alone. For example, US wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 certainly had an economic motivation (for example, protecting the supply of Middle East oil, perhaps even gaining more control over Iraq's oil), but there were many other factors (misguided fears of "weapons of mass destruction" and of al-Qaeda in Iraq, demonization of Islam in general and of Saddam Hussein in particular, and so on). Political globalization: Political relations that exist at a global level, including inter-national relations.

Those who study political globalization tend to think in terms of inter-national relations. However, the key contribution of globalization studies in this domain is to encompass, but look beyond, inter-national relations to other kinds of political relations that exist at a global level. Examples include those involving global organizations, especially the United Nations (UN), relations between regions and cities that bypass the nation-states in which they exist, and m o r e specific p h e n o m e n a such as terrorist organizations (e.g. al-Qaeda) that are not based in, or associated with, any particular nation-state; that are "state-less." Indeed, statelessness and the increasing problems associated with it (e.g. in the tribal territories of Pakistan, in several countries in Africa [e.g. Somalia, Congo] which seem to have a government in n a m e only) are of increasing global interest and concern.

CULTURAL Cultural globalization: Cultural influences that exist at a global level, between and among various nations.

There is a wide variety of cultural flows that exist, at least in part, independently of the other major forms of globalization. Examples include food (Italian, Chinese, Indian, etc.), television offerings (BBC and al-Hurra), movies (from Hollywood and Bollywood), m u s e u m shows, touring rock and classical music performances, and so on. Of course, cultural globalization cannot be divorced totally from the other major forms of globalization. They often have roots in particular nation-states (e.g. India's Bollywood) and their global movement may lead to political outcries in various countries (the hostility to American-style fast food a m o n g at least some in

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

France, Italy, and elsewhere). More importantly, all of these forms of cultural globalization are affected by economic considerations (e.g., whether or not they can at least earn back their expenses, if not show a profit, in other geographic locales) and have economic consequences (the continued production of new cultural offerings depends u p o n previous ones showing a profit, or at least not losing money).

RELIGION Most of the world's religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism, etc.) are global in scope and often seek to extend their global influence (Beyer 2007: 444-60). For example, Catholicism, with about a billion adherents, is a global operation run from the Vatican. There are Catholics, Catholic churches, and Catholic priests in most parts of the world and all sorts of information flows to and from them and the Vatican. Many other religions, both large and small, are, or seek to be, global in scope and work toward that through proselytizing throughout the world, sending missionaries, and opening religious centers (churches, mosques, synagogues, and so on). Great attention these days is devoted to the global spread of Islam, especially Islamic fundamentalism, although it has been a globalizing religion since its creation in the seventh century (it spread through the Middle East, northern Africa, and as far as Spain) (Levering Lewis, Vertigans, and Sutton 2002).

SCIENCE Science today is inherently a global enterprise as its knowledge base is formed by inputs from many parts of the world and that knowledge is disseminated virtually everywhere. This has been true for quite some time (e.g. work on atomic and subatomic theory in the first half of the twentieth century), but has been made much easier by various technological advances. The advent of the Internet was of particular importance in enhancing the global character and reach of science. Many scientific journals are now online and can be accessed by scientists in most parts of the world. Furthermore, many scientists no longer wait for journals to accept and publish their articles; they now publish their work online. Such work, often in its early stages, can be read by scientists everywhere. It can affect their own work almost instantaneously, or they can offer rapid feedback or corrections to the original author(s) who can quickly revise a work and publish the revised paper online. To take one other example, large if not massive collaborations among scientists around the world are now much more likely because of e-mail and the Internet.

HEALTH AND MEDICINE Health and medicine have been increasingly globalized in many different ways (Hashemian and Yach 2007: 516-38). Diseases can and do proliferate globally. There is also the global spread of medical knowledge and expertise as well as technologies useful in diagnosing and treating various diseases. As with scientific knowledge, much medical knowledge is available online and disseminated rapidly around the world.

Issues, Debates, and Controversies

SPORT Sport, too, has been globalized in various ways (Andrews and Grainger 2007: 4 7 8 97). We have already touched on a few of the major organizations involved in the globalization of sport; other sports that are quite global in reach are professional tennis and golf. The global media, especially television, have played a key role in the globalization of sport and creating global interest in, and an audience for, sport.

EDUCATION Higher education has spread through increasing areas of the world and the systems of higher education have grown increasingly similar (Manicas 2007: 461-77). This is even truer of schools of business administration, especially those that offer MBA programs (Clegg and Carter 2007: 516-38). Recently, American universities have, in effect, been opening "franchises" in various countries, especially the oil-rich Persian Gulf area (Lewin 2008b: 8). However, primary and secondary schools have not done as well in keeping up with globalization. Three key failures have been associated with today's primary and secondary schools as they relate to globalization: 1.

Schools are generally not engaging young people in learning with the result that when asked, most students say that school is "boring." The various facets of globalization - economic, sociocultural, demographic - are everyday realities for young people, but the schools offer little that is relevant to those realities. Schools, especially in the North, are not responding adequately to the needs of the large numbers of immigrant youth from the South. They often "quickly become marginalized as racially, ethnically, religiously, and linguistically marked minority g r o u p s . . . . The results of these general trends are painfully obvious in multiple measurable ways: from the high dropout rates a m o n g immigrant, ethnic and racial minorities in many wealthy countries, to stark differences in achievement patterns between native and racialized minorities" (Suarez Orozco and Smith 2007: 3). Arguably the most alarming problem is associated with the failures of schools in the South and the fact that so many children and young people (about 200 million) in the South are not enrolled in schools. As a result, they fall everfurther behind children in the North. Further, these failures contribute to the enormous problem of illiteracy which is concentrated in the South and growing illiteracy there can only serve to widen the gap between North and South.

Primary and secondary schools need to change in order to adapt to the realities of the new global world. The above gives at least a sense of the range of globalizations, but, in fact, even this iteration touches only on a small number of the globalizations to be dealt with in this volume.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

One important point about the idea that there are multiple globalizations is the fact that it further complicates the whole idea of finding a point of origin for globalization. Clearly, there are different points of origin depending on whether one is focusing on globalization in the economy, or politics, or science, or higher education, and so on. It clearly makes far more sense in the search for origins (assuming one wants to search for them) to specify different origins for each of the many forms of globalization than to seek out a single point of origin for globalization as a whole. Furthermore, even within each of the forms, there are sub-areas each of which is likely to have a different point of origin for the beginning of globalization (for example, malaria has been spreading globally for centuries while Avian flu has yet to [and may never] affect large numbers of humans throughout the world).

This is another highly complex question with no easy answers. For example, if we accept the fact that there are multiple globalizations, then it is clear that it would be illusory to think that we could find a single driver, or even a small number of drivers. Yet, to seek out the drivers of each and every form of globalization would be a long and tedious process. At this point, at least, we need to restrict ourselves to a search for the drivers of globalization at the most general level. While we will focus on globalization in general, many of these same factors apply to at least some of the more specific globalizations. One way to approach this is through one of the classic divisions in the social sciences - the distinction between material and ideal explanations. A material, or materialist, explanation would tend to focus on objective factors and forces. While there can be other material forces (e.g. the nation-state in the political realm), this generally comes down, as it did for Karl Marx (who was a materialist), to a focus on economic factors such as "forces" and "relations" of production, technology, and so on. It is this kind of thinking that leads many to the view that it is capitalism in general, or the contemporary MNC, that is the most important driving force in contemporary globalization. The polar view, as it was for Marx, is that it is not material factors, but rather ideal factors, that are the main drivers of globalization. The emphasis on ideal factors was characteristic of the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel and his followers, the "young Hegelians." Marx came of age in this intellectual context, but famously planted Hegel on his feet by focusing on material rather than ideal factors. However, Marx retained a secondary interest in such idea systems as ideology (for more on ideology, at least as it relates to the neo-liberal view of globalization, see Chapter 5). Today, the idealist position on globalization is that the main drivers of the process are changes in thinking and ideas, as well as in information and knowledge. We have come increasingly to think in global, rather than in local or even in national, terms. And, our knowledge base has followed suit so that it, too, is increasingly global in scope. A good example of the latter involves the issue of global climate change. In some ways (because, for example, of movies and books like Al Gore's [2006] An Inconvenient

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

Truth) we have come to know a great deal about global climate and climate change, perhaps a lot more than we know about our local climate. And this greater knowledge about global climate change is leading at long last to more serious global efforts to deal with its causes and consequences. Thus, in this view, globalization is driven not by material changes, but by changes in ideas and knowledge. Of course, there is a middle ground on this which sees both material and ideal factors as being of great importance. In terms of the history of social theory, Max Weber was the most famous social theorist to adopt such a view. While he set out, in contrast to Marx and the Marxists, to show the importance of ideal factors (e.g. the role of the ethos of Protestantism in the rise of capitalism in the West [Weber 1904-5/1958]), this was in the context of a larger view that recognized the importance of both ideal and material factors (Weber 1927/1981). Actually, in the end, Weber saw material factors as the main drivers, but what is of greatest importance from our point of view is that he accorded importance to both. Thus, from this perspective, we can see globalization as being driven by a range of both material and ideal drivers. This is clear today in the global green movement which is driven by both ideas (e.g. those of Al Gore) and material realities (high gasoline prices).

Assuming there is such a thing as globalization, is its further development and expansion inevitable? The inevitability of globalization is a view that is widespread both in academic work and especially in more popular sources. It is, for example, the view of Thomas Friedman (1999; 2005) who, in The World is Flat, argues that globalization is expanding in various ways and directions. Daniel Altman (2007: x) contends that "the forces often labeled ' g l o b a l i z a t i o n ' . . . are here to stay." Nayan Chanda (2007: 320) argues that "[c]alls to shut down globalization are pointless." 8

Globalization does seem inexorable as it encompasses more and more areas of the social world. However, ideas like inexorability and inevitability are always problematic from the point of view of the social sciences. It is certainly the case that there are quite strong social trends here and a very strong likelihood that they will continue, and even accelerate, in the years to come. Yet, that is not the same as saying that such changes are inevitable. Indeed, the social sciences in general point to the view that there are never any inevitabilities and this applies in particular to such a wide-ranging and globe-straddling process as globalization. For example, the current counter-reactions in, especially, the US, Europe, and South Africa to widespread immigration, especially illegal immigration from less developed nations (in South Africa's case, Zimbabwe), is leading, or at least could lead, to less rather than more globalization, at least in terms of flows of these types of people. Thus, the counter-reactions (e.g. violence against Zimbabweans in South Africa) against globalization constitute an important check on its seemingly inevitable expansion.

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

Furthermore, thinking in terms of such inevitabilities serves to reduce people to the status of "judgmental dopes" (Ritzer 2008c: 387) who can do nothing but blindly accept such changes. While it is true that people may often be overwhelmed by such large-scale changes, they always retain the ability to act singly and collectively to modify, if not prevent, such changes. While people may at times seem like judgmental dopes, at other times they are m u c h m o r e likely to act as powerful agents (Giddens 1984) and even "dangerous giants." 9

This relates to the distinction between "globalization from above" and "globalization from below" (Kahn and Kellner 2007: 662-74). Globalization, especially as it is viewed by popularizers like Thomas Friedman, is generally associated with globalization from above. We can define globalization from above as a process that is created and disseminated by large-scale forces (such as the nation-state and the M N C ) , especially those associated with the North, and imposed on the South (especially their nation-states and businesses). Furthermore, when looked at in this way, globalization is to a large degree imposed on individual actors in both the North and the South. While m u c h of globalization is certainly from above, social scientists are particularly attuned to globalization from below that serves, at least to some degree, to counteract it and make it less inevitable. Globalization from below can take the form of individual actors, and small groups of actors, opposing and acting to oppose globalization in both developed and less developed countries. In addition, globalization from below can also involve large groups, and even whole nations (largely in the less developed world). From the perspective of globalization from below, people are agents, even "dangerous giants." Globalization from below generally relates to the counter-reactions to globalization from above. As a result, it is often called the "anti-globalization" movement, but this would be a misnomer because the movement is generally not against globalization per se, but rather specific forms of that process, especially globalization from above. (Terms like alter-globalization or global justice movement are also often affixed to it - for more on this, see Chapter 16.) Thus the various groups and organizations associated with that movement (most generally the World Social Forum) oppose impositions by, for example, the US, Wal-Mart, and the IMF. These organizations and groups cannot be seen as being anti-globalization because in many cases they are global themselves and their ambition is to create and sustain global processes and movements that stand in opposition to globalization from above. Alter-globalization is generally seen to have come of age in protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999 (although there were precursors such as protests in Madrid in 1994). In Seattle, the protestors forced the postp o n e m e n t of the opening session of the W T O meeting and violent protests occurred for days. The media attention to these activities gave important visibility and m o m e n t u m to the alter-globalization movement. This movement took a more collective form with the creation of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001. That organization has met every year since, usually in January because that is the m o n t h that the group that represents m u c h of what it is opposed to, the World Economic Forum (WEF) (composed mainly of business and political leaders, although others - journalists, intellectuals - may also be invited),

Globalization from above: Process that is created and disseminated by large-scale forces, especially in the North, and imposed especially on the South.

Globalization from below: Individual actors, and groups of actors, opposing and acting to oppose globalization.

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d Controversies

meets annually in Davos, Switzerland. Both the WEF and, m o r e importantly in this context, the WSF (as well as the organizations and groups that are involved in it) are global in nature and ambitions and therefore WSF cannot be considered as being anti-globalization. Rather, it is an example of globalization from below. A particularly good example of this is the Italian-based Slow Food Movement. Founded in 1989 and getting its spark from protests against the opening of a McDonald's at the foot of the Spanish Steps in Rome, Slow Food has become a social movement involving over 86,000 members in about 100 countries around the world (Severson 2008: D I , D7). Thus, Slow Food is global in character and involved in various ways in globalization. It is clearly not anti-globalization, but it is opposed to various types of globalization from above, most obviously the global proliferation of McDonald's and other fast-food chains that offer industrialized fast food. More positively, Slow Food is in favor of the support and even global distribution of local foods that are produced by traditional methods and that have not come to be controlled by agro-industries. Slow Food has expanded in various directions and is involved in various activities, many of which are global in scope and opposed to globalization from above. For example, since 2004 it has sponsored a meeting, Terra Madre, that involves representatives from many countries around the world brought together to discuss such issues as organic foods, small-scale farming and fishing, and above all the sustainable production of food. At the same time, it opposes such forms of globalization from above as the global exportation and proliferation of genetically modified foods.

Globaphilia: Emphasis on the positive aspects of globalization, especially greater economic success and the spread of democracy.

Globaphobia: Emphasis on the negative aspects of globalization, especially for the less well-off parts of the globe.

The most general point here is that globalization is not restricted to the actions of those on "top" (e.g. nation-state and M N C leaders), but also comes from the "bottom" in the actions of people and groups that have a different, often conflicting, vision of globalization. Of course, there are also many other people and groups between these two extremes involved in globalization. Perhaps the most important point in this context is that another reason why globalization, or at least any specific type of globalization, is not inexorable is because of the actions of the groups associated with alter-globalization.

The preceding is related to the chasm that exists between those who are fans of, and favor, globalization (globaphilia) and those w h o fear it and are opposed to it (globaphobia) (Kellner and Pierce 2007: 383-95). Those who are globaphiliacs see m u c h to celebrate about globalization. They tend to emphasize its positive, and to deemphasize its negative, sides. Those associated with globaphobia tend to see people as "victims" of globalization and its largely negative consequences. Then there are middle-ground positions on this: "neither globaphobia nor globaphilia seem entirely justified. Globalization is neither a limitless source of benefit to humanity, as some claim, nor is it guilty of all the ills for which it is held responsible" (de la Dehesa 2006: x).

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

GLOBAPHILIA A great deal of attention has been devoted, at least until recently, to the economic success attributed to globalization (Wolf 2005). It is clear to supporters that the North has gained disproportionately from globalization. There is a tendency to ignore the "losers" in the process, including not only most of the South, but also those in the North who have not been beneficiaries of these economic gains. While the losers are ignored, they are expected to take solace in the assumption that while they may not yet have gained much, they will soon, if only they are patient. Adopted here is the view that a "rising sea raises all boats" and eventually most, if not all, will be beneficiaries of globalization's economic advances. Another positive view associated with globaphilia is globalization will bring with it increasing democratization. There is an assumption that economic progress leads to democracy and/or democracy leads to economic progress (Friedman 2002). In addition, there is the view that democracy itself is being spread by globalization. The benign view on this issue is that more and more people around the world are coming to the view that democracy is preferable to any other form of government and they are taking the steps needed to bring that form of government to more and more nations. The more malignant view, one that globaphiliacs are loath to admit publicly (and maybe even privately), is that it is pressure from the US, and perhaps even military intervention by the US (as in Iraq and Afghanistan), that is the m o t o r force behind the global movement toward democracy (assuming that there is such a movement and it is not clear that there is as, for example, in the failure, at least thus far, to bring democracy to Iraq; also of note is the military coup in late 2006 that overthrew the democratically elected [but likely corrupt] government in Thailand and instituted, at least for the time being, a military dictatorship). There are various other positive outlooks associated with globaphilia including the idea that globalization is furthering the spread of "civil society" (Kaldor 2007: 153-7; Keane 2003). Civil society (see Chapter 6) involves those organizations and institutions that are separable from the nation-state and the market and that are able to represent some alternative, if not opposition, to them and their hegemony. The spread of democracy throughout the world is seen as furthering civil society in those countries that move in that direction. After all, the ability of civil society to stand up to the power of the state and the market serves to reduce authoritarianism and to foster democratization. Furthermore, globalization is seen as bringing with it global organizations, especially INGOs like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation, that are themselves part of global civil society. Characteristically, what globaphiliacs ignore is the ways in which globalization can adversely affect civil society through the power of some global INGOs (e.g. World Economic Forum) as well as through global processes such as the market, the emergence and spread of authoritarian regimes, and military incursions. All of these can short circuit, and even destroy, indigenous civil society.

Issues, Debates, and Controversies

GLOBAPHOBIA While globaphilia predominates, at least in the United States, there is no shortage of globaphobia there, and more generally in other parts of the world, especially the less developed areas. Clearly m u c h of the criticism of globalization, especially as it relates to capitalism, comes from scholars, especially those who are more liberal and left-leaning. There is also no shortage of m o r e popular criticisms of globalization from not only the left (e.g. N o a m Chomsky [2003]) but also the right (e.g. Lou Dobbs [2004]). Furthermore, there is the now widespread alterglobalization movement that has its basis in critical perspectives on globalization. Lou Dobbs is a prominent conservative critic of globalization. He is best known as a US TV newscaster, but has recently taken to authoring books on globalization, especially attacks on outsourcing, immigration, and the declining fortunes of the American middle class (Dobbs 2004). While Dobbs has moved from a conservative Republican base to being critical of at least some of the policies of American business as they relate to these issues (Auleta 2006: 66ff.), his position remains highly conservative in the sense that he wants to protect Americans, especially American jobs, from both outsourcing and competition from immigrants, especially those in the country illegally. Dobbs is concerned with the tendency of American firms to outsource (Ritzer and Lair 2007: 307-29; forthcoming) work now performed by workers in the US to other parts of the world. In Dobbs's view, this means that in their drive to lower costs and thereby increase profits, American firms (which are, as we have seen, increasingly multi-national and therefore increasingly difficult to think of as American) are willing, even eager, to sacrifice the jobs and livelihoods of American workers. He operates with a zero-sum model with the gain of jobs in other countries directly linked to the loss of jobs in the US. We will critically analyze this view later (see Chapter 8), but suffice it to say that this is major conservative criticism of globalization. 10

Dobbs also criticizes the flood of immigrants, especially those who are illegal, into the United States. In his view this, too, poses a threat to American workers who are losing jobs to such immigrants willing to work for far less and with few if any benefits. Once again, Dobbs's position is essentially a conservative one (even though the immigration policies of the conservative former US President George W. Bush were subjected to scathing criticism by Dobbs) because he wants to conserve the jobs and lifestyles of Americans. Here, as in the case of outsourcing, Dobbs has little or no interest in the well-being of immigrants to the US (again, especially of those in the country illegally), to say nothing of workers in India and in other less developed parts of the world who are the recipients of work outsourced from the US. 11

When we turn to criticisms from the left, there is no shortage of them either, including from such notable political figures as Fidel Castro of Cuba and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. The latter, in a speech to the United Nations in 2006, lambasted the US as an imperialistic nation endeavoring to create a world empire through globalization. In the process, Chavez called President George W. Bush a "devil." At several points during his speech he held aloft a b o o k authored by the noted American linguist, turned left-wing political analyst, N o a m Chomsky (2003).

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

Noam Chomsky is not opposed to globalization per se. Rather, his target is neoliberal globalization dominated by the US and its economic interests (2003: 24). To put it another way, he is opposed to corporate globalization, a process aimed at opening markets in order to maximize profits and the interests and economic well-being of investors. However, he favors globalization as it is represented by, for example, the labor movement and by the World Social Forum. In other words, Chomsky favors globalization from below rather than from above; he favors alterglobalization. Most generally, he argues that no one can really oppose globalization as an overall process; it is the specific ways in which it is presently operating that he and other left-wing critics oppose. Chomsky is critical of neo-liberal economic globalization on several grounds. For one thing, such globalization is largely sponsored by the US and is designed to further its interests as well as those of American corporations and the "haves" within the US. More generally, it works to the benefit of the North in general, and the elites there, as well. Related to this is the fact that globalization of this type benefits the few in the world, but does not benefit the masses, the "people." Chomsky obviously favors a globalization that works to the benefit of the vast majority of people in the world, not just a select few. Chomsky also argues that neo-liberal globalization does not enhance, but rather operates to the detriment of, democracy. That is, it enhances the power of the interlinked corporate and state leaders who exert control over the economy, and much else, without being answerable, accountable to the people. Privatization, which he sees as one element of neo-liberalism, "reduces the arena of potential democratic choice" (2003: 138). Furthermore, with truly important matters usurped by those in power, the people are left to decide democratically upon relatively trivial matters: "What remains of democracy is largely the right to choose among commodities" (2003: 139). As an American, and as a world-famous scholar, Chomsky's stinging attacks on the US are particularly notable. He is critical of not only America in general, and of its economic actions, but also of its political and military undertakings. He was particularly critical of American actions throughout the world during the presidency of George W. Bush. He sees these as part of an American effort to achieve hegemony in the world. It is the vehemence of his critique of the US, and the fact that it is offered by a notable American, that led Chavez to hold Chomsky's book aloft at that UN meeting. Moving beyond specific arguments such as those offered from the right (Dobbs) and the left (Chomsky), what are the more general criticisms of the globaphobics? As is clear from the above, a major criticism is that globalization has not had the positive effects that globaphiliacs like Friedman assume and assert. The critics tend to emphasize globalization's negative effects on the less well-off, especially in the South. The latter are seen as losing more than they gain from globalization. Indeed, what is often emphasized is that instead of catching up as a result of globalization, many of those in the less developed world fall farther behind those in the developed world; the gap grows wider rather than narrower as a result of globalization. Thus, global capitalism, like capitalism in general, serves to benefit the "haves" while disadvantaging the "have nots"; it makes the latter's economic situation worse rather

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

than better, at least relatively. To put this another way, the globaphobic view is that globalization leads to greater global inequality (although this is a hotly debated issue in sociology; see Chapter 14). This is in stark contrast to at least one of the implications of Friedman's "flat world" thesis that globalization is leading to greater global equality. Needless to say, the globaphiliacs have little use for the globaphobics (and vice versa). For example, Martin Wolf, a prominent neo-liberal, often argues that the criticisms of globalization are "wrong," "almost entirely mistaken," "largely, though not entirely, groundless," and so on. Wolf calls one of the most important recent critical works in globalization, Hardt and Negri's Empire (see Chapter 5), an "absurdity" (Wolf 2005: 57). His most general judgment of the critics is the following: The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the collapse of the Soviet c o m m u n i s t tyranny, an unprecedentedly rapid spread of democracy and nigh on universal economic liberalization. East and South Asia, h o m e to 55 per cent of humanity, enjoyed a leap towards prosperity. Yet critics of globalization talk of this period of h o p e and achievement as if it were a catastrophe. Some do so out of a genuine and understandable dismay over the extent of poverty and misery in a world of plenty, b u t then reach the wrong conclusion on the causes and cures. Others do so because they lament the death of the revolutionary tradition that held sway over the imaginations of so m a n y for two centuries. Most of these critics compare the imperfect world in which we live with a perfect one of their imagining. It is in their way of viewing what has happened in the world, rather than the details of their critique, that those hostile to global economic integration are most in error. (Wolf 2005: 308, italics added)

FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND Some scholars have sought to find some sort of middle ground position between the two extremes discussed above. One example is In Defense of Globalization by the well-known economist, Jagdish Bhagwati (2004). However, the title indicates the problems involved in finding such a compromise position since the book is mainly a defense of globalization, especially the economics of it, in the face of a raft of criticisms. Bhagwati uses hard data, subjective impressions, and personal experiences to argue that, in the main, economic globalization has been a good thing. However, he admits that left to itself globalization will produce good results, but not necessarily the best results. Thus, he grudgingly acknowledges that there are not only benefits, but also problems, in globalization today: "Everything does not necessarily improve every time! There are occasional downsides" (2004: 228). His solution to the problems, his suggestion on how to make globalization better, is to manage the process by coming up with more appropriate social policies. Managing globalization is heresy to most economists (especially neo-liberals) who believe in a market free of outside interference, but Bhagwati is willing to deviate from established economic dogma. In the process, he offers a comparatively balanced position, but nonetheless his work is most strongly associated with globaphilia. 12

A similar position is taken by Martin Wolf, w h o admits that there are problems with economic globalization, but traces most of them not to the global economy

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversi

but to the nation-state. To some degree, the source of the problem is the mere existence of nearly 200 sovereign states in the world today. More important are the differences in those states in terms of how well they are run, especially how well they run the economy. It is this difference among and between states that is the source of inequality among individuals across the globe. Among the political problems identified by Wolf (2005: 320) are "hypocrisy, greed and stupidity that so often mar our politics, in both developing and developed countries." If we want to make the world a better place, in Wolf's view, we must look to the state and these problems and not to the market economy which, while not perfect, is the best hope we have for greater prosperity and equality. Wolf's middle-ground position, if we can call it that, would be more convincing if he took more seriously the problems in, and produced by, the global economy Finally, de la Dehesa takes a middle-ground position by arguing that globalization, "although positive overall, entails certain unavoidable, but mainly temporary, negative economic, social, political, and cultural consequences that must be urgently addressed" (2007:2). De la Dehesa closes his analysis with a long list of the criticisms of globalization and his views on each. •

While "globalization has been accused of increasing the world's poverty level," de la Dehesa concludes that the data and evidence "tend to demonstrate how the world's absolute and relative poverty has been reduced significantly since the 1980s, while globalization has gathered m o m e n t u m " (2007: 294). • Globalization "has been accused of significantly increasing the world's inequality," but while measurement is problematic, "there is a considerable a m o u n t of empirical evidence demonstrating that inequality among the citizens of the world has been reduced, albeit quite modestly" (2007: 295). • "[I]t is argued that globalization has enabled multinationals to acquire more power than states and governments and that they have become bigger than most countries." However, "[njeither of these two arguments is substantiated by available empirical evidence" (2007: 2 9 5 - 6 ) . • While "multinationals have been accused of exploiting workers in developing countries, paying them much lower wages and making them work in shameful, undignified conditions" . . . "[e]xcept for a few very notable cases, fortunately in a diminishing trend, there is extensive empirical evidence that reaches just the opposite conclusion" (2007: 296). • He accepts the accusation that "developed countries have been accused of maintaining high levels of protectionism on the goods and services exported by developing countries, such as agricultural and food products, textiles, footwear and clothing," but there is "much evidence that, on average, developing countries protect their production much more than developed countries, even though their protection is m u c h less widespread" (2007: 298). • •

He is outraged by the "stinginess" of the developed countries and their reduction of, rather than increase in, aid to developing countries. It is "partly true" that international financial organizations (e.g. IMF, World Bank) act in the interests of the developed countries.

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d Controversies

• • •

The World Bank does not always work well as far as developing countries are concerned. Financial crises have always existed, but it is surprising that the financial markets have not gotten better than they have in dealing with them. He agrees with, and is most concerned about, the fact that "the huge d e m o graphic imbalance between wealthy and poor countries could spark a very severe and unsustainable situation in the long run" (2007: 305).

While de la Dehesa presents a reasonably balanced picture, it must be remembered that it is from an economist, reviewing work in economics, who, when all is said and done, finds globalization to be positive.

There are those who do not necessarily see globalization as inexorable, or as moving ahead inexorably, but who nonetheless think the process has gone too far. Needless to say, there are those who vehemently disagree with this and argue that globalization has not gone nearly far enough. There are, for example, those who argue that in the economic realm many barriers remain to free trade and that among the things that need to be done is the elimination of those barriers. Then there are those who argue that there is far more to globalization than simply free trade and who want to see globalization proceed farther so that it leads to freedom for h u m a n k i n d in general. Those who argue that globalization has gone too far tend to be critics of it in general, or of particular aspects of globalization. Dani Rodrik has written a book entitled Has Globalization Gone Too Far . (1997) arguing that globalization may have gone too far in the ways in which it has adversely affected social stability. The following are the specific areas in which, in his view, globalization has gone too far: 7

1.

" . . . reduced barriers to trade and investment accentuate the asymmetries between groups that can cross international borders . . . and those that cannot" (1997: 4). Professionals, entrepreneurs, and skilled works can cross borders easily; the unskilled and unemployed cannot. This obviously makes for great inequality. Furthermore, the fact that many workers can move from one country to another serves to erode the social contract that existed for a long period of time between workers and employers in many nations. That contract entailed regular increases in wages and benefits for workers within a country in exchange for having them desist from work stoppages. The stable relationship between employers and workers in various countries has eroded.

2.

" . . . globalization engenders conflicts within and between nations over domestic norms and the social institutions that embody them" (1997: 5). The standardization that is increasingly characteristic of global trade comes into conflict with, and may undermine, domestic norms and institutions. Furthermore, the norms

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

and institutions of one nation may conflict with those of another. In either case, national and global stability is undermined. " . . . globalization has made it exceedingly difficult for governments to provide social insurance" (1997: 6). Clearly social insurance has been a source of internal stability within the nation-states that were able to offer it and as it disappears people's lives are likely to be disrupted radically. Rodrik is operating within a limited economic frame in this discussion, but within it he points to various ways in which globalization has gone too far. However, there is a far more radical and a far broader view on this that stems from the alter-globalization movement. In this view, the problems identified by Rodrik are minor matters compared to the enormous problems caused by globalization, especially the growing disparity between the global haves and have nots and the possibility of growing hostility between them. Then there is the damage to the environment caused by the expansion of global capitalism with the possibility of increased global warming and ultimately the destruction of great parts of the planet and, under certain extreme scenarios, of the planet as a whole. Many of those who worry about global warming feel that we have already gone too far down this road and that global changes are underway that are irreversible.

There are clearly large groups of people who feel disadvantaged, if not oppressed and exploited, by various aspects of, and by some groups and organizations involved in, globalization. What can they do about the problems as they perceive them?

NOTHING! In this view, globalization is an inexorable process and there is nothing that can be done to stop it - it is a "runaway world." While there is clearly great economic and political power involved in and behind globalization, the idea that nothing can be done about it only serves to reify the process. Reification is the idea, derived from Marxian theory, that people come to accord social processes a reality of their own and come to feel that even though they created, and in fact are in many ways, those processes, there is nothing they can do about them (Ritzer 2008c: 278-9). As a result, these processes come to have a life of their own and instead of being controlled by people, they come to control people. While reification certainly occurs, it is not inevitable. Those who see globalization as inevitable and beyond their control are guilty of reifying the process and if they persist in doing so, it will be beyond their control; there will be nothing to be done about it. However, reification, like globalization, is a social process and this means that people are involved in, create, and regularly re-create both reified and globalized structures and processes through their involvement (or lack of involvement) in them (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Thus,

Reification. People come to accord social processes a reality of their own and come to feel that there is nothing they can do about them.

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

just as people create these realities, they can certainly change them by altering the nature of their involvement in them. Of course, this is no easy matter, but in principle no social process, including one as all-encompassing as globalization, is inexorable; all social processes are open to change by those who create them and are involved in them.

EVERYTHING! The antithetical point of view takes seriously the idea that people construct their social realities, including globalization, and therefore makes it clear that globalization can be affected by their actions. Indeed, it is possible, in this view, not only to slow or alter globalization, but also to stop the process completely. This extreme view seems as unrealistic as its polar opposite. For one thing, globalization has been going on for some time, in some eyes for centuries, if not millennia. For another, there are many different people, groups, organizations, and nation-states involved in globalization and while some may want to dismantle the process, there are many others deeply involved in, and highly committed to, it. And they will fight hard to resist any efforts to alter the process in any significant way. Furthermore, the latter are often the most powerful of the agents involved in globalization (again, MNCs and nation-states, among others, that benefit greatly from it) and they likely constitute powerful opposition to any effort to change the process, let alone dismantle it. It would seem that those who wish to put an end to globalization would need to deal also with far wider political (e.g., democracy) and economic systems (e.g., capitalism), as well as other systems (e.g., cultural) that are key components of globalization and have deep and vested interests in it and its continuation.

NECESSARY ACTIONS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY This is the view that whatever problems exist in globalization are already being addressed not only by major players like the UN, IGOs (e.g. International Monetary Fund), nation-states, and MNCs, but also by a variety of INGOs that seem to be growing in importance and power in a global world. It is hard to take the actions of the UN, IGOs, nation-states, and MNCs too seriously in this context because they have such vested interests in globalization that they are only likely to undertake and support changes on the margins of the process. There are certainly INGOs that are trying to address problematic aspects of globalization (e.g. Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, Slow Food). However, while such INGOs are important, they pale in comparison to the strength of nation-states and M N C s that oppose them, to say nothing of such IGOs as the World Bank, the IMF, and so on, that are devoted to the continuation, if not expansion, of globalization.

MORE, PERHAPS MUCH MORE, NEEDS TO BE DONE Many activists, even those involved in INGOs opposed to globalization in its current form, feel that not enough is being done, that much more needs to be done, to

Global Issues, Debates, and Controversies

deal with at least the most problematic aspects of globalization, if not the process as a whole. Given the great problems associated with globalization already mentioned to this point and to be discussed m u c h more throughout this volume, it is clear that this is the view that is closest to the one taken here. Much can be done and needs to be done to address the ills associated with globalization. In terms of specifics, what needs to be done is defined by the various problems associated with globalization. All of those that can be addressed need to be addressed and they should be addressed in the order of their negative effects on the largest n u m b e r of people in the largest areas of the globe. Clearly, that means that what needs to be addressed first is the wide range of problems traceable to globalization as they are experienced in, especially, the South, as well as in the impoverished areas in the North.

The study of globalization is h o m e to significant debates and controversies. The major split is between globalists and the skeptics. The "great globalization debate" engages with the question of the very existence of globalization. Globalists argue that globalization exists and it encompasses the entire globe. Skeptics contend that there is no such thing as globalization since a significant portion of the world's population is excluded from the processes associated with it. While the globalists observe one broad process of globalization, the skeptics point to not one, but many globalizations. Globalists consider globalization an increasingly powerful p h e n o m e n o n , which, among other things, has led to the decline of the nation-state. The skeptics respond by pointing out that, in recent years, the nation-state has reasserted itself and regained its role as a key world player. Globalists view globalization as a new process while the skeptics argue that it is simply a new term for an old, even, ancient process. Economically, globalists emphasize structures such as the multi-national corporations (MNCs), the transnational economy, and the emergence of a new global division of labor. The skeptics retain a focus on national economies and nation-state-based regional conglomerations, arguing that there are few genuine M N C s today. The globalists maintain that while the continuing power of nation-states is undeniable, their ability to control economic markets is steadily declining. In terms of the global order, the globalists observe the development of various relationships in the global world which do not involve the government. On the other hand, skeptics contend that the world continues to be dominated by relations among and between national governments. Culturally, globalists tend to accept the idea of a culture c o m m o n to most areas of the world. Skeptics generally reject the idea of a c o m m o n global popular culture and argue that culture is becoming increasingly varied. The origin of globalization can be analyzed through five perspectives. First, globalization can be seen as being hardwired into humans, in the form of a basic urge for a better life. This instinct results in the spread of globalization through

Issues, Debates, and Controversies

commerce, religion, politics, and warfare. Second, globalization may be perceived as a long-term cyclical process. In this view, there have been other global ages prior to the present one, and each age is destined to contract and disappear, after attaining a peak. Third, globalization can be viewed as a series of historical epochs or waves, each with its own point of origin. A fourth perspective argues that the multiple points of origin of globalization are located in seminal historical events. A fifth view focuses on broader, more recent changes in the twentieth century It argues that the global processes in motion prior to WW II were more limited in geographic scope and less intensive than the global processes of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. There exist various types of globalizations. Some major categories include economic globalization, political globalization, cultural globalization, globalization of religion, science, health and medicine, globalization of sport, and globalization of higher education. Rather than a single point of origin for globalization as a whole, there are separate points of origin for different globalizations. The factors that drive globalization are also hotly debated. The materialist approach tends to identify objective factors such as capitalism, technology, and multinational corporations as the driving forces of contemporary globalization. The idealist position stresses the role of idea systems, information, and knowledge as the prime movers in the process. Alternatively, we can see globalization as being driven by both material and ideal factors. Disputes exist regarding the future development and expansion of globalization. Some view globalization as an inexorable process. Here, it is important to distinguish between globalization from above and globalization from below. Globalization from above is a process created and disseminated by large-scale forces, especially those associated with the North. Globalization from below, which involves individual actors as well as small groups of actors opposing globalization, can serve to make the process less inevitable, and even derail it completely. A difference of opinion exists between globaphiliacs and globaphobics. Globaphiliacs emphasize the positive aspects of globalization. They argue that globalization leads to great economic growth and a contingent spread of democratization and civil society. Globaphiliacs tend to deemphasize its negative aspects, particularly the people who have not been beneficiaries of the process. The globaphobics critique of globalization is diverse, emerging not only from left and liberal quarters, but also from the conservative right. These critics emphasize the negative impact of globalization on the less well-off portions of the world's population. They contend that globalization leads to greater inequality. Some scholars adopt a middle ground in this debate. Large groups of people feel disadvantaged by various aspects of globalization. Some are of the opinion that globalization is an inexorable process. Others argue that not only can the process be slowed down, it can be stopped completely. Another view is that the problems existing in globalization are being addressed by major players as well as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). However, many activists feel that much more needs to be done to deal with the most problematic aspects of globalization.

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1.

Is the current era u n i q u e in terms of globalization? W h a t factors contribute to or detract f r o m this uniqueness?

2. 3.

Is g l o b a l i z a t i o n a h o m o g e n i z i n g process? Discuss. Define globalization from below. Is it capable of offering a d e q u a t e resistance to the pressures created by globalization from a b o v e ?

4.

Discuss the different drivers of globalization. A r e materialist factors more

influential than

idealist factors?

5.

Is g l o b a l i z a t i o n an inexorable process? S h o u l d it be?

6.

D o e s g l o b a l i z a t i o n lead to a "flat w o r l d " ? Discuss.

ADDITIONAL READINGS David Held a n d A n t h o n y McGrew. " T h e Great Globalization D e b a t e : A n Introduct i o n . " In D a v i d H e l d a n d A n t h o n y M c G r e w , eds. The Global Transformations Reader: An

Introduction

Hoffman,

to

Stanley.

the

Globalization

"Clash

Debate.

Cambridge:

of Globalizations."

Polity,

2000:

Foreign Affairs 8 1 , 4 ,

1-50.

2002:

104-

15. Martin

Wolf.

Noam

Chomsky.

Why Globalization

Works.

N e w H a v e n : V a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 5 .

Hegemony or Survival: America's

Quest for Global Dominance.

New

York: Metropolitan Books, 2003. J a g d i s h B h a g w a t i . In Defense of Globalization. N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2004. Guillermo

de

and Income Dani

Rodrik.

la

Dehesa.

Distribution. Has

What Do

Maiden,

Globalization

MA:

Gone

We Know About Globalization? Issues Blackwell, Too

Far?

of Poverty

2007.

Washington,

DC:

Institute

for

I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c s , 1997.

NOTES 1

The title of this chapter is derived from an antho-

5

logy I edited many years ago. See Ritzer (1972). 2

By the way, this idea of such a basic " u r g e " is quite

6

somewhat with the discussion of types of flows in

(and others) as being suggestive of "essentialism,"

the preceding chapter. This is the case because types

characteristic of humans that lies at their essence and

of globalization are, to a large degree, types of flows. 7

To take another example, Wolf (2005: 19) says:

explains much of what they do. See Ritzer (1997a).

"Globalization is defined in what follows as inte-

Robertson's analysis ends at this point since his essay

gration of economic activities, via markets." See also

was published in 1990. 4

Not surprisingly, this discussion of types overlaps

controversial and is critiqued by postmodernists or the notion that there is some fundamental

3

http://news.yahoo.eom/s/ap/20061110/ap_on_bi_ge/ asia_iron_silk_road_1.

Or as an end to at least a phase of globalization, see James (2001).

Rodrik (1997). 8

See Chapter 5 for a discuss of Friedman's work in the context of neo-liberalism.

G l o b a l Issues, D e b a t e s , a n d C o n t r o v e r s i e s

9

Goffman (1961: 81). The quotation: "To be awkward

there was a substantial decrease in the number of

or unkempt, to talk or move wrongly, is to be a

illegal immigrants from the rest of Latin America

dangerous giant, a destroyer of worlds. As every

and the Caribbean In 2008. See Ginger Thompson

psychotic and comic ought to know, any accurately improper move can poke through the thin sleeve

(2008: A17). 11

of immediate reality." 10

However, illegals do work most Americans are loath to accept and are willing (often they have

However, the " f l o o d " seems to have declined. Since

little choice) to work under conditions that most

2005 there has been a yearly average of 500,000

American workers would find intolerable.

Illegal Immigrants to the US from Mexico, but it had averaged 800,000 a year between 2000 and 2004;

12

This is also true of de la Dehesa (2006).

Imperialism •

The

n e w imperialism

Colonialism •

Post-colonialism

Development Westernization Easternization Comparisons with Globalization The Era of the "Posts" Chapter Summary

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism a n d More

G

lobalization has come to be the preeminent term for describing and thinking about processes that affect, and structures c o m m o n to, large portions of the world today. However, there are many other concepts that either describe earlier historical, or contemporary, realities that deal with at least a portion of that which is encompassed by globalization. In this chapter we deal with several concepts that are related to globalization - imperialism (Berberoglu 2003), colonialism (and post-colonialism), development (and dependency), Westernization, and Easternization. The next chapter picks up the discussion and focuses exclusively on one other concept that is usually closely linked to globalization - Americanization (as well as the anti-Americanism that often accompanies it).

We devote much more attention to Americanization than the other processes even though there is much to indicate, and many scholars argue (and as will be discussed in many places in this book), that the era of American preeminence in the global arena is in decline and can only fall further in the future. For example, in a recent book Fareed Zakaria (2008) argues that we are living in a "post-American world." While there is m u c h to recommend such arguments, the fact is that Americanization was of great global importance after WW II and until very recently. While it is greatly weakened, it remains to this day an important global force. Furthermore, even if it were to disappear tomorrow (a highly unlikely possibility), its effects throughout the world would linger and be felt for many years, decades, or even centuries to come. One other reason for devoting an entire chapter to Americanization and anti-Americanism is that it has attracted the attention of many popular writers and scholars and as a result there is a huge literature on the topic that is not easy to deal with in a few pages. It is important to point out early on that while all of these concepts are discussed separately, many of them overlap, sometimes quite substantially. For example, imperialism is sometimes difficult to distinguish from colonialism; Americanization is a sub-type of Westernization and it has also involved imperialism, colonialism, and a commitment to development (and dependency). Similar overlaps a b o u n d a m o n g and between all of these concepts. Furthermore, globalization cannot be completely divorced from these other ideas. In some cases their past impact lingers in the global age and they continue to affect globalization. In other cases, they continue to be viable and to affect, and even to be part of, globalization.

Imperialism: Methods employed by one nationstate to gain power over an area(s) and then to exercise control over it.

Imperialism is a broad concept that describes various methods employed by one country to gain control (sometimes through territorial conquest) of another country (or geographic area) and then to exercise control, especially political, economic, and territorial, over that country (or geographic area), and perhaps many other countries (as, most famously, did the British Empire). It is an idea and reality that came of age in the mid- to late 1800s (although its history, as we will see, is far more ancient), and is therefore rooted, at least since that time, in the idea of the nation-state and the control that it exercises over other nation-states as well as less well-defined geographic areas.

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism a n d More

Imperialism can encompass a wide range of domains of control. In the era of the cultural t u r n in sociology, the latter is of increasing interest and concern and has come to be labeled cultural imperialism (more specific manifestations of cultural imperialism are sufficiently important to earn a label of their own with the most important being media imperialism [see Chapters 9 and 10 for a discussion of these two forms of imperialism]). 1

The term imperialism itself comes from the Roman imperium (Markoff 2007b: 609-14) and was first associated with domination and political control over one or more neighboring nations. The term "empire" is derived from imperium and it was used to describe political forms that had characteristics of Roman rule, especially the great power of the leader (the Roman imperator or emperor) and the huge chasm between the power of the ruler and the ruled (Gibbon 1998). Over time, the notion of empire, and of the process of imperialism, came to be associated with rulership over vast geographic spaces and the people who lived there. It is this characteristic that leads to the association between imperialism and globalization. In fact, many of the processes discussed in this book u n d e r the heading of globalization - trade, migration, communication, and so on - existed between the imperial power and the geographic areas that it controlled. The term imperialism came into widespread use in the late nineteenth century as a number of nations (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, France, United States) competed for control over previously undeveloped geographic areas, especially in Africa. (Before that, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands had been other leading imperialist nations.) While used mainly descriptively at first, imperialism came to have a negative connotation beginning, perhaps, with the Boer War (1899-1902). Questions were being raised about the need for political control by the imperial powers. Also being questioned was the longstanding rationale that the "superior" cultures associated with imperial powers were necessary and beneficial to the "inferior" cultures they controlled. While it is true that much culture flowed from the imperial nations to the areas they controlled, culture flowed in the other direction, as well. Imperial nations exercised great, albeit variable, political, economic, and cultural control over vast portions of the world. In terms of political power, Great Britain exercised great control over a vast empire well into the twentieth century (that included the United States until the end of the Revolutionary War [also called the "War of Independence" from Great Britain] and the Treaty of Paris in 1783; India until its independence in 1947, and so on). The Soviet Union created a great political empire in the early part of the twentieth century by integrating various nations into it (e.g. the Ukraine), as well as exercising great control over other Soviet bloc nations (e.g. Poland, East Germany). The United States has also been an important, perhaps the most important, imperialistic nation, but its political control has generally (but certainly not always) been more subtle and less direct than that exercised by Great Britain and the Soviet Union in their heyday. Political imperialism declined dramatically after WW II as most imperial nations withdrew, often reluctantly, from the domains they controlled. The imperial power of the Soviet Union continued longer, but it disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. While there is little, if any political imperialism today (i.e.,

Cultural imperialism: Cultures imposing themselves, more or less consciously, on other cultures.

Media imperialism: Western (especially US) media and their technologies dominating less developed nations, cultures.

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism and More

the representatives of an imperial nation ruling a controlled area), other forms of imperialism persist. In terms of imperialism in an economic sense, the actions of the British were most notable. For example, the British East India Company (the Dutch, French, and Swedish also had East India Companies) exercised great economic (as well as political and military) power on behalf of Great Britain in India. Also important was Britain's Hudson's Bay Company which, from its base in Canada, exercised great control over the fur trade, and later other forms of commerce, in North America. However, it is the United States that dominated the world economy, especially throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, as an imperialistic power, at least in an economic sense. Vladimir Lenin (1917/1939), the first leader of the Soviet Union, was an important early theorist of imperialism, especially in his book, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin was influenced by J. A. Hobson's (1902/1905/1938) even earlier 1902 book, Imperialism. The title of Lenin's work well expresses his view that the economic nature of capitalism leads capitalistic economies, and the nation-states that are dominated by such an economic system, to seek out and control distant geographic areas. This was also Hobson's (1902/1905/1938: 85) view: "Thus we reach the conclusion that Imperialism is the endeavour of the great controllers of industry to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods a n d capital they cannot sell or use at home." Control over those areas was needed to provide resources for capitalist industries and also to create new markets for those industries. In other words, a capitalist economic system tended to expand imperialistically throughout the world. 2

While he recognizes that there are other dimensions to imperialism, Lenin sees "purely economic factors" as the most basic, as the essence of imperialism. His definition of imperialism encompasses five dimensions, all of which highlight economic factors: 1.

The concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage that it created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital," of a "financial oligarchy!"]. The export of capital, which has become extremely important, as distinguished from the export of commodities. The formation of international capitalist monopolies which share the world among themselves. The territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers is completed (Lenin 1917/1939: 89). 3

2.

4

3. 4. 5.

The (mainly European) capitalist nations and firms are seen as having expanded throughout the world and as having carved up that world among themselves. From a revolutionary point of view, Lenin sees imperialism as a parasitic system and one that is part, and reflects the decay, of capitalism. Thus, it is an(other) indication of the rottenness of capitalism and the fact that capitalism is either in danger of collapse or that its decayed carcass will eventually prove easy to discard.

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism and More

Ironically, although it was not capitalistic, it was Lenin's Soviet Union that became an important imperial power, especially politically, but also through the economic exploitation of the countries in the Soviet bloc. While political imperialism has all but disappeared, economic imperialism remains quite powerful, if for no other reason than the fact that capitalism remains preeminent in the global economic system. There are several arguments against the view that imperialism is a purely economic phenomenon. For one thing, in its early years the flow of profits to the dominant countries was not as great as many assumed. For another, imperialism had much more to do with European politics and competition among European nation-states. Perhaps of greatest importance was the European sense of its superior culture and the belief that it gave Europeans the right to exploit, and in the process civilize, the rest of the "less developed" world (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998:126). Cultural imperialism involved, among many other things, exploration, missionary and humanitarian missions, travel, and the use of education and publishing to disseminate European ideas. For example, wherever in the world they ventured, the French brought with them, among other things, their language and their cuisine. The British brought those things (although their cuisine was far less notable than that of France), as well as others such as their sports, most notably cricket which continues to be a major sport in many of their former colonies, especially India (see Chapter 9) (Appadurai 1996). Thus, today it remains the case that many of the former colonies play the English sport of cricket and engage in spirited matches not only among themselves, but also with England (and, at times, defeating English teams to the consternation of their fans). In what has been described as a form of "neo-imperialism," many in Africa (Economist 2008: February 14), even those who might be highly critical of the North in general, and Great Britain in particular, are avid football (soccer) fans and religiously watch matches being broadcast from Great Britain (Economist 2007: November 1 ["Neo-Imperialism at the Point of a Boot"]). Another form of British cultural imperialism has been exercised by the global presence of the BBC, most notably the BBC World Service (this, of course, is an example of media imperialism). However, the United States has been the most powerful global force from a cultural perspective and that power became particularly notable after the close of WW II and in the second half of the twentieth century. Among the avenues through which the United States has engaged in cultural imperialism is through its movie, television, and book publishing businesses. However, there are many signs in the early twenty-first century that American cultural imperialism has peaked and is in decline (Tunstall 2008). The continuing importance of the idea of imperialism has been challenged in one of the most important books in the study of globalization, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's Empire (2000). In their view, the often heavy-handed, nation-based forms of imperialism described above have been replaced by a far more subtle and complex network of global political/economic/cultural processes that are exercising a new form of control that is better captured, in their view, by the idea of empire rather than imperialism. We will have occasion to examine their work in detail later

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism a n d More

in this book (see Chapter 5), but the key point is that while the process may have changed, efforts at gaining hegemonic control continue unabated. Related to Hardt and Negri's argument is the idea that the decline of the importance of the nation-state makes it difficult to continue to talk in terms of imperialism which, at its base, is a view that a given nation (or elements of it, e.g., in the case of media imperialism, the US's Voice of America) exercises control over other nations (or geographic areas) around the world. It is this decline that leads to Hardt and Negri's more "decentered" view of globalization. That is, imperialism was a modern process and perspective that was "centered" on the nation-state (Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the US), but the declining importance of the nation-state requires a very different view of control exercised on a global scale. To Hardt and Negri it is the power exercised by a decentered empire that has replaced that exercised by imperialism and practiced by nation-states.

THE NEW IMPERIALISM David Harvey (2003) has recently articulated the idea that a "new imperialism" has arisen with the United States as its prime (if not only) representative. He calls this "capitalist imperialism" and sees it as a contradictory fusion of economics and politics. Thus, Harvey offers a more integrated view of imperialism than did Lenin or Hobson. More specifically, it involves a fusion of the political - "imperialism as a distinctively political project on the part of actors whose power is based in command of a territory and a capacity to mobilize its h u m a n and natural resources towards political, economic, and military ends" and the economic - "imperialism as a diffuse political-economic process in space and time in which c o m m a n d over and use of capital takes primacy" (Harvey 2003: 26). There are fundamental differences between the two (political interest in territory and capitalist interest in c o m m a n d , and use, of capital), but the "two logics intertwine in complex and sometimes contradictory ways" (2003: 29). For example, to the American government the Vietnam War made sense from a political point of view, but it hardly made sense from an economic perspective and may even have adversely affected the American economy. More generally, Harvey wonders whether we are now seeing an increase in US political imperialism (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan) while it is declining in importance from the perspective of economic imperialism (e.g. the rise in economic power of China, the EU, India, etc.). To Harvey, the new imperialism is the uncomfortable mix of these two types under the broad heading of capitalist imperialism. In addition, what is "new" here, at least in reference to the classic imperialism of say the British, is that it is the US that is the paradigm for, and the leader in, the new imperialism. Harvey not only describes US imperialism, but is highly critical of it. He sees it as burdened by a series of internal and external contradictions and problems which make it unsustainable in the long term (and perhaps even in the short term). Whether or not he is correct in that prognostication, he makes a useful contribution to our understanding of imperialism by offering a more balanced sense of its economic and political aspects, as well as their interrelationship.

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism and More

Colonialism is clearly related to imperialism (Williams and Chrisman 1994a), and is sometimes used interchangeably with it, but it has a more specific meaning. At the most extreme, imperialism involves a control without the creation of colonies (Harvey 2006: 21). Colonialism generally involves settlers as well as m u c h more formal mechanisms of control than imperialism. Thus, colonialism often entails the creation by the colonial power in the country (or geographic area) that has been colonized of an administrative apparatus to run its internal affairs, including its settlements. Edward Said well describes the key differences between imperialism and colonialism, as well as their relationship to one another: "imperialism means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; 'colonialism', which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory" (cited in Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998: 45). While both imperialism and colonialism involve economic and political (as well as cultural) control, imperialism is (following Lenin) more defined by economic control (and exploitation), while colonialism is more about political control. 5

Although colonialism has an ancient history, it can be said to have had two great and more recent ages. These occurred during and after the Renaissance (fourteenth through seventeenth centuries) and are associated mainly with European societies. The first, beginning in the fifteenth century, was led by European powers, especially Spain and Portugal, and involved creating colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The second, or modern, phase lasted roughly between 1820 and the end of WW I. It involved other European powers (most importantly Great Britain, France, and Germany), as well as the US and Japan. It is important to note that the term colonialism is also used far more broadly to include, for example, "cultural colonialism" (Amsler 2008). This involves "the extension of colonial power through cultural activities and institutions (particularly education and media) or the asymmetrical influence of one culture on another." Culture in this context is a m e d i u m of political and economic control. In spite of such extensions, our focus in this section will be on the classic sense of colonialism (settlement and administration) mentioned above. Some colonies (e.g. India as a colony of the British) persisted well into the twentieth century. However, during that period the m o m e n t u m shifted in the direction of decolonization, or "the process of revealing and dismantling colonialist power in all its forms. This includes dismantling the hidden aspects of those institutional and cultural forces that had maintained the colonialist power and that remain even after political independence is achieved" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1998: 63). Decolonization movements began to succeed with greater frequency as the twentieth century unfolded. They were followed by decolonization and the achievement of political independence (Grimal 1878). Decolonization was particularly important after the close of WW II. That was followed by a period of neo-colonialism (Nkrumah 1965), where efforts at control over the former colonies,

Colonialism: Creation by the colonial power of an administration in the area that has been colonized to run its internal affairs.

Related Processes I: Imperialism, Colonialism and More

and other nation-states, grew much more indirect, subtle (e.g. through cultural and educational institutions), and focused on economic control and exploitation. The subtlety of neo-colonialism made it more insidious and harder to detect and therefore more difficult to resist and combat.

POST-COLONIALISM Postcolonialism: Developments that take place in a former colony after the colonizing power departs.

Today, few, if any, colonies remain with the result that we can now think in terms of post-colonialism (Bhambrah 2007: 8 7 1 - 8 4 ) . Clearly, this implies the era in once-colonized areas after the colonizing power has departed (although post-colonial thinking and work could already be well under way before the colonizing power departs). However, in recent years it has come to take on more specific meanings that relate to various developments that take place in a former colony after the colonizing power departs. For example, it relates to a critical issue in globalization studies today, that of national identity, especially the difficulty of gaining identity (as an Indian, for example) after a colonial power (the British in the case of India) has departed. The most notable work on this is Edward Said's Orientalism (1979/ 1994: 93) which deals with this problem in the context of both overt and more subtle negative stereotypes developed in the West about those who live in the East. The issue raised is the difficulty experienced by "Orientals" in developing a positive identity in light of all of the negativity about t h e m in the West which, of course, dominated the East in various ways (imperialism, colonialism, etc., until very recently). This negativity is especially clear in the history of Western literature (and film) about the East (and, as a result, this issue is of special importance in Edward Said's field of literary criticism). In fact, it is argued that "post-colonial theory was a creation of literary study" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2006: 5). 6

7

8

Post-colonial theorists focus on literary texts for several reasons. For one thing, literary texts can be used as a way of exercising cultural control over the "natives" (Janmohamed 2006: 19-23). For example, textbooks written by the colonial power will reflect its perspective including its right to be in power, its superiority, and the inferiority of the "natives." For another, those texts can be subverted by those who oppose the colonial power and can be used to help bring down its regime. Finally, knowledge of the importance of texts can lead to new texts that can be used by newly freed colonies to portray themselves positively and to better understand, critique, and overcome the often continuing legacies of post-colonialism. These post-colonial texts can be an important base for the new society created in the aftermath of colonialism. However, the focus on texts by post-colonial theorists has been criticized on several grounds. For one thing, it is argued that it is mainly Western intellectuals, especially Europeans, who have produced these texts. Post-colonial thinkers are therefore seen as too closely aligned with those who produced the colonial texts that helped enslave the subalterns. That is, post-colonial scholarship is producing what is "at best only a refined version of the very discourse it seeks to displace" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2006: 11). Furthermore, post-colonialists' orientation as European, or at least European-trained, scholars has led to work that is produced

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for other scholars and therefore largely incomprehensible to the natives without similar academic training. Finally, their work is seen as far removed from the needs and interests of the natives who would be the agents of any movement against colonialism or the legacy of post-colonialism. The work of post-colonialists is seen as quite distant from that of, say, Frantz Fanon (e.g. The Wretched of the Earth [1968]) who wrote in more widely accessible terms and was oriented to practical action to bring down both colonialism and the post-colonial legacy.

Development can be seen as a historical stage (roughly the 1940s to the 1970s) that preceded the global age (McMichael 2008: 21). Specifically, development can be viewed as a "project" that predated the project of globalization. As a project, development was primarily concerned with the economic development of specific nations, usually those that were not regarded as sufficiently developed economically. This project was especially relevant after WW II in helping countries devastated by the war, as well as in the Cold War and the efforts by the Western powers, the US in particular, to help various weak nations to develop economically. Much of the latter was motivated by a desire to keep those countries from falling to the communists and becoming part of the Soviet Empire. The focus was on financial aid in order to strengthen these countries' economies, but development also involved technological and military aid. 9

Development was inherently an elitist project with the nation-states of the North, given, or better taking, the responsibility for the development of the nation-states of the South. (Thus, unlike the later globalization project, development was based on the nation-state as the fundamental unit of concern both as that which was to be aided as well as that which was doing the helping.) The assumption was that not only was the North better off economically (and in many other ways) than the South, but it knew best how the South was to develop. Thus, it tended to help the South on its terms rather than on the S o u t h s own terms. Furthermore, there was an assumption that the North was the model, something approaching the ideal model, and the goal was to make the South as much like the North as possible. This often extended beyond simple economics, to making the South resemble the North in many other ways (culturally, morally, politically, etc.). Implied was the fact that the South was "inferior" to the North in various ways and that the only solution was for it to change, or to be changed, so that it came to resemble the North to a greater degree and in m a n y different ways. This tended to be associated with the "Orientalism" that characterized the North (more the West in this case) as well as its academic work, and thinking, on the South (East). Furthermore, it tended to be associated with efforts by the North to exert control over the nation-states of the South. Thus, development was not simply an economic project, but it was also "a method of rule" (McMichael 2008: 49).

A key aspect of development projects was i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n . That is, in order to undergo development, Southern countries had to develop their own industries instead of focusing on producing for export and relying on imports from other 10

Development: A "project" primarily concerned with the economic development of specific nation-states not regarded as sufficiently developed.

Importsubstitution: Countries (usually in the South) "encouraged" to develop their industries: instead of producing for export, rely on imports.

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countries, especially the North. Thus, for example, developing countries were urged to develop an automobile industry. Such an industry was important not only in itself, but because it would lead to other kinds of development such as "parts manufacturing, road building, service stations . . . in addition to industries such as steel, rubber, aluminum, cement, and paint" (McMichael 2008: 42). Such independence would not seem to be in the interest of the developed nations of the North. For example, wouldn't the US prefer to sell its automobiles to Brazil rather than having Brazil produce its own automobiles? While it might, the fact is that the US and other developed nations of the North benefited from import-substitution development by increasing foreign direct investment (FDI; see Chapter 7) in the industries that emerged in less developed countries and they reaped great profits from these investments. The development project also encompassed a n u m b e r of other elements in the p o s t - W W II period. One was the Marshall Plan, named for then-US Secretary of State George Marshall, which began operation in mid-1947. It was basically a bilateral plan by the US to funnel large sums of m o n e y to European nations (those outside the Soviet orbit) in order to help them to develop (and to keep them beyond the reach of the Soviets). The multilateral Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 and the institutions it created (especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) were, at the time, oriented to similar goals although, as we will see in Chapter 7, they ultimately have come to play a central role in the later globalization project. Also to be included under the heading of the development project was foreign aid offered by developed countries to those that were less developed. This encompassed both financial assistance, as well as aid in terms of food (for example, the US shipping its excess wheat to developing countries). While such aid was certainly helpful in the short run, in the longer run it often adversely affected the ability of some countries to grow and produce their own food (e.g. wheat) and therefore led to greater food dependency in some less developed countries.

Dependency theory: Development of the nationstates of the South contributed to a decline in their independence; to an increase in their dependence on the North.

Many are critical of development theory on a variety of grounds. For example, Paul Collier (2007) critiques those interested in development for focusing on those nations that have had a good chance of succeeding while ignoring the poorest nations (and failed nation-states) that are at the bottom of the global hierarchy on various dimensions (life expectancy, infant mortality, long-term malnutrition, etc.). This currently involves 58 countries that have a population of about one billion people (we will have more to say about this group of nations in Chapter 14). There is also a whole body of work critical of the development project and development theory known as dependency t h e o r y (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). As the name suggests, it emphasizes the fact that the kinds of programs discussed above led not so m u c h to the development of the nation-states of the South, but more to a decline in their independence and to an increase in their dependence on the countries of the North, especially the US. Underdevelopment is not an aberrant condition, or one caused by the less developed nations themselves, but it is built into the development project (as well as into global capitalism). It also involves the idea that instead of bringing economic improvement, development brings with it greater impoverishment. The notion of dependency has wide applicability (e.g., in the food dependency created, at least in part, by food aid).

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A key work in dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank's (1969) "The Development of Underdevelopment." One of his arguments is that behind the whole idea of development is the notion that the present of less developed countries resembles the past of the developed countries. Thus, if the less developed countries simply follow the same path taken by developed countries, they too will become developed. However, the developed countries were never in the same position of less developed countries today; the developed countries were undeveloped while the less developed countries were (and are) underdeveloped. The result is that the path followed by the former is not necessarily the best one for the latter. 11

Frank also rejects the idea that the underdevelopment of a country is traceable to sources internal to that country. Rather, he argues that it is a product of the capitalist system and of the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries within that system. Further, he rejects the idea that the solution to underdevelopment lies in the diffusion of capital, institutions, values, and so on from the developed world. He contends, however, that the less developed countries can only develop if they are independent of most of these capitalist relationships which, after all, are really the cause of their lack of development. It is capitalism that is the cause of development in the developed nations and of underdevelopment in the less developed nations. 12

Dependency theory has tended to w a n e , but it has been replaced, and to some degree incorporated, in a broader theory known as world system t h e o r y (Wallerstein 1974). This theory envisions a world divided mainly between the core and the periphery with the nation-states associated with the latter being dependent on, and exploited by, the core nation-states. Nordstrom (2004:236) critiques this distinction, as well as the North-South differentiation, arguing that the periphery "is not merely 'useful' to cosmopolitan centers; it is critical. It is not the periphery of the economic system; it is central to it." 13

While the development project had some successes, it was basically a failure since the world clearly remained, and remains, characterized by great inequalities, especially economic inequalities, between the North and the South. More pointedly, most nations associated with the South did not develop to any appreciable degree. Indeed, it could be argued that they fell further behind, rather than gaining on, the developed countries. Furthermore, the whole development project came to seen as offensive since it tended to elevate the North, and everything about it, especially its economic system, while demeaning everything associated with the South. In its place, the globalization project at least sounded more equitable since it was inherendy multilateral and multidirectional while development was unilateral and unidirectional with money and other assistance flowing from the North to the South. There is much evidence that the globalization project has not worked out much differently than the development project in terms of differences between the N o r t h and South. Furthermore, many of the institutions created during the period of dependency (those associated with Bretton Woods and the UN) continue to function and play a central role in globalization. This raises the question of whether globalization is simply development with another, less offensive, label. This would be the view taken by those who are critics of neo-liberalism which undergirds m u c h of contemporary economic globalization (see Chapter 5).

World system theory: Sees the world divided mainly between the core and the periphery with the latter dependent on, and exploited by, the core nation-states.

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Westernization: Economic, political, and cultural influence of the West on the rest of the world.

There are many who n o t only associate globalization with Westernization, b u t who see the two as more or less coterminous (Sen 2002: 1-14). This, of course, is closely related to equating globalization with Americanization (see Chapter 4), b u t the latter in this case is subsumed under the broader heading of Westernization, largely by adding its influence to that of Europeanization (Headley 2008). It is also c o m m o n , especially today as a result of globalization, to ascribe a negative connotation to Westernization (as it is to Americanization) if one lives in other parts of the world (although critics in the West also view Westernization negatively), especially the South. Specifically, it is tied closely to the notions and earlier periods of Western imperialism and colonialism. Much of the world now blanches at the idea of Western imperialism or colonialism of any kind . . . and for good reason. However, in rejecting them, what tends to be ignored or excluded is the best of what the West has had to offer, and can still offer, to other parts of the world. Claims of the Westernization of the world are supported in various ways, b u t it is important to recognize both differences within the West, as well as differences between the West and other parts of the world, even those that seem to adopt Western ways (Gray 2000). For example, political democracy is closely associated with the West and the effort to democratize many other parts of the world is linked to Westernization. However, there are great differences between the nature of d e m o cracies in the West (e.g. between the US and Great Britain) and, more importantly, between Western democracies broadly conceived and those that have arisen elsewhere. For example, Pakistan is considered a democracy, b u t it has experienced several periods of autocratic military rule since it was founded in 1947. In late 2007 the country was led by a military leader, martial law had been declared, and the nation was in chaos after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. All of this calls into question Pakistan's commitment to democracy (although Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower, was elected president in late 2008) and its ability to sustain it in the face of many destabilizing forces, including the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban within its borders. Also in 2007, Thailand experienced another of its military coups casting out its duly elected (albeit likely corrupt) leader. Democracies that are periodically subject to being overthrown by disaffected generals are very different from the longlasting democracies in the West. Furthermore, the nitty gritty of the way democracy works on a day-to-day basis is wildly different from one part of the world to another. Finally, there are non-Western areas of the world - most notably China - that have been able to resist democratization totally and remain totalitarian. Similarly, the market economies of the West are seemingly t r i u m p h a n t throughout much of the non-Western world, but the ways in which those markets function elsewhere differs greatly from one location to another. In the West in general (although there is great variation within the West, as well) the market is typically quite open and free (hence the term the "free market"), b u t in other parts of the world such a market is partly or greatly circumscribed. The best example is China in the early

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twenty-first century which in some cases has an open market, b u t in others the market is dominated by state-run enterprises and/or controlled by the state. In its early years the post-Soviet economy was quite anarchic, but more recently, buoyed by the b o o m i n g oil business, it has come to resemble m o r e the Western market, at least in some areas. Westernization goes beyond politics and economics to include a wide variety of other exports to the rest of the world including its technologies, languages (English as the lingua franca [see Figure 3.1 for map showing significant use of "Global English" in the world today] in m u c h of the world; French is still spoken in m a n y places in the world), law (this is especially important in Hardt and Negri's view of the origin of the Empire's "constitution" in the West, especially the US Constitution), lifestyle (the centrality of consumption), food (the global proliferation of Western-style fast food), and so on. Some of the latter is associated more specifically with the US and therefore with Americanization, b u t before we deal with the latter we will discuss a process with the same magnitude as Westernization, at least in terms of point of global origin, "Easternization." However, we close this section with three broad criticisms of Westernization. First, globalization is m u c h more complex than the one-way flow implied by Westernization. Instead, it must be understood "as a process of mutual, if uneven, infiltration: with West permeating the rest and vice versa" (Inda and Rosaldo 2008b: 24). Second, Westernization implies homogenization, that the rest of the world comes to resemble the West, but globalization involves both homogenization and heterogenization. Finally, Westernization "neglects those circuits of culture that circumvent the West - those which serve primarily to link the countries of the periphery with one another" (Inda and Rosaldo 2008b: 25). Thus, for example, for Taiwan, the links with China and Japan may be far more important than those with the West. The growth of other power centers (such as the East, especially China) leads to the view that "there is not just one global cultural power center b u t a plurality of them, even if the West stands out a m o n g these" (Inda and Rosaldo 2008b: 29).

Globalization is often equated to a large extent with Westernization, and more specifically with Americanization. However, this is clearly a very narrow view of globalization that ignores all sorts of processes (e.g., the role of regional powers such as Japan and increasingly China in East Asia). A m o n g the many things that it ignores are many counter-flows and one that is of particular interest is what Colin Campbell (2007) has recently called Easternization, especially the "Easternization of the West." While this process will be discussed here from the point of view of globalization, it is important to point out that the Easternization of the West has, in Campbell's view, far m o r e to do with factors internal to the West than it does with flows from the East. In that sense, it is very different from Westernization which has m o r e to do with flows from the Western parts of the world. Nonetheless, Campbell does accord some importance to the flow of various influences from the

Easternization: Economic and cultural influences of the East on the West.

Figure 3.1 Global English. Places where English has one or more of the following roles: as the national or as an official language,

p. 47)

Geography, Destiny, and Globalization's Rough Landscape [2008] by H. J. de Blij. Chapter 2: The Imperial Legacy of Language,

Encyclopaedia Britannica 2007], and Graddol [2004]. Map used by permission of Oxford University Press Inc. From Power of Place:

R. G. Gordon, Jr. [ed.] Ethnologue: Languages of the World [Dallas: SIL International 2007], Book of the Year 2007 [Chicago:

education, and commerce in plural societies, and as an outpost dating from colonial times. (Data from several sources, including

as a language in which more than 50% of the general population has fluency, as the lingua franca of government, higher

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East to the West. In other words, Easternization is, at least to some degree, another process that can be differentiated from, but related to, globalization. It is probably the case that most Westerners would not think of Easternization as a major influence on their lives. The most obvious influence is undoubtedly the presence and popularity of various ethnic restaurants and cuisine in the West - most importantly Chinese, Thai, Indian, and Japanese food and restaurants. But Campbell points to a wide array of other p h e n o m e n a that are Eastern in origin and that are increasingly visible in the West. Among t h e m are yoga, a "Zen" outlook on life, various beliefs (e.g. reincarnation), vegetarianism, I Ching, Tarot, Runes, and so on. Then there is the impact of Eastern music and musical instruments on the change in the music of the Beatles in the 1960s as well as the Beatles' growing interest in the East in general and Eastern spirituality in particular. While Campbell does not discuss this, we could also add the powerful impact of Eastern manufacturers on the American market, especially the market for automobiles (Toyota, Nissan, and Honda from Japan and now Hyundai from Korea - with the likelihood of a growing impact from the newly rising Chinese auto industry) and electronics (Sony and Panasonic, in particular). It could be argued that Eastern manufacturers are not exporting "Eastern" products to the West (there is nothing "Eastern" about automobiles or video recorders; they were Western inventions), but they have made distinctive innovations in production that greatly enhanced their ability to compete successfully in the West. For example, Toyota introduced the Japanese focus on the collectivity into the production process by, for example, developing "quality control groups" (Ritzer 2001: 2 3 0 - 1 ) . These are groups of workers who meet after work to discuss the production processes and their work routines, weaknesses in them, and ways of improving them. Meritorious ideas are accepted by management and used to improve the production process. The result is not only improved production processes, but also heightened morale as employees see their ideas taken seriously. By "Easternizing" the production of automobiles (and many other things) in this and many other ways (e.g. the ringi system of collective decision making), Toyota (and the other major Japanese manufacturers) was able to catch up with, and vault ahead of, the Western, especially American, manufacturers and capture a major portion of the American (and European) market. They also can be said to have Easternized American manufacturing techniques since when the American companies realized what was happening, they sought to adapt by incorporating many Japanese techniques. For example, some tried to utilize versions of quality circles. 14

Another Japanese innovation - "just-in-time" delivery of needed components rather than the American "just-in-case" system where large quantities of components were kept in stock at great cost when and if they might be needed - was m u c h more widely adopted by American firms, including many not in automobile manufacturing (Schönberger 1982). Companies like Toyota continue to grow (by 2009 it expects to sell 10.4 million automobiles around the world, double its total sales in 2000, becoming the largest automobile company in the world, surpassing General Motors), to expand globally (Toyota is now in 27 countries), and to innovate in many different ways (Maynard

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2008: C1, C4). For example, Toyota is attempting to strike a balance between centralized control by the all-Japanese top management at Toyota City in Japan and giving its operations around the world more autonomy and flexibility. According to Toyota's president, "It's extremely important to have the same c o m m o n Toyota Way infiltrated to employees in all corners of the w o r l d . . . . But on the other hand, in each corner of the world, in each region, there are inherent characteristics that need to be respected" (quoted in Maynard 2008: C I ) . As successful as it has been, Toyota knows that it must innovate and many of those innovations, like those that preceded them, are likely to have a strong global impact. In fact, the chief executive at Ford, which is seeking to reverse its long decline, acknowledges that Toyota is the model for a global approach to the automobile business. The following is one innovation other manufacturers in the US and elsewhere may follow in the future: Workers on the plant floor used to choose the parts they needed to install on each vehicle from bins next to the assembly-line. Now, a crew of workers upstairs loads the required parts into containers. The bins are placed inside the empty car bodies. Workers need only reach for the appropriate parts. After use, the bins are collected and sent upstairs to be refilled. (Maynard 2008: C4) Thus, it is clearly legitimate to discuss Easternization as an important process that is related to globalization. Further, as China continues to explode as a global power, especially economically, we can expect its influence on the West to grow, ushering in a new and expanded form of Easternization. For example, China already has huge reserves in Western currencies, especially American dollars, as a result of its hugely positive balance of trade (far more exports than imports). It possesses the ability, an ability that will grow exponentially in the coming years, to affect greatly the West not only in the way it uses those reserves (e.g. by investing in the West, or not), but also by merely threatening to use those reserves in certain ways. For example, China has so many dollars that should it decide to " d u m p " them for other currencies (say, the euro), the value of the dollar would go into free fall.

Globalization continues apace in the early twenty-first century and, if anything, is increasing in scope and importance. Some of the other processes have all but disappeared (colonialism, development) and others seem to have passed their prime and to be in decline (Westernization, Americanization). It could be argued that imperialism, or at least the "new imperialism," has been incorporated into globalization. Given the rise of China as a global power, Easternization, like globalization, is likely to show dramatic growth in the coming years. Globalization is inherently multi-directional with global flows moving in innumerable directions. It has no single, definable point of geographic origin. All of the others are much more unidirectional, flowing from well-defined points - the imperial powers, the colonial powers, the developed world, the West, the United States, the East.

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Globalization is not nation-state based and is likely, as we will see in several places in this book, to pose a threat to the nation-state. All of the other processes tend to be based in one or more nation-states (e.g. Soviet imperialism, British colonialism) and to affect one or more nation-states (e.g. states