F O U C A U LT O N F R E E D O M Freedom and the subject were guiding themes for Michel Foucault throughout his philosop...
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F O U C A U LT O N F R E E D O M Freedom and the subject were guiding themes for Michel Foucault throughout his philosophical career. In this clear and comprehensive analysis of his thought, Johanna Oksala identifies the different interpretations of freedom in his philosophy and examines three major divisions of it: the archaeological, the genealogical, and the ethical. She shows convincingly that in order to appreciate Foucault’s project fully we must understand his complex relationship to phenomenology, and she discusses Foucault’s treatment of the body in relation to recent feminist work on this topic. Her sophisticated but lucid book illuminates the possibilities which Foucault’s philosophy opens up for us in thinking about freedom. j o h a n n a o k s a l a is a Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. She has published articles on Foucault, phenomenology and feminist philosophy.
MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY General Editor Robert B. Pippin, University of Chicago Advisory Board Gary Gutting, University of Notre Dame Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Humboldt University, Berlin Mark Sacks, University of Essex
Some recent titles Daniel W. Conway: Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game John P. McCormick: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism Frederick A. Olafson: Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics Gunter ¨ Z¨oller: Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy Warren Breckman: Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory William Blattner: Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism Charles Griswold: Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment Gary Gutting: Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity Allen Wood: Kant’s Ethical Thought Karl Ameriks: Kant and the Fate of Autonomy Alfredo Ferrarin: Hegel and Aristotle Cristina Lafont: Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure Daniel Dahlstrom: Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Michelle Grier: Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion Henry Allison: Kant’s Theory of Taste Allen Speight: Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency J. M. Bernstein: Adorno Will Dudley: Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy Taylor Carman: Heidegger’s Analytic Douglas Moggach: The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer Ru¨ diger Bubner: The Innovations of Idealism Jon Stewart: Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered Nicholas Wolterstorff: Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology Michael Quante: Hegel’s Concept of Action Wolfgang Detel: Foucault and Classical Antiquity
F O U C A U LT O N F R E E D O M
JOHANNA OKSALA University of Helsinki
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, S˜ao Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521847797 C Johanna Oksala 2005
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2005 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library isbn-13 978-0-521-84779-7 hardback isbn-10 0-521-84779-6 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
CONTENTS
page vii
Acknowledgements
viii
List of abbreviations Introduction
1 pa rt i l a n g ua g e
1
Philosophical laughter An archaeology of order The three epistemes The birth and death of man The being of language
17 19 23 30 34
2
The Foucaultian failure of phenomenology The history of science The analytic of finitude
40 41 53
3
The anonymity of language A view from nowhere The subject of change The freedom of language
70 71 78 81
pa rt i i b o dy 4
A genealogy of the subject The constitution of the subject The problem of circularity
93 95 104
5
Anarchic bodies The body of power The discursive body
110 111 117 v
vi
6
contents
The resistance of the body The anarchic body
121 124
Female freedom The anonymous subjectivity of the body The historical constitution of the body Female freedom?
135 138 145 150
pa rt i i i e t h i c s 7
The silence of ethics History of ethics Ethics as practice The ethical subject Ethics as aesthetics Philosophy lived
157 157 160 161 165 169
8
The freedom of philosophy The freedom of critical reflection Freedom as ethos The different meanings of freedom
175 176 182 188
9
The other Ethical subject and the other Subjectivity as passivity The other as precondition of ethics
193 195 199 204
Conclusion: freedom as an operational concept
208
References
211
Index
220
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am fortunate to have had some of the leading philosophers in my field to read parts or versions of this work at different stages of its development: Rosi Braidotti, Simon Critchley, Thomas Flynn, Gary Gutting, Sara Hein¨amaa, Jana Sawicki and Dan Zahavi. I am deeply grateful to them for their perceptive comments, good advice and constructive criticism. I want to thank the many networks of colleagues and good friends who have inspired, supported and discussed my work. I also want to thank my students, whose critical questions and fresh insights have contributed to my views on Foucault. A different version of chapter 5 originally appeared as the article ‘Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Feminist Question of Experience’ in Hypatia, A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 4. I am grateful for the permission to reprint it here. Last but not least, I want to thank my family for their love, support and remarkable patience.
vii
A B B R E V I AT I O N S F O R W O R K S B Y F O U C A U LT
Books in English AK DL DP HS OT UP
The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel. Trans. Charles Ruas. New York: Doubleday, 1986. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977/1991. The History of Sexuality, vol. i, An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 1970/1994. The History of Sexuality, vol. ii, The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Hurley. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. Articles, essays and interviews in English
ATT
B/P
CF
‘The Art of Telling the Truth’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 86–95. ‘Body/Power’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 55–62. ‘The Confession of the Flesh’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972–1977, ed. Colin
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CT
CT/IH
EPF
GE
HES
IHB
INP
MS
NGH
OWH
ix
Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 194–228. ‘The Concern for Truth’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 255–67. ‘Critical Theory/Intellectual History’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 17–46. ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practise of Freedom’, in The Final Foucault, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988, 1–20. ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. J. Harari. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, 340–72. ‘The Hermeneutic of the Subject’, in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1997, 93–106. ‘Introduction’, in Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century French Hermaphrodite, ed. Michel Foucault, trans. Richard McDougall. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, vii–xvii. ‘Introduction’, in Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett. New York: Zone Books, 1991, 7–24. ‘Minimalist Self’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 3–16. ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. J. Harari. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, 76–100. ‘On the Ways of Writing History’, in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion, series ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1998, 279– 95.
x
PE
PS
PT
PR
QG
RM
SC
SP
SPPI
SPS
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‘Politics and Ethics: An Interview’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. J. Harari. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, 373–80. ‘Postscript, An Interview with Michel Foucault by Charles Ruas’, in Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel, trans. Charles Ruas. New York: Doubleday, 1986, 169– 86. ‘A Preface to Transgression’, in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion, series ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1998, 69–87. ‘Politics and Reason’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 57–85. ‘Questions on Geography’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 63–77. ‘The Return of Morality’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 242–54. ‘Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault and Homosexuality’, in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge, 1988, 286– 303. ‘Subject and Power’, in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Press, 1982, 208–26. ‘Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity’, in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1997, 163–73. ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion, series ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1998, 433–58.
l i s t o f a b b r e v i at i o n s
ST
STW
TES
TJF
TL
TP
WA
WC
WE
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‘Subjectivity and Truth’, in The Politics of Truth: Michel Foucault, ed. Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. New York: Semiotext(e), 1997, 171–98. ‘A Swimmer Between Two Words’, in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. James D. Faubion, series ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1998, 171– 4. ‘Technologies of the Self’, in Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1997, 223–51. ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’, in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, ed. James D. Foubion, series ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others. New York: New Press, 1997, 1–89. ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 78–108. ‘Truth and Power’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, 109–33. ‘What is an Author?’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. J. Harari. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, 101– 20. ‘What is Critique?’, in The Politics of Truth: Michel Foucault, ed. Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. New York: Semiotext(e), 1997, 23–82. ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. J. Harari. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, 32–50. Books in French
AS MC RR
L’arch´eologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969/2001. Les mots et les choses. Une arch´eologie des sciences humaines. Paris: Gallimard, 1966/1996. Raymond Roussel. Paris: Gallimard, 1963.
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Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard, 1975/2001. Histoire de la sexualit´e, vol. ii, L’usage des plaisirs. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994. Histoire de la sexualit´e, vol. i, La volont´e de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976. Articles, essays and interviews in French
CJ
EPL
IMF
JMF
PA
PC
PEI
QA
QL1
QL2
‘Cours du 14 janvier 1976’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iii, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1976/1994, 175–89. ‘L’´ethique du souci de soi comme pratique de la libert´e’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994, 708–29. ‘Introduction par Michel Foucault’, in Dits et e´crits 1954– 1988, vol. iii, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1978/1994, 429–42. ‘Le jeu de Michel Foucault’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iii, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1978/1994, 298–9. ‘La philosophie analytic de la politique’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iii, 1976–1979, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1978/1994, 534–51. ‘Pouvoir et corps’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. ii, 1970– 1975, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1975/1994, 754–60. ‘Politique et e´ thique: une interview’, in Dits et e´crits 1954– 1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994, 584–90. ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. i, 1954–1969, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1969/1994, 789–821. ‘Qu’est-ce que les Lumi`eres?’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994, 562–78. ‘Qu’est-ce que les Lumi`eres?’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994, 679–88.
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SEPS
SFH
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‘Structuralisme et poststructuralisme’, in Dits et e´crits 1954– 1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1983/1994, 431–57. ‘Sur les fa¸cons d’´ecrire l’histoire’, in Dits et e´crits 1954–1988, vol. i, 1954–1969, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1967/1994, 585–600. ‘La vie: l’exp´erience et la science’, in Dits et e´crits 1954– 1988, vol. iv, 1980–1988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran¸cois Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 1984/1994, 763–76.
INTRODUCTION
Freedom is a concept that it is repeatedly used today in discourses ranging from political philosophy and rhetoric to self-help guides, yet it seems that it has never been less clear what it means. This is not only due to conceptual confusion or lack of philosophical precision. The effects of the rapid process of economic and cultural globalization have made many of our traditional ways of thinking and living redundant, and have raised critical questions about our ‘freedom’ to command our lives. On the other hand, neo-liberalism and the extreme individualism characterizing our culture have made ‘freedom’ itself a contestable value. One strand in this present ‘crisis’ of freedom is the critique of an autonomous subject which characterizes post-structuralist thinking. Michel Foucault’s thought – and post-structuralist thinking as a whole – is often read as a rejection of the subject. This ‘rejection’ is interpreted in varying terms. The subject cannot ground knowledge, meanings or morality. It is not the agent of social or epistemic changes, but rather the effect of them. There is no subject in itself prior to the normalizing cultural coding that turns the human being into a subject. All possible ways to comprehend oneself and to act in a coherent fashion are conditioned by a historically varying cultural matrix. The charges against Foucault’s thought in contemporary debates often focus on the question of the freedom of the subject and the notions that are understood as intrinsically tied to or dependent on it: autonomy, authenticity, responsibility, political agency. According to many of Foucault’s critics, the denial of an autonomous subject leads to the denial of any meaningful concept of freedom, which again leads to the impossibility of emancipatory politics. When there is no authentic subjectivity to liberate, and power, as the principle of constitution, 1
2
fo u c au lt o n f r e e d o m
has no outside, the idea of freedom becomes meaningless. Since we are always the products of codes and disciplines, the overthrow of constraints will not free us to become natural human beings. Hence, all that we can do is produce new codes and disciplines.1 I will argue that, rather than dismissing post-structuralist thinking as politically dangerous and trying to hold on to the autonomous, humanist subject for political or simply conservative reasons, it is more fruitful to take seriously the major impact post-structuralist thought has had on our ways of thinking about the subject, and also to try to rethink freedom. The post-structuralist understanding of the subject clearly makes problematic many of our traditional and accepted ways of conceiving of freedom. It cannot be understood as an inherent capacity or characteristic of the subject. We cannot say that we are born free. Neither can freedom be linked to emancipation: it does not lie in finding our true or authentic nature and liberating it from the constraints of power or society. For Foucault, freedom is not the freedom of protected rights that must be safeguarded. Neither does there seem to be much point in arguing that it is the ability to choose between different courses of action and to govern oneself autonomously, if our choices themselves are culturally constituted. Freedom cannot be conceived of negatively either: it cannot be linked to the ability to think or act despite external constraints, when the external constraints are understood as the condition of possibility of subjectivity. I will show that Foucault’s thought, however, opens up alternative ways of thinking about freedom. It provides us with important tools for trying to answer the question, perhaps more burning than ever: what is freedom? While it is thus strongly argued by many commentators that there is no freedom in Foucault’s thought, at the same time, and seemingly paradoxically, others argue that the main motive and theme in his work is precisely freedom. Gary Gutting (1989, 1), for example, writes that Foucault’s thought is a search for ‘truths that will make us free’. John Rajchman (1985, 50) claims that Foucault is ‘the philosopher of freedom in a post-revolutionary time’. Given the obvious differences in commentators’ understandings of philosophy, and of Foucault’s thought in particular, it seems plausible to look for the source of the contrasting interpretations in the different ways of understanding freedom in his philosophy. My work will explicate the different meanings of freedom that can be found in Foucault’s works, and inquire into the possibilities he opens up for us in thinking about freedom today. 1 See e.g. Walzer 1986, 61.
introduction
3
Before focusing on the topic of freedom, I will explicate the understanding of the subject to which the question of freedom in Foucault’s thought is essentially tied. When it is argued that there is no freedom in it, the argument rests on the claim that there is no autonomous subject. When, on the other hand, it is argued that freedom is what Foucault’s thought is fundamentally about, it is often claimed that this is due to the fact that his work reveals constraining forms of subjectivity as historically contingent. Foucault himself claimed that the general theme of his research was the subject (e.g. SP, 208). Even though many commentators argue that his own interpretations of his work were continuously changing, not compatible, and were therefore not to be trusted,2 I take this claim to be significant. I will argue that Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies not only contain implicit assumptions and presuppositions about the subject while their actual objects of study, focus and domain are elsewhere – for example, systems of thought, power, social history – but that they also contain explicit efforts to rethink the subject. Foucault characterized his work as a genealogy of the modern subject: a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. He further distinguished three modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects. These modes correspond with three relatively distinct periods in his thought (SP, 208.) The first is the modes of inquiry that give themselves the status of science. Human beings are turned into subjects in processes of scientific study and classification, for example, into speaking subjects in linguistics, subjects who labour in economics, subjects of life in biology. Foucault’s archaeology deals with this first mode in analyzing systems of knowledge. In The Order of Things he showed how the discourses of life, labour and language historically developed and structured themselves as sciences, and how human sciences further constituted man as their object of study. The second phase of Foucault’s work, his genealogies, studied what he himself called ‘dividing practices’ (SP, 208). These are practices of manipulation and examination that classify, locate and shape bodies in the social field. His books Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality are inquiries into this second mode of objectification. He shows how modern disciplinary technologies constitute the subject as their object of control: human beings are examined, measured and categorized. This process defines them as modern 2 See e.g. Hoy 1986, 2.
4
fo u c au lt o n f r e e d o m
individuals. The disciplinary mechanisms do not shape subjectivity only by external coercion; they also function through being ‘interiorized’. In The History of Sexuality, for example, Foucault shows how our belief in a true sexual nature is a disciplinary mode of knowledge that makes us objects of control as well as subjects of sexuality. Our self-understanding, sexuality and even embodiment are constituted by the normative ideas of what is healthy, true and beautiful. The third phase of Foucault’s work, represented by volumes ii and iii of The History of Sexuality, studies the way the human being turns himself or herself into a subject. It is an analysis of the subject’s relationship to itself in the domain of sexuality. He asks how human beings recognize and constitute themselves as subjects of sexuality. The subject’s self-understanding and relationship to the self are important dimensions in the constitution of forms of subjectivity. The subject is studied now not only as an effect of power/knowledge networks, but also as capable of moral self-reflexivity – critical reflection on its own constitutive conditions – and therefore also of resistance to normative practices and ideas. Subjects constitute themselves through different modes of self-understanding and self-formation. Foucault’s ‘ethical turn’ does not essentially change his understanding of the subject, however, it is only the perspective that shifts. He still denies the autonomy of the subject: the subject is always constituted in the power/knowledge networks of a culture, which provide its conditions of possibility. The modes of self-knowledge and techniques of the self that subjects utilize in shaping themselves as subjects of sexuality, for example, are not created or freely chosen. Rather, they are culturally and historically intelligible conceptions and patterns of behaviour that subjects draw from the surrounding society. Self-understanding is internally tied to historically varying social and discursive practices – techniques of governmentality. The governing of oneself is tied to the governing of others. My study of Foucault’s understanding of the subject is traversed by two axes: feminist philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology acts as Foucault’s interlocutor and as a point of comparison. Feminist philosophy traverses the work in the sense that it motivates the questions I pose to Foucault. Even though my starting point is Foucault’s thought, the aim is also at reappropriation, bringing it closer to my own questions and concerns stemming initially from feminist philosophy. Rethinking subjectivity is essential in feminist philosophy, as several feminist writers have argued. Rather than arguing that women too are subjects
introduction
5
when the subject is understood as the independent, autonomous and rational subject of the Enlightenment, a lot of contemporary feminist theoreticians consider it important to question traditional notions of subjectivity. Theorists from diverse philosophical frameworks – such as Luce Irigaray, Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti – have argued that we should not seek to simply redefine the subject in neutral terms, but we should rather define a whole new sense of subjectivity: both problematize the subject and embrace a new subjectivity for women. While the Enlightenment characteristics of the subject – autonomy, independence and rationality – have been firmly associated with masculinity, Braidotti’s nomadic subjects, Haraway’s cyborgs and Irigaray’s images drawn from female morphology represent new figurations aiming to subvert traditional imaginings of female subjectivity.3 Feminist theory does, on the one hand, share with Foucault and poststructuralist thought the aim of rethinking the subject of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, the idea of feminist emancipation is both historically and theoretically connected to the Enlightenment ideal of freedom: the autonomy of subjects. This tension between the modernist legacy of feminist theory and its radical challenging of some of the most fundamental assumptions of the Enlightenment characterizes much of the contemporary feminist debate. This debate has often been cast in terms of feminism versus postmodernism. Since there is no consensus over the meaning of either one of these terms, the debate has taken many different forms, ranging over diverse issues and positions.4 My aim is not to take part in it, but rather to study critically some of the underlying ideas constitutive of the tension between emancipatory politics and post-structuralist understanding of the subject. The feminist task of rethinking female subjectivity is often understood as one of finding an in-between position: we must manage to argue for the culturally constituted status of female subjectivity without losing agency, singularity or the Enlightenment values of freedom and 3 See e.g. Irigaray 1977/1985; 1984/1993, Haraway 1991, Braidotti 1994. 4 The debate involves large epistemological questions about how postmodern feminist critiques of objectivity can avoid falling into relativism; debates about whether the concept of gender functions as a false generalization transcending boundaries of culture, class and race, or as a unifying and empowering notion; aesthetic issues contesting the borders between high and mass culture; analyses of the material changes involved in postmodernism, for example, in the structure of the family, and in work and class distinctions. See e.g. Butler 1990, Haraway 1991, Hekman 1990, Nicholson 1990, Braidotti 1991 and 1994.
6
fo u c au lt o n f r e e d o m
equality motivating the feminist movement. Susan Hekman (1990, 81), among others, has argued that Foucault’s understanding of the subject is a fruitful approach for feminist theory for the very reason that it manages to question the dichotomy between a constituting subject that is autonomous and active versus a constituted subject totally determined by external circumstances. Hekman claims that Foucault’s conception of the subject avoids the eclecticism of many feminist approaches by describing a subject that is capable of resistance and political action without any reference to elements of a disembodied and autonomous Cartesian subjectivity.5 I agree with Hekman that Foucault’s understanding of the subject may well provide a fruitful point of departure in feminist efforts to rethink subjectivity, but my stance is more critical. I will argue that Foucault managed to retain the subject’s capacity for resistance, self-reflection and criticism, but only by leaving open important questions. My work will explicate these questions and discuss the problems involved in answering them. I will also argue that when Foucault’s thinking about the subject is applied to feminist theory, the question of female emancipation has to be rethought. Another axis in my study of Foucault, in addition to feminist philosophy, is phenomenology. Foucault is normally presented as being in opposition to phenomenology, both to its fundaments in Husserl’s thought and to existentialist reinterpretations.6 The common claim is that he rejected Husserl’s transcendentalism and focused on concrete historical facts. He did not align himself with Husserl and his philosophy of transcendental (inter)subjectivity, but rather followed Nietzsche and the ‘postmodern’ thinkers celebrating the death of the subject, meta-narratives and reason. My study questions this common understanding of Foucault’s relationship to phenomenology. I will argue that the simple opposition is based on a narrow reading of phenomenology, and on a simplification of Foucault’s thought, and that there are interesting connections between Foucault and phenomenology which are not adequately understood. I will show that, although Foucault clearly rejected existentialist readings of phenomenology, he did not deny all links to it. The aim of his critique of phenomenology was rather to reveal its problems (as he saw them), and to deal with them through a different approach. 5 On Descartes’ conception of the body and feminist critiques of Cartesian mind–body dualism, see e.g. Reuter 2000, Judovitz 2001. 6 The few exceptions are e.g. Mohanty 1997, Flynn 1997, Han 1998/2002, Visker 1999.
introduction
7
I will argue that Foucault’s thought links up with the phenomenological tradition in at least two senses: (1) it is a critical inquiry into the conditions of possibility of knowledge and the historicity of reason; and (2) as a philosophical study of the subject, it is an effort to rethink critically the phenomenological subject. It may seem difficult to defend a view linking Foucault’s thought to phenomenology, given the fact that he explicitly distanced himself from it in various texts and interviews. The Order of Things, for example, contains explicit criticism, which I discuss in chapter 2. In his introduction to the English translation, he furthermore presents his whole method specifically as an alternative and antidote to phenomenology.7 His criticism of phenomenology in OT is, however, partly self-criticism. Foucault’s first published works – a monograph Maladie mental et personalit´e (1954) and an introduction to the French translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and Existence (1954) – were both strongly influenced by existential phenomenology. He argues in the first edition of Maladie mentale et personalit´e that to understand mental illness we have to take into account the lived experience of the patient, we need ‘a phenomenology of mental illness’. The second edition, published in 1962, was radically rewritten. Keith Hoeller (1993) notes that it reflects the views of mental illness that Foucault put forth in Madness and Civilization in 1961: we need a historical study of madness. Hoeller dates the marked turn in Foucault’s thought from the lived experience to a broader historical and political analysis of its preconditions in these intervening years. Foucault himself describes his turn away from phenomenology: I belong to the generation who as students had before their eyes, and were limited by, a horizon consisting of Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism . . . at the time I was working on my book about the history of madness [Folie et d´eraison]. I was divided between existential psychology and phenomenology, and my research was an attempt to discover the extent that these could be defined in historical terms . . . That’s when I discovered that the subject would have to be defined in other terms than Marxism or phenomenology. (PS, 174)8
7 See OT, xiv. 8 The French original is not available. Wherever possible, I will give the French or German original of the long English citations in a footnote.
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Hence, while it is uncontestable that Foucault was a critic of phenomenology and not a phenomenologist, phenomenology nevertheless forms an important background from which he sought to differentiate and distance his own thought. He started from phenomenology, but he also significantly returned to it in his late texts by reformulating his relationship to it: it no longer appears in terms of an opposition, but is rather presented as a continuum. In a text on the Enlightenment written in late 1970s, he turns to Husserl’s late writings, reading him not essentially as presenting a philosophy of the subject, but as inquiring into the legitimacy of reason. Foucault associates the Enlightenment firmly with critique, a critical attitude that questions not only obstacles to the use of reason, but also reason itself and its limits. According to Foucault, this critical attitude took the form of questioning reason in its connection with power, ‘the relationships between the structures of rationality which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it’ (WC, 45). Foucault saw the critique of reason as responsible for excesses of power taking different forms in the history of philosophy from the Hegelian left to the Frankfurt School. Husserl is also used as an example here, who, according to Foucault, referred to the crisis of European humanity as something that involved the changing relationship between knowledge and technique. Foucault considered Husserl’s thought as importantly questioning rationalization and hence studying reason as a historical phenomenon. In an introduction to the English translation of Georges Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological, Foucault argues that, in his late works, Husserl was not asking traditional epistemological questions about the universal nature of knowledge or its timeless conditions of possibility, but he was rather posing a critical question about our epistemic history as well as about our present reality.9 He thereby situates Husserl in the tradition of thought that questioned western rationality about its claims of universality and autonomy, and hence penetrated the historico-critical dimension of philosophy. Foucault writes: 9 Foucault distinguishes two different modalities according to which French thinkers appropriated Husserl’s thought after his Paris lectures in 1929. One was the existentialist reading of Sartre, which took Husserl in the direction of a philosophy of the subject, and the other was Cavaill`es’ reading, which, according to Foucault, brought it back to its founding principles in formalism and the theory of science (INP, 8–9). Foucault situates his own thought in the tradition of Cavaill`es, which developed as the history of thought and the philosophy of science.
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And if phenomenology, after quite a long period when it was kept at the border, finally penetrated in its turn, it was undoubtedly the day when Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis, posed the question of the relations between the ‘western’ project of a universal development of reason, the positivity of the sciences and the radicality of philosophy. (INP, 11)10
According to Foucault, the critique of rationality led Husserl to develop a new mode of questioning (VES, 767). Husserl did not just study the universal structures of knowledge, he also proposed an inquiry into the historical meaning of knowledge, that is, into the meaning that the ideas of science and philosophy have for us now, at this very moment. Foucault thus considered his thought to be in line with phenomenology to the extent that the answers to the question ‘What is philosophy?’ would be similar: philosophy is understood essentially as a critical practice responding to our present. It is, however, not only critical towards other forms of knowledge or practices of living, but it is also significantly selfcritical. It must turn to question its own conditions of possibility, the legitimacy of reason and its own historicity. I will argue that understanding Foucault’s background in phenomenology and relating his work to it is important for understanding his philosophical position. I will show how many of Foucault’s central philosophical issues and methodological directions are motivated by the problems arising out of the phenomenological enterprise. By constructing a dialogue in this book between Foucault and three major phenomenological thinkers – Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas – I aim to bring to light some common forms of questioning and points of fruitful exchange as well as of fundamental contrast. By focusing on Foucault’s relationship to phenomenology, however, I do not want to claim that it is the only or even the most important influence on his thought. His work had many different themes and influences: Nietzsche’s philosophy, structuralism, French historiography and philosophy of science, for example. Any study of Foucault’s thought representing one choice of many possible perspectives is therefore a distortion of his multifaceted and original thought. 10 ‘Et si la ph´enom´enologie, apr`es une bien longue p´eriode ou` elle fut tenue en lisi`ere, a fini par p´en´etrer a` son tour, c’est sans doute du jour ou` Husserl, dans les M´editations cart´esiennes et dans la Krisis, a pos´e la question des rapports entre le projet occidental d’un d´eploiement universel de la raison, la positivit´e des sciences et la radicalit´e de la philosophie.’ (IMF, 432)
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This book is divided into three parts: Language (chapters 1, 2, and 3), Body (chapters 4, 5, and 6) and Ethics (chapters, 7, 8, and 9). These three parts explicate the three constitutive modes of subjectivity in Foucault’s thought, and they also correspond loosely with the three chronological periods in it: archaeology, genealogy and his late writings on ethics. The structure of the book is primarily thematic, however. I do not offer a chronological reading of the development of Foucault’s thought, or a philosophical reconstruction of ‘Foucault’s theory of the subject’. Instead, I ask what freedom means at different points in his work and study its preconditions as well as its problems. My argument is that language, the body and ethics are the domains in which the different senses of freedom can be found. My focus on certain Foucault texts, and the omission of others, are based on this thematic priority. The first part of the book, Language, inquires into the idea of freedom present in Foucault’s archaeology. The focus of my reading is on The Order of Things, which studies the question of language most explicitly. I explicate Foucault’s philosophical position by contrasting it to Husserl’s phenomenology, particularly to his late work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This is illuminative in terms of understanding the philosophical implications of Foucault’s treatment of the history of science in OT. I also make a stronger claim about the importance of reading OT in relation to phenomenology. I will show how many of the central philosophical issues, as well as the methodological directions, that are present in OT are motivated by the problems arising out of the phenomenological enterprise. In OT Foucault advocates the idea of language as something that always outruns the subject, who can never completely master it. Language is not simply an instrument of expression, it also generates an excess of meanings. Foucault gives language a regulative role in the mode of scientific discourse, but it also demarcates a domain of freedom in the mode of literature, particularly as avant-garde writing. There is an ontological order of things implicit in the theories of scientific discourse. Language as avant-garde writing is, however, capable of forming alternative, unscientific and irrational ontological realms: different experiences of order on the basis of which different perceptual and practical grids become possible, and hence lead to new ways of seeing and experiencing. While Foucault’s archaeology is generally viewed as emphasizing the necessary structures of thought and opposing humanist aspirations of looking for the freedom of man, there is an antihumanist understanding of freedom as an opening of new possibilities
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of thought implicitly safeguarded in archaeology. Foucault tried to show not only how the limits of knowledge, representation and experience are constituted, but also what distorts them. It is not that freedom characterizes the subject, it characterizes language in the mode of literature, which is capable of undermining the stability of our ways of seeing, understanding and acting. The second part of the book, Body, explicates the genealogical approach and engages with feminist appropriations of Foucault. Foucault’s understanding of the historical construction of the body through mechanisms of power has influenced feminist theory profoundly, but the feminist appropriations are based on varying readings of what exactly Foucault meant. He did not present a theory of the body anywhere, not even a unified account of it, and thus his view has to be discerned from his genealogical books and articles, which aim at bringing the body into the focus of history. I will discuss Foucault’s understanding of the sexual body in volume i of The History of Sexuality, and ask what he meant by the idea of bodies and pleasures as a form of resistance to power. I argue that we must take this idea seriously and not simply dismiss it as a naive fall back to the prediscursive body. I will show that if we are to understand Foucault’s idea of bodily resistance, we must leave behind the conception of the body as a mere material or bio-scientific object. The question of resistance only opens up if we take the experiential body – the body as experiencing in everyday practices – as the starting point. I will argue for a certain kind of irreducibility of embodied experience which does not mean that experience is treated as ahistorical or prediscursive, but that it can never be wholly reduced to discursive meanings. Elisabeth Grosz writes (1995, 222) that a distinction must be drawn between discourse and experience, even given the understanding that language or systems of representation are the prior condition for the intelligibility of experience. I argue that this distinction is crucial for understanding the resistance of the body. The experiential body is the permanent contestation of discursive definitions, values and normative practices. Even if linguistic intelligibility structures and constitutes the limits of experience, these limits are never firmly set and are constantly transgressed. The existence of the abject and the mute is furthermore necessary for constituting the intelligible and the normal. Foucault’s genealogy, like his archaeology, thus also displays a dimension of freedom in the sense of a constitutive outside to the discursive order: embodied experiences capable of distorting, multiplying and overflowing definition, classification and articulation.
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The idea of understanding the Foucaultian body as the experiential body raises the question of its relationship to the lived body as described by the phenomenologists. Foucault’s dialogue with phenomenology, which features in part ii of this book, thus takes place with MerleauPonty. Chapter 6 presents a Foucaultian reworking of Merleau-Ponty’s lived body, and I argue that this could provide feminist theory with new ways of understanding ‘female freedom’. Emancipation requires a body that is conceived in ways that are open to reinterpretations and multiple meanings, rather than one that is pure of cultural inscription. Part iii, Ethics, discusses the understanding of freedom that is to be found in Foucault’s late work. His thinking on ethics elaborates his understanding of freedom by introducing a deliberate dimension to it: ethics as care for the self is the deliberate part of freedom. Freedom is not only a non-subjective opening of possibilities, but it can also be deliberately cultivated and practised by its subjects. Subjects exercise freedom in critically reflecting on themselves and their behaviour, beliefs and the social field of which they are a part. They materialize and further stylize the possibilities that are opened around themselves. Care for the self as a practice of freedom means challenging, contesting and changing the constitutive conditions of subjectivity as well as its actual forms. It means exploring possibilities for new forms of subjectivity, new fields of experiences, pleasures and relationships, and modes of living and thinking. The quest for freedom in Foucault’s ethics becomes a question of developing forms of subjectivity that are capable of functioning as resistance to normalizing power. Foucault’s late essays on the Enlightenment also postulate the idea of freedom as a historical ethos originating from the Enlightenment: the championing of political freedom in the modern sense cannot be found in any pre-Enlightenment tradition of thought. Foucault does not simply embrace traditional Enlightenment ideas, however, he also submits them to critical reappropriation. What, for him, characterized the philosophical ethos originating in the Enlightenment is that it is a permanent critique of our own philosophical era. By linking his thought to the Enlightenment, he made the normative move of adopting the values associated with it – critical reasoning and personal and political autonomy – as the implicit ground on which his critiques of domination, abusive forms of power and rationality rest. The Enlightenment provided him with the historical – not transcendental – values on which to base his implicit critiques. Its ethos represents a commitment to a specific historical tradition within which we think about human life and
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politics, and freedom as the autonomous use of reason is a precondition of critical reflection on our present. The last chapter of this book, focuses on the question of the other in Foucault’s ethics. I explicate two interconnected problems that I claim are riddling his understanding of the ethical subject: the autonomy of the subject and the role of the other in its constitution. I will show, through a reading of Emmanuel Levinas, how these problems are interconnected. With the help of Levinas, I argue that we must acknowledge the fundamental importance of the other person for the constitution of ethical subjectivity. To discuss the centrality of freedom in Foucault’s thought is to situate him in a long lineage of thinkers who have held freedom as a central theme in philosophical reflection. It has been argued that an emphasis on freedom characterizes French philosophy in particular and also lies in France’s revolutionary heritage.11 The discussion of freedom in the context of political philosophy forms only one fraction of its pervasive importance in the French philosophical tradition, however. Descartes understood freedom most of all as an epistemological question: freedom is the condition of possibility of knowledge because it enables us to refrain from believing things that are not completely certain and hence to avoid error. Sartre saw freedom primarily as an ontological question: in Being and Nothingness freedom is a structure of the being of man and thus forms a part of a comprehensive ontology. By tracing the meanings of freedom in the different phases of Foucault’s thought I will argue that it is best understood as an epistemological and ontological question also in his thought, rather than as a strictly political question. Freedom lies in the ontological contingency of the present, in the unpredictability of our ways of thinking, acting and relating to other people. Thinking can only take place within a historically defined framework of rules and practices, but this framework is never a necessity. Philosophy as an ontology of the present is the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of crossing them (WE, 50). Its aim is to free us from ourselves: shatter our preconceptions concerning the present by showing the historical contingency of our thought and practice. 11 See e.g. Cohen 1997, Gutting 2001, 382.
I LANGUAGE
1 PHILOSOPHICAL LAUGHTER
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him – you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.’ (Nietzsche 1887/1974,181)
The instant bestseller that made Foucault famous, The Order of Things (OT), arose out of laughter. Foucault opens the book by writing that the book arouse out of a passage in Borges, from a laughter that shattered all the familiar landmarks of his thought and continued long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse the age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quoted ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia’ which presented a wholly other system of thought and therefore broke up ‘all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things’ (OT, xv). The shattering impossibility to think in certain ways
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motivated Foucault’s philosophical inquiry in OT and led him to ask: what is it possible to think? Foucault’s archaeological question about the limits of thought resembles the transcendental question of phenomenology concerning the conditions of possibility of knowledge: what are the conditions of possibility of our experiences, the constitution of objects and modes of knowledge? I will argue that, although the mode of questioning is similar, the methodological route followed by Foucault diverts sharply from phenomenology. Hence, the methodological question that must follow the transcendental one – how can we study the conditions of possibility of our thought since, by definition, we cannot set ourselves outside of it – is given a very different answer by Foucault. I will also show how, in Foucault’s thought, the question of the limits of thought, by implication, must be followed by the question of what falls outside the discursive limits of being. I will argue that, by explicitly questioning the conditions of possibility of knowledge, Foucault also implicitly inquires into an otherness that escapes the existing order imposed upon being by scientific discourse. Even after being brought within the order of the same, this otherness is still capable of forcing a shattering laughter upon us. Foucault points to his phenomenological background himself in several contexts. In an essay entitled ‘Subjectivity and Truth’ (ST), he explicitly describes the development of his thought – the genealogy of the modern subject – as a reaction to phenomenology.1 He claims that as the intellectual climate in France became more critical of phenomenology in the 1960s, two hitherto hidden theoretical paradoxes implicit in phenomenology could no longer be avoided. The first one was that phenomenology had failed to found a philosophy of scientific knowledge, and the second that it had failed to take into account the formative mechanisms of signification and the structure of systems of meaning. Different approaches developed in France as efforts to deal with these paradoxes: logical positivism, semiology, Marxism, psychoanalysis and structuralism (ST, 174–5). The close relationship between Foucault’s archaeology and phenomenology has also been noted by some of Foucault’s commentators.2 Beatrice Han argues in her book Foucault’s Critical Project that a profound reading of Foucault’s relationship with phenomenology 1 See also e.g. SPS, 442. 2 See e.g. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, Gutting 1989, Lebrun 1989/1992.
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shows the continuity of the two projects as well as their roots in a common Kantian origin. According to Han, for Foucault, phenomenology is both an interlocutor and a favoured target, because it also attempts to overcome the obstacle of pure transcendentalism. Despite appearances, archaeology is profoundly connected to phenomenology in that it attempts to find a solution to the same problem and adopts a method that is similar in aspects such as its descriptive rather than explicative outlook (Han 1998/2002, 5). This first chapter presents a concise explication of the main philosophical arguments in OT. The explication prepares the way for the reading put forward in the second chapter, which contrasts OT to Husserl’s thought, particularly to his late work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Following the presentation of the negative or critical side of archaeology as an effort to overcome the problems inherent in phenomenology, the third chapter evaluates the positive contribution of Foucault’s archaeology to philosophical questioning. It focuses on the topic that is the overriding theme of the present book: the question of freedom in Foucault’s thought. I will argue that OT contains an idea of otherness – a realm outside the discursive order of things – which represents freedom for Foucault. This possibility of an otherness outside of what can be scientifically ordered and brought within the realm of knowledge does not lie in some pure and prelinguistic sphere of originary experience, however, but in language itself.
An archaeology of order Foucault argues in OT that there is a level of order, ‘a positive unconscious of knowledge’, that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is formative of scientific discourse. This level gives us the organizing principles of knowledge, the unconscious structures that order scientific discourses. Even though individual scientists never formulated these principles, nor were they even aware of them at the time, this level nevertheless defines the objects proper to their study. It constitutes the condition of possibility for forming concepts and building theories (OT, xi). Hence, beyond the level of scientific discoveries, discussions, theories and philosophical views exists an archaeological level formative of them. This level consists of the ontological order of things assumed to exist, and also of the principles that organize the relationships between things and words in terms of what exists and how it
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can be known and represented. It is the historical a priori of scientific discourse. This a priori is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man’s everyday perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true. (OT, 158)3
Foucault’s objective in OT is to study this historical a priori, the formative level of scientific discourse. His method is a historical inquiry into the ordering codes of our culture since the sixteenth century: how the space of knowledge has been arranged, how discursive practices have been structured. By studying how scientific discourses have been ordered, he seeks to reveal or unveil the ontological order of things assumed to exist prior to them. This order behind ordering fundamentally but ‘unconsciously’ forms and structures scientific discourse. Foucault describes his analysis: Quite obviously such an analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards. (OT, xxii)4
The question that guides Foucault’s archaeology is thus a transcendental question in the sense that it concerns the condition of possibility of knowledge: what determines different forms of scientific knowledge and makes possible certain discussions and problems? The condition 3 ‘Cet a priori, c’est ce qui, a` une e´ poque donn´ee, d´ecoupe dans l’exp´erience un champ de savoir possible, d´efinit le mode d’ˆetre des objets qui y apparaissent, arme le regard quotidien de pouvoirs th´eoriques, et d´efinit les conditions dans lesquelles on peut tenir sur les choses un discours reconnu pour vrai.’ (MC, 171) 4 ‘Une telle analyse, on le voit, ne rel`eve pas de l’histoire des id´ees ou des sciences: c’est plutˆot une e´ tude qui s’efforce de retrouver a` partir de quoi connaissances et th´eories ont e´ t´e possibles; selon quel espace d’ordre s’est constitu´e le savoir; sur fond de quel a priori historique et dans l’´el´ement de quelle positivit´e des id´ees ont pu apparaˆıtre, des sciences se constituer, des exp´eriences se r´efl´echir dans des philosophies, des rationalit´es se former, pour, peut-ˆetre, se d´enouer et s’´evanouir bientˆot.’ (MC, 13)
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of possibility must, however, in connection with Foucault’s archaeology, be understood in a specific way. It is not universal a priori, but conditions that are importantly historical: they are formed in history and also change in it. Neither can they be found through an analysis of the subject’s faculties or experiences. They condition, significantly, also the subject’s experiences. By revealing the conditions of possibility of the thought of a particular period, Foucault seeks to reveal the nonsubjective conditions that make subjective experiences of order and knowledge possible.5 His aim is thus to write a history of the transcendental: a historical description of the varying conditions of possibility of knowledge in different periods. Foucault introduces the concept of episteme (´epist´em`e) in OT. There has been much discussion and confusion about what exactly he means by this, and he himself has offered different definitions.6 One common but mistaken reading is to understand it to simply refer to the existing field of different forms of knowledge in a specific period. Claire O’Farrell, for example, describes episteme as the differing configurations of knowledge at different periods.7 Understood in this way, the main function of the concept would be to enable Foucault to locate the points of discontinuity in the western history of thought.8 Foucault’s archaeological inquiry in OT distinguishes three epistemes, and analyzes the epistemic systems underlying three historical epochs: the Renaissance, the classical age and modernity. The notion of the episteme is not only a tool for writing the history of thought and describing ruptures in it. I argue that it is, most of all, a tool for understanding the historical conditions of possibility of knowledge 5 Beatrice Han (1998/2002) shows that Foucault’s inquiry into the historical a priori of knowledge is a search for a principle of determination, which is non-subjective. It has ‘the function of introducing into the field of knowledge a principle of nonsubjective determination, which defines for a given period and geographical area the historical form taken by the constitution of various forms of knowledge’ (45). 6 The notion of episteme presented in OT was widely criticized for being a totality as well as a static notion that excludes change. In the book that followed OT, The Archaeology of Knowledge (AK), Foucault answers this criticism and modifies his stance. He denies that there is one episteme for the science of a particular period: the relations that he describes are valid only in order to define a particular configuration (AK, 159). He also writes that episteme is not an immobile figure but rather ‘an infinitely mobile group of scansions, shifts, and coincidences which establish and dismantle themselves’ (AK, 250). 7 O’Farrell (1989, 54–5) argues that when the notion of episteme is introduced for the first time in OT, Foucault uses it in two different ways: firstly to denote the entirety of western knowledge, and secondly to describe different configurations of knowledge at different periods. 8 See e.g. Machado 1989/1992, 14.
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in a particular period. Hence, episteme refers to the historical a priori of an epoch. Rather than referring to the different configurations of knowledge, it refers to their historical conditions of possibility. Foucault writes, for example: ‘In any given culture and at any given moment, there is only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice’ (OT, 168). He also describes his aim in OT in terms of transcendental analysis. What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and therefore manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility. (OT, xxii)9
The first break or discontinuity that Foucault’s archaeological inquiry reveals positions the dawning of the classical age roughly halfway through the seventeenth century. The second epistemic break took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century and, according to Foucault, marked the beginning of the modern age (OT, xxii). By documenting breaks or discontinuities between the epistemes, Foucault argues against the continuous development of European science and rationality. The history of western science cannot be understood as a steady progression from unscientific forms of knowledge to ever more accurate and rational methods and theories. Foucault’s aim in OT is to show that, on the contrary, the whole order of existing things on the basis of which we think today is radically different from that of the classical thinkers, just as their mode of being of words and objects was completely different from that of the Renaissance thinkers. The epistemic changes fundamentally affect what kinds of things can be the objects of knowledge. The fundamental changes in the mode of being of what could be known resulted in a change in modes of knowledge to the point that some of the theories of the previous episteme were no longer even recognized as belonging to the field of scientific knowledge. Neither were scientific discoveries simply improvements of 9 ‘ce qu’on voudrait mettre au jour, c’est le champ e´ pist´emologique, l’´epist´em`e ou` les connaissances, envisag´ees hors de tout crit`ere se r´ef´erant a` leur valeur rationnelle ou a` leur formes objectives, enfoncent leur positivit´e et manifestent ainsi une histoire qui n’est pas celle de leur perfection croissante, mais plutˆot celle de leurs conditions de possibilit´e’ (MC, 13).
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previous theories. Foucault writes about the birth of natural history at the beginning of the classical age, for example, that it ‘did not become possible because men looked harder and more closely’, but because the mode of being of the natural order had changed (OT, 131–2). To better understand how modes of knowledge in Foucault’s thought are determined by non-subjective, discursively formed historical a prioris, I will next give a short description of how his concept of episteme functions in OT. This vaguely defined and abstract notion is fleshed out by detailed historical studies of the birth of the different sciences. This emphasis on history exemplifies Foucault’s method of discarding abstract conceptual definitions and instead elaborating the vague, often frustratingly ambiguous, philosophical ideas through concrete historical description. Unfortunately, this method also, at times, makes it difficult to reconstruct Foucault’s philosophical position coherently.
The three epistemes The Renaissance episteme. Foucault starts his explication of the three epistemes with a relatively short description of Renaissance episteme. The chapter has a telling title, ‘The Prose of the World’. Foucault’s aim is to show that what characterized the episteme of the Renaissance was the implicit assumption that words and things formed a unified texture and were linked through resemblance. Adjacent things were similar or they emulated and reflected each other from afar. Some similitudes were not visible, but were rather subtle resemblances of relations: the relation of the stars to the sky could be found between man’s skin moles and the body of which they were the secret marks. Things that resembled each other were further drawn together. Through sympathy similar things assimilated and transformed, through antipathy they maintained their isolation (OT, 19–24). The shortness of a certain line on a man’s hand, for example, reflected, through analogy, the image of a short life. The analogy between body and destiny, again, indicated sympathy that created communication between them. Knowledge meant uncovering the resemblances that linked things to one another in an infinite chain of similitudes. To know meant to interpret: to find a way from the visible marks to what they resembled. For these chains of similitudes to become knowledge they had to be linked to words, but the way words were linked to things was, again, through resemblance. Signs could signify only insofar as they resembled what they indicated. They signified by forming another order of
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resemblances: they were signatures of resemblances that made it possible to recognize them. According to Foucault, ‘The sixteenth century superimposed hermeneutics and semiology in the form of similitude’ (OT, 29). To search for a meaning meant bringing to light a resemblance. To search for a law governing signs was to discover things that were alike. Language was thus one of the things in the world to be interpreted. There was a common order for words and things, ‘the relation of languages to the world is one of analogy rather than signification’ (OT, 37). Because words were signs woven into the overall network of similitudes that had to be interpreted, observation, accepted authority and magical divination were on the same level of knowledge. According to Foucault, for Renaissance knowledge ‘there is no difference between the visible marks that God has stamped upon the surface of the earth, so that we may know its inner secrets, and the legible words that the Scriptures, or the sages of Antiquity, have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition’ (OT, 33). He argues that, although it is easy for us to interpret that rational beliefs and esoteric knowledge were in conflict during the Renaissance, and that esotericism lost the battle as western science and rationality developed, if we study the archaeological level of knowledge – the level that makes different forms of knowledge possible – this does not hold. The Renaissance episteme not only made possible the coexistence of what, for us, are rational arguments, erudition and magic, it also made it impossible to distinguish them as different forms of knowledge, since they all relied on the same principles of organization. The prose of the world was formed as one infinite text binding together words and things through resemblance. The classical episteme. With the advent of the classical age there occurred a change. At the beginning of the seventeenth century similitude ceased to be the organizing principle of words and things. It was, rather, understood as the occasion for error, something that tempted man to draw conclusions from the deceiving senses (OT, 51). The hierarchy of analogies was substituted by the analysis of identity and difference. Rationalism was to replace old superstitious beliefs. It was firmly believed in the classical age that being had a universal order that could be analyzed by a universal method and that could be represented by signs that mirrored perfectly this order of being. Knowledge was organized in a table, it could be displayed as a perfect system. The method was to find the simple nature of beings and proceed from them to more complex ones
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by comparison and ordering. If the analysis was carried out correctly, it would yield perfect certainty. To know no longer meant to draw things together by finding a shared nature in them, it meant to discriminate (OT, 54–5, 75). The relationship of words to things thus changed fundamentally. The common order dissolved into two separate orders that were nevertheless inseparably linked in a transparent relation of representation. There was an external order of objects and an ideal order of signs. Signs, including language, were representations that directly represented their objects. The order of language was therefore the order of the world and could mirror it perfectly. Knowledge became representation. Foucault writes polemically that ‘language in the classical era does not exist’ (OT, 79). Language as an object of knowledge was not possible. It only had a function, it represented, but it was not an object of knowledge in itself. It was the transparent medium of representation, conveying the immutable and perfect order of the visible world: [L]anguage is no longer one of the figurations of the world, or a signature stamped upon things since the beginning of time. The manifestation and sign of truth are to be found in evident and distinct perception. It is the task of words to translate that truth if they can; but they no longer have the right to be considered the mark of it. Language has withdrawn from the midst of things themselves and has entered a period of transparency and neutrality. (OT, 56)10
Foucault’s point in his long discussion of the three classical forms of knowledge – general grammar, natural history and analyses of wealth – is to show how the same order underlies them, how they were all authorized by the same organizing principles. The form of these modes of knowledge is that of an ordered table of representations in which different beings could be named and could find their place in a language. General grammar was not the classical predecessor of modern linguistics because its object of study was not language as we understand it. It was a mode of knowledge limited and structured by the classical 10 ‘le langage n’est plus une des figures du monde, ni la signature impos´ee aux choses depuis le fond des temps. La v´erit´e trouve sa manifestation et son signe dans la perception e´ vidente et distincte. Il appartient aux mots de la traduire s’ils le peuvent; ils n’ont plus droit a` en eˆ tre la marque. Le langage se retire du milieu des eˆ tres pour entrer dans son aˆ ge de transparence et de neutralit´e.’ (MC, 70)
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episteme. In the ontological order of things language did not exist as a historical, variable object to be known. Similarly, just as there was no language to be known, neither could life be an object of knowledge. In terms of natural history, life did not create a fundamental distinction in the order of things, it was not an obvious threshold dividing certain forms of knowledge from others. It was only one category in the classification of beings (OT, 161). According to Foucault, the idea of biology was not possible in the classical episteme: ‘Natural history is nothing more than the nomination of the visible’ (OT, 132). The task of natural history was to represent the visible order of nature by ascribing a name to living beings, and in that name to name the character that situated them within the taxonomic system of identities and differences. The goal was to lay out a unified grid that covered the entire vegetable and animal kingdom (OT, 141): ‘The naturalist is the man concerned with the structure of the visible world and its denominations according to characters. Not with life’ (OT, 161). The analysis of wealth obeys the same configuration as natural history and general grammar. In the Renaissance episteme, just as words had the same reality as what they said, and living beings were marked by visible signs, the signs that indicated and measured wealth carried the marks of wealth in themselves. Money, gold and silver coins were themselves precious and desirable. In the classical episteme, however, money no longer had intrinsic value, but instead became the pure representation of wealth. The sign that coins bore was merely the exact and transparent mark of the measure they constituted (OT, 170). Money had the power to represent all possible wealth, it was the instrument through which wealth, as well as the objects of need and desire, could be turned into a universal system of identities and differences. Foucault’s general claim is thus that the classical knowledge ascribed to each thing represented a name and laid out a linguistic grid across the whole of representation. The form of knowledge that named the being of all representation in general was philosophy: the theory of knowledge and the analysis of ideas (OT, 120). The modern episteme. There occurred another a major change at the end of the eighteenth century. Foucault claims that the visible order of things was torn apart: a space opened up behind it that required explanation. Knowledge no longer meant perceiving and representing the visible order in language. It now meant disclosing the invisible basis of living beings in life, of different discourses in the being of language, of the systems of wealth in labour. Language, life and labour become
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questions in their own right. Knowledge meant reconstituting the hidden unities that underlay the dispersion of visible differences. The consequence was the collapse of the classical episteme (OT, 268–9). While the classical thinkers saw knowledge in the form of an ordered table, in the modern age, according to Foucault, it was understood in terms of series and development (OT, 262). The realm of knowledge was no longer one of identities and differences forming one ordered table, but an area made up of organic structures, of internal relations between elements whose totality performs a function (OT, 218). Objects of knowledge had become susceptible to external influences and subject to time. The historicity of empirical beings had become definitive of knowledge in the modern age. Things were defined not by their place in a timeless system of classification, but by their place in history. This meant that there had to be a whole new conception of order. The form of knowledge, as well as the mode of being of its objects, were fundamentally altered: the modern manner of empiricism had begun (OT, 250). Thus, European culture is inventing for itself a depth in which what matters is no longer identities, distinctive characters, permanent tables with all their possible paths and routes, but great hidden forces developed on the basis of their primitive and inaccessible nucleus, origin, causality and history. (OT, 251–2)11
The fundamental change from one episteme to another is again recognizable in the specific changes in the areas of knowledge that Foucault examines. Language evolved with its own density, and therefore also philology. Words no longer simply represented things, but for a word to be able to convey meaning it had to belong to a grammatical totality which, in relation to the word, was primary, fundamental and determining (OT, 281). In biology, living beings were ordered and conceived of on the basis of functional homogeneity, not visible identities and differences. Life was a non-perceptible, purely functional aspect, it had ‘left the tabulated space of order and become wild again’ (OT, 277). In economics, wealth was no longer considered to be distributed over a table as a system of equivalencies, but was organized and accumulated in a temporal sequence. 11 ‘Ainsi, la culture europ´eenne s’invente une profondeur ou` il sera question non plus des identit´es, des caract`eres distinctifs, des tables permanentes avec tous leurs chemins et parcours possibles, mais des grandes forces cache´es d´evelopp´ees a` partir de leur noyau primitif et inaccessible, mais de l’origine, de la causalit´e et de l’histoire.’ (MC, 263)
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Foucault’s point, from the perspective of the history of science, is thus to show how modern forms of knowledge originated from a fundamental break in the history of thought and were not simply more advanced developments of previous modes of knowledge. This enables him to show how certain controversies and oppositions, which are traditionally regarded as fundamental by historians, are in fact part of the same epistemic order. Although the birth of biology, economics and philology were part of the same archaeological upheaval, and although the epistemic forms of these disciplines are similar, what distinguishes the epistemic structure from the classical one is that there is no longer a homogenous or uniform basis of knowledge. It is now possible for different empirical sciences to have different knowledge bases. While man as both a subject and an object of knowledge provides the basis for human sciences, natural sciences are grounded in the unproblematized being of their object. According to Foucault, the dispersal of the basis of knowledge in the modern age was tied to the failure of representation. Representation had become problematic, it had became opaque. It could no longer define the common order of things and knowledge. The parallel orders of words and things were diverted and torn apart: there were, on the one hand, ‘things, with their own organic structures, their hidden veins, the space that articulates them, the time that produces them’, and on the other, representation, ‘a purely temporal succession, in which those things address themselves (always partially) to a subjectivity’ (OT, 239– 40). The representing relation had become problematic. Epistemology had taken the central place in philosophy that was previously held by ontology. The questions that haunted philosophy in the modern age were questions about the legitimacy and possibility of representation: what linked things to words and propositions and provided the basis of true knowledge? According to Foucault, Kant was the first to question representation on the basis of its rightful limits, and therefore Kant’s thought marks the threshold of the modern episteme (OT, 242). Kant’s transcendental question about the condition of possibility of knowledge marked the end of the classical episteme and the age of representation. Questioning the rightful limits of representation meant looking beyond the space of representation for its condition of possibility. In Descartes’ thought, ordered knowledge was possible because clear and distinct ideas were in perfect correspondence with things, and this correspondence was created by God. God was the ultimate ground of knowledge, not man.
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Man was simply another being in God’s well-ordered table. His place as the organizer of the representations was never problematised in the classical episteme. According to Foucault, man as an ordering subject thus did not appear in western thought until Kant. In Kant’s thought, man has taken the place of God as the organizer of the world, but he has done this by virtue of being tied to finitude, by being limited. It is the limits of his knowledge that make knowledge of the world possible. Foucault describes the philosophy following Kant up to the present as different efforts to deal with the dissolution of the homogenous field of orderable representations. He distinguishes between two correlative new forms of thought. On the one hand, there is the reformulation of transcendental philosophy in the form of phenomenology: the questioning of the conditions of possibility of representation from the point of view of the experiencing subject. On the other hand, there are the forms of thought in which knowledge is grounded in the mode of being of the object. Foucault writes that in the latter modes of thought, ‘the conditions of possibility of experience are being sought in the conditions of possibility of the object and its existence whereas in transcendental reflection the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience are identified with the conditions of possibility of experience itself’ (OT, 244). Foucault refers here, on the one hand, to positivism: ‘There are philosophies that set themselves no other task than the observation of precisely that which is given to positive knowledge’ (OT, 244). The other possible counterpart to transcendental philosophy of the subject are the various ‘metaphysics of the object’. For these forms of thought there are ‘transcendentals’ – ‘Will’ for Schopenhauer, ‘Life’ for Nietzsche – which form the conditions of possibility of the always partial knowledge of the subject. These ‘metaphysics of the object’, according to Foucault, posit an objective foundation behind experience, with its own rationality that the subject is never able to bring to light completely. The modern episteme thus has become severely fractured. There is no one unified archaeological basis of knowledge.12 12 Foucault argues that there are, in fact, two forms of fracture. Firstly, there is the split between forms of knowledge finding their basis in transcendental subjectivity and those finding a basis in the mode of being of the object. Secondly, because of the emergence of empirical fields of which mere internal analysis of representation can no longer provide an account, there is also a split between the field of a priori sciences, pure, formal sciences, and the domain of a posteri sciences, empirical sciences. These two forms of fracture give rise to the modern problem concerning the relations between the formal field and the transcendental field, the domain of empiricity and the transcendental foundation of knowledge (OT, 248).
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Foucault’s caricatured picture of modern philosophy as following Kant’s thought in different variations is clearly simplistic and problematic. Nevertheless, even if Foucault’s characterization of modern philosophy is not accurate as far as other thinkers are concerned, it is revealing in terms of his own philosophical position. Foucault clearly sees the question of the problematic status of representation – particularly in the form of language – as the main question of modern philosophy, and hence as the question that his thought for its part must address. Although Foucault rejects the solution offered by phenomenology, he moves uneasily between the other two philosophical alternatives that he sketches for us, namely positivism and ‘metaphysics of the object’. Foucault’s attack against phenomenology in OT gains its full force in chapter 9, ‘Man and his Doubles’, but it begins already to take shape in the paragraphs in which he lays out in bold strokes the predicament of all post-Kantian philosophy. The epistemological conjuncture in which phenomenology is born, in a sense, already seals its fate. Foucault’s critical attack advances on multiple fronts. He seeks to situate phenomenology historically, and thus to show how the self-understanding implied in its fundamental project is only one necessary moment in modern thought. The questions it considers as fundamental to philosophy are those that were made possible and necessary by the modern episteme. This episteme not only has given birth to the phenomenological enterprise as a whole, but has also made possible the modes of experience of the phenomenologist, which serve as the starting point of his inquiries. Phenomenology becomes Foucault’s key example of a problematic form of thought made possible by the modern episteme and the birth of the empirical sciences of man. I will return to Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in detail in the next chapter. To pave the way for this, I will now explicate Foucault’s controversial and often misunderstood concept of ‘man’. For Foucault, man marks a form of thought that the modern episteme has given birth to, and the death of man is the mark of the beginning of the next one.
The birth and death of man For Foucault, man refers to a human being, but a human being only insofar as he is understood in a certain way, in a way that was not possible in the classical age, for example. Man is a being who is the source of
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knowledge of the world, and at the same a being in the world that can be known. Foucault calls man an empirico-transcendental doublet. Man, finite, yet a basis of all knowledge, is an invention of modern thought. In his double aspect, man is at the same time a fact among other facts to be studied empirically, and he is the transcendental ground of all knowledge. He is formed by a complex network of background practices that he can never fully understand, and yet he is the possibility of their elucidation. He is a product of a history whose beginning he cannot reach and at the same time he is the writer of that history. Foucault claims that the new conceptual space in which the human sciences were formed in the modern age took shape in the figure of man: In classical thought, the personage for whom the representation exists, and who represents himself within it, recognizes himself therein as an image or reflection, he who ties together all the interlacing threads of the ‘representation in the form of the table’ – he is never to be found in that table himself. Before the end of the eighteenth century, man did not exist – anymore than the potency of life, the fecundity of labour, or the historical density of language. He is quite a recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with his own hands less than two hundred years ago: but he has grown old so quickly that it has been only too easy to imagine that he had been waiting for thousands of years in the darkness for that moment of illumination in which he could finally be known. (OT, 308)13
Foucault thus claims that our understanding of the human being as an ‘empirico-transcendental doublet called man’ is by no means necessary or unproblematic. Although taken for granted by us to the extent that it is difficult for us to conceive of any other ways of thinking about the relationships between the subject, knowledge and history, Foucault diagnoses man as the problem of the modern episteme. According 13 ‘Dans la pens´ee classique, celui pour qui la repr´esentation existe, et qui se repr´esente lui-mˆeme en elle, s’y reconnaissant pour image ou reflet, celui qui noue tous les fils entrecrois´es de la “repr´esentation en tableau”, – celui-l`a ne s’y trouve jamais pr´esent lui-mˆeme. Avant la fin du XVIIIe si`ecle, l’homme n’existait pas. Non plus que la puissance de la vie, la f´econdit´e du travail, ou l’´epaisseur historique du langage. C’est une toute r´ecente cr´eature que la d´emiurgie du savoir a fabriqu´ee de ses mains, il y a moins de deux cents ans: mais il a si vite vieilli, qu’on a imagin´e facilement qu’il avait attendu dans l’ombre pendant des mill´enaires le moment d’illumination ou` il serait enfin connu.’ (MC, 319)
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to Foucault, modern thought has been a series of attempts to overcome the paradox inherent in the figure of man. It has been searching for a discourse whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both; a discourse that would make it possible to analyze man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge which has been empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible to what makes it possible, and as a pure form immediately present to those contents. (OT, 320–1)14
According to Foucault, the first attempt by post-Kantian thinkers to overcome the paradox of man was through reductionism: if they reduced man to his empirical side they could not account for the possibility of knowledge, and if they emphasized the transcendental side, they could not claim scientific objectivity or account for the contingency of man’s empirical nature. Foucault associates this stage with the positivism of Comte and the thought of Hegel and Marx. Foucault places phenomenology within the next stage in which the problem was stabilized, that is, in the coexistence of empiricism and transcendentalism in an ambiguous balance. His discussion of the three doubles of man – empirical/transcendental, the cogito/the unthought, the retreat/the return of origin – is an explicit criticism of phenomenology. He engages with Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Husserl and Heidegger respectively. I will focus in the following chapter on Foucault’s criticism of Husserl, although Foucault’s argument follows the same structure in connection with all of the three doubles: a mode of thought that centres on man – a human being in the order of positivity and in the order of a foundation, as both the source of meaning as well as the outcome of the natural world, human culture and history – necessarily remains ambiguous and circular. It superimposes the transcendental and the empirical dimensions of man.15 Phenomenology can only show how ‘what is given 14 ‘un discours dont la tension maintiendrait s´epar´es l’empirique et le transcendantal, en permettant pourtant de viser l’un et l’autre en mˆeme temps; un discours qui permettrait d’analyser l’homme comme sujet, c’est-`a-dire comme lieu de connaissances empiriques mais ramen´ees au plus pr`es de ce qui les rend possibles, et comme forme pure imm´ediatement pr´esente a` ces contenus’ (MC, 331). 15 Beatrice Han (1998/2002) argues that Foucault’s critique of phenomenology and of all post-Kantian theory, which is denounced as being imprisoned by the ‘analytic of finitude’ in OT, applies to Kant himself. According to Han, Foucault’s presentation of Kant’s position in OT is ambivalent. On the one hand, Foucault credits Kant with being the
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in experience and what renders experience possible correspond to one another in an endless oscillation’ (OT, 336). Foucault’s bold aim is thus to show how, after a series of convoluted attempts to deal with the paradoxical predicament of the modern episteme, modern thought has arrived at a dead end. ‘And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more . . . this time not the sleep of Dogmatism but that of Anthropology’ (OT, 341). Foucault’s judgement of philosophy in general – but particularly of phenomenology – is cutting: phenomenology is ‘a sleep – so deep that thought experiences it paradoxically as vigilance, so wholly does it confuse the circularity of a dogmatism folded over upon itself in order to find a basis for itself with the agility of a radical philosophical thought’ (OT, 341). Hence, the grand aim of Foucault in OT is to show, first, how all previous philosophy has erred and then to give it new direction and impetus. Just as Nietzsche heralded the death of God as promising philosophical thought a new beginning, Foucault clearly and consciously imitates him in heralding the death of man as an event important enough to inaugurate a new episteme: ‘The void left by man’s disappearance’ is ‘the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think’ (OT, 342). initiator of the discursive space in which Modernity deploys itself by critically questioning the conditions of possibility of representation, and consequently of all possible knowledge. On the other hand, for Foucault, Kant was the insurmountable limit of Modern thought because his thought initiated the monopolization of the field of possible knowledge by ‘man’ and his doubles. The critical question of the conditions of possibility of true knowledge was, for Kant, intrinsically connected to the introduction of the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental. Han reads Foucault’s unpublished complementary doctoral thesis, which was a commentary to his translation of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, and argues that in this text Foucault’s aim was to show how the strict separation between the transcendental and the empirical put forward by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason undergoes an inflection in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View symbolized by the recentring of Kant’s triple interrogation on to the question ‘What is man?’ This displacement is problematic for Foucault, as it makes the contents of empirical experience work as their own condition of possibility; moreover it seeks within human finitude the elements of a transcendental determination henceforth made impossible in principle by the anthropological confusion between the empirical and the a priori (Han 1998/2002, 3). Han writes: ‘Commentary permits us to establish that it is not the “Kantian critique” in its totality that marks “the threshold of our Modernity”, but that the line of division passes within Kant’s work itself, separating the original formulations of the transcendental theme from its later versions’ (35). This means that Foucault’s work is not only a critical reaction to phenomenology, but also and more profoundly to Kant. According to Han, it is the identification of the Kantian aporia that provided Foucault with a guide from which he was able to build a contrario an original method and conceptual apparatus, and that allowed him to reopen the critical question of the conditions of possibility of knowledge while attempting to throw off the last anthropological constraints (Han 1998/2002, 4–5).
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The being of language The new possibilities for thinking opened up by the death of man are connected with a new understanding of language. Foucault argues that in Western culture the being of man and the being of language have never, at any time, been able to coexist together as a basis of knowledge, and that their incompatibility has been one of the fundamental features of our thought. This forms the root of ‘the most important philosophical choice of our period’ (OT, 339). Foucault suggests that it is in the analysis of language as something more fundamental than man that the new possibilities for thought lie. The birth of man was possible because of the collapse of the classical discourse, but now we are again on the brink of a new episteme. Man’s being is weighed down by ‘the reappearance of language in the enigma of its unity and its being as by a threat’ (OT, 338). Although the modern episteme detached language from representation, which meant that it could appear as a philosophical problem in its own right, Foucault suggests that philosophical reflection held itself aloof for a long time because of the dispersion of language, because of its multiple modes of being (OT, 304).16 According to Foucault, language did not appear in the field of thought directly and in its own right until the end of the nineteenth century with Nietzsche. Now, however, Foucault claims that it is the most important question confronting us. ‘The whole curiosity of our thought now resides in the question: what is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plenitude?’ (OT, 306). This question heralds a new episteme (OT, 307). Foucault suggests a solution to the paradoxes of the modern episteme in an inquiry based on the functioning of language. 16 While language was posited and reflected upon only in the form of an analysis of representation in the classical age, in the modern age it appeared as a question in its own right. Language itself had become an object of science, instead of having the sole right to represent the natural order of things. According to Foucault, this ‘demotion of language’ was compensated for in three ways. Firstly, because language was not only an object of science but also the necessary medium for any scientific knowledge, there arose the aim of neutralizing scientific language so that it could mirror the world as exactly as possible. Foucault calls this the positivist dream of a purified, logical language (OT, 296–7). Secondly, because language had lost its transparency and resumed instead the enigmatic density it possessed at the time of the Renaissance, this resulted in the revival of the techniques of exegesis (OT, 298). And thirdly, there was the birth of literature in the modern sense. According to Foucault, modernist writing is not about creating beauty or pleasing our senses. What it lays before us is the enigmatic being of language, the bare existence of words with their indefinite meanings (OT, 300).
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Foucault’s position is thus nominalist rather than phenomenological in the sense that the historical a priori ordering scientific practices is discursively constituted.17 By studying how discourses have been ordered at different historical times, he seeks to reveal or unveil the ontological order of things assumed to exist independently of them. Scientific discourses always presuppose certain historically varying things as existing in the world, and this implicit, presupposed ontology grounds the explicit order of things. However, not only do scientific discourses rely on certain implicit ontological assumptions, they also explicitly create them, at least in the realm of human sciences. This reading of the ontological order not as the transcendental ground of scientific discourses but as their implicit effect – presupposed but by that same movement also created by them – is explicit in certain passages in OT, such as: If one wishes to undertake an archaeological analysis of knowledge itself . . . One must reconstitute the general system of thought, whose network, in its positivity, renders an interplay of simultaneous and apparently contradictory opinions possible. It is this network that defines the conditions that make a controversy or a problem possible, and that bears the historicity of knowledge. (OT, 75)18
Hence, one can say that Foucault considers the whole network of knowledge, in its positivity, also to constitute its own ‘unconscious’, the historical a priori that makes certain problems and ways of questioning possible. Thus, he does not claim that there exists two separate ontological levels, the network of scientific discourses, on the one hand, and the conditions that form it, on the other. There is only the network of discourses, which can, however, be retrospectively analyzed on different levels. Archaeological analysis reveals the structures of this network that have remained unconscious to its practitioners while conditioning their thought and experience. The nominalist idea that discourse systematically forms the objects of which it speaks, as well as the ontological order on the basis of which they become possible, is made more explicit in the book that followed 17 For more on Foucault’s nominalism, see e.g. Flynn 1994, Rouse 1994. 18 ‘Si on veut entreprendre une analyse arch´eologique du savoir lui-mˆeme . . . Il faut reconstituer le syst`eme g´en´eral de pens´ee dont le r´eseau, en sa positivit´e, rend possible un jeu d’opinions simultan´ees et apparemment contradictoires. C’est ce r´eseau qui d´efinit les conditions de possibilit´e d’un d´ebat ou d’un probl`eme, c’est lui qui est porteur de l’historicit´e du savoir.’ (MC, 89)
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OT, The Archaeology of Knowledge.19 Foucault sets out to present a method for studying discourse; a rule-governed practice of making scientific statements (AK, 138).20 Discursive practices constitute their objects of study through rule-governed transformations, they do not simply seek to articulate the already existing and ordered things themselves. Discourse is not reducible to language and speech, but must rather be understood as a formative practice that constitutes its objects and also circumscribes its subjects in creating all feasible positions from which it is possible to make scientific statements. Foucault now writes about the task of archaeology: A task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe. (AK, 49)21 19 Beatrice Han (1998, 87–93) argues that Foucault’s nominalist position is not consistent in OT, and that there is a major shift between OT and AK. The historical a priori is defined in OT as an implicit relationship between words and things, or between being and language: the conditions of possibility of forms of knowledge consist of different relationships between the being of signs and being in general. Foucault considered it his task to chart the different forms of this relationship between words and things through history, from the Renaissance to modernity. According to Han, his form of analysis already makes it clear that he must still have presupposed an ontology of ‘words’ and ‘things’ in OT – an ontology of two separate and autonomous modes of existence – to be able to analyze the changing forms of their relationship. Hence, although he retrospectively claimed that his book dealt with neither words nor things, but rather with ‘objects’, which are discursively constituted, his position becomes consistently nominalist only after OT. 20 Foucault acknowledged in AK that he used the notion of discourse in at least three different ways: (1) as a general domain of all statements, (2) as an individualizable group of statements, (3) as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements (AK, 80). I will restrict myself to the last meaning, which, I argue, is central to understanding Foucault’s philosophical position. For more on Foucault’s concept of discourse see e.g. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, Frank 1989/1992. 21 ‘Tˆache qui consiste a` ne pas – a` ne plus – traiter les discours comme des ensembles de signes (d’´el´ements signifiants renvoyant a` des contenus ou a` des repr´esentations) mais comme des practiques qui forment syst´ematiquement les objets dont ils parlent. Certes, les discours sont faits de signes; mais ce qu’ils font, c’est plus que d’utiliser ces signes pour d´esigner des choses. C’est ce plus, qui les rend irr´eductibles a` la langue et a` la parole. C’est ce “plus” qu’il faut faire apparaˆıtre et qu’il faut d´ecrire.’ (AS, 66–7)
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In AK, Foucault also reformulates his mode of questioning in order to emphasize the idea that his aim is not to reveal a set of transcendental rules or conditions that are ontologically separate from the empirical practices. Rather, the analysis of discourse aims to isolate ‘the conditions of existence’ of statements as opposed to the conditions of possibility (AK, 28). These conditions of existence determine what actually exists and thus, in principle, imply a finite group of statements. Foucault thus argues that his analysis of scientific discourses moves on a solely descriptive plane. He does not concern himself with possible statements or with the conditions of possibility for making statements, but rather focuses on actual statements. Foucault refers to disciplinary unities such as natural history by using a broader term discursive formation. He claims that the unity of a discursive formation is not defined by a unity of any of its elements, for example, its objects or themes, but rather by the rules that govern the formation of its statements and objects. His major premise in AK is thus that discursive formations are identifiable as rule-governed systems. The aim of an archaeology of scientific discourse is to identify these rules of formation in their historical existence. Such rules are the historical a priori in AK: they are regulative and formative but historical. They provide ‘an a priori not of truths that might never be said, or really given to experience, but an a priori of a history that is given, since it is of things actually said’ (AK, 127). The rules governing discursive formations are not abstract laws or formal principles, but refer to the ways in which the statements are actually related. ‘The regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation itself. The fact of its belonging to a discursive formation and the laws that govern it are one and the same thing’ (AK, 116). It is possible to abstract the rules from the practices only retrospectively, as a result of an archaeological analysis. Hence, the rules are not transcendental in the sense that they form the condition of all possible statements. For Foucault, there is nothing more than the particular and limited amount of statements and the relations that exist between them. The rules of discursive formation are simply the description of these existing relations (AK, 116–17). They determine what, in a particular historical situation, in a particular field, did count as scientific objects, what sort of things were said about them, who said them, and what concepts were used in the saying (AK, 71). While, in OT, Foucault presented archaeology as a modification of
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transcendental philosophy in the sense that his aim was to isolate the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge for an epoch, in AK he restricts his analysis more strictly to particular discursive fields and their conditions of existence. I will show in the following chapter how the central role Foucault gives to language, as well as the methodological paths that he explores in studying it, can be read as reactions to the problems arising out of phenomenology. I take the main motivation in Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in OT to be to reveal the problems involved in grounding knowledge on the being of man and to press upon us the need to find a new direction for philosophical inquiry in the study of language. By comparing Foucault’s archaeology to Husserl’s phenomenology, especially to the formulations Husserl gives his project in his late work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, I hope to bring to light both the common forms of questioning as well as the profound methodological differences. The philosophical laughter that inaugurates OT reappears later on in the book as laughter directed at phenomenology as a prime example of a thought centred on man. Philosophical laughter is what Foucault thinks is needed in order to shatter ‘the familiar landmarks’, the domineering forms of thought, and to inaugurate a new mode of thinking. However, he must have been aware of the vulnerability of his own philosophical position, since his philosophical laughter could only ever be silent laughter. He ends his criticism of phenomenology in chapter 9 by writing: Anthropology constitutes perhaps the fundamental arrangement that has governed and controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day. This arrangement is essential, since it forms part of our history; but it is disintegrating before our eyes, since we are beginning to recognize and to denounce in it, in a critical mode, both a forgetfulness of the opening that made it possible and a stubborn obstacle standing obstinately in the way of an imminent new form of thought. To all those who still wish to talk about man, about his reign or liberation, to all those who still ask themselves questions about what man is in his essence, to all those who wish to take him as their starting point in their attempts to reach the truth, to all those who, on the other hand, refer all knowledge back to the truths of man himself, to all those who refuse to formalize without anthropologizing, who refuse to mythologize without demystifying, who refuse to think without immediately thinking that it is
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man who is thinking, to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection we can answer only with a philosophical laugh – which means, to a certain extent, a silent one. (OT, 342–3)22 22 ‘L’Anthropologie constitue peut-ˆetre la disposition fondamentale qui a command´e et conduit la pens´ee philosophique depuis Kant jusqu’`a nous. Cette disposition, elle est essentielle puisqu’elle fait partie de notre histoire; mais elle est en train de se dissocier sous nos yeux puisque nous commen¸cons a` y reconnaˆıtre, a` y d´enoncer sur un mode critique, a` la fois l’oubli de l’ouverture qui l’a rendue possible, et l’obstacle tˆetu qui s’oppose obstin´ement a` une pens´ee prochaine. A tous ceux qui veulent encore parler de l’homme, de son r`egne ou de sa lib´eration, a` tous ceux qui posent encore des questions sur ce qu’est l’homme en son essence, a` tous ceux qui veulent partir de lui pour avoir acc`es a` la v´erit´e, a` tous ceux en revanche qui reconduisent toute connaissance aux v´erit´e de l’homme lui-mˆeme, a` tous ceux qui ne veulent pas formaliser sans anthropologiser, qui ne veulent pas mythologiser sans d´emystifier, qui ne veulent pas penser sans penser aussitˆot que c’est l’homme qui pense, a` toutes ces formes de r´eflexion gauches et gauchies, on ne peut qu’opposer un rire philosophique – c’est-`a-dire, pour une certaine part, silencieux.’ (MC, 353–4)
2 T H E F O U C A U LT I A N FA I L U R E OF PHENOMENOLOGY
G´erard Lebrun (1989/1992) suggests in an article on Foucault’s archaeology that it is worth rereading The Order of Things, at least once, as an anti-Krisis. To present such a reading will be my aim in this chapter. Lebrun points out that The Order of Things and Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences bear many rhetorical, thematic and structural affinities. Both Foucault and Husserl engage in a constructive rereading of the history of philosophy, both prepare their main arguments about modern and contemporary thought with careful analyses of seventeenthcentury thought, and both set as their task the elucidation of the fundamental conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge. Some of Foucault’s key concepts in OT, such as ‘historical a priori’ originate from Husserl (Lebrun 1989/1992, 32).1 Yet despite the similarity of their tasks, themes and vocabulary, the two thinkers end up with fundamentally different understandings of the historicity of reason, the conditions of possibility of knowledge, and the development of the sciences. OT sets out to ultimately reveal the failure of phenomenology and to chart a way out the impasse. Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in OT can be divided roughly into two different types. I will present his discussion here according to this twofold schema, although the issues in question necessarily overlap. Firstly, there is implicit criticism of the phenomenological understanding of the philosophy of science as presented in Husserl’s Crisis. By laying out a very different understanding of the development of science in 1 Husserl explicates the notion of historical a priori in his essay ‘The Origin of Geometry’. Although Foucault’s historical a priori originates from there, it gets a very different meaning in Foucault’s thought. I will return to the difference between Husserl’s and Foucault’s notions at the end of this chapter.
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OT, Foucault implicitly challenges Husserl’s method and central ideas about the history of thought. In his introduction to the English translation, he presents the method of the book specifically as an alternative and antidote to phenomenology. If there is one approach that I reject, however, it is that (one might call it broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which in short, leads, to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that the historical analysis of scientific discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to the theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice. (OT, xiv)
Secondly, there is explicit criticism of phenomenology in the text of OT, in chapter 9, which focuses on the paradox of man. Because the chapter is notoriously cryptic, to be able to follow Foucault’s arguments one cannot simply lay them out for evaluation: they must first be rebuilt from fairly sparse and ambiguous references. I will therefore explicate what I take to be the main points in Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in relation to Husserl’s thought.
The history of science Foucault’s engagement with Husserl in OT takes issue mainly with Husserl’s late work, particularly The Crisis of European Sciences. By the time of he had written The Crisis, Husserl had been forced to acknowledge that the ‘Cartesian way’ into phenomenology was misleading. One reason for this was that there were fundamental structures of the world which the Cartesian way overlooked, or presupposed unproblematically, in its explication of the ego. In The Crisis, therefore, Husserl develops the important concept of the life-world. This refers to a horizon of meaning that is always ‘already there’ for the experiencing subject before any efforts are made to articulate or understand it. The life-world constitutes the universal field of all actual and possible experiences. The life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. (Husserl 1954/1970a, 142)2
Husserl argues that the life-world forms the basis of all human praxis, including all scientific praxis. All theories of science – not just empirical sciences but also the a priori sciences, such as mathematics and logic – derive their meaning and grounds for validity from the life-world. They presuppose the existence of a directly experienceable world, and set themselves the task of making this ‘prescientific and subjective knowledge’ into perfect and objective knowledge. In the process, however, they lose sight of this ground on which their theoretical formulations rest and can only rest. The ‘objective-true world’ that results from the theoretical activity of the sciences and of the scientists is a construction of something that, in principle, is not perceivable or experienceable in its own being. Husserl writes: The contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the ‘objective’, the ‘true’ world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical substruction, the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable. (Husserl 1954/1970a, 127)3
The life-world is, by its being, experienceable and is therefore the realm of original self-evidences. It consists of what is intuitable in principle (Husserl 1954/1970a, 127). It is thus both the reference point of meaning for the theories of objective science as well the concrete unity that
2 ‘Die Lebenswelt ist . . . fu¨ r uns, die in ihr wach Lebenden, immer schon da, im voraus fu¨ r uns seiend, “Boden” fu¨ r alle, ob theoretische oder außertheoretische Praxis. Die Welt ist uns, den wachen, den immerzu irgendwie praktisch interessierten Subjekten, nicht gelegentlich einmal, sondern immer und notwendig als Universalfeld aller wirklichen und m¨oglichen Praxis, als Horizont vorgegeben. Leben ist st¨andig In-Weltgewißheit-leben.’ (Husserl 1954/1962, 145) 3 ‘Der Kontrast zwischen dem Subjektiven der Lebenswelt und der ‘objektiven’, der ‘wahren’ Welt liegt nun darin, daß die letztere eine theoretisch-logische Substruktion ist, die eines prinzipiell nicht Wahrnehmbaren, prinzipiell in seinem eigenen Selbstsein nicht Erfarhrbaren, w¨ahrend das lebensweltlich Subjektive in allem und jedem eben durch seine wirkliche Erfahrbarkeit ausgezeichnet ist’ (Husserl 1954/1976, 130).
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encompasses them. Objective science is one kind of human praxis and is therefore itself also part of the life-world. The task that Husserl sets for his ‘new science’ in The Crisis is to break ‘the scholastic dominance of objective-scientific ways of thinking’ and to inquire into the life-world as the only possible ground for the sciences and their claims to objective validity (Husserl 1954/1970a, 129). The life-world must become a subject of investigation in its own right. This cannot mean a simple description of our surroundings, however. Husserl clearly sees the problems involved in a project aimed at elucidating something that is both the basis of objective validity or the ‘scientifically true’ world, as well as what encompasses it and all theoretical pursuits, including its own. He asks: ‘How are we to do justice systematically – that is, with appropriate scientific discipline – to the all encompassing, so paradoxically demanding, manner of being of the life-world?’ (131). Husserl claims to achieve this goal by performing a series of inquiries, starting from the pregiven life-world and moving back to its constitution in transcendental subjectivity, and ultimately in transcendental intersubjectivity. The first step is the epoche of objective science resulting in the disclosure of the life-world. This means that all our objectivescientific opinions and cognitions are put out of play and ‘one can place oneself completely upon the ground of this straightforwardly intuited world’ (123). After suspending all our scientific beliefs about the world, we come to realize that the life-world is not merely subjective and relative, but that it has a general structure. Prescientifically, the world is already a spatio-temporal unity containing bodies with causal relations between them. The structures of the life-world, however, are now intuited directly and are not theoretical abstractions. To elucidate these invariant structures of the life-world would be the task of life-world ontology. However, the phenomenologist must not be content with staying at this level, which still remains the level of the natural attitude, but should proceed to ask how the life-world is pregiven to us: what is its manner of being and what makes it a universal basis for any sort of knowledge (146). We notice thereby that the first step which seemed to help at the beginning, that epoche through which we freed ourselves from all the objective sciences as grounds of validity, by no means suffices. In carrying out this epoche, we obviously continue to stand on the ground of the world; it
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m is now reduced to the life-world which is valid for us prescientifically; it is just that we may use no sort of knowledge arising from the sciences as premises, and we may take the sciences into consideration only as historical facts, taking no position of our own on their truth. (Husserl 1954/1970a, 147)4
It then becomes necessary to accomplish a second epoche the ‘transcendental epoche’, which reveals the transcendental correlation between the world and world consciousness.5 This is accomplished by the ‘withholding of natural, naive validities and in general of validities already in effect’ (135). By placing himself above his practical and natural interests, and even his own natural being, the philosopher arrives at an attitude that is ‘above the pregivenness of the validity of the world’ (150) and is therefore capable of discovering its mode of giveness in the constituting consciousness. After all natural interests have been put out of play, the world appears ‘purely as a correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world is at all’ (152). The life-world is studied as multiplicities of manners of appearing, which refer back to the ego-pole as constitutive of their unity. The general structure of all experience, as well as the manner of being of the world, are comprehended under three headings: the ego-pole, the subjective as appearance tied together synthetically, and the object-poles (171). Foucault’s critique of phenomenology in OT questions the possibility of accomplishing either one of the steps or epoches that Husserl presents in The Crisis. While Foucault explicitly attacks the second in his discussion of the double of man, ‘the cogito and the unthought’,
4 ‘Wir bemerken dabei, daß jener n¨achste Schritt, der anfangs zu helfen schien, jene Epoch´e, in der wir uns aller objektiven Wissenschaften als Geltungsbodens entheben mußten, keineswegs schon genugt. ¨ Im Vollzug dieser Epoch´e stehen wir offenbar noch weiter auf dem Boden der Welt; sie ist nun reduziert auf die vorwissenschaftlich uns geltende Lebenswelt, nur daß wir keinerlei Wissen, das aus den Wissenschaften herstammt, als Pr¨amisse verwenden und die Wissenschaften nur in der Weise historischer Tatsachen, ohne eigene Stellungnahme zu ihrer Wahrheit, in Rechnung ziehen durfen.’ ¨ (Husserl 1954/1962, 150) 5 Recent studies in phenomenology argue that reduction is not strictly speaking something that is accomplished. It is not a planned procedure or an expected result, but rather, unanticipated experience. Juha Himanka (1999) emphasizes that reduction allows us to move from the habitual to the unforeseen and the unexpected: after reduction we are able to look as if for the first time. On this kind of interpretation of reduction, see e.g. Waldenfels 1993, Himanka 1999 and 2001, Hein¨amaa 2002. See also already Fink 1933, Merleau-Ponty 1945/1994.
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I will show here that the method and overall understanding of the history of science present in OT also makes it impossible to accomplish the first epoche. Husserl’s aim in The Crisis, in concise terms, is to show how the lifeworld is the starting point for all scientific abstractions and theories. All scientific truths, even the detailed calculations of observed phenomena given by complicated measuring devices, must derive their ground of validity from the life-world, which alone is directly experienceable. Foucault, on the other hand, understands scientific development as irreversibly removed from direct intuition and experience. In order to explicate the difference between Foucault’s and Husserl’s understanding of the philosophy of science, I will argue here that many of the central ideas that Foucault inherits from Gaston Bachelard’s and George Canguilhem’s thought are illuminative.6 A third important influence would be Jean Cavaill`es, whose posthumously published essays contain an explicit critique of Husserlian phenomenology and a call to abandon the subject and to develop in its place a philosophy of the concept.7 6 Gary Gutting (1989) explicates the relationship between Foucault’s archaeology and Canguilhem’s and Bachelard’s philosophies of science in his book Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason. Gutting argues that Foucault’s method in OT is primarily an application and an extension of Canguilhem’s history of concepts, as well as a refinement of Bachelard’s understanding of the historicity of scientific conceptions. Gutting (1989, 54, 218–20) also points out, however, that Foucault’s archaeology is not only a continuation of Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s work. His archaeology is an original method for the study of history of science, with its own distinctive topics and concerns. Even in areas where Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s influence is particularly strong, Foucault extends, adapts and transforms their ideas and methods. As a historian of biology, Canguilhem focused on concepts that were in fact deployed by the biologists whose work he was analyzing. Foucault, however, deals not only with first-order biological concepts, but also with concepts that define the conditions of possibility for formulating such concepts. According to Gutting, Foucault’s extension of the history of concepts thus undermines the privileged role of disciplines in the history of thought and introduces a level of conceptual history that is more fundamental than that of the first-order concepts of scientific disciplines. While Foucault’s work follows Bachelard in emphasizing the epistemological factors working below the level of first-order concepts as well as the consciousness of the scientists, unlike Bachelard, Foucault does not see this level as entirely negative. For Bachelard, such factors are residues of outdated modes of thought that obstruct the path of scientific development. For Foucault, this deep epistemological level has positive significance: it embodies the conditions that make possible the formation of new concepts. Since my principal topic is Foucault’s relationship to phenomenology and not to French philosophy of science, my presentation of Foucault’s relationship to Bachelard’s and Canguilhem’s thought relies considerably on Gutting’s work. 7 See Cavaill`es 1947/1994, 473–560.
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Bachelard’s philosophy of science as a critique of phenomenology. Bachelard’s work reiterates the central idea in Husserl’s thought, that scientific entities and theories are essentially historical, and that the development of science is best understood by reflecting on its concrete historical employment. However, while The Crisis strongly argues that sciences have a derivative status in relation to philosophy understood as rigorous science, Bachelard claims that the achievements of science in fact create and must create philosophical understanding (Bachelard 1934/1949, 3–5; Gutting 1989, 13–14).8 In his book Le nouvel esprit scientifique (1934/1949), Bachelard sought to show how modern physics radically altered our metaphysical understanding of the nature of reality: of matter, movement, space and time. He further argued that it implied a non-Cartesian epistemology, which condemns the doctrine that knowledge must proceed from simple natures that can be known directly to more complex ones. Modern physics reveals that there are no simple ideas or essences which could be understood in themselves, and which would serve as a basis for further deductions. All simple ideas or essences are in fact always derivative and can initially only be understood as parts of complex systems of thought and experience (Bachelard 1934/1949, 142–8). Modern science thus forces us to rethink our ideas about direct intuition by questioning its primacy as well as its reliability. The intuitive clarity of scientific claims is achieved in a discursive manner, by progressive clarification resulting from varying examples, and by putting theoretical notions to work (Bachelard 1934/1949, 145).9 Bachelard’s notion of the epistemic break characterizes the way in which scientific knowledge splits off from, and even contradicts, common-sense experiences and beliefs. It places objects of experience into new categories that reveal properties and relations not available to ordinary sense perception. Bachelard rejects any view that makes the 8 Gary Gutting (1989, 23) argues that it is important to note that Bachelard’s subordination of philosophy to science is not an instance of positivistic scientism. Bachelard did not consider philosophy itself to be a part of science. Philosophy is a reflection of the sciences, and its methods and results do not share the empirical character of scientific disciplines. See also Canguilhem 1994a, 33, 43. 9 In his book La philosophie de non (1940/1949) Bachelard also argued against the idea of a unitary epistemological base underlying modern science. Reason, rather, must obey science: it must not privilege immediate experience, but rather balance it with scientific experience, which is more richly structured (144). Paul Rabinow (1994, 13) elaborates on this by writing that Bachelard’s aim was not to attack science, but rather to show it in action in its specificity and plurality.
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contents of ordinary, subjective experience more real than scientific objects (Gutting 1989, 14–19). According to him, ‘Objective research pursued in a laboratory commits us to progressive objectification that gives reality at the same time to both a new experience and a new form of thought’ (Bachelard 1934/1949, 172). Foucault’s aim of searching for the conditions of possibility for scientific modes of knowledge in the structuring of the discourses themselves follows Bachelard’s views in this respect. Foucault’s fundamental idea of the episteme – the development of the sciences in accordance with a historical a priori that unites, regulates and structures them – is in direct opposition to Husserl’s argument that the lived experience is the indispensable starting point and condition of possibility of scientific discourse. By studying scientific discourses themselves, Foucault claims to be able to reveal the ordering codes that condition, regulate and structure even the ordinary, non-scientific experiences of an age. Even though his explicit criticism in OT is mainly targeted at the effectiveness of Husserl’s second, transcendental epoche, Foucault’s method and the philosophical implications of the book refute Husserl’s first epoche, the reduction to the life-world. According to Husserl, the first epoche reveals to us a universal a priori belonging purely to the life-world. From this it is possible to proceed to life-world ontology, which explicates the universal structures of the life-world, as well as to transcendental inquiry into the constituting function of subjectivity. What we need first is ‘a separation in principle of the latter (universal life-world a priori) from the objective a priori, which is always immediately substituted for it. It is this separation that is effected by the first epoche of all objective sciences’ (Husserl 1954/1970a, 140). Husserl thus holds that science always involves some kind of a rupture with prescientific experience, while at the same time it can only find its basis in the life-world. The view of scientific discourse that Foucault advocates in OT, on the other hand, questions the possibility of separating what belongs purely to the life-world and what is a second-order idealization of scientific discourse. Science constructs ordinary experiences and blurs the line separating them from its own theoretically informed experiences. Scientific idealizations become part of the ordinary life-world. Foucault’s notion of the episteme covers, in Husserl’s terms, both the life-world and the objective world of science. A change in episteme means a change in the perceptual, practical and theoretical grids: the mode of being of words, as well as of objects, changes. Husserl
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acknowledges the historical dimension of the sciences and considers the relation between the prescientific life-world and the scientific world as dynamic.10 Nevertheless, even if their relation changes historically, reduction to the life-world presupposes that this distinction is in place, that we know what belongs to the scientific world and what belongs to the life-world. For Foucault, on the other hand, even everyday perceptions are structured according to the changing historical a prioris of scientific discourse, and hence the distinction becomes impossible in principle. He would thus agree with Husserl that there is a more fundamental level underneath the level of particular scientific theories, but he would claim that this level is not that of life-world experiences. The fundamental, archaeological level structures not only the order of discourses but also the subjective experiences of this order. Foucault also searches for the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge as well as of life-world experiences, but rather than turning to the constituting transcendental subjectivity, he argues that these conditions are essentially non-subjective and anonymous, and that they can be made explicit only in regard to the past by the historical analysis of scientific discourses. Moreover, contrary to Husserl’s aim in The Crisis, Foucault aims to show in OT that the history of science is not a continuous and unified development of rationality. This idea is also central to Bachelard’s work. Bachelard argues that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the history of science, only various histories of different regions of scientific work. Philosophy thus cannot uncover one single, unified conception of rationality from reflections on the history of science, it can only find various regions of rationality (Gutting 1989, 14).11 Bachelard also emphasizes sharp breaks in the history of science and in the conception of reason, and claims that for a phenomenologist there can be no sharp breaks, because scientific discoveries are always additions of truth about the objects given to ordinary experience. For a phenomenologist, science rests on the indispensable and fundamental perceptual framework and proceeds from it (Gutting 1989, 27). Foucault’s presentation of the history of western thought in distinct epistemes in which the epistemic breaks make the central questions 10 See, in particular, the readings of Husserl that emphasize the importance of intersubjectivity and his phenomenology of the social world, most notably Steinbock 1995 and Zahavi 1996/2001. 11 See also Machado 1989/1992, 4.
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of one episteme incompatible with, sometimes even totally incomprehensible in the next, is thus an implicit criticism of Husserl’s method of reading the history of philosophy and science in The Crisis. Husserl begins his search for the origins of the contemporary crisis in philosophy and science with a critical study of Galileo’s mathematization of nature. Husserl shows how the mathematical idea of nature was given priority in philosophy, and how this led to the fatal separation of philosophy and the natural sciences and to the forgetting of the life-world as ‘the meaning-fundament of natural science’ (Husserl 1954/1970a, 48). After arriving at the discovery of transcendental subjectivity, first Descartes, and later Kant, made the mistake of objectifying it and therefore postponed the forging of a true basis of science. In the light of Foucault’s history of thought, it would be pointless to blame Galileo for leading western thought in the wrong direction, or Descartes and Kant for failing to discover transcendental subjectivity. Not only do epistemic breaks make the questions of one episteme impossible in another, but Foucault’s method of writing the history of thought in terms of concepts rather than individual discoveries also argues against Husserl’s approach. Canguilhem’s influence on Foucault’s archaeology is apparent here. Canguilhem’s history of science as a critique of phenomenology. Canguilhem’s aim as a historian of science was to write histories of concepts, particularly the concepts of life sciences such as reflex, cell and the immune system. According to Canguilhem, concepts regulate the production of forms of knowledge: ‘The history of science should be a history of the formation, deformation and rectification of scientific concepts’ (Canguilhem 1994a, 110). He discusses the origins of cell theory to argue that theories never proceed from simple facts. Cell theory was not formulated because cells could be observed with the new aid of a microscope; the first premise of cell theory was not that living things are composed of cells, but that all living things consist of nothing but cells. Such an assertion could not be justified by observations made through a microscope (Canguilhem 1994a, 161). Canguilhem shows how ideas and concepts borrowed from political theory in fact dominated debates in early cell theory; whether cells are elementary, independent organisms akin to the individuals of liberalism, or simply parts of a whole unable to exist independently. While facts act as a stimulus to theory, they neither engender the concepts that provide the theories with their
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internal coherence, nor initiate the intellectual ambitions that theories pursue (177). Another example that Canguilhem gives to illustrate the fundamental role of concepts in the development of science is Claude Bernard’s discovery in 1855 of the concept of ‘internal secretion’, a concept that ‘only a few years earlier would have been taken as a contradiction in terms, an impossibility as unthinkable as a square circle’ (Canguilhem 1944a, 265–6). The concept implied that animals were influenced and regulated not only by an external environment, but also by an internal environment. This meant, on the one hand, that the old distinction between the plant kingdom and the animal kingdom, according to which plants could and animals could not synthesize simple organic compounds, was blown away. Life was seen in a new way, without the distinction between plant and animal. On the other hand, it also meant the birth of physiology: without the idea of an internal environment, there could be no autonomous science of physiology (266–9). Scientific concepts are thus not simply parts of the theories used to interpret phenomena. They often provide us with the cognitive and perceptual grids for understanding a phenomenon that make it possible to formulate scientific theories explaining it. Foucault’s aim in OT of showing how concepts such as life and labour fundamentally structured the theories of a discipline, follows this idea. As Gary Gutting (1989, 34) notes, the fundamental, regulative status of concepts makes it possible to write historical accounts of their formation and transformation that operate at a different, more fundamental level than accounts of a succession of explanatory theories. According to Canguilhem, this view of the development of science also makes it pointless to search for early precursors of major scientific discoveries: ‘Strictly speaking, if precursors existed, the history of science would loose all meaning, since science itself would merely appear to have a historical dimension’ (Canguilhem 1994a, 49). A precursor is generally understood as a thinker or a researcher who proceeded some distance along a path that was later explored all the way to the end by someone else. He is thus someone who belongs to more than one age: he is a man of his own time, but also simultaneously a contemporary of those later investigators credited with completing his unfinished project. He is therefore a thinker whom the historian believes can be extracted from his cultural milieu and inserted into others. Such adaptability is only obtained at the cost of neglecting the ‘historicity’ of the object under study. Canguilhem thus concludes:
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So long as texts and other works yoked together by the heuristic compression of time have not been subject to critical analysis for the purpose of explicitly demonstrating that two researchers sought to answer identical questions for identical reasons, using identical guiding concepts, defined by identical systems, then insofar as an authentic history of science is concerned, it is completely artificial, arbitrary and unsatisfactory to say that one man finished what the other started or anticipated what the other achieved. By substituting the logical time of truth relations for the historical time of these relations’ inventions, one treats the history of science as though it were a copy of science and its object a copy of the object of science. The result is the creation of an artifact, a counterfeit historical object – the precursor. (Canguilhem 1994a, 51)12
The ‘discovery’ of a precursor is thus usually based on the failure to recognize fundamental conceptual differences that underlie superficially similar formulations. It also relies on an individualist model of scientific discovery. In Canguilhem’s view, as soon as the methods and problems of modern science become adjusted to each other, and instruments become so highly specialized that their very use implies the acceptance of common working hypotheses, then it will be true to say that science shapes scientists just as much as scientists shape science (107). Foucault reiterates this idea in OT by showing, for example, that the so-called precursors of evolutionary theory in the classical age, despite superficial similarities, were in fact relying on a wholly different understanding of nature. For them, nature was only conceivable as a unified, ahistorical table in which changes were shifts of the whole towards a higher state of perfection. It was only the emergence of the modern concept of life understood as a historical, dynamic phenomenon that made possible the idea of the evolutionary development of a species. Contrary to Husserl’s presentation of Galileo’s fundamental discovery of mathematized nature, and to Descartes’ and Kant’s mistakes of objectifying transcendental subjectivity, Foucault would argue that these individual discoveries or ‘errors’ were, in fact, made possible, even necessary, by certain epistemic conditions and concepts. Galileo’s idea of calculable nature was only one part of the classical idea of an orderable nature as mathesis. The mathematization of nature that Husserl attributed to Galileo, was, for Foucault, simply a typical mode of 12 The original French is not available.
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knowledge in the classical episteme, structured in terms of representation.13 Similarly, Foucault would object to the idea of viewing the philosophies of Descartes and Kant in terms of mistakes. As G´erard Lebrun (1989/1992, 24) writes, for Foucault ‘There is no point in regretting that Descartes missed the idea of the transcendental ego, when he was far from being able to foresee it’. Or, to see in Kantianism a way of thinking that allowed the continued predominance of ‘the evidence of objectivity’ was not only futile, but also missed the essential point. Kant’s thought inaugurated an epistemic break and with him the classical mathesis was swept away forever (Lebrun 1989/1992, 27). This same criticism also, implicitly, includes phenomenology itself. From Foucault’s point of view, phenomenology is not sensitive enough to the historicity of its own project – its historical conditions of possibility in Kant’s thought and in the modern episteme. Rather than phenomenology being able to reveal the true ground of the sciences, its own project, in fact, depends on their discoveries. The coming into being of new positive elements – life, work, language – which to a large extent determined what it was to be a human being, posed the problem of how a human being was to understand himself as the subjective ground of science, as well a being dependent on a life-world he could not subjectively create. Phenomenology is, thus, a child of its time, an offspring of the modern episteme, which discovered life, labour, language and therefore also man, a double figure, dependent on the positivities it discovered. ‘This is why phenomenology . . . has never been able to exorcise its insidious kinship, its simultaneously promising and threatening proximity, to the empirical sciences of man’ (OT, 326). In ‘The Vienna lecture’, Husserl presented phenomenology as the culmination of the European teleology of the infinite goal of reason. Its aim was to realize the ancient ideal of philosophy as an infinite task, and to inaugurate ‘the total reorientation of the task of knowledge’ (Husserl 1954/1970b, 298).14 Foucault’s historical contextualization of the phenomenological project as a necessary moment in the modern episteme is thus an implicit criticism of the aims or pretensions of phenomenology. He does not consider phenomenology to be the culmination of the history of philosophy, but, rather, gives it a far more 13 Cf. Lebrun 1989/1992, 23. 14 According to Husserl, phenomenology alone has been capable of attaining ‘the higher stage of reflexivity which is decisive for the new form of philosophy and of European humanity’ by realizing the aim of philosophy as a rigorous science on which all objective sciences are based (Husserl 1954/1970b, 292).
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modest role. It is a sensitive acknowledgement of the paradox of man, a particular configuration in modern thought, but a failed effort to solve this paradox. Moreover, its ultimate failure means that all further reformulations of its project are equally futile. The true solution to the problem would require abandoning the starting point of the whole phenomenological project, questioning what has in fact rendered the whole of our contemporary thought historically possible. According to Foucault, the question we must ask is: how will we think after the death of man?
The analytic of finitude It is often argued that Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in OT is inaccurate and that it is based on sweeping generalizations that are not supported by textual references. Gary Gutting (1989, 223), for example, notes that because Foucault’s discussions of the three ‘doubles’ contain some of the most convoluted and obscure passages in OT, readers can easily be fooled into thinking that there is a level of profound criticism that they have failed to penetrate. Gutting argues that whatever profundity there is in these analyses only concerns Foucault’s way of understanding the major projects of recent continental philosophy and relating them to one another. The contortions of his interpretative analysis serve only to hide the weakness of his criticism of phenomenology. Because Foucault does not provide any textual references, it is a matter of interpretation who exactly is the target of his criticism of phenomenology in chapter 9, ‘Man and his Doubles’. There are clear echoes of the three doubles in Merleau-Ponty’s, Husserl’s, Sartre’s and Heidegger’s thought. It could be argued that the discussion of the ‘actual experience’ in connection with the first double refers to Merleau-Ponty, while the criticism of the second mainly characterizes Husserl’s thought and the third double points to Heidegger.15 My aim here, however, is not to decodify Foucault’s cryptic and missing references. Instead, I will ‘translate’ the three doubles into a criticism of Husserl’s work, although it could be argued that this would apply in 15 See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 33–41, Gutting 1989, 204. Didier Eribon (1991, 157) claims that OT was a challenge to Sartrean hegemony in France at the time. He points out that the book contained numerous attacks on Sartre that Foucault omitted from the final version.
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differing degrees to all phenomenological projects. My aim in reconstructing Foucault’s three doubles as an explicit criticism of Husserl’s thought is not to argue for the philosophical superiority of Foucault’s thought in relation to Husserl. What is clearly contestable is whether the problems at issue are insurmountable within the phenomenological enterprise itself, and require us to reject it, as Foucault claims. My point in reconstructing Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology is firstly to argue that, despite its undeniable vagueness, it points to profound philosophical questions about the relationships between history and philosophy, the transcendental and the empirical, language and the subject. Secondly, I will show that the problems that Foucault points to are not external but rather internal to phenomenology: they were evident to Husserl himself to a certain extent, but certainly to his followers, both in France and Germany. Hence, my argument is that Foucault’s work should be seen not as a total break with phenomenology but rather as part of a continuum, even if the relationship is fundamentally critical. The cornerstone of Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology is his claim that Kant’s distinction between the empirical field of knowledge and its a priori conditions becomes blurred in the modes of thought that Foucault calls ‘the analytic of finitude’.16 This is a configuration of knowledge, or a mode of thinking, that is characterized by the fact that knowledge is grounded on the human being in his finitude. This leads to the paradox of man. Foucault discusses three forms of this paradox – the three doubles of man, as he calls them – empirical/transcendental, the cogito/the unthought, the retreat/the return of origin. The empirical and the transcendental. The first paradox, the empirical and the transcendental, refers to the paradoxical role a human being has as an empirically limited being and a transcendentally determining subject: ‘such a being that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible’ (OT, 318). Man is both part of the world and, as such, an object of empirical sciences, and at the same time the transcendental ground of all knowledge, including these very same empirical sciences. Foucault argues that this analytic of finitude transforms questions about the empirical limits of the knowing subject into questions about the conditions of possibility of knowledge. The ‘anthropological’ becomes the transcendental 16 Cf. Han 1998/2002, 17–20.
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when the empirical determinations of the knowing subject are understood as the condition of possibility of the subject’s knowledge. Foucault credits Husserl with an acute diagnosis of the paradox of man. He presents phenomenology as ‘the sensitive and precisely formulated acknowledgement of the great hiatus that occured in the modern episteme at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (OT, 325). He argues that Husserl acknowledged the historicity of the knowing subject, its dependence on positivities it did not create, nor can ever fully elucidate. At the same time, Husserl strongly argued that empirical sciences cannot provide the condition of possibility of knowledge. Foucault clearly echoes Husserl by arguing that naturalism and historicism have common roots; two modes of thought that appeared out of a discourse centred on man. His criticism of the claims of the autonomy of naturalism and historicism can furthermore be seen as a representation of Husserl’s anti-naturalism. The problem, according to both Husserl and Foucault, is the foundation of knowledge, which naturalism and historicism are unable to study. Husserl’s criticism of naturalism and historicism, especially in his Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911/1965), seeks to show that naturalism and historicism are unfounded modes of thought. Their presuppositions concerning the possibilities of knowledge are never made explicit, and the rules governing their concepts, theories and values of research are never revealed or grounded. These theories claim objectivity, but the claims are, in fact, empty rhetoric. The status of what is true and stable scientific discourse remains undefined. Husserl’s line of argument is reiterated by Foucault, when he argues that the first efforts to solve the paradox of man meant trying reductionism. However, attempts to reduce man to his empirical side, as positivism did, could not account for the possibility of knowledge, and when the emphasis turned to the transcendental side, in the manner that, for example, Hegel’s phenomenology did, it was not possible to claim scientific objectivity, or to account for the contingency of man’s empirical nature. Foucault writes: For the threshold of our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the constitution of an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called man. Two kinds of analysis then came into being: There are those that operate within the space of the body . . . ; these led to the discovery that knowledge has anatomo-physiological conditions, that it is formed gradually within
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m the structures of the body, that it may have a privileged place within it, but that its forms cannot be dissociated from its peculiar functioning; in short, that there is a nature of human knowledge that determines its forms and that can at the same time be made manifest to it in its own empirical contents. There were also analyses that . . . functioned as a sort of transcendental dialectic; by this means it was shown that knowledge had historical, social or economic conditions, that it was formed within the relations that are woven between men, and that it was not independent of the particular form they might take here or there; in short that there was a history of human knowledge which could both be given to empirical knowledge and which prescribe its forms . . . they claim to be able to rest entirely on themselves, since it is the contents themselves that function as transcendental reflection. But in fact the search for a nature or a history of knowledge, in the movement by which the dimension proper to the critique is fitted over the contents of empirical knowledge, already presupposes the use of a certain critique – a critique that is not the exercise of pure reflection, but the result of a series of more or less obscure divisions. (OT, 319)17
Both Foucault and Husserl thus claim that naturalism and historicism stand on the same epistemological ground. Naturalism, which presupposes that empirical sciences can answer philosophical questions about the possibility of knowledge, and historicism, according to which 17 ‘Car le seuil de notre modernit´e n’est pas situ´e au moment ou` on a voulu appliquer a` l’´etude de l’homme des m´ethodes objectives, mais bien le jour ou` s’est constitu´e un doublet empirico-transcendantal qu’on a appel´e l’homme. On a vu naˆıtre alors deux sortes d’analyses: celles qui se sont log´ees dans l’espace du corps . . . on y d´ecouvrait que la connaissance avait des conditions anatomo-physiologiques, qu’elle se formait peu a` peu dans la nervure du corps, qu’elle y avait peut-ˆetre un si`ege privil´egi´e, que ses formes en tout cas ne pouvaient pas eˆ tre dissoci´ees des singularit´es de son fonctionnement; bref, qu’il y avait une nature de la connaissance humaine qui en d´eterminait les formes et qui pouvait en mˆeme temps lui eˆ tre manifest´ee dans ses propres contenus empiriques. Il y a eu aussi les analyses qui . . . ont fonctionn´e comme une sorte de dialectique transcendantale; on montrait ainsi que la connaissance avait des conditions historiques, sociales, ou e´ conomiques, qu’elle se formait a` l’int´erieur des rapports qui se tissent entre les hommes et qu’elle n’´etait pas ind´ependante de la figure particuli`ere qu’ils pouvaient prendre ici ou` l`a, bref qu’il y avait une histoire de la connaissance humaine, qui pouvait a` la fois eˆ tre donn´ee au savoir empirique et lui prescrire ses formes . . . elles pr´etendent pouvoir ne reposer que sur elles-mˆemes, puisque ce sont les contenus eux-mˆemes qui fonctionnent comme r´eflexion transcendantale. Mais, en fait, la recherche d’une nature ou d’une histoire de la connaissance, dans le mouvement ou` elle rabat la dimension propre de la critique sur les contenus d’une connaissance empirique, suppose l’usage d’une certaine critique. Critique qui n’est pas l’exercise d’une r´eflexion pure, mais le r´esultat d’une s´erie de partages plus ou moins obscurs.’ (MC, 329–30)
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factual history is capable of providing these answers, have common roots in how man is understood as an object of their study while at the same time, although this is not admitted, he is the foundation of all knowledge. The paradoxical role man has as the source of all knowledge and as an object of it is ignored. Discourse attempting to be both empirical and critical cannot but be both positivist and eschatological at the same time. ‘Man appears within it as a truth both reduced and promised. Precritical naivete holds undivided rule’ (OT, 320). Foucault presents phenomenology as ‘a radical contestation of positivism and eschatology’ and argues that it ‘has tried to restore the forgotten dimension of the transcendental’ and to ‘exorcise the naive discourse of truth reduced wholly to the empirical’ (OT, 321). However, phenomenology fails because it remains caught in the mode of thought that is structured by the paradoxical figure of man as an empirical/ transcendental double. In his late work, Husserl explored the idea that the life-world becomes the determiner of the subject’s experiences in the sense that he or she is an empirical object limited by his or her environment. At the same time, Husserl also became convinced of the transcendental importance of intersubjectivity, and consequently of the transcendental significance of the life-world. The life-world becomes the horizon of meaning that makes individual meaning-giving acts possible. Therefore if we are to understand the experiences that are ultimately constitutive of the world, we need to elucidate their implicit background, to make this background an object of phenomenological analysis. Husserl wanted to show how, by means of the two epoches, the initially unthinkable background could be elucidated. The first epoche brings the life-word into the view of the phenomenologist, making it possible for him to proceed to analyze its structures. The second epoche places the phenomenologist above this necessary horizon of his own thought, and therefore enables him to study its constitution in transcendental intersubjectivity. According to Foucault, the second epoche leads to the paradox of man as an empirical/transcendental double. This is because the knowing subject is essentially understood as fundamentally dependent on positivities it did not create. For can I, in fact, say that I am this language I speak, into which my thought insinuates itself to the point of finding in it the system of all its own possibilities, yet which exists only in the weight of sedimentations
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m my thought will never be capable of actualizing altogether? Can I say that I am this labour I perform with my hands, yet which eludes me not only when I have finished it, but even before I have begun it? Can I say that I am this life I sense deep within me, but which envelops me both in the irresistible time that grows side by side with it and poses me for a moment on its crest, and in the imminent time that prescribes my death? (OT, 324–5)18
According to Foucault, Husserl was trying to make explicit ‘the horizon that provides experience with its background of immediate and disarmed proof’ (OT, 327). But he could only accomplish this through the already existing figure of man, and was therefore trapped in inevitable circularity. The life-world makes all thought and action of the subject possible, it is the horizon within which all beings must be situated in order to be. Yet Husserl’s aim was to show how the world in its pregivenness can be understood through the constitutive acts of the phenomenologizing subject. How can a being that can only have validity within the pregiven world constitute that world? Foucault concludes: ‘The phenomenological project continually resolves itself, before our eyes, into a description – empirical despite of itself – of actual experience, and into an ontology of the unthought that automatically shortcircuits the primacy of the “I think”’ (OT, 326). Husserl himself, however, was well aware of the apparent circularity of his project. He himself formulates Foucault’s ‘paradox of man’ in The Crisis: How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a partial formation within the total accomplishment? The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity! Or is this a paradox which 18 ‘puis-je dire, en effet, que je suis ce langage que je parle et ou` ma pens´ee se glisse au point de trouver en lui le syst`eme de toutes ses possibilit´es propres, mais qui n’existe pourtant que dans la lourdeur de s´edimentations qu’elle ne sera jamais capable d’actualiser enti`erement? Puis-je dire que je suis ce travail que je fais de mes mains, mais qui m’´echappe non seulement lorsque je l’ai fini, mais avant mˆeme que je l’aie entam´e? Puis-je dire que je suis cette vie que je sens au fond de moi, mais qui m’enveloppe a` la fois par le temps formidable qu’elle pousse avec soi et qui me juche un instant sur sa crˆete, mais aussi par le temps imminent qui me prescrit ma mort?’ (MC, 335)
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can be sensibly resolved, even a necessary one, arising necessarily out of the constant tension between the power of what is taken for granted in the natural objective attitude . . . and the opposed attitude of the ‘disinterested spectator’? (Husserl 1954/1970a, 179–80)19
Husserl continues to argue that the paradox vanishes once the epoche has been radically and universally carried out. At this point, we do not have human beings either as subjects constituting the world or as objects dependent on it, because we have achieved the ‘attitude above the subject–object correlation which belongs to the world and thus the attitude of focus upon the transcendental subject–object correlation’ (Husserl 1954/1970a, 181). We are led to recognize the constitutive function, not of human beings, but of transcendental subjectivity constitutive even of the ‘phenomena’ of human beings (180–3). After the reduction, the reflecting subject is annulled as man, and transcendental subjectivity, previously concealed, reflectively turns to inquire about itself. Thus, for Husserl, Foucault’s paradox of man is only a paradox if the reduction has not been accomplished. Man as both a subject and an object of knowledge is a figure of the natural attitude and its reality is suspended in the reduction. Underlying both sides of the double is transcendental subjectivity, above or beyond the subject/object distinction and constitutive of all worldly objectivities. What still remains a problem in Husserl’s account is how mundane subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity are related to each other, if they cannot be conflated. Transcendental subjectivity is not a human being in either one of its two aspects or sides. Yet, in order to reveal transcendental subjectivity, the starting point of the investigation must be mundane subjectivity, subjectivity as it is in everyday life. The phenomenologist is thus both part of the universal field of the life-world, as well as curiously being able to stand outside of it. Husserl’s assistant 19 ‘Wie soll ein Teilbestand der Welt, ihre menschliche Subjektivit¨at, die ganze Welt konstituieren, n¨amlich konstituieren als ihr intentionales Gebilde? – Welt, ein immer schon gewordenes und fortwerdendes Gebilde des universalen Konnexes der intentional leistenden Subjektivit¨at – wobei sie, die im Miteinander leistenden Subjekte, selbst nur Teilgebilde der totalen Leistung sein sollen? Der Subjektbestand der Welt verschlingt sozusagen die gesamte Welt und damit sich selbst. Welch ein Widersinn. Oder ist es doch eine sinnvoll aufl¨osbare, sogar eine notwendige Paradoxie, notwendig entspringend aus der best¨andigen Spannung zwischen der Macht der Selbstverst¨andlichkeit der naturlichen ¨ objektiven Einstellung . . . und der sich ihr gegenubersetzenden ¨ Einstellung der “uninteressierten Betrachters”?’ (Husserl 1954/1962, 183)
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Eugen Fink formulates this problem clearly in The Sixth Cartesian Meditation.20 He takes issue precisely with the relationship between the transcendental ego and the human ego, with their necessary difference on the one hand, and their necessary identity on the other.21 He raises two questions in particular: (1) how ‘pre/non-existent’ transcendental subjectivity relates to mundane/human subjectivity, forming a unity in difference; and (2) how that same transcendental agency as an absolute constitutive source relates to the world that is its constitutive end product, forming with it a unity in bipolar differentation (Bruzina 1995, lvi). Fink indicates and anticipates solutions by arguing that the ‘fullsided subject’ of phenomenology is neither the transcendental subject taken purely in its transcendentality, nor the human subject taken as uninvolved with the transcendental, but it is rather transcendental subjectivity appearing in the world. He writes: In the universal epoche, in the disconnection of all belief-positings, the phenomenological onlooker produces himself. The transcendental tendency that awakens in man and drives him to inhibit all acceptednesses nullifies man himself; man unhumanizes himself in performing the epoche, that is, he lays bare the transcendental onlooker in himself, he passes into him. This onlooker, however, does not first come to be by the epoche, but is only freed of the shrouding cover of human being. (Fink 1932/1995, 39–40)22 20 There are different interpretations as to the extent to which Fink’s presentation of phenomenology is attributable to Husserl. Ronald Bruzina (1995, xxviii, xxxii), for example, writes in his translator’s introduction to Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation that Husserl’s phenomenology, at least as it reached its maturity in his last years, was not just Husserl’s – it was Husserl’s and Fink’s. The differences from Husserl that emerged in Fink’s thinking were genuine problems for and within transcendental phenomenology, which developed intrinsically within it rather than antagonistically confronting or undercutting it from the outside. According to Bruzina, Husserl agreed in principle with what Fink was writing, even though he might not have grasped the depth of the implications of Fink’s thought or the radicality with which the fundamental ideas of phenomenology were being challenged, thus implying the need for critical rethinking. Dan Zahavi (1994), on the other hand, argues that Fink’s position is ultimately incompatible with and fundamentally foreign to Husserl’s approach, because Fink did not acknowledge the constitutive importance of transcendental intersubjectivity, or consequently the radical transformation that Husserl’s thinking underwent in the last period of his life, due to his preoccupation with intersubjectivity. 21 See in particular chapter 5, ‘Phenomenologizing as the Action of Reduction’, and chapter 8 ‘Phenomenologizing as a Theoretical Experience’. 22 ‘In der universalen Epoch´e, in der Ausschaltung aller Glaubenssetzungen, produziert sich der ph¨anomenologische Zuschauer selbst. Die transzendentale Tendenz, die im Menschen erwacht, die ihn dazu treibt, einmal alle Geltungen zu inhibieren, hebt den
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Fink thus sought to avoid the paradox by positing a difference in a unity. He recognized that the phenomenologizing onlooker must always operate with already given habituated abilities which, however, must go through a transformation after the reduction. To show exactly how this peculiar transformation takes place ‘would be a major particular and far-reaching task of the transcendental theory of method’ (70). I will not go more deeply into Fink’s suggested solution here.23 My point is simply to show that Foucault’s paradox of man as an empiricotranscendental double reiterates the phenomenological question of the ‘full-sided subject’ – how mundane subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity are related to each other. The cogito and the unthought. I will now move on to the second of Foucault’s pradoxes – cogito and unthought – which surfaces as a consequence of the phenomenological method: self-reflection as a way of investigating subjectivity. The substance of this paradox is that the phenomenologizing subject is fundamentally constituted by what eludes his reflection – the unthought – yet reflection is the method for illuminating it. Foucault claims that, while modern thought has been forced to focus on the thinking subject as the precondition of knowledge, the modern cogito – for example Husserl’s transcendental ego – is not transparent to itself. It cannot reduce the whole being of things to thought in the way Descartes’ cogito could ‘without ramifying the being of thought right down to the inert network of what does not think’ (OT, 324). Self-reflection can no longer lead to the affirmation of being, or, as Foucault writes, ‘I think’ does not anymore lead to the evident truth of ‘I am’. The cogito cannot provide epistemic immediacy and selfcertainty because there are prereflective conditions of knowledge that obfuscate the evident truths of reflection. Instead, modern subjectivity is permeated by an unthought that eludes reflection, but that nevertheless must determine the ways of questioning it. Menschen selbst auf, der Mensch entmenscht sich im Vollzug der Epoch´e, d.h. er legt den transzendentalen Zuschauer in sich frei, er vergeht in ihn. Dieser ist aber nicht erst durch die Epoch´e geworden, sondern ist nur frei geworden von der verhu¨ llenden Verkleidung des Menschseins.’ (Fink 1932/1988, 43–4) 23 Of the contemporary phenomenologists, J. N. Mohanty and David Carr have extensively studied the problem of the relation between the transcendental subject and the empirical subject. See e.g. Mohanty 1989, 1997, and Carr 1999. On the relationship between Foucault’s critique of the paradox of subjectivity and contemporary phenomenological understandings of it, see Oksala 2003.
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Husserl claims that the life-world can be elucidated as a realm of subjective phenomena that has remained anonymous (Husserl 1954/1970a, 111). Although it is essentially an obscure horizon, it can still be opened up through methodological regressive inquiry, taking the phenomenologist back to its constitution in transcendental intersubjectivity. The phenomenological attempt to describe the pregivenness of the life-world in terms of its transcendental constitution is, however, itself a theoretical activity. Reflection is always already a theoretical attitude that involves an objectification of that which is the object of it. This inevitably means that the life-world, when elucidated through phenomenological description, will lose its pregivenness. A second problem is that not only is the pregiven experience inaccessible to reflection, but it is also inexpressible. All expression, any attempt to put something into words, objectifies. It transforms lived experience into conceptual entities, such as the life-world, for example. Foucault describes phenomenology as ‘the endeavor to raise the ground of experience, the sense of being, the lived horizon of all our knowledge to the level of discourse’ (OT, 299). The phenomenologist thus argues both that the life-world is pretheoretical, even prelinguistic, and that its essential structures can be described and articulated through phenomenological analysis; life-world ontology and transcendental phenomenological inquiry. Foucault writes about phenomenology: What it touches it immediately causes to move: it cannot discover the unthought, or at least move towards it, without immediately bringing it nearer to itself – or, even, perhaps, without pushing it further away, and in any case without causing man’s own being to undergo a change by that very fact, since it deploys the distance between them. (OT, 327)24
The act of describing the life-world necessarily gives it a theoretical form, which futhermore becomes constitutive of man’s own selfunderstanding, since he is dependent on the life-world as a part of it. The pure description of the pregiven life-world becomes, in fact, an interpretative act, constitutive of both the world around us as well as of ourselves as parts of it. 24 ‘Elle fait aussitˆot bouger ce qu’elle touche: elle ne peut d´ecouvrir l’impens´e, ou du moins aller dans sa direction, sans l’approcher aussitˆot de soi, – ou peut-ˆetre encore sans l’´eloigner, sans que l’ˆetre de l’homme, en tout cas, puisqu’il se d´eploie dans cette distance, ne se trouve du fait mˆeme alt´er´e.’ (MC, 338)
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Furthermore, the unthought in Husserl’s phenomenology does not only refer to the prereflective horizon of all thought and praxis. Husserl also concedes that the intentional activity of the subject is founded upon and conditioned by an obscure and blind passivity, by drives and association. He argues in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, for example, that there are constitutive processes of an anonymous and involuntary nature taking place in the underground or depth dimension of subjectivity, which can only be uncovered through an elaborate ‘archaeological effort’ (Zahavi 2001, 2). For Husserl, this ‘archaeological effort’ means a reflective investigation of consciousness. In the context of Foucault’s criticism, this means that a paradox surfaces again, albeit in a different form. The task is to make explicit through reflection something that, by definition, eludes reflection. Through reflective inquiry the depth-dimension of subjectivity becomes thematic and loses its prereflective elusiveness. As Dan Zahavi notes, reflection does not merely repeat or copy the original experience, it changes the givenness of the experience reflected upon – otherwise there would be no need for reflection (Zahavi 2001, 6). Thus, the paradox inherent in reflection means that we are obviously confronted with a fundamental limit: when I reflect, I encounter myself as a thematized ego, whereas functioning subjectivity always eludes my thematization and remains anonymous (8). Unlike Foucault, however, Zahavi argues that this does not constitute a major sceptical challenge for the phenomenological enterprise, but only creates a harmless and unavoidable impasse. Firstly, although reflection cannot apprehend the anonymous life in its very functioning, neither is it supposed to. The aim is to lift the naivete of prereflective experience, not to reproduce it. Secondly, although it must be acknowledged that there are depth-dimensions in the constitutive process that do not lie open to the view of reflection, this does not necessarily imply that they remain forever completely ineffable, beyond phenomenological investigation. They can be disclosed, not through direct thematization, but through an indirect operation of dismantling and deconstruction (Zahavi 2001, 8–9). I do not take a stand on this question. My point, again, is simply to show that Foucault’s criticisms of the double figure of man as a structural problem inherent in phenomenology – the phenomenologizing subject as both the object and subject of reflection – is accurate in the sense that it points to a genuine impasse in the phenomenological project, even if it is understood as a harmless one.
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The problem of explicating the unthought linguistically can be extended to include the explication of any of the results of the phenomenological inquiry after the reduction. If the epoche is carried out radically, then all wordly habitualities and abilities, such as logic, conceptuality and language, must also fall subject to bracketing. The phenomenologist must first bracket the existence and validity of language, but he is then forced to bring it back through the back door so to say, to be able to explicate and communicate the findings of his phenomenological inquiries. All notions like ‘transcendental ego’ and ‘flow of consciousness’ revealed by the epoche are worldly concepts already tied to shared and existing meanings and linguistic expressions.25 Husserl only touches on the problem of language in his analyses of the life-world.26 In The Crisis he notes that, after the transcendental epoche has been performed and the life-world has become a mere ‘component’ within transcendental subjectivity, words taken from the sphere of the natural attitude become dangerous and ‘the necessary 25 Derrida presents one of the most influential forms of this criticism in his introduction to Husserl’s essay ‘The Origin of Geometry’. In this essay, too, Husserl inquires into the production of the ideal objects of science, and shows how they originate in the life-world, from its pre-scientific, sensibly evident truths. Derrida shows (1962/1989, 63) that in order to study how the subjective egological evidence of the senses derived from the life-world can give rise to the ideal objects of science, Husserl must ask how this sense-evidence becomes objective and intersubjective. Derrida credits Husserl with acknowledging that the only possibility is through language. According to Derrida, however, Husserl ultimately fails to question how his own project must also depend on language. He argues that Husserl distinguishes ideal objectivities from the concepts of language. Ideal objects must be free from all factual subjectivity, from any de facto language and also from the fact of language in general. Nevertheless, Husserl claims that ideality comes to objectivity by means of language. According to Derrida, the paradox that emerges is, thus, that although objective ideality must be independent of language, nevertheless ‘without the apparent fall back into language and thereby into history, a fall which would alienate the ideal purity of sense, sense would remain an empirical formation imprisoned as fact in a psychological subjectivity – in the inventor’s head. Historical incarnation sets free the transcendental, instead of binding it’ (77). Hence, while being aware that only language can make possible ideal objectivity, Husserl does not follow up the consequences that this idea has for the phenomenological enterprise. 26 Earlier, Husserl dealt with language extensively in Logical Investigations. The First and Forth Investigations put forward a theory of expression and signification. This was before Husserl had introduced the idea of reduction in Ideas I, however, and the question of language in connection with the phenomenological reduction could thus not be initially asked. The second edition of Logical Investigations, which came out in 1913, was extensively rewritten by Husserl in the light of his new understanding of phenomenology. In the introduction to the second volume he takes up the problem of language, but solves it rather quickly by referring to a necessary transformation of sense. (Husserl 1913/2001, 171–2.) For more on language in Husserl, see e.g. Mohanty 1976, Edie 1976, Hutcheson 1981.
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transformation of their sense must therefore be noticed’ (Husserl 1954/1970a, 174). He does not, however, explain how this transformation takes place or what exactly it means. Fink took up the problem of language in more detail and set out to solve it in The Sixth Cartesian Meditation. He claimed at the outset that the problem would disappear ‘if there could be a proper transcendental language’ (Fink 1932/1995, 84), but that phenomenological inquiry does not lead to the construction of a new language, nor could it ever do so. ‘Language is indeed retained as habituality right through the epoche . . . the phenomenological onlooker must make use of it, if he at all wants to give predicative expression to his cognitions’ (86). Like Husserl, Fink saw a solution emerging from the necessary tranformation of sense. He argues that, in taking over language, the phenomenologizing onlooker transforms its natural sense. ‘If this kind of transformation did not occur, then the phenomenologist would slip out of the transcendental attitude every time he spoke’ (Fink 1932/1995, 86). He describes the transformation of sense as an uneasy tension, a rebellion inside the words of the natural attitude: On the one hand, the natural meaning of the word and sentence points analogously to a corresponding transcendental sense, while, on the other hand, the intended transcendental meaning protests, as it were, against its expressional formulation; the sense to be expresssed does not rest quietly in the expressional form, it is in constant rebellion against the constraint imposed upon it by the formulation in natural attitude. (Fink 1932/1995, 88–9)27
The necessary transformation of sense taking place in language has important implications for the phenomenological method. Although phenomenology becomes communicable through its necessary articulation in language, it must still retain a radically personal character. There is thus no phenomenological understanding that comes simply by reading reports of phenomenological research; these can only be ‘read’ at all by performing the investigations themselves. Whoever fails to do that just does not read phenomenological sentences; he reads queer 27 ‘Einerseits weist die natu¨ rliche Wort-und Satzbedeutung analogisierend auf einen entsprechenden transzendentalen Sinn hin, andererseits aber protestiert gleichsam die intendierte transzendentale Bedeutung gegen ihre Ausdrucksfassung; der auszudruckende ¨ Sinn kommt in der Ausdrucksform nicht zur Ruhe, er ist in st¨andiger Rebellion gegen den ihm durch die Fassung in natu¨ rlichen Worten und S¨atzen angetanen Zwang.’ (Fink 1932/1988, 97–8)
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m sentences in natural language, taking a mere appearance for the thing itself to his own self-deception . . . The transformation that natural language, as expressive of that which is existent, undergoes in being claimed by the phenomenologizing I must always be kept in mind as transformation of ontic-naive meanings into ‘analogically’ indicated, transcendental-ontic meanings. It signifies a lapse into ‘dogmatism’ (that of the natural attitude) if explicit knowledge of this necessary transformation dies away, and the phenomenologist thereby in his explications falsifies the object of his theoretical experiences. (Fink 1932/1995, 92–3)28
Although the necessary transformation of sense taking place after the reduction seems to alleviate the problematic role of language in the phenomenological method, it still remains a difficult step to understand. An obvious objection springs to mind: how can we know that the personal transformation that I, as a phenomenologist, undergo in performing the epoche is the same as the transformation of other phenomenologists, and thus results in an identical transformation of the sense of language? The transformation of sense must enable communication in the same language. Even though the transformation of sense resulting from the epoche must be absolutely singular, it must also be generic enough not to result in multiple ‘queerings’ of language. To properly deal with these questions, one would have to go into Husserl’s complex account of semantics in Logical Investigations and Formal and Transcendental Logic. I will not do this, nor will I take a stance on the extent to which Fink manages or even attempts to solve the question of phenomenological language. Nevertheless, he should be credited with a clear formulation of the problem: he inquires into the necessary condition of possibility of the phenomenological project in language, and asks how its findings can be expressed in a language that is essentially a worldly phenomenon. My point is to show that against this 28 ‘Es gibt hier demnach kein ph¨anomenologisches Verstehen durch das blosse Lesen ph¨anomenologischer Forschungsberichte, sondern solche k¨onnen uberhaupt ¨ erst ‘gelesen’ werden im Nachvollzug der Forschungen selbst. Wer das unterl¨asst, liest gar nicht ph¨anomenologische S¨atze, sondern liest absonderliche S¨atze der naturlichen ¨ Sprache, nimmt die blosse Erscheinung fu¨ r die Sache selbst und betru¨ gt sich . . . Die Verwandlung, die die natu¨ rliche Sprache, als Aussprechen von Seiendem, durch die Inanspruchnahme durch das ph¨anomenologisierende Ich erf¨ahrt, muss immer als Verwandlung der ontisch-naiven Bedeutungen in die sich “analogisch” anzeigenden transzendental-ontischen Bedeutungen bewusst bleiben. Es bedeutet ein Verfallen in den “Dogmatismus” (der naturlichen ¨ Einstellung), wenn das ausdruckliche ¨ Wissen um die notwendige Verwandlung erlischt und damit der Ph¨anomenologe den Gegenstand seiner theoretischen Erfahrungen auslegend verf¨alscht.’ (Fink 1932/1988, 101–2)
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background, Foucault’s attempt to find the conditions of possibility of knowledge in the workings of discourse – the being of language instead of the being of man – is not only a break with phenomenology, but also an effort to solve one of its central problems. The retreat and the return of the origin. The third paradox – the return and the retreat of the origin – refers to man as both dependent on a history whose beginning will always elude him, and as the condition of possibility of writing that history. Man is essentially a historical being, he is burdened by a history that is not of his own making and ‘it is always against a background of the already begun that man is able to reflect on what may serve for him as origin’ (OT, 330). Yet the world becomes a historical reality through man: ‘It is in him that things (those same things that hang over him) find their beginning’ (OT, 332). According to the phenomenologists, the structures of human consciousness are understood as the condition of possibility of all factual history. Husserl introduces the notion of historical a priori in his essay ‘The Origin of Geometry’. He emphasizes the historicity of ideal entities and theories by arguing that they always have a historical origin, and that this fact is essential to them and to their constitutive power. Sciences can only stand ‘within the historical horizon in which everything is historical’ (Husserl 1939/1989, 172). Husserl goes on to argue that this historicity cannot be revealed by factual history, in which the conclusions are always drawn naively and straightforwardly from the facts. It ‘never makes thematic the general ground of meaning upon which all such conclusions rest, has never investigated the immense structural a priori which is proper to it’ (174). Husserl thus again argues against the naivety of historicism in regard to the grounding of the sciences as well as the resulting relativism. He proposes a methodological inquiry that can reveal the essential structure of the necessary historical horizon of all sciences, ‘the apriori structure contained in this historicity’ (Husserl 1939/1989, 172). This is the historical a priori for Husserl. The proposed method for revealing it is free variation: ‘In running through the conceivable possibilities for the life-world, there arises, with apodictic self-evidence, an essentially general set of elements going through all the variants, and of this we can convince ourselves with truly apodictic certainty’ (177). Even if we know almost nothing of the historical surrounding world of the first geometers, we do know that it had an invariant, essential structure, which could be revealed to us through the method of free
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variation. Thus, the original meaning of geometry can be rediscovered by us. It follows that a study of the historical a priori is essential for Husserl, because all factual history presupposes it. Without it, historical inquiry would be a meaningless enterprise, since it alone can provide ‘the truly apodictic self-evidence extending beyond all historical facticities’ (Husserl 1939/1989, 175). An analysis of the historical a priori provides the ground on which it is possible to identify or recognize different cultural codes and historical events. ‘We need not first enter into some kind of critical discussion of the facts set out by historicism; it is enough that even the claim of their factualness presupposes the historical a priori if this claim is to have a meaning’ (176). Although geometrical idealities are thus essentially historical for Husserl in the sense that they can only originate in concrete historical events, they only become understandable as idealities on the basis of a universal and apodictic horizon of meaning. The historical a priori signifies this universal structure of meaning. As Beatrice Han writes, Husserl’s a priori is not ahistorical like the Kantian apriori, but it is ‘suprahistorical’: it exists essentially to guarantee the possibility of recovering, beyond the sedimentations of history and tradition, the primary evidences originally thematized by the ‘proto-founder’ of geometry (Han 1998/2002, 4). The historical a priori thus conveys the historicity of scientific idealities, but this historicity means only that they originate in history – in contrast to all formal a prioris – but they do not depend on factual history in the sense that they would change in it. The original meaning of geometry can be reactivated because, for Husserl, ‘the human surrounding world is the same today and always’ (Husserl 1939/1989, 180). The way Foucault appropriates Husserl’s notion of historical a priori can be seen as being symptomatic of the more general way in which he both criticizes and reappropriates phenomenology. By developing his own version of the historical a priori, he admits the necessity of finding a historical version of the transcendental, and thus acknowledges the importance of the Husserlian effort. Foucault’s reformulation of the historical a priori is, however, a critical reaction to the problems he identifies in it in its Husserlian form. By appropriating Husserl’s historical a priori, Foucault acknowledges the claim that factual history cannot reveal the basis of knowledge, which is also its own condition of possibility. This is why he clearly distinguished his archaeology from the history of ideas, representations and
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modes of behaviour. He claims that there is a more fundamental level that structures and unites observations, discussions and concepts by ordering and determining what can appear as an object of knowledge and how it can be known. This transcendental level is referred to as the historical a priori by Foucault. For him, however, the historical a priori is not a universal structure of meaning, but, rather, is revealed by factual history. It changes in history while also forming the conditions of possibility of knowledge of a period. It is thus not a principle of the constitution of objects in general, but always limited to local and particular forms of knowledge.29 Foucault’s method of studying the historical a priori is different, too. One of the central tenets of transcendental philosophy is that, while the aim is to study the conditions of possibility of thought and experience, we cannot, by definition, step outside of them and adopt a view from nowhere. This is why the phenomenological method is essentially characterized by reduction as the only way to achieve clarity about the conditions of possibility constituting our thought while starting from within our own experience. Foucault rejects the possibility that historical a priori could be revealed by starting from the meaning-giving activity of a subject. For him, the only means of studying the transcendental is through history: while it is impossible to study the conditions of possibility of our own thought, it is possible to reveal the fundamental level determining the order of knowledge of a different age. Hence, Foucault rejects the transcendental subject and postulates instead a transcendental without a subject. In this way he seeks to solve the paradox of man in all its forms. He also historized the transcendental more radically by introducing his own version of the historical a priori that changes in history. Through his criticism of phenomenology in OT, he sought to show the inadequacy of the phenomenological understanding of language as well as of the history of science, and he supported the radical historicity of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. By explicating the paradox of man that the phenomenological method leads to, he stressed the necessity of finding a new method. I will now take a closer look at Foucault’s proposed method, archaeology, of which the ‘aim is to free history from the grip of phenomenology’ (AK, 203). Is there philosophy after the death of man? 29 Cf. Han 1998/2002, 64–5.
3 THE ANONYMITY OF LANGUAGE
The Order of Things has been severely criticized by both historians and philosophers.1 Since its publication, the philosophical criticism has centred around two themes. Firstly, a common charge is that Foucault does not problematize his own position, but assumes it to be situated outside of the epistemic orders he studies. This means that he ends up reiterating the problem of empirical/transcendental circularity of which phenomenology stands accused. Secondly, it has been claimed that Foucault’s alternative to the subject-centred approach of phenomenology leads to serious difficulties in conceiving change and consequently also freedom. Archaeology is therefore a step backwards rather than a step forwards from phenomenology: it does not manage to solve the problems with which phenomenology is riddled, but rather adds to them by creating a host of new ones. Both strands of the criticism are connected to the question of the subject. On the one hand it raises questions about the subject as the 1 Gary Gutting (1989, 175–9, 221) notes that, of all Foucault’s books, OT has been the most severely criticized by historians. In order to assess the impact of these criticisms, he distinguishes several different historical levels on which OT operates. The first is that of specific history: the interpretation of particular texts in their own terms. Second, the level of constructive history, which builds general interpretative frameworks connecting a range of texts. Third is the level of critical history: the use of the outcomes of specific and constructive history to question the self-understanding of various contemporary disciplines. Following this schema, Gutting argues that Foucault’s interpretations of particular authors have drawn some criticism, but the primary objection has been to the lack of detailed evidence for the sweeping claims of his constructive history. Nevertheless, he defends Foucault by pointing out that the value of his work is most of all as a source of fruitful suggestions rather than as accurate generalizations. Foucault’s account of the modern episteme is important primarily as the basis of his critical history of the human sciences. My focus here is on the philosophical criticism of Foucault’s archaeology. For more on Foucault as a historian, see e.g. Veyne 1971/1997, Flynn 1994 and Goldstein 1994.
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writer of its own history. Who is the writer of archaeology? To what extent was Foucault himself determined by the discursive structures under study? The other strand concerns the subject as the agent of change. How can we understand change if we do not study the intentions and motives of the subject? Does freedom not become an impossible idea? My aim in this chapter is to explicate the question of the subject in connection with the criticism of OT. I will not attempt to clear up all the ambiguities in Foucault’s archaeology, however. It contains several contradictions, problems and errors that have been thoroughly discussed by other commentators.2 My principle goal is to show how the central, philosophical role Foucault assigns to language has important consequences in terms of how we conceive of our subjectivity as well as of our freedom. I will show that, despite its firm refusal to accept the subject as the basis of explanation, Foucault’s archaeology does not eradicate it as a question. Neither does it eradicate freedom, but charts instead new dimensions of it, which are not tied to the subject’s expressions and initiatives, but rather make them possible.
A view from nowhere A central theme in the criticism of OT has been the question of the starting point of the description. What is Foucault’s own position with regard to the epistemes that condition all scientific practices? Is his own thought not also inevitably determined by the epistemic order underlying his archaeology? How can he analyze, using language, the grid that orders language? How can he escape the order that our discourse constitutes, and understand an order of a different kind, a different episteme? Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest in their influential book Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, that the archaeologist is situated outside of the epistemic orders he studies and therefore does not speak from within any horizon of intelligibility. They compare 2 See, in particular, Han 1998/2002. Roberto Machado (1989/1992, 17), on the other hand, argues that one of the essential characteristics of archaeology is exactly the multiple ways in which it can be defined, and another is its fluidity as a mode of research. The successive shifts are not marks of inadequacy or a lack of rigour: they illustrate the deliberate and well-considered provisional nature of the analysis. The tensions in archaeology are more prominent after the book that followed OT, The Archaeology of Knowledge, in which Foucault claims to present one method, archaeology, that characterizes all of his work. In reality, however, the methods, theoretical frameworks and aims in OT and in AK are not identical. Cf. Machado 1989/1992, 12, 17; Han 1998/2002, 52–4, 67–8.
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archaeology to phenomenology in that the archaeologist, like the phenomenologist, claims to be able to accomplish a bracketing, which enables him to situate himself outside of his own thought and thus to study its underlying structures.3 [T]he archaeologist, like Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologist, must perform an ‘ego split’ in order to look on as a detached spectator at the very phenomena in which, as an empirical interested ego . . . one can’t help being involved. Foucault the archaeologist looks on, as a detached metaphenomenologist, at the historical Foucault who can’t, if he thinks about human beings in a serious way, help thinking in terms of the meaning and truth claims governed by the latest discursive formation. (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 87)
Despite Foucault’s criticism of the phenomenological method and the procedure of reduction, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that he ends up making a similar move himself in trying to elucidate the epistemic conditions of scientific practices. This leads him to exactly the same type of circularity or ‘double trouble’ that he criticized phenomenology for. If discursive practices take the place of the transcendental in the sense that they condition what is said and known, and discourse is understood as a historically existing network of forms of knowledge and practice, then the empirical content becomes the transcendental condition. Foucault attempted to pass from the analysis of positivities to the historical a priori foundations that provide the ground of its own possibility – the very thing for which he had criticized phenomenology (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 93). Dreyfus and Rabinow thus understand archaeology to be an ahistorical, ‘quasi-structuralist theory’ conducted from a position of phenomenological detachment. They criticize it for falling into the trap of 3 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, 85–90) argue that Foucault’s archaeology is a radicalization of Husserl’s reductions. Their argument is that the phenomenologist only brackets the truth of the statement he is studying, that is, its validity, but an archaeologist even brackets its meaning. Foucault’s approach is thus more radical in the sense that the ‘bracketing’ includes more entities: not just the truth, but also the meaning. This is a problematic characterization of both Foucault’s and Husserl’s methods, however. Hein¨amaa points out that Dreyfus and Rabinow’s comparison is based on a controversial interpretation of Husserl’s concept of noema as being similar to Frege’s sense. They presuppose that truth and meaning are two separate entities that can be bracketed one after the other. This is possible only if the noema is understood to be like the Fregean sense, between the act and the reference and distinct from both. Such an understanding is by no means self-evident or undisputed (see Hein¨amaa and Oksala 2000). For alternative readings of the noema, see e.g. Drummond 1990 and Haaparanta 1994.
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the empirical/transcendental doublet, and hail genealogy as Foucault’s breakthrough and corrective method, which avoids this trap by aligning itself with hermeneutical insights in certain respects. While Foucault the archaeologist aims at viewing the discursive practices with external neutrality, Foucault the genealogist realized that he could only describe them from the inside. Dreyfus and Rabinow go as far as to argue that the insoluble contradictions in archaeology ultimately led Foucault to abandon it as his method, and to take up genealogy a few years later (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 99–100). Their criticism of archaeology relies on some problematic assumptions, however. They understand it as a form of structuralism, a characterization that Foucault himself vehemently denied.4 They also read Foucault’s thought in terms of a radical break: archaeology failed as a method and was replaced by genealogy. This interpretation was also denied by Foucault on several occasions. He claimed that archaeology and genealogy were complementary methods of investigation representing different axes of analysis, not alternatives.5 In an interview in 1967 in which Foucault responds to the controversy surrounding the publication of OT, he explains his own position as the author of the book. While he argued that his position should be understood as anonymous, he did not claim to be situated outside of the discursive order characterizing his time. On the contrary, he was anonymous exactly because he was situated inside his own episteme and was a product of a specific historical development. [I]t should be possible to define the theoretical model to which not only my book belongs but also those which belong to the same configuration of knowledge [savoir]. It is doubtless the one that now allows us to treat history as a set of actually articulated statements, and language as an 4 Foucault himself explicitly refused this label in the preface to the English translation of OT, for example, and the significance of this refusal has been further discussed by commentators. Gary Gutting (1989, 228) argues that, although there is a close link between Foucault’s work and structuralism, we must understand why Foucault insists on several occasions that he is not a structuralist. According to Gutting, the link derives from the fact that, like structuralist work on language, culture and the unconscious, archaeology displaces man from his privileged position. At the same time, it is a historical method of inquiry, concerned not with structural possibilities but with actual occurrences and their effects. Beatrice Han (1998/2002, 45) also points out that Foucauldian understanding is distinguished from the structuralist model in that the historical a priori is understood neither as universal nor as invariant; rather, it undergoes the historical transformations that archaeology is to identify. On Foucault’s relationship with structuralism, see also e.g. Caws 1988, Dosse 1991, 1992, Frank 1989/1992. 5 See e.g. SP, UP.
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m object of description and an ensemble of relations linked to discourse, to the statements that are the objects of interpretation. It is our age and it alone that makes possible the appearance of that ensemble of texts which treat grammar, natural history, or political economy as so many objects. So, in that respect and only in that respect, the author is constitutive of the thing he is talking about . . . So the subject is, in fact, present in the whole book, but it is the anonymous ‘one’ who speaks today in everything that is said. (OWH, 286)6
Foucault self-consciously places his analysis in the general anonymity of all the investigations that were at the time revolving around language (OWH, 290). The new epistemic configuration signalled by the death of man made possible his questions about language. He also explained his method at this time by noting that ‘archaeology owes more to Nietszchean genealogy than to structuralism properly so called’ (294). It is my contention that the hermeneutical insight that the thinker is always situated inside a horizon of intelligibility that conditions his thought does not suddenly appear with genealogy, but is already central in OT. Although archaeology is strictly opposed to hermeneutics in the sense that it does not attempt to interpret the deep meaning of sentences, it is nevertheless a historically situated form of analysis and this is a definitive characteristic of it. Several commentators have remarked how OT relies heavily on Heidegger’s anti-humanism.7 In particular, there are striking similarities between OT and Heidegger’s essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’. Heidegger’s aim in this text, like Foucault’s in OT, is to reveal the ontological order upon which the sciences as well as the everyday practices 6 ‘on devrait pouvoir d´efinir le mod`ele th´eorique auquel appartient non seulement mon livre mais aussi ceux qui appartiennent a` la mˆeme configuration de savoir. Sans doute estce celle qui nous permet aujourd’hui de traiter de l’histoire comme ensemble d’´enonc´es effectivement articul´es, de la langue comme objet de description et ensemble de relations par rapport au discours, aux e´ nonc´es qui font l’objet de l’interpr´etation. C’est notre e´ poque et elle seule qui rend possible l’apparition de cet ensemble de textes qui traitent de la grammaire, de l’histoire naturelle ou de l’´economie politique comme autant d’objets. Si bien que l’auteur, en cela, et en cela seulement, est constitutif de ce dont il parle . . . Si bien que le sujet est en effet pr´esent dans la totalit´e du livre, mais il est le “on” anonyme qui parle aujourd’hui dans tout ce qui se dit.’ (SFH, 591) 7 See e.g. Han 1998/2002, Elden 2001. Foucault hardly ever referred directly to Heidegger. In his last interview he made a surprisingly strong statement about him, however. ‘For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher . . . I have never written anything on Heidegger and I wrote only a small article on Nietzsche; these are nevertheless the two authors I have read the most.’ (RM, 250).
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characteristic of an age are grounded. What becomes a question of scientific study and the method through which it is approached is determined by the ontological order through which the world is interpreted and presents itself. Heidegger writes: ‘Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age a basis upon which it is essentially formed’ (Heidegger 1952/1977, 115). The metaphysical ground plan sketches out in advance the manner in which something can appear as an object of scientific investigation. ‘Only within the perspective of this ground plan does an event in nature become visible as such an event’ (119). The world picture, like Foucault’s concept of episteme, thus refers to the overall schema, the implicit order of things, on the basis of which reality is comprehended. This normally hidden ontological order can only be made visible by comparing it with the different modes of thinking of the past. Heidegger writes, for example, that the metaphysics underlying the modern age can be characterized by throwing it into relief over against the medieval and ancient world pictures (Heidegger 1952/1977, 128). Similarly, Foucault emphasizes that it is only against the background of what is different in history that the epistemic structures show up. I can, in fact, define the classical age in its particular configuration by the twofold difference that contrasts it with the sixteenth century, on the one hand, and with the nineteenth century, on the other. But I can define the modern age in its singularity only by contrasting it with the seventeenth century, on the one hand, and with us, on the other hand; so, in order to effect this transition, it is necessary to bring out in all our statements the difference that separates us from it. It is a matter of pulling oneself free of that modern age which begins around 1790 to 1810 and goes up to about 1950, whereas for the classical age it’s only a matter of describing it. (OWH, 293)8
Revealing the ontological structures of the past becomes possible only from the vantage point of the present. It is possible for us to describe 8 ‘Je peux, en effet, d´efinir l’ˆage classique dans sa configuration propre par la double diff´erence qui l’oppose au XVIe si`ecle, d’une part, au XIXe , de l’autre. En revanche, je ne peux d´efinir l’ˆage moderne dans sa singularit´e qu’en l’opposant au XVIIe si`ecle, d’une part, et a` nous, d’autre part; il faut donc, pour pouvoir op´erer sans cesse le partage, faire surgir sous chacune de nos phrases la diff´erence qui nous en s´epare. De cet aˆ ge moderne qui commence vers 1790–1810 et va jusque vers 1950, il s’agit de se d´eprendre alors qu’il ne s’agit, pour l’ aˆ ge classique, que de le d´ecrire.’ (SFH, 598–9)
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the modern episteme only when we manage to pull ourselves free from it and analyze it as a past that is in some important ways different from our present. The ability to recognize the differences signals the break that separates us from it.9 In the book that followed OT, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault avoids the notion of episteme and introduces that of archive, which he defines as ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of statements’ (AK, 130). In this connection, he states explicitly that it is not possible for us to describe our own archive (AK, 130). We cannot free ourselves from the rules ordering our own discursive practices and submit them for archaeological analysis. Foucault thus argues against the possibility of studying the conditions of possibility of our own knowledge at all, whether or not these conditions are understood as historical or not. All that he presents is a historical description, a study of the conditions of existence, which is conducted from the vantage point of the present in regard to the past. Unlike the Husserlian phenomenologist, Foucault thus does not claim to be able to study the constitutive conditions of our own thought and experience. It is my contention that this impossibility is exactly why he had to engage in historical study in his quest to understand the semantic relationships between words and things. It is only from the vantage point of the present ontological order that the semantic relationships of another epoch can be described. This description cannot reveal any ultimate foundations. Not only are the ontological orders historical, they can only appear as such from our own interpretative perspective. This perspectivism is the positive condition that allows such orders to appear at all. Foucault’s question of the historical limits of language, for example, is a question that can only self-consciously be asked after the linguistic turn in philosophy. Reading history through our questions, concepts and ways of thinking makes it possible to reveal what is different. Hence, Foucault does not hold that the other epistemic orders are completely cut off from us. But neither is his archaeology anachronistic in the sense that past forms of thinking were treated as directly accessible and understandable. Because they are based on a different 9 Thomas Flynn (1997, 251–5) argues that Foucault’s aim was to distance himself from the modern episteme by questioning its basic presuppositions and by viewing it from without. He refers to the end of OT, where Foucault charts the privileged positions of ethnology and psychoanalysis in our present-day knowledge, and argues that he was undertaking an ethnology of his own culture.
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ontological order, they cannot be directly accessible to us, but revealing them requires archaeological work. George Canguilhem (1994b, 78) explicates Foucault’s archaeology by arguing that, while the episteme of a given era cannot be fully grasped via the intellectual history of that era, which is subtended by the episteme of a different era, the two are not entirely foreign to one another. What remains is precisely the archaeological project, ‘the fact that painstakingly, slowly, laboriously, indirectly, we can dive deep down from our own epistemic shores and reach a submerged episteme’ (Canguilhem 1994b, 78). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, 95) summarize their devastating criticism of archaeology by suggesting that if it is to avoid self-elimination it must either only study the past, or else, like therapy and phenomenology, it must see to it that its task is interminable. It is my contention that archaeology studies only the past. To the extent that it is intended as a method of writing history, this should be fairly uncontroversial.10 It is also possible to argue, however, that Foucault’s philosophical method is history understood as archaeology. Perhaps the most fruitful way to read OT is to see it as questioning the independence of history and philosophy. Foucault’s studies show how historical discourses and practices are both empirical facts and constitute the only possible philosophical basis of knowledge. They can be analyzed on an empirical level to explain historical events, and on a philosophical, ‘transcendental’ level to reveal structural regularities and conditions of possibility. Transcendental questions are, for Foucault, of necessity questions of history: the historical limits of knowledge and experience.11 As he writes in the
10 Gary Gutting (1989, 227–8, 244, 269) argues that archaeology must be read primarily as a distinctive approach to the history of thought. It is a historical counterpart of the structuralist counter-sciences and a move away from the modes of thought centred on the concept of man. It is only open to the devastating philosophical criticism that Dreyfus and Rabinow develop in their study of Foucault when it is understood as a general philosophical theory. Gutting argues that it should not be construed along these theoretical lines. Foucault’s aim was not to develop a general theory of discursive regularities at all. What might appear to be foundational philosophical theories of language, for example, are better construed as no more than attempts to show that the archaeological approach can be coherently formulated without relying on the modern philosophical category of the subject. 11 Claire O’Farrell writes (1989, 33) that history reveals the limits of the formation of ideas and objects which are both part of historical order and beyond that order. History is thus in a unique position to attach philosophy to empirical realities while studying their conditions of possibility at the same time. Shortly before his death Foucault himself described his books as ‘historical studies’ but noted that they were not the work of a historian, as they were embarked on as a ‘philosophical exercise’ (UP, 15).
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preface to OT, his aim is to bring to light the history of the conditions of possibility of knowledge (OT, xxii).
The subject of change In an interview, Foucault also further explained his aim of analyzing change in terms of a structure. The interviewer mentioned that the articles that attacked OT contained the words ‘to freeze history’, which recurred like a leitmotif and seemed to formulate the strongest accusation against it. Foucault replied that, in the context of the history of ideas, description of change follow two strategies: (1) one uses concepts such as influence, crisis, sudden realization or the interest taken in the problem; or (2) one moves to a level of explanation that is exterior to the level of analysis of the statements themselves, such as an explanation based on social conditions, mentality or the worldview. He explained that he wanted to avoid giving himself these two expedients and to describe statements by bringing out the relations of implication, opposition and exclusion that might connect them. Rather than inventing radical breaks between epistemes, he was in fact trying to chart the rapid changes in a precise way by establishing a set of transformations between two sets of scientific discourse. This set of transformations preserves a certain number of theoretical elements and displaces certain others (OWH, 282–3). Rather than denying change, Foucault was thus describing it, but only on the level of discourse, the domain of statements obeying rules. He was not attempting to provide causal explanations for the changes in history, but was, in a ‘positivist’ fashion, describing certain processes in it.12 The historical analysis of discursive practices will reveal numerous types of relationships and modes of connection that should be analyzed in different ways and along different axes. The archaeological method represents only the horizontal axis, which describes the theoretical coherence of discourses among themselves in a given period (OWH, 285). Foucault thus does not argue that discursive structures do not change or that they contain some autonomous mechanism of change. The subjects who engage in different types of practice still instigate the changes, but developments in the sciences cannot be explained by the 12 Arnold Davidson (1997b, 10–13) argues that the influence of structuralism on Foucault’s thought shows here: only a synchronic analysis allows one to define the field within which a causal explanation can then operate. An analysis of the logical structures of knowledge has to precede any effort to provide causal explanations.
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subject’s structures of consciousness. Here the fundamental influence that Jean Cavaill`es’ thought had on Foucault’s understanding of the history of thought is apparent. Cavaill`es’ philosophy was an effort to combine necessity and radical innovation in logic and mathematics, areas of science that are generally regarded as particularly rule-bound. Although Cavaill`es initially followed Husserl’s thought closely, in his late work he became increasingly critical of it, arguing that mathematical objects, concepts, rules and procedures cannot be grounded in the structures of consciousness. This means that mathematics is an autonomous becoming; its historical development cannot be accounted for or grounded in any discipline other than itself. Its development is genuinely unpredictable. Analysis cannot find the new ideas within those already in use (Cavaill`es 1947/1994, 504). David Webb (2003) summarizes Cavaill`es’ position by writing that, for him, each act of thinking takes place within a defined context of rules that it did not itself frame, but this does not represent the end of its freedom. At stake is not the radical spontaneity of thinking, but the conviction on Cavaill`es’ part that no set of formal conditions of thinking can be so primary or fundamental that they necessarily encompass all the changes in conceptual objects and their relations that the future may bring. Thinking may therefore engage in the necessary unfolding of ideas, while at the same time preserving its power to participate in the transformation of any given set of conceptual objects and relations (Webb 2003, 69). In connection with Foucault’s very similar understanding of the history of science, we must thus interpret that the idea of an episteme underlying the scientific thinking of an age does not imply epistemic determinacy. Rather, the implication would be that the development of science is always genuinely unpredictable. In the foreword to the English edition of OT Foucault lists three problems that were left open in the book: change, causality and the subject. While he explicitly states that he did not even attempt to address the first two, the question of the subject was not simply left aside. It was posed – albeit from a perspective that was different from the phenomenological one – even though he was not able to give any definitive answer at that point. I do not wish to deny the validity of intellectual biographies, or the possibility of a history of theories, concepts or themes. It is simply that I wonder whether such descriptions are themselves enough, whether they do justice to the immense density of scientific discourse, whether there
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f o u c au lt o n f r e e d o m do not exist, outside their customary boundaries, systems of regularities that have a decisive role in the history of the sciences. I should like to know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them. (OT, xiii–xiv)
One of Foucault’s questions in OT was thus exactly to what extent subjects are determined by rules and structures unknown to them. His aim was to chart the conditions of possibility of their initiatives. Rather than eradicating the subject or taking it as the unproblematic starting point of his analyses, he wanted to question it. He also explicitly denied in AK that he had excluded the question of the subject. He writes that his aim instead is to ‘define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of language’ (AK, 200). The archaeological approach does not mean the denial of the subject’s initiatives: ‘These positivities are not so much limitations imposed on the initiative of subjects as the field in which that initiative is articulated . . . I have not denied – far from it – the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it’ (AK, 209).13 Although the subjects of scientific discourse are regulated and even partly constituted by the rules immanent to the discourse itself, they are not completely determined by them: the subject is not without the initiative or the capacity to effect changes in the discourse. Archaeology is simply not about the subject’s abilities to cause changes, but rather focuses on the more fundamental discursive structures that make different initiatives possible or impossible. Foucault was thus trying to develop a method that allows us to study discourse as a relatively autonomous field of regularities and transformations without positing the subject as the cause and principle of these unities, regularities and transformations. Archaeology is a method for analyzing and accounting for the constitution of meanings that are not dependent on individual speakers. It is an alternative to subject-centred approaches to the history of thought. Although statements are uttered by individual speakers, in making a statement the speaker takes up a position that has already been defined – quite apart from his mental activity – by the rules of the relevant discursive formation. Foucault thus 13 ‘Il s’agit moins des bornes pos´ees a` l’initiative des sujets que du champ ou` elle s’articule . . . Je n’ai pas ni´e, loin de l`a, la possibilit´e de changer le discours: j’en ai retir´e le droit exclusif et instantan´e a` la souverainet´e du sujet.’ (AS, 272)
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claims that every statement has a subject, but that this subject is not a ‘speaking consciousness’ but rather ‘a position that may be filled in certain conditions by various individuals’ (AK, 115). The subject position is established by the rules of the discursive formation. By focusing on the systems of the actual statements that define the space in which speaking subjects operate, archaeology seeks to question the fundamental role of the human subject in the constitution of knowledge. Statements are studied historically in their own right, not as means of understanding the thoughts of the dead. The source of scientific discourse is an anonymous field of discursive practices, not the meaning-giving subject. Foucault writes ironically in AK that it is unpleasant ‘to reveal the limitations and necessities of a practice where one is used to seeing, in all its pure transparency, the expression of genius and freedom’ (AK, 210). Even though archaeology describes the discursive conditions that limit and make different subject positions possible, it is not until Foucault’s genealogy introduces the notion of productive power that his idea of a constituted subject gets its full force. Archaeology describes the possibility and availability of various subject positions. It also concerns the ways in which scientific discourses produce subjects as their object of study, for example, the speaking subject in general grammar, philology and linguistics, and the labouring subject in the analysis of wealth or economics. Nevertheless, these studies only bring out partial analyses of subjectivity. As Foucault himself admitted later, his archaeology presented only one of the axes of the constitution of the subject (SP, 208).
The freedom of language By establishing a new perspective on the question of the subject, archaeology also maps out new ideas of freedom that are not tied to the idea of a founding subject, its nature, initiatives or abilities. The intention is to draw a line marking the discursive limits of thought and experience of an age, and implicitly therefore also to question what falls outside of these limits. Foucault not only gives language a regulative role in the mode of scientific discourse, but also allows that it demarcates a domain of freedom in the mode of literature. While scientific discourses form an ontological order of things that is implicit in their theories and practices, language in the form of literature is capable of forming alternative, unscientific and irrational ontological realms: different experiences of order
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on the basis of which different perceptual and practical grids become possible, and hence new ways of seeing and experiencing emerge. Foucault generally emphasizes the necessary structures of knowledge and opposes the humanist aspirations of looking for the freedom of man, but there is an anti-humanist understanding of freedom as an opening of new possibilities of thought implicitly safeguarded in archaeology. He attempts to show not only how the discursive limits of scientific knowledge, representation and experience are constituted, but also what escapes them. According to John Rajchman (1985, 11–12), Foucault’s early thought conformed to the spirit of the influential movement in France in the 1960s that saw a revolution emerging from avant-garde writing.14 Foucault later came to realize that the central questions of our era are not, after all, about commentary, language and avant-garde art, but rather about the politics of documentation, secrecy and individuality, which have made subjectivity our basic problem. Rajchman clearly points to an important shift of emphasis in Foucault’s thought, which is often identified as his break from archaeology and move towards more politically motivated genealogy. I will argue, however, that the question of the subject was already prominent in his early thought, and, furthermore, that it was interwoven with the question of language. Foucault’s book Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel is among his works that have been least commented on.15 In writing a book about Raymond Roussel – an eccentric writer admired by the Surrealists – he raises questions about the writing subject as the origin of meaning. In writing some of his books, Roussel used a method he described in his posthumous work Comment j’ai ecrit certain de mes livres. He would take a phrase containing two words, each of which had a double meaning, and use the least likely meaning as the basis of a story. He would transform a common phrase, a book title, or a line of poetry into a series of words with similar sounds. By selecting a sentence at random, he would draw images from it by distorting it. John Ashbery (1986, xxiii–xxv) describes the method by referring to Roussel’s work in which the hazards of language result in strange but beautiful rhyming events, and banal mechanisms create convincing juxtapositions.
14 Rajchman (1985, 111) identifies Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida as central figures in this movement. 15 Foucault said (PS, 185) in an interview that he was happy that no one had paid much attention to this book, because it had remained his ‘secret affair’. He also claimed that it did not have a place in the sequence of his books.
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Foucault was clearly fascinated by Roussel’s experiments with language. He said in an interview that Roussel’s work was extremely interesting because it was not only a linguistic experiment, but also an experiment with the nature of language (PS, 175). Roussel’s experiments were mechanical processes that blindly followed certain rules and principles, and yet they were capable of creating new and beautiful meanings. It is clear in relation to Foucault’s own interests that the machine-like production of surreal beauty illustrated for him the idea that language produces meanings independently of the initiatives of the subject. While the Surrealists’ interest in Roussel was connected to their idea of automatic writing and the utilization of the unconscious mind, Foucault’s motivation was somewhat different: he was interested in the ‘unconscious’ of language, not of the writing subject. He saw Roussel’s work as celebrating the role of chance in the interstices of language. Roussel’s process of writing purified discourse of ‘all the false coincidences of inspiration’, in order to confront ‘the unbearable evidence that language comes to us from the depth of a perfectly clear night and is impossible to master’ (DL, 39). It seems that chance triumphs on the surface of the narrative in those forms which rise naturally out of the depths of the impossible; in the singing mites, the truncated man who is a one-man band, the rooster that writes his name by spitting blood, Fogar’s jellyfish, the gluttonous parasols. But these monstrosities without family or species are necessary associations; they obey mathematically the laws governing homonyms and the most exacting principles of order; they are inevitable . . . At the start no instrument or stratagem can predict their outcome. Then the marvelous mechanism takes over and transforms them, doubles their improbability by the game of homonyms, traces a ‘natural’ link between them, and delivers them at last with meticulous care. The reader thinks he recognizes the wayward wanderings of the imagination where in fact there is only random language, methodologically treated. (DL, 38)16 16 ‘En apparence le hasard triomphe a` la surface du r´ecit, dans ces figures qui surgissent naturellement du fond de leur impossibilit´e – dans les cirons chanteurs, dans l’homme-tronc qui est un homme-orchestre, dans le coq qui e´ crit son nom en crachant du sang, dans les m´eduses de Fogar, ombrelles gloutonnes. Mais ces monstruosit´es sans esp`eces ni familles sont des rencontres oblig´ees, elles ob´eissent, math´ematiquement, a` la loi des synonymes et au principe de la plus juste e´ conomie; elles sont in´evitables . . . Au d´epart, il y a ces lots, dont aucun instrument, aucune ruse ne pr´evoit la sortie; puis le merveilleux m´ecanisme s’en empare, les transforme, double leur improbabilit´e par le jeu des synonymes, trace entre eux un chemin “naturel”, et les livre enfin dans une n´ecessit´e m´eticuleuse. Le lecteur pense reconnaˆıtre les errements sans chemins de l’imagination l`a ou` il n’y a que les hasards de langage trait´es m´ethodiquement.’ (RR, 52–3)
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What is important in connection with a different understanding of freedom is that Foucault read Roussel’s work as an effort to capture what lies outside the discursive order of things by means of language. As he noted, Roussel ‘doesn’t want to duplicate the reality of another world, but, in the spontaneous duality of language, he wants to discover an unexpected space, and to cover it with things never said before’ (DL, 16). The task of avant-garde literature was thus not so much to create an alternative ontological order – another world – but to show the instability of the order of things that we take for granted. This idea of literary writing as constitutive of alternative forms of reality also underlies Foucault’s interest in Surrealism. In an interview he gave in 1966, he discusses the importance of Andr´e Breton to contemporary thought. He was asked what Breton and Surrealism represented to a philosopher of 1966 who concerned himself with language and knowledge (STW, 171). Foucault replied that, for Breton, writing had the power to change the world. He reiterated the idea present in OT that language and writing used to be understood as transparent instruments in which the world was reflected. However, Breton was one of the figures with whom the status of writing changed. As Foucault suggested, ‘Perhaps there is a writing so radical and so sovereign that it manages to face up to the world, to counterbalance it, to offset it, even to utterly destroy it and scintillate outside it’ (STW, 173). He argued that Breton had contributed to the changing status of writing in two ways. Firstly, he had remoralized it by demoralizing it completely: the ethic of writing no longer came from what one had to say, from the ideas that one expressed, but it emerged from the very act of writing. ‘In that raw and naked act, the writer’s freedom is fully committed at the same time as the counter-universe of words takes form’ (STW, 173). While freedom as an attribute of the writing subject loses strength, there is a freedom in language itself, in the creation of unexpected worlds. This is the second characteristic of literary language: writing solidifies and asserts itself apart from everything that might be said through it. Writing and art constitute reality, they create objects. Underlying all the activities of the Surrealists, whether writing, painting or wandering around the city, is the aim to constitute new, previously unimaginable objects, to see things differently and expand the domain of what can be thought and imagined. For Foucault, literature thus forms ‘a sort of counter-discourse’ (OT, 300) freed from the principles of order regulating scientific as well as everyday discourses. Its aim is precisely to transgress the limits of
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discourse, and thus to make them visible and contestable, to discover a ‘madness’ in language as ‘that formless, mute, unsignifying region where language can find its freedom’ (OT, 383). Literary writing can express this freedom of language and also shatter our familiar order of thought. This also means, significantly, that it can make visible the limits of the discursive order. John Rajchman (1985, 24) takes this idea as far as to claim that the picture of an avant-garde writer as the hero of our age is built into the very structure of OT, and that this determines its plot. Literature, represented by figures such as Cervantes and Sade, is never placed directly within an episteme, but is rather in a position from which it can articulate its limits. Don Quixote signals the end of the Renaissance episteme, and Sade, by taking classification to its extreme limits, shows the impossibility of the classical modes of knowledge. According to Rajchman, arts as described in OT are thus meta-epistemic, allegories of the deep arrangements that make knowledge possible. Furthermore, Foucault himself adopted an avant-garde or vanguard position in relation to our modernity, and claimed to have announced a whole new form of thought. By being able to demonstrate the limits of a discursive order, literary writing is also able to reveal important limits of subjectivity. Because the discursive order is constitutive of the limits of subjectivity, counterdiscourse in the form of avant-garde writing, for example, can question these limits. Foucault aimed to show how modes of subjectivity are constituted in scientific discourse, and also how these limits are transcended in avant-garde writing and art.17 Foucault takes up the question of the relationship between the subject and language in an essay entitled What is an Author? His starting point is the claim that writing has freed itself from the dimension of expression and refers only to itself. He does not simply accept this claim, but seeks to problematize it further. It is not enough to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. Instead we must locate the space left empty by this disappearance: follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the opening that the disappearance 17 I will argue in chapter 7 that Foucault’s understanding of art as being capable of revealing and transgressing the limits of subjectivity was explicitly brought out in his late work on ethics. He saw ‘the arts of existence’ as a possibility for challenging normalizing power. Language and writing become tools for recreating the self – ways of opening new forms of experience, modes of thinking and living. According to Foucault, one writes to become someone other than who one is: language is a possibility for modifying one’s way of being through the act of writing. See e.g. UP, 8.
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uncovers (WA, 105). Foucault asks what happens in the openings of the discourse into which the writing subject has disappeared. Foucault suggests that analyses of discourse should proceed through the notion of an author function. The author’s name can no longer be thought of as simply referring to the actual person writing the books on the cover of which it appears, but it has other characteristics that can be analyzed and explicated. It performs certain unique roles with regard to narrative fiction. Analyses proceeding through the concept of author function can provide new methods for literary study, a new approach to a typology of discourse as well as a historical analysis of it. Foucault also attaches a third, distinctly philosophical importance to this type of study: the re-examining of the subject. I realize that in undertaking the internal and architectonic analysis of a work (be it a literary text, a philosophical system, or scientific work), in setting aside biographical and psychological references, one has already called back into question the absolute character and founding role of the subject. Still perhaps one must return to this question, not in order to re-establish the theme of an originating subject, but to grasp the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning and systems of dependencies. (WA, 117–18)18
Foucault’s approach, far from eliminating the question of the subject, in fact poses this question explicitly, but from a new angle. It is no longer a case of analyzing the subject as the originator of discourse, but rather one of analyzing it as a variable and complex function. The author becomes one example of a discursively constructed subject position that has come into being with the development of a certain kind of narrative discourse, and which holds a specific function and position in relation to it. Therefore the questions that Foucault suggests we ask about the subject concern how, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse. What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what function can it assume, and by obeying what rules (WA, 118)? 18 ‘Je sais bien qu’en entreprenant l’analyse interne et architectonique d’une œuvre (qu’il s’agisse d’un texte litt´eraire, d’un syst`eme philosophique, ou d’une œuvre scientique), en mettant entre parenth`eses les r´ef´erences biographiques ou psychologiques, on a d´ej`a remis en question le caract`ere absolu, et le rˆole fondateur du sujet. Mais il faudrait peuteˆ tre revenir sur ce suspens, non point pour restaurer le th`eme d’un sujet originaire, mais pour saisir les points d’insertion, les modes de fonctionnement et les d´ependances du sujet.’ (QA, 810.)
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Foucault does not claim that there are no subjects writing books with their pens or on their computers. What he claims is that we cannot understand what an author is by only studying the individual writing a book. We need a new method. Apart from presenting a new method, however, he also seems to suggest that his approach has an additional advantage. He ends his essay with a curious, Utopian twist that brings us back to the question of freedom. The author as a functional principle not only organizes the work in a certain way, but also limits, excludes and chooses. It is the means by which the free circulation, manipulation, composition, decomposition and recomposition of fiction is impended (WA, 119). The author for Foucault is thus both a contingent and a constraining figure.19 Although there will never be a completely free circulation of texts, the modes of constraint are historically changing, and it is therefore possible that one day we might live in a culture in which we are not limited by the figure of the author, but rather surrounded by an anonymous murmur, an endless proliferation of meanings (WA, 119–20). Hence, by a curious twist, the methodological ‘disappearance’ of the subject in Foucault’s thought does not signal the disappearance of freedom. It is, rather, the case that freedom is understood as the endless proliferation of meanings, which undermines the stability of the historical a priori determining possible ways of seeing, understanding and acting. Rather than thinking of the subject in terms of individuals, and of freedom as something they have or do not have, he suggests that we attempt to think of the subject as a discursive effect and freedom as a non-subjective opening up of possibilities for multiple creative practices. This does not mean that he denies the possibility of understanding subjects as individuals or agents, and freedom as a capacity that is tied to their initiatives. His analysis simply does not operate on this level. It charts new dimensions of freedom. He is trying to find freedom on a level that orders and regulates subjective expressions and initiatives. In the realm of scientific discourse, Foucault emphasized the rules and formal conditions of thinking, and questioned the possibility of saying something completely new. In the realm of literature this possibility is emphasized, however, because the ontological order of things, the historical a priori, can be suspended, even thrown out. Language solidifies the identity of things by repetition, it creates an ontological order taken as unquestioned reality, but it can also act as ‘a thin blade 19 Cf. DL, 156.
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that slits the identity of things, showing them as hopelessly double and self-divided even as they are repeated’ (RR, 23). There is a dimension of language capable of undermining reality instead of only materializing and solidifying it according to pre-existing rules. Hence, as it is often argued that Foucault wanted to construct a history and politics without human nature,20 it could equally well be argued that he wanted to rethink freedom without human nature. In the same way as archaeology questions the privileged role of the subject in the constitution of knowledge without eradicating it as a question, it also seeks to understand freedom in non-subjective terms without eradicating the notion. Freedom characterizes language rather than the subject. The limits of freedom are the limits of the discursive order, and they must not be conflated with the limits of the social order or of acceptance. Although Foucault showed interest in marginal subjectivities throughout his work, he did not romanticize marginal lifestyles, nor did he see them as exemplifying freedom. The limits that he attempted to identify demarcated discursively constructed ontological realms. What lies outside of them is not socially unacceptable, it is unintelligible in existing modes of order. The history of madness would be the history of the Other – of that which, for a given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded . . . whereas the history of the order imposed on things would be the history of the Same – of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities. (OT, xxiv)21
Clare O’Farrell (1989, vii) points to this passage, and argues that Foucault’s whole work can be read as a history of limits, of that edge between the systems societies impose upon order (the Same), and that which is outside or beyond that order (the Other). His work of the 1960s presents, in this sense, a consistent ontological view of a changing boundary between the Same and the Other, apparent in the events of history (O’Farrell 1989, 40, 90). In Madness and Civilization, the confrontation between the Same and the Other was between reason 20 See Davidson 1997b, 15. 21 ‘L’histoire de la folie serait l’histoire de l’Autre – de ce qui, pour une culture, est a` la fois int´erieur et e´ tranger, donc a` exclure . . . l’histoire de l’ordre des choses serait l’histoire du Mˆeme, – de ce qui pour une culture est a` la fois dispers´e et apparent´e, donc a` distinguer par des marques et a` recueillir dans des identit´es.’ (MC, 15)
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and madness, while in The Birth of the Clinic the Other was represented by death, and in The Order of Things by the being of language. O’Farrell nevertheless claims that, during the 1970s, Foucault gradually constructed a vision of society and history in which the Same and the Other were totally coextensive and indeed interchangeable, inextricably bound together in their movement. Notions of power and politics came to occupy an important place in his thought at the expense of the Other. According to O’Farrell, the problem of the limit did not reappear until the 1980s, when the notion of the subject took centre stage and the Same and the Other become distinct and free terms again (41, 91, 115). I will argue, against O’Farrell, that the limit, and freedom as its transgression, never disappears from Foucault’s thought. I now turn my attention to Foucault’s thought in the 1970s, and my focus is on the question of the body. Although the realm of freedom opened up by literary writing – or in O’Farrell’s conceptual terminology, the Other – is harder to locate in the tightly knit networks of power and knowledge, it is nevertheless present. The body will come to represent resistance to power, and it will open up new ways of understanding freedom. In the works following The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault further developed the idea that subjects are formed in discursive practices, but he also turned to study other axes of the constitution of the subject in non-discursive practices as well as in the technologies of the self. This means that the realms of freedom are also expanded. Freedom emerges not only through the practice of writing as constitutive of an ontological otherness to the discursive order, but also in other kinds of practice. At the same time, writing becomes entangled with subjectivity in even more integral ways: it becomes inseparable from sexuality and life: ‘The private life of an individual, his sexual preferences, and his work are interrelated not because his work translates his sexual life, but because the work includes the whole life as well as the text. The work is more than the work: the subject who is writing is part of the work’ (PS, 184).
II BODY
4 A GENEALOGY OF THE SUBJECT
So far, all that has given color to existence still lacks a history. Where could you find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a comparative history of law or at least of punishment is so far lacking completely. Has anyone made a study of different ways of dividing up the day or of the consequences of a regular schedule of work, festivals and rest? (Nietzsche 1887/1974, 81–2)
In an interview conducted in 1983, Foucault situates his thought, as well as the trends of thought influenced by structuralism, linguistic theory and psychoanalysis in the 1960s as explicit efforts to rethink the phenomenological subject. The phenomenological theory of the subject was his point of departure, and his thought has been an effort to make distance from it (SPS, 442). I would say that everything that took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject, and involved different escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs, according to whether we use a negative or positive term, in the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche. (SPS, 438)1
The linguistic turn of structuralism and post-structuralism in French thought was thus, according to Foucault, a reaction to phenomenology. 1 ‘Donc, je dirais que tout ce qui sest pass´e autour des ann´ees soixante venait bien de cette insatisfaction devant la th´eorie ph´enom´enologique du sujet, avec diff´erentes e´ chapp´ees, diff´erentes e´ chappatoires, diff´erentes perc´ees, selon qu’on prend un terme n´egatif ou positif, vers la linguistique, vers la psychoanalyse, vers Nietzsche’ (SEPS, 437).
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The importance of the structuralist method and also of Nietzsche’s thought to Foucault lay in the fact that they provided ways of rethinking the phenomenological subject and the historicity of reason as forms of rationality. In his lecture ‘Subjectivity and Truth’, he also describes his choice of direction in terms of rethinking the phenomenological subject: I have tried to get out from the philosophy of the subject through a genealogy of this subject, by studying the constitution of the subject across history which has led us up to the modern concept of the self. This has not always been an easy task, since most historians prefer a history of social processes (where society plays the role of the subject) and most philosophers prefer a subject without history. (ST, 176)2
Reading Foucault’s genealogy as an effort to rethink the phenomenological subject opens up a new angle on his relationship with phenomenology. I have argued in the previous section that Foucault’s archaeology and phenomenology shared a common mode of questioning in inquiring into the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge. Here I will cast their relationship in a slightly different mould through the question of the subject: my aim in this chapter is to explicate Foucault’s genealogical conception of the subject as a critical reaction to the phenomenological subject. I will ask what Foucault meant by his controversial claims that power makes individuals subjects and that the subject is an effect of power. I will argue that we must not understand the constitution of the subject as a causal process.3 Power relations are immanent to the social reality and have empirical causal effects, but they are also paradoxically ‘transcendental’, in the sense that they are a condition of possibility for the constitution of the subject. Pheng Cheah (1996, 126), for example, argues that power is quasi-transcendental for Foucault, because it is both the immanent causal origin of empiricality and physicality and a condition of possibility for grasping social reality, a grid of its intelligibility, which cannot itself be accessible to cognitive or practical-intentional mastery and control. While Foucault’s genealogy of the subject is thus a critical reaction to the phenomenological subject, I argue that it nonetheless presents a modification of transcendental analysis: the network of power/knowledge is understood primarily to provide the condition of possibility for the subject, not the material 2 Originally delivered in English.
3 Cf. Flynn 1989, 189.
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cause. Historical and transcendental constitution are again inseparable in the sense that the conditions of possibility of the subject are to be found in the historical practices and discourses structured by power relations. By claiming that power relations are productive of forms of the subject, Foucault does thus not simply suggest that individuals are produced as subjects just as cars are produced from various materials in a factory. Rather, we must understand the subject to be intrinsically entangled with power and knowledge. Power/knowledge network constitutes the subject in the sense of forming the grid of intelligibility for its actions, intentions, desires and motivations. My discussion ends by considering the problems involved in this ‘transcendental’ reading. I will question the apparent circularity of Foucault’s understanding of the constitution of the subject, and will suggest ways of combating this problem.
The constitution of the subject Foucault’s genealogy is often characterized by the fact that it introduces into his thought non-discursive practices and the relations of power.4 This kind of characterization is, however, misleading in many ways. Archaeology already treated discourse as a set of practices, making the opposition of discursive and non-discursive difficult to uphold. It also explicitly postulated a close tie between the discursive and the nondiscursive. Archaeology provided a distinctive approach to the relations between discourses and non-discursive domains such as ‘institutions, political events, economic practices and processes’ (AK, 162). It aimed to determine how the rules that govern a discursive formation ‘may be linked to non-discursive systems’ (AK, 162). Foucault explicitly stated in The Archaeology of Knowledge that discourse poses the question of power, because it is by nature an object of political struggle (AK, 120). He 4 Foucault introduced his conception of genealogy in an article Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (1971/1984), in which he presents an interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogy. The tone of the article is polemical, and Foucault presents his own ideas alongside those of Nietzsche without clear distinctions. Although his thought was strongly influenced by Nietzsche, there were also other major influences on it. His genealogy is by no means a faithful reapplication of Nietzsche’s method. Foucault does not introduce his own conception of genealogy as a coherent method in any of his other writings either. His idea of genealogy has therefore to be built up from different books, articles and interviews, which means that it is hard to give a uniform presentation of it. For a systematic explication of ‘Foucaultian’ genealogy, see Kusch 1991.
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did not, however, elaborate on how the close tie between the discursive and the non-discursive should be understood, except that he clearly denied both that they symbolically reflect each other, and that nondiscursive changes should be studied in terms of a causality communicated through the consciousness of the speaking subject (e.g., AK, 163). By suspending causal analysis of discursive changes, he denied that he was trying to give discourse ‘the status of pure ideality and total historical independence’, but was rather doing it ‘in order to discover the domain of existence and functioning of a discursive practice’ (AK, 164–5). Foucault’s focus on discourse was thus a methodological choice, not the ontological choice of discursive idealism. He did not hold that discursive formations were completely autonomous, nor did he later give up this position – despite its problems – in favour of a completely new position emphasizing non-discursive practices. Instead, he further developed his central philosophical claim that scientific objects are constituted in history through discursive practices. Foucault’s genealogy in the 1970s also looked more comprehensively at the tie between discursive and non-discursive practices through the notion of power/knowledge. Beatrice Han (1998/2002) also argues that a shift of attention from discursive to non-discursive practices is not sufficient to mark the difference between archaeology and genealogy.5 According to her, what is important in the introduction of genealogy is the claim that it is impossible to understand the conditions of possibility of scientific discourse without taking into account the development of new forms of power. With genealogy Foucault is able to analyze the way non-epistemic demands not only control the effective predication of scientific truths, but also shape the overall conditions of possibility of scientific discourse (Han 1998/2002, 104, 109–10). The conditions of possibility under investigation are thus no longer a set of purely epistemic rules, but a power/knowledge network consisting of all kinds of practices: institutional, architectonic, juridical and medical. The episteme, or what Foucault now refers to as the ‘regime of discourses’, only constitutes the specifically discursive element of a more general regime, the dispositif or apparatus (Han 1998/2002, 137–8). Foucault clarifies their relationship by writing that ‘the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its general form is both discursive 5 Gary Gutting (1989, 271) also argues that genealogy does not replace or even seriously revise Foucault’s archaeological method, but rather combines it with the complementary technique of causal analysis, which establishes an essential symbiotic relation between power and knowledge.
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and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous’ (CF, 197). It is not a question of power relations presenting a new level or a simple addition to previous analyses of discursive practices, but rather that the idea of the fundamental entanglement of power and knowledge, power/knowledge, becomes central: knowledge and power are intrinsically tied together, they condition each other and cannot be understood independently of each other. Foucault defines the new notion of apparatus by writing: What I am trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a wholly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. (CF, 194)6
The apparatus now becomes the ‘transcendental’ in Foucault’s thought, in the sense of providing the conditions of possibility for the emergence of scientific objects. It also, crucially, becomes the condition of possibility for the subject. While archaeology facilitated partial analysis of the subject by approaching it through the discursive subject positions made possible by the episteme and produced through a set of formative rules, the introduction of genealogy as Foucault’s method in the 1970s provided a way to present a more comprehensive account of the constitution of the subject. Genealogy analyzes the constitutive effects of non-discursive practices as well as of the scientific truths dependent on them. The subjection of the body. Central to Foucault’s genealogy is the idea of ‘subjection’ (assujettissement), which refers to the process of constituting subjects. The body is an important instrument in this process. In his first major genealogical book, Discipline and Punish Foucault 6 ‘Ce que j’essaie de rep´erer sous ce nom, c’est, premi`erement, un emsemble r´esolument h´et´erog`ene, comportant des discours, des institutions, des am´enagements architecturaux, des d´ecisions r´eglementaires, des lois, des mesures administratives, des e´ nonc´es scientifiques, des propositions philosophiques, morales, philanthropiques, bref: du dit, aussi bien que du non-dit, voil`a les e´ l´ements du dispositif. Le dispositif lui-mˆeme, cest le r´eseau qu’on peut e´ tablir entre ces e´ l´ements.’ (JMF, 299)
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analyzes the ways disciplinary technologies subject prisoners by manipulating and materially inscribing their bodies. Their bodies are separated from others in practices of classification and examination, but also concretely and spatially. They are manipulated through exercise regimes, diet and strict time schedules. These processes of subjection are essentially objectifying: through processes of classification and examination the individual is given a social and a personal identity: he/she is objectivized as mad, criminal or sick, for example. Disciplinary power thus constitutes criminal subjects through concrete bodily manipulation and discursive objectification. These two dimensions strengthen each other. On the one hand, material subjection made theoretical objectification possible, resulting in the birth of human sciences such as criminology, criminal psychiatry and pedagogy. The development of the corresponding sciences, on the other hand, helped the development and rationalization of disciplinary technologies. The two dimensions furthermore link together effectively through normalization. Scientific discourses produce truths that function as the norm. Norms further the subjection by reducing individuality to a common measure. They also make possible the subjection of individuals through the internalization of norms. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes the disciplinary strategy that utilizes the idea of an inner core or essence in the subjection of criminals. Where prisoners are concerned, disciplinary power does not aim at repressing their interests or desires, but rather at constructing them as normal. This is done on and through the bodies of criminals who subject themselves to power to the extent that its aims become their own inner meaning of normal. In a later text, in a famous passage, Foucault writes: ‘There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and subject tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to’ (SP, 212). Hence, a novel aspect of modern disciplinary power is that it is not external to the bodies that it subjects. Although the body has also in the past been intimately tied to power and social order, Foucault claims that disciplinary power is essentially a modern phenomenon. It differs from earlier forms of bodily manipulation, which were violent and often performative – public tortures, slavery and hanging. Disciplinary power does not subject the body to external violence, it is not external or spectacular. It focuses on details, on single movements, on their timing and rapidity. It organizes bodies in space and schedules their every
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action for maximum effect. This is done in factories, schools, hospitals and prisons through fixed and minutely detailed rules, constant surveillance and frequent examinations and check-ups. Bodies are classified according to their best possible performance, their size, age and sex. Unlike older forms of bodily coercion, disciplinary power thus does not only causally mutilate and shape the criminal body. The criminal literally incorporates the objectives of power, which become the norm for his own aims and behaviour. Foucault formulates this poetically by writing that the ‘soul’ is an effect of the material reality of the subjection of the body (DP, 30). It is in this context that he presents his most extreme formulations of subjects as effects of power. The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. ‘A soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body. (DP, 30)7
In his ‘Two Lectures’, which dates from around the same period as Discipline and Punish, Foucault discusses the relationship between body, power and the subject. These lectures represent one of his early efforts to conceptualize power in new terms.8 He wanted to find an alternative to theorizing power in terms of sovereignty as well as in terms of rights, repression or economy. He turned to the ‘Nietzschean’ alternative, according to which the basis of the relationships of power lie in the ‘hostile engagement of forces’ (TL, 91). Foucault also wanted to construct a model that would better account for the new form of power, disciplinary power. This type of power functions through material operators; it presupposes a ‘tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign’ (TL, 104). Foucault suggests that we should not look for the centre of power, but rather study it at its extremities, the points at which it ‘becomes capillary’ 7 ‘L’homme dont on nous parle et qu’on invite a` lib´erer est d´ej`a en lui-mˆeme l’effet d’un assujettissement bien plus profond que lui. Une “ˆame” l’habite et le porte a` l’existence, qui est elle-mˆeme une pi`ece dans la maˆıtrise que le pouvoir exerce sur le corps. L’ˆame, effet et instrument d’une anatomie politique; l’ˆame, prison du corps.’ (SEP, 38) 8 Foucault presents his account of power as a series of propositions in HS and elucidates it further in numerous interviews and essays. Foucault’s account of power should not be understood as a universally applicable theory of power. His goal in HS is rather to find a method that will help us to understand ‘a certain form of knowledge regarding sex’ (HS, 92). See also e.g. Cousins and Hussain 1984, 2 and Gutting 1994, 19–20.
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(TL, 96). Neither should we look for the individuals who dominate, or question their motives, but rather study ‘the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as results of the effects of power’ (TL, 98). Rather than studying how subjects exercise power, Foucault turns the question around and asks how the subject emerges as an effect of power. Now he clearly formulates his project in terms of constitutional analysis.9 [R]ather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. (TL, 97)10
The emphasis on material bodies as the locus of a struggle between power relations is also strong in Foucault’s introduction of the concept of biopower at the end of The History of Sexuality, volume i. Biopower is a particularly modern form of power, which links together power, sexuality and the body. Its function is to ‘invest life through and through’ by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life (HS, 139). This ‘power over life’ evolved in two basic forms, which were linked together. The first was the disciplinary power that centred on the individual body as a machine. The second focused on the species body, the population. It effected the regulatory control of propagation, births and mortality, the level of health and life expectancy, for example (HS, 139–40). Foucault’s aim again is to isolate the functions that the body has as a central component in the power relations of society. The forms of the subject. If we understand subjection to mean, on the one hand, that material bodies are causally formed into subjects in processes of subordination with different manipulative technologies of power, and on the other hand that individual bodies internalize the objectives of power to the extent that they become the meaning of their subjectivity, Foucault’s understanding of the subject seems to 9 See also e.g. EPF, TP. 10 ‘plutˆot que de se demander comment le souverain apparaˆıt en haut, chercher a` savoir comment sont progressivement, r´eellement, mat´eriellement constitu´es les sujets a` partir de la multiplicit´e des corps, des forces, des e´ nergies, des mati`eres, des d´esirs, des pens´ees; saisir l’instance mat´erielle de l’assujettissement en tant que constitution des sujets’ (CJ, 179).
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be some kind of combination of behaviourist and social constructivist accounts of the subject. In fact, these kinds of labels have invariably been stuck on him. It has been argued that the core idea of Foucault’s genealogy is a reduction of subjects to bodies: he denies the existence of subjectivity, now understood as individual consciousness and transformative agency, and redefines it as disciplined, corporeal materiality causally formed and shaped. Power causally shapes material bodies into subjects through subjection, and subjectivity is an illusory effect of the subordination of bodies. This kind of conception often underlies the feminist criticisms of Foucault, according to which his understanding of the subject in terms of passive bodies is problematic for feminist theory because it cannot account for women’s experiences or agency.11 Power is not seen as the constitutional moment and precondition of any kind of subject – autonomous or determined – but is rather understood as the constraining grip that squeezes bodies into subjects. In the context of analyzing the functioning of disciplinary power, Foucault conceives of subjects as bodies. Furthermore, subjection always has as its correlate the process of objectification, the body of the criminal as an object-body, the body as useful and docile. This does not, however, mean that he adopts a mechanical view of the body and simply equates subjects with object-bodies.12 In his later work he insisted that the subject is not a substance: ‘It is a form and this form is not above all or always identical to itself’ (EPF, 10). The subject must thus be understood as the intelligible form of a human being, not as an object-body. Human beings become socially recognized as well as recognize themselves through a culturally and historically constituted form, and there is not just one universal form, but rather forms of this form, forms of the subject. ‘It is precisely the historical constitution of these different forms of the subject relating to the games of truth that interest me’ (EPF, 10). It is thus not merely that power causally turns bodies into subjects according to its requirements: the idea of subjection is more complex and sophisticated. The disciplinary manipulation of bodies does not 11 See e.g. McNay 1991, Soper 1993, Deveaux 1996. 12 According to Foucault, the body is not understood as a passive mechanism. In the next chapter I will argue that it is exactly in the body that a margin of excess and the possibility for subverting the normalizing aims of power take place. Foucault suggests ‘bodies and pleasures’ as a possible form of resistance. Although power constitutes the mastery and awareness of one’s body, it is the body that produces the resistance, ‘the counter-attacks’ against the same power (B/P, 56).
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produce subjects per se, but is only one part of a complex network of power/knowledge, or ‘apparatus’, which forms the constitutive conditions of subjectivity. Bodily subjection partakes in the formation of a discursive order, through the birth of human sciences, for example. This discursive order then feeds back to the non-discursive practices by creating material effects. Human sciences and their truths create objects not only of science, but also of reality: desires, forms of experience, certain kinds of bodies. Scientific discourse and practice constitute not only conceptual objects and identities, but also the subjects who make them materialize. Hence, the manipulation of bodies forms only one dimension of a complex power/knowledge network, which further constitutes subjects through the material effects generated by scientific truths. Ian Hacking (1984, 115, 122) argues that Foucault restricts his analysis to the human sciences exactly for the reason that it is only in the human sciences that scientific truths have constitutive effects on the subjects under study. In the natural sciences our invention of new identities and categories does not ‘really’ change the way the world works. Even though we may create new phenomena that did not exist before our scientific endeavours, what happens in our experiments is constrained by the world: if we do certain things, certain phenomena will always appear. But in the social sciences we may generate kinds of people and kinds of action as we devise new classifications and categories. Categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way interaction between these processes.13 Beatrice Han (1998/2002, 125) also explains this process in her discussion of a course given by Foucault in 1974 at the College de France, in which the effects of truth specific to medical discourse on hysteric patients were analyzed. Medical discourse elaborated a 13 One of Hacking’s examples is the notion of psychic trauma. He discusses it along with the three axes that Foucault distinguishes in his analyses of the constitution of the subject: knowledge, power and ethics. First, there is the person as known about, as having a kind of behaviour and sense of self that is produced by psychic trauma. There is a vast body of knowledge in the growing field of tramatology. Second, in addition to the power of courts and legislatures, there is the anonymous power that this concept has in people’s lives. It organizes their ideas and emotions by creating a new sense of self. At the third, moral level, the new sense of self as a victim of childhood trauma, for example, also creates a new moral being. An understanding of who one is and why one is as one is has implications for our understanding of a person’s responsibilities and duties (Hacking 2002, 18–20).
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theoretical object, following a process made possible by the hospital structure and therefore by the techniques of subjection practised on the patient. But by the same token, this discourse generated a real object corresponding to its knowledge. The conceptual objectification of the illness hysteria was therefore doubled by a second material form of objectification, in which the hysterical woman reproduced in her very person the phenomena. The objectification process was thus transposed from the theoretical level to that of reality, where in turn it produced concrete effects, since real forms of illness ended up corresponding to the newly constituted concept of the patient’s sickness. Hence, Foucault’s idea of subjection does not simply mean that power externally and causally forms human beings into subjects by disciplining them in their materiality. Bodily manipulation produces or constitutes modern forms of the subject by being an integral component of biopower, which not only controls subjects but also constitutes them through the normalizing effects of scientific truths. By urging us to dispense with the subject, Foucault does not deny that there are actual subjects exercising influence on their environments and on the course of historical events. What his genealogical account of the subject denies is the foundational status of the subject. This is done on several different levels. On an ontological level, Foucault denies all metaphysical claims that posit it as a substance or endow it with an essence. The subject is the intelligible form of a human being, not a static substance. In contrast to phenomenology, Foucault further seeks to historisize this form more radically. He does not only historically situate pre-existing subjects, but also puts forward a stronger version of historical constitution. Historically variable practices not only condition what is possible to know about the subject, but they also engender its experiences. Human sciences and the disciplinary practices tied to them constitute not only conceptual objects or identities, but also the subjects who materialize them.14 This ontological claim about the subject is motivated and argued for on both epistemological as well as ethical/political levels. Above 14 J. N. Mohanty (1997, 79) explains Foucault’s position concisely by suggesting that Foucault reworks the problem of constitution by rejecting transcendental subjectivity as constitutive of all objectivities, and by offering instead a theory of how the subject itself is historically constituted. The principle of this constitution is not history in the traditional sense, however, for the idea of one continuous historical process unfolding itself at one time is itself a construction, behind which stands the transcendental subject. Mohanty argues that the principle of constitution, ‘the transcendental’, is for Foucault, power (83–4).
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I discussed how Foucault’s criticism of phenomenology in The Order of Things aimed to show the instability of all efforts to ground knowledge on the subject. What is constituted in historical practices – namely the subject and its experiences – cannot provide the basis of explanation for these practices. The subject cannot have a foundational role in the constitution of meaning, because it is dependent on the nonsubjective mechanisms of signification and on historically changing discursive structures. The ethical or political motivation arises from the claim that the modern philosophies of the subject are intrinsically entangled with the modern forms of subjection. I will return to this idea in more detail below, when I focus on Foucault’s late work on ethics. According to my constitutional reading of Foucault, genealogy thus shares with phenomenology the transcendental mode of questioning as opposed to a purely empirical study of the subject, but it does not share the methodological starting point in the subject. Foucault rejects the phenomenological subject that is the ground and source of knowledge, meaning and value, and asks how the subject itself and its experiences are historically constituted through discursive games of truth, practices of power and technologies of the self. He does not deny subjectivity, but neither does he construct a general theory of it. He studies the historical constitution of different fields of experience – sexuality, delinquency, madness. His thought is in a sense left circulating around the place left empty by the transcendental subject.
The problem of circularity Foucault’s modification of the transcendental mode of questioning seems to open up a host of problems. We have to ask: how should we understand the power/knowledge network as the transcendental? Several commentators have pointed out that Foucault’s totalizing formulations at times give the impression that power/knowledge is a metaphysical, monolithic entity or a structural invariant. Charles Tay