French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century

F R E N C H P H I L O S O P H Y IN THE T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y In this book Gary Gutting tells, clearly a...

Author: Gary Gutting

351 downloads 2096 Views 29MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!

Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

F R E N C H

P H I L O S O P H Y

IN

THE

T W E N T I E T H

C E N T U R Y

In this book Gary Gutting tells, clearly and comprehensively, the story of French philosophy from 1890 to 1990. H e examines the often neglected background of spiritualism, university idealism, and early philosophy of science, and also discusses the privileged role of philosophy in the French education system. Taking account of this background, together with the influences of avant-garde literature and G e r m a n philosophy, he develops a rich account of existential phenomenology, which he argues is the central achievement of French thought during the century, and of subsequent structuralist and poststructuralist developments. His discussion includes chapters on Bergson, Sartre, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Derrida, with sections on other major thinkers including Lyotard, Deleuze, Irigaray Levinas, and Ricoeur. He offers challenging analyses of the often misunderstood relationship between existential phenomenology and structuralism and of the emergence of poststructuralism. Finally, he sketches the major current trends of French philosophy, including liberal political philosophy, the return to phenomenology, and French analytic philosophy. G A R Y G U T T I N G is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and a leading authority on twentieth-century French philosophy. He is the author of Michel Foucault 's Archaeology of Scientific Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1989) and the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994). His many publications also include Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY GARY

G U T T I N G

University of Notre Dame

CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED B Y T H E PRESS S Y N D I C A T E OF THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF C A M B R I D G E

T h e Pitt Building, T r u m p i n g t o n Street, C a m b r i d g e , U n i t e d K i n g d o m CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

PRESS

T h e E d i n b u r g h Building, C a m b r i d g e C B 2 2 R U , U K 40 West 20th Street, N e w Y o r k N Y 1 0 0 1 1 - 4 2 1 1 , U S A 10 S t a m f o r d R o a d , O a k l e i g h , v i e 3166, Australia R u i z de A l a r c o n 13, 28014 M a d r i d , Spain D o c k H o u s e , T h e Waterfront, C a p e T o w n 8001, S o u t h Africa http://www.cambridge.org © G a r y Gutting 2001 T h i s b o o k is in copyright. Subject to statutory e x c e p t i o n a n d to the provisions o f relevant collective licensing agreements, no r e p r o d u c t i o n o f any part m a y take place without the written permission of C a m b r i d g e University Press. First published 2001 Printed in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m at the University Press, C a m b r i d g e Typeface Baskerville u / i 2 . 5 p t

System

3B2

A catalogue recordfor this hook is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Gutting, G a r y French philosophy in the twentieth century / G a r y Gutting, p.

cm.

Includes b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l references and index. ISBN O-52I-66212-5 - ISBN O - 5 2 I - 6 6 5 5 9 - O (pbk.) i. P h i l o s o p h y French — 20th century. B2421.G88 2001

i94-dc2i

I S B N o 521 66212 5 I S B N 0 521 66559

0

I. Title.

To Anastasia with love r e m e m b e r i n g o u r first d a y i n P a r i s , J u n e 2 0 , 1 9 6 8

Contents

Preface

page x i

A note on references

xiii

List of abbreviations

xiv

PART

I! T H E P H I L O S O P H E R S

OF THE THIRD

REPUBLIC

(l890-I94 ) 0

1

1

F i n - d e - s i e c l e : t h e professors o f t h e R e p u b l i c

3

Positivism

8

Spiritualism: Ravaisson and Renouvier Idealism: Lachelier and Boutroux 2

3

4

3

Philosophy a n d the new university

Science and idealism

9 14 26

Philosophers o f science: Poincare, D u h e m , a n d Meyerson

26

Brunschvicg

40

Bergson

49

Bergson on the history o f philosophy

51

T i m e and free will

56

Matter a n d m e m o r y

60

Creative evolution

66

Religion and morality

75

B e t w e e n the wars

84

Bachelard

85

Blondel

89

N e o - T h o m i s m a n d Maritain

94

Marcel

98

T o w a r d the concrete

102

vii

Contents

Mil PART

Ii: THE

REIGN

OF E X I S T E N T I A L

PHENOMENOLOGY

(194O-I960) 5

119

Sartre

121

Being and nothingness

128

Background

128

T h e basic ontological scheme

131

Consciousness

133

Nothingness and anguish

137

Bad faith

140

Being-for-others

144

Freedom

147

Critique of dialectical reason

6

7

151

Beauvoir

158

Beauvoir and the origins of existentialism

158

T h e second sex

165

Merleau-Ponty

181

T h e phenomenology of perception

186

Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology

186

T h e body

190

Language

192

The Other

195

T h e cogito and the truth of idealism

197

Freedom

203

Phenomenology and structuralism

PART

8

Hi:

STRUCTURALISM

BEYOND

(1960-1990)

T h e structuralist i n v a s i o n

213 215

Saussure

215

Lévi-Strauss

221

Structuralism and phenomenology

224

Philosophy of the concept: Cavaillès, Canguilhem, and Serres

227

T h e high tide of structuralism

234

M a r x and Althusser

235

Freud, L a c a n , and Kristeva

238

Barthes Poststructuralism

9

AND

208

Foucault

244 249

258

Madness

264

Order

267

Contents

10

11

Discipline

278

Sex

282

Derrida

289

Deconstruction

291

Differance

298

Is Derrida a skeptic?

304

Ethics

308

Religion

313

P h i l o s o p h i e s o f difference Lyotard

12

ix

318 318

Deleuze

331

Irigaray

341

Fin-de-siecle a g a i n : " l e t e m p s r e t r o u v e " ?

353

Levinas

353

Ricoeur

363

Recent directions

371

Conclusion: the philosophy of freedom

380

Appendix: philosophy and the French educational system

391

References

394

Index

412

Preface

T h e r e is n o t h i n g s a c r e d a b o u t the c e n t u r y as a unit o f t i m e , b u t there is a relatively self-contained a n d c o h e r e n t story to be told a b o u t F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y f r o m a b o u t 1890 to a b o u t 1990. In telling it,

I

have

exhaustive.

tried There

to

be

comprehensive

are full

chapters

although

o n the

r e g a r d as o f the highest i m p o r t a n c e

by

no

half-dozen

means

figures

a n d substantial sections

I on

a b o u t a d o z e n other m a j o r thinkers. B e y o n d that, I h a v e let the logic

of my

narrative,

completeness, constraints

more

determine

than

whom

I

any

desire

discuss

for

and

o f l e n g t h , it has b e e n i m p o s s i b l e

how.

encyclopedic Given

to a v o i d

the

arbitrary

exclusions. T h o u g h t f u l r e a d e r s will r e g r e t n o m o r e t h a n I that there is little or n o t h i n g o n A n d r e L a l a n d e , A l a i n , S i m o n e W e i l , Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Badiou . . . M y a p p r o a c h has b e e n that o f a historically m i n d e d p h i l o s o p h e r rather than

a historian per

se. I h a v e , accordingly,

paid

more

attention to the i n t e r n a l logic o f ideas t h a n to, for e x a m p l e , socialpolitical c o n t e x t s , e c o n o m i c

determinants,

or the p s y c h o l o g y

influence. I h a v e , h o w e v e r , tried to give a sense o f the

flow

of and

i n t e r a c t i o n o f ideas f r o m o n e thinker to a n o t h e r a n d to e x p l a i n , at least

in

intellectual

terms,

major

changes

in

views

(from,

for

e x a m p l e , i d e a l i s m to existentialism a n d existentialism to poststructuralism). M y m a i n g o a l has b e e n to p r o v i d e the r e a d e r w i t h lucid a n d fair analyses o f w h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e t h o u g h t a n d o f h o w the t h o u g h t s o f different p h i l o s o p h e r s are related. I h a v e also p a i d s o m e , necessarily limited, attention to the b r o a d e r intellectual c o n t e x t o f French philosophical

thought

(for e x a m p l e ,

German

philosophy,

a v a n t - g a r d e literature, a n d structuralist social science) a n d to its dependence

o n the distinctive F r e n c h system o f e d u c a t i o n .

(The

a p p e n d i x p r o v i d e s a s u m m a r y o f basic facts a n d t e r m i n o l o g y that m a y b e useful for u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e f e r e n c e s to this system.) XI

Preface

Xll

M y first four c h a p t e r s , o n the years b e f o r e W o r l d W a r II, c o v e r m u c h m a t e r i a l s e l d o m discussed in E n g l i s h . I h o p e that r e a d e r s will see the i m p o r t a n c e o f spiritualism, university i d e a l i s m , B e r g s o n , a n d F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y o f science for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t s of the latter h a l f o f the century. I also h o p e t h e y will c o m e to share m y a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the intrinsic p h i l o s o p h i c a l v a l u e o f w h a t

thinkers

such as L a c h e l i e r , P o i n c a r é , B r u n s c h v i c g , a n d B l o n d e l a c h i e v e d . M y later c h a p t e r s , c o v e r i n g b e t t e r - k n o w n b u t often quite difficult p h i l o sophers, p u t a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong e m p h a s i s on clarity o f analysis. T h e y also d e f e n d s o m e c o n t r o v e r s i a l j u d g m e n t s a b o u t , for e x a m p l e , the centrality o f Sartre's L'être et le néant, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f B e a u v o i r ' s Le deuxième sexe, the relatively m a r g i n a l role o f structuralism, a n d the significance

of poststructuralism. T h e

Conclusion

presents m y v i e w that t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y is best r e a d as a sustained reflection o n the p r o b l e m o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . I a m especially grateful to those w h o r e a d a n d so p e r c e p t i v e l y c o m m e n t e d o n drafts o f this b o o k : K a r l A m e r i k s , Philip Frederick Crosson, T h o m a s

Bartok,

F l y n n , A n a s t a s i a Friel G u t t i n g ,

and

S t e p h e n W a t s o n . W a r m thanks also to those w h o offered their e x p e r t assessment o f p a r t i c u l a r c h a p t e r s o r sections: Alissa B r a n h a m , D a v i d Carr, Jean G a y o n , Eric Matthews, T o d d May, William M c B r i d e , and E r n a n M c M u l l i n . Philip B a r t o k deserves special m e n t i o n b o t h for his a c u t e close r e a d i n g a n d his i n v a l u a b l e b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l assistance. I also w a n t to t h a n k the U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e D a m e ' s

Erasmus

Institute, w h i c h p r o v i d e d financial s u p p o r t a n d a splendid intellectual

atmosphere

for

a

semester's

work

on

this

book.

I

am

especially grateful to the D i r e c t o r , J a m e s T u r n e r , a n d the A s s o c i a t e D i r e c t o r , R o b e r t S u l l i v a n . T h a n k s are also d u e for all the stimulation a n d assistance I r e c e i v e d f r o m the 1999—2000 c o h o r t o f E r a s m u s fellows: T e r r y B a y s , W i l l i a m D o n a h u e , A n i t a H o u c k , P a m e l a J a s o n , Wesley K o r t , Daniella Kostroun, R o g e r L u n d i n , J o h n

McGreevy

and Susan Rosa. S p e c i a l t h a n k s are d u e to H i l a r y G a s k i n , the p h i l o s o p h y editor at C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, w h o suggested that I write this b o o k a n d e n c o u r a g e d m e t h r o u g h o u t its w r i t i n g , a n d to J o c e l y n P y e for e x c e l l e n t copy-editing. Finally, as a l w a y s , b y far m y greatest d e b t is to m y family: to m y c h i l d r e n , T o m , E d w a r d , a n d T a s h a , for all the p r i d e a n d j o y they b r i n g ; a n d to m y wife A n a s t a s i a for the p e r f e c t gift o f l o v i n g a n d b e i n g l o v e d b y her.

A note on references

B o o k s a n d articles are cited simply b y title, w i t h full details g i v e n in the R e f e r e n c e s . A l l citations are in E n g l i s h a n d are f r o m a p u b l i s h e d translation w h e n one is listed in the R e f e r e n c e s . O t h e r w i s e ,

the

English translations are m y o w n . W h e n a text is cited repeatedly, the title is a b b r e v i a t e d (e.g., EN for L'être et le néant) a n d p a g e references are g i v e n in the m a i n text, the first n u m b e r r e f e r r i n g to the F r e n c h original a n d the s e c o n d to the E n g l i s h translation.

Xlll

Abbreviations

A

M a u r i c e B l o n d e l , L'action

CRD

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique

CS

L u c e Irigaray, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un

D

J e a n - F r a n ç o i s L y o t a r d , Le différend

DS

S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r , Le deuxième sexe

DSM

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion

EC

H e n r i B e r g s o n , L'évolution créatrice

EDI

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

EDS

L u c e Irigaray, Ethique de la différence sexuelle

EH

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique

EN

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, L'être et le néant

FI

Jules L a c h e l i e r , Du fondement de l'induction

LI

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Limited Inc.

MC

M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , Les mots et les choses

MJ

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , La modalité du jugement

MM

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Matière et mémoire

MF

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Marges de la philosophie

PK

M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , Power/Knowledge

PP

M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Phénoménologie de la perception

PS

C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s , La pensée sauvage

QM

J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , " Q u e s t i o n de m é t h o d e "

S

M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Signes

SH

H e n r i P o i n c a r é , La science et l'hypothèse

SR

J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , " J e a n - P a u l Sartre r é p o n d "

77

E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s , Totalité et infini

VS

H e n r i P o i n c a r é , La valeur de la science

XIV

PART

I

The Philosophers of the Third Republic (1890-1940)

CHAPTER

I

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic

Abandoning the study of John Stuart Mill only for that of Lachelier, the less she believed in the reality of the external world, the more desperately she sought to establish herself in a good position in it before she died. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, iv, 438)

PHILOSOPHY

AND THE NEW

UNIVERSITY

W r i t i n g j u s t after t h e e n d o f W o r l d W a r I, a n a c u t e o b s e r v e r o f t h e F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l scene j u d g e d that " p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s e a r c h h a d n e v e r b e e n m o r e a b u n d a n t , m o r e serious, a n d m o r e intense a m o n g us t h a n in the last thirty y e a r s " . T h i s flowering w a s d u e to t h e p l a c e 1

o f p h i l o s o p h y in t h e n e w e d u c a t i o n a l system set u p b y t h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c in t h e w a k e o f the d e m o r a l i z i n g defeat in t h e F r a n c o Prussian W a r . T h e F r e n c h h a d b e e n h u m i l i a t e d b y t h e c a p t u r e o f N a p o l e o n I I I at S e d a n , d e v a s t a t e d b y the l o n g siege o f Paris, a n d terrified b y w h a t m o s t o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e s a w as seventy-three days o f a n a r c h y u n d e r t h e r a d i c a l socialism o f t h e C o m m u n e . M u c h o f the n e w R e p u b l i c ' s effort at spiritual r e s t o r a t i o n w a s d r i v e n b y a rejection o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s o f institutional r e l i g i o n , w h i c h it a i m e d to r e p l a c e w i t h a n e n l i g h t e n e d secular w o r l d v i e w . A p r i n c i p a l vehicle o f this enterprise w a s e d u c a t i o n a l r e f o r m a n d specifically t h e b u i l d i n g o f a university system d e d i c a t e d to t h e ideals o f science, reason, a n d humanism. Albert T h i b a u d e t highlighted the importance

o f this r e f o r m

when

republic o f professors".

he labeled the T h i r d

Republic "the

2

P h i l o s o p h y w a s at t h e c e n t e r o f t h e n e w e d u c a t i o n a l

regime,

e x e r t i n g its influence t h r o u g h t h e f a m o u s " c l a s s e de p h i l o s o p h i e " !

2

D o m i n i q u e Parodi, La philosophie contemporaine en France, 9 — 1 0 . In his La république des professeurs.

3

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

4

(1890-1940)

that w a s the m a i n r e q u i r e m e n t for students in F r e n c h p u b l i c h i g h schools (lycées) d u r i n g their last y e a r (when t h e y w e r e s e v e n t e e n to eighteen

years

regulations

old).

3

The

class's m o d e r n

o f 1809 that reestablished

back

to

the m e d i e v a l divisions

history w e n t

of

p h i l o s o p h y into l o g i c , m e t a p h y s i c s , a n d m o r a l i t y a n d stipulated that it b e studied for eight h o u r s a w e e k . T h e r e w a s also i n t r o d u c e d a division t r e a t i n g the history o f philosophy. A r o u n d Cousin

4

1830, V i c t o r

a d d e d p s y c h o l o g y , w h i c h s o o n b e c a m e the m o s t i m p o r t a n t

e l e m e n t o f the c u r r i c u l u m . A l s o , w h e r e the rules o f 1809 h a d g i v e n m e r e l y a set o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for t e a c h i n g a n d a list o f authors, C o u s i n w o r k e d out a d e t a i l e d r e q u i r e d structure. T h e i d e a w a s to c o v e r the w h o l e o f philosophy, b o t h its p r o b l e m s a n d its history, in a y e a r - l o n g g r a n d synthesis. C o u s i n also b e g a n the p r o c e s s o f l a i c i z i n g philosophy, b y r e d u c i n g the role o f religious questions. H i s structure stayed in p l a c e until p h i l o s o p h y w a s e l i m i n a t e d f r o m the c u r r i c u l u m o f the lycées in 1853 u n d e r the S e c o n d E m p i r e . In 1863 p h i l o s o p h y w a s restored to the lycées a n d b e c a m e required

subject

education.

5

for

all students

in the

last y e a r

of

D u r i n g the First E m p i r e , a l y c é e e d u c a t i o n

became

r e q u i r e d for m a n y civil service positions. T h i s m e a n t that, 1863, the

"classe

de p h i l o s o p h i c "

was

extremely

a

secondary

important

after for

F r e n c h s e c o n d a r y students, since it w a s n o w a k e y topic on the e x a m they h a d to pass to r e c e i v e their d e g r e e (the baccalauréat) a n d be eligible for state e m p l o y m e n t . Its i m p o r t a n c e w a s further

empha-

sized b y the r e f o r m o f 1874, w h i c h m a d e p h i l o s o p h y a n d r h e t o r i c separate divisions, e m p h a s i z i n g p h i l o s o p h y ' s a u t o n o m y a n d distinctiveness. M o r e o v e r , since p h i l o s o p h y w a s t a u g h t o n l y in a single y e a r — the final o n e — it w a s p r e s e n t e d as the c u l m i n a t i o n a n d synthesis o f all that h a d g o n e b e f o r e , the " c r o w n " , as it w a s i n e v i t a b l y p u t , o f s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n . It w a s n o t surprising that p h i l o s o p h y

soon

r e p l a c e d r h e t o r i c as the course w i t h the h i g h e s t intellectual status :i

4

5

For an overview o f the structure of the French e d u c a t i o n a l system, see the A p p e n d i x . V i c t o r C o u s i n (1792-1867) was minister of e d u c a t i o n in the 1830s a n d 1840s under the bourgeois m o n a r c h y o f Louis-Philippe. His o w n philosophical position, w h i c h he called eclecticism, tried to synthesize French philosophical p s y c h o l o g y (deriving from M a i n e de Biran) with empiricism, Scottish realism, a n d G e r m a n idealism. D u r i n g the mid-nineteenth century, eclecticism h a d the status of an "official" philosophy in the French university. C o u s i n was also important as an editor, translator, and historian o f philosophy. For a general discussion of French e d u c a t i o n in the later nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries, see Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920. O n the role of philosophy in France d u r i n g this period, see J e a n - L o u i s Fabiani, Les philosophes de la république.

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic

5

a n d , accordingly, a t t r a c t e d a large n u m b e r o f t h e brightest students interested in s e c o n d a r y t e a c h i n g . S i n c e t h e m a i n g o a l o f t h e university t e a c h i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y w a s to

produce

teachers

for the l y c é e

philosophy

class, there w a s

c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n t h e c o n t e n t o f the t w o p r o g r a m s . A t the s a m e t i m e , t h e q u a l i f y i n g e x a m i n a t i o n (the agrégation) for those who

wanted

to t e a c h

philosophy

in t h e lycées

was geared

to

university-level r e s e a r c h r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y w h a t w e w o u l d think o f as h i g h - s c h o o l t e a c h i n g . T h e result w a s a l a r g e n u m b e r o f t a l e n t e d lycée t e a c h e r s w i t h a h i g h level o f specialist k n o w l e d g e in p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d , o f c o u r s e , the best o f these w e n t o n to take d o c t o r a t e s in p h i l o s o p h y a n d b e c o m e university professors. T h e F r e n c h e d u c a t i o n a l system thus g a v e p h i l o s o p h y a h i g h l y p r i v i l e g e d p l a c e in t h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c . T h e r e w a s a n a u d i e n c e c o m p o s e d o f a g e n e r a l p u b l i c e d u c a t e d in the r u d i m e n t s o f philosophy, as w e l l as a substantial n u m b e r o f s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l t e a c h e r s w i t h specialist k n o w l e d g e o f the subject; a n d there w a s a h i g h l y elite g r o u p o f university professors e n g a g e d in p h i l o s o p h i c a l

research.

A c c o r d i n g l y , a faculty o f p h i l o s o p h y p r e s i d e d over the " r e p u b l i c o f professors".

Thibaudet

falls into religious l a n g u a g e

in t r y i n g to

express t h e sublimity o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s role: " T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l vocation

embodies

a principle

a n a l o g o u s to a priestly

vocation.

A n y o n e w h o h a s p r e p a r e d for t h e agrégation in p h i l o s o p h y . . . h a s b e e n t o u c h e d , at s o m e p o i n t , like a s e m i n a r i a n , b y t h e i d e a that t h e highest d e g r e e o f h u m a n g r a n d e u r is a life c o n s e c r a t e d to t h e service o f the m i n d a n d that t h e U n i v e r s i t y lets o n e c o m p e t e for positions that m a k e it possible to r e n d e r this s e r v i c e . " Nevertheless,

as E r n s t

Curtius

6

(writing in 1930) e m p h a s i z e d ,

F r e n c h culture r e m a i n e d essentially literary. T h e d o m i n a n t figures w e r e writers such as Z o l a a n d A n a t o l e F r a n c e , w h o w e r e outside t h e university system; a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g itself w a s literary in t h e sense that, as B e r g s o n said, there w a s " n o p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a , n o m a t t e r h o w p r o f o u n d or subtle, that c o u l d n o t b e e x p r e s s e d in t h e language

of everyday

life

[la langue de tout le monde]".

7

Curtius,

i m b u e d w i t h G e r m a n idealism's c o n c e p t i o n o f philosophy, s a w t h e

6

7

La république des professeurs, 139. C i t e d b y Ernst C u r t i u s , The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 100. Fabiani notes, however, that " d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1880-1914 there were n o close connections b e t w e e n professors of philosophy a n d avant-garde w r i t e r s " [Les philosophes de la république, 115). A s w e shall see, that changes with the generation o f the 1930s.

6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

F r e n c h as s u r r e n d e r i n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l enterprise " t o literary f o r m a n d a v e r a g e i n t e l l i g e n c e " a n d t h o u g h t this w a s why, a l t h o u g h " i n G e r m a n y intellectual culture m a y be p h i l o s o p h i c a l , in F r a n c e it c a n be literary o n l y " .

8

T h e university p h i l o s o p h y o f the early T h i r d R e p u b l i c

(before

W o r l d W a r I) h a d b o t h the strengths a n d the w e a k n e s s e s o f its p r i v i l e g e d status. T h e h i g h level o f talent a n d the i n f o r m e d critical a u d i e n c e sustained a professional solidity that c o n t e m p o r a r i e s favora b l y (and rightly) c o n t r a s t e d to the e l o q u e n t v a g a r i e s o f V i c t o r C o u s i n ' s e c l e c t i c i s m a n d H y p p o l i t e T a i n e ' s positivism, w h i c h

had

d o m i n a t e d the S e c o n d E m p i r e . A l s o , u n i v e r s a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a tion a n d the h i g h social position a n d c o n n e c t i o n s o f professors g a v e p h i l o s o p h y a strong influence o n the g e n e r a l F r e n c h culture. S c i e n tists such as H e n r i P o i n c a r é (brother-in-law o f the p h i l o s o p h e r E m i l e Boutroux)

showed

a

particular

interest

in

philosophical

issues.

M a r c e l P r o u s t (a g r o o m s m a n at B e r g s o n ' s w e d d i n g ) , w a s a friend of L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , his fellow l y c é e - s t u d e n t in the p h i l o s o p h y c o u r s e o f A l p h o n s e D a r l u . T h e strong p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e n t o f the writings o f A n d r é G i d e a n d P a u l V a l é r y is often r e m a r k e d ; a n d the w o r k o f A n d r é M a l r a u x , w h o studied p h i l o s o p h y w i t h A l a i n (the p s e u d o n y m o f E m i l e C h a r t i e r ) , the m o s t f a m o u s o f all l y c é e t e a c h e r s , has b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " t h e t h o u g h t o f A l a i n t r a n s p o s e d into the n o v e l " . But

privilege

also

encouraged

intellectual

complacency

9

and

d a m p e d the c r e a t i v i t y that c a n rise f r o m r a d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y less socially secure thinkers. W i t h the a r g u a b l e e x c e p t i o n o f B e r g s o n , the p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the early T h i r d R e p u b l i c w o r k e d w i t h i n a relatively n a r r o w b a n d defined b y their t r a i n i n g in the history o f t h o u g h t , their b o u r g e o i s m o r a l ideals, a n d the political realities o f their

time.

C u r t i u s stretches the p o i n t to the m a x i m u m : [French philosophy's] conservative Humanism could not endure either the Pantheism of a world-intoxicated ecstasy, nor the transcendental idealism of the creative spirit, nor the knowledge of salvation which desires redemption and depreciates the value of the world, nor the moral criticism of an heroic will to power. A Hegel, a Schopenhauer, a Nietzsche are unthinkable in F r a n c e . 10

O n the o t h e r h a n d , e s c h e w i n g the ecstasies o f G e r m a n i c m e t a p h y sics — a n d the a t t e n d a n t drive for strong originality — a l l o w e d the 8

9

1 0

The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 99-100. J e a n G u i t t o n , Regards sur la pensée française, 1870—1940, 59. The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 104.

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic

7

F r e n c h professors to c r e a t e a fruitful circle o f sensible c o n v e r s a t i o n , f o c u s i n g on a small set o f k e y topics a n d g r o u n d e d in a c o m m o n f o r m a t i o n a n d strong m u t u a l respect. S u c h c o n v e r s a t i o n w a s c a r r i e d out in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale (founded b y X a v i e r L é o n a n d L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g in 1893) a n d in m e e t i n g s o f the closely r e l a t e d S o c i é t é Française de P h i l o s o p h i e (founded in 1901). T h e d e g r e e of s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g that c o u l d b e a s s u m e d is m o s t striking in André

Lalande's project

of a

Vocabulaire technique et critique de la

philosophic T h i s v o l u m e , w h i c h w e n t t h r o u g h e l e v e n editions b e t w e e n 1900 a n d

1926, offered

detailed définitions

o f the full r a n g e

of

p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e r m s , finally f o r m u l a t e d b y L a l a n d e b u t i n f o r m e d by c o m m e n t a r y f r o m m o s t o f the l e a d i n g p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the p e r i o d . (Lalande's p r o p o s e d definitions w e r e discussed r e g u l a r l y at sessions o f the S o c i é t é , a n d the c o m m e n t s o f m e m b e r s are p r i n t e d b e n e a t h the Vocabulaire''% entries.) T h e w o r k c a m e r e m a r k a b l y close to its g o a l o f " a c h i e v i n g a c c o r d a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s — as m u c h as possible — on what they understand b y . . . philosophical t e r m s " . Focused

and

fruitful,

if n o t

drastically

1 1

creative,

early

R e p u b l i c p h i l o s o p h y w a s r a t h e r like m u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y

Third analytic

p h i l o s o p h y (or m e d i e v a l scholasticism), t h o u g h far less t e c h n i c a l a n d rigorous

and

far

more

accessible

to

the

general

culture.

t h o u g h t is n o t likely to m a k e n e w e p o c h s , b u t it is an

Such

effective

c o n t r i b u t i o n to the civility a n d rationality o f the age in w h i c h it finds itself. Politically,

the

philosophers

o f the

Third

Republic,

like

other

m e m b e r s o f the n e w university, o c c u p i e d an interesting a n d i m p o r t a n t position.

1 2

T h e i r social status a n d position as g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s

o b v i o u s l y m a d e t h e m p a r t o f the e s t a b l i s h m e n t , b u t since t h e y h a d typically b e e n b o r n into intellectual families (with p a r e n t s w h o w e r e t e a c h e r s , writers, p h y s i c i a n s , etc.) t h e y w e r e less i n c l i n e d to identify w i t h the c o n s e r v a t i v e v a l u e s o f the w e a l t h y b o u r g e o i s class. ( T h e y h a d , in P i e r r e B o u r d i e u ' s t e r m s , m u c h m o r e c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l t h a n e c o n o m i c capital.) A c c o r d i n g l y , professors as a w h o l e f o r m e d

an

influential class o f liberal s u p p o r t e r s o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s ideals, w i t h those w i t h the highest level o f intellectual status g e n e r a l l y the m o s t liberal. S o , for e x a m p l e , in the D r e y f u s affair, w h i c h split F r a n c e 1 1

1 2

Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, ix. See Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic I8 O-I 2O, 9

9

219-25.

Culture in Comparative Perspective,

8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

at the t u r n o f the century, the m a j o r i t y o f professors at the S o r b o n n e a n d the E c o l e N o r m a l e

Supérieure

supported Dreyfus, and

this

s u p p o r t w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y strong a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s . R e f l e c t i n g the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s secular l i b e r a l i s m , the

central

c o n c e r n s o f its p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e science, h u m a n f r e e d o m , a n d the relation b e t w e e n the t w o . U n l i k e the G e r m a n idealists, w h o

felt

t h e m s e l v e s possessed o f intuitive or dialectical m o d e s o f k n o w i n g that far o u t s t r i p p e d the p l o d d i n g efforts o f e m p i r i c a l science, these philosophers

saw

their

reflections

as

grounded

in

an

accurate

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n o f scientific results. O n the o t h e r h a n d , e v e n those closest to a positivist a c c e p t a n c e o f the u l t i m a t e cognitive a u t h o r i t y o f science r e j e c t e d empiricist e p i s t e m o l o g i e s o f scientific e x p e r i e n c e in favor o f a rationalist active role for the m i n d . In

a parallel

way,

construals

of freedom

typically

avoided

the

d e t e r m i n i s m or c o m p a t i b i l i s m f a v o r e d b y e m p i r i c i s m a n d the subo r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n will to an idealist absolute spirit. B e c a u s e o f this l a c k o f s y m p a t h y w i t h the d o m i n a n t traditions of both G e r m a n y and Britain, French thought was very nearly autonom o u s d u r i n g this p e r i o d .

1 3

POSITIVISM

S u r v e y s o f p h i l o s o p h y in F r a n c e f r o m 1870 to 1920 a l m o s t a l w a y s employ

a standard

division

o f their

subject

into three

schools:

positivism, spiritualism, a n d idealism. T h e s e are useful c a t e g o r i e s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r o b l e m s a n d a p p r o a c h e s o f the p e r i o d , b u t they are m u c h less helpful as classifications o f i n d i v i d u a l thinkers. T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y so for positivism. T h e t e r m w a s first u s e d b y A u g u s t e C o m t e (1798—1857) to c h a r a c t e r i z e his effort to d e v e l o p a p h i l o s o p h y b a s e d on o n l y the p l a i n (positive) facts o f e x p e r i e n c e -

of which

science p r o v i d e s p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e s — a n d to a v o i d m e t a p h y s i c a l hypotheses.

It c a m e

to b e

applied

to a n y v i e w

that

privileged

e m p i r i c a l science over m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t . A " p o s i t i v i s t " m i g h t well h o l d strongly scientistic v i e w s such as H u m e a n e m p i r i c i s m or materialistic

1 3

reductionism,

but

not

necessarily.

Many

positivists

Similarly, there was little foreign interest in French philosophy. H a r a l d Hoffding, for e x a m p l e , in his comprehensive history o f m o d e r n philosophy, omits any treatment of French philosophers of the latter half of the nineteenth century, noting that, although they are important in the thought of their o w n country, " t h e y have b r o u g h t n o n e w principles to b e a r on the discussion of p r o b l e m s " (A History of Modern Philosophy, 486).

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

9

rejected C o m t e ' s e x c l u s i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l entities, such as a t o m s , f r o m science, a n d C o m t e h i m s e l f m a i n t a i n e d the irreducibility o f biology

and sociology

to physics

a n d chemistry.

Later,

leading

positivists such as E r n e s t R e n a n a n d H y p p o l i t e T a i n e p a i n t e d g r a n d visions o f historical p r o g r e s s that w e r e w i t h s o m e plausibility l a b e l e d H e g e l i a n . T h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a b r o a d e n i n g a n d dilution o f positivism as it b e c a m e m o r e a g e n e r a l intellectual o r i e n t a t i o n t h a n a welldefined p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . I n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, positiv i s m w a s still a m a j o r force, b u t its m a i n p r o p o n e n t s w e r e literary figures

such as R e n a n a n d T a i n e r a t h e r t h a n a c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h e r s .

F r o m 1870 o n it w a s r e j e c t e d b y e v e r y m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r .

14

N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e positivist spirit survived. It w a s a m a j o r m o t i v a tion for e x t e n d i n g the m e t h o d s o f the n a t u r a l sciences to the h u m a n d o m a i n , l e a d i n g to the seminal w o r k o f D ü r k h e i m in s o c i o l o g y a n d o f P i e r r e J a n e t in e m p i r i c a l p s y c h o l o g y .

15

S u c h w o r k did n o t a s s u m e

or i m p l y that all k n o w l e d g e w a s scientific, b u t it did constitute a c h a l l e n g e to anti-positivist a r g u m e n t s that the specifically domain

was not open

legacies

of positivism

to e m p i r i c a l were

understanding.

the d e v e l o p m e n t ,

human

Other

by Poincare

vital and

D u h e m , o f p h i l o s o p h y o f science as a s e p a r a t e subdiscipline a n d the c e n t r a l role a c c o r d e d d e t a i l e d discussions o f the history a n d results o f science b y v i r t u a l l y e v e r y m a j o r figure f r o m B o u t r o u x to B r u n s c h v i c g a n d B e r g s o n . I n d e e d , b y the 1930s B a c h e l a r d c o u l d r e s p e c t a b l y m a i n t a i n that philosophy, w h i l e n o t r e d u c i b l e to science, should b e identified w i t h the p h i l o s o p h y o f science.

SPIRITUALISM:

Spiritualism h a s a g o o d

RAVAISSON

AND

RENOUVIER

c l a i m to b e the n a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y o f

F r a n c e . It is r o o t e d in D e s c a r t e s ' assertion o f t h e epistemic a n d

1 4

1 5

O n e thinker w h o did defend a strong positivist position in the early 1900s w a s Felix L e D a n t e c (1869-1917). Parodi briefly s u m m a r i z e s his views in his survey of the c o n t e m p o r a r y scene; b u t then, in place of his usual critical assessment, h e merely remarks, "it w o u l d be pointless to criticize such w o r k " (La Philosophie contemporaine en France, 57). T h e m a r g i n a l place of positivism is also suggested by the t w o pages devoted to it in L a l a n d e ' s Vocabulaire, in contrast to the four pages o n spiritualism a n d the nine o n idealism. For a l o n g time, there w a s n o sharp distinction d r a w n b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g y / s o c i o l o g y a n d philosophy. E v e n well into the twentieth century, D ü r k h e i m , Janet, a n d similar thinkers were routinely r e g a r d e d as philosophers a n d included in standard surveys such as Parodi's La philosophie contemporaine en France and Isaac Benrubi's Les Sources et les courants de la philosophic contemporaine en France. E v e n today, the w o r k o f sociologists such as Pierre B o u r d i e u a n d B r u n o L a t o u r has a strong philosophical c o m p o n e n t .

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

10

(1890-1940)

m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i m a c y o f t h o u g h t b u t does n o t r e q u i r e his m i n d b o d y d u a l i s m . T h e v i e w is, in fact, consistent w i t h a n y o n t o l o g y that allows for these t w o c e n t r a l assertions: that the v a l u e o f h u m a n existence d e r i v e s f r o m the h i g h e r m e n t a l faculties (both intellectual a n d affective) o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; a n d that these faculties are n e i t h e r reducible

to m a t e r i a l processes (including sense e x p e r i e n c e ) n o r

assimilable to a h i g h e r level o f reality (the absolute). Spiritualism is thus a n assertion o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d ethical p r i m a c y o f the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d (l'esprit), against the claims o f m a t e r i a l i s m , empiricism, a n d c e r t a i n sorts o f idealism. O n e o f the earliest a n d m o s t influential spiritualists w a s F r a n ç o i s M a i n e de B i r a n ( 1 7 6 6 - 1 8 2 4 ) . A r g u i n g against L o c k e , H u m e , a n d , especially, C o n d i l l a c a n d the Idéologues, h e m a i n t a i n e d that empiricist r e d u c t i o n s o f m e n t a l life to the flow o f p a s s i n g sense impressions w e r e refuted b y o u r e x p e r i e n c e s o f w i l l i n g (effort voulu), w h i c h r e v e a l a persisting self c o n t i n u a l l y straining against b o d i l y resistance. I n these e x p e r i e n c e s , a unified self or m i n d is r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h w h a t M a i n e de B i r a n calls o u r sens intime (inner awareness). S u c h i n n e r e x p e r i ences o f h u m a n f r e e d o m r e m a i n e d the f o u n d a t i o n o f later spiritualist cases for the ultimate a u t o n o m y a n d v a l u e o f the i n d i v i d u a l . The

spiritualist l e g a c y r e a c h e d early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y

philosophy

primarily

through

Félix

Ravaisson

French

(1813—1900). R a -

vaisson n e v e r h e l d a university chair ( C o u s i n , w h o h a d initially helped

advance

his career,

blocked

the a p p o i n t m e n t ) .

B u t he

e x e r c i s e d m a j o r influence t h r o u g h a series o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e positions: i n s p e c t o r o f libraries, g e n e r a l i n s p e c t o r o f h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t , c h a i r o f the c o m m i t t e e that set a n d g r a d e d the agrégation e x a m i n a t i o n

in philosophy.

H i s interest

in art l e d to

scholarly w o r k o n D a V i n c i a n d o n a n c i e n t G r e e k sculpture a n d a n a p p o i n t m e n t as c u r a t o r at the L o u v r e , w h e r e h e c a r r i e d o u t a m a j o r restoration o f the V e n u s de M i l o . In 1867, R a v a i s s o n p u b l i s h e d his La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle, a r e p o r t c o m m i s s i o n e d b y the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t o n the o c c a s i o n o f the E x p o s i t i o n o f 1867. S u r v e y i n g the history o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y after

1800, h e n o t e d the d o m i n a n t p l a c e o f C o m t e ' s

positivism a n d o f its m a i n rival, the e c l e c t i c i s m o f V i c t o r C o u s i n . Ravaisson

a r g u e d that b o t h these positions h a d failed a n d that

e x i g e n c i e s o f fact a n d a r g u m e n t w e r e d r i v i n g F r e n c h

philosophy

t o w a r d the spiritualism that M a i n e de B i r a n h a d d e v e l o p e d b u t his contemporaries ignored. Ravaisson predicted a n e w philosophical

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

II

e p o c h d o m i n a t e d b y w h a t he called "spiritualistic r e a l i s m or positiv i s m " ; that is, a p h i l o s o p h y that gives priority to spiritual " f a c t s " in the s a m e w a y that o r d i n a r y r e a l i s m a n d p o s i t i v i s m do to p e r c e p t u a l a n d scientific

facts. S u c h an e p o c h w o u l d , he said, h a v e

" g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e the consciousness that m i n d itself,

a

self r e c o g n i z e d

as

an

existence

from

as its

[Fesprit] has of

which

all

other

existences derive a n d o n w h i c h t h e y d e p e n d , a n d w h i c h is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its o w n a c t i v i t y " .

1 6

H i s p r e d i c t i o n w a s entirely c o r r e c t . B y 1890 R a v a i s s o n ' s b o o k s w e r e , in P a r o d i ' s w o r d s , " t h e b r e v i a r i e s o f all the y o u n g p h i l o s o phers"

1 7

a n d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a g e n d a w a s b e i n g set b y thinkers

such as L a c h e l i e r , B o u t r o u x , a n d B e r g s o n (all students o f R a v a i s s o n at the

Ecole

Normale), who

were

strongly

sympathetic

to

the

spiritualist view. If, as C o m t e h a d f a m o u s l y said, m a t e r i a l i s m is the c l a i m that the h i g h e r c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y the lower, spiritualism c l a i m s to e x p l a i n the l o w e r b y the higher. H e r e , o f c o u r s e , the h i g h e r is the m i n d , but not the C a r t e s i a n m i n d that i n c l u d e s a n y e x p e r i e n c e

whatsoever.

T h e spiritualist m i n d is the locus o f o n l y the h i g h e r m e n t a l functions such as i n t e l l i g e n c e , will, a n d aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n . It d o e s n o t include l o w e r f o r m s o f m e n t a l i t y (e.g., sense p e r c e p t i o n a n d e m o tions), associated w i t h o u r " a n i m a l " n a t u r e . T h e m i n d or spirit is, t h e n , the locus o f the " p r o p e r l y h u m a n " d i m e n s i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . T h e p r o j e c t o f spiritualism is, first, to d e s c r i b e , a c c u r a t e l y a n d in detail, o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f ourselves as spiritual b e i n g s ; a n d s e c o n d , to s h o w that e v e r y t h i n g else (the r e a l m o f nature) is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n d d e p e n d e n t on spirit. T r u e to M a i n e de B i r a n ' s s e m i n a l descriptions, R a v a i s s o n a n d his followers m a d e f r e e d o m the f u n d a m e n t a l feature o f the m i n d , t h e r e b y p l a c i n g creative a c t i o n at the r o o t o f all reality. W h e r e a s M a i n e de B i r a n u n d e r s t o o d f r e e d o m p r i m a r i l y in t e r m s o f the effort e x e r t e d b y the will, R a v a i s s o n e m p h a s i z e d the desire (and therefore the love o f the g o o d ) b e h i n d this effort, a desire he saw as u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the p e r f e c t g o o d n e s s o f the Christian G o d . A l t h o u g h D e s c a r t e s c a n be r e a d i l y r e g a r d e d as the first F r e n c h spiritualist, since he g a v e clear epistemic a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l priority to

intelligence

and

volition,

Ravaisson

replaced

1 6

La philosophic en France au XIXe siecle, 275.

1 7

La philosophic contemporaine en France, 2g.

the

Cartesian

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

12

(1890-1940)

d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r as s e p a r a b l e substances w i t h a distinction b e t w e e n m e n t a l life a n d n a t u r e as t w o i n t e r d e p e n d e n t p o l e s of activity. (Here he w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y the later p h i l o s o p h y o f Schelling, w i t h w h o m he h a d studied in M u n i c h ,

1 8

a n d b y Aristotle's d o c t r i n e

o f f o r m . ) T h i s w a s the basis for his o w n introspective study o f o u r 1 9

e x p e r i e n c e o f h a b i t , a topic s u g g e s t e d b y b o t h M a i n e de B i r a n a n d Aristotle. F o l l o w i n g M a i n e de B i r a n , he saw h a b i t as a p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e o f the u n i o n o f the creative free a g e n c y o f m i n d w i t h the repetitive stability o f the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . In m o v i n g f r o m k n o w l e d g e b a s e d o n explicit reflection to a h a b i t o f implicit u n d e r s t a n d i n g (as a c o o k m i g h t at hrst m a k e c r e p e s b y m e t i c u l o u s l y f o l l o w i n g a r e c i p e b u t later c o m e to toss t h e m off " b y s e c o n d n a t u r e " ) , w e g o f r o m an e x t e r n a l relation to the objects o f o u r k n o w l e d g e to " a n i m m e d i a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in w h i c h o b j e c t a n d subject are f u s e d " .

2 0

H e r e w e are

not far f r o m the intuition o f B e r g s o n , w h o w r o t e an e l e g a n t a n d p e r c e p t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f R a v a i s s o n w h e n he s u c c e e d e d h i m in the A c a d é m i e des S c i e n c e s M o r a l e s et P o l i t i q u e s .

21

Spiritualism was typically a conservative position, a comfortable intellectual n i c h e for s u p p o r t e r s o f an elitist b o u r g e o i s politics a n d C a t h o l i c Christianity. B u t there w a s a m o r e r a d i c a l v a r i a n t , that of Charles

Renouvier

(1815-1903), which,

though

always

relatively

m a r g i n a l , e v e n t u a l l y e x e r t e d significant influence. R e n o u v i e r w a s a student at the s a m e time as R a v a i s s o n at the E c o l e N o r m a l e . H e w a s v e r y active in politics at the time o f the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n b u t b e c a m e disillusioned after L o u i s N a p o l e o n ' s c o u p in 1851 d e s t r o y e d h o p e s for a

socialist

democracy.

He

abandoned

politics

for

philosophy,

a l t h o u g h he did later edit a n d p u b l i s h a j o u r n a l , La critique philosophique, a i m e d at a g e n e r a l intellectual a u d i e n c e . R e n o u v i e r

never

h e l d an a c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n (he h a d sufficient i n h e r i t e d w e a l t h to 1 8

1 9

2 0

2 1

W e should not m a k e too m u c h of the personal contact with Schelling. A s B e r g s o n tells us. R a v a i s s o n spent only a few weeks in M u n i c h . Also, Schelling spoke French b a d l y and R a v a i s s o n was not m u c h better at G e r m a n . See H e n r i B e r g s o n , " N o t i c e sur la vie et les oeuvres de M . Félix R a v a i s s o n - M o l l i e n " , in La pensée et le mouvant, reprinted in Oeuvres, 1458. Ravaisson first m a d e his n a m e with a t w o - v o l u m e c o m m e n t a r y on Aristotle's Metaphysics (1837). H e v i e w e d Aristotle as the true founder o f spiritualist philosophy because, even m o r e than Plato, he o v e r c a m e empiricism a n d materialism, by m a k i n g forms the causes of the m o v e m e n t s of real existents a n d locating formal perfection in the mental lives of individual intelligences. O n this a n d other aspects of Ravaisson's thought, see Emile B o u t r o u x ' s very helpful " L a philosophie de Félix R a v a i s s o n " , in his Nouvelles études d'histoire de la philosophie, 194-220. Félix R a v a i s s o n , De l'habitude, 37. H e n r i B e r g s o n , " N o t i c e sur la vie et les oeuvres de M . Félix R a v a i s s o n - M o l l i e n " , in La pensée et le mouvant, reprinted in Oeuvres.

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic

13

m a k e a profession u n n e c e s s a r y ) . A f t e r the c o u p , he left Paris for the south o f F r a n c e , w h e r e he h a d b e e n b o r n , a n d , w o r k i n g there in relative isolation, w r o t e c o n t i n u o u s l y until his d e a t h in 1903, p r o d u c i n g one o f the largest o e u v r e s in the history o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y .

22

R e n o u v i e r tied his philosophy, w h i c h he c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " n e o criticism"

(or, s o m e t i m e s ,

"French

c r i t i c i s m " ) , to that o f

Kant,

a l t h o u g h he does n o t s e e m to h a v e p e n e t r a t e d v e r y d e e p l y

into

K a n t ' s t h o u g h t , w h i c h w a s m o r e a starting-point t h a n a c o n t i n u i n g inspiration. W h a t he t o o k f r o m K a n t w a s m a i n l y the i d e a o f our p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e as structured b y intellectual c a t e g o r i e s that are c o n d i t i o n s

o f the possibility o f this e x p e r i e n c e . H e

rejected

K a n t ' s n o u m e n a l w o r l d , m a i n t a i n i n g that the p h e n o m e n a l r e a l m is the sole reality. H e also saw p h e n o m e n a l reality as f u n d a m e n t a l l y relational,

excluding

including becoming) which

all

others

are

substance and

from

the

list o f c a t e g o r i e s

m a k i n g relation the

forms.

These

empiricist

basic

(and

category

tendencies

of

were,

h o w e v e r , b a l a n c e d b y the a d d i t i o n o f c a t e g o r i e s w i t h a stronger metaphysical

content than

Kant's.

Specifically,

Renouvier

intro-

d u c e d finality (purpose) a n d p e r s o n a l i t y as essential structures o f the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d . T h i s led h i m to the characteristic

spiritualist

e m p h a s i s o n the c r e a t i v e c h o i c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s as the d r i v i n g force o f reality. R e n o u v i e r ' s ethical a n d political t h o u g h t reflects the centrality o f individual f r e e d o m .

2 3

B u t f r e e d o m is also a c r u c i a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

c a t e g o r y for h i m , since he holds that e x p e r i e n c e , e v e n as i n f o r m e d b y the system o f c a t e g o r i e s , d o e s n o t entirely d e t e r m i n e w h a t w e m u s t a c c e p t as the truth. O u r j u d g m e n t s , f r o m the l o w e s t p e r c e p tions to the highest m e t a p h y s i c a l speculations, a l w a y s involve

an

i r r e d u c i b l e e l e m e n t o f free c h o i c e . Spiritualists such as R a v a i s s o n w e r e u n e a s y w i t h this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n d e t e r m i n i s m a n d e v e n m o r e so w i t h R e n o u v i e r ' s religious v i e w s .

2 4

H i s relativism left n o p l a c e for

a b e i n g o f absolute p e r f e c t i o n , such as the C h r i s t i a n G o d , a n d he also rejected the i d e a o f an a c t u a l infinity - q u a n t i t a t i v e or qualitative — as i n c o h e r e n t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , R e n o u v i e r t h o u g h t that the

2 2

2 3

2 4

R e n o u v i e r ' s most important w o r k is his four-volume Essais de critique générale, Paris: 1854—64. W i l l i a m L o g u e , Charles Renouvier: Philosopher of Liberty, emphasizes R e n o u v i e r ' s ethics and politics a n d provides some useful historical b a c k g r o u n d . R a v a i s s o n offers a g u a r d e d l y sympathetic treatment of R e n o u v i e r in his La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle, n o — 1 8 . T h i s was p r o b a b l y the b e g i n n i n g o f an awareness of R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k in the w i d e r intellectual community.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

14

impossibility

o f an

actual

infinity

required

(1890-1940) a beginning

of

the

universe in t i m e a n d a c c e p t e d p e r s o n a l i m m o r t a l i t y as n e c e s s a r y to m a k e sense o f m o r a l obligations. T h i s l e d h i m to assert the existence o f G o d as c r e a t o r a n d m o r a l i d e a l , b u t he insisted that this b e i n g w a s finite

in b o t h k n o w l e d g e a n d p o w e r (which

finitude,

he

thought,

p r o v i d e s the o n l y p l a u s i b l e solution to the p r o b l e m o f evil). M o r e over, G o d ' s c r e a t i v e role is consistent w i t h h u m a n f r e e d o m since he is, as R e n o u v i e r

put

it, a

"creator

of c r e a t o r s " .

Renouvier's

2 5

h e t e r o d o x t h e o l o g i c a l v i e w s u n d e r l a y his v i g o r o u s p r a c t i c a l o p p o sition to the p o w e r o f the F r e n c h C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , an o p p o s i t i o n focused

during

the

1870s

and

1880s in his j o u r n a l ,

La

critique

philosophique (and its s u p p l e m e n t , La critique religieuse), w h i c h f o l l o w e d a strongly a n t i - C a t h o l i c editorial policy. R e n o u v i e r ' s l a c k o f a p o s i t i o n in the e d u c a t i o n a l establishment, a l o n g w i t h the u n o r t h o d o x y o f his v i e w s , l i m i t e d his influence

on

F r e n c h philosophy. B u t the v i g o r o f his t h o u g h t — n o t to m e n t i o n the h u g e a m o u n t he p u b l i s h e d over a p e r i o d o f sixty-one y e a r s — h a d an u n d e n i a b l e i m p a c t . H e a t t r a c t e d a small g r o u p o f disciples (and the strong a d m i r a t i o n o f W i l l i a m J a m e s ) a n d e v e n t u a l l y r e c e i v e d s o m e v e r y b e l a t e d official r e c o g n i t i o n , i n c l u d i n g e l e c t i o n to the A c a d e m i e des S c i e n c e s M o r a l e s et Politiques in 1900, at the age o f eighty-five. H i s m o s t i m p o r t a n t direct influence w a s on the w o r k o f O c t a v e H a m e l i n , w h o offered a detailed analysis o f R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k in his Sorbonne course of 1906-7 and whose o w n powerful philosophical system w a s strongly i n f o r m e d b y R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k .

IDEALISM:

LAGHELIER

AND

2 6

BOUTROUX

M a i n l i n e spiritualist t h o u g h t h a d a n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y to idealism (and, i n d e e d , R a v a i s s o n s o m e t i m e s called the v i e w he c h a m p i o n e d idealism). B u t spiritualism allows the d e n i a l o f the key idealist c l a i m that u l t i m a t e l y o n l y m i n d s exist a n d is c o m m i t t e d to a g e n u i n e plurality

of individual

persons

and,

especially,

to

a

distinction

b e t w e e n finite h u m a n m i n d s a n d the infinite G o d that c r e a t e d t h e m . ( H e n c e the attraction o f spiritualism for C a t h o l i c thinkers, i n c l u d i n g R a v a i s s o n , L a c h e l i e r , a n d B l o n d e l . ) W e n e e d , t h e r e f o r e , to distin2 5

2 6

A d d r e s s to the E d i n b u r g h Philosophical Society (1914), cited by J. A l e x a n d e r G u n n , Modern French Philosophy, 294. O c t a v e H a m e l i n , Le systeme de Renouvier. H a m e l i n also wrote i m p o r t a n t studies of the " s y s t e m s " o f Aristotle a n d Descartes.

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

5

l

guish at least b e t w e e n spiritualism a n d t h e absolute i d e a l i s m o f a Fichte o r a H e g e l . In a n y case, idealism in F r a n c e d e r i v e d f r o m a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f K a n t , n o t H e g e l , w h o h a d little influence there b e f o r e t h e 1 9 2 0 s .

27

T h e r e w e r e n o translations o f H e g e l until 1859 (twenty-eight years after his death), a n d it w a s n o t until w e l l into t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y that full F r e n c h versions o f m a j o r b o o k s such as The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic, a n d The Philosophy of Right w e r e available. E v e n K a n t ' s influence w a s slow in d e v e l o p i n g a n d b e c a m e i m p o r t a n t o n l y w i t h Jules L a c h e l i e r (1832 —1918), w h o p r e s e n t e d a K a n t i a n a c c o u n t o f scientific r e a s o n i n g in his thesis, Dufondement d e f e n d e d in 1871 a n d p u b l i s h e d t h e n e x t y e a r .

de I'induction,

2 8

L a c h e l i e r ' s thesis is a n e l e g a n t l y w r i t t e n tour de force, w h i c h , in t h e space o f a b o u t 100 p a g e s , e x p a n d s a n analysis o f t h e p r o b l e m o f induction

into

a

comprehensive

idealist

view

o f reality.

The

p r o b l e m o f i n d u c t i o n is that o f finding a n d j u s t i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s that w a r r a n t the m o v e " f r o m k n o w l e d g e o f facts to k n o w l e d g e o f t h e laws w h i c h o r d e r t h e m " (Du fondement de I'induction [FI\, 3/1). H e endorses t h e c o m m o n v i e w s that t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f a n i n d u c t i v e inference assert m o r e t h a n its p r e m i s e s a n d so c a n n o t b e g r o u n d e d in t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f d e d u c t i v e logic, a n d that i n d u c t i v e

inferences

r e q u i r e a p r i n c i p l e o f efficient causality, g u a r a n t e e i n g that t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a will follow w h e n e v e r the s a m e a n t e c e d e n t

conditions

occur. B u t h e a r g u e s that i n d u c t i o n also r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. Efficient causality tells us o n l y that if c o n d i t i o n s are t h e s a m e , t h e s a m e results will follow. Successful i n d u c t i o n also requires that w e k n o w that t h e c o n d i t i o n s a r e t h e s a m e . W e c a n , o f c o u r s e , k n o w f r o m o b s e r v a t i o n that c o n d i t i o n s n o w seem to b e t h e s a m e as they w e r e previously. B u t this gives n o assurance that there are n o t unobserved c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e t h e situation different t h a n it w a s previously. L a c h e l i e r gives t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e b i o l o g i c a l l a w that m e m b e r s o f a g i v e n species g e n e r a l l y p r o d u c e m e m b e r s o f that s a m e species. I f all w e k n e w w a s that t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a follow if t h e 2 7

2 8

O c t a v e H a m e l i n (1856-1907), m e n t i o n e d above, c o m b i n e d the spiritualism o f R e n o u v i e r with s o m e t h i n g like H e g e l i a n dialectic in his well-regarded Essai sur les elements principaux de la representation (1907). B u t H a m e l i n died early a n d his H e g e l i a n tendencies h a d no extended influence. T h e index to Ravaisson's La philosophie en France au XIXe siecle shows the continuing d o m i n a n c e of p r e - K a n t i a n influences. It lists 6 references to H e g e l , 7 to K a n t , b u t 43 to Leibniz.

16

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

s a m e c o n d i t i o n s occur, " w e w o u l d h a v e to limit ourselves to asserting that the p r o d u c t o f e a c h g e n e r a t i o n w o u l d r e s e m b l e its p r o g e n i t o r s if all the r e q u i r e d

conditions

come

together".

To

g o further

and

m a i n t a i n that the n e w g e n e r a t i o n will a c t u a l l y b e o f the s a m e species as the p r e v i o u s , w e must also k n o w that " a l l these c o n d i t i o n s do in fact c o m e t o g e t h e r " (FI, 11/5). S i n c e w e c a n n o t g e n e r a l l y k n o w this b y direct o b s e r v a t i o n , w e m u s t assume that there is a p r i n c i p l e o f o r d e r at w o r k that g u a r a n t e e s the stability o f species b y m a i n t a i n i n g the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s o f g e n e r a t i o n . B y such a p r i n c i p l e , a feature o f a w h o l e (the stability o f a species) d e t e r m i n e s the d e v e l o p m e n t s o f its parts (the g e n e r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l organisms). S u c h d e t e r m i n a t i o n is, a c c o r d i n g to K a n t ' s definition,

an instance

of hnal

causality.

A l t h o u g h this e x a m p l e is b i o l o g i c a l , the p o i n t also holds for c h e m i c a l a n d p h y s i c a l systems. W i t h o u t a p r i n c i p l e o f h n a l causality, w e w o u l d know

only a world

o f (efficient)

causal relations a m o n g

objects

defined entirely b y those relations. W e w o u l d h a v e n o access to the familiar w o r l d o f substantial objects that are the e n d u r i n g instantiations o f n a t u r a l kinds. T h e r e are, t h e n , t w o p r i n c i p l e s r e q u i r e d for successful i n d u c t i v e inference: o n e o f efficient causality, " i n virtue o f w h i c h p h e n o m e n a f o r m a series w h e r e i n the e x i s t e n c e o f the p r e c e d i n g d e t e r m i n e s the existence o f the f o l l o w i n g , " a n d one o f h n a l causality, " i n v i r t u e of w h i c h these series, in their t u r n , f o r m systems, in w h i c h the i d e a of the w h o l e d e t e r m i n e s the existence o f the p a r t s " (FI, 12/6). B u t is there a n y w a y to justify these principles? L a c h e l i e r thinks w e c a n d o so b y s h o w i n g that the p r i n c i p l e s are essential to the " c o n c r e t e

a n d p a r t i c u l a r acts b y w h i c h

thought

constitutes itself w h i l e seizing i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n r e a l i t y " (FI, 14/7). B u t n e i t h e r e m p i r i c i s m n o r r a t i o n a l i s m c a n m a k e the case. If, w i t h empiricists,

we

hold

that

knowledge

is m e r e l y

of

phenomenal

a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e n — as the failure o f M i l l ' s justification o f i n d u c t i o n shows — a n y a r g u m e n t for i n d u c t i o n will h a v e to be f r o m p h e n o m enal

experience

and

therefore

valid

o n l y if circular.

If,

on

the

contrary, as rationalists m a i n t a i n , k n o w l e d g e is o f sensorily i n a c c e s sible

things-in-themselves,

then

induction

could

in p r i n c i p l e

be

justified on the basis o f truths a b o u t the structure a n d stability o f the substances or causes b e n e a t h a p p e a r a n c e s . B u t w e h a v e n o access to such substances a n d causes, a n d e v o c a t i o n o f t h e m is m e r e l y " t h e assertion o f a p r o b l e m t r a n s f o r m e d into its s o l u t i o n " (FI, 36/20). (Lachelier also m a i n t a i n s that, e v e n if there w e r e , say, an intellectual

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic intuition o f things-in-themselves, this w o u l d still give t h e m o n l y as they a p p e a r to us intellectually at a g i v e n m o m e n t , n o t as they are a p a r t f r o m o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f them.) T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , b a s e d o n the

Kantian

c l a i m " t h a t w h a t e v e r m a y be the m y s t e r i o u s f o u n d a t i o n

beneath

p h e n o m e n a , the o r d e r in w h i c h t h e y follow e a c h o t h e r is exclusively d e t e r m i n e d b y the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f o u r o w n t h o u g h t " . T o see if K a n t m i g h t be right, L a c h e l i e r says that w e should try to establish the t w o p r i n c i p l e s o f i n d u c t i o n " b y s h o w i n g that if t h e y did n o t exist t h e n h u m a n t h o u g h t w o u l d n o t b e p o s s i b l e " (FI, 42/23). A

successful

d e m o n s t r a t i o n will c o n f i r m K a n t ' s v i e w o f the active role o f the m i n d in k n o w l e d g e a n d justify i n d u c t i o n . T h o u g h t is a b o u t the p h e n o m e n a (sensations) o f o u r w o r l d . B u t a t h o u g h t is n o t itself a n o t h e r p h e n o m e n o n n o r is it a b o u t j u s t o n e p h e n o m e n o n . It r e q u i r e s a subject, distinct f r o m the succession o f phenomena,

that exists as a u n i t y over

against this

succession.

T r a d i t i o n a l (pre-critical) v i e w s l o c a t e this distinctness a n d u n i t y in the t h i n k i n g subject's existence as a m e t a p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e separ a t e d f r o m the w o r l d it e x p e r i e n c e s . B u t , g i v e n this s e p a r a t i o n , there is n o w a y to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h o u g h t c o u l d ever k n o w the w o r l d outside o f it. It w o u l d h a v e to r e m a i n e n c l o s e d in its o w n a u t o n o m o u s existence. For k n o w l e d g e to be possible, t h o u g h t m u s t r a t h e r be a u n i t y in virtue o f its relation to the w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a ; that is, t h o u g h t m u s t be o n e precisely b e c a u s e it unites the succession o f p h e n o m e n a into a single w o r l d that is the object o f its e x p e r i e n c e a n d k n o w l e d g e . T h e unity o f t h o u g h t is n o t that o f an a u t o n o m o u s m e t a p h y s i c a l act b u t t h a t o f a f o r m p r o v i d i n g c o h e r e n c e a n d h e n c e intelligibility to the flux o f sensations. R e f l e c t i o n on o u r e x p e r i e n c e i m m e d i a t e l y reveals that one aspect o f this c o h e r e n c e a n d intelligibility is the single time a n d space in which phenomena

occur. B u t , L a c h e l i e r a r g u e s , s p a c e a n d

time

a l o n e are n o t sufficient to unify p h e n o m e n a into a c o h e r e n t w o r l d . P h e n o m e n a existing in the s a m e space a n d t i m e c o u l d still o c c u r in total i n d e p e n d e n c e o f one a n o t h e r a n d n e v e r p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t o b j e c t for t h o u g h t . P h e n o m e n a m u s t also be unified t h r o u g h their i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b y l a w s o f n e c e s s a r y c a u s a l succession. S u c h l a w s o f efficient causality p r o v i d e the unity n e e d e d for p h e n o m e n a to b e c o h e r e n t objects o f t h o u g h t . " T h u s , all p h e n o m e n a are subject to the l a w o f efficient causes, b e c a u s e this l a w is the o n l y f o u n d a t i o n to w h i c h w e c a n attribute the unity o f the universe, a n d in its t u r n this

18

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

unity is the s u p r e m e c o n d i t i o n o f the possibility o f t h o u g h t " (FI, 4 7 / 26). L a c h e l i e r further m a i n t a i n s that the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d , precisely b e c a u s e it is g o v e r n e d b y efficient causality, m u s t be a m e c h a n i s t i c w o r l d ; that is, a w o r l d consisting entirely o f m o t i o n s d e t e r m i n e d by their a n t e c e d e n t m o t i o n s . P h e n o m e n a

o c c u r in s p a c e a n d

time;

c o n s e q u e n t l y their unity m u s t be a u n i t y that exists t h r o u g h s p a c e a n d time. B u t the o n l y possible f o r m o f unity t h r o u g h space a n d time is c o n t i n u o u s m o v e m e n t , u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t i n u o u s c h a n g e o f spatial l o c a t i o n o v e r time. A l l p h e n o m e n a

must be

movements.

W h a t w e h a v e , t h e n , is a system o f m o v e m e n t s g o v e r n e d at every p o i n t a n d m o m e n t b y strict l a w s o f efficient causality: a m e c h a n i s t i c universe. O u r K a n t i a n t u r n seems to h a v e led to w h a t L a c h e l i e r calls an "idealistic m a t e r i a l i s m " (FI, 69/38). B u t w e h a v e n o t yet t a k e n a c c o u n t o f the role o f h n a l causality. It m i g h t s e e m that w e c a n n o t effect a K a n t i a n d e r i v a t i o n o f final causality since the distinctness a n d u n i t y o f the subject (and h e n c e the possibility o f t h o u g h t ) are g u a r a n t e e d b y efficient causality a l o n e . B u t L a c h e l i e r m a i n t a i n s that the u n i t y so g u a r a n t e e d is " i n c o m p l e t e a n d s u p e r f i c i a l " (FI, 76/42). T h i s is b e c a u s e an o b j e c t g i v e n simply as p a r t o f a m e c h a n i c a l system o f efficient causes is n o t g i v e n as a f u l l - b l o o d e d t h i n g in its o w n right (an instance o f a structured kind) b u t o n l y as, so to speak, a p l a c e - h o l d e r in the c a u s a l n e t w o r k . It has n o intrinsic c o n t e n t b u t exists o n l y t h r o u g h its causal relations to o t h e r items in the n e t w o r k . T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s to the p o i n t

made

a b o v e , in o u r analysis o f i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e , that efficient causality b y itself g u a r a n t e e s o n l y that the s a m e results follow f r o m the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s , n o t that the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s will r e g u l a r l y r e c u r ; r e g u l a r r e c u r r e n c e is n e c e s s a r y for the stability o f e n d u r i n g kinds. T h i s sort o f stability (or, equivalently, a w o r l d o f things w i t h e n d u r i n g natures) is, as w e h a v e seen, g u a r a n t e e d o n l y b y a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. L a c h e l i e r a c k n o w l e d g e s that t h o u g h t c o u l d exist in the d i m i n i s h e d w o r l d o f m e r e efficient causality. B u t he m a i n t a i n s that this w o u l d b e a " p u r e l y abstract e x i s t e n c e " , b e c a u s e it w o u l d be in a w o r l d w i t h n o substantial c o n t e n t . S u c h an existence " w o u l d b e , so far as t h o u g h t is c o n c e r n e d , a state o f illusion a n d d e a t h " (FI, 79/44). H e therefore c o n c l u d e s that the fully r e a l (concrete) existence o f consciousness requires a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. The

reality

of

final

causality

radically

transforms

Lachelier's

p i c t u r e o f the w o r l d . T h e truth o f c o s m i c reality is n o t "idealistic

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

19

m a t e r i a l i s m " , w h i c h in fact expresses m e r e l y the a b s t r a c t m e c h a n i c a l skeleton o f a robust p u r p o s i v e n a t u r e . M o v e m e n t still c o n f o r m s to the p a t t e r n s o f m e c h a n i c a l l a w s , b u t it is n o w seen to be u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e d f r o m forces that express the w o r l d ' s intrinsic teleology. T h e s e forces are n o t i n t e r v e n i n g outside causes; they flow directly f r o m the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f n a t u r a l objects. I n d e e d , L a c h e l i e r

insists

that force is n o t a t h i n g in itself b u t " o n l y the t e n d e n c y o f m o v e m e n t t o w a r d an e n d " (FI, 93/51). M o s t i m p o r t a n t , the p r i o r i t y o f (teleological) force over m o v e m e n t implies the p r i o r i t y o f f r e e d o m over d e t e r m i n i s m . A n e n d c a n n o t e x t e r n a l l y d e t e r m i n e the m e a n s (movements) that b r i n g it a b o u t b e c a u s e the e n d does n o t exist until the m e a n s h a v e p r o d u c e d it. R a t h e r , " t h e m e a n s dispose t h e m s e l v e s in the o r d e r fitted to realize the e n d " (FI, 87/48). C o n s e q u e n t l y , requires that the forces i n f o r m i n g n a t u r a l m o v e m e n t s b e n e o u s t e n d e n c i e s to the r e l e v a n t ends. O n

finality sponta-

the a b s t r a c t level

of

efficient causes, the p u r e l y q u a n t i t a t i v e f o r m a l structures o f n a t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t s are still m e c h a n i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d . B u t the qualitative c o n t e n t o f c o n c r e t e things is the c o n t i n g e n t p r o d u c t o f s p o n t a n e o u s activity.

29

M e r e s p o n t a n e i t y is n o t full f r e e d o m . E v e r y p a r t o f n a t u r e enjoys a certain f r e e d o m (and h e n c e life a n d e v e n t h o u g h t ) in that its goals are a c h i e v e d b y its innate t e n d e n c y t o w a r d t h e m , n o t b y m e c h a n i s t i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n . B u t f r e e d o m in its full sense consists " i n the p o w e r o f v a r y i n g one's p u r p o s e s a n d in c o n c e i v i n g n e w i d e a s " (FI, 9 7 / 5 3 - 4 ) . A n i m a l s act w i t h a f r e e d o m limited to the precise m e a n s o f fulfilling goals set for t h e m b y n a t u r e , as w h e n a bird c h o o s e s materials a n d l o c a t i o n s for its nest. R a t i o n a l b e i n g s such as h u m a n s ,

however,

e m p l o y intelligence n o t j u s t to a c h i e v e p r e - g i v e n goals b u t also " t o conceive

an infinite n u m b e r

undertakes

to realize

of pure

externally"

(FI,

ideas w h i c h

o u r will

98/54). F r e e d o m

then

properly

u n d e r s t o o d is n o t , as so m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e t h o u g h t , the will's u n c o n s t r a i n e d c h o i c e o f m e a n s o f a c t i o n ; it is r a t h e r the intellect's i n v e n t i o n o f n e w g o a l s o f a c t i o n . L a c h e l i e r a r g u e s that f r e e d o m in this sense is r e q u i r e d b y the p r i n c i p l e o f final causality " s i n c e the systematic unity o f n a t u r e c o u l d n o t be r e a l i z e d e x c e p t as the result o f original i n v e n t i o n a n d c r e a t i o n s p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d " (FI, 97/54). W e see, t h e n , the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n effected b y the n e e d to i n c l u d e 2 9

In his Etudes sur k syllogisme, L a c h e l i e r argues that the syllogism provides the appropriate logic for the qualitative while m a t h e m a t i c a l logic (including the logic o f relations) is appropriate for the quantitative.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

20

(1890-1940)

the p r i n c i p l e o f final causality in o u r a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e a n d the world:

"the

realm

of hnal

causes, b y p e n e t r a t i n g the r e a l m

efficient causes w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g it, e x c h a n g e s e v e r y w h e r e

of

force

for inertia, life for d e a t h , f r e e d o m for f a t a l i t y " (FI, 1 0 1 / 5 6 , translation modified). T h e result is n o l o n g e r the "idealistic m a t e r i a l i s m " o f the w o r l d as a n e x u s o f efficient causes b u t w h a t L a c h e l i e r calls a "spiritualistic

r e a l i s m " , in w h i c h

mechanism

is s u b o r d i n a t e d

to

hnality a n d " e v e r y b e i n g is a force, a n d e v e r y force is a t h o u g h t w h i c h tends t o w a r d a m o r e a n d m o r e c o m p l e t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i t s e l f " (FI, 1 0 2 / 5 6 , translation modified). L a c h e l i e r ' s h n a l insistence on " r e a l i s m " r a t h e r t h a n " i d e a l i s m " reflects n o t an assertion o f a reality i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h o u g h t - he r e m a i n s an idealist in rejecting this — b u t r a t h e r an insistence on the m e t a p h y s i c a l a u t o n o m y

of

i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , w h i c h he refuses to assimilate to a n y absolute t h o u g h t . T h i s keeps o p e n a p a t h to L a c h e l i e r ' s C a t h o l i c c o m m i t m e n t to an afterlife o f p e r s o n a l salvation a n d immortality. B u t this is n o t a p a t h that he thinks c a n b e t r a v e l e d b y p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection since on it w e " c r o s s , b y an act o f m o r a l faith, b e y o n d the b o u n d a r i e s b o t h o f t h o u g h t a n d o f n a t u r e " (FI, 102/56). L a c h e l i e r p u b l i s h e d v e r y little b e y o n d his thesis on i n d u c t i o n ,

3 0

b u t his influence w a s i m m e n s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h his t e a c h i n g at the E c o l e N o r m a l e , w h e r e he w a s maître de conférences (a p o s t r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t to a R e a d e r

at a British university or an

American

associate professor) f r o m 1864 to 1875, a n d , like R a v a i s s o n , t h r o u g h his later p o s i t i o n as c h a i r o f the c o m m i t t e e that set the agrégation in philosophy. H i s w r i t i n g a n d t e a c h i n g set h i g h standards o f c o n c e p tual subtlety a n d r i g o r a n d also m a d e serious e n g a g e m e n t w i t h K a n t de rigueur a m o n g his pupils, i n c l u d i n g , m o s t p r o m i n e n t l y , B o u t r o u x and B e r g s o n .

3 1

E m i l e B o u t r o u x ( 1 8 4 5 - 1 9 2 1 ) d o m i n a t e d the a c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h y o f the

Third

Republic

teacher, L a c h e l i e r ,

through World War

I. H e

as maître de conférences at the

followed

Ecole

( 1 8 7 7 - 8 6 ) , w h e r e he t a u g h t B e r g s o n , B l o n d e l , a n d D ü r k h e i m . 3 0

3 1

his

Normale He

W e should, however, m e n t i o n his famous article, " P s y c h o l o g i c et m é t a p h y s i q u e " (translated as " P s y c h o l o g y and M e t a p h y s i c s " in The Philosophy of Jules Lachelier), first published in 1885. in w h i c h L a c h e l i e r develops his idealism via a description of psychological experience (developed in opposition to positivist reductionism) a n d with a particular emphasis on the role of the will. B e r g s o n was not formally a student o f Lachelier, since he did not enter the Ecole N o r m a l e until 1878, three years after Lachelier stopped teaching there. But Lachelier was a strong influence on B e r g s o n , w h o dedicated his doctoral thesis to him.

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic formulated

21

his m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas in his thesis, La contingence

de les lois de la nature (1874). H i s later w o r k consisted o f r e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f these v i e w s (particularly in De Vidée de loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophie contemporaine [1895]) a n d n u m e r o u s i m p o r t a n t studies in the history o f p h i l o s o p h y (from 1888 to 1902 he w a s professor o f the history o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y at the S o r b o n n e ) . B o u t r o u x w a s also a l e a d i n g figure in " o f f i c i a l " F r e n c h a c a d e m i c life, a role that, p e r h a p s , led to his w r i t i n g , in 1915, Philosophy and War, one o f those unfortunate

books

osophy

connecting

German

aggression

with

German

phil-

3 2

B o u t r o u x s h a r e d the g e n e r a l c o n c e r n w i t h the tension b e t w e e n science a n d f r e e d o m . H e e n d o r s e d L a c h e l i e r ' s p i c t u r e o f a w o r l d in w h i c h free a n d p u r p o s i v e c r e a t i v i t y h a d p r i o r i t y over the abstractions

o f scientific

causality

but was

dissatisfied

with

Lachelier's

K a n t i a n willingness to a c c e p t a total scientific d e t e r m i n i s m for the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d . B e c a u s e o u r lives are led in this w o r l d , B o u t r o u x a r g u e s , this c o n c e s s i o n to d e t e r m i n i s m m e a n s that a n y g i v e n h u m a n a c t i o n is the n e c e s s a r y p r o d u c t o f past actions. P e r h a p s I h a v e a n o u m e n a l n a t u r e (or c h a r a c t e r ) that has b e e n c r e a t e d b y a c h o i c e outside the d e t e r m i n i s t i c n e t w o r k . B u t t h e n m y f r e e d o m has b e e n entirely spent in the c r e a t i o n o f this c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h b e c o m e s the d e t e r m i n i n g cause o f all m y i n d i v i d u a l actions. " A strange d o c t r i n e " , he c o n c l u d e s , " o n e that r e g a r d s . . . r e p e n t a n c e , c o n q u e s t s o f self, struggles b e t w e e n g o o d a n d evil, as b u t the n e c e s s a r y events o f a d r a m a the issue o f w h i c h has b e e n d e c i d e d u p o n

beforehand".

M o r e o v e r , B o u t r o u x a d d s , e v e n this c h a r a c t e r c a n n o t be p r o p e r l y r e g a r d e d as m y free c r e a t i o n . A s a p a r t o f the intelligible ( p h e n o m enal) w o r l d , it too must b e l o n g to a deterministic

system.

The

K a n t i a n effort at r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f r e e d o m a n d d e t e r m i n i s m succ e e d s o n l y in p l a c i n g f r e e d o m a n d h e n c e " m o r a l i t y in a s p h e r e inaccessible to h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . A s a result, " t h i s hypothesis w o u l d p r e v e n t us f r o m p a s s i n g a n y m o r a l j u d g m e n t either o n others or on o u r s e l v e s " .

3 3

B o u t r o u x c o n c l u d e s t h a t the assertion o f h u m a n f r e e d o m m u s t be at the e x p e n s e o f a deterministic v i e w o f p h e n o m e n a ; to justify the c l a i m that w e are free, w e m u s t establish that the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d d e s c r i b e d b y science is i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c . T o say that the w o r l d is For an A m e r i c a n e x a m p l e of this genre, see G e o r g e Philosophy. La contingence de les lois de la nature, 169, 170.

S a n t a y a n a , Egotism and German

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

22

(1890-1940)

indeterministic is to say that the l a w s g o v e r n i n g it are n o t necessary. H e r e B o u t r o u x has in m i n d three senses o f necessity: the analytic necessity o f l o g i c a l truth, the synthetic a p r i o r i necessity o f K a n t i a n truths a b o u t the c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e , a n d the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f de facto c o n s t a n t correlations. H e u n d e r t a k e s to s h o w that, in all o f these senses a n d at e v e r y level, there is n o necessity in the w o r l d . H i s a p p r o a c h is n o t h i n g if not c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d s y s t e m a t i c .

34

It b e g i n s b y distinguishing a

series o f six successively m o r e specific levels o f d e s c r i p t i o n . T h e hrst level (that o f " b e i n g " , in B o u t r o u x ' s t e r m i n o l o g y ) is s i m p l y that o f an a g g r e g a t e o f separate individuals. S u b s e q u e n t levels c o r r e s p o n d to further specifications o f these individuals. T h e s e c o n d l e v e l (that of " g e n e r a " ) a d d s that the individuals h a v e n a t u r e s a l l o w i n g t h e m to be d i v i d e d into qualitatively similar classes; the third (that o f " m a t t e r " ) m a k e s the i n d i v i d u a l s m a t e r i a l b e i n g s , e x t e n d e d in space a n d time; the fourth (that o f " b o d i e s " ) a d d s that t h e y are s t r u c t u r e d m a t e r i a l substances, for e x a m p l e , a t o m s or c o m p o u n d s o f a t o m s ; the hfth (that o f " l i f e " ) that t h e y are o r g a n i s m s ; the sixth (that o f " m a n " ) that they are intelligent. For e a c h level, B o u t r o u x a r g u e s that there is neither

e x t e r n a l n o r i n t e r n a l necessity; that is, the level is not

r e q u i r e d to exist in v i r t u e o f a p r e c e d i n g level (external necessity), nor, g i v e n

its e x i s t e n c e ,

are there

necessary

laws

governing

its

d e v e l o p m e n t (internal necessity). In so a r g u i n g , he m u s t , o f course, s h o w that there is n o e x t e r n a l or i n t e r n a l necessity o f a n y o f the three types (analytic, synthetic a p r i o r i , a n d e m p i r i c a l ) . H e must, t h e n , p r o v i d e six a r g u m e n t s against necessity for e a c h level, for a g r a n d total o f thirty-six a r g u m e n t s . T h e r e are, h o w e v e r , j u s t a few basic p a t t e r n s to B o u t r o u x ' s a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e p a t t e r n s are w e l l illustrated in his t r e a t m e n t o f b e i n g , the first

level o f reality. H e r e

we

begin with nothing more

than

c o l l e c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g s a n d do n o t a s s u m e that t h e y

a

are

intelligent, alive, substantial, m a t e r i a l , or e v e n g r o u p e d into distinct g e n e r a . B o u t r o u x ' s first q u e s t i o n is a b o u t e x t e r n a l necessity: is there a n y t h i n g outside the r e a l m o f a c t u a l b e i n g (in the r e a l m o f m e r e possibility) that r e q u i r e s the existence o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f beings? Certainly, there is n o a n a l y t i c necessity, n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in asserting that a g i v e n c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s d o e s n o t exist. A n existent is a

M a t h i e u Schyns offers an excellent a c c o u n t o f B o u t r o u x ' s sometimes difficult a r g u m e n t a tion in La philosophie d'Emile Boutroux.

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

23

synthesis o f possibility a n d actuality (the a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a possibility), a n d there is n o l o g i c a l necessity for a n y s u c h synthesis. N o r c a n it be m a i n t a i n e d that the v e r y possibility o f e x p e r i e n c e requires the a c t u a t i o n o f a specific set o f possible b e i n g s . In the d o m a i n o f e x p e r i e n c e , the possible is simply that w h i c h m a y or m a y n o t be given

as

an

object

of

experience.

Our

experiential

knowledge

(science) tells us a b o u t c o n n e c t i o n s that exist a m o n g the a c t u a l i z e d possibilities, b u t the m e r e fact o f e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e that certain possible b e i n g s be a c t u a l i z e d . N o r , hnally, is it possible to a r g u e that w e k n o w as a m a t t e r o f e m p i r i c a l fact that a n y o f the objects o f our e x p e r i e n c e had to be a c t u a l i z e d . S o the existence o f b e i n g s is a c o n t i n g e n t fact, n o t an e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d necessity. B u t , g i v e n this e x i s t e n c e , are there n e c e s s a r y laws for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s (i.e., i n t e r n a l necessity)? B o u t r o u x hrst a r g u e s that there c a n be n o q u e s t i o n o f a logical necessity b e c a u s e d e v e l o p m e n t a l l a w s r e q u i r e us to think o f the b e i n g s t h e y g o v e r n as in certain respects stable a n d

unchanging,

w h e r e a s the m e r e i d e a o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s is consistent w i t h their b e i n g in r a n d o m flux. A s to the possibility o f a K a n t i a n a p r i o r i causal c o n n e c t i o n , B o u t r o u x a g r e e s that the i d e a o f a p r o d u c t i v e cause w o u l d h a v e to be a p r i o r i , since it g o e s b e y o n d a n y t h i n g g i v e n in o u r e x p e r i e n c e . B u t he notes that, precisely for this r e a s o n , w e h a v e n o basis for p o s t u l a t i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n n e c t i o n that is not g r o u n d e d in e x p e r i e n c e . It m i g h t be m a i n t a i n e d that there is still the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f a scientific law, w h i c h is r e v e a l e d b y e x p e r i ence

and

does

determine

that

one

phenomenon

follow

upon

another. B u t B o u t r o u x a r g u e s , hrst, that e v e n an e x a c t c o r r e s p o n dence

between

cause

and

effect

would

not

prove

a

necessary

c o n n e c t i o n . E v e n if, for e x a m p l e , o b s e r v a t i o n o f gases s h o w e d that the p r o d u c t o f pressure a n d v o l u m e w a s a l w a y s e x a c t l y e q u a l to a c o n s t a n t m u l t i p l i e d b y t e m p e r a t u r e , this m i g h t m e r e l y s h o w that gases

have

possible.

always

But

more

behaved

this w a y ;

important,

he

deviations

argues,

is the

might fact

still that

be our

o b s e r v a t i o n s are n e v e r able to s h o w the e x a c t v a l i d i t y o f a law. W e m e a s u r e pressure, v o l u m e , a n d t e m p e r a t u r e o n l y u p to a certain r a n g e o f uncertainty, a n d c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n these

phenomena

m a y b e i n d e t e r m i n a t e precisely w i t h i n this r a n g e . B o u t r o u x d e p l o y s similar a r g u m e n t s for the h i g h e r levels o f reality. H e e x c l u d e s l o g i c a l necessities o f existence or d e v e l o p m e n t a l l a w s b y s h o w i n g that e a c h successive l e v e l involves n e w features a n d laws

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

24

(1890-1940)

that are n o t i m p l i e d b y the p r e c e d i n g levels. For e x a m p l e , a w o r l d of n o n - m a t e r i a l g e n e r a a n d species is d i s c o n t i n u o u s , w h e r e a s a w o r l d o f m a t t e r is e x t e n d e d a n d h e n c e c o n t i n u o u s ; a n d m a t t e r m a y v a r y in size a n d position w i t h o u t c h a n g i n g qualitatively, so that the qualitative l a w s o f n o n - m a t e r i a l g e n e r a c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e p u r e l y q u a n t i tative relations a m o n g m a t e r i a l entities. K a n t i a n a p r i o r i claims o f existence or causal c o n n e c t i o n he rejects b y s h o w i n g that o u r a c t u a l experience

of

phenomena

does

not

support

such

claims.

For

e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h m e t a p h y s i c i a n s m a y u n d e r s t a n d the solubility o f sugar in w a t e r in t e r m s o f u n o b s e r v a b l e p o w e r s i n f o r m i n g these t w o substances, scientific o b s e r v a t i o n reveals o n l y that there is a constant c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n sugar's m e l t i n g a n d its b e i n g p u t into water. Finally, B o u t r o u x rejects claims o f e m p i r i c a l necessity b y a r g u i n g , first, that e x p e r i e n c e n e v e r e x c l u d e s the possibility that a g i v e n level o f o b j e c t m i g h t n o t exist. For e x a m p l e , e v e n if w e k n e w that living cells w e r e the p r o d u c t s o f certain c h e m i c a l r e a c t i o n s , w e w o u l d not k n o w that such r e a c t i o n s h a d to o c c u r or that cells did n o t m e r e l y h a p p e n to f o l l o w f r o m t h e m . A n d B o u t r o u x a l w a y s e x c l u d e s the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f l a w s b y a p p e a l i n g to the i n e x a c t n e s s in o u r k n o w l e d g e o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s t h e y express. For the case o f o r g a n isms, he suggests that the l a w s g o v e r n i n g t h e m (e.g., the l a w

of

a d a p t a t i o n , w h i c h says that species v a r y to survive in n e w c i r c u m stances) are so i m p r e c i s e that b i o l o g y d o e s n o t in fact constitute a positive science. B o u t r o u x ' s defense o f i n d e t e r m i n i s m has a distinctly positivist, a n t i - K a n t i a n , anti-idealist b e n t . H e takes for g r a n t e d the a u t h o r i t y o f scientific

descriptions,

rejects

logical

analysis

of concepts

as

irrelevant to questions o f truth a b o u t the w o r l d , a n d insists o n an empiricist r e a d i n g o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e that r e p l a c e s K a n t i a n necessities w i t h H u m e a n c o r r e l a t i o n s . T h i s positivist b e n t is e v e n m o r e o b v i o u s in De l'idée de loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophic contemporaine, w h e r e B o u t r o u x m a k e s his case b y a direct analysis of scientific results r a t h e r t h a n b y abstract p h i l o s o p h i c a l tion.

3 5

argumenta-

B u t his a c c o u n t is also relentlessly a n t i - r e d u c t i v e , w i t h e a c h

successive level o f reality distinguished b y n e w traits (the c o n t i n u i t y o f matter, the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f life, the m o r a l f r e e d o m o f h u m a n beings) that c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d v i a " l o w e r " c a t e g o r i e s . M o r e o v e r ,

^

H e r e , as w e shall see, B o u t r o u x ' s views have important similarities to those o f his brotherin-law — with w h o m he also h a d close intellectual contacts — H e n r i Poincaré.

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

25

the distinctive features o f e a c h o n t o l o g i c a l level are a l w a y s further and richer achievements of freedom. B o u t r o u x deploys

positivist

e p i s t e m o l o g y in the service o f spiritualist ontology. R a v a i s s o n a n d L a c h e l i e r m i g h t w e l l q u e s t i o n his m e a n s , b u t t h e y w o u l d a g r e e w i t h his result.

CHAPTER

2

Science and idealism

It's like t h e rules o f l o g i c o r scientific l a w s , r e a l i t y c o n f o r m s t o them more Poincare:

o r less, b u t r e m e m b e r

he's by no means

the great

certain

that

mathematician

mathematics

is a

rigorously exact science. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, m , 149)

T h e n a r r a t i v e o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y d u r i n g the hrst t w o d e c a d e s o f the

twentieth

century

consists

o f three

intertwined

stories: t h e

d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y o f science as a n i n d e p e n d e n t discipline, the solidification o f university i d e a l i s m in t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f L e o n B r u n s c h v i c g , a n d t h e brilliant rise o f B e r g s o n ' s spiritualist m e t a p h y sics. T h i s

chapter

treats the hrst t w o topics, a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g

c h a p t e r is d e v o t e d to B e r g s o n .

PHILOSOPHERS

OF SCIENCE:

POINCARE,

DUHEM,

AND

MEYERS ON

A l t h o u g h F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s h r m l y rejected positivism, t h e y still recognized Lachelier

t h e centrality o f science and Boutroux,

for p h i l o s o p h i c a l

in particular,

insisted

reflection.

o n t h e n e e d to

c o n s t r u c t a u n i h e d a c c o u n t o f n a t u r e that s h o w e d h o w t h e truths o f science a n d o f h u m a n f r e e d o m Such

a synthesis

involved

combined

exhibiting

in a c o h e r e n t

t h e limitations

whole.

o f science

( i n d e t e r m i n i s m , a b s e n c e o f hnality) that r e q u i r e us to c o m p l e m e n t it w i t h m e t a p h y s i c a l a c c o u n t s if w e are to describe t h e full c o n c r e t e ness o f reality. nature

called

This

enterprise

for serious

of developing

philosophical

a metaphysics

reflection

on

of

scientific

k n o w i n g , w h i c h in t u r n r e q u i r e d a t h o r o u g h a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h t h e methods

a n d results

o f science.

Moreover,

t h e survival

of the

G o m t e a n i d e a that science h a d to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a historical 26

Science and idealism phenomenon

27

led to a r a p i d d e v e l o p m e n t o f the e p i s t e m o l o g y

of

science, a historically b a s e d effort to u n d e r s t a n d the structure

of

1

science as a c o g n i t i v e enterprise. In p r i n c i p l e , the n e w e p i s t e m o l o g y o f science c o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d entirely s u b o r d i n a t e d to the goals o f the m e t a p h y s i c s o f n a t u r e . In p r a c t i c e , it e m e r g e d as m o r e a n d more

an

autonomous

study

o f science

in its o w n

terms,

d e c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n for i n c l u d i n g scientihc results in a

with

synthetic

m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w o f n a t u r e as a c o n c r e t e w h o l e . T h e m o v e to a u t o n o m y is p e r h a p s clearest in the p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections o f H e n r i P o i n c a r e (1854—1912). A s a distinguished m a t h e m a t i c i a n a n d scientist, P o i n c a r e h a d little t r a i n i n g in p h i l o s o p h y a n d n o interest in the spiritualist a n d idealist o r i e n t a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h e r s such as R a v a i s s o n a n d L a c h e l i e r . (Neither are m e n t i o n e d in his three m a i n b o o k s o n p h i l o s o p h y o f science, a n d e v e n B e r g s o n receives o n l y o n e p a s s i n g reference.) O n the o t h e r h a n d , P o i n c a r e w a s well a w a r e o f c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d limitations o f science a n d w a s v e r y s y m p a t h e t i c to the ideas o f B o u t r o u x , his friend a n d brother-in-law, a b o u t the c o n t i n g e n c y o f laws. Poincare's w r i t i n g s on m e t h o d o l o g i c a l topics set a m o d e l for a n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p r o a c h to science, one that p l a c e d a h i g h p r e m i u m on careful discussion o f the c o n c e p t u a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r theories a n d , on this basis, d e v e l o p e d sophisticated analyses o f the k e y c o n c e p t s o f o b s e r v a t i o n , law, theory, a n d e x p l a n a t i o n . H e w a s , a l o n g w i t h M a c h a n d D u h e m , a f o u n d e r o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f science that b e c a m e so c e n t r a l in t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y analytic philosophy. P o i n c a r e w a s , h o w e v e r , less n a i v e l y logical

positivist

philosophers

of

empiricist t h a n the

science

who

came

after

early him.

R e f l e c t i n g the K a n t i a n i s m o f his m i l i e u , he a c k n o w l e d g e s the role of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in scientihc o b s e r v a t i o n , a n d his sophistic a t e d c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m gives the m i n d an active role in the constitution o f e m p i r i c a l objects a n d truth. B u t his w o r k derives m o r e f r o m reflection on scientific p r a c t i c e t h a n f r o m p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n ciple, l e a d i n g h i m , for e x a m p l e , to different a c c o u n t s o f c o n v e n t i o n s in g e o m e t r i c a l a x i o m s , e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , a n d theories; a n d his a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i e s , such as simplicity, are m o r e a f u n c t i o n o f p r a g m a t i c utility t h a n o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e . !

In the first lesson of his Course in Positive Philosophy (1830—42), C o m t e h a d e m p h a s i z e d the n e e d to trace " t h e course actually followed by the h u m a n m i n d in action, through the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the methods really e m p l o y e d to obtain the exact k n o w l e d g e that it has already a c q u i r e d " {The Essential Comte, 32).

28

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

A m o n g P o i n c a r e ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t v i e w s are his a c c o u n t o f the roles o f h y p o t h e s e s in science a n d his defense o f the objectivity o f scientific

knowledge.

In La

science et I'hypothese, he

distinguishes

several kinds o f h y p o t h e s e s , e a c h w i t h a distinctive a n d essential role in scientific i n q u i r y (La science et I'hypothese [SH],

3/28). T h e hrst k i n d

c o m p r i s e s g e n e r a l c l a i m s testable b y o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e y are essential to science's p r o j e c t o f f o r e s e e i n g the future, an enterprise inconsistent w i t h the p o p u l a r v i e w o f science as simply a b o d y o f certain facts, p r o v e n b y o b s e r v a t i o n . G e n e r a l e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s are b y their v e r y n a t u r e an e x t r a p o l a t i o n b e y o n d w h a t o b s e r v a t i o n gives a n d so are a l w a y s o p e n to refutation b y s u b s e q u e n t

experience.

T h e y are m o s t often explicitly f o r m u l a t e d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , s u p p o r t e d but

not

logically

entailed

by

experimental

data;

for

example,

K e p l e r ' s laws o f p l a n e t a r y m o t i o n , b a s e d on T y c h o B r a h e ' s o b s e r v a tions o f the solar system. T h e r e are also u n c o n s c i o u s h y p o t h e s e s of this sort, u n t h i n k i n g a s s u m p t i o n s , often e n g r a i n e d in o u r l a n g u a g e , about

how

nature

must

behave.

(Poincare

cites e x a m p l e s

from

A m p e r e ' s w o r k on e l e c t r o d y n a m i c s a n d notes the v a l u e o f rigorous m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s in b r i n g i n g s u c h a s s u m p t i o n s to light.) P o i n c a r e notes that scientists should try to m a k e h y p o t h e s e s o n e at a time, so that t h e y will k n o w j u s t w h a t has b e e n refuted b y a n e g a t i v e e x p e r i m e n t a l result. ( D u h e m , as w e shall see, will q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r this is in fact possible.) P o i n c a r e a r g u e s that a falsified h y p o t h e s i s is not a failure o f science. A scientific h y p o t h e s i s is f o r m u l a t e d o n the basis o f w h a t w e h a v e r e a s o n to e x p e c t , a n d the failure o f o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s p o i n t s to the existence o f a n e w p h e n o m e n o n

that

represents an a d v a n c e in o u r k n o w l e d g e . H e also distinguishes a subclass o f e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s that are " p e r f e c t l y n a t u r a l a n d f r o m which

one c a n h a r d l y e s c a p e " (SH,

187/135). E x a m p l e s o f such

a s s u m p t i o n s (no d o u b t often u n c o n s c i o u s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y are so natural) are that the influence o f v e r y distant b o d i e s is negligible, that q u a n t i t a t i v e effects v a r y c o n t i n u o u s l y w i t h their causes, a n d that nature b e h a v e s a c c o r d i n g to b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f symmetry.

Such

h y p o t h e s e s , for all their o b v i o u s n e s s , m a y t u r n out to b e falsified b y o b s e r v a t i o n , a l t h o u g h t h e y are so f u n d a m e n t a l that " t h e y are the last that o u g h t to be a b a n d o n e d " (SH, 188/135). Poincare

also

thinks

that

some

scientific

hypotheses

are

not

e m p i r i c a l l y testable at all. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e s are claims that s e e m to be substantive e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s b u t t u r n out to be "reducible

to

disguised

definitions

or

conventions"

(SH,

3/28).

Science and idealism

29

C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , the q u e s t i o n o f the g e o m e t r i c a l structure of p h y s i c a l space. For a l o n g t i m e , there s e e m e d to be n o d o u b t that this w a s E u c l i d e a n , since there s e e m e d to be n o c o h e r e n t alternative to the familiar a x i o m s o f E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y (such as, for e x a m p l e , that t w o lines intersect in at m o s t o n e point). T h e o n l y q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n e d the n a t u r e o f the necessity o f these a x i o m s : w e r e they analytic truths, d e r i v a b l e f r o m the v e r y d e h n i t i o n s o f basic g e o m e trical t e r m s (as L e i b n i z held) or w e r e they, as K a n t

maintained,

synthetic a p r i o r i truths r e q u i r e d as c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e ? B u t a c c o r d i n g to P o i n c a r e , the d e v e l o p m e n t in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y o f a l t e r n a t i v e , n o n - E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r i e s refuted b o t h these

claims

by

showing

that

the

Euclidean

axioms

were

of not

necessary. S u c h g e o m e t r i e s c o n t a i n e d a x i o m s c o n t r a r y to those o f E u c l i d (those o f R i e m a n n i a n g e o m e t r y , for e x a m p l e , a l l o w e d distinct lines to intersect in m o r e t h a n o n e point) a n d c o u l d , m o r e o v e r , b e p r o v e d to be self-consistent if E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y w a s . T h i s put t h e m o n a l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l p a r w i t h E u c l i d e a n geometry. O f c o u r s e , e v e n if E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y is n o t the o n l y c o n c e p t u a l possibility, it m i g h t s e e m to b e the o n l y one s u p p o r t e d b y e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . D o precise m e a s u r e m e n t s n o t show, for e x a m p l e , that the three interior angles o f a triangle a d d u p to 180 d e g r e e s ? Euclidean

geometries

require

sums

lesser

degrees.) O n e difficulty w i t h this i d e a -

or

greater

suggested by

(Non-

than

180

Boutroux's

t r e a t m e n t o f m e a s u r e m e n t - is that the n o n - E u c l i d e a n n a t u r e

of

p h y s i c a l g e o m e t r y m i g h t be a p p a r e n t o n l y b e y o n d the limits o f the a c c u r a c y o f o u r c u r r e n t m e a s u r e m e n t s . B u t a c c o r d i n g to P o i n c a r e e v e n u n l i m i t e d a c c u r a c y in m e a s u r e m e n t c o u l d n o t establish the e m p i r i c a l truth o f o n e g e o m e t r y over a n o t h e r b e c a u s e w e

would

a l w a y s be free to r e i n t e r p r e t the m e t r i c (that is, the w a y in w h i c h m e a s u r i n g i n s t r u m e n t s v a r y in different

parts o f space) u s e d

to

m a k e the m e a s u r e m e n t s . P e r h a p s , for e x a m p l e , if w e a s s u m e that o u r m e a s u r i n g rods are p e r f e c t l y rigid b o d i e s , o u r

measurements

will s u p p o r t E u c l i d e a n geometry. B u t the v e r y s a m e m e a s u r e m e n t s will s u p p o r t a n o n - E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y o n the a s s u m p t i o n that the lengths o f o u r rods v a r y w i t h their p o s i t i o n . (We m i g h t , o f course, try to m e a s u r e o u r m e a s u r i n g rods at v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s — say b y t i m i n g light rays that w e shot b a c k a n d forth a l o n g their l e n g t h . But

the

result

of

these

meta-measurements

would

depend

on

e q u a l l y u n t e s t a b l e a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the s p e e d a n d straightness of the light rays.) P o i n c a r e c o n c l u d e s , t h e n , that the q u e s t i o n o f the

30

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

g e o m e t r y o f p h y s i c a l space c a n be r e s o l v e d o n l y b y our specifying a convention. T h i s d o e s n o t , he insists, p u t the n a t u r e

o f s p a c e u p to

our

a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e . O u r c h o i c e o f a c o n v e n t i o n is n o t a w h i m ; it is b a s e d o n p o w e r f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f c o n v e n i e n c e (e.g., simplicity). O u r c h o i c e is free in the sense o f n o t c o m p e l l e d b y logic or o b s e r v e d facts,

but

it is n o t

arbitrary.

In

fact,

Poincare

maintains

that

" E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y is, a n d will r e m a i n , the m o s t c o n v e n i e n t " [SH, 70/65), n o t o n l y b e c a u s e o f o u r familiarity w i t h it a n d its o b v i o u s a d e q u a c y to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t also b e c a u s e o f its g r e a t e r intrinsic simplicity.

2

P o i n c a r e also thinks that s o m e o f the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s of physics are c o n v e n t i o n a l . H e r e w e often b e g i n w i t h an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s , say that b o d i e s attract one a n o t h e r in inverse p r o p o r t i o n to their distance or that e n e r g y is c o n s e r v e d in c l o s e d systems. T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e

evidence

for

the h y p o t h e s i s ; it has v e r y

fruitful

c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e s c e n t r a l to o u r w a y o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t p h y s i c a l p h e n o m e n a . A t this p o i n t , w e b e g i n m a i n t a i n i n g the hypothesis e v e n in the face o f c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e . I f t w o b o d i e s s e e m to m o v e a c c o r d i n g to s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the inverse s q u a r e law, w e take this as e v i d e n c e that there are o t h e r forces o p e r a t i v e , n o t that the l a w is invalid. I f e n e r g y seems n o t to b e c o n s e r v e d , w e assume

that the

system is n o t closed. Eventually, w h a t w a s

an

e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s b e c o m e s a p r i n c i p l e true b y definition, a n d the rest o f o u r physics is built a r o u n d it. (We c a n , o f c o u r s e , d e c i d e to cease t r e a t i n g a p r i n c i p l e as a definition, b u t that too is a c o n v e n tional decision.) P o i n c a r e s h o w e d h o w the history o f m o d e r n physics supports his distinction b e t w e e n e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s a n d definitional p r i n c i p l e s . P o i n c a r e w a s f o r c e d to a careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the objectivity o f science b y the w r i t i n g s o f one o f his students, a brilliant m a t h e m a t i cian-turned-philosopher,

Edouard

Le

Roy.

Le

Roy

argued

that

P o i n c a r e ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y o f certain scientific principles should be e x t e n d e d to all o f science: " t h e scientist creates [fait] the o r d e r a n d d e t e r m i n i s m that he i m a g i n e s he discovers in t h i n g s " . W h y , after all, c a n w e n o t e x t e n d to all scientific claims the 3

2

3

T h i s v i e w has, o f course, b e e n proven w r o n g , at least for the purposes of theoretical physics, by the general theory of relativity, w h i c h describes the universe in terms o f a R i e m a n n i a n g e o m e t r y of variable curvature. E d o u a r d Le Roy, " S c i e n c e et p h i l o s o p h i c " , 513.

Science and idealism analysis that P o i n c a r é

gives for the l a w

3 of gravitation

and

1

the

c o n s e r v a t i o n o f e n e r g y ? It m a y s e e m that this suggestion m i s u n d e r stands P o i n c a r é 's analysis. T h e

c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f certain

scientihc h y p o t h e s e s w a s u n c o v e r e d , in effect, b y s e p a r a t i n g t h e m into t w o c o m p o n e n t s , one c o n v e n t i o n a l , the o t h e r e m p i r i c a l . S o , P o i n c a r é p o i n t s out (La valeur de la science [VS], s t a t e m e n t The stars obey Newton's

2 6 0 / 3 3 4 - 5 ) , the

laws is b r o k e n u p into: Gravitation

obeys Newton's laws a n d Gravitation is the only force acting on the stars. T h e first c o m p o n e n t s t a t e m e n t m a y be t r e a t e d as a c o n v e n t i o n a l definition, b u t t h e n the s e c o n d m u s t be r e g a r d e d as an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h esis, falsihable b y o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e latter, t h e n , r e m a i n s as a c l a i m of fact o n w h i c h the truth o f the N e w t o n i a n t h e o r y d e p e n d s . B u t such a response will n o t satisfy L e Roy, w h o m a i n t a i n s that e v e n scientihc facts are c r e a t e d b y the scientist: " F a r f r o m b e i n g i m p o s e d o n h i m f r o m outside, scientific facts a r e , in t r u t h , m a d e [faits] b y the scientist w h o asserts t h e m . "

4

Here Le Roy's thought,

inspired b y B e r g s o n , is that the sole reality truly g i v e n to the m i n d is an u n s t r u c t u r e d c o n t i n u u m o f p a s s i n g time (la durée).

5

This con-

t i n u u m is n o t accessible to the intellect a n d is r e v e a l e d o n l y b y an extra-intellectual intuition. A l l the structures o f science are i m p o s e d b y the m i n d on this c o n t i n u u m : " T h e facts are c a r v e d out [taillés] b y the m i n d in the a m o r p h o u s m a t t e r o f the G i v e n . " I f so, there are n o 6

o b j e c t i v e l y g i v e n scientihc facts, m e r e l y the free decisions o f the intellect to divide reality u p in c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a y s . T h e p o i n t o f this division is to p r o v i d e us w i t h rules o f a c t i o n as g u i d e s t o w a r d p r a c t i c a l goals. T h e rules w o r k , b u t o n l y b e c a u s e w e h a v e f o r m u l a t e d t h e m so that t h e y will. A s a result, " o u r c a l c u l a t i o n s are n o t , p r o p e r l y speaking, true, b u t t h e y are effective. T h e i r f a v o r a b l e results are less the success o f o u r science t h a n o f o u r a c t i o n . "

7

P o i n c a r é ' s i m m e d i a t e response to this e x t r e m e c l a i m is that the v e r y success o f o u r rules o f a c t i o n is p r o o f that science is n o t p u r e l y o u r c r e a t i o n : " I f science did n o t s u c c e e d , it c o u l d n o t serve as [a] rule o f a c t i o n . " Further, the p r a c t i c a l success o f science derives f r o m its ability to p r e d i c t the future. A c c o r d i n g l y , " t h e r e is n o e s c a p e from this d i l e m m a : either science d o e s n o t e n a b l e us to foresee, a n d t h e n it is valueless as a rule o f a c t i o n ; or else it e n a b l e s us to foresee . . . " U n positivisme n o u v e a u " , 145. See below, chapter 3. " S c i e n c e et p h i l o s o p h i e " , 517. ' " L a Science positive et la l i b e r t é " , 3 3 8 - 9 .

4

5

6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

3->

(1890-1940)

a n d t h e n it is n o t w i t h o u t v a l u e as [a] m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e "

(VS,

240-1/324). T h i s response is effective in p r i n c i p l e , b u t h o w do w e k n o w that it does n o t tell against P o i n c a r e as well as L e R o y ? P e r h a p s P o i n c a r e ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n into o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f science u n d e r m i n e s the i d e a o f an objective scientific fact a n d m a k e s e v e n his o w n position v u l n e r a b l e to his d i l e m m a . T o r e s p o n d a d e q u a t e l y to L e Roy, P o i n c a r e n e e d s an a c c o u n t o f the n a t u r e o f scientific facts. H e has such an a c c o u n t , b a s e d on a distinction, a c k n o w l e d g e d b y Le

Roy,

between

brute

facts

(les fails

bruts) a n d

scientific

P o i n c a r e ' s c o m p l a i n t against L e R o y is that he tries to

facts.

separate

entirely the b r u t e fact f r o m scientific w o r k , so that the first exercises n o c o n s t r a i n t on the s e c o n d . P o i n c a r e m a i n t a i n s that a scientific fact is simply a translation o f a b r u t e fact into a p a r t i c u l a r (scientific) l a n g u a g e a n d , as s u c h , has to f o l l o w constraints i m p o s e d b y the b r u t e fact. H e offers the e x a m p l e o f the " f a c t s " a b o u t an eclipse of the sun. T h e r e is a c o n t i n u u m , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the c o m m o n - s e n s e fact that it is g e t t i n g dark, a n d m o v i n g t h r o u g h ever h i g h e r levels of scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n such as, An eclipse occurred at nine o'clock, An eclipse occurred at the time predicted by Newton's laws, a n d The eclipse occurred because of the earth's revolution around the sun. In fact, e v e n o u r "common-sense" impression

fact involves

of obscurity"

(VS,

a minimal

interpretation

of

245/327), so that it is really

first "the this

i m p r e s s i o n r a t h e r t h a n the assertion " I t is g e t t i n g d a r k " that is the b r u t e fact. A t e a c h stage b e y o n d the sheer i m p r e s s i o n o f darkness, this

brute

fact

is

expressed

in

increasingly

rich

and

nuanced

l a n g u a g e . B u t , P o i n c a r e m a i n t a i n s , e a c h such e x p r e s s i o n is c o n strained b y the b r u t e fact it is t r y i n g to f o r m u l a t e . G r a n t e d ,

we

c h o o s e to express the fact t h r o u g h the simple qualitative c a t e g o r i e s o f dark a n d light or t h r o u g h the far m o r e sophisticated c a t e g o r i e s of the h e l i o c e n t r i c theory. B u t in all cases, g i v e n the c a t e g o r i e s w e h a v e c h o s e n , s o m e f o r m u l a t i o n s are better t h a n others (it w o u l d n o t d o to say It is getting lighter or The sun is in front of the moon); a n d this is b e c a u s e o f the c o n t r o l l i n g role o f the b r u t e fact w e are t r y i n g to express. T h i s r e s p o n s e m a k e s scientific a n d c o m m o n sense, b u t it scarcely resolves the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s raised b y L e R o y ' s position. For the dispute b e t w e e n h i m a n d P o i n c a r e d e p e n d s o n the n a t u r e of " b r u t e f a c t s " : w h e t h e r there are a n y such things a n d , if there are, w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e the m i n i m a l c o n c e p t u a l structure r e q u i r e d to

Science and idealism

33

c o n s t r a i n "scientific f a c t s " . R e s o l v i n g such issues w o u l d r e q u i r e a m u c h closer p r o b i n g t h a n P o i n c a r é is p r e p a r e d to u n d e r t a k e o f the precise n a t u r e o f the c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e in w h i c h w e alleged

"brute facts".

S u c h p r o b i n g will be

encounter

a high priority

for

s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s o f e x p e r i e n c e such as B e r g s o n a n d , later, Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y . B u t P o i n c a r é has little interest in the nature

of experience, just

as

he

has little

interest

in

Kantian

questions a b o u t the c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e . H e is, p e r h a p s rightly, c o n t e n t w i t h o u r h u m d r u m , c o m m o n - s e n s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f "fact" and "experience". Pierre D u h e m (1861 —1916) w a s also a p r o m i n e n t scientist (and an e v e n m o r e p r o m i n e n t historian o f science), but, unlike

Poincaré,

v e r y interested in f u n d a m e n t a l issues o f e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d m e t a p h y sics. N o n e t h e l e s s , his w o r k , like P o i n c a r é ' s , h e l p e d constitute philo s o p h y o f science as an a u t o n o m o u s discipline. In La théorie physique D u h e m insisted on a s h a r p split b e t w e e n the w o r l d k n o w n b y science a n d the w o r l d o f m e t a p h y s i c a l truth. In his view, the o b j e c t science w a s m e r e l y the sensory a p p e a r a n c e s

o f things. T h e

of real

w o r l d b e n e a t h these a p p e a r a n c e s — for D u h e m a d o m a i n o f A r i s totelian substances — w a s inaccessible to scientihc scrutiny a l t h o u g h o p e n to n o n e m p i r i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e a s o n i n g . D u h e m e n f o r c e d this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m w i t h his c o n t e n t i o n that e m p i r i c a l science has n o e x p l a n a t o r y capacity. T o e x p l a i n is to trace p h e n o m e n a b a c k to their r e a l causes i n the r e a l m o f m e t a p h y s i c a l substances. S c i e n c e , h a v i n g n o access to such c a u s e s , c a n m e r e l y f o r m u l a t e a n d systematize e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g the p h e n o m e n a . A c c o r d i n g to D u h e m , scientific p r a c t i c e has often b e e n c o n f u s e d b y efforts to use theories to e x p l a i n . T o e l i m i n a t e this c o n f u s i o n , he distinguishes

between

the

explanatory

aspects o f a n y g i v e n theory. W h a t

and

the

representational

a t h e o r y represents are p h e -

n o m e n a . S c i e n c e c o n c e r n s itself w i t h m e a s u r a b l e features o f the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d a n d associates t h e m w i t h m a t h e m a t i c a l s y m b o l s . T h e s e s y m b o l s , in t u r n , are c o n n e c t e d to one a n o t h e r in m a t h e m a tical p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n s are f o r m e d w i t h a v i e w to l o g i c a l consistency

and

considerations

of convenience

(e.g.,

simplicity).

T h e y are also c o n s t r u c t e d in the h o p e that c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e m will, w h e n

deduced

translated b a c k into o b s e r v a t i o n a l

terms,

a c c o r d w i t h e x p e r i e n c e d p h e n o m e n a . D u h e m insists, h o w e v e r , that there is n o r e a s o n to think there is o n e p a r t i c u l a r set o f m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s o b s e r v a t i o n a l l y s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r sets. M a n y different

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

34

(1890-1940)

w a y s o f r e p r e s e n t i n g p h e n o m e n a m a t h e m a t i c a l l y w o u l d y i e l d interesting

and

useful

conformities

with

the

phenomena.

There

is,

accordingly, n o r e a s o n to think that the m a t h e m a t i c a l structures o f e v e n the m o s t e m p i r i c a l l y successful t h e o r y tell us w h a t underlies a n d e x p l a i n s p h e n o m e n a . T h o s e w h o speak o f theories as e x p l a i n i n g p h e n o m e n a , r a t h e r t h a n j u s t d e s c r i b i n g a n d p r e d i c t i n g t h e m , misu n d e r s t a n d the significance o f t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . S u c h m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l e a d s to a fruitless c o n c e r n w i t h the details o f t h e o r e t i c a l structures, b a s e d o n the false i d e a that these details p r o v i d e the d e e p truth a b o u t n a t u r e . In fact t h e y are j u s t c o n v e n i e n t — a n d h a r d l y u n i q u e — tools for r e p r e s e n t i n g p h e n o m e n a . C o r r e s p o n d i n g to D u h e m ' s distinction b e t w e e n e x p e r i e n c e d p h e n o m e n a a n d t h e o r e t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is his distinction "practical

facts"

and

"theoretical

facts".

A

practical

between fact

is

a

description o f p h e n o m e n a in o r d i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e (for e x a m p l e , This paperweight is heavy, or a basic g e n e r a l i z a t i o n such as Heavy objects fall translation example,

to earth when dropped). A

o f the This

practical

fact

into

a

theoretical symbolic

fact is the

language

(for

body of mass m is being acted on by a force g). T h i s

distinction is v e r y similar to P o i n c a r é ' s b e t w e e n " b r u t e f a c t s " a n d "scientific

facts",

but

in

his La

théorie physique,

Duhem

rejects

P o i n c a r é ' s v i e w that the scientific description is merely a (convenient) translation o f the b r u t e f a c t .

8

H e p o i n t s out that, j u s t as there are

n u m e r o u s alternative scientific descriptions o f a n y g i v e n b r u t e fact, so t o o there description.

same

scientific

There is a current of n amps in the circuit, for

are n u m e r o u s

b r u t e facts w i t h the

example,

translates b r u t e facts a b o u t the b e h a v i o r o f a n y n u m b e r o f e x p e r i m e n t a l set-ups for m e a s u r i n g electric c u r r e n t . P o i n c a r é a d m i t s this b u t says that it m e r e l y reflects the v a r i e t y o f l a w s c o n n e c t i n g currents w i t h different w a y s o f m e a s u r i n g t h e m . D u h e m a g r e e s b u t m a i n t a i n s that this s h o w s that o u r t h e o r e t i c a l description o f the b r u t e fact as a current

in

a

circuit

is n o t

a mere

translation

but

a

complex

t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the fact. H i s c o n c l u s i o n is that theoretical facts are n o t basic scientific truths; t h e y are a l r e a d y c o m p l i c a t e d instruments o f c a l c u l a t i o n that h a v e n o truth v a l u e in their

own

right. It follows d i r e c t l y that scientific l a w s a n d t h e o r i e s c a n n o t

8

be

See D u h e m ' s c o m m e n t s on Poincaré's distinction in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [La théorie physique], 149—51.

Science and idealism

35

r e g a r d e d as simply i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v e d (practical) facts. T h e initial scientific descriptions o f such facts a l r e a d y assume

a theory about them. But D u h e m

s h o w i n g that l a w s

a n d theories

does n o t see this as

are, as L e

Roy

maintains,

the

a r b i t r a r y c r e a t i o n s o f o u r m i n d s . A s w e h a v e seen, l a w s a n d theories c a n be rejected if t h e y h a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s that, w h e n translated b a c k into the l a n g u a g e o f p r a c t i c a l facts, t u r n out to b e false. O f c o u r s e , Duhem

also f a m o u s l y

holds that there c a n n e v e r b e a

decisive

refutation o f a n y single t h e o r e t i c a l h y p o t h e s i s b e c a u s e a n y e m p i r i c ally m e a n i n g f u l d e d u c t i o n will r e q u i r e several h y p o t h e s e s to derive its

conclusion.

(There

will,

for

example,

be

hypotheses

giving

t h e o r e t i c a l descriptions o f o u r m e a s u r i n g a p p a r a t u s or stating the a b s e n c e o f v a r i o u s distorting forces.) A n y e m p i r i c a l refutation will s h o w o n l y that at least o n e o f the r e l e v a n t h y p o t h e s e s is false. D u h e m ' s p o i n t h e r e , h o w e v e r , is n o t the skeptical one that n o test c a n justify r e j e c t i n g a h y p o t h e s i s . H e is simply n o t i n g the i n a d e q u a c y o f p u r e logic to g r o u n d such a rejection. T h e r e is, he says, s u c h a t h i n g as " g o o d s e n s e " , w h i c h e n a b l e s us to m a k e r a t i o n a l j u d g m e n t s a b o u t cases " t h a t d o n o t fall u n d e r the h a m m e r o f the p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n " . It m a y be difficult for scientists to a c h i e v e consensus 9

a b o u t such cases, b u t e v e n t u a l l y there will e m e r g e a s h a r e d j u d g m e n t a b o u t w h a t it is r a t i o n a l to c o n c l u d e .

1 0

D u h e m ' s a c c o u n t o f science is, as he e m p h a s i z e s , strictly positivist in the sense that it rejects a n y u n d e r l y i n g o n t o l o g y for

scientific

theories. T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n t e n t o f science is n o t h i n g b e y o n d the common-sense

world given

in the

"practical

facts"

of

ordinary

e x p e r i e n c e . T h e o r i e s f u n c t i o n simply as i n s t r u m e n t s o f c a l c u l a t i o n w i t h o u t r e v e a l i n g the reality b e n e a t h the a p p e a r a n c e s o f o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h is w h y t h e y h a v e n o e x p l a n a t o r y force. S c i e n t i h c results

are,

therefore,

strictly

independent

of any

metaphysical

claims: t h e y c a n n e i t h e r establish n o r refute a n y t h e o r y a b o u t the real n a t u r e s o f things. B u t D u h e m thinks n o n e t h e l e s s that w e c a n

The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 217. O n a related issue, D u h e m agrees with Poincare that there are cases of theoretical principles that are not o p e n to empirical refutation because they c o m e to have the status of definitions. But he rejects Poincare's v i e w that there are some principles (e.g., the axioms of E u c l i d e a n geometry) so e n t r e n c h e d in our thought that w e could never reject them. " T h e history o f physics shows us that very often the h u m a n m i n d has b e e n led to overthrow such principles completely, though they have b e e n r e g a r d e d by c o m m o n consent for centuries as inviolable a x i o m s " (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 212).

3

6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f the reality b e n e a t h a p p e a r a n c e s a n d that, m o r e over, scientific results are n o t irrelevant to that k n o w l e d g e . D e v e l o p i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l a c c o u n t (or, as D u h e m often puts it, a c o s m o l o g y ) requires first o f all close attention to the p r a c t i c a l facts g i v e n in

experience,

apart

from

any theoretical

interpretations.

T h e s e c o m m o n - s e n s e truths are the f u n d a m e n t a l d a t a o f m e t a p h y sics. T h e trick is to separate t h e m f r o m the t h e o r e t i c a l a c c r e t i o n s that w e so easily confuse w i t h the p l a i n truth. H e r e is r e q u i r e d the finesse

o f the

subtle

and imaginative

mind

(/'esprit de finesse), as

o p p o s e d to the l o g i c a l r i g o r o f the g e o m e t r i c a l m i n d (I'esprit geometrique)}

G i v e n an a d e q u a t e g r a s p o f the p r a c t i c a l facts, p u r e r e a s o n

1

c a n p e n e t r a t e to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l reality l y i n g b e n e a t h t h e m . For D u h e m , the c o r e o f Aristotle's p h i l o s o p h y

of

nature is still the best e x p r e s s i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c a l truth, a l t h o u g h this truth m u s t be s e p a r a t e d f r o m the mass o f o u t d a t e d science

that

Aristotle a n d his successors built u p a r o u n d it. Duhem

r e c o g n i z e s o u r inveterate t e n d e n c y to m o v e f r o m

the

p r e d i c t i v e success o f scientific t h e o r i e s to a b e l i e f that they are true, to a s s u m e , as he puts it, that o u r m o s t successful theories p r o v i d e a " n a t u r a l classification" o f objects, r a t h e r t h a n j u s t a c o n v e n i e n t b u t dispensable system o f c o n c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . H e insists that this move

is

a

matter

o f faith

rather

than

knowledge;

ontological

inferences f r o m e v e n the best c u r r e n t t h e o r y are u n g r o u n d e d , since the p r o b l e m s o f the m o m e n t often r e q u i r e t h e o r e t i c a l structures that will h a v e to b e s u b s e q u e n t l y a b a n d o n e d . B u t he also a g r e e s that it is possible to c o n s t r u c t g o o d m e t a p h y s i c a l a r g u m e n t s f r o m the history of

science,

convergence nomena.

when, toward

There

as

in

fact

a single

is a b s o l u t e l y

happens, unified no

empirical,

e x p l a i n or e x p e c t such c o n v e r g e n c e description

o f the p h e n o m e n a

this

theory

history

exhibits

o f all n a t u r a l scientific

no reason w h y

a

phe-

reason

to

adequate

should n o t r e q u i r e t w o or

more

m u t u a l l y i r r e d u c i b l e t h e o r e t i c a l systems. B u t the fact o f c o n v e r g e n c e supports the c o n c l u s i o n that there is a c o h e r e n t reality u n d e r l y i n g the w o r l d o f a p p e a r a n c e s . M o r e o v e r , D u h e m m a i n t a i n s , t h e r e will be an a n a l o g y b e t w e e n the scientific t h e o r y that gives an ideally a d e q u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p h e n o m e n a a n d the c o s m o l o g y that explains w h y the p h e n o m e n a are as t h e y are. W i t h a t h o r o u g h g r o u n d i n g in

1 1

For D u h e m ' s version o f this Pascalian distinction a n d his application of it to the history of science, see The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, chapter 4.

Science and idealism

37

the history o f science, w e c a n discern an overall d i r e c t i o n in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e o r e t i c a l structures, f r o m w h i c h w e c a n m a k e an educated

guess a b o u t w h a t

would

be

the

nature

o f an

ideally

a d e q u a t e theory. H i s o w n r e a d i n g o f the historical d a t a w a s that the c o n v e r g e n c e is n o t t o w a r d m o d e r n atomistic theories b u t t o w a r d a generalized

thermodynamics

strongly

analogous

to

Aristotelian

n a t u r a l philosophy. D u h e m ' s e n d o r s e m e n t o f A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m is n o t u n c o n n e c t e d w i t h his C a t h o l i c religious faith. C e r t a i n l y , he saw his b e l i e f as r e q u i r i n g a " s p i r i t u a l i s t " m e t a p h y s i c s such as he f o u n d in Aristotle a n d his m e d i e v a l successors, as o p p o s e d , say, to a m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m or n a t u r a l i s m . N o r did D u h e m d e n y that it w a s i m p o r t a n t to his faith to s h o w that there c o u l d be n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n C a t h o l i c d o c t r i n e s a n d scientihc results. B u t he insists that his v i e w o f science w a s d e v e l o p e d in c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f his religious c o m m i t m e n t a n d should b e entirely c o n v i n c i n g to n o n b e l i e v e r s . In this sense, it is n o t , as A b e l R e y suggested, the " p h y s i c s o f a b e l i e v e r " .

1 2

D u h e m ' s positivist rejection o f science as e x p l a n a t o r y a n d realistic w a s c h a l l e n g e d b y the w o r k , likewise d e e p l y i n f o r m e d b y the history o f science, o f E m i l e M e y e r s o n (1859—1933). M e y e r s o n hrst a r g u e s that e x p l a n a t i o n has b e e n the consistent a i m o f science t h r o u g h o u t its history. Scientists f r o m Aristotle t h r o u g h G a l i l e o a n d N e w t o n to M a x w e l l a n d Einstein h a v e tried to discover the true n a t u r e

of

p h y s i c a l reality a n d to use this as a basis for e x p l a i n i n g o b s e r v e d phenomena.

Duhem,

of

course,

agrees

but

sees

the

drive

for

e x p l a n a t i o n as a d e a d - e n d that has distracted scientists f r o m their true business o f d e s c r i b i n g p h e n o m e n a . B u t a c c o r d i n g to M e y e r s o n , w h e n scientists " d e s c r i b e " p h e n o m e n a t h e y are really r e p l a c i n g the i n a d e q u a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f c o m m o n sense w i t h m o r e

accurate

scientihc i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . H e a c c e p t s the distinction b e t w e e n b r u t e or p r a c t i c a l facts a n d t h e o r e t i c a l or scientihc facts a n d a g r e e s w i t h D u h e m that the distinction is b e t w e e n t w o different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . "The

1 2

scientist makes scientihc facts a n d n o t b r u t e f a c t s " , but, in

A b e l Rey, " L a philosophic scientifique de M . D u h e m " , 44ft and 133m D u h e m ' s response, " T h e Physics o f a B e l i e v e r " , is included as an a p p e n d i x to The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. E d o u a r d L e R o y was likewise a strongly c o m m i t t e d C a t h o l i c (although, unlike D u h e m , he was a strong o p p o n e n t of scholastic Aristotelianism). H e also insisted that his hyper-conventionalist view o f science did not derive from his religious faith. O n the other h a n d , L e Roy's extension of his conventionalism to religious d o g m a s , w h i c h he presented as merely rules for g u i d i n g action, resulted in his views being included in Pius X ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n of m o d e r n i s m (in his encyclical " P a s c e n d i g r e g i s " o f 1907).

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

38

(1890-1940)

m a k i n g a scientific fact, the scientist " h a s e x a c t l y f o l l o w e d the s a m e process w h i c h c o m m o n sense e m p l o y e d in c r e a t i n g the b r u t e f a c t " a n d has t h e r e b y p r o d u c e d an i m p r o v e d v e r s i o n o f p r a c t i c a l f a c t s .

1 3

T h e resulting t h e o r e t i c a l facts are, t h e r e f o r e , better descriptions o f p h y s i c a l reality a n d , as such, h a v e the o n t o l o g i c a l significance that D u h e m a c c o r d s to p r a c t i c a l facts: t h e y are d a t a f r o m w h i c h w e must c o n s t r u c t a m e t a p h y s i c a l cosmology. It follows that this c o n s t r u c t i o n is c a r r i e d out n o t b y t r a n s e m p i r i c a l m e t a p h y s i c s b u t b y t h e o r e t i c a l science itself. M e y e r s o n ' s realistic v i e w o f t h e o r y is i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d to his f a m o u s thesis that to e x p l a i n is to identify. A c c o r d i n g to this thesis, to e x p l a i n a p h e n o m e n o n scientifically is to identify it w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l description that r e p l a c e s our c o m m o n - s e n s e

description.

So,

for

e x a m p l e , the kinetic t h e o r y e x p l a i n s h e a t b y identifying it as the m o t i o n o f m o l e c u l e s , a n d e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the c u r r e n t in a circuit b y identifying it w i t h the flow o f electrons. M e y e r s o n supports this thesis t h r o u g h detailed historical studies o f c h e m i c a l and physical histories.

14

theories,

studies that

challenge

Duhem's

positivist

H e also uses the thesis to a r g u e that a surd o f irrationality

underlies the scientific enterprise. S i n c e to e x p l a i n is to identify, a total e x p l a n a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s e w o u l d r e q u i r e r e d u c i n g it to a sheer undifferentiated

unity. T h i s , h o w e v e r , c o n t r a d i c t s the p l u r a l i t y o f

objects that a l w a y s confronts science a n d that, accordingly, p o s e s an i m p a s s a b l e limit on r a t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n . Despite Duhem,

important and

disagreements

Meyerson

represent

a m o n g themselves, a

single

new

and

Poincaré, distinctive

a p p r o a c h to p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection o n science. T h e y are positivist in their effort to a v o i d m e t a p h y s i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s a n d empiricist in their insistence o n the c e n t r a l role o f o b s e r v a t i o n a n d e x p e r i m e n t . B u t their p o s i t i v i s m does n o t e x t e n d to the d o g m a t i c e l i m i n a t i o n of all m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y a n d their e m p i r i c i s m is a sophisticated sort that allows for the m i n d ' s active role in the constitution o f b o t h theory

and

experience.

They

also

all

emphasize

the

need

for

p h i l o s o p h e r s o f science to o p e r a t e out o f an i n t i m a t e a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e o f science, b o t h historical a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y . N o t o n l y the spirit o f their a p p r o a c h b u t also m a n y o f their specific 1 3

1 4

Emile M e y e r s o n , Identity and Reality, 378. T h e s e studies are found b o t h in Identité et réalité a n d , especially, in De l'explication dans les sciences. Later, in La déduction relativiste, he supports his views by an analysis of Einstein's theory of relativity.

Science and idealism formulations

of problems

and

discussions,

and

contemporary

39

solutions are their

directly

thought

has

relevant

to

maintained

a

significance outside o f F r a n c e u n u s u a l in F r e n c h thinkers o f their period. A t the s a m e t i m e , its positivism a n d e m p i r i c i s m s e p a r a t e d the n e w philosophy continued

of to

science dehne

from

the

mainline

spiritualism

French

and

philosophy

idealism in

the

that Third

R e p u b l i c . T h e s e p a r a t i o n w a s d e e p e n e d b y the s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g in science a n d its history that the n e w discipline r e q u i r e d . and

Brunschvicg

combined

traditional

interests w i t h

1 5

Bergson

specialized

w o r k o n scientihc issues. Eventually, h o w e v e r , F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y of science b e c a m e a n e a r l y a u t o n o m o u s d o m a i n , r e s p e c t e d a n d influential in the F r e n c h university, but, especially after the rise o f existential philosophy,

mostly

left

to

a

small

circle

of

specialists.

Gaston

B a c h e l a r d a n d G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m w e r e , as w e shall see, i m p o r t a n t h g u r e s in the g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n o f successive g e n e r a t i o n s o f students at the S o r b o n n e . B u t , a p a r t f r o m the e x c e p t i o n a l case o f M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , t h e y h a d relatively little influence

o n existentialist

and

post-structuralist p h i l o s o p h e r s d o m i n a n t f r o m the 1940s o n . O u t s i d e o f F r a n c e , after the rise o f logical positivism, p h i l o s o p h y o f science took a f o r m a l , n o n - h i s t o r i c a l t u r n for w h i c h the F r e n c h tradition w a s u n c o n g e n i a l . T h e F r e n c h in t u r n w e r e disdainful o f w h a t they saw as the n a i v e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m o f logical positivism a n d its insensitivity to the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e o f science. Later, w h e n historicist r e a c t i o n against positivism t o o k h o l d ,

the

English-speaking

p h i l o s o p h e r s o f science r e d i s c o v e r e d m a j o r t h e m e s a r t i c u l a t e d l o n g before

b y the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n , such as the t h e o r y - l a d e n n e s s

of

o b s e r v a t i o n a n d the irreducibility o f scientihc r a t i o n a l i t y to logic. B u t b y t h e n the t w o a p p r o a c h e s w e r e t o o far a p a r t for

fruitful

i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e F r e n c h c o u l d h a r d l y share the e x c i t e m e n t o f w h a t they rightly saw as old n e w s ;

1 6

a n d the British a n d A m e r i c a n s h a d

scant interest in discussions w h i c h , if t h e y r e a d t h e m at all, l a c k e d

1 5

1 6

A l s o relevant here is the fact that Poincare, D u h e m , and M e y e r s o n were all, in different w a y s , outsiders to the close c o m m u n i t y o f the philosophers o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c . All were trained in science rather than philosophy. D u h e m , at least partly because o f his conservative religious and political views, never received a call to Paris a n d r e m a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t his career at the provincial university of B o r d e a u x . M e y e r s o n was b o r n in L u b l i n , Russia (now Poland), e d u c a t e d in G e r m a n y , a n d never held a teaching position in France. W h e n G e o r g e Steiner chided Foucault for (in Les mots et Us choses) not m e n t i o n i n g K u h n . Foucault r e s p o n d e d that he h a d instead cited a thinker w h o h a d anticipated K u h n , G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m ("Foucault responds 2", 60).

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

4<)

(1890-1940)

the analytic clarity a n d rigor to w h i c h t h e y w e r e a c c u s t o m e d a n d that i g n o r e d l o g i c a l positivist p h i l o s o p h y o f science as h a r d l y w o r t h refuting.

17

BRUNSGHVIGG

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g (1869—1944) w a s the l e a d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e university idealism. A s a professor o f p h i l o s o p h y at the from

1900 to

1939, he

exercised immense

influence,

of

Sorbonne and

every

aspiring F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r , f r o m M a r c e l to Sartre a n d M e r l e a u Ponty, h a d to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h his t h o u g h t . B r u n s c h v i c g w a s famous

as

an

editor

of Pascal

and

a

historian

of

philosophy

(particularly that o f S p i n o z a ) , b u t the h e a r t o f his w o r k w a s the "critical

idealism"

he

developed

and

defended

throughout

his

career. T h e r o o t a n d f o u n d a t i o n o f critical i d e a l i s m is his thesis, La modalité du jugement, c o m p l e t e d w h e n B r u n s c h v i c g w a s o n l y t w e n t y eight y e a r s

old. W h a t

might

seem

to

be

merely

a

specialized

m o n o g r a p h o n m o d a l i t y is in fact an outline o f an entire philosophy. B r u n s c h v i c g ' s idealism is b a s e d , first o f all, on a t h o r o u g h rejection o f the thing-in-itself. H e finds n o sense in the i d e a that w e c o u l d h a v e a n y k n o w l e d g e o f s o m e t h i n g as it exists entirely a p a r t f r o m its relation to o u r k n o w l e d g e . " K n o w l e d g e is n o t an a c c i d e n t that is a d d e d o n f r o m outside a b e i n g " b u t r a t h e r " c o n s t i t u t e s a w o r l d that is the w o r l d for u s " , for " a t h i n g outside o f k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be b y definition inaccessible, i n d e t e r m i n a b l e , that is to say e q u i v a l e n t for us to n o t h i n g " (La modalité du jugement [MJ],

2). Further, B r u n s c h v i c g

does n o t reject e x t e r n a l , m a t e r i a l realities in favor o f an i n t e r n a l , spiritual reality. A substantial subject o f e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d be j u s t as m u c h a thing-in-itself as the e x t e r n a l substances p o s i t e d b y realism. A consistent idealism m u s t see all b e i n g s as the objects o f a t h o u g h t that is itself a f u n c t i o n or act o f thinking, n o t an

independently

existing thing. Whereas

natural

sciences

are

concerned

with

the

objects

of

t h o u g h t , p h i l o s o p h y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h o u g h t itself, the intellectual activity t h r o u g h w h i c h objects are p r e s e n t e d to (constituted for) us. It

1 7

A n g l o p h o n e s m a y also have b e e n put off by the fact that, d u r i n g the 1960s and 1970s, a n u m b e r of French students of philosophy of science (or, as the French say, l'épistémologié) were followers of L o u i s Althusser's structuralist M a r x i s m , w h i c h a p p r o p r i a t e d some key concepts o f G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d , by then the most influential French philosopher o f science. See below, chapter 8.

Science and idealism

41

m a y s e e m that c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the activity o f t h o u g h t as " i n t e l l e c t u a l " begs

important

prepared

to

questions

argue

quintessential

that

intellectual

about

its n a t u r e ,

thinking activity.

is identical Since

but

Brunschvicg

with judging,

philosophy

is the

itself is

an

e x a m p l e o f intellectual activity, it follows that it is an essentially reflective enterprise: " I n t e l l e c t u a l activity b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f itself {prenant conscience d'elle-même] . . . - that's w h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s " (MJ, 4). B r u n s c h v i c g tries to establish his c e n t r a l c l a i m that t h i n k i n g is judging

by

arguing

that

the

other

two

traditional

elements

of

t h o u g h t , c o n c e p t s a n d r e a s o n i n g , are r e d u c i b l e to j u d g m e n t . P h i l o sophers h a v e p e r e n n i a l l y a r g u e d over w h e t h e r c o n c e p t s should be defined b y their e x t e n s i o n (nominalism) or b y their c o m p r e h e n s i o n (realism). B u t a c c o r d i n g to B r u n s c h v i c g the p r e m i s e o f this v e n e r a b l e d e b a t e is w r o n g . T h e r e is n o n e e d or possibility o f r e d u c i n g a c o n c e p t to either the i n d i v i d u a l s that fall u n d e r it or the p r o p e r t i e s that describe those individuals. R a t h e r , a c o n c e p t is p r e c i s e l y the linking o f a certain set o f p r o p e r t i e s to a certain set o f individuals. " T o c o n c e i v e man is to unite t o g e t h e r certain characteristics certain

individuals

[and]

to assert these

characteristics

and

o f these

i n d i v i d u a l s . " B u t such an assertion is p r e c i s e l y w h a t is m e a n t b y a j u d g m e n t , so " w e c a n say w i t h o u t p a r a d o x that to c o n c e i v e is to j u d g e " (MJ, 8). W e are i n c l i n e d to think that d e d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g is a m a t t e r of c o n n e c t i n g t w o or m o r e j u d g m e n t s

so as to derive y e t

another

j u d g m e n t . N o w a c o n n e c t i o n o f t w o j u d g m e n t s c a n n o t be itself a judgment,

since

a judgment

unites t w o t e r m s (a subject

and

a

p r e d i c a t e ) , n o t t w o j u d g m e n t s . S o it w o u l d s e e m that an instance o f deductive reasoning must be something other than a j u d g m e n t . B r u n s c h v i c g , h o w e v e r , m a i n t a i n s that d e d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g is n o t a m a t t e r o f c o n n e c t i n g t w o or m o r e j u d g m e n t s b u t o f m a k i n g a single j u d g m e n t . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , a s t a n d a r d syllogism: A l l p h i l o s o p h e r s are j u s t ; S o c r a t e s is a p h i l o s o p h e r ; t h e r e f o r e , S o c r a t e s is j u s t . O n B r u n s c h v i c g ' s analysis, this syllogism expresses the single j u d g m e n t , Socrates is just.

The

two premises

o f the syllogism

merely

e x p l i c a t e this j u d g m e n t b y n o t i n g , hrst, that the characteristic being just (the p r e d i c a t e o f the j u d g m e n t ) is i n c l u d e d in the characteristic being a philosopher

a n d , s e c o n d , that S o c r a t e s (the subject o f the

j u d g m e n t ) is an instance o f the g e n e r a l subject, a philosopher. B e c a u s e o f this, the j u d g m e n t , Socrates is just,

c a n also be e x p r e s s e d as

This

philosopher (i.e., Socrates) has the characteristic of being a philosopher (which

4

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

2

(1890-1940)

includes b e i n g just). W h e n w e r e a s o n deductively, w e b e g i n w i t h the first f o r m o f the j u d g m e n t (expressed in the premises) a n d c o n c l u d e w i t h the s e c o n d f o r m . B u t the c o n c l u s i o n is n o t a n e w j u d g m e n t , j u s t a " n e w e x p r e s s i o n o f a j u d g m e n t that w a s a l r e a d y in m y m i n d " (MJ, 19). In this way, r e a s o n i n g is r e v e a l e d as j u s t a m a t t e r o f m a k i n g a j u d g m e n t ( B r u n s c h v i c g d e v e l o p s similar analyses for o t h e r syllogistic figures). H a v i n g established that to think is to j u d g e , B r u n s c h v i c g turns to the q u e s t i o n o f w h a t a j u d g m e n t is. It is, first o f all, an affirmation, an assertion that s o m e t h i n g is the case. T h e d e e p

philosophical

issues arise w h e n w e ask w h a t " i s " m e a n s in a g i v e n j u d g m e n t . S i n c e A r i s t o t l e , p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e a g r e e d that j u d g m e n t s v a r y d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r w h a t t h e y affirm is n e c e s s a r y e x i s t e n c e , a c t u a l existence, or possible existence. B r u n s c h v i c g a c c e p t s this distinction o f the three m o d a l i t i e s o f j u d g m e n t (hence three m e a n i n g s o f " i s " ) but m a i n t a i n s that the significance o f these m o d a l i t i e s c a n n o t be disc o v e r e d b y a m e r e l y f o r m a l (logical) analysis o f the l a n g u a g e

in

w h i c h t h e y are expressed. U n d e r s t a n d i n g the f o r m s o f j u d g m e n t requires us to a n s w e r f u n d a m e n t a l m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l questions o f b e i n g a n d truth. Brunschvicg

begins

by

n o t i n g that,

in

some

cases, j u d g m e n t

seems to be a m a t t e r o f o u r a w a r e n e s s o f the i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o ideas. W h e n , for e x a m p l e , I j u d g e that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is two right angles, the " i s " o f m y j u d g m e n t expresses the n e c e s s a r y intellectual

connection between

terms connected.

expresses the unity that

Such a judgment

m i n d finds b e t w e e n t w o n o t i o n s that are o n l y v e r b a l l y

the

two the

separated

a n d are in t h e m s e l v e s m u t u a l l y i m p l i c a t e d . H e r e B r u n s c h v i c g will say that j u d g m e n t takes the " f o r m o f i n t e r i o r i t y " , since its " i s " expresses the i n t e r n a l u n i t y o f ideas. In o t h e r cases, h o w e v e r , m y j u d g m e n t seems to h a v e n o t h i n g to do w i t h the i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n s o f ideas b u t r a t h e r expresses the b r u t e fact that s o m e t h i n g exists in reality, that, for e x a m p l e , this thing exists here and now. In such a case, " i s " does n o t express a unity r e q u i r e d b y the m i n d ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t a " s h o c k o f r e a l i t y " that the m i n d m u s t s i m p l y a c c e p t w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g : " i t is the impossibility o f the intellect's p e n e t r a t i n g to the

interior

of what

it represents

in

order

to

analyze

and

u n d e r s t a n d it that obliges [the intellect] to stop short [s'arrêter], to posit b e i n g , that is, to r e c o g n i z e the fact that that is" (MJ, 88). H e r e j u d g m e n t takes the " f o r m o f e x t e r i o r i t y " , its " i s " e x p r e s s i n g n o t the

Science and idealism

43

internal necessity o f intelligible t h o u g h t b u t the u n d e n i a b l e g i v e n ness o f an e x t e r n a l reality. B r u n s c h v i c g ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f this givenness d o e s n o t m e a n that he is a b a n d o n i n g

idealism.

Like

Fichte

(from

whom

he

takes

the

e x p r e s s i o n " s h o c k o f r e a l i t y " ) , he is p r e p a r e d to a r g u e that the v e r y exteriority o f e x t e r n a l objects is j u s t the w a y t h e y are g i v e n

to

(constituted by) the m i n d . B u t there n o n e t h e l e s s r e m a i n s an u n b r i d g e a b l e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l g a p b e t w e e n w h a t c a n be k n o w n simply t h r o u g h the m i n d ' s i n t e r n a l reflection a n d w h a t r e q u i r e s the j o l t of external experience. B r u n s c h v i c g e m p h a s i z e s that p u r e interiority a n d p u r e exteriority are m e r e l y ideal f o r m s , l i m i t i n g cases o f j u d g m e n t , w h i c h in reality is a l w a y s a m i x t u r e o f the t w o . T h i s m e a n s that o u r effort to discover the truth o f reality c a n n o t be

a matter, as s o m e idealists

have

t h o u g h t , o f the m i n d ' s reflectively intuiting or d e d u c i n g its o w n intellectual

content.

Such

an

enterprise

will

yield

only

fragile

abstractions that c a n n o t sustain the shock o f reality. A t the s a m e time, B r u n s c h v i c g o f course rejects the empiricist error o f b e l i e v i n g that the truth lies simply in w h a t the m i n d passively r e c e i v e s from outside. T r u t h a n d reality are r a t h e r e x p r e s s e d in " m i x e d j u d g m e n t s " t h r o u g h w h i c h w h a t has b e e n g i v e n so far in e x p e r i e n c e is i n t e r p r e t e d t h r o u g h the best intellectual f r a m e w o r k so far d e v e l o p e d b y the m i n d . S i n c e b o t h the m o s t precise e x p e r i e n c e a n d the m o s t a c c u r a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f it are a c h i e v e d b y science, it follows that the p h i l o s o p h i c a l pursuit o f truth a n d reality m u s t take the f o r m of historical reflection on science's d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n c r e a s i n g l y a d e quate judgments. It is this c o n c l u s i o n

that j u s t i h e s P a r o d i ' s

characterization

of

B r u n s c h v i c g ' s t h o u g h t as a u n i o n o f p o s i t i v i s m a n d i d e a l i s m ("positivisme i d é a l i s t e " ) .

18

T h e p o s i t i v i s m consists in his c l a i m that w e k n o w

the truth b y e x p e r i e n c i n g the historical p r o g r e s s o f science, the idealism in his c o r r e s p o n d i n g insistence that this history is the r e c o r d o f the m i n d ' s constitution o f ever m o r e successful f r a m e w o r k s for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e truth is d e r i v e d f r o m reflection o n the life o f the m i n d , b u t the m i n d itself is e n c o u n t e r e d as a positive

1 8

D o m i n i q u e Parodi, Philosophie contemporaine en France, 425, 430. P a r o d i notes the similar positions o f Louis W e b e r (Vers le positivisme absolu par l'idéalisme), a n d of A l a i n (pseudonym of Emile Ghartier). A l a i n (1868—1951) was an exceptionally charismatic teacher, w h o , at the L y c é e H e n r i I V in Paris (1909-33), influenced a generation o f students that included Simone Weil, R a y m o n d A r o n , and J e a n - P a u l Sartre.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

44

(1890-1940)

reality in h u m a n history o f science, n o t as an esoteric

ahistorical

o b j e c t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l insight. B r u n s c h v i c g ' s early v i e w s on j u d g m e n t , t r u t h , a n d reality p r o v i d e the g u i d i n g t h r e a d for the three massive

historical

studies

that

constitute the bulk o f his life's w o r k . T h e hrst w a s Les étapes de la pensée mathématique (1912), w h i c h follows the entire history o f m a t h e m a t i c s a n d o f m a t h e m a t i c a l l y inspired p h i l o s o p h y f r o m the a n c i e n t Greeks

through

twentieth-century

logicism

and

intuitionism.

B r u n s c h v i c g rejects the i d e a that m a t h e m a t i c s is a p u r e study o f m e r e l y ideal relations a n d instead v i e w s it as essentially tied to o u r efforts

to

understand

the

world.

His

history

shows

how

novel

m a t h e m a t i c a l ideas e m e r g e f r o m the m i n d ' s creative efforts to m a k e sense o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d : " n a t u r e puts the m i n d to the test; the m i n d r e s p o n d s b y c o n s t i t u t i n g m a t h e m a t i c a l s c i e n c e . "

At

1 9

the s a m e t i m e , B r u n s c h v i c g follows the w o r k o f p h i l o s o p h e r s

-

particularly, P l a t o , D e s c a r t e s , L e i b n i z , a n d K a n t — inspired b y the mathematical

a c h i e v e m e n t s o f their times. H e

acknowledges

resulting a d v a n c e s in p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t

the

denounces

the p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems that p r e s e n t those results as the h n a l w o r d on the n a t u r e o f reality, a r g u i n g that the s u b s e q u e n t history mathematics

always

creates

new

ideas

that

undermine

the

of old

systems. T h e o n l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s u p p o r t e d b y the history o f m a t h e m a t i c s is B r u n s c h v i c g ' s o w n anti-systematic v i e w o f the m i n d r e s p o n d i n g to e v e r n e w a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e " s h o c k s " o f n a t u r e w i t h its o w n n e w a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . A s e c o n d v o l u m e , L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique (1922), d e v e l o p s the s a m e g e n e r a l v i e w p o i n t , this time t h r o u g h a study o f scientific a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f causality. It c o n c l u d e s that history u n d e r m i n e s the p r e t e n s i o n s o f b o t h the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f nature o f absolute idealists such as H e g e l a n d the p h i l o s o p h i e s of science o f o t h e r m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r s such as D e s c a r t e s a n d K a n t , b u t supports the m o r e m o d e s t claims o f B r u n s c h v i c g ' s p h i l o s o p h y of t h o u g h t (philosophie de pensée). A s he uses the t e r m , a p h i l o s o p h y o f nature offers a v i e w o f the n a t u r a l w o r l d , d e r i v e d entirely

from

p h i l o s o p h i c a l insight a n d r e a s o n i n g , that claims to be i n d e p e n d e n t of a n d s u p e r i o r to the e m p i r i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f n a t u r a l Whereas

both

ancient

intimate

connection,

1 9

and

if n o t

early

modern

identity,

philosophers

between

Les étapes de la pensée mathématique, 569.

scientists. saw

philosophical

an and

Science and idealism

45

scientific efforts to u n d e r s t a n d the w o r l d , the p h i l o s o p h y o f n a t u r e , first fully d e v e l o p e d b y G e r m a n idealists o f the early

nineteenth

century, c l a i m e d to be able to " a c h i e v e , o n its o w n , t h r o u g h original p r o c e d u r e s , the system o f things that scientists h a v e n o t b e e n able to a c h i e v e " w i t h their m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l m e t h o d s périence humaine et la causalité physique [EH],

(L'ex-

544). B r u n s c h v i c g rejects

this p r o j e c t as " a c h i m e r a " , refuted b y its o b v i o u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h scientihc truths a n d e x p l a i n e d b y the h u m a n desire for " d o g m a t i c s p e c u l a t i o n that seeks simple a n d dehnitive s y s t e m s " (EH, 545). B y contrast a p h i l o s o p h y o f science quite p r o p e r l y d o e s n o t seek "truths

beyond

the p l a n e

o f scientihc

v e r i h c a t i o n ; it limits

the

h o r i z o n o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e [connaissance] to the results furnished by

science

[savoir scientifique]"

(EH,

546).

Such

philosophies

-

especially in the f o r m o f K a n t ' s critique or C o m t e ' s p o s i t i v i s m — effectively o p p o s e systems o f d o g m a t i c m e t a p h y s i c s . B u t t h e y

go

w r o n g in t h i n k i n g that, f r o m the de facto science o f their t i m e , they can

extract hnal

truths that m u s t

dehne

the

framework

of

all

s u b s e q u e n t science. B r u n s c h v i c g notes h o w often, d u r i n g the last century, d e v e l o p m e n t s in p u r e m a t h e m a t i c s — a n d e v e n m o r e in m e c h a n i c s a n d p h y s i c s — " h a v e blithely i g n o r e d [jouées comme à plaisir] the a l l e g e d limits i m p o s e d

on t h e m in the n a m e

criticism or o f p o s i t i v i s m " (EH, hnds

Einstein's

general

theory

546). (In this r e g a r d , o f relativity

of

[Kantian]

Brunschvicg

particularly

revolu-

tionary.) B r u n s c h v i c g ' s o w n " p h i l o s o p h y o f t h o u g h t " b a l a n c e s the c l a i m that only science c a n p r o v i d e the dehnitive a c c o u n t o f reality w i t h a r e a l i z a t i o n that the c o n t e n t o f its a c c o u n t c a n n o t b e e x t r a c t e d from the science o f a n y g i v e n time. W h a t is r e q u i r e d instead is historical reflection o n the full s w e e p o f science as it has d e v e l o p e d over the last 2500 y e a r s : " s c i e n c e c o n s i d e r e d a p a r t f r o m its history [devenir] is a n a b s t r a c t i o n " . T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h o u g h t h o p e s to s h o w that this history is n o t a m e r e " a g g r e g a t e o f disparate a n d d i v e r g i n g opin i o n s " . Its p r o j e c t is to e m p l o y a " t o t a l k n o w l e d g e o f the f o l l o w e d [by science] u p to n o w . . .

curve

to p r o j e c t the light o f a n e w

reflection o n t o the p r e v i o u s p h a s e s o f t h o u g h t a n d . . . in p a r t i c u l a r to clarify the relative p o s i t i o n o f the p r e s e n t " . T h e result will be " a p h i l o s o p h y o f h u m a n h i s t o r y " that will " d e h n e the d i r e c t i o n [sens] of the d r a m a in w h i c h h u m a n i t y has f o u n d itself e n g a g e d since it hrst b e c a m e a w a r e o f its c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s " (EH, 552). B r u n s c h v i c g speaks o f his p h i l o s o p h y o f t h o u g h t as b e i n g " p r o -

46

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

g r e s s i v e " a n d in tune w i t h the " r h y t h m o f p r o g r e s s " (EH, G i v e n his strong claims a b o u t the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f the d i r e c t i o n o f science, it is h a r d to see h o w

552). future

e v e n the m o s t well-

i n f o r m e d history c o u l d give us a real sense o f w h e r e science is g o i n g in the l o n g r u n . B u t B r u n s c h v i c g thinks there is s o m e t h i n g substantial that c a n be said a b o u t the m o r a l a n d religious p r o g r e s s

of

h u m a n k i n d , a p r o g r e s s that he sees as i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f science a n d w h i c h he treats in his third m a g n u m opus, Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale (1927). B r u n s c h v i c g ' s v i e w o f p r o g r e s s is r o o t e d in the a c c o u n t o f p r a c t i c a l j u d g m e n t s that he d e v e l o p e d in La modalité du jugement. T h e r e

he

a r g u e d that p r a c t i c a l j u d g m e n t s should b e u n d e r s t o o d as p a r a l l e l to t h e o r e t i c a l j u d g m e n t s . C o r r e s p o n d i n g to the distinction b e t w e e n the f o r m o f exteriority a n d the f o r m o f interiority (that is, b e t w e e n j u d g m e n t s a b o u t e x p e r i e n t i a l l y g i v e n facts a n d j u d g m e n t s a b o u t the internal relation o f ideas), there is a distinction b e t w e e n j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g h a p p i n e s s , w h i c h d e p e n d o n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ,

and

j u d g m e n t s o f morality, w h i c h , f o l l o w i n g K a n t , B r u n s c h v i c g sees as d e r i v i n g f r o m " i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s tied to a r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e " (MJ, 217). L i k e w i s e , j u s t as t h e o r e t i c a l j u d g m e n t s are in fact a l w a y s a m i x t u r e o f exteriority a n d interiority, so o u r p r a c t i c a l j u d g m e n t s a l w a y s c o m b i n e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f h a p p i n e s s a n d o f morality. Just as scientists m u s t a p p l y a p r i o r i intellectual f r a m e w o r k s to the g i v e n facts o f e x p e r i e n c e , so w e m u s t a p p l y the a p r i o r i p r i n c i p l e s

of

m o r a l i t y to the g i v e n passions a n d desires o f o u r c o n c r e t e existence. " I n the t w o cases, the task o f j u d g m e n t is the s a m e : it faces us w i t h a g i v e n n a t u r e , either as e x t e r n a l w o r l d or as i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r . " Just as in the t h e o r e t i c a l r e a l m scientists " d e s t r o y bit b y bit the illusions b o r n f r o m sensible r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " , so in the

practical

r e a l m moralists " d e n o u n c e the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f h u m a n n a t u r e a n d the v a n i t y o f its s p o n t a n e o u s w i l l " . M o r e generally, m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d the p r i n c i p l e s "rational purity

of mathematics

and universality"

are b o t h

characterized

that is g r a d u a l l y

by

extended

a to

v a r i o u s levels o f p h y s i c a l a n d social reality (MJ, 221). B r u n s c h v i c g insists that these parallels are n o t simply an artifact o f his m o d e o f e x p o s i t i o n . T h e y express the " h i g h e r t r u t h " o f the " u n i t y o f the h u m a n m i n d [l'esprit]".

A l t h o u g h o u r analyses distin-

guish " k n o w l e d g e a n d a c t i o n , t h e o r y [speculation] a n d p r a c t i c e , life does n o t k n o w this d i s t i n c t i o n " since " t h e o r e t i c a l m a t t e r s [démarches spéculatives] are i n t i m a t e l y tied to p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e

Science and idealism a n d p r e s u p p o s e t h e m " (MJ,

47

221). S i n c e B r u n s c h v i c g identihes the

m i n d w i t h the activity o f j u d g m e n t , the o n l y difference

between

t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e lies in the object o f the j u d g m e n t , n o t in the n a t u r e o f the j u d g m e n t itself, w h i c h is in either case a

creative

s t r u c t u r i n g o f p r e g i v e n materials. E v e n m o r e importantly, the attainm e n t o f t h e o r e t i c a l truth a n d o f m o r a l g o o d n e s s b o t h r e q u i r e the s a m e c e n t r a l virtue: a r i g o r o u s pursuit o f the u n i v e r s a l b y r e n o u n c i n g all p e r s o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d interests. H e r e it is i m p o r t a n t to take a c c o u n t o f B r u n s c h v i c g ' s e m p h a s i s o n f r e e d o m . In its o w n right, the m i n d is entirely free to

construct

w h a t e v e r laws a n d n o r m s it c h o o s e s . In b o t h science a n d ethics, " t h e r e is n o t h i n g outside o f f r e e d o m " ; " c o n s c i o u s n e s s is the c r e a t o r o f m o r a l v a l u e s , as it is o f scientihc v a l u e s a n d o f aesthetic v a l u e s " .

2 0

Its " e x i s t e n c e is to d e v e l o p in c o n f o r m i t y to the l a w that it i m p o s e s on i t s e l f " .

2 1

In b o t h science a n d morality, the m i n d is essentially

creative: " I n all d o m a i n s , the h e r o e s o f the spiritual life are those w h o , w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g to o u t d a t e d m o d e l s . . ., h a v e cast a h e a d of themselves lines o f intelligence a n d truth that are destined to create a m o r a l universe in the s a m e w a y that t h e y h a v e c r e a t e d the m a t e r i a l universe o f g r a v i t a t i o n or o f e l e c t r i c i t y . "

22

T h u s far,

Brunschvicg

sounds like a proto-existentialist, a n d there surely are s o m e anticipations o f Sartre in his f o r m u l a t i o n s . B u t he g o e s on to insist that the d e v e l o p m e n t o f b o t h science a n d ethics requires that the m i n d ' s f r e e d o m be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a u n i v e r s a l , objective v i e w p o i n t ; never

makes

the

key

existentialist

move

of

giving

he

individual

consciousness o n t o l o g i c a l a n d ethical p r i o r i t y over this v i e w p o i n t . B r u n s c h v i c g sees the epistemic a n d the m o r a l p r o g r e s s o f h u m a n ity as i n t e r t w i n e d . Just as w e h a v e m o v e d f r o m the

perspectival

limitations o f sense p e r c e p t i o n t o w a r d universal l a w s v a l i d for all observers, so w e h a v e m o v e d f r o m m o r a l ideals limited to o u r o w n social g r o u p s to an ideal o f love for all h u m a n s . T h e history o f h u m a n i t y is the history o f its p r o g r e s s to unity, b o t h c o g n i t i v e a n d ethical.

2 3

A s B r u n s c h v i c g sees it, this p r o g r e s s has i n v o l v e d s l o u g h i n g off m a n y o f the e l e m e n t s o f t r a d i t i o n a l religion. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale, 715, 705. L'idéalisme contemporain, 32. " V i e intérieure et vie spirituelle", 146. H e n c e Brunschvicg's title, Le progrès de la conscience, intends b o t h meanings o f the French conscience: consciousness a n d conscience.

4

8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

critical i d e a l i s m s h o w s that the i d e a o f G o d as a t r a n s c e n d e n t b e i n g , entirely

independent

of our

minds,

is i n c o h e r e n t .

Further,

the

a p p a r a t u s o f institutional religion - its rites, c r e e d s , a n d c o d e s - h a v e been impediments

to the free

development

of thought.

To

this

extent, there s h o u l d be n o p l a c e for " r e l i g i o u s c o n s c i o u s n e s s " in the future history o f humanity. B r u n s c h v i c g d o e s allow, h o w e v e r , for a reformulation

o f religious l a n g u a g e in defensible t e r m s . T h i s re-

quires an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f G o d n o t as a s u p e r h u m a n p e r s o n a g e , causally i n v o l v e d w i t h the w o r l d , b u t as a v a l u e , i n d e e d the ultimate v a l u e o f truth a n d love, the u n i t y t o w a r d w h i c h h u m a n history is converging.

CHAPTER

3

Bergson

For the truths which the intellect apprehends directly in the world of full and unimpeded light have something less profound, less necessary than those which life communicates to us against our will in an impression which is material because it enters us through the senses but yet has a spiritual meaning which it is possible for us to extract. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, vi, 273)

The

strong focus o f the early T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s p h i l o s o p h e r s

on

science is h a r d l y u n u s u a l . T h e identity o f p h i l o s o p h y has always b e e n i n t i m a t e l y associated w i t h that o f science. W e c a n think of p h i l o s o p h y ' s p r e m o d e r n p e r i o d as the t i m e , b e f o r e the

scientific

r e v o l u t i o n , w h e n it w a s identical w i t h science, w h e n p h i l o s o p h y w a s simply the enterprise o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the w o r l d in all its aspects. The

scientific r e v o l u t i o n d e s t r o y e d this identity b y s h o w i n g

that

there w a s at least one d o m a i n — k n o w l e d g e o f the m a t e r i a l w o r l d — w h e r e p h i l o s o p h y ' s m e t h o d s o f r a t i o n a l insight a n d logical a r g u m e n t w e r e n o t a d e q u a t e . H e r e , it w a s g r a d u a l l y d i s c o v e r e d (and, o f c o u r s e , anticipations

o f the

discovery

can

be

traced

back

to

the

very

b e g i n n i n g s o f G r e e k inquiry) that the e m p i r i c a l m e t h o d o f testing c o n j e c t u r e s b y o b s e r v i n g w h e t h e r their c o n s e q u e n c e s w e r e true w a s far superior. N o d o u b t philosophy, c o n s i d e r e d simply as o u r search for truth, c o u l d be r e g a r d e d as e m p l o y i n g this m e t h o d . T h e n w h a t the m o d e r n w o r l d has c o m e to k n o w as science w o u l d still b e p a r t of philosophy. B u t this is m e r e c o n t i n g e n c y o f w o r d s . T h e d e t e r m i n i n g historical fact is that p h i l o s o p h y c a m e to b e i d e n t i h e d w i t h e m p l o y m e n t s o f r e a s o n o t h e r t h a n the e m p i r i c a l , p r e d i c t i o n - d r i v e n p r o c e d u r e s o f science. T h e future o f philosophy, in the w a k e o f these p r o c e d u r e s , d e p e n d e d o n the v a l u e o f these o t h e r e m p l o y m e n t s o f reason. It is n o t , t h e r e f o r e ,

surprising that r o u g h l y f r o m the time 49

of

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

5°

D e s c a r t e s , the critique o f science b e c a m e

(1890-1940) a major

philosophical

c o n c e r n . E x p l i c i t l y or implicitly, e v e r y m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l enterprise has h a d to g u a r a n t e e a p l a c e for itself b y s h o w i n g that there is s o m e t h i n g for it to k n o w that escapes the g r a s p o f e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e . T h e r e h a v e b e e n m a n y v e h i c l e s for staking out the d o m a i n

1

of

philosophy, f r o m D e s c a r t e s ' d u a l i s m t h r o u g h the positivists' analyticsynthetic distinction. B u t o n e o f the m o s t persistently attractive has b e e n the c l a i m that p h i l o s o p h y c a n a n d s h o u l d r o o t itself in an e x p e r i e n c e w i t h an immediacy or concreteness that escapes the abstractions r e q u i r e d for successful e m p i r i c a l science. H e r e the

general

t h o u g h t is that the p r e c i s i o n r e q u i r e d for r i g o r o u s l y testing h y p o t h e ses r e q u i r e s us to i g n o r e certain aspects o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e that are not o p e n to scientific (e.g., quantitative) f o r m u l a t i o n . T h e c l a i m (or hope),

however,

is that p h i l o s o p h y

is c a p a b l e

of giving

us

an

e p i s t e m i c a l l y a d e q u a t e access to the e x p e r i e n c e that science m u s t i g n o r e . T h e a p p e a l to a distinctive r e a l m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e is p r o m i n e n t in the F r e n c h spiritualist tradition a n d especially in the w o r k o f its greatest r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , H e n r i B e r g s o n ( 1 8 5 9 - 1 9 4 1 ) .

2

S i n c e B e r g s o n ' s m o t h e r w a s E n g l i s h , he spent c o n s i d e r a b l e time visiting h e r relatives a n d g r e w u p w i t h a native fluency in E n g l i s h . B u t his e d u c a t i o n w a s entirely in the F r e n c h system. H e e n t e r e d the E c o l e N o r m a l e in 1878 (where he w a s a classmate o f J e a n J a u r è s a n d E m i l e D ü r k h e i m ) , p a s s e d the agrégation in 1881, a n d r e c e i v e d his d o c t o r a t e in 1889. For m a n y y e a r s B e r g s o n t a u g h t at lycées, p a r ticularly t w o elite Parisian schools, the L y c é e L o u i s - l e - G r a n d a n d the L y c é e H e n r i I V H e n e v e r h e l d a university professorship b u t d i d t e a c h at the E c o l e N o r m a l e b e f o r e b e i n g e l e c t e d to a c h a i r at the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e in 1900, w h e r e his lectures b e c a m e the r a g e of f a s h i o n a b l e Paris. H e h a d i m m e n s e influence n o t only o n p h i l o s o p h e r s b u t also on F r e n c h writers such as P r o u s t , Valéry, a n d Péguy, as w e l l as m a n y British a n d A m e r i c a n m o d e r n i s t s ; psychologists such as P i e r r e J a n e t a n d J e a n P i a g e t ; political theorists such as G e o r g e s Sorel; a n d a v a n t - g a r d e artistic m o v e m e n t s s u c h as C u b i s m , F a u v i s m , and 1

2

Futurism.

Unlike

other

French

philosophers

of

the

time,

S o m e philosophers, such as Q u i n e , hold a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l naturalism that assimilates their enterprise to empirical science. H o w e v e r , for t h e m , the fact that w e still continue to talk of " p h i l o s o p h y " - if w e do - reflects only the contingent g e n e a l o g y of certain discussions or the sociological classification o f certain groups o f inquirers. Philosophy has no irreducible epistemic status. O n Bergson's relation to spiritualism, see D o m i n i q u e J a n i c a u d , Une généalogie du spiritualisme fiançais.

Bergson

5

1

B e r g s o n g a i n e d a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p u t a t i o n ; h e r e c e i v e d the N o b e l Prize for literature in 1928. H e w a s also active in d i p l o m a t i c affairs, w o r k i n g for the entry o f the U n i t e d States into W o r l d W a r I a n d , after the w a r , s e r v i n g o n the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s ' C o m m i s s i o n for Intellectual C o o p e r a t i o n .

Bergson's health

(particularly,

crippling

arthritis) f o r c e d h i m to retire f r o m his c h a i r in 1921 a n d eventually f r o m m o s t o t h e r p u b l i c activities. S h o r t l y b e f o r e his d e a t h h e refused a p e r s o n a l e x e m p t i o n offered b y the V i c h y r e g i m e to its a n t i - S e m i t i c laws a n d insisted o n r e g i s t e r i n g as a Jew.

BERGSON

ON THE HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY

T o w a r d the e n d o f his m o s t influential b o o k , L'évolution créatrice (1907), B e r g s o n offers a critical sketch o f the history o f p h i l o s o p h y in its relation to science that p r o v i d e s a n e x c e l l e n t i n t r o d u c t i o n to his p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t . B e r g s o n sees science as essentially tied to w h a t he calls the " c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c a l m e t h o d " (L'évolution créatrice [EC], 773/357). B y this h e m e a n s that science v i e w s reality n o t as a c o n t i n u o u s flux (the d u r a t i o n that it in fact is) b u t as a series o f i n s t a n t a n e o u s " s n a p s h o t s " e x t r a c t e d f r o m this flux. In t e r m s o f a simple b u t f u n d a m e n t a l e x a m p l e , science d e r i v e s f r o m a mind-set that m a k e s Z e n o ' s p a r a d o x e s b o t h i n e v i t a b l e a n d u n s o l v a b l e . Its e n d is the c o n t r o l o f n a t u r e a n d t h e r e b y m o r e effective a c t i o n in the w o r l d . N o w a c t i o n , B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s , is a l w a y s d i r e c t e d f r o m a starting-point to a n e n d - p o i n t a n d h a s n o essential c o n c e r n

with

w h a t e v e r c o m e s b e t w e e n the t w o . T h e r e f o r e , the focus o f science o n a c t i o n l e a d s directly to its c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c v i e w o f reality. It m a y b e r e a d i l y a c c e p t e d that such a c o n s t r u a l m a k e s sense for a n c i e n t science, w h i c h d i v i d e d the w o r l d into a d i s c o n t i n u o u s series o f qualitatively

distinct

essences

or n a t u r e s

a n d for w h i c h ,

as

B e r g s o n puts it, " p h y s i c s is b u t logic s p o i l e d " (EC, 765/347). B u t w h a t a b o u t m o d e r n science, w h i c h rejects the qualitative a p p r o a c h a n d c o n c e p t u a l i z e s the w o r l d as a c o n t i n u o u s m a n i f o l d , o p e n to the t e c h n i q u e o f the differential calculus? B e r g s o n r e c o g n i z e s the distinctive c h a r a c t e r o f m o d e r n science b u t d o e s n o t see it as a b a n d o n i n g the division o f the n a t u r a l

flux

into isolatable

moments.

M o d e r n science a b a n d o n s n o t the a n c i e n t division o f n a t u r e into m o m e n t s b u t the a n c i e n t a s s u m p t i o n that certain o f these m o m e n t s are p r i v i l e g e d over others, in favor o f the d e m o c r a t i c v i e w

that

science m u s t b e able to describe n a t u r e f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f a n y

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

52

(1890-1940)

one o f its m o m e n t s . T h u s , the a n c i e n t s saw the m o t i o n o f a falling b o d y as intelligible in t e r m s o f the p r i v i l e g e d m o m e n t o f its telos, its r e t u r n to the e a r t h to w h i c h it w a s n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d . G a l i l e o , b y contrast, d e v e l o p e d a k i n e m a t i c s for w h i c h " t h e r e w a s n o essential m o m e n t , n o p r i v i l e g e d i n s t a n t " a n d for w h i c h " t o study the falling b o d y is to c o n s i d e r it at it m a t t e r s n o t w h a t m o m e n t in its c o u r s e " (£67,775/360). A c c o r d i n g l y , a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n physics do n o t differ over the a s s u m p t i o n that the flux o f n a t u r e is divisible into discrete e l e m e n t s . They

differ

only on whether

there is an intrinsically

privileged

division or an e q u i v a l e n c e o f all possible divisions. B e r g s o n c o m p a r e s the difference to that b e t w e e n an a n c i e n t sculptural aesthetic for w h i c h the horses on the P a r t h e n o n frieze are c a u g h t at a m o m e n t that distills the essence o f their g a l l o p a n d a m o d e r n p h o t o g r a p h i c aesthetic

that sees all i n s t a n t a n e o u s

e q u a l l y v a l i d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (EC,

snapshots

o f the

7 7 6 / 3 6 1 ) . F r o m this

gallop

as

difference

follow the m o d e r n e m p h a s i s on q u a n t i t a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n qualitative descriptions a n d the m o d e r n c o n c e r n w i t h l a w s r a t h e r t h a n c o n cepts. B u t the essential scientific v i e w o f n a t u r e as a succession o f h x e d m o m e n t s , as o p p o s e d to o u r lived e x p e r i e n c e o f c o n t i n u o u s time, r e m a i n s in p l a c e . It m a y be o b j e c t e d that m o d e r n science has g i v e n time an essential role, m a k i n g it the i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e in all its e q u a t i o n s , w h e r e a s a n c i e n t science t o o k a f u n d a m e n t a l l y static v i e w o f n a t u r e . Aristotle t h o u g h t he h a d u n d e r s t o o d p l a n e t a r y m o t i o n a d e q u a t e l y w h e n he c o n c e p t u a l i z e d it as circular (and e v e n P t o l e m y did n o t p r e t e n d to p r o v i d e a p h y s i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f celestial motions). B u t K e p l e r w a s not c o n t e n t w i t h his d i s c o v e r y that p l a n e t a r y orbits w e r e elliptical. H e r e q u i r e d l a w s that d e s c r i b e d h o w the p l a n e t s t r a v e l e d t h r o u g h these orbits over time. B e r g s o n a d m i t s this m o d e r n e n t h r o n e m e n t o f the t e m p o r a l b u t m a i n t a i n s that the time in q u e s t i o n is n o t the c o n t i n u o u s flux o f d u r a t i o n b u t a spatialized, i m m o b i l e surrogate for it: In contrast with ancient science, which stopped at certain so-called essential moments, [modern science] is occupied indifferently with any moment whatever. But it always considers moments, always virtual stopping-places, always, in short, immobilities. Which amounts to saying that real time, regarded as flux, or, in other words, the very mobility of being, escapes the hold of scientific knowledge. (EC, 779—80/366) It a p p e a r s , t h e n , that e v e n m o d e r n scientific a c c o u n t s fail to c a t c h the essential m o v e m e n t o f lived time. W e m i g h t h a v e

expected,

Bergson

53

accordingly, that m o d e r n philosophy, w h i c h w a s d e e p l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h h n d i n g itself a distinctive p l a c e in a c o g n i t i v e r e a l m m o r e a n d m o r e d o m i n a t e d b y science, w o u l d h a v e g r o u n d e d itself p r e c i s e l y on lived d u r a t i o n . W e m i g h t h a v e e x p e c t e d a p h i l o s o p h y that rejected the " c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c a l m e t h o d " a n d f o c u s e d on the " f l u x itself of d u r a t i o n " o f w h i c h " s c i e n c e n e i t h e r w o u l d n o r c o u l d lay h o l d "

(EC,

784/372). C e r t a i n l y , " t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c s is that w h i c h m o d e r n science s u g g e s t s " (EC, 785/373). H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h B e r g s o n finds s o m e hints o f such a c o n s t r u a l o f philosophy,

he

maintains

that,

o n the w h o l e ,

this w a s

not

the

d i r e c t i o n t a k e n b y D e s c a r t e s a n d his successors. O n e r e a s o n w a s the a b i d i n g influence o f the a n c i e n t v i e w o f reality, w h i c h m a d e " t i m e a d e g r a d a t i o n , a n d c h a n g e the d i m i n u t i o n o f a f o r m g i v e n f r o m all e t e r n i t y " (EC, 786/374). T h i s v i e w h a d led to m e t a p h y s i c a l systems, f r o m the E l e a t i c to the A r i s t o t e l i a n , that, despite their differences, p r i v i l e g e d e t e r n a l , spiritual structures a n d r e g a r d e d the w o r l d matter

and

change

Aristotle, w h o

as

inessential

and

so resisted the P l a t o n i c

of

ultimately

unreal.

Even

separation

of form

from

matter, e n d e d b y in effect c o m b i n i n g all the f o r m s into o n e , w h i c h he i d e n t i h e d w i t h the

self-thinking

"Thought

of T h o u g h t "

and

established as the ultimate u n m o v e d c a u s e o f all m o t i o n . M o d e r n metaphysicians

were

strongly i n c l i n e d

to

" r e p e a t w i t h the

new

science w h a t h a d b e e n tried on the o l d " ; that is, to v i e w the n e w world of mechanized metaphysicians

had

m a t t e r in the s a m e w a y that the viewed

their

world

of eternal

ancient

forms:

as

a

c o m p l e t e a n d u n i h e d system e n c o m p a s s i n g all truth a n d all reality. A d m i t t e d l y , g i v e n its essential role as i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e , t i m e c o u l d n o t b e simply r e d u c e d to an u n r e a l status. B u t , since the m o d e r n v i e w t r e a t e d t i m e as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a fourth

spatial

d i m e n s i o n , it c o u l d r e a d i l y be v i e w e d as h a v i n g n o creative efficacy, 3

as m e r e l y the v e h i c l e for the a u t o m a t i c u n r o l l i n g o f a n o m o l o g i c a l l y determined sequence. A c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , the d i r e c t i o n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y t o o k is the n a t u r a l d i r e c t i o n o f the h u m a n m i n d , g i v e n its

evolutionary

o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n . A m e t a p h y s i c s o f d u r a t i o n is a p r e c i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l t r u t h , b u t n o t o n e for w h i c h w e are a d a p t e d . "The

3

science

of

matter

proceeds

like

ordinary

knowledge",

T h e spatialization o f time b e c o m e s explicit only in Minkowski's formulation o f special relativity, but Bergson sees it as implicit in m o d e r n science since at least Galileo.

54

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

perfecting

and extending

(1890-1940)

it b u t n o t a l t e r i n g

its

fundamentally

c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c bias (EC, 779/ 365). D e s c a r t e s himself, a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , s h o w s s o m e i n c l i n a t i o n to the n e w m e t a p h y s i c a l possibility in his s e p a r a t i o n o f the m i n d as free

a g e n t (and G o d as c o n t i n u o u s

creator) f r o m

the universal

m e c h a n i s m o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . H i s d u a l i s m m a y w e l l b e i n c o h e r e n t , b u t it at least represents a b o w to the reality o f d u r a t i o n . B y contrast, S p i n o z a a n d L e i b n i z , insisting o n total systematic unity, r e t u r n fully to the spirit o f a n c i e n t m e t a p h y s i c s a n d refuse the n e w p a t h suggested b y the limitations o f m o d e r n science. T h e y t r a n s f o r m the d e t e r m i n i s m that is a plausible m e t h o d o l o g i c a l or heuristic rule o f the n e w science into " a f u n d a m e n t a l l a w o f t h i n g s " (EC, 788/378). T h e a n c i e n t system o f concepts is m e r e l y r e p l a c e d w i t h a m o d e r n system o f laws. B e r g s o n sums u p the essential similarity o f a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n m e t a p h y s i c s as follows: The resemblances of this new metaphysics to that of the ancients arise from the fact that both suppose ready-made - the former above the sensible, the latter within the sensible - a science one and complete, with which any reality that the sensible may contain is believed to coincide. For both, reality as well as truth are integrally given in eternity. Both are opposed to the idea of a reality that creates itself gradually, that is, at bottom, to an absolute duration. (EC, 794/384-5) In K a n t , h o w e v e r , B e r g s o n admittedly,

ever properly

finds

a n i m p o r t a n t t e n d e n c y (not,

d e v e l o p e d ) to a n e w m e t a p h y s i c s . H e

a g r e e s that, f r o m o n e p o i n t o f view, K a n t ' s p h i l o s o p h y " i s o n l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the m e t a p h y s i c s o f the m o d e r n s a n d a transposition o f the a n c i e n t m e t a p h y s i c s " . C e r t a i n l y , " t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f K a n t is . . . imbued

with

the b e l i e f in a science

single

and complete,

e m b r a c i n g the w h o l e o f the r e a l " (EC, 795—6/387). B e r g s o n does not, accordingly, r e a d K a n t as a critic o f m e t a p h y s i c s as such. B u t h e does see K a n t as d e v e l o p i n g a n e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t criticism o f the m o d e r n m e t a p h y s i c s o f S p i n o z a a n d L e i b n i z . T h e g e r m o f this criticism is a distinctive feature, n o t e d a b o v e , o f m o d e r n science as o p p o s e d to a n c i e n t : the focus o n l a w s r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e p t s . L a w s , K a n t a r g u e s , a r e relations b e t w e e n t w o t e r m s , a n d " a relation is n o t h i n g outside o f the intellect that r e l a t e s " (EC, 796/387). Since, t h e n , as m o d e r n

science tells u s , the p h e n o m e n a l

universe is a

system o f l a w s , it follows that the " p h e n o m e n a h a v e p a s s e d t h r o u g h the filter o f a n i n t e l l e c t " . S o far h e is in a g r e e m e n t w i t h the m o d e r n rationalist m e t a p h y s i c i a n s , w h o , h o w e v e r , g o o n t o identify

this

Bergson

55

intellect w i t h that o f G o d , the inhnitely g o o d a n d p o w e r f u l source o f the universe. K a n t notes that there is n o n e e d to g o so far, that the unification r e q u i r e d for p h e n o m e n a to b e g o v e r n e d b y l a w s m i g h t be p r o v i d e d b y the h u m a n intellect. T o this extent, " t h e criticism of K a n t consisted chiefly in l i m i t i n g the d o g m a t i s m o f his p r e d e c e s s o r s , a c c e p t i n g their c o n c e p t i o n o f science a n d r e d u c i n g to the m i n i m u m the m e t a p h y s i c s it i m p l i e d " (EC, 7 9 7 / 3 8 8 - 9 ) . If this w e r e all o f K a n t ' s t h o u g h t , he w o u l d offer m e r e l y a m o r e m o d e s t a n d defensible - but, for B e r g s o n , still m i s g u i d e d - v e r s i o n o f m o d e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . B u t at the s a m e t i m e that he substituted h u m a n for divine intelligence as the source o f the f o r m s o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , K a n t also insisted on a distinction b e t w e e n these f o r m s a n d the m a t t e r o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e relations constituted b y the intellect are, for h i m , b e t w e e n t e r m s that h a v e " a n extra-intellectual o r i g i n " . C o n t r a r y to S p i n o z a a n d L e i b n i z , K a n t " a f f i r m e d . . . that k n o w l e d g e is n o t entirely r e s o l v a b l e into t e r m s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e " (EC, 797/389). B e r g s o n a r g u e s that this extra-intellectual c o g n i t i v e m a t t e r c o u l d a n d s h o u l d be identified as the d u r a t i o n he r e g a r d s as the c o n t e n t o f o u r lived e x p e r i e n c e

and of a new type

of metaphysics.

Kant,

h o w e v e r , p a s s e d b y this o p e n d o o r b e c a u s e he " b e l i e v e d this m a t t e r to b e either c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h intellect or less extensive t h a n i n t e l l e c t " (EC,

798/390). R a t h e r

than

seeing the m a t t e r

of knowledge

as

e x t e n d i n g b e y o n d its f o r m s a n d p r o v i d i n g the richer reality f r o m w h i c h t h e y are a b s t r a c t e d , he insisted that intellectual f o r m s exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f matter, w h i c h h a d n o role e x c e p t to receive their imprint. A s B e r g s o n sees it, K a n t s u b o r d i n a t e d m a t t e r b e c a u s e , despite the critical b e n t o f his philosophy, he n e v e r q u e s t i o n e d science itself. " T h e criticism o f o u r k n o w l e d g e o f n a t u r e that w a s instituted b y K a n t consisted in a s c e r t a i n i n g w h a t o u r m i n d m u s t be a n d w h a t N a t u r e m u s t b e if the claims o f o u r science are j u s t i h e d ; b u t o f these claims t h e m s e l v e s K a n t has n o t m a d e the c r i t i c i s m . " K a n t h e l d b a c k f r o m the critique o f science b e c a u s e " h e t o o k for g r a n t e d the i d e a of a science that is o n e , c a p a b l e o f b i n d i n g w i t h the s a m e force all the parts o f w h a t is g i v e n , a n d o f c o - o r d i n a t i n g t h e m into a system p r e s e n t i n g on all sides an e q u a l s o l i d i t y " (EC, 798/390). In so d o i n g , he i g n o r e d the fact that, as w e m o v e f r o m the m e r e l y p h y s i c a l to the vital a n d t h e n the p s y c h i c a l , science b e c o m e s less a d e q u a t e as an a c c o u n t o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e , that it b e c o m e s "less a n d less objective, m o r e a n d m o r e s y m b o l i c a l " (EC, 798/390).

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

56

(1890-1940)

F o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s c r u c i a l for b o t h K a n t a n d B e r g s o n , K a n t ' s v i e w is that all o u r intuitions are " s e n s u o u s , or, in o t h e r w o r d s , infrai n t e l l e c t u a l " . T h a t is to say, for K a n t , i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e yields k n o w l e d g e o n l y to the e x t e n t that it c o n f o r m s to the structures o f the intellect; b e y o n d these structures it offers o n l y the n o n - c o g n i t i v e stuff f r o m w h i c h k n o w l e d g e is constituted. K a n t thus i g n o r e s the possibility, e x p l o i t e d b y B e r g s o n ' s philosophy, that there m i g h t be a supra(or ultra-) intellectual intuition (EC,

799/391) that w o u l d

provide

direct k n o w l e d g e o f c o n c r e t e life a n d t h o u g h t . S u c h life a n d t h o u g h t are n o t things-in-themselves l y i n g b e y o n d o u r e x p e r i e n c e b u t the v e r y stuff o f that e x p e r i e n c e in its m o s t i m m e d i a t e f o r m , the stuff f r o m w h i c h the w o r l d o f the intellect is an a b s t r a c t i o n . T h i s stuff o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e is B e r g s o n ' s d u r a tion, the l i v e d p a s s a g e o f time that p e r v a d e s o u r lives. B e r g s o n ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t consists in the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f d u r a t i o n , the c o n t r a s t o f this e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u r s t a n d a r d ("spatial i z e d " ) m o d e s o f e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h o u g h t , a n d the reassessment o f f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l questions in the light o f this a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d contrast.

TIME

In B e r g s o n ' s

first

book,

AND

FREE

his d o c t o r a l

immédiates de la conscience, d e f e n d e d

WILL

thesis Essai

and

published

sur les données in

1889,

his

ultimate c o n c e r n is w i t h the p r o b l e m o f f r e e d o m . B u t the basis for his t r e a t m e n t o f f r e e d o m is laid d o w n b y a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t , in the t w o o p e n i n g c h a p t e r s , o f the n a t u r e

of psychological

states, in-

c l u d i n g , for e x a m p l e , feelings o f p l e a s u r e or p a i n , e m o t i o n s o f a n g e r or pity, p e r c e p t i o n s o f e x t e r n a l objects, a n d aesthetic e n j o y m e n t . H e b e g i n s w i t h the c o m m o n - s e n s e v i e w that s u c h states are qualitative b u t c a p a b l e o f different d e g r e e s o f intensity, that t h e y s u c c e e d o n e a n o t h e r in t i m e , a n d that later m e m b e r s o f t e m p o r a l series are causally d e t e r m i n e d b y p r i o r m e m b e r s . H i s ultimate c l a i m is that the so-called p r o b l e m o f f r e e d o m arises f r o m confusions implicit in this c o m m o n - s e n s e p i c t u r e , confusions B e r g s o n thinks he c a n eliminate b y p r e s e n t i n g a better description o f the qualitative n a t u r e o f p s y c h o l o gical states a n d o f their t e m p o r a l character. No

o n e will d e n y that w e

experience

psychological

states

as

intrinsically qualitative, b u t B e r g s o n rejects the c o m m o n i d e a that they are also s o m e h o w intrinsically q u a n t i t a t i v e b e c a u s e w e

can

Bergson

57

speak o f t h e m as " g r e a t e r " or " l e s s e r " in intensity. D i s c u s s i n g a w i d e r a n g e o f cases, he a r g u e s that such q u a n t i t a t i v e l a n g u a g e m u s t refer either to the q u a n t i t a t i v e features o f a state's e x t e r n a l cause (as w h e n one d r u m - b e a t is l o u d e r t h a n a n o t h e r b e c a u s e it w a s p r o d u c e d b y a g r e a t e r force) or to the g r e a t e r i n v o l v e m e n t o f the state in

our

o r g a n i c or p s y c h i c life (as w h e n a p a i n is g r e a t e r t h a n

another

b e c a u s e it affects m o r e o f the b o d y or w h e n

exceeds

one g r i e f

a n o t h e r b y i n t r u d i n g into m o r e parts o f o u r life). T h e alternative to B e r g s o n ' s v i e w is to try to think o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l states as intensive quantities, i r r e d u c i b l y qualitative b u t still subject to the c a t e g o r i e s of m a t h e m a t i c a l m e a s u r e m e n t . B u t , a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , there is n o c o h e r e n t w a y o f c o m b i n i n g quality w i t h measurability, a n d therefore n o consistent c o n c e p t i o n o f the intrinsic q u a n t i t a t i v e intensity o f a quality. Further, as w e shall see, t r y i n g to d e p l o y such a c o n c e p t i o n leads to u n s o l v a b l e p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g h u m a n f r e e d o m . T h e mistake o f t h i n k i n g o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l states as q u a n t i t a t i v e is c o m p o u n d e d if, as p h i l o s o p h e r s often d o , w e g o o n to think o f the t e m p o r a l succession o f a multiplicity o f such states as a w h o l e m a d e up o f discrete, c o u n t a b l e e l e m e n t s . T h e r e is n o d o u b t that p s y c h o logical states exist in t i m e , c o m i n g , in s o m e sense, one after another. B u t w e are u n f o r t u n a t e l y i n c l i n e d to think o f this t e m p o r a l d u r a t i o n as a m a t t e r o f distinct e l e m e n t s , e a c h existing at a g i v e n p o i n t o f time, p r e c e d i n g a n d s u c c e e d i n g other distinct e l e m e n t s existing at o t h e r g i v e n points o f t i m e . T h i n k i n g this w a y m a k e s t i m e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a locus that unites a multiplicity o f discrete p s y c h o l o g i c a l states into a q u a n t i h a b l e (e.g., c o u n t a b l e ) w h o l e . B u t this is to r e d u c e time to a f o r m o f s p a c e : a c o n t a i n e r in w h i c h are g a t h e r e d a set o f discrete a n d h o m o g e n e o u s e l e m e n t s ; that is, s e p a r a t e c o m p l e t e units that share a h x e d n a t u r e e n a b l i n g us to g r o u p t h e m t o g e t h e r for p u r p o s e s o f e n u m e r a t i o n . S u c h a r e d u c t i o n denies w h a t is g i v e n in o u r i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e o f o u r p s y c h o l o g i c a l states as t e m p o r a l ; namely, " a w h o l l y qualitative multiplicity, an absolute h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f e l e m e n t s w h i c h pass over into one a n o t h e r " (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

[EDI],

149/229). A s

existing

in

time,

p s y c h o l o g i c a l states are aspects o f a c o n t i n u o u s flux o f n o v e l t y in w h i c h n o t h i n g is e v e r h x e d , c o m p l e t e , or separate. In this a n y t h i n g that w e c a n say exists " n o w "

flux,

also i n c o r p o r a t e s into a

qualitative w h o l e e v e r y t h i n g that w e c a n say is " p a s t " , a w h o l e that is itself b e i n g i n c o r p o r a t e d into the n e w synthesis o f the " f u t u r e " . C o m m o n sense a n d , especially, science m i s d e s c r i b e p s y c h o l o g i c a l

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

58

(1890-1940)

states b y t r y i n g to a p p l y the c a t e g o r i e s o f q u a n t i t y a n d e x t e n s i o n to w h a t is in fact i r r e d u c i b l y qualitative a n d t e m p o r a l . T h i s m i s r e p r e sentation derives f r o m o u r t e n d e n c y to assimilate q u a l i t y to q u a n t i t y a n d d u r a t i o n to e x t e n s i o n . T h i s assimilation is, as w e h a v e seen, w e l l justified in the c o n t e x t o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n , w h i c h c o n c e r n s

only

r e a c h i n g a g i v e n g o a l f r o m a fixed starting p o i n t a n d has n o interest in the reality o f the interval in b e t w e e n . B u t the n e e d s o f a c t i o n a b s t r a c t f r o m the c o n c r e t e reality that w e

experience

when

we

w i t h d r a w ourselves f r o m p r a c t i c a l n e e d s a n d seek disinterested truth. Further, on B e r g s o n ' s view, m a n y o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m s philosophy

derive

from

an

attempt

to

describe

the

of

qualitative

d u r a t i o n o f c o n c r e t e reality t h r o u g h the q u a n t i t a t i v e abstractions of science. T h e result is a confusion o f d u r a t i o n a n d e x t e n s i o n that leads to u n r e s o l v a b l e a p o r i a e . B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s that the t r a d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m o f f r e e d o m is a p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e o f s u c h confusion. T h e p r o b l e m arises f r o m the suggestion, a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a r y to o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f ourselves as free agents, that all o u r actions are d e t e r m i n e d b y a n t e c e d e n t causes. D e t e r m i n i s t s m a i n t a i n that d e t e r m i n i n g causes exist a n d m a k e o u r actions unfree. N o n - d e t e r m i n i s t s either d e n y that such causes exist and maintain

that o u r actions are u n c a u s e d

and therefore

free

(libertarianism) or t h e y a g r e e that d e t e r m i n i n g causes exist b u t a r g u e that their existence is consistent w i t h the f r e e d o m o f the actions they p r o d u c e (compatibilism). A c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , h o w e v e r , all these positions share the false a s s u m p t i o n that the self (the agent) c a n be p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as a succession o f s e p a r a t e p s y c h o l o g i c a l states (feelings, t h o u g h t s , volitions) that could be r e l a t e d b y causal c o n n e c tions.

(Bergson

referring

to

calls

the

this

the

associationist

"associationist"

view

o f the

psychology

Hume

and

of

empiricists.) T h i s associationist v i e w is false b e c a u s e , as w e

self, other have

seen, the self is n o t a set o f successive i n d e p e n d e n t e l e m e n t s b u t a unified o r g a n i c p r o c e s s . It is n o t a " m u l t i p l i c i t y o f j u x t a p o s i t i o n " but a multiplicity

" o f fusion

or i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n "

(EDI,

107/162). It

m a k e s n o sense to speak o f c a u s a l relations w i t h i n such a multiplicity b e c a u s e there are n o e l e m e n t s that c a n be p r o p e r l y s e p a r a t e d out as causes or effects. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the self that a c c o r d s w i t h the " i m m e d i a t e g i v e n s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " s h o w s it to be an o r g a n i c w h o l e that c r e a t i v e l y p r o d u c e s its future, a n d this p r o d u c t i o n is precisely w h a t w e m e a n b y f r e e d o m . A t the deepest level, o u r "states

of

Bergson

59

consciousness cease to stand in j u x t a p o s i t i o n a n d b e g i n to p e r m e a t e a n d m e l t into o n e another, e a c h to b e t i n g e d w i t h the c o l o u r i n g o f all the o t h e r s " . T h u s , " e a c h o f us has his o w n w a y o f l o v i n g a n d h a t i n g ; a n d this l o v e or this h a t r e d reflects his w h o l e p e r s o n a l i t y "

(EDI,

108/164). M o r e o v e r , " t h e o u t w a r d m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f this i n n e r state will be j u s t w h a t is called a free act, since the self a l o n e will h a v e b e e n the a u t h o r o f it, a n d since it will express the w h o l e o f the s e l f " (EDI, 109/165—6). H e r e B e r g s o n is close to the A r i s t o t e l i a n n o t i o n of a g e n t causality, r e v i v e d m u c h later in the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y

by

analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s such as R o d e r i c k C h i s h o l m . B e r g s o n i a n d u r a 4

tion has n o p l a c e for the " t r a n s i e n t " c a u s a t i o n w h e r e b y o n e discrete o c c u r r e n c e is c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a n o t h e r in a c c o r d w i t h a universally valid l a w o f n a t u r e . B u t it d o e s a l l o w for the " i m m a n e n t " c a u s a t i o n w h e r e b y an a g e n t as an o r g a n i c w h o l e p r o d u c e s an effect. O f course, in contrast to A r i s t o t e l i a n v i e w s , B e r g s o n does n o t see his " a g e n t " as a stable substance b u t as a d e v e l o p i n g synthesis w i t h i n the everc h a n g i n g flux o f d u r a t i o n . B e r g s o n ' s v i e w o f f r e e d o m allows for the sort o f inversion o f cause a n d effect that is characteristic o f the a c c o u n t Sartre offers

more

t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y l a t e r . T h u s , B e r g s o n describes cases in w h i c h " i t 5

h a p p e n s that w e w e i g h m o t i v e s , w e d e l i b e r a t e , a l t h o u g h o u r decision has a l r e a d y b e e n m a d e . A n

i n t e r n a l v o i c e , scarcely

perceptible,

m u r m u r s : ' W h y this d e l i b e r a t i o n ? Y o u k n o w the result a n d y o u are quite certain w h a t y o u are g o i n g to d o ' " (EDI,

104/158). In fact,

a l t h o u g h B e r g s o n presents this as j u s t o n e kind o f case that is inconsistent w i t h the associationist a c c o u n t o f a c t i o n , it w o u l d s e e m to be a g e n e r a l m o d e l for h i m , as it is for S a r t r e , since his d u r a t i o n a l v i e w o f the self c a n n o t a l l o w for the isolation o f a n t e c e d e n t m o t i v e s or r e a s o n s as the causes o f o u r actions. A t the s a m e t i m e , B e r g s o n ' s v i e w differs f r o m Sartre's b e c a u s e it identifies consciousness w i t h the p s y c h o l o g i c a l self a n d d o e s n o t posit the entirely t r a n s p a r e n t a w a r e ness, separate f r o m the self, that is the l o c u s o f Sartre's r a d i c a l thesis o f entirely u n c o n s t r a i n e d f r e e d o m . T h i s difference w i t h Sartre is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t in B e r g s o n ' s v i e w that f r e e d o m is a m a t t e r o f d e g r e e s a n d that, in fact, " f u l l y free actions are v e r y r a r e " . M o r e often, w h a t w e do is the p r o d u c t o f a habitual

response

to

stimuli

that

has

no

connection

4

A . R. L a c e y notes this similarity in his Bergson, 85.

5

See the discussion of Sartre on f r e e d o m in chapter 5, below.

with

the

6o

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

" f u n d a m e n t a l s e l f " (moi profond) (EDI,

(1890-1940)

110/168) o f d u r a t i o n a l e x p e r i -

e n c e . T h i s is b e c a u s e m o s t o f the time w e o p e r a t e n o t o n the l e v e l of duration

but

on

the

categories. W h e n ,

level

for

o f the

intellect's

example, my

alarm

abstract

spatialized

clock rings, it

might

h a p p e n that " I m i g h t r e c e i v e this i m p r e s s i o n o~ùv okr\ xfj \|/oxfj [with m y entire s o u l ] , as Plato says; I m i g h t let it b l e n d w i t h the c o n f u s e d mass o f impressions w h i c h fill m y m i n d ; p e r h a p s in that case it w o u l d n o t d e t e r m i n e m e to a c t " . B u t m o s t often the r i n g i n g o f the a l a r m does n o t " d i s t u r b . . . m y w h o l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s " b u t o p e r a t e s on a superficial level as an i m p r e s s i o n that I m e c h a n i c a l l y associate w i t h the i d e a o f g e t t i n g u p in the m o r n i n g . T h e n , " t h e act follows the i m p r e s s i o n w i t h o u t the self i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h it. In this instance I a m a c o n s c i o u s a u t o m a t o n . " B e r g s o n a c k n o w l e d g e s that " t h e m a j o r i t y o f o u r daily actions are p e r f o r m e d in this w a y " a n d that " i t is to these acts, w h i c h are v e r y n u m e r o u s b u t for the m o s t part insignificant, that the associationist t h e o r y is a p p l i c a b l e "

(EDI,

111/168). In a free a c t i o n , b y c o n t r a s t , " t h e d e e p - s e a t e d self rush[es] up to the s u r f a c e " a n d b r e a k s t h r o u g h the " c r u s t " o f m e c h a n i c a l habits (EDI,

m / 1 6 9 ) . S u c h an a c t i o n " d o e s n o t . . . express . . .

s o m e superficial i d e a , a l m o s t e x t e r n a l to ourselves, distinct a n d easy to a c c o u n t f o r " (EDI, our

most

intimate

111/170). R a t h e r , it " a g r e e s w i t h the w h o l e o f feelings,

thoughts

and

aspirations, w i t h

that

p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f life w h i c h is the e q u i v a l e n t o f all o u r past e x p e r i e n c e , in a w o r d , w i t h o u r p e r s o n a l i d e a o f h a p p i n e s s a n d o f h o n o r " (EDI,

112/170).

U n l i k e S a r t r e , t h e n , B e r g s o n d o e s n o t h a v e the p r o b l e m o f m a k i n g e v e n the m o s t trivial actions r a d i c a l expressions o f a f u n d a m e n t a l project. S u c h expressions are as rare as t h e y are i m p o r t a n t , a n d the vast m a j o r i t y o f o u r actions are either entirely m e c h a n i c a l or at least o n l y v e r y p a r t i a l expressions o f the d u r a t i o n a l self. B e r g s o n notes that, in this r e g a r d , his v i e w o f f r e e d o m " d o e s n o t h a v e the absolute c h a r a c t e r that spiritualism s o m e t i m e s ascribes to i t " (EDI,

109/166,

translation modified).

MATTER

AND

MEMORY

B e r g s o n ' s s e c o n d b o o k , Matière et mémoire, w a s p u b l i s h e d in 1896, seven y e a r s after the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. A s the subtifie (Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit) indicates, its focus is the relation o f the b o d y to the m i n d . A t the c o r e o f B e r g s o n ' s

Bergson

61

position is w h a t w e m i g h t call (although he did not) his p r a g m a t i c v i e w o f the body, that " t h e b o d y is an i n s t r u m e n t o f a c t i o n , a n d of a c t i o n o n l y " . T h e o b v e r s e o f this v i e w is that b o d i l y events a n d states — i n c l u d i n g those o f the b r a i n — h a v e n o role in our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the w o r l d . T h e force o f these claims b e c o m e s clear in B e r g s o n ' s a c c o u n t s o f the t w o cognitive p h e n o m e n a to w h i c h the b o d y is most o b v i o u s l y r e l e v a n t (and w h e r e , t h e r e f o r e , the q u e s t i o n o f its relation to the m i n d as locus o f k n o w l e d g e is m o s t pressing): p e r c e p t i o n a n d m e m o r y . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , " t h e r e is o n l y a difference o f d e g r e e , n o t o f k i n d , b e t w e e n the so-called p e r c e p t i v e faculties o f the b r a i n a n d the reflex functions o f the spinal c o l u m n " (Mature et mémoire

[MM],

356/225). B o t h b r a i n a n d spinal c o l u m n serve simply to t r a n s f o r m e x t e r n a l e x c i t a t i o n s (e.g., sense stimulations) into m o t o r responses (actions). T h e o n l y difference is that in reflex a c t i o n these responses are g e n e r a l l y causally n e c e s s a r y w h e r e a s in p e r c e p t i o n t h e y " m o r e or less freely c h o s e n " (MM,

are

356—7/225). A s for

memory,

B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s that the b r a i n d o e s n o t , as is often

thought,

" s t o r e u p " i m a g e s o f the past. It m e r e l y r e s p o n d s to p r e s e n t stimuli in a m a n n e r similar to past responses. It is the locus o f w h a t B e r g s o n calls " h a b i t u a l m e m o r y " (in contrast to the " p u r e m e m o r y " , w h i c h , as w e shall see, he attributes to the m i n d alone). A s B e r g s o n sees it, all the s t a n d a r d responses to the " m i n d — b o d y p r o b l e m " fail b e c a u s e they insist o n t r e a t i n g p e r c e p t i o n a n d m e m o r y as instances o f p u r e (i.e., representational) k n o w l e d g e a n d t h e r e f o r e h a v e to treat the body, w h i c h has an o b v i o u s role in b o t h p e r c e p t i o n and

memory,

as

somehow

capable

of representing

the

world.

M a t e r i a l i s t s , for e x a m p l e , m u s t see k n o w l e d g e as a c h i e v e d o n c e the b o d y (brain) attains the r e l e v a n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l state. B u t t h e n they h a v e n o e x p l a n a t i o n for the e p i p h e n o m e n a l

existence o f m e n t a l

states, w h i c h c a n b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the useless d u p l i c a t i o n o f physical

states.

Idealists,

on

the

other

hand,

locate

knowledge

entirely in the p e r c e p t i o n s (representations) o f the m i n d , so that e v e n m y b o d y is real o n l y as an o b j e c t o f m y e x p e r i e n c e . B u t e v e n idealists m u s t a c c e p t scientihc results a b o u t the role o f brain-states in sensee x p e r i e n c e . T h e y will, o f c o u r s e , r e g a r d such states n o t as i n d e p e n dently existing things b u t as t h e m s e l v e s objects o f possible p e r c e p tions. B u t t h e n they will h a v e to a d m i t that this v e r y restricted set o f possible p e r c e p t i o n s is m y s t e r i o u s l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h m y

ordinary

p e r c e p t i o n s o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; that is, t h e y " m u s t s u p p o s e . . . an i n e x p l i c a b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n m y real p e r c e p t i o n o f things

62

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

a n d m y possible p e r c e p t i o n o f c e r t a i n c e r e b r a l m o v e m e n t s w h i c h d o not in a n y w a y r e s e m b l e these t h i n g s " (MM,

358/226—7). ( M o r e

generally, B e r g s o n thinks that " t h i s is the r e e f o n w h i c h all idealism is w r e c k e d : there is n o possible transition f r o m the o r d e r w h i c h is p e r c e i v e d b y o u r senses to the o r d e r w h i c h w e are to c o n c e i v e for the sake o f o u r s c i e n c e " (MM, The

inadequacies

358/227).)

of materialism

and idealism might seem

to

constitute a p r o o f o f d u a l i s m . B u t if d u a l i s m is f o r m u l a t e d in the s t a n d a r d representationalist way, it will r e d u c e to either m a t e r i a l i s m or idealism. For I will h a v e to r e g a r d brain-states as either the cause or the o c c a s i o n o f m y m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an object. If t h e y are the cause, t h e n t h e y are sufficient to p r o d u c e m y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d consciousness

becomes

merely

epiphenomenal.

If,

on

the

other

h a n d , brain-states are m e r e l y the occasion o f m y m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a tion, t h e y h a v e n o essential role in k n o w l e d g e , a n d w e are b a c k o n the r o a d to i d e a l i s m (MM,

358/227). H o w e v e r , B e r g s o n thinks that

d u a l i s m c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d so as to a v o i d the mistake o f m a k i n g p e r c e p t i o n a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the w o r l d .

6

H e d e v e l o p s his a c c o u n t in t e r m s o f the image, a n o t i o n he d e p l o y s in a w a y he thinks avoids b o t h r e a l i s t i c

7

matter.

catch

He

intends

this d e s c r i p t i o n

to

a n d idealistic v i e w s the

standpoint

of of

" c o m m o n s e n s e " , w h i c h w o u l d b e e q u a l l y p u z z l e d b y the idealist c l a i m that the things w e see a n d t o u c h exist o n l y for the m i n d a n d b y the (scientific) realist c l a i m that these objects exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y b u t h a v e n o n e o f the " s e c o n d a r y " qualities (color, t e x t u r e , etc.) c o m m o n sense attributes to t h e m . In B e r g s o n ' s u s a g e , a n i m a g e is " a c e r t a i n existence w h i c h is m o r e t h a n that w h i c h the idealist calls a representation, b u t less t h a n that w h i c h the realist calls a thing" (MM,

161/9).

T h i s , he says, reflects the c o m m o n - s e n s e v i e w in w h i c h " t h e o b j e c t exists in itself, a n d , on the o t h e r h a n d , the o b j e c t is, in itself, p i c t o r i a l , as w e p e r c e i v e it: i m a g e it is, b u t a self-existing i m a g e " (MM, 6

162/10).

B e r g s o n does not explicitly consider the possibility of similarly reformulating materialism and idealism, but such reformulations w o u l d seem to be non-starters. Representation must enter into our a c c o u n t o f cognition at some point, and materialists, w h o c a n have no recourse to i n d e p e n d e n t higher cognitive functions, must therefore m a k e our most basic perceptions representative if k n o w l e d g e is to be possible at all. Idealism is stuck with a representationalist a p p r o a c h from the beginning, since it must regard k n o w l e d g e as entirely located in the intentional structures of the mind.

' As will soon be apparent, " r e a l i s m " here m e a n s the view that w e might characterize as a "scientific r e a l i s m " , w h i c h holds that external objects exist independently o f consciousness but only as described by scientific theories, not as perceived in ordinary experience.

Bergson In o r d e r to d e v e l o p a n o n - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s t

a c c o u n t o f per-

c e p t i o n , B e r g s o n p r o p o s e s that w e r e g a r d the b o d y as a " c e n t e r of a c t i o n " (MM,

359/228). It r e c e i v e s " v i b r a t i o n s " f r o m the e x t e r n a l

w o r l d into its " p e r c e p t i v e c e n t e r s " . T h e s e v i b r a t i o n s m a y well be said to s o m e h o w " r e p r e s e n t " the w o r l d , b u t t h e y d o n o t constitute my

perception

o f it (for o n e

thing, I d o

not

experience

these

v i b r a t i o n s , w h i c h are r e v e a l e d o n l y b y n e u r o - s c i e n c e ) . O n the o t h e r h a n d , science s h o w s that the f u n c t i o n o f the v i b r a t i o n s "is solely to p r e p a r e the r e a c t i o n o f m y b o d y o n n e i g h b o r i n g b o d i e s , to sketch out m y v i r t u a l a c t i o n s " . T h e r e are certain aspects o f e x t e r n a l b o d i e s that m a t t e r Perception

for

my

reactions

is n o t h i n g

more

to t h e m than

my

and

others that do

body's

selection,

not.

effected

t h r o u g h the m e c h a n i s m s o f afferent a n d efferent n e r v e s , o f those features o f o t h e r b o d i e s that are to be t a k e n a c c o u n t o f in its actions in the w o r l d . T h e f u n c t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n " i s to eliminate f r o m the totality o f i m a g e s all those on w h i c h I c a n h a v e n o h o l d , a n d t h e n , f r o m e a c h o f those w h i c h I r e t a i n , all that d o e s n o t c o n c e r n the needs o f the i m a g e w h i c h I call m y b o d y " (MM,

360/229).

W h a t B e r g s o n has so far d e s c r i b e d is m e r e l y w h a t he calls " p u r e p e r c e p t i o n " . P u r e p e r c e p t i o n is an a b s t r a c t limit-case o f w h a t w e o r d i n a r i l y m e a n b y p e r c e p t i o n , since it d o e s n o t i n c l u d e the b o d y ' s p e r c e p t i o n s ( " a f f e c t i o n s " or " s e n s a t i o n s " ) o f its o w n i n n e r states or, m o r e i m p o r t a n t , o u r m e m o r i e s o f p r e v i o u s p e r c e p t i o n s . Sensations are o f far less i m p o r t a n c e for B e r g s o n t h a n t h e y are for

many

empiricist a n d idealist p h i l o s o p h e r s , w h o see t h e m as the epistemic basis o f o u r k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r l d . B e r g s o n , on the contrary, sees sensations as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n p e r c e p t i o n s o f m y o w n b o d y that color, in a p e r i p h e r a l way, m y p e r c e p t i o n s o f o t h e r b o d i e s .

Such

sensations " f a r f r o m b e i n g the m a t e r i a l s f r o m w h i c h the i m a g e is w r o u g h t , w i l l t h e n a p p e a r as the i m p u r i t y w h i c h is i n t r o d u c e d into it, b e i n g that p a r t o f our o w n b o d y w h i c h w e p r o j e c t into all o t h e r s " ( M M , 365/235). Memory,

h o w e v e r , is a n o t h e r

matter. H e r e

Bergson

does

not

m e a n the h a b i t u a l m e m o r y w h e r e b y the b o d y itself reacts as it has p r e v i o u s l y to past stimuli. H e is referring, rather, to p u r e m e m o r y , in the sense o f " t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an absent o b j e c t " (MM, 8

366/236).

8

A g o o d e x a m p l e o f Bergson's distinction is given by the case o f l e a r n i n g to recite from m e m o r y a p o e m by r e a d i n g it over twenty or thirty times. M y reciting o f the p o e m so learned is an instance of habitual memory. M y m e m o r y o f e a c h separate r e a d i n g o f the p o e m is an e x a m p l e o f pure memory. See Matter and Memory, 79 — 80.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

64

(1890-1940)

W h e r e a s p u r e p e r c e p t i o n is essentially a f u n c t i o n o f the b o d y (a c e n t e r o f activity, n o t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) , p u r e m e m o r y , a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , is essentially a function o f the m i n d (in its c a p a c i t y for representation). T o establish this c l a i m , he closely scrutinizes the data of empirical physiology

a n d p s y c h o l o g y to s h o w that

they

e x c l u d e the view, c o m m o n l y h e l d , that m e m o r i e s are stored in the b r a i n . If m e m o r i e s w e r e stored in the b r a i n , t h e n

"characteristic

lesions o f the b r a i n w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to definite g a p s in m e m o r y " (MM,

367/237). B u t a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n n o such c o r r e s p o n d e n c e

exists. W h e n definite g a p s in o u r m e m o r y occur, for e x a m p l e w h e n w e suffer f r o m " a n a m n e s i a in w h i c h a w h o l e p e r i o d o f o u r past existence . . .

is a b r u p t l y a n d entirely o b l i t e r a t e d f r o m

this is n o t t r i g g e r e d b y " a n y precise c e r e b r a l l e s i o n " .

memory", Conversely,

w h e n there is a distinct l o c a l i z e d b r a i n lesion (for e x a m p l e , in certain cases o f aphasia), there is n o t a loss o f a specific set o f m e m o r i e s b u t r a t h e r a partial d i m i n u t i o n o f the " w h o l e faculty o f r e m e m b e r i n g " (MM, 367/237). T h e l o c u s o f m e m o r y , t h e r e f o r e , is n o t the b o d y b u t the m i n d : " W i t h m e m o r y w e a r e , in t r u t h , in the d o m a i n o f spirit" (MM,

370/240).

9

W e are also in the d o m a i n o f d u r a t i o n . M e m o r y — t h a t is, " p u r e m e m o r y " , i n d e p e n d e n t o f the b o d y - is simply o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the c o n t i n u o u s , h e t e r o g e n e o u s flow o f time that B e r g s o n sees as fully c o n c r e t e reality. B e c a u s e it is total i m m e r s i o n in d u r a t i o n , w h i c h in turn is the w h o l e o f o u r t e m p o r a l reality, B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s that p u r e m e m o r y c o n t a i n s r e c o l l e c t i o n o f literally all o u r past e x p e r i e n c e . O f c o u r s e , w e are explicitly a w a r e o f o n l y a small p a r t o f this past at a n y g i v e n t i m e , so it follows that the largest p a r t o f o u r p u r e m e m o r y is u n c o n s c i o u s . Matière

et mémoire is n o t , h o w e v e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c e r n e d

with

e x p l o r i n g the d o m a i n o f d u r a t i o n a n d p u r e m e m o r y for its o w n sake. This

is a m a j o r

theme

o f L'évolution

créatrice, p a r t i c u l a r l y

in

its

discussion o f intuition. B u t in the earlier b o o k B e r g s o n is m o r e interested in h o w p u r e m e m o r y intersects w i t h p u r e p e r c e p t i o n to constitute o u r o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e as m i n d — b o d y c o m p o s i t e s . E n tirely p u r e m e m o r y (full i m m e r s i o n in d u r a t i o n ) is a r a r e , entirely spiritual a c h i e v e m e n t , one m o s t o f us attain o n l y 9

fleetingly.

Pure

Bergson's claims w o u l d n e e d at least some serious reformulation in the light of later developments in neuroscience. See J e a n D e l a c o u r , " M a t i è r e et m é m o i r e , à la lumière des neurosciences c o n t e m p o r a i n e s " a n d other essays in Philippe Gallois a n d G é r a r d Forzy (eds.), Bergson et les neurosciences.

Bergson perception

65

is an ideal limit, c o r r e s p o n d i n g

to an

instantaneous

e n g a g e m e n t o f the b o d y (controlled b y the brain) w i t h other b o d i e s , entirely a b s t r a c t e d f r o m t e m p o r a l i t y (MM,

373/244). A c t u a l per-

c e p t i o n o f o u r e v e r y d a y w o r l d is a synthesis o f p u r e p e r c e p t i o n a n d p u r e m e m o r y . For B e r g s o n , it is this synthesis that constitutes the u n i o n o f m i n d a n d body. The

synthesis o c c u r s w h e n the m i n d

perception

memories

that r e s e m b l e

" i n s e r t s " into a p r e s e n t

the p e r c e p t i o n ,

thereby

en-

r i c h i n g it a n d g i v i n g it t e m p o r a l thickness. B e r g s o n cites the simple example of what happens w h e n we read. Psychological experiments p r o v e that w e d o n o t a c t u a l l y r e a d " l e t t e r - b y - l e t t e r " . R a t h e r , " o u r m i n d notes h e r e a n d there [on the p a g e ] a few characteristic lines a n d fills all the intervals w i t h m e m o r y - i m a g e s w h i c h , p r o j e c t e d o n the paper, take the p l a c e o f the real p r i n t e d c h a r a c t e r s a n d m a y b e m i s t a k e n for t h e m " (MM,

248/103). O n the l o w e s t level, a p u r e l y

p h y s i c a l p e r c e p t i o n o f the shapes " c a " a n d " l e " may, w h e n supplem e n t e d w i t h a r e l e v a n t m e m o r y (of the c o n n e c t i n g " n d " ) , y i e l d a p e r c e p t i o n o f the sign " c a n d l e " . F u r t h e r m e m o r i e s will t h e n b e supplied, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to p a s t uses o f " c a n d l e " , that specify its s e m a n t i c m e a n i n g . A h i g h e r level m i g h t insert m e m o r i e s that a d d a specific e m o t i o n a l tone to the p e r c e p t i o n , a n d a still h i g h e r level might

infuse

speaks,

it w i t h

therefore,

a

o f the

symbolic inhnity

religious of

signihcance.

"planes

of

Bergson

consciousness",

c o r r e s p o n d i n g to all the different levels o f w h a t w e m i g h t call the "interpretation"

of perception

by memory.

In this

terminology,

B e r g s o n will call p u r e p e r c e p t i o n the " p l a n e o f a c t i o n " a n d p u r e memory

"the plane of d r e a m " .

1 0

When

b o t h are i n c l u d e d ,

the

p l a n e s o f consciousness e n c o m p a s s the w h o l e o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e , f r o m the ideal limit o f a p u r e l y p h y s i c a l r e s p o n s e to o u r w o r l d , t h r o u g h the v a r i o u s m o d e s o f c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g that w o r l d for p r a c tical p u r p o s e s , to the intuitive a p p r e h e n s i o n o f the final reality o f duration itself.

11

It m a y s e e m that n o t h i n g B e r g s o n has said, original a n d perceptive as it m i g h t b e , really addresses the k e y q u e s t i o n o f j u s t h o w m i n d a n d b o d y interact. E v e n if w e g r a n t h i m that this i n t e r a c t i o n

1 0

1 1

" D r e a m " here signifies d e t a c h m e n t not from reality but from the practical w o r l d o f action. O n the central role of the notion o f planes of consciousness in Matière et mémoire, see Frédéric W o r m s , " L a théorie bergsonienne des plans de conscience: G e n è s e , structure et signification de Matière et mémoire", in Gallois a n d Forzy (eds.), Bergson et les neurosciences, 85—108. See also W o r m s ' s Introduction à M a t i è r e et m é m o i r e de Bergson.

66

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

r e d u c e s to the insertion o f m e m o r i e s into p e r c e p t i o n , h o w are w e to u n d e r s t a n d the " i n s e r t i o n " o f a spiritual m e m o r y into the p h y s i c a l process o f p e r c e p t i o n ? T o this B e r g s o n w o u l d n o d o u b t r e p l y that the

question

itself derives

from

an

inappropriate

reification

of

m e m o r y a n d p e r c e p t i o n . It assumes a m e t a p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f material brain

and immaterial

memory

that m u s t be

somehow

b r i d g e d . B u t this is a m i s l e a d i n g p i c t u r e . C o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e does not p r e s e n t the i n t e r a c t i o n

o f i n d e p e n d e n t entities b e l o n g i n g

to

distinct o n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s . R a t h e r , it presents a n o r g a n i c e x p e r i ential w h o l e o f w h i c h w h a t w e call m i n d ( m e m o r y ) a n d b o d y (brain) are a b s t r a c t d i m e n s i o n s . E x p e r i e n c e does n o t r e v e a l an metaphysical

duality that the

"union"

of mind

ultimate

and body

must

o v e r c o m e . I n s t e a d , m i n d a n d b o d y are e a c h aspects o f the s a m e m e t a p h y s i c a l reality, the reality he will later call the " v i t a l i m p e t u s " (élan vital). A d m i t t e d l y , h o w e v e r , n e i t h e r o f B e r g s o n ' s first t w o b o o k s , restricted as t h e y are to issues o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t h r o p o l o g y , d e v e l o p (even if t h e y s o m e h o w require) this sort o f c o m p r e h e n s i v e ontology. T h i s B e r g s o n tried to s u p p l y in his n e x t b o o k , L'évolution créatrice

CREATIVE

EVOLUTION

H e r e B e r g s o n takes as his topic the m o s t basic o f all m e t a p h y s i c a l questions: w h a t d o e s it m e a n to exist? H e b e g i n s , h o w e v e r , w i t h o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f o u r o w n e x i s t e n c e , the o n e case for w h i c h o u r access to existence is " i n t e r n a l a n d p r o f o u n d " (EC,

495/3). G i v e n

what

B e r g s o n has a l r e a d y said a b o u t d u r a t i o n , it is n o surprise that he sees existence as a m a t t e r o f t e m p o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t , u n d e r s t o o d as a process o f self-creation: " f o r a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g , to exist is to c h a n g e , to c h a n g e is to d e v e l o p [se mûrir], to d e v e l o p is to g o o n c r e a t i n g o n e s e l f e n d l e s s l y " (EC, 5 0 0 / 1 0 ) .

1 2

B u t c a n this c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n b e

e x t e n d e d to all reality? E a r l y o n , B e r g s o n seems to h a v e t h o u g h t that it c o u l d n o t . In his first b o o k he says: " T h u s , w i t h i n o u r e g o , there is succession w i t h o u t m u t u a l exteriority; outside the e g o , in p u r e s p a c e , m u t u a l exteriority w i t h o u t s u c c e s s i o n " (EDI, 7 2 - 3 / 1 0 8 ) . 1 2

1 3

1 3

B u t b y the time of L'évolution

H e r e I have altered the English translation o f se mûrir. T h e text has " m a t u r e s " , w h i c h strikes m e as h a v i n g too m u c h of an ethical connotation. T h e r e are, however, other passages in the Essai that suggest s o m e t h i n g like duration in the external world. For e x a m p l e : " W e certainly feel . . . that although things do not endure as

Bergson

67

créatrice, B e r g s o n h a d c o m e to r e g a r d t e m p o r a l succession as an " u n d e n i a b l e fact, e v e n in the m a t e r i a l w o r l d " (EC, 502/12). If, he says, I m i x s o m e s u g a r in s o m e water, " I m u s t , willy-nilly, w a i t until the sugar m e l t s " . Further, the time I w a i t is n o t the

physicist's

m a t h e m a t i c a l t i m e , for w h i c h all that m a t t e r are the b e g i n n i n g - a n d e n d - p o i n t s , w i t h n o c o n s i d e r a t i o n g i v e n to the interval in b e t w e e n . T h e time " c o i n c i d e s w i t h m y i m p a t i e n c e , that is to say, w i t h a certain p o r t i o n o f m y o w n d u r a t i o n . . . It is n o l o n g e r s o m e t h i n g thought, it is s o m e t h i n g lived" (EC, 5 0 2 / 1 2 - 1 3 ) . B e r g s o n also notes that the

assumption

of

a

totally

isolated

system,

necessary

for

the

c o m p l e t e m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n o f t i m e , is a l w a y s o n l y an i d e a l i z a t i o n . T h e r e is a l w a y s a t h r e a d o f c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n a n y system a n d the rest o f the universe, a n d " i t is a l o n g this t h r e a d that is t r a n s m i t t e d d o w n to the smallest p a r t i c l e o f the w o r l d in w h i c h w e live the d u r a t i o n i m m a n e n t to the w h o l e o f the u n i v e r s e " . B e r g s o n therefore c o n c l u d e s that " t h e r e is n o r e a s o n . . . w h y a d u r a t i o n , a n d so a f o r m o f existence like o u r o w n , should n o t be attributed to the systems that science isolates, p r o v i d e d such systems are r e i n t e g r a t e d into the W h o l e " (EC, 5 0 3 / 1 4 ) .

1 4

M o r e o v e r , w i t h i n the p h y s i c a l w o r l d there is a special class o f isolated systems that h a v e the characteristics o f d u r a t i o n . T h e s e , of c o u r s e , are o r g a n i s m s , the life that B e r g s o n thinks w e c a n m a k e the primary

model

for his g e n e r a l i z a t i o n

of duration

to

all

reality.

A r g u i n g against r e d u c t i o n i s m on scientific g r o u n d s , B e r g s o n m a i n tains

that

the

individuality

of

an

organism,

its

existence

as

an

a u t o n o m o u s b i o l o g i c a l system, r e q u i r e s the " c o n t i n u i t y o f c h a n g e " a n d " p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the past in the p r e s e n t " that are characteristics o f the

duration

we

hnd

in

consciousness.

The

only

remaining

q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r life also involves the " i n v e n t i o n , [the] u n c e a s i n g

1 4

w e d o ourselves, nevertheless there must be [in them] some [incomprehensible] reason w h y p h e n o m e n a seem to succeed one another instead o f b e i n g unfolded all at o n c e " (EDI, 137/ 209—10). ( T h e bracketed terms correspond to words in the French that are not translated in the English version, Time and Free Will.) E x t e n d i n g duration to the w o r l d described by physics raises the question of h o w duration relates to time as understood by science, in particular Einstein's theory o f relativity. Bergson addressed this question in Durée et simultanéité. H e a r g u e d that, properly interpreted, relativity theory is entirely consistent with his philosophy o f duration. H e also a r g u e d that his philosophy requires the constancy of the velocity of light characteristic of relativity a n d offered a solution to the famous " t w i n - p a r a d o x " . Bergson's discussion was the occasion o f a great deal o f controversy, a n d it is n o w generally a g r e e d that there are mistakes in his interpretation of relativity, although some c o m m e n t a t o r s insist that his w o r k is nonetheless an important contribution to our understanding o f the theory. See A . R. Lacey, Bergson, 59 — 66 a n d Milic G a p e k , Bergson and Modern Physics, 238—56.

68

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

c r e a t i o n " o f consciousness (EC, 513/27). I f so, t h e n life will b e the perfect m o d e l for e x t e n d i n g the d u r a t i o n o f consciousness to reality as a w h o l e . W e will t h e n b e able to p l a u s i b l y think o f the entire universe as an o r g a n i c w h o l e , n o t j u s t existing b u t " e n d u r i n g " . B u t hrst B e r g s o n n e e d s to s h o w that life

shares the

1 5

creative

n o v e l t y o f c o n s c i o u s d u r a t i o n . H e r e he turns to e v o l u t i o n (or, as he t e r m s it, " t r a n s f o r m i s m " ) . H i s ultimate g o a l is to s h o w that the fact o f e v o l u t i o n m u s t be seen as the p r o d u c t o f a d y n a m i c i m p u l s e , the élan vital, that is the p r i n c i p l e o f all life. T h i s i m p u l s e will be the creative force w i t h i n d u r a t i o n , n o w r e g a r d e d b y B e r g s o n as the highest m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e .

1 6

B u t in o r d e r to establish the role o f élan vital B e r g s o n m u s t first exclude

the

standard

understandings

of

evolution

in

terms

of

m e c h a n i s m a n d h n a l i s m . A m e c h a n i s t i c t h e o r y o f e v o l u t i o n , such as D a r w i n ' s f o r m u l a t i o n in t e r m s o f n a t u r a l selection, presents functionally u n i h e d ultimate

structures

outcome

(e.g., the

eye

o f a vast multiplicity

of a vertebrate) o f small

as

the

changes,

each

o c c u r r i n g for reasons i n d e p e n d e n t o f the ultimate o u t c o m e .

Like

m a n y o t h e r critics, B e r g s o n p o i n t s out that a n i m m e n s e n u m b e r o f v a r i a t i o n s is n e c e s s a r y a n d n o p r o p e r subset o f t h e m is sufficient for sight. It is m o n s t r o u s l y i m p r o b a b l e that all o f these v a r i a t i o n s j u s t h a p p e n e d to o c c u r simultaneously, b u t it is e q u a l l y i m p r o b a b l e that 1 5

1 6

B e r g s o n is also c o n c e r n e d with the traditional metaphysical objection to a metaphysics o f duration: that if process is the ultimate reality, it is impossible to explain w h y there is something rather than nothing, since only a self-existent absolute, free from c h a n g e , can provide such an explanation. B e r g s o n thinks this objection falsely assumes that w e have a coherent c o n c e p t o f " n o t h i n g " in an absolute sense. O n the contrary, he argues, " n o t h i n g " always means " s o m e t h i n g e l s e " , that is, something other than w h a t w e n e e d e d or expected. W e have no idea o f sheer absence (nothingness), merely o f the relative absence implied by another presence. T h e r e f o r e , the question, " W h y is there something rather than n o t h i n g ? " , is meaningless (EC, 728—47/299—324). B e r g s o n thinks this mistake underlies a wide range of metaphysical a n d epistemological errors. Interestingly, B e r g s o n says that his philosophical case does not strictly require accepting evolution (transformism) as a fact. E v e n if it were proven " t h a t species . . . have arisen by a discontinuous p r o c e s s " , the similarities of species a n d the parallels established by e m b r y o l o g y a n d a n a t o m y w o u l d r e m a i n . O n the basis of these similarities a n d parallels, B e r g s o n thinks, " b i o l o g y could a n d w o u l d continue to establish b e t w e e n living forms the same relations a n d the same kinship as transformism supposes t o d a y " (EC, 515/29). It w o u l d just be that the connections w e r e " i d e a l " , not the o u t c o m e of physically real evolutionary processes, a l t h o u g h , given the data of paleontology, w e w o u l d still have to admit that c o n n e c t e d forms a p p e a r e d successively, not simultaneously. But even without a physical process o f evolution, this chronological realization o f a sequence o f logically c o n n e c t e d organisms w o u l d be as m u c h o f evolution as he needs for philosophical purposes. For " a n evolution somewhere w o u l d have to be s u p p o s e d " , w h e t h e r this w e r e , for e x a m p l e , in a "creative T h o u g h t " that generates the universe or in some " p l a n o f vital organization i m m a n e n t in nature, w h i c h gradually works itself o u t " (EC, 515—16/30).

Bergson

69

they j u s t h a p p e n e d to o c c u r o n e after a n o t h e r a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , j u s t h a p p e n e d to b e r e t a i n e d over eons as features o f the o r g a n i s m . D a r w i n i a n s will try to rescue the latter alternative b y s u g g e s t i n g that e a c h successive v a r i a t i o n p r o v i d e d its o w n distinct a d v a n t a g e , but there is simply n o e v i d e n c e that this w a s the case. T h e b l i n d forces of m e c h a n i s m thus p r o v e i n c a p a b l e o f e x p l a i n i n g the f u n c t i o n a l structures o f o r g a n i s m s .

1 7

B u t B e r g s o n ' s rejection o f m e c h a n i s m g o e s m u c h d e e p e r t h a n this s t a n d a r d attack on its e x p l a n a t o r y a d e q u a c y . A s he sees it, m e c h a n ism's failure is n o t j u s t a m a t t e r o f its inability to a c c o u n t for s o m e r e c a l c i t r a n t facts. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m w i t h m e c h a n i s m is its defining a s s u m p t i o n that the b i o l o g i c a l w o r l d is a c o n s t r u c t i o n out of diverse parts. T h i s is true o f the things h u m a n craft p r o d u c e s , b u t it is n o t so for b i o l o g i c a l n a t u r e . " A m e r e g l a n c e at the d e v e l o p m e n t o f an e m b r y o s h o w s that life g o e s to w o r k in a v e r y different way. Life does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division" [EC, 571/99)- O r g a n i c processes, in o t h e r w o r d s , are not processes o f manufacture, in w h i c h simple e l e m e n t s are c o m b i n e d to p r o d u c e a c o m p l e x w h o l e ; they are processes o f organization, in w h i c h initially g i v e n structures (e.g., a fertilized egg) " e x p l o d e " into a n e w structure. B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s that the t r a d i t i o n a l rival o f m e c h a n i s m , alism, assumes the s a m e f u n d a m e n t a l p i c t u r e o f o r g a n i c Positing a p u r p o s e explain,

as

fin-

nature.

(final cause) outside a b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s will

mechanism

cannot,

how

the

process

achieves

its

o u t c o m e . B u t the e x p l a n a t i o n is b a s e d o n the s a m e i n a d e q u a t e i d e a , e m p l o y e d b y m e c h a n i s m , o f simple parts a s s e m b l e d into a c o m p l e x w h o l e . F i n a l i s m m e r e l y p r o v i d e s an a n a l o g u e to the w o r k e r

who

does the assembling. T h i s is an a d v a n c e on m e c h a n i s m ' s effort to h a v e the parts s o m e h o w a s s e m b l e t h e m s e l v e s , b u t it involves the s a m e m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f b i o l o g i c a l processes. " F i n a l i s m thus u n d e r stood is o n l y inverted m e c h a n i s m . It springs f r o m the s a m e p o s t u l a t e " (EC, 528/45). T h e picture shared by mechanism and

finalism

is one for w h i c h

life n e v e r p r o d u c e s a n y t h i n g g e n u i n e l y new. T h e o u t c o m e o f a n y b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s is a l w a y s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t , either in the m e c h a n i c a l forces that will p r o d u c e it or in the ideas or f o r m s that g u i d e these

1

'

For responses to this sort o f objection to D a r w i n i s m , see Philip Kitcher, Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism.

7

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

o

(1890-1940)

forces. In r e j e c t i n g this p i c t u r e , w e see that life d o e s i n d e e d i n c l u d e the n o v e l t y — in a d d i t i o n to the c o n t i n u i t y a n d historicity — n e e d e d to p l a c e it in the r e a l m o f d u r a t i o n . In o t h e r w o r d s , life, like c o n s c i o u s ness, is a n e x p r e s s i o n o f the vital i m p e t u s (élan vital). B e r g s o n ' s c o s m o l o g y is b a s e d o n t w o f u n d a m e n t a l features o f the vital i m p e t u s . First, it n e v e r o p e r a t e s outside o f a c o n t e x t (environment)

defined

by

brute

material

givens

of which

it m u s t

take

a c c o u n t . (Bergson's a n a l o g y h e r e is w i t h a r o a d that, e v e n t h o u g h its ultimate d i r e c t i o n is n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y the l a n d s c a p e , will h a v e to w i n d a n d slope to c o n f o r m to " t h e ups a n d d o w n s o f the h i l l s " (EC, 582/114).) T h u s , the f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g i c a l g i v e n is n o t the vital impulse a l o n e b u t the vital impulse situated in an inert m a t t e r that it strives to m o l d . S e c o n d , the vital i m p u l s e is a t e n d e n c y to creative d e v e l o p m e n t b u t n o t to a n y p a r t i c u l a r line o f such

development.

T h e r e is n o p r e f i x e d p l a n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h it acts; its d i r e c t i o n varies c o n t i n g e n t l y over t i m e . M o r e o v e r , the i m p u l s e d o e s n o t h a v e o n l y o n e d i r e c t i o n ; it is a drive t o w a r d varieties o f d e v e l o p m e n t a n d so forks into an indefinite diversity o f p a t h s (like, B e r g s o n

says,

artillery shells b u r s t i n g in the sky in an endless tree o f b r a n c h i n g e x p l o s i o n s (EC, 578/109)). E v o l u t i o n displays p r o g r e s s o f a sort, but not the finalist's p r o g r e s s o f the g r a d u a l r e a l i z a t i o n o f a p r e d e s i g n e d plan. M o r e fully, B e r g s o n sees e v o l u t i o n as p r o g r e s s i v e in t w o senses. O n the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l level, there is " a c o n t i n u a l a d v a n c e in the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n d e t e r m i n e d b y a first i m p u l s i o n " (EC, 5 8 3 / 1 1 6 ) . W e c a n , that is, a l w a y s trace all the f o r m s o f life existing at a g i v e n m o m e n t b a c k to a single i m p u l s e f r o m w h i c h t h e y all o r i g i n a t e .

18

M o r e o v e r , w e c a n distinguish " t w o or three g r e a t lines o f e v o l u t i o n on w h i c h f o r m s e v e r m o r e c o m p l e x , e v e r m o r e a n d m o r e

high,

a p p e a r " . B e t w e e n these g r a n d lines o f p r o g r e s s there are " a c r o w d o f m i n o r p a t h s in w h i c h , o n the contrary, d e v i a t i o n s , arrests, setb a c k s are m u l t i p l i e d " (EC,

5 8 4 / 1 1 6 ) . T h e " g r a n d l i n e s " w e r e not,

h o w e v e r , e n v i s a g e d a h e a d o f t i m e ; they h a v e m e r e l y e m e r g e d as the m o s t relatively stable a c h i e v e m e n t s o f the vital impulse. O n e g r a n d line has b e e n that o f the plants. T h i s is a c o n s e r v a t i v e d i r e c t i o n that avoids " a c t i o n a n d c h o i c e . . . a n d a r r a n g e [s] to get e v e r y t h i n g that it n e e d s in situ, w i t h o u t g o i n g to look for i t " . H e r e

1 8

T h i s , of course, c a n be true even if there is n o absolute b e g i n n i n g of the evolutionary process. Bergson's "first i m p u l s i o n " n e e d not be a u n i q u e act o f creation.

Bergson

7i

the élan vital has p u r s u e d a " s a f e , t r a n q u i l , a n d b o u r g e o i s e x i s t e n c e " b u t o n e that is also " t o r p i d " . B u t a n o t h e r g r a n d line has b e e n that of the a n i m a l s . H e r e the vital i m p u l s e has g o n e " i n the d i r e c t i o n o f m o v e m e n t a n d a c t i o n , m o v e m e n t that is m o r e a n d m o r e a n d a c t i o n that is m o r e

effective,

a n d m o r e free; here there is risk

and

a d v e n t u r e , a n d also c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w i t h its i n c r e a s i n g d e g r e e s depth and i n t e n s i t y " .

1 9

of

T h e line o f a n i m a l d e v e l o p m e n t has itself

d i v i d e d into t w o o t h e r g r a n d lines, that o f instinct a n d that

of

intelligence. Instinct a n d intelligence b o t h act b y e m p l o y i n g instruments, b u t the i n s t r u m e n t s o f instinct are a l r e a d y available o r g a n i z e d (particularly

an o r g a n i s m ' s

o w n ) , w h e r e a s intelligence

bodies

constructs

artihcial tools to a c h i e v e its ends. A s a result, instinct

operates

i m m e d i a t e l y , effortlessly, a n d infallibly; b u t its r a n g e o f effectiveness is s h a r p l y restricted a n d inflexible. I n t e l l i g e n c e , b y contrast, requires effort a n d reflection, trial a n d error, a n d will n e v e r a c h i e v e

the

efficiency o f a n a u t o m a t i c m e c h a n i s m . B u t it is o p e n to i n d e h n i t e i m p r o v e m e n t a n d h i g h l y a d a p t a b l e to v a r i a b l e situations. W h e r e a s instinct o p e r a t e s on the p r i n c i p l e that there is j u s t one solution to a g i v e n p r o b l e m (that e m b e d d e d in the instinctive r e a c t i o n ) , intellig e n c e is b a s e d on the n e e d to survey a n d c h o o s e f r o m a r a n g e of possible solutions. T h i s is w h y intelligence r e q u i r e s consciousness, which

Bergson

dehnes

as

"an

arithmetical

difference

p o t e n t i a l a n d real a c t i v i t y " ; that is, a m e a s u r e

o f the

between "interval

b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d a c t i o n " (EC, 6 1 8 / 1 6 0 ) . Conscious

intelligence

thus

distances

itself f r o m

the

material

instantiation o f its objects in o r d e r to focus on the f o r m a l , r e l a t i o n a l features that give t h e m distinct positions in the r e a l m o f possibilities. Intelligence does n o t r e s p o n d to the specific a n a t o m y a n d p h y s i o l o g y o f an a r m that c a n b e used to r e a c h f o o d b u t to the g e n e r a l structure (roughly,

a

long,

narrow,

solid

object)

that

makes

it

a

useful

i n s t r u m e n t . T h i s is w h y intelligence c a n use a stick in p l a c e o f or as a s u p p l e m e n t to the a r m . It is this c a p a c i t y for f o r m a l a b s t r a c t i o n that leads the intellect to separate its objects f r o m the c o n t i n u o u s flux o f d u r a t i o n a n d to think o f t h e m instead as fixed a n d distinct units available for o u r use. M o r e o v e r , this s e p a r a t i o n o f objects is o f g r e a t p r a c t i c a l v a l u e , since it allows us to focus e x c l u s i v e l y on the features r e l e v a n t for a t t a i n i n g our ends. B u t , at the s a m e t i m e , it results in the

1 9

L'énergie spirituelle, n ; as translated by F.G.T. M o o r e in Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 1 2 2 .

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

72

(1890-1940)

intellect's c i n e m a t o g r a p h i c vision o f the w o r l d as a discrete series of i n d e p e n d e n t units, as, that is, a spatialized system o f m a t e r i a l things, stripped o f the d u r a t i o n o f life. With

this the

cosmology

o f L'évolution

créatrice r e t u r n s to

and

justihes the starting-point o f B e r g s o n ' s p h i l o s o p h y : his insistence that the

intellectual

categories

of

science

are

not

adequate

to

the

concreteness of our immediate experience of lived duration. W e now see j u s t w h y a n d h o w the intellect, a l t h o u g h it is b i o l o g i c a l l y the distinctive h u m a n trait, is a limited i n s t r u m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e , f o r m e d to deal o n l y w i t h inert matter, that has " a n a t u r a l inability

to

c o m p r e h e n d l i f e " (EC, 6 3 5 / 1 8 2 , e m p h a s i s omitted). B u t w e also see h o w h u m a n s c a n o v e r c o m e the limitations o f the intellect. For w e are c r e a t u r e s o f instinct as w e l l as o f intellect; a n d instinct, as w e h a v e seen, is d i r e c t e d to the singular, c o n c r e t e o b j e c t , that is, to t i m e as d u r a t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y , o f c o u r s e , instinct lacks the distance from objects n e e d e d

for t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e

o f t h e m ; its access

to

d u r a t i o n r e m a i n s an unreflective s y m p a t h y that g o e s n o further t h a n a n implicit k n o w - h o w . B u t , a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , it is possible for instinct to b e c o m e d i s e n g a g e d , for it to " b e c o m e disinterested, selfc o n s c i o u s , c a p a b l e o f reflecting on its o b j e c t " (EC, 645/194). Instinct then

becomes

intuition,

the

privileged

vehicle

of

philosophical

knowledge. B e r g s o n thinks that the possibility o f s o m e t h i n g like intuition is a p p a r e n t f r o m the reality o f aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h grasps the t e m p o r a l unity o f i n d i v i d u a l objects in a w a y that n o r m a l , spatialized perception

does

not.

Philosophical

intuition

is the

basis

of

an

" i n q u i r y t u r n e d in the s a m e d i r e c t i o n as art, w h i c h w o u l d take life in general for its o b j e c t " (EC,

645/194).

2 0

T h e turn toward generality

derives, a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , f r o m intelligence itself.

"Without

intelligence, [intuition] w o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d in the f o r m o f instinct, r i v e t e d to the special o b j e c t o f its p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t " (EC,

646/195).

P h i l o s o p h y is b o r n f r o m a f u n d a m e n t a l c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t w o c o m p l e m e n t a r y p o w e r s : " T h e r e are things that intelligence a l o n e is able to seek, b u t w h i c h , b y itself, it will n e v e r h n d . T h e s e things instinct a l o n e c o u l d find; b u t it will n e v e r seek t h e m " (EC,

2 0

623/167,

Bergson's classic essay on h u m o r (Le rire) locates it at the intersection of the lived time grasped by aesthetic and philosophical intuition and the m e c h a n i s m s of spatialized perceptions. W h a t w e laugh at is a concretely existing h u m a n being's acting with the rigidity o f an a u t o m a t o n (by, for e x a m p l e , falling through a trap d o o r or responding to a question with a mindless literalism).

Bergson

73

e m p h a s i s omitted). I n t u i t i o n is p r e c i s e l y instinct d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the intellect's g o a l o f g e n e r a l , t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e . Intuition e n a b l e s us to g o b e y o n d the limitations o f intelligence, b u t B e r g s o n insists that w e m u s t c o n t i n u e to r e c o g n i z e a n d e v e n e m p l o y the a c h i e v e m e n t s o f intelligence. For one thing, intellectual k n o w l e d g e is e p i s t e m i c a l l y u n m a t c h e d b y philosophy, w h i c h

"will

n e v e r o b t a i n a k n o w l e d g e o f its o b j e c t c o m p a r a b l e to that w h i c h science has o f its o w n " . I n d e e d , B e r g s o n says that

"intelligence

r e m a i n s the l u m i n o u s n u c l e u s a r o u n d w h i c h instinct, e v e n e n l a r g e d a n d purified into intuition, f o r m s o n l y a v a g u e n e b u l o s i t y " a n d that p h i l o s o p h y does n o t a c h i e v e " k n o w l e d g e p r o p e r l y so c a l l e d " , w h i c h is the p r i v i l e g e o f science a l o n e . (This h i g h epistemic r e g a r d is n o d o u b t w h a t lies b e h i n d the careful attention that B e r g s o n p a y s to r e l e v a n t scientific results.) M o r e o v e r , p h i l o s o p h y

always demon-

strates the limitations o f intelligence b y e m p l o y i n g intelligence itself to s h o w j u s t w h e r e its c a t e g o r i e s b e c o m e i n a p p l i c a b l e (EC, 6 4 6 / 1 9 5 ) . O n l y t h e n d o e s intuition b e g i n to o p e r a t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y in its o w n right a n d " b y the s y m p a t h e t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h it establishes b e t w e e n us a n d the rest o f the l i v i n g . . . i n t r o d u c e s us into life's o w n d o m a i n , w h i c h is r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n , endlessly creation".

But

Bergson

recalls

that

even

continued

this t r a n s c e n d e n c e

of

intelligence has b e e n the result o f the " p u s h " o f intelligence, w h i c h insists o n g e t t i n g b e y o n d its limitations (EC,

6 4 6 / 1 9 5 ) . T h e r e is,

therefore, n o basis for c h a r a c t e r i z i n g B e r g s o n ' s t h o u g h t as irration¬ alist or a n t i - r e a s o n , a l t h o u g h it does insist o n an essential transr a t i o n a l m o m e n t at the h e a r t o f philosophy. B e r g s o n is n o t an anti-rationalist, b u t he is a n anti-intellectualist, p a r t i c u l a r l y in contrast to B r u n s c h v i c g , w h o s e insistence

on

the

centrality o f j u d g m e n t a n d the priority o f science m a k e his philo s o p h y aggressively intellectualist. (In Les étapes de la pensée mathématiques, B r u n s c h v i c g

even

labeled

his p o s i t i o n

as

"mathematical

intellectualism".) T h i s raises the q u e s t i o n o f B r u n s c h v i c g ' s v i e w o f B e r g s o n ' s critique o f the intellect, p a r t i c u l a r l y since he w a s a g o o d friend o f B e r g s o n ' s a n d a l w a y s t r e a t e d his v i e w s w i t h the greatest respect.

21

B r u n s c h v i c g r e a d i l y endorses B e r g s o n ' s " b r i l l i a n t d e m o n -

s t r a t i o n " that " t h e reality o f t i m e , in its p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r u t h , consists . . . in the i n d i v i d u a l r h y t h m o f d u r a t i o n , w h i c h is . . . constitutive o f 2 1

See, for e x a m p l e , his discussions o f B e r g s o n in Le progrès de la conscience, chapter 21. In addition this important b o o k is dedicated to B e r g s o n ("in witness o f affectionate admiration for the m a n a n d o f intimate gratitude [reconnaissance] for the w o r k " ) .

74

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

the interior l i f e " .

2 2

(1890-1940)

B u t he d o e s n o t a g r e e w i t h B e r g s o n ' s

further

c l a i m that intelligence c a n d e a l w i t h time o n l y b y r e d u c i n g it to a spatialized a b s t r a c t i o n . H e suggests that this c o n c e p t i o n o f intellig e n c e is " a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f scientific k n o w l e d g e [savoir]" that has b e e n " s u r p a s s e d b y the e v o l u t i o n o f h u m a n t h o u g h t " . Specifically, it is the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f intelligence g i v e n in K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l aesthetic, w h i c h r e g a r d s the intelligible w o r l d (e.g., the q u a n t i t a t i v e w o r l d o f m a t h e m a t i c s ) as " g i v e n at a stroke, forever crystallized in a priori f o r m s " a n d r e q u i r i n g " t h e sacrifice o f w h a t e x p e r i e n c e reveals ...

o f the p e r p e t u a l l y m o b i l e a n d p e r p e t u a l l y n e w in the a p p e a r -

ances o f the u n i v e r s e " . B u t this is an o u t d a t e d view, since m a t h e m a tical physics has p r o g r e s s i v e l y d e v e l o p e d into " a supple a n d living instrument,

infinitely

plastic

and

infinitely

fruitful,

intended

to

c a p t u r e a n d to m a k e p r e s e n t - if n o t to the senses, at least to the intelligence - qualities that e s c a p e the i n h r m i t y o f o u r o r g a n i s m a n d our p e r c e p t i o n " .

2 3

M o r e o v e r , B r u n s c h v i c g m a i n t a i n s that d u r a t i o n

itself has n o reality a p a r t f r o m its constitution b y intelligence. H e cites L a c h e l i e r ' s f o r m u l a t i o n : " T h e r e is time a n d , t h e r e f o r e , m e m o r y o n l y for an intelligence that d o e s n o t exist in t i m e . "

Consciousness

2 4

itself, u n d e r s t o o d as the activity o f j u d g m e n t , " g r a s p s in itself. . . the flux o f u n i v e r s a l life . . . in o r d e r to restore the freshness a n d e n e r g y o f its i m m e d i a t e r e a l i t y " . In this way, " t h e impulse o f consciousness [élan de conscience] is . . . an impulse o f life [élan de vie] that traverses the u n i v e r s e " . I n d e e d , it m u s t be m o r e t h a n a n " i m p u l s e o f l i f e " ; it m u s t b e an Brunschvicg's

"impulse response

o f intelligence

[élan d'intelligence]".

25

to B e r g s o n is that, p r o p e r l y

Thus,

understood,

intelligence has all the d y n a m i s m B e r g s o n finds in his vital i m p u l s e a n d m u s t , m o r e o v e r , constitute this i m p u l s e as an o b j e c t o f our e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s is an i n g e n i o u s effort at an idealist a p p r o p r i a t i o n of B e r g s o n ' s m e t a p h y s i c s . B u t , a l t h o u g h B e r g s o n n e v e r explicitly res p o n d e d to B r u n s c h v i c g o n this p o i n t , w e c a n readily see that he c o u l d n e v e r a c c e p t his r e d u c t i o n o f the cognitive l e a p o f intuition to the g r a d u a l historical p r o g r e s s o f scientific j u d g m e n t .

2 2

2 3

2 4

2 5

2 6

2 6

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique, 570. Ibid., 571. J. Lachelier, " R a p p o r t sur la p e r s o n n a l i t é " , 697. C i t e d in Le progrés de la conscience, 655, n. 1. L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique, 655. O n the personal a n d philosophical relations b e t w e e n B e r g s o n a n d Brunschvicg, see the reminiscence o f V l a d i m i r Jankélévitch, w h o was the student and friend of b o t h , in his "Léon Brunschvicg".

Bergson RELIGION

AND

75 MORALITY

B e r g s o n ' s last b o o k , Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), a p p e a r e d twenty-five years after L'évolution créatrice. N o n e t h e l e s s , it reads as a direct e x t e n s i o n o f the p r e v i o u s w o r k ' s vision to ethics a n d religion.

"All

morality",

Bergson

maintains,

"is in essence

bio-

l o g i c a l " , p r o v i d e d that t e r m is u n d e r s t o o d in a p r o p e r l y w i d e sense (Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion \DSM\, means

is that ethics a n d

religion

are n o t

1061/101). W h a t he

(and

should

not

be)

g r o u n d e d , as p h i l o s o p h e r s so often think, in intellectual u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t ; t h e y derive instead f r o m " L i f e " , f r o m the vital i m p e t u s as it w o r k s in the h u m a n species. T h i s w o r k i n g is f r o m t w o directions, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the " t w o s o u r c e s " o f morality. B u t n e i t h e r source derives f r o m the r a t i o n a l , intellectual r e a l m in w h i c h p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e traditionally s o u g h t the basis o f ethics. R a t h e r , the sources are, respectively, b e l o w r e a s o n (infra-rational) a n d a b o v e r e a s o n (supra-rational) (DSM,

1029/64).

The

of

infra-rational

source

of morality

is the

pressure

social

constraints o n i n d i v i d u a l s , p u s h i n g t h e m to b e h a v e a c c o r d i n g to p a t t e r n s r e q u i r e d for the stability o f their society. H e r e , in B e r g s o n ' s view, w e h a v e the h u m a n e q u i v a l e n t o f the social instincts that produce

an ant-hill or a b e e - h i v e . T h e

difference

is that,

since

h u m a n intelligence raises us a b o v e the l e v e l o f p u r e instinct, the m e c h a n i s m o f social c o n s t r a i n t consists instead in an o v e r w h e l m i n g sense o f o b l i g a t i o n , itself d e r i v e d f r o m d e e p l y e n t r e n c h e d b e h a v i o r a l habits. T h e " h a b i t " o f m o r a l i t y — " t h e h a b i t w h o s e strength is m a d e up o f the a c c u m u l a t e d force o f all social h a b i t s " -

is the

most

p o w e r f u l o f all a n d " t h e one w h i c h best imitates i n s t i n c t "

(DSM,

9 9 6 / 2 6 ) . T h i s m o s t d e e p l y i n g r a i n e d h a b i t c o r r e s p o n d s to

"pure

obligation"

(DSM,

1002/33), w h i c h

defines

what

Bergson

calls

" c l o s e d m o r a l i t y " , the m o r a l i t y that encloses individuals in a g i v e n society a n d closes t h e m off f r o m i n d i v i d u a l s outside that society. T h e pressure o f p u r e social o b l i g a t i o n is a l w a y s , B e r g s o n m a i n tains, restricted to the p a r t i c u l a r society to w h i c h a p e r s o n b e l o n g s ; it does n o t p r e s e n t us w i t h

any

moral

obligation

to m a n k i n d

in

g e n e r a l . (Bergson admits that m o r e " c i v i l i z e d " societies will p r o c l a i m o b l i g a t i o n s o f entirely g e n e r a l altruism, b u t he says the b e h a v i o r of such societies in w a r - t i m e

belies these v e r b a l expressions

(DSM,

1001/31).) H i s p o i n t is n o t , h o w e v e r , that m o r a l i t y is relative to a g i v e n society b u t that the " a b s o l u t e m o r a l i t y " (DSM,

1003/34) of

7

6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

universal love for h u m a n k i n d has a source quite different f r o m the pressures o f society. T h i s s e c o n d , s u p r a - r a t i o n a l source B e r g s o n calls " a s p i r a t i o n " a n d finds in the a p p e a l s m a d e to us b y

exceptional

individuals (sages, p r o p h e t s , saints) w h o d e v e l o p m o r a l visions that go b e y o n d the limitations o f closed m o r a l i t y a n d that, in particular, call us to a l o v e o f a n d c o m m u n i t y w i t h all h u m a n s . T h e m o r a l i t y c o r r e s p o n d i n g to such a p p e a l s is " o p e n m o r a l i t y " . W h i l e the d r i v i n g force o f c l o s e d m o r a l i t y is h a b i t , the d r i v i n g force

o f o p e n m o r a l i t y is e m o t i o n . N o t , h o w e v e r , the

mundane

e m o t i o n o f c o n t e n t m e n t w i t h one's state (which b e l o n g s to closed morality) b u t the e n t h u s i a s m a n d j o y that n o t o n l y a c c o m p a n y but also inspire " t h e g r e a t creations o f art, o f science a n d o f civilization in g e n e r a l " (DSM,

1011/43). T h e e m o t i o n s o f closed m o r a l i t y are

after the fact, r e s p o n d i n g w i t h a p p r o v a l to a m o r a l

achievement

p r e v i o u s l y defined b y society. T h e e m o t i o n s o f o p e n m o r a l i t y are creative, n o t r e a c t i v e . S u c h e m o t i o n s are the sources o f n e w m o r a l p r a c t i c e s a n d o f n e w c o n c e p t s r a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e m , n o t the e n d o r s e m e n t o f p r a c t i c e s a l r e a d y available. C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e ,

"the

e m o t i o n i n t r o d u c e d b y C h r i s t i a n i t y u n d e r the n a m e o f c h a r i t y " . T h i s e m o t i o n s w e p t the a n c i e n t w o r l d a n d c r e a t e d b o t h a n e w m e t a p h y s i c s a n d a n e w morality, w h i c h " e x p r e s s the self-same t h i n g [the e m o t i o n o f c h a r i t y ] , one in t e r m s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e , the other in t e r m s o f w i l l " (DSM, Behind

Bergson's

1016/49). description

of our

moral

situation

lies

his

response to the p e r e n n i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l question o f the rationality o f ethical c o m m i t m e n t . H e a g r e e s that in o n e sense this c o m m i t m e n t is e m i n e n t l y r a t i o n a l . B o t h the h a b i t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s o f closed m o r a l i t y a n d the e m o t i o n a l a p p e a l s o f o p e n m o r a l i t y are p r o j e c t e d into the r e a l m o f intelligence as o b v i o u s " h r s t p r i n c i p l e s " . I n t e l l i g e n c e t h e n sets a b o u t the p r o j e c t o f o r g a n i z i n g these p r i n c i p l e s into a selfconsistent system (e.g., m a k i n g c o m m e n s u r a t e the d e m a n d s o f j u s t i c e a n d charity). T h e result — the t y p i c a l s t a n d p o i n t o f m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y -

is a f o r m u l a t i o n

of morality

on the

"intermediate

plane"

of

intelligence, w h e r e the m o r a l life o f h u m a n i t y is v i e w e d as " h i g h e r t h a n that o f a n i m a l society, w h e r e o b l i g a t i o n w o u l d be b u t the force o f instinct, b u t n o t so h i g h as an a s s e m b l y o f g o d s , w h e r e e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d p a r t a k e o f the creative i m p e t u s " . S o o r g a n i z e d b y intelligence, " m o r a l life will be a r a t i o n a l l i f e " (DSM,

1047/85).

B u t , B e r g s o n g o e s o n , n o n e o f this shows that " m o r a l i t y has its origin or its f o u n d a t i o n in p u r e r e a s o n " (DSM,

1047/85). In one

Bergson

11

sense, a r a t i o n a l d e d u c t i o n o f m o r a l i t y is all t o o easy; in another, it is simply impossible. It is all too easy b e c a u s e j u s t a b o u t a n y p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y e m p l o y e d b y h u m a n b e i n g s will y i e l d at least a r o u g h a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f morality, simply b e c a u s e it has b e e n f o r m e d b y the forces that h a v e c r e a t e d m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n . S o , for e x a m p l e , e v e n if w e b e g i n w i t h p e r s o n a l interest, w e will find that, since w e are social a n i m a l s to the c o r e , satisfying this interest will r e q u i r e taking account

o f the

welfare

o f others. E v e n

the

most

selfish

i n d i v i d u a l will desire the l e g i t i m a t e praise a n d r e s p e c t o f others. O u r v e r y vices are " s a t u r a t e d w i t h vanity, a n d v a n i t y m e a n s s o c i a b i l i t y " , since it requires the g o o d will o f others (DSM,

1051/90).

O n the o t h e r h a n d , a strict d e d u c t i o n o f m o r a l i t y f r o m principles not a l r e a d y implicitly m o r a l is out o f the q u e s t i o n . K a n t i a n s c l a i m , for e x a m p l e , that a " d e p o s i t " (that is, m o n e y or g o o d s e n t r u s t e d to s o m e o n e w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that they are to b e r e t u r n e d u p o n request) m u s t be g i v e n b a c k w h e n asked for, since otherwise it w o u l d not be a deposit. B u t , B e r g s o n says, if " d e p o s i t " m e a n s m e r e l y the " m a t e r i a l f a c t " o f g i v i n g s o m e o n e m o n e y w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it will b e r e t u r n e d later, t h e n there is clearly n o i n c o n s i s t e n c y in refusing to r e t u r n

the m o n e y .

To

get a contradiction

we

must

u n d e r s t a n d " d e p o s i t " in a m o r a l sense, for e x a m p l e , as i n v o l v i n g a " t r u s t " that, b y definition, " m u s t n o t b e b e t r a y e d " . T h e n it w o u l d be inconsistent to refuse to r e t u r n a deposit (since the

recipient

w o u l d in effect b e saying: " I a g r e e that w h a t y o u g a v e m e m u s t be g i v e n b a c k b u t I will n o t give it b a c k " ) . B u t this c o n t r a d i c t i o n results o n l y b e c a u s e w e h a v e a s s u m e d m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . B e r g s o n also questions the K a n t i a n a s s u m p t i o n that the r e q u i r e m e n t o f self-consistency, essential in scientific a n d speculative pursuit o f the truth, is likewise n e c e s s a r y for h u m a n life in g e n e r a l .

2 7

In a n y case, the failure to justify m o r a l i t y r a t i o n a l l y is o f n o significance, since, a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , regardless o f the results o f intellectual inquiry, a c o m m i t m e n t to m o r a l i t y is i n e v i t a b l e . T h i s is 2 7

B e r g s o n thinks that w h a t n o w a d a y s w o u l d be called " t e l e o l o g i c a l " (in contrast to K a n t i a n " d e o n t o l o g i c a l " ) justifications of morality are even m o r e obviously inadequate. For "it is easy to see that n o objective . . . will impose itself p e r e m p t o r i l y as a m e r e rational p r o p o s i t i o n " . T h e claim that a given goal must be accepted by a rational being will have n o force on s o m e o n e w h o is c o m m i t t e d to some other goal: " o n e can always reason with reason, confront its a r g u m e n t s with others, or simply refuse all discussion and reply b y a 'sic volo, sicjubeo' " (DSM, 1050/89). Bergson's critiques of justifications o f morality w o u l d clearly n e e d m u c h m o r e d e v e l o p m e n t to be effective against the sophisticated arguments of analytic philosophers (e.g., A l a n Gewirth) d u r i n g the last fifty years. B u t the m a i n strands of his criticisms are very similar to the points standardly raised against these arguments.

7

8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

so first on the level o f o b l i g a t i o n , w h i c h is simply a necessity o f the b i o l o g i c a l life o f our species. E v o l u t i o n has m a d e us social c r e a t u r e s a n d the o b l i g a t i o n s o f c l o s e d m o r a l i t y are built into us b i o l o g i c a l l y as part o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the g r o u p to w h i c h w e essentially b e l o n g . T h e aspirations o f o p e n m o r a l i t y do n o t arise f r o m the c o m p u l s i o n s o f social pressure, b u t t h e y irresistible a t t r a c t i o n " (DSM,

do

derive

from

the

"more

or

less

1056/96) to a m o r a l ideal stirred b y a

c o m p e l l i n g life in w h i c h w e see it e m b o d i e d . I n b o t h cases, the ultimate source o f m o r a l i t y is the vital i m p u l s e . In the first, it acts t h r o u g h the m e c h a n i s m s that h a v e p r o d u c e d social a n i m a l s , a n d w e c a n w e l l i m a g i n e n a t u r e ' s r e m a i n i n g c o n t e n t w i t h the stability o f the structures o f closed morality. B u t the reality o f o p e n m o r a l i t y shows that the vital i m p u l s e h a s , so to speak, r e n e w e d itself t h r o u g h the lives o f m o r a l h e r o e s ("those geniuses o f the w i l l " (DSM,

1023/58)).

H e r e the i m p u l s e " c o m e s into p l a y directly, a n d n o l o n g e r t h r o u g h the m e d i u m o f the m e c h a n i s m s it h a d set u p , a n d at w h i c h it h a d provisionally

halted"

(DSM,

1021/55).

Whereas

closed

morality

expresses n a t u r e as it has b e e n c o n s t i t u t e d , o p e n m o r a l i t y expresses nature as constituting itself a n e w (in S p i n o z a ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , natura naturans r a t h e r t h a n natura naturata) (DSM,

1024/58).

C o r r e s p o n d i n g to the distinction b e t w e e n c l o s e d a n d o p e n m o r ality is B e r g s o n ' s distinction b e t w e e n static a n d d y n a m i c religion. In its static f o r m , religion functions to p r e s e r v e the stability o f society against c h a l l e n g e s

from

intelligence. A l t h o u g h

human

society is

a n a l o g o u s to the entirely instinctual societies o f ants a n d b e e s , it differs

in that its i n d i v i d u a l s

are c a p a b l e

of understanding

and

q u e s t i o n i n g their situation, a fact that raises the real possibility o f refusing social obligations. A s B e r g s o n sees it, such refusal c a n derive either f r o m selfishness (why should I s u b o r d i n a t e m y interests to those o f others?) or f r o m despair in the face o f the u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f life a n d the inevitability o f d e a t h (since m y projects are n e v e r sure o f success a n d I a m g o i n g to die anyway, w h y does it m a t t e r h o w I b e h a v e ? ) . Static r e l i g i o n i n t e r v e n e s w i t h m y t h s a b o u t the u n i v e r s e a n d o u r p l a c e in it that c o u n t e r such q u e s t i o n i n g , for e x a m p l e b y p r o m i s i n g r e w a r d s a n d p u n i s h m e n t s in an afterlife

and

offering

m a g i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s for the c o n t r o l o f n a t u r e . B e r g s o n ' s

detailed

discussion takes a c c o u n t o f the t h e n r e c e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

and

s o c i o l o g i c a l w o r k o f L e v y - B r u h l a n d o f E m i l e D ü r k h e i m b u t argues against t h e m that there is n o distinctive " p r i m i t i v e m e n t a l i t y " . W e are b e y o n d " p r i m i t i v e s " in w h a t w e k n o w a b o u t the w o r l d b u t h a v e

Bergson

79

the s a m e desires a n d fears a n d so are still susceptible to the superstitions o f static religion. " S c r a t c h the surface, abolish e v e r y t h i n g w e o w e to an e d u c a t i o n w h i c h is p e r p e t u a l a n d u n c e a s i n g , a n d y o u h n d in the d e p t h o f our n a t u r e p r i m i t i v e h u m a n i t y , or s o m e t h i n g v e r y n e a r i t " (DSM,

1083/127).

Just as o p e n m o r a l i t y e x t e n d s m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n f r o m a limited c o m m u n i t y to all o f h u m a n k i n d , so d y n a m i c religion m o v e s f r o m the guardian

gods

of one

tribe

to

a divinity w h o s e

love

embraces

e v e r y o n e . A n d , j u s t as o p e n m o r a l i t y spreads f r o m the e m o t i o n s of h e r o i c ethical l e a d e r s , so d y n a m i c religion flows f r o m the e x p e r i ences o f a select g r o u p o f religious " g e n i u s e s " , the mystics. T h e close c o n n e c t i o n o f o p e n m o r a l i t y a n d d y n a m i c r e l i g i o n is a p p a r e n t f r o m the o v e r l a p b e t w e e n their h e r o e s , especially C h r i s t , w h o m B e r g s o n sees as the

greatest h g u r e

in b o t h

morality

and

religion.

The

c o n n e c t i o n is all the closer b e c a u s e , B e r g s o n insists, the m o s t p e r f e c t f o r m o f m y s t i c i s m involves n o t j u s t d e t a c h e d c o n t e m p l a t i o n b u t also p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n in the w o r l d . T h e greatest mystics are those s u c h as St. P a u l , St. J o a n o f A r c , St. Francis o f Assisi, St. T e r e s a o f A v i l a , St. C a t h e r i n e o f S i e n a , a n d C h r i s t himself, w h o p r o f o u n d l y t r a n s f o r m e d h u m a n affairs. B e r g s o n defines m y s t i c i s m quite explicitly: In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequendy of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not G o d himself. T h e great mystic is to be conceived as an individual being, capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action. Such is our definition. (DSM, 1162/220-1) S o u n d e r s t o o d , m y s t i c i s m in its h i g h e s t f o r m ( " c o m p l e t e m y s t i c i s m " ) is f o u n d o n l y in the g r e a t C h r i s t i a n mystics. It is often said that such p e o p l e are m e n t a l l y d e r a n g e d , a n d t h e y are u n d e n i a b l y susceptible to m o r b i d a n d h a l l u c i n a t o r y states. B u t B e r g s o n m a i n t a i n s that such p a t h o l o g i e s are likely to a c c o m p a n y r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f the soul, a n d that visions a n d n e r v o u s a g i t a t i o n are o n l y a c c i d e n t a l l y related to w h a t is at the c o r e o f the m y s t i c s ' e x p e r i e n c e s : the love o f G o d p e r v a d i n g their entire selves a n d inspiring t h e m " t o c o m p l e t e the c r e a t i o n o f the h u m a n s p e c i e s " (DSM,

1174/234). In the c o m -

pleteness o f m y s t i c i s m , " v i s i o n s are left far b e h i n d " a n d all that r e m a i n s is a total a n d h n a l u n i o n w i t h G o d , " w h o is a c t i n g t h r o u g h the soul . . . w i t h an irresistible i m p u l s e that hurls it into

great

8o

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

enterprises" direction

(DSM,

1172/232).

The

(1890-1940)

mystics'

as the vital i m p u l s e , i n d e e d ,

the

same

" i t ¿5 this i m p e t u s

love

has

itself,

c o m m u n i c a t e d in its entirety to e x c e p t i o n a l m e n w h o i n their t u r n w o u l d fain i m p a r t it to all h u m a n i t y " . T h e g o a l is the ("living c o n t r a d i c t i o n " )

of turning a biological

paradox

species, w h i c h

precisely a stable p r o d u c t o f the vital i m p u l s e , into the m o v e m e n t o f that impulse (DSM,

is

creative

1175/235).

B u t m y s t i c i s m faces the s a m e obstacle that a l w a y s obstructs the vital i m p e t u s : the inertness o f matter, in this case, the h u m a n n e e d for p h y s i c a l s u s t e n a n c e , w h i c h takes u p a l m o s t all o u r energies a n d turns us a w a y f r o m h i g h e r things. H i n t i n g at an u l t i m a t e l y political d i r e c t i o n o f his t h o u g h t , B e r g s o n suggests that the total fulfillment of mysticism's

spiritual

goal

requires

"a

profound

change

m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s i m p o s e d o n h u m a n i t y b y n a t u r e " (DSM,

in

the

1176/

236), a c h a n g e that in the e n d m i g h t be best effected b y " a vast system o f m a c h i n e r y such as m i g h t set h u m a n activity at liberty, this liberation

being,

moreover,

stabilized

by

a political

and

social

o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d ensure the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the m e c h a n i s m to its true o b j e c t " (DSM, are n o t i m m e d i a t e l y

1175/235).

possible,

28

Such radical transformations

a n d mystics h a v e

instead

limited

t h e m s e l v e s to the m o r e feasible tasks o f p l a n t i n g a n d sustaining the m y s t i c a l flame in established social institutions, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of static r e l i g i o n , m a i n l y b y f o u n d i n g religious c o m m u n i t i e s . A s a result, the historical actuality o f religion has b e e n n e i t h e r p u r e l y static n o r p u r e l y d y n a m i c . " W e r e p r e s e n t r e l i g i o n , t h e n , as the crystallization, b r o u g h t a b o u t b y a scientific p r o c e s s o f c o o l i n g , o f w h a t m y s t i c i s m h a d p o u r e d , w h i l e h o t , into the soul o f m a n . T h r o u g h religion all m e n g e t a little o f w h a t a few p r i v i l e g e d souls possessed in full"

(DSM,

1177/238). Christianity,

for e x a m p l e ,

"has

preserved

m a n y rites, m a n y c e r e m o n i e s , m a n y beliefs e v e n " f r o m static religion (along w i t h l a r g e p o r t i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y ) . T h i s w a s i m p o r t a n t for its g a i n i n g p o p u l a r a c c e p t a n c e , " b u t n o n e o f all that w a s essential; the essence o f the n e w religion w a s to be the diffusion o f m y s t i c i s m " (DSM,

1178/238). B e r g s o n , in o t h e r w o r d s , r e g a r d s C h r i s t i a n i t y (and

o t h e r historical religions) as a v e h i c l e

for the p o p u l a r i z a t i o n

of

m y s t i c a l t r u t h , quite p a r a l l e l to the " h i g h - l e v e l p o p u l a r i z a t i o n , w h i c h respects the b r o a d outlines o f scientific t r u t h , a n d e n a b l e s o r d i n a r y S o m e of Bergson's further thoughts a l o n g these lines are d e v e l o p e d in the often surprisingly non-philosophical political a n d historical c o m m e n t s of the last chapter o f Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.

Bergson

81

c u l t i v a t e d m i n d s to g e t a g e n e r a l g r a s p o f it until . . . a g r e a t e r effort reveals it to t h e m in detail, a n d , a b o v e all, allows t h e m to p e n e t r a t e d e e p l y into its s i g n i f i c a n c e " (DSM,

1178/238-9).

B e r g s o n also thinks that mystical e x p e r i e n c e is a basis for r e s o l v i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s o f the existence a n d n a t u r e o f G o d . Its first c o n t r i b u t i o n is to b r i n g p h i l o s o p h y b a c k to a c o n c e p t of G o d that allows h i m to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h us. A n y such c o n c e p t is e x c l u d e d b y t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f G o d , w h i c h are m o d e l e d on Aristotle's " m o t i o n l e s s M o v e r , a T h o u g h t t h i n k i n g itself, self-enclosed, o p e r a t i v e o n l y b y the a p p e a l o f its p e r f e c t i o n "

(DSM,

1180/242). S u c h a b e i n g has little or n o t h i n g in c o m m o n w i t h the G o d o f the G r e e k s or o f the G o s p e l s , a n d a p h i l o s o p h y c o n c e r n e d w i t h it will b e i r r e l e v a n t to the reality o f religious life. B y contrast, the G o d o f m y s t i c i s m , offering his l o v e a n d c a l l i n g for o u r o w n , is precisely at the r o o t o f w h a t is m o s t vital in historical religions. B u t d o e s the existence o f m y s t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e give the p h i l o s o p h e r r e a s o n to believe in the G o d o f w h i c h it speaks? T h e fact that the greatest mystics " h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n m e n or w o m e n o f a c t i o n , e n d o w e d w i t h superior c o m m o n s e n s e " (DSM, common

objection

that t h e y

are

"crazy"

1183/245) refutes the and

n o t to b e

taken

seriously. L i k e w i s e , the o b j e c t i o n that o n l y a few e x c e p t i o n a l individuals h a v e h a d mystical e x p e r i e n c e s carries, in B e r g s o n ' s view, little w e i g h t . T h e t e s t i m o n y o f mystics has essentially the s a m e status as the reports, w h i c h w e rightly b e l i e v e , o f those few e x p l o r e r s w h o h a v e p e n e t r a t e d b a r e l y accessible r e g i o n s o f the e a r t h . M o r e o v e r , a l m o s t all mystics, e v e n f r o m v e r y different religious traditions, a g r e e in their c o r e a c c o u n t o f divinity, a n d these a c c o u n t s s e e m d u e m u c h m o r e to the e x p e r i e n c e s t h e m s e l v e s t h a n to the d o c t r i n a l traditions to w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l mystics b e l o n g . T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m a k e it p r o b a b l e , t h o u g h n o t a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n , that the t e s t i m o n y o f the mystics is reliable. B u t B e r g s o n thinks h n a l c o n h r m a t i o n c o m e s from the w a y m y s t i c a l t e s t i m o n y c o h e r e s w i t h the results o f i n d e p e n d e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l investigation. O n the o n e h a n d , p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection o n e v o l u t i o n (e.g., in L'évolution créatrice) s h o w s that w e s h o u l d e x p e c t intelligence to b e s u r r o u n d e d w i t h a " h a l o o f i n t u i t i o n " , w h i c h p r o v i d e s s o m e direct c o n t a c t w i t h the c o n c r e t e reality

of

d u r a t i o n . It is f r o m this intuition that w e c o u l d e x p e c t to l e a r n s o m e t h i n g o f " t h e i n n e r w o r k i n g s o f the vital i m p u l s e " (DSM,

1187/

250). T h u s , p h i l o s o p h y establishes p r e c i s e l y the n i c h e that is hlled by mystical k n o w l e d g e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , m y s t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e w o u l d

8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

2

(1890-1940)

s e e m to be a fruitful g u i d e to c o n t i n u i n g the line o f t h o u g h t that l e d p h i l o s o p h y to the vital i m p u l s e . It directs us a w a y f r o m

useless

m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t the n a t u r e o f G o d a n d helps us d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n o f divine love (identical w i t h G o d ' s reality) as the d r i v i n g force o f the universe. B e r g s o n briefly sketches h o w this c o n c e p t i o n suggests fruitful speculations a b o u t the n a t u r e o f creation, the ultimate p u r p o s e o f the universe, the p r o b l e m o f evil, a n d the l i k e l i h o o d o f immortality. T h e s e s p e c u l a t i o n s , as B e r g s o n h i m s e l f p o i n t s out (DSM,

1193/

256), take h i m b e y o n d his position in L'évolution créatrice a n d t o w a r d a m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w o f G o d as c r e a t o r a n d o f h u m a n i t y as the p u r p o s e o f this c r e a t i o n . T h i s helps e x p l a i n B e r g s o n ' s m o v e t o w a r d C a t h o l i c i s m at the e n d o f his life. H e n e v e r f o r m a l l y e n t e r e d the Church,

primarily

because,

although

he

had

never

practiced

J u d a i s m , he did n o t w a n t to a p p e a r to be r e n o u n c i n g his h e r i t a g e at a t i m e w h e n H i t l e r a n d the V i c h y r e g i m e w e r e p e r s e c u t i n g J e w s . B u t he d i d express his a c c e p t a n c e o f C a t h o l i c d o c t r i n e a n d ask that a priest say p r a y e r s at his funeral.

There

is n o d o u b t a b o u t

the

sincerity o f this " c o n v e r s i o n " , b u t its significance n e e d s to be u n d e r stood in t e r m s o f B e r g s o n ' s rejection o f the scholastic m e t a p h y s i c s implicit in the C h u r c h ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f its doctrines a n d , especially, o f his v i e w o f the limited a n d essentially i n s t r u m e n t a l role o f religious institutions. B e r g s o n ' s l o n g - t e r m influence

on F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y has

been

w i d e b u t diffuse. T h e w a v e o f his initial i m m e n s e p o p u l a r i t y r a t h e r q u i c k l y subsided, a n d , as w e shall see in the n e x t chapter, he did n o t h a v e a m a j o r effect on the y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the 1930s a n d 1940s.

29

B u t he r e m a i n e d a p r e s e n c e in the F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l

w o r l d , a n d his b o o k s are e v e n t o d a y r e q u i r e d r e a d i n g for the classe de philosophie a n d the agrégation. Further, the s u b s t a n c e a n d , e v e n m o r e , the spirit o f his p h i l o s o p h y w a s p a s s e d o n to successive g e n e r a t i o n s o f students b y V l a d i m i r J a n k é l é v i t c h (1903—85), o n e o f the

most

p o p u l a r professors at the S o r b o n n e , w h e r e he t a u g h t f r o m 1951 to 1978. J a n k é l é v i t c h ' s Henri Bergson (1931) is w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as one of the

most

subtle

and

penetrating

books

on

Bergson.

His

own

p h i l o s o p h y ( d e v e l o p e d in, for e x a m p l e , Traité des vertus a n d Le je-nesais-quoi et le presque-rien) offers a refined a n d passionate vision

of

B e r g s o n did have a very strong influence on the w o r k o f Pierre Teilhard de C h a r d i n (1881-1955), a j e s u i t paleontologist w h o c o m b i n e d the philosophy o f creative evolution with Christian theology in L'apparition de l'homme.

Bergson m o r a l life

that m e r g e s

Bergsonian

8 metaphysics

with

an

3

almost

existentialist c o m m i t m e n t to i n d i v i d u a l a g e n c y a n d creativity.

He

avoids, h o w e v e r , a n y t e n d e n c y to existential e g o i s m b y insisting o n the ethical p r i m a c y o f g e n e r o s i t y (a c o n c e p t in w h i c h Sartre w a s g r e a t l y interested in his reflections o n ethics). J a n k e l e v i t c h w a s an accomplished musician and musicologist, with important books on Lizst, Debussy, a n d R a v e l , a n d saw music as b o t h s y m b o l a n d source o f the p u r e a n d i n n o c e n t love r e q u i r e d b y ethical life.

CHAPTER

4

Between the wars

Meanwhile the philosophers of journalism are at work castigating the preceding epoch, and not only the kind of pleasures in which it indulged, which seem to them to be the last word in corruption, but even the work of its artists and philosophers, which have no longer the least value in their eyes, as though they were indissolubly linked to the successive moods of fashionable frivolity. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, n, 123)

It is quite possible to v i e w F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y d u r i n g the last t w e n t y years

o f the

Third

Republic

(1920—40)

as little

more

than

an

e x t e n s i o n o f the p r e c e d i n g t w e n t y years. A l l the m a i n figures o f the earlier p e r i o d (Bergson, B r u n s c h v i c g , M e y e r s o n , B o u t r o u x ) c o n t i n u e to

produce

major

works.

Important

younger

philosophers

usually r e a d i l y p l a c e d in the old traditions. For e x a m p l e ,

are

Louis

L a v e l l e a n d R e n é L e S e n n e d e v e l o p a " p h i l o s o p h y o f s p i r i t " that has close affinities w i t h the old spiritualism o f M a i n e

de B i r a n

and

R a v a i s s o n ; a n d G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d c o n t i n u e s the tradition o f F r e n c h history a n d p h i l o s o p h y o f science. F r o m this v i e w p o i n t , the m o s t original d e v e l o p m e n t is that o f distinctively C a t h o l i c b o t h in B l o n d e P s " p h i l o s o p h y o f a c t i o n "

1

philosophy,

a n d in M a r i t a i n ' s n e o -

T h o m i s m . B u t this d e v e l o p m e n t r e m a i n s relatively isolated, precisely b e c a u s e o f its strongly sectarian inclinations a n d is, in a n y case, still c o n n e c t e d to B e r g s o n a n d the earlier spiritualist tradition. B u t a l t h o u g h this continuist p i c t u r e reflects i m p o r t a n t features of the i n t e r w a r p e r i o d , it c o m p l e t e l y misses the c e n t r a l fact that the p e r i o d is at r o o t one o f u n d e r m i n i n g a n d u p h e a v a l . T h i s fact is signaled b y a striking reversal in the v i e w o f D o m i n i q u e P a r o d i , w h o ,

1

Blondel's main work, L'action, a p p e a r e d already in 1893, after w h i c h he published little until the 1930s, w h e n his revision of L'action a p p e a r e d a l o n g with two major c o m p a n i o n volumes.

84

Between the wars

85

as w e saw, said in 1919 that " p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s e a r c h h a d n e v e r b e e n m o r e a b u n d a n t , m o r e serious, a n d m o r e intense a m o n g us t h a n in the last thirty y e a r s " . Just fifteen y e a r s later P a r o d i o p e n s his n e w 2

b o o k w i t h a c h a p t e r entitled " T h e Crisis o f M o d e r n P h i l o s o p h y " in w h i c h he says: " O v e r the last thirty y e a r s , it has b e c o m e quite clear that the intellectual disarray is c o m p l e t e . "

3

T h e disarray w a s d u e to

the r a d i c a l c h a l l e n g e to the university p h i l o s o p h i e s o f the Third Republic

b y the n e w

"philosophy

o f e x i s t e n c e " that

early was

e m e r g i n g in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h y o u n g intellectuals' fascinations w i t h a v a n t - g a r d e literature a n d w i t h G e r m a n philosophy. W e will hrst p a u s e to e x a m i n e the m o r e continuist w o r k o f B a c h e l a r d , B l o n d e l , a n d M a r i t a i n a n d t h e n m o v e to the i n c i p i e n t existential surge.

BACHELARD

G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d (1884—1962) w a s initially t r a i n e d in science a n d m a t h e m a t i c s , r e c e i v i n g his licence in m a t h e m a t i c s in 1912 a n d his agrégation in p h i l o s o p h y o n l y in 1922, w h e n he w a s thirty-eight years old (though he c o m p l e t e d his d o c t o r a t e in p h i l o s o p h y j u s t five years later). For m a n y y e a r s (1919—30) he t a u g h t p h y s i c s a n d chemistry, a l o n g w i t h philosophy, at the college ( s e c o n d a r y school) o f Bar-surA u b e , the small s o u t h w e s t e r n t o w n w h e r e he w a s b o r n a n d raised. In 1930 he b e c a m e professor o f p h i l o s o p h y at D i j o n , a n d in 1940 w a s a w a r d e d a chair at the S o r b o n n e , w h e r e he b e c a m e d i r e c t o r o f the Institut

d'Histoire

des

Sciences

et

des

Techniques.

Although

B a c h e l a r d c a m e to p h i l o s o p h y late a n d to the Parisian m a i n s t r e a m e v e n later, he w a s for

many

years o n e

o f the

most

influential

m e m b e r s o f the " r e p u b l i c o f p r o f e s s o r s " . A l o n g w i t h his successor, G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m , he n o t o n l y t r a i n e d an impressive c a d r e o f specialists in the history a n d p h i l o s o p h y o f science b u t also g a v e successive g e n e r a t i o n s o f students (including future " s t a r s " s u c h as F o u c a u l t a n d Althusser) their basic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e of scientihc inquiry. B a c h e l a r d ' s w o r k , w i t h its d e e p roots in d e t a i l e d k n o w l e d g e o f the history a n d c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e o f science, i m m e d i a t e l y associates h i m w i t h the tradition o f P o i n c a r é , M e y e r s o n , a n d B o u t r o u x . B u t his basic v i e w o f the relation o f science a n d p h i l o s o p h y derives m o s t

2

:i

La philosophie contemporaine en France, 9 - 1 0 . En quête d'une philosophie, 1.

86

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

directly f r o m B r u n s c h v i c g , w h o (along w i t h A b e l R e y ) d i r e c t e d his doctoral

work.

Like

Brunschvicg,

Bachelard

sees p h i l o s o p h y

as

h a v i n g to w o r k out a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e a s o n b y reflection on the historical d e v e l o p m e n t o f science; a n d , a g a i n like B r u n s c h v i c g , his w o r k is b a s e d o n case-studies in the history o f m a t h e m a t i c s a n d the physical sciences.

O n the o t h e r h a n d , B a c h e l a r d e m p h a s i z e s far

4

m o r e t h a n B r u n s c h v i c g the role o f discontinuity in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f science a n d at least tries to a v o i d a w h o l e - h e a r t e d e n d o r s e m e n t o f idealism over realism. B a c h e l a r d ' s p i c t u r e o f scientific d e v e l o p m e n t centers o n his n o t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k (coupure épistémologique). S c i e n c e

requires,

first o f all, a b r e a k f r o m o u r c o m m o n - s e n s e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d beliefs, since it p l a c e s e v e r y d a y objects u n d e r n e w c o n c e p t s a n d shows t h e m to possess p r o p e r t i e s n o t r e v e a l e d b y o r d i n a r y sense p e r c e p t i o n (or e v e n in c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h sense p e r c e p t i o n , as w h e n w h a t s e e m to be intrinsic qualities, s u c h as color, are r e i n t e r p r e t e d as relations to sense

organs). B u t

scientific

progress

also r e q u i r e s b r e a k s

from

p r e v i o u s scientific c o n c e p t i o n s , w h i c h , as m u c h as c o m m o n sense, c a n b e c o m e obstacles to o u r a t t a i n i n g scientific truth. T h u s , the viewpoint

of

Newtonian

mechanics

became,

in

the

twentieth

century, a m a j o r obstacle to Einstein's f o r m u l a t i o n o f an a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f s p a c e , t i m e , a n d g r a v i t a t i o n . B r e a k i n g w i t h the

New-

t o n i a n v i e w initiated a " n e w scientific s p i r i t " that i n v o l v e d n o t only new conceptions

o f the p h y s i c a l w o r l d b u t also n e w criteria

scientific m e t h o d o l o g y .

5

of

B a c h e l a r d ' s t r e a t m e n t o f this subject p r e -

cedes T h o m a s K u h n ' s t r e a t m e n t o f "scientific r e v o l u t i o n s " b y m o r e t h a n thirty years. S i n c e for B a c h e l a r d p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d reality a r e , quite properly, derivative f r o m the best science o f their time, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

b r e a k s in scientific

thought require

corre-

s p o n d i n g r e v o l u t i o n s in philosophy. M u c h o f his w o r k is d e v o t e d to d e v e l o p i n g n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s to r e p l a c e those " o u t d a t e d " b y the p r o g r e s s o f science. H e p r o p o s e s , for e x a m p l e , a " n o n - C a r t e s i a n epistemology"

4

;>

(a n o t i o n

meant

to p a r a l l e l

"non-Euclidean

geo-

O n the similarities o f Bachelard's thought to Brunschvicg's, see M i c h e l V a d é e , Gaston Bachelard, especially 2 2 9 - 3 5 . V a d é e maintains that Bachelard's debt to B r u n s c h v i c g has been ignored by his followers and c o m m e n t a t o r s (in particular, C a n g u i l h e m ) . See also Bachelard's paper, " L a philosophie scientifique de L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g " . See G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d , Le nouvel esprit scientifique, as well as his earlier detailed discussion of relativity theory, La valeur inductive de la relativité.

87

Between the wars

m e t r y " ) , b a s e d on a rejection o f D e s c a r t e s ' (and m a n y s u b s e q u e n t philosophers')

foundationalist

privileging

o f the

"givens"

of im-

m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y will, o f c o u r s e , also be " n o n K a n t i a n " in its d e n i a l o f the e t e r n a l v a l i d i t y o f c a t e g o r i e s that in fact are c o n t i n g e n t expressions o f N e w t o n i a n science. B a c h e l a r d further suggests the n e e d for a " p s y c h o a n a l y s i s o f k n o w l e d g e " that will e x p o s e the u n c o n s c i o u s role o u t d a t e d c o m m o n - s e n s e a n d scientihc c o n c e p t s p l a y in o u r t h i n k i n g .

6

B a c h e l a r d ' s insistence o n b r e a k s a n d discontinuity m i g h t s e e m to reject B r u n s c h v i c g ' s v i e w o f science as an essentially

progressive

enterprise. B a c h e l a r d , h o w e v e r , m a i n t a i n s that p r o g r e s s d o e s not r e q u i r e continuity. E v e n t h o u g h there are s h a r p c o n c e p t u a l

and

m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b r e a k s f r o m o n e scientihc w o r l d v i e w to a n o t h e r , w e are

still j u s t i h e d

in s p e a k i n g o f p r o g r e s s

because

some

specihc

a c h i e v e m e n t s o f p a s t science are p r e s e r v e d as special cases w i t h i n later theories. O n c e a g a i n , B a c h e l a r d invokes the a n a l o g y w i t h n o n E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y , w h i c h , for e x a m p l e , denies the E u c l i d e a n c l a i m that all triangles h a v e 180 d e g r e e s as the s u m o f their interior angles, while a d m i t t i n g a special class o f triangles ( " E u c l i d e a n t r i a n g l e s " ) for w h i c h this is true. In the s a m e way, c o n c e p t s such as specihc h e a t (developed b y B l a c k in t e r m s o f the n o w s u p e r s e d e d caloric theory) a n d m a s s (as u n d e r s t o o d b y N e w t o n ) h a v e b e e n r e f o r m u l a t e d in the c o n t e x t o f later theories. T h e r e is d e e p e r tension b e t w e e n B a c h e l a r d a n d B r u n s c h v i c g on the issue o f idealism. B a c h e l a r d does criticize a p o s i t i o n he calls " r e a l i s m " , c h a r a c t e r i z e d as the b e l i e f " i n the p r o l i x richness o f the i n d i v i d u a l sensation a n d in the systematic i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f a b stractive t h o u g h t " .

R e a l i s m in this sense asserts the epistemic a n d

7

m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i m a c y o f o r d i n a r y sense objects o v e r w h a t it r e g a r d s as a b s t r a c t a c c o u n t s in t e r m s o f the t h e o r e t i c a l entities o f science. Bachelard's

critique

of realism

is in

effect

an

assertion

of

the

o n t o l o g i c a l p r i m a c y o f t h e o r e t i c a l entities as c o n c r e t e realities. T o this extent, it a m o u n t s to a defense o f w h a t analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s of science n o w a d a y s call " s c i e n t i h c r e a l i s m " . B a c h e l a r d d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , u n d e r s t a n d this scientihc r e a l i s m as i m p l y i n g a t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c a l realism, w h i c h asserts that the objects

of

our

knowledge

b

1

are

entirely

mind-independent.

In this regard, see his La psychoanalyse du feu. La valeur inductive de la relativité, 206.

He

88

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

m a i n t a i n s a " r a t i o n a l i s m " that e m p h a s i z e s b o t h the active role of the m i n d in the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the scientific c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h w e describe reality a n d the richness a n d specificity o f these c o n c e p t s in contrast to the v a g u e n e s s a n d g e n e r a l i t y o f sensations. A t the s a m e time, he tries to stay clear o f an i d e a l i s m that w o u l d see the w o r l d as constituted b y p u r e t h o u g h t . T r u t h is n o t a m a t t e r o f the m i n d ' s c r e a t i n g or c o n s t i t u t i n g the w o r l d . It is, rather, the result o f the m i n d ' s " r e v i s i o n " (rectification) b y scientific c o n c e p t s o f a w o r l d that is a l r e a d y there. B a c h e l a r d says, accordingly, that his r a t i o n a l i s m is " a p p l i e d " ; that is, the m i n d n e v e r p r o d u c e s its objects e x nihilo but rather applies its c o n c e p t s to p r e g i v e n objects. H o w e v e r , he also e m p h a s i z e s that objects are n o t " p r e g i v e n " in a n y absolute sense b u t are

the

results

of previous

applications

of

concepts.

Although

B a c h e l a r d w a n t s a p p l i e d r a t i o n a l i s m to b e a m e a n b e t w e e n idealism a n d realism, his refusal to a c c e p t objects that exist i n d e p e n d e n t of o u r c o n c e p t i o n s seems to force h i m b a c k to s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h like B r u n s c h v i c g ' s critical i d e a l i s m .

8

W h a t e v e r its relation to i d e a l i s m , B a c h e l a r d ' s a p p l i e d r a t i o n a l i s m also i n t r o d u c e s the c r u c i a l i d e a that scientific i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n has a c e n t r a l role in the constitution o f the p h y s i c a l w o r l d . I n s t r u m e n t s are, he says, " t h e o r i e s m a t e r i a l i z e d " , a n d a c o n c e p t is truly scientific only

to

the

extent

that

it r e c e i v e s

concrete

reality

through

a

" t e c h n i q u e o f r e a l i z a t i o n " . Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y describes h o w 9

the m i n d constitutes the objects o f e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t w e also r e q u i r e a " p h e n o m e n o - t e c h n i c s " that will describe the constitution o f scientific objects b y i n s t r u m e n t a l t e c h n o l o g y . As

we

have

seen,

Bachelard's

epistemology

of

science

gives

o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y to the objects o f science a n d presents the d o m a i n o f o r d i n a r y sense e x p e r i e n c e s a n d i m a g e s as obstacles to a t t a i n i n g scientific truth. H o w e v e r , a r o u n d 1940 (just after his a p p o i n t m e n t to the S o r b o n n e

c h a i r in the history o f science), B a c h e l a r d

began

p u b l i s h i n g a series o f b o o k s that e x p l o r e d the positive significance o f prescientific e x p e r i e n c e .

1 0

H e r e he p r e s e n t e d the d o m a i n o f p o e t i c

i m a g i n a t i o n , d o m i n a t e d b y the p r i m i t i v e a n d f u n d a m e n t a l i m a g e s o f

8

9

1 0

For a m o r e detailed discussion o f Bachelard's philosophy of science, see chapter i o f my Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason. A s I argue there (and as w e shall see below), Bachelard's thought has considerable significance for Foucault a n d for other thinkers of his generation such as L o u i s Althusser and M i c h e l Serres. Le nouvel esprit scientifique, 13, 16. See, for e x a m p l e , La poétique de la rêverie a n d La poétique de l'espace.

Between the wars

89

fire, air, water, a n d e a r t h , as c e n t r a l for o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g

and

c r e a t i o n o f ourselves as h u m a n b e i n g s . T h i s w o r k h a d a c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p a c t in literary studies (even outside F r a n c e ) , a n d Sartre m a k e s s y m p a t h e t i c r e f e r e n c e to it in his b o o k on i m a g i n a t i o n a n d in L'être et le néant w h e n d e v e l o p i n g his m e t h o d o f existential p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . B a c h e l a r d i n t e n d e d his c e l e b r a t i o n o f the p o e t i c as a c o m p l e m e n t to r a t h e r t h a n a r e c a n t a t i o n o f his defense o f the o n t o l o g i c a l priority o f science, b u t he n e v e r w o r k e d out in a n y detail the relation b e t w e e n these t w o aspects o f his w o r k .

1 1

BLONDEL

T h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c w a s a n a v o w e d l y secular institution, e n d o r s i n g V o l t a i r e ' s v i e w that beliefs in a l l e g e d religious r e v e l a t i o n s w e r e a private m a t t e r o f the i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e a n d s h o u l d n o t i n t r u d e into the p u b l i c d o m a i n . S i n c e p h i l o s o p h y c l a i m e d to b e a m o d e l o f public

discourse,

appealing

to

a common

human

rationality,

it

p r e s e n t e d itself as a secular enterprise, n e u t r a l a m o n g all c l a i m s o f revealed

truth.

Lachelier,

Some

Boutroux,

philosophers and

Le

Roy,

were, for

o f c o u r s e , religious example,

were

-

devout

C a t h o l i c s . B u t their r e l i g i o n w a s n e i t h e r the source n o r the j u s t i fication

o f their p h i l o s o p h i c a l

views. A n d

these v i e w s , in

turn,

a l t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h their religious beliefs, w e r e not p r e s e n t e d as f o u n d a t i o n s or p r o l e g o m e n a to these beliefs. T h e y were

Christian

philosophers

but with

no

distinctively

Christian

philosophy. In his f a m o u s thesis, L'action, d e f e n d e d in 1893, M a u r i c e B l o n d e l (1861 — 1949) did n o t g o so far as to e m p l o y his C a t h o l i c beliefs as p r e m i s e s o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t s or to try to derive these beliefs f r o m n a t u r a l l y k n o w n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e m i s e s . B u t he

did

m a i n t a i n that a p r o p e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n w o u l d s h o w that o u r deepest aspirations c o u l d n o t be satisfied in the n a t u r a l r e a l m , that the intelligibility a n d fulfillment w e desire are possible o n l y if the C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e o f salvation t h r o u g h s u p e r n a t u r a l g r a c e is true. L i k e P a s c a l , he set out to s h o w that, w h e t h e r or n o t C h r i s t i a n i t y is true, w e o u g h t to h o p e w i t h all o u r hearts that it is. In this sense he p r o p o s e s a C h r i s t i a n philosophy.

1 1

See J e a n Hyppolitc's philosophique, 643—83.

three

essays on B a c h e l a r d ,

collected in his Figures de la pensée

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

go

(1890-1940)

L'action b e g i n s w i t h the u r g e n t question: " Y e s or n o , d o e s h u m a n life m a k e sense, a n d d o e s m a n h a v e a d e s t i n y ? " (L'action [A],

1/1),

a n d this d r a m a t i c , proto-existentialist tone is i n t e r w o v e n t h r o u g h o u t its c o m p l e x a n d s o m e t i m e s tediously e x t e n d e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions. T h i s tone c o r r e s p o n d s , m o r e o v e r , to B l o n d e l ' s g u i d i n g c o n v i c tion that his q u e s t i o n m u s t be a n s w e r e d b y an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r c o n c r e t e e n g a g e m e n t in the w o r l d t h r o u g h a c t i o n , w h e r e

"action"

m e a n s the totality o f our t h o u g h t , feeling, a n d w i l l i n g in relation

with

their

objects.

Blondel

begins

by

direct

emphasizing

the

inevitability o f a c t i o n : at e v e r y instant w e a r e , willy nilly, a c t i n g (even if w e are t r y i n g to w i t h d r a w f r o m all action). T h e q u e s t i o n is w h a t sort o f overall m e a n i n g , if any, w e m u s t ascribe to o u r life o f a c t i o n . It m i g h t s e e m possible to reject B l o n d e l ' s q u e s t i o n , to refuse e v e n to c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r life has a n y m e a n i n g .

S u c h a rejection,

he

m a i n t a i n s , entails a " d i l e t t a n t i s m " that w o u l d endlessly e x p l o r e a r a n d o m v a r i e t y o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e s a n d activities w i t h n o c o n c e r n for finding a unified or e v e n consistent p a t t e r n in the variety. H e r e B l o n d e l has in m i n d the positivist i r o n i s m o f R e n a n a n d T a i n e , as well as the p o e t i c d e c a d e n c e o f B a u d e l a i r e . (His v i e w o f dilettantism also recalls K i e r k e g a a r d ' s t r e a t m e n t o f the aesthetic sphere, b u t there is n o e v i d e n c e o f direct influence, a l t h o u g h there are s o m e striking

similarities

in

their

discussions.)

Blondel

has

enough

e m p a t h y w i t h dilettantism to p r o v i d e a v i v i d a n d n u a n c e d e v o c a t i o n o f its attitude. B u t he c o n c l u d e s that the s t a n d p o i n t is u l t i m a t e l y i n c o h e r e n t . D i l e t t a n t e s c l a i m to h a v e n o interest in overall m e a n i n g b u t are in fact c o m m i t t e d to u n d e r s t a n d i n g e v e r y t h i n g in t e r m s of their o w n selfish p r o j e c t o f an endless succession o f e n j o y m e n t s . D i l e t t a n t i s m "is a r a d i c a l e g o i s m that w o u l d destroy e v e r y t h i n g in o r d e r to r e m a i n a l o n e like a g o d " (A, 16/30), a n d this deification o f the self is p r e c i s e l y the u l t i m a t e m e a n i n g that the dilettante p u r p o r t s to eschew. The

pessimist

(Schopenhauer

is explicitly

cited

as a

primary

e x a m p l e ) a c c e p t s the v a l i d i t y o f B l o n d e l ' s q u e s t i o n b u t gives it an 1 2

entirely n e g a t i v e

a n s w e r : life has n o m e a n i n g , a n d o u r

attitude

t o w a r d it should be one o f pessimistic d e n i a l . P u t t i n g the p o i n t in B l o n d e l ' s t e r m s o f v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n , w e should will n o t h i n g at all, since n o t h i n g in life is w o r t h y o f o u r desire, a n d find c o n t e n t m e n t in 1 2

A t the time B l o n d e l wrote his thesis, S c h o p e n h a u e r w a s very influential in France, although his initial i m p a c t was m o r e in the literary than the professional philosophical world. See J e a n - L o u i s Fabiani, Les philosophes de la république, 118.

Between the wars

9

4

a state o f p u r e " n o l i t i o n " (Blonclel's c o i n a g e f r o m the L a t i n nolo, I d o not will). B l o n d e l a r g u e s , h o w e v e r , that p e s s i m i s m is, like

dilet-

tantism, i n c o h e r e n t , since its p r o j e c t o f w i l l i n g n o t h i n g m u s t b e parasitic

on

the

willing

of

some

positive

reality.

Anticipating

B e r g s o n ' s analysis in L'évolution créatrice, he a r g u e s that there is n o absolute

conception

of " n o t h i n g " ; negation

is a l w a y s a

m a t t e r o f r e p l a c i n g one positive reality w i t h

relative

another. T h e r e

is,

accordingly, n o c o h e r e n t o b j e c t to w h i c h an absolute n o l i t i o n c o u l d c o r r e s p o n d . T h i s is c o n f i r m e d , B l o n d e l m a i n t a i n s , b y the fact that S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s a c t o f r e n u n c i a t i o n is itself g r o u n d e d in a positive p r e f e r e n c e for the state o f nolition that he seeks. " P e s s i m i s m . . . lets loose an i m m e n s e a n d invincible c o n f i d e n c e in the o m n i p o t e n c e of the will since the will a p p e a r s b o t h n e c e s s a r y produce

the p a i n

o f existence

as w e l l

as to

a n d sufficient create

the

to

happy

a n n i h i l a t i o n that w o u l d n o t be w i t h o u t i t " (A, 36/48). H e c o n c l u d e s " w e c o u l d n o t h a v e either a c o n c e p t i o n o f or a will for n o t h i n g n e s s . . . b e c a u s e f r o m the m o m e n t w e posit the p r o b l e m o f a c t i o n [that is, the p r o b l e m o f the m e a n i n g o f h u m a n life] the fact is that w e a l r e a d y h a v e a positive solution for i t " (A, 39/50). T h e largest p a r t o f L'action offers a systematic survey o f possible positive v i e w s o f the m e a n i n g o f life. B l o n d e l follows a minimalist principle

1 3

o f b e g i n n i n g w i t h the lowest d e g r e e o f positive c o m m i t -

m e n t that w o u l d s e e m c a p a b l e o f e x p l i c a t i n g w h a t the m e a n i n g of life is. O n l y after he has s h o w n the i n a d e q u a c y o f a lesser d e g r e e o f c o m m i t m e n t does he m o v e o n to a h i g h e r one. H e thus tries to a v o i d i g n o r i n g possibilities for g i v i n g life an a c c e p t a b l e sense that fall short o f his o w n v i e w that o n l y the existence o f the C h r i s t i a n G o d will do. B l o n d e l ' s t r e a t m e n t o f the r a n g e o f positive m e a n i n g s s h o w s h i m to be firmly w i t h i n the F r e n c h spiritualist tradition. A l t h o u g h his h n a l g o a l is to s u p p o r t the C a t h o l i c faith, his p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e c u r s o r s are not A u g u s t i n e or A q u i n a s b u t M a i n e de B i r a n , R a v a i s s o n , Lachelier, a n d L é o n O l l é - L a p r u n e , his t e a c h e r at the L c o l e N o r m a l e . Blondel

begins with

the possibility

that

scientihc

1 4

materialism

a n s w e r s his q u e s t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f life, b u t he rejects 1 3

1 4

this

O n this, see R e n é Virgoulay, "L'action" de Maurice Blondel, 15. Blondel's thought does have some strong similarities to that o f A u g u s t i n e , particularly in his treatment of the will, but this seems due to Augustine's pervasive influence on Christian thought in general rather than any specific study o f his works by Blondel. B l o n d e l m a y also have assimilated A u g u s t i n i a n ideas through M a l e b r a n c h e . J o h n M c N e i l l has a r g u e d (in his The Blondelian Synthesis) for a major role o f the G e r m a n idealist tradition in the d e v e l o p m e n t of Blondel's thought, but his case is rather weak.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

9-'

(1890-1940)

possibility o n the s t a n d a r d spiritualist g r o u n d s that consciousness is not r e d u c i b l e to matter. S i m i l a r l y he rejects an a n s w e r in t e r m s of psychological

d e t e r m i n i s m , a r g u i n g that f r e e d o m ,

concretely

ex-

pressed in a c t i o n , is an essential feature o f consciousness. H i s c l a i m , in fact, is e v e n stronger. Free a c t i o n is " t h e c e m e n t o f o r g a n i c life, the b o n d o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s " (A, 180/175). B l o n d e l e v e n anticipates Sartre's existentialist l a n g u a g e : " T h e s u b s t a n c e o f m a n is a c t i o n ; he is w h a t he m a k e s h i m s e l f . "

1 5

B u t B l o n d e l insists that the

life o f the i n d i v i d u a l a l o n e c a n n o t sustain the m e a n i n g w e r e q u i r e . O u r a c t i o n i n e v i t a b l y e x t e n d s to the social w o r l d , s e e k i n g m e a n i n g first

in the family, t h e n in the n a t i o n , in the c o m m u n i t y o f all

humankind,

and

e v e n in p r o j e c t i o n s

of humanity

o n t o idols

of

superstitious w o r s h i p . A t e v e r y stage, a c t i o n is d r i v e n to seek further levels o f m e a n i n g b e c a u s e o f the g a p b e t w e e n w h a t o u r w i l l i n g has a c h i e v e d so far (what B l o n d e l calls the " w i l l e d w i l l " , volonte voulue) a n d w h a t w e m o s t p r o f o u n d l y will (the " w i l l i n g w i l l " , volonte voulante). N o m a t t e r h o w successful o u r willing, n o m a t t e r h o w extensive the r e a l m o f objects it attains, the will (volonte voulante) is never entirely satisfied. This is because, at the very least, our willing itself, the very root of our action, is not something we have willed: Suppose that man does everything as he wills it, obtains what he covets, vivifies the universe according to his liking, organizes and produces as he wishes the total ordering of conditions on which he rests his life: it remains that this will itself has not been posited or determined as it is by him . . . he wills, but he did not will to will. (A, 326/303) T h e will is n o t c o n t e n t that its a c t i o n b e finally d e r i v e d f r o m outside. O u r u l t i m a t e desire is to b e entirely self-sufficient; to b e , in a w o r d , G o d : " M a n aspires to b e a g o d . " O n c e a g a i n , B l o n d e l anticipates Sartre. B u t , unlike S a r t r e , he d o e s n o t c o n c l u d e that o u r desire to b e G o d is a "useless p a s s i o n " , c o l l a p s i n g u n d e r the impossibility o f a b e i n g that w o u l d b e b o t h in-itself a n d for-itself. A c c o r d i n g to B l o n d e l , the impossibility follows o n l y if w e c h o o s e " t o b e g o d w i t h o u t G o d a n d against G o d " . B u t there is a n o t h e r alternative: " t o be

God

t h r o u g h G o d a n d w i t h G o d " (A, 356/328). T o take this route is to o p e n m y s e l f to the will o f a n o t h e r b e i n g , b u t one that is the source of m y b e i n g a n d h e n c e o f m y v e r y will. In u n i o n w i t h this b e i n g

1 5

C i t e d by J e a n L a c r o i x , Maurice Blondel, 33.

Between the wars

93

( G o d ) , I c a n a c h i e v e the self-sufficiency that is m y ultimate volition. It is this

alternative

that

opens

the

way

to

our

rebirth

in

a

supernatural order of grace. Philosophy, a c c o r d i n g to B l o n d e l , c a n take us as far as the possibility o f this s u p e r n a t u r a l order. B u t it c a n n o t tell us w h e t h e r the o r d e r is a c t u a l or w h e t h e r w e o u g h t to c h o o s e the alternative it w o u l d present. T h e role o f p h i l o s o p h y is to " p r o v e that w e c a n n o t , in p r a c t i c e , n o t p r o n o u n c e for o r against this s u p e r n a t u r a l : 'Is it or is it n o t ? ' " Philosophy

can even

"examine

the c o n s e q u e n c e s

of

one

solution or the o t h e r a n d . . . m e a s u r e their i m m e n s e disparity. B u t p h i l o s o p h y c a n g o n o further, n o r c a n it say, in its o w n n a m e a l o n e , w h e t h e r it b e or n o t . " B l o n d e l sees the w h o l e o f L'action as o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n this limited d o m a i n o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d so r e s p e c t i n g the b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n w h a t is k n o w a b l e to n a t u r a l r e a s o n a n d w h a t is g r a s p e d o n l y b y s u p e r n a t u r a l faith. O n l y in the h n a l sentence o f the b o o k d o e s he cross the b o u n d a r y to speak the " o n e w o r d , . . . w h i c h c a n n o t be c o m m u n i c a t e d b e c a u s e it arises o n l y f r o m the i n t i m a c y o f totally p e r s o n a l action: . . . 'It i s ' " (A, 4 9 2 / 4 4 6 ) . D e s p i t e his insistence o n the strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d i n g of L'action,

B l o n d e l ' s secular c o l l e a g u e s w e r e n o t c o n v i n c e d that his

project

stood i n d e p e n d e n t

o f his C a t h o l i c i s m .

The

doubts

were

t h o r o u g h l y a r t i c u l a t e d at the defense o f his thesis, w h e r e the b o a r d subjected h i m to four h o u r s o f intense q u e s t i o n i n g b e f o r e a w a r d i n g a p a s s i n g g r a d e . M o r e seriously, his a p p o i n t m e n t to a university position (there w a s one w a i t i n g for h i m in Dijon) w a s h e l d u p for a l m o s t t w o y e a r s b e c a u s e o f official d o u b t s a b o u t his p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . H e w a s finally a w a r d e d the p o s t o n l y after B o u t r o u x , his thesis director, directly i n t e r v e n e d w i t h the minister o f e d u c a tion.

In

Catholic

any

case, B l o n d e l ' s

influence

was

mostly

restricted

circles a n d w a s further l i m i t e d b y his failure to

to

follow

L'action w i t h a n y o t h e r b o o k s for over forty years. It w a s o n l y in 1934 that he b e g a n to p u b l i s h an i m m e n s e trilogy, w i t h a revised version o f L'action p r e c e d e d b y treatises o n t h o u g h t (La pensée) a n d o n t o l o g y (L'être et les êtres). T h e s e v o l u m e s - as w e l l as La philosophie et l'esprit chrétien, p u b l i s h e d in 1944 - d e e p e n a n d e x t e n d the basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t o f L'action

(which n o n e t h e l e s s

remains

the best expression o f the c o r e o f B l o n d e l ' s t h o u g h t ) , b u t t h e y c a m e too late to h a v e m u c h i m p a c t o n the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n o f F r e n c h philosophy.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

94

NEO-THOMISM

AND

(1890-1940)

MARITAIN

E v e n a m o n g C a t h o l i c s , B l o n d e l h a d m u c h less i m p a c t t h a n he m i g h t have

had, because

medieval Aquinas.

his w o r k lay outside

scholasticism, 1 6

particularly

the m o d e r n

the

thought

revival

o f St.

of

Thomas

T h e r e v i v a l b e g a n a r o u n d 1850, led b y M a t e o L i b e r a t o r e

in Italy a n d J o s e p h K l e u t g e n in G e r m a n y .

B u t it took on c e n t r a l

1 7

i m p o r t a n c e for C a t h o l i c s w i t h L e o X I I I ' s e n c y c l i c a l , Aeterni Patris (1879), w h i c h in effect established A q u i n a s as the official p h i l o s o p h e r o f the

Catholic

Church.

One

of

the

first

major

francophone

reactions to the e n c y c l i c a l w a s D é s i r é (later, C a r d i n a l ) establishment Catholic

o f the

University

Institut

Supérieure

de

Mercier's

Philosophie

o f L o u v a i n in B e l g i u m , w h i c h

at

developed

the a

distinctive school o f T h o m i s m that e x e r c i s e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l influence. In F r a n c e , the T h o m i s t i c r e v i v a l w a s l e d b y the D o m i n i c a n s a n d w a s especially c e n t e r e d in the order's h o u s e o f studies, L e

Saulchoir

(located in B e l g i u m b e c a u s e o f F r e n c h anti-clerical laws). A l m o s t all the i m p o r t a n t F r e n c h D o m i n i c a n n e o - T h o m i s t s , i n c l u d i n g A n t o n i n D a l m a c e Sertillanges (1863—1943) a n d Reginald G a r r i g o u - L a g r a n g e (1877—1964), w e r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h L e Saulchoir. For all its vitality, the n e o - T h o m i s t m o v e m e n t h a d little i m p a c t outside C a t h o l i c - a n d , in fact, clerical - circles until the w o r k o f t w o C a t h o l i c l a y m e n : E t i e n n e G i l s o n (1884—1978) a n d J a c q u e s M a r i t a i n (1882—1973). G i l s o n w a s a distinguished historian o f philosophy, w h o first m a d e his n a m e w i t h a thesis o n the scholastic b a c k g r o u n d to D e s c a r t e s ' philosophy, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie, a n d t h e n w e n t o n to write a series o f m a g i s t e r i a l b o o k s on the

"Christian

p h i l o s o p h i e s " o f A u g u s t i n e , B o n a v e n t u r e , a n d A q u i n a s . It is in large part d u e to G i l s o n that m e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y b e c a m e a n d r e m a i n s a fruitful a r e a o f historical studies in F r a n c e a n d e l s e w h e r e . Although

Gilson's

version

of

"existential

Thomism"

had

an

interest that w e n t w e l l b e y o n d historical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the l e a d i n g original p h i l o s o p h e r

o f the n e o - T h o m i s t m o v e m e n t w a s J a c q u e s

M a r i t a i n . M a r i t a i n c a m e f r o m an agnostic f a m i l y a n d w a s initially a n a d h e r e n t o f B e r g s o n ' s philosophy. ( T h e story is that he a n d his

1,1

1 7

B l o n d e l did avoid c o n d e m n a t i o n by the V a t i c a n , although there w e r e those in the C h u r c h w h o thought his i n d e p e n d e n c e o f the T h o m i s t i c tradition and s y m p a t h y for philosophy since Descartes led h i m into the errors of m o d e r n i s m , c o n d e m n e d by Pius X in 1907. M y discussion o f neo-scholasticism — as well as o f Gilson and M a r i t a i n — is indebted to the excellent treatment provided in G e r a l d M c C o o l , The .Neo-Thomists.

Between the wars

95

fiancee, R a i s s a O u m a n g o f f , h a d b e e n in despair at the m e a n i n g l e s s ness o f m o d e r n existence, e v e n to the p o i n t o f c o n t e m p l a t i n g a suicide p a c t , b u t h e a r i n g B e r g s o n l e c t u r e at the C o l l e g e de F r a n c e , a l o n g w i t h an e n c o u n t e r w i t h the w r i t i n g s o f L e o n Bloy, r e v i v e d their hope.) In 1906 M a r i t a i n

(and R a i s s a , to w h o m he w a s b y

m a r r i e d ) c o n v e r t e d to C a t h o l i c i s m . G i v e n the C h u r c h ' s

then

condem-

n a t i o n o f m o d e r n i s t t h o u g h t , he b e c a m e u n e a s y w i t h his B e r g s o n i s m a n d for a t i m e confessor,

c o n s i d e r e d g i v i n g u p philosophy.

a Dominican

priest, r e c o m m e n d e d

B u t his

that he

wife's

study

St.

T h o m a s A q u i n a s . M a r i t a i n did so a n d s o o n b e c a m e c o n v i n c e d that here was a philosophy

superior e v e n to B e r g s o n ' s

a n d , in

fact,

c a p a b l e o f p r e s e r v i n g the truth in B e r g s o n i s m w h i l e c o r r e c t i n g its mistakes. H i s first b o o k , La philosophie Bergsonienne, w a s a v i g o r o u s (Maritain

e v e n later

Thomistic standpoint. Maritain's primary

said

"violent")

attack

on

Bergson

from

a

18

disagreement with

Bergson

concerned

the

status o f the intuition that is o u r f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t a c t w i t h reality. A s w e h a v e seen, B e r g s o n ' s intuition is a s u p r a - r a t i o n a l insight that reveals intellectual c a t e g o r i e s as abstractions for the sake o f p r a c t i c a l action.

Maritain,

on

the

other

hand,

insisted

that there

is

an

intellectual intuition o f b e i n g as such that puts us into direct c o n t a c t w i t h f u n d a m e n t a l structures o f reality, w h i c h is t h e r e b y r e v e a l e d to be intelligible t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . M a r i t a i n saw these structures as m o s t clearly r e v e a l e d in A q u i n a s ' s m e t a p h y s i c s o f act a n d p o t e n c y for w h i c h reality is a multiplicity of hnite substances c r e a t e d a n d sustained b y the inhnite

substance,

G o d . E v e r y finite s u b s t a n c e is c o n t i n g e n t (capable o f n o t existing) b e c a u s e o f the real distinction b e t w e e n its essence (the p o t e n t i a l to be w h a t it is) a n d its existence (the act o f b e i n g - esse - w h e r e b y its essence is a c t u a l i z e d ) . In G o d , b y contrast, essence a n d existence are identical; his n a t u r e or essence is simply to exist. T h e divine reality is, accordingly, necessarily existent, a p u r e act c o n t a i n i n g the r e a l i z a tion o f all p e r f e c t i o n .

Maritain's major

treatises on

metaphysics

d e v e l o p his p o s i t i o n o n t r a d i t i o n a l scholastic a n d T h o m i s t i c d e b a t e s , such as w h e t h e r the act o f b e i n g (esse) is g r a s p e d t h r o u g h an abstract

1!i

La philosophie Bergsonienne, translated as Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. T h i s is a translation of a slightly revised version o f the F r e n c h work's second edition, a l o n g with an added " E s s a y o f A p p r e c i a t i o n " , consisting o f two chapters o f Maritain's Ransoming the Time, giving his later a n d less harsh view of Bergson. Maritain's reference to the " v i o l e n c e " of the original b o o k is in the f o r e w o r d to this translation, p. 5.

g6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

c o n c e p t or t h r o u g h a j u d g m e n t .

1 9

(1890-1940)

M a r i t a i n initially a g r e e d

with

F r e n c h D o m i n i c a n s such as G a r r i g o u - L a g r a n g e that b e i n g is k n o w able t h r o u g h c o n c e p t s . B u t he later m o v e d t o w a r d G i l s o n ' s v i e w that b e i n g is a p p r e h e n d e d in c o n c r e t e j u d g m e n t s o f existence a n d , also like

Gilson,

argued

that this v i e w

showed

Thomism

to b e

an

a u t h e n t i c a l l y existential philosophy. T h e s e discussions o f issues so t h o r o u g h l y sifted b y the T h o m i s t i c tradition g a v e little scope to M a r i t a i n ' s c a p a c i t y for original p h i l o s o p h i z i n g a n d , in a n y case, h a d little i m p a c t o n those outside the circle o f T h o m i s m , w h o f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s i n c a p a b l e o f the

intellectual

intuitions on w h i c h M a r i t a i n ' s m e t a p h y s i c s w a s b a s e d . B u t o t h e r aspects o f M a r i t a i n ' s T h o m i s m w e r e m o r e original a n d h a d w i d e r appeal. His epistemology

2 0

forthrightly rejected the C a r t e s i a n idea,

w h i c h he saw as c o r r u p t i n g m o d e r n t h o u g h t , that p h i l o s o p h y m u s t b e g i n w i t h the contents o f consciousness a n d s o m e h o w justify the existence o f e x t e r n a l objects. T o this M a r i t a i n

o p p o s e d a direct

realism in the A r i s t o t e l i a n tradition that a l l o w e d h i m to b e g i n w i t h o u r k n o w l e d g e o f n a t u r e a n d use it as a basis for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c o u n t o f k n o w i n g . M a r i t a i n ' s n a t u r a l i s m , h o w e v e r , did n o t follow the l e a d o f m o d e r n e m p i r i c a l science — w h i c h he saw as d e a l i n g w i t h only abstracted mathematical

structures -

b u t that o f A q u i n a s ' s

d o c t r i n e o f i n t e n t i o n a l species. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l species is p o s i t e d as a n essentially r e l a t i o n a l f o r m , s h a r e d b y b o t h the o b j e c t k n o w n a n d the k n o w i n g m i n d ; it is that b y w h i c h w e know, n o t in the sense o f an internal i m p r e s s i o n f r o m w h i c h w e object,

b u t in the

somehow

infer the

sense o f the p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l

external

connection

that

constitutes a n d e x p l a i n s , b u t d o e s n o t justify, k n o w l e d g e as a n a t u r a l fact. T h i s m i g h t s e e m an u n p r e p o s s e s s i n g l y m e d i e v a l basis for an a c c o u n t o f the varieties o f m o d e r n k n o w l e d g e . B u t M a r i t a i n ingeniously d e p l o y e d it to differentiate m e t a p h y s i c a l , scientific, religious, aesthetic,

and

moral

ways

of knowing

in t e r m s

o f the

formal

structures o f signification distinctive to e a c h . T h u s , he c o u l d distinguish b e t w e e n the a b s t r a c t objectivity w i t h w h i c h a scientific object is in the m i n d a n d the i m a g i n a t i v e i m m e d i a c y o f an aesthetic object. Similarly, in the religious r e a l m , he c o u l d distinguish the m e t a p h y s i cian's d e m o n s t r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f G o d f r o m the mystic's e x p e r i e n -

1 9

2 0

T w o of Maritain's most important expositions o f his metaphysics are Sept leçons sur l'être, a n d Court traité de l'existence et l'existant. D e v e l o p e d particularly in Distinguer pour unir, ou, les degrés du savoir.

Between the wars

97

tial k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p l a i n w h y the t w o sorts o f k n o w l e d g e h a d to be e x p r e s s e d in such diverse l a n g u a g e s . M a r i t a i n ' s m o s t w i d e l y influential w o r k w a s in political t h e o r y .

21

M a n y T h o m i s t s h a d strongly r i g h t - w i n g (e.g., royalist) political views and even supported Charles M a u r r a s ' reactionary Action Française m o v e m e n t . M a r i t a i n w a s initially s y m p a t h e t i c to A c t i o n F r a n ç a i s e b u t s u p p o r t e d Pius X I ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n o f the g r o u p a n d eventually d e v e l o p e d a T h o m i s t i c defense o f liberal d e m o c r a c y . T h i s defense w a s b a s e d on A q u i n a s ' s distinction b e t w e e n n a t u r e a n d p e r s o n , the s a m e distinction u s e d to e x p l a i n the T r i n i t y as o n e divine n a t u r e s h a r e d b y three divine p e r s o n s . A s instantiations o f h u m a n n a t u r e w e are all m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i t y

a n d o b l i g e d to f o l l o w

the

dictates o f the authorities to p r o d u c e the c o m m o n g o o d . B u t as p e r s o n s w e are also u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l s c r e a t e d as such b y G o d a n d w i t h a direct r e l a t i o n s h i p to h i m . A s p e r s o n s w e possess f u n d a m e n t a l rights that c a n n o t be s u b o r d i n a t e d to social g o o d s . Specifically, o n c e w e r e a c h the a p p r o p r i a t e level o f intellectual a n d social maturity, w e have

the

right to

set the

basic

direction

of our

lives,

without

interference f r o m the state. M a r i t a i n allows that there m a y b e e n times a n d p l a c e s w h e r e

the m a j o r i t y

of humans

had

have not

r e a c h e d the requisite l e v e l o f maturity. B u t he insisted that in the m o d e r n w o r l d a l m o s t all adults h a v e r e a c h e d this level, so that traditional

forms

of authoritarian

government

are

not

morally

permissible. In this way, his a p p l i c a t i o n o f T h o m i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s to the m o d e r n w o r l d e n t a i l e d the necessity o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , d e m o cratic g o v e r n m e n t . M a r i t a i n ' s case for d e m o c r a c y h e l p e d inspire the C h r i s t i a n D e m o c r a t i c m o v e m e n t s in E u r o p e after W o r l d W a r II. For all their skill a n d originality, the C h r i s t i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c h a d little e n d u r i n g influence. G i l s o n a n d M a r i t a i n h a d a m u c h l a r g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u d i e n c e t h a n B l o n d e l , signaled by their

later

positions

at

North

American

universities,

i m p a c t , like his, s e l d o m e x t e n d e d b e y o n d the circle o f thought.

This

was

not

because,

as

some

critics

but

their

Catholic

claimed,

their

p h i l o s o p h i e s simply p r e s u p p o s e d C a t h o l i c doctrines. B o t h the philo s o p h y o f a c t i o n a n d n e o - T h o m i s m w e r e s c r u p u l o u s in s e p a r a t i n g philosophical

claims, d e f e n d e d

entirely b y n a t u r a l

reason,

from

religious faith a n d its t h e o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . B u t the fact r e m a i n s that the

2 1

fundamental

principles

o f these p h i l o s o p h i e s

had

See his Primauté du spirituel, Du régime temporel de la liberté, and L'homme et l'état.

little

9

8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

a p p e a l to those w h o w e r e n o t a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d to C a t h o l i c i s m (or strongly i n c l i n e d to it). B l o n d e l presents his claims a b o u t the will's drive for the infinite as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a reflective analysis o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , b u t his analysis r a n g true to few w h o did n o t a l r e a d y share his religious s e n s i b i l i t i e s .

22

Similarly, the

f o u n d i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l intuitions o f M a r i t a i n ' s t h o u g h t w e r e s e l d o m s h a r e d b y p h i l o s o p h e r s outside C a t h o l i c i s m . T h e failure o f C a t h o l i c p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t that it c o n f u s e d faith w i t h r e a s o n b u t that its reasoning was unpersuasive.

MARCEL

T h e r e was, however, a Catholic philosopher whose views were much closer to w h a t w a s b e c o m i n g the m a i n s t r e a m a n d w h o c a n e v e n b e plausibly

put

forward

as the

first

French

existentialist.

This

G a b r i e l M a r c e l (1889—1973), w h o , w h i l e Sartre a n d the o t h e r

is

fledg-

ling existentialists w e r e still in s c h o o l , w a s p u b l i s h i n g careful descriptions o f h o w e m b o d i e d subjectivity e x p e r i e n c e s c o n c r e t e existence, the h u m a n situation, the other, a n d b e i n g itself. T h e r e is, in fact, n o m a j o r t h e m e o f existentialism that is n o t t r e a t e d , t h o r o u g h l y

and

perceptively, in his w o r k . M o r e o v e r , like the later existentialists, he c o m b i n e d p h i l o s o p h y w i t h literature, w r i t i n g thirty p l a y s that w e r e p r o d u c e d w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e success on the Parisian stage. M a r c e l ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g d o e s n o t take the f o r m o f tightly o r g a n i z e d treatises. M u c h o f it consists o f essays on specihc topics or — a distinctive M a r c e l i a n m e d i u m — j o u r n a l s in w h i c h he j o t t e d d o w n his p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t s as t h e y d e v e l o p e d f r o m d a y day.

2 3

H i s first b o o k , in fact, w a s ajournai

to

métaphysique (1927) in w h i c h

he r e c o r d e d his l o n g a n d c o m p l i c a t e d m o v e f r o m the m e t a p h y s i c a l idealism he h a d b e e n i n c l i n e d to as a student to his first f o r m u l a t i o n s o f existentialist philosophy.

Similarly, his n e x t b o o k , Etre et avoir

(1935), c o m b i n e d further selections f r o m his j o u r n a l s w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f essays. S o m e t i m e s M a r c e l e m p h a s i z e d the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n his

2 2

2 3

A s w e have noted, Sartre does accept something like BlondePs analysis, although o f the two options posed by it he chooses the anti-religious one. I suggest that this is not a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e to m y thesis but an indication that Sartre's thought is i m b u e d with a negative religiosity, expressed in a v e h e m e n t denial o f the possibility of the faith with w h i c h it sees itself faced. In this M a r c e l was p r e c e d e d by the Swiss philosopher a n d p o e t , Henri-Frédéric A m i e l (1821-81), w h o h a d d e v e l o p e d his p h i l o s o p h y (a c o m b i n a t i o n o f French spiritualism and G e r m a n idealism) in a v o l u m i n o u s j o u r n a l .

Between the wars

99

d r a m a a n d his p h i l o s o p h y b y a p p e n d i n g a p h i l o s o p h i c a l essay to the printed version

o f a play. H i s one a t t e m p t at s o m e t h i n g like a

systematic e x p o s i t i o n o f his ideas w a s in the t w o v o l u m e s o f his G i f f o r d l e c t u r e s , Mystère de l'être (1951). B u t e v e n h e r e his discussion often c a n n o t h e l p b u t g o off in i n t r i g u i n g directions that take h i m b e y o n d his f o r m a l structure. M a r c e l presents his p h i l o s o p h y

as a m a t t e r

of what

"secondary reflection" rather than "primary reflection".

he

calls

Primary

reflection is p r i m a r y o n l y in that it c o r r e s p o n d s to the descriptions of o u r e x p e r i e n c e that are nearest to the surface a n d that w e

are,

therefore, m o s t likely to p u t f o r w a r d first w h e n w e b e g i n t h i n k i n g a b o u t the h u m a n situation. It expresses the s t a n d p o i n t o f c o m m o n sense a n d o f science. P r i m a r y reflection m a k e s a s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n the objects o f the w o r l d a n d the m i n d that e x p e r i e n c e s a n d k n o w s t h e m . K n o w l e d g e is a m a t t e r o f the m i n d o b t a i n i n g a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f w h a t is outside it, a n d this a c c u r a c y requires a distant, dispassionate, totally objective v i e w o f things, i m p a r t i a l l y verified b y the facts. L i k e w i s e , the b o d y is s h a r p l y distinguished from the m i n d ; it is, in fact, j u s t a n o t h e r o b j e c t in the w o r l d ( k n o w a b l e in the s a m e objective w a y as o t h e r objects), a l t h o u g h it also p l a y s an essential i n s t r u m e n t a l role in o u r k n o w l e d g e o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , since it transmits to the m i n d the p h y s i c a l impressions m a d e o n it b y o t h e r b o d i e s . T h e k n o w l e d g e a t t a i n e d b y p r i m a r y reflection is not o n l y objective b u t also g e n e r a l , f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s o f a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t s a p p l i c a b l e to entire r a n g e s o f similar objects. T h i s g e n e r a l ity is e x p r e s s e d b y u n i v e r s a l l a w s such as those o f n a t u r a l science. M a r c e l has n o q u a r r e l w i t h the v a l i d i t y or i m p o r t a n c e o f p r i m a r y reflection. Its truths — especially the truths o f science — are u n d e n i able a n d essential for o u r p r a g m a t i c dealings w i t h the w o r l d . B u t he v i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e s the i d e a that p r i m a r y reflection p r o v i d e s the only or the m o s t i m p o r t a n t truth a b o u t o u r w o r l d a n d o u r lives. T h e r e is also w h a t he calls " s e c o n d a r y r e f l e c t i o n " — s e c o n d a r y n o t in the sense o f s u b o r d i n a t e or m a r g i n a l b u t in the sense o f o p e r a t i n g at a further, d e e p e r level. S e c o n d a r y reflection is the inverse, at e v e r y p o i n t , o f p r i m a r y reflection. Its k n o w l e d g e is c o n c r e t e r a t h e r t h a n abstract, p e r s o n a l r a t h e r t h a n o b j e c t i v e , a n d b a s e d on o u r involvem e n t w i t h the w o r l d r a t h e r t h a n o u r s e p a r a t i o n f r o m it. T h e p r o t o t y p e o f s e c o n d a r y reflection is o u r k n o w l e d g e o f the existence o f the m a t e r i a l w o r l d directly p r e s e n t to us. F r o m

the

s t a n d p o i n t o f s e c o n d a r y reflection, w e are f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g

FARIS

ioo

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

i n v o l v e d in the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . I, as a thinker, a m also a b o d y (not a s e p a r a t e d m i n d ) ; a n d , as a body, I h a v e direct access to o t h e r b o d i e s . For s e c o n d a r y reflection, the so-called p r o b l e m o f the existence o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d is a non-starter. T h i s is b e c a u s e the m o d e l for secondary

reflection

is n o t d i s e n g a g e d

contemplation

but

active

participation. I k n o w the w o r l d n o t b y d i s t a n c i n g m y s e l f f r o m it for the sake o f objectivity b u t b y f o r m i n g p a r t o f it. W h a t such k n o w l e d g e lacks in objectivity a n d g e n e r a l i t y it m a k e s u p in i m m e d i a c y

and

fullness. M a r c e l speaks o f it as " b l i n d e d i n t u i t i o n " , w h e r e " i n t u i t i o n " expresses the directness a n d c e r t a i n t y o f s e c o n d a r y k n o w l e d g e a n d " b l i n d e d " expresses its lack o f the clarity a n d distinctness o f p r i m a r y knowledge. C o r r e l a t e d w i t h the distinction b e t w e e n p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y reflection is M a r c e l ' s distinction b e t w e e n p r o b l e m s a n d mysteries. Primary

reflection

deals

with

problems,

that

is, w i t h

precisely

f o r m u l a b l e questions w i t h a n s w e r s that c a n b e j u d g e d in a p u b l i c w a y b y clear criteria. A c r o s s w o r d p u z z l e is a p r o b l e m , b u t so are e x t r e m e l y c o m p l e x scientific questions (e.g., W h a t are the u l t i m a t e constituents o f matter?) that m a y take centuries to answer. I m a y or m a y n o t b e interested in a g i v e n p r o b l e m , a n d o n c e it is solved I c a n turn m y

attention

to s o m e t h i n g else. E v e n if I a m

desperately

interested in s o l v i n g a p r o b l e m , the solution has n o t h i n g to do w i t h w h o I f u n d a m e n t a l l y a m . B y contrast, a m y s t e r y is a q u e s t i o n that implicates m e in m y deepest reality. T h e r e are n o objective criteria for a n s w e r i n g it, a n d n o a n s w e r c a n h a v e universal validity. I n d e e d , it is w r o n g to think that there is a n y p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d a n s w e r that I c o u l d e v e r discover. R e s p o n d i n g to a m y s t e r y is as m u c h a m a t t e r o f creatively t r a n s f o r m i n g as o f d i s c o v e r i n g s o m e truth a b o u t myself. E x a m p l e s o f questions that l e a d to mysteries r a t h e r t h a n p r o b l e m s are: Am I free?, Have I been created by God?, Should I despair in the face of death?, Do I love this person?. S u c h questions are n o t u n a n s w e r a b l e , but they c a n n o t b e a n s w e r e d in the m a n n e r o f a solution to a p r o b l e m . T h i s is b e c a u s e , in contrast to a p r o b l e m , a m y s t e r y is n o t s o m e t h i n g f r o m w h i c h I c a n w i t h d r a w to attain an objective p e r s p e c t i v e . In response to a mystery, I c a n o n l y try to j o u r n e y further into a reality that is an essential p a r t o f m e . S u c h a j o u r n e y will simultaneously r e v e a l a n d create this reality. T h e mistake o f m u c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t is to treat the self, o t h e r p e o p l e , a n d G o d as objects a b o u t w h i c h w e p o s e a n d solve p r o b l e m s . T h e true task o f p h i l o s o p h y is to a b a n d o n this quest for

Between the wars

101

objective k n o w l e d g e , m o d e l e d on science, in favor o f c r e a t i v e intuitions o f these realities as mysteries o f e x i s t e n c e (where " e x i s t e n c e " m e a n s the fullness o f c o n c r e t e reality). T h r o u g h such intuitions I not o n l y e n c o u n t e r m y self in its full existential c o n c r e t e n e s s ; I also e n c o u n t e r o t h e r p e o p l e , n o t as alien b e i n g s b u t as m e m b e r s w i t h m e o f a c o m m u n i t y essential to us all. For M a r c e l , the

fundamental

e x p e r i e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h y is n o t " I a m " b u t " w e a r e " . Further, this " w e " e v e n t u a l l y is seen to involve n o t j u s t finite c r e a t u r e s b u t e v e n G o d . O f c o u r s e , for M a r c e l , there is n o q u e s t i o n o f p r o v i n g the existence o f G o d b y l o g i c a l or scientific a r g u m e n t . T h a t is impossible b e c a u s e it w o u l d r e q u i r e that G o d be j u s t a n o t h e r t h i n g in

an

objective multiplicity o f things. T h e reality o f G o d m u s t b e that o f a p e r s o n (a " t h o u " , as M a r c e l , like M a r t i n B u b e r , puts it) w i t h w h o m I have

direct

communication;

a n d this c o m m u n i c a t i o n

is n o t

an

e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n s e p a r a t e d subjects b u t a s h a r e d life w h e r e b y I p a r t i c i p a t e in the divine reality. T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f s e c o n d a r y reflection is t h o r o u g h l y p e r s o n a l in t w o senses: it is u n d e r g o n e b y a p e r s o n a n d it is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d persons. A s such, the e x p e r i e n c e is f r a u g h t w i t h the e m o t i o n a l a n d m o r a l s u b s t a n c e o f p e r s o n a l life. A c c o r d i n g l y , M a r c e l m a i n t a i n s that this e x p e r i e n c e m u s t take the f o r m o f the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l

and

intense m o d e s o f h u m a n feeling a n d v a l u e s : fidelity (or faith), h o p e , a n d love. I b e c o m e fully a w a r e o f myself, o f h o w I a m one w i t h others, a n d h o w w e are all o n e w i t h G o d o n l y b y o p e n i n g m y s e l f to the w o r l d t h r o u g h

a faithful, h o p e f u l , a n d l o v i n g life. S o m e

of

M a r c e l ' s m o s t impressive w o r k consists o f his close descriptions of j u s t w h a t is i n v o l v e d in such a life. Faith, he says, is that w h e r e b y the self is c r e a t e d , h o p e is u l t i m a t e l y for s a l v a t i o n , a n d love involves the affirmation that the b e l o v e d shall n o t die. Although

he

has

little

use

for

most

traditional

metaphysics,

M a r c e l gives central p l a c e to the k e y m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n o f being. For h i m , h o w e v e r , b e i n g is n o t an abstract c o n c e p t (the m o s t g e n e r a l a n d therefore e m p t y o f all, since it applies to literally everything) or the g r o u n d o f an intellectual j u d g m e n t ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the " i s " implicit in a n y assertion). R a t h e r , b e i n g for M a r c e l is the c o n c r e t e c o n s t a n t that r e m a i n s t h r o u g h all the d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d t r a n s f o r m a tions o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . It is the ultimate constancy, a s s u r a n c e , a n d j o y in w h i c h all reality p a r t i c i p a t e s a n d t o w a r d w h i c h o u r faith, h o p e , a n d l o v e are u l t i m a t e l y directed. B u t in s e e k i n g b e i n g w e d o not

transcend

or

subordinate

the

individual

beings

of

our

102

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

e x p e r i e n c e . O n the contrary, it is o n l y b y e x p e r i e n c i n g o u r u n i o n w i t h b e i n g that w e c a n fully a p p r e c i a t e a n d a c h i e v e o u r u n i o n w i t h o t h e r b e i n g s . Ultimately, in fact, o u r u n i o n w i t h b e i n g c a n n o t be distinguished f r o m o u r u n i o n w i t h the s u p r e m e b e i n g , G o d . D e s p i t e the p r i o r i t y o f his w o r k , M a r c e l h a d limited influence o n the y o u n g e r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s .

24

A s w e shall see, t h e y e n g a g e d m u c h m o r e

w i t h t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y G e r m a n s such as H u s s e r l a n d

Heidegger,

p h i l o s o p h e r s to w h o m M a r c e l ' s t h o u g h t o w e d little or n o t h i n g . M o r e over, M a r c e l w a s a theist (and, f r o m

1929 o n , a C a t h o l i c )

who

e m p h a s i z e d fidelity, h o p e , a n d love r a t h e r t h a n the absurdity, despair, a n d conflict that b e c a m e c a n o n i c a l for Sartre a n d c o m p a n y . It is as t h o u g h M a r c e l ' s p l u n g e into the lived e x p e r i e n c e

o f the

human

situation r e v e a l e d to h i m the p o l a r opposites o f w h a t S a r t r e , B e a u v o i r , a n d C a m u s f o u n d there. (Also, his political positions a l o n e , s u c h as s u p p o r t for F r a n c o ' s S p a i n , w o u l d h a v e a l i e n a t e d these p h i l o s o p h e r s f r o m him.) A s a result, M a r c e l r e m a i n e d the o d d m a n out a m o n g F r e n c h existentialists.

TOWARD

THE

CONCRETE

If y o u n g secular p h i l o s o p h e r s i g n o r e d B l o n d e l , the n e o - T h o m i s t s , and even M a r c e l , they rebelled, sometimes with disconcerting verbal v i o l e n c e , against the e n t r e n c h e d w i s d o m o f their t e a c h e r s .

They

were

more

hardly

alone,

since

there

was

also

a

related,

p r o m i n e n t , literary a n d artistic c h a l l e n g e to the T h i r d

and

Republic's

intellectual a n d cultural establishment. S o m e o f the earliest o p p o sition c a m e f r o m the literary surrealists, led b y A n d r é B r e t o n , w h o used " a u t o m a t i c

2 4

w r i t i n g " to u n l e a s h the i r r a t i o n a l ,

unconscious

M e r l e a u - P o n t y gives a s o m e w h a t different impression: " T h e m o m e n t o f our great initiation into the philosophy o f e x i s t e n c e " o c c u r r e d " w h e n w e discovered Husserl, Jaspers, Heidegger, a n d G a b r i e l M a r c e l " ( " T h e Philosophy of E x i s t e n c e " , in his Texts and Dialogues, 132). H e particularly cites M a r c e l as the source for the theme o f e m b o d i m e n t . But although M a r c e l was surely k n o w n to the y o u n g French philosophers (Sartre, for e x a m p l e , r e a d a p a p e r at a c o l l o q u i u m at M a r c e l ' s house), it seems likely that M e r l e a u - P o n t y himself h a d a special interest, p r o b a b l y because o f his early a t t a c h m e n t to the C a t h o l i c i s m M a r c e l had e m b r a c e d . T h u s , in the sentence q u o t e d from a b o v e , M e r l e a u - P o n t y also mentions the C a t h o l i c j o u r n a l Esprit (edited by M o u n i e r ) , w h i c h published articles on the philosophy of existence, but w h i c h was h a r d l y likely to influence non-believers such as Sartre a n d Beauvoir. It also seems that M a r c e l ' s influence on M e r l e a u - P o n t y was not very d e e p or enduring. T h e r e is, for e x a m p l e , only one m e n t i o n o f h i m in M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's major work, Phénoménologie de la perception. A s w e shall see, however, M a r c e l did have considerable influence on Paul Ricoeur.

Between the wars

103

springs o f creativity a n d s u p p o r t e d political r e v o l u t i o n t h r o u g h a s t o r m y alliance w i t h the C o m m u n i s t s . O f m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l significance w e r e the projects o f G e o r g e s Bataille (1897—1962), w h o w o r k e d as a n archivist a n d l i b r a r i a n w h i l e also p r o d u c i n g v i o l e n t l y erotic novels a l o n g w i t h r a d i c a l p h i l o s o p h i cal essays a n d social s c h e m e s . Bataille w a s initially a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the surrealists b u t b r o k e w i t h t h e m a n d w a s d e n o u n c e d b y B r e t o n . He

regarded

the irrational forces the

surrealists w e r e

trying

to

u n l e a s h as o f far m o r e t h a n artistic significance. A l l h u m a n life a n d society, he m a i n t a i n e d , w a s b a s e d on a p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c e

of

v i o l e n c e a n d transgression, an e x p e r i e n c e he saw as a c o n t a c t w i t h the

sacred

that

was

smothered

by

the

smooth

rationalities

of

b o u r g e o i s society. Bataille's novels e v o k e d a n d a n a l y z e d this e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h he also e x p l o r e d t h r o u g h a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l

studies

primitive societies. In the latter p r o j e c t he w a s j o i n e d b y

of

Roger

C a l l o i s , a classicist w i t h strong interests in a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d M i c h e l Leiris, a surrealist w r i t e r w h o h a d d o n e e t h n o g r a p h i c h e l d w o r k in A f r i c a . F r o m 1937 to 1939, t h e y r a n a b i w e e k l y discussion g r o u p , called the C o l l è g e de S o c i o l o g i e , d e v o t e d to the study o f e x p e r i e n c e s o f the sacred. (At the s a m e t i m e , Bataille started a secret society, Acéphale violent

[headless], w h i c h rituals

designed

to

seems to h a v e tried to r e v i v e stimulate

ecstatic

experiences

ancient of

the

sacred.) Bataille also a t t e n d e d K o j è v e ' s s e m i n a r o n H e g e l (discussed b e l o w ) , w h e r e he w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y interested in the role H e g e l g a v e n e g a t i o n (violence a n d destruction) in the p r o g r e s s o f history. A l t h o u g h the y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s e n d o r s e d Bataille's rejection of b o u r g e o i s v a l u e s a n d often s h a r e d his fascination w i t h v i o l e n c e a n d transgressive a c t i o n , t h e y h a d n o s y m p a t h y w i t h his r a d i c a l irrationalism. Sartre strongly criticized h i m in a 1943 article as " a mystic",

2 5

new

a n d , like B r e t o n , he h a d little i m p a c t o n the d e v e l o p m e n t

o f existentialism. H o w e v e r , as w e shall see, there w a s a g r e a t u p s u r g e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l interest in Bataille w i t h the e m e r g e n c e o f poststructuralism in the 1960s. P e r h a p s the m o s t v i o l e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l assault on T h i r d R e p u b l i c v a l u e s w a s P a u l N i z a n ' s attack on " t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the established o r d e r " , as he p u t it in the subtitle to his 1930 b o o k , Les chiens de garden 2 5

2 6

" W h e n " , he says in a t y p i c a l l y vitriolic p a s s a g e , " o n e hears

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, " U n n o u v e a u m y s t i q u e " , in Situations I, N i z a n was Sartre's close friend at the E c o l e N o r m a l e and helped p r o m o t e his early literary writings. N i z a n , himself a successful novelist a n d journalist, was a militant C o m m u n i s t until

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

M . B r u n s c h v i c g [who is N i z a n ' s p a r t i c u l a r bête noire] . . . give a series o f lectures on the t e c h n i q u e o f the transition to the absolute, o n e fails to see h o w these bacilli o f the m i n d , these g r o t e s q u e fruits o f the c o n t e m p l a t i v e p r o c e s s , c o u l d possibly h e l p the c o m m o n h e r d . . . to u n d e r s t a n d their d a u g h t e r s ' tuberculosis, their w i v e s ' fits o f anger, their

military

service w i t h

all its h u m i l i a t i o n s

. . ., the

stinking

c o r r u p t i o n o f their p a r l i a m e n t s , or the insolence o f the a u t h o r i t i e s " . N i z a n sees p h i l o s o p h e r s ' failure to address these social a n d e c o n o m i c o u t r a g e s as a sign that t h e y h a v e " b e t r a y e d m a n k i n d for the sake of the b o u r g e o i s i e " .

2 7

N i z a n ' s militant M a r x i s m gives a political cast to his criticism that w a s n o t t y p i c a l o f the early 1930s (Sartre a n d B e a u v o i r , for e x a m p l e , w e r e at this t i m e r a t h e r unpolitical). B u t the t h o u g h t w a s w i d e s p r e a d that the d o m i n a n t p h i l o s o p h i e s o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c h a d n o t h i n g to say a b o u t the real issues o f h u m a n existence. T h e early w r i t i n g s of M a r c e l , the p o l a r opposite o f N i z a n in t e m p e r a m e n t , style, a n d politics, e q u a l l y c o n d e m n the v a p i d i t y o f established p h i l o s o p h y .

28

M e r l e a u - P o n t y p r o v i d e s an e v e n b e t t e r e x a m p l e . H e offers n o n e o f N i z a n ' s a b u s e , a n d in fact praises B r u n s c h v i c g for his

"quite

e x t r a o r d i n a r y p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s " a n d as " a m a n o f the first o r d e r " . B u t , he says, " a s r e g a r d s p u r e philosophy, his essential c o n t r i b u t i o n consisted p r e c i s e l y in i n f o r m i n g us that w e m u s t t u r n t o w a r d the m i n d , t o w a r d the subject w h i c h constructs science a n d the perc e p t i o n o f the w o r l d " . A s w e h a v e seen, B r u n s c h v i c g t h o u g h t that science c o u l d tell us all there w a s to k n o w a b o u t the objects o f this m i n d . T h e m i n d itself is, for h i m , simply the u n i v e r s a l r e a s o n in w h i c h all thinkers p a r t i c i p a t e , a n d " l e n g t h y p h i l o s o p h i c a l descriptions or e x p l i c a t i o n s c a n n o t be m a d e o f this m i n d , this s u b j e c t " .

2 9

M e r l e a u - P o n t y w a s o f c o u r s e a w a r e o f B r u n s c h v i c g ' s a c c o u n t o f the v a r i o u s m e n t a l functions in La modalité du jugement,

b u t he

Brunschvicg's

functions

relentless

intellectualization

o f these

finds an

•939 (when he resigned from the Party). H e was killed in 1940, fighting the G e r m a n invasion. See Sartre's m o v i n g reminiscences in his preface to a reissue o f Nizan's 1931 book. Aden Arabie. Les chiens de garde, 28—9, 140. T h i s critique reflects N i z a n ' s M a r x i s t tendency to c o n d e m n any political stance short of a revolutionary one as reactionary. Brunschvicg, for example, was, like most p r o m i n e n t philosophers, considerably to the left in c o n t e m p o r a r y French politics. 2 8

2 9

For e x a m p l e , Journal métaphysique, w h i c h , however, focuses m o r e on the A n g l o p h o n e idealists, R o y c e and Bradley; on B r u n s c h v i c g in particular, see the " I n t r o d u c t i o n " to M a r c e l ' s De refus à l'invocation. Merleau-Ponty, " T h e Philosophy of E x i s t e n c e " , in Texts and Dialogues, 130.

Between the wars implausible

impoverishment

of

our

Brunschvicg

has n o t h i n g to

offer

the

lived

consciousness.

existential

So

philosopher

in

either direction: he c o n c e d e s the w o r l d o f objects to science, a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection on the m i n d reveals n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n an intellectual e n g i n e for constituting scientihc objects. M o r e o v e r , b o t h lacks derive f r o m B r u n s c h v i c g ' s failure to r e c o g n i z e that his m i n d a n d its objects are a b s t r a c t i o n s f r o m the c o n c r e t e reality o f m a n - i n the-world. T h e positive c o u n t e r p a r t o f the y o u n g T u r k s ' critique w a s a drive vers le concret ( " t o w a r d the c o n c r e t e " ) , as the title o f a 1932 b o o k b y Jean Wahl put i t .

3 0

In contrast to w h a t t h e y saw as the

sterile

abstractions o f rationalist i d e a l i s m a n d spiritualism, y o u n g p h i l o s o phers

such

as W a h l ,

Marcel,

and,

later,

Sartre, Beauvoir,

and

M e r l e a u - P o n t y s o u g h t an a p p r o a c h to p h i l o s o p h y g r o u n d e d in faceto-face e n c o u n t e r s w i t h the fullness o f reality. R e l i g i o u s thinkers, so different in m o s t o t h e r w a y s , often s h a r e d this o r i e n t a t i o n o f the y o u n g secular p h i l o s o p h e r s . For e x a m p l e , the R u s s i a n é m i g r é s L e v S h e s t o v a n d N i c o l a s B e r d y a e v insisted o n c o n c r e t e n e s s a n d develo p e d existential a p p r o a c h e s to religious e x p e r i e n c e . drive for c o n c r e t e n e s s thinkers

to

the

that a t t r a c t e d

phenomenological

31

b o t h religious

philosophies

It w a s and

the

secular

of Husserl

and

Heidegger. T h u s , Jean Hering, a Protestant theologian from Alsace seeking an e x p e r i e n t i a l a p p r o a c h to religion that did n o t fall into w h a t he saw as the p s y c h o l o g i s t i c subjectivism o f r e c e n t

German

t h e o l o g i a n s , t h o u g h t that Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y m i g h t b e j u s t w h a t he n e e d e d . H e studied extensively w i t h H u s s e r l at G ô t t i n g e n a n d in 1925 p u b l i s h e d Phénoménologie et philosophie religieuse, the

first

b o o k in F r e n c h o n Husserl. I n d e e d , m u c h o f the earliest F r e n c h interest in p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s f r o m religiously i n c l i n e d p h i l o s o phers and from t h e o l o g i a n s .

3 2

T h e a t t r a c t i o n to p h e n o m e n o l o g y h a d little to do w i t h Husserl's ambitions 3 0

3 1

3 2

for

foundational

certainties

and

scientihc

rigor.

This

J e a n W a h l , Vers le concret. H e r e w e should m e n t i o n also S i m o n e Weil (1909-43), an agrégée in philosophy (and one of the first w o m e n to attend the Ecole N o r m a l e ) , w h o c o m b i n e d strongly c o m m i t t e d leftist social theorizing with intense C a t h o l i c theological reflection. See in particular her L'enracinement. For a very helpful, detailed discussion o f this religious interest, see Christian D u p o n t . Receptions of Phenomenology in French Philosophy and Religious Thought, 1889—1939. A n o t h e r early channel for p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l thought was A r o n G u r w i t s c h , a L i t h u a n i a n J e w w h o h a d studied with Husserl and lectured at the S o r b o n n e d u r i n g the 1930s on Gestalt psychology and on p h e n o m e n o l o g y . M e r l e a u - P o n t y attended his lectures in 1937.

io6

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

p e r h a p s e x p l a i n s the tepid r e a c t i o n o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s to his lecture at the S o r b o n n e in 1929, w h i c h p r e s e n t e d the m a t e r i a l later p u b l i s h e d as the Méditations cartésiennes.

33

French

interest

in

phenomenology

In fact, m u c h o f the initial

was

directed

more

toward

H e i d e g g e r t h a n H u s s e r l , a n d the v i e w s o f H u s s e r l w e r e s o m e t i m e s assimilated to those o f H e i d e g g e r .

3 4

T h i s t e n d e n c y is a p p a r e n t in

L e v i n a s ' s i m p o r t a n t early study, Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (1930), w h i c h explicitly m o v e s a w a y f r o m Husserl's e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s a n d t o w a r d a H e i d e g g e r i a n e m p h a s i s on ontology. T h e r e w a s also serious early interest in M a x

Scheler's

p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the e m o t i o n s . S c h e l e r w a s the first p h e n o m e n o l o gist invited to visit F r a n c e (in 1924 a n d a g a i n in 1926), w h e r e he seems to h a v e m a d e a m u c h b e t t e r i m p r e s s i o n t h a n H u s s e r l did a few y e a r s later. In 1928, S c h e l e r ' s

Wesen und Formen der Sympathie

(1923) b e c a m e the first p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b o o k p u b l i s h e d in F r e n c h translation. T h e initial p u b l i c a t i o n in 1947 o f Husserl's

Sorbonne

lectures w a s in F r e n c h (translated b y L e v i n a s a n d G a b r i e l l e Pfeiffer), the G e r m a n

original a p p e a r i n g o n l y p o s t h u m o u s l y , in 1950. B u t

a p a r t f r o m this special case, there w a s n o F r e n c h v e r s i o n o f a m a j o r w o r k b y H u s s e r l until P a u l R i c o e u r ' s translation o f Idem / in 1950. A n d G e o r g e s G u r v i t c h ' s influential b o o k o n c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n philosophy, p u b l i s h e d in 1930, puts m o r e e m p h a s i s o n S c h e l e r t h a n on a n y o n e e l s e .

3 5

B u t it w a s H e i d e g g e r w h o h a d the strongest a n d

deepest effect, especially after 1931, w h e n a translation o f his Was ist Metaphysik? a p p e a r e d in the a v a n t - g a r d e literary m a g a z i n e Bifur, in an issue edited b y P a u l N i z a n that also c o n t a i n e d Sartre's early essay, " L é g e n d e de la v é r i t é " . T h e s a m e year, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l j o u r n a l Recherches philosophiques p u b l i s h e d a translation o f H e i d e g g e r ' s " V o m W e s e n des G r u n d e s " .

3 6

T h e early a p p e a r a n c e o f H e i d e g g e r in a literary f o r u m w a s n o

3 3

3 4

3 5

3 6

T h e r e m a y also have b e e n a certain a m o u n t of Parisian snobbery, since Husserl c a m e across as an unexciting provincial a c a d e m i c (Herbert Spiegelberg, 77K Phenomenological Movement, 403—4). T h i s p e r h a p s explains the odd story that " w h e n asked soon after the W a r a b o u t his early a c q u a i n t a n c e with Sartre, H e i d e g g e r did n o t first r e m e m b e r h i m by n a m e ; then he identified h i m as 'the F r e n c h m a n w h o h a d always confused h i m with H u s s e r l " ' (Spiegelberg, 77K Phenomenological Movement, 463, fn. 2). G e o r g e s G u r v i t c h , Les tendances actuelles de la philosophie allemande. O n Scheler's reception in France, see Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 4 0 2 - 3 . H o w e v e r , there w e r e no full French translations of Being and Time published until M a r t i n e a u ' s version, privately printed in 1985, a n d Vezin's version, published by G a l l i m a r d in 1986.

Between the wars

107

accident. Heideggerian themes of anguish and nothingness

were

i m p o r t a n t i n the w o r k o f s o m e o f the y o u n g e r F r e n c h a v a n t - g a r d e writers, w h i c h is w h e r e y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e likely to h a v e hrst e n c o u n t e r e d t h e m . For e x a m p l e , in R a y m o n d Q u e n e a u ' s jours

(1936), the

hero, who

has c o m e

from

Le

Havre

Derniers to

study

p h i l o s o p h y at the S o r b o n n e , is, like R o q u e n t i n in La nausee (published t w o years later), o v e r w h e l m e d in a g a r d e n b y the n o t h i n g n e s s o f things. T h e t h e m e s o f n o t h i n g n e s s a n d c o n t i n g e n c y are also c e n t r a l in P a u l N i z a n ' s hrst n o v e l , Antoine Bloye (1933), w h i c h , for e x a m p l e , has

a

phenomenological

description

of

anxiety

expressed

in

H e i d e g g e r i a n t e r m i n o l o g y . Sartre's La nausee fits in n a t u r a l l y w i t h this literary c u r r e n t , quite a p a r t f r o m its origins in philosophical reflection.

distinctively

37

T h e r e w a s , t h e n , a p e r v a s i v e desire a m o n g F r e n c h intellectuals after the w a r for m o d e s o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h o u g h t , a n d e x p r e s s i o n that would

put

them

into

direct

contact with

concrete

reality;

and

G e r m a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s e x c i t i n g b e c a u s e it p r o m i s e d to fulfill this

desire.

The

point

is

particularly

clear

in

Sartre's

initial

e n t h u s i a s m for H u s s e r l , p o r t r a y e d in S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r ' s f a m o u s a n e c d o t e . It w a s 1932, a n d R a y m o n d A r o n , w h o h a d j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m B e r l i n , w h e r e he h a d b e e n s t u d y i n g H u s s e r l , w a s t a l k i n g to Sartre a n d B e a u v o i r in a Parisian cafe, the B e e de G a z on R u e Montparnasse: We ordered the speciality of the house, apricot cocktails. Aron said, pointing to his glass: "You see my dear fellow, if you are a phenomenologist. you can talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it!" Sartre turned pale with emotion at this. Here was just the thing he had been longing to achieve for years - to describe objects just as he saw and touched them, and extract philosophy from the process. 38

B e a u v o i r g o e s o n to tell h o w S a r t r e t h e n b o u g h t L e v i n a s ' s

book

a b o u t H u s s e r l o n the B o u l e v a r d S a i n t - M i c h e l " a n d w a s so e a g e r to i n f o r m h i m s e l f on the subject that he leafed t h r o u g h the v o l u m e as he w a l k e d

along, without

e v e n h a v i n g cut the p a g e s " .

3 9

Sartre

h i m s e l f recalls this i n c i d e n t in a later i n t e r v i e w (but his m e m o r y is that A r o n p o i n t e d to a glass o f beer) a n d e x p l a i n s his e n t h u s i a s m b y n o t i n g that Husserl's m e t h o d p r o m i s e d a w a y o f t a l k i n g p h i l o s o p h i 3 7

3 8

3 9

O n these e x a m p l e s o f early literary existentialism, see D e n i s Hollier, " P l e n t y o f N o t h i n g " , in D e n i s Hollier (ed.), A New History of French Literature, 896, Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, 1 1 2 . Ibid.

io8

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

(1890-1940)

cally a b o u t c o n c r e t e objects a n d that " w e t h o u g h t a g r e a t deal a b o u t one thing: the c o n c r e t e " .

4 0

S a r t r e , w i t h A r o n ' s h e l p , a r r a n g e d to

s u c c e e d h i m as a fellow at the F r e n c h Institute in B e r l i n . Sartre's strong r e s p o n s e to H u s s e r l is e v i d e n t i n the startling p i e c e he w r o t e in 1939, " U n e idée f o n d a m e n t a l e de la p h é n o m é n o l o g i e de Husserl: l ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t é " . Sartre contrasts Husserl's v i e w w i t h w h a t he calls the " d i g e s t i v e p h i l o s o p h y " o f the F r e n c h idealists a n d n e o K a n t i a n s (he m e n t i o n s B r u n s c h v i c g a n d M e y e r son), w h o assimilate objects to " t h e spidery m i n d ,

[which] t r a p p e d things in its w e b ,

c o v e r e d t h e m w i t h a w h i t e spit a n d slowly s w a l l o w e d t h e m , r e d u c i n g t h e m to its o w n s u b s t a n c e " . H u s s e r l , h o w e v e r , " p e r s i s t e n t l y affirmed that one c a n n o t dissolve things in c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . For h i m , " t o k n o w is to 'burst t o w a r d ' , to tear o n e s e l f out o f the moist gastric intimacy, v e e r i n g out there b e y o n d o n e s e l f " . S a r t r e asks us to " i m a g i n e for a m o m e n t a c o n n e c t e d series o f bursts w h i c h tear us out o f ourselves . . . into the d r y dust o f the w o r l d , o n to the p l a i n e a r t h amidst things. I m a g i n e us thus r e j e c t e d a n d a b a n d o n e d b y o u r o w n n a t u r e in an indifferent, hostile, a n d restive w o r l d - y o u will t h e n g r a s p the p r o f o u n d m e a n i n g o f the d i s c o v e r y w h i c h H u s s e r l expresses in his f a m o u s p h r a s e , A l l consciousness is consciousness o f s o m e t h i n g ' . " Sartre further

notes that n o t o n l y k n o w l e d g e

b u t also

allegedly

" s u b j e c t i v e " r e a c t i o n s ( " h a t r e d , l o v e , fear, s y m p a t h y " ) are intentional. R a t h e r t h a n " f l o a t i n g in the m a l o d o r o u s b r i n e o f the m i n d . . . t h e y are m e r e l y w a y s o f d i s c o v e r i n g the w o r l d . It is things w h i c h a b r u p t l y u n v e i l t h e m s e l v e s to us as hateful, s y m p a t h e t i c , h o r r i b l e , l o v a b l e . " A c c o r d i n g l y , " H u s s e r l has r e s t o r e d to things their h o r r o r a n d their c h a r m . H e has restored to us the w o r l d o f artists a n d p r o p h e t s : frightening, hostile, d a n g e r o u s , w i t h its h a v e n s o f m e r c y a n d l o v e . " F o l l o w i n g the H u s s e r l i a n d o c t r i n e o f intentionality,

"we

are d e l i v e r e d f r o m P r o u s t " a n d the obsession w i t h " i n t e r n a l l i f e " . " I t is n o t in s o m e h i d i n g - p l a c e that w e will discover ourselves; it is o n the r o a d , in the t o w n , in the m i d s t o f a c r o w d , a t h i n g a m o n g things, a man among m e n . "

4 1

A n y o n e w h o reacts to Husserl's sober d e l i b e r a t i o n s w i t h

such

passion is b r i n g i n g a substantial a g e n d a to the text. Sartre a n d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s w e r e l o o k i n g for s o m e t h i n g quite specific in the w o r k s o f H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r . It w a s n o t a q u e s t i o n o f their 4 0

4 1

Sartre by Himself, 26—7. Sartre also mentions the i m p o r t a n c e for him a n d his friends o f J e a n Wahl's Vers le concret. "Intentionality: A F u n d a m e n t a l Idea o f Husserl's P h e n o m e n o l o g y " , 4, 5.

Between the wars passively u n d e r g o i n g " i n f l u e n c e s " f r o m across the R h i n e b u t o f their actively a p p r o p r i a t i n g carefully c h o s e n aspects o f G e r m a n t h o u g h t for their o w n p u r p o s e s . A s M e r l e a u - P o n t y later said, w h e n he a n d his friends r e a d p h e n o m e n o l o g y it w a s n o t so m u c h a m a t t e r

"of

e n c o u n t e r i n g a n e w p h i l o s o p h y as o f r e c o g n i z i n g w h a t t h e y

had

been waiting f o r " .

4 2

W h a t t h e y w e r e w a i t i n g for w a s n o t a m o r e

r i g o r o u s f o u n d a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e or a r e t u r n to the q u e s t i o n o f B e i n g b u t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l access to the c o n c r e t e w o r l d . T h e s a m e p o i n t applies to the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f H e g e l into F r a n c e b e t w e e n the w a r s . H e g e l i a n t h o u g h t h a d n e v e r t a k e n h r m root in F r a n c e b e f o r e the 1920s, for a c o m b i n a t i o n o f socio-political causes (dislike for a thinker p e r c e i v e d as a n apologist for the G e r m a n state) a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l reasons (opposition to absolute i d e a l i s m a n d n e o K a n t i a n distrust o f the obscurities o f dialectical thinking). T h e r e w a s occasional

interest,

but

Hegel's

writings

were

not

part

of

the

s t a n d a r d university p h i l o s o p h i c a l syllabus. (Sartre recalls L a c h e l i e r saying, " T h e r e w o n ' t b e a n y H e g e l as l o n g as I ' m a r o u n d . " ) 4 3

O n e o f the hrst signs o f serious F r e n c h interest in H e g e l w a s J e a n W a h l ' s 1929 b o o k , Le malheur de la conscience de Hegel. W a h l ' s p r e f a c e sets the t o n e for the F r e n c h a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H e g e l . " T h e d i a l e c t i c " , he says, " b e f o r e b e i n g a m e t h o d is an e x p e r i e n c e b y w h i c h H e g e l m o v e s f r o m o n e i d e a to a n o t h e r " . M o r e generally, " a t the origin of this d o c t r i n e , w h i c h is p u t f o r w a r d as an i n t e r c o n n e c t e d series o f c o n c e p t s , there is a k i n d o f m y s t i c a l intuition a n d affective w a r m t h " . In s u m , " b e h i n d the rationalist, w e h n d the r o m a n t i c " ; " t h i s system, in w h i c h the c o n c e p t s s e e m at hrst so m a r v e l o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d a n d a r r a n g e d , is in fact the e x p r e s s i o n o f a living e x p e r i e n c e " . acknowledges formulations

that his v i e w o f the y o u n g

of Hegel Hegel

corresponds

than

to those

Wahl

better to o f the

the

mature

systematist. B u t he is n o t a s h a m e d to prefer y o u t h , m a i n t a i n i n g that the strongest o b j e c t i o n to " t h e H e g e l i a n system in its

dehnitive

f o r m " is that " r i c h as it m i g h t b e , it is n o t rich e n o u g h to c o n t a i n the m u l t i t u d e o f t h o u g h t s , i m a g i n i n g s , h o p e s , a n d despairs o f the y o u n g H e g e l " . A n d , he a d d s , a g o o d m a n y criticisms o f H e g e l tell against his later systematic d o c t r i n e s b u t n o t against " t h e H e g e l i a n 'vision' itself in its original c h a r a c t e r o f c o n c r e t e p l e n i t u d e " . 4 2

4 3

4 4

4 4

G i v e n this

Phenomenology of Perception, vii. Sartre by Himself 25. Le malheur de la conscience de Hegel, v, vii. W a h l h a d earlier discussed K i e r k e g a a r d ' s critique of H e g e l in his Etudes kierkegaardiennes.

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

110

(1890-1940)

attitude, it is h a r d l y surprising that W a h l ' s b o o k focuses o n o n e o f H e g e l ' s m o s t v i v i d a n d specific descriptions, that o f the " u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s " in The Phenomenology of Spirit, ( A n d it is H e g e l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f u n h a p p y consciousness as d u e to the impossibility o f a being-for-itself that is also a being-in-itself that n o d o u b t inspired Sartre's identical description o f the h u m a n condition.) E v e n b e f o r e the a p p e a r a n c e o f W a h l ' s b o o k , A l e x a n d r e K o y r e h a d b e e n offering a s e m i n a r o n H e g e l at the E c o l e P r a t i q u e s des H a u t e s E t u d e s . K o y r e ' s a p p r o a c h w a s less " e x i s t e n t i a l " t h a n W a h l ' s b u t still emphasized

the historical

and anthropological

rather

t h a n the

o n t o l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n s o f his t h o u g h t . ( K o y r e w a s also familiar w i t h H e i d e g g e r , a n d m a d e use o f his discussion o f H e g e l a n d t e m p o r a l i t y in Being and Time.)

45

I n 1933, K o y r e left to t e a c h in C a i r o , a n d the

s e m i n a r w a s t a k e n over b y A l e x a n d r e K o j e v e (1902—68). K o j e v e ' s seminar, c e n t e r e d

o n H e g e l ' s Phenomenology, c o n t i n u e d

until w a r

b r o k e o u t in 1939, a n d b e c a m e o n e o f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t stimuli for F r e n c h interest in H e g e l . R a y m o n d Q u e n e a u , G e o r g e s Bataille, a n d Jacques L a c a n were regular participants; Merleau-Ponty attended d u r i n g the a c a d e m i c y e a r 1 9 3 7 — 8 .

46

L i k e W a h l a n d K o y r e , K o j e v e h a d n o interest in the H e g e l i a n absolute.

47

M o r e o v e r , h e w a s m o r e interested in u s i n g H e g e l as a

starting-point for his o w n p h i l o s o p h i c a l thinking, strongly i n f l u e n c e d by M a r x (and H e i d e g g e r ) , t h a n in p r o v i d i n g a t e x t u a l l y a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t o f H e g e l ' s t h o u g h t . R e s p o n d i n g to criticism in Les temps modernes f r o m the V i e t n a m e s e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t , T r a n D u e T h a o , h e said his r e a d i n g o f H e g e l w a s a " w o r k o f p r o p a g a n d a , d e s i g n e d to shake u p p e o p l e ' s m i n d s [frapper les esprits)".

48

W h e r e a s W a h l ' s exist-

ential i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H e g e l focused o n the c h a p t e r o n u n h a p p y consciousness, K o j e v e ' s M a r x i s t take g a v e p r i d e o f p l a c e to H e g e l ' s

O n K o y r é a n d H e g e l , see M i c h a e l R o t h , Knowing and History, 5 - 1 0 a n d 9 6 - 7 . T h i s list is based on the official record o f those registered for the course, as reprinted in Roth's Knowing and History, 2 2 5 - 7 . R o t h notes that there w e r e also participants - e.g., A n d r é B r e t o n — w h o h a d not registered. J e a n Hyppolite reports that R a y m o n d A r o n (and possibly J e a n - P a u l Sartre) also attended (see " L a ' P h é n o m é n o l o g i e ' de H e g e l et la pensée française c o n t e m p o r a i n e " , in his Figures de la pensée philosophique, 2 3 1 - 4 ) . T h e views discussed in the following p a r a g r a p h are those developed in K o j e v e ' s seminar, as presented in Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. T h i s is a v o l u m e of transcripts a n d notes from Kojeve's seminar assembled b y Q u e n e a u . S e c also Roth's excellent analysis in Knowing and History, part 2. For Kojeve's later revisions o f his views, see Knowing and History, 134—46. Letter to Les temps modernes, O c t o b e r 7, 1948. For a b a l a n c e d appreciation a n d criticism of Kojeve's interpretation of H e g e l , see J e a n H y p p o l i t e , " L a ' P h é n o m é n o l o g i e ' de H e g e l et la pensée française c o n t e m p o r a i n e " , 235—41.

Between the wars

III

description o f the master—slave relation. H e

t o o k the desire

for

r e c o g n i t i o n b y a n o t h e r consciousness as definitive o f the distinctively h u m a n c o n d i t i o n a n d r e a d the e n s u i n g " b a t t l e to d e a t h o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s e s " in t e r m s o f M a r x i s t class struggle. A s K o j e v e sees it, h u m a n history b e g i n s w i t h the c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f t w o consciousnesses, e a c h desiring a b o v e all the other's r e c o g n i t i o n o f its d o m i n a n c e .

The

e n s u i n g struggle (the " b l o o d y b a t t l e " ) is v i o l e n t p r e c i s e l y to the e x t e n t that the c o m b a t a n t s are w i l l i n g to die in seeking victory. A n d it is this v i o l e n c e that m a k e s the struggle a n d its p a r t i c i p a n t s h u m a n : " t h e b e i n g that c a n n o t risk its life in a struggle for Recognition, in a fight for p u r e prestige . . . is n o t a truly human b e i n g " .

4 9

W i t h o u t this

risk, w e r e m a i n at the l e v e l o f a n i m a l s , d o m i n a t e d b y the instinct for self-preservation. T h e v i o l e n t struggle ends w h e n one p a r t y surrenders, the fear o f d e a t h o u t w e i g h i n g the desire for r e c o g n i t i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n . T h u s w e arrive at the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f slave to master. It m i g h t s e e m that the slave has m e r e l y r e v e r t e d to the a n i m a l level o f self-preservation. B u t K o j e v e m a i n t a i n s that s o m e t h i n g m u c h m o r e significant

has

h a p p e n e d . T h e slave's s u r r e n d e r does n o t r e p r e s e n t a r e v e r s i o n to b i o l o g i c a l instinct b u t a self-conscious a w a r e n e s s o f h u m a n

finitude

in the f a c e o f d e a t h . A t least in this H e i d e g g e r i a n way, the slave's s u r r e n d e r involves a decisive a d v a n c e in consciousness — a n d one in w h i c h the n e w m a s t e r d o e s n o t share. B u t there are still o t h e r w a y s in w h i c h the slave's p o s i t i o n is superior. T h e slave is c o n d e m n e d to w o r k for the master, b u t this v e r y w o r k involves creative i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h a n d m a s t e r y o v e r the w o r l d . A l s o , the fact that the slave w o r k s to satisfy the master's desires r e q u i r e s an " a b s t r a c t " g r a s p o f a desire one d o e s n o t o n e s e l f feel as well as a p o s t p o n e m e n t or s u b l i m a t i o n of one's o w n desires. T h e slave, t h e r e f o r e , b e c o m e s the source o f the t e c h n o l o g i c a l p o w e r , c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d reflective selfm a s t e r y that are the m a r k s o f p r o g r e s s in h u m a n history. B y contrast, the master, w h o s e desires are fulfilled b y the slave's w o r k , r e m a i n s at the a n i m a l level o f m e r e satisfaction. T h e master's sole distinctively h u m a n characteristic is the willingness to risk d e a t h for the sake o f d o m i n a t i o n . B u t , as K o j e v e puts it, this m e a n s that the m a s t e r " c a n die as m a n , b u t . . . c a n live o n l y as a n i m a l " . A p p l y i n g the

categories

of master and

5 0

slave to the

4 9

Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 141.

5 0

Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 55.

historical

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

112

realities

o f successive

struggles

between

(1890-1940)

socio-economic

classes,

K o j e v e offers a M a r x i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the entire s w e e p o f H e g e l ' s dialectical history. this history

as

He

ignores Hegel's

a series

of moments

speculative in

absolute

conception thought's

of

self-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sees e a c h n e w l e v e l o f synthesis as a h i g h e r level o f h u m a n consciousness a n d a c h i e v e m e n t p r o d u c e d b y the striving o f o p p r e s s e d classes. A s history progresses in M a r x i s t f a s h i o n , a previously

"slave"

class successfully

rebels

and becomes

master.

T h i s , o f c o u r s e , d o e s n o t c h a n g e the essential structure o f o p p r e s s i o n . B u t f r o m the c r e a t i v e t h o u g h t o f the slaves there e m e r g e s an ideal o f e q u a l i t y a m o n g all h u m a n k i n d that is o p p o s e d to the existing ideal o f h i e r a r c h i c a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n . T h i s d e v e l o p s first in a spiritualized, t r a n s c e n d e n t f o r m w i t h C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d t h e n in a m a t e r i a l , t e m p o rally r e a l i z a b l e f o r m w i t h M a r x i s m . T h e i d e a l is a vision o f a U t o p i a in w h i c h n o one is satisfied at the e x p e n s e o f a n y o n e else a n d all equally

achieve

fellows.

But,

in

the basic h u m a n this

Utopia,

the

desire

of recognition

struggle

(more

by

their

abstractly,

the

negativity) characteristic o f m a s t e r - s l a v e relations also d i s a p p e a r s a n d w i t h it the creative i m p e t u s that led h u m a n k i n d to h i g h e r a n d h i g h e r levels o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d a c h i e v e m e n t . T h e result w o u l d be w h a t K o j e v e called the " e n d o f h i s t o r y " - n o t a literal c e a s i n g o f h u m a n existence in time b u t an e n d to the dialectical p r o c e s s of synthesis out o f n e g a t i o n that has defined w h a t w e h a v e so far experienced

as o u r history. W i t h the e n d o f history,

humankind

ceases to b e defined b y its future, that is, it is n o l o n g e r a b e i n g that is n o t w h a t it is b u t w h a t it will b e , a n d r e a c h e s the final stability of e g a l i t a r i a n e q u i l i b r i u m . K o j e v e d o e s n o t think that w e h a v e a l r e a d y a t t a i n e d this state a n d i n d e e d

insists that the p o i n t o f

Marxist

a c t i v i s m is p r e c i s e l y to r e a c h it. B u t he b e l i e v e s that the state has been

given

an

adequate

theoretical

characterization

by

Hegel

(understood t h r o u g h M a r x ) a n d that the c o n c r e t e historical p r o c e s s l e a d i n g to it w a s initiated b y the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n a n d e x t e n d e d to the w h o l e o f E u r o p e b y N a p o l e o n ' s a r m i e s . K o j e v e c o n t r i b u t e d to a n e w interest in M a r x as m u c h as in H e g e l a n d i n f l u e n c e d literary

figures

(especially the surrealists a n d those

associated w i t h t h e m , for e x a m p l e , B r e t o n , Q u e n e a u , a n d Bataille) at least as m u c h as p h i l o s o p h e r s .

:)1

51

But although Kojeve, along with

T h e published version of K o j e v e ' s seminar did not a p p e a r until 1947. H o w e v e r , K o j e v e ' s translation with c o m m e n t a r y of Hegel's "master—slave" discussion a p p e a r e d as a j o u r n a l

Between the wars

"3

W a h l , m a d e H e g e l a figure to be r e c k o n e d w i t h in F r e n c h intellectual circles, the h i g h l y distinctive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s they g a v e h i m — a l o n g w i t h the a b s e n c e o f translations o f H e g e l ' s m a j o r w o r k s - m e a n t that there w a s n o easy access to H e g e l in a n y t h i n g like his o w n t e r m s . S u c h access b e c a m e available o n l y in the 1940s, w h e n J e a n H y p p o lite ( 1 9 0 7 - 6 8 ) p u b l i s h e d his translation o f the Phenomenology of Spirit a l o n g w i t h his d e t a i l e d , t w o - v o l u m e

commentary

on the

text.

5 2

H y p p o l i t e ' s c o m m e n t a r y on H e g e l w a s itself strongly c o l o r e d b y the M a r x i s t a n d existentialist v i e w s d o m i n a n t at the time he w r o t e it. B u t , r a t h e r t h a n r e d u c i n g H e g e l to either o f these

standpoints,

H y p p o l i t e tried to f o r m u l a t e his p o s i t i o n in w a y s that w o u l d m a k e H e g e l a s i g n i h c a n t n e w v o i c e in c o n t e m p o r a r y discussions. In this he w a s fully successful, n o t o n l y t h r o u g h his translation a n d c o m m e n tary b u t also t h r o u g h his t e a c h i n g , hrst at l e a d i n g Parisian lycées a n d , f r o m 1954, at the E c o l e N o r m a l e S u p é r i e u r e , until he r e c e i v e d a c h a i r at the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e in 1962. (His students i n c l u d e d Althusser,

Foucault,

Deleuze,

and

Derrida.)

Hyppolite

was

not

e x a g g e r a t i n g w h e n he said that, for the g e n e r a t i o n o f the 1940s a n d 1950s, " t h e r e a d i n g o f H e g e l ' s Phenomenology w a s essential, a f u n d a mental reference point". (More mundanely, readings from

Hegel

b e c a m e , for the hrst t i m e , p a r t o f the r e q u i r e d list for the p h i l o s o p h y agrégation.) In particular, H e g e l ' s t h o u g h t w a s the "site o f e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n those fraternal e n e m i e s , the existentialists a n d the M a r x ists", a c o m m o n g r o u n d w h e r e " b o t h sides adjusted their positions a n d , w i t h o u t f o r m a l l y a d m i t t i n g it, softened their r i g i d i t y " .

5 3

W e m a y w e l l w o n d e r why, if the y o u n g F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e s e e k i n g c o n c r e t e n e s s , t h e y d i d n o t t u r n to B e r g s o n r a t h e r t h a n to H e g e l , H u s s e r l , a n d H e i d e g g e r . M e r l e a u - P o n t y h i m s e l f raises this issue in s o m e reflections (in 1959) on the attitude o f h i m s e l f a n d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a r o u n d 1930: article in 1939, a n d Kojève's interpretations w e r e m u c h discussed a m o n g Parisian intellectuals. 1 2

5 3

La Phénoménologie de l'esprit, published in 1941 (the first part o f the translation a p p e a r e d in 1939); J e a n H y p p o l i t e , Genèse et structure de la P h é n o m é n o l o g i e de l'esprit de Hegel. Sartre provides a striking e x a m p l e o f Hyppolite's impact. In L'être et le néant, written from the later 30s to early 40s, the citations o f H e g e l are taken not from the originals but from a French anthology, Morceaux choisis d'Hegel, published in 1936 by H e n r i Lefebvre a n d N. G u t t e r m a n (see C h r i s t o p h e r M . Fry, Sartre and Hegel: The Variations of an Enigma in L'être et le néant). But Sartre's Cahiers pour une morale, written in 1945—7, has obviously profited from Sartre's reading o f Hyppolite's translation a n d commentary. J e a n H y p p o l i t e , " L a ' P h é n o m é n o l o g i e ' de H e g e l et la pensée française c o n t e m p o r a i n e " . 236.

n

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

4

(1890-1940)

If w e h a d b e e n c a r e f u l r e a d e r s o f B e r g s o n , a n d i f m o r e t h o u g h t h a d b e e n given

to h i m , w e w o u l d

have

been

drawn

to a m u c h

more

concrete

p h i l o s o p h y , a p h i l o s o p h y m u c h less r e f l e x i v e t h a n B r u n s c h v i c g ' s . B u t s i n c e B e r g s o n w a s h a r d l y r e a d b y m y c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , it is c e r t a i n t h a t w e h a d to wait for the philosophies o f existence in order to b e able to l e a r n m u c h of w h a t h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n a b l e t o t e a c h us. I t is q u i t e c e r t a i n - as w e r e a l i z e m o r e a n d m o r e t o d a y - t h a t B e r g s o n , h a d w e r e a d h i m carefully, w o u l d h a v e t a u g h t u s t h i n g s t h a t t e n o r fifteen y e a r s l a t e r w e b e l i e v e d t o b e discoveries m a d e b y the philosophy o f existence itself.

54

T h i s still leaves us w o n d e r i n g w h y M e r l e a u - P o n t y a n d his friends did not take B e r g s o n seriously. O n e r e a s o n m i g h t h a v e b e e n his i n c r e a s i n g affinity for C a t h o l i c i s m , w h i c h w a s clearly e m e r g i n g b y 1932 in Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. F r o m this p o i n t o f view, the entire story m i g h t b e s u m m e d u p in Sertillanges's r e m a r k that the C h u r c h w o u l d n e v e r h a v e p u t B e r g s o n ' s b o o k s o n the I n d e x in 1913 h a d it r e a l i z e d h o w his t h o u g h t w o u l d l o o k b y 1 9 3 4 .

5 5

B u t this e x p l a n a t i o n is u n p e r s u a s i v e for the v e r y case o f M e r l e a u Ponty, w h o b e g a n commitment.

his p h i l o s o p h i c a l

Further, c o u n t e r

life w i t h

a strong

to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s

Catholic

generalization

a b o u t his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s ' l a c k o f interest in B e r g s o n , S a r t r e says that h e h i m s e l f b e c a m e a p h i l o s o p h e r precisely b e c a u s e o f B e r g s o n . Previously

interested

in literature

b u t n o t philosophy,

he was

assigned B e r g s o n ' s Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience in his classe de philosophie a n d " w a s b o w l e d over b y it. I said to myself, ' W h y p h i l o s o p h y ' s absolutely terrific, y o u c a n l e a r n the truth t h r o u g h i t ' . " Sartre g o e s o n to e m p h a s i z e the g r o u n d s o f the b o o k ' s attraction: "It's a b o o k w i t h c o n c r e t e t e n d e n c i e s , despite a p p e a r a n c e s , in that it tries to describe c o n c r e t e l y w h a t g o e s o n in the c o n s c i o u s m i n d . A n d I think it w a s that, in fact, w h i c h o r i e n t e d m e t o w a r d the n o t i o n o f the c o n s c i o u s m i n d that I still h o l d t o d a y . "

5 6

B u t if B e r g s o n ' s p h i l o s o p h y p r o v i d e d the c o n c r e t e n e s s S a r t r e a n d his friends l o n g e d for, it still failed in a n o t h e r k e y way. It w a s , as J e a n H y p p o l i t e h a s n o t e d , a p h i l o s o p h y o f a " f i n a l s e r e n i t y " , a serenity " T h e Philosophy o f E x i s t e n c e " , in Texts and Dialogues, 132. In another essay, also written in 1959 (and explicitly in celebration of Bergson's centennial), M e r l e a u - P o n t y distinguishes b e t w e e n an original " a u d a c i o u s " Bergsonism that created a genuinely n e w a n d exciting philosophical vision a n d a "retrospective or e x t e r n a l " Bergsonism that "loses its b i t e " because its "insights are identified with the v a g u e cause of spiritualism or some other entity". It w a s , he says, this latter Bergsonism that his generation e n c o u n t e r e d ("Bergson in the M a k i n g " , in Signs, 182). M e r l e a u - P o n t y cites this remark in " B e r g s o n in the M a k i n g " , in Signs, 183. Sartre by Himself, 27.

Between the wars arising f r o m a n overall v i e w that gives h u m a n reality a h o m e in the natural scheme o f t h i n g s .

5 7

For B e r g s o n , after all, e v e n before his

b o o k o n r e l i g i o n , o u r lives are intelligible as p r o d u c t s o f the élan vital that w e e n c o u n t e r in o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the d u r a t i o n that constitutes the u n i v e r s e . A n y a l i e n a t i o n or i n a u t h e n t i c i t y that w e m i g h t h n d in the w o r l d o f objectifying science is o v e r c o m e in the c o n c r e t e n e s s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l intuition, w h i c h reveals the unity a n d directedness o f the w o r l d a n d p l a c e s h u m a n b e i n g s c o m f o r t a b l y in it. A l l o f this is entirely o p p o s e d to the y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s ' d e h n i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f a f r e e d o m that m u s t create its o w n m e a n i n g s in a n intrinsically a b s u r d w o r l d . For these p h i l o s o p h e r s , the c o n c r e t e truth w a s n o t serenity b u t a n g u i s h [angoisse). W h a t B e r g s o n l a c k e d , t h e r e f o r e , w a s a sense o f the tragic n a t u r e o f h u m a n existence. H i s p h i l o s o p h y o f life w a s a way

of transcending

o u r existence

as i n d i v i d u a l s ,

of giving

it

m e a n i n g t h r o u g h its relation to the g r a n d s c h e m e o f the c o s m o s . T h e f o u n d i n g insight o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f existence w a s , o n the contrary, that the w o r l d p r o v i d e s o u r lives w i t h n o t r a n s c e n d e n t m e a n i n g . (Even C h r i s t i a n s like M a r c e l h e l d that w e c o u l d

reach

t r a n s c e n d e n c e o n l y b y faith in s o m e t h i n g s u p e r n a t u r a l , n o t t h r o u g h an a p p r o p r i a t e relation to n a t u r e . )

5 8

T h e insistence o n the tragic

n a t u r e o f h u m a n existence also e x p l a i n s the e n t h u s i a s m o f the y o u n g French philosophers appropriation

they

for H e i d e g g e r , made

as well

o f Husserl's

as the i d i o s y n c r a t i c

phenomenology

a n d the

distinctive slant o f their interest in H e g e l . D e s p i t e their g e n e r a l l a c k o f e n t h u s i a s m for B e r g s o n , Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y d o often e n o u g h take a c c o u n t o f his v i e w s . B u t by this time t h e y are a l r e a d y w e l l a l o n g the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r o a d a n d h n d B e r g s o n quite d e h c i e n t . S a r t r e , for e x a m p l e , criticizes B e r g s o n for failing to p r o v i d e " a positive d e s c r i p t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y that constitutes [ t h o u g h t ] " .

5 9

M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s critique o f B e r g s o n is a p a r t i c u l a r l y g o o d e x a m p l e 5 7

5 8

5 9

J e a n H y p p o l i t e , " D u Bergsonisme à l'existentialisme", in his Figures de la pensée philosophique, 453. T h i s p a r a g r a p h is based o n this very perceptive article. B e r g s o n w a s , nonetheless, an important thinker for M a r c e l , w h o dedicated his Journal métaphysique to h i m (and also to W. E. H o c k i n g , the A m e r i c a n idealist). B u t Bergson's philosophy served M a r c e l m o r e as a general inspiration than as a specific guide. T h i s w a s so not only b e c a u s e o f the naturalism o f Bergson's w o r k prior to Deux sources but also because M a r c e l h a d little s y m p a t h y for Bergson's impersonal c o s m o l o g y of the élan vital a n d because he was uneasy with Bergson's a p p e a l to intuition, a n unease reflected in his o w n p a r a d o x i c a l references to " b l i n d e d intuition". J e a n - P a u l Sartre, L'imaginaire, 85. Sartre is also critical, in L'être et le néant, o f Bergson's views on temporality a n d the self.

116

o f the

The Philosophers of the Third Republic philosophical

tensions

between

the

(1890-1940) Bergsonian

and

the

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l standpoints. H i s d o u b t s are d i r e c t e d t o w a r d B e r g sonian intuition a n d c a n b e cast in the f o r m o f a d i l e m m a . O n the o n e h a n d , B e r g s o n ' s intuition m a y b e t a k e n as p r e t e n d i n g to " t h e absolute observer's v i e w p o i n t "

that w o u l d

"transcend

the w o r l d " .

I f so,

" B e r g s o n is n o t fully a w a r e o f his o w n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d o f that simple fact that all w e live is l i v e d against the b a c k g r o u n d o f the w o r l d " . If, o n the o t h e r h a n d , B e r g s o n in fact avoids this illusion of t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d " h i s p h i l o s o p h y is finally to be u n d e r s t o o d as a philosophy of i m m a n e n c e " , then " h e m a y be reproached with having d e s c r i b e d the h u m a n w o r l d o n l y in its m o s t g e n e r a l structures (e.g., d u r a t i o n , o p e n n e s s to the future); his w o r k lacks a p i c t u r e o f h u m a n history w h i c h w o u l d give a c o n t e n t to these intuitions, w h i c h p a r a doxically remain very g e n e r a l " . Moreover,

in

developing

6 0

this

second

horn

of

his

dilemma,

M e r l e a u - P o n t y objects n o t m e r e l y to the g e n e r a l i t y o f B e r g s o n ' s a c c o u n t b u t to its rejection o f certain essential structures o f lived e x p e r i e n c e . B e r g s o n rightly rejects the scientific v i e w o f reality as a m e r e " m u l t i p l i c i t y o f things e x t e r n a l l y j u x t a p o s e d " . B u t his alternative to this v i e w is a " m u l t i p l i c i t y o f fusion a n d i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n " . Specihcaliy,

Bergson's

duration

s w a l l o w s objects, a l o n g w i t h

the

space a n d time in w h i c h they exist, into an a m o r p h o u s unity: " H e p r o c e e d s b y w a y o f dilution, s p e a k i n g o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a l i q u i d in w h i c h instants a n d positions d i s s o l v e . " B e r g s o n ' s mistake is to " s e e k a solution in a m b i g u i t y " .

6 1

M e r l e a u - P o n t y m a i n t a i n s that " s p a c e ,

m o t i o n a n d time c a n n o t b e e l u c i d a t e d b y d i s c o v e r i n g an ' i n n e r ' l a y e r o f e x p e r i e n c e in w h i c h their multiplicity is e r a s e d a n d really a b o l i s h e d " . T h e p r o b l e m w i t h B e r g s o n ' s intuition is that it p u r p o r t s to b e a p r i m o r d i a l e x p e r i e n c e , p r i o r to a n y division b e t w e e n subject a n d object. E v o k i n g K a n t , M e r l e a u - P o n t y a r g u e s that " e x t e r n a l e x p e r i e n c e is essential to i n t e r n a l e x p e r i e n c e " , that there is an implicit s e p a r a t i o n o f subject a n d object, o f consciousness a n d w o r l d , in e v e n our most immediate experience. M e r l e a u - P o n t y m a k e s the s a m e p o i n t in t e r m s o f the

central

B e r g s o n i a n n o t i o n o f time. A s B e r g s o n describes it, d u r a t i o n is a c o n c r e t e unity in w h i c h w h a t the intellect distinguishes as past, present, a n d future are all dissolved. C o n s c i o u s n e s s , as B e r g s o n ' s bo " T h e M e t a p h y s i c a l in M a n " , in Sense and,Non-Sense, 97 n.15. O n the other h a n d , Merleau-Ponty, as w e shall see, gives ambiguity a central role in his p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f perception. s l

Between the wars

117

f a m o u s m e t a p h o r has it, is a s n o w b a l l rolling d o w n a hill, g a t h e r i n g the w h o l e o f t i m e into a h o m o g e n e o u s unity. T h e r e is, a c c o r d i n g to h i m , a p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t i n u i t y w h e r e b y " t h e p a s t still b e l o n g s to the p r e s e n t a n d the p r e s e n t a l r e a d y to the p a s t " . B u t t h e n , M e r l e a u P o n t y a r g u e s , " t h e r e is n o l o n g e r a n y past or p r e s e n t " . " I f c o n s c i o u s ness s n o w b a l l s u p o n itself, it is, like the s n o w b a l l a n d e v e r y t h i n g else, wholly

in the p r e s e n t "

a n d the

structures o f t e m p o r a l i t y

present, a n d future) lose all m e a n i n g .

(past,

6 2

T o s u m u p , M e r l e a u - P o n t y m a i n t a i n s that if B e r g s o n is offering a description o f our a c t u a l lived e x p e r i e n c e in the w o r l d , t h e n the description is i n a c c u r a t e

b e c a u s e it dissolves into a u n i h e d

flux

structural e l e m e n t s (past, p r e s e n t , subject, object) that n e e d to b e differentiated for o u r e x p e r i e n c e to h a v e a n y m e a n i n g at all. T h e o n l y alternative w o u l d be for B e r g s o n to m a i n t a i n that he has g o t t e n b e y o n d our l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e a n d a t t a i n e d a t r a n s c e n d e n t , absolute s t a n d p o i n t that yields m e t a p h y s i c a l truth b e y o n d w h a t is a v a i l a b l e to lived e x p e r i e n c e . Bergson, no

doubt, would respond

that it is M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's

description o f lived e x p e r i e n c e that is i n a c c u r a t e . T h e p e r c e p t i o n he takes as f u n d a m e n t a l is structured b y o u r p r a c t i c a l activity in the w o r l d a n d is, t h e r e f o r e , i n f o r m e d b y the c a t e g o r i e s a p p r o p r i a t e for a c t i o n . T h e s e c a t e g o r i e s r e p l a c e the c o n c r e t e c o n t i n u i t y o f life w i t h the m o r e p r a c t i c a l l y effective discontinuities o f spatial a n d t e m p o r a l m o m e n t s a n d s e p a r a t e l y existing b o d i e s . F r o m B e r g s o n ' s p o i n t o f view, the w o r l d M e r l e a u - P o n t y r e g a r d s as c o n c r e t e is in fact

an

a b s t r a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d b y intellectualist c a t e g o r i e s that distort the lived experience of pure duration. T h e r e is little p o i n t in s p e c u l a t i n g as to h o w M e r l e a u - P o n t y (and the o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s o f existence) m i g h t r e p l y to this response. H o w , in g e n e r a l , c a n w e resolve disputes a b o u t w h a t is " r e a l l y " g i v e n in " c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e " ?

6 3

In a n y case, the y o u n g p h i l o s o -

p h e r s o f the 1930s w o u l d h a v e f o u n d B e r g s o n ' s w o r l d o f d u r a t i o n , n o m a t t e r h o w c o n c r e t e in p r i n c i p l e , t o o far r e m o v e d f r o m

the

w o r l d o f e v e r y d a y life that f a s c i n a t e d t h e m as an o b j e c t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l description. 6 2

6 3

The Phenomenology of Perception, 276 n . i ; for Bergson's snowball i m a g e , see L'évolution créatrice, 4. I return to this question in m y conclusion.

PART

II

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-19H

CHAPTER

5

Sartre

It is difficult, w h e n o n e ' s m i n d is t r o u b l e d b y the i d e a s o f K a n t a n d the y e a r n i n g s o f B a u d e l a i r e , to w r i t e the e x q u i s i t e F r e n c h of Henri I V (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, in, 689)

O v e r a l l , J e a n - P a u l Sartre (1905—80) c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f a w r i t e r m o r e t h a n a p h i l o s o p h e r . A l m o s t as s o o n as he c o u l d r e a d , he p r o j e c t e d a c a r e e r as a m a s t e r o f F r e n c h literature, his i d e a o f w h a t this m i g h t m e a n c h a n g i n g as his taste m o v e d f r o m b o y s ' a d v e n t u r e novels to the classics. In his m i d - t e e n s , he d e c i d e d , f o l l o w i n g his e x c i t e m e n t at first r e a d i n g B e r g s o n , to study p h i l o s o p h y at the E c o l e N o r m a l e ; b u t that w a s b e c a u s e he r e g a r d e d p h i l o s o p h y as " s i m p l y a m e t h o d i c a l description o f m a n ' s i n n e r states, o f his p s y c h o l o g i c a l life, all o f w h i c h w o u l d serve as a m e t h o d a n d i n s t r u m e n t for m y literary w o r k s . . . I t h o u g h t that t a k i n g professor subjects."

the

agrégation e x a m

of philosophy 1

would

in p h i l o s o p h y

help

me

and

becoming

in t r e a t i n g m y

literary

T h e i d e a w a s that p h i l o s o p h y w o u l d p r o v i d e an intel-

lectual f o u n d a t i o n for literature. W h e n S a r t r e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t d e v e l o p e d a n d , predictably, took the d i r e c t i o n o f the n e w p h i l o s o p h y o f existence, it is h a r d l y surprising that he m a i n t a i n e d a close tie b e t w e e n literature philosophy. A s M e r l e a u - P o n t y

said in his r e v i e w

of Simone

and de

B e a u v o i r ' s first n o v e l , L'invitée: " E v e r y t h i n g c h a n g e s w h e n a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l or existential p h i l o s o p h y assigns itself the task, n o t o f e x p l a i n i n g the w o r l d or o f d i s c o v e r i n g its ' c o n d i t i o n s o f possibility', b u t r a t h e r o f f o r m u l a t i n g an e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d , a c o n t a c t w i t h the w o r l d w h i c h p r e c e d e s all t h o u g h t about the w o r l d . . . F r o m n o w o n the tasks o f literature a n d p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o l o n g e r

1

be

" I n t e r v i e w with Jean-Paul S a r t r e " , in Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, 6. 121

a

122

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

separated."

2

B u t Sartre d i d n o t g o as far as G e o r g e s Bataille, w h o ,

after r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , d e c l a r e d that, b y o p e n i n g itself " d i r e c t l y o n life, p h i l o s o p h y w a s finally r e d u c e d to l i t e r a t u r e " .

3

O n the contrary,

he insisted o n a s h a r p distinction o f the t w o , at least as f o r m s o f expression.

Literary

style

involves

"making

sentences

in

which

several m e a n i n g s co-exist a n d in w h i c h the w o r d s a r e t a k e n as allusions, as objects r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e p t s . I n philosophy, a w o r d m u s t signify a c o n c e p t a n d that o n e o n l y . " T h a t is why, Sartre insists, " I never h a d a n y stylistic a m b i t i o n for philosophy. N e v e r , never. I tried to write clearly, that's a l l . " None

o f this

means

that

4

Sartre's

literary

and

philosophical

writings f o r m t w o i n d e p e n d e n t c a t e g o r i e s . B u t it d o e s suggest that his novels a n d p l a y s r e q u i r e a distinctly c o m p l e x sort o f r e a d i n g as m o r e t h a n illustrations o r r e h n e m e n t s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l positions. I will o c c a s i o n a l l y cite Sartre's literary w o r k s to m a k e p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t s b u t will n o t overstep the limits o f m y topic a n d c o m p e t e n c e b y t r y i n g to d o t h e m j u s t i c e in their o w n t e r m s . T h e hrst p e r i o d o f Sartre's career, e n d i n g a r o u n d 1945, w i t h the v i c t o r y over the A x i s , w a s a t r i u m p h o f his y o u t h f u l a m b i t i o n for p h i l o s o p h i c a l - l i t e r a r y success. B y a g e forty, h e h a d p u b l i s h e d a m a j o r novel (La nausée), h a d t w o r e a d y to a p p e a r (L'âge de raison a n d Le sursis), a n d w a s a successful p l a y w r i g h t (with Les mouches a n d Huisclos). M o r e o v e r , quite a c c o r d i n g to p l a n , these literary p i e c e s w e r e all in s o m e sense b a s e d o n his existentialist philosophy, d e v e l o p e d in three classic m o n o g r a p h s (on the e g o , the e m o t i o n s , a n d i m a g i n ation) a n d a massive systematic treatise (L'être et le néant) that w a s from

the hrst p l a u s i b l y

philosophical books.

considered

o n e o f the c e n t u r y ' s

major

5

A f t e r the w a r , t w o n e w factors e n t e r e d Sartre's life. First, his literary success m a d e it e c o n o m i c a l l y u n n e c e s s a r y for h i m to c o n tinue his c a r e e r as a t e a c h e r o f philosophy. T r a i n e d at the E c o l e N o r m a l e , h e h a d b e e n t e a c h i n g in lycées, hrst in L e H a v r e a n d L a o n

2

:i

4

1

" M e t a p h y s i c s a n d the N o v e l " , in Sense and Nonsense, 2 7 - 8 . " L ' e x i s t e n t i a l i s m e " , in Oeuvres complètes, v o l . x i , 83. " I n t e r v i e w with Jean-Paul S a r t r e " , in Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, 1 1 . See W i l l i a m M c B r i d e ' s fascinating survey o f the book's early reviews, " S a r t r e : les premiers comptes-rendus de L'être et le néant". M c B r i d e points out that philosophers o f the stature o f G a b r i e l M a r c e l , A l p h o n s e D e Waehlens, a n d Ferdinand Alquié r e c o g n i z e d its significance. But M a r c e l , like some other C a t h o l i c critics, saw s o m e t h i n g Satanic in Sartre's work, citing the " l u c i f e r i a n " character o f "this rebellious individuality, d r u n k e n with i t s e l f " (Homo Viator.

Sartre

123

a n d t h e n , d u r i n g the w a r , in Paris. H e h a d e x p e c t e d , n o t w i t h o u t a certain d i s t a s t e , to follow the s t a n d a r d a c a d e m i c p a t h , p e r h a p s to a 6

position at the S o r b o n n e . N o w financially i n d e p e n d e n t , h e b r o k e w i t h the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s m o d e l o f the professor o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d worked

without

professional

colleagues

a n d students.

This had

e n o r m o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s for his c h o i c e o f topics a n d g e n r e s , the scope o f his a u d i e n c e , a n d his ability to speak o u t o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues. S a r t r e b e c a m e a p u b l i c intellectual in a w a y that his university predecessors could never have b e e n .

7

In a d d i t i o n , the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r p o l i t i c i z e d Sartre. Previously, he h e l d v i e w s fairly s t a n d a r d for a leftist student a n d s h a r e d N i z a n ' s h a t r e d o f the b o u r g e o i s i e , b u t w a s n o t politically active. H i s e x p e r i e n c e o f the w a r , w h i c h i n c l u d e d m o b i l i z a t i o n , a stint in G e r m a n prisoner-of-war

c a m p s , a n d life u n d e r the N a z i o c c u p a t i o n a n d

V i c h y g o v e r n m e n t , c o n v i n c e d h i m that h e h a d to take a n active p a r t in the fight against o p p r e s s i o n . D u r i n g the w a r h e p l a y e d a m o d e s t role in the intellectual resistance, o r g a n i z i n g , w i t h M e r l e a u - P o n t y , a c l a n d e s t i n e g r o u p called " S o c i a l i s m a n d L i b e r t y " . A f t e r the w a r h e t h r e w h i m s e l f into a n activist life, u s i n g his n e w j o u r n a l , Les temps modernes, as a v e h i c l e for political p o l e m i c s as w e l l as for literature a n d philosophy, a n d e v e n f o u n d i n g a short-lived political p a r t y ( T h e Revolutionary

Democratic

A s s e m b l y ) . H i s r e m a i n i n g years

were

i n c r e a s i n g l y filled w i t h s p e e c h e s , petitions, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , c o m m i s sions, a n d f o r e i g n travel, all u n d e r t a k e n w i t h a p a s s i o n a t e intensity not a l w a y s e q u a l e d b y g o o d j u d g m e n t . Sartre's n e w status a n d c o m m i t m e n t c o u l d n o t b u t h a v e a p o w e r f u l effect o n his p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d literary w o r k . T h e first result w a s a series o f articles in Les temps modernes, r e p r i n t e d in 1947 as a b o o k entitled Qu'est-ce que la littérature?. H e r e Sartre e m b r a c e d t h e enterprise o f littérature engagée ( " e n g a g e d l i t e r a t u r e " or, p e r h a p s

better,

" c o m m i t t e d w r i t i n g " ) . T h i s h e c o n t r a s t e d to the " p u r e l i t e r a t u r e " ("art for art's s a k e " ) that the e n d o f La nausée seems to e n d o r s e . Littérature engagée is w r i t i n g that, r e a l i z i n g its essential r e l a t i o n to a

6

7

S e e his c o m m e n t s in Sartre par lui-même, 34. Sartre's e x a m p l e w a s , of course, difficult to follow to the letter b u t it did e n g e n d e r a fair a p p r o x i m a t i o n in the " s u p e r - s t a r " a c a d e m i c s w h o e m e r g e d in the 1960s. T h e s e were thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, a n d D e r r i d a , w h o r e m a i n e d c o n n e c t e d to the a c a d e m y b u t attained a level of public prestige that gave t h e m a f r e e d o m a n d an audience far b e y o n d that of the ordinary professional. It should be noted that G a b r i e l M a r c e l , because of family w e a l t h , w a s in a position similar to Sartre's, a n d did, in fact, m a k e a n a m e for himself as a playwright as well as a philosopher.

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

124

p a r t i c u l a r historical situation, strives to m a k e its r e a d e r s a w a r e o f and

a c t o n the p o t e n t i a l

for h u m a n

l i b e r a t i o n implicit in that

situation. S u c h w r i t i n g is n o t , Sartre m a i n t a i n s , m e r e p r o p a g a n d a , since it s u b o r d i n a t e s itself n o t to a n y specihc i d e o l o g y b u t o n l y to the " e t e r n a l v a l u e s implicit in social a n d political d e b a t e s " .

8

Qu'est-ce que

la littérature? s h o w s the strains b o t h o f hasty, j o u r n a l i s t i c c o m p o s i t i o n a n d o f c o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s its a u t h o r d o e s n o t y e t h a v e the resources to resolve. B u t it is a n i n v i g o r a t i n g start o f Sartre's l o n g struggle to r e c o n c i l e his literary v o c a t i o n w i t h his political c o m m i t m e n t . The

n e w issue

influence

o f political

engagement

o n the n e x t p r o j e c t

also h a d a n

obvious

o n Sartre's p h i l o s o p h i c a l

agenda,

d e v e l o p i n g the existentialist ethics a n n o u n c e d at the e n d o f L'être et le néant that w o u l d c o m p l e t e that b o o k ' s o n t o l o g y o f f r e e d o m .

This

sequel w a s l o n g a w a i t e d a n d e v e n a d v e r t i s e d as f o r t h c o m i n g u n d e r the title L'homme, b u t Sartre n e v e r

made

good

o n his p r o m i s e .

D e s p i t e over 500 p a g e s o f drafts a n d notes (written b e t w e e n 1945 a n d 1947 a n d p o s t h u m o u s l y p u b l i s h e d as Cahiers pour une morale), Sartre was unable

to f o r m u l a t e

a satisfactory

existentialist

ethics. T h e

p r o b l e m w a s n o t , as m a n y critics t h o u g h t , the i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f his r a d i c a l v i e w o f h u m a n f r e e d o m w i t h a n y sense o f ethical v a l u e s . Sartre h a d suggested, at the e n d o f L'être et le néant, that this difficulty c o u l d b e a v o i d e d b y t a k i n g f r e e d o m itself as the u l t i m a t e v a l u e ; a n d S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r , in h e r Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté, h a d s k e t c h e d out h o w such a m o v e c o u l d g e n e r a t e p l a u s i b l e m o r a l n o r m s . R a t h e r , as Sartre s a w it, the p r o b l e m w a s o n e o f c o n c r e t e n e s s . Existentialism m i g h t g e n e r a t e consistent u n i v e r s a l v a l u e s , b u t w h a t c o u l d it say a b o u t h o w to b e h a v e in a specihc historical situation? I n L'existentialisme est un humanisme S a r t r e h a d said that w e m u s t a l w a y s i n v e n t o u r v a l u e s a n d that all that m a t t e r e d w a s " w h e t h e r the i n v e n t i o n is m a d e in the n a m e o f f r e e d o m " . T h i s m i g h t h a v e h a d s o m e p u r c h a s e 9

u n d e r the o c c u p a t i o n , w h e n the m o r a l c h o i c e b e t w e e n c o l l a b o r a t i o n a n d resistance c o u l d b e seen as a simple alternative b e t w e e n suppo r t i n g f r e e d o m a n d s u p p o r t i n g o p p r e s s i o n . B u t f r e e d o m in so p u r e a f o r m h a s little m e a n i n g in m o s t p r a c t i c a l situations, w h e r e o p p o s i n g c h o i c e s (say b e t w e e n capitalist free enterprise a n d socialist liberation)

8

9

Situations II, 15. "Existentialism is a H u m a n i s m " , 367. Despite Sartre's later disavowal o f this lecture — w h i c h he rightly thought w a s given a definitive status inconsistent with its informal nature — it remains not only a very useful introduction to his thought but also an important a d u m bration of his attitude t o w a r d M a r x i s m .

Sartre

!25

c a n b o t h p l a u s i b l y c l a i m the interest o f " f r e e d o m " . S o m u c h must h a v e b e e n o b v i o u s to S a r t r e as h e t o o k p a r t in the fray o f p o s t w a r F r e n c h politics. T h e p r o b l e m o f a n ethics, t h e n , w o u l d b e to base it on a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o t o f f r e e d o m as such b u t o f f r e e d o m in a specific h u m a n situation. Sartre's failure to d e v e l o p a n existentialist ethics w a s his failure to h n d a w a y o f a d e q u a t e l y e x p l i c a t i n g the n o t i o n of situatedfreedom. T h i s failure strongly i n f l u e n c e d Sartre's n e x t m a j o r

intellectual

p r o j e c t , his b i o g r a p h i c a l study o f the writer, J e a n G e n e t .

1 0

O n one

level, this b o o k , Saint Genet, comédien et martyr (1952), w a s i n t e n d e d to s h o w that the " e x i s t e n t i a l p s y c h o a n a l y s i s " d e v e l o p e d in L'être et le néant w a s superior to M a r x i s t a n d F r e u d i a n t e c h n i q u e s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s in their totality. B u t Sartre also p r e s e n t e d G e n e t as a e x e m p l a r o f existentialist ethics, telling " i n detail the story o f a liberation"

1 1

a c h i e v e d despite the a p p a r e n t l y o v e r w h e l m i n g forces o f

b o u r g e o i s o p p r e s s i o n . It is as if Sartre h o p e d to at least show w h a t he c o u l d n o t articulate philosophically. B u t h e e v e n t u a l l y r e a l i z e d that b o t h Saint Genet a n d his a b o r t i v e ethical p r o j e c t suffered f r o m the s a m e flaw a n d that this flaw flowed f r o m a f u n d a m e n t a l i n c o m p l e t e ness in his existentialist vision. T h e real p r o b l e m w a s that the c a t e g o r i e s o f L'être et le néant, e v e n as m o r e subtly a n d c o n c r e t e l y d e p l o y e d in Saint Genet, w e r e n o t a d e q u a t e for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the social a n d historical d i m e n s i o n o f h u m a n existence a n d , especially, h o w objective, e x t e r n a l structures a r e essential c o n d i t i o n s o f o u r existential c h o i c e s . A s S a r t r e later p u t it, " I t ' s o b v i o u s that the study o f G e n e t ' s c o n d i t i o n i n g b y the events o f his objective history is i n a d e q u a t e , very, v e r y i n a d e q u a t e . "

1 2

For the five y e a r s after the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Saint Genet, S a r t r e w a s m a i n l y o c c u p i e d in political disputes a b o u t the C o m m u n i s t Party. I n 1952, o u t r a g e d b y the arrest, o n v e r y d u b i o u s g r o u n d s , o f a F r e n c h c o m m u n i s t leader, h e d e c i d e d that, for all its faults, there w a s n o alternative to u n r e s t r i c t e d s u p p o r t for the Party: " a n a n t i c o m m u n i s t is a r a t . . . I swore to the b o u r g e o i s i e a h a t r e d w h i c h w o u l d only die w i t h

me".

1 3

H e announced

his n e w c o m m i t m e n t

in " T h e

J e a n G e n e t ( 1 9 1 0 - 8 6 ) , a b a n d o n e d as a child a n d raised in o r p h a n a g e s , lived as a thief a n d prostitute before achieving success with novels a n d plays that brutally d e n o u n c e d bourgeois society a n d exalted the lives of pariahs like himself Saint Genet, 645. Situations IX, 114. " M e r l e a u - P o n t y " , in Situations, 198. 1 2

126

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

C o m m u n i s t s a n d P e a c e " (1952) a n d for the n e x t four y e a r s , a l t h o u g h he n e v e r f o r m a l l y j o i n e d

the Party, b e c a m e

little m o r e

than

a

p r o p a g a n d i s t for the C o m m u n i s t s , n o t only t h r o u g h essays in Les temps modernes b u t also t h r o u g h reports to the C o m m u n i s t j o u r n a l Libération o n his trip to the S o v i e t U n i o n . T h e result w a s s o m e o f the m o s t e m b a r r a s s i n g statements Sartre ever m a d e .

1 4

H i s w i l l i n g role

as easily the m o s t influential " f e l l o w t r a v e l e r " l e d to h a r s h b r e a k s w i t h C a m u s a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y , b o t h close friends f r o m the d a y s o f the R e s i s t a n c e . B u t in 1956, in " L e f a n t ô m e de S t a l i n e " , h e c o n d e m n e d the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f H u n g a r y a n d o n c e a g a i n b r o k e w i t h the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t Party. T h e n e x t year, he b e g a n w o r k o n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t h e n o w r e a l i z e d w a s n e c e s s a r y as a r e s p o n s e to the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f his earlier f o r m u l a t i o n o f existentialism in L'être et le néant: a systematic r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f existentialism in t e r m s o f socio-historical c a t e g o r i e s d e r i v e d f r o m M a r x i s m , w h i c h h e n o w r e c o g n i z e d as " t h e o n e p h i l o s o p h y o f o u r time w h i c h w e c a n n o t g o beyond".

1 5

T h e result, a t o m e o f o v e r 700 p a g e s entitled Critique de la

raison dialectique, w a s p u b l i s h e d in i 9 6 0 . Critique de la raison dialectique w a s Sartre's last strictly p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k . T h r e e years later h e p u b l i s h e d the story o f his early c h i l d h o o d , Les mots, w h i c h t u r n e d o u t to b e his last strictly literary w o r k . F r o m 1963 o n , a p a r t f r o m his m o s t l y political o c c a s i o n a l essays a n d a n u m b e r o f political a n d a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l i n t e r v i e w s , Sartre's only p u b l i c a t i o n s w e r e his three massive v o l u m e s o n the life o f G u s t a v e F l a u b e r t , L'idiot de la famille, w h i c h a p p e a r e d in 1 9 7 1 - 2 . H i s g r a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d literary a m b i t i o n s e n d in the obsessive l u c u b r a tions o f a literary b i o g r a p h e r . I n retrospect, h o w e v e r , the F l a u b e r t p r o j e c t is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e as a response to the tensions in Sartre's t h o u g h t that h a d b e e n i n c r e a s i n g since 1945. L i t e r a t u r e , n o t p h i l osophy, h a d f r o m the b e g i n n i n g b e e n his raison d'être. B u t h o w w a s a literary v o c a t i o n consistent w i t h the life o f political a c t i v i s m to w h i c h Sartre w a s irresistibly d r a w n after the w a r ? H i s early n o t i o n o f

1 4

{ b

For e x a m p l e , his claim in 1954 (in Libération) that " f r e e d o m to criticize is total in the U S S R " . H e m a d e even m o r e disturbing claims in the 1970s, in support o f increasingly radical M a o i s t student groups, for e x a m p l e , his p r o n o u n c e m e n t that " a revolutionary regime has to get rid o f a certain n u m b e r of individuals w h o threaten it, a n d I don't see a n y m e a n s other than death. T h e y c a n always escape from prison. T h e revolutionaries of 1793 p r o b a b l y didn't kill e n o u g h " (Actuel 28 [February 1973]). T o n y j u d t , in Past Imperfect, provides a detailed discussion a n d perceptive analysis of the political stands of Sartre (and others), although his discussion o f Sartre's philosophical views is sometimes confused. Search for a Method, xxxiv.

Sartre

127

littérature engagée p r o v e d impossible to d e f e n d in a r i g o r o u s w a y ; a n d in a n y case, Sartre h a d n o t b e e n able to sustain a h i g h l e v e l o f literary creativity in these o r a n y o t h e r t e r m s . T h e first t w o novels in his p r o j e c t e d t e t r a l o g y o n W o r l d W a r II w e r e p u b l i s h e d in 1945, b u t the third v o l u m e (Mort dans l'âme) did n o t a p p e a r until 1949; a n d the fourth

volume,

promised

as a p o r t r a i t

R e s i s t a n c e , r e m a i n e d unfinished,

o f the h e r o i s m

o f the

a literary p a r a l l e l to the failed

p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t o f a n existentialist ethics. D u r i n g the 1950s, Sartre's

literary

writing

w a s limited

to a f e w n o t

particularly

successful p l a y s . Les mots w a s a splendid s w a n song, a classically crafted, brilliantly ironic m a s t e r p i e c e , his finest a c h i e v e m e n t since La nausée. B u t Sartre literature that

explicitly p r e s e n t e d

finally

Les mots as a farewell

to

e x o r c i s e d his a t t a c h m e n t t h r o u g h a caustic

analysis o f its origins. My

suggestion is that S a r t r e f o u n d it i m p o s s i b l e to follow his

literary v o c a t i o n in a w a y that w a s intellectually consistent w i t h his political c o m m i t m e n t s . B u t h e also f o u n d it impossible to give u p t h i n k i n g a b o u t literature a n d struggling to m a k e sense o f its role in human

existence.

T h e solution

w a s to w r i t e ,

more

and

more

elaborately, a b o u t writers. H e h a d , after all, b e g u n w i t h a b r i e f m o n o g r a p h o n B a u d e l a i r e in 1947. T h e b i g b o o k a b o u t G e n e t in 1952 h a d , as w e h a v e seen, o t h e r m o t i v e s t o o , b u t after the w o r k o n F l a u b e r t w e m u s t see it as also a m a j o r step in Sartre's

fixation

on

literature. Les mots itself is, o f c o u r s e , a literary b i o g r a p h y , a n d functions as a self-reflective p r o l o g u e to the g i a n t F l a u b e r t enterprise. It is also striking that the three w r i t e r s , besides himself, w h o m Sartre a n a l y z e s a r e all writers o f " p u r e l i t e r a t u r e " , j u s t a b o u t as far r e m o v e d as o n e c o u l d i m a g i n e f r o m Sartre's o w n p u r p o r t e d ideal o f littérature engagée b u t e x a c t l y the m o d e l s that the y o u n g Sartre w o u l d have e m u l a t e d .

1 6

W e will n o t g o w r o n g , t h e n , in r e a d i n g L'idiot de la famille as the final step in Sartre's p e r s o n a l effort to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h his literary v o c a t i o n . B u t it is also, like Saint Genet, a c o n c r e t e e x p l o r a t i o n a n d test o f Sartre's p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas, r e t h i n k i n g a n d a p p l y i n g the c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s o f Critique de la raison dialectique, as the earlier b i o g r a p h y did that o f L'être et le néant. T h e w o r k e v e n i n c o r p o r a t e s a final effort at s y n t h e s i z i n g Sartre's entire p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t

1 6

Sartre also wrote, b e t w e e n 1948 a n d 1952, Mallarmé, a l o n g study of the French p o e t , part of w h i c h has been posthumously published. H e seems to have lost the bulk of the manuscript.

128 since

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960) it c o m b i n e s

explicitly

existential

categories

such

as lived

e x p e r i e n c e (le vécu) w i t h t h e objective socio-historical structures o f the Critique de la raison dialectique. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e b o o k ' s e x t r e m e l e n g t h a n d self-indulgent l a c k o f o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o m i s e t h e scant i m p a c t o f w h a t is, in R o n a l d A r o n s o n ' s o n l y slightly e x a g g e r a t e d p h r a s e , " a b o o k that n o b o d y will r e a d " .

1 7

T h e focus a n d limits o f this study dictate that w e l o o k at Sartre's a c h i e v e m e n t as a p h i l o s o p h e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y as it influenced

other

p h i l o s o p h e r s o f his a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a t i o n . T h i s m e a n s g i v i n g c e n t r a l p l a c e to L'être et le néant, w h i c h is, in a n y case, far a n d a w a y Sartre's greatest a c h i e v e m e n t as a p h i l o s o p h e r . It is also at t h e c o r e o f all Sartre's s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , w h i c h r e h n e s a n d d e v e l o p s its c e n t r a l theses b u t n e v e r simply rejects t h e m . I will, t h e r e f o r e , c o n c e n t r a t e o n L'être et le néant, a l t h o u g h I will also discuss t h e Critique de la raison dialectique as a n e x t e n s i o n o f Sartre's existentialism to t h e social d o m a i n .

1 8

BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

Background Despite

his e v e n t u a l

break

with

university

philosophy,

initiation into t h e discipline w a s entirely c o n v e n t i o n a l .

Sartre's O n c e he

resolved to p u r s u e p h i l o s o p h y as a g r o u n d for his literary career, h e simply f o l l o w e d t h e course set o u t b y his t e a c h e r s : " T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f m y ideas o n p h i l o s o p h y w a s r e l a t e d to w h a t I w a s t a u g h t at the l y c é e a n d at t h e S o r b o n n e . I didn't c o m e to p h i l o s o p h y i n d e p e n -

1 7

1 8

R o n a l d A r o n s o n , "L'idiot de la famille: T h e U l t i m a t e S a r t r e ? " , in R o b e r t Wilcocks (ed.). Critical Essays on Jean-Paul Sartre, 136. I a m also ignoring a n y n e w directions that m i g h t be indicated b y Sartre's discussions with B e n n y Levy, shortly before his death, in w h i c h h e e m b r a c e s a " h o p e " that seems in tension with existential despair a n d suggests an interest in - though by n o means an a c c e p t a n c e o f — certain religious viewpoints (see J e a n - P a u l Sartre, L'espoir maintenant). T h e natural — if often merely expedient - response that Sartre's intellectual p o w e r s w e r e failing a n d that Levy exercised u n d u e influence o n the old m a n m a y have some point. B u t Sartre's u n e q u i v o c a l rejection o f religion w a s - as J a m e s Collins l o n g a g o p o i n t e d o u t (in The Existentialists) — a d o g m a t i c postulate rather than a considered philosophical position a n d w o u l d have been an entirely appropriate object of his critical philosophical attention. (See Sartre's o w n a c c o u n t of w h a t h e calls his " s e p a r a t i o n " from G o d from c h i l d h o o d in Les mots, 97—103; 250—1.) In a n y case, Sartre never gave these very late ideas t h o r o u g h critical consideration, a n d w e have n o w a y o f k n o w i n g h o w h e m i g h t have eventually related them to the existentialism that defined his philosophical thought for his entire adult life.

Sartre dently o f the courses I h a d . . .

129

In o t h e r w o r d s , the p h i l o s o p h i c a l

e d u c a t i o n I r e c e i v e d all those y e a r s w a s an a c a d e m i c e d u c a t i o n . "

1 9

H i s e d u c a t i o n m o v e d b e y o n d the syllabus o n l y after he d i s c o v e r e d Husserl a n d H e i d e g g e r a n d studied in B e r l i n f r o m N o v e m b e r 1933 to J u l y 1934. T h i s study, he suggests, consisted m a i n l y o f a careful reading

o f Husserl's

Ideen.

20

His

German

seems

to

w e a k , a n d he did n o t h a v e significant p h i l o s o p h i c a l

have

been

contacts

in

Berlin. Sartre's early p h i l o s o p h i c a l essays are p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l studies, in the H u s s e r l i a n sense o f careful descriptions o f the essential natures o f specific p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a . B u t f r o m the b e g i n n i n g he s h o w e d his i n d e p e n d e n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y in La transcendance de l'égo (1936), w h e r e he r e j e c t e d Husserl's v i e w that consciousness is the activity o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o a n d a r g u e d instead that consciousness as such is an i m p e r s o n a l

awareness, with no internal

structure that

could

c o r r e s p o n d to an e g o . T h e e g o exists, b u t it c a n n o t be identified w i t h consciousness;

it is instead

a transcendent

being,

an

object

of

consciousness, a n d so a p a r t o f the w o r l d like a n y o t h e r object. Sartre's o t h e r early essays, o n i m a g i n a t i o n a n d on e m o t i o n , are less r a d i c a l b u t still s u p p o r t his earlier thesis that consciousness has n o i n t e r n a l structure. C o n t r a r y to s t a n d a r d v i e w s , Sartre m a i n t a i n s that i m a g e s a n d e m o t i o n s are n o t s o m e h o w " i n " consciousness (as, for e x a m p l e , states or a t t r i b u t e s ) .

21

R a t h e r t h e y are simply w a y s in

w h i c h consciousness relates to objects outside o f it. S o , for e x a m p l e , w h e n I (in Paris) i m a g i n e w h a t m y friend P i e r r e , w h o is in B e r l i n , is d o i n g , I do n o t f o r m an i m a g e o f Pierre in m y m i n d b u t r a t h e r t u r n m y consciousness t o w a r d the real P i e r r e , t h o u g h in a n i m a g i n a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n a p e r c e p t u a l m o d e . W h e n I i m a g i n e a n o n e x i s t e n t thing, such as a c e n t a u r p l a y i n g a flute, there is, o f c o u r s e , a sensory i m a g e that is the o b j e c t o f m y consciousness. B u t this i m a g e is n o t in m y

1 9

2 0

2 1

" I n t e r v i e w with Jean-Paul S a r t r e " , in Paul Schilpp (éd.), The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, 9. N o t e also J a c q u e s D e r r i d a ' s c o m m e n t on Sartre a n d the university: " I t is said that he escaped it or resisted it. It seems to m e that university n o r m s d e t e r m i n e d his w o r k in the most internal f a s h i o n " (Points, 123). " S o there I was in Berlin, r e a d i n g Husserl and taking notes on w h a t I r e a d . . . [Question:] A n d in w h a t order did y o u read Husserl, first the Ideen, or did y o u start with Logische Untersuehungen? Sartre: Ideen, and n o t h i n g but Ideen. For m e , y o u know, w h o doesn't read very fast, a y e a r was just a b o u t right for r e a d i n g his Ideen" (Sartre by Himself, 2 9 - 3 0 ) . Sartre published two books on imagination. T h e first, L'imagination, is a critique o f standard views o f the imagination. T h e second, L'imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination. presents his o w n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of the imagination a n d also interprets a range of empirical data on the topic. B o t h books derive from his degree w o r k in philosophy.

130

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

consciousness a n d , m o r e importantly, the p r e s e n c e o f the i m a g e is not sufficient for a n a c t o f i m a g i n a t i o n to h a v e o c c u r r e d (it m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , b e a n o b j e c t o f h a l l u c i n a t i o n , n o t i m a g i n a t i o n ) . A s b e f o r e , the i m a g i n i n g o c c u r s b e c a u s e o f the special attitude that consciousness takes t o w a r d its object. Similarly, for m e to feel a n e m o t i o n is n o t for m y consciousness to be infused w i t h a certain affective quality b u t for it to take u p a certain attitude t o w a r d the w o r l d . Fear, for e x a m p l e , is n o t a m a t t e r o f consciousness's b e i n g passively o v e r c o m e b y o r infused w i t h a feeling o f terror; rather, it is consciousness's active effort to e x c l u d e (by fleeing, fainting, or g o i n g into shock) t h e object o f fear f r o m its e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d . A s in the cases o f the e g o a n d o f i m a g e s , Sartre is c o n c e r n e d to p r e s e r v e w h a t h e sees as t h e f u n d a m e n t a l phenomenological transparent

truth

awareness

that

consciousness

o f objects,

not a

is a n entirely container

pure,

hlled

with

t h o u g h t s , i m a g e s , a n d feelings. F r o m early o n , Sartre's p h i l o s o p h i c a l a m b i t i o n s e x t e n d e d b e y o n d g i v i n g H u s s e r l i a n descriptions o f specihc r e g i o n s o f p h e n o m e n a . H e w a n t e d to offer a c o m p r e h e n s i v e ontology, that is, a n a c c o u n t o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r i e s o f b e i n g as such, a n a c c o u n t b a s e d n o t o n conceptual

analysis

or abstract

reasoning

b u t o n the

concrete

descriptions o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . H e w a n t e d , in s u m , a " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y " , as h e p u t it in the subtitle o f L'être et le néant. Sartre's interest in o n t o l o g y m a y well h a v e s o m e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s , b u t t h e c e n t r a l issues o f h o w t h e b e i n g o f consciousness relates to the b e i n g o f its objects a n d the p l a c e o f c o n t i n g e n c y in t h e w o r l d are r o o t e d in his strongly C a r t e s i a n e d u c a t i o n a n d in his p e r s o n a l obsessions. I f n o t h i n g else, the intensity w i t h w h i c h these issues a r e raised in La nausée suggests a n a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l

origin.

M o r e o v e r , in a n i n t e r v i e w w i t h S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r , S a r t r e tells us that

both

his interest

in c o n t i n g e n c y

a n d his c o n v i c t i o n

that

consciousness c o u l d g r a s p objects j u s t as t h e y are g o all the w a y b a c k to b e f o r e h e e n r o l l e d in the E c o l e N o r m a l e in 1923, w e l l before h e knew anything about H e i d e g g e r or H u s s e r l .

2 2

A l s o , Sartre says h e

studied H e i d e g g e r seriously for the hrst time w h i l e h e w a s a p r i s o n e r o f war, w h e n h e w a s a l r e a d y w r i t i n g L'être et le nêant?"^ O n t h e o t h e r

2 2

2 3

S e e S i m o n e de Beauvoir, " C o n v e r s a t i o n s with S a r t r e " , in Adieux: Farewell to Sartre, 141 — 2 (on contingency) a n d 157 (on the objects o f consciousness). Sartre by Himself, 50—1 (on studying Heidegger) a n d S i m o n e de Beauvoir, " C o n v e r s a t i o n s with S a r t r e " , 156—7 (on writing L'être et le néant).

Sartre h a n d , Sartre o b v i o u s l y f o u n d m u c h in H e i d e g g e r , as in H u s s e r l , that w a s to his p u r p o s e s in L'être et le néant.

The basic ontological scheme L'être et le néant o p e n s w i t h a t h o r n y i n t r o d u c t i o n , g i v e n the ironic P r o u s t i a n subtitle, " A la r e c h e r c h e de l ' ê t r e " ("in search o f b e i n g " ) , which

presents

Sartre's

fundamental

ontological

categories.

He

b e g i n s b y r e j e c t i n g o n e f o r m o f realism, that w h i c h p l a c e s reality in a n u n d e r l y i n g substance o f w h i c h w e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y the a p p e a r ances. O n Sartre's view, a p h e n o m e n o n ( a p p e a r a n c e ) is relative to the consciousness to w h i c h it a p p e a r s , b u t it is n o t relative to a n y n o n - a p p e a r i n g b e i n g o f w h i c h it is m e r e l y the p h e n o m e n a l e x p r e s sion (L'être et le néant [EN],

12/4).

Sartre notes that this construal o f the p h e n o m e n o n eliminates a n u m b e r o f p r o b l e m a t i c dualisms: o f the i n n e r (substance) a n d the outer ( a p p e a r a n c e ) , o f (hidden) p o w e r a n d (manifest) a c t , etc. It also recasts the n o t i o n o f essence, w h i c h is n o l o n g e r a secret core, accessible only t h r o u g h p h e n o m e n a l manifestations. I n s t e a d , essences a p p e a r directly to us: " t h e essence . . . is simply the c o n n e c tion o f the a p p e a r a n c e s " a n d so is "itself a n a p p e a r a n c e " (EN, 1 2 / 5 ) . T h i s , Sartre says, is the r e a s o n H u s s e r l c a n speak o f a n " i n t u i t i o n o f e s s e n c e s " (Wesensschau) (EN, 2 - i 3 / 5 ) . :

T h e r e still r e m a i n s , h o w e v e r , o n e last d u a l i s m , that o f the hnite a n d the infinite. W h a t Sartre h a s in m i n d h e r e is the fact that, a l t h o u g h w e at a n y p o i n t h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d o n l y a

finite

set o f

a p p e a r a n c e s o f a n object, the object itself c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to a n y such finite set. A c o m p l e t e g r a s p o f its reality m u s t refer to the u n l i m i t e d set o f all its possible a p p e a r a n c e s . It is at this p o i n t that Sartre's discussion b e c o m e s

explicitly

o n t o l o g i c a l , i.e., c o n c e r n e d w i t h being. O n the old p i c t u r e , w h i c h t h o u g h t o f the object or its essence as h i d d e n b e h i n d its p h e n o m e n a l a p p e a r a n c e s , it w a s n a t u r a l to take this h i d d e n reality as the being o f a n o b j e c t in contrast to the m e r e l y p h e n o m e n a l appearance to w h i c h w e h a v e direct access. B u t Sartre's a c c o u n t c a n n o t m a k e sense o f such a contrast b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s a n d u n d e r l y i n g being. T h e a p p e a r a n c e s t h e m s e l v e s m u s t b e r e c o g n i z e d as h a v i n g b e i n g , that is, as fully real in their o w n right. B u t , Sartre says, this m e a n s that w e m u s t ask a b o u t the n a t u r e o f this b e i n g , a n d the first q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r this b e i n g is itself a n a p p e a r a n c e . S a r t r e is quite w i l l i n g to

132

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

say that it is, since, after all, a n a p p e a r a n c e (or p h e n o m e n o n ) is simply w h a t e v e r is m a n i f e s t e d to us, a n d o u r ability to talk a n d think u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y a b o u t the b e i n g o f a p p e a r a n c e s surely suggests that it is in s o m e sense manifest to us. (He also notes, w i t h a n implicit reference to his n o v e l La nausee, that e x p e r i e n c e s such as b o r e d o m a n d existential n a u s e a directly manifest the b e i n g o f a p p e a r a n c e s to us.) W e c a n , t h e n , speak o f the " p h e n o m e n o n o f b e i n g " a n d d e h n e o n t o l o g y as the d e s c r i p t i o n o f this p h e n o m e n o n (EN, 14/7). H e r e w e h a v e the origin a n d j u s t i h c a t i o n o f Sartre's p r o j e c t o f " p h e n o m e n ological ontology". It is, h o w e v e r , c r u c i a l that w e n o t think o f this p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f b e i n g as simply a n instance o f the s t a n d a r d H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f essences. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f essences (eidetic p h e n o m e n o l o g y ) is a m a t t e r o f m o v i n g , v i a i m a g i n a t i v e v a r i a t i o n , f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r r e d to the essence o f r e d (redness). B u t b e i n g is n o t a n essence. It is n o t , that is, s o m e t h i n g that a n object h a s b u t rather, as K a n t a r g u e d , the c o n d i t i o n o f an object's h a v i n g a n y p r o p e r t i e s at all. W e c a n n o t , therefore, describe the p h e n o m e n o n o f b e i n g b y b e g i n ning with a p h e n o m e n o n and achieving, through standard p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d , a n intuition o f the b e i n g o f that p h e n o m e n o n as some sort o f m e a n i n g or essence o f the p h e n o m e n o n . W e c a n n o t , in o t h e r w o r d s , r e d u c e the p h e n o m e n o n o f b e i n g to the b e i n g o f the p h e n o m e n o n (as w e w o u l d , for e x a m p l e , a c h i e v e a n intuition o f redness b y p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

reflection

on a red p h e n o m e n o n ,

t h e r e b y r e d u c i n g the p h e n o m e n o n o f redness to the redness o f the p h e n o m e n o n ) . B e i n g is a p h e n o m e n o n — it a p p e a r s to us — b u t n o t in the m a n n e r o f o r d i n a r y p h e n o m e n a that are k n o w n t h r o u g h a n intuition o f their essences. I n this sense, b e i n g is transphenomenal. T h e a b o v e line o f t h o u g h t expresses the f u n d a m e n t a l realism o f Sartre's ontology. It differs f r o m some t r a d i t i o n a l representationalist realisms b y a c c e p t i n g the " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " v i e w that there is n o t h i n g b e h i n d the p h e n o m e n a , that, accordingly, the real is directly g i v e n to us (and is o n l y so given) in p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e . D e s p i t e this, as w e h a v e

seen,

Sartre

holds

that reality

(being) is n o t

p h e n o m e n a l ; that, in o t h e r w o r d s , the reality o f the objects o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e does n o t consist in the fact that t h e y are p h e n o m e n a l l y g i v e n to us. T h e objects t h e m s e l v e s a r e so g i v e n (and o n l y so given), b u t t h e y are n o t real in virtue o f this. T h e i r reality is g i v e n in o u r p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e , b u t it is g i v e n precisely as i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . B e i n g , w e m i g h t say, is in b u t n o t o f the p h e n o m e n a l

Sartre

133

r e a l m . O r , to e m p l o y S p i e g e l b e r g ' s deft c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , v i e w is " a c o m b i n a t i o n realism o f e x i s t e n c e " . Given

of a phenomenalism

Sartre's

o f essences w i t h a

2 4

the difficulties

of formulating with proper

nuance

this

c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e a l i s m , it m a y b e s u g g e s t e d that Sartre w o u l d d o b e t t e r simply to a c c e p t idealism. ( H e thinks that this is w h a t H u s s e r l h i m s e l f did.) W h y n o t , in particular, p u s h o u r a c c e p t a n c e o f p h e n o m e n a in their o w n t e r m s to its limit a n d a g r e e that the b e i n g o f a n a p p e a r a n c e is simply the fact that it a p p e a r s ? T h i s w o u l d a m o u n t to a c c e p t i n g B e r k e l e y ' s c l a i m that to b e is to b e p e r c e i v e d

(esse estpercipi). B u t , a c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , this c l a i m c a n n o t b e m a i n t a i n e d . H i s a r g u m e n t (which, w i t h a n ironic n o d t o w a r d St. A n s e l m , h e calls the " o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f " ) is b a s e d o n the intentionality o f consciousness so e m p h a s i z e d b y Husserl ( a l t h o u g h , a c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , H u s s e r l did not p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t a n d it). I n t e n t i o n a l i t y is the essential r e l a t i o n s h i p o f consciousness to a n object. B u t c o n t r a r y to o u r usual w a y o f thinking, Sartre m a i n t a i n s that consciousness h a s n o positive reality a p a r t f r o m its relation to its objects. Its b e i n g is entirely e x h a u s t e d b y its directedness t o w a r d its objects. A s Sartre puts it, consciousness is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a " r e v e a l i n g i n t u i t i o n " (EN, 28/23). B u t this m a k e s n o sense unless consciousness h a s a n o b j e c t that exists entirely s e p a r a t e l y f r o m it. (To say that consciousness reveals itself or that it s o m e h o w constitutes the b e i n g o f its o b j e c t is to m a k e o f c o n s c i o u s ness s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a p u r e directedness t o w a r d its object.) Accordingly, w e must recognize a kind of being beyond consciousness: the b e i n g o f the o b j e c t o f consciousness or, in the t e r m s w e u s e d earlier, the b e i n g o f the p h e n o m e n o n . T h i s Sartre calls being-in-itself. In s u m , t h e n , Sartre's initial description o f the p h e n o m e n o n o f b e i n g (as it is directly p r e s e n t to o u r e x p e r i e n c e ) h a s r e v e a l e d t w o distinct r e g i o n s o f b e i n g : the b e i n g o f the objects o f consciousness (being-in-itself) a n d the b e i n g

o f consciousness

(beingfor-itself), to

which w e n o w turn.

Consciousness T h e rest o f L'être et le néant consists in the descriptive ( p h e n o m e n o l o gical)

filling

in o f the details o f the g e n e r a l o n t o l o g i c a l Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 489.

scheme

i34

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

sketched in the p r e f a c e . B u t b e f o r e t u r n i n g to that p r o j e c t , it will b e helpful to discuss the n o t i o n o f consciousness that is the k e y s t o n e o f Sartre's analysis. A n o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n is w h y Sartre thinks philosophy, r a t h e r t h a n (or, at least, in a d d i t i o n to) science, should b e able to tell us a b o u t consciousness. O f c o u r s e , scientihc m e t h o d s c a n be a p p l i e d in o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r to a n y subject m a t t e r at all, b u t there is n o g u a r a n t e e that these m e t h o d s (essentially, the rigorous intersubjective testing o f precisely f o r m u l a t e d hypotheses) will tell us e v e r y t h i n g w e w a n t to k n o w a b o u t a g i v e n subject. T h i s w o u l d s e e m to b e p a r t i c u l a r l y true o f consciousness, the hrst-person a w a r e n e s s that is o u r c o n s t a n t a n d i m m e d i a t e m o d e o f e n c o u n t e r i n g the w o r l d a n d , especially, ourselves. It seems that scientihc a c c o u n t s

always

leave o u t s o m e t h i n g o f this a w a r e n e s s ; t h e y d o n o t , as E i n s t e i n r e m a r k e d , give us " t h e taste o f the s o u p " . It is easy to c o n c l u d e t o o m u c h f r o m this fact. It d o e s n o t , for e x a m p l e , follow that there is a n o t h e r r e a l m o f things outside o f those t r e a t e d b y science, for e x a m p l e , spiritual substances such as souls. N o r does it follow that the entire d o m a i n o f consciousness c o u l d n e v e r b e entirely u n d e r stood in t e r m s o f strictly e m p i r i c a l scientihc categories. B u t at the v e r y least w e c a n say that hrst-person a w a r e n e s s c a n n o t b e i g n o r e d . Science must ultimately c o m e

to t e r m s w i t h it, a n d w e

cannot

i m a g i n e o u r lives n o t c e n t e r i n g o n it. T h i s is sufficient j u s t i h c a t i o n for a p r o j e c t , such as Sartre's, o f offering a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f o u r hrst-person a w a r e n e s s .

2 5

Sartre's f u n d a m e n t a l p o s i t i o n is this: consciousness is a l w a y s o f s o m e t h i n g , b u t it itself is n o t s o m e t h i n g . T o say that I a m c o n s c i o u s implies that there is s o m e o b j e c t - t y p i c a l l y s o m e t h i n g real, t h o u g h in s o m e cases s o m e t h i n g i m a g i n a r y o r illusory — that I a m c o n s c i o u s of. C o n s c i o u s n e s s is, in the l a n g u a g e o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , essentially intentional - d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g else. I n t e n t i o n a l i t y is a r e l a t i o n , b u t it c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d b y a n a l o g y w i t h o r d i n a r y relations b e t w e e n things in the w o r l d , for e x a m p l e , the r e l a t i o n w h e r e b y a b o x is o n t o p o f a table o r a h s h is in a s t r e a m . T h i s is b e c a u s e consciousness is n o t a t h i n g , n o t a m a t e r i a l t h i n g b u t also not a n i m m a t e r i a l t h i n g such as a soul or a spiritual substance. It is not a t h i n g b e c a u s e its entire existence is e x h a u s t e d b y its r e l a t i o n to

T h e r e is n o reason to think that Sartre w o u l d reject this minimalist defense o f a philosophical study of consciousness, b u t his o w n v i e w gives scant r o o m for any significant scientific k n o w l e d g e o f consciousness.

Sartre

t35

its objects. It has n o c o n t e n t or structure o f its o w n . N o r d o e s it take on c o n t e n t or structure b y s o m e h o w i n c o r p o r a t i n g its objects. O u r o r d i n a r y talk o f w h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e or think a b o u t b e i n g " i n the m i n d " is misleading. In t y p i c a l cases (e.g., sense p e r c e p t i o n , n o n d e c e p t i v e m e m o r y ) the object e x p e r i e n c e d exists outside the m i n d in the real w o r l d . B u t e v e n w h e n , as in i m a g i n a t i o n or illusions, there is n o real o b j e c t , the object is n o t literally in the m i n d . C o n s c i o u s ness is a totally " t r a n s p a r e n t " i n t e n d i n g o f its objects a n d n o t h i n g m o r e . In v i e w o f this, Sartre is p r e p a r e d to say that c o n s c i o u s n e s s is

nothing. C o n s c i o u s n e s s is also t r a n s p a r e n t in a n o t h e r sense. It is a l w a y s a w a r e , directly a n d i m m e d i a t e l y , o f itself as consciousness. A s Sartre puts it, to be c o n s c i o u s is to be self-conscious. B u t h e r e w e n e e d to be careful. Self-consciousness m i g h t s e e m to m e a n consciousness o f self, w h e r e " s e l f " refers to consciousness as an o b j e c t o f a w a r e n e s s like a n y other. B u t t h e n consciousness w o u l d also be a t h i n g like any other, a n d this o f course S a r t r e firmly denies. T o p r e s e r v e his insight a b o u t self-consciousness w i t h o u t reifying c o n s c i o u s n e s s , S a r t r e introduces

the

notion

o f a special m o d e

of consciousness,

whereby

consciousness is a w a r e o f itself b u t w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g itself as an object. T h i s is n o t to d e n y the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . W h e n I a m a w a r e , there is a l w a y s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n consciousness that I a m a w a r e of; b u t a l o n g w i t h this a w a r e n e s s o f an o b j e c t , there is also a l w a y s an implicit (sidelong, so to speak) a w a r e n e s s o f m y consciousness. modes

To

mark

o f consciousness:

the

difference,

thetic

(directed

Sartre

distinguishes

toward

two

or p o s i t i n g

an

object) a n d n o n - t h e t i c (not d i r e c t e d t o w a r d or p o s i t i n g an object). C o n s c i o u s n e s s ' s implicit a w a r e n e s s o f itself is n o n - t h e t i c .

26

Suppose,

for e x a m p l e , I a m a p h a r m a c i s t c o u n t i n g out pills for a p r e s c r i p t i o n , intent on n o t m a k i n g a mistake in the n u m b e r . I will h a v e a thetic a w a r e n e s s o f the pills that are the focus o f m y activity. B u t there will also b e a n o n - t h e t i c a w a r e n e s s o f m y c o n s c i o u s act o f counting. For, if s o m e o n e asks m e w h a t I a m d o i n g , I will i m m e d i a t e l y

reply,

" C o u n t i n g the p i l l s " , an a n s w e r b a s e d on an implicit (non-thetic)

Sartre also uses the equivalent terms " p o s i t i o n a l " and " n o n - p o s i t i o n a l " . H e further marks the distinction b e t w e e n thetic (positional) a n d non-thetic (non-positional) by writing "consciousness (of) s e l f " for the case of non-thetic consciousness, instead o f the n o r m a l "consciousness o f s e l f " that he continues to use for thetic consciousness. (This is particularly important in French, w h e r e the " o f " c a n n o t be avoided, since even "selfconsciousness" must be expressed as " c o n s c i e n c e de soi".)

136

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

a w a r e n e s s o f the consciousness that is explicitly (thetically) a w a r e o f the p i l l s .

27

B e c a u s e consciousness is a l w a y s self-aware, S a r t r e says that it has being-for-itself. its v e r y existence involves an i n t e r n a l relation to itself. T h e objects o f consciousness are n o t self-aware (we will c o n s i d e r the special case o f o t h e r consciousnesses b e l o w ) . O n the o t h e r h a n d , unlike consciousness, objects o f consciousness are things, w i t h the p r e s e n c e a n d solidity o f intrinsic c o n t e n t ; t h e y h a v e , in

Sartre's

t e r m i n o l o g y , being-in-itself w h i c h consciousness o f c o u r s e lacks. Sartre's

account

seems

to

ignore

an

obvious

feature

of

our

e x p e r i e n c e : the p e r s o n (or p s y c h o l o g i c a l self) as the subject o f the p r o p e r t i e s (habits, character-traits, beliefs, inclinations) that d e h n e us as individuals. In fact, Sartre d o e s n o t i g n o r e this o b v i o u s reality, b u t he displaces it. R a t h e r t h a n identifying it w i t h (or situating it within) consciousness, he m a i n t a i n s that the self exists o n l y as an o b j e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , that it is a p a r t o f the w o r l d , like a n y o t h e r thing. O u r a w a r e n e s s o f this self n e e d s , o f c o u r s e , to be distinguished f r o m self-awareness in the sense o f implicit, n o n - t h e t i c

sharply

consciousness's

a w a r e n e s s o f itself. T o m a k e the

distinction,

Sartre speaks o f consciousness's (thetic) a w a r e n e s s o f the self as reflective consciousness, a n d o f consciousness's (non-thetic)

awareness

(of) itself as non-reflective consciousness. ( T h e i d e a is that reflection involves an explicit a w a r e n e s s o f the self as a separate object.) N o n reflective consciousness is p r i o r to reflective c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; w e do not, as D e s c a r t e s t h o u g h t , hrst k n o w ourselves t h r o u g h explicit acts o f reflection b u t t h r o u g h o u r implicit a w a r e n e s s o f o u r a w a r e n e s s o f objects in the w o r l d . W e n e e d , finally, to say a bit m o r e a b o u t the relation o f b e i n g - i n itself to being-for-itself. O u r o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e is o f objects that h a v e a basic intelligibility - a n a t u r e or structure that gives t h e m a m e a n i n g (e.g., p a t t e r n e d or functional b e h a v i o r in the n a t u r a l w o r l d , a p u r p o s e in o u r lives). In Sartre's view, h o w e v e r , this intelligibility does n o t b e l o n g to the o b j e c t in virtue o f its m o s t basic reality as being-in-itself. O n the f u n d a m e n t a l level the o b j e c t is a b r u t e , u n -

2 7

Sartre also ties thetic as opposed to non-thetic consciousness to his notion o f knowledge. W h e n w e have explicit awareness o f an object, he says w e k n o w it. But consciousness's nonthetic grasp of itself he does not regard as k n o w l e d g e , since there are n o propositions about the nature o f consciousness that c a n be formulated on the basis o f non-thetic awareness. His view here recalls Russell's distinction b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e by a c q u a i n t a n c e and k n o w l e d g e by description.

Sartre structured g i v e n , m e r e l y existing w i t h n o intrinsic m e a n i n g . O n this level w e s h o u l d n o t , in fact, speak o f different things, since the structure n e c e s s a r y for differentiation is n o t p r e s e n t . T h e r e is j u s t sheer indistinct being-in-itself.

In the literary p h e n o m e n o l o g y

of

R o q u e n t i n ' s vision in La nausee, Sartre c h a r a c t e r i z e s the unintelligibility o f being-in-itself in t e r m s o f superfluity, absurdity, a n d contingency, Being-in-itself is m e a n i n g f u l (and d i v i d e d into discrete, intelligible objects) o n l y insofar as it is the object o f consciousness. C o n s c i o u s ness is, t h e r e f o r e , the ultimate source n o t o f the reality o f b e i n g - i n itself b u t o f its m e a n i n g .

2 8

In La nausee R o q u e n t i n ' s c e n t r a l e x p e r i -

e n c e (of the chestnut tree in the B o u v i l l e park) is precisely o f the intrinsic unintelligibility o f b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f .

29

O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e

should n o t be m i s l e d into t h i n k i n g that, b e c a u s e consciousness is the source o f m e a n i n g in the w o r l d , it has itself intrinsic m e a n i n g . A s sheer t r a n s p a r e n t a w a r e n e s s , the for-itself has n o m o r e

intrinsic

structure t h a n does the in-itself. T h e m e a n i n g o f m y consciousness is g i v e n o n l y in the self, w h i c h , as w e h a v e seen, is strictly o t h e r t h a n consciousness

and

possesses

meaning

precisely

as

an

object

of

consciousness.

Nothingness and anguish S o far w e h a v e b e e n f o l l o w i n g Sartre's analysis o f b e i n g in t e r m s of its t w o m o d e s , being-in-itself a n d being-for-itself. In t u r n i n g to the p r o j e c t o f " c o n c r e t i z i n g " his o n t o l o g y t h r o u g h a series o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions, Sartre b e g i n s b y t r a n s p o s i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g f r o m the m o d e o f analysis to that o f synthesis; that is, he takes as his o b j e c t

o f reflection

n o t being-in-itself a n d

being-for-itself

s e p a r a t e l y b u t the c o n c r e t e u n i o n o f the t w o in the synthesis being-in-

the-world (EN, 38/34). T h i s has the result o f a l l o w i n g Sartre to p r o c e e d b y the e x a m i n ation o f h u m a n c o n d u c t ("the c o n d u c t o f m a n in the w o r l d " ) , w h i c h he says w e c a n discover simply b y " o p e n i n g o u r e y e s " (EN, 38/34). T h i s m o v e is m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t , since it allows Sartre to s u p p l e m e n t the austere logical analyses o f a b s t r a c t o n t o l o g y w i t h concrete phenomenological

descriptions

o f lived e x p e r i e n c e .

His

p r o c e d u r e will be to d e v e l o p his o n t o l o g y b y d e s c r i b i n g a series of 2 8

2 9

H e r e w e can recall again Spiegelberg's c o m m e n t that Sartre holds a p h e n o m e n a l i s m of essences (meanings) but a realism of existence (The Phenomenological Movement, 489). Nausea, 1 7 0 - 8 2 .

138

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

( a p p r o p r i a t e l y chosen) types o f h u m a n c o n d u c t . O n e issue to w h i c h w e n e e d to p a y careful attention is that o f the precise between Sartre's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

relation

descriptions a n d his abstract

ontology. T h e hrst result o f Sartre's d e s c r i p t i o n o f o u r c o n c r e t e

situation

(being-in-the-world) is the reality of negation. S o m e p h i l o s o p h e r s (Sartre has in m i n d B e r g s o n a n d also B r u n s c h v i c g ) m a i n t a i n that w e d o n o t e n c o u n t e r n e g a t i o n as a n a s p e c t o f o u r c o n c r e t e situation, that it enters o n l y at the level o f p r o p o s i t i o n s (intellectual j u d g m e n t s ) a b o u t that situation. O n this view, w e w o u l d e n c o u n t e r n e g a t i o n o n l y w h e n w e reflect a n d c o m p a r e o u r j u d g m e n t s a n d the c o n c e p t s in t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y are f o r m u l a t e d . S o , f r o m i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e I w o u l d k n o w o n l y positive things such as snow is white a n d grass is green; n e g a t i o n w o u l d enter o n l y w h e n , reflecting o n w h a t I k n o w o f s n o w a n d w h a t I k n o w o f grass, I f o r m the j u d g m e n t s snow is not green a n d

grass is not white. S a r t r e , h o w e v e r , m a i n t a i n s that o u r v e r y ability to f o r m n e g a t i v e j u d g m e n t s at the reflective l e v e l requires that w e a l r e a d y h a v e a n o t i o n o f negativity, a n d that this n o t i o n itself c o m e s f r o m i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e s o f n e g a t i o n as a g i v e n reality. H e illustrates the essential nature o f such a n e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h the e x a m p l e o f a p a r t i c u l a r instance o f q u e s t i o n i n g b e h a v i o r : m y search for a friend, P i e r r e , in a cafe (EN, 4 3 - 5 / 4 0 - 2 ) . A s I enter the cafe, late for a n a p p o i n t m e n t w i t h P i e r r e , w h o is m e t i c u l o u s l y p u n c t u a l , I at hrst s e e m to e n c o u n t e r a fullness o f b e i n g ; e v e r y w h e r e I l o o k there are objects or activities. B u t , since I a m l o o k i n g for Pierre a n d w o r r i e d that h e m a y h a v e a l r e a d y left, e a c h e l e m e n t o f this scene falls b a c k , as s o o n as it b e g i n s to p r e s e n t itself, b e c a u s e I see it as n o t - P i e r r e . S i n c e m y e x p e r i e n c e is p e r c e p tual, it exhibits the s t a n d a r d structure o f g r o u n d a n d h g u r e . B u t in this case, the cafe itself, w i t h all its c o n t e n t s , b e c o m e s the g r o u n d against w h i c h I e x p e r i e n c e n o t Pierre b u t his a b s e n c e as a c o n c r e t e reality. Sartre

introduces

the n e o l o g i s m

"nihilation"

(neantisation) to

d e n o t e the p r o c e s s w h e r e b y n e g a t i o n is i n t r o d u c e d o n the c o n c r e t e level o f i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n (as o p p o s e d to the reflective level o f intellectual j u d g m e n t ) . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , nothingness is his t e r m for the o n t o l o g i c a l reality o f n e g a t i o n that is i n t r o d u c e d b y nihilation. T h e fact that m y e x p e r i e n c e o f the Pierreless cafe involves nihilation — o f b o t h the absent P i e r r e a n d o f the cafe that lacks h i m — s h o w s that

Sartre

139

n e g a t i o n exists as a c o n c r e t e reality. S i n c e this reality is n o t r e d u c i b l e to that o f being-in-itself (which is p u r e positivity) or to being-foritself (because n o t h i n g n e s s is n o t conscious) it follows that n o t h i n g ness is r e q u i r e d as a distinct o n t o l o g i c a l category, in a d d i t i o n to being-in-itself a n d being-for-itself. G i v e n this category, w e are able to f o r m at will n e g a t i v e j u d g m e n t s that are n o t specifically b a s e d in o u r e x p e r i e n c e , for e x a m p l e , that Attila

the H u n or V l a d i m i r

contrived

a n d trivial

nature

Nabokov

is n o t in the café. T h e

o f such j u d g m e n t s

serves

only

to

e m p h a s i z e the o n t o l o g i c a l priority o f j u d g m e n t s that a r e g r o u n d e d in direct e x p e r i e n c e s o f n o t h i n g n e s s . A l t h o u g h Sartre thinks o u r e x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e s n o t h i n g n e s s as a basic o n t o l o g i c a l category, h e does n o t (as h e thinks H e g e l a n d Heidegger

do) see it as e q u i - p r i m o r d i a l

w i t h being. R a t h e r , h e

m a i n t a i n s that n o t h i n g n e s s is l o g i c a l l y s u b s e q u e n t to a n d g r o u n d e d in b e i n g , since there is n o sense in s p e a k i n g o f s o m e t h i n g that exists entirely i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h a t is. N o t h i n g n e s s m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , exist like " a w o r m in the h e a r t o f b e i n g " (EN, 56/56). B u t h o w d o e s it arise? C e r t a i n l y n o t f r o m itself, t h r o u g h s o m e i n c o h e r e n t self-nihilation, n o r f r o m being-in-itself, w h i c h is entirely e n c l o s e d in its inert g i v e n n e s s . N o t h i n g n e s s m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e s o m e h o w d e r i v e d f r o m consciousness (and h e n c e f r o m being-for-itself), a c o n c l u s i o n s u p p o r t e d , m o r e o v e r , b y o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f n e g a t i o n s as arising in the face o f o u r e x p e c t a tions a n d fears. B u t consciousness is a l w a y s o f being-in-itself a n d so it m u s t give rise to n o t h i n g n e s s b y n e g a t i n g being-in-itself. T h i s n e g a t i o n is n o t , o f c o u r s e , a m a t t e r o f literally d e s t r o y i n g (annihilating) being-in-itself R a t h e r , consciousness n e g a t e s b y withdrawing f r o m being. S a r t r e identifies this w i t h d r a w a l w i t h freedom, since f r e e d o m is a t r a n s c e n d i n g o f the d e t e r m i n i s m o f c a u s a l laws a n d these l a w s exist only as structures o f being-in-itself.

Specifically,

f r e e d o m involves consciousness's ability to w i t h d r a w f r o m (revise o r e v e n reject) the self, w h i c h , as w e h a v e seen, is in the d o m a i n o f objects a n d so o f being-in-itself. B e c a u s e I a m free, I c a n d e n y w h a t I a m (that is, w h a t I h a v e b e e n u p to n o w ) a n d constitute at a n y m o m e n t a n e w m e a n i n g for m y existence as a self. N e g a t i o n enters the w o r l d in v i r t u e o f consciousness's c h o i c e to m a k e its self this a n d not that in relation to the rest o f the w o r l d . T h u s , in t e r m s o f o u r earlier

example,

Pierre's

absence

from

the café

h a s real

b e c a u s e I h a v e c h o s e n to b e a self that is c o n c e r n e d w i t h

force finding

Pierre in the café. I f I a m indifferent to Pierre's p r e s e n c e , t h e n his

140

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

a b s e n c e is a p p a r e n t o n l y o n the level o f intellectual j u d g m e n t s , like the a b s e n c e o f A t t i l a the H u n . I a m free s i m p l y b e c a u s e I a m c o n s c i o u s , for to b e c o n s c i o u s is to give m e a n i n g to the objects, p a r t i c u l a r l y m y self, o f w h i c h I a m a w a r e . I n particular, w h e n e v e r I reflect o n m y s e l f (on w h a t I h a v e b e e n u p until n o w ) , I c a n n o t a v o i d b e i n g a w a r e o f m y f r e e d o m a n d its ability to w i t h d r a w f r o m w h a t I a m . It follows that, if Sartre is c o r r e c t , a w a r e n e s s o f f r e e d o m s h o u l d b e a c o n s t a n t feature o f m y reflective a w a r e n e s s o f myself: w h e n e v e r I think, as I r e g u l a r l y d o , o f myself, I m u s t realize m y f r e e d o m . H e calls this a w a r e n e s s anguish (angoisse). A n g u i s h is n o t the s a m e as fear, w h i c h a l w a y s h a s a specihc object (a g u n , the n i g h t , dying). A n g u i s h c a n , f o l l o w i n g H e i d e g g e r , be called the fear o f n o t h i n g , b u t only if, like K i e r k e g a a r d , w e identify " n o t h i n g " w i t h the f r e e d o m w h e r e b y w e nihilate the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g the self. T h e r a t h e r d r a m a t i c t e r m " a n g u i s h " s h o u l d n o t l e a d us to forget that S a r t r e is t a l k i n g a b o u t a n o n t o l o g i c a l , n o t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , category. " A n g u i s h " d o e s n o t in itself refer t o , for e x a m p l e , a state o f m e n t a l agitation (anxiety) b u t m e r e l y to the fact o f o u r reflective a w a r e n e s s o f f r e e d o m . B u t n e i t h e r should w e think that a n g u i s h has n o t h i n g to d o w i t h a n x i e t y a n d r e l a t e d m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a . It is the o n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f a v a r i e t y o f m e n t a l states, r a n g i n g from certain f o r m s o f " d i f f u s e " a n x i e t y to a n y n u m b e r o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l states i n v o l v i n g a " r e p r e s s i o n " o f such a n x i e t y - for e x a m p l e , m y t r o u b l e d c o m p l a c e n c y w h e n I self-deceptively c l a i m that I " h a v e n o a l t e r n a t i v e " in a g i v e n situation. A c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , a n g u i s h m a y b e a b o u t either w h a t I m a y reject o u t o f m y past or w h a t I m a y m a k e o f m y s e l f in the future. A n e x a m p l e o f the hrst is m y r e a l i z a t i o n as a r e f o r m e d g a m b l e r , p a s s i n g b y a c a s i n o , that there is n o t h i n g to p r e v e n t m e f r o m o v e r r i d i n g all m y g o o d resolutions a n d m o t i v a t i o n s a n d p u t t i n g m y p a y c h e c k o n a roll o f the dice. A n e x a m p l e o f the s e c o n d is v e r t i g o , a " f e a r " o f heights g r o u n d e d n o t in a n y r e a l sense o f objective d a n g e r b u t in m y r e a l i z a t i o n that I c o u l d , at a n y m o m e n t , j u m p over the rail (EN, 67-8/69-70, 65-6/66-7).

Badfaith W e are likely to r e s p o n d to Sartre that a n g u i s h is surely n o t as c o m m o n as his a c c o u n t implies. B u t this, he w o u l d reply, results

Sartre

141

f r o m o u r efforts to flee f r o m a n g u i s h , to p r e t e n d to ourselves that w e are

not

really

free,

despite

our

ongoing

consciousness

of

our

f r e e d o m . T h i s flight f r o m a n g u i s h expresses the w i d e s p r e a d b e h a v i o r o f bad faith (mauvaise foi,

s o m e t i m e s translated as " s e l f - d e c e p t i o n " ) .

Sartre d o e s n o t m a i n t a i n that b a d faith is i n e v i t a b l e , b u t he clearly r e g a r d s it as v e r y c o m m o n , at least in o u r c u r r e n t social situation, a n d takes e l a b o r a t e p a i n s to describe the m a n y varieties a n d subtleties o f its manifestations. T h e s e descriptions are d e s i g n e d , hrst o f all, to

convince

us that,

contrary

to

appearances,

consciousness

of

f r e e d o m a n d the a c c o m p a n y i n g a n g u i s h are constants in o u r lives. B u t Sartre also intends his study o f b a d faith to p r o v i d e a basis for a d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e o f consciousness as a b e i n g c a p a b l e o f such b e h a v i o r . T h e o b v i o u s a n a l o g y for u n d e r s t a n d i n g b a d faith is the lie, since " t h e o n e w h o p r a c t i c e s b a d faith is h i d i n g a d i s p l e a s i n g truth or p r e s e n t i n g as truth a p l e a s i n g u n t r u t h " (EN, 83/89). B u t the p r o b l e m is that a lie r e q u i r e s a duality o f d e c e i v e r a n d d e c e i v e d , w h e r e a s I w o u l d s e e m to b e a single u n i h e d b e i n g . understanding

of b a d

faith,

Sartre

offers

3 0

T o o b t a i n a positive a number

of

striking

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions. I will focus on the f a m o u s e x a m p l e o f " a w o m a n w h o has c o n s e n t e d to g o out w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r m a n for the hrst t i m e " . S h e k n o w s that h e r c o m p a n i o n is interested in a sexual r e l a t i o n s h i p ; she k n o w s that she will fairly s o o n h a v e to d e c i d e w h e t h e r to sleep w i t h h i m . T h i s k n o w l e d g e seems s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a n d u n a m b i g u o u s . H e r desires are a n o t h e r m a t t e r — " s h e d o e s n o t quite k n o w w h a t she w a n t s " (EN, 90/97). A s S a r t r e p a i n t s the p i c t u r e , this w o m a n d o e s n o t explicitly w a n t a sexual r e l a t i o n s h i p or e v e n to a c k n o w l e d g e the possibility o f one. S h e k n o w s ("is p r o f o u n d l y a w a r e o f " ) the m a n ' s desire for h e r ; " b u t the desire cruel a n d n a k e d w o u l d h u m i l i a t e a n d horrify h e r "

(EN,

90/97). S o should w e say that she simply does n o t desire a sexual relationship? N o t exactly. I f she w e r e simply u n i n t e r e s t e d , h e r clear course o f a c t i o n w o u l d b e to deflate the p r e s e n t situation (leave, call a friend over to the table, spill s o m e t h i n g on h e r c o m p a n i o n ) . W h y does n o t she d o this? B e c a u s e there are things in the situation that she d o e s w a n t . S h e enjoys, for e x a m p l e , the a p p r e c i a t i o n a n d respect h e r c o m p a n i o n s h o w s h e r — the c o m p l i m e n t s , the polite gestures, the

3 0

Sartre maintains that a Freudian a p p e a l to the unconscious to explain b a d faith likewise fails to preserve the unity o f consciousness.

142

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

a d m i r i n g looks. N o p r o b l e m , w e m i g h t say. T h e s e things are readily available e l s e w h e r e — f r o m h e r friends, f r o m h e r family. D i d n ' t h e r father tell h e r she l o o k e d beautiful b e f o r e she left the h o u s e , a n d didn't h e r y o u n g e r sister l o o k at h e r w i t h a d m i r a t i o n ? Y e s , Sartre says, b u t that sort o f familial r e s p o n s e is n o t w h a t she has in m i n d . " S h e w o u l d h n d n o c h a r m in a r e s p e c t that w o u l d b e m e r e l y r e s p e c t " (EN, 90/97). S h e d o e s , in o t h e r w o r d s , w a n t to b e the object o f sexual desire, b u t at the s a m e t i m e she d o e s n o t w a n t to r e c o g n i z e the desire for w h a t it is. S h e w a n t s to m a i n t a i n a situation in w h i c h she is desired b u t in w h i c h she is able to p r e t e n d to h e r s e l f that she is n o t . S h e d o e s this b y e x p l o i t i n g the g a p b e t w e e n existence a n d essence (meaning). T h e r e is a sense in w h i c h a polite gesture o r a kind p h r a s e is m e r e l y that. S h e c a n a l w a y s say to herself: " H e m e r e l y h e l p e d m e w i t h m y c o a t " , or " H e m e r e l y said m y dress w a s lovely." W e m a y u r g e , " B u t h e m e a n t m u c h m o r e ! " B u t the fact r e m a i n s that, if y o u sufficiently c i r c u m s c r i b e the a c t i o n , y o u lose sight o f its ulterior m e a n i n g . T h e w o m a n d e c e i v e s herself first o f all b y restricting h e r attention to the sheer existence o f w h a t h e r c o m p a n i o n does a n d says (its being-in-itself) a n d i g n o r i n g its essential m e a n i n g (constituted b y his consciousness). T h i s g a m b i t , h o w e v e r , w o r k s o n l y u p to a p o i n t - the p o i n t at w h i c h the c o m p a n i o n g o e s b e y o n d a n y t h i n g that c a n b e c o n s t r u e d as m e r e politeness a n d acts in a n u n e q u i v o c a l l y r o m a n t i c way. I n Sartre's s c e n a r i o , h e takes h e r h a n d , a gesture that, a g a i n g i v e n the c o n v e n t i o n s o f the situation, h a s a n u n d e n i a b l y r o m a n t i c (and so ultimately sexual) significance. S u r e l y this will destroy the " t r o u b l e d a n d unstable h a r m o n y w h i c h gives the h o u r its c h a r m " (EN, 90/97)? N o t necessarily, since there is a n o t h e r l e v e l o f e v a s i o n . H i s t a k i n g h e r h a n d m a k e s his intentions u n e q u i v o c a l , b u t w h a t does that h a v e to do w i t h her? S h e , after all, is n o t h e r h a n d , this t h i n g that h a p p e n s to be e n t w i n e d w i t h h e r c o m p a n i o n ' s a n d o f w h i c h she, as a n intelligent p e r s o n w h o h a p p e n s to b e e n g a g e d in a r a t h e r d e e p intellectual c o n v e r s a t i o n , does n o t e v e n really n o t i c e . H e r e the b a d faith is founded

on another

g a p , that b e t w e e n

the b o d y

a n d the self.

A l t h o u g h there is surely a d e e p sense in w h i c h I a m m y b o d y (we d o not say that the c l u m s y w a i t e r spilled w a t e r o n m y b o d y b u t n o t o n me), there a r e still w a y s a n d c o n t e x t s in w h i c h w e d e n y the identity ("he's o n l y interested in m y b o d y " , " m y b o d y isn't w h a t it u s e d to b e " ) . T h e w o m a n ' s b a d faith p l a y s o n this, identifying h e r s e l f w i t h h e r b o d y to the e x t e n t that this e n a b l e s h e r to enjoy h e r c o m p a n i o n ' s

Sartre

143

sexual a t t e n t i o n , b u t s e p a r a t i n g h e r s e l f f r o m it w h e n it is a q u e s t i o n o f a d m i t t i n g h e r c o m p l i c i t y w i t h his d e s i r e .

31

U l t i m a t e l y , b a d faith is b a s e d o n the distinction o f being-for-itself a n d being-in-itself a n d the essential relation o f the t w o . T h e w o m a n is able to treat h e r c o m p a n i o n or h e r s e l f as a being-in-itself, w h i c h in one sense e a c h is, w h i l e at the s a m e time t r e a t i n g e a c h , w h e n it suits her, as a being-for-itself. In the m o s t basic t e r m s , b a d faith is possible b e c a u s e being-for-itself is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a f u n d a m e n t a l

duality

w h e r e b y it is b o t h s e p a r a t e d f r o m a n d identified w i t h being-in-itself. Accordingly,

it

is

always

incorrect

(ontologically)

to

treat

a

c o n s c i o u s b e i n g as simply b e i n g w h a t it is or as n o t b e i n g w h a t it is not. R a t h e r , a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g is, in Sartre's H e g e l i a n

formulae,

w h a t it is in the m o d e o f n o t b e i n g it (or, is w h a t it is n o t a n d is not w h a t it is). T h e r e follows the c e n t r a l o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e

of

Sartre's d e s c r i p t i o n o f b a d faith: b a d faith is possible o n l y b e c a u s e consciousness has the p e c u l i a r status o f b e i n g w h a t it is n o t a n d n o t b e i n g w h a t it is. It also follows that sincerity ( u n d e r s t o o d as j u s t b e i n g w h a t y o u are) is n o t p o s s i b l e .

32

B u t w h a t are w e to m a k e o f the a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y c l a i m that being-for-itself (consciousness) is w h a t it is n o t a n d is n o t w h a t it is? W e c a n p u t the p o i n t this w a y : T h e " w h a t it i s " is the set o f facts true o f the entity. T h e reality o f a being-in-itself is e x h a u s t e d b y these facts, b u t the reality o f a being-for-itself lies r a t h e r in i n t e r p r e t i n g (giving m e a n i n g to) these facts. A s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the facts a b o u t it, it is n o t (it g o e s b e y o n d ) these facts, t h o u g h o f course there is a sense in w h i c h t h e y are true o f it. A final question: if sincerity is n o t possible, is there a n y alternative to b a d faith? S a r t r e thinks there is, in an attitude that he

calls

" a u t h e n t i c i t y " . H u m a n s are a u t h e n t i c w h e n t h e y r e c o g n i z e — a n d live out in their actions - the basic truth that t h e y h a v e n o essential reality or n a t u r e b u t are fully a n d solely free agents. I f I h a v e this attitude, I w i l l a v o i d b a d faith, b e c a u s e I will a l w a y s r e c o g n i z e m y c o m p l e x reality as b e i n g w h a t I a m in the m o d e o f n o t b e i n g it (and h e n c e b e i n g entirely responsible for w h a t I am). A u t h e n t i c i t y also

Feminist critics have objected to w h a t they see as the sexist nature o f Sartre's discussion of this e x a m p l e ; see, e.g., Toril M o i , Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, chapter 4. For a b r o a d e r and deeper analysis o f Sartre's sexism (and with special reference to his relations with Beauvoir), see M i c h è l e L e D o e u f f L'étude et le rouet. H e r e Sartre's discussion evokes classic treatments o f sincerity in French literature, from M o n t a i g n e through Stendhal to G i d e .

144

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

a m o u n t s to a r e c o g n i t i o n o f f r e e d o m itself as the sole v a l u e o f h u m a n existence a n d thus p r o v i d e s a basis for a positive S a r t r e a n ethics. B u t , Sartre notes (EN, 106, n. 1 / 1 1 6 , n. 9), these ethical c o n c e r n s are not p a r t o f his p r o j e c t here.

Being-for-others S o far, Sartre's p h é n o m é n o l o g i e s o f the c o n c r e t e realities o f m a n - i n the-world

have

found

a

ready

ontological

context

in his t w o

c a t e g o r i e s o f being-for-itself a n d being-in-itself. B u t there a r e , h e thinks, realities that r e q u i r e a n a d d i t i o n to these c a t e g o r i e s , realities involving our experience o f other people. Philosophers

have typically

approached

the q u e s t i o n

o f other

consciousnesses as a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m . T h e i r t h o u g h t is that, since w e h a v e n o e x p e r i e n c e as such o f a n o t h e r consciousness b u t a r e a w a r e o f o n l y the other's body, w e n e e d s o m e w a y o f a r g u i n g f r o m the b o d i l y b e h a v i o r o f w h i c h w e are a w a r e to the consciousness o f w h i c h w e a r e n o t . O t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e m a i n t a i n e d that there is n o p r o b l e m o f o t h e r m i n d s at all. W e simply a n d directly k n o w that there are o t h e r consciousnesses a n d n o a c c o u n t n e e d b e g i v e n o f h o w this is or h o w it m i g h t b e j u s t i h e d . Sartre a g r e e s that there is n o sense in a r g u i n g for the existence o f o t h e r m i n d s ; the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m o f o t h e r m i n d s is a n o n starter. B u t h e does think that w e c a n give a n intelligible a c c o u n t o f h o w w e b e c o m e a w a r e o f others, a n a c c o u n t that will p r o v i d e a basis for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the n a t u r e o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations a n d that will also r e q u i r e us to a d d to o u r o n t o l o g i c a l

categories

one corre-

s p o n d i n g to being-for-others. T h e r e is, in o t h e r w o r d s , a n intelligible and important ontological p r o b l e m of other minds. Sartre c o n c r e t i z e s the p r o b l e m b y a d e s c r i p t i o n o f b e h a v i o r that leads to e x p e r i e n c e s o f s h a m e . S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , that I h a v e h e a r d s o m e sounds b e h i n d a h o t e l d o o r a n d s t o o p e d to l o o k t h r o u g h the k e y h o l e . Initially, I a m , let us suppose, entirely d i r e c t e d to the objects o f m y interest, so that m y consciousness o f self is entirely non-reflective (implicit). A t this p o i n t , there is n o r o o m for s h a m e , since I a m n o t a w a r e o f a self as a n o b j e c t (reflective consciousness) that I c a n j u d g e as s h a m e f u l . B u t n o w suppose s o m e o n e , say a h o t e l detective, s u d d e n l y c o m e s u p b e h i n d m e . I b l u s h w i t h s h a m e a n d start stuttering a n i n c o h e r e n t " e x p l a n a t i o n " o f m y b e h a v i o r . W h a t has h a p p e n e d ?

Sartre

H5

I h a v e s u d d e n l y b e c o m e a w a r e o f myself, b u t in a w a y w e h a v e not previously either "itself"

encountered.

consciousness's is

sheer

Previously,

non-thetic

transparent

"self-consciousness"

awareness

consciousness,

meant

o f itself (where with

no

nature

the or

structure) or else thetic (reflective) consciousness o f a substantive, p s y c h o l o g i c a l self. T h e consciousness I n o w h a v e , Sartre says, is n o n thetic; it does n o t i n v o l v e reflection a n d so does n o t p r e s e n t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l self that I constitute as m y m e a n i n g for myself. A t the s a m e t i m e , this consciousness is n o t m e r e l y o f consciousness as a totally t r a n s p a r e n t directedness t o w a r d its objects. It is o f a substantive, contentful p s y c h o l o g i c a l self. W h a t is this self, if it is n o t the self o f reflective consciousness? Sartre's a n s w e r is that it is the self as it exists for the other, n o t for m e . M o r e concretely: As I blubber m y explanation of w h y I have been l o o k i n g t h r o u g h a k e y h o l e , I realize that, n o m a t t e r w h a t I say, the h o t e l detective has his o w n v i e w o f w h a t sort o f p e r s o n skulks a r o u n d h o t e l c o r r i d o r s l o o k i n g t h r o u g h k e y h o l e s . R e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t I think o f m y s e l f or h o w I r e p r e s e n t m y s e l f to h i m , he will h a v e his o w n p e r c e p t i o n o f w h a t I a m . For a n o t h e r consciousness, I a m a n object w i t h a n a t u r e (perhaps that o f a d e g e n e r a t e pervert), j u s t like a n y other. In s h a m e , m y non-reflective a w a r e n e s s o f m y s e l f is o f m y s e l f as this object. I a m a w a r e o f m y s e l f as an object for a n o t h e r c o n s c i o u s ness. In this a w a r e n e s s , I e n c o u n t e r m y s e l f n o t as h a v i n g being-foritself (as a consciousness) or being-in-itself (as an o b j e c t o f m y o w n reflective consciousness) b u t as h a v i n g being-for-others. T h e r e are t w o k e y p o i n t s a b o u t the n a t u r e o f this a w a r e n e s s o f m y being-for-others. First, it presents m e to m y s e l f as w h a t I a m for the other. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that I entirely g r a s p j u s t h o w in detail the o t h e r sees m e (perhaps he thinks I a m a silly old m a n or curious a d o l e s c e n t r a t h e r t h a n a d e g e n e r a t e pervert). B u t I d o k n o w that the o t h e r has s o m e v i e w o f m y n a t u r e , a n d that a l o n e is sufficient to establish m y a w a r e n e s s o f m y s e l f as a b e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s . A l s o , the b e i n g I h a v e for the o t h e r is clearly being-in-itself; that is, the o t h e r sees m e as an o b j e c t , w i t h a fixed n a t u r e , n o t as the t r a n s p a r e n t consciousness o f a being-for-itself. I n d e e d , Sartre says, I a m u n e q u i v o c a l l y a being-in-itself for the other. W h e r e a s w i t h r e s p e c t to m y o w n reflective consciousness I a m a l w a y s w h a t I a m in the m o d e of not b e i n g it, for the o t h e r I simply a m w h a t I a m . S e c o n d , implicit in m y a w a r e n e s s o f m y s e l f as an o b j e c t o f the other's c o n s c i o u s n e s s is an a w a r e n e s s o f that v e r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f

146

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

the other. T h i s , o f c o u r s e , does n o t m e a n that I a m l i v i n g the other's consciousness " f r o m the i n s i d e " , the w a y the other does; I d o n o t see the w o r l d the w a y the o t h e r sees it. B u t I a m directly a w a r e o f the fact o f the other's consciousness. I n particular, I a m a w a r e o f the o t h e r as a f r e e d o m other t h a n m y o w n . T h i s is especially i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e , as w e h a v e seen, to b e free is to b e able to give m e a n i n g to the w o r l d . T h e other's f r e e d o m is, t h e r e f o r e , a c h a l l e n g e to m y h e g e m o n y over m y w o r l d , since I h a v e n o c o n t r o l o v e r the m e a n i n g that the o t h e r m a y give to objects that w e b o t h e x p e r i e n c e . T o take a simple e x a m p l e , the p a r k b e n c h that I see, as I a p p r o a c h it, as j u s t the r i g h t p l a c e to spend m y a f t e r n o o n r e a d i n g m a y b e for a n o t h e r person, coming from

a different

d i r e c t i o n , the p l a c e w h e r e she

a l w a y s eats h e r l u n c h . S i n c e w e b o t h live in the s a m e w o r l d , these different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

are the source o f real conflicts

between

m y s e l f a n d others. Potentially m o s t serious are conflicts over the self — b e t w e e n w h a t I a m f o r - m y s e l f a n d w h a t I a m for-others. I n d e e d , as w e h a v e seen, the o t h e r is m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d as a threat to m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t I a m , offering a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m y b e h a v i o r ("that d e g e n e r a t e p e r v e r t " ) that I a m in n o position to u n d e r m i n e (although, o f c o u r s e , I c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h m y o w n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the other: e.g., " a p e t t y t y r a n t " ) . F r o m this w e c a n see h o w Sartre arrives at his c o n c l u s i o n that " c o n f l i c t is the original m e a n i n g o f b e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s " (EN, 4 0 4 / 4 7 5 ) .

33

Sartre d e v e l o p s this v i e w b y discussing a v a r i e t y o f specific m o d e s of interpersonal

relations,

ranging

from

romantic

love

through

sadism. B e h i n d e a c h t y p e o f b e h a v i o r , h e finds the effort to control, one w a y o r another, the f r e e d o m o f the other. S o m e t i m e s the strategy is a n indirect o n e : to let the o t h e r m a k e a n object o f m e (confer o n m e a m e a n i n g , a self, f r o m outside) in the h o p e that I will n o t b e j u s t one o f the m a n y objects in the other's w o r l d b u t the special o n e that will fascinate a n d e v e n enthrall the other. Sartre u n d e r s t a n d s the desire to b e l o v e d in this w a y a n d treats m a s o c h i s m as a n e x t r e m e d e v e l o p m e n t o f this desire. B u t the strategy m a y also b e direct: to

Huis-clos, Sartre's 1945 play, is c o m m o n l y r e a d as a striking illustration of this conclusion, with its famous line, " H e l l is — other p e o p l e " always cited. B u t although the t h e m e of interpersonal conflict is surely present, it is important to keep in m i n d that the characters are dead in the precise sense of b e i n g no longer able to transform their lives b y free action. T h e y represent the fate o f those w h o fail to break out o f the bourgeois morality that makes h u m a n solidarity impossible, but n o t necessarily Sartre's j u d g m e n t on the h u m a n condition as such.

Sartre

147

m a k e the o t h e r an object that I c a n c o n t r o l a n d e v e n possess. T h i s , for e x a m p l e , is w h a t Sartre thinks is i n v o l v e d in s e x u a l desire.

Freedom T h e last p a r t o f L'être et le néant is c o n c e r n e d w i t h m o v i n g f r o m being to doing. It m i g h t s e e m that this w o u l d r e q u i r e yet a n o t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f o n t o l o g i c a l categories. B u t , o n Sartre's analysis, a c t i o n

derives

entirely f r o m the f r e e d o m o f being-for-itself. D o i n g , t h e r e f o r e , c a n be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f the o n t o l o g y a l r e a d y established. N o n e theless, this section is a p r o p e r c u l m i n a t i o n o f L'être et le néant, since f r e e d o m is, for S a r t r e , the f u n d a m e n t a l truth o f h u m a n existence. Sartre loses n o time

establishing the

connection

of action

to

f r e e d o m : a c t i o n is a l w a y s i n t e n t i o n a l (not necessarily reflective b u t w i t h an implicit e n d or goal); i n t e n t i o n a l (goal-directed) b e h a v i o r implies a lack — s o m e t h i n g n o t yet p r e s e n t that is seen as n e e d i n g to be p r e s e n t ; b u t l a c k is a n e g a t i o n , w h i c h , as w e h a v e seen, is a l w a y s the p r o d u c t o f consciousness as being-for-itself.

In-itself, b e i n g is

m e r e l y p u r e undifferentiated positivity. N e g a t i o n a p p e a r s o n l y in light o f consciousness's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the in-itself. F r o m this follows the f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n . C o n s c i o u s n e s s , n o t the world,

must

be

the

ultimate

motive

o f an

act,

since

it

alone

i n t r o d u c e s the n e g a t i o n that lies b e h i n d a c t i o n . N o r c a n w e e v e n say that the w o r l d (the in-itself) d e t e r m i n e s consciousness to see it in a n e g a t i v e w a y ; the n e g a t i v i t y is all in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n o t in the fact. A s the sole source o f its a c t i o n , consciousness is free in e v e r y action. W e m i g h t a g r e e that the w o r l d as such does n o t d e t e r m i n e o u r actions b u t still think that there is an i n t e r n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n via reasons (rational c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f the d e l i b e r a t i n g will) or m o t i v e s (non-rational causes such as feeling a n d desires). T h e i d e a w o u l d be that in a c t i n g consciousness is d e t e r m i n e d n o t f r o m outside b u t b y these i n t e r n a l factors. T h i s , h o w e v e r , is r u l e d out f r o m the start b y Sartre's

fundamental

view

o f consciousness

as t r a n s p a r e n t

and

empty, n o t a structure that c o u l d " c o n t a i n " things s u c h as reasons and

motives.

But

Sartre

also

thinks

the

point

can

be

directly

established b y n o t i n g that b o t h d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d p a s s i o n are intentional p h e n o m e n a , a l w a y s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d ends. T h u s , to d e l i b e r a t e a n d r e a c h a r a t i o n a l decision (the t r a d i t i o n a l p r o v i n c e o f the " w i l l " ) p r e s u p p o s e s ends for the sake o f w h i c h the d e l i b e r a t i o n is c a r r i e d

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

148

out. B u t the p r e s e n c e o f a n e n d implies a n i n t e n t i o n , w h i c h , as w e h a v e seen, m u s t itself b e established b y a free c h o i c e . S o the deliberative exercise o f the will p r e s u p p o s e s r a t h e r t h a n

constitutes

h u m a n f r e e d o m . I n r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n , the c o n c e r n is o n l y w i t h m e a n s to a n a l r e a d y c h o s e n g o a l . T h e s a m e is true o f w h a t w e call a c t i o n o u t o f feeling o r desire (motives, in Sartre's t e r m i n o l o g y ) . T h i s a l w a y s involves a n i n t e n d e d e n d ; fear h a s the i n t e n t i o n o f a v o i d i n g a danger, a m b i t i o n o f g a i n i n g s o m e p r i z e . S i n c e consciousness is the o n l y possible source o f a g o a l , it is the o n l y possible source o f the feelings a n d desires that are d e t e r m i n e d b y goals. B o t h reasons (motifs) a n d m o t i v e s (mobiles ) a r e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e m 34

selves results o f free c h o i c e s , n o t the causes o f t h e m . M o r e o v e r , b o t h are s i m p l y aspects o f consciousness's free c h o i c e o f its g o a l - d i r e c t e d action.

Thus,

"the reason,

the m o t i v e ,

a n d the e n d are three

indissoluble t e r m s o f the thrust o f a free a n d l i v i n g consciousness w h i c h projects itself t o w a r d its possibilities a n d m a k e s itself defined b y these possibilities" (EM, 493/579)Sartre's a c c o u n t m a k e s a c t i o n n o t o n l y free b u t r a d i c a l l y a n d f u n d a m e n t a l l y free; there is n o d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f it f r o m a n y o t h e r source. B u t this raises the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r his analysis confers too m u c h f r e e d o m . Surely, w e d o n o t e x p e r i e n c e ourselves as totally and unlimitedly

free. O n the o n e h a n d , f r e e d o m

is n o t p u r e l y

g r a t u i t o u s c a p r i c e ; o n the o t h e r h a n d , it is surely s o m e h o w c o n d i t i o n e d b y the c o n c r e t e situation in w h i c h I find myself. S a r t r e agrees w i t h these p o i n t s , b u t thinks t h e y c a n b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h his r a d i c a l v i e w o f f r e e d o m . H e a t t e m p t s the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h discussions

of the fundamental project a n d o f the situation. A f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t is the for-itself's overall o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the w o r l d , the c o m p r e h e n s i v e

g o a l o f all o f consciousness's

free

a c t i o n . T h e fact that w e a c t in the c o n t e x t o f a f u n d a m e n t a l project e x p l a i n s w h y o u r lives are n o t a r a n d o m series o f u n c o n n e c t e d a n d g r a t u i t o u s actions. B u t w e m u s t n o t think o f the f u n d a m e n t a l project as s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d f r o m outside o r a b o v e ; it is itself a free c h o i c e , entirely the p r o j e c t o f consciousness's decision to see itself a n d its w o r l d in a certain way. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t is in n o w a y a T r o j a n horse for p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m . N o r should w e think

T h i s term is confusingly r e n d e r e d as " c a u s e " in the Barnes translation o f L'être et le néant.

Sartre

149

that the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t is s o m e sort o f U r - c h o i c e or p r i m o r d i a l f r e e d o m that itself controls m o r e o r d i n a r y c h o i c e s . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l project exists n o t as a decision separate f r o m m y daily actions but o n l y as an o r i e n t a t i o n c o n s t a n t l y r e n e w e d in e a c h o f these actions. For this r e a s o n , it c a n , in p r i n c i p l e , b e r e v e r s e d or r e p l a c e d at a n y instant. R a d i c a l c o n v e r s i o n is a p e r m a n e n t possibility o f h u m a n existence.

As

a

result,

the j u d g m e n t

that

a

given

individual's

f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t is o f a g i v e n sort c a n b e m a d e o n l y retrospectively: m y p r o j e c t is o n l y w h a t it has b e e n , as a m a t t e r o f m y free c h o i c e s , u p to now. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t functions as a reified ideal, g u i d i n g a h u m a n life o n l y f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e

of a bio-

g r a p h i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t f r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f a life as it is a c t u a l l y lived. B u t as such an i d e a l , S a r t r e m a d e the n o t i o n o f the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t basic for the " e x i s t e n t i a l p s y c h o a n a l y i s " that he p r o p o s e d in p l a c e o f F r e u d ' s analysis o f the " u n c o n s c i o u s m i n d " , a c o n c e p t that Sartre saw as a self-contradiction. In t e r m s o f f u t u r e - d i r e c t e d life itself, the p r o j e c t is essentially a m e a s u r e o f the p r i c e o f a c t i n g in o n e w a y or another. O f c o u r s e , I c a n a l w a y s k e e p c l i m b i n g a m o u n t a i n or r u n n i n g a r a c e in spite o f m y fatigue a n d p a i n . B u t e v e n t u a l l y this m a y be at the p r i c e

of

c h a n g i n g the basic o r i e n t a t i o n o f all m y c h o i c e s u p until now. S u c h a c h a n g e is, n o n e t h e l e s s , a l w a y s possible. M y free acts constitute the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t , n o t v i c e versa. A c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , f r e e d o m

(action) a l w a y s takes p l a c e in a

situation. T h a t is, a c t i o n is a l w a y s in the midst o f a n d s o m e h o w directed against being-in-itself. A c c o r d i n g l y , there is a l w a y s s o m e resistance, s o m e " c o e f f i c i e n t o f a d v e r s i t y " (a t e r m b o r r o w e d f r o m B a c h e l a r d ) e n c o u n t e r e d b y a free a c t i o n . F r e e d o m a l w a y s e n c o u n t e r s obstacles. S o m u c h is c o m m o n sense, a n d Sartre does n o t d e n y it. B u t he says w e n e e d to think m o r e d e e p l y a b o u t the origin o f these obstacles. Being-in-itself m a y h a v e s o m e totally g e n e r i c intrinsic inertia that " o p p o s e s " o u r a c t i o n on it. B u t the f o r m o f o p p o s i t i o n that arises in a n y p a r t i c u l a r case, the specific obstacles to o u r f r e e d o m in a g i v e n situation, derive f r o m the specific intentions o f the for-itself in that situation — a n d therefore f r o m f r e e d o m itself. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , there has b e e n m u c h criticism o f Sartre's existentialist v i e w o f f r e e d o m . T h e critics i n c l u d e Sartre

himself,

w h o in a 1969 i n t e r v i e w c o m m e n t e d o n his r e a c t i o n in r e c e n t l y rereading

his

remark

that

"whatever

the

circumstances,

and

w h e r e v e r the site, a m a n is a l w a y s free to c h o o s e to be a traitor or

M& L

150

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

not . . . " : " W h e n I r e a d this, I said to myself: it's i n c r e d i b l e , I actually believed t h a t ! "

3 5

Sartre g o e s o n to e x p l a i n his v i e w (at the time o f L'être et le néant) as d u e to the " d r a m a o f the w a r " a n d its " e x p e r i e n c e o f h e r o i s m " . I p r o p o s e , h o w e v e r , that the v i e w o f L'être et le néant is m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n the s i m p l i h c a t i o n s o f a f e w striking p a s s a g e s m i g h t suggest, a n d that there are i n t e r n a l r e a s o n s for the a p p a r e n t r a d i c a l i t y o f Sartre's v i e w o f f r e e d o m in this w o r k . T h e s e r e a s o n s also suggest that L'être et le néant supports a m o r e c o m p l e x a n d n u a n c e d v i e w o f f r e e d o m . M y p o i n t derives f r o m m e t h o d o l o g i c a l features o f L'être et le néant. A s w e h a v e seen, the b o o k offers a deft a n d fruitful c o m b i n a t i o n o f c o n c e p t u a l dialectics (system) a n d c o n c r e t e existential descriptions (experience). T h e hrst represents Sartre's m a s t e r y o f the p h i l o s o p h i cal t h i n k i n g he l e a r n e d in the F r e n c h university system a n d the s e c o n d his o w n literary a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Throughout terms

the b o o k ,

Sartre d e v e l o p s a systematic

o f his f u n d a m e n t a l

being-for-itself,

ontological

categories

structure in

(being-in-itself,

n o t h i n g n e s s , b e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s , etc.); this is his o n -

tology. A t the s a m e t i m e , he shows h o w c o n c r e t e descriptions o f existential situations (e.g., o f negativities, b a d faith,

interpersonal

relations, situated f r e e d o m ) c o m p l e m e n t a n d d e e p e n this structure; this is his p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

3 6

T h i s is, overall, a v e r y effective

dual

a p p r o a c h , b u t it involves t w o limitations. First, the abstract o n t o l o gical c a t e g o r i e s , dialectically d e p l o y e d simply in their o w n t e r m s , are not

always

adequate

to the richness

o f the

phenomenological

descriptions. T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t in the latter p a r t o f the b o o k , w h e r e the s h a r p c o n c e p t u a l s e p a r a t i o n o f being-for-itself f r o m being-in-itself m a k e s it difficult to a p p r e c i a t e the p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f situated f r e e d o m . (A similar p o i n t holds for Sartre's descriptions o f the b o d y a n d sexuality.) T h i s is essentially d u e to the fact - o f w h i c h Sartre

1

6

is w e l l

aware

— that

his (and p e r h a p s

any) o n t o l o g i c a l

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, " T h e Itinerary of a T h o u g h t " (interview with Hew Left Review, 1969). reprinted in Jean-Paul Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism, 3 3 - 4 . T h e c o m m e n t to w h i c h Sartre is reacting is in the preface to a n early collection o f his plays. A s w e have seen, Sartre's general ontology ultimately derives (in his introduction) from a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description, in Husserlian terms, of the cognitive relation b e t w e e n subject a n d object. B u t this description takes place o n a level of generality that sharply separates it from L'être et le néant's later existential p h é n o m é n o l o g i e s o f "being-in-thew o r l d " . Further, Sartre's d e v e l o p m e n t o f his ontology is m o r e a matter o f abstract reasoning about the categories of being-in-itself a n d being-for-itself than o f describing the n u a n c e s of our experience o f them.

Sartre c a t e g o r i e s are a n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m the c o n c r e t e situation o f m a n - i n t h e - w o r l d . T h e p r o p e r attitude is o b v i o u s l y to give p r i o r i t y to the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions a n d m o d i f y the a p p a r e n t i m p o r t o f the c a t e g o r i e s accordingly. B u t Sartre's t r e a t m e n t o f f r e e d o m also n e e d s to b e p u t in the c o n t e x t o f a clear p a t t e r n o f d e v e l o p m e n t in his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x a m p l e s in L'être et le néant. A s his systematic structures d e v e l o p , Sartre's e x p e r i e n t i a l e x a m p l e s e x p a n d f r o m the h y p e r - i n d i v i d u a l i t y p r o j e c t e d o n t o his objects b y theflâneurdisinterestedly o b s e r v i n g café life, to the c o m m i t m e n t

o f a situated a g e n t struggling w i t h the

n a t u r a l a n d historical w o r l d s . A s a result, the early e x a m p l e s j o i n the a b s t r a c t o n t o l o g y in s u p p o r t i n g a r a d i c a l l y d i s e n g a g e d c o n c e p t i o n o f f r e e d o m that is n o t consistent w i t h the later e x a m p l e s . O n c e w e d i s c o u n t the c a t e g o r i c a l abstractions a n d the distorted early e x a m p l e s , L'être et le néant p r o v i d e s a m u c h m o r e sensitive a n d nuanced view of freedom.

3 7

T h i s is n o t to d e n y Sartre's o w n claims

that the b o o k w a s overly i n f l u e n c e d b y the e x t r e m i t y o f the w a r a n d o c c u p a t i o n a n d that h e d i d n o t really a p p r e c i a t e the social d i m e n sion o f h u m a n existence until after the w a r .

3 8

B u t it also supports

Sartre's further c o n t e n t i o n that his existentialism is f u n d a m e n t a l l y consistent w i t h the m o r e a d e q u a t e v i e w o f f r e e d o m d e v e l o p e d in later w o r k s such the Critique de la raison dialectique.

THE

CRITIQUE

OF D I A L E C T I C A L

REASON

T h e r e are at least three useful w a y s o f c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the overall project

o f Sartre's

reformulation

Critique de la raison dialectique. First,

o f his existentialism, w i t h a v i e w to t a k i n g

it is a better

a c c o u n t o f the limitations o f f r e e d o m a n d , especially, p r o v i d i n g a n a c c o u n t o f the social d i m e n s i o n s o f h u m a n reality. S e c o n d , it is a rethinking designed

of Marxism to a v o i d

(specifically,

the d e a d

its t h e o r y

o f social

end o f reductionist

units),

a n d positivist

f o r m u l a t i o n s (which S a r t r e associates especially w i t h S o v i e t o r t h o doxy) b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g into it a n existentialist v i e w o f h u m a n b e i n g i n - t h e - w o r l d . (Sartre thinks, m o r e o v e r , that this is m o r e in k e e p i n g

3 7

3 8

It is also w o r t h noting that Sartre's play, Les mouches, w h i c h a p p e a r e d the same year as L'être et le néant (1943), has a similarly m o r e developed view o f freedom, implicitly distinguishing, for e x a m p l e , b e t w e e n the " l i g h t " freedom that everyone has simply b y existing a n d the " h e a v y " f r e e d o m that w e take o n b y e n g a g e d action. J e a n - P a u l Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism, 34.

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960) w i t h M a r x ' s o w n views.) T h i r d , Critique de la raison dialectique p r o v i d e s the basis for, in S a r t r e ' s w o r d s , " a structural, historical

anthro-

p o l o g y " (Critique de la raison dialectique [CRD], 9/822); that is, a t h e o r y o f h u m a n society b a s e d n o t o n the " a n a l y t i c a l r e a s o n " o f the positive sciences b u t o n the " d i a l e c t i c a l r e a s o n " S a r t r e m a i n t a i n s is r e q u i r e d for the study o f h u m a n r e a l i t y .

39

W e h a v e n o t e d a l r e a d y in L'être et le néant a n i n c r e a s i n g tension b e t w e e n the r a d i c a l f r e e d o m o f consciousness that e m e r g e s in the early p a r t o f the b o o k a n d the sense o f limits o n this f r e e d o m as the later p a r t situates consciousness in the social a n d m a t e r i a l w o r l d s . Critique de la raison dialectique p r e s e r v e s c o r e existentialist v i e w s a b o u t f r e e d o m a n d its locus in i n d i v i d u a l consciousness. B u t it a l m o s t entirely a b a n d o n s the o n t o l o g i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y o f L'être et le néant a n d d e v e l o p s instead a set o f r o u g h l y p a r a l l e l t e r m s that p l a c e far m o r e e m p h a s i s o n the situated a n d c o m m u n a l n a t u r e o f h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l transition is f r o m the l a n g u a g e o f b e i n g to the l a n g u a g e o f p r a c t i c e . Sartre n o l o n g e r speaks o f " b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f " , w i t h its c o n n o t a t i o n s o f a solitary c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t o f " p r a x i s " , the action

of an agent

(individual

or group)

o n the w o r l d . ( O n e

c o n n e c t i n g t h r e a d to L'être et le néant is Sartre's c o n t i n u i n g use o f "project"

in Critique de la raison dialectique to express the c h o i c e

implicit in a n y praxis.) Similarly, talk o f being-in-itself is r e p l a c e d b y the l a n g u a g e o f the practico-inert, a t e r m that e m p h a s i z e s n o t the wholly

undifferentiated

givenness

o f the in-itself b u t r a t h e r the

resistance to o u r projects o f objects (from artifacts to f o r m s o f life) structured b y past p r a x i s o f ourselves a n d others. I n this r e g a r d , Sartre speaks o f the " e x i g e n c y " that is i m p o s e d o n p r a x i s b y the "exis"

4 0

(inertia) o f the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t a n d that h e is e v e n w i l l i n g to

say p r o v i d e s i n d i v i d u a l s or g r o u p s w i t h a (not inevitable) " d e s t i n y " . Corresponding

to the earlier

work's

notions

of negativity

and

n o t h i n g n e s s are the ideas o f alterity (any relation o f s e p a r a t i o n , n o t j u s t the distinction

o f consciousness f r o m

its object)

and, more

specifically, t r a n s c e n d e n c e (dépassement) in the sense o f a p r o c e s s o f g o i n g b e y o n d a g i v e n set o f m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s w h i l e at the s a m e time, in the m a n n e r o f H e g e l ' s dialectic, i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e m . Finally, talk o f the o t h e r (and being-for-others) is often r e p l a c e d b y a m o r e

For a very helpful discussion o f Sartre's M a r x i s m a n d its relation to his existentialism, see T h o m a s F l y n n , Sartre and Marxist Existentialism. Properly, " h e x i s " , but Sartre consistently ignores the G r e e k r o u g h - b r e a t h i n g mark.

Sartre

t53

g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f the T h i r d (le Tiers) that constitutes the unity o f a g r o u p b y o b s e r v i n g o r c o n t r o l l i n g it. T o g e t a n i d e a o f S a r t r e ' s M a r x i s t t h e o r y o f social structures, w e n e e d to l o o k at the m a i n c o n c e p t s a r o u n d w h i c h he builds his a c c o u n t : n e e d , scarcity, seriality, a n d the v a r i o u s f o r m s o f e n s e m b l e s (Sartre's m o s t g e n e r a l w o r d for a g g r e g a t e s o f h u m a n b e i n g s , also termed "multiplicities") . H u m a n s need things such as f o o d , c l o t h i n g , h o u s i n g , a n d sex in o r d e r to survive (that is, to live, a n d to live as h u m a n s ) . H o w e v e r , o u r w o r l d is o n e of scarcity; it does n o t a l w a y s p r o v i d e sufficient r e s o u r c e s to fulfill all o u r n e e d s (or the n e e d s o f all o f us). W e m u s t struggle to survive a n d e v e n face the possibility that the n e e d s o f s o m e p e o p l e will b e satisfied at the e x p e n s e o f others. B e c a u s e o f scarcity in the face o f o u r n e e d , w e live in a situation d o m i n a t e d b y the m a t e r i a l structures (both n a t u r a l a n d , especially, social) that c a n satisfy o u r needs. I n such a situation, S a r t r e says, h u m a n relations take o n a n inert a n d a t o m i z e d

form

that h e calls seriality. A n e n s e m b l e

of

individuals m a y h a v e a c o m m o n a i m (e.g., finding a d e q u a t e f o o d o r g i v i n g their c h i l d r e n a g o o d e d u c a t i o n ) . B u t b e c a u s e o f scarcity, the c o m m o n a i m separates r a t h e r t h a n unites t h e m . R a t h e r t h a n seeking f o o d o r e d u c a t i o n for " u s " , e a c h i n d i v i d u a l is f o r c e d to seek w h a t is n e e d e d for " m e " . I n d i v i d u a l s thus b e c o m e c o m p e t i t o r s for their s h a r e d n e e d a n d c o m e to see e a c h o t h e r as threats. Sartre's e x a m p l e is that o f p e o p l e w a i t i n g in a line at a bus-stop. T h e y f o r m a series d o m i n a t e d b y a t h i n g (the bus) that satisfies a n e e d (transportation to w o r k ) . A l t h o u g h t h e y share this n e e d , it separates t h e m b e c a u s e o f scarcity (there m a y n o t b e a seat for e v e r y o n e ) . I n this simple

case, the s e p a r a t i o n

a n d isolation are

strikingly e x p r e s s e d b y the fact that i n d i v i d u a l s line u p for the b u s — first c o m e , first served - e a c h in his or h e r o w n p l a c e . T h e y literally f o r m a series; b u t e v e n in m o r e c o m p l e x cases — say that o f h i g h school students s e e k i n g a d m i s s i o n to elite colleges - the c o n c e p t o f seriality applies to their situation o f a t o m i z e d isolation f r o m o n e a n o t h e r (CRD, 4 6 8 - 7 4 / 4 5 6 - 6 1 ) . W h a t p l a c e is there for f r e e d o m in this stark d e s c r i p t i o n o f the h u m a n situation? I n o n e sense, w e are still entirely free despite the scarcity a n d seriality i m p o s e d b y the w o r l d . A f t e r all, e v e r y l i m i t a t i o n a n d constraint derives u l t i m a t e l y f r o m the fact that w e h a v e m a d e certain c h o i c e s ; at a m i n i m u m , c h o i c e s to find a d e q u a t e f o o d , e a r n a living, stay alive. T h i s o f course is the sort o f p o i n t Sartre e m p h a -

154

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

sized in L'être et le néant. B u t n o w Sartre m a k e s it entirely clear that there

is a n o t h e r

constrained

basic

by material

sense

in w h i c h

scarcity:

w e a r e n o t free

we cannot

alter the

when

situation

c o n s t r a i n i n g us so that it will n o t b e a n obstacle to o u r n e e d s . H i s language

here

s h o w s h o w far h e h a s c o m e

from

some

o f the

f o r m u l a t i o n s o f L'être et le néant: " I t w o u l d b e quite w r o n g to interpret m e as s a y i n g that m a n is free in all situations, as the Stoics c l a i m e d . I m e a n the e x a c t opposite: all m e n are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the p r a c t i c o - i n e r t h e l d a n d in so far as this h e l d is a l w a y s c o n d i t i o n e d b y s c a r c i t y " (CRD, 369/331). T h i s d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , m e a n that the situation m u s t b e simply e n d u r e d , that f r e e d o m is helpless in the face o f the limits i m p o s e d b y the situation. Sartre's t h o u g h t is that often (and p a r t i c u l a r l y in the m o d e r n w o r l d , w i t h its i m m e n s e c a p a c i t i e s for p r o d u c t i o n ) scarcity is n o t d u e to a literal lack o f e n o u g h g o o d s b u t to i m b a l a n c e d allocations o f those g o o d s . Scarcity, in such a case, is n o t a sheer p h y s i c a l necessity b u t the p r o d u c t o f the social system o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution. Further, the limitations in o u r p o w e r to t r a n s f o r m a n u n a c c e p table situation often a p p l y o n l y to the isolated, serialized i n d i v i d u a l . A l o n e , I c a n n o t t r a n s f o r m the situation; b u t we c a n , p r o v i d e d that we

begin

acting

as a u n i h e d group (an e n s e m b l e

in w h i c h the

m e m b e r s h a v e r e c i p r o c a l relations) r a t h e r t h a n a m e r e seriality. S o the k e y question b e c o m e s the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " g e n u i n e g r o u p , w i t h p o w e r to t r a n s f o r m

one: H o w can a

an unacceptable

social

w o r l d , e m e r g e f r o m the a l i e n a t i o n o f seriality? A c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , a g r o u p e m e r g e s hrst as a " g r o u p - i n - f u s i o n " , as a series o f individuals c o m i n g t o g e t h e r for c o m m o n a c t i o n for a specihc g o a l , as in the s t o r m i n g o f the Bastille. Typically, this process o c c u r s u n d e r t h r e a t o f e x t e r n a l danger. I n such a situation, individuals c o n t i n u e to see o n e a n o t h e r as others (in the sense of L'être et le néant), b u t n o w as others that h a v e the s a m e p r o j e c t . A s a result, individuals n o w a c t n o t as i n d i v i d u a l s b u t as w h a t

Sartre

calls

" s i n g u l a r i n c a r n a t i o n s o f the c o m m o n p e r s o n " (where the " c o m m o n p e r s o n " is d e h n e d b y the s h a r e d project). T h i s sort o f j o i n t a c t i o n constitutes the group in Sartre's t e c h n i c a l sense. It is, Sartre says, w i t h the e m e r g e n c e o f the g r o u p that f r e e d o m , a p p a r e n t l y lost in the a l i e n a t i o n o f seriality, is r e c o v e r e d . A g r o u p c a n tear d o w n the Bastille, w h e r e a s a series o f a t o m i z e d individuals c a n n o t . S o , in this a c c o u n t , f r e e d o m is fully r e a l i z e d n o t as p r i v a t e subjectivity b u t as a n objective social structure. N o n e t h e l e s s , Sartre's

Sartre

r

55

existentialism r e m a i n s the r o o t o f his p o s i t i o n , since the objective social structure — the g r o u p — u l t i m a t e l y derives entirely f r o m the c h o i c e s o f individuals. B u t precisely b e c a u s e a g r o u p is f o r m e d b y i n d i v i d u a l c h o i c e s , it c a n b r e a k u p b e c a u s e o f such c h o i c e s : if e n o u g h individuals w i t h d r a w f r o m the p r o j e c t , the g r o u p dissolves. T h e r e

are s t a n d a r d

t e c h n i q u e s , a p p a r e n t in the history o f the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , for m a i n t a i n i n g g r o u p stability (e.g., the O a t h a n d the Terror, c h a r a c t e r istic o f w h a t S a r t r e called a " p l e d g e d g r o u p " ) . B u t in the l o n g r u n , the survival o f the g r o u p will r e q u i r e m u c h m o r e structure a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a n it has " i n f u s i o n " o r e v e n as the result o f p r o m i s e s e n f o r c e d b y terror. T h i s will b e especially so w h e n (as in the case o f the n e w r e v o l u t i o n a r y F r e n c h R e p u b l i c ) it m u s t survive assaults b y p o w e r f u l forces o f e n t r e n c h e d r e a c t i o n . In particular, the g r o u p ' s individuals will h a v e to b e d i v i d e d into s p e c i a l i z e d roles, c o o r d i n a t e d b y a c e n t r a l authority. A s a result, the g r o u p b e c o m e s a n institution, in w h i c h

people

identify w i t h their s p e c i a l i z e d roles (so l o s i n g sight o f the overall project) a n d the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y b e g i n s m o n i t o r i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g individuals

to see that t h e y

carry

o u t their

tasks. I n this way,

institutionalization r e i n t r o d u c e s seriality a n d p e o p l e b e c o m e o p e n to the m a n i p u l a t i o n o f a sovereign. A s a result, the o p p r e s s i o n that t r i g g e r e d the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p a c t i o n returns (the N a p o l e o n i c empire,

Soviet

communism).

This

leads

Sartre

to

the

central

p r o b l e m o f political activity: that o f f o r m i n g a stable a n d e n d u r i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y g r o u p that avoids b o t h the a l i e n a t i o n a n d o p p r e s s i o n o f institutions a n d the c h a o s o f anarchist spontaneity. T h i s w a s a m a j o r g o a l o f his political activities right after the w a r . Sartre's t r e a t m e n t o f institutions is also the l o c u s o f his r e f o r m u l a tion o f the central M a r x i s t c o n c e p t s o f a l i e n a t i o n a n d class. M o r e over, institutions a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y w h a t Sartre calls structures (not p r e s e n t in the group-in-fusion). T h e s e a r e socially c r e a t e d systems o f inertia that constrain a n d limit the f r e e d o m o f o u r p r a x i s . T h e y are also p r o p e r objects o f the " a n a l y t i c a l r e a s o n " o f positivist

social

science. T h i s last p o i n t leads to o u r third w a y o f c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the Critique de la raison dialectique, as a " s t r u c t u r a l historical 4 1

anthropology".

4 1

Sartre uses structurelle, not the m o r e c o m m o n structurale, perhaps e v o k i n g Heidegger's distinction of existenzial a n d existenziett, with an emphasis o n process rather t h a n o n system. See Peter C a w s , Sartre, 143.

156

The Reign of Existential Phenomenology (1940-1960)

W h i l e S a r t r e , as w e h a v e j u s t seen, fully r e c o g n i z e s a d o m a i n for the e m p i r i c a l t e c h n i q u e s o f m a i n s t r e a m social science in the study o f h u m a n b e i n g s , h e insists that such t e c h n i q u e s c a n n o t give a c o n c r e t e a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f h u m a n reality. T h i s is b e c a u s e p r a x i s , the r o o t o f the distinctively h u m a n , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d o n l y in t e r m s o f the " p r o g r e s s i v e - r e g r e s s i v e m e t h o d " o f " d i a l e c t i c a l r e a s o n " . T h i s t e r m i n o l o g y e m e r g e s f r o m Sartre's extensive m e t h o d o l o g i c a l reflections,

particularly

in

"Question

de m é t h o d e " ,

the l o n g

essay

i n c l u d e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the F r e n c h edition o f Critique de la raison dialectique (but p u b l i s h e d s e p a r a t e l y in English). T h e c o r e o f Sartre's m e t h o d o l o g y is b a s e d o n the v i e w f a m o u s l y f o r m u l a t e d b y E n g e l s (but e q u i v a l e n t to the d e s c r i p t i o n o f situated f r e e d o m in L'être et le néant) that S a r t r e p a r a p h r a s e s as follows: " m e n m a k e their history o n the basis o f real, p r i o r c o n d i t i o n s ( a m o n g w h i c h w e w o u l d i n c l u d e a c q u i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , distortions i m p o s e d b y the m o d e o f w o r k a n d o f life, a l i e n a t i o n , etc.), b u t it is the men w h o m a k e it a n d n o t the p r i o r c o n d i t i o n s " ( " Q u e s t i o n de m é t h o d e " [ Q M ] , 6 1 / 8 7 ) . (Sartre in fact r e g a r d s the m a i n b o d y o f the Critique de la raison dialectique as essentially a t h o r o u g h e x p l i c a t i o n a n d j u s t i h c a t i o n o f this c l a i m — w h i c h is w h y he said that, logically, the " Q u e s t i o n de m é t h o d e " c o u l d h a v e p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d the work.) Sartre's f u n d a m e n t a l p o i n t is that a n a c c o u n t o f p r a x i s ( h u m a n action)

solely

in t e r m s

o f its p r i o r

conditions

(an i n s t r u m e n t a l

a c c o u n t in t e r m s o f e x t e r n a l causes o r e v e n in t e r m s o f the reasons a n d m o t i v e s o f L'être et le néant) is possible o n l y if w e hrst h a v e a n understanding

o f the p r a x i s in t e r m s

o f its overall p u r p o s e

or

m e a n i n g . S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e (QM, 9 6 - 1 0 0 / 1 5 2 - 9 ) , a friend a n d I are seated in a r o o m , r e a d i n g . M y friend s u d d e n l y gets u p , g o e s to the w i n d o w , a n d o p e n s it. I instantly u n d e r s t a n d this a c t i o n as a n effort to c o o l off a n o v e r h e a t e d r o o m . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is " p r o g r e s s i v e " (forward looking) in the sense o f g r a s p i n g the future g o a l that m a k e s m y friend's a c t i o n intelligible. In its w a k e , I a m t h e n able to c o n s t r u c t a " r e g r e s s i v e " analysis o f the a c t i o n . I c a n , for e x a m p l e , note that the r o o m w a s , in fact, quite h o t , that m y friend w a s doubtless m a d e

uncomfortable

b y the h e a t ,

i n d e e d so m u c h so that she w a s w i l l i n g to i n t e r r u p t h e r study to alleviate

the situation.

B u t , Sartre

emphasizes,

I construct

this

" a n a l y t i c " e x p l a n a t i o n (or " i n t e l l e c t i o n " , in his t e r m i n o l o g y ) only given m y p r o g r e s s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B e f o r e m y friend's a c t i o n I m a y have

been

aware

o f the h e a t

only

as a

"confused,

unnamed

Sartre

157

d i s c o m f o r t " (QM, 9 6 / 1 5 3 ) , n o t as a specific causal factor a b l e to provoke action, and I certainly h a d no awareness o f any internal effects

o f the h e a t

o n m y friend's

dispositions.

T h e r o o m , the

w i n d o w , etc. w e r e p r e s e n t as possibly r e l a t e d to a n a c t i o n , b u t it w a s the a c t i o n itself that r e v e a l e d t h e m as actually o p e r a t i v e in this p a r t i c u l a r case. T h e h e a t , for e x a m p l e , w a s o v e r b e a r i n g precisely b e c a u s e m y friend a c t e d to alleviate it. Sartre takes this simple e x a m p l e as a m o d e l o f a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e is r o o m for c a u s a l or structural analyses o f h u m a n a c t i o n f r o m a strictly e x t e r n a l v i e w p o i n t . B u t such analyses m u s t t h e m s e l v e s b e b a s e d o n a r i c h e r i n t e r n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (in the sense o f Verstehen) o f the a c t i o n as a n i n t e n t i o n a l , g o a l - d i r e c t e d w h o l e . T h i s f u n d a m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g lies in the d o m a i n o f w h a t S a r t r e calls " d i a l e c t i c a l r e a s o n " . A s in H e g e l a n d M a r x , this n o t i o n e m b r a c e s not o n l y the p r o c e s s w h e r e b y w e u n d e r s t a n d reality b u t also the intelligibility o f the o b j e c t u n d e r s t o o d . W i t h r e g a r d to b o t h poles, " d i a l e c t i c " refers to a p r o c e s s o f totalization w h e r e b y the e l e m e n t s o f reality a n d o f o u r k n o w l e d g e o f it are unified in a d y n a m i c w h o l e . The

h e a r t o f Sartre's criticism o f r e d u c t i o n i s t M a r x i s t s

such as

L u k â c s is that t h e y r e p l a c e the a l w a y s unfinished d i a l e c t i c a l process of totalization w i t h fixed totalities that c a n b e g r a s p e d t h r o u g h analytic reason. Just as L'être et le néant e n d e d w i t h a p r o m i s e o f a n ethics that w o u l d c o m p l e m e n t its p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l ontology, so Critique de la raison dialectique p r o m i s e d a s e c o n d v o l u m e that w o u l d a p p l y its " s o c i a l ontology"

to the course

p u b l i s h e d or e v e n

finished

o f a c t u a l history.

k n o w e n o u g h history to c o m p l e t e i t . 4 2

Sartre

himself

never

this v o l u m e ; h e said h e s i m p l y d i d n o t 4 2

T h e substantial fragment that he did complete was published posthumously as v o l u m e I I of Critique de la raison dialectique.

CHAPTER

6

Beauvoir

O m i g h t y a t t i t u d e s o f M a n a n d W o m a n , in w h i c h t h e r e seek to b e u n i t e d . . . w h a t the C r e a t i o n m a d e s e p a r a t e . (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, v, 97)

BEAUVOIR

AND

THE

ORIGINS

OF

EXISTENTIALISM

S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r (1908—86) w a s b o r n in Paris, w h e r e she w a s raised a n d spent m o s t o f h e r life. H e r m o t h e r w a s a d e v o u t C a t h o l i c , w h e r e a s h e r father, w h o e m b r a c e d the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s secularism, t h o u g h t religion a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y for w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . B e a u v o i r says it w a s this clash in f u n d a m e n t a l p a r e n t a l v a l u e s that m a d e h e r an intellectual, c o n c e r n e d w i t h the critical assessment o f ideas. S i n c e m o t h e r s h a d c o n t r o l over the earlier e d u c a t i o n o f their c h i l d r e n , B e a u v o i r ' s p r e - u n i v e r s i t y e d u c a t i o n w a s at c o n v e n t schools, w h e r e she w a s a brilliant student b u t c a m e to resist the intellectual a n d the m o r a l n a r r o w n e s s o f a C a t h o l i c e d u c a t i o n . T h e family's h n a n c i a l situation

(middle-class b u t financially

strained) m a d e

a

c a r e e r a n a t u r a l c h o i c e for the b r i g h t elder daughter.

teaching Moreover,

B e a u v o i r ' s father's secularism, a l o n g w i t h h e r o w n desire to e s c a p e f r o m religious e d u c a t i o n , l e d h e r to enroll as an u n d e r g r a d u a t e at the S o r b o n n e , a state institution (although m u c h o f h e r w o r k w a s initially d o n e at institutes w i t h i n the S o r b o n n e d e s i g n e d for C a t h o l i c students). Although

a university

education

was

at this time

no

longer

u n u s u a l for a w o m a n , B e a u v o i r w a s intent on a s p e c i a l i z a t i o n in the a l m o s t entirely m a s c u l i n e d o m a i n o f philosophy. S h e a c h i e v e d this g o a l , despite p a r e n t a l o p p o s i t i o n , a n d b e c a m e o n l y the ninth w o m a n in F r a n c e

to

receive

the

agrégation in philosophy.

Beauvoir

did

e x c e p t i o n a l l y well in h e r e x a m i n a t i o n s , h n i s h i n g s e c o n d o n l y to S a r t r e , w h o w a s three y e a r s older t h a n she a n d r e - t a k i n g the e x a m 158

Beauvoir

159

after his failure the p r e v i o u s year. ( B e a u v o i r w a s also the y o u n g e s t p e r s o n to date to pass the e x a m . ) T h e e x a m i n e r s h a d a l o n g d e b a t e over w h i c h o f the t w o should r e c e i v e first p l a c e : " I f Sartre s h o w e d g r e a t intelligence a n d a solid, if at times i n e x a c t , culture, e v e r y b o d y a g r e e d that, o f the t w o , she w a s the real p h i l o s o p h e r . "

1

D e s p i t e h e r o b v i o u s ability a n d the close r u n w i t h S a r t r e , B e a u v o i r c o n c l u d e d that she did n o t h a v e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l m i n d on a p a r w i t h his a n d d e c i d e d to p u r s u e literature instead. In this r e g a r d , m u c h has b e e n m a d e o f an a p p a r e n t l y decisive discussion she h a d w i t h Sartre d u r i n g their p r e p a r a t i o n for the agrégation e x a m , a discussion w h i c h she felt he " t o o k a p a r t " h e r i d e a s .

2

in

T h e experience was not

an isolated o n e : " D a y after day, a n d all d a y l o n g I set m y s e l f u p against S a r t r e , a n d in o u r discussions I w a s simply n o t in his c l a s s . "

3

W e n e e d , h o w e v e r , to r e m e m b e r that the " c l a s s " B e a u v o i r h a d in m i n d w a s that o f the highest l e v e l o f creative p h i l o s o p h e r . S h e h a d , she a c k n o w l e d g e d , a r e m a r k a b l e ability to u n d e r s t a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas a n d " p e n e t r a t e d to the h e a r t o f a t e x t " m o r e r e a d i l y t h a n Sartre. B u t this v e r y facility, she said, w a s d u e to h e r " l a c k

of

o r i g i n a l i t y " , w h i c h m a d e h e r better able to assimilate o t h e r s ' ideas. A s a p h i l o s o p h e r , she t h o u g h t she c o u l d h a v e b e e n an

excellent

e x p o s i t o r a n d critic b u t n o t " a g e n u i n e l y creative t a l e n t " . W h a t she 4

m e a n s is clear f r o m h e r r e s p o n s e in an i n t e r v i e w w i t h

Margaret

S i m o n s , w h o expresses d o u b t s a b o u t B e a u v o i r ' s c l a i m that " s h e is not a p h i l o s o p h e r " : " F o r m e , a p h i l o s o p h e r is s o m e o n e like S p i n o z a , H e g e l , etc., or like Sartre: s o m e o n e w h o builds a g r e a t system, a n d not s o m e o n e w h o loves philosophy, w h o

c a n t e a c h it, w h o

can

u n d e r s t a n d it, a n d w h o c a n use it in essays, etc., b u t is s o m e o n e w h o truly constructs a philosophy. A n d that, I did n o t d o . " S h e a d d s that there are, in h e r sense, p e r h a p s o n l y t w o p h i l o s o p h e r s in a c e n t u r y a n d says that " S a r t r e , in m y o p i n i o n , will b e one o f t h e m " .

5

Given

this, h e r t u r n a w a y f r o m p h i l o s o p h y w a s a sign less o f self-deprecation t h a n o f h i g h a m b i t i o n : " I possessed far too m u c h intellectual a m b i t i o n to let this satisfy m e . " S h e w a n t e d to " c o m m u n i c a t e the e l e m e n t o f o r i g i n a l i t y " in h e r o w n e x p e r i e n c e a n d " i n o r d e r to d o

1

2

:î

4

5

A n n i e C o h e n - S o l a l , Sartre: A Life, 74. S i m o n e de Beauvoir, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, 364. Ibid. S i m o n e de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, 178. " B e a u v o i r Interview (1979)", in M a r g a r e t S i m o n s , Beauvoir and the Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism, 11.

160 this

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960) successfully

knew

orientate m y s e l f " .

it w a s literature

towards

which

I

must

6

B e a u v o i r did p r o d u c e o n e b o o k in the s t a n d a r d

philosophical

m o d e , Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté (1947), a n essay that tries to d e v e l o p a n ethics o n the basis o f Sartre's existentialism. T h e b o o k goes m u c h further t h a n Sartre's p u b l i s h e d w o r k s in t r y i n g to d e r i v e a morality from freedom

as the f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e . B u t B e a u v o i r

h e r s e l f e v e n t u a l l y r e j e c t e d t h e b o o k ' s p r o j e c t o n the g r o u n d s that it tried to " d e h n e a m o r a l i t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f a social c o n t e x t " ,

a n d it

7

c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d as a m a j o r a c h i e v e m e n t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , there is a b r o a d e r sense in w h i c h B e a u v o i r is a n i m p o r t a n t c o n tributor to the p h i l o s o p h y o f existence in h e r n o v e l s , h e r m e m o i r s , a n d h e r treatises o n social issues. A l t h o u g h b a s i c a l l y w o r k i n g o u t o f Sartre's

existentialist

framework,

she offers

distinctive

views

of

f r e e d o m a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations; a n d , m o s t importantly, in Le deuxième sexe she brilliantly d e p l o y s a n d a d a p t s existentialist categories in a v e r y p o w e r f u l a n d original expression o f f e m i n i s m . True

to h e r literary resolve, B e a u v o i r

published

three

8

novels

d u r i n g the 1940s: L'invitée (1943), Le sang des autres (1945), a n d Tous les

6

7

8

The Prime of Life, 178. B e a u v o i r adds that the highest levels o f philosophical creativity require a " s t u b b o r n n e s s " of w h i c h " t h e female condition does not facilitate the d e v e l o p m e n t " . Force of Circumstance, 67. S e e above, chapter 5, on Sartre's parallel effort in the 1950s to develop an existentialist ethics in his Cahiers pour une morale. S o m e scholars have a r g u e d that B e a u v o i r is a major source of the basic ideas of existentialism, in particular, those o f L'être et le néant. B e a u v o i r herself was a d a m a n t that she h a d n o such role: " O n the philosophical plane, I w a s influenced b y Sartre. Obviously, I was not able to influence h i m , since I did n o t d o philosophy. I criticized h i m , I discussed m a n y of his ideas with h i m , but I did not have any philosophical influence o n Sartre, whereas h e h a d such an influence o n m e , that is c e r t a i n " (Simons, " B e a u v o i r Interview (1979)", 9). T h o s e w h o think w e should discount such statements point to evidence that B e a u v o i r h a d been thinking a b o u t such existentialist themes as f r e e d o m , b a d faith, a n d , especially, the other before Sartre b e g a n writing L'être et le néant a n d even before the t w o k n e w o n e another. M a r g a r e t Simons, in particular, has recently cited Beauvoir's diary entries from 1927 to support a " k e y discovery . . . : Beauvoir's statement o f h e r interest in the philosophical theme, 'the opposition of self a n d o t h e r ' " (Margaret Simons, Beauvoir and the Second Sex, 186). H o w e v e r , the passages S i m o n s cites are all expressions o f fairly ordinary experiences that w o u l d find parallels in a great m a n y diaries a n d novels. T h e y evoke Sartre's a c c o u n t of interpersonal relations simply because they refer to the e v e r y d a y p h e n o m e n a his a c c o u n t wants to elucidate. B u t they d o n o t provide any substantial p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l (or otherwise philosophical) analysis o f these p h e n o m e n a . T h i s , o f course, is hardly surprising, since Beauvoir, w h o h a d just b e g u n h e r serious study of philosophy d u r i n g the last year, has nothing c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the rich m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d ontological a p p a r a t u s that Sartre brings to his discussion. M o r e o v e r , even if, like S i m o n s , w e extract an implicit " p h i l o s o p h y of the O t h e r " from Beauvoir's remarks, it bears little resemblance to Sartre's, since, as Simons emphasizes, it eliminates his striking emphasis o n the essential conflict b e t w e e n rival consciousnesses.

Beauvoir

161

hommes sont mortels (1946). T h e s e are all distinctively

philosophical

novels, a n d they raise the question o f j u s t w h a t sort o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l role

a novel

might

play.

I n a n essay

from

the s a m e

period,

" L i t e r a t u r e a n d M e t a p h y s i c s " (first p u b l i s h e d in 1946), B e a u v o i r outlines a literary m e t h o d o f d e v e l o p i n g a n d e v e n in a sense testing philosophical

theses.

"A good

novel",

she says,

" c a n stimulate

i m a g i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e s that a r e as c o m p l e t e a n d as d i s t u r b i n g as lived e x p e r i e n c e s " .

9

O f t e n , o f c o u r s e , novelists create such e x p e r i -

ences m e r e l y to s u p p o r t p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d theses. B u t novels c a n also p r e s e n t c h a r a c t e r s a n d situations that a r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f c o n c l u s i o n s we

already

hold

a n d that

function

as i n d e p e n d e n t

sources

of

e x p e r i e n t i a l truth. S o , for e x a m p l e , in L'invitée, B e a u v o i r i m a g i n e s a complex

love

triangle

(based, h o w e v e r ,

on her experience

with

Sartre a n d O l g a K o s a k i e v i c z ) t h r o u g h w h i c h she p r o b e s the n a t u r e of interpersonal relations.

10

A n d in Tous les hommes sont mortels, in

o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the significance o f d e a t h a n d h u m a n

finitude,

she creates a c h a r a c t e r w h o h a s e t e r n a l life. In this way, B e a u v o i r ' s novels are a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y b y o t h e r m e a n s . W e m a y ask h o w w h a t is, after all, simply fiction c o u l d h a v e a n y r e l e v a n c e for p h i l o s o p h i c a l truth. B u t b y the s a m e t o k e n , w e m i g h t w o n d e r w h a t a d v a n t a g e true stories c o u l d h a v e , since their t r u t h c a n easily r e p r e s e n t m e r e l y c o n t i n g e n t features o f h u m a n existence, w i t h n o r e l e v a n c e for its central or f u n d a m e n t a l truths. T h i s is the r e a s o n traditional p h i l o s o p h y refuses to b a s e its c l a i m s o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r e x a m p l e s , w h e t h e r real o r

fictional,

a n d c o n t e n t s itself w i t h the

analysis o f g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s . T h i n k i n g a l o n g these lines, w e m i g h t c o n c l u d e that existentialism, w h i c h denies that the truth o f h u m a n existence c a n b e e x p r e s s e d in c o n c e p t u a l a b s t r a c t i o n s , finds itself in a double

methodological

bind.

I n s e e k i n g a truth that is b o t h

c o n c r e t e a n d f u n d a m e n t a l it w o u l d s e e m to b e after a n impossible

9

0

S i m o n e de Beauvoir, "Littérature et m é t a p h y s i q u e " , 107. E d w a r d a n d K a t e Fullbrook, in Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, m a k e m u c h o f the fact that Sartre (and Merleau-Ponty) r e a d a n early draft o f Beauvoir's L'invitée in 1940. But, apart from the fact that w e d o not have this draft a n d have n o w a y o f k n o w i n g h o w m u c h influence Sartre might have h a d on its philosophical content, there is the e n o r m o u s g a p , even for a n existentialist, b e t w e e n a literary expression o f an idea a n d the detailed analysis and a r g u m e n t a t i o n required for a philosophical d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n idea. Sartre's originality and greatness as a philosopher d e p e n d on the w a y he carried out this development, something that, as B e a u v o i r repeatedly emphasizes, she did n o t even try to do. M o r e o v e r , if w e are l o o k i n g for novelistic influences on Sartre's thoughts, Proust, in w h o m he was steeped w h e n attending the E c o l e N o r m a l e , is p r o b a b l y a m u c h richer source than Beauvoir.

162

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

c o m b i n a t i o n o f the specihcity o f a c t u a l existence a n d the g e n e r a l i t y o f abstractions. B e a u v o i r ' s suggestion, h o w e v e r , is that the m e d i u m o f literature p r o v i d e s a resolution o f the existentialist's

dilemma.

F i c t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r s a n d events are the sort o f synthesis o f c o n c r e t e ness a n d g e n e r a l i t y that w e n e e d to see b e y o n d t h e triviality o f m e r e facts w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g lost in t h e abstractions o f m e r e c o n c e p t s . T o use H e g e l ' s e x p r e s s i o n , t h e c r e a t i o n s o f h c t i o n are " c o n c r e t e uni¬ v e r s a l s " : i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r s a n d events that e m b o d y f u n d a m e n t a l truths a b o u t o u r existence. In these t e r m s , B e a u v o i r ' s novels a r e a distinctly original p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t , a l t h o u g h a n a c h i e v e m e n t o f quite a different k i n d f r o m Sartre's in L'être et le néant, w h e r e phenomenological

description

rather

than

novelistic

narration

supplies the " c o n c r e t e u n i v e r s a l " . M o s t o f B e a u v o i r ' s later w o r k w a s n e i t h e r n a r r o w l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l nor strictly literary. B u t it c a n still b e r e a d as a response to t h e existentialist p r o b l e m

of combining concreteness with

generality.

T h e s e w r i t i n g s (from 1949 on) take t w o m a i n f o r m s : a u t o b i o g r a p h y a n d treatises o n social issues. H e r a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l p r o j e c t b e g a n w i t h three l a r g e v o l u m e s , p u b l i s h e d b e t w e e n

1958 a n d 1963, in

w h i c h she gives a n a c c o u n t o f h e r life f r o m the b e g i n n i n g a l m o s t u p to t h e p r e s e n t . T h e hrst v o l u m e , Mémoires d'une jeune fille rangée, traces h e r d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m a little girl d e v o t e d to p l e a s i n g h e r p a r e n t s to a n i n d e p e n d e n t w o m a n w i t h a sophisticated p h i l o s o p h i c a l

educa-

tion, h e r c e literary a m b i t i o n s a n d political c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d J e a n P a u l Sartre as a life-long c o m p a n i o n . T h e f o l l o w i n g t w o v o l u m e s (La force de l'âge a n d La force des choses) r e c o u n t h o w she a n d Sartre survive the w a r , b e c o m e p r o m i n e n t cultural personalities, a n d l e a d lives in which

they maintain

their special p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p

through

n u m e r o u s l o v e affairs, intense political i n v o l v e m e n t s , a n d c o n s t a n t writing. N i n e y e a r s later, B e a u v o i r p u b l i s h e d a h n a l v o l u m e (Tout compte fait), w h i c h c o n t i n u e d the story u p to 1972. A f t e r S a r t r e d i e d in 1980 she p u b l i s h e d , as a c o d a to the a u t o b i o g r a p h y , a c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d m o v i n g a c c o u n t o f his last d a y s (La cérémonie des adieux). H e r e w e should also m e n t i o n the m e m o i r o f h e r m o t h e r ' s last d a y s , Une mort très douce (1964), a b o o k that m a n a g e s to unite clinical r e a l i s m a n d existentialist reflection w i t h t h e sheer e m o t i o n a l p o w e r o f a child's g r i e f for the loss o f a p a r e n t . B e a u v o i r ' s a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s m e e t the existentialist d e m a n d for a c o n c r e t e universal in t w o respects. O n o n e level, t h e y o p e r a t e in the s a m e w a y as novels, w i t h c h a r a c t e r s a n d events that are specihc b u t

Beauvoir

163

at the s a m e time c o n s t r u c t e d to express the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n in g e n e r a l . T h e r e is, n o d o u b t , m o r e e m p h a s i s in an a u t o b i o g r a p h y o n k e e p i n g to the literal facts, but, a p a r t f r o m o u r curiosity a b o u t the author, there m a y be little to distinguish a g o o d a u t o b i o g r a p h y from a g o o d a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l n o v e l . B u t there is a n o t h e r level o n w h i c h B e a u v o i r ' s a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s h a v e a distinctive v a l u e . S h e a n d Sartre tried to live their lives o n the basis o f an existentialist c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n reality. B e a u v o i r ' s n a r r a t i v e s h a v e the p a r t i c u l a r a d v a n t a g e o f s h o w i n g the strengths a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f this c o n c e p t i o n in their lives. T h e r e is p a r t i c u l a r focus on their ideal o f an intense

and

p e r m a n e n t p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t that, at the s a m e t i m e , r e c o g n i z e s the r i g h t o f e a c h p a r t n e r to less c e n t r a l liaisons w i t h others. A s Sartre p u t it to B e a u v o i r : " W h a t we h a v e is an essential l o v e ; b u t it is a g o o d i d e a for us also to e x p e r i e n c e contingent love a f f a i r s . "

11

The

a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s p r o v i d e close scrutiny o f the viability o f this i d e a l and

raise

extremely

interesting questions

about

Beauvoir's

own

ultimate attitude t o w a r d this v e r s i o n o f existentialist c o m m i t m e n t , especially t h r o u g h the n a r r a t i v e o f h e r love affair w i t h the A m e r i c a n novelist, N e l s o n A l g r e n , a n d h e r r e a c t i o n s to Sartre's affairs w i t h a v a r i e t y o f w o m e n . M o r e generally, it m a y be a r g u e d that B e a u v o i r ' s a u t o b i o g r a p h i e s , e v e n m o r e t h a n h e r o w n a n d Sartre's novels a n d plays, c a r r y out the existentialist p r o j e c t of, in T o r i l M o i ' s w o r d s , " b r e a k i n g ] d o w n the distinction b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d life so as to

endow

life w i t h

the

truth

and

necessity

of philosophy

p h i l o s o p h y w i t h the e x c i t e m e n t a n d p a s s i o n o f l i f e " .

and

1 2

B u t B e a u v o i r also c a r r i e d out the existentialist p r o j e c t in h e r treatises o n social issues. B y far the m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f these w a s h e r b o o k on w o m e n , Le deuxième sexe, p u b l i s h e d in 1949. ( T h e r e is also a m a j o r study o f old a g e , La vieillesse, p u b l i s h e d in 1970.) A s w e shall see, Le deuxième sexe is an e n c y c l o p e d i c survey o f e v e r y aspect of t h o u g h t a b o u t a n d t r e a t m e n t o f w o m e n . T h e topic is c o v e r e d in t e r m s o f biology, m y t h , literature, history, politics, a n d philosophy. H o w , w e m a y w e l l w o n d e r , c a n such a p r o j e c t fit into the existentialist d e m a n d for i n d i v i d u a l i t y a n d c o n c r e t e n e s s ? T h e a n s w e r is that behind

all the

abstractions

and

objectivities

o f the

treatise

lies

B e a u v o i r ' s o w n d e v e l o p i n g a w a r e n e s s o f the effect h e r sex h a d o n h e r life.

1 1

1 2

The Prime of Life, 24. Toril M o i , Simone de Beauvoir, 147.

164

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

For a l o n g t i m e , she tells us, she h a d n o t r e g a r d e d it as o f a n y s i g n i h c a n c e . In 1946, w h e n she hrst b e g a n t h i n k i n g o f w r i t i n g h e r a u t o b i o g r a p h y , she p o s e d the q u e s t i o n o f w h a t it h a d m e a n t for h e r to b e a w o m a n . " A t hrst t h o u g h t " , she says, " I t h o u g h t I c o u l d dispose

o f that p r e t t y

quickly.

I h a d n e v e r h a d a n y feeling

of

inferiority, n o o n e h a d e v e r said to m e : ' Y o u think that w a y b e c a u s e y o u ' r e a w o m a n ' ; m y f e m a l e n e s s h a d n e v e r b e e n i r k s o m e to m e in a n y way. 'For m e ' , I said to S a r t r e , ' y o u m i g h t a l m o s t say it j u s t hasn't c o u n t e d ' . "

1 3

T h i s indifference to h e r s e x is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e ,

g i v e n the fact that, b y the time B e a u v o i r w e n t to college, the F r e n c h e d u c a t i o n a l system h a d (just) b e c o m e m o r e or less e q u a l l y o p e n to w o m e n a n d m e n a n d that she h a d e n j o y e d i m m e d i a t e a c c e p t a n c e b y Sartre a n d o t h e r m a l e m e m b e r s o f the y o u n g Parisian intellectual elite.

1 4

Certainly,

we can understand

how, w h e n

she

compared

h e r s e l f to m o s t o t h e r w o m e n , past a n d p r e s e n t , B e a u v o i r c o u l d think that she existed m o r e or less outside the d o m a i n o f sexist o p p r e s s i o n . B u t w h e n B e a u v o i r t h o u g h t further a b o u t the q u e s t i o n (she says it w a s at Sartre's suggestion), h e r v i e w c h a n g e d radically: I looked, and it was a revelation: this world was a masculine world, my childhood had been nourished by myths forged by men, and I hadn't reacted to them at all in the same way I should have done if I had been a boy. I was so interested in this discovery that I abandoned my project for a personal confession in order to give all my attention to finding out about the condition of woman in its broadest t e r m s . 13

It is, t h e n , clear that B e a u v o i r ' s g e n e r a l a n d objective study o f w o m e n ' s c o n d i t i o n d e r i v e d f r o m h e r r e a l i z a t i o n o f the s i g n i h c a n c e o f this c o n d i t i o n for her. M o r e o v e r , this r e a l i z a t i o n d o e s n o t f u n c t i o n m e r e l y as a n e x t e r n a l o c c a s i o n for the w r i t i n g o f Le deuxième sexe. M u c h o f the brilliance o f the w o r k derives f r o m B e a u v o i r ' s ability to infuse h e r factual a n d objective study w i t h h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f h e r s e l f as a w o m a n . T h e result is a r e m a r k a b l e synthesis — precisely a l o n g the lines r e q u i r e d b y existentialism — o f the g e n e r a l a n d the p e r s o n a l . F i n d i n g n e w a n d m o r e effective w a y s o f a c h i e v i n g this synthesis is B e a u v o i r ' s p r i m a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to existentialist t h o u g h t .

1 3

1 4

1 5

Force ofCircumstance, 94. A t the time B e a u v o i r b e g a n her university education, w o m e n were still technically e x c l u d e d from the Ecole N o r m a l e , a n d B e a u v o i r did not even try to gain entry. B u t exceptions to the formal rule were possible, as S i m o n e Weil's admission to the E c o l e N o r m a l e during this same p e r i o d shows. Force of Circumstance, 9 4 - 5 .

165

Beauvoir

I n d e e d , at p r e s e n t , Le deuxième sexe is b y far the single m o s t influential w o r k b y a n existentialist.

THE

SECOND SEX

W h a t , B e a u v o i r asks, does it m e a n to b e a w o m a n ? T h e r e are t w o s t a n d a r d a n s w e r s . Essentialists say that there is a female (the " e t e r n a l

feminine"), while

anti-essentialists

nature

(nominalists) say

that there is n o such t h i n g , that w o m e n a r e j u s t h u m a n b e i n g s , as m e n a r e , their " f e m i n i n i t y " m e r e l y a n a c c i d e n t a l characteristic n o different f r o m h a v i n g r e d h a i r or b e i n g o v e r six feet tall. W e will not b e surprised that B e a u v o i r rejects the essentialist view, w h i c h contradicts precedes

the

fundamental

essence,

that

the

existentialist free

choices

claim of

that

our

existence

consciousness

d e t e r m i n e w h a t w e are. I n this sense, h e r f a m o u s f o r m u l a , " O n e is not b o r n , b u t r a t h e r b e c o m e s , a w o m a n " (Le deuxième sexe [DS], 11: 13/267) is, for her, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p l a t i t u d e . B u t B e a u v o i r

also

rejects the anti-essentialist view. B e i n g a w o m a n is, at least in o u r w o r l d , n o t a casual fact, i r r e l e v a n t to a person's c o r e identity — a n y m o r e t h a n is b e i n g J e w i s h or b l a c k or o l d . N o r is b e i n g a w o m a n simply a m a t t e r o f one's o w n c h o i c e : precisely h o w y o u a r e a w o m a n m a y b e u p to y o u , b u t the fact that y o u are a w o m a n a n d that this fact m a k e s a g r e a t deal o f difference is i m p o s e d o n y o u by y o u r situation. H e r e it is clear that B e a u v o i r h a s m o v e d b e y o n d the simplistic existentialist v i e w o f f r e e d o m that is at least often suggested b y L'être et le néant. O n that view, b e i n g a w o m a n c o u l d limit m y f r e e d o m only to the e x t e n t that I chose it to b e a limitation. B e a u v o i r , h o w e v e r , r e c o g n i z e s that s o m e features o f m y situation m a y w e l l b e obstacles to m y f r e e d o m n o m a t t e r h o w I c h o o s e . It does n o t f o l l o w that such a feature m u s t a l w a y s b e a n obstacle: w e c a n i m a g i n e a situation in w h i c h b e i n g a w o m a n is o f n o m o r e significance t h a n h a v i n g blue eyes. B u t the fact is that in the c u r r e n t historical situation, b e i n g a w o m a n d o e s restrict y o u r f r e e d o m , n o m a t t e r h o w y o u c h o o s e to live y o u r life. T h i s is a significant revision o f the n a ï v e conception of freedom

existentialist

(and, as w e h a v e seen, a revision

Sartre

h i m s e l f later d e v e l o p s in Critique de la raison dialectique). B e a u v o i r ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the constraints u n d e r w h i c h w o m e n exist is built a r o u n d a n o t h e r existentialist c a t e g o r y : that o f " t h e Other".

The

freedom

of women

is limited

(i.e.,

women

are

166

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

oppressed) b e c a u s e , historically, they h a v e c o m e to b e d e h n e d as the other o f m e n . T h e r o o t o f B e a u v o i r ' s line o f t h o u g h t h e r e is Sartre's n o t i o n o f b e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s . N o t o n l y d o e s consciousness exist " f o r - i t s e l f " ; it also exists for o t h e r consciousnesses that a r e a w a r e o f it as a n object. W e h a v e seen h o w S a r t r e derives f r o m his p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the other

the i d e a

that

each

consciousness

experiences

a

conflict

b e t w e e n itself a n d a n y o t h e r consciousness, as e a c h struggles to control

the other's f r e e d o m .

Beauvoir

starts w i t h

this i d e a b u t

signihcantly t r a n s f o r m s it. First, she m o v e s the n o t i o n o f the o t h e r f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l to society, s p e a k i n g o f the s h a r e d consciousness that o n e g r o u p h a s o f another. Further, w h e r e a s Sartre focuses o n the w a y that the o t h e r poses

a challenge

to identity,

Beauvoir

e m p h a s i z e s h o w consciousness uses its v i e w o f the o t h e r to c o n s t r u c t its o w n identity. It is n o t j u s t that the other's a w a r e n e s s

o f us

constitutes a c h a l l e n g e to o u r self-understanding. I n a d d i t i o n , o u r a w a r e n e s s o f the o t h e r is p a r t o f h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d

ourselves.

" T h u s it i s " , B e a u v o i r says, " t h a t n o g r o u p ever sets itself u p as the O n e w i t h o u t at o n c e setting u p the O t h e r o v e r against i t s e l f " (DS, 1: 16/xxiii). A c c o r d i n g l y , " t h e c a t e g o r y o f the Other is as p r i m o r d i a l as consciousness i t s e l f " (DS, 1: 1 6 / x x i i ) . B e a u v o i r ' s basic i d e a , t h e n , is that w o m e n exist as a n o t h e r for m e n : p a r t o f w h a t it m e a n s to b e a m a n is n o t to b e a w o m a n . T h i s a l o n e , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t e x p l a i n the distinctive o p p r e s s i o n w o m e n h n d in their situation. A f t e r all, as she notes, e v e r y g r o u p is a n o t h e r for s o m e o t h e r g r o u p s . T h e m e r e fact that, say, a g r o u p o f p e o p l e live o n the s a m e b l o c k l e a d s t h e m to define t h e m s e l v e s in o p p o s i t i o n to the " o t h e r s " w h o live o n o t h e r blocks. T h i s a l o n e does n o t result in o p p r e s s i o n or restriction o f the other's f r e e d o m . B u t the r e a s o n it does n o t is that, in t y p i c a l cases, the o p p o s i t i o n o f consciousnesses is entirely r e c i p r o c a l or s y m m e t r i c a l . I f A m e r i c a n s t r a v e l i n g in F r a n c e see the F r e n c h Americans

as alien others, the F r e n c h visiting the U S see

in a p a r a l l e l way. T h e p r o b l e m

for w o m e n

is that,

w h e r e a s they exist as the o t h e r for m e n , m e n are n o t in the s a m e w a y the o t h e r for w o m e n . W o m e n are d e h n e d in relation to m e n , b u t n o t v i c e versa. R a t h e r , the m a l e is r e g a r d e d as the n o r m o f h u m a n i t y (which is w h y the m a s c u l i n e p r o n o u n s c a n refer to a n y o n e at all), w h e r e a s the female is, as Aristotle a n d A q u i n a s m a i n t a i n e d , a defective or i n c o m p l e t e m a l e . B e a u v o i r sees h e r p o i n t as p r o v e d simply b y the fact that it m a k e s p e r f e c t sense to write a b o o k such as

Beauvoir

167

hers a b o u t " t h e p e c u l i a r s i t u a t i o n " o f w o m e n , w h e r e a s there w o u l d be n o p o i n t at all to a p a r a l l e l b o o k a b o u t m e n . " T h u s h u m a n i t y is m a l e a n d m a n defines w o m a n n o t in h e r s e l f b u t as relative to h i m ; she is n o t r e g a r d e d as an a u t o n o m o u s b e i n g " (DS, 1: 15/xxii). T h e q u e s t i o n , o f c o u r s e , is w h y this is so. " W h y is it that w o m e n do n o t dispute m a l e s o v e r e i g n t y ? " (DS, 1: 1 7 / x x i v ) . A c c o r d i n g to Beauvoir,

the

reason

is that

women

do

not

form

a

coherent

c o m m u n i t y : " w o m e n l a c k c o n c r e t e m e a n s for o r g a n i z i n g themselves into a unit w h i c h c a n stand face to face w i t h " the c o m m u n i t y o f m e n . T h i s in t u r n is b e c a u s e w o m e n " h a v e n o past, n o history, n o religion o f their o w n " (DS, 1: 1 9 / x x v ) . T h e r e

are a l w a y s m e n —

fathers, h u s b a n d s , sons - to w h o m t h e y are m o r e strongly a t t a c h e d t h a n to o t h e r w o m e n . U p p e r - c l a s s w h i t e w o m e n identify m o r e w i t h similar m e n t h a n t h e y do w i t h b l a c k or p o o r w o m e n . T h e female

male-

c o u p l e "is a f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y " , in w h i c h the f e m a l e is

a l w a y s at least implicitly s u b o r d i n a t e d to the m a l e a n d s e p a r a t e d f r o m unity w i t h o t h e r w o m e n . It is, o f c o u r s e , true that there are w a y s in w h i c h m e n n e e d w o m e n (as c o m p a n i o n s , as sexual partners) j u s t as m u c h as w o m e n n e e d m e n . B u t this is so o n l y in the sense that, as H e g e l s h o w e d , masters n e e d slaves. T h e m a s t e r n e e d s the slave p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e t h a n the slave n e e d s the master. B u t the m a s t e r " h a s in his g r a s p the p o w e r o f satisfying this n e e d t h r o u g h his o w n a c t i o n " , w h e r e a s the slave's n e e d s are m e t o n l y to the e x t e n t that this facilitates the master's satisfaction (DS, 1: 2 0 / x x v i ) .

The

s a m e is true o f w o m e n in relation to m e n . B e a u v o i r also p o i n t s out that w o m e n t h e m s e l v e s often c o m e n o t o n l y to a c c e p t b u t e v e n to e n d o r s e their s u b o r d i n a t e position. T h i s is b e c a u s e " t o decline to b e the O t h e r , to refuse to b e a p a r t y to the deal

. . . would

b e for w o m e n

to r e n o u n c e

all the

advantages

c o n f e r r e d u p o n t h e m b y their alliance w i t h the s u p e r i o r

caste".

H e r e , o f c o u r s e , B e a u v o i r is d e s c r i b i n g a classic case o f S a r t r e a n b a d faith: " a l o n g w i t h the ethical u r g e o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l to affirm his subjective e x i s t e n c e , there is also the t e m p t a t i o n to f o r g o liberty a n d b e c o m e a t h i n g " . T h i s is a r o a d m a n y w o m e n take b e c a u s e it is an easy o n e : " o n it one avoids the strain i n v o l v e d in u n d e r t a k i n g an a u t h e n t i c e x i s t e n c e " . A c c o r d i n g l y , " W h e n m a n m a k e s o f w o m a n the Other, he may, t h e n , e x p e c t h e r to manifest d e e p - s e a t e d t e n d e n c i e s to c o m p l i c i t y " (DS, 1: 2 1 / x x v i i ) . S o , on a first level, the a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n o f w h y w o m e n are a s u b o r d i n a t e d other, is this: m e n f o r m a unified g r o u p that takes

168

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

w o m e n as a n other, w h i l e w o m e n are n o t able to r e c i p r o c a t e a n d e v e n often c o m e to h a v e a b a d - f a i t h c o n t e n t m e n t w i t h their situation. B u t the d e e p e r q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s o f w h y w o m e n h a v e

been

u n a b l e to f o r m a c o m m u n i t y o f their o w n , w h y their c o n n e c t i o n to m e n d o m i n a t e s their lives in w a y that m e n ' s c o n n e c t i o n to w o m e n does n o t d o m i n a t e theirs. H e r e , o f c o u r s e , the t r a d i t i o n a l a n s w e r is that w o m e n a r e intrinsically inferior to m e n . T h i s c l a i m h a s b e e n d e f e n d e d in v a r i o u s w a y s , as, for e x a m p l e , the will a n d design o f G o d ( w h o seems to h a v e m a d e E v e for the sake o f A d a m ) o r as the direct c o n s e q u e n c e o f b i o l o g i c a l a n d p s y c h o logical science (which are said to s h o w w o m e n to b e p h y s i c a l l y weaker, less intelligent, m o r e e m o t i o n a l , etc.). I n m o d e r n times, the rhetoric

of democracy

h a s l e d m a n y m e n to a g r e e that, as a n

abstract, g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , w o m e n a r e their equals (so that now, e v e n m o r e t h a n w h e n B e a u v o i r w r o t e , there a r e l a w s p r o c l a i m i n g e q u a l i t y o f the sexes). B u t in fact there are countless p r a c t i c e s a n d m o d e s o f t h o u g h t that m a i n t a i n the s u b o r d i n a t e position o f w o m e n : " I t is, in p o i n t o f fact, a difficult m a t t e r for a m a n to realize the e x t r e m e i m p o r t a n c e o f social d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s w h i c h s e e m o u t w a r d l y i n s i g n i h c a n t b u t w h i c h p r o d u c e in w o m e n m o r a l a n d intellectual effects nature"

so p r o f o u n d

that t h e y

(DS, 1: 2 8 / x x x i i ) .

s e e m to spring f r o m h e r original

As

a result,

even

many

apparently

" e n l i g h t e n e d " m e n still think that w o m e n as a g r o u p are different f r o m m e n in w a y s that p r e v e n t t h e m , w i t h o n l y a small n u m b e r o f e x c e p t i o n s , f r o m r e a c h i n g the highest levels o f h u m a n a c h i e v e m e n t . In a similar w a y , m e n w h o are v e r y strong o n the p r i n c i p l e o f w o m e n ' s e q u a l i t y will often in p r a c t i c e r e g a r d t h e m s e l v e s as the n a t u r a l superiors o f the p a r t i c u l a r w o m e n t h e y deal w i t h o n a daily basis. I n these w a y s , the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a o f intrinsic

inferiority

r e m a i n s m u c h stronger t h a n w e m i g h t at hrst think. B u t is the p r e j u d i c e against w o m e n m e r e p r e j u d i c e ? D o e s sheer b i o l o g y n o t justify the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n ? T h e r e is, p e r h a p s , no

biological

necessity

that

even

advanced

mammalian

species

r e p r o d u c e sexually; " t h e division o f a species into m a l e a n d f e m a l e individuals is simply a n i r r e d u c i b l e fact o f o b s e r v a t i o n " (DS, 1: 38/6). Nor

is it e v e n

true that h u m a n s w o u l d

b e essentially

different

w i t h o u t sexual r e p r o d u c t i o n (as w e w o u l d b e if, for e x a m p l e , w e d i d not h a v e b o d i e s or w e r e n o t subject to death): " a m i n d w i t h o u t a b o d y a n d a n i m m o r t a l b o d y are strictly i n c o n c e i v a b l e , w h e r e a s w e c a n i m a g i n e a p a r t h e n o g e n e t i c o r h e r m a p h r o d i t e s o c i e t y " (DS, 1:

Beauvoir

169

40/7). B u t e v e n t h o u g h sexuality is n o t strictly essential to humanity, it d o e s n o t follow that it is n o t o f central significance, g i v e n the w a y w e h a v e in fact d e v e l o p e d . S e x u a l " d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is characteristic o f [ h u m a n ] existents to such an e x t e n t that it b e l o n g s in a n y realistic definition o f e x i s t e n c e " (DS, 1: 40/7). G i v e n this central, if n o t strictly essential, role o f sexuality, it m i g h t s e e m that the b i o l o g y o f sex supports the inferiority o f w o m e n . Certainly, their role in r e p r o d u c t i o n s u b o r d i n a t e s w o m e n to the species as a w h o l e in a v e r y striking way. A s B e a u v o i r puts it: Woman

is

of

all

mammalian

females

at

once

the

one

who

is

most

p r o f o u n d l y a l i e n a t e d (her i n d i v i d u a l i t y the p r e y o f o u t s i d e forces), a n d the o n e w h o m o s t v i o l e n t l y resists this a l i e n a t i o n ; in n o o t h e r is e n s l a v e m e n t o f the o r g a n i s m to r e p r o d u c t i o n m o r e i m p e r i o u s o r m o r e u n w i l l i n g l y a c c e p t ed. Crises o f p u b e r t y

a n d the m e n o p a u s e , m o n t h l y

"curse", long

and

difficult p r e g n a n c y , p a i n f u l a n d s o m e t i m e s d a n g e r o u s c h i l d b i r t h , illnesses, u n e x p e c t e d s y m p t o m s a n d c o m p l i c a t i o n s — t h e s e a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the h u m a n f e m a l e . (DS, 1: 6 9 / 3 2 )

16

T h e h u m a n m a l e , b y contrast, " s e e m s infinitely f a v o r e d : his sexual life is n o t in o p p o s i t i o n to his existence as a p e r s o n , a n d b i o l o g i c a l l y it runs an e v e n c o u r s e , w i t h o u t crises a n d g e n e r a l l y w i t h o u t m i s h a p " ( 0 $ 1:69/32). E v e n a p a r t f r o m their role in r e p r o d u c t i o n , b i o l o g y has clearly m a d e w o m e n w e a k e r t h a n m e n : " s h e has less m u s c u l a r strength, f e w e r r e d b l o o d c o r p u s c l e s , less l u n g c a p a c i t y ; she runs m o r e slowly, c a n lift less h e a v y w e i g h t s , c a n c o m p e t e w i t h m a n in h a r d l y any sport; she c a n n o t stand u p to h i m in a

fight".

In s u m , w o m a n ' s

" g r a s p o n the w o r l d is thus m o r e restricted; she has less firmness a n d less steadiness

available

for

projects

that in g e n e r a l

she is less

c a p a b l e o f c a r r y i n g out. In o t h e r w o r d s , h e r i n d i v i d u a l life is less rich t h a n m a n ' s " (DS, 1: 73/34). S h o u l d w e c o n c l u d e , t h e n , that b i o l o g y e x p l a i n s a n d justifies the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n to m e n ? N o , says B e a u v o i r : these facts c a n n o t be d e n i e d -

"Certainly,

b u t in t h e m s e l v e s t h e y h a v e

no

s i g n i f i c a n c e " (DS, 1: 73/34). H e r e B e a u v o i r invokes the c o r e o f h e r existentialist v i e w o f h u m a n existence. A m e r e fact has n o m e a n i n g a p a r t f r o m that g i v e n it b y consciousness. In this sense, " b i o l o g y b e c o m e s an abstract science . . . o n c e w e a d a p t the h u m a n p e r s p e c t i v e " (DS, 1: 73/34). W o m e n ' s w e a k n e s s a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n to the

1 6

See also Beauvoir's disconcerting portrait of pregnancy, DS, n: 307—8/495—6.

170

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

species h a v e s i g n i h c a n c e o n l y in t h e c o n t e x t d e h n e d b y t h e p u r p o s e s , m e a n s , a n d l a w s that w e establish. If, for e x a m p l e , p h y s i c a l m a s t e r y of nature were not a paramount h u m a n goal and violence

were

e x c l u d e d as a source o f social p o w e r , t h e n the w e a k n e s s o f w o m e n w o u l d b e o f n o s i g n i h c a n c e . Similarly, " t h e b o n d a g e o f w o m e n to t h e s p e c i e s " w o u l d b e m u c h less if society r e q u i r e d fewer births a n d insisted o n m o r e c a r e a n d p r i v i l e g e s for p r e g n a n t w o m e n (DS, 1: 73—4/34—5). (We c o u l d , p e r h a p s , e v e n i m a g i n e a situation in w h i c h c h i l d b e a r i n g w a s r e g a r d e d as a h o l y f u n c t i o n , r e q u i r i n g the revere n c e a n d s u b s e r v i e n c e o f m e n to w o m e n . ) A s B e a u v o i r says, " t h e b e a r i n g o f m a t e r n i t y u p o n the i n d i v i d u a l life . . . is n o t dehnitely p r e s c r i b e d in w o m a n - society a l o n e is t h e a r b i t e r " (DS, 1: 73/35). N o n e o f this m e a n s that w e c a n i g n o r e the truths o f b i o l o g y : " T h e e n s l a v e m e n t o f the female to the species a n d the limitations o f h e r v a r i o u s p o w e r s are e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t facts; the b o d y o f w o m a n is one o f the essential e l e m e n t s in h e r situation in the w o r l d . " B u t b i o l o g y a l o n e tells us n o t h i n g h n a l a b o u t the h u m a n possibilities o f w o m e n . T h e s e d e p e n d o n the m e a n i n g w e c o n f e r o n the b i o l o g i c a l facts. A c c o r d i n g l y , " b i o l o g y is n o t e n o u g h " to tell us " w h y w o m a n is the Other". B e a u v o i r m a k e s the s a m e sort o f case for p s y c h o l o g i c a l (e.g., Freudian) a n d e c o n o m i c (e.g., M a r x i s t ) e x p l a n a t i o n s . It is n o t the facts b u t the m e a n i n g s w e give t h e m that are decisive. T h e r e f o r e , w e m u s t " h n d o u t w h a t h u m a n i t y h a s m a d e o f the h u m a n f e m a l e " b y t u r n i n g to the history, the m y t h s , a n d t h e social p r a c t i c e s that h a v e constituted w o m a n ' s existence (DS, 1: 76/37). B e a u v o i r thinks the a n s w e r is a p p a r e n t f r o m h u m a n k i n d ' s earliest history, o n c e this is u n d e r s t o o d v i a the c a t e g o r i e s o f existential p h i l o s o p h y (DS, 1: 107/61). First, g i v e n that " c o n f l i c t is the fundam e n t a l m e a n i n g o f relations to the O t h e r " , it is n o t at all surprising that m e n h a v e

tried

to d o m i n a t e

women.

But w h y have

they

s u c c e e d e d ? A c c o r d i n g to B e a u v o i r , the k e y is in h e r existential c a t e g o r i e s o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d i m m a n e n c e , c a t e g o r i e s inspired b y b u t b y n o m e a n s s i m p l y t a k e n over f r o m S a r t r e . W h e r e a s

Sartre

thinks o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e p r i m a r i l y in o n t o l o g i c a l t e r m s , as the foritself's existence outside o f itself (its " n o t b e i n g w h a t it is a n d b e i n g w h a t it is n o t " ) , for B e a u v o i r it is a c e n t r a l ethical category. S h e hrst i n t r o d u c e s it after l a y i n g d o w n the basic m o r a l a n d political p r e m i s e o f h e r b o o k : " w e h o l d that the o n l y p u b l i c g o o d is that w h i c h assures the p r i v a t e g o o d o f the citizens; w e shall pass j u d g m e n t o n institutions a c c o r d i n g to their effectiveness in g i v i n g c o n c r e t e o p p o r t u n i t i e s

Beauvoir to i n d i v i d u a l s "

(DS,

171

1: 3 0 / x x x i v ) . B u t ,

she insists, w e

must

not

u n d e r s t a n d " p r i v a t e g o o d " in t e r m s o f h a p p i n e s s b u t in t e r m s of f r e e d o m . T h e " w o m e n o f the h a r e m " m a y b e h a p p i e r t h a n w o m e n w h o h a v e the right to v o t e a n d w o r k outside the h o m e , b u t the latter are better off e t h i c a l l y b e c a u s e o f their g r e a t e r f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m , m o r e o v e r , m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e :

"Every

subject p l a y s his p a r t as such specifically t h r o u g h exploits or projects that serve as a m o d e

o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e ; h e a c h i e v e s liberty

only

t h r o u g h a c o n t i n u a l r e a c h i n g o u t t o w a r d o t h e r liberties. T h e r e is n o justification for p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e o t h e r t h a n its e x p a n s i o n into a n indefinitely o p e n f u t u r e " (DS, 1: 3 1 / x x x i v - v ) . T r a n s c e n d e n c e , t h e n , u n d e r s t o o d as " a c o n t i n u a l r e a c h i n g

out

t o w a r d " further f r e e d o m is the s u p r e m e v a l u e o f h u m a n e x i s t e n c e . Correspondingly,

the

supreme

evil

is

immanence,

the

loss

of

f r e e d o m , t h r o u g h a relapse o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s into being-in-itself: E v e r y time t r a n s c e n d e n c e falls b a c k i n t o i m m a n e n c e , s t a g n a t i o n , t h e r e is a d e g r a d a t i o n o f e x i s t e n c e i n t o t h e " e n - s o i " - t h e b r u t i s h life o f s u b j e c t i o n t o given conditions -

a n d of liberty into constraint and contingence.

This

d o w n f a l l r e p r e s e n t s a m o r a l f a u l t if t h e s u b j e c t c o n s e n t s to it; if it is i n f l i c t e d u p o n h i m , it spells f r u s t r a t i o n a n d o p p r e s s i o n . I n b o t h c a s e s it is a b s o l u t e evil. (DS, 1: 3 1 / x x x v )

M e n h a v e s u b o r d i n a t e d w o m e n b y c o n f i n i n g t h e m to the sphere of i m m a n e n c e , r e s e r v i n g the sphere o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e for t h e m s e l v e s . This

subordination

was

made

easier,

though

not

inevitable,

by

w o m e n ' s b i o l o g i c a l role. B e a u v o i r ' s t h o u g h t h e r e is b a s e d o n a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n the b i o l o g i c a l n e e d to p r e s e r v e a species b y " r e p e a t i n g the s a m e Life in m o r e i n d i v i d u a l s " a n d the t r a n s c e n d e n c e t h a t " c r e a t e s v a l u e s t h a t d e p r i v e p u r e r e p e t i t i o n o f all v a l u e " . B e c a u s e " w o m a n is [biologically] b a s i c a l l y a n existent w h o gives L i f e " , m e n h a v e b e e n able to restrict h e r to the repetitive, i m m a n e n t f u n c t i o n o f simply p r e s e r v i n g the species w h i l e m a n " r e m o d e l s the face o f the e a r t h , h e c r e a t e s n e w i n s t r u m e n t s , h e i n v e n t s , h e s h a p e s the f u t u r e " (DS, 1: 1 1 2 / 64). F r o m the earliest n o m a d i c d a y s o f the r a c e , m a n s u p p o r t o f the g r o u p , n o t . . .

"furnished

b y a simple vital p r o c e s s , t h r o u g h

b i o l o g i c a l b e h a v i o r , b u t b y m e a n s o f acts t h a t t r a n s c e n d e d his a n i m a l n a t u r e " (DS,

1: 110/63). T h e

"bondage

of reproduction"

worked

a g a i n s t w o m e n ' s j o i n i n g in these t r a n s c e n d e n t acts. By

taking

transcendence

for

themselves

and

the

restricting

morally

women

to

positive, the

active

morally

role

of

negative,

passive role o f i m m a n e n c e , m e n h a v e b e e n able to force w o m e n into

172

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

the role o f a n inferior o t h e r a n d to p r e v e n t t h e m f r o m r e s p o n d i n g w i t h a r e c i p r o c a l c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f m e n . O f c o u r s e , there h a v e b e e n n u m e r o u s c h a n g e s in the status o f w o m e n t h r o u g h o u t history, a n d it is u n d e n i a b l e that, overall, their situation is n o w far s u p e r i o r to w h a t it h a s often b e e n in the past. B u t , B e a u v o i r m a i n t a i n s , i m p r o v e m e n t s for w o m e n h a v e t y p i c a l l y b e e n d u e to the initiatives o f m e n m o r e t h a n w o m e n . " T h e w h o l e o f f e m i n i n e history h a s b e e n m a n - m a d e " (DS, 1: 216/128). A p a r t i c u l a r l y striking case is p r o v i d e d b y societies, such as early a g r i c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t i e s , w h e r e the f e m a l e , precisely b e c a u s e o f h e r association w i t h the fertility so i m p o r t a n t to those w h o till the soil, h a s b e e n e l e v a t e d to divinity. T h i s priority o f the f e m i n i n e h a s l e d to s p e c u l a t i o n that early a g r i c u l t u r a l societies w e r e matriarchies, ruled by w o m e n and by feminine values. B u t Beauvoir a r g u e s that this is a d e e p m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . First, e v e n as a g o d d e s s , w o m a n is still a n other. It is a l w a y s "beyond the h u m a n r e a l m that h e r p o w e r w a s affirmed, a n d she w a s therefore outside o f that r e a l m " . W i t h i n the h u m a n

r e a l m , m e n r e m a i n in c h a r g e :

" S o c i e t y has

a l w a y s b e e n m a l e , political p o w e r h a s a l w a y s b e e n in the h a n d s o f m e n " (DS, 1: 120/70). M o r e o v e r , " t h e prestige she enjoys in m e n ' s eyes is b e s t o w e d b y t h e m ; t h e y k n e e l b e f o r e the O t h e r , t h e y w o r s h i p the G o d d e s s M o t h e r . B u t h o w e v e r puissant she m a y thus a p p e a r , it is o n l y t h r o u g h the c o n c e p t i o n s o f the m a l e m i n d that she is a p p r e h e n d e d as s u c h " (DS, 1: 1 2 2 - 3 / 7 3 ) . T o see that u l t i m a t e p o w e r w a s in m a l e h a n d s , w e n e e d o n l y note that, o n c e the t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s o f the b r o n z e a g e m a d e m e n less d e p e n d e n t o n a n d fearful o f the N a t u r e w o m e n s y m b o l i z e d , the goddesses w e r e d e t h r o n e d in favor o f Z e u s a n d Y a h w e h a n d society b e c a m e explicitly p a t r i a r c h a l . T h e rest o f history tells the s a m e k i n d o f story. Christianity, for e x a m p l e , involves a h i g h religious status for w o m e n t h r o u g h the cult o f the V i r g i n b u t also the P a u l i n e s u b o r d i n ation o f w i v e s to h u s b a n d s , a n d in a n y case C h r i s t i a n i t y is c r e a t e d a n d r u l e d b y m e n . E v e n in o u r m o r e e n l i g h t e n e d a g e , " i t h a s b e e n the t e c h n o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n a c c o m p l i s h e d b y m e n that h a s e m a n c i p a t e d the w o m e n o f t o d a y " , a n d " i t w a s a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in m a s c u line ethics that b r o u g h t a b o u t a r e d u c t i o n in f a m i l y size t h r o u g h birth c o n t r o l a n d p a r t i a l l y freed w o m a n f r o m b o n d a g e to m a t e r n i t y " (DS, 1: 217/129). Similarly, w e m i g h t p l a u s i b l y a r g u e that the most r e c e n t w o m e n ' s l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t , b e g i n n i n g in the 1960s, w a s itself l a r g e l y d u e to the e c o n o m i c n e e d to h a v e w o m e n outside the h o m e .

working

Beauvoir B e a u v o i r further supports h e r c l a i m a b o u t the historical d o m i n a n c e o f m e n b y reflecting on the relatively few cases in w h i c h w o m e n h a v e c o m e to p r o m i n e n c e . T h e r e h a v e , for e x a m p l e , b e e n the g r e a t f e m a l e rulers, such as E l i z a b e t h I a n d C a t h e r i n e the G r e a t . B u t , she m a i n t a i n s , their a c h i e v e m e n t s w e r e possible b e c a u s e they w e r e " e x a l t e d b y the p o w e r o f social institutions a b o v e all sexual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s " (DS, i: 219/130) a n d these social institutions (absolute m o n a r c h i e s ) w e r e devised b y a n d for m e n . Similarly,

women

saints such as C a t h e r i n e o f S i e n a a n d T e r e s a o f A v i l a h a v e a t t a i n e d the highest religious status, b u t o n l y w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f a C h u r c h d e h n e d as an institution b y p a t r i a r c h a l v a l u e s . M o s t o t h e r w o m e n w h o h a v e b e c o m e f a m o u s historically h a v e b e e n " n o t a b l e less for the i m p o r t a n c e o f their acts t h a n for the singularity o f their f a t e s " . T h e y l e a d lives that are interesting a n d even

admirable

but

achieve

little

o f e n d u r i n g historical

signifi-

c a n c e ; " t h e y are e x e m p l a r y h g u r e s r a t h e r t h a n historical a g e n t s " . T h e life o f J o a n o f A r c m a k e s a g o o d a n d uplifting story, b u t the lives o f R i c h e l i e u , D a n t o n , a n d L e n i n t r a n s f o r m e d the w o r l d . T h e basic p r o b l e m , B e a u v o i r says, is that " i n o r d e r to c h a n g e the face o f the w o r l d , it is hrst n e c e s s a r y to be a n c h o r e d in it; b u t the women who

are h r m l y r o o t e d in society are those w h o

subjection to i t " (DS,

1: 220/131). T h o s e w o m e n

who

are

in

somehow

e v a d e the g e n e r a l subjection are " s t r a n g e m o n s t e r s " (DS, 1: 220/132), w h o exist at the m a r g i n s o f society a n d c a n h a v e n o p r o f o u n d effect o n it. W h a t a b o u t the d o m a i n o f culture, w h e r e w o m e n h a v e b e e n m o r e successful t h a n in science, war, or g o v e r n m e n t ? W o m e n h a v e p l a y e d a special role h e r e , b u t m u c h m o r e as subjects, inspirations, p a t r o n s , a n d c o n n o i s s e u r s t h a n as p r o d u c e r s . " B e c a u s e o f w o m a n ' s m a r g i n a l position in the w o r l d , m e n will t u r n to h e r w h e n t h e y strive t h r o u g h culture to g o b e y o n d the b o u n d a r i e s o f their u n i v e r s e " (DS, 1: 2 2 1 / 132). W o m e n h a v e b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y successful as writers, b u t e v e n h e r e , B e a u v o i r n o t e s , " t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s h a v e in g e n e r a l b e e n o f less v a l u e " t h a n those o f m e n (DS, 1: 221/132). O n e is not b o r n b u t b e c o m e s a g e n i u s , " a n d the f e m i n i n e situation has u p to the p r e s e n t r e n d e r e d this b e c o m i n g p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e " (DS, 1: 222/133). In s u m , t h e n , w o m e n exist as the o t h e r o f m e n b e c a u s e m e n h a v e e x p l o i t e d w o m e n ' s b i o l o g i c a l l y c e n t r a l role in r e p r o d u c t i o n to d e h n e t h e m in t e r m s o f an i m m a n e n c e that p r e s e r v e s the species r a t h e r

174

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

t h a n the t r a n s c e n d e n c e that takes it b e y o n d itself a n d so constitutes its v a l u e s . T h e last p a r t o f B o o k 1 o f Le deuxième sexe s h o w s h o w a v a r i e t y o f m a l e m y t h s a b o u t w o m e n p r o v i d e the c o n t e x t a n d justification for their definition as other. A m o n g these, o n e o f the m o s t i m p o r t a n t is the m y t h o f w o m a n as a " m y s t e r y " . T h i s m y t h is p e r h a p s the most forthright assertion that w o m a n is o t h e r — s o m e t h i n g so alien to m e n that t h e y c a n n o t

e v e n u n d e r s t a n d it. B e y o n d

this, the m y t h

of

m y s t e r y h a s a n u m b e r o f e x t r e m e l y c o n v e n i e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s . It legitimates the a p p l i c a t i o n to w o m e n o f i n c o m p a t i b l e m y t h s . T h e p u r e v i r g i n a n d the l e w d t e m p t r e s s , the i n s p i r i n g m u s e a n d the n a g g i n g wife, the s o o t h i n g c o m f o r t e r a n d the v e n g e f u l b i t c h - all express aspects o f a f e m i n i n i t y that c a n n e v e r b e fully u n d e r s t o o d . Further, p o r t r a y i n g w o m e n as essentially m y s t e r i o u s relieves m e n o f the o b l i g a t i o n o f e v e n t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m a n d therefore o f t r e a t i n g t h e m in a j u s t a n d consistent way. Finally,

acknowledging

t h e m as a m y s t e r y c a n b e r e a d as a n e l e v a t i o n to a n i d e a l i z e d h e i g h t that c o m p e n s a t e s for a n d c o v e r s o v e r m u n d a n e ill-treatment. M o r e generally, m y t h s allow m e n to i g n o r e the a c t u a l facts a b o u t w o m e n . I f a w o m a n does n o t c o n f o r m to a r e l e v a n t m y t h , t h e n she c a n b e dismissed as " n o t really a w o m a n " . " T h e c o n t r a r y facts o f e x p e r i e n c e are i m p o t e n t against the m y t h " (DS, 1: 383/253). I n this way, w o m e n c a n a l w a y s b e t r e a t e d as instances o f a n ideal type, n e v e r as i n d i v i d u a l s in their o w n right. It a c c o r d i n g l y

becomes

a l m o s t impossible to c o n v i n c e m e n that there is s o m e t h i n g w r o n g w i t h their p o r t r a y a l o f w o m e n as the other. A s a n existentialist, B e a u v o i r d o e s n o t e n d o r s e the F r e u d i a n v i e w that a n a t o m y (or b i o l o g y ) is destiny for w o m e n . N o t h i n g h u m a n is simply the p r o d u c t o f the e x t e r n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f destiny. W o m e n h a v e b e e n r e l e g a t e d to the status o f o t h e r as the result o f a free p r o j e c t o f m e n a n d o f their o w n failure to effectively o p p o s e this project. B u t there is n o d e n y i n g that B e a u v o i r gives s o m e t h i n g like destiny a strong role in h e r a c c o u n t . M e n ' s p r o j e c t a n d w o m e n ' s failure w e r e b o t h facilitated b y the t e n d e n c y o f w o m e n ' s lives to b e s w a l l o w e d u p in the r e p r o d u c t i o n

o f the species. T h e

question

r e m a i n i n g is h o w it m i g h t b e possible to o p p o s e this m a l e p r o j e c t a n d a l l o w w o m e n " t o b e r e c o g n i z e d as existents b y the s a m e right as m e n a n d n o t to s u b o r d i n a t e

[their] existence to life, the h u m a n

b e i n g to a n i m a l i t y " (DS, 1: 113/65). A l t h o u g h Le deuxième sexe n e v e r uses the t e r m , its f o r m u l a t i o n a n d

Beauvoir

175

discussion o f this q u e s t i o n h a v e m a d e it a classic of feminist writing. It will, t h e r e f o r e , b e useful to situate B e a u v o i r ' s

question and

her

response to it in the c o n t e x t o f r e c e n t d e b a t e s o v e r f e m i n i s m . It is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y o b v i o u s that, o v e r the centuries, w o m e n h a v e often

been

treated

very

harshly

and

unfairly.

Even

societies

e s p o u s i n g liberal ideals h a v e f r e q u e n t l y insisted that w o m e n w i t h certain talents a n d aspirations n o t b e a l l o w e d to d e v e l o p

them,

simply b e c a u s e t h e y are w o m e n . S o , for e x a m p l e , w o m e n h a v e b e e n f o r b i d d e n to a t t e n d universities, f o r b i d d e n to b e d o c t o r s , l a w y e r s , or priests, a n d f o r b i d d e n to o w n property. F e m i n i s m ' s hrst p r e m i s e is that such t r e a t m e n t is b o t h w i d e s p r e a d a n d entirely u n a c c e p t a b l e . O n c e w e a g r e e that certain historical w a y s o f t r e a t i n g w o m e n are u n a c c e p t a b l e , the q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s o n e o f h o w best to e l i m i n a t e this t r e a t m e n t . O n e v i e w is that all w e n e e d to d o is insist o n equality o f t r e a t m e n t b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n . T h e t h o u g h t is that all the manifest abuses o f w o m e n h a v e arisen f r o m o u r t r e a t i n g t h e m in w a y s that w e do n o t treat m e n , so that the r e m e d y is a l w a y s to treat the t w o sexes in the s a m e way, a v i e w that, in a certain sense, is by n o w entirely n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . B u t a n u n q u a l i h e d e q u a l i t y - f e m i n i s m r e m a i n s c o n t r o v e r s i a l . Why, critics ask, s h o u l d w e assume that there are n o respects in w h i c h w e should treat w o m e n differently f r o m m e n ? T h e r e a r e , after all, m a j o r b i o l o g i c a l differences b e t w e e n the t w o sexes. W h y think that these do n o t c o r r e s p o n d to further differences in abilities a n d interests that should b e reflected in differential t r e a t m e n t o f m e n a n d w o m e n ? A p u r e e q u a l i t y - f e m i n i s m w o u l d insist that, p r e j u d i c e ment

aside,

women

have

exactly

the

same

a n d mistreat-

intellectual,

social,

political, a n d m o r a l capacities a n d aspirations as m e n . In an ideal society w e should e x p e c t all differences ( b e y o n d the basic b i o l o g i c a l ones) b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n to be e l i m i n a t e d . P r o p o n e n t s o f this v i e w will, for e x a m p l e , m a i n t a i n that as l o n g as there is n o t r o u g h e q u a l i t y in the n u m b e r s o f m e n a n d w o m e n in e v e r y profession, a c h i e v i n g a n d b e i n g r e w a r d e d at r o u g h l y e q u a l rates, w e will not h a v e e l i m i n a t e d unjust d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n . M a n y , i n c l u d i n g m a n y feminists, are u n e a s y w i t h p u r e equalityf e m i n i s m . T h e worry, in particular, is that it has simply a c c e p t e d the v a l u e s established b y a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d society a n d w o r k s to h a v e w o m e n s u c c e e d as well as m e n in t e r m s o f those v a l u e s . B u t , it m i g h t be a r g u e d , has n o t the m i s t r e a t m e n t o f w o m e n g o n e m u c h further t h a n j u s t p r e v e n t i n g t h e m f r o m a c h i e v i n g the h i g h e s t h u m a n values?

176

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

H a s it n o t also distorted the n a t u r e o f h u m a n v a l u e s , d e n y i n g the status o f v a l u e s especially associated w i t h w o m e n a n d asserting only those especially associated w i t h m e n ? T h i s line o f t h o u g h t l e a d s to w h a t h a s c o m e to b e c a l l e d d i f f e r e n c e - f e m i n i s m , for w h i c h e n d i n g the ill-treatment o f w o m e n r e q u i r e s a l l o w i n g distinctively f e m i n i n e v a l u e s a n d virtues to flourish - for e x a m p l e , the v a l u e s o f c o o p e r a tion, n u r t u r i n g , a n d sensitivity r a t h e r t h a n those o f c o m p e t i t i o n , d o m i n a t i o n , a n d self-expansion. R e c e n t discussions o f w o m e n ' s status h a v e often f o c u s e d o n the tensions

between

equality-feminism

a n d difference-feminism.

In

p r a c t i c a l t e r m s , the k e y issue is w h e t h e r feminists should b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h e n t e r i n g as equals into the w o r l d that m e n a l r e a d y o c c u p y o r w i t h t r a n s f o r m i n g in a distinctively f e m i n i n e w a y the v a l u e s d e h n i n g that w o r l d . Interestingly, k e y e l e m e n t s o f e a c h v i e w p o i n t c a n also b e the basis for s u p p o r t i n g a s u b o r d i n a t e role for w o m e n . T h e r e a r e , for e x a m p l e , those w h o a g r e e w i t h

equality-

feminists that there is a c o m m o n set o f v a l u e s that d e h n e success for a n y h u m a n b e i n g b u t d e n y that w o m e n are as c a p a b l e as m e n at a c h i e v i n g t h e m . O n the o t h e r h a n d , there a r e those w h o a g r e e w i t h difference-feminists that there is a distinctive set o f v a l u e s associated w i t h w o m e n b u t m a i n t a i n , in the m a n n e r o f t r a d i t i o n a l p a t r i a r c h i e s , that these v a l u e s should b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to m a s c u l i n e v a l u e s . T o try to resolve these d i s a g r e e m e n t s , w e n e e d to r e t u r n to o u r initial p r e m i s e that there a r e c e r t a i n historical w a y s o f t r e a t i n g w o m e n that are simply n o t a c c e p t a b l e . T h e r e is n o l o n g e r a n y question o f s a y i n g that w o m e n a r e n o t really h u m a n , exist o n l y for the sake o f m e n , etc. H o w e v e r , it is o b v i o u s that w i t h i n the h u m a n species there are s o m e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o h a v e g r e a t e r c a p a c i t i e s for h u m a n a c h i e v e m e n t t h a n others. T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r there are a n y g e n e r a l differences b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n w i t h r e g a r d to these capacities that w a r r a n t t r e a t i n g w o m e n as a g r o u p as the inferiors o f m e n . O f c o u r s e , e v e n if there are such differences, w e should all a g r e e that there is n o basis for refusing to a l l o w a w o m a n w h o h a s a c a p a c i t y a t y p i c a l o f h e r s e x f r o m e x e r c i s i n g a n d develo p i n g it. (Even if, for e x a m p l e , w o m e n are g e n e r a l l y less g o o d at m a t h e m a t i c s t h a n m e n , w e should still a d m i t that a w o m a n w h o does h a v e the c a p a c i t y should b e a l l o w e d to study a d v a n c e d m a t h e matics.) S o m e feminists m a i n t a i n that there are n o such differences. T h a t is, t h e y h o l d either that w o m e n as a g r o u p h a v e

capacities

e q u a l to those o f m e n for a c h i e v i n g all h u m a n g o o d s

(equality-

Beauvoir feminism);

or

they

hold

that

men

177 and

women

have

different

c a p a c i t i e s that suit t h e m for a c h i e v i n g different v a l u e s , b u t that the values

defining

women's

distinctive

achievements

are

equal,

or

p e r h a p s superior, to those defining m e n ' s distinctive a c h i e v e m e n t s . B y contrast, anti-feminists h o l d that there are differences

between

m e n a n d w o m e n that w a r r a n t t r e a t i n g w o m e n as a g r o u p as, in s o m e respects, inferior

to m e n .

This

does not m e a n

that t h e y

think

w o m e n ' s c o r e h u m a n rights should be v i o l a t e d o r that i n d i v i d u a l w o m e n w i t h capacities at least e q u a l to m e n s h o u l d n o t b e a l l o w e d to d e v e l o p t h e m . B u t it d o e s m e a n that t h e y think w e s h o u l d n o t e x p e c t w o m e n as a g r o u p to a c h i e v e in the s a m e w a y or to as g r e a t a n e x t e n t as m e n ; a n d that w e should take a c c o u n t o f this in f o r m i n g p u b l i c policy. H o w does S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r stand on these issues? Specifically, w h a t w o u l d she think a b o u t the c h o i c e b e t w e e n a n d difference-feminism?

equality-feminism

A n d h o w m i g h t she m a k e the case

for

f e m i n i s m ? It m i g h t s e e m that, as an existentialist, she w o u l d object to b o t h e q u a l i t y - f e m i n i s m a n d d i f f e r e n c e - f e m i n i s m o n the g r o u n d s that t h e y b o t h a s s u m e an objective set o f g i v e n v a l u e s , e q u a l i t y b e i n g understood

as w o m e n ' s

and men's

equal

capacity

to a c h i e v e

a

c o m m o n h u m a n g o o d a n d difference u n d e r s t o o d as w o m e n ' s c a p a city to a c h i e v e a distinctively f e m i n i n e g o o d at least as w o r t h w h i l e as the m a s c u l i n e g o o d . H o w c o u l d either o f these v i e w s b e consistent w i t h the existentialist i d e a that e a c h i n d i v i d u a l creates his or h e r o w n values? B u t

at least for the

case

of equality-feminism

the

p r o b l e m is q u i c k l y r e s o l v e d . T h e c o m m o n v a l u e p o s i t e d b y equalityf e m i n i s m c a n simply be the existentialist's u l t i m a t e v a l u e o f f r e e d o m ; that is, o f c r e a t i v e h u m a n activity. T h e r e is n o n e e d for equalityf e m i n i s m to define the h u m a n g o o d , e q u a l l y accessible to m e n a n d w o m e n , as c o n f o r m i t y to s o m e p r e e s t a b l i s h e d substantive f o r m o f life.

By

contrast,

there

would

seem

to

be

a

conflict

between

existentialism a n d difference-feminism's assertion o f specific values, such as n u r t u r i n g a n d sensitivity, that are distinctive o f w o m e n . S u c h virtues s e e m to b e tied to a c o n c e p t i o n o f a distinctly nature, independent

o f the c h o i c e s o f individuals, a

feminine

conception

inconsistent w i t h the p r e c e d e n c e o f existence over essence. It seems plausible, t h e n , to take B e a u v o i r as a certain sort of equality-feminist:

one w h o

u n d e r s t a n d s the f u n d a m e n t a l

v a l u e to be creative e n g a g e m e n t w i t h a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n

human o f the

w o r l d . B u t this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n faces a m a j o r difficulty. I f m e n a n d

178

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

w o m e n share the s a m e v a l u e o f free creativity, t h e n , g i v e n B e a u v o i r ' s e m p h a s i s o n the difficulties p o s e d b y w o m e n ' s " b u r d e n o f r e p r o d u c t i o n " , it is e x t r e m e l y h a r d to see h o w she c a n m a i n t a i n that w o m e n are as c a p a b l e as m e n at a c h i e v i n g this v a l u e . A d m i t t e d l y ,

their

c e n t r a l role in the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f the species d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y c o n d e m n t h e m to lives o f i m m a n e n c e r a t h e r t h a n t r a n s c e n d e n c e . B u t , unless w e revert to the n a i v e t e o f early existentialism, w e c a n n o t d e n y that w o m e n t e n d to i m m a n e n c e far m o r e t h a n m e n d o . A s B e a u v o i r c o n t i n u a l l y e m p h a s i z e s , their b o d i e s a n d their b i o l o g i c a l role d r a g t h e m d o w n f r o m the heights o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e . W e h a v e seen h o w B e a u v o i r insists that the m e a n i n g o f b i o l o g i c a l facts is d e t e r m i n e d o n l y b y the free i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f consciousness. B u t she also a g r e e s that these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c a n o n l y r e s h a p e , n o t e l i m i n a t e , the force o f b i o l o g i c a l fact. W o m a n ' s r e p r o d u c t i v e

role

will a l w a y s b e in s o m e sense a g i v e n . M o r e o v e r , it is h a r d to see h o w a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that g a v e p r i o r i t y to w o m e n ' s r e p r o d u c t i v e

role

w o u l d b e consistent w i t h B e a u v o i r ' s o w n e n d o r s e m e n t o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e over i m m a n e n c e , since i m m a n e n c e c o r r e s p o n d s p r e c i s e l y to the f u n c t i o n o f r e p r o d u c t i o n or r e p e t i t i o n r a t h e r t h a n n o v e l p r o d u c t i o n . A s B e a u v o i r h e r s e l f puts it: " I t is n a t u r a l for w o m a n to r e p e a t , to b e g i n a g a i n w i t h o u t ever i n v e n t i n g . . . S h e is o c c u p i e d w i t h o u t ever doing a n y t h i n g , a n d thus she identifies h e r s e l f w i t h w h a t she has. . . H e r life is n o t d i r e c t e d t o w a r d ends: she is a b s o r b e d in p r o d u c i n g o r c a r i n g for things that are n e v e r m o r e t h a n m e a n s " (DS, 11: 430/604). T h e alternative seems to b e either to reject B e a u v o i r ' s f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e in favor o f this sort o f repetitive immanence

or to u r g e

that

women

renounce

their

"natural"

t e n d e n c y to r e p e t i t i o n , r e a l i z i n g that t h e y will n e v e r b e a b l e to d o this as c o m p l e t e l y as m e n . T h e a t t e m p t to r e a d B e a u v o i r as a n equality-feminist is, t h e n , textually p l a u s i b l e ; b u t h e r strong e m p h a s i s o n the b o n d a g e

of

r e p r o d u c t i o n supports the anti-feminist c o n c l u s i o n that w o m e n are inferior to m e n .

1 7

G i v e n this, it is interesting that, at least t o w a r d the

e n d o f h e r b o o k , B e a u v o i r seems to m o v e in the d i r e c t i o n o f a kind o f difference-feminism. S h e is a d a m a n t a b o u t the n e e d to reject the

1 7

B e a u v o i r m i g h t resist this anti-feminist talk o f " i n f e r i o r i t y " on the grounds that "all comparisons are idle w h i c h p u r p o r t to show that w o m a n is superior, inferior, or equal to m a n , for their situations are profoundly different". B u t she still admits that, " i f w e c o m p a r e these situations rather than the people in t h e m , w e see clearly that man's is far p r e f e r a b l e " (DS, n: 454/627)-

Beauvoir old m y t h s o f f e m i n i n i t y in o r d e r to m a k e w o m e n g e n u i n e l y

free

agents. S h e r e c o g n i z e s the v a l u e o f the o l d ideal o f the " c h a r m i n g w o m a n " b u t m a i n t a i n s that it m u s t b e e l i m i n a t e d j u s t as the j o y s o f S o u t h e r n p l a n t a t i o n life h a d to b e e l i m i n a t e d to destroy the slavery t h e y d e p e n d e d o n (DS, n: 574/729). B u t she also suggests that

the w o r l d

universalization

in w h i c h

women

a r e free

need

o f the w o r l d o f m a l e f r e e d o m .

not just

be a

" T o begin with,

there will a l w a y s b e certain differences b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n . " For e x a m p l e , " h e r e r o t i c i s m , a n d therefore h e r s e x u a l w o r l d , h a v e a special f o r m o f their o w n a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t fail to e n g e n d e r a sensuality,

a sensitivity

o f a special n a t u r e "

(DS, 11:575/731).

A

w o r l d o f f e m i n i n e f r e e d o m will n o t , after all, j u s t d u p l i c a t e w h a t m e n have achieved. B u t w h a t o f the w o r r y that the p o s i t i n g o f u n i q u e l y

feminine

v a l u e s j u s t establishes w o m e n as the b e a r e r s o f p r e s e r v i n g v a l u e s that are s u b o r d i n a t e d

to the superior p r o d u c t i v e

values of men? In

particular, is n o t such a c o n s e q u e n c e i n e v i t a b l e g i v e n

Beauvoir's

e n d o r s e m e n t o f the priority o f m a s c u l i n e creativity? T h i s r e m a i n s a n important

difficulty,

b u t at the v e r y e n d o f h e r b o o k

Beauvoir

suggests a n e w a p p r o a c h that m a y b e able to o v e r c o m e it. For the hrst t i m e , she begins t a l k i n g a b o u t the possibility o f m e n a n d w o m e n c r e a t i n g n e w v a l u e s t o g e t h e r a n d suggests that the v a l u e s c r e a t e d b y free m e n together with free w o m e n will b e s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t m e n a l o n e w o u l d h a v e b e e n able to create. S h e a g r e e s that w o m e n m u s t b e e m a n c i p a t e d f r o m their b o n d a g e to m e n b u t , she notes, " l e t h e r h a v e h e r i n d e p e n d e n t existence a n d she will c o n t i n u e n o n e the less to exist for h i m also: m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z i n g e a c h o t h e r as subject, e a c h will y e t r e m a i n the other for a n o t h e r " (DS, 11: 575/731). H e r e she b e g i n s to speak o f the couple as a u n i h e d creative agent: " w h e n w e abolish the slavery o f h a l f o f h u m a n i t y , t o g e t h e r w i t h the w h o l e system o f h y p o c r i s y that it implies, the 'division' o f h u m a n i t y will h n d its g e n u i n e s i g n i h c a n c e a n d the human couple will find its true form" (DS, 11: 5 7 6 / 7 3 1 , m y emphasis). T h e suggestion, t a k e n u p , as w e shall see, b y later F r e n c h feminists such as L u c e Irigaray, is that, as they presently exist, b o t h m e n a n d w o m e n are d e p r i v e d a n d i n c o m p l e t e because

o f the b o n d a g e

of women.

Once

women

have

moved

sufficiently t o w a r d i n d e p e n d e n c e , the t w o sexes c a n j o i n in a u n i h e d f r e e d o m that m u t u a l l y respects the differences o f e a c h a n d o p e n s u p a

new domain

of human

creativity.

T o achieve

this,

Beauvoir

c o n c l u d e s , " i t is necessary, for o n e thing, that b y a n d t h r o u g h their

180

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

n a t u r a l differentiation m e n a n d w o m e n u n e q u i v o c a l l y affirm their b r o t h e r h o o d [fraternité ]" 18

1 8

(DS, 11: 577/732).

W a s B e a u v o i r consciously ironic in e n d i n g Le deuxième sexe w i t h this w o r d , w h i c h later French feminists have protested as a symbol o f the Revolution's exclusion o f w o m e n from the "rights of m a n " ?

CHAPTER

7

Merleau-Ponty

. . . like t h e i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r , w h o s e b o d y t a k e s a c c o u n t o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i n t h e r e a l i t y o f w h i c h his i n t e l l e c t d e c l i n e s to b e l i e v e . (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, i, 571)

Initially, M a u r i c e

Merleau-Ponty

(1908—61) a n d J e a n - P a u l

Sartre

m o v e d a l o n g the s a m e p a t h . B o t h studied p h i l o s o p h y at t h e E c o l e Normale

( M e r l e a u - P o n t y t h r e e y e a r s b e h i n d Sartre), w h e r e

they

w e r e friendly b u t n o t close, a n d b o t h b e g a n t e a c h i n g c a r e e r s that w e r e i n t e r r u p t e d b y t h e w a r , in w h i c h b o t h s e r v e d i n t h e F r e n c h a r m y until its collapse. D u r i n g t h e o c c u p a t i o n , t h e y w o r k e d t o g e t h e r in

the

short-lived

intellectual

resistance

group,

Socialism

and

Liberty. T h i s r e n e w e d a n d d e e p e n e d their friendship, a n d w h e n t h e w a r e n d e d , t h e y a n d S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r f o u n d e d a n d r a n Les temps modernes. B u t w h e r e a s S a r t r e s i m p l y p u r s u e d his p a t h as a n i n d e p e n d e n t p u b l i c intellectual a n d writer, M e r l e a u - P o n t y c o m b i n e d his w o r k at Les temps modernes w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l c a r e e r o f a university professor. A f t e r t h r e e y e a r s at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f L y o n , h e w a s c a l l e d to a chair at t h e S o r b o n n e a n d t a u g h t t h e r e until h e w a s e l e c t e d to the

College

de F r a n c e

in

1952, w h e r e

he remained

until his

u n e x p e c t e d d e a t h f r o m a h e a r t a t t a c k in 1961. Unlike Sartre, Merleau-Ponty w a s a committed Catholic w h e n he entered the Ecole N o r m a l e

1

(Sartre m e n t i o n s this as the m a i n r e a s o n

t h e y w e r e n o t close), a n d r e l i g i o n p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t role in his early intellectual f o r m a t i o n . H e w r o t e for Esprit, a C a t h o l i c j o u r n a l edited b y E m m a n u e l M o u n i e r . Esprit s u p p o r t e d M o u n i e r ' s "person¬ a l i s t " v e r s i o n o f F r e n c h spiritualism a n d often p u b l i s h e d articles o n the

1

new philosophy

o f existence.

It seems

that

Merleau-Ponty

T h a t is to say, in the o d d slang o f the E c o l e , he was a " t a l a " : o n e w h o "va-t-a la m e s s e " (goes to mass) o n Sundays.

l8l

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

182

r e j e c t e d C a t h o l i c i s m after a " c r i s i s o f f a i t h " a r o u n d 1 9 3 5 - 6 , b u t t h e r e a s o n s a r e n o t a t all c l e a r . more

sympathy

B u t t h r o u g h o u t h i s life h e s h o w e d

2

to religion

than

did Sartre

and Beauvoir,

s o m e t i m e s r e v e a l s a n e x t r e m e l y sensitive a n d n u a n c e d of Catholic

doctrine and life.

he died, M e r l e a u - P o n t y

3

much

and he

appreciation

I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t , n o t l o n g

declined to allow Sartre to identify

before h i m as

a n a t h e i s t i n Les temps modernes.

4

Merleau-Ponty

did share

Sartre's interest in p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

He

h a d h e a r d Husserl's Paris lectures in 1929, a n d also l e a r n e d a b o u t h i m (and H e i d e g g e r ) i n a c o u r s e t a u g h t b y G e o r g e s G u r v i t c h (1928—30). During

the

1930s

Sartre

and Merleau-Ponty

pursued

their

interest

renewed

their

acquaintance

they

h a d in c o m m o n

words were

in H u s s e r l

each

and Heidegger,

independently and when

in 1941, they soon r e a l i z e d

philosophically.

spoken: phenomenology,

A s Sartre

they

how much

tells it: " T h e k e y

existence. W e discovered our

real c o n c e r n . " H e goes on to describe the mixture

of comradeship

a n d tension that c o l o r e d their p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions: T o o individualist to ever p o o l o u r research, w e b e c a m e

reciprocal

while

r e m a i n i n g separate. A l o n e , e a c h o f us w a s t o o easily p e r s u a d e d o f h a v i n g understood t h e idea o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Together, w e w e r e , for e a c h other, t h e i n c a r n a t i o n o f its a m b i g u i t y . E a c h o f u s v i e w e d t h e w o r k b e i n g d o n e b y the

other

own.

These

2

:i

4

5

6

as a n u n e x p e c t e d ,

a n d sometimes

hostile,

deviation

f r o m his

6

differences

m a y well

have

been

due to

Sartre's

penchant,

" E d i t o r ' s I n t r o d u c t i o n " to J o n S t e w a r d (ed.), The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, xvii. Sartre, w h o m a y o r m a y n o t have k n o w n very m u c h a b o u t the matter, says that M e r l e a u Ponty gave u p his faith " b e c a u s e , as h e said, ' W e believe that w e believe, b u t w e don't b e l i e v e ' " . " M o r e specifically", h e continues, " h e asked that C a t h o l i c i s m reintegrate h i m in the unity o f i m m a n e n c e , a n d this w a s precisely w h a t it couldn't d o " (Jean-Paul Sartre, " M e r l e a u - P o n t y " , in Situations, 167). S e e , in particular, "Faith a n d G o o d F a i t h " , in Sense and Nonsense, 172—81; a n d the discussion of Christianity a n d philosophy in " E v e r y w h e r e a n d N o w h e r e " , in Signs, 1 4 0 - 6 . It is sometimes said that the story M e r l e a u - P o n t y tells at the b e g i n n i n g o f the first essay (about a y o u n g m a n , clearly himself, w h o w a s shocked to hear priests h e respected support the reactionary Dollfuss g o v e r n m e n t in Austria) explains his loss o f faith. B u t nothing in M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's presentation o f this a n e c d o t e supports this claim. H e r b e r t Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 754. S p i e g e l b e r g says M e r l e a u - P o n t y told h i m that " i t w a s Sartre w h o , after his return from G e r m a n y in 1935, first a c q u a i n t e d h i m with Husserl's w r i t i n g s " (The Phenomenological Movement, 529). T h i s does not quite fit with w h a t w e k n o w a b o u t his earlier awareness o f Husserl, or with Sartre's remark that the t w o h a d "lost sight o f e a c h o t h e r " b e t w e e n their school days a n d the w a r ( " M e r l e a u - P o n t y " , in Situations, 156). B u t there m a y have b e e n a n encounter with Sartre that raised the level o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's interest in Husserl. " M e r l e a u - P o n t y " , in Situations, 159.

Merleau-Ponty

183

n o t e d in c h a p e r 5, for t o o r e a d i l y m i x i n g o n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions. Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y w e r e a b l e to live quite h a p p i l y w i t h their p h i l o s o p h i c a l differences (which h a v e often b e e n o v e r e m p h a sized). B u t their friendship f o u n d e r e d o n political differences. T h e details a r e c o m p l e x , b u t the b r e a k w a s u l t i m a t e l y over that t o u c h stone for F r e n c h intellectuals in the 1950s: s u p p o r t o f the C o m m u n i s t Party. T h e C o m m u n i s t s ' l e a d i n g role in the R e s i s t a n c e

movement

h a d g i v e n t h e m a m o r a l superiority a m o n g the F r e n c h p e o p l e a n d , especially, a m o n g intellectuals w i t h leftist s y m p a t h i e s . For S a r t r e , M e r l e a u - P o n t y , a n d m a n y others, the c o m p e l l i n g q u e s t i o n w a s w h y they w e r e n o t m e m b e r s o f the P a r t y that w a s the v a n g u a r d against fascism a n d for a d e s p e r a t e l y n e e d e d social r e v o l u t i o n . T h e answer, o f c o u r s e , a l w a y s e v o k e d the b r u t a l a n d totalitarian c h a r a c t e r o f C o m m u n i s m , especially in its d o m i n a n t S o v i e t f o r m . D e s p i t e often effective

mechanisms

o f self-deception,

leftist

intellectuals

were

a w a r e o f a n d u n e a s y w i t h such excesses as the M o s c o w trials a n d the c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p s . T h e s t a n d a r d r e s p o n s e w a s that these w e r e a c c i d e n t a l flaws in a n essentially g o o d enterprise a n d that, in a n y case, the i n c i d e n t a l evils o f C o m m u n i s m w e r e o f little w e i g h t in comparison

to the intrinsic

evil o f capitalist

oppression.

In the

c o n c r e t e political w o r l d , the o n l y w a y to w o r k t o w a r d the elimin a t i o n o f a b s o l u t e l y u n a c c e p t a b l e evils w a s to s u p p o r t the C o m m u nists. I n 1947, M e r l e a u - P o n t y h a d h i m s e l f a r g u e d a l o n g these lines w i t h subtlety a n d p a s s i o n in Humanisme et terreur. B u t b y 1950, w i t h the K o r e a n

War, Merleau-Ponty

h a d lost faith in

Communism,

w h i c h h e n o w s a w as a flagrant c o r r u p t i o n o f the ideals o f socialism. U n l i k e C a m u s a b o u t the s a m e t i m e , h e w a s n o t y e t w i l l i n g to speak out against the evil (so as n o t to s u p p o r t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g evils o f capitalism) a n d so u n d e r t o o k a p o i n t e d silence. H e e v e n c o n v i n c e d a reluctant

Sartre to a c c e p t

a substantial w i t h d r a w a l

o f Les temps

modernes f r o m political controversy. T h i n g s r e m a i n e d in this u n e a s y state until 1952, w h e n S a r t r e , as w e h a v e seen, d e c i d e d h e h a d to give u n e q u i v o c a l s u p p o r t to the C o m m u n i s t s . T h e b r e a k w i t h M e r l e a u - P o n t y f o l l o w e d quickly. T h e i m m e d i a t e cause

was a

comment

dispute

over

Merleau-Ponty

Sartre's

eliminating

h a d written

modernes b y a C o m m u n i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l . 7

an

introductory

to a n article

in Les temps

7

Merleau-Ponty

demanded

T h e r e m a y well have b e e n something m o r e driving the issue, at least o n Sartre's side, since

184

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

space in the j o u r n a l to state his political p o s i t i o n , b u t S a r t r e replied that h e h a d n o right to s u c h s p a c e , since h e h a d m a d e the c o w a r d l y c h o i c e o f w i t h d r a w a l f r o m political d e b a t e . M e r l e a u - P o n t y r e s i g n e d f r o m Les temps modernes, a n d their friendship w a s over. T h e b r e a k e v e n t u a l l y l e d to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s

strong a n d detailed attack o n

Sartre's politics in his article, " S a r t r e et l ' u l t r a - b o l c h e v i s m e " .

8

After

1956, w h e n e v e n Sartre a t t a c k e d the S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f H u n g a r y , the t w o h a d several positive c o n t a c t s , a n d it s e e m e d that the b r e a c h m i g h t b e o v e r c o m e . B u t M e r l e a u - P o n t y died b e f o r e a n y t h i n g w a s settled. Sartre said: " T h e r e is n o t h i n g to b e c o n c l u d e d f r o m this e x c e p t that this l o n g friendship, n e i t h e r d o n e n o r u n d o n e , obliterated w h e n it w a s a b o u t to b e r e b o r n , o r b r o k e n , r e m a i n s inside m e , an e v e r - o p e n s o r e . "

9

M e r l e a u - P o n t y w a s especially stimulated b y Husserl's later p h i l osophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y as it w a s d e v e l o p e d in u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t s that H . L. V a n B r e d a saved f r o m d e s t r u c t i o n at the b e g i n n i n g o f the w a r a n d g a t h e r e d in the Husserl A r c h i v e s at L o u v a i n .

1 0

H e became

c o n v i n c e d that this later philosophy, w h i c h h e also f o u n d in Husserl's last b o o k , The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, w a s a significant

improvement

o n his earlier view,

which

M e r l e a u - P o n t y s a w as t o o s k e w e d t o w a r d idealism. H e w a s p a r ticularly i m p r e s s e d w i t h the i d e a o f the Lebenswelt (lifeworld) as the focus o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description. H i s hrst i m p o r t a n t p u b l i c a t i o n w a s La structure du comportement (1942). T h i s h a d b e e n finished in 1938 a n d features, m u c h m o r e t h a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s intense interest in r e c e n t e m p i r i c a l psychology, especially G e s t a l t p s y c h o l o g y .

11

La structure du comportement

uses G e s t a l t p s y c h o l o g y to c o n s t r u c t a scientifically detailed a r g u m e n t against b e h a v i o r i s t m o d e l s a n d t h e n g o e s o n to s h o w the deficiencies o f e v e n the G e s t a l t a c c o u n t . T h e last c h a p t e r

refers

in the period just before his p r o - C o m m u n i s t crusade he h a d noisy breaks with several other friends a n d colleagues, including C a m u s a n d C l a u d e Lefort, w h o was a friend a n d former student of Merleau-Ponty. 8

9

1 0

1 1

Included in Les aventures de la dialectique. I discuss b e l o w aspects o f this attack related to Merleau-Ponty's critique o f Sartre's existentialism. " M e r l e a u - P o n t y " , in Situations, 2 2 5 - 6 . M e r l e a u - P o n t y w a s one of the first to visit the A r c h i v e , in 1938. For details o n w h i c h manuscripts he consulted a n d w h e n , see H . L. V a n B r e d a , " M e r l e a u - P o n t y a n d the Husserl Archives at L o u v a i n " . V a n B r e d a also tells the c o m p l e x story of the establishment of a Husserl archive in Paris a n d of M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s role in this enterprise. T h i s interest explains w h y M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s a p p o i n t m e n t at the S o r b o n n e w a s not as a professor of philosophy but as "Professor of Psychology a n d P e d a g o g y " .

Merleau-Ponty

185

explicitly to p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d suggests that it p r o v i d e s the standpoint

for a n a d e q u a t e

understanding

o f consciousness

a n d its

relation to the n a t u r a l w o r l d . M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s n e x t b o o k , Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), i m m e d i a t e l y established h i m as a m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r a n d a leader, w i t h Sartre, o f the n e w m o v e m e n t o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y . H i s later p u b l i c a t i o n s (mostly articles c o l l e c t e d in Sens et non-sens a n d in Signes) are extensions o f the f u n d a m e n t a l position o f Phénoménologie de la perception to topics such as l a n g u a g e , art, a n d politics. H o w e v e r , d u r i n g the last f e w y e a r s o f his life, M e r l e a u - P o n t y b e g a n

what

p r o m i s e d to b e a r a d i c a l r e t h i n k i n g o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l position. H e does n o t s e e m to h a v e e n v i s a g e d a rejection o f Phénoménologie de la perception b u t surely d i d i n t e n d to e n r i c h a n d e v e n revise his p h e n o m e n o l o g y o n the basis o f a d e e p e r level o f o n t o l o g i c a l thinking. T h i s n e w a p p r o a c h w a s i n d i c a t e d b y the i n t r o d u c t i o n to Signes (published in i960) a n d sketched - a l t h o u g h quite o b s c u r e l y - in L'oeil et l'esprit, o n e o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s last c o m p l e t e d essays (published in 1961). B u t these t w o items w e r e j u s t m i n o r p r e l i m i n a r i e s to the p r o j e c t for a m a j o r n e w b o o k , Le visible et l'invisible. H e d i e d j u s t as this w a s g e t t i n g well o n its w a y , l e a v i n g a b o u t

160 p a g e s o f

relatively h n i s h e d , c o n t i n u o u s text a n d a mass o f w o r k i n g notes. T h e c o n t i n u o u s text a p p a r e n t l y w o u l d h a v e b e e n j u s t the i n t r o d u c t i o n to a m u c h l o n g e r w h o l e . T h e w o r k i n g notes — a selection o f w h i c h h a v e b e e n p u b l i s h e d w i t h the c o n t i n u o u s text - are often f r a g m e n t a r y a n d g e n e r a l l y e n i g m a t i c . T h e s e m a t e r i a l s a r e useful sources for critical aperçus o n M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s earlier w o r k a n d for s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t the w a y his w o r k m i g h t h a v e g o n e . B u t enthusiastic

commentators

s o m e t i m e s forget that, as a m a t t e r o f b r u t a l fact, there is n o b o o k titled Le visible et l'invisible b y M e r l e a u - P o n t y (despite the p u b l i s h e d v o l u m e o f that title, w i t h his n a m e o n the cover). T h e v e r y t h i n g that m a k e s us so interested in such a b o o k — o u r c o n v i c t i o n that M e r l e a u P o n t y w a s a c r e a t i v e p h i l o s o p h e r o f v e r y h i g h o r d e r — should m a k e us realize that w e h a v e n o h o p e o f r e c o n s t r u c t i n g , f r o m the m e a g e r materials w e have, w h a t he w o u l d have produced. T h e following discussion is, t h e r e f o r e , b a s e d o n the fact that the p h i l o s o p h y o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y is, in its c o r e a n d essence, that p r e s e n t e d in Phénoménologie de la perception, a l t h o u g h I will briefly discuss the critique o f Sartre in Le visible et l'invisible a n d its p l a c e in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Merleau-Ponty's thought.

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

i86

THE P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

OF

PERCEPTION

Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology M e r l e a u - P o n t y sees p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a "style o f t h i n k i n g " that has existed at least since H e g e l a n d that d e e p l y i n f o r m e d the w o r k o f Marx,

Nietzsche,

and Freud.

B u t it is o n l y

with

Husserl

that

p h e n o m e n o l o g y b e c a m e explicitly a w a r e o f itself as a distinctive m a n n e r o f d o i n g philosophy. Husserl's m e s s a g e , h o w e v e r , w a s n o t w i t h o u t a m b i v a l e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , his p h e n o m e n o l o g y a p p e a r s m o r e as a set o f tensions t h a n as a single, c o h e r e n t program.

It is p r o c l a i m e d

as a realistic

return

to " t h e things

t h e m s e l v e s " b u t r e q u i r e s a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " s u s p e n s i o n " o f existence claims a n d c u l m i n a t e s in a n idealistic science o f essences. It seeks a n a c c o u n t o f the w o r l d as w e are a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d in it t h r o u g h o u r lived e x p e r i e n c e b u t at the s a m e time presents itself as a r i g o r o u s , d i s e n g a g e d science. It seeks g e n e t i c a c c o u n t s o f the constitution o f objects b u t also aspires to b e a n o n - c a u s a l , descriptive a c c o u n t o f w h a t is g i v e n in o u r e x p e r i e n c e . M e r l e a u - P o n t y d o e s n o t think that these tensions l e a d to c o n t r a d i c t i o n b u t a c k n o w l e d g e s that r e c o n ciling t h e m r e q u i r e s s o m e

subordination

of opposing

emphases.

R o u g h l y , h e sees h i m s e l f as g i v i n g p r i o r i t y to the first side o f e a c h o f the a b o v e pairs as o p p o s e d to Husserl's e m p h a s i s o n the s e c o n d . A s a m o d e o f k n o w i n g o u r w o r l d , p h e n o m e n o l o g y is, a c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , distinct f r o m a n d in c r u c i a l respects s u p e r i o r to b o t h scientific

explanations

m o d e r n philosophy,

a n d to the a n a l y t i c a l reflections

superior, t h e r e f o r e , to b o t h

of much

empiricism and

rationalism. I n b o t h cases, the superiority c o n c e r n s the a c c o u n t p h e n o m e n o l o g y is able to give o f o u r c o n c r e t e e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d . S c i e n c e r e d u c e s this e n g a g e m e n t to a m e c h a n i s m o f p h y s i c a l a n d p h y s i o l o g i c a l causes. A n a l y t i c reflection (characteristic o f n e o K a n t i a n idealists such as B r u n s c h v i c g — a n d also o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's Brunschvicgian readings of Descartes and Kant) reduces our concrete e x p e r i e n c e to a p s e u d o - e x p l a n a t o r y system o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e d faculties (judgment, v o l i t i o n , etc.). T h e i n a d e q u a c y o f science a n d o f analytic reflection is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t w h e n w e realize that e a c h enterprise m u s t itself b e b a s e d (incoherently) o n the v e r y w o r l d o f lived

experience

that it r e d u c e s . It is precisely

this w o r l d

that

p h e n o m e n o l o g y aims to describe. M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s c o n s t r u a l o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y d e p e n d s o n his anti-

Merleau-Ponty

187

idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n . T h e p o i n t o f the r e d u c t i o n is to get b e y o n d the c o m m o n - s e n s e p r e j u d i c e s associated w i t h the " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " in w h i c h w e

unreflectively

e n c o u n t e r the w o r l d . T o take the r e d u c t i o n in a n idealist sense is to see it as a r e t u r n to a p r e - p e r s o n a l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject w h i c h the entire w o r l d a p p e a r s w i t h c o m p l e t e transparency.

before (The

t r a n s p a r e n c y w o u l d b e d u e to the fact that the w o r l d is entirely constituted

by

transcendental

consciousness

from

the

epistemic

m a t t e r - hyle - o f sense data.) O n this view, the r e d u c t i o n reveals the w o r l d as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n m e a n i n g - f o r - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . M e r l e a u - P o n t y a g r e e s that the r e d u c t i o n m u s t b e a w i t h d r a w a l f r o m the w o r l d as w e c o m m o n l y think o f it, a suspension o f o u r n o r m a l " c o m p l i c i t y " w i t h the w o r l d . B u t , c o n t r a r y to the idealist c o n s t r u a l o f the r e d u c t i o n , he insists that the effect o f this w i t h d r a w a l is n o t a s e p a r a t i o n o f the self (as t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ego) f r o m the w o r l d . R a t h e r , the w i t h d r a w a l p r o d u c e s a m o r e explicit a w a r e n e s s o f the precise w a y s in w h i c h w e are i n e x t r i c a b l y i n v o l v e d in the w o r l d . If the " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " is o u r s p o n t a n e o u s a c c e p t a n c e o f ourselves as situated in the w o r l d , the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

reduction

is n o t a

rejection o f that attitude b u t a m e a n s o f e l u c i d a t i n g a n d a p p r e c i a t i n g the f u n d a m e n t a l truths it e m b o d i e s . T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c tion, t h e r e f o r e , is n o t the a t t a i n m e n t o f a n e w s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h w e v i e w p r e v i o u s l y inaccessible p h i l o s o p h i c a l truths b u t a m e a n s o f s l o u g h i n g off false c o n c e p t i o n s due to, for e x a m p l e , the abstractions o f science a n d o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , a n d o f r e t u r n i n g to o u r original position in the midst o f the w o r l d — a position that, in s o m e sense, w e c a n n e v e r h a v e entirely a b a n d o n e d . P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l does

not,

then,

strictly

separate

consciousness

from

reflection the

world.

R a t h e r , " i t slackens the i n t e n t i o n a l t h r e a d s w h i c h attach us to the w o r l d a n d thus b r i n g s t h e m to o u r n o t i c e " [Phénoménologie de la perception \PP~\, viii/xiii). S i n c e these t h r e a d s c a n n o t b e b r o k e n , since w e a l w a y s r e m a i n situated in the w o r l d , M e r l e a u - P o n t y

concludes

(against a n y idealist r e a d i n g o f Husserl), " t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t lesson w h i c h the r e d u c t i o n t e a c h e s us is the impossibility o f a c o m p l e t e r e d u c t i o n " (PP, v i i i / x i v ) . H u s s e r l also speaks o f an eidetic reduction, an e x t r a c t i o n o f the essential structures implicit in the p h e n o m e n a that a p p e a r to us. M e r l e a u - P o n t y suggests that this is in fact j u s t an i n t e g r a l aspect o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n , so that there is really o n l y one r e d u c t i o n . Specifically, the m o v e to ideality (essential intuition) is

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

i88

n e e d e d b e c a u s e w e are so tightly a n d unreflectively i n v o l v e d in the w o r l d that w e c a n n o t really k n o w o u r situation unless w e m o m e n t a rily b a c k a w a y f r o m it in its c o n c r e t e facticity a n d describe it in t e r m s o f ideal essential structures. B u t s u c h descriptions are o n l y a means

o f r e t u r n i n g to the c o n c r e t e n e s s

o f o u r true

primordial

relation to the w o r l d o f existence. H e r e M e r l e a u - P o n t y distinguishes his p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m the l o g i c a l a n d linguistic analysis o f the V i e n n a C i r c l e , w h i c h h e sees as r e m a i n i n g o n the level o f s e p a r a t e d linguistic essences a n d so n e v e r r e t u r n i n g f r o m the m e a n i n g o f w o r d s to the m e a n i n g o f things (PR, x / x v ) .

1 2

M e r l e a u - P o n t y also expresses his non-idealist c o n c e p t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y t h r o u g h his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Husserl's k e y c o n c e p t o f intentionality. A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is n o t j u s t the i d e a that e v e r y a c t o f consciousness is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s o m e o b j e c t , since this w o u l d b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a n idealist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that s a w subject a n d object as essentially c o r r e l a t e d b u t w i t h a f u n d a m e n t a l p r i o r i t y r e s i d i n g in the subject. M e r l e a u - P o n t y

sees

intentionality

and

as e x p r e s s i n g

the i n e x t r i c a b l e

unity o f w o r l d

consciousness, w i t h n e i t h e r assimilated to the other. L i k e S a r t r e , h e sees the unity o f " m a n - i n - t h e - w o r l d " as the u l t i m a t e starting-point of phenomenology. T h e d o m a i n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y is w h a t M e r l e a u - P o n t y calls the " p h e n o m e n a l

field",

our immediate

experience

as w e

actually live t h r o u g h it (as o p p o s e d to scientific, p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d e v e n c o m m o n - s e n s e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f that e x p e r i e n c e ) . M e r l e a u P o n t y p a r t i c u l a r l y insists o n the i n a d e q u a c y o f b o t h science a n d traditional p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection for p r o v i d i n g a n a c c u r a t e a n d c o m p l e t e description o f this field. T h e basic p r o b l e m w i t h a scientific a p p r o a c h is that the d e p l o y ment

o f its r i g o r o u s l y

empirical

a n d quantitative

methodology

requires us to r e g a r d the c o n t e n t s o f the p h e n o m e n a l field as fully d e t e r m i n a t e a n d totally objective (that is, in n o w a y d e p e n d e n t o n o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m ) . S c i e n c e m u s t c o n c e i v e o f its objects in a w a y that allows t h e m to b e u n d e r s t o o d entirely in t e r m s o f ideal mathematical

constructs.

This

means

that

science

understands

e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g living, feeling, a n d t h i n k i n g b o d i e s , as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a set o f p h y s i c a l e l e m e n t s c o n n e c t e d b y c a u s a l relations. 1 2

For further c o m m e n t s b y M e r l e a u - P o n t y o n analytic philosophy; see his discussion with Ryle a n d others in " P h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d A n a l y t i c P h i l o s o p h y " , in Texts and Dialogues,

59-72-

Merleau-Ponty

189

A s a result, e v e n the h u m a n b o d y b e c o m e s p u r e exteriority, a m e r e c o l l e c t i o n o f parts outside o f parts, i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h one

another

a c c o r d i n g to scientihc l a w s . A c c o r d i n g to this view, g e n u i n e subj e c t i v i t y is e l i m i n a t e d , s o m e t h i n g that M e r l e a u - P o n t y r e g a r d s as an o b v i o u s travesty o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the p h e n o m e n a l held. T h i s is the m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d his d r a m a t i c s t a t e m e n t that p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s " r e t u r n to the 'things t h e m s e l v e s ' . . . is f r o m the start a rejection o f s c i e n c e " (PP, ii/viii). H e also thinks he c a n s h o w that the p u r e l y scientihc a c c o u n t fails systematically w h e n it is a p p l i e d to p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i o l o g i c a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l d a t a , w h e n , for e x a m p l e , w e try to u n d e r s t a n d sense p e r c e p t i o n in t e r m s o f sensations p r o d u c e d b y the brain's i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the w o r l d . T h e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m in all these a p p l i c a t i o n s is that the p h e n o m e n a l h e l d involves i r r e d u c i b l e m e a n ings (signihcations) that c a n n o t b e d e a l t w i t h in objective

causal

t e r m s . S c i e n c e c a n n o t , for e x a m p l e , e x p l a i n w h y (to take an e x a m p l e f r o m M a x Scheler) " t h e light o f a c a n d l e c h a n g e s its a p p e a r a n c e for a child w h e n , after a b u r n , it stops a t t r a c t i n g the child's h a n d a n d b e c o m e s literally r e p u l s i v e " (PP, 64/52). R a t i o n a l i s t s a n d idealists h a v e often o p p o s e d the scientihc r e d u c tion o f the p h e n o m e n a l h e l d a n d a g r e e d w i t h M e r l e a u - P o n t y that the p h e n o m e n a l h e l d is p r i o r to the objective w o r l d o f science, w h i c h represents an a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m it. In M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s view, their mistake (and, in s o m e texts, Husserl's) is in g o i n g o n to s u b o r d i n a t e the p h e n o m e n a l h e l d to a d o m a i n o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subjectivity, a separate a n d entirely " i n n e r " w o r l d accessible o n l y v i a special acts of introspection

or intuition. T h i s

p r i v i l e g e d reflective

domain

is said to p r o v i d e

a

s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h w e c a n , in p r i n c i p l e ,

h a v e c o m p l e t e l y explicit k n o w l e d g e

o f the p h e n o m e n a l h e l d ,

by

u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w its m e a n i n g s are constituted b y the t r a n s c e n dental ego. D e s p i t e their differences, the empiricist (scientistic) a n d rationalist (intellectualistic) a p p r o a c h e s are g r o u n d e d in a c o m m o n desire to m a k e o u r f u n d a m e n t a l e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d entirely explicit a n d disengaged.

The

world

must

be

the

pure

object

o f either

an

a u t o n o m o u s subjectivity or an a u t o n o m o u s scientihc m e t h o d . T h e mistake

in b o t h

cases is to think that there

can

ever be

total

d i s e n g a g e m e n t f r o m the p h e n o m e n a l held. B o t h scientihc objectihc a t i o n a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection are t h e m s e l v e s r o o t e d in a n d ultimately

inseparable

from

the

lived

world.

To

overcome

the

mistake, w e m u s t realize that there is n o g o i n g b e y o n d the p h e n o m -

190

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

enal field, n e i t h e r b e l o w it v i a empiricist r e d u c t i o n n o r a b o v e it by idealist

constitution.

W e must,

in o t h e r

words,

remain

o n the

c o n c r e t e level o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

The Body T h e k e y to a v o i d i n g empiricist a n d idealist errors is to m a i n t a i n a p r o p e r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the c e n t r a l p l a c e o f the body in o u r e x p e r i e n c e . T h e b o d y is n o t a n o b j e c t o n a p a r w i t h o t h e r objects. A s my b o d y it is the i n e r a d i c a b l e locus o f e x p e r i e n c e , the s t a n d p o i n t from which

I must

perceive

the w o r l d .

This

is a p p a r e n t

from

the

p e r s p e c t i v a l n a t u r e - b o t h spatially a n d t e m p o r a l l y - o f p e r c e p t i o n . W e e x p e r i e n c e a n o b j e c t situated in a s u r r o u n d i n g w o r l d a n d h e n c e as h a v i n g different

perspectives from

different

positions. In this

sense, a n o b j e c t , far f r o m b e i n g seen f r o m n o w h e r e (as e m p i r i c i s m a n d i d e a l i s m w o u l d suggest), is in fact seen f r o m everywhere. B u t a m o n g all these p e r s p e c t i v e s the o n e f r o m here — f r o m m y p e r c e i v i n g b o d y - is p r i v i l e g e d . M y g a z e a c t u a l l y presents only those aspects o f the o b j e c t that are a p p a r e n t f r o m here (that is, g i v e n i n a full p e r c e p t u a l synthesis); all o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e i n d e h n i t e a n d only presumptive. T h e b o d y is p r i v i l e g e d w i t h r e g a r d n o t o n l y to p e r s p e c t i v e b u t also to all o t h e r p e r c e i v e d m e a n i n g s , such as c o l o r o r tactile sensation. H o w I e x p e r i e n c e , say, a p i n prick, d e p e n d s n o t o n l y o n the p i n b u t also o n the i n t e r n a l disposition o f the b o d y that is b e i n g p r i c k e d . " T h e f u n c t i o n o f the o r g a n i s m in r e c e i v i n g stimuli is, so to speak, to ' c o n c e i v e ' o f a c e r t a i n f o r m o f e x c i t a t i o n " (PP, 89/75). T h e r e is a " c o n s t i t u t i o n " o f the objects o f m y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t it is t h r o u g h a p r e - c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r i n g p r o v i d e d b y m y body. T h e a b o v e line o f t h o u g h t assumes, h o w e v e r , that o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the b o d y c a n n o t itself b e u n d e r s t o o d in a n o b j e c t i v e , d i s e n g a g e d way,

b y either

the m e c h a n i s m s

of empirical

physiology

or o f

introspective p s y c h o l o g y . T o e x c l u d e these possibilities - a n d , at the s a m e t i m e , to s h o w the superiority o f his a c c o u n t in t e r m s o f " b e i n g i n - t h e - w o r l d " — M e r l e a u - P o n t y discusses a p a r a d i g m case o f b o d i l y self-perception: that o f the p h a n t o m l i m b . (For o u r p u r p o s e s , this will also

illustrate

Merleau-Ponty's

phenomenological

distinctive

method

of

combining

description w i t h analysis o f the results o f e m -

pirical scientihc inquiries.) People

w h o have

lost a n a r m or a l e g s o m e t i m e s

still

have

Merleau-Ponty e x p e r i e n c e s that t h e y describe as l o c a t e d in the

no-longer-present

l i m b ; thus, " a m a n w o u n d e d in battle c a n still feel in his p h a n t o m a r m the shell splinters that l a c e r a t e d his real o n e " (PP, 90/76). Merleau-Ponty

m a i n t a i n s that this p h e n o m e n o n

c a n be

entirely

explained neither by purely physiological nor by purely psychological c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . P h y s i o l o g y a l o n e c a n n o t , for e x a m p l e , a c c o u n t for situations in w h i c h a m e r e m e m o r y o f the loss o f the l i m b evokes the p h a n t o m p e r c e p t i o n

(PP, 9 1 / 7 6 ) . B u t , similarly,

introspective

p s y c h o l o g y c a n n o t e x p l a i n w h y s e v e r i n g the afferent nerves o f the s t u m p eliminates the p h a n t o m e x p e r i e n c e (PP, 91/77). F r o m this, M e r l e a u - P o n t y c o n c l u d e s that to a c c o u n t for p h a n t o m l i m b e x p e r i ences w e n e e d a f r a m e w o r k that c a n c o m b i n e b o t h the p h y s i o l o g i c a l a n d the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h e s . H e m a i n t a i n s that his v i e w p o i n t o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d p r o v i d e s the n e e d e d f r a m e w o r k . T o say that a p e r c e i v e r (animal or h u m a n ) exists is to say that it " h a s a w o r l d " (or " b e l o n g s to a w o r l d " ) . H a v i n g a w o r l d , h o w e v e r , is not a m a t t e r o f h a v i n g a d i s e n g a g e d , objective consciousness o f a w o r l d . I a m i n - t h e - w o r l d in a p r e - o b j e c t i v e m a n n e r ; that is, there is n o s h a r p s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n the subjective p e r c e i v e r a n d the objects that it p e r c e i v e s . T h e r e is, n o n e t h e l e s s , a structure (meaning) to the p e r c e i v e r ' s situation w i t h r e s p e c t to its w o r l d . T h i s structure defines the limits w i t h i n w h i c h m y e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d m u s t occur. B u t this defining structure is n o t w h o l l y d e t e r m i n a t e ; it is partially a m b i g u o u s a n d thus consistent w i t h a certain r a n g e o f attitudes a n d actions. A p p l y i n g this f r a m e w o r k o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d to the p h a n t o m limb

case

removes

the

need

to

choose

between

describing

the

p h e n o m e n o n in t e r m s o f either w h a t is strictly p r e s e n t (e.g., c u r r e n t n e r v e transmissions) or w h a t is strictly n o t p r e s e n t (e.g., a r e m e m b e r e d limb). T h i s o p e n s the w a y to r e g a r d i n g the l i m b as h a v i n g w h a t M e r l e a u - P o n t y calls an " a m b i v a l e n t p r e s e n c e " . T h e r e is, that is to say, a r e t e n t i o n o f the p r a c t i c a l field o f actions that w e r e o p e n to the a g e n t b e f o r e the l i m b w a s lost. T h i s r e t e n t i o n is a p p a r e n t in a c o n t i n u i n g p e r c e p t i o n o f the w o r l d as m a n i p u l a b l e in c e r t a i n w a y s , e v e n t h o u g h the a g e n t c a n n o t in fact a c t u a l l y so m a n i p u l a t e it. T h e basis o f this p e r c e p t i o n is the fact that certain objects (e.g., a glass an " a r m ' s r e a c h " f r o m me) r e m a i n " i m p e r s o n a l l y " m a n i p u l a b l e ( " o n e " c o u l d r e a c h out a n d take the glass) e v e n t h o u g h I c a n n o t p e r s o n a l l y do so. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , m y b o d y is p e r c e i v e d as able to m a n i p u l a t e the glass insofar as it is r e g a r d e d i m p e r s o n a l l y as " s o m e b o d y or

10,2

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

a n o t h e r " . T h u s , the l i m b is n o t p r e s e n t o n the level o f p e r s o n a l , firstp e r s o n e x p e r i e n c e , b u t it is p r e s e n t o n the level o f i m p e r s o n a l , thirdp e r s o n e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s is possible b e c a u s e m y b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d is a m b i g u o u s b e t w e e n the i m p e r s o n a l a n d the p e r s o n a l . G i v e n this v i e w p o i n t , M e r l e a u - P o n t y says, w e c a n s u b s u m e the successful aspects o f b o t h the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d the p h y s i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t s o f the p h a n t o m l i m b . W h y , for e x a m p l e , d o m e m o r i e s a l o n e e v o k e the p h a n t o m l i m b e x p e r i e n c e ? B e c a u s e the l i m b is a part o f the p a s t that r e m a i n s quasi-present in the sense o f c o n t i n u i n g to h a v e a role in the s t r u c t u r i n g o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s role is n o r m a l l y p e r i p h e r a l b u t b e c o m e s c e n t r a l in certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w h i c h a r e p r e c i s e l y those in w h i c h the p h a n t o m l i m b e x p e r i e n c e s e m e r g e . T o say that the p h a n t o m l i m b is e v o k e d b y m e m o r i e s is j u s t to say that w e " r e o p e n " the p a s t time that is still tied to the p r e s e n t via i n t e n t i o n a l t h r e a d s s u c h as the q u a s i - p r e s e n t l i m b . Similarly, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t allows us to u n d e r s t a n d w h y e x p e r i e n c e o f the p h a n t o m l i m b d e p e n d s o n the f u n c t i o n i n g o f specific nerves. T h e h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d involves a f r e e d o m f r o m the m o m e n t a r y situation; for e x a m p l e , to p e r c e i v e m y e n v i r o n m e n t I c a n n o t b e totally i m m e r s e d in it (just as the eye c a n n o t see w h a t is flush u p against it). T h i s f r e e d o m is a c h i e v e d b y h a v i n g a large n u m b e r

o f functions

o c c u r in a u t o m a t i c w a y s , a l o n g p r e -

existing c h a n n e l s . I n this w a y f r e e d o m is p u r c h a s e d at the p r i c e o f total spontaneity. A s a result, reflex actions are essential for h u m a n f r e e d o m a n d a r e , a l o n g w i t h the p h y s i o l o g i c a l c a u s a l c h a i n s that underlie t h e m , o n e m o d e o f o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e p h e n o m enal field, the d o m a i n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n , thus p r o vides a locus for situating the truths p o i n t e d to b y b o t h t r a d i t i o n a l philosophical

reflection

a n d scientific

explanation.

This

is w h y

M e r l e a u - P o n t y c a n p r e s e n t p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a n a c c o u n t that is b o t h g e n u i n e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d r e c e p t i v e to scientific results. B u t this " s y n t h e s i s " r e q u i r e s that w e r e c o g n i z e the i n a d e q u a c y o f b o t h traditional reflection a n d e m p i r i c a l science as a u t o n o m o u s a c c o u n t s o f o u r i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e a n d a c c e p t the p r i o r i t y o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description.

Language A s h e d o e s so often, M e r l e a u - P o n t y presents his v i e w o f l a n g u a g e as a n alternative to the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f empiricist a n d intellectualist

Merleau-Ponty accounts.

Empiricism

mediated

through

understands

chains

of

193

language

association,

to

use

as

a

stimuli.

response, Linguistic

m e a n i n g is u l t i m a t e l y l o c a t e d in the e x t e r n a l stimulus that p r o d u c e s a n u t t e r a n c e (stimulus-meaning). I n t e l l e c t u a l i s m ( w h e t h e r idealism or rationalism) sees u t t e r a n c e s as expressions o f t h o u g h t , w h i c h is itself r e g a r d e d as a l o n e f u n d a m e n t a l l y m e a n i n g f u l . E a c h o f these v i e w s o f l a n g u a g e has its o w n d e h c i e n c i e s . B u t their c o m m o n failing is to d e n y that w o r d s in their o w n right h a v e m e a n i n g s . E a c h view, in its o w n way, sees w o r d s as m e r e l y d e r i v a t i v e c o n v e y e r s o f m e a n i n g s that in fact reside e l s e w h e r e , in stimuli or in t h o u g h t s . (In fact, M e r l e a u - P o n t y thinks that the empiricist a c c o u n t in the e n d eliminates m e a n i n g , r e p l a c i n g it w i t h m e r e causal sequence.) A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , " w e refute b o t h intellectualism a n d e m p i r i c i s m b y simply s a y i n g that the word has meaning" (PP, 206/177). H e a g r e e s w i t h the intellectualisa a g a i n s t the empiricist, that t h o u g h t is a reality. B u t , he m a i n t a i n s , t h o u g h t is n o t a p r i v a t e locus o f m e a n i n g that is s o m e h o w e x p r e s s e d b y l a n g u a g e . R a t h e r , l a n g u a g e is itself t h o u g h t as a c o n c r e t e reality, j u s t as the b o d y is h u m a n existence. T h e c l a i m that l a n g u a g e is t h o u g h t is v a l i d , h o w e v e r , o n l y for language

that

Merleau-Ponty

calls

"hrst-order"

or

"originary"

s p e e c h . A g r e a t m a n y o f o u r u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t originate m e a n i n g b u t m e r e l y r e p e a t m e a n i n g s a r t i c u l a t e d b y p r e v i o u s speech. T h i s is a p r a c t i c a l necessity for e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d lies b e h i n d o u r common

view

of

language

as

merely

expressing

pre-existent

t h o u g h t s . Further, o r i g i n a r y s p e e c h n e e d n o t be entirely i n d e p e n d e n t o f a l r e a d y established systems o f m e a n i n g s . It m a y originate

new

m e a n i n g s b y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f an a l r e a d y existing l a n g u a g e . A s M e r l e a u - P o n t y sees it, linguistic e x p r e s s i o n is entirely p a r a l l e l to m u s i c a l e x p r e s s i o n , w h e r e

there is n o q u e s t i o n o f a

musical

m e a n i n g separate f r o m the s o u n d s that " e x p r e s s " it. W e c a n also quite p r o p e r l y

speak o f l a n g u a g e

as a k i n d o f gesture, like

the

s p o n t a n e o u s raising o f m y e y e b r o w s that simply is m y a m a z e m e n t or p u z z l e m e n t at y o u r r e m a r k . A critic m a y suggest that M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s v i e w o f l a n g u a g e is not consistent w i t h the existence o f different l a n g u a g e s , all c a p a b l e o f e x p r e s s i n g w h a t surely are the s a m e m e a n i n g s . T h e critic will c l a i m that this is d u e to the fact that, c o n t r a r y to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ,

the

m e a n i n g is separate f r o m the w o r d , w h i c h expresses it m e r e l y in virtue o f the c o n v e n t i o n s implicit in the p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e to w h i c h it b e l o n g s . H o w , for e x a m p l e , c a n " s q u a r e " (in English) literally be

'94

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

the m e a n i n g o f the g e o m e t r i c a l entity, w h e n this m e a n i n g is e q u a l l y well e x p r e s s e d b y " c a r r e " (in French)? M e r l e a u - P o n t y a g r e e s w i t h the critic's p o i n t for the case o f m e r e l y c o n c e p t u a l m e a n i n g , w h i c h h e u n d e r s t a n d s as a n a b s t r a c t e d c o r e o f c o n t e n t s h a r e d b y the c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r d s o f different l a n g u a g e s . B u t , h e m a i n t a i n s , the full m e a n i n g o f a n y w o r d c a n n o t b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m its c o n c r e t e physicality. T h e r e a r e , for e x a m p l e , a l w a y s e m o tional o v e r t o n e s a n d n u a n c e s , implicit in the s o u n d o r shape o f a w o r d , that f o r m a n i n e x t r i c a b l e aspect o f its m e a n i n g . O n this level, it is n o t a r b i t r a r y that F r e n c h says " n u i t " r a t h e r t h a n

"night".

D e s p i t e a c o m m o n c o n c e p t u a l c o r e , there are subtle differences in the w a y in w h i c h F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h a l l o w us to u n d e r s t a n d , to live, the night. O n the m o s t c o m p l e t e a n d c o n c r e t e level, t h e n , w o r d s are not c o n v e n t i o n a l . " T h e p r e d o m i n a n c e o f v o w e l s in o n e l a n g u a g e , or o f c o n s o n a n t s in another, a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n a l a n d syntactical systems, do n o t r e p r e s e n t so m a n y a r b i t r a r y c o n v e n t i o n s for the e x p r e s s i o n o f one a n d the s a m e i d e a , b u t several w a y s for the h u m a n b o d y to sing the w o r l d ' s praises a n d in the last resort to live i t " (PP, 218/187). M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s a c c o u n t so far h a s e m p h a s i z e d the similarity o f l a n g u a g e to o t h e r f o r m s o f b o d i l y expressions (gesture, m u s i c , etc.). B u t h e also insists o n its distinctive acquisition

o f the h u m a n

character

community:

"alone

as a

permanent

o f all

expressive

processes, s p e e c h is able to settle into a s e d i m e n t a n d constitute a n acquisition for use in h u m a n r e l a t i o n s " (PP, 221/190). H e r e M e r l e a u P o n t y is n o t r e f e r r i n g to o u r ability to p r e s e r v e s p e e c h b y w r i t i n g it d o w n ; the s a m e , after all, c a n b e d o n e for m u s i c . W h a t h e h a s in m i n d is r a t h e r the reflexive c h a r a c t e r o f l a n g u a g e , t h e fact that there c a n b e s p e e c h a b o u t s p e e c h (whereas there is n o t music a b o u t m u s i c , etc.) B e c a u s e o f this, p r e s e n t s p e e c h activity c a n take past s p e e c h activities as its subject a n d p r e s e r v e t h e m b y r e f e r r i n g to t h e m as established givens. T h i s , in t u r n , l e a d s to the i d e a o f a linguistic u t t e r a n c e that a c q u i r e s a p e r m a n e n t status b y b e i n g p r e s e r v e d in all s u b s e q u e n t s p e e c h ; that is, to the i d e a o f a truth. L i k e his m o r e g e n e r a l discussion o f the body,

Merleau-Ponty's

t r e a t m e n t o f l a n g u a g e e m p h a s i z e s the impossibility o f s e p a r a t i n g consciousness f r o m

the w o r l d that is its object.

I n this

regard,

p h e n o m e n o l o g y s h o w s the limitations o f dualistic o n t o l o g i e s d e r i v e d f r o m the C a r t e s i a n tradition. For such o n t o l o g i e s , " t h e o b j e c t is a n object t h r o u g h

a n d t h r o u g h , a n d consciousness is consciousness

t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . T h e r e are t w o senses, a n d t w o only, o f the

Merleau-Ponty

195

w o r d 'exist': one exists as a t h i n g or one exists as a c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " B u t in fact " t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f o u r o w n b o d y . . . reveals to us an a m b i g u o u s m o d e o f e x i s t i n g " (PP, 231/198). T h e b o d y is n o t m e r e l y an o b j e c t a n d o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f it is n o t m e r e l y a t h o u g h t . H e r e , o f course,

Merleau-Ponty

is g i v i n g

not just

a general

critique

of

C a r t e s i a n i s m b u t also a p o i n t e d r e m i n d e r o f the limitations o f the o n t o l o g y o f Sartre's L'être et le néant (but limitations, as w e h a v e seen, also quite a p p a r e n t f r o m Sartre's o w n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

descrip-

tions).

The Other It m i g h t s e e m that M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's a c c o u n t o f l a n g u a g e (and, m o r e generally, his v i e w o f the b o d y o f w h i c h the a c c o u n t is part) w o u l d a l l o w h i m to m a k e short shrift o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m o f the existence o f o t h e r m i n d s . A s he says, l a n g u a g e is a cultural object that p l a y s " a c r u c i a l role in the p e r c e p t i o n o f o t h e r p e o p l e " (PP, 407/354). M o r e fully, m y e n c o u n t e r w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n d e p e n d s o n the fact that n e i t h e r o f us is a p u r e l y t r a n s p a r e n t subjectivity. S u c h a subjectivity " h a s n o outside a n d n o p a r t s " a n d so c a n n o t b e p a r t o f m y p e r c e p t u a l w o r l d . A p u r e subject c a n be directly o n l y b y itself. ( A n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y

experienced

is entirely u n i m p r e s s e d

with

efforts to infer the existence o f o t h e r subjectivities t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s f r o m a n a l o g y or to the best e x p l a n a t i o n . ) B u t , as w e h a v e seen, m y subjectivity is n o t p u r e b u t e m b o d i e d . Further, as e m b o d ied, I a m f r o m the b e g i n n i n g i n c l u d e d in a s h a r e d w o r l d w i t h o t h e r b o d i e s , s o m e o f w h i c h a r e , like m e , a source o f m e a n i n g .

Conse-

quently, I h a v e a l w a y s f o u n d m y s e l f in a w o r l d w i t h m e a n i n g s that are n o t m i n e b u t that I r e c e i v e f r o m others. T h e P y r a m i d s , a c a n opener, m y n e i g h b o r ' s smile are all instances o f cultural or b o d i l y m e a n i n g s b y w h i c h I a m in direct c o n t a c t w i t h the subjectivity of o t h e r p e o p l e . A n d l a n g u a g e , as the p r i m a r y m o d e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h i n this h u m a n w o r l d , w o u l d p e r h a p s be the strongest i n d i c a t i o n that, for M e r l e a u - P o n t y , there is n o p r o b l e m o f other m i n d s . B u t in fact M e r l e a u - P o n t y thinks there is such a p r o b l e m , a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h y reveals an i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n o f his v i e w o f h u m a n reality. T h e

k e y p o i n t is that the

o t h e r as

encountered

t h r o u g h its b e h a v i o r a l (including linguistic) e x p r e s s i o n in o u r s h a r e d w o r l d c a n n o t be simply i d e n t i h e d w i t h the o t h e r as the l i v e d subject o f its o w n e x p e r i e n c e . T h e w o r l d I share w i t h the o t h e r is a c o m m o n

196

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

d o m a i n o f t h o u g h t a n d activity, b u t b y that v e r y fact it is n o t m y p e r s o n a l w o r l d n o r the p e r s o n a l w o r l d o f the other. O n this level, " w h a t w e d o in effect is to i r o n o u t the I a n d the T h o u in a n e x p e r i e n c e s h a r e d b y a plurality, thus i n t r o d u c i n g the i m p e r s o n a l into the h e a r t o f subjectivity a n d e l i m i n a t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f p e r s p e c t i v e s " (PP, 4 0 8 / 3 5 5 - 6 ) . It is this i m p e r s o n a l (or pre-personal) c h a r a c t e r o f the s h a r e d b e h a v i o r a l w o r l d that m a k e s it i n a d e q u a t e as the basis for m y e n c o u n t e r w i t h the o t h e r in its full

subjectivity.

M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s p o i n t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s to w h a t h e thinks is a n essential truth r o o t e d in idealism (indeed, in solipsism). H e has u r g e d , against i d e a l i s m , that I d o n o t e x p e r i e n c e m y s e l f as " t h e c o n s t i t u t i n g a g e n t either o f the n a t u r a l or the cultural w o r l d : into e a c h p e r c e p t i o n a n d into e a c h j u d g e m e n t I b r i n g either

sensory

functions or cultural settings w h i c h a r e n o t a c t u a l l y m i n e " . B u t e v e n so, there is a n o t h e r level o n w h i c h I a m a w a r e o f the entire c o n t e n t o f this description o f a w o r l d in w h i c h I a m e n g a g e d a n d in w h i c h " I a m o u t r u n o n all sides b y m y a c t s " . M y acts a n d their w o r l d h a v e a m e a n i n g b e y o n d m e , b u t " t h e fact r e m a i n s that I a m the o n e by w h o m t h e y are e x p e r i e n c e d , a n d w i t h m y first p e r c e p t i o n s there w a s l a u n c h e d a n insatiable b e i n g w h o a p p r o p r i a t e s e v e r y t h i n g that h e m e e t s , to w h o m n o t h i n g c a n b e s i m p l y a n d p u r e l y g i v e n " (PP, 4 1 1 / 358). T h i s b e i n g , this self, is n o t g i v e n in the s h a r e d

behavioral

w o r l d , a l t h o u g h it is o b v i o u s l y g i v e n to itself in m y f u n d a m e n t a l e x p e r i e n c e o f self-consciousness. (This w o u l d s e e m to b e M e r l e a u Ponty's e q u i v a l e n t o f Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness.) B u t j u s t as I, in this sense, a m n o t g i v e n in the w o r l d , neither is the other. T h e r e f o r e , m e r e l y a p p e a l i n g to the b o d y a n d the s h a r e d b e h a v i o r a l w o r l d o f w h i c h it m a k e s m e a p a r t does n o t s h o w h o w I a m a w a r e o f the e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r p e r s o n s as i n d i v i d u a l subjects. T h e truth o f i d e a l i s m , t h e n , is that I a m m o r e t h a n j u s t the self that is i n c a r n a t e d in m y b o d y a n d its w o r l d . A n d the truth o f solipsism is that the other's self (in this sense) c a n n o t b e k n o w n in the s a m e w a y that I k n o w m y self (as directly g i v e n in m y e x p e r i e n c e ) . N o n e t h e l e s s , I o b v i o u s l y d o k n o w o t h e r selves. I know, for e x a m p l e , that m y friend h a s a

first-person

e x p e r i e n c e o f his g r i e f (as I d o o f

m i n e ) , e v e n t h o u g h I c a n n e v e r share this e x p e r i e n c e . B u t h o w d o I k n o w this? A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , to u n d e r s t a n d this w e n e e d to stop t h i n k i n g o f solitude (the self's g r a s p o f itself) a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n (the self's g r a s p o f others) as i n c o m p a t i b l e alternatives. W e m u s t instead think o f t h e m as t w o aspects o f the s a m e p h e n o m e n o n .

Merleau-Ponty

197

H e r e he d r a w s an a n a l o g y b e t w e e n m y e x p e r i e n c e o f others a n d m y reflective a w a r e n e s s o f myself. R e f l e c t i o n c a n n o t o c c u r w i t h o u t the nonreflective (prereflective) as its source a n d object. Similarly, m y (solitary) e x p e r i e n c e o f m y s e l f c a n n o t o c c u r w i t h o u t a n o n - s o l i t a r y ( c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) e x p e r i e n c e o f others. M o r e fully, there is a social w o r l d ( p r e s u m a b l y n o t r e d u c i b l e to the s h a r e d b e h a v i o r a l w o r l d ) , a n d I a m g i v e n to m y s e l f o n l y b e c a u s e I a m a l r e a d y p a r t o f this w o r l d . For m e to be or to d o a n y t h i n g is to be or d o it in the social w o r l d . T h e r e f o r e , m y a w a r e n e s s o f the other is n o t a m a t t e r o f s o m e p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n b u t simply o f the fact that I h a v e m y b e i n g in a social w o r l d . M e r l e a u - P o n t y is right a b o u t the i n a d e q u a c y o f the w o r l d

of

s h a r e d b e h a v i o r (the o b j e c t o f his earlier p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions) as the locus o f m y e n c o u n t e r w i t h o t h e r p e o p l e possessed, like m e , o f subjectivity in the full sense. B u t his i n v o c a t i o n o f the " s o c i a l w o r l d " a n d its n e c e s s a r y role in self-awareness is, in this c o n t e x t , a deus ex machina, arbitrarily i n t r o d u c e d to resolve a n u n t e n a b l e situation. T h e p r o b l e m is, hrst, that he has g i v e n us n o a c c o u n t (as S a r t r e , on the o t h e r h a n d , has) o f the n a t u r e o f the self or o f its selfa w a r e n e s s . S e c o n d , a n d m o r e importantly, he does n o t tell us how, e v e n g i v e n the c o n t e x t o f the social w o r l d , the self is a w a r e o f o t h e r selves. In b o t h r e g a r d s , S a r t r e ' s a c c o u n t , w i t h its descriptions o f p r e reflective consciousness a n d o f m y e x p e r i e n c e o f m y s e l f as the object o f the other's l o o k , offers m o r e t h a n M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s . M o r e o v e r , by M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s o w n s h o w i n g , the c o m m o n w o r l d o f s h a r e d b e h a v ior is n o t the locus o f m y e x p e r i e n c e o f o t h e r selves a n d this is precisely b e c a u s e h e r e it is a q u e s t i o n o f a self that is " a n insatiable b e i n g w h o a p p r o p r i a t e s e v e r y t h i n g that he m e e t s " . T h i s surely lends further plausibility to Sartre's story o f conflict as the origin o f m y a w a r e n e s s o f the other.

The cogito and the truth of idealism M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s t r e a t m e n t o f o t h e r m i n d s r e v e a l e d a c o r e o f truth in idealism. M o r e generally, he thinks that there is an " e l e m e n t o f h n a l truth in the C a r t e s i a n r e t u r n o f things or ideas to the s e l f " (PP, 4 2 3 / 369), despite its ultimate failure. H i s t r e a t m e n t o f the c o g i t o , the p r i m a r y l o c u s o f idealist t h o u g h t , is his effort to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h this truth. T h e e v i d e n c e for realism is simply m y e x p e r i e n c e o f m y c o n s c i o u s -

198

The Reign ofExistential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

ness as t h r o w n into a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f it. B u t the idealist rightly points o u t that e v e n this e x p e r i e n c e h a s a c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t o n the self. O b j e c t s a p p e a r as t r a n s c e n d e n t to the e x t e n t that I a m i g n o r a n t o f their n a t u r e s a n d c a n o n l y b l i n d l y assert that t h e y (or c e r t a i n features o f them) exist. B u t e v e n such a b a r e assertion is m e a n i n g l e s s unless it is b a s e d o n at least a " g l i m p s e " o f the n a t u r e o f the object, a n d a n y such n a t u r e will h a v e a n intelligibility that d e p e n d s o n c a t e g o r i e s constituted b y the m i n d . G i v e n the f u n d a m e n t a l role o f consciousness in the constitution o f a n y possible o b j e c t o f t h o u g h t o r e x p e r i e n c e , it follows that consciousness m u s t b e a u t o n o m o u s (ind e p e n d e n t o f all outside influences) a n d timeless (outside the system o f the t e m p o r a l objects it constitutes). I n d e e d , as M e r l e a u - P o n t y sees it, consciousness m u s t , for the idealist, b e u l t i m a t e l y identified w i t h absolute consciousness a n d therefore w i t h G o d . B u t i d e a l i s m is m i s t a k e n a n d the m i s t a k e , M e r l e a u - P o n t y m a i n tains, is its s h a r p (epistemic) s e p a r a t i o n o f the act o f p e r c e p t i o n from

the object o f p e r c e p t i o n .

Idealists

distinguish, for e x a m p l e ,

There is a book in front of me f r o m / think I see a book in front of me, with the first b e i n g u n c e r t a i n a n d the s e c o n d certain. T h e c e r t a i n t y o f the a c t o f p e r c e p t i o n is t h e n e x p l o i t e d to m a k e the u n c e r t a i n object d e p e n d e n t o n consciousness's p e r c e p t u a l act. (This, for e x a m p l e , is the

strategy

of phenomenalist

arguments

from

illusion,

which

m a i n t a i n that m a t e r i a l objects, b e c a u s e they a r e objects o f d o u b t , must

be

constructed

from

the

certainties

o f sense-data.)

But,

M e r l e a u - P o n t y a r g u e s , the idealists' s e p a r a t i o n o f a c t a n d o b j e c t is not t e n a b l e . P e r c e p t i o n is n o t p e r c e p t i o n unless it attains its object: if I really see a b o o k in front o f m e , there m u s t be a b o o k in front o f m e . T h e r e f o r e , the idealist m u s t c o n c l u d e either that m y p e r c e p t i o n is c e r t a i n a n d so is its object; o r that the object is u n c e r t a i n a n d so is m y p e r c e p t i o n . T h e r e is n o r o o m for the C a r t e s i a n (nonetheless uncertain

appropriated

by many

but m y perception

idealists)

o f it is certain.

that

argument

the o b j e c t

Recognizing

is

this

u n d e r m i n e s the case for i d e a l i s m a n d r e q u i r e s us to reject the a u t o n o m y o f consciousness in favor o f a n i n e x t r i c a b l e

connection

b e t w e e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its objects. A n d , o f c o u r s e , it is precisely this c o n n e c t i o n that M e r l e a u - P o n t y articulates in his p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the body. It m a y b e suggested, h o w e v e r , that M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's case against idealism is b a s e d o n l y o n certain peculiarities o f (sense) p e r c e p t i o n . Is it likewise possible to give a non-idealist a c c o u n t o f o t h e r d o m a i n s

Merleau-Ponty o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e s , in particular, introspective a w a r e n e s s o f p s y c h i c states a n d exercises o f p u r e t h o u g h t such as m a t h e m a t i c a l u n d e r standing? M e r l e a u - P o n t y m a i n t a i n s that it is. It m a y s e e m that in contrast to the case o f sense p e r c e p t i o n , m y introspective states such as anger, l o v e , a n d d o u b t d o h a v e a certainty that is i n d e p e n d e n t o f the n a t u r e or e v e n existence o f their intentional objects. B u t in fact there c a n b e illusion e v e n r e g a r d i n g such states. C o n s i d e r the case o f love (PP, 433/378). T h e r e is such a t h i n g as "false l o v e " , w h i c h I c a n mistake for true l o v e . B e n e a t h w h a t I take to b e love, there m a y b e a reality quite other t h a n love (e.g., a w a r e n e s s o f a similarity to s o m e o n e p r e v i o u s l y loved). T h e falseness, M e r l e a u - P o n t y says, will b e i n d i c a t e d b y the failure o f m y a p p a r e n t love to entirely i n f o r m m y consciousness, w h i c h a l w a y s m a i n t a i n s s o m e c o r n e r i m m u n e to it. I n such a case, it is possible that I b e d e c e i v e d a b o u t w h e t h e r or n o t I a m in love. But what

a b o u t the case

of mathematical

u n d e r s t a n d i n g , for

e x a m p l e , m y g r a s p o f a p r o o f that the s u m o f the interior angles o f a triangle is 180 d e g r e e s ? M e r l e a u - P o n t y b e g i n s b y n o t i n g , as d i d D e s c a r t e s , that a g r a s p o f such a p r o o f r e q u i r e s a m e n t a l a c t u n i t i n g the v a r i o u s

steps o f the proof, w h i c h

would

otherwise

remain

t e m p o r a l l y s e p a r a t e d insights. I n the case at h a n d , for e x a m p l e , I m u s t g r a s p in a single a c t the three sides o f the triangle, the three angles f o r m e d b y the sides o f the triangle, a n d the p a r a l l e l t h r o u g h its a p e x . W i t h o u t such a u n i f y i n g a c t , I will b e u n a b l e to see the v a r i o u s steps o f the p r o o f as all w o r k i n g to s u p p o r t the c o n c l u s i o n . E v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d s o n the n a t u r e o f this u n i f y i n g act. I f it is the autonomous

grasping

of

a

completely

transparent

intellectual

o b j e c t , t a k e n either idealistically as a n ideal essence or positivistically as a c o n v e n t i o n a l d e h n i t i o n , t h e n w e h a v e a c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s v i e w o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h w o u l d , at least in this case, exist entirely i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its objects. B u t M e r l e a u P o n t y m a i n t a i n s that the a c t o f m a t h e m a t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n act o f i m a g i n a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n , r u n n i n g b e y o n d the i m m a n e n c e o f p u r e t h o u g h t a n d itself essentially tied to a t r a n s c e n d e n t

object.

C o n s i d e r , h e says, w h a t a c t u a l l y g o e s o n w h e n w e p r o v e a m a t h e m a tical truth such the a n g l e - s u m t h e o r e m . T h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n is n o t c a r r i e d o u t b y a n analysis o f the f o r m a l essence or d e h n i t i o n o f a triangle. W e d o n o t , for e x a m p l e , b e g i n w i t h the c o n c e p t three-sided enclosed plane figure a n d discover c o n t a i n e d in it the p r o p e r t y sum of interior angles equal to 180 degrees. R a t h e r , the p r o p e r t y is r e v e a l e d b y a

200

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

series o f c o n s t r u c t i o n s ( e x t e n d i n g lines, d r a w i n g a p a r a l l e l t h r o u g h the apex) f r o m w h i c h the p r o p e r t y b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t . T h e d e m o n stration d o e s m a k e explicit w h a t is implicit in the triangle, b u t this is the triangle as a n o b j e c t in m y l i v e d s p a c e , n o t as a f o r m a l essence. It m a y b e o b j e c t e d that M e r l e a u - P o n t y is c o n f u s i n g w h a t m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n the p s y c h o l o g y o f the d i s c o v e r y o f the t h e o r e m w i t h the rigorous p r o o f e v e n t u a l l y g i v e n

o f it. C e r t a i n l y ,

the h i g h - s c h o o l

t e x t b o o k p r e s e n t a t i o n (based, admittedly, o n E u c l i d ' s Elements) o n w h i c h M e r l e a u - P o n t y is r e l y i n g is a far c r y f r o m the p r o o f offered in, say, H i l b e r t ' s a x i o m a t i z a t i o n o f geometry. S u c h a p r o o f involves n o a p p e a l to o u r spatial i m a g i n a t i o n b u t p r o c e e d s entirely f r o m a n implicit definition o f the triangle a n d its p r o p e r t i e s b y the a x i o m s o f o u r f o r m a l system. B u t a c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y such f o r m a l i z a tion is a l w a y s

a retrospective

enterprise,

itself p r e s u p p o s i n g

an

intuitive e x p e r i e n c e that it a n a l y z e s a n d explicates. T h i s is especially a p p a r e n t f r o m the fact, p r o v e n b y G o d e l , that a f o r m a l i z a t i o n is a l w a y s in p r i n c i p l e i n c o m p l e t e . It n e v e r e x h a u s t s the richness o f the intuitive i m a g i n a t i o n f r o m w h i c h there c o n t i n u e to arise n e w insights that c a n o n l y s u b s e q u e n t l y b e i n c l u d e d in o u r f o r m a l s y s t e m s .

13

W e m u s t , accordingly, r e c o g n i z e that e v e n m a t h e m a t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d e r i v e d f r o m lived p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . In the p r o o f o f the a n g l e - s u m t h e o r e m , the triangle is n o t a n entirely ideal intellectual object. It is a p o l e t o w a r d w h i c h m y b o d i l y m o v e m e n t s (as I c a r r y o u t the c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f the p r o o f ) are d i r e c t e d a n d , as such, a part o f m y spatial w o r l d . S i n c e I a m in this w o r l d o n l y t h r o u g h m y body, it follows that the b o d y is a c o n d i t i o n for the possibility o f geometrical

knowledge

(which

is a n o t h e r

reason w h y m y

body

c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d as j u s t a n o t h e r o b j e c t in space). M e r l e a u - P o n t y further a r g u e s that the b o d y " i s the c o n d i t i o n o f possibility, n o t o n l y o f the g e o m e t r i c a l synthesis, b u t o f all expressive operations

a n d all a c q u i r e d v i e w s w h i c h

constitute

the cultural

w o r l d " (PP, 445/388). T h e role o f the b o d y is to " t h r o w " c o n s c i o u s ness b e y o n d itself t o w a r d the t r a n s c e n d e n t w o r l d . A s w e h a v e seen, this role

is p a r t i c u l a r l y

"embodying"

thought,

apparent goes

in the w a y that l a n g u a g e , by

beyond

what

is i n v o l v e d

t h o u g h t a b s t r a c t l y c o n s i d e r e d in itself. B u t M e r l e a u - P o n t y sizes that l a n g u a g e 1 3

has no privileged

position

in

mere

empha-

o v e r other, n o n -

T h e Belgian philosopher, J e a n L a d r i e r e , later offered a thorough discussion, from a broadly p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l standpoint, o f G o d e l ' s t h e o r e m a n d related results in Les limitations internes des formalismes.

Merleau-Ponty

201

linguistic m o d e s o f e x p r e s s i o n (music, art) b e c a u s e the ideas that it expresses are cultural objects in the s a m e sense that s y m p h o n i e s , c h u r c h e s , a n d p a i n t i n g s are. W e m a y object that, unlike at least s o m e o t h e r cultural objects, ideas are indestructible. B u t a c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , j u s t as a g r e a t c a t h e d r a l c a n be d e s t r o y e d b y b o m b s , so an i d e a c a n b e e l i m i n a t e d b y the loss o f the tradition in w h i c h it is e m b o d i e d . W e m a y r e s p o n d that at least s o m e ideas express e t e r n a l truths that set them

off f r o m

o t h e r cultural p r o d u c t s . A f t e r

all, the

Euclidean

t h e o r e m s are true o f triangles w h e t h e r a n y o n e k n o w s it or n o t . Paintings a n d s y m p h o n i e s d o n o t express similar e t e r n a l truths that c a n be instantiated i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f p a r t i c u l a r cultural manifestations. For M e r l e a u - P o n t y , h o w e v e r , ideas c a n b e r e g a r d e d as true o n l y to the e x t e n t that t h e y are d e s c r i p t i o n s o f r e a l (i.e., p e r c e i v e d ) things. P r e c i s e l y as such descriptions, ideas d o n o t h a v e

eternal

validity, as w e d i s c o v e r e d w h e n real triangles t u r n e d out n o t to b e Euclidean. N o n e t h e l e s s , a critic will reply, E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y r e m a i n s in s o m e sense a b o d y o f truths, e v e n if it is n o t instantiated in the p e r c e p t u a l w o r l d . M e r l e a u - P o n t y a g r e e s b u t denies that the e n d u r i n g truth o f E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y r e q u i r e s us to think o f this t r u t h as outside time. It is e t e r n a l , if it is, o n l y in the sense that all future formulations

o f g e o m e t r y will s o m e h o w h a v e to i n c l u d e it as a

special, l i m i t i n g case. ( C o m p a r e this v i e w to B a c h e l a r d ' s on " p e r m a nent t r u t h s " in science.) H e r e there is n o essential distinction, such as i d e a l i s m r e q u i r e s , b e t w e e n factual a n d r a t i o n a l truth. A l l truths are m e r e l y factual in the sense that they are f o r m u l a t e d in c a t e g o r i e s specihc to a p a r t i c u l a r historical p e r i o d . I f t h e y retain a n y validity b e y o n d that p e r i o d , it is o n l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e , as a m a t t e r o f fact, able to be r e f o r m u l a t e d in the n e w c a t e g o r i e s o f s u c c e e d i n g p e r i o d s . S o - c a l l e d r a t i o n a l truths a l w a y s retain a " c o e f f i c i e n t o f f a c t i c i t y " that ties t h e m to their historical origins a n d m a k e s it possible in p r i n c i p l e that t h e y will s o m e d a y be a b a n d o n e d . Finally, M e r l e a u - P o n t y e x t e n d s his v i e w o f the historicity o f truth to the " s e l f - e v i d e n t " truths to w h i c h idealistic p h i l o s o p h y typically a p p e a l s as its ultimate f o u n d a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , e v e r y idea, e v e r y assertion o f a l l e g e d truth has a " s e d i m e n t a r y h i s t o r y "

ex-

t e n d i n g into the i n d e h n i t e past. E a c h i d e a a n d p r o p o s i t i o n is the p r o d u c t o f a l o n g series o f historical usages, the a c c u m u l a t i o n w h i c h constitutes its c o n t e n t at a n y g i v e n time. T h i s

of

sedimentary

202

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

history n o t o n l y e x p l a i n s h o w I h a v e c o m e to h a v e m y c u r r e n t t h o u g h t s (their genesis); it also d e t e r m i n e s the m e a n i n g (signihcation) o f these t h o u g h t s . B e c a u s e o f this, the total e v a l u a t i o n o f a n y g i v e n i d e a o r assertion w o u l d r e q u i r e a c o m p l e t e u n p a c k i n g a n d e v a l u a tion o f e v e r y e l e m e n t o f this history. S u c h a p r o c e s s c o u l d in p r i n c i p l e n e v e r b e c o m p l e t e , since it w o u l d r e q u i r e m y s t e p p i n g o u t o f t h e ongoing

flux

o f history. T h i s is w h y the i d e a o f a b s o l u t e l y p r e -

suppositionless truth (self-evident truth) is empty. P a r t i c u l a r truths a p p e a r self-evident o n l y b e c a u s e t h e y define a set o f c o n d i t i o n s to w h i c h I a m (perhaps o n l y implicitly) c o m m i t t e d as the c o n t e x t o f m y e x p e r i e n c e a n d t h o u g h t . S e l f - e v i d e n c e is a l w a y s relative to a p a r ticular c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k a n d reflects m e r e l y m y a c c e p t a n c e o f this f r a m e w o r k , n o t t h e i n e v i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e as such (PP, 454/396). M e r l e a u - P o n t y sums u p his non-idealistic a c c o u n t o f c e r t a i n t y a n d truth b y s a y i n g that h e is " r e s t o r i n g to the c o g i t o

a

temporal

t h i c k n e s s " (PP, 4 5 6 / 3 9 8 ) . H e h a s rejected the a u t o n o m o u s , e t e r n a l t h i n k i n g self o f the idealists. B u t , h e notes, this d o e s n o t m e a n that the c o g i t o is m e r e l y a n o t h e r o f the w o r l d ' s u n c e r t a i n facts. A s such a fact, the c o g i t o w o u l d b e o p a q u e to m e a n d therefore " t h e r e w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e either i n n e r e x p e r i e n c e or c o n s c i o u s n e s s " (PP, 4 5 7 / 399). M y b o d i l y i n c a r n a t i o n m e a n s , o f c o u r s e , that I a m , at e a c h m o m e n t , a consciousness w i t h a " s e d i m e n t a r y h i s t o r y " , d e p e n d e n t on the w o r l d . B u t M e r l e a u - P o n t y

thinks that I m u s t also b e a

consciousness that s o m e h o w escapes f r o m this p a r t i c u l a r history: " i t is n e c e s s a r y that b e h i n d all o u r p a r t i c u l a r t h o u g h t s there should lie a retreat o f n o t - b e i n g , a S e l f " . T h e series o f m y historical c o n s c i o u s nesses

"must

present

itself to

[this]

perpetual

absentee".

The

p r o b l e m , accordingly, is to u n d e r s t a n d " h o w subjectivity c a n b e b o t h d e p e n d e n t y e t i r r e m o v a b l e {indeclinable]" (PP, 459/400). M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s solution is to a p p e a l to the existence o f w h a t h e calls a " s i l e n t " o r " t a c i t " c o g i t o . H e r e h e is starting f r o m the fact that m y i n v o l v e m e n t in the w o r l d is essentially t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e (identihed, as w e h a v e seen, w i t h t h o u g h t ) . B u t , h e says, l a n g u a g e does n o t entirely e n v e l o p a n d d e t e r m i n e m e . L a n g u a g e itself " p r e supposes n o t h i n g less t h a n a consciousness o f l a n g u a g e , a silence o f consciousness e m b r a c i n g the w o r l d o f s p e e c h in w h i c h w o r d s hrst receive

a form

experienced

and meaning".

by myself"

This

is the " t a c i t

cogito, m y s e l f

(PP, 462/403). M e r l e a u - P o n t y

does n o t

r e g a r d this tacit c o g i t o as the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l source o f the w o r l d : " i t

Merleau-Ponty

203

does n o t constitute the w o r l d " . T h i s is a p p a r e n t l y b e c a u s e its g r a s p o f the w o r l d , a l t h o u g h f u n d a m e n t a l , r e m a i n s g e n e r i c . T h e p a r t i c u l a rities o f o u r lives are f o u n d e d e l s e w h e r e . " T h e consciousness w h i c h conditions language

is m e r e l y a c o m p r e h e n s i v e

and

inarticulate

g r a s p u p o n the w o r l d , like that o f an infant at its first b r e a t h . . . t h o u g h it is true that all p a r t i c u l a r k n o w l e d g e is f o u n d e d o n this p r i m a r y view, it is true also that the latter w a i t s to b e w o n b a c k ,

fixed

a n d m a d e explicit b y p e r c e p t u a l e x p l o r a t i o n a n d b y s p e e c h . Silent consciousness grasps itself o n l y as a g e n e r a l i z e d T t h i n k ' in face o f a c o n f u s e d w o r l d 'to b e t h o u g h t a b o u t ' " (PP, 462/404). T h e c o m p e l ling q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a c c e p t i n g this " t a c i t c o g i t o " puts M e r l e a u P o n t y b a c k in the c a m p o f the idealists. W e will r e t u r n to this q u e s t i o n after w e discuss his v i e w o f f r e e d o m .

Freedom M e r l e a u - P o n t y b e g i n s his reflections on f r e e d o m w i t h an a p p r e c i a tive sketch o f Sartre's v i e w o f f r e e d o m as c o n s t r a i n e d b y n o t h i n g b e y o n d itself. H e first notes s o m e a p r i o r i c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a p p a r e n t l y b a s e d o n the v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f f r e e d o m : that if a n y o f m y actions are free, t h e y are all free, since there is n o w a y for f r e e d o m to arise f r o m u n f r e e d o m ; a n d that the n o t i o n o f a t t e n u a t e d f r e e d o m m a k e s n o sense: a n a c t is either free or n o t , w i t h n o m i d d l e g r o u n d . H e also notes that close p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description eliminates w h a t at first

seem

to

determinations

be

limitations

on

freedom.

Allegedly

"objective"

(being c r i p p l e d , h a n d s o m e , Jewish) do n o t

really

limit m y f r e e d o m b e c a u s e t h e y express o n l y w h a t I a m for others; as being-for-itself m y consciousness is n o t a n y o f these things. Similarly, the m o t i v e s that s e e m to d e t e r m i n e m y b e h a v i o r t u r n o u t themselves to be the result o f m y free c h o i c e s . Finally, the fact that there are certain things I c a n n o t successfully d o (be a g r e a t singer, c l i m b a steep cliff) limits m y f r e e d o m o n l y to the e x t e n t that I h a v e m a d e c h o i c e s that constitute certain features o f the w o r l d as obstacles. In light o f all these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , it m a y s e e m that Sartre is r i g h t to see f r e e d o m as entirely u n l i m i t e d b y a n y e x t e r n a l factors. B u t in fact, M e r l e a u - P o n t y says, Sartre m u s t b e w r o n g , if only b e c a u s e , b y m a k i n g all actions e q u a l l y free, he in effect eliminates " f r e e a c t i o n " as a m e a n i n g f u l

category. T o see this, w e n e e d to

realize that a free a c t i o n is a m a t t e r o f d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , that is, o f i n t e r v e n i n g in the w o r l d in a w a y that m a k e s a difference. B u t an

204

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

a c t i o n that p l a c e s n o c o n d i t i o n s o r limitations o n s u b s e q u e n t actions literally m a k e s n o difference. It follows that for a n y a c t i o n to b e free it m u s t i m p o s e m e a n i n g f u l limitations o n o t h e r actions. T h e existe n c e o f f r e e d o m is itself i m p o s s i b l e if all actions are free in Sartre's sense. W h a t Sartre i g n o r e s is the fact that f r e e d o m c a n exist o n l y in a field o f possibilities that specify t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s , g i v e n m y situation, that I will a c t in o n e w a y r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r (cf. PR, 504—5/442). M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s positive enterprise is to outline this " f i e l d - t h e o r y " of freedom. H e b e g i n s w i t h the status o f e x t e r n a l obstacles to a c t i o n , s u c h as the steepness o f a cliff I w a n t to c l i m b . Sartre is right that n o t h i n g a p p e a r s as a n obstacle e x c e p t as a result o f a p r o j e c t that I h a v e c h o s e n . I n this sense, all obstacles are constituted b y f r e e d o m itself. B u t , M e r l e a u - P o n t y n o t e s , f r e e d o m constitutes obstacles o n l y in a g e n e r a l w a y ; it creates, t h r o u g h its p r o j e c t , a c o n t e x t in w h i c h certain things will a p p e a r

as obstacles, others as aids, etc. B u t

f r e e d o m d o e s n o t d e t e r m i n e w h i c h objects will b e obstacles a n d w h i c h n o t . T h e p a r t i c u l a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f obstacles in the field o f f r e e d o m d e p e n d s o n the situation, n o t o n f r e e d o m . M y w a n t i n g to c l i m b the cliff results in there b e i n g (generically) obstacles to m y effort. B u t the p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l structures o f the cliff a n d o f m y b o d y d e t e r m i n e j u s t w h a t these obstacles will b e . W e c a n p r e s e r v e Sartre's c l a i m that all obstacles, e v e n in their specificity, a r e d u e to the self, b u t o n l y if, c o n t r a r y to S a r t r e a n ontology, w e u n d e r s t a n d the self as i n c a r n a t e a n d in the w o r l d , n o t as a n a u t o n o m o u s b e i n g for-itself. But

what

about

the " i n t e r n a l "

psychic

states

that

seem

to

c o n s t r a i n m y f r e e d o m — for e x a m p l e , m y fatigue, m y inferiority c o m p l e x ? Sartre is, o f c o u r s e , c o r r e c t that such states d o n o t literally d e t e r m i n e m y b e h a v i o r . I c o u l d a l w a y s " e x p l o d e " m y fatigue o r m y c o m p l e x a n d c l i m b the cliff (or die trying). B u t Sartre i g n o r e s the c r u c i a l fact that, a l t h o u g h I a l w a y s can alter d e e p - r o o t e d attitudes or p a t t e r n s o f r e a c t i o n , it is i m p r o b a b l e that I will. P r o b a b i l i t y is n o t merely an abstraction

o f m a t h e m a t i c a l t h o u g h t . It is a g e n u i n e

p h e n o m e n o n o f " w e i g h t " (or " t e n d e n c y " ) that is g i v e n in i m m e d i a t e experience.

Having

a n inferiority

complex

means

that

"I

have

c o m m i t t e d m y s e l f to inferiority, that I h a v e m a d e it m y a b o d e " . T h i s past c o m m i t m e n t , " t h o u g h n o t a fate, h a s at least a specific w e i g h t a n d is n o t a set o f events over t h e r e , at a distance f r o m m e " . It is,

Merleau-Ponty

205

rather, " t h e a t m o s p h e r e o f m y p r e s e n t " that d e t e r m i n e s n o t h o w I m u s t act b u t h o w I a m likely to act, g i v e n the situation to w h i c h m y f r e e d o m m u s t " g e a r i t s e l f " (PP, 505/442). T h e h e l d t h e o r y o f f r e e d o m gives us an alternative to the s t a n d a r d objectivist a n d idealist v i e w s o f i n d i v i d u a l s ' relation to their social a n d historical c o n t e x t . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , social class (bourgeoisie, p r o l e t a r i a t , etc.). In the objectivist view, this is entirely a m a t t e r o f e x t e r n a l historical facts, w h e r e a s in the idealist v i e w it derives solely f r o m m y u n f e t t e r e d free c h o i c e to think o f m y s e l f in a certain way. E a c h o f these v i e w s has its specihc

flaws.

Objectivism

c a n n o t e x p l a i n , for e x a m p l e , w h y the v e r y c o n d i t i o n s that it posits as p r o d u c i n g the p r o l e t a r i a t actually emerged. proletarian

existed

for

Idealism can make

consciousness

emerges

centuries

before

this

n o sense o f the fact

gradually,

in

association

class that with

specihc events, a n d is far m o r e likely to d e v e l o p in certain g r o u p s r a t h e r t h a n others (e.g., w o r k e r s r a t h e r t h a n intellectuals). B u t m o r e fundamentally, chotomy

both

between

objectivism

and

idealism

assert

being-in-itself

and

being-for-itself.

a false

di-

Given

this

d i c h o t o m y , n o d o u b t w e m u s t c h o o s e b e t w e e n these t w o categories as the f u n d a m e n t a l source o f class a l l e g i a n c e . B u t the t r u t h is that these c a t e g o r i e s are o n l y abstractions f r o m the c o n c r e t e reality o f consciousness-in-the-world.

F o c u s i n g o n this reality instead o f o n

o n t o l o g i c a l abstractions f r o m it leads us to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s

held

theory of freedom. A n idealist (perhaps e v e n a Sartrean) m a y o b j e c t that M e r l e a u Ponty's v i e w is c o r r e c t b u t o n l y f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the other. For others I a m c o n s t r a i n e d e v e n if n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y m y situation, b u t this is n o t so f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f m y consciousness itself (the for-itself). A s consciousness I a m n o t h i n g . In m y a w a r e n e s s o f m y s e l f as consciousness, I a m a w a r e that m y f r e e d o m has n o limitations. S i n c e m y hrst-person v i e w p o i n t has p r i o r i t y over the t h i r d - p e r s o n v i e w p o i n t o f the o t h e r (this is the " h n a l t r u t h " o f the cogito), w e m u s t p r i v i l e g e the s t a n d p o i n t o f m y being-for-itself. B u t j u s t as M e r l e a u - P o n t y rejects the s h a r p distinction o f the foritself a n d the in-itself, so too he rejects the s h a r p distinction o f the for-itself a n d the for-others.

I f the t w o

categories were

sharply

distinct, it w o u l d n o t be possible for m e to e x p e r i e n c e the o t h e r as a n o t h e r self (ego): " I f the o t h e r p e o p l e w h o e m p i r i c a l l y exist are to b e , for m e , o t h e r p e o p l e , I m u s t h a v e a m e a n s o f r e c o g n i z i n g t h e m , a n d the structures o f the For A n o t h e r m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , a l r e a d y b e the

2o6

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

d i m e n s i o n s o f the For O n e s e l f " (PR, 511/448). H e r e , as in his earlier discussion o f the other, M e r l e a u - P o n t y invokes o u r p r i m o r d i a l situation, as c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s , in a social w o r l d . G i v e n M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s v i e w o f the situatedness o f o u r f r e e d o m , w e c a n speak o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f m e a n i n g in h u m a n history. I n a S a r t r e a n a c c o u n t , history c a n h a v e n o m e a n i n g , since n o a c t i o n c a n d e p e n d o n a n y other. T h e r e a r e , for e x a m p l e , n o statesmen setting a course that m o l d s the s h a p e o f the future in the light o f the s h a p e o f the present. T h e r e a r e o n l y a d v e n t u r e r s w h o arbitrarily confer their o w n p e r s o n a l m e a n i n g s o n events that h a v e n o e n d u r i n g s i g n i h c a n c e . I m a y b e a d e s p o t o n e d a y a n d a n a n a r c h i s t the n e x t , w i t h the w o r l d p o s i n g n o obstacles to m y r a n d o m v a r i a t i o n s . A s a result, there c a n b e n o m e a n i n g f u l c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n historical events, a p a r t f r o m the e p h e m e r a l ties I m a y c r e a t e or alter f r o m m o m e n t to m o m e n t . B y contrast, M e r l e a u - P o n t y allows for m e a n i n g f u l

connections,

independent o f m y choices, but without introducing determinism. In his view, w e c a n think o f ourselves as free, in o u r u n i q u e individuality, b u t o n l y in the c o n t e x t o f a g e n e r a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f o u r possibilities b y o u r historical situation. T h i s p r o v i d e s a v i a b l e sense o f f r e e d o m in a situation. W e m a y w e l l think that M e r l e a u - P o n t y h a s m e r e l y s h o w n certain limitations in Sartre's ontology, limitations o f w h i c h h e w a s h i m s e l f a w a r e a n d w h i c h a r e b a l a n c e d b y his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions (of the b o d y a n d o f situated freedom) a n d c o r r e c t e d b y the social o n t o l o g y o f Critique de la raison dialectique. T h i s , in p a r t , w a s S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r ' s reply, n o d o u b t a p p r o v e d b y S a r t r e , to the extensive critique o f Sartre that M e r l e a u - P o n t y p u b l i s h e d in his Les aventures de la dialectique. T h a t critique t o o k Sartre to task for his support, in the early hfties, o f the C o m m u n i s t Party, a n d tried to c o n n e c t

that

s u p p o r t to the o n t o l o g y o f f r e e d o m d e v e l o p e d in L'être et le néant. Beauvoir

was attacking a

"pseudo-

S a r t r i a n i s m " a n d a n d that h e " d e n i e d coldly the w h o l e

replied

that M e r l e a u - P o n t y

Sartrean

phenomenology of engaged freedom".

She acknowledged

"prob-

l e m s " w i t h " t h e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f Sartre's o n t o l o g y a n d p h e n o m e n o l o g y " b u t a r g u e d that this w a s n o r e a s o n to i g n o r e the o n e in favor o f the other. S h e also n o t e d that " M e r l e a u - P o n t y k n o w s perfectly well that Sartre is p r e p a r i n g a w o r k o f p h i l o s o p h y [Critique de la raison dialectique] w h i c h attacks this p r o b l e m d i r e c t l y " .

1 4

1 4

S i m o n e de Beauvoir, " M e r l e a u - P o n t y et le p s e u d o - s a r t r i s m e " , 2122.

Merleau-Ponty

207

T o this kind o f defense, M e r l e a u - P o n t y seems to h a v e t w o replies. T h e hrst is that in Sartre's o w n political t h i n k i n g a n d a c t i o n , it is the r a d i c a l o n t o l o g i c a l v i e w o f f r e e d o m r a t h e r t h a n the m o r e n u a n c e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l v i e w that d o m i n a t e s . D i s c u s s i n g in Les aventures de la dialectique Sartre's decision (in 1952) to give decisive s u p p o r t to the C o m m u n i s t Party, w h i l e a d m i t t i n g g r a v e defects in its structure a n d policies, h e says that Sartre is w o r k i n g f r o m a t h e o r y o f t h e Party b a s e d o n the " p h i l o s o p h y o f fact, o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d . . . o f t i m e " in L'être et le néant. T h i s p h i l o s o p h y is b e h i n d Sartre's " t r e a t i n g the e v e n t as i n e f f a c e a b l e , as a decisive test o f o u r intentions a n d a n i n s t a n t a n e o u s c h o i c e o f the w h o l e future a n d o f all that w e a r e " . T h e revolutionary's

choice

o f the P a r t y c a n n o t , a c c o r d i n g to Sartre,

derive f r o m a j u d i c i o u s a n d n u a n c e d w e i g h i n g o f the relative merits o f the C o m m u n i s t s a n d their o p p o n e n t s in t e r m s o f the specifics o f the p r e s e n t situation a n d its historical a n t e c e d e n t s . " T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y will o f the militant . . . does n o t c o m e o u t o f w h a t h e w a s b u t out o f the future, o u t o f n o n b e i n g . . . B e c a u s e it is g r a t u i t o u s , p r i o r to a n y m o t i v e , a n d p u r e affirmation o f v a l u e , t h e will a d d i t i o n a l l y postulates in b e i n g w h a t is n e c e s s a r y for its f u l f i l l m e n t . "

15

A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , t h i n k i n g a b o u t f r e e d o m in this w a y leads Sartre to treat c o n t e m p o r a r y political c h o i c e s as m a t t e r s o f unconstrained either

entirely

choice between support

stark alternatives. T h u s , w e must

the P a r t y

o r entirely

support

capitalist

o p p r e s s i o n . (This recalls Sartre's self-criticism o f the v i e w o f f r e e d o m g i v e n in L'être et le néant as reflecting o n l y the e x t r a o r d i n a r y c i r c u m stances

o f the w a r a n d o c c u p a t i o n ,

which

called

for

absolute

c o m m i t m e n t s . ) B u t this line o f response is n o t c o n v i n c i n g . T h e fact that Sartre m a y h a v e m i s r e a d (or e v e n , as w a s p e r h a p s t h e case w i t h the w a r a n d o c c u p a t i o n , c o r r e c t l y read) political situations in t e r m s o f his dualistic

ontology

says n o t h i n g

a b o u t the ultimate

com-

patibility o f that o n t o l o g y w i t h a r i c h e r a n d m o r e n u a n c e d p h e n o m enology of freedom. M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s s e c o n d response to a defense o f Sartre is implicit in his l o n g critique o f S a r t r e a n o n t o l o g y in t h e unfinished m a n u script, Le visible et l'invisible. H e r e h e insists that S a r t r e , despite his claims to the contrary, is n e v e r a b l e to o v e r c o m e his rigid s e p a r a t i o n o f b e i n g a n d n o t h i n g n e s s , a s e p a r a t i o n that allows n o c o n c e p t u a l r o o m for the c o n c r e t e reality in w h i c h the t w o are i n t e r m i n g l e d . 1 5

Lea aventuren de la dialectique, 105, 106—7.

208

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

"Nothingness

and being

are a l w a y s

absolutely

other

than one

another, it is precisely their isolation that unites t h e m . " H e a c k n o w l edges that " S a r t r e does i n d e e d say that at the end of his book it will b e p e r m i s s i b l e to m o v e to a b r o a d e r sense o f B e i n g , w h i c h

contains

B e i n g a n d n o t h i n g n e s s " . B u t h e insists that this n e v e r

happens

b e c a u s e for Sartre consciousness is a l w a y s a d i s e n g a g e d s p e c t a t o r o f h u m a n existence. A s M e r l e a u - P o n t y puts it: " I t c a n n o t b e o t h e r w i s e if o n e starts w i t h the p u r e n e g a t i v e ; for it will n e v e r a d m i t a n y t h i n g into itself, a n d e v e n if o n e c o m e s to r e c o g n i z e that it h a s n e e d o f B e i n g , it will n e e d B e i n g o n l y as a distant e n v i r o n m e n t that does n o t a d u l t e r a t e it. It will dispose it a b o u t itself, as a p u r e spectacle or as w h a t it h a s to b e . " ultimately

reconcile

T h i s attack m a y s h o w that Sartre

1 6

the o n t o l o g y

cannot

o f L'être et le néant w i t h

the

p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f f r e e d o m . I f so, p h e n o m e n o l o g y m a y n e e d a n alternative ontology, p e r h a p s o f the sort that M e r l e a u - P o n t y seems to b e d e v e l o p i n g in Le visible et l'invisible. B u t it d o e s n o t f o l l o w that Sartre prefers his o n t o l o g y to his p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a c l a i m

made

p a r t i c u l a r l y d u b i o u s b y Sartre's d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n alternative social o n t o l o g y in Critique de la raison dialectique.

PHENOMENOLOGY

AND

STRUCTURALISM

A m o n g F r e n c h existential p h i l o s o p h e r s , M e r l e a u - P o n t y p r o v i d e d the fullest

and most

acute

phenomenological

description

of human

existence. B u t at t h e s a m e t i m e h e p l a y e d a m a j o r role in the s u d d e n f a d i n g o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m the F r e n c h scene b e g i n n i n g a b o u t i 9 6 0 . T h i s role h a d t w o m a i n d i m e n s i o n s . O n the o n e h a n d , M e r l e a u - P o n t y p u s h e d the effort to describe c o n c r e t e h u m a n existence p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y so far that h e r e a c h e d the limits o f the project's c o h e r e n c e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , h e i n t r o d u c e d into p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions Saussure's linguistics a n d L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s a n t h r o pology, theories that w e r e , a l o n g w i t h p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the m a i n instruments o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s r a p i d overthrow. T h e strength o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s t h e extent to w h i c h , in contrast to S a r t r e ' s , it p u r s u e d the sheer c o m p l e x i t y o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g oversimplifying o n t o l o g i c a l categories. B u t at s o m e p o i n t the o n t o l o g i c a l issue h a d to b e f a c e d , since his descriptions c a r r i e d a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t j u s t w h a t sorts o f beings

1 6

Le visible et l'invisible, 68, 70.

Merleau-Ponty the w o r l d

and

our

consciousness

209

o f it are. W e

have

seen,

e x a m p l e , h o w M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the " t a c i t

for

cogito"

suggests an implicit i d e a l i s m in his d e s c r i p t i o n o f self-awareness. M o r e generally, as V i n c e n t D e s c o m b e s p o i n t s out, p h e n o m e n o l o g y tends t o w a r d i d e a l i s m p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , g i v e n its insistence o n the p r i m a c y o f " m y " p e r c e p t i o n , it c a n n o t a l l o w a distinction b e t w e e n being a n d being-for-myself. P h e n o m e n o l o g y b e c o m e s n o t j u s t a description o f the p h e n o m e n a b u t a d e s c r i p t i o n b a s e d o n the hypothesis that there is n o t h i n g (no m e a n i n g , n o being) e x c e p t in relation to m y experience.

1 7

It is in virtue o f this h y p o t h e s i s that p h e n o m e n o l o g y

r e m a i n s , as M e r l e a u - P o n t y insists, a p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o g i t o . A s w e h a v e seen, h o w e v e r , M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s c o g i t o is ultimately " t a c i t " , that is, n o t m y s e l f as this i n d i v i d u a l b u t a g e n e r a l subject, the " o n e " r a t h e r t h a n the " I " . It m i g h t s e e m that this is the k e y to his a v o i d i n g the collapse o f b e i n g into being-for-myself.

" I f the

T

h a r b o r s an i m p e r s o n a l subject . . . , t h e n the s a m e holds g o o d for the ' w e ' "

1 8

a n d it is this subject c o m m o n to " u s " that p l a c e s us in

the s h a r e d w o r l d o f h u m a n historical e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i d e a o f an i m p e r s o n a l c o g i t o m a y s e e m n o different

than

B r u n s c h v i c g ' s " u n i v e r s a l r e a s o n " , w h i c h has n o c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t of its o w n a n d serves o n l y to d e n y a n y g e n u i n e h u m a n i n v o l v e m e n t in the a c t u a l historical w o r l d . M e r l e a u - P o n t y , h o w e v e r , w o u l d

claim

that his c o g i t o c o u l d be distinguished f r o m this u n a c c e p t a b l y idealist c o g i t o in t w o w a y s . First, it has a specihc c o n t e n t that is e x p r e s s e d in the structures d i s c o v e r e d b y the n e w social sciences o f linguistics a n d cultural a n t h r o p o l o g y , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e y h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d by Saussure

and

fundamental

Levi-Strauss.

Second,

it is possible

to

develop

o n t o l o g y that will s h o w h o w b o t h the subject

a

(the

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l tacit cogito) a n d its o b j e c t (the world) derive from a c o m m o n " s t u f f " or " f l e s h " , w h i c h sustains t h e m as t w o distinct b u t i n e x t r i c a b l y e n t w i n e d d i m e n s i o n s o f being. T h e latter response c o r r e s p o n d s to the o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t that M e r l e a u - P o n t y h o p e d to c a r r y out in Le visible et I'invisible. U n f o r t u nately, the

160 p a g e s o f fairly u n i h e d

discussion he left us

are

p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h f o r m u l a t i n g the p r o b l e m a n d w i t h critic i z i n g i n a d e q u a t e solutions (e.g., Sartre's). T h e m a i n i n d i c a t i o n s o f his positive a p p r o a c h are s k e t c h e d in t w e n t y - h v e p a g e s entitled " T h e

1 7

1 ! i

V i n c e n t D e s c o m b e s , Modern French Philosophy, 66. Ibid., 71.

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

210

I n t e r t w i n i n g , the C h i a s m " . T h e s e h a v e rightly p e r p l e x e d a n d intrig u e d m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s , b u t t h e y offer n o t h i n g sufficiently definite a n d substantial to h a v e h a d m u c h influence o n future p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . B y contrast, M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s c h a m p i o n i n g o f Saussure a n d L é v i - S t r a u s s (in several essays a n d , especially, in his lectures at the C o l l è g e de France) h a d a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y i m p a c t a n d contrib u t e d to a h u g e u p s u r g e o f interest in the structuralist social sciences a m o n g philosophically minded students.

1 9

T h e irony, o f c o u r s e , is

that this interest l e d to the u n d e r m i n i n g o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y b y structuralist a n d poststructuralist criticism. T h e b r i d g e f r o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y to structuralism is a p p a r e n t in the f o l l o w i n g c r u c i a l sentence f r o m M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s essay o n L é v i Strauss (derived f r o m his p r e s e n t a t i o n o f L é v i - S t r a u s s for m e m b e r ship in the C o l l è g e de France): " F o r the p h i l o s o p h e r , the p r e s e n c e o f structure outside o f us in n a t u r a l a n d social systems a n d w i t h i n us as s y m b o l i c f u n c t i o n p o i n t s to a w a y b e y o n d the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t correlation

which

has dominated

philosophy

from

Descartes

to

H e g e l " (Signes [S], 155/123). A s w e h a v e seen, the positivist i m p u l s e in F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y split off into the scientific study o f society. D ü r k h e i m w a s the l e a d e r o f a n e w s o c i o l o g y that, as M e r l e a u - P o n t y notes, " w a n t e d . . . to treat social facts 'as t h i n g s ' a n d n o l o n g e r as 'objectified ciology

systems

tried

of ideas'"

to r e p l a c e

(S, 143/114). W h i l e

social

meanings

with

positivist so-

causal

relations

a m o n g objects, F r e n c h idealist p h i l o s o p h y c o n t i n u e d to think o f t h e m as c o n s t i t u t e d b y the intellectual activity o f the m i n d . T h e one

assimilated

the m i n d

to things, the o t h e r

did the reverse;

neither did j u s t i c e to the c o m b i n a t i o n o f i n t i m a c y a n d s e p a r a t i o n that is o u r c o n c r e t e life in the w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y M a r c e l M a u s s , in his f a m o u s a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l w o r k o n the gift, s h o w e d the w a y to a s o l u t i o n .

20

Mauss

w a s s y m p a t h e t i c to positivist s o c i o l o g y (he w a s D u r k h e i m ' s n e p h e w and

had worked

"concomitant

with

variations

h i m ) . B u t h e insisted and external

that

correlations"

beyond of

the

scientific

s o c i o l o g y there is a " r e s i d u e " that a c c o u n t s for the a c c e p t a n c e o f a g i v e n p r a c t i c e o r institution b y individuals. T h i s residue is a d o m a i n o f " s o c i a l f a c t " , n o t in the positivist sense o f e x t e r n a l causal factors b u t in the sense o f " a n efficacious system o f s y m b o l s or a n e t w o r k o f

1 9

2 0

For details, see Francois Dosse, History of Structuralism, i: 37—42. M a r c e l M a u s s , Essai sur le don.

Merleau-Ponty

211

s y m b o l i c v a l u e s " that is " i n s e r t e d into the depths o f the i n d i v i d u a l " (S, 145/115). M a u s s , h o w e v e r , offered " m o r e o f an insight c o n c e r n i n g the social t h a n a t h e o r y a b o u t i t " (S, 145/116). T h e latter task, a c c o r d i n g to M e r l e a u - P o n t y , w a s c a r r i e d out b y L é v i - S t r a u s s , w h o s e w o r k p a r a l lels earlier w o r k in linguistics b y S a u s s u r e . B o t h L é v i - S t r a u s s a n d Saussure give a c c o u n t s o f social realities (e.g., l a n g u a g e ,

kinship

relations) in t e r m s o f structures ( a l t h o u g h S a u s s u r e tends to use instead the t e r m " s y s t e m s " ) . T h e s e structures are m e a n i n g s (that is, they " o r g a n i z e principle"

[their] c o n s t i t u e n t parts a c c o r d i n g to an

internal

[S, 147/117]) a n d are therefore n o t r e d u c i b l e to c a u s a l

relations a m o n g objects. A t the s a m e t i m e , they are n o t the idealist's " c r y s t a l l i z e d i d e a s " , since the subjects w h o live in a c c o r d w i t h the meanings typically have no conscious grasp of them. People " m a k e use o f [structure] as a m a t t e r o f c o u r s e " , b u t " r a t h e r t h a n their h a v i n g g o t it, it has, if w e m a y p u t it this way, 'got t h e m ' " (S, 147/ 117). B e c a u s e structures are b o t h objective realities, i n d e p e n d e n t o f a n y m i n d , a n d m e a n i n g s i n f o r m i n g the lives o f i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e y are the vehicle o f the c o n c r e t e unity o f m a n - i n - t h e - w o r l d . B u t w e c a n n o t limit ourselves to the study o f structures a l o n e . W e also n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d h o w structures enter into the lives o f individuals. " T h e surprising l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s attested to b y the f o r m a l structures o f societies m u s t c e r t a i n l y b e effected in s o m e w a y b y the p o p u l a t i o n s w h i c h live these . . . s y s t e m s " (for e x a m p l e , the kinship studied b y Lévi-Strauss) structure, w e

systems

(S, 149/119). A c c o r d i n g l y , for a n y

m u s t l o o k for

"a

sort o f l i v e d e q u i v a l e n t

given

o f that

structure . . . T h e v a r i a b l e s o f a n t h r o p o l o g y . . . m u s t be m e t w i t h , s o o n e r or later, o n the l e v e l at w h i c h p h e n o m e n a h a v e an i m m e d i ately

human

significance"

(S,

150/119).

In

fact,

Merleau-Ponty

suggests, " t h i s p r o c e s s o f j o i n i n g objective analysis to l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e is p e r h a p s the m o s t p r o p e r task o f a n t h r o p o l o g y , the one w h i c h distinguishes it f r o m o t h e r social sciences such as e c o n o m i c s

and

d e m o g r a p h y " (S, 149—50/119). H o w are w e to j o i n " o b j e c t i v e analysis to lived e x p e r i e n c e " ? B y " o u r insertion as social subjects into a w h o l e in w h i c h the synthesis o u r intelligence l o o k s for has a l r e a d y b e e n e f f e c t e d " (S, 150/119). S u c h an " i n s e r t i o n " is, o f c o u r s e , i m m e d i a t e l y a v a i l a b l e to us in o u r direct e x p e r i e n c e o f m e a n i n g s in our o r d i n a r y life, a n d " w e c a n g a i n s o m e k n o w l e d g e f r o m this synthesis w h i c h is o u r s e l v e s " . Presumably,

212

The Reign of Existential Phenomonenology (1940-1960)

phenomenological

description w o u l d

be a main

source

o f such

k n o w l e d g e . B u t there is also a n e e d for " e t h n o l o g i c a l e x p e r i e n c e " , w h i c h results f r o m inserting ourselves into a n o t h e r culture so that w e e x p e r i e n c e a n " i n c e s s a n t testing o f self t h r o u g h the o t h e r p e r s o n a n d the o t h e r p e r s o n t h r o u g h the s e l f " . Field w o r k , in o t h e r w o r d s , is n e e d e d so that w e c a n c o n s t r u c t " a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h b e c o m e s in p r i n c i p l e accessible to m e n o f a different t i m e a n d c o u n t r y " (S, 150/120). B y u n d e r s t a n d i n g structure a n d its relation to l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e , w e c o m e " t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w w e are in a sort o f circuit w i t h the sociohistorical w o r l d " (S, 123) a n d thus o v e r c o m e t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l mistakes o f p r i v i l e g i n g the subject over the o b j e c t or the o b j e c t o v e r the subject. S t r u c t u r a l i s m turns o u t to b e j u s t w h a t M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p h i l o s o p h y w a s l o o k i n g for.

PART

III

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

CHAPTER

8

The structuralist invasion

I l i k e d to fix m y t h o u g h t s o n l y o n w h a t w a s still o b s c u r e to m e . a n d to b e a b l e . . . t h a n k s to t h e i n c r e a s i n g b u t , alas, d i s t o r t i n g and

alien light

of m y

i n t e l l e c t , to link to o n e

another

the

f r a g m e n t a r y a n d i n t e r r u p t e d l i n e s o f s t r u c t u r e w h i c h a t first h a d b e e n a l m o s t h i d d e n in mist. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, v, 501)

Although

Merleau-Ponty

heralded

structuralism

as

an

essential

c o m p l e m e n t to p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d a k e y to solving its p r o b l e m of the

subject-object

relation,

the

success

o f structuralism

among

p h i l o s o p h e r s w a s v e r y s o o n p r o c l a i m e d as the defeat o f p h e n o m e n ology. W e n e e d , accordingly, to l o o k at the structuralist p r o j e c t a n d its a p p r o p r i a t i o n b y F r e n c h intellectuals. I will b e g i n w i t h the t w o originary

developments,

Saussure's

linguistics

and

Lévi-Strauss's

a n t h r o p o l o g y , a n d t h e n l o o k at the w o r k o f C a v a i l l è s , C a n g u i l h e m , and

Serres, w h o s e

"philosophy

o f the

concept"

has

important

similarities to structuralism. Finally, I will briefly e x p l o r e extensions o f structuralism to social t h e o r y (Althusser), p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ( L a c a n a n d K r i s t e v a ) , a n d literary t h e o r y (Barthes).

SAUSSURE

From

1907 to 1911, F e r d i n a n d de Saussure

(1857—1913), a

Swiss

professor o f linguistics, offered a course in g e n e r a l linguistics at the University of G e n e v a .

1

A l t h o u g h he n e v e r p u b l i s h e d a n y t h i n g b a s e d

on this c o u r s e , t w o o f his c o l l e a g u e s did after his d e a t h . T h i s b o o k , Cours de linguistique general, is d e r i v e d f r o m notes t a k e n b y students the three times Saussure offered the course. S i n c e there w e r e v e r y few notes m a d e b y Saussure h i m s e l f a n d since his c o u r s e w a s signihcantly 1

For an excellent discussion o f Saussure, see J o n a t h a n Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure.

2 1

5

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

2l6

different e a c h time h e t a u g h t it, the Cours as p u b l i s h e d c a n n o t b e strictly r e g a r d e d as a n e x p r e s s i o n o f Saussure's o w n v i e w s o n linguistics. ( M o r e r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s o f the full text o f Saussure's a n d his students' notes m a k e it possible to g o further in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g w h a t S a u s s u r e h i m s e l f thought.) B u t it w a s the Cours as p u b l i s h e d in 1915 that so strongly i n f l u e n c e d s u b s e q u e n t w o r k in linguistics a n d the social sciences b y p u t t i n g f o r w a r d the f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s o f structuralism. Saussure w a s c o n v i n c e d that despite the v a l u a b l e w o r k d o n e o n v a r i o u s aspects o f linguistics t h r o u g h o u t

the n i n e t e e n t h

century,

there w a s n o clear c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t the discipline w a s b e c a u s e there w a s n o clear c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t a l a n g u a g e w a s . H i s p r o j e c t was

to distinguish

various

aspects

of language

a n d to

specify

precisely the p a r t i c u l a r aspect that h e t h o u g h t s h o u l d b e the c o n c e r n o f linguistics. H i s m a i n claims c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s o f a p a i r o f distinctions h e i n t r o d u c e d , w h i c h h a v e b e c o m e f u n d a m e n t a l in the t e r m i n o l o g y o f linguistics a n d o t h e r structuralist studies. The

first

distinction is b e t w e e n parole (speech) a n d langue (lan-

g u a g e ) . O n the o n e h a n d , there a r e the a c t u a l s p e e c h acts (e.g., u t t e r a n c e s or inscriptions o f sentences) p e r f o r m e d b y p e o p l e w h o speak a g i v e n l a n g u a g e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , there are the rules that g o v e r n those s p e e c h acts. T h e s p e e c h a c t " M y c o m p u t e r c r a s h e d last n i g h t " is g o v e r n e d b y v a r i o u s rules, r a n g i n g f r o m laws o f p h o n o l o g y to g r a m m a t i c a l rules. I f w e think o f l a n g u a g e as the totality o f a c t u a l s p e e c h acts, w e are t r e a t i n g it, in Saussure's t e r m i n o l o g y , as parole o r s p e e c h . I f w e think o f it as the totality o f rules g o v e r n i n g s p e e c h acts, w e are t r e a t i n g it as langue or l a n g u a g e (in a t e c h n i c a l sense). A n o t h e r w a y to p u t the distinction: l a n g u a g e is the system (the linguistic structure, defined b y rules) that is s o m e h o w p r e s e n t in the m i n d o f a n y o n e w h o k n o w s a g i v e n l a n g u a g e ; s p e e c h is the realization (or actualization) o f this system in specific things said b y a speaker. I n t e r m s later u s e d b y N o a m C h o m s k y , l a n g u a g e

c o r r e s p o n d s to a

speaker's c o m p e t e n c e , a n d s p e e c h to a speaker's p e r f o r m a n c e .

2

Saussure's s e c o n d k e y distinction is b e t w e e n the s y n c h r o n i c a n d the d i a c h r o n i c . O n the o n e h a n d , a l a n g u a g e h a s a specific structure

2

Langue a n d parole apply to particular l a n g u a g e s , n o t to l a n g u a g e as a general category: langue is the system o f rules for English or French, etc., n o t for l a n g u a g e in general; parole is the totality o f speech acts in English or French, etc. C h o m s k y postulated the existence o f a single structure that defined generic linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , but this is n o t a step required b y Saussure's distinction.

The structuralist invasion

217

at a n y g i v e n time (e.g., r i g h t n o w there is a specihc set o f rules defining s t a n d a r d A m e r i c a n English). O n the o t h e r h a n d ,

every

l a n g u a g e d e v e l o p s over time (e.g., the transitions f r o m E l i z a b e t h a n to m o d e r n English). I f w e study the " i n s t a n t a n e o u s " structure o f a l a n g u a g e at a g i v e n t i m e , w e a p p r o a c h it synchronic ally; if w e study its historical d e v e l o p m e n t o v e r t i m e , w e a p p r o a c h it cliachronically. S a u s s u r e t h o u g h t that the u n c l a r i t y a b o u t the n a t u r e o f linguistics as a discipline w a s l a r g e l y d u e to confusions b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e as langue a n d as parole a n d b e t w e e n s y n c h r o n i c proaches.

Some

studies

were

historical,

and diachronic ap-

some

structural;

some

f o c u s e d o n rules, s o m e o n acts. T h e r e w a s n o h o p e o f a u n i h e d discipline

that tried to i n c l u d e

all such

studies.

Saussure's o w n

p r o p o s a l , b a s e d o n his v i e w s a b o u t w h a t w a s m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l in l a n g u a g e , w a s that linguistics should b e u n d e r s t o o d as the s y n c h r o n i c study o f linguistic systems. T h i s d i d n o t m e a n that S a u s s u r e t h o u g h t there w a s n o r o o m for studies of parole a n d o f the d i a c h r o n i c . B u t h e t h o u g h t that linguistics as h e c o n s t r u e d it h a d priority o v e r these o t h e r sorts o f studies. G i v e n these distinctions, w e c a n m o v e to a discussion o f Saussure's g e n e r a l v i e w o f l a n g u a g e . L a n g u a g e (in the sense o f langue) is n o t j u s t a n y system b u t a system in w h i c h the basic e l e m e n t s a r e signs. A s such, o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f it d e p e n d s o n o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f signs. A t the h e a r t o f Saussure's linguistic t h e o r y is his distinctive (and, in m a n y w a y s , counter-intuitive) a c c o u n t o f signs. It is p e r h a p s easiest to u n d e r s t a n d S a u s s u r e o n signs b y c o n trasting

his v i e w

with

a common-sense

one, which

I will

call

" r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t " . T h i s is the v i e w that signs a r e p h y s i c a l entities (marks o r sounds) that are associated w i t h ideas (used in the b r o a d C a r t e s i a n sense to i n c l u d e c o n c e p t s , feelings, p e r c e p t i o n s , etc.) a n d that g e t their m e a n i n g f r o m this association. O n the r e p r e s e n t a tionist view, signs h a v e n o m e a n i n g s in their o w n right b u t o n l y f r o m their association w i t h ideas. S o c o n c e i v e d , a l a n g u a g e (a system o f signs) is entirely derivative a n d parasitic. M e a n i n g in the full a n d p r i m a r y sense is in ideas ("the l a n g u a g e o f t h o u g h t " ) , a n d v e r b a l l a n g u a g e is j u s t a n e x t e r n a l m i m i c k i n g o f this p r i m a r y system o f m e a n i n g . H e r e there a r e t w o steps: hrst, w e associate e a c h simple i d e a w i t h a single w o r d (the c o n c e p t dog w i t h " d o g " , etc.); s e c o n d , w e associate relations b e t w e e n ideas ( c o m b i n a t i o n s that m a k e for m o r e complex

ideas) w i t h

relations

between

words

(e.g., the relation

b e t w e e n a s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t - say, dog - a n d a p r e d i c a t e - c o n c e p t - say,

2l8

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

barks - is associated w i t h the relation o f j u x t a p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n the w o r d s that c o r r e s p o n d to the t w o concepts). S a u s s u r e rejects the representationist v i e w b e c a u s e he thinks it is b a s e d on the false a s s u m p t i o n that ideas exist as m e a n i n g f u l units a p a r t f r o m their r e l a t i o n to l a n g u a g e . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , t h o u g h t (ideas) is n o t possible a p a r t f r o m o u r i n v o l v e m e n t in a linguistic system. T h e r e a r e , o f c o u r s e , m e n t a l events a n d states (or, at least, b r a i n events a n d states) that exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f l a n g u a g e . B u t , he m a i n t a i n s , such events a n d states h a v e n o m e a n i n g a p a r t f r o m their relation to linguistic systems. T h i s is n o t a m a t t e r o f s i m p l y r e v e r s i n g the representationist v i e w a n d h o l d i n g , implausibly, that w o r d s (the e l e m e n t s o f l a n g u a g e ) h a v e intrinsic m e a n i n g s f r o m w h i c h

ideas

derive their sense. R a t h e r , S a u s s u r e m a i n t a i n s that n e i t h e r w o r d s nor ideas h a v e m e a n i n g s in t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y c o m e to h a v e m e a n i n g o n l y b y b e i n g r e l a t e d to one another. S a u s s u r e d e v e l o p s his p o s i t i o n b y i n t r o d u c i n g s o m e c r u c i a l t e r m i nology, w h i c h b e c a m e c o i n o f the r e a l m for structuralists. H e uses " s i g n " to refer to the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a w o r d a n d an i d e a as a r e l a t e d pair. (Note that, in this u s a g e , a w o r d is n o t , as w e usually w o u l d say, a sign.) Further, the w o r d as an e l e m e n t o f a sign is called a " s i g n i f i e r " (signifiant), a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i d e a a " s i g n i f i e d " (signifie). T h u s , a sign is the u n i o n o f a v e r b a l signifier (a w o r d ) a n d a m e n t a l signified (an idea); a n d o n l y the sign, n o t its c o m p o n e n t s t a k e n separately, has m e a n i n g . T h e r e is n o r e a l m o f distinct t h o u g h t (ideas) p r i o r to the system that constitutes signs. H o w does a sign c o m e to h a v e m e a n i n g ? O r , p e r h a p s better, in w h a t does its m e a n i n g consist? S a u s s u r e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l thesis here is that a sign's m e a n i n g is entirely a m a t t e r o f its p l a c e in the overall system o f signs a n d that this p l a c e is d e t e r m i n e d b y the w a y it differs f r o m e a c h o t h e r sign. T h i s p o i n t is best u n d e r s t o o d t h r o u g h a series of examples. C o n s i d e r first a non-linguistic case, the g a m e o f chess. W h a t is a p a w n ? W e m i g h t at first describe it in positive p h y s i c a l t e r m s : a small w o o d e n p i e c e , n a r r o w e r a n d r o u n d at the t o p , etc. B u t a little reflection s h o w s that this is entirely w r o n g . A p a w n c o u l d in fact b e a n y sort o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , as w e c a n see b y t h i n k i n g o f substitutions w e c o u l d m a k e for a lost p a w n . R e a l i z i n g this, w e m i g h t g o o n to say that w h a t is really essential for a p a w n is that it b e m o v e d in certain w a y s (one or t w o spaces f o r w a r d o n its first m o v e ,

one

thereafter, etc.). B u t e v e n this c a n b e misleading. It is n o t literally

The structuralist invasion

219

n e c e s s a r y that a p a w n m o v e f o r w a r d ; if the b o a r d w e r e a p p r o p r i ately a l i g n e d , w e m i g h t h a v e to say that it m o v e s u p , d o w n , or sideways. In fact, w e c o u l d p l a y chess in such a w a y that there w a s n o literal sense at all in w h i c h the p i e c e s m o v e d . A

" m o v e " is

n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a transition f r o m o n e state (position) to another. A g i v e n state c o u l d be defined b y h a v i n g a c e r t a i n color, h a v i n g clicked a c e r t a i n n u m b e r o f times, b e i n g assigned a certain n u m b e r . In s u m , there is n o p a r t i c u l a r set o f positive characteristics that a p a w n m u s t in p r i n c i p l e h a v e . W h a t is n e c e s s a r y is that its c h a r a c t e r istics, w h a t e v e r t h e y are, b e r e l a t e d to (specifically, differ from) the characteristics o f the o t h e r p i e c e s in the w a y s r e q u i r e d b y the rules o f chess. For e x a m p l e , as w e o r d i n a r i l y p l a y chess, a k i n g on a far c o r n e r s q u a r e c a n , in a single t u r n , m o v e one space t o w a r d the opposite e x t r e m e square, w h e r e a s a b i s h o p c a n m o v e the

entire

distance. B u t w e c o u l d p l a y in such a w a y that a k i n g c o u l d m o v e the

same

as a b i s h o p

usually

does, p r o v i d e d

our board

had

a

d i a g o n a l o f sixty-four squares a n d a b i s h o p w a s a l l o w e d to m o v e this entire distance at o n c e . T h u s , the p a w n c a n h a v e a n y characteristic w e like, p r o v i d e d a p p r o p r i a t e c h a n g e s are m a d e in the c h a r a c t e r istics

of

other

pieces,

that

is, p r o v i d e d

the

differences

in

the

characteristics are p r e s e r v e d . N e x t c o n s i d e r the role o f letters (and the sounds c o r r e s p o n d i n g to them) in a l a n g u a g e . W e assign b a c e r t a i n r a n g e o f sounds a n d d a different r a n g e . B u t n o t h i n g essential w o u l d be lost if w e systematically i n t e r c h a n g e d these t w o s o u n d r a n g e s — e.g., if instead o f " T h e b o y fell d o w n " w e said " T h e d o y fell b o w n " . P r o v i d e d w e m a i n t a i n the systematic differences b e t w e e n the sounds, it d o e s n ' t m a t t e r w h a t p a r t i c u l a r a s s i g n m e n t s are m a d e . Finally, c o n s i d e r the case o f the m e a n i n g o f c o l o r t e r m s in a g i v e n l a n g u a g e . It m i g h t s e e m that the m e a n i n g o f a g i v e n c o l o r t e r m is not, as S a u s s u r e m a i n t a i n s , simply a m a t t e r o f its relation to o t h e r t e r m s (particularly, c o l o r terms). W e m i g h t in p a r t i c u l a r think that a color t e r m ' s m e a n i n g essentially d e p e n d s on the a c t u a l c o l o r to w h i c h it refers. ( T h u s , if a t e r m m e a n s " r e d " , t h e n it m u s t refer to r e d objects.) S u p p o s e , h o w e v e r , w e are t r y i n g to t e a c h s o m e o n e the m e a n i n g o f " r e d " a n d do so simply b y p r e s e n t i n g a v a r i e t y o f r e d objects.

Our

student

might

never

catch

o n , implicitly

thinking

p e r h a p s that " r e d " refers to s o m e o t h e r characteristic s h a r e d b y all the objects p r e s e n t e d (e.g., b e i n g smaller t h a n the m o o n , b e i n g o n the surface o f the earth). T o o v e r c o m e this difficulty, w e w o u l d h a v e

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

220

to p r e s e n t the student w i t h objects that w e r e e x a c t l y the s a m e except for their c o l o r a n d tell the student that the o n e w a s r e d a n d the o t h e r blue o r y e l l o w or s o m e o t h e r color. I n this way, the student w o u l d l e a r n all the colors at o n c e , b u t p r e c i s e l y insofar as t h e y differ from one another. Further, it w o u l d n o t m a t t e r at all, f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f l a n g u a g e c o m p e t e n c e , w h a t a c t u a l colors the student saw, p r o v i d e d the system o f differences w e r e m a i n t a i n e d . M a y b e the sky is in fact blue to y o u b u t r e d to m e (in t e r m s o f sense d a t a o r e v e n w a v e l e n g t h s p r o d u c i n g t h e m ) . T h i s does n o t m a t t e r as l o n g as w e b o t h say " b l u e " w h e n asked the c o l o r o f the d a y t i m e sky, the sea o n a c l e a r day, etc. T o s u m u p : O n the level o f parole (actual s p e e c h acts), a sign (signifier plus signified) will o f course a l w a y s h a v e s o m e positive c o n t e n t . A

spoken

or w r i t t e n w o r d

specific

(signifier) will

have

p a r t i c u l a r a u d i t o r y or spatial qualities a n d will b e associated w i t h a n i d e a (a feeling, a n i m a g e — the signified) that also h a s p a r t i c u l a r qualities (painful, b r i g h t , etc.). B u t , a c c o r d i n g to Saussure, t w o signs w i t h entirely different c o n t e n t s (signifier a n d signified) will h a v e the s a m e m e a n i n g p r o v i d e d the w a y s in w h i c h the t w o signs differ from o t h e r signs in their system r e m a i n s the s a m e . Linguistic m e a n i n g is, accordingly, n o t a m a t t e r o f c o n t e n t b u t o f f o r m o r structure, as defined b y a system o f differences. T h i s is w h a t is m e a n t b y s a y i n g that S a u s s u r e ' s linguistics is structuralist. O n Saussure's a c c o u n t , there are three basic levels o f linguistic structure a n d , at e a c h level, t w o f u n d a m e n t a l

types o f relations

a m o n g signs. T h e l o w e s t l e v e l o f linguistic structure is that o f the p h o n e m e (the p h o n o l o g i c a l level). A p h o n e m e is a least unit o f s o u n d (e.g., l o n g a, t e r m i n a l t), w i t h the set o f all a l a n g u a g e ' s p h o n e m e s defined

b y the linguistically

significant

differences

among

them.

(Various a c c e n t s c o r r e s p o n d to p e r m i s s i b l e r a n g e s o f differences in the s a m e basic p h o n e m e s — i.e., to sound-differences that a r e n o t linguistically significant.) T h e n there is the level o f the m o r p h e m e (the m o r p h o l o g i c a l level). M o r p h e m e s are the least units o f m e a n i n g , i n c l u d i n g n o t o n l y simple w o r d s b u t also prefixes, suffixes, a n d the like. Finally, there is the level o f the sentence (the syntactical level). T h e p r o j e c t o f linguistics is to discover the rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the e l e m e n t s o f e a c h level c o m b i n e . A t e a c h level o f linguistic structure, S a u s s u r e finds relations o f t w o distinct types: p a r a d i g m a t i c (or, as h e p u t it, associative) a n d syntagm a t i c . P a r a d i g m a t i c relations o b t a i n b e t w e e n t e r m s that yield differ-

The structuralist invasion

221

ent results w h e n substituted into a g i v e n linguistic c o n t e x t . T h u s , at the p h o n o l o g i c a l level, / s / is p a r t i a l l y d e h n e d b y the fact that there is a p h o n o l o g i c a l l y s i g n i h c a n t difference b e t w e e n / s a g / , o n the o n e h a n d , a n d / b a g / , / r a g / , / t a g / , etc. o n the other. O n the m o r p h o logical level, the differences

a m o n g words

such as friend, lecture,

professor, etc. a r e p a r t l y d e h n e d b y the differences t h e y m a k e w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h the suffix -ship. O n the syntactical level, a set o f expressions such as three miles, for my health, a n d along the seashore is differentiated f r o m a set such as of miles, my health, a n d the seashore b y the fact the m e m b e r s o f the hrst b u t n o t the s e c o n d c a n m e a n i n g f u l l y follow Iran. I n a p a r a d i g m a t i c r e l a t i o n , the r e l a t e d t e r m s are o p p o s i n g alternatives to o n e a n o t h e r : w e g e t different linguistic m e a n i n g s b y substituting o n e r a t h e r t h a n the other. S y n t a g m a t i c relations h o l d b e t w e e n t e r m s that c a n b e c o m b i n e d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r to f o r m m o r e c o m p l e x linguistic units. T h u s , p h o n o l o g i c a l l y , / s / is p a r t l y d e h n e d b y the fact that, unlike o t h e r c o n s o n a n t s , it is able to p r e c e d e / p / . M o r p h o l o g i c a l l y , care c a n c o m b i n e w i t h -Jul, -less, a n d -ing, b u t n o t w i t h -ly, -est, o r -ness. Syntactically, he told c a n c o m b i n e w i t h a lie, on her, a n d what he knew, b u t n o t w i t h orange, yourself, o r into. T e r m s r e l a t e d s y n t a g m a t i c a l l y a r e n o t o p p o s i n g alternatives b u t c o m p l e m e n t a r y components.

Saussure m a i n t a i n e d that e v e r y aspect o f linguistic

structure c o u l d b e e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s o f these relations o f contrast and combination.

LÉVI-STRAUSS

A l t h o u g h b y his o w n a c c o u n t C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s (b. 1908) f o u n d the initial inspiration for his structuralist a p p r o a c h to a n t h r o p o l o g y in geology, h e s o o n c a m e to see that the best m o d e l w a s in fact linguistics. I n fact, his w o r k is a p r i m e e x a m p l e o f the e x t e n s i o n o f Saussure's v i e w o f l a n g u a g e to non-linguistic signs. (Saussure anticip a t e d such extensions w i t h his c o n c e p t o f semiology,

a general

science o f signs o f w h i c h linguistics w o u l d b e j u s t o n e b r a n c h . ) T h e basic strategy in e x t e n d i n g structuralism to non-linguistic phenomena

is to identify

elements, parallel

to w o r d s

or

other

linguistic units, that c a n b e c o m b i n e d to f o r m c o m p l e x e s that h a v e s o m e sort o f social " m e a n i n g " . I n e a c h case, there a r e , hrst, v a r i o u s sets o f alternative possibilities (related to e a c h o t h e r p a r a d i g m a t i cally) a n d , s e c o n d , v a r i o u s w a y s o f c o m b i n i n g selections f r o m e a c h set to f o r m c o m p l e x expressions (dehned b y s y n t a g m a t i c relations).

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

222

T h e system o f fashion p r o v i d e s a simple e x a m p l e . H e r e the p a r a d i g 3

m a t i c sets o f alternatives are different sorts o f c l o t h i n g — e.g., h e a d c o v e r i n g s (hats, h o o d s , bonnets), l e g c o v e r i n g s (pants, skirts, shorts), a n d foot c o v e r i n g s (shoes, sandals). T h e s y n t a g m a t i c

combinations

are v a r i o u s total " o u t f i t s " p u t t o g e t h e r b y selecting one f r o m e a c h of the p a r a d i g m a t i c sets (e.g., a b o n n e t , p a n t s , sandals, etc.), t h e r e b y m a k i n g a fashion " s t a t e m e n t " . W e c a n think in the s a m e w a y o f the dishes served at a m u l t i - c o u r s e m e a l , o f the a r r a n g e m e n t o f furniture in a r o o m , a n d o f the a r c h i t e c t u r a l design o f a building. L é v i - S t r a u s s takes the basic a p p r o a c h o f structural linguistics (as d e v e l o p e d n o t o n l y b y S a u s s u r e b u t also b y others in his tradition, especially R o m a n J a k o b s o n a n d N i c h o l a s T r o u b e t z k o y ) a n d applies it to a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n a such as kinship systems a n d m y t h s . In e a c h case, a p p r e c i a t i n g w h a t L é v i - S t r a u s s is d o i n g r e q u i r e s a clear sense o f h o w he e m p l o y s Saussure's signifier/signified distinction. P u t generally, the signified is a l w a y s in the d o m a i n o f t h o u g h t (as in S a u s s u r e , an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d mass p r i o r to its " f o r m a t i o n " b y the r e l e v a n t structure). T h u s , for the case o f kinship relations, the signifieds are the t h o u g h t s o f a culture a b o u t f a m i l y relations, for e x a m p l e , a b o u t d e g r e e s o f r e l a t i o n , r e s p e c t d u e to relationships, a n d incest rituals,

t a b o o s ; the etc.)

Saussurean

that

signifiers "express"

linguistics,

are

the

these

specific

thoughts.

Lévi-Strauss's

practices As

approach

in

(customs,

the

contrasts

case with

of a

representationist one. H e does n o t see a society or culture as h a v i n g certain ideas a b o u t kinship (or the g o d s , or a n i m a l totems) that are then i m p l e m e n t e d b y p r a c t i c e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e m , the p r a c t i c e s b e i n g m a t e r i a l i m a g e s o f the society's " s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " . R a t h e r , b o t h the ideas a n d the p r a c t i c e s are specified b y their s h a r e d f o r m a l structure, o n c e a g a i n u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f differences

between

e l e m e n t s w i t h i n a system. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s a p p r o a c h to t o t e m i s m offers a useful e x a m p l e o f his structuralist a p p r o a c h . C e r t a i n a n i m a l s (or e v e n n a t u r a l objects such as trees or v o l c a n o e s ) often p l a y a central role in the lives o f cultures. T h e s e are called " t o t e m s " , a n d their role often seems to b e t r a y a distinctively " p r i m i t i v e " w a y o f t h o u g h t , c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y

absurd

beliefs a b o u t the c o m m u n i t y ' s relation to the t o t e m s . T r i b e s m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , say that t h e y are the c h i l d r e n o f a n eagle or that their village w a s built b y a p a n t h e r . L é v i - S t r a u s s questions o u r i n c l i n a t i o n

3

For a m o r e c o m p l e x elaboration, see R o l a n d B a r t h e s ' semiotics o f fashion, Système de la mode.

The structuralist invasion

223

to i n t e r p r e t such statements as n a i v e a n d false. H e likewise questions a s t a n d a r d a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t o t e m s as h a v i n g simply a functional

value

within

a society

(e.g., p r e s e r v i n g

a

valuable

r e s o u r c e , p r o v i d i n g a basis for social unity, s u p p o r t i n g the a u t h o r i t y o f the rulers). H e m a i n t a i n s instead that t o t e m i c talk a n d p r a c t i c e s should b e u n d e r s t o o d

as expressions o f a culture's

fundamental

c a t e g o r i e s in c o n c r e t e r a t h e r t h a n a b s t r a c t f o r m . Consider

the

following

contrived

and

greatly

oversimplihed

e x a m p l e . A g i v e n tribe says that it is d e s c e n d e d f r o m a G r e a t E a g l e , w h o nests in an inaccessible

spot a t o p a n e i g h b o r i n g

mountain.

Stories a b o u t this eagle a n d its relations w i t h early m e m b e r s o f the tribe are c o r r e l a t e d w i t h v a r i o u s tribal p r a c t i c e s . P e r h a p s a d o l e s c e n t m a l e s are g i v e n special h e a d d r e s s e s o f e a g l e feathers as p a r t o f an initiation rite, it b e i n g said that t h e y thus b e c o m e eagles (or r e c e i v e an eagle g u a r d i a n ) a n d so m u s t n e v e r kill an e a g l e e x c e p t u n d e r special,

ritually

controlled

circumstances;

pregnant

women

are

f o r b i d d e n to visit the n e i g h b o r i n g m o u n t a i n , o n the g r o u n d s that the E a g l e will steal the souls o f the c h i l d r e n t h e y are c a r r y i n g ; clay h g u r e s o f eagles are e x c h a n g e d b y the p a r e n t s o f m a r r y i n g c o u p l e s a n d said to h a v e special h e a l i n g p o w e r s . A " p r i m i t i v i s t " e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d a c c o u n t for these p r a c t i c e s o n the basis o f beliefs h e l d b y tribal m e m b e r s out o f i g n o r a n c e confusion.

Perhaps some

early tribe m e m b e r s w o r e

eagle

and

head-

dresses for o r n a m e n t a n d o t h e r tribes, seeing t h e m at a distance, m i s t o o k t h e m for l a r g e eagles; p e r h a p s s o m e p r e g n a n t w o m e n h a d m i s c a r r i a g e s after s t u m b l i n g o n the r o c k y terrain o f the m o u n t a i n . S u c h events, the primitivist will a r g u e , h a v e b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d over time into the childish beliefs the tribe n o w has (helped, n o d o u b t , b y the p r i m i t i v e s ' love o f the fantastic a n d the mysterious). A functionalist e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d r a t h e r p o i n t out that, for e x a m p l e ,

eagle

feathers are a v a l u a b l e t r a d i n g c o m m o d i t y for the tribe a n d the totemic

status o f the

bird prevents

overuse

that m i g h t l e a d

to

e x t i n c t i o n , that it is d a n g e r o u s for p r e g n a n t w o m e n to be c l i m b i n g m o u n t a i n s a n d the t a b o o p r e v e n t s this, a n d so on. By

contrast

with

both

these

approaches,

Lévi-Strauss

would

suggest that w e r e g a r d the t o t e m i c E a g l e as p a r t o f a c a t e g o r i a l system w h e r e b y the tribe classihes a n d thus u n d e r s t a n d s the objects a n d facts o f its w o r l d . P e r h a p s , for e x a m p l e , " e a g l e " expresses the c o n c e p t o f " h u n t i n g in the m o u n t a i n s " , w h i c h is h o w the tribe gets its f o o d (whereas a n e i g h b o r i n g tribe, that hshes in the river, m i g h t

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

224

be said to be d e s c e n d e d f r o m a G r e a t S a l m o n ) . M o r e Lévi-Strauss's idea

is that a system o f relations

generally,

among

natural

objects b e c o m e s a c o m p l e x m e t a p h o r for (or a set o f c a t e g o r i e s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) social p r a c t i c e s a n d relations. T h u s , n a t u r a l

facts

a b o u t h o w eagles h u n t , their relations to s a l m o n , the n a t u r e o f their m o u n t a i n d w e l l i n g s , etc. w o u l d all b e u s e d to express social facts a b o u t the h u m a n w o r l d o f the tribe. P u t t i n g this in structuralist t e r m s , the i d e a is that the n a t u r a l " e a g l e - w o r l d " possesses the s a m e f o r m a l structure as the tribe's social w o r l d . T h e t o t e m i c system is essentially a logic: a system o f c a t e g o r i e s for t h i n k i n g a b o u t the social w o r l d . In contrast to functionalist a c c o u n t s , L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s sees totems n o t as " g o o d for e a t i n g " (or for o t h e r b i o l o g i c a l a n d social needs) b u t " g o o d for t h i n k i n g " . Lévi-Strauss's distinction

structuralist

between

anthropology

"primitive"

and

rejects

"advanced"

the

normative

societies.

He

a g r e e s that t h o u g h t c a n b e either a b s t r a c t or c o n c r e t e b u t denies that there is a n y superiority o f the latter over the former. T r i b e s that think v i a c o n c r e t e c a t e g o r i e s are j u s t d o i n g in a n o t h e r w a y w h a t w e do w i t h our abstractions. T h e y are n o t at an earlier, less d e v e l o p e d stage o f t h o u g h t . L é v i - S t r a u s s also asserts a u n i v e r s a l i s m r e g a r d i n g the structures of human

thought

and

society

and

insists

on

the

priority

of

the

u n c o n s c i o u s in h u m a n life. H e m a i n t a i n s that his studies p r o v i d e a g o o d i n d u c t i v e basis for g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a b o u t the structures o f all h u m a n societies a n d also s h o w that these structures are n o t t y p i c a l l y things o f w h i c h individuals are c o n s c i o u s l y a w a r e . O u r t h o u g h t a n d b e h a v i o r are i n f o r m e d b y u n i v e r s a l u n c o n s c i o u s structures. Finally, the m o s t p e r v a s i v e a n d f u n d a m e n t a l structure o f h u m a n life is that defined b y the o p p o s i t i o n o f n a t u r e a n d culture. T h e entire f r a m e w o r k o f a n y society's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its w o r l d is d e v e l o p e d as a response to the q u e s t i o n o f j u s t h o w h u m a n b e i n g s are r e l a t e d to the natural (non-human) world.

STRUCTURALISM

AND

PHENOMENOLOGY

W e h a v e seen h o w M e r l e a u - P o n t y h e r a l d e d structuralism as a k e y to solving the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m o f the relation o f subject a n d object. T h e

i d e a o f c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o a p p r o a c h e s is

likewise suggested b y the fact that L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s La pensée sauvage, the m a j o r s t a t e m e n t o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l significance o f his structuralist

The structuralist invasion

225

a n t h r o p o l o g y , is d e d i c a t e d to the m e m o r y o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y . B u t it is precisely in the h n a l c h a p t e r o f this b o o k that L é v i - S t r a u s s opposes his structuralism to p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d

descriptions

o f h u m a n reality. H e explicitly attacks Sartre's r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d Critique de la raison dialectique, d e f e n d i n g " a n a l y t i c r e a s o n "

against

w h a t h e sees as Sartre's i m p e r i a l i s m o f " d i a l e c t i c a l r e a s o n " . B u t his critique, if effective, clearly applies to a n y s t a n d p o i n t that takes the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l subject as primary. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s c e n t r a l c l a i m is that Sartre's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l (or dialectical) u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n b e i n g s c a n o n l y b e a startingp o i n t , o n e that m u s t b e c o m p l e t e d b y a n objective, analytic g r a s p o f the u n c o n s c i o u s structures u n d e r l y i n g a n d c o m m o n to the l i v e d w o r l d s o f the i m m e n s e v a r i e t y o f h u m a n c o m m u n i t i e s . H e d o e s n o t deny

that

what

phenomenologists

describe

has an

irreducible

validity that a n t h r o p o l o g y c a n n o t i g n o r e . A d m i t t e d l y , h e says that " t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l o f the h u m a n sciences [is] n o t to constitute, b u t to dissolve m a n " , w h e r e

" m a n " m e a n s h u m a n b e i n g s as t h e y

con-

cretely e x p e r i e n c e t h e m s e l v e s . A n d h e e v e n g o e s o n to speak o f a "reduction"

o f this e x p e r i e n c e to m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l

(eventually,

p h y s i c o - c h e m i c a l ) levels o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t h e also insists that for such

a reduction

reduction

to b e l e g i t i m a t e

"the phenomena

must not be impoverished;

subject

o n e m u s t b e certain

to that

e v e r y t h i n g c o n t r i b u t i n g to their distinctive richness a n d originality has b e e n c o l l e c t e d a r o u n d t h e m " [Lapensée sauvage [PS], 327/247). A s a result, the r e d u c t i o n w i l l n o t m e a n the e l i m i n a t i o n o f the r e d u c e d level in favor o f a simpler a n d t h i n n e r reality. R a t h e r the r e d u c e d " s u p e r i o r " l e v e l will " c o m m u n i c a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y s o m e o f its richness to the inferior l e v e l to w h i c h it will h a v e b e e n a s s i m i l a t e d " (PS, 3 2 8 / 248). T h u s , e v e n o n the p u r e l y p h y s i c a l level, " w h e n w e d o h n a l l y s u c c e e d in u n d e r s t a n d i n g life as a f u n c t i o n o f inert matter, it will b e to d i s c o v e r that the latter h a s p r o p e r t i e s v e r y different f r o m those p r e v i o u s l y a t t r i b u t e d to i t " (PS, 3 2 7 - 8 / 2 4 7 - 8 ) . But even though

the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

level is in this

sense

i n e l i m i n a b l e , it r e m a i n s true that u n c o n s c i o u s structures, n o t accessible to p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n , a r e the l o c u s o f the ultimate truth

about human

b e i n g s . B y r e m a i n i n g o n the level o f lived

e x p e r i e n c e , Sartre a n d the other existentialists h a v e limited t h e m selves to the partial truths o f subjectivity: H e w h o b e g i n s b y steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident truths o f introspection never emerges from them. K n o w l e d g e

of m e n sometimes

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

226

seems easier to those w h o allow themselves to be c a u g h t u p in the snare o f p e r s o n a l identity. B u t t h e y t h u s s h u t t h e d o o r o n k n o w l e d g e o f m a n . . . S a r t r e i n f a c t b e c o m e s t h e p r i s o n e r o f his C o g i t o . (PS, 330/249)

A n d if w e r e p l y that this is n o t true o f Critique de la raison dialectique, w h i c h m o v e s f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l to the social level, L é v i - S t r a u s s replies that " b y s o c i o l o g i z i n g the C o g i t o , Sartre m e r e l y e x c h a n g e s one p r i s o n for a n o t h e r " (PS, 330/249). T h e l i m i t a t i o n o f Sartre's position is m o s t a p p a r e n t in its inability to u n d e r s t a n d the f u n d a m e n t a l role o f l a n g u a g e , as e x p l i c a t e d b y m o d e r n linguistics: " L a n g u a g e , a n u n r e f l e c t i n g t o t a l i z a t i o n , is h u m a n r e a s o n w h i c h h a s its reasons a n d o f w h i c h m a n [i.e., the subject o f

first-person

experi-

ence] k n o w s n o t h i n g " (PS, 334/252). T h e v a l i d i t y o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t is limited a n d local. V i e w e d a n a l y t i c a l l y in t e r m s o f a n objective a n d c o m p a r a t i v e anthropological

account

o f the u n d e r l y i n g

structures

of human

societies, it c a n b e o n l y p a r t i a l a n d misleading. H e r e , L é v i - S t r a u s s m a i n t a i n s , Sartre h a s i g n o r e d the lessons o f M a r x a n d F r e u d . L i k e Sartre, t h e y a g r e e , as d o e s L é v i - S t r a u s s , " t h a t m a n h a s m e a n i n g only on the c o n d i t i o n that h e v i e w h i m s e l f as m e a n i n g f u l " . B u t t h e y a d d what

Sartre ignores: " t h a t this m e a n i n g is n e v e r the r i g h t o n e :

superstructures are faulty acts w h i c h h a v e ' m a d e it' socially. H e n c e it is v a i n to g o to historical consciousness for the truest m e a n i n g " (PS, 33 /253-4) Sartre m i g h t well r e s p o n d that h e is entirely a w a r e o f the vast 6

influence

;

o f p r e g i v e n , s e d i m e n t e d m e a n i n g s , o f w h a t he h i m s e l f

called the " p r a c t i c o - i n e r t " . H i s o n l y p o i n t is that w e a r e a l w a y s to at least s o m e e x t e n t c a p a b l e o f c o n s t i t u t i n g a m e a n i n g o f o u r o w n , e v e n if it is c o n s t r a i n e d b y a g i v e n w o r l d w e are n o t able to p e n e t r a t e entirely. W e a r e , in o t h e r w o r d s , a l w a y s able to forge o u r o w n history out o f the m a t e r i a l s w i t h w h i c h w e are p r e s e n t e d . It is this c o n c e p tion o f h u m a n s as distinctively historical agents, that is, m a k e r s o f their o w n e x i s t e n c e , that is c e n t r a l to his position. B u t a c c o r d i n g to Lévi-Strauss, Sartre

fails to realize

that this v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f

ourselves as historical (i.e., as agents m a k i n g o u r o w n history) is m e r e l y o u r l o c a l a n d c o n t i n g e n t w a y o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t ourselves, n o t a f u n d a m e n t a l truth o f h u m a n reality. W h e r e a s " p r i m i t i v e " societies see t h e m s e l v e s as passive r e c e i v e r s o f a n ahistorical p a t t e r n d e c r e e d b y their

g o d s , w e see ourselves

as active

creators

of our own

m e a n i n g s . B u t there is n o basis for o b j e c t i v e l y p r e f e r r i n g o u r v i e w over that o f the p r i m i t i v e s . S a r t r e ' s " p o s i t i o n in relation to history is

The structuralist invasion

227

therefore the s a m e as that o f p r i m i t i v e s to the e t e r n a l past: in Sartre's system, history p l a y s e x a c t l y the role o f m y t h " (PS, 336/254). Sartre is b l i n d to this p a r a l l e l (and h e n c e to the s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n the disciplines o f history a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y ) b e c a u s e he thinks that historical

societies

such

as ours h a v e

the

advantage

of

making

reflectively explicit w h a t , in p r i m i t i v e societies, is m e r e l y implicit in their

praxis.

But here

he

misunderstands

what

is g o i n g

on

in

primitive societies. P r i m i t i v e p r a c t i c e s — for e x a m p l e , initiation rites, w h i c h are strikingly similar in v e r y different

societies -

are

not

t h o u g h t b u r i e d b e n e a t h b l i n d a n d inarticulate customs. T h e y are r a t h e r t h o u g h t itself, o r g a n i z i n g a n d m a k i n g intelligible the n a t u r a l a n d social w o r l d . T h e t h o u g h t is c o n c r e t e , in contrast to o u r a b s t r a c t c a t e g o r i e s , b u t it is n o t for all that inferior or, m o r e to the p o i n t , less free t h a n ours. Sartre's

mistake,

then,

is to

maintain

that

his

(our) w a y

of

c a t e g o r i z i n g the w o r l d is p r i v i l e g e d . In this, o f c o u r s e , he is h a r d l y u n i q u e . " E a c h o f the tens or h u n d r e d s or t h o u s a n d s o f societies w h i c h h a v e existed . . . has c l a i m e d that it c o n t a i n s the essence o f all the m e a n i n g a n d dignity o f w h i c h h u m a n society is c a p a b l e . " Sartre's c l a i m o f privilege for m o d e r n E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t differs little f r o m the p a r a l l e l c l a i m o f " a M e l a n e s i a n s a v a g e " . In all cases,

a

g o o d deal o f e g o c e n t r i c i t y a n d n a i v e t y is n e c e s s a r y to believe that m a n has t a k e n refuge in a single o n e o f the historical or g e o graphical

modes

of

his

existence"

(PS,

329/249).

Accordingly,

Sartre's t h o u g h t is " u n q u a l i f i e d to pass j u d g m e n t o n " the s a v a g e m i n d b e c a u s e it shares its f u n d a m e n t a l characteristics. O n the o t h e r h a n d , " t o the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t . . . this p h i l o s o p h y (like all the others) affords a hrst-class e t h n o g r a p h i c d o c u m e n t , the study o f w h i c h is essential to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m y t h o l o g y o f o u r o w n t i m e " (PS, 3 3 o n / 2 4 9 n ) .

PHILOSOPHY

4

OF T H E C O N C E P T : AND

CAVAILLES,

CANGUILHEM,

SERRES

For all its originality, structuralism w a s n o t the hrst m a j o r m o v e m e n t in F r a n c e

to o p p o s e

the centrality o f the

subject. A s

Foucault,

c o m m e n t i n g on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r l d in w h i c h he w a s e d u c a t e d ,

4

In the next chapter, w e will discuss Sartre's response to the structuralist challenge in the context o f Foucault's Les mots et Us choses.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

228

p o i n t e d o u t , there w a s , w e l l b e f o r e structuralism, a basic split in French

philosophy

between

a

"philosophy

of

experience,

of

m e a n i n g , o f the subject a n d a p h i l o s o p h y o f k n o w l e d g e [savoir], o f rationality, a n d o f the c o n c e p t " .

I n F o u c a u l t ' s student d a y s , the

" p h i l o s o p h y o f e x p e r i e n c e " w a s , o f c o u r s e , existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y (but F o u c a u l t l o c a t e d earlier instantiations o f it in the v a r i o u s versions o f spiritualism a n d in B e r g s o n ) . T h e " p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t " w a s historically tied to the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n ,

ultimately

t r a c e a b l e to C o m t e , o f the history a n d p h i l o s o p h y o f science. In the latter h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century, this tradition w a s p r i m a r i l y r e p r e s e n t e d b y G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d a n d his successor as d i r e c t o r o f the Sorbonne's

Institut

d'Histoire

des S c i e n c e s

et des

Techniques,

G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m . A l t h o u g h the w o r k o f B a c h e l a r d a n d C a n guilhem

w a s scarcely

known

outside

of France,

p h i l o s o p h y w a s s i m p l y identified w i t h existential

where

French

phenomenology,

they w e r e m a j o r influences o n several g e n e r a t i o n s o f F r e n c h philo s o p h y students a n d their " p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t " r e m a i n e d a significant alternative to existential philosophy. I n d e e d , b u t for the c o n t i n g e n c i e s o f the w a r , there m i g h t w e l l h a v e b e e n a " c o n c e p t u a l " a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l to rival Sartre's a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s " e x p e r i e n t i a l " r e a d i n g s . J e a n C a v a i l l è s (1903—1944), w r i t i n g in the 1940s, h a d offered

a brilliant f o r m a l

reading of

Husserl that m o v e d his t h o u g h t a w a y f r o m its H e i d e g g e r i a n future a n d b a c k t o w a r d its origins in l o g i c a n d the p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s . For e x a m p l e , c o m m e n t i n g o n Husserl's Formal and Transcen6

dental Logic, h e c o n c l u d e d : " I t is n o t a p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness b u t a p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t w h i c h c a n p r o v i d e a t h e o r y o f science." the

7

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , C a v a i l l è s , w h o w a s o n e o f the f o u n d e r s o f

French

Resistance

to the N a z i

occupation

of France, was

c a p t u r e d b y the G e r m a n s a n d e x e c u t e d . H i s " r a t i o n a l i s t " d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s c o n t i n u e d by, a m o n g others, S u z a n n e B a c h e l a r d (the d a u g h t e r o f G a s t o n B a c h e l a r d ) a n d the B e l g i a n J e a n L a d r i è r e . B u t the existentialized

Husserl remained

d o m i n a n t in

France. T h e p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t is also strongly r e p r e s e n t e d in the

5

M i c h e l Foucault, " L i f e : E x p e r i e n c e a n d S c i e n c e " , in Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 954 — 9%4> Volume II: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 466. J e a n Cavaillès, Méthode axiomatique et formalisme a n d Remarques sur la formation de la théorie abstraite des ensembles. J e a n Cavaillès, " O n L o g i c a n d the T h e o r y of S c i e n c e " , 409. I

6

7

I

The structuralist invasion w o r k o f G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m (1904—95).

8

229

Although

Canguilhem

starts f r o m an essentially B a c h e l a r d i a n v i e w o f science, the foci o f his w o r k are different f r o m B a c h e l a r d ' s : p h i l o s o p h i c a l history

rather

t h a n historical p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , the b i o l o g i c a l a n d m e d i c a l sciences r a t h e r t h a n physics a n d chemistry. Further, his results suggest a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t m o d i h c a t i o n s in B a c h e l a r d ' s position. C a n g u i l h e m ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n is his distinction

between

concepts

and

theories.

In

much

twentieth-

c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h y o f science, c o n c e p t s are functions o f theories, d e r i v i n g their accounts

meaning

of phenomena.

from

the

roles t h e y p l a y

Newtonian

and

in

theoretical

Einsteinian

mass,

for

e x a m p l e , are r e g a r d e d as f u n d a m e n t a l l y different c o n c e p t s b e c a u s e they are e m b e d d e d

in f u n d a m e n t a l l y

different p h y s i c a l

theories.

T h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f c o n c e p t to t h e o r y derives f r o m the v i e w that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n a (that is, their s u b s u m p t i o n u n d e r a g i v e n set o f concepts) is a m a t t e r o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e m on the basis o f a particular

theoretical

framework.

For

Canguilhem,

by

there is a c r u c i a l distinction b e t w e e n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

contrast, of phe-

n o m e n a (via concepts) a n d their t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to h i m , a g i v e n set o f c o n c e p t s p r o v i d e s the p r e l i m i n a r y descriptions o f a p h e n o m e n o n that allow the f o r m u l a t i o n o f questions a b o u t h o w to e x p l a i n it. D i f f e r e n t theories (all, h o w e v e r , f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of the s a m e set o f basic concepts) will p r o v i d e c o m p e t i n g a n s w e r s to these questions. G a l i l e o , for e x a m p l e , i n t r o d u c e d a n e w c o n c e p t i o n o f the m o t i o n o f falling b o d i e s to r e p l a c e the A r i s t o t e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n . G a l i l e o , D e s c a r t e s , a n d N e w t o n all e m p l o y e d this n e w c o n c e p t i o n in their description o f the m o t i o n o f falling b o d i e s a n d in the theories they d e v e l o p e d to e x p l a i n this m o t i o n . A l t h o u g h the basic c o n c e p t o f m o t i o n w a s the s a m e , the e x p l a n a t o r y theories w e r e v e r y different. T h i s s h o w s , a c c o r d i n g to C a n g u i l h e m , the " t h e o r e t i c a l p o l y v a l e n c e " o f c o n c e p t s : their ability to f u n c t i o n in the c o n t e x t o f w i d e l y differing theories. H i s o w n historical studies (for e x a m p l e , o f reflex m o v e m e n t ) are t y p i c a l l y histories o f c o n c e p t s that persist t h r o u g h a series of theoretical f o r m u l a t i o n s . T a k e n seriously, C a n g u i l h e m ' s e m p h a s i s on the history o f c o n c e p t s as o p p o s e d to the history o f theories r e q u i r e s i m p o r t a n t m o d i h c a tions in B a c h e l a r d ' s v i e w o f science. E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k s , for 8

For a m o r e detailed discussion o f C a n g u i l h e m , see m y Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Knowledge, chapter i. Translations of some o f C a n g u i l h e m ' s i m p o r t a n t essays are available in A Vital Rationalist: Sekcted Writings from Georges Canguilhem.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

230 example,

must

be

construed

as d u e

to

conceptual

rather

than

t h e o r e t i c a l i n n o v a t i o n . S i n c e successful c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s t e n d to r e a p p e a r in e v e n quite diverse theories, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k s are, for C a n g u i l h e m , less f r e q u e n t a n d , in m a n y cases, less r a d i c a l t h a n B a c h e l a r d h a d suggested. T h e p r i o r i t y o f c o n c e p t s also r e q u i r e s us to rethink the n o t i o n o f an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l obstacle. T h e s a m e p i e c e o f scientific w o r k m a y b e an obstacle in t e r m s o f the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t in w h i c h it is f o r m u l a t e d a n d a creative b r e a k t h r o u g h in t e r m s o f some

of

its

conceptual

content.

Thus,

the

eighteenth-century

c h e m i s t J o s e p h B l a c k , e v e n t h o u g h he w o r k e d in the n o w o u t d a t e d c o n t e x t o f p h l o g i s t o n theory, i n t r o d u c e d the e n d u r i n g c o n c e p t o f specific h e a t . T h e n o t i o n o f an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l obstacle is m o r e a m b i v a l e n t t h a n B a c h e l a r d suggests. C a n g u i l h e m m a k e s p a r t i c u l a r l y effective use o f this a m b i v a l e n c e in his discussion o f vitalism, so often a b u s e d as an e n e m y o f p r o g r e s s in biology. C a n g u i l h e m a d m i t s that vitalistic theories h a v e g e n e r a l l y i m p e d e d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f m o r e a d e q u a t e m e c h a n i s t i c a c c o u n t s , b u t he m a i n t a i n s that the c o n c e p t o f vitalism,

through

its insistence

on

the

uniqueness

of

biological

p h e n o m e n a , has served as a v a l u a b l e p r o t e c t i o n against u n f o r t u n a t e reductionist t e n d e n c i e s o f m e c h a n i s t i c theories. C a n g u i l h e m ' s r e f i n e m e n t o f the n o t i o n s o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k s and

obstacles

also

suggests

a

weakening

of

Bachelard's

sharp

distinction b e t w e e n science a n d n o n - s c i e n c e . S c i e n c e is w h a t overc o m e s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l obstacles a n d effects e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k s . T o the e x t e n t that the n o t i o n s o f obstacle a n d b r e a k h a v e b e c o m e a m b i v a l e n t , so has the n o t i o n o f science. A s a result, C a n g u i l h e m is r e l u c t a n t to say m o r e t h a n that in a g i v e n c o n t e x t , a g i v e n i d e a or a p p r o a c h is " m o r e scientific" t h a n a n o t h e r (e.g., m o r e fully integ r a t e d into c u r r e n t e x p e r i m e n t a l p r o c e d u r e s ) . F u r t h e r

developing

this line o f t h o u g h t , C a n g u i l h e m (influenced here b y his students, A l t h u s s e r a n d Foucault) i n t r o d u c e d the n o t i o n o f scientific ideology as an i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n science a n d n o n - s c i e n c e .

9

A scientific i d e o l o g y ( H e r b e r t S p e n c e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f e v o l u t i o n is a g o o d e x a m p l e ) is scientific in the sense that it m o d e l s itself on a successful

scientific

theory. It is i d e o l o g i c a l , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e

m a k e s claims a b o u t the w o r l d that g o b e y o n d w h a t the

it

science

c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h it is able to establish; it h a s , in o t h e r w o r d s , p r e t e n s i o n s that are n o t scientifically g r o u n d e d . S u c h p r e t e n s i o n s

9

G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m , Ideologie et rationalité.

The structuralist invasion

231

m a y v e r y w e l l f u n c t i o n as obstacles to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f science. B u t C a n g u i l h e m also sees a positive role for scientihc ideologies: they p r o v i d e an essential, if n o t entirely responsible, d i m e n s i o n o f intellectual

adventure,

without

which

many

scientihc

advances

w o u l d n o t occur. S c i e n t i h c i d e o l o g i e s are a p r i m e e x a m p l e o f the a m b i v a l e n c e o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l obstacles. L i k e o t h e r a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s o f science, C a n g u i l h e m p a y s p a r t i c u l a r attention to the p r o b l e m o f rationality a n d objectivity. I f there are n o C a r t e s i a n certainties g r o u n d i n g science, if its d e v e l o p m e n t is a c o n t i n g e n t historical p r o c e s s , w h a t g u a r a n t e e d o w e h a v e that it is a reliable source

o f truths a b o u t the

world?

B a c h e l a r d tried to g r o u n d the objectivity o f science t h r o u g h social norms.

Contrary

to D e s c a r t e s ,

he

holds

that objectivity

is

not

f o u n d in the i n d i v i d u a l self's intuitions (which will a l w a y s r e m a i n obstacles to scientihc progress) b u t in c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that c o n v i n c e all r a t i o n a l m i n d s . T h i s m o v e f r o m the isolated cogito (I think) to the social cogitamus (we think), takes us, B a c h e l a r d m a i n t a i n s , f r o m the subjectivity o f the m e r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l to the objectivity o f the epistemological. C a n g u i l h e m offers a m u c h m o r e extensive t r e a t m e n t o f n o r m s , r o o t e d in his analysis o f b i o l o g i c a l n o r m s .

1 0

H e n o t e s that w h e r e a s

m o d e r n physics has rejected a n y distinction b e t w e e n n o r m a l a n d pathological

states

o f its entities, b i o l o g i c a l

systems

(organisms)

r e q u i r e a distinction b e t w e e n states that e n h a n c e their f u n c t i o n i n g a n d those that i m p e d e it; in o t h e r w o r d s , a distinction h e a l t h a n d disease. H o w e v e r , C a n g u i l h e m m a i n t a i n s , w e

between cannot

d e h n e h e a l t h as simply life in a c c o r d w i t h the r e l e v a n t b i o l o g i c a l n o r m s . In a n y state, e v e n o n e that is clearly p a t h o l o g i c a l , there will be n o r m s specifying the p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g o f the o r g a n i s m in that state.

(For

example,

a person

who

has

lost

a

kidney

is in

a

p a t h o l o g i c a l state, e v e n t h o u g h the n o r m s for p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g in this state are the s a m e as for s o m e o n e w i t h b o t h kidneys.)

The

p a t h o l o g i c a l m u s t , accordingly, be u n d e r s t o o d r a t h e r as a r e d u c t i o n in the r a n g e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h an o r g a n i s m c a n f u n c t i o n properly. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , h e a l t h is a state in w h i c h an o r g a n i s m is not o n l y able to survive in its c u r r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s b u t is c a p a b l e o f s u r v i v i n g in a s i g n i h c a n t r a n g e o f v a r y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . C a n g u i l h e m e m p h a s i z e s that a c c o r d i n g to his a c c o u n t b i o l o g i c a l 1 0

G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m , On the Normal and the Pathological.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

232 norms

are n o t objective

in a n y

scientific

sense. P h y s i o l o g y

can

describe the states that w e call " n o r m a l " or " p a t h o l o g i c a l " , b u t their n o r m a t i v e status as such derives n o t f r o m the p h y s i o l o g i c a l description b u t f r o m the m e a n i n g o f those states for the o r g a n i s m . P u t a n o t h e r way, b i o l o g i c a l n o r m s are subjective in the sense that they are constituted b y the o r g a n i s m itself. O n

the o t h e r h a n d ,

this

constitution is n o t a m a t t e r o f i n d i v i d u a l i d i o s y n c r a s y b u t corresponds to the essential n a t u r e o f the o r g a n i s m in q u e s t i o n . B i o l o g i c a l n o r m s are n o t o b j e c t i v e in the sense o f b e i n g d e r i v e d f r o m v a l u e n e u t r a l scientific inquiry, b u t t h e y are r o o t e d in the b i o l o g i c a l reality o f the o r g a n i s m s that t h e y r e g u l a t e . T u r n i n g to the q u e s t i o n o f social n o r m s , such as those B a c h e l a r d sees as g o v e r n i n g scientific p r a c t i c e , C a n g u i l h e m notes that there are i m p o r t a n t w a y s in w h i c h societies are similar to o r g a n i s m s a n d that social n o r m s c a n h a v e the s a m e sort o f n e c e s s a r y force that b i o l o g i c a l n o r m s do. T h e b i o l o g i c a l a n a l o g y w o r k s , h o w e v e r , o n l y for so-called " t r a d i t i o n a l " societies, w h e r e there is a set o f n o r m s that defines, o n c e a n d for all, the essential n a t u r e a n d p u r p o s e o f the society. M o d e r n societies h a v e n o such "intrinsic

finality",

of what

direction

should

be

their

fundamental

since the q u e s t i o n is c o n t e s t e d

in

principle. A distinguishing feature o f a m o d e r n society such as ours is dissent r e g a r d i n g basic n o r m s . C a n g u i l h e m d o e s n o t c o n c l u d e , h o w e v e r , that a c o n s e n s u s , n o m a t t e r h o w f o r m e d , w o u l d legitimately

establish

norms

in

a modern

society.

He

criticizes,

for

e x a m p l e , T h o m a s K u h n ' s a c c o u n t o f scientific n o r m s b e c a u s e , in his view,

it

derives

them

from

a

contingent,

merely

psychological

a g r e e m e n t that has n o g e n u i n e r e g u l a t i v e force. C a n g u i l h e m m a k e s a similar criticism o f B a c h e l a r d , w h o , he suggests, poses b u t d o e s not solve the p r o b l e m o f

finding

a middle ground between

grounding

scientific n o r m s in the illusion o f C a r t e s i a n f o u n d a t i o n s a n d r e d u c i n g them

to

the

merely

descriptive

realm

of empirical

psychology.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , C a n g u i l h e m h i m s e l f n e v e r p r o v i d e s a solution to this p r o b l e m a n d , after all the subtiety o f his analysis o f n o r m s , t h e y are still left w i t h o u t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l basis. C a n g u i l h e m ' s t r e a t m e n t o f normativity

provides

the

context

for

Foucault's

discussions,

especially in Surveiller et punir a n d v o l u m e 1 o f Histoire de la sexualité, of n o r m s as an i n s t r u m e n t o f societal p o w e r . The

work

of Michel

Serres (b. 1930) n o t o n l y c o n t i n u e s

the

tradition o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t ; it also c o n v e r g e s w i t h structuralism. V i n c e n t D e s c o m b e s , in fact, says that, strictly speak-

The structuralist invasion

233

ing, Serres is the o n l y structuralist p h i l o s o p h e r . no

means

important

a disciple ways

transformation

of Bachelard

in w h i c h

Serres's

o f theirs. L i k e

11

A l t h o u g h h e is b y

and Canguilhem, work

there

is a c o n t i n u a t i o n

Bachelard,

are and

Serres e m p h a s i z e s the

dispersed, r e g i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f scientific w o r k . E a c h d o m a i n is like a L e i b n i z i a n m o n a d , w i t h a life a n d intelligibility o f its o w n . ( T h e c o m p a r i s o n to L e i b n i z is far f r o m superficial. Serres w r o t e his thesis on the L e i b n i z i a n system a n d his s u b s e q u e n t w o r k c a n b e v e r y fruitfully

read

as a t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y

reformulation

of Leibniz's

philosophy.) B u t h e r e , unlike B a c h e l a r d b u t like F o u c a u l t , Serres sees a structural unity that c o n n e c t s i n d e p e n d e n t scientific d o m a i n s . H e e x p l i c a t e s this unity in t e r m s o f the c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h h e expresses t h r o u g h b o t h the m e t a p h o r o f the G r e e k g o d H e r m e s a n d the f o r m a l i s m o f m o d e r n c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y .

12

Serres also q u e s t i o n s B a c h e l a r d ' s s h a r p d e m a r c a t i o n o f science f r o m n o n - s c i e n c e . H e r e o n e o f his m o t i v e s is ethical: h e thinks that science s e p a r a t e d f r o m the h u m a n i t i e s c o m p e l s us to the t e r m i n a l violence represented by nuclear w e a p o n s .

1 3

B u t Serres also offers

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d e s i g n e d to s h o w h o w d o m a i n s c o n v e n t i o n a l l y regarded

as non-scientific,

such

as art a n d literature,

share

the

structures o f scientific disciplines a n d m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as their epistemic

peers.

S o , for e x a m p l e ,

expressed thermodynamics

he

claims

in his novels b e f o r e

that

Emile

Zola

it w a s explicitly

f o r m u l a t e d b y physicists, tries to s h o w the structural identity o f D e s c a r t e s ' Meditations a n d L a Fontaine's fables, a r g u e s that " T u r n e r translates C a r n o t " , a n d presents L u c r e t i u s ' De Rerum Natura as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y p h y s i c a l theory. Similarly, Serres's o w n w r i t i n g s a r e a stimulating, if often disconc e r t i n g m i x t u r e o f the m a t h e m a t i c a l , the p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d the artistic.

H i s style

combines

close

technical

analysis w i t h

poetic

e v o c a t i o n , a n d c a s u a l r e a d e r s m a y b e in d o u b t as to w h e t h e r they h a v e p i c k e d u p a p h i l o s o p h i c a l treatise or a p r o s e p o e m .

Serres

w o u l d , o f c o u r s e , m a i n t a i n that such a p p a r e n t i n c o n g r u i t i e s simply 1 1

1 2

1 3

V i n c e n t D c s c o m b e s , Modern French Philosophy, 85, 87. T h e structuralism derives, however, not from structuralist social science but from m a t h e m a t i c s (especially abstract algebra a n d topology), w h i c h Serres studied at an a d v a n c e d level. See M i c h e l Serres a n d B r u n o Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 10. Hermes, in fact, is the general title of the five v o l u m e s of essays that m a k e u p the bulk of Serres's publications from 1968 to 1980. Serres says he has b e e n strongly influenced in this b y S i m o n e Weil's reflections o n violence (Serres a n d Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 18).

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

234

reflect the limitations o f c o n v e n t i o n a l intellectual c a t e g o r i e s a n d that the pursuit o f truth r e q u i r e s the transgression o f artihcial disciplinary boundaries. Serres's m o r e r e c e n t w o r k has m o v e d f r o m historical c o m m e n taries to the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a p o e t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o s m o l o g y that c a n be t h o u g h t o f as e x p r e s s i n g the m e t a p h y s i c s implicit in his earlier writings. T h e

cosmology

is one

of

flux

a n d relations,

a

" p h i l o s o p h y o f p r e p o s i t i o n s " , n o t o f substantives, that b e a r s a b r o a d resemblance

to D e l e u z e ' s .

Here

Serres's p r e f e r r e d

mathematical

structures are c h a o s t h e o r y a n d fractal g e o m e t r y , a n d the i m a g e o f H e r m e s is r e p l a c e d b y that o f a m u l t i t u d e o f a n g e l s , e m b o d i m e n t s o f the c h a o t i c multiplicity o f m e s s a g e s that constitute r e a l i t y .

14

T h e c o n t i n u i n g tradition o f p h i l o s o p h y o f the c o n c e p t p r o v i d e d an alternative

to Sartre

and Merleau-Ponty

existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y

and was

e v e n in the h e y d a y

an i m p o r t a n t

factor

in

of the

positive r e c e p t i o n o f structuralism in the 1960s. It w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y signihcant, as w e shall see in discussing M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , for its ability to sustain an a p p r o a c h to the history o f t h o u g h t that did n o t assume the centrality o f subjectivity. M o r e o v e r , after the d e c l i n e of structuralism, it h e l p e d sustain poststructuralist d e c e n t e r i n g s o f the subject a n d its e x p e r i e n c e .

THE HIGH TIDE

OF

STRUCTURALISM

In the 1960s, structuralism s p r e a d q u i c k l y to p h i l o s o p h y f r o m its base in linguistics a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y g a i n e d force from

its association

with

German-language thinkers.

a second 15

wave

of French

interest

in

W h e r e a s the 1930s h a d seen a p p r o -

priations o f H e g e l , H u s s e r l , a n d H e i d e g g e r , n o w similar attention w a s d i r e c t e d to, as R i c o e u r f a m o u s l y p u t it, the three " m a s t e r s o f s u s p i c i o n " : M a r x , F r e u d , a n d N i e t z s c h e . Interest in N i e t z s c h e w a s p r i m a r i l y tied to later, poststructuralist d e v e l o p m e n t s , b u t M a r x a n d F r e u d w e r e the focus o f the structuralist projects o f A l t h u s s e r a n d

1 4

1 5

See Le tiers-instruit, Le contrat naturel, and La légende des anges, all of w h i c h have been a c a d e m i c best-sellers in France. O n e o f the requirements for a licence in philosophy was a certificate in some scientific area. Since most philosophy students h a d little b a c k g r o u n d in the " h a r d " sciences, they frequently chose to fulfill the r e q u i r e m e n t in the social sciences. T h i s helps explain the rapidity with w h i c h philosophers b e c a m e a w a r e of n e w developments in the social sciences. See M i c h e l Serres's c o m m e n t s on this point in M i c h e l Serres a n d B r u n o Latour. Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 35.

The structuralist invasion

235

L a c a n . W e will l o o k at these projects, as w e l l as that o f R o l a n d B a r t h e s in literary theory, w h i c h will r e v e a l the tensions that l e d f r o m structuralism to p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m .

Marx and Althusser French philosophical

disdain for scientistic positivism,

combined

w i t h the o v e r w h e l m i n g social a n d political d o m i n a n c e o f the b o u r geoisie, stifled a n y serious interest in M a r x b e f o r e the 1930s. B u t the " e x i s t e n t i a l " r e a d i n g s o f H e g e l b y W a h l a n d , especially, b y K o j e v e led to similar a p p r o a c h e s to M a r x . T h i s " n e w M a r x " f o u n d a r e a d y a u d i e n c e a m o n g the y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s o f existence. T h e interest i n c r e a s e d e n o r m o u s l y after the war. O n the political side, this w a s d u e to the existentialists' c o m m i t m e n t to " e n g a g e d t h i n k i n g " a n d the m o r a l h i g h g r o u n d the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y h e l d b e c a u s e o f its c e n t r a l role in the R e s i s t a n c e d u r i n g the war. Intellectually, there w a s the i n c r e a s i n g availability o f M a r x ' s "humanistic" writings

1 6

early a n d m u c h

the c o n c e p t o f alienation) b y a w i d e r a n g e o f intellectuals, Communists Calvez.

1 7

more

a n d the e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e m (focusing on

such as H e n r i L e f e b v r e

to C a t h o l i c s

from

such as J e a n

W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen Sartre's s t o r m y political relation to

C o m m u n i s m a n d his intellectual synthesis o f M a r x i s m a n d existentialism in Critique de la raison dialectique. F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y intellectuals, m a i n l y o c c u p i e d w i t h the d u b i o u s business o f j u s t i f y i n g Stalinist policies, t h e m s e l v e s t o o k quite a w h i l e c o m i n g to t e r m s w i t h the n e w M a r x . H o w e v e r , w i t h the i d e o l o g i c a l a n d political t h a w that f o l l o w e d K h r u s h c h e v ' s d e n u n c i a tion o f Stalin in F e b r u a r y 1956, P a r t y p h i l o s o p h e r s , l e d b y R o g e r Garaudy, joined

in the

Marxist

humanist

parade.

They

began

discussing topics such as a l i e n a t i o n a n d , in line w i t h the n e w Soviet policy

of

"peaceful

coexistence",

initiated

dialogues

with

non-

M a r x i s t existentialists a n d e v e n C h r i s t i a n s . Louis Althusser (1918-90), a y o u n g philosopher and C o m m u n i s t P a r t y m e m b e r , o p p o s e d the h u m a n i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f M a r x w i t h 1 6

1 7

Translations o f the early writings b e g a n a p p e a r i n g in 1927, a l t h o u g h even by 1937 there was only a partial and defective translation o f the important Paris manuscripts o f 1844 (translated as Economic politique et philosophic). For details on the early history of M a r x i s m in France, see chapter 2 o f M a r k Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France. T h e s e French discussions were also influenced by earlier developments of a humanistic M a r x i s m by the " C e n t r a l E u r o p e a n M a r x i s t s " , especially G e o r g L u k a c s , w h o s e thought was introduced into France by his disciple, L u c i e n G o l d m a n .

23

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

6

his

structuralist-inspired

"theoretical

anti-humanism".

Althusser

t a u g h t at the E c o l e N o r m a l e , w h e r e h e w a s c h a r g e d w i t h p r e p a r i n g students for the agrégation^ a n d d e v e l o p e d a n enthusiastic circle o f 9

y o u n g M a r x i s t disciples, i n c l u d i n g Pierre M a c h e r e y Balibar.

1 9

Like

Lévi-Strauss, Althusser

given primacy by p h e n o m e n o l o g y

and Etienne

h e l d that the e x p e r i e n c e

a n d existentialism

represented

n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n subjectivist m y t h o l o g y . I n M a r x i s t t e r m s , indiv i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e is j u s t a f o r m o f i d e o l o g i c a l distortion that c a n n o t f u n c t i o n as the basis o f a n objective t h e o r y o f society. A l t h u s s e r d i d not d e n y that M a r x ' s

earlier w o r k , inspired b y H e g e l , h a d t h e

subjectivist cast o f the h u m a n i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . B u t h e m a i n t a i n e d that M a r x b r o k e w i t h this a p p r o a c h a r o u n d 1845 (with his German Ideology a n d Theses on Feuerbach) a n d that his m a t u r e t h e o r y in Capital fits the structuralist ideal o f objective science. In o p p o s i t i o n to the p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t s ' c l a i m that l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e is e p i s t e m i c a l l y p r i m a r y a n d p r o v i d e s the basis for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n o f science, A l t h u s s e r a d o p t e d B a c h e l a r d ' s v i e w that w e m u s t b e g i n f r o m a n u n d i s p u t e d scientific a c h i e v e m e n t a n d d e v e l o p o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w o f the w o r l d a n d o f science b y reflection o n that a c h i e v e m e n t .

2 0

W h a t N e w t o n a n d E i n s t e i n h a d p r o v i d e d for t h e

p h y s i c a l w o r l d , M a r x ' s Capital h a d p r o v i d e d for the social w o r l d . F o l l o w i n g s t a n d a r d M a r x i s t lines, A l t h u s s e r distinguished

between

historical materialism, u n d e r s t o o d as M a r x ' s a c h i e v e m e n t o f a n objective scientific a c c o u n t o f t h e social w o r l d , a n d dialectical materialism, u n d e r s t o o d as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r a s p o f the n a t u r e a n d significance o f M a r x ' s scientific w o r k . I n Althusser's view, M a r x ' s w r i t i n g s establish the science o f historical m a t e r i a l i s m b u t d o n o t fully c a r r y o u t the p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f this a c h i e v e m e n t t h r o u g h dialectical m a t e r i a l i s m . A g a i n deploying Bachelardian concepts, Althusser reads M a r x ' s historical m a t e r i a l i s m as effecting a t w o f o l d " e p i s t e m i c b r e a k " : first w i t h the existential subjectivism p r e s e n t in his early writings, a n d s e c o n d w i t h scientistic m o d e l s that r e d u c e the social to a n e x u s o f m e c h a n i c a l causes a n d effects. A c c o r d i n g to Althusser, M a r x ' s p a t h

1 8

1 9

2 0

T h i s w a s the position k n o w n in the slang of the Ecole N o r m a l e as caïman (alligator). For the views o f a student with a strongly negative assessment of Althusser's influence, see J a c q u e s Bouveresse, Le philosophe et le réel, 91—4. For a detailed a n d critically perceptive a c c o u n t o f Althusser's relation to B a c h e l a r d , see Peter D e w s , "Althusser, Structuralism, a n d the French Epistemological T r a d i t i o n " , in G r e g o r y Elliott (éd.), Althusser: a Critical Reader, 104—41.

The structuralist invasion

237

b e t w e e n these t w o " e p i s t e m i c o b s t a c l e s " is p r e c i s e l y that o f structural analysis. M a r x u n d e r s t o o d a n y society ("social f o r m a t i o n " ) as m a d e up o f a " b a s e " o f e c o n o m i c forces ("forces o f p r o d u c t i o n " ) a n d a " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " o f political, cultural, a n d intellectual objects a n d institutions. O n n a i v e scientistic a c c o u n t s , a n y e l e m e n t o f the superstructure (say, the o u t c o m e o f a g i v e n election or the w r i t i n g o f a g i v e n novel) is v i e w e d as directly c a u s e d b y specihc features o f the e c o n o m i c base. A l t h u s s e r sees M a r x as r e j e c t i n g such a c c o u n t s a n d instead

explaining

social p h e n o m e n a

by

appealing

to the j o i n t

o p e r a t i o n o f a v a r i e t y o f levels o f structures, i n c l u d i n g n o t o n l y the e c o n o m i c b u t also, a m o n g others, the political a n d the i d e o l o g i c a l . R a t h e r t h a n r e d u c t i v e l y e x p l a i n i n g in t e r m s o f o n l y e c o n o m i c forces, M a r x e x p l a i n s v i a a structuralist p r i n c i p l e o f " o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n " (in the F r e u d i a n sense), a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e a c h level o f social structure m a k e s an i r r e d u c i b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the o u t c o m e . A t the s a m e time, since the v a r i o u s levels o f social structure o p e r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y of i n d i v i d u a l consciousnesses, M a r x also avoids subjectivism. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n g u a r a n t e e s the relative a u t o n o m y o f the social s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , b u t it is n o n e t h e l e s s consistent w i t h Marx's

fundamental

insistence

on

the

ultimate

priority

of

the

e c o n o m i c b a s e . T h i s is b e c a u s e the overall structure o f a society a n d the m o d e o f i n t e r a c t i o n o f its v a r i o u s structural levels is d e t e r m i n e d " i n the last i n s t a n c e " b y e c o n o m i c factors. In a n y g i v e n e x p l a n a t i o n , all structural levels will b e i n v o l v e d a n d the e c o n o m i c m a y e v e n be o f relatively m i n o r s i g n i h c a n c e . (In s o m e social f o r m a t i o n s , in fact, a n o n - e c o n o m i c l e v e l m a y t y p i c a l l y d o m i n a t e ; for e x a m p l e , a c c o r d i n g to Althusser, the p r i m a r y m o d e for e x p l a i n i n g features o f f e u d a l society is political.) B u t if w e persist in seeking d e e p e r a n d d e e p e r levels o f e x p l a n a t i o n (for e x a m p l e , if w e ask w h y political structures d o m i n a t e f e u d a l society), the ultimate a n s w e r will h a v e to be in economic

t e r m s . In this way, Althusser's M a r x

postulations

of

immediate

economic

causes

of

can avoid everything

naive that

h a p p e n s w i t h o u t g i v i n g u p his insight into the h n a l social p r i o r i t y o f the e c o n o m i c .

2 1

S i n c e h u m a n i s t M a r x i s t s w e r e strong critics o f Stalinist repression, Althusser's a n t i - h u m a n i s m t e n d e d to be seen as a defense o f Stalin2 1

In a similar way, theologians have b e e n able to maintain the a u t o n o m o u s action o f created " s e c o n d a r y c a u s e s " while still r e c o g n i z i n g G o d as the sole " p r i m a r y c a u s e " . T h i s c o m p a r i s o n w o u l d not have b e e n entirely foreign to Althusser, w h o in his y o u t h h a d b e e n a devout C a t h o l i c .

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

2 8 3

ism. B u t a l t h o u g h like m a n y o t h e r P a r t y m e m b e r s A l t h u s s e r often r e m a i n e d silent in the face o f S o v i e t o u t r a g e s , there is n o n e e d to r e a d his M a r x i s t t h e o r i z i n g as an e n d o r s e m e n t o f terror. S e e i n g the e x p e r i e n c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l s as h a v i n g n o effective role in the d e v e l o p ment

o f society d o e s n o t entail h a v i n g n o

concern

for

human

suffering. M o r e o v e r , A l t h u s s e r saw his v i e w as p r o v i d i n g a M a r x i s t response to the Stalinist c l a i m that political events a n d institutions such as the M o s c o w trials a n d the c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p s w e r e justified as i n e v i t a b l e s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l features o f a c l e a r l y desirable socialist e c o n o m i c base. G i v e n the relative a u t o n o m y o f the superstructure, A l t h u s s e r c o u l d m a i n t a i n that Stalin's terror w a s the p r o d u c t

of

superstructural factors n o t necessitated b y a socialist e c o n o m i c b a s e . T h e work of Althusser

a n d his students in the

1960s

quickly

eclipsed that o f existential M a r x i s t s such as Sartre. In particular, their t h e o r i z a t i o n o f M a r x i s m p r o v i d e d the basis, d u r i n g the late 60s, for the s u p p o r t o f the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t P a r t y b y

Tel quel, the

l e a d i n g a v a n t - g a r d e literary j o u r n a l . A l t h o u g h Althusser, like the Party itself, h a d little role in the student a n d w o r k e r revolts o f M a y J u n e 1968, he did b e c o m e especially p r o m i n e n t d u r i n g the w a v e of political interest that f o l l o w e d

les événements de mai. H i s

influence

d e c l i n e d w i t h the t u r n a w a y f r o m M a r x i s m in the 1970s. In 1980 A l t h u s s e r strangled his wife, b u t he e s c a p e d p r o s e c u t i o n

on

the

g r o u n d s o f m e n t a l instability. (He h a d b e e n u n d e r p s y c h i a t r i c c a r e for depression on a n d off for over thirty years.) H e spent the last ten years o f his life in a n d out o f m e n t a l h o s p i t a l s .

22

Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva F r e n c h interest in F r e u d c a m e late. A n official p s y c h o a n a l y t i c orga n i z a t i o n w a s f o u n d e d in F r a n c e only in 1926, a n d it r e m a i n e d a small a n d m a r g i n a l g r o u p until w e l l after W o r l d W a r II. D u r i n g the 1950s the

dominance

o f existentialism, w i t h its rejection

o f the

u n c o n s c i o u s , m a d e F r e u d i a n i s m a non-starter. B u t the structuralist assault o n existentialism w a s a n a t u r a l o p e n i n g for a t h e o r y b a s e d o n m e n t a l realities outside o f o u r l i v e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

conscious-

ness, a n d J a c q u e s L a c a n ' s r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s in explicitly structuralist t e r m s w a s a p r i m e c a n d i d a t e for e x p l o i t i n g this

Althusser's only significant writing after L'avenir dure longtemps.

1980

was a m e m o i r published

posthumously.

The structuralist invasion

239

o p e n i n g . A k e y d e v e l o p m e n t o c c u r r e d in 1963, w h e n L a c a n a c c e p t e d Althusser's

invitation to offer

a seminar

at the E c o l e

Normale.

A l t h u s s e r h a d c o n c l u d e d that L a c a n ' s structuralist a p p r o a c h overcame

the

orthodox

Marxist

objection

that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s

gave

i m p r o p e r p r i m a c y to the i n d i v i d u a l subject, a n d Althusser's t h e o r y of

overdetermination

allowed

psychoanalytic

structures

relative

a u t o n o m y f r o m d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y the e c o n o m i c base. J a c q u e s L a c a n (1901—81) w a s a p r a c t i c i n g F r e u d i a n p s y c h o a n a l y s t w h o insisted that his t h e o r i z i n g w a s s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f g e t t i n g b a c k to the real m e a n i n g o f F r e u d ' s text. I n his view, this m e a n t r e s t o r i n g Freud's

meaning

in

opposition

to

the

standard

interpretations

a c c e p t e d b y his followers. (It also m e a n t c o r r e c t i n g s o m e parts o f Freud's text in the light o f others.) L a c a n ' s story u p to 1963 w a s one o f c o m p l e x t h e o r e t i c a l a n d clinical e v o l u t i o n a n d stormy, B y z a n t i n e relations w i t h the F r e n c h p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o m m u n i t y . B u t w h a t is s i g n i h c a n t for o u r p u r p o s e s is the m a t u r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d that he b e g a n p r e s e n t i n g to an i n c r e a s i n g l y f a s c i n a t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l a u d i e n c e in 1963. L a c a n ' s m a i n c h a l l e n g e to the F r e u d i a n s c o n c e r n e d the p r i v i l e g e d p l a c e t h e y assigned the e g o . O n the s t a n d a r d p i c t u r e , the p s y c h e is m a d e u p o f three d o m a i n s . T w o o f these are entirely u n c o n s c i o u s : the id, w h i c h is the l o c u s o f r a w drives for i m m e d i a t e satisfaction, a n d the s u p e r e g o , w h i c h lays d o w n inflexible c o m m a n d s , usually c o n t r a r y to the id's desires, for c o n f o r m i t y to societal n o r m s . T h e third d o m a i n , p r i m a r i l y c o n s c i o u s , is that o f the e g o , w h i c h has the task o f d e a l i n g w i t h the r e a l w o r l d a n d s e e i n g that the d e m a n d s o f the id a n d the s u p e r e g o are sufficiently c o n t r o l l e d to a l l o w a p e r s o n to l e a d a " n o r m a l " life. M e n t a l illness (neurosis or psychosis) o c c u r s w h e n the e g o is o v e r w h e l m e d b y u n c o n s c i o u s desires a n d c o m m a n d s a n d so c a n n o t f u n c t i o n as a stable, c o h e r e n t w h o l e in the w o r l d . T h e p o i n t o f p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e r a p y is to restore the integrity o f the e g o (to b r i n g it to its true identity) a n d so m a k e it c a p a b l e o f f u n c t i o n i n g in the real w o r l d . L a c a n , h o w e v e r , m a i n t a i n s that the ideal o f an integral a n d stable e g o that is m y true identity is a l w a y s a d e c e p t i o n , a false i d e n t i h c a t i o n o f m y reality w i t h s o m e i m a g e outside myself. H i s p o i n t , m o r e o v e r , is not that m y true identity lies e l s e w h e r e , outside the d o m a i n o f the e g o , b u t r a t h e r that the v e r y i d e a o f " t r u e i d e n t i t y " is a falsihcation of the h u m a n situation. T h e e g o a n d a n y o t h e r n o t i o n s o f true identity are constructs in the r e a l m o f w h a t L a c a n will call the Imaginary.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

240

W h a t d o e s h a v e p r i o r i t y in h u m a n existence for L a c a n is the domain

o f the

unconscious.

The

question,

however,

is h o w

to

u n d e r s t a n d this d o m a i n . F r e u d h i m s e l f s o m e t i m e s t h o u g h t o f it as ultimately r e d u c i b l e to a p h y s i c a l e n e r g y system, t a k i n g literally his metaphors

of repression,

displacement,

etc. L a c a n

rejected

this

reductionist m o d e l f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . H i s d i s c o v e r y o f w h a t he r e g a r d e d as the c o r r e c t m o d e l o f the u n c o n s c i o u s d e r i v e d f r o m his e n c o u n t e r w i t h structuralist linguistics (due, in all probability, to his friendship w i t h L é v i - S t r a u s s ) . T h i s e n a b l e d h i m to f o r m u l a t e in a fruitful

way

the

idea

that the

unconscious

is s t r u c t u r e d

like

a

l a n g u a g e , that it is, specifically, a system o f signs in S a u s s u r e ' s sense. S o u n d e r s t o o d , the u n c o n s c i o u s b e l o n g s to the r e a l m o f w h a t L a c a n calls the Symbolic. H e m a i n t a i n s that this insight is implicit in F r e u d , w h o w a s u n a b l e to articulate it p r o p e r l y b e c a u s e he h a d n o k n o w ledge o f Saussure's linguistics. S o m e o f L a c a n ' s earliest i m p o r t a n t t h e o r e t i c a l w o r k

concerned

w h a t he called the " m i r r o r s t a g e " in p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . H e m a i n t a i n e d that, s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n six a n d e i g h t e e n m o n t h s , e a c h infant c o m e s to h a v e an i m a g e o f itself as a stable self (ego, moi) that is the a u t h o r o f its actions. Specifically, the infant, g u i d e d b y its elders, identifies w i t h s o m e t h i n g outside itself - p e r h a p s literally its i m a g e in a mirror, p e r h a p s w i t h a sibling or a p l a y m a t e — a n d thus b e g i n s to think o f itself as a distinct a n d a u t o n o m o u s being. L a c a n ' s p o i n t is n o t that this initial identification is in itself decisive. R a t h e r , it is the b e g i n n i n g o f a series o f identifications that r e p r e s e n t a persistent a n d d e v e l o p i n g p r o j e c t o f m a k i n g o n e s e l f into a stable e g o . T h u s , at later stages, I m a y find m y identity in m y role as d e v o t e d son, successful p h y s i c i a n , star athlete, a n d so o n . A s w e h a v e seen, L a c a n d o e s n o t see a n y such identifications as the p r o p e r c u l m i n a t i o n

o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t (the

emer-

g e n c e o f m a t u r i t y or s o m e such). T h e y are n o t n o r m a t i v e goals b u t self-deceptive m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h e p o i n t , o f c o u r s e , is that in s o m e basic sense, I a m n o t the e g o (image) w i t h w h i c h I identify. B u t w h a t t h e n a m I? W e

a l r e a d y k n o w that L a c a n rejects

this

q u e s t i o n if it is t a k e n to i m p l y that I h a v e s o m e o t h e r stable identity. H e d o e s , h o w e v e r , i n t r o d u c e a c r u c i a l distinction b e t w e e n the moi (ego) a n d thejV (subject, I). It is m y f u n d a m e n t a l reality as a subject that is i g n o r e d or m i s r e p r e s e n t e d b y an i m a g i n a r y

identification

w i t h an e g o . T h e q u e s t i o n , o f c o u r s e , is h o w w e are to u n d e r s t a n d the

subject.

Lacan's

answer

merges

with

his

account

of

the

The structuralist invasion

241

u n c o n s c i o u s in t e r m s o f l a n g u a g e a n d takes us into his d o m a i n o f the S y m b o l i c . First o f all, the subject m u s t be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the e g o : it is n o t a structured stable w h o l e , b u t an u n s t a b l e , d i v i d e d flux. A s L a c a n puts it, " T h e I is an o t h e r " ( e v o k i n g R i m b a u d ' s "Je est u n a u t r e " ) ; that is, the subject is non-self-identical, o t h e r t h a n i t s e l f .

23

Thus, Lacan

puts division, dissolution, a n d a l i e n a t i o n at the h e a r t o f h u m a n reality. S o far, it m i g h t s e e m that L a c a n ' s subject is n o different t h a n Sartre's consciousness. B u t his v i e w is in fact quite o p p o s e d

to

Sartre's. For one t h i n g , L a c a n ' s subject d e p e n d s on the u n c o n s c i o u s (a n o t i o n the existentialist S a r t r e rejects), the r e a l m o f desires that are e x c l u d e d f r o m the c o n s c i o u s existence o f the e g o . E v e n m o r e important,

unlike

Sartrean

consciousness, L a c a n ' s

subject

has

a

structure, e v e n t h o u g h it is n o t the self-identical structure o f the e g o . T h i s structure is that o f a l a n g u a g e as u n d e r s t o o d b y Saussure, a n d L a c a n a c c o r d i n g l y calls the u n c o n s c i o u s the d o m a i n o f the Symbolic. T h e r e is an i m m e d i a t e o d d i t y in the c l a i m that the u n c o n s c i o u s is a l a n g u a g e in Saussure's sense. For Saussure a sign is a c o m b i n a t i o n o f a signiher a n d a signihed, w i t h the f o r m e r b e i n g a m a r k or s o u n d a n d the latter a m e n t a l reality c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the m a r k or s o u n d . N o n - l i n g u i s t i c s e m i o l o g y (for e x a m p l e , L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s a n t h r o p o l o g y ) has p r a c t i c e s a n d the like as signihers, b u t still m a i n t a i n s m e n t a l items as signiheds. B u t if w e treat a m e n t a l d o m a i n s u c h as the u n c o n s c i o u s as a S a u s s u r e a n sign system, h o w do w e g e t b o t h signs a n d signihers? W e c a n take t h o u g h t s t h e m s e l v e s as signs, p e r h a p s , b u t t h e n w h a t do t h e y signify? ( W h a t signiheds c o r r e s p o n d to them?) A c c o r d i n g to L a c a n , the signihed is " t h e d i a c h r o n i c set o f c o n c r e t e l y pronounced discourses".

2 4

S o it seems that L a c a n has i n t r o d u c e d

parole itself as the signified o f the u n c o n s c i o u s . W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d this b y t h i n k i n g it t h r o u g h in the c o n t e x t of p s y c h o a n a l y t i c therapy. L a c a n e m p h a s i z e s that the analytic situation involves n o t h i n g b u t l a n g u a g e : the p a t i e n t (analysand) s p e a k i n g to the analyst. T h r o u g h t e c h n i q u e s such as free association a n d the r e c o u n t i n g o f d r e a m s , the a n a l y s a n d puts forth a n a r r a t i v e o f his or h e r life a n d its s i g n i h c a n c e — e.g., r e c o l l e c t i o n s o f a set o f events in a g i v e n s e q u e n c e . T h e p r e m i s e o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s is that this s e q u e n c e does n o t h a v e m e a n i n g in its o w n right. ( T h e a n a l y s a n d m a y assign

2 3

Écrits, 517.

Écrits, 126.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

242

it a certain m e a n i n g — i.e., m a k e it a c e r t a i n sort o f self-identity — b u t this is b a s e d o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d b e l o n g s to the r e a l m o f the Imaginary.) T h e s e q u e n c e is in fact m e a n i n g f u l o n l y in relation to the c o d e defined b y the system o f signifiers that is the u n c o n s c i o u s . In this sense, the d i a c h r o n i c s e q u e n c e s s p o k e n b y the a n a l y s a n d (i.e., the

analysand's

actual

speech

acts -

paroles) are the

c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the u n c o n s c i o u s subject's s i g n i f i e r s .

signiheds

25

T h e u n c o n s c i o u s so c o n c e i v e d is " o t h e r " in t w o senses. First, it is metaphysically

separate

from

Second,

the c o n s c i o u s

separate

domain.

its structure

different

f r o m that o f o r d i n a r y

e g o ; it exists

(or " l o g i c " )

as a

is r a d i c a l l y

c o n s c i o u s t h o u g h t a n d talk (the

c o n s c i o u s t h o u g h t a n d s p e e c h o f the e g o ) . T h i s h a s b e e n a p p a r e n t since Freud's w o r k o n d r e a m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d slips o f the t o n g u e . The Real is L a c a n ' s t e r m for the u n a t t a i n a b l e a n d inexpressible limit o f l a n g u a g e . A s w e h a v e seen, the h e a r t o f L a c a n ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s is his c l a i m that the u n c o n s c i o u s m i n d h a s the structure o f a l a n g u a g e in Saussure's sense o f a system o f signs w h o s e m e a n i n g s a r e entirely defined b y their roles in the system. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l F r e u d i a n processes o f c o n d e n s a t i o n a n d d i s p l a c e m e n t , often m i s u n d e r s t o o d as a n a l o g o u s w i t h t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f energy, b e c o m e instances of, respectively, m e t a p h o r a n d m e t o n y m y . A s a self-enclosed

linguistic

system, the u n c o n s c i o u s

has no

essential

c o n n e c t i o n s to e x t e r n a l objects, a n d its desires fail to r e a c h b e y o n d the s e m i o l o g i c a l system f r o m w h i c h t h e y r e c e i v e their

meaning.

L a c a n d o e s speak o f a n u l t i m a t e o b j e c t o f desire, c a l l i n g it the object a (I'objet petit a), b u t the a d e n o t e s

autre (other), a n d the object a

c o r r e s p o n d s to w h a t e v e r , in a g i v e n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o n t e x t , is the u n a t t a i n a b l e o b j e c t o f desire. Lacan's example

construal

o f the O e d i p a l

o f h o w his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

complex differs

provides

from

a

good

standard

Freu-

d i a n i s m . I n the usual a c c o u n t , m a l e sexuality is initially defined b y the little b o y ' s love o f his m o t h e r , w h i c h e v e n t u a l l y takes the f o r m o f a desire to possess the m o t h e r sexually. H e r e the b o y finds that h e is a rival to his father. K n o w i n g that the p e n i s is the i n s t r u m e n t for sexual possession o f the m o t h e r a n d that the m o t h e r lacks a penis,

2 5

A n oddity remains, however, since L a c a n also says that the unconscious system, w h i c h w e are treating as just the signifiers, is the parallel of langue. B u t langue is the c o m b i n a t i o n of signifiers a n d signifieds. T h i s p e r h a p s reflects the fact that, on the level o f the unconscious, there is n o real role for thoughts (the signified), a n d w e c a n effectively r e d u c e the sign to the signifier.

The structuralist invasion

243

the b o y c o m e s to fear that his father will take a w a y his p e n i s (castrate him) to eliminate h i m as a rival. B e c a u s e he sees the father as allp o w e r f u l , the b o y represses his desire for his m o t h e r . A d u l t c h a r a c t e r derives f r o m the specihc n a t u r e a n d effectiveness o f this repression. L a c a n ' s a c c o u n t r e p l a c e s the p e n i s (as p h y s i c a l organ) w i t h

the

p h a l l u s , u n d e r s t o o d as s y m b o l i c signiher. T h e c r u x o f the c o m p l e x , t h e n , is n o t the s e p a r a t i o n o f p e n i s f r o m b o d y b u t the s e p a r a t i o n o f signiher (phallus) f r o m signihed. W h a t the little b o y m u s t u l t i m a t e l y c o m e to t e r m s w i t h is n o t so m u c h the possible loss o f his p e n i s as the loss o f the u n a t t a i n a b l e o b j e c t o f the signiher that constitutes his desire. (But, p r e s u m a b l y , in a g i v e n case the p h y s i c a l p e n i s c o u l d c o m e to stand for the phallus-signiher.) L a c a n ' s r e a d i n g o f F r e u d also has m a j o r c o n s e q u e n c e s for p s y c h o analytic

therapy.

Standard

psychoanalysis

regards

the

mature

c o n s c i o u s e g o a n d the " o b j e c t i v e " a d u l t w o r l d to w h i c h it adapts itself as the realities to w h i c h the fantasies o f u n c o n s c i o u s desires m u s t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d . T h e p o i n t o f analysis, t h e r e f o r e , is to give the e g o c o n t r o l over the u n c o n s c i o u s so that it c a n relate in a stable w a y to reality. T h e whereby

the

s t a n d a r d m e a n s o f a c h i e v i n g this is t r a n s f e r e n c e ,

analysand

attains

stability

by

identifying

with

the

m a t u r e e g o o f the analyst. B u t L a c a n , as w e h a v e seen, p l a c e s this e g o a n d its w o r l d in the d o m a i n o f the I m a g i n a r y a n d insists o n its s u b o r d i n a t i o n to the S y m b o l i c , the u n c o n s c i o u s as an a u t o n o m o u s sign system. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the p o i n t o f analysis m u s t be to destroy the illusion that the e g o a n d its objective w o r l d are realities a n d r e p l a c e it w i t h an a c c e p t a n c e o f the a u t o n o m y o f the u n c o n s c i o u s r e a l m o f signihers. T r a n s f e r e n c e is a t h r e a t , n o t a m e a n s , to effective therapy. T o p r e v e n t t r a n s f e r e n c e a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the a n a l y s a n d ' s fall into

stability,

Lacan

introduced

disruptive

techniques

such

as

a b r u p t l y t e r m i n a t i n g analytic sessions or e v e n refusing to m e e t w i t h the a n a l y s a n d . T h e s e t e c h n i q u e s , w h i c h w e r e said to h a v e p r o d u c e d c a t a s t r o p h i c relapses a n d e v e n suicides, w e r e a focus o f L a c a n ' s disputes w i t h official p s y c h o a n a l y t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A n o t h e r fertile c o m b i n a t i o n o f structural linguistics a n d p s y c h o analysis

w a s Julia

Kristeva's

work

on

what

she

came

to

call

" s e m a n a l y s i s " . K r i s t e v a (b. 1941) a r r i v e d in Paris f r o m B u l g a r i a as a student in 1966, a n d the f o l l o w i n g y e a r m a r r i e d P h i l i p p e Sollers, the a v a n t - g a r d e w r i t e r a n d editor o f Tel quel. S h e studied linguistics in R o l a n d B a r t h e s ' s e m i n a r a n d later t r a i n e d as a L a c a n i a n p s y c h o analyst, b e f o r e

r e c e i v i n g a c h a i r in linguistics at the

Vincennes

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

244

b r a n c h o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris. In h e r d o c t o r a l thesis, La révolution du langage poétique (1974), she i n t r o d u c e d a f u n d a m e n t a l

distinction

b e t w e e n the semiotic a n d the symbolic. T h e s y m b o l i c is l a n g u a g e in the s t a n d a r d sense o f a r u l e - g o v e r n e d system e m p l o y e d b y a c o m m u n i t y o f speakers to refer to their s h a r e d w o r l d . T h e semiotic is a p r e discursive a r t i c u l a t i o n , in the c h a o t i c s p a c e o f b o d i l y functions, of u n c o n s c i o u s drives, a n d it e m e r g e s e v e n b e f o r e the O e d i p a l p h a s e . It does n o t itself signify (have m e a n i n g ) , b u t it p r o v i d e s the c o n d i t i o n s (biological a n d social) o f possibility for the significance o f the s y m b o l ic. K r i s t e v a e m p l o y s Plato's t e r m i n o l o g y o f the chora (literally, p l a c e or space) to express the semiotic's role as the m a t r i x o f linguistic m e a n i n g . In p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e r m s , the semiotic is the l o c u s o f the u n c o n s c i o u s drives f r o m w h i c h the self is g e n e r a t e d , b u t w h i c h also t h r e a t e n its stability. T h e s y m b o l i c c o r r e s p o n d s to the social w o r l d in w h i c h a stable self is c r e a t e d f r o m semiotic " m a t t e r " .

Kristeva's

semanalysis p r o v i d e s a basis for h e r influential w o r k as a literary analyst. L i t e r a t u r e , especially certain sorts o f poetry, is a m o d e of expression in w h i c h the semiotic c o m p o n e n t o f l a n g u a g e d o m i n a t e s , a n d w h e r e , accordingly, the p r e - O e d i p a l drives o r d i n a r i l y r e p r e s s e d b y the s y m b o l i c structures o f a d u l t " n o r m a l i t y " b r e a k t h r o u g h the fabric

o f l a n g u a g e . K r i s t e v a ' s literary criticism subtly tracks

the

semiotic a n d its c o m p l e x interrelations w i t h the s y m b o l i c .

Barthes R o l a n d B a r t h e s (1915—80) p r o v i d e s s o m e o f the best e x a m p l e s o f a structuralist a p p r o a c h to literary criticism as w e l l as a clear indication o f the limits o f structuralism. T h i s is n o t the p l a c e comprehensive account of Barthes' w o r k ,

2 6

for

be l i m i t e d to t w o p a r t i c u l a r l y instructive e x a m p l e s o f his use structuralist

concepts:

his cultural

a

a n d o u r discussion will

treatment

of what

he

of

called

mythologies, a n d the m e t h o d o f structuralist literary analysis p r e s e n t e d

mS/Z

M y t h o l o g y is B a r t h e s ' t e r m for a use o f l a n g u a g e (or o t h e r signs) to express a s e c o n d - l e v e l m e a n i n g , o n e b e y o n d the m e a n i n g prim a r i l y e x p r e s s e d b y the sign. H o w e v e r , this f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n ignores the

flavor

o f B a r t h e s ' analyses o f m y t h o l o g i e s , w h i c h

are

a l m o s t a l w a y s a i m e d at r e v e a l i n g the special interest o f a p a r t i c u l a r 2 6

For an excellent overview, see J o n a t h a n Culler, Roland Barthes.

The structuralist invasion

245

social class (usually the b o u r g e o i s i e ) b e h i n d a n e x p r e s s i o n o f s e c o n d level m e a n i n g . T h e m y t h o l o g i c a l use o f l a n g u a g e is, for B a r t h e s , r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t to p r o p a g a n d a . It is, h o w e v e r , simplest to b e g i n w i t h a p u r e (non-propagandistic) e x a m p l e . T h e student o f L a t i n o p e n s a g r a m m a r b o o k a n d , in a section o n a g r e e m e n t o f subject a n d v e r b , r e a d s : quia ego nominor leo ( " b e c a u s e I a m n a m e d l i o n " ) . O n the hrst level o f m e a n i n g this is a sentence f r o m a L a t i n fable. (A lion is asked to share its p r e y w i t h others a n d says n o o n the g r o u n d s that it is a lion.) B u t in the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t this hrst-level m e a n i n g is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n o t h e r m e a n i n g — i.e., " t h i s is a n e x a m p l e o f n o u n — v e r b a g r e e m e n t " . T h e hrst-level m e a n i n g (about a lion a n d its status) is there in the text, b u t it is e m p l o y e d to express a n o t h e r m e a n i n g (about L a t i n g r a m m a r ) . A m o r e c o m p l e x a n d t y p i c a l e x a m p l e is B a r t h e s ' f a m o u s discussion

o f a Paris-Match c o v e r

photo

of a black

soldier

saluting

( p r e s u m a b l y the F r e n c h flag). H e r e the hrst-level m e a n i n g o f the p h o t o is s o m e t h i n g like " h e r e is a b l a c k soldier in the F r e n c h a r m y g i v i n g a s a l u t e " . B u t in the c o n t e x t o f the c o v e r o f a m a i n s t r e a m F r e n c h m a g a z i n e , this m e a n i n g itself expresses a further m e a n i n g — s o m e t h i n g like, " Y o u see, the F r e n c h a r m y is o p e n to the b l a c k r a c e , a n d b l a c k s a r e g o o d patriotic

soldiers, j u s t like a n y o n e

e l s e " (a

m e a n i n g w h i c h directly r e s p o n d s to discussions o f r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e , the e t h n o - c e n t r i s m

o f the F r e n c h

nation,

exploitation

o f native

p e o p l e s b y the F r e n c h E m p i r e , etc.). Using

these

sorts

of examples,

structuralist analysis o f m y t h o l o g y . a sign as c o m p o s e d

2 7

o f a signiher

Barthes

proposed

a

general

F o l l o w i n g Saussure, h e r e g a r d s a n d a signihed,

although he

g e n e r a l i z e s to i n c l u d e non-linguistic signs. T h u s , a rose signihes a lover's p a s s i o n for a b e l o v e d : the rose is a signiher, the p a s s i o n is a signihed. B u t B a r t h e s g o e s o n to note that this sign (signiher

+

signihed) c a n itself b e the signiher in a n o t h e r sign. In such a case, the

sign

as a m e a n i n g f u l

whole

signihes

a n e w signihed. For

e x a m p l e , s o m e o n e m a y p o i n t to the rose g i v e n to the b e l o v e d as a typical e x a m p l e o f m i d d l e - a g e d sentimentality (or o f m a r i t a l hdelity). H e r e a sign that h a s m e a n i n g o n o n e level (rose-signifying-passion) is also i n v o l v e d in a s e c o n d level o f m e a n i n g . O n this s e c o n d level, w h a t is a sign o n the hrst level is, o n the s e c o n d level, a signifier in a n o t h e r sign (in o u r e x a m p l e , the rose-signifying-passion

2 7

See " M y t h T o d a y " , the c o n c l u d i n g essay in Mythologies.

signihes

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

246

sentimentality or fidelity). W e c a n s c h e m a t i z e this " m y t h o l o g i c a l " situation as follows: L e v e l I (the linguistic system): signiher + signihed = sign L e v e l II (the m y t h o l o g i c a l system): sign [= S I G N I F I E R ] + SIGNIFIED =

SIGN,

w h e r e t e r m s in l o w e r case o p e r a t e at l e v e l I a n d t e r m s in u p p e r case operate

at level II. T h e

c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the levels is m a d e

t h r o u g h the identity, sign = S I G N I F I E R . B a r t h e s calls the (linguisticlevel) sign a meaning a n d the ( m y t h o l o g i c a l level) S I G N I F I E R a form. W h a t on the linguistic l e v e l is a sign, h e n c e a unit o f m e a n i n g , is, on the m y t h o l o g i c a l level, " r e d u c e d " to the e m p t y f o r m o f a signiher that n e e d s c o m p l e t i o n b y a signihed to h a v e m e a n i n g in the full sense. It m i g h t s e e m that a m y t h c a n n e v e r b e effective in c o n v i n c i n g p e o p l e o f its m e s s a g e . For there s e e m to b e o n l y t w o possibilities: the r e a d e r o f the m y t h is a w a r e o f o n l y its f o r m or the r e a d e r is a w a r e of b o t h its f o r m a n d its m e a n i n g . In the hrst case, the r e a d e r d o e s not get b e y o n d the m e r e l y linguistic m e a n i n g o f the m y t h ' s

signiher,

seeing, for e x a m p l e , o n l y the soldier saluting a n d m a k i n g n o t h i n g else o f it; to such a reader, the signihcation o f the m y t h is n o t e v e n c o n v e y e d . In the s e c o n d case, it w o u l d s e e m that the r e a d e r w o u l d see t h r o u g h the m y t h , b e i n g a w a r e o f the m y t h o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g to w h i c h the f o r m is b e i n g c o n n e c t e d . B u t w h a t in fact h a p p e n s w h e n a m y t h is effective is this: the r e a d e r is a w a r e o f the

mythological

m e a n i n g b u t r e g a r d s it n o t as m e r e l y a m e a n i n g (just s o m e o n e ' s interpretation) b u t as p a r t o f n a t u r e (a simple fact). I f I r e c o g n i z e that the m y t h ' s e v o c a t i o n o f the F r e n c h n a t i o n (as an e m b o d i m e n t o f liberty, equality, fraternity) is m e r e l y a w a y o f t h i n k i n g that the j o u r n a l i s t is t r y i n g to g e t m e to a c c e p t w h e n l o o k i n g at the p i c t u r e (the f o r m or m y t h o l o g i c a l signiher), t h e n I will n o t b e t a k e n in. I will p e r c e i v e the m e a n i n g as an interested m o t i v e b e h i n d the p r e s e n tation o f the f o r m . B u t w h e n the m y t h is effective I will see the i d e a l i z e d F r e n c h n a t i o n as a reality, a reality that causes the a c t i o n p o r t r a y e d b y the p i c t u r e , as the b l a c k soldier r e c o g n i z e s a n d salutes the liberty, equality, a n d fraternity F r a n c e has p r o v i d e d h i m . C o r r e spondingly, the f o r m (the picture) will n o t b e seen as the c o n t r i v a n c e o f an interested m o t i v e b u t as e v i d e n c e for the reality o f the i d e a l i z e d F r e n c h n a t i o n . In s u m , B a r t h e s says, w h e n m y t h is effective, w h a t is a c t u a l l y j u s t a system o f signs (a s e m i o l o g i c a l system) is t a k e n to b e a system o f facts.

The structuralist invasion

247

L a n g u a g e is susceptible to m y t h o l o g i z a t i o n b e c a u s e o f t w o o f its typical

characteristics.

First,

we

ordinarily

expect

language

to

express s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d the sheer literal m e a n i n g c o n v e y e d b y its signs, since it r a r e l y exists at the " z e r o - d e g r e e " o f a sign that has n o s e c o n d - l e v e l m e a n i n g ; a n d , s e c o n d , the m e a n i n g o f a sign is typically i n c o m p l e t e (not fully d e t e r m i n e d ) a n d so is o p e n to further interpretation. M y t h is p a r t i c u l a r l y effective a m o n g us b e c a u s e o u r capitalist society has so t h o r o u g h l y t a k e n o n the m a s k o f the n a t u r a l ; it has convincingly

presented

itself n o t j u s t

as a c o n t i n g e n t

historical

d e v e l o p m e n t b u t as the w a y h u m a n b e i n g s n a t u r a l l y are. Barthes makes m a n y

a n d diverse uses o f w h a t c a n be

called

" s t r u c t u r a l i s t " a p p r o a c h e s to literary texts, b u t the m o s t extensive a n d i m p o r t a n t use is in his b o o k

a detailed analysis o f B a l z a c ' s

short story " S a r r a s i n e " (the analysis is six or seven times as l o n g as the s t o r y ) .

28

H i s a p p r o a c h is t h r o u g h w h a t he calls the codes on w h i c h

the m e a n i n g o f B a l z a c ' s t e x t d e p e n d s . In the m o s t g e n e r a l t e r m s , a c o d e is simply a sign system, i.e., a set o f ( p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y related) e l e m e n t s that c a n be c o m b i n e d (syntagmatically) in v a r i o u s w a y s . Specifically, B a r t h e s h e r e has in m i n d c o d e s a l r e a d y established in p r e v i o u s w r i t i n g s a n d p r a c t i c e s o f a culture that g o v e r n a literary w o r k a n d w i t h w h i c h a r e a d e r m u s t b e familiar to u n d e r s t a n d the w o r k . A trivial e x a m p l e : y o u c o u l d n o t u n d e r s t a n d a n o v e l built a r o u n d a b a s e b a l l g a m e unless y o u u n d e r s t o o d the c o d e (the rules) that defines b a s e b a l l . B a r t h e s a n a l y z e s " S a r r a s i n e " in t e r m s o f five basic c o d e s .

He

divides the text o f the story (about thirty p a g e s in p r i n t e d form) into 561 b r i e f s e g m e n t s (called lexias; units o f reading) a n d discusses e a c h in t e r m s o f the c o d e s r e l e v a n t to it. T h e h e r m e n e u t i c c o d e g o v e r n s l a n g u a g e that is u s e d to p o s e questions or p r o b l e m s a n d to give clues to the answers. T h e p r o a i r e t i c c o d e (from Aristotle's t e r m for the ability to d e t e r m i n e

r a t i o n a l l y the result o f an action)

provides

typical p a t t e r n s o f a c t i o n in t e r m s o f w h i c h w e c a n a n t i c i p a t e a n d make

sense

o f a plot's

development.

The

semic

code

provides

c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n b e h a v i o r , situation, social p o s i t i o n , etc., a n d v a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r traits, e n a b l i n g us to d e t e r m i n e the n a t u r e o f the characters

from

the

events

and

descriptions

o f the

story.

The

s y m b o l i c c o d e specifies the w a y s , w i t h i n a g i v e n text, that specific

T h e title S/£ derives from the initials of the two m a i n characters, Sarrasine and Z a m b i n e l l a - with a lot of c o m p l i c a t e d semantic play involved.

248

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

details a r e able t o b e seen as h a v i n g s y m b o l i c s i g n i h c a n c e . T h e referential (or cultural) c o d e is a set o f s u b - c o d e s , e a c h e x p r e s s i n g a b o d y o f a c c e p t e d " k n o w l e d g e " (science, c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m , etc.) that the text takes for g r a n t e d . B a r t h e s ' e m p h a s i s is o n the w a y the h v e c o d e s a r e i n t e r w o v e n w i t h one a n o t h e r t h r o u g h o u t the text. A l l h v e o c c u r b e f o r e the e n d o f the story's hrst s e n t e n c e , a n d e a c h l e x i a t y p i c a l l y involves e l e m e n t s o f m o r e t h a n o n e c o d e . T h e result, B a r t h e s a r g u e s , is that the text does not h a v e a n y single overall structure; it is r a t h e r a n i r r e d u c i b l e complex

o f alternative,

meshing

structures.

sometimes

conflicting,

sometimes

I n contrast to w h a t w e m i g h t

expect

interof a

structuralist analysis, B a r t h e s e x p l o d e s the text r a t h e r t h a n unifying it. M o r e specifically, B a r t h e s ' analysis t r a n s f o r m s w h a t seems to b e a p r e e m i n e n t l y readable (lisible) text into a writable (scriptible) text.

A

r e a d a b l e text, in B a r t h e s ' sense, is o n e that is easily accessible to the r e a d e r b e c a u s e it follows e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s (hts c o n v e n t i o n a l codes). A w r i t a b l e text, b y contrast, in o n e that c o n f o u n d s o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d so is difficult to r e a d . W h e r e a s r e a d i n g a r e a d a b l e t e x t is a b a s i c a l l y passive e x p e r i e n c e , r e a d i n g a w r i t a b l e text r e q u i r e s o u r active e n g a g e m e n t . I n a sense, the r e a d e r m u s t b e i n v o l v e d in the w r i t i n g o f the text, c o n s t r u c t i n g its m e a n i n g s f r o m s c r a t c h o u t o f w h a t the a u t h o r h a s p r o d u c e d . B a r t h e s m a k e s entirely clear his p r e f e r e n c e for w r i t a b l e texts. Classic literature (such as B a l z a c ) w o u l d s e e m to b e a m o d e l o f r e a d a b l e writing. T h e r e a d a b i l i t y c o m e s f r o m the role o f familiar c o d e s in the text. T h i s , h o w e v e r , p r e s u p p o s e s that the c o d e s w o r k together, s u p p l e m e n t o n e a n o t h e r to p r o d u c e a u n i h e d ,

self-con-

tained text. W h a t B a r t h e s d o e s t h r o u g h his t r a c i n g o f the c o d e s o f " S a r r a s i n e " is to r e v e a l a w r i t a b l e text b e n e a t h the surface r e a d ability. H e s h o w s h o w the v a r i o u s c o d e s collide a n d i n t e r t w i n e w i t h one a n o t h e r to c o m p l i c a t e B a l z a c ' s text in a w a y that u n d e r m i n e s a n y easy, c o m f o r t a b l e r e a d i n g . T h e c o d e s d o n o t c o m b i n e to suggest a u n i f y i n g m e a n i n g b u t r a t h e r p u s h the text in o p p o s i n g directions. B a r t h e s , h o w e v e r , insists that w e should n o t m a k e the t r a d i t i o n a l mistake o f a s c r i b i n g the c o m p l e x i t y o f " S a r r a s i n e " to the explicit intentions o f B a l z a c as a n author. T h e c o m p l e x i t y is r a t h e r the result o f B a l z a c ' s m o s t l y u n c o n s c i o u s i m m e r s i o n in the c o d e s e m b e d d e d in the story. B a l z a c ' s o w n intentions (e.g., his aesthetics o f realism, his m o r a l v i e w p o i n t ) e x p l a i n o n l y the m o s t superhcial aspects o f the

The structuralist invasion

249

story. In the deepest sense, " S a r r a s i n e " is " w r i t t e n " m o r e b y the c o d e s u n d e r l y i n g its p r o d u c t i o n a n d the r e a d e r s w h o d e c i p h e r the c o d e s . W e see, t h e n , h o w B a r t h e s ' a p p r o a c h reveals w h a t he called " t h e d e a t h o f the a u t h o r " . Although

S/£

is B a r t h e s '

fullest

employment

of

structuralist

t e c h n i q u e s , it in effect u n d e r m i n e s the structuralist p r o j e c t b y failing to discover

a unique

structure

c o n t r o l l i n g the t e x t .

2 9

Structural

analysis a p p e a r s as an e x c e l l e n t w a y o f g e n e r a t i n g n e w levels o f textual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y ones that do n o t refer all m e a n i n g b a c k to a u t h o r i a l i n t e n t i o n . B u t the i r r e d u c i b l e v a r i e t y o f conflicting structures

is inconsistent

with

the

idea

that

structuralism

is

a

scientific m e t h o d l e a d i n g to the f u n d a m e n t a l truth o f a text. T h i s b e c o m e s p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t w h e n w e w i d e n o u r p e r s p e c t i v e to i n c l u d e B a r t h e s ' o t h e r w o r k a n d the w o r k o f o t h e r literary critics employing

structuralist

techniques.

There

is

no

scientific

con-

v e r g e n c e to a u n i q u e or unified structure for a n y g i v e n text b u t rather

a proliferation

of diverging

interpretations.

Moreover,

r a p i d l y b e c o m e s clear that this p r o l i f e r a t i o n , a l t h o u g h

it

somehow

r o o t e d in the text, is also g r e a t l y d e p e n d e n t o n the creative ability o f i n d i v i d u a l critics to constitute n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . A s a result, the structuralist e l i m i n a t i o n o f the a u t h o r i a l subject is b a l a n c e d b y the e m e r g e n c e o f the r e a d e r (particularly the literary critic) as a subject c o n s t i t u t i n g n o t the m e a n i n g o f the text b u t an endless succession o f meanings.

3 0

POSTSTRUGTURALISM

It w a s a l o n g such lines that the p r o j e c t o f a structuralist science o f literary texts w a s t r a n s f o r m e d into a poststructuralist d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the v e r y i d e a o f texts as

fixed

structures c a p a b l e o f scientific

investigation. S i m i l a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o c c u r r e d in virtually all the d o m a i n s structuralism h a d so q u i c k l y c a p t u r e d d u r i n g the 1960s. B e h i n d the c h a n g e w a s structuralism's failure to sustain its c l a i m to p r o v i d e objective, scientific k n o w l e d g e o f the h u m a n d o m a i n . T h e failure d e r i v e d f r o m a c r u c i a l confusion in the c o n c e p t i o n o f science implicit in structuralist projects. T h e a s s u m p t i o n w a s that an analysis w a s scientific as l o n g as it a s s u m e d an objectivist stance (eliminating 2 9

3 0

Since S/,^ a p p e a r e d in 1970, it m a y well have b e e n influenced by D e r r i d a ' s early works. T h e role of the reader b e c o m e s particularly a p p a r e n t in B a r t h e s ' later emphasis on the priority of the reader's enjoyment of literature, in Le plaisir du texte.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

250

the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the subject), e m p l o y e d a r e h n e d t e c h n i c a l v o c a b u lary, a n d a p p l i e d c o m p l e x f o r m a l s c h e m a t a in a l o g i c a l l y r i g o r o u s way. T h e r e w a s n o attention p a i d to the c r u c i a l attribute o f e m p i r i c a l a d e q u a c y . Althusser's t r e a t m e n t o f M a r x is a striking e x a m p l e . H e a s s u m e d that Capital c o u l d b e assigned the s a m e sort o f c o g n i t i v e a u t h o r i t y as N e w t o n ' s Principia o r D a r w i n ' s Origin a n d t r e a t e d , in the manner

of Bachelard,

philosophical because, account

as a n e p i s t e m i c a l l y

reflection.

despite

This

its t r a p p i n g s

has never

passed

was

an

privileged

illegitimate

o f objectivity

the test o f careful

object

of

assumption

a n d rigor,

Marx's

empirical

testing.

T h e r e f o r e , the m o s t that c a n b e c l a i m e d for it is that it p r o v i d e s a self-consistent (and p e r h a p s t h e o r e t i c a l l y stimulating) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a g i v e n b o d y o f data. B u t there are alternatives e q u a l l y consistent (and stimulating), a n d , g i v e n the l a c k o f e m p i r i c a l tests, there is n o scientihc w a y o f d e c i d i n g b e t w e e n t h e m a n d M a r x i s m . T h e s a m e is true o f L a c a n ' s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d e v e n L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s a n t h r o p o l o g y . T h e y h a v e their strengths as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the d a t a b u t l a c k the g e n u i n e l y scientihc status o f a n e m p i r i c a l l y c o n h r m e d theory. T h e b r i e f prestige o f structuralist a c c o u n t s rested o n a confusion o f the f o r m a l t r a p p i n g s o f science w i t h science itself. A l t h o u g h the scientihc c l a i m s o f structuralism s o o n c o l l a p s e d (and w e r e n e v e r t a k e n seriously b y m o s t social scientists), the m o v e m e n t h a d a c o n t i n u i n g i m p a c t o n literary a n d , m o r e broadly,

cultural

studies as w e l l as philosophy. T h i s i m p a c t c o r r e s p o n d s to w h a t h a s , rather

uninformatively,

come

to b e t e r m e d

"poststructuralism".

Poststructuralism c o m b i n e s the structuralist style o f objective, technical, a n d e v e n f o r m a l discourse a b o u t the h u m a n w o r l d w i t h a rejection o f the structuralist claim that there is a n y d e e p o r h n a l truth that such discourse c a n u n c o v e r . T h e poststructuralist p r o j e c t n e e d not b e self-contradictory, b u t it is i n e v i t a b l y ironic, since it sees its m e t h o d s o f analysis as b o t h n e c e s s a r y a n d , g i v e n t r a d i t i o n a l goals, d o o m e d to failure. F r e n c h poststructuralist p h i l o s o p h y c o n t i n u e d the structuralist a t t a c k o n p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d d e v e l o p e d structuraliststyle

methods

(Foucault's

archaeology,

Derrida's

grammatology,

D e l e u z e ' s logic o f multiplicities) to r e p l a c e that o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . B u t at the s a m e time it tried to u n d e r m i n e the structuralist a s s u m p tion — s h a r e d , m o r e o v e r , b y the W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n — that there is a n objective b o d y o f ultimate truth that c a n b e k n o w n b y such m e t h o d s . W h a t h a s c o m e to b e called p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m , t h e n , is b y n o

The structuralist invasion m e a n s m e r e l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f or r e a c t i o n against the e p i p h e n o m e n o n o f structuralism. It is, rather, a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a l l e n g e to the defining intellectual ideal o f p h i l o s o p h y since P l a t o : the possibility of attaining knowledge human

existence.

a b o u t the ultimate

More

locally,

this

nature

ideal

had

and meaning defined

of

French

p h i l o s o p h y since D e s c a r t e s a n d h a d , d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, b e e n p u r s u e d t h r o u g h the varieties o f spiritualism, critical idealism, a n d finally p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Positivism, w h i c h m a i n t a i n e d that

final

truth w a s scientific truth, c h a l l e n g e d n o t the i d e a l o f u l t i m a t e truth b u t the c l a i m that p h i l o s o p h y r a t h e r t h a n science w a s the m e a n s to the ideal. Perennially, the o n l y o t h e r alternative s e e m e d to b e a skeptical denial o f all serious truth claims. A s the 1960s b e g a n in F r a n c e , the t r a d i t i o n a l claims o f p h i l o s o p h y were represented by p h e n o m e n o l o g y

a n d the p e r e n n i a l positivist

c h a l l e n g e b y structuralism. A s w e h a v e seen, after M e r l e a u - P o n t y the major

issue

seemed

to

be

that

of complementing

the

subject-

c e n t e r e d s t a n d p o i n t o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y w i t h the objectivist stance o f scientific structuralism a n d s o m e h o w b a s i n g the synthesis on

an

o n t o l o g y m o r e a d e q u a t e t h a n Sartre's. B u t the n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f thinkers, led b y F o u c a u l t a n d D e r r i d a , h a d a far m o r e project.

They

questioned

the

ideal

defined n o t o n l y p h e n o m e n o l o g y

o f ultimate

radical

knowledge

that

a n d structuralism b u t the v e r y

enterprise o f philosophy. T h i s q u e s t i o n i n g , h o w e v e r , w a s n o t b a s e d on the p o v e r t y o f a skeptical d e n i a l o f k n o w l e d g e as such. T h e i d e a w a s n o t m e r e l y to u n d e r m i n e the old ideal b u t to r e p l a c e it w i t h a n e w m o d e o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g , one that did n o t seek ultimate truth but c o u l d c l a i m to be the l e g i t i m a t e successor to the tradition that h a d . It w a s n o t , accordingly, structuralism that u n d e r m i n e d existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e c l a i m that it did w a s an illusion d u e to an indefensible r e a d i n g o f structuralism as the final scientific truth that would

replace

subjectivist p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

Once

this

pretension

c o l l a p s e d , it w o u l d h a v e b e e n entirely feasible to r e t u r n to M e r l e a u Ponty's p r o j e c t o f s y n t h e s i z i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description w i t h structuralist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h a t this n e v e r h a p p e n e d w a s d u e to the poststucturalist q u e s t i o n i n g o f the a s s u m p t i o n , s h a r e d b y p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d structuralism alike, that w e c o u l d attain d e e p truths a b o u t the h u m a n situation. P h e n o m e n o l o g y fell n o t to an e x t e r n a l scientific critique b u t to an i n t e r n a l m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v o l u t i o n . One

way

immediate

in w h i c h

the poststructuralists

philosophical

still r e s e m b l e d

ancestors w a s in their d e m a n d

for

their the

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

252

c o n c r e t e . A s m u c h as S a r t r e , M e r l e a u - P o n t y ,

and Beauvoir

they

s o u g h t a c o n n e c t i o n to directly l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e . B u t t h e y rejected p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s v e r s i o n o f such e x p e r i e n c e b e c a u s e , t h e y m a i n t a i n e d , it w a s b a s e d o n an u n t e n a b l e centrality o f the i n d i v i d u a l subject that c a m e to be called " h u m a n i s m " . H e r e

"humanism"

referred to the f a m i l y o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , from Descartes'

cogito

through

Kant's

transcendental

e g o to

Sartre's

being-for-itself, that m a d e i n d i v i d u a l subjects the ultimate sources o f m e a n i n g a n d truth. T h e t e r m h a d b e c o m e c u r r e n t w h e n S a r t r e , in his f a m o u s l e c t u r e in 1946, p r o c l a i m e d against C a t h o l i c a n d M a r x i s t critics that " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m is a h u m a n i s m " a n d H e i d e g g e r , in his " L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m " to a F r e n c h disciple, J e a n B e a u f r e t , a r g u e d that this w a s p r e c i s e l y its failing, since h u m a n i s m p r e s u p p o s e d the v e r y sort o f t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s that H e i d e g g e r ' s

fundamental

ontology had overcome. T h e poststructuralists f o u n d the c o n c r e t e w i t h o u t h u m a n i s m in literature, t h o u g h n o t , o f c o u r s e , the s t a n d a r d fare o f realist novels or romantic

poetry,

which

(apart

from

the

sort

of

deconstruction

B a r t h e s c a r r i e d out on B a l z a c ) t h e y saw as m e r e l y e x p l o r a t i o n s or celebrations

of humanist

consciousness.

They

turned

instead

to

a v a n t - g a r d e writers such as Bataille a n d B l a n c h o t , w h o d e l i n e a t e the collapse o f the c o n c e p t s that structure o u r c o n s c i o u s life a n d , as D e r r i d a p u t it, " m a k e the limits o f o u r l a n g u a g e t r e m b l e " . literature p r o v i d e s

"the non-place

'other' of p h i l o s o p h y "

3 1

[non-lieu] w h i c h w o u l d b e

Such the

as it has b e e n traditionally u n d e r s t o o d , a n d

s h o w s the w a y to new, n o n - h u m a n i s t m o d e s o f t h o u g h t . F o u c a u l t , for e x a m p l e , w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y f a s c i n a t e d b y Bataille's concept of transgression,

32

w h i c h he a p p l i e d to the act o f w r i t i n g ,

u n d e r s t o o d as i m p l y i n g " a n a c t i o n that is a l w a y s . . . transgressing a n d r e v e r s i n g an o r d e r that it a c c e p t s a n d m a n i p u l a t e s " . A s a result, he saw w r i t i n g as " a q u e s t i o n o f c r e a t i n g a s p a c e into w h i c h the w r i t i n g subject

constantly

disappears".

3 3

Similarly, F o u c a u l t

was

i m p r e s s e d w i t h B l a n c h o t ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a " l i t e r a r y s p a c e " in w h i c h a u t h o r i a l identity is d i s s o l v e d . 3 1

3 2

3 3

3 4

34

For F o u c a u l t , B l a n c h o t ' s writings

" D i a l o g u e with J a c q u e s D e r r i d a " , in R i c h a r d K e a r n e y (ed.), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 112. See his "A Preface to T r a n s g r e s s i o n " , Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-11)84, Volume u: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 69—87. M i c h e l Foucault, " W h a t Is an A u t h o r ? " , in Essential Works, Volume 11, 206. M a u r i c e Blanchot, L'espace littéraire, 1955. For a perceptive study of Blanchot's literary and philosophical significance, see G e r a l d B r u n s , Maurice Blanchot.

The structuralist invasion

253

" l a y b a r e w h a t p r e c e d e s all s p e e c h , w h a t underlies all silence: the continuous streaming o f language. A language spoken by no one: a n y subject it m a y h a v e is n o m o r e t h a n a g r a m m a t i c a l f o l d . " W i t h B l a n c h o t , " w e n o w k n o w that the b e i n g o f l a n g u a g e is t h e visible e f f a c e m e n t o f the o n e w h o s p e a k s " .

3 5

D e r r i d a p a i d special attention to Bataille's " n o t i o n o f e x p e n d i ture",

3 6

the i d e a that a n y a p p a r e n t l y c o h e r e n t system (a " r e s t r i c t e d

economy"

in

Bataille's

terminology)

produces

an

excess

that

m a k e s n o sense in t e r m s o f the system a n d in so d o i n g s u b o r d i n a t e s the

restricted

economy

to a

c o n c e p t s lose their c o h e r e n c e .

3 7

"general

economy"

in w h i c h

its

B l a n c h o t attracts D e r r i d a b o t h for

the self-reference o f his texts, w h i c h l e a d n o t to the clarity o f selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t to f u n d a m e n t a l structural instability, a n d for his e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e p a r a d o x i c a l status o f l a n g u a g e as a b o r d e r that limits us e v e n as w e cross it (as in B l a n c h o t ' s title, Le pas au-delà, which

means

beyond").

both

" t h e step

(pas) b e y o n d "

a n d " t h e n o t (pas)

3 8

A m a i n l o c u s o f poststructuralist literary interests w a s the j o u r n a l Tel quel, f o u n d e d in i 9 6 0 a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y associated w i t h P h i l i p p e Sollers a n d Julia K r i s t e v a .

3 9

I n a d d i t i o n to its r e g u l a r articles, the

j o u r n a l p u b l i s h e d b o o k s (in its " C o l l e c t i o n tel quel") a n d s p o n s o r e d c o n f e r e n c e s . It p r o m o t e d — w i t h v a r y i n g e m p h a s e s over its t w e n t y t w o y e a r s o f p u b l i c a t i o n — a v a n t - g a r d e w r i t i n g , literary theory, a n d leftist political a c t i o n . Tel quel w a s a m a j o r v e n u e for Sollers' avantg a r d e w r i t i n g a n d for K r i s t e v a ' s literary t h e o r i z i n g . B a r t h e s a n d D e r r i d a w e r e also f r e q u e n t c o n t r i b u t o r s . S h o r t l y after the M a y '68 student a n d w o r k e r s revolt, the j o u r n a l b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y interested in politics a n d , d u r i n g the 1970s, a d o p t e d a strongly M a o i s t o r i e n t a t i o n , c u l m i n a t i n g in 1974 in a visit o f m e m b e r s o f the editorial b o a r d (including Sollers, K r i s t e v a , a n d Barthes) to C h i n a . I n its later years, Tel quel reflected S o l l e r s ' e v e n t u a l disillusion w i t h

Marxism

a n d his n e w interests in sexuality a n d theology. I n 1982, a switch to a

3 5

3 6

3 7

3 8

3 9

M i c h e l Foucault, " T h e T h o u g h t o f the O u t s i d e " , in Essential Works, Volume n, 166. G e o r g e s Bataille, " T h e N o t i o n o f E x p e n d i t u r e " , in Visions of Excess. J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , " F r o m Restricted E c o n o m y to G e n e r a l E c o n o m y : a H e g e l i a n i s m without R e s e r v e " , in Writing and Difference. J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , " L a loi du g e n r e " a n d " P a s " , both in Parages. T h e j o u r n a l ' s title (meaning literally " s u c h a s " or "just as") evokes the (identical) title o f a b o o k b y Paul V a l e r y a n d , especially, Nietzsche's p r o c l a m a t i o n that w e should "affirm this w o r l d just as it i s " .

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

254 new publisher

and a name

effective d e m i s e . The

change

(to L'infini) a m o u n t e d

to its

4 0

poststructuralists

also

made

their

own appropriation

of

G e r m a n philosophy, h n d i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y fruitful reflection o n H e g e l , Nietzsche, and, o f course, H e i d e g g e r .

4 1

H e g e l ' s t e c h n i q u e s o f dialec-

tical a r g u m e n t w e r e attractive b e c a u s e o f their c a p a c i t y for s h o w i n g the i n c o h e r e n c e o f specihc c o n c e p t s , b u t m o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g the philosopher critique

o f absolute

spirit w a s a w a r n i n g o f h o w easily the

o f p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d itself b e c o m e j u s t the m o s t

recent

p r e t e n d e r to s u p r e m e c o g n i t i v e authority. F o u c a u l t spoke o f h o w " w e h a v e to d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n t to w h i c h o u r a n t i - H e g e l i a n i s m is possibly o n e o f his tricks d i r e c t e d against us, at the e n d o f w h i c h h e stands, m o t i o n l e s s , w a i t i n g for u s " .

4 2

Derrida

says that his key

n o t i o n , differance, " m u s t sign the p o i n t at w h i c h o n e b r e a k s w i t h the system o f the Aufhebung a n d w i t h speculative d i a l e c t i c s " .

4 3

B u t like

F o u c a u l t , D e r r i d a is e x t r e m e l y w a r y o f the H e g e l i a n t e m p t a t i o n , a n d in Glas (1974) h e w e n t to e x t r e m e lengths o f artihce a n d o b s c u r i t y to c o n f r o n t H e g e l w i t h o u t falling v i c t i m to the S y s t e m ' s u n c a n n y p o w e r to assimilate its critics. H e split his text into t w o c o l u m n s o n e a c h p a g e , the left p r o v i d i n g a n analysis o f H e g e l o n the f a m i l y a n d the right a n analysis o f J e a n G e n e t ' s novels. B y m a k i n g the final i m p o r t o f his text reside in the n e v e r e x p r e s s e d relations b e t w e e n the t w o c o l u m n s , D e r r i d a eludes H e g e l b y p l a c i n g h i m s e l f outside his o w n discussion o f h i m .

4 4

B e f o r e the 1960s, F r e n c h interest in N i e t z s c h e w a s m o r e literary t h a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l . It arose hrst a r o u n d the t u r n o f the century, in writers such as V a l e r y a n d G i d e . B e g i n n i n g in the 1930s, Bataille a n d , later, B l a n c h o t w e r e at the c e n t e r o f a n o t h e r w a v e o f i n t e r e s t . 4 0

4 1

4 2

4 3

4 4

4 5

45

For b a c k g r o u n d o n Tel quel a n d a selection of articles from it, see Patrick ffrench a n d R o l a n d - F r a n ç o i s L a c k (eds.), The Tel Quel Reader. Julia Kristeva's novel, Samouraïs, contains fictionalized versions o f m a n y o f the personalities a n d events c o n n e c t e d with Tel quel. D e r r i d a explains his preference for G e r m a n (and Greek) philosophy over French: " I have a p r o f o u n d respect for the great F r e n c h thinkers, but I have always h a d the impression that a certain kind o f rigorous analysis could render their texts accessible a n d exhaustible. Before a Platonic or H e i d e g g e r i a n text, b y contrast, I feel that I a m confronting a n abyss, a bottomless pit in w h i c h I could lose m y s e l f " (Richard K e a r n e y [éd.], Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 113). M i c h e l Foucault, " T h e Discourse on L a n g u a g e " , in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 235. Positions, 44. A s Christina Howells notes, D e r r i d a ' s treatment of G e n e t is also a (generally implicit) critique o f Sartre a n d the latter's b i o g r a p h y o f Genet (see Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics, 85). S e e , for e x a m p l e , G e o r g e s Bataille, Sur Nietzsche.

The structuralist invasion

255

N i e t z s c h e finally b e c a m e a m a j o r influence in F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h e r s ' interest in Bataille a n d B l a n c h o t . F o u c a u l t , for e x a m p l e , says it w a s t h e y w h o l e d h i m to r e a d N i e t z s c h e .

4 6

The

poststructuralists b e c a m e e x c i t e d a b o u t N i e t z s c h e m a i n l y b e c a u s e h e philosophized philosophical

in o p p o s i t i o n

to the t r a d i t i o n a l

ideal

o f absolute

truth. A s D e l e u z e , w h o in 1962 p u b l i s h e d

a very

influential study o f N i e t z s c h e , p u t it, h e w a s m o s t i m p o r t a n t for his " r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the i m a g e o f t h o u g h t that w e create for ourselves. N i e t z s c h e snatches t h o u g h t f r o m the e l e m e n t o f truth a n d falsity. H e turns it into a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a n e v a l u a t i o n , interp r e t a t i o n o f forces, e v a l u a t i o n o f p o w e r . "

4 7

T o F o u c a u l t , this r e n u n c i a t i o n o f truth first m e a n t the rejection o f " m a n " as the l o c u s o f claims to absolute k n o w l e d g e , a rejection h e c o n n e c t e d to the d e a t h o f G o d . " R a t h e r t h a n the d e a t h o f G o d - or, rather, in the w a k e o f that d e a t h a n d in p r o f o u n d c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h it — w h a t N i e t z s c h e ' s t h o u g h t h e r a l d s is the e n d o f his m u r d e r e r . "

4 8

Later, F o u c a u l t w a s especially t a k e n w i t h N i e t z s c h e ' s r e p l a c e m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems w i t h m e t i c u l o u s historical g e n e a l o g i e s : " I f I w a n t e d to b e p r e t e n t i o u s , I w o u l d use 'the g e n e a l o g y o f m o r a l s ' as the g e n e r a l title o f w h a t I a m d o i n g . "

4 9

D e r r i d a w a s fascinated by

N i e t z s c h e ' s n o t i o n o f play, w h i c h h e n o t o n l y discussed b u t also often e x e m p l i f i e d in the p u n n i n g r o c o c o o f his literary style, i n c l u d i n g his d a z z l i n g a n d frustrating m o n o g r a p h , Eperons: les styles de Nietzsche. Later, D e r r i d a w o r k e d t h r o u g h

the v e x e d

question

o f the N a z i

a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f N i e t z s c h e ' s t h o u g h t in Otobiographies: L'enseignement

de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre. Heidegger's

postwar

influence

in F r a n c e

owed

much

to the

interest o f literary figures such as B l a n c h o t a n d the p o e t R e n é C h a r . C h a r , a l o n g w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s m a i n F r e n c h disciple, J e a n B e a u f r e t , o r g a n i z e d a n i m p o r t a n t c o n f e r e n c e o n his w o r k at C e r i s y - l a - S a l l e in 1955, a n d at C h a r ' s invitation H e i d e g g e r g a v e three seminars in A v i g n o n d u r i n g the later 1960s. Poststructuralist a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f H e i d e g g e r rejected the existentialists' " h u m a n i s t " r e a d i n g ,

which

p r e s e n t e d h i m as a p h i l o s o p h e r o f consciousness a n d f r e e d o m , a n d ,

" I read [Nietzsche] because of Bataille, a n d Bataille because of B l a n c h o t " ("Structuralism and Poststructuralism", interview with G é r a r d R a u l e t , in Essential Works, Volume a, 439). His interest in Nietzsche p r o b a b l y also derives from his r e a d i n g of Heidegger, another source of the French turn to Nietzsche. Gilles D e l e u z e , " P r e f a c e to the English T r a n s l a t i o n " , in Nietzsche and Philosophy, xiii. The Order oj'Things, 385. Power/Knowledge, 3$. 4 9

25

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

6

consistent w i t h

Heidegger's

self-interpretation

in his " L e t t e r

H u m a n i s m " , saw h i m as a critic o f s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d p h i l o s o p h y . Heidegger's

influence

on

explicit. H i s key n o t i o n

Derrida

is p a r t i c u l a r l y

o f differance has o b v i o u s

H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g i c a l difference

(the difference

on

50

strong

and

connections between

to

beings

a n d their B e i n g ) . It is n o t surprising that D e r r i d a o n c e told an i n t e r v i e w e r : " N o t h i n g that I h a v e tried to do w o u l d h a v e

been

possible w i t h o u t the o p e n i n g o f H e i d e g g e r i a n questions . . . w i t h o u t the attention to w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls the difference b e t w e e n B e i n g a n d b e i n g , the o n t i c - o n t o l o g i c a l difference as it r e m a i n s u n t h o u g h t in a certain fashion b y p h i l o s o p h y . "

5 1

Derrida's Heideggerian pedi-

gree is also a p p a r e n t in his p e n c h a n t for d e t a i l e d c o m m e n t a r i e s on the history o f philosophy, u s i n g a t e c h n i q u e that he calls " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " , a t e r m he i n t r o d u c e d to translate H e i d e g g e r ' s Destruktion. Further, the p r i m a r y result o f D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n s , a critique of " m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e " , is v e r y similar to H e i d e g g e r ' s criticism of representationalist m e t a p h y s i c s . B u t D e r r i d a r e m a i n s v e r y suspicious o f w h a t he sees as H e i d e g g e r ' s " n o s t a l g i a " for p r e - S o c r a t i c unveilings o f B e i n g , w h i c h he r e g a r d s as a lapse b a c k into the m e t a p h y s i c s o f p r e s e n c e , a n d e v e n t u a l l y a c k n o w l e d g e d a substantive tie b e t w e e n H e i d e g g e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y a n d his N a z i p o l i t i c s . Hubert Heidegger

Dreyfus

52

has especially e m p h a s i z e d

for F o u c a u l t ,

5 3

a claim Foucault

the i m p o r t a n c e confirms.

5 4

At

of

hrst,

h o w e v e r , F o u c a u l t t o o k H e i d e g g e r as an existentialist thinker a n d w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p r e s s e d w i t h L u d w i g B i n s w a n g e r ' s Daseinanalysis, a H e i d e g g e r i a n v e r s i o n o f existential p s y c h o l o g y .

55

But from

the

b e g i n n i n g F o u c a u l t e x p r e s s e d reservations a b o u t this H e i d e g g e r i a n existentialism, a n d Les mots et les choses (published in 1966), w i t h its h o p e for an i m m i n e n t " d e a t h o f m a n " , is clearly i n f l u e n c e d

5 0

5 1

5 2

1 5

5 4

5 5

by

See, for e x a m p l e , J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , " T h e Ends of M a n " , in Writing and Difference. Positions, 18. See De l'esprit and Psyché: inventions de l'autre. H u b e r t Dreyfus, " O n the O r d e r i n g of T h i n g s : B e i n g a n d Power in H e i d e g g e r and F o u c a u l t " , in T . J . A r m s t r o n g (ed.), Michel Foucault: Philosopher, 8 0 - 9 5 . " M y entire philosophical d e v e l o p m e n t was d e t e r m i n e d by m y r e a d i n g of H e i d e g g e r . " But Foucault continues, " I nevertheless recognize that Nietzsche o u t w e i g h e d h i m " , a n d a little later says, " I a m simply N i e t z s c h e a n " ( " T h e R e t u r n o f M o r a l i t y " , in M i c h e l Foucault. Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 250, 251). Foucault's first significant publication, in 1954, was a l o n g introduction to a French translation o f Binswanger's article " T r a u m u n d E x i s t e n z " (translated as M . Foucault a n d L. Binswanger, Dream and Existence). T h e r e are also clear traces o f the existential H e i d e g g e r in Foucault's Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (1961).

The structuralist invasion

257

H e i d e g g e r i a n a n t i - h u m a n i s m . T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t in the t r e a t m e n t o f l a n g u a g e , w h i c h is also m u c h i n d e b t e d to B l a n c h o t . Foucault's c o n c e p t i o n o f p o w e r , c e n t r a l in his w r i t i n g s o f the 1970s, does, as D r e y f u s s h o w s , h a v e s o m e i m p o r t a n t affinities to H e i d e g ger's n o t i o n o f B e i n g , b u t F o u c a u l t is far m o r e interested in detailed g e n e a l o g i c a l studies o f h o w p o w e r is e m b o d i e d in specific institutions a n d p r a c t i c e s t h a n in its o n t o l o g i c a l roots. Further, as P a u l R a b i n o w has suggested, it is difficult

to give

a Heideggerian

reading

of

Foucault's c e n t r a l c o n c e r n , at least d u r i n g the 1980s, w i t h subjectivity a n d e t h i c s . 5 6

Paul

Rabinow,

5 6

"Modern

and

Countermodern:

Ethos a n d

Epoch

in H e i d e g g e r

F o u c a u l t " , in G a r y G u t t i n g (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 199.

and

CHAPTER

g

Foucault

You remember that book of philosophy we read together at Balbec, the richness of the world of possibilities compared with the real world. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, in, 148) M i c h e l F o u c a u l t (1926—84) w a s b o r n in Poitiers, w h e r e his father w a s a p r o m i n e n t p h y s i c i a n . I n 1945 h e studied u n d e r J e a n H y p p o l i t e at the L y c é e H e n r i I V in p r e p a r a t i o n for the e n t r a n c e e x a m i n a t i o n for the E c o l e N o r m a l e S u p é r i e u r e , w h e r e h e b e g a n studies in 1946. H e r e c e i v e d licences in b o t h p h i l o s o p h y a n d p s y c h o l o g y , w o r k i n g w i t h , among

others, M a u r i c e

Merleau-Ponty.

Dissatisfied

with

French

culture a n d society, F o u c a u l t w a s able to a v o i d the usual " p u r g a t o r y " o f lycée t e a c h i n g a n d instead t o o k v a r i o u s t e m p o r a r y a c a d e m i c posts in S w e d e n , P o l a n d , a n d G e r m a n y

from

1955 to i 9 6 0 , w h i l e h e

c o m p l e t e d his d o c t o r a l thesis (on m a d n e s s in the C l a s s i c a l A g e ) . D u r i n g the 1960s F o u c a u l t h e l d a series o f positions in F r e n c h universities, a n d in 1969 h e w a s elected H y p p o l i t e ' s successor in the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e , w h e r e h e c h o s e the title " P r o f e s s o r o f the H i s t o r y o f Systems o f T h o u g h t " . F r o m the 1970s o n , F o u c a u l t w a s v e r y active politically, h e l p i n g f o u n d the Groupe d'information sur les prisons a n d s u p p o r t i n g protests o n b e h a l f o f h o m o s e x u a l s a n d o t h e r m a r g i n alized

g r o u p s . H e also f r e q u e n t l y

lectured

outside

France,

par-

ticularly in the U n i t e d States, a n d in 1983 a g r e e d to t e a c h a n n u a l l y at the U n i v e r s i t y o f C a i f o r n i a at Berkeley. O n e o f the first p r o m i n e n t victims o f A I D S , F o u c a u l t d i e d in Paris o n J u n e 25, 1984. Contrary

to c o m m o n

views

of authorship

as

self-expression,

F o u c a u l t said that h e w r o t e to e s c a p e f r o m a n y fixed identity: " I a m n o d o u b t n o t the o n l y o n e w h o writes in o r d e r to h a v e n o f a c e . "

1

C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , there is n o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o r t h e o r e t i c a l unity o f 1

The Archaeology of Knowledge, 17.

258

Foucault Foucault's

thought

that

will

support

259 a n y single

comprehensive

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H i s w r i t i n g s instead fall into several m a i n g r o u p s , each

characterized

b y a distinctive p r o b l e m a t i c

and method

of

a p p r o a c h . It is fruitful to f o l l o w c e r t a i n t h e m e s t h r o u g h s o m e o r all o f these g r o u p s , b u t the c o r e o f his effort at a n y p o i n t is defined b y w h a t is specific to the p r o b l e m s t h e n e n g a g i n g h i m .

2

In all his v a r i o u s projects, F o u c a u l t , like Sartre a n d M e r l e a u Ponty, s o u g h t a m a n n e r o f t h i n k i n g that w a s b a s e d in the c o n c r e t e reality o f h u m a n existence a n d o r i e n t e d t o w a r d h u m a n l i b e r a t i o n . Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y s o u g h t c o n c r e t e n e s s in p h e n o m e n o l o g y and liberation through M a r x i s m ; and Foucault, pursuing a philos o p h i c a l e d u c a t i o n in a F r a n c e d o m i n a t e d b y their w o r k , initially f o u n d h i m s e l f w i t h the s a m e o r i e n t a t i o n . " I b e l o n g to that g e n e r ation w h o as students h a d b e f o r e their eyes, a n d w e r e l i m i t e d by, a horizon

consisting

alism."

P a r t i c u l a r l y b e c a u s e o f the influence o f A l t h u s s e r at the

3

of Marxism,

phenomenology,

and

existenti-

E c o l e N o r m a l e , F o u c a u l t ' s early intellectual a t t a c h m e n t to M a r x i s m w a s strong, as his 1954 b o o k , Maladie mentale et personnalité, m a k e s clear.

He

characterizes

non-Marxist

approaches,

including

the

existential, as p r o v i d i n g o n l y " m y t h i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s " , a n d m a i n tains that m e n t a l illnesses arise u l t i m a t e l y f r o m

"contradictions"

d e t e r m i n e d b y " p r e s e n t e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s in the f o r m o f conflict, e x p l o i t a t i o n , imperialist w a r s , a n d class s t r u g g l e " .

4

Foucault was

e v e n for a t i m e a m e m b e r o f the F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t Party. B u t h e w a s v e r y s o o n disillusioned w i t h b o t h the t h e o r y a n d the p r a c t i c e o f M a r x i s m . H e quit the P a r t y after o n l y " a f e w m o n t h s or a little more",

5

a n d in the s e c o n d edition o f his b o o k o n m e n t a l illness

(retitled Maladie mentale et psychologie) in 1962, he e l i m i n a t e d almost all M a r x i s t e l e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g his entire c o n c l u d i n g chapter. F r o m then o n , F o u c a u l t m a i n t a i n e d a leftist b u t distinctively n o n - M a r x i s t politics. T h e ties to existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y w e r e m u c h stronger, b u t there is n o d o u b t that F o u c a u l t r a t h e r s o o n r e j e c t e d the subjective s t a n d p o i n t o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description. H e s h a r e d a g e n e r a l

2

:i

4

:>

For further d e v e l o p m e n t o f this line o f thought, see m y essay, " M i c h e l Foucault: a User's M a n u a l " , in G a r y Gutting, The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, " A n Interview with M i c h e l F o u c a u l t " (with C h a r l e s Ruas), " P o s t s c r i p t " to M i c h e l Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: the World of Raymond Roussel, 174, Maladie mentale et personnalité, 86. " M i c h e l Foucault r é p o n d à S a r t r e " , 21.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

26o

sense that, especially g i v e n the w o r k o f Saussure, L é v i - S t r a u s s , a n d L a c a n , p h e n o m e n o l o g y c o u l d n o t give a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t s o f l a n g u a g e , the u n c o n s c i o u s , a n d social s t r u c t u r e s .

6

A more

distinctive

a n d p e r s o n a l c h a l l e n g e c a m e f r o m F o u c a u l t ' s p a s s i o n for literature, p a r t i c u l a r l y a v a n t - g a r d e writers such as R o u s s e l , B e c k e t t , R o b b e ¬ Grillet, a n d Butor, w h o s e r e j e c t i o n o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l novel p r o v i d e d an alternative to p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d e x i s t e n t i a l i s m .

7

A s w e h a v e seen, F o u c a u l t f o u n d the s a m e sort o f q u e s t i o n i n g in Bataille a n d B l a n c h o t .

8

B u t F o u c a u l t ' s b r e a k w i t h existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y

occurred

p r i m a r i l y o n the h e l d o f history. S a r t r e , as w e h a v e seen, r e a l i z e d the i m p o r t a n c e o f history a n d w a s quite p r e p a r e d to revise his abstract o n t o l o g y to take a c c o u n t o f the historical situatedness o f c o n s c i o u s ness. B u t he a l w a y s insisted, against structuralist critics, that the m e a n i n g o f history derives f r o m the free subject. B y r e j e c t i n g this subject,

Sartre c l a i m e d , the structuralists (and h e r e he

included

Foucault) rejected history. A c c o r d i n g to F o u c a u l t , h o w e v e r ,

Sartre

w a s i g n o r i n g the m o s t successful h i s t o r i o g r a p h y o f his t i m e , the Annales s c h o o l ,

particularly

associated

with

Ferdinand

Braudel.

B r a u d e l a n d his c o l l e a g u e s o b t a i n e d e x t r e m e l y interesting results (especially in social history) b y g i v i n g u p the p e r s p e c t i v e o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e (history as the acts o f kings, g e n e r a l s , d i p l o m a t s , r e v o l u tionaries) a n d a s s u m i n g the m u c h b r o a d e r s t a n d p o i n t o f l o n g - t e r m factors such as g e o g r a p h y , c l i m a t e , a n d n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s . W i t h o u t t a k i n g over a n y o f B r a u d e l ' s specihc results or m e t h o d s , F o u c a u l t tried to effect a p a r a l l e l c h a n g e o f p e r s p e c t i v e in the history

of

t h o u g h t : a m o v e a w a y f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the i n d i v i d u a l thinker and

toward

the

standpoint

of broader

but

more

fundamental

c a t e g o r i e s a n d structures. More

directly

influential

were

Bachelard's

and

Canguilhem's

histories o f science, w h i c h w e r e c e n t e r e d n o t o n subjective e x p e r i e n c e b u t objective

concepts. M u c h

o f Foucault's historical

work

(especially Les mots et les chases) is an e x t e n s i o n to the social sciences of 6

7

8

"Structuralism and Poststructuralism", interview with G e r a r d R a u l e t , in Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume II: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, 4 3 6 - 7 . " A n Interview with M i c h e l F o u c a u l t " (with C h a r l e s Ruas), 174. See Foucault's Raymond Roussel (1963), a n d various literary essays from the same p e r i o d reprinted in M i c h e l Foucault, Essential Works, Volume II. T h e influence o f B l a n c h o t , especially early on, was particularly strong. S p e a k i n g of the early 1950s, Foucault once told his close friend, the historian Paul V e y n e , "At the time, I d r e a m e d of b e i n g B l a n c h o t " (Didier E r i b o n , Michel Foucault, 133).

Foucault

261

the k i n d o f studies B a c h e l a r d h a d d o n e for the p h y s i c a l sciences a n d Canguilhem

for the b i o l o g i c a l

sciences.

Foucault

9

also t o o k for

g r a n t e d m a n y o f the k e y c l a i m s o f B a c h e l a r d ' s a n d C a n g u i l h e m ' s philosophy

o f science.

These

included

the essentially

historical

c h a r a c t e r o f science a n d the c e n t r a l role o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b r e a k s o r discontinuities. O n a d e e p e r level, B a c h e l a r d ' s n o t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o gical obstacle f o r e s h a d o w s F o u c a u l t ' s p r o j e c t o f s h o w i n g the historical,

contingent

nature

of concepts

and practices

that

present

t h e m s e l v e s as ahistorical necessities. Just as B a c h e l a r d spoke o f a p s y c h o a n a l y s i s o f k n o w l e d g e , F o u c a u l t c h a r a c t e r i z e d his o w n w o r k as a n effort to discover the u n c o n s c i o u s o f o u r k n o w l e d g e . C a n g u i l h e m ' s strongest m e t h o d o l o g i c a l influence o n F o u c a u l t w a s t h r o u g h his e m p h a s i s o n the history o f c o n c e p t s as o p p o s e d to the history o f theories. O n F o u c a u l t ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n

of Canguilhem,

e x p e r i e n c i n g subjects (individual scientists) are p r i m a r i l y sources o f n e w theories, w h i c h , h o w e v e r , e m p l o y c o n c e p t s that derive

from

linguistic structures p r i o r to the subject's e x p e r i e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , C a n g u i l h e m i a n histories o f c o n c e p t s e x t e n d the structuralist d e c e n t e r i n g o f the subject to the history o f science. Beyond

his rejection

subject, F o u c a u l t ' s

o f the p r i o r i t y o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

enterprise

differs

from

Sartre's in t w o m a j o r

respects. First, h e d o e s n o t see his role to b e the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f universally v a l i d theories. H e will d e v e l o p theories (for e x a m p l e , o f l a n g u a g e , o f social p o w e r , o f the ethical subject) b u t o n l y to elucidate a specific r e g i o n a l issue such as m a d n e s s , p u n i s h m e n t , or sexuality. D e s p i t e o c c a s i o n a l b e n d i n g to t e m p t a t i o n , h e e s c h e w s generalization

for its o w n sake. T h i s

instrumental

theoretical

approach

to

p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r y keeps F o u c a u l t f r o m the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f syst e m a t i c m o n u m e n t s such as L'étre et le néant a n d Critique de la raison dialectique. H i s alternative is t o w r i t e critical histories o f c o n c e p t s that have

embodied

necessary

limitations

b u t are in fact

on thought contingent.

a n d action I n a late

that

essay,

appear Foucault

c h a r a c t e r i z e d this p r o j e c t as a positive inversion o f K a n t ' s critical philosophy: If the Kantian question was that of knowing [.yazwjwhat limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to

9

Foucault's historical w o r k is also influenced b y the proto-structuralist studies of G e o r g e s D u m é z i l on the c o m p a r a t i v e study of I n d o - E u r o p e a n religions.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

262

us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? T h e point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossingover [franchissement]. 10

In

accord

historical

with

this u n d e r s t a n d i n g

methodology

depended

o f his p r o j e c t ,

more

on

a

Foucault's

sensitivity

to

particularities o f historical events a n d structures t h a n o n

the

funda-

m e n t a l v i e w s a b o u t k n o w l e d g e a n d reality. O n the o t h e r h a n d , he w a s n o t a " p u r e " h i s t o r i a n , simply d i s p l a y i n g n e u t r a l truths a b o u t the

past.

His

histories

originate

concerns about contemporary something

is w r o n g

prisoners, w i t h

our

with

our

experiences

and

society: a c o n c r e t e a w a r e n e s s

from

specihc

that

treatment

of mental

patients

sexual attitudes a n d p r a c t i c e s . H e

says,

or for

e x a m p l e , that he u n d e r t o o k a historical study o f p s y c h i a t r y (in Folie et déraison) " b e c a u s e I h a d h a d a certain a m o u n t o f p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e in p s y c h i a t r i c hospitals a n d w a s a w a r e o f the c o m b a t s , the lines of force, tensions

and points

o f collision w h i c h

existed

there.

My

historical w o r k w a s u n d e r t a k e n o n l y as a f u n c t i o n o f those c o n f l i c t s "

(Power/Knowledge [PK], 64). It is this origin in c o n t e m p o r a r y e x p e r i e n c e that led F o u c a u l t to c h a r a c t e r i z e his w o r k as a " h i s t o r y o f the p r e s e n t " .

B u t this origin

1 1

does n o t m e a n that F o u c a u l t t h o u g h t his histories p r o v i d e d e x p e r t solutions

to

madness,

although

our

social

and

taken up

political by

Laing

problems. and

His

others

history

in the

of

anti-

p s y c h i a t r y m o v e m e n t , w a s n o t i n t e n d e d as a call to abolish asylums or for a n y o t h e r specihc r e f o r m s in society's t r e a t m e n t o f the m a d . In Foucault's view, decisions a b o u t h o w to d e a l w i t h political a n d social p r o b l e m s are the p r o v i n c e o f those i m m e d i a t e l y i n v o l v e d in a n d familiar w i t h t h e m . D i s e n g a g e d intellectual analysis is i m p o r t a n t but o n l y as a b a c k g r o u n d suggesting possibilities, n o t as a n o r m a t i v e s u m m o n s to a c t i o n . " T h e p r o j e c t , tactics a n d g o a l s to be a d o p t e d are a m a t t e r for those w h o d o the hghting. W h a t the intellectual c a n do is to p r o v i d e i n s t r u m e n t s o f analysis, a n d at p r e s e n t this is the historian's essential role . . . [ T h e historian provides] a t o p o l o g i c a l a n d g e o l o g i c a l survey o f the battlefield. . . . B u t as for saying, ' H e r e is w h a t y o u m u s t d o ! ' , certainly n o t " (PK, 62). 1 0

1 1

" W h a t Is E n l i g h t e n m e n t ? " , in M i c h e l Foucault, 1954—1984, Volume I: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 315. Discipline and Punish, 30-1.

Essential

Works

of Michel

Foucault,

Foucault On

the

other

hand,

Foucault

263

does

think

there

is a

sort

of

intellectual w h o has the r i g h t to r e c o m m e n d p a r t i c u l a r policies a n d tactics. T h i s is the "specific i n t e l l e c t u a l " , w h o " h a s at his disposal, w h e t h e r in the service o f the State or against it, p o w e r s w h i c h c a n benefit or i r r e v o c a b l y destroy l i f e " (PK,

129). I n c l u d e d u n d e r this

rubric are all those experts (teachers, e n g i n e e r s , d o c t o r s , consultants) w h o d e v e l o p a n d d e p l o y d o m a i n s o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h i n the p o w e r structures o f society. F o u c a u l t distinguishes the specific intellectual f r o m the " u n i v e r s a l i n t e l l e c t u a l " , a free spirit, " t h e s p o k e s m a n o f the u n i v e r s a l " , " s p e a k i n g in the c a p a c i t y o f m a s t e r o f truth a n d j u s t i c e " (PK, 126). H e suggests that such a u t o n o m o u s intellectuals - V o l t a i r e and

Sartre

are

no

doubt premier

examples -

once

played

an

i m p o r t a n t role. B u t t o d a y the relation b e t w e e n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e has c h a n g e d , a n d w e c a n n o l o n g e r e x p e c t universal systems

of

m o r a l i t y to p r o v i d e effective responses to social a n d political d o m i n a t i o n . W e n e e d , rather, specific

responses f o r m u l a t e d

by

c o n c r e t e l y i n v o l v e d in the p r o b l e m s . Foucault's "specific

those

intellec-

t u a l s " are o f course n o t the o n l y ones so i n v o l v e d ; there are also the direct objects o f society's p o w e r structures (e.g., prisoners, a s y l u m i n m a t e s , students), as w e l l as a n e t w o r k o f n o n i n t e l l e c t u a l functionaries

(prison

guards,

office

workers).

But

specific

intellectuals'

s p e c i a l i z e d k n o w l e d g e a n d reflective capacities m a k e their

efforts

particularly important. T h e intellectual role F o u c a u l t sees for h i m s e l f does n o t s e e m to b e that o f either the specific or the u n i v e r s a l intellectual. H i s w o r k is g r o u n d e d n e i t h e r in the latter's g e n e r a l m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s n o r in the f o r m e r ' s specific responsibilities w i t h i n society's p o w e r

structures.

W e m i g h t (though F o u c a u l t d o e s n o t use the term) call h i m r a t h e r a " c r i t i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l " . C r i t i c a l intellectuals d o n o t speak w i t h the a u t h o r i t y o f universal p r i n c i p l e s or o f specific

social or

political

responsibilities b u t simply o n the basis o f their historical e r u d i t i o n a n d analytic skills. N e i t h e r " t h e r h a p s o d i s t o f the e t e r n a l " n o r " t h e strategist o f life a n d d e a t h " (PK, 129), the critical intellectual p r o v i d e s the intellectual tools — a w a r e n e s s e s o f strategic a n d tactical possibilities — n e e d e d to c o m b a t a r b i t r a r y constraints o n h u m a n f r e e d o m . Although

critical

intellectuals'

social

and

political

concerns

e x p l a i n their c h o i c e s o f p a r t i c u l a r historical p h e n o m e n a for analysis, they d o n o t a c c o u n t for the historical m e t h o d s e m p l o y e d or for the results these m e t h o d s yield. F o u c a u l t , for e x a m p l e , chose to study the historical origins o f certain disciplines a n d institutions b e c a u s e he

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

264

r e g a r d e d t h e m as p a r t i c u l a r l y d a n g e r o u s c o n t e m p o r a r y threats to f r e e d o m . B u t his studies t h e m s e l v e s w e r e i n t e n d e d to h e l p g e n e r a t e reliable strategies for c o m b a t t i n g these threats. C o n s e q u e n t l y , they had

to b e d e s i g n e d

ideological

to y i e l d

accurate

historical

caricatures. Foucault was committed

accounts,

not

to struggles for

f r e e d o m in the m a n n e r o f a n intelligence analyst, n o t a p r o p a g a n dist. C o n s e q u e n t l y , h e a l w a y s a i m e d at a reliable u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the historical p h e n o m e n a h e w a s investigating. H e s o u g h t , as h e said,

" a discourse

which

would

be both

true

and

strategically

effective . . . a truth w h i c h c o u l d h a v e a political e f f e c t " (PK, 64).

MADNESS

T h e hrst e x a m p l e o f this a p p r o a c h is F o u c a u l t ' s critique o f m e n t a l illness in his Folie et déraison ( 1 9 6 1 ) .

12

H i s earlier w o r k o n m a d n e s s

(Maladie mentale et personnalité) took for g r a n t e d the c o n c e p t o f m e n t a l illness as a n o b j e c t i v e , essentially n o n h i s t o r i c a l g i v e n . Folie et déraison m o v e s to a n entirely n e w level b y seeing o u r n o t i o n o f m e n t a l illness as m e r e l y a c o n t i n g e n t historical construct. Philosophically, it r e p r e sents the b e g i n n i n g o f F o u c a u l t ' s

gradual move

away

f r o m the

influence o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y (although the b o o k still often speaks o f the " e x p e r i e n c e o f m a d n e s s " ) a n d t o w a r d a n o n - s u b j e c t c e n t e r e d a p p r o a c h . Historically, it s h o w s h i m g r o p i n g for a n e w m e t h o d o f analysis: a m i d a g o o d deal o f s t a n d a r d historical description a n d e x p l a n a t i o n , there is also the g e r m o f his a r c h a e o l o g i c a l method. T h e b o o k , especially in its p r e f a c e ( d r o p p e d in the s e c o n d edition) a n d c o n c l u s i o n , also s h o w s F o u c a u l t ' s i n c l i n a t i o n to a

romantic

i r r a t i o n a l i s m that sees art a n d literature, v i a its association

with

m a d n e s s (in such h g u r e s as v a n G o g h , A r t a u d , R o u s s e l , N e v a l , a n d , especially, N i e t z s c h e ) as h a v i n g special access to a d e e p truth a b o u t h u m a n reality. H o w e v e r , this e m p h a s i s d o e s n o t p e r v a d e the entire b o o k , w h i c h o n the w h o l e r e m a i n s a history o f psychiatry, n o t a history o f m a d n e s s in itself. F o u c a u l t sees the history o f m a d n e s s in E u r o p e as c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y

1 2

T h e English version of Folie et déraison, Madness and Civilization, is a translation o f only just over h a l f of Foucault's text. For a discussion o f the status o f Foucault's w o r k on madness as history, see m y " F o u c a u l t a n d the History of M a d n e s s " , in G. G u t t i n g (ed.), 77« Cambridge Companion to Foucault.

Foucault two major

265

" b r e a k s " : o n e in the m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h

century

which

s h a r p l y separates " C l a s s i c a l " (that is, s e v e n t e e n t h - a n d e i g h t e e n t h century) v i e w s o f m a d n e s s f r o m those Renaissance; another

o f the M i d d l e A g e s

at the e n d o f the e i g h t e e n t h

century

and that

i n a u g u r a t e s the m o d e r n v i e w o f m a d n e s s . H i s t r e a t m e n t o f p r e C l a s s i c a l ( m e d i e v a l a n d R e n a i s s a n c e ) m a d n e s s is cursory. B u t he does m a k e o n e c l a i m c r u c i a l for his a r g u m e n t : p r i o r to the C l a s s i c a l Age,

madness

was

seen

as

an

integrally

human

phenomenon.

M a d n e s s w a s o p p o s e d to r e a s o n , b u t as an alternative m o d e human

existence,

not

a

simple

rejection

of

it.

of

Consequently,

m a d n e s s , e v e n if d i s d a i n e d or a b h o r r e d , w a s a m e a n i n g f u l c h a l l e n g e to r e a s o n . It c o u l d e n g a g e in ironic d i a l o g u e w i t h r e a s o n (as in Erasmus) or c l a i m a d o m a i n o f h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d insight n o t available to r e a s o n (as in m e d i e v a l p a i n t i n g or R e n a i s s a n c e t r a g e d y ) . In contrast to the m e d i e v a l a n d R e n a i s s a n c e v i e w s , the C l a s s i c a l A g e saw m a d n e s s as m e r e l y the n e g a t i o n o f the essential

human

attribute o f r e a s o n . It w a s r e g a r d e d as u n r e a s o n (déraison), a p l u n g e into an

animality

that h a d

no h u m a n

significance.

There

accordingly, a conceptual exclusion o f the m a d f r o m h u m a n

was, society.

(Here F o u c a u l t cites as a p r i m e e x a m p l e D e s c a r t e s ' rejection in the First M e d i t a t i o n o f the possibility o f his o w n m a d n e s s as a g r o u n d s of doubt.) C o r r e l a t i v e to this c o n c e p t u a l e x c l u s i o n , there w a s a p h y s i c a l e x c l u s i o n o f the m a d effected b y their c o n f i n e m e n t in institutions that

isolated

them

from

ordinary

human

life.

This

was

most

strikingly signaled in F r a n c e b y the " G r e a t C o n f i n e m e n t " o f 1656, w h e n , w i t h i n a p e r i o d o f j u s t a few m o n t h s , over 1 p e r c e n t o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f Paris w a s c o m p e l l e d to m o v e into one or

another

division o f the H ô p i t a l G é n é r a l . F o u c a u l t notes that similar confinements occurred throughout Europe. T h e c o n c e p t u a l a n d p h y s i c a l e x c l u s i o n o f the m a d reflected a m o r a l c o n d e m n a t i o n . T h e m o r a l fault, h o w e v e r , w a s n o t the ordin a r y sort, w h e r e b y a m e m b e r o f the h u m a n c o m m u n i t y violates o n e o f its basic n o r m s . R a t h e r , m a d n e s s c o r r e s p o n d e d to a r a d i c a l c h o i c e that rejected h u m a n i t y a n d the h u m a n c o m m u n i t y in toto in favor of a life o f sheer ( n o n h u m a n ) animality. In the C l a s s i c a l view,

the

a n i m a l i t y o f the m a d w a s e x p r e s s e d in their d o m i n a t i o n b y passions, a d o m i n a t i o n that led t h e m to a d e l i r i u m in w h i c h t h e y m i s t o o k the u n r e a l for the real. Passionate d e l i r i u m thus resulted in a f u n d a m e n t a l blindness that cut the m a d off f r o m the light o f r e a s o n . S o construed,

Classical

madness

is an

affliction

o f the

mind—body

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

266 composite,

not

something

distinctly

psychological

or

somatic.

Specifically, it is n o t c o n c e i v e d as a " m e n t a l illness". W i t h the m o d e r n age (roughly, f r o m the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y on), the m a d

are

once

again

regarded

as b e i n g w i t h i n

the

human

c o m m u n i t y , n o t as a n i m a l s b e y o n d the p a l e o f humanity. B u t w i t h i n the h u m a n

community

they

are

now

violators o f specihc social n o r m s , w h o

seen

as m o r a l

offenders,

should feel guilt at their

c o n d i t i o n a n d w h o n e e d r e f o r m o f their attitudes a n d

behavior.

C o r r e s p o n d i n g to this n e w c o n c e p t i o n o f m a d n e s s is the c h a r a c t e r istic m o d e r n m o d e o f t r e a t i n g the m a d : n o t m e r e l y isolating t h e m but m a k i n g t h e m the objects o f a m o r a l t h e r a p y that subjects t h e m to social n o r m s . T h i s is the m o v e f r o m the m e r e l y custodial c o n h n e m e n t o f the C l a s s i c a l A g e to the m o d e r n t h e r a p e u t i c a s y l u m , f o u n d e d b y S a m u e l T u k e in E n g l a n d a n d b y P h i l i p p e P i n e l in F r a n c e . A l t h o u g h this institution w a s w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as an u n q u e s t i o n a b l e a d v a n c e in humanitarianism, thorough

method

Foucault for

sees it as m e r e l y a m o r e

controlling

the m a d .

Rather

subtle than

a

and true

l i b e r a t i o n o f the m a d , it is a " g i g a n t i c m o r a l i m p r i s o n m e n t " . T h e m o s t striking feature o f the m o r a l d o m i n a t i o n o f the a s y l u m w a s w h a t F o u c a u l t calls " t h e a p o t h e o s i s o f the m e d i c a l p e r s o n a g e " .

1 3

T o us, it seems n a t u r a l that the d o c t o r s s h o u l d rule the m a d , since w e see the latter as " m e n t a l l y i l l " . B u t F o u c a u l t claims that in the a s y l u m the rule is n o t really so m u c h b y m e d i c a l as b y

moral

authority. D o c t o r s h a v e a u t h o r i t y n o t b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e the k n o w ledge to c u r e (this is h a p h a z a r d at best) b u t b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t the m o r a l d e m a n d s o f society. T h i s is e v i d e n t t o d a y in p s y c h i a t r i c p r a c t i c e s s u c h as p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . T h e p r a c t i c e is a c c o m p a n i e d b y the t r a p p i n g s o f m e d i c a l science, b u t the k e y to t h e r a p y r e m a i n s the p e r s o n a l m o r a l a u t h o r i t y o f the therapist, w h o serves as an instrum e n t o f social v a l u e s . W e r e a d i l y see that for F o u c a u l t the i d e n t i h c a t i o n o f m a d n e s s as m e n t a l illness w a s n o t an objective scientihc discovery. R a t h e r , it w a s i n t r o d u c e d as a m e a n s o f l e g i t i m a t i n g the a u t h o r i t y o f p h y s i c i a n s in the a s y l u m

once

the i d e a

o f a distinctively

moral therapy

was

a b a n d o n e d . M o r e fully, the fact that p h y s i c i a n s c a m e to be in c h a r g e o f a s y l u m s initially h a d little to d o w i t h their m e d i c a l expertise. T h e m o r a l t r e a t m e n t r e c o m m e n d e d b y T u k e a n d P i n e l w a s n o t essentially m e d i c a l a n d c o u l d be c a r r i e d out b y a n y p e r s o n w i t h m o r a l

1 3

Madness and Civilization, 278, 269.

Foucault

267

authority. H o w e v e r , as the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y d e v e l o p e d , m e d i c i n e b e c a m e d o m i n a t e d b y the ideal o f o b j e c t i v e , value-free k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h left n o r o o m for v a l u e - l a d e n m o r a l t h e r a p i e s . T h e i d e a o f a distinctively m e n t a l sort o f illness w a s i n t r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y to justify the c o n t i n u i n g a u t h o r i t y o f d o c t o r s o v e r the m a d , n o t b e c a u s e o f its scientific truth o r c u r a t i v e success. In the c o n c l u s i o n o f Folie et déraison, F o u c a u l t turns f r o m a historical analysis o f h o w different p e r i o d s h a v e c o n c e i v e d m a d n e s s to a n effort to evoke the v i e w p o i n t o f the m a d t h e m s e l v e s . H e r e h e sees art (literature a n d painting) as p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t . T h e i d e a is n o t that m a d n e s s expresses itself in art (rather, " m a d n e s s is p r e c i s e l y the a b s e n c e o f the w o r k o f a r t " ) . best art h a s b e e n p r o d u c e d

B u t F o u c a u l t thinks that s o m e o f the

1 4

b y artists w h o , h a v i n g

experienced

m a d n e s s , w e r e t r y i n g to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h it in the face o f society's o p p o s i n g v i o l e n c e . H i s suggestion is that there is a d e e p truth a b o u t h u m a n reality that w e reject in r e j e c t i n g m a d n e s s a n d that art c a n help lead

us b a c k to this truth.

This

romantic

i d e a lingers in

Foucault's t h o u g h t for a surprisingly l o n g time - e v e n into L'archéologie du savoir. H o w e v e r , it r e m a i n s a s e p a r a b l e e l e m e n t o n w h i c h his historical analyses d o n o t essentially d e p e n d (although it does h a v e a deleterious effect o n his prose style, w h i c h suffers f r o m p u r p l e efforts to e v o k e these m y s t e r i o u s depths).

ORDER

L i k e F o u c a u l t ' s o t h e r b o o k s , Les mots et les choses (1966) tries to u n d e r s t a n d a c o n t e m p o r a r y cognitive enterprise t h r o u g h its historical

antecedents,

unnecessary

the ultimate

constraints

goal

associated

h o w e v e r , the topic is o f i m m e n s e

being with

our liberation the

enterprise.

from Here,

scope: the entire b o d y o f the

m o d e r n h u m a n sciences ("the sciences o f m a n " ) . F o u c a u l t ' s specific c l a i m is that the h u m a n sciences, as t h e y o r i g i n a t e d at the t u r n o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, are b a s e d o n a distinctive c o n c e p t w h i c h h e calls the c o n c e p t o f m a n ; a n d that this c o n c e p t , far f r o m b e i n g the inevitable essence o f h u m a n i t y , is a lately e m e r g i n g , entirely c o n tingent,

and not even

clearly

coherent

n o t i o n . It is, m o r e o v e r ,

F o u c a u l t says hopefully, o n e that m a y w e l l b e v a n i s h i n g . Les mots et les choses covers r o u g h l y the s a m e c h r o n o l o g i c a l p e r i o d s 1 4

Madness and Civilization, 287.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

268

as Folie et déraison: the R e n a i s s a n c e , the C l a s s i c a l A g e , a n d the m o d e r n a g e . For e a c h p e r i o d , F o u c a u l t sketches the g e n e r a l epist e m i c structure (the episteme) u n d e r l y i n g its t h o u g h t a n d t h e n shows h o w the disciplines that are the c o u n t e r p a r t s

o f today's

human

sciences c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f this basic epistemic structure. This, he maintains,

shows that these

earlier

disciplines are n o t

h a l t i n g a n t i c i p a t i o n s o f the m o d e r n h u m a n sciences b u t a u t o n o m o u s alternative w a y s o f c o n s t r u i n g h u m a n reality. F r o m this h e will a r g u e for the c o n t i n g e n c y a n d r e p l a c e a b i l i t y o f the h u m a n sciences. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , Les mots et les choses is the full fruition o f t h e a r c h a e o l o g i c a l m e t h o d t o w a r d w h i c h F o u c a u l t w a s g r o p i n g in Folie et déraison (and also Naissance de la clinique, his 1963 study o f m o d e r n clinical m e d i c i n e ) . that

reveals

1 5

A r c h a e o l o g y e m e r g e s as a m e t h o d o f analysis

the intellectual

structures

that

underlie

and make

possible the entire r a n g e o f diverse ( a n d often conflicting) c o n c e p t s , m e t h o d s , a n d theories c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the t h o u g h t o f a g i v e n p e r i o d . C o n c e p t s , m e t h o d s , a n d theories b e l o n g to the c o n s c i o u s life o f i n d i v i d u a l subjects. B y r e a d i n g texts to discover n o t the intentions o f their

authors

but the deep

structure

Foucault's a r c h a e o l o g y g o e s b e n e a t h epistemic viduals'

"unconscious" knowledge.

As

that

defines

Foucault

o f the l a n g u a g e

itself,

c o n s c i o u s life to r e v e a l t h e and makes

explains

in

possible his

indi-

subsequent

m e t h o d o l o g i c a l treatise, L'archéologie du savoir, a r c h a e o l o g y is similar to logic

and grammar

in that it discovers rules g o v e r n i n g o u r

discursive b e h a v i o r o f w h i c h w e m a y w e l l n o t b e a w a r e . G r a m m a r f o r m u l a t e s the rules defining t h e d o m a i n o f sheer

meaningfulness

a n d logic the rules o f sheer consistency. B u t it is o b v i o u s that there are m a n y g r a m m a t i c a l l y a n d l o g i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e statements that are n e v e r u t t e r e d in a g i v e n

domain

o f discourse. W e m a y b e

inclined to attribute this simply to the fact that n o individuals h a p p e n to w a n t to m a k e these statements. B u t F o u c a u l t m a i n t a i n s that, in a d d i t i o n to the rules o f g r a m m a r

a n d logic, there a r e

further

o f permissible

u n d e r l y i n g rules l i m i t i n g the r a n g e

state-

m e n t s . (For e x a m p l e , the rules o f classical discourse a b o u t m a d n e s s did n o t p e r m i t t h e statement: " M a d n e s s is simply a disease o f t h e m i n d . " ) F o u c a u l t ' s a r c h a e o l o g y , the a r c h a e o l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e , is the historical m e t h o d that u n c o v e r s such rules.

1 5

For fuller discussions of Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason.

"archaeological"

works,

see m y Michel

Foucault's

Foucault

269

Foucault's p r o j e c t is to sketch the epistemes o f v a r i o u s p e r i o d s o f intellectual history. H i s use o f this t e r m often suggests that he is t h i n k i n g globally, c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the

fundamental

c a t e g o r i e s o f a n y a n d all t h i n k i n g in a g i v e n age. C e r t a i n l y m o s t r e a d e r s h a v e t a k e n h i m to b e d o i n g this (and w i t h g o o d basis),

and

criticisms

by

historians

have

frequently

textual

insisted

on

c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s to his g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . F o u c a u l t , h o w e v e r , explicitly d e n i e d a n y g l o b a l intent, a n d the logic o f his p r o j e c t r e q u i r e s an a c c u r a t e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f o n l y the m o d e r n h u m a n sciences a n d their a n t e c e d e n t s . W e should a d m i t , against F o u c a u l t , that there are grand

speculations

about

the

general

structure

of

Renaissance,

C l a s s i c a l , a n d m o d e r n t h o u g h t in Les mots et les choses, b u t also realize that such speculations are n o t essential to the a r g u m e n t o f the b o o k . Foucault's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f the epistemes o f the R e n a i s s a n c e , the C l a s s i c a l A g e , a n d the m o d e r n age are f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of, hrst, an e p i s t e m e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l m a n n e r o f o r d e r i n g the objects o f t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e (its " o r d e r o f t h i n g s " ) ; s e c o n d , the c o n 1 6

s e q u e n c e s o f this o r d e r i n g for the n a t u r e o f signs (especially linguistic signs); a n d third, the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the episteme's v i e w o f o r d e r a n d o f signs for its c o n c e p t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l w a y in w h i c h things are r e l a t e d for R e n a i s s a n c e t h o u g h t is resemblance. T h e basic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a n y t w o objects will n o t d e p e n d o n (as will be the case for later periods) the essential p r o p e r t i e s that they share or fail to share or o n the c a u s a l functions they d o or do n o t h a v e in c o m m o n . T h e relation is r a t h e r d u e to the similarities (e.g., analogies) in virtue o f w h i c h t h e y r e s e m b l e another.

For

example,

Renaissance

thought

regarded

the

one plant

a c o n i t e a n d the h u m a n eye as closely r e l a t e d b e c a u s e the seeds o f the p l a n t l o o k v e r y m u c h like little eyes. L i k e w i s e , there is an i m p o r t a n t connection

between

the h u m a n

head

a n d the p l a n e t a r y

system

b e c a u s e the n u m b e r o f orihces in the h e a d (seven) is e q u a l to the n u m b e r o f planets. R e s e m b l a n c e is also the relation b e t w e e n signs a n d the things t h e y signify. W o r d s , for e x a m p l e , are n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f their referents b u t r a t h e r h a v e a

1 6

fundamental

T h i s title for the English translation o f Les mots et les choses apparently h a d Foucault's sanction. A c c o r d i n g to the "Publisher's N o t e " to the translation, a n e w title was sought because there were two other English books entitled Words and Things, a n d " t h e publisher . . . agreed with the author on the alternative title The Order of Things, w h i c h was, in fact, M . Foucault's original p r e f e r e n c e " (The Order of Things, viii).

270

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

similarity to t h e m , t h o u g h to see the r e s e m b l a n c e fully w e m a y h a v e to trace a w o r d ' s roots b a c k to the p r i m a l l a n g u a g e b e f o r e B a b e l . T h e C l a s s i c a l A g e r e p l a c e d the v a g u e a n d a m o r p h o u s

Renais-

sance n o t i o n o f r e s e m b l a n c e w i t h the m u c h m o r e p r e c i s e notions of identity (sameness) a n d difference. T h e

essential relations

among

things are d e t e r m i n e d n o t b y the v a r y i n g d e g r e e s to w h i c h t h e y are similar to one a n o t h e r b u t b y the precise p r o p e r t i e s that they do or do n o t h a v e in c o m m o n . T h u s , D e s c a r t e s will m a i n t a i n that w e must p e n e t r a t e b e y o n d the r e s e m b l a n c e s e v i d e n t to the senses a n d r e a c h a precise (clear a n d distinct) intellectual analysis o f the simple natures that d e h n e things in their true reality. F o u c a u l t e m p h a s i z e s , h o w e v e r , c o n t r a r y to a c o m m o n v i e w a m o n g historians, that C l a s s i c a l o r d e r does n o t necessarily m e a n t h i n k i n g o f n a t u r e in q u a n t i t a t i v e m a t h e m a t i c a l t e r m s . P u r e l y qualitative p r o p e r t i e s c a n be the basis o f strict identities a n d differences. T h e C l a s s i c a l A g e w a s n o t m e r e l y the age of mathematicized mechanisms. T h e C l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f signs a n d l a n g u a g e likewise a b a n d o n s the v a g u e n e s s o f r e s e m b l a n c e in favor o f the m o r e e x a c t n o t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A sign is n o w n o t j u s t a n o t h e r t h i n g in the w o r l d , related to its referent in the w a y all things are r e l a t e d (although n o w b y identity a n d difference). S i n c e a sign m u s t e x a c t l y r e p r e s e n t a thing, it w o u l d , if it w e r e p a r t o f the w o r l d , simply be the t h i n g itself. T h e r e f o r e , C l a s s i c a l signs m u s t be p l a c e d in an entirely

different

o r d e r f r o m that o f reality. T h i s , o f c o u r s e , is the r e a l m o f ideas, so c e n t r a l in s e v e n t e e n t h - a n d e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

philosophy.

Idea-

signs h a v e n o c o n t e n t o f their o w n — n o o n t o l o g i c a l " t h i c k n e s s " — b u t are entirely t r a n s p a r e n t expressions o f w h a t t h e y

represent.

M o r e o v e r (and v e r y i m p o r t a n t l y ) , for the C l a s s i c a l A g e t h i n k i n g is entirely i d e n t i h e d w i t h representing. T h o u g h t is o f its v e r y n a t u r e representative. T h i s d o e s n o t , o f c o u r s e , m e a n that e v e r y i d e a is true; w h a t it represents m a y n o t in fact exist. B u t there is n o q u e s t i o n i n g — as there w a s later for K a n t a n d the m o d e r n age — o f h o w or w h e t h e r a g i v e n i d e a is able to r e p r e s e n t its (real or unreal) object. G i v e n this v i e w o f o r d e r a n d signs, C l a s s i c a l k n o w l e d g e will be a m a t t e r o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a system o f signs that a c c u r a t e l y represents the identities a n d differences that exist a m o n g a g i v e n d o m a i n o f objects. S u c h systems o f k n o w l e d g e

are f o r m u l a t e d in the

C l a s s i c a l tables, such as those o f g e n e r a a n d species in

great

natural

history. In contrast to R e n a i s s a n c e k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h w a s in p r i n ciple i n c o m p l e t e (since there is n o e n d to the c h a i n o f r e s e m b l a n c e s ) ,

Foucault

271

C l a s s i c a l k n o w l e d g e c o u l d aspire to the ideal o f c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e . S u c h k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be f o r m u l a b l e in an e x h a u s t i v e set o f tables that d i s p l a y e d p r e c i s e l y h o w e a c h t h i n g differed f r o m e v e r y other thing. T h e C l a s s i c a l o r d e r i n g o f things is b a s e d on the s a m e n e s s a n d difference o f p r o p e r t i e s ; it is essentially ahistorical a n d c o n t i n u o u s , e a c h t h i n g filling o n e slot in the c h a i n o f b e i n g defined b y all possible combinations

of presence

and

absence

o f basic

properties.

By

contrast, m o d e r n o r d e r derives f r o m similarities a n d differences in function. A n entity is u n d e r s t o o d a n d r e l a t e d to o t h e r things in v i r t u e o f the role it p l a y s n o t in an ideal table o f possibilities b u t in a real, historically d e v e l o p i n g e n v i r o n m e n t . A s such, m o d e r n o r d e r is essentially historical a n d d i s c o n t i n u o u s . T h e

(functional) discontinuity

derives f r o m the impossibility o f defining f u n c t i o n in t e r m s o f the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a set o f basic p r o p e r t i e s ; the s a m e f u n c t i o n c a n b e a c h i e v e d b y quite different c o m b i n a t i o n s o f p r o p e r t i e s , as in the case o f lungs a n d gills. W i t h r e g a r d to signs a n d l a n g u a g e , the k e y feature o f the m o d e r n episteme is w h a t F o u c a u l t calls " t h e decline o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " . T h i s does

not

mean

that

representation

is n o

longer

an

important

category. B u t it d o e s m e a n that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is n o l o n g e r r e g a r d e d as i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h o u g h t itself; t h o u g h t is n o l o n g e r seen as b y its very nature representative.

T h i s is b e c a u s e

representation

is an

analytic p r o c e d u r e in w h i c h simple m e n t a l units (ideas) are c o m b i n e d in a w a y that e x a c t l y m a t c h e s the c o m b i n a t i o n o f p r o p e r t i e s in the

thing

being

analyzed

(and

hence

represented).

Within

the

m o d e r n e p i s t e m e , w e c a n still u n d e r t a k e such analyses, b u t there is n o g u a r a n t e e that t h e y will a d e q u a t e l y c a t c h the c o n c r e t e reality o f the t h i n g a n a l y z e d , since this reality is e x p r e s s e d in the

thing's

historical f u n c t i o n , n o t its ahistorical p r o p e r t i e s . A n a l y s i s c a n discover

only

the

ahistorical

(logically

or

conceptually

necessary)

features, n o t those that are historical a n d c o n t i n g e n t . T h i s decline o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n has, a c c o r d i n g to F o u c a u l t , resulted in the f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f m o d e r n k n o w l e d g e . T h i s is a p p a r e n t first in the division w e h a v e j u s t b e e n discussing b e t w e e n analytic k n o w l e d g e o f l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l truths a n d synthetic k n o w l e d g e c o n t i n g e n t facts. T h i s division l e a d s , in t u r n , to the

of

distinction

b e t w e e n f o r m a l (a priori) a n d e m p i r i c a l (a posteriori) disciplines. T h e r e is, further, a division b e t w e e n the f o r m a l a n d the e m p i r i c a l disciplines, on the o n e h a n d , a n d philosophy, o n the other. T h i s

272

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

arises b e c a u s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n m a i n t a i n s a n i m p o r t a n t role e v e n in the m o d e r n e m p i r i c a l sciences. E v e n t h o u g h t h o u g h t does n o t b y its v e r y n a t u r e r e p r e s e n t the w o r l d , it o b v i o u s l y d o e s r e p r e s e n t it (and a c c u r a t e l y so) in m a n y cases. T h i s poses the q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h o u g h t is able to r e p r e s e n t reality a n d o f w h a t limits there m i g h t b e to this ability. A n s w e r i n g this q u e s t i o n is precisely the (critical) task o f p h i l o s o p h y as it h a s b e e n u n d e r s t o o d f r o m K a n t o n . A t the c e n t e r o f the m o d e r n e p i s t e m e is the c o n c e p t o f m a n . B y " m a n " F o u c a u l t o b v i o u s l y does n o t m e a n simply h u m a n b e i n g s as m e m b e r s o f a b i o l o g i c a l a n d social species. R a t h e r , " m a n " refers to certain aspects o f the h u m a n c a p a c i t y for f o r m i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f the w o r l d . F o u c a u l t m a i n t a i n s that the c o n c e p t o f m a n is distinctive o f the m o d e r n a g e , that " m a n " did n o t exist i n , for e x a m p l e , the C l a s s i c a l A g e . T h i s is n o t to say that p e o p l e in the C l a s s i c a l A g e w e r e n o t c a p a b l e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g the w o r l d o r that t h e y w e r e n o t a w a r e o f t h e m s e l v e s as h a v i n g this capacity. F o u c a u l t ' s p o i n t is r a t h e r that o n l y in the m o d e r n

a g e h a s this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l

capacity

b e c o m e available as a n explicit o b j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e . I n C l a s s i c a l t e r m s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o u l d b e a n object o f k n o w l e d g e only t h r o u g h an e x p r e s s i o n o f its sameness a n d difference w i t h r e s p e c t to o t h e r f o r m s o f t h o u g h t . It w o u l d , in o t h e r w o r d s , h a v e to b e p r e s e n t e d as one species w i t h i n the g e n u s o f t h o u g h t . B u t this w a s n o t possible b e c a u s e , for the C l a s s i c a l A g e , t h o u g h t w a s identical w i t h r e p r e s e n tation.

In o t h e r

words,

representation

was too fundamental

a

C l a s s i c a l c a t e g o r y to possess the status o f a n o r d i n a r y object o f k n o w l e d g e . For the s a m e r e a s o n , m a n — d e h n e d b y the c a p a c i t y for representation

-

could

not be an object

of knowledge.

O r in

Foucault's m e l o d r a m a t i c p h r a s e , " M a n did n o t e x i s t " (Les mots et les choses [iWC], 319/308). A f t e r K a n t , h o w e v e r , the q u e s t i o n o f m a n ' s status b e c o m e s

unavoidable:

the fact that t h o u g h t is n o l o n g e r

c o n c e i v e d as i n e v i t a b l y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l allows a n d requires us to ask h o w h u m a n t h o u g h t (man) is a b l e to r e p r e s e n t reality. T h e q u e s t i o n o f " m a n " is p a r t i c u l a r l y difficult b e c a u s e m a n is understood

as s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

the source

of representations

(a

subject) a n d a n object o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . B e c a u s e o f this, the question o f h o w r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is possible b e c o m e s the q u e s t i o n o f h o w there c a n b e a b e i n g that is b o t h the ultimate subject o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d a r e p r e s e n t e d object. D e v e l o p i n g a c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n o f m a n in this sense h a s b e e n the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o j e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h i n the m o d e r n e p i s t e m e (i.e., p h i l o s o p h y since K a n t ) .

Foucault

273

F o u c a u l t discusses this p r o j e c t in w h a t is p e r h a p s the m o s t difficult section

o f Les mots et les choses, " M a n a n d H i s D o u b l e s " .

He

distinguishes three different m o d e r n w a y s o f f o r m u l a t i n g the distinction o f m a n as subject a n d m a n as object. First, there is the division, especially a s s o c i a t e d w i t h K a n t , b e t w e e n a transcendental subject that establishes the c o n d i t i o n s o f the possibility o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d a n empirical object o f scientific k n o w l e d g e . S e c o n d , there is a division, especially associated w i t h H u s s e r l , b e t w e e n the t h i n k i n g cogito a n d the unthought e n c o u n t e r e d as the o b j e c t a n d limit o f t h o u g h t . T h i r d , there is the division, especially associated w i t h H e i d e g g e r , b e t w e e n a r e c a p t u r i n g o f the historical m e a n i n g o f h u m a n existence t h r o u g h a return to its origin a n d the p e r p e t u a l retreat o f this origin into a n inaccessible past. T h e s e three divisions arise f r o m the c o n s t r u a l o f h u m a n objectivity in t e r m s of, respectively, science, the lifeworld, a n d history. O f p a r t i c u l a r interest f r o m o u r v i e w p o i n t is Foucault's assessment o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a p a t h to r e s o l v i n g the d u a l status o f m a n . H e r e a first possibility is the H u s s e r l i a n p r o j e c t (e.g., i n the Cartesian Meditations) o f d e r i v i n g all objective m e a n i n g f r o m the constituting activity o f the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o . I f this p r o j e c t c o u l d actually b e c a r r i e d o u t , it w o u l d , F o u c a u l t a c k n o w l e d g e s , resolve the p r o b l e m o f m a n , since m a n as o b j e c t w o u l d b e r e d u c e d to m a n as constituting subject. H o w e v e r , F o u c a u l t a g r e e s w i t h his teacher, M e r l e a u - P o n t y that t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subjectivity is, t h r o u g h the body, itself in the w o r l d o f objects, so that the s e p a r a t i o n o f subject a n d o b j e c t r e q u i r e d for H u s s e r l i a n r e d u c t i o n a n d constitution is impossible. T h i s m i g h t suggest that F o u c a u l t w o u l d b e o p e n to M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s v e r s i o n o f existential

phenomenology,

which

gives

primacy

to

embodied

consciousness ( " m a n - i n - f h e - w o r l d " ) . H e d o e s , in fact, a p p l a u d existential 332/321)

phenomenology's for its o p p o s i t i o n

"analysis

of actual

to r e d u c t i o n s

experience"

(MC,

o f m a n to either the

e m p i r i c a l o r the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m p o n e n t . It h a s , h e a g r e e s , tried to p r o v i d e

" a discourse w h o s e

tension w o u l d k e e p separate the

e m p i r i c a l a n d the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , w h i l e b e i n g d i r e c t e d at b o t h " (MC, 331/320). B u t , F o u c a u l t m a i n t a i n s , existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' s analysis o f a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e

c a n n o t in the e n d e s c a p e its o w n

r e d u c t i o n o f the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l to the e m p i r i c a l . This analysis seeks to articulate the possible objectivity of a knowledge of nature upon the original experience of which the body provides an outline; and to articulate the possible objectivity of a culture upon the semantic

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

274

density which is both hidden and revealed in actual experience [l'expérience vécu]. It is doing no more, then, than fulfilling with greater care the hasty demands laid down when the attempt was made [e.g., by Comte and Marx] to make the empirical, in man, stand for the transcendental. (MC, 332/321) T h i s is n o t a v e r y satisfactory critique, since F o u c a u l t gives n o r e a s o n for his c l a i m that the w o r l d o f lived e x p e r i e n c e is simply the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d . H e r e he seems to b e i g n o r i n g his o w n r e c o g n i t i o n , b e f o r e the s t a t e m e n t o f this criticism, o f the i r r e d u c i b l e a m b i g u i t y o f lived e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h he describes as " a specihc yet a m b i g u o u s stratum, concrete

e n o u g h for it to b e possible to a p p l y to it a

m e t i c u l o u s a n d descriptive l a n g u a g e , yet sufficiently r e m o v e d f r o m the positivity o f things for it to b e possible, f r o m that starting-point, to e s c a p e f r o m that n a ï v e t é , to contest it a n d seek f o u n d a t i o n s for i t " (MC, 332/321). W h y , w e w o n d e r , if lived e x p e r i e n c e in fact has this " m i x e d " n a t u r e , d o e s F o u c a u l t insist that p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description is a l w a y s " e m p i r i c a l despite i t s e l f " (MC, 337/326)? P e r h a p s his p o i n t is j u s t that existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y p r o v i d e s no

satisfactory

account

of how

lived

experience

can

have

the

a m b i g u o u s status its descriptions r e v e a l . B u t w h a t , t h e n , are the g r o u n d s for F o u c a u l t ' s a p p a r e n t insistence that the viability o f a c o n c e p t r e q u i r e s an a d e q u a t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l (or o t h e r

theoretical)

e x p l i c a t i o n o f it? S u p p o s e w e g r a n t h i m that there are n o c o h e r e n t , n o n - r e d u c t i v e theories o f j u s t h o w h u m a n consciousness c a n b e b o t h a c o n s t i t u t i n g subject a n d a constituted object. It still d o e s n o t follow that there is n o t a g e n u i n e , i r r e d u c i b l e p h e n o m e n o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to this duality. In a n y case, w e

are n o w

in a position

to discuss

Foucault's

assessment o f the h u m a n sciences. A s he uses the t e r m ,

"human

s c i e n c e s " refers to disciplines that are built a r o u n d the

modern

c o n c e p t o f m a n . T h e s e he distinguishes f r o m the m o d e r n e m p i r i c a l sciences that deal w i t h h u m a n b e i n g s — biology, e c o n o m i c s , philology,

concerned

r e s p e c t i v e l y w i t h life, labor, a n d

and

language.

W h e r e a s the e m p i r i c a l sciences treat h u m a n b e i n g s as p a r t o f n a t u r e (and therefore simply as objects o f k n o w l e d g e ) , the h u m a n sciences (sciences o f m a n ) also treat h u m a n s as subjects, c a p a b l e o f r e p r e senting the w o r l d modern

human

and

sciences

themselves. are

So understood,

psychology,

sociology,

the and

primary literary

analysis. ( H o w e v e r , F o u c a u l t links e a c h h u m a n science to a corres p o n d i n g e m p i r i c a l science b y a r g u i n g that biology, e c o n o m i c s , a n d philology

each

provide

models

for,

respectively,

psychology,

Foucault

275

sociology, a n d literary analysis.) F o u c a u l t also gives history a distinctive p l a c e as a h u m a n science that p r o v i d e s a t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n to disciplines that in t h e m s e l v e s treat m a n only in t e r m s o f a set of " s y n c h r o n o u s p a t t e r n i n g s " (MC, 382/370). A l t h o u g h it m i g h t s e e m that the failure o f p h i l o s o p h y to f o r m u l a t e an

adequate

account

of man

undermines

the

human

sciences,

F o u c a u l t w o u l d n o t a g r e e w i t h this i n f e r e n c e . T h i s is b e c a u s e , in his view, the h u m a n sciences t h e m s e l v e s h a v e b e e n m o r e successful t h a n p h i l o s o p h y in d e v e l o p i n g a c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t o f m a n . T h e y h a v e , in particular, p o s i t e d u n c o n s c i o u s functions, conflicts, a n d

meanings

that e x p l a i n h o w m a n is a b l e to r e p r e s e n t the f u n d a m e n t a l realities o f his w o r l d . (Presumably, p h i l o s o p h y is n o t able to d o this b e c a u s e it treats

the

problem

of

representation

entirely

on

the

level

of

consciousness.) H o w e v e r , this i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the u n c o n s c i o u s itself e v e n t u a l l y u n d e r m i n e s the c o n c e p t o f m a n . T h e

h u m a n sciences posit the

u n c o n s c i o u s , b u t they do n o t h a v e the r e s o u r c e s to give a positive a c c o u n t o f its n a t u r e a n d capacities. For this, w e n e e d to d e v e l o p m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l a c c o u n t s that p r o v i d e c o n d i t i o n s o f possibility for m a n h i m s e l f — a n d , particularly, for his p o w e r s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Such

accounts

are a v a i l a b l e in the n e w

Lacan's psychoanalysis provides

structuralist

the c o n d i t i o n s

disciplines:

o f possibility

for

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s on the level o f i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y , L e v i - S t r a u s s ' s e t h n o l o g y o n the level o f society. F o u c a u l t also anticipates a special, n o t - y e t - r e a l i z e d v e r s i o n o f linguistics that w o u l d unite the levels o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d e t h n o l o g y into a single a c c o u n t o f the u n i t y o f individuals a n d their cultures. T h e p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r , is that these n e w disciplines, w h i c h F o u c a u l t calls countersciences, are b a s e d

on

systems o f structures that are n o t t h e m s e l v e s constituted b y h u m a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b u t r a t h e r u n d e r l i e a n d c o n s t r a i n these r e p r e s e n t a tions. In this f u n d a m e n t a l intellectual sense, these c o u n t e r s c i e n c e s entail the " d e a t h o f m a n " ; that is, the e l i m i n a t i o n o f m a n as a basic c a t e g o r y for u n d e r s t a n d i n g ourselves. N o n e o f this m e a n s that F o u c a u l t thinks that there is n o truth available f r o m the h u m a n sciences. It is j u s t that w h a t e v e r

truth

there m a y b e c o n c e r n s a c o n t e n t that c a n (and u l t i m a t e l y must) b e f o r m u l a t e d w i t h o u t the use o f the c a t e g o r y o f m a n . (Here F o u c a u l t m i g h t invoke B a c h e l a r d ' s v i e w that p e r m a n e n t scientific truths c a n be f o r m u l a t e d in f r a m e w o r k s that are later discredited.) also

admits

that he

cannot

be

sure

that

it is the

Foucault

structuralist

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

276

c o u n t e r s c i e n c e s that will r e p l a c e the sciences o f m a n or e v e n that the cultural e l i m i n a t i o n o f m a n will in fact b e c a r r i e d o u t . H i s c o n c l u d i n g c o m m e n t is m e r e l y that " i f s o m e e v e n t o f w h i c h w e c a n at the m o m e n t d o n o m o r e t h a n sense the p o s s i b i l i t y " s h o u l d in fact f u n d a m e n t a l l y alter o u r episteme, " t h e n o n e c a n c e r t a i n l y w a g e r that m a n w o u l d b e e r a s e d , like a face d r a w n in sand at the e d g e o f the s e a " (MC, 398/387). B u t w h a t h e does c l a i m to h a v e established is the historical c o n t i n g e n c y o f the m o d e r n e p i s t e m e a n d its p e c u l i a r c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n reality, m a n . Although modern

Les mots et les choses w a s d i r e c t e d against the entire

episteme

from

Kant

o n , its i m m e d i a t e

target

w a s the

o r t h o d o x y o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a l r e a d y u n d e r strong attack f r o m L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s structural a n t h r o p o l o g y . Sartre h i m s e l f l a u n c h e d a c o u n t e r a t t a c k in a n i n t e r v i e w that a p p e a r e d in O c t o b e r 1966, right after the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Les mots et les choses (which sold 8000 c o p i e s in six w e e k s after p u b l i c a t i o n ) .

17

H e a r g u e d that F o u c a u l t ' s

method

should n o t b e c o m p a r e d to a r c h a e o l o g y b u t to g e o l o g y (recall that L é v i - S t r a u s s h a d f o u n d his initial inspiration in g e o l o g y ) . A r c h a e ology, Sartre n o t e d , tries to r e c o n s t r u c t a structure ( " s t y l e " is Sartre's term) that h a s the a p p e a r a n c e o f a " n a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n " . B u t in fact the ruins to b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d are " t h e result o f a praxis"; t h e y w e r e " c o n c e i v e d a n d built b y h u m a n b e i n g s " . F o u c a u l t , h o w e v e r , m e r e l y presents us w i t h a series o f " l a y e r s " , e a c h defining " t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f possibility o f a certain t y p e o f t h o u g h t that t r i u m p h e d d u r i n g a certain

period".

H e h a s n o interest

in " h o w e a c h

thought

is

c o n s t r u c t e d o n the basis o f these c o n d i t i o n s n o r h o w h u m a n s pass from

one thought

to a n o t h e r " .

T o ask these

questions -

and,

a c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , t h e y a r e the really interesting ones — F o u c a u l t w o u l d h a v e to deal w i t h p r a x i s a n d h e n c e w i t h history, w h i c h is " p r e c i s e l y w h a t h e refuses to d o " . Sartre a d m i t s that there is a sense in

which

Foucault's

perspective

is historical:

"he

distinguishes

e p o c h s , a b e f o r e a n d a n a f t e r " ("Jean-Paul Sartre r é p o n d " [ S R ] , 87). B u t h e presents m e r e l y i n s t a n t a n e o u s " s t i l l s " o f the past, w i t h n o sense o f the m o v e m e n t o f history (which, in Sartre's view, is p r o v i d e d b y h u m a n subjectivity). Sartre g o e s o n to say that h e h a s n o t h i n g against this a n d o t h e r 1 7

Sartre w a s responding n o t only to Les mots et les choses b u t also to an interview Foucault h a d given in c o n n e c t i o n with its publication in w h i c h he dismissed Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique as " T h e magnificent a n d pathetic effort o f a m a n o f the nineteenth century to think the twentieth c e n t u r y " ( " L ' h o m m e est-il m o r t ? " ) .

Foucault

277

structuralist a p p r o a c h e s , p r o v i d e d " s t r u c t u r a l i s m r e m a i n s a w a r e o f the limits o f its m e t h o d " (SR., 88). I n this r e g a r d , h e distinguishes t w o levels o f analysis o f a n y h u m a n p h e n o m e n o n , t a k i n g as a n e x a m p l e the v e r y p h e n o m e n o n o f l a n g u a g e o n w h i c h F o u c a u l t a n d his c o h o r t p l a c e

such e m p h a s i s . O n o n e level, l a n g u a g e

is " a n

a u t o n o m o u s system, reflecting a social unification . . . T h e linguist takes this totality o f relations as a n o b j e c t o f study a n d is right to d o so since it is a l r e a d y constituted. T h i s is the m o m e n t o f s t r u c t u r e " (SR, 89). B u t , Sartre says, it is n o n e t h e l e s s true that this structure itself h a s b e e n

"worked

b y m a n a n d b e a r s the trace

of m a n " .

L a n g u a g e exists o n l y b e c a u s e it h a s b e e n spoken b y m e n . T h e r e f o r e , a full u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e r e q u i r e s a s e c o n d level o f analysis, one that r e i n t r o d u c e s p r a x i s to s h o w h o w the structures o f l a n g u a g e have been made. Sartre a g r e e s that " m a n is . . . the p r o d u c t o f s t r u c t u r e " . H e " r e c e i v e s structures - a n d in that sense w e c a n say that t h e y m a k e him".

B u t Sartre

also

maintains

that m a n " r e c e i v e s

structures

insofar as h e is h i m s e l f e n g a g e d in h i s t o r y " a n d e n g a g e d in such a w a y that h e m u s t destroy these structures a n d " c o n s t i t u t e n e w ones that, in t u r n , serve as c o n d i t i o n s " for o t h e r m e n ( S R , 91). It is h a r d to see h o w F o u c a u l t c o u l d consistently disagree w i t h Sartre's claims h e r e . H i s entire a r c h a e o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t , after all, is d i r e c t e d u l t i m a t e l y t o w a r d h u m a n l i b e r a t i o n , w h i c h surely requires j u s t the sort o f p r a x i s in the face o f structures that Sartre e m p h a s i z e s . M o r e o v e r , the critique d e v e l o p e d in Les mots et les choses is n o t d i r e c t e d against the n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s as free a g e n t s b u t against

a particular

philosophical

conception

of human

beings.

Sartre's o n t o l o g y m a y o r m a y n o t b e a n instance o f that c o n c e p t i o n . B u t , as I a r g u e d a b o v e , there is n o basis for F o u c a u l t ' s c l a i m that the e m b o d i e d consciousness o f Sartre's a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions is s u c h a n instance. T h e r e is e v e n less basis for t h i n k i n g that the e t h i c a l a n d political subject, the c o n c e r n o f b o t h Sartre's a n d F o u c a u l t ' s liberationist a c t i v i s m , is r e d u c i b l e to " m a n " . In this f u n d a m e n t a l sense, Sartre is surely right a b o u t the limitations o f F o u c a u l t ' s structuralist history. Finally, it is striking that F o u c a u l t n e v e r c o n n e c t s his critique o f the h u m a n sciences in Les mots et les choses to the issue o f h u m a n l i b e r a t i o n . T h i n k i n g in t e r m s o f " m a n " m a y well b e a c o g n i t i v e limitation,

b u t h o w is it a s i g n i h c a n t

impingement

on

human

f r e e d o m in a n y m o r a l sense? H i s later, " g e n e a l o g i c a l " histories d o

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

278

(as did Folie et déraison) discuss the evils that arise f r o m

making

h u m a n s the objects o f the h u m a n sciences a n d further s h o w h o w o u r o w n self-awareness as subjects c a n b e a tool o f c o n t r o l . B u t e v e n h e r e there is n o i n d i c a t i o n o f h o w such d e v e l o p m e n t s c o u l d b e related to the specifically p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w o f m a n that is the focus

of Les mots et les choses. A s a result, Les mots et les choses, for all its intrinsic interest as intellectual history, r e m a i n s o d d l y m a r g i n a l to Foucault's f u n d a m e n t a l project. T h i s m a r g i n a l i t y c o r r e s p o n d s to the ultimate irrelevancy, n o t e d in c h a p t e r 8, o f structuralism to the collapse o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

DISCIPLINE

W i t h Surveiller et punir, F o u c a u l t ' s w o r k returns to the explicitly ethical m o t i v a t i o n s o f Folie et déraison, b u t n o w w i t h a h r m sense o f h o w to i n c o r p o r a t e c a u s a l a c c o u n t s o f c h a n g e s in k n o w l e d g e systems. H i s particular

focus

is the e m e r g e n c e

o f the m o d e r n

discipline

of

c r i m i n o l o g y a n d other r e l a t e d social scientihc disciplines. W i t h a b o w to N i e t z s c h e , h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s his n e w a p p r o a c h as g e n e a l o g i c a l . T h e g e n e r a l i d e a is h a r d l y original: that shifts in t h e p o w e r structures o f a society p r o d u c e c h a n g e s in epistemic f o r m a t i o n s . W h a t is n e w is his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e o f p o w e r a n d o f the p r e c i s e w a y in w h i c h p o w e r a n d k n o w l e d g e are r e l a t e d . I will here c o m m e n t briefly on t h e latter p o i n t b u t defer the f o r m e r to o u r discussion o f Histoire

de la sexualité. Genealogy

deals

with

the connection

between

nondiscursive

p r a c t i c e s a n d systems o f discourse (bodies o f k n o w l e d g e ) . I n this regard, Foucault's interrelation

central

of knowledge

c l a i m is that there is a n i n e x t r i c a b l e (discourse)

and power

(expressed in

n o n d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s , in particular, t h e c o n t r o l o f bodies). T h i s is w h y a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his g e n e a l o g i c a l

a p p r o a c h requires a n

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his v i e w o f the relation o f k n o w l e d g e a n d p o w e r . N e g a t i v e l y , F o u c a u l t does n o t h a v e in m i n d t h e s t a n d a r d B a c o n i a n idea, w h i c h sees k n o w l e d g e hrst existing as a n a u t o n o m o u s a c h i e v e m e n t w h i c h is t h e n u s e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f a c t i o n (e.g., p u r e science vs. t e c h n o l o g y ) . H e m a i n t a i n s that k n o w l e d g e simply d o e s n o t exist in c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f p o w e r , that the d e p l o y m e n t o f k n o w l e d g e a n d the d e p l o y m e n t o f p o w e r are s i m u l t a n e o u s f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . O n the o t h e r h a n d , F o u c a u l t d o e s n o t g o so far as to identify k n o w l e d g e w i t h p o w e r , to m a k e k n o w l e d g e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a n

Foucault

279

e x p r e s s i o n o f social or political c o n t r o l . A s h e said, " T h e v e r y fact that I p o s e the q u e s t i o n o f their relation p r o v e s c l e a r l y that I d o n o t identify t h e m . "

1 8

H i s positive v i e w is that systems o f k n o w l e d g e ,

a l t h o u g h e x p r e s s i n g objective (and p e r h a p s e v e n universally valid) truth in their o w n right, a r e n o n e t h e l e s s a l w a y s m o r e or less closely tied to the r e g i m e s

o f p o w e r that exist w i t h i n

Conversely,

of power

regimes

necessarily

a given

society.

give rise to b o d i e s o f

k n o w l e d g e a b o u t the objects t h e y c o n t r o l , b u t this k n o w l e d g e m a y — in its objectivity -

g o b e y o n d a n d e v e n u l t i m a t e l y t h r e a t e n the

p r o j e c t o f d o m i n a t i o n f r o m w h i c h it arises. F o u c a u l t p r e t t y clearly intends this i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r as a g e n e r a l thesis, b u t h e d e f e n d s a n d is specifically c o m m i t t e d to it o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t to p a r t i c u l a r m o d e r n disciplines. In Surveiller et punir F o u c a u l t treats k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r w i t h respect to the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the d i s c i p l i n a r y p r a c t i c e s u s e d to c o n t r o l h u m a n b o d i e s in the m o d e r n p e r i o d a n d m o d e r n social scientific disciplines. H i s p r i m a r y e x a m p l e is the p r a c t i c e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t as a w a y o f p u n i s h i n g c r i m i n a l s in its relation to c r i m i n o l o g y a n d r e l a t e d social scientific disciplines. B u t h e discusses i m p r i s o n m e n t in the c o n t e x t o f m o d e r n disciplinary p r a c t i c e s in g e n e r a l (as e m p l o y e d in schools, factories, the military, etc.), a n d he s h o w s h o w the p r i s o n served as a m o d e l a n d c e n t e r o f diffusion for this w h o l e r a n g e o f disciplinary p r a c t i c e s . A s a l w a y s , F o u c a u l t b e g i n s b y c o n t r a s t i n g the m o d e r n a g e w i t h the C l a s s i c a l A g e i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g . H e notes that the m o s t striking a n d essential difference b e t w e e n the t w o p e r i o d s w a s the v i o l e n t a n d f l a m b o y a n t l y p u b l i c n a t u r e o f the p u n i s h m e n t o f c r i m i nals o f the p r e m o d e r n p e r i o d in contrast to the p h y s i c a l l y milder and " l o w profile"

modern punishment

much

of imprisonment.

W h e r e a s s t a n d a r d a c c o u n t s h a v e attributed this difference p r i m a r i l y to a m o r e h u m a n e a n d c o m p a s s i o n a t e m o d e r n attitude (based o n n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas a n d a scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c r i m i n a l ity), F o u c a u l t ' s p o w e r / k n o w l e d g e h y p o t h e s i s suggests that there is s o m e t h i n g else g o i n g o n , a l t h o u g h he a g r e e s h u m a n e n e s s m a y b e a s e c o n d a r y factor. Specifically, h e e x p l o r e s the i d e a that p u n i s h m e n t b e c o m e s m i l d e r n o t simply for the sake o f mildness b u t for the sake o f new, m o r e effective a n d m o r e extensive f o r m s o f c o n t r o l . A s h e puts it, the p o i n t w a s n o t so m u c h to p u n i s h less as to p u n i s h better.

! B

Politics, Philosophy, Culture, 43.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

280

In F o u c a u l t ' s a c c o u n t , m o d e r n discipline is distinctive in three w a y s . First, its o b j e c t o f c o n t r o l is n o t p r i m a r i l y the m i n d (thoughts, feelings, etc.) b u t the b o d y itself. S e c o n d , its scale o f o p e r a t i o n is n o t a g e n e r a l c o n t r o l o f the b o d y as a w h o l e b u t a c o n t r o l in detail e x e r c i s e d o n specihc c o r p o r e a l m e c h a n i s m s . T h i r d , its m o d a l i t y o f c o n t r o l is to focus n o t simply o n the results o f b o d i l y activity (by seeing that, o n e w a y or another, p e o p l e d o w h a t is desired) b u t to m a i n t a i n a c o n s t a n t supervision a n d c o n t r o l o f the processes o f b o d i l y activity. T h e result is a " d o c i l e b o d y " : i.e., o n e that n o t only does w h a t o n e wishes b u t d o e s it as o n e wishes. M o d e r n discipline is, m o r e o v e r , i m p l e m e n t e d t h r o u g h three distinctive t e c h n i q u e s . T h e basic t e c h n i q u e

is hierarchical observation,

careful m o n i t o r i n g b y observers w h o are n o t t h e m s e l v e s o b s e r v e d . S u c h o b s e r v a t i o n lays the g r o u n d w o r k for normalizing judgment: a n assessment o f the d e h c i e n c i e s o f those disciplined that is d i r e c t e d n o t t o w a r d p u n i s h m e n t for the sake o f r e v e n g e , as in t h e p r e m o d e r n a g e , b u t to r e f o r m o f d e v i a n t b e h a v i o r . P r e m o d e r n j u d i c i a l p u n i s h m e n t w a s c o n c e r n e d m e r e l y w i t h w h e t h e r actions w e r e in a c c o r d w i t h a g i v e n law. M o d e r n reformist j u d g m e n t further situates i n d i v i d u a l s in a system o f e v a l u a t i o n that p r o n o u n c e s t h e m n o r m a l o r a b n o r m a l . T h u s , the N o r m a l takes its distinctive p l a c e in m o d e r n society a l o n g side the s t a n d a r d f o r m s

of power

such as L a w a n d T r a d i t i o n .

Indeed, normalization becomes a primary instrument of m o d e r n p o w e r . A n e x a m p l e o f n o r m a l i z i n g j u d g m e n t is the examination, a "normalizing

gaze"

whereby

individuals

are differentiated

and

j u d g e d , for e x a m p l e b y tests in schools, m e d i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n s , j o b evaluations.

Foucault

also

cites

Bentham's

"panopticon"

prison

design as a n ideal m o d e l o f h o w m o d e r n disciplinary p o w e r controls t h r o u g h its n o r m a l i z i n g g a z e . Although enclosed spread welfare

modern

disciplinary p r a c t i c e s o r i g i n a t e d in isolated,

institutions

throughout

such society,

as prisons

a n d asylums, they

to schools, factories,

medical

a g e n c i e s , etc. I n this e x p a n s i o n , these p r a c t i c e s

rapidly clinics, became

positive as w e l l as n e g a t i v e , n o t j u s t p r e v e n t i n g d i s a p p r o v e d b e h a v i o r but increasing production a n d knowledge. D e t a c h e d from particular institutions, the p r a c t i c e s also fell u n d e r the c o n t r o l o f the n a t i o n state a n d e x e r t e d their influence o n society as a w h o l e . T h e g e n e r a l result w a s the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f society f r o m o n e o f v i o l e n t spectacle to o n e o f insidious surveillance. Foucault

concludes

Surveiller et punir w i t h

a discussion

o f the

Foucault

281

c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the e x t e n s i o n o f the p r i s o n m o d e l o f k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r to society as a w h o l e , the d e v e l o p m e n t o f w h a t he calls the c a r c e r a l society or the c a r c e r a l a r c h i p e l a g o . A first result has b e e n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a single c o n t i n u u m o n w h i c h is l o c a t e d e v e r y f o r m o f i m p r o p e r b e h a v i o r , f r o m felonies to m i n o r infractions

of

f a m i l y or school rules. T h i s c o n t i n u u m reflects the fact that in the m o d e r n age all i m p r o p e r b e h a v i o r is r e g a r d e d as o f the s a m e basic n a t u r e : a d e v i a t i o n f r o m the n o r m . A serial m u r d e r e r a n d an u n r u l y s c h o o l c h i l d are b o t h " d e v i a n t s " , a n d the b e h a v i o r o f the one is m e r e l y a r a m i f i c a t i o n or an a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the b e h a v i o r o f the other. G i v e n this c o n t i n u u m o f deviancy, w e n o l o n g e r think o f a special set o f " o u t l a w s " , w h o exist b e y o n d or at the b o r d e r o f society. R a t h e r , the class o f d e v i a n t s (delinquents) exists w i t h i n the b o s o m o f society, w h e r e it is c u l t i v a t e d , m o n i t o r e d , a n d c o n t r o l l e d . W i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the c a r c e r a l a r c h i p e l a g o , the n o t i o n o f l a w in the t r a d i t i o n a l sense o f legislative acts a n d j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a tions o f these acts b e c o m e s s u b o r d i n a t e d to the n e w l a w o f the n o r m . N o r m s are n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y senators or j u d g e s b u t b y psychiatrists, criminologists,

social w o r k e r s ,

and

teachers.

These,

accordingly,

b e c o m e the d e facto authorities in society. T h e i r authority, o f c o u r s e , itself d e r i v e s f r o m the a u t h o r i t y o f the social sciences o f w h i c h they are the t r a i n e d representatives. power

is s y m b i o t i c a l l y

knowledge.

The

related

power

The to the

system's

carceral

system o f

system

techniques

of

modern

social-scientific

of observation

and

d o c u m e n t a t i o n are essential c o n d i t i o n s for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the k n o w l e d g e system, a n d the k n o w l e d g e system p r o v i d e s l e g i t i m a t i o n for the p o w e r system's exercise o f authority. T h i s relation o f p o w e r a n d k n o w l e d g e is the basis o f Foucault's g e n e a l o g i c a l a c c o u n t o f the transition f r o m o n e e p i s t e m e to a n o t h e r : I am not saying that the human sciences emerged from the prison. But, if they have been able to be formed and to produce so many profound changes in the episteme, it is because they have been conveyed by a specific and new modality of power: a certain policy of the body, a certain way of rendering the group of men docile and useful. 19

It is, h o w e v e r , striking that the a b o v e text is the only m e n t i o n o f epistemes in Surveiller etpunir. T h i s suggests that, t h o u g h F o u c a u l t is not rejecting the a r c h a e o l o g i c a l results o f Les mots et les choses, he has not f o u n d those results p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to the c o n c e r n s of Surveiller et 1 9

Discipline and Punish, 305.

282

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

punir. I n a c c o r d w i t h m y p r e v i o u s r e m a r k s , I take this as a n i n d i c a t i o n that the " s u b j e c t s " a n d " o b j e c t s " o f disciplinary p o w e r a n d k n o w ledge a r e quite different f r o m the m o d e r n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l sense o f those t e r m s at w o r k in Les mots et les choses. Certainly, there is n o suggestion in Surveiller et punir that the threats o f m o d e r n disciplinary p o w e r are o n the v e r g e o f e v a p o r a t i n g in the w a k e o f the " d e a t h o f m a n " . I n fact, F o u c a u l t ' s b r i e f discussion o f factors that m i g h t u n d e r m i n e c a r c e r a l p o w e r cite n e w n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l systems o f illegality that e s c a p e the disciplinary n e t w o r k (arms a n d d r u g sales, i n t e r n a t i o n a l business transactions) a n d the t a k e - o v e r o f the p r i s o n system itself b y a u t o n o m o u s l y o p e r a t i n g m e d i c a l a n d e d u c a t i o n a l systems. T h e s e are o b v i o u s l y social trends that will c o n t i n u e to exist i n d e p e n d e n t o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f the self.

SEX

Foucault's history o f sexuality b e g a n

as a fairly

straightforward

e x t e n s i o n o f the g e n e a l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h o f Surveiller et punir to the topic o f sexuality. H i s i d e a w a s that the v a r i o u s m o d e r n b o d i e s o f k n o w l e d g e a b o u t sexuality (various " s c i e n c e s o f s e x u a l i t y " , i n c l u d i n g psychoanalysis) h a v e a n i n t i m a t e association w i t h the p o w e r structures o f m o d e r n society a n d so are p r i m e c a n d i d a t e s for g e n e a l o g i c a l analysis. V o l u m e 1, La volonte de savoir (1976), w a s i n t e n d e d as the i n t r o d u c t i o n to a series o f studies o n p a r t i c u l a r aspects o f m o d e r n sexuality (children, w o m e n , p e r v e r t s , p o p u l a t i o n control). It outlines the p r o j e c t o f the overall history, e x p l a i n i n g the basic v i e w p o i n t a n d the m e t h o d s to b e used. A m a i n t h e m e o f La volonte de savoir is that o u r s t a n d a r d v i e w o f the history o f sexuality is distorted b y o u r a c c e p t a n c e o f the " r e p r e s s i v e h y p o t h e s i s " , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the p r i m a r y attitude o f m o d e r n society t o w a r d sex ( b e g i n n i n g in the e i g h t e e n t h century, r e a c h i n g a p e a k in the V i c t o r i a n a g e , a n d still e x e r t i n g strong influence today) w a s that, e x c e p t for the closely d e l i m i t e d sphere o f m o n o g a m o u s m a r r i a g e , it w a s to b e o p p o s e d , silenced, a n d , as far as possible, eliminated. In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the repressive h y p o t h e s i s , F o u c a u l t argues, w e m u s t see it in relation to the fact that the last three centuries h a v e p r o d u c e d a " v e r i t a b l e discursive e x p l o s i o n " r e g a r d i n g 2 0

History of Sexuality, v o l u m e i, 17.

sex.

2 0

Foucault The

283

e x p l o s i o n b e g i n s in the religious r e a l m , w i t h the C o u n t e r -

Reformation's emphasized

development

the n e e d

o f rules for confessions. T h e s e

for penitents

to e x a m i n e

rules

themselves and

articulate to their confessors n o t j u s t all their sinful sexual actions b u t all the t h o u g h t s , desires, a n d inclinations b e h i n d these actions, there

being

distinctive

nothing

modern

t o o small turn,

to b e w o r t h y

however,

of concern.

is the s e c u l a r i z a t i o n

The

o f this

c o n c e r n w i t h k n o w i n g a n d e x p r e s s i n g the truth a b o u t sex. T h i s a p p e a r s in a w i d e r a n g e o f c o n t e x t s : confessional literature, the political a n d e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m o f p o p u l a t i o n (size a n d quality), infantile sexuality ( e x t r a o r d i n a r y efforts to c o n t r o l m a s t u r b a t i o n a n d h o m o s e x u a l i t y in b o a r d i n g schools), a n d beliefs a b o u t the sexual origin o f p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l illness. It m i g h t s e e m that all this talk a b o u t sex is n o n e t h e l e s s d e s i g n e d to repress sexual activity (prevent m a s t u r b a t i o n , r e d u c e

illegitimacy,

d i s c o u r a g e h o m o s e x u a l i t y ) . H o w e v e r , o n a n a l o g y w i t h his c o n c l u s i o n in Surveiller et punir, F o u c a u l t suggests that a m u c h m o r e p l a u s i b l e r e a d i n g is that m o d e r n discourse a b o u t sexuality in fact constitutes v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s o f s e x u a l d e v i a t i o n , n o t to e l i m i n a t e t h e m b u t to exercise c o n t r o l over those w h o fall into t h e m . T h u s , the obsession w i t h m a s t u r b a t i o n d i d n o t stop the activity, b u t it d i d establish unprecedented

mechanisms

for

controlling

the

thoughts

and

b e h a v i o r o f adolescents. Similarly, h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s b y n o m e a n s e l i m i n a t e d (or d e c r e a s e d ) , b u t h o m o s e x u a l s w e r e m u c h m o r e closely e n c l o s e d in the n e t o f social c o n t r o l . Modern

control

o f sexuality

also parallels m o d e r n

control of

c r i m i n a l i t y b y m a k i n g sex, like c r i m e , a n o b j e c t o f allegedly scientific disciplines, w h i c h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y offer k n o w l e d g e a n d d o m i n a t i o n o f their objects. H o w e v e r , it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t that there is a further d i m e n s i o n o f the p o w e r associated w i t h the sciences o f sexuality. N o t o n l y is there c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d v i a o t h e r s ' k n o w l e d g e o f individuals; there

is also

Individuals

control

internalize

via individuals'

knowledge

the n o r m s laid d o w n

o f themselves.

b y the sciences o f

sexuality a n d m o n i t o r t h e m s e l v e s in a n effort to c o n f o r m to these n o r m s . T h u s , t h e y are c o n t r o l l e d n o t o n l y as objects o f disciplines b u t also as self-scrutinizing a n d self-forming subjects. T h i s is the r e a s o n F o u c a u l t sees o u r a p p a r e n t l y l i b e r a t i n g focus o n o u r sexuality as j u s t a r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f the m e c h a n i s m s o f social c o n t r o l . I n t r y i n g to discover o u r d e e p sexual n a t u r e t h r o u g h selfscrutiny a n d to express this n a t u r e b y o v e r c o m i n g v a r i o u s h a n g - u p s

284

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

a n d n e u r o s e s , w e are m e r e l y s h a p i n g ourselves a c c o r d i n g to t h e n o r m s a n d v a l u e s implicit in m o d e r n sciences o f sexuality. W e m a y b r e a k w i t h certain social c o n v e n t i o n s a n d constraints, b u t w e d o so o n l y b y p u t t i n g ourselves j u s t as h r m l y in the c o n t r o l o f a n o t h e r system o f constraints. In a c c o r d w i t h his critique o f the repressive h y p o t h e s i s , F o u c a u l t m a i n t a i n s his view, a l r e a d y d e v e l o p e d in Surveiller et punir, that p o w e r is n o t p u r e l y n e g a t i v e b u t is a positive, creative force in society, p r o d u c i n g b o t h n e w f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d n e w social c a t e g o r i e s a n d structures (along w i t h the constraints c o r r e s p o n d i n g to these). A further p o i n t - also d e v e l o p e d in Surveiller et punir - is that p o w e r c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f the a c t i o n o f a n y single c e n t r a l p o i n t o f c o n t r o l . A society c o n t a i n s n u m e r o u s centers o f p o w e r (a " m i c r o p h y s i c s o f p o w e r " ) that interact in c o m p l e x w a y s . P o w e r is dispersed a n d does n o t flow f r o m o n e (or j u s t a few) centers that a r e the k e y to seizing it. In La volonte de savoir F o u c a u l t e m p h a s i z e s the C h r i s t i a n g r o u n d to the history o f m o d e r n

back-

sexuality in p r a c t i c e s such as

confession. I n his outline o f the entire s i x - v o l u m e effort, he projects the n e x t v o l u m e

as a discussion

o f the a n t e c e d e n t s

of modern

sexuality in the C h r i s t i a n n o t i o n o f the flesh. T h i s w a s to b e f o l l o w e d b y v o l u m e s o n " T h e C h i l d r e n ' s C r u s a d e " (about efforts to eliminate childhood masturbation), " T h e Hysterical W o m a n " , "Perverts", and " T h e M a l t h u s i a n C o u p l e " (on p o p u l a t i o n control). B u t a l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t w r o t e the v o l u m e o n Christianity, Les avoux de la chair, he n e v e r p u b l i s h e d it, a n d t h e others w e r e n e v e r w r i t t e n . W h a t seems to h a v e s t o p p e d F o u c a u l t w a s his r e a l i z a t i o n that the true topic o f his history o f sexuality w a s the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n o f the self as a reflective subject. H e w a s , o f c o u r s e , also still d e a l i n g w i t h the topic o f k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r a n d w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the m o d e r n c o n c e p t o f sexuality. B u t his focus b e c a m e the q u e s t i o n o f h o w , in its t h o u g h t a b o u t sexuality, the m o d e r n a g e h a s constituted a u n i q u e i d e a o f w h a t it is to b e a self (the m o d e r n n o t i o n o f a subject), w h i c h is itself a m a j o r i n s t r u m e n t o f m o d e r n disciplinary c o n t r o l . (Perhaps there is a n implicit r e c o g n i tion o f the p o i n t I m a d e a b o u t Les mots et les choses: that its c e n t r a l n o t i o n , the m o d e r n

concept

o f man, h a d little c o n n e c t i o n

with

t e c h n i q u e s o f social control.) G i v e n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his project, F o u c a u l t d e c i d e d that it w o u l d n o t b e sufficient to give a relatively b r i e f sketch o f t h e C h r i s t i a n a n t e c e d e n t s o f the m o d e r n c o n c e p t o f

Foucault

285

the self. R a t h e r , h e felt h e n e e d e d to o b t a i n a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f these a n t e c e d e n t s b y f o l l o w i n g the p r o c e s s w h e r e b y the C h r i s t i a n n o t i o n o f the self d e v e l o p e d o u t o f a n c i e n t ( G r e e k a n d R o m a n ) notions. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,

Foucault

e x p a n d e d his i n q u i r y so that it

w o u l d b e g i n w i t h t w o v o l u m e s o n a n c i e n t sexuality — v o l u m e 11 (L'usage des plaisirs) o n the fifth a n d fourth centuries B C , a n d v o l u m e m (Le souci de soi) o n the s e c o n d a n d first centuries B C — b e f o r e t u r n i n g to C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d , finally, the m o d e r n p e r i o d .

2 1

In the i n t r o d u c t i o n to L'usage des plaisirs F o u c a u l t offers a v e r y helpful o v e r v i e w o f his final u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his basic p r o j e c t as a historian

a n d o f h o w his m e t h o d s fit into this project.

O n the

b r o a d e s t level, h e says, the w o r k h e h a s d o n e is a c o n t r i b u t i o n to a " h i s t o r y o f t r u t h " . H e c o n c e i v e s this history as h a v i n g three m a i n aspects: a n analysis o f " g a m e s o f t r u t h " (i.e., v a r i o u s systems o f discourse d e v e l o p e d to p r o d u c e truth), b o t h in their o w n right a n d in relation to o n e a n o t h e r ; a n analysis o f the r e l a t i o n o f these " g a m e s o f t r u t h " to p o w e r relations; a n d a n analysis o f the r e l a t i o n o f " g a m e s o f t r u t h " to the self. It seems clear that the first aspect, the analysis o f g a m e s o f truth, c o r r e s p o n d s to F o u c a u l t ' s a r c h a e o l o g i c a l m e t h o d — a n analysis o f systems o f discourse

in their o w n right.

Similarly,

the study o f

discourse in its relation to p o w e r is the d o m a i n o f his g e n e a l o g i c a l m e t h o d , as d e p l o y e d in Surveiller et punir. T h e third aspect, t h e r e l a t i o n to t h e self, c o r r e s p o n d s to his r e a l i z a t i o n , in La volonté de savoir, that there is a distinction b e t w e e n p o w e r that o p e r a t e s b y c o n s t i t u t i n g us as objects a n d p o w e r that o p e r a t e s b y constituting us as subjects. Both

are the c o n c e r n

of genealogical

analysis, b u t w e n e e d to

distinguish a g e n e a l o g y o f a n o b j e c t f r o m a g e n e a l o g y o f a subject. It is the latter that is the c o n c e r n o f F o u c a u l t ' s history o f sexuality. In p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , Foucault's w o r k in t h e last t w o v o l u m e s o f Histoire de la sexualité does n o t r e p r e s e n t a r a d i c a l b r e a k w i t h his p r e v i o u s w o r k , either in a r c h a e o l o g y o r genealogy. T h e s e r e m a i n his distinctive m e t h o d s , e v e n t h o u g h they a r e e m p l o y e d in a v e r y n e w c o n t e x t . H o w e v e r , F o u c a u l t d o e s p o i n t o u t that in this later w o r k h e

2 1

Foucault died before h e could publish any o f his recast project b e y o n d the t w o volumes on the ancients. H e did, however, continue reflecting o n m o d e r n p o w e r - in lectures at the C o l l è g e de France a n d in seminars at Berkeley — with particular focus on the " g o v e r n m e n t a l rationality" (or " g o v e r n m e n t a l i t y " ) o f m o d e r n societies. T h i s line of thought has b e e n taken up b y his associates, François E w a l d a n d D a n i e l Defert. S e e the essays b y Foucault, E w a l d , Defert, a n d others collected in G r a h a m Burchell, et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

286

has b e e n able to e n r i c h his c o n c e p t i o n s o f a r c h a e o l o g y a n d g e n e alogy. First, a r c h a e o l o g y is n o w seen as c o n c e r n e d w i t h

human

b e i n g s ' " p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n s " o f t h e m s e l v e s , their w o r l d , a n d their actions. I n o t h e r w o r d s , a r c h a e o l o g i c a l analyses o f the structure o f discourses a r e n o w seen as especially i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e t h e y r e v e a l the f u n d a m e n t a l issues a n d p r o b l e m s in t e r m s o f w h i c h individuals c o n f r o n t their existence. Further, g e n e a l o g y is n o w seen as c o n c e r n e d w i t h the " a r t s o f e x i s t e n c e " ; that is, " t h o s e i n t e n t i o n a l a n d v o l u n t a r y actions b y w h i c h m e n n o t o n l y set t h e m s e l v e s rules o f c o n d u c t , b u t also seek to m a k e their life a n oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic v a l u e s a n d m e e t s certain stylistic c r i t e r i a " .

2 2

T h i s focus o f a r c h a e o l o g y a n d g e n e a l o g y o n p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n s a n d p r a c t i c e s represents a v e r y i m p o r t a n t n e w e m p h a s i s o f F o u cault's w o r k . H e h a s in the e n d r e t u r n e d to a focus o n the v i e w p o i n t o f the individuals t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d a n d live in their w o r l d . H e has n o t r e n o u n c e d his earlier p o s i t i o n o n the h i g h l y derivative a n d e p h e m e r a l status o f the i n d i v i d u a l . O u r history is still, to a v e r y g r e a t extent, s t r u c t u r e d b y discursive a n d n o n d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s

that

o p e r a t e at m u c h d e e p e r levels t h a n that o f h u m a n consciousness. B u t this does n o t m e a n that w e (as c o n s c i o u s subjects) are n o t real or that o u r c o n c e r n s h a v e n o s i g n i h c a n c e . I n his h n a l w o r k , F o u c a u l t t u r n e d to this level o f the i n d i v i d u a l self — w h a t h e calls " e t h i c s " . L'usage des plaisirs is a g o o d e x a m p l e o f this n e w t u r n . F o u c a u l t b e g i n s w i t h w h a t is r e a d i l y r e c o g n i z a b l e as a n a r c h a e o l o g y o f a n c i e n t pleasures, d e s i g n e d to c o m p a r e the a n c i e n t p a g a n v i e w o f sexuality with

that

o f Christianity.

H e notes

that there

are v e r y

strong

similarities at the level o f m o r a l c o d e s (i.e., o f rules o f c o n d u c t a n d a c t u a l p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o r d e t e r m i n e d b y these rules). B u t there a r e f u n d a m e n t a l differences at the level o f the f o r m a t i o n o f a n ethical subject; that is, in the w a y i n d i v i d u a l selves a r e f o r m e d b y the ethical c o d e . F o u c a u l t distinguishes four aspects o f this f o r m a t i o n (the four " f o r m s o f s u b j e c t i h c a t i o n " ) : ethical substance (the basic c o n c e p t i o n o f the sort

o f acts

sexual

ethics

is c o n c e r n e d

with); m o d e

of

subjection (the m a n n e r o f — a n d the basis for — a n individual's s u b o r d i n a t i o n to a n ethical c o d e , e.g., social c o n v e n t i o n , religious duty, m e a n s o f self-fulfillment); f o r m s o f e l a b o r a t i o n (that is, different m o d e s o f m a k i n g o n e s e l f a n ethical subject, such as the m e t i c u l o u s f o l l o w i n g o f rules vs. a s u d d e n c h a n g e o f life); a n d the telos o f the

2 2

The Use of Pleasure, 1 0 — n .

Foucault

287

ethical subject (the ultimate g o a l o f ethical p r a c t i c e s -

e.g., self-

mastery, purification for i m m o r t a l i t y ) . Foucault's a r c h a e o l o g y o f a n c i e n t G r e e k sexuality consists o f an analysis

o f its v i e w

on

each

o f these

four

topics.

The

ethical

substance o f G r e e k sexuality w a s ta aphrodisia, the v a g u e l y defined r a n g e o f s e x u a l acts. T h e k e y p o i n t , in contrast w i t h early C h r i s t i a n v i e w s , is that ta aphrodisia w e r e n o t r e g a r d e d as evil in their o w n right (and h e n c e m o r a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c intrinsically a n d inevitably). T h e y w e r e r a t h e r r e g a r d e d as n a t u r a l a n d necessary. N o n e t h e l e s s ,

the

G r e e k s did see s e x u a l acts as objects o f m o r a l c o n c e r n b e c a u s e o f their

natural

inferiority

(they

were,

for

example,

shared

with

animals) a n d their g r e a t intensity. T h i s l e d to a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n w i t h the d a n g e r s o f these actions n o t in t h e m s e l v e s , as for Christians,

but

because

o f excesses

to

which

they

could

the lead.

C o n s i s t e n t w i t h this, the G r e e k m o d e o f subjection to the c o d e o f sexual ethics w a s n o t the C h r i s t i a n o n e o f absolute e x c l u s i o n

or

restriction to strictly specified c i r c u m s t a n c e s . R a t h e r , it w a s a m a t t e r o f the p r o p e r use (chresis) o f pleasures. It w a s n o t a m a t t e r o f a v o i d i n g certain actions that w e r e strictly f o r b i d d e n (because essentially evil) b u t o f e n g a g i n g in the full r a n g e o f s e x u a l activities (heterosexual, h o m o s e x u a l , in m a r r i a g e , out o f m a r r i a g e ) w i t h p r o p e r m o d e r a t i o n . T h e w a y in w h i c h the G r e e k s constituted t h e m s e l v e s as

ethical

subjects w a s t h r o u g h self-mastery (enkrateia). T h i s w a s a m a t t e r o f struggling w i t h o n e s e l f for c o n t r o l over one's desires. T h e k e y to w i n n i n g this struggle w a s t r a i n i n g (askesis) t h r o u g h exercises o f selfc o n t r o l . B y contrast, C h r i s t i a n subjectivity w a s a c h i e v e d p r i m a r i l y through

self-renunciation.

Finally, the telos o f G r e e k

ethics

m o d e r a t i o n (sophrosyne), u n d e r s t o o d as a f o r m o f f r e e d o m -

was both

n e g a t i v e (from one's passions) a n d positive (as m a s t e r y over others). Foucault

also

discusses

how

freedom

in

these

two

senses

essentially tied to truth, s h o w i n g the distinctively G r e e k with

an

"aesthetics

of existence"

in

contrast

to

the

was

concern Christian

" h e r m e n e u t i c s o f the s e l f " . T h e p r e c e d i n g a r c h a e o l o g y s h o w s the g e n e r a l w a y the Greeks problematized

ancient

sexuality. F o u c a u l t n e x t turns to the

pre-

s u m a b l y g e n e a l o g i c a l analysis o f issues this p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n raised in specific d o m a i n s o f life a n d o f the p r a c t i c e s in w h i c h these issues were

dealt w i t h . H e

obsession

with

discusses the relation

health,

the

role

o f sex to the

of pleasure

especially, the p r o b l e m s o f h o m o e r o t i c relations.

in

marriage,

Greek and,

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

288

It is easy to see F o u c a u l t ' s analysis o f the four f o r m s o f subjectihcation as a n a r c h a e o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t o f the a n c i e n t G r e e k v i e w o f sex, a n d as such it is v e r y effective

in p r e s e n t i n g us w i t h a striking

contrast w i t h o u r o w n v i e w o f sex. B u t it is m u c h less easy to see the b o o k as d e v e l o p i n g a g e n e a l o g y , since there is a l m o s t n o discussion o f the factors w h e r e b y a n c i e n t s e x u a l k n o w l e d g e is causally tied to the p o w e r structures o f a society. A d m i t t e d l y , a n y g e n e a l o g y F o u c a u l t is offering w o u l d b e a g e n e a l o g y o f the subject (self), n o t o f the o b j e c t o f a b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e . S u c h a n analysis w o u l d h a v e to distinguish

between

authentic

self-formation

and

self-formation

c o o p t e d b y a n e x t e r n a l p o w e r n e t w o r k , a n d to a n a l y z e the latter by s h o w i n g the tie b e t w e e n a set o f " t e c h n i q u e s o f the s e l f " a n d a n e x t e r n a l p o w e r n e t w o r k (as w a s d o n e in La volonte de savoir). L'usage des plaisirs offers little or n o t h i n g a l o n g these lines. T h e r e is n o a c c o u n t o f a n a n c i e n t G r e e k r e g i m e for m a k i n g individuals objects o f social p o w e r , n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f h o w t e c h n i q u e s o f self-formation a r e tied to this r e g i m e . M o r e o v e r , it is easy to see w h y F o u c a u l t does n o t especially n e e d to c a r r y o u t this g e n e a l o g i c a l analysis. H e is n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h the a r b i t r a r y constraints that m a y h a v e b e e n a c t i n g o n the a n c i e n t G r e e k s b u t w i t h the light G r e e k v i e w s c a n shed o n C h r i s t i a n (and ultimately m o d e r n ) t e c h n i q u e s o f self-formation. A s a l w a y s , h e is w r i t i n g a history o f the present. C o n s e q u e n t l y , it is n o surprise that F o u c a u l t p a y s little or n o attention to questions o f p o w e r that are n o t r e l e v a n t to o u r c u r r e n t situation. B u t s a y i n g this is to a d m i t , c o n t r a r y to F o u c a u l t ' s o w n suggestions, that L'usage des plaisirs (and Le souci de soi) is p r i m a r i l y a r c h a e o l o g i c a l , n o t g e n e a l o g i c a l -

at least as he

u n d e r s t o o d these n o t i o n s in the 1970s. T h e a r c h a e o l o g y o f L'usage des plaisirs is, h o w e v e r , a n effective vehicle

for Foucault's

fruitful

alternatives

critical history o f the p r e s e n t ; it p r o v i d e s

to

our present

understanding

of

t h e r e b y s u g g e s t i n g w a y s o f transgressing its b o u n d a r i e s .

sexuality, Foucault

insists that there is n o q u e s t i o n o f " g o i n g b a c k to the G r e e k s " . B u t there is r e a s o n to think that — m u c h m o r e t h a n in a n y o f his o t h e r w o r k s — h e does h n d inspiration in a n c i e n t history for a n e w v i e w o f sexuality (especially the n o t i o n o f a n " a e s t h e t i c s o f e x i s t e n c e " ) . H e r e more than anywhere involved

in a positive

else, w e g e t s o m e i d e a o f w h a t m i g h t b e Foucaultian view

generally, a F o u c a u l t i a n ethics.

o f sexuality

and, more

CHAPTER

10

Derrida

We feel in one world, we think, we give names to things in another; between the two we can establish a certain correspondence, but not bridge the gap. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, in, 56) F o u c a u l t a n d D e r r i d a b o t h reject the t r a d i t i o n a l p r o j e c t o f philosophy, a l t h o u g h t h e y also p r o p o s e alternative e m p l o y m e n t s for its intellectual legacy. ( T h e y seek n o t a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y by o t h e r m e a n s b u t a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y ' s m e a n s for

other

ends.) B u t w h e r e F o u c a u l t is centrifugal in relation to philosophy, m o v i n g a w a y f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l a p o r i a e t o w a r d successor projects o f a r c h a e o l o g y a n d g e n e a l o g y , D e r r i d a is c e n t r i p e t a l , dissecting

the

body

o f failed

philosophical

relentlessly

knowledge.

In

this

i m p o r t a n t sense, D e r r i d a r e m a i n s closer to the t r a d i t i o n a l v o c a t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h e r , a fact for w h i c h there are r e a s o n s b o t h in his education

a n d in his p h i l o s o p h i c a l position. B o t h F o u c a u l t

D e r r i d a w e r e normaliens,

1

and

a n d D e r r i d a , four y e a r s y o u n g e r , a t t e n d e d

a l e c t u r e course that F o u c a u l t , at Afthusser's invitation, g a v e at the E c o l e N o r m a l e in the early 1950s. B u t w h e r e a s F o u c a u l t w a s f r o m early o n as interested in p s y c h o l o g y a n d history as in philosophy, D e r r i d a p u r s u e d an e x c l u s i v e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a i n i n g a n d first m a d e his n a m e as a H u s s e r l s c h o l a r .

1

2

2

Further, w h i l e F o u c a u l t h a d little

D e r r i d a was b o r n and raised in A l g e r i a and entered the Ecole N o r m a l e after three years of p r e p a r a t i o n at the L y c é e L o u i s - l e - G r a n d in Paris. In particular, Derrida's translation o f Husserl's " O r i g i n of G e o m e t r y " (Introduction à "L'origine de la géométrie" de Husserl), with its l o n g introductory essay, a n d La voix et le phénomène, a close study o f Husserl's theory of signs, w e r e a p p l a u d e d by the French university establishment. But Derrida's later works w e r e m u c h less well received, a n d he has r e m a i n e d at the margins of the p o w e r centers o f French a c a d e m i c philosophy, never h a v i n g held a university professorship. From 1964 to 1984 he taught at the E c o l e N o r m a l e (as maître-assistant). In 1983 he b e c a m e a director of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales a n d also was chosen as the first director o f the C o l l è g e International de philosophie, a teaching and

289

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

290

interest i n t r a d i t i o n a l m o d e s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t (except w h e n , as in Les mots et les choses, t h e y f o r m e d p a r t o f his historical subjectm a t t e r ) , D e r r i d a m a i n t a i n e d that a l t h o u g h t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues are u n d e c i d a b l e in p r i n c i p l e , t h e y are also i n e l i m i n a b l e f r o m o u r t h o u g h t a n d in s o m e sense r e q u i r e our c o n s t a n t attention. A s a result, D e r r i d a ' s writings, unlike F o u c a u l t ' s , are

a constant

explicit p r o b i n g o f t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t s .

and

3

D e r r i d a presents himself, h o w e v e r , n o t as a p r a c t i t i o n e r o f traditional p h i l o s o p h y b u t as its m o s t assiduous reader. A n d he is, i n d e e d , a b o v e all a r e m a r k a b l e r e a d e r w i t h a distinctive talent for close, subtle, a n d i m a g i n a t i v e scrutiny o f texts. N o r is his r e a d i n g l i m i t e d to p h i l o s o p h e r s . A l o n g w i t h his studies o f P l a t o , R o u s s e a u , C o n d i l l a c , H e g e l , M a r x , H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r , a n d L e v i n a s , there are essays o n literary h g u r e s such as K a f k a , Valéry, M a l l a r m é , J o y c e , A r t a u d , a n d B l a n c h o t a n d o n m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r s to the h u m a n sciences (e.g., Freud, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss). M o r e than any important philosop h e r since the M i d d l e A g e s , D e r r i d a has d e v o t e d h i m s e l f to r e a d i n g a n d c o m m e n t i n g on the w r i t i n g s o f others. R e a d i n g D e r r i d a h i m s e l f is f r e q u e n t l y an i n t i m i d a t i n g a n d frustrating p r o j e c t . T o say the least, his texts are m u c h closer to the " w r i t e r l y " t h a n to the " r e a d e r l y " e n d o f R o l a n d B a r t h e s ' s p e c t r u m . T h i s has p a r t i c u l a r l y irritated A n g l o - A m e r i c a n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s such as J o h n regarded

as

Searle, a n d there are circles in w h i c h an

obscurantist

charlatan.

I would

hope

D e r r i d a is that

our

discussion here will refute the n o u n , b u t there is s o m e t h i n g to the adjective. T h e fault is n o t entirely D e r r i d a ' s . H e discusses difficult thinkers, g e n e r a l l y at a v e r y h i g h level o f sophistication, so that r e a d e r s w h o are n o t fully u p to the level o f his discussion will o f course h a v e p r o b l e m s . M o r e importantly, D e r r i d a d e p l o y s a v a r i e t y o f w r i t i n g styles, m o s t o f w h i c h h a v e little to d o w i t h the analytic p h i l o s o p h e r ' s efforts to clarify a n d r e h n e o u r c o m m o n - s e n s e intuitions. H e will, for

3

research center he helped to found. H e has also regularly held visiting appointments at A m e r i c a n universities (although typically in literature rather than philosophy departments), first at J o h n s H o p k i n s a n d later at Y a l e and then the University of California at Irvine. T h e one direct confrontation b e t w e e n D e r r i d a and Foucault arose from Derrida's critique (first presented at a m e e t i n g o f J e a n Wahl's C o l l è g e de Philosophie) o f Foucault's treatment of Descartes in Folie et déraison. See Derrida's " C o g i t o et histoire de la folie", in L'écriture et la différence and Foucault's response, " M y Body, T h i s Paper, T h i s F i r e " . See also Derrida's later discussion of Foucault in " ' T o D o Justice to Freud': T h e History o f M a d n e s s in the A g e o f Psychoanalysis".

Derrida

291

e x a m p l e , p l a y w i t h l a n g u a g e t h r o u g h p u n s , b i z a r r e associations, or perverse self-referentiality, simply to effect a disorientation o f o u r o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t u a l c a t e g o r i e s . ( T h e final section, o n signatures, o f " S i g n a t u r e é v é n e m e n t c o n t e x t e " is a g o o d b r i e f e x a m p l e , as is the o p e n i n g o f his e x t r a o r d i n a r y response to J o h n S e a r l e in Limited Inc. T h e w h o l e o f Glas is a m u c h l o n g e r a n d m o r e a g g r a v a t i n g instance.) H e will also strain o r b r e a k c o n v e n t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s in o r d e r to i n t r o d u c e n e w v o c a b u l a r i e s , as in his f a m o u s essay, " L a d i f f é r a n c e " .

4

O n e k e y to a p p r e c i a t i n g D e r r i d a is to realize that such n e g a t i v e a n d positive p y r o t e c h n i c s h a v e their o w n distinctive functions a n d a r e not failed efforts to a n a l y z e c o n c e p t s or c o n s t r u c t a r g u m e n t s . A t the s a m e t i m e , it is often h a r d to a v o i d the c o n c l u s i o n that there is little p u r p o s e to the i m m e n s e l e n g t h a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f m a n y o f these displays. B u t m a n y o f D e r r i d a ' s efforts d o r e q u i r e c o n c e p t u a l

explication

a n d l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t o f a b r o a d l y analytic sort. T h i s is f r e q u e n t l y called for in his d e c o n s t r u c t i o n v i a close r e a d i n g o f a text's f u n d a m e n t a l d i c h o t o m i e s . La voix et le phénomène s h o w s D e r r i d a at his best in this m o d e . It is a v e r y " r e s p o n s i b l e " study, the difficulties o f w h i c h derive p r i m a r i l y f r o m the closeness o f the a r g u m e n t a n d the t h o r n i ness o f the H u s s e r l i a n texts b e i n g a n a l y z e d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , in o t h e r cases, D e r r i d a falls c o n s i d e r a b l y short o f the clarity a n d r i g o r his discussion requires. T h i s h a p p e n s , for e x a m p l e , in the essay o n A u s t i n , " S i g n a t u r e é v é n e m e n t c o n t e x t e " , w h i c h d r e w Searle's criticism. S e a r l e u n d o u b t e d l y m i s r e a d s D e r r i d a , b u t the syntactic c o m plexity

and conceptual

confusions

of Derrida's

text

(including,

despite his protests, a m u d d l i n g o f the u s e / m e n t i o n distinction) give a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y for m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t e v e n D e r r i d a ' s m o s t difficult texts offer significant r e w a r d s to the persistent reader, a n d it is h a r d to believe that those d e n o u n c i n g h i m as a n intellectual f r a u d h a v e m a d e a serious effort to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h his t h o u g h t .

DECONSTRUCTION

W h y should a p h i l o s o p h e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y o n e at D e r r i d a ' s historical site, b e so obsessed w i t h w h a t others h a v e written? B e c a u s e , as D e r r i d a sees it, w r i t i n g reveals the essential peculiarities a n d limitations o f h u m a n t h o u g h t . A w r i t t e n text will a l w a y s e s c a p e

4

Included in Marges de la philosophie.

total

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

292

clarification. T h e r e will a l w a y s b e t e x t u a l a m b i v a l e n c e s that r e m a i n u n r e s o l v a b l e a n d p r e v e n t us f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g fully " w h a t

the

a u t h o r really m e a n s " . W e m a y think, as Plato s o m e t i m e s suggests, that the p r o b l e m is d u e simply to the m e d i u m o f writing. I f w e c o u l d directly speak to the author, our p e r c e p t i o n

of intonations

and

gestural n u a n c e s - a l o n g w i t h the possibility o f f o l l o w - u p questions w o u l d e l i m i n a t e all a m b i v a l e n c e , all undecidability. B u t o f course e v e n face-to-face s p e a k i n g will n o t c o n v e y a m e s s a g e perfectly. T h e inevitable differences (in p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , in e x p e c t a t i o n s , in idiolect) b e t w e e n speaker a n d h e a r e r m a i n t a i n p e r m a n e n t possibilities

of

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S u p p o s e , t h e n , that to e l i m i n a t e these differences, I c o n s i d e r j u s t the case o f m y o w n i n t e r n a l f o r m u l a t i o n

of my

t h o u g h t s . E v e n h e r e , D e r r i d a m a i n t a i n s , the linguistic f o r m u l a t i o n will n o t be totally a d e q u a t e . T h e g e n e r a l i t y o f a n y linguistic e x p r e s sion will m a k e it a less t h a n p e r f e c t e x p r e s s i o n o f the precise details o f m y t h o u g h t or the e x a c t n u a n c e s o f m y feelings. It w o u l d s e e m that p e r f e c t

adequacy

is a c h i e v e d

o n l y in the

immediate,

pre-

linguistic p r e s e n c e o f m y t h o u g h t to itself. B u t D e r r i d a a r g u e s that there is n o such p u r e p r e s e n c e o f t h o u g h t s to the self. A l l t h o u g h t is m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e a n d c a n n e v e r attain such total clarity. T h e r e is a l w a y s a difference b e t w e e n w h a t is t h o u g h t (or e x p e r i e n c e d or said or written) a n d the ideal o f p u r e , self-identical m e a n i n g . T h e a b o v e line o f a r g u m e n t is a p r o t o t y p e o f D e r r i d a ' s r e p e a t e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , in different c o n t e x t s a n d t e r m s , that the a p p a r e n t l y c o n t i n g e n t a n d r e m e d i a b l e defects o f w r i t i n g are in fact i n e v i t a b l e features o f all t h o u g h t , all e x p r e s s i o n , all reality. D e r r i d a ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t is an u n e n d i n g e x t r a p o l a t i o n o f the r e a d e r ' s inability to m a s t e r a text. In search o f total clarity, p h i l o s o p h e r s (and others) since P l a t o h a v e r e p e a t e d l y insisted o n a s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d writing. A s D e r r i d a presents it, the basic contrast o f the d i c h o t o m y is a l w a y s b e t w e e n s p e e c h as the p r i m a r y a n d i m m e d i a t e e x p r e s s i o n of t h o u g h t a n d w r i t i n g as a s e c o n d a r y a n d d e r i v a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n

of

t h o u g h t . W h e n I h e a r s o m e o n e speak, the source o f the t h o u g h t (the speaker) is i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t to m e , so there is m i n i m a l possibility o f m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W h e n I r e a d w h a t s o m e o n e has w r i t t e n , the source is absent, a n d there are m a n y m o r e possibilities for misinterp r e t a t i o n . D e r r i d a s h o w s h o w thinkers f r o m P l a t o to R o u s s e a u a n d Saussure associated

have the

derogated division

w r i t i n g in

between

the

comparison two

with

to

speech

all the

and

standard

Derrida philosophical dichotomies.

5

293

S p e e c h involves p r e s e n c e , reality, truth,

certainty, purity; w r i t i n g involves a b s e n c e , a p p e a r a n c e ,

falsehood,

d o u b t , impurity. A t the s a m e t i m e , D e r r i d a p o i n t s o u t , the v e r y texts in w h i c h P l a t o , Rousseau, a n d Saussure celebrate speech over writing u n d e r m i n e or reverse the distinction. P l a t o , for e x a m p l e , d e h n e s t h o u g h t (of w h i c h s p e e c h is s u p p o s e d to b e the p u r e expression) as a k i n d o f " w r i t i n g inscribed in the s o u l " . (This leads D e r r i d a to speak o f a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m o f w r i t i n g - archi-writing - o f w h i c h s p e e c h itself is an instance.) Further, w r i t i n g , for all its d a n g e r s , is in the e n d the only w a y that s p e e c h , w h i c h itself exists o n l y in the fleeting m o m e n t , c a n be p r e s e r v e d . T h i s is w h y P l a t o refers to w r i t i n g as apharmakon, w h i c h m e a n s b o t h p o i s o n a n d remedy. Similarly, R o u s s e a u , w h i l e d e n o u n c i n g the d e c e p t i o n s o f w r i t i n g , a d m i t s that it, r a t h e r t h a n s p e e c h , is the o n l y w a y in w h i c h h e c a n express his true self. A n d Saussure, a l t h o u g h h e m a k e s the s t a n d a r d p o i n t s a b o u t the derivative n a t u r e o f w r i t i n g , e v e n t u a l l y uses it as his p r i m a r y m o d e l for the w a y in w h i c h the m e a n i n g s o f signs are s p e c i h e d b y differences.

Derrida

refers to the p r o j e c t o f s t u d y i n g the role o f w r i t i n g in W e s t e r n t h o u g h t , i n c l u d i n g b o t h its d e n i g r a t i o n s a n d surreptitious r e t u r n s , as the discipline o f grammatology, f r o m the G r e e k for letters o r w r i t i n g (although h e later tends to speak o f his efforts here as j u s t o n e example o f deconstruction). D e s p i t e o u r relentless failure to attain p e r f e c t m e a n i n g a n d truth, all o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e is b a s e d o n the a s s u m p tion o f a n d drive for such p e r f e c t i o n . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n a n d drive c a n be f o r m u l a t e d b y three p r i n c i p l e s that a r e c e n t r a l in the W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l tradition. ( D e r r i d a h i m s e l f n e v e r states the p r i n c i p l e s in these t e r m s , b u t t h e y c a t c h w h a t h e h a s in m i n d b y " l o g o c e n t r i c " thinking.) First, the basic e l e m e n t s o f t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e are pairs of

opposing

concepts,

such

as p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e ,

truth/falsity,

being/nothingness, same/other, one/many, male/female, hot/cold. T h i s w e c a n call the p r i n c i p l e o f o p p o s i t i o n . N e x t , the o p p o s i n g pairs are r e g a r d e d as exclusive l o g i c a l alternatives, g o v e r n e d b y the principles o f identity (A = A ) a n d n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ( n o t h i n g is b o t h A a n d n o t - A ) . T h i s w e c a n call the p r i n c i p l e o f logical e x c l u s i o n . For e x a m p l e , b e i n g p r e s e n t e x c l u d e s b e i n g absent; the p r e s e n t is simply

:)

O n Plato, sec " L a p h a r m a c i e de P l a t o n " , in La dissémination. O n Rousseau, see De la grammatologie, part 11; o n Saussure, part 1, chapter 2.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

294

w h a t it is (present) a n d is in n o w a y w h a t it is n o t (absent). F i n a l l y e a c h f u n d a m e n t a l p a i r is a s y m m e t r i c a l in the sense that o n e t e r m has in s o m e c r u c i a l sense p r i o r i t y over the o t h e r (e.g., is m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l , m o r e real, m o r a l l y b e t t e r t h a n the other). T h i s is the p r i n c i p l e o f priority. A t y p i c a l D e r r i d e a n r e a d i n g will r e v e a l the e x t e n t to w h i c h a g i v e n text does n o t fit the m o d e l o f a logical system as defined b y the a b o v e three p r i n c i p l e s .

Specifically,

it will s h o w that the b i n a r y

oppositions o n w h i c h the text is b a s e d a r e n o t sustained, that the alleged relations o f l o g i c a l e x c l u s i o n a n d priority c a n n o t b e c o h e r ently f o r m u l a t e d a n d are implicitly d e n i e d b y the v e r y text that f o r m u l a t e s t h e m . D e r r i d a calls this t e c h n i q u e deconstruction. D e c o n struction s h o w s h o w texts b a s e d o n b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s violate b o t h the p r i n c i p l e o f e x c l u s i o n a n d the p r i n c i p l e o f priority. T h u s , a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g o f a text reveals p o i n t s at w h i c h it i n t r o d u c e s o n e o f the o p p o s i n g t e r m s into the definition o f the o t h e r or reverses the o r d e r o f priority b e t w e e n the t w o t e r m s . D e r r i d a c h a r a c t e r i z e s in v a r i o u s w a y s the v i e w s p u t into q u e s t i o n b y d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis. T h e g e n e r a l p r o j e c t o f d e c o n s t r u c t i n g the fundamental

dichotomies

built into t h o u g h t yields a critique

of

logocentrism. T h e d o m i n a n t t e r m s o f the s t a n d a r d p o l a r oppositions a l w a y s c o r r e s p o n d to s o m e sort o f p r e s e n c e , a reality that is positive, complete,

simple, i n d e p e n d e n t ,

and fundamental

(Plato's

forms,

Aristotle's substances, A q u i n a s ' s G o d , H e g e l ' s absolute). T h i s p r e s e n c e is a l w a y s u n d e r s t o o d as the p o l a r opposite o f s o m e t h i n g that is n e g a t i v e , i n c o m p l e t e , c o m p l e x , d e p e n d e n t , a n d derivative (matter, c r e a t u r e s , a p p e a r a n c e , etc.). D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analyses show, h o w e v e r , that the p u r i t y a n d priority o f p r e s e n c e is n e v e r sustained in the texts o f the g r e a t m e t a p h y s i c i a n s . For e x a m p l e , P l a t o discovers that the f o r m s p a r t i c i p a t e in n o n - b e i n g , C h r i s t i a n s think o f G o d as s o m e h o w h u m a n l y i n c a r n a t e , a n d so o n . T h e result is a critique o f

metaphysical presence.

6

T h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l to d o c t r i n e s o f m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e are the v a r i o u s f o r m s o f epistemological foundationalism. T h e s e express efforts to g r o u n d all k n o w l e d g e in s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l c e r t a i n t y such as intellectual 6

insight

(various

rationalisms,

from

Plato

through

H e r e , as elsewhere, the point o f deconstruction is n o t to reverse the standard bifurcation a n d give, for e x a m p l e , priority to absence over presence, a reversal that w o u l d merely continue logocentrism in another key. S e e , for e x a m p l e , D e r r i d a ' s critique o f absence in " V i o l e n c e et m é t a p h y s i q u e " (in L'écriture et la différence).

Derrida

295

D e s c a r t e s ) o r sense e x p e r i e n c e (various e m p i r i c i s m s , f r o m Aristotle through

Hume).

Foundationalists

assert

something

present

and

i m m e d i a t e (to the m i n d , in e x p e r i e n c e ) that o p p o s e s a n d o v e r c o m e s w h a t is a b s e n t a n d d e r i v a t i v e , for e x a m p l e , o p i n i o n s r e c e i v e d f r o m others, unjustified

inferences, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that g o b e y o n d the

g i v e n facts. D e c o n s t r u c t i o n , h o w e v e r , s h o w s that the f o u n d a t i o n a l elements

themselves

are " t a i n t e d "

b y the v e r y

epistemological

limitations t h e y are d e s i g n e d to o v e r c o m e . T h u s , entirely clear a n d h e n c e infallible intellectual insights are f o u n d to c o n t a i n q u e s t i o n able h i d d e n

assumptions, allegedly pure

sense d a t a t u r n o u t to

e m b o d y culturally relative i n t e r p r e t a t i v e f r a m e w o r k s , a n d so o n . In the d o m a i n o f ethics, d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis reveals that v a l u e s asserted

as e t e r n a l verities

historically culture.

developed

This

effects

are in fact simply reflections

and contingent a

critique

of

practices

of a

o f the

particular

ethnocentrism. D e r r i d a

and,

especially, s o m e o f his followers h a v e f o c u s e d o n the specific v e r s i o n o f e t h n o c e n t r i s m that p r i v i l e g e s m a l e over female. T h i s is phallocentrism, w h i c h presents distinctively " m a s c u l i n e " traits as o b v i o u s l y superior to distinctively

"feminine"

traits (e.g., d o m i n a t i o n

over

sympathy, clarity over depth) a n d c o n c l u d e s that the social a n d political s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n to m e n is entirely n a t u r a l a n d a p p r o p r i a t e . ( D e r r i d a sees p h a l l o c e n t r i s m as derivative f r o m l o g o c e n t r i s m a n d so speaks ofphallogocentrism.)

1

A t the v e r y least, D e r r i d a is a p h i l o s o p h e r in the t r a d i t i o n a l sense o f c o n t i n u i n g the S o c r a t i c p r o j e c t o f q u e s t i o n i n g o u r assumptions. H i s q u e s t i o n i n g is distinctly r a d i c a l in its p r o b i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y ' s o w n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a b o u t itself. W e h a v e a l r e a d y n o t e d his questioning

o f the basic

concepts

in t e r m s

of which

philosophers

c o n s t r u c t their v i e w s o f reality. B u t D e r r i d a also questions the v e r y f o r m o f philosophy, raising objections to the i d e a o f " a p h i l o s o p h y " as a unified b o d y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k a n d e v e n p r o b l e m a t i z i n g the distinction b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d its a n c i e n t P l a t o n i c rival, literature. H i s p o i n t applies, in the first i n s t a n c e , to his o w n writings: " I n w h a t y o u call m y b o o k s , w h a t is first o f all p u t in q u e s t i o n is the unity o f the b o o k a n d the u n i t y ' b o o k ' c o n s i d e r e d as a p e r f e c t totality." W e think o f a b o o k as a self-contained unity, p e r h a p s p a r t o f a l a r g e r w h o l e , b u t still a unit intelligible in its o w n t e r m s . (Or, if there is 7

See also the c o m m e n t s o n D e r r i d a a n d feminism in m y discussion o f Irigaray in chapter 11.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

20,6

r e a s o n to think that this is n o t so, t h e n w e e x p e c t to b e able to r e a d the m a t e r i a l in q u e s t i o n as p a r t o f a text that d o e s f o r m a selfc o n t a i n e d unity.) D e r r i d a says his b o o k s " d o n o t c o n f o r m to this ideal unity o f a b o o k " . M o r e o v e r , t h e y are w r i t t e n to s h o w that o t h e r "books"

also

lack

this unity.

All

so-called

books

are

"entirely

c o n s u m e d b y the r e a d i n g o f o t h e r t e x t s " : a text c a n be u n d e r s t o o d 8

o n l y b y r e l a t i n g it to o t h e r texts, f r o m w h i c h it d r a w s its p r o b l e m s , c o n c e p t s , v o c a b u l a r y . " O t h e r t e x t s " also i n c l u d e s o t h e r parts o f the g i v e n text. U n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t I say here requires u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t I h a v e j u s t said a n d w h a t I will say t w e n t y p a g e s o n . A text has an inhnite o p e n n e s s to other texts that m a k e s impossible the r e d u c tion to the strict u n i t y that w e fantasize w h e n s p e a k i n g o f it as a "book".

T h i s is explicit in D e r r i d a ' s o w n w r i t i n g , w h i c h

almost

a l w a y s takes the f o r m o f close c o m m e n t a r y on the w r i t i n g o f others a n d , at the s a m e t i m e , w r a p s the r e a d e r in an endless spiral o f selfreferences. Similarly, his c o m m e n t a r i e s o n the texts o f others s h o w h o w w h a t at hrst s e e m to be c o h e r e n t w h o l e s split, o n scrutiny o f the e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l relations that constitute t h e m , into d i v e r g e n t and incommensurable multi-dimensionalities. Derrida's books, both those he writes a n d those he r e a d s , are n o t really b o o k s b e c a u s e they c a n n e v e r b e closed. D e r r i d a sums u p his p e r s p e c t i v e as w r i t e r a n d r e a d e r t h r o u g h a m e t a p h o r o f inhnite c o m p l e x i t y b o r r o w e d , ironically, f r o m H u s s e r l , w h o in his Ideas 1 i m a g i n e s a situation in w h i c h : A name on being mentioned reminds us of the Dresden gallery . . . We wander through the rooms . . . A painting by Teniers . . . represents a gallery of paintings . . . T h e paintings of this gallery would represent in their turn paintings, which on their part exhibited readable inscriptions and so forth. 9

H e r e o n e t h i n g a l w a y s l e a d s to a n o t h e r w i t h a g r o w t h that c a n n e v e r be c a u g h t in a n y p r i n c i p l e o f p a t t e r n or p r o g r e s s i o n . In such a case — a n d this is, for D e r r i d a , the case w i t h e v e r y t h i n g w e call a b o o k or the w o r k o f an a u t h o r — there c a n be n o ultimate u n i t y or c o h e r e n c e . T h e a b o v e line o f t h o u g h t m i g h t l e a d us to revise o u r t h i n k i n g a b o u t the u n i t y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l (and other) writings. B u t it does not o f itself m e a n that w e c a n n o t still d e h n e p h i l o s o p h y as a distinct g e n r e , clearly s e p a r a t e d f r o m o t h e r sorts o f w r i t i n g ,

8

Positions, 3.

9

Ideas i, no. 100, as cited in Speech and Phenomena, 104.

particularly

Derrida

297

literature. O f c o u r s e , there are v a r i o u s w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p h i l o s o p h y / l i t e r a t u r e distinction: in t e r m s o f t r u t h / h c t i o n , r e a s o n / emotion,

general/concrete,

etc.

But

Derrida's

view

is best

ap-

p r o a c h e d in t e r m s o f a p u t a t i v e distinction b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y as a m o d e o f e x p r e s s i o n for w h i c h all that m a t t e r s is the p u r e essential c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t o f l a n g u a g e a n d literature as a m o d e o f e x p r e s sion d e v o t e d to m a k i n g effective use o f the c o n t i n g e n t features o f the specihc l a n g u a g e e m p l o y e d . T h u s , p h i l o s o p h e r s , unlike p o e t s , will not c a r e w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e a c h i e v e d mellifluous r h y t h m or ironic r h y m e , as l o n g as t h e y h a v e c o n v e y e d their " b a s i c i d e a s " . T h e p o i n t is p a r t i c u l a r l y v i v i d for the c e n t r a l literary trope o f m e t a p h o r , w h i c h will for the p h i l o s o p h e r

at best b e an aesthetic

or

pedagogical

e n h a n c e m e n t o f w h a t c o u l d b e w e l l e n o u g h said w i t h o u t it, b u t will be the v e r y h e a r t o f w h a t the p o e t says. In o t h e r w o r d s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t a p h o r s will a l w a y s b e translatable into literal l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t loss o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e n t , w h e r e a s a literal p a r a p h r a s e

always

loses the poetry. D e r r i d a insists that his texts " b e l o n g n e i t h e r to the ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' register n o r to the 'literary' r e g i s t e r " . show

us that

no

text,

not

even

1 0

B u t , e v e n m o r e , he tries to

the

clearest,

most

literal

t r a n s p a r e n t l o g i c a l discourse, c a n a v o i d an essential r e l i a n c e

and on

literary devices. I n d e e d , as D e r r i d a p o i n t s out, the v e r y clarity that pure

philosophy

would

contrast w i t h

the

obscurities

of

literary

m e t a p h o r is itself a m e t a p h o r : " t h e a p p e a l to criteria o f clarity a n d o b s c u r i t y w o u l d suffice to c o n f i r m . . . that this w h o l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e l i m i t a t i o n o f m e t a p h o r a l r e a d y lends itself to b e i n g c o n s t r u c t e d and worked by 'metaphors'. H o w could a piece of knowledge l a n g u a g e be p r o p e r l y clear or o b s c u r e ? "

or

1 1

N o n e o f this m e a n s that D e r r i d a denies the existence o f philo s o p h y as a distinguishable aspect o f intellectual history, e v e n one associated w i t h distinctive c o g n i t i v e skills a n d habits o f m i n d . B u t he does reject the c l a i m that the c o n t i n g e n t historical p h e n o m e n o n w e call p h i l o s o p h y c o r r e s p o n d s to an e p i s t e m i c a l l y p r i v i l e g e d m o d e of fundamental cognition.

1 0

1 1

Positions, 71. Nonetheless, some of his writings, such as the closely argued critique o f Husserl in La voix et le phénomène, are m u c h closer to the philosophical end o f the c o n t i n u u m a n d others, such as La carte postale, w h i c h includes something close to an epistolary novel, are m u c h closer to the literary end. T h e r e are also texts such as Glas that deliberately a i m to blur the line b e t w e e n the literary a n d the philosophical. " W h i t e M y t h o l o g y " , Margins of Philosophy, 252.

2 8 9

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990) DIFFERANCE

Derrida's deconstructive

readings

are c o m p l e m e n t e d

by a

more

positive a n d , in s o m e w a y s , e v e n systematic p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t . T h i s is c a r r i e d out t h r o u g h his r e p e a t e d efforts to i n t r o d u c e v o c a b u l aries that a t t e m p t to a d u m b r a t e the level - w h i c h w e m i g h t call o n t o l o g i c a l or e v e n p r e o n t o l o g i c a l — w h e r e d i c h o t o m i e s dissolve a n d their oppositions reverse a n d slide into o n e another. T h i s p r o j e c t is systematic b o t h in the c o m p r e h e n s i v e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f e a c h o f the v o c a b u l a r i e s a n d in the c o m p l e x i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s that b i n d t o g e t h e r t e r m s f r o m different v o c a b u l a r i e s . W e will discuss hrst the v o c a b u lary o f differance, the one D e r r i d a has m o s t fully d e v e l o p e d a n d most often d e p l o y s , a n d t h e n , m o r e briefly, the v o c a b u l a r i e s o f supplement

a n d o f trace. " D i f f e r a n c e " , a transliteration o f the F r e n c h n e o l o g i s m differance, is m e a n t to evoke the instability o f the b i n a r y oppositions f u n d a m e n t a l to l o g i c a l systems. D e r r i d a d e s i g n e d the t e r m to h a v e t w o basic c o n n o t a t i o n s : difference a n d deferral. ( T h e F r e n c h v e r b f r o m w h i c h it derives, différer, m e a n s b o t h to differ a n d to defer.) T h e hrst c o n n o t a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s to the w a y in w h i c h a n y p a i r o f b i n a r y opposites a l w a y s fails to m a t c h e x a c t l y the d o m a i n to w h i c h it is s u p p o s e d to apply. T h e r e are a l w a y s i r r e d u c i b l e differences b e t w e e n the structure o f the a c t u a l p h e n o m e n o n (a historical e v e n t , a text, a personality) a n d the b i n a r y divisions r e q u i r e d b y a logical system. For e x a m p l e , R o u s s e a u ' s a c t u a l use o f the c o n c e p t s speech a n d writing does n o t c o r r e s p o n d to the s h a r p division he claims to m a k e b e t w e e n them. Further, efforts to i m p o s e the s h a r p distinction r e q u i r e d b y b i n a r y oppositions m u s t a l w a y s b e " p u t o f f " (deferred) in the face o f the r e c a l c i t r a n c e o f the p h e n o m e n o n . For e x a m p l e , w h e n w e see that Plato has v i o l a t e d the s p e e c h / w r i t i n g d i c h o t o m y b y d e h n i n g the t h o u g h t e x p r e s s e d b y s p e e c h as a w r i t i n g in the soul, w e m a y try to fall b a c k to a distinction b e t w e e n " g o o d w r i t i n g " - w h i c h is like s p e e c h - a n d " b a d w r i t i n g " . T h e i d e a is that, e v e n if the distinction fails at one level, it c a n b e r e v i v e d at a n o t h e r level (we

merely

" d e f e r " d r a w i n g it). B u t , D e r r i d a m a i n t a i n s , further analysis will s h o w that e v e n the " f a l l - b a c k " distinction c a n b e u n d e r m i n e d a n d that a truly s h a r p distinction will r e m a i n elusive, will h a v e to b e indehnitely deferred. W e see, t h e n , D e r r i d a ' s p o i n t in f o r m i n g a n o u n f r o m différer. B u t

Derrida

299

w h y d o e s h e i n t r o d u c e the " m i s s p e l l i n g " difference instead o f the s t a n d a r d difference? First, a l t h o u g h h e w a n t s his t e r m to recall the s t a n d a r d o n e , he also w a n t s to e m p h a s i z e the difference b e t w e e n his use o f the t e r m a n d its use b y o t h e r thinkers ( H e g e l ,

Saussure,

H e i d e g g e r ) . Further, the a in the final syllable follows the p a t t e r n in F r e n c h for f o r m i n g v e r b a l n o u n s (gerunds), so that differance m a i n tains a p o i n t e d a m b i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n a n a c t i o n (a m a k i n g different) a n d the state resulting f r o m this a c t i o n (a difference). I n this way, Derrida's

term

metaphysical

suggests

dichotomies

a reality

not caught

as a c t i v e / p a s s i v e ,

b y such

standard

event/state,

action/

passion. Finally, the fact that there is a written b u t n o spoken difference b e t w e e n differance a n d difference e v o k e s D e r r i d a ' s discussion o f the s p e e c h / w r i t i n g d i c h o t o m y , a n d gives a priority to w r i t i n g (which a l o n e c a n express D e r r i d a ' s m e a n i n g ) that subverts the force o f the s t a n d a r d distinction. H a v i n g seen D e r r i d a ' s g e n e r a l strategy for d e p l o y i n g his n e w w o r d , w e c a n n o w e x p l o r e its role as a n " a l t e r n a t i v e " ( " r e p l a c e m e n t " o r "supplement")

to s t a n d a r d

philosophical

often c h a r a c t e r i z e s differance

terminologies.

Derrida

in the l a n g u a g e o f m o v e m e n t a n d

causality. For e x a m p l e : " d i f f e r a n c e refers to the (active and passive) m o v e m e n t that consists in d e f e r r i n g " . Further, this m o v e m e n t " i s the production of . . . differences" between basic philosophical oppositions such as " s e n s i b l e / i n t e l l i g i b l e , i n t u i t i o n / s i g n i f i c a t i o n , culture, e t c . " .

1 2

nature/

H o w e v e r , D e r r i d a also e m p h a s i z e s that w e c a n n o t

literally c o n c e i v e o f differance in t e r m s o f the s t a n d a r d c a t e g o r i e s o f m o v e m e n t a n d causality (cf. Marges de la philosophic \MP\, T h e y t o o are t e r m s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i c h o t o m i e s

12-13/12).

(rest/movement,

cause/effect) a n d so m u s t t h e m s e l v e s b e the " p r o d u c t s " o f differa n c e . Eventually, D e r r i d a says, h e m u s t d e c o n s t r u c t the m e a n i n g s e v e n o f m o v e m e n t a n d cause (but h e " d e f e r s " the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n to another occasion). T h e a b o v e w a y o f t a l k i n g a b o u t differance is n e i t h e r i n c o h e r e n t nor m e r e l y cute. It reflects r a t h e r D e r r i d a ' s c o n v i c t i o n that despite the intrinsic limitations o f the s t a n d a r d d i c h o t o m i e s — s i g n a l e d in their " p r o d u c t i o n " b y a differance that eludes t h e m — w e h a v e n o w a y o f t h i n k i n g a p a r t f r o m t h e m . T h e r e is n o s t a n d p o i n t outside o f the d i c h o t o m i e s f r o m w h i c h w e c a n o v e r l o o k a n d m a s t e r

them.

D i f f e r a n c e is n o t , like H e g e l ' s a b s o l u t e , a synthesis o f all opposites

1 2

Positions, 8, 9.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

300

into a fully intelligible w h o l e . It is itself c a u g h t in the endless p l a y of differences, n e i t h e r c o n t r o l l i n g n o r c o n t r o l l e d , a l w a y s g e n e r a t i n g n e w p a r a d o x e s . W e c a n use " d i f f e r a n c e " to i n d i c a t e the limitations o f o u r c o n c e p t s a n d l a n g u a g e b u t n o t to o v e r c o m e t h e m . D e r r i d a ' s quest i o n i n g o f the distinctions o n w h i c h t h i n k i n g is b a s e d is n o t u n d e r taken in the n a m e o f a n e w set o f dehnitive a n s w e r s (i.e., a n e w set of d i c h o t o m i z e d concepts) b u t in the n a m e o f the p e r p e t u a l n e e d to be a w a r e o f the limits o f a n y a n s w e r s . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i h c a n c e o f differance is m o s t r e a d i l y a p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h the question o f l a n g u a g e , the system o f signs t h r o u g h w h i c h m e a n i n g s are expressed. H e r e w e c a n b e g i n w i t h Saussure, w h o saw the a r b i t r a r y a n d the differential c h a r a c t e r of signs

as their

fundamental

and

inseparable

features.

Signs

are

a r b i t r a r y b e c a u s e " t h e system o f signs is constituted b y the differences in the t e r m s , a n d n o t b y their p l e n i t u d e " . T h e p r i n c i p l e of difference as the basis o f signs "affects the totality o f the sign, that is, the sign as b o t h signihed a n d s i g n i h e r " (MP, n / 1 0 ) . T h e k e y p o i n t , as S a u s s u r e says, is that a l t h o u g h " a difference g e n e r a l l y implies positive t e r m s b e t w e e n w h i c h the difference is set u p . . . in l a n g u a g e there are o n l y differences without positive terms" }^ F r o m this, D e r r i d a says, it follows " t h a t the signihed c o n c e p t is n e v e r p r e s e n t in a n d o f itself. . . E v e r y c o n c e p t is i n s c r i b e d in a c h a i n or in a system w i t h i n w h i c h it refers to . . . o t h e r c o n c e p t s , b y m e a n s o f the systematic p l a y o f d i f f e r e n c e s . " D i f f e r a n c e is p r e c i s e l y this sort o f play, w h i c h is w h y it is n o t a c o n c e p t " b u t r a t h e r the possibility o f conceptuality, o f a c o n c e p t u a l system a n d p r o c e s s in g e n e r a l " . Similarly, differance is not a w o r d : it is n o t " t h e c a l m , p r e s e n t , self-referential unity o f c o n c e p t a n d p h o n i c m a t e r i a l " (MP, 12/11). W i t h i n a l a n g u a g e as a system there are o n l y differences,

but

" t h e s e differences are t h e m s e l v e s effects". D i f f e r a n c e is " t h e p l a y i n g m o v e m e n t that ' p r o d u c e s ' — b y m e a n s o f s o m e t h i n g that is n o t simply an activity — these differences, these effects o f difference . . . Differance

is the

non-full,

non-simple

structured

and

differing

' o r i g i n ' o f d i f f e r e n c e s " (MP, 12/11). If, as classical t h o u g h t has it, a cause h a d to b e a p r e s e n c e (subject or substance), w e w o u l d h e r e s o o n b e led to speak o f effects w i t h o u t causes, a n d therefore

we

Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 120 (cited by D e r r i d a in Margins of Philosophy, n ) .

Derrida

301

w o u l d s h o r d y stop s p e a k i n g e v e n o f effects. (As w e shall see, D e r r i d a tries to fill this c o n c e p t u a l g a p w i t h the n o t i o n o f a trace) D e r r i d a cites Saussure's c l a i m that l a n g u a g e (langue) is n e e d e d for speech

(parole) to b e intelligible,

while

speech

is n e c e s s a r y

for

l a n g u a g e to b e established historically, a n d suggests e x t e n d i n g the thought

to signs in g e n e r a l .

Thinking

this way, w e c a n d e h n e

differance as " t h e m o v e m e n t a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h l a n g u a g e , or a n y c o d e , a n y system o f referral in g e n e r a l , is constituted 'historically' as a w e a v e o f d i f f e r e n c e s " . D e r r i d a notes that h e uses t e r m s s u c h as "constituted", venience"

"historically",

etc. o n l y

a n d in p r e p a r a t i o n

" f o r their

for " t h e i r

strategic

deconstruction

c u r r e n t l y m o s t decisive p o i n t " . H e further insists that

con-

at the

differance,

e v e n t h o u g h h e h a s d e s c r i b e d it in t e r m s o f the genesis o f a structure "is n o m o r e

static

than

it is g e n e t i c ,

no more

structural

than

historical. O r is n o less so . . . . S u c h o p p o s i t i o n s h a v e n o t the least p e r t i n e n c e to differance, w h i c h m a k e s the t h i n k i n g o f it u n e a s y a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l e " (MP, 13/12). W e may, h o w e v e r , o b j e c t that it will n o t b e so easy to e x t e n d differance b e y o n d the r e a l m o f l a n g u a g e . T h e r e is, for e x a m p l e , the e x p e r i e n c e that o u r l a n g u a g e (both v e r b a l signifiers a n d signified concepts) is u l t i m a t e l y a b o u t . Surely, w e m a y c l a i m , this h a s a fixed c o n t e n t that escapes the endless p l a y o f linguistic differences. D e r r i d a ' s response to this c h a l l e n g e is m o s t fully d e v e l o p e d in his reflections in La voix et le phénomène o n Husserl's

phenomenology,

w h i c h a c c o r d s to e x p e r i e n c e j u s t the sort o f p r i v i l e g e d role that D e r r i d a questions. W i t h o u t t r y i n g to follow all the twists a n d turns o f this close discussion, let m e try to f o r m u l a t e the c e n t r a l thrust o f D e r r i d a ' s critique. W e c a n p u t Husserl's c h a l l e n g e in this w a y : o n the p u r e l y linguistic level, there is, as w e s a w in o u r discussion o f Saussure, n o r e a s o n w h y s o m e o n e c o u l d n o t c o m p l e t e l y m a s t e r a certain p a r t o f o u r l a n g u a g e (say, the l a n g u a g e o f colors) w i t h o u t a n y a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e o f the objects the l a n g u a g e is u s e d to refer to. S o , for e x a m p l e , a b l i n d p e r s o n , e v e n t h o u g h n e v e r h a v i n g seen a color, c o u l d speak quite e x a c t l y a b o u t colors, s h a d e s , t o n e s , a n d intensities solely o n the basis o f a k n o w l e d g e

o f the w a y these t e r m s p l a y

against o n e a n o t h e r (the " d i f f e r e n c e s " a m o n g t h e m ) . T o this extent, D e r r i d a ' s story a b o u t differance as the " s o u r c e " o f all m e a n i n g is c o r r e c t . B u t , w e w a n t to a r g u e , s o m e t h i n g further is a v a i l a b l e for those w h o h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d colors. T h e y h a v e seen the c o l o r as a directly p e r c e i v e d p r e s e n c e , n o t j u s t r e f e r r e d to it as the trace o f a

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

302

system o f signs. S u r e l y this m e a n s that t h e y k n o w s o m e t h i n g m o r e about

the

color

than

the

blind person.

(A p a r a l l e l

example

is

Diderot's blind mathematician, w h o m a y k n o w m u c h more about g e o m e t r i c a l shapes t h a n I do b u t does n o t k n o w how they look.) D e r r i d a c a n n o t p l a u s i b l y d e n y that those w h o see h a v e access to s o m e t h i n g that the b l i n d d o not. B u t his q u e s t i o n w o u l d be w h e t h e r this access is itself i n d e p e n d e n t o f the linguistic system (system o f differences). Is n o t o u r v e r y c a p a c i t y to see colors, tones, a n d shades itself a f u n c t i o n

o f the linguistic

system in w h i c h

we

operate?

W i t h o u t l a n g u a g e , in o t h e r w o r d s , w o u l d w e in fact h a v e e x p e r i e n c e in a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a b r u t e p h y s i o l o g i c a l sense? D e r r i d a ' s v i e w suggests

that the

knowledge

answer

or m e a n i n g

constitutes l a n g u a g e .

1 4

is n o ,

so that w e

apart from

never

the p l a y

achieve

any

o f differences

that

T h i s is w h a t D e r r i d a m e a n s b y his f a m o u s

assertion, " T h e r e n e v e r w a s a n y ' p e r c e p t i o n ' . "

1 5

Finally, a few w o r d s a b o u t supplement a n d trace. D e r r i d a is attracted to the t e r m " s u p p l e m e n t " (which he e n c o u n t e r s in his r e a d i n g s of R o u s s e a u a n d C o n d i l l a c on l a n g u a g e ) b e c a u s e o f its d u a l m e a n i n g . O n the one h a n d , a s u p p l e m e n t c a n be an inessential e x t r a (e.g., an a d v e r t i s i n g s u p p l e m e n t to a n e w s p a p e r ) . O n the o t h e r h a n d , it c a n b e a n essential a d d i t i o n , r e m e d y i n g a c r u c i a l i n c o m p l e t e n e s s in that to w h i c h it is a d d e d (e.g., a v i t a m i n s u p p l e m e n t r e q u i r e d to r e m e d y a d e h c i e n c y in a patient's diet). In the b i n a r y oppositions o f W e s t e r n t h o u g h t , the s e c o n d t e r m is t r e a t e d as a s u p p l e m e n t , in the inessential sense, to the hrst t e r m . T h u s , reality (e.g., Plato's forms) is c o m p l e t e in itself, a n d a p p e a r a n c e (the m a t e r i a l world) is j u s t an u n n e c e s s a r y a n d i m p e r f e c t i m i t a t i o n . L i k e w i s e , s p e e c h expresses the fullness of m e a n i n g , w h i l e w r i t i n g is j u s t an inessential reflection o f s p e e c h . D e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis, h o w e v e r , s h o w s w a y s in w h i c h the supplem e n t is in fact essential, w a y s in w h i c h it r e m e d i e s an i n c o m p l e t e n e s s in the hrst t e r m . T h u s , it m a y t u r n out that a p p e a r a n c e is the only w a y that the e t e r n a l c a n b e r e a l i z e d in time or (as D e r r i d a ' s analysis of Saussure

shows) that w r i t i n g is the m o d e l for

understanding

s p e e c h as a m e a n i n g f u l system. S o , like differance, s u p p l e m e n t refers to aspects o f the realities w i t h w h i c h w e d e a l (whether they be texts, lives, or w h a t e v e r ) that e s c a p e a n d u n d e r m i n e the divisions

and

s u b o r d i n a t i o n s that b i n a r y oppositions try to i m p o s e . 1 4

1 5

H e r e , o f course, D e r r i d a is very close to analytic philosophers such as Sellars a n d Q u i n e . w h o have criticized the " m y t h of the g i v e n " . Speech and Phenomena, 103.

Derrida

303

D e r r i d a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e v e l o p s the n o t i o n o f s u p p l e m e n t in his discussion

of Rousseau

in De

la grammatologie.

A

first

example

c o n c e r n s the s p e e c h / w r i t i n g d i c h o t o m y . R o u s s e a u f r e q u e n t l y

em-

p h a s i z e s that the living p r e s e n c e o f s p e e c h is far superior to writing, w h i c h is a m e r e inferior s u p p l e m e n t to the s p o k e n w o r d . N o n e t h e less, in a striking p a s s a g e cited b y D e r r i d a , R o u s s e a u says: " I w o u l d love society as others d o if I w e r e n o t sure o f s h o w i n g m y s e l f n o t j u s t at a d i s a d v a n t a g e b u t as c o m p l e t e l y different f r o m w h a t I a m . T h e decision I h a v e t a k e n to write a n d to h i d e m y s e l f is p r e c i s e l y the one that suits m e . I f I w e r e p r e s e n t p e o p l e w o u l d n e v e r h a v e k n o w n w h a t I was w o r t h . "

1 6

S o the unnecessary, inferior s u p p l e m e n t b e c o m e s

the essential m e a n s o f e x p r e s s i n g the truth. Similarly,

Rousseau

famously

glorifies

human

beings

in

their

n a t u r a l state, m a i n t a i n i n g that o u r entire g o o d is there a n d is only c o r r u p t e d b y the artificialities o f society a n d civilization. O n r e a d i n g , e d u c a t i o n , to w h i c h R o u s s e a u p a y s so m u c h

this

attention,

w o u l d be a m e r e s u p p l e m e n t to n a t u r e . B u t in fact his discussions of e d u c a t i o n m a k e s it clear that o u r n a t u r a l g o o d n e s s is a l w a y s only implicit a n d that e d u c a t i o n is in fact n e c e s s a r y to a l l o w it to e m e r g e full-blown. Finally, R o u s s e a u

refers disdainfully

to m a s t u r b a t i o n -

which

clearly obsessed h i m — as " t h a t d a n g e r o u s s u p p l e m e n t " , w h i c h he presents as an inferior a n d u n n e c e s s a r y substitute for

"normal"

sexual relations w i t h a partner. B u t his o w n e x p e r i e n c e s s h o w e d that e v e n so-called n o r m a l sex involves strong e l e m e n t s o f fantasy a n d self-focus that it shares w i t h m a s t u r b a t i o n . " T r a c e " is a t e r m that e m e r g e s f r o m reflection on the w a y that w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y presents as solid, u n p r o b l e m a t i c prese n c e a l w a y s dissolves in the face o f d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis. It is as t h o u g h p r e s e n c e itself is a d e r i v e d p h e n o m e n o n , s o m e t h i n g w e c a n at best c a t c h a g l i m p s e o f a m i d s t the p l a y o f differences. It is n o t that there is literally n o t h i n g t h e r e , b u t that w h a t is there a p p e a r s only indirectly, o b l i q u e l y ; w e m i g h t say it is p r e s e n t t h r o u g h its a b s e n c e . D e r r i d a uses " t r a c e " to refer to this p h e n o m e n o n . T h e n o t i o n o f " t r a c e " is implicit in Saussure's v i e w o f l a n g u a g e . T r a d i t i o n a l v i e w s w o u l d l o c a t e the m e a n i n g o f a sign in the t h o u g h t it signifies, w i t h the t h o u g h t t a k e n to b e the m e a n i n g itself, fully a n d

positively

p r e s e n t to the m i n d . B u t , as w e h a v e seen, for Saussure the m e a n i n g

6

Jean-Jacques R o u s s e a u , Confessions (cited in Of Grammatology, 142).

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

3°4

o f a sign c o r r e s p o n d s n o t to a p r e s e n c e b u t to a system o f differences that distinguish o n e sign f r o m all the others. T h e m e a n i n g , w e m i g h t say, exists in a g i v e n sign b u t o n l y as a set o f traces o f all the o t h e r signs f r o m w h i c h the sign differs. I think o f dog a n d u n d e r s t a n d its m e a n i n g . B u t this m e a n i n g is n o t s o m e t h i n g I r e a d o u t o f a p r e s e n t c o n c e p t . It is r a t h e r s o m e t h i n g I d i s c e r n f r o m m y a w a r e n e s s o f the w a y s that dog differs f r o m o t h e r signs such as cat, animal, a n d bark. Z e n o ' s o l d p a r a d o x o f the a r r o w p r o v i d e s a simple b u t helpful e x a m p l e o f t h i n k i n g in t e r m s o f the t r a c e .

1 7

R e g a r d i n g the a r r o w in

m o t i o n as a m e r e succession o f self-contained p r e s e n c e s fails to y i e l d the c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n o n o f a moving arrow. T o a v o i d p a r a d o x , w e m u s t insinuate into e a c h " p o i n t " o f m o t i o n essential r e f e r e n c e to past a n d future points that a r e n o t p r e s e n t b u t s o m e h o w leave their traces.

1 8

IS D E R R I D A

A

SKEPTIC?

D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n s c h a l l e n g e b o t h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e t e n sions o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d the scientific p r e t e n s i o n s o f structuralism.

B u t critics

rational

thought

suggest

that

by denying

it further

rejects

the " l o g o c e n t r i c "

any p r o j e c t assumption

of that

reality c a n b e g r a s p e d t h r o u g h c o n c e p t s the m e a n i n g a n d applic a t i o n o f w h i c h a r e p r e c i s e l y d e h n e d b y the l a w s o f l o g i c (identity a n d n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) . T h i s is the position o f those w h o think D e r r i d a falls into the trap o f a self-refuting r a d i c a l skepticism. W e n e e d therefore to l o o k at the possibilities for a skeptical interpretation o f D e r r i d a ' s philosophy. T h e m o s t r a d i c a l possibility w o u l d b e to r e a d D e r r i d a as d e n y i n g or seriously q u e s t i o n i n g the laws o f logic, d e n y i n g , for e x a m p l e , that there is a n y m e a n i n g f u l distinction b e t w e e n a truth a n d its false denial. I f so, it w o u l d s e e m that his t h o u g h t refutes itself. For, as Aristotle l o n g a g o p o i n t e d o u t , those w h o truly q u e s t i o n , say, the l a w o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n destroy a n y possibility o f c o h e r e n t l y e x p r e s s i n g their position. I f I say that b o t h p a n d not-jfr c a n (in e x a c t l y the s a m e sense) b e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

true,

then

m y saying

this c o n v e y s

no

i n f o r m a t i o n , since it is entirely c o m p a t i b l e w i t h its d e n i a l . T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , n o t h i n g in D e r r i d a that suggests this i n c o h e r e n t view. H e

1 ;

1 8

Sec J o n a t h a n Culler, On Deconstruction, 94—5. T h i s is a t h e m e w e have seen in B e r g s o n a n d will encounter again in D e l e u z e .

Derrida

305

a c c e p t s the logic o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o n t h o u g h t a n d discourse, a n d surely m e a n s all o f his assertions to entail the d e n i a l o f their c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . D e r r i d a m a k e s this p e r f e c t l y clear in his r e s p o n s e to the o b j e c t i o n that since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-relativistnihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, . . . how can he demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? H o w can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified, deformed it, etc.? D e r r i d a says the r e s p o n s e is simple: this definition of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble . . . . T h e value of truth (and of all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. (LimitedInc. (LI), 270/146).

19

P e r h a p s , h o w e v e r , D e r r i d a a d m i t s that the l a w s o f logic necessarily g o v e r n o u r t h o u g h t a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n b u t denies that t h e y a r e true o f the w o r l d a b o u t w h i c h w e think a n d speak. I f so, his skepticism w o u l d still s e e m indefensible. For h e w o u l d b e either simply d e n y i n g the reality o f a w o r l d outside o f o u r t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e o r h e w o u l d b e a c c e p t i n g that reality b u t a l l o w i n g for the truth o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y statements a b o u t it. E i t h e r alternative is surely a b s u r d . D e r r i d a is often said to h o l d the first alternative, m a i n l y o n the basis o f his f a m o u s , "II n ' y a p a s de h o r s t e x t e " ( " T h e r e is n o t h i n g outside the t e x t " ) .

2 0

H o w e v e r , the p o i n t o f this assertion is n o t that

there are n o things, o n l y w o r d s . It is r a t h e r m e a n t to c o n v e y that at e v e r y level — b o t h that o f reality itself a n d that o f o u r l a n g u a g e a n d t h o u g h t a b o u t reality - there are n o simply p r e s e n t facts o r m e a n i n g s b u t o n l y the u n e n d i n g p l a y o f differences that S a u s s u r e h a s s h o w n to c h a r a c t e r i z e l a n g u a g e . T h e r e is n o t h i n g outside the text (language) o n l y in the sense that b o t h l a n g u a g e

a n d reality are systems o f

differences a n d n o t h i n g else, a n d that the m e t a p h y s i c s o f p r e s e n c e applies to neither. O n c e

a g a i n , D e r r i d a h i m s e l f m a k e s the p o i n t

quite clearly: "there is nothing outside the text" . . . does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book . . . . But it does mean that every

1 9

2 0

T h e French edition of Limited Inc. (to w h i c h the first p a g e n u m b e r refers) is a direct translation of the English edition, in w h i c h Derrida's text first a p p e a r e d . De la grammatologie, 227/158.

3

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

o6

referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this " r e a l " except in an interpretive experience. T h e latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring. That's all. (LI, 273/148) It m a y s e e m , n e v e r t h e l e s s , that D e r r i d a at least allows for the truth o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y statements a b o u t reality. H e d o e s , after all, m a i n t a i n that the b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s o f logic d o n o t a p p l y to reality, so that, for e x a m p l e , w h a t is p r e s e n t is also a b s e n t a n d w h a t is also is not. B u t w h a t w e n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d h e r e is that the p a r a d o x i c a l assertions sprinkled t h r o u g h o u t D e r r i d a ' s texts are expressions o f the limitations o f our l o g i c a l systems, n o t descriptions o f the n a t u r e of reality. H e is n o t saying, for e x a m p l e , that s o m e aspect o f reality is itself s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a n d in the s a m e sense b o t h p r e s e n t a n d absent. H e is r a t h e r p o i n t i n g out that if w e insist o n a p p l y i n g to reality the precisely d e h n e d c a t e g o r i e s present a n d absent, w e will i n e v i t a b l y say such c o n t r a d i c t o r y things. C o n s i d e r s o m e simple e x a m p l e s . If I insist o n d e s c r i b i n g the w o r l d o f colors w i t h o n l y the t w o p r e d i c a t e s " r e d " a n d " n o t - r e d " , I m a y well be o b l i g e d to say that certain i n t e r m e d i a t e shades are b o t h r e d a n d n o t - r e d ; or, if I a m f o r c e d to d e s c r i b e a football g a m e in the l a n g u a g e o f b a s e b a l l , I will h n d m y s e l f s a y i n g things that violate d e h n i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f b a s e b a l l — for e x a m p l e , the p i t c h e r (quarterback) struck out three times (threw three i n c o m p l e t e passes) a n d then hit a h o m e r u n (threw a t o u c h d o w n pass). O r , to cite a m o r e s i g n i h c a n t case, if w e m u s t use the l a n g u a g e o f classical p h y s i c s to describe q u a n t u m p h e n o m e n a , w e are f o r c e d to m a k e claims that violate

categorical

truths

regarding

space,

time,

and

causality.

D e r r i d a is n o t i n g the limits o f all o u r l o g i c a l s c h e m a for talking a b o u t reality on a f u n d a m e n t a l level, n o t m a k i n g a b s u r d statements a b o u t reality. T h e n e x t possibility is that D e r r i d a is an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l skeptic; that is, e v e n if he a c c e p t s the laws o f l o g i c a n d does n o t d e n y the existence or l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y o f reality, it m a y s e e m that he at least denies the possibility o f our h a v i n g a n y s i g n i h c a n t k n o w l e d g e

of

reality, o f our b e i n g e p i s t e m i c a l l y j u s t i h e d in p r e f e r r i n g o n e interp r e t a t i o n o f it to another. B u t a l t h o u g h D e r r i d a is skeptical o f any p h i l o s o p h i c a l claims to h a v e u n c o v e r e d a d e e p , u n i v o c a l m e a n i n g o f reality, this q u e s t i o n i n g o f f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l claims n e e d not entail a rejection o f the everyday, c o m m o n - s e n s e k n o w l e d g e that is the basis o f a n y i n q u i r y a b o u t o u r w o r l d .

Derrida

307

D e r r i d a ' s attitude h e r e is i n d i c a t e d b y his v i e w s on the special case o f t e x t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h e r e he has often b e e n a c c u s e d o f the skeptical v i e w that n o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is superior to a n y other. In contrast to this c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , he says in De la grammatologie, for e x a m p l e , that there is a n e e d for a " d o u b l i n g c o m m e n t a r y " , a kind o f " l i t e r a l " s t a t e m e n t o f the text's m e a n i n g that p r o v i d e s an " i n d i s p e n s a b l e g u a r d r a i l " w i t h o u t w h i c h " c r i t i c a l p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d risk d e v e l o p i n g in a n y d i r e c t i o n at all a n d a u t h o r i z e itself to say a l m o s t anything".

2 1

Twenty

years

later,

responding

to

Gerald

Graff's

citation o f this p a s s a g e , D e r r i d a expresses s o m e dissatisfaction w i t h the

term

"doubling

commentary",

which

he

says

is

"perhaps

c l u m s i l y " p u t . T h i s e x p r e s s i o n s h o u l d n o t , he says, be t a k e n to m e a n that there is " a m o m e n t o f s i m p l y reflexive r e c o r d i n g that w o u l d transcribe

the

originary

and

true

layer

of

a

text's

intentional

m e a n i n g , a m e a n i n g that is u n i v o c a l a n d s e l f - i d e n t i c a l " (LI,

265/

143). B u t he still insists that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m u s t b e g i n w i t h a g r a s p o f a text's l a n g u a g e a n d c o n t e x t that p r o v i d e s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g " w h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y d o m i n a n t a n d

of

conven-

tionally a c k n o w l e d g e d to g r a n t access to w h a t [the a u t h o r ] t h o u g h t he m e a n t a n d to w h a t r e a d e r s for the m o s t p a r t t h o u g h t t h e y c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d " (LI, 267/144). T h e r e is, in o t h e r w o r d s , a " ' m i n i m a l ' d e c i p h e r i n g o f the 'first' p e r t i n e n t or c o m p e t e n t access to structures that are relatively stable (and h e n c e destabilizable!) a n d f r o m w h i c h the m o s t v e n t u r e s o m e questions a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h a v e to s t a r t " (LI, 268/145). W i t h o u t such a starting-point, he says, " o n e

could

i n d e e d say j u s t a n y t h i n g at all a n d I h a v e n e v e r a c c e p t e d saying, or e n c o u r a g i n g others to say, j u s t a n y t h i n g at a l l " (LI,

267/144-5).

N o n e o f this, h o w e v e r , m e a n s that D e r r i d a thinks there is s o m e a b s o l u t e , u n i v o c a l truth a b o u t the m e a n i n g o f a g i v e n text. More

generally,

there

is n o

reason

to think

that D e r r i d a

is

skeptical a b o u t o u r c o m m o n - s e n s e k n o w l e d g e f r o m w h i c h w e must b e g i n a n y i n q u i r y a b o u t the w o r l d , e v e n t h o u g h he is skeptical a b o u t philosophical

claims to h a v e

determined

the essential n a t u r e

of

reality. H e questions such c l a i m s on the g r o u n d s that the f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r i e s (expressed in b i n a r y oppositions) t h e y p r o p o s e for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the w o r l d collapse f r o m the i n t e r n a l tensions r e v e a l e d b y d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis. B u t this d o e s n o t m e a n that he denies the viability o f such c a t e g o r i e s for e v e r y d a y life.

2 1

Of Grammatology, 158.

3

o8

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

It m i g h t be m a i n t a i n e d , h o w e v e r , that it is n o t possible to d o u b t the p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f our c o m m o n - s e n s e a n d scientihc k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t c a l l i n g into q u e s t i o n that k n o w l e d g e itself. T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s to D e s c a r t e s ' p o i n t that w i t h o u t a h r m p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u s t i h c a t i o n for its p r i n c i p l e s , n e i t h e r science n o r c o m m o n sense has a n y defense against skeptical questioning. B u t to this D e r r i d a will surely r e s p o n d (as h a v e c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h e r s f r o m the later W i t t g e n s t e i n to R o r t y ) that the d e m a n d for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a tion o f n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e is m i s p l a c e d . In a n y case, he c a n surely consistently m a i n t a i n that the d e m a n d for such f o u n d a tions is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l one that has n o m o r e c l a i m on us t h a n the rest o f the t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l enterprise (which d e c o n s t r u c t i o n has c a l l e d into question). T h e h n a l possibility is that D e r r i d a is a m o r a l skeptic, d e n y i n g that w e h a v e a n y g e n u i n e k n o w l e d g e o f v a l u e s ; or p e r h a p s a m o r a l relativist, h o l d i n g that m o r a l truths are v a l i d o n l y for g i v e n cultures or individuals a n d h a v e n o absolute status. U p until a b o u t 1980, D e r r i d a h a d little to say a b o u t specifically ethical issues, a n d , in contrast to Sartre a n d F o u c a u l t , for e x a m p l e , he d i d n o t tie his p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections to political activity. B u t s u b s e q u e n t l y he has m a d e ethics (and religion) a m a j o r t h e m e . S o m e attention to this d e v e l o p m e n t will b o t h p r o v i d e a response to the question o f m o r a l skepticism a n d serve as an i n t r o d u c t i o n to D e r r i d a ' s m o r e r e c e n t writings.

ETHICS

Ethics c o n c e r n s our t r e a t m e n t o f others a n d is therefore linked to the n o t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y .

2 2

tightly

Derrida readily admits

to

feelings o f u n e a s e r e g a r d i n g c o m m u n i t y : I don't much like the word community, I am not even sure I like the thing. If by community one implies, as is often the case, a harmonious group, consensus, and fundamental agreement beneath the phenomenon of discord or war, then I don't believe in it very much and I sense in it as much a threat as promise. I have always had trouble vibrating in u n i s o n .

2 2

2 3

23

For D e r r i d a ' s recent treatments o f ethical topics, see, for e x a m p l e , De l'esprit, Spectres de Marx, a n d Politiques de l'amitié. Points, 355, 348.

Derrida D e r r i d a ' s d o u b t s a b o u t c o m m u n i t y c a n be c o n n e c t e d to a tension a p p a r e n t in the w o r d ' s e t y m o l o g y , w h i c h refers to a fortified city ( c u m = c o m m o n , m u n i s = d e f e n s e , as in " m u n i t i o n s " ) . T h e p r o b l e m , e t y m o l o g y aside, is that c o m m u n i t y s i m u l t a n e o u s l y implies s h a r i n g a n d e x c l u s i o n (sharing w i t h a c i r c u m s c r i b e d g r o u p a n d e x c l u s i o n of everyone

else). A

moral

commitment

to

a

specific

community

requires c u t t i n g o n e s e l f off f r o m a w h o l e r a n g e o f o t h e r p e o p l e , s o m e t h i n g D e r r i d a finds is in tension w i t h an ethical c o n c e r n for the o t h e r as such. A similar tension s h o w s u p if w e reflect on a n o t h e r t e r m that initially has v e r y positive ethical c o n n o t a t i o n s : hospitality. In fact, at first g l a n c e , hospitality m i g h t s e e m to offer a solution to the p r o b l e m o f the e x c l u s i o n a r y u n d e r t o n e s o f c o m m u n i t y . For, e v e n if I do h a v e a special c o m m i t m e n t to one c o m m u n i t y (my family, m y c h u r c h , m y c o u n t r y ) , surely there c a n a n d should b e an attitude o f w e l c o m i n g strangers, those w h o d o n ' t b e l o n g to the c o m m u n i t y .

Hospitality

does n o t m a k e strangers b e l o n g to m y c o m m u n i t y , but, short o f this, it d o e s p r o v i d e a special m o d e o f a c c e p t a n c e . B u t e v e n h e r e there are tensions, o n c e a g a i n signaled b y the etymology

For " h o s p i t a l i t y " derives, first, f r o m " h o s p e s " (guest),

w h i c h itself derives f r o m " h o s t i s " , w h i c h originally m e a n s " s t r a n g e r " b u t c o m e s to m e a n " e n e m y " . M o r e o v e r , the s e c o n d p a r t o f the w o r d derives f r o m " p o t e s " , m e a n i n g " p o w e r " . S o there is a n e t y m o l o g i c a l sense in w h i c h w e l c o m i n g a g u e s t m e a n s h a v i n g p o w e r over (or, p e r h a p s , g i v i n g p o w e r to) an enemy. W e c a n notice this tension on a p r a c t i c a l level in the c o m m o n p l a c e expression,

"Make

y o u r s e l f at h o m e . "

Hosts

can

say this

only

b e c a u s e t h e y in fact o w n their h o m e s , that is, t h e y are in c o n t r o l of the s p a c e that the guest is entering. A l s o , guests h a v e n o right to literally m a k e t h e m s e l v e s at h o m e - a n d a host w o u l d be s h o c k e d a n d o u t r a g e d if a guest did so. T h e r e

is clearly a limit to the

w e l c o m e a n d a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the guest to the p o w e r o f the host. B u t at the s a m e time the essence o f hospitality is to m o v e b e y o n d this limit a n d this s u b o r d i n a t i o n .

G o o d hosts c o n t i n u a l l y

act to put

themselves entirely at the disposition o f their guests, b u t the g o o d guest will n e v e r fully a c c e p t w h a t is so u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y offered. A t the ideal limit, the p e r f e c t host w o u l d offer all he has to the guest — a n d sincerely so. B u t , if the guest a c c e p t e d this, the host w o u l d n o l o n g e r be in possession o f his h o m e a n d so w o u l d n o l o n g e r be able to b e the host. In this sense, hospitality is w h a t w e m i g h t call a "self-

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990) e x c e e d i n g " c o n c e p t . In m o v i n g t o w a r d r e a l i z i n g it, w e also m o v e to d e s t r o y i n g the c o n d i t i o n s o f its a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s self-excess is the source o f the tension b e t w e e n host a n d guest that a c c o u n t s for the e t y m o l o g i c a l t r a c e w e d i s c o v e r e d o f the guest as enemy. The

same

self-exceeding

character

ethical c o n c e p t , that o f the gift.

shows

up

in

another

key

Surely, g i v i n g to others is the

essence o f ethical b e h a v i o r . B u t w h a t actually h a p p e n s w h e n I give a gift — say a b i r t h d a y p r e s e n t to a friend? First o f all, I, the giver, a m established as s o m e o n e w h o has d o n e the r i g h t thing, m a y b e m o r e t h a n the right t h i n g , if the gift e x c e e d s the m i n i m u m that w o u l d h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d . T h i s " m o r a l " g a i n m a y offset a n y e x p e n s e o f m o n e y or t i m e the gift m a y h a v e cost m e . T h u s , all things c o n s i d e r e d , I a m better off t h a n I w a s b e f o r e I g a v e the gift. A t the s a m e t i m e , the r e c i p i e n t o f the gift is n o w i n d e b t e d to the g i v e r to r e c i p r o c a t e . In fact, the o b l i g a t i o n g o e s b e y o n d that. R e c i p i e n t s c a n n o t j u s t literally r e c i p r o c a t e , by, for e x a m p l e , j u s t g i v i n g b a c k the s a m e gift. T h e y have

to seek out s o m e t h i n g r o u g h l y

e q u a l in v a l u e

different, to s h o w that t h e y h a v e n o t j u s t m e c h a n i c a l l y

but

clearly

responded

b u t h a v e m a d e , as w e say, a " t h o u g h t f u l " gift. M o r e o v e r , t h e y c a n n o t i m m e d i a t e l y relieve t h e m s e l v e s o f the o b l i g a t i o n (e.g., b y t a k i n g the giver to d i n n e r that evening). T h e y m u s t live w i t h the b u r d e n o f o w i n g a gift until an a p p r o p r i a t e time for r e c i p r o c a t i o n o c c u r s (e.g., the giver's o w n b i r t h d a y ) . It follows that the h n a l result o f the gift g i v i n g is that the r e c i p i e n t is w o r s e off. T h i s , t h e n , is the p a r a d o x of the gift: on the d e e p e s t level, it is the g i v e r w h o r e c e i v e s a n d the r e c i p i e n t w h o w i n d s u p in debt. So

in

all three

o f these

key

ethical

concepts

-

community,

hospitality, the gift — w e e n c o u n t e r the s a m e thing: an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w a y w e should relate to o t h e r p e o p l e that is r e v e a l e d as internally i n c o h e r e n t o n c e w e p u s h it far e n o u g h . T h i s , o f c o u r s e , is an e x a m p l e o f w h a t D e r r i d a m e a n s b y " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " . It m i g h t s e e m that the p o i n t o f such a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is to p r o d u c e skepticism a b o u t ethics, to s h o w that there is n o sense or p o i n t to b e h a v i o r , b e c a u s e the ideas o n w h i c h it is b a s e d collapse

ethical upon

analysis. T h i s , h o w e v e r , is e m p h a t i c a l l y n o t D e r r i d a ' s p o i n t . W e c a n best see this b y r e a l i z i n g that, in e a c h case, his d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is in the n a m e o f a n d for the sake o f s o m e t h i n g that he r e c o g n i z e s as not d e c o n s t r u c t i b l e . W h a t is this? It is p r e c i s e l y the reality o f c o m m u n i t y , o f hospitality, o f gift-giving in o u r lives. D e s p i t e the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f o u r c o n c e p t s to these realities, w e k n o w that t h e y exist a n d h a v e an

Derrida

3"

u n d e n i a b l e v a l u e . D e c o n s t r u c t i o n is n o t m e a n t to assail the l i v e d reality that o u r c o n c e p t s are t r y i n g to c a t c h . It is r a t h e r d i r e c t e d against o u r c o m p l a c e n c y in t h i n k i n g that the u n d e r s t a n d i n g these c o n c e p t s p r o v i d e o f the reality is a d e q u a t e , that t h e y c a n in effect r e p l a c e — w i t h o u t l e a v i n g a t r a c e u n a c c o u n t e d for — the reality. H e r e D e r r i d a ' s l a n g u a g e o f " t r a c e " expresses the fact that reality (the

truth)

always

somehow

eludes

our

thought

and

even

our

e x p e r i e n c e (which itself is impossible w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f w h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e ) . W e h a v e access to it o n l y as a t r a c e , p r e s e n t o n l y indirectiy as w h a t o u r t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e s o m e h o w points to b u t c a n n o t express. T h e p o i n t c a n likewise b e e x p r e s s e d in o t h e r D e r r i d e a n t e r m s . T h e " t r a c e - r e a l i t y " c o r r e s p o n d s to the differance b e t w e e n reality a n d w h a t w e think a n d e x p e r i e n c e , a n d it is the n e c e s s a r y supplement to this t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e . D e r r i d a ' s p o i n t , t h e n , is n o t that there is n o ethical reality b u t that e v e r y direct access w e h a v e to ethical reality is i n a d e q u a t e to its object. A t the s a m e t i m e , he is n o t s a y i n g that the truth o f ethics lies in s o m e m y s t i c a l , inaccessible b e y o n d . T h e o n l y w a y the truth is or c o u l d c o m e to us is as differance, as t r a c e , as s u p p l e m e n t . In this sense, t h e n , D e r r i d a does a c k n o w l e d g e a truth b e y o n d d e c o n s t r u c tion that d e h n e s the d o m a i n o f the ethical. A l l the a b o v e issues c o m e to a h e a d in D e r r i d a ' s t r e a t m e n t o f the c e n t r a l ethical c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e .

2 4

H e r e he o n c e a g a i n b e g i n s f r o m

an essential tension: j u s t i c e is in o n e sense n o t h i n g other t h a n the rule o f l a w ; b u t in fact the m e r e , literal a p p l i c a t i o n o f the l a w is g e n e r a l l y unjust. T h e p o i n t is n o t m e r e l y the t r a d i t i o n a l one that there is a distinction b e t w e e n a n y positive l a w (legislated b y s o m e p a r t i c u l a r h u m a n society) a n d the absolute s t a n d a r d s d e h n e d by, say, divine c o m m a n d , the F o r m o f Justice, or h u m a n n a t u r e . D e r r i d a ' s c l a i m is m u c h stronger: that a n y system o f l a w s - h u m a n , n a t u r a l , divine - will n e v e r be able in itself to specify a d e q u a t e l y the c o n d u c t that is j u s t in a g i v e n situation. A c c o r d i n g l y , a n y system o f l a w s is subject to d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . N o m a t t e r h o w stable, consistent, a n d c o h e r e n t it m a y b e in its o w n t e r m s , there will b e p o i n t s o f a p p l i c a t i o n w h e r e it b e c o m e s i n c o h e r e n t . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , the case o f m u r d e r s b y

children

b e l o w the legal age o f responsibility. It m a k e s p e r f e c t sense, w h e n setting u p laws, to h a v e s o m e age limit on v a r i o u s sorts o f responsi-

2 4

See, for e x a m p l e , Du droit à la philosophie a n d Force de loi: le "fondement mystique de l'autorité".

3

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

I2

bility. B u t such l a w s are c o n f o u n d e d w h e n

children behave

like

v i c i o u s adults. A t s u c h critical p o i n t s o f a p p l i c a t i o n , w e see the tension b e t w e e n l a w a n d j u s t i c e . D e r r i d a d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , m e a n to suggest that w e h a v e access to j u s t i c e t h r o u g h a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n law. T h e r e is, as a l w a y s , n o q u e s t i o n o f s o m e special access, t h r o u g h a p r i v i l e g e d e x p e r i e n c e or insight, to w h a t lies b e y o n d the law. Just as w e c a n n e v e r get b e y o n d our concepts, we

cannot get beyond

our laws, which

are

only

c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s o f e t h i c a l obligations. R a t h e r , w e m o v e t o w a r d justice simply b y r e m a i n i n g e v e r sensitive to possible limitations of laws, b y b e i n g a l w a y s r e a d y to d e c o n s t r u c t l a w s that are w o r k i n g against j u s t i c e . T h i s is o n e r e a s o n w h y D e r r i d a c a n suggest that "deconstruction

is j u s t i c e " .

2 5

Or,

as he

says in a less

lapidary

explanation: T h e law as such can be deconstructed and has to be deconstructed. T h a t is the condition of historicity, revolution, morals, ethics, and progress. But justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the l a w . 26

T h i s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is n o t a skeptical rejection o f the l a w b u t a c l e a r i n g o f the g r o u n d for a n e w j u d g m e n t o f h o w w e should b e h a v e . T h i s n e w j u d g m e n t (decision) does n o t itself d r a w a u t h o r i t y from a n y system o f l a w - h o w c o u l d it, w h e n it p r e s u p p o s e s a d e c o n s t r u c tion o f p r e v i o u s systems? B u t n e i t h e r does it d r a w a u t h o r i t y from s o m e p r i v i l e g e d insight b e y o n d the l a w (say a P l a t o n i c intuition of Justice). T h e j u d g m e n t is a l e a p , a t a k i n g o f a stand w h e n there is n o a d e q u a t e justification for t a k i n g a stand. In this r e g a r d , D e r r i d a cites Kierkegaard:

"The

instant

o f decision is a m a d n e s s " ; it is the

m o v e m e n t o f the i n d i v i d u a l b e y o n d the universal. B u t this l e a p does not take us b e y o n d the r e a l m o f l a w as such. It m o v e s previous

formulations

of law but must

in t u r n justify

beyond itself b y

c o n s t r u c t i n g a new, m o r e a d e q u a t e system o f l a w that will, o f c o u r s e , itself b e subject to d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . In contrast to d a n g e r o u s irrationalisms (e.g., fascism, religious fanaticism) that l e a v e r e a s o n b e h i n d in a flood o f m e r e will or e m o t i o n , D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i v e a p p r o a c h a l w a y s subjects o u r " l e a p s " b e y o n d o n e system o f r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t

" F o r c e of L a w : T h e ' M y s t i c a l Foundation o f A u t h o r i t y ' " , in D. C o r n e l l , et al. (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. 26 " V i l l a n o v a R o u n d t a b l e " , in J o h n C a p u t o (ed.), Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 16. 2 5

Derrida

3*3

to the constraint o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a n e w system o f r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t . I n this way, h e b a l a n c e s r e a s o n a n d a sense o f its limitations against o n e a n o t h e r in a c o n s t a n t p l a y o f tensions. P e r h a p s the best w a y to s u m u p D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i v e v i e w o f ethics is to say that it is at r o o t an openness to the other. T h i s hrst o f all expresses a t r a d i t i o n a l ethical c o n c e r n for the w e l f a r e o f others. It further c o r r e s p o n d s to the strong c o n t e m p o r a r y ethical v a l u a t i o n o f alternative v i e w p o i n t s ( " d i v e r s i t y " , " m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m " ) . B u t , m o s t o f all, it expresses D e r r i d a ' s b e l i e f that o u r c o n v i c t i o n s a l w a y s h a v e d a n g e r o u s limitations that m a y l e a d us a w a y f r o m j u s t i c e unless w e continually

try to think

beyond

them.

Such

thought

keeps

us

m o v i n g , as w e m u s t , t o w a r d a n o t h e r that will a l w a y s lie b e y o n d o u r current horizon.

RELIGION

T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , " a n o t h e r that will a l w a y s lie b e y o n d o u r c u r r e n t horizon",

evokes

the t r a n s c e n d e n c e

associated

with

G o d , and

D e r r i d a ' s reflections o n ethics thus easily take o n a religious t o n e (a tone also a n t i c i p a t e d b y his e t h i c a l e m p h a s i s o n the gift, w h i c h o f course e v o k e s divine g r a c e ) . T h e religious t h e m e b e c o m e s explicit in, for e x a m p l e , the last t w o c h a p t e r s o f D e r r i d a ' s b o o k Donner la mort, where

h e reflects

— following

A b r a h a m ' s sacrihce o f I s a a c .

Kierkegaard

— o n the story

of

2 7

T h i s story, f r o m the b o o k o f G e n e s i s , is t a k e n b y K i e r k e g a a r d (in Fear and Trembling) to p r e s e n t A b r a h a m as the " f a t h e r o f f a i t h " , the first a n d greatest e x a m p l e o f faith. K i e r k e g a a r d r e a d s the story as illustrating the difference

between

the ethical a n d the religious

v i e w p o i n t s ; that is, b e t w e e n a universal l a w that w e c a n articulate a n d u n d e r s t a n d a n d a n i n d i v i d u a l relation to G o d that w e c a n neither g r a s p n o r express. H e sees this difference especially in the silence o f A b r a h a m , w h o n e v e r e x p l a i n s to Isaac or to his wife the real p u r p o s e o f his j o u r n e y to the m o u n t a i n . E v e n w h e n h e does speak - e.g., to a n s w e r Isaac's q u e s t i o n a b o u t w h e r e t h e y will h n d a l a m b to sacrihce - h e replies (saying that G o d will p r o v i d e one)

2 7

D e r r i d a ' s turn to religious topics correlates with his interest in his o w n Jewish origins. See, in particular, " C i r c u m f e s s i o n " , his r u n n i n g response to Geoffrey Bennington's exposition ("Derriclabase") of his thought, in G. B e n n i n g t o n a n d J. D e r r i d a , Jacques Derrida, For a thorough a n d stimulating discussion o f D e r r i d a o n religion, see J o h n C a p u t o , The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida.

314

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

in a w a y that, a l t h o u g h n o t a lie, does n o t c o n v e y w h a t he takes to be the truth o f the situation. ( A l t h o u g h , as D e r r i d a points out, it does

convey

what

is

in

fact

the

truth

of

the

situation.)

For

K i e r k e g a a r d , this silence contrasts w i t h the p a n o p l y o f e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d justifications

that

are

available

to

those

who

are

acting

ethically. T h e y c a n a p p e a l to c h a p t e r a n d verse o f the l a w to clarify j u s t w h a t t h e y are d o i n g a n d w h y t h e y are d o i n g it. T h i s , o f course, is b e c a u s e the l a w is s o m e t h i n g f o r m u l a t e d in h u m a n c o n c e p t s a n d so totally accessible to o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t A b r a h a m ' s

obedi-

e n c e to G o d is an o b l i g a t i o n o f faith, n o t o f ethics. It arises f r o m an entirely m y s t e r i o u s c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m G o d that c a n m a k e

no

ethical sense to A b r a h a m a n d w h i c h p r o v i d e s n o justification for his action. It is n o t j u s t that w h a t A b r a h a m does m a k e s n o sense ethically, that it lies outside the d o m a i n

o f ethics. R a t h e r , his actions

go

directly a g a i n s t his ethical responsibility. H e is p r o p o s i n g to m u r d e r his son. A n y o n e w h o did this w e w o u l d c o n d e m n out o f h a n d , n o m a t t e r w h a t he or she m i g h t try to say a b o u t divine c o m m a n d s or religious duty. A s K i e r k e g a a r d presents it, the A b r a h a m story shows the conflict b e t w e e n ethical a n d religious responsibility. Faith, the act b y w h i c h w e enter the religious sphere, involves o u r

acting

against o u r f u n d a m e n t a l ethical responsibilities. T h i s is a p p a r e n t in such strong l a n g u a g e as that o f L u k e 14:26: " I f a n y o n e c o m e s to m e a n d d o e s n o t h a t e his o w n father a n d m o t h e r a n d his wife

and

c h i l d r e n a n d b r o t h e r s a n d sisters, yes, a n d e v e n his o w n life, he c a n n o t be m y d i s c i p l e . " T h e r e are t w o o b v i o u s w a y s o f r e a c t i n g to K i e r k e g a a r d ' s r e a d i n g o f the A b r a h a m story. O n the o n e h a n d , w e m i g h t try to tone d o w n the r a d i c a l v i e w o f religion a n d say that A b r a h a m ' s b e h a v i o r does not really o u t r a g e ethical n o r m s , that religion does n o t really r e q u i r e a c h o i c e b e t w e e n G o d a n d morality. O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e m i g h t a c c e p t K i e r k e g a a r d ' s v i e w o f religion b u t c l a i m that this is precisely w h y religious faith is n o t an o p t i o n for a sensible p e r s o n : a n y t h i n g that r e q u i r e s s u b o r d i n a t i n g m o r a l i t y to s o m e alleged divine revelation is simply u n a c c e p t a b l e . A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h , c o m m o n

among

religious believers, is n o t to reflect on the story's i m p l i c a t i o n s b u t j u s t p o i n t to it as an e x a m p l e o f the total mysteriousness o f faith a n d c o n s e q u e n t lack o f a n y n e e d to think it t h r o u g h at a f u n d a m e n t a l level. T h i s , h o w e v e r , is entirely c o n t r a r y to K i e r k e g a a r d ' s p o i n t in m e d i t a t i n g o n the story.

Derrida

3i5

D e r r i d a , h o w e v e r , does n o t take a n y o f these routes. I n s t e a d , he suggests that the story m i g h t be telling us s o m e t h i n g a b o u t nature

o f ethical

responsibility

itself, r a t h e r

than

the

distinguishing

ethical f r o m religious responsibility. Is t h e r e , he asks, really s o m e t h i n g so distinctive a n d different a b o u t A b r a h a m ' s situation? Is it n o t r a t h e r the situation o f e v e r y o n e , e v e r y d a y ? In K i e r k e g a a r d ' s r e a d i n g o f the A b r a h a m story, " G o d " is the n a m e for an o t h e r to w h o m A b r a h a m has a n absolute responsibility, o n e that overrides his duty to a n y o n e else. B u t , D e r r i d a suggests, this is p r e c i s e l y the situation of a n y o f us w h e n w e h n d ourselves ethically responsible to a n o t h e r p e r s o n . I f I a m truly responsible, h e r e a n d now, for m y spouse, m y c h i l d r e n , m y friend, m y c o u n t r y - t h e n this responsibility overrides o t h e r duties I m i g h t h a v e e l s e w h e r e . For e x a m p l e , if I a m responsible for w a t c h i n g m y c h i l d r e n this m o r n i n g , I c a n n o t take care o f m y ailing father, or h e l p i m p r o v e e d u c a t i o n in the i n n e r city, o r w o r k for the relief o f w o r l d h u n g e r . In a c c e p t i n g one responsibility, I must, like A b r a h a m , r e n o u n c e all the others. W e m a y r e s p o n d that clear ethical t h i n k i n g will e n a b l e us to r a n k o u r v a r i o u s responsibilities so that w e h a v e a h r m basis for s a y i n g w h i c h take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r others. B u t a little (Sartrean) reflection should m a k e it clear that there are n o ethical rules specihc e n o u g h to tell us w h e t h e r w e s h o u l d , for e x a m p l e , spend m o r e time w i t h o u r f a m i l y or m o r e time w o r k i n g at a h o m e l e s s shelter. O u r

ethical

p r i n c i p l e s c a n p r o v i d e s o m e v a l u e s r e l e v a n t to such a d e c i s i o n , b u t it is u p to us to d e c i d e j u s t h o w to w e i g h t the v a l u e s . N o m a t t e r h o w fully i n f o r m e d a n d reflective w e a r e , our decision will s i m p l y b e o u r o w n , n o t the c o n s e q u e n c e o f c o m p e l l i n g r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A s D e r r i d a puts it: " A t the instant o f e v e r y decision a n d t h r o u g h the relation to e v e r y o t h e r . . . e v e r y one else asks us at e v e r y m o m e n t to b e h a v e like knights o f f a i t h . " C l e a r l y D e r r i d a has f o u n d the A b r a h a m story a n d K i e r k e g a a r d ' s reflections on it v a l u a b l e for e x p r e s s i n g his deconstructivist v i e w o f ethics. B u t w h a t a b o u t the specifically religious d i m e n s i o n s o f the story?

Derrida

is a w a r e

that his use

o f the

story

differs

from

K i e r k e g a a r d ' s . T h e k e y difference is that for D e r r i d a the " o t h e r " to w h o m w e are o b l i g a t e d is a n y o n e to w h o m w e h a v e an

ethical

o b l i g a t i o n — that is, e v e r y o n e w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . For K i e r k e g a a r d (and surely for a religious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in general) the " o t h e r " w h o calls A b r a h a m is distinctively a n d u n i q u e l y G o d . A s D e r r i d a h i m s e l f puts it, in an a m a z i n g u n d e r s t a t e m e n t , his r e a d i n g " p e r h a p s . . .

3

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

i6

displaces a certain e m p h a s i s o f K i e r k e g a a r d ' s discourse: the absolute u n i q u e n e s s o f Y a h w e h d o e s n ' t tolerate a n a l o g y " .

2 8

W e m a y be t e m p t e d to g o e v e n further a n d say that D e r r i d a ' s r e a d i n g represents a rejection o f a religious v i e w p o i n t in favor o f a p u r e l y h u m a n ethics. A f t e r all, religion is a response to a call from G o d , n o t f r o m o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g s . H u m a n others n o d o u b t h a v e their

own

establish

mystery

and

a limit to the

inaccessibility application

and,

of our

as

we

have

seen,

ethical laws. B u t

to

substitute such h u m a n , m u n d a n e m y s t e r y for the G o d w h o transc e n d s e v e r y t h i n g h u m a n w o u l d s e e m to be p r e c i s e l y w h a t it m e a n s to r e n o u n c e religion. B u t there is religion a n d there is r e l i g i o n ; or, as D e r r i d a has p u t it, there is religion a n d there is f a i t h .

2 9

Faith, in this t e r m i n o l o g y , is

simply the a c c e p t a n c e o f the " c a l l " o f the other as w e h a v e seen it in D e r r i d a ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the A b r a h a m story. Its object is " m e r e l y h u m a n " in the sense that it d o e s n o t posit a n y " p r e s e n c e s " (entities, substances) b e y o n d the h u m a n w o r l d . B u t the o b j e c t o f D e r r i d a ' s faith is c e r t a i n l y n o t h u m a n i t y a n d its v a l u e s as w e e n c o u n t e r t h e m . It is, rather, ethical v a l u e as the inaccessible limit o f a n y possible h u m a n t h o u g h t or e x p e r i e n c e . P u t this way, it is n o t so o u t r a g e o u s to say that D e r r i d a in s o m e sense a c c e p t s the divine. R e l i g i o n ,

by

contrast, is w h a t w e get w h e n w e i n t e r p r e t the " o t h e r " o f A b r a h a m ' s call as the G o d o f o n e o f the historical religions, a G o d w h o is n o l o n g e r the n o n d e c o n s t r u c t i b l e limit o f all o u r t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e b u t a b e i n g w h o has b e e n r e v e a l e d to (some o f ) us as h a v i n g specific characteristics: p e r f o r m i n g certain actions, h a v i n g certain desires, issuing certain c o m m a n d s . For r e l i g i o n , the divine as o t h e r is a p r e s e n c e , s o m e t h i n g " h e r e " , to w h i c h w e h a v e positive access, e v e n if " t h r o u g h a glass d a r k l y " . D e r r i d a is v e r y u n e a s y w i t h the further m o v e to religion. H i s w o r r y is that religion absolutizes a l l - t o o - h u m a n c a t e g o r i e s b y identifying the o t h e r w i t h o n e p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n .

This

gives a G o d w h o is c a t e g o r i c a l r a t h e r t h a n t r a n s c e n d e n t , a G o d w h o is o f the J e w s or o f the C a t h o l i c s or o f the M u s l i m s — in short, a G o d w h o is a reflection r a t h e r t h a n a n u n r e a c h a b l e limit o f t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e . D e r r i d a suggests that r e l i g i o n in this sense is the u l t i m a t e f o r m o f idolatry. 2 8

2 9

The Gift ofDeath, 79. " V i l l a n o v a R o u n d t a b l e " , in J o h n C a p u t o (ed.), Deconstruction in a .Nutshell; see also G a p u t o ' s commentary, 164—8.

Derrida

3*7

T h e p o i n t c a n also be m a d e in t e r m s o f D e r r i d a ' s reflections o n the religious n o t i o n o f the m e s s i a h — the savior w h o is to c o m e . D e r r i d a has n o p r o b l e m w i t h this n o t i o n p r o v i d e d the m e s s i a h is always yet to c o m e . T h i s w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to w h a t he calls the i d e a o f the messianic — the p e r p e t u a l " b e y o n d " , the o t h e r that is a l w a y s i m m i n e n t (casting its s h a d o w o v e r us) b u t n e v e r a c t u a l l y h e r e , that w h i c h m a k e s us c o n s t a n t l y a w a r e o f the limits a n d surpassability of o u r c o n c e p t i o n s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s (e.g., o u r systems o f e t h i c a l law). B u t religion gives us, instead o f the messianic (or messianicity), w h a t D e r r i d a calls m e s s i a n i s m : a m e s s i a h w h o has a l r e a d y c o m e (or will s o m e d a y actually c o m e ) . For m e s s i a n i s m , the c o m i n g o f the m e s s i a h is a specific historical reality o c c u r r i n g in real t i m e a n d therefore c o l o r e d a n d limited b y the features o f that p a r t i c u l a r

historical

p e r i o d . D e r r i d a ' s w o r r y is that in a c c e p t i n g such a m e s s i a h w e falsely privilege the t h o u g h t a n d e x p e r i e n c e o f one p a r t i c u l a r

historical

p e r i o d , a n d that, in particular, w e a c c e p t as absolutes v a l u e s that are in fact j u s t the e x p r e s s i o n o f a limited culture, a culture that itself needs

deconstruction.

Derrida's

messianic

view

is e x p r e s s e d

in

B l a n c h o t ' s v i g n e t t e : o n e d a y on the outskirts o f R o m e , I m e e t a m a n in rags w h o is, in fact, the M e s s i a h . W h a t should I say to h i m ? I should ask h i m : " W h e n will y o u c o m e ? " .

3 0

E v e n if the M e s s i a h w e r e

s o m e h o w h e r e , w e should still think o f h i m as he w h o is yet to c o m e . In s u m , D e r r i d a ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is o p e n to r e l i g i o n in the sense that its focus on the o t h e r c a n b e p l a u s i b l y r e a d as a r e f e r e n c e to the divine as the absolute t r a n s c e n d e n t that is the e n l i g h t e n i n g

and

enlivening

not

limit

o f our

thought

and

experience.

But

it is

consistent w i t h religion that presents itself as a special m e a n s o f access to a divine reality that s o m e h o w b e c o m e s a positive, presently g r a s p e d truth for us. T h i s is the t r a d i t i o n a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of

religious institutions (churches), b u t it is n o p a r t o f the faith

of

Jacques Derrida. •

50

M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , The Writing of the Disaster, 141—2. C i t e d by D e r r i d a , Politiques de Vamitie, 55 n

CHAPTER

II

Philosophies of difference

As for the truths which the intellectual faculty — even that of the greatest minds - gathers in the open, the truths that lie in its path in full daylight, their value may be very great, but they are like drawings with a hard outline and no perspective; they have no depth because no depths had to be traversed in order to reach them, because they have not been re-created. ( M a r c e l P r o u s t , In Search of Lost Time, v i , 303) A l t h o u g h D e r r i d a ' s talk o f différance is t i n g e d w i t h his o w n p e c u l i a r coyness a n d taste for p a r a d o x , the g e n e r a l t h e m e o f difference is f u n d a m e n t a l for all poststructuralists, w h o are in p r i n c i p l e w a r y o f t h o u g h t that r e d u c e s diverse e l e m e n t s to the sameness o f u n i f y i n g concepts

or

theories.

Moreover,

even

though

Derrida

is

most

strongly associated w i t h the n o t i o n , he offers a f o c u s e d discussion of it in only one essay ( " L a d i f f é r a n c e " ) . B y contrast, L y o t a r d , D e l e u z e , and Irigaray provide

extensive

developments

of what

they

call,

respectively, the différend, difference, a n d s e x u a l difference.

LYOTARD

E v e n b e f o r e his b o o k - l e n g t h t r e a t m e n t o f difference in Le différend, J e a n - F r a n ç o i s L y o t a r d (1924—98) insistentiy a n d p o w e r f u l l y

devel-

o p e d the t h e m e o f a reality s o m e h o w b e y o n d a n d different

from

intelligible structure. H e did this in a v a r i e t y o f keys, s p e a k i n g o f desire in the c o n t e x t o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , o f line in the c o n t e x t o f art, a n d , in a w i d e r a n g e o f c o n t e x t s , o f h g u r e , e v e n t , a n d singularity. A

g o o d initial e x a m p l e

is his critique

of Lacan's

structuralist

a c c o u n t o f desire. A s w e h a v e seen, L a c a n claims that the u n c o n scious m i n d has the structure o f a l a n g u a g e , u n d e r s t o o d as a system o f signs w h o s e m e a n i n g s are entirely d e h n e d b y their roles in the system. T h e

u n c o n s c i o u s is entirely a f u n c t i o n 318

o f this linguistic

Philosophies of difference

3*9

system. I n o p p o s i t i o n to L a c a n , L y o t a r d asserts the a u t o n o m y a n d primacy

o f desire

as a

non-linguistic

force

(Freud's

"primary

p r o c e s s " ) . S o u n d e r s t o o d , desire is n o t m e r e l y the l a c k o r limit o f the u n c o n s c i o u s as a s y m b o l i c system. It is a d y n a m i c p r o c e s s , a sheer undifferentiated

energy

that

fuels

the life

o f the

unconscious.

L y o t a r d c o m p a r e s the case o f desire to that o f i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . E v e n t h o u g h the p e r c e p t u a l o b j e c t is n o t " s i m p l y g i v e n " to the m i n d in a n e x p e r i e n c e u n f o r m e d b y a n y linguistic categories, it does n o t follow that the c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e is e x h a u s t e d b y l a n g u a g e . " W e c a n say that the tree is g r e e n , b u t this does n o t p u t the color into the s e n t e n c e . "

1

A similar a r g u m e n t c a n b e m a d e for

desire. Just as p e r c e p t i o n is fulfilled b y a n object w i t h a n intrinsic content

that

cannot

be reduced

to the linguistic

structures

of

consciousness, so t o o desire c a n b e fulfilled b y a n o b j e c t i r r e d u c i b l e to the linguistic structures o f the u n c o n s c i o u s . I n this w a y , desire takes us b e y o n d the b o u n d a r i e s o f a p u r e l y structuralist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the u n c o n s c i o u s . L y o t a r d m a k e s a similar p o i n t in aesthetic c o n t e x t s t h r o u g h his distinction b e t w e e n letter a n d line. B y " l e t t e r " h e m e a n s a linguistic sign as u n d e r s t o o d b y Saussure: a n e l e m e n t in a system that has significance solely in virtue o f its differences f r o m o t h e r e l e m e n t s in a system. If, for e x a m p l e , a M a g r i t t e p a i n t i n g c o n t a i n s the w r i t t e n m e s s a g e , " T h i s is n o t a p i p e " , the letters u s e d c a n h a v e a n y p h y s i c a l shape at all (so l o n g as those shapes a l l o w us to distinguish a t f r o m a p, etc.) a n d still c o n v e y the m e s s a g e . B u t , as lines in the p a i n t i n g , the precise shapes o f the p, t, etc. are crucial. A thick r e d script will c o n v e y o n e aesthetic m e a n i n g , a thin g r e e n another. For the p a n d t as letters, pre-linguistic c o n t e n t is i r r e l e v a n t , b u t for t h e m as lines it is c r u c i a l . For " T h i s

is n o t a p i p e "

as read, there

is n o

content

i r r e d u c i b l e to the linguistic system; b u t for " T h i s is n o t a p i p e " as seen, there is. In a p a r a l l e l b u t m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l w a y , L y o t a r d

distinguishes

b e t w e e n discourse a n d figure. D i s c o u r s e is the system o f c o n c e p t u a l structures w h e r e b y w e r e p r e s e n t the w o r l d . It is, accordingly, the d o m a i n o f m e a n i n g a n d rationality, o f that w h i c h c a n b e explicitly f o r m u l a t e d in l a n g u a g e (and h e n c e translated f r o m o n e l a n g u a g e to a n o t h e r ) . F i g u r e , b y c o n t r a s t , is w h a t r e m a i n s u n a s s i m i l a b l e to discourse — w h a t c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d o r f o r m u l a t e d in o u r l a n g u a g e ,

1

Discours, figure, 52.

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

320

w h a t d e h n e s the limits o f m e a n i n g a n d rationality. It is, for e x a m p l e , w h a t r e m a i n s o f the p o e m after w e h a v e c o m p l e t e l y

paraphrased

a n d e x p l i c a t e d it in p r o s e (or w h a t r e m a i n s o f an e x p e r i e n c e after o u r c o n c e p t s h a v e e x h a u s t i v e l y d e s c r i b e d it). F i g u r e is n o t outside of or in o p p o s i t i o n to discourse. T h a t w o u l d be to say that the real p o e t r y is outside the p o e m or that the singular feel o f the e x p e r i e n c e is outside the e x p e r i e n c e . F i g u r e is b e t t e r r e g a r d e d as a n essential inverse o f discourse, w h e r e b y discourse is a l w a y s e n t a n g l e d

with

s o m e t h i n g it c a n n o t master. For m a n y y e a r s before his m a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k s , L y o t a r d w a s a p o l i t i c a l intellectual, an instigator o f protests at N a n t e r r e j u s t before M a y '68 a n d a m e m b e r o f the activist g r o u p S o c i a l i s m e ou Barbarie, where

he

specialized

in the A l g e r i a n

problem.

2

It is,

accordingly, n o t surprising that his w o r k has c o n s e q u e n c e s for social a n d political t h o u g h t or e v e n that, as G e o f f r e y asserted, " h i s t h o u g h t is f u n d a m e n t a l l y p o l i t i c a l " .

Bennington 3

has

S o , for e x a m p l e ,

L y o t a r d claims that p s y c h o l o g i c a l desire a n d political p o w e r m u s t b e t h o u g h t o f as n e c e s s a r y c o u n t e r p a r t s . D e s i r e is p r e c i s e l y that w h i c h p o w e r constrains, a n d that w h i c h struggles against p o w e r . It m a d e sense, t h e r e f o r e , for L y o t a r d to d e v e l o p a " l i b i d i n a l p o l i t i c s " : a t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t b a s e d on the f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e o f the

flourishing

o f a plurality o f diverse desires. T h i s he did in his

1974 b o o k , Economic libidinale. L y o t a r d , like F o u c a u l t , saw k n o w l e d g e a n d p o w e r as essentially c o n n e c t e d , a n d m a i n t a i n e d that " t o t a l i z i n g " theories (e.g., M a r x i s m ) c l a i m i n g u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y are sources o f t o t a l i t a r i a n social structures that destroy the plurality o f d e s i r e s .

4

L y o t a r d p a y s p a r t i c u l a r attention to w h a t he sees as the i n e v i t a b l e conflict b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d truth. W e c o n t i n u a l l y - a n d p r o p e r l y

-

m a k e j u d g m e n t s that p a r t i c u l a r situations or actions are unjust. B u t w e are also i n c l i n e d to think that these j u d g m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s r e q u i r e

2

3

4

Socialisme ou B a r b a r i e and the j o u r n a l of the same n a m e w e r e founded in 1949 by C o r n e l i u s Castoriadis a n d C l a u d e Lefort, themselves b o t h important political thinkers. T h e g r o u p was radically leftist b u t extremely critical o f Stalinism a n d other versions o f M a r x i s t totalitarianism. Lyotard: Writing the Event, 175. L y o t a r d c o m b i n e d his political activism with an a c a d e m i c career. After failing to win a place at the Ecole N o r m a l e , he studied philosophy at the S o r b o n n e . H e taught for ten years in lycees a n d held various university positions, e n d i n g with his a p p o i n t m e n t as Professor of Philosophy at the University o f Paris V I I (located first at V i n c e n n e s a n d later at St. Denis). H e was also active, a l o n g with Derricla, in the C o l l e g e Internationale de la Philosophic and taught regularly in the U n i t e d States. For an excellent discussion o f L y o t a r d , L a c a n , a n d Foucault on issues at the intersection of desire a n d politics, see Peter D e w s , Logics of Disintegration.

Philosophies of difference

321

justification t h r o u g h d e r i v a t i o n f r o m a g e n e r a l a c c o u n t o f the n a t u r e o f h u m a n society. W e think, that is, that p a r t i c u l a r

prescriptions

r e g a r d i n g j u s t i c e m u s t b e j u s t i h e d b y the truth o f g e n e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l descriptions. L y o t a r d , h o w e v e r , m a i n t a i n s that this a p p e a l to g e n e r a l truth

is itself a n instance

o f injustice.

T h e general

description

presents a total p i c t u r e o f society that e x c l u d e s all alternative views as false a n d rejects as u n a c c e p t a b l e desires b a s e d o n these v i e w s . B u t a c c o r d i n g to L y o t a r d such a n e x c l u s i o n is inconsistent w i t h the f u n d a m e n t a l v a l u e o f m a i n t a i n i n g a p l u r a l i t y o f desires. D e s p i t e the i m p o r t a n c e o f this earlier w o r k , I will focus r a t h e r o n L y o t a r d ' s later b o o k , Le différend (1983), w h i c h p r o v i d e s the m o s t explicit a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x p o s i t i o n o f his p h i l o s o p h y o f difference.

5

T h i s b o o k is also o f special interest b e c a u s e , a l t h o u g h it

presents

views

generally

similar

to those

o f Discours, figure a n d

Economie libidinale, the f o r m u l a t i o n is strikingly different, b o t h stylistically a n d conceptually. T h e w r i t i n g e s c h e w s the b a r o q u e intensity a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f the earlier b o o k s in favor o f a d e l i b e r a t e l y " z e r o d e g r e e " style often r e m i n i s c e n t o f analytic philosophy. T h e b o o k ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is closer to the n o t e b o o k j o t t i n g s o f the later W i t t g e n s t e i n t h a n to that o f a s t a n d a r d analytic t r e a t m e n t . L y o t a r d ' s position is d e v e l o p e d a r o u n d the linguistic n o t i o n o f the p h r a s e , thus giving, at least m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y , the l e a d i n g role to discourse r a t h e r t h a n h g u r e ( a l t h o u g h , as w e shall see, the claims o f h g u r e — differently n a m e d - e v e n t u a l l y assert themselves). Le différend b e g i n s b y d e s c r i b i n g a situation in w h i c h I c a n n o t p r o v e the existence

o f g a s c h a m b e r s in N a z i G e r m a n y

because I a m

a r g u i n g b e f o r e a t r i b u n a l that requires that a n y p r o o f b e f r o m an e y e witness w h o died in a gas c h a m b e r (and so c a n n o t testify). I n s u c h a situation

making

m y case

requires

arguing

in c o n f o r m i t y

" e s t a b l i s h [ e d ] p r o c e d u r e s defined b y a u n a n i m o u s l y p r o t o c o l " (Le différend

[D\ij/^)

;

with

agreed-upon

b u t , b y the n a t u r e o f m y c l a i m , it

c a n n o t b e established u s i n g these p r o c e d u r e s . It is n o t j u s t that there does n o t h a p p e n to b e e v i d e n c e for m y c l a i m b u t that, g i v e n the s t a n d a r d s o f e v i d e n c e , there c o u l d n o t b e e v i d e n c e for it. In L y o t a r d ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , such a situation is a différend (which, in o r d i n a r y F r e n c h , m e a n s simply " c o n f l i c t " ) . D i f f é r e n d s involve w r o n g s (torts), that is, damages

5

"accompanied

b y the loss o f the m e a n s

to p r o v e the

I a m also ignoring Lyotard's studies, published the y e a r he died, o f spiritual a n d even religious themes in Chambre sourde a n d La confession d'Augustin.

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

322

d a m a g e " (D, 18/5). O r , as L y o t a r d also puts it: " I w o u l d like to call a différend the case w h e r e the plaintiff is divested o f the m e a n s to a r g u e a n d b e c o m e s for that r e a s o n a v i c t i m " (D, 24/9). T h e logic o f the différend m i r r o r s the l o g i c o f v a r i o u s a n c i e n t p a r a d o x e s , especially that o f the l a w suit b e t w e e n P r o t a g o r a s a n d his p u p i l .

6

L y o t a r d ' s e x a m p l e s o f différends are m o s t often ethical or political, b u t t h e y c a n also arise in o t h e r c o n t e x t s such as science, w h e r e L y o t a r d ' s différend w o u l d s e e m to b e illustrated b y K u h n i a n i n c o m mensurability. ( H o w e v e r , as w e shall see later, there is a sense in w h i c h for L y o t a r d all différends are political.) L y o t a r d also e m p h a sizes that a différend will a l w a y s o b t a i n for " I d e a s " in the K a n t i a n sense o f c o n c e p t s o f such scope or absoluteness that there are n o p r o c e d u r e s available for establishing the reality o f their referents. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l structure o f a différend c a n b e specified linguistically, in t e r m s

of what

Lyotard

calls " p h r a s e s " . A

p h r a s e is,

roughly, a unit o f linguistic m e a n i n g . It is often a sentence (the s t a n d a r d m e a n i n g o f " p h r a s e " in F r e n c h ) , b u t c a n also b e a n intelligible f r a g m e n t o f a sentence ( " p h r a s e " in the o r d i n a r y E n g l i s h sense) or s o m e t h i n g w i t h a non-linguistic m e a n i n g such as a gesture or e v e n a silence. T h e p h r a s e presents four elements or, in L y o t a r d ' s terminology,

" i n s t a n c e s " : the addressor

(the o n e speaking), the

addressee (the o n e s p o k e n to), the sense (sens) o f the c l a i m b e i n g m a d e , a n d the a l l e g e d referent o f this sense. I n a différend, the v i c t i m s ' inability to m a k e their case c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f the elements o f the p h r a s e : they c a n n o t s h o w that the referent o f their c l a i m exists b e c a u s e the r e l e v a n t p r o c e d u r e s d o n o t a u t h o r i z e the addressor (the victim) to speak; or t h e y d o n o t r e q u i r e the addressee to listen; or t h e y r e n d e r the e v i d e n c e p u t f o r w a r d senseless (D, 2 2 - 3 / 8 ) . The

" p r o c e d u r e s " and " r e q u i r e m e n t s " governing phrases and

their e l e m e n t s a r e e x p r e s s e d in t w o kinds o f f u n d a m e n t a l linguistic rules. O n e is the phrase regimen, the set o f rules that " c o n s t i t u t e s " a p h r a s e , in the sense o f defining the linguistic function that it perf o r m s . Phrases that p r o v i d e descriptions, give orders, ask questions,

6

Protagoras h a d trained a student to argue in the l a w courts a n d h a d a g r e e d to postpone receiving his fee until the student w o n his first case. After several years, the student h a d not even tried a single case, a n d Protagoras sued for the fee. H e a r g u e d that, if the court found in favor o f the student, he w o u l d have w o n a case a n d so w o u l d o w e the fee in virtue o f their a g r e e m e n t ; a n d that, if the court found against the student, he w o u l d b y that very fact o w e the fee.

Philosophies of difference

323

r e c o u n t events, express l o g i c a l inferences, or p o i n t out objects all b e l o n g to distinct p h r a s e r e g i m e n s (D, 10/xii). G i v e n a n u m b e r o f phrases, in g e n e r a l f r o m different p h r a s e r e g i m e n s , a s e c o n d set o f rules b e c o m e s r e l e v a n t . T h e s e define the genre of discourse a n d are rules for l i n k i n g p h r a s e s together, that is, for

moving from

the

u t t e r a n c e o f one p h r a s e to the u t t e r a n c e o f another. A g e n r e is distinguished b y the distinctive g o a l that lies b e h i n d its l i n k i n g o f phrases. A s e x a m p l e s o f g o a l s , L y o t a r d cites " t o know, to t e a c h , to be just, to s e d u c e , to justify, to e v a l u a t e , to rouse e m o t i o n , to o v e r s e e " (D, 10/xii). A différend arises w h e n the rules o f r e g i m e n a n d o f g e n r e e x c l u d e certain p e o p l e f r o m the discussion. L y o t a r d in effect distinguishes t w o c o n c e p t u a l l y different f o r m s of différend. In the first, the v i c t i m s (those w h o c a n n o t p l e a d their case) simply l a c k a l a n g u a g e in w h i c h to d o so. T h e r e are n o p h r a s e s available to articulate their situation a n d interests (e.g., the p a i n or affront that t h e y feel). In s u c h a case, the v i c t i m s are t r e a t e d unjustly simply b e c a u s e their j u d g e s w r o n g l y p r e s u p p o s e that the v i c t i m s possess a m e s s a g e that t h e y c a n c o m m u n i c a t e to the j u d g e s . U n d e r stood in this way, " t h e différend is the unstable state a n d instant o f l a n g u a g e w h e r e i n s o m e t h i n g w h i c h m u s t b e able to b e p u t into p h r a s e s c a n n o t yet b e " (D, 29/13). L y o t a r d notes that for such cases w e t y p i c a l l y say there is a " f e e l i n g " that c a n n o t b e p u t into w o r d s . S u c h a situation calls for efforts to " f i n d n e w rules for f o r m i n g a n d l i n k i n g p h r a s e s that are able to express the différend disclosed b y the f e e l i n g " . A c c o r d i n g to L y o t a r d , " w h a t is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics p e r h a p s , is to b e a r witness to différends by finding i d i o m s for t h e m " (D, 30/13). B u t L y o t a r d also speaks o f a différend arising b e t w e e n t w o a l r e a d y established m o d e s o f e x p r e s s i o n . T h i s s e c o n d case

occurs

when

" p h r a s e s b e l o n g i n g to different r e g i m e n s or g e n r e s . . . e n c o u n t e r e a c h o t h e r to the p o i n t o f g i v i n g rise to d i f f é r e n d s " (D, 5 0 / 2 8 , n o . 39). S u c h e n c o u n t e r s d o n o t i m p l y a c o m m o n " u n i v e r s e " o f m e a n i n g in w h i c h t h e y occur, since such a u n i v e r s e is a l w a y s relative to a specific f a m i l y o f p h r a s e s . W h e n there is this sort o f s h a r e d m e a n i n g a n d w h e n , t h e r e f o r e , there are s h a r e d rules for r e s o l v i n g disputes, L y o t a r d will speak o f " l i t i g a t i o n " r a t h e r t h a n " d i f f é r e n d " . It is n o t possible to a v o i d remaining

silent

e n c o u n t e r s l e a d i n g to a différend, constitutes

a phrase

that r e s p o n d s

since to

even

another

p h r a s e . S o , for e x a m p l e , w h e n a native o f M a r t i n i q u e , a F r e n c h colony, says " I protest the fact that I a m r e q u i r e d to be a F r e n c h

324

Structuralism and Beyond

(1960-1990)

c i t i z e n " , e v e n the j u d g e w h o r e m a i n s silent (because there is literally n o t h i n g that c a n b e said in a F r e n c h c o u r t to such a claim) has r e s p o n d e d to the c l a i m . T h i s illustrates L y o t a r d ' s v i e w that " i t is n e c e s s a r y to l i n k " (to r e s p o n d to a n y p h r a s e w i t h a n o t h e r phrase), e v e n t h o u g h " t h e m o d e o f l i n k a g e is n e v e r n e c e s s a r y " (D, 5 2 / 2 9 , n o . 41). A differend arises f r o m the availability o f t w o o r m o r e different genres for l i n k i n g p h r a s e s . L y o t a r d insists that p h r a s e s (and therefore differends) s h o u l d n o t be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f the i n t e n t i o n a l m e a n i n g s o f subjects. T h e a d d r e s s o r a n d the addressee, for e x a m p l e , a r e , quite a p a r t f r o m their m e n t a l states, entirely d e h n e d b y their roles o f f o l l o w i n g (or n o t following) the p r o c e d u r a l rules that g o v e r n the d i s p u t e d issue. A l s o , the reality o f the referent is n o t established b e c a u s e it is " ' g i v e n ' to this o r that ' s u b j e c t ' " ; r a t h e r it is j u s t i h e d b y " e s t a b l i s h [ e d ] p r o cedures dehned by a unanimously agreed-upon protocol, and from the possibility offered to a n y o n e to r e c o m m e n c e the effectuation as often as h e o r she w a n t s " [D, 17/4). Similarly, the m e a n i n g o f the c l a i m d e p e n d s o n the rules g o v e r n i n g the use o f the p h r a s e . It m i g h t s e e m that o u r analysis o f a differend m u s t at least take account

o f the c o m p e t e n c e

and "good

faith"

o f the i n d i v i d u a l

subjects i n v o l v e d in it. B u t L y o t a r d m a i n t a i n s that the rules t h e m selves a r e sufficient to d e t e r m i n e that the p a r t i c i p a n t s in a dispute are c o m p e t e n t a n d o f g o o d will. S o , for e x a m p l e , " o n e 'plays the g a m e ' p e r m i t t e d b y these rules; a n d the addressee's r e j o i n d e r shows that h e or she does n o t o b s e r v e

them"

(D, 38/19). A n d , if a

p a r t i c i p a n t tries to simulate c o n f o r m i t y to the rules by, say, fabric a t i n g e v i d e n c e that seems to m e e t the s t a n d a r d s o f proof, t h e n this c h a r a d e c a n itself b e d i s c o v e r e d b y c h a l l e n g e s b a s e d o n the rules o f the discussion. ( L y o t a r d cites the case o f the D r e y f u s affair.) T h e existence o f p h r a s e s a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g differends p r e s u p p poses a set o f rules b y w h i c h w e c a n e v a l u a t e the p a r t i c i p a n t s in a dispute. B u t w h a t a b o u t the initial setting u p o f the rules? " W h a t a b o u t those w h o establish these rules, aren't t h e y p r e j u d g i n g their c o m p e t e n c e to establish t h e m ? H o w , i n d e e d , c o u l d t h e y n o t p r e j u d g e it as l o n g as the rules h a v e n o t b e e n established a n d as l o n g as they therefore lack the criteria b y w h i c h to distinguish c o m p e t e n c e ? " (D, 38/19). I n d e e d , to identify a differend is to c h a l l e n g e the a u t h o r i t y o f the rules that m a k e it impossible for v i c t i m s to p l e a d their cases. It m i g h t b e c l a i m e d that the i d e a o f such a c h a l l e n g e is i n c o h e r e n t a n d that, t h e r e f o r e , g e n u i n e differends d o n o t exist. O n e m i g h t , for

Philosophies of difference

325

e x a m p l e , a r g u e that if there is n o established cognitive basis for s o m e o n e ' s c l a i m , t h e n there c a n b e n o r e a s o n to take the seriously. B u t , L y o t a r d says, this a r g u m e n t confuses the established

by

a

particular

phrase-regimen

with

claim

referents

reality

itself.

N o t h i n g says that these p a r t i c u l a r referents are real, as is clear f r o m the fact that " i n m a n y p h r a s e families [presumably, p h r a s e s b e l o n g i n g to the s a m e p h r a s e r e g i m e n ] , the referent is n o t at all p r e s e n t e d as r e a l " (D, 50/28). ( L y o t a r d cites e x a m p l e s o f p o e t i c , m a t h e m a t i c a l , a n d aesthetic discourse, a m o n g others.) T h e disputes cognitive

are

a b o u t reality

genre

and therefore

o f discourse

a s s u m p t i o n that all

resolvable

is a p e r v a s i v e

false

through

assumption

the of

modern thought. W e c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a v o i d the p r o b l e m o f the a u t h o r i t y o f o u r rules. N o r c a n w e solve the p r o b l e m b y a p p e a l to s o m e ultimate, totally p r i v i l e g e d linguistic system; for e x a m p l e , a discourse o n the rights o f m a n or a H e g e l i a n " t r i b u n a l o f the w o r l d " (D, 5 4 / 3 1 , nos. 44, 45). For a n y such t r i b u n a l w o u l d itself be j u s t a n o t h e r p h r a s e family

and genre

o f discourse

(D, 5 4 / 3 1 , n o . 45). T h e

ultimate

v a l i d a t i o n o f a p h r a s e c o m e s n o t f r o m the rules o f its r e g i m e n or g e n r e b u t f r o m its r e c e p t i o n . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , the o r d e r " S t o p s i n g i n g " a n d the a p p r a i s a l " W h a t a beautiful a r i a ! " . A c c o r d i n g to L y o t a r d , " t h e v a l i d a t i o n o f the o r d e r w o u l d s e e m to b e for the addressee to stop singing, a n d the v a l i d a t i o n o f the a p p r a i s a l for the addressee to p a r t a k e in the addressor's e m o t i o n " (D, 5 4 - 5 / 3 1 , n o . 45). W e will r e t u r n b e l o w to the question o f v a l i d a t i o n w h e n w e discuss L y o t a r d ' s a c c o u n t o f j u d g m e n t . L y o t a r d p a y s special attention to the referent that is " p r e s e n t e d " (along w i t h the addressor, the addressee, a n d the sense) b y a p h r a s e . H e is p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c e r n e d to show, against p h e n o m e n o l o g y

and

idealism, that the reality o f the referent d o e s n o t d e p e n d on (is not " c o n s t i t u t e d " by) the e x p e r i e n c i n g s u b j e c t .

7

H e a r g u e s that estab-

lishing the reality o f a referent has three distinct aspects; one is descriptive, o n e n o m i n a t i v e , a n d one ostensive. For e x a m p l e ,

to

establish the reality o f Paris, w e must: (1) d e s c r i b e it (as, for e x a m p l e , " t h e c a p i t a l o f F r a n c e " ) ; (2) n a m e it ("Paris"); (3) p o i n t it out w i t h a deictic or ostensive p h a s e ( " T h i s is i t " , " H e r e it is"). T h e p h e n o m e n ologist claims that reality is established s i m p l y b y the referent's b e i n g

7

H e r e L y o t a r d is c o m i n g to terms with his o w n early a t t a c h m e n t to especially in M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's formulations. See his La phénoménologie (1954).

phenomenology,

3

26

Structuralism and Beyond

(1960-1990)

g i v e n in e x p e r i e n c e , a n d that, t h e r e f o r e , reality is established by description (1) a n d ostensión (3) a l o n e . B u t a c c o r d i n g to L y o t a r d this c l a i m is refuted b y a classic d i l e m m a (D, 7 0 / 4 2 , n o . 64). T h e referent is either m e r e l y w h a t is g i v e n in e x p e r i e n c e or it is n o t . I f the referent is m e r e l y w h a t is g i v e n , t h e n it m a y b e m e r e l y a n a p p e a r a n c e (just the w a y things s e e m to us) a n d so n o t real. I f the referent is n o t j u s t w h a t is g i v e n , t h e n there is n o decisive e v i d e n c e for the reality o f the referent (since, o n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n , givenness in e x p e r i e n c e is the o n l y such e v i d e n c e ) ; t h e r e f o r e , o n c e m o r e , the referent m a y n o t b e real. T o a v o i d the force o f this a r g u m e n t , w e n e e d to r e c o g n i z e the role o f n a m i n g (2) as a " l i n c h p i n " b e t w e e n description a n d ostensión (givenness). L y o t a r d u n d e r s t a n d s n a m e s as, in K r i p k e ' s p h r a s e , rigid designators. T h a t is, a n a m e refers to its referent in all possible w o r l d s (in w h i c h the referent exists) a n d it d o e s n o t o f itself entail a n y p a r t i c u l a r description o f the referent. A s such, the n a m e d e p e n d s n e i t h e r o n h o w the referent a p p e a r s to us n o r o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r

description

u n d e r w h i c h w e m a y k n o w it. T h i s is w h y it is able to a c t as a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n n e c t o r b e t w e e n ostensión a n d description. L y o t a r d ' s a c c o u n t o f the reality o f the referent supports his v i e w o f the differend. T h e r e is n o " a b s o l u t e e y e w i t n e s s " (D, 8 6 / 5 3 ,

n o

- 88) -

n o C a r t e s i a n self, n o H e g e l i a n absolute — that c a n d e t e r m i n e o n c e a n d for all the truth o f the referent. T h e r e f o r e , at a n y m o m e n t the referent r e m a i n s the possible subject o f a n indefinite n u m b e r o f senses. W e c a n assign the referent a definition, b u t future events m a y p l a c e it in p h r a s e r e g i m e n s a n d g e n r e s o f discourse that are inc o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h o u r definition. T h e fact that referents are n e v e r definitively constituted b y a u n i f y i n g subjectivity m a k e s

differends

p e r m a n e n t possibilities. It m a y s e e m that, w i t h all this e m p h a s i s o n l a n g u a g e , L y o t a r d has r e v e r s e d his earlier v i e w a n d g i v e n p r i o r i t y to discourse. W h e r e , in this p h i l o s o p h y o f the p h r a s e , is there r o o m for his f o r m e r t h e m e s o f desire

and

Differends regimens

figure?

T h e answer

arise precisely and genres

is, first o f all, in the

because

o f discourse

o f the i n a d e q u a c y to f o r m u l a t e

differend. of phrase

a victim's

plea.

L y o t a r d e v e n says that a differend is a state " s i g n a l e d b y w h a t o n e o r d i n a r i l y calls a feeling: ' O n e c a n n o t find the w o r d s , ' etc. A lot o f s e a r c h i n g m u s t b e d o n e to find n e w rules for f o r m i n g a n d linking p h r a s e s that are able to express the differend f e e l i n g " (Z), 2 9 / 1 3 , n o . 22).

disclosed b y the

Philosophies of difference

327

B u t L y o t a r d ' s o l d t h e m e is p r e s e n t e v e n in his v i e w o f p h r a s e s themselves. A p h r a s e is, after all, a n e v e n t (a linguistic t o k e n , n o t a type), a n o c c u r r e n c e w i t h its o w n singular reality. It is, as L y o t a r d puts it, a n " I t h a p p e n s " (or e v e n , a n " I s it h a p p e n i n g ? " , w h e r e the i n t e r r o g a t i v e p r e s u m a b l y c o r r e s p o n d s to the c o n c e p t u a l elusiveness o f events). L y o t a r d e m p h a s i z e s that " i t h a p p e n s " is to b e disting u i s h e d f r o m " w h a t h a p p e n s " : "It happens is n o t w h a t h a p p e n s , in that

sense

that

quod is n o t quid", w h e r e

"quod"

refers

to a n

intelligible n a t u r e a n d " q u i d " to sheer " t h e r e n e s s " a p a r t f r o m a n y nature. A p h r a s e " i s " , b u t there n e e d n o t b e a n y t h i n g (essence) that it is. "Is doesn't signify a n y t h i n g , it w o u l d designate t h e o c c u r r e n c e ' b e f o r e ' the signihcation (the content) o f the o c c u r r e n c e " (D, 120/79, n o . 131). Admittedly,

the p h r a s e

presents

a situation,

that is instances

(addressor, a d d r e s s e e , sense, referent) r e l a t e d to o n e another. B u t the

phrase

as p r e s e n t a t i o n

is n o t the

situation

presented.

It

possesses its o w n singularity a n d thus p r o v i d e s the h g u r e o f its o w n discourse. B e c a u s e o f this, n o p h r a s e is ever intrinsically w e d d e d to a n y p a r t i c u l a r g e n r e o f discourse. T h e u t t e r a n c e o f a p h r a s e a l w a y s poses t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w w e will link into it; that is, u n d e r w h i c h g e n r e o f discourse w e will s u b s u m e it. T h e c o n t e x t o f p r e v i o u s linkages m a y e x e r t s t r o n g pressure: in s t a n d a r d c o n t e x t s , a " T h a n k y o u " calls for a " Y o u ' r e w e l c o m e " . B u t linkages are n e v e r determ i n e d ; " t o link is necessary, b u t a p a r t i c u l a r l i n k a g e is n o t " (D, 122/80, n o . 136). T h e r e

is n o g e n r e

o f discourse

that h a s the

ultimate p o w e r to d e t e r m i n e w h a t p h r a s e is to f o l l o w a n y g i v e n p h r a s e . It follows that e v e r y p h r a s e p o s e s its o w n différend: the q u e s t i o n , u n r e s o l v a b l e b y a n y g e n r e o f discourse, o f w h a t follow

it. T h i s

is w h y L y o t a r d

says

that

" n o matter

should

w h a t its

r e g i m e n , e v e r y p h r a s e is in p r i n c i p l e w h a t is at stake in a différend between

genres

o f discourse.

This

différend

proceeds

f r o m the

q u e s t i o n , w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s a n y p h r a s e , o f h o w to link o n to i t " [D, 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 / 1 3 7 - 8 , n o . 188). T h e différends p o s e d b y p h r a s e s are thus a direct c o n n e c t i o n o f p h r a s e s to the u n a r t i c u l a t e d

"feeling"

that will l e a d to the u t t e r a n c e o f the n e x t p h r a s e . This

continuity

o f La

différend w i t h

Lyotard's

earlier

works

b e c o m e s entirely explicit in the b o o k ' s t r e a t m e n t o f the e t h i c a l a n d the political. H e r e his discussion b e g i n s w i t h a distinction b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e a n d prescriptive p h r a s e s . A p r e s c r i p t i v e p h r a s e h a s the f o r m : X is obliged to do A. A c c o r d i n g to t h e rules o f the prescriptive

3

28

Structuralism and Beyond

(1960-1990)

p h r a s e r e g i m e n , such a p r o n o u n c e m e n t calls for a r e s p o n s e f r o m its addressee, w h i c h m a y r a n g e f r o m i m m e d i a t e c o m p l i a n c e to direct refusal. B y contrast, a n o r m a t i v e p h r a s e h a s the f o r m : It is a norm for Y that X is obliged to do A. T h i s is a p e r f o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t , in itself p u t t i n g a n o r m into p l a c e a n d so c a l l i n g for n o response to c o n f i r m its n o r m a t i v e status. O f c o u r s e , n o t j u s t a n y u t t e r a n c e in n o r m a t i v e f o r m actually sets up a n o r m . T h e effectiveness o f the p e r f o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e s a social c o n t e x t in w h i c h it is r e c o g n i z e d as v a l i d . C o n s i d e r s o m e e x a m p l e s . A n o r m m i g h t b e f o r m u l a t e d in a n entirely self-focused w a y : / set up as a norm that I am obliged to do A. B u t this h a s n o ethical authority, since it m a y simply express m y i d i o s y n c r a t i c i n t e n t i o n r e g a r d i n g h o w I should b e h a v e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , a n o r m m i g h t b e f o r m u l a t e d in an entirely e x t e r n a l w a y : Y sets up as a norm that X is obliged to do A. H e r e Y ' s d e c r e e s m a y h a v e n o a u t h o r i t y for X . E t h i c a l a u t h o r i t y requires a n a p p r o p r i a t e u n i o n b e t w e e n the a d d r e s s o r o f the n o r m a tive p h r a s e a n d the addressee o f the p r e s c r i p t i v e p h r a s e (which is e m b e d d e d in the n o r m a t i v e phrase). T h i s is the f u n c t i o n o f the " w e " in ethical discourse. T h u s , a t y p i c a l ethical n o r m will b e : We set up as a norm that we are obliged to do A, f r o m w h i c h w o u l d follow

more

specific n o r m s such as We set up as a norm that I (a member of the normative "we") am obliged to do A. But

according

to

Lyotard

the ethical

" w e " is

problematic.

Historically, there h a v e b e e n t w o w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g it. T h e first is a p r e m o d e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , for w h i c h " w e " is a p a r t i c u l a r tribe, n a t i o n , o r culture, p r i v i l e g e d over against e v e r y o n e else as the sole addressor s o f n o r m a t i v e claims. T h e " A r y a n " m o r a l i t y o f Nazism,

which

made

non-Aryans

the addressees

b u t n o t the

addressors o f its racist n o r m s , w a s a tragic r e v e r s i o n to p r e m o d e r nity. T h e s e c o n d embraces

is a m o d e r n

all m a n k i n d

understanding,

o r e v e n , as in K a n t ,

for w h i c h

all r a t i o n a l

"we" agents.

W h e r e a s a p r e m o d e r n " w e " is u n a c c e p t a b l e b e c a u s e o f its arbitrary e x c l u s i o n s (and c o n s e q u e n t différends, since those

excluded

h a v e n o ethical v o i c e ) , the m o d e r n " w e " is unjustifiable. O n the one h a n d , it c a n n o t c l a i m to r e p r e s e n t the de facto state o f ethical discourse,

a n d so c a n n o t

appeal

to

a

"this

language-game

is

p l a y e d " defense. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a t t e m p t s to p r o v i d e it w i t h a theoretical

justification

— say t h r o u g h

Kantian

philosophy

C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y - h a v e c o l l a p s e d w i t h the p o s t m o d e r n of

the " g r a n d

narratives"

(comprehensive

accounts

of

or

failure human

Philosophies of difference nature

and

history,

as

opposed

to

the

329

"little

p r e m o d e r n societies) characteristic o f m o d e r n i t y .

narratives"

of

8

L y o t a r d also suggests that m o d e r n efforts to justify ethics conflict w i t h the n a t u r e o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n . S u c h efforts a m o u n t to an application

o f the c o g n i t i v e g e n r e o f discourse, w i t h its g o a l

of

k n o w l e d g e , to n o r m a t i v e p h r a s e s e x p r e s s i n g obligations. T h i s g e n r e asks for a j u s t i h c a t i o n o f the a u t h o r i t y o f the a d d r e s s o r o f an ethically n o r m a t i v e p h r a s e . T h i s leads to a d i l e m m a . I f the j u s t i h c a t i o n is g i v e n , t h e n the a u t h o r i t y o f the j u s t i f y i n g r e a s o n r e p l a c e s that o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n . (Here L y o t a r d refers to L e v i n a s , w h o , as w e will see, e m p h a s i z e s the utterly u n c o n d i t i o n a l , u n d e r i v e d n a t u r e o f the other's ethical d e m a n d for r e c o g n i t i o n . ) B u t if n o j u s t i h c a t i o n is f o r t h c o m i n g , t h e n the a u t h o r i t y is j u d g e d to b e a r b i t r a r y a n d so w i t h o u t force. A s L y o t a r d puts it: " I n the i d i o m o f c o g n i t i o n , either the l a w is r e a s o n a b l e , a n d it d o e s n o t o b l i g a t e , since it c o n v i n c e s ; or else, it is n o t r e a s o n a b l e , a n d it does n o t o b l i g a t e , since it c o n s t r a i n s " (D, 172/117, n o . 176). O u r discussion so far has m e r e l y d e h n e d the limits w i t h i n w h i c h the e t h i c a l m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d . O n e b o u n d a r y is set b y the fact that ethical p r e s c r i p t i o n s

c a n n o t be

derived from

knowledge

of

n o n - e t h i c a l truths (e.g., o f the essence o f h u m a n i t y , the n a t u r e of society, the will o f G o d ) . T h e r e are, in o t h e r w o r d s , n o i n d e p e n d e n t criteria on the basis o f w h i c h w e c a n j u d g e e t h i c a l p r e s c r i p tions to be v a l i d or not. In K a n t ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , ethics is n o t ruled b y determinate judgments. O n the o t h e r h a n d , ethics is n o t a m a t t e r o f the u n c r i t i c a l assertion o f a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l ' s or g r o u p ' s will (as in the

case

o f N a z i s m ) . E t h i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s m u s t derive

from

critical reflection a n d h e n c e f r o m j u d g m e n t . S i n c e this c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g m e n t , b a s e d o n criteria, it m u s t b e w h a t

Kant

called regulative judgment: j u d g m e n t n o t d e r i v e d f r o m criteria

and

therefore n o t r e d u c i b l e to the a r g u m e n t s o f the c o g n i t i v e g e n r e o f discourse. The

absence

of determinate j u d g m e n t means, of course,

that

ethical decision lies in the r e a l m o f desire, h g u r e , the e v e n t , the différend. L y o t a r d identihes this as the r e a l m o f politics: "Politics, h o w e v e r , is the t h r e a t o f the différend. It is n o t a g e n r e . It is the multiplicity o f g e n r e s , the diversity o f ends, a n d p a r e x c e l l e n c e the

8

T h i s theme is d e v e l o p e d in Lyotard's most widely read book, La condition postmoderne. See also his discussion o f narrative as a genre o f discourse in La différend, nos. 2io,ff

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

33«

q u e s t i o n o f l i n k a g e " (D, 2 0 0 / 1 3 8 , n o . 190). Politics is n o t a g e n r e of discourse b e c a u s e t h e n it w o u l d be j u s t a n o t h e r one o f the genres c o m p e t i n g to d e t e r m i n e the l i n k a g e o f p h r a s e s . A s the locus o f the regulative j u d g m e n t s that d e c i d e a m o n g g e n r e s , it m u s t lie outside all g e n r e s . Politics has a p r i v i l e g e d role, b u t it is n o t that o f " t h e g e n r e that c o n t a i n s all the g e n r e s " (D, 2 0 1 / 1 3 9 , n o . 192). T h e r e is often confusion a b o u t this p o i n t b e c a u s e w e t e n d to think that the a n c i e n t G r e e k s " i n v e n t e d " politics w h e n w h a t t h e y actually did w a s s u b o r d i n a t e all political decisions to the dialectical a n d the r h e t o r i c a l genres. O t h e r cultures h a v e g i v e n h e g e m o n y to o t h e r g e n r e s (e.g., the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n led to the d o m i n a n c e

o f the

technical

genre). B u t the decision to let o n e g e n r e , r a t h e r t h a n a n y other, resolve all différends is itself a political act, a n d o n e that c a n n o t be v a l i d a t e d b y the rules o f a p a r t i c u l a r g e n r e . L y o t a r d c o n c l u d e s that " e v e r y t h i n g is p o l i t i c s " in the sense that " p o l i t i c s is the possibility o f the différend o n the o c c a s i o n o f the slightest l i n k a g e " (D, 2 0 1 / 1 3 9 , n o . 192). It m i g h t s e e m that this is far too b r o a d

a conception

decision

about

which

example,

should

o f politics, since it m a k e s p o l i t i c a l genre

a choice

of

discourse

between

to

a chemical

explanation of a physical p h e n o m e n o n

any

apply.

Why,

and

biological

a

for

(i.e., the decision to link

" W h y do s a l m o n s p a w n ? " w i t h p h r a s e s a b o u t o r g a n i c

molecules

r a t h e r t h a n p h r a s e s a b o u t e v o l u t i o n a r y niches) be political? L y o tard's

answer

immediately

is

that

'social' "

"the

universe

presented

in the sense that " a n

by

a

phrase

is

[and]

an

addressor

addressee . . . are situated t o g e t h e r w i t h i n i t " (D, 201—2/139, n o . 193). T o the e x t e n t that decisions a b o u t social relations are political, e v e r y resolution o f a différend is political. L y o t a r d resists the P l a t o n i c a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n v i e w that politics is the science (or art) o f the g o o d . T h i s is b e c a u s e decisions

about

différends a l w a y s e x c l u d e certain w a y s o f l i n k i n g w i t h p h r a s e s (that is, o f g o i n g o n w i t h o u r social life) a n d , as such, i n v o l v e evil. T h i s is so b e c a u s e " b y evil, I u n d e r s t a n d , a n d o n e c a n o n l y u n d e r s t a n d , the incessant i n t e r d i c t i o n o f possible p h r a s e s " . S u c h i n t e r d i c t i o n , w h i c h is a n essential c o m p o n e n t o f political decisions, is " a defiance o f the occurrence

[event],

the

contempt

for

Being".

Given

Lyotard's

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f politics a n d o f evil, " p o l i t i c i a n s c a n n o t h a v e the g o o d at stake, b u t t h e y o u g h t to h a v e the lesser e v i l " . O r , p u t t i n g it a n o t h e r way, " t h e lesser evil o u g h t to b e the political g o o d " (D, 2 0 3 - 4 / 1 4 0 , n o . 197). G i v e n this, it is impossible to take

entirely

Philosophies of difference

331

seriously the l a w established b y political sovereignty, since it will a l w a y s create v i c t i m s , those w h o s e v o i c e s are silenced b y the laws. L y o t a r d sees h u m o r as the l o c u s o f o p p o s i t i o n to the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f the law: " T h e l a w should a l w a y s be r e s p e c t e d w i t h h u m o r b e c a u s e it c a n n o t be c o m p l e t e l y r e s p e c t e d . " T h e p e o p l e m u s t a l w a y s to s o m e e x t e n t l a u g h at the law: " T h e ' p e o p l e ' is n o t the s o v e r e i g n , it is the d e f e n d e r o f the différend against the sovereign. It is full o f laughter. Politics is t r a g e d y for the authorities, c o m e d y for the p e o p l e " (D, 2 0 9 / 1 4 4 , n o . 208).

DELEUZE

W h i l e L y o t a r d d e v e l o p s the n o t i o n o f difference far m o r e extensively t h a n D e r r i d a , the n o t i o n has m u c h the s a m e role for b o t h o f t h e m . D i f f e r a n c e a n d the différend alike e v o k e the limits o f t h o u g h t , limits that m a k e it i m p o s s i b l e for us to g r o u n d or e v e n fully e x p l i c a t e o u r c e n t r a l p r a c t i c e s (aesthetic, e t h i c a l , a n d political) t h r o u g h c o n c e p t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n s . For b o t h D e r r i d a a n d L y o t a r d , difference

represents

the i n s u r p a s s a b l e b o u n d a r y o f t h o u g h t a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the i n a d e q u a c y o f t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . P h i l o s o p h y m a y still survive as an essential critical or disruptive d i m e n s i o n o f o u r t h o u g h t , b u t the g r a n d p r e t e n s i o n s of, say, systematic m e t a p h y s i c s m u s t be p r o n o u n c ed d e a d . Gilles D e l e u z e ( 1 9 2 5 - 9 5 ) i g n o r e s p r o c l a m a t i o n s o f the d e a t h o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d e v e n expresses s u p p o r t for systematic m e t a p h y s i c s .

9

H e r e m a i n s a poststructuralist in r e j e c t i n g the u n i f y i n g d e v i c e s o f m a i n s t r e a m p h i l o s o p h y (subject, o b j e c t , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , cause, etc.), a n d his s y m p a t h y w i t h projects o f systematic p h i l o s o p h y is b a s e d on their c o n s t r u a l n o t as searches for truth in the t r a d i t i o n a l sense of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b u t as c r e a t i o n s o f n e w c o n c e p t s . that past p h i l o s o p h e r s

— the

1 0

T h e fact r e m a i n s

Stoics, L u c r e t i u s , H u m e ,

Bergson,

N i e t z s c h e , a n d e v e n arch-systematists such as S p i n o z a a n d K a n t — p r o v i d e m u c h o f the m a t e r i a l s D e l e u z e e m p l o y s to c o n s t r u c t his intellectual vision o f reality as a flux o f i r r e d u c i b l e plurality. A m o n g 9

1 0

" I ' v e never b e e n w o r r i e d about going b e y o n d metaphysics or any death o f p h i l o s o p h y " (Negotiations, 136); " I believe in p h i l o s o p h y as systematic" (Deleuze's preface to J e a n - C l e t M a r t i n , Variations: la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze). " P h i l o s o p h y is always a matter o f inventing c o n c e p t s " (Negotiations, 136). N o t e also the c o m m e n t o f D e l e u z e and G u a t t a r i in What Is Philosophy?: " T h o u g h t as such produces something interesting w h e n it accedes to the infinite m o v e m e n t that frees it from truth as supposed p a r a d i g m and r e c o n q u e r s an i m m a n e n t p o w e r o f c r e a t i o n " (140).

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

332

the poststructuralists, D e l e u z e is m o s t impressive for his effort to w o r k out o f r a t h e r t h a n against the tradition o f systematic m e t a p h y sics.

11

For D e l e u z e , h o w e v e r , systems m u s t be o p e n , n o t closed. A closed system assimilates e v e r y t h i n g it e n c o u n t e r s to the

pre-established

identities that d e h n e its essential structure. A n o p e n system always r e c o g n i z e s the possibility o f c o n n e c t i n g w i t h new,

heterogeneous

e l e m e n t s that will t r a n s f o r m the system r a t h e r t h a n assimilate to it. A system is " a n o p e n system w h e n the c o n c e p t s relate to c i r c u m stances r a t h e r t h a n to e s s e n c e s " .

1 2

A s a result, " t h e logic o f s o m e -

one's t h o u g h t is the w h o l e set o f crises t h r o u g h w h i c h it passes; it's m o r e like a v o l c a n i c librium".

c h a i n t h a n a stable system close to

equi-

1 3

D e l e u z e ' s t h o u g h t d e v e l o p s out o f t w o f u n d a m e n t a l " i n t u i t i o n s " , one o f b e i n g , the o t h e r o f the t h i n k i n g w h e r e b y b e i n g is g r a s p e d . T h e hrst intuition is that b e i n g is r a d i c a l l y diverse, the s e c o n d that, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h o u g h t is a r e c o g n i t i o n o f o n t o l o g i c a l diversity, n o t a r e d u c t i o n to unity. W e c a n g e t a p u r c h a s e o n D e l e u z e ' s w o r k , as it d e v e l o p s t h r o u g h his c e n t r a l texts, b y f o l l o w i n g the o n t o l o g i c a l a n d the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t h r e a d s that c o r r e s p o n d to these t w o intuitions, e x p l i c a t i n g his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g v i a his n o t i o n s o f multiplicity, difference, a n d event a n d his v i e w o f t h i n k i n g b y his n o t i o n s o f the

concept a n d the idea. D e l e u z i a n multiplicity e m e r g e s f r o m the series o f historical studies that w e r e his initial p u b l i c a t i o n s , f r o m 1953 to 1 9 6 6 .

1 4

T h e s e studies

(on H u m e , N i e t z s c h e , K a n t , B e r g s o n , a n d S p i n o z a ) are easily r e a d as historical Deleuze

expositions,

but, p a r t i c u l a r l y

in retrospect,

they

a d u m b r a t i n g his o w n s t a n d p o i n t b y r e t h i n k i n g

show

classical

t h e m e s . H i s a p p r o a c h w a s distinctive b e c a u s e he g e n e r a l l y f o c u s e d

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

T h i s m a y have some c o n n e c t i o n with D e l e u z e ' s philosophical formation, w h i c h did not occur at the Ecole N o r m a l e but at the S o r b o n n e , w h e r e he studied especially with Hippolyte and C a n g u i l h e m . After teaching at lycées from 1948 to 1964, D e l e u z e taught at the University of L y o n until 1968, w h e n he was appointed Professor at the n e w University of Paris at V i n c e n n e s (on the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f Foucault, w h o was h e a d o f the philosophy department). D e l e u z e r e m a i n e d at this post until he retired because of ill-health (severe respiratory problems) in 1987. His health continued to deteriorate a n d seems to have led to his suicide in 1995. Negotiations, 32. Ibid., 84. T h e v o l u m e on H u m e a p p e a r e d in 1953. T h e r e followed a p e r i o d o f nine years during w h i c h D e l e u z e published almost nothing, but from 1962 to 1966 he published a b o o k each year.

Philosophies of difference

333

o n thinkers w h o w e r e n o t , at the t i m e , p a r t i c u l a r l y f a s h i o n a b l e in F r a n c e , a n d b e c a u s e he seems scarcely c o n c e r n e d w i t h the d o m i n a n t G e r m a n s , Husserl and Heidegger. D e l e u z e sees multiplicity as c e n t r a l to B e r g s o n ' s t h o u g h t , since his k e y distinction o f space a n d time (duration) is b e t w e e n different which

two

sorts o f multiplicities (groups o f diverse elements): that

is

organized

qualitatively.

quantitatively

Deleuze

and

is p a r t i c u l a r l y

that w h i c h

interested

in

is the

organized fact

that

B e r g s o n puts this distinction in p l a c e o f the t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c a l distinction Deleuze

between

the

one

and

the

many,

thinks a l w a y s leads to the p r i m a c y

deriving,

in

Platonic

fashion,

the

many

as

a

distinction

that

o f unity, either

by

an

or

imitation

of

e m a n a t i o n f r o m the one or b y c o m b i n i n g the o n e a n d the many, in H e g e l i a n fashion, in a dialectical synthesis. B y refusing a n y i r r e d u cible p r i n c i p l e o f unity, B e r g s o n is true to D e l e u z e ' s intuition o f the basic diversity o f being. Further, D e l e u z e m a i n t a i n s that unity m u s t itself be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f multiplicity. U n i t y involves a n affirmation o f multiplicity, s o m e t h i n g D e l e u z e h n d s originally in H e r a c l i t u s , w h e n he asserted that b e c o m i n g (the flux) is the sole reality. B u t the p o i n t is m o s t fully developed

in

Nietzsche,

in

the

doctrine

o f the

eternal

return.

D e l e u z e gives p a r t i c u l a r w e i g h t to the i m a g e o f the d i c e t h r o w in Thus Spake ^arathustra (Part i n , " T h e S e v e n S e a l s " ) . T h e t h r o w o f the dice, the m o m e n t o f p u r e c h a n c e , c o r r e s p o n d s to multiplicity as sheer diversity. T h e "fall b a c k " o f the dice, w i t h its h x i n g o f a specihc n u m b e r as the t h r o w ' s result, is, o f c o u r s e , itself entirely a c h a n c e result. B u t this result takes o n the c h a r a c t e r o f necessity w h e n w e affirm it b y j o y f u l l y a c c e p t i n g an existence in w h i c h it will r e c u r to inhnity, that is, b y a c c e p t i n g a w o r l d in w h i c h there is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the m u n d a n e events o f o u r h u m a n history. D e l e u z e d o e s n o t see Nietzsche's

eternal return

as a m e t a p h y s i c a l

assertion

o f literal

r e c u r r e n c e ; the p o i n t is r a t h e r that, b y affirming s u c h a r e c u r r e n c e , w e express o u r total a c c e p t a n c e o f this w o r l d , i n d e p e n d e n t o f any relation to a g r o u n d i n g a n d s a v i n g t r a n s c e n d e n c e . T h i s affirmation p r o v i d e s , on the level o f v a l u e s , the u n i t y s o u g h t b y P l a t o n i c a n d H e g e l i a n m e t a p h y s i c i a n s b u t w i t h o u t their o n t o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n of multiplicity to the one. W h i l e B e r g s o n ' s d u r a t i o n helps articulate a D e l e u z i a n o n t o l o g y of multiplicity, a n d N i e t z s c h e ' s e t e r n a l r e t u r n a D e l e u z i a n ethics of multiplicity, S p i n o z a p r o v i d e s a f o r m u l a t i o n o f a D e l e u z i a n politics

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

334 of multiplicity.

15

T h e k e y h e r e is the n o t i o n o f p o w e r , a m e t a p h y s i c a l

c a t e g o r y that S p i n o z a uses to redefine the a n c i e n t c o n c e p t i o n o f n a t u r a l rights: e a c h i n d i v i d u a l h a s a right to m a x i m i z e its p o w e r (that is, its c a p a c i t y for positive

action) in relation to all o t h e r

individuals. T h e result is a multiplicity o f i n d i v i d u a l s in conflict w i t h one another, a n d the S p i n o z i s t (and D e l e u z i a n ) p r o b l e m o f politics is to o r g a n i z e this multiplicity into a stable, c o h e r e n t g r o u p that still allows all individuals to assert their p o w e r . Further, the o r g a n i z a t i o n m u s t n o t s u b o r d i n a t e the multiplicity to a n e x t e r n a l authority, such as a t r a n s c e n d e n t G o d w h o g u a r a n t e e s i n d i v i d u a l rights. T h i s m e a n s that the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the social multiplicity m u s t derive

solely

f r o m interactions a m o n g the i n d i v i d u a l s that are its e l e m e n t s . I n the t e r m i n o l o g y o f S p i n o z a ' s Political Treatise, the multiplicity m u s t b e t r a n s f o r m e d into a multiple, a multiplicity in w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s as such are e m p o w e r e d b y their u n i o n . S i n c e this e m p o w e r m e n t is impossible w i t h o u t the c o m m o n c o n s e n t o f those a c h i e v i n g it, the multiple m u s t take the f o r m o f a d e m o c r a c y .

A t the e n d o f the 1960s, in Difference et repetition a n d Logique du sens, D e l e u z e t u r n e d f r o m historical a d u m b r a t i o n s to full-blown expositions o f his p h i l o s o p h y in its o w n t e r m s . A l t h o u g h D e l e u z e does n o t entirely a b a n d o n the l a n g u a g e o f multiplicity in these b o o k s , t w o parallel t e r m s , difference (in Difference et repetition) a n d event (in Logique du sens), assume a d o m i n a n t role. D e l e u z e ' s " d i f f e r e n c e " is the k e y to his r a d i c a l r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the classical p r o b l e m o f the o n e a n d the many. O n e s t a n d a r d source o f this p r o b l e m is o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the different i n d i v i d u a l s that are e x a m p l e s (instances) o f the s a m e sort o f t h i n g T h e r e are m a n y trees in the forest, m a n y h u m a n b e i n g s o n the earth. H o w is this possible? H o w , that is, c a n m a n y things all b e w h a t w o u l d s e e m to b e j u s t o n e thing? T r a d i t i o n a l

metaphysics

r e s p o n d s b y distinguishing b e t w e e n (1) a g e n e r a l structure (or form), consisting o f the essential characteristics that define a k i n d to w h i c h e a c h i n d i v i d u a l b e l o n g s a n d (2) a n u n s t r u c t u r e d stuff (or matter) that, w h e n a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e l a t e d to the g e n e r a l structure, b e c o m e s a c o n c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l o f the g i v e n k i n d . Classic m e t a p h y s i c a l debates c o n c e r n the p r e c i s e o n t o l o g i c a l status o f this f o r m a n d m a t t e r a n d the precise n a t u r e o f the relation b e t w e e n the t w o . D o , for e x a m p l e , 1 5

D e l e u z e ' s overall r e a d i n g o f S p i n o z a also shows h o w the ontological a n d the ethical conceptions o f multiplicity are formulable in Spinozist terms. See M i c h a e l H a r d t , Gilles Deleuze: an Apprenticeship in Philosophy, for enlightening discussion of this point as well as of D e l e u z e ' s appropriations of B e r g s o n a n d Nietzsche.

Philosophies of difference

335

f o r m s exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y , as P l a t o t h o u g h t , w i t h individuals arising only through

matter's

"imitation

of"

or "participation

i n " the

forms? O r is it rather, as Aristotle h e l d , that f o r m s t h e m s e l v e s exist not s e p a r a t e l y b u t as p r i n c i p l e s o f structure for the m a t t e r o f a g i v e n individual? D e l e u z e objects to the a s s u m p t i o n o f these d e b a t e s : that there m u s t b e p r i n c i p l e s o f unity (forms, w h a t e v e r their o n t o l o g i c a l status) that constitute the essential n a t u r e o f c o n c r e t e realities. T r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s privileges the unity o f f o r m s b y m a k i n g it the basis a n d e x p l a n a t i o n o f all differences. D i f f e r e n c e s in k i n d o c c u r b e c a u s e o n e kind i n c l u d e s f o r m s that a n o t h e r does n o t . W i t h i n a g i v e n kind, differences b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s are d u e to the fact that the individuals b e l o n g to different sub-kinds. In either case, w h a t differentiates s o m e t h i n g (kind o r individual) f r o m s o m e t h i n g else is entirely a m a t t e r o f the f o r m s that d e t e r m i n e its reality. D i f f e r e n c e is a l w a y s d e r i v e d f r o m unified m e t a p h y s i c a l structures (forms) that, therefore, constitute the reality o f e v e r y t h i n g there is. T r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s , a c c o r d i n g l y , denies D e l e u z e ' s

intuition

that the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e o f reality (being) is n o t u n i t y b u t difference, that at root to b e is n o t to b e o n e b u t to b e diverse. T h i s d e n i a l is n o t a l w a y s as s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as the (roughly, L e i b n i z i a n ) m e t a p h y s i c s o f f o r m s s k e t c h e d a b o v e . T r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s does often r e c o g n i z e the i r r e d u c i b i l i t y o f the m a n y (difference) to the o n e (form) b y i n t r o d u c i n g a special p r i n c i p l e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the many, such as the n o n - b e i n g o f Plato's Sophist or Aristotle's p r i m e matter. B u t a n y such p r i n c i p l e is explicitly outside the p r i n c i p l e s o f unity a n d s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e m ; it functions m e r e l y as a n unintelligible surd e l e m e n t o n w h i c h f o r m s are s o m e h o w i m p r e s s e d . H e g e l ' s dialectic m a y s e e m to offer m o r e , since it m a k e s n o n - b e i n g (negation) the creative p r i n c i p l e o f m e t a p h y s i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . B u t for H e g e l , e v e n m o r e t h a n for P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e , n o n - b e i n g is e x t e r n a l to the b e i n g that it c o n t r a d i c t s . A b e i n g is different o n l y b e c a u s e it is n e g a t e d b y e v e r y t h i n g e x t e r n a l to it. A s D e l e u z e puts it in a n early article o n B e r g s o n : " I n H e g e l , the t h i n g differs w i t h itself b e c a u s e it differs w i t h e v e r y t h i n g that it is n o t . " D e l e u z e , like B e r g s o n , insists that " t h e t h i n g differs w i t h itself first, immediately" }

6

D e l e u z e ' s positive o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t is to d e v e l o p c o n c e p t s a n d l a n g u a g e that express this v i e w that " t h e t h i n g differs w i t h i t s e l f " , ! ( l

" L a c o n c e p t i o n de la difference chez B e r g s o n " , 96.

33

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

6

that to b e is to b e different. I n Différence et répétition h e d o e s this b y r e c a s t i n g the s t a n d a r d distinction b e t w e e n difference a n d repetition. In the s t a n d a r d view, for w h i c h the b e i n g o f c o n c r e t e realities is u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f f o r m s , t w o c o n c r e t e things differ b y e x p r e s sing different f o r m s or t h e y r e p e a t o n e a n o t h e r b y e x p r e s s i n g the s a m e f o r m . D i f f e r e n c e a n d r e p e t i t i o n a r e , t h e r e f o r e , o n this u n d e r standing, exclusive alternatives. D e l e u z e , h o w e v e r , asks us to think that

to r e p e a t

is to differ.

I n o n e sense,

o f course,

standard

m e t a p h y s i c s allows this. E v e r y r e p e t i t i o n (instance) o f a f o r m will differ, in s o m e non-essential w a y , f r o m o t h e r repetitions o f the f o r m , by, for e x a m p l e , h a v i n g a different spatial o r t e m p o r a l

location.

D e l e u z e ' s t h o u g h t , h o w e v e r , is that a repetition is essentially different f r o m w h a t it r e p e a t s . T h i s will, o f c o u r s e , s e e m a b s u r d in t e r m s o f o u r s t a n d a r d u n d e r s t a n d i n g , for w h i c h to b e is to b e the s a m e (that is, to b e this sort o f t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n a n y other). B u t if to b e is to b e different, w h a t c o u l d repetition b e o t h e r t h a n a n e x p r e s s i o n o f a b e i n g ' s difference w i t h itself? W e m u s t n o t , h o w e v e r , think that identifying b e i n g w i t h difference gives o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y to n e g a t i o n . D e l e u z i a n difference is affirm a t i o n n o t d e n i a l , since d e n i a l p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e t h i n g else that is n e g a t e d a n d thus leads to precisely w h a t D e l e u z e is t r y i n g to avoid: a r e l a t i v i z a t i o n o f difference to sameness. D i f f e r e n c e m u s t b e u n d e r stood as a m a t t e r o f w h a t a b e i n g is in itself, n o t o f h o w it is related to other things. A

being,

simply

as a b e i n g , is a l o c u s o f the

h e t e r o g e n e i t y (novelty, creativity) that is difference. T h e r e p e t i t i o n o f a b e i n g — for e x a m p l e , its c o n t i n u e d existence t h r o u g h t i m e o r a n e w instantiation o f it - c a n o n l y b e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f this heterogeneity. Deleuze's

ontology

further

requires

a radical

revision

of our

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s , that is, o u r c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t it is to think a b o u t b e i n g s . T h e epistemic c o u n t e r p a r t o f t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a physics is r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m , w h i c h thinks o f k n o w l e d g e

as the

a c c u r a t e r e p r o d u c t i o n in the m i n d o f the f o r m s that d e h n e a n entity. T h e basis o f s u c h k n o w l e d g e is the c o n c e p t r e g a r d e d as a n e x p r e s sion o f the u n i t y (the form) c o m m o n to a multiplicity o f instances. T r u t h is a m a t t e r o f f o r m u l a t i n g c o n c e p t s that a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t the individuals falling u n d e r t h e m . D e l e u z e h a s n o use for such a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n c e p t s , since, a c c o r d i n g to h i m , b e i n g is n o t d e h n e d b y the structural identities (forms) that c o n c e p t s a r e supp o s e d to represent. A D e l e u z i a n c o n c e p t is n o t a m e a n i n g ( c o m p r e hension)

under

which

instances

(extension)

fall.

It is r a t h e r

a

Philosophies of difference

337

c o n t i n u u m o f v a r i a t i o n s in several d i m e n s i o n s , e m b r a c i n g n u m e r o u s relations a m o n g the v a r y i n g e l e m e n t s b u t p r o v i d i n g n o overall sense or o r d e r to t h e m . O n a D e l e u z i a n r e a d i n g , for e x a m p l e , the c o n c e p t o f the c o g i t o is n o t , as D e s c a r t e s t h o u g h t , that o f a (finite) t h i n k i n g substance.

17

It is, rather, a m e l a n g e

o f at least three r a n g e s o f

" i n t e n s i v e v a r i a t i o n s " : t h i n k i n g (a v a r i a b l e

r a n g i n g over

feeling,

i m a g i n i n g , c o n c e i v i n g , etc.), d o u b t i n g ( r a n g i n g o v e r d o u b t that is scientific, n e u r o t i c , m e t a p h y s i c a l , etc.), a n d b e i n g ( r a n g i n g over the infinite, the finite, the e x t e n d e d , the thinking, etc.). T h e c o n c e p t o f the c o g i t o is the c o m p l e x set (multiplicity, D e l e u z e will s a y )

1 8

of

c o n n e c t i o n s a m o n g all these v a r i a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g , for e x a m p l e , the facts that to d o u b t is to think, to think is to b e , to d o u b t is to b e finite.

The

c o n c e p t h a s unity o n l y in the sense that there is a

c o n t i n u o u s p a t h t h r o u g h all the v a r i a t i o n s a n d relations that it c o m p r i s e s . T h e r e is n o extrinsic unity p r o v i d e d b y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subjectivity or a n y o t h e r t o t a l i z i n g grasp. Further, c o n c e p t s , like the w o r l d o f w h i c h they f o r m u l a t e k n o w l e d g e , a r e d y n a m i c , o p e n to c o n t i n u a l n o v e l t y a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . I n fact, D e l e u z e denies a n y s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n c o n c e p t s a n d b e i n g s , t h e r e b y e x c l u d i n g the d u a l i s m o f subject a n d o b j e c t that is at the h e a r t o f r e p r e s e n t a tionalism. D e l e u z e ' s p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as he f o r m u l a t e s it in Difference et repetition, a p p e a r s osophy.

1 9

as a p a r o d i c

inversion

A c c o r d i n g to K a n t , k n o w l e d g e

of Kant's

critical

phil-

o c c u r s o n l y w i t h i n the

epistemic i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n the e x t r e m e s o f p u r e sensations a n d p u r e ideas. T h i s i n t e r v a l , in w h i c h the c a t e g o r i e s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i m u l t a n e o u s l y structure sheer sensory i m m e d i a c y a n d restrict sheer intellectual s p e c u l a t i o n , is, for K a n t , the sole d o m a i n o f legitimate r e p r e s e n t a t i v e k n o w l e d g e . O u t s i d e o f this d o m a i n , there is o n l y the unintelligible sensible c o n t i n u u m , w h i c h is less t h a n k n o w l e d g e , a n d the r e a l m o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l illusions, w h i c h p r e t e n d s to a n intellectual intuition b e y o n d the limits o f o u r k n o w l e d g e .

Deleuzian

k n o w l e d g e , h o w e v e r , derives precisely f r o m the e x t r e m e s outside the K a n t i a n i n t e r v a l , u n m e d i a t e d b y the c a t e g o r i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e intensities o f p u r e sensation a n d the p a r a d o x e s o f p u r e ideas c o m b i n e to p r o d u c e a n a n t i - K a n t i a n " s y n t h e s i s " o f ! /

1 8

1 9

For this e x a m p l e , see G. D e l e u z e a n d F G u a t t a r i , What Is Philosophy?, 24—9. D e l e u z e also speaks of a c o n c e p t as a " p l a t e a u " a n d as a " r h i z o m e " (the latter being a plant, such as a n iris, with a root structure that is n o t unified in a central core). For D e l e u z e ' s analysis o f K a n t , see his La philosophic critique de Kant.

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

338

n o n - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e . W e m u s t n o t , h o w e v e r , think o f ideas a n d sensations as s e p a r a t e p r i n c i p l e s that n e e d to b e b r o u g h t together

to constitute k n o w l e d g e .

Such

a separation would

risk

l e a d i n g us b a c k to a n o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m (an o p p o s i t i o n o f t w o f u n d a m e n t a l identities) that w o u l d d e n y the p r i m a c y o f difference. R a t h e r , sensory intensity is a n a s p e c t o f a n i d e a , specifically, that aspect w h e r e b y its virtuality as a n a b s t r a c t s c h e m a t r a n s f o r m s the i d e a into a n actuality. A c c c o r d i n g l y , D e l e u z e says that his v i e w is a "transcendental alism.

empiricism"

rather

than

a transcendental

ide-

2 0

For K a n t , the c a t e g o r i e s c a n constitute objects o n l y w h e n t h e y a r e e x p r e s s e d ( " s c h e m a t i z e d " , as h e says) in the t e m p o r a l f o r m t a k e n by our lived

experience.

e x p r e s s e d temporally,

Similarly, although

Deleuze

requires

that ideas b e

n o t , o f c o u r s e , a c c o r d i n g to the

c o m m o n - s e n s e n o t i o n o f time K a n t takes for g r a n t e d , w h i c h assumes the spatialization o f t i m e criticized b y B e r g s o n . I n s t e a d , develops

in Différence et répétition a n e l a b o r a t e

account

Deleuze o f three

" t e m p o r a l s y n t h e s e s " , the hrst c o r r e s p o n d i n g to Husserl's c o n c e p tion o f the p r e s e n t as i n c o r p o r a t i n g

retentions o f the past a n d

p r o t e n t i o n s o f the future, the s e c o n d to the past as u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f B e r g s o n ' s p u r e m e m o r y (and Proust's i n v o l u n t a r y m e m o r y ) , a n d the third to the future as seen b y N i e t z s c h e ' s m y t h o f the e t e r n a l return. D e l e u z e also d e v e l o p s his m e t a p h y s i c s o f t i m e t h r o u g h his n o t i o n o f the e v e n t , w h i c h p l a y s a c e n t r a l role in Logique du sens. G i v e n the affinity for p r o c e s s m e t a p h y s i c s implicit in the p r i o r i t y D e l e u z e gives to difference, it is n o t surprising that h e assigns events a m a j o r p l a c e . B u t h e d o e s n o t m e r e l y invert the P l a t o n i c p r i o r i t y o f f o r m s over flux,

a move

that w o u l d retain o n t o l o g i c a l

dualism. Rather, he

a p p r o p r i a t e s the a n t i - P l a t o n i c Stoic distinction o f b o d i e s a n d events, a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h events a r e the l o c u s o f i n c o r p o r e a l m e a n i n g s that do n o t exist in a s e p a r a t e P l a t o n i c r e a l m b u t instead " f l o a t " o n the surfaces o f substantial b o d i e s , o f w h i c h t h e y are the e p i p h e n o m e n a l effects. (At the s a m e t i m e , D e l e u z e construes the existential c o n c r e t e ness o f b o d i e s a l o n g the lines o f B e r g s o n i a n d u r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o f Democritean

atoms

or

Aristotelian

substances.)

Understanding

events in this w a y , Logique du sens c o n t i n u e s , in a n o t h e r key, the m e t a p h y s i c s o f intensities a n d ideas d e v e l o p e d in Différence et répétition. See his late article, " L ' i m m a n e n c e : une vie . . . " , Philosophie 47 (1995), 3—7-

Philosophies of difference

339

T h e a b o v e survey o f k e y D e l e u z i a n ideas gives at best only a r o u g h g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his m e t a p h y s i c s o f difference. C o n sistent w i t h his intuition o f the diversity o f reality, D e l e u z e presents multiple versions o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l vision, a p p r o p r i a t i n g , a m o n g others, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l v o c a b u l a r i e s o f H u m e a n e m p i r i c i s m a n d Foucaultian theory

archaeology,

21

a n d o f differential

derived

from

reflection

the m a t h e m a t i c a l geometry,

o n Proust's

vocabularies

a n d aesthetic novels

o f set

vocabularies

a n d Francis

Bacon's

p a i n t i n g s . O f special i m p o r t a n c e , for scope a n d detail a n d , a b o v e all, for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f D e l e u z e ' s ethical a n d political t h o u g h t , are his t w o m a j o r c o l l a b o r a t i v e w o r k s w i t h Felix G u a t t a r i , L'anti-oedipe (1972) a n d Milk plateaux (1980), p r e s e n t e d as the t w o parts o f a n overall p r o j e c t entitled Capitalisme et schizophrenic T h e focus o n social a n d political issues c o r r e s p o n d s to D e l e u z e ' s t u r n to militant political a c t i v i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y in F o u c a u l t ' s G r o u p e

d'Information

Prison

a n d in s u p p o r t o f Palestinian rights. Capitalisme et schizophrenic h

M a n f r e d F r a n k puts it, a " c o n -

sciously dadaist a n d c a r n i v a l e s q u e s t y l e " systematic a n a l y s i s . synthesis

23

theorizing.

Deleuze's 24

that p u r p o s e l y

eludes

T h e overall g o a l seems to b e a N i e t z s c h e a n

o f psychoanalysis

combines

2 2

and Marxism,

metaphysics

with

a synthesis

Guattari's

that

also

psycho-social

T h e l e a d i n g n o t i o n is that o f desire, w h i c h c a n b e

c o n s t r u e d as a p s y c h o - s o c i a l

expression of D e l e u z i a n

difference,

since desire is p r e c i s e l y the i m p e t u s for b e c o m i n g o t h e r (differing). Traditionally, h o w e v e r , f r o m P l a t o t h r o u g h F r e u d , desire has b e e n s u b o r d i n a t e d to the l a c k that it is c o n s t r u e d as striving to fulfill. T h i s contradicts

Deleuze's

intuition

o f the p r i m a c y

o f difference

d e r i v i n g it f r o m a n a n t e r i o r n e e d . D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i

by

instead

p r o p o s e a v i e w o f desire that, like N i e t z s c h e a n w i l l to p o w e r , is a

His Foucault is a n impressive analysis but one that sheds m o r e light o n D e l e u z e himself than on Foucault. M a n f r e d Frank, What Is Neostructuralism?, 316. Frank's characterization is particularly apt for L'anti-oedipe. Milk plateaux is less e x u b e r a n t but prodigiously - a n d deliberately unorganized. A g o o d introductory guide is provided b y E u g e n e H o l l a n d , Deleuze and Guattari's AntiO e d i p u s : Introduction to Schizoanalysis. Felix G u a t t a r i (1930—92) w a s a L a c a n i a n psychoanalyst a n d political activist. Before his collaboration with D e l e u z e his theoretical w o r k c o m b i n e d a Freudian a n d a M a r x i s t v i e w p o i n t by e m p h a s i z i n g the social nature o f individual consciousness a n d distinguishing the subjected g r o u p (groupe assujettt), w h i c h allows itself to be d e t e r m i n e d b y fantasies imposed from outside, from the group-subject (groupe-sujet), w h i c h creates a n d transcends its o w n fantasies. See the essays collected in his Psychoanalyse et transversalite.

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

34« pure

desire

is

" d e t e r r i t o r i a l i z e d " , that is, n o t r o o t e d in a n y p r e g i v e n n a t u r e

affirmation

o f difference

for

its o w n

sake.

Such

or

institution. S o c o n s t r u e d , desire c o r r e s p o n d s to m o d e r n capitalism's m o d e l o f individuals as a u t o n o m o u s c h o o s e r s o f g o o d s v a l u e d only b e c a u s e t h e y are desired, n o t in virtue o f a n y intrinsic w o r t h (e.g., ethical, religious, cultural). D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i h a v e n o p r o b l e m w i t h this m o d e l ; their criticism o f c a p i t a l i s m is r a t h e r that it g o e s o n to a c c o r d g e n e r a l (public) v a l u e to desires o n l y o n the basis o f their m a r k e t v a l u e , r e l e g a t i n g a n y n o n - e c o n o m i c m o d e s o f v a l u a t i o n to the p r i v a t e sphere. T h e y a g r e e w i t h M a r x i s m ' s call for a critique (and r e v o l u t i o n a r y o v e r t h r o w ) o f this capitalist a l i e n a t i o n o f desire b u t in t u r n criticize Marxism

for its o w n r e d u c t i o n

o f v a l u e s to those

of

economic

p r o d u c t i o n (labor), a r e d u c t i o n that eliminates desire as an i r r e d u cibly p s y c h o l o g i c a l

category.

Here

they

see the n e e d to

correct

M a r x i s m in the light o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . B u t t h e y also think that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s as f o r m u l a t e d to date (even b y L a c a n ) , has b e e n in c o m p l i c i t y w i t h capitalism. T h i s o c c u r s p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h

the

t h e o r y o f the O e d i p a l c o m p l e x , w h i c h sees all desires as u l t i m a t e l y restricted to the f a m i l y (in particular, to l o v e or h a t r e d o f the m o t h e r or the father), t h e r e b y l e g i t i m a t i n g the capitalist r e l e g a t i o n o f n o n e c o n o m i c desire to the p r i v a t e sphere. T h e p r o j e c t o f L'anti-oedipe is to r e f o r m u l a t e p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d M a r x i s m in w a y s that a v o i d the a b o v e deficiencies a n d , c o m b i n i n g w i t h a D e l e u z i a n t h e o r y o f desire, will b e able to l a u n c h

(Nietzschean)

an effective

critique

of

capitalism. In the t e r m i n o l o g y o f D e l e u z e

and Guattari,

"schizophrenia"

refers to the d e t e r r i t o r i a l i z e d desire that is g e n e r a t e d b y capitalism and

endorsed

by

Deleuzian

philosophy

o f difference.

They

see

s c h i z o p h r e n i a in this sense n o t as an illness to be c u r e d b u t as a value

to

be

nurtured.

The

problem

is that

capitalism

restricts

s c h i z o p h r e n i c desire to either its e c o n o m i z e d (public) or its O e d i p a l (private) f o r m . T h o s e w h o try to live out n o n - e c o n o m i z e d desires in the p u b l i c r e a l m are v i o l e n t l y r e p r e s s e d a n d l e a d the lives o f terror and

frustration

that

define

what

is

generally

termed

"schizo-

p h r e n i a " . T h e h o r r o r o f such lives is r e a l , b u t it is a p r o d u c t o f the capitalist system, n o t an i n e v i t a b l e feature o f d e t e r r i t o r i a l i z e d desire. D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i offer a " s c h i z o a n a l y s i s " o f c a p i t a l i s m d e s i g n e d to e x p o s e a n d h e l p e l i m i n a t e the arbitrariness o f its constraints, t h e r e b y freeing the creative p o w e r o f " s c h i z o p h r e n i a " .

Philosophies of difference The

positive

basis o f D e l e u z e

and Guattari's project

is their

f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f h u m a n b e i n g s in t e r m s o f desiringmachines. T h e y

speak o f " m a c h i n e s " n o t to e n d o r s e

a n y sort o f

m e c h a n i s m o r d e t e r m i n i s m b u t to e m p h a s i z e the p r o d u c t i v e n a t u r e o f desire (what D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i call

"desiring-production",

their e q u i v a l e n t o f N i e t z s c h e ' s w i l l - t o - p o w e r ) . I n their t e r m i n o l o g y , a " m a c h i n e " is a p r o d u c t i v e (creative) entity, a n d to say that w e a r e d e s i r i n g - m a c h i n e s (or, rather, a g g r e g a t e s o f d e s i r i n g - m a c h i n e s ) is to say that the desires c o n s t i t u t i n g o u r existence are creative a c h i e v e m e n t s in their o w n rights, n o t responses to lacks d e t e r m i n e d b y factors (the w o r l d , h u m a n nature) outside o f o u r desires. T h e n o t i o n o f a d e s i r i n g - m a c h i n e is D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i ' s synthesis o f F r e u d ian desire w i t h M a r x i s t p r o d u c t i o n , a synthesis that simultaneously m a k e s desire p a r t o f the M a r x i s t infrastructure

a n d gives socio-

e c o n o m i c significance to F r e u d i a n desire (libido). T h e y e m p l o y the n o t i o n — a l o n g w i t h a d i z z y i n g p a n o p l y o f r e l a t e d c o n c e p t s — to criticize s t a n d a r d f o r m u l a t i o n s o f M a r x i s m a n d p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , to argue

that such f o r m u l a t i o n s

simultaneously

support

systems o f

p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m a n d o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c capitalism, a n d to c o n s t r u c t their o w n alternative o f c r e a t i v e s c h i z o p h r e n i a .

IRIGARAY

The

difference

that c o n c e r n s

Luce

Irigaray

(b. 1930) is sexual

difference. S h e a p p r o a c h e s sexual difference in p h i l o s o p h i c a l , linguistic, a n d p y s c h o a n a l y t i c

t e r m s , interests c o r r e s p o n d i n g to h e r

o w n a c a d e m i c t r a i n i n g : a d o c t o r a t e in p h i l o s o p h y (1955) f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f L o u v a i n in B e l g i u m , w h e r e she w a s b o r n , a d e g r e e in p s y c h o p a t h o l o g y (1962) f r o m the Institut de P s y c h o l o g i e in Paris, a d o c t o r a t e in linguistics f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f V i n c e n n e s (1968), a n d a F r e n c h state d o c t o r a t e in p h i l o s o p h y (1974). S h e h a s h e l d t e a c h i n g positions (e.g., at the U n i v e r s i t y o f V i n c e n n e s ) as well as r e s e a r c h positions (e.g., at the C e n t r e N a t i o n a l de R e c h e r c h e

Scientifique),

a n d is also a p r a c t i c i n g p s y c h o a n a l y s t . I r i g a r a y sees s e x u a l difference as " o n e o f the m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues, if n o t the issue, o f o u r a g e " . S h e thinks it is also " p r o b a b l y the issue in o u r time w h i c h c o u l d b e o u r ' s a l v a t i o n ' if w e t h o u g h t it t h r o u g h " (Ethique de la difference sexuelle [EDS],

13/5). O n the o n e

h a n d , I r i g a r a y e v o k e s U t o p i a n c o n s e q u e n c e s o f d e v e l o p i n g a n adeq u a t e g r a s p o f the differences b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n :

"Sexual

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

342 difference

[properly u n d e r s t o o d ] w o u l d constitute t h e h o r i z o n o f

w o r l d s m o r e f e c u n d t h a n a n y k n o w n to date - at least in the West . . . For l o v i n g p a r t n e r s this w o u l d b e a f e c u n d i t y o f birth a n d r e g e n e r a t i o n , b u t also the p r o d u c t i o n o f a n e w a g e o f t h o u g h t , art, p o e t r y a n d l a n g u a g e : t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n e w poetics." O n the o t h e r h a n d , I r i g a r a y h a s a p r o f o u n d sense o f the difficulty f a c i n g t h e effort to u n d e r s t a n d sexual difference. C o n t e m p o r a r y sexism is n o t only r o o t e d in social a n d e c o n o m i c p r a c t i c e s ; it derives f r o m o u r f u n d a m e n t a l linguistic a n d o n t o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k s . " W e n e e d to reinterpret e v e r y t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g the relations b e t w e e n the subject a n d discourse, the subject a n d the w o r l d , the subject a n d the c o s m i c , the m i c r o c o s m i c a n d the m a c r o c o s m i c " (EDS, 14/6). For Irigaray, t h e n , m a l e d o m i n a n c e c a n n o t , ultimately, b e effectively a d d r e s s e d b y political o r social r e f o r m o r e v e n r e v o l u t i o n , a l t h o u g h she a g r e e s that actions at these levels a r e still c a l l e d for. In the e n d w h a t is r e q u i r e d is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v o l u t i o n in the fund a m e n t a l c a t e g o r i e s t h r o u g h w h i c h w e think o u r w o r l d a n d o u r p l a c e in it. T h i s is b e c a u s e " m a n [in the sense o f the m a s c u l i n e sex, c o n t r a r y to claims that the t e r m is n e u t r a l a n d u n i v e r s a l a n d so includes w o m e n ]

h a s b e e n the subject o f discourse, w h e t h e r in

theory, morality, o r politics. A n d the g e n d e r o f G o d , the g u a r d i a n o f e v e r y subject a n d e v e r y d i s c o u r s e , is a l w a y s masculine and paternal, in the W e s t " {EDS, 1 4 / 6 - 7 ) . P h i l o s o p h y is I r i g a r a y ' s m a i n focus " i n a s m u c h as this discourse sets forth the l a w for all others, i n a s m u c h discourse

as it constitutes the

o n d i s c o u r s e " (Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un [CS],

72/74).

P h i l o s o p h y carries o u t this meta-linguistic d o m i n a t i o n (reminiscent o f the B a r t h e s i a n m o t t o : " m e t a - l a n g u a g e is t e r r o r i s m " ) t h r o u g h " i t s p o w e r to r e d u c e all others to the e c o n o m y o f the S a m e " , that is, to reduce

all e x p e r i e n c e ,

all reality to a h x e d

categories. A n d , as w e h a v e

seen, I r i g a r a y

set o f f u n d a m e n t a l maintains

that o n e

f u n d a m e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e o f this r e d u c t i o n is " t o eradicate the difference between the sexes in systems that a r e self-representative o f a ' m a s c u l i n e s u b j e c t ' " (CS, 72/74). I r i g a r a y ' s p r i m a r y tool for e x p o s i n g the implicit s e x i s m o f p h i l o sophical

discourse

indifference

is p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ,

which

reveals

the

"sexual

[refusal to r e c o g n i z e t h e difference o f the sexes] that

underlies the truth o f a n y science, the logic o f e v e r y d i s c o u r s e " (CS, 6 7 / 6 9 , italics omitted). H e r a s s u m p t i o n seems to b e that p s y c h o analysis shows h o w all h u m a n cultural a c h i e v e m e n t s express the

Philosophies of difference resolution

343

o f the tensions s u r r o u n d i n g c h i l d h o o d

sexuality

(par-

ticularly, the r e s p o n s e to the O e d i p a l c o m p l e x ) a n d that, accordingly, the f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r a m e w o r k o f culture will

embody

this resolution. F r e u d ' s essential c o n t r i b u t i o n is to s h o w that o u r c h i l d h o o d tensions are resolved b y the r e d u c t i o n o f f e m i n i n e sexuality to m a s c u l i n e sexuality. " F e m a l e sexuality . . . is n e v e r defined w i t h r e s p e c t to a n y sex b u t the m a s c u l i n e . . . T h e

' f e m i n i n e ' is

a l w a y s d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s o f d e h c i e n c y or atrophy, as the o t h e r side o f the sex that a l o n e holds a m o n o p o l y on virtue: the m a l e s e x " (CS, 67—8/69). T h u s , w e h a v e the all too familiar story o f " p e n i s - e n v y " as the k e y to female sexuality a n d fear o f l o s i n g the p e n i s as the k e y to m a l e sexuality. T h e f e m i n i n e is u n d e r s t o o d entirely as the l a c k o f w h a t d e h n e s m a l e sexuality. In F r e u d i a n t e r m s , the t u r n i n g p o i n t in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f m a l e sexuality is the little b o y ' s repression, f r o m fear o f castration b y his father, o f desire for his m o t h e r . G i v e n the u n c o n s c i o u s n a t u r e o f this desire,

it

can

express

itself as

a

desire

for

anything

that

the

u n c o n s c i o u s sees as the s y m b o l i c e q u i v a l e n t o f the m o t h e r . R e n o u n c i n g the m o t h e r therefore m e a n s d e v a l u i n g all o f these

symbolic

e q u i v a l e n t s . T h i s i n c l u d e s a n y t h i n g v i e w e d as passive, r e c e p t i v e , soft, l a c k i n g , e n c l o s i n g - a n y o f the attributes o f w o m e n as r e c i p i e n t s of the p e n i s a n d b e a r e r s o f c h i l d r e n . A t the s a m e t i m e , the opposites o f these

attributes,

particularly

the

distinctively

masculine

(penile)

p o w e r s o f a c t i o n , p e n e t r a t i o n , h a r d n e s s , are p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u e d . T h e result is a w a y o f t h i n k i n g that s h a r p l y separates " f e m a l e " qualities f r o m their " m a l e " opposites, l e a d i n g to d i c h o t o m i e s b e t w e e n the active f o r m a n d the passive m a t t e r it m o l d s , b e t w e e n a d v a n c i n g time and receptive

space, between

solid objects

a n d the p l a c e s

that

c o n t a i n t h e m . O n a n o t h e r level, the female is associated w i t h m a t t e r a n d the m a t e r i a l w o r l d in g e n e r a l , b e c a u s e o f b o t h its passivity a n d its role in o u r n u r t u r e a n d s u p p o r t . T h i s leads to s h a r p distinctions b e t w e e n m i n d a n d body, intellect a n d sense, a c t i o n a n d p a s s i o n , w i t h , in e a c h case, the hrst t e r m c o r r e s p o n d i n g to a m a l e v a l u e a n d the s e c o n d to a female disvalue. A l o n g the s a m e lines, vision, b e i n g m o r e active a n d d i s e m b o d i e d , is v a l u e d over the o t h e r senses. F e m a l e sexuality d e v e l o p s in distinctive w a y s b u t w i t h the s a m e ultimate " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " effects. L i k e the little boy, the little girl desires h e r m o t h e r sexually. T h e girl, h o w e v e r , soon l e a r n s that h e r desire c a n n o t b e fulfilled b e c a u s e she has n o p e n i s . T h i s l e a d s the girl to h a t e h e r m o t h e r for n o t p r o v i d i n g h e r w i t h this essential

Structuralism and Beyond

344

(1960-1990)

o r g a n a n d , m o r e generally, to v a l u e w o m e n n e g a t i v e l y for b e i n g "castrated".

Correspondingly,

she c o m e s to love the father a n d

r e g a r d s the m o t h e r as a rival for his affection. B u t , unlike the boy, the girl (having n o penis) c a n n o t fully identify w i t h the father. T h i s leaves h e r w i t h n o w a y o f identifying h e r s e l f e x c e p t b y the unfulfillable desire o f b e i n g a m a n . S h e is thus l e d to disvalue h e r femininity a n d to see h e r w o r t h as d e p e n d e n t o n m a l e a p p r o v a l . T h u s , girls c o m e to a c c e p t the s a m e a s y m m e t r i c a l d i c h o t o m i e s as b o y s d o , although

their

psychological

route

to this

acceptance

is

quite

different. It m i g h t b e o b j e c t e d that F r e u d ' s a c c o u n t is itself the p r o d u c t o f a sexist v i e w d e t e r m i n e d to give p r i o r i t y to the m a l e a n d that, therefore, a feminist s h o u l d p a y n o attention to it. I r i g a r a y a g r e e s that Freud's o w n w o r k is p e r v a d e d b y sexism (see h e r critique o f F r e u d in Speculum de Vautre femme). B u t , she m a i n t a i n s , this d o e s n o t m e a n that his d e s c r i p t i o n o f h u m a n sexuality is i n c o r r e c t : " F r e u d is d e s c r i b i n g an a c t u a l state o f affairs"; the f e m i n i n e is i n d e e d u n d e r s t o o d entirely in t e r m s o f the m a s c u l i n e

(CS, 68/70). F r e u d ' s failing (and also

L a c a n ' s ) is to a c c e p t this description as a n u n q u e s t i o n e d n o r m a n d so e n d o r s e the c o n t i n g e n t historical fact as a n i n e v i t a b l e constraint on h u m a n existence. W e rightly object to F r e u d ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f the p h a l l o c e n t r i c order, " b u t that o r d e r is i n d e e d the o n e that lays d o w n the l a w t o d a y " (CS, 71/73). I r i g a r a y does n o t , h o w e v e r , simply a r g u e f r o m the g e n e r a l descriptive truth o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s to the m a s c u l i n e d o m i n a n c e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l discourse. S h e also a n a l y z e s p h i l o s o p h i c a l texts to s h o w precisely h o w t h e y e m b o d y this d o m i n a n c e . O n e o f h e r m o s t i m p o r t a n t analyses is o f Plato's m y t h o f the c a v e , c a r r i e d o u t in the l o n g c o n c l u d i n g essay of Speculum de I'autrefemme. E x p o s i n g the m a s c u l i n e bias o f p h i l o s o p h y is m e r e l y the prelim i n a r y stage o f I r i g a r a y ' s p r o j e c t . S h e also p r o p o s e s to find a w a y to express f e m a l e sexuality in its o w n t e r m s , w i t h o u t s u b o r d i n a t i n g it to masculinity. T h i s r e q u i r e s h e r to " s o l v e the p r o b l e m o f the articulation o f the f e m a l e s e x in d i s c o u r s e " . T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y

difficult

since, o n I r i g a r a y ' s o w n a c c o u n t , o u r t h o u g h t a n d l a n g u a g e is, at the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l level, d e p e n d e n t o n the system o f " m a s c u l i n e l o g i c " . " H o w c a n w e i n t r o d u c e ourselves into such a t i g h t l y - w o v e n s y s t e m a t i c i t y ? " (CS, 7 3 / 7 6 ) . It w o u l d s e e m that w o m e n m u s t c h o o s e b e t w e e n n o t s p e a k i n g at all o r s p e a k i n g in t e r m s o f c a t e g o r i e s that s u b o r d i n a t e their sexuality to that o f m e n .

Philosophies of difference

345

I r i g a r a y a g r e e s that a n y sort o f direct assault o n m a s c u l i n e logic w o u l d m e a n " d e m a n d i n g to speak as a (masculine) 'subject' " a n d so w o u l d " p o s t u l a t e a relation to t h e intelligible that w o u l d m a i n t a i n sexual i n d i f f e r e n c e " (CS, 74/76). H e r positive p r o j e c t is to d e v e l o p a distinctive

feminine

identity, n o t as it is defined

b y masculinist

t h o u g h t b u t as it c a n b e c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m f e m i n i n e " r e s i d u e s " that elude

masculine

domination

(alternatively,

from

the

feminine

" m a t t e r " that is n e v e r entirely assimilated b y t h e m a s c u l i n e " f o r m " ) . S u c h a n identity e m e r g e s , w e m i g h t say, f r o m t h e interstices o f t h e masculinist system a n d does n o t m i r r o r t h e m a l e c o n c e p t i o n o f w o m e n . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , it constitutes a basis for w o m e n to a s s u m e a p a r i t y w i t h m e n that d o e s n o t simply t u r n t h e m into m e n . I r i g a r a y ' s i n d i r e c t a p p r o a c h to c o n s t r u c t i n g a f e m i n i n e

identity

e m p h a s i z e s w h a t she calls " m i m i c r y " . M i m i c r y is a t r a d i t i o n a l role o f t h e f e m a l e , tied b o t h to h e r f u n c t i o n o f b i o l o g i c a l r e p r o d u c t i o n (providing m e n w i t h their i m a g e s in h e r children) a n d to h e r status as inferior reflection o f m a l e qualities. B u t I r i g a r a y ' s t h o u g h t is that this role c a n b e t u r n e d against m a l e d o m i n a n c e to r e v e a l " b y a n effect o f playful r e p e t i t i o n , w h a t w a s s u p p o s e d to r e m a i n invisible: the c o v e r - u p o f a possible o p e r a t i o n o f the f e m i n i n e in l a n g u a g e " {CS, 74/76). Specifically,

she suggests

that w o m e n

can develop

their o w n

distinctive f e m i n i n i t y b y t a k i n g o n , in their o w n w a y , stereotypically f e m i n i n e attributes. H e r i d e a c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f t h e traditional identification o f w o m a n w i t h matter, d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e o r g a n i z i n g force o f (masculine) f o r m . (Consider, for e x a m p l e , l o n g established

views

about

t h e relation

o f passive

ovum

to

active

sperm.) C o n s t r u e d in these t e r m s , w o m a n is v i e w e d as t h e epistemic m a t t e r structured b y the c o n c e p t u a l f o r m s o f m a l e rationality. B u t , as w e h a v e

seen, I r i g a r a y

suggests that there

a l w a y s persists a

m a t e r i a l residue, s o m e t h i n g n e v e r fully assimilated to or c o n t r o l l e d b y f o r m . D e l i b e r a t e l y a s s u m i n g a n d " p l a y i n g " roles defined for t h e m b y m a s c u l i n e c o n c e p t s m a y a l l o w w o m e n to u n e a r t h a n d d e v e l o p this residue. S u c h a p r o c e d u r e m i g h t , t h e n , p r o v i d e a f o o t h o l d for autonomous

female

speech

a n d destroy

the male

monopoly

on

discourse. A s a result, " t h e m a s c u l i n e w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e 'everyt h i n g ' " , a n d " t h e right to define e v e r y v a l u e . . . w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e l o n g to i t " (CS, 77/80). I r i g a r a y does n o t , h o w e v e r , p r o p o s e to d e v e l o p a " n e w t h e o r y o f w h i c h w o m a n w o u l d b e t h e subject o r t h e object". S u c h a t h e o r y

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

346

w o u l d b e m e r e l y w o m e n ' s effort to rival m e n in m a s c u l i n e t e r m s b y constructing a "logic

o f the f e m i n i n e " .

Rather, Irigaray

speaks,

adapting Lacan's terminology, o f constructing a feminine " I m a g i n a r y " to r e p l a c e the d o m i n a n t i m a g e s o f w o m e n d e r i v e d f r o m the m a l e u n c o n s c i o u s . H e r g o a l is " j a m m i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l m a c h i n e r y i t s e l f " b y e v o k i n g a positive f e m i n i n e " d i s r u p t i v e excess" w h e r e in the past m a s c u l i n e t h e o r y h a s assigned w o m e n o n l y the negativities o f lack a n d d e h c i e n c y (CS, 76/78). T h i s j a m m i n g o f m a l e t h e o r y will, at the s a m e t i m e , initiate distinctively f e m i n i n e discourses. One

o f the p r i m e

loci

of Irigaray's

positive

construction

of

f e m i n i n e identity is h e r r e t h i n k i n g o f the t r a d i t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s o f n a t u r a l philosophy. " T h e transition to a n e w a g e [in w h i c h s e x u a l difference w o u l d b e p r o p e r l y r e c o g n i z e d ] r e q u i r e s a c h a n g e in o u r p e r c e p t i o n a n d c o n c e p t i o n of space-time, the inhabiting ofplaces, a n d o f containers or envelopes of identity" (EDS, 15/7). It also r e q u i r e s n e w w a y s o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t the m a t t e r a n d f o r m that constitute objects in s p a c e - t i m e a n d a b o u t the intervals b e t w e e n these objects. H e r e o n e k e y p r o b l e m is that w o m e n are u n d e r s t o o d s i m p l y as p l a c e s for m e n : the w o m b s in w h i c h t h e y grow, the h o m e s in w h i c h they a r e sheltered. T h i s leaves the w o m a n w i t h n o p l a c e o f h e r o w n - a p r o b l e m r e c a l l i n g Aristotle's a p o r i a : h o w c a n a p l a c e itself h a v e a p l a c e ? I r i g a r a y n o t e s , h o w e v e r , that w o m e n a r e also associated w i t h the intervals ( " e m p t y " spaces) b e t w e e n things a n d the thresholds t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e y enter a n d exit (prototypically, the v a g i n a ) . S h e evokes the b e a u t y a n d w o r t h o f w o m a n as a n i n t e r m e d i a t e , m e d iating p l a c e that c o n n e c t s a n d unihes the w o r l d . W o m e n as creative " i n t e r v a l s " a r e , she suggests, like angels, the m e s s e n g e r s

between

h e a v e n a n d e a r t h . " T h e s e m e s s e n g e r s w h o n e v e r r e m a i n e n c l o s e d in a p l a c e , w h o are also n e v e r i m m o b i l e . . . circulate as m e d i a t o r s o f that w h i c h h a s n o t y e t h a p p e n e d , o f w h a t is still g o i n g to h a p p e n , o f w h a t is o n the h o r i z o n . E n d l e s s l y r e o p e n i n g the e n c l o s u r e o f the universe, o f universes, identities, the u n f o l d i n g o f actions, o f h i s t o r y " (EDS, 22/15).

S h e also e v o k e s w o m e n ' s lips (facial a n d genital),

a l w a y s p a r t l y o p e n , p a r t l y closed a n d so " s t r a n g e r s to d i c h o t o m y a n d o p p o s i t i o n " , as i m a g e s o f the f e m i n i n e (EDS, 24/18). I r i g a r a y further

d e v e l o p s the t h e m e

of w o m a n

as i n t e r v a l b y

s h o w i n g how, in the Symposium, D i o t i m a , w h o s e w o r d s are r e p o r t e d b y S o c r a t e s , p r o p o s e s a n alternative to Plato's dialectic (and all the s u b s e q u e n t dialectics in the history o f p h i l o s o p h y ) . I n s t e a d o f m o v i n g from

term

to t e r m in a w a y that requires

the a b a n d o n i n g

or

Philosophies of difference

347

destruction o f earlier t e r m s , " s h e establishes a n i n t e r m e d i a r y that will n e v e r b e a b a n d o n e d Diotima's

dialectic

moves

as a m e a n s or a p a t h " (EDS, 27/20). from

"here"

to a " b e y o n d " ,

but " a

b e y o n d that n e v e r abolishes the h e r e " . M o r e o v e r , its m e a n s , its i n t e r m e d i a r y , is love, a love that w e " d o n o t h a v e to give u p . . . in o r d e r to b e c o m e wise o r l e a r n e d " (EDS, 28/21). T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f dialectic w o u l d a l l o w for a k n o w l e d g e o f the intelligible that did n o t r e q u i r e a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the sensible, a g r a s p o f the e t e r n a l that w o u l d n o t h a v e to take p l a c e outside o f time. U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,

this

c o n c e p t i o n o f dialectic is a b a n d o n e d in the s e c o n d h a l f o f D i o t i m a ' s s p e e c h — p e r h a p s S o c r a t e s as a m a l e c o u l d n o t k e e p the m e s s a g e u n m u d d l e d ? B u t it r e m a i n s as a basis for a f e m i n i n e a n t i d o t e to the relentless d i c h o t o m i e s o f m a l e t h o u g h t . I r i g a r a y also d e v e l o p s a p o e t r y o f the fluids w h o s e lack o f substance a n d d e h n i t i o n h a v e m a r g i n a l i z e d t h e m i n m a s c u l i n e t h o u g h t -

a p o i n t she supports b y citing the l a g g i n g d e v e l o p m e n t o f fluid

m e c h a n i c s in the history o f science (CS, 103/106). H e r e she speaks o f the r e d b l o o d (sang rouge) w i t h w h i c h w o m e n n o u r i s h c h i l d r e n in the w o m b , in contrast to the (re)semblance ( h o m o p h o n i c a l l y , sang blanc, white b l o o d ) o f m a l e representationalist e p i s t e m o l o g y ; a n d o f the m u c u s that l u b r i c a t e s tissues a n d , especially, facilitates s e x u a l u n i o n . T h e s e liquids e v o k e b o t h the f e m i n i n e t h e m e s o f inclusive b e c o m i n g (opposed to exclusive

dialectics o f b e i n g a n d n o n - b e i n g ) a n d o f

connection and nourishment. T h e p r o j e c t o f a r t i c u l a t i n g female sexuality is n o t the h n a l g o a l o f I r i g a r a y ' s philosophy. T h i s p r o j e c t is p u r s u e d as a n essential p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a v i a b l e ethics. For Irigaray, b e c a u s e o u r c o n c e p t i o n s o f sexual difference are f u n d a m e n t a l to all t h o u g h t a n d a c t i o n , ethics m u s t take the f o r m o f s e x u a l ethics. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that all ethical questions are explicitly a b o u t sex; I r i g a r a y e m p h a s i z e s , for e x a m p l e , the ethical i m p o r t a n c e o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l issues. B u t questions o f sexuality are ethically c e n t r a l a n d implicit in virtually all m o r a l c o n c e r n s . (For e x a m p l e , I r i g a r a y r e g a r d s e n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s as d u e to the limitations o f o u r masculinist c o n c e p t i o n o f science.) T h e c o n c e r n o f I r i g a r a y ' s s e x u a l ethics is the fruitful i n t e r a c t i o n o f men

and women.

A t present,

there

are n o alternatives

to the

s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f w o m e n to m e n , since w o m e n h a v e n o distinctive sexual identity. T h e y c a n b e t h o u g h t o f o n l y as inferior m e n a n d therefore as m e r e i n s t r u m e n t s for social relations a m o n g m e n . I n

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

348

this r e g a r d , I r i g a r a y speaks o f our society as " h o m ( m ) o s e x u a l " : there are relations o f e q u a l i t y o n l y a m o n g m e m b e r s o f the s a m e (homos, in G r e e k ) sex, n a m e l y m e n

(hommes, in French). In such a

society,

w o m e n c a n o n l y be " s e r v a n t s o f the phallic cult, or the objects o f use a n d e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n m e n , rival objects on the m a r k e t " . B u t ethics m u s t n o t b e limited to c r e a t i n g an identity for w o m e n . A s I r i g a r a y sees it, m e n t o o n e e d to d e v e l o p an identity b e y o n d that p r o v i d e d b y masculinist t h o u g h t . Just as w e n e e d to a v o i d " s u b o r d i n a t i n g w o m e n to destiny w i t h o u t a l l o w i n g t h e m a n y access to m i n d , or c o n s c i o u s ness o f self a n d for s e l f " , so t o o w e m u s t a v o i d " c l o s i n g m a n a w a y in a consciousness o f self a n d for self that leaves n o s p a c e for the g o d s " (EDS, 121/126). W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen h o w I r i g a r a y tries to d e v e l o p an alternative vision o f the f e m i n i n e t h r o u g h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n vocabulary effective,

and hence

of ontological

this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n

must

of

fundamental

categories. T o be

also b e

realized

in

ethically women's

relations to one a n o t h e r a n d , specifically, to one a n o t h e r ' s b o d i e s . T h e r e m u s t , in o t h e r w o r d s , b e the possibility o f g e n u i n e h o m o e r o t i c relations a m o n g w o m e n : " W h a t w e h a v e to d o . . . is to discover o u r sexual identity, that is, the singularity o f o u r a u t o - e r o t i c i s m , o f o u r narcissism, the singularity o f o u r h o m o s e x u a l i t y . "

2 5

I r i g a r a y is not

c l a i m i n g , as s o m e r a d i c a l feminists d o , that the o n l y

appropriate

sexual relations for w o m e n are lesbian. H e r p o i n t is r a t h e r that one c o n c r e t e c o n s e q u e n c e o f an i n d e p e n d e n t female s e x u a l identity must be

the

capacity

of w o m e n

to o v e r c o m e

Oedipal

hatred

o f the

f e m i n i n e a n d to love one another. S u c h love w o u l d be quite different from

female

homosexuality

understood,

as

in

Freudian

theory,

simply as a m i m i c k i n g o f m a s c u l i n e desire. B u t I r i g a r a y seems to r e g a r d female h o m o s e x u a l i t y as itself o n l y a step to the ultimate g o a l o f p r o d u c t i v e m a l e - f e m a l e relations. O n l y w o m e n c a p a b l e o f l o v i n g one a n o t h e r for their o w n sakes h a v e the a u t o n o m o u s identity n e e d e d to love m e n

as " e q u a l s " . H e r e ,

of

c o u r s e , " e q u a l s " d o e s n o t i m p l y that m e n a n d w o m e n share

an

identical n a t u r e . R a t h e r , I r i g a r a y ' s i d e a is that m e n a n d w o m e n must develop

their

own

independent

identities

as m a l e

and

female,

identities that p r o v i d e the basis for truly creative, n o n e x p l o i t a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n the sexes. T h e e m o t i o n a l a n d intellectual force b e h i n d such interactions is 2 5

Le eorps-a-eorps avec la mere, 30—1.

Philosophies of difference

349

w o n d e r , " t h i s hrst p a s s i o n . . . i n d i s p e n s a b l e n o t o n l y to life b u t also or still to the c r e a t i o n o f an e t h i c s " . G i v e n his or h e r o w n distinctive sexual identity, " t h i s other, m a l e or f e m a l e , should surprise us a g a i n a n d a g a i n , a p p e a r to us as new, very different f r o m w h a t w e k n e w or w h a t w e t h o u g h t he or she should b e " . W o n d e r p r e c e d e s a relation that

does

not

involve

reduction

or

assimilation

of

the

other.

" W o n d e r g o e s b e y o n d that w h i c h is or is n o t suitable for us . . . W e w o u l d in s o m e w a y h a v e r e d u c e d the o t h e r to ourselves if he or she suited us c o m p l e t e l y . " W e w o n d e r at the excess o f the other, that is, at " t h e other's existence a n d b e c o m i n g as a p l a c e that p e r m i t s u n i o n a n d / t h r o u g h resistance to assimilation or r e d u c t i o n to s a m e n e s s " (EDS, 77/74). I r i g a r a y suggests that w o n d e r b e f o r e the o t h e r w o u l d l e a d us to a " s e c o n d b i r t h " , n a m e l y a birth into " a t r a n s c e n d e n c e , that o f the o t h e r " . A s t r a n s c e n d e n t , the birth w o u l d be spiritual, b u t it w o u l d also b e " p h y s i c a l a n d c a r n a l " , a n d so w o u l d o v e r c o m e the s p i r i t / m a t t e r b i f u r c a t i o n s u b t e n d e d b y the m a s c u l i n i s t distinction o f male and female. W e would have reached a "place of incidence and j u n c t i o n o f b o d y a n d s p i r i t " (EDS, 84/82), the l o c u s o f the " s e n s i b l e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " (EDS, 124/129). I r i g a r a y ' s l a n g u a g e o f " w o n d e r " a n d " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " has o b v i o u s religious c o n n o t a t i o n s , c o n n o t a t i o n s she is w i l l i n g to e n d o r s e d e v e l o p . H e r descriptions o f the e x p e r i e n c e

o f sexual

d e p l o y the t r a d i t i o n a l religious t e r m s o f infinity

and

and

encounter ineffability

speaking, for e x a m p l e , o f " a n e m b r a c e that t r a n s c e n d s all l i m i t s " a n d in w h i c h " e a c h o n e discovers the self in that e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h is inexpressible y e t f o r m s the supple g r o u n d i n g o f life a n d l a n g u a g e " . I r i g a r a y ' s n e x t c o m m e n t b e c o m e s explicitly religious: " F o r this, ' G o d ' is necessary, or a l o v e so attentive that it is d i v i n e . " T h i s is b e c a u s e " l o v e a l w a y s p o s t p o n e s its t r a n s c e n d e n c e b e y o n d the h e r e a n d now, e x c e p t in certain e x p e r i e n c e s o f G o d " (EDS, 25/19). T h i s c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e the G o d o f t r a d i t i o n a l o n t o l o g y a n d r e l i g i o n , w h i c h is simply the ultimate e x p r e s s i o n o f m a s c u l i n e d o m i n a n c e . B u t since " i t seems w e are u n a b l e to eliminate or suppress the p h e n o m e n o n o f r e l i g i o n " , it is " c r u c i a l that w e

rethink religion,

and

especially

religious c a t e g o r i e s , initiations, rules, a n d u t o p i a s , all o f w h i c h h a v e b e e n m a s c u l i n e for c e n t u r i e s " .

2 6

T h i s r e t h i n k i n g m u s t , a c c o r d i n g to Irigaray, i n c l u d e first o f all a d e v e l o p m e n t o f female religious g e n e a l o g i e s (scarcely existent in the Sexes and Genealogies, 75.

Structuralism and Beyond

35«

(1960-1990)

West, e x c e p t for s o m e isolated G r e e k cases), w h i c h will a l l o w w o m e n to

have

their

alternatives

o w n religious

to s a c r i h c e ,

identity.

a notion

It also

t o o closely

requires tied

symbolic

to the m a l e

p e n c h a n t for b i f u r c a t i o n a n d e l i m i n a t i o n . Finally, I r i g a r a y calls for the spiritualization o f sexual relations, w h i c h in t u r n will m a k e t h e m , as w e h a v e seen, the site o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f the d i v i n e .

2 7

O f c o u r s e , this n e w G o d , like the f e m a l e identity a n d the n e w r e a l m o f s e x u a l relations so closely l i n k e d to it, is still to c o m e (although, unlike D e r r i d a , I r i g a r a y seems to h o p e for a n a c t u a l coming

of

the

divine).

Holderlin's) " O n l y

Irigaray

even

cites

Heidegger's

(and

a g o d c a n save us n o w " (EDS, 123/128). B u t

unlike H e i d e g g e r she sees the a d v e n t o f the divine as r e q u i r i n g o u r o w n c r e a t i v e efforts. A s she says at the e n d o f the title essay o f Ethique de la difference sexuelle, in a p a s s a g e that also sums u p h e r p r o j e c t o f c r e a t i n g a f e m a l e sexual identity: " N o t o n l y in m o u r n i n g for the d e a d G o d o f N i e t z s c h e , n o t w a i t i n g passively for the g o d to c o m e , b u t b y c o n j u r i n g h i m u p a m o n g us, w i t h i n us, as r e s u r r e c t i o n a n d t r a n s h g u r a t i o n o f b l o o d , o f flesh, t h r o u g h a l a n g u a g e a n d a n ethics that is o u r s " (EDS, 123/128). I r i g a r a y ' s critiques o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t h a v e o b v i o u s strong affinities to the w o r k o f o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s o f difference

such as

L y o t a r d a n d , especially, D e r r i d a . T h e m o s t o b v i o u s c o n n e c t i o n is h e r effort to u n d e r m i n e the " m e t a p h y s i c s o f the s a m e "

whereby

W e s t e r n t h o u g h t h a s e x c l u d e d the " o t h e r s " (prototypically w o m e n ) that c o r r e s p o n d to the d e v a l u e d t e r m s o f its a s y m m e t r i c a l d i c h o t o mies. L i k e L y o t a r d a n d D e r r i d a , she offers, for e x a m p l e , a critique o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s m , the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f k n o w l e d g e as a reflection in the m i n d (as in a mirror) o f the s a m e o b j e c t that exists in reality. I r i g a r a y p o i n t s o u t that in such a v i e w o f k n o w l e d g e objects a r e k n o w a b l e o n l y to the e x t e n t that t h e y r e s e m b l e the reflecting m i r r o r (the m a l e m i n d ) . A p r o f o u n d l y different object, such as a w o m a n , c a n a p p e a r o n l y as a defective m a n — as a flat m i r r o r i m a g e will s h o w the f e m a l e genitals as simply a n a b s e n c e o f a p e n i s . suggests that w o m a n

2 8

(She also

c o r r e s p o n d s instead to the m a t e r i a l s

from

w h i c h the m i r r o r is m a d e — e.g., the tain (thin tin plate) b e h i n d the reflecting

surface

(CS,

147/151);

a n d that

knowledge

of

female

sexuality r e q u i r e s — b o t h literally a n d m e t a p h o r i c a l l y — a c u r v e d 2 7

2 8

For a fuller discussion of Irigaray's religious thought, see M a r g a r e t Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, 140—7. Speculum of the Other Woman, 89.

Philosophies of difference

35

1

mirror, e.g., a speculum.) I r i g a r a y ' s affinity w i t h d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is all the stronger g i v e n D e r r i d a ' s o w n singling out o f the

male/female

d i c h o t o m y as a t a r g e t o f d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis a n d his resulting critique o f p h a l l o g o c e n t r i s m . T h e r e is, n o n e t h e l e s s , an a p p a r e n t tension b e t w e e n D e r r i d a ' s a n d Irigaray's

deconstructive

projects,

D e r r i d a ' s rejection o f f e m i n i s m .

2 9

as

is p a r t i c u l a r l y

clear

from

A s he p u t it in a 1985 i n t e r v i e w :

For me deconstruction is certainly not feminist. At least as I have tried to practice it. I believe it naturally supposes a radical deconstruction of phallogocentrism, and certainly an absolutely other and new interest in women's questions. But if there is one thing it must not come to, it's feminism. So I would say that deconstruction is deconstruction of feminism, from the start, insofar as feminism is a form — no doubt necessary at a certain moment - but a form of phallogocentrism among others. 30

D e r r i d a ' s rejection m a k e s sense if w e think f e m i n i s m m u s t b e either the m e r e d e m a n d that w o m e n be t r e a t e d j u s t as m e n are or else an effort to reverse the v a l u a t i o n o f the m a l e / f e m a l e d i c h o t o m y , m a k i n g the f e m a l e the superior t e r m . ( T h e s e o p t i o n s , o f course, c o r r e s p o n d to the s t a n d a r d distinction b e t w e e n e q u a l i t y - f e m i n i s m a n d

differ-

ence-feminism.) In either o p t i o n , f e m i n i s m is a reassertion o f the traditional d i c h o t o m y that D e r r i d a w a n t s to d e c o n s t r u c t . It w o u l d b e a n a t t e m p t to " i m p r o v e the l o t " o f w o m e n w i t h o u t a d d r e s s i n g the m e t a p h y s i c a l basis o f m a l e d o m i n a n c e , a n d D e r r i d a w o u l d n o d o u b t p r e d i c t that such an

a t t e m p t will l e a d

o n l y to the t r i u m p h

of

p h a l l o g o c e n t r i s m in s o m e o t h e r f o r m . Irigaray, h o w e v e r , has a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f e m i n i s m . S h e explicitly rejects the e q u a l i t y a n d the difference options, the hrst b e c a u s e it has w o m e n seeking to be man's equal, h e n c e r e d u c i n g t h e m to " p o t e n t i a l m e n " , a n d the s e c o n d b e c a u s e it e m b r a c e s a " f e m i n i n i t y " that "is a role, an i m a g e , a v a l u e , i m p o s e d u p o n w o m e n b y m a l e v a l u e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " (CS, 80/84). H e r o w n f e m i n i s m c a n b e t h o u g h t o f as a i m i n g at goals similar to those o f e q u a l i t y - f e m i n i s m and

difference-feminism,

but without

their

phallogocentric

pre-

suppositions. I r i g a r a y ' s vision (at least in its Utopian limit) is o f a w o r l d in w h i c h w o m e n a n d m e n h a v e their o w n e q u a l b u t distinctive identities that allow 2 9

3 0

them

to

interact

with

a

fecundity

impossible

in

today's

For a fuller discussion o f D e r r i d a a n d Irigaray on feminism, see M a r g a r e t W h i t f o r d , Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, 126—35. J. C r e e c h et al., " D e c o n s t r u c t i o n in A m e r i c a : A n Interview W i t h J a c q u e s D e r r i d a " , 30—1.

Structuralism and Beyond (1960-1990)

352 world.

3 1

A s she says: " T o r e m e m b e r that w e m u s t g o on l i v i n g a n d

c r e a t i n g w o r l d s is o u r task. B u t it c a n be a c c o m p l i s h e d o n l y t h r o u g h the c o m b i n e d efforts o f the t w o h a l v e s o f the w o r l d : the m a s c u l i n e a n d the f e m i n i n e " (EDS,

122/127). S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o f f e m i n i s m

m a y o r m a y n o t b e possible or realistic, b u t it does n o t r e d u c e to f e m i n i s m in either o f the senses in w h i c h D e r r i d a rejects it. T h e r e is, t h e n , n o i n c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n I r i g a r a y ' s f e m i n i s m a n d the p r o j e c t of deconstructing

the

categories

of traditional

metaphysics

and

epistemology. 3 1

T h i s vision recalls Beauvoir's conception of the couple, sketched at the end o f Le deuxieme sexe.

CHAPTER

Fin-de-sikle

12

again: "le temps retrouvé"?

The power to make me rediscover days that were long past, the Time that was Lost. ( M a r c e l P r o u s t , In Search of Lost Time, v i , 263) T h e last t w e n t y years o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y h a v e b e e n m o r e a m a t t e r o f assessing a n d r e v i v i n g the past t h a n o f b r e a k i n g o u t in n e w directions. A p a r t i c u l a r l y striking illustration is the fact that the t w o most prominent

figures

during the period have been philosophers

w h o w e r e c o n t e m p o r a r i e s o f Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y : E m m a n u e l Levinas and Paul Ricoeur. Indeed, both Levinas and Ricoeur were important

figures

in t h e history o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y . B u t

they w e r e also, t h o u g h in quite different w a y s , outsiders to the Parisian m a i n s t r e a m d o m i n a t e d b y Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y a n d e v e n t u a l l y w e n t c o n s i d e r a b l y b e y o n d their existential origins. T h e i r r e c e n t p o p u l a r i t y reflects n o t o n l y a r e n e w e d interest in the subjectc e n t e r e d p h i l o s o p h y o f the 1940s a n d 1950s b u t also a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f t h e m e s a n d e m p h a s e s that h a d b e e n l o n g r e p r e s s e d in F r e n c h t h o u g h t . A f t e r discussing these t w o m a j o r v o i c e s f r o m the past, I will conclude with a brief overview o f other recent currents.

LEVINAS

Emmanuel

Levinas

(1906—95) w a s literally a n outsider; b o r n in

L i t h u a n i a , h e lived there a n d in the U k r a i n e b e f o r e m o v i n g to F r a n c e in 1923, w h e r e h e r e c e i v e d his p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a i n i n g at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Strasbourg. A f t e r a y e a r o f study in F r e i b u r g w i t h Husserl a n d H e i d e g g e r , h e l i v e d in Paris w i t h o u t a university p o s i t i o n , t e a c h i n g at a n d e v e n t u a l l y h e a d i n g the E c o l e N o r m a l e Israélite O r i e n t a l e . It w a s o n l y in 1 9 6 1 , after the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Totalité et infini, that L e v i n a s b e c a m e a professor at a F r e n c h university, in Poitiers. H e s u b s e q u e n t l y h e l d positions at the U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r i s - N a n t e r r e a n d at the Sor¬ bonne. 353

354

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

L e v i n a s w a s n o t o n l y g e o g r a p h i c a l l y a n d institutionally outside the m a i n s t r e a m o f Parisian existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y ; h e w a s also s e p a r a t e d b y his religious interests a n d c o m m i t m e n t s . L e v i n a s w a s raised in a n o r t h o d o x J e w i s h f a m i l y a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y after W o r l d W a r I I , w a s v e r y active as a distinctively J e w i s h thinker, w r i t i n g n u m e r o u s essays o n religious topics, i n c l u d i n g a n u m b e r o f T a l m u d i c c o m m e n t a r i e s . H i s coolness to M a r x i s m — as a child h e h a d lived t h r o u g h the S o v i e t R e v o l u t i o n in the U k r a i n e — p u t h i m at a further r e m o v e f r o m Parisian intellectual life, a l t h o u g h h e w a s a g o o d friend of Maurice Blanchot. Levinas knew both Sartre, w h o m he h a d met at G a b r i e l M a r c e l ' s F r i d a y discussion sessions, a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y w h o m h e f r e q u e n t l y s a w at J e a n W a h l ' s C o l l è g e de P h i l o s o p h i e ; a n d 1

he o c c a s i o n a l l y p u b l i s h e d in Les temps modernes. Further, as w e h a v e seen, L e v i n a s ' s w a s the first b o o k Sartre r e a d a b o u t H u s s e r l . B u t Sartre a n d his circle did n o t w e l c o m e religious believers w i t h n o interest in M a r x i s t politics. W e h a v e a l r e a d y e n c o u n t e r e d L e v i n a s for his s e m i n a l w o r k in i n t r o d u c i n g H u s s e r l (and H e i d e g g e r , t h r o u g h w h o s e lens h e r e a d Husserl)

to F r a n c e .

Through

the

1950s,

his p u b l i c a t i o n s

were

p r i m a r i l y critical c o m m e n t a r i e s o n Husserl a n d H e i d e g g e r , w i t h his o w n distinctive p h i l o s o p h y o n l y g r a d u a l l y a n d p a r t i a l l y e m e r g i n g . B u t in 1961 h e p u b l i s h e d Totalité et infini, w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y established h i m as a n i m p o r t a n t

independent

thinker,

although one

scarcely in tune w i t h the d e v e l o p i n g t u r n to s t r u c t u r a l i s m .

2

The

b o o k ' s g r o u n d i n g in careful e x p e r i e n t i a l descriptions — for e x a m p l e , o f the e n j o y m e n t the self takes in " l i v i n g off o f " [vivre de) the n a t u r a l g o o d s o f the w o r l d , a n d o f the e x p e r i e n c e o f the o t h e r w i t h its call to an absolute ethical o b l i g a t i o n — s h o w the a u t h o r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l roots. B u t L e v i n a s h a d c o m e to see H u s s e r l a n d e v e n H e i d e g g e r as i n v o l v e d in a f u n d a m e n t a l mistake that h a s t a i n t e d all o f W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y : the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the o t h e r to the same. W h a t L e v i n a s m e a n s b y the s a m e is p e r h a p s best e x p r e s s e d in his 1

2

T h e C o l l è g e de Philosophic, w h i c h W a h l founded in 1946 a n d directed until 1966, w a s an important f o r u m , through its weekly meeting, for discussing n e w philosophical ideas. It has recently b e e n revived b y L u c Ferrys a n d A l a i n R e n a u t . Levinas's second major book, Autrement qu'être, is to an important extent a reformulation o f Totalité et infini in a n e w vocabulary, one designed to eliminate w h a t he c a m e to see as the earlier work's d e p e n d e n c e on terms too closely tied to the philosophies of the same that have d o m i n a t e d philosophical thought. H e r e he seems to have b e e n in part m o t i v a t e d b y Dcrrida's sympathetic but forceful critique o f Totalité et infini in " V i o l e n c e et m é t a p h y s i q u e " (in L'écriture et la différence). W i t h a few exceptions, I limit m y discussion to the m o r e influential and, for all its f o r m i d a b l e difficulties, m o r e accessible Totalité et infini.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

355

n o t i o n o f totality, an e n c o m p a s s i n g w h o l e in w h i c h e a c h p a r t has intelligibility solely t h r o u g h its p l a c e w i t h i n the w h o l e . T o b e l o n g to a totality a n d therefore to b e c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t o o d as p a r t o f a w h o l e is to be " r e d u c e d to the S a m e " . T h e p r o j e c t o f W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y has b e e n o n e o f r e d u c t i o n to the s a m e b e c a u s e it has a l w a y s insisted o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g e v e r y t h i n g in relation to s o m e selfintelligible w h o l e , w h e t h e r it b e P l a t o n i c f o r m s , A r i s t o t e l i a n substance, the divine p u r e a c t o f the m e d i e v a l s , or H e g e l ' s absolute. P h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e a c k n o w l e d g e d l o c i o f " o t h e r n e s s " that lie outside the totality b u t h a v e a l w a y s w o u n d u p u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m o n l y in their relation to the totality. S o Plato's n o n - b e i n g is relative to the forms,

Aristotle's

substance, hnite

primary beings

matter

require

can

exist

a divine

only

creator,

as p a r t and

of

a

Hegelian

n e g a t i o n s are a l w a y s s u b s u m e d in a s u b s e q u e n t synthesis. L e v i n a s ' s f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m is that n o totality truly e n c o m p a s s e s all reality, that there a l w a y s r e m a i n s an o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t o f a n y relation to the totality. T a k i n g a c c o u n t o f the o t h e r r e q u i r e s t h i n k i n g in t e r m s n o t of totality b u t o f w h a t L e v i n a s calls infinity: a w h o l e , b u t one e n c o u n t e r i n g an o t h e r that it c a n n o t i n c l u d e . H e r e L e v i n a s e v o k e s D e s c a r t e s ' a r g u m e n t in the " T h i r d M e d i t a t i o n " for the e x i s t e n c e

of

G o d , b a s e d on his c l a i m that w e h a v e an i d e a o f inhnite s u b s t a n c e that w e a r e , n o n e t h e l e s s , u n a b l e to c o m p r e h e n d . T h i s inhnity, o n c e w e d e t a c h it f r o m D e s c a r t e s ' s u b s t a n c e o n t o l o g y a n d his v a i n effort to p r o v e

the

existence

o f the

utterly

other, w e l l

expresses

the

" t r a n s c e n d e n c e " o f the other: " a relation w i t h a reality inhnitely distant f r o m m y o w n reality, y e t w i t h o u t this distance d e s t r o y i n g this relation a n d w i t h o u t this relation d e s t r o y i n g this d i s t a n c e " (Totalité et infini [ 7 7 ] , 12/41). L e v i n a s also c h a r a c t e r i z e s the o t h e r in t e r m s o f its exteriority, that is, its s e p a r a t i o n f r o m the i m m a n e n c e o f totality. It w i l l b e n o surprise, g i v e n his insistence on the i r r e d u c i b l e other, that L e v i n a s rejects H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y b e c a u s e o f its relativi z a t i o n o f e v e r y t h i n g to the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o . H e r e he

readily

invokes H e i d e g g e r ' s critique o f the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, w i t h its c l a i m , e c h o e d in M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f ambiguity, that talk o f such a subject is an a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m the c o n c r e t e reality "being-in-the-world".

B u t L e v i n a s thinks that H e i d e g g e r

falls into a p h i l o s o p h y o f totality.

3

3

It m a y s e e m that

of

himself

Heidegger's

Levinas limits his discussion o f H e i d e g g e r almost entirely to Being and Time, r e g a r d i n g it as

35

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

6

B e i n g , so s h a r p l y distinguished f r o m the totality o f b e i n g s (the things that are), is j u s t w h a t L e v i n a s h a s in m i n d in insisting o n a n o t h e r outside a n y totality. B u t L e v i n a s m a i n t a i n s that Dasein ( H e i d e g g e r ' s e x p r e s s i o n for h u m a n - r e a l i t y - i n - t h e - w o r l d ) functions as a t o t a l i z i n g center. A d m i t t e d l y , Dasein is p r e s e n t e d as " t h r o w n " into the w o r l d , a c o n t i n g e n t " b e i n g - f o r - d e a t h " that lacks the a g e n c y a n d a u t o n o m y o f Husserl's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o a n d that c a n o n l y a w a i t B e i n g ' s selfr e v e l a t i o n . B u t L e v i n a s m a i n t a i n s that Dasein r e m a i n s the c e n t e r o f a " p a n o r a m i c d i s c l o s u r e " (77, 248/270) o f B e i n g , a c e n t e r w i t h o u t w h i c h there w o u l d b e n o truth. (In a n o t h e r v e i n , L e v i n a s s o m e t i m e s suggests that H e i d e g g e r i a n B e i n g itself, as the h o r i z o n o f all existents, functions as a n o n t o l o g i c a l totality.)

4

L e v i n a s does n o t , h o w e v e r , limit his discussion o f the other to the a b o v e h i g h level o f o n t o l o g i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n . T h e o t h e r is n o t m e r e l y a p r i n c i p l e o r entity s e p a r a t e f r o m a n y totality w e m i g h t e n c o u n t e r or envision. R a t h e r , the o t h e r is the other person as a n absolute ethical d e m a n d , unconditionally, non-negotiably requiring m y respect a n d responsibility. T h e o n t o l o g i c a l i d e a l o f a totality is o v e r t u r n e d b y the ethical

imperative

standard

idea

that

o f the other.

Levinas

metaphysics

is " h r s t

rejects,

therefore,

philosophy"

the

a n d that,

therefore, ethics m u s t b e s o m e h o w d e r i v e d f r o m it. O n the contrary, " m o r a l i t y is n o t a b r a n c h o f philosophy, rather, it is hrst p h i l o s o p h y " (77, 2 8 1 / 3 0 4 , translation m o d i h e d ) . In Totalite et infini L e v i n a s p r e c e d e s his t r e a t m e n t o f o u r e n c o u n t e r w i t h the o t h e r w i t h a detailed d e s c r i p t i o n o f h u m a n existence a p a r t f r o m this e n c o u n t e r . S u c h a description is, o f c o u r s e , a n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m c o n c r e t e reality, w h i c h a l w a y s involves the other. B u t it c a t c h e s the w a y in w h i c h w e often like to think o f o u r lives a n d p r o v i d e s a useful

background

for f o c u s i n g

the effect

o f the o t h e r

on our

existence. T h e s t a n d p o i n t o f L e v i n a s ' s descriptions is the self or e g o r e g a r d e d as in full possession o f its w o r l d , as the source a n d focus o f all m e a n i n g s . A s L e v i n a s sees it, this is the s t a n d p o i n t o f s t a n d a r d p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g b o t h H u s s e r l a n d the H e i d e g g e r of Being and Time, a n d h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s it as the s t a n d p o i n t o f inferiority (as o p p o s e d to the exteriority i n t r o d u c e d b y the other). T h e s t a n d p o i n t

4

one of the greatest philosophical books ever written but seeing m u c h less value in Heidegger's later philosophy. For m o r e on the c o m p l e x issues o f Levinas's critique of Heidegger, see A d r i a a n Peperzak, To the Other.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

357

c a n also b e t h o u g h t o f as e x p r e s s i n g h o w things w o u l d l o o k if the traditional v i e w p o i n t

sufficient.

The

attention L e v i n a s gives to this description reflects the fact

o f totality

(the same) w e r e

that,

a l t h o u g h h e rejects the ultimate truth o f totality, he r e c o g n i z e s it as one c r u c i a l d i m e n s i o n o f h u m a n existence. T h e life o f interiority does n o t i g n o r e e x t e r n a l objects, b u t it a p p r o p r i a t e s t h e m for the e n j o y m e n t o f the self. W e " l i v e off o f " (vivre de) the things o f o u r w o r l d (77, 8 2 / n o ) , u s i n g t h e m n o t o n l y as m e a n s to ends b u t as satisfactions in their o w n right. T h e satisfaction consists in the p l e a s u r e w e e x p e r i e n c e b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g

external

objects into o u r d o m a i n o f c o n t r o l , b y t a k i n g t h e m " h o m e " [chez nous)? L e v i n a s ' s m o d e l h e r e is eating, a p r o c e s s a d m i t t e d l y n e c e s s a r y as a m e a n s to sustain life, b u t also o n e w e enjoy for its o w n sake as an assimilation o f the o t h e r to the self. L e v i n a s insists that life is n o t a m a t t e r o f H e i d e g g e r i a n c a r e [Sorge) b u t o f e n j o y m e n t (jouissance), w h i c h " i s n o t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l state a m o n g others . . . b u t the v e r y p u l s a t i o n o f the I " ( 7 7 , 85/113). E n j o y m e n t is n o t the g o a l o f o u r life's activity b u t the v e r y c o n d i t i o n o f its existence. T o live is to b e happy. " T h e I is, to b e sure, h a p p i n e s s , p r e s e n c e at h o m e

with

i t s e l f " (77, 116/143). The

e n j o y m e n t o f interiority is n o t u n r e a l , b u t it is o n l y o n e

d i m e n s i o n o f h u m a n existence a n d a d i m e n s i o n that c o u l d n o t exist w i t h o u t the exteriority o f the other. E n j o y m e n t p r e s u p p o s e s a self that h a s the f r e e d o m to a p p r o p r i a t e

a n d assimilate its w o r l d in

a c c o r d w i t h its taste. B u t h o w does there c o m e to b e a free self? A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s , the self is free n o t for the sake o f its e n j o y m e n t b u t for the sake o f the other. T h i s is w h y his description o f the life o f interiority u l t i m a t e l y m a k e s sense o n l y in the c o n t e x t o f the exteriority o f the other. T h e e n c o u n t e r w i t h the o t h e r is m o s t fully d e s c r i b e d in a c r u c i a l section o f Totalite et infini entitled " E t h i c s a n d the F a c e " . A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s , I e n c o u n t e r

the o t h e r

through

its face

[visage) a n d

t h r o u g h its s p e e c h [parole). I see the face o f the other, b u t n o t as a n 6

o b j e c t c o n t a i n e d in m y w o r l d (my interiority), available for m y e n j o y m e n t . R a t h e r , " t h e face is p r e s e n t in its refusal to b e c o n -

5

6

T h i s tie of the life o f interiority to the domestic explains Levinas's characterizing it in terms o f " e c o n o m y " , with its e t y m o l o g y of " h o u s e h o l d [oikos in Greek] m a n a g e m e n t " . O f course, I n e e d n o t literally see the face or hear the cry o f the other; the encounter m a y be effected by other m e a n s . B u t seeing a face a n d h e a r i n g a cry^ are typical forms o f the encounter to w h i c h alternatives (touching the a r m , feeling the pulse) are equivalent.

358

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

t a i n e d " , as s o m e t h i n g that I c a n n o t " c o m p r e h e n d " or " e n c o m p a s s " (77, 168/194). T h e face is n o t a n object that I c a n p e r c e i v e b u t a n epiphany, a r e v e l a t i o n ( 7 / , 168/194). T h e c o n t e n t o f this r e v e l a t i o n — a n d h e r e w e m o v e n a t u r a l l y to the s p e e c h o f the o t h e r — is the simple injunction: Do not kill me. T h i s is neither a t h r e a t (Ifyou try to kill me, I will try to kill you or If you kill me, society will punish you) n o r a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e (Killing is wrong, so don't do it to me). It is n o t , in o t h e r w o r d s , a n expression o f either a utilitarian or a d e o n t o l o g i c a l ethics. It is, rather, a simple assertion o f the inviolability o f this p e r s o n b e f o r e m e , o f m y absolute responsibility to respect this p e r s o n ' s p r e s e n c e , to refrain f r o m t r y i n g to m a k e it j u s t a n o t h e r e l e m e n t o f the d o m a i n in w h i c h I h o l d s w a y .

7

A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s this responsibility is b o t h inhnite a n d a s y m m e t r i c a l . It is inhnite in that there are n o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , n o t e v e n that o f m y o w n d e a t h , that c a n in a n y w a y limit m y o b l i g a t i o n to the other. " T o e x p o s e m y s e l f to the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f the face is to p u t m y ontological

right to exist into

question."

8

T h e responsibility is

a s y m m e t r i c a l b e c a u s e , unlike K a n t ' s c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , it does not logically r e q u i r e a r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n to m e o n the p a r t o f the other. N o d o u b t o t h e r p e o p l e h a v e their o w n e x p e r i e n c e s o f the o t h e r (perhaps e v e n o f me) that c o n f r o n t t h e m w i t h their o w n inhnite responsibility. T h e p o i n t , h o w e v e r , is that the responsibility c a n arise o n l y f r o m their o w n e x p e r i e n c e s , n o t f r o m s o m e sort o f g e n e r a l ization o f or i n f e r e n c e f r o m m i n e . G i v e n m y e x p e r i e n c e - a n d this is all I a m g i v e n — I a m in n o p o s i t i o n to assert a n y o b l i g a t i o n o f the other. T h e i n c u r s i o n o f the o t h e r jolts the w o r l d o f interiority in w h i c h I reign as m a s t e r o f m y e n j o y m e n t a n d transforms it into o n e in w h i c h I a m constantly c h a l l e n g e d b y the reality o f the other. T o this extent, L e v i n a s ' s t r e a t m e n t recalls that o f Sartre in L'être et le néant, w h e r e the o t h e r is likewise e x p e r i e n c e d as disrupting the w o r l d that I h a v e constituted for myself. It is t e m p t i n g to say that there is a fundam e n t a l difference in that Sartre's a c c o u n t is m e r e l y o n t o l o g i c a l , w i t h n o ethical s i g n i h c a n c e . B u t a l t h o u g h this is certainly w h a t S a r t r e intends, h e c o u l d n o t d e n y that, to some e x t e n t at least, the conflict

7

H

Presumably, then, the injunction is not m e r e l y that I not kill the other, as t h o u g h any violation short o f that w o u l d be permitted. B u t killing is the p a r a d i g m case of violation, a n d any claim of a right to treat the other as a n object o f m y e n j o y m e n t — w h i c h I legitimately make of the rest of the w o r l d — w o u l d ultimately i m p l y the right to kill the other. R i c h a r d K e a r n e y (ed.), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 60.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

359

b e t w e e n t w o consciousnesses c o n c e r n s the v a l u e s implicit in the meanings each

confers on the other. P r i d e

and shame,

Sartre's

p a r a d i g m m o d e s o f e x p e r i e n c i n g the other, i n e v i t a b l y h a v e m o r a l c o n n o t a t i o n s . Similarly, w e m i g h t cite the fact that, for S a r t r e , the encounter with

the

o t h e r is entirely

symmetrical.

I can

always

r e s p o n d to the other's l o o k w i t h m y o w n r e c i p r o c a l g a z e , m a k i n g the o t h e r an o b j e c t for m e in t u r n . T h i s seems in f u n d a m e n t a l c o n t r a diction w i t h L e v i n a s ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f an o b l i g a t i o n i m p o s e d b y the o t h e r that I a m n o t able to i m p o s e on the other. B u t

Levinas's

a s y m m e t r y reflects the fact that, a l t h o u g h I e x p e r i e n c e m y s e l f as responsible for the other, I a m n o t able to i m p o s e a

reciprocal

e x p e r i e n c e on the other. A similar a s y m m e t r y holds for Sartre: g i v e n that I e x p e r i e n c e s h a m e or p r i d e b e f o r e the other, n o t h i n g I c a n d o will g u a r a n t e e a p a r a l l e l e x p e r i e n c e in the other, since this d e p e n d s o n w h a t the o t h e r m a k e s of, for e x a m p l e , m y l o o k o f disdain. R a t h e r , the f u n d a m e n t a l difference b e t w e e n S a r t r e a n d L e v i n a s c o n c e r n s f r e e d o m . A c c o r d i n g to S a r t r e , the e x p e r i e n c e o f the o t h e r requires the a n t e c e d e n t f r e e d o m o f b o t h m y s e l f a n d the o t h e r ; b e i n g for-others is the b e i n g of a free consciousnessyor a free consciousness. For L e v i n a s , the self b e c o m e s free o n l y in face o f the other, since freedom

is n o t h i n g b u t m y

r e a c t i o n to the other's d e m a n d

for

respect. Sartre m i g h t r e s p o n d that e v e n the self in L e v i n a s ' s state of p u r e interior e n j o y m e n t is free, b e c a u s e it c h o o s e s h o w a n d w h e n to appropriate

objects for its p l e a s u r e . B u t L e v i n a s m a i n t a i n s

that,

insofar as it is g e n u i n e , this f r e e d o m itself derives f r o m the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the other. M e r e (Sartrean) s p o n t a n e i t y is n o t f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m does n o t consist in an a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e that creates the v e r y v a l u e o f w h a t it chooses. It is r a t h e r the o p p o r t u n i t y to c h o o s e for or against a v a l u e that exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o u r c h o i c e . A s L e v i n a s says in a 9

passage o b v i o u s l y d i r e c t e d against Sartre: Existence is not in reality condemned to freedom, but is invested as freedom. Freedom is not bare. To philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies before it, to disclose the investitude that liberates freedom from the arbitrary. (TI, 57/84-5)

9

L e v i n a s further argues that there is not even a world of objects, available for our choice, apart from our e n c o u n t e r with the other. A p a r t from the other, I w o u l d be entirely immersed in m y enjoyment o f the w o r l d a n d w o u l d lack the distance n e e d e d to constitute it as a d o m a i n of distinguishable objects. T h i s distance arises only w h e n I c o m e to experience m y w o r l d as also available to the other a n d therefore as a locus of intersubjective m e a n i n g a n d reality. See 77, 142—9/168—74 ^ Peperzak, To the Other, 165—6. a n c

3

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

6o

It is, for L e v i n a s , the o t h e r that " i n v e s t s " m e w i t h f r e e d o m b y p r e s e n t i n g m e w i t h a n ethical v a l u e n o t constituted as such b y m y c h o i c e . T h e difference b e t w e e n L e v i n a s a n d Sartre lies, t h e n , in their f u n d a m e n t a l l y o p p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f f r e e d o m . L e v i n a s ' s d e p i c t i o n o f the o t h e r in t e r m s o f its r a d i c a l alterity a n d absolute d e m a n d s often e v o k e s the l a n g u a g e o f r e l i g i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y as it h a s b e e n d e p l o y e d b y K i e r k e g a a r d a n d others set o n o p p o s i n g the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f religious e x p e r i e n c e to t o t a l i z i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s . T h i s is n o a c c i d e n t , a n d L e v i n a s , a l t h o u g h the t h e m e is m u t e d in Totalité et infini, is quite w i l l i n g to d e v e l o p his p h i l o s o p h y o f the o t h e r in a religious d i r e c t i o n . H e d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , identify t h e o t h e r o f o u r ethical e x p e r i e n c e w i t h G o d . " G o d is n o t simply t h e 'hrst o t h e r ' , or ' o t h e r p a r e x c e l l e n c e ' o r the ' a b s o l u t e l y o t h e r ' , b u t o t h e r t h a n the other, o t h e r o t h e r w i s e , a n d o t h e r w i t h a n alterity p r i o r to the alterity o f the other, p r i o r to the ethical o b l i g a t i o n to the other."

Thus,

1 0

Levinas

rejects

Buber's

I—Thou

relation

(and

M a r c e l ' s similar view) as a m o d e l for o u r relation to G o d o n the g r o u n d s that it destroys the utter alterity o f the d i v i n e .

1 1

A t the same

time, o u r o n l y access to G o d is t h r o u g h the other. O u r " r e s p o n s i bility for the O t h e r " is a " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y p r i o r to the L a w " , a n d this responsibility " i s G o d ' s r e v e l a t i o n " .

1 2

Somehow, God's

"absolute

r e m o t e n e s s , his t r a n s c e n d e n c e , turns into m y responsibility . . . for the o t h e r " .

1 3

L e v i n a s is n e a r l y obsessive in his c a u t i o n r e g a r d i n g a n y efforts to speak o f G o d . In his f o r e w o r d to t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f essays that c o n t a i n some

o f his m o s t

important

discussions

of G o d , he

"wonders

w h e t h e r it is possible to speak l e g i t i m a t e l y o f G o d w i t h o u t striking a blow

against the absoluteness

signify".

14

[absoluité] that his w o r d

seems to

H e is e v e n d u b i o u s o f the s t a n d a r d trope — w h i c h h e

nonetheless often e m p l o y s - o f n e g a t i v e theology. H i s worry, p r e sumably, is that e v e n to d e n y a n attribute A o f G o d is to suggest that he at least falls w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l d o m a i n d e h n e d b y A a n d its n e g a t i o n (as, for e x a m p l e , s a y i n g that s o m e t h i n g is n o t blue suggests that it falls w i t h i n the d o m a i n o f color). L e v i n a s tries to a v o i d such p r o b l e m s b y i n t r o d u c i n g n e o l o g i s m s such as " i l l e i t y " (an abstract

1 0

1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

" G o d a n d P h i l o s o p h y " , in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 69. Otherwise than Being, 12 — 13, a n d " D i a l o g u e " , in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 137—51. Ethics and Infinity (interviews with Philippe N e m o ) , 113. " G o d a n d P h i l o s o p h y " , 69. Of God Who Comes to Mind, xii.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

361

n o u n b a s e d o n the F r e n c h t h i r d - p e r s o n m a s c u l i n e p r o n o u n ) , w h i c h is d e s i g n e d to p r e v e n t us f r o m t h i n k i n g o f G o d as accessible v i a a direct, p e r s o n a l e n c o u n t e r . A n o t h e r m o v e , p e r h a p s m o r e successful, is to substitute a-Dieu for Dieu, w i t h the striking d o u b l e m e a n i n g o f " t o w a r d s (a) G o d " , s u g g e s t i n g that w e c a n n e v e r a c t u a l l y r e a c h the divine, a n d " f a r e w e l l " (adieu), suggesting b o t h that w e are g o i n g b e y o n d s t a n d a r d c a t e g o r i e s a n d that w e e n c o u n t e r G o d o n l y as h e is leaving.

15

Levinas's philosophical

discussions

o f G o d are n o t d e v e l o p e d

w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f a n y p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m to religious r e v e l a t i o n a n d c o u l d p r e s u m a b l y b e a p p r o p r i a t e d b y a n y o n e c o m m i t t e d to the i d e a that there is a t r a n s c e n d e n t deity that reveals itself to us. H e allows that his p h i l o s o p h y m a y w e l l b e r o o t e d in his J u d a i s m , b u t n o n e t h e less insists o n a clear distinction b e t w e e n w h a t h e calls his " p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d confessional t e x t s " , o n the g r o u n d s that t h e y e m p l o y " s e p a r a t e l a n g u a g e s " a n d distinct m e t h o d s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n .

16

A t the

s a m e t i m e , there is c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r l a p in t e r m i n o l o g y a n d ideas b e t w e e n L e v i n a s ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g s a n d his explicitly J e w i s h " c o n f e s s i o n a l w o r k s " , a n d e a c h g r o u p o f texts sheds c o n s i d e r a b l e light o n the o t h e r .

17

W h e r e a s L e v i n a s ' s ethics o f the o t h e r is r e a d i l y e x t e n d e d to the t r a n s c e n d e n t religious r e a l m , there r e m a i n serious questions a b o u t its a p p l i c a b i l i t y or e v e n r e l e v a n c e to the h u m d r u m w o r l d o f e v e r y d a y m o r a l p r o b l e m s . G i v e n that I r e c o g n i z e m y absolute responsibility for the other, j u s t w h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s d o e s this h a v e for m y daily actions? D o e s it r e q u i r e a r a d i c a l p a c i f i s m or a life o f total selfsacrifice? O r is it s o m e h o w consistent w i t h s t a n d a r d p r i n c i p l e s o f i n d i v i d u a l m o r a l i t y a n d social j u s t i c e ? L e v i n a s a c k n o w l e d g e s the difficulty, n o t i n g that the suggestion that, as R i c h a r d K e a r n e y puts it, " t h e ethical relation is entirely Utopian a n d u n r e a l i s t i c " is " t h e g r e a t o b j e c t i o n to m y t h o u g h t " . L e v i n a s ' s i m m e d i a t e response to K e a r n e y w a s simply that the ethical relation's " b e i n g Utopian does not p r e v e n t it f r o m investing o u r e v e r y d a y actions o f g e n e r o s i t y o r

1 5

1 6

! /

S e e , for e x a m p l e , " T h e B a d C o n s c i e n c e a n d the I n e x o r a b l e " , in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 1 7 6 - 7 . L e v i n a s also speaks o f the " t r a c e " of G o d to express the elusive divine " p r e s e n c e through a b s e n c e " , a t e r m with roots in Husserl a n d Freud that, as w e have seen, is also central for D e r r i d a . See " D i a l o g u e with E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s " , in R i c h a r d K e a r n e y (ed.), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 5 3 - 5 . See the helpful discussion o f this topic in C o l i n D a v i s , Levinas: an Introduction, 100—19. A g o o d selection of Levinas's "Jewish w r i t i n g s " is collected in Difficile liberte.

3

6

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

2

g o o d w i l l t o w a r d the o t h e r " .

1 8

B u t this h a r d l y suffices to s h o w h o w

this m i g h t h a p p e n a n d , especially, w h a t specific m o r a l guidelines m i g h t result. T o m o v e his ethics o f the o t h e r at least in the d i r e c t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l morality, L e v i n a s i n t r o d u c e s his n o t i o n o f the third party (le tiers)}

9

T h i s seems to b e b a s e d on a r e c o g n i t i o n that " e v e r y d a y m o r a l i t y " , e v e n if u l t i m a t e l y g r o u n d e d in a n a s y m m e t r i c a l absolute responsibility for the other, r e q u i r e s at s o m e l e v e l p r i n c i p l e s o f s y m m e t r y a n d r e c i p r o c i t y that constitute a c o m m u n i t y o f m o r a l p e e r s . T h e

re-

sponse to specific m o r a l issues c a n n o t be m e r e l y m y total s u b o r d i n a tion to the o t h e r ; there must b e s o m e w a y in w h i c h all m o r a l agents, i n c l u d i n g myself, c a n b e r e c o g n i z e d as h a v i n g m o r a l standing. T h e third p a r t y is a n o t h e r p e r s o n , in a d d i t i o n to m y s e l f a n d the other, w h o s e reality L e v i n a s finds s o m e h o w implicit in m y e n c o u n t e r w i t h the other. O n e suggestion he m a k e s is that the third p a r t y enters the p i c t u r e b e c a u s e the o t h e r is n o t o t h e r in virtue o f s o m e

special

p e r s o n a l traits or situation b u t o n l y in virtue o f b e i n g v u l n e r a b l e to h a r m . T h e r e f o r e , there m a y w e l l be o t h e r others o f w h o m I must also take a c c o u n t . H e also suggests that I m a y b e c o m e a w a r e that the o t h e r to w h o m I a m responsible is itself responsible to an other, w h o is thus also i n c l u d e d in m y responsibility. In either case, m y ethical

situation

becomes

complicated

by

the

need

to

assume

responsibility for t w o or m o r e others, w h o s e n e e d s m a y conflict in w a y s that m a k e it impossible for m e to entirely satisfy t h e m b o t h . S u c h a situation r e q u i r e s precisely the sorts o f a r r a n g e m e n t s (compromises

and

prioritizations)

that

characterize

ordinary

human

societies. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f these a r r a n g e m e n t s is the e q u a l distrib u t i o n o f l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s to those in n e e d o f t h e m , a p r i n c i p l e that i n t r o d u c e s the e q u a l i t y o f p e r s o n s essential to o r d i n a r y systems o f morality. O n c e such a system o f u n i v e r s a l e q u a l i t y is established, c o n s i s t e n c y requires that e v e n I, despite the a s y m m e t r y o f m y basic o b l i g a t i o n to the other, b e i n c l u d e d in i t .

2 0

A p p e a r i n g in 1961, j u s t w h e n the structuralist critique o f all subjectc e n t e r e d t h i n k i n g w a s b e g i n n i n g to c o m m a n d the field, Totalité et infini 1 8

1 9

2 0

R i c h a r d K e a r n e y (éd.), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, 68. " T h e third p a r t y " is briefly i n t r o d u c e d in TI, 187—90/212—4, and s o m e w h a t m o r e fully developed in Otherwise than Being, 1 5 7 - 6 2 . For a t h o r o u g h and lucid critical discussion of this ffustratingly o p a q u e material, see Peperzak, To the Other, 167—84. Levinas nonetheless seeks to maintain s o m e t h i n g of the asymmetry, often citing the p e r p l e x i n g but m o v i n g line from The Brothers Karamazov: " W e are all responsible for everything and everyone in the face of everybody, a n d I m o r e than the o t h e r s . "

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

3 3 6

w a s r e s p e c t e d for its subtlety a n d originality, b u t w a s m e t w i t h few serious discussions a n d e v e n f e w e r supporters. T h e poststructuralist p h i l o s o p h e r s o f difference w e r e quite s y m p a t h e t i c to L e v i n a s ' s critique o f the s a m e a n d his e m p h a s i s on r a d i c a l alterity. B u t they r e m a i n e d v e r y u n e a s y w i t h the c e n t r a l p l a c e he gives to subjectivity a n d , especially, to a religiously o r i e n t e d e t h i c s .

21

It w a s o n l y w i t h the

" r e t u r n o f the s u b j e c t " a n d o f ethics in the 1980s that L e v i n a s ' s w o r k b e c a m e a c e n t e r o f intense p h i l o s o p h i c a l interest in F r a n c e .

2 2

RIGOEUR

P a u l R i c o e u r (b. 1913) failed the e x a m for the E c o l e N o r m a l e f a i l u r e " , he said, " t h a t m a r k e d m e for a l o n g t i m e " ) 2 3

and

("a so

r e c e i v e d his p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a t i o n t h r o u g h the master's d e g r e e at the p r o v i n c i a l university o f R e n n e s . H e spent j u s t one y e a r ( 1 9 3 4 - 5 ) s t u d y i n g in Paris, in p r e p a r a t i o n for the agrégation, after w h i c h he t a u g h t in p r o v i n c i a l lycées until the war. S h o r t l y after the war, R i c o e u r b e c a m e professor o f p h i l o s o p h y at S t r a s b o u r g , w h e r e

he

r e m a i n e d until called to the S o r b o n n e in 1957. R i c o e u r c o m e s f r o m a strongly religious f a m i l y a n d has a l w a y s b e e n active in liberal P r o t e s t a n t g r o u p s . D u r i n g his y o u t h f u l y e a r in Paris, he w a s i n t r o d u c e d to M a r c e l ' s F r i d a y circle. H e w a s v e r y i m p r e s s e d b y M a r c e l , w h o r e m a i n e d an i m p o r t a n t influence o n his work.

2 4

In the y e a r s b e f o r e the war, R i c o e u r w a s v e r y active in

C h r i s t i a n socialist a n d pacifist circles a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y with E m m a n u e l M o u n i e r

a n d his j o u r n a l Esprit. W h e n

associated the

war

b e g a n , he w a s called u p as an officer in the F r e n c h a r m y a n d spent five years in G e r m a n p r i s o n e r - o f - w a r c a m p s , w h e r e he w a s , h o w e v e r , able to c a r r y out intense studies o f K a r l J a s p e r s (on w h o m he later 2 1

2 2

2 3

2 4

S o , for e x a m p l e , D e s c o m b e s ' s 1979 survey o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y scene has only two passing references to Levinas - b o t h incidental to a discussion o f D e r r i d a (Modem French Philosophy, 139—40). Feminists such as B e a u v o i r a n d L u c e Irigaray have criticized Levinas's portrayal of femininity (in his description o f enjoyment a n d o f the erotic) as based on a d e m e a n i n g conception of w o m e n as m e r e negations o f m e n (Beauvoir, The Second Sex, xxii n. 3; Irigaray, " Q u e s t i o n s to E m m a n u e l Levinas: O n the D i g n i t y o f L o v e " , in R. B e r n a s c o n i and S. C r i t c h l e y (eds.), Re-Reading Levinas; " T h e Fecundity o f the C a r e s s : A R e a d i n g o f L e v i n a s , Totality and Infinity, ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y o f E r o s ' " , in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. A n early sign of this interest was the collection edited by François Laruelle, Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas, which contains essays by, a m o n g others, Derrida, Blanchot, Lyotard, and Ricoeur. Paul Ricoeur, "Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , in Lewis H a h n (ed.), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 6. See R i c o e u r ' s early book, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: philosophie du mystère et philosophie du paradoxe.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

3 4 6

c o - a u t h o r e d a b o o k w i t h a fellow prisoner, M i k e l D u f r e n n e ) , b e g i n his translation o f Husserl's Ideas,'

25

a n d start w o r k o n w h a t e v e n t u a l l y

b e c a m e the hrst v o l u m e o f his Philosophie de la volonté. A f t e r the w a r , as R i c o e u r d e v e l o p e d his o w n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , his affinities w i t h existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y w e r e clear. A s h e p u t it, his p r o j e c t w a s to a p p l y Husserl's m e t h o d o f eidetic analysis to M a r c e l ' s p r o b l e m a t i c o f the e m b o d i e d s e l f . Merleau-Ponty,

26

T h i s p r o j e c t w a s o b v i o u s l y v e r y close to that o f

a n d R i c o e u r , v e r y e x c i t e d b y the a p p e a r a n c e

Phénoménologie de la perception, s o u g h t

h i m out. T h e y

c o n t a c t s , b u t n o real c o n n e c t i o n w a s f o r m e d .

2 7

had

of some

Although Merleau-

Ponty's p r e - w a r b a c k g r o u n d w a s r a t h e r similar to R i c o e u r ' s , it w o u l d s e e m that a C h r i s t i a n a n d a politically m o d e r a t e socialist w a s simply not the sort o f thinker that S a r t r e ' s c o - e d i t o r at Les temps modernes c o u l d take

seriously.

28

Sartre h i m s e l f is said to h a v e

spoken of

R i c o e u r as " a k i n d o f p a r s o n [curé] w h o w a s interested in [s'occupait de] p h e n o m e n o l o g y " .

2 9

R i c o e u r h a s a l w a y s b e e n a d e v o u t P r o t e s t a n t , a n d m u c h o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k - for e x a m p l e , the seminal c o n c e r n w i t h evil a n d w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f texts — h a s religious m o t i v a t i o n s . M o r e over, he h a s v e n t u r e d into distinctly t h e o l o g i c a l areas such as B i b l i c a l exegesis, a n d b o t h his p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d t h e o l o g i c a l w o r k s h a v e b e e n v e r y influential in d e p a r t m e n t s o f t h e o l o g y a n d o f religious s t u d i e s .

30

H o w e v e r , like L e v i n a s , h e h a s insisted o n a strict s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d faith. Specifically, h e insists that w h a t e v e r religious origin his interests

or ideas

m a y have, he always

supports his

c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h a r g u m e n t s that d o n o t p r e s u p p o s e p r e m i s e s a c c e p t ed o n religious a u t h o r i t y .

31

N o n e t h e l e s s , e v e n strictly as a p h i l o s o -

pher, h e h a s , like L e v i n a s , t a k e n religious t h e m e s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s seriously in a w a y u n h e a r d o f a m o n g other m a j o r F r e n c h p h i l o s o 2 : )

2 6

2 /

2 8

2 9

3 0

1,1

T h i s translation w a s published in 1950. A l o n g with R i c o e u r ' s a c c o m p a n y i n g introduction and commentary, it has l o n g h a d a major influence o n Husserl scholarship. "Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , 12. A c c c o r d i n g to R o g e r M e h l , a long-time friend o f R i c o e u r , " M e r l e a u - P o n t y always avoided contact. H e didn't even answer his letters" (François Dosse, Paul Ricoeur: les sens d'une vie, 134 [author's interview with M e h l ] ) . R i c o e u r was, however, quite capable of taking difficult political stands. For e x a m p l e , in 1961 he was seriously harassed b y the French police for his outspoken support o f A l g e r i a n independence. Dosse, Paul Ricoeur: les sens d'une vie, 134 (author's interview with M a r c Richir). R i c o e u r ' s p r i m a r y a p p o i n t m e n t at the University of C h i c a g o w a s in the D i v i n i t y S c h o o l , w h e r e he succeeded to the chair held b y Paul Tillich. See, for e x a m p l e , his c o m m e n t s in a n interview in C h a r l e s R e a g a n , Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work, 1 2 5 - 6 .

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

3 5 6

p h e r s after M a r c e l a n d b e f o r e t h e later D e r r i d a . T h e r e is n o d o u b t that this religious o r i e n t a t i o n is a s i g n i h c a n t p a r t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n for t h e l o n g p e r i o d o f n e g l e c t o f his w o r k in F r a n c e . In later y e a r s , despite R i c o e u r ' s distinguished p u b l i c a t i o n s a n d i m m e n s e p o p u l a r i t y as a l e c t u r e r at t h e S o r b o n n e , h e r e m a i n e d outside t h e g r o u p o f l i o n i z e d Parisian intellectual " s t a r s " . Eventually, his situation in F r a n c e b e c a m e u n t e n a b l e . H i s 1965 b o o k o n F r e u d w a s v i c i o u s l y a t t a c k e d b y L a c a n i a n s o u t r a g e d at w h a t t h e y w r o n g l y regarded

as his u n a c k n o w l e d g e d

borrowings

from

their

master.

T h e n , as D e a n o f t h e F a c u l t y o f Letters at N a n t e r r e in 1 9 6 9 , h e suffered h u m i l i a t i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h student militants a n d a n e m b a r r a s s i n g p o l i c e i n v a s i o n o f his c a m p u s . A f t e r t h e d e b a c l e at N a n t e r r e , R i c o e u r t o o k a t h r e e - y e a r l e a v e f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris, d u r i n g w h i c h h e effectively m o v e d his c e n t e r o f activities a w a y f r o m F r a n c e , first to B e l g i u m (at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f L o u v a i n ) a n d later to t h e U n i t e d States (at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o ) . For t h e hfteen years f r o m 1970 to 1985 h e b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y distant f r o m F r e n c h intellectual life, so m u c h so that m o s t o f his articles w e r e p u b l i s h e d in o t h e r countries. It w a s o n l y in t h e mid-1980s, w i t h t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e three v o l u m e s o f Temps et récit, that R i c o e u r b e c a m e

once

a g a i n a m a j o r h g u r e in F r a n c e . R i c o e u r ' s initial p r o j e c t w a s to a p p l y p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l to t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e affective d i m e n s i o n o f h u m a n

method

existence,

p a r t i c u l a r l y p h e n o m e n a c o n n e c t e d w i t h v o l i t i o n . I n Le volontaire et l'involontaire, h e p r e s e n t e d a H u s s e r l i a n " e i d e t i c a n a l y s i s " w h i c h h e h o p e d w o u l d d o for t h e sphere o f p r a c t i c e w h a t M e r l e a u - P o n t y h a d d o n e for p e r c e p t i o n . A t the s a m e t i m e , b y s h o w i n g h o w i n v o l u n t a r y factors, f r o m t h e b o d y a n d its e n v i r o n m e n t to e m o t i o n a n d character, are essential correlates o f v o l u n t a r y

a c t i o n , h e offered a n

implicit critique o f Sartre's r a d i c a l existentialist o n t o l o g y o f f r e e d o m . F r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , h o w e v e r , R i c o e u r h a d e m p h a s i z e d that a phenomenology

o f the essential structures o f v o l i t i o n

could not

e x p l i c a t e t h e c o n t i n g e n t b u t - especially for a C h r i s t i a n -

crucial

p h e n o m e n o n o f t h e evil will. S i n c e there is n o t h i n g in t h e n a t u r e o f the will that c o m p e l s it to evil, this aspect o f h u m a n existence w o u l d r e q u i r e a n o t h e r m o d e o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection.

Such

reflection

w a s a c o n c e r n o f t h e n e x t stage o f R i c o e u r ' s Philosophie de la volonté. U n d e r the g e n e r a l title Finitude et culpabilité h e p u b l i s h e d in i 9 6 0 t w o v o l u m e s , L'homme fallible a n d La symbolique du mal. T h e hrst v o l u m e r e m a i n e d w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n o f n e c e s s a r y truths, a l t h o u g h it is as

366

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

K a n t i a n as it is H u s s e r l i a n , s e e k i n g the c o n d i t i o n s o f the possibility o f evil w i t h i n the essential structures o f the will. R i c o e u r finds these c o n d i t i o n s in w h a t he calls, e v o k i n g P a s c a l , an " o n t o l o g y o f disprop o r t i o n " . T h e d i s p r o p o r t i o n , w h i c h he u n c o v e r s at the three levels of k n o w l e d g e , p r a c t i c e , a n d feeling, is a l w a y s b e t w e e n a t e n d e n c y to the hnite a n d a t e n d e n c y to the infinite. In k n o w l e d g e , for e x a m p l e , the limitations o f p e r c e p t i o n to a specific profile o f its o b j e c t is in t e n s i o n w i t h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' s drive to think in t e r m s o f g e n e r a l categories. Similarly, o n the p r a c t i c a l level o f morality, there is tension b e t w e e n limits that define m y c h a r a c t e r a n d m y desire for u n l i m i t e d h a p p i n e s s ; a n d , o n the level o f feeling, b e t w e e n m y

contentment

w i t h a familiar situation a n d m y o p e n n e s s to the total r a n g e affective balance

experiences.

Human

at the m i d - p o i n t s

frailty

between

consists

in

our

the e x t r e m e s

of

precarious

defining

these

tensions, a n d evil c o r r e s p o n d s to the possibility o f o u r suppressing one e x t r e m e in favor o f the other. In La symbolique du mal, R i c o e u r finally turns to the c o n t i n g e n t fact o f w i l l e d evil. W e h a v e a l r e a d y seen that the c o n t i n g e n c y o f an evil will p l a c e s it outside the d o m a i n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description. Positively, R i c o e u r m a i n t a i n s that an a c c o u n t o f evil has to be g i v e n in h e r m e n e u t i c t e r m s , specifically t h r o u g h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the g r e a t religious a n d c u l t u r a l s y m b o l s a n d m y t h s o f evil. T h e h e r m e neutic t u r n is r e q u i r e d b y o u r t e n d e n c y to h i d e o u r evil, to d e n y it or to distort its n a t u r e . T h i s m a k e s direct self-reflection ( p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l or otherwise) an i n a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e for e x p l o r i n g it. B u t artistic a n d religious traditions c o n t a i n o u r implicit u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r evil. R i c o e u r ' s t u r n to h e r m e n e u t i c s in La symbolique du mal does n o t , h o w e v e r , derive s i m p l y f r o m the p e c u l i a r features o f his topic. It also reflects his c o n c l u s i o n that, quite generally, there is an o p a q u e n e s s in consciousness that limits all p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t s o f self-knowledge a n d r e q u i r e s the " d e t o u r " o f h e r m e n e u t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f cultural s y m b o l s a n d m y t h s .

3 2

Ricoeur

did

not

d e n y the validity o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y in its limited d o m a i n , n o r did he reject — as m a n y F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s w o u l d s o o n do — the central

role

of

subjectivity

in

human

existence.

But

from

La

symbolique du mal o n he has insisted on the n e e d for the p h i l o s o p h i c a l study o f h u m a n reality to c o m b i n e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

description

with hermeneutic interpretation.

Sec R i c o e u r ' s essays on Husserl collected in

À l'école de la phénoménologie.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"? Ricoeur's vantage

hermeneutic

point

for

turn

provided

evaluating and

him

with

appropriating

37 6

an

the

excellent

structuralist

critique o f the subject that s w e p t the F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r l d in the 1960s. A m a j o r focus o f his c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h structuralism w a s his b o o k De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud (1965). H e w a s initially l e d to F r e u d b y an interest in the p h e n o m e n o n o f guilt, a n d h a d b e e n r e a d i n g h i m systematically since i 9 6 0 . A t the s a m e t i m e , F r e u d w a s b e c o m i n g o f g r e a t interest to structuralist critics o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y , who

thought

his

account

of

the

unconscious

p r i m a c y o f the c o n s c i o u s subject. R i c o e u r

undermined

the

a g r e e d that a strictly

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l v i e w — limited to the analysis o f m e a n i n g s — c o u l d not d o j u s t i c e to the F r e u d i a n u n c o n s c i o u s , w h i c h r e q u i r e d description v i a a m i x t u r e o f the l a n g u a g e o f m e a n i n g a n d the l a n g u a g e of force. T h e u n c o n s c i o u s is p r e c i s e l y the intersection o f l a n g u a g e a n d desire, i n v o l v i n g b o t h i n t e n t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s such as w i s h , distortion, a n d fulfillment, a n d p h y s i c a l c a t e g o r i e s s u c h as drive, d i s p l a c e m e n t , a n d repression. P s y c h o a n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s a m e t h o d o f i n t e r p r e t i n g u n c o n s c i o u s m e a n i n g s in their relation to p h y s i c a l expressions o f desire. It is, t h e r e f o r e , a h e r m e n e u t i c discipline d e d i c a t e d to u n e a r t h i n g m e a n i n g s that are inaccessible to p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reflection b e c a u s e o f their e n t a n g l e m e n t w i t h desires. B u t it does not s u p p o r t the structuralist c l a i m to e l i m i n a t e the c e n t e r o f subjective m e a n i n g s that is consciousness. R i c o e u r ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s as h e r m e n e u t i c r e q u i r e d , however,

an e x p a n s i o n

o f his c o n c e p t i o n

of hermeneutics.

Pre-

viously (in La symbolique du mat) he h a d r e c o g n i z e d o n l y interpretation that r e v e a l e d a m e a n i n g w o r t h y o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n into o u r selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g (for e x a m p l e , o f ourselves as guilty before G o d ) . H i s study o f F r e u d r e v e a l e d that, besides this sort o f p r o g r e s s i v e

(or

ampliative) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , there w a s a n o t h e r sort, u n c o v e r e d

by

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , that discovers a r c h a i c or infantile m e a n i n g s that w e n e e d to o v e r c o m e r a t h e r t h a n i n c o r p o r a t e (for e x a m p l e , incestuous or m u r d e r o u s desires). R i c o e u r w a s thus l e d to distinguish b e t w e e n a t e l e o l o g i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s that e n r i c h e s h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d an a r c h a e o l o g i c a l h e r m e n e u t i c s , the " h e r m e n e u t i c s o f s u s p i c i o n " , that purihes i t .

3 3

He

now

h e l d that a full u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of

human

In his "Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , R i c o e u r cites G a d a m e r as h a v i n g recently " r e n o v a t e d " teleological hermeneutics a n d associates this enterprise with p h e n o m e n o l o g y (as " e n r i c h e d by M e r l e a u - P o n t y " ) a n d " t h e tradition of reflexive philosophy illustrated by J e a n N a b e r t " . All these are o p p o s e d to the "masters of suspicion", w h o include not only Freud

3

68

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

existence r e q u i r e d a dialectical

"conflict

of interpretations"

that

r e c o g n i z e d b o t h the s e p a r a t e validity a n d the m u t u a l o p p o s i t i o n of the a r c h a e o l o g i c a l a n d the t e l e o l o g i c a l m o m e n t s . R i c o e u r ' s direct r e a c t i o n s to structuralism c o m b i n e d an a p p r e c i ation o f its v a l u e as a s p e c i a l i z e d m e t h o d for a d d r e s s i n g

certain

issues, w i t h criticism o f the e x t r a p o l a t i o n o f its v i e w p o i n t into a universal t h e o r y o f h u m a n reality, an e x t r a p o l a t i o n that he c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a " K a n t i a n i s m w i t h o u t a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t " . a r g u e d , for e x a m p l e , that L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s myths required

supplementation

3 4

structuralist analyses

by a hermeneutic

He of

study o f the

historical traditions that t r a n s m i t t e d the m y t h s f r o m one g e n e r a t i o n to another. H e also o p p o s e d the structuralist c l a i m , d e r i v e d f r o m Saussure, that linguistic m e a n i n g w a s entirely a m a t t e r o f differential relations a m o n g signs. A c c o r d i n g to R i c o e u r , this i g n o r e d the c e n t r a l linguistic role o f the sentence as the v e h i c l e o f linguistic e x p r e s s i o n . O n c e w e r e c o g n i z e this role (as does, for e x a m p l e ,

Benveniste's

system o f linguistics), w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d l a n g u a g e (discourse, in Benveniste's t e r m i n o l o g y ) as r e q u i r i n g n o t o n l y structural rules but also s o m e o n e w h o uses these rules to say s o m e t h i n g to s o m e o n e . S o u n d e r s t o o d , l a n g u a g e r e q u i r e s essential r e f e r e n c e b o t h to a w o r l d o f objects a n d to s p e a k i n g a n d listening subjects. F o l l o w i n g his w o r k o n F r e u d a n d structuralism, R i c o e u r w a s in a position to f o r m u l a t e his o w n h e r m e n e u t i c a l t h e o r y in a systematic way. tion

3 5

T y p i c a l o f R i c o e u r , this t h e o r y c o n t i n u e s the classical tradi-

of hermeneutics

standpoints

while

o f structuralism

also i n c o r p o r a t i n g

the

and poststructuralism.

more The

recent classical

s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d s t a n d p o i n t is r e c o g n i z e d t h r o u g h R i c o e u r ' s insistence that m e a n i n g is r o o t e d in the c o m m u n i c a t i v e

function

of

l a n g u a g e : a sentence is a d d r e s s e d b y s o m e o n e to s o m e o n e . B u t he also e m p h a s i z e s that l a n g u a g e is often sufficiently distant f r o m its but also Feuerbach, M a r x , a n d Nietzsche ("Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , 22). "Reflexive p h i l o s o p h y " is R i c o e u r ' s term for the French spiritualist tradition. J e a n N a b c r t ' s 1924 thesis, L'expérience intérieure de la liberté (reissued with additional essays a n d a preface by Paul Ricoeur, 1994) established h i m as one o f the last l e a d i n g figures in this tradition, w h i c h was soon s w a m p e d by existentialism. H e also published an important study o f ethics, Elements pour me éthique. A later w o r k on evil a n d religion, Essai sur le mal, particularly impressed R i c o e u r a n d was an important influence on his Finitude et culpabilité. M o r e generally, R i c o e u r has always shown a strong appreciation for the spiritualist tradition, b e g i n n i n g with his master's thesis (1934) on L a c h e l i e r and L a g n e a u on the p r o b l e m o f G o d . 3 4

3 5

" S t r u c t u r e a n d H e r m e n e u t i c s " , in The Conflict of Interpretations. See his brief exposition, Interpretation Theory, a n d his essays collected in Le conflit des interprétations.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

3 9 6

subjective origin that it c a n b e fruitfully a n a l y z e d as a n abstract system,

so that

structuralist

explanation

can be integrated

into

classical h e r m e n e u t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g . R i c o e u r g o e s e v e n further to a r g u e that u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself r e q u i r e s a d i s t a n c i n g o f l a n g u a g e f r o m its p r o d u c t i o n in s p e e c h , so that the o b j e c t o f h e r m e n e u t i c s m u s t b e the text in the sense o f w r i t t e n discourse. I n this w a y h e e n r i c h e s his h e r m e n e u t i c s w i t h D e r r i d a ' s poststructuralist critique o f logocentrism.

36

R i c o e u r c o m p l e m e n t e d his h e r m e n e u t i c s w i t h a series o f studies on the creative r e s o u r c e s o f l a n g u a g e , p a y i n g special attention to metaphor

and narrative.

37

T h e standard

Aristotelian

theory

of

m e t a p h o r deflates it into a simple attribution o f a p r o p e r t y g e n e r a l l y associated w i t h o n e t h i n g to another, similar thing. S o I say, " M a n is a w o l f " , m e a n i n g that a l t h o u g h w e d o n o t t y p i c a l l y think o f it, h u m a n b e i n g s h a v e s o m e o f the m o r e u n p l e a s a n t p r o p e r t i e s o r d i n a rily assigned to w o l v e s . B u t , R i c o e u r points o u t , m e t a p h o r c a n b e creative far b e y o n d such m i n i m a l i s t extensions o f o u r v o c a b u l a r y . It m a y set u p so strong a tension b e t w e e n t w o t e r m s - b y c o n n e c t i n g t h e m in a w a y so outside o u r s t a n d a r d u s a g e — that w e c a n m a k e sense o f the m e t a p h o r o n l y b y r e c o n s t r u i n g the entire s e m a n t i c h e l d d e h n i n g the t e r m s ' m e a n i n g s . T h i s is w h a t h a p p e n s , for e x a m p l e , w h e n w e try to u n d e r s t a n d S h a k e s p e a r e ' s c o m p a r i s o n o f time to a b e g g a r w i t h a w a l l e t o n his b a c k (Troilus and Cressida, i n , hi, 1 4 5 - 5 0 ) . R i c o e u r d e h n e s m e t a p h o r in t e r m s o f its p o w e r to thus t r a n s f o r m o u r system o f m e a n i n g (and the m o r e m u n d a n e sorts o f m e t a p h o r readily h t in as " i n f i n i t e s i m a l " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s ) . H e further m a i n tains that a d e e p l y effective m e t a p h o r m a y t r a n s f o r m n o t j u s t m e a n ings b u t also o u r g r a s p o f reality. W e m a y b e able to m a k e sense o f a sufficiently r a d i c a l c h a n g e in o u r system o f m e a n i n g s o n l y b y revising o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w o r l d this system describes. A c c o r d i n g l y , poetry, so often r e g a r d e d as a m e r e gloss o n literal truths or, w i t h m o r e sophistication, as a n isolated g a m e p l a y e d entirely for its o w n sake, a c t u a l l y h a s the creative p o w e r o f r e d e s c r i b i n g o u r w o r l d . R i c o e u r later e x p a n d e d this c r e a t i v e v i e w o f literary

language

f r o m m e t a p h o r to n a r r a t i v e . L i k e a m e t a p h o r , a (hctional) n a r r a t i v e m a y v a r y o n l y m i n i m a l l y f r o m the true stories b y w h i c h w e r e c o u n t 3 6

3 7

D e r r i d a was the teaching assistant in R i c o e u r ' s seminar on p h e n o m e n o l o g y at the S o r b o n n e in the early 1960s a n d , despite d e e p philosophical differences, the t w o m a i n t a i n e d a cordial if often distant relationship. See La métaphore vive a n d the three v o l u m e s of Temps et récit

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

370

the events o f o u r lives. B u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m o r e d e e p l y creative narrative m a y r e q u i r e a r a d i c a l r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n

o f the possi-

bilities o f a life-story, a n d such a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n m a y l e a d to a n e w u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o u r historical lives. S u c h t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s h a v e d e e p c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h h o w w e think o f time: n e w c o n c e p t i o n s of time will g e n e r a t e n e w m o d e s o f n a r r a t i v e , a n d v i c e versa. R i c o e u r ' s Temps et recit e x p l o r e s t h o r o u g h l y a n d subtly the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f these connections. R i c o e u r ' s initial p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t w a s the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p r a c t i c a l a n d affective w o r l d o f h u m a n v o l i t i o n . T h e n e c e s s a r y hermeneutic

detour

from

his

original

direct

phenomenological

a p p r o a c h to this topic l e d h i m t h r o u g h m a n y y e a r s o f s e c o n d - o r d e r discussions o f the l a n g u a g e b y w h i c h w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d ourselves. B u t since, as Aristotle l o n g a g o e m p h a s i z e d , n a r r a t i v e is an i m i t a t i o n (mimesis) o f a c t i o n , R i c o e u r ' s d e v e l o p m e n t o f a sophisticated a c c o u n t o f n a r r a t i v e p r o v i d e d a n a t u r a l v e h i c l e for r e t u r n i n g to his original project.

3 8

H e further d e v e l o p s Aristotle's insight b y s h o w i n g h o w

actions c a n , for a n a l y t i c p u r p o s e s , be t r e a t e d as texts, since agents are d i s t a n c e d f r o m w h a t they d o in the s a m e w a y that a u t h o r s are distanced

from

language

also p r o v i d e d

what

they

write.

Ricoeur

integrate his h e r m e n e u t i c

This with

tie

between

a natural

action

and

opportunity

approach with approaches

of

to

analytic

p h i l o s o p h y such as Searle's s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y a n d D a v i d s o n ' s a c t i o n theory.

Parallel to his earlier i n t e g r a t i o n o f structuralist e x p l a n a -

39

tions a n d h e r m e n e u t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f texts, R i c o e u r a t t e m p t s to dissolve the a l l e g e d d i c h o t o m y , often e m p h a s i z e d in analytic discussions, b e t w e e n the c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f actions a n d the h e r m e neutic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their m e a n i n g . H i s w o r k on a c t i o n

also

n a t u r a l l y led R i c o e u r into the areas o f ethics a n d political t h e o r y .

40

R i c o e u r ' s later w o r k also b r i n g s h i m b a c k to his roots in p h e n o m enology.

41

H e d o e s n o t reject his earlier criticisms o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y

b u t notes that t h e y a p p l y o n l y to the f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t v e r s i o n o f the

R i c o e u r notes ("Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , 32) that this reentry via action, in comparison with his original a p p r o a c h through will, leads h i m to e m p h a s i z e results rather than intentions a n d the social rather than the solitary. See, for e x a m p l e , the essays in Paul R i c o e u r , Soi-même comme une autre. R i c o e u r ' s ethical writings have shown a particular interest in the w o r k o f Levinas. See, for e x a m p l e , " E m m a n u e l Levinas, penseur du t é m o i g n a g e " , in J.-C. A e s c h l i m a n (ed.), Répondre d'autrui: Emmanuel Levinas, iy—40. See " P h e n o m e n o l o g y and H e r m e n e u t i c s " , in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"? method

that H u s s e r l puts f o r w a r d ,

for e x a m p l e

37

1

in his Cartesian

Meditations. It is the d e m a n d that p h e n o m e n o l o g y p r o v i d e r i g o r o u s f o u n d a t i o n s for all k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h in t u r n leads to d e m a n d s for total

self-reflective

transparency

a n d apodictic

certainty,

that is

u n d e r m i n e d b y structuralism a n d h e r m e n e u t i c s . H o w e v e r , h e r m e neutics, like p h e n o m e n o l o g y , seeks the m e a n i n g s implicit in h u m a n existence a n d m u s t , as w e h a v e seen, a c c e p t the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l claim

that

these

meanings

are ultimately

rooted

in

subjective

consciousness. W e n e e d , t h e r e f o r e , o n l y separate the p h e n o m e n o l o gical

search

for

subject-centered

meaning

from

the

Cartesian

d e m a n d for f o u n d a t i o n a l certainty. R i c o e u r notes that this s e p a r a tion is a l r e a d y p r e s e n t in Husserl's early f o r m u l a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y in the Logical Investigations, w h i c h R i c o e u r sees as a m o d e l for the h e r m e n e u t i c d e p l o y m e n t o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . I n this sense, he is r e a d y to assert that " p h e n o m e n o l o g y presupposition of h e r m e n e u t i c s " .

REGENT

The

interest

in L e v i n a s

r e m a i n s the u n s u r p a s s a b l e

4 2

DIRECTIONS

and Ricoeur,

beginning

a r o u n d 1980,

c o r r e s p o n d e d to a n e w g e n e r a t i o n o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o w e r e r e a d y to cast a c o l d e y e o n p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m . C r i t i q u e s

typically

c e n t e r e d o n the p e r c e i v e d c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n f a s h i o n a b l e p h i l o s o p h e r s such as Althusser, F o u c a u l t , D e l e u z e , a n d D e r r i d a , a n d the student revolts o f 1968. N o t that the revolts w e r e inspired b y the p h i l o s o p h e r s , w h o o n the c o n t r a r y s e e m , in strictly political t e r m s , to h a v e b e e n t h e m s e l v e s r a d i c a l i z e d b y the événements de mai. B u t m a n y o f the f o u n d i n g texts o f p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m w e r e n e a r l y s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h the revolts - for e x a m p l e , F o u c a u l t ' s Les mots et les choses (1966), D e r r i d a ' s De la grammatologie (1967), D e l e u z e ' s Différence et répétition (1968) — a n d it w a s t e m p t i n g to see their p h i l o s o p h i c a l r a d i c a l i s m as s o m e h o w o f a p i e c e w i t h the students' political r a d i c a l i s m . A s early as the mid-1970s, there h a d b e e n the n o i s y b u t p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l assault o f the " n e w p h i l o s o p h e r s " . T h e s e w e r e f o r m e r student radicals — especially B e r n a r d - H e n r i L e v y a n d A n d r é G l u c k s m a n n — w h o briefly d o m i n a t e d the m e d i a w i t h i m p a s sioned p r o c l a m a t i o n s o f their disillusion w i t h M a r x i s m , w h i c h they b e l a t e d l y r e c o g n i z e d as responsible for such h o r r o r s as the Soviet "Intellectual A u t o b i o g r a p h y " , 34.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

372

G u l a g s . T h e tone is a p p a r e n t in the o p e n i n g s e n t e n c e o f Levy's La barbarie à visage humain: " I a m the b a s t a r d child o f a n u n h o l y u n i o n b e t w e e n fascism a n d S t a l i n i s m . "

4 3

O f course, e x c e p t for Althusser,

n o n e o f the poststructuralists w e r e M a r x i s t s , b u t Levy a n d Glucks¬ m a n n raised the n o t o b v i o u s l y illegitimate issue o f possible c o n n e c tions b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n t i - h u m a n i s m a n d ethical

outrages

against h u m a n i t y . T h e i r discussions, h o w e v e r , offered m o r e political p o l e m i c t h a n p h i l o s o p h i c a l insight. In similarly p o l e m i c a l v e i n , b u t w i t h m u c h m o r e n u a n c e a n d substance, w a s L u c Ferry a n d A l a i n R e n a u t ' s La pensée 68 (1985). Ferry a n d R e n a u t c h a r a c t e r i z e the poststructuralist " t h o u g h t o f ' 6 8 " as a critique

of modernist humanism,

derived from M a r x and

H e i d e g g e r (via N i e t z s c h e ) . T h e p r i m a r y object o f this critique w a s the m o d e r n n o t i o n o f the subject as the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , m e t a p h y sical, a n d ethical center o f existence. Poststructuralists rejected the m e t a p h y s i c a l (and epistemological) p r i m a c y o f the subject o n the basis o f H e i d e g g e r ' s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f W e s t e r n philosophy. A l t h o u g h they did n o t a c c e p t M a r x i s m , w h i c h for t h e m w a s in its h a r d e r materialist f o r m t o o positivist a n d in its softer existential f o r m t o o h u m a n i s t , t h e y w e r e , as leftist intellectuals, s y m p a t h e t i c to its critique o f b o u r g e o i s m o r a l i t y a n d politics. B u t t h e y d i d r e a d H e i d e g g e r ' s critique o f m e t a p h y s i c s as u n d e r m i n i n g the ethical p r i m a c y o f the subject, a result that destroyed the intellectual basis o f b o u r g e o i s m o r a l i t y a n d politics. I n this way, p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m a c h i e v e d M a r x i s t ends b y H e i d e g g e r i a n m e a n s . Ferry a n d R e n a u t a r e l a r g e l y s y m p a t h e t i c to the H e i d e g g e r i a n critique o f m e t a p h y s i c s b u t d e n y that it u n d e r m i n e s the ethical p r i m a c y o f the subject. T h e critique effectively attacks the i d e a o f a " s e l f - t r a n s p a r e n t subject that lays c l a i m to the m a s t e r y o f e v e r y t h i n g that e x i s t s " , a subject w i t h its o w n absolute existence that constitutes the w o r l d .

4 4

B u t this does n o t eliminate a unified consciousness,

finite, t e m p o r a l , a n d essentially d e p e n d e n t o n the w o r l d a n d society, as the c o r e o f e a c h person's identity a n d m o r a l status. I n fact, Ferry a n d R e n a u t m a i n t a i n , the Dasein o f Being and Time is j u s t such a subject. I n d e e d , t h e y a r g u e that H e i d e g g e r ' s Dasein is e q u i v a l e n t to K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, o n c e that subject's c o n c e p t s

have

b e e n m a d e a p p l i c a b l e to the t e m p o r a l w o r l d t h r o u g h w h a t K a n t

4:5

4 4

B e r n a r d - H e n r i Levy, Barbarism with a Human Face, ix. L u c Ferry a n d A l a i n R e n a u l t , French Philosophy of the Sixties, 213 — 14.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

373

calls " s c h e m a t i z a t i o n " . T h e y further a r g u e that such a subject c a n be established as the b e a r e r o f m o r a l rights a n d responsibilities, thus p r o v i d i n g a n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l basis for ethics. Ferry a n d R e n a u t also m a i n t a i n that the m o r a l p r i m a c y o f the subject is r e q u i r e d to m a k e

sense o f the poststructuralists'

own

political c o m m i t m e n t s to i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m a n d to resisting totalitarian o p p r e s s i o n . I f the H e i d e g g e r i a n

critique

o f the subject is

a l l o w e d to e x t e n d to the ethical a n d political spheres, t h e n there is n o w a y to o p p o s e H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n disdain for d e m o c r a c y .

The

poststructuralists in effect tried to e s c a p e this c o n c l u s i o n b y substituting the individual for the subject. B o t h the subject a n d the i n d i v i d u a l are free. B u t the (poststructuralist) i n d i v i d u a l is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n this f r e e d o m , a n d the i n d i v i d u a l ' s g o o d consists simply in the unrestricted exercise o f its free creativity, in the m a n n e r o f D e l e u z e a n d Guattari's

desiring-machines.

A

subject,

by

contrast,

exercises

f r e e d o m n o t for its o w n sake b u t for the sake o f an objective g o o d r e c o g n i z e d as the a p p r o p r i a t e e n d o f a r a t i o n a l will. T h e f r e e d o m o f a subject is autonomy in K a n t ' s sense, w h i c h is " p e r f e c t l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the i d e a o f p e r s o n s s u b m i t t i n g to laws or n o r m s as l o n g as these are freely a c c e p t e d " . T h e f r e e d o m o f an i n d i v i d u a l is independence, u n d e r s t o o d as an ideal that " c a n n o l o n g e r tolerate such a limitation o f the self; o n the contrary, it aims at the p u r e a n d simple affirmation o f the self as a v a l u e " .

4 5

For Ferry a n d R e n a u t , the self h a s an

inviolable ethical v a l u e , b u t this d o e s n o t derive f r o m p u r e

self-

assertion b u t f r o m a consensus a m o n g r a t i o n a l m i n d s as to the objective truth o f this inviolability. T h i s objective truth, h o w e v e r , is g r o u n d e d n o t in d o g m a t i c k n o w l e d g e o f the subject's t r a n s c e n d e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l n a t u r e ; rather, it expresses a critical g r a s p , in the Kantian action.

sense,

o f the

conditions

required

for

coherent

moral

4 6

T h e w o r k o f Ferry a n d R e n a u t is a c e n t r a l e x a m p l e o f the striking e m e r g e n c e o f liberal political t h e o r y in F r a n c e , a d e v e l o p m e n t that represents a m o v e to the c e n t e r in b o t h c o n t e n t a n d m e t h o d .

4 7

The

d o m i n a n t thinkers o f p o s t w a r F r a n c e saw n o m i d d l e g r o u n d b e t w e e n

4 ; )

4 6

4 7

A l a i n R e n a u t , The Era of the Individual, 19. R e n a u t and Ferry have also d r a w n their non-metaphysical a p p r o a c h to subjectivity from reflections on K a n t ' s Critique of Judgment and on Fichte's early writings. See (on K a n t ) L u c Ferry, Homo aestheticus and (on Fichte) A l a i n R e n a u t , Le systeme du droit. For an excellent survey a n d analysis of recent French political theory, see the editor's introduction to M a r k Lilla (ed.), .New French Political Philosophy.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

374

r e v o l u t i o n a r y r a d i c a l i s m a n d r e a c t i o n a r y c o n s e r v a t i s m . S a r t r e , for e x a m p l e , saw the r e s p e c t o f R a y m o n d A r o n (an old friend f r o m the E c o l e N o r m a l e ) for A m e r i c a n d e m o c r a c y a n d the m o r a l hesitations o f A l b e r t C a m u s r e g a r d i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i o l e n c e as n o t h i n g less t h a n a b a n d o n m e n t s o f the struggle against o p p r e s s i o n . W i t h 1980s, h o w e v e r , A r o n

the

a n d C a m u s g a i n e d the r e s p e c t o f a

new

g e n e r a t i o n that h a d d r a w n its o w n c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m the p o s t w a r history

o f the

Soviet bloc

and

saw t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l i s m

as

attractive basis for t h i n k i n g a b o u t politics. T h i s g e n e r a t i o n

an also

f o u n d a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l m i d d l e g r o u n d b e t w e e n the highest level o f philosophical

theorizing

and

engagement

in

concrete

political

causes. W h e r e a s b o t h Sartre a n d , especially, the poststructuralists a l t e r n a t e d b e t w e e n a b s t r a c t o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s or d e c o n s t r u c tions a n d d r a m a t i c political gestures, the n e w g e n e r a t i o n ' s taste w a s for m i d d l e - l e v e l theories that lack the a m b i t i o n s o f those p r o m u l g a t e d b y the " m a s t e r t h i n k e r s " b u t c o n n e c t far m o r e directly a n d , they h o p e , fruitfully

with

the p r a c t i c a l p r o b l e m s

of

democratic

politics. W h i l e p h i l o s o p h e r s s u c h as R e n a u t a n d Ferry see w a y s a r o u n d the poststructuralist p r o c l a m a t i o n s o f the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y " ,

others

h a v e c o n t i n u e d the D e r r i d e a n p r o j e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y as d e c o n s t r u c tion o f its past. T o cite the m o s t p r o m i n e n t

example, Jean-Luc

N a n c y (b. 1940) a c c e p t s D e r r i d a ' s v i e w that the l o g o c e n t r i s m defini n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l tradition is b o t h impossible a n d u n a v o i d a b l e , and

sets

out

to

understand

the

human

condition

through

its

c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h this p a r a d o x i c a l situation. For all its m o d e r n h u m a n i s t c o n n o t a t i o n s , the existentialist e x p r e s s i o n " h u m a n

con-

d i t i o n " is a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e b e c a u s e N a n c y explicitly u n d e r t a k e s a poststructuralist m e d i t a t i o n o n the classic S a r t r e a n t h e m e s o f existence, freedom, Sartre's

and

insistence

the

on

other.

the

48

According

priority

to

o f existence

Nancy, over

however, essence

is

a r g u e s that w e m u s t , rather, think simply in t e r m s

of

insufficiently r a d i c a l . Nancy

e x i s t e n c e , w i t h n o r e f e r e n c e at all to essence, e v e n in a s u b o r d i n a t e

4 8

N a n c y and R e n a u t seem to agree that Sartre's was the last major effort to philosophize in the traditional g r a n d manner, t h o u g h they differ on the lessons that follow from the failure of that effort. See A l a i n R e n a u t , Sartre, le dernierphilosophe. S e e i n g Sartre as even a significant part o f the philosophical past is a distinct a d v a n c e on the almost total eclipse his reputation suffered in France during the 1970s and 80s. For another e x a m p l e o f r e n e w e d interest in Sartre, see the recent b i o g r a p h y by B e r n a r d - H e n r i Levy, Le sucle de Sartre.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"? ontological

role.

constructing

an

Our

reality

essence

is n o t

through

a matter

its free

375

o f our

choices;

existence

it is

entirely

e n c o m p a s s e d b y existence itself. Sartre's p i c t u r e is o f h u m a n beings (consciousnesses) d e h n i n g t h e m s e l v e s (giving t h e m s e l v e s essences) b y c h o i c e s m a d e w i t h i n a w o r l d w i t h its " c o e f f i c i e n t

of

adversity",

c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the c a u s a l n e x u s against w h i c h f r e e d o m acts. B u t for N a n c y " f r e e d o m . . . does n o t designate a force o p p o s e d to or c o m b i n e d w i t h o t h e r forces o f n a t u r e " . O n the contrary, f r e e d o m " d e s i g n a t e s that f r o m w h i c h there c a n rise relations o f force as such, between human

beings and nature

and between h u m a n

beings

themselves. It is the force o f force in g e n e r a l , or the v e r y resistance o f the thing's e x i s t e n c e . "

4 9

W h e r e a s Sartre's o n t o l o g y distinguishes the

passive m a t e r i a l i t y o f the w o r l d

(being-in-itself)

f r o m the

active

actuality o f consciousness (being-for-itself), N a n c y sees existence as c o m b i n i n g w i t h i n its o w n non-self-identical reality the passivity o f m a t t e r a n d the a g e n c y o f consciousness. " A c c o r d i n g l y , [freedom] is a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l force, b u t o n e that is a m a t e r i a l a c t u a l i t y . . . P r i o r to e v e r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f matter, this m a t e r i a l i t y o f existence, w h i c h sets d o w n the fact o f f r e e d o m , is n o less e n d o w e d w i t h the m a t e r i a l p r o p e r t i e s o f exteriority a n d r e s i s t a n c e . " Nancy's project

ontological

eradication

of confronting

50

o f essence

us w i t h the

c o r r e s p o n d s to

consequences

o f the

end

his of

philosophy. B u t this c o n f r o n t a t i o n , he m a i n t a i n s , also o p e n s the w a y to a fruitful t r e a t m e n t o f c o m m u n i t y a n d the political that e s c a p e d existentialism. T h e o p e n i n g derives f r o m the fact that w e are all d e h n e d n o t b y e a c h constituting a distinct essence b u t b y o u r s h a r e d lack o f a n y essence at all. W e are all together, n o t b e c a u s e o f a n y c o m m o n essence b u t p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o f o u r s h a r e d l a c k o f any such essence. T h i s is N a n c y ' s starting p o i n t for a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t a c c o u n t o f c o m m u n i t y . T h i s a c c o u n t a r g u e s for a sense o f " t h e p o l i t i c a l " that is n o t r e d u c i b l e to " p o l i t i c s " . Politics, in this sense, is the effort to d e h n e a n d a c h i e v e the s h a r e d essence that w e lack. B u t this p r o j e c t - n o d o u b t at the h e a r t o f R e n a u t a n d Ferry's political t h e o r i z i n g — is precisely a d e n i a l o f w h a t N a n c y calls " t h e p o l i t i c a l " : the l i v i n g o f our s h a r e d l a c k o f e s s e n c e .

51

I n d e e d , N a n c y identihes

" w i c k e d n e s s " (in K a n t ' s sense o f " r a d i c a l evil") as the destruction o f the political b y p o l i t i c s . 4 9

5 1

5 2

52

The Experience ofFreedom, 102. The Experience of Freedom, 102, 103. N a n c y ' s major treatment of the political is in Communauté désoeuvrée. The Experience of Freedom, chapter 12. 5 0

37

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

6

Although

Derrideans

such as N a n c y

d o n o t share Ferry

and

R e n a u t ' s n e g a t i v e assessment o f H e i d e g g e r ' s influence o n F r e n c h philosophy, their t u r n to the political r e q u i r e d a serious r e t h i n k i n g of H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n l o y a l t y to the N a z i cause, p a r t i c u l a r l y g i v e n the intense c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r H e i d e g g e r ' s political activities that f o l l o w e d the p u b l i c a t i o n

in F r a n c e

o f the s h a r p l y critical b i o g r a p h i e s

by

V i c t o r Farias (1987) a n d H u g o O t t (1990). H e r e the w o r k o f N a n c y ' s c o l l e a g u e a n d c o l l a b o r a t o r , P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e (b. 1940), is c r u c i a l . L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e is c o n c e r n e d a b o v e all w i t h the distinction, at the v e r y origins o f W e s t e r n philosophy, b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y as a search for the truth o f reality a n d art (especially literature) as a m e r e " i m i t a t i o n " (mimesis) o f reality. O n his r e a d i n g , p h i l o s o p h y

uni-

f o r m l y insisted on this distinction until the late e i g h t e e n t h century, w h e n early G e r m a n r o m a n t i c s b e g a n q u e s t i o n i n g the s h a r p s e p a r a tion o f truth f r o m m i m e s i s .

5 3

L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e reads Heidegger's

d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c s as the m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t i n u a t i o n o f this q u e s t i o n i n g , b u t one that implicitly retains the old distinction t h r o u g h a p i c t u r e o f B e i n g as the " t y p e " o f w h i c h b e i n g s are the i n a d e q u a t e " t r a c e s " . T h i s residue o f the m i m e t i c m a k e s H e i d e g g e r ' s thought

susceptible

to

a political

aestheticism

that

regards

the

c o m m u n i t y as a " w o r k o f a r t " i m i t a t i n g the m o d e l laid d o w n b y its leader,

an

aestheticism

that is at the h e a r t

of N a z i

ideology.

54

L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e tries to c o n s t r u c t a n e w c o n c e p t i o n o f m i m e s i s that gives it p a r i t y w i t h truth, t h e r e b y a v o i d i n g the classic d i c h o t o m y that m a d e H e i d e g g e r susceptible to N a z i s m . T h e D e r r i d e a n focus o n historical studies, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r , has flourished a m o n g r e c e n t F r e n c h thinkers, e v e n those n o t entirely c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h D e r r i d a ' s p l a c e m e n t o f p h e n o m enology

at the

Henry,

and Jean-François C o u r t i n e ,

5 5

"end

of philosophy". Jean-Luc 5 6

Marion,

Michel

in particular, w h i l e attentive

a n d often s y m p a t h e t i c to the D e r r i d e a n s t a n d p o i n t , h a v e d e v e l o p e d strategies for c o n t i n u i n g the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l projects o f H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r . M a r i o n (b. 1946), for e x a m p l e , thinks that p h e n o m e n o l o g y r e q u i r e s a third " r e d u c t i o n " , u n d e r s t o o d as an access to w h a t is e x p e r i e n t i a l l y g i v e n . V i a Husserl's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e d u c t i o n w e are g i v e n objects, the m e a n i n g s o f w h i c h are constituted b y their 5 3

) 4

;>5

5 6

L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e a n d N a n c y d o c u m e n t this d e v e l o p m e n t in Absolu littéraire. See L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e a n d N a n c y , " T h e N a z i M y t h " . See his L'essence de la manifestation. See his Heidegger et la phénoménologie.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"?

377

relation to t r a n s c e n d e n t a l consciousness. V i a H e i d e g g e r ' s " e x i s t e n tial r e d u c t i o n " b e i n g s a r e g i v e n to Dasein, the b e i n g t h r o u g h w h i c h B e i n g itself is r e v e a l e d . A c c o r d i n g to M a r i o n , e a c h o f these r e d u c tions c o r r e s p o n d s to m e r e l y o n e limited aspect o f w h a t is g i v e n (the g i v e n as m e a n i n g f u l , the g i v e n as existing). M a r i o n ' s third r e d u c t i o n p u r p o r t s to give n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n givenness (or the gift) itself. T h e " o b j e c t " o f the r e d u c t i o n is b e y o n d m e a n i n g , e v e n b e y o n d b e i n g , a sheer givenness that is n o t h i n g b u t a call for us to r e s p o n d to its givenness:

"the pure

form

o f the c a l l " .

Correspondingly,

the

" s u b j e c t " o f this third r e d u c t i o n is n e i t h e r a n e g o n o r a b e i n g - i n - t h e w o r l d (Dasein) b u t " t h e p u r e preceded important construal

a n d simple h g u r e

a n d instituted b y the c a l l " . hgure

in C a t h o l i c

of phenomenology

5 7

theology,

[of] an auditor

M a r i o n , w h o is also a n is p r e p a r e d

in a religious

t o take his

direction,

ultimately

identifying the call o f g i v e n n e s s w i t h the offered gift o f a G o d w h o , a l t h o u g h h e exists, is " w i t h o u t b e i n g " .

5 8

M a r i o n h a s also d e v e l o p e d

his t h o u g h t t h r o u g h close a n d i m a g i n a t i v e studies o f D e s c a r t e s .

5 9

A n i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t c u r r e n t in F r e n c h t h o u g h t is o n e that allies itself w i t h the i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t o f analytic philosophy. H e r e the m a i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e is J a c q u e s B o u v e r e s s e , w h o is often seen as the quintessential outsider o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y - a p o s i t i o n neatly a c c e p t e d in the title o f his article

" W h y I A m So Very

U n F r e n c h " , d e n o u n c i n g poststructuralist o b s c u r a n t i s m a n d l a u d i n g the virtues o f clarity a n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e r i g o r .

60

B u t h e h a s also

b e c o m e a n i m p o r t a n t F r e n c h intellectual h g u r e , as is a p p a r e n t in his r e c e n t (1995) e l e c t i o n to the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e . N o r is B o u v e r e s s e entirely w i t h o u t p r e d e c e s s o r s . H i s o w n intellectual l i n e a g e is t r a c e able t h r o u g h G . - G . G r a n g e r (b. 1920) a n d Jules V u i l l e m i n (b. 1920), w h o s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l interests a n d style are m u c h closer to analytic t h a n to existentialist o r poststructuralist philosophy, a n d w h o s e w o r k c a n , m o r e o v e r , b e seen as c o n t i n u a t i o n s o f a F r e n c h tradition o f logic a n d p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s that e x t e n d s f r o m L o u i s 5 7

5 8

5 9

6 0

Couturat

Reduction and Givenness, 204. J e a n - L u c M a r i o n , Dieu sans l'être. T h e religious ramifications of p h e n o m e n o l o g y are also pursued b y M i c h e l H e n r y and Jean-François C o u r t i n e . See D o m i n i q u e J a n i c a u d , Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française. See his Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes a n d Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. See in particular his La philosophie chez les autophages a n d Rationalité et cynisme. W h i l e Bouveresse's objections to the often pretentious a n d u n f a t h o m a b l e style o f poststructuralist philosophers is surely o n target, his arguments that their k e y claims c a n be readily dismissed as self-refuting forms o f relativism or skepticism d o n o t seem to m e to b e b a s e d on sufficiently careful readings o f their texts.

Structuralism and Beyond (i960—1990)

378 (1868—1914)

to

Jean

(1908-31), and Jean

Nicod Cavaillès

(1893—1924), (1903-44).

61

Jacques

Herbrand

However,

this

"indi-

g e n o u s " line o f F r e n c h a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y n e v e r b e c a m e seriously tied to the w i d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t a n d r e m a i n e d a distinctly m i n o r force w i t h i n F r a n c e , p a r t l y b e c a u s e o f the early d e a t h s o f its m a i n representatives d u r i n g the first h a l f o f the c e n t u r y .

62

M u c h o f B o u v e r e s s e ' s earlier w o r k w a s o n W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d c o m bined

perceptive

exposition

and

commentary

with

creative

re-

thinking of fundamental problems of epistemology and philosophy o f m i n d f r o m a b r o a d l y W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p e r s p e c t i v e . M o r e recently, he

has

placed

h i m s e l f in

the

line

of what

he

calls

"Austrian

p h i l o s o p h y " , a s e q u e n c e b e g i n n i n g w i t h B o l z a n o ' s critique o f K a n t a n d p r o c e e d i n g — on a p a t h that a v o i d e d the p o s t - K a n t i a n idealism a n d existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m w h i c h p o s t w a r F r e n c h philo s o p h y arose -

through Brentano

a n d M e i n o n g to Schlick,

V i e n n a circle, a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n . B o u v e r e s s e sees this

the

Continental

line o f analytic p h i l o s o p h y ( s u p p l e m e n t e d , for ethical a n d political perspectives, b y R o b e r t M u s i l , for w h o s e t h o u g h t B o u v e r e s s e has an e x t r a o r d i n a r y affinity a n d r e v e r e n c e ) as the m o s t fruitful basis for c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . H i s m a i n c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s are

to

d e v e l o p a c o h e r e n t realist a c c o u n t o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d truth a n d to e x t e n d his t h o u g h t to ethical a n d political issues. B o u v e r e s s e has n o t y e t s u c c e e d e d in establishing a strong school of French

analytic

philosophers,

although

there

are

a

greater

n u m b e r o f y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s setting out o n the analytic p a t h . In r e c e n t years the C e n t r e de R e c h e r c h e en E p i s t é m o l o g i e A p p l i q u é e ( C R E A ) at the E c o l e P o l y t e c h n i q u e has g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r a n u m b e r o f analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s w i t h special interests in p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d b a s e d on c o g n i t i v e science. P e r h a p s the best k n o w n is P a s c a l E n g e l (now a professor at the S o r b o n n e ) , w h o s e b o o k in d i a l o g u e f o r m , La dispute, is a lively i n t r o d u c t i o n to analytic philosophy. It r e m a i n s to be seen w h e t h e r there will e m e r g e a relatively unified, distinctively F r e n c h a n a l y t i c school or w h e t h e r F r e n c h analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s will

e l

6 2

V u i l l e m i n is a historian o f p h i l o s o p h y w h o has written i m p o r t a n t books on Descartes and K a n t a n d has also written on Russell, G o o d m a n , a n d C a r n a p . His major study of philosophical systems, Nécessité ou contingence, makes extensive use of c o n t e m p o r a r y m o d a l logic. G r a n g e r works on the philosophy o f science a n d o f language, and he published the first French b o o k on Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein). For some helpful b a c k g r o u n d on analytic philosophy in France, see Pascal Engel. " C o n t e m p o r a r y French A n a l y t i c P h i l o s o p h y " , in A . Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Contemporary French Philosophy.

Fin-de-siècle again: "le temps retrouvé"? remain

individual

contributors

to

debates

that

379

are

dehned

by

A n g l o - A m e r i c a n interests. In a n y case, e v e n p h i l o s o p h e r s n o t c o m m i t t e d to an

analytic

p r o g r a m h a v e e x h i b i t e d a c o n c e r n for clarity a n d for c o m m u n i c a t i o n across the C h a n n e l a n d the A t l a n t i c w h i c h w a s for m a n y y e a r s in short s u p p l y a m o n g F r e n c h thinkers. S o , for e x a m p l e , r e a d i n g the professionally c o o l a n d l u c i d p r o s e o f R e n a u t a n d Ferry p r o d u c e s a distinct feeling that the stylistic fever, w h i c h has so l o n g r a v a g e d the Left B a n k , has finally b e g u n to b r e a k . M o r e o v e r , they a n d o t h e r liberal political p h i l o s o p h e r s are directly e n g a g e d in d i a l o g u e w i t h A n g l o p h o n e liberal political thinkers such as J o h n R a w l s . In a n o t h e r v e i n , M i c h è l e L e D o e u f f (b. 1946), a p h i l o s o p h e r o f science w i t h strong feminist c o m m i t m e n t s , is e q u a l l y at h o m e discussing British empiricist t h o u g h t (e.g., that o f Francis B a c o n ) a n d d e v e l o p i n g an a c u t e m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l critique o f Sartre t h r o u g h reflections o n his relationship w i t h B e a u v o i r — a n d a l w a y s in accessible a n d directly effective

prose. H e r w o r k

continues

the tradition

of

Bachelard,

w h i c h is the u l t i m a t e origin o f h e r c e n t r a l u n d e r t a k i n g to articulate the i m a g e s that d o m i n a t e systems o f scientihc a n d

philosophical

t h o u g h t , b u t d e v e l o p s it in a m a n n e r that c a n readily e n g a g e A n g l o American philosophers.

63

For the last t w e n t y - h v e y e a r s or so, observers o f the F r e n c h scene have been

a w a i t i n g the arrival o f the n e x t S a r t r e , F o u c a u l t ,

or

D e r r i d a - a n e w m a s t e r - t h i n k e r w h o w o u l d erect the b a r r i c a d e s o f the

next

frustrated

French

philosophical

hopes have

revolution.

given w a y

Recently,

to the c o n c l u s i o n

these that

longFrench

p h i l o s o p h y is s i m p l y in a fallow p e r i o d . W r i t i n g the history o f the v e r y r e c e n t p a s t runs a h i g h risk o f disdain f r o m future g e n e r a t i o n s , w h o m a y w e l l smile at o u r failure to see the o b v i o u s greatness o f s o m e n a m e w e h a v e p a s s e d over lightly or n o t e v e n m e n t i o n e d . B u t w e should also r e m e m b e r that g o o d p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t r e q u i r e g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d that o u r r o m a n t i c m o d e l o f h e r o i c masterthinkers m a y itself n o t h a v e an e t e r n a l future. In a n y case, there are g o o d r e a s o n s to think that, at the e n d o f the t w e n t i e t h

century,

F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y r e t u r n e d to the k i n d o f c o m p e t e n t stability that c h a r a c t e r i z e d the p r e v i o u s h n - d e - s i è c l e , a n d in that t h o u g h t there is, if n o t h i n g else, a p l e a s a n t symmetry.

6 3

See, in particular, Recherches sur l'imaginaire philosophique, Étude et le rouet, a n d Le sexe du savoir.

Conclusion: the philosophy of freedom

. . . that sense of relief which one has in reading K a n t when, after the most rigorous demonstration of determinism, one finds that above the world of necessity there is the world of freedom. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, m, 654) In l o o k i n g b a c k o v e r m y a c c o u n t o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, I h a v e b e e n struck b y the centrality o f discussions o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . O f c o u r s e , this focus m a y h a v e b e e n

the

u n c o n s c i o u s result o f m y o w n p r e d i l e c t i o n s , a n d there surely are o t h e r t h e m e s (perhaps consciousness or science) that w o u l d n i c e l y unify the story. B u t it is h a r d to d e n y that F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the last h u n d r e d years h a v e p r o d u c e d a r e m a r k a b l y b r o a d a n d

deep

b o d y o f w o r k o n f r e e d o m , a n d , b y w a y o f c o n c l u s i o n , I offer s o m e b r i e f reflections on the g e n e r a l significance o f this t h e m e a n d o n the w a y it has d e v e l o p e d over the century. T h e c o n c e r n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m as a c o n c r e t e , l i v e d reality has,

more

than

a n y t h i n g else, m a i n t a i n e d

the

distinctiveness

of

F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g h o u t the century. It lay b e h i n d the F r e n c h resistance to G e r m a n i d e a l i s m , w h i c h w a s a l w a y s r e a d as t e n d i n g to s w a m p i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m in the focus

on f r e e d o m

sophers

from

also

flood

o f the absolute.

e x p l a i n s the insulation

epistemological

foundationalism,

of French whether

The

philothat

of

Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " p h i l o s o p h y as a r i g o r o u s s c i e n c e " or that o f l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s m . F r o m B e r g s o n t h r o u g h the existentialists to the poststructuralists, i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n

freedom

r a d i c a l starting-point that r e q u i r e d n o p h i l o s o p h i c a l

w a s itself a foundation.

T h e focus o n f r e e d o m did c o n v e r g e w i t h certain t h e m e s o f H e g e l , Husserl a n d , especially, H e i d e g g e r . B u t , as w e h a v e seen, it also restricted thought.

French Hegel

interest

was

to

quite

exciting w h e n

380

specific he

aspects

concretized

of

German

his

dialectic

The philosophy of freedom through

historical

perspectives

on

the

381

vicissitudes

of

human

f r e e d o m , b u t n o t w h e n h e s u b s u m e d i n d i v i d u a l s into the absolute's synthesis. T h e realist thrust o f Husserl's d o c t r i n e o f intentionality a n d the c o n c r e t e richness o f his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions w e r e fascinating, b u t the F r e n c h h a d n o interest in the aspects o f his t h o u g h t that t e n d e d to f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m

a n d idealism.

Heidegger

l o o m e d l a r g e for the d r a m a t i c anti-idealist vision in Being and Time o f Dasein t h r o w n into the w o r l d , b u t there w a s little c h a r m in his l a r g e r ontological project. T h e French importation o f G e r m a n philosophy w a s a m a t t e r n o t o f translation b u t o f selective a p p r o p r i a t i o n . Individual

freedom,

particularly

since

it w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y a p -

p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e , l e d to strong c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d literature. It is n o a c c i d e n t that t w o o f France's

leading

philosophers,

Bergson

a n d Sartre,

have

been

a w a r d e d the N o b e l P r i z e for literature (although Sartre refused it). Since Bergson, almost every major French philosopher has h a d a distinctive p h i l o s o p h i c a l identity as a r e a d e r if n o t also a w r i t e r o f literature. C o n v e r s e l y , there is r e a s o n to think that c o n c e r n s a b o u t f r e e d o m h e l p e d m o t i v a t e the b r a n c h i n g off o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y o f science as a n a u t o n o m o u s subdiscipline (and the similar s e p a r a t i n g o f the positivist social sciences). T h e s e splits e x p r e s s e d in m e t h o d o logical t e r m s a c o m m i t m e n t to the i r r e d u c i b i l i t y o f f r e e d o m in the face o f scientihc d e t e r m i n i s m . A c c o r d i n g l y , the p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a i n s t r e a m , after B e r g s o n a n d B r u n s c h v i c g , t u r n e d a w a y f r o m questions that science m i g h t p o s e or answer. T h i s l e d to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the

history

and philosophy

of natural

science,

particularly

by

B a c h e l a r d a n d C a n g u i l h e m , as a n essentially a u t o n o m o u s subdiscipline. M a i n l i n e p h i l o s o p h e r s a c k n o w l e d g e d its a u t h o r i t y in its o w n d o m a i n , a n d s o m e (notably A l t h u s s e r a n d Foucault) d r e w o n s o m e o f its results for their

o w n purposes.

But no major

hgure

was a

p h i l o s o p h e r o f n a t u r a l science. T h e social sciences, insofar as they aspired to b e r i g o r o u s e m p i r i c a l disciplines, b e c a m e further a n d further s e p a r a t e d f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y in w h i c h t h e y h a d their roots. P h i l o s o p h e r s t h e m s e l v e s m a i n t a i n e d a n interest p r i m a r i l y in the less e m p i r i c a l , " h u m a n i s t i c " d o m a i n s o f social science, such as p s y c h o analysis a n d ethnology. T h e b r i e f u p s u r g e o f fascination w i t h the structuralist social sciences doubtiess i n v o l v e d a t t r a c t i o n to a n a u r a o f rigor s u r r o u n d i n g their p e n c h a n t for t e c h n i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y a n d f o r m a l i z a t i o n . B u t , as w e h a v e seen, b o t h the r i g o r a n d p h i l o s o p h e r s ' a t t r a c t i o n to it p r o v e d s u p e r h c i a l . T h e scientihc (and scientistic)

Conclusion

382

t e n d e n c i e s that m o t i v a t e d m u c h a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y w e r e p r e s e n t in F r a n c e , b u t t h e y w e r e c h a n n e l e d a l o n g p a t h s outside o f philosophy. (This, h o w e v e r , is n o t to d e n y that m u c h F r e n c h social science, f r o m D ü r k h e i m t h r o u g h L é v i - S t r a u s s to B o u r d i e u , has h a d m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l significance.) T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l r o o t o f the F r e n c h focus o n f r e e d o m w a s its distinctive n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , spiritualism. Initially, spiritualism w a s a p h i l o s o p h y to c o m p l e m e n t an optimistic b o u r g e o i s

Catholicism,

for w h i c h h u m a n life w a s a m a t t e r o f i n d i v i d u a l s freely w o r k i n g out their salvation in a c o m f o r t a b l e

s o c i o - e c o n o m i c w o r l d itself e m -

b e d d e d in a p r o v i d e n t i a l l y b e n e v o l e n t c o s m o s . In the course o f the century, b o t h the religion a n d the o p t i m i s m lost their c e n t r a l p l a c e in F r e n c h t h o u g h t , b u t there r e m a i n e d the focus o n

understanding

i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m a n d o n c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e as the locus o f this understanding. T h e ultimate e x p l a n a t i o n o f this e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m m a y w e l l lie in F r a n c e ' s religious a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y h e r i t a g e . B u t the specific i n s t r u m e n t o f transmission for this h e r i t a g e w a s the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a t i o n a l system. H e r e the t w o salient features o f this system w e r e its c e n t r a l i s m a n d its institutionalism. A l m o s t

every

i m p o r t a n t F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r w a s t r a i n e d in Paris, a n d o f those, the g r e a t m a j o r i t y studied at the E c o l e N o r m a l e . Further, this e d u c a t i o n w a s d o m i n a t e d b y the institutional d e m a n d s o f the lycée 's classe de philosophie, i m p l e m e n t e d b y the c r u c i a l agrégation e x a m i n a t i o n . P h i l o sophers w e r e t r a i n e d to b e p u r v e y o r s o f a syllabus; a n d it w a s this syllabus,

with

its

emphasis

on

French

philosophy

(and

French

interpretations o f n o n - F r e n c h classics) that t r a n s m i t t e d the e m p h a s i s on i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m as the c o r e o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . T h e F r e n c h c e n t e r i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a t i o n a r o u n d a historical syllabus contrasts w i t h the A n g l o - A m e r i c a n a n d the

German

m o d e l s c o n t e m p o r a r y w i t h it. T h e analytic p h i l o s o p h y d o m i n a n t in the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g w o r l d p r o d u c e d solvers o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b lems, g u i d e d m u c h less b y their f o r m a t i o n i n a n a t i o n a l tradition or in the m o r e g e n e r a l history o f p h i l o s o p h y t h a n b y their c o n c e p t u a l quickness a n d i m a g i n a t i o n . G e r m a n p h i l o s o p h y f a v o r e d history over p r o b l e m s , b u t initiated the y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r into a tradition as the disciple

of one

o f its master-thinkers.

Twentieth-century

French

p h i l o s o p h y p r o d u c e d its share o f m a s t e r - t h i n k e r s , b u t t h e y t y p i c a l l y r e m a i n e d at s o m e distance f r o m the university system, either, like B e r g s o n , M e r l e a u - P o n t y , a n d F o u c a u l t , m o v i n g to the C o l l è g e de

The philosophy of freedom

383

F r a n c e or, like M a r c e l , S a r t r e , a n d B e a u v o i r , o p e r a t i n g as i n d e p e n d e n t intellectuals. T h e l e i t m o t i v o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m is o b v i o u s f r o m the b e g i n n i n g in the spiritualism o f R a v a i s s o n , the h n a l i s m o f L a c h e l i e r , a n d the indeterminism

of

Renouvier

and

of

Boutroux.

Lachelier

and

B o u t r o u x , in particular, are c o n c e r n e d to m a k e sense o f f r e e d o m in the c o n t e x t o f a w o r l d o f scientihc causality. T h e y insist f r o m the outset o n f r e e d o m as a fact, b u t their focus is n o t o n e x p l i c a t i n g the fact in its o w n t e r m s b u t o n h n d i n g a p l a c e for it in a g e n e r a l o n t o l o g i c a l s c h e m e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a scientihc w o r l d v i e w .

Thus

L a c h e l i e r , after establishing that a k n o w a b l e w o r l d m u s t b e a system o f efficient causes, g o e s o n to a r g u e that this system itself m u s t , for p a r a l l e l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e a s o n s , b e e m b e d d e d in a m o r e

concrete

system o f h n a l causes. T h i s latter system is the l o c u s o f the creative goals o f a c t i o n in t e r m s o f w h i c h L a c h e l i e r u n d e r s t a n d s f r e e d o m . B o u t r o u x , h o w e v e r , a r g u e s that L a c h e l i e r ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e system o f efficient causes c a n n o t consistently m e s h w i t h the h n a l i t y o f free agents. R e f e r r i n g to o u r e x p e r i e n c e

o f the m o r a l s i g n i h c a n c e

of

f r e e d o m , he m a i n t a i n s that f r e e d o m is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h universal causal

determinism

and

concludes

that

its

reality

requires

an

i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c universe. H i s m u l t i - l a y e r e d analysis o f the v a r i o u s f o r m s o f necessity claims to discover, b e n e a t h

e v e r y necessity, a

fundamental contingency. The

disagreement

between

Lachelier

and Boutroux

is, to

an

i m p o r t a n t e x t e n t , an instance o f the classic division b e t w e e n c o m p a tibilism (so-called soft d e t e r m i n i s m ) a n d l i b e r t a r i a n i s m . C o n t e m p o rary

analytic

philosophy

has t a k e n this dispute

to the

limit

of

c o n c e p t u a l r i g o r a n d ingenuity, s e e k i n g to r e c o n c i l e , u n d e r o n e or the

other

banner,

our

common-sense

"intuitions"

regarding

f r e e d o m . C a n the c o m p a t i b i l i s t , w h o thinks free actions are causally d e t e r m i n e d , do j u s t i c e to o u r sense that a free a c t i o n is one that I c o u l d h a v e d o n e o t h e r w i s e ? C a n the l i b e r t a r i a n , w h o thinks free actions m u s t b e u n c a u s e d , m a k e sense o f o u r b e l i e f that there are a l w a y s e x p l a n a t i o n s o f w h y I act as I do? W i t h o u t losing all interest in the p r o g r e s s o f this still lively discussion, w e m a y w e l l w o r r y that it is n o t

sufficiently

concreteness

and

grounded nuance

of

in

an

our

adequate lived

description

experience

of

of

the

freedom.

P e r h a p s the c o m m o n - s e n s e intuitions f r o m w h i c h it seeks to e x t r a c t a finally a d e q u a t e solution to the " p r o b l e m o f f r e e d o m " are not u l t i m a t e l y reliable

guides to the p h e n o m e n o n .

A t the least,

we

Conclusion

384

should a c k n o w l e d g e that a full u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f r e e d o m is likely to r e q u i r e e x p e r i e n t i a l descriptions as c o m p l e x a n d subtle as the a n a lytic c o n c e p t u a l clarifications. B e r g s o n , the greatest figure o f the early p e r i o d , b e g i n s w i t h such

descriptions in his Essai sur les données immédiates de conscience. A s w e h a v e seen, h e t h o u g h t that the c o n c r e t e reality o f f r e e d o m u n d e r m i n e d the p r e m i s e s h a r e d b y b o t h sides o f t h e libertarian—determi¬ nist d e b a t e : that the free self is a series o f distinct p s y c h o l o g i c a l states that a r e (or e v e n c o u l d be) c a u s a l l y c o n n e c t e d . T o the contrary, a c c o r d i n g to B e r g s o n , the self is a n o r g a n i c c o n t i n u i t y o f d u r a t i o n that c a n n o t , e x c e p t b y a m i s l e a d i n g a b s t r a c t i o n , b e d i v i d e d

into

distinct states. Its f r e e d o m , t h e r e f o r e , is n o t a m a t t e r o f the d e t e r m i nation

or indétermination

o f its states b u t o f its c r e a t i v e

self-

e x t e n s i o n into a n o v e l future. A l t h o u g h , unlike his K a n t i a n p r e d e c e s s o r s , B e r g s o n starts f r o m a careful description o f o u r i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m , h e still follows t h e m in p l a c i n g this e x p e r i e n c e in the c o n t e x t o f a l a r g e r m e t a p h y s i c a l s c h e m e . H i s s u b s e q u e n t b o o k s situate the l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f d u r a t i o n in relation t o , successively, the g e n e r a l u n i o n o f m i n d a n d body, the c o s m i c force o f the élan vital, a n d the c o n n e c t i o n o f this force to the divine. T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n o f descriptive c o n c r e t e ness a n d systematic scope is o n e o f t h e signal merits that

make

Bergson a great philosopher. T h e iconoclasm of the y o u n g philosophers w h o emerged between the w a r s did n o t e x t e n d to their p r e d e c e s s o r s ' focus o n f r e e d o m , w h i c h t h e y did n o t reject b u t r a t h e r intensified. T h e C a t h o l i c s , B l o n d e l a n d M a r c e l , situated f r e e d o m in the c o n c r e t e w o r l d o f lived experience and practical action. (And even Maritain's n e o - T h o m i s m led to a defense

o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s political f r e e d o m . )

Atheistic

existentialism w e n t e v e n further, r a d i c a l i z i n g f r e e d o m b y u n d e r m i n i n g the objective m e a n i n g s a n d v a l u e s to w h i c h it w a s t r a d i t i o n ally s u b o r d i n a t e d . N o n e t h e l e s s , the y o u n g existential p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o e m e r g e d in the 1920s a n d 1930s d i d n o t find B e r g s o n ' s vision c o m p e l l i n g . W e s a w h o w M e r l e a u - P o n t y r e j e c t e d his d e s c r i p t i o n o f o u r lived e x p e r i e n c e

of freedom

essential p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

o n the g r o u n d s that it ignores

structures, such as the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t

differentiation a n d the three i r r e d u c i b l e t e m p o r a l modalities. N o r , o f c o u r s e , is it m e r e l y B e r g s o n a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y w h o disagree over the c o n t e n t o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e . E v e n w i t h i n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c a m p , Sartre's descriptions differ f r o m M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s in at

The philosophy of freedom

385

least s o m e significant details; a n d w e saw h o w M a r c e l (and, b e f o r e h i m , Blondel) f o u n d essential d i m e n s i o n s o f h o p e , c o m m u n i t y , a n d t r a n s c e n d e n c e that h a d n o p l a c e in Sartre's a n d phenomenologies.

Broadening

our

temporal

Merleau-Ponty's

and

geographical

h o r i z o n will, o f c o u r s e , l e a d to a m u c h w i d e r r a n g e o f c h a r a c t e r i z a tions o f w h a t w e m o s t directly e x p e r i e n c e ; for e x a m p l e , the classical sense-data a c c o u n t o f H u m e a n d the positivists, R e i d ' s

common-

sense realism, e v e n the p a n t h e i s t i c sensibility o f certain mystics — a n d w i t h these w e r e m a i n w i t h i n o u r o w n W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n , t a k i n g n o a c c o u n t o f the lived e x p e r i e n c e s o f less accessible cultures. It m i g h t be m a i n t a i n e d

that this diversity m e r e l y s h o w s

how

c o m p l e x m u s t be the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o j e c t o f d i s c o v e r i n g j u s t w h a t is g i v e n in i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e . B u t c a n w e in fact e v e n i m a g i n e c a r r y i n g out this p r o j e c t ? R e c e n t p h i l o s o p h y o n b o t h sides o f the C h a n n e l has d e v a s t a t e d the i d e a that i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e is an epistemic g i v e n that c a n serve as the ultimate g r o u n d o f o u r cognitive structures. I suggest that the v e r y i d e a o f a u n i q u e e x p e r i e n t i a l g i v e n is e q u a l l y v u l n e r a b l e - a n d to m a n y o f the s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . For e x a m p l e , the critiques o f the i d e a o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - f r e e o b s e r v a t i o n , c o m b i n e d w i t h a r g u m e n t s for the historically c o n t i n g e n t n a t u r e of interpretative c a t e g o r i e s , refute n o t o n l y f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m b u t also the c l a i m to h a v e d i s c o v e r e d the u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r o f i m m e d i a t e experience. A c c o r d i n g l y , there is n o p o i n t in t r y i n g to d e t e r m i n e a u n i q u e l y correct description of our lived experience. Experiential immediacy is a w e l l f r o m w h i c h m a n y b u c k e t s m a y draw. T h e

"immediate

givens o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " are an irrefutable a n d i n e v i t a b l e

starting

p o i n t o f a n y inquiry. B u t w h i l e the sheer e x p e r i e n c e itself is certainly g i v e n , n o p r e f e r r e d or c o n t r o l l i n g d e s c r i p t i o n or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f it is. E x p e r i e n c e c a n b e r e a d in m a n y different w a y s , e a c h w i t h its o w n plausibility, self-consistency, a n d limitations. S o m e o f these r e a d i n g s m a y b e m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , b u t m a n y are literally consistent, tensions arising o n l y w h e n w e ask w h i c h is the m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e or m o s t c o n c r e t e . It is these latter questions I suggest w e eschew, at least in their g e n e r a l f o r m . O n the w h o l e , questions o f superiority m a k e sense o n l y g i v e n a specihc c o n t e x t , p e r s p e c t i v e , or p u r p o s e . E x p e r i e n c e as such is n o d o u b t a n a b s o l u t e , b u t there is n o t h i n g absolute that follows f r o m it. T h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n to suspect that, for

a

domain

as

complex

and

elusive

as

experience,

no

one

f o r m u l a t i o n will be c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y a n d e x h a u s t i v e l y a d e q u a t e . In

Conclusion

386

a p p r e c i a t i n g a n d e v a l u a t i n g the g r e a t p h i l o s o p h i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e , w e should r a t h e r think, in N i e t z s c h e a n t e r m s , o f e a c h as a p a r t i c u l a r v o c a b u l a r y , w i t h its o w n strengths a n d limitations, w h i c h w e

can

e x p e c t to b e o f v a r y i n g v a l u e for different p u r p o s e s . In this r e g a r d , p h i l o s o p h i e s are like novels, n o t alternative absolutes a m o n g w h i c h w e m u s t c h o o s e the " r i g h t o n e " b u t different p e r s p e c t i v a l visions (perhaps c o m p l e m e n t a r y , b u t p e r h a p s i n c o m p a t i b l e or e v e n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e ) , all o f w h i c h h a v e their relative v a l u e s a n d uses. F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , the n e w p h i l o s o p h i e s o f existence that arose in F r a n c e after W o r l d W a r I r e p r e s e n t n o t a refutation o f B e r g s o n b u t an e x p l o r a t i o n o f n e w aspects o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m , aspects that c a m e to the fore in virtue o f a n e w o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d h u m a n existence. Specifically, the p h i l o s o p h e r s o f existence w e r e n o l o n g e r c o n t e n t w i t h B e r g s o n ' s optimistic h o l i s m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h o u r species is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h n a t u r e a n d assured a c e n t r a l role in its creative a d v a n c e . T h e y s o u g h t instead a p h i l o s o p h y consistent w i t h their

tragic

contingency

vision

of

human

a n d conflict,

beings

in w h i c h

thrown

into

a

world

salvation r e q u i r e s either

of the

intrusion o f divine g r a c e or o u r o w n c r e a t i o n o f a u t h e n t i c m e a n i n g s . This transformation

o f vision is n o t a refutation

of Bergson's

philosophy, b e c a u s e p h i l o s o p h i e s are i n s t r u m e n t s for f o c u s i n g a n d e l a b o r a t i n g f u n d a m e n t a l visions o f the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , n o t f o u n dationalist justifications o f such visions. W e i n e v i t a b l y b e g i n w i t h f u n d a m e n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e s on o u r lives that t h e m s e l v e s define w h a t w e r e q u i r e o f o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection. Past p h i l o s o p h i e s

are

r e l e v a n t or i r r e l e v a n t to o u r c o n c e r n s d e p e n d i n g on the d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e y share o u r f u n d a m e n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e s . T h e y o u n g p h i l o s o p h e r s o f existence s h a r e d their n e o - K a n t i a n t e a c h e r s ' c o m m i t m e n t to the centrality o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m a n d , at least in the case of Sartre,

even

their

commitment

to

situating

this f r e e d o m

in

a

c o m p r e h e n s i v e o n t o l o g i c a l s c h e m e . T h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e differed f r o m that o f the n e o - K a n t i a n s a n d a g r e e d w i t h B e r g s o n ' s in its d e m a n d for a detailed p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p l i c a t i o n o f o u r c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m . B u t their e x p l i c a t i o n o f this e x p e r i e n c e w a s d r i v e n b y their o w n distinctive tragic vision o f h u m a n existence. T h e split b e t w e e n theistic

and

atheistic

existentialism

turned

on

pre-philosophical

differences r e g a r d i n g the u l t i m a t e absoluteness o f h u m a n f r e e d o m . T h e g r e a t a c h i e v e m e n t o f F r e n c h existentialism is its p e n e t r a t i n g descriptions o f j u s t w h a t it m e a n s to be free in a w o r l d in w h i c h w e are, n o n e t h e l e s s , so i n t e g r a l l y i m p l i c a t e d that w e m u s t speak o f o u r

The philosophy of freedom

387

b e i n g as " b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l c i " . S a r t r e is the p h i l o s o p h e r o f f r e e d o m p a r e x c e l l e n c e , n o t o n l y for the u n p a r a l l e l e d detail a n d subtlety o f his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l descriptions a n d o n t o l o g i c a l e x p l i c a t i o n s o f it, b u t also for his c o n t i n u i n g struggle to e m b e d it in the realities o f society a n d history. It is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e S a r t r e b r i n g s t h i n k i n g a b o u t f r e e d o m to a p e a k o f intensity that h e r e m a i n s the c e n t r a l F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r o f this century. H i s L'être et le néant, w h a t e v e r the limitations o f its o n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s , p r o v i d e s a p o w e r f u l a c c o u n t o f o u r l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f f r e e d o m as a n i r r e d u c i b l e reality in o u r e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d . A n d all his w o r k , b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d literary, e v e n if it d o e s n o t a c h i e v e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e vision,

establishes

the centrality

of freedom

as a m o r a l

ethical value.

M e r l e a u - P o n t y 's a p p r e c i a t i o n o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t p r o v i d e s a n essential

correction

to the dualistic

tendencies

o f Sartre's

ontology.

B e a u v o i r ' s Deuxième sexe g o e s e v e n further, d e s c r i b i n g the s i g n i h c a n c e o f f e m a l e e m b o d i m e n t as a b i o l o g i c a l a n d historical reality a n d c o n n e c t i n g it to a specihc ethical a n d political project. W e m a y readily q u e s t i o n details o f these descriptions a n d , e v e n m o r e , the n e t w o r k o f o n t o l o g i c a l a n d political c o m m i t m e n t s to w h i c h Sartre a n d c o m p a n y c o n n e c t e d t h e m . B u t n o o n e w h o seeks a p h i l o s o p h y o f f r e e d o m r o o t e d in the c o n c r e t e n e s s o f daily life should i g n o r e the rich starting-point the existentialists h a v e p r o v i d e d . We

have

seen

that

what

often

appears

as a n o v e r t h r o w

of

existentialism f r o m the outside b y structuralism in fact o r i g i n a t e d , in the w o r k o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y , f r o m the i n t e r n a l logic o f existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y . U n l e s s it r e c o g n i z e s h u m a n structures (social a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ) inaccessible to consciousness, p h e n o m e n o l o g y c a n n o t a v o i d c o l l a p s i n g into idealism. A c c o r d i n g l y , p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l experience requires supplementation by "ethnological experience", of which

Lévi-Strauss's

structuralism w a s a p a r a d i g m

example. As

M e r l e a u - P o n t y s a w it, a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f r e e d o m , o n e that a v o i d e d a n u n a c c e p t a b l e g a p b e t w e e n subject a n d o b j e c t , r e q u i r e d a synthesis o f these t w o p e r s p e c t i v e s . Sartre's o w n responses to L é v i Strauss a n d F o u c a u l t , as w e l l as the o n t o l o g y o f Critique de la raison dialectique, s h o w that h e also a c c e p t e d the n e e d for such a synthesis. W h y t h e n d i d structuralism c o m e to b e instead r e g a r d e d as a stark alternative to existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y ? A hrst l e v e l o f e x p l a n a t i o n lies in the rivalry b e t w e e n L é v i - S t r a u s s a n d Sartre for the p o s i t i o n o f r e i g n i n g F r e n c h master-thinker. L é v i - S t r a u s s ' s explicit,

sometimes

virulent c h a l l e n g e to Sartre's d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n (as in the c o n c l u d i n g

Conclusion

388

c h a p t e r o f La pensée sauvage) left n o r o o m for c o o p e r a t i v e inquiry. If M e r l e a u - P o n t y , w i t h his close ties to L é v i - S t r a u s s , h a d lived l o n g e n o u g h a n d s u c c e e d e d Sartre (whose interests w e r e b e c o m i n g m u c h less p h i l o s o p h i c a l ) as the l e a d i n g existential p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t , the relations b e t w e e n structuralism a n d p h e n o m e n o l o g y m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n v e r y different. M o r e o v e r , w i t h the d e a t h o f M e r l e a u - P o n t y a n d Sartre's relative w i t h d r a w a l f r o m philosophy, the vitality o f F r e n c h p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s s a p p e d a n d its e n e r g y f l o w e d into the

new

poststructuralist d i r e c t i o n . Poststructuralism

strongly

challenged

the

privileged

role

of

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l consciousness, s p e a k i n g o f the " d e a t h o f m a n " a n d insisting o n the subject's d o m i n a t i o n b y social a n d linguistic structures. B u t it w o u l d

be

a gross error to c o n c l u d e

that

this

c h a l l e n g e w a s a b r e a k w i t h the t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h focus on individual

freedom.

With

the

possible

exception

of

Althusser's

M a r x i s m , F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y after i 9 6 0 strongly o p p o s e d the suggestion that i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m c o u l d find n o p u r c h a s e in a structuralist world.

Such

opposition was part of w h a t m a d e

this

philosophy

philosophical

apparatus

/^/structuralist. The

poststructuralists

rejected

the

t h r o u g h w h i c h existential p h e n o m e n o l o g y h a d e x p l i c a t e d f r e e d o m , q u e s t i o n i n g its descriptive a n d o n t o l o g i c a l m e t h o d s as w e l l as its c e n t r a l c a t e g o r y o f consciousness. B u t this v e r y rejection e x p r e s s e d their c o m m i t m e n t to i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . (Indeed, o n e r e a s o n structuralist social science so q u i c k l y c o l l a p s e d as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r a m e w o r k w a s its i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h f r e e d o m . ) F o u c a u l t ' s a r c h a e o l o g i e s a n d g e n e a l o g i e s , for e x a m p l e , are explicitiy d e v e l o p e d to free us f r o m the limitations o f specific c o n c e p t u a l a n d social structures. H i s critique

is m e r e l y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l

conceptions

of freedom

t h r e a t e n its historical reality. Similarly, D e r r i d e a n

that

deconstruction

a n d the o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i e s o f difference attack p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n structions — the subject, identity, the m a s c u l i n i s t self — t h r o u g h w h i c h the tradition has c o n c e p t u a l i z e d f r e e d o m . B u t this attack is itself for the sake o f freeing us f r o m the constraints o f those c o n s t r u c t i o n s . T h e j u s t i c e s o u g h t b y D e r r i d a a n d L y o t a r d , like the ethical

and

political goals o f D e l e u z e a n d I r i g a r a y flows f r o m a p r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m i t m e n t to i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . T h e

fin-de-siècle

" r e t u r n to the

s u b j e c t " is in the n a m e o f a f r e e d o m that thinkers such as Ferry a n d R e n a u t see as d e s t r o y e d b y the r a d i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m o f poststructuralism. B u t this c l a i m is a significant c h a l l e n g e to D e r r i d a , N a n c y , a n d

The philosophy of freedom

389

L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , if c o r r e c t , it effects a g e n u i n e r e d u c t i o o f their t h o u g h t , w h i c h b e c o m e s i n c o h e r e n t if it is truly incapable o f maintaining individual freedom. N o n e t h e l e s s , p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m c o n t r i b u t e d little to o u r p h i l o s o p h i cal u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f r e e d o m . F o u c a u l t m a d e

us a w a r e

of h o w

v a r i o u s p o p u l a r a n d scientihc (or pseudo-scientihc) c o n c e p t i o n s o f the self — p a r t i c u l a r l y in t e r m s o f m o d e r n n o t i o n s o f " n o r m a l i t y " — c o u l d b e i n s t r u m e n t s o f d o m i n a t i o n . A n d his g e n e a l o g y a n d D e r r i da's d e c o n s t r u c t i o n

can show h o w what w e regard

as essential

limitations o n t h o u g h t a n d a c t i o n are often historically c o n t i n g e n t constraints. B u t , as w e h a v e seen, F o u c a u l t ' s critique o f " m a n " in Les mots et les choses d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e that t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f the subject a r e as such p a r t o f oppressive

social

p o w e r . M o r e o v e r , it is n o t at all o b v i o u s that the c o r e existentialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f r e e d o m , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t e r m s o f S a r t r e a n n e g a tion,

is

susceptible

Kantian,

or

to

Husserlian

poststructuralist subjectivity.

critiques

The

of

freedom

Cartesian,

of

Sartrean

consciousness, w h i c h " i s w h a t it is in the m o d e o f n o t b e i n g i t " , is not v e r y far f r o m a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f D e r r i d e a n differance. A t the v e r y 1

least, L'être et le néant a n d Critique de la raison dialectique w o u l d b e e x c e l l e n t starting-points for a serious poststructuralist e x p l o r a t i o n o f freedom. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , f e w poststructuralists h a v e b e e n interested in develo p i n g a positive p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f r e e d o m (although J e a n - L u c N a n c y , w h o s e w o r k picks u p S a r t r e a n t h e m e s , h a s b e e n a n important recent exception). T h e y remain content with a naive, prereflective

commitment

to the u n q u e s t i o n a b l e

status o f trans-

gression, novelty, plurality, a n d difference as absolute ethical ideals. T h e r e is, accordingly, n o i n c l i n a t i o n to ask difficult questions a b o u t the roots a n d limits o f h u m a n f r e e d o m ; the c o n s u m i n g task is to e x p o s e a n d o v e r c o m e all obstacles to its u n r e s t r i c t e d e x p a n s i o n . S o , for

example,

Lyotard's

philosophy

o f difference

and

Deleuze's

o n t o l o g y u n q u a l i h e d l y e n d o r s e the m o s t r a d i c a l l i b e r a t i o n w i t h o u t s t o p p i n g to ask j u s t w h a t it w o u l d

consist in a n d w h y it is so

important. In this r e s p e c t at least, p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s m is a n interlude

rather

t h a n a decisive t u r n i n g - p o i n t in the history o f F r e n c h philosophy. It 1

O n the similarity of Sartrean a n d poststructuralist views o f subjectivity, see Christina Howells, " C o n c l u s i o n : Sartre a n d the D e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the S u b j e c t " , in Christina Howells (ed.), 77« Cambridge Companion to Sartre.

Conclusion

39«

has b e e n i m p o r t a n t for its q u e s t i o n i n g o f limits a n d , especially, for its rejection o f t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l claims to u l t i m a t e truth. B u t , o n c e its critiques are p r o p e r l y

acknowledged,

there r e m a i n s

the

f u n d a m e n t a l t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y p r o j e c t o f a r t i c u l a t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l as a l o c u s o f f r e e d o m . T h e r e c e n t r e t u r n o f F r e n c h t h o u g h t to the ethical p h i l o s o p h i e s o f K a n t a n d L e v i n a s is an effort to revive the project

o f this a r t i c u l a t i o n .

In this retrospective

mood,

current

F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s o f f r e e d o m c o u l d also fruitfully r e v i v e — as s o m e h a v e b e g u n to do - an interest in B e r g s o n a n d Sartre. B u t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o g r e s s is n e v e r a m a t t e r o f m e r e returns or revivals, a n d there is a real possibility that the

twentieth-century

F r e n c h p r o b l e m a t i c o f f r e e d o m has finally w o r k e d itself out. It has, after

all,

thoroughly

developed

the

topic

through

embedding

f r e e d o m in g e n e r a l systems o f t h o u g h t , d e s c r i b i n g o u r lived e x p e r i e n c e o f it, a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i n g the forces that act against it. P e r h a p s the t h e m e has, for the f o r e s e e a b l e future, b e e n essentially e x h a u s t e d . Further, there are signs that F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y is losing its distinctive n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r a n d m a y be splitting into a v a r i e t y o f e l e m e n t s ( p h e n o m e n o l o g y , analytic philosophy, feminism) that will e a c h m a k e its o w n c o n t r i b u t i o n to c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l discussions. A t the s a m e t i m e , the e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g prestige o f the social sciences has d r a w n c o n s i d e r a b l e talent out o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d u n d e r m i n e d its status as the l e a d i n g intellectual discipline. It m a y n o t be l o n g b e f o r e w e l o o k b a c k on t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y as a v a n i s h e d g o l d e n age.

Appendix: Philosophy and the French educational system

S i n c e N a p o l e o n , the b a s e o f F r e n c h e d u c a t i o n h a s b e e n t h e l y c é e , a state-funded

a n d - c o n t r o l l e d s e c o n d a r y school (the e q u i v a l e n t o f

A m e r i c a n h i g h school), w h i c h a w a r d s the baccalauréat d e g r e e . T h e r e are also a n u m b e r o f non-state s e c o n d a r y schools, n o w g e n e r a l l y r u n b y the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , w h i c h are called collèges. (State schools for c h i l d r e n at the j u n i o r h i g h level are n o w also called collèges.) AU students in the final y e a r o f t h e l y c é e take at least t w o h o u r s o f p h i l o s o p h y p e r w e e k , a n d there a r e , a c c o r d i n g l y , a b o u t 8000 t e a c h ers o f p h i l o s o p h y in the lycées. U n d e r g r a d u a t e university studies b e g i n w i t h t w o y e a r s o f w o r k in a b r o a d l y d e f i n e d a r e a o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n (for e x a m p l e , p h i l o s o p h y ) , f o l l o w e d b y t w o or three y e a r s o f m o r e a d v a n c e d study in the s a m e a r e a . S t u d e n t s c o m p l e t i n g t h e third y e a r r e c e i v e a licence in their a r e a o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , a n d those c o m p l e t i n g the fourth y e a r r e c e i v e a maîtrise. ( T h e first t w o years are n o w called the premier cycle a n d l e a d to a D i p l ô m e d ' E t u d e s U n i v e r s i t a i r e s G é n é r a l e s ( D E U G ) ; t h e n e x t t w o y e a r s constitute the deuxième cycle) G r a d u a t e e d u c a t i o n (now called the troisième cycle) h a s t a k e n v a r i o u s f o r m s over the t w e n t i e t h century.

C u r r e n t l y , the first y e a r o f g r a d u a t e

studies leads to a

D i p l ô m e d ' E t u d e s A p p r o f o n d i e s ( D E A ) , the r o u g h e q u i v a l e n t o f a n A m e r i c a n master's d e g r e e , w h i c h is w h e r e m o s t g r a d u a t e students e n d their studies. F u r t h e r w o r k is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a d o c t o r a l d e g r e e . U n t i l recently, there w a s the university d o c t o r a t e (doctorat d'université), which,

however,

carried

little p r e s t i g e ,

a n d the state

doctorate

(doctorat d'état), w h i c h w a s the s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e m e n t for a p o s i t i o n as a full professor in a university (as o p p o s e d to a maître de conférences, the e q u i v a l e n t o f a n associate professor). T h e latter d e g r e e r e q u i r e d t w o theses, a p r i m a r y o n e w r i t t e n in F r e n c h a n d a shorter " c o m p l e m e n t a r y " thesis (which, until the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century, h a d to b e w r i t t e n in L a t i n ) , t y p i c a l l y o n a historical topic r e l a t e d to the

391

Appendix

392

m a i n thesis. I n 1 9 6 6 , a third d o c t o r a l d e g r e e , a doctorat du troisième cycle, w a s a d d e d as a p r e l i m i n a r y to the doctorat d'état. I n 1984 t h e three d o c t o r a t e s w e r e r e p l a c e d b y a single d o c t o r a t e (itself c a l l e d the doctorat du troisième cycle), b u t there is n o w also a habilitation ( m o d e l l e d on the G e r m a n degree) r e q u i r e d for a position as full professor, w h i c h is a w a r d e d f o l l o w i n g a c a n d i d a t e ' s defense o f a set o f scholarly writings (often a l r e a d y p u b l i s h e d ) . T h e agrégation is a c o m p e t i t i v e e x a m for positions as t e a c h e r s in lycées. It is n o t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for l y c é e t e a c h i n g , a n d t o d a y the m a j o r i t y o f l y c é e t e a c h e r s are n o t agrégés. ( T h e alternative p a t h to lycée t e a c h i n g is a C e r t i h c a t d ' a p t i t u d e a u professorat de l ' e n s e i g n e m e n t d u s e c o n d d e g r é [ C A P E S ] . ) B u t the f e w w h o pass the agrégation (ranked in strict n u m e r i c a l order) are a v e r y elite g r o u p , w i t h the best c h a n c e s for positions at t o p lycées. M o r e o v e r , university t e a c h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the h u m a n i t i e s , t y p i c a l l y are agrégés, a l t h o u g h this is not a n official r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e usual - a n d surest - p r e p a r a t i o n for the agrégation is study at the E c o l e N o r m a l e S u p é r i e u r e ( E N S ) in Paris, a super-elite institution, a c c e p t a n c e to w h i c h d e p e n d s o n success in a h e r c e l y c o m p e t i tive (written a n d oral) e x a m i n a t i o n .

C a n d i d a t e s for the E N S spend

t w o y e a r s b e y o n d their baccalauréat d e g r e e s t u d y i n g at elite lycées for the test. ( T h e s e c o n d y e a r is called khâgne, f r o m the G r e e k for " l a z y " a n d the hrst hypokhâgne [ " b e f o r e

khâgne"].) C o r r e s p o n d i n g

to its

p r i v i l e g e d position in the g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n a l system, p h i l o s o p h y w a s for a l o n g time the m o s t prestigious c o n c e n t r a t i o n at the E c o l e N o r m a l e , a n d m o s t o f the l e a d i n g p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e (and still are) normaliens. T h e school is l o c a t e d in the h e a r t o f the L a t i n Q u a r t e r o n the r u e d ' U l m . (A b r a n c h for w o m e n w a s established in 1881 at Sèvres, j u s t outside o f Paris, b u t since the 1930s w o m e n h a v e b e e n a d m i t t e d at the r u e d ' U l m . ) Normaliens c a n f o l l o w courses at t h e S o r b o n n e , a n d S o r b o n n e students p r e p a r i n g for t h e agrégation c a n sit in o n E N S courses. T h e E N S is j u s t o n e o f several grandes écoles established after the R e v o l u t i o n to train F r e n c h elites for v a r i o u s areas o f g o v e r n m e n t service. C u r r e n t l y , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t grandes écoles i n c l u d e

the E N S , the E c o l e

Polytechnique,

the E c o l e des

H a u t e s E t u d e s C o m m e r c i a l e s (for business), a n d the E c o l e N a t i o n a l e d ' A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (for g o v e r n m e n t officials). M o s t influential p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e h a d positions at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris (specifically, at the S o r b o n n e , the U n i v e r s i t y ' s C o l l e g e o f A r t s a n d Sciences), a l t h o u g h s o m e f e w h a v e r e m a i n e d at p r o v i n c i a l

Philosophy and the French educational system

393

universities, the t o p Parisian lycées, or the E N S . For centuries, the U n i v e r s i t y o f Paris w a s s i m p l y the f a m o u s m e d i e v a l institution o n the Left B a n k , b u t t o d a y there are n u m e r o u s b r a n c h e s , at v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s in a n d a r o u n d the c a p i t a l . Another

i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f the F r e n c h

intellectual

scene is a

v a r i e t y o f m u l t i - d i s c i p l i n a r y centers, i n d e p e n d e n t o f the university system. T h e m o s t f a m o u s o f these is the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e , r o u g h l y similar to the P r i n c e t o n Institute for A d v a n c e d Study, w h o s e professors h a v e n o f o r m a l students a n d are m e r e l y r e q u i r e d to give a series o f p u b l i c lectures e a c h year. A c h a i r at the C o l l è g e is a h i g h honor, often bitterly f o u g h t for, b u t it c a n also m e a n f e w e r disciples a n d m u c h less influence

on university e d u c a t i o n .

Bergson,

Merleau-

Ponty, a n d F o u c a u l t all h e l d chairs at the C o l l è g e de F r a n c e . A l s o deserving

mention

are

the

Ecole

Pratiques

des H a u t e s

Etudes,

f o u n d e d u n d e r N a p o l e o n III a n d , especially, the E c o l e des H a u t e s E t u d e s en S c i e n c e s S o c i a l e s , w h i c h split off f r o m it after W o r l d W a r II, w h e r e m a j o r

figures

o f the structuralist m o v e m e n t in the 1950s

a n d 1960s (e.g., C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s , G e o r g e s D u m é z i l , a n d R o l a n d Barthes) h e l d positions. S i n c e W o r l d W a r I I , the C e n t r e N a t i o n a l de la R e c h e r c h e

Scientifique

(CNRS)

has b e e n

a major

source

of

facilities a n d s u p p o r t for r e s e a r c h in n u m e r o u s a c a d e m i c disciplines, i n c l u d i n g philosophy. O n a n o t h e r level, the C o l l è g e I n t e r n a t i o n a l de P h i l o s o p h i e has, since its f o u n d i n g in 1983, b e e n an i m p o r t a n t c e n t e r o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l activity. It has n o p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s a n d is n o t p a r t o f the official e d u c a t i o n a l system. N o n e t h e l e s s , l e d successively b y directors such as Jacques

Derrida, Jean-François

Lyotard,

and

Philippe

Lacoue-

L a b a r t h e , it has b e e n an e x c i t i n g l o c u s o f t e a c h i n g a n d r e s e a r c h for p h i l o s o p h e r s f r o m b o t h F r a n c e a n d a b r o a d a n d has e n c o u r a g e d w o r k outside the

conventional

grandes écoles.

boundaries

o f the universities a n d

the

References

Aeschliman, J.-G. (ed.), Répondre d'autrui: Emmanuel Levinas, Neuchâtel: Baconnière, 1 9 8 9 . Althusser, Louis, L'avenir dure longtemps, Paris: S t o c k / I M E C , 1992 (The Future Lasts Forever, translated by Richard Veasey, N e w York: T h e New Press,

993)-

r

Armstrong, T. J. (ed.), Michel Foucault: Philosopher, New York: Routledge. <)<)'• Bachelard, Gaston, L'engagement rationaliste, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. Le nouvel esprit scientifique, Paris: Alcan, 1934 (The New Scientific Spirit, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Boston: Beacon, 1984). " L a philosophie scientifique de Léon Brunschvicg", Revue de métaphysique et de morale 50 (1945), 7 7 - 8 4 ; reprinted in L'engagement rationaliste, 1

l 6

9"77-

La poétique de l'espace, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961 (The Poetics of Space, translated by Maria Jolas, N e w York: Orion, 1964). La poétique de la rêverie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, i 9 6 0 (The Poetics of Reverie, translated by Daniel Russell, Boston: Beacon, 1969).

La psychoanalyse de feu, Paris: Gallimard, 1938 (The Psychoanalysis of Fire, translated by G. C. Waterston, N e w York: Orion, 1969). La valeur inductive de la relativité, Paris: Vrin, 1929. Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, Paris: Seuil, 1957 (Mythologies, selections. translated by Annette Lavers, London: Cape, 1972). Le plaisir du texte, Paris: Seuil, 1973 (The Pleasure of the Text, translated by Richard Miller, N e w York: Hill and Wang, 1975). Système de la mode, Paris: Seuil, 1967 (The Fashion System, translated by M . Ward and R. Howard, New York: Hill and Wang, 1983). S/£, Paris: Seuil, 1970 (S/Zi translated by Richard Miller, N e w York: Hill and Wang, 1974). Bataille, Georges, Oeuvres complètes, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 8 8 . Sur Nietzsche, Paris: Gallimard, 1945 (On Nietzsche, translated by Bruce Boone, New York: Paragon, 1992). Visions of Excess, edited and translated by Alan Stoekl, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985. 394

References

395

Beauvoir, Simone de, La cérémonie des adieux, Paris: Gallimard, 1981 (Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, translated by Patrick O'Brian, N e w York: Pantheon Books, 1984). Le deuxième sexe, 2 vols., Paris: Gallimard, 1949 (The Second Sex, translated by H. M . Parshley, N e w York: Vintage, 1989). La force de l'âge, Paris: Gallimard, i 9 6 0 (The Prime of Life, translated by Peter Green, Cleveland: World Publishing, 1962). La force des choses, Paris: Gallimard, 1963 (Force of Circumstance, translated by Richard Howard, New York: Putnam, 1965). L'invitée, Paris: Gallimard, 1943 (She Came to Stay, translated by Peter Green, London: Seeker & Warburg, 1949). "Littérature et métaphysique", in L'existentialisme et la sagesse des nations, Paris: Nagel, 1948. Mémoires d'une jeune fille rangée, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 (Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959). "Merleau-Ponty et le pseudo-sartrisme", Les temps modernes 10 (1955), 2072-122.

Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté, Paris: Gallimard, 1947 (Ethics of Ambiguity, translated by Bernard Frechtman, N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1948).

Le sang de autres, Paris: Gallimard, 1945 (The Blood of Others, translated by R. Senhouse & Y. Moyse, N e w York: Knopf, 1948). Tous les hommes sont mortels, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 4 6 (All Men are Mortal, translated by Leonard Friedman, N e w York: World Publishing,

'955)La vieillesse, Paris: Gallimard, 1970 (The Coming of Age, translated by Patrick O'Brian, N e w York: Putnam, 1972). Bennington, Geoffrey, Lyotard: Writing the Event, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Bennington, Geoffrey and Derrida, Jacques, Jacques Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Benrubi, Isaac, Les sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France, Paris: Alcan, 1933. Bergson, Henri, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translated by R. Audra and C. Brereton, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre D a m e Press,

•977)- .

,

Durée et simultanéité, 2 n d edn., Paris: Alcan, 1923 (Duration and Simultaneity, translated by Leon Jacobson, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). L'énergie spirituelle, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Time and Free Will, translated by F. L. Pogson, London: Sonnenschein, 9 o) L'évolution créatrice, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Modern Library, 1944). I

I

;

39

References

6

Matière et mémoire, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Matter and Memory, translated by N. M . Paul and W. S. Winter, New York: Zone Books, 1988). Oeuvres, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 9 5 9 . La pensée et le mouvant, in Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (The Creative Mind, translated by Mabelle Andison, N e w York: Greenwood, 1968). Bernasconi, Robert and Simon Critchley (eds.), Re-Reading Levinas, Bloomington, IN; University of Indiana Press, 1997. Blanchot, Maurice, L'écriture du désastre, Paris: Gallimard, 1980 (The Writing of the Disaster, translated by A n n Smock, Lincoln, N E : University of Nebraska Press, 1986). L'espace littéraire, Paris: Gallimard, 1955 (The Space of Literature, translated by A n n Smock, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). Le pas au-delà, Paris: Gallimard, 1973 (The Step not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson, Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1992). Blondel, Maurice, L'action, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963 (Action, translated by Olivia Blanchette, Notre D a m e , IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). L'être et les êtres, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 9 6 3 . La pensée, Paris: Alcan, 1934. La philosophie et l'esprit chrétien, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944.

_

Boutroux, Emile, De l'idée de loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophie contemporaine, Paris: Alcan, 1895 (Natural Law in Science and Philosophy, translated by Fred Rothwell, London: O p e n Court, 1914). La contingence de les lois de la nature, Paris: Alcan, 1874 (Natural Law in Science and Philosophy, translated by Fred Rothwell, London: O p e n Court, Nouvelles études d'histoire de la philosophie, Paris: Alcan, 1927. Philosophy and War, translated by Fred Rothwell, N e w York: E. P. Dutton, 1916.

Bouveresse, Jacques, La philosophie chez les autophages, Paris: Minuit, 1984. Le philosophe et le réel, Paris: Hachette, 1 9 9 8 . Rationalité et cynisme, Paris: Minuit, 1985. " W h y I am so very UnFrench", in Alan Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy in France Today, 9 - 3 3 . Bruns, Gerald, Maurice Blanchot, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

miBrunschvicg, Léon, Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique, Paris: Alcan, 1912. L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique, Paris: Alcan, 1922. L'idéalisme contemporain, Paris: Alcan, 1921. La modalité du jugement, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964. Le progrès de la conscience dans le philosophie occidentale, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. " V i e intérieure et vie spirituelle", Revue de métaphysique et de morale 32 ('925)> I 3 9 - 4 8 .

References

397

Burchell, G r a h a m , et al. (eds.), The Foucault Effect, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Canguilhem, Georges, Idéologie et rationalité, Paris: Vrin, 1977 (Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, M A : M I T Press, 1988). Le normal et le pathologique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 9 6 6 (On the Normal and the Pathological, translated by Carolyn R. Fawcett, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978). A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem, edited by François Delaporte, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, New York: Zone Books, 1994. Capek, Milic, Bergson and Modern Physics, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971. Caputo, John, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997. Caputo, John (ed.), Deconstruction in a Nutshell, N e w York: Fordham University Press, 1997. Cavaillès, Jean, Méthode axiomatique et formalisme, Paris: Hermann & cie. :

9:;8.

" O n Logic and the Theory of Science", in Kockelmans and Kisiel (eds.). Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences, 3 5 3 - 4 0 9 . Remarques sur la formation de la théorie abstraite des ensembles, Paris: Hermann & Cie, 1938. Caws, Peter, Sartre, London: Routledge, 1 9 7 9 . Cohen-Solal, Annie, Sartre: A Life, translated by A n n a Cancogni, N e w York: Pantheon, 1987. Collins, James, The Existentialists, Chicago: Regnery, 1952. Comte, Auguste, The Essential Comte, edited by Stanislav Andreski, translated by Margaret Clarke, London: C r o o m Helm, 1974. Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M . , and Carlson, D. (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, London: Routledge, 1992. Courtine, Jean-François, Heidegger et la phénoménologie, Paris: Vrin, 1 9 8 6 . Creech, J., Kamuf, P., and Todd, J , "Deconstruction in America: A n Interview with Jacques Derrida", Critical Exchange 14. Culler, Jonathan, Roland Barthes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. On Deconstruction, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982. Ferdinand de Saussure, revised edition, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1 9 8 6 . Curtius, Ernst, Die Französische Kultur, Bern: Francke, 1975 (first published 1930) (Civilization of France, translated by Olive Wyon, N e w York: Macmillan, 1932). Davis, Colin, Levinas: An Introduction, Notre D a m e , IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Deleuze, Gilles, Bergsonisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965 (Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 1988).

References

398

" L a conception de la différence chez Bergson", Les études bergsoniennes 4

(wJ°\ l^-} ;. 12

Différence et répétition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968 (Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Foucault, Paris: Minuit, 1986 (Foucault, translated by Séan Hand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). "L'immanence: une vie . . .", Philosophie 47 (1995), 3—7. Logique du sens, Paris: Minuit, 1 9 6 9 (The Logic of Sense, translated by M . Lester and C. Stivale, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1990). Nietzsche et la philosophie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962 (Nietzsche and Philosophy, translated by H u g h Tomlinson, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1983). La philosophie critique de Kant, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963 (Kant's Critical Philosophy, translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberj a m , Minneapolis, M N : University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Pourparlers, Paris: Minuit, 1990 (Negotiations, translated by Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). Spinoza et le problème de l'expression, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1968 (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, translated by Martin Joughin, New York: Zone Books, 1990). Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, L'anti-oedipe, Paris: Minuit, 1972 (AntiOedipus, translated by R. Hurley, M . Seem, and H. Lane, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Mille Plateaux, Paris: Minuit, 1980 (A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian

Massumi,

Minneapolis:

University

of

Minnesota

Press.

I987)Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris: Minuit, 1991 (What is Philosophy?, translated by H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Derrida, Jacques, La carte postale, Paris: Flammarion, 1980 (The Post Card, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). De la grammatologie, Paris: Minuit, 1967 (Of Grammatology, corrected edition, translated by Gayatri Spivak, Baltimore, M D : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). De l'esprit, Paris: Gallimard, 1987 (Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, translated by G Bennington and R. Bowlby, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). La dissémination, Paris: Seuil, 1972 (Dissemination, translated by Barbara Johnson, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). Donner la mort, Paris, Galilée, 1999 (The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Du droit à la philosophie, Paris: Galilée, 1990. L'écriture et la différence, Paris: Seuil, 1967 (Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

References

399

Eperons: les styles de Nietzsche, Venice: Corbo e Fiori, 1976 (Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, translated by Barbara Harlow, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). Force de loi: le "fondement mystique de l'autorité", Paris: Galilée, 1 9 9 4 ("Force of L a w " , translated by Mary Quaintance in Cornell et al., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice). Glas, Paris: Galilée, 1974 (Glas, translated by J. Leavey Jr. and R. Rand. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). Introduction à "L'origine de la géométrie" de Husserl, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962 (Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, translated by J. P. Leavey, Jr., Lincoln, N E : University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Limited Inc., translated by Elizabeth Weber, Paris: Galilée, 1990 (Limited Inc., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988). " L a loi du genre", Glyph 7 (1980), 176—201 (English translation following, 202-29).

Marges de la philosophie, Paris: Minuit, 1972 (Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Otobiographies: L'enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre, Paris: Galilée, 1984 (The Ear of the Other, translated by Peggy Kamuf, et al., N e w York: Schocken, 1985). Parages, Paris: Galilée, 1984. Points, edited by Elizabeth Weber, Paris: Editions Gallilée, 1992 (Points, translated by Peggy Kamuf, et. al., Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 1995). Politiques de l'amitié, Paris: Galilée, 1994 (Politics of Friendship, translated by George Collins, London: Verso, 1997). Positions, Paris: Minuit, 1972 (Positions, translated by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). Psyché: inventions de l'autre, Paris: Gallimard, 1987. Spectres de Marx, Paris: Galilée, 1993 (Specters of Marx, translated by Peggy Kamuf, London: Routledge, 1994). " 'To D o Justice to Freud': T h e History of Madness in the A g e of Psychoanalysis", in Arnold Davidson (ed.), Foucault and His Interlocutors, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, 57—96. La voix et le phénomène, 3 r d edn., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976 (Speech and Phenomena, translated by David Allison, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Descombes, Vincent, Le même et l'autre, Paris: Minuit, 1979 (Modem French Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Dews, Peter, Logics of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London: Verso, 1987. Dosse, François, History of Structuralism, 2 vols., translated by Deborah Glassman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Paul Ricoeur: les sens d'une vie, Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1997.

400

References

Duhem, Pierre, La théorie physique: son objet, sa structure, 2 n d edn., Paris: Rivière, 1914 (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, translated by Philip Wiener, N e w York: Atheneum, 1962). Dupont, Christian, Receptions of Phenomenology in French Philosophy and Religious Thought, i88g-igjg, dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1997. Elliot, Gregory (ed.), Althusser: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Engel, Pascal, La dispute, Paris: Minuit, 1997. Eribon, Didier, Michel Foucault, 2 n d edn., Paris: Flammarion, 1991 (Michel Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing, Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1991). Fabiani, Jean-Louis, Les philosophes de la république, Paris: Minuit, 1 9 8 8 . Farias, Victor, Heidegger et le nazisme, Paris: Verdier, 1987 (Heidegger and Nazism, translated by P. Burreil and G. Ricci, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989). Ferry, Luc, Homo Aestheticus, Paris: Grasset, 1990 (Homo Aestheticus, translated by Robert de Loaiza, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Ferry, Luc and Renaut, Alain, La pensée 68, Paris: Gallimard, 1988 (French Philosophy of the Sixties, translated by Mary Cattani, Amherst, M A : University of Massachusetts Press, 1990). ffrench, Patrick, and Lack, Roland-François (eds.), The Tel Quel Reader, London: Routledge, 1 9 9 8 . Flynn, Thomas, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Foucault, Michel, L'archéologie du savoir, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 9 (The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A. Sheridan Smith, N e w York: Harper and Row, 1972).

Essential Works of Foucault, igj4-ig84, 3 vols., edited by Paul Rabinow, New York: T h e New Press, 1997—9. Folie et déraison, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 6 (Madness and Civilization, translated by Richard Howard, N e w York: Pantheon, 1965). Histoire de la sexualité, 3 vols.: La volonté de savoir, L'usage des plaisirs, and Le souici de soi, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 7 6 , 1984 (History of Sexuality, 3 vols.: Introduction, The Uses of Pleasure, and Care of the Self, translated by Robert Hurley, N e w York: Vintage Books, 1 9 8 8 - 9 0 ) . " L ' h o m m e est-il mort?" interview in Arts 30 (1966). Language, Counter-Memory, and Practice, edited by Donald Bouchard, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977. Maladie mentale et personnalité, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954. Maladie mentale et psychologie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962 (Mental Illness and Psychology, translated by Alan Sheridan, New York: Harper and Row, 1976). "Michel Foucault répond à Sartre", Quinzaine Littéraire, March 1, 1 9 6 8 . Les mots et les choses, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 6 (The Order of Things, N e w York: Vintage, 1973). " M y Body, this Paper, this Fire", Oxford Literary Review 4 (1979), 5—28.

References

401

Naissance de la clinique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963 (The Birth of the Clinic, translated by A. Sheridan Smith, N e w York: Pantheon, 1973). Politics, Philosophy, Culture, edited by L. Kritzman, translated by A. Sheridan, et al., London: Routledge, 1988. Power I'Knowledge, edited and translated by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon, 1980. Raymond Roussel, Paris: Gallimard, 1963 (Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, translated by Charles Ruas, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1986). Surveiller et punir, Paris: Gallimard, 1975 (Discipline and Punish, translated by Alan Sheridan, N e w York: Pantheon, 1977). Foucault, Michel, and Binswanger, Ludwig, Dream and Existence, edited by Keith Hoeller, Newjersey: Humanities Press, 1993. Frank, Manfred, What is Neostructuralism?, translated by S. Walker and R. Gray, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 9 8 9 . Fry, Christopher, Sartre and Hegel: The Variation of an Enigma in L'être et le néant, Bonn: Bouvier, 1 9 8 8 . Fullbrook, Edward and Kate, Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Twentieth-Century Legend, N e w York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. Galois, Philippe and Forzy, Gérard, Bergson et les neurosciences, Institut Synthelabo pour le Progrès de la Connaissance, 1997. Gilson, Etienne, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie, Paris: Alcan, 1913. Granger, Gilles-Gaston, Wittgenstein, Paris: Seghers, 1 9 6 8 . Griffiths, A. Phillips (ed.), Contemporary French Philosophy, Cambridge: C a m bridge University Press, 1987. Guattari, Félix, Psychoanalyse et transvers alité, Paris: Maspero, 1972. Guitton, Jean, Regards sur la pensée française, I8JO-IQ40, Paris: Beauchesne, 1968.

Gunn, J. Alexander, Modern French Philosophy, London: T. Fisher Unwin, I

.

9 2 2

'

Gurvitch, Georges, Les tendences actuelles de la philosophie allemande, Paris: Vrin. !930Gutting, Gary, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 8 9 . Gutting, Gary (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Hahn, Lewis (ed.), The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Library of Living Philosophers, 22), LaSalle, IL: O p e n Court, 1995. Hamelin, Octave, Essai sur les elements principaux de la représentation, Paris: Alcan, 1907. Le système de Renouvier, Paris: Vrin, 1927. Hardt, Michael, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 9 9 3 .

402

References

Hegel, G. W. F., La phénoménologie de l'esprit, translated by Jean Hyppolite, Paris: Aubier, 1941. Henry, Michel, L'essence de la manifestation, Paris: Vrin, 1986. Hering, Jean, Phénoménologie et philosophie religieuse, Strasbourg: Alsacienne, Hôffding, Harald, A History of Modem Philosophy, translated by B. E. Meyer, London: Macmillan, 1924. Holland, Eugene, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, N e w York: Routledge, 1 9 9 9 . Hollier, Denis (éd.), A New History of French Literature, Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1 9 8 9 . Howells, Christina, Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics, C a m bridge: Polity Press, 1 9 9 9 . Howells, Christina (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 2 . Husserl, Edmund, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, translated by Frederick Kersten, T h e Hague: Nijhoff, 1972. Méditations cartésiennes, Paris: Vrin, 1947 (Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns, T h e Hague: Nijhoff, i960). Hyppolite, Jean, Figures de la pensée philosophique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel, Paris: Aubier, 1946.

Irigaray, Luce, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un, Paris: Minuit, 1977 (This Sex Which Is Not One, translated by C. Porter with C. Burke, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). Le corps-à-corps avec la mère, Montreal: Editions de la Pleine Lune, 1981. Ethique de la différence sexuelle, Paris: Minuit, 1984 (An Ethics of Sexual Difference, translated by C. Burke and G Gill, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Sexes et parentés, Paris: Minuit, 1987 (Sexes and Genealogies, translated by Gillian Gill, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Speculum de l'autre femme, Paris: Minuit, 1977 (Speculum of the Other Woman, translated by Gillian Gill, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). Janicaud, Dominique, Une généalogie du spiritualisme français, T h e Hague: Nijhoff, 1 9 6 9 . La tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française, Combas: L'Éclat, 1991. Jankélévitch, Vladimir, Leje-ne-sais-quoi et le presque-rien, Paris: Seuil, 1980. " L é o n Brunschvicg", in Vladimir Jankélévitch, Sources. Sources, Paris: Seuil, 1984 (first published 1969). Traité des vertus, Paris: Bordas, 1949. Henri Bergson, 3rd edn., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975. Judt, Tony, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-ig$6, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 9 2 .

References

403

Kaufmann, Walter (ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, N e w York: New American Library, 1975. Kearney, Richard (ed.), Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, Manchester, U K : Manchester University Press, 1984. Kitcher, Philip, Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism, Cambridge, M A : M I T Press, 1982. Kockelmans, J. J., and Kisiel, T.J. (eds.), Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Kojève, Alexandre, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, edited by R a y m o n d Queneau, Paris: Gallimard, 1947 (Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, translated by James Nichols Jr., N e w York: Basic Books, 1969). Kristeva, Julia, La révolution du langage poétique, Paris: Seuil, 1974 (Revolution in Poetic Language, translated by Margaret Waller, N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Samouraïs, Paris: Fayard, 1990 (The Samurai, translated by Barbara Bray, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). Lacan, Jacques, Ecrits, Paris: Seuil, 1 9 6 6 (Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan, N e w York: Norton, 1977). Lacey, A. R., Bergson, London: Routledge, 1 9 8 9 . Lachelier, Jules, Du fondement de l'induction, 7 t h edn., Paris: Alcan, 1916 ("The Foundation of Induction", translated by Edward Ballard, in Jules Lachelier, The Philosophy of Jules Lachelier). Etudes sur le syllogisme, Paris: Alcan, 1907. Oeuvres, Paris: Alcan, 4 t h edn., 1902. The Philosophy of Jules Lachelier, translated by Edward Ballard, T h e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, i 9 6 0 . (Contains translations of " T h e Foundation of Induction", "Psychology and Metaphysics", "Notes on Pascal's W a g e r " , and some of Lachelier's comments in Lalande's Vocabulaire) " R a p p o r t sur la personnalité", in Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques, NS, 5 4 (1900). Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe and Nancy, Jean-Luc, Absolu littéraire, Paris: Seuil, 1978 (The Literary Absolute, translated by P. Barnard and C. Lester, Albany, NY: State University of N e w York Press, 1988). " T h e Nazi M y t h " , Critical Inquiry 16 ( 1 9 8 9 - 9 0 ) , 2 9 1 - 3 1 2 . Lacroix, Jean, Maurice Blondel, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, i9 36

Ladrière, Jean, Les limitations internes des formalismes, Louvain: Nauwelaerts.

957-

r

Lalande, A., Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 15th edn., 1985, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lamelle, François (ed.), Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas, Paris: Jean-Michel Place, 1980. Le Doeuff, Michèle, L'étude et le rouet, Paris: Seuil, 1989 (Hipparchia's Choice, translated by Trista Selous, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

404

References

Recherches sur l'imaginaire philosophique, Paris: Payot, 1980 (The Philosophical Imaginary, translated by Colin Gordon, Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 1989). Le sexe du savoir, Paris: Aubier, 1 9 9 8 . Lefebvre, H. and Gutterman, N. (eds.), Morceaux choisis d'Hegel, Paris, 1936. Leo X I I I , Aetemi Patris, translated in The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII, Rockford, IL: T A N Books, 1995. Le Roy, Edouard, "Science et philosophie", Revue de métaphysique et de morale 7 (1899), 7 0 8 - 3 1 .

" L a science positive et la liberté", in Bibliothèque du Congrès International de Philosophie de igoo, vol. 1, Paris: Colin, 1900. " U n positivisme nouveau", Revue de métaphysique et de morale 9 (1901). Lévinas, Emmanuel, Autrement qu'être, T h e Hague: Nijhoff, 1974 (Otherwise than Being, translated by Alphonso Lingis, T h e Hague: Nijhoff. 1981). De Dieu qui vient à l'idée, Paris: Vrin, 1982 (Of God Who Comes to Mind, translated by Bettina Bergo, Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press. •<><>•> • Difficile liberté, Paris: Michel, 1963 (Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, translated by Séan Hand, Baltimore: T h e Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Ethique et infini, dialogues with Philippe Nemo, Paris: Fayard, 1982 (Ethics and Infinity, translated by Richard Cohen, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985). Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl, Paris: Alcan, 1930 (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, translated by André Orianne, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Totalité et infini, T h e Hague, Nijhoff, 1961 (Totality and Infinity, translated by Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, .

: ! , t

'

! l

'

Lévi-Strauss, Claude, La pensée sauvage, Paris: Pion, 1962 (The Savage Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Levy, Bernard-Henri, La barbarisme à visage humain, Paris: Grasset, 1977 (Barbarism with a Human Face, translated by George Holoch, N e w York: Harper and Row, 1979). Le siècle de Sartre, Paris: Grasset, 2000. Lilla, Mark (ed.), New French Political Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Logue, William, Charles Renouvier: Philosopher of Liberty, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993. Lyotard, Jean-François, Chambre sourde, Paris: Galilée, 1 9 9 8 . La condition postmoderne, Paris: Minuit, 1979 (The Postmodern Condition, translated by G. Bennington and B. Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). La confession d'Augustin, Paris: Galilée, 1 9 9 8 .

References

405

Le différend, Paris: Minuit, 1983 (The Différend, translated by Georges van den Abbeele, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Discours,figure, Paris: Klincksieck, 1971. Economie libidinale, Paris: Minuit, 1974 (Libidinal Economy, translated by Iain Hamilton Grant, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). La phénoménologie, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954 (Phenomenology, translated by Brian Beakley, Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1991). Marcel, Gabriel, De refus à l'invocation, Paris: Gallimard, 1940. Etre et avoir, Paris: Aubier, 1935 (Being and Having, translated by Katherine Farrer, N e w York: Harper and Row, 1965). Homo Viator, Paris: Aubier, 1944 (Homo Viator, translated by E m m a Crawford, Chicago: Regnery, 1951). Journal métaphysique, Paris: Gallimard, 1927 (Metaphysical Journal, translated by Bernard Wall, Chicago: Regnery, 1952). Mystère de l'être, Paris: Aubier, 1951 (The Mystery of Being, translated by Rene Hague, Chicago: Regnery, 1951). Marion, Jean-Luc, Dieu sans l'être, Paris: Fayard, 1982 (God Without Being, translated by Thomas Carlson, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, /99 )1

Réduction et donation, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989 (Reduction and Givenness, translated by Thomas Carlson, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998). Sur l'ontologie grise de Descartes, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1981.

*

Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1981.

Maritain, Jacques, Court traité de l'existence et de l'existant, Paris: Hartmann, 1944 (Existence and the Existent, translated by L. Galantiere and G. Phelan, N e w York: Pantheon, 1948). Distinguer pour unir, ou, les degrés du savoir, Paris: Brouwer, 1932 (Distinguish to Unite, or, The Degrees of Knowledge, translated under the supervision of Gerald Phelan, Notre D a m e , IN: University of Notre D a m e Press. !995)-

Du régime temporel de la liberté, Paris: Brouwer, 1933 (Freedom in the Modem World, translated by Richard O'Sullivan, N e w York: Gordian, 1971). L'homme et l'état, translated from the English by R. Davril and F. Davril. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953 (Man and the State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). La philosophie Bergsonienne, Paris: Rivière, 1930 (Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, translated by Mabelle Andison, N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1955). Primauté du spirituel, Paris: Pion, 1927 (The Things that are not Caesar's, translated by J. F. Scanlan, London: Sheed and Ward, 1932).

References

4o6

Ransoming the Time, translated by Harry Binnse, N e w York: Scribner's, 1941.

Sept leçons sur l'être, Paris: Tequi, 1934 (Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lessons on Being, N e w York: Sheed and Ward, 1948). Martin, Jean-Clet, Variations: la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze, Paris: Payot. r

993-

Mauss, Marcel, Essai sur le don, Paris: Alcan, 1925 (The Gift, translated by W. D. Halls, New York: Norton, 1990). McBride, William, "Sartre: les premiers comptes-rendus de L'être et le néant'', in Ingrid Galster (ed.), La naissance du phénomène Sartre, 1938-1945 (Actes du Colloque d'Eichstätt), Paris: Seuil, 2000. M c C o o l , Gerald, The Neo-Thomists, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,

I994McNeill, John, The Blondelian Synthesis, Leiden: Brill, 1 9 6 6 . Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Les aventures de la dialectique, Paris: Gallimard, 1955 (Adventures of the Dialectic, translated by Joseph Bien, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Humanisme et terreur, Paris: Gallimard, 1947 (Humanism and Terror, translated by John O'Neill, Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). L'oeil et l'esprit, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 4 ("Eye and M i n d " , translated by Carleton Dallery, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception). Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris: Gallimard, 1945 (The Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith, London: Routledge, 1962). The Primacy of Perception, edited by James Edie, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. Sens et non-sens, Paris: Nagel, 1948 (Sense and Non-Sense, translated by Hubert and Patricia Dreyfus, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Signes, Paris: Gallimard, i 9 6 0 (Signs, translated by Richard McCleary, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964). La structure du comportement, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942 (The Structure of Behavior, translated by Alden Fisher, Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). Texts and Dialogues, edited by H. Silverman and J. Barry, Jr., translated by Michael Smith, et al., Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press,

'99/-'Le visible et l'invisible, edited by Claude Lefort, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 4 (The Visible and the Invisible, translated by Alfonso Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Meyerson, Emile, La déduction relativiste, Paris: Payot, 1925 (The Relativistic Deduction, translated by David Sipffe and Mary-Alice Sipffe, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985). De l'explication dans les sciences, Paris: Payot, 1927 (Explanation in the Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).

References

407

Identité et réalité, Paris: Alcan, 1908 [Identity and Reality, translated by K a t e Loewenberg, N e w York: Macmillan, 1930). Moi, Toril, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Montefiore, Alan (ed.), Philosophy in France Today, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Moore, F. C. T., Bergson: Thinking Backwards, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 6 . Nabert, Jean, Eléments pour une éthique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1943 (Elements for an Ethic, translated by William Petrek. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Essai sur le mal, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. L'expérience intérieure de la liberté, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1924 (reissued in an edition edited by Paul Ricoeur, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994). Nancy, Jean-Luc, Communauté désoeuvrée, Paris: Bourgeois, 1990 (The Inoperative Community, translated by P. Connor, et al., Minneapolis, M N : University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Expérience de la liberté, Paris: Galilée, 1988 (The Experience of Freedom, translated by Bridget M c D o n a l d , Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 1993). Nizan, Paul, Aden Arabie, with a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, Paris: Maspero, i 9 6 0 (Aden Arabie, translated by Joan Pinkham, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968). Antoine Bloyé, Paris: Grasset, 1971 (Antoine Bloye, translated by Edmund Stevens, N e w York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). Les chiens de garde, Paris: Maspero, i 9 6 0 (The Watchdogs, translated by Paul Fittingoff, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). Ott, Hugo, Martin Heidegger: éléments pour une biographie, Paris: Payot, 1990 (Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, translated from the original German by Allan Blunden, N e w York: Basic Books, 1993). Parodi, Dominique, La philosophie contemporaine en France, Paris: Alcan, 1 9 1 9 . En quête d'une philosophie, Paris: Alcan, 1935. Peperzak, Adriaan, To the Other, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993. Poincaré, Henri, The Foundations of Science, translated by George Bruce Halstead, N e w York: T h e Science Press, 1913. La science et l'hypothèse, Paris: Flammarion, 1900 (English translation in Henri Poincaré, The Foundations of Science). La valeur de la science, Paris: Flammarion, 1 9 1 4 (English translation in Henri Poincaré, The Foundations of Science). Poster, Mark, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Proust, Marcel, A la recherche du temps perdu, Paris: Gallimard, 1954 (In Search

408

References

of Lost Time, translated by C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor, revised by D. J. Enright, New York: Modern Library, 1993). Regan, Charles, Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 6 . Renaut, Alain, L'ère de l'individu, Paris: Gallimard, 1989 (The Era of the Individual, translated by M . B. DeBevoise and F. Philip, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Sartre, le dernier philosophe, Paris: Grasset, 1993. Le système du droit, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1 9 8 6 . Renouvier, Charles, Essais de critique générale, Paris: Librairie Philosophique de Ladrange, 1 8 5 4 - 6 4 . Rey, Abel, " L a philosophie scientifique de M . D u h e m " , Revue de métaphysique et de morale 12 (1904), 6 9 9 - 7 4 4 . Ricoeur, Paul, A l'école de la phénoménologie, Paris: Vrin, 1 9 8 6 . Le conflit des interprétations, Paris: Seuil, 1 9 6 9 (The Conflict of Interpretations, edited by D o n Ihde, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, !974)-

De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, Paris: Le Seuil, 1965 (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by D. Savage, New Haven, C T : Yale University Press, 1970). Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: philosophie du mystère et philosophie du paradoxe, Paris: Temps Présent, 1948. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, edited and translated by J. B. Thompson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Interpretation Theory, Fort Worth, T X : Texas Christian University Press, 1976. La métaphore vive, Paris: Seuil, 1975 (The Rule of Metaphor, translated by R. Czerny with K. McLaughlin and J. Costello, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). Philosophie de la volonté, 3 vols.: L'homme fallible, La symbolique du mal, and Le volontaire et l'involontaire, Paris: Aubier, 1 9 6 0 - 3 (Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, translated by E. V Kohâk, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966; Fallible Man, translated by C. A. Kelbley, Chicago: Regnery, 1 9 6 5 ; The Symbolism of Evil, translated by E. Buchanan, N e w York: Harper and Row, 1967). Soi-même comme une autre, Paris: Seuil, 1990 (Oneself as Another, translated by Kathleen Blarney, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Temps et récit, 3 vols., Paris: Seuil, 1 9 8 3 - 5 (Time and Narrative, 3 vols.. translated by K. McLaughlin and D. Pellauer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984—8). Ringer, Fritz, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, i8go—ig20, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Roth, Michael, Knowing and History: The Resurgence of French Hegelianism from the 1930's through the Post-War Period, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1 9 8 8 .

References

409

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Confessions, London: Dent, i 9 6 0 . Santayana, George, Egotism and German Philosophy, London: J. M . Dent, 1916 (reissued: N e w York: Scribner, 1940). Sartre, Jean-Paul, L'âge de raison, Paris: Gallimard, 1945 (The Age of Reason, translated by Eric Sutton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961). Cahiers pour une morale, Paris: Gallimard, 1983 (Notebook for an Ethics, translated by David Pellauer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

'99'-')Critique de la raison dialectique, vol. 1, Paris: Gallimard, i 9 6 0 (Critique of Dialectical Reason, vol. 1, translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith, London: New Left Books, 1976). Critique de la raison dialectique, vol. 11, Paris: Gallimard, 1985 (Critique of Dialectical Reason, vol. 11, translated by Quinton Hoare, London: Verso, 99 )L'espoir maintenant (interviews with Benny Levy), Lagasse: Verdier, iggi (Hope Now, translated by Adrian van den Hoven, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). L'être et le néant, Paris: Gallimard, 1943 (Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel Barnes, N e w York: Washington Square Press, 1956). L'existentialisme est un humanisme, Paris: Nagel, 1947 ("Existentialism Is a Humanism", translated by P. Mairet, in Walter Kaufmann (ed.). Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre). Huis-clos, Paris: Gallimard, 1947 (No Exit, translated by Stuart Gilbert, New York: Knopf, 1948). " U n e idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: l'intentionalité", in Nouvelle revue française 52 (1939), 1 2 9 - 3 2 ; reprinted in Situations 1, 3 1 - 5 ("Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology", translated by Joseph Fell, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1 (1970), 4 - 5 ) . L'idiot de la famille, Paris: Gallimard, 1971 (The Family Idiot, translated by Carol Cosman, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). L'imaginaire, Paris: Gallimard, 1940 (The Psychology of Imagination, translated by Bernard Frechtman, N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1948). L'imagination, Paris: Alcan, 1936 (Imagination, translated by Forrest Williams, Ann Arbor, M I : University of Michigan Press, 1962). "Jean-Paul Sartre répond", L'Arc 30 (1966), 8 7 - 9 6 . Mallarmé, Paris: Gallimard, 1986 (Mallarmé, or, The Poet of Nothingness, translated by Ernest Sturm, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988). La mort dans l'âme, Paris: Gallimard, 1949 (Troubled Sleep, translated by Gerald Hopkins, N e w York: Knopf, 1951). Les mots, Paris: Gallimard, 1 9 6 4 (The Words, translated by Bernard Frechtman, N e w York: Braziller, 1964). Les mouches, Paris: Bordas, 1974 (The Flies, translated by Stuart Gilbert. New York: Knopf, 1948). 1

1

References

410

La nausée, Paris: Gallimard, 1938 (Nausea, translated by Lloyd Alexander, New York: N e w Directions, 1964). Qu'est-ce que la littérature?, Paris: Gallimard, 1948 (What is Literature?, translated by Bernard Frechtman, New York: Philosophical Library,

!949); "Question de méthode", in Critique de la raison dialectique (The Problem of Method, translated by Hazel Barnes, London: Methuen, 1 9 6 3 ; also published as The Search for a Method, New York: Knopf, 1963). Saint Genet, Paris: Gallimard, 1952 (Saint Genet, translated by Bernard Frechtman, N e w York: Braziller, 1963). Sartre par lui-même, transcript of a documentary film directed by Alexandre Astruc and Michel Contat, Paris: Gallimard, 1977 (Sartre by Himself, translated by Richard Seaver, New York: Urizen Books, 1980).

Situations (10 vols.), Paris: Gallimard, 1947—72 (volume iv: Situations, translated by Benita Eisler, N e w York: Braziller, 1965; volumes vin and ix: Between Existentialism and Marxism, translated by John Mathews, New York: Morrow, 1974). Le sursis, Paris: Gallimard, 1945 (The Reprieve, translated by Eric Sutton, New York: Knopf, 1947) • La transcendence de l'égo, Paris: Vrin, 1 9 6 6 (Transcendence of the Ego, translated by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, New York: Noonday, 1957). Saussure, Ferdinand de, Cours de linguistique général, Paris: Payot, 1980 (Course in General Linguistics, translated by Wade Baskin, N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1959). Scheler, M a x , Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn: Cohen, 1923 (The Nature of Sympathy, N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1954). Schilpp, Paul (ed.), The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (Library of Living Philosophers 16), LaSalle, IL: O p e n Court, 1981. Schyns, Mathieu, La philosophie d'Emile Boutroux, Paris: Fischbacher, 1924. Serres, Michel, Le contrat naturel, Paris: Bourin, 1990 (The Natural Contract, translated by E. MacArthur and W. Paulson, A n n Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Hermès, 5 vols., Paris: Editions Minuit, 1 9 6 8 - 8 0 (Hermes, edited by J. Harari and D. Bell, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982). La légende des anges, Paris: Flammarion, 1 9 9 3 . Le tiers-instruit, Paris: Bourin, 1991. Serres, Michel and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, translated by Roxanne Lapidus, Ann Arbor, M I : University of Michigan Press, 1995. Simons, Margaret, Beauvoir and the Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism, N e w York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1 9 9 9 . Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomena logical Movement, 2 n d edn., 2 vols., T h e Hague: Nijhoff, 1 9 6 5 .

References

411

Steward, Jon (ed.), The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1 9 9 8 . Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, L'apparition de l'homme, Paris: Seuil, 1956 (The Phenomenon of Man, London: Collins, 1959). Thibaudet, Albert, La république des professeurs, Paris: Grasset, 1927. Vadée, Michel, Gaston Bachelard, Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975. Van Breda, H.L., "Merleau-Ponty and the Husserl Archives at Lonvain", translated by Stephen Michelman, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Texts and Dialogues. Virgoulay, René, "L'action" de Maurice Blondel, Paris: Beauchesne, 1992. Vuillemin, Jules, Nécessité ou contingence, Paris: Minuit, 1984. Wahl, Jean, Études kierkegaardiennes, Paris: Aubier, 1938. Le malheur de la conscience de Hegel, 2 n d edn., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951 (first published in 1929). Vers le concret, Paris: Vrin, 1932. Weber, Louis, Vers le positivisme absolu par l'idéalisme, Paris: Alcan, 1903. Weil, Simone, L'enracinement, Paris: Gallimard, 1949 (The Need for Roots, translated by Arthur Wills, NY: Putnam, 1952). Whitford, Margaret, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, London: Routledge, 1991. Wilcocks, Robert (ed.), Critical Essays on Jean-Paul Sartre, Boston: G. K. Hall. 1988.

Worms, Frederic, Introduction à Matière et mémoire de Bergson, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997.

Index

action, 8 9 - 9 3 , 370 adversity, c o e m c e n t of, 149, 375 aesthetic experience, B e r g s o n on, 72; L a c o u e L a b a r t h e on, 376; L y o t a r d o n , 319; M a r i t a i n o n , 96 agrégation, 5, 82, 113, 158, 236, 382, 392 Alain (Emile Charrier), 6, 43 n i 8 Alexander, M . , 22 Alquié, F., 122 n5

Ponty, 206; a n d Sartre, 158-60, 161 m o , 163; works: autobiography, 162-3; novels, 160—1; Philosophy of Ambiguity, 160; Ttie Second Sex, 163—80 Beckett, S., 260 being, B o u t r o u x o n , 22; D e l e u z e on, 332—6; D e r r i d a on, 256; Foucault on, 257; H e i d e g g e r on, 109, 256-7, 356, 376, 377; Levinas o n , 356; M a r i t a i n on, 9 5 - 6 ; M a r c e l on, 101—2; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 207-8, 209; M a r i o n , o n , 377; N a n c y on,

Althusscr, L., 40, 85, 88 n8, 113, 230, 2 3 5 - 8 , 250. 259, 381, 388 A m i e l , H . - F , 98 n23 anguish, 107, 115; Sartre on, 140-1 Annales school, 260 anthropology, 152; Lévi-Strauss's, 221-7, 250: M e r l e a u - P o n t y o n , 209—11 A q u i n a s , T., 91, 94, 95, 97 a r c h a e o l o g y of k n o w l e d g e , 264, 268, 285—8 Aristotle, 12, 37, 36, 42, 52, 53, 81, 166, 247,

376; Sartre on, 130—3 being-for-itself 133, 136-7, 252, 330 being-for-others, 144-7 being-in-itself 133, 136-7 being-in-the-world, 137, 190-2, 355, 387 B e n n i n g t o n , C , 313 1127, 320 Benrubi, I., 9 015 Bcnveniste, E., 368 Berdyaev, N., 105

294, 295, 304. 335, 346, 355, 370 A r o n , R,, 43 m 8 , 107—8, 119 n46, 374 A r o n s o n , R., 128 Augustine, 94; a n d Blondel, 91 1114 Austrian philosophy, 378

Bergson, H . , 6, 9, 12, 20, 27, 33, 4 9 - 8 3 , 84, 9 , 9 4 - 5 , 138, 228, 380, 381, 384, 386, 390, 393; and existential philosophy, 113-17; D e l e u z e on, 333, 335; M a r c e l and, 115 1158; M e r l e a u - P o n t y o n , 113—7; Sartre on, 114—15; works: Creative Evolution, 51—6, 66—74; Matter and Memory, 60—6; Time and Free Will, 5 6 - 6 0 ; Two Sources of Religion and Morality, 75-82 1

baccalauréat, 4, 391 B a c h e l a r d , G., 9, 39, 40 n i 7 , 84, 8 5 - 9 , 149, 233, 236, 2 6 0 - 1 , 379, 381; and C a n g u i l h e m , 228-32 B a c h e l a r d , S., 28 B a c o n , F. (painter), 33g B a c o n , F. (philosopher), 278, 379 b a d faith, 140—4 Balibar, E., 236 Balzac, H., 247-g

binary division, D e r r i d a on, 293—4 Binswanger, L., 256 Blanchot, M . , 252-3, 2 5 4 - 5 , 260, 317, 354 Blondel, M . , 14, 20, 84, 8 9 - 9 3 , 94, 97, 98, 102, 384 body, B e a u v o i r o n , 170; Foucault on, 273, 280; M a r c e l o n , 99—100; Merleau-Ponty on, 190—2, 195—6, 200; Sartre on, 142; see also mind—body p r o b l e m

Barthes, R., 222 113, 244-9, 253. 290, 342, 393 Bataille, C , 103, n o , 122, 2 5 2 - 3 , 254-5 Baudelaire, C , 90, 127 Beaufret, J., 252, 255

B o l z a n o , B., 378 books, D e r r i d a o n , 295—6 B o u r d i e u , P., 7, 9 n i 5 , 382

Beauvoir, S. de, 105, 107, 121, 124, 158—80, 379; a n d Irigaray, 352 n 3 i ; a n d M e r l e a u -

412

Index B o u t r o u x , E., 6, 9, 2 0 - 5 , 26, 29, 84, 85, 89. 383 Bouveresse, J., 236 n i g , 377-8 Bradley, F. H . , 104 1128 B r a u d e l , F., 260 B r e n t a n o , F., 378 Breton, A . , 102, 103, 110 Bruns, G., 252 n34 Brunschvicg, L., 6, 7, g, 40—8, 84, 381; and Bachelard, 86—8; a n d Bergson, 73—4; and Merleau-Ponty, 104—5, °4> 8 6 ; d N i z a n , 104; and Sartre, 108 Buber, M . , 101, 360 Butor, M . , 260 J

a n

G a l v e z J . , 235 C a m u s , A . , 126, 183, 374 C a n g u i l h e m , G , 37, 3g n i 6 , 85, 228-32, 2 6 0 - 1 , 381 C a p e k , M . , 67 n i 4 capitalism, D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i on. 339-4 C a p u t o J . , 3131127, 3161129 C a r n a p , R., 378 1161 Castoriadis, C , 320 112 C a t h o l i c i s m , Althusser and, 237 n 2 i ; B e a u v o i r a n d , i 5 8 ; B e r g s o n and, 82, 114: Blondel and, 84, g3; B o u t r o u x and, 8g; D u h c m and, 37; L a c h e l i e r a n d , 20; L e R o y and, 37 1112; M a r c e l and, 102; M a r i o n and. 377; M a r i t a i n and, 84, M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 102 n24, 114, 181—2; R e n o u v i e r and, 14; spiritualism and, 12, 14; see aim M a r i t a i n , neo-Thomism 1

causality, 5 8 - 9 ; a n d D e r r i d a ' s differance, 299; efficient, 15—20; final, 15—20 Cavaillcs, J., 228, 378 C a w s , P., 155 1141 C e n t r e de R e c h e r c h e en Epistémologie A p p l i q u é e ( C R E A ) , 378 C e n t r e N a t i o n a l e de la R e c h e r c h e Scientifique ( C N R S ) , 393 Certificat d'aptitude au professorat de l'enseignement du second degré ( C A P E S ) . 392 C h a r , R., 255 Charticr, E., see A l a i n C h i s h o l m , R., 5g Chomsky, N , 216 classe de philosophie, 3-4, 382 Classical A g e , Foucault on, 265—6, 270—1, 279 C o h a n - S o l a l , A . , 159 n i C o l l è g e de France, 3 8 2 - 3 , 393 C o l l è g e de Philosophie, 290 113, 354 C o l l è g e de Sociologie, 103

413

C o l l è g e International de Philosophie, 289-90, n2, 393 Collins, J., 128 m 8 c o m m u n i s m , Althusser and, 235, 238; Foucault and, 259; M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 183-4, 206-7; " n e w p h i l o s o p h e r s " and, 371—2; Sartre and, 125—6, 183—4, 206—7; see also M a r x i s m community, 76, 79, 101, 167—8, 308—g, 375, 376 C o m t e , A . , 8, 11, 27, 45 concept, D e l e u z e on the, 336-7; philosophy of the, 227-34 concrete, the, 50, 102-17, 252, 259 C o n d i l l a c , E., 10 consciousness, 47, 5 8 - 9 , 68, 71, 74, g2, 108. m , 129, 133-7, 5 2 , 166, 194-5; d freedom, 147; a n d negation, 139—40; planes of, 65; see also being-for-itself, being-forothers, f r e e d o m , idealism couple, the, 1 7 9 - 8 0 , 352 C o u r t i n e , J . - E , 376 C o u r t u r a t , L., 377 C o u s i n , V , 4, 10 :

a n

creative evolution, 6 6 - 7 4 Culler, J., 215 n i , 244 n26, 304 n i 7 Curtius, E., 5, 6 Darlu, A., 6 Dasein, 256, 356, 372, 377 D a v i d s o n , D., 370 Davis, C , 361 n i 7 D c W a c h l e n s , A . , 122 n5 deconstruction, 291-7, 374 Defert, D., 285 n2i Delacour, J., 64 ng D e l e u z e , G , 113, 234, 250, 255, 3 3 1 - 4 1 , 388, 389; a n d G u a t t a r i , 339-41 democracy, 97, 334, 373 D e r r i d a , J., 113, 123 n7, 250, 289-317, 354 112, 388, 393; and Bataille, 252-3; and Blanchot, 252-3; a n d Foucault, 289-90, 308; a n d Heidegger, 254, 256; a n d Husserl, 289, 291, 2g6, 2g7 m o , 301—2; and Irigaray, 350—1; and Levinas, 354 112; and Ricoeur, 369 1136; a n d Sartre, 129 1119, 389; and Saussure, 293, 3 0 0 - 1 , 302, 303; a n d skepticism, 304—8; works: " L a différance", 291, 299-301; The Gift of Death, 313-7; Glas, 254, 291, 297 m o ; Limited Inc., 305—7; Of Grammatology, 303, 307; Speech and Phenomena, 291, 301 Descartes, R., 9, 11, 54, 186, 233, 252, 355. 377 D e s c o m b e s , V , 209, 232—3, 363 n2i

414

Index

desiring-machines, 341 determinism, 2 1 - 5 , 58, 92, 1 4 7 - 8 , 383; see also causality D e w s , P., 236 n20, 320 n4 differance, D e r r i d a on, 298—302 difference, D e l e u z e o n , 334—36; sexual, in I r i g a r a y 341—2 différend, 321-31 D i p l ô m e d'Études A p p r o f o n d i e s ( D E A ) , 391 D i p l ô m e d'Etudes Universitaires G é n é r a l e s ( D E U G ) , 391 discipline, Foucault on, 278-82 discourse vs. figure, 319-20 doctorat d'état, 391 doctorat d'université, 391 Dosse, F , 210 n i 9 , 364 n27,112g Dreyfus affair, 7—8 Dreyfus, H . , 256-7 D u f r e n n e , M i k e l , 364 D u h e m , E., 9, 27, 33-8, D u m é z i l , G., 261 ng, 393 D u p o n t , C . , 105 n32 duration, 51, 53, 5 5 - 6 , 64, 7 3 - 4 D ü r k h e i m , E., 9, 20, 78, 210, 382

101; M a r i t a i n on, 95; N a n c y o n , 374—5; Sartre on, 133, 142; see also essence existence, philosophy of, 114—5, 117, 181, 235, 284, 286, 386; see also existentialism existentialism, 98, 102—3, 3 > > 4 > 386—7, 389; a n d M a r x i s m , 126, 151-2, 155, 235, 238; B e a u v o i r and, 160, 161-3, 164, 165, 169—70, 177; Foucault and, 260; H e i d e g g e r and, 252, 255—6; M a r c e l a n d , 386—7; N a n c y and, 3 7 4 - 5 ; see also existence, philosophy of n

I 2 2

I2

experience, 3 8 5 - 6 exteriority, 355; see also interiority Fabiani, J.-L., 4 n5, 5 n7, g o n i 2 face, 3 5 7 - 8 facts, see scientific facts Farias, V , 376 feminism, a n d Levinas, 363 n 2 i ; B e a u v o i r on, 175—80, D e r r i d a a n d Irigaray o n , 351—2; see also Beauvoir, Irigaray, L e D o e u f f Ferry, L., 354 n i , 3 7 2 - 4 , 379, 388 F i c h t e J . , 4 3 , 373 n46 figure, see discourse Flaubert, G., 126, 127

Ecole N o r m a l e Supérieure, 8, 105 n 3 i , 181 n i , 236 1118, 382, 392 École Pratiques des H a u t e s Études, 393 educational system, French, 3 - 5 , 3 8 2 - 3 , 39!-3 élan vital (vital impetus), 66, 68, 70, 75, 80, 115 n 8 emotions, m o r a l a n d religious, 76; Sartre on, 129-30 E n g e l , E , 378 enjoyment, 357, 359 epistemological break, 86—7, 229—30, 236 Esprit, see M o u n i e r , E. essence, B e a u v o i r o n , 165, 177; M a r i t a i n on, 95; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 186, 187-8. 199—200; N a n c y on, 374—5; Sartre on, 131-2, 142; see also existence 5

ethics, B e r g s o n on, 7 5 - 8 ; B r u n s c h v i c g o n , 47; D e r r i d a on, 308-13; Ferry and R e n a u t on, 373; Foucault on, 286—8; Irigaray on, 347—8; L y o t a r d o n , 327—9; L e v i n a s on, 356, 357—8, 361—2; R i c o e u r on, 370; Sartre on, 124-5 ethnology, see a n t h r o p o l o g y event, D e l e u z e o n , 338 evil, R i c o e u r o n , 365—6

fluids, Irigaray on, 347 F l y n n , T., 1521139 Foucault, M . , 39, 85, 113, 123 n7, 2 2 7 - 8 , 230. 232, 234, 250, 2 5 8 - 8 8 , 381, 389; and Bataille, 252—3; a n d B a c h e l a r d a n d C a n g u i l h e m , 2 6 0 - 1 ; and B l a n c h o t , 252-3; and D e l e u z e , 339; a n d Heidegger, 256—7, 273; a n d M a r x i s m , 259; and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 259—60; and Sartre, 260, 261, 358—60; works: Discipline and Punish, 278-82; History of Madness, 264-7; history of Sexuality, 2 8 2 - 8 ; The Order of Things, 267-78 foundationalism, 39, 2 9 4 - 5 , 3 7 France, A . , 5 Frank, M . , 339

0 _ i

J 3^0, 3^5

fraternity, 180 freedom, 11, 13, 380—90; and poststructuralism, 3 8 8 - 9 ; B e a u v o i r on, 387; B e r g s o n on, 5 6 - 6 0 , 384; B o u t r o u x on, 21—5; B r u n s c h v i c g on, 47; Ferry and R e n a u t on, 373; L a c h e l i e r on, 19—20; Levinas o n , 359—60; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 203-8, 3 8 7 - 8 ; N a n c y o n , 3 7 4 - 5 ; Sartre o n , H7~5h 3 5 9 - « = 3 8 7 - 8 6

creative evolution E w a l d , F , 285 n2i

Freud, S., 174, 186, 238-44, 3 3 9 - 4 ; 3 5 i Sartre on, 141 1130, 149; see also psychoanalysis Fry, C , 113 n52 Fullbrook, E. a n d K., 161 n i o

existence, B e a u v o i r on, 165, 177; M a r c e l on.

fundamental project, 148—9

evolution, B e r g s o n o n , 68-70, 78, 81; see also

1

6

Index G a d a m e r , H.-G., 367 1133 Garaudy, R., 235 G a r r i g o u - L a g r a n g e , R., 94, 96 genealogy, 278, 2 8 5 - 6 , 288 G e n e t , J . , 125, 127

4!5 Foucault, 27; and L e v i n a s , 353-4; and Merleau-Ponty, 182, 184, 1 8 6 - 8 ; and N a z i s m , 376; a n d Sartre, 129—31, 132—3; early influence in France, 105, 106, 107—8; recent French interest in, 376—7; see also p h e n o m e n olo gy

G e r m a n philosophy, 5—6, 21, 380—1, 382 G e w i r t h , A . , 77 1127 Gide, A., 6

hypokhâgne, 392

gift, D e r r i d a on, 310, 313; M a r i o n on, 377; Mauss on, 210—11 Gilson, E., 94, 96, 97 G l u c k s m a n n , A . , 371—2 G o d , Bergson on, 79, 81—2; Blondel on, 90, 91, 92—3; Brunschvieg on, 48; D e r r i d a on. 313—17; Irigaray on, 349—50; L e v i n a s on, 360—1; M a r c e l on, 100—1, 102; M a r i o n on, 377; M a r i t a i n on, 95, 96, 97; R e n o u v i e r on,

hypotheses, scientific, 28-30 Hyppolite, J., 89 n n , n o n48, 113, 115 n 57, 258

13—14; spiritualism and, 11, 14; see also

idealism, a n d Bachelard, 87—8; a n d Brunschvieg, 40, 42—3; a n d Lachelier, 20; and M a r c e l , 98; a n d spiritualism, 14—15; Bergson on, 61—2; G e r m a n , 5—6, 109—13. 380; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 196, 197-203; 380; see also B o u t r o u x , Brunschvieg, H e g e l , Lachelier

religion

Idéologues, 10

G o l d m a n , L., 235 ni7 G o o d m a n , N., 338 n6i grammatology, 293

imagination, 88—9, 129—30

grandes écoles, 392, 393

induction, 15-20 infinity, 355 intellectual, specific vs. universal, 263 intelligence, 71—4 intentionality, 108, 134-5 interiority, 356—7, 358; see also exteriority intuition, 7 1 - 4 , 95, 100 Irigaray, L., 179, 341-52, 388

i m m a n e n c e , 171—2, 178; see also transcendence

indeterminism, 21-5; see also causality

Granger, G.-G., 377, 378 n6i Guattari, E , 339-41 Guitton, J., 6 119 G u n n , J. Alexander, 14 1125 G u r v i t c h , G., 106 G u r w i t s c h , A . , 105 1132 habit, 12, 75 H a m e l i n , O . , 14, 15 n27 H a r d t , M . , 334 n i 5 H e g e l , G., 109-13, 115, 236, 254, 335, 355, 380-1 Heidegger, M . , 102 n24, 106, 107, 108, 115, H°> 5 > 3 5 ° . 3 5 3 - 4 . 37 "3> 3 " ; D e r r i d a , 254, 256; a n d Foucault, 256-7, 273; French translations of, 36; and N a z i s m , 256, 376; a n d poststructuralism. 255—7; - Sartre, 129—31 Henry, M . , 376 H e r b r a n d , J . , 378 H e r i n g , J . , 105 hermeneutics, R i c o e u r on, 366—9, 371 H o c k i n g , W. E., 115 1158 HöfTding, H . , 8 n i 3 Holland, E., 339 n23 Hollier, D., 107, n37 homosexuality, 283, 287, 348 hospitality, D e r r i d a on, 309 Howells, C . , 254 1144, 389 111 H u m e , D., 10, 385 humor, B e r g s o n on, 72 Husserl, E., 102 1124, 115, 228, 380-1; and 2

2

2

a n a

8 0

1

a

n

d

Jakobson, R., 222 James, W , 14 Janet, P., 9, 50 J a n i c a u d , D., 50 n2, 377 1158 Jankélévitch, V , 74 1126, 82-3 Jaspers, K . , 102 n24, 363 Jaurès, J., 50 J o a n of A r c , 173 j u d g m e n t , 4 1 - 3 , 4 6 - 7 ; regulative vs. determinate, 329 Judt, T., 126 n i 4 justice, 311—13, 320—1 K a n t , I., 29, 252, 329, 390; Bergson and, 54—6; B o u t r o u x and, 21; Brunschvieg and, 45, 46, 74, 77; D e l e u z e and, 329, 337-8; Ferry a n d R e n a u t and, 372-3; Foucault and, 261—2, 270, 272—3; Lachelier and, 15—18; M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 116, 186; R e n o u v i e r and, 13; Sartre and, 132 Kearney, R., 361

khâgne, 392 K i e r k e g a a r d , S., 90, 109 n44, 140, 360; and D e r r i d a , 313—16

4i 6

Index

Kitcher, P., 69 1117 K l e u t g e n , J., 94 k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r , 2 7 8 - 9 , 284 K o j è v e , A . , 103, 110-13, 235 K o s a k i e v i c z , O . , 161 K o y r é , A . , 110

linguistics, 215-21

Kristeva, J., 243-4, 253> 254 n o K u h n , T., 39 n i 6 , 86, 232 4

L a Fontaine, J. de, 233

literature, Sartre and, 121, 123-4; B e a u v o i r on, 161—2; D e r r i d a on, 296—7; and philosophy, 102-3, 252-4, 2 9 6 - 7 , 381 L o c k e , J., 10 logocentrism, 294, 369, 374 L o g u e , G., 13 n23 Lucretius, 233 Lukâcs, G , 235 n i 7 lycée, 4, 391

L a c a n , J., 110, 238-43, 250, 275, 344, 346; and L y o t a r d , 3 1 8 - 1 9 ; a n d Ricoeur, 260 365

L y o t a r d , J . - E , 3 1 8 - 3 1 , 388, 389, 393

Lacey, A . R., 59 n4, 67 n i 4 Lachelicr, J., 14-20, 25, 26, 27, 74, 89, 91, 383; and Ricoeur, 368 1133; on H e g e l , 109

M a c h , E., 27 Macherey, P., 236 madness, Foucault on, 264-7 M a i n de B i r a n , F , 4 114, 10, 84, 91 maître de conférences, 391 maîtrise, 391 M a l l a r m é , S., 127 1116 Malraux, A., 6

L a c o i x , J., 92 n i 5 L a c o u c - L a b a r t h e , P., 376, 388, 393 Ladrière, J., 200 n i 3 , 228 L a g n e a u , J . , 368 1133 Lalande, A., 7 language, and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 226; D e r r i d a and, 252, 292, 300-2; Foucault a n d , 252-3, 257, 260, 268-71, 277; L y o t a r d on, 3 1 8 - 9 , 326—7; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on; 192—5, 202—3; R i c o e u r on, 368-70; the unconscious as (Lacan), 240-4; see also linguistics, phrases, Saussure Latour, B., 9 n i 5 Lavelle, L., 84 law, D e r r i d a on, 311—12; scientific, B o u t r o u x on, 2 2 - 4 ; D u h e m o n , 3 4 - 5 ; Poincaré on, 28-30; Le D a n t e c , F , 9 n i 4 Le Doeuff, M . , 143 1131, 379 Le Roy, E., 3-32, 37 1112, 89 Le Saulchoir, 94 Lefebvre, H . , 113 n52, 235 Lefort, C , 184 rï], 320 n2 Leibniz, G., 54, 233 L e S e n n e , R., 84 Levinas, E., 106, 107, 3 5 3 - 6 3 , 390; and Descartes, 355; a n d feminism, 363 n 2 i ; and Heidegger, 353, 354, 3 5 5 - 6 , 357; and Husserl, 353, 354; a n d J u d a i s m , 354, 361; and M a r x i s m , 354 Lévi-Strauss, G., 123 n7, 209, 210, 211, 221-7, 250, 368, 382, 393; and Merleau-Ponty, 208-10, 2 2 4 - 5 , 3 8 7 - 8 ; d Sartre, 225-7, 387-8 a n

Lévy, Benny, 128 n i 8 Lévy, B e r n a r d - H e n r i , 371—2, 374 1148 L é v y - B r u h l , 78 Libera tore, M . , 94 licence, 234 n i 5 , 391 Lilla, M . , 373 1147

M a r c e l , G., 98-102, 105, 115, 123 n7, 354, 360, 363, 384; and Bergson, 115 n58; and Brunschvicg, 104,1128; and Merleau-Ponty, 102 n24; on Sartre, 122 115 M a r i o n , J - L . , 376-7 M a r i t a i n , J., 84, 9 4 - 8 , 384 M a r x , K., 110-13, 152, 186, 2 3 5 - 8 ; see also Marxism M a r x i s m , 151-7, 250, 339-41, 354, 372, 388; see also c o m m u n i s m , M a r x materialism, 6 1 - 2 , 9 1 - 2 M a u r r a s , C , 97 Mauss, M . , 2 1 0 - n M a y 1968, 238, 253, 320, 371, 372 M c B r i d c , W., 122 n5 M c C o o l , G., 94 n i 7 M c N e i l l , J , 91 n i 4 M e h l , R., 364 n27 M e i n o n g , A . , 378 memory, 61, 63—6 Mercier, D., 94 Merleau-Ponty, M . , 3, 102 n24, 104-5, 9 > n o , 121, 181-212, 251, 258, 355, 3 8 4 - 5 , 387—8, 393; a n d Beauvoir, 161 m o ; and Bergson, 113—17, 384; a n d Lévi-Strauss, 208-10, 224-5, 3 8 7 - 8 ; a n d L y o t a r d , 325 117; a n d M a r c e l , 102 1124; and Sartre, 123, 126, 181-4, 195, 196, 197, 203-8, 3 8 4 - 5 ; Foucault on, 273-4; works: Phenomenology of Perception, 185, 186-208; 77K Structure of Behavior 184—5; Th Visible and the Invisible, 185, 2 0 7 - 8 , 2 0 9 - 1 0 I0

e

metaphor, 242, 297, 369 M e y e r s o n , E., 3 7 - 8 , 84, 85, 108 Mill, J , 16

Index Pius X I , 97

mimesis, 276 mind-body problem, 60-6 M o i , T., 143, n 3 i , 163 M o o r e , F. T. G., 71 n i g morality, see ethics M o u n i e r , E., 102 n24, 181, 363 multiplicity, D e l c u z e on, 3 3 2 - 4 Musil, R . , 3 7 8 mysteries, 100 mythologies, 244-7

Plato, 293, 346-7, 355 Poincarc, H . , 6, 9, 26, 2 7 - 3 3 , 85 politics, 3 2 9 - 3 1 , 375; see also political theory political theory, 373-4; see also politics positivism, 8-9, 1 0 - 1 1 , 251; B o u t r o u x a n d , 25; B r u n s c h v i c g a n d , 43, 45; French philosophy o f science and, 26, 39—40 Poster, M . , 235 n i 6 poststructuralism, 249-57, 372—4, 377. 388-90 p o w e r / k n o w l e d g e , 2 7 8 - 9 , 284 problems, 100 Protagoras, 322 Proust, M . , 6, 50, 108, 131, 339 psychoanalysis, 342-4; see also Freud, Kristeva, Lacan

N a b e r t , J., 368 n33 Nancy, J.-L., 3 7 4 - 6 , 388, 38g narrative, 369—70 nausea, 107, 137 negation, 138—40, 147 n e o - T h o m i s m , 94—6, 102, 384 new philosophers

(nouveaux philosophes),

371—2

N i c o d , J., 378 Nietzsche, F , 186, 234, 253 n39, 2 5 4 - 5 , 386: D e l e u z e on, 333 N i z a n , P., 103—4, 6 > 7 , 3 N o b e l Prize, 51, 381 norms, C a n g u i l h e m on, 231—2; Foucault o n . 266, 280-1; L a c a n on, 239; L y o t a r d o n , IQ

I 0

I 2

328; see also ethics nothing, 68 n i 5 , 91; see also negation, nothingness nothingness, 138-9 objectivity, scientific, 3 0 - 3 O l l é - L a p r u n e , L., 91 ontology, see being order, Foucault o n , 267—78 other, the, 144-7, O t t , H., 376

l 6

417

5 - 8 , 95-7> 355-9 :

Q u e n e a u , R., 107, n o Q u i n e , W., 50 111, 302 n i 4 R a b i n o w , P., 257 Ravaisson, F., 1 0 - 1 2 , 13, 14, 15, 25, 27, 84, 91, 383 R a w l s , J., 379 realism, 62, 8 7 - 8 , 132-3, 197-8 reduction, p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l , 187, 273, 376-7; cidetic, 187-8 reflection, p r i m a r y vs. s e c o n d a r y (Marcel), 99—101 Reid, X , 385 relativity theory, 30 n2, 38 n i 4 , 53 n3; Bergson o n , 67 n i 4 religion, 12, 20, 37, 4 7 - 8 , 89, 93, 377; Bergson on, 78—82; D e r r i d a on, 313—17; Irigaray on, 349—50; Levinas o n , 360—1; R i c o e u r o n ,

364—5; Sartre on, 128 n i 8 ; see also G o d Parodi, D . , 3, 9, 1 1 , 4 3 , 8 4 - 5 Pascal, B., 40, 89 Péguy, C , 50 Peperzak, A . , 356 n , 359 ng, 362 1119 perception, 6 1 - 3 PfeifFer, G , 106 4

p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 129-31, 186-90, 228, 376-7; and ontology, 121—3, 150—1, 206—8; a n d Ricoeur, 365—6, 370—1; a n d structuralism. 208-12, 224-7, 251; Foucault on, 273-4,

276; see also Heidegger, Husserl philosophy, analytic, 7, 27, 321, 370, 3 7 8 - 9 , 382, 383, 390; D e r r i d a o n , 2 g 3 - 4 , 2g5-7; in French education, 3 - 5 , 3 8 2 - 3 , 3 9 1 - 3 ; poststructuralist critique of, 390 phrases, L y o t a r d on, 322—8 P i a g e t J . , 50 Pius X , 37

Renaissance, Foucault on, 265, 269—70 R e n a n , E., 9, 90 R e n a u t , A . , 354 n i , 379, 388 Renouvier, C . , 1 2 - 1 4 , 383 repetition, D e l e u z e o n , 336 representation, B e r g s o n o n , 61—4; D e l e u z e on, 331, 336—8, 341; D e r r i d a on, 256; D u h e m on, 33-4; Foucault on, 270-2, 275; Irigaray on, 347, 350, 351; Lévi-Strauss on, 222; Saussure on, 217-18 resemblance, Foucault on, 269—70; Irigaray on, 347 ^

Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 7 Rey, A . , 37 Richir, M . , 364 1129 Ricoeur, P., 102 n24, 106, 234, 363—71; a n d Husserl, 364, 3 6 5 - 6 , 371; a n d Jaspers, 363; and L e v i n a s , 370; a n d M a r c e l , 363; a n d

Index

4i8 Ricoeur, P. (cont.) Merleau-Ponty, 364; a n d Sartre, 364, 365: on h e r m e n e u t i c s , 366—g; on psychoanalysis, 367 R i m b a u d , A . , 241 R o b b c - G r i l l e t , A . , 260 Rorty, R., 308 R o t h , M . , 1 1 0 n45~7 R o u s s e a u , J.-J., 2g3, 2g8, 302, 303 Roussel, R., 260 R o y c e , J., 104 n28 Russell, B., 136 n27 Rylc, G., 188 1112 same, the, 354-5 S a n t a y a n a , G , 21 n32 Sartre, J . - P , 33, 43 n : 8 , 47, 5 g - 6 o , g2, g8, 105, 106, 107-8, i o g , n o n46, 121-57, 251,

374 48> 379, 381, 384-5- 3 8 7 - 8 , 3 9 ° ; B e r g s o n , 114—15; and Foucault, 276—7; and Freud, 141 n30, 14g; and Heidegger, 12g—31; a n d Husserl, 12g—31, 132—3; and Lévi-Strauss, 225-7, 3 8 7 - 8 ; a n d Levinas, 354, 3 5 8 - 6 0 , 3 8 7 - 8 ; and M a r x i s m , 1 2 5 - 6 , 151-7; and Merleau-Ponty, 123, 126, 1 8 1 - 4 , 195, 196, 197, 203-8; and Nancy, 374 n48, 3 7 5 - 6 ; and structuralism, 225-7, 276-7; works: Being and .Nothingness, 122, 128-51, 358, 387; C r i t i q u e o f Dialectical R e a s o n , 126, 151—7, 387; The Family Idiot, 126, 127-8; The Flies, 151 n37; Nausea, 107; No Exit 146 n33; Saint Genet, 125; What Is Literature?, 123-4; Th Words, 127 n

a

e

Saussure, F., 209, 2 1 5 - 2 1 , 222 Scheler, M , , 106, 18g schizophrenia, D e l e u z e and G u a t t a r i on, 339-4 Schlick, M . , 378 S c h o p e n h a u e r , A . , 90, 91 Schyns, M . , 22 n34 science, limitations of, 51—4, 134, 188—9; objectivity of, 3 0 - 3 ; philosophy of, 9, 26—40, 229—34, 260—1, 381; progress of, 44-6, sciences, h u m a n , 267—8, 274—6 sciences, social, 9 n i 5 , 3 8 1 - 2 ; see also anthropology, D ü r k h e i m , Lévi-Strauss, M a u s s , structuralism scientific facts, 3 1 - 3 , 3 4 - 5 , 37-8 Searlc, J., 290, 291, 370 self-deception, see b a d faith Seilars, W., 302 1114 Serres, M . , 8 n8, 232-4, 234 n i 5 Sertillanges, A . - D . , 94, 114 sexual difference, Irigaray o n , 341—2 1

n

d

sexuality, history of, 282-8 Shakespeare, W., 369 Shestov, L., 105 Simons, M . , 160 118 situation, 14g skepticism, D e r r i d a and, 304—8 social sciences, see sciences, social Socialisme ou B a r b a r i e , 320 Société Français de la Philosophie, 7 Sollers, P., 243, 253 S o r b o n n e , 3g2 Sorel, G., 50 speech, D e r r i d a on, 2 g 2 - 3 , 2g8, 302-3; L a c a n o n , 241—2; L e v i n a s on, 357; Saussure o n , 216, 217; see also writing Spencer, H . , 230 Spicgelberg, H . , 106 ^ 3 - 5 , 133, 137 n28, 182 114 S p i n o z a , B., 40, 54, 78; D e l e u z e o n , 333-4 spiritualism, g - 1 4 , 25, g i , 382, 383 Steiner, G , 3g n i 6 Steward, J., 182 n2 structuralism, 208-12, 215-57, 381; and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 224-7, 3 8 7 - 8 ; R i c o e u r on, 3 6 7 - 8 ; see also Lévi-Strauss; sciences, social supplement, 302-3 surrealism, 102—3 "suspicion, masters o f " , 367 1133 Taine, H . , 6, 9, 90 Teilhard de C h a r d i n , P , 82 n29 Tel quel, 238, 253-4 temps modernes, Les, 123, 126, 181, 182, 183-4, 345 text, D e r r i d a o n , 305—6; see also books Thao, Tran Duc, n o T h i b a u d e t , A . , 3, 5 T h o m i s m , see n e o - T h o m i s m totality, 3 5 5 - 6 totems, 222-4 trace, 303-4, 311, 361 1115 transcendence, 170—1, 178, 349, 355; see also immmanence Troubetzkoy, N., 222 truth, a n d poststructuralism, 2 5 0 - 1 , 255; B r u n s c h v i c g on, 43; D e l e u z e on, 331, 336; D e r r i d a o n , 304—8, 311; Foucault's history of, 285; L y o t a r d on, 320—1; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 201—2; vs. mimesis, 376 unconscious, Foucault on, 260, 261, 275; L a c a n on, 240—2, 318—19; Lévi-Strauss on, 224; L y o t a r d o n , 3 1 8 - 1 9 ; R i c o e u r on, 367; Sartre o n , 149; see also Freud, psychoanalysis

Index Vadee, M . , 86 114

Whitford, M . , 350 n27, 351 n2g

Valcry, P., 6, 50, 253 1139 V a n B r e d a , H . L., 184 V e y n e , P , 260 n8 V i e n n a C i r c l e , 188, 378 Virgoulay, R., 91 n i 3 vital force, see élan vital Vuillcmin, J., 377, 378 n 6 i

will, Blondel o n , 9 2 - 3 ; R i c o e u r on, 3 6 5 - 6 ,

W a h l , J., 105, 108 1140, 109-10, 290 n3,

370 Wittgenstein, L., 378 w o m e n , 1 6 4 - 5 , ! 6 5 - 8 o ; a n d biology, 169-70, 170-2, 178; as other, 1 6 5 - 8 ; see also feminism W o r m s , F., 65 n u writing, D c r r i d a o n , 2 9 1 - 3 , 2 9 5 - 7 , 298, 302—3; see also speech

354 Weber, L., 43 n i 8 Weil, S., 43 m 8 , 105 n 3 i , 164 n i 4

Z e n o , 51, 304 Z o l a , E., 5