Fiction and Economy Edited by
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner
Fiction and Economy
Also by Susan Bruce SHAKESPEARE: King Lear (editor) THREE EARLY MODERN UTOPIAS (editor)
Also by Valeria Wagner BOUND TO ACT: Models of Action, Dramas of Inaction Literatura y vida cotidiana. Ficción e imaginario en las Américas
Fiction and Economy Edited by
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner
Introduction, Selection and editorial matter © Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 2007; Individual chapters © contributors 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–00524–2 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–00524–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 16
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
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For Simone Oettli
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Table of Contents Acknowledgements
ix
Notes on Contributors
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Introduction: Fiction and Economy Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner
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1 Supreme Fictions: Money and Words as Commodifying Signifiers Richard Waswo
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2 Trafficking Words Margaret Bridges
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3 The Stain of the Signature Peter de Bolla
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4 Semiotics and Economics Giulia Colaizzi and Jenaro Talens
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5 ‘Parties in Converse’ Literary and Economic Dialogue in Michael Almereyda’s Hamlet Mark Thornton Burnett 6 The Fabric of Society: Money, Cloth, and Symbolic Exchanges in Njal’s saga Fabienne L. Michelet 7 ‘There’s none / Can truly say he gives, if he receives’: Timon of Athens and the Possibilities of Generosity Or The Gift of a Stranger Susan Bruce 8 Spend, Spend, Spend: Expenditure and Waste in Hegel, Bataille, Derrida Roy Sellars
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9 Towards a General Economics of Cinema Bruce Bennett
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Index
187 vii
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Acknowledgements A number of people and institutions have played a part in the genesis of this volume. Fred Botting, of the University of Lancaster, and Ann Hughes, of Keele University, offered very useful comments and suggestions on our initial proposal for the collection; we thank them for their time, interest and support. The idea for the project originated during a colloquium at the University of Geneva, held to mark the retirement of Rick Waswo. We thank the University of Geneva for hosting that event and the Faculty of Letters, the Rectorate of the University, the English Department, the ASSH (Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales) and the Société académique de Genève for their generous funding, as well as Ancilla Stefani and Clare Tierque for their tireless help on that occasion. We thank Paula Kennedy, Palgrave's commissioning editor, for her support throughout the project, and Palgrave's anonymous reader for his or her constructive suggestions for improvement. Susan would like to thank successive years of students at the Keele, for their animated discussions of possibilities of generosity. Marguerite Palmer ought to know just what Susan owes her, but she would never think about it that way. And Daniel and Luke Lustig-Bruce have, over the past few years, reminded Susan not only of the early manifestation of the pleasures of giving, but also of the irritation that can ensue when you find that you’ve spent all your pocket money on someone else, and now have none left over to buy anything for yourself. Seeing their names in print might (Susan hopes) help redress some of that maternally inflicted balance, but she also hopes that in years to come they’ll agree that generosity always generates imperfect and incomplete economies – and that’s a good thing, by and large. Valeria would like to thank Saba Bahar once again, for her help with this project and with countless others over the years they worked together. Wonderful Clara was good natured about the various deprivations she suffered at the final stages of the book, and is hereby publicly acclaimed for her patience. Finally, Simone Oettli. Anyone who knows Simone knows also that she is a person of extraordinary, larger-than-life, warmth, generosity and courage. Our respective debts to her, as well as our recognition of those qualities in her, we mark in the dedication to the present volume. ix
Notes on Contributors Bruce Bennett (BA, Leeds; MA, Cardiff; PhD, Lancaster) is a lecturer in film studies at the Institute for Cultural Research of the University of Lancaster. He has interests in science fiction cinema, Chinese and Japanese cinema, and early cinema, as well as in Bataille and the economics of film production. Margaret Bridges has taught medieval English literature at various universities in Switzerland, especially Geneva (where she also received her PhD) and Berne (where she is a professor in the Department of English Languages and Literatures). Originally an Anglo-Saxonist working on the Old English poetic saints’ lives, she has since extended her research interests and publications to Middle and Early Modern English, foregrounding questions of closure, self-reflexivity, cross-cultural exchange and gender, in works as diverse as dream-visions, founding legends, medieval travel narratives and renaissance discourses of discovery. She is currently working on a book project (Embedding Literature) which explores discursive configurations linking literature to beds, whether in the form of commonplaces (such as that of abandoned lovers addressing their personified and fetishized beds) or in the form of the bed as locus of literary inspiration and production. Susan Bruce (BA, Cantab; MA and PhD, Cornell) is Senior Lecturer at Keele University (email:
[email protected]). She is the editor of Three Early Modern Utopias (Oxford University Press, 1999) and of Shakespeare: King Lear (Palgrave, 1997), as well as the author of articles on various subjects, from More to Harper Lee, published in academic and more popular fora. She is currently embarking on a project with colleagues in English and Education departments at several UK universities, to try to ascertain what people think they are doing – and how they do it – when they ‘teach’ English literature, the concerns of which, in her view, are not unconnected with her written contributions to this volume. Mark Thornton Burnett is Professor of Renaissance Studies at Queen’s University, Belfast. He is the author of Masters and Servants in English Renaissance Drama and Culture: Authority and Obedience (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) and Constructing ‘Monsters’ in Shakespearean x
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Drama and Early Modern Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002) and is the editor or co-editor of numerous other works. Giulia Colaizzi (MA in English, University of Bari; MA in Romance Languages, University of Valencia; ABD in Comparative Literature, University of Minnesota) obtained a PhD in Literary Theory and Comparative Literature from the University of Valencia, where she is currently Associate Professor of Communication and Gender Studies. She has widely published on Film Theory and Feminism in Spanish, Italian, Swiss and US Journals, and authored, among other books, Feminismo y teoría del discurso and La pasión del significante. Peter de Bolla is Reader in Cultural History and Aesthetics at the University of Cambridge and the author most recently of Art Matters (Harvard, 2001) and The Education of the Eye (Stanford, 2003). His Fourth of July and the Founding of America will appear from Profile Press in 2007. Fabienne L. Michelet completed her ‘licence’ at the University of Geneva, after which she studied at the Vatican Library in Rome, and in Oxford, where she undertook graduate studies on the Berrow Scholarship (1997–9) and on the Fellowship for Prospective Researchers of the Swiss National Science Foundation (2001–3). She did her doctorate at the University of Geneva, specializing in Old English literature. She is presently teaching medieval English literature both at the University of Geneva and at the University of Fribourg. Her research focuses primarily on Old English literature, exploring questions of space, place and geography. Her work in progress includes an interest in questions of heroism and agency, gender studies and historiography. She is the author of Creation, Migration, and Conquest: Imaginary Geography and Sense of Space in Old English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), and the co-editor of Cultures in Contact, Past and Present: Studies in Honor of Paul Beekman Taylor. Multilingua 18 (1999). Roy Sellars is Senior Lecturer in the Department of English and Danish, University of Southern Denmark, Kolding, Denmark (e-mail
[email protected]); in 2005–6 he is in residence at the Kierkegaard Library, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN, USA. A graduate of Oxford University, he previously worked at the Department of English, National University of Singapore; the Department of Comparative Literature and the Society for Humanities, Cornell University; the Department of English, Geneva
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University and the Department of English, Marburg University. His current research projects include Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Freud, Adorno, Derrida and Bloom, as well as Spenser, Milton, Wordsworth and Beckett. He is co-editor (with Graham Allen) of Figures of Bloom: The Salt Companion to Harold Bloom (Cambridge: Salt, forthcoming) and (with Per Krogh Hansen) of Glossing Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming). ‘Educational Remains: Back to School with Hegel (and Adorno)’, a companion to the present essay, appears in Parallax. Jenaro Talens is Professor of Hispanic and Comparative Literature and European Studies at the University of Geneva. He has published 15 books of poetry, both in Spanish and Catalan and translated into Spanish, among others, Shakespeare, Hölderlin, Goethe, Novalis, Trakl, Brecht, Pound, Walcott, Heaney, Judice and Petrarca. He has authored numerous books on Literary and Film History and Theory. Some of those available in English are Through the Shattering Glass: Cervantes and the Self-Made World (University of Minnesota Press, 1993), The Branded Eye (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) and, as co-editor, Modes of Representation in Spanish Cinema (University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Valeria Wagner is maître d’enseignement et de recherche at the Faculty of Letters, University of Geneva, where she teaches in the Hispanic literature and Comparative literature programmes. She has published Literatura y vida cotidiana. Ficción e imaginario en las Américas (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2005), Bound to Act: Models of Action, Dramas of Inaction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), as well as various articles in English and French, bearing mainly on the imaginary of the Americas, the constitution of political imaginaries, and the historicity of the notion of action. Richard Waswo is professor emeritus of English, Université de Genève. A.B. Stanford, 1961; MA and PhD, Harvard, 1962 and 1970. He taught at San Francisco and San José State Colleges and the University of Virginia before coming to Geneva in 1976. He is the author of Language and Meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton, 1987), The Founding Legend of Western Civilization (Wesleyan, 1997), and various articles on British writers from Chaucer to Scott. Nothing in professional life became him like the leaving it: some of the contributions in this volume were first presented at a conference in Geneva on his current research interest in the manifold relations between words and money.
Introduction: Fiction and Economy Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner
1. ‘A textbook case’ Money is indeed the most important thing in the world; and all sound and successful personal and national morality should have this fact for its basis. George Bernard Shaw, preface to The Irrational Knot. In Money to Burn, a recent narrative of a real historical event by the Argentinean writer Ricardo Piglia,1 a group of men steal seven million pesos (the equivalent of almost six hundred thousand US dollars in 1965, when the story takes place) from the Provincial Bank of Buenos Aires. After their initial plans of escape fail, they cross the border to Montevideo, where they end up besieged in an apartment previously bugged by the police. Sustained by an arsenal of weapons, a good provision of various drugs, their faith in their leader’s capacity to come up with a plan to rescue them and a deep hatred for the armed forces, the men resist increasingly violent attacks from the police force, scoring several ‘victories’ (deaths) in the process. According to a journalist’s account, ‘every victory achieved under such impossible conditions increased their capacity to resist. . . . This was why what followed had the aspect of a tragic ritual that no one who was there that night could ever forget’ (Piglia 2003b, 155). In the episode from which the narrative takes its title, the men’s resistance reaches its climax when they set fire to the stolen money and throw the burning 1000-peso bills out of the window, one by one, ‘in a move that left the city and the country horror-struck, and which lasted precisely fifteen interminable minutes, which is exactly how long it takes to burn such an astronomical quantity of money . . .’ (ibid., 157). 1
2
Introduction
This act elicits strong reactions from the surrounding crowd: ‘they should be hanged’, some say; ‘they should be left to die slowly, burnt to a crisp’ (ibid., 158). The enormity of the crime is explained as follows: If the money were the sole justification for the murders they committed, and if what they did, they did for the money they were now burning, that had to mean they had no morals nor motives, that they acted and killed gratuitously, out of a taste for evil, out of pure evil, that they were born assassins, insensate criminals, degenerates. . . . If they had given away the money, if they had thrown it out of the window at the people gathered on the street, if they agreed with the police to hand it over to a charitable foundation, everything would have gone differently for them. . . . As it was, everyone understood perfectly well that this was a declaration of war, a direct attack, a textbook case, waged on society as whole. (ibid., 157–8) Piglia’s narration of the scene of this ‘declaration of war’ can itself be read as a ‘textbook case’ for its deconstruction of the crucial role money plays in the stories society tells about itself, and of the smoke-screen these stories throw on the operations of capitalism. At first, for the crowd and other important social actors, money appears to be the guarantor of rationality, the last bastion of reason when human actions appear devoid of any reasonable motivations; devoid, in short, of any reasons. Underpinning this perception is reason’s intimate relation to a specific economic system, namely capitalism, in whose legitimation its service is invoked. Thus, an act appears rational – and hence, to the onlookers, moral – if it respects basic economic principles, and can be inscribed within a logic of gain (or loss). As long as the thieves behave like thieves, defending their loot, they still belong to society, and, indeed, shore up that social system to which they appear to stand in opposition. For, as Marx once famously remarked, the criminal operates as ‘one of the “natural counterweights” which bring about a correct balance and open up a whole perspective of “useful” occupations’:2 criminals produce crime, as well as criminal law and the professor who lectures on it, the police force, criminal justice, lawyers and so on, besides reducing unemployment and breaking the counter-productive monotony of everyday bourgeois life. These ‘criminals’, however, refuse to cooperate, disregarding the options left open to them to remain within the reasonable realm of society, some of which, as we have seen, are voiced by various members of
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 3
the watching community: to save, with the money, the lives of orphaned children; to throw it out of the window to the crowd; to donate it to charity; to use it to improve conditions in the prisons in which ‘they themselves are going to be held’ (Piglia 2003b, 158). Rejecting both the possibilities of a Robin Hoodian redistribution of the money and the use of it as a rational investment in their incarcerated future, they instead destroy it, thereby rendering their crimes unproductive, gratuitous and incomprehensible. This gesture, as the narration of Piglia’s text makes clear, disarms the police, who are forced to watch ‘in stupefaction, for what could they do with criminals capable of such nonsense?’ (ibid., 157).3 With this ‘non-sense’ the ‘criminals’ invalidate the rationalizing powers of money as well as their status as ‘criminals’, relinquishing at the same time their last rational human trait: from then on they are for the crowd complete social outcasts – ‘degenerates’, ‘born assassins’, evil itself. In incinerating the pesos, the criminals have also, as it were, burnt the social bridges connecting them to others, their action serving to place them in the starkest of opposition to the idealized subject of capitalism, homo economicus. The crowd’s presupposition that in burning the money the criminals have effectively abdicated from society generates in this text a complex and suggestive account of why burning money should end up carrying the moral weight which the onlookers and commentators on the episode ascribe to it. Television stations, we are told, transmit day-long repeats of the ‘rite’, within which one TV commentator proclaims that ‘burning innocent money is an act of cannibalism’ (ibid., 158). The implicit suggestion here (that, by opposition, there might exist such a thing as ‘guilty’ money, deserving of its own, unproductive, destruction) may not be lost on the reader of Piglia’s text, but it is on the witnesses, who, deaf to the implications of ‘guilty’ money, decide instead that ‘money is innocent, even when acquired as a consequence of death and crime. It couldn’t be considered culpable, but rather it should be viewed as a neutral symbol, as a symbol that comes in useful depending on how one wants to use it’ (ibid., 158). Money here appears innocent because it is an instrument, and even more precisely, a blunt instrument, a neutral symbol, presumably symbolizing the potentialities of whatever it is used to do. But what happens, then, when it is put to no use? And even more radically, what happens when it is not only withdrawn from use – or exchange – but simply destroyed? What does money come to symbolize then? For the crowd, who react with such horror to money’s immolation, the destruction of money is the very figure of an anarchic rejection of
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all social value, ‘an act of nihilism and an example of pure terrorism’, according to the dailies reporting on the incident, ‘worse than all the crimes [the gang] had committed’ (ibid., 159). Thus, as it disappears into smoke, money appears to be what is most valuable in society, representing, beyond its exchange value, the values upheld by society and even the sheer fact that a society has such values: that, in short, there is value and that there is society. Destroying money consequently becomes tantamount to the destruction of value itself, and hence of the conditions that enable social relationships and exchanges: of the social ‘anima’ in general. The money, indeed, acquires a soul in this text as it is animated by the flames, burning like ‘butterflies’ or like ‘flaming birds’ before ‘transforming into a heap of charcoal, a funeral pyre of society’s values (as declared an eye-witness on television)’ (ibid., 159).4 Finally, it turns into a ‘wonderfully beautiful column of azure ash . . . resembling the calcified remains of the dead that get scattered across the ocean, or over the mountains and woods, only not over the filthy city streets, for ash must never drift onto the stone floor of our concrete jungles’ (ibid., 159–60). As the bills metamorphose into ash, money is gradually divested of its function of guarantor of rationality, revealing its unacknowledged transcendental status and the religious feelings with which it is invested until, in its consumed state, it comes to stand for the dead that the ‘concrete jungle’ of capitalism does not admit in the accounts of itself. This is apparent in the robbers’ understanding of what they are doing: ‘burning money is ugly, it’s a sin. E peccato’ (ibid., 156), one of the besieged men is recorded to have said, falling back into the language of his European ancestors to mark his recognition that what he is doing transgresses the prescriptions (and proscriptions) of the economy and of the Church. But he then qualifies the ‘sin’ (or perhaps more properly, the ‘pity’, the ‘shame’ or even the ‘waste’)5 with examples of what money amounts to: ‘just think: to earn a bill this size, a security guard, . . . would have to work for a fortnight . . . and a bank-clerk, . . . would have to work at least a month . . . as he whiles away his life counting other people’s money’ (ibid.). Now money is pragmatically traced back to the salary a worker earns, and hence to the work it represents, to the time it takes in a worker’s life and to the surplus-value of the man’s labour, which he does not get in return for his toils, but which contributes to keep him working and to keep him needing to work, counting his life out in other people’s money. Here the robber’s observations function as a commentary to Brecht’s ironic question, which figures as the epigraph to Piglia’s text: ‘After all, what is robbing a bank
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 5
compared to founding one?’ In other words, what is a singular act of robbery compared to an institutionalized form of robbery? In the light of this question, the fact that the money that the gang steal and burn is the cash that would have been used to pay the municipal wages bill appears to fulfil a certain poetic justice, the suggestion being that the original theft is the salaries themselves, by means of which the bank fills its coffers. Thus the waste, the shame and perhaps also the sin would ultimately be the conversion of the worker’s life into money. But the robbers’ comment does more than refer the reader to the system of exploitation money would ‘really’ stand for. Rather, as the crowd’s reactions testify, burning money is a ‘sin’ because it constitutes a breach of the faith in social institutions and fellow citizens that its value presupposes. As such, it is not just tantamount to rejecting the social contract, it also questions the model of a ‘reality’ that can be unselfconsciously referred to, which is clearly distinguishable from the imaginary. Burnt, money is reduced to its ultimate materiality, ashes, the illusion of its intrinsic value shattered and with it its referential status with regard to all that it measures (time, work, commodities). Thus what is destroyed with the bills exceeds their material existence, and affects the entire imaginary make-up of the crowd, its actual perception of what is ‘the real’. One might argue, in fact, that the different levels at which money functions at this point in the text correspond loosely to two of the three functions of money discussed by Jean-Joseph Goux in Symbolic Economies (Goux 1990), that is, its ‘real’ and its ‘imaginary’ functions. The remaining function is the ‘symbolic’, by which money is a medium of circulation and a means of payment. To the extent that Goux’s distinctions recall Lacan’s ‘real’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’, the symbolic function of money can be considered akin to that of the sign, and the burning pesos thrown out of the window, as so many signs, undetermined messages to the crowd, destined to reach its social unconscious. Thus the transfiguration of the ashes into butterflies and flaming birds, and their final transformation into a funerary pyre of social values, acts to put pressure on the crowd to acknowledge the emotional investment that money represents and the imaginary realm that it articulates, as well as the ‘reality’ that this imaginary organizes. In the ashes of the burnt money the real and the imaginary collapse into one another, a collapse which challenges the crowd’s understanding of what it is that it is witnessing. The fundamental nature of that challenge, as well as the depth of the crowd’s resistance to its acknowledgement, is measured in the horror of their reaction to the event. But the objectifying stance of Piglia’s purportedly ‘documentary’ prose here
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prohibits the reader from inhabiting that ‘natural’ horror, opening up instead a space where an alternative understanding of this moment becomes available. Clearly, then, in this seminal (and central) episode of Money to Burn Piglia isolates instances wherein the roles that money and the economies (ethical as well as pragmatic) within which it functions transcend their apprehension in the social imaginary to achieve a degree of social acknowledgement, an acknowledgement which may be repressed or denied by the watching crowd, but which is registered, albeit transiently, by others whose voices are transcribed in the narrative (as well as, perhaps, by the reader). The burning of the pesos is, for instance, repeatedly described in this narrative as a kind of rite or ritual: cannibalistic, tragic (Piglia 2003b, 155), even sacrificial. The latter claim is lodged in the text by a Uruguayan philosopher, Washington Andrada,6 who claims to the magazine Marcha that the action is ‘a kind of innocent potlatch let loose on a society with no memory of such a ritual, an act absolute and free in itself, a gesture of sheer waste and sheer outpouring . . .’ (ibid., 159). In other societies, he maintains, the act would have been understood as a ‘sacrifice made to the gods because only what is most valuable is worthy of sacrifice and there is nothing more valuable among ourselves than money ...’ (ibid.).7 With this intervention, Washington Andrada does himself no favours: he is ‘at once summoned by the magistrate’, presumably because his theory is at once too sympathetic to the ‘criminals’, and too explicit in its statement of what remains, essentially, a social taboo: that is, that money is what society most values, above, even, human life. More generally, the philosopher’s account of the robbers’ ‘nonsensical’ act as ritual confers upon the burning of the money a social meaning, thus re-inscribing both the crime and the ‘criminals’ within the social sphere from which the society which has produced them wishes to banish them. In so doing, it recalls the imaginary articulation of society that capitalism, with its claims to rationality, purports to have eliminated from its mode of functioning. Even though the likening of the burning of the pesos to a sacrificial ritual situates the crime and the criminals within a pre-capitalistic logic and society, the comparison ultimately foregrounds the irrationality of capitalist societies, which value money more than human lives, and shows value itself to be a production of the imaginary. If the philosopher’s analysis is unacceptable to the authorities (at least in Piglia’s version of these events), it is precisely because it recognizes (albeit only partially) the imaginary dimension of the economy and its ultimate irreducibility to what is purely utilitarian, rationalistic and controlled.
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 7
The intersection, in the figure of sacrifice, of pre-capitalist and capitalist logic, moreover, displaces the image that society might have of itself, raising the question of how its own practices might be understood, of what they are and of how events in general can be assimilated within a society’s sense of the real. Here, of course, the burning, immolation, destruction or ritual sacrifice of the pesos constitutes the kind of event that cannot be integrated unequivocally and coherently in the social order of things. This questioning of the visible, of the real, of events and of their significance is pursued at the level of the narrative in the tension underlying Piglia’s claim that ‘[t]his novel tells a true story’, with which apparent contradiction in terms opens the epilogue to Money to Burn (Piglia 2003b, 204), the concluding account of the genesis of the narrative. In this epilogue, Piglia details the sources – the transcripts of interviews and interrogations, the psychiatric reports, the witness statements, the newspaper archives and the court records – which, he tells us, he has ‘freely reproduced’ in Money To Burn, and without which, he maintains, ‘it would have been impossible to obtain an exact reconstruction of the facts narrated in this book’ or to ‘orchestrate the different versions of this same story’ (ibid., 207). Such claims to ‘truth’, of course, beg the very questions which are simultaneously raised by the peculiar genre of which Money to Burn forms a part. Truman Capote, whose In Cold Blood lodged similar claims to veracity (its subtitle being A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences), intended to contribute with that text to the ‘establishment of a serious new literary form: the Nonfiction Novel’, as the cover copy to the first edition of the text tells us (Capote 1965). Piglia also refers to his text as a ‘non-fictional account’ (Piglia 2003b, 207), although elsewhere his language suggests that the boundaries between what is ‘fact’ and what is ‘fiction’ (or what is ‘true’ and what is ‘false’) are more porous and malleable than that simplistic opposition would imply: he describes ‘facts’ and ‘events’ as, for instance, ‘resembling the last memories of a lived experience’ and analogizes them to ‘the account of a dream’, a dream which, moreover, ‘opens with an image’ (ibid., 209). Piglia’s ‘true story’ consists, technically, in an exploration of the multiple and non-exclusive relations between fact and fiction, falsity and truth. Accordingly, the ‘orchestration’ of the ‘different versions’ of the ‘same story’ proceeds not so much by way of an editorial exclusion of one ‘version’ in favour of another, of the verificatory authorial adjudication, as it were, between competing and sometimes contradictory accounts of the same event, but, instead, through a refusal so to choose, and rather, the representation of each of those competing accounts as
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somehow equally ‘true’. Take, for instance, the moment where the gangsters are interrupted in a game of cards by the voice of the police: Mereles emerged from the kitchen with some packs of cards and a jar of chickpeas . . . ‘I found some packs of cards, let’s play three-handed poker.’ ‘Let’s go . . . every chickpea is worth ten grand, I’ll deal . . . Let’s see what we can get . . .’ At that point they heard a buzzer, perhaps they even heard it before it sounded, an instant before they first heard the metallic buzz and then the voice calling up to them. They’d been playing cards for a little while, on the wicker table covered with a white kitchen cloth, ... when they heard the metallic buzzer, sounding like a rat squealing, ... a microphone making a metallic hum as it’s first connected and then the voice warning them to give themselves up. (Piglia 2003b, 121) These accounts cannot all be literally ‘true’: either the gangsters had begun their game of cards when the buzzer sounds, or they had not; similarly, they cannot in reality have heard the buzzer before it sounded (a hypothetical impossibility inserted by Piglia between two more overtly credible versions of events). Yet there is a sense in the prose here that every account negotiates its own truthful path between the action remembered and the relation of that action; that no single account is more true, or more false, than any other; that each deserves an uncontested place in the relation of the event. The reader of this text is not asked to choose between the variant accounts, or to establish a hierarchy of truth-value. Rather, to the extent that the narrative features all of them, without authorizing any one of them above the others, the reader is confronted with equally valid accounts from which a single ‘truth’ could only be sorted out arbitrarily. ‘When, precisely, did the buzzer sound?’ is just the wrong question here, a question which would not help to generate a ‘true’ account of this particular event, any more than the questions asked of the police by the journalist Emilio Renzi later in the narrative can guarantee that he will be able to produce for El Mundo the ‘accurate account of what’s going on’ (ibid., 164) that he seeks. ‘Throughout the book’, Piglia tells us, he has ‘attempted to maintain the stylistic register and “metaphorical gesture” (as Brecht called it) of the social reports whose theme remains illegal violence’ (ibid., 205). Like the phrase ‘innocent money’, the phrase ‘illegal violence’ implies its
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 9
converse: Piglia may maintain the stylistic register of the ‘social report’ but his arrangement of the material from which he constructs his narrative generates ‘themes’ that are rather different from those underlying the documents which constitute his source material. Using a fictional form (the novel) to relate a ‘true’ story, Piglia deconstructs, among other things, the very notion of an ‘accurate account’ u0nderstood as unequivocal, or one that reproduces an ideal (though unverifiable) one-to-one relation between language and what it refers to as well as a clear distinction between the real and the imaginary. Instead, Piglia’s suggestion is that an accurate account is one that conveys precisely the equivocal nature of any report of events, and of all circumscriptions of the real and the imaginary. Employing what Michael McKeon described so elegantly in The Origins of the English Novel as the novel’s ‘claims to truth’ (McKeon 1987), Piglia suggests, perhaps, that a ‘fictionalized’ account of a ‘real’ event may encompass more veracity than the journalist’s prose, or the stenographer’s record of court proceedings, and that it may do so precisely because fiction can unsettle the distinction between the imaginary and the real. It is to that more general claim that we now wish to turn.
2. ‘This is not about money’ Words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values. Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, xvi.3. ‘This is not about money’ (Piglia 2003b, 153), one of the robbers in Piglia’s text tells the police, in a moment of telling insight and lucidity. For money itself is never only what is at stake in such conflicts, or never just in itself. Rather, as the early Marx had already intuited, what is at stake in critiques of the capitalist economic system is its increasing autonomization, the loss of grasp on the actual articulation of social relations that the abstraction of labour entails. Money plays a part in the abstraction of social relations, and in its own, perfect, abstraction, may even symbolize that abstraction, as Simmel argued (Simmel 1990). But it is not the whole, or the only, story. According to Marx this loss of grasp on the articulation of social relations is eventually what happens in bourgeois societies, where the process of production reaches such a degree of autonomization that it effectively masters man, in spite of the latter’s persistent belief in his own mastery over the economy (and the world in general). Social relations are shrouded in mystery as a result, no longer considered in personal terms, but rather perceived as relations
10
Introduction
between things – or alternately, relations between things take on the significance of relations between people, whereupon things are endowed with the attributes of human, even divine, agency. This point has been fruitfully developed by contemporary thinkers such as Cornelius Castoriadis, for whom the economy is the domain of capitalist societies in which the imaginary reigns most completely and most unquestioned, presenting itself as the rationale for the entire society, but itself bordering on a ‘systematic delirium’ (Castoriadis 1987), and cognate issues are addressed by Goux, whose distinctions between the ‘real’, ‘imaginary’ and ‘symbolic’ functions of money we have already touched upon above. The scene that Piglia narrates in Money to Burn stages a sort of counterdelirium, as the robbers’ excessive behaviour first divests money of its rationale, then shows its religious connotations and finally points to its anchorage in human life and relations. As money can make more apparently concrete the workings of the economy, so fiction can offer tangible form to the imaginary foundations of society. In fiction, those imaginary foundations of society are given to be read, if not seen, and the social relations they cover up are given in turn concrete embodiments. Fiction (to borrow a formulation from Raymond Williams) offers structures of feeling through which we can make sense of the contradictions that beset us in our lived experiences (Williams 1973). Or, as Simmel claimed, the great advantage of art over philosophy, is that it sets itself a single, narrowly defined problem every time: a person, a landscape, a mood. Every extension of these to the general, every addition of bold touches of feeling for the world is made to appear an enrichment, a gift, an undeserved benefit. (Simmel 1990, 55) Giving to airy nothing a local habitation and a name, fiction offers ways of shaping and embodying the social relations which the economy works to mystify and obscure; in so doing, it explores the implications of, and often implicitly contests, that imaginary association between (economic) wealth and (social) value, which, as in Money to Burn, can be experienced as so profound and self-evident that the destruction of money is comprehended as ‘a taste for evil, . . . pure evil’. The ‘delirious’ discourse of the (dominant) economy is deployed in the mode of fiction, with which it entertains a tense relationship, because fiction is also the mode in which the domination of the economic over the imaginary can be given to be read, acquiring concrete embodiments that may undergo critical scrutiny. In this light, the interest of literary
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 11
studies in economic discourses is understandable, as is the now widely established axiom that the discourse and the functioning of the economy can be enlightened, however controversially, by the study of literature, in the re-editing of early literary writings on economics, for example,8 or in attempts to teach economics through literary exempla, wherein selections of literary fragments through which economic concepts and mechanisms are explained to non-economists accompany the enticing introduction of ‘literature’ to economists.9 For many years now, literary studies have integrated in their basic bibliographies the works of the ‘founders’ of political economy, most obviously, Karl Marx, but also of succeeding theorists who have investigated the economic paradigms that govern contemporary thought in general as well as literary thought in particular. Most notably, for Jacques Derrida – whose work on the gift is discussed by Susan Bruce in Chapter 7 – the operations and the mode of thinking known as deconstruction would not be possible, or thinkable, without money and capital, while money is itself – as Piglia’s robbers seem to have understood – a deconstructive principle of the capitalist form of organization we live in.10 So too, for Michel Foucault (whose 1969 essay ‘What is an Author’ is one of the most widely read articles by students of letters), the notion of the author is a category which regulates the economy of meaning.11 In engaging with such theorists literary studies have begun to describe and interrogate the analogic functioning of economic and literary imaginaries, and have also, perhaps most importantly, traced the social relations that, to adopt Richard Waswo’s terms, the ‘supreme fictions’ of the economy at once plot and obscure (see Waswo, Chapter 1, this volume). More recent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest in the work of such writers as Marc Shell (1978, 1982, 1995), Kurt Heinzelman (1980) and, perhaps particularly, Georg Simmel, and have seen a marked return to the interrogation of the relationship between literary studies and economics, as is evidenced by the number of international conferences, graduate courses and publications that investigate the connections between the two disciplines; and also by the affording of a name (the ‘New Economic Criticism’) to a growing body of work that seeks to revisit the intersections of the two (Woodmansee and Osteen 1999; Osteen, 2002; Woodbridge 2003; Bigelow 2004). Quite what has caused this upsurge of interest in the relationship between literary productions and economics is uncertain: it may be symptomatic of the current crisis of the humanities and of a further expansion of the hegemony of the economic, or it may be a healthy (if generally tacit, in this respect)
12
Introduction
response to the increasing predominance of the economic over the social and the political in this era of globalization and of the marketization of higher education (Readings 1996; Shumar 1997; Brantlinger 2001). Whatever the answer to that question, the literary focus on the economy is productive of its own tensions and sets of questions. As evidence of this we might, for instance, cite the debates which have issued from the tendency of the New Economic Criticism to appeal to an intellectual tradition embedded in (say) Simmel rather than (say) Marx. In fact, this debate over the ‘politics’ of the New Economic Criticism rehearses, to some extent, a more established one on the relation between Marx and Simmel, where the latter’s contribution is understood to be less radical and more ‘metaphysical’ than the former’s.12 For Bottomore, Simmel’s translator, Lukács was probably right in claiming that any vestiges of historical materialism present in Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money are ‘embedded in an idealist metaphysics of culture’ (Bottomore, introduction to Simmel 1990, 23). For Bottomore, moreover, Simmel’s acquaintance with Marx was patchy (ibid., 24) and his attack on the labour theory of value at once obfuscatory (ibid., 25), inadequate (ibid., 26) and universalist, rather than properly anchored in a concrete historicism that pays due attention to ‘the consequences of a specific mode of the division of labour as resulting from the nature of capitalist society’ (ibid., 28). Consequently, still according to Bottomore, Simmel’s writings are ultimately unable to come to the aid of the victims of capitalism’s rapacious operations: they fail to allow those victims to ‘confront a social class that stands in opposition to them’ (ibid., 28). Yet for others, Simmel’s relation to Marx is less radically oppositional, and more complementary: Goldscheid, for instance, whom Bottomore quotes, claims that The Philosophy of Money ‘contains a supplementation of Marx’s life work such as has hitherto not existed in social science’ (Goldscheid, quoted in Bottomore’s introduction to Simmel 1990, 11); and Bryan S. Turner credits Simmel, not Lukács, with the ‘reconstruc[tion] of Marx’s analysis of money as alienation from the 1844 manuscripts’, arguing that ‘Simmel’s philosophical inquiry into the development of an abstract and universal system of money as the measure of all human activity provided a fundamental model of the cultural manifestations of an underlying process of rationalisation in Western societies’ (Turner 1986, 104–5). So if the jury is still wavering on the relation between Simmel and Marx and on the ways in which readings of Simmel might or might not be politically inflected (and politically effectual), it seems to us that it can only be more undecided on the political engagement (or potential
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 13
thereof) of the New Economic Criticism, fledgling field that it still is. That said, this brief excursion into a part of that field’s intellectual background is intended neither as an attack nor as a defence; the field itself is new, not yet defined, and certainly few, if any, of our contributors here would label themselves as part of its number, ‘New Economic Critics’. But we ourselves are pleased to see signs of a return to the interrogation of the relation between the literary and the economic. We think the influence of economic thought on the social imaginary should be questioned in all its manifestations, and that considerations on the relationship between fiction and economy should be encouraged, especially now, when globalizing processes tend, more than ever before, to make the economy appear to be a fact of nature rather than an elaborate fictional construct (that has, doubtless, a very concrete and determining impact on the real). Thus, besides contributing to the current investigation of the intersections of literary and economic studies, this particular collection of essays focusses on the ways in which literary and artistic thought can question the economy’s grasp on our imaginary, illuminating its fictional foldings and unfoldings.13
3. Dissonant exchanges Cash is so twentieth century. Slogan in advertising campaign for credit/debit card, 2006. The present collection covers aspects of the nexus of interconnections between the literary and the economic, which cannot be subsumed under any single heading or disciplinary category. Accordingly, we have resisted the temptation to present the essays following the chronological order of the period they bear upon, not merely because we do not pretend to offer a ‘history’ of the relations between the literary and the economic, but also, and more importantly, because we do not believe these relations follow a linear pattern. Michelet’s essay, on Old Norse sagas, for instance, speaks to Bruce’s on Timon of Athens despite the centuries separating the texts they discuss. Similarly, we have chosen not to group the essays according to thematic criteria, because however focussed the issues they address are, they all, ultimately, address each other, in a chorus (not necessarily harmonic) of exchanges that echoes, in our view, the dissonances produced by the allegiances and conflicts between fiction and economy which are far, yet, from being adequately understood. Order, however, there must be, and the one we have imposed on
14
Introduction
the essays is intended to highlight some of their interconnections by proposing, through juxtaposition, an argumentative thread leading from one to the other. Not altogether arbitrary, this imagined exchange between the essays suggests some of the ways they can be read in relation to each other. The first essay is the most wide ranging of all, summarizing and innovating on the tradition of philosophical thought on fiction and economy from Aristotle to Jean-François Lyotard. Richard Waswo’s article invites us to consider how the process of production of meaning and value are interrelated, focussing in particular on the functional nature shared, historically, by the systems of language and of money. As Waswo makes clear, it has long been recognized that both systems engender meaning and value by usage, exchange and comparison, rather than by anything intrinsic to the words or currencies they employ. Elaborating this fundamental analogy, Waswo argues that the money system bears the characteristic traits of what Wallace Stevens defined as those of the supreme fiction (‘it must be abstract’; ‘it must change’; ‘it must give pleasure’). Money is pure symbol, absolute functionality; capitalism, linked as it is to the system of money (especially in its many textual forms as credit), is for Waswo ‘the supreme fiction become dynamic, fuelled by the energy and pleasure of infinite will’. It is this compulsive play and the pleasure it affords which gives capitalism its extraordinary power to overcome all resistance, profiting from its own contradictions, its energy exponentially self-proliferating and seductive. Emblematic of these energies, for Waswo, is Jonson’s Volpone, which (like other city comedies), exposes the compulsive pleasures of playing the proto-capitalist game, delighting in the very improvizations which its author simultaneously deplores. The next essay compiles ‘raw material’ on which the relations between fiction, language and the economy developed by Waswo are exemplarily inscribed. Set at the early stages of European colonialism and of the expansion of its markets – whose importance to the instantiation of modernity is signalled, in this collection, by several other essays which take as their foci or exempla early modern texts – Bridges’s ‘Trafficking Words’ examines the bilingual lists of words and phrases that appear frequently in the travel narratives of the early modern period, most notably Hakluyt’s Principall Navigations. As Bridges argues, these lists are early examples of the commodification, and even fetishization, of language, for, detached from the narratives of discovery, adventure and trade that generate their meaning, words take on a life of their own as worthy curiosities. At the same time, the very fragmentary
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 15
form of these lists evokes ‘the rudiments of a scenario of exchange’, and more specifically, of unequal exchange, while their very lack of syntax raises questions about the social practices accompanying the ‘trafficking’. Thus, even as they offer us an insight into the ‘real and imagined exchanges of words and commodities’ that they are intended to facilitate, these word-lists also indicate that the scene of trade is always already invested with discursive fictions serving specific ideologies and interests – witness to that effect Bridges’s discussion of the particular interest naked bodies awaken, because they anticipated an as yet imaginary market for the textiles of the Old World. Bridges’s essay suggests that the rise of capitalism and its particular inflexion of language not only entails profit, but also has unsettling effects on the parties that seem to benefit from it. This is further apparent in Peter de Bolla’s essay, which discusses the conceptual and social ‘side-effects’ of what might be considered to be capitalism’s main enabling logistics, namely, the various textual forms (bonds, accounts etc.) that money can take. These forms permit, as Waswo shows in his essay, the ‘divisible multiplication of ownership into negotiable paper that constitutes and obtains credit’, but so also do they enable the discrediting practice of counterfeit. Counterfeit thus emerges as one of the main threats not only to society, but also, as de Bolla convincingly demonstrates in ‘The Stain of the Signature’, to the philosophical model that articulates its self-understanding. In particular, as de Bolla argues, counterfeit affects the notion of a person’s identity (self-identicality), which is as much certified by the credit the person undersigns, as credit is backed by the person’s signature. De Bolla’s article examines the case of the Perreau identical twin brothers, tried and hanged in the eighteenth century for forgery. Reading through the complex and various textual narratives of the Perreau affair (the police and court reports, the testimony of the two brothers, newspaper accounts and the protestation of innocence by the principal suspect in the case, Margaret Rudd), de Bolla shows how the enormous public interest in the case was generated by the strange power and magic of the signature and its relationship to paper money. For de Bolla, that relationship is radically destabilized not merely by forgery, but in this case, by the fact that the counterfeiter is not just one person, but twins. What fascinated and horrified the eighteenth-century commonweal, de Bolla argues, was the possibility of a signature being authentic in respect of not one, but two persons; and it is this challenge to the notion of the necessary singularity of authentification which, de Bolla argues, comes in this case to frame the moment at which the stain of the signature authenticates and authorises
16
Introduction
money. For de Bolla, anxiety over identity crystallizes in the need to punish those that challenge the authenticating powers of the signature. This has as a side effect the reinforcement of the belief in the voice as the expression of a single authentic self – precisely the model of identity that is not at work in an economy based on credit and reliant on writing to function properly. Shifting modes of economic organization, in short, will affect conceptions of the self, and force us to re-articulate our understanding of identity, what a person or a subject is, at the same time as they reinforce, against all pragmatics, the models that are being belied by changes. This pattern of change in conceptions of the self is also discussed in Giulia Colaizzi’s and Jenaro Talens’ essay on ‘Semiotics and Economics’, which begins with a discussion of the homology between language and the capitalist system of value that complements that undertaken by Waswo. Taking as a starting point the work of the Italian semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, the authors discuss the interrelatedness of the principles underlying Marx’s political economy and those of a semiotics of culture. They conclude that it is possible to consider medium and message as commodities, and hence to consider language as a kind of capital, while capital becomes a kind of language. Language emerges from this re-organization as a social product (because it is produced), but also as a process implying work, and as a space where commodities and messages circulate. The subject, in turn, becomes, following Rossi-Landi’s analysis, primarily a speaking subject, ‘hired in the service of the society in which he is born’, and defined by his belonging to it. We have, then, a similar turn to the voice, the fact of speaking, as the mark of subjecthood, to which is added what was, according to the authors, a still-valid conception at the time Rossi-Landi wrote, of the national rooting of individuals’ identities. Colaizzi and Talens argue, however, that in the present context of globalization, this model of the subject, tributary of the Cartesian cogito, does not hold. Thus they set out to extend RossiLandi’s insights through a discussion of Donna Haraway’s analysis of social relations and reality as an ‘integrated circuit’, taking up her proposal to consider the cyborg as an emblematic and more adequate model of identity and subjecthood for our present. The next essay also dwells on the context of globalization, but rather than arguing for new models to understand how we live in it, it addresses the ways in which the literary can assist us in the identification of, and hence in the resistance to, tensions which inhabit the dominant economy. In the new millennium, Mark Thornton Burnett
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 17
suggests, the literary can generate positions for a critical gaze to resist the apparatus of surveillance embedded in the economy, the ways in which, as it were, that dominant economy gazes at its subjects. In ‘“Parties in Converse”: Literary and Economic Dialogue in Michael Almereyda’s Hamlet’, Burnett discusses how Almereyda’s film negotiates, through signifiers of consumption and particularized forms of representation, with a world of product placement and the corporate image. Inside this system, the individual subject is discovered as displaced and disoriented, at the mercy of a late capitalist ethos, robbed of linguistic ability and integrity. But, in contradistinction to the dominance of the realm of the economic, Almereyda’s Hamlet simultaneously makes available sites of resistance, including modes of amateur filmmaking, images, snapshots and shards of memory. In particular, a reliance upon the category of the literary – which is variously and capaciously understood – allows for anticorporate positions and for a questioning of a culture of inspection and introspection, a culture systematically shaped by gazes of various kinds, from the inscrutable eye of global business to the surveillant scrutiny of the contemporary cityscape. As it explores the economic face of the millennium, Burnett argues, Almereyda’s Hamlet makes visible, and takes as a subject of enquiry, the economic practices that bring literary originals, filmic reincarnations and visual disciplines into an uneasy proximity, while it dialogizes with its future and rehearses the possibility of enduring the changes modernity has undergone. Although it bears on a completely different – albeit not altogether incomparable – historical context, Fabienne Michelet’s essay, ‘The Fabric of Society: Money, Cloth, and Symbolic Exchanges in Njals’ saga’, also considers a given textual practice as a site where the tensions of the economy can be identified. The essay explores the intricacies of the social, the symbolic and the economic fabric as it crystallizes in key moments of the narrative of Njals’ saga around pieces of cloth – cloaks, tapestries and the like. Those key moments serve to pinpoint a tension between two concurrent economies, or mediums of exchange and the systems of justice associated with each of them. As Michelet shows, textiles in the saga possess both economic value – they function as currency alongside silver – and symbolic value, the former appearing to be subordinated to the latter. Evoking the metaphor of weaving as the consolidation and narrative of social bonds, textiles refer to kinship systems of justice and to the specific obligations imposed by social bonds. These obligations and bonds are overruled, or neglected, when conflicts and grievances are arranged via monetary compensation. It is at such (but not
18
Introduction
all of these) moments, Michelet argues, that the appearance of a textile signals the resistance of the kinship system to the system of justice implied by the money-economy, in which crimes can be equated among themselves and are treated indifferently. Thus Michelet argues that with money and cloth, two different economies seem to be competing, each imagining the social relationships uniting its members in different ways. If in Burnett’s essay the literary dimension of Hamlet sets limits to the operations of the economy and provides a critical stance from which to resist it, and in Michelet’s essay, the text of textiles disrupts the monetary economy, in Susan Bruce’s we find the suggestion that the literary can be the mode in which that which exceeds, and yet pertains to, the dominant economy can find articulation. Most accounts of Timon of Athens, Bruce argues, have understood the text to communicate a conservative warning against excess, coupled with a tacit injunction to conform to the demands of the ‘commonsensical’ (or rational) economies of exchange within which we all co-exist. Yet to take seriously Timon’s assertion that ‘there’s none, / Can truly say he gives, if he receives’ is to realize that in this play, Shakespeare is raising many of the questions which have found a more extended interrogation in twentieth-century gift theory. Bruce argues that Mauss’s Essay on the Gift and Derrida’s Given Time, two of the most influential theories of the gift and its relation to the economy, share with each other an implicit or explicit negation of the possibility of generosity, writing the gift into an economy which is always already one of reciprocity. Yet, Bruce argues, almost all of us, at some point in our lives, want to give without necessary return, and this desire is neither necessarily impossible to fulfil, nor merely a wayward expression of the logic of reciprocity. Timon of Athens, according to Bruce, aesthetically deploys this desire for the possibility of a generosity untrammelled by notions of ‘return’ or ‘desert’. In so doing, the text momentarily transcends the logic of profit and of reciprocity; lodges an implicit critique of the rational, economistic world which it challenges in Timon’s counter-ethos of giving; and articulates instead a utopian desire for a society governed by considerations of the ‘general’ as well as the individual good, which we dismiss as irrational – or indeed impossible – at our peril. Roy Sellars’s essay, ‘Spend, Spend, Spend’, develops another series of transfigurations of economic categories, which in this case affect the making and unmaking of philosophical discourse and are manifest in the excessive, and contingent, activities of reading and writing. Sellars begins his essay by showing how Hegel integrates into his philosophical system the historical and economic contingencies to which his own philosophical production is subject. Mainly, as stated in one of the
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 19
philosopher’s aphorisms, money is ‘the abbreviation of all external necessity’, but as Sellars argues, it fails to account for all contingency, the unaccounted forms of which appear in Hegel’s system in the guise of waste and risk, and crystallize in the philosopher’s life in his inclination to play the lottery. Sellars shows how the figure of gambling spreads across Hegel’s philosophy, threatening the scriptural ‘I’, which is constantly at risk of being divided and lost, and more generally, the relation between particulars and universals. ‘Post-Hegelian’ philosophy, Sellars then suggests, ultimately picks up the thread of gambling and risk in Hegel’s work to attempt to resist the drive of the ‘omnivorous pseudoHegelian dialectic of globalisation’. Discussing Georges Bataille’s work, Sellars argues that the Hegelian drive of globalization (where capital has replaced spirit) easily recuperates attempts to counter it through a logic of non-production (waste, non-consumption etc.). Following Derrida’s reading of both Hegel and Bataille, Sellars argues instead that if the Hegelian dialectics that organizes both economy and thought cannot be avoided, it can be ‘imploded’, at times, by sheer repetition – an excess or waste in signifying rather than in the actual economic circuit of goods. Sellars concludes by tracing the operations of gambling and of spending in the activity of reading, which remains, for him, something which is always exorbitant in relation to any theory of it, and most importantly, a practice which can be ‘a spectacular waste of money’. The volume concludes with Bruce Bennett’s ‘Towards a General Economics of Cinema’, which, like Roy Sellars’s essay, addresses the notion of excess and of expenditure, this time in relation to contemporary ‘commercial’ cinema and to film theory. The essay takes as its primary case study James Cameron’s $200m blockbuster Titanic, a film notable for its phenomenal scale and expense as well as for its massive commercial success. But, as Bennett points out, film critics have tended to dismiss it as sentimental, nostalgic, simplistic, incoherent, anachronistic and bombastic, a rejection which is in accordance with the more general failure of film criticism to account for cinematic spectacle as anything other than a reprehensible device for audience manipulation. This, however, excludes popular cultural objects from an academic discourse of film criticism, and also it reveals a simplistic model of the spectatorial interaction with films and, more generally, the lack of a critical model capable of reconciling the economic and aesthetic functions of cinema. According to Bennett, Georges Bataille’s work on economics and excess, and in particular his formulation of the critical concept of ‘general economy’, constitutes a productive frame to elaborate such a critical model of cinema. Within this frame, the economic
20
Introduction
‘waste’ of excessive productions such as Titanic can be read as ritual spectacles, sacrifices, that reflect back unto the audience’s imaginary in much the same way as the immolation of the stolen money did unto its spectators in Piglia’s Money to Burn. For Piglia, as we noted earlier in this introduction, facts are like ‘the account of a dream’, a dream which ‘opens with an image’. Essays, perhaps, especially literary critical ones, can bear a similar analogy. The essays in this volume are clearly ‘not about money’ (Piglia), nor, we hope, will reading them be ‘a spectacular waste’ of it (Sellars). But to the extent that they interrogate, through multiple perspectives, the fictional basis of our imagined economy, and expose its rhetorical and narrative articulations, the essays in this collection sometimes gesture towards alternative economies, different dreams. In addressing the economy’s ‘supreme fictions’, we must also sometimes confront its contradictions and nightmares. And in so doing, we may begin to imagine relations whose operation – through excess, non-pertinence or sheer extravagance – is not limited to the service of profit, but open to other narratives of social intercourse. This, at least, is our desire.
Notes 1. We have used Amanda Hopkinson’s translation (Piglia 2003b) from the Spanish, Plata quemada (Piglia 2003a). On a few occasions we have adopted Valeria Wagner’s translation instead. We have clearly indicated all such amendments in notes to our text. 2. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part I. Cited in Mandel 1984, 11. 3. Hopkinson translates ‘despropósito’ (Piglia 2003a, 150) as ‘outrageous behaviour’ (which is indeed implied). ‘Nonsense’ is, however, more accurate here, for its denotation of a rejection of any system of rationality. 4. Hopkinson renders this passage as ‘a funeral pyre to our social values’ (emphasis ours). This suggests that the ashes of the burnt money perform a rite of mourning for particular, local, social values (‘ours’). The Spanish, however (‘una pila funeraria de los valores de la sociedad’ – Piglia 2003a, 151), refers rather to ‘society’ in general, and also suggests that it is those values themselves which burn in the pyre. Money is those social values; it does not merely represent or symbolize them. Quite what this ceremony mourns is thus left open: it could be society, or value or even, as the text suggests, the bodies of those society sacrifices in the name of its values. 5. As Hopkinson points out, the Italian ‘e peccato’ carries both secular and sacred connotations: it means both ‘it’s a pity’ or ‘it’s a shame’ and ‘it’s a sin’. Less immediately, perhaps, it also connotes ‘waste’. 6. It is unclear whether Piglia invents the name of the philosopher or takes up the ‘real name’ from the journals’ accounts. But it is worth noting that there are at least two famous Andrades in Brazilian literary history, both of whom are related to the ‘anthropophagist movement’, which called for the ‘ingestion’
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 21
7. 8.
9. 10.
11. 12.
13.
and the ‘digestion’ of First World culture in order to produce authentic ‘Third World’ culture: Oswald Andrade, author of an ‘Anthropophagist Manifesto’ (1928), and Mário de Andrade, author of Macunaíma (1928). Hopkinson adopts ‘valiant’ for ‘valioso’ (Piglia 2003a, 151); we consider ‘valuable’ more accurate. Witness for instance Economics as Literature – Microsoft Reader eBooks, which compiles texts by authors such as Maria Edgeworth, Harriet Martineau and Jane Marcet. See for instance Michael Watts’s The Literary Book of Economics (Watts 2003). ‘. . . je crois que la possibilité de l’argent porte en elle des effets potentiels de déconstruction. Je crois qu’il n’y aurait pas de déconstruction sans la possibilité de l’abstraction, de la neutralisation, du signe monétaire, de l’arbitraire, du langage. Ce qu’on appelle couramment déconstruction ne serait pas possible s’il n’y avait pas d’argent et de capital’; but also, if deconstruction is contingent on the presence of money and capital, so too money deconstructs itself: ‘. . . l’argent déconstruit l’argent d’une certaine manière; l’argent introduit dans la calculabilité monétaire un principe de l’ incalculabilité’ (Derrida 2004, 228). [‘. . . I think that the possibility of money bears in itself potential effects of deconstruction. I think that there would not be deconstruction without the possibility of abstraction, of neutralization, of the monetary sign, of the arbitrary, of language. What is currently called deconstruction would not be possible if there were no money and no capital’; ‘. . . money deconstructs money in a certain sense; money introduces in monetary calculability a principle of incalculability’] (our translation). See Foucault 1977. See Lawrence 1980, who argues that Simmel tends to ‘dethrone industrialisation as the determining force of modern society’ (ibid., 183), the ‘paratypical phenomenon of [his] conceptual world [being] the metropolis (Grosstadt), not the industrial corporation’ (ibid., 186). Vincent B. Leitch has a thought-provoking discussion (‘The Rise of the Lilliputians’) of the New Economic Criticism in his Theory Matters (Leitch 2003), which, unfortunately, we came upon too late to incorporate into this introduction. We thank him, nevertheless, for his collegiality in sending us, at late notice, the essay. The interventions in this volume, of course, derive from the perspective of literary (and film) scholars rather than from that of economists. But it is worth noting too that the imaginary dimension of the economy has also recently been perceived as a problem for economists, who have been accused, as Uskali Mäki points out in his introduction to Fact and Fiction in Economics. Models, Realism and Social Construction (Mäki 2002), of working with entirely fictitious models and of having lost touch with reality.
References de Andrade, Mário. 1985. Macunaíma. Trans. E. A. Goodland. London: Quartet. de Andrade, Oswald. 1972. Obras completas. In convênio com o Instituto Nacional do Livro, MEC. Vol. 6, Do Pau-Brasil à Antropofagia e às Utopias: Manifestos, teses de concursos e ensaios. Rio de Janeiro: Civilisação brasileira.
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Bacon, Francis. 2000. The Advancement of Learning. Ed. Michael Kiernan. Oxford : Clarendon. Bigelow, Gordon. 2004. Fiction, Famine and the Rise of Economics in Victorian Britain and Ireland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brantlinger, Patrick. 2001. Who Killed Shakespeare? What’s Happened to English Since the Radical Sixties. New York and London: Routledge. Capote, Truman. 1965. In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences. New York: Random House. Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1987. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge: Polity Press. Derrida, Jacques. 2004. L’esprit de l’argent. Autour des écrits de Jacques Derrida sur l’argent. In L’argent. Croyance, mesure, spéculation. Ed. Marcel Drach. 193–234. Paris: La Découverte. Foucault, Michel. 1977. What is an Author? Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. In Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. Donald F Bouchard. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Goux, Jean-Joseph. 1990. Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud. Trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Heinzelman, Kurt. 1980. The Economics of the Imagination. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Lawrence, Peter A. 1980. Radicalism and the Cash Nexus. American Journal of Sociology 86(1): 182–6. Leitch, Vincent B. 2003. Theory Matters. New York and London: Routledge. Mäki, Uskali. 2002. Fact and Fiction in Economics. Models, Realism and Social Construction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mandel, Ernest. 1984. Delightful Murder. A Social History of the Crime Story. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. McKeon, Michael. 1987. The Origins of the English Novel 1600–1740. Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press. Osteen, Mark. Ed. 2002. The Question of the Gift. London: Routledge. Piglia, Ricardo. 2003a. Money to Burn. Trans. Amanda Hopkinson. London: Granta Books. —. 2003b. Plata quemada. Buenos Aires: Seix Barral. Readings, Bill. 1996. The University in Ruins. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Shaw, George Bernard. 1950. The Irrational Knot. London: Constable. Shell, Marc. 1995. Art and Money. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. —. 1982. Money, Language and Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modern Era. Berkeley and London: University of California Press. —. 1978. The Economy of Literature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Shumar, Wesley. 1997. College for Sale. London: Falmer. Simmel, Georg. 1990. The Philosophy of Money. Ed. David Frisby, 2nd enlarged edition. Trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby from a first draft by Kaethe Mengelberg. London: Routledge. Turner, Bryan S. 1986. Simmel, rationalisation and the sociology of money. Sociological Review 34: 93–114.
Susan Bruce and Valeria Wagner 23 Watts, Michael. Ed. 2003. The Literary Book of Economics. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books. Williams, Raymond. 1973. Drama from Ibsen to Brecht. Penguin: Harmondsworth. Woodbridge, Linda. Ed. 2003. Money and the Age of Shakespeare: Essays in New Economic Criticism. Basingstoke: New York, Palgrave. Woodmansee, Martha and Osteen, Mark. Eds. 1999. The New Economic Criticism. London: Routledge.
1 Supreme Fictions: Money and Words as Commodifying Signifiers Richard Waswo
Language, as both speech and writing, and money, as both coinage and credit, each constitute highly organized and conventional systems of exchange (of goods, other currencies, information, innuendo, amusement, and any possible emotional attitude). And each system is material and symbolic at once: sounds or letters, metal or paper (and now, in both, electric impulses on a screen) – the material stuff (or energy) conveys intangible, symbolic meanings, and values, which, in turn, form conceptions of that stuff. Things that do exist can project in our imagination things that don’t – fictions, business plans, dividend estimates, moneys of account. I shall try here to elucidate the functional nature shared by these systems, and then suggest that it helps to account for the (so far) unstoppable force of capitalism, which, if we count its origins in banking, commerce, and corporate equity, seems co-extensive with modernity.1
I Let’s start with money, which has been historically somewhat less well understood than language. By the functions it performs and the way it performs them, money can create material (i.e. behavioural) forms of unity by becoming a more widely shared symbolic measure of value. Money is an undeniable fact that, I shall argue, fulfils the three main criteria – abstraction, change, and pleasure – of what Wallace Stevens adumbrates in his major poem, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. He deliberately avoided defining this fiction more specifically either in the poem or in letters and interviews, where he sometimes referred to it as a replacement for God, sometimes as an idea, like ‘heaven’, that is but an extension of reality, other times as a form of cultural production like 24
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‘poetry’ (Rehder 1988, 220–1). And of course, the standard denunciation of money, from Aristotle’s analysis (Aristotle 1947, 1.10) down to the entertaining, hostile account of it as Frozen Desire (Buchan 1997), is precisely that it substitutes itself for these worthier aims or objects: the real wealth of the householder, God, happiness, friendship, and so forth. The ease with which money can thus insinuate itself into these otherwise honorific places was identified by the great thinker who most deplored it, Karl Marx, as a consequence of just the symbolic function that money performs.
‘It must be abstract’ Like all writers on the subject from the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century, Marx worries at length over the supposedly ‘intrinsic’ value of money, its actual content of precious metal. But when he comes to consider the circulation of money as a total process of one exchange after another (C for M and M for C), it occurs to him that a fake pound does the job as well as a real one. From this he infers that even the real pound is ‘nothing more than a symbol’, which, as representative of all commodity prices, is ‘but the symbol of itself.’ That is, ‘in the act of circulation’, the material of money, ‘gold and silver, is irrelevant’ (Marx 1993, 210–1). Hence, for the purposes of circulation (i.e. exchange), money is, precisely, ‘a material symbol’, which needn’t be precious at all. Fake money will do the same job: thus ‘symbolic money can replace the real, because material money as mere medium of exchange is itself symbolic’ (ibid., 212). The next step in this chain of reasoning will not be taken until the early twentieth century, and its material proof will not occur until 1971. Marx, however, refused to generalize these observations. He remained insistent on precious metals for other monetary purposes, such as realizing prices and storing treasure; and also on regarding the various, often-enumerated functions of money – means of payment, medium of exchange, measure of value, store of wealth2 – as ‘contradictions’ (ibid., 213). But these are rather merely paradoxes, as Marx’s own analysis of the material that is itself symbolic suggests. But for Marx, the symbolism, dependent wholly on abstraction – that is, a principle tied to no particular, concrete embodiment, but capable of defining all relative quantities – was but a description of money as the ‘universal equivalent’ of everything, and hence responsible for the ease with which both money and all it buys get fetishized, usurping what are supposed to be social relations. Marx did not see that the very
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functioning of money as he himself analyzed it depended on, was itself, a form of social relation. This perception is part of the next step in the chain of reasoning about the symbolic abstraction of money taken in the second edition (1907) of Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money. Simmel begins his investigation by developing a highly original axiology, or theory of value. His first chapter presents value not as something that objects ‘have’ a priori, not any inherent quality or property, but rather something projected onto them by human communities (Simmel 1978, 60). Valuation is a psychological process that makes a ‘claim’ of significance and recognition (ibid., 68) that is intersubjective, necessarily social. The source of value (monetary, erotic, religious, and aesthetic) is neither supply and demand, which are merely its particular conditions (ibid., 72), nor ‘utility’, except insofar as this assumes ‘desire’ (ibid., 91); but rather, any kind of ‘distance’ which requires ‘sacrifice or renunciation’ to overcome and which presupposes that the object of any individual’s demand ‘is, simultaneously, the object of someone else’s demand’ (ibid., 77–8). The process of measuring and overcoming this distance is that of exchange: gain for surrender, what we must give for what we get. It is precisely in and by exchange that value is created; it’s not something that objects have prior to exchange, but rather their ability to be exchanged that constitutes their value (ibid., 86). This ability is social, requiring ‘someone else’s demand’. Value, in short, is what other people want – nothing less than collective, shared desire. For Simmel, the operation and nature of money is ‘the autonomous manifestation of the exchange relation, . . . the substance that embodies abstract economic value’ (ibid., 119). Price is the ‘degree of exchangeability’ between any one and all other commodities. As an abstract but substantivized value, money ‘expresses nothing but the relativity of things that constitute value’ (ibid., 121). In sum: the philosophical significance of money is that it represents within the practical world the most certain image and the clearest embodiment of the formula of all being, according to which things receive their meaning through each other, and have their being determined by their mutual relations. (ibid., 128–9) Money is but the supreme abstraction that measures the relative desirability of objects, thus recording both what they mean and what they are. And for money to perform what is now seen as its central function of exchange,
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‘It must change’ How money has changed over time is the basis of the careful argument of Simmel’s second chapter that logically, money need have no intrinsic value at all. Paper money requires no backing of precious metal and may be established by nothing more than governmental fiat, or may be replaced by various forms of credit (ibid., 143). Money is pure quantity symbolized, so any substance will do; gold and silver merely handy for a transitional stage: ‘money has to pass through this incarnation in order to achieve its greatest effects, and it seems unlikely that it will escape from it in the foreseeable future’ (ibid., 151). Unlikely, perhaps; but Simmel’s analysis proved prophetic and, so far as I know, unique. Money, he continues, strives to emancipate itself from the material and become pure symbol, though it hasn’t made it yet because: it is not technically feasible to accomplish what is conceptually correct, namely to transform the money function into a pure token money, and to detach it completely from every substantial value that limits the quantity of money, even though the actual development of money suggests that this will be the final outcome. (ibid., 165) And so indeed it was, in gradual stages occurring through the second half of the last century. As a child, I myself spent coins that contained at least a little shiny silver and earned bills that sometimes announced their convertibility into metal. Today, of course, our pockets and wallets contain nothing but ‘token money’ whose material (still necessary for daily transactions) bears no relation to the numbers inscribed on it, is entirely irrelevant to its value. Simmel’s logic was enacted in 1971, when President Nixon annulled the convertibility of US dollars into gold (by then only possible for central banks), and completed in 1973, when, having unpegged the dollar from gold, the USA removed it as the standard of other First-World currencies, allowing it to float as now it does. Perhaps we need reminding that these events were traumatic at the time, and remained so until recently – in the same way and for the same reason that the introduction of paper money was attended by anxiety, reluctance, and ridicule since Marco Polo first described to Europeans how it circulated in Cathay. The idea that values aren’t intrinsic or stable has never been welcome in western thought; it is remarkable that Simmel should have figured this out in 1907. But Simmel was simply able to take the long view: money, he observed, had moved from substance – at first
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in its crudest form as measured by weight – to function, and so was poised to arrive where it is today: as substanceless as electronic impulses, pure instrumentality or tool. As ‘absolute means’ (ibid., 236), money doesn’t just have a function, it is one. Or rather, several, most others being corollaries of its primary role as the ultimate facilitator. As such,
‘It must give pleasure’ Stevens, a highly sophisticated rhetorician, offers a paradox as the pleasure provided by the supreme fiction: ‘To be stripped of every fiction except one, / The fiction of an absolute –’ (Stevens 1964, vii, 18). That might describe God – or Simmel’s notion of money. In a Modernist, post-Nietzschean universe where disillusion reigns and all fictions have been seen through, there may still be – what? nostalgic comfort, poetic need? – some satisfaction in willed belief, an embrace of the unreal. In Simmel’s utterly relativist and social world, where money is naked, unmasked, and the values it records ever changing, there may still be some satisfaction in perceiving its ‘absolute’ functionality. Simmel himself drew a related analogy between God’s creation of the world and ours of money: as He allows the world to run by its own laws, so we invest objects with value, and they run according to the mechanisms of exchange and return whence they began, in the pleasure of our experience of them (Simmel 1978, 78). Toward the end of his poem, Stevens offers a further identification of pleasure: The irrational Distortion, however fragrant, however dear, That’s it: the more than rational distortion, The fiction that results from feeling. Yes, that. They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne. (Stevens 1964, x, 12) The feeling could easily be the collective desire that is value, and the resulting ‘more than rational distortion’ would be the operation of the exchange mechanism called the market, which is subject to all sorts of emotional fluctuations and to no rational reduction or understanding such as universities (or economists) might seek to formulate. The recent and epoch-making introduction (in January 2002) of the euro illustrates some of the lessons, poetic and sociological, suggested by these meditations. Going in reverse order, let’s continue considering
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pleasure – first, of a lower, far more mundane kind, described thus by Gertrude Stein: ‘But there was the pleasure of spending money and there is no doubt about it there is no pleasure like it, the sudden splendid spending of money and we spent it’ (Stein 1993, 48). And how much more splendid is it, for individual travellers, to be able to spend it in different countries without losing some of it (by having to change it) every time a border is crossed. These net individual gains in time and money realizable by a single currency depend on the very nature of money as understood by Marx and Simmel: all it has to be is spendable, that is, accepted in a community. Social assent – not any form of intrinsic, representative, or convertible value – makes money money, what one of Simmel’s commentators calls a ‘pure social mediation’ (Orléan 1992, 91). Orléan goes on to stress Simmel’s recognition that utilitarian theories of ‘instrumental rationality’ cannot account for the operation of money as a ‘social bond’ whose legitimacy is more affective, dependent on notions of trust, faith, credit, confidence, and so forth. Given these feelings, Marx’s counterfeit pound, fictional in the worst sense of fake, works just as well as the real, factual note issued by the Bank of England. Something like Stevens’s ‘pleasure’ is surely provided by the paradox that in terms of function, which are the defining terms of what money is (it is simply what it does), there is no difference between real and fake, fiction and fact. That money is constituted, not by an object, but by a ‘social bond’, the trust required to make it spendable, is apparent throughout the history of currencies and finance. Until the formation of nation-states in modernity, innumerable currencies chaotically competed and made the fortunes of merchants who understood how to manipulate them – mainly those people the English and French called ‘Lombards’ (i.e. any northern Italian banker). So great did the chaos occasionally become that merchants resorted to the creation of purely fictional (never, or no longer, coined) monies of account, in order to calculate real prices and balance their books (de Roover 1953, 78–9; Spufford 1988, 411). And after the rise of nation-states, all four major modern revolutions, according to J. K. Galbraith, were largely financed by unsecured, worthless paper notes (like Continental dollars and assignats), which their users mutually agreed to accept if only for the duration of the conflict (Galbraith 1975, 61–2). And for what became the most powerful, imperial nations, their currencies (the pound until the Great War and the dollar after it) as a result of their success became the property of everybody (much like the English language, whose grammar and usage is no longer exclusively determined by Brits or Yanks).
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There is one other pleasurable consequence of the simplest form of the affective bond: I pay you for goods or services and trust you’ll give me the correct change. That I can now do this with the same currency in Fiesole, Helsinki, Athens, and Madeira does not require me to share any cultural presupposition (except the practice of spending money) or political association or even language with the person who counts out my change. A purely instrumental politeness – expressed in smiles and gestures if words are wanting – will suffice. Nor is the transaction basely dehumanizing, for we are not engaged in a personal relationship but a social one. We spend the same money, for very similar products. This is shared, if tacit, knowledge, a broad field of common interest, a kind of community. Far from reducing the human to the status of object (fetishized or not), the act of spending money is precisely the contrary: an act so completely social that it is unique to humanity, as Sohn-Rethel noted some time ago: the ‘abstract paradox’ of money, he claimed, might define humanity better than the criteria of speech and reason, since no animal has yet been found that uses or comprehends it (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 45).
‘It must change’ Once the closely fixed exchange rates established in Bretton Woods in 1946 were abandoned by the great float in 1973 that enacted (however inadvertently) Simmel’s logic of money, all currencies have done nothing but change in relation to each other. The euro, in relation to its major and immediate rivals (dollars, yen, pounds, Swiss francs), sank slightly below its initial equivalents during the first month of its existence, but has since climbed steadily. From the January 2002 until April 2007, the euro gained about 48 per cent against the dollar, 32 per cent against the yen, 10 per cent against the pound, and 10 per cent against the franc.3
‘It must be abstract’ Since all money is a symbolic abstraction, the use of a single currency in different nations – or across large areas of space, as in America, Russia, and China – is a further abstraction, which, by the usual paradox, is also perfectly material and concrete. The abstract is an agent of unity; the concrete the guarantee of possibility. This is why the introduction of a common currency could, in defiance of all received opinion, precede the establishment of any form of common and real political power. The history of
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the EU already suggested this. The wisdom of its founders – Monnet, Schuman, and Spaak – was precisely to begin with something concrete, specific, and therefore feasible: the production of coal and steel – from there to the Common Market and thence to Euroland. If all these gradual and highly contested achievements had had to await the foundation of some single European government, nothing would have occurred. By proceeding with specific activities, much has occurred, and nothing so potentially unifying as the money that has already defined the geography of ‘Europe’ more precisely than ever before: it’s wherever euros can be spent. The power of money has been more often deplored than celebrated – as has the power of fiction. Since antiquity, the same accusations have been repeated against each: the love of money is the root of all evil; stories of sex and violence mislead youth and waste everyone else’s time. But, to adapt an excellent question from a great critic of Renaissance literature: ‘Why should fiction be potent to corrupt and powerless to edify?’ (Lewis 1954, 346). If money makes people compete with each other for its possession, why should it not also link them in tacit recognition of shared desires? By the Renaissance, Europe had learned to distinguish fiction from history on the one hand and lying on the other. But it hasn’t yet fully learned that money is the supreme fiction, enabling the community that uses it to evaluate, embody, and exchange its desires. The euro should help us figure this out.
II It is the basis of the pure functionality of money in social assent that makes it homologous to language, according to various observers since Quintilian, who wrote: ‘Custom indeed is the indisputable mistress of speaking, and language is to be employed just like currency, as having the public stamp’.4 The comparison made its way through Renaissance rhetoric to the Enlightenment, when it was echoed by the Marquis de Mirabeau and David Hume, after being repeated by John Locke: ‘For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man’s private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to’ (Locke 2002, 3.11.11). As a contemporary scholar reminds us, the same connection had been made before in one of the oldest and most versatile gods in the ancient Greek pantheon. Taking his name from a stone heap that marked distances and was associated with fertility, Hermes became the messenger of the Olympians; the god of exchange and the alphabet, of merchants, thieves,
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travellers, and gamblers; gave ‘his name to the business of interpretation’, (hermeneutics) and is ‘the mythological intersection of the central means of western socialization: writing and money’ (Lauer 1994, 43).5 The most seminal development of the homology was that of Ferdinand de Saussure, whose discussion of linguistic value (Saussure 1983, 2.4.2) makes explicit the identical way that words and coins work, being exchanged for something dissimilar (ideas or goods), and compared to something similar (other words or currencies). For Saussure, these processes establish values, determine them. He thus arrived about the same time as Simmel at the same revolutionary notion that both linguistic and monetary values – meaning and worth – are not intrinsic but differential, depending not on any fixed characteristic of the objects (the word’s referent, the coin’s content of precious metal), but on the process of exchanging and comparing them, on their relations with what is like and unlike them. Values are established in and by usage, as Quintilian declared. Custom – what Saussure called the ‘social fact’ – rules, gives the currency to both words and coins. Jean-François Lyotard made the most radical contemporary statement of the relation in a postscript to his diagnosis of postmodernity. There, he describes capitalism as ‘infinite will’, and finds it to be invading language itself, transforming it into a ‘productive commodity’ by means of computerized treatment and exchanges of ‘information’. On this basis, he offers a warning that updates the ancient homology between words and money: Under the guise of an extension of markets and a new industrial strategy, the coming century is that of the investment of the desire for infinity, according to the criterion of optimum performance, in matters of language. Language is the whole social bond (money is only an aspect of language, the accountable aspect, payment and credit, at any rate a play on differences of place or time). This investment of the desire for the infinite in language is thus going to destabilize the living creations of social life; itself. (Lyotard 1993, 27) Assuming the Saussurean description of semantics as a ‘play on differences’, Lyotard subsumes the operations of currency and credit under those of language itself, as Saussure’s ‘social fact’. Lyotard’s parenthesis thus reduces both social facts to one. We need not go quite so far in order to grasp the cogency of the traditional observation of similar or identical function between words and money. However, both the
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homology and the effects that Lyotard attributes to computerization and describes as destabilization have a rather longer history. Capitalism, according to Lyotard, consists in commodification, or the determination of values by the ‘indifferent’ mechanisms of exchange, the ‘commensurability’ of all things (Readings 1991, 102). Reflection on this process dates back to Aristotle, who certainly found it to ‘destabilize’ properly ‘social’ life. For him, exchange was legitimate only to secure the material welfare of the household (); whereas exchange for the sake of profit (i.e. commerce,) is unnatural, because things are made to be used and consumed, which fixes a limit to their acquisition (no point in buying more bread than the family can eat); and wrong, because acquiring things merely to sell them (Marx’s M-C-M) has no limit: money may be thus accumulated forever. Hence Aristotle condemns the trade of merchants, second in iniquity only to that of moneylenders: the reproduction of money by taking interest is the most ‘unnatural’, therefore immoral, activity of all (Aristotle 1947, 1.9–10). Such attitudes, formed in the largely self-sufficient economies of classical Greece, were endlessly repeated in the burgeoning commercial economies of late medieval and early modern Europe, to which they were increasingly irrelevant.6 Aristotle also noted the other ‘artificial’ feature of money: that it is merely ‘conventional . . . because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless’, thus observing the arbitrariness of the material of money and its dependence on social assent, but only further to condemn it as ‘unnatural’. Computerization merely accelerates (with unpredictable consequences) the process of making language a ‘productive commodity’ which is, according to economic historians (Spufford 1988; Day 1987), coterminous with, perhaps definitive of, capitalism itself as Lyotard regards it. For what got commodified, and monetarized, by Tuscan bankers in ways that made the commercial revolution of the thirteenthcentury possible was written text: signifiers (certificates, bills, letters) of debt, deposit, equity, and exchange. Negotiable paper, functioning as money came to provide the credit essential to long-distance exchange of cheap, bulk commodities in the specie-poor economy that Europe remained even after the influx of bullion from the western hemisphere. ‘The birth of capitalism coincides with the emergence of an organized market for short-term credit based on foreign exchange’ (Day 1987, 142). The textual commodity that began as payment orders in foreign currencies gradually became a (covert) way of making loans (at interest), via a fictitious or ‘dry’ exchange, and finally evolved into an endorsable note that constituted credit and circulated just like money. These ‘letters
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of exchange’, as they came to be called, were complex in operation – partly because cunningly devised to evade the prohibition of usury – but simple in principle: they were paper money, they generated their own market (of sale at discount) just as, by the sixteenth century, did coinages.7 As for destabilization, even more of it was observed during the late Renaissance. In the fifteenth century the word ‘commodity’ (in English and in French) began to shift from designating the useful qualities of an object (how ‘commodious’ it was) to objects produced exclusively for sale. The fact that in the mid-sixteenth century centre of mercantile finance, Lyon, there was a money market (specialists whose business was to profit from foreign exchange), was horrifying to most commentators, since what was supposed to be some fixed standard of value had itself become a commodity, whose value fluctuated in the course of trade. By early modernity not only had these forms of paper, textual credit, become commodities, but so too, in the new mass market provided by the technology of print, had fiction. Only on the scale permitted by print did linguistic products begin to generate their own market. The printing of books, or rather of sheets to be cut and sent to the binder to be sewn into whatever covers the buyer could afford, was also the first model of assembly-line production, the fabrication of objects consisting of (nearly – given the vagaries of sixteenth-century print shops and practices) identical and interchangeable parts. At the same time, perhaps the most telling example of the commodification of language in the form of fiction was occurring in the first industry of mass entertainment, the public theatres of Elizabethan and Jacobean London (industry, of course, in the new sense of manufacture, here performance, for private profit). What is more, this commodification of fiction was but the second activity to be organized as a modern corporation – a joint-stock company whose shares were themselves commodities; the first was long-distance trade and colonization. So accepting Lyotard’s description of capitalism as commodification, and tracing its origins to the written credit instruments of the late middle ages offers a newly concrete, historical illustration of the homologous signifying systems of language and money. And, considering the present economy, we also have a new suggestion of the power of capitalism thus conceived. For ‘almost anything can be turned into a commodity’, observes a financial journalist as praise for Enron’s discovery of new commodities and new markets: electric power, bandwidth, credit risk, advertising space, weather derivatives. All that could be traded would be, and Enron would get its cut (Surowiecki 2001, 39). Despite its crash, Surowiecki finds a convincing analogy between
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Enron’s ideas and those of Michael Milken (the 1980s inventor of junk bonds – which are still practiced, despite Milken’s jail sentence), which is simply the invention of new markets – for anything, including the wholly intangible factor of risk. These are but the more notorious examples of the enormous expansion of all the financial products called ‘derivatives’ during the last quarter century. Warrants, puts and calls – despite the jargon and proliferating complexities, all this paper does is to place bets on the future, promising to buy something (usually other paper) under specified conditions, within a certain range of price and date. What is at stake is just that ‘play on differences of place or time’ that Lyotard designated as the monetary aspect of language. Seen as the simple wager that it is, what is being traded in these transactions is, of course, hope. Other things, commodified even more recently, are now also traded, in what is called (and often excoriated as) ‘outsourcing.’ The (now defunct) airline Swissair was much criticized some years ago when it eliminated its accounting division, and hired a firm in Bombay to do it. According to one reporter, ‘almost twenty per cent of the jobs on Wall Street have disappeared in the last three years’, including such sophisticated services as ‘equity analysis, legal research, and accounting’ (Boo 2004, 58). Here is an initial consequence of transmitting language by computers, without which such outsourcings would be impossible. The removal of high-level jobs from the USA has become a political hot potato, in a neat backlash of globalization: only blue-collar jobs were lost when American companies exported production to wherever the price of labour was lowest and the tax breaks most favourable; but with the exportation of these services, and others in telecommunications, insurance, and stock-broking, almost no white-collar job is safe. So destabilizing is this, that the chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers was lately attacked for offering the traditional defence of outsourcing as but a perfect manifestation of the division of labour and the freedom of trade preached by Adam Smith: ‘More things are tradable than were tradable in the past and that’s a good thing’ (Cassidy 2004, 26). Whether good or not, and for whom, this defence states the fact: more things – material and/or symbolic: objects, energy, skills, services, space, hope, fictions, performances – are commodities than ever before. The ‘extension of markets’ and the multiplication of things that can be exchanged in them have been going on for over five hundred years. But there is more here, more power in the practice of late capitalism, than the unstoppable fact of commodification alone. It’s not merely that anything can be bought and sold, but rather the manner of the transaction: once the resulting ownership (equity) is divisible in negotiable
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shares (the principle of stock certificates and futures contracts that, like the old bill of exchange, can be discounted before term) – presto, another commodity, another market, is born. Corporate equity is selfpropagating: as Aristotle deplored, it has no ascertainable limit. Words signifying money (stock certificates, bonds, any tradable paper) beget words promising to signify money (futures, options), which may (I think, but my comprehension of derivatives is very defective) beget words promising to promise to signify money. In any case, it doesn’t require a new product to produce a new market; old products will do fine when differences in time, place, and outcome are played with in new ways. This is self-propagation more awesome even than that of money alone, by lending it at interest, so repugnant and denounced (even while necessarily practiced) for so long. The fundamental offence, to Aristotle, of being without limit usefully recalls the more original part of Lyotard’s description of capitalism, as ‘infinite will’. Or, more precisely, as both a ‘system’ deriving its force from ‘energy in general’, and a ‘figure’ deriving ‘its force from the Idea of infinity’ (Lyotard 1993, 26). These terms are capacious enough to suggest the abstraction, adaptability, and pleasure of Wallace Stevens’s supreme fiction. This vague analogy, or blasphemous implied comparison, of God and money is meant as neither judgmental nor provocative, merely as explanatory. What it explains is the success of capitalism, its ability to co-opt or overcome all resistance (so often observed, especially since 1991, whether in tones of despair or triumph). In the words of Lyotard’s translator, ‘capitalism does not suffer from contradictions so much as profit from them’ (ibid., xiv). Linked to the pure symbol, the absolute functionality, of money, and especially to all its textual forms (paper or electronic impulses) as credit, capitalism is the supreme fiction become dynamic, fuelled by the energy and pleasure of infinite will. Reduced to less philosophical terms, this diagnosis boils down to something already evoked: the pleasure is simply that of gambling, of ‘play’ in all senses of the word.
III Let me, to conclude, trace this diagnosis to a class of fictions – ‘plays’ – generated in the place, time, and milieu of the formation of the early modern economy: city comedies produced on London’s public stages in the first few decades of the seventeenth century.8 All share what one critic calls a ‘master-structure’ of ‘gulling’ (Leinwand 1986, 53); they’re about confidence games, and the perpetrators are the heroes. They are
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the fictional, artistic branch of another, putatively factual, genre of texts produced in the same era: the ‘rogue literature’ (Agnew 1986) or ‘conny-catching’ pamphlets that purported to expose the real con games that proliferated around the bear-baiting dens, leaping houses, taverns, fairs, and playhouses of London’s suburbs. Extra-mural London, particularly the south bank (where the Globe was after 1599), was the site for simultaneously material and symbolic, real and fictional, forms of carnival and criminality. The poet laureate of this place, who thoroughly disapproves of it, but who portrays its energies on its stages time and again, is Ben Jonson. No fewer than five comedies, including his best and most frequently performed, produced between 1606 and 1616, exhibit the genre’s ‘masterstructure’ of ‘gulling’ and present various forms of con men as protagonists (Volpone, Epicoene, The Alchemist, Bartholomew Fair, and The Devil Is an Ass). The first of these is sufficient to manifest the nascent power of capitalism as unstoppable self-propagation and the compulsive pleasures of playing the game. Volpone derives from Roman comedy satirizing social types (misers, misanthropes, climbers, and legacy-hunters), often by means of their being outwitted by a tricky slave, who manages a plot designed to get both girl and fortune for the young hero (sometimes earning thereby his own freedom). Jonson transfers the legacy-hunting plot to his own time, sets it in Venice, identifies the gulls with predatory or noxious animals, and has everyone punished at the end. From the outset, however, the noble Fox and his tricky parasite, the Fly, manage a plot of whirling complexity by promising Volpone’s estate to (thus implicitly wheedling expensive gifts from) four different people, meanwhile attempting to seduce the young wife of one of them. The villains are the sole protagonists; the virtuous are present only to be victimized, along with the gulls. Volpone’s initial address to his gold praises it with blasphemous, erotic hyperbole: Thy looks when they [poets] to Venus did ascribe, They should have given her twenty thousand Cupids; Such are thy beauties, and our loves! Dear saint, Riches, the dumb god, that giv’st all men tongues; That canst do naught, and yet mak’st men do all things; … Thou art virtue, fame, Honour, and all things else! (1.1.21f.)
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Sainthood excepted, all this might have been spoken in antiquity. But what follows is a remarkable denial of actual, contemporary ways of making money; having or spending it is nothing to Volpone: Yet I glory More in the cunning purchase of my wealth Than in the glad possession, since I gain No common way; I use no trade, no venture; I wound no earth with ploughshares; fat no beasts To feed the shambles; have no mills for iron, Oil, corn, or men, to grind ‘em into powder; I blow no subtle glass; expose no ships To threatenings of the furrow-facèd sea; I turn no moneys in the public bank; Nor usure private – (1.1.30f.) This catalogue is comprehensive and up-to-date: Volpone does not engage in commerce, investment, farming, herding, industrial manufacture (hydraulic ‘mills’ were a major technological innovation of the Middle Ages), food processing, artistic manufacture (Murano glass had been famous since the thirteenth century), shipping, banking, or money-lending. He is perfectly unproductive, and, as Mosca interrupts to emphasize, benevolent (he imprisons no one for debt), and generous – spending, as Mosca begs and receives a bit of gold, merely for his ‘pleasure’. ‘That’s it, the more than rational distortion’, as Stevens said (we’ll see shortly how compulsively it operates). This wonderful disavowal of the capitalist objective (rational utility, profit-making) is at the same time a revelation of the capitalist motive. Volpone’s pleasure is not having, but getting: ‘cunning purchase’. It’s the game, the process, that excites. Volpone is the first in a long line of capitalist figures in fact and fiction who, when asked why, when they’re already so rich, they keep on dealing, reply: ‘money’s just the way we keep score’. It’s playing and winning the game (not amassing superfluous wealth) that’s fun. Here in the play’s first scene Volpone dedicates himself to pleasure – Call forth my dwarf, my eunuch, and my fool, And let ‘em make me sport. What should I do, But cocker up my genius and live free To all delights my fortune calls me to? (1.1.70f.)
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– and explains how he gets it, by flattering the greed of those who would become his sole heir, furthering their competition, letting them: Contend in gifts, as they would seem, in love. All which I suffer, playing with their hopes, And am content to coin ‘em into profit, And look upon their kindness, and take more, And look on that; still bearing them in hand [assuring them falsely], Letting the cherry knock against their lips, And draw it by their mouths, and back again. (1.1.84f.) This is a game of tantalizing, which has no structural limit; it’s indeed a form of Lyotard’s ‘infinite will’. The next scene begins the hilarious merry-go-round of improvised impositions on the gulls, with Volpone first feigning terminal illness; then in act two disguising himself as a mountebank selling a cure-all elixir. This is carnivalesque metadrama, the staging of a play consisting of staged deceptions of most of the characters, fiction about the production of fictions, the two producers reassuring each other throughout on the quality of their disguises and performance. Mosca asks for the good actor’s reward: ‘And, as I prosper, so applaud my art’ (2.4.38) and begins the third act with a soliloquy of self-congratulation: I fear I shall begin to grow in love With my dear self, and my most prosperous parts, They do so spring and burgeon; I can feel A whimsy i’ my blood: I know not how, Success hath made me wanton. I could skip Out of my skin now, like a subtle snake, I am so limber. (3.1.1f.) All the improvised impositions culminate in the trial of the fourth act, wherein two gulls aid the heroes to invert the course of justice: the innocent young couple are found guilty of the con-men’s own attempted debaucheries. Volpone and Mosca begin act five with an antiphonal litany of gloating: ‘How now, sir? . . . / Are we recovered? . . . / Is our trade free, once more?’ To which Volpone replies, ‘Exquisite Mosca!’ but offers no further praise, prompting Mosca to initiate this exchange: You were not taken with it enough, methinks? Vol. Oh, more than if I had enjoyed the wench;
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The pleasure of all womankind’s not like it. Mos. Why, now you speak, sir. We must here be fixed; Here we must rest; this is our masterpiece: We cannot think to go beyond this. Vol. True, Thou’st played thy prize, my precious Mosca. (5.2.4 f.) They recapitulate their accomplishment: gulling the court, convicting the innocent, marvelling at the credulity of the gulls. Mosca finds their profession more profitable than commerce or landowning: Merchants may talk of trade, and your great signiors Of land that yields well; but if Italy Have any glebe more fruitful than these fellows, I am deceived. (5.2.29 f.) Further appreciation of the lawyer’s performance and hypocrisy leads Volpone to sudden inspiration: ‘I will begin e’en now to vex ‘em all: / This very instant’ (56). He instructs the dwarf and eunuch to announce his death from ‘the grief / Of this late slander’ (62). Mosca’s astonishment is dissipated by Volpone’s invoking the instant arrival of all four gulls: To peck for carrion, my she-wolf and all, Greedy, and full of expectation – Mos. And then to have it ravished from their mouths? (66) Mosca recognizes the game of tantalizing raised to a higher pitch, as Volpone elaborates his inspiration: Mosca will pretend to be sole heir and Volpone will watch from concealment his arrogant treatment of the gulls – ‘a rare meal of laughter’ (87). And so it proves for the rest of the play, as this scheme is enacted more furiously than ever. Not content with witnessing the gulls’ discomfiture, Volpone disguises himself as bailiff further to torment them, especially the lawyer, which stings him into recanting before the court. The upshot is that after Mosca tries to keep Volpone’s fortune by maintaining the fiction of his death, the Fox must ‘uncase’ (5.12.85) and be sentenced to lose it all anyway, though with the satisfaction that Mosca
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is made a galley slave for life. When Volpone first gets the bad news that the lawyer is recanting, he summarizes the situation thus: To make a snare for mine own neck! and run My head into it, wilfully! with laughter! When I had newly ‘scaped, was free and clear! Out of mere wantonness! (5.11.1 f.) But there’s nothing ‘mere’ about ‘wantonness’: this pleasure is compulsive, irresistible, better than sex, a kind of Schadenfreude. These latter two qualities raise fascinating connections necessarily excluded from this essay, but the first two capture the exponentially self-proliferating energy of capitalism. Volpone and Mosca just can’t stop, even when they agree to. No authority in their society can make them stop; they have hoodwinked the law court, and nearly prevail over it again. They’re stopped only by themselves; they go too far, outsmarting each other. Only they make possible their punishment. Enron and Drexel (Milken’s investment bank) also went too far, and only then got punished. But their business practices still flourish. It’s not just individuals (or single corporations), but the whole capitalist economy cannot stop either. As we so often hear, productivity must always increase; if there’s no growth, there’s stagnation. The economy is the only thing in nature in which limitless growth is health – in everything else, it’s cancer. And it is also, like the markets that compose it, ‘not rational’, in the words of a Swiss banker who ought to know (Galliker 1988, 11). Volpone and Mosca enjoy mocking the gulls for not having the sense to see the obvious, being blinded by hope. But they themselves are equally blinded by ‘wantonness’, and no matter how cleverly they plan, nothing goes quite according to their calculation. Their real intelligence lies in spur-of-the-moment improvisation – and this is also the appeal and brilliance of the play itself. Not that they spend much time calculating, anyway: there’s no announcement, let alone deliberation, of Volpone’s final scheme; he just does it, and then works out the details with the enthusiastic participation of Mosca, who’s just rationally suggested resting. But the show must go on (until it gets dark); the economy must expand (though it often contracts); pleasure must be sought (though it become its opposite). And some writers, like Jonson, must compulsively repeat what they disapprove of, joyously dramatizing at length the operation of energies that must be punished at the end.
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Taking Volpone as emblematic of capitalism’s energies allows us to see how they reside, at least in part, in the functional nature of the supreme fictions of money and words. Capitalism is not only the ownership of the means of production; nor motivated only by greed. It is rather the (endlessly?) divisible multiplication of ownership into negotiable paper that constitutes and obtains credit, the equivalent of money. As social creations, both language and money can be socially changed – but ‘social facts’ like these are collective and historical in ways that no conscious, rational program (an academy to regulate linguistic usage, a political revolution) can control. Marx wanted, famously, to understand the world in order to change it. Perhaps, if we understand it differently, we may see how it might be changed. At least we’ll have a better idea of what we’re up against. The challenge would be to find a way to replace (the patent inequalities and injustices of) capitalism with a system that would also harness the energies of supreme fictions, that would be as generalizable (abstract), as adaptable (changeable), and as much fun.
Notes 1. Parts of this essay consist of shreds and patches torn from two earlier articles noted in the references, ‘Shakespeare and the Formation of the Modern Economy’ (Waswo 1996a) and ‘The Fact (and Figures) of the Supreme Fiction’ (Waswo 2003). 2. One of the latest mathematical modelling theorists gives variants of these: ‘1) numéraire, 2) means of exchange, 3) store of value, 4) source of liquidity’, with the useful remark that the first two are usually combined and do not require to be the third (Shubik 1999, 365). 3. These, and many other, rates are kept track of at: www.ecb.int/stats/eurofxref 4. ‘Consuetudo vero certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone ut nummo, cui publica forma est’ (Institutio Oratoria 1.6.3). 5. Of other contemporary observers of these connections, the widest-ranging (and the farthest fetched) is Jean-Joseph Goux (1990); the most intelligent are Marc Shell (1978 and 1982) and Kurt Heinzelman (1980). The first chapter of Florian Coulmas (1992) surveys the homology from Locke to Simmel and Saussure. Two recent books both confirm and extend the sketch offered here: Mark C. Taylor, Confidence Games (2004), Jochen Hörisch, Heads or Tails: The Poetics of Money (2000). For a demonstration that capital itself is constituted in and by the symbolic, see Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital (2000). 6. See Waswo 1996b, 404–11. 7. See, The best explanation and still standard history of their operation is de Roover 1953. 8. See Gibbons 1968, and Waswo 2004.
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References Agnew, Jean-Christophe. 1986. Worlds Apart: The Market and the Theatre in Anglo-American Thought, 1550–1750. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle. 1947. Politics. In Introduction to Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, trans. B. Jowett. New York: Modern Library. Boo, Katherine. 2004. The Best Job in Town. The New Yorker, July 5, 56–69. Buchan, James. 1997. Frozen Desire: An Inquiry into the Meaning of Money. London: Picador. Cassidy, John. 2004. Winners and Losers. The New Yorker, August 2, 26–30. Coulmas, Florian. 1992. Language and Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. Day, John. 1987. The Medieval Market Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. de Roover, Raymond. 1953. L’Evolution de la Lettre de Change XIVème-XVIIIème siécles. Paris: Armand Colin. De Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books. Galbraith, J. K. 1975. Money: Whence it Came, Where it Went. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Galliker, Franz. 1988. The Banking Business after the Crash. Switzerland: Swiss Bank Corporation. Gibbons, Brian. 1968. Jacobean City Comedy: A Study of Satiric Plays by Jonson, Marston, and Middleton. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. Goux, Jean-Joseph. 1990. Symbolic Economies: After Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Heinzelman, Kurt. 1980. The Economics of the Imagination. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Hörisch, Jochen. 2000. Heads or Tails: The Poetics of Money, trans. Amy Horning Marschall. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Jonson, Ben. 1985. Volpone. In Ben Jonson (The Oxford Authors), ed. Ian Donaldson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lauer, Erik. 1994. Literarischer Monetarismus: Studien zur Homologie von Sinn und Geld. St. Ingbert: Röhrig University Press. Leinwand, Theodore B. 1986. The City Staged: Jacobean Comedy, 1603–1613. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Lewis, C.S. 1954. English Literature in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Locke, John. 2002. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. http://www. szymona.net/philosophy/texts/locke/understanding/book3/ch11.html Lyotard, Jean-François. 1993. Political Writings. Trans. Bill Readings and Kevin P Geiman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Marx, Karl. 1993. Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Orléan, André. 1992. La Monnaie comme lien social. Genèses, 8: 86–107. Quintilian. 1920. Instituto Oraria, ed. and trans. H. E. Butler. Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann. Rehder, Robert. 1988. The Poetry of Wallace Stevens. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Readings, Bill. 1991. Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics. London: Routledge. Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1983. Course in General Linguistics, eds. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, Albert Riedlinger, trans. Roy Harris. London: Duckworth. Shell, Marc. 1978. The Economy of Literature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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—. 1982. Money, Language, and Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modern Era. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shubik, Martin. 1999. The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Vol. I. Boston: MIT Press. Simmel, Georg. 1978. The Philosophy of Money, trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sohn-Rethel, Alfred. 1978. Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Episte- mology. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Spufford, Peter. 1988. Money and its Use in Medieval Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stein, Gertrude. 1993. Everybody’s Autobiography. Cambridge: Exact Change. Stevens, Wallace. 1964. Collected Poems. New York: Knopf. Surowiecki, James. 2001. Drexel 2.0. The New Yorker, December 17, 39. Taylor, Mark C. 2004. Confidence Games: Money and Markets in a World without Redemption. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Waswo, Richard. 1996a. Shakespeare and the Formation of the Modern Economy. Surfaces 6, www.pum.umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol6/waswo —. 1996b. Shifting Values: Words, Money, and Credit in the Sixteenth Century. In Italy and Europe in Renaissance Linguistics, ed. Mirko Tavoni, II: 401–13. Ferrara: Panini. —. 2003. The Fact (and Figures) of the Supreme Fiction. In Images and Myths of Europe, ed. Luisa Passerini, 147–57. Bruxelles: Peter Lang. —. 2004. Crises of Credit: Monetary and Erotic Economies in the Jacobean Theatre. In Plotting Early Modern London, eds. Dieter Mehl, Angela Stock, and Anne-Julia Zwierlein, 55–73. Aldershot: Ashgate.
2 Trafficking Words Margaret Bridges
As recently as 1977, British Airways published a tiny French phrasebook ‘for visitors to Belgium, France and Switzerland’. The editor’s foreword is explicit about the purpose of its ‘carefully compiled’ lists, which should provide ‘the tourist and businessman [sic]’ with ‘the appropriate phrase for every situation’ (Harvard 1977, v). Needless to say, its bilingual lists of commodities and ‘useful phrases’ speak volumes about the commercial activity in which non-francophone British travellers were expected to engage. Items of clothing, fabrics and haberdashery not only construct a scenario in which the visitor desires to acquire ‘nylon stockings, gloves, scarf’ (des bas de nylon, des gants, un foulard) but also imply that this acquisition is negotiated in terms of linguistic politeness: ‘may I try this on?’ (puis-je l’essayer?) They moreover assume that the buyer is in a position to determine which commodity is desirable – ‘have you anything more sophisticated, more floral toned?’ (avez-vous quelque chose de plus raffiné, d’un ton plus naturel?) – and to state, politely of course, the amount of money he or she is prepared to spend: ‘This is too dear. Have you anything cheaper?’ (C’est trop cher. N’avez-vous rien de meilleur marché?) The ‘visitor’ is constructed here as being in control of the fictional exchange, and in spite of the four centuries separating them, this is just one feature that the late twentieth-century tourists’ lexicon shares with its precursors: the word lists of early modern travel writings which I want to examine in this essay. Although these are less explicit about the purposes they were made to serve, they too yield information about the economic fictions attending the nascent ideology of ‘traffiquing’. Virtually devoid both of syntax and of context, these word lists resist interpretation by virtue of their typology. Yet the emergent text type of 45
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the foreign word or phrase list can also be inscribed in a history that is at once economic and literary. The rudimentary texts, or text fragments, that I interrogate here are part of the long literary and linguistic history of European trade with natives of those territories which hover between the uncertainly charted space of travellers’ reports and the fictive space of imaginary geography. One of the earliest chapters in that history is found in book four of Herodotus’s Histories. Here the Carthaginians’ report of their trade ‘with a race of men who live in part of Libya, beyond the Pillars of Hercules’ involves a silent scenario on a beach, on which the Carthaginians place their wares, but are not themselves present when the natives ‘place on the ground a certain quantity of gold in exchange for the goods’. Both parties have to be satisfied that the exchange is fair before it can be concluded, but in this utopian scene there is no need for language, no opportunity for bargaining or dispute. The fairness of the exchange seems guaranteed by the linguistic vacuum in which it takes place: ‘There is perfect honesty on both sides’, Herodotus admiringly relates, for ‘the Carthaginians never touch the gold until it equals in value what they have offered for sale, and the natives never touch the goods until the gold has been taken away’.1 The culture that designated speakers of a language other than its own as ‘barbarians’ could also imagine them as perfect trading partners operating with shared ideals of ‘fairness’ or ‘honesty’. A much later episode in the literary history of trade, promoting and reflecting the discovery and colonization of New Spain, Antarctic France, New France, and so forth, was to be marked by the representation of linguistic problems encountered by Europeans in their attempts to negotiate grossly unfair conditions of exchange. These problems – such as the process by which natives speaking languages ‘neither known nor understood of any’ were kidnapped as potential translators – have been admirably and repeatedly studied (see for example Greenblatt 1991, 1992). But Elizabethan and Jacobean travel narratives of early modern England, premised on the Portuguese, Spanish and French literature of discovery (see Hart 2001), have their own particular contribution to make to the literary and linguistic history of trade. That contribution is only just beginning to be studied by a handful of scholars working on Richard Hakluyt’s Principall Navigations, and its continuation, Hakluytus Posthumus, by the aptly named clergyman Samuel Purchas in 1625. As indicated by the addition of the word ‘traffiques’ to the title page of the second (1599) edition of the Principall Navigations, Hakluyt’s collation of texts (which includes diplomatic documents, logbooks, medieval and contemporary travel narratives) unabashedly serves the interests of
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national trade and traffic. Although the history of that word in its various grammatical forms suggests that it does not take long after its first attested use (1506) for negative connotations to appear,2 there is every reason to believe that in the works under scrutiny here ‘traffiquing’ evoked an ideal proudly to be pursued. This is nowhere more apparent than in Purchas’s work, where we find one of the more winning formulations of the conviction that commerce and traffiquing are divinely ordained human activities, as anyone who can read the semiotic system informing God’s Book of Nature ought to know: God hath therefore encompassed the Earth with the Sea [. . .] adding so many inlets, bayes, havens and other naturall inducements and opportunities to invite men to this mutuall commerce. Therefore hath he also diversified the Windes, which in their shifting quarrels conspire to humaine trafficke. (Purchas 1905–7, 1: 11) More encompassed with sea than most stretches of earth, this blessed isle called England is perhaps better predisposed to commerce and trafficking than its European rivals. Be that as it may, sixteenth-century merchants returned from their expeditions not just with exotic and precious merchandise, but also with specimens of strange language. These reached English ports not just in the outlandish form of kidnapped natives, but also in the less spectacular form of lists of foreign words and phrases, which have received scarce critical attention, perhaps because of their apparent inability to tell a tale: some editions of the Principall Navigations (such as Beeching’s for Penguin) Hakluyt (1972) simply elide these lists, and such attention as they have received is largely from linguists seeking to map, say, early West-African languages (see for instance Hair 1970; Dalby and Hair 1967). These non-narrative text-fragments belong to what Frank Lestringant (1999) has called the ‘inventaire’ (itemizing the contents of the newly discovered territory while divorcing them from their narrative context) as opposed to the ‘aventure’ (narrativizing the voyages). Lestringant’s dichotomy, in fact, seems to be anticipated in the Principall Navigations, where the Table of Contents indicates Hakluyt’s own sense that his compilation comprises two fundamental text types: ‘The Voyages ...’ and ‘The Ambassages, letters, Privileges, and other necessarie matters of circumstance appertaining to the voyages ...’. Two distinct types of word or phrase lists inform this emergent national discourse of traffiquing and trading. The first is constituted by monolingual lists of commodities, objects potentially or really exchanged; the items in
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these inventories are attributed to clearly identified owners, donors or recipients and serve an explicitly articulated economic principle. Together they constitute a heterogeneous set of texts, ranging from lists of diplomatic gifts exchanged between rulers through ambassadors to versified enumerations of exported commodities (as in the fifteenth-century Libelle of Englyshe Polycye).3 The bilingual lists of words or phrases are sometimes introduced as anthropological curiosities, though more often for their usefulness to the future merchant-traveller. This text type is both more comprehensive and more elusive than that of the monolingual inventories. Its lexicon may include local commodities for export or consumption in situ, but the rudiments of a scenario of exchange, or traffique, are conveyed without syntax, potentially confusing speaker and addressee, donor and recipient, subject and object. Both text types are informed by the contradictory objectives of maintaining and erasing cultural difference, and both embody the fantasy that the culture that possessed writing could accurately present to itself and manipulate the culture without writing (Greenblatt 1991, 9–12). It is the second text type, the list of ‘foreign words and phrases’, that I interrogate here for what it might tell us of real and imagined exchanges of words and commodities in that space on the threshold of the unknown/always already known.
The word lists in Hakluyt’s Principall Navigations In the most recent complete edition of the Principall Navigations4 there are nine such typographically distinct sequences of words and phrases set off from the main body of text as a mark of alterity. That applies both to their typographical arrangement in columns5 and to the fact that the foreign lexical items are italicized, or otherwise distinguished from the Gothic fount of the main body of the narrative. Like the Hebrew, Arabic and other ‘exotic’ alphabets found in many versions of Mandeville’s Travels,6 these lists are in and of themselves ‘maps of difference’. The activities of glossing and translating can of course be seen as a form of cultural dispossession, as can the process of anthologizing, with its levelling of difference. The following nine Elizabethan and pre-Elizabethan word lists were incorporated in the second edition of the Principall Navigations. Two of them add the insult of theft (from a rival colonizing nation) to the injury of dispossession, for two French word lists brought back by Jacques Cartier from New France in the 1530s were translated into English in 1580 by John Florio with Hakluyt’s aid. The first of these, consisting of
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57 items of ‘the language that is spoken in the Land newly discovered’, contains a number of blanks (marked by an extended dash) where the scribe apparently expected to record, but was unable to do so, the native words for ‘God’, ‘the Day’, ‘Flesh’ and a ‘Bow’. These blanks might reflect European expectations that the natives are without ‘proper’ language. Three of these blanks are filled, and the fourth (for ‘the Day’) elided, in the later, longer list (111 items) brought back in 1536 from the kingdoms of Hochelaga and Canada (‘of us called New France’). The language now captured in neat columns and boxes seems better to reflect the worldorder its transcriber perceived. The earliest of the ‘English’ word lists were brought back by the merchant William Towerson from his first (1555–6) trading venture along the Guinea coast: eleven ‘words of speach’ record the language of a ‘wilde and idle’ people dwelling by the St Vincent river, while eight specimens of the language of Don John’s town follow Towerson’s report of trade with an informant, a former captive, who ‘could speake a little Portuguise’ (Hakluyt 1927, 4: 85). These two vocabularies have been associated with the Guinea dialects of Vai and Twi, respectively (see Hakluyt 1965, 967). And at about the time that Towerson was bringing gold and words back from his third voyage to Guinea (1557), Stephen Burrough brought back to England news of the loss of the North-East bound Bona Confidentia (which Burrough had been sent to seek) and 95 items of a language he identified as that of the ‘Lappians’, with whom he was apparently able to communicate because ‘some of them could speake the Russe tongue’ (Hakluyt 1927, 1: 372). Most of the words in this vocabulary have been associated with two dialects of the Kola-Lapp languages: Kildin and Ter (see Hakluyt 1589, Index 968). Captain Martin Frobisher, best known for having brought back, from his search for a North-West Passage to the riches of Cathay, gold-that-was-none, and for the dubious distinction of having kidnapped a savage ‘whose language was neyther knowne nor understoode of anye’ (Beste 1578, 74), also reached the port of Harwich in 1576 with 17 items of the language of Meta Incognita, recorded, like the rest of the narrative of his first voyage, by a certain Cristopher Hall, master of The Gabriel.7 Linguists have associated this lexis with four present-day Eskimo dialects: Caribou, Cumberland Sound, Labrador and West Greenland (Hakluyt 1589, Index 968). Some ten years after the ‘accidents unlooked for’ that had marked Frobisher’s voyages, John Davis resumed the attempt to discover a new North-West passage to Cathay. A word list obtained from an unidentifiable group of ‘theevish miscreants’, of ‘vile’ but ‘simple’ nature, encountered
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by Davis during his second voyage in 1586, yields 40 lexical items. These presumably reflect the course of an acquaintance that oscillated between ‘courtesie’ and animosity and that involved numerous occasions for barter and exchange. The narrator mentions that the English acquired red and black copper from these people, but the list contains no word for any metal except iron (‘Aoh’), which ‘they could in no wise forebeare stealing’ from the English.8 The introduction to this word list suggests a parallel between the appropriation of metal and language, which emerges from the depths of the throat as ore emerges from the depths of the earth: ‘We had among them copper oare, black copper and red copper: they pronounce their language very hollow, and deep in the throat: these words following we learned from them’ (Hakluyt 1927, 5, 296). Only a handful of these lexical items have confidently been linked with present-day Eskimo dialects (Hakluyt 1589, Index 967). The remaining two lists in Hakluyt are associated with texts that show how inferior were the rewards of barter and trade to the spectacular gains to be had from robbing the Spanish ships and raiding their not-so-strong holds in the colonies. During the 3-year circumnavigation of Sir Francis Drake (1577–80), thirteen Spanish ships moored off the coast of Chile, and another in the bay of San Francisco, afforded the English more ready wealth than did his prospecting of the Moluccas and of Java. Of all the peoples visited by Drake, only the population of Java yielded a list of its six ‘Kings or Princes’ (‘Rajas’) as well as of ‘certaine wordes’ – thirty two, to be precise – of their ‘naturall language, as learned and observed by [his] men’ (Hakluyt 1927, 8: 74).9 Finally, when the dashing Robert Dudley junior returned from Trinidad in 1595, he wrote a contribution to the second edition of the Principall Navigations at Hakluyt’s request (Quinn 1974, 449). The word list appended to Dudley’s first-person narrative itemizes 67 ‘wordes of the language of Trinidad which I obserued at my being there’. As with the other lists, only a few of these items arranged in double columns are found emplotted in the preceding adventure, a narrative containing propagandistic descriptions of an island of plenty – except gold. Intelligence of the ‘fine shaped and gentle’ natives and their language was the only booty Dudley earned on a journey marked by singular failures: to acquire the gold he had sent fourteen of his men to fetch from the empire of Guyana, to meet up with Sir Walter Raleigh, to sell the ‘prize’ taken north of Grenada, to plunder the nine Spanish ships, which were sunk and lost. A Spanish-speaking Indian is mentioned in connexion with the information he provides about the great wealth of gold to be had on the mainland of Guyana, opposite Trinidad: the ‘private interpreter’,
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‘Balthazar my Indian’, as Dudley calls him, finally runs away, leaving the men without gold and without provisions (Hakluyt 1927, 7: 164–70). But whereas the riches promised by the native interpreter remain unverifiable, the lesser commodities evoked in the English gentleman’s word list take on their own value for having been personally observed and symbolically appropriated. What follows is neither a systematic linguistic or cultural analysis of these word lists, nor an attempt to detect their ordering principles. I focus instead on some of the features that the lists have in common, and speculate on ways in which these common features may reflect the various forms of fictive or real traffiquing in which English travellers and their ‘strange’ interlocutors engaged.
Numbers The liminary tags afforded by the report of Cartier’s second expedition highlight some of the most common features of this text type. There we see that numbers occupy a prominent place, as though they were of a different order, over and above language: ‘Here followeth the language of the country and kingdoms of Hochelaga and Canada, of us called New France. But first the names of their numbers’ (Hakluyt 1927, 9: 438). The numbers one to ten follow, glossed by Arabic numerals rather than the corresponding English words. In view of the indisputable usefulness of numbers in trading situations, it is perhaps surprising that they are only present in three of the nine word lists. In addition to this list by Cartier, there is one by Burrough, postfixed to his list of ‘Lappian’. Drake’s Javanese word list on the other hand incorporates words for ten and for twenty. Not only, then, was the positioning of numbers variable, but their very inclusion in the word lists would not seem to have been a prerequisite of the ‘genre’, in spite of the precedent set by Andrew Boorde’s 1542 Fyrst Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge. Words for numbers there had systematically preceded glossed phrases of imaginary dialogues between Englishmen and natives of the (European) country to whose geography, customs, money and language the reader was introduced.10 In the Hakluytian word lists we are as likely to find, instead of numbers, expressions like ‘much’ or ‘enough’, which bring in the notion of quantity assessment by a controlling subject: the narratives reporting trade similarly alternate between numeric representation of exchanged merchandise and adjectives or adverbs assessing the (un)fairness of the exchange. Frobisher’s lexicon from Meta Incognita contains neither words for numbers nor quantitative adverbs. It does, however, list
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five different words for the five fingers of the hand (in addition to words for other parts of the body).
The body and its parts The possibility that the fingers were associated with the activity of counting comes to mind in connection with narratives like Jean de Léry’s 1578 Histoire d’un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil. Chapter 22 cites the Tupi words for the numbers one to five within a bilingual imaginary dialogue not between two traders engaged in exchange, but between a newly disembarked Frenchman and two ‘sauvages’. When the Tupi asks the Frenchman how many pieces of luggage he has with him, the latter is taught (by an intrusive author) to reply, as the case may require, by the word for one, two, three, four or five; the traveller is advised, should he have more than five pieces of luggage, to count them on his own fingers and on the fingers of those standing near him (de Léry 1994, 481). Léry’s colloquy comprises both a lexicon and a grammar: the conversation between the Tupi and the Frenchman is followed by a list of the parts not of the body and its organs, visible and invisible, but of the first-person singular’s body and soul (Che-eneg ‘mon âme ou ma pensée’; che-enc gouere ‘mon âme après qu’elle est sortie de mon corps’). This in turn is followed by the untranslated Tupi words for those parts of the body ‘qui ne sont honnestes à nommer’, that is, the male and female genitals (ibid., 495).11 The body of this Tupi colloquy, unlike that of the Hakluytian vocabularies, exists as whole. Strangely, there seems to be no word for the body as such in any of the nine word lists under scrutiny, although its itemized parts occur fairly regularly and the gendered, socialized body (‘man’/‘woman’/‘boy’/‘wench’/‘daughter’, etc.) is also a frequent feature. Cartier’s 1535 listing of native words for numbers is, like de Léry’s, followed by ‘the names of the chiefest partes of man, and other words necessary to be knowen’ (Hakluyt 1927, 9: 438). The chiefest parts of man itemize twenty-four parts of the body from the head to the feet. The resulting top-heavy, grotesque body has ten visible features associated with the head, from which the nose is missing – a nose which is present in the other emblazoned bodies of the word lists.12 The blazon here as elsewhere culminates in the naming of the male and female genitals. There are a lot of questions that need to be asked of this and of other features of these grotesque and minimalist versions of the emblazoned body which deploy none of the metaphors, similes and comparisons that we associate with our favourite early modern representations of the
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body as territory, ‘an (as yet) undiscovered country [. . .] which demanded from its explorers skills [that] seemed analogous to those displayed by the heroic voyagers across the terrestrial globe’ (Sawday 1995, 23). We are familiar with the Elizabethan courtier’s and the Caroline anatomist’s dissection of the body and with its reconstruction as ‘a fantasy of male consumption and pleasure’ on the one hand, and as ‘fantasy object of knowledge from which flowed control and mastery’ on the other (Sawday 1995, 211). We now need to interrogate the dissective gaze of the traveller compiling his beginner’s lexicon, and to ask ourselves what fantasy its rearticulated body obeys. Given one explicit purpose of these lists – to initiate future travellers to the language of those distant peoples with whom they engage in trade (see Burrough in Hakluyt 1927, I: 372) – a more pragmatic reflection on the role played by the body in language acquisition situations may be appropriate.
Clothing as commodity The travellers’ lexical blazons cannot but remind us of the languagelearning problems of Princess Catherine of France in Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth in a scene which was italicized throughout in the Folio edition. The francophone Lady13 learns from her nurse the words for de hand, de fingres, de nails, de arm, de elbow, de nick, de chin, de foot and de coun – for the gown, an item of clothing which also follows the enumeration of body parts in Cartier’s list of ‘words necessary to be knowen’. Catherine’s horrified refusal to pronounce in public these words ‘corruptibles, gros et impudiques’ is prompted by their phonological resemblance with a six-lettered word (foutre) and a three-lettered one (con) that were the stuff of French farces and fabliaux – as indeed were the ladies’ horrified refusals to pronounce them. The last word learned in the course of this language lesson, then, collapses the distinction between the body and its extension, the clothes through which it is both perceived and with which it is (here comically) identified. It is intriguing to speculate on the nature of the relationship between the language lessons of travel literature, of Elizabethan drama and of the classroom, but a vast corpus of sixteenth-century classroom materials still awaits further scrutiny before such a question can seriously be addressed. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to surmise that the body and its parts – like numbers – enjoyed something of the status of a cultural universal, as opposed to the items of clothing, whose cultural variability was abundantly underscored both in travel literature and in social satire.
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The question of whose language these vocabularies really represent – as opposed to purport to represent – would therefore seem to be a simple matter when we consider items of clothing rather than body parts. The latter must have been common to speakers of both languages represented in the glossed vocabularies, even though the writings of Pliny and Mandeville may have suggested otherwise.14 By contrast ‘the doublet’ is no more likely to have been an autochthonous item of clothing than ‘grapes’ can have been widespread in Cartier’s Canada, and yet there are words in his 1535 vocabulary for both. It would be naive to assume that the vocabularies are reliable anthropological informants, capable of representing indigenous cultures. The presence in the lists of words for items foreign to the cultures in question may darkly mirror traffiquing and its attendant mirages. For items of clothing and the materials from which they were made, in the word lists from New France, Lapland and sundry Northern islands (where they most abound),15 reflect not only what the traveller might have observed the natives wear and name, but also the adventurers’ hopes of finding a vent – or outlet – for national products, especially wool. The absence of words for clothing in Dudley’s Trinidadian lexicon implies a naked native body adorned only with a bracelet (techir). This extensive list juxtaposes words for desirable local commodities – silver, copper, iron or steel, and the (problematically glossed)16 word for gold – with words for the vegetables, fish and bread that would have sustained the company during their presence on board ship. Within an emergent mercantile system that has been analysed in terms of promotional literature’s fundamental linkage of economics and the environment, these two categories of terms identify the natural commodities that constitute new sources of input (Sweet 1999, 402–3). The list also suggests that Trinidad’s environment is one of plenitude, contrasting with earlier Humanist fantasies of colonizing void and vacant land. From the perspective of English traffiquing, the indigenous inhabitants are regarded less as people to be conquered than as prospective trading partners – no matter how unequal the exchange (Sweet 1999, 405). Dudley’s list therefore unsurprisingly yields terms for the trifles that served the Englishmen as local currency: glass, buttons, beads and bells. The exchange that is implied by the terse lexical items of this inventaire clearly duplicates the exchange emplotted in Dudley’s aventure: About 3 leagues to the Eastwards of [Pelicans Bay] we found a mine of Marcazites which glister like golde (but all is not gold that glistereth) for so we found the same nothing worth, though the Indians
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did assure us it was Calvori, which signifieth gold with them. These Indians are a fine shaped and gentle people, all naked and painted red [. . .]. [They] did often resort unto my ship, & brought us hennes, hogs, plantans, potatoes, pinos, tobacco, & many other pretie commodities, which they exchanged with us for hatchets, knives, hookes, belles, and glasse buttons. (Hakluyt 1927, 7: 166)
Predecessors and pidgins Robert Dudley returned home later that year after his fleet ‘tooke, sunke and burned nine Spanish ships; which was loss to them, though I got nothing’ (Hakluyt 1927, 7: 170). If Trinidad produced a worthless simulacrum of gold, the Spanish ships transported the real thing, and Dudley’s narrative is haunted by their elusive presence. It is they whom he fears, their cargo he desires. The words glossed as ‘hat’ (sambolers) and as ‘pappe’ (carotta) as well as the expressions denoting a cognitive impasse (non yuo/non quapa) raise the question of the extent to which Dudley’s Hispanic predecessors have left their trace on this lexicon, and of whether we are in presence of an emergent trading pidgin. The entries molta, bassina, crocow afoye and cowrte in the list brought back by Towerson in 1555 betray the presence of the Englishman’s Portuguese predecessor, who throughout the narrative constitutes a threat to traffiquing: the adventure proper abounds in moments when the ‘Portugals’ interfere with the English merchants’ trading ventures by rendering the natives indisposed to and incapable of trade. In addition to suggesting that a West-African Portuguese pidgin emerged not long after the first Lusitanian trading ventures on the Gold-coast and in Guinea, lexical items like these raise tantalizing questions. The expression beggecome might well combine Portuguese comer (‘to eat’), with English ‘beg’; in this case the item identified by Towerson as a phrase meaning ‘give me bread’ reflects the presence of two competing traffiquing nations. Did the English merchants not recognize these traces of their rivals’ and their own presence, and, if not, what blind hope could make them close their eyes to linguistic evidence that they were capable of negotiating in other contexts (Spanish, Portuguese and French, after all, held few secrets for Hakluyt and his contemporaries)? Were the natives of Guinea not speaking a ‘foreign’ language when engaging in trade?17 These specific questions in turn lead us once again to the major question begged by all of these word lists: whose language is this anyway?
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Linguistic exchange Because of its syntax, which may or may not be able to tell a story that the terse lexical items are silent about, ‘Give me bread’ is one of many phrases that seem to reproduce or construct relations between natives and their visitors or among the natives themselves. All of the nine lists (except Frobisher’s) include such instances of social exchange, and three of them mimic communicative opening moves by beginning with phrases of salutation (Towerson’s, for example, where the salutation is reduplicated – once for each speaker perhaps) or with a question inviting the addressee to engage in a language-learning process: ‘what call you this?’ (Burrough in Hakluyt 1927, 1: 372). One list mimics the inability to continue the language-learning process by concluding with the phrases ‘I know not, I cannot tell’ (Dudley in Hakluyt 1927, 7: 172). I will conclude by addressing a set of open questions to these phrases, most of which seem to be scattered randomly throughout the lists. Can we distinguish formulas of linguistic politeness representing a fictive or real relation of reciprocity from formulas that suggest asymmetrical relationships of domination and subordination? Does the juxtaposition of verbal salutations with expressions of thanks construct or reflect a scenario of mutual satisfaction governing the exchange of gold for trifles emplotted in the ‘adventures’ as commodities that natives desire? A cluster of similar phrases followed by the word for ‘a friend’ constructs a vision of civil behaviour among equals in the ‘Lappian’ phrases glossed by Burrough as ‘farewell’, ‘good morrowe’, and ‘I thanke you’. Expressions such as these sit uneasily with the representation of these natives in the narrative to which the list is appended as wild scavengers who search the crevices of rocks by the sea for raw meat, ‘foules egges rawe and the yong birdes also that were in the egges’ and seaweed which they devour ‘as a cow doeth grasse when shee is hungrie’ (Hakluyt 1927, 1: 372). Asymmetrical relations between the traffiquing travellers and the natives are clearly implied by expressions like ‘come hither’ and ‘get thee hence’, as well as by the commands ‘hold your peace’ (in both Towerson and Cartier) and ‘give me my supper’ (Cartier). And yet the vexed question of identity of the implied speaker – visitor or native – remains an open one in the accusatory phrase ‘ye lye’ (Towerson). Whoever we imagine as uttering them, these phrases confirm that Towerson thought little good of this particular indigenous community. They also reduplicate the explicit condemnation emplotted in his narrative: I could not perceive that here was any gold, or any other good thing: for the people be so wilde and idle, that they give themselves to seeke
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out nothing: if they would take paines they might gather great store of graines, but in this place I could not perceive two Tunne. There are many foules in the Countrey, but the people will not take the paines to take them. (Hakluyt 1927, 4: 74–5) But would the learning by rote of such phrases be useful, inasmuch as it would allow the European traveller to put these ineffectual traders in their place? Would the future travellers’ recognition of these phrases serve to confirm Towerson’s view of the speaking natives as uncivil brutes, or would the collecting of fragments of strange languages serve yet another purpose to which no amount of sociolinguistic inference – no amount of filling in the gaps – can do justice? My hypothesis that, when prodded, even the most terse and rudimentary of word lists will yield a scenario of trade in the service of an ideology of traffiquing is not without risks. Las Casas is said to have objected indignantly to the biased and falsified stories of what early Indian interpreters actually said during their complex negotiations with the Spaniards: he reminded us that they communicated essentially with rudimentary phrases like ‘gimme food’, ‘gimme bread’, ‘take this’ and ‘give me that’ – the very phrases we have just seen in word lists from other climes – and that the coherent European narratives which these encounters proceeded to produce were at best wishful thinking, and at worst deliberate falsification (see Greenblatt 1991, 95 and 181, n. 23). There is no denying the fragmentary nature of the exotic verbal cargo with which the captains returned, or, indeed, the inability of these lists to familiarize their readers with the values, beliefs and cultural practices of remote trading partners. Rather they articulate the failure of the project of naming an other, extralinguistic world. Captured and displaced, the foreign lexical items that set out to speak the other can only ‘speak us’. Although the declared purpose of their compiler-translators is to subordinate them to a useful purpose – the common good of traffiquing – they tend to take on a life of their own, like so many commodity fetishes. Some fine recent criticism, emphasizing the homology between economic and literary semiotics, has theorized the predicament at the heart of all sign systems tending to towards the autonomy of the signifier. David Hawkes (2001) has further analyzed the accusations of idolatry that late sixteenthcentury/early seventeenth-century Protestant Englishmen directed at perceived processes of commodification. The raw materials presented in this chapter may afford more matter for the discussion of these theoretical issues. For, like so many ‘idols of the marketplace’, the inventories represented by these wordlists exemplify the process of fetishization by
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detaching themselves from the narratives of adventure, encounter and the culturally sanctioned practice of commodity exchange. I would, however, like to give the Elizabethan editor/author/compiler/ translator Richard Hakluyt the last word. Although they beg restoration and completion, exotic fragments constitute a prime exhibit in the early modern aesthetics of the curiosity cabinet; at the same time they are, however, subordinated to the antiquarian collector’s unifying impulse which participates in the process of collective (national) identity formation. In his abundant prefatory matter, Hakluyt articulates his concept of the author as ‘traffiquer’ whose travail/travel partakes in the colonial activity of the colonizer, providing commodities for the reader who occupies the position of the consumer: ‘Good Reader’ he says, ‘it remaineth that thou take the profite and the pleasure of the worke: which I wish to bee as great to thee, as my paines and labour have bene in bringing these rawe fruits unto this ripenesse, and, in reducing these loose papers into this order’ (Hakluyt 1927, 1: 12). He also relates to the materials he has collected, collated, revised, corrected and reconstituted as an affluent and laborious antiquarian might relate to the fragments of the distant culture that he lovingly contemplates in his museum or curiosity cabinet. The cultural historian’s task, as Hakluyt sees it, is to restore a culture to itself by uniting its scattered fragments in an extended metaphor of embodiment. The culture thus reconstituted and resurrected is not, however, the foreign one, but that of Hakluyt’s native Britain (see further Fuller 1995, 141–74)18: Having for the benefit and honour of my Countrey zealously bestowed so many yeres, so much traveile and cost, to bringe Antiquities smothered and buried in dark silence, to light, and to preserve certain memorable exploits of late yeeres by our English nation atchieved, from the greedy and devouring jawes of oblivion: to gather likewise and as it were to incorporate into one body the torn and scattered limmes of our ancient and late Navigations by Sea [. . .] and traffiques of merchandise [. . .]and having [. . .] restored each particular member, being before displaced, to their true joynts and ligaments; I meane by the helpe of Geographie and Chronologie (which I may call [. . .] the right eye and the left of all history)[. . .] I do this second time [. . .] presume to offer unto thy view this first part of my three-fold discourse. (Hakluyt 1927, 1: 19) At the same time as it constructs a national identity, the entangled discourse of objectivity has here practically written the subject out of its
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self-representation. In this convoluted period, the natural historian’s object (or corpus) is indistinguishable from the body (or fragmented discipline of history) that subjects it to scrutiny, and the discourse of historical recovery turns out itself to be subject to fragmentation. Just so, the fragments of language of uncertain attribution which this essay has scrutinized as so many curiosities that might be made to speak of the commodification of language in an age of emerging capitalism, the colonization of the locus of exchange with discursive fictions, and the cultural dispossession inherent in traffiquing may only spell out, in the end, the aporias and dangers of discovery. In this connexion, it is no small irony that a much later stage of discovery and empire was to be marked by native belief that the linguistic cargo of British missionaries spelled out the promise of material goods (Romaine 1992). The investment in literacy has been fraught with dangers of a different kind for twentieth-century Papua New Guineans, whose commodification of language has effectively led to loss of land and other forms of disenfranchisement. So the tables must turn on those who invest in words as a form of wealth, as legendary scenarios of silent trading have long been suggesting.
Notes 1. Herodotus 1972, 336. The importance of this episode for the enduring myth of silent trade is pointed out by Sundström (Sundström 1965, 22–31), who in turn is referred to by Stephen Greenblatt in a footnote to his chapter on ‘Kidnapping Language’ (Greenblatt 1991, 182, n. 34). 2. This is especially true when the term ‘traffiquing’ refers to illicit or secret commerce and is used in the sense of ‘conspiring’, which is already apparent in 1567, even though the OED does not record the term’s sinister and evil connotations or its ‘disparaging sense’ before the mid-seventeenth century. 3. Included in the second edition of the Principall Navigations, 1: 187–207. 4. Hakluyt 1927. 5. The disposition of the columns and the sequence in which words are listed are not always accurately reproduced in modern editions. 6. Kathleen Biddick (1998, 279 et passim) analyzes medieval and early modern practices of inclusion and exclusion through alphabets, which she sees as cartographic codes. 7. The narrative of the second journey (1577) was reprinted from Dionyse Settle, and Frobisher’s third and last journey (1578) reached Hakluyt via Thomas Ellis. A pre-Hakluytian narrative of Frobisher’s three voyages, by George Beste, in his True discourse of the late voyages of discouerie, for the finding of a passage to Cathaya, by the Northweast, under the conduct of Martin Frobisher Generall (1578) does include the report of Frobisher’s kidnapping of a native, but not of his language. Indeed, Beste relates how, ‘for very choller and disdain [at being lured into captivity], [the captive] bit his tongue in
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8.
9. 10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Trafficking Words twayne within his mouth’ (Beste 1963, 74) – an image, if ever there was one, of communicative impasse. Quotations from John Davis are from 5: 281–98 of the 1927 edition of the Principal Navigations. The writer of Davis’s first and third voyages, reported in the first person plural, is given in Hakluyt’s captions as John Janes. The caption for Davis’s second voyage, related in the first-person singular, does not mention a writer. Davis subsequently wrote The worldes hydrographical discription (1595), part of which was included in The Principall Navigations. The narrative, in the first person plural throughout, contains no indication of authorship, although Drake is there referred to as ‘our generall’. Parallels with Hakluyt’s word lists include: the intention to ‘teache a man to speake part of all maner of languages’; the assumption that commercial activity motivates all travel and intercultural contact; the importance of notions of ‘civility’. I thank Margaret Tudeau-Clayton for drawing my attention to this work. Lestringant notes that there are many other versions of this type of ‘colloque’, which circulated on board the ships headed for Brazil, and that this chapter may not have originated with de Léry (1994, 479–80, n. 3). Latin translations of the Tupi words for the genitals are found in Latin translations of the Histoire d’un voyage de Léry (1994, 496, n. 1). Only two lists – those brought back by William Towerson from Guinea – fail to refer to body parts. John Davis has words for the nose, the eye and the beard scattered in apparently random order throughout his list. Frobisher’s seventeen lexical items only include four words that are not body parts. Burrough lists fourteen body parts immediately after his enumeration of five social categories of person: friend, man, woman, son and ‘daughter or yonge wenche’. Dudley’s sixteen body parts form a sequence from the ‘heare of one’s head’ to the feet, and constitute the only blazon to mention the calf and the wrist. Drake’s Javanese refers only to a woman and to the head. In 1534 Cartier had listed twelve body parts (in two clusters of seven and five, in addition to ‘the privy members’, inserted between the lexical items for gold and an arrow), besides a woman and a man (and his social variants – a sick man, a dead man – as well as the grammatical variant ‘that’ man). For reasons I cannot explain, this scene is repeatedly perceived by critics as an embarrassment: examples are Norwich 1999, 212; Taylor 1982, 176 and Walter 1991, 69. A version of Mandeville’s Travels was included in the first edition of the Principall Navigations; so were numerous references to Plinian monstrous races, some of which were extended into the second edition (e.g. in ‘The Second Voyage to Guinea [. . .] the Captaine whereof was M. John Lok’, Hakluyt 1927, 4: 47–66). Items of clothing worn by the French, such as a shirt or a pair of trousers, figure in one of the earliest Tupi vocabularies, dated before the mid-1540s by Dalby and Hair (1967, 49–50). Rather than suggesting that the word is polysemous – calvori meaning one thing to the Trinidadians (‘gold’) and another to the English (‘marcazite’) – the list constitutes an implicit condemnation of native ignorance by insisting on the lexical equivalence of calvori and gold. The asterisk preceding the item
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*calcouri draws attention to a spelling variant (‘it is before in this voyage called calvorie’) as though the discrepancy between the spellings of the glossed and the emplotted words constituted a parallel to the discrepancy between the word’s nominal and real values. The name can be revealed as a fiction only in the narrative of the adventure. 17. I am indebted to Gustav Ungerer for a reference to the ‘fala da Guiné’, a variety of Portuguese which served as a vehicle of communication between slaves imported from Africa and the Portuguese population before being appropriated by Portuguese and Spanish dramatists as a sign of racial difference and cultural inferiority. 18. I am indebted to Natalie Zemon Davis for having drawn my attention to Fuller’s work.
References Beste, George. 1963 [1578]. The True Discourse of the Late Voyages of Discouerie, for the Finding of a Passage to Cathaya, by the Northweast, Under the Conduct of Martin Frobisher Generall. In The Three Voyages of Martin Frobisher, in Search of a Passage to Cathaia and India by the North-West, A.D. 1576–8. New York: B. Franklin. Biddick, Kathleen. 1998. The ABC of Ptolemy: Mapping the World with the Alphabet. In Text and Territory: Geographical Imagination in the European Middle Ages, eds. Sylvia Tomasch and Sealy Gilles, 268–93. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Boorde, Andrew. 1870. The Fyrst Boke of the Introduction of Knowledge, ed. F. J. Furnivall. London: Early English Text Society e. s. 10. Dalby, David and Hair, P. E. H. 1967. ‘Le langaige du Brésil’: A Tupi Vocabulary of the 1540s. Transactions of the Philological Society 1966/1967: 42–66. de Léry, Jean. 1994. Histoire d’un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil, ed. Frank Lestringant. Paris: Librairie générale française. Fuller, Mary C. 1995. Voyages in Print: English Travel to America, 1576–1627. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greenblatt, Stephen. 1991. Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World. Oxford: Clarendon. —. 1992. Learning to Curse. New York: Routledge. Hair, P. E. H. 1970. The Contribution of Early Linguistic Material to the History of West Africa. In Language and History in Africa, ed. David Dalby, 50–63. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation. Hakluyt, Richard. 1598–1600. The Principall Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation. 3 vols. London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and C. Barker. —. 1927. Richard Hakluyt: The Principal Navigations Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation. n. ed., 8 vols. London: Dent. —. 1965 [1589]. The Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation by Richard Hakluyt, eds. D. B. Quinn and R. A. Skelton, index by Alison Quinn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. 1972. Richard Hakluyt: Voyages and Discoveries, ed. Jack Beeching. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
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Hart, Jonathan Locke. 2001. Representing the New World: The English and French Uses of the Example of Spain. New York: Palgrave. Harvard, Joseph. 1977. British Airways French Phrasebook. For Visitors to Belgium, France and Switzerland, ed. Frances R. Harper. London: Harper (Holloway) Ltd. Hawkes, David. 2001. Idols of the Marketplace. Idolatry and Commodity Fetishism in English Literature, 1580–1680. London: Palgrave. Herodotus. 1972. Herodotus: The Histories, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt, ed. A. R. Burn. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Lestringant, Frank. 1999. Jean de Léry ou l’Invention du Sauvage: Essai sur l’Histoire d’un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil. Paris: Champion. Norwich, John Julius. 1999. Shakespeare’s Kings: The Great Plays and the History of England in the Middle Ages 1337–1485. New York: Scribner. Purchas, Samuel. 1905–7. Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas his Pilgrimes. [1625] 20 vols. Glasgow: James Maclehose. Quinn, D. B., ed. 1974. The Hakluyt Handbook. 2 vols. London: The Hakluyt Society. Romaine, Susanne. 1992. Literacy as Cargo in Papua New Guinea. Swiss Papers in English Language and Literature. 6: 13–31. Sawday, Jonathan. 1995. The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture. London: Routledge. Shakespeare, William. 1982. Henry V, ed. Gary Taylor. The Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —. 1991. Henry V, ed. John Henry Walter. The Arden Shakespeare. London: Routledge. Sundström, Lars. 1965. The Trade of Guinea. Studiae Ethnographica Upsaliensia 24. Lund: Hakan Ohlsson. Sweet, Timothy. 1999. Economy, Ecology, and Utopia in Early Colonial Promotional Literature. American Literature. 71: 399–427. Taylor, Gary, ed. 1982. Henry V. The Oxford Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walter, John Henry, ed. 1991. Henry V. The Arden Shakespeare. London: Routledge.
3 The Stain of the Signature Peter de Bolla
On Wednesday 17 January 1776 Robert and Daniel Perreau were removed from Newgate Prison and taken by carriage to Tyburn Cross – the site of modern day Marble Arch – where the gallows awaited their execution. They had been convicted of forgery, and London had been obsessed by their stories for nearly a year. Thirty thousand spectators turned up to see them swing. Their case was tied up with another, that of Mrs Margaret Caroline Rudd who, the brothers claimed, had duped them and was the real perpetrator of the crime. Mrs Rudd walked free. I want to open this, one of the most famous forgery cases in the eighteenth century, to a set of speculations regarding the fate of the Perreau brothers – as to why they had to hang, why their fate was so caught up with the mono-zygotic stain of the printed bank note’s signature, and the work this – the signature – does in respect of the complex, concatenated ensemble of cultural practices that inform, construct and perform the concept ‘person’. Here I mean to invoke terms such as character, psyche, authenticity, originality, personality, temperament and identity, and to place these within the orbit of another complex conceptual form: writing. Essentially I want to highlight the connections that may be perceived between writing as a form of self-fashioning, writing (the) self, and writing credit, since these connections bring into focus the extent to which any writing activity – writing person or writing money – depends on trust. In the era that witnessed this trial, the mid-eighteenth century, it was still possible literally to write money, in the sense of carry out transactions through the medium of the bill of exchange, so that the mark or seal of trust, of fiduciary probity, had especial power. That mark was, of course, the signature. I am particularly interested in the fact that both the hand that signs the bill of exchange, and the stain of the signature are deeply embedded in the set of fictions that create the singularity 63
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of person. As we shall see, both voice and hand are supposed to provide an indelible stain that acts as a marker to and for identity. But what if more than one voice or hand exhibits an identical stain? What if ‘person’ may be either replicated exactly or alternatively fragmented, split into multiple selves with the same markers? In opening the case to forensic inquiry some serious problems arise. Problems of fact in the simple sense: who did what and when? And problems of fabulation: how are ‘facts’ enmeshed in the counters of narrative? Although I do not mean to suggest that it will become evident who actually carried out the fraud there are nevertheless some elements to the intertwined stories that enable a clearer sense of what was at stake in this celebrated case. Here is the Annual Register for 1775: On Saturday evening, March 11th, a gentleman came to the Public Office, in Bow street, . . . with a woman elegantly dressed, and inquired for one of the Magistrates, William Addington, Esq., being then in the parlour, the parties were introduced, when the man, after a short preface in which he acquainted the Justice that his name was Robert Perreau, and that he had lived as an apothecary, for some time in Golden Square, in great reputation, said he was come to do himself justice, by producing the person who had given him a bond for 7.500L, which was a forgery.1 Robert Perreau was a respected gentleman, well connected and known about town. He had been born on St Kitts in the West Indies on 22 July 1733. His parents had thought his chances in life would be improved by being sent to England, so they apprenticed him to an apothecary called Mr Tribe in London. Perreau learnt his trade well and took over the business in Pall Mall after Tribe died. He married Henrietta Alice Thomas and fathered seven children, four of whom died in infancy. His clients included many well to do gentlemen, including one of the actors in the drama that will shortly unfold. The woman was Margaret Caroline Rudd, an altogether different character, good looking and by many accounts something of a society lady. Her story is a complicated one; it has encrustations of detail, contradiction and downright fabrication which make it hard to be sure about much. But let us start with this. On 11 March 1775 she went by the name of Mrs Daniel Perreau, the wife of Robert’s twin brother.2 In the furore of publicity that surrounded the court case that was to engross the inhabitants of London much was claimed, both for and
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against the three main protagonists; these claims being reproduced, often verbatim, in the monthlies and other less frequent publications. The Gentleman’s Magazine, for example, provided a compilation of the various accounts that had appeared in the newspapers or in pamphlet publication, and we can glean from its version some of the uncontested facts of the case. The entry for Friday, 10 March reads: A discovery was made of a very uncommon . . . forgery, carried on for some time past, by Robert and Daniel Perreau, twins, the former an apothecary . . .; the other living in genteel life in Pall Mall. These two, in confederacy with a Mrs Rudd, who cohabited with Daniel, and generally passed for his wife, have . . . raised considerable sums by means of bonds forged in the name of the well-known agent, William Adair, Esq. which they have imposed upon several gentlemen . . . as collateral securities with their own notes for the payment of said sums. The occasion that led to the discovery was as follows: Robert Perreau, the apothecary, who bore an irreproachable character, applied to Mr Drummond, the banker, for the loan of 5000L and offered a bond, which he said Mr Adair had given to his brother for 7500L as a pledge for the payment. . . . [T]o give colour to these bonds, it had been artfully given out, that Mrs Rudd . . . was nearly connected with Mr Adair, and even insinuated that she was his natural daughter; but Mr Drummond, who was well acquainted with the hand writing of Mr Adair, on examining the signature, doubted the authenticity of it, and . . . asked Mr Perreau if he had seen Mr Adair sign it, who frankly answered that he had not, but added, that he could not entertain the least doubt considering the connection, but that it was authentic. Mr Drummond replyed, that he could not . . . advance so large a sum without consulting his brother, and therefore desired him to leave the bond, with a promise of either returning it the next morning, or supplying him with the sum he wanted to borrow upon it. With this answer Mr Perreau departed, leaving the bond as requested, and next morning called as directed.3 So the story that remained uncontested goes like this: on Tuesday 7 March Robert Perreau presents a bond for £7,500 (calculated at about £300,000 in today’s money) to Mr Drummond in payment of an earlier loan for £5,000. This bond, signed by a Mr William Adair and witnessed by his solicitor, Mr Jones, and his servant was to be used in identical ways to earlier bonds presented in payment for earlier loans. Drummond, acquainted with Adair, does not recognize the signature and suspects
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foul play. Perreau claims that it is bona fide and agrees to leave the bond overnight, promising to return in the morning. Drummond, however, thinks it wise to get another opinion. The Gentleman’s Magazine continues: In the mean time Mr Drummond had more narrowly examined the bond, and Mr Stephens, of the Admiralty, calling in, was asked his opinion of it, who having letters of a recent date from Mr Adair in his pocket, on comparison, gave it as his opinion that the bond was a forgery. Being now confirmed in his suspicion, Mr Drummond . . . told Mr Perreau frankly, that he believed he had been imposed upon; but added, that, to remove all doubt, if he would go with him to Mr Adair, and procure . . . an acknowledgement of its validity; he would then immediately advance the money: to this Mr Perreau readily consented. They went, found Mr Adair at home, asked the question, and were answered in the negative: on which Mr Perreau put on an affected smile, and told him he jested. But Mr Adair . . . told him it was no jesting matter, and that it behoved him to clear it up. Mr Perreau then said, if that was the fact, he had been sent upon a fine errand indeed! He desired to have the bond, and added that he should make the proper enquiries. This request, however, was refused and it was thought advisable not to lose sight of Robert, till he had produced Daniel and his pretended wife.4 The two Drummond brothers (Henry’s brother Robert had turned up) threatened to call a constable; Robert exclaiming, ‘You are either the greatest fool, or the greatest rogue, that I ever saw; I do not know what to make of you’.5 A servant was dispatched to find Caroline and Daniel Perreau. They were duly arraigned and the inquisition took place. At first Caroline asked to speak to Robert Perreau alone but this was denied. Then she requested a private interview with William Adair but he said there was nothing she could say that could not be said in front of the others: ‘You are quite a stranger to me’, Adair protested.6 Daniel, for his part, denied knowing anything about the scam and Robert kept to his story that Caroline would explain all. Caroline went off to speak to the Drummonds in private and it seems that she confessed to being the forger. Moving from fact to hypothesis, the Gentleman’s Magazine states: On his return home, it is probable that he had acquainted the parties with what had happened, and that, in their first agitation, it had been consulted either to make their escape, or, in case that should be
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found impracticable, that Mrs Rudd should acknowledge the signature, as most likely to escape punishment, and procure for the two brothers their liberty . . . Instead, however, . . . an information was laid against them, and they were obliged to appear before Sir John Fielding, by whom they were committed to different prisons for further examination.7 In fact, as we know, on 11 March Robert Perreau decided to bring the matter to the attention of the magistrate, and it was Mr Addington, not Sir John Fielding, who first thought the stories from the two parties were so conflictual that both should be held over. Addington committed them both to Tothill-Fields, Bridewell and, since he had also learnt of the involvement of Robert’s twin, Daniel, in the affair he instructed that Daniel also be detained when he turned up at Tothill-Fields to pay his brother a visit. At this point the story becomes rather more complex. The brothers appear to have clung to the hope that Caroline’s confession to the crime would enable them to walk free. Moreover they also seem to have believed that Caroline would also be set free on account of her particular skills in gaining sympathy from her interlocutors. But events did not transpire this way and the three protagonists became locked in a war of assertion and counter-assertion about the facts of the case, played out in public through the mechanism of the press. While Daniel and Robert languished in prison Caroline began to publish, in serial form, her own story of what had transpired. Each installment in the Morning Post was eagerly awaited by her curious public who seemed partisan to her cause. By 21 March the case was so celebrated that the paper was able to comment on the affair to date in rather gushing terms. These forgeries were: the most remarkable . . . that ever appeared in this country, or perhaps in the whole world. . . . All other forgeries were commonly a grand stroke at raising money and running away with it, but these adventurers appear to have forged one bond to pay off another, and raised it at last to something like a regular branch of trade; how their profit or advantage was at last to arise from this trade is difficult to conceive, for their lives were at stake.8 Forgery at this time was a capital offence. According to Blackstone: ‘It may with us be defined (at common law) to be, “the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man’s right”’ (Blackstone 1979, IV: 245). The statute of 5 Eliz c. 14 details the punishment as ‘a
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forfeiture to the party grieved of double costs and damages; by standing in the pillory, and having both his ears cut off, and his nostrils slit, and seared; by forfeiture to the crown of the profits of his lands, and by perpetual imprisonment’ (ibid.). More recent statutes had made the punishment even tougher: Besides this general act, a multitude of others, since the revolution (when paper credit was first established) have inflicted capital punishment on the forging or altering of bank bills or notes, or other securities; of bills of credit issued from the exchequer; of south sea bonds, &; of lottery orders; of army or navy debentures; of east India bonds; of writings under seal of London, or Royal exchange, assurance, of a letter of attorney or other power to receive or transfer stock or annuities, or for the personating a proprietor thereof, to receive or transfer such annuities, stock or dividends. (ibid., 246) And, the last statute that will be decisive in this case, 7 Geo II. c. 22: ‘it is equally penal to forge or utter a counterfeit acceptance of a bill of exchange, or the number of any accountable receipt for any note, bill, or any other security for money’ (ibid., 247). Blackstone concludes: ‘So that, I believe, through the number of these general and special provisions, there is now hardly a case possible to be conceived, wherein forgery, that tends to defraud, whether in the name of a real or fictitious person, is not made a capital crime’ (ibid.). On Monday, 13 March Caroline and Robert appeared again at Bow Street in front of the magistrates – this time the completely blind Sir John Fielding was presiding. By now Caroline was beginning to change her story, claiming that she had not in fact forged the bond, she had merely wished to save Robert’s life by faking a confession. According to this new account it was Robert who had been the originator of the false bond. Robert, for his part, stuck to his guns. He repeated his claim that Caroline was to blame for this and for previously forged bonds now held by Sir Thomas Frankland. Daniel was now implicated – since he had passed these bonds on – and he too was held captive until the next stage of the hearing scheduled for two days later. The Gentleman’s Magazine picks up the story: [T]heir story had taken air, and, as they were all three well known, the concourse of people was so great on the day appointed for hearing them, that the justices were obliged to adjourn from Bow-Street to Guildhall, Westminster; where the facts already related were
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attested by Mr Adair, Mr Drummond, and others, with several additional charges, particularly by Admiral Sir Thomas Frankland, from whom they had obtained 4000L on the first application, which they honestly repaid before the money became due; afterwards 5000L and lastly 4000L upon similar bonds, all signed with the name of Mr Adair; of which bonds a Mr Watson, money-scrivener, said, he had drawn to the number of eight, all of them by order of one or other of the brothers, but which he could not, he said, be certain, they were both so much alike. Being pressed to make a positive declaration, he at last fixed upon Daniel.9 What next transpired was controversial. Caroline took the stand and for a day and a half entranced the court. The magistrates were, according to the Morning Post, struck by ‘the plaintive tone of Mrs Rudd’s voice, the artless manner in which she told her story, and the decency of her whole deportment’.10 While the hand may dissemble, the voice, it appears, tells its own truth. Commenting on the hearing The Morning Post concluded that her tale ‘produced a scene so truly pathetic, as drew tears from many of the spectators’ (18 March 1775). The story she told, and re-told in a series of publications, claimed that she had been put up to signing the bond, first by Robert, and then, after she refused, by Daniel. The Gentleman’s Magazine elaborates: The facts being made appear, the brothers were remanded to prison, and the parties bound to prosecute. But Mrs Rudd, being advised by her counsel to become King’s evidence, was afterwards admitted to bail. On her future examination, she declared, that she was the daughter of a nobleman in Scotland; that she married, when young, a Mr Rudd, an officer in the army, against her friends consent; that she had a very considerable fortune; and that . . . when her husband and she determined to part, she made a reserve of money, jewels, and effects to the amount of 13,000L all of which she gave to Daniel Perreau, whom she loved, she said, with the tenderness of a wife; that she had had three children by him; that he had returned her kindness in every respect till lately, when having been unfortunate in gaming in the alley, he had become uneasy, peevish, and much altered towards her; that he cruelly constrained her to sign the bond now in question, by holding a knife to her throat, and swearing he would murder her if she did not comply; that, being struck with remorse, she had acquainted Mr Adair with what she had done, and that she was now willing to declare every transaction with which she was acquainted, whenever she should be called upon by law to do so.11
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Things were not all plain sailing from here on. A further hearing was required to ascertain the legality of granting Mrs Rudd immunity: the ruling was three to two in her favour. But the consequence of this strategy was that Caroline maintained her freedom right up to the trial of Robert which began on June 1. These months were spent in a public war to discredit the twins and gain sympathy for her own story. If the story so far has moved in and out of ‘fact’ it now begins to enter an Alice world in which the ground of certainty no longer supports any statements made by the protagonists. This is her story – at least one version of it and it is as forceful a piece of self-fashioning, of fabulation of person, or writing the subject as undertaken by any Clarissa, Moll or Evelina. ‘Mrs Rudd’ was born Margaret Caroline Youngson in 1744 or 1745 in Lurgan, near Belfast. Her father was an apothecary and her mother, Isabella Stewart, apparently had noble connections. After an unsettled childhood she met Lieutenant Valentine Rudd and after ten days of courtship married him on 4 February 1762. Life with Rudd was unsteady – they had moved to St Albans, which bored Caroline, and then to London at her request – and four and a half years into the marriage Caroline started an affair with another soldier, Benjamin Bowen Read, who lived above them in the same building. In November 1766 she left her husband and ran away with Read. She gaily spent money on whatever she pleased and managed to run up debts on the accounts of both Read and Rudd. The latter, her husband, attempted to find her but the level of debt she was incurring on his behalf resulted in his being imprisoned. Eventually Rudd found his way back to Ireland while Caroline made her way in London life. She was to meet Daniel Perreau in April 1770. According to the book length account Caroline published under the title Authentic Anecdotes of the Life and Transactions of Mrs Margaret Rudd, the attraction was immediate and compelling. The day following their first acquaintance they went to a masquerade and adjourned to ‘a certain retreat in Leicester Fields, always open for the reception of both sexes’,12 and so began their affair. The story of their meeting is given more interesting bones in Genuine Memoirs of the Messieurs Perreau. By a Gentleman Very Intimate with the Unfortunate Families (London, 1775). Here we learn that Daniel turned up ‘in an extraordinary garb, one side of which represented a skeleton, the other a proper handsome figure’.13 The account continues: ‘Everyone was struck with the oddity, and the cry of “it is he”, “it is he” was at length re-echoed by some dozens, males and females, from all quarters of the room, who were too well acquainted with his voice and abilities to be mistaken’.14 Once again the voice is taken as the
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authentic index to identity. Caroline, dressed in ‘an elegant domino’ followed him for a while before challenging him as to his identity (the custom of the masquerade), saying: ‘One half of you seems no ineligible acquaintance, but the horrid memento of mortality you bear about you on the other, is an insuperable impediment to my gratifying a curiosity I own your expressions have excited’.15 If he wished to speak to her, she said, he should ‘assume a less terrible shape’. Daniel accordingly divested himself of his skeleton and began to whisper ‘such things in the lady’s ear as were best calculated to win her heart’.16 By the end of May they were living together as a married couple; Caroline later claiming that from that moment, ‘I considered myself in every sense his wife’.17 According to Daniel he was unaware of the fact that she was still married to Rudd – having been first under the impression that she was Mrs Gore (the name she claimed to have taken in order to prevent her detection by her husband). Daniel claimed that she had given him the impression that she hailed from a wealthy background, connected, she said, to a Mr James Adair, who subsequently became a kind of benefactor. As Daniel explained, throughout the early years of their connection money appeared, as if from some legacy, courtesy of this Mr Adair. So in 1771 they went to Paris courtesy of this benefaction. On their return they settled into a house in Pall Mall, had three children and lived a life of some ease. Now, to be even handed, Daniel’s version of events has it that in late 1773 Caroline announced that James Adair wanted to give them a large capital sum to start them off in business. The only problem was that the money would have to be routed indirectly since he did not want to arouse the suspicions of his wife. Thus, again according to Daniel’s story, he arranged for his cousin, William Adair, to make the payments. Whether or not this was so, money started to come in – first £150.00 in cash, then £800.00. Then, in 1774, Daniel was told that serious capital sums were to come to their way, only not in the form of cash since James and William did not have the immediate wherewithal, but in the form of bonds which, Daniel was informed, they could then use to raise cash. It was also alleged that William Adair wanted to set the two Perreau brothers up in the banking business, and, perhaps most unbelievably, that the Adairs would arrange for Daniel to be made a Baronet. Neither happened. According to Daniel, his repeated requests to meet their generous benefactor, William Adair, were all refused. The money continued to flow in and in December 1774 they bought a £4,000 house at the Cavendish Square end of Harley Street, moving in January 1775. So when another bond appeared, this time the one for £7,500 that was to
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cause all the trouble, Daniel simply put it down to just one more example of his benefactor’s largesse. Caroline told a different story. The tale I have just told was, according to her, Daniel’s fantasy. She was the wronged party, forced into forging the bond at knifepoint. In a series of letters to the Morning Post she gave her own side (or sides) of the story. The papers began to fill up with the intrigue. Correspondents wrote in. One claimed that Caroline’s story lacked credibility since, ‘as she was no wife to Perreau, she was subject to no controul’18 and therefore would not have felt it necessary to forge the bond. But the real fascination lay in Rudd’s ability to appear credit worthy, credible whatever she said: It seems she has always been remarkable for her great powers in moving the passions, therefore it is not the least object of admiration, that the tone of her voice, the artless manner in which she related her story, and the decency of her whole deportment was so truly pathetic, as to lull the wisdom of the Magistracy that examined her, and make them give credit to all she said and unsaid. (Morning Post, 29 March 1775) She was, in other words, a living embodiment of the principle that grounds paper money: the continuing belief in the credit worthiness of the signature which authenticates paper as money. As long as the paper instruments remain fiduciary all is well and the circulation of credit continues. And what gave the stamp of authenticity to her story was the grain of her voice, the voice that cannot lie. The affective power of her verbal presentation beguiled her listeners into giving credit to her story. Not everyone, however, was taken in and some correspondents resisted this siren’s voice; one, for example, put another side of the story in a barely disguised set of accusations: [Did she] not elope ... with an officer who frequented the house where she and her husband lodged? ... [Did she] not as a foreign Princess submit herself to the embraces of a noted amorous son of Levi, and get from him the many thousands mentioned in her case? . . . [Did she] not afterwards personate the sister of the Princess, and again impose upon the Levite? ... [Did she] not, in conjunction with Mr D.P who ... passed for her husband, under pretence of crim con extort a further large sum from him? ... [Did she] not pretend to be with child by this Jew, go through the farce of a mock lying-in, actually hire a child for the purpose, and under these pretences get large sums for child-bed linen,
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nurse, &? ... [Has she] not ... personated many . . . Ladies of the first quality . . . and in their names prostituted herself? And, . . . [has she] not . . . procured persons to pass for her mother, aunt, and other relations, in order to give colour to such impositions, and the better to carry on such intrigues?19 This takes us to the real meat of the case, and the reasons for it having such importance for a speculative society. It comes down to the singularity of person, or, to put it another way, the deeply disturbing possibility of personation – the fabrication of person. If fictions of the self are procurable, then so are fictions of the other. Forgery, at its most insidious, contagious level, inserts the possibility of multiple personality, or no identity at all, into the paper-thin circulation of trust in a speculative society. Forgery – or at least duplicity, the hall of mirrors that is the real for the Perreau twins – creates the possibility for the destabilization of self, society and certainty. Once personation is in the system – let loose like a virus – it begins to infect all it comes into contact with. So we find a letter sent to The Morning Post by one John Stewart, claiming to be Caroline’s uncle. The editor, however, infected by the virus of suspect person, refused to publish it until he had met its signatory, since he suspected it – and him – to be a fake. They met, he was satisfied, the letter was subsequently published. But other persons were not so bona fide: another correspondent, also self styled John Stewart but now of Balimoran, County of Down Ireland, currently resident in London was widely tipped off to be, in fact, Caroline writing in an alternate persona, with a different hand. This kind of speculation as to the identity of various correspondents began to rip through the media: for what can a correspondent correspond to if not the hand that signs the signature? What basis for truth – for correspondence in this sense – remains once fiction enters the house of identity? Once the hand is disguised in and by print, and the witness to the hand potentially fictitious? And what does the signature sign? Or, to put it another way, what is the sign of the signature? If the signature is not the sign or site of the hand, then what is it? Why do we require that each individual has but one signature, our true seal of self? If two persons look alike – their deportment, even their voices are indistinguishable – why should their signatures be distinct? What personality disorder is it that leads to a variable signature, what psychic disorder caused by variant signature syndrome? What solvent removes the stain of a forged signature if not the voice? These questions return again and again as the fascination of the trials, first of the Perreau brothers and then of Mrs Rudd, begins to exert its force.
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The trials Caroline had turned state’s evidence, so she was to be the major witness in the trial of the two brothers, which began on 1 June 1775. Sir Richard Ashton was presiding; he opened the case by dismissing Mrs Rudd, arguing that the magistrates had no authority to grant her immunity and that she had no legal protection. Indeed she was to be prosecuted by Sir Thomas Frankland for the forgeries conducted against him. At this point she was removed to Newgate Prison, next door to the court. The trial began with the first witness, Henry Drummond. He told the court how he had known Robert as an apothecary for some years and that he had lent him £4000 for a short period in January 1775. The loan was supposed to be for ten days but Robert did not repay it until 7 March, when he came with a bond signed by William Adair and asked to borrow a further £5000 saying that he would repay the original loan out of this new loan. There follows an account of the suspicion aroused, and Henry’s summons to his brother, Robert, so that his opinion of the validity of the bond might be expressed. All of this corresponds well enough to The Gentleman’s Magazine report. Then Robert took the stand, beginning his defence with an hour and half peroration, claiming his credit thus: There are many respectable witnesses at hand, and many more . . . to be found, if it had been necessary to have summoned them upon a point of such notoriety, who will inform . . . the court, how I have appeared to them to act in the course of my calling, what trust they reposed in me and what credit I had in their opinion for my diligence, honesty and punctuality.20 He then states that his only crime was gullibility: ‘My Lord, and Gentlemen of the jury, men . . . unpracticed in deceit, will . . . credit others for that sincerity which they themselves possess’,21 outlining how he was asked to act as an agent and raise money on behalf of his brother and his wife (claiming no knowledge that they were unmarried). An agent, he says: . . . is a deputy, a substitute, a representative for the Principal, and it is, . . . natural for an Agent to speak of whatever appertains to his Employer or Principal as of things belonging to himself . . . for he himself is to transact business . . . as if no third person were concerned – So Mr Perreau had said ‘I have a house in Harley Street; although he
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himself knew, and Mssrs Drummond must also know afterward by the writings that this house was not actually his OWN, but in reality his brother’s’.22 And in explaining how he, Robert, got involved in the scam he says: Thus influenced, he ventured . . . to become collateral security for sums raised upon Mr Adair’s bonds, which he believed . . . genuine. If this be literally true, then Mr Robert Perreau was really Principal as well as Agent, and the conclusion of the note seems to confirm . . . his saying, that Mr Adair was in his debt.23 So person here is doubled, may simultaneously perform the function of both Principal and Agent. Of course, in the case of identical twins distinguishing the Agent from the Principal is conceptually problematic. The defence lawyers then had their turn. How, they wondered, could Robert Perreau have known that the bond was forged since, as became clear, the handwriting precisely matched that of the letters he had seen from William Adair. It is rather strange, that Mrs Rudd never obtained any signature of Mr William Adair to copy from it some similitude: but tho a circumstance so essentially necessary to Forgery escaped her thought, or was not it the reach of her single endeavours, yet it could be wonderful indeed if the two brothers had been privy to the forgery, that they, among all their acquaintance or pretences, should never find . . . something that might give an idea of the style of the handwriting. It adds still to the wonder, that they should utter Bonds with such confidence, if they were not certain there was some likeness – But suppose them innocent, and they were in their deceived imaginations not only certain that there was perfect similarity, but also that the signatures were really genuine.24 And of course they were genuine. They were Rudd’s signatures only in her hand personating William Adair. Here the concept personation begins to take on disturbing features since what is a ‘true’ personation, in the sense of impersonation – alleged or fabricated person, pretended subject-hood – if not a successful dupe? And that includes duping one’s self. The signatures on the bonds were genuine: we know this from the authenticity test held at Adair’s house. At that point Drummond exclaimed that he could not believe Rudd’s confession because the writing
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was ‘so different from a woman’s hand’.25 Nothing would convince him otherwise unless she could write that sort of hand now in front of him: He said he did not want to ensnare her, and would immediately threw the writing into the fire. She wrote upon a bit of paper, William Adair, or part of the name, so extremely like the signature to the bond, that it satisfied him, and he burnt the paper.26 And, at this moment when the evidence is neatly destroyed in front of all the accused parties, it sends up in smoke the self-sameness of the signature. Here is a woman whose hand is both male and female, whose masculine stain is not an imitation or copy of another’s. It is hers. A self-forgery, a self-impersonation. But what does Drummond’s satisfaction consist in? If Rudd could do one manly hand why not others, why not fake bonds from a whole cast of unknown but credit worthy characters? This point is made, in defence of Robert, by one of his lawyers: There can surely be nothing extraordinary in an honest man’s going to a scrivener to have a Bond filled up; but it would be rather very extraordinary if a guilty person, that could write himself, should transact his frauds so publicly with the same person, not only once but several times for such capital sums, and all the Bonds to be executed by the same person.27 If Robert was in on the fraud, it is suggested, it was either very bold or very stupid. Of course the possibility presents itself that it was not the same person at all. Since Daniel and Robert were only distinguishable from their clothing no one could be sure who was perpetrating the fraud. Their problem is precisely the opposite of Caroline’s. Where she seems to have a multiple person, a whole string of aliases, Daniel and Robert have a shared identity. They inhabit the same person. And this is why they must swing. The multiple personalities of Caroline became one of the themes of her own trial. During the cross examination of Daniel’s footman we learn that she could write as more than one person: ‘The witness (Caroline) wrote two very different hands. In one hand, she wrote letters to his master, as coming from Mr William Adair, and in the other, the ordinary business of the family’.28 But who is Mrs Rudd? This is the question that reverberates through her own trial, in which she faced Sir Thomas Frankland, the defrauded friend of Robert Perreau. Frankland was on the stand accused of removing effects to the value of his loans once he had learnt of the forgery. And under question the problematic
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of identity, of self-sameness leaks like a spreading stain into the courtroom. He is being grilled on the propriety of his hasty recovery of his money in the form of goods. The lawyer asks: By whom did you suppose the gowns and petticoats and other womens apparel were worn, by the two Perreaus or by whom? – They might go in masquerade. As this man was your apothecary for seventeen years, and you and he were acquaintance, you best know his manner of dressing; therefore you suppose he might go to the masquerade in these cloaths? – I suppose as they were womens cloaths she wore them.29 He is on the ropes since it is evident he has improperly removed goods belonging to someone – Mrs Rudd – who has yet to be convicted of any fraudulent activity at all. He is, nevertheless, convinced that she is a con artist. The cross examination continues: Do you know a Mrs Potter or Porter of Hackney – I wrote to Lord Northington about it. Are you the prosecutor of this indictment? – Yes, I was bound over to prosecute. Are you at the expense of it? – I do expect to pay it. Then I ask you, whether you have prosecuted this woman as and believing her to be a Mrs Potter or Porter of Hackney? – I know nothing at all about that. I don’t know that she is, but I believe she is. Do you know one Jane Williams? – I do not know whether I do. Take time and consider. I saw several people at Hackney, she might be one of them. Have you enquired of one George Downe, whether this prisoner was that Mrs Porter or Potter that had lived at Hackney? – I did. Did you enquire of any woman? I believe there were two women. Of Mrs Elizabeth Pendellow? – I know nothing of her. Or Catherine Peake? – Catherine Peake called at my house one afternoon, and I did not speak two words to her. But they might be very significant words; were they concerning Mrs Potter of Hackney? – They were. Might there not be two more Mrs Rudds and Mrs Potters? – Yes, there might. That Mrs Rudd might be this Mrs Potter; even that the subject of your evening with her? – She came to my house, I asked her if Mrs Rudd was not the same woman that was Mrs Potter at Hackney.
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. . . Then, though you had given no authority to any one to enquire whether Mrs Rudd was Mrs Porter of Hackney, yet this woman found out your house, and came to you, and knew all the business without being told now what answer did you make? – I told her, I thought Mrs Rudd was Mrs Porter of Hackney. Why did you believe so? Why did you tell her, and by what information was you enabled to tell her, that you believed Mrs Rudd to be Mrs Porter or Potter of Hackney? – I had seen Madam Grosenbergs writing. Was that the same woman you believed to be Mrs Rudd and Mrs Porter? – Yes.30 This line of questioning did little to sway the jury. They were entranced by Caroline’s personality. She sat demurely through the trial – writing over 500 notes to her lawyers – well dressed, well spoken, creditable. Following the judgment ‘there were the loudest applauses at this acquittal almost ever known in a court of justice’.31 The twins were not so lucky and even though petitions were made to the king from Henrietta, Robert’s wife and thirty or so bankers, they received no clemency. Both went to the gallows still protesting their innocence. Why was the crime so capital, deemed to be so heinous it required the death penalty? We can gauge the tenor of the times by looking at Stephen Roe’s account of the execution of John Ayliffe, hanged for forgery in 1759: [forgery is] . . . a complicated falsehood and injustice, confounding the distinction of true and false, right and wrong; . . . one of the . . . most dangerous kinds of theft, bereaving a person of his nearest and most undoubted property, even his hand-writing, which is the key of all he possesses.32 So the real threat is property in one’s self – the distinguishing feature of identity. This is why the twins’ story is so important since they are, in effect, mono-zygotic forgeries of each other, the living embodiment of the confusion that arises when one can no longer tell one hand from another. They spell out the fear that credit will collapse the moment it becomes impossible to tell the original from the copy: one side a skeleton, the other a proper handsome figure. This is why bank notes at this period are signed, since the signature legitimates in its singular act of staining. Bank tellers kept ledgers recording the time and date at which
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each note was signed, with an identical signature, in order to facilitate its continuing legitimacy and aid in the detection of forgeries. The brothers hang because, as is clear from the police reports, they are to all intents and purposes interchangeable. They have the same signature. Its stain is mono-zygotic. The credit of one – say Robert – can be used by the other as collateral. As such they pose a threat to the foundations of paper credit – a threat that will disappear with the introduction of the printed bank note, which nevertheless to this day still carries the stain of the signature, though it is no longer this which proves its authenticity. They hang because of the weird warping of our collective investments in the symbolic realm of representation that is paper money, which occurs when the signature is no longer the sole preserve of person. They hang because identity is precisely discernible in the case of identical twins as sameness; identity, in the sense of person, is indistinguishable, ‘uncernable’. On Wednesday, 17 January 1776, a crowd gathered outside Newgate and lined the streets from the prison to Tyburn Cross. The brothers were given the dignity of a carriage to themselves – three others were to be executed alongside them – and were accompanied by the Ordinary, John Villette, who had overseen their last hours in the prison. On reaching the gallows they were prepared for the hanging – the ropes removed from their wrists, nooses placed around their necks. Villette asked them – as was customary – to acknowledge the justice of their sentence: both said nothing, preferring instead to hand their executioner written statements, carefully folded, in which each had given their own account of what had happened. Daniel then placed his hand over his heart and swore that he was innocent. Robert followed suit. The clergyman took his leave, which Robert and Daniel returned by bowing, and immediately embraced and saluted each other in a most tender and affectionate manner. They then took hold of each other’s hands, the caps having been drawn over their faces, and in this manner, the cart driving away, they launched into eternity. Their hands remained clinched together about half a minute after the cart was driven away; when, by the motion of their bodies, they separated.33 It was a moving moment, commented upon in the Annual Register: ‘Not the least fear of death was discernible in either of their countenances . . . they both behaved with a firmness and resolution rarely to
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be met with in men at the hour of death. . . . Thus two brothers, in the same moment quitted that world which they had entered together’.34 We will never know the truth of this case – immediately following the execution many commentators, moved by the dignity with which the brothers faced their demise, began to wonder if, in fact, justice had miscarried. But the reason for Margaret Rudd’s freedom lay not in the powers of detection held by the court, but in the requirement that a speculative society, founded on fiduciary probity, must insist on the singularity of the subject. Forgery – the adoption of another person in the guise of a fraudulent signature – opens up the possibility of mistaking identity. Or, even worse, of a mobile and protean identity. And, to make things even more worrying for a society that was increasingly faced with the conundrum of how to maintain credit in an economy and society based on speculation, if the possibility of two persons, identical twins, having the same signature arose then the entire pack of cards was in danger of collapsing. Mrs Rudd walked free because she represented the singularity of the voice, the stamp or mark of person which, at all costs, had to be subscribed to. The stain of the signature, its capacity for personation, had to be constrained, brought to law.
Notes 1. The Annual Register, 222. 2. Two recent books on this very famous case have told this story. See Sarah Bakewell (2001), The Smart and Donna T. Andrew and Randall McGowen (2001), The Perreaus & Mrs Rudd. 3. Gentleman’s Magazine, 45: 148–9. 4. Gentleman’s Magazine, 45: 149. 5. The Trials of Robert and Daniel Perreau’s, 52. 6. Ibid. 7. Gentleman’s Magazine, 45:149. 8. Morning Post, 21 March 1775. 9. Gentleman’s Magazine, 45: 149. 10. Morning Post, 18 March 1775. 11. Gentleman’s Magazine, 45: 149–50. 12. Authentic Anecdotes of the Life and Transactions of Mrs Margaret Rudd, 2: 36. 13. Genuine Memoirs of the Messieurs Perreau. By a Gentleman very intimate with the Unfortunate Families, 121. 14. Ibid., 11. 15. Ibid., 122. 16. Ibid., 124. 17. Margaret Caroline Rudd, 1775. Facts, or, a Plain and Explicit Narrative of the Case of Mrs Rudd, Published from Her Own Manuscript, 9. 18. Morning Post, 29 March 1775. 19. Morning Post, 30 March 1775.
Peter de Bolla 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
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Observations on the Trial of Mr Robt. Perreau, 44. Ibid., 45. Ibid., 54. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 30. The Annals of Newgate or Malefaction Register, 4: 401. Ibid., 401. Observations on the Trial of Mr Robt. Perreau, 5. The Whole Trials, at Large of Robert Perreau, Daniel Perreau and Margaret Carolina Rudd, 47. Ibid., 52. The Trial of Margaret Caroline Rudd, 14–15. Annual Register, 18: 231. The Ordinary of Newgate’s Account . . . of John Ayliffe, 19–20. Annual Register, 18: 235. Morning Post, 18 January 1776.
References Andrew, Donna T., and McGowen, Randall. 2001. The Perreaus & Mrs Rudd. Berkeley: University of California Press. The Annals of Newgate or Malefaction Register. 4 vols. London, 1776. The Annual Register. London, 1775. Authentic Anecdotes of the Life and Transactions of Mrs Margaret Rudd. 2 vols. London, 1776. Bakewell, Sarah. 2001. The Smart. London: Chatto and Windus. Blackstone, William. 1979. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Genuine Memoirs of the Messieurs Perreau. By a Gentleman very intimate with the Unfortunate Families. London, 1775. Gentleman’s Magazine. London, 1776. Morning Post. 1775–6. Observations on the Trial of Mr Robt. Perreau. London, 1775. The Ordinary of Newgate’s Account . . . of John Ayliffe. London, 1759. Rudd, Margaret Caroline. 1775. Facts, or, a Plain and Explicit Narrative of the Case of Mrs Rudd, Published from Her Own Manuscript. London. The Trial of Margaret Caroline Rudd. London, 1786. The Trials of Robert and Daniel Perreau’s. London, 1775. The Whole Trials, at Large of Robert Perreau, Daniel Perreau and Margaret Carolina Rudd. London, 1776.
4 Semiotics and Economics Giulia Colaizzi and Jenaro Talens
[La storia del denaro] è la storia del rapporto fra uomo e Tecnologia (o, se si preferisce, fra uomo e Cultura), dove finiamo immancabilmente per essere soggiogati dai meccanismi che abbiamo creato, ragni prigioneri della propria tela. (Massimo Fini, Il denaro, ‘sterco del demonio’ ) [The History of money] is the history of the relation between man and technology (or, if one prefers, between man and culture), within which we ineluctably end up enslaved by the very mechanisms which we ourselves created, like spiders imprisoned in their very own webs. (Editors’ translation) In this essay we offer a series of considerations about the way in which new technologies have already changed, and might further change, our cultural, artistic and philosophical geography and practices; and some suggestions about how we might deal with such changes. At a moment in which postmodernity seems to be giving way to what Fredric Jameson has called a ‘geo-political aesthetic’ (Jameson 1992), two modes of analysis are particularly useful, in our opinion, to account for the complexity of contemporary changes: semiotics and poststructural feminism. Together, these two modes of analysis can radically undo the presuppositions of the modern aesthetic by installing a critical awareness of what life in the ‘global village’ implies. To inhabit the technological polis, we shall see, situates us at the crossroad between old and new conflicts, tensions and problems, but it means, above all, to take a 82
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critical standing vis-à-vis modernity’s underpinnings: the notion of the subject, the idea of objective knowledge, the logic of realism, authorship, identity, the subject/object split and so on. Nowadays, when the ‘web’ seems to be displacing the ‘world’ and constituting a world of its own, when the subject of writing can exist in the circuit as a totally inauthentic fiction, as pure virtuality and multiplicity, and while the Western culture of literacy comes into full crisis, it is crucial to continue, and to widen, discussion of the multiple and complex functions that language performs. As Wlad Godzich has pointed out, language’s foremost feature is ‘the ability to code and transcode experience’: it is in and through language, therefore, that we can find ‘cultural directions for [the] interpretation, handling and elaboration’ of the present crisis (Godzich 1994, 5). In his book Il linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato, Italian semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi analyzes the relationships between economy and language and, by taking as starting point the Hegelian notion of the anthropogenic nature of work and the idea that human beings communicate with the whole of the social structure, affirms his ‘principle of homology’: the different modes and typologies of human communication are interconnected, there are no ‘natural’ divisions between them that would justify their being considered as different areas of social signification; furthermore, there is a correspondence between economic and semiotic production. The labor of manipulation and transformation through which we produce physical objects is analogous at every moment to linguistic labor; we must, therefore, speak of ‘commodities/ messages’ and of ‘messages/commodities’ as well as acknowledge the linguistic alienation and exploitation inherent in the production, circulation and consumption of messages. The economic model of commodity production and the semiotic model of message production and circulation are homologous, they refer back and forth to each other; in the same way, there is an analogy between the individual speaker and the worker. The individual speaker is also part of a system, he is ‘employed at the service of the society in which he is born’ (Rossi-Landi 1968, 333; our translation), whose production process he does not control. His work helps to reproduce the existing system and the power position of hegemonic class, which is the class that controls the modalities of codification/decodification/ interpretation of the messages and of their channels of circulation/ distribution (in this sense, and only in this sense, we can talk of private property when talking of language). In the text to which we refer (as well as in Semiotica ed ideologia), Rossi-Landi proposes a general theory of the semiotics of social codes
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as a theory of society, thus allowing a re-articulation of the Marxian distinction between basis and superstructure in a new and productive way; a way that also allows us to consider the medium per se as a commodity. The medium is a commodity/message and the message/commodity is a medium: language is a kind of capital, and capital is a kind of language; language does not have only the status of an object: it is a social product in the sense that it is produced and it is a process at the same time, it implies work and is the place where commodities and messages circulate (it is an instrument for communication, but, especially, it is also the material and the space where the trade of commodities and messages takes place). Language, that is, is not simply words, but a structure and a logic of exchange that applies both to verbal and nonverbal languages. In his texts Rossi-Landi writes of the exploitation, alienation and gradual territorialization of the speaking subject that, through the mastering of what Rossi-Landi calls ‘logotechnics’, finds itself subjected more and more to the signifiers of dominant ideology and says, therefore, always, more or less, what he wants to say, but never exactly what he really wants to say (because both the ‘wanting’ and the ‘saying’ in themselves are defined, structured and determined by the codes of language). On the other hand, although Rossi-Landi thinks of language and the social space as market and as the place where the human being’s alienation takes place, he also, as Massimo Bonfantine underlines, espouses a conviction of belonging, of identity (as, for instance, in his reference to the speaking subject as a subject that is ‘hired in the service of the society in which he is born’ (Bonfantini 1996, 75; our translation). At the time in which Rossi-Landi wrote, the 1960s and 70s, in Italy as much as in other countries, it was still possible to think – and to think in critical terms – of the possibility of being ‘employed’, and employed by and at the service of the society in which one was born. Italy was a national State with a national market, a national and State TV, national and traditional parties that did integrate its citizens in spite of various contradictions. Now, in the dawn of the twenty-first century, after the debacle of the traditional parties, with a regional party that in 1996 declared the independence of the so-called Republic of the North, in a country troubled by unemployment and increasing racial tensions, would it be possible to have the same expectations, the same feeling of identity and belonging? If the answer is ‘no’, a look at the multiple conflicts of racial and nationalistic tension that surround us at all levels makes it clear that the problem is global, and that this question can be generalized.
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The end of the Cold War and the fall of State socialism in Eastern Europe; the crisis of national States; the emergence of Japan and the European Community as competing Super States; the reassumption by the US of a ‘refurbished vocation as global policeman’, to adopt Jameson’s phrase (Jameson 1992); the telematic revolution and the subsequent globalization of the economy and communication: all these have triggered a complex process of generalized transformation which is necessary to analyze, and which the traditional means of critical analysis fail to understand. Let’s go back to Rossi-Landi’s work as an example of a critical enterprise which is informed by a Marxist point of view and which attempts a project of socio-ideological criticism inserted in the theoretical horizon of the so-called ‘linguistic turn’. Rossi-Landi uses and applies to the model of both economic and semiotic production the Marxian concepts of ‘exploitation’, ‘surplus’, ‘alienation’; he speaks of ‘ideology’, of ‘dialectic process’, of ‘praxis’, of ‘alienated work’, of how the individual’s exploitation/alienation begins with this ‘being employed at the service of the society in which one is born’ (op. cit.). But what happens in a society of huge and continuous migrations (from the East, the South), in a society which refuses to employ us, and in which work – precisely the kind of alienated and alienating work which is the starting point of Marxian analysis – turns into a luxury; a society in which ever increasing numbers of young people try desperately and unsuccessfully to be initiated into the rite of exploitation/alienation? How can we even conceive of class struggle in a society in which, with the increasing automatization of production, the classical places of exploitation – the factories – are closing down, and in which to be a proletarian has become a luxury? How can we organize social praxis, or even conceive of the polis, in a society which is becoming more and more a society of unemployment and which pushes to the margins, away from the place of productivity, larger and larger sections of the population? (This is what Jacques Delors’s White Book admits by starting with the question: ‘Why this book? One reason contained in one word: “unemployment”’ – in Commissione della Comunitá Europea 1994). The problem of global communication and economy, of what has been called the problem of the relation between economy and culture in the phase of late capitalism, or postmodernism, is a serious and complex one; it requires an individual, collective and necessary effort of reflection and critique. Globalization does not mean global integration, integration for everyone, but ‘greater interrelation between national and international economies at the level of capital and commercial interchange’
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(Chomsky and Ramonet 1995; our translation), that is, integration according to the logic of market economy. This logic implies growth, competitiveness and, necessarily, an increase in the polarization of the developed and the underdeveloped, and of the distance between rich and poor areas of the world’s surface. In a world in which the logic of capital affirms itself as the only and true logic that can govern and regulate society, globalization means, finally, as Augusto Ponzio has stated, the ‘extension of the market as universal market in the sense of planetary expansion, and in the sense of the total extension of commodification, that is, the transformation of everything into a commodity’ (Ponzio 1996, 12). The affirmation of the logic of capital as the only and universal logic produces appalling data: if in 1960 in the US 1 per cent of the population owned 22 per cent of the country’s wealth, in 1993 the same percentage of population owned 39 per cent. And while unemployment increases dramatically, the capital mobilized by private companies multiplies and can now be compared to the wealth of national States: the multinational Ford is richer than South Africa, Toyota is richer than Norway. In this context it is not possible, in our opinion, to nourish the hope of cutting off for oneself a peaceful and quiet life within the McLuhnian ‘global village’, to enjoy the de-centralization allowed and facilitated by the technological revolution, and to play at being an unconcerned villager able to connect in an instantaneous way, thanks to his multi-media system, with a world that is supposed to be out there at his disposal – something that McLuhan’s enthusiasm about the electronic media may have authorized us to expect. If it is true that there seem to be a generalized feeling of confusion, we have to be aware of what the ‘global village’ implies already in McLuhan’s analysis: the ‘closing of the whole human family in one planetary family’, the ‘return to Africa within us’ (McLuhan 1976, 30). A family living in ‘one space that is filled with the sound of tribal drums’ is something that might be attractive for the religious spirit of the ‘oracle of the electronic age’ (ibid. 75). But it may not be so compelling to those who, in suffering the degradation of the urban space, cannot find exoticism, the idealization of the Other or the widening and strengthening of family relationships at a universal level, to be adequate or satisfactory answers to the problems they face, and who seek instead political answers to political questions. McLuhan was quite right when he pointed out that the development of new technologies of information would determine changes in human forms of perception, inter-relation and subjectivity. For McLuhan, the invention of print, which translated the voice into repetitions and
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homogeneous spatial segments, brought about the primacy of vision, linearity, perspective and abstraction, the individualism of modern man; now a change of similar proportion is to be expected in the ‘new electric galaxy’, because the media, extensions of man, are also ‘the message’. This well-known statement/slogan (‘The medium is the message’) seems to bring McLuhan close to Rossi-Landi’s conclusion (the medium is a commodity, the commodity a message), but there are substantial differences between these two positions, differences which are important to underline. What is missing from the notion of the ‘global village’ structured by the media as extensions of man is a rigorous pondering about the function of language (language as a medium per se, the medium par excellence, Rossi-Landi’s starting point), with the subsequent lack of politicization both of the presuppositions and of the consequences of McLuhan’s discourse (we could say with Derrida that he does not question the ethno- and logo-centrism of Western metaphysics). McLuhan talks of the Greek alphabet and of print technology as psycho-technologies that organize perception and knowledge in Western societies, and that are capable of creating a mental space that adapts to an outside that it reflects and interprets. For McLuhan writing is the process through which we translate and give representation to the contents and meanings of an experience which is supposed to be intrinsically meaningful and which precedes the act of writing; language is, therefore, just a symbolic system within which meanings originate from reality in a direct, unmediated way, as closed concepts which are possessed and entirely controlled by the subject of knowledge. In our age, after a century of the ‘hypertrophy of the unconscious’ (which is conceived of as direct product of print technology) the new media return the human word to the ‘unified field of being’ to the ‘daylight of consciousness’ and hence undo the ‘hiatus between appearance and reality’ which was created by writing. Or, as Derrik de Kerchhove, a disciple of McLuhan’s, has written more recently, the ‘ecumenism’ that characterizes the electronic media poses the question of a ‘collective consciousness’ (de Kerchhove 1995, 212) as a substitute for Freud’s personal unconscious and Jung’s collective one. In short, McLuhan’s ‘global village’, being founded on a messianic notion of technology, does not return us to language and the polis; rather, it returns us to the nostalgia and the dream of a pre-alphabetized, tribalized world behind which, in spite – in fact, precisely because of – its ‘inclusivity’ we find the ominous presence of the Cartesian Cogito: the presence of a totalizing conscience and rationality destined to erase all differences. What we think is crucial in the whole question of globalization and of
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communication as parts and consequences of the technological revolution of the last decades is the impossibility of disengaging the problem of communication, the media, language, from a political-ideological horizon, and this was Rossi-Landi’s lesson, the most direct consequence of his principle of homology. Technological effectiveness is not a value per se, technology is not intrinsically good or bad, since it is developed and used not in a vacuum, but in the market, that is, in a concrete historical and socio-cultural context. Its status in other words, depends on the socio-economic structures from which it emerges and on the power games in which it is inserted. In this sense we have to reject both demonological points of view, which end up proposing an antiscience metaphysics, as much as we do a technological determinism incapable of analyzing the supposedly innovative developments of technology in the light of theoretical foundations that do not give in to the fascination of the ‘impossible made possible’. If we are interested in a project of cultural criticism and want to be able to articulate sites for resistance and rebellion to the system, we can be neither ‘apocalyptic’ nor ‘integrated’, to use Umberto Eco’s (1965) terms; we must neither endorse the apocalyptic vision of the end of history, nor participate in the anthropocentrism and neo-liberalism of the supporters of the ‘global village’. In fact, if we look at the complex ensemble of phenomena that are identified with the term ‘globalization’ we shall find a variety of elements that are both homogeneous and contradictory, new and old, and which, rather than pointing to the ‘empathy’ of the ‘whole human family’ kept together in the ‘one planetary tribe’ to which McLuhan refers, indicate instead a social organization that Donna Haraway, has called an ‘integrated circuit’. This model’s implications, far from eliminating all differences, have consequences from the point of view of gender, race and for the whole of social relationships. According to Haraway, among the consequences and implications of globalization we find the formation of a new working class and of new sexualities and ethnicities. The huge mobilization of capital and the growing division of labor at an international scale is intertwined with the emergence of new communities, the weakening of familiar groupings and the disappearance of public life. The growing disappearance of stable jobs, previously held, in general, by white men, has issued in the emergence of a homework economy, originally connected to electronics assembling. Connected to the crisis of the Welfare State and facilitated – but not triggered, according to Haraway – by the new technologies, this new socio-economic configuration has brought about new relations between the factory, the household and the market which
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undo the opposition between public/productive space (the factory, the market) and private/reproductive space (the household); it also implies a re-articulation of working and existential relationships between human beings. In fact, strictly connected with the homework economy is the new phenomenon of the ‘feminization of work’. This notion is twofold: on the one hand it indicates the massive access of women to production, both in the First and Third Worlds, which has allowed US black women, for example, to escape barely remunerated work in the house and to hold office jobs as a consequence of the war industry development. It has also allowed Third World women who work in the electronic industry (or in prostitution) increasingly to become the only source of income for their families. According to Haraway, the process of the integration of women into the world of production will gradually affect their relationship with the environment, their personal lives, their self-esteem, their attitudes and expectations and ‘must have major consequences in the psychodynamics and politics of gender and race’ (Haraway 1991, 167). At the same time the ‘feminization of work’ means that work itself is re-defined, and that more and more men have jobs that have the characteristics of jobs held earlier only by women: jobs that imply lack of security, de-centralization, isolation, vulnerability. Another phenomenon that pushes us away from the ‘empathy’ of the McLuhnian family or tribe is the ‘feminization of poverty’, connected to crucial changes in the model of the nuclear, bourgeois family (constituted by a father working in the sphere of production, a mother that stays home and takes care of the household and o