From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen: Political Incorporation in the United States (The New Americans: Recent Immigration and American Society)

The New Americans Recent Immigration and American Society

Edited by Steven J. Gold and Rubén G. Rumbaut

A Series from LFB Scholarly

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Catherine Simpson Bueker

LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC New York 2006

Copyright © 2006 by LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bueker, Catherine Simpson, 1974From immigrant to naturalized citizen / Catherine Simpson Bueker. p. cm. -- (The new Americans) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-59332-137-6 (alk. paper) 1. Immigrants--United States--Political activity. 2. Voting--United States--History. 3. Political participation--United States. I. Title. II. Series: New Americans (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC) JV6477.B84 2006 324.9730086'912--dc22 2006009808

ISBN 1-59332-137-6 Printed on acid-free 250-year-life paper. Manufactured in the United States of America.

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………….......xi CHAPTER 1: Why Immigrant Political Incorporation? An Introduction.....................1 CHAPTER 2: Assessing Immigrant Political Activity................................................19 CHAPTER 3: The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation.....53 CHAPTER 4: The Role of Family...............................................................................93 CHAPTER 5: Does Community Matter?...................................................................121 CHAPTER 6: Gone, but Not Forgotten: The Enduring Influence of Home Society.149 CHAPTER 7: A Look Back, A Look Forward: Contributions & Future Research..181 SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES...……………………………………..193 REFERENCES……………………………………………………...213 INDEX…………………………………............................................225

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LIST OF TABLES TABLE 2.1: Operationalization of Individual Characteristics..............23 TABLE 2.2: Operationalization of Family Characteristics…...............25 TABLE 2.3: Definition of Sub-Samples……………………………...32 TABLE 2.4: Operationalization of Community Characteristics……...35 TABLE 2.5: Operationalization of Country of Origin Characteristics………………………………………….38 TABLE 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables in SubSample A…………………………………………..…...44 TABLE 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables in SubSample C…………………………………………..…...45 . TABLE 2.8: Summary Statistics for Those Eligible to Naturalize, by Immigrant Group……………………….……………....49 TABLE 2.9: Summary Statistics for Those Eligible to Vote, by Immigrant Group…………………………………….....50 TABLE 3.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Immigrants……………………………………………...69 TABLE 3.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Immigrants………..70 TABLE 3.3: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Country of Origin…………………………...………………………79 TABLE 3.4: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Country of Origin…...…80 TABLE 3.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout, Immigrants versus the Native-Born………………………………………...…..86 TABLE 4.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Marital Status………………………………………104 vii

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TABLE 4.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Marital Status.….…….109 TABLE 4.3: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Immigrants and the Native-Born by Marital Status……………...…………110 TABLE 4.4: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status……………..…………..112 TABLE 4.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status………...……...……………………..114 TABLE 5.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition for Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics………..…138 TABLE 5.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout for Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics…………..139 TABLE 5.3: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Mexican Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics………………………………………...143 TABLE 5.4: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Mexican Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics…..…....144 TABLE 6.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Immigrants with Selected Country of Origin Characteristics……...167 TABLE 6.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Immigrants with Selected Country of Origin Characteristics...…………173

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1.1: Potential Paths of Immigrant Political Incorporation…...5 FIGURE 2.1: Estimated Direction of Coefficients…………………...42 FIGURE 2.2: Levels of Political Incorporation among Immigrants with Varying Levels of Education and Income…………..….46 FIGURE 3.1: The Odds of Naturalizing and Voting by Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics…….………………......72 FIGURE 3.2: The Odds of Naturalizing by Country of Origin……....73 FIGURE 3.3: The Odds of Voting by Country of Origin…………….75 FIGURE 3.4: The Odds of Women versus Men Naturalizing and Voting by Country of Origin…..…………………...….83 FIGURE 3.5: The Odds of Immigrants versus Native-Born Voting…87 FIGURE 4.1: The Odds of Naturalizing among Single and Single and Separated versus Married, Co-Residing Immigrants, by Gender……………………………………………...…106 FIGURE 4.2: The Odds of Women versus Men Naturalizing, by Marital Status….............................................................108 FIGURE 5.1: The Odds of Immigrant Naturalization in a Metro Area with Increasing Rates of Foreign-Born versus Non-Metro Residence...................................................................... 140 FIGURE 5.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout in a Metro Area with Increasing Rates of Foreign-Born versus Non-Metro Residence……………………………………………...141 FIGURE 6.1: The Effect of Rising GDP in the Country of Origin on the Odds of Naturalizing among Immigrants of Differing Educational and Economic Levels…………...……….170 FIGURE 6.2: The Odds of Immigrant Voter Turnout under Three Different Country of Origin Scenarios……………......175 ix

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are numerous people and institutions I would like to thank for making this book a reality. Brown University provided me with significant financial support through a University Fellowship, allowing me to complete my research in a timely manner. Calvin Goldscheider and Michael White, both in the Department of Sociology at Brown, and Alan Zuckerman, in the Department of Political Science, all provided me with invaluable feedback and support throughout this project, constantly pushing me to think more deeply about the findings. Greg Elliott, of the Department of Sociology, lent unending hours assisting me in my statistical analysis. I would like to thank Leo Balk of LFB Scholarly Publishing, and Steven Gold and Ruben Rumbaut, editors of the series The New Americans: Recent Immigration and American Society, for initially contacting me and publishing my work. Finally, my proofreaders, David Simpson and John Bueker, are owed tremendous gratitude. As my father and husband, respectively, they walked the dangerous line of being both family and critics. I really do appreciate all they have done.

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CHAPTER 1

Why Immigrant Political Incorporation? An Introduction The United States is frequently viewed as a country of immigrants, a great experiment that has successfully incorporated each new wave of immigration into the various folds of American culture. This is a country founded by immigrants from Europe, coming voluntarily to seek religious freedom and economic opportunity, and largely built by involuntary migrants from Africa. Individuals have come to the United States from virtually every country and for every reason. Some have even viewed the historical and ongoing flows of migrants to American shores as the “defining attribute of American society” (Hirschman, Kasinitz & DeWind, 1999, p.1). Another way Americans commonly view their country is as a great democracy, a place where each individual has the freedom, right, and even obligation to voice his or her political opinion. At least theoretically, the rights and privileges of one citizen are no greater or lesser than those of any other. No citizen’s vote is any more or less powerful than that of another’s. The overarching question, therefore, is how do these two fundamental principles of American society interact with one another? This book is intended to improve our understanding of immigrant political incorporation, the process of integrating a previously disenfranchised individual into the polis. Do immigrants truly become politically incorporated into American society? Do they seek out the status of citizenship or remain outside of the polis? If they choose to naturalize, do they then voice their opinions, beliefs, and desires at the voting booth, or do they remain silent citizens? This book, based principally on four years of Current Population Survey data, is intended to provide greater insight into the process of political integration of immigrants, a field that has received less attention than other areas of immigrant incorporation. By examining immigrants from Mexico, Cuba, Canada, Britain, Italy, the former Soviet Union, China, Southeast Asia, India, and the Philippines, I explore how those with diverse individual characteristics, histories in 1

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the United States, reasons for immigrating, and political and cultural situations in the country of origin either become politically incorporated in the United States or fail to do so. Such diversity allows us to see whether immigrant groups are affected differently by the same factors, whether the degree of political incorporation varies across groups, or whether, given enough time, all immigrant groups become similarly incorporated. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION Understanding whether and how immigrants become incorporated into American society has received substantial attention from immigration scholars. But these studies have largely focused on three areas of incorporation: economic, educational, and social, with less attention given to political integration. The inattention of scholars to immigrant political incorporation gives no indication of its theoretical importance or its relevance to American society and to public policy. In fact, given the current immigration climate, understanding how immigrants become part of the polis is increasingly important. From 1991 through 2000, more than 9 million legally documented immigrants entered the United States (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005), surpassing the number of immigrants who entered from 1901 through 1910, the period viewed as the height of U.S. immigration. Although the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States led to significant restrictions in entry to the United States, particularly for individuals from Middle Eastern countries of origin, considerable numbers of immigrants have continued to enter. Nearly 3 million documented immigrants entered the United States from 2002 through 2004 (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005), and over 500,000 naturalized during 2004 (Rytina & Saeger, 2005), the most recent year for which statistics are available. At the individual-level, naturalization provides immigrants with a host of civic, economic, and social benefits (Johnson, Reyes, Mameesh, & Barbour, 1999). Politically, citizenship offers immigrants the right to vote, the right to hold most elected offices, and the rights and protections offered to the native-born (Jones-Correa, 2001). Citizenship also unlocks economic benefits (Lister, 1998; Pachon, 1987). In recent years, citizenship status has come to have greater economic implications, with many social welfare benefits limited to

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American citizens. Under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, economic aid in the form of cash transfers and food stamps has been tied to citizenship status. In the private sector, American citizenship is frequently a requirement to secure credit, and to obtain home and educational loans. Citizenship has implications beyond the individual. With the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965, the United States altered its focus. Though labor needs continued to be a primary concern, country of origin preferences were jettisoned for family reunification goals (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, & Taylor, 2005). As a result, skilled workers from all around the world and relatives of American citizens suddenly topped the list to receive visas (Johnson et al., 1999). This has meant that immigrants in the post-1965 period who have chosen to naturalize have been able to help relatives gain access to the United States, thus perpetuating immigration flows from their respective countries of origin. In 2004, 65% of all immigrants who legally entered the United States entered either as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen, or under the family preference category (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005), suggesting how individual-level behavior can affect migration flows at the societal level. In the United States, voting continues to be the most formalized, systematic, and frequent type of political activity and is arguably the most fundamental form of political participation in a democracy (Putnam, 2000). Who chooses to vote has implications for which politicians are elected, what policies are enacted, and how resources are allocated. Immigrants who mobilize and vote as a bloc can attain significant political power (Plotke, 1999). Choosing not to vote may have similarly important implications for the nation. Some argue that large groups of disenfranchised residents constitute a destabilizing influence on American democracy, by narrowing the percentage of people making decisions for the society as a whole (Harles, 1993; Plotke, 1999). These unincorporated individuals may turn into the political equivalent of an economic underclass. While the individual-level effects and benefits of voting may be far smaller, less tangible, and less direct than those which accrue from naturalizing, the implications at the societal level may be just as large.

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Therefore the importance of better understanding immigrant political incorporation should be apparent, given the substantial consequences for the individual, the community, and the larger society. Unfortunately, we continue to know relatively little about the factors which promote the processes of naturalizing and voting. As discussed, citizenship brings an individual many concrete benefits, far beyond just access to the voting booth. Although voting may be viewed by some as a precious right and duty, as the very embodiment of citizenship, and as the most fundamental political act in a democracy (Putnam, 2000), it provides fewer immediate and tangible benefits than does the acquisition of citizenship. Individuals may receive a psychic reward for having participated in the electoral process; and with sufficient group mobilization, voting may translate into the election of a preferred candidate or the implementation of favored policies. However, such outcomes and benefits rely upon the turnout of large numbers of likeminded voters, and mere participation does not ensure them. Thus, although naturalizing is one step in the process of political participation, and is a necessary condition for voting in the United States, as Figure 1 illustrates, it is far from sufficient indication of full political participation. Are immigrants becoming citizens and part of the polis, or are they remaining outsiders? Do those who become citizens vote and do they thereby succeed in making their political voices heard, or do they fail even to go to the voting booths? Given the differing incentives behind the two acts, it is likely that the causal structures of naturalizing and voting are distinct. Exploring voting trends, as well as citizenship trends, allows us to understand the three potential courses of action open to immigrants: not becoming a citizen and thus being precluded from formal political participation; becoming a citizen, but failing to vote; and becoming a citizen and voting. Further, in the wake of the 1965 Immigration Act, patterns of immigration have changed dramatically. The immigrants of today arrive disproportionately from Asia and Latin America; not a single European country is listed among the top ten contributors of immigrants to the United States in recent years (Massey et al., 2005; Office of Immigration Statistics, 2005). Substantial portions of recent

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FIGURE 1.1: Potential Paths of Immigrant Political Incorporation Immigrant

Citizen

Voter

Non-Citizen

Non-Voter

immigrants arrive from non-democratic regimes, with countries such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba consistently ranking among the top ten countries of origin. A common concern among both the American public and policy makers has been the lack of familiarity of some immigrant groups with the American political system, specifically, and democratic governance, more generally. Do immigrants learn the ways of democratic society and become incorporated, politically, or do they remain ignorant of and uninvolved in American democracy? Some scholars (Black, Niemi, & Powell, 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989) argue that immigrants from democratic societies are able to transfer their previous experience to the new democratic society in which they find themselves. If this is indeed the case, though not familiar with the American system of governance, immigrants should be able to transfer their previous experience and knowledge to American electoral procedures. At the same time, Americans are arguably raised with a very specific set of political values, “Examinations of the republic’s political culture typically maintain that Americans are to a remarkable degree united on the tenets of a central political value system…most often defined in terms of a variety of liberalism” (Harles, 1993, p.2). If this is the case, the transfer of previous democratic experience may not work, leaving even larger numbers of immigrants unfamiliar with this country’s political norms

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and requiring all immigrants, even those from democracies, to be politically re-socialized. Therefore, it is essential to move beyond just examining whether immigrants naturalize and vote to understand which immigrants do so and why. By exploring these different paths of political incorporation, as measured by naturalizing and voting, we can better understand whether certain groups have different propensities to naturalize and/or vote, whether voting is the natural outgrowth of becoming an American citizen, and why there may be differentials in these political behaviors across groups. These explorations contribute to the literature by increasing what we know about political incorporation, a theoretically less developed area. What are the multi-leveled factors that affect the process of political incorporation? Are citizenship and voting similar political processes, or are they different practices motivated by diverse factors? Do the processes of political integration follow patterns similar to those identified in the realms of economic or educational incorporation, or does civic integration operate differently? PREVIOUS STUDIES The majority of research examining immigrant incorporation has focused on economic, educational, and social assimilation. These three areas have received such attention largely because they are viewed as potentially having the greatest consequences for American society. If immigrants cannot support themselves financially, will the burden fall on the native-born? Are immigrants “catching up” educationally, or will they develop into an underclass? Are immigrants learning the English language, or will we become a multilingual society? In short, many studies have focused on the extent to which American society is being altered by immigrants, rather than on how immigrants are being altered by American society. Historically, the economic, educational and social areas have been used to measure the level of assimilation or incorporation of immigrant groups. Milton Gordon (1964) identified seven phases of assimilation, beginning with acculturation or the acquisition of such mainstream characteristics as language, food and dress, and ending in civic assimilation or the acquisition of the political norms and values of the host society. Between the first step of acculturation and the last step of

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civic assimilation, Gordon argued that immigrant groups would travel through structural integration, amalgamation, identification, attitudinal assimilation, and behavioral assimilation, with each of the steps leading inevitably to the next, until the immigrant group was indistinguishable from the host population. Though Gordon suggested the process might take several generations to complete, he argued that assimilation followed a “straight-line,” with each phase leading to the next, in an ordered fashion for all groups. Given enough time, immigrants, regardless of country of origin, would take the same path toward assimilating with the reference group, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Immigrants would acquire the English language, begin to live in more integrated neighborhoods, identify as American, and affiliate with mainstream, rather than ethnic, organizations. Political incorporation, called civic assimilation in Gordon’s work, would translate into embedded democratic values and indistinguishable rates and types of political participation among all immigrant groups, given equal amounts of time in the United States. Gordon wrote prior to the 1965 changes in immigration policy, thus largely confining his analysis to European immigrants. The changes in migration patterns to Asian and Latino-dominated flows in the post-1965 period have led many scholars to compare today’s immigrants with their European predecessors of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Perlmann & Waldinger, 1999). Will the current immigrants and the new second generation follow the same “straight-line” patterns of assimilation as their forerunners did, or will they follow a different path? In recent years, scholars have developed theories of segmented assimilation and have tested Gordon’s straight-line assimilation theory against the new patterns of migration to the United States. This “new” theory allows for diversity in immigrant assimilation and incorporation by immigrant group, order and type of incorporation, and area of settlement (Alba & Nee, 1999; Portes, 1995a; Zhou, 1999). Segmented assimilation theorists have identified three potential paths of incorporation: upward assimilation towards the white middle-class, downward assimilation towards the native-born minority underclass, and a third option whereby immigrant groups retain some of the

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country of origin characteristics, while assimilating to the mainstream society in other ways (Zhou, 1999). Most interest and attention has focused on Gordon’s first two phases of assimilation: cultural and structural. Studies of cultural assimilation largely focus on language acquisition, while structural assimilation is generally measured by entry into mainstream institutions, such as schools, middle-class jobs, integrated neighborhoods, and intermarriage. Though they do not directly relate to patterns of political incorporation, the findings from these studies serve as roadmaps for such an investigation. Economic Incorporation In the economic sphere, research has been dominated by questions about the ability of post-1965 waves of immigrants to reach economic parity with the native-born, as compared with the pre-1965 immigration flows. Some studies have found that the more recent waves remain consistently behind the native-born economically, and have a more difficult time “catching-up” than did their predecessors (Borjas, 1994, 1998; Frenette & Morissette, 2005; Raijmin & Tienda, 1999). These “lesser quality” immigrants migrate with lower levels of human capital than did earlier waves, placing them at a consistent economic disadvantage. Scholars argue that this human capital disadvantage is then passed down to their children and even grandchildren, delaying economic success for a full three generations, and potentially creating a permanent underclass. A study conducted by Alba, Lutz, and Vesselinov (2001), specifically designed to test such findings, reaches very different conclusions. The researchers find that over several generations, economic differences between the foreign-born and the native-born disappear, supporting straight-line assimilation theory. Others come to even more optimistic conclusions, arguing that differences will disappear over a period of decades rather than generations (Perlmann & Waldinger, 1999, 2000). Given enough time in the United States, today’s immigrants will reach economic parity with the native-born and are not at any greater disadvantage than were earlier waves of immigrants. Although it may take 15 or 20 years to reach economic equality, this is simply the “cost of migration,” and should not be taken as an indication of immigrant quality or of the ability of immigrants to

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succeed economically in the United States. Mexican migrants are the exception to this finding, consistently remaining at the bottom of the economic ladder. Just as Mexican immigrants are located at the bottom, migrants from India are consistently found at the top, suggesting that today’s migration flows resemble an hourglass shape in terms of the human capital immigrants bring with them. This hourglass shape is the result of a number of factors, specifically selectivity and public policy. Though migration is always selective, with those who migrate being distinct from those who do not, selectivity may be particularly pronounced among economic migrants who tend to be younger, more aggressive, and have higher levels of human capital (Stark, 1991). However, meeting American labor needs is one of the primary goals of current U.S. immigration policy, with those needs being met by individuals at both ends of the human capital spectrum. The result is that levels of human capital are highly correlated with country of origin. Immigrants from Europe, as well as those from certain Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Japan, and India have similar (or even higher) rates of education and income as their native-born counterparts. Immigrants from Vietnam, Mexico and other Latin American and Asian countries have substantially lower levels of income and education than their native-born counterparts, frequently finding themselves in low SES occupations with little room for advancement. For example, Indians who migrate to the United States have tended to come as highly skilled laborers, with 72% of economically active Indian immigrants holding professional or managerial jobs. In contrast, less than 19% of Dominicans hold such positions. Mexicans have similarly low rates, generally migrating as agricultural workers. As a result of the selectivity growing out of migration policy, immigrants from certain countries of origin tend to become more economically incorporated than immigrants from other countries of origin, who remain economically marginalized (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Although previous studies have focused on individual levels of human capital and their effect on economic incorporation, we know that this is a process influenced by factors at multiple levels. Family and social networks play a role both in the country of origin and the country of destination, bearing on both the initial decision to migrate

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and the choice of settlement area (Boyd, 1989; Foner, 1999; Goldscheider, 1995; Palloni, Massey, Ceballos, Espinosa, & Spittel, 2001; Pessar, 1999). Family contacts help migrants to find jobs and places to live, encouraging economic incorporation. Community characteristics may similarly encourage economic integration, with immigrants residing in ethnic enclaves potentially having greater access to jobs, start-up capital, and additional resources than their counterparts living in more integrated areas (Light, 1984; Light & Bonacich, 1988; Portes, 1987). Rates of self-employment and small business ownership tend to be higher in immigrant communities (Sanders & Nee, 1987; Waldinger, 1996). At the same time, living in ethnically segregated areas may translate into higher levels of exploitation and lower levels of income than found among those in the mainstream economy (Chiswick & Miller, 2005; Sanders & Nee, 1987). Finally, a growing body of research has found economic characteristics in the home country to effect the relative permanence of migration (Constant & Massey, 2002; Lindstrom, 1996; Lindstrom & Lauster, 2001). Individuals who have investment opportunities and job prospects in their home communities may migrate to the United States for limited periods of time, returning to the country of origin once a financial goal has been met. These immigrants tend to be less incorporated economically and socially than those with longer-term settlement plans. At the same time, recent research has found that among first generation Mexican migrants in California, home ownership, a sign of socioeconomic incorporation, is positively associated with remittances, an act previously thought to suggest less socioeconomic integration (Marcelli & Lowell, 2005). These most current studies suggest that characteristics in the community of origin and an immigrant’s relationship with that community influence economic incorporation at the individual level, but the relationship is not as unidirectional as one might think. “Looking” towards the home society does not necessarily suggest a lack of incorporation in the host society. Educational Incorporation Educational incorporation is another area that has received a substantial amount of attention from researchers. How do immigrant children

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measure up to their native-born counterparts in terms of academic achievement? Are they less likely to complete high school? Are they more likely to become burdens on society? Studies of students in California have found that immigrant children have generally performed better than their native-born peers, assuming comparable socio-economic characteristics. Interestingly, the differences in GPA between the native and foreign-born become less dramatic with increased exposure, suggesting a downward assimilation towards the native-born (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut, 1999; Rumbaut & Portes, 2001; Zhou, 1999). In terms of high-school enrollment, immigrants who enter at younger ages and have longer-term exposure to American society have rates of high-school completion comparable to the native-born (Hirschman, 2001). Mexicans, again, counter the trend, as do Dominicans and recent Cubans, all of whom have lower rates of highschool enrollment. Just as in the studies of economic incorporation, these findings suggest two distinct trends: country of origin matters and length of exposure matters. Where an immigrant hails from is a significant predictor of academic performance. Similarly, length of exposure or the amount of time spent in the United States is also a predictor of the level of educational incorporation, as measured by school enrollment and grades. Studies of educational incorporation have also examined how immigrant children of limited language ability and socioeconomic means come to have such success in school. These studies have frequently identified both family and community factors as predictors of success (Gibson & Ogbu, 1991; White & Glick, 2000; Zhou, 1999). Immigrant children embedded in more closely knit families and ethnic communities and those with greater amounts of social capital tend to have higher levels of educational performance, more consistent with the cultural expectations of their families and communities than children who are more “Americanized.” Social Incorporation Still others studies have examined “social” incorporation, specifically patterns of language acquisition and intermarriage (Lopez, 1999). What characteristics are associated with higher rates of English-

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language attainment? Who is most likely to intermarry? How do immigrants become a part of the social fabric of American society? A study of destination language acquisition by male immigrants to Canada has found that age at migration is negatively correlated with linguistic attainment, while education, exposure, distance of country of origin, and linguistic proximity of native tongue to destination tongue, are all positively correlated with language acquisition. Once again, the factors of country of origin and length of exposure play key roles in this form of incorporation, supporting in part both straight-line and segmented assimilation theories (Chiswick & Miller, 2001). Another study examining immigrant social incorporation has focused on rates of English language acquisition and intermarriage among Asians and Latinos in California (Lopez, 1999). According to the study, Asians are more likely to learn English and lose the mother tongue than are Latinos, even with comparable levels of exposure. In keeping with the language findings, Asians also have higher rates of intermarriage than do Latinos, suggesting different rates of incorporation across a number of dimensions. These findings imply that factors other than length of exposure predict levels of social incorporation, supporting segmented assimilation theory. At the same time, the difference may be due to greater residential integration among Asians, suggesting that greater incorporation in one area leads to incorporation in other areas, as Gordon had argued. Furthermore, these findings reinforce the role that multilevel factors play in various types of immigrant integration. Political Incorporation Fewer studies have addressed questions of political incorporation. This is not to suggest that the field is entirely barren, but rather that it is less well-developed than are the areas of economic, educational, and social incorporation. By examining these studies in light of the research conducted in other more developed areas, it becomes clear that the political incorporation literature has fallen short. Ideally, this book can fill some of the gaps. Studies of citizenship acquisition, the most common measurement of political incorporation, have repeatedly focused on individual-level characteristics (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997). Demographic factors, such as age and

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country of origin, and economic factors, such as education and income, are recurrently the variables of focus. Although individual-level characteristics are frequently found to be significant predictors of political incorporation, just as they have been identified as important indicators of others types of integration, it is essential to move beyond this individual-level focus. Research exploring other types of immigrant incorporation has identified multilevel factors as affecting levels of integration. For example, school performance has been found to be influenced by family-level factors, namely how tightly-knit the family unit is (Zhou, 1999). Economic incorporation is impacted by the community in which an individual settles, specifically whether or not an immigrant resides in an ethnic enclave (Chiswick & Miller, 2005; Portes, 1987; Sanders & Nee, 1987). Social incorporation, specifically language acquisition and intermarriage, is affected by levels of residential integration (Lopez, 1999). Some scholars have begun to identify the importance of multi-level factors in the political incorporation process, examining family structure and social contact in their research (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). Their findings, which will be discussed in detail in ensuing chapters, have shown these characteristics to be significant in the political incorporation process. Unfortunately, more detailed studies of the effect of family and community on political incorporation have not been conducted. On the most fundamental level, an immigrant’s family structure should have implications for the relative permanence of a migration, and thus the likelihood of naturalizing. Migrating as a family, rather than as an individual, suggests longer-term settlement plans, with citizenship acquisition acting as both a reflection and indicator of more permanent settlement. Furthermore, public policy is consistently argued to affect an individual immigrant’s reception into a new society (Portes, 1995b). This is particularly true in U.S. immigration policy, which has implications far beyond the individual. As discussed earlier, the 1965 immigration legislation gives preference to immediate relatives of American citizens over any other group of immigrants trying to gain legal access to the United States, thus encouraging citizenship acquisition for individual immigrants who may wish to help spouses or children migrate. The more recent 1996 Personal

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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, known more commonly as PRWORA or the Welfare Reform Act, may similarly have implications for individual political incorporation within the context of the family (Lister, 1998). The presence of children and/ or the absence of a spouse may have more of an impact on political decisions in the post-welfare policy period than in the pre-policy era. For example, a single-mother who was eligible for food stamps in the pre-policy period may decide she needs to naturalize to protect her and her children’s benefits, even though she has no desire to vote or become involved in the electoral process. In short, studies of immigrant behavior too frequently focus on the individual when they should also focus on the family unit. Community factors, such as population size and composition, may also have implications for an immigrant’s level of incorporation. As scholars have uncovered in other areas of research, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances resulting from one’s residential neighborhood affect social networks, ties to mainstream society, information on jobs outside of the neighborhood, and general life chances (Fischer, 1984; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). These factors may affect immigrant incorporation. Given that segmented assimilation theorists contend that the three potential paths of assimilation (upward, downward, and middle-of-the-road) are influenced by settlement area (Alba & Nee, 1999; Portes, 1995a; Zhou, 1999), and that empirical research in economic, educational, and social incorporation has supported this argument, community-level characteristics should most certainly be examined in the political incorporation process. Another limitation of many previous studies is their failure to take into account country of origin characteristics in the political integration process. Studies outlined above have generally included country of origin dummy variables in their models to explore how naturalization rates vary by nativity, but these studies have done little to tell us what it is about the country of origin that leads to such variation. As Chiswick and Miller (2001) argue in their study of destination language acquisition, “dichotomous variables for country of birth may be regarded as a measure of what we do not know: that is, of the relevant unmeasured behavioral variables that underlie country-of-birth effects” (pp.395-396). If, for example, Koreans consistently have the highest naturalization rates among men, but Filipinos consistently have the

Why Immigrant Political Incorporation?

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highest naturalization rates among women (Smith & Edmonston, 1997), then we need to better understand whether there are factors in the country of origin that lead to such consistent differences. Although a few studies have taken the step to examine the relationship between home society characteristics and political incorporation (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Liang, 1994; Yang; 1994), country of origin factors have been frequently overlooked. The further weakness of political incorporation studies lies in their singular focus on citizenship acquisition (Jones-Correa, 2001; Rumbaut, 1999). Naturalizing is certainly one dimension of political incorporation, and an important one at that, but it is far from the only form of political integration. Immigrants can become incorporated politically through a wide range of formal and informal activities. Just as studies of economic, educational, and social incorporation use multiple measurements to assess the particular field being explored, so too should studies of political integration. Political incorporation studies that have examined voter turnout are even less common and more limited than those examining citizenship acquisition. The absence of attention to voting in the political incorporation literature is largely due to the dearth of quantitative data available (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). Research that has examined immigrant voting has many of the same limitations as citizenship studies, but to an even greater extent. These studies, which will be discussed in greater detail in upcoming chapters, have focused on the same individual-level factors examined in the citizenship literature, namely education, income, and place of origin (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). Unfortunately, some researchers have examined voting patterns by regions of the world (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001), conflating the divergent migration flows from different countries of origin and ignoring the migration selectivity that may be taking place (Cain, Kiewiet & Uhlaner, 1991; Cho, 1999; White & Sassler, 2000). As one group of scholars writes about their own work on Asian and Latino immigrants “The divergence of our findings concerning Asians and Latinos thus underscores…[the] admonition against conflating the political experiences of different ethnic groups” (Cain et al., 1991, p.416). Others have examined a particular immigrant group, or a particular part of the country (de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992, 1996; DeSipio & de la Garza, 1998; Sierra, Carillo &

16

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

DeSipio, 2000). The limitation of these studies has been an inability to compare the voting trends of different immigrant groups around the United States Although individual-level characteristics are known to play an important role in various types of immigrant incorporation, the research conducted on economic, educational, and social integration also suggests that factors at the family, community, and country of origin level matter. One study of immigrant voter turnout has essentially come to this conclusion, finding that Latino voter turnout varies substantially from state to state (de la Garza & DeSipio, 1996). Some states, such as California and Arizona, experienced increases in Latino voter turnout by more than 30% from one election cycle to the next, while states such as Colorado and New York had declines in the rate of Latinos going to the polls. These findings suggest that contextual factors matter, but research has failed to identify what it is about settlement communities that differentially influence immigrant voter turnout. Additionally, immigrants enter the United States with very different political experiences, based upon the political system in their respective country of origin. Individuals raised in democracies are taught, either implicitly or explicitly, the accepted behaviors and values associated with democratic governance. Those raised in nondemocratic regimes similarly learn the conventional political behavior in those societies. If people have not been raised in countries with democratic traditions, they will not likely know how to participate in a democratic society, “Having come from other places and having been socialized to alien political norms, it is unlikely that that the majority will possess the necessary ideological credentials” (Harles, 1993, p.2). Such a statement is backed up by empirical research conducted on immigrant voting in other countries (Black et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989). Research finds variation across immigrant groups, with those migrating from more similar political regimes able to translate their previous knowledge and experiences. Specifically, someone migrating from a democracy to a democracy should be more likely to vote than someone migrating from a communist country to a democracy. These findings argue strongly for an examination of the relationship between country of origin characteristics and individual political incorporation.

Why Immigrant Political Incorporation?

17

THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS VOLUME Scholars stress “the need for comparative cross-national studies of citizenship, membership, and modes of political inclusion and exclusion” (Rumbaut, 1999, p.191), as so little is understood about the political incorporation process. Previous work has been too focused on identifying individual-level factors that affect political incorporation, ignoring influences at other levels that selectively affect who migrates and who becomes incorporated. Qualitative work that has examined influences at multiple levels has failed to do so comparatively, instead focusing on one particular immigrant group (Forment, 1989; JonesCorrea, 1998; Karpathakis, 1999). The goal of this volume is to add to the political incorporation literature by empirically testing the influence of individual, family, host community, and country of origin factors on two types of formal political incorporation—naturalizing and voting—across multiple immigrant groups in the United States. Specifically, I will address the following questions: How are factors at different levels associated with political incorporation, net of other factors? How do these multi-level characteristics interact with one another to encourage or discourage political integration? Do patterns vary across types of political incorporation, i.e. are citizenship and voting differentially motivated? Do patterns vary across immigrant groups? The following chapter examines the data sources and methodology used to systematically answer the questions posed here. I start in Chapter 3 to examine the relationship between individual-level factors and their relationship with political incorporation. By beginning with individual-level factors, I am able to establish a baseline of political incorporation, as well as to compare the findings from this data source with research conducted using other data. Chapter 4 explores the effect of family structure, specifically marital status, both net of individual level factors, and in interaction with them. In Chapter 5, I introduce community characteristics into the model, to explore how factors such as population size, density, and segregation influence political incorporation. In Chapter 6, my final empirical chapter, I will examine the relationship between country of origin characteristics and individual political integration, again both net of individual, family, and community factors and in interaction with them. By including these many factors in one study, I can systematically demonstrate what

18

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

affects two different types of political incorporation, whether the factors vary across groups, and whether support is found for straightline or segmented assimilation, or something in between.

CHAPTER 2

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity The lack of studies on political incorporation is certainly not a reflection of the level of interest (or lack thereof), but is instead a reflection of quantitative data availability. Quantitative studies of immigrant political incorporation, by definition, require data on both immigration status and measures of political incorporation. Some of the more common sources of data, such as the U.S. Census, simply fail to include questions related to political participation, other than citizenship status. Other data sources that focus explicitly on political participation, such as the National Election Study (NES), sample only citizens, making it impossible to measure the foreign-born who select citizenship versus those who remain non-citizens. Further, the NES fails to ask for country of origin, likely due to the presumption that American citizens are overwhelmingly native-born. As a result, it is impossible to determine whether naturalized citizens from different countries of origin behave similarly to or differently from one another, or to or from the native-born. The lack of quantitative data has led to a variety of responses from immigration scholars. Most commonly, researchers interested in immigrant political incorporation have used qualitative methodology to examine the process. Case studies (Jones-Correa, 1998; Karpathakis, 1999; Rivera-Salgado, 1999) have provided us with insights into the mechanisms encouraging or discouraging political incorporation, but their general applicability is limited without further empirical testing. Theoretical works (Harles, 1993; Plotke, 1999) similarly contribute to the discussion, but without rigorous empirical testing, they remain hypotheses to be explored. Others have “made due” with the quantitative data available, or have even collected their own survey data (de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992, 1996). Unfortunately, these quantitative studies are of limited usefulness as similar issues emerge again and again: the lumping together of all immigrants into one “foreign-born” group (Black et al., 1987); the equally problematic grouping and study of immigrants by broad region of origin, rather than 19

20

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

country of origin (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001), or the focus on immigrants from a singular area of origin (Cho, 1999; de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992, 1996). Other quantitative studies that have moved beyond some of these limitations have tended to explore immigrant political incorporation solely through the avenue of citizenship (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). The limitations of many of these studies have grown out of the common problem of insufficient data by which to study more precisely various questions in the area of political incorporation. Fortunately, recent changes in one data source, the Current Population Survey (CPS), have made the study of immigrant political incorporation more feasible. THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY Background This project relies primarily on the CPS, a joint venture between the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The primary goal of this month-by-month, national survey is to gain information on workforce participation. A certain body of questions on labor force involvement is asked every month, providing comprehensive data on movements in and out of the workforce. The CPS has been the primary source of information on labor force participation in the United States for over fifty years. As well as serving as the primary source of American labor statistics, the CPS also asks a series of demographic questions and, in 1994, began including a question on citizenship status. The addition of this citizenship question has meant that social scientists no longer have to infer citizenship by length of time in the United States, as they were forced to do prior to 1994. The specific citizenship question on which I will be relying asks “In what citizenship group do you belong?” with the possible responses including: 1) Native, born in US; 2) Native, born in Puerto Rico or US outlying area; 3) Native, born abroad of US parent(s); 4) Foreign Born, US citizen by naturalization; 5) Foreign Born, not a US citizen.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

21

My citizenship analysis subdivides responses to this citizenship question into a dichotomous variable, looking exclusively at individuals who identify themselves as being in categories 4 or 5. Furthermore, some months of the CPS have special supplements, focusing on a particular aspect of American society. Every election year, the November supplement to the CPS, entitled the “Voter and Registration Supplement,” includes questions on whether or not a respondent participated in the most recent set of elections. The specific voting question that I use to examine voter participation is asked as follows: “In any election some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do not want to vote. Did (you/name) vote in the election held on Tuesday, November __?” The format of this question is intended to limit over-reporting by removing the stigma of non-voting. The question is only asked of those 18 years of age or older, who reported U.S. citizenship by birth or naturalization. The CPS’s inclusion of citizenship and voting questions makes it possible to accurately explore two types of formal political participation across a large number of immigrants—an improvement over what other data sets allow. Additionally, the survey includes many demographic characteristics associated with immigrant political participation. The respondent’s country of origin is asked as an open-ended question, and reads “In what country were you born?” Gender is dichotomous: male or female. The education variable is categorical, giving respondents a series of possible responses. I have recoded this variable to create two new variables, one that measures lower levels of education and one that measures higher levels. Country specific migration flows tend to be characterized by higher or lower levels of skill or education, due to selectivity. Creating the education-level variable in this manner does not appear to have country-specific effects, however, as each sub-group included in the study has enough educational variability. Income is similarly reported as a categorical variable. I have created a new economic variable, one that measures whether an individual is above or below the poverty line, by combining information on total family income and total family size. Individuals are assigned a poverty status based on whether their combination of family income and size place them above or below the national poverty

22

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

threshold, as dictated by the Department of Health and Human Services, in the year in which they participated in the CPS. I have chosen to measure the number of years that an immigrant is eligible for citizenship, rather than his or her length of residence in the United States, as documented immigrants are not able to participate formally in the political sphere for the first five years. 1 I have calculated length of eligibility in the United States by using the “year of entry” variable in the survey. The “year of entry” variable is categorical, asking in what period of time an individual entered the United States. I have calculated the mid-point of each of these categories, and subtracted that year from the year in which the respondent participated in the survey. I have then subtracted five additional years off of the total, as this is the usual length of time required before an immigrant has the opportunity to naturalize. The result is a “quasi” continuous variable, measuring the amount of time one has been eligible to formally participate.2 Table 2.1 illustrates the operationalization of these individual characteristics. The construction of this length of eligibility variable is not ideal for multiple reasons. First, the immigrant’s time of entry is collected as a categorical variable, with categories of varying lengths. As a result, the final variable is not truly continuous. I could simply have used the initial categories to measure length of time in the United States, or collapsed them into a handful of time periods. Doing so would make it 1

In a few instances (marriage to an American citizen, military service), the residency requirement is cut to three years. Because these cases represent such a small percentage of all immigrants in the U.S., I have chosen to use the standard five year residency requirement. 2

Correspondingly, age at migration could be calculated in a similar manner: age at migration=current age-(survey year-year of entry). The age at which an individual migrates to the United States is predictive of immigrant assimilation, with those arriving at younger ages more likely to become incorporated on a host of fronts. Immigration scholars even refer to immigrants who migrate as children as the “.5” generation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include both current age and age at migration in the same model, due to issues of multicollinearity. As a result, I include only age at the time of the survey and length of eligibility. This is not to suggest that age at migration is unimportant in the political incorporation process.

TABLE 2.1: Operationalization of Individual Characteristics Name

Meaning

Measurement

Coding

Source

AGE

R’s age at time of survey participation

Self-reported age

Continuous

CPS

AGE

R’s age at time of survey participation, squared

Self-reported age* Self-reported age

Continuous

CPS

FEMALE

R’s sex

Self-reported sex

CPS

LESSHS

Whether R has less than a high school degree or GED

Calculated from multiple categories from self-reported citing of years of education completed

1=Female 0=Male 1=Less than high school degree/ GED 0=High school degree/ GED

MOREHS

Whether R has more than a high school degree or GED

Calculated from multiple categories from self-reported citing of years of education completed

1=More than high school degree/ GED 0=High school degree/ GED

CPS

POVERTY

Whether R is living below the poverty line, as measured in survey year

Calculated from self-reported size of family and self-reported family income, compared with poverty line for family of that size and income in survey year

1=At or below poverty line 0=Above poverty line

CPS, Department of Health and Human Services

WORK

Whether R reports working for pay outside of the home

Self-reported workforce participation

1=Works outside of home 0=Does not work outside of home

CPS

ELIG

Length of time R has been eligible to naturalize and vote in the US

Survey year-midpoint of entry category-5

Quasi continuous

CPS

YEAR96

Whether survey year is 1996

Year of survey participation

CPS

YEAR98

Whether survey year is 1998

Year of survey participation

YEAR00

Whether survey year is 2000

Year of survey participation

1=1996 0=1994 1=1998 0=1994 1=2000 0=1994

2

CPS

CPS CPS

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

difficult to determine the effect of cohort versus period versus length of eligibility in the United States. The length of eligibility variable is also limited by lack of information on entry status. Many, particularly Mexican immigrants, may have entered the United States as undocumented. By subtracting 5 years from the date of entry, I assume that everyone has initially entered as a documented migrant and is therefore eligible for citizenship five years later. This is certainly not the case. As a result, we could find that the length of eligibility variable does not appear to have a relationship with naturalizing or voting, or has a more limited relationship for certain groups, resulting from “starting the clock” on political eligibility too soon. I have included three control variables of age, age2, and workforce participation. The age variables are both continuous. I have included both age and age2 in the models, as previous studies have found a curvilinear relationship between age and political participation (Converse, 1969; Niemi, Stanley, & Evans, 1984). The workforce participation variable is categorical and measures whether or not the respondent is in the workforce. I have also included control variables for the year in which the respondent participated in the survey. Additionally, the CPS provides some limited information on a respondent’s family and household structure. In some years, respondents are asked how many, if any, of their own minor children are living in the same household. Questions on one’s marital status are also included and provide data on whether a respondent is single or married, and if married, whether they reside with or apart from the spouse. Table 2.2 outlines the operationalization of these family characteristics. Sampling The CPS is a multistage stratified probability sample of approximately 56,000 housing units from 792 sample areas. The first stage of the sample takes place by dividing the United States into primary sampling units, or PSUs, comprised of a single metropolitan area, a county, or a group of smaller counties. A sampling of housing units, updated from the most recent U.S. Census, is then drawn from each PSU. Individuals within each household are selected through a simple, random sample to represent the civilian non-institutional population, 16 years of

TABLE 2.2: Operationalization of Family Characteristics Name

Meaning

CHILDREN

Measurement

Coding

Source

Number of R’s own minor children in Self-reported number of R’s own the household minor children in the household

Continuous

CPS

UNMARRIED

Whether or not R is married

Self-reported measure of R’s marital status

1=Unmarried CPS 0=Married and residing with spouse

SPOUSE ABSENT

Whether or not R is living with spouse

Self-reported measure of R’s marital status and household structure

1=Married, R and spouse CPS residing apart 0=Married and residing with spouse

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

age and older. Each household is surveyed for four months in a row, cycled out, and then brought back into the survey sample eight months later to be interviewed for another four months in a row, before being discarded. The data were designed to be used as cross-sectional, rather than panel or longitudinal data. 3,4 Weaknesses of the CPS I have chosen to use the CPS to systematically examine the political incorporation process as it contains information on citizenship status and voter turnout, the two most formal measurements of political integration. Furthermore, the CPS allows for the study of these two processes across multiple immigrant groups, providing data on country

3

For a more detailed discussion of the CPS, please refer to Technical Paper 63, entitled “Design and Methodology,” published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau. It can be found at the following address: http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/tp63.pdf

4

The CPS weights are largely designed to account for state-level sampling differences, as well as to correct for other types of over and under representation. The CPS weight “PWCMPWGT,” is an individual person’s composite final weight and is intended to produce population level statistics for the adult civilian population ages 16 and above in the United States, based upon the CPS sample. This weight takes into account 1) the basic weight, 2) adjustments for special weighting, such as might be done for a particular racial group, 3) non-interview bias, 4) first stage ratio adjustment factor, and 5) second stage ratio adjustment factor. This is the weight used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to tabulate the official published labor force numbers. Initial descriptive statistics were run using this individual-level composite final weight. Descriptive statistics have also been run without weights and with an individual second stage weight provided by the CPS. This second stage weight, “PWSSWGT,” only weights for the second stage sampling, as opposed to the multiple factors that are used to comprise the composite weight. Though the total population sizes associated with each of these three different methods of weighting (none, PWCMPWGT, and PWSSWGT) vary, the percentages remain very similar to one another. Because the multivariate regression models presented in later chapters are unweighted, the final descriptive statistics presented here are the unweighted statistics.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

27

of origin, time period of entry, and a host of other important demographic characteristics. However, like most secondary data sources, the CPS is not without limitations. The data on which I rely are self-reported measurements of citizenship status and voter turnout. Because both questions touch on sensitive issues, albeit for different reasons, both are susceptible to misreporting. In the instance of citizenship status, individuals who are in the United States illegally may be hesitant to report that they are not citizens. Although the survey does not touch on questions of legality, the question of citizenship status may keep some people from answering the survey honestly and others from answering the survey entirely. A preliminary examination of the data suggests that the citizenship status reported by the respondents seems to be generally accurate. I have checked this variable by constructing cross-tabs with other variables that give hints at citizenship status, specifically questions on the respondent’s country of origin and year of entry to the United States. For instance, by finding that virtually everyone who reports that they are native-born also report the United States as their birth place suggests accuracy in the data. Finding that those who cite their status as naturalized citizens and who also report that they have been in the country for at least five years (the minimum amount of time needed to gain citizenship) also points to consistent self-reporting. The lack of information on visa type or legal status is a significant weakness of these data, particularly for this study, as the variation in legal migration flows by country of origin could be appearing as country of origin effects. For instance, lower naturalization rates among Mexican immigrants could speak more to the selectivity of that particular migration flow, comprised largely of undocumented workers, than to country of origin effects. Mexican immigrants might be as likely to naturalize as any other group, given the opportunity. Unfortunately, these data do not allow for the identification of an immigrant’s legal status. The best that can be done is to interpret the results with caution. A perennial concern of survey data is non-response bias. In this study, the concern lies with individuals choosing not to participate due to their immigration or citizenship status. Some comfort can be found in the fact that previous scholars who tracked the naturalization trajectories of Mexican immigrants found little difference between

28

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

those who “went missing” and those followed throughout the process (Portes & Bach, 1985; Portes & Curtis, 1987).5 Still, non-response bias remains a concern. Finally, over-reporting on questions of voter turnout is common, as respondents want to appear to be “doing their civic duty.” A study of Latino voter turnout in the 1996 election found significant overreporting when aggregate self-reports were examined against aggregate validated rates (Shaw, de la Garza, & Lee, 2000). The self-reported voter turnout rate in the CPS is lower than what has been recorded in other surveys, such as the National Election Study, viewed as the “gold standard” of electoral data. In comparing self-reported rates of voter turnout of all respondents in the CPS with the Federal Election Commission’s actual tally for the years 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000, I have found an over-reporting rate of approximately 10%. For instance, in 1994, the CPS has a self-reported turnout of 85,700,000 voters across the country versus the Federal Election Commission’s tally of 75,105,860. In 1996, the CPS reports 105,000,000 Americans going to the polls versus 96,456,345 actual votes cast. In 1998, 73,117,022 Americans actually cast ballots versus 83,100,000 self-reported votes. Finally in the 2000 election, 110,800,000 Americans self-reported voting, versus an actual turnout of 105,586,274. The primary concern with over-reporting is that it may not be randomly distributed, with certain groups, such as the better educated, over-reporting at higher rates than their less educated counterparts. Though this study is concerned with actual political participation as a measurement of political incorporation, over-reporting tells us something in its own right. That an immigrant incorrectly reports having voted suggests, in its own way, a form of political incorporation, by recognizing the normative pressure to vote in American society. The collection of certain demographic information is also imperfect. Characteristics such as education, income, and year of entry were collected as categorical variables, rather than as continuous 5

Portes and Bach (1985) were able to determine similarities between the tracked and “lost” Mexican immigrants by examining initial records and demographic characteristics collected on the immigrants upon their entry to the United States.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

29

measurements. Other desirable information, specifically visa type and level of English-language proficiency, was simply not collected. Family and community-level data are also limited, or missing entirely. Previous research suggests that family income 6 has a consistent and significant impact on political incorporation, with higher levels of income leading to higher rates of incorporation. The CPS records family income,7 but the lifestyle afforded by the family income is very dependent upon the family size. Receipt of social welfare benefits, such as food stamps and cash transfers, are determined by both family income and family size. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act limited many means-tested benefits to citizens, increasing the incentive to naturalize among those at the lower levels of the economic spectrum. Because the CPS does not include information on welfare receipt or poverty status, potentially an important factor in political incorporation, I have constructed a variable that will place an individual’s family above or below 100% of the poverty line. Although I am able to correct for the lack of information on welfare dependency, other absent information on the family, household, and community is not so easily corrected. For instance, relationships and social networks outside of the household likely affect political incorporation, as do characteristics in the country of origin. Unfortunately, this information is absent in the CPS. I supplement the CPS data with other data sources to correct for the limitations found in the primary data source.

6 Ideally, one would be able to examine both the impact of individual and household income on political incorporation. Unfortunately, the individuallevel income variable has a large percentage of missing cases, making the household income variable the better choice. 7

The variable “HUFAMINC,” described as the total household-family income in past 12 months, reads as follows: “I am going to read a list of income categories. Which category represents the total combined income of all members of this Family during the past 12 months. This includes money from jobs, net income from business, farm or rent, pensions, dividends, interest, social security payments and any other money income received by members of this Family who are 15 years of age or older?” The possible responses are categorical.

30

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

A final weakness of the CPS, as it relates to this study, is the lack of over-sampling among immigrants. In order to achieve more reliable estimates, I have pooled four years of data. Furthermore, I have made the decision to include two supra-national groups in my analysis: former Soviets and Southeast Asians, respectively. This is not to suggest these two grouped categories are monolithic religiously, culturally, politically, or educationally. I have formed these supranational groups in an attempt to gain some insight into the political incorporation of these immigrants, whom I would otherwise be unable to include due to small sample size. Immigrants from both the former Soviet countries, as well as those from the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, are too significant in American immigration flows to disregard entirely. Even with these shortcomings, these data continue to be the best available for a large-scale examination of immigrant political integration in the United States. Missing Data As with all data sets, some of the cases in the CPS have missing data. With respect to the variables of age, education, and income, I have filled in an individual’s missing data with the median value from his or her respective immigrant group. This is a common method of dealing with missing information. I have chosen to drop cases in which the citizenship status or voting information is missing. As these are the dependent variables on which this study focuses, I thought it imprudent to infer the missing information.8 The Sample I have drawn my individual cases from the November 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 CPS (“Voter and Registration Supplement”). Because the sample sizes of some of the immigrant groups are small, I have merged all four years of data to gain greater statistical reliability. Each 8

I have compared the cases with missing information to those with complete information. Though there are statistically significant differences between those who answer the citizenship or voting questions versus those who do not, this study is limited to cases with information on the respective dependent variables.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

31

wave of the survey contributes approximately ¼ of the cases to my pooled sub-samples. Those included in the sub-samples must be at least 18 years old, as this is the age at which someone is eligible to acquire citizenship and vote. Among immigrants, individuals must have been in the country for at least five years, as this is generally the minimum required length of residency in order to be eligible for citizenship. The individuals must also have answered the question on citizenship status. To be included in the voting sub-samples (see Samples B and C), the individuals must be citizens of the United States and have answered the voting question. Table 2.3 illustrates each of the samples used in this study. In addition to the qualifications cited above, the overall sub-sample from the CPS is further limited to Native-Born Whites, Blacks, Asians, and Latinos, and to immigrants from Britain, Italy, the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, China, India, and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). 9 I have chosen these immigrant groups as they have varied immigrant histories in the United States, reasons for immigrating, and political and economic situations in their countries of origin, allowing us to see how variations in different characteristics affect the political incorporation process. Sample A: “The Naturalization Sample” Sub-sample A is limited to eligible immigrants (age 18+ and residing in the United States for at least five years) from the ten chosen immigrant groups who answered the citizenship question. Native-born Americans are not included in this sub-sample, as those born in the United States are citizens by law. As Table 2.3 shows, Sub-sample A is comprised of 17,019 cases, consisting of 7,373 Mexicans, 1,157 Cubans, 1,060 Canadians, 854 Britons, 967 Italians, 638 Former Soviets, 1,768 Filipinos, 900 Indians, 1,255 Southeast Asians, and 1,047 Mainland Chinese. Models predicting citizenship are run on Sub-sample A.

9

I refer to the “overall” sample because sub-samples will be drawn from this larger sample as I examine particular groups throughout this project. The subsamples are defined in this section. Please refer to Table 2.3 for a summary of the three different samples drawn from the CPS.

TABLE 2.3: Definition of Sub-Samples Sub-Sample A: Citizenship Eligible

Sub-Sample B: Voting Eligible Foreign & Native

Sub-Sample C: Voting Eligible Foreign O nly

M EXICANS, N=7,373

M EXICANS, N=1,492

M EXICANS, N=1,492

CUBANS, N=1,157

CUBANS, N=693

CUBANS, N=693

CANADIANS, N=1,060

CANADIANS, N=551

CANADIANS, N=551

BRITONS, N=854

BRITONS, N=430

BRITONS, N=430

ITALIANS, N=967

ITALIANS, N=622

ITALIANS, N=622

FORM ER SOVIETS, N=638

FORM ER SOVIETS, N=348

FORM ER SOVIETS, N=348

FILIPINOS, N=1,768

FILIPINOS, N=1,078

FILIPINOS, N=1,078

INDIANS, N=900

INDIANS, N=404

INDIANS, N=404

SE ASIANS, N=1,255

SE ASIANS, N=560

SE ASIANS, N=560

CHINESE, N=1,047

CHINESE, N=463

CHINESE, N=463

NATIVE-BORN W HITES, N=254,097* NATIVE- BORN BLACKS, N=29,111* NATIVE-BORN ASIANS, N=3,102 NATIVE-BORN LATINOS, N=10,692** N=17,019

N=303,643

N=6,641

* Non-Hispanic. **The Latino category is comprised of those who identified racially as Black or White, and ethnically as Latino. Source: The November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

33

Sub-Sample B: “The Voting Sample” Sub-sample B, the larger voting sample, includes White, Black, Asian and Latino native-born Americans who are eligible to vote (18+) and naturalized citizens, all of whom must have answered the voting question. The overall voting sample consists of 297,002 native-born Americans and 6,641 naturalized immigrants, 10 comprised of 1,492 Mexicans, 693 Cubans, 551 Canadians, 430 Britons, 622 Italians, 348 former Soviets, 1,078 Filipinos, 404 Indians, 560 Southeast Asians, and 463 Mainland Chinese, for a total of 303,643 cases. Sub-Sample C: “The Immigrant Voting Sample” Sub-sample C is culled from Sub-sample B, but includes only the naturalized citizens who answered the voting question. This sample is comprised of 1,492 Mexicans, 693 Cubans, 551 Canadians, 430 Britons, 622 Italians, 348 former Soviets, 1,078 Filipinos, 404 Indians, 560 Southeast Asians, and 463 Mainland Chinese, for a total of 6,641 cases. SUPPLEMENTAL DATA SOURCES 1990 U.S. Census The CPS provides the individual cases, and most of the necessary information regarding individual and family characteristics, but these data lack some important indicators needed for a more complete examination of immigrant political incorporation. Although the CPS provides some geographic information for each respondent, including state of residence and MSA, it fails to provide characteristics of the respective community. In order to gain some insight into the effect of community-level factors, I use measurements of residential segregation to act as a proxy for social and community networks. Fortunately, by providing an immigrant’s MSA, I am able to merge metropolitan level characteristics from the 1990 U.S. Census with individual cases. There are a total of 262 MSAs represented in the CPS.

10 The total number of naturalized cases from the first sample does not equal the total number of cases in the voting sample, as some naturalized immigrants were dropped for failing to answer the voting question, as was discussed in the Missing Data section of this chapter.

34

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

I merge indices of residential dissimilarity, or residential segregation, by metropolitan area. The indices of dissimilarity are calculated as follows: N D=1/2Σ Pi1-Pi2 i=1 P1 P2 where D is the level of dissimilarity, P1 and P2 are the populations of the two groups of interest in a given geographic area, such as a state or metropolitan area, while the I values are the populations of those groups in the smaller geographic area of focus, i.e. an MSA or census tract (White & Glick, 1999). The residential segregation variable, calculated from the 1990 U.S. Census, will be attached to the individual cases to determine how and to what extent community, as measured by residential segregation, impacts individual political incorporation. In addition to a measurement of residential segregation within a metropolitan area, I will also include a measure of immigrant concentration, also calculated from the 1990 U.S. Census. By including the total percentage of foreign-born in a given metropolitan area, I have another proxy for social ties. Larger percentages of foreign-born might suggest a higher likelihood of pan-ethnic identity formation, leading to greater political incorporation. Alternatively, smaller percentages of foreign-born in an area might lead to greater assimilation by immigrants. Other community-level characteristics are also borrowed from the 1990 U.S. Census and merged with the CPS data, including overall population size of an MSA and whether it is defined as metropolitan or rural. Table 2.4 illustrates these community characteristics and how they are measured. U.S. Census Bureau Just as factors in the host community may influence an individual migrant’s level of political incorporation, so too may characteristics of the country of origin. The distance of the home society to the United States is one such factor that likely influences both an individual’s initial decision to migrate to the United States and how incorporated he or she becomes once here.

TABLE 2.4: Operationalization of Community Characteristics Name

Meaning

Measurement

Coding

Source

METROPOLITAN

Urban/suburban v. rural location

Whether R lives in urban/suburban v. rural area

1=Urban/suburban 0=Rural

1990 U.S. Census

POPULATION

Population in R’s reported MSA

Log of overall population in R’s reported MSA

Continuous

1990 U.S. Census

PERFOR

Percentage of overall population in (Raw number of foreign-born in R’s reported MSA/ Continuous R’s reported MSA that is foreign- divided by the total population in R’s reported born MSA)*100

1990 U.S. Census

W-B DIS

Level of White-Black dissimilarity D=1/2Σ [(Black pop in MSA/Black pop in state)in R’s reported MSA (White pop in MSA/White pop in state)]

Continuous

1990 U.S. Census

W-L DIS

Level of White-Latino dissimilarity D=1/2Σ [(Latino pop in MSA/Latino pop in state)- Continuous in R’s reported MSA (White pop in MSA/White pop in state)]

1990 U.S. Census

W-A DIS

Level of White-Asian dissimilarity D=1/2Σ[(Asian pop in MSA/Asian pop in state)in R’s reported MSA (White pop in MSA/White pop in state)]

1990 U.S. Census

Continuous

36

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

The Census Bureau provides geographic mileage between most major cities in the United States and most major cities around the world. Distance between home and host society is measured by the mileage between the country of origin’s capital city and the closest port of entry to the United States. Although the Census Bureau reports these distances as continuous, I have chosen to categorize this variable by breaking it into three categories of less than 1,000 miles, 1,000 to 5,000 miles, and more than 5,000 miles.11 Once again, these state-level factors are attached to the individual immigrant cases. Table 2.5 illustrates the country of origin factors included in the analysis and how they are measured. The Freedom House Index (FHI) Additional country of origin characteristics, such as the level of political and civic freedom in the home society, may affect an individual immigrant’s propensity to stay in the United States or return to his or her country of origin. Similarly, it may impact an individual’s predisposition to naturalize or vote, if longer-term settlement is planned. Freedom House, an independent, not-for-profit, pro-democracy organization founded more than 60 years ago, has developed an index that includes two measurements, one gauging the level of civil rights in a country and one measuring the level of the country’s political freedoms. Both the level of civil rights and political rights are measured on a scale of 1 through 7, with scores increasing as levels of freedom decrease. The two measurements are combined to create an overall assessment of the country’s level of civic and political freedom. The overall assessment is constructed as a 3-point scale, with higher numbers suggesting lower levels of freedom. A score of “1” means the country has high levels of civic and political freedom, a “2” suggests partial freedom, and a “3” means little if any freedom. The FHI has been calculated for countries around the world every two years since 1972. The country of origin FHI score is attached to individual respondents to make this state-level factor an individual-level 11

I have run the models with the distance variable as both continuous and categorical. The significance and direction is similar in both models, but the results are more easily interpreted with the categorical version.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

37

characteristic. I have allowed the level of freedom in the country of origin to vary by year of immigrant entry to the United States to more precisely measure the civic and political conditions in the country of origin when the individual migrated to the United States. In actuality, however, the level of freedom, or lack thereof, has remained very stable for most countries over the 30-year period this information has been collected. Immigrants who entered the United States prior to 1972 receive the earliest FHI assessment. The FHI is considered reliable as a measurement of the political freedom of a country—the purpose of the index. The most common criticism of the index is that such a measurement comprises much more than simply the political state of the country. More democratic countries tend to be more developed countries, with higher levels of health care, income, and education. I attempt to remedy part of this problem by including other state-level characteristics. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include every variable that is possibly subsumed by a measurement of political freedom. Human Development Indicators (HDI) The World Bank, as part of its overall mission, collects annual statistics on the social and economic development of virtually every country around the world. I utilize the HDIs, collected annually by the World Bank, to gain greater insight into the countries of origin. Like the level of democracy in the country of origin, other statelevel factors may impact the likelihood of an individual becoming politically incorporated in the United States. The level of economic development, or GDP, suggests the extent to which an individual has economic opportunities in the country of origin. Individuals from countries with greater levels of economic development will likely have lower incentives to become politically incorporated through naturalizing and voting, while those from less economically developed countries likely have greater incentives to remain in the United States

TABLE 2.5: Operationalization of Country of Origin Characteristics Name

Meaning

OPPRESSION

Measurement

Coding

Source

3-point scale of civil and political Level of civil and political oppression oppression

Continuous

FHI

Continuous

HDI

1=English 0=Not English

CIA Factbook

GDP

Per person gross domestic product

Log of per person gross domestic product

ENGLISH

Language in country of origin

Whether English is an official language in country of origin

CLOSE GEO

Distance from capital city in country 1=less than 1,000 miles of origin to closest U..S. port of 0=more than 5,000 miles U.S. Census Bureau How close country of origin is to U.S. entry

MED GEO

Distance from capital city in country 1=1,000-5,000 miles How close country of origin is to U.S. of origin to closest U.S. port of entry 0=more than 5,000 miles U.S. Census Bureau

EDUC RATIO

Ratio of boys to girls in primary school

Percentage of boys enrolled in primary school/ percentage of girls enrolled in primary school

Continuous

HDI

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

39

and acquire citizenship. I attach the 1997-1998 reported GDP in the country of origin to each case to again make this an individual-level characteristic. Individual opportunities may also vary by gender in many countries of origin. Life opportunities, though somewhat difficult to operationalize, can be measured in part by educational opportunities, as education dictates many other life chances. The World Bank Indicators include information on the percentages of school age boys and girls who are enrolled in primary school. From these two variables measuring school enrollment by gender, I have constructed a ratio of percentage of school age boys to girls enrolled in school as a proxy for gender equity in the country of origin. Again I attach this state-level indicator to the individual cases. The CIA Factbook The language spoken in the country of origin may also have implications for an immigrant’s level of political incorporation. Specifically, immigrants who migrate from countries where English is an official language may be more likely to become politically integrated as a result of linguistic congruence. The CIA Factbook, a data source compiled annually by the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., provides economic, political, and cultural information on every country around the world, including the most commonly used languages. The CIA Factbook cites the countries of Britain, Canada, and the Philippines as using English as an official language. The country of India uses it as an “associate” language, a status that suggests less universality. I examine the English-language variable in two ways: once including India and once excluding India. I have chosen the more conservative construction, limiting the English language variable to countries where it is used as an official language. This linguistic measurement is again attached to the individual cases to make it an individual-level characteristic of each immigrant. THE MODELS Because the two outcome variables, naturalizing and voting, are both dichotomous, multivariate logistic regression models, using SAS’s “proc logistic” procedure, are used. Figure 2.1 outlines the variables

40

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

that are included in each of the four levels of analysis (individual, family, community, and country of origin), and the posited direction of the coefficients. Factors that indicate greater levels of social or economic incorporation into American society, such as education, income, workforce participation, length of residence, family ties, or English-language ability, likely have positive relationships with both naturalizing and voting. Other characteristics, such as migrating from a democracy, should have a negative association with citizenship acquisition, but a positive relationship with voting. The posited relationships outlined in Figure 2.1 will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. Each model builds on the previous model in a cumulative manner, so as to control for lower level characteristics. In a few models, I have had to remove certain variables in order to include others. For instance, I am unable to include both country of origin dummy variables and country of origin characteristics in the same model, due to multicollinearity. These specific issues are discussed in the respective empirical chapters. Each of the four models are used to predict both citizenship and voting. I begin by examining the effect of individual-level characteristics, particularly country of origin, on the political incorporation process (see Chapter 3). Models one through four when predicting naturalizing, will be limited to Sub-sample A, as naturalizing is only a possibility for immigrants. Models one through four will also be used to predict voting. In the models predicting this second stage of political incorporation, I will rely on sub-samples B and C, the sub-samples limited to native-born and naturalized citizens, all of whom must have answered the voting question. Sub-sample B will allow for a comparison in voter turnouts between the native-born and naturalized immigrants. Using Subsample C, I will examine the likelihood of different naturalized groups voting, in comparison to one another. The results from Sub-samples B and C illustrate whether the same factors affect all of the native-born and naturalized groups in the same way, or whether the strength or the direction of a variable differs in its affects on voter turnout by immigrant group.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

41

A Few Caveats When examining the foreign-born versus the native-born, it is not possible to include both age and length of voting eligibility in the same equation. For immigrants, length of voting eligibility is calculated by subtracting the year of entry from the current year. This leaves the number of years the individual has been in the country. An additional five years are subtracted from this number, as that is the residency requirement to become a citizen, and citizenship is a pre-requisite for voting. The length of voting eligibility among the native-born is calculated by subtracting 18 (the earliest age at which one can vote) from the current year. This leaves the number of years a native-born citizen has been eligible to vote. Because I am calculating length of voting eligibility among the native-born in this way, it is not possible to include both age and length of voting eligibility in the same model, due to problems of multicollinearity. Some researchers have argued that age is the more important factor (Black, et al., 1987; Converse, 1969; Niemi, et al., 1984), while others argue that length of voting eligibility is critical in predicting likelihood of voting (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). Therefore, I run every model on Sub-sample B in two ways, one with age and age2, and one with length of voting eligibility. When the models are run on Sub-sample C (the immigrant voting subsample), I am able to include both age and length of voting eligibility in the same model, certainly the preferable option, as it gets at both political experience in the United States and age at the same time.

FIGURE 2.1: Estimated Direction of Coefficients_____________________________________________________ Model #1 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

V

AGE

+

AGE2

-

FEMALE

+

LESS THAN HIGH-SCHOOL (v. HS)

-

MORE THAN HIGH-SCHOOL (v. HS)

+

POVERTY

-

N A T U R A L I Z E

V + + + -

LENGTH OF EXPOSURE

+

WORK FORCE PARTICIPATION

+

+

YEAR 96, 98, 00 (v. 1994)

V

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN*INDIV. FACTORS

V

Model #2 SINGLE (V. MAR., RES. W/ SPOUSE)

-

SPOUSE AB (V. MAR., RES. W/ SPOUSE)

-

CHILDREN (V. NO CHILDREN)

+

+

MARRIED*FEMALE

?

?

+

V O

V V

-

T E

Model #3 POPULATION SIZE

?

METROPOLITAN (V. RURAL)

?

% FOREIGN BORN

?

LEVEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEG

?

Model #4 GDP

-

FHI

+

SCHOOL SEX RATIO

?

DISTANCE

+

DISTANCE*FHI

+

SCHOOL SEX RATIO*FEMALE

?

SCHOOL SEX RATIO* MARSTAT

?

GDP*POVERTY

?

GDP*EDUCATION

?

?

N A T U R A L I Z E

? ? ?

+ ? -

V O T

? ? ?

E

?

+=positive relationship -=negative relationship V=varied relationship ?=direction of relationship not posited

44

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS Table 2.6 provides some basic demographic information on Sub-sample A, immigrants who are eligible to naturalize. TABLE 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables in Sub-Sample A Demographic Characteristics AVERAGE AGE % FEMALE % MARRIED % MARRIED BUT APART % SINGLE

45.0 50.1% 63.7% 3.0% 33.3%

Socioeconomic Characteristics % WITH LESS THAN HS DEGREE % WITH MORE THAN HS DEGREE % WORKING FULL TIME % LIVING IN POVERTY

42.7% 34.6% 63.3% 30.3%

Contextual Characteristics % IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

93.4%

Migration Characteristics AVERAGE LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN US (in years)

15.8

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

The sample is evenly divided between men and women. These immigrants average 45 years of age and have an average length of residency in the United States of nearly 16 years. Approximately twothirds, or 63.7% of the sample, are married and residing with their spouses, with most of the remaining migrants reporting that they are unmarried. A small percentage, 3%, report being married but living apart from their husbands or wives. A plurality of these immigrants, 42.7%, have less than a high school degree or general equivalency diploma (GED) and nearly one third, or 30.3%, of this sample lives at or below the poverty line. Although 63.3%, or nearly two-thirds of these immigrants, work full time, the low levels of education and high levels of poverty suggest they are likely working in unskilled, low-paying jobs. At the same

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

45

time, more than a third of these immigrants, 34.6%, have education beyond high-school, suggesting an hourglass distribution in terms of schooling. Table 2.7 presents similar descriptive statistics for Sub-sample C, immigrants who have naturalized and are eligible to vote. On average, this latter group is slightly older at 50.5 years. A slightly larger percentage of this group is female. A full two-thirds of these naturalized immigrants report being married and residing with their spouses. Slightly smaller percentages of these immigrants fall into the other two marital status categories of single, or married but living apart. TABLE 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables in Sub-Sample C Demographic Characteristics AVERAGE AGE % FEMALE % MARRIED % MARRIED BUT APART % SINGLE

50.5 52.6% 66.5% 2.0% 31.6%

Socioeconomic Characteristics % WITH LESS THAN HS DEGREE % WITH MORE THAN HS DEGREE % WORKING FULL TIME % LIVING IN POVERTY

29.4% 45.5% 60.5% 19.6%

Contextual Characteristics % IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

93.3%

Migration Characteristics AVERAGE LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN US (in years) Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

21.6

100%

FIGURE 2.2: Levels of Political Incorporation among Immigrants with Varying Levels of Education and Income

80% 54.7%

60%

45.5%

42.7%

40%

34.6%

29.4%

30.3%

21.8%

19.6% 12.6%

20% 0% % with Less than a HS Degree

% with More than a HS Degree

Eligible to Naturalize

Naturalized

% Living in Poverty Voted

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

47

In comparing Tables 2.6 and 2.7, one should note significant variation between the immigrants in Sub-sample A, those who are eligible to naturalize, and the immigrants in Sub-sample C, those who have naturalized and are eligible to vote, particularly in the areas of education, income, and length of residency in the United States. The latter group has, on average, higher levels of education, lower levels of poverty, and longer residencies in the United States. Figure 2.2 illustrates these distinctions in education and income between those who can naturalize, those who have naturalized and can vote, and those who have voted. The bar chart in Figure 2.2 reveals a bivariate relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and the level of political incorporation. Immigrants who are progressively more incorporated, via naturalizing and voting, appear to have greater amounts of education and lower levels of poverty. For example, 34.6% of all immigrants who are eligible for citizenship have more than a high-school degree, while 45.5% of those who have naturalized have greater levels of education. Among those who have voted the rate of more than a high-school education is 54.7%. The other notable distinction between the samples concerns length of residency in the United States. As Table 2.6 highlights, the citizenship-eligible sample shows an average length of residency of 15.8 years. The average length of stay among those who have naturalized and are able to vote is 21.6 years. Those who have voted have an average residency of 24.6 years. Table 2.8 examines the relationship between country of origin, rates of citizenship acquisition, and other demographic characteristics among those eligible to naturalize. Of immediate note is the huge range in rates of naturalizing. At the high end, nearly ¾ of Italians, 74.5%, have naturalized. This is followed by Filipinos, Cubans, and former Soviets, groups with rates of citizenship acquisition well over 60%. Canadians, Britons, Chinese, Southeast Asians, and Indians all follow, with naturalization rates ranging from about 50-55%. At the low end, only 22.2% of Mexican immigrants have become U.S. citizens, a dramatic drop-off from the other immigrant groups under examination in this study. Also of note is the economic and educational diversity among groups. For example, two thirds of Mexicans have less than a highschool diploma, while less than one tenth of Britons and Indians fall

48

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

into this category. Indians and Filipinos dominate at the higher educational levels. Eighty percent of Indians and 68.5% of Filipinos have more than a high-school degree. Educational differences translate into economic differences. Mexicans have the highest rate of poverty at 45.9%, while Indians have the lowest at 5.8%. Although the initial relationship between citizenship and country of origin gives reason enough to move from a bivariate to a multivariate analysis, these educational and economic variations make an in-depth analysis even more important to determine whether country of origin is a proxy for other characteristics. Table 2.9 examines the distribution of characteristics among all those who have naturalized and are eligible to vote. At the high end of voter turnout are Canadians, Britons, and Cubans, with 67.0%, 66.1%, and 64.4%, respectively. Italians, Indians, and Filipinos have voter turnout rates in the low 50% range. Southeast Asians and Chinese have the lowest turnout rates among all of those qualified to vote, with rates of 34.1% and 39.3%, respectively. Clearly, voter turnout varies by country of origin. Further, the relationship between country of origin and political incorporation appears to fluctuate by type of political activity, given the significantly different patterns identified in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Certain immigrant groups with rates of citizenship acquisition on the higher end of the spectrum, such as former Soviets and Chinese, have voter turnout rates on the lower end. Table 2.9 also shows variation by country of origin on certain demographic characteristics. Educational attainment is wide-ranging, with 21.0% of Mexicans having more than a high-school degree versus 86.9% of Indians. The average length of eligibility also varies significantly, reflecting diverse migration histories. Canadians have the longest average length of political eligibility at 33.3 years versus Southeast Asians who have the shortest average length of political eligibility at 11.8 years. These are the same two groups that define the upper and lower bounds of voting rates, suggesting a correlation between voter turnout and length of eligibility.

TABLE 2.8: Summary Statistics for Those Eligible to Naturalize, by Immigrant Group

Immigrant Group

N in Citizenship Models

% Naturalized

% Less HS Degree

% More HS Degree

% Below Poverty

Mean Eligibility (in years)

MEXICANS

7,373

22.2%

66.4%

13.3%

45.9%

12.8

CUBANS

1,157

63.6%

30.6%

37.5%

18.8%

21.0

CANADIANS

1,060

55.4%

17.7%

55.9%

7.9%

27.1

BRITONS

854

54.1%

9.0%

56.7%

9.4%

25.0

ITALIANS

967

74.5%

47.7%

21.0%

11.1%

30.0

FORMER SOVIETS

638

61.6%

17.2%

54.1%

26.5%

15.2

1,768

69.0%

13.4%

68.5%

8.1%

13.4

900

50.4%

9.8%

80.0%

5.8%

11.3

SE ASIANS

1,255

51.9%

31.5%

39.2%

26.0%

9.9

CHINESE

1,047

50.8%

29.0%

49.5%

16.5%

12.3

FILIPINOS INDIANS

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

TABLE 2.9: Summary Statistics for Those Eligible to Vote, by Immigrant Group

Immigrant Group

N in Voting Models

% Voted

% Less HS Degree

% More HS Degree

% Below Poverty

Mean Eligibility (in years)

1,492

40.0%

55.4%

21.0%

34.7%

19.6

CUBANS

693

64.4%

24.2%

44.4%

16.3%

24.4

CANADIANS

551

67.0%

19.4%

52.6%

8.7%

33.3

BRITONS

430

66.1%

9.1%

50.7%

10.0%

31.7

ITALIANS

622

56.4%

46.8%

23.6%

10.0%

32.8

FORMER SOVIETS

348

48.6%

16.4%

56.6%

25.9%

21.4

CHINESE

463

39.3%

23.5%

52.5%

13.8%

17.8

SE ASIANS

560

34.1%

18.0%

53.6%

15.9%

11.8

FILIPINOS

1,078

53.0%

11.3%

71.2%

7.0%

15.8

404

54.2%

4.5%

86.9%

4.7%

15.3

MEXICANS

INDIANS

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

Assessing Immigrant Political Activity

51

CONCLUSION This preliminary examination of the data suggests variability in political incorporation by country of origin, education, income, and length of eligibility. However, some important differences emerge in the relationships of these characteristics with naturalizing and voting, respectively. Figure 2.2 illustrated increasing rates of education and decreasing rates of poverty with rising levels of political incorporation. Those eligible to naturalize show lower levels of education and income, on average, than those who have naturalized. Those eligible to vote, i.e. the naturalized, show lower levels of education and income than those who have voted. In short, political incorporation is not random, but is selectively sought out by those with greater schooling and/or economic means. Further breakdown of the samples by country of origin reveals a more complex picture. While education and income appear to be correlated with both forms of political incorporation, the relationship is not perfectly consistent within or across immigrant groups. Britons and Canadians who have naturalized exhibit lower levels of income and education, on average, than among the larger sample of their eligible (but not necessarily naturalized) compatriots. Interestingly, naturalized Britons and Canadians have higher levels of voter turnout than any other eligible group. This preliminary finding suggests that “key” predictors of incorporation may work differently for different groups. Finally, this initial analysis of naturalizing and voting by immigrant group suggests differential motivations for these two political processes. Immigrant groups with high levels of citizenship acquisition do not necessarily have high levels of voter turnout. Conversely, low levels of naturalizing do not necessarily mean low levels of voting. This finding suggests that voting is not necessarily a natural outgrowth of naturalizing. These two processes may be quite distinct, with varied motivations. The prima facia evidence of a relationship between country of origin and political incorporation, the variation in other types of predictors by country of origin, and the seemingly distinct nature of naturalizing and voting, respectively, require a more in-depth analysis. The next four chapters explore these initial findings further to see how individual, family, community, and country of origin factors more fully explain these two formal modes of political incorporation, or lack thereof, among immigrants in the United States.

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CHAPTER 3

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation The differing benefits attached to naturalizing and voting, respectively, beg the question of whether these two formal acts of political incorporation are attractive to the same groups of people for the same reasons. Naturalizing may be undertaken for political reasons, but there are countless economic, legal, and social incentives to naturalize, as well. Voting, although frequently viewed as the natural outgrowth of citizenship, provides far fewer immediate and tangible benefits, with its primary benefit being participation in the polis. Thus, voting suggests to an even greater extent than does citizenship the individual incorporation of a democratic society’s political values. Citizens, both foreign-born and native-born equally, voice their political concerns, affect the outcome of elections, and influence public policy through voting, with little individual benefit. Perhaps an individual will help influence the outcome of an election. Perhaps his or her candidate will gain political office. However, the individual benefits that an immigrant will accrue from voting pale in comparison to what citizenship provides. As a result of these differential benefits, one should not be surprised that more immigrants naturalize than vote. Of greater interest is that both citizenship and voting, respectively, are differentially distributed throughout the foreign-born population. Not every immigrant is as likely to naturalize as every other immigrant, nor is every eligible citizen as likely to vote as every other. Previous studies have repeatedly found that individual-level characteristics, such as education, income, country of origin, and length of exposure to the United States, significantly affect the odds of various types of immigrant incorporation. But how do these individual-level characteristics impact political integration? Further, are the sources of variation similar in magnitude, or even direction, for both naturalizing and voting? 53

54

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Individual-level characteristics, specifically education, income, and length of exposure to the United States, are likely linked to political incorporation through the mechanisms of knowledge and contact. As immigrants come to possess higher levels of education, income, or experience in the United States, their knowledge of the benefits of naturalizing likely increases. Greater education and experience should also make the process of political incorporation easier, with the sometimes overwhelming litany of tests and procedures required for citizenship made easier for those with more knowledge of the system. These same factors should influence voting, as well, with higher levels of education, income, or exposure increasing familiarity with the political system, thus encouraging and facilitating voter turnout. Greater economic, educational, and social incorporation should also encourage immigrant political incorporation through increased contact with the native-born. Immigrants with higher levels of education, income, or length of exposure to the United States are more likely to interact with native-born Americans in professional, educational, residential, and social settings. As immigrants become more entrenched in mainstream society, they should be more likely to view their migration as relatively more permanent, encouraging both naturalizing and voting. Just as individual immigrants enter the United States with different amounts of human capital, so too do they enter with diverse political histories, cultural experiences, and reasons for migrating. Therefore it is not surprising to find that country of origin affects political incorporation, with some immigrant groups, such as Filipinos or Chinese, naturalizing at higher rates than other groups, such as Mexicans or Britons (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997). In previous research, country of origin variables have been included in models as summary measures of home society characteristics (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). A country of origin variable might stand for the ease of reverse migration, i.e., how costly or difficult it is to return to one’s country of origin. An individual migrating from a geographically proximate democracy would likely have an easier time returning to his or her home society than an individual migrating from a greater distance or from a more hostile political regime. The ease with which one can reverse his or her

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 55 migratory course and return home is known as the level of “reversibility” (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). An immigrant’s previous political experiences may also influence his or her likelihood of participating in the electoral process. Individuals with previous democratic experience may be able to “translate” this political knowledge and apply it to new political experiences in the United States. The ability to apply prior political knowledge to a new political environment is known as “translation” (Black et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989). Greater distances or more hostile regimes may mean greater propensities to naturalize, while previous democratic experience likely translates into a higher likelihood of voter turnout, once naturalized. Both the reversibility and translation theories suggest that country of origin really constitute a proxy for something else, such as geographic distance between countries, previous political experience, or linguistic congruity, with the effect of country of origin likely varying by political process. However, apart from these factors, country of origin likely has its own influence on political incorporation. Immigrants encounter very different receptions upon entering the United States, based largely upon their country of origin (Guranizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Koopmans, 1999; Portes, 1995b). Immigrants from certain countries of origin, such as Cuba, are more warmly received and encounter greater help navigating through the naturalization process than immigrants from other countries, such as Haiti, who meet greater discrimination (Alvarez, 1987; Garcia, 1987; Pedraza-Bailey, 1987). An immigrant’s country of origin also provides access to ethnic social networks and organizations; the best example is that of Cuban immigrants who have access to an extensive and highly entrenched set of formal and informal groups (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Forment, 1989; Togeby, 1999). In this example, it is likely the country of origin as such that affects political incorporation, rather than some other characteristic subsumed in the country of origin variable. Immigrants from different countries of origin, even those sharing similar geographic, economic, or political characteristics, enter into different environments in the United States, which in turn influence political integration. Country of origin, while likely important in its own right, may also mediate the effect of other individual-level characteristics, such as

56

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

income and education, on political incorporation. The selectivity of migration flows means that countries tend to send a particular type of immigrant. Immigrants from some countries, such as India, tend to come from the highest echelons of their respective societies. In the case of other countries, such as Mexico, the lower economic and educational tiers of the society dominate immigration to the United States. Furthermore, the reasons for migrating to the U.S. and the longer-term settlement plans may reflect not just an individual’s personal situation, but also the larger country of origin context. A Canadian immigrant with a high-level of education may be substantially less likely to naturalize than a Soviet immigrant with a comparable level of education, due to differences in the home society. The two personal characteristics of education and country of origin likely interact to result in different propensities to become politically incorporated. Does an individual migrant with a high level of education have professional opportunities in his or her country of origin? Is the goal of migration to the United States part of a larger plan to raise capital and return to opportunities in the home society, or are job opportunities for the highly educated so limited in the country of origin that the plan is for more permanent settlement in the United States? As a result, the political incorporation of immigrants with shared economic or educational characteristics, but from different countries of origin, might differ dramatically, as individual characteristics interact with country of origin to influence political behavior. It is essential to examine both the main effects of country of origin, as well as its interactions with other factors, to understand fully the interplay of all of these influences on political incorporation. The goals of this chapter are (1) to create a baseline of the individual level characteristics that predict political incorporation among the foreign-born, looking closely at the influences of education, income, exposure, and country of origin; (2) to determine whether the two processes of naturalizing and voting are predicted by the same or different individual-traits; (3) to examine how individual-characteristics might interact with each other to affect political incorporation; and (4) to compare the foreign-born with the native-born to explore the extent to which individual-level characteristics predict voter turnout for both groups.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 57 CHANGING POLICIES, CHANGING PATTERNS The passage of the 1965 Immigration Act led to a dramatic change in the composition of migration flows to the United States. Whereas immigration was dominated by Europeans during the first half of the century, the change in legislation has since led to immigrant streams comprised primarily of Asians and Latinos. Such a dramatic shift in country of origin has highlighted the need to answer the question of whether today’s immigrants assimilate into American society as their European predecessors did. At the foundation of this debate is the question of how and to what extent individual-level characteristics determine incorporation. Straight-line assimilation theorists (Gordon, 1964) argue that with the passage of enough time, immigrants eventually become indistinguishable from the native-born. Through language-acquisition, residential integration, and intermarriage, the two groups meld into one, with time being the major difference in the level of incorporation of different groups. In this theory, individual traits, other than length of exposure to American society, have less to do with incorporation. More recent arguments suggest that time alone will not erase the differences between the native-born and the foreign-born (Alba & Nee, 1999; Portes, 1995a). Contemporary immigrants are simply too different from the native stock and no amount of time will make up for these differences. Today’s migrants are of “lesser quality” than previous waves (Borjas, 1998). Their lower levels of education result in lower levels of income, and the development of a two-tiered society (Frenette & Morissette, 2005). The questions and goals outlined in the introduction of this chapter– what predicts political incorporation and how does it vary by process or group? – are fundamentally part of this larger debate about incorporation. To begin to answer these questions, it is essential to understand what characteristics have been identified as crucial components of incorporation and how such characteristics encourage or discourage political integration. PREDICTORS OF POLITICAL INCORPORATION Socio-Economic Factors Historically, models developed to predict citizenship have been of the socio-economic variety, exploring income, education, and occupational status to examine their impacts on the naturalization process. Though a

58

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

considered and conscious cost-benefit analysis is unlikely to be performed by individuals in either the naturalizing or voting realm, given the many unquantifiable emotional factors involved, consideration of some of the costs and benefits of participation is justified. Studies of citizenship acquisition have specifically focused on the influence of income and education, repeatedly finding that increased income and education lead to higher odds of naturalizing (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Yang, 1994). One study finds that approximately 66% of immigrants with college degrees, household incomes above $100,000, and white-collar jobs have naturalized. At the other end of the educational and economic spectrum, the naturalization rate of those who have not completed high school stands at 44% and the naturalization rate of those in households earning less than $15,000 annually is 52% (Mogelonsky, 1997). The posited mechanisms behind these relationships vary. Income and education may encourage naturalizing by increasing the benefits, or perceived benefits, of U.S. citizenship, with the better educated more fully aware of the social, political, and economic advantages of naturalizing (Yang, 1994). Greater levels of income or schooling may also encourage naturalizing by easing the daunting citizenship process. The more educated are better able to navigate through the complicated naturalization process that includes tests of civics, history, and Englishlanguage (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Those with more income can better afford a lawyer to guide them through the maze of laws, tests, and procedures associated with naturalizing. As with naturalizing, resource or socio-economic based theories dominate the literature on voting, and identify education and income as the biggest predictors of turnout (Bass & Casper, 2001; de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Sierra et al., 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). More educated individuals are more likely to participate in politics than those with less education, likely due to a greater awareness of and interest in the political system and stronger feelings of political efficacy. Higher levels of income translate into individuals feeling that they have a greater stake in society and more to protect. Individuals compare the time and effort of voting with what may be won or lost by going to the polls (Verba et al., 1995).

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 59 Studies of voter turnout among the native-born suggest that education and income work in the same way for those born in the United States as they do for the foreign born (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Tate, 1991; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). As education and income rise, so does the propensity of the native-born to vote. The mechanisms- interest, efficacy, and resources- are thought to be similar for both groups. Increasing levels of income and education also likely encourage immigrant political incorporation through greater contact with mainstream society. Immigrants with lower levels of skill, income, or education are more likely to be segregated into jobs, social circles, and neighborhoods that are dominated by other immigrants. In contrast, immigrants who have higher levels of income or education, such as those from India, may find themselves working with or living near the native-born. This contact likely encourages immigrant political incorporation, with the native-born acting as role models, applying peer pressure, or simply helping to further entrench immigrants into American society. Exposure Exposure, understood as the length of time an immigrant lives in the United States and is exposed to American society, is one of the most consistent predictors of immigrant incorporation (Gordon, 1964). Longer residencies expose individuals to the language, habits, culture, people, and institutions found in the United States. This greater contact with both people and institutions provides immigrants with more “local” knowledge and increasingly strong ties to American society. As an immigrant’s exposure increases, he or she becomes more entrenched in mainstream culture, with social, economic, educational, and linguistic incorporation all increasing (Lopez, 1999). The propensity of immigrants to become politically incorporated also increases with extended stays, reducing many of the educational, economic, and country of origin differences (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). More time in the United States translates into greater experience with American institutions, increased knowledge about the potential benefits of naturalizing and how to do so, greater contacts with the native-born, a more permanent view of migration, and higher

60

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

levels of social capital (Liang, 1994). These factors, in turn, encourage citizenship acquisition. In the voting realm, increased time in the United States may translate into greater internalization of American political norms, more familiarity with the American democratic system, and greater feelings of peer pressure to become “American” and participate in the political life of the community (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Gordon, 1964). Age The impact of certain demographic characteristics on the naturalization and voting processes has also been explored. An individual’s age has repeatedly appeared as a significant predictor of voting for the native-born and, for naturalizing and voting for the foreign-born. In the naturalization process, the relationship with age is curvilinear. Immigrants who are younger when they arrive are less likely to naturalize than are their more senior counterparts. Progressively older immigrants are ever more likely to acquire citizenship until approximately middle age. At that point, the relationship changes direction, with each passing year decreasing the likelihood of naturalizing (Yang, 1994). A similar trend has been identified in the voting realm. Younger people, both native-born and foreign-born, are less likely to be politically active than are their older counterparts. Age increases interest and involvement. This positive trend continues on until individuals reach old age. At the oldest ages, involvement drops off, with this pattern identified among both native-born (Converse, 1969; Niemi et al., 1984; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Verba et al., 1995) and foreign-born (Black et al., 1987). There are multiple mechanisms mediating between age and political incorporation. In the naturalization process, younger migrants may not yet have decided whether they will remain in the United States. As they get older, they view their host country as a more permanent home. Furthermore, younger migrants may not see the benefits of naturalizing, and only with increased age do the social, economic, and political benefits of citizenship fully become apparent. At too advanced an age, citizenship becomes less appealing. Older immigrants may have a harder time emotionally giving up formal ties to their country of origin to acquire American citizenship. From a

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 61 practical perspective, language acquisition becomes more difficult for people as they age. Since English-language ability is a component of the citizenship process, elderly immigrants may feel they are unable to pass the naturalization exams. Finally, elderly immigrants may simply conduct the same cost-benefit analysis that their younger counterparts conduct. Because they are older, the length of time they will benefit from U.S. citizenship is shorter, making the somewhat difficult and time-consuming process seem less appealing. Though the relationship between age and voting is similar to that of age and citizenship, the mechanisms at work are different. Younger people, both native-born and foreign-born, are simply less engaged in politics (Converse, 1969; Niemi et al., 1984; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). Increased age boosts interest in the political system in a variety of ways. Increased age may translate into greater wealth and a larger stake in society. In an effort to protect what one has earned, individuals are more likely to go to the polls. Older people may also have more free time to become involved in politics, or simply develop greater interest. Among the elderly, the time, interest, and desire to be involved in politics may still exist. Unfortunately, older people have a harder time getting to the polls to vote. Sickness, isolation, and immobility make voting a more difficult process for both the foreign-born and the nativeborn, leading to a negative relationship between turnout and age at the upper reaches of the age spectrum. Age may also stand as a proxy for where an individual is in the life-course. As one advances through young adulthood into the twenties and thirties, they are more likely to be married and have children. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, these familial relationships may encourage both the foreign-born and the native-born to become politically engaged through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from greater stability resulting from marriage to greater interest in the distribution of resources resulting from having children. Gender The gender gap in political participation has existed for years, with women frequently participating at lower rates than men (Burns, Lehman Schlozman & Verba, 2001; Milbraith & Goel, 1982; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Unfortunately, much of the knowledge about the political gender gap is based upon studies of the

62

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

white native-born (Lien, 1998). Knowing that white men are more likely to vote than white women or that native-born women are more likely to be Democrats than native-born men does little to inform our knowledge of immigrant political behaviors, given the very different ways gender manifests itself across cultures even within the United States (Lien, 1998; Tate, 1991). One study finds women are less likely to participate politically than are men, due to their lower rates of participation in the workforce, an arena thought to encourage political discussion and mobilization (Burns et al., 2001). In a study focusing specifically on black Americans, women are found to vote more than their male counterparts, arguably resulting from women’s greater involvement in the black churches (Tate, 1991). Case studies of Latino immigrant incorporation find a greater propensity among female migrants to become integrated into American society (Hongdagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Jones-Correa, 1998). Women tend to seek permanent settlement in the host society, while men continue to look back towards the country of origin. Studies that have explicitly examined political behaviors have found mixed results. While some studies find women to be more likely to naturalize (Yang, 1994) and vote (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001), another study finds lower naturalization rates among women (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990). Clearly, the role of gender varies from context to context and must be understood and interpreted for each group. Country of Origin Even after factors such as income, education, length of residence, and age have been taken into account, both naturalizing and voting vary by country of origin (Alba & Nee, 1999; de la Garza & DeSipio, 1996; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Sierra et al., 2000; Smith & Edmonston, 1997). One author argues “national origin is the overriding predictor of the tendency to naturalize, however, above and beyond socioeconomic characteristics. A Mexican college graduate is less likely than a highschool dropout from China to become a U.S. citizen…” (Mogelonsky, 1997, p.47). The numbers may support this argument, but we are left wondering what it is about country of origin that leads to such differences. Surely some immigrant groups are not innately more likely to naturalize than other immigrant groups.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 63 Country of origin likely acts as a proxy for a host of other characteristics that define and distinguish that particular country of origin, such as geographic distance, political system, economic opportunities, or gender structure. Previous research examining the effect of country of origin on political incorporation has identified the cost/benefit structure as one of the mechanisms mediating the relationship (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Individual immigrants assess the costs and benefits of acquiring U.S. citizenship within their country of origin context. Although applying a formal cost-benefit analysis to something as emotionally driven as naturalizing or voting is questionable, using the general framework to think of both the positives and negatives for an individual immigrant can be useful. How difficult, expensive, or painful is it to return to the country of origin? Is reversibility dangerous or prohibitive in some other way? Immigrants migrating from greater distances, such as the Philippines, or from nondemocratic regimes, such as China, are far more likely to naturalize than are those from geographically closer or more democratic countries, such as Canada, where the financial or psychic costs of return are lower (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Liang, 1994; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). However, country of origin likely influences the voting process differently than it does the naturalization process. The process of voting generally provides little tangible, immediate, or individual benefit. Individuals vote because they gain psychic satisfaction from “doing their civic duty.” Some scholars argue that this ingrained sense of civic responsibility results from having grown up in a democratic society (Black et al., 1987). According to the “translation” argument (Finifter & Finifter, 1989), previous experience with democratic systems is among the best predictors of future participation for immigrants. Other scholars make a slightly different argument regarding the influence of country of origin on voting, contending that refugees are less likely to participate politically, not because of a lack of experience, but rather due to their histories of state-sponsored oppression and lack of trust in government institutions (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Harles, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). In these instances, country of origin is influencing individual political incorporation, but through different mechanisms than those that impacted naturalizing. More recently, the effect of country of origin on voter participation has been viewed as a mechanism of mobilization. Ethnic social

64

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

networks and organizations encourage political participation by turning the powerlessness of one vote into the power of many (Barreto, 2005; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Shaw et al., 2000; Togeby, 1999). An isolated individual may vote for psychic satisfaction, out of a sense of duty, or simply out of habit. An individual who is part of a larger ethnic network may turnout to vote in an effort to push a particular agenda or elect a certain official. As part of a mobilized group, an individual likely feels a sense of duty to others in the network, as well as the real possibility of electoral success. Being from a particular country of origin is what provides access to and involvement in such ethnic networks and organizations, and the resulting political mobilization (Gibson & Ogbu, 1991; Portes, 1995b; Portes & Zhou, 1999). Successful ethnic mobilization is best seen in the Cuban community, where extensive social networks and ethnic organizations have led to high levels of voter turnout (Forment, 1989; PedrazaBailey, 1987; Portes & Bach, 1985). Country of origin also influences political incorporation indirectly by mediating the effect of other characteristics. In research conducted by Liang (1994), predictors of political incorporation vary by immigrant group. For instance, homeownership is a bigger predictor of naturalizing among Chinese, Koreans, and Cubans than among Mexicans, while residential integration matters the most for naturalizing among the latter group. In this instance, having an economic “stake in society” seems to encourage political incorporation for certain groups, while having social ties seems to matter more for other groups. These findings suggest that mechanisms vary by country of origin, making source country important to study as much for the influence it exerts indirectly as for its main effects. Gender is another characteristic that is affected by country of origin and cannot simply be studied in a vacuum (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Irish women are more likely to acquire U.S. citizenship than are Irish men, while among Israelis, men are more likely to naturalize than are women. Though scholars have not determined the mechanisms at work, the mixed gender findings by country of origin suggests that the impact of gender on political incorporation varies by home society. Even characteristics found to affect political incorporation in the same way across immigrant groups must be examined more closely.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 65 For instance, greater levels of education translate into greater odds of naturalizing, but the importance varies by country of origin (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). A college-educated Mexican immigrant is more likely to naturalize than a compatriot with lesser education, but a Chinese immigrant with the lowest level of education has the highest odds of naturalizing (Mogelonsky, 1997). Little work has been done to understand how different characteristics interact with country of origin to affect voting. Two studies that have begun to explore these relationships have focused on how gender varies in its effect across different immigrant groups. Female immigrants from Latin America seem to have higher propensities to become politically active (Jones-Correa, 1998) and vote (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001), as compared with their male counterparts. Scholars argue that women from Latin American countries experience new freedoms and opportunities in the United States, while Latin American men find economic and social adjustment difficult (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991). The reaction of the women is to become more politically incorporated, flexing their new power. Men from the same countries react by retreating into ethnic groups and organizations that reflect the more traditional patriarchal structures (Jones-Correa, 1998). Because so little work has been done to explore how gender differentially affects political incorporation across immigrant groups, it is not known whether this gender pattern exists across all migrant communities. What we do know is that gender roles vary significantly by place of origin. Such diversity in gender structures suggests that it likely does impact the political incorporation of different immigrant groups in a range of ways. HYPOTHESES Socio-economic factors have consistently been identified as some of the biggest predictors of incorporation (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Yang, 1994). An individual’s level of education and income impact the type of job one holds, with whom one comes into contact, and where one lives. As education and income increase, they encourage these multiple types of social and structural integration which in turn encourage political incorporation through increased contact with the native-born, stronger ties to American society, and greater knowledge about the benefits and processes of naturalizing and voting. This leads to the first hypothesis.

66

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen The Socio-Economic Hypothesis: Immigrants with greater levels of education and income should show higher rates of naturalizing and voting, net of other characteristics. However, the power of these predictors will vary by country of origin.

Previous research has identified ease or difficulty of reversibility as a factor affecting an individual’s decision to naturalize (Liang, 1994; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Immigrants from greater distances, more hostile political regimes, or generally from countries where return is more difficult are more likely to acquire American citizenship than immigrants from societies with fewer barriers to return. The second hypothesis is intended to test this argument, examining immigrants from ten places of origin, each with distinct levels of economic, political, and geographic barriers. The Reversibility Hypothesis: Because of the geographic, economic, and/or political difficulties associated with reverse migration, immigrants from China, the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and India should show higher propensities to naturalize than immigrants from Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, and Italy. Other scholars have argued that similarities between the home country and the host country lead to greater levels of political incorporation (Black et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989). Those that have experienced democratic elections in his or her home society will be more likely to participate in electoral politics in the United States, as previous political experience can be translated. Though earlier work (Black et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989) has identified these trends, this hypothesis has not previously been tested on voter participation in the United States, leading to the third hypothesis. The Translation Hypothesis: The political environment of the country of origin impacts an immigrant’s level of political integration in the United States. Immigrants from countries with histories of democracy, specifically Great Britain, Italy, Canada, and India, should be more likely to vote, once naturalized, than immigrants from the former Soviet Union,

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 67 Southeast Asia, and China, societies that lack a democratic tradition. Immigrants from Mexico and the Philippines are likely found somewhere between the extremes, given their more mixed democratic histories. An immigrant group’s initial reception in the United States has implications for its longer-term incorporation (Portes, 1995b). Immigrants that are welcomed and targeted to receive financial aid and assistance will have a greater likelihood of integration, as has happened in the Cuban community (Pedraza-Bailey, 1987). Settlement patterns also play a role, with concentrations of immigrants both helping to integrate new waves from the home society into the political and economic systems in the United States (Forment, 1989), as well as to increase the interest of major political parties who identify a voting bloc worthy of courtship. These multiple factors, characteristic of the Cuban community, lead to the next hypothesis. The Mobilization Hypothesis: Cubans, though emigrating from a non-democratic society, will have high levels of voter turnout due to extensive mobilization efforts. This voter push emanates both from the ethnic social networks and organizations within the highly segregated Cuban community and externally, from the major political parties. Though an increasing amount of attention has recently focused on the gendered nature of migration, much of the work has focused on one or two immigrant groups (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998). This hypothesis is applied to test the effect of gender across ten distinct countries of origin, building on the growing body of research on gender and migration. The Gender Diversity Hypothesis: The effect of gender on political incorporation should vary by country of origin in both the naturalization and voting processes. An immigrant’s length of exposure to the United States, net of other characteristics, should play a significant role in encouraging immigrant political incorporation. Immigrants, regardless of education, income, country of origin, or any of the other characteristics previously

68

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

discussed, will likely become more “American” with the passage of time, as Gordon (1964) suggested. The Straight-Line Assimilation Hypothesis: As length of time in the United States increases, immigrants should be more likely to become politically incorporated. Further, the differences between native-born and foreign-born voter turnout should decrease in significance when length of eligibility is included in the model. FINDINGS The Pooled Models Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give the odds-ratios of naturalizing and voting, respectively, among individuals with certain socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Taken together, the tables show a strong, positive relationship between socio-economic predictors, specifically income and education, and political incorporation. For instance, immigrants with less than a high-school degree are only about half as likely to naturalize as those with a high-school degree. Those with at least some higher education are 38% more likely to naturalize than someone who holds only a highschool degree. In terms of voting, those in the lowest educational category are about a third less likely to vote as those immigrants holding highschool diplomas, while those with higher levels of education are nearly twice as likely to vote as those in the reference group. Income, similarly, is a strong predictor of both naturalizing and voting, with those living below the poverty line only 78% as likely to naturalize as those living above the poverty line. Poverty has a similarly negative relationship with voting, with poorer immigrants only 76% as likely to vote as their wealthier counterparts. These findings suggest that socio-economic variables are similar in direction for both forms of political incorporation, in keeping with previous studies (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997). The results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also lend strong support for the Socio-economic Hypothesis; as education and income increase, so does the propensity for political incorporation.

TABLE 3.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Immigrants, N=17,019 CONTROLS

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

CHINA

PHIL

USSR

ITALY

BRIT

AGE 2 AGE

1.01

**

CUBA

NA

NA

2.91

***

3.43

***

0.62

***

1.04

0.83

(a)

0.47

***

0.60

***

1.11

1.00

(a)

MEXICO

0.34 ***

NA

NA

1.18

(a)

0.21

***

0.36

***

0.29

***

0.16

***

0.21

***

0.38

***

1.07

FEMALE

1.00

CANADA

0.29 ***

0.85

(a)

NA

NA

0.18

***

0.30

***

0.24

***

0.14

***

0.18

***

0.32

***

0.91

LESSHS

0.53 *** SE ASIA

1.61 ***

4.67

***

5.51

***

NA

NA

1.67

***

1.33

**

0.75

***

0.97

1.78

***

MOREHS

1.38 *** INDIA

0.96

2.80

***

3.30

***

0.60

***

NA

NA

0.78

*

0.45

***

0.58

***

1.07

POVERTY

0.78 *** CHINA

1.21

(a)

3.51

***

4.14

***

0.75

**

1.25

*

NA

NA

0.56

***

0.73

**

1.34

WORK

1.18 *** PHIL

2.14 ***

6.24

***

7.35

***

1.33

***

2.23

***

1.78

***

NA

NA

1.29

*

ELIGTIME

1.10 *** USSR

1.66 ***

4.84

***

5.70

***

1.04

1.73

***

1.37

**

0.78

*

NA

NA

YEAR96

1.15

0.90

2.63

***

3.10

***

0.56

***

0.94

0.75

*

0.42

***

0.54

***

YEAR98

1.43 *** BRIT

0.32 ***

0.94

0.20

***

0.34

0.27

***

0.15

***

0.19

***

YEAR00

1.37 ***

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2

**

ITALY

17,048.76 .31

MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

2

.41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

1.11

***

3.10

***

4.99

***

2.99

***

*

3.75

***

2.37

***

6.65

***

1.84

***

5.16

***

NA

NA

2.81

***

0.36

***

NA

NA

TABLE 3.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Immigrants, N=6,641 CONTROLS

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

INDIA

AGE AGE2

1.05 *** CUBA

NA

1.00 *** MEXICO

0.68 *** NA

NA 0.81

(a)

FEMALE

0.94

0.83

1.23

(a)

NA

NA 1.72

*** 1.31

LESSHS

0.68 *** SE ASIA

0.49 *** 0.72

**

0.58 ***

NA

NA 0.76

MOREHS

1.95 *** INDIA

0.64

0.76

1.31

(a)

NA

CANADA

NA 1.48 *** 1.20

SE ASIA

** 0.94

(a)

2.06

*** 1.58

1.39

**

**

CHINA

PHIL

2.63

***

1.47

1.78

***

0.99

(a)

2.19

***

1.22

(a)

1.28

(a)

0.71

NA 1.67

***

0.93

1.06

***

USSR

ITALY ***

BRIT

1.96

***

1.52

1.33

*

1.03

1.29

(a)

1.63

**

1.27

(a)

1.07

*

0.95

0.74

*

0.63

1.25

0.97

0.76 *** CHINA

0.38 *** 0.56 *** 0.46 *** 0.78

(a)

0.60 ***

NA

NA

0.56

***

0.75

(a)

0.58

WORK

1.05

PHIL

0.68 *** 1.01

**

1.07

1.79

***

NA

NA

1.34

*

1.04

ELIGTIME

1.03 *** USSR

0.51 *** 0.75

0.80

1.34

(a)

0.75

*

NA

NA

0.78

(a)

0.66

YEAR96

1.58 *** ITALY

NA

0.85

YEAR98

0.83

YEAR00

1.67 ***

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2

*

BRIT

(a)

1.40

0.61

**

1.05

0.66 *** 0.97

0.80

(a)

1.35

*

1.04

1.73

***

0.97

1.29

(a)

NA

0.78

0.93

1.60

**

1.22

2.04

***

1.14

1.53

**

1.18

8,152.60 .15

MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

.20

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

(a) 1.15

*

**

0.82

POVERTY

0.82

(a)

0.87

***

0.50 *** 0.86

NA

** NA

71

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Figure 3.1 further illustrates the relationship between education and income and the two respective forms of political incorporation. As income and education increase, so, too, do the odds of immigrants becoming citizens and going to the polls. This figure also illustrates the differing ways in which education influences the two processes: having less than a high-school diploma or GED is the more significant predictor of failing to naturalize, while having more than a high-school education is the bigger predictor of voting. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also highlight the effect of country of origin on the political incorporation process and clarify the results from the bivariate relationships examined in the previous chapter. In Table 2.8, Italians had the highest naturalization rates and Mexicans had the lowest. But is the effect of country of origin real, or is it a proxy for some other characteristic? What happens when critical factors such as education, income, and length of eligibility are taken into account? Figure 3.2 compares the odds of naturalization among immigrants from specific countries of origin and compares their likelihood of citizenship acquisition with the likelihood of naturalization among the other immigrant groups combined. Country of origin is a statistically significant predictor of citizenship for nine of the ten immigrant groups under examination, net of education, poverty status, length of eligibility, gender, workforce participation, age, and age2. Mexicans continue to have the lowest naturalization rates, being only about onethird as likely to naturalize as all other immigrants included in the study. Filipinos now have the highest naturalization rates, being about three times as likely to become citizens as all other immigrants. Southeast Asians are second to Filipinos, with naturalization rates nearly two and a half times that of the rest of the sample, followed by former Soviets who are nearly twice as likely to naturalize as all other groups. Italians who had the highest naturalization rate in the bivariate relationship are slightly over one and one half times as likely to naturalize, followed closely by Chinese and Cubans. Britons,

3.50

FIGURE 3.1: The Odds of Immigrants Naturalizing and Voting by Selected Socioeconomic Characteristics

3.00 2.50 ***

2.00 ***

1.50 1.00 ***

***

***

***

0.50 0.00 Less than HS Degree (v. HS)

More than HS Degree (v. HS)

Odds of Naturalizing

Living in Poverty (v. Above)

Odds of Voting

Source: Tables 3.1 and 3.2. ***P<=.001 **P<=.01 *P<=.05 (a)P<=.1 2

Control variables: age, age , gender, eligtime, country of origin, workforce participation, and year of survey.

3.50

FIGURE 3.2: The Odds of Naturalizing by Country of Origin N=17,019

3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50

EX IC O

A

** *M

N A D ** *C A

** *B RI T

D IA IN

BA ** *C U

IN A ** *C H

** *I TA LY

** *U SS R

SI A A E ** *S

** *P H IL

0.00

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys . ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a)P<.1 Numbers reported are the odds-ratio of each group naturalizing, as compared to all other immigrant groups combined. 2

Control Variables: age, age , gender, eligtime, education, poverty status, workforce participation, and year of survey.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 74 Canadians, and Mexicans are the least likely to naturalize, about half as likely to become citizens as are other immigrants. These results reveal that country of origin does matter, even after controlling for a host of factors. For some immigrant groups, country of origin is the biggest predictor of naturalizing. This is true both for groups naturalizing at the highest rates, specifically Filipinos and Southeast Asians, and for groups naturalizing at the lowest rates, specifically Canadians and Mexicans. The findings from Figure 3.2 also suggest that immigrants who have migrated from greater geographic distances, such as Filipinos, as well as those from non-democratic societies, such as Southeast Asians, former Soviets, Cubans, and Chinese, are the most likely to naturalize. Greater ease of reversibility is reflected in the lower naturalization rates of Mexicans, Canadians, and Britons. These patterns imply that citizenship is a status that may be acquired for longer-term security and protection, as well as an indicator of more permanent settlement. These findings are in keeping with Jasso and Rosenzweig’s 1990 findings and Portes and Rumbaut’s 1996 findings and lend support to the Reversibility Hypothesis. As Figure 3.3 shows, country of origin is a significant predictor of voter turnout among five of the ten immigrant groups, at both the highest and lowest levels of participation, but the voting findings are virtually the reverse of the naturalization findings. Immigrants from non-democratic regimes are generally most affected by their country of origin. Although that was the case in the naturalization process, as well, the result is quite different. Former Soviets, Southeast Asians, and Chinese, those with the highest naturalization rates, are about 25% to 40% less likely to vote than are other immigrant groups. Immigrants from democratic societies tend not to be affected by their country of origin, with the exception of Canadians. Canadians are about onequarter more likely to vote than are other immigrants. What the data

FIGURE 3.3: The Odds of Voting by Country of Origin N=6,641

3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00

*C ** A

A

IN H

SI A

LY

R SS

SE **

*U

A IT

A

O

IA D IN

IC EX M

D A N

IL PH

A

BA U

IT BR

*C

*C **

Numbers reported are the odds-ratio of each group voting, as compared to all of the other immigrant groups combined. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a)P<.1 Control Variables: age, age2, gender, eligtime, education, poverty status, workforce participation, and year of survey.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 76 show is that immigrants from non-democratic societies are generally less likely to vote than others, but immigrants from democracies are not necessarily more likely to vote. The Translation Hypothesis posited that previous democratic experience would lead to greater political participation in the U.S. The findings show that previous experience does matter, but it is actually the absence of previous democratic experience that best predicts formal political (in)activity. The one anomaly is the Cuban case, with this immigrant group having higher voting rates than any other. Although refugees from a dictatorship, their reception and resettlement in the United States is quite distinct from other refugee groups, likely explaining the variation in political behavior. Early waves of Cuban refugees were welcomed to the United States, settling predominantly in the Miami area. They received vast amounts of settlement money and support from the American government, facilitating resettlement efforts (Pedraza-Bailey, 1987). The Cuban exile community reconstituted in Florida the social networks and organizations that had existed in Cuba, leading to internal community pressure on Cubans to naturalize and vote in an effort to gain and maintain political power (Forment, 1987). The mobilization efforts from within the Cuban community have combined with the external efforts from the major political parties to explain much of the Cuban deviation from the pattern of refugee non-participation. The findings in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, suggest a limited relationship between naturalizing and voting. Though citizenship is a necessary condition for voting, it is far from sufficient. Based on the mixed findings by immigrant group, with the most likely citizens being the least likely voters and vice versa, it appears that citizenship is acquired for a host of reasons, with the ability to participate in the electoral process only one motivation. Groups from greater distances may simply naturalize because the costs of return migration are too great, as posited by Portes and Rumbaut (1996). Refugees may acquire American citizenship as a sort of protection, a way of ensuring that they will never have to return to their home society. They may also naturalize as a sort of re-birth, essentially giving up any hope of returning to their respective countries of origin and taking on the United States as an adopted home. However, formal political participation for these groups appears to begin and end with naturalization. As Harles (1993) argues, this could be the result of a

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 77 history of state sponsored oppression. Their goal in the United States maybe to exist below any “political radar screen.” It might also be explained via translation theory, with groups having differential levels of political knowledge and experience to apply to the United States’ system of government. The Split Models The variation by immigrant group in the two types of political incorporation may be the result of characteristics differentially affecting immigrants from different countries of origin. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 explore what factors are associated with naturalizing and voting, respectively, for each of the ten immigrant groups individually. Dividing a pooled sample into split groups works the same way as including interaction terms in the full model. By dividing the sample and running the same multivariate models, it is possible to see the effect of particular variables on individual immigrant groups, net of the control variables.12 Among the most important findings from the split models concerns the varying relationship education has with the different types of political incorporation. Table 3.3 shows the strong association between education and naturalizing for the ten different groups. Having less than a high-school education is consistently and negatively associated with citizenship for nine of the ten immigrant groups, with immigrants of this educational level only between 30% and 65% as likely to naturalize as those with a high-school degree. Having more than a high-school education is significant and positive for five of the ten immigrant groups. The range of its relationship is larger- Southeast Asians with some college education are 2.44 times more likely to naturalize than are Southeast Asians with a high-school degree, while Mexicans with some college education are only 1.39 times more likely to naturalize than are their counterparts with only a high-school education. 12

Before making a final decision to run pooled and split models, I calculated Chi-Square statistics to determine whether split models were necessary. For both citizenship (X2=708.33, DF=90, P<.001) and voting (X2=12,711.06, DF=90, P<.001), the Chi-Squares were highly significant, suggesting the need for split models.

78

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Education has a similarly important relationship with voting for many of the immigrant groups. As Table 3.4 shows, a higher level of education has one of the biggest and most significant relationships with voting. Eight of the ten groups show a significant and positive relationship between greater levels of education and voter turnout. The size of the association varies substantially across groups—Mexicans and Filipinos are both 67% more likely to vote than are those with only a high-school degree, while Italians with greater levels of education are three times more likely to vote than are their high-school educated counterparts. The important finding from these split models is not simply that education influences political incorporation, as this relationship has been identified before. Of note is the varying ways in which education works to affect different types of political incorporation. In the naturalization model, the absence of education is more likely to predict citizenship status. For most of the immigrant groups, those with lower levels of education are statistically less likely to have naturalized than those with a high-school degree. Figure 3.1, which illustrates the relationship between socioeconomic factors and political incorporation for the pooled sample of immigrants, shows this general pattern. Citizenship requires the passage of civics, history, and Englishlanguage exams. An individual with a high-school diploma or GED could likely master such tests, while someone without such a degree may have greater difficulty or be more intimidated. At the same time, more education is not essential to conquer the process. Higher education has the more significant relationship with voting. Higher levels of education likely mean more interest in and knowledge of the political system and stronger feelings of political efficacy. These mechanisms likely matter more for voting than for naturalizing. The varying effects of education both between types of political activity and across immigrant groups may also speak to the political institutions in the country of origin. Voting in some countries may be mandatory, thus largely eliminating the relationship between education and voter participation in the home society. Conversely, voting in other countries may be limited to those holding a certain amount of education, likely strengthening the relationship between education and turnout both in the home and host societies.

TABLE 3.3: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Country of Origin

NATIVITY

AGE

AGE2

FEMALE LESSHS

MOREHS POVERTY

WORK

ELIGTIME

YEAR96 YEAR98 YEAR00

MAX. PSEUDO RESCALED -2 LOG PSEUDO R2 LIKELIHOOD R2

CUBA, N=1,157

1.02 (a)

1.00

1.04

0.52 ***

1.89 ***

0.75

0.94

1.10 ***

0.95

1.38

1.60 *

1,213.23

.23

.32

MEXICO, N=7,373

1.01 *

1.00

1.12 (a)

0.56 ***

1.39 **

0.76 ***

1.24 **

1.08 ***

1.22 *

1.63 ***

1.67 ***

6,652.26

.15

.22

CANADA, N=1,060

0.97 **

1.00 **

0.79

0.65 (a)

1.18

1.04

0.80

1.09 ***

1.10

1.38

1.10

1,154.46

.25

.33

SE ASIA, N=1,255

1.04 ***

1.00 *

0.98

0.40 ***

2.44 ***

0.61 **

1.48 *

1.13 ***

1.08

1.24

0.96

1,393.68

.24

.32

INDIA, N=900

1.00

1.00

1.39 *

0.30 **

0.98

0.93

1.95 **

1.16 ***

1.07

2.13 **

1.46 (a)

966.71

.27

.36

CHINA, N=1,047

1.02 (a)

1.00 *

1.12

0.41 ***

0.91

0.88

1.26

1.19 ***

1.42 (a)

1.09

1.18

1,451.17

.32

.43

PHIL, N=1,768

1.01 *

1.00 ***

0.94

0.49 ***

1.25

0.72 (a)

0.86

1.12 ***

1.29

1.04

0.98

1,862.87

.17

.24

USSR, N=638

1.02 (a)

1.00 **

0.73

0.49 *

2.03 **

1.46

1.33

1.15 ***

1.08

2.77 **

1.71 (a)

610.59

.31

.42

ITALY, N=967

1.04 **

1.00 **

0.68 *

0.72

1.65 *

0.78

1.08

1.11 ***

1.24

1.37

1.65 *

887.20

.20

.29

BRIT, N=854

0.99

1.00

0.99

0.41 **

0.87

1.85 *

1.06

1.10 ***

0.97

1.11

1.11

920.49

.26

.35

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

TABLE 3.4: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Country of Origin

AGE

AGE2

FEMALE

LESSHS

CUBA, N=693

1.05 ***

1.00 *

0.95

0.70

2.21 ***

0.89

1.25

1.02

MEXICO, N=1,495

1.06 ***

1.00 ***

0.95

0.60 ***

1.67 **

0.70 **

0.93

1.02 **

CANADA, N=551

1.13 ***

1.00 ***

1.47 (a)

1.10

3.28 ***

0.51 *

SE ASIA, N=560

1.03 **

1.00

1.10

0.57 (a)

1.70 *

INDIA, N=404

1.03 (a)

1.00

0.66 (a)

0.80

1.81

NATIVITY

MOREHS POVERTY WORK ELIGTIME YEAR96

YEAR98

YEAR00

1.66 *

1.04

2.06 **

840.80

.09

2.15 ***

1.07

1.76 ***

1,786.59

.14

.19

2.16 ** 1.01

1.46

0.76

1.60

597.63

.17

.23

0.99

1.22

1.01

1.58 (a)

0.34 ***

2.53 **

615.21

.17

.23

1.51

0.87

1.01

0.97

0.44 **

0.90

519.03

.09

.12

CHINA, N=463

1.04 *

1.00

1.11

0.44 *

2.06 **

0.63

1.10

1.02 *

1.36

0.87

1.61

PHIL, N=1,078

1.03 ***

1.00 (a)

0.92

0.69

1.67 **

0.69

1.22

1.03 ***

1.72 **

0.90

1.47 *

USSR, N=348

1.01

1.00

0.83

0.44 *

1.39

1.41

1.48

1.02 *

1.50

0.57

ITALY, N=623

1.07 ***

1.00 ***

0.80

0.86

3.10 ***

0.60 (a) 0.95

1.05 ***

1.48 (a)

1.34

BRIT, N=430

1.04 (a)

1.00 **

1.17

1.00

2.45 ***

0.43 *

1.01

0.81

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

MAX. PSEUDO RESCALED -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD R2 PSEUDO R2

0.60 (a) 1.06 ***

.12

553.36

.14

.18

1,387.01

.09

.12

1.52

446.60

.10

.13

2.03 *

769.40

.12

.17

2.00 *

481.47

.15

.21

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 81 Like education, the impact of poverty varies in its effect by country of origin and political process. In the citizenship model, the association is less universally significant and directionally consistent than the educational variables, suggesting that poverty status has different implications by country of origin. Mexicans, Southeast Asians, and Filipinos living below the poverty line are all less likely to naturalize than are their counterparts living above the poverty line. Britons living below the poverty line are actually 85% more likely to become citizens than are their wealthier counterparts—in contradiction to expectations. An increased odds of naturalizing among the most economically vulnerable, as demonstrated in the case of Britons, may result from an interaction between economic need and accessibility of naturalization. Since citizenship status provides certain economic entitlements, particularly in the post-1996 welfare reform period, it can be particularly appealing for the most economically vulnerable. For many immigrants, however, poverty status is synonymous with lower levels of education, a lack of English-language ability, and a general lack of social incorporation into American society. Poverty status may very well have a different effect on Britons, as even the poor among them do not suffer from the latter two conditions. Though citizenship acquisition is equally accessible to Britons of all socio-economic levels, its promise of certain entitlements may make citizenship most appealing to those most financially in need. Mexicans, Canadians, Italians, and Britons living below the poverty line are significantly less likely to vote than are their wealthier compatriots, in keeping with expectations. Interestingly, poverty status is not a significant predictor of voting for the other six groups under investigation. The absence of a relationship between income and voting may again speak to the political and social institutions in the country of origin. Four of the six groups for whom poverty has no impact on voter turnout are from communist regimes (Southeast Asians, Former Soviets, Chinese, and Cubans). Societies that have engineered more even distributions of wealth may have removed the relationship between socioeconomic status and political activity. Immigrants from communist societies may generally be less likely to vote than those from democratic countries for a range of reasons, but the political, social, and economic environment in the country of origin may mean

82

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

that the level of political activity among immigrants from communist societies varies little by an individual’s economic situation. The educational and economic findings from both the citizenship and voting split models lend support for the Socio-Economic Hypothesis. Increasing levels of education are positively associated with political incorporation. Generally, the relationship between poverty and political activity also works as one would expect, with those in poverty being less likely to be politically incorporated. The most glaring exception to this pattern is found among the Britons and, as discussed, may be the effect of linguistic and social congruities between the countries, making naturalizing more accessible to this particular group. Length of eligibility is the only variable that is significantly and positively associated with citizenship for all ten of the immigrant groups. Each additional year of eligibility increases the odds of naturalizing by between 8% and 19%. This variable has the most consistent effect across groups and is in keeping with previous research that shows exposure increases political incorporation as measured by naturalizing (Yang, 1994). In the voting model, increasing length of eligibility also matters. It is significant and positive for predicting voting among six of the ten immigrant groups. Each additional year of eligibility increases the odds of voting by 2% to 6%. Though neither as universal in significance nor as strong, eligibility affects voting in the same way across groups when it is significant. The greater amount of time one is eligible to participate in the United States’ political system, the more likely one is to become politically incorporated in multiple ways, supporting the Straight-Line Assimilation Hypothesis. Figure 3.4 highlights the relationship between gender and political incorporation. The effect of gender on citizenship varies by country of origin, in both significance and direction. Mexican and Indian women are 12% and 39%, respectively, more likely to naturalize than are their male counterparts. In contrast, Italian women are 32% less likely to naturalize than are Italian men. Gender’s impact on citizenship clearly varies by country of origin.

FIGURE 3.4: The Odds of Women Versus Men Naturalizing and Voting, by Country of Origin 1.60 (a) *

1.40 1.20

(a)

1.00 0.80

(a)

*

0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 Mexico

Cuba

Canada

SE Asia India China Philippines Odds of Naturalizing Odds of Voting

USSR

Source: Tables 3.3 and 3.4. ***P<=.001 **P<=.01 *P<=.05 (a)P<=.1 Control variables: age, age2, gender, eligtime, country of origin, workforce participation, and year of survey.

Italy

Britain

84

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Gender is even more limited and less consistent in its relationship with voter turnout. Only two immigrant groups, Canadians and Indians, show statistically significant gender effects. Canadian women are 47% more likely to vote than are their male counterparts. Indian women are 34% less likely to vote than are Indian men. Gender does influence voter turnout, but its significance and direction are substantially influenced by country of origin. The varying relationship between gender across countries of origin and across types of political incorporation lends support for the Gender Diversity Hypothesis. Unfortunately, these findings give little insight into the mechanisms mediating gender and political incorporation among immigrants from different countries of origin. Though beyond the scope of this study, future research must explore what gender means in different societies, how it reproduces itself in particular immigrant communities in the United States, and what this results in for political incorporation among immigrants from different places. The Native-Born Versus the Foreign-Born Though we now know how various immigrant groups compare to one another, in terms of political incorporation, we do not yet know how they compare to the native-born. Table 3.5 presents the results of models predicting voter turnout among the native-born and the foreignborn.13 As one can see from Table 3.5, the relationship between education and voter turnout is statistically significant among both the native-born and the foreign-born. A greater level of education is most strongly associated with voting in both Models 1 and 2. Those with more than a high-school degree are about 2½ times more likely to vote than those with only a high-school diploma. This is in keeping with the findings from the immigrant-only sample, as well as from previous studies. Having less than a high-school diploma reduces the odds of voter turnout by about 50%, again in keeping with previous studies and with 13 As discussed in Chapter 2, it is not methodologically possible to include both age and length of exposure in models that include the native-born. These two characteristics are highly collinear for this population. To counter this problem, I have run two models—one that includes the age variables and one that includes the length of exposure. It is essential to have both, as I have argued that these are two distinct measurements.

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 85 the findings from the immigrant sample. Education is clearly linked to this form of political participation. It should be noted, however, that the effect of education (or its lack) on voter turnout is greater in the sample of White, Black, Asian, and Latino native-born than it is for naturalized citizens. Immigrants with less than a high-school degree are about 70% as likely to vote compared to those with a high-school diploma (Table 3.2), while in the larger population, the rate of voter turnout for those with comparable levels of education is only about 50% (Table 3.5). The impact of education at the higher levels is also greater on the general population. Immigrants with more than a high-school diploma are about 2 times as likely to vote as the reference group (Table 3.2), while among the entire population, the odds of turnout jump to 2.5 times (Table 3.5). The association between poverty and voting is similarly lessened in the immigrant-only sample. Though poverty consistently has a negative relationship with political participation across both groups, its association is greater among the general population. Immigrants living below the poverty line are about 80% as likely to vote as their wealthier counterparts (Table 3.2). Among the general population, the poor are only about 70% as likely to go to the polls (Table 3.5). Women in this larger sample are statistically more likely to vote than are their male counterparts. The odds of a female voting are 8% greater than the odds of a male going to the polls. Gender is not statistically significant in the immigrant sample. But how do turnout rates of different immigrant groups compare to that of the native-born sample? In Model 1, one can see that eight of the ten groups show statistically significant differences in turnout from the native-born. In every instance, immigrants are less likely to vote. In Model 2, which includes a variable measuring the length of time one has been eligible to participate in the political process, the effect of country of origin is lessened in every instance. As is illustrated in Figure 3.5, the second model shows that seven of the groups have statistically significant differences in turnout rates from the native-born. The difference now is that three of the seven immigrant groups show higher rates of voter turnout as compared with native-born Americans.

TABLE 3.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout, Immigrants versus the NativeBorn, N=303,643 Variable

Model 1

AGE AGE2

Model 2

1.06 *** AGE 2 1.00 *** AGE

ELIGTIME

NA NA ELIGTIME

NA NA NA NA 1.04 ***

FEMALE

1.08 *** FEMALE

1.06 ***

LESSHS

0.46 *** LESSHS

0.43 ***

MOREHS

2.38 *** MOREHS

2.36 ***

POVERTY

0.71 *** POVERTY

0.69 ***

WORK

1.14 *** WORK

1.32 ***

YEAR96

1.66 *** YEAR96

1.65 ***

YEAR98

0.85 *** YEAR98

0.85 ***

YEAR00

1.88 *** YEAR00

1.87 ***

MEXICO

0.76 *** MEXICO

1.08

CUBA

0.94

CUBA

1.73 ***

CANADA

0.88

CANADA

SEASIA

0.38 *** SEASIA

0.60 ***

INDIA

0.45 *** INDIA

0.80

CHINA

0.30 *** CHINA

0.62 ***

PHIL

0.50 *** PHIL

0.92

USSR

0.40 *** USSR

0.78 **

1.20 (a) *

ITALY

0.80

** ITALY

1.27 **

BRIT

0.74

** BRIT

1.12

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

355,463.87

358,147.75

.17

.16

.23

.22

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

86

FIGURE 3.5: The Odds of Immigrant Versus Native-Born Voting 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 in ita Br

ly

R SS

na

s

sia

e in pp

Ita **

U **

ili Ph

hi *C **

ia nd *I

A

da na

E *S **

a )C (a

o ic

a ub *C **

ex M

Source: Table 3.5. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a)P<.1 Control Variables: eligtime, gender, education, poverty status, workforce participation, and year of survey.

88

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Cubans, Italians, and Canadians are 73%, 27%, and 20%, respectively, more likely to go to the polls as are native-born citizens. Southeast Asians, Indians, Chinese, and former Soviet citizens all continue to be less likely to vote than the native-born, just as they were in Model 1. However, controlling for length of eligibility lessens the statistical significance for two of the groups. More importantly, the results from the second model show a narrowing of the gap in voter turnout between all four of these immigrant groups and the native-born. In each instance, the odds-ratio is closer to 1 in the second model. Controlling for length of political eligibility clearly reveals a trend towards convergence and further support for the Straight-Line Assimilation Hypothesis. DISCUSSION The results from this chapter begin to give us a better understanding of the individual-level factors associated with immigrant naturalizing and voting. The socio-economic factors, specifically, income and education, are most strongly linked to both naturalizing and voting, in keeping with previous empirical studies (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; de la Garza & DeSipio, 1992; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Mogelonsky, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Sierra et al., 2000; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Verba et al., 1995; Yang, 1994). What has not been clearly identified before is the way in which education varies in its effect depending upon whether the measure of political incorporation is naturalizing or voting. Lower levels of education are most closely linked to the absence of citizenship acquisition while greater levels of education are related to an increased likelihood of voter turnout. This critical finding suggests that educational advantage or disadvantage directly translates into an individual’s likelihood of political incorporation. Though the cross-sectional nature of the data do not allow for tests of causality, one can certainly speculate about the relationship between education and political incorporation. Naturalization requires a certain level of education in order to navigate through the sometimes-daunting process of exams and requirements. Though passage of the citizenship test does not require advanced education, having met the requirements of a high-school degree or GED likely facilitates naturalization. The

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 89 effect of a high-school diploma could be psychological— people with a diploma are less daunted by the naturalization requirements; it could be practical—those with a high-school degree simply are more capable of passing the tests; or it may be more prudential—individuals with a high-school degree are simply more likely to see the benefits of naturalizing. In the immigrant voting model, having more education has the strongest positive relationship with voter turnout. Again, this finding is in keeping with previous theoretical and empirical arguments that suggest education increases interest in and understanding of the political process. People with greater levels of education also tend to have a greater economic stake in society and hence more to lose, adding a further impetus to go to the polls. The relationship between poverty and political incorporation tends to be statistically significant, and negative, as expected. Economic incorporation is frequently thought to be a precursor to other types of immigrant incorporation. Immigrants living below the poverty line have not yet become integrated into the economic realm, and consequently may remain unincorporated in other areas. These findings all lend strong support for the Socio-Economic Hypothesis. Higher levels of education and income are strongly and positively associated with political incorporation. These findings also suggest that the two forms of political incorporation, citizenship and voting, have similar relationships with socio-economic factors. Further, all of these socioeconomic trends are found in the larger voting sample (Sub-sample B) that includes both the native-born and the foreign-born. In short, there is consistency across types of political incorporation, and across immigrants and the native-born. Length of political eligibility has a positive relationship with both forms of political incorporation, as found in previous studies (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Gordon, 1964). Though the effect is stronger in the context of the naturalization process, it is significant and positive for both types of incorporation. As time passes, immigrants become more politically incorporated. In Sub-sample B, the inclusion of a variable measuring length of eligibility decreases differences between the various immigrant groups and the native-born. Some immigrant groups show no difference in voter turnout from the native-born once the time variable is included.

90

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Other groups, though still showing statistically significant differences from the native-born in terms of voter turnout, show smaller differences. Both the results from the pooled immigrant models and the results from the general sample strongly support the Straight-Line Assimilation Hypothesis. As time passes and immigrants experience greater familiarity with the United States, they appear more likely to become politically incorporated via naturalizing. In the realm of political engagement, their distinctiveness from the native-born wanes with greater exposure. Time does appear to wash away differences. Though education, income, and the passage of time all have positive associations with political incorporation across groups, tremendous diversity still exists in the propensity of specific immigrant groups to become integrated. Country of origin is a significant predictor of political incorporation, as found in previous studies, (Alba & Nee, 1999; de la Garza & DeSipio, 1996; Liang, 1994; Mogelonsky, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Sierra et al., 2000; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Yang, 1994). Immigrants from greater distances or from more hostile political regimes are more likely to naturalize than are those immigrants with greater ease of return migration. Those from communist countries, such as Cuba and China, have among the highest naturalization rates of any of the immigrant groups, while those from Britain, Canada, and Mexico are the least likely to naturalize. These findings support the Reversibility Hypothesis. Within the voting realm, the results are almost reversed. Immigrants from Britain, Canada, and Mexico, while the least likely to naturalize, are, once naturalized, among the most likely to vote. At the same time, the Chinese, former Soviet citizens, and Southeast Asians, all groups with very high odds of naturalizing, are the least likely to vote. The Translation Hypothesis clearly receives support from these results. The voting model run on the larger sample similarly finds differences by country of origin. Once the length of eligibility variable has been included, Mexicans, Canadians and Britons are indistinguishable from native-born Americans in terms of voter turnout. Italians and Cubans actually vote at higher rates than do the nativeborn, while the remaining five groups vote at lower rates. If Britons and Canadians were the only two groups to have indistinguishable

The Effect of Individual Characteristics on Political Incorporation 91 voting rates from the native-born, one could argue that straight-line assimilation continues to work for the old-stock immigrants, but fails for the more diverse post-1965 flows. But with Mexicans voting at indistinguishable rates from the native-born and Cubans actually voting at higher rates, it is clearly too early to assume straight-line assimilation does not work in the political realm for the “new” immigrants. Though the findings from this chapter show significant support for straight-line assimilation, segmented assimilation theorists are not without empirical support. Immigrants from different countries of origin do not have equal propensities to naturalize or vote, even after controlling for other critical individual-level characteristics. Further, “key” socio-economic and demographic factors work differently by country of origin. For example, gender varies in its effect by nativity, in keeping with previous research (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Yang, 1994). Gender is a statistically significant predictor of naturalizing among Mexicans, Indians, and Italians, respectively. In the voting models, it is a predictor for Canadians and Indians. However, the direction varies by immigrant group and form of political incorporation. Clearly these results lend support for the Gender Diversity Hypothesis, but they also suggest something more, specifically interactions between various characteristics that lead to an uneven propensity for political incorporation. CONCLUSION The results from this chapter show that individual-level factors are significant and strong predictors of political incorporation, with R2s in the .4 range for citizenship and in the .2 range for voting. However, this chapter also leaves us with questions. Why do we find ongoing differences among immigrant groups, even after controlling for such “key” factors as education, income, and length of eligibility? Where does gender fit in? How do family factors, such as marital status, affect individual political incorporation? What effect does the local community have on encouraging or discouraging political activity? What do the country of origin variables really mean? The objective of the remaining chapters is to provide greater insight into, and expand on, these initial findings. This requires us to move beyond the individual, to explore the family, local community, and country of origin. Only by exploring the full range of factors can one claim to have provided a comprehensive examination of the political incorporation process.

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CHAPTER 4

The Role of Family The impact of family on immigrant political incorporation has been analyzed relatively infrequently in the research. Scholars have largely tried to explain political participation through individual-level traits, most specifically, socio-economic characteristics and country of origin. To be sure, individual characteristics matter, as illustrated in the previous chapter. But family factors, mediating between the individual and the larger society, are also likely to have a powerful impact on the political incorporation process. Immigrant families, like all families, act as a buffer between the individual and the larger society, influencing a host of outcomes. Studies of the native-born have found that marital status affects everything from health and life expectancy to an individual’s social circles and economic status (Waite & Gallagher, 2000). Among immigrants, family structure has been identified as influencing who migrates, to where, and for how long (Boyd, 1989; Foner, 1999; Pessar, 1999). Migrating as part of a family both encourages and signifies greater incorporation and longer-term settlement plans. Previous research exploring the relationship between family structure and individual-level political behavior has consistently found married people to be more politically active than their unmarried counterparts (Burns et al., 2001; Milbraith & Goel, 1982; Pattie & Johnston, 2002; Stoker & Jennings, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Scholars, again and again, cite the role of spouses as “built-in” political discussants, as well as witting and unwitting promoters of greater stability, wider social networks, and more communal integration. Yet few studies have explored the impact of marital status on political incorporation among immigrants. Does marital status influence immigrants as it does the native-born? Are immigrant men and women similarly affected by household structure, or should one expect differences by gender? And how does culture, as measured by country of origin, mediate the relationship between marital status and political activity? 93

94

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Although little is known about the relationship between marital structure and political incorporation among the foreign-born, research focusing on the native-born provides a basic roadmap for the potential mechanisms at work and the likely outcomes. Studies of the nativeborn find that the presence of a spouse encourages political incorporation by extending an individual’s social contacts (Burns et al., 2001; Milbraith & Goel, 1982; Pattie & Johnston, 2002; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Expanded social ties mean more peer pressure and a higher likelihood of participation (Putnam, 2000). For immigrants, increased social networks may work to encourage political mobilization (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Forment, 1989; Togeby, 1999). Marriage also translates into greater stability and community integration. Among the native-born, marriage decreases the likelihood of internal migration due to the increased costs of moving. International migration is significantly more costly and difficult than internal migration, and even more so for a couple than for a single migrant. As a result, marriage should encourage “rootedness” and stability for the foreign-born, promoting civic incorporation. It is not enough to simply explore the influence of family structure on political incorporation, however. The relationship between family and political participation is likely mediated by other factors, specifically gender and country of origin. Men and women are differentially affected by marriage, as studies in other fields have recognized (Gove, 1973; Gove & Shin, 1989; Pienta, Hayward, & Jenkins, 2001). Furthermore, men and women are differentially affected by the migration process. Immigrant men often participate in international migration for the purpose of earning money to send back to families in their country of origin. Such marital separation is, in fact, quite common for international economic migrants who enter the United States for a limited period of time, with the full expectation of returning home (Lindstrom, 1996). In contrast, many immigrant women coming to the United States may be doing so for the express purpose of leaving a husband, with no intention of returning to the country of origin and the spouse left behind. Although women have historically been viewed as passive migrants, crossing borders for the sake of accompanying their husbands, recent research shows that this premise needs to be rethought (Foner, 1999; Pessar, 1999).

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95

As a result, it is essential to move beyond the main effects of family structure to examine the more nuanced relationships among marital status, gender, country of origin, and political incorporation. The goal of this chapter is to examine empirically the effect of family on the political integration of immigrants, both net of other factors and in interaction with them. Though individual-level factors can go a long way toward predicting who naturalizes or does not and who votes or does not, family structure may provide additional clarification that has been neglected in previous research. 14 PREVIOUS RESEARCH Marriage & Naturalizing Within the naturalization process, married people are more likely to become citizens than are their single counterparts (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). Marriage is thought to increase stability, social networks and embeddedness, all factors associated with greater levels of economic, linguistic, and social integration (Lopez, 1999; Portes, 1987). These other forms of immigrant incorporation may very well lead to political incorporation (Gordon, 1964; Lien, 1998).

14

Ideally, this chapter would examine the impact of children on political incorporation, as children may also influence the process. Jones-Correa (1998) has found that children draw their parents into mainstream institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and social service agencies, increasing contact and social networks within mainstream society and, thus, political activity. Other research has similarly found increased rates of naturalizing with the presence of children (Yang, 1994). However, some have identified a negative relationship between children and naturalizing (Liang, 1994) and voting (Bass & Casper, 1999). Unfortunately, CPS data do not allow for an examination of the effect of children on political participation, as information on even the presence within a household of children under age 16 is restricted in the 1994, 1996, and 1998 CPS. Only in the 2000 survey did the CPS include and publicly distribute questions on the presence of minors in the household. In an analysis limited strictly to the 2000 data, the effect of children was not statistically significant when marital status variables were included in the analysis. Furthermore, the effects of the marital status variables are very similar across all four years in which the survey was conducted. The coefficients and odds-ratios of the other variables are virtually unchanged whether the child variable is included or removed. This suggests that the coefficients pre- and post-2000 are unbiased. Refer to Tables 4.6 and 4.7 in Supplemental Tables to examine these analyses.

96

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Beyond the increased social connections thought to result from marriage, being part of an immigrant couple suggests greater levels of stability and commitment to remaining in the United States. Sojourners tend to migrate without family, with the plan of eventually returning to the country of origin after a specific economic goal has been met (Lindstrom, 1996). In contrast, migrating as a couple suggests a longer-term vision—a goal of permanent settlement. Finding a job, acquiring a visa, and locating a place to live are difficult enough tasks for one person. For both members of a couple to migrate requires an even greater effort and commitment. Not surprisingly, the benefits of remaining in the United States and the costs of return migration are also greater for a couple than for an unmarried or separated migrant, and may thus explain the greater propensity of married individuals to naturalize (Yang, 1994). At the same time, many benefits resulting from citizenship accrue to the entire family, rather than solely to the individual who naturalizes. Although the political benefits of naturalizing, namely the opportunity to vote and run for elected office, are available exclusively to the individual holding U.S. citizenship, many other benefits of citizenship advantage the entire family. American citizenship provides greater access to state and federal loans, eligibility for social welfare benefits, and the opportunity for family reunification. With either spouse holding citizenship, the entire family gains access to many of these benefits. As a result, an immigrant who is married to a native-born American or to a fellow immigrant who has acquired citizenship may actually be less likely to naturalize, as he or she already benefits indirectly from his or her spouse’s citizenship status (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990). Less is known about the effect of endogamous versus exogamous marriage partners on political participation. Unfortunately, the data used in this research do not contain information on the ethnicity or citizenship status of the spouse. Marriage & Voting Marital status also affects voter turnout. Married immigrants are about 20% more likely to vote than are their single counterparts (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). Numerous voter studies conducted on the nativeborn have found parallel results (Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Tate, 1991; Wolfinger, 1994), suggesting

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97

that the relationship between marriage and voting may cut across diverse populations. One of the primary mechanisms mediating between family structure and political activity appears to be stability. A study with a more nuanced approach to marital status finds that individuals who have been in the state of marriage for an extended period of time are indeed more likely to vote than are their single counterparts. However, changes in marital status, be it getting married or getting divorced, temporarily depress political participation rates to below those of their single counterparts (Stoker & Jennings, 1995). On the surface, these findings suggest a divergence from studies linking marriage with voter turnout. In actuality, the findings do not conflict at all with other studies, but are the result of more accurate measurement of the mechanism of stability thought to mediate between marital status and political activity. Greater levels of stability and larger social networks are largely a function of the ongoing presence of a spouse. Being married but physically separated from one’s partner likely translates into reduced levels of stability and smaller social networks when compared with those of married couples residing together. Marital transitions, whether positive or negative, represent a period of instability. In short, “rootedness,” as opposed to the mere fact of being married, is what encourages political incorporation and participation. Gender, Family Structure, and Country of Origin Marriage has historically been one of the most gendered institutions, having different implications for men and women (Katz Rothman, 1998). In most industrialized societies, marriage has positioned women inside the home and responsible for the domestic aspects of life, while placing men in the public sphere. The expectations for and roles given to married women have traditionally been distinct from those of married men, resulting in different health, economic, and social outcomes (Gove, 1973; Gove & Shin, 1989; Pienta et al., 2000; Waite & Gallagher, 2000). Although these patterns have been reproduced across time and space, American society has developed to give women of all marital statuses greater freedoms and opportunities. The opportunities afforded married women in American society likely become more salient when

98

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

experienced by those from less egalitarian countries. As a result, many scholars argue that gender should play a particularly significant role in the incorporation process, with immigrant women embracing new found freedoms in the United States and immigrant men struggling with downward status readjustment (Foner, 1999; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998; Pessar, 1999). Case studies of Dominican immigrants have identified the differential impact of family structure on the incorporation of immigrant men and women (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998). Dominican wives have been found sabotaging their husbands’ attempts to return to the country of origin, by spending savings set aside for reverse migration. In this way, stays in the United States become indefinite, with the husband constantly trying to rebuild the reserve consumed by the wife (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991). In these cases, the wives are clearly the ones committed to longer-term settlement in the United States, which could suggest a greater propensity to become politically incorporated. A study focusing explicitly on political activity among Dominicans in New York City finds that in caring for the household and family, women develop increased contact with mainstream institutions, such as schools and social service agencies. This contact with mainstream society, combined with new found freedoms, leads to increased political activity. At the same time, their husbands are struggling with the indignities and difficulties of immigration. The men respond by staying apart from American society, participating in ethnic organizations, and focusing on return to the country of origin (JonesCorrea, 1998). Conversely, a study of the native-born finds that women become less politically engaged than their husbands once they have children and move primarily into the household sphere (Burns et al., 2001). Among these native-born women, greater contact with schools, social service organizations, and other child-related institutions does not encourage political activity, and fails to replace the role of the workplace in encouraging civic engagement. The differing foci, strategies, and outcomes of husbands and wives suggest that marital status has very different implications across genders and countries of origin. The effect of family on political incorporation must be examined both by sex and within particular

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99

cultural contexts. As one scholar argues “…it should always be remembered that families or households are defined by different economic, political, cultural, demographic, and ecological settings and are not social units with universal behavior” (Faist, 1997, p.205). The impact of family structure on the political incorporation of immigrants is clearly an area that needs closer examination and must be done with a greater appreciation for the complexity of marital status, country of origin, and gender. Limitations of Previous Studies Although previous research has provided some insight into how marital structure impacts individual political activity, many questions remain unanswered. Much of the previous research conducted in this area focuses on the native-born (Burns et al., 2001; Milbraith & Goel, 1982; Pattie & Johnston, 2002; Stoker & Jennings, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Despite the fact that much of this research is useful in helping us understand the mechanisms mediating between marital structure and voter turnout among the native-born, the same marital structure may have quite different implications for immigrants. First, the native-born are automatically citizens and therefore never entertain the notion of citizenship acquisition. The mechanisms that encourage the native-born to go to the polls may be quite different from those that encourage immigrants to become citizens, given the more extensive and immediate benefits that accrue from naturalizing versus voting. Citizenship, though necessary for voting and holding many elected offices, is not just about access to the political realm. It also provides social welfare benefits, legal protections, greater access to jobs and loans, and family reunification (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Johnston et al., 1997). Given the family-wide benefits resulting from one member of the family naturalizing, it seems particularly important to better understand how marital structure influences political decisions. Focusing exclusively on the native-born also means the absence of any attention paid to the selectivity of migration flows and to the influence that such selectivity has on mediating between marital structure and political incorporation. Migration flows from certain countries of origin, such as Mexico, tend to be dominated by the

100

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

traditional male sojourner. Mexican men may arrive without spouses, but with the intention of returning to the home society. In this instance, the migration may be viewed as temporary, with the express purpose of earning money for the family at home. Flows from other countries, such as India, tend to be dominated more by married couples migrating together. In this instance, the migration may be viewed as more permanent, with both spouses intending to acquire citizenship. Furthermore, the relationships identified in studies of the nativeborn vary for men and women (Burns et al., 2001; Stoker & Jennings, 1995). If this is the case for the native-born, variations may also exist for men and women from different countries of origin. The little research that has examined the effect of marital structure on the political activity of different immigrant groups has tended to be qualitative (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Hongdagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Jones-Correa, 1998). Although this research has helped us to better understand the relationship between marital structure and political activity, it has focused on Mexicans and Dominicans, and in very specific regions of the United States. One cannot necessarily generalize from these findings. Larger-scale quantitative studies that have examined the impact of marital structure on political activity have significant limitations. Some studies have failed to take country of origin into account (Yang, 1994). Including variables that measure factors such as distance from the home society and English as an official language certainly tap into some important home society characteristics, but could potentially place very different immigrants in the same group. Other studies have included geographic variables, but have limited their analyses to just a few immigrant groups or to very general regions of the world (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Jasso & Rosenweig, 1990; Liang, 1994). Given the gender and marital selectivity of migration flows by country of origin, country of origin must be considered. A final limitation of many of the previous family studies lies in their conceptualization of marital status. With the exception of the Stoker and Jennings study (1995), marital status is viewed as a purely dichotomous variable. One is either married or not. Viewing marital status as dichotomous is particularly problematic among immigrants, as migration decisions are frequently made at the household level (Boyd, 1989; Goldscheider, 1995; Pessar, 1999). The

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decision to send someone abroad may be made in the face of economic need, in an attempt to diversify household income. As a result, it is not uncommon for economic migrants to migrate individually, leaving family members, spouses included, in the country of origin. For such sojourners, the plan is usually to work abroad for a period of time, then to return home. With this homeward vision, the separated migrant likely has fewer social networks and less stability than does an individual who migrates with his or her spouse and who can more likely conceive of permanent settlement in the United States. Therefore, by simply dichotomizing marital status, studies miss the more nuanced effect of different categories of marital relationship. Dichotomized studies that simply examine those who are married versus those who are single may erroneously water down the effect of marriage. Substantial numbers of immigrants who are married but separated from their spouses may be grouped into the “married” category, when in fact their separated status could make them substantially less likely to naturalize. Scholars argue that stability and social networks are the true benefit of marriage, and the mechanisms that encourage political incorporation— factors much less likely to be operative in the case of married but separated individuals. If these outgrowths of marital status are really relevant, we must more effectively isolate and distinguish these variations in marital status in order to better explore the impact of these mechanisms. HYPOTHESES Marriage is thought to encourage political participation by providing a conversation partner, greater social networks, and more stability. These mechanisms likely only work when the spouse is physically present. Previous studies have tended to view marriage as a dichotomous variable, failing to examine the more multifaceted variations in marital status. Hypotheses one and two attempt to move past the limitations of previous studies by more precisely defining different marital statuses. The Marriage Hypothesis: Married immigrants who are residing with their spouses should be more likely to both naturalize and vote than their single counterparts, given the

102

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen greater levels of stability, social contact and embeddedness thought to result from marriage. The Separation Hypothesis: Married immigrants who are residing apart from their spouses should show lower levels of naturalizing and voting than immigrants who are married and living with their spouses, and than single migrants.

Previous research has suggested that marital status, in and of itself, should affect political incorporation and participation. However, gender theory suggests that marital status should differentially affect men and women, with women more likely to become politically incorporated than their male counterparts, across all levels of marital status. Research in other areas has shown men to be more reliant on their partners for social contact than are women (Gove, 1973; Waite & Gallagher, 2000). The third hypothesis is a test of this interaction between marital status and gender, examining whether the gender patterns found in other areas of research reproduce themselves in the realm of political incorporation, with women less affected by their respective marital status. The Gender Hypothesis: Women should be more likely to naturalize and vote than their male counterparts at all levels of marital status. Additionally, marital status should have a larger impact on men than on women. As discussed earlier, the interaction between marital status, gender, and culture has not been fully explored within large-scale quantitative studies. Ideally, this study would carry out a systematic examination of the way gender and marital status interact within various cultural contexts to affect political incorporation. Unfortunately, limitations within the data only allow for such an examination among Mexican immigrants. Not surprisingly, Mexican immigrants appear in the CPS in larger numbers than do other immigrant groups, due to their greater presence in the United States. Examining these interactions in other immigrant groups would result in unreliable estimates due to their smaller sample sizes in the CPS. The focus on Mexican immigrants is not without precedent. One brief examination of the interaction between gender and culture,

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without looking at marital status, has found that Latino women are more politically incorporated than Latino men (Bass & Casper, 1999). Community studies exploring the relationship between family structure and gender on political participation have similarly found that within certain Latino communities, marital status has differential effects on men and women, with women more likely to become incorporated (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998). The following hypothesis is designed to quantitatively test the differential impact of marital status on political incorporation among Mexican men and women, respectively. The Gender/Culture Hypothesis: Mexican women will be more likely to naturalize and vote than Mexican men at all levels of marital status. Additionally, marital status should have a smaller impact on Mexican women’s political incorporation. FINDINGS Marriage The data suggest that marital status is indeed associated with the political incorporation process.15 Table 4.1 highlights the relationship between marital status and naturalizing. In Model 1 (the main-effects model), both being single and being married but separated are statistically significant in predicting citizenship. Single individuals are about 92% as likely to be naturalized as are their married counterparts who are residing with spouses, while individuals who are married but separated from their spouses are only about 65% as likely to acquire U.S. citizenship as those living with their spouses. These findings support the Marriage Hypothesis that states married individuals living with their spouses should be more likely to naturalize than their unmarried counterparts. The mechanisms at work are likely the greater levels of stability and larger social networks resulting from co-residential marriage. 15

A chi-square log likelihood test comparing the model from Chapter 3 with this more expanded model confirms the importance of marital status in explaining naturalizing. With a difference in the -2 log likelihoods of 13.619, with 2 degrees of freedom, the improvement of model fit is significant at the .005 level of statistical significance.

104

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

The data also support the Separation Hypothesis that states that married but separated individuals should have the lowest propensities to hold citizenship of the three marital status categories. Stability and social networks are again the probable influences mediating between marital status and political incorporation, only now one sees what happens in the absence of such stability and connections. Though the data do not indicate the residential location of the estranged spouse (i.e., home country versus another host society versus another host community in the United States), geographic separation is negatively associated with immigrant naturalization. TABLE 4.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Marital Status, N=17,019 Model 1

Marital Status Variables FEMALE

Model 2

NA

0.98

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT

0.65 **

0.53 ***

UNMARRIED

0.92 *

0.89 (a)

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT

NA

1.58 (a)

FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA

1.06

17,035.15

17,031.92

.31

.31

.41

.41

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2

PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R Numbers reported are odds-ratios.

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2

The models include control variables for age, age , eligtime, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

The relationship between marital status and political incorporation becomes more pronounced in Model 2, which includes interaction terms between gender and marital status. Because interactions are included, the main-effects of gender and marital status must be

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interpreted differently. The main-effect of being unmarried becomes substantively the effect of being unmarried and male. The results show that single men are about 89% as likely to be U.S. citizens as married men who are living with their spouses. Men who are married but living apart from their spouses are about 53% as likely to naturalize as their male counterparts in co-residential marriages.16 Figure 4.1 illustrates the effect of marital status on men and women, respectively. As Figure 4.1 shows, the patterns are a bit different among women, suggesting marital status does vary in its effect by gender. Women who are married but living apart from their spouses are about 84% as likely to naturalize as married female migrants who are living with their spouses. Unmarried women do not show statistically significant differences in their propensity to naturalize from women residing with their husbands. Marital status clearly has different implications for whether men and women naturalize. Whereas single women show no difference in their propensity to become citizens from married women living with husbands, single men are statistically less likely to naturalize than are

16

To calculate the true main and interaction effects, one must determine the variable of interest. I am interested in how the effect of a particular marital status varies across genders. To determine what the effect of being married but separated is for women, I multiply the odds-ratios of “spouse absent” and “female*spouse absent.” The respective odds ratios are .53 and 1.58. The result is .84. Substantively, this means that females who are married but separated from their spouses are 84% as likely to naturalize as women who are married and residing with their husbands. To determine the effect of being male and married but separated, I simply refer to the main effect from the “spouse absent” variable. This is because men score a 0 on the “female” variable, causing the interaction effect of “female*spouse absent” to drop out. The remaining variable is “spouse absent.” So, the odds of naturalizing for a male who is married but separated from his spouse are .53. Substantively, this means that males who are married but separated from their spouse are 53% as likely to naturalize as their married male counterpart residing with their wife. Clearly, the effect of being married but separated is larger for men than it is for women, more severely dampening their likelihood of acquiring citizenship.

FIGURE 4.1: The Odds of Naturalizing Among Single and Separated Versus Married and Cohabiting Immigrants, by Gender

2.00

1.50

1.00

(a)

***

0.50

***

0.00 All Single Immigrant Men

All Separated Immigrant Men

Single Mexican Men

Separated Mexican Men

All Single Immigrant Women

All Separated Immigrant Women

Single Mexican Women

Separated Mexican Women

Source: Tables 4.1, Model 2 and 4.3, Model 2. ***P<.001 **P<.01 *P<.05 (a)P<.1 Control Variables: age, age2, eligtime, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey.

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married men living with wives. Furthermore, the difference in the propensity to naturalize between those who are separated from spouses and those who are married and living with spouses is again greater for men than for women. Men tend to be more substantially impacted by marital status in the naturalization process than are their female counterparts, in keeping with previous health and income studies (Gove, 1973; Gove & Shin, 1989). These findings, supporting the Gender Hypothesis, are likely the result of men’s greater dependency on their spouses for social contact and conversation. Women tend to have more social options and larger networks outside of the home, resulting in lower levels of spousal dependency. But how do men and women within the same marital status compare with each other? Are married men residing with their wives more likely to naturalize than married women residing with their husbands? Are single women more likely to become citizens than single men? Figure 4.2 illustrates the findings. Married men and women who are residing with their spouses do not exhibit statistically significant differences from one another in their propensity to naturalize. The same pattern is found among single men and women. Only among the married but separated are there statistically significant differences between males and females. Women in this category are about 55% more likely to naturalize than are men. Table 4.2 highlights the relationship between marital status variables and voting.17 Both forms of marital status show statistically significant differences from the reference group of married immigrants residing with their spouses. Those who are married but separated are about 63% as likely to vote as those living with their spouses. Unmarried migrants are about 79% as likely to vote as the reference group. This model was also run with interactions between gender and marital status.

17

Again, a chi-square log likelihood test comparing this expanded model with the Chapter 3 model including only individual characteristics shows a marked improvement in fit. With a difference in the –2 log likelihood of 17.651 at 2 degrees of freedom, the marriage model is a statistically significant better fit in predicting voting at the .001 level of significance.

FIGURE 4.2: The Odds of Women Versus Men Naturalizing, by Marital Status

3.00

*

2.50 2.00

(a)

1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 All Married & Cohabiting Immigrants

Married & Cohabiting Mexican Immigrants

All Single Immigrants

Single Mexican Immigrants

All Separated Immigrants

Separated Mexican Immigrants

Source: Tables 4.1, Model 2 and 4.3, Model 2. ***P<.001 **P<.01 *P<.05 (a)P<.1 Control Variables: age, age2, eligtime, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey.

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TABLE 4.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout by M arital Status, N=6,641 Variables (REF GROUP: M ARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT UNM ARRIED -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R 2 M AX. RESCALED PSEUDO R 2

0.63 * 0.79 *** 352,665.46 .18 .24

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 The model includes control variables for age, age 2 , eligtime, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

They were not found to be significant, and as a result, have been excluded from the model. These main-effects findings are in keeping with those from Table 4.1 and lend additional support for the Marriage and Separation Hypotheses. Those who are married and residing with their spouses exhibit the highest likelihood of voting, followed by those who are single. Married but separated individuals show the lowest likelihood of going to the polls. Though Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show similar findings, it should be noted that marital status has a stronger association with voting than it does with naturalizing. A married but separated individual is about 65% as likely to naturalize as someone who is married and residing with his or her spouse. The odds of the same separated individual voting are 63%, compared with a married individual living with a husband or wife. Similarly, an unmarried individual in Table 4.1 is about 92% as likely to naturalize as someone married and living with his or her spouse. In Table 4.2, the comparable odds are 79%. The results from Sub-sample B, the combined foreign-born and native-born sample, are presented in Table 4.3. The trends found among this larger sample are similar to what was found among the immigrant-only sample—co-residential marriage has the strongest positive relationship with voting. The primary difference is that among

Table 4.3: The Odds of Voter Turnout among Immigrants and the Native-Born by Marital Status, N=303,643

Variables

1.09 ***

1.09 ***

Model 3 1.11 ***

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.62 ***

0.59 ***

0.58

UNMARRIED

0.63 ***

0.58 ***

0.59

FEMALE

Model 1

Model 2

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSES)

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT

NA

NA

1.03

FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA

NA

0.96

352,665.46

353,924.19

353,918.40

.18

.17

.17

.24

.23

.23

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

*** ***

*

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2 Model 1 includes control variables for age, age , gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey. Models 2 and 3 control for length of eligibility, rather than age. To see the results of the full models, refer to the supplemental tables.

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the native-born, the association between being unmarried and being married but separated is virtually indistinguishable with respect to voting, with both groups only about 60% as likely to participate as those who are married and living with their spouse. Table 4.2 shows this not to be the case among immigrants, who exhibit a clear hierarchy of political participation based on marital status. Among immigrants, the single and separated are 79% and 63%, respectively, as likely to vote as their counterparts living with a husband or wife. These findings suggest that differences in marital status matter more for immigrants than for the native-born. The greater impact of marital separation on immigrants as compared to the native-born may derive from where the respective spouses are residing. A spouse living in the home country or in another foreign country may have a bigger impact on voting than does a spouse living in another American city (the more likely case for the nativeborn). Unfortunately, it is not known where the respondent’s separated spouse resides—a factor that could have implications for political participation. The Mexican Sample Table 4.4 highlights the relationship between marital status and political incorporation among Mexican immigrants. In Model 1, the status of being separated from one’s spouse is statistically significant. This group is less than half (48%) as likely to naturalize as those who are married and residing with their spouses. Unmarried Mexican migrants are no more likely to naturalize than are their married counterparts living with spouses. These data suggest that the association between marital status and political incorporation varies in its effect across immigrant groups. In Table 4.1, both unmarried and married but separated individuals show statistically significant differences from the reference group (married, residing with spouse). In Model 1 of Table 4.4, one sees that the difference between the unmarried and the reference group has disappeared. Mexican immigrants within these two marital statuses are not distinct from one another in their propensity to naturalize. Though the Married Hypothesis has strong support from Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the Mexican sub-sample does not reinforce this hypothesis. However, the effect of marital separation among Mexican-origin immigrants does provide further support for the Separation Hypothesis.

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It should be noted that Model 1 shows a difference in the naturalization propensities between Mexican men and women. Women are about 12% more likely to naturalize than are their male counterparts. Though this chapter is not focused on individual-level factors, but rather on family factors and how their effects vary across levels of gender, this main-effect finding is of interest. It suggests that gender matters for the political incorporation of Mexican immigrants, in keeping with previous studies of Latinos (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Hongdagneu-Sotelo, 1994; JonesCorrea, 1998). TABLE 4.4: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status N=7,373 Variables FEMALE

Model 1 1.12 (a)

Model 2 1.08

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT 0.48 ** UNMARRIED 0.89

0.34 *** 0.86

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT FEMALE*UNMARRIED

2.42 * 1.07

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

NA NA 6,638.26 .15 .22

6,634.44 .15 .23

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 The models include control variables for age, age2, length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

Model 2 in Table 4.4 includes interaction terms between gender and marital status. The data suggest that the effect of marital status varies by gender for Mexican immigrants. In this model, it is again the absence of a spouse that seems to matter. Men who are married but

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separated from their spouse are only 34% as likely to naturalize as their married counterparts who are residing with their spouse, as is shown in Figure 4.1. The relationship is substantially less for women who are separated from their husband, with these women about 82% as likely to naturalize as married, co-residing Mexican women. There is no difference between unmarried Mexican immigrants of either sex and counterparts living with a husband or wife. Overall, these findings suggest that the relationship between marital status and political incorporation varies for Mexican men and women, with married but separated men substantially less likely to naturalize than comparable Mexican women. In comparing Mexican men and women within the same marital structure, the findings show no statistically significant difference between married immigrants who are co-residing with a spouse and those who are single. The big difference between men and women is among those who are married but separated. In this category, women are at significantly greater odds of naturalizing, as is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Females who are married but estranged from their spouses are 2.6 times more likely to naturalize than are their male counterparts. The second set of results show that separated women are far more likely to naturalize than are separated men. These data strongly support the Gender/Culture Hypothesis. Again, the difference may be in male and female reactions to American society: new opportunities and freedom for women, but downward status readjustment and indignities for men. The difference may also result from why separated men and women migrate to the United States. As discussed earlier, married men who migrate without their wives may come to the United States as temporary economic migrants, with the intention of returning to Mexico after having earned enough money. In contrast, married Mexican women who migrate without their husbands may be doing so to escape an unhappy marriage, with the intention of staying in the United States permanently. The data also show that among Mexicans, the only marital status that shows a difference from the reference group are those who are married but separated from their spouse. Mexican immigrants who are married and residing with their spouse and those who are unmarried show similar levels of political incorporation. Individuals residing with their spouse may have put down roots and made the decision to stay

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permanently in the U.S. Those who are unmarried may have created their own networks and plans. It is those Mexican immigrants who are estranged from their spouse who are the least likely to commit politically to the United States. TABLE 4.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status, N=1,492 Variables

Model 1

FEMALE

1.01

Model 2 1.00

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT 0.21 * UNMARRIED 0.69 **

0.48 0.66 *

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA NA

0.19 1.07

1,771.78 .15 .20

1,770.00 .15 .20

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2 The models include control variables for age, age , length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, and year of survey. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

Within the Mexican-only voting model (Table 4.5), the relationship with marital status is more extreme than what was found in the naturalization model. In Model 1, those who are married but separated are only 21% as likely to go to the polls as those who are married and residing with their spouse. Unmarried Mexican immigrants are 69% as likely to vote as the reference group. Clearly, the absence of a spouse has a more depressing effect on this form of political participation than does the complete lack of a legal partner. Model 2 includes interactions between marital status and gender. Though the interactions are not significant, there is a change in both the

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interpretation and the results of the main-effects. Married but separated men show no difference in their propensity to vote from married men residing with their spouse. Unmarried men are 66% as likely to vote as their counterparts who are married and living with their wife. Women show no differences from one another in their propensity to naturalize across all levels of marital status. Though the actual interactions are not significant, there is still some difference by gender and marital status, as is evidenced by the main-effects. This suggests some additional support for the Gender/Culture Hypothesis. Overall, among Mexican immigrants, the relationship between marital status and voting is stronger than the association between marital status and naturalizing. The differences by marital status are more pronounced in the voting models than in the naturalization models. This is in keeping with Models 4.1 and 4.2, run on the larger immigrant sample. These repeat findings suggest again that the decision to vote is more impacted by family structure than is the decision to naturalize. DISCUSSION The results from this chapter describe the relationship between marital status and political incorporation. Generally, married immigrants who are residing with their partner appear to be more politically integrated, in terms of both naturalizing and voting, than are their unmarried or separated counterparts, supporting the Marriage Hypothesis. This general finding is in keeping with previous work on political incorporation among the foreign-born (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994) and among the native-born (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Milbraith & Goel, 1982; Putnam, 2000; Tate, 1991; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Marriage appears to provide the stability, wider social networks, and greater ties to the community that encourage both naturalizing and voting among immigrants. The non-dichotomous nature of marital status is also revealed in these findings. Among immigrants, it is not simply that those who are married and living with their spouse are more likely to be politically incorporated than all others, but rather that there is a type of hierarchy. Those who are married but separated from their mate have the lowest rates of political integration, below those of unmarried migrants. This finding characterizes both naturalizing and voting. These results are in

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keeping with the posited mechanisms of stability and embeddedness. Married migrants residing with their spouse likely have the greatest levels of stability, ties, and commitment to the United States. Single migrants, though less bound to the host-community than those living with a husband or wife, may be considering permanent settlement in the U.S. Those who are married but separated, have the lowest levels of permanence and commitment. The estranged spouses may be in the country of origin or simply in another American city. In either case, the respondents who live apart from their partner appear less likely to become politically incorporated and vote, supporting the Separation Hypothesis. Among the native-born, both single individuals and those who are married but living apart from their spouse are about 60% as likely to vote as those residing with husband or wife. The effect of marital status on naturalizing is further mediated by gender. Matrimony has different implications for immigrant men and women, providing them with diverse opportunities and expectations. Examining how gender interacts with marital status across both types of political incorporation has revealed that marital status has bigger implications for a man’s level of political integration than for a woman’s. Men who are married but separated from their spouse are only half as likely to become a citizen as are men living with their wife. Though women in the same marital status are less likely to acquire citizenship than are their counterparts living with their husband, the difference between the two groups is smaller. At the same time, unmarried men are less likely to acquire citizenship than are married men residing with their wife, while women in these two marital categories show no statistically significant difference from one another. A gender gap exists among those who are estranged from their spouse, with women in this category more likely to naturalize than men. This may suggest the selectivity of migration flows, with married but separated women migrating to the United States for different reasons or with different intentions from men similarly situated in terms of marital status, or it may indicate something about the differing receptions that men and women of this marital status experience once in the United States. The test of the Gender/Culture Hypothesis, run on the Mexican sample, further elucidates these findings. The interaction effect between gender and spousal separation is significant on the larger

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immigrant sample, but even more so on the smaller Mexican sample, an interesting result given that significance is harder to achieve as samples become smaller. Though unmarried Mexican migrants, both male and female, show no difference in the propensity to naturalize from their married counterparts residing with a spouse, there is a substantial difference among those who are married but separated. This difference is further clarified through interactions. Men in this category are only about a third as likely to have naturalized as married men residing with their spouse. Married but separated women are about 82% as likely to become U.S. citizens as Mexican women living with a spouse. Clearly, the difference between men and women in the separated category is substantial, with Mexican men being more impacted by separation than either their female Mexican counterparts, or than male immigrants, generally. Mexican men and women, respectively, who are married but separated show statistically significant differences in their propensities to naturalize. Women who are separated from their spouse are 2.6 times as likely to acquire citizenship as are men of the same marital status. These findings, both of the differential effect of marriage on men and women and of the differential effect of gender on marital status, support patterns found by previous qualitative researchers who have studied Latino communities through observations and in-depth interviews (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Hongdagneu-Sotelo, 1994; Jones-Correa, 1998; Pessar, 1999). Prior studies have argued that Latino men have a harder time acclimating to American society, often experiencing status readjustment. The result may be that men have less inclination to acquire American citizenship, a status that suggests a longer-term commitment to the United States. At the same time, these studies have found Latino women experience new levels of freedom and opportunity in the United States and rarely want to give that up. Citizenship acquisition may be one concrete way of cementing their new lives. Though the cross-sectional nature of these data make it impossible to discuss causality or intention, the patterns from the Mexican sample show quantitative support for the trends found in these earlier qualitative studies. At the same time, the results from the Mexican sub-sample may reveal some specific features about Mexican migration patterns. The

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findings may be as much about the selectivity of migration as about the role of gender or marital status. Mexican immigrants, male and female, married and unmarried, are less likely to become politically incorporated than are many of their foreign-born counterparts from other parts of the world. This pattern was observed in the previous chapter, which finds Mexicans to have among the lowest naturalization rates, and has been reproduced in this chapter. These depressed levels of citizenship acquisition may be the result of an overrepresentation of undocumented immigrants within the Mexican migration stream to the United States. The United States has a long history of relying on Mexican men to work in agriculture, a practice that began with the Bracero Agreement between the U.S. and Mexican governments (Massey et al., 2005). Though this agreement has long since expired, many Mexican immigrants, particularly younger men, continue to cross their northern border to find work in the United States. The fact that Mexican men show a lower likelihood of holding U.S. citizenship than either immigrant men of similar marital statuses or than their female counterparts from Mexico may be further evidence of the selectivity of the Mexican migration flow. Overall, it is important to note the differing relationships between marital status and the separate acts of naturalizing and voting. The general trends are similar, with married migrants living with a spouse having the highest naturalization and voting rates and the estranged having the lowest propensities to naturalize and vote. However, the magnitude varies somewhat by process, with voter turnout tending to show greater differences among marriage categories. At the same time, gender seems to interact with marital status to influence citizenship acquisition in a way that it does not tend to impact voting. These results suggest that the two forms of political incorporation are sought out by different groups of people and, likely, for different reasons. CONCLUSION The findings from this chapter suggest that family factors, in conjunction with individual-level characteristics, help to tell the story of immigrant political incorporation. The fit of the models in predicting naturalizing and voting show statistically significant improvement when marital status is included. Who naturalizes and who votes are determined by more than socio-economic or singular

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demographic characteristics. The individuals around us (in this case, spouses) affect the decisions we make and how we behave. Though these findings have helped to uncover more of the political incorporation story, they also suggest that even more exploration needs to be done. Spouses may be those with whom individuals have the greatest contact, causing the largest impact on behavior. However, spouses are not the only individuals who exert influence. Community should also impact the political incorporation process, as an immigrant’s larger surroundings dictate the local political environment and the size and nature of social networks, influencing individual-level behavior. It is to an investigation of this larger environment that I now turn.

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CHAPTER 5

Does Community Matter? Ecological studies of human behavior have a long tradition within sociology, resulting from the rise of urban areas over the 19th and 20th centuries. Some have even stressed urbanization as the defining feature of modern-day life (Wirth, 1956). Scholars contend that the concentration of people in particular geographic areas may mean changes in both the quantity and quality of contacts between people, with implications for a host of individual, community, and societallevel outcomes (Baldassare, 1977; Durkheim, 1984; Fischer, 1977; Simmel, 1955). An individual’s extended environment is thought to affect everything from levels of aggression and crime (Krivo & Peterson, 1996; McCarthy, Galle, & Zimmern, 1975; Peterson & Krivo, 1993) to job opportunities (Wilson, 1987) to the transformation of “traditional” values (Fischer, 1975, 1982). Though little has been done to test the impact of environment on the political incorporation of immigrants, the ecological setting in which an individual is embedded may very well influence levels of political integration. One of the hallmarks of the urban environment is the size of its population. Community size has implications for the number of contacts an individual has, the composition of social networks, his choice of acquaintances, and the potential density of the community. Through a variety of mechanisms, each of these defining characteristics has, in turn, implications for the political incorporation of immigrants. Community size affects how many people an individual potentially has contact with, determining the breadth of his or her social networks, the amount of resources available, and the overall level of social integration. Larger communities should provide wider social networks and more resources, while smaller communities may translate into a more limited number of acquaintances and resource options. In this instance, the sheer quantity of people within the community may affect how much social interaction individual immigrants experience, and thus the likelihood of political incorporation. An outgrowth of community size is community composition. Because the majority of immigrants settle in urban areas, those living in rural environments likely have one of two choices: greater contact with 121

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the native-born or social isolation. Immigrants living predominantly among the native-born may naturalize in an effort to become more like those in their community. The native-born may act as role models, instilling democratic principles and practices into their foreign-born counterparts. Under these circumstances, communities dominated by the native-born may encourage immigrant political incorporation. Alternatively, immigrants in these environments may remain outside of the community, with this social isolation discouraging political integration. Conversely, larger, more urban environments translate into greater social choice and/or more social conflict. As communities increase in size, individuals may have more contacts and more options for friends and intimates, choosing people based on common interests and goals rather than developing relationships out of necessity (Fischer, 1977). More populated areas with greater diversity also portend more conflict, with different groups having different needs, goals, and problems. These potential clashes should further encourage individuals to find and associate with those who are similar to them, in an effort to find strength in numbers (Fischer, 1984). For immigrants, this may mean seeking out those who are of similar nationality or immigration status, leading to sub-community formation and integration. Communities comprised of large numbers of immigrants may lead to the identification of shared problems or goals, which in turn lead to political mobilization. Another possible outcome is that the diversity of the urban environment may translate into the formation of ethnic enclaves that are largely detached from mainstream society. Such was the case with the Jewish Ghetto in Chicago in the early 20th century (Wirth, 1958). Similar patterns have been identified in more recent years in ethnic enclaves around the country (Light & Bonacich, 1988; Lopez, 1999; Portes, 1987; Portes & Manning, 1994; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Sanders & Nee, 1987; Waldinger, 1996). The higher the levels of immigrant and linguistic concentration in a community, the less likely immigrants are to learn English, develop ties to the native-born, and become economically incorporated (Chiswick & Miller, 2005). Living in these communities may also mean depressed immigrant political incorporation.

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The level of “social” density, or interdependence, in a community should have implications for immigrant political incorporation. Urban areas may have lower levels of “social” density, due to both the size of the community and the choice rather than assignment of social contacts (Baldassare, 1977). The result may be weaker networks with lower levels of integration and greater feelings of anomie (Wirth, 1956). Immigrants may feel more isolated and disconnected from mainstream society, thus translating into a lower propensity to become politically incorporated and into generally depressed levels of political participation. The lack of multiplexity also translates into lower levels of adherence to normative political behavior (i.e., naturalizing and voting). However, sub-communities (Fischer, 1984) or “cliques” (Portes, 1995b) with high levels of interdependency can develop in even the largest urban environments, encouraging political incorporation. The goal of this chapter is to examine how the size, composition, density, and level of conflict of communities impact political incorporation. Under what circumstances does size encourage political incorporation and under what circumstances does it depress it? Are immigrants in co-ethnic social networks more or less likely to become politically integrated than their counterparts embedded in native communities, as a result of more cross-cutting ties, more similar goals, and greater social density? Though the available indicators of community size and composition are weak proxies for the actual social interactions that would ideally be measured, the accessible measures act as a starting place for determining how and to what extent ecological settings influence immigrant political incorporation. THE EVOLVING STUDY OF CONTEXT Durkheim (1984), in exploring the impact of growing urbanization on individuals during the nineteenth century, concluded that the bonds that tie people to each other would weaken as society modernized, leaving individuals in more isolated and fragile states. Traditional relationships based on “organic” criteria would cease to exist, replaced by weaker, rationally driven relationships, based on shared goals and interests, rather than on fundamental need (Simmel, 1955). The ability and desire to create relationships based on mutual interests, rather than on fundamental dependency, has developed as

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people have enjoyed greater freedom of association (Baldassare, 1977; Fischer, 1977). As geographic areas become more populated, individuals simply have more options from which to choose (Simmel, 1955). This greater choice, resulting from increasing population density, has meant that our relationships are largely characterized by “secondary” rather than “primary” contacts, i.e., weaker, more distant relationships in place of the dependent, kin networks characteristic of pre-modern society (Wirth, 1956). Though the nuclear family continues to exist, with individuals continuing to rely on immediate relatives for everything from financial support to political interchanges, the more extended familial networks are largely gone. In an increasingly urban society with greater amounts of specialization, people are less dependent on each other for the most basic needs and are more likely to form “intentional communities” designed to match personal interests, needs, and goals (Fischer, 1977). Though greater numbers of people translate into greater numbers of social options—a seemingly positive outcome for the individual— the “new” relationships people form with one another may be quite limited. Individuals know a smaller proportion of the population and have less intimate relationships with those that they do know (Wirth, 1956). Individuals become more and more atomized, leading to feelings of “anomie” (Durkheim, 1984). These weaker bonds, even in the face of numerically increasing contacts and affiliations, may prove harmful for both the individual and the society. Recent empirical work suggests that lower levels of community and declining social networks are as harmful as earlier theorists argued (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Putnam, 2000). As social networks decline in number and quality, individuals seem to lose their sense of community. Increasing population density appears to weaken social networks, even in the face of increasing social options. Fewer and/or weaker ties mean lower levels of peer pressure and fewer feelings of obligation. The result appears to be a decline in the political incorporation and participation of both native-born and foreign-born (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Putnam, 2000). Community involvement and stronger social networks do appear to encourage political incorporation and participation, but it is not clear that urban environments necessarily detract from relationships, as has been argued by numerous scholars (Durkheim, 1984; Putnam, 2000;

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Simmel, 1955; Wirth, 1957). Though some empirical research does suggest that urban areas weaken associations, and thereby limit community involvement (Fischer & Jackson, 1977; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Putnam, 2000), other studies have found this not to be the case (Baldassare, 1977; Fischer, 1977). Individuals living in suburban areas may be only slightly more likely to “neighbor” than are their urban counterparts (Fischer & Jackson, 1977), but those living in cities are found to have just as many friends, just as much contact, and just as much organizational involvement as those living in non-urban areas (Baldassare, 1977; Fischer, 1982). The environments in which people live certainly set a stage that impacts how they act or react, but people can adapt their behavior to the particular environments, continuing to have numerous and strong relationships. The social-context literature growing out of political science has paid an increasing amount of attention to what specific ecological conditions influence political behavior. Studies have explored the way in which structural conditions influence civic activity. Specifically, scholars have examined how different types of communities accentuate or de-emphasize individual-level characteristics to impact political participation (Huckfeldt, 1986; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1988; Huckfeldt, Plutzer & Sprague, 1993; Oliver, 1999; Putnam, 1966; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Zuckerman, 1995; Zuckerman, Kotler-Berkowitz & Swaine, 1998). This “social-context” research has made important contributions to our understanding of individual political activity, showing that individuals exist and operate within a larger social environment. For instance, working classes living in white-collar neighborhoods are found to vote more like their neighbors than their class counterparts (Johnston, Rollings & Thrasher, 2002; Johnston, Pattie, Dorling, MacAllister, Tunstall & Rossiter, 2002; Pattie & Johnston, 2002). Individuals living in high-income census tracts are more likely to vote than high-income individuals living in lower-income census tracts (Huckfeldt, 1986; Leighley & Nagler, 1992). In these instances, the “usual” determinants of political participation—individual levels of education, income, and SES (Campbell et al., 1960; Milbraith & Goel, 1977; Verba & Nie, 1972)—work at a macro-level to affect individual behavior.

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THE MANY ASPECTS OF COMMUNITY The Quantity of Social Networks Social networks are by definition sets of ongoing interactions between individuals (Portes, 1995b). These networks develop out of shared occupations, physical spaces, family, culture or some other commonality. The importance of social networks is that they embed individuals within a larger framework, a framework that acts as both a source of resources, in the form of information and support, and as a source of pressure, encouraging individuals to adhere to the norms of the community. The relevance of a social network is, in part, attributable to its size. Simply put, how many individuals belong to it? The size of a network determines the number of people with whom an individual has contact, with increasing size translating into greater numbers of resources, but potentially greater amounts of peer pressure, as well. Though social networks need not be limited by geography, one’s geographic location certainly has implications for the formation and size of community. One’s immediate geographic area is even argued to be a “natural community,” taking the place of traditional relationships of family and dependency (Fischer, 1977). Certain geographic contexts put an individual in contact with greater numbers of people. For instance, living in an urban area places people in greater proximity to larger numbers of people than does living in a rural area. Residing in a high-rise apartment building rather than on a farm has implications for the sheer number of people with whom an individual interacts. Under this line of thinking, individuals living in more populated areas should have larger social networks than their counterparts living in less populated communities. The size of the underlying population may have particular implications for minority groups. Urban and suburban geographic settings have been found to encourage community formation and political mobilization among “visible” minority groups, specifically African-Americans. Metropolitan areas may lead to increased political activity among this community due to the increased size of the networks, leading to greater contact with and recognition of like group members (Olzak, 1983; Tate, 1991). These more recent empirical studies illustrate earlier theoretical arguments that suggest larger and more densely populated areas provide people with more social options,

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allowing them to form networks or “sub-communities” based on shared interests (Fischer, 1977, 1982, 1984). In this way, increasing the size of a community or social network can encourage political mobilization by allowing individuals to identify others with similar characteristics and goals. Larger social networks can also encourage political participation through the greater amount of resources they potentially provide. An individual may not personally know everyone else in the network, but extended ties may mean more access to information (Portes, 1995b), which can in turn, influence an individual’s level of political participation. The opportunity for an individual to get information on a particular political issue or candidate, find out where the local polling station is located, or learn how to register to vote is enhanced by larger social networks. Social networks do not simply provide benefits and resources; they also exact costs in the form of normative pressure and constraints. As size increases, so do the number of eyes on an individual. Within the political realm, this may translate into increased peer pressure to become politically involved. Having ten people ask an individual whether or not she voted on Election Day is likely more powerful than having three people ask the same question. At the same time, increasing population size may have other, more depressive effects on political participation. As geographic areas become more populated, local government becomes more formalized and bureaucratic. The mayor, city council people, and public safety officials tend to hold these positions as full-time jobs, rather than as part time volunteers, as would likely be the case in smaller towns. Furthermore, the proportion of residents who can hold political positions at any level decreases as population size increases. The result is that urban residents come to feel more distant from the political system and are less likely to vote, run for office, or become politically active in some other way than are their rural counterparts who can have a larger and more immediate impact on the local environment (Fischer, 1984). The Composition of Social Networks Network composition is dictated in part by the size of the underlying local population. Individuals living in more rural areas with smaller

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populations have more limited social options (Fischer, 1977). Through selectivity, these communities tend to be compromised of more educationally, economically, and racially similar individuals. Selectivity has implications for where immigrants in the United States settle, with the great majority settling in urban areas as a result of chain migration. As a result, rural residence has particular implications for the foreign-born who likely find themselves surrounded by American-born neighbors and acquaintances. Immigrants residing in rural environments generally have one of two options: incorporation into native-born networks or isolation. Immigrants embedded in predominantly native-born social networks have greater interaction with mainstream society, leading to increased social, linguistic, marital, and political incorporation compared to their counterparts living in more immigrant dominated environments (Liang, 1994; Light & Bonacich, 1988; Lopez, 1999). Encouragement toward political incorporation takes place through a host of mechanisms. Immigrants may view the native-born as role models and attempt to become more like them. Their membership in a native-born community may make them feel more attached to the United States, generally, resulting in a greater desire to become politically incorporated (Portes, 1987). The native-born may pressure immigrants, through active or passive means, to become “more” American through naturalizing and voting. More than likely, some combination of these mechanisms is at work pushing immigrants embedded in native-born communities toward greater levels of political incorporation. In contrast, urban areas present more social options for individuals. With increasing size comes increasing diversity, affording people a wider range of social contacts. Relationships can be built more on common characteristics and goals, and less on need, dependency, and lack of choice (Fischer, 1977, 1984). The Density of Social Networks Scholars have argued the detrimental effect of urbanization on human relations (Durkheim, 1984; Simmel, 1955; Wirth, 1956). The primary concern has been that urbanization means weaker ties between people and greater feelings of isolation. In short, lower levels of social density.

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A social network’s efficacy as a source of information or peer pressure is influenced in large part by its strength of ties and density (Baldassare, 1977; Portes, 1995b). Do individuals know everyone else in the network? Are the ties between individuals singular or multiple? Are the relationships primary or secondary? As ties become more singular and less essential, their impact on an individual’s life become less relevant, leading to fears of individual instability and isolation. In contrast, more multiplex, primary ties suggest greater levels of individual social integration, with greater adherence to normative behavior. Socially dense or multiplex relationships result from interactions across multiple contexts (Baldassare, 1977; Portes, 1995b; Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). According to Durkheim, social density both encourages and grows out of the interdependence of individuals on one another (Baldassare, 1977). This results in greater levels of social integration for the individual, but also a greater degree of group peer pressure and social controls. After all, incorporation in multiplex networks means that more and more components of an individual’s life may be affected by how he behaves in a single context. Although the density or nature of a social network is distinct from its size, the two are intimately connected. As a community increases in size, it becomes more difficult for individuals to have relationships with all of the individuals in the group (Fischer, 1977). There are simply too many other people to know. The relationships that do exist may very well be weaker than those found in smaller social networks, that by definition are characterized by fewer people with whom to interact (Wirth, 1956). For instance, an urban dweller may casually interact with twenty different people in his building in a given day, but the interactions may be as brief as a quick “hello.” In contrast, someone living in a rural community may only encounter five people in a day, but they may include people he will see again at church on Sunday, at his child’s school, or in the local grocery store. The social or network density of a community influences political participation through the level of peer pressure it exerts (Huckfeldt, 1986). As communities become denser, the level of normative pressure to participate or participate in a particular manner becomes more acute. Studies of the native-born have identified this relationship, with those living in communities with lower levels of social cohesion less likely to

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vote (Putnam, 2000). In contrast, studies of native-born minorities have found that concentrated ethnic populations who continue to maintain distinct neighborhoods, places of worship and social organizations, i.e. those with higher levels of structural segregation and greater multiplexity, are more likely to participate politically than those who are more assimilated (Gordon, 1970; Portney & Berry, 1997; Schlicting & Tuckel, 1998; Zuckerman, 1995). Conflict As population increases, so too does diversity of ideas. Individuals living in small towns or villages are more likely to share views on a host of political issues, from education to land use to social welfare policies. In contrast, the political views held in urban areas tend to be more assorted, just as the residents are. Such diversity of opinion leads to conflict (Fischer, 1984). As a result, individuals begin to search out others who are more like them, sharing similar backgrounds, goals, and political views. As they identify one another, they may form their own sub-communities, with these “cliques” often developing to gain or maintain access to scarce resources (Portes, 1995b). Residents of more diverse cities are found to be more politically active than residents of less diverse metropolitan areas, with conflict over economic and social issues the hypothesized mechanism (Oliver, 1999). Complementary research has found that greater levels of social isolation or perceived social isolation depresses voter turnout (AlexAssensoh & Assensoh, 2001). As contact with mainstream role models and institutions declines, social networks become increasingly homogeneous and deprived, resulting in greater disenfranchisement for members of the community (Alex-Assensoh & Assensoh, 2001; Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). It is not that such isolated communities lack conflict, but due to the extreme isolation, the conflicts tend to be internal. Within these consonant minority communities, particularly those that are economically deprived, the clashes may occur at the individual level. As communities become more racially or ethnically diverse, group conflicts may encourage political mobilization (Barreto, 2005; Gordon, 1970; Jones-Correa, 2001). A fight between two African-American men likely remains a fight between those two individuals, while a fight between a Native-

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born White and a Korean immigrant may develop into a fight between Whites and Koreans in the neighborhood. The end result may be political mobilization on the part of one or both groups, in an effort to protect the group’s position in the community. The Ethnic Enclave and Political Incorporation The first place of settlement for many immigrants is an ethnic enclave, a segregated neighborhood with clear geographic boundaries where immigrants from a particular country of origin live, work, and socialize (Logan, Alba, & McNulty, 1994; Sanders & Nee, 1987). The basis for the initial formation of an ethnic enclave and its perpetuation results from limited access to mainstream society, and the resulting reliance on one’s co-ethnics, leading to group or “bounded” solidarity (Portes & Zhou, 1999). Immigrants create sub-communities whereby they pool resources, share information, and rely on one another. “Reactive ethnicity” bonds immigrant groups together in ways they were not in the country of origin. Though immigrants do not know one another, their shared histories, values, and experiences as coethnics or even just as fellow immigrants combine with their shared and disadvantaged place in a social network, encouraging the development of a foreign-born clique. Although ethnic enclaves are often viewed as economic units, where businesses are owned, run by, and service co-ethnics, these subcommunities can have political implications. Ethnic enclaves provide many of the ingredients essential for individual political incorporation and group mobilization—frequency of interaction, multiplexity of ties, group peer pressure, commonality of goals, and targeting by political parties. These multiple factors encourage immigrants to become politically incorporated through naturalizing and voting (Barreto, 2005; Gibson & Ogbu, 1991; Jones-Correa, 2001; Portes, 1995b; Portes & Zhou, 1999). Studies of different immigrant groups throughout the United States have reached similar conclusions regarding the ability of the ethnic enclave to encourage political incorporation. Cuban immigrants living in the Miami ethnic enclave are more likely to naturalize and vote (and vote as a unified bloc), than those more dispersed throughout the country. Failing to do so results in stiff sanctions socially and economically, as a result of the many crosscutting ties on which

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individuals in the community depend (Forment, 1989). Other studies of the Miami enclave come to similar conclusions (Pedraza-Bailey, 1987; Portes, 1987). A case study of Greeks in New York City finds that individuals living in the Greek enclave of Astoria become politically incorporated as a result of membership in the immigrant community. The pressure emanating from the network results in increased rates of citizenship and voting (Karpathakis, 1999). By being embedded within immigrant dominated social networks, individuals are subject to acute peer pressure to naturalize and vote, with economic and social sanctions threatened for not conforming to the political desires of the larger community. When informal social networks and sub-communities are not enough to meet group goals, formal associations are often established to make official the aims of the community (Fischer, 1984). The transformation from informal social networks to formal institutions has been identified within immigrant sub-communities who are trying to mobilize politically and develop ethnic and pan-ethnic political organizations to do so. For example, a Cuban builder’s association in Miami transformed itself into a powerful lobbying organization as the co-ethnic members began to realize the importance of political power at the community level (Forment, 1989). A case study of Asian immigrants in Orange County, California identified the process by which the Asian immigrant community identified a social problem, specifically an anti-immigrant ballot initiative, developed a pan-ethnic political organization, and mobilized individual migrants (Saito, 1998). Middle-Eastern immigrants in Dearborn, Michigan and immigrants of all backgrounds in New York City have become politically active through letter writing campaigns, lobbying efforts, and protests. The formalization of relationships through official associations may help to further increase the power of the group by increasing the density of the networks. Limitations Ecological studies have shown how community influences many types of individual-level behaviors. Unfortunately, few works have examined the effect of context on political participation. Those that have (Fischer, 1984; Putnam, 2000) have focused on the native-born. We cannot simply assume that the effect of community is the same for

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the native-born, even for minority sub-sets of the native-born, as it is for immigrants. Though the majority of large-scale, quantitative studies have failed to pay particular attention to the foreign-born, scholars of immigration have done some work in the area. Multiple scholars have conducted case studies of particular ethnic enclaves to examine how these communities encourage or discourage political incorporation (Forment, 1989; Karpathakis, 1999; Rivera-Salgado, 1999). Researchers have repeatedly found that enclaves produce dense social networks, placing peer pressure on individuals within the community to become politically active. Several scholars have identified such mechanisms across ethnic enclaves, suggesting consistency and credibility of findings. The question remains, however, as to whether these findings can be generalized. The works of Karpathakis (1999) and Forment (1989) suggest that Greeks in Astoria appear to use social networks in much the same way that Cubans in Miami do. The outcome, namely increased political incorporation, also appears to be the same in both settings. But do social networks always work this way for different immigrant groups? What happens to individual immigrants who are not part of immigrant communities? Previous research, while doing much to improve our understanding of the processes and mechanisms at work in social networks, have not produced large-scale comparative work that allows us to see how community influences may vary across immigrant groups. Furthermore, selectivity should be a consideration of any study examining the effect of context on individual behavior. We cannot simply assume that individuals who settle in the suburbs are the same in all ways as those who settle in urban or rural areas. In fact, the attraction to a particular environment likely says a lot about an individual, from level of education to political views to occupation. This concern should be particularly acute for immigrants, the majority of whom settle in urban areas. While it is extremely difficult to take selectivity into account, it is an issue that should be considered in any ecological study.

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HYPOTHESES18 The ecological and social-context literature has repeatedly identified relationships between community and social networks and various types of individual-level behavior. However, both schools of thought have come up with fairly inconsistent findings, regarding the direction of effect on numerous outcomes. Some works find that certain contexts, such as homogeneity of networks, encourage individual-level political participation through the development of group consciousness and peer pressure. Other research has found the same sorts of networks to depress political activity by failing to establish internal group conflict, necessary for the development of clique formation. As a result, this chapter and its hypotheses are largely exploratory, examining the competing arguments and findings from previous research. As discussed previously, individuals embedded in larger social networks may have greater numbers of contacts and resources. Larger social networks may mean individuals have more access to conversation partners and information, potentially encouraging political incorporation. This leads to the first hypothesis. The Increasing Network Hypothesis: Immigrants living in metropolitan areas should show higher propensities to naturalize and vote than those living in rural areas, as a result 18

To really test the influence of community and social networks, I would ideally have far more precise measurements than what the CPS actually provides. Network size would be measured by the number of people an individual has contact with on a daily or weekly basis. Network composition would be measured by such things as friendship circles or conversation partners, who one works with, and who one lives next to. To measure the level of social density within immigrant groups, I would have more precise measures of neighborhood boundaries to determine the existence of ethnic enclaves, as well as information on the existence of ethnic institutions. Community conflict would be measured by reported incidents of ethnically motivated crimes and the attitudes of one group toward another. Unfortunately, these data do not exist in the CPS, forcing the operationalization of social network factors in other ways. As a result, I am forced to use metropolitan status, percentage foreign born, and level of residential segregation as rough proxies to test what effect the size, density, composition of, and conflict within communities have on immigrant political incorporation.

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of the more extensive and diverse social networks in which they are embedded. Population size should have a similarly positive effect on political incorporation. However, the relationship between community size and density is often inverse, with a decrease in density leading to a decrease in political incorporation. If this is indeed the case, the relationship between size and political participation should be reversed. The Decreasing Density Hypothesis: Immigrants living in metropolitan areas should show lower propensities to naturalize and vote than those living in rural areas, as a result of the declining density and peer pressure of these larger communities. Population size should similarly discourage incorporation. The relationship between social network composition and immigrant political incorporation is similarly unclear. Immigrants embedded in majority native-born networks have been shown to have higher levels of political incorporation. The native-born act as role models and encourage integration more generally, leading to the following hypothesis: The Native-Born Network Hypothesis: Living in rural areas and in places with lower levels of foreign-born should be positively associated with naturalizing and voting. Other studies have found conversely that immigrants living in areas with greater numbers of other immigrants should develop subcommunities. Individuals living in these environments should feel greater peer pressure from their co-ethnics to become politically incorporated. As an entire immigrant community mobilizes to gain political power, individuals within that community should be more likely to naturalize and vote. Under these conditions, the following hypothesis should gain support.

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen The Immigrant Sub-Community Hypothesis: Living in urban areas and in communities with higher percentages of foreign-born is positively associated with political incorporation.

As the composition of social networks becomes more diverse, conflicts grow, encouraging the development of sub-communities. Immigrants living in more conflicted settings will likely develop their own cliques in an attempt to protect what is theirs. This leads to the next hypothesis: The Conflicted Network Hypothesis: Increasing levels of residential segregation should be positively associated with naturalizing and voting, as those living in such environments attempt to protect their position in the community. Both the selectivity of migration and settlement have implications for how ecological factors influence different groups. Mexican migrants who settle in rural areas are likely working as undocumented agricultural workers with little ability to naturalize as a result of their status. In contrast, Indian migrants who settle in rural areas have likely entered the United States as legal, highly-skilled workers. Their move to rural America may be a sign of their integration, rather than the isolation and disenfranchisement more likely marking rural settlement among Mexican immigrants. Ideally the data would allow for a systematic examination of the way community factors influence political incorporation across multiple immigrant groups. Because many of the immigrant groups are captured in small numbers in the CPS, with even smaller numbers living in rural portions of the United States, such an analysis is not possible. As a result, the final hypothesis will explicitly examine the effect of community factors on Mexican immigrants, the largest migration flow to the United States, and a group well-represented in rural as well as urban portions of the United States. The Mexican Community Hypothesis: Mexican immigrants living in rural areas should be less likely to naturalize than their urban counterparts, due to the selectivity of their

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migration and settlement. Among those living in urban areas, increasing segregation should encourage both naturalizing and voting. FINDINGS Table 5.1 presents the linkages between community characteristics and an immigrant’s propensity to naturalize. 19 The population size of a metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant relationship with naturalizing. However, living in a metropolitan versus a nonmetropolitan community is statistically significant and negative. Substantively, this means immigrants living in urban or suburban areas are about 30% less likely to naturalize than their counterparts living in more rural areas, even after adjusting for individual and marital structure characteristics. These findings, in part, support the Decreasing Density Hypothesis. The significance of the dichotomous metro/non-metro variable and the lack of significance of the continuous population size variable suggest a qualitative difference between living in a metropolitan versus a non-metropolitan area. The effect of population size and metropolitan status are both nonsignificant in predicting voting among immigrants, as evidenced by the findings in Table 5.2. Though non-significant predictors of voting, both variables work in the opposite direction to what is seen in Table 5.1 predicting citizenship. The odds-ratio for population size is below 1, suggesting a negative relationship, and metropolitan status is above 1, showing a positive association. But how do other community-level characteristics, such as the percentage foreign-born in a community, influence individual immigrant behavior?

19

Chi-square log likelihood tests of Models 5.1 and 5.2 show that the introduction of these community characteristics significantly improves the fit over the marriage models found in Chapter 4. In the naturalization models the fit is improved at the .001 level of significance (chi-square=31.38, df=6). In the voting model the fit is improved at the .005 level of significance (chisquare=21.54, df=6).

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen TABLE 5.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition for Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics, N=17,019 VARIABLES POPULATION SIZE (LOG) METROPOLITAN (V. RURAL RESIDENTS) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

1.03 0.71 (a) 0.99 ** 0.99 (a) 1.01 (a) 1.00 17,003.77 .31 .41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 The model includes control variables for age, age2, length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, year of survey, and marital status. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

Table 5.1 shows that increasing percentages of foreign-born discourage naturalization. Each percentage point increase in the fraction of foreign-born in an area decreases the odds of citizenship acquisition by 1%. Figure 5.1 simulates the probability of an immigrant naturalizing under varying contextual circumstances. In a city such as New York, with approximately 20% of the population foreign-born, an immigrant would be about 62% as likely to naturalize as the same immigrant living in a non-metropolitan area. An immigrant living in a city that has 50% foreign-born, such as Miami, would be about half as likely to naturalize as the same non-metro migrant. This finding suggests support for the Native-born Network Hypothesis that argues that immigrants enmeshed in native-born networks should be more likely to naturalize, an argument scholars have made previously (Light & Bonacich, 1988). Greater contact with mainstream society appears to encourage naturalization, likely through

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TABLE 5.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics, N=6,641 VARIABLES POPULATION SIZE (LOG) METROPOLITAN (V. RURAL) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

0.97 1.44 1.01 ** 0.99 * 1.00 1.01 (a) 8,113.51 0.15 0.20

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 The model includes control variables for age, age2, length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, country of origin, year of survey, and marital status. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

the role models and peer pressure of the native-born, while more immigrant dominated communities discourage integration. In contrast, Table 5.2 shows that increasing percentages of foreignborn in a metropolitan area have a positive relationship with voting among immigrants. Every one-percentage point increase in foreignborn increases the odds of an individual immigrant voting by the same amount. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.2, which simulates the odds of an immigrant going to the polls under various circumstances. An immigrant living in a metropolitan area that is 10% foreign-born is 57% more likely to vote than a non-metropolitan immigrant. It appears that immigrants in more immigrant-dominated areas are less likely to naturalize, but once naturalized, more likely to vote, supporting the Immigrant Sub-Community Hypothesis. The level of segregation in a metropolitan area, a proxy for conflict, has similarly mixed effects on naturalizing and voting,

FIGURE 5.1: The Odds of Immigrant Naturalization in a Metro Area with Increasing Rates of Foreign Born Versus Non-Metro Residence 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Simulation for a married male immigrant, residing with spouse, with a high-school degree, living above poverty.

FIGURE 5.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout In a Metro Area with Increasing Rates of Foreign-Born Versus Non-Metro Residence 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Simulation for a married male immigrant, residing with spouse, with a high-school degree, living above poverty.

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respectively. The findings from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that an increasing rate of White-Black dissimilarity is associated with a lower level of citizenship acquisition and voter turnout. Each percentage point increase in this form of segregation is linked to a similar amount of decrease in the likelihood of naturalizing and voting. In contrast, Table 5.1 shows that a rising rate of White-Hispanic dissimilarity is associated with a greater propensity for naturalization. Table 5.2 illustrates that greater White-Asian dissimilarity translates into a greater likelihood of immigrant voter turnout. These findings lend mixed support for the Conflicted Network Hypothesis. This hypothesis posited that increasing rates of residential segregation are associated with higher levels of conflict, and thus sub-community formation and political mobilization. White-Hispanic and White-Asian dissimilarity support the argument that inter-group discord promotes political incorporation, while White-Black dissimilarity runs counter to the argument. The Mexican Sub-Sample The results from the sub-sample of Mexican immigrants suggest that the relationship between community characteristics and political incorporation is distinct for this immigrant group. Table 5.3 presents the results from the model predicting citizenship acquisition. In this table, Mexican immigrants living in metropolitan areas are only 56% as likely to naturalize as their rural counterparts. Among Mexican immigrants living in metropolitan areas, those in cities with higher proportions of foreign-born residents have lower odds of naturalizing than their counterparts in metropolitan areas with smaller percentages of immigrants. Each one percentage point increase in foreign-born residents translates into a two percent reduction in the likelihood of a Mexican immigrant naturalizing. Although both of these patterns appeared among immigrants generally (see Table 5.1), the relationship is both more significant and stronger among the Mexican sub-sample. At the same time, measures of residential segregation which were significant predictors of political incorporation in the larger immigrant sample are non-significant in predicting Mexican patterns of naturalizing.

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TABLE 5.3: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Mexican Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics, N=7,373 VARIABLES POPULATION SIZE (LOG) METROPOLITAN (V. RURAL) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2

PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

1.05 0.56 * 0.98 *** 1.00 1.00 1.00 6,575.37 0.15 0.24

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 Current Population Surveys and 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2 The model includes control variables for age, age , length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, year of survey, and marital status. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

Table 5.4 presents the relationship between community characteristics and voting among Mexican-origin immigrants. As one can see, none of the contextual factors examined in this chapter are significant predictors of voter turnout among those of Mexican-origin. These results are in contrast to the patterns found in Table 5.2, which examined the entire immigrant sample. The results from Tables 5.3 and 5.4 run counter to the Mexican Community Hypothesis that proposed Mexican-origin immigrants living in rural areas would be less likely to hold U.S. citizenship, due to the selectivity of Mexican migration flows. It further suggested that greater levels of conflict, as measured by levels of segregation, would encourage Mexican sub-community formation, and hence political incorporation. Neither of these suppositions is supported by the data. Contextual characteristics that suggest more native-born networks and communities are associated with higher levels of Mexican citizenship acquisition, with the influence of mainstream integration seemingly more powerful for this sub-sample than for immigrants, generally.

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TABLE 5.4: Effect of Community Factors on Citizenship Among Mexican Immigrants, N=1,492 VARIABLES POPULATION SIZE (LOG) METROPOLITAN (V. RURAL) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2

PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

0.92 0.94 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.02 1,748.05 0.16 0.22

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 Current Population Surveys and 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 The model includes control variables for age, age2, length of eligibility, gender, level of education, poverty status, workforce participation, year of survey, and marital status. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

DISCUSSION The previous chapter focusing on the family found that marital status has large and significant implications for political incorporation. As individuals become more entrenched within social networks, due in part to their marital structure, they are more likely to become politically incorporated. In this chapter, I have tried to extend and test this line of thinking by examining characteristics within the immediate host community. The unique characteristics of a community appear linked to naturalizing and voting among immigrants, although not in a clear-cut and consistent manner. Immigrants residing in rural areas are more likely to naturalize than their urban and suburban counterparts, with this pattern particularly pronounced for Mexican immigrants. The differing propensities to acquire citizenship by metropolitan status may be the result of variations in the types of social networks that exist, with rural

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ties likely to be denser with greater levels of monitoring and peer pressure. Scholars argue that increasing urbanization and suburbanization is detrimental to community formation (Durkheim, 1984; Putnam, 2000; Simmel, 1955; Wirth, 1956). As geographic areas become more populated and communities become less tight-knit, individuals may feel more isolated and less integrated, potentially explaining the lower rates of naturalization. Similarly, increasing rates of foreign-born are associated with lower levels of citizenship acquisition. Previous research finds that increasing immigrant concentrations discourage linguistic and economic incorporation (Chiswick & Miller, 2005). Given that civic integration is thought to follow economic, linguistic, and social integration (Gordon, 1964), this chapter’s findings should come as no surprise. Being embedded in more native-born dominated communities may mean a higher likelihood of other types of incorporation that tend to precede political integration. Through choice or necessity, immigrants in less immigrant dominated environments will likely have more American-born contacts who encourage various types of incorporation. Interestingly, both geographic location and rates of foreign-born in an area have the opposite relationship with electoral participation. This seemingly contradictory finding is in keeping with earlier research that has found that states, such as California, with lower rates of naturalization among immigrants have higher rates of voter turnout among those that have naturalized (Jones-Correa, 2001). Immigrants in more densely populated areas are more likely to vote, as are individuals living in areas with higher rates of immigrants. Larger communities provide more contacts, social options, and resources. Fischer argues (1982, 1984) individuals in metropolitan areas have more choices and are thus more likely to develop networks or sub-communities comprised of those with similar backgrounds, interests, or goals. This sub-community or clique development can result in political mobilization, in large part due to the formal structures in place to mobilize immigrants and the significant amounts of monitoring and peer pressure that exist in many immigrant communities (Forment, 1989; Jones-Correa, 2001; Karpathakis, 1999; Portes, 1987; RiveraSalgado, 1999).

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The contradictory effects of metro-residence and rates of foreignborn on the likelihood of naturalizing and voting, respectively, may speak to the selectivity of migration. Migrants settling in metropolitan or immigrant-dominated environments may be more likely to be undocumented, and thus not be able to naturalize. As a result, cities with larger immigrant populations appear to do a poorer job of naturalizing the foreign-born because the overall pool of foreign-born is larger. At the same time, metropolitan areas with larger rates of foreign-born may have a more developed infrastructure designed to politically mobilize immigrants (Fischer, 1984; Forment, 1989; Saito, 1998). Though such organizations can do little to change the legal status of undocumented immigrants, they can encourage the mobilization of those who are citizens. Naturalized citizens may be particularly important to immigrant communities as individuals who can make their voices heard, fight for resources, and help protect the interests of the larger immigrant community comprised of both citizens and non-citizens. Another possibility is that immigrants in more rural areas or communities with lower rates of foreign-born are in greater need of social welfare benefits than are their metropolitan counterparts. As discussed in previous chapters, and borne out again here, citizenship and voting are distinctive forms of political integration, motivated by different factors. Citizenship acquisition is acquired for a host of reasons—with access to the polls being only one of many. As a result, it may be that migrants in rural or native-born dominated environments are actually less integrated financially or socially and have fewer networks to rely upon for assistance, and thus turn to the state for support. In this instance, “political” integration would likely begin and end with citizenship. If a lack of social integration is indeed the case, these individuals likely lack political discussants and organizations specifically concerned with engaging them, thus leading to lower levels of voter turnout. In contrast, immigrants in metropolitan areas and communities with greater rates of co-migrants may be less in need of state support due to more extensive immigrant networks and social service organizations. As a result, migrants in metro areas and those in communities with higher rates of foreign-born have a decreased need to naturalize for welfare benefits or social services. They may be

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acquiring citizenship for the primary purpose of voting. Furthermore, these immigrants may show significantly increased odds of voting due to greater immigrant peer pressure and the existence of formal structures, factors less likely to exist in rural areas or where there are lower rates of foreign-born residents. CONCLUSION One can draw few definitive conclusions about the effect of community and social networks on political incorporation based on the weak, proxy measurements used to test concepts not available in CPS data. At the same time, however, neither can these factors be ignored. Characteristics of the communities in which immigrants are embedded are associated with certain types of political behavior. Sometimes that behavior is action, at other times inaction. Ideally, future research will more systematically and with better measurements assess the relationship between characteristics of the host community and immigrant political behavior. I will now turn to an examination of characteristics in the home country, to see how factors in the community of origin influence political incorporation in the United States.

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CHAPTER 6

Gone, but not Forgotten: The Enduring Influence of Home Society The previous chapters have focused on how connected and incorporated individual immigrants are to and with the host society as the basis for understanding their political integration. Though individual, family, and local community characteristics are important in examining the political integration process, immigrants do not arrive in the United States without a past. Immigrants migrate for numerous reasons. Some come for economic or educational opportunities. Other immigrants seek greater political freedom. Still others migrate to reunite with spouses, parents, or children. For many immigrants, some combination of these factors is at work. As such, they bring with them unique experiences and histories from their home societies. Findings presented in earlier chapters and from previously published studies show country of origin variables to be among the biggest and most significant predictors of political incorporation, supporting the notion that prior conditions are important in understanding future outcomes (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). But what do these country of origin dummy variables really mean? “Country of origin” represents a host of factors, including the economic, political, social, demographic, and geographic characteristics of that country (Yang, 1994). In short, country of origin dummy variables represent all that “we do not know” (Chiswick & Miller, 2001). Institutional factors both in the country of origin and in the country of destination must not simply be grouped under a larger sub-heading, given the influence they exert on economic (Chiswick, Lee & Miller, 2003) and political incorporation (Jones-Correa, 2001). Macro-level country of origin characteristics, such as its levels of political freedom and economic opportunity, suggest the extent to which a migration is more or less permanent. Similarly, the geographic distance of the home society from the United States has implications for the ease of 149

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reversibility and the maintenance of cross-national social networks, with greater distance likely encouraging greater levels of political integration. Additional country of origin factors, such as the official language spoken or form of governance, bear on the level of congruence between the home society and the United States, and thus the ease with which an individual can become incorporated. Because of the many factors that the country of origin variable may be representing, it is necessary to parse out and examine the characteristics subsumed under its heading to see whether and how they affect political incorporation, net of individual, family, and community factors. As a result of the selectivity of migration flows, country of origin characteristics do not exist independently of those at the individual, family, or community levels. For example, migration flows from English-speaking societies, such as Britain or Canada, may be comprised of immigrants with higher levels of education or income and greater abilities to become socially incorporated (Rumbaut, 1999). Immigrant streams from economically less developed countries of origin, such as Mexico, may be more likely to be comprised of single sojourners, rather than married couples. Furthermore, certain society of origin factors might vary in their effect within immigration flows. For example, distance from the United States might have differing effects on immigrants with varying levels of income. Poorer immigrants from India, or another geographically distant society, might be more likely to naturalize than their wealthier counterparts who can more likely afford the costs of trips and telephone calls home, activities that help to maintain social networks in the country of origin. Similarly, the gender structure in the country of origin may differentially affect male and female migrants in the United States. Women who come from less egalitarian societies, such as China, may be more likely to naturalize than their male counterparts from the same types of societies. As a result, it is essential to examine both country of origin characteristics in their own right, and as interactions with other factors. BACKGROUND Naturalizing provides the same legal, financial, and political benefits to everyone, but not all immigrants choose to naturalize. The variation in

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an immigrant’s propensity to acquire U.S. citizenship suggests that individuals consider these benefits within their particular country of origin context. For political refugees, such as those from Southeast Asia or Cuba, the freedoms provided in the United States are significant and powerful draws to citizenship (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Yang, 1994). But immigrants from similarly democratic countries, such as Canada or Britain, may not view American democracy as a particularly strong pull. If they were to return to their country of origin, they would find the same type of freedoms, lessening the gleam and promise of U.S. citizenship. Similarly, economic migrants evaluate the benefits of citizenship acquisition in light of what awaits them in the country of origin. For instance, Indian immigrants who come to the United States with high levels of education and skill likely consider what their economic prospects might be if they were to return home. For some, return to the country of origin might represent a substantial decline in wages. As economic differentials between the United States and the country of origin increase, individuals might be more encouraged to acquire citizenship (LaLonde & Topel, 1997). Others with economic opportunities in the country of origin might view migration to the United States as temporary, staying just long enough to save a certain amount of money to invest in opportunities in the home society. These “target” migrants come with specific economic goals in mind, intending to return to the country or community of origin when that goal has been attained (Berg, 1961; Lindstrom & Lauster, 2001). Although country of origin is a consistent predictor of who becomes more politically incorporated and who remains more marginalized, most studies have failed to more closely examine the many characteristics subsumed under the country or region of origin variable (Chiswick & Miller, 2001; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). We accept that Filipinos are more likely to naturalize than are Mexicans and that Chinese are more likely to naturalize than are Canadians, with the explanation for these trends frequently framed in the context of potential reversibility. (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Mogelonsky, 1997; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Mexicans and Canadians are certainly geographically closer to their country of origin, but assuming geography is the only explanation for differences in naturalizing may be too simplistic. What specific

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characteristics of the home society encourage or discourage naturalizing? Why are the incentives of U.S. citizenship more appealing to immigrants from some countries than other countries? To determine why country of origin is a consistently significant predictor of political integration, it is essential to better understand what these country of origin variables really mean. Chinese are not inherently more likely to naturalize than are Mexicans; it is something about their particular countries of origin that encourage or discourage political incorporation. Varying contextual characteristics translate into differing levels of reversibility, and thus, political incorporation in the United States. By breaking down the country of origin variable into its key components, one can begin to understand why certain immigrant groups show such different rates of naturalizing and voting. Furthermore, we can examine how these home country factors interact with other characteristics, such as income or age, to better understand the many considerations that determine an individual’s propensity to become politically incorporated. Political Freedom American democracy is a significant attraction for many immigrants. Although the United States pledges equal political access to all its citizens, this promise carries varying degrees of significance, based on an individual’s previous political experiences. Canadians may view the political benefits of U.S. citizenship as minimal; return to their country of origin would provide similar freedoms. In contrast, immigrants from less democratic societies, such as Cuba or China, likely place greater weight on the freedoms offered by U.S. citizenship (Harles, 1993). Direct measures of political freedom have been tested to see their effects on political incorporation. Refugees, the great majority of whom are political, are more likely to naturalize than those entering on other types of visas (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Yang, 1994). Similarly, immigrants migrating from socialist societies are more likely to become U.S. citizens than those coming from non-socialist countries (Yang, 1994). Lacking the option of return migration, refugees are more likely to view the United States as their new and relatively permanent home. As a result, they show a greater propensity to naturalize.

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The political system in the country of origin may have different implications for the voting process. Though migrating from a nondemocratic society may encourage citizenship acquisition as a means of legally securing one’s position in the United States, or as a sign of permanence, those same political experiences in the home country may discourage participation in the American electoral process. Refugees and other immigrants from less democratic societies may decide to live “below the radar screen” as a result of negative political experiences in their country of origin (Harles, 1993). Conversely, immigrants from democratic societies who decide to naturalize have previous experience with free electoral processes. The congruent political systems found in the home society and the United States should encourage political participation. Previous research supports the argument that an immigrant’s prior political experience in the home country is a good predictor of political participation in the host country, with immigrants migrating from democracies translating their past experience into the new setting (Black et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989). Economic Development Among voluntary migrants, financial opportunities in the United States are frequently the largest attraction. Neo-classical migration theory argues that migration takes place as a result of income differentials between the country of origin and the country of destination (LaLonde & Topel, 1997; Massey et al., 2005; Mincer, 1987) or economic “push” and “pull” factors (Hammar & Tamas, 1997; Portes, 1995b). The “push” factors, specifically the economic opportunities or lack thereof that exist in the home society, are matched by the “pull” factors, or the economic prospects found in the United States. As economic differentials between the home and host society increase in favor of the latter, the pull becomes stronger. Though economic opportunities found in the United States can be substantial, the relative wealth or deprivation experienced by individual immigrants reflect both individual-levels of education and skill and the economic circumstances in the country or community of origin, affecting the relative permanence of a migration, and thus the likelihood of naturalization (Constant & Massey, 2002; Lindstrom, 1996; Lindstrom & Lauster, 2001; Stark, 1984, 1991). This “new” line

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of thinking forsakes the traditional neo-classical theory of migration that assumes migration to be a permanent step towards maximization of earnings over a lifetime of the migrant and his family (Constant & Massey, 2002; Lindstrom, 1996; Lindstrom & Lauster, 2001; Stark, 1984). Immigrants who feel more deprived in their communities are more likely to migrate than those who feel more privileged (Stark, 1991). Immigrants compare their increased earnings and standard of living in the host society to what they could realize and achieve at home (Stark, 1984). Though perhaps low by native-born standards, the economic opportunities in the United States may far exceed what immigrants could expect at home. For these lower skilled migrants, this prospect may translate into relatively more permanent settlement than in the case of wealthier or more skilled immigrants. The latter may also use their home country status and standard of living as a point of reference, but the comparison may produce a sort of cognitive dissonance for the wealthier migrants who will likely experience some level of downward status adjustment in the United States, encouraging reverse migration. Furthermore, less skilled individuals from less developed countries may find a substantially higher standard of living in the host community as a result of social welfare programs. In such instances, their lifestyle may improve beyond that afforded by a minimum wage job alone, encouraging more permanent settlement (LaLonde & Topel, 1997) and further lessening the dissonance between the home and host communities experienced by higher-income immigrants (Stark, 1984). Higher-skilled individuals will likely earn too much to be eligible for similar social welfare benefits. In the United States, where access to benefits is increasingly dependent upon citizenship acquisition, one may find that lower levels of skill, education, or income will interact with the level of economic development in the country of origin to encourage political incorporation. Alternatively, the draw of the United States may become stronger as the economic differentials between the home and host society increase for an individual (Fischer, Martin & Straubhaar, 1997; LaLonde & Topel, 1997; Malmberg, 1997). This is perhaps best illustrated in the Indian migration, a “brain drain” flow, whereby the best and brightest of a developing society migrate to first-world economies (Atal & Dall’Oglio, 1987; Fischer et al., 1997; Ghosh, 2001;

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Niland, 1970; Rumbaut, 1999). Russian migration flows have been similarly characterized (Simanovsky, Strepetova, & Naido, 1995). These higher earning migrants experience even greater economic differentials between the home society and the United States than do their lower income counterparts, potentially encouraging more permanent settlement. At the same time, migrants tend to use the home community as their reference group, allowing them to retain positive psychological benefits from their migration and the financial benefits it provides. By becoming overly incorporated into the new society, migrants may begin to use the host community as the reference group, likely a better compensated, more financially successful group than either the individual migrant or the home community. In order to retain the positive psychological benefits of the migration, immigrants may choose to remain outsiders, sometimes even declining the option to naturalize, with the intention of eventually returning to the country of origin (Stark,1984). Gender Equality By definition, women from less sexually egalitarian societies have fewer opportunities at home than do their male counterparts. Although little work has been done to examine how gender structure in the country of origin influences incorporation in the country of settlement, a few studies have begun to touch on this relationship. Qualitative studies of Dominican immigrants have found Dominican women to be more politically incorporated in the host community than are their male counterparts (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998). Though these studies are limited in scope, due to their methodology, a largescale quantitative study of immigrant voting has similarly found Latin American women to be more politically engaged than Latin American men (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001). Female migrants from such societies likely view their migration as relatively more permanent than do their male counterparts, given the differential opportunities in the home society. Women have far more to lose by returning to their country of origin and far too much to gain by staying in the United States (Guarnizo et al., 2003). As a result, women from less egalitarian societies should have a greater propensity to become incorporated than men from similar societies.

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Furthermore, a female immigrant’s marital status may mediate between the level of gender opportunity in the country of origin and its effect on political incorporation, as found in Chapter 4. Female immigrants from more patriarchal societies who are married and residing with their spouse may continue to follow more gendered patterns. The households they have established in the United States may not be dramatically different from those back at home, with the woman responsible for the home and family and the man responsible for the economic and public spheres. In contrast, their single counterparts may more fully embrace the greater gender equality in the United States and singularly decide to make their settlement more permanent, through naturalizing. Geographic Distance Geography is another critical factor in an individual’s propensity to become politically integrated in the United States. As the geographic distance between the home country and the United States increases, so do transportation costs, making it more difficult for the migrant to return to his or her country of origin. This means fewer visits home and a general weakening of the ties and social networks binding the immigrant to the home society. In contrast, immigrants from geographically closer societies have an easier time returning to the home country either for short or extended stays. Furthermore, this greater ease of travel likely means individuals are more able to maintain ties to their home communities, making permanent settlement and incorporation in the United States less likely. Such has been the case with Mexicans and Dominicans (Rumbaut, 1999). Canadians similarly have among the lowest rates of permanent settlement and naturalization. In short, the development and maintenance of extensive cross-national social networks is facilitated by geographic proximity to the United States, potentially discouraging more permanent settlement in the host society. Previous scholars have examined the role that distance from the home country plays in the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States. As distance increases, so too does the propensity to naturalize. For example, an immigrant who comes from a country 7,000 miles from the United States is 70% more likely to naturalize than is an immigrant from 1,000 miles away (Yang, 1994). Other

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studies have similarly found a positive and linear relationship between distance and citizenship acquisition (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). However, the effect of geographic distance is affected by other considerations, namely the political situation in the country of origin. As discussed above, migrants from Mexico and the Dominican Republic are less likely to settle permanently in the United States, maintaining cross-national social networks through trips and phone calls home. The same is true for Canadians, who can easily cross the northern border to visit family and friends. In contrast, Cubans whose country of origin is a mere 90 miles from the United States are very unlikely to return to the home society, due to the political situation in Cuba. Their settlement is relatively more permanent than those from similarly proximate societies, suggesting that geographic distance interacts with other country of origin characteristics to affect the political incorporation process. The potential reversibility of migration and maintenance of crossnational social networks may work against the naturalization process, but could encourage voting among those who have acquired citizenship. Research conducted on earlier waves of immigrants argues that immigrants came to the United States in search of support for their political causes in their country of origin (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Contemporary migrants may similarly use the American political system to effect change in the home country (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Portes & Truelove, 1987). Immigrants from geographically closer countries are more likely to maintain social networks and ties to their home society, keeping them more entrenched in the politics of home. Scholars have found that two current immigrant groups, Dominicans and Mexicans, have fashioned bi-national identities, largely made possible by both their ability to return to their respective countries of origin on a regular basis and their ability to hold dual citizenship (Guarnizo, 1994; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Jones-Correa, 2001; RiveraSalgado, 1999). 20 In contrast, immigrants who come from greater 20

Though the United States allows dual citizenship, other countries such as India require that only one citizenship be held, forcing immigrants to make a decision about which affiliation they will retain. I am not examining dual citizenship in this chapter because the meaning of citizenship and the benefits it provides vary significantly from country to country. For example, some

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distances are more likely to lose contact with the communities from which they came. The weakening of these ties may encourage naturalizing, but give them little incentive to become more politically active. This pattern of greater political incorporation, via voting, should be even more pronounced among those from societies that are both geographically proximate and politically repressive. The Cuban refugee community is the best example of such a situation. Despite being only 90 miles away from the country of origin, its focus remains securely on influencing American foreign policy toward Cuba, encouraging voter turnout in the United States. The Cuban example again suggests the need to explore the effect of geographic distance on political incorporation, both in its own right, and as it interacts with other country of origin characteristics. English Language For many immigrants in the United States, the inability to speak or understand the English language is one of the biggest obstacles in the settlement and incorporation process (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Linguistic “congruence” or the ability to translate one’s nativelanguage to the United States places immigrants at a tremendous advantage with respect to multiple types of incorporation (LaLonde & Topel, 1997). English-language ability makes finding a job and gaining advancement within it far easier, making it a key to economic success (Alba & Nee, 1999; Chiswick et al., 2003). Socially, Englishspeaking immigrants are far more likely to develop contacts and social relationships with the native-born. Though area of settlement in the United States certainly affects the extent to which English language influences social and economic integration, English language acquisition generally places immigrants at a significant advantage. In many ways, English-language proficiency acts as both a litmus test of and as a key to incorporation.

countries only allow citizens to hold property. Other countries allow noncitizens to vote. As a result, the use of “dual citizenship” in a model is an oversimplification of what citizenship status means from country to country. For studies that have explicitly examined the effect of dual citizenship on naturalization trends, see Freeman and Ogelman (1998) and Bloemraad (2004).

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English-language ability should have even more profound effects for political integration. The citizenship process requires passing a test of English-language proficiency, in addition to the written history and civics exams. As a result, immigrants who come from a country where English is an official language are at a great advantage in terms of citizenship acquisition. This advantage should continue into the voting process. Political campaigns are mostly conducted in English, limiting the engagement of less fluent English-language speakers. Depending upon the election, state, and foreign-language spoken, the foreign-born may or may not be able to access a voting ballot in their native-tongue. As a result, English-language ability, or its lack, should significantly affect the propensity of immigrants to both naturalize and vote. Scholars have examined whether immigrants from countries where English is an official language are more or less likely to become politically incorporated, via naturalizing. Some have found that those migrating from countries where English is spoken are more likely to become American citizens (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990). Other studies that have measured an individual’s English language ability have similarly found that the effect on citizenship acquisition is positive (Liang, 1994). Speaking English should greatly increase the propensity to naturalize both by demystifying the citizenship process and facilitating passage of the naturalization tests. Surprisingly, however, there are also other studies which have found that English as an immigrant’s official language may actually reduce the propensity to naturalize (Yang, 1994). And some scholars have found an inability to explain the exceedingly low naturalization rates among immigrants from Britain and Canada, two countries where English is an official language (Rumbaut, 1999). The results shown by these latter studies are likely to be the result of the selectivity of migration flows. Immigrants from countries where English is an official language may enter the United States with higher levels of income, skill, or education. For many, U.S. citizenship is acquired for economic reasons: access to social services, better jobs, or the ability to borrow money, to cite just a few of the economic advantages which citizenship may confer. Immigrants from countries where English is an official language, such as Canada or Britain, may be less in need of the economic benefits that accrue from American citizenship, accounting for their seemingly illogical failure to

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naturalize, when U.S. citizenship acquisition would be particularly easy for these groups of immigrants. Limitations Though previous studies have examined the effect of country of origin characteristics on naturalization, these studies have failed to include important individual-level characteristics. One extensive study that explored the effect of GNP, literacy, distance, English-language, and a series of other origin-country characteristics failed to look at many key individual-level factors, such as education and income (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990). Other studies that are more inclusive in their models have nevertheless failed to explore potential interactions between country of origin characteristics, such as GNP, and individual-level characteristics, such as income (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). Assuming that characteristics at either level work only as main effects may be overlooking more nuanced relationships that might more fully explain political incorporation. Though the level of economic development in the country of origin may suggest the overall economic differential between the host society and the United States, an individual’s relative wealth or lack thereof can only be measured by interacting country of origin factors with individual-level characteristics, such as education. It is an individual’s relative wealth or lack thereof, rather than the generic economic differential between the home society and the United States, which should most accurately measure an individual’s decision to settle permanently or return to the country of origin. A further limitation of earlier studies (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994) is their incomplete conception of political incorporation. As I have argued throughout, naturalizing and voting are two distinct processes with different incentives and motivations. Each process must be examined in its own right. This becomes particularly true when country of origin characteristics work through the mechanisms of reversibility and translation. These mechanisms may have very different implications for naturalizing and for voting. For example, as levels of democracy increase in the home country, an individual has greater ease of reversibility and thus a lower propensity to naturalize. However, immigrants from such societies who do in fact naturalize likely have a

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greater propensity to vote, as they can translate their previous democratic political experience to the United States. This is just one example of why the definition of political incorporation must be expanded and examined more comprehensively. The goal of this chapter is to better understand how key country of origin characteristics affect both naturalizing and voting, while controlling for individual, family, and host community factors. It will also examine how certain country of origin characteristics interact with each other, and with lower level characteristics, to determine the relative permanence of settlement and the resulting implications for individual political incorporation. HYPOTHESES Previous research suggests that country of origin characteristics should influence individual political incorporation. Societal factors that make return migration easier from a financial, geographical, or psychological perspective should discourage political incorporation. Immigrants who come from wealthier, more geographically accessible, or freer societies have significantly less to lose in returning home than do their counterparts coming from more remote, poorer, or more politically repressive countries. Using supplementary data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the World Bank’s Human Development Indicators, and the Freedom House Index, the following hypothesis will be tested: The Relative Permanence Hypothesis: Immigrants from geographically distant, poorer, or less democratic societies should be more likely to naturalize than their counterparts from more accessible, wealthier, and more democratic countries. While geographic proximity likely has a positive and linear relationship with naturalizing, its effect should be mediated by the political situation in the country of origin. A country that is geographically proximate to the United States likely suggests a less permanent migration, and the likelihood of reversibility should only increase as the level of democracy in the country of origin increases. I will therefore test for an interaction between geographic proximity and the level of political freedom in the country of origin.

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen The Geography by Democracy Hypothesis: Immigrants coming from both geographically proximate and politically open societies should have a lower likelihood of naturalizing than immigrants from geographically proximate and politically repressive societies.

While characteristics of the country of origin suggest to a large degree how much opportunity an individual will have upon return, individual-level characteristics should interact with these societal factors in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, little work has been done to explore the interaction between macro-economic conditions and individual levels of resources. As a result, two competing hypotheses should be tested, both of which examine how economic conditions at multiple levels influence individual decisionmaking. Immigrants who come from poorer countries, but who themselves have higher levels of education or income may have relatively more to lose upon return migration than their counterparts with lower levels of education or income. Immigrants with greater economic or educational resources may have attained a standard of living in the United States that they would be unable to reproduce in their country of origin, given the diminished levels of compensation they would receive for the same type of work. As income differentials increase, individuals may be more likely to migrate and settle permanently (LaLonde & Topel, 1997). The first hypothesis thus explores this potential relationship between macro- and micro-economic conditions. The Income Differential Hypothesis: Better educated and wealthier immigrants from less economically developed societies should be more likely to naturalize than their counterparts who live below the poverty line or have lower levels of education. Conversely, immigrants with greater levels of education or income might actually be more likely to return to their less economically developed countries of origin than their poorer and less educated counterparts. The wealthier and better educated may be able to achieve very high standards of living in the home society, encouraging them to

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maintain their home community as the reference group, with the plan of eventually returning (Stark, 1984). These immigrants have the resources to return home and live well there. Additionally, they may be less enticed by the economic incentives associated with U.S. citizenship than will be their needier counterparts (LaLonde & Topel, 1997). This leads to the competing economic hypothesis: The Economic Incentive Hypothesis: More economically vulnerable immigrants from poorer countries will naturalize for the financial incentives associated with U.S. citizenship. Their wealthier and better-educated counterparts have greater incentives to return to their country of origin, given the elevated standard of living they can enjoy in the home country. Overall, the economic situation in the country of origin should matter less for the poorer immigrants than for wealthier one’s having more to gain or lose. Similarly, other country of origin factors may vary in their effect across individual level characteristics. For example, men and women from the same country of origin may have vastly different educational, economic, or social opportunities. The World Bank measures the percentage of boys and girls enrolled in primary school, as a determinant of a society’s egalitarianism. Women migrating from less egalitarian societies have far more to lose in a return migration than their male counterparts and are thus likely to view their migration as relatively more permanent. This leads to the following hypothesis: The Gender Opportunity Hypothesis: Women from more gender-stratified societies, as measured by a higher ratio of boys to girls enrolled in primary school, should be more likely to naturalize. However, family structure may impact the extent to which patriarchal systems are reproduced in the United States. The Gender Opportunity and Family Structure Hypothesis: Women from less egalitarian societies who are married and residing with their spouse should be less likely to

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen naturalize than their single counterparts, as the former are more likely to be living in more gendered households in the United States.

The level of linguistic and political congruence between the country of origin and the United States likely makes the transition to American society much easier, lowering the barriers to access and thus encouraging political incorporation. Immigrants migrating from societies where English is an official language should find both naturalizing and voting to be far more accessible. The Linguistic Congruence Hypothesis: Immigrants from societies where English is an official language should be more likely to both naturalize and vote. Previous democratic experience should also smooth the transition to the American political system. While greater levels of freedom in the home society are likely to work against naturalizing, as U.S. citizenship acquisition is less valuable to immigrants from other democratic societies, immigrants from such societies that do naturalize should be more likely to vote. Their previous political experiences at home “translate” into the American context. The Political Congruence Hypothesis: Immigrants from societies with higher levels of democracy, as measured by the FHI, should be more likely to vote. Finally, geographic distance should affect the voting process. Immigrants from geographically more accessible societies are more able to remain a part of their original social networks. As a result, these migrants remain more interested in the social, political, and economic conditions in their home societies, where they have retained ties. They are likely to use the American political system to seek to influence conditions in the home country. The Proximity and Politics Hypothesis: Immigrants from geographically closer societies should be more likely to vote than their counterparts from greater distances.

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The effect of geographic proximity on voting should be further amplified by the political situation in the country of origin. As discussed above, geographic proximity allows for ongoing relationships between the immigrant and his or her country of origin, increasing his or her ability to remain informed about and involved in the political, social, and economic situation in the home country. Immigrants from geographically closer but more repressive political regimes should be even more likely to try to influence the situation in the country of origin, via voting. Large-scale political mobilization can influence American economic, military, and immigration policies toward the home society. The Proximity and Politics Hypothesis, Amplified: Immigrants from geographically proximate but politically repressive countries of origin, should be more likely to vote than their counterparts from similarly situated but less repressive environments. FINDINGS The results from Table 6.1 strongly suggest that country of origin characteristics significantly influence the naturalization process, even after controlling for a host of individual, family, and community factors.21 21

It is not possible to do a formal statistical test comparing the power of this model with less comprehensive models presented in the earlier chapters. Such tests comparing the models in previous chapters were possible because they were nested. The necessary removal of country of origin variables means this is no longer simply an expansion of a smaller model presented in the previous chapters, but rather a whole new model. However, there are ways to indirectly compare the effectiveness of non-nested models. The pooled models in Chapter 3 were able to explain 31% and 15% of the variance in naturalizing and voting, respectively. Each of these models contained 20 parameters. In this chapter, the country of origin dummy variables have been replaced by country of origin characteristics. With 25 parameters in the main-effects models, 30% and 15% of the variance has been explained in naturalizing and voting, respectively. The expanded naturalization model that includes interactions has an improved fit over the main-effects model at the .001 level of

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The models predicting citizenship, presented in Table 6.1, show the significant impact of certain characteristics on the naturalization process. The level of political and civic freedom in a home society matters, with increasing oppression encouraging greater immigrant incorporation in the United States. As the level of political repression increases in the home society, the odds of an individual naturalizing increase by 8%. Immigrants appear to weigh the benefits of naturalizing versus the costs of reverse migration and determine that the political and psychological costs of return to such a society are simply too high. The result is a relatively more permanent migration, evidenced by the decision to naturalize. At the same time, immigrants from geographically closer societies are less likely to naturalize, with each increment in distance encouraging citizenship. Immigrants from the geographically closest societies, those that are less than 1,000 miles away from the closest United States border, are only about 32% as likely to naturalize as their counterparts who hail from the most distant countries (5,000+ miles away). Immigrants from intermediate distances, between 1,000 and 5,000 miles away, are about 77% as likely to naturalize as their more distant counterparts. As reversibility becomes more difficult, the propensity to naturalize increases. The economic prospects in the country of origin also influence individual decision-making. Individuals who come from more economically developed societies are less likely to acquire U.S. citizenship than immigrants from societies with lower GDPs. Each

significance (chi-square=62.06, df=8). The voting model with interactions is similarly found to be an improvement over the main-effects model at the .05 level of significance (chi-square=18.86, df=8). The pseudo R2s from these expanded models continue to explain similar levels of variance. Given the larger number of parameters in the Chapter 6 models and the virtually indistinguishable amount of explained variance over the Chapter 3 models, it appears the country of origin dummy variables are a better option from the standpoint of statistical parsimony. From a substantive standpoint, however, the replacement of country of origin dummy variables with multiple home society characteristics is a better option, as one is able to see what aspects of the country of origin influence the political incorporation process.

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TABLE 6.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition among Immigrants with Selected Country of Origin Characteristics, N=17,019 Model 1

Model 2

FEMALE (V. MALE)

NA

0.53

LESS HS (V. HS DEGREE)

NA

0.54 ***

MORE HS (V. HS DEGREE)

NA

1.29 ***

POVERTY (V. ABOVE POVERTY)

NA

0.80 ***

SPOUSE ABSENT (V. MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE)

NA

0.52 ***

UNMARRIED (V. MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE)

NA

0.91

LEVEL OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL OPPRESSION

1.08 (a)

1.08

GDP (LOG)

0.62 ***

0.54 ***

ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

0.89

0.93

CLOSE GEO. PROXIMITY (V. 5,000+ MILES)

0.32 ***

0.63

MEDIUM GEO. PROXIMITY (V. 5,000+ MILES)

0.77 *

0.76

RATIO OF BOYS TO GIRLS IN PRIMARY SCHOOL

0.97 ***

0.98 ***

EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE

NA

EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA

1.00

EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*SEPARATED

NA

1.00

GDP*POVERTY

NA

1.14 (a)

GDP*LESS HS

NA

1.20 **

GDP*MORE HS

NA

0.87 *

CLOSE GEO. PROX.*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION

NA

0.76

MEDIUM GEO. PROX*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION

NA

1.16

17,164.07

17,102.01

0.30

0.31

0.41

0.41

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

1.01

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Sources: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys, 1990 U.S. Census, 1997 World Bank's Human Development Indicators, U.S. Census Bureau, CIA World Fact Book 2002, and Freedom House Index 2000. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2 In addition to the variables shown abover, the model includes control variables for age, age , length of eligibility, workforce participation, year of survey and community characteristics. To see the results of the full model, refer to the supplemental tables.

one-percentage point increase in the log of the gross domestic product results in a 38% decline in the propensity to naturalize. In this instance, the costs of return migration decrease as the economic prospects in the

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

home society increase, thus decreasing the odds of citizenship acquisition.22 The political, geographic, and economic effects on naturalization suggest strong support for the Relative Permanence Hypothesis. As reversibility becomes more difficult, the likelihood of greater incorporation, via citizenship acquisition, increases. In Chapter 3, the similar Reversibility Hypothesis found support—Cubans and Filipinos were among the most likely to naturalize, while Mexicans and Britons were among the least likely. By replacing the country of origin variables with factors that are subsumed under the country of origin heading, the relative permanence of a migration and thus the decision to naturalize, can be more fully explained. Model 2 of Table 6.1 examines how certain country of origin characteristics interact with other factors to influence the relative permanence of a migration for individual immigrants. How do different origin country traits interact with each other to affect individual decision-making? How do these macro forces interact with individual and family-level characteristics to impact naturalization decisions? The Geography by Democracy Hypothesis stated that those from closer and more democratic societies should be the least likely to naturalize, as return to such societies should be particularly easy. Model 2 finds that the interaction between geography and political freedom is not a statistically significant predictor of naturalizing, failing to support the Geography by Democracy Hypothesis. The competing Wealth Differential and Economic Incentive Hypotheses posit that the economic opportunities in the home country should vary in their impact on naturalizing by individual levels of income and/or education. Are wealthy immigrants from poorer 22

As statistically significant and powerful as GDP appears to be on individual political incorporation, it is important to note the changing role of the nationstate. Supra-national economic units, such as the European Union, are becoming more common. Individuals belonging to these larger economic units are increasingly finding fewer barriers to traveling and working within the larger unit. As a result, an individual’s economic fortune is less tied to the GDP of his or her specific country of origin. Consequently, an immigrant should increasingly be less affected by his specific country of origin’s GDP, as he will likely have economic opportunities beyond what is available in his home country.

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societies more likely to naturalize than their poorer counterparts as a result of the greater differences in earnings between home and host society? Or are their poorer counterparts more likely to naturalize given the economic incentives in the form of social welfare benefits they will receive in the U.S. by becoming citizens? At every level of GDP, the wealthier are more likely to naturalize. For example, a poor immigrant from a country with an average GDP of $4,000 per person is 85% as likely to naturalize as a non-poor migrant from a society with the same level of GDP. At an average GDP of $20,000, the poor migrant is 86% as likely to naturalize as an immigrant from an economically similar country. Although the difference in the propensity to naturalize between immigrants of differing educational and economic statuses becomes smaller as GDP increases, the findings support the Income Differential Hypothesis and refute the first portion of the Economic Incentive Hypothesis. The findings also indicate that within educational and economic groups, the effect of GDP varies (Figure 6.1). A one-unit increase in GDP in the country of origin has a bigger influence on those immigrants who are not poor than on those who are poor. For example, an immigrant living above the poverty line is only 54% as likely to naturalize as he would be if he were from a country with a lower level of GDP. Stated differently, each one-unit increase in the mean level of GDP decreases the propensity of a non-poor immigrant of naturalizing by about half. For immigrants living in poverty, each one-unit increase in the mean level of GDP decreases an individual’s propensity to become a citizen by 39%. As GDP increases, the propensity of all immigrants to naturalize decreases, but it decreases more for wealthier migrants. The relationship between GDP and level of education is similar, as can be seen in Figure 6.1. For less educated immigrants—those with less than a high-school degree— each one-unit increase in the mean log of GDP translates into a 35% decrease in the propensity to acquire U.S. citizenship. A similar increase in GDP translates into a 46% decrease in the likelihood of someone with a high school degree of naturalizing, and a 53% decline in the propensity to naturalize among immigrants with more than a high school education. Though rising GDP depresses the propensity of all immigrants to naturalize, its influence is greater

FIGURE 6.1: The Effect of Rising GDP in the Country of Origin on the Odds of Naturalizing Among Immigrants of Differing Educational and Economic Levels

1.00 0.80 **

0.60

(a) ***

*** *

0.40 0.20 0.00 Less than a HS Degree

HS Degree

More than a HS Degree

Living Below Poverty

Living Above Poverty

***P<=.001 **P<=.01 *P<=.05 (a)P<=.1 Source: Table 6.1, Model 2. Control Variables: age, age2, length of eligibility, gender, workforce participation, year of survey, marital status, and community characteristics.

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for those with higher levels of education, just as it is for those with greater amounts of income. The differing effects of GDP across levels of income and education may result from the greater needs of more economically vulnerable immigrants, as suggested by previous scholars (LaLonde & Topel, 1997), or from the greater number of options available to better resourced immigrants. Citizenship provides many economic benefits, namely access to social services, better jobs, and loans. Wealthier individuals, regardless of GDP, may not be as attracted by these financial incentives. As the level of GDP in their country of origin rises, they have even fewer incentives to naturalize, as they have a greater ability to tap into the economic opportunities available at home than do their less educated and poorer counterparts. Those with little money or education remain poor and uneducated regardless of the situation in the country of origin. At the same time, the social welfare benefits associated with citizenship in the United States remain constant. As a result, the effect of rising GDP in the country of origin has less influence among the more marginal immigrants. The gender structure in the country of origin, as measured by the ratio of boys to girls in primary school, has a statistically significant effect on the naturalization process. Each one unit increase in the ratio, suggesting greater levels of gender inequality, depresses the propensity to naturalize by 3%. However, the ratio of boys to girls in primary school has no gender specific effect nor does it vary in its effect across women of different marital statuses. The gender structure in the country of origin is statistically significant, but its effect appears to be consistent across immigrants, regardless of sex or family structure. Table 6.2 presents the results of the voter turnout models, illustrating that the effect of several of the country of origin characteristics vary by type of political process. For example, Table 6.1 illustrates that increasing levels of political and civic oppression encourage citizenship acquisition. In contrast, Table 6.2 shows a negative relationship between repression in the country of origin and voter turnout in the United States. Immigrants from less democratic societies are about 20% less likely to vote than their counterparts from more democratic societies, supporting the Political Congruence Hypothesis.

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Geographic distance is a highly significant predictor of political incorporation, and one whose impact similarly changes by type of political process. In the citizenship model, immigrants from closer distances were significantly less likely to naturalize, given the greater ease of reversibility. The results from the voting models show the opposite effect. Immigrants from closer distances are substantially more likely to vote than their counterparts from greater distances. Those from societies located within 1,000 miles of the United States (Canada, Cuba, and Mexico) are 72% more likely to vote than immigrants from the farthest distances. Immigrants from intermediary distances (1,000-5,000 miles away) are 62% more likely to vote than their most distant counterparts. These findings strongly support the Proximity and Politics Hypothesis. Although the main-effect of distance on voter turnout is strong, the variable needs to be examined in greater detail. The interaction between geographic distance and the level of political freedom in the country of origin is statistically significant, in contrast to what was found in the citizenship model. Individuals who migrate from proximate, but politically repressive societies, such as Cuba, are more likely to vote than their counterparts from geographically similar, but freer countries of origin, such as Canada and Mexico. Each one unit increase in the level of political oppression in a geographically proximate country is associated with a 54% increase in an immigrant’s propensity to vote. However, this finding may be a Cuba-specific effect, with Cuban refugees highly concentrated geographically and the target of political mobilization by the major political parties. Chapter 3 identified Cubans as having the highest rates of voter turnout among the ten groups under examination in this study, surpassing Canadians and Mexicans.

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TAB LE 6.2: T he O dds of Voter Turnout Among Immigrants with Selected Country of Origin Characteristics, N =6,641 M odel 1

M odel 2

FEM ALE (V. M ALE)

NA

LESS HS (V. H S DEGR EE)

NA

1.48 0.70 ***

M OR E HS (V. HS DEGR EE)

NA

2.05 ***

POVERTY (V. AB OVE POVERTY)

NA

0.69 ***

SPOUSE AB SENT (V. M AR R IED, R ESID ING W / SPOUSE)

NA

0.82

UNM AR R IED (V. M AR R IED, R ESIDING W / SPOUSE)

NA

0.79 *

LEVEL OF C IVIL AND POLITICAL OPPR ESSION

0.80 ***

GDP (LOG)

0.77 ***

0.83 ** 1.09

ENGLISH AS OFFIC IAL LANGUAGE

1.27 *

1.49 **

C LOSE GEO. PR OXIM ITY (V. 5,000+ M ILES)

1.72 ***

0.38

M EDIUM GEO. PR OXIM ITY (V . 5,000+ M ILES)

1.62 ***

0.78

R ATIO OF B OYS TO GIR LS IN PR IM AR Y SC HOOL

1.00

1.01

EDUC ATIONAL R ATIO*FEM ALE

NA

1.00

EDUC ATIONAL R ATIO*FEM ALE*UNM AR R IED

NA

1.00

EDUC ATIONAL R ATIO*FEM ALE*SEPAR ATED

NA

1.00

GDP*POVERTY

NA

0.76 **

GDP*LESS HS

NA

1.14

GDP*M OR E HS

NA

1.11

C LOSE GEO. PR OX.*LEVEL OF OPPR ESSION

NA

1.86 *

M EDIUM GEO. PR OX*LEVEL O F OPPR ESSION

NA

1.18

8,126.19

8,107.33

0.15

0.15

0.20

0.20

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 M AX. R ESC ALED PSEUDO R

Num bers reported are odds-ratios. Sources: Novem ber 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 C urrent Population Surveys, 1990 U.S. C ensus, 1997 Hum an Developm ent Indicators, U.S. C ensus B ureau, C IA W orld Fact B ook 2002, and Freedom House Index 2000. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1 2 In addition to the variables shown above, the m odel controls for age, age , length of eligibility, workforce participation, year of survey and com m unity characteristics. To see the results of the full m odel, refer to the supplemental tables.

Though the findings support The Proximity and Politics Amplified Hypothesis, it is not clear that the interaction between geography and level of democracy would remain statistically significant if other geographically proximate and repressive regimes were included in the sample. The use of English in the country of origin is another characteristic that varies in its effect by process. Migrating from a society with English as an official language has no effect on the odds of

174

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

naturalizing. In contrast, immigrants who come from countries where English is spoken are 27% more likely to vote than those who come from non-English speaking societies. The power of the Englishlanguage variable becomes even stronger in the expanded voting model. Immigrants from English-speaking countries are nearly 50% more likely to vote than their counterparts from non-English speaking countries. The simulation in Figure 6.2 illustrates the power of English-language ability on the voting process. Though GDP and level of freedom also influence the likelihood of voting, the line graph shows that the large drop in the odds of voting results from an immigrant coming from a society where English is not an official language. The results from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively, lend partial support for the Linguistic Congruence Hypothesis. The differing influence of linguistic ability on political incorporation likely speaks to the distinct natures of naturalizing and voting. The economic, legal, and social pay-offs of citizenship acquisition may be sufficient to encourage non-native English speakers to learn enough English to naturalize. Becoming involved in the electoral process likely requires a higher level of language proficiency, and one that many immigrants do not attain. DISCUSSION Factors at multiple levels affect whether an individual immigrant decides to become politically incorporated in the United States or to remain outside of the polis. Each immigrant confronts and likely considers individual, family, community, and country of origin factors when contemplating political integration. Although the permanence of a migration and the consequent decision about political incorporation varies by individual circumstances, some clear patterns in both the naturalizing and voting processes are identifiable. Country of origin factors that determine the permanence of a migration, the congruence or “translation” between societies, and the proximity of home societies all appear to play prominent roles in political incorporation. Interactions between certain of these macro factors and lower level characteristics also impact individual decision-making.

FIGURE 6.2: The Odds of Immigrant Voter Turnout Under Three Different Country of Origin Scenarios 1.00

English-speaking, Democratic society, double the average GDP

0.80 0.60 Non-English speaking country, moderate levels of civil and political freedom, average GDP

0.40 Non-English speaking, repressive society, half the average GDP

0.20 0.00 Simulation for a married male immigrant, residing with spouse, with a high-school degree, living above poverty.

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

In the citizenship realm, increasing distance and decreasing economic opportunities and political freedoms all encourage more permanent settlement in the United States, as evidenced by higher rates of citizenship acquisition. The findings support the Relative Permanence Hypothesis and are in keeping with previous research (Liang, 1994; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Yang, 1994). While the societal factors that appear to have the biggest effect on citizenship acquisition relate to the reversibility of migration and the difficulties associated with return, the characteristics of the country of origin that affect an individual’s propensity to vote relate to translation or congruence. In the voting process, immigrants who come from more democratic countries are more likely to participate than those from more repressive political regimes, lending support for the Political Congruence Hypothesis. This finding is the opposite of what I found in the citizenship realm, where greater freedom in the country of origin discouraged naturalization, as posited in the Relative Permanence Hypothesis. In short, greater similarities between societies discourage one form of political incorporation (naturalizing), but encourage another form (voting). These “contradictory” findings are not a surprise—the costs of returning to more democratic regimes are lower, making reversibility easier. Once naturalized, however, previous democratic experience encourages voting through the mechanism of translation, in keeping with the findings of previous studies (Black, et al., 1987; Finifter & Finifter, 1989). The ability to “translate” linguistic skills from the home society to the United States also makes voter participation far more accessible. Individuals who come from societies where English is an official language are much more likely to vote than their counterparts who come from non-English speaking societies, as posited in the Linguistic Congruence Hypothesis. Interestingly, home language does not have a statistically significant effect on naturalizing, suggesting firstly that immigrants may learn just enough English to pass the naturalization process, but not enough to become active in the electoral process, and secondly that voting may be a better indicator of integration than is naturalization. What has been largely absent from previous research is any examination of how individual characteristics interact with factors in

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the home society. The research presented in this volume finds that net of other characteristics, more individual-level resources in the form of income or education translate into a greater likelihood of naturalizing, while more societal resources discourage it. The effect of individual and societal levels of income is more nuanced, however. Rising GDP depresses naturalizing for immigrants, generally, but it depresses it more for those with greater resources. The wealthier and better educated are more able to tap into the economic opportunities of their home societies, and thus have less reason to stay in the United States. These better resourced immigrants from more economically developed societies may also have entered the United States on specialty skill visas, always with a plan of reverse migration. In contrast, the poor and less educated may view the United States as their best option. Although the goal of this chapter has been to better understand what the country of origin variables really represent by breaking them down into some of the most critical components, the findings may have uncovered that some of the characteristics here continue to act as proxies for other unmeasured characteristics. I may have replaced one proxy variable—country of origin—with a series of other proxies. For example, geographic distance, though largely understood in terms of mileage alone, has other implications for immigrant incorporation. We know that as the physical distance between the home country and the United States increases so do the costs and difficulties associated with return migration. My findings show greater distances encourage naturalization, supporting the Geographic Proximity Hypothesis. Migrants who come from greater distances may be less likely to maintain their country of origin social networks. Though this may be a by-product of the financial and logistical difficulties of return visits, it likely has independent effects. Weakening social networks and ties may both allow and force immigrants to become more a part of American society. This likely encourages naturalization in its own right. Cross-national social networks likely also impact the voting process. Immigrants from geographically more proximate societies who have naturalized are more likely to vote than their counterparts from more distant regions, further supporting the Geographic Proximity Hypothesis. Immigrants from physically closer countries of origin may be more able to maintain their cross-national social networks and stay

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

interested and entrenched in the social, economic, and political conditions of the home country. Previous research has found this to be the case for Dominicans, Mexicans, and Cubans (Guarnizo, 1994; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Pedraza-Bailey, 1987; Rivera-Salgado, 1999). Ongoing involvement in the home society encourages immigrants to become involved in the American political system for purposes of influencing U.S. foreign policy as it affects their country of origin (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Karpathakis, 1999; Pedraza-Bailey, 1987; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). Although my data do not allow me to measure the level of bi-national social networks, the geographic effect in both the citizenship and voting processes suggests the influence of ties to the home community. Similarly, the effect of English in the country of origin may be acting as a proxy for other factors. Coming from an English speaking society may suggest similarities other than simply language between the home and host countries. Immigrants who come from places where English is an official language may be more integrated socially into American society, with more mainstream contacts. The findings from this chapter once again support the argument that citizenship and voting are two fundamentally different processes. Citizenship provides individuals with many immediate and tangible benefits, such as equal standing before the law, the ability to bring over relatives to the United States, and social welfare benefits, to name just a few. The draw of these incentives, particularly the economic inducements, appears to be a large draw for many immigrants. For the poorer and less educated, the lure of citizenship remains, even as the economic situation in their respective countries of origin improves. In contrast, voting provides many fewer immediate, concrete and individual benefits. As a result, factors which encourage voter participation are very different from those which encourage citizenship acquisition. Immigrants who appear more entrenched in cross-national social networks and the politics of the home society are more likely to participate than those who have lost contact with their countries of origin. This greater participation likely results from a desire to affect the political, social, and economic situation in the country of origin, as opposed to participating for more individualistic reasons. Furthermore, the lack of immediate, tangible, and individual benefits from voting limits the efforts an individual will put into the

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voting process. If an immigrant already has the skills or ability to participate in American democracy, then voter participation is more likely. Immigrants who do not come equipped with political or linguistic knowledge from their country of origin are less likely to become politically engaged, as the difficulties of participating without having congruent skills are too many for a process that provides little obvious benefit. These findings also suggest that voting may be the better indicator of how integrated into American society an immigrant really is, with the act of voting constituting both an outgrowth and an indicator of social and political integration. CONCLUSION From a statistical standpoint the models in Chapter 3, which included country of origin variables rather than characteristics of the home society, may be more parsimonious and seemingly the better option. However, the major findings from this chapter are theoretically important, and would not have been identified if statistical parsimony were the only concern. Country of origin dummy variables stand as proxies for many different factors, making it difficult to determine with precision the factors driving the results. Although one ethnic group may not inherently be more likely to naturalize or vote than another, previous research both in this volume and elsewhere has failed to identify why we consistently find that immigrants from one country or another naturalize or vote at higher rates than do other immigrant groups. Chinese consistently naturalize at higher rates than do Canadians. Italians consistently vote at higher rates than do Southeast Asians. Certainly the geographic, economic, and political situations in the respective countries of origin provide us with some hypotheses, but we cannot simply accept them without putting them to the test. By breaking the country of origin variables into some of the key characteristics they represent, I have been able to move beyond untested but often used cultural explanations to better understand the predictive power of country of origin. The geographic, economic, and political situations in the home societies do indeed affect rates of naturalizing and voting in the United States, as hypothesized, and usually in the directions predicted. Greater distances, lower levels of GDP, and lower levels of political freedom encourage citizenship,

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

while English as an official language and higher levels of political freedom in the country of origin encourage voting. These findings make sense and support many of the cultural explanations that have been used to explain the consistently strong effect of country of origin on political incorporation, but it is only through a systematic analysis that we can move away from “black box” explanations.

CHAPTER 7

A Look Back, A Look Forward: Contributions & Future Research For much of this nation’s history, acquiring American citizenship was the exclusive domain of White European male immigrants. Over the course of the 20th century, barrier after barrier has been removed, opening up access to female migrants, as well as those from nonEuropean countries of origin. But while the opportunity to naturalize has been opened up to anyone who meets the mandatory visa and residency requirements, we continue to see varying rates of citizenship acquisition, somewhat of a surprise, given that those who hold this title, either through birth or naturalization, are privy to a world of legal, political, and economic benefits. So why do some immigrants acquire citizenship, while others who are eligible do not? And what does citizenship really mean? Is it a first step into the formal political realm, with voting the obvious outgrowth? Is it a sign of more fully internalizing American democratic values? Or is citizenship a status acquired primarily for access to favorable economic and social policies limited to the naturalized and native-born? The general trend found throughout this volume has been that individual, family, and community characteristics that suggest greater integration and “rootedness” encourage citizenship acquisition. Holding at least a high-school degree, having higher levels of income, living in the United States for longer periods of time, residing with one’s spouse, and living in more native-born communities are all characteristics that encourage citizenship acquisition. However, the context from which one migrates mediates the effect of some of these “lower level” characteristics, suggesting a more nuanced relationship with both citizenship acquisition and voting. A review of the key findings below suggest that some characteristics that suggest greater similarities between immigrants and the native-born encourage naturalizing, while other characteristics that suggest congruence between groups discourage citizenship acquisition but encourage voting among those who choose to become U.S. citizens.

181

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From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

A LOOK BACK The Role of Socio-Economic Characteristics Previous research has identified education and income as among the strongest predictors of both naturalizing and voting (Bass & Casper, 1999, 2001; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Liang, 1994; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Verba et al., 1995; Verba & Nie, 1972; Yang, 1994). As immigrants become more economically and educationally integrated into American society, they are more likely to become politically incorporated, through both naturalizing and voting. The results in Chapter 3 mirror the findings from previous research. However, the real impact of these characteristics is only fully understood through an examination of how income and education interact with other factors, a line of inquiry not previously undertaken. Two competing theories test whether and how the economic situation in the country of origin would differentially affect immigrants of varying levels of income and education. The Income Differential Hypothesis posited that wealthier and better-educated immigrants should be more likely to naturalize than their poorer, less educated counterparts from societies with comparable levels of GDP. Those with more resources had more to lose by returning to their respective home societies where the return on their human capital would be lower than that received in the United States. The competing Economic Incentive Hypothesis posited that poorer and less educated immigrants from low GDP countries would be more likely to naturalize, given the social welfare incentives in the United States. The results find that better resourced immigrants from economically comparable societies are, in fact, more likely to naturalize, supporting the former hypothesis. As economic conditions in the country of origin improve, the difference in naturalization rates between the better resourced immigrants and their more marginal counterparts slowly lessens, but the former group consistently retains higher rates of citizenship acquisition. Looking at the interaction between individual and societal economic characteristics in a different way reveals that the effect of GDP varies for immigrants of different socioeconomic statuses. An increase in GDP is associated with lower levels of naturalization for immigrants of all educational and economic levels, but the decline is larger for the wealthier and better educated. The more prosperous

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183

immigrants have more to gain or lose, thus causing the economic situation in the home society to have a larger effect on their decision to naturalize. At the same time, the more marginal immigrants continue to have fewer life chances in the country of origin, even as the economic situation improves at the macro-level. Remaining in the United States and acquiring citizenship is likely viewed as the best option for economic advancement, in light of both what little they have to gain in the country of origin and the economic opportunities and social welfare benefits associated with citizenship in the United States. Gender As with the socioeconomic factors examined in previous research, the study of demographic characteristics has frequently stopped short of where it has needed to go. Although scholars have increasingly understood the gendered nature of migration (Bass & Casper, 1999; Foner, 1999; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991; Jones-Correa, 1998; Pessar, 1999), they have failed to explore how gender differentially influences life chances and opportunities in settings ranging from the household to the home society. The findings from this research fail to identify any systematic pattern that gender plays across all immigrant groups. For instance, Mexican and Indian women are more likely to naturalize than are their male counterparts. Canadian women are more likely to vote than Canadian men. This mixed set of findings does little to elucidate the main-effect of gender on political incorporation. However, the role of gender is more clearly understood as an interaction with marital status. The findings show that men and women who are single and men and women who are married and residing with their spouse show no difference in their respective propensities to naturalize. However, women who are married but living apart from their spouse are 55% more likely to naturalize than are men in the same family situation. Men also seem to be more affected by their marital status than are women. Women show no difference in their propensities to naturalize from one another, regardless of marital situation. In contrast, men who are single and men who are married but living apart from their wife are both statistically less likely to naturalize than married men residing with their spouse. Clearly, gender influences the political incorporation

184

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

process, but only by digging more deeply than has been done before is the relationship more fully revealed. Country of Origin Characteristics The enduring influence of an immigrant’s home society was first identified in Chapter 3, when country of origin dummy variables revealed themselves as some of the biggest predictors of both naturalizing and voting. In Chapter 6, I tried to better understand what these dummy variables were really representing. Previous scholars have identified characteristics of the home society, such as distance, GDP, and levels of political freedom, as influencing the likelihood of individuals naturalizing (Liang, 1994; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Yang, 1994). Greater distances, lower levels of political freedom, and lower levels of GDP all encourage citizenship acquisition. In short, characteristics that make societies of origin distinct from the United States tend to be associated with higher levels of naturalization. The research presented in this volume is in keeping with previous studies. This volume has extended the field by exploring the influence of home society factors on voting. The findings suggest that congruence across societies, in the form of similar languages and political structures, encourages voter turnout. Immigrants from Englishspeaking countries are nearly 30% more likely to vote than immigrants from non-English speaking countries. Similarly, immigrants from societies with greater levels of freedom are significantly more likely to vote than their counterparts from less democratic societies. Previous research has found this to be the case for immigrants in Canada (Black et al., 1987) and Australia (Finifter & Finifter, 1989). The findings support the hypothesis, with previous democratic experience encouraging voter turnout in the United States. Exposure to American Society As discussed previously, immigrants with more education and more income are at greater odds of both naturalizing and voting. Immigrants from English-speaking and more democratic countries are also more likely to become politically engaged, via voting. Does this mean that those who lack education, income, English-language skills, previous

A Look Back, A Look Forward

185

democratic experience, or some other inhibiting factor are destined to remain politically unincorporated? With the change in migration flows, pre- and post-1965, there is much concern over the ability of today’s immigrants to assimilate. Some scholars have found that certain groups appear much more likely to catch up with the native-born while other groups fall behind and stay so across multiple generations, leading to an immigrant underclass (Borjas, 1998). This finding lends support for theories of segmented assimilation (Alba & Nee, 1999; Portes, 1995b; Zhou, 1999). Others (Alba et al., 2001), in contrast, find that given enough time, immigrants will become economically incorporated, in keeping with Gordon’s theory of straight-line assimilation. Still others find a mix of results, with length of exposure increasing incorporation for some immigrant groups, but not for others (Hirschman, 2001). Will a political underclass develop, as some contend an economic underclass has, or given enough time, will all immigrants become politically incorporated? I have found length of residence to be one of the most consistently positive predictors of both naturalizing and voting, supporting the hypothesis. However, length of time in the United States does not override all other factors. In fact, country of origin is one of the biggest predictors of naturalizing and voting for multiple immigrant groups, net of other characteristics. This finding suggests that groups become incorporated at different rates from one another, showing a more segmented pattern. It is especially important to note here that the “oldstock” immigrant groups, such as Britons, Italians, and Canadians, are not necessarily associated with the highest rates of naturalizing. In point of fact, Canadians and Britons have some of the lowest naturalization rates as compared to the other groups under study. This suggests that while segmented assimilation theory may have found some support in the political realm, it is not necessarily the result of changes in migration flows following the 1965 immigration act. Naturalizing and Voting as Two Distinct Processes The findings throughout all four empirical chapters strongly suggest that while naturalizing and voting are two possible indicators of political incorporation, they remain distinct processes with diverse influences. As I have said throughout the preceding chapters, the

186

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

benefits of citizenship are far more immediate and tangible than those gained from voting. While citizenship provides political, legal, and economic incentives (Johnson et al., 1999), voting does little more than offer an individual with psychic satisfaction for having participated in the democratic process. As a result, an individual who naturalizes may be doing so for a host of different reasons. Though citizenship has come to be viewed as the indicator of political incorporation (Rumbaut, 1999), the reality may be that it is a status acquired for economic or legal benefits. The differing nature of the two processes manifests itself in various quantitative findings. In Chapter 3, which focused on individual-level factors, education appeared to have distinct relationships with naturalizing and voting. Greater levels of education encouraged both forms of incorporation. However, naturalization was best predicted by the absence of education. Having less than a high-school degree was most frequently associated with failing to naturalize. In contrast, the presence of higher education was the stronger predictor of voting. This educational finding suggests that having a high-school degree is enough education for someone to acquire citizenship, but it is frequently greater levels of education that are necessary to get people to vote. The distinction between the two processes is further amplified in Chapter 6, which explored the effect of country of origin characteristics on political integration. The level of oppression in the country of origin has a positive and significant relationship with naturalizing, in keeping with previous research (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994). In contrast, the relationship changes direction in the voting model. In short, those who come from more oppressive political regimes are more likely to naturalize, while those who come from freer societies are more likely to vote once naturalized. These “contradictory” outcomes suggest that naturalizing and voting may be undertaken for distinct reasons. Individuals from more politically hostile environments may naturalize for security reasons or because of the difficulties associated with reverse migration, perhaps having little to do with a desire to become an active member of the American political system. In fact, the reverse effect that appears in the voting model suggests that immigrants from more oppressive societies have significantly less interest in active and formal political involvement than do their counterparts from more democratic societies.

A Look Back, A Look Forward

187

The status of citizenship is a necessary first step towards other formal types of political participation, but because of the many additional benefits it provides, it is not necessarily an assurance of greater political activity. Voting, in contrast, is in and of itself a political act and shows that an immigrant has moved from a potential participant into an actual one. Voting may indicate the internalization of democratic values to a far greater extent than naturalizing alone. Finally, the difference in the two processes is illustrated in the respective amounts of variance explained by the models. The preceding models predicting citizenship explain over 40% of the variability. In contrast, less than 25% of voting behavior is accounted for. Because the benefits of voting are far less concrete and individual, voter turnout may be much more affected by targeted mobilization efforts. Though individual-level factors such as education and income are important predictors of voting, group and community factors may be more important motivations in the voting process. The weakness of the available community and social network measurements may be failing to tap into the most important predictors of voter turnout. Limitations The findings from this study, while contributing to the literature on immigrant political incorporation, have limitations. Immigration studies, as is true of most social science studies, are frequently plagued by inadequate data sources. This study is no different. Because the data used are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, I am able to say little about causality. Though I have posited what the mechanisms are between various independent variables and the outcomes of naturalizing and voting, the reality is that the direction of causality is unknown. For example, higher levels of income and education are associated with a greater propensity to naturalize and vote. Previous scholars (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996) have argued that these human capital factors increase the knowledge, ability, and interest necessary for political incorporation. I have followed their line of thinking. In actuality, citizenship acquisition could precede increased income and education, and actually be the cause of it. We know that non-citizens have a harder time getting certain jobs, as well as gaining credit and home and educational loans. As a result, immigrants could be naturalizing and then gaining education or income by accessing the

188

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

benefits of the citizenship status they have acquired. Though unlikely, it is not a scenario that can be discounted without a systematic analysis. This study is further limited by the measurements available in the data. Family and community characteristics are particularly wanting. Ideally I would have more detailed information on family structure, including greater information on the presence of children and more detailed information on the spouse. Information on ecological characteristics are even more limited. I have tried to compensate for the dearth of these data by supplementing the CPS with information from other sources. At best, I have been able to find rough proxies for many measurements of social networks, community characteristics, and social integration. Finally, this study is limited by its methodology. The tremendous benefit of large-scale quantitative data analysis is the ability to examine large numbers of people in an effort to identify patterns and draw generalizable conclusions. The data and methods used in this book have allowed me to do just that—an essential step in better understanding a field that has received limited attention. The downside to this methodology is the inability to clearly identify mechanisms. Qualitative work, while much more limited in scope and therefore comparability and generalizability, allows researchers to more fully identify the mechanisms mediating between independent variables and their effect on particular outcomes. A LOOK FORWARD Future Research Both the findings and the limitations from this book suggest many areas for future research. The following suggestions just begin to touch on the many directions in which future research might go to allow us to better understand the field of political incorporation. First and foremost, future analyses would benefit from data sets with over samples of immigrants from various countries of origin. Throughout this book I have been limited in my analysis by the small number of cases for many of the immigrant groups under study. I have repeatedly done country specific analyses on Mexican immigrants, largely as a result of their larger presence in the data. Ideally, scholars would be able to systematically explore the influence of factors such as marital structure or area of residence on many immigrant groups.

A Look Back, A Look Forward

189

Unfortunately the samples of many of the immigrant groups included in this book are simply too small, disallowing the use of such interactions. The data, and thus analysis, could be also improved by the inclusion of additional individual and social network measurements that are not currently available. At the individual-level, including questions on additional sorts of political participation would allow researchers to see whether immigrants are becoming politically incorporated in other ways. This study has only examined citizenship and voting, the two most formal methods of political incorporation. By asking additional questions around political participation, one could see whether individuals are politically active in other ways, both formal and informal. Questions that ask about involvement in political campaigns, the signing of petitions, or involvement in strikes are just a few examples. The inclusion of these additional measures would also allow us to deal, in part, with the issue of selectivity in political incorporation. Those who are not eligible to naturalize, due to legal status or length of residency, or those who have chosen not to become citizens, may very well influence the American political system through less formal means. Additional social network measurements could also be of tremendous use. The measurements I have used to gauge these factors are the result of merging multiple data sets, and even then, are exceedingly weak proxies for ecological factors. Information on a respondent’s friends, neighbors, and work associates would go far in measuring the composition of an individual’s social networks. Who does an individual cite as his or her closest friend? Are they foreign or native-born? Merging the 2000 U.S. Census with the CPS, one might better examine the effect of community on political incorporation. What effect do ethnic concentrations within specific MSAs have on various types of political activity? In this study, I have used the 1990 U.S. Census to explore the effect of the rate of foreign-born residents on individual political integration. A better measure of political mobilization might be ethnic concentrations. By disaggregating by ethnic group, as is now possible with the U.S. Census, one could examine whether ethnic-specific enclaves exist in various MSAs, and if so, what effect they have on individual immigrants from the respective ethnic group.

190

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

Furthermore, it would be of use to have community-level information on political mobilization. How much money did political parties spend on particular towns or cities in an effort to “get out the vote?” What is the racial or ethnic composition of current office holders? Though beyond the scope of this study, these data are likely available from the major political parties. Such additional measurements would be most beneficial if collected at a smaller geographic level than the MSA or state. Perhaps the biggest contribution to our understanding of political incorporation would be the collection and analysis of longitudinal data that follows immigrants from the time of entry into the United States through several decades. By collecting this sort of data, researchers could more accurately identify causal relationships. For example, does increased education encourage political incorporation, or does political incorporation encourage greater education? Further, by using hazards models, one could examine what factors encourage or discourage various types of political activity. Though this sort of data collection requires extensive amounts of time and money, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has occasionally carried out this kind of project, following two immigrant cohorts from previous decades. Their data, while limited in the breadth of measurements, has served as a very useful tool for researchers attempting to understand multiple types of immigrant incorporation. The GSOEP, a German data set, follows individuals over years and years, allowing for this type of longitudinal analysis. An updated and more detailed collection of longitudinal data in the United States would behoove social scientists attempting to understand the processes of integration. The implementation of coordinated qualitative studies, examining multiple immigrant groups in multiple areas of the country, would improve our understanding of the mechanisms at work in political incorporation. Interviews with individual immigrants and community leaders would do much to improve our understanding of political activity within immigrant communities. By studying numerous groups across multiple research sites, all under one umbrella, scholars could more accurately compare qualitative data. These data have, in the past, done much to improve our understanding of the mechanisms at work (Karpathakis, 1999; Light & Bonacich, 1988; Portes, 1987).

A Look Back, A Look Forward

191

Unfortunately, their limited focus on singular groups in a particular location has limited both generalizability and comparability. CONCLUSION This book has focused on whether or not immigrants become politically incorporated into American society, examining what characteristics are associated with naturalizing and voting. Just as important a question to answer is why immigrants choose to naturalize or vote. Though there is no definitive answer resulting from this project, the findings suggest multiple reasons for both forms of political incorporation. Some immigrants appear to naturalize for political reasons. They come from repressive societies and migrate to the United States seeking freedom of some sort. Naturalizing is both a method of legal protection and psychologically, a fresh start. Others seem to naturalize to gain the valuable economic benefits associated with citizenship. Social welfare benefits, such as food stamps and cash assistance, have largely been limited to U.S. citizens, creating a powerful economic motivation. Finding that Britons of lower socio-economic status are more likely to naturalize than their wealthier and better-educated counterparts suggest such motivations are at work. Still others become Americans in order to help relatives migrate to the United States, an incentive put in place with the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act. Naturalizing allows for greater involvement in democratic society, and some immigrants surely acquire citizenship in order to vote. In all likelihood, some combination of factors is at work for most people who become citizens. Sometimes factors that suggest greater integration, such as higher levels of education and income, encourage naturalizing. Sometimes factors that show greater differences between immigrants and the American-born, such as the political and economic situations in the country of origin, promote citizenship acquisition. The reasons for voting are less obvious and tangible. The United States neither forces voter participation nor offers strong incentives for it. People vote for psychological satisfaction and to help their candidates of choice. They vote to influence foreign-policy towards their country of origin. People vote as a result of peer pressure and because it is the “right thing to do.” Generally, I have found that characteristics suggesting greater levels of similarity between

192

From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen

immigrants, and the native-born and the host society—heightened levels of income and education, migrating from a democratic society or from a country where English is an official language—encourage voting. This book has enhanced our understanding of what factors encourage and discourage both forms of political incorporation. Ideally, future research will take the next step, getting inside the numbers, to better understand why immigrants choose to become American.

Supplemental Tables

193

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Marital Status, N=17,019 Model 1

NATIVITY

AGE

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

CHINA

PHIL

USSR

ITALY

BRIT

1.01 *

CUBA

NA

NA

2.93

***

3.44

***

0.62

***

1.04

0.83

(a)

0.47

***

0.61

***

1.12

1.00

MEXICO

0.34

***

NA

NA

1.18

(a)

0.21

***

0.36

*** 0.28

***

0.16

***

0.21

***

0.38 *** 1.06

FEMALE

1.01

CANADA

0.29

***

0.85

(a)

NA

NA

0.18

***

0.30

*** 0.24

***

0.14

***

0.18

***

0.33 *** 0.90

LESSHS

0.53 *** SE ASIA

1.61

***

4.70

***

5.53

***

NA

NA

1.68

*** 1.33

**

0.75

***

0.98

MOREHS

1.38 *** INDIA

0.96

2.80

***

3.30

***

0.60

***

NA

NA 0.80

*

0.45

***

0.58

***

1.07

POVERTY

0.81 *** CHINA

1.20

(a)

3.52

***

4.15

***

0.75

**

1.26

NA

NA

0.56

***

0.73

**

1.35

WORK

1.18 *** PHIL

2.15

***

6.28

***

7.39

***

1.34

***

2.24

*** 1.78

***

NA

NA

1.31

*

2.40 *** 6.67 ***

ELIGTIME

1.10 *** USSR

1.64

***

4.81

***

5.66

***

1.02

1.71

*** 1.36

**

0.77

*

NA

NA

1.84 *** 5.10 ***

YEAR96

1.15 *

0.89

2.61

***

3.08

***

0.56

***

0.93

0.74

**

0.42

***

0.54

***

NA

YEAR98

1.43 *** BRIT

1.15

***

0.34

*** 0.27

***

0.15

***

0.20

***

0.36 *** NA

YEAR00

1.37 ***

AGE

2

ITALY

(REFERENCE GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE)

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.65 **

UNMARRIED

0.92 *

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R

17,035.15

2

MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

.31 2

.41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

0.32

***

0.94

1.11

*

3.11 ***

1.80 *** 4.99 *** 2.98 *** **

3.74 ***

NA 2.78 *** NA

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Marital Status, N=17,019 Model 2

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

AGE

1.01 *

CUBA

NA

NA

2.92

***

3.44

***

0.62

***

1.05

AGE2

1.00

MEXICO

0.34

***

NA

NA

1.18

(a)

0.21

***

0.36

FEMALE

0.98

CANADA

0.29

***

0.85

(a)

NA

NA

0.18

***

0.30

LESSHS

0.53 ***

SE ASIA

1.61

***

4.70

***

5.53

***

NA

NA

1.68

MOREHS

1.38 ***

INDIA

0.96

2.80

***

3.29

***

0.60

***

NA

POVERTY

0.80 ***

CHINA

1.20

(a)

3.51

***

4.13

***

0.75

**

WORK

1.18 ***

PHIL

2.15

***

6.27

***

7.38

***

1.33

***

ELIGTIME

1.10 ***

USSR

1.64

YEAR96

1.15 **

ITALY

0.89

YEAR98

1.43 ***

BRIT

0.32

YEAR00

1.37 ***

(REFERENCE GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE)

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.53 ***

UNMARRIED

0.89 (a)

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT

1.58 (a)

FEMALE*UNMARRIED

1.06

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD

17,031.92

PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

.31 2

.41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

***

USSR

ITALY

BRIT

(a)

0.47

***

0.61

***

1.12

0.29

***

0.16

***

0.21

***

0.38

***

0.24

***

0.14

***

0.18

***

***

1.34

**

0.75

***

0.98

NA

0.80

*

0.45

***

0.58

***

1.07

1.26

*

NA

NA

0.56

***

0.73

**

1.34

**

3.73

***

***

2.24

***

1.79

***

NA

NA

1.31

*

2.40

***

6.67

***

1.72

***

4.80

***

5.65

***

1.02

***

3.08

***

0.56

***

0.93

0.20

***

0.34

1.11

PHIL

0.83

2.61 0.94

CHINA

***

***

3.11 ***

***

1.06

0.33

***

0.90

1.80

***

5.00

***

2.97

***

1.37

**

0.77

*

NA

NA

1.84

***

5.11

***

0.74

**

0.42

***

0.54

***

NA

NA

2.78

***

0.27

***

0.15

***

0.20

***

0.36

***

NA

NA

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Marital Status, N=6,641 Model 1

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

CHINA

PHIL

USSR

AGE 2 AGE

1.04 *** CUBA

NA

NA

1.51 ***

1.21

2.07

***

1.61

*** 2.68

***

1.49

1.00 *** MEXICO

0.66

***

NA

NA

0.80

(a) 1.37

**

1.07

1.78

***

0.99

FEMALE

0.97

0.83

1.25

(a)

NA

NA 1.71

***

1.33

(a)

2.23

***

1.23

LESSHS

0.68 *** SE ASIA

0.48

***

0.73

**

0.58 *** NA

NA

0.78

(a)

1.80

(a)

0.72

MOREHS

1.97 *** INDIA

0.62

***

0.94

0.75

(a) 1.29

(a)

NA

NA 1.67

***

0.93

***

NA

NA

0.56

***

0.74

(a)

0.58

1.80

***

NA

NA

1.34

*

1.04

*

POVERTY

0.79

WORK

1.05

CANADA

** CHINA PHIL

0.81

1.34

(a)

0.75

NA

NA

0.78

(a)

0.64

1.04

1.73

***

0.96

1.29

(a)

NA

NA

0.83

1.61

**

1.25

2.09

***

1.16

1.56

**

1.21

0.78

(a)

1.18

0.94

1.67 ***

***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

0.62

*

(a) 1.39

0.60 *** 1.04 *

**

0.78

*

0.83

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys.

0.97

1.33

YEAR00

Numbers reported are odds-ratios.

1.24

1.06

0.60

YEAR98

.24

*

1.08

0.78

.18

*

0.75

**

0.76

352,665.46

1.29

(a)

0.97

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

***

0.97

0.45 *** 0.77

***

*

1.66

**

(a)

0.85

0.81

***

0.63

(a)

1.28

0.56 ***

0.50

0.79 ***

***

1.02

0.64

UNMARRIED

1.03

***

1.03 *** USSR

SPOUSE ABSENT

1.55

*

***

1.58 *** ITALY

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE)

***

1.32

0.37

YEAR96

BRIT

2.00

BRIT

0.67

ELIGTIME

*

***

ITALY

***

0.48 *** 0.86

NA

** NA

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.3: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among the Foreign-Born and Native-Born by Marital Status, N=303,643 Variables AGE 2 AGE ELIGTIME

Model 1

Model 2

1.05 ***

NA

1.00 ***

NA

NA

1.04 ***

Model 3 NA NA 1.04 ***

FEMALE

1.09 ***

1.09 ***

1.11 ***

LESS HS

0.47 ***

0.45 ***

0.45 ***

MORE HS

2.4 ***

2.39 ***

2.39 ***

POVERTY

0.76 ***

0.76 ***

0.76 ***

WORK

1.14 ***

1.25 ***

1.25 ***

YEAR 96

1.67 ***

1.67 ***

1.67 ***

YEAR 98

0.85 ***

0.86 ***

0.86 ***

YEAR 00

1.91 ***

1.91 ***

1.91 ***

MEXICO

0.72 ***

0.97

0.97

CUBA

0.94

1.67 ***

1.67 ***

CANADA

0.89

1.22 *

1.22 *

SE ASIA

0.37 ***

0.56 ***

0.57 ***

INDIA

0.42 ***

0.71 **

0.71 **

CHINA

0.29 ***

0.55 ***

0.55 ***

PHIL

0.49 ***

0.85 *

0.85 *

USSR

0.39 ***

0.73 **

0.74 **

ITALY

0.77 **

1.20 *

1.20 *

BRIT

0.76 *

1.15

1.15

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT

0.62 ***

0.59 ***

0.58 ***

UNMARRIED

0.63 ***

0.58 ***

0.59 ***

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT

NA

NA

1.03

FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA

NA

0.96 *

352,665.46

353,924.19

353,918.40

.18

.17

.17

.24

.23

.23

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R Numbers reported are odds-ratios.

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

197

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.4: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status N=7,373

Variables

Model 1

Model 2

AGE

1.01

1.01

AGE2

1.00

1.00

FEMALE

1.12 (a)

1.08

LESSHS MOREHS POVERTY

0.56 *** 1.39 *** 0.76 ***

0.56 *** 1.40 *** 0.76 ***

WORK

1.26 **

1.26 **

ELIGTIME YEAR96 YEAR98

1.08 *** 1.20 (a) 1.63 ***

1.08 *** 1.20 (a) 1.63 ***

YEAR00

1.67 ***

1.66 ***

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT UNMARRIED

0.48 ** 0.89

0.34 *** 0.86

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA NA

2.42 * 1.07

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD

6,638.26

6,634.40

PSEUDO R2

.15

.15

MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

.22

.23

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

198

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 4.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Mexican Immigrants by Marital Status N=1,492

Variables

Model 1

Model 2

AGE

1.06 ***

1.06

AGE2

1.00 ***

1.00

FEMALE

1.01

1.00

LESSHS

0.60 ***

0.60 ***

MOREHS

1.69 **

1.68 **

POVERTY

0.72 **

0.72 *

WORK

0.95

0.94

ELIGTIME

1.02 **

1.02 **

YEAR96

2.16 ***

2.17 ***

YEAR98

1.06

1.06

YEAR00

1.75 **

1.77 ***

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT

0.21 *

0.48

UNMARRIED

0.69 **

0.66 *

FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT

NA

0.19

FEMALE*UNMARRIED

NA

1.07

1,771.78

1,770.00

.15

.15

.20

.20

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

199

TABLE 4.6: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Presence of Children, N=4,594 Model 1 AGE 2 AGE FEMALE LESSHS MOREHS POVERTY WORK ELIGTIME

NATIVITY

1.01 1.00 1.06 0.60 1.47 0.85 1.16 1.09

* CUBA MEXICO

*** *** (a) (a) ***

(REF GROUP: NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

1.21 4,688.47 .30 .40

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

*

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA 1.31

CHINA 1.12

PHIL 0.67

*

USSR

NA NA 3.20

*** 4.51 *** 0.82

0.31 *** NA

NA

1.41

(a)

0.26

*** 0.41 *** 0.35

*** 0.21 *** 0.23

0.73 ***

NA

NA 0.18

*** 0.29 *** 0.25

*** 0.15 *** 0.16

***

CANADA

0.22 *** 0.71

(a)

SE ASIA

1.21

3.89

*** 5.47 ***

INDIA

0.77

2.45

*** 3.45 *** 0.63

CHINA

0.89

2.85

*** 4.01 *** 0.74

1.17

PHIL

1.49

4.76

*** 6.69 *** 1.23

1.94 *** 1.67

**

NA NA 1.08

*

0.93

*

NA

NA 1.59 *

1.38

4.41

*** 6.20 *** 1.13

1.80

ITALY

0.96

3.08

*** 4.33 *** 0.79

1.26

BRIT

0.26 *** 0.85

0.22

1.36

0.82

NA NA 0.86

USSR

1.19

*

NA **

1.54

NA 0.60

1.04

0.88

0.52 *** 0.56 **

0.65 NA

1.08

0.65 (a) 0.70

*** 0.35 *** 0.30

*** 0.18 *** 0.19

ITALY

** *

***

3.79 ***

0.33 *** 1.18 0.23 *** 0.84 1.26

4.60 ***

0.80

2.90 ***

0.93 1.54

NA

BRIT

3.38 *** (a)

5.63 ***

1.43

5.22 ***

NA

NA 3.65 ***

0.27 ***

NA NA

TABLE 4.6: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Presence of Children, N=4,594 Model 2

NATIVITY

AGE AGE2 FEMALE LESSHS MOREHS POVERTY WORK ELIGTIME

1.01 1.00 1.07 0.60 1.47 0.87 1.18 1.09

(REF GROUP: NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN

1.11

*** *** (a) ***

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT 0.80 UNMARRIED 0.83 * -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

4,683.86 .30 .40

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

CUBA MEXICO CANADA SE ASIA INDIA CHINA PHIL USSR ITALY BRIT

CUBA NA 0.31 0.22 1.21 0.75 0.88 1.48 1.33 0.93 0.26

NA *** ***

*

***

MEXICO

CANADA

3.23 NA 0.70 3.92 2.43 2.83 4.77 4.30 3.01 0.84

4.59 1.42 NA 5.57 3.45 4.02 6.77 6.10 4.28 1.20

*** NA * *** *** *** *** *** ***

*** * NA *** *** *** *** *** ***

SE ASIA 0.82 0.26 0.18 NA 0.62 0.72 1.22 1.10 0.77 0.22

INDIA

1.33 0.41 0.29 1.61 NA 1.16 1.96 1.77 1.24 *** 0.35

*** *** NA * (a)

CHINA

PHIL

USSR

1.14 0.68 * 0.75 0.35 *** 0.21 *** 0.23 0.25 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 1.39 (a) 0.82 0.91 0.86 0.51 *** 0.57 NA NA 0.59 ** 0.66 *** 1.69 ** NA NA 1.11 ** 1.52 * 0.90 NA 1.07 0.63 (a) 0.70 *** 0.30 *** 0.18 *** 0.20

*** *** * NA

*** *** ** * NA ***

ITALY 1.07 0.33 0.23 1.30 0.81 0.94 1.58 1.43 NA 0.28

BRIT

3.83 *** 1.19 *** 0.84 4.65 2.88 3.35 (a) 5.66 5.10 NA 3.57 *** NA

***

*** *** *** *** *** *** NA

TABLE 4.6: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition by Presence of Children, N=4,594 Model 3

NATIVITY

AGE AGE2 FEMALE LESSHS MOREHS POVERTY WORK ELIGTIME

1.01 1.00 0.98 0.60 1.47 0.86 1.17 1.09

(REF GROUP: NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN

1.09

*** *** (a) (a) ***

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT 0.45 * UNMARRIED 0.74 * FEMALE*SPOUSE ABSENT 3.27 * FEMALE*UNMARRIED 1.21 -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

4,676.39 .30 .40

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

CUBA MEXICO CANADA SE ASIA INDIA CHINA PHIL USSR ITALY BRIT

CUBA NA 0.31 0.22 1.24 0.75 0.86 1.47 1.33 0.94 0.26

NA *** ***

*

***

MEXICO

CANADA

3.22 NA 0.70 4.00 2.42 2.78 4.73 4.29 3.02 0.84

4.60 1.43 NA 5.71 3.46 3.97 6.76 6.13 4.31 1.20

*** NA * *** *** *** *** *** ***

*** * NA *** *** *** *** *** ***

SE ASIA 0.81 0.25 0.18 NA 0.61 0.70 1.18 1.07 0.76 0.21

INDIA

1.33 0.41 0.29 1.65 NA 1.15 1.96 1.77 1.25 *** 0.35

*** *** NA ** (a)

CHINA

PHIL

USSR

1.16 0.68 * 0.75 0.36 *** 0.21 *** 0.23 0.25 *** 0.15 *** 0.16 1.44 (a) 0.85 0.93 0.87 0.51 *** 0.56 NA NA 0.59 ** 0.65 *** 1.70 ** NA NA 1.10 ** 1.54 * 0.91 NA 1.09 0.64 (a) 0.70 *** 0.30 *** 0.18 *** 0.20

*** *** ** NA

*** *** ** * NA ***

ITALY 1.07 0.33 0.23 1.33 0.80 0.92 1.57 1.42 NA 0.28

BRIT

3.83 *** 1.19 *** 0.83 4.76 2.88 3.31 (a) 5.63 5.11 NA 3.59 *** NA

***

*** *** *** *** *** *** NA

TABLE 4.7: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Presence of Children, N=1,803 Model 1

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

CHINA

USSR

1.05 *** CUBA

NA

NA

1.78

**

1.35

1.48

2.12

2.98

***

1.91

1.41

1.01

1.00 *** MEXICO

0.56

**

NA

NA

0.76

0.83

1.18

1.68

*

1.07

1.16

0.79

0.57

FEMALE

0.85

0.74

NA

NA 1.10

1.57

2.22

**

1.42

1.54

1.05

0.75

1.42

2.02

*

NA

NA 1.42

0.71

NA

NA (a)

LESSHS

0.67 ** SE ASIA

0.68

**

1.20

0.91

NA

MOREHS

1.94 *** INDIA

0.48

***

0.85

0.64

0.70

POVERTY

0.73

* CHINA

0.34

***

0.60

WORK

0.93

PHIL

0.53

**

0.94

0.71

0.78

1.11

1.57

ELIGTIME

1.02 ** USSR

0.48

**

0.86

0.65

0.72

1.02

1.44

0.95

1.05

1.49

2.11

1.33

1.46

2.08

2.95

(REF GROUP:NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

0.99 2,203.18 .13 .17

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

ITALY

0.71

1.26

BRIT

0.99

1.76

*

*

0.45

**

0.50

NA *

*

2.07

**

BRIT

AGE2

1.32

**

ITALY

AGE

CANADA

**

PHIL

*

1.29

1.40

0.95

0.68

0.91

0.98

0.67

0.48

*

0.47

0.34

***

0.64

(a)

0.69

NA

NA

**

1.09

0.74

0.53

*

0.92

NA

NA 0.68

0.49

*

**

1.35

1.47

NA

***

1.88

*

2.04

*

1.39

NA

0.72 NA

NA

TABLE 4.7: The Odds of Voter Turnout by Presence of Children, N=1,803 Model 2 AGE AGE2

NATIVITY

FEMALE LESSHS MOREHS POVERTY WORK ELIGTIME

1.04 1.00 0.90 0.66 1.94 0.77 0.95 1.02

(REF GROUP:NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN

0.85

*** CUBA ** MEXICO CANADA ** SE ASIA *** INDIA (a) CHINA PHIL ** USSR ITALY BRIT

(REF GROUP:MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT 0.63 ** UNMARRIED 0.68 -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

2,193.00 .13 .18

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 2000 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

CUBA

MEXICO

NA NA 1.85 0.54 ** NA 0.72 1.32 0.65 1.20 0.46 ** 0.84 0.32 *** 0.59 0.51 ** 0.94 0.45 ** 0.83 0.67 1.24 0.97 1.78

CANADA SE ASIA

INDIA

CHINA

** 1.40 1.54 2.20 ** 3.13 *** NA 0.76 0.83 1.19 1.70 * NA NA 1.10 1.57 2.25 ** 0.91 NA NA 1.43 2.04 * 0.64 0.70 NA NA 1.43 * 0.45 ** 0.49 * 0.70 NA NA 0.71 0.78 1.12 1.60 (a) 0.63 0.69 0.99 1.41 0.94 1.03 1.48 2.11 ** * 1.35 1.48 2.12 * 3.02 ***

PHIL 1.97 ** 1.06 1.41 1.28 0.90 0.63 (a) NA NA 0.88 1.32 1.90 *

USSR

ITALY

2.23 ** 1.48 1.21 0.80 1.60 1.06 1.45 0.97 1.01 0.68 0.71 0.47 * 1.13 0.76 NA NA 0.67 1.50 NA NA 2.15 * 1.43

BRIT 1.04 0.56 * 0.74 0.68 0.47 * 0.33 *** 0.53 * 0.47 * 0.70 NA NA

Table 4.8: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among the Foreign-Born and Native-Born by Presence of Children, N=70,317 Variables

Model 1

AGE 2

AGE

ELIGTIME

Model 2

Model 3

1.05 ***

1.05

***

NA

1.00 ***

1.00

***

NA

NA

NA

Model 4 NA NA

1.04 ***

1.04 ***

FEMALE

1.12 ***

1.17

***

1.11 ***

1.17 ***

LESS HS

0.45 ***

0.46

***

0.43 ***

0.45 ***

MORE HS

2.69 ***

2.70

***

2.67 ***

2.69 ***

POVERTY

0.72 ***

0.78

***

0.72 ***

0.78 ***

WORK

1.19 ***

1.20

***

1.31 ***

1.27 ***

MEXICO

0.67 ***

0.64

***

0.93

0.84

CUBA

1.02

1.05

1.97 ***

1.84 ***

CANADA

0.79

0.99

0.94

SE ASIA

0.60

INDIA CHINA

0.77 *

(a)

0.58

**

1.02

0.35 ***

0.34

***

0.65

*

0.90 0.56

0.30 ***

0.28

***

0.57

**

0.49 ***

**

PHIL

0.40 ***

0.40

***

0.73

*

0.66

**

USSR

0.38 ***

0.36

***

0.72

(a)

0.62

**

ITALY

0.93

0.88

1.37

1.23

BRIT

0.95

0.95

1.28

1.24

1.14 ***

0.91

1.23 ***

0.93 ***

(REF GROUP: NO CHILDREN) CHILDREN

***

(REF GROUP: MARRIED, RESIDING W/ SPOUSE) SPOUSE ABSENT

NA

0.68

***

NA

0.66 ***

UNMARRIED

NA

0.57

***

NA

0.54 ***

77,166.74

76,414.99

77,542.95

76,592.38

.15

.15

.14

.15

.20

.22

.20

.21

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2

PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 2000 Current Population Survey. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

205

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 5.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics, N=17,019 VARIABLES

NATIVITY

AGE

CUBA

MEXICO

CANADA

SE ASIA

INDIA

1.01 *

CUBA

NA

NA

3.47

***

4.33

***

0.74

**

1.21

1.00

MEXICO

0.29

***

NA

NA

1.25

*

0.21

***

0.35

FEMALE

1.00

CANADA

0.23

***

0.80

*

NA

NA

0.17

***

0.28

LESSHS

0.53 ***

SE ASIA

1.36

**

4.72

***

5.89

***

NA

NA

1.65

MOREHS

1.38 ***

INDIA

0.83

2.86

***

3.57

***

0.61

***

NA

POVERTY

0.80 ***

CHINA

1.07

3.70

***

4.62

***

0.78

*

1.29

WORK

1.17 ***

PHIL

1.84

*** 6.39

***

7.98

***

1.36

***

ELIGTIME

1.10 ***

USSR

1.46

**

5.08

***

6.34

***

1.08

YEAR96

1.15 *

ITALY

0.77

*

2.68

***

3.34

***

0.57

***

0.94

YEAR98

1.43 ***

BRIT

0.27

0.19

***

0.32

YEAR00

1.37 ***

2

AGE

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.65 **

UNMARRIED

0.93 (a)

POPULATION SIZE (LOG)

1.03

METROPOLITAN STATUS

0.71 (a)

PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN

0.99 **

WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY

0.99 (a)

WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY

1.01 (a)

WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.00

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R

17,003.77

2

MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

*** 0.92

.31 2

.41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and the 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

1.15

CHINA 0.94

***

PHIL

USSR

ITALY

0.54

***

0.68

**

1.30

0.16

***

0.20

***

0.37 *** 1.09

***

0.16

***

***

0.93

0.27

***

***

0.22

***

0.13

***

1.28

*

0.74

NA

0.77

*

0.45

***

0.56

***

1.07

*

NA

NA

0.58

***

0.73

**

1.38

*

BRIT 3.78

***

0.30 *** 0.87 1.76 *** 5.14 **

***

3.12

***

4.03

*** ***

2.23

***

1.73

***

NA

NA

1.26

*

2.39 *** 6.97

1.77

***

1.37

**

0.80

*

NA

NA

1.90 *** 5.54

***

0.72

**

0.42

***

0.53

***

NA

***

0.25

***

0.14

***

0.18

***

0.34 ***

***

NA 2.92 NA

NA

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 5.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Immigrants in Communities with Selected Characteristics, N=6,641 VARIABLES

NATIVITY

CUBA

MEXICO CANADA

AGE AGE2

1.04 *** CUBA 1.00 *** MEXICO

0.65

FEMALE

0.98

0.87

LESSHS

0.68 *** SE ASIA

0.48 *** 0.73

MOREHS

1.96 *** INDIA

0.67

POVERTY

0.78 **

CHINA

WORK

1.06

PHIL

ELIGTIME YEAR96

CANADA

NA NA 1.53 **

** 1.51 *

INDIA

2.08

***

1.49

*

1.36

**

0.98

NA NA

1.81

***

1.30

NA NA 0.75 1.33

SE ASIA

** 0.55 ***

CHINA *

PHIL

***

1.52 ***

1.87 *** 1.39

1.73

***

1.00

1.22

(a)

2.30

***

1.32

*

1.62

**

0.90

0.67

1.25

0.93

NA

NA

0.72

*

1.27

(a)

0.73

*

NA

NA

1.77

***

1.02

0.38 *** 0.58 *** 0.44 ***

***

0.66

0.77

(a)

ITALY

2.64

1.39

* 1.02

USSR

**

1.21

0.91

0.79

1.21

1.05 **

0.58

(a) ***

0.81

0.79

(a)

0.57

NA

NA

0.58 ***

0.71

0.53 *** 0.46

***

** 1.01

0.76

*

1.37

**

0.98

1.74

***

NA NA

1.23

0.92

0.80

(a)

1.03 *** USSR

0.54 *** 0.82

0.62

**

1.12

0.80

1.42

*

0.82

NA

NA 0.75

*

0.65

**

1.59 *** ITALY

0.72

* 1.10

0.83

1.50

**

1.07

1.90

***

1.09

1.34

*

NA

NA

0.87

YEAR98

0.83 *

0.83

1.26

(a) 0.95

1.72

***

1.23

2.18

***

1.25

1.54

**

1.15

YEAR00

1.68 ***

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.63 *

UNMARRIED

0.78 ***

POPULATION SIZE (LOG)

0.97

METROPOLITAN STATUS

1.44

PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN

1.01 **

WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY

0.99 *

WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY

1.00

WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.01 (a)

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

BRIT

8,113.51 0.15 0.20

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and the 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

(a)

*

*

BRIT

NA

NA

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 5.3: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Mexican Immigrants in Communities with Selected Traits, N=7,373 VARIABLES AGE 2 AGE

1.01 (a)

FEMALE

1.12 (a)

LESSHS

0.55 ***

1.00

MOREHS

1.40 ***

POVERTY

0.76 ***

WORK

1.23 **

ELIGTIME

1.08 ***

YEAR96

1.22 *

YEAR98

1.66 ***

YEAR00

1.67 ***

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.47 ***

UNMARRIED

0.91

POPULATION SIZE (LOG)

1.05

METROPOLITAN STATUS

0.56 *

PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN

0.98 ***

WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY

1.00

WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY

1.00

WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.00

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

6,575.37 0.15 0.24

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and the 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

208

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 5.4: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Mexican Immigrants in Communties with Selected Traits, N=1,492 VARIABLES AGE 2 AGE

1.00 ***

1.06 ***

FEMALE

1.02

LESSHS

0.61 ***

MOREHS

1.72 **

POVERTY

0.75 *

WORK

0.96

ELIGTIME

1.02 **

YEAR96

2.09 ***

YEAR98

1.01

YEAR00

1.68 **

SPOUSE ABSENT

0.21 *

UNMARRIED

0.69 **

POPULATION SIZE (LOG)

0.92

METROPOLITAN STATUS

0.94

PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN

1.01

WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY

0.99

WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY

1.02

WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.02

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 2 PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R

1,748.05 0.16 0.22

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys and the 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

209

TABLE 5.5: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Foreign-Born and Native-Born in Communities with Selected Traits, N=303,647 Variables

Model 1

Model 2

AGE

1.05

***

NA

NA

AGE2 ELIGTIME FEMALE LESS HS MORE HS POVERTY WORK YEAR 96 YEAR 98

1.00 NA 1.09 0.47 2.40 0.76 1.15 1.67 0.86

*** NA *** *** *** *** *** *** ***

NA 1.04 1.09 0.45 2.38 0.76 1.25 1.67 0.86

NA *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***

YEAR 00 SPOUSE ABSENT UNMARRIED MEXICO CUBA CANADA SE ASIA INDIA CHINA PHIL USSR ITALY BRIT

1.92 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.76 0.88 0.35 0.40 0.25 0.46 0.34 0.72 0.74

*** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** **

1.92 0.59 0.57 0.91 1.32 1.21 0.54 0.67 0.48 0.79 0.65 1.11 1.12

*** *** *** (a) ** * *** *** *** *** ***

POPULATION SIZE (LOG) METROPOLITAN STATUS PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.00

*** * *** *** * ***

0.97 0.91 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01

*** * *** *** * ***

-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD

352,292.38

353,528.50

0.18 0.24

0.17 0.23

2

PSEUDO R 2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R Numbers reported are odds-ratios.

Source: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Survey and the 1990 U.S. Census. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

210

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 6.1: The Odds of Citizenship Acquisition Among Immigrants with Various Country of Origin Characteristics, N=17,019 Variables

Model 1

Model 2

AGE AGE2 ELIGTIME FEMALE LESS HS MORE HS POVERTY WORK YEAR 96 YEAR 98 YEAR 00 SPOUSE ABSENT UNMARRIED METROPOLITAN AREA POPULATION SIZE (LOG) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.01 1.00 1.10 1.00 0.51 1.41 0.77 1.15 1.14 1.40 1.35 0.63 0.93 0.79 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99

1.01 1.00 1.10 0.53 0.54 1.29 0.80 1.14 1.14 1.41 1.34 0.52 0.91 0.81 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99

LEVEL OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL OPPRESSION GDP (LOG) ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE CLOSE GEO. PROXIMITY (V. 5000+ MILES) MEDIUM GEO. PROXIMITY (V. 5,000+ MILES) RATIO OF BOYS TO GIRLS IN PRIMARY SCHOOL

1.08 0.62 0.89 0.32 0.77 0.97

EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*UNMARRIED EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*SEPARATED GDP*POVERTY GDP*LESS HS GDP*MORE HS CLOSE GEO. PROX.*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION MEDIUM GEO. PROX*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 17,164.07 0.30 0.41

** *** *** *** *** ** * *** *** ***

**

* (a) *** *** * ***

*** *** *** *** *** ** * *** *** ***

(a)

**

1.08 0.54 *** 0.93 0.63 0.76 0.98 *** 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.14 (a) 1.20 ** 0.87 * 0.76 1.16 17,102.01 0.31 0.41

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Sources: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys, the 1990 U.S. Census, the 1997 Human Development Indicators, the U.S. Census Bureau, the CIA World Fact Book 2002, and the Freedom House Index 2000. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

211

SUPPLEMENT TO TABLE 6.2: The Odds of Voter Turnout Among Immigrants with Various Country of Origin Characteristics, N=6,641 Variables

Model 1

AGE AGE2 ELIGTIME FEMALE LESS HS MORE HS POVERTY WORK YEAR 96 YEAR 98 YEAR 00 SPOUSE ABSENT UNMARRIED METROPOLITAN AREA POPULATION SIZE (LOG) PERCENTAGE FOREIGN BORN WHITE-BLACK DISSIMILARITY WHITE-LATINO DISSIMILARITY WHITE-ASIAN DISSIMILARITY

1.04 1.00 1.03 0.97 0.67 1.95 0.76 1.06 1.58 0.82 1.64 0.63 0.79 1.60 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01

LEVEL OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL OPPRESSION GDP (LOG) ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE CLOSE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY (V. 5,000+ MILES) MEDIUM GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY (V. 5,000+ MILES) RATIO OF BOYS TO GIRLS IN PRIMARY SCHOOL

0.80 0.77 1.27 1.72 1.62 1.00

EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*UNMARRIED EDUCATIONAL RATIO*FEMALE*SEPARATED GDP*POVERTY GDP*LESS HS GDP*MORE HS CLOSE GEO. PROX.*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION MEDIUM GEO. PROX*LEVEL OF OPPRESSION -2 LOG LIKELIHOOD PSEUDO R2 MAX. RESCALED PSEUDO R2

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 8,126.19 0.15 0.20

*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** * ***

*** (a)

*** *** * *** ***

Model 2 1.04 1.00 1.03 1.48 0.70 2.05 0.69 1.07 1.60 0.83 1.67 0.82 0.79 1.52 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01

*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** *

*** *

0.83 ** 1.09 1.49 ** 0.38 0.78 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 ** 1.14 1.11 1.86 * 1.18 8,107.33 0.15 0.20

Numbers reported are odds-ratios. Sources: November 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 Current Population Surveys, the 1990 U.S. Census, the 1997 Human Development Indicators, the U.S. Census Bureau, the CIA World Fact Book 2002, and the Freedom House Index 2000. ***P<.001, **P<.01, *P<.05, (a) P<.1

212

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Yang, P. 1994. "Explaining Immigrant Naturalization." International Migration Review 28(3):449-467. Zhou, M. 1999. "Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation." pp. 196-211 in The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz and J. DeWind. New York: Russell Sage. Zuckerman, A. 1995. "On the Structure of Ethnic Groups: Crisscrossing Ties of Ethnicity, Social Class, and Politics in Europe." pp. 223-266 in Population, Ethnicity, and Nation-Building, edited by C. Goldscheider. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zuckerman, A., L. Kotler-Berkowitz and L. Swaine. 1998. "Anchoring Political Preferences: The Structural Bases of Stable Electoral Decisions and Political Attitudes in Britain." European Journal of Political Research 33(March): 285-321

Index 1965, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 91, 185, 191, 218, 221 1965 Immigration Act, 4, 57 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (see also PRWORA, 1996 Welfare Reform Act, Welfare Reform Act), 14 1996 Welfare Reform Act (see also Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act, Welfare Reform Act), 3, 29 Asian, 7, 9, 15, 30, 33, 85, 132, 142, 214, 219, 222 Asians, 12, 15, 30, 31, 33, 47, 48, 57, 71, 74, 77, 81, 88, 90, 179 assimilation, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 22, 34, 57, 91, 185 Blacks, 31 Britain, 1, 31, 39, 66, 90, 150, 151, 159, 224 Britons, 31, 33, 47, 48, 51, 54, 71, 74, 81, 82, 90, 168, 185, 191, 217 Cambodia, 30, 31 Canada, 1, 12, 31, 39, 63, 66, 90, 150, 151, 159, 172, 184 Canadian, 56, 84, 183, 216 Canadians, 31, 33, 47, 48, 51, 74, 81, 84, 88, 90, 91, 151, 152, 156, 157, 172, 179, 185 Census Bureau, 36

China, 1, 5, 31, 62, 63, 66, 67, 90, 150, 152, 219 Chinese, 31, 33, 47, 48, 54, 64, 65, 71, 74, 81, 88, 90, 151, 152, 179 CIA Factbook, 39 communist, 16, 81, 90 community, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 29, 33, 34, 40, 51, 60, 64, 67, 76, 91, 94, 104, 115, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 158, 161, 163, 165, 174, 178, 187, 188, 190 CPS (see also Current Population Survey), 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 95, 102, 134, 136, 147, 188, 189 Cuba, 1, 5, 31, 55, 66, 76, 90, 151, 152, 157, 158, 172, 220 Cuban, 55, 64, 67, 76, 131, 132, 158, 172, 215, 220, 221 Cubans, 11, 31, 33, 47, 48, 64, 67, 71, 74, 76, 81, 90, 133, 157, 168, 172, 178 cultural assimilation, 8 Current Population Survey (see also CPS), 1, 20, 26 democracies, 6, 16, 76, 153 225

226 democracy, 1, 3, 4, 5, 16, 36, 37, 40, 54, 66, 151, 160, 161, 164, 173, 179 democratic, 4, 5, 7, 16, 37, 53, 55, 60, 63, 66, 67, 74, 81, 122, 151, 153, 161, 164, 168, 171, 176, 181, 184, 186, 191, 192 dissimilarity, 34, 142 documented, 2, 22, 24 Dominicans, 9, 11, 98, 100, 156, 157, 178 English, 6, 7, 11, 12, 29, 39, 40, 58, 61, 78, 81, 100, 122, 150, 158, 159, 160, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180, 184, 192, 217 English language, 12, 39, 158, 159 ethnic enclave, 13, 131 ethnic enclaves, 10, 122, 131, 133, 134 European, 4, 7, 57, 168, 181, 213, 216, 219, 224 family, 3, 11, 13, 16, 17, 21, 24, 29, 33, 40, 51, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 112, 115, 118, 124, 126, 144, 149, 150, 154, 156, 157, 161, 163, 165, 168, 171, 174, 181, 183, 188 Federal Election Commission, 28 FHI (see also Freedom House Index), 36, 37, 43, 164 Filipinos, 14, 31, 33, 47, 48, 54, 71, 74, 78, 81, 151, 168 Freedom House Index (see also FHI), 36, 161

Index gender, 39, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 82, 84, 91, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 150, 155, 156, 163, 171, 183 Gender, ix, 21, 61, 64, 67, 82, 84, 85, 91, 97, 102, 103, 107, 113, 115, 116, 155, 163, 183, 214, 218, 220, 221 Haiti, 55 HDI (see also Human Development Indicators), 37 human capital, 8, 9, 54, 182, 187 Human Development Indicators (see also HDI), 37, 161 Immigration Act of 1965, 3 India, 1, 9, 31, 39, 56, 59, 66, 100, 150, 157, 219 Indians, 9, 31, 33, 47, 48, 84, 88, 91 intermarriage, 8, 11, 12, 13, 57 Irish, 64 Israelis, 64 Italians, 31, 33, 47, 48, 71, 78, 81, 88, 90, 91, 179, 185 Italy, 1, 31, 66 Japan, 9, 219 Koreans, 14, 64, 131, 218 language acquisition, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 61, 158 Laos, 30, 31 Latin America, 4, 65 Latin American, 9, 65, 155 Latino, 7, 15, 16, 28, 32, 33, 62, 85, 103, 117, 215, 222

Index Latinos, 12, 15, 16, 31, 57, 112, 214, 222 Mexican, 9, 10, 24, 27, 28, 47, 62, 65, 82, 100, 102, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 136, 142, 143, 144, 183, 188, 215, 216, 219, 221 Mexican-origin, 9, 102, 111, 112, 136, 142, 143, 144, 188 Mexicans, 9, 11, 31, 33, 47, 48, 54, 64, 71, 74, 77, 78, 81, 90, 91, 100, 113, 118, 151, 152, 156, 157, 168, 172, 178 Mexico, 1, 9, 31, 56, 66, 67, 90, 99, 113, 118, 150, 157, 172, 218 National Election Study (see also NES), 19, 28 native-born, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 19, 27, 31, 33, 40, 41, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 109, 111, 115, 116, 122, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 135, 138, 143, 145, 146, 154, 158, 181, 185, 189, 192 native-born Americans, 33, 54, 85 NES (see also National Election Study), 19 non-democratic, 16, 76 Philippines, 1, 9, 31, 39, 63, 66, 67 political mobilization, 64, 94, 122, 126, 130, 142, 145, 165, 172, 189, 190

227 poverty, 21, 29, 44, 47, 48, 51, 68, 71, 81, 82, 85, 89, 162, 169 PRWORA (see also 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilation Act, 1996 Welfare Reform Act, Welfare Reform Act), 14 segmented, 7, 12, 14, 18, 91, 185 segmented assimilation, 7, 12, 91 segregated, 10, 59, 131 segregation, 17, 33, 34, 130, 134, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143 social capital, 11, 60 social networks, 9, 14, 29, 55, 64, 67, 76, 93, 94, 95, 97, 101, 103, 104, 115, 119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 144, 147, 150, 156, 157, 164, 177, 178, 188, 189 Southeast Asia, 1, 31, 66, 67, 151 Soviet Union, 1, 31, 66 Soviets, 30, 31, 33, 47, 48, 71, 74, 81 straight-line, 7, 8, 12, 18, 91, 185 Straight-Line Assimilation, 68, 82, 88, 90 structural assimilation, 8 U.S. Census, 19, 20, 24, 26, 33, 34, 161, 188, 189, 213 underclass, 3, 6, 7, 8, 185

228 undocumented, 24, 27, 118, 136, 146 Vietnam, 5, 9, 30, 31 welfare, 2, 14, 29, 81, 96, 99, 130, 146, 154, 169, 171, 178, 182, 183, 191

Index Welfare Reform Act, 14 Whites, 31, 131, 222 World Bank, 37, 39, 161, 163, 223