Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

E VOLUTION OF U.S. C OUNTERTERRORISM P OLICY

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

E VOLUTION OF U.S. C OUNTERTERRORISM P OLICY VOLUME 1

Edited by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft Foreword by Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy / compiled by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-0-275-99529-4 (set : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-275-99531-7 (vol 1 : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-275-99533-1 (vol 2 : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-313-34692-7 (vol 3 : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—United States—History. 2. Terrorism—Prevention— United States—History. 3. Terrorism—Prevention—Government policy— United States—History. 4. Civil defense—United States. 5. National security—United States. I. Title: Evolution of United States counterterrorism policy. II. Alexander, Yonah. III. Kraft, Michael, 1937– HV6432.E86 2008 2007028388 363.3250 170973—dc22 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2008 by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007028388 ISBN: 978-0-275-99529-4 (set) 978-0-275-99531-7 (vol. 1) 978-0-275-99533-1 (vol. 2) 978-0-313-34692-7 (vol. 3) First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Volume 1 Contents Foreword by Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Yonah Alexander 1.

Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Laws, Policies, and Programs Michael B. Kraft

xv xvii xix xxi 1

PART ONE: U.S. POLICY PRE–SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

45

2.

The White House

47

President Richard M. Nixon

47

President Richard M. Nixon, Memorandum Establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, September 25, 1972

47

President Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Action to Combat Terrorism, September 27, 1972

48

President James Earl Carter

49

President James Earl Carter, Remarks at the 13th Constitutional Convention of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, November 15, 1979

49

President James Earl Carter, State of the Union Address, 1980

52

President James Earl Carter, State of the Union Address to Congress, January 16, 1981

54

President Ronald Reagan

55

President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan, December 27, 1981

55

President Ronald Reagan, Transcripts of an Interview with US News & World Report, On Foreign Government-Sponsored Terrorism, December 15, 1983

56

vi

Contents Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary, ‘‘International Terrorism,’’ April 17, 1984

56

President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress, International Terrorism Legislation, April 26, 1984

57

President Ronald Reagan, ‘‘The Hijacking of TWA Flight 847: ‘America Will Never Make Concessions to Terrorists’,’’ June 18, 1985

61

President Ronald Reagan, ‘‘The ‘Terrorist Menace’,’’ Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985

62

President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism, May 31, 1986

67

President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, November 13, 1986

68

President George H.W. Bush

71

President George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, New York, New York, January 31, 1992

71

President George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the American Legion National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, August 25, 1992

72

President William Jefferson Clinton

74

President William Jefferson Clinton, Radio Address on Terrorism from G-7 Summit Meeting, June 29, 1996

74

President William Jefferson Clinton, ‘‘American Security in a Changing World,’’ Remarks at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., August 5, 1996

76

President William Jefferson Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, August 20, 1998

79

President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly United Nations, New York, New York, September 21, 1998

81

President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at the Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing 10th Anniversary Observance, Arlington, Virginia, December 21, 1998

84

President William Jefferson Clinton, ‘‘On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century,’’ Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1999

86

President George W. Bush

89

President George W. Bush, Remarks to Troops and Personnel, Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, February 13, 2001

89

President George W. Bush, Remarks to Central Intelligence Employees, Langley, Virginia, March 20, 2001

90

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President George W. Bush, Statement on Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, May 8, 2001

90

President George W. Bush, Joint Press Conference with President Jose Maria Aznar, Moncloa Palace, Madrid, Spain, June 12, 2001

91

President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President and the Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon During a Photo Opportunity at the Oval Office, June 26, 2001

91

Department of State and Department of Defense

93

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

93

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s,’’ Statement Before the Trilateral Commission, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1984

93

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies,’’ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 24, 1984

101

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Remarks at the Luncheon in Honor of The Gulf Cooperation Council, U.N. Plaza Hotel, New York, New York, October 1, 1985

104

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘The Struggle Against Terrorism,’’ Before the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, On the Occasion of Receiving the Joseph Prize for Human Rights, Palm Beach, Florida, February 12, 1988

105

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger

113

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, ‘‘The Use of Military Power,’’ Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 1984

113

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Conference on Low-Intensity Warfare, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., January 14, 1986

120

Secretary of State James Baker

127

Secretary of State James Baker, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 1, 1990

127

Secretary of State Warren Christopher

128

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Address to the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York, September 25, 1995

128

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, ‘‘Fighting Terrorism: Challenges for the Peacemakers,’’ Address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Annual Soref Symposium, May 21, 1996

130

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4.

Contents Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright

133

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Remarks on Designation of Terrorist Organizations, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1997

133

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1999

134

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Written Statement Submitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request for Foreign Operations, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2000

139

Undersecretary of State Timothy E. Wirth

140

Undersecretary of State Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department of State, Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, March 1, 1994

140

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

144

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony at the Budget Hearing Before the Senate Budget Committee, 2002 International Affairs Budget, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2001

144

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony on Counterterrorism Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2001

146

Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism

151

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley

151

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Director, Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, ‘‘International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S. Response,’’ Before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on the Judiciary, May 15, 1985

151

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III

164

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Practical Measures for Dealing with Terrorism,’’ Address Before the Discover Conference on Terrorism in a Technological World, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1987

164

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Terrorism and the Rule of Law,’’ Address Before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, April 23, 1987

169

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics,’’ Address Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, Florida, November 4, 1987

176

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ix

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Countering Terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s,’’ Address Before the George Washington University Conference on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., November 22, 1988

182

Ambassador Morris D. Busby

188

Ambassador Morris D. Busby, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Counter-Terrorism in the 1990s,’’ Address to the International Seminar on Maritime and Port Security, Miami, Florida, January 3, 1990

188

Ambassador Morris D. Busby, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to House Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, April 18, 1991

195

Ambassador Thomas E. McNamara

199

Ambassador Thomas E. McNamara, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 12, 1993

199

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.

203

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, June 29, 1995

203

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks Before the Denver Council on Foreign Relations, Denver, Colorado, September 12, 1996

207

Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan

211

Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2000

211

Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Drugs, Terrorism, and Crime,’’ Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000

216

Attorney General Janet Reno

221

Attorney General Janet Reno, Department of Justice Press Briefing, Fiscal Year 1997 Budget, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1996

221

Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement at the Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Paris, France, July 30, 1996

222

Attorney General Janet Reno, Address to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Conference on ‘‘Shaping the Future,’’ Arlington, Virginia, June 12, 1998

223

Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Justice Department Oversight, May 5, 1999

225

x

6.

Contents Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, February 29, 2000

226

The Intelligence Community

229

Central Intelligence Agency

229

Director William Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘The Practice of International Terrorism Has to be Resisted by All Legal Means,’’ Address Before the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 17, 1985

229

Director James Woolsey, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Terrorism in America,’’ Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C., April 21, 1993

233

Federal Bureau of Investigation

236

Director Louis J. Freeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prepared Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, March 12, 1997

236

PART TWO: U.S. POLICY POST–SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

245

7.

President George W. Bush

247

President George W. Bush, Statement to the Nation, September 11, 2001

247

President George W. Bush, Remarks During Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, The Cabinet Room, September 12, 2001

248

President George W. Bush, Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001

249

President George W. Bush, ‘‘Islam Is Peace,’’ Remarks at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C., September 17, 2001

250

President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001

251

President George W. Bush, Q&A on Afghanistan During Photo Opportunity with King Abdullah of Jordan, The Oval Office, September 28, 2001

256

President George W. Bush, Meeting with Congressional Leaders, The Oval Office, October 2, 2001

257

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on Afghanistan, October 6, 2001

258

President George W. Bush, Address Announcing Military Strikes Against the Taliban, October 7, 2001

259

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President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, World Congress Center, Atlanta, Georgia, November 8, 2001

260

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002

263

President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point, Remarks at 2002 Graduation at Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002

266

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003

268

President George W. Bush, Address at the FBI on New Terrorist Threat Integration Center, February 14, 2003

273

President George W. Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln, At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003

275

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, The White House, Washington, D.C., September 7, 2003

278

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 20, 2004

281

President George W. Bush Discusses America’s Leadership in the Global War on Terror, Remarks at the Roswell Convention and Civic Center, Roswell, New Mexico, January 22, 2004

283

President George W. Bush, Terrorism-Related Remarks from the 2004 Bush Administration Campaign Speech, St. Cloud, Minnesota, September 16, 2004

285

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives, The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2005

287

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., March 8, 2005

289

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, James S. Brady Briefing Room, March 16, 2005

293

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas, April 12, 2005

296

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the Naval Academy Commencement, Navy Marine Corps Memorial Stadium, Annapolis, Maryland, May 27, 2005

298

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, May 31, 2005 300 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq and the War on Terror, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 2005

301

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the FBI Academy, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, July 11, 2005

304

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Military Officers Association, Washington, D.C., September 5, 2006

307

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Contents President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the National Endowment for Democracy, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., October 6, 2005

310

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Chicago, Illinois, May 22, 2006

314

President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 27, 2006

317

President George W. Bush Meets with Supporters of the U.S. Military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Roosevelt Room, June 26, 2006

319

President George W. Bush Discusses Foreign Policy During a Visit to the State Department, Washington, D.C., August 14, 2006

321

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, White House Conference Center Briefing Room, August 21, 2006

324

President George W. Bush Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror, Cobb Galleria Centre, Atlanta, Georgia, September 7, 2006

328

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Reserve Officers Association, Washington, D.C., September 29, 2006

333

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on the National Intelligence Estimate and Iraq, September 30, 2006

338

President George W. Bush, Meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, The White House, December 7, 2006

339

President George W. Bush, Interview, The Washington Post, December 20, 2006

345

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, Indian Treaty Room, December 20, 2006

349

Vice President Richard B. Cheney

357

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement, Annapolis, Maryland, May 24, 2002

357

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002

359

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at a Town Hall Meeting, John Q. Hammons Convention Center, Joplin, Missouri, August 11, 2004

364

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at a Town Hall Meeting, Radisson Quad City Plaza, Davenport, Iowa, August 24, 2004 367 Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terrorism, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., November 22, 2005 369 Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terror, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., January 4, 2006

373

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Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 2006 Policy Conference, Washington D.C., March 7, 2006

375

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at a Rally for Expeditionary Strike Group One, The USS Bonhomme Richard, San Diego, California, May 23, 2006

378

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, May 26, 2006

379

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at the Gerald R. Ford Journalism Prize Luncheon, The National Press Club, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2006

382

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by John King, CNN, The Vice President’s Residence, June 26, 2006

384

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, Reno, Nevada, August 28, 2006

388

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Satellite Interview by WFLA-TV, 9th Congressional District Open Seat Candidate Gus Bilirakis, Tampa, Florida, October 19, 2006

389

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by Scott Hennen, WDAY, at Radio Day, The Vice President’s Office, The White House, October 24, 2006

391

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the Federalist Society’s National Convention, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2006

392

9. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

397

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2002

397

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Report, Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, Washington, D.C., April 24, 2002

400

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council on Iraq WMD, New York, New York, February 5, 2003

408

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the Senate Budget Committee, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2003

426

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004

428

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Interview with Barry Schweid and George Gedda of the Associated Press, September 10, 2004

432

Foreword Counterterrorism is a discipline propelled by events that have not yet happened. It involves speculating on possible threats, undertaking measures to prevent them, fortifying our defenses, and bolstering our capability to respond to and recover from an attack. In short, counterterrorism practitioners try to predict the future and then attempt to change it. But to do so, looking back is just as important as looking forward. Particularly now, when counterterrorism efforts have been so greatly expanded and so frequently misguided, an evaluation of our own practices is crucial. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, the exhaustive collection that follows, is an invaluable tool in crafting the most effective strategies for preventing future terrorist attacks and protecting Americans. Throughout my career in counterterrorism, I have always held that analyzing past terrorist attacks and plots is one of the most effective ways to assess future threats. Case studies of attacks by groups like al Qaeda reveal their modus operandi, methodology, and capability—vital indicators of what their future ambitions may be. And just as there is no greater lens into the intent of terrorists than their history, our own counterterrorism track record holds invaluable insights into what does and does not work. Only through a thorough selfassessment of our past efforts to stop terrorism can we divine the most effective policies going forward. This book lays the foundation for that assessment. The laws, policies, and speeches collected in Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy catalog the scope of American counterterrorism initiatives for the past three decades. These documents are raw history—the artifacts of our ongoing struggle against terrorism. For many Americans, it is a fight that began in September of 2001. But as these volumes show, the genesis came long before. Beginning in the early 1970s, we see the first real recognition of the terrorist threat by America’s national security establishment, then preoccupied by traditional interstate conflict and counterinsurgency. The growing frequency and urgency of the policies that follow in the next three decades reflect the increasing focus on terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s up to the post-9/11 era, when it became the driving force behind America’s national security policy. But it is not only our own history contained here. By telling the story of our historical fight against terrorism, our counterterrorism policies present a perspective on the evolution of terrorism itself. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy begins with a 1972 speech by President Nixon broadly addressing the terrorist threat and then proposes legislative prescriptions outlining

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specific, even arcane, counterterrorism tools. The increasing complexity of the policies reveals an adaptation to an evolving and ever more dangerous enemy. Terrorism is both provoked and sustained by development, technological progress, and globalization. As the world becomes smaller, the ability of the terrorist to communicate, travel, raise and transfer money, and obtain or develop weaponry is enhanced. This has extended the global reach of terrorist groups and magnified their lethality. As terrorists became more cunning, more mobile, and more dangerous, the means used to fight them followed suit. The reader will discern obvious patterns in the intensity of U.S. counterterrorism initiatives. The documents presented here demonstrate only sporadic, reactive attention to terrorism before 9/11. Those of us who devoted our careers to counterterrorism watched in frustration as the institutional focus of the U.S. government locked onto terrorism in the weeks and months following an attack, but inevitably faded as time passed. In this sense, this collection also offers a view of the pre-9/11 world, during which time terrorism occasionally emerged as a foreign policy headache but would reliably return to the back burner, second to the more traditional challenges posed by the Soviet Union or China. This book also archives the work of those individuals within the federal government whose focus on counterterrorism never wavered. In doing so, these documents will answer questions on the minds of Americans who rightly wonder what their government was doing to protect them against terrorism in the pre-9/11 era. Though terrorism was never the national priority it should have been, there were dedicated public servants who did everything they could to prevent attacks. The policies contained in these pages are a testament to those who strove to stop terrorist groups despite bureaucratic hurdles and, when they failed, worked relentlessly to refine their policies to prevent future attacks. Terrorism is a conflict that will be with us for decades to come. If we are to fight terrorism effectively, we must engage in constant, rigorous analysis—not only of terrorist groups, but also of our own efforts to fight them. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy will be the cornerstone of that effort. In an age in which counterterrorism demands so much of our attention and resources, this book is especially important. Since 9/11, there has been an unprecedented expansion of counterterrorism initiatives, many of which have been a waste of valuable time and money. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is a monumental first step toward righting those well-intended but ultimately ineffective policies. We will continue to struggle against terrorist groups, and they will succeed in attacking us again. I am confident, however, that this tremendous resource will go a long way toward ensuring that, over time, our counterterrorism efforts will become effective enough that they are no longer needed. Ambassador (Ret.) Michael A. Sheehan New York City October 2007 MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN served as coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department from 1998 to 2000, with the rank of ambassador. He later became assistant secretary for peacekeeping operations at the United Nations and served as deputy commissioner for counterterrorism in the New York City Police Department. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the New York University Center for Law and Security and has also taught at the U.S. Military Academy’s Center for Counterterrorism at West Point.

Preface The speeches, statements, and testimony contained in these three volumes provide an overview of publicly enunciated U.S. government counterterrorism policies, analysis, and programs. These selections contain many documents that have been collected over the years by the editors and are no longer readily available. They predate the Internet and postings on various Web sites and, as a result, were only slightly edited. Where URLs are available for documents, they are included at the end of the items. These documents were, at times, heavily excerpted to eliminate duplicative or irrelevant sections. In many cases, terrorism-related comments were only part of much broader speeches. In other instances, such as speeches, somewhat duplicative phrases were left in where their inclusion provide richer context or include slight changes in terminology. The links provided were those available at the time this manuscript went to press and it is possible that some URLs are no longer accessible. This compilation is by no means all inclusive—the massive volume of terrorism-related statements, especially since the transformative events of the September 11 attacks and the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, prohibits the inclusion of all available documents. Every effort was made, however, to include the most useful statements, speeches, and testimony for both the general reader and as a resource for researchers. The time period covered in the various chapters extends from the Nixon administration to the end of 2006. Because of space limitations, with a few exceptions, we did not include material from daily press briefings by the State Department and other agencies but instead focused on formal testimony and speeches, which usually were precleared and vetted through the Office of Management and Budget’s clearance process. For the same reason, the full texts of useful documents such as Executive Orders were not included; however, their titles and URLs are listed in the Key Documents (chapter 27). Our intent is to provide leads and references for readers who are interested in more detailed research. We note that because of the relationship between the subject matter in various chapters, it is useful to read these chapters together. For example, the chapters covering President George W. Bush (chapter 7) and Vice President

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Richard B. Cheney (chapter 8) include material related to the Iraq chapter (chapter 19). The Threats chapter (chapter 17) should be read alongside both the Intelligence chapter (chapter 18) and the statements by the various Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism (chapter 11). The Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Financial chapters (chapters 20–22) also are interrelated. We hope these documents will further the understanding of the development of U.S. counterterrorism policies and provide a context for understanding the crucial terrorism problems facing the United States and other countries.

Acknowledgments Work on these three volumes began in 1991 in recognition of the reality that many governments and writers have failed to appreciate the magnitude and implications of the contemporary terrorist threat. Some countries have regarded terrorism as a minor nuisance or irritant and therefore have not developed a strong commitment to dealing effectively with the challenge. However, the United States, beginning with the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, has understood the true vulnerability of modern society to current and future terrorist threats and has accordingly sought to develop credible responses and capabilities to reduce the dangers posed by both state and nonstate actors utilizing terrorist tactics. The editors, therefore, recognized a need to provide a resource that illustrates the evolution of official U.S. government policies and actions within this important field of growing public concern. The aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks only served to reinforce this pressing mission. Research on this project was initially conducted from 1991 through 2005 by Professor Yonah Alexander and several teams of assistants representing many universities and colleges located both within the United States and abroad. Additional significant research work was undertaken by Michael Kraft upon his retirement from the U.S. State Department’s Counterterrorism Office in 2004 and work at the National Defense University in 2005. The editors acknowledge the contributions of all those who participated in this project over the past 16 years with special emphasis given to those who were involved during the 2005–2007 period. Special gratitude goes to Jack Baber (Alumnus, Rhodes College) for his dedicated and extraordinary efforts in coordinating the massive, 10-month enterprise of preparing the manuscript for publication. Without his professionalism and perseverance throughout, this project could not have been completed in such a timely manner. Most recently, he was assisted by Brett Wallace (Alumnus, George Washington University), Steven Lockfield (Alumnus, London School of Economics and Political Science), Mark Graham (University of New Hampshire), and Michael Atkinson (Cabrini College). Research assistance was provided by the following individuals: Andrew Fulton (Alumnus, Hamilton College), Colin Costello (Georgetown University),

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Acknowledgments

Jack Mountjoy (Whitman College), Alexandra Wald (Vanderbilt University), Zachary Riskind (University of Virginia), Petr Krakora (Norfolk State University), Ian Mulderry-Hoffer (University of Connecticut), Nick Quon (Loyola Marymount University), Robert Daniels (Wake Forest University), Tobias Senzig (University of Trier), Gregory Kruczek (Pennsylvania State University), Ann Koppuzha (Georgetown University), Patricia Rueda (American University), Deandra Perruccio (Assumption College), Michelle Phillips (University of Iowa), and Lauren Kari (Tufts University). Several academic institutions and a number of individuals provided encouragement and support for this project over the years. We are most appreciative of the contributions of Michael S. Swetnam, chairman and chief executive officer of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and Professor Edgar Brenner, co-director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute. The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and George Washington University’s Terrorism Studies Program also assisted in the realization of this project. Finally, several foundation grants also provided support for this publication. We express our appreciation to the many dedicated public servants in the U.S. government, including the legal specialists in the Justice and State Departments, who have labored over the years to cope with the evolving terrorism threat. The editors also express their thanks to their wives, Miriam Alexander and Lisa Kraft, who provided their strong support during the countless hours of work on this endeavor.

Introduction Yonah Alexander The struggle for power—political, social, economic, and strategic—within and among nations has endured the boundaries of time and space. Recorded historical cycles underscore that nothing is static in world affairs. Indeed, as countries and empires rise, decline, and even vanish completely, others are taking their place. Napoleon once asserted that individuals are moved by only two levers–– self-interest and fear. Foreign policy, for instance, is motivated by national interests. Each distinct juridical entity, as well as various ideological and theological groups, determines the nature of what constitutes ‘‘interests.’’ Despite both fundamental or marginal differences regarding its meaning, historical lessons clearly indicate that national interests are essentially based on the popular notion that everybody is trying to ‘‘water their own tree,’’ and, as a result, the causes of peace, justice, and progress are not always served. An early glimpse of this stark reality was demonstrated by President George Washington in his ‘‘Farewell Address’’ on September 19, 1796, when he declared, ‘‘‘tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with a portion of the foreign world.’’ It was not, however, until the presidency of John F. Kennedy that contemporary American national interests were most clearly articulated. In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961, President Kennedy stated, ‘‘Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty.’’ Another significant aspect to consider regarding power politics is the element of fear. ‘‘Nothing is to be feared but fear,’’ Francis Bacon has correctly asserted. Indeed, the most practiced projection of man’s inhumanity to man is

Note: This introduction consists of research work completed on September 30, 2007. The information presented is based on various published and unpublished studies prepared specifically for this project since 1991. Sources utilized are governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental. No classified information is incorporated. First, Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism: An International Resource File (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 1986–91), 8 vols. Second, Yonah Alexander and Donald J. Musch, eds., Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1990–2002), vols. 16–35.

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the spread of fear through the employment of terror in violation of law. This strategy and tactic—constituting random and systematic intimidation, coercion, repression, or destruction of individuals, communities, and nations—has been utilized by both the strong and the weak from time immemorial. This tool of power, in all its manifold manifestations, has been utilized to achieve realistic or imaginary objectives, ranging from preserving internal oppression to defeating adversaries through propaganda and violence. It is no wonder that Tacitus asserted that ‘‘even the bravest are frightened by sudden terrors’’ and that Mao Tse-Tung, in his classic On Guerrilla Warfare (1973) contended that ‘‘political power emanates from the barrel of a gun.’’ Thus, throughout human history, fear and brute force employed in the name of ‘‘higher’’ rationalizations and justifications have traditionally been commonplace. Among the numerous precedents frequently highlighted are the assassinations by the Muslim radical Hashasheen of their co-religionists opponents and Christian ‘‘infidels’’ in the Middle East between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries; the Spanish Inquisition’s frequent resort to violence in its effort to ‘‘protect’’ Catholicism during the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries; the ‘‘Reign of Terror’’ of the French Revolution in the eighteenth century; the illegal underground operations of Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) in Czarist Russia in the nineteenth century; and the unprecedented tyranny and brutality of Soviet, Fascist, and Nazi regimes during the last century.1 Since terrorism is a cheap, attractive, and effective instrument of fear, it has been repeatedly employed by a variety of groups and even nations in the post– World War II era. Currently, it is becoming a permanent fixture of international life, threatening every nation, large and small, including the United States, the only remaining superpower, with its unmatched economic and military capabilities. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have utilized tactics of propaganda and violence on an unprecedented scale, with serious implications for national, regional, and global security. Specifically, modern terrorism is characterized by an ideological and theological fanaticism, based on hatred toward one’s perceived enemy, which has been coupled with rapid technological advancements in communications (for example, the Internet), transportation (for example, modern international air travel), as well as conventional and unconventional weaponry to create a truly lethal threat. Indeed, this threat has become much more decentralized, as it now emanates not only from established terrorist organizations, but from individuals with the motives, means, and opportunity to visit harm upon civil society. As a result of these developments, modern terrorism presents a multitude of threats to the safety, welfare, and civil rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the health of national and international economic systems; and the expansion of democracies. What is of particular concern is the likelihood that highly motivated terrorists would resort to employ weapons of mass death and destruction potential. Already in the 1970s, Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, then the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, warned of this development:

1

For some historical perspectives, see, for example, Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Terrorism Reader, Rev. Edition (New York: NAL Penguin Inc., 1987).

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Indeed modern terrorism with sophisticated technological means at its disposal and the future possibility of access to nuclear weapons, presents a clear and present danger to the very existence of civilization itself.2

More recently, former Senator Sam Nunn, currently the co-chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in discussing catastrophic terrorism asserted: In my view the threat of terrorism with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction present the gravest danger to our nation and the world. We know that al Qaeda is seeking nuclear weapons. We don’t know how many other groups also have similar ambitions. We know that nuclear material al Qaeda desires is housed in many poorly structured sites around the globe. We believe that if they get that material, they can build a nuclear weapon. We believe that if they build a nuclear weapon, they will use it.3

Senator Nunn further explained: I am not sure we fully grasp the devastating, world changing impact of a nuclear attack. If a 10 kiloton nuclear device goes off in mid-town Manhattan on a typical work week, it could kill more than half a million people. Ten kilotons, a plausible yield for a terrorist bomb, has the power of 10,000 tons of TNT. To haul that volume of explosives you would need a cargo train one hundred cars long. But if it were a nuclear bomb, it could fit into the back of a truck. Beyond the immediate deaths and the lives would be shortened by radioactive fallout—the casualty list would also include an erosion of civil liberties, privacy, and the world economy. So American citizens have every reason to ask, ‘‘Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?’’ The simple answer is ‘‘no, we are not.’’4

And according to the latest annual report by Harvard University’s project on Managing the Atom and the Nuclear Threat Initiative titled ‘‘Securing the Bomb 2007,’’ the worrisome news is that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium ‘‘the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries, and terrorists are actively trying to get a nuclear bomb or the materials to make one.’’5 Despite the forgoing awareness of the dangers of ‘‘superterrorism’’ and the extensive national and international efforts to control the level of modern threats, the prospects for future escalation of the globalization and brutalization of this mode of warfare remains high. Many factors contribute to this situation, including (1) different perceptions of the nature of the challenge;

2

‘‘Foreword’’ by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), VI. For earlier studies related to ‘‘superterrorism,’’ see, for instance, Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds., Nuclear Terrorism: Defining the Threat (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986) and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987). 3 Cited in American Bar Association (Standing Committee on Law and National Security). National Security Law Report 29, no. 3 (August 2007), 1–2. 4 Ibid. 5 Matthew Bunn, ‘‘Thwarting Terrorists: More to Be Done,’’ The Washington Post, September 26, 2007, A19.

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(2) disagreements regarding contributing factors that encourage terrorism such as political, social, and economic; (3) some state tolerance, appeasement, support, and even sponsorship of terrorism; and (4) the existence of a regional and global network and infrastructure of nonstate actors, providing, among other things, inspiration, financial support, training, weapons supplies, document forging, safe houses, and operational direction and coordination. It is amply evident that the major terrorist challenges that have faced nation-states in the post–World War II period consisted of three ‘‘long battles or wars.’’ The first was the four-decade Cold War, during which time the Soviet Union employed terrorism via proxy client and cooperative states, including Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and North Korea. In turn, these states directly supported nations such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran that openly sponsored specific terrorist organizations with financing weapons, training, and operational assistance. Thus, the former Soviet Union was able to reap the geopolitical benefits of terrorist actions from a distance. Indeed, the Soviet Union, in pursuing its own global political and strategic objectives, deftly exploited the popular notions of ‘‘liberation struggle’’ and a ‘‘war of national liberation’’ to justify its direct and indirect support of both allies and like-minded states as well as numerous left-wing and revolutionary movements throughout the world. That ‘‘long war’’ ended when the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991.6 The second ‘‘long war,’’ which continues today, began on November 4, 1979, when Iranian militants, with the support Ayatollah Khomeini’s government, seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking some 50 American diplomats hostage. After 444 days in captivity, the hostages were released in January 1981 immediately after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president, succeeding the Carter administration.7 Later, in the early 1980s after Americans were taken hostage in Lebanon, Reagan’s top aides initiated the Iran-Contra ‘‘arms-for-hostages’’ deal, in which America sold arms to Tehran to persuade Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God) terrorists to release the American hostages. These hostages were taken by Hezbollah in an effort to force the United States and other Western countries to pressure Kuwait to release two Lebanese militants who were among the 17 terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait for the December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait City as well as the failed attacks on a Kuwaiti oil refinery facility and the Kuwait International Airport control tower. The attacks were conducted by the Iranian-backed Islamic Da’wa party as a result of Kuwait’s support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.

6 For details see, for example, Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crowe Russak, 1984). One of the most dramatic terrorist plots during the Cold War was the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in May 1981. Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turkish gunman, accused Sergei Antonov, a representative in Rome of Bulgaria’s owned airline, as an accomplice working for his country’s secret service on behalf of the Kremlin. For recent articles on this case, see The Washington Post, August 2, 2007, and The New York Times, August 3, 2007. 7 For an excellent analysis, see for instance, Gary Sick, October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan (New York: Times Books, 1991).

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Many argue that the U.S. decision to effectively negotiate with Hezbollah via its state sponsor, Iran, in an effort to secure the release of American hostages, combined with the Reagan administration’s withdrawal of the Marine peacekeeping force within months of Lebanese Hezbollah’s 1983 suicide truck bomb attack on the Marine barracks, illustrated U.S. weakness in confronting terrorists. This perception led terrorist groups worldwide to conclude that asymmetrical warfare tactics could be effectively employed against the American superpower and therefore encouraged a global escalation of antiAmerican attacks in the following decades. Even now, some 28 years after the Tehran embassy takeover, Iran is still engaged in this ‘‘long war’’ against the United States.8 In the early 1980s, Iran supported Hezbollah, which attacked American embassies in Lebanon and Kuwait as well as well as the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, killing and wounding hundreds of civilian and military personnel. Iran was implicated in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American servicemen. During the summer of 2007, Iran was identified by U.S. officials as having directly and indirectly supported both Islamic and nationalist terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Iraq against American, Iraqi, and allied forces attempting to regain control amid a vicious insurgency. Tehran provides training and weapons, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to include a deadly type of IED called an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) capable of disabling heavily armored U.S. military vehicles with deadly effect, as well as other assorted light arms. Indeed, in August 2007, a top U.S. commander asserted that Shiite militia groups that received weapons and training from Iran were responsible for 73 percent of U.S. military casualties in Baghdad in July of that year.9 More ominously, according to the U.S. intelligence community’s consensus, a hasty withdrawal of American troops from Iraq could result in an Iranian intervention in Iraq, either unilaterally or by invitation from Iraqi Shiite factions. In addition, Tehran is supporting terrorism in other regional hotspots. In Afghanistan, Iranian financial support and weapons have been provided to forces affiliated with the Taliban, which has been conducting guerrilla warfare against American and coalition troops present in the country since November 2001 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and the wider, U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism. Also, in Lebanon, Iran, in cooperation with Syria, has long funded and equipped Hezbollah with technologically sophisticated weapons,

8 For recent studies, see, for example, Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, The New Iranian Leadership: Terrorism, Nuclear Ambition, and the Middle East Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), and Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran, Policy Focus No. 72 (Washington, DC: Institute for Near East Policy, 2007). 9 Associated Press Baghdad article by Kim Gamel, quoting Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, second in command of U.S. forces, The Washington Times, August 6. 2007, 13, http:// www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID¼/20070806/FOREIGN/108060033/ 1003&template¼printart.

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which enabled the Shiite terrorist movement to launch and sustain a monthlong war against Israel in the summer of 2006. This conflict included the launching of thousands of unguided Katyusha rockets into Israeli territory, causing civilian casualties and temporarily shutting down activity in some northern Israeli towns and villages. Furthermore, Iran continues to support Hamas, a Sunni Islamic radical group now in control of Gaza, as well as other Palestinian militant groups in the West Bank, with financial assistance, weapons supplies, and training, to further its goal of undermining Israel and the Middle East peace process, which the United States and its allies in the region and elsewhere sought to revive in the summer of 2007. The most disturbing and challenging current threat to U.S. security interests—and, indeed, to the security of the Middle East region as a whole—is Tehran’s decision to actively pursue the development of nuclear materials with weaponized applications. Iran’s current activities have focused on the acquisition of fissile materials, such as enriched uranium—a core of any nuclear device. Despite public statements professing its peaceful intentions regarding the production of nuclear materials, the Iranian regime is widely believed to desire a weapons-grade nuclear program. This potentiality, when coupled with its traditional utilization of terrorism as a state instrument, engenders the truly nightmarish possibility (if not probability) that Iran could deploy the ultimate weapon via a terrorist proxy against Israel, a regional Middle Eastern opponent, the United States, or other perceived adversaries.10 A stark reminder of this scenario is highlighted in the recent address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 2007, by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He asserted that his country will not submit to the pressure applied by ‘‘the arrogant powers,’’ led by the United States and other leading nations through the Security Council, attempting to force Tehran to abandon its quest for a nuclear program. Denouncing what Ahmadinejad called the ‘‘master-servant relationship of the Medieval Age,’’ he declared that ‘‘the nuclear issue of Iran is now closed.’’11 Despite Ahmadinejad’s defiance, three days later the U.N. Security Council agreed to consider in November 2007 tighter sanctions against Iran if it fails to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.12 A third form of the ‘‘long war’’ against the United States has already marked its sixteenth anniversary: the ongoing battle initiated by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda (the ‘‘Base’’) terrorist group.13 More specifically, this dangerous contemporary 10

See for instance, Ephraim Kam, ‘‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does It Mean, and What Can Be Done’’ (Tel Aviv, The Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum No. 88, February 2007). 11 Cited in press reports from the United Nations. See, for example, The Washington Post and The New York Times, September 26, 2007. 12 See, for instance, The Washington Times, September 29, 2007. 13 For a study published prior to 9/11 see Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, Usama bin Laden’s al Qaeda: Profile of a Terrorist Network (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001). Numerous studies were published in the post–September 11 period. See, for example, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America (New York: Random House, 2003), and Laurent Muraweiec, Pandora’s Boxes: The Mind of Jihad, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2007).

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Sunni terrorist network and affiliated groups, composed of supporters, cells, and links in some 100 countries, is now responsible for the spread of a radical Salafist ideology of jihad (holy war) to all corners of the world, a development that has gravely affected many nations in addition to the United States.14 The ideology and objectives of al Qaeda are crystal clear. It opposes all nations and institutions governed in a manner inconsistent with bin Laden’s particular extremist interpretation of Islam, and specifically targets countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, to name a few. These militants support the violent overthrow of these countries’ governments because, according to their puritanical Salafist Islamic beliefs, these governments have been corrupted by Western, specifically American, influence and do not adhere to the concept of a ‘‘true’’ Islamic society. Ultimately, al Qaeda’s followers believe that all Muslim state boundaries will disappear, and that the broader umma, or Islamic community, will be united under the rule of the Caliphs governed by Sharia, or Islamic jurisprudence. The evolution of this brutal and costly ideological and physical conflict between al Qaeda and the United States has been shaped by a series of specific events that have particularly influenced American policymakers, both unilaterally and multilaterally, as they have developed new strategies to confront this continually evolving threat. Four specific benchmarks in this intellectual and physical struggle are worth noting: (1) in August 1996, bin Laden issued a Declaration of Jihad against the United States and the Saudi Arabian government; (2) in February 1998, al Qaeda’s founder, along with his senior associate Ayman al-Zawahiri, endorsed a fatwah (religious ruling) stating that Muslims should kill Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world they can be found; (3) in May 1998, Mohammed Atef (bin Laden’s second in command) sent Khaled al Fawwaz (al Qaeda’s spokesmen) a letter endorsing a fatwah issued by bin Laden and including a declaration by the ‘‘Ulema Union of Afghanistan’’ calling for a Jihad against the United States and its allies; and (4) in late May 1998, bin Laden issued a statement entitled ‘‘The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,’’ in which he stated that it is the duty of Muslims to prepare as many forces as possible to attack the enemies of God. Additionally, a series of spectacular attacks by al Qaeda in both the United States and abroad underscored, more than ever before, America’s vulnerability and the urgent need to overhaul its counterterrorism policies to confront the threat. The first dramatic attack, which was the largest foreign terrorist operation on American soil at the time, occurred on February 26, 1993, when a large truck bomb exploded in the basement parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing 8 people, injuring more than 1,000, and causing widespread damage and panic. The attack was perpetrated by a group of foreign terrorists from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the Palestinian 14

al Qaeda is also known as the ‘‘International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders’’; ‘‘Islamic Salvation Foundation’’; ‘‘Group for the Preservation of the Holy Site’’; and ‘‘Islamic Army of the Liberation of the Holy Places’’. Moreover, al Qaeda is not only a network in the conventional sense, it is also considered to include loosely affiliated groups that may be inspired or supported by the movement leadership but not under the direct command as far as is known.

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Authority. Ramzi Yousef, an al Qaeda operative and Sheik Omar AbdelRahman, the spiritual leader of the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad, with links to bin-Laden, were convicted of carrying out this attack and sentenced to life imprisonment. On October 3–4 of that same year, 18 U.S. servicemen were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, by local militia men. al Qaeda claimed credit for helping train them to effectively employ rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers against U.S. helicopters operating in the area. Other major al Qaeda–affiliated attacks include the November 13, 1995, car bomb explosion outside the American-operated Saudi National Guard training center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 Americans and 2 Indians; the June 25, 1996, car bombing attack with Iranian support at Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 soldiers and wounding hundreds more; the two virtually simultaneous August 7, 1998, truck bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 234 people, 12 of them American, and wounding more than 5,0000 others; and the October 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the USS Cole during a refueling stop in Aden, Yemen harbor, which killed 17 and wounded 39 American sailors. It was not, however, until September 11, 2001, that the most heinous demonstration of America’s unprecedented vulnerability to contemporary terrorism occurred. Bin Laden’s ‘‘War in the Shadows’’ hit the American homeland in an attack that what was described by many as a second ‘‘Day of Infamy,’’ causing more casualties than the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Nineteen al Qaeda terrorists on a suicide mission hijacked four U.S. airliners, crashing two into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and a third into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. A fourth plane, headed toward Washington, D.C., and apparently destined for the U.S. Capitol building or the White House, crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers, alerted by cell phone calls about the earlier New York strikes, attacked the hijackers, who then crashed the plane. The human cost of these attacks was 2,974 dead with thousands more injured. Even six years after this most devastating assault on the American homeland, the United States is still facing daily warnings and threats of terrorism from al Qaeda’s leadership. On September 11, 2007, for instance, al Qaeda’s bin Laden, in a new propaganda video, urged sympathizers to join the ‘‘caravan’’ of martyrs as he praised one of the 9/11 suicide attackers, reading his last will.15 The seriousness of this message lies in the growing realization within the U.S. intelligence community that the homeland continues to face a jihadist terrorist threat for many years to come. Clearly, these dangers did not originate on September 11, 2001, as terrorism has challenged the United States to some degree throughout its 231-year history. Terrorism will undoubtedly continue to represent a sporadic, yet relentless, form of fear and violence for at least the remainder of the twentyfirst century. More specifically, while it is expected that homegrown and foreign terrorists will continue to use a wide range of conventional arms (for example, small arms, bombs, and more sophisticated weapons), the arsenal of 15

Reported by NBC News, September 11, 2007.

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tomorrow’s terrorists will most probably include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cyber instruments capable of inflicting mass destruction and death. Terrorists, led by the al Qaeda movement, have shifted their modus operandi from more traditional attacks, such as those conducted by earlier secular groups directed at a relatively limited number of persons—often for specific goals such as releasing imprisoned comrades—to attacks on a massive scale intended to kill or maim as many people as possible. In other words, the technological advances in weaponry and other terrorist instruments, combined with their increasingly lethal intentions and methods, are turning all societies into potential victims of a new and deadly form of ‘‘superterrorism.’’ As such, past notions of perceived immunity from terrorist attack generated by an assumed ideological or geographic distance from the area of a particular terrorist group’s grievances no longer hold true. Indeed, in their eyes, all of civil society has become a legitimate target of terrorist violence. This globalization and brutalization of modern terrorism requires the United States to develop effective strategies to reduce this threat to manageable levels. As such, understanding the context and history of this national policymaking effort can be useful in the effort to counter the evolving terrorism threat. The foregoing overview of the challenges of contemporary terrorism to all societies provides a general context for the following sections dealing with some perspectives in the evolution of U.S. policies and actions. The first section details different terrorist threats to America, focusing on past experience, current challenges, and future prospects. It outlines some perceptions and definitional issues as well as domestic and foreign terrorist threats. The second section presents a survey of selected U.S. policies and actions during the pre– and post–September 11 periods.

TERRORIST CHALLENGES AND THE UNITED STATES: PAST EXPERIENCE, CURRENT THREATS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Definitional Considerations No historical period has been immune to the threat of terrorism. The Lasswellian formula, ‘‘who gets what, when and how,’’ often accompanied with the element of the unexpected or unthinkable strike, has characterized the nature of political and ideological violence for millennia. It is understandable, for instance, that Sun Tzu particularly stressed the advantage of a surprise attack against adversaries. He noted: The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in many places … If he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, there will be a few on the left. And when he prepares everywhere he will be weak everywhere.

The utility of this strategy and tactic becomes evident both in ancient history and modern times. And yet, despite this record as a symbol, tool, method, or process, terrorism has evaded a universally accepted definition. What

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constitutes ‘‘terrorism’’ was highly controversial throughout the ages. Some have asserted that the validity of their cause, such as resistance to imperial domination or draconian totalitarian regimes, justified the resort to violence, viewing it as an acceptable alternative to the exercise of legitimate power. To others, the use of any form of terrorism, regardless of motivation, is perceived as negative and essentially criminal, outside the realm of what is tolerated, and punishable in accordance with relevant domestic and international law. Moreover, American public consciousness has never completely embraced the true meaning or impact of terrorism as Americans, by and large, have regarded the threat as an irritant that can be effectively managed by the administration in power. Additionally, there have been numerous official disagreements concerning the nature and extent of the threat and what can, and should, be done about it. For instance, before the 9/11 attacks, U.S. government officials did not consider ‘‘terrorism’’ to constitute a major strategic challenge to the survival of the Republic. In fact, semantic, moral, and legal confusion and differences over the precise meaning and implications of ‘‘terrorism’’ have hindered formulation of national coherent policies and actions aimed at preventing, deterring, and decreasing the effectiveness of terrorist acts, or punishing identified terrorists after they have struck. Indeed, the United States, as a pluralistic democracy, spoke with a variety of voices on the definition of ‘‘terrorism.’’ Both state and federal entities have used a range of definitions. More specifically, in the American federal system, each state determines what constitutes an offense under its criminal or penal code. States have therefore defined terrorism generically as a crime, thus sidestepping the need for the use of specific statutes covering selected criminal acts identified as terrorism. For instance, the Arkansas Criminal Code states that ‘‘a person commits the offense of terroristic threatening if with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial property damage to another person.’’16 In general, state laws concerning terrorism appear under nine separate headings, including civil defense (interstate compacts and state emergency management plans), antiterrorism provisions, destructive devices, terrorist threats, enhanced criminal penalties, victim compensation, street terrorism, ecological terrorism, and taxes. Regarding the first category, as an example, the authority of states to enter into interstate compacts of any kind is governed by Article I, Section IV, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires congressional authorization. Similarly, the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, authorizes interstate compacts dealing with civil defense against various emergencies, including terrorist attacks. At the federal level, the executive branch, partly as a result of the very nature of its jurisdictional diversities and focus, has not developed a universal coordinated position on the meaning of the term. Since the 1980s, for instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), operating domestically as a law enforcement agency within the Department of Justice, has defined terrorism as ‘‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to 16

ARK. Code ANN. J-13-301 (Michie 1997). For a definition of ‘‘a crime that furthers terrorism’’ see, for example, Minn.Stat § 609.714 (2002).

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intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.’’17 Prior to 9/11, the FBI also made a distinction between ‘‘domestic terrorism’’ as perpetrated by a ‘‘group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction’’ and ‘‘international terrorism,’’ involving acts that ‘‘occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum.’’ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with jurisdiction over intelligence gathering and espionage activities abroad, asserted in 1980 that ‘‘international terrorism is terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against federal nationals, institutions, or governments.’’18 Additionally, the Department of Defense, when reporting on the 1983 suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 American marines, emphasized the ‘‘unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization.’’ The Department of the Army, although adhering to the ‘‘violence’’ theme, added the following: ‘‘Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.’’19 It was not until a decade later that the Department of State formally adopted a definition, which is codified in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d), stating that ‘‘the term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’’ The term ‘‘noncombatant,’’ according to the Department of State, is interpreted to mean, ‘‘in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether on duty or not) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.’’ Moreover, ‘‘the term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one country’’ and ‘‘the term ‘terrorist group’ means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.’’ These definitions originally were used for the State Department’s annual reports, then called ‘‘Patterns of Global Terrorism,’’ and were formally enacted via the 1998 law that formally mandated these annual reports to Congress.20 In short, American perceptions have gradually evolved from the traditional view of terrorism as a ‘‘crime’’ to a new disposition characterizing it as a new and unprecedented tactical and strategic form of warfare. Clearly, 9/11 provided the U.S. government, and particularly the president, with extensive

17 ‘‘Terrorism in the United States, 3–4’’ (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC, 1998). 18 ‘‘Pattern of International Terrorism: 1980’’ (National Assessment Center, Washington DC, ii). 19 U.S. Army Regulation 190–52. 20 Section 140 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988/89 [P.L. 100– 204].

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wartime authority to protect the American people. However, in the aftermath of the sixth anniversary of this defining tragedy, the debate continues as to the meaning, legality, and the implications of the war against terrorism. Domestic Perspectives Although the focus of these volumes is the threats of international terrorism and American efforts to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy, it became brutally clear after 9/11 that homeland security cannot be separated from overseas security interest concerns. This section, therefore, provides a general overview of domestic perspectives regarding the nature of the challenge within America itself and some of the governmental responses. More specifically, throughout American history, sporadic outbreaks of terrorism in the homeland have been mounted by domestic and foreign groups. Among the early ‘‘homegrown’’ militants were, for example, the Molly Maguires, a band of militant Irish immigrants, who resorted to vengeance against the anti-Catholic, Scotch, Ulster, Welsh, and English Protestants in Pennsylvania during the 1870s. However, the most notable historical, radical movement employing terrorist tactics is the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Surviving its early beginnings during the post–Civil War period, the KKK has continued its modus operandi of intolerance, hatred, and violence well into contemporary times. Dramatic attacks by the KKK in the United States during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement included the abduction and murder of two white civil rights workers, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner, along with their African American colleague, Mississippian James Chaney. Only in 2005, some 41 years later, was Klansman Edgar Ray Killen, the mastermind behind the murders, convicted and sentenced to three consecutive 20-year prison terms. Other historical domestic terrorist groups also failed in achieving their aims. It was not, however, until the turbulent 1960s that a proliferation of radical movements with violent tendencies emerged. The Weather Underground, the New World Liberation Front, the George Jackson Brigade, the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Black Liberation Army, and the Black Panther Party were among the most active left-wing groups in the United States during the late 1960s and 1970s. During the same period, ethnic and nationalist groups (for example, the Jewish Defense League, Armenian movements, Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation, Omega 7-Cuban Nationalist Movement, and the Cuban National Liberation Front) operated within the United States and Puerto Rico. While these domestic U.S. terrorist groups were often less professional and successful than their international counterparts, they succeeded in attacking a variety of targets, including the police, the military, businesses, and others in more than 600 attacks during the 1970s. Additionally, foreign terrorist groups were actively targeting non-Americans victims in the United States during that decade. Some of these groups included the Croatian Group Otpar (Resistance), the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Black September. During the 1980s, the number of terrorist activities in the United States, both indigenous and foreign, dropped to around 220, and a further decline

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was seen during the 1990s, when only 60 domestic attacks were recorded. These incidents included the 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, by El Sayyid Nosair, an Egyptian follower of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Additionally, individual Middle Eastern gunmen, some acting independently and others with broader terrorist connections, fired on foreign tourists at the Empire State Building in 1997 and at the El Al ticket counter in Los Angeles International Airport in 2002. A significant contributing factor in this three-decade long downward trend in attacks was the success of proactive operations by the FBI, which included effective cooperation with other law enforcement agencies in the United States and abroad followed by vigorous criminal prosecutions. The 1990s, however, registered a variety of new groups committed to ideological and political violence. These included reactionary right-wing movements advancing anti-Semitic and white supremacist causes as well as antigovernment and antitax beliefs (for example, the Aryan Nations). Additionally, radical environmentalist movements resorted to violent tactics in pursuit of their goals. Groups such as the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC) sought to preserve ecological systems by sabotaging perceived despoilers of the environment, and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) has damaged laboratories that use animals in medical research and industry. Mention should be made of several foreign groups and agents who continued sporadic terrorism support activities within the United States during the 1980s, to include fundraising and weapons acquisitions for their colleagues abroad. Examples include activities by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Sikh militants, and Iranian agents. Additionally, other groups supporting Hamas and other Middle Eastern terrorist organizations became more active in the 1990s. Although fear of attacks was widespread during the 1991 Gulf War, no incidents occurred in the United States, perhaps because of the preventive security measures undertaken by the U.S. government and the private sector. These efforts included a reduction of Iraqi diplomatic staff, scrutiny of Iraqi and other nationals suspected of being linked to radical Arab causes, and upgrading security at government and military installations as well as airports and other commercial and industrial sites. Despite the foregoing effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism measures, two devastating attacks in the 1990s dramatically altered American perceptions of the nature of the threat to the homeland. The first spectacular event was the February 26, 1993, bombing of the World Trade Center (discussed previously). The second attack, labeled the largest act of domestic terrorism in American history, took place on April 19, 1995, and destroyed the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This unprecedented attack, perpetrated by two American terrorists, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, claimed 168 lives, including 19 children, and wounded 674 people. The bomb not only destroyed the federal building, but also severely damaged or destroyed more than 25 other structures. Another noteworthy incident unfolded on December 14, 1999, when Ahmed Ressam, a militant linked to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group

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(GIA), affiliated with al Qaeda, living in Montreal, Canada, was arrested as he attempted to cross into the United States at Port Angeles, Washington, with explosives in the trunk of his car. Ressam’s ‘‘millennium plot’’ to attack symbolic targets such as Los Angeles International Airport, as well as other attempted attacks thwarted by Jordanian authorities, triggered alarm bells throughout the U.S. government. In spite of these events, however, some U.S. officials failed to fully comprehend the nature of the threat from abroad, and despite a flurry of terrorism threat reports during the early summer of 2001, it was not until September 11, 2001, that the United States truly realized the full extent of the terrorist challenge to the homeland. Two additional aspects related to homeland security concerns are relevant. First, the threats recorded in the United States involved not only organized terrorist groups but also individuals acting on their own to achieve some sort of ideological and political goal. A case in point was the activities of Theodore John ‘‘Ted’’ Kaczynski, better known as the ‘‘Unabomber.’’ He became infamous in the late 1970s through the early 1990s for having engaged in a campaign of mail bombings to universities and airlines in an effort to ‘‘protect’’ the environment from destruction by technologically advanced modern societies.21 Second, in the post-9/11 period, the security concern in the United States has understandably shifted from domestic to foreign threats to the homeland. It is not surprising, therefore, that on July 17, 2007, a publicly released summary of the National Intelligence Estimate asserted that the United States will face ‘‘a persistent and evolving threat from renewed al Qaeda over the next three years.’’22 Consider, for instance, two recent incidents that underscore the nature of these dangers. On May 7, 2007, six individuals were arrested in New Jersey for allegedly plotting terrorist attacks against the military base at Fort Dix. Less than a month later, a spectacular plot to blow up fuel tanks at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City was averted by authorities.23 Threats to U.S. Security Abroad In contrast to the domestic threats the United States has confronted, which have remained relatively few, its citizens and interests abroad have borne the brunt of anti-American ideological and political violence. Indeed, during the past four decades, U.S. government and civilian interests have become major targets of acts of terrorism throughout the world. Many factors contribute to this situation, including the fact that the United States maintains an extensive cultural, political, economic, and military presence abroad and that a considerable number of foreign individuals, groups, and governments oppose American values, policies, and actions. By and large, about one-quarter of international terrorist attacks have been directed against U.S. citizens or interests, mostly during the 1970s 21 See, for example, The Crime Library, http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists-spies/terror ists/kaczynski/1.html. 22 Quoted in HS Today 4, no. 8 (September 2007), 28. 23 Various press reports covered these events. See, for instance, The New York Times, May 8 and June 3, 2007.

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and 1980s. American citizens, officials, diplomats, and military officers have been victimized by both state-sponsored terrorism (for example, Libya, Syria, and Iran) and substate groups, including Marxist-oriented (for example, Germany’s Red Army Faction [RAF]), Islamic radicals (for example, Hezbollah), Palestinian nationalist (for example, Abu Nidal Organization [ANO], and ideological (for example, Japanese Red Army [JRA]) organizations. The 1980s attacks by Hezbollah against the U.S. embassy and Marine base in Beirut, Lebanon, as well as the U.S. embassy in Kuwait City, Kuwait, have already been noted. In addition, there have been kidnappings, assassinations, and other attacks on Americans in Lebanon, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, West Germany, and the Philippines. Terrorists have hijacked both American and foreign airliners, killing and wounding many in the process. The most dramatic incident during this decade was the 1988 destruction of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, utilizing plastic explosives concealed in a radio by Libyan agents. A total of 271 people, mostly U.S. citizens, died on the aircraft and on the ground. It was not until 18 years later, in 2006, that the U.S. government rescinded Libya’s designation as a state-sponsor of terrorism and resumed full diplomatic relations with Tripoli after it agreed to financially compensate the victims’ families of the Lockerbie attack, relinquish its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, and give assurances it would not engage in future acts of international terrorism and cooperate with the United States in its international counterterrorism efforts. The 1990s also recorded numerous attacks against American targets abroad. As a result of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, U.S. officials detected low-level targeting of U.S. citizens, including business people, diplomats, and military personnel throughout the world. An explosive device was discovered on the grounds of the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Jakarta, Indonesia, and two Iraqis were later apprehended when a bomb they were carrying detonated prematurely as they made their way to the U.S. Information Agency Library in Manila, Philippines. The overall number of attacks was apparently reduced because, in a little-known campaign, the U.S. State Department led an effort to encourage other governments to deport or otherwise thwart the activities of an estimated 200 Iraqi ‘‘diplomats’’ around the world. It was the emergence of al Qaeda, however, that dramatically affected American interests abroad. The October 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, was the last major attack perpetrated by al Qaeda in the pre-9/11 period. Targeting Americans abroad has not ended since September 11. Indeed, two distinct categories of post-9/11 American victimization are discernable. The first category includes attacks against ‘‘private U.S. citizens,’’ meaning those individuals who are not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government (for example, students, business people, tourists, and journalists). According to recent statistics, in 2006, the number of noncombatant Americans killed was 28, with 27 injured. The second category, U.S. military, diplomatic personnel, and other individuals operating in an official capacity, has been targeted particularly as a result of the military

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operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the end of July 2007, the total number of U.S. fatalities in the Iraq War reached more than 3,600.24

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND ACTIONS: SOME PERSPECTIVES Because the historical record from America’s founding in 1776 until the end of World War II indicates only sporadic terrorist attacks at home and infrequent targeting abroad, U.S. policies and actions combating this form of ‘‘warfare-on-the-cheap’’ were rather limited in scope. In general, terrorism was not considered a major strategic challenge to American national interests, with some exceptions such as the Barbary threats in the nineteenth century. Domestic radical movements failed to achieve their objectives and adversaries in foreign countries—both state and nonstate actors—were unable to seriously threaten American political, economic, and strategic concerns. It was not, therefore, until the 1970s that the United States began to develop a basic counterterrorism strategy. More specifically, two developments can be attributed to the realization of the need to articulate relevant policies and actions in this area. First were the September 6, 1970, hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) of four international airline flights. Three of the flights, a TWA Boeing 707 en route from Frankfurt to New York, a Swissair flight en route from Zurich to New York, and a BOAC (British Overseas Airway Corporation) flight en route from Bahrain to London, were diverted to Dawson’s Field in Zarqa, Jordan, where they were blown up in front of an international television audience after the mostly American passengers and crews were released. It is against this unprecedented backdrop of international media coverage of terrorist incidents, which also included the 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists during the summer Olympics in Germany, that President Richard M. Nixon established a cabinet-level committee to coordinate counterterrorism efforts. A smaller Interagency Group on Terrorism, led by the State Department, was established to deal with daily issues. Another body, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, was also established at that time. Through successive presidential directives, the State Department was designated as the lead U.S. government body responsible for coordinating American counterterrorism efforts overseas. The FBI, before the Department of Homeland Security was established, was designated as the lead agency for dealing with terrorism domestically. The second contributing factor involved major racial riots that erupted in the United States in the 1970s, causing casualties and damage and seriously interfering with the normal functioning of diverse communities in some American cities. In the aftermath of these events, the U.S. government established a National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. In 1976, this body issued a ‘‘Report on the Task Force on Disorders

24

The Washington Post, July 31, 2007.

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and Terrorism’’ that recommended a variety of specific steps to ensure greater community stability. The 1970s also marked the beginning of enactments of antiterrorism laws by the U.S. Congress. For instance, section 303 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 called for cutting off American assistance to ‘‘any government which aids or abets terrorism, by providing sanctuary from prosecution, to any group or individual which has committed an act of international terrorism.’’ Another export control mechanism to control the sale of military or dual-use equipment was established by Congress in 1979 that consequently developed into a ‘‘black list’’ or ‘‘terrorism list’’ of countries that the Secretary of State designated as repeatedly supporting international terrorism. Governments so designated were not, therefore, allowed to benefit from American assistance, and tax legislation was enacted to discourage U.S. investment. The initial ‘‘terrorism list’’ included Libya, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. Over the years, other countries, including Iran, Cuba, North Korea, and the Sudan, have been added to the list. (South Yemen was dropped from the list when it merged with North Yemen. Iraq and Libya were later removed after the new Iraqi government took office and Libya compensated the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing and abandoned its nuclear program.) But it was not until the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut that the U.S. government, for the first time in its history, decided to seriously develop a more coherent and proactive strategy to confront terrorism. It immediately established two commissions to investigate the incidents and to offer appropriate recommendations to improve the security of American military and diplomatic personnel abroad. The first commission was set up within the Department of Defense and was chaired by retired Admiral L.J. Long. It recommended, among other things, a major shift in national policy from a reactive antiterrorism posture to a proactive counterterrorism strategy. The Long Commission’s report was significant in that it was the first to officially characterize terrorism as a form of warfare, therefore, elevating it to a top national security concern. The second commission, headed by former CIA Deputy Director Admiral Bobby Inman (Ret.), recommended a series of major security upgrades at U.S. diplomatic posts abroad, to include improved personnel protection, physical security measures, and enhanced building construction intended to ‘‘harden’’ them against potential terrorist attack. Subsequently, the head of the State Department’s small counterterrorism office was elevated to the position of ambassador-at-large with the purpose of coordinating all government efforts against international terrorism. Other units at the State Department became involved in counterterrorism activities. For instance, the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism (Public Law 98-533) established the Counterterrorism Rewards Program to be administered by the department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The State Department Legal Advisor’s office also worked with the Justice Department to strengthen international cooperation and treaties to counter terrorism. Additionally, the State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau established a counterterrorism and narcotics subunit.

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In 1985, President Ronald Reagan appointed Vice President George H.W. Bush to chair a cabinet-level Task Force on Combating Terrorism. In its report, issued in December of that year, the Task Force recommended a broad range of actions, such as efforts to improve coordination among government agencies; creation of a full-time counterterrorism position on the National Security Council staff; and the establishment of a consolidated intelligence center on terrorism. In light of numerous kidnappings of American citizens in Lebanon by Hezbollah during the 1980s, the vice president’s Task Force public report of February 1986 also established a key American policy regarding this practice. It stated: The United States has a clear policy of no concessions to terrorists as the best way to protect the greatest number of people. However, the United States Government has always stated that it will talk to anyone and use every available resource to gain the release of Americans held hostage.

Another tool of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy that emerged during this period was the ‘‘long-arm statute’’ of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 that made it a federal crime for a terrorist to threaten, detain, seize, injure, or kill an American citizen abroad. This legislation provided American law enforcement agencies with the legal authority to conduct criminal investigation overseas. Ultimately, it resulted in the stationing of FBI Special Agent Legal Attach´es (called ‘‘Legats’’) in American embassies abroad. Of particular significance in the development of U.S. counterterrorism policies is the fact that America has, at times, selectively utilized military force against terrorist groups and those states believed to support them. President Reagan, for instance, launched bombing raids in April 1986 against Tripoli and Benghazi in retaliation for Libya’s attack on a Berlin disco nightclub that killed two American soldiers. President Bill Clinton deployed cruise missiles against Baghdad in 1993 in retaliation for its plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush during a visit to Kuwait earlier that year. Also, following the al Qaeda attack on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, President Clinton authorized the military to launch some 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan (that officials believed was also used to produce VX nerve agent) and at bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan. Bin Laden survived the missile attack, apparently having left the camps shortly before the attack. During the Clinton presidency, numerous other counterterrorism actions were undertaken, including Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 issued in June 1995 on ‘‘U.S. Policy on Terrorism,’’ which declared that the United Sates will pursue all efforts to ‘‘deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute individuals who perpetuate or plan to perpetuate such attacks’’; Executive Order (E.O. 1015), establishing a Commission (led by Vice President Al Gore) on Aviation Safety and Security; the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, which authorized $1 billion for federal law enforcement efforts; and the January 1997 joint report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FBI submitted a report to Congress that focused on capabilities and interagency roles in responding to WMD terrorist incidents. The Clinton administration also imposed the July

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1999 financial and commercial measures on Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers because of their refusal to cooperate with American counterterrorism efforts, and established the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, which issued a report in 2000 outlining the growing dangers of terrorism and recommending various response strategies to be considered by the president and Congress. Finally, two other efforts of Clinton’s administration are noteworthy. First is the establishment in 1999 of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. In its 2000 report, for example, it recommended that an Office for Combating Terrorism be created, along with improved training and response capabilities. And second, a bipartisan panel, the 21st Century Commission, was also formed in 1999. Co-chaired by former U.S. Senators Warner B. Rudman and Gary Hart, the Commission report in 2000 called for the establishment of a cabinet-level agency to assume responsibility to defend America. However, despite the warnings contained in the various reports, as well as numerous intelligence assessments advising of increased terrorist activity directed against the homeland during the winter and summer of 2001, terrorists were still able to execute the devastating September 11 attacks. Since that catastrophic day, which resulted in unprecedented human, political, social, economic, and strategic losses from a single terrorist attack, the United States found itself engaged in the most extensive counterterrorism undertaking in its history. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush declared war against al Qaeda, accusing it of perpetrating the 9/11 attacks. He then mobilized an international coalition of allied countries to prosecute this new war and, on October 6, 2001, the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom, a massive military operation against al Qaeda bases and the Taliban regime, which had been providing sanctuary to bin Laden’s terrorist infrastructure within Afghanistan. This military effort succeeded in largely destroying the existing terrorist infrastructure in the country, ultimately resulting in the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the establishment of a freely elected Afghan government in 2005 headed by President Hamid Karzai. And yet, terrorist operations are still a daily menace in the country and are, in fact, escalating. For instance, in 2006, the U.S. government’s annual report to Congress on international terrorism recorded a total of 749 terrorist incidents, an increase from 491 attacks during the previous year.25 Three Taliban operations in 2007 illustrate the nature of the challenges. First, on February 27 a suicide bomber attacked the main U.S. base in Afghanistan, killing 19 people and wounding 11. The attacker reportedly targeted Vice President Richard Cheney during his visit to the country. Second, on July 19, some 23 Korean missionaries on a humanitarian mission to Afghanistan were taken hostage. Several captives were executed and those who survived were ultimately freed after prolonged negotiations with the

25

Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 (U.S. Department of State Publication 11409, Office of the Coordinator, Washington, DC, April 2007).

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government of South Korea. Third, on September 29, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive vest next to a bus in Kabul killing some 30 Afghan soldiers, including 2 civilians, and wounding numerous others.26 Although these and many other incidents have failed to achieve any decisive strategic successes, the fact remains that currently, more than six years after the invasion of the country, the United States and its allies, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, are still fighting both surviving members of al Qaeda and resurgent Taliban forces in parts of southern Afghanistan as well as along the largely ungoverned tribal areas of Pakistan’s Northwestern Frontier Province. It has become increasingly clear that this region is being used as a sanctuary for the reconstitution and continuation of al Qaeda’s activities as well as a base from which to plan attacks against American regional and global interests. In response to this assessment, the Bush administration signaled through official statements and press leaks its determination not only to pursue ‘‘actionable targets’’ in Afghanistan but also to consider unilaterally pursuing targets within Pakistan’s northern frontier, if necessary. Realizing, however, that the terrorist and insurgency challenges cannot be resolved militarily, President Karzai, has introduced a reconciliation process whereby several thousand Taliban members who gave up violence and recognized the government have been allowed to return to their homes with an amnesty. Moreover, in fall 2007, Karzai declared that he is willing to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict with Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban head, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the insurgent leader, on the condition that foreign troops remain in the country until a ‘‘better Afghan national army and national police’’ are formed.27 The most significant strategic decision made by the Bush administration was to undertake military action against Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussein’s regime was developing links with al Qaeda and had continued its unilateral efforts to develop WMDs. The war against Iraq began in March 2003 and within a month, U.S.-led coalition forces ousted the defeated Saddam Hussein regime. Since the defeat of Saddam and his subsequent capture, trial, and execution, Iraq’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was formally rescinded in 2004, and the country began to move along the difficult road of political, social, and economic reconstruction under the guidance of American and coalition partners. Yet, despite the ongoing democratization process, as reflected by the December 15, 2005, legislative elections, and the presence of 160,000 American troops and some 100,000 contractors in Iraq, the security situation in the country has deteriorated precipitously over the past few years, characterized by an insurgency and classic terrorist acts undertaken by a wide range of actors, including former regime officials, local Islamists, foreign jihadist terrorists, tribal groups, and ordinary criminals. The unending violence in the country, marked dramatically first by terrorist and insurgent operations in fall 2003 and subsequently by attacks on coalition forces, the United Nations’ Baghdad Office, and Shiite and 26 27

See, for example, The Washington Post, September 30, 2007. See, for instance, The New York Times, September 30, 2007.

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Sunni religious sites and neighborhoods, already resulted in a high cost in terms of human lives, property damage, and negative political consequences. For example, 3,468 terrorist incidents were recorded in Iraq in 2005 and 6,630 attacks occurred in 2006. During the first half of 2007, some 1,160 terrorist operations were mounted. The total number of American casualties since the campaign’s inception through September 28, 2007, had reached 3,798 killed and 28,009 wounded.28 During the same period, coalition military fatalities reached 300 and more than 7,300 members of the new Iraqi military and police forces have been killed. Additionally, it is estimated that between 74,186 and 80,824 Iraqi civilians lost their lives since the invasion of the country in spring 2003, and that 2 million Iraqis have become refugees, mostly settling in Syria and Jordan.29 Clearly, this bloody record has contributed to the intensification of the debate in the policymaking community in the United States over the wisdom of continuing the war in Iraq. Among noteworthy other factors mention should be made of two assessments. First, the preliminary U.S. conclusion that only eight out of the eighteen benchmarks for political, economic, and security progress in Iraq have been reached. Second, according to the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, representing the consensus analysis of 16 intelligence agencies, several dangers are discernable: (1) a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian violence; (2) al Qaeda in Iraq attempts to use parts of the country to plan increased attacks both inside and outside Iraq; and (3) neighboring countries, such as Iran and Turkey, intervening openly in the conflict. Despite these assessments, President Bush continued to ‘‘stay the course,’’ and on January 10, 2007, announced his ‘‘surge’’ plan to send 20,000 more U.S. troops into Iraq to secure Baghdad and other troubled areas. On July 24 of that year, he warned that ‘‘those who justify withdrawing our troops from Iraq by denying the threat of al Qaeda in Iraq and its ties to Osama bin Laden ignore the clear consequences … if we were to follow their advice, it would be dangerous for the world and dangerous for America.’’30 As the president’s Iraq policy continues, it is challenged not only by the Democratic Party but also by an increasing number of Republican members in Congress. A recent example reflecting the deep division of policy approaches dealing with Iraq is the nonbinding Senate resolution passed on September 26, 2007, calling for the creation of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish federal regions in the country. At this stage, it is unlikely that the Bush administration will alter its policy supporting a federal Iraq. Washington’s standing view is that the ultimate solution to the future of the country should be left to the Iraqis themselves. Indeed, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki already asserted

28

It should be noted that the figure 3,798 U.S. military casualties includes 3,099 killed in hostile action and 699 in nonhostile action. Similarly, the figure 28,009 wounded includes 15,432 persons who returned to duty within 72 hours. It excludes, however, those injured or those who became sick outside combat. See The Washington Post, September 29, 2007. 29 See, for example, The New York Times, September 23, 2007. 30 See, The Washington Post, July 25, 2007.

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that the proposed religious and ethnic divisions of the country ‘‘could be a disaster not just for Iraq but also for the region.’’31 Reportedly, the Baghdad government would apparently seek a long-term U.S security pact beyond the extension of the mandate of the multinational force through the end of 2008. In the interim, the Bush administration plans to request Congress to increase its next-year financial requirements by almost $50 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus financing the war effort through 2008 with approximately $200 billion.32 Aside from the broad strategic military campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States in the post9/11 period has selectively projected power directed against tactical terrorist targets. For example, on January 7, 2007, a U.S. AC-130 gunship destroyed a convoy in Somalia that reportedly included one al Qaeda member who was involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa. What has been, however, an unprecedented developing trend during the past six years is that the United States has initiated extensive domestic counterterrorism measures, both traditional and ‘‘outside-of-the-box.’’ These measures include emergency funding and other financial support; aviation security improvements; expanded emergency medical readiness; upgraded immigration regulations and border control requirements; an increase in the number of domestic law enforcement joint terrorism task forces; and revised military orders related to the detention, treatment, and trial of non-U.S. citizens detained on terrorism-related charges. Additionally, there were four critical elements to the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policies concerning homeland security as well as the threat to Americans abroad. The first development was the enactment of the October 26, 2001, USA Patriot Act. The Act intended to better equip the U.S. government to identify, investigate, follow, detain, prosecute, and punish suspected terrorists. As today’s terrorists use increasingly sophisticated tools—advanced technology and international money transfers—the government’s capabilities must be able to adapt to these methods of operation. In essence, the USA Patriot Act sought to significantly improve the surveillance of terrorists and increase the speed with which terrorists are tracked and intercepted. The Patriot Act, almost from its inception, has been criticized both within and outside the U.S. government. Among the major criticisms of the Act and its implementation was that the legislation allows the government to conduct surveillance of activities protected under the First Amendment; that it would radically diminish personal privacy by removing checks on government power; and that it would increase government secrecy while limiting public accountability. The second major development was the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security on July 16, 2003. It involved an extraordinary governmental reorganization on a scale similar to that initiated with the establishment of the Department of Defense. This new 180,000-employee department, which integrated 22 previously separate agencies, consists of four core divisions: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness 31 32

See, The New York Times, September 29, 2007. Ibid., September 30, 2007

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and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. It intended to provide for effective intergovernmental cooperation on national, state, and local levels and consequently ensures that homeland security is a shared responsibility, although this too has been criticized for an inability to resolve numerous bureaucratic organizational problems inherent in merging so many disparate agencies. A third significant step undertaken by the George W. Bush administration and Congress was the establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, better known as the 9/11 Commission (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002). In its public report, released on July 22, 2004, the Commission offered some 41 recommendations covering a broad range of topics, such as strategic policies, communications, physical security, intelligence, operational structures, WMDs, education, and public offices. While many of these recommendations were implemented, several outstanding recommendations, including airport and seaport security measures, were finally included in a bill passed by both the House and the Senate in late July 2007. This legislation, introduced as HR1, became Public Law 110-53 when President Bush signed it on August 3. The major provisions of the law require that DHS screen all cargo on passenger airplanes within three years as well as scan containers on board ships leaving foreign ports for nuclear devices within five years. Another aspect of the act provides a formula for awarding homeland security grants to states and cities by placing a greater emphasis on terrorist risk assessments of those jurisdictions. A more controversial legislation was signed by President Bush on August 5, 2007. The Protect America Act (Public Law 110-055) broadened the executive’s authority to eavesdrop without warrant on international telephone calls and e-mail communication of American citizens who are suspected or known to have contacted terrorists outside the country. This new legal framework permits targeted surveillance without warrants by the National Security Agency (NSA) and outside the confines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The final significant step was demonstrated by the legislative action of the development of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, constituting the most extensive reform of the Intelligence Community since 1947. The Act brought together some 16 intelligence agencies under a cabinet-level Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Another important structural change was the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center. In light of these developments, it seems that the reconstituted intelligence community, under the directorship of John Negroponte, and currently Michael McConnell, operates more efficiently than ever before. A recent demonstration of the emerging new ‘‘culture of realism’’ is the August 2007 Department of Defense policy directive for U.S. military intelligence. This directive mandates information sharing with domestic agencies and foreign partners as well as recognizes the leadership role of Lieutenant General Michael Hayden. For all practical purposes, this directive replaces the previous ‘‘need-to-know’’ approach with the requirement that the military intelligence has to be coordinated with, and to some extent subordinate to, the

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directorship of national intelligence.33 It is premature, however, to conclude that these evolving changes in the intelligence organization will advance the goals of the National Security Strategy of the United States, among other things, ‘‘to defend the peace by fighting terrorism and tyrants.’’ After all, the administration’s position on related intelligence matters, including interrogations, detentions, renditions, and information classification, are increasingly becoming subject to congressional and public scrutiny as well as judicial review. It is sufficient to mention, for example, disagreements between the administration and the judiciary over the issue of terrorist suspects. On September 28, 2006, Congress passed the Military Commission Act establishing military commissions to try ‘‘enemy combatant’’ detainees, which President Bush signed into law on October 17. On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Military Commission Act, but on June 29 of that year, it reversed its earlier decision and agreed to hear appeals by Guantanamo Bay detainees.34 Another example of public concern relates to the claim by some segments of the population such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that charged the U.S. government of ‘‘spying’’ on private citizens as part of the war on terrorism. The ACLU, in its September 2007 report, asserted that during the past several years, the USA Patriot Act, Real ID, the proliferation of identity checks, health privacy legislation, and the NSA ‘‘terrorism surveillance program’’ have been approved by Congress. It concluded that the ‘‘surveillance clock,’’ patterned after the ‘‘Doomsday Clock’’ created by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 1947 to warn against a nuclear holocaust, is now set at six minutes before midnight.35 While counterterrorism overreaction and expansive tactics could lead to repression and the ultimate weakening of the very democratic institutions we seek to protect, the reality is that there are no simplistic or complete solutions to the threat of terrorism. All we can do is to strike a balance between security concerns and civil liberties. Furthermore, we must learn from the historical experience of what works and what does not. Otherwise, as George Santayana rightly concluded, ‘‘those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’’36 The Purpose of This Collection While the preceding examination has presented a general overview of contemporary terrorism, the challenges confronting the United States, and selected responses by different governmental bodies, the purpose of these volumes is to provide the public in general with documentation on the evolution of American counterterrorism policies and actions, with resources extending from the presidency of Richard M. Nixon to midway through the second term of President George W. Bush. 33

See, The Washington Post, September 28, 2007. See, The New York Times, June 30, 2007. 35 ACLU, ‘‘Even Bigger, Even Weaker: The Emerging Surveillance Society: Where Are We Now?’’ (an update to the ACLU report ‘‘Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains,’’ published in January, 2003; September 2007). 36 George Santayana, The Life of Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998). 34

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With the aid of a team of research assistants, I began to search for relevant materials in 1991, before speeches and testimony were available on the Internet and had to be obtained directly from the White House, State Department, or other government offices. The goal of this academic effort was to identify, collect, and select from an extensive variety of policy statements by American officials those documents most appropriate in illustrating the development of U.S. counterterrorism approaches within the executive branch, as well as relevant legislative developments in Congress. Michael Kraft, who worked for many years at the State Department’s counterterrorism office, provided extraordinary professional guidance to this project. Once he retired from government service in 2005, we decided to join together in organizing the documents for publication with the research cutoff date of December 31, 2006. Our intent is to provide the public dimension of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policy, both its shifts in emphasis as well as its remarkable continuity in many aspects. This primarily reference work pays particular attention to those difficult-to-access unclassified documents that predate Web sites or digital technology and are buried in achieves or filing cabinets. The compilation includes excerpts from important speeches, testimony, and documents that are scattered across many Web sites on the Internet. In most cases, the documents have been pared down, eliminating introductory remarks or discussions of other subjects, to highlight the most important passages that illustrate official views at the time. Where available, Web addresses are provided for those who wish to view the full documents online. This monumental undertaking became even more critical during the post-9/ 11 period when an unprecedented outpouring of material on official American policies and undertakings resulted in confusion and misunderstanding regarding the official U.S. counterterrorism strategies, both domestically and abroad. As such, in an effort to clarify these misperceptions, we felt it important to illustrate the historical context and articulation of U.S. counterterrorism policies. For clarity and efficiency, we have organized these documents into three volumes. The first volume consists of pre–September 11 material divided into sources originating from the White House dating back to the Nixon administration, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and other officials including the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The second volume includes documents from the post-9/11 period, again providing statements by President George W. Bush, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The third volume is organized by counterterrorism topics ranging from legislation to intelligence to international cooperation. As editors of this research undertaking, we fully recognize that our efforts represent only the beginning of scholarship in this critical field of U.S. security concerns. After all, Karl Von Clausewitz’s diction that ‘‘the art of war in its highest point of view is policy’’ reminds us that in this long war against terrorism, response strategies are never static and therefore will require continual reevaluation and adjustment to most effectively confront and defeat the ever-evolving dangers of terrorism directed against the United States of America and the entire world.

1 Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Laws, Policies, and Programs Michael B. Kraft INTRODUCTION In this age of television sound bites and mini-reports without much historical context, it is easy to forget that the United States has been fighting a war against terrorism for more than three decades. As the terrorism threat has evolved, so too has the United States government’s policies, programs, and laws—the main focus of this chapter. Countering terrorism has increasingly become a national priority, although the U.S. government’s implementation of policy and provision of resources toward that effort has often fallen short. This chapter will outline the evolution of the U.S. government’s efforts to counter the emerging and ever-evolving terrorism threat, beginning with a description of the efforts in Washington to coordinate and develop policies. Primarily, this chapter will describe the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism laws, from their initial focus on countries that support terrorism to efforts in combating groups that operate without state backing. It will examine the task of securing national borders, the use of civil suits by terrorism victims, and challenges in implementing counterterrorism laws and programs. The chapter is best understood when read in conjunction with the testimony and speeches in the chapters of this book on specific subjects, particularly those on legislation and law enforcement, as well as the chapters containing speeches from Justice Department officials and the State Department Coordinators for Counterterrorism. Many aspects of the development of legislation take place in meetings, drafting, or negotiations, often with a handful of congressional members, professional staff, and executive branch officials. While these behind-the-scenes working meetings were not secret, only key participants were invited and seldom did anyone take time to prepare a written record other than the legislation itself or perhaps a committee report explaining the bill before it went to the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives. To provide some insights and flavor of what really goes on, descriptions are included of some of the meetings that I attended over the years, and that I thought were relevant to several key pieces of legislation that emerged.

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THE BACKGROUND The battle against international terrorism did not start on September 11, 2001. Nor did it begin with the simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 or the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Scotland in December 1988. The U.S. employment of military force against terrorism, more spectacular than using economic and diplomatic pressures, also is not an invention of the early twenty-first century. The military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq followed a wellworn path of U.S. policy The use or potential use of military force as appropriate to fight terrorism has always been an option under U.S. policy. The Reagan administration launched air strikes against Libya in 1986 because of Libya’s involvement in the terrorist bombing of a Berlin disco club in April 1986 that killed two American soldiers and a Turkish woman. The Clinton administration launched cruise missiles against Iraq’s intelligence headquarters in 1993 after Baghdad’s failed plot to kill former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait. It also fired cruise missiles against al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan after al Qaeda terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. Many counterterrorism specialists date the modern era of terrorism to the 1968 hijacking of an Israeli El Al jet in Rome by three Palestinian terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).1 The plane was later flown to Algiers. After 40 days of negotiations, the passengers were freed and the Algerians allowed the terrorists to escape. These events led to the U.S. government starting to keep statistics in 1968 on international terrorism. The era of ‘‘spectacular’’ television terrorism began with the simultaneous hijacking and blowing up of three passenger airliners at a former British Air Force base in Jordan. This 1970 attack by Palestinian terrorists capitalized on the emergence of television as a communications media capable of reaching a worldwide audience. Four years later, terrorists staged another made-for-TV attack with the 1972 massacre of 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. This attack prompted President Nixon to establish a cabinet-level committee to coordinate U.S. government efforts to counter terrorism. The committee met only once. Such a high-level committee was not suitable for day-to-day activities. It set into motion, however, efforts to confront the terrorism threat in a more systemic fashion and a small policy coordinating office was soon established within the State Department. That office has grown since then from half a dozen officers in the late 1970s to more than 80 full-time officers, specialists detailed from other agencies, and contract personnel in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The office has become a center for the development of U.S. counterterrorism policy and programs over the years. The office, in effect a mini-bureau, 1

See http://www.terrorism-research.com/history/recent.php.

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is headed by an official with the rank of ambassador, who, as established in legislation,2 reports to the secretary of state and is equivalent to an assistant secretary of state. Meanwhile, interagency coordinating groups at the assistant secretary level were established. They have gone through several evolutions and name changes. Currently known as the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the high-level interagency group brings together the senior officials of each agency involved with terrorism, such as the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, and assistant secretary–level officials from the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Defense Department, and Homeland Security. They meet regularly, sometimes weekly, and major decisions can be escalated to the principals’ meeting of cabinet members. Reporting to the CSG are a number of specialized working groups that deal with such subjects as training, research and development, and countering terrorism financing. Under a series of presidential directives,3 the White House designated the Department of State as the lead U.S. agency for coordinating U.S. counterterrorism efforts overseas. The Justice Department, until the formation of the Department of Homeland Security in early 2003, had been the lead agency for dealing with terrorism inside the United States. Working together over the past several decades, the various agencies have developed and honed a number of tools to improve both American and friendly countries’ abilities to engage in counterterrorism. Especially since the simultaneous bombings in the summer of 1998 of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, more personnel, programs, and financial resources than ever are being dedicated to implement the U.S. government policies and strategies for countering the terrorism threat. (Whether enough resources are being allocated is another matter, and is discussed later in this chapter.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENTS The collection of statements, speeches, and Congressional testimony contained in this three-volume series are intended to provide a reference source for the public face of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policies. Of course, much of the effort to counter international terrorism is cloaked in secrecy, in part to facilitate cooperation and information sharing with other countries as well as to avoid tipping off the terrorists to sensitive countermeasures. In some cases, the government’s own policies were violated; most notably during the Lebanon hostage situation in the 1980s when Reagan 2 22 USC Chapter 39 section 2651(e) at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/usc_ sec_22_00002651—a000-.html. Congress passed the measure after House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman objected in 1993 to the State Department’s plans to combine the counterterrorism office with the Bureau of Narcotics and International Law. See http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_cr/s950105-terror.htm. 3 For example, PDD 39 in 1995, which reaffirmed earlier Presidential Decision Directives outlining agency responsibilities. See http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.

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administration officials secretly attempted to exchange TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) antitank missiles for the release of American hostages. Nevertheless, in the public enunciation of counterterrorism policies, the basic principles and many of the approaches date back two decades, to the 1980s, although there were shifts in emphasis over the years. In brief, a primary change, especially in the legislative arena, has been from the focus on countering state sponsors of terrorism to measures designed to counter nonstate actors—groups such as al Qaeda who have developed their own financial resources and support networks. Four basic, enduring policy principles have guided U.S. counterterrorism efforts since the 1980s. As enunciated in detail in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report for 2001,4 the first annual report to Congress published after the 9/11 attacks, these principles are as follows: ¥ Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; ¥ Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; ¥ Isolate and apply pressure to states that support terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and ¥ Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance.

One year later, in The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released in February 2003,5 President Bush stated: We are using all elements of our national power and international influence to attack terror networks; reduce their ability to communicate and coordinate their plans; isolate them from potential allies and from and each other, and identify and disrupt their plots before they attack.

Additionally, the international aspects of countering terrorism were summarized in the State Department’s 2004 annual terrorism report to Congress.6 The report said: International cooperation is an integral and growing aspect of the overall U.S. ‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’’ which calls for: ¥ Defeating terrorist organizations by eliminating their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control and communications capabilities; ¥ Denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating with other states to take action against those who provide support; ¥ Diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus our mutual efforts and resources on

4 The State Department 2001 Annual Patterns of Global Terrorism Report to Congress, released May 21, 2002 (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10220.htm). 5 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html. 6 The State Department Annual Countries Report on Terrorism for 2004, released April 2005 (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/45321.htm).

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addressing legitimate political and social needs and by reducing security vulnerabilities in the countries most at risk; and ¥ Defending the United States, its citizens, and interests at home and abroad.

The goals further evolved in the revised National Strategy for Countering Terrorism issued in September 2006.7 This document reflected the Bush administration’s views of the Iraq situation, specifically mentioning the development of democracies as part of the War on Terrorism: ¥ Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; ¥ Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; ¥ Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; ¥ Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and ¥ Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

International Cooperation One constant theme over the years is that international cooperation is essential to fighting international terrorism. American diplomatic efforts to build closer ties and working relationships with various countries cover many issues. They include fostering regional stability through foreign assistance, military and law enforcement cooperation and training, and economic ties. Countering terrorism has become part of this fabric. Closer diplomatic ties help to improve information sharing on intelligence and counterterrorism techniques, joint actions, and preventive measures. At their most basic level, these diplomatic efforts take place in four areas: Bilateral: Bilateral working relationships are perhaps the oldest and most important. The United States has strong bilateral ties and counterterrorism working relationships with various countries. U.S. officials have been meeting regularly for more than a decade with some nations, such as Canada and Britain. More recently, U.S. counterterrorism officials have been holding regular bilateral meetings with countries in other parts of the world, such as Australia, Russia, Israel, Jordan, India, Pakistan, and Russia. The United States also has close working relationships and holds meetings with various countries in diplomatic and intelligence channels. Multilateral: The United States works in the multilateral area with the United Nations and other organizations. Enactment and enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1373,8 requiring member states to take steps to curb terrorism fundraising, is but one example. The United States also works with smaller international groups such as the G-8 countries and specialized agencies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization. 7 See excerpts in chapter 28, Key Documents. For full text, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/ nsc/nsct/2006/. 8 For text of UNSCRES 1373, see http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=5108. Background on the United Nation’s Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) that was established to help enforce UNSCR 1373 can be found at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/.

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Regional: In a more recent development, the United States has begun working more frequently on a regional basis with groups such as the Organization of American States and the African Union as well as through regional conferences. The State Department’s first major regional terrorism conference was held with central Asian states in Washington, D.C., in June 1999. It has been followed by regional conferences with the nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Henry Crumpton, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator who served from August 2005 to January 2007, placed a great deal of emphasis on regional cooperation to encourage neighboring countries to work closely with each other. 9 Practical: The development of improved practical operational measures with overseas partners facilitates counterterrorism cooperation. For example, since the 1970s a number of steps have been taken to improve physical security of buildings and airlines. The United States and other countries have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to develop improved screening devices at airports around the world and additional equipment to protect buildings and embassies. The techniques and technology have been shared with friendly countries. The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program10 is essential to the U.S. government’s overseas cooperative efforts. The ATA Program was first authorized by Congress in 1983 to help other friendly countries improve the professional skills of their security officials tasked with confronting terrorism threats. Since its inception, the ATA Program focused on such hands-on skills as detecting bombs and training hostage negotiators. In recognition of the evolving nature of the terrorism threat, after the 1998 East African bombings, courses were developed in countering the financial underpinnings of terrorist groups, crisis management, and specialized medical responses. The State Department Counterterrorism Office, in concert with the Justice Department, sponsored seminars in Washington through the ATA Program to provide advice and suggestions to other countries seeking to strengthen their counterterrorism laws in a range of areas. The seminars included presentations by British, Australian, U.S. and other allied legal specialists. Seminars also have been held in Africa. Meanwhile, more specific and intensive assistance to counterterrorist fundraising has been provided by interagency State Department, Treasury Department, and Justice Department experts. Small teams were dispatched overseas to help other countries draft legislation to strengthen their laws, regulations, and investigative abilities in an effort to curb terrorism fundraising and money transfers. In some countries, the Justice Department’s legal attach´es have provided assistance to the host countries in evaluating and/or helping draft new legislation. In the mid-1980s, the United States developed the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to coordinate the actions of dozens of U.S. government agencies involved in developing improved equipment to deter and counter terrorist attacks. The TSWG has been conducting joint projects for a decade with Britain, Canada, and Israel. Australia and Singapore recently 9

August 10, 2006, interview with the authors. For more information see the State Department Counterterrorism Office Web site at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm. 10

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became partners. Some of the equipment developed under the auspices of the TSWG is being used by American specialists and first responders and is also being made available to countries that receive training from the U.S. government. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) became involved in counterterrorism research and development soon after its inception. This initially led to coordination and duplication problems with the TSWG, especially when DHS began trying to develop its own international programs, but the two organizations have begun to cooperate more closely.11 The terrorism information rewards program is another important tool that dates back to the mid-1980s. Now called the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) Program, it hosts its own Web site12 and uses inventive advertising methods, such as matchbook covers and posters, to publicize offers of rewards for credible information resulting in the successful prevention or resolution of an act of international terrorism directed against the United States. Rewards of up to $25 million have been authorized for information leading to the capture of Osama bin Laden and other key al Qaeda leaders. Since its inception in 1984,13 RFJ has paid more than $72 million to more than 50 people who provided credible information. In 2007, rewards totaling $10 million were approved for the successful resolution of terrorist cases in the Philippines. Rewards are approved by an interagency committee that includes representatives of the State Department, Justice Department, FBI, and intelligence community. The procedures protect the confidentiality of the reward payment and identity of the recipient. Congress even approved a special ‘‘S’’ visa category to expedite the relocation of the informant to the United States, and his or her immediate family, if necessary for their relocation. These various programs to help other countries counter terrorism were conceived before 9/11. After 9/11, they were given more priority with increased, though not always sufficient, funding and staffing to take the offensive against terrorists by actively curtailing their financial support. Terrorists Are Criminals During the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government made increasing efforts to deglamorize terrorists and drive home the point that their attacks were criminal and should be punished regardless of their professed ‘‘cause.’’ Statements and testimony from the period, including those during the Reagan administration, stressed that terrorists are criminals and that hijacking aircraft and ships and attacks on airports and public places are criminal acts, which should be punished as such, regardless of underlying motivation.14 The 11

For more details on the U.S. government’s counterterrorism research and development program, see the author’s chapter in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, James J.F. Forest, ed., volume I, chapter 8 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). Also see background paper at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/d20011129tswg.pdf. 12 See http://www.rewardsforjustice.net. 13 Enacted by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, (P.L. 98-533) 22 U.S. Code Sec 2708. for text of the statute, see http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode22/usc_ sec_22_00002708——000-.html. 14 For example, President Reagan’s Radio address to the nation, May 31, 1986 (http:// www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/53186a.htm).

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U.S. government emphasized this theme not only because it was intrinsically correct, but also to counteract the sympathy that some terrorist groups seemed to garner in certain segments of the media and academia, especially in Europe and the Middle East, that tended to romanticize terrorists or excuse their terrorist actions on the grounds that they were ‘‘freedom fighters.’’ Thus, what has sometimes been criticized since 9/11 as an overemphasis on law enforcement in the past had its origins not only in the effort to capture and punish terrorists, but also as part of a broader effort to delegitimize terrorists. After the 1983 bombings of both the U.S. embassy buildings and the Marine barracks in Beirut, Secretary of State George Shultz and other senior officials launched an interagency public diplomacy campaign as part of the fight against terrorism. The State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Defense Department were the lead agencies. One of the goals was to stress to foreign audiences that terrorism was a threat and that its criminal actions should not be condoned. These efforts included the drafting and distribution of unclassified ‘‘white papers’’ and other material describing the activities of Libya and other supporters of terrorism. The interagency program faded away, however, and finally collapsed for lack of support and staff after James Baker became secretary of state in George H.W. Bush’s presidential administration. One official in the State Department’s Public Affairs Bureau confided that colleagues in his office had reached the conclusion that Baker simply did not believe in public diplomacy. If this assessment is true, it puts an ironic spin on a decision by George W. Bush’s administration to appoint as the head of the Public Diplomacy Program a former top aide to Secretary Baker, Margaret Tutwiler. She had served as his assistant secretary of state for public affairs and later became an ambassador to Morocco. She left the public diplomacy job and returned to the private sector after only six and a half months. Karen Hughes, a long-time top aide to President George W. Bush who had returned to Texas in 2002, was recalled to Washington to head the Public Diplomacy Program. She got off to a rocky start during her trips to the Middle East. By almost all accounts and public opinion polls overseas, this public diplomacy effort in the counterterrorism campaign has been ineffective so far.

LEGISLATION Strengthening U.S. counterterrorism laws and encouraging other countries to bolster their own laws is an important part of the campaign against international terrorism. Law enforcement, the rule of law, strong domestic legislation, international conventions, and international legal cooperation are essential tools of international counterterrorism efforts. American counterterrorism law and the focus on the law as an instrument against terrorism have continued to evolve since the 1970s to meet the ever-changing terrorist threat. Key elements include the development of international treaties and conventions, the expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the development of sanctions against terrorist-supporting states, and efforts to cut off funds and other material support for terrorists that are self-supporting. More recent years saw

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the use of civil suits against terrorist groups and even banking institutions that transferred their funds and laws designed to strengthen border security. The following is an overview of American legislation and efforts in the domestic and international legal arena. This section is not intended to provide a complete listing of U.S. counterterrorism laws,15 but rather to highlight key developments and illustrate how American counterterrorism law has evolved to bolster U.S. counterterrorism policies and programs to meet the changing threats.16 International Conventions Beginning in the early 1970s, in the wake of repeated airliner hijackings and other acts of terrorism, two separate streams of U.S. legal approaches began to emerge. One focused on specific acts, such as attacks on civilian airplanes, and gave the United States explicit authority to prosecute terrorist crimes that occurred overseas. The second stream took the form of sanctions designed to pressure governments that supported such terrorist attacks to change their behavior.17 Working with like-minded governments such as Britain, Canada, and Australia, the United States sought to broaden the web of international treaties and conventions against terrorism. These treaties generally required signatory nations to either ‘‘prosecute or extradite’’ the terrorist suspects. The signatory nations were obliged to either prosecute in their own courts terrorists who committed specific crimes under the treaties (such as attacking civilian aircraft or diplomats) or turn them over to a country with appropriate jurisdiction (that is, to the country whose aircraft was hijacked or whose diplomats were killed). Until these international conventions were developed and the U.S. government enacted implementing legislation, the United States generally did not have explicit authority to prosecute terrorist attacks that took place overseas.18

15 For a fuller list of U.S. statures related to counterterrorism see the Web site Counter-Terrorism: Training and Resources for Law Enforcement, established under the auspices of the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice (http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/leg/index.html). 16 Much of the legislative history has not been formally recorded in Congressional floor debates or Committee discussions. Indeed many of the decisions and negotiations took place in informal meetings with members of Congress and their staff. Some of the descriptions are based on my participation in the drafting of legislation or meetings with members of Congress, their staff, and executive branch officials during my 19 years in the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism or earlier when I served as a Congressional foreign policy staff specialist. 17 For an earlier description of some of the terrorism laws enacted before 2005, also see chapter 21, ‘‘Legal Issues,’’ which the author contributed to the McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, Kaiman, David, ed. (New York, 2005), 325–345. 18 For this and other background for this publication and over the years of working together, I’m indebted to James Reynolds, a senior Justice Department official and former head of the Justice Department’s Terrorism and Violent Crimes section and other career lawyers in that section. This group of dedicated government officials is the unseen core of the U.S. government’s development of more useful laws to counter the terrorism threat while showing sensitivity to civil liberties.

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Early examples of these conventions include the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. In response to several kidnappings and killings of diplomats, the international community developed the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. Dramatic attacks in the 1980s stimulated additional conventions, such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which was prompted by the 1985 hijacking in the eastern Mediterranean of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro. The incident demonstrated to international lawyers that there was a loophole in existing antipiracy agreements, which primarily covered attacks by one ship upon another, not hijackings by passengers. Another convention, the Convention for the Suppression of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, resulted from the 1985 attacks by the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) against the Rome, Vienna, and Karachi airports. Broader conventions have emerged in the last decade, and include the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.19 These early international conventions and treaties did not specifically define terrorism as such. This was primarily to avoid prolonged disputes with Arab and other developing countries that often chose to portray violent actions conducted by ‘‘revolutionaries’’ or ‘‘freedom fighters’’ as legitimate political options. Over the years, Syria and its Middle East and other allies largely have been successful in maintaining references in United Nations resolutions to past resolutions that exempt ‘‘legitimate liberation’’ or anticolonialist movements from being considered terrorist groups, a thinly veiled effort to protect groups that have committed terrorist attacks against Israelis. Indeed, scholars throughout the world have proffered over 110 separate definitions of terrorism.20 Because of the early difficulties in reaching consensus on a definition of terrorism, international conventions focused on the criminal acts themselves, 19 A list of international conventions and their status can be found in the State Department 2006 Annual Terrorism Report appendix (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238. htm). 20 The definition of terrorism used in the State Department Annual report is specified in Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code:

(1) the term ‘‘international terrorism’’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country; (2) the term ‘‘terrorism’’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and (3) The term ‘‘terrorist group’’ means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism. The Department says the term ‘‘non-combatant,’’ which is referred to but not defined in 22 USC 2656f(d)(2), ‘‘is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a warlike setting.’’ See Chapter 7, U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, released April 30, 2007 (http://www/state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ 2006/827726htm).

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calling for prosecution or extradition for specific crimes, such as aircraft hijacking or attacks on diplomats, regardless of the underlying motive. The first exception was the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,21 aimed at curbing terrorism financing, which gained support in the wake of the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attacks that killed and wounded far more Africans than Americans. As the number and scope of international conventions and protocols concerning terrorism expanded, the U.S. government began working with other governments to update a number of bilateral extradition treaties to ensure that terrorists’ violent acts could not be treated as nonextraditable ‘‘political offenses.’’ Mutual legal assistance treaties are being strengthened to enhance the effectiveness and speed of bilateral and international cooperation in criminal cases. The Long-Arm Statute In addition to the treaties, another important law enforcement development to strengthen extraterritorial jurisdiction was enacted as the so-called long-arm statue of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.22 The measure was drafted by the Justice Department after a series of aircraft hijackings in 1985 and the brutal killing that year of a wheelchairbound American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer.23 He was tossed overboard by Palestinian terrorists after they hijacked the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship. Justice Department lawyers felt that the international conventions and U.S. laws on the books at the time did not clearly give the U.S. jurisdiction over the murder of Americans overseas in all cases of terrorist attacks. The long-arm statute makes the terrorist murder of an American citizen overseas a crime punishable in U.S. courts. To limit the extraterritorial reach to terrorist acts, instead of ordinary criminal cases in other countries, the attorney general has to make a determination that the event was terrorist related—defined as acts intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or civilian population. The legislation was sponsored in the Senate by Senator Arlen Spector, a Pennsylvania Republican serving on the Senate Judiciary Committee and a former prosecutor. Looking for a vehicle bill in the House, Justice Department officials and I promoted the legislation with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which incorporated it into the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.24

21

Section(2)(a) of the Convention refers to ‘‘Any (other) act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’’ (http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf). 22 18 USC 2332. 23 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leon_Klinghoffer. 24 Section 1202 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399 and later modified and codified as 18 USC 2332 (http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00012.htm).

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The new statute provided a legal basis for the FBI to conduct overseas criminal investigations of terrorist attacks against Americans. The provision also greatly increased number of legal attach´es assigned overseas to U.S. embassies. The ‘‘Legats,’’ as they are called, not only facilitate U.S. investigations, but also can assist host countries in their own investigations or help improve existing laws. The investigations have helped develop a forensic database that has been useful in tracing weapons used in attacks in one country to a source in another nation, sometimes a state sponsor. Currently, there are 60 Legat offices around the world.25 Sharpening Sanctions Against State Sponsors of Terrorism At the same time that the international community was negotiating and ratifying more counterterrorism conventions, the United States unilaterally began focusing on governments that supported terrorism. This effort represented the first major step to use legislation against states that funded and otherwise supported international terrorism. These laws stemmed partly from the U.S. government’s widespread provision of military and economic foreign assistance to other countries, including Syria. Congress decided that America should not give financial or other kinds of assistance to countries that sponsor or assist terrorists. One of the first antiterrorism laws enacted in this arena was a 1976 provision cutting off foreign assistance to ‘‘any government which aids or abets, by providing sanctuary from prosecution, to any group or individual which has committed an act of international terrorism.’’26 As international terrorism continued in the 1970s, Congress began looking for additional ways to put more pressure on these regimes. This eventually led to the development of what become known as the ‘‘terrorism list.’’ One indirect precipitating event, all but forgotten, was the August 11, 1976, attempt by a combined group of PFLP and Japanese Red Army terrorists to hijack an Israeli El Al passenger plane at Istanbul airport. They killed four civilians and wounded 20 others. One of the murdered passengers was Hal Rosenthal, a 29-year-old Senate foreign policy legislative aide to Senator Jacob Javits of New York, a senior Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A memorial service was held in the Senate for Mr. Rosenthal, attended by a standing-room only crowd. Senator Walter Mondale, a Minnesota Democrat who previously had employed Mr. Rosenthal, delivered an eloquent eulogy urging some of the attending senators and staffers to ‘‘do something’’ about terrorism. A small bipartisan group helped develop a strong counterterrorism bill, and their drafts became part of the Omnibus Antiterrorism Act cosponsored by Senators Javits and Abraham Ribicoff, a Connecticut Democrat and chairman of the Senate Government Operations Committee. 25

See http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm. Section 303 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which created Sec. 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act (since modified in 2002, P.L. 107-115: Stat. 3147, 2153. 2155). 26

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Among other features, the bill mandated sanctions against countries that aided and abetted terrorism and would have barred airline baggage from those countries from coming into the United States unless inspected in a third country. The bill was introduced in 1978 and passed Senator Ribicoff’s Government Operations Committee. It became bogged down, however. The Carter administration opposed the bill because it would have mandated sanctions against countries that supported terrorists. These were expected to be primarily Arab states. Consequently, according to one account, the Carter administration tried to tangle the bill in disputes over definitions of terrorism.27 This maneuvering may well have been the case, but key senators and their foreign policy aides did not need any outside help to disagree. At one contentious meeting28 to discuss the legislation, aides to Senator Dick Clark, a liberal Iowa Democrat and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, opposed draft language that they feared might result in the terrorist designation being applied to the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and African opposition groups opposed to the white government in present-day Zimbabwe. Firing back, senior aides to Senator Javits argued that although the liberal Republican senator strongly opposed the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Ian Smith minority government in what was then known as Rhodesia, he believed that the attacks on isolated white farmhouses were acts of terrorism. This disagreement between two groups of basically centralist American senators and staffers, one slightly left of center and the other slightly right, who generally agreed on most foreign policy issues, is an example of the difficulties in reaching a consensus on the definition of terrorism—one that I have often cited during seminars and other discussions of the definition issue. Some of the concepts contained in the Omnibus Antiterrorism Bill survived its demise and reemerged in 1978, thanks indirectly to State Department and Commerce Department officials who lacked political or foreign policy antenna. New legislation was touched off by Congressional reactions to mid-level Commerce Department and State Department officials who had approved export licenses for U.S.-made equipment to Libya and Syria that could be used for military purposes. In Libya’s case, the sale involved 400 heavy-duty off-road trucks that could be used to carry tanks long distances for possible attacks against Libya’s neighbors, primarily Egypt. The large trucks, allegedly sought for hauling oil rigs, were identical to the heavy-duty type used by the American and Canadian armies to transport tanks to the battlefront. In Syria’s case, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Near East Bureau approved the export of six so-called civilian versions of the Lockheed C-130 transport plane. Shortly after the license was approved, Syria stepped up the shelling of the Christian suburbs of East Beirut. A Lockheed Washington office 27 Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot; The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 105–106, 111–113. The book provides a good description of the behind the scenes aspects of the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 28 I took part in the meeting as the foreign policy assistance to Senator Clifford Case, a liberal New Jersey Republican, who sided with Senator Javits.

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representative later told me that, although the licenses had been issued, Damascus never went ahead with the purchase. He said he thought the Syrians were just testing the United States. Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs felt that exports of such dual-use equipment had important foreign policy implications, and should be approved only by high-level officials in consultation with Congress, not by low-level licensing clerks and mid-level State Department regional officials (who often were suspected of clientitis, especially in the Near East Bureau). Otherwise, the members felt, the purchasing countries might conclude that they could engage in terrorism and still do business as usual, even obtaining equipment that could support military or terrorist activity. The leading member on the issues was the late Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, an outspoken liberal Republican from New Jersey and new member of the committee. Representative Fenwick, a tall, pipe-smoking woman of a ‘‘certain age’’ was considered to be the model for the Doonesbury character Lacy Davenport. She often expressed indignation about the lack of common sense among government officials. At that time, I was Representative Fenwick’s national security legislative assistant, and a State Department official expressed concern to us about the possible impact of the tank transporter sale on Egypt in view of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi’s mischief-making policies. Meanwhile, Lebanese-American constituents of Congressman Ed Derwinski, a Republican from Illinois, aroused his concern about the Syrian licenses. Working with Representative Jonathan Bingham, a Democrat from New York and chairman of the relevant House Foreign Affairs subcommittee dealing with export controls, and his staff, Representative Fenwick and I drafted a counterterrorism provision of the Export Control Act legislation. The act was intended to provide tighter scrutiny and controls over such potential exports of dual-use equipment. Thus, contrary to the usual perception that counterterrorism measures were aimed at Arab countries, this major legislation was actually prompted by concerns for two Arab countries, Egypt and Lebanon.

THE TERRORISM LIST The Fenwick amendment required that Congress be notified 30 days before export licenses were issued for goods or services valued at more than $7 million dollars that would significantly enhance the military capability or the ability to support acts of international terrorism. The amendment applied to the government of any country that the secretary of state determined had repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism. This concept of publicly listing countries that support international terrorism and then imposing sanctions was influenced by the original Senate omnibus counterterrorism bill and an earlier exchange of letters between Senator Javits and the State Department, in which the State Department noted countries that gave support to international terrorists. The primary intent of the Fenwick provision was to provide a mechanism for scrutinizing potentially sensitive exports at a high level. Requiring

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Congressional prenotification was intended to ensure that licensing decisions concerning dual-use equipment for state sponsors of international terrorism were reviewed and approved at the top levels of the State Department and reviewed for consistency with overall American foreign policy goals, rather than primarily for commercial considerations. The prenotification procedure also would give Congress time to weigh in and protest, if it wished. The Fenwick provision passed the House, was accepted by the Senate, and was signed into law by President Ford in October 1979 as Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.29 (The measure was later tightened up and the ‘‘would enhance’’ threshold was changed in 1989 to ‘‘could enhance.’’ The dollar threshold also was dropped, making the provision more stringent.30) What was intended as an export control mechanism quickly became known as the ‘‘terrorism list’’ or ‘‘state sponsors list’’ and developed into a major tool in the U.S. counterterrorism effort. In the years following enactment of the terrorism list amendment, Congress passed a series of ‘‘piggy back’’ amendments that, by reference, imposed additional economic sanctions on countries designated under the Export Administration Act’s Section 6(j). For example, the Internal Revenue Code,31 as amended, prohibits U.S. corporations or individuals from claiming foreign tax credits on income earned in 6(j) countries. This measure is intended to discourage American investment that might help shore up these governments. Other provisions deny economic and military assistance and financial transactions; the latter is a provision intended to discourage tourist travel or business dealings and to require that the United States oppose international banking institution loans to these countries. The terrorist list countries initially designated in 1979 were Libya, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. Since then, Cuba, North Korea, and the Sudan have been designated. South Yemen was dropped after it merged with North Yemen in 1990. The State Department removed Iraq in 1982, but redesignated it after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Iraq was taken off the list again in 2004 after Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled and a new government was formed. Libya was removed in 2006 after lengthy negotiations over the Pan Am 103 bombing. The current list includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria The Fenwick amendment did have an impact. After its enactment, the State Department consulted with key Congressional members and staff while considering at least some export licenses. There have been decisions, at least in the past, not to proceed with licenses and notification to Congress, because Congress was expected to object and potentially raise foreign policy problems. An unusual and unexpected consequence of the Export Administration Act of 1979 provision came to light only a dozen years later. One of the first 29 P.L. 96-72. As amended. Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50 USC app. 2405(j)). 30 Section 4 of the Anti-Terrorism and Export Control Act of 1989, P.L. 101-222, enacted in the wake of the Iran-Contra Affair (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c101:1:./temp/ ~c101oiyO1J). 31 26 USC section 901(j). For text, see http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/ts_search.pl? title=26&sec=901.

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potential exports caught in the new export control was the sale of eight General Electric gas turbine engines for use in four heavily armed Luppo-class missile frigates that Italy was building for the Iraqi navy. Iraq at that time, like neighboring countries, had only small missile boats. The frigates would have helped Iraq dominate the small naval forces of the Gulf countries and control the oil shipping lanes to the Strait of Harmuz. In early 1980, only a month or two after Iraq was designated as a state supporter of terrorism, a White House official who opposed the sales to Iraq told me that that sale of the engines had been approved by the Commerce Department. Two engines already had been shipped. Mrs. Fenwick and some of her colleagues in the House and Senate protested and were able to block the shipment of the remaining six engines. Italy was then forced to redesign the hulls to accommodate the larger dimensions of British-made engines. As a result of the delay and later changes in Italian government attitudes toward providing the ships to Iraq, the frigates were still in an Italian shipyard when the 1991 Gulf War broke out. Thus, fortuitously, there were four fewer sophisticated military threats that would have diverted the resources of the Coalition’s naval and air forces. A decade after the terrorism list legislation was enacted in 1979, it underwent major modifications. Aside from making the terrorist list provision more stringent by changing the ‘‘would’’ enhance to ‘‘could’’ enhance language mentioned earlier, the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Act of 198932 laid out specific criteria and advance notification procedures that had to be followed before a country could be taken off the terrorism list. This provision was a Congressional reaction to the State Department’s removal of Iraq from the terrorism list in 1982 without consulting with or informing Congress—a move intended by the Reagan administration to tilt toward Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war on the theory that the Saddam Hussein regime was the lesser of two evils, even though he initiated the conflict. The legislation was sponsored by Representative Howard Berman, a California Democrat, and Representative Lee Hamilton, then chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and later co-chairman of the 9-11 Commission. Passage of the bill followed hearings into the Reagan White House’s contra arms deals. This scheme developed by National Security Council (NSC) staff member Oliver North involved selling TOW antitank missiles to Iran, a terrorist list country, in exchange for the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon by Shiite groups supported by Tehran. The plan then used the proceeds from the missile sales to go around Congress and illegally fund the anti-Marxist Contras in Nicaragua. This scheme was a violation of U.S. laws and a major departure of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policy against rewarding hostage takers or other terrorists. Aside from tweaking the laws regulating arms exports, the 1989 legislation laid out specific procedures for removing a country from the terrorism list. They require that, before the designation is rescinded, the president must

32 P.L. 101-222. For text, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c101:1:./temp/ ~c101oiyO1J.

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make a determination and notify Congress 45 days in advance that the government of the country in question has not supported terrorism for the previous six months and has given assurances that it will not support terrorism in the future. The six-month time period was the result of a compromise worked out between Representative Berman and Richard Murphy, then the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs.33 The 45-day notification requirement was intended to give time to object or otherwise react to a resolution, for example, through legislation, or to informally protest. The formal lifting of Iraq’s designation had to await the formation of a new Iraqi government that could formally provide the required assurances. Libya was removed under these procedures after it agreed to pay compensation for families of the victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing and Qadhafi renounced efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

COUNTERING TERRORISM FUNDING In the mid-1990s, another major evolution in U.S. counterterrorism law began to develop. This was a shift in focus to terrorist groups that were not dependant on support from rogue states. Government counterterrorism officials became aware that secular terrorist groups, such as the ANO, increasingly were using front companies and organizations to raise and transfer money instead of depending upon state sponsors. Some of the state sponsors, perhaps responding to pressure from U.S. sanctions, had begun reducing their direct financial or other support to terrorist groups. These groups, in turn, began reducing their dependency on their state supporters State Department and Justice Department officials began looking for countermeasures after a partially declassified intelligence community paper on the ANO terrorist organization described some of the ANO’s front company activities in Eastern Europe. The study was turned into an unclassified State Department ‘‘white paper’’ or fact sheet.34 Meanwhile, fundamentalist and more independent groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas were emerging. These radical militant fundamentalist terrorist groups were raising large sums of money through so-called charities, which were used as front organizations, as well as through business fronts and criminal enterprises. In response, the Justice Department and State Department in the early 1990s began to develop legislation aimed at individuals (rather than counties) 33

In practice, the State Department’s Counterterrorism Office used a much longer time period to gauge whether a country was engaging in terrorism and took into account indirect forms of support, such as providing sanctuary or headquarters for terrorist groups even though its own agents may not have been detected to be involved in operations. 34 United States Department of State Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Abu Nidal Organization (Washington, D.C.: The Office, 1989). Terrorism—International Offenses—IsraelArab Relations, 1949– / Terrorists—Abu Nidal, 1937–2002—Abu Nidal (Organization). OCLC 21233325.

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who provided funding, weapons, safe houses, or other forms of material support for specific terrorist attacks. The proposed provision made it a crime for U.S. citizens, residents, or organizations to knowingly provide funds or other forms of material support, such as weapons, safe houses, and training, for a specific act of terrorism, regardless of whether it was committed by a terrorist organization or individual. During the final drafting stage, Justice Department officials inserted the provision of financial services as one of the material support offenses to be covered by the new legislation. This modification was a result of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation, chaired by Senator John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat, which disclosed the ANO’s use of the British-based BCCI bank as a financial conduit. The concept for penalizing individuals who provide material support actually went back a decade earlier. In response to the discovery that a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, acting on his own and for compensation, had provided training and other assistance to Libya, the Reagan administration proposed legislation that would make it illegal for an American to act in concert with the armed forces or any intelligence agency of any foreign government or international terrorist group designated as a national security threat by the Secretary of State. This legislation was called the Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984.35 However, the Senate and companion House measures died after running into strong opposition by members who were concerned the bill could affect free speech and the provision of food. They also objected to giving the secretary of state the authority to designate terrorist organizations.36 This abortive effort, however, influenced the drafting of an amendment to the definitions in Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which required the denial of visas to aliens who had engaged in terrorist activity. The amendment, incorporated into the Immigration Act of 1990, said terrorist activity was defined as providing material support to include not only weapons and explosives but also financial help, safe houses, transportation, communications, false documents, and training.37 The Justice Department then picked up this material support language and incorporated it into what became the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994.38 Unfortunately, from a law enforcement perspective, the provision was watered down during a late night, backroom drafting deal between then FBI Director Louis Freeh and Congressman Don Edwards, a liberal California Democrat. Freeh agreed to Edwards’s addition of a 35

S. 2626 and HR in the 98th Congress, 1984. For more details on this early history of the material support provisions and other aspects of terrorism support laws, including various cases, see Robert M. Chesney, Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, ‘‘The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention’’ 42 Harv. J. Legis. 1 (2005) (http://ssrn.com/abstract¼587442). 37 For current version of Section 212, as revised, see 8 USC section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (supp. I12001) (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/8/chapters/12/subchapters/ ii/parts/ii/sections/section_1182.html). 38 Section 12005a of P.L. 103-322, enacted November 13, 1994. The legislation was better known for controls on assault weapons. 36

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subsection that made it virtually impossible to start an investigation unless the authorities already had facts that the crime already had taken place or was about to take place. Some lower-level FBI and Justice officials were privately furious, because the change significantly impeded the initiation of an investigation.39 This was finally corrected two years later in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, described in more detail below.40 Meanwhile in 1994, as the administration’s omnibus crime bill was winding its way through Congress and preoccupying members of the Judiciary Committees, administration officials began working on more comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. They were prompted by two sets of events. The first was the February 25, 1994, shooting of 29 Palestinians at a Hebron mosque by Baruch Goldstein, an American who immigrated to Israel and had been involved in the extremist far-right Kahane movement. That group was launched by Rabbi Meir Kahane, the hard-line founder of the Jewish Defense League in New York who later emigrated to Israel with a group of supporters. He was assassinated in 1990 by an Egyptian gunman at a speaking engagement in a New York City hotel. The second series of events was a string of six Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis in late 1994, including three bus bombings that killed 53 people and wounded dozens of others. These events prompted the formation of two interagency working groups of legislative specialists from the State, Justice, and Treasury Departments. One working group began examining existing laws to see whether they could be used quickly against terrorist groups. Meanwhile a parallel group, involving some of the same officials, began looking at ways to strengthen U.S. laws to counter terrorist organizations. Two Front Steps Against Terrorism Financing These working groups, in retrospect, marked a new emphasis in U.S. counterterrorism efforts—going after the money and targeting terrorist organizations that did not depend on state sponsors for their funds or other forms of support such as weapons. Their efforts resulted in two major actions. The task force focusing on using existing laws came with the first move. On January 23, 1995, the Clinton administration issued Executive Order Number 12947,41 freezing the assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction of 12 groups whose support of violence were determined to be threatening the Middle East peace process. The so-called dirty dozen included 10 Arab groups and 2 Israeli groups affiliated with the Kahane movement. This action was taken under the existing authority of the International Emergency Economics Powers Act (IEEPA),42 a statute that gives the president broad authority, including the freezing of assets upon the declaration of a national emergency. 39

Conversations at the time with FBI and Department of Justice officials. P.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 41 See http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/12947.pdf. 42 The International Emergencies Economic Powers Act (http://www.treas.gov/offices/ enforcement/ofac/legal/statutes/ieepa.pdf). 40

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Meanwhile on the legislative front, the second working group completed new draft legislation that the interagency group had started drafting in 1994. Officials from the Department of Justice—led by lawyers from the Office of Terrorism and Violent Crime—the FBI, the State Department’s Legal Advisor’s Office, and the Counterterrorism office were the main participants. After numerous meetings and drafting sessions, we developed a score of provisions to strengthen existing U.S. counterterrorism law. The draft legislation was polished over the November 1994 Armistice Day weekend by Jim Reynolds, the veteran head of the Justice Department’s Terrorism and Violent Crime section.43 The draft bill was then cleared by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) through the various government agencies and introduced in February 2005 by key Democratic members of the judiciary committees: Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware and, on the House side, Representative Charles Schumer of New York. Senate Republicans later introduced an alternative bill containing material support provisions but also proposed habeas corpus reform restrictions.44 The key provisions, aimed at curbing the flow of money and other resources to terrorist groups, would make it a criminal offense for American citizens, residents, or organizations to knowingly provide funds and other material support to groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the secretary of state. This legislation was intended to curb support by individuals or organizations for terrorist groups, just as nearly two decades earlier Congress began enacting legislation aimed against governments that supported international terrorism. Before the bill was actually introduced, representatives of the Arab-American community were briefed at my suggestion by Ambassador Philip Wilcox, the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism the Justice Department’s Jim Reynolds, and FBI officials. The Arab-American community representatives opposed the bill and denounced it publicly, even before they read the text. The denunciations may have had the unintended effect of making at least some donors more cautious and slowing down contributions to legitimate as well as dubious charities even before the bill was enacted. The original administration bill contained a licensing provision allowing donors to contribute to specific charitable activities such as medical supplies and other humanitarian assistance provided that the organizations provided documentation that the contribution actually was being used for those purposes. This attempt to accommodate legitimate humanitarian concerns ultimately was dropped however as a result of opposition in Congress. During discussions between State and Justice Department officials and the Senate

43 As Mr. Reynolds, now a senior Justice Department official, noted in a May 2007 interview, the administration legislation was drafted on a nonpartisan basis by little-known career professionals. They included Steve Weglian, in his office; Mike Lindemann, an expert in the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration Litigation; and Sam Witten, a State Department Legal Advisor’s Office attorney specializing in terrorism issues. I was the Counterterrorism Office’s representative and drafter. Some of the core ideas, as noted earlier, predated the Clinton administration. 44 The Senate bill was S.735.

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Judiciary Committee staff, one key staffer who worked for Republican Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan, a state with a large Arab-American population rejected the provision. She said that the recipient ‘‘charity’’ organizations would not stand for opening their books to inspection.45 In any event, the licensing proposal would have been difficult to administer effectively. The Senate version of the bill generally had been weakened, largely through the efforts by staff for Senator Abrahams and other Republican members. Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch, a conservative Utah Republican, generally deferred to those who felt the most strongly about the bill. One Senate draft version even would have prohibited prosecutions unless the U.S. government could prove that the leaders of the recipient organization knew that the contributions were funds designated for specific acts of terrorism—as if these highly secret organizations were willing to provide transparent and accurate organizational charts. The House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Henry Hyde, an Illinois Republican, and the House Judiciary Crime Subcommittee, chaired by Representative Bill McCollum, a Florida Republican, and Representative Schumer, the senior Democrat on the crime subcommittee, held lengthy hearings and mark-up sessions. They had to work out a balance between liberal Democrats, such as Barney Frank of Massachusetts, and conservative Republicans, such as Bob Barr from Georgia, who were dubbed by some staffers working on the bill as the ‘‘Unholy Unlikely Alliance.’’ After a lengthy conference committee to work out final versions of the bill, in which the House’s stronger features generally prevailed, the bill ultimately was passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton into law on April 24, 1996, as part of the landmark AEDPA of 1996,46 which became a key element in the efforts to counter terrorism fundraising. The Congressional attitude toward funding for terrorist groups was expressed in the ‘‘FINDINGS and PURPOSE’’ Sec. 301 (7) of the Act.47 This section stated that ‘‘foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contributions to such an organization facilitate that conduct.’’ In effect, Congress was reinforcing the view that the money is fungible and, even if the money is intended for legitimate charitable purposes, it frees up funds that could be used to support terrorist activities. Some terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah and those in Egypt use funds for weapons and to provide schools and medical clinics that attract supporters and potential operatives.

45 This took place during negotiating discussions between Senate Judiciary Committee staff members and Justice Department and State Department officials, including the author. This is a good example of the way legislation is sometimes shaped in behind-the-scenes discussions that are not necessarily reflected in the formal legislative history of committee reports and floor debate. 46 P.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 47 For the entire ‘‘Findings and Purpose Section, 301, see http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/ infousa/laws/majorlaw/s735.htm#t3.

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Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations There are three main components of the 1996 AEDPA legislation’s efforts to counter terrorist fundraising and further restrict the entry into the United States of aliens associated with terrorist organizations First, the legislation authorizes the secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general and secretary of the treasury, to designate groups involved in international terrorism as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The statute blocks FTOs’ assets in the possession or control of U.S. financial institutions, subject to regulation by the secretary of the treasury. Some members of the House Judiciary Committee, both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, initially opposed the designation process as too sweeping and were concerned that once an organization was named it could never get off the list. The issue was resolved during a negotiating session with Congressional staff when a Justice Department official suggested the compromise in which the designations expired after two years unless renewed. The Republican-controlled Congress added provisions allowing FTO designations to be challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia. The designations and redesignations require lengthy administrative records that contain detailed descriptions of the organization, chronologies of attacks and other activities, and other information. Classified as well as unclassified information can be used. The first designations were made in October 1997, when Secretary of State Madeline Albright, in consultation with the attorney general and secretary of treasury as required by law, designated 30 groups.48 The year-and-a-half delay in making the first designations was the result of the provision of ADEPA that required designation decisions to be based on an administrative record and that mandated court challenges and defenses be based solely on that administrative record. Justice Department attorneys told the State Department that the administrative records therefore had to be the equivalent of court briefs. The State Department Foreign Service regional specialists in the Counterterrorism Office generally had no experience in this type of procedure and thus there were lengthy discussions and rewriting sessions with their Justice Department colleagues. Meanwhile, the officers had to deal with their regular counterterrorism duties. Furthermore, at that time in 1996 and 1997, State Department offices had only limited access to the unclassified Internet to aid their search of public sources—indeed there was only one such computer in the Counterterrorism Office. It was so slow and outdated that some of us who worked on preparing administrative records used our more up-to-date personal computers at home to conduct unclassified Internet research on the organizations. Some members of Congress publicly complained about the delays in letters to the secretary of state and a press release. In actuality, these delays were primarily the result of cutbacks in the State Department’s budget by Congress

48

See http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/10/fr100501.html.

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and resulting curbs on staffing and computer equipment, not any reluctance to implement the law that originated with the State Department. Two years later the process was repeated. During the October 1999 redesignations cycle required by the sunset provision, several groups that were no longer in business were dropped and al Qaeda was added. More groups were added in later years. The redesignations in 1999, 2001, and 2003 required an inordinate amount of paperwork, because complete new administration records had to be drafted for every group. This was required even though the groups may have had openly engaged in terrorist activities during the previous two years. The task consumed thousands of staff hours in the intelligence community, State Department, Justice, and Treasury. Thus, in 2003, at the request of my colleagues, I drafted for the Counterterrorism Office an amendment to extend the time period to four years. A modified version cleared the OMB interagency vetting process and the House of Representatives approved a modified version. The amendment, however, became bogged in the Senate when the vehicle bill, the State Department Authorization Bill, was pulled off the floor calendar because of filibuster threats against other proposed amendments. The next year, in June 2004, the House passed a slightly revised version, spearheaded by Representative Elton Gallegly, a Republican from California and chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Bill. That measure passed by the Senate and was signed into law on December 23, 2004.49 This provision allows a designated group to appeal the designation every two years and provides for a review by the State Department every five years. The current listing, from October 2005, designates 42 groups.50 Only a handful of the designated groups have challenged the designations as allowed under the law in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Colombia. The court has consistently upheld the secretary of state.51

MATERIAL SUPPORT The second key component of AEDPA makes it a criminal offense for Americans to knowingly provide material support or resources to a terrorist 49

Section 7119 Intelligence Authorization Act of 2005, P.L. 108-458 Also see 8 USC Chapter 12, Section 1184 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode08/usc_sec_08_00001189—— 000-.html. 50 See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 51 The most aggressive group in challenging the designations is the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iranian government group that, among other things, has fired mortar shells at Iranian court houses. The group, which carries on a lobbying campaign in Congress, has claimed that it originally was designated in 1997 as a gesture to the Iranian government, citing an unnamed NSC official to that effect. However, the designations process is a ‘‘bottoms up’’ approach. The initial list is compiled by State Department counterterrorism officers, in consultation with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Only much later in the process is the list forwarded to the NSC and White House before the final designations. The only change in the original 1997 process came when the NSC removed the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from the original list because the British and Irish governments were in a delicate stage of negotiations with the IRA.

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group formally designated as an FTO by the secretary of state under the procedures described above. The material support provisions have been an important legal tool against those people who help provide funds, weapons, training, financial services, and other forms of support for terrorist activities, even though they may not be the bombers or shooters. Along with the use of IEEPA-related executive orders used to freeze terrorist assets and related steps to block transactions, the material support laws are a major component of the U.S. government’s efforts to choke off the financial flows to terrorists. The Justice Department, in a lengthy ‘‘Counterterrorism White Paper’’ issued on June 22, 2006, said— The material support statutes have been a cornerstone of our success in terrorism financing cases as well as in a wide range of other cases addressing all types of support to terrorism. Our effective use of these statutes has allowed us to intervene at the early stages of terrorist planning, before a terrorist act occurs. We also have effectively used other terrorism and weapons of mass destruction statutes, and have drawn on more general statutes, such as immigration fraud and false statement offenses, where they apply in terrorism investigations.52

There are actually two material support provisions. One section, 18 USC 2339A, is a refinement of the measure watered down several years earlier in the Freeh-Edwards deal mentioned above. It dropped the restrictive language that Representative Edwards inserted that made it difficult to launch an investigation. The modified 18 USC 2339A provision made it illegal to knowingly provide material support for specific acts of terrorism, whether or not they are carried out by a known organization.53 The law does not define terrorism directly, but instead cites as predicate offenses a series of U.S. laws that criminalize certain specific acts, such as attacking aircraft, taking hostages, or attacking the president, cabinet officers, and members of Congress. Many of these previously enacted laws cited in 18 USC 2339A are the implementing legislation for the various international terrorism conventions. The second and broader material support provision, Section 18 USC 2339B, made it a criminal offense to knowingly provide material support to a designated FTO, whether or not the funds or other support can be directly linked to a terrorist attack.54 This measure was intended to curb the flow of funds or forms of material support without the prosecutors having to prove that each contribution or provision of material support was linked to a specific terrorist attack. As of July 31, 2007, according to Justice Department officials, 190 people have been charged with violations under one or both of the material support provisions, of whom 16 have been convicted and 31 have pled guilty. 52 For full text of the June 22, 2006, Justice White paper, which describes its law enforcement efforts against terrorism, including some of the specific cases, see http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf. 53 See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/sections/ section_2339a.html. 54 See http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/sections/ section_2339b.html.

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By contrast, as of July 2004, 39 people had been charged under the two material support provisions and 14 had been convicted or pled guilty to these or other criminal charges.55 Also, though it is hard to measure, the provisions making it a criminal offense to knowingly provide funding to terrorist organizations may have some deterrent effect on possible donors to questionable groups. To those who complained that they had a strong desire or even religious duty to contribute to charities that operate overseas, officials have said, as during the previously mentioned January 1995 meeting with Arab-American organization representatives, that a number of reputable charities, such as the Red Crescent, assist local populations without also supporting terrorist activities. A third important provision of AEDPA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize the secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general, to designate foreign terrorist groups on the so-called Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL).56 Such a designation precludes the issuance of U.S. visas for members of such designated groups as well as officers and other leaders, as previously was the case. The year and a half it took Congress to pass AEDPA is an illustration of how the process of enacting legislation is not always a perfect process and sometimes has been compared to making sausage. In some instances, there is a last-minute rush to reconcile the differences between the Senate version and the House version of a bill in the joint Senate-House conference committee. The resulting bill that emerges from the conference committee and goes to the White House for the president’s signature can contain hurriedly drafted provisions. The Congressional debate over the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was one of the first times that the terrorism issue became openly partisan—with the Clinton administration and the Republican-controlled Congress pointing fingers at each other over various provisions or for allegedly dragging their feet, especially after the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City bombings. Although the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people and injured more than 800 resulted in more attention for the bill, it was nearly a year later before both the Senate and House passed their versions. The joint Senate-House conference committee then rushed through the drafting of a final bill that was signed into law on April 24, 1996, just after the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombings.57 Sometimes, in the process, small but useful provisions are overlooked. For example, in the State and Justice Department, draft legislation for ADEPA broadened the existing immigration law’s description of terrorist acts to include terrorist attacks using knives and other bladed weapons in addition to guns and explosives. Many of the terrorists conducting attacks in Algeria and Egypt had used hatchets, knives, and swords to kill their victims. In the final rush, the Congressional conference committee that worked out a compromise 55

Statistics from Justice Department provided at the author’s request. See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/15222.htm. 57 For a Congressional Research Service Summary, see Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary by American Law Division, June 3, 1996 (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm). 56

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version of the 1996 act omitted the administration’s proposed changes on this subject. A corrective provision was finally enacted as part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.58 The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act also modified the FTO designations, originally enacted in the 1996 AEDPA, to deal with an issue previously discussed with Congress: terrorist groups that do not conduct actual attacks for two or more years but are still capable. The USA PATRIOT Act allowed for the redesignations of a terrorist group even if terrorist activities have not been detected during the previous two years, but the group retains the ‘‘capability and intent’’ to engage in terrorist activities. This change takes account of the fact that terrorist groups sometime ‘‘lie low’’ and do not conduct an actual attack for a considerable time period. They may be operating in effective secrecy, however, with their money raising and planning activities too well hidden to detect. Another example was the definition of training under the material support sections of AEDPA. The provision of training is one of the forms of prohibited material support. From my observations, executive branch officials and Congressional staffers did not even discuss the training prohibition. It was drawn from earlier legislation and everyone seemed to assume that training meant training people for terrorism activities. However, a December 3, 2003, decision by the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California barred prosecution for training support, saying that the law did not sufficiently define training and providing of personnel.59 Subsequently, the Justice Department obtained clarifying amendments in Section 2006 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.60 Additional refinements were included, including those expanding the definitions to include people who volunteered to join FTOs—such as an American who joined the Taliban in Afghanistan.61 The USA PATRIOT Act Five and a half years after the enactment of the AEDPA and 45 days after 9/ 11, Congress enacted the next major counterterrorism legislation. This was the USA PATRIOT Act, which was enacted on October 26, 2001. (The full name is the rather ungainly ‘‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intersect and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.’’62) 58

Section 411 (B)(ii) of the PATRIOT Act, 115 State. 346. The case involved a group of supporters of the Tamil Tigers against the Justice Department and Secretary of State Powell (http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/044DE357B D726D7288256DF10063BDE4/$file/0255082.pdf). 60 P.L. 108-458 (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/108-796/titlevi_terrorism_ prevention.pdf). 61 For additional background, see Congressional Research Brief, Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, American Law Division, Material Support for Material Support of Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Sunset Amendments in Brief, March 17, 2006 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/terror/RS22222.pdf). 62 P.L. 107-56. For text of the PATRIOT Act, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname¼107_cong_public_laws&docid¼f:publ056.107. 59

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The fears of more terrorist attacks in the wake of 9/11 were reflected in the shape of the legislation and the speed with which it was rushed through. Title I was named ‘‘Enhancing Domestic Security against Terrorism.’’ Many of the provisions in other titles also related to protecting homeland security by, for example, facilitating investigations and surveillance. The legislation had been criticized for being hastily put together and rushed through Congress before most members had a chance to really examine it. Actually, some of the provisions had been drafted much earlier, during the Clinton administration by career officials in the Justice Department and other agencies. However, the provisions had been rebuffed by Congress before 9/11 or otherwise fell by the wayside. A prime example is a ‘‘roving wiretap provision’’ that allows federal officials to get a wiretapping order that allows the tapping of any phone used by a suspect, including cell phones. Previously, a wiretap order that allowed monitoring had to be applied to a specific phone number. The roving wiretaps already were permitted in ordinary criminal cases. Justice Department and FBI officials had been trying to change the law for years, but until 9/11, Congress had not been willing to go along. Breaking Down ‘‘The Wall’’ A major feature of the USA PATRIOT Act also permits the sharing of foreign intelligence information with federal law enforcement, protective, immigration, national defense, and national security officials for the performance of official duties. This includes information relating to protection against international terrorism or foreign attack, or concerning foreign activity and the conduct of foreign affairs. The removal of this legal barrier is considered by administration officials and some other observers to be a major benefit of the PATRIOT Act. For intelligence analysts, the removal has made it easier to ‘‘connect the dots.’’ The sharing of intelligence information has enhanced the ability to investigate and prosecute cases because useful information often is obtained from intelligence sources overseas where the recipients of the material support are located. Some observers, however, suggest that the barriers were more the result of attorney general guidelines, perceived restrictions, and operating practices within the CIA and FBI, rather than a matter of law. Whether or not that indeed was the case, the passage of the provision in the PATRIOT Act has opened the door to increased information sharing that Justice Department officials say has enhanced the ability to investigate and prosecute cases, especially under the material support laws. The PATRIOT Act also addresses the issue of terrorism funding, containing new provisions on money laundering that give the United States jurisdiction over foreign people who maintain a bank account in the United States. The new law requires U.S. financial institutions to terminate their correspondent relationships with foreign banks that ignore U.S. subpoenas for records.

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In addition, the PATRIOT Act makes terrorism an offense under the Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),63 which originally was used against ordinary crime. The modification allows for forfeiture of all the assets of a person or entity that takes part in or plans an act of domestic or international terrorism. The provision includes a procedure for the owner of the confiscated assets to contest the seizure. Elements of the USA PATRIOT Act were controversial partly because some members and civil liberties organizations objected to the way the voluminous bill was rushed through Congress in the aftermath of 9/11 without enough time to read and study it. In the wake of the strong emotions following 9/11, members were reluctant to be painted as obstructionists or weak on terrorism. Librarians and civil libertarians, however, feared that a provision allowing the FBI to obtain access to the records of books checked out by terrorist suspects and Web sites they visited was an invasion of privacy. The original intent of the provisions was to assist investigators to determine if a suspect was looking at books on making explosives or other publications useful for terrorist activities. The issue became somewhat of a cause c´e l e` bre. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others charged that provisions of the Act violated the Constitution by allowing investigators in a ‘‘sneak-and-peak’’ procedure to obtain search warrants and not disclose that fact to the person subject to search. Critics even mounted an effort to get local city councils to vote for repeal of the law. The reaction against the Act was at least partially fueled by distrust of then Attorney General Ashcroft’s leadership of the Justice Department. As a result of the uneasiness over some of the provisions, Congress wrote a ‘‘sunset’’ clause into the 2001 Act that requires the legislation to expire in four years unless renewed. Reauthorizing and Improving the PATRIOT Act The Justice Department drafted a reauthorization bill that became a focus point of criticism and numerous administration speeches in its support.64 Various changes were made before it was eventually enacted as the USA

63

Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 USC § 1961 through 18 USC § 1968. RICO, as well as the material support provisions, were used to prosecute several persons arrested in 2001 for smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina, where the taxes were low, and reselling them in Michigan, where they could make a profit selling them in that high–cigarette tax state. The proceeds were then funneled to Hezbollah, one of the original groups designated as a foreign terrorist organization. (As a side note, during a series of seminars that the State Department and Justice Department conducted for other countries in 2002 to provide suggestions and pointers for strengthening their own legislation, officials from several countries were quite taken by the asset forfeiture concept. They saw it as a deterrent to terrorist supporters and an incentive for the investigative agencies that could use the proceeds from the sale of the assets to bolster their budgets.) 64 See chapter 21, Legislation.

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PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.65 The road to passage was bumpy, with one version failing to get through the Senate in December 2006, when the Senate Republican leaders were unable to round up the 60 votes needed to shut off debate. This was partly a reaction to a New York Times report shortly before the vote that President Bush had signed a secret executive order in 2002 authorizing the National Security Agency to monitor the e-mail, phone calls, and other communications of U.S. citizens in the United States without a court order. The final version of the bill made permanent 14 provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 that were due to expire at the end of 2006. It extended the sunset procedures, until 2009, for three provisions, including those relating to roving wiretaps, access to business records, and the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act. This provision permits surveillance of a non-U.S. person suspected of engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism, even if the individual is not linked to a specific terrorist group. It also included about two dozen provisions designed to protect civil liberties. For example, it raised the threshold for the FBI to obtain access to certain business records under the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court66 procedures. The new law requires that applications to the court for access to library or medical records have to be personally approved by one of three top-level FBI officials, the director, deputy director, or the FBI official in charge of the Intelligence Division. Applications must include a statement of facts demonstrating that the records sought are ‘‘relevant’’ to an authorized investigation to obtain terrorism or foreign intelligence information. The new law imposed additional reporting requirements on the use of roving wiretaps and any Justice Department development or use of data mining programs. These are just a sampling of the efforts to modify the original 2001 PATRIOT Act after that measure was rushed through during the heated atmosphere following the 9/11 attacks. The debate and the changes reflect the continuing efforts to find the right balance between laws intended to prevent terrorism, or prosecute them after the fact, and civil liberties concerns. The consensus shifts from time to time. Sometimes, it is affected by major attacks or increased threats. The consensus is also affected by perceptions among the public and lobby groups as to 65 There were actually two bills involved, the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177 stat 192 (2006) and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (2006). For Summary and Status, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.03199; for text, see http:// frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ177. 109. For CRS Summary, see Brian T. Yeh and Charles Doyle, USA United State Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), updated December 21, 2006 (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ organization/78416.pdf). For President Bush’s speech on signing the legislation into law on March 9, 2006, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-4.html. For the President’s official signing statement, which contains executive branch interpretations, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060309-8.html. 66 For background, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Foreign_Intelligence_ Surveillance_Court.

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whether the measures intended to increase security for the society as a whole are applied with fairness to innocent suspects and privacy concerns. If there is a major terrorist attack on American soil again or more individuals or groups of people living in the United States are stopped on the verge of launching major attacks, the pendulum could well swing again. Focusing on Border Security Homeland and border security issues have come to the fore in the past several years, fueled partly by fears that more terrorists such as the 9/11 hijackers might sneak into the United States. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security67 also reflected the post-9/11 fears that the United States was no longer safe behind its oceans and friendly borders with Canada and Mexico. The legislation described in this section reflects this continuing evolution of U.S. legislation, this time toward domestic terrorism concerns. There are many layers to this evolution. The border security issue has become wrapped into broader concerns, especially in the southwest states, because of the large number of illegal immigrants crossing the border from Mexico. Actually, to date, more terrorists have been found north of the border in Canada or trying to cross southward. To some extent, this border issue reflects more than worries about terrorists sneaking into the United States. It is a reaction to large numbers of poorly educated Spanish-speaking illegal immigrants who are perceived to be creating a subculture of people who are slow to learn English and a perception that they are changing the social composition of American society. Congress passed the ‘‘Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Act of 2002,68 which among other components, authorized 400 additional inspectors, investigators, and other staff on the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) over the next five years. It required every foreign visitor desiring entrance into the United States to carry a travel document containing biometric identification—that would be fingerprints or facial recognition. It strengthens the requirements that all commercial passenger ships and airplanes entering the United States provide a list of passengers and crew before arrival. The implementing procedures were still being negotiated with foreign countries as of early 2007. Twenty seven months later, Congress enacted and the president signed the Secure Fence Act,69 which among other things, authorized construction of a 700-mile-long fence along the border with Mexico. President Bush wanted to include immigration reform procedures that would allow illegal aliens who had been living in the United States for a period of time to eventually obtain 67

See chapter 24, Homeland Security. For text of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishing the Department of Homeland Security, see P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. Also see http:// frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname¼107_cong_public_laws&docid¼f:publ296.1 07.pdf. 68 P.L. 101-173. For text, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ173.107. 69 P.L. 109-367, 120 State. 2638. For text, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ367.109.

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U.S. citizenship. The Republican-controlled Congress, however, declined to go along. It was one of the first major splits with President Bush and the president’s statement when he signed the bill reflected this.70 The heated debates of the issue in early 2007 reflected unhappiness from both sides of the issue about the proposed compromise legislation that was brought to the Senate floor in May. Other border issues were included in previous legislation, for example, the PATRIOT Act. One issue allows the secretary of state, based on reciprocity, to share with foreign governments information in the Department’s visa lookout system for the purpose of countering terrorism and other crimes. The United States already has such a working relationship with Canada and one was established with Australia before the 2000 Sydney Olympics. In addition, the PATRIOT Act broadens Immigration Act provisions, permitting the denial of visas for people who use their position of prominence to endorse terrorist activities, such as raising funds for terrorist groups. Dealing with the physical and cargo aspects of border security, Congress enacted the Maritime Security Act of 200271 and then stronger measures in the SAFE Port Act of 2006.72 The measures are intended to improve the checking of the hundreds of thousands of cargo containers that arrive in the United States each year. The legislation gave a boost to the purchase and use of scanning and detection equipment. For example, it requires radiation detection technology at 22 of the busiest American ports by the end of 2007. These measures reflect concerns that only about 5 percent of the cargo containers entering the United States are inspected and that they may be used to smuggle in nuclear devices or other weapons of mass destruction. The SAFE Port Act provides legislative authority for key elements of our port security strategy. The bill codifies into law the Container Security Initiative, launched in 2002, in which American inspectors have been assigned to dozens of foreign ports to screen cargo before it leaves for the United States.73 Alien Terrorist Removal Court An interesting earlier approach to the border security and immigration issues emerged in the 1990s when the Justice Department developed a procedure under which alien terrorist suspects could be deported while protecting the classified information. Section 50374of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 established a special court of judges trained to evaluate classified information, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC). 70

See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026.html. For the White House Fact Sheet, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026-1.html 71 P.L. 107-295. 116 Stat. 2064. For text, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname¼107_cong_public_laws&docid¼f:publ295.107. 72 P.L. 109-347, formally called the Security And Accountability For Every Port Act Of 2006 (page 120 STAT. 1884). For text, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-. 73 See President Bush’s speech upon signing the legislation, October 13, 2006 (http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061013-2.html). 74 See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid¼cp104s8xQ8&refer¼&r_n¼hr518.104 &db_id¼104&item¼&sel¼TOC_153662&.

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Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act75 to allow the Justice Department to use classified information without disclosure in deportation cases in a special federal court involving alien terrorist suspects. The attorney general, however, would have to make a determination that conventional immigration proceedings in administrative courts would pose a threat to U.S. national security. In general, the ATRC process requires that the alien be provided an unclassified summary of the classified information. A judge of the court examines the information ex parte and in camera to determine whether it is adequate to enable the alien to prepare a defense. The ATRC statute, however, permits a case to go forward without such a summary if both the alien and disclosure of the classified information would pose grave risks. The judges of the ATRC would have to examine the unclassified version of the information made available to the defendant and the attorneys and verify whether it was an accurate representation of the classified material. The Chief Justice of the United States has appointed five judges to the court, but so far the court has not been used. Justice Department officials have said that other substantive changes that Congress brought to immigration provisions, beginning in 1996 and continuing through the USA PATRIOT Act and Real ID Act,76 have enabled more cases to proceed conventionally and obviated the need for the attorney general’s ATRC certification. There also appear to be other issues, including definitions of suspects who can be tried and whether the criminal charges or investigative priorities are more important. Nevertheless, even though the special court procedure has not been used, this mechanism for protecting classified evidence while using specially trained judges to verify the accuracy of the unclassified summary could provide a useful model for future consideration or for other countries to consider. The ATRC concept originated in the Justice Department, with support from the State Department, to help the United States avoid the dilemma of either allowing alien terrorists to remain in the United States, on the one hand, or endangering national security by disclosing classified evidence in their removal proceedings, on the other. This was a problem before the creation of the ATRC. Justice department officials believe that without the ATRC the government is likely to once again face this dilemma in at least a small number of cases, and ‘‘thus the ATRC remains a potentially critical tool.’’77 75

See INA sections 502-504, 8 USC §§ 1532-1534. The Real ID Act of 2005 is intended to establish national standards for the issuance of drivers’ licenses, the most commonly used form of identification, by state governments. It was enacted as Title II of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, P.L. 109-13. For text, see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:6:./temp/c109JYrU6H. 77 The description of this complex legislation is based on 1996 discussions with Justice Department officials, May 2007 e-mail exchanges with Michael Lindemann, a veteran career attorney in the Justice Department’s Office of Immigration who helped draft the court legislation, and excerpts from an April 12, 2002, Department of Justice letter to the Senate and House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. For more background on the court provision, see a Washington Legal Foundation paper by Steve Valentine, February 22, 2002 (http://www.wlf.org/upload/222-02valentine.pdf). 76

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CIVIL SUITS Meanwhile, in another evolving dimension of using legislation against terrorism, families of American victims of international terrorism began filing civil suits against terrorist groups and or their supporters. One of the first cases was filed by the family of Leon Klinghoffer, the elderly American who was thrown overboard in his wheelchair when Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985. An Italian court had convicted in absentia Abu Abbas, the PFLP leader who masterminded the hijacking. He first took refuge in Yugoslavia for about 10 days and then moved to Iraq. A U.S. warrant was dropped two years after the hijacking when a Justice Department review concluded that the nature of the evidence (largely believed to have been intercepts) could not be used under U.S. legal procedures. The Klinghoffer family filed suit in 1990 against the PLO, which had property in the United States, because Abu Abbas was a member of the Fatah ruling council. The case, brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, dating back to the 1920s78 was later settled out of court in 1996. The terms were never publicly disclosed. Several changes79 in U.S. law made it easier for victims of terrorism (or their families) to file civil suits against terrorists and their alleged supporters. The Antiterrorism Act of 1991,80 enacted with the strong backing of the Klinghoffer family and the families of Pan Am 103 victims and supported by the State Department, allowed U.S. nationals or their survivors injured by acts of international terrorism to file civil suits to seize assets of terrorists. The measure contained provisions to address Justice Department concerns about protecting evidence that might be used for criminal prosecution. Initially, the law was not really tested and it excluded suits against foreign states and their agents, in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA),81 which was part of the international agreements under which nations did not sue each other in court. However, this changed in 1996. Families of terrorist victims lobbied to open the door to sue state sponsors of terrorism, such as Libya. Congress enacted Section 221 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,82 amending the FSIA to allow U.S. nationals to bring civil actions against terrorist states. Families of the victims of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing filed suit against Libya for its complicity in the attack, winning large settlements. American hostages held captive in Lebanon during the 1980s by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah also brought suits against the government of Iran. 78

46 USC Sec 761 46 USC, Appendix Section 761. For more details, see Congressional Research Service Report, Jennifer K. Elsea, American Law Division, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, May 27, 2005 (http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:VZwTuTvRctUJ:opencrs.cdt.org/getfile.php%3Frid% 3D49925+crs+suite). 80 18 USC Sec. 2333. 81 P.L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 289l, 28 USC Sec. l330, l332(a), l39l(f) and l60l-l6ll. For a State Department Fact sheet, see http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_693.html#. 82 P.L. 104-132, (28 USC 1602 Seq). 79

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So, too, have families of some of the American citizens killed by Palestinian terrorists groups that receive support from Iran. The collection of favorable judgments is problematic, however, because in some cases the terrorist-supporting countries did not have available assets in the United States or previously frozen assets were bound up with earlier claims and agreements. The State Department has had difficulty persuading the families and the public to accept its concerns that paying out the frozen assets to private individuals reduces the U.S. bargaining leverage and pressures against the terrorist-supporting states or that other countries might use the terrorist exemptions in the American foreign sovereign immunity law as a precedent to justify the seizure of U.S. assets. To meet the concerns of the families (and their lawyers) about the difficulty in collecting damages, Congress enacted several measures. One, in 1999,83 allowed victims who obtained judgments against terrorist states to receive compensations from assets that the foreign country or entity holds in the United States. Because President Clinton exercised a national security interest waiver, Congress passed Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,84 which permitted the judgments against foreign countries to be paid out of U.S. funds. In effect, the U.S. Treasury was authorized to pay damages awarded in suits against foreign governments. As a Congressional Research issue brief noted, [T]he payment of the ten judgments against Iran out of U.S. funds seemed to some observers to contradict one of the major justifications for enacting the terrorist state exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in the first place, namely to force terrorist states to pay a price for their actions and to deter them from engaging in such acts in the future.85

This rationale for making exceptions to the FSIA was the reason the State Department Counterterrorism Office supported the 1991 civil suit legislation in the first place, despite the reluctance of some State Department lawyers. About two dozen cases involving scores of plaintiffs have been filed in this relatively new use of civil suits against terrorists and their facilitators. 86 Examples of the variety of cases include the following: ¥ In July, 2004, a judgment in the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island ruled that the Palestinian Authority and PLO did not enjoy sovereign immunity because 83

Section 117 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-277). See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_ cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ277.105. 84 P.L. 106-386 page 114 stat 1542. See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ386.106. 85 See the Congressional Research Service Report, Jennifer K. Elsea, American Law Division, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, May 27, 2005, page 5. 86 For a more detailed list, see Appendix I, Congressional Research Service Report, Jennifer K. Elsea, American Law Division, Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview, May 27, 2005 (http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:w6Adu2oXVosJ:opencrs.net/getfile.php%3Frid%3D40100+crs+suites+against+terrorist+states&hl=en&ct=clnk&&cd=7&gl=us&client=firefox-a).

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¥

¥

¥

¥

87

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‘‘Palestine’’ does not constitute a state under U.S. law. The judge awarded $116 million in damages to the family of Yaron Ungar who was shot and killed by Palestinian gunmen in 1996. Three years later, however, in April 2007, a New York Court ruled that the PLO funds should be unfrozen. Lawyers for the family said they would take additional steps in the case.87 In another dimension to the use of U.S. legislation against terrorists approach, the material support statutes are being used in civil suits against financial institutions accused of facilitating the transfer of funds to support terrorist operations. A major law suit brought in 2002 by families of the victims of 9/11 seeks a trillion dollars in damages against banking institutions, including Saudi banks, charities, and others, that they contend helped support al Qaeda operations. The defendants are charged, among other things, with providing material support in the form of financial services to the al Qaeda terrorist group. The case is under appeal.88 In September, 2004, Cantor Fitzgerald LP, a major bond broker that lost about 60 percent of its New York employees in the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks, filed a $7 billion lawsuit against Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda, and more than 50 Middle Eastern banks and foundations. The suit alleges racketeering and conspiracy by Saudi Arabia, foreign charities, banks, and relief organizations in lending ‘‘financial and other material support and substantial assistance’’’ to al Qaeda, which is blamed for the attacks.89 A civil case was filed in July 2004 against the Arab Bank of Jordan on charges that it was providing material support to terrorist by serving as a conduit for funds from Saudi contributors to families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Several American families joined in the suit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They included the widow of John Linde, one of three U.S. civilian contractors killed by a roadside bomb serving on protective detail for U.S. diplomats who were visiting the West Bank to interview Palestinian candidates for Fulbright scholarships.90 The court denied the Bank’s motions to dismiss the case and as of early 2007 it was in the discovery stage. Meanwhile, in August 2005, without admitting or denying the facts of the case, the Bank suspended its operations in the United States under a consent order with the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) for failing to properly monitor and report suspicious transactions. The Bank paid $24 million to the U.S. government. In a case that stemmed from an attack two decades ago, in April 2006, lawyers representing the surviving passengers, estates, and family members of the 1985 hijacking of Pan Am 73 in Karachi Pakistan that killed 20 people, filed a civil suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit seeks $10 billion in compensatory damages, plus unspecified punitive damages, from Libya, Colonel Qadhafi, and the five convicted hijackers. The lawsuit alleges Libya provided the ANO with material support and also ordered the attack as part of a Libyansponsored terrorist campaign against American, European, and Israeli interests. The Libyan government sought to dismiss the charges and the case is still pending.91

See the Reuters article at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN072066322 0070408?feedType=RSS. 88 See http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/15/attacks.suit/. 89 See the Bloomberg Press account at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_ us&refer=top_world_news&sid=a7GTOzeI_jDY. 90 The Associated Press article is available on http://www.swtriallaw.com/case-arab-bank/ suit-accuses-arab-bank-of-aiding-terror.html. 91 For more background, see http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=167908.

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Richard D. Heideman, a prominent Washington attorney in the Linde and several other cases, including those against the Libyan, Syrian, and Iranian governments, summed up the civil suit efforts this way: I believe that the use of the American judicial system by victims and families to seek recovery for the maiming and murder of Americans is an essential tool for countering terrorism. It was the right thing for Congress to do, to allow victims to seek redress. States and others involved in terrorism must be held fully accountable for their heinous conduct.92

IMPLEMENTING THE LAWS Enacting and updating strong counterterrorism laws and even effective investigation and enforcement is not enough to effectively counter the evolving terrorism threat. Good intelligence, persistence, strong programs, and international cooperation—and even luck—are important. Sometimes it takes years to bring terrorists to justice. Successes do not come overnight. Abu Abbas, who was convicted in absentia in an Italian court for the 1985 Achille Lauro atrocity after the Italians let him go, was apprehended in Iraq only after Saddam Hussein was overthrown. American military officials said he died of illness in March 2004 of natural causes while in custody. Abu Nidal, whose ANO had been one of the most dangerous international terrorist groups in the 1980s, died of multiple gunshot wounds in Iraq in 2002, before the invasion. He had been enjoying Saddam Hussein’s ‘‘hospitality,’’ but widespread reports suggest that he was murdered. Other terrorists have been tracked for years before being caught and brought to trial or in some cases killed. In one early and noteworthy case of international cooperation in bringing a terrorist to justice, the United States tracked down in Africa and convicted Omar Mohammed Ali Rezak for the murder of an American woman passenger on Egyptian Airline flight 645, which was hijacked to Malta in November 1985. The Maltese had quietly released Rezak after serving only 8 years of a 25-year sentence. American officials located him after he traveled to Africa, and by arrangement with Nigerian authorities, he was rendered to the United States when he landed in Lagos after being detained and then released in an arrangement with another African country. Rezak was convicted in U.S. courts in 1996, 11 years after the hijacking, to a life sentence for the murder.93 Justice Department lawyers, and even the State Department Counterterrorism Office, which happened to have a foreign service officer who was also a lawyer with experience in Africa, spent many days in Africa negotiating the arrangements. This case underscores the importance of patience and resources in tracking down and convicting terrorists. Since 9/11, not only the United States but also many other countries have strengthened their counterterrorism laws. Strong laws and good policies are 92 93

Interview with the author, May 2007. See http://www.cnn.com/US/9610/07/terrorist.sentenced/index.html.

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not sufficient in fighting terrorism. It is also necessary to enforce and implement the laws and to back up counterterrorism programs and investigators with sufficient personnel and financial resources. Yet, when it comes to actually funding programs that strengthen our ability to combat international terrorism overseas, the White House and Congress often fail to back up their strong rhetoric with the necessary money. For example, the 9/11 Commission report94 noted that Attorney General John Ashcroft testified at a May 9, 2001, Senate Appropriations Congressional hearing that ‘‘one of the nation’s most fundamental responsibilities is to protect its citizens … from terrorist attacks.’’ The very next day, however, his Justice Department issued internal guidance for preparing the fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request to Congress and it listed fighting gun violence and illegal drugs as a priority, but not terrorism. As related in the Commission report, the head of the FBI counterterrorism unit, Dale Watson, ‘‘told us that he almost fell out of his chair when he saw the memo, because it made no mention of counterterrorism.’’95 The Commission’s report also said that when the Justice Department’s draft budget request was completed, it did not increase the FBI’s counterterrorism funding above the FY 2002 level still pending in Congress. FBI Director Thomas Pickard ‘‘appealed for more counterterrorism enhancements, an appeal the Attorney General denied,’’ the report said. The FBI’s requested $588 million increase included proposed funds for 54 additional translators and 248 counterterrorism agents and support staff. However, the budget request that Attorney General Ashcroft forwarded to the White House on September 10 did not include any increase, according to budget documents obtained by the Washington Post and reported in a March 22, 2004, story.96 After 9/11, the FBI requested $1.5 billion in additional funds to enhance its counterterrorism efforts, but the White House OMB cut the request by nearly a third, according to the Washington Post account. During the summer of 2001 when U.S. officials were on high alert for possible terrorist attacks, NSC, CIA, and State Department officials proposed a covert action program against al Qaeda. But it was caught up in a budget shortage problem. The 9/11 Commission said the proposals would have needed more funds than already budgeted in that fiscal year. This budget issue was not resolved before 9/11. Even after 9/11, and the terrorist attacks in the wake of the Iraq war, the White House and its OMB failed to provide sufficient resources needed for important programs that help stop terrorists before they can strike against American allies and at the American presence overseas. Compounding the problem, the Republican-controlled Congress sliced even deeper into the 94 For link to the full, see Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. For a booked-marked version, see http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/08/b133128.html 95 Ibid., 209. 96 See Dana Milbank, ‘‘FBI Budget Squeezed After 9/11: Request for New Counterterrorism Funds Cut by Two-Thirds,’’ The Washington Post, March 22, 2004, A06. For text, see http:// www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A13541-2004Mar21?language¼printer.

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administration’s already pared-down requests for practical measures against the terrorist threat. The attitudes that led to these cuts were long standing. As the 9/11 Commission report noted, the State Department ‘‘came into the 1990s overmatched by the resources of other departments and with little support for its budget either in the Congress or the President’s Office of Management and Budget.’’97 The problem is compounded by the inclination of some members of Congress or their election opponents in some districts to grandstand against the foreign assistance program as a ‘‘foreign giveaway’’—even as they slipped in amendments for their favorite causes. This type of sloganeering inevitably led to reluctance by some members to support higher foreign aid appropriations. Cutting the foreign aid budget cuts not only traditional economic assistance but also counterterrorism and other security-related programs that help our allies become more capable in fighting terrorism or drug trafficking (often a money source for some terrorist groups). An example is the State Department’s ATA Program, which helps strengthen the counterterrorism capabilities of foreign law enforcement personnel. Courses range from training personnel in detecting explosives and rending them safe, to hostage negotiations, VIP protection, crisis management, and airport security. The program provides foreign law enforcement officials with crucial counterterrorism skills they cannot get on their own. This not only strengthens international working relationships, but also helps other countries to counter terrorists while they are still overseas, far from our borders, and to protect their own citizens and American visitors and residents. The program’s importance was underscored when Jordan, a major ATA participant, disrupted major attacks planned against American tourists during the December 1999 millennium threat. The widespread terrorist attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, Morocco, the Philippines, Indonesia, and other countries during the past several years demonstrate the need to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities throughout the world. Accordingly, the ATA Program planners mapped out an expanded training program. In a September 7, 2003, address to the nation on Iraq, President Bush said, Two years ago, I told the Congress and the country that the war on terror would be a lengthy war, a different kind of war, fought on many fronts in many places.… This will take time and require sacrifice. Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure.’’ (emphasis added)98

In a July 12, 2004, speech at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, President Bush said of the fight against terrorists, ‘‘we will confront them overseas so that we do not have to confront them at home.’’

97 98

The 9/11 Commission Report, 94–95. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html.

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Despite these and similar statements, the Bush White House’s OMB cut the State Department budget requests for the ATA Program and related counterterrorism programs an average of a fifth for the regular budget cycle years after 9/11—FY 2003, FY 2004, and FY 2005. The same week of the Oak Ridge speech and despite the administration’s warnings of possible terrorist attacks during the election campaign, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed a foreign assistance appropriations bill that cut the ATA Program funding by 13.5 percent, to $111 million. The Appropriations Committee report on the bill gave no explanation for the cut in the administration’s requests, except to portray it merely as an increase over the previous year’s appropriation. Cuts also were made in later years. The administration had requested $135.6 million for the ATA Program for FY 2007. Congress approved $122 million. A continuing resolution passed after the 2006 elections carried the funding level over for another year—in effect no increase and actually a cut when inflation is taken into account. The funding problems have affected the interagency effort to curb the flow of money going to terrorists. OMB and Treasury had cut the Internal Revenue Service’s request for additional financial investigators to unravel complex terrorist money trails. Treasury’s new Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence—which has been given an elevated status in the bureaucracy and an ambitious mission to develop and target financial intelligence, coordinate law enforcement, sanctions, and regulatory enforcement, and maintain an international coalition against terrorist financing—initially operated on a shoestring budget and extremely limited travel funds. The State Department’s component of the interagency teams that help other countries strengthen their ability to counter terrorism funding also was strapped for staff and travel funds and lost several key experts. Another section of Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which among other things, deals with assets of terrorist groups and terrorism-supporting countries, had been kept for years at the same level of funding while the work load has increased. Only recently has the situation improved. The State Department’s contribution to the successful interagency counterterrorism research and development program the TSWG also has been shortchanged. As a result of State’s leadership, five foreign partners take part in this program, contributing financial and technical resources. While the Defense Department and other agencies now fund the bulk of the program, which runs at about $70 million a year, the budget officials at State and OMB have kept the State Department’s contribution to the same $1.8 million for the past six years. This makes it increasingly difficult for the State Department to keep the program running on an even keel, not tilting toward one agency or another, and to enhance the partnership relations with other countries. In addition to budgetary constraints, an important weakness of the counterterrorism effort is a lack of strong laws and enforcement capability in many developing countries. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, passed after 9/11, requires member nations to take steps against the financing of terrorists. As part of this effort, the United States and other industrial

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countries such as Britain, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have worked with emerging nations, but there is still much work to be done. The State Department and Justice Department used ATA funding to hold six seminars for 36 countries in 2002 to provide suggestions for assessing and strengthening counterterrorist laws and regulations. Additional seminars were held in Southern Africa. Seminars involving half a dozen countries or more, however, are not by themselves the way to give detailed assistance to help individual countries improve their specific legislation. As a follow-up to the seminars, small teams that specialize in drafting legislation were supposed to be sent to countries that requested their assistance. A third stage of assistance was to provide training for investigators and prosecutors. However, these follow-up stages, which would cost only an estimated $800,000 a year for about six countries annually, were stalled because of budget and staff issues in the State Department’s Counterterrorism Office and funding issues between the ATA Program and the Justice Department. At the same time, there is at least an awareness of policy makers, if not the budget offices, of the need to help other countries strengthen their legal systems. The 2006 National Strategy paper for Countering Terrorism99 noted the following: Some legal systems lack adequate procedural, substantive, and international assistance laws that enable effective investigation, prosecution, and extradition of terrorists. Such gaps offer a haven in which terrorists and their organizations can operate free from fear of prosecution. In the United States we have developed a domestic legal system that supports effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities while preserving individual privacy, the First Amendment rights of association, religious freedom, free speech, and other civil rights. We will continue to work with foreign partners to build their legal capacity to investigate, prosecute, and assist in the foreign prosecution of the full range of terrorist activities—from provision of material support to conspiracy to operational planning to a completed act of terrorism.

There must be sufficient financial resources and human resources— investigators, prosecutors, trainers, and security officials. At the level of the White House and the NSC, priority should be given to implementing counterterrorist programs and pushing the bureaucracy and Congress to provide these necessary resources. Dealing with the Congressional Appropriations Committees is difficult at best for the State Department. Because of competing priorities and the desire to focus lobbying efforts on ‘‘the big picture,’’ the State Department Congressional Relations and Management Bureau officials who deal with the overall budget try to restrict and control contacts between individual State Department bureaus and the appropriations committee key staff. Committee staffs have a great deal of power and are not always shy about showing it. One example burst out after a relatively rare meeting several years ago that Counterterrorism Office officials were able to arrange with several House Appropriations Committee members. A junior State Department 99

For full text, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionV.html#longterm.

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official handed out talking points that included the Department’s arguments for restoring the cuts made earlier by the foreign operations subcommittee in the ATA Program. When a senior Republican subcommittee staffer saw the talking points, she scolded a State Department official saying, ‘‘How dare you challenge the chairman’s mark!’’ referring to the figures approved by the subcommittee for which she was the staff director. Another illustrative example of the relatively low priority the House Appropriations committee attached to funding counterterrorist programs was illustrated in a press release issued by the House Appropriations Committee after the committee acted on the foreign assistance appropriations bill in 2003. The press release neglected to mention the funding levels for the counterterrorism programs. This was despite the fact that other programs approved at lower appropriations levels were listed in the press release. When I could not reach a foreign operations subcommittee staffer involved in working on the bill, I called the committee press aide to see whether he had the counterterrorism figures. He said no. I politely suggested that terrorism funding might be of some interest and worth listing in the press release the next time. The young-sounding staffer responded ‘‘Are you trying to tell me how to write my press release?’’ and slammed down the phone. The following year, the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee and the full Committee did refer to some counterterrorism programs in its press releases, although not the ATA Program. I cite these examples not to point fingers at individual staffers who often work under pressure but to illustrate the real world of personalities and sometimes even arrogance that can affect the Congressional and the executive branch process in funding the counterterrorism effort. To some extent, there is a problem of mind-set. OMB and Congressional budget specialists tend to look at the previous year’s budget as the baseline for the new fiscal year. Thus, when they work out appropriations levels for the coming year, they usually look back at the previous year’s budget and add or subtract a certain percentage, instead of focusing on the actual projected needs of a program. They may then describe an appropriation as an increase of X percent over last year’s budget instead of noting that it is, say, only 75 percent of the program’s projected requirement. The White House has a major role in these budget issues. The OMB evaluates budget proposals from the various agencies and decides the amounts to request from Congress. If an issue is a priority, the White House and the NSC can and should make this clear to the OMB ‘‘green eye shades’’ who work out the numbers. Second, if an issue is a priority, the White House should make this clear to the Congress, especially if cuts were made by one House and there is a chance to obtain the administration’s original request in the Senate-House conference committee that works out the final figures. This, however, takes leadership and commitment to fight for unglamorous but important nuts-and-bolts programs. In my observations, the commitments were all too lacking despite 9/11. Congress, in addition to cutting appropriations requests, also has, if inadvertently, hindered the counterterrorism effort in other ways. For example, in its desire to sell foodstuffs to Cuba and other countries on the terrorism list,

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the Congressional agricultural block pushed through legislation that loosened controls over the exports of agricultural and medical products to countries on the terrorism list. The Trade Enhancement Act of 2000,100 sponsored by Representative George R. Nethercutt, Jr., a Republican from the appleexporting region of Washington State, greatly increased the burden of evaluating export licenses by the Commerce and State Departments and in some cases the Defense Department. The problem was not with food products, which were approved quickly, but the need to scrutinize medical equipment exports to Iran. Some of the export license applications for such items as scanning equipment raised suspicions that they might be used for nonmedical purposes. The scrutiny of the licenses for possible dual use or improper end-users chewed up thousands of staff hours in several bureaus of the State Department and Commerce Department, diverting State Department officials from their other counterterrorism tasks. Even then, it is difficult to ensure that the dozens of scanners that companies want to sell to Iran are going to legitimate medical facilities to treat Iranians and will not being diverted to treat people who fought against American troops in neighboring Iraq or to examine components for the missile and nuclear program. Congress also diverted scarce staffing resources by too often demanding that State Department officials testify at public hearings on short notice. At times, these hearings appear to help members get press publicity rather than a better understanding of the issues. In a typical scenario, a terrorism-related incident gets headlines in the press and a Congressional member or committee staffer or member says, ‘‘Let’s have a hearing.’’ During the aftermath of the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988, Congress held at least 16 hearings or briefings, with more than half a dozen subcommittees claiming jurisdiction. At one point in March 2004, Ambassador Cofer Black, then the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, had three hearings in two days. One subcommittee went ahead and scheduled a hearing without checking to find out that another subcommittee already had scheduled Ambassador Black as a witness for the same day. A day earlier, Ambassador Black had to pull out early from an important bilateral meeting with the Russians because then-Senator George Allen of Virginia, the chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee involved, was—according to his staff—‘‘just dying to hold a public hearing’’ after the terrorist bombing of the Madrid railway station. These ‘‘show business’’ hearing often chew up a great deal of valuable time and effort for no real legislative or oversight benefit gain. However, the State Department’s Bureau of Congressional Relations, whose main job of course is to improve relations with Congress, usually is reluctant to turn down a request for a hearing. It is more inclined to pressure a bureau to comply with a request rather than persuade the subcommittee to back off. Congress is certainly entitled to and should play its oversight role, but this can often be accomplished better by closed-door briefings where officials can talk more candidly. Formal hearings too often divert understaffed State Department offices from fighting terrorism to preparing testimony and 100

P.L. 106-385 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:H.R.4461).

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briefing books. All too often, these hearings appear to help members get a television sound bite or play to their constituents than actually obtain information or shape legislation. Other agencies are affected as well. DHS high-level officials reportedly were called up to the Hill 142 times in one year and that most of the meetings were defined as ‘‘more PR stunt than real oversight.’’ Again, I cite these examples not to castigate Congress (as a former staffer I am sympathetic to their role) but to illustrate how the real world operates. It is our hope that the above description of the practical and political problems, along with the documents contained in this book, will help further the understanding of some of the problems in implementing U.S. counterterrorism policies, laws, and programs.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ¥ The broad outlines of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policy have remained remarkably consistent for the past three decades, with increased emphasis on international cooperation, applying economic and political pressures against terrorist-supporting states, and supporting the principle of not making deals that reward terrorists. ¥ There have been departures from this policy, most notably the missiles for hostage deals by Reagan administration officials during the Lebanon hostage situation. ¥ The United States has used military options against terrorists and the use of military assets—as appropriate—and this remains a policy option. But it is not always a viable option, especially in confronting shadowy cells operating in urban areas. Thus legal, economic, political, and diplomatic tools and international cooperation will continue to be of primary importance in countering terrorism. ¥ Efforts to denigrate legal tools as a weak substitute for taking military actions are more rhetoric than realistic. Increasingly, terrorists are hiding in urban areas, including Western cities and there is no ready address. ¥ The U.S. government’s counterterrorism laws have evolved over the years, from an initial focus on sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism to the development of measures to curb the flow of money and other material resources to nonstate actors. ¥ Meanwhile, new branches of counterterrorism law have emerged, such as specific measures intended to enhance border security and the use of civil suits against terrorists by victims and families of victims. But while the evolution may continue, better enforcement of existing laws is paramount. ¥ Laws can be drafted and improved over the years, evolving to meet new conditions. The 9/11 Commission said we are not safe. But without enough welltrained people and programs to implement the laws, the counterterrorism policy and legal tools cannot fully play their role in helping the United States and its allies counter the ever-changing terrorist threats. ¥ The counterterrorism laws of the United States and some of its allies, such as Britain and Australia are quite strong, but there are weaknesses in the legal systems of many of the developing counties. The international community, including U.N. agencies such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee need to make a more vigorous effort to help these countries draft, enact, and implement stronger laws to counter terrorism funding and the flow of terrorists across international boundaries.

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Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy ¥ Implementing counterterrorism programs and helping other countries improve their law enforcement capabilities have been hampered by a lack of high-level attention and financial resources. The White House’s OMB and Congress have not matched their counterterrorism rhetoric with money for low-profile programs that are not conducive to media sound bites.

The executive branch and Congress need to pay more attention to implementing unglamorous but important programs, such as training investigators, prosecutors, analysts, and law enforcement personnel here and overseas. Funding flows cannot just be turned up or down depending on the threats or attacks that may be on television in a given week. The terrorist threat will continue to evolve. Our countermeasures should not just evolve in a reactive way, but rather should try to get one step ahead. For this to be achieved, greater attention to the details, priorities, and coordination will be needed in the White House, the NSC staff, and Congress than has been shown so far. A great deal has been done since 9/11. Nevertheless, we may not be able to thwart all major terrorism attacks. But policy makers and budget gurus should be able to face themselves in the mirror afterward and be able to say they did all they could. The evolution of U.S. policy, legislation, and programs still needs to continue. EDITOR’S NOTE: The views expressed here are solely the author’s and do not reflect the views of the State Department, from which he retired in 2004.

Pa rt One U.S. P OLICY P RE –S EPTEMBER 11, 2001 Chapter 2, covering pre-9/11 policy, begins with the U.S. government’s efforts to cope in a coordinated way with the emerging terrorism threat. A key document, and the first in this chapter, is President Nixon’s September 25, 1972, memorandum establishing a cabinet-level committee to combat terrorism. The committee was created following the kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists during the 1972 Munich Olympic games. The high-level committee was not suitable for day-to-day coordination, however, and the State Department soon set up a separate counterterrorism office. Many of these documents predated the Internet and are not available online but rather were collected by the editors during the past two decades. The statements span key periods during the tumultuous period of spectacular terrorist attacks during the 1980s such as the bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the hijackings of TWA Flight 847 and the Achille Lauro cruise liner in 1985, during which Palestinian terrorists threw overboard an elderly, wheelchair-bound American, Leon Klinghoffer. During that time period, President Reagan delivered his June 18, 1985, speech ‘‘America Will Never Make Concessions to Terrorists.’’ The previous year, President Reagan had ordered the withdrawal of the U.S. peacekeeping units after the Marine barracks bombing. And later, National Security Council staff officers Rear Admiral John Poindexter and Marine Colonel Oliver North became involved in deals to trade American antitank missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of Americans taken hostage by Lebanese terrorists. Chapter 3 contains the texts of the major controversial 1984 speeches in which Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger publicly aired their differences over whether it was appropriate to use military force against terrorists before all facts were verified linking them to specific terrorist attacks. Secretary Shultz was more forward leaning than Secretary Weinberger. After terrorists linked to Libya killed two American solders and a Turkish woman at a Berlin disco in 1985, the Reagan administration carried out bombing attacks against the Libyan capital. A later discussion of the appropriate use

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of military power is included in President George H.W. Bush’s speech in August 25, 1992, in which he justified his decision not to occupy Baghdad by saying, ‘‘If we’d continued, hundreds of thousands of American troops would be on the ground in Iraq today attempting to pull warring factions together or bogged down in some guerrilla warfare.’’ Chapter 4 contains selected key speeches or testimony by the Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism, beginning with Ambassador Robert Oakley’s May 15, 1985, testimony that laid out some of the basic precepts of the evolving U.S. policy. It ends with a note expressed by almost every counterterrorism official: that is, even after 9/11, the counterterrorism programs are not allocated sufficient funding. Chapter 5 contains former Attorney General Janet Reno’s speeches made during the 1990s, which reflect her concerns, held long before 9/11, about the need to improve coordination and information exchanges with local and state officials in countering terrorism.

2 The White House PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON President Richard M. Nixon, Memorandum Establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, September 25, 1972 Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Subject: Action to Combat Terrorism Your report to me on the measures that are being taken to combat terrorism indicates that we are moving effectively against the problem of thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad. The two committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are making commendable progress toward this end. Because of the great importance and urgency I attach to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am hereby establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by the Secretary of State and will comprise The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Secretary of Transportation The United States Ambassador to the United Nations The Director of Central Intelligence The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs The Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.

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The Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively. The Secretary of State will be in touch with other governments and international organizations toward this goal. Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee. More specifically, the Cabinet Committee shall: (1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States. (2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation. (3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur. (4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs; and (5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.

Richard Nixon SOURCE: http://www.nixonfoundation.org/Research_Center/1972_pdf_files/1972_ 0319.pdf EDITOR’S NOTE: The memorandum was made available to the press. On the same day, the White House released an announcement of the establishment of the Cabinet Committee. These actions were prompted by the Terrorist Actions at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Subsequently, the State Department established a small counterterrorism office to coordinate policy on a day-to-day basis.

President Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Action to Combat Terrorism, September 27, 1972 Monday, here in New York, Secretary of State Rogers urged prompt action by the United Nations on three measured to combat the inhuman wave of terrorism that has been loosed on the world. I am gratified that the United Nations has agreed to take up the urgent matter of terrorism, and—in the strongest possible terms—I endorse the plea which the Secretary made on behalf of the United States and of human decency. Also Monday in Washington, I directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism—to be chaired by Secretary Rogers—aimed at bringing the full resources of all appropriate United States agencies to bear effectively on the task of eliminating terrorism wherever it occurs. I have charged it to move vigorously and immediately toward this end.

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The use of terror is indefensible. It eliminates in one stroke those safeguards of civilization which mankind has painstakingly erected over the centuries. But terror threatens more than the lives of the innocent. It threatens the very principles upon which nations are founded. In this sense, every nation in the United Nations, whatever its ideological assumptions, whoever its adversaries, whatever its sympathies, is united with every other nation by the common danger to the sovereignty of each. If the world cannot unite in opposition to terror, if we cannot establish some simple ground rules to hold back the perimeters of lawlessness, if, in short, we cannot act to defend the basic principles of national sovereignty in our own individual interests, then upon what foundations can we hope to establish international comity? There are those who would tell us that terror is the last resort of the weak and oppressed, a product of despair in an age of indifference, and that it seeks only political justice. This is nonsense. The way to seek justice is through negotiation. We have sought in our own relations to turn from confrontation to negotiation. We believe that this is the only way for grievances to be resolved in a way that will contribute to peace and stability. In recent months we have seen nations moving to achieve accommodation and the resolution of differences, and we have seen terrorists acting to destroy those efforts. The time has come for civilized people to act in concert to remove the threat of terrorism from the world. The world is reaching out for peace. The way may be hard and treacherous, but men of reason and decency are determined today, as perhaps never before, to make the effort. Let us not be disrupted or turned away by those who would loose anarchy upon the world; let us seek no accommodations with savagery, but rather act to eliminate it. SOURCE: http://www.nixonfoundation.org/Research_Center/1972_pdf_files/1972_ 0324.pdf

PRESIDENT JAMES EARL CARTER President James Earl Carter, Remarks at the 13th Constitutional Convention of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, November 15, 1979 This is the 12th day that more than a hundred innocent human beings, some 60 of whom are members of the United States diplomatic mission, have been held hostage in our Embassy in Iran. For a rare time in human history, a host government has condoned and even encouraged this kind of illegal action against a sovereign territory and official diplomatic relations of another nation. This is an act of terrorism-totally outside the bounds of international law and diplomatic tradition. In this time of trial, our deep concern is for the lives of these brave hostages, our Nation’s loyal citizens and faithful representatives. Every American feels anger and outrage at what is happening to them, just as every American

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feels concern for their safety and pride in their great courage. This crisis calls for firmness, and it calls for restraint. And I’m proud that this situation has brought forth calm leadership by officials and private citizens throughout this country. Firmness does require patience, and it requires perseverance. Firmness also means measured action, deliberate actions that clarify the real issues, reduce the likelihood of violence, protect our interests, and ensure justice. The United States has done nothing and will do nothing that could be used to justify violent or imprudent action by anyone. While we are pursuing all avenues of diplomatic resolution, we’re also acting unilaterally as appropriate—with restraint, yes, but without hesitation. First, in order to discourage violence and possible bloodshed here, which when televised and transmitted back to Iran might threaten the safety of the hostages, I’ve discouraged the issuing of permits for demonstrations on Federal properties here in Washington. Consistent with our laws and pursuant to my own powers and responsibilities, I have also encouraged local and State officials to take similar legal action. Second, I’ve directed our immigration authorities to review the visas of some 50,000 Iranian students, who are guests here in our country. Our Nation is fully committed to the enhancement of human rights, the protection of legal rights, and the enhancement of civil justice. All provisions of the United States Constitution will be honored. All foreign nationals who are here lawfully may continue here with their work or their studies. But those who are here illegally will be processed promptly and lawfully for deportation back to their own country. Third, I want to remove any question that our principles might be compromised by our supposed need for Iranian oil. Early this week, therefore, I ordered an immediate halt to any purchases or shipments of Iranian oil to the United States of America. I’m determined to make clear that we will never allow any foreign country to dictate any American policy. Fourth, in order to protect our economic interests and to ensure that claims on Iran by the United States or by United States citizens are settled in an orderly manner, we’ve legally frozen official Iranian property and financial assets. The order does not affect any accounts other than those of the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or other government-controlled entities. Yesterday I further instructed Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador McHenry to oppose any discussion of Iran’s problems in the United Nations Security Council as long as American hostages are being held. Only after the hostages are released will we be willing to address Iran’s concerns and, then, under the provisions of international law and under the charter of the United Nations. The members of the United Nations Security Council, I am pleased to announce to you, have agreed unanimously with our own proposal. It’s important for all of us to remember that we will not compromise our fundamental principles of justice no matter how grave the provocation nor how righteous our indignation. At the same time, we will continue to use our influence around the world to obtain the same kinds of human rights for people everywhere.

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In this instance, we are upholding an important principle on behalf of the entire world community. It’s a clear tenet of international law and diplomatic tradition that the host government is fully responsible for the safety and wellbeing of the property and the legal representatives of another country. Less than a year ago—and this is a fact not generally known or recognized—less than a year ago, 70,000 American citizens were in Iran. As you know, thousands of people were killed during the upheavals there, but almost miraculously and because of the good work of Cyrus Vance and others, our people were brought home safely. I thank God for it. Despite the turmoil, each succeeding Iranian Government—and they were being changed, as you know, quite rapidly—protected the citizens of other countries. Foreign visitors are often vulnerable to abuse. An embassy is not a fortress. There are no embassies anywhere in the world that can long withstand the attack of a mob if the mob has the support of the host government itself. We had received repeated assurances of protection from the highest officials in the Iranian Government, even a day or two before the mob was incited to attack and before that protection was withdrawn at the last minute. The principle of inviolability of embassies is understood and accepted by nations everywhere, and it’s particularly important to smaller nations which have no recourse to economic or military power. This is why the United Nations Security Council has also unanimously supported our demand for the release of the American hostages. In accordance with this principle, as recognized and observed by all civilized countries, the Iranian Government and its leaders are fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our representatives in Iran, in Tehran, and they will be held accountable for that responsibility. It is unthinkable that any responsible government in today’s modern world could regard the seizure and the holding of the diplomatic officials of another nation as a realistic means to advance any cause whatsoever. Terrorism is not an acceptable means to resolve disputes between individuals or between nations. No act has so galvanized the American public toward unity in the last decade as has the holding of our people as hostages in Tehran. We stand today as one people. We are dedicated to the principles and the honor of our Nation. We’ve taken no action which would justify concern among the people or among the Government of Iran. We have done nothing for which any American need apologize. The actions of Iranian leaders and the radicals who invaded our Embassy were completely unjustified. They and all others must know that the United States of America will not yield to international terrorism or to blackmail. These difficult days have reminded us of basic facts and principles which are fundamental to the existence of us as a people. We will honor all constitutional protections and international law and custom, and we will not let our freedom and our security be jeopardized. The developments in Iran have made it starkly clear to all of us that our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a direct, physical threat to our freedom and security as Americans. That’s why we must all join together in the battle for an energy-secure America. This struggle demands the deliberate and the conscientious participation of every single citizen. Unfortunately, our

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dependence on foreign oil has been growing for the last 5 or 6 years, especially, when it should have been diminishing. As a nation we have become dependent on the undependable and addicted to the unaffordable. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼31691&st¼&st1¼

President James Earl Carter, State of the Union Address, 1980 EXCERPTED This last few months has not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our Union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our Union. The 1980’s have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values and it’s a time that tests our wisdom and our skills. At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace. I’m determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran. Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together, squarely and courageously. We will face these challenges, and we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail. In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our Nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail. We continue to pursue these specific goals: first, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States; secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure, as quickly as possible, their safe release, if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens; to enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence, which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a

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civilized world; and also to convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north, in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them. If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages are released. … But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union. … the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It’s using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War. The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. That’s why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union. I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I’ve cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products. I’ve limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I’ve asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow. The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values. The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the

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Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened. Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region. Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. SOURCE: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml

President James Earl Carter, State of the Union Address to Congress, January 16, 1981 EXCERPTED … [W]e face some of the most serious challenges in the history of this nation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a threat to global peace, to East-West relations, and to regional stability and to the flow of oil.… the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence and security. Turmoil within the region adjacent to the Persian Gulf poses risks for the security and prosperity of every oil importing nation and thus for the entire global economy. The continuing holding of American hostages in Iran is both an affront to civilized people everywhere, and a serious impediment to meeting the self-evident threat to widely shared common interests—including those of Iran. One very immediate and pressing objective that is uppermost on our minds and those of the American people is the release of our hostages in Iran. We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution or the people of Iran. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in the region. We are prepared to work with the Government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship. But that will not be possible so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostages, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful diplomatic and economic steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. This reflects the deep respect of our nation for the rule of law and for the safety of our people being held, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is not unlimited and our concern for the well-being of our fellow citizens grows each day. SOURCE: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su81jec.phtml

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PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan, December 27, 1981 Our current concern regarding Poland should not cause us to forget that 2 years ago today, massive Soviet military forces invaded the sovereign country of Afghanistan and began an attempt to subjugate one of the most fiercely independent peoples of the world. Despite the presence of 90,000 Soviet combat troops, a recent increase of some 5,000, the courageous people of Afghanistan have fought back. Today they effectively deny Soviet forces control of most of Afghanistan. Efforts by the Soviets to establish a puppet government in the Soviet image, which could govern a conquered land, have failed. Soviet control extends little beyond the major cities, and even there the Afghan freedom fighters often hold sway by night and sometimes even by day. The battle for Afghan independence continues. But the gallant efforts of the people of Afghanistan to regain their independence have come at great cost. Almost 3 million Afghan refugees, a fifth of the pre-invasion population of Afghanistan, have fled their homes and have taken refuge across the border, largely in Pakistan. Those who have remained at home have become the unfortunate victims not only of the dislocations of war but also of indiscriminate Soviet attacks on civilians. So, while we express our admiration for those who fight for the freedom we all cherish, we must also express our deep sympathy for those innocent victims of Soviet imperialism who, because of the love of freedom of their countrymen, have been forced to flee for their lives. On three separate occasions, most recently on November 18, 1981, the United Nations General Assembly passed by overwhelming margins resolutions aimed at Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government and the American people join in the broad international condemnation of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Just as in Poland we see the use of intimidation and indirect use of power to subjugate a neighboring people, in Afghanistan we see direct aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter and other principles governing the conduct among nations. While extending our admiration and sympathy to the people of Afghanistan, we also call upon the Soviet Union to avail itself of proposals set forth by the community of nations for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan so that an independent and nonaligned nation can be reestablished with a government responsive to the desires of the people, so that the millions of Afghans who have sought refuge in other countries can return with honor to their homes. As long as the Soviet Union occupies Afghanistan in defiance of the international community, the heroic Afghan resistance will continue, and the United States will support the cause of a free Afghanistan. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/122781a.htm

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President Ronald Reagan, Transcripts of an Interview with US News & World Report, On Foreign Government-Sponsored Terrorism, December 15, 1983 EXCERPTED Q. … with the prospect of continuing widespread terrorist attacks, how can the United States retaliate, especially when such attacks are inspired or sponsored by governments? THE PRESIDENT. One of the hardest things, of course, is to prove that the terrorist attacks are sponsored by a government. For example, these groups that are taking credit for the recent suicide attacks are believed to have an Iranian connection. There is a faction of Iranians that believe in a holy war. We do have the evidence that Khomeini has spoken a number of times about advocating a holy war in the Moslem world to promote his type of fundamentalism. So it’s hard not to believe that he must, in some way, instigate or at least egg on those that are doing these things. But the important thing about terrorism is not to be turned back by it. It is a worldwide threat, as we know. The threat is right here in our own country. It’s every place in the world. Q. What can be done to counter the terrorist threat? THE PRESIDENT. I believe that if terrorists are claiming triumphs when they do these terrible deeds, acknowledging what their goal is and that they have a connection with some country—then I think it’s up to the government of that country to try to curb and control such groups. If some of our own terrorist groups commit these outrages—such as the groups that just bombed a naval recruiting station in New York—it’s our responsibility to corral them, find out who and what they are, and bring them to justice. But the same is true for all the other countries. But the one thing we can’t do is what so many people, even here in our own country, are advocating in the face of the terrorist attacks against our forces in Lebanon. That is to bring home the Marines from Lebanon. If terrorism can succeed in its goal, then the world is going to find itself under the control of the terrorists. You have to stand against that and not let it succeed. Q. What do you do if a government is actually responsible, as you say, for instigating terrorism? Can you really ask that kind of a government to assume responsibility for controlling these terrorists? THE PRESIDENT. In those cases, I think that the civilized world has to get together and see what action can be taken. This does not necessarily mean warlike action, but pressures that can be put on a government—pressures such as saying to that government, ‘‘You start taking some steps to control this, or you’ll be outlawed in the rest of the world.’’ SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/121583d.htm

Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary, ‘‘International Terrorism,’’ April 17, 1984 Acts of terrorism continue to plague us and our friends and allies. The toll of bombings, assassinations and kidnappings bears terrible witness to the

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indiscriminate attacks and lawlessness that rules the behavior of terrorist groups. It is also apparent that several states have adopted these lawless acts as instruments of state policy. While we diligently seek the means to control this scourge, we must also take the steps that are necessary to protect our citizens, our institutions and our friends and allies. We have, in the course of a detailed review, reached some conclusions on what we must do to protect ourselves, and to assist others in protecting themselves, from this growing threat. Our actions will be guided by the following principles: First, no nation can condone international terrorism. Second, it is the right of every legitimate government to resist the use of terrorism against its people, institutions or property for all nations, and this Government will work as closely as possible with other governments—particularly other similarly threatened democracies—to deal with it. While we have cause for deep concern about the states that now practice or support terrorism, our policies are directed against all forms of international terrorism. The states that practice terrorism or actively support it cannot be allowed to do so without consequence. As a first step in dealing with these states, every channel of communication that is available to us will be used to dissuade them from the practice or support of terrorism. We will increase our efforts with other governments to obtain and exchange the information needed about states and groups involved in terrorist activities in order to prevent attacks, warn our people, our friends and allies, and reduce the risk. We will also do everything we can to see that acts of state-supported terrorism are publicized and condemned in every appropriate forum. When these efforts fail, however, it must be understood that when we are victimized by acts of terrorism we have the right to defend ourselves—and the right to help others to the same. Finally, it should be noted that our paramount interest is in improving our ability to prevent terrorist attacks on our citizens, installations and those foreign persons and facilities in the U.S. we are obligated to protect. We believe we can best achieve these results through a combination of improved information and better security and protection. This does not present any change in U.S. policy—rather, a refocused emphasis. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/41784d.htm

President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress, International Terrorism Legislation, April 26, 1984 To the Congress of the United States: I am sending to the Congress today four separate bills to attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism. In 1983 more than 250 Americans citizens were killed in terrorist attacks, the largest number in any year of record. In the wake of the tragic deaths of our diplomats and Marines as well as French and Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, in light of the cynical murder of four South Korean cabinet officers and many others by North Korean terrorists in Burma, and as a result of the attack on our embassy in Kuwait, it is essential that we act immediately to cope with this menace and to increase cooperation with other governments in dealing with this growing threat to our way of life.

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In the past fifteen years, terrorism has become a frightening challenge to the tranquility and political stability of our friends and allies. During the past decade alone, there have been almost 6,500 terrorist incidents. Over 3,500 people have been killed in these incidents, and more than 7,600 people have been wounded. American citizens have been the victims of more than 2,500 terrorist incidents. Of special concern to me has been the toll inflicted on our diplomats and members of the Armed Forces. I am also deeply concerned, however, about attacks against other American citizens, who have been victims of forty percent of the terrorist incidents over the past decade. In recent years, a very worrisome and alarming new kinds of terrorism has developed: the direct use of instruments of terror by foreign states. This ‘‘state terrorism,’’ starkly manifest in the recent dreadful spectacles of violence in Beirut, Rangoon, and Kuwait, accounts for the great majority of terrorist murders and assassinations. Also disturbing is state-provided training, financing, and logistical support to terrorists and terrorist groups. These activities are an extremely serious and growing source of danger to us, our friends and our allies, and are a severe challenge to America’s foreign policy. The protection of our citizens, our official personnel, and our facilities abroad requires the close cooperation and support of other governments. We depend on other governments to provide security protection to more than 250 United States diplomatic and consular posts abroad. We look to other governments to maintain the normal protections of law in their countries for our citizens living and traveling abroad and for our business representatives and our business properties. In 1983, this Administration sent to the Congress legislation to enable us to provide adequate protection for foreign officials in the United States. Not only is their protection essential to meet the obligations of the United States under international treaties, it is equally important to demonstrate to officials of other governments that they can count on full protection while they are in the United States. I also asked the Congress to provide legislative authority for anti-terrorism training, and in some cases equipment, to foreign governments in order to enhance cooperation with governments on whom we must depend for protection abroad. In my view, the more effective and knowledgeable local law enforcement officials and officers are, the greater will be their ability to provide the kind of security both they and we need. I commend the Congress for providing a two-year authorization for this program and an appropriation of $2.5 million for 1984. I am determined that my Administration will do whatever is necessary to reduce the incidence of terrorism against us anywhere in the world and to see the perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice. I believe it is essential, however, that the Executive branch, the Congress and the public clearly understand that combating terrorism effectively requires concerted action on many different fronts. With trained personnel, effective laws, close international cooperation, and diligence, we can reduce the risks of terrorism to our people and increase the deterrent to future acts of terrorism. Dealing with the immediate effect of terrorist violence is only part of the challenge, however. We must also assure that the states now practicing or

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supporting terrorism do not prosper in the designs they pursue. We must assure that international forums, such as the United Nations, take a balanced and practical view of who is practicing terrorism and what must be done about it. We must assure that governments that are currently passive—or inactive— respecting this scourge understand the threat that terrorism poses for all mankind and that they cooperate in stopping it. We must work to assure that there is no role in civilized society for indiscriminate threatening, intimidation, detention, or murder of innocent people. We must make it clear to any country that is tempted to use violence to undermine democratic governments, destabilize our friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic governments, or disrupt our lives that it has nothing to gains, and much to lose. The legislation I am sending to the Congress is an important step in our war against terrorism. It will send a strong and vigorous message to friend and foe alike that the United States will not tolerate terrorist activity against its citizens or within its borders. Our legislative package consists of four separate bills, each of which is outlined below. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking In September 1981, I signed the instrument ratifying the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which was adopted by the United Nations on December 17, 1979.1 The convention has not been implemented domestically through enabling legislation, however. This legislation would implement the 1979 convention. It would amend the Federal kidnapping statute to provide for Federal jurisdiction over any kidnapping in which a threat is made to kill, injure, or continue to detain a victim in order to compel a third party to do or to abstain from doing something. This is a common ploy of terrorists.… Aircraft Sabotage Act The United States became a party to the Tokyo Convention, which covers certain offenses or acts committed aboard aircraft, in 1969 and the Hague Convention concerning the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, in 1971. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation was adopted at Montreal in 1971 and ratified by the United States in November 1972.2 The Montreal Convention requires all states party to it to establish jurisdiction over certain offenses affecting the safety of civil aviation.

1 For text of the treaty, which entered into force for the United States on January 6, 1985, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 28, No. 6 (November 1979), 1457–1463. 2 For text of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on September 14, 1963, and entered into force December 4, 1969, see 20 UST 2941. For text of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970, and entered into force on October 14, 1971, see 22 UST 1641. For text of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) signed in Montreal on September 23, 1971, and entered into force on January 26, 1973, see 24 UST 565.

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The Congress has approved enabling legislation for the first two of these conventions but not for the Montreal Convention. This means that certain criminal acts related to aircraft sabotage or hijacking are not adequately covered by United States law.… Action by the Congress now would provide the basis for long-overdue implementation of this convention. Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts Current law authorizes the payment of rewards for information concerning domestic crimes but is outdated. Maximum rewards are inadequate, and terrorism is not specifically included as a basis for paying a rewards. Moreover, there is no authority for the payment of rewards for information on acts of terrorism abroad. The proposed legislation, which is modeled on an existing statute that allows payment of rewards for information concerning the unauthorized manufacture of atomic weapons, recognizes that payment of a reward in connection with acts of domestic terrorism raises a matter of law enforcement that is properly within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General, but that the payment of a reward in connection with an act of terrorism abroad poses a political and foreign relations problem within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. By increasing the amounts of fines that may be paid, and by authorizing rewards for information concerning terrorist acts committed abroad, this Act would markedly improve the ability of the Departments of Justice and State to obtain information leading to the freeing of hostages or the capture of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism. Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984 The training and support of terrorist groups and activities by a number of countries has reached alarming proportions. In addition, the number of states now using terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy is both increasing and highly disturbing. The provision of assistance to countries that support terrorism and use terrorism as a foreign policy tool has thus become a matter of grave concern to national security. This Act, together with revised and strengthened regulations that the Department of State intends to issue shortly, would enhance the ability of the Department of Justice to prosecute persons involved in the support of terrorist activities and of states using terrorism. Enactment of this legislation would be a strong contribution to the effort to combat terrorism. We must recognize that terrorism is symptomatic of larger problems. We must dedicate ourselves to fostering modernization, development, and beneficial change in the depressed areas of the world. We must renew our commitment to promoting and assisting representative and participatory governments. We must attack the problem of terrorism as a crime against the international community whenever and wherever possible, but we must strive to eradicate the sources of frustration and despair that are the spawning places and nutrients of terrorism. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/42684a.htm

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President Ronald Reagan, ‘‘The Hijacking of TWA Flight 847: ‘America Will Never Make Concessions to Terrorists’,’’ June 18, 1985 THE PRESIDENT. … One hour ago the body of a young American hero Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem, was returned to his native soil in a coffin after being beaten and shot at pointblank range. His murder and the fate of the other American hostages still being held in Beirut underscore an inescapable fact: The United States is tonight a nation being attacked by international terrorists who wantonly kill and who seize our innocent citizens as their prisoners. In response to this situation, I am directing that the following steps be taken. I have directed the Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, to explore immediately an expansion of our armed sky marshal program aboard international flights of U.S. air carriers for better protection of passengers. I have directed the Secretary of State to issue an immediate travel advisory for U.S. citizens traveling through the Athens International Airport warning them of dangers. This warning shall remain in effect until the Greek Government has improved the security situation there and until it has demonstrated a willingness to comply with the security provisions of the U.S.-Greek civil aviation agreement and the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague conventions regarding prosecution and punishment of air pirates. I’ve asked for a full explanation of the events surrounding the takeover of the aircraft in Athens. I have appealed the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration for all U.S. air carriers to review the wisdom of continuing any flights into Athens until the security situation there improves. And further, I have asked the Secretaries Shultz and Dole to report to me on whether we should terminate the service of foreign air carriers whose governments do not honor appropriate international conventions or provide adequate security at their airports. I’m calling upon all allied and friendly governments to redouble their efforts to improve airport security and take other measures to prevent the hijacking of aircraft. I will also be asking them to take steps to prevent travel to places where lawlessness is rampant and innocent passengers are unprotected. And I’m urging that no American enter any Middle Eastern country that does not publicly condemn and disassociate itself from this atrocity and call for the immediate safe release of our citizens. Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make any concessions to terrorists—to do so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we ask nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay.

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This act of terrorism is a stain on Lebanon and particularly on those Lebanese in whose name it has been done. Those in Lebanon who commit these acts damage their country and their cause, and we hold them accountable. I call upon those holding our people to release them without condition. I call upon the leaders of Lebanon, political and religious, to meet their responsibilities and to do all that is necessary to end this crime now in the name of the God they worship. And I call on other governments to speak out and use their influence as well. This attack is an attack on all citizens of the world who seek to live free from the fear and scourge of terrorism. My thoughts and prayers are, as those of all Americans, with the prisoners now being held in Lebanon and with their families. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=38789

President Ronald Reagan, ‘‘The ‘Terrorist Menace’ ,’’ Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, July 8, 1985 EXCERPTED Now, I want to be very candid with you this morning and tell you I’d been planning to come here today to speak on a number of legal issues—the problems of our courts, our administration’s enforcement of antitrust and civil rights laws, as well as our ongoing attack on the drug trade and organized crime in general. But I’m afraid this discussion will now have to wait for another occasion, for it’s been overtaken by events of an international nature, events that I feel compelled as President to comment on today. And yet I think these matters will be of interest to you, not only because you’re Americans, but because, as lawyers, you are also concerned with the rule of law and the danger posed to it by criminals of both a domestic and international variety. The reason we haven’t had time to discuss the issues that I’d originally hoped to address this morning has to do with our hostages and what all of America has been through during recent weeks. Yet my purpose today goes even beyond our concern over the recent outrages in Beirut, El Salvador or the Air India tragedy, the Narita bombing or the Jordanian Airlines hijacking. We must look beyond these events because I feel it is vital not to allow them—as terrible as they are—to obscure an even larger and darker terrorist menace. There is a temptation to see the terrorist act as simply the erratic work of a small group of fanatics. We make this mistake at great peril, for the attacks on America, her citizens, her allies, and other democratic nations in recent years do form a pattern of terrorism that has strategic implications and political goals. And only by moving our focus from the tactical to the strategic perspective, only by identifying the pattern of terror and those behind it, can we hope to put into force a strategy to deal with it.

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So, let us go to the facts; here is what we know: In recent years, there’s been a steady and escalating pattern of terrorist acts against the United States and our allies and Third World nations friendly toward our interests. The number of terrorist acts rose from about 500 in 1983 to over 600 in 1984. There were 305 bombings alone last year—that works out to an average of almost one a day. And some of the most vicious attacks were directed at Americans or United States property and installations. And this pattern has continued throughout 1985, and in most cases innocent civilians are the victims of the violence. At the current rate, as many as 1,000 acts of terrorism will occur in 1985. Now, that’s what we face unless civilized nations act together to end this assault on humanity. In recent years, the Mideast has been one principal point of focus for these attacks—attacks directed at the United States, Israel, France, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. Beginning in the summer of 1984 and culminating in January and February of this year, there was also a series of apparently coordinated attacks and assassinations by leftwing terrorist groups in Belgium, West Germany, and France—attacks directed against American and NATO installations or military and industrial officials of those nations. Now, what do we know about the sources of those attacks and the whole pattern of terrorist assaults in recent years? Well, in 1983 alone, the Central Intelligence Agency either confirmed or found strong evidence of Iranian involvement in 57 terrorist attacks. While most of these attacks occurred in Lebanon, an increase in activity by terrorists sympathetic to Iran was seen throughout Europe. Spain and France have seen such incidents, and in Italy seven pro-Iranian Lebanese students were arrested for plotting an attack on the US embassy, and this violence continues. It will not surprise any of you to know that, in addition to Iran, we have identified another nation, Libya, as deeply involved in terrorism. We have evidence which links Libyan agents or surrogates to at least 25 incidents last year. Colonel Qadhafi’s outrages against civilized conducts are, of course, as infamous as those of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The gunning down last year—from inside the Libyan Embassy—of a British policewoman is only one of many examples. Since September 1984, Iranian-backed terrorist groups have been responsible for almost 30 attacks, and, most recently, the Egyptian government aborted a Libyan-backed plot to bomb our Embassy in Cairo. It was this pattern of state-approved assassination and terrorism by Libya that led the United States a few years ago to expel Libyan diplomats and has forced other nations to take similar steps since then. But let us, in acknowledging his commitment to terrorism, at least give Colonel Qadhafi his due. The man is candid. He said recently that Libya was—and I quote—‘‘capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation and destruction of arson inside America.’’ … recognition of this deep and on-going involvement of Iran and Libya in international terrorism is hardly confined to our own government. Most police forces in Europe now take this involvement for granted … the Jordanian leadership has publicly noted that Libyan actions caused the destruction of the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.

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Now, three other governments, along with Iran and Libya, are actively supporting a campaign of international terrorism against the United States, her allies, and moderate Third World states. First, North Korea. The extent and crudity of North Korean violence against the United States and our ally, South Korea, are a matter of record. Our aircraft have been shot down; our servicemen have been murdered in border incidents; and 2 years ago, four members of the South Korean cabinet were blown up in Burma by North Korean terrorists—a failed attempt to assassinate President Chun. This incident was just one more of an unending series of attacks directed against the Republic of Korea by North Korea. Now, what is not readily known or understood is North Korea’s wider links to the international terrorist network. There isn’t time today to recount all of North Korea’s efforts to foster separatism, violence, and subversion in other lands well beyond its immediate borders. But to cite one example, North Korea’s efforts to spread separatism and terrorism in the free and prosperous nation of Sri Lanka are a deep and continuing source of tension in South Asia. And then there is Cuba, a nation whose government has, since the 1960’s, openly armed, trained, and directed terrorists operating on at least three continents. This has occurred in Latin America. The OAS has repeatedly passed sanctions against Castro for sponsoring terrorism in places and countries too numerous to mention. This has also occurred in Africa. President Carter openly accused the Castro government of supporting and training Katangan terrorists from Angola in their attacks on Zaire. And even in the Middle East, Castro himself has acknowledged that he actively assisted the Sandinistas in the early seventies when they were training in the Middle East with terrorist factions of the PLO. And finally there is the latest partner of Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba in a campaign of international terror—the Communist regime in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras—terror that led recently to the murder of four US marines, two civilians, and seven Latin Americans—they provide one of the world’s principle refuges for international terrorists. … [W]e have evidence that in addition to Italy’s Red Brigades other elements of the world’s most vicious terrorist groups—West Germany’s BaaderMeinhoff gang, the ETA, the PLO, the Tupamaros, and the IRA—have found a haven in Nicaragua and support from that country’s Communist dictatorship. In fact, the Communist regime in Nicaragua has made itself a focal point for the terrorist network and a case study in the extent of its scope. … We see the Nicaraguans tied to Cuba, Libya, and North Korea. And that leaves only Iran. What about ties to Iran? Well, yes, only recently the Prime Minister of Iran visited Nicaragua bearing expressions of solidarity from the Ayatollah for the Sandinista Communists. … Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua—continents away, tens of thousands of miles apart, but the same goals and objectives. I submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing

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involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world. This is terrorism that is a part of a pattern, the work of a confederation of terrorist states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments—a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are united by one, simple, criminal phenomenon—their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our international stature. And the strategic purpose behind the terrorism sponsored by these outlaw states is clear: to disorient the United States, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to sow discord between ourselves and our allies, to frighten friendly Third World nations working with us for peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, and, finally, to remove American influence from those areas of the world where we’re working to bring stable and democratic government. In short, to cause us to retreat, retrench, to become Fortress America. Yes, their real goal is to expel America from the world. And that is the reason these terrorist nations are arming, training, and supporting attacks against this nation. And that is why we can be clear on one point: these terrorists are now engaged in acts of war against the Government and people of the United States. And under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself. Now, for the benefit of these outlaw governments, who are sponsoring international terrorism against our nation, I’m prepared to offer a brief lesson in American history. A number of times in America’s past, foreign tyrants, warlords, and totalitarian dictators have misinterpreted the well-known likeability, patience, and generosity of the American people as signs of weakness or even decadence. Well, it’s true; we are an easygoing people, slow to wrath, hesitant to see danger looming over every horizon. But it’s also true that when the emotions of the American people are aroused, when their patriotism and their anger are triggered, there are no limits to their national valor nor their consuming passion to protect this nation’s cherished tradition of freedom. Teddy Roosevelt once put it this way: ‘‘The American people are slow to wrath, but when the wrath is once kindled it burns like a consuming flame.’’ And it was another leader, this time a foreign adversary, Admiral Yamamoto, who warned his own nation after its attack on Pearl Harbor that he feared ‘‘we have only awakened a sleeping giant and his reaction will be terrible.’’ So, let me today speak for a united people. Let me say simply: We’re Americans. We love this country. We love what she stands for, and we will always defend her. Thank you very much. Thank you. God bless you. Thank you and God bless you. We live for freedom—our own, our children’s—and we will always stand ready to sacrifice for that freedom. So, the American people are not—I repeat, not—going to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people. And we’re especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of misfits, loony tunes, and squalid criminals—since the advent of the Third Reich. Do not for a moment, however, think that this discussion has been all inclusive. First of all, though their strength does not match that of the groups

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supported by the terrorist network I’ve already mentioned, there are some terrorist organizations that are indigenous to certain localities or countries which are not necessarily tied to this international network. And second, the countries I have mentioned today are not necessarily the only ones that support terrorism against the United States and its allies. Those which I’ve described are simply the ones that can be most directly implicated. Now, the question of the Soviet Union’s close relationship with almost all of the terrorist states that I have mentioned and the implications of these Soviet ties on bilateral relations with the United States and other democratic nations must be recognized. So, too, Secretary of State Shultz in his speech of June 24 of last year openly raised the question of Soviet support for terrorist organizations, as did Secretary Haig before him. With regard to the Soviet Union, there is one matter that I cannot let go unaddressed today. During the recent hostage crises in Beirut—39 Americans were brutally kidnapped; an American sailor was viciously beaten; another American sailor stomped and shot to death; the families and loved ones of these hostages undergo indescribable suffering and a sense of distress, anger, and outrage spreading through our nation like a prairie fire—the Soviet Union made some official comments through its government controlled press. The Soviet Government suggested that the United States was not sincerely concerned about this crisis, but that we were, instead, in the grip of—and I use the Soviets’ word here—‘‘hysteria.’’ The Soviet Union also charged that the United States was only looking for a—and, again, I use their word—‘‘pretext’’ for a military—and again, I use their word—‘‘invasion.’’ Well now, ladies and gentlemen of the American Bar, there is a non-Soviet word for that kind of talk. It’s an extremely useful, time-tested original American word, one with deep roots in our rich agricultural and farming tradition. Now, much needs to be done by all of us in the community of civilized nations. We must act against the criminal menace of terrorism with the full weight of the law, both domestic and international. We will act to indict, apprehend, and prosecute those who commit the kind of atrocities the world has witnessed in recent weeks. We can act together as free peoples who wish not to see our citizens kidnapped or shot or blown out of the skies … There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest or train or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Vice President Bush returned from Europe last week after intense consultations with our allies on practical steps to combat terrorism. He’ll be heading up a government wide task force to review and recommend improvements in our efforts to halt terrorism. For those countries which sponsor such acts or fail to take action against terrorist criminals, the civilized world needs to ensure that their nonfeasance and malfeasance are answered with actions that demonstrate our unified resolve that this kind of activity must cease. For example, I’ve informed our allies and others that the Beirut International Airport, through which have passed 15 percent of the world’s hijackings since 1970, must be made safe. And until that time, the airport should be closed.

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Finally, I want you to accept a challenge to become part of the solution to the problem of terrorism. You have a fundamental concern for the law, and it’s upon the law that terrorists trample. You need to address this problem in conferences and conventions that will lead us to a better domestic and international legal framework for dealing with terrorism. You must help this government and others to deal with lawlessness. Where legislation must be crafted to allow appropriate authorities to act, you should help to craft or change it. In the past lawyers have helped when civilization was threatened by lawbreakers, and now is the time to do so again. … [T]here’s another point that needs to be made here, the point I made at the start of this discussion. That in taking a strategic, not just a tactical view of terrorism, we must understand that the greatest hope the terrorists and their supporters harbor, the very reason for their cruelty and viciousness of their tactics is to disorient the American people, to cause disunity, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to keep us from the steady pursuit of our strategic interests, to distract us from our very real hope that someday the nightmare of totalitarian rule will end and self-government and personal freedom will become the birthright of every people on Earth. And here, my fellow Americans, is where we find real motive behind the rabid and increasing anti-Americanism of the international terrorist network. I’ve been saying for some years now that the cause of totalitarian ideology is on the wane; that all across the world there is an uprising of mind and will, a tidal wave of longing for freedom and self-rule. Well, no one senses this better than those who now stand atop totalitarian states, especially those nations on the outer periphery of the totalitarian world like Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Their rulers are frightened; they know that freedom is on the march and when it triumphs their time in power is over. … You see, it’s true that totalitarian governments are very powerful and, over the short term, may be better organized than the democracies. But it’s also true—and no one knows this better than the totalitarian rulers themselves—that these regimes are weak in a way that no democracy can ever be weak. For the fragility of totalitarian government is the fragility of any regime whose hold on its people is limited to the instruments of police-state repression. That’s why the stakes are so high and why we must persevere. Freedom itself is the issue—our own and the entire world’s. Yes, America is still a symbol to a few, a symbol that is feared and hated, but to more, many millions more, a symbol that is loved, a country that remains a shining city on a hill. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/70885a.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: See chapter 3, Department of State and Department of Defense.

President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism, May 31, 1986 History is likely to record that 1986 was the year when the world, at long last, came to grips with the plague of terrorism. For too long, the world was

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paralyzed by the argument that terrorism could not be stopped until the grievances of terrorists were addressed. The complicated and heartrending issues that perplex mankind are no excuse for violent, inhumane attacks, nor do they excuse not taking aggressive action against those who deliberately slaughter innocent people. In our world there are innumerable groups and organizations with grievances, some justified, some not. Only a tiny fraction has been ruthless enough to try to achieve their ends though vicious and cowardly acts of violence upon unarmed victims. Perversely, it is often the terrorists themselves who prevent peacefully negotiated solutions. So, perhaps the first step in solving some of these fundamental challenges in getting to the root cause of conflict is to declare that terrorism is not an acceptable alternative and will not be tolerated. Effective antiterrorist action has also been thwarted by the claim that—as the quip goes—‘‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’ That’s a catchy phrase, but also misleading. Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submission. Freedom fighters target the military forces and the organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. Now, this is not to say that those who are fighting for freedom are perfect or that we should ignore problems arising from passion and conflict. Nevertheless, one has to be blind, ignorant, or simply unwilling to see the truth if he or she is unable to distinguish between those I just described and terrorists. Terrorists intentionally kill or maim unarmed civilians, often women and children, often third parties who are not in any way part of a dictatorial regime. Terrorists are always the enemies of democracies. Luckily the world is shaking free from its lethargy and moving forward to stop the bloodshed. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/53186a.htm

President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, November 13, 1986 I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy. For 18 months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages. Without Iran’s cooperation, we cannot bring an end to the Persian Gulf war; without Iran’s concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the Middle East. For 10 days now, the American and world press have been full of reports and rumors about this initiative and these objectives. Now, my fellow Americans, there’s an old saying that nothing spreads so quickly as a rumor. So, I thought it was time to speak with you directly, to tell you firsthand about our dealings with Iran. As Will Rogers once said, ‘‘Rumor travels faster, but it don’t stay put as long as truth.’’ So, let’s get to the facts.

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The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not. Other reports have surfaced alleging U.S. involvement: reports of a sealift to Iran using Danish ships to carry American arms; of vessels in Spanish ports being employed in secret U.S. arms shipments; of Italian ports being used; of the U.S. sending spare parts and weapons for combat aircraft. All these reports are quite exciting, but as far as we’re concerned, not one of them is true. During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran. My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship. These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the 6-year war between Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries. Those with whom we were in contact took considerable risks and needed a signal of our serious intent if they were to carry on and broaden the dialog. At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there. Some progress has already been made. Since U.S. Government contact began with Iran, there’s been no evidence of Iranian Government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the Government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking. But why, you might ask, is any relationship with Iran important to the United States? Iran encompasses some of the most critical geography in the world. It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. Geography explains why the Soviet Union has sent an army into Afghanistan to dominate that country and, if they could, Iran and Pakistan. Iran’s geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with oil flows from the Arab States that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran’s oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy. For these reasons, it is in our national interest to watch for changes within Iran that might offer hope for an improved relationship. Until last year there was little to justify that hope. Indeed, we have bitter and enduring disagreements that persist today. At the heart of our quarrel has been Iran’s past sponsorship of international terrorism. Iranian policy has been devoted to expelling all Western influence from the Middle East. We cannot abide that

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because our interests in the Middle East are vital. At the same time, we seek no territory or special position in Iran. The Iranian revolution is a fact of history, but between American and Iranian basic national interests there need be no permanent conflict. Since 1983 various countries have made overtures to stimulate direct contact between the United States and Iran; European, Near East, and Far East countries have attempted to serve as intermediaries. Despite a U.S. willingness to proceed, none of these overtures bore fruit. With this history in mind, we were receptive last year when we were alerted to the possibility of establishing a direct dialog with Iranian officials. Now, let me repeat: America’s longstanding goals in the region have been to help preserve Iran’s independence from Soviet domination; to bring an honorable end to the bloody Iran-Iraq war; to halt the export of subversion and terrorism in the region. A major impediment to those goals has been an absence of dialog, a cutoff in communication between us. It’s because of Iran’s strategic importance and its influence in the Islamic world that we chose to probe for a better relationship between our countries. Our discussions continued into the spring of this year. Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialog, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements. The 4 days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion, and American personnel were not mistreated. Since then, the dialog has continued and step-by-step progress continues to be made. Let me repeat: Our interests are clearly served by opening a dialog with Iran and thereby helping to end the Iran-Iraq war. That war has dragged on for more than 6 years, with no prospect of a negotiated settlement. The slaughter on both sides has been enormous, and the adverse economic and political consequences for that vital region of the world have been growing. We sought to establish communication with both sides in that senseless struggle, so that we could assist in bringing about a cease-fire and, eventually, a settlement. We have sought to be evenhanded by working with both sides and with other interested nations to prevent a widening of the war. This sensitive undertaking has entailed great risk for those involved. There is no question but that we could never have begun or continued this dialog had the initiative been disclosed earlier. Due to the publicity of the past week, the entire initiative is very much at risk today. Since the welcome return of former hostage David Jacobsen, there has been unprecedented speculation and countless reports that have not only been wrong but have been potentially dangerous to the hostages and destructive of the opportunity before us. The efforts of courageous people like Terry Waite have been jeopardized. So extensive have been the false rumors and erroneous reports that the risks of remaining silent now exceed the risks of speaking out. And that’s why I decided to address you tonight. It’s been widely reported, for example, that the Congress, as well as top executive branch officials, were circumvented. Although the efforts we undertook were highly sensitive and involvement of government officials was limited to those with a strict need to

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know, all appropriate Cabinet officers were fully consulted. The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with Federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being, and will be, fully informed. Another charge is that we have tilted toward Iran in the Gulf war. This, too, is unfounded. We have consistently condemned the violence on both sides. We have consistently sought a negotiated settlement that preserves the territorial integrity of both nations. The overtures we’ve made to the Government of Iran have not been a shift to supporting one side over the other, rather, it has been a diplomatic initiative to gain some degree of access and influence within Iran—as well as Iraq—and to bring about an honorable end to that bloody conflict. It is in the interests of all parties in the Gulf region to end that war as soon as possible. To summarize: Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. That no concessions policy remains in force, in spite of the wildly speculative and false stories about arms for hostages and alleged ransom payments. We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we. Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Qadhafi. We have not, nor will we, capitulate to terrorists. We will, however, get on with advancing the vital interests of our great nation—in spite of terrorists and radicals who seek to sabotage our efforts and immobilize the United States. Our goals have been, and remain, to restore a relationship with Iran; to bring an honorable end to the war in the Gulf; to bring a halt to state-supported terror in the Middle East; and finally, to effect the safe return of all hostages from Lebanon. As President, I’ve always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now. I cannot guarantee the outcome. But as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism. Certainly there are risks in this pursuit, but there are greater risks if we do not persevere. It will take patience and understanding; it will take continued resistance to those who commit terrorist acts; and it will take cooperation with all who seek to rid the world of this scourge. SOURCE: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/111386c.htm

PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH President George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, New York, New York, January 31, 1992 EXCERPTED It was just one year ago that the world saw this new, invigorated United Nations in action as this Council stood fast against aggression and stood for the sacred principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter. And now it’s time to step forward again, make the internal reforms, accelerate the revitalization, accept the responsibilities necessary for a vigorous and effective United Nations.

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I want to assure the members of this Council and the Secretary-General, the United Nations can count on our full support in this task. Our changed world is a more hopeful world, indeed, but it is not absent those who would turn back the clock to the darker days of threats and bullying. And our world is still a dangerous world, rife with far too many terrible weapons. The danger of proliferation remains. And again, let me single out the earlier remarks by the President of the French Republic, President Mitterrand, on this subject, the clarion call to do something about it. We must act together so that from this time forward, people involved in sophisticated weapons programs can redirect their energies to peaceful endeavors. We’ll do more in cooperation with our allies to ensure that dangerous materials and technology don’t fall into the hands of terrorists or others. And we will continue to work with these new States to ensure a strong commitment in word and deed to all global nonproliferation standards. Our triumph in the Gulf is testament to the U.N.’s mission. Its security is a shared responsibility. Today, this institution spearheads a quarantine against the outlaw regime of Saddam Hussein. It is the strong belief of my country that we must keep sanctions in place and take the following steps to preserve our common security: We must continue to focus on Iraq’s capability to build or maintain weapons of mass destruction. And we must make clear to the world and, most important, to the people of Iraq that no normalization is possible so long as Saddam Hussein remains there, remains in power. As on all of the urgent issues I’ve mentioned today, progress comes from acting in concert, and we must deal resolutely with these renegade regimes, if necessary, by sanctions or stronger measures, to compel them to observe international standards of behavior. We will not be blind to the dangers we still face. Terrorists and their state sponsors must know there will be serious consequences if they violate international law. Two weeks ago, this Council, in unity, sent a very strong message to Libya. And let me repeat today Resolution 731, passed unanimously by this body, by the Security Council, calls on Libya to comply fully with the requests of three states on this Council. And I would just like to use this meeting today to call on Libya to heed the call of the Security Council of the United Nations. Last year in the Gulf, in concert, we responded to an attack on the sovereignty of one nation as an assault on the security of all. So, let us make it our mission to give this principle the greatest practical meaning in the conduct of nations. SOURCE: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92013100.html

President George H.W. Bush, Remarks to the American Legion National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, August 25, 1992 Foreign policy is not a footnote, a loose end that we wrap up and then safely forget. It requires steady, experienced leadership. Think back not too long ago to the time of gas lines and grain embargoes. In Teheran, Americans were held hostage. In Moscow, America was seen as weak and uncertain. This is a

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lesson we ignore at our own peril. Now those days are gone, but our strength in the future, like any great nation, rests on our eternal vigilance. We need to speak up for the military muscle that gives meaning to America’s moral leadership. We need to say even now that the cold war is over: America is safe as long as America stays strong. You see, the world is still a dangerous place, and if America does not lead, who will? Take Iraq as a test case for the most difficult security challenges we are likely to face in the future. We tried peaceful means to bring Iraq into the family of nations. Given the dangerous neighbors, given the vital interests at stake, it was right to try. Had we not made those efforts, had we not exhausted every peaceful means, we would never have been able to build the unprecedented United Nations coalition that stopped a tyrant in his tracks and rolled him back to Baghdad. Now, let’s also get straight what was at stake: A madman with missiles and chemical weapons stood on the brink of a choke-hold on much of the world’s energy supplies, threatening to overrun our allies. We destroyed that threat, liberated Kuwait, and locked up a tyrant in the prison of his own country. We know now Saddam Hussein was developing the weapons to destroy Israel. Tens of millions of deaths of Arabs or Israelis would not matter to this killer. The Middle East could well have become a nuclear apocalypse. That is what was at stake. Now, some who were faint-hearted and stood in the way of crushing Saddam’s aggression now have the gall to say, ‘‘You stopped the war too soon.’’ Some also say that General Norman Schwarzkopf wanted to march into Baghdad and ‘‘get’’ Saddam. False! I’ll never forget—this is a true story and history has it recorded on film—sitting in the Oval Office on February 27, 1991, our troops having performed so magnificently in the field. And with me in the room was General Scowcroft and the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell. They recommended to me, as President who has the responsibility for this, that we stop the slaughter; our mission was accomplished. I asked, are you sure that our field commanders feel this way? They both said yes. But to double-check, Colin Powell got up from the couch in our office—you all have seen pictures of it— walked over to the desk that you see pictures of, reached into the front righthand corner of the desk, and there was a secure telephone; picked up that secure phone and got General Schwarzkopf on the line in my presence. And General Powell looked up at me after he had talked to Schwarzkopf, and he said, ‘‘Mission accomplished. Stop the killing.’’ And it was right. We are not in the slaughter business. We were in the business of crushing aggression. And we did it. And I don’t like this historical revision. We did the right thing; we did the compassionate thing in the end as well. If we’d continued, hundreds of thousands of American troops would be on the ground in Iraq today attempting to pull warring factions together or bogged down in some guerrilla warfare. Whether in Korea or in Lebanon, history shows us the danger of losing sight of our objectives. Liberators can easily become occupiers. A Commander in Chief has to know not only when his objectives have been reached but when to consolidate his gains.

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And one other thing let me say right here. I feel on me the obligation to every family of every single man or woman serving in the Armed Forces. And I am not going to commit our ground forces to a war until I know what the mission is, how that mission will be achieved, and how those forces will come out, their honor intact, victory in hand. We’ve seen too many combat situations where we asked those kids to fight with one hand behind their back. Not as long as I am Commander in Chief. Instead of playing the world’s policeman, we worked with the United Nations to destroy Iraq’s remaining weapons of mass destruction, to keep Iraq under control. Through an embargo, through tight control over oil exports and U.N. inspections, we are putting the lid on Saddam. And believe me, he is going to live up to each and every one of those U.N. resolutions. I am determined to see that, and I will. As you know, today a whole new world of hope is dawning in the Middle East. This very week, as Arab and Israeli sit down together in Washington, DC, we are winning the peace. And that was made possible by the sacrifice of those involved in Desert Storm. There will be other regional conflicts. There will be other Saddam Husseins. Look around the world. Look at the threats we face: terrorism, the terrible drug cartels, regional conflicts as the breakup of empire gives vent to ancient hatreds, the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons. From Qadhafi in Libya to Kim Il-song in North Korea, the threats on our horizon could look a lot like the threat we turned back in Iraq. … banning chemical weapons has been a priority since the day 8 years ago when I went to Geneva on instructions from President Reagan to present our draft convention. In the next few days, we expect the completed convention to be presented in Geneva. And it is my hope, it is my aim that before this year is out, the nations of the world will unite to ban chemical weapons, to banish this scourge from the face of the Earth. Now, our work in the world did not end with our victory in the cold war. Our task is to guard against the crises that haven’t yet even caught fire, the wars that are waiting to happen, the threats that will come upon us with little or no warning. SOURCE: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92082500.html

PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON President William Jefferson Clinton, Radio Address on Terrorism from G-7 Summit Meeting, June 29, 1996 Good morning. I’m speaking to you today from Lyons, France, where the leaders of the world’s industrialized democracies have gathered for our annual summit. We’re meeting at a time of peace and prosperity but in the shadow of terrorism. The cowardly, brutal attack on American military personnel in Saudi Arabia is on everyone’s mind. This weekend, all Americans will join me

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in mourning the 19 Americans who lost their lives, in sending prayers to their loved ones. I’ve made it clear that I’ll do everything in my power to discover who’s responsible, to pursue them, and to punish them. I am pleased that our summit partners here agreed with me to direct our agenda to the work we can do together to fight terrorism and international crime. This is especially important now. While the international perils of the 20th century, fascism and communism, have been defeated, new dangers are rising up to take their place as we enter the 21st. New technologies and the rapid movement of information, money, and people across borders bring us closer together and enrich our lives. But they also make us all more vulnerable to rogue states, crime, drugs, and terrorism. Unlike the previous great struggles of this century, we must confront these threats along a moving front, from the Tokyo subway to the streets of London, from a bus in Paris to the World Trade Center in New York and the heartland in Oklahoma City and, of course, in Saudi Arabia. But just as no enemy could drive us from the fight to meet our challenges and protect our values during World War II and the cold war, we will not be driven from the frontiers of our fight against terrorism today. Working with our partners around the world, we will take on the forces of terror. As a result of United States leadership, here in Lyons we have adopted specific recommendations to combat crime and terrorism, practical steps that all governments can take and should take. They fall into four key areas. First, we need to make sure that criminals and terrorists have nowhere to hide. So we will strengthen our efforts to prosecute and extradite major criminals and terrorists, to share information, and to develop joint witness protection programs. Second, we must deny criminals and terrorists the resources they need to do violence to our citizens. So we will work to seize their assets, to gather more information on their financial transactions, and to shut down money laundering. Third, we have to strengthen the defense of our national borders so that criminals and terrorists cannot violate them. So we will crack down on weapons trafficking, alien smuggling. We’ll do a better job in safeguarding travel documents from fraud and abuse. And we will track forged or stolen documents together. Finally, we must stop criminals and terrorists from misusing the high-tech communications we all rely on for commerce and cooperation, so we will take the fight to those who would abuse government and financial institutional data bases. There’s more we can do together, so we directed our senior officials to come together as soon as possible to discuss additional steps to intensify the worldwide fight against terrorism. All these steps against terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are part of a campaign America has been leading for 3 years now. Without our leadership, the job will not get done. SOURCE: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_n27_v32/ai_18709997

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President William Jefferson Clinton, ‘‘American Security in a Changing World,’’ Remarks at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., August 5, 1996 … America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America, and only America, can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. Of course, we can’t take on all the world’s burden. We cannot become its policemen. But where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference, America must act and lead. Nowhere is that responsibility more clear or more urgent than in the struggle against terrorism. No one is immune, whether you’re riding a subway in Tokyo or a bus in Tel Aviv, whether you’re window shopping in London or walking the streets in Moscow, whether you’re doing your duty in Saudi Arabia or going to work in Oklahoma City. Terrorism has become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders. Whether we like it or not, in ways both good and bad, we are living in an interdependent world. That is why we must break down the walls in our mind between foreign and domestic policy … The reality is that our personal, community, and national prosperity depend upon our policies on economics in trade at home and abroad … [O]ur personal, community, and national security depend upon our policies on terrorism at home and abroad. We cannot advance the common good at home without also advancing the common good around the world. We cannot reduce the threats to our people without reducing threats to the world beyond our borders. That’s why the fight against terrorism must be both a national priority and a national security priority. We have pursued a concerted national and international strategy against terrorism on three fronts: First, beyond our borders, by working more closely than ever with our friends and allies; Second, here at home, by giving law enforcement the most powerful counterterrorism tools available; and, Third, in our airports and airplanes by increasing aviation security. This will be a long, hard struggle. There will be setbacks along the way. But just as no enemy could drive us from the fight to meet our challenges and protect our values in World War II and the Cold War, we will not be driven from the tough fight against terrorism today. Terrorism is the enemy of our generation, and we must prevail. First, on the international front, stopping the spread of terrorism clearly requires common action. The United States has a special responsibility to lead in this effort. Over the past four years, our intelligence services have been sharing more information than ever with other nations. We’ve opened up a law enforcement academy in Budapest which is training people from 23 nations, an FBI office in Moscow, and just last Friday, Congress gave us the funding for FBI offices in Cairo, Islamabad, Tel Aviv, and Beijing. We have requested more money for intelligence in 1997. This focus is making a difference. As the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded in its 1996

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report on the Intelligence Authorization bill, the work of U.S. intelligence agencies against terrorism has been an example of effective coordination and information sharing. I’ve also worked to rally other nations to the fight against terrorism—last year at the UN General Assembly; this spring at the historic Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh, where 29 nations, including 13 Arab nations, for the first time condemned terrorism in Israel and anywhere else it occurs in the Middle East and throughout the world; at the G-7 Summit in Lyon and the recently held follow-on conference we called for in Paris, where we were represented ably by the Attorney General. … More countries are taking the ‘‘no sanctuary’’ pledge and living up to their extradition laws so that terrorists have no place to run or hide. More countries are helping us to shut down the gray markets that outfit terrorists with weapons and false documents. Last week in Paris, the G-7 nations and Russia agreed to pursue a sweeping set of measures to prevent terrorists from acting, and to catch them if they do. And we set timetables with specific dates by which progress must be made. We are also working with Saudi Arabia to improve the security of our forces stationed there, so that we can continue to deter aggression by rogue states and stand against terrorism in the Middle East. After Khobar Towers I immediately ordered investigation by the FBI and a commission headed by Gen. Wayne Downing … And we are working with the Saudi government to move almost all our troops to other bases to better protect them from terrorist attacks. Even though we’re working more closely with our allies than ever, and there is more agreement on what needs to be done than ever, we do not always agree. Where we don’t agree, the United States cannot and will not refuse to do what we believe is right. That is why we have maintained or strengthened sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong. I hope, and expect, that before long our allies will come around to accepting this fundamental truth. This morning I signed into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. It builds on what we have already done to isolate those regimes by imposing tough penalties on foreign companies that go forward with new investments in key sectors. The act will help to deny them the money they need to finance international terrorism or to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It will increase the pressure on Libya to extradite the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103. The second part of our strategy is to give American law enforcement officials the most powerful tools available to fight terrorism without undermining our civil liberties. In the wake of Oklahoma City, I strengthened the terrorism bill I had previously sent to Congress, but which had not then been passed. Despite the vow of Congress to act quickly, it took a year before that bill came to my desk to be signed. The bill had some very good points. It made terrorism a federal offense, expanded the role of the FBI, and imposed the death penalty for terrorism.

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But as strong as it was, it did not give our law enforcement officials other tools they needed and that they had asked for, including increased wiretap authority for terrorists to parallel that which we have for people involved in organized crime now, and chemical markers for the most common explosives so that we can more easily track down bomb makers. … Next month I will submit to Congress the international crime control act that our Justice, State, and Treasury Departments drafted at my request, because more and more, terrorism, international organized crime, and drug trafficking are going hand-in-hand. This bill expands our fight against money laundering, so criminals and terrorists will have a tougher time financing their activities. It strengthens our extradition powers and border controls to keep more criminals and terrorists out of America. It increases the ability of American law enforcement to prosecute those who commit violent crimes against Americans abroad. Congress should pass it. Once again, I urge the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, so that we can eliminate chemical weapons stockpiles and give our law enforcement new powers to investigate and prosecute people planning attacks with such weapons … Finally, the third front of our struggle against terrorism is at the airports and on the airplanes that bring us all closer together. Air travel remains the safest form of transportation. Our airlines have the best safety record and security record in the business. But that’s a small consolation when a single attack can take so many lives. Last year, we began field testing new high-tech explosive detection machines in Atlanta and San Francisco. We significantly increased security at our airports, and the FAA created a new government and industry panel to review airline security. After the TWA crash, I ordered new measures to increase the security of air travel. As any of you who have flown in recent days will have noticed, we are doing more hand searches and machine screening of luggage. We are requiring preflight inspections for every plane flying to or from the United States— every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every time. The Vice President is leading a commission on aviation security that is to report back to me within 45 days with an action plan to deploy machines that can detect the most sophisticated explosives and other needed changes. So, greater international cooperation, stronger American law enforcement, safer air travel—these are the fronts of our concerted strategy against terrorism. Much of this work by law enforcement, intelligence, and military professionals goes unheralded, but we are getting results. For example, we prevented attacks on the United Nations and the Holland Tunnel in New York. We thwarted an attempt to bomb American passenger planes from the skies over the Pacific. We convicted those responsible for the World Trade Center bombing and arrested suspects in the Oklahoma City and Unabomber cases. We have tracked down terrorists around the world and extradited more terrorists in four years than in the previous 12. But I want to make it clear to the American people that while we can defeat terrorists, it will be a long time before we defeat terrorism. America will remain a target because we are uniquely present in the world, because we act

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to advance peace and democracy, because we have taken a tougher stand against terrorism, and because we are the most open society on earth. But to change any of that, to pull our troops from the world’s trouble spots, to turn our backs on those taking risks for peace, to weaken our opposition against terrorism, or to curtail the freedom that is our birth right would be to give terrorism a victory it must not and will not have. In this fight, as in so many other challenges around the world, American leadership is indispensable. In assuming our leadership in the struggle against terrorism, we must be neither reluctant nor arrogant, but realistic, determined, and confident. And we must understand that in this battle we must deploy more than police and military resources … Our greatest strength is our confidence. And that is the target of the terrorists. Make no mistake about it: The bombs that kill and maim innocent people are not really aimed at them, but at the spirit of our whole country and the spirit of freedom. Therefore, the struggle against terrorism involves more than the new security measures I have ordered and the others I am seeking. Ultimately, it requires the confident will of the American people to retain our convictions for freedom and peace and to remain the indispensable force in creating a better world at the dawn of a new century. SOURCE: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1996/html/Dispatchv 7no32.html

President William Jefferson Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, August 20, 1998 Good afternoon. Today I ordered our Armed Forces to strike at terroristrelated facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security. I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why it was necessary. Our target was terror; our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Usama bin Ladin, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today. The groups associated with him come from diverse places but share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against. A few months ago, and again this week, bin Ladin publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America, saying, and I quote, ‘‘We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They’re all targets.’’ Their mission is murder and their history is bloody. In recent years, they killed American, Belgian, and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747’s over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt.

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The most recent terrorist events are fresh in our memory. Two weeks ago, 12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded, when our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the bin Ladin terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned, financed, and carried out by the organization bin Ladin leads. America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we’ve used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific. We have quietly disrupted terrorist groups and foiled their plots. We have isolated countries that practice terrorism. We’ve worked to build an international coalition against terror. But there have been and will be times when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens. With compelling evidence that the bin Ladin network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedomloving people, I decided America must act. And so this morning, based on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, I ordered our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the bin Ladin network. Earlier today the United States carried out simultaneous strikes against terrorist facilities and infrastructure in Afghanistan. Our forces targeted one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It contained key elements of the bin Ladin network’s infrastructure and has served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe. We have reason to believe that a gathering of key terrorist leaders was to take place there today, thus underscoring the urgency of our actions. Our forces also attacked a factory in Sudan associated with the bin Ladin network. The factory was involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons. The United States does not take this action lightly. Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens. I want you to understand, I want the world to understand that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world, including the United States. No religion condones the murder of innocent men, women, and children. But our actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness and in so doing profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act. … [O]f this I am also sure: The risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact. In this case,

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we knew before our attack that these groups already had planned further actions against us and others. I want to reiterate: The United States wants peace, not conflict. We want to lift lives around the world, not take them. We have worked for peace in Bosnia, in Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in the Middle East, and elsewhere. But in this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism. Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets; there will be no sanctuary for terrorists; we will defend our people, our interests, and our values; we will help people of all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence. We will persist, and we will prevail. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid¼54799

President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly United Nations, New York, New York, September 21, 1998 EXCERPTED Today, I would like to talk to you about why all nations must put the fight against terrorism at the top of our agenda. Obviously this is a matter of profound concern to us. In the last 15 years our citizens have been targeted over and over again—in Beirut, over Lockerbie, in Saudi Arabia, at home in Oklahoma City by one of our own citizens, and even here in New York in one of our most public buildings, and most recently on August 7th in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where Americans who devoted their lives to building bridges between nations, people very much like all of you, died in a campaign of hatred against the United States. Because we are blessed to be a wealthy nation with a powerful military and a worldwide presence active in promoting peace and security, we are often a target. We love our country for its dedication to political and religious freedom, to economic opportunity, to respect for the rights of the individual. But we know many people see us as a symbol of a system and values they reject, and often they find it expedient to blame us for problems with deep roots elsewhere. But we are no threat to any peaceful nation, and we believe the best way to disprove these claims is to continue our work for peace and prosperity around the world. For us to pull back from the world’s trouble spots, to turn our backs on those taking risks for peace, to weaken our own opposition to terrorism, would hand the enemies of peace a victory they must never have. Still, it is a grave misconception to see terrorism as only, or even mostly, an American problem. Indeed, it is a clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies and innocent people everywhere. No one in this room, nor the people you represent, are immune. Certainly not the people of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. For every American killed there, roughly 20 Africans were murdered and 500 more injured—innocent

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people going about their business on a busy morning. Not the people of Omagh in Northern Ireland, where the wounded and killed were Catholics and Protestants alike, mostly children and women, and two of them pregnant, people out shopping together, when their future was snuffed out by a fringe group clinging to the past. Not the people of Japan who were poisoned by sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. Not the people of Argentina who died when a car bomb decimated a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. Not the people of Kashmir and Sri Lanka killed by ancient animosities that cry out for resolution. Not the Palestinians and Israelis who still die year after year for all the progress toward peace. Not the people of Algeria enduring the nightmare of unfathomable terror with still no end in sight. Not the people of Egypt, who nearly lost a second President to assassination. Not the people of Turkey, Colombia, Albania, Russia, Iran, Indonesia, and countless other nations where innocent people have been victimized by terror. … Some argue, of course, that the problem is overblown, saying that the number of deaths from terrorism is comparatively small, sometimes less than the number of people killed by lightning in a single year. I believe that misses the point in several ways. First, terrorism has a new face in the 1990s. Today terrorists take advantage of greater openness and the explosion of information and weapons technology. The new technologies of terror and their increasing availability, along with the increasing mobility of terrorists, raise chilling prospects of vulnerability to chemical, biological, and other kinds of attacks, bringing each of us into the category of possible victim. This is a threat to all humankind. Beyond the physical damage of each attack, there is an even greater residue of psychological damage—hard to measure, but slow to heal. Every bomb, every bomb threat has an insidious effect on free and open institutions, the kinds of institutions all of you in this body are working so hard to build. Each time an innocent man or woman or child is killed, it makes the future more hazardous for the rest of us. For each violent act saps the confidence that is so crucial to peace and prosperity. In every corner of the world, with the active support of U.N. agencies, people are struggling to build better futures, based on bonds of trust connecting them to their fellow citizens and with partners and investors from around the world. The glimpse of growing prosperity in Northern Ireland was a crucial factor in the Good Friday Agreement. But that took confidence—confidence that cannot be bought in times of violence. We can measure each attack and the grisly statistics of dead and wounded, but what are the wounds we cannot measure? In the Middle East, in Asia, in South America, how many agreements have been thwarted after bombs blew up? How many businesses will never be created in places crying out for investments of time and money? How many talented young people in countries represented here have turned their backs on public service? The question is not only how many lives have been lost in each attack, but how many futures were lost in their aftermath. There is no justification for

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killing innocents. Ideology, religion, and politics, even deprivation and righteous grievance do not justify it. We must seek to understand the roiled waters in which terror occurs; of course we must. Often, in my own experience, I have seen where peace is making progress, terror is a desperate act to turn back the tide of history. The Omagh bombing came as peace was succeeding in Northern Ireland. In the Middle East, whenever we get close to another step toward peace, its enemies respond with terror. We must not let this stall our momentum. The bridging of ancient hatreds is, after all, a leap of faith, a break with the past, and thus a frightening threat to those who cannot let go of their own hatred. Because they fear the future, in these cases terrorists seek to blow the peacemakers back into the past. We must also acknowledge that there are economic sources of this rage as well. Poverty, inequality, masses of disenfranchised young people are fertile fields for the siren call of the terrorists and their claims of advancing social justice. But depravation cannot justify destruction, nor can inequity ever atone for murder. The killing of innocents is not a social program. Nevertheless, our resolute opposition to terrorism does not mean we can ever be indifferent to the conditions that foster it. The most recent U.N. human development report suggests the gulf is widening between the world’s haves and have-nots. We must work harder to treat the sources of despair before they turn into the poison of hatred … Some people believe that terrorism’s principal fault line centers on what they see as an inevitable clash of civilizations. It is an issue that deserves a lot of debate in this great hall. Specifically, many believe there is an inevitable clash between Western civilization and Western values, and Islamic civilizations and values. I believe this view is terribly wrong. False prophets may use and abuse any religion to justify whatever political objectives they have—even coldblooded murder. Some may have the world believe that almighty God himself, the merciful, grants a license to kill. But that is not our understanding of Islam. A quarter of the world’s population is Muslim—from Africa to Middle East to Asia and to the United States, where Islam is one of our fastest growing faiths. There are over 1,200 mosques and Islamic centers in the United States, and the number is rapidly increasing. The 6 million Americans who worship there will tell you there is no inherent clash between Islam and America. Americans respect and honor Islam. As I talked to Muslim leaders in my country and around the world, I see again that we share the same hopes and aspirations: to live in peace and security, to provide for our children, to follow the faith of our choosing, to build a better life than our parents knew and pass on brighter possibilities to our own children. Of course, we are not identical. There are important differences that cross race and culture and religion which demand understanding and deserve respect. When it comes to terrorism there should be no dividing line between Muslims and Jews, Protestants and Catholics, Serbs and Albanians, developed societies and emerging countries. The only dividing line is between those who practice, support, or tolerate terror, and those who understand that it is murder, plain and simple.

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If terrorism is at the top of the American agenda—and should be at the top of the world’s agenda—what, then, are the concrete steps we can take together to protect our common destiny. What are our common obligations? At least, I believe they are these: to give terrorists no support, no sanctuary, no financial assistance; to bring pressure on states that do; to act together to step up extradition and prosecution; to sign the Global Anti-Terror Conventions; to strengthen the Biological Weapons and Chemical Convention; to enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention; to promote stronger domestic laws and control the manufacture and export of explosives; to raise international standards for airport security; to combat the conditions that spread violence and despair. We are working to do our part. Our intelligence and law enforcement communities are tracking terrorist networks in cooperation with other governments. Some of those we believe responsible for the recent bombing of our embassies have been brought to justice. Early this week I will ask our Congress to provide emergency funding to repair our embassies, to improve security, to expand the worldwide fight against terrorism, to help our friends in Kenya and Tanzania with the wounds they have suffered. But no matter how much each of us does alone, our progress will be limited without our common efforts. We also will do our part to address the sources of despair and alienation through the Agency for International Development in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in Haiti and elsewhere. We will continue our strong support for the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees, UNICEF, the World Bank, the World Food Program. In closing, let me urge all of us to think in new terms on terrorism, to see it not as a clash of cultures or political action by other means, or a divine calling, but a clash between the forces of the past and the forces of the future, between those who tear down and those who build up, between hope and fear, chaos and community. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼54944&st¼openingþ sessionþofþthe&st1¼

President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks at the Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing 10th Anniversary Observance, Arlington, Virginia, December 21, 1998 Even though it is painful today to remember what happened 10 years ago, it is necessary, necessary to remember that the people on that plane were students coming home for the holidays, tourists going on vacation in America, families looking forward to a long-awaited reunion, business people on a routine flight. Their average age was just 27. Last week in the annual report on the condition of the health of the American people, the average life expectancy of Americans has now exceeded 76; their average age was 27. Beneath them, the people of Lockerbie were sitting down to supper on a quiet winter evening. And of course, we have already heard the names; those of you who loved them have relived their lives in that awful moment.

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Now, for 10 years, you have cherished your memories, and you have lived with the thought, I’m sure, of what might have been. You have also, for 10 years, been steadfast in your determination to stand against terrorism and to demand justice. And people all around the world have stood with you, shared your outrage, admired your fellowship with one another, and watched with awed respect your determined campaign for justice. Although 10 years or 20 or 30 or 50 may never be long enough for the sorrow to fade, we pray it will not be too long now before the wait for justice and resolution is over. I know I speak for every American citizen when I say a simple, humble, heartfelt thank-you for all you have done to keep the memory and spirit of your loved ones alive by the memorials you have built, the scholarships you have funded, the charities you have supported. We thank you for reaching out to one another, to the people of Lockerbie, to all others who have been victims of terrorism. We thank you for helping to strengthen the resolve of nations to defeat terror, to deny safe haven to terrorists, to isolate those who sponsor them. We thank you for working to improve security for air travelers and for all the lives your work has saved. We thank you for your determination to see that things that are good and meaningful and lasting come out of your overpowering tragedy. And we thank you for not letting the world forget that it is necessary and right to pursue the perpetrators of this crime, no matter how long it takes. I thank you for what you have done to drive me to work harder on your behalf, not just the imperative of fighting terror but the passion and commitment and conviction of the families who have spoken to me and to the members of my administration, who all remind us this cannot be considered a mere misfortune; this was deliberate murder. And while all of us have to strive for reconciliation in our hearts, we must also pursue justice and accountability. … [N]one of us want to live in a world where such violence goes unpunished and people can kill with impunity. And none of us will be safe as long as there is a single place on our planet where terrorists can find sanctuary. That is why our Nation has never given up the search for justice. For 10 years we have ensured that Libya cannot be a member of the international community until it turns over suspects in this case. That is why, in late August, after speaking with many of you, we put forward the initiative which has already been referred to: try the two suspects before a Scottish court sitting in The Netherlands. Since then the Libyan leader, Mr. Qadhafi, has given us mixed signals. We believe there is still some possibility he will accept our offer. That would be the best outcome, for it would mean that finally there would be a trial. But let me be absolutely clear to all of you: Our policy is not to trust Mr. Qadhafi’s claims; it is to test them. This is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We will not negotiate its terms. If the suspects are convicted, they will serve their time in Scotland. And if the suspects are not turned over by the time of the next sanctions review, we will work at the United Nations with our allies and friends to seek yet stronger measures against Libya. In doing so, we will count on the support of all nations that counseled us to make this proposal in the first place. If

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the proposal fails, all should make clear that the responsibility falls on Mr. Qadhafi alone. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼55439&st¼panþamþ flight&st1¼

President William Jefferson Clinton, ‘‘On Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century,’’ Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1999 In the struggle to defend our people and values and to advance them wherever possible, we confront threats both old and new—open borders and revolutions in technology have spread the message and the gifts of freedom but have also given new opportunities to freedom’s enemies. Scientific advances have opened the possibility of longer, better lives. They have also given the enemies of freedom new opportunities. The United States has mounted an aggressive response to terrorism—tightening security for our diplomats, our troops, our air travelers, improving our ability to track terrorist activity, enhancing cooperation with other countries, strengthening sanctions on nations that support terrorists. Since 1993, we have tripled funding for FBI anti-terrorist efforts. Our agents and prosecutors, with excellent support from our intelligence agencies, have done extraordinary work in tracking down perpetrators of terrorist acts and bringing them to justice. And as our air strikes against Afghanistan—or against the terrorist camps in Afghanistan—last summer showed, we are prepared to use military force against terrorists who harm our citizens. But all of you know the fight against terrorism is far from over. And now, terrorists seek new tools of destruction. Last May, at the Naval Academy commencement,3 I said terrorist and outlaw states are extending the world’s fields of battle, from physical space to cyberspace, from our earth’s vast bodies of water to the complex workings of our own human bodies. The enemies of peace realize they cannot defeat us with traditional military means. So they are working on two new forms of assault, which you’ve heard about today: cyber attacks on our critical computer systems, and attacks with weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, potentially even nuclear weapons. We must be ready—ready if our adversaries try to use computers to disable power grids, banking, communications and transportation networks, police, fire and health services—or military assets. More and more, these critical systems are driven by, and linked together with, computers, making them more vulnerable to disruption. Last spring, we saw the enormous impact of a single failed electronic link, when a satellite malfunctioned—disabled pagers, ATMs, credit card systems and television networks all around the world. And we already are seeing the first wave of deliberate cyber attacks—hackers break into government and business computers, 3

See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼56012&st¼navalþ academy&st1¼.

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stealing and destroying information, raiding bank accounts, running up credit card charges, extorting money by threats to unleash computer viruses. The potential for harm is clear.… We have to be ready for adversaries to launch attacks that could paralyze utilities and services across entire regions. We must be ready if adversaries seek to attack with weapons of mass destruction, as well. Armed with these weapons, which can be compact and inexpensive, a small band of terrorists could inflict tremendous harm. Four years ago, though, the world received a wake-up call when a group unleashed a deadly chemical weapon, nerve gas, in the Tokyo subway. We have to be ready for the possibility that such a group will obtain biological weapons. We have to be ready to detect and address a biological attack promptly, before the disease spreads. If we prepare to defend against these emerging threats we will show terrorists that assaults on America will accomplish nothing but their own downfall. Let me say first what we have done so far to meet this challenge. We’ve been working to create and strengthen the agreement to keep nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, because this can help keep these weapons away from terrorists, as well. We’re working to ensure the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; to obtain an accord that will strengthen compliance with the biological weapons convention; to end production of nuclear weapons material. We must ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to end nuclear tests once and for all. As I proposed Tuesday in the State of the Union Address,4 we should substantially increase our efforts to help Russia and other former Soviet nations prevent weapons material and knowledge from falling into the hands of terrorists and outlaw states. But we cannot rely solely on our efforts to keep weapons from spreading. We have to be ready to act if they do spread. Last year, I obtained from Congress a 39 percent budget increase for chemical and biological weapons preparedness. This is helping to accelerate our ongoing effort to train and equip fire, police and public health personnel all across our country to deal with chemical and biological emergencies. It is helping us to ready armed forces and National Guard units in every region to meet this challenge; and to improve our capacity to detect an outbreak of disease and save lives; to create the first ever civilian stockpile of medicines to treat people exposed to biological and chemical hazards; to increase research and development on new medicines and vaccines to deal with new threats. … [O]ur commitment on the cyber front has been strong, as well. We’ve created special offices within the FBI and the Commerce Department to protect critical systems against cyber attack. We’re building partnerships with the private sector to find and reduce vulnerabilities; to improve warning systems; to rapidly recover if attacks occur … Today, I want to announce the new initiatives we will take, to take us to the next level in preparing for these emerging threats. In my budget, I will ask Congress for $10 billion to address terrorism and terrorist-emerging tools. This will include nearly $1.4 billion to protect citizens against chemical and 4

See http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/01/19/sotu.transcript/.

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biological terror—more than double what we spent on such programs only two years ago. We will speed and broaden our efforts, creating new local emergency medical teams, employing in the field portable detection units the size of a shoe box to rapidly identify hazards; tying regional laboratories together for prompt analysis of biological threats. We will greatly accelerate research and development, centered in the Department of Health and Human Services, for new vaccines, medicines and diagnostic tools. I should say here that I know everybody in this crowd understands this, but everyone in America must understand this: the government has got to fund this. There is no market for the kinds of things we need to develop; and if we are successful, there never will be a market for them. But we have got to do our best to develop them. These cutting-edge efforts will address not only the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but also the equally serious danger of emerging infectious diseases. So we will benefit even if we are successful in avoiding these attacks. The budget proposal will also include $1.46 billion to protect critical systems from cyber and other attacks. That’s 40 percent more than we were spending two years ago. Among other things, it will help to fund four new initiatives. First, an intensive research effort to detect intruders trying to break into critical computer systems. Second, detection networks, first for our Defense Department, and later for other key agencies so when one critical computer system is invaded, others will be alerted instantly. And we will urge the private sector to create similar structures. Third, the creation of information centers in the private sector so that our industries can work together and with government to address cyber threats. Finally, we’ll ask for funding to bolster the government’s ranks of highly skilled computer experts—people capable of preventing and responding to computer crises. In all our battles, we will be aggressive. At the same time I want you to know that we will remain committed to uphold privacy rights and other constitutional protections, as well as the proprietary rights of American businesses. It is essential that we do not undermine liberty in the name of liberty … I have tried as hard as I can to create the right frame of mind in America for dealing with this. For too long the problem has been that not enough has been done to recognize the threat and deal with it. And we in government, frankly, weren’t as well organized as we should have been for too long. I do not want the pendulum to swing the other way now, and for people to believe that every incident they read about in a novel or every incident they see in a thrilling movie is about to happen to them within the next 24 hours. What we are seeing here, as any military person in the audience can tell you, is nothing more than a repetition of weapons systems that goes back to the beginning of time. An offensive weapons system is developed, and it takes time to develop the defense. And then another offensive weapon is developed that overcomes that defense, and then another defense is built up—as surely as castles and moats held off people with spears and bows and arrows and riding horses, and the catapult was developed to overcome the castle and the moat.

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But because of the speed with which change is occurring in our society— in computing technology, and particularly in the biological sciences—we have got to do everything we can to make sure that we close the gap between offense and defense to nothing, if possible. That is the challenge here. We are doing everything we can, in ways that I can and in ways that I cannot discuss, to try to stop people who would misuse chemical and biological capacity from getting that capacity. This is not a cause for panic—it is a cause for serious, deliberate, disciplined, long-term concern. And I am absolutely convinced that if we maintain our clear purpose and our strength of will, we will prevail here … But we must be deliberate, and we must be aggressive. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼57688&st¼&st1¼ EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see President Clinton’s Remarks at the Opening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit in Istanbul, November 18, 1999 (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56952&st=&st1¼).

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH President George W. Bush, Remarks to Troops and Personnel, Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, February 13, 2001 EXCERPTED Because America, NATO and our allies have made the world more secure, we have an opportunity today given to few nations in history, to prepare for the future, to think anew. Eleven years after the Cold War, we are in a time of transition and testing, when it will be decided what dangers draw near or pass away, what tragedies are invited or averted. We must use this time well. We must seize this moment. First, we must prepare our nations against the dangers of a new era. The grave threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. It has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder to answer. And the adversaries seeking these tools of terror are less predictable, more diverse. With advance technology, we must confront the threats that come on a missile. With shared intelligence and enforcement, we must confront the threats that come in a shipping container or in a suitcase. We have no higher priority than the defense of our people against terrorist attack. To succeed, America knows we must work with our allies. We did not prevail together in the Cold War only to go our separate ways, pursuing separate plans with separate technologies. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼45992&st¼norfolk& st1¼

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President George W. Bush, Remarks to Central Intelligence Employees, Langley, Virginia, March 20, 2001 EXCERPTED I was also struck by the contrast between today’s world and the world as it looked 25 years ago, when my dad was the DCI. To say that a lot has changed is an understatement. Back then, America faced an over-arching threat and everything we did, from strategy to resource allocation, was oriented to defending against that threat. Today, that single threat has been replaced by new and different threats, sometimes hard to define and defend against; threats such as terrorism, information warfare, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Back then, freedom was in peril. Today, freedom is taking root in more and more lands around the world. In retrospect, the world of 1976 looks staid and static compared to the revolutions of change that characterize our times. But what hasn’t changed, what isn’t different is the fact that sound intelligence is still critically important to America’s national security. The challenges are new, but we still need your work to help us meet them. The opportunities are new, but we need your help to take advantage of them. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼45788&st¼Centralþ Intelligence&st1¼

President George W. Bush, Statement on Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, May 8, 2001 Protecting America’s homeland and citizens from the threat of weapons of mass destruction is one of our Nation’s important national security challenges. Today, more nations possess chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons than ever before. Still others seek to join them. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states—states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. Some non-state terrorist groups have also demonstrated an interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Against this backdrop, it is clear that the threat of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons being used against the United States—while not immediate—is very real. That is why our Nation actively seeks to deny chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to those seeking to acquire them. That is why, together with our allies, we seek to deter anyone who would contemplate their use. And that is also why we must ensure that our Nation is prepared to defend against the harm they can inflict. Should our efforts to reduce the threat to our country from weapons of mass destruction be less than fully successful, prudence dictates that the United States be fully prepared to deal effectively with the consequences of such a weapon being used here on our soil. Today, numerous Federal departments and agencies have programs to deal with the consequences of a potential use of a chemical, biological, radiological,

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or nuclear weapon in the United States. Many of these Federal programs offer training, planning, and assistance to state and local governments. But to maximize their effectiveness, these efforts need to be seamlessly integrated, harmonious, and comprehensive. Therefore, I have asked Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort so that we may do the very best possible job of protecting our people from catastrophic harm. I have also asked Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal agencies. The Office of National Preparedness will work closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment needs are addressed. FEMA will also work closely with the Department of Justice, in its lead role for crisis management, to ensure that all facets of our response to the threat from weapons of mass destruction are coordinated and cohesive. I will periodically chair a meeting of the National Security Council to review these efforts. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼45592&st¼weaponsþ ofþmassþdestruction&st1¼

President George W. Bush, Joint Press Conference with President Jose Maria Aznar, Moncloa Palace, Madrid, Spain, June 12, 2001 I look forward to making my case, as I did today over lunch, about missile defense. It starts with explaining to Russia and our European friends and allies that Russia is not the enemy of the United States; that the attitude of mutually-assured destruction is a relic of the Cold War, and that we must address the new threats of the 21st century if we’re to have a peaceful continent and a peaceful world. Those new threats are terrorism, based upon the capacity of some countries to develop weapons of mass destruction, and therefore, hold the United States and our friends hostage. It is so important we think differently in order to address those threats. SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼45848&st¼&st1¼

President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President and the Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon During Photo Opportunity at the Oval Office, June 26, 2001 Q. Mr. President, you said that we should be realistic. Don’t you think it’s a price for terrorists, for terrorism, if right now the United States will force

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Israel to begin the cooling-off period? We see that in the field the hostilities continue. The President: Any terror is too much terror. Any death is too much death. We recognize that. And we recognize the pressure that the Prime Minister is under. And we condemn terror. We condemn violence. We condemn death. We also believe progress is being made. If you look at—yes, there’s violence; yes, there’s terror, but it’s being isolated, it’s beginning to—contained. Can the parties do more? Absolutely. And that’s what the Secretary of State is going to do, is to urge Mr. Arafat to do more, to take better control of his security forces. We’re going to talk to the Prime Minister about his attitudes. We’re friends, and I believe that what’s important from this perspective is not to let the progress that’s been made so far to break apart. We cannot let violence take hold. And so that’s why I’ve said I admire the Prime Minister’s restraint and his patience. I understand the difficulties and the pressures. As he just said, five Israeli lives lost is [the] equivalent of 250—five is too many. But nevertheless, progress is being made. And it’s essential that we continue the process and continue the progress that’s being made. We’re gaining by inches, I recognize. Progress is in inches, not in miles. But, nevertheless, an inch is better than nothing. And so, therefore, this administration is committed to working with the parties. We urge people in the region … to stop the violence. And that’s first and foremost. You know, it’s—either you’re an optimist in life, or not. And I’m optimistic that we can get—start the process of Mitchell at some point in time. Q. But, Mr. Prime Minister— Prime Minister Sharon: … Yesterday we had 16 terror attacks, and that included multi-fire, it included side bombs, it included shooting and sniping. We had 10 wounded. So all together, generally speaking, maybe there are less, but still terror is going on. And by now, though I would like very much to hear that Chairman Arafat instructed to re-arrest those terrorists which are planning and sending and mobilizing those suiciders, he has not done it yet. He has not instructed to arrest them and they were not arrested. And beside that, he has not instructed yet to stop incitement. And that, of course, he could do—I would say he could have done it immediately … SOURCE: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid¼45848&st¼&st1¼

3 Department of State and Department of Defense SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s,’’ Statement Before the Trilateral Commission, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1984 Over 20 years ago, President John Kennedy pledged that the United States would ‘‘pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.’’ We know now that the scope of that commitment is too broad—though the selfconfidence and courage in those words were typically American and most admirable. More recently, another administration took the view that our fear of communism was ‘‘inordinate’’ and that there were very complicated social, economic, religious, and other factors at work in the world that we had little ability to affect. This, in my view, is a counsel of helplessness that substantially underestimates the United States and its ability to influence events. Somewhere between these two poles lies the natural and sensible scope of American foreign policy. We know that we are not omnipotent and that we must set priorities. We cannot pay any price or bear any burden. We must discriminate; we must be prudent and careful; we must respond in ways appropriate to the challenge and engage our power only when very important strategic stakes are involved. Not every situation can be salvaged by American exertion even when important values or interests are at stake. At the same time, we know from history that courage and vision and determination can change reality. We can affect events, and we all know it. The American people expect this of their leaders. And the future of the free world depends on it. Americans, being moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being practical people, also want their foreign policy to be effective. If we truly care about our values, we must be prepared to defend them and advance them. Thus we as a nation are perpetually asking ourselves how to reconcile our morality and our practical sense,

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how to pursue noble goals in a complex and imperfect world, how to relate our strength to our purposes—in sum, how to relate power and diplomacy. We meet this evening amid the excitement of America’s quadrennial exercise of self-renewal, in which we as a country reexamine ourselves and our international objectives. It is an unending process—almost as unending as the presidential campaign season. But there are some constants in our policy, such as our alliance with the industrial democracies, as embodied in this distinguished gathering. This partnership—the cornerstone of our foreign policy for 35 years—itself reflects our ability to combine our moral commitment to democracy and our practical awareness of the crucial importance of maintaining the global balance of power. So I consider this an appropriate forum at which to share some thoughts on the relationship between power and diplomacy in the last two decades of the 20th century. The World We Face By the accident of history, the role of the world leadership fell to the United States just at the moment when the old international order had been destroyed by two world wars but no new stable system had developed to replace it. A century ago, the international system was centered on Europe and consisted of only a few major players. Today in terms of military strength, the dominant countries are two major powers that had been, in one sense or another, on the edge or outside European diplomacy. But economic power is now widely dispersed. Asia is taking on increasing significance. The former colonial empires have been dismantled, and there are now more than 160 independent nations on the world scene. Much of the developing world itself is torn by a continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism. Most of the major international conflicts since 1945 have taken place there—from Korea to Vietnam to the Middle East to Central America. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues to exploit nuclear fear as a political weapon and to exploit instabilities wherever they have the opportunity to do so. On a planet grown smaller because of global communications, grown more turbulent because of the diffusion of power—all the while overshadowed by nuclear weapons—the task of achieving stability, security, and progress is a profound challenge for mankind. In an age menaced by nuclear proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism, tendencies toward anarchy are bound to be a source of real dangers. It is absurd to think that America can walk away from these problems. This a world of great potential instability and great potential danger. There is no safety in isolation. We have a major, direct stake in the health of the world economy; our prosperity, our security, and our alliances can be affected by threats to security in many parts of the world; and the fate of our fellow human beings will always impinge on moral consciousness. Certainly the United States is not the world’s policeman. But we are the world’s strongest free nation, and therefore, the preservation of our values, our principles, and our hopes for a better world rests in great measure, inevitably, on our shoulders.

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Power and Diplomacy In this environment, our principle goal is what President Reagan has called ‘‘the most basic duty that any President and any people share—the duty to protect and strengthen peace.’’ History teaches, however, that peace is not achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim must always be to shape events and not be the victims of events. In the fast moving and turbulent world, to sit in a reactive posture is to risk being overwhelmed or to allow others, who may not wish us well, to decide the world’s future. The Great Seal of the United States, as you know shows the American eagle, clutching arrows in one claw and olive branches in the other. Some of you may have seen the Great Seal on some of the china or other antique objects in the White House or in the ceremonial rooms on the eighth floor of the State Department. On some of the older items, the eagle looks toward the arrows, on others, toward the olive branches. It was President Truman who set it straight; he saw to it that the eagle always looked toward the olive branches—showing that America sought peace. But the eagle still holds onto those arrows. This is the way of saying that our forefathers understood quite [well] that power and diplomacy always go together. It is even clearer today that a world of peace and security will not come about without exertion or without facing up to some tough choices. Certainly power must always be guided by purpose, but the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual. That is why, for example, the United States has succeeded many times in its mediation when many other well-intentioned mediators have failed. Leverage, as well as good will, is required. Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct alternatives. To take a very recent example, the Long commission report on the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut urged that we work harder to pursue what is spoken of as ‘‘diplomatic alternatives,’’ as opposed to ‘‘military operations.’’ This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding—not only of our intensive diplomatic efforts throughout the period but of the relationship between power and diplomacy. Sometimes, regrettable as it may be, political conflict degenerates into a test of strength. It was precisely our military role in Lebanon that was problematical, not our diplomatic exertion. Our military role was hamstrung by legislative and other inhibitions; the Syrians were not interested in diplomatic compromise so long as the prospect of hegemony was not foreclosed. They could judge from our domestic debate that our staying power was limited. In arms control, also, successful negotiation depends on the perception of a military balance. Only if the Soviet leaders see the West as determined to modernize its own forces will they see an incentive to negotiate agreements establishing equal, verifiable, and lower levels of armaments. The lesson is that power and diplomacy are not alternatives. They must go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world. The relationship between them is a complex one, and it presents us with both practical and moral issues. Let me address a few of those issues. One is

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the variety of the challenges we face. A second is the moral complexity of our response. A third is a problem managing the process in a democracy. The Range of Challenges Perhaps because [of] our long isolation from the turmoil of world politics, Americans have tended to believe that war and peace, too, were two totally distinct phenomena: we were in a blissful state of peace or else (as in World Wars I and II) we embarked on an all-out quest for total victory, after which we wanted to retreat back into inward-looking innocence, avoiding ‘‘power politics’’ and all it represented. During World War II, while single-mindedly seeking the unconditional surrender of our enemies, we paid too little heed to the emerging postwar balance of power. Similarly, since 1945 we have experienced what we saw as a period of clearcut cold war, relived by a period of seeming d´etente, which raised exaggerated expectations in some quarters. Today we must see the East-West relationship as more complex, with the two sides engaging in trade and pursuing arms control even as they pursue incompatible aims. It is not as crisis prone or starkly confrontational as the old cold war; but neither is it normal relationship of peace or comfortable coexistence. Thus in the 1980s and beyond, most likely we will never see a state of total war or a state of total peace. We face instead a spectrum of often ambiguous challenges to our interests. We are relatively well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our Western European and Japanese allies; that’s why these are the least likely contingencies. But, day in and day out, we will continue to see a wide range of conflicts that fall in a gray area between major war and millennial peace. The coming can be counted upon to generate their share of crises and local outbreaks of violence. Some of them—not all of them—will affect our interests. Terrorism—particularly state-sponsored terrorism—is already a contemporary weapon directed at America’s interests, America’s values, and America’s allies. We must be sure we are as well prepared and organized for this intermediate range of challenges. If we are to protect our interests, values, and allies, we must be engaged. And our power must be engaged. It is often said that the lesson of Vietnam is that the United States should not engage in military conflict without a clear and precise military mission, solid public backing, and enough resources to finish the job. This is undeniably true. But does it mean there are no situations where a discrete assertion of power is needed or appropriate for limited purposes? Unlikely. Whether it is crisis management or power projection or a show force or peacekeeping or a localized military action, there will always be instances that fall short of an all-out national commitment on the scale of World War II. The need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that [we] turn automatically away from hardto-win situations that call for prudent involvement. These will always involve risks; we will not always have the luxury of being able to choose the most advantageous circumstances. And our adversaries can be expected to play rough. The Soviets are students of Clasusewitz, who taught that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is highly unlikely that we can respond to

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gray-area challenges without adapting power to political circumstances or on the psychologically satisfying, all-or-nothing basis. This is just not the kind of reality we are likely to be facing in the 1980s, or 1990s, or beyond. Few cases will be as clear or as quick as Grenada. On the contrary, most other cases will be a lot tougher. We have no choice, moreover, but to address ourselves boldly to the challenge of terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism is really a form of warfare. Motivated by ideology and political hostility, it is a weapon of unconventional war against democratic societies, taking advantage of the openness of these societies. How do we combat this challenge? Certainly we must take security precautions to protect our people and our facilities; certainly we must strengthen our intelligence capabilities to alter ourselves to the threats. But it is increasingly doubtful that a purely passive strategy can even begin to cope with the problem. This raises a host of questions for a free society: in what circumstances—and how should we respond? When—and how—should we take preventive and preemptive action against known terrorist groups? What evidence do we insist upon before taking such steps? As the threat mounts—and as the involvement of such countries as Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea has become more and more evident—then it is more and more appropriate that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against terrorism. Once it becomes established that terrorism works—that it achieves its political objectives—its practitioners will be bolder, and the threat to us will be all the greater. The Moral Issues Of course, any use of force involves moral issues. American military power should be resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. If we do, the world’s future will be determined by others—most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to our deeply held principles. The New Republic stated it well a few ago: [T]he American people know that the force and the threat of force are central to the foreign policy or our adversaries and they expect their President to be able to deter and defeat such tactics.

As we hear now in the debate over military aid to Central America, those who shrink from engagement can always find an alibi for inactions. Often is takes the form of close scrutiny of any moral defects in the friend or ally who we are proposing to assist. Or it is argued that the conflict has deep social and economic origins which we really have to address first before we have a right to do anything else. But rather than remain engaged in order to tackle these problems—as we are trying to do—some people turn these concerns into formulas for abdication, formulas that would allows the enemies of freedom to decide the outcome. To me, it is highly immoral to let friends who depend on us be subjugated by brute force if we have the capacity to prevent it.

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There is, in addition, another ugly residue of our Vietnam debate: the notion, in some quarters, that America is the guilty party, that the use of our power is a source of evil and, therefore, the main task in foreign policy is to restrain America’s freedom to act. It is inconceivable to me that the American people believe any of this. It is certainly not President Reagan’s philosophy. Without being boastful or arrogant, the American people know that their country has been a powerful force for good in the world. We helped Europe and Asia—including defeated enemies—rebuild after the war and we helped provide a security shield behind which they could build democracy and freedom as well as prosperity. Americans have often died and sacrificed for the freedom of others. We have provided around $165 billion in economic assistance for the developing world. We have played a vital facilitating role in the Middle East peace process, in the unfolding diplomacy of southern Africa, as well as in many other diplomatic efforts around the globe. We have used our power for good and worthy ends. In Grenada, we helped restore self-determination to the people of Grenada, so that they could choose their own future. Some have tried to compare what we did in Grenada to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We welcome such comparison. Contrast, for example, the prospects for free elections in the two countries. In Grenada, they will be held this year; in Afghanistan, when? Contrast the number of American combat troops now in Grenada 5 months after the operation with the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan 55 months after their invasion. The number in Grenada is 0: the number in Afghanistan is over 100,000. More often, the issue is not the direct use of American military power but the military assistance to friends to help defend themselves. Around the world, security support for friends is a way to prevent crises; it bolsters our friends so they can deter challenges. And it is a way of avoiding the involvement of American forces, because it is only when our friends’ efforts in their own defense are being overwhelmed that we are faced with the agonizing decision whether to involve ourselves more directly. Security assistance is thus an essential tool of foreign policy. It is an instrument for deterring those who would impose their will by force and for making political solutions possible. It gets far less support in this country than it deserves. Central America is a good example. The real moral question in Central America is not do we believe in military solutions, but do we believe in ourselves? Do we believe that our security and the security of our neighbors has moral validity? Do we have faith in our democratic values? Do we believe that Marxist-Leninist solutions are antidemocratic and that we have a moral right to try to stop those who are trying to impose them by force? Sure, economic and social problems underlie many of these conflicts. But in El Salvador, the communists guerrillas are waging war directly against the economy, blowing up bridges and power stations, deliberately trying to wreck the country’s economy. The conflict in Central America is not a debate between social theorists; it is one of those situations I mentioned where the outcome of political competition will depend in large measure on the balance of military strength. In El Salvador, the United States is supporting moderates who believe in democracy and who are resisting the enemies of democracy on both the extreme right

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and the extreme left. If we withdrew our support, the moderates, caught in the crossfire, would be the first victims—as would be the cause of human rights and the prospects for economic development. Anyone who believes that military support for our friends isn’t crucial to a just outcome is living in a dream world. And anyone who believes that military support can be effective when it’s given an uncertain installment plan is not facing reality. Accountability Without Paralysis The third issue I want to mention is the question of how this country, as a democracy, conducts itself in the face of such challenges. Over the last 35 years, the evolution of the international system was bound to erode the predominant position the United States enjoyed immediately after World War II. But it seems to me that in this disorderly and dangerous new world, the loss of American predominance puts an event greater premium on consistency, determination, and coherence in the conduct of our foreign policy. We have less margin for error than we used to have. This change is our external circumstances, however, coincides historically with a kind of cultural revolution at home that has made it harder us to achieve the consistency, determination and coherence that we need. The last fifteen years left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action embedded permanently in our laws. At the same time, the diffusion of power within the Congress means that a president has a hard time when he wants to negotiate with the Congress, because congressional leaders have lost their dominance of the process and often cannot produce a consensus or sometimes even a decision. The net result, as you well know, is an enormous problem for American foreign policy—a loss of coherence and recurring uncertainty in the minds of friend and foe about the aims and constancy of the United States. Particularly in the war powers field, where direct use of our power is at issue, the stakes are high. Yet the war powers resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out. Our Commander in Chief is locked in battles at home at the same time he is trying to act effectively abroad. Under the resolution, even inaction by the Congress can force the president to remove American forces from an area of challenge, which, as former President Ford has put it, undermines the president even when the Congress can’t get up the courage to take a position. Such constraints on timely action may only invite greater challenges down the road. In Lebanon our adversaries’ perception that we lacked staying power undercut the prospects for successful negotiation. As the distinguished Majority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, said on the floor of the Senate 4 weeks ago: [W]e cannot continue to begin each military involvement abroad with a prolonged, tedious and divisive negotiations between the executive and the legislative branches of Government. The world and its many challenges to our interests simply do not allow us that luxury.

I do not propose changes in our constitutional system. But some legislative changes may be called for. And I propose, at a minimum, that all of us in both

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Congress and the executive branch exercise our prerogatives with a due regard to the national need for an effective foreign policy. Congress has the right, indeed the duty, to debate and criticize, to authorize and appropriate funds and share in setting the broad lines of policy. But micromanagement by a committee of 535 independent-minded individuals is a grossly inefficient and ineffective way to run any important enterprise. The fact is that depriving the President of flexibility weakens our country. Yet a host of restrictions on the President’s ability to act are not built into our laws and our procedures. Surely there is a better way for the President and the Congress to exercise their prerogatives without hobbling this country in the face of assaults on free-world interests abroad. Surely there can be accountability without paralysis. The sad truth is that many of our difficulties over the last 15 years have been selfimposed. The issue is fundamental. If the purpose of our power is to prevent war, or injustice, then ideally we can’t discourage such occurrences rather than have to use our power in a physical sense. But this can happen only if there is assurance that our power be used if necessary. A reputation for reliability becomes then, a major asset—giving friends a sense of security and adversaries a sense of caution. A reputation for living up to our commitments can, in fact, make it less likely that pledges of support will have to be carried out. Crisis management is most successful when a favorable outcome is attained without firing a shot. Credibility is an intangible, but is not less real. The same is true of a loss of credibility. A failure to support a friend always involves a price. Credibility, once lost, has to be re-earned. Facing the Future The dilemmas and the hard choices will not go away, no matter who is president. They are not partisan problems. Anyone who claims to have a simple answer is talking nonsense. The United States faces a time of challenge ahead as great as any in recent memory. We have a diplomacy that has moved toward peace through negotiations. We have rebuilt our strength so that we can defend our interests and dissuade others from violence. We have allies whom we value and respect. Our need is to recognize both our challenge and our potential. Americans are not timid people. A foreign policy worthy of America must not be a policy of isolationism or guilt but a commitment to active engagement. We can be proud of this country, of what it stands for, and what is has accomplished. Our morality should be a source of courage when we make hard decisions, not a set of excuses for self-paralysis. President Reagan declared to the British Parliament nearly 2 years ago: ‘‘We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and the universal right of all humans beings.’’ As long as Americans hold to this belief, we will be actively engaged in the world. We will use our power and our diplomatic skill in the service of peace and our ideals. We have our work cut out for us. But we will not shrink from our responsibility.

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Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies,’’ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 24, 1984 Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope. The distressing fact is that over these past five years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 such attacks, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and then the Marine barracks in Beirut. But around the world many of our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the Bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in the United Arab Emirates, and the Rangoon bombing of South Korean officials are just a few examples—not to mention the brutal attack on a West Jerusalem shopping mall this past April. Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past five years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the ‘‘League of Terror,’’ as full-fledge sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate— and not so indiscriminate—murder. Terrorists attacks supported by what Qadhafi calls the ‘‘holy alliance’’ of Libya, Syria and Iran, and attacks sponsored by North Korea and others, have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation. As a result, more of the world’s people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After five years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies. Nevertheless, these past five years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments, citizens, and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism in intellectual and in practical terms. I say intellectual because the first step toward a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem and then to understand its nature. In recent years we have learned a great deal about terrorism, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat international terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals. Armed with this knowledge we can focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat. We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we are able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

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The Anatomy of Terrorism Let me speak briefly about the anatomy of terrorism. What we have learned about terrorism, first of all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response must be twofold: we must deny them the means but above all we must deny them their goals. But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that covers a diverse array of methods, resources, instruments, and immediate aims. It appears in many shapes and sizes—from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center, to the small clandestine group that plans kidnappings and assassinations of public figures, to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population. Its stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. International drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that our responses will have to fit the precise character and circumstances of the specific threats. But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: with rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what all of us here are seeking to build. They’re a threat to democracy. The Threat to the Democracies The United States and its democratic allies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. In our foreign policies, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes change without violent conflict. We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all government, a world based on the rule of law. We know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom. Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even governing relations between adversaries. Conflict persists; but, with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted with certain restraints—indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned; the use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed; and most, but not all, nations have heeded those proscriptions. We all know that the world as it exists is still far from our ideal vision. But today, even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision—who, indeed, violently oppose it. For we must understand, above all, that terrorism is a form of political violence. Wherever it takes place, it is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies—against our most basic values and often our fundamental

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strategic interests. The values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies, or their religious beliefs by force. A terrorist has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of democratic society, and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy. And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike against us. Terrorists and Freedom Fighters The antagonism between democracy and terrorism seems so basic that it is hard to understand why so much intellectual confusion still exists on the subject. We have all heard the insidious claim that ‘‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’ Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson, who, Mr. Chairman, as you observed, is very much with us. The idea that one person’s ‘‘terrorist’’ is another’s ‘‘freedom fighter’’ cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘‘freedom’’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.

Where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is, again, its enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause; his deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance. The terrorist seeks to undermine institutions, to destroy popular faith in moderate government, and to shake the people’s belief in the very idea of democracy. in Lebanon, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has exploited existing tensions and attempted to prevent that nation from rebuilding its democratic institutions. Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people. Turkey faced such a challenge but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced; and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the widely and properly deplored ‘‘disappearances’’ of the 1970s were, in fact, part of a response—a deliberately provoked response—to a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they, too, must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat with the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist’s scheme to undermine civilized society.

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Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Remarks at the Luncheon in Honor of The Gulf Cooperation Council, U.N. Plaza Hotel, New York, New York, October 1, 1985 I have some prepared comments which I would like to read, which touch on the problem of escalating violence in the Middle East. But let me make a comment, first of all, about the Israeli raid in Tunisia. What I know about it at this point is really what I have learned as of about 9:00 o’clock this morning. I’ve been pretty much out of touch in various meetings, as you have, since then, so I don’t know what the facts are, and you hear many different reports. But we certainly deplore acts of violence in the region, including this act of violence. I fear that what we see always is, in a sense, a contest between the people who want to move toward peace and the people who are afraid of it. We all know there are people in all camps who don’t want to see a successful resolution, just as I believe most do want to see one. And so one act of violence touches off another, and there’s a pattern of escalation that goes on. And I think, myself, that we need to do two things: First of all, we need to be clear in our opposition to the acts of violence from whatever quarter they come, and without respect to what is the presumed rationale for them. And, second, we have to be clear in our minds that we will do everything we can to prevent violence from stopping efforts towards peace. Now, we know that most poignantly with King Hussein, who has taken some steps, and Prime Minister Peres who has responded in a similar way. But Jordan has been subjected to threats and actions which can only be attributed to the fact that King Hussein has taken some steps. We recognize that. And it is with that in mind that the President last week went ahead with the proposed arms transfer to Jordan because we feel it is in the—the King needs it, and we feel it is in the U.S. interests to support him. So I just want to be clear with everybody our attitude toward violence in the region, including this action, the dimensions of which are not known to me at this point, and I don’t want to comment on it until I know more. Obviously, from the Israeli standpoint, they conceive of it as a defensive move against the terrorist actions that they see taking place in Israel. But, as I say, I don’t want to make further comment until I know more precisely what has happened. Let me tell you what I had on my mind before this action took place, and you can see that it bears some resemblance. The recent weeks have seen an upswing in tension in the Gulf. Iraq has stepped up its attacks on Kharg Island, and they’ve been more effective. And Iranian naval forces are intensifying their so-called ‘‘visit, search and seizure’’ actions against third-country shipping. We hope that these developments do not threaten the security and stability of the countries in the area. Remarking on these incidents, the President, in his September 21 radio address, reiterated our determination to preserve the free shipment of oil through the Persian Gulf. The United States stands by its commitment to the right of international access to the Gulf and free transit passage of neutral shipping through the Straits of Hormuz. We take seriously any infringement on these rights and are ready to work with the GCC in areas such as joint contingency planning.

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The United States is willing to assist the GCC militarily, should its member states publicly request such aid and provide access to suitably facilities. As we have for the past five years, we urge both Iran and Iraq to seek an early, negotiated end to the conflict which has generated these understandable fears in the Gulf. And we feel at this point that it is Iran which does not seem to want to bring the war to an end, and for that reason we have undertaken quite comprehensive and reasonably successful efforts to try to stop arms sales to Iran. Despite our best efforts, terrorism continues to plague the international community. The tragic bombings in Kuwait against the Emir and innocent Kuwaitis enjoying a weekend outing, hijackings of Saudi and Kuwaiti aircraft, and attacks against GCC diplomats reinforce our desire to work with you to help eradicate terrorism. We value our exchanges on this issue and look forward to receiving key GCC personnel to study our training methods. Rest assured, however, that these multilateral efforts will not overshadow consultations between our individual governments on this important issue. I’m pleased that the United States and the GCC will soon begin informal exploratory talks on economic matters of mutual concern. Obviously, it’s too early to determine where such talks may eventually lead. However, we look upon these exchanges as an opportunity to develop a means for possible periodic consultations on a wide range of economic issues. We look forward to expanding the areas of cooperation that have long existed between us, and identifying new ones for our mutual benefit. Today the GCC represents a key force for progress and stability in the Gulf. As the GCC develops, it will naturally assume even greater responsibilities in regional affairs. Your friendship and our mutual beneficial relations are very important to us. We value them highly and my Government and I personally will work to preserve and enhance them. We look forward to dealing even more closely with the GCC as we do so. As you are well aware, this is the 40th Anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. At this historic time I hope that we can redouble our efforts to work together to solve the pressing issues which will come before the Assembly. It is a pleasure to be with you again, and I hope God will bless our efforts to achieve a more secure and peaceful future. I thank you very much.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, ‘‘The Struggle Against Terrorism,’’ Before the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, On the Occasion of Receiving the Joseph Prize for Human Rights, Palm Beach, Florida, February 12, 1988 From time to time, people—especially our friends abroad—have asked me what does human rights have to do with American foreign policy? Well, the answer is straightforward. Human rights are at the heart of our foreign policy because human rights are at the heart of our constitution as a nation. Last year, celebrating the Constitution’s bicentennial, President Reagan called our national charter a ‘‘covenant with all mankind.’’ America holds at the center of its values the worth and dignity of the individual. We are a great

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nation because we have never forgotten our faith in the unique value of every human being. And our public policy—if we are to be true to our selves—must always reflect that faith and commitment. Our advocacy of human rights is, therefore, a natural part of our foreign policy. The denial of those rights, whether through unjust laws or unjust action, arouses our anger and offends our sense of justice. Of course, as the times change, so does the challenge to human rights. Two centuries ago, it meant revolution, spelling out fundamental principles in our constitution. Today, we continue to observe those fundamental principles. Two decades ago, it meant civil rights and opening America’s promise to all our citizens. Ten years ago, it meant an international code at Helsinki, politically binding on all the participants—including the Soviet Union. Today, we continue our commitment to that ideal. And when I meet Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow later this moth, human rights, including the plight of Soviet Jewry, including the plight of those who are divided from their husbands or wives, will be at the very top of my agenda. In this decade, an important part of the struggle for human rights has also meant the struggle against terrorism. This is because the terrorists use innocent human beings the way a smoker uses matches. People become throwaways. They are stripped of their humanity; used, then abandoned. Nothing could be more repugnant to America’s commitment to the rights and dignity of the individual. Fortunately, we are not alone in the fight against terrorism. Among our allies, Israel, in particular, has shown us a great example. Courage, skill, and public support are the watchwords of the Israeli efforts against terrorism. We have been proud to work with Israel on this problem, and we will continue to do so. When the story is written of how the democracies beat the terrorists, let our names appear together. Today I want to update you on our struggle against terrorism. I want to tell you, as clearly as I can, that the right policies are in place. Not only are they in place, they are working. It’s been a tough fight, and we have had our share of bitter experiences. But it is paying off. To succeed against terrorism, we have to understand the terrorists’ aims and strategy and how terrorism affects us. That comes first. Second, we need timely and accurate intelligence. That often means pooling resources with other concerned governments. Third, we must strengthen security measures to protect American citizens from terrorist attack at home and abroad. And forth, very important, defense is not enough. We have to go on the offense to disrupt terrorist operations, destroy their networks, and bring them to justice. Understanding Terrorist Aims and Strategy So, first, we must understand terrorist aims and strategy. The facts show that most acts of terrorism are committed against the citizens of democracies. That is not just because they oppose our polices. Terrorists are drawn to attack democracies because they believe they can turn our regard for human rights into vulnerability. They try to play our compassion for the innocent against our instinct for self-defense. The terrorists say to us, ‘‘Look, it’s very

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simple. Change your policy, and no more planes are hijacked. Figure out a way to give us what we want, and no more children will be killed. We’ll release your hostages if you free our brothers or pay us ransom. After all, injustice has made us this desperate.’’ That’s the con job they try to put over on you. Our first response to this challenge must be clear thinking. Terrorism naturally arouses our emotions, our anger; our compassion. I have felt it, and you have felt it. I am saying, however, that hard as it may be, the best approach to counter terrorists is to act with cool reason and cold calculation. Let me take, for example, what is sometimes called the Stockholm syndrome. Psychologists have noticed that individuals held hostages often begin to sympathize with the cause of their captors. Nations, not just individuals, are vulnerable to this syndrome. After all, if men are so desperate that they commit indiscriminate violence, should we not reexamine their grievances? So there are those who conclude that terrorism is an inevitable response to unresolved political and social problems. Cool reason, however, leads us to a different conclusion. If we think clearly about terrorism, we see the fatal fallacy in the slogan ‘‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’ As Scoop Jackson often reminds us, no cause justifies attacking the innocent. Freedom fighters do not hijack or blow up civilian airplanes. Freedom fighters do not shoot people in wheelchairs and toss them into the sea. Freedom fighters do not take teachers and journalist’s hostage. Terrorists do. While innocent civilians are the pawns, the real object of the game—if there is any beyond money and a perverse sense of power—is to get governments to change their polices. Much international terrorism originates in the Middle East, we know. I can tell you the policy that they do not like. It’s our support for Israel. It’s our support for a peace process, for negotiated and compromise solutions to the regions problems. It’s our support for those Arabs who want peace and who want to negotiate. That is why vigorous efforts to defeat terrorism are an essential element in our strategy to advance the diplomatic solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Elsewhere in the world, the pattern is similar. The closer an issues comes to peaceful resolution, the harder terrorists try to thwart these efforts. In Spain, the ETA claims that its terrorists are a response to repression by the central government. Yet, the vast majority of the more than 700 deaths resulting from Basque terrorism have occurred since 1979, when the Spanish government granted significant autonomy to the Basque region. In Peru, terrorists claim to act on behalf of poor peasants. Yet who are the victims? The overwhelming majority of more than 10,000 innocent people murdered by these terrorists have been rural poor. Hostage-holding is another illustration of the terrorists’ total contempt for humanity. Terrorists employ this tactic precisely because they known that civilized societies, and particularly democracies, place a high value on human life and the rule of law. The choices faced by democratic governments in hostage situations are, therefore, agonizingly difficult. There is one thing we and other countries have learned from bitter—very bitter—experience. If we pay ransom, if we release prisoners, if we change our policies—or if we encourage other governments to do so—then we will simply

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encourage more terrorism. Our government has repeatedly made clear that we will talk to anyone, to any group, to any government about the well being and release of the Americans still held hostage in Lebanon. Thus far, those holding the hostages have been unwilling to discuss with us the issue or its resolution, either directly or indirectly. In fact, their only communications are impersonal and one way—through press releases and video recordings. We will continue to pursue actively whatever contacts we can. At the same time, our policy is firm—we will not make concessions to terrorists or compromise our fundamental principles. And what are the demands of these terrorists? They want us to force another country to release their brothers in crime. Just think about that. They kidnap innocent people to try to force us to free other terrorists who have been caught and convicted of murder. Well, we are not going to do it. I don’t know how anyone can call that moral. I don’t know of any religion that justifies it. I am confident that the American people understand and support the logic of our policy toward hostage taking. While our deepest sympathies go out to the families of those held captive—for they, too, are victims of the terrorists scourge—we also must protect the national interest. We have to protect our citizens in the future even as we seek to help the victims of the present. As we move into this election year, I am equally confident that any effort by the hostage-holders to exploit our democratic electoral process will be met with ringing and cold rejection. Eventually, we hope that the hostage-takers will realize that there is no point in holding innocent Americans. I can only tell you that we have not given up at home. Circumstances change in the Middle East, sometimes very rapidly. To sum up our position, we believe that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated. Terrorism must not pay. It is a very difficult rule to follow in practice. We know that. But follow it we must if we are ever to turn the tables on terrorists. Obtaining Reliable Intelligence The second element of our four-part Counterterrorism effort is to obtain reliable intelligence. Who are the terrorists? Clearly, some are small groups of fanatics. Others are well-organized groups operating across national borders. Some support themselves through crime. In some cases, an unholy alliance has been formed between drug peddlers and terrorists. The peddlers provide the money and the terrorists provide the muscle. Other terrorists draw support directly from governments. I think you would agree with me that the increase of state-sponsored terrorism is one of the most disturbing developments of late on the international scene. Solid intelligence on terrorism is not easy to develop. Technical means of collection, through satellite or electronic intercepts, are good, but to do better we need people on the post. And penetrating terrorist organizations is a difficult and dangerous job. Nevertheless, in spite of what the leaders of these groups like to think, we are finding ways to reach less-than-loyal subordinates. We know more about them than they think we do. I would like to salute the unsung hero’s of the struggle against terrorism. These heroes are the intelligence analysts. Often they have little to go

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on: a photograph, a fragment of an overheard conversation, the text of a communiqu´e, the summary of a meeting, a used airline ticket. Sometimes, it is like piecing together a gigantic jigsaw puzzle, but it’s a puzzle that can save lives. We are always ready to hear from other nations who have experience with this problem. We are ready to pool our efforts. I am encouraged by the willingness of our close allies and friends to work together on these problems. And we are getting good results. Most recently, for example, international cooperation among a half-dozen countries led to the arrest of the North Korean agents who destroyed the civilian airliner last November. The resources devoted to improved intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing are paying off. In the past three years, we have averted more than 200 terrorists attacks through intelligence efforts. No one wrote about it. Not many know about it. But we can take great satisfaction from the fact that people are alive and well today who never even suspected they were in danger. Improving Security Measures The third critical element of our policy against terrorism is to improve our security measures. Let me give you two examples: ¥ Our efforts to improve security at U.S. embassies; and ¥ International efforts to improve airline safety

The people who represent the United States abroad serve in the front lines of America’s interests. Our diplomats often work in areas, which can only be described as combat zones. I am reminded of this every time I enter the state department and see two plaques on the wall commemorating members of the Foreign Service who died in the line of duty. The older plaque took 187 years to fill up. Most of the people listed there lost their lives to accident or disease. The more recent plaque, however, took only 20 years to fill up. And most people on it were murdered by terrorists. So, don’t let anyone tell you that diplomacy is a tea party or pushing cookies. We have developed tough new standards about how our diplomatic installations are to be defended, and we have improved coordination with hostcountry security officials. The State Department has also taken the lead in training over 6,000 civilian law enforcement officials from 45 countries in the techniques of Counterterrorism. All of this has been done without changing the essentials of our representation abroad. The terrorists cannot be allowed to run us out of town. The progress has not been cheap. Over the past four years we have spent over a billion dollars to provide a better defense for America’s diplomatic facilities overseas. Now look at the results. As protective devices have been installed and our diplomatic establishments have become harder to hit, attacks and casualties have declined. Let me give you some examples. ¥ In Baghdad, a missile detonated near a plate-glass window in the home of the deputy chief of mission. Had shatter-resistant film not been placed on that window, his daughter would have suffered serious injury or death.

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¥ On June 25, 1983, the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador was strafed by machine guns for several minutes. After the attack, it was found that the wall around the embassy and the armor plated windows had prevented several bullets from penetrating offices.

Other attacks have been thwarted. We regularly received reports that terrorist groups have given up trying to attack an American establishment because they found it too well defended. Experience tells us that the myth of the terrorists willing to die for a cause is largely that—a myth. Terrorists are not dumb, and they are not courageous. Most of them do not go on suicide missions. That is not their purpose. In the field of airline safety as well, tremendous strides have been made in the past few years. A decade or two ago, it was not unusual to have 15 or even 18 hijackings a year. In 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked three airlines in one day. Since then, we and the international community have developed near-universal screening of airline passengers for weapons and explosives. As a result, terrorist air piracy has declined to its lowest level since we began keeping records over 20 years ago. In 1986, there were only two terrorists hijackings of aircraft, and only one in 1987. Some have criticized the cost and effectiveness of defense measures. I remember when we first started at this, I was Director of the Budget, and along came this program, and you know how the Director of the Budget reacts to something that’s going to cost a lot of money. You try to poke holes in it. But, of course, I had to go along. And then I remember people complaining: ‘‘why do I have to stand in line in the airport, because I have to go through this thing?’’ Nowadays, I suspect, that any of you who go to an airport, and you don’t have to go through a security measure, you don’t like that. You want this to go on. I agree that it is costly. But I would rather see us spend the money than spend the lives. This is slow work, it’s not exciting, but better security equipment and procedures do make a difference. Let me add here that our policy is not simply government people protecting themselves. Our ambassadors are sensitive to security threats to any Americans abroad, whatever their status, and we have established an Overseas Security Advisory Council designed specifically to help U.S. businessmen abroad. And our embassy security officers are always available to talk about safety measures. Taking the Offensive While I have told you about strategy, intelligence, and defense, this describes only part of the policy. The terrorists are waging war against us. And we have every right under international law to defend ourselves. Part of that defense is to take the offensive. The first goal of our action program is to pressure states which sponsor terrorism. An ugly fact of international life today is that some states provide terrorists with important resources—weapons, financing, passports, safe houses, training areas. In return, the terrorists commit violence that serves a government’s interests but which can be denied by that government. We must expose the link between terrorists and their state sponsors and then break it.

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The first state to feel the pressure of an American offensive against terrorism was Libya. You all know the story. For 5 years we tried to reason with Qadhafi. We used political, economic, and diplomatic pressures. But they were not enough. When the President had convincing evidence of Libyan involvement in the attack on the La Belle disco in Berlin—and a dozen other planned attacks on American diplomatic establishments abroad—he did what he had to do. The American bombing raid on Libya opened a new chapter in the international fight against terrorism. It brought home to Qadhafi and other terrorists that the United States was not going to take it anymore. We would use military action against terrorism if necessary. The European allies, initially a little reluctant, very quickly followed with political, diplomatic, and economic measures against Libya. In this regard, the work of the Tevi Group of European ministers has been invaluable. I look forward to the day—unfortunately not here yet—when Libya is out of that business altogether. Libya is not the only state supporting terrorism. In late 1986, courts in London and Berlin found Syrian complicity in the terrorist attacks in those cities. The United States joined with Great Britain in an international campaign to convince Syria to reduce its connections with terrorists groups. These measures also produced results. In June of last year, Syria finally expelled the notorious Abu Nidal group from Syrian territory. Even so, because of its relationship to other terrorist organizations, Syria remains on our list of terrorsupporting states. Iran, too, is a key supporter of terrorism. Terrorism has been a hallmark of its policy ever since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power nine years ago. Iran has been responsible for attacks on U.S. targets, on French and British interests, and on moderate Arabs. Our government has imposed a series of tight sanctions on Iran and encourages other governments to do the same. Following North Korea’s clear culpability in the bombing of South Korean airliner number 858, last month the United States officially designated North Korea a terrorist-supporting state. Realistically, the United has little leverage it can use directly against North Korea. But other governments have more leverage. We have indicated that we want their help in persuading North Korea that such tactics will not succeed. I am never reluctant to raise the issue of terrorism with governments who may be involved and who want better relations with us. Recently, we were able to wage a diplomatic campaign that seriously disrupted the commercial network supporting the Abu Nidal terrorists in Eastern Europe. A second goal of our program to take the offensive is to streamline international legal procedures and promote closer cooperation among law enforcement agencies. We are making headway here. The State Department has worked successfully to change extradition treaties with Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Canada, and Spain. Terrorists should not be able to escape justice by availing themselves of loyal protection intended for refugees seeking political asylum. At long last, thanks to good police work and including international cooperation, we are bringing the terrorists to justice.

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¥ In Britain, Nezar Hindawi is serving a life sentence for his attempt to destroy an El Al airliner. ¥ In France, George Ibrahim Abdallah is serving a life sentence for his part in the assassination of an American military attach´e and an Israeli diplomat and the attempted assassination of the American charge d’affaires. ¥ In Italy, the Achille Lauro hijackers have been tried and convicted. ¥ In the United States, Fawaz Younis faces trial on charges that he held American citizens hostage as he led the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight in Beirut. ¥ In the Federal Republic of Germany, one Hamadi brother is on trial for kidnapping a German businessman and the other is expected to go on trial shortly for the hijacking of TWA 847.

This is just a sampling. Over the past 2 years, another 40 significant terrorists were arrested or convicted. Many of these cases are important for another reason. The prosecutions have been undertaken by countries whose interests were not the primarily targets of the terrorists. In every case, the prosecuting government has faced real or potential reprisal attacks from supporters of the terrorists. Yet, despite these threats, governments have gone forward with the rule of law. It saddens me to report that the war against terrorism is still producing casualties. Just a few weeks ago, the Columbia Attorney General was struck down. He was murdered for doing his job, for trying to lift the curse of the drug cartels from his country and, for that matter, from our own. In their search for allies to overthrow Columbia’s democracy, the political terrorists and the drug terrorists have made common cause. Every free institution has been attacked. Two newspaper editors, 21 judges, and a minister of justice are among the dead in this struggle. We are going to redouble our efforts to help our fellow democracy, Columbia, in this hour of crisis and pain. And we are going to win. A Successful Strategy Against Terrorism Some 4 years ago, I delivered another speech on terrorism. At that time, I expressed my fear that moral confusion and our instinct for finding fault with ourselves would paralyze us in the face of this insidious threat. Since then, much has happened. But I believe that we have all emerged from our experiences with a firm set of convictions about terrorism. We are clearer today, both about the danger and about ourselves. Above all, the American people understand more clearly the risks, especially the risks of dealing with hostage situations. The policy I have described is the result of those experiences, the good ones and the bad ones. It builds upon the enduring foundations of a successful strategy against terrorism: a strategy that applies cool reason to the problem; a strategy that finds the hard facts; a strategy that combines defense and offense to raise the costs and reduce the rewards to terrorists; finally, a strategy that does not flinch from pressuring governments that support terrorists. What we know about terrorists and terrorism indicates that there are no instant remedies or easy ways out. We face a long and hard struggle against this modern barbarism. It will take our skill and our strength, our will and

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our wisdom, our patience and our perseverance to prevail. But prevail we must. I am convinced that if the American people and our allies support our policy, we will succeed. Terrorism will ebb. And humanity will be served. SOURCE: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2133_v88/ai_6761419

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, ‘‘The Uses of Military Power,’’ Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., November 1984 Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the members of the National Press Club, a group most important to our national security. I say that because a major point I intend to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will never work. And you help to build that understanding among our citizens. Of all the many policies our citizens deserve—and need—to understand, none is so important as those related to our topic today—the uses of military power. Deterrence will work only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping the peace … and only from a well-informed public can we expect to have that national will and commitment. So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps that most important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such as ours reach that painful decision that the use of military force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national policy? National power has many components, some tangible—like economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other components are intangible—such as moral force, or strong national will. Military forces, when they are strong, and ready and modern, are a credible—and tangible—addition to a nation’s power. When both the intangible national will and those forces are forced into one instrument, national power becomes effective. In today’s world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then Lay 2-3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months. Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war comes. Yet, so blurred have the lines become between open conflict and half-hidden hostile acts that we cannot confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared, at any moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale military confrontation.

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Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said that ‘‘It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.’’ If it was true then, how much more true it is today, when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and individual terrorist action. And how much more important is it now, considering the consequences of failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of military force to defend territory has never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, conquer or subjugate other nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other situations which fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use of force. We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace—the gray area conflicts—are precisely the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and nature of today’s challenges are uncertain, our response must be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to apply the resources needed. Because we face a spectrum of threats—from covert aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, to [the] use of brute force—choosing the appropriate level of our response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been made, and the purpose clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the purpose has been achieved. That, too, has been difficult to accomplish. The issue of which branch of government has authority to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making of foreign policy and in the decision making process for the employment of military forces abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality of decision-making authority in the executive branch has been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process. At the same time, there has not been a corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of military forces. Yet the outcome of decisions on whether—and when—and to what degrees—to use combat forces abroad has never been more important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or settle all the world’s conflicts, we must recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict in its early stages, to contain and control it—but to do that our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner, and be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged, because many of those difficult decisions must be made extremely quickly.

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Some on the national scene think they can always avoid making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While they may maintain in principle that military force has a role in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the circumstance or the place where it would apply. On the other side, some theorists argue that military force can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are American forces of any size present they will somehow solve the problem. Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or satisfactory solutions. The first—undue reserve—would lead us ultimately to withdraw from international events that require free nations to defend their interests from the aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our responsibilities as the leader of the free world—responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the aftermath of World War II—a war incidentally that isolationism did nothing to deter. These are responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked throughout the world. In an international system based on mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances between friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States: we would be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent nations. The second alternative—employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts—would surely plunge us head-long into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric of our society, endangering the single most critical element of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, who would have an understandable opposition to being used—in every sense of the word—casually and without intent to support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win. And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would fall off and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so wracked the country in the ’60s. We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have fought so hard to regain? In maintaining our progress in strengthening America’s military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.

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Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars, involving every aspect of our society. All our means of production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the unconditional surrender of our enemies … the only acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our freedom. But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we encountered a more subtle form of warfare—warfare in which, more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked. Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of ‘‘national liberation,’’ but far more frequently ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder. Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends. They realize that if they can divide our national will at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad. So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to intimidate western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in their countries, because public opinion there is simply prohibited and does not exist. Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity. It is true that until democratic nations have the support of the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling message to friend and fore alike by the vote of their citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by re-electing a strong chief executive. They know that President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for his actions and is able to lead us through these complex times by insisting that we regain both our military and our economic strength. In today’s world where minutes count, such decisive leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill-defined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of the United States and our allies … and then responding appropriately. Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on our territory, and our response may not necessarily require the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our vital national interests and those of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies. At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world’s defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and should offer substantial amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them maintain forces to deter attacks against them—usually we cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.

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We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory—without their strong invitation—when our own freedom is not threatened. On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the United States has seen the need to join forces with other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for combat—they were armed only for their self-defense. Their mission required them to be— and to be recognized as—peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring nations, their peace keeping mission could not be realized, then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the number and arms of our troops—in short to equip them for combat, or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we faced just such a choice, because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President properly withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping. In those cases where our national interests require us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient numbers and we must support them, as effectively and resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning. Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just that. Just as clearly, there are other situations where United States combat forces should not be used. I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now share them with you: (1) First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter. (2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could perhaps have prevented the Holocaust of World War II.

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(3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, ‘‘no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it.’’ War may be different than in Clausewitz’s time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping. (4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: ‘‘Is this conflict in our national interest?’’ ‘‘Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?’’ If the answers are ‘‘Yes,’’ then we must win. If the answers are ‘‘No,’’ then we should not be in combat. (5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected Representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face: The support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there. (6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should be a last resort. I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest possible number of our citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that may be required later. We must never forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged that ‘‘Danzig is not worth a war,’’ and ‘‘Why should we fight to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?’’ These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased negatively for a purpose—they are intended to sound a note of caution—caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required. In many situations we may apply

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these tests and conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of America’s responsibilities—either to its own citizens or to its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal that this country, or this administration, is unwilling to commit forces to combat overseas. We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those interests. Let no one entertain any illusions—if our vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are resolved that if we must fight, we must win. So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have learned from the past, they also can—and should—be applied to the future. For example, the problems confronting us in Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize. If this happens we will clearly need more economic and military assistance and training to help those who want democracy. The President will not allow our military forces to creep—or be drawn gradually—into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. This means we will need sustained congressional support to back and give confidence to our friends in the region. I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist incremental approach which almost always means the use of insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not vital to our national interest to fight. But policies and principles such as these require decisive leadership in both the executive and legislative branches of government—and they also require strong and sustained public support. Most of all, these policies require national unity of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the policies and leadership to gain that public support and unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the strength of character to protect peace with freedom. In summary, we should all remember these are the policies—indeed the only policies—that can preserve for ourselves, our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom. I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs around the world. We can enable our friends in Central America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed by the unfolding complexity of the 1980’s. We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will enable all of us—ourselves at home, and our friends abroad— to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream. SOURCE: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/840000-cap.htm

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Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Conference on Low-Intensity Warfare, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., January 14, 1986 Tonight, one out of every four countries around the globe is at war. In virtually every case, there is a mask on the face of war. In virtually ever case, behind the mask is the Soviet Union and those who do its bidding. Much has been written about low-intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively in the effort to contain the slow erosion of human liberty and self-determination around the globe. We may see to the protean nature of this phenomenon in the welter of descriptions attached to it: low-intensity warfare, low-intensity conflict, insurgency, guerrilla war, and others. What we can agree on, I think, is that the least accurate term is the one popularized by the Soviet Union, and that is ‘‘war of national liberation.’’ We in this land take special exception to so Orwellian a corruption of language, for we are ourselves the children of revolution, and we well know what liberty means. It has nothing to do with guns and searchlights and barbed wire and censorship and labor camps. In fact the object of their activities is not liberation at all, but subjugation. If we are to deal with it, we must understand it, and understand the circumstances which gave rise to it. When the Second World War was ended, those of us who served in it and the families of those who were lost believed, and had a right to do, that we had seen the last of the great wars of conquest, and that our children might live in a better world, at peace. We were not complacent that such a hope would consummate itself through some mystical mutation driven by the numbers sacrificed, the pain suffered, or the hardships endured. Rather, we were prepared, even anxious, to work to assure that what had been achieved should be nourished and sustained. To former adversaries and erstwhile allies alike we offered assistance through the Marshall Plan. History should not wonder that a melting pot nation, representing so many of the world’s people, should have approached the aftermath of a world war as we once approached the close of a civil war: no vanquished, really, and no victors; only people needing help, and people having help to give. We had it, and we gave it, without ulterior motives. The results would later be recorded in a series of so-called ‘‘economic miracles.’’ Yet even as compassion and faith and common sense worked to keep the better world we fought to build, another power sought to go another way. As the lights went on again in the Pacific and Western Europe, they flickered out, one by one, in Eastern Europe. As old colonies became new nations, old nations—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and half of Germany—became new colonies. We were witnessing, though we did not know it, a new kind of warfare. At length we called it the cold war, but it was hotter than we knew, and insidious.

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In the pre-industrial age, the object of those at war was to destroy the opponent’s army. In the industrial age, it was to destroy not only armies but that economic infrastructure by which armies were fed, armed, transported, and supplied. And this we called to total war, so brutal in its exigencies that we believed the art and science of war could not go further, but must impress itself and its dangers so profoundly upon the minds of men that they would turn away from it, and seek some other means to resolve their differences. The opportunity was there. The mechanisms were there. God knows the need was there. Yet in the face of it all, we were presented with a further step in the evolution of a phenomenon we prayed had run its course. Where once it was the goal of aggression to destroy armies, and later to destroy the fruits of men’s labors, now we saw a form of warfare directed at the destruction of hope itself. As the Soviet Union, unhindered, was consolidating its hold over it neighbors, the emergence of new nations in the aftermath of colonialism created a new international political phenomenon, which we came to call the Third World. And as it emerged, so too did the opportunity for the extension of a strategy proven in the takeover of Russia herself, and refined in the enslavement of Eastern Europe. It was as strategy which benefited from the confluence of a number of new circumstances and old realities. On one hand, the expectations of communist dogma for the collapse of capitalism and the automatic ‘‘economicallydetermined’’ spread of communism had itself long since collapsed. Thus, the justification of the very existence of the ruling party of the Soviet Union had no force. Against this backdrop, there could certainly be no pretense that communism would expand though some inevitable, dialectical process. If it were to expand, it must expand by aggression. On the other hand, the advent of nuclear power, and the means to deliver it, gravely increased the risks of open aggression. While the West monopolized that power, it presented no threat to world peace, and certainly no threat to legitimate Soviet interests. It did, however, present a threat to Soviet expansionism. Thus if the Soviets were to expand, they would have to do so below thresholds that would trigger a Free World response. Not to expand meant for them to sit in a global backwater, among the dust and ashes of a governing theory without political dynamism or historical validity. Added to these considerations were two others of significance. One was the simple fact that the Soviet economic system itself led to the perpetual impoverishment of the nation. The Soviets had also to conjure with enormous losses in manpower from the Second World War, the need to hold manpower both for their regular military forces, and for those security forces required to control their own population, and those of their satellites. The other consideration was the reluctance of the industrialized democracies, particularly the United States, to go to war. Historically, the American people had wished to be left in peace, and could be moved to war only through the most egregious and galvanizing impact on their sensibilities. Further to the point, U.S. military doctrine, reflecting the larger traditions out of which it grew, aimed at the rapid resolution of conflict through the rapid application of overwhelming power. And the American nation was and

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remains culturally disposed to quick conclusions—not least in the prosecution of so ugly at work as war. Taken whole, the situation offered constraints and opportunities. Poor and ill-prepared peoples were reaching for nationhood. Within them, men and women avid for power, and willing to pursue it with violence and keep it by force, could be co-opted at bargain basement prices. And the process could be represented to the industrialized democracies as the liberation of nations—a process not merely of no threat to us, but one congruent with our values. So we saw the exploitation by brute force of the efforts of others to free themselves from oppression. It is not necessary here to recount each event. A cruel consistency links the betrayal of the Russian Revolution and the betrayal of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Nowhere have communist governments acquired and maintained power through the freely expressed will of the governed. The world today is at war. It is not global war, though it goes on around the globe. It is not war between fully mobilized armies, though it is no less destructive for all that. It is not war by the laws of war and, indeed, law itself, as an instrument of civilization, is a target of this peculiar variety of aggression. It benefits from the pernicious sophistries of those who wish to construe these wars as efforts of sovereign people to pursue their own destinies and, as such, no business of our own. Yet, in a world as small as our own, the destruction of human liberty anywhere resonates everywhere, and affects all of us. So it matters that we understand the means by which such destruction comes, and that we trouble ourselves to discover not merely how to end the destruction of liberty, but how to reverse it, and to recover and restore what has been destroyed. Because if it is proper and just that we should help those who wish to remain free, then we can hardly turn our backs on those who have lost their freedom and want it back. It is certain that we cannot co-exist with the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine—an impudent diktat that argues like a bullying child cheating at marbles: ‘‘Whatever I can get, I get to keep.’’ Nothing is brought to life with bullets and bombs, least of all an absurd doctrine dead before the dictator who proclaimed it, and buried by the brave people of Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Kampuchea and others who look to us to look to our heritage. We cannot ignore their aspirations without betraying our own. For twenty-five years we have considered how to prevent the voices of freedom from being stilled. We cannot abandon that obligation. But neither can we turn away from the obligation to help now-smothered voices of freedom to be heard again. This is the work in which we are now engaged, and the purpose that brings us to this occasion. It is no small task. From Augustine to Aquinas to Grotius, and coming forward to successive efforts of various conventions at Geneva and elsewhere, men have labored to contain war, to limit its ferocity, to hold harmless the innocent, to mitigate destruction, to infuse mercy. We share in, and are instructed by, these civilizing impulses. Every American officer, soldier sailor, airman and marine is indoctrinated in the principles flowing from them, and is held accountable for the most rigid adherence to them. The conflict we face today violates, by design, these principles.

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In those depredations known as wars of national liberation, any effort to improve the lot of peoples is a target. A nation’s stability is a bar to its capture; its stability is a product of its prosperity and the means of broadening access to its prosperity; as is the educating of its people, and their health, and their conveniences, their progress and their hope. Therefore, in these obscenely misnamed ‘‘wars of national liberation,’’ it is not a nation’s military forces that are attacked. Instead, agricultural assistance teams are murdered, as are medical assistance teams, teachers, judges, union leaders, editors, and priests. It is not a nation’s military structures that are targeted, but its clinics and classrooms, its power and transportation systems, its livelihood, its possibilities, its hopes for a better future … The social and economic dimensions of these conflicts are of paramount importance. For the sake of their own lives, people are intimidated into a mute tolerance of subversion in their midst. Among the means to this end are disinformation and propaganda—including what is euphemistically known as ‘‘propaganda of the deed.’’ Such deeds may include assembling an entire village to watch the village headman disemboweled, proving thereby that the established government cannot assure anyone’s physical safety, and that the better part of wisdom consists of resignation to the will of the insurgents, be they ever so small in number, brutal in behavior, or unrepresentative in their goals. The object is to instill fear, to institutionalize anxiety, to rob men of their manhood, and make of craven survival the ultimate value. On the economic front, people are coerced into paying taxes to support their alleged liberation; crops are burned, marketing systems destroyed, and people living on the economic margin are further impoverished. So the burden on the established government grows, the presumption that it cannot provide for the security of its people grows; people move into the urban areas for greater security or better economic circumstances, the land is abandoned and the cities become more and more crowded, with more pressure on the urban infrastructure, and withal, the creation of better targets for urban attacks. In its early stages, much of this activity is like nothing so much as gardenvariety crime—vandalism, arson, kidnapping, extortion, murder: thuggery flying under the specious legitimacy of ‘‘political liberation.’’ Against such actions, well-integrated societies interpose police forces. But targeted nations are not well-integrated societies, and their police are rarely equal to the threat. We should be able to assist in improving the police capabilities of threatened nations, but we are now prohibited by law from doing so. And so long as this prohibition stands, the threats to others will be permitted to grow unimpeded until the violence is sufficiently great and sufficiently well organized that the use of overt military assistance finally can be justified. This gives to aggression an advantage we should not give it, and virtually assures a more protracted violence and greater bloodshed. What is the role of the U.S. military in all this? The question has existed and propounded itself in varying configurations, most especially during the Vietnam war and since. It has given rise to disagreements ranging from the philosophical to the visceral, and has generated criticism of our military, and its willingness and capacity to confront the conflict before us.

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Let me say, on behalf of the most selfless segment of America’s public servants that, contrary to what some have said, it is not pre-eminently the role or the object of our military to preserve hallowed doctrine, nor to preserve honored traditions, nor to preserve budgets. It is to preserve freedom. And they need no instruction as to that obligation. They do need, and the constitution mandates it, to be told what is wanted of them. They do need, and have a right to expect, the support of any American government which commits them, and the support of the people from which they come, in the efforts to which they are asked to risk their lives for us all. On another occasion, I expressed my thoughts on the general question of those criteria which ought to govern the use of military force. Some have questioned whether the assurance of support is a reasonable criterion. But the assurance of support is a function of the national will in the area of lowintensity conflict, far more than it is the capacity of our adversaries to prevail in that arena. And the strength of the national will depends, as it always has, on how far our cause is just, and seen to be; on how vital it is to our interests for us to be engaged, and, on how far our efforts in such endeavors are conducted in accordance with our national values. It will readily be seen, in the framework of a conflict which is prosecuted in such a way as to erode and destroy the values of civilization itself, that we have a special obligation to act so as to uphold those values. The strategy of lowintensity conflict is such as to make a liability of that obligation. Yet we dare not, for the sake of expediency, abandon it. For example, to pursue terrorism we cannot commit acts of blind revenge that may kill innocent people who had nothing to do with the terrorism. This necessity complicates our task, as it is intended to do. So we must think carefully, and in certain respects rethink entirely, what are the imperatives and exigencies of this war, as it how reveals itself to us. It is among the highest skills of the medical profession to be able to diagnose an illness in its earliest stages, and then to act to cure it before it becomes dangerous. Low-intensity conflict presents a similar challenge to our skills at diagnosing political and geo-strategic ills at their incipient stages. Such troubles do not begin in advanced, educated, stable, and prosperous nations which are well-led and which, even if badly led, have the means, peacefully, to change their leadership. Nor do they begin in nations of little or no geostrategic significance. You may be certain that no dictatorial excess, no violation of human rights, however outrageous, will attract the solicitous ministrations of the Soviet Union or its surrogates to a nation having to resource, a nation contiguous to no other nation of strategic interest, or a nation not situated upon some global chokepoint. The Soviet Union will not go to the aid of anyone for what we call humanitarian reasons. Analyzing the situation at even so elementary a level, we will have little difficulty determining prospective targets for communist subversion through low-intensity conflict. Superimpose over this matrix other indicators: weapons thefts, assassinations of police and other officials, attacks on critical infrastructural nodes, and further, more refined, conclusions may be drawn. It is at the critical point at which these conclusions can be drawn that some basic

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decisions must be made, and not years later when whole populations are polarized, and countrysides set aflame. We must decide if our interests justify intervention. We must decide if the leadership of the country threatened is capable of using our assistance to the proper effect, which is to say for the security and well-being of the nation, rather than merely to sustain itself in power, and to reinforce those abuses which may have contributed to the nation’s difficulties from the beginning. We must decide whether an existing leadership is better or worse for its people and our interest than any possible alternatives. We cannot permit out disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives. We must decide what form intervention should take, if we are to intervene, and by what means, and through which agencies it should come. If our involvement is warranted, we must be prepared to act alone. We have had at times an unfortunate tendency to believe it is essential to multilateralize every exertion on behalf of freedom in the international arena, as though our judgment must be validated by others before we could trust it ourselves. Yet it remains a fact that for the most part, where freedom is in jeopardy, it is to us that the world looks for leadership. We are belabored in some quarters with being to ‘‘interventionist.’’ And yet we remember, and those who belabor us remember too, other times and other places in which our earlier intervention must have saved the world from monstrous crimes and profligate destruction and bloodshed. Finally, as a pacific people, we cling fiercely to the hope that solutions to international aggression may be found short of the use of power, and by this tendency delay in the recognition of aggression for what it is, and of our duties for what they are. There is a place for power in responding to low-intensity conflict. What is important is to understand the role of military force, and the role of other responses, and how these fit together. Those particular skills and supporting capabilities which the military offers to the prosecution of low-intensity conflict are chiefly to be found in our Special Operations Forces. Each of the services contribute to these capabilities, some more than others, according to the mission and the level of conflict involved. At the low-intensity end of the spectrum, which concerns us here, Army Special Forces bear a very large share of the burden. They are trained to instruct others in providing for their own defense. In this mission, their knowledge of foreign languages, as well as their specialized foreign area orientation, are essential elements of their capabilities. They are familiar with the full range of weapons to be found in other nations and can provide training in the use of those weapons and other ordnance, as well as instructing in small unit tactics, reconnaissance, communications, field medicine, escape and evasion, and equipment maintenance. As one looks at the strategy of low-intensity conflict, however, in all its multiple dimensions, it is clear that defending the nation is only one part of the required response, and a highly problematical part at that. For this conflict strategy is one of destruction, and it is always easier to destroy than to build up, and easier too, to destroy than to defend against destruction. So we must assist in the business of building and, by doing so, of providing the nation’s

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people with a stake in their future—a stake they themselves will choose to protect in the face of all efforts at destruction. Our Special Operations Forces play a role here as well, through civic action: the construction and restoration of infrastructure, the assisting of others in the improvement of their own lives, whether by restoring land, building roads, digging wells, or helping to provide medical and educational services. In the past, such work was not thought to be the work of the military. This is popular wisdom, at any rate. But here popular wisdom fails, for it divorces us from our own history—from the memory of the Minuteman, standing by his plow, with his musket in his hand; and the pioneer defending what he built even as he built it. There is, in short, no gainsaying the argument that we know something about nation-building, having built one ourselves. Nor is it deniable that the larger conflict—or, the competition for those who prefer it—has everything to do with those political and economic constructs which form the skeletons of nations. The question then is what forms of government, what kinds of economic systems, are most in accord with human realities to conduce to the betterment of mankind? On our own terms, we can compete with shovels and win. Our adversaries require guns. It is an instructive difference. The greater share of our assistance to the lesser developed nations is in economic aid and, of our security assistance, in non-lethal aid. The Soviets offer relatively little in foreign economic assistance; virtually all of their subventions go to the provision of weapons. So our military can help with the contemporary equivalent of the use of plows and muskets. But that help must be designed into a strategy which involves diplomacy, and economic leverage, and the proper management of our technological riches, and the proper, unashamed and unremitting willingness to make our case at the bar of public opinion abroad and at home. Absent such a strategy, the use of military assets alone will be feckless, wasteful, and unfair. The private sector that is the wellspring of our power and prosperity must see the greater long-term economic advantage of access to marketing opportunities in a broad and stable world market, rather than in the short-term benefits to be derived from those whose aim it is to prevent the emergence of a broad and stable world market. The self-serving notion of tempering Soviet aggressiveness through trade is the most fraudulent excuse for making a quick dollar that can be imagined; Lenin himself recognized that that proclivity would help the Soviets survive the ravages of their own self-imposed economic incapacity. He said that The capitalists will supply us with the materials and technology which we lack and will restore our military industry which we need for our future victorious attacks upon our suppliers. In other words, they will work hard in order to prepare their own suicides.

We must not gratify that expectation, or fulfill that prediction. Similarly, we must see the foolishness in subsidizing governments, produced by communist insurgencies, in their effort to consolidate a totalitarian hold over their nations. We should not be so mesmerized by our self-imposed obligations to international organizations dedicated to the peaceful development of nations, that we acquiesce in the shoring up of hostile government through various international financial institutions and agencies of the United

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Nations. Our stature and credibility as a peace-loving and generous nation will surely survive our effective objection to such contradictory and self-defeating actions. And if we are unwilling to make such objection, and make it effective as only we can, then we must surely not ask our own military to go in the way of guns indirectly paid for through our own financial assistance. Those who mold public opinion in America, and who should refresh our convictions and thus save us from a smug complacency and the slow unwitting betrayal of our founding values, must see the failing in a fatuous objectivity which affects to judge the ambitions of the wolf and the lamb by an equal measure. There is still the obligation to distinguish right from wrong, and as we have no reluctance to judge ourselves by standards we set for ourselves, we should not, out of a misplaced sense of fairness, refuse to judge others merely because they have no standards. We know what are criminal means to the acquisition of power, and we know, with burke, that ‘‘criminal means, once tolerated, are soon preferred.’’ To be tolerant for the sake of an intellectual fastidiousness is to be an accessory to the behavior at issue. The servants of public opinion and founding conviction, by which we are admirably governed for more than two centuries, must see the fragility of our freedom, and that national longevity is not divinely assigned but is a product of alertness and selflessness, which selflessness must extend even to the sacrifice of political advantage from time to time. ‘‘It wonders me,’’ as the Old Pennsylvania Dutchman said, when I hear the defense budget attacked on the basis of what the attackers are pleased to call a ‘‘fairness doctrine,’’ as though our security is merely one of a competing set of national priorities. When nations place their comfort before their security, they end with neither. These are some of the concerns we must take into account and the adjustments and sacrifices we must be prepared to make, as we consider the role to the military in the very real conflict we face today. What is important is that we never lose sight of the fact that the military is an instrument of the national will, and not a substitute for it.

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER Secretary of State James Baker, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 1, 1990 EXCERPTED Terrorism. The Administration is committed to combating the terrorist threat. Our policy of pressuring state sponsors of terrorism, putting terrorists on trial, and refusing to negotiate with them is central to our long-term success in this struggle. In my confirmation testimony before the Committee last year, I spoke of the need to develop policies of collective action against terrorism. We are working with other countries—including our European partners and the Soviet Union—to coordinate and strengthen counter-terrorism efforts worldwide. To enhance aviation safety, we are now negotiating a multilateral treaty to tag plastic explosives.

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We will continue to seek ways to improve our counter-terrorism efforts and protect our citizens abroad, just as we improve our procedures at home.

SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Address to the 50th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York, September 25, 1995 EXCERPTED One region where UN forces and the international community have played a critical role is the Middle East. Another historic milestone will be marked this Thursday in Washington when Israel and the Palestinians sign their agreement to implement phase two of the Declaration of Principles. That agreement will bring to life a goal first set in the Camp David accords—that is, to protect Israel’s security and to give Palestinians throughout the West Bank control over their daily lives. The international community and the UN must continue to support this process politically and economically. The framers of the UN Charter created this institution to meet threats to peace and security posed by aggression and armed conflict. These threats are still very much with us. But the world also faces a set of new security challenges, including proliferation, terrorism, international crime and narcotics, as well as the far-reaching consequences of damage to the environment. These have assumed a new and dangerous scope in a more interdependent world.… While new technologies have brought us closer together, they have also made it easier for terrorists, drug dealers, and other international criminals to acquire weapons of mass destruction, to set up cocaine cartels, and to hide their ill-gotten gains. The collapse of communism has shattered dictatorships. But it has also left the political and legal institutions of newly liberated nations even more vulnerable to those who seek to subvert them. Although these threats are sometimes sponsored by states, they increasingly follow no flag. Each of us must vigorously fight these enemies on our own. But we will never be truly secure until we effectively fight them together. That is the new security challenge for the global community. It must be the new security mission of the UN. There is no area where the UN can make a more significant contribution than in nonproliferation. Fifty years ago, the United States was the only country capable of making a nuclear bomb. Today, many countries have the technology that would enable them to turn a fist-sized chunk of plutonium into a bomb as small as a suitcase. That is one reason why more than 170 countries agreed to extend for all time the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last May, at the conference chaired here by Ambassador Dhanapala. We must build on that achievement. The UN is also playing an invaluable role in focusing attention on pressing regional proliferation problems. In Iraq, UNSCOM and its chairman Rolf Ekeus continue to uncover horrific details about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.

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Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq developed a deadly biological weapons capacity hidden from view. It was conducting research to turn some of the most toxic substances known to man into weapons of war. We know Saddam succeeded in putting anthrax and botulism in bombs and missile warheads. In December 1990, he deployed these with every intent of using them against the international coalition and innocent civilians. He was dissuaded only by the steadfast determination of the United States and the international community. In light of what Ambassador Ekeus has uncovered, we can only conclude that for the last four and a half years Saddam Hussein has lied about the full scope of Iraq’s weapons programs. There should be no easing of the sanctions regime until the Iraqi government complies with all the demands of the Security Council and demonstrates that it has changed its ways. The proliferation of weapons has added a disturbing dimension to another threat we all face: international terrorism. Indeed, this year’s sarin gas attack in Tokyo is a grim warning of what can happen when terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction. More nations are joining the fight against those individuals and groups who attack civilians for political ends. The United Nations has supported this effort in important ways. The UN Security Council recognized the importance of countering state-sponsored terrorism by imposing sanctions against Libya for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772. Terrorists should be treated as criminals and there must be no place where they can hide from the consequences of their acts. States that sponsor terrorists should feel the full weight of sanctions that can be imposed by the international community. Let us not deceive ourselves: Every dollar that goes into the government coffers of a state sponsor of terrorism such as Iran helps pay for a terrorist’s bullets or bombs. Iran’s role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism makes its secret quest for weapons of mass destruction even more alarming. We must stand together to prevent Iran from acquiring such threatening capabilities. The United States has taken a leading role in meeting the international terrorist threat. We have intensified our sanctions against Iran. Last January, President Clinton also issued an Executive Order prohibiting financial transactions with terrorist groups and individuals who threaten the Middle East peace process. We are urging our Congress to tighten our immigration and criminal laws to keep terrorists on the run or put them behind bars. The United States strongly supports the counter-terrorism measures the G7 and Russia announced at the Halifax Summit, and we expect the P-8 Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism in Ottawa to produce a concrete action plan to implement these measures. Just as the UN’s founders devised a new framework to deter aggression and armed conflict, the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, must now assign the same priority to combating the threat posed by proliferation, terrorism, international crime, narcotics, and environmental pollution. SOURCE: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1995/9509/950925dossec. html

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Secretary of State Warren Christopher, ‘‘Fighting Terrorism: Challenges for the Peacemakers,’’ Address to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Annual Soref Symposium, May 21, 1996 AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY I last spoke at the Institute in October 1993, soon after Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn and forever changed the course of Middle East history. Since then, much has happened. Israel and Jordan are at peace. Palestinians defied the Hamas call to boycott elections and in doing so gave their clear mandate for peace. Today, they govern themselves in Gaza and most cities in the West Bank. The Palestinian National Council voted overwhelmingly to make good on its commitment to cancel the egregious provision of its charter. Economic summits have been held in Casablanca and Amman. Eight members of the Arab League have made official visits to Israel and—with the exception of Libya, Iraq, and Sudan—every Arab League member has participated in some aspect of the peace process. Had I predicted these events in 1993, you probably would have said that I needed a long rest. The scope and pace of change has truly been breathtaking. It has come so fast that what was previously unthinkable is now routine. In the face of difficult challenges, it is easy to forget how dramatically the peace process has already transformed the landscape of the Middle East. As we move forward, we must remember the enormous progress we have made. None of the challenges we now face is more pressing than the fight against terrorism. Terrorism destroys innocent lives. It undermines a society’s sense of security—and with it the very foundation upon which a lasting peace must be built. As such, terrorism is a threat to our national interests—not simply in the Middle East, but around the world. President Clinton has rightly identified terrorism as one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of the Cold War. As he said in his address to the United Nations last October, terrorism today is a world-wide phenomenon. No one is immune. Certainly not Israel. But also not Egypt. Or Japan. Or France, Britain, or Germany. Or Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, or Algeria. And, unfortunately not America, where terrorists have struck from lower Manhattan to Oklahoma City. As if the threat is not already severe enough, we now face an even more alarming danger: the terrorist armed with weapons of mass destruction. Last year’s nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system was a grim omen. It was also a wakeup call for the world. The threat is real. We must act now to meet it. The United States is leading the way. Last month, the President signed into law landmark anti-terrorism legislation. This bill provides law enforcement with new tools to stop terrorists before they strike and to bring them to justice when they do. It strengthens our ability to prevent international terrorists from raising funds in the United States. And while ensuring legal safeguards, it allows us quickly to expel foreigners who provide support for terrorist activities. The United States has also spearheaded efforts to combat terrorism on a global level. We have imposed strong sanctions against states that sponsor or

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harbor terrorists. We have intensified our counter-terrorism cooperation with other countries, allowing us to apprehend key figures in attacks like the World Trade Center bombing. Last December, with our partners in the G-7 and Russia, we convened a ministerial meeting in Ottawa to develop common strategies for fighting terror. And in April, President Clinton joined President Yeltsin and other leaders in Moscow, where they agreed on new steps to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. Nowhere in the world has America’s leadership in the fight against terror been more evident than in the Middle East. We have maintained UN sanctions against Libya for its role in the bombing of Pan Am 103. And we are working to increase pressure on Sudan for its support of last June’s assassination attempt against Egypt’s President Mubarak. America’s most critical role, however—and the one I want to focus on today—is defending the Middle East peace process and the peacemakers against the vicious attacks of their enemies. Terrorists and their supporters are now engaged in a systematic assault on Israel and the peace process. Their goal is clear: They seek to kill the very possibility of peace by destroying every Israeli’s sense of personal security. The enemies of peace are escalating their attacks for a very clear reason: the peace process is succeeding. With every step toward peace that Israel and her neighbors take, the enemies of peace grow more desperate and more determined to lash out. They must promote fear because they know that hope is their undoing. The United States is determined to ensure that the enemies of peace do not succeed. We will never give in to their terror. We refuse to allow terrorists to undermine our resolve or divert us from our goal of real, secure, and lasting peace for Israel and for all the peoples of the Middle East. When Israel was terrorized by a wave of suicide bombings in February and March, President Clinton responded by organizing the Sharm el-Sheikh summit. Literally overnight, leaders from around the world answered his call to join Israel—not to celebrate another breakthrough in the peace process, but to defend the peace process at a moment of crisis. It was an unprecedented event that sent an unmistakable message: The enemies of peace are doomed. Their terror will only strengthen our resolve to complete the circle of peace and put them out of business for good. Sharm el Sheikh launched a process to expand joint efforts against terrorism throughout the region. Most recently, President Clinton and Prime Minister Peres signed a new anti-terrorism accord that will strengthen cooperation between our two governments. In addition, the United States is providing Israel with more than $100 million in anti-terrorism equipment and training. We have also begun to bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of the Palestinian Authority. With our support, Israel and Palestinian security services are now cooperating in a joint campaign to root out the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian forces have intercepted many suicide bombers. They have uncovered explosives and arms caches. They have arrested, tried, and imprisoned perpetrators or terrorist acts and continue to hunt down others. Chairman Arafat today clearly understands that he must give a 100 percent effort in the war on terror—and not just because his agreements with Israel

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require it. He is doing it because he knows that the bombs of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are trying to destroy Palestinian aspirations as much as they are Israeli lives. The United States will continue to insist that this increased Palestinian effort is sustained. Like Hamas before it, Hizbollah’s purpose in last month’s attacks in Lebanon was also to kill the peace process. As hostilities escalated, America’s responsibility and interests were clear: To use our influence to stop the suffering of innocent civilians, to end the crisis, and to create a new framework to limit the chances of it happening again. The agreement that resulted from my shuttle mission achieved those objectives. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis and Lebanese have been able to return to their homes. New, written understandings have been reached to contain the dangers of any hostilities. An international effort will be mounted to assist in Lebanon’s reconstruction. And we are organizing a Monitoring Group in which Israel, Lebanon, and Syria are being brought together for the first time to help prevent another crisis. This recent campaign of violence has again shone the spotlight on a disturbing reality: When it comes to terrorism against the peace process, Iran is playing a leading role. Iran’s leaders regularly use rhetoric that incites terrorism. President Rafsanjani called Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination ‘‘divine vengeance.’’ And just prior to the Hamas bombing spree, Iran’s Supreme Leaders, Khameini, preached that ‘‘The power of Islam will ultimately bring about the end of the rootless Zionist regime … which must be destroyed.’’ Iran has not stopped at rhetoric. It frequently meets with all the major terrorist groups—including Hizbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFL-PGC. It actively encourages these groups to use terror to destroy the peace process. It provides them with money—up to several million dollars a year in the case of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others; and up to $100 million a year for Hizbollah. Iran also supplies them with arms and material support, training, and—in some cases—operational guidance. The evidence has grown in recent months. In advance of Israel’s elections, Iranian-trained terrorists have been sent to infiltrate Israel and the Palestinian territories. Some have been intercepted. Others narrowly failed in carrying out their deadly activities. Still others have succeeded in their murderous missions. We believe that an Iranian-backed group was responsible for last week’s driveby shooting of an Israeli-American yeshiva student in the West Bank. In another case, Belgium intercepted a shipment containing a mortar, which came from Iran and was probably intended for an attack on a Jewish target in Europe. There should no longer be any debate about Iran’s involvement in terrorism against the peace process. German Foreign Minster Kinkel left no doubt about that in remarks he made here in Washington just two weeks ago. He said that Germany is ‘‘fully aware of the evil things that Iran has been doing and is still doing.’’ He went on to say that ‘‘[t]he Americans and Germans agree as to the general assessment of what Iran means by way of terrorism … support of Hizbollah, Hamas, and Jihad.’’ While we and our allies now share a similar analysis of the facts, we differ when it comes to how best to deal with Iran. The United States believes that Iran will only change its behavior when the world makes it pay a sufficiently

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high political and economic price. We must deny Iran’s leaders the resources to finance their dangerous policies. That is why the President decided last year to impose a comprehensive embargo on U.S. trade with Iran. And that is why we have been working with Congress on legislation to further tighten economic restrictions on Iran. In contrast, some European nations continue to engage Iran in what they call a critical dialogue, while maintaining normal trade. The Europeans themselves acknowledge that their policy has produced no significant change in Iranian behavior. We remain convinced that no amount of dialogue will alter Iran’s policies, unless it is coupled with real economic pressure. Let me stress one point: We do not oppose the EU policy because we oppose the principle of speaking with Iran. The United States has long said that we are ready to conduct an open dialogue with authoritative representatives of the Iranian government, in which we could fully air our two major concerns: First, Iran’s support for terrorism, especially against the peace process. And second, its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Iran, however, has never taken up this offer. Our determination to contain Iran and to defeat the enemies of peace is clear. But so is our commitment to press peace. Anything less would hand the terrorist the very victory they seek. To close the circle of peace, agreements between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon are essential. Syria presents us with a unique challenge. On the one hand, we continue to have serious problems in our bilateral relationship with Syria. Syria remains on our narcotics list as well as our terrorism list. Both President Clinton and I have consistently pressed our concerns with President Assad and other senior Syrian officials. We will continue to do so, and to make clear that these concerns must be met before the United States can build a mutually beneficial relationship with Syria. Yet we recognize that Syria is different from Iran. Iran rejects the very notion of peace and has dedicated itself to Israel’s destruction. By contrast, Syria has been negotiating directly with Israel to end their conflict. I have no illusions. Translating that willingness to negotiate into a peace agreement will be difficult. But the talks thus far have provided a solid foundation for progress when negotiations resume. SOURCE: dossec.html

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/9605/960521

SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks on Designation of Terrorist Organizations, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1997 SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good afternoon. Today the United States is demonstrating once again its leadership and determination in the struggle against international terror.

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Under a provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, I’m designating 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations. These designations have three main consequences. First, as of today, it is a crime to provide funds, weapons or other types of tangible support to any of the designated organizations. Second, members and representatives of these organizations are hereby ineligible for visas to enter the United States, and are subject to exclusion from the United States. And third, any funds that these organizations have in our country will be blocked. The Anti-Terrorism Act was designed to put a stop to fundraising in the United States by and on behalf of organizations that engage in or sponsor terrorist acts. President Clinton has rightly identified terrorism as one of the most important security challenges we face in the wake of the Cold War. As the designations made today suggest, terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon. No nation is immune; certainly not the United States—where terrorists have struck from lower Manhattan to Oklahoma City. The United States is responding to that threat with every available tool. We are seeking the help and cooperation of all our citizens, and we seek the help and cooperation of peoples from around the world. This requires a recognition that terrorism is not a self-sustaining enterprise. It needs money and supplies to succeed. Our goal is to make the United States fully a no-support-for-terrorism zone. Our message to anyone who comes into our country intending to raise money for a terrorist organization is, you risk going to jail. And our message to anyone who is part of a terrorist organization and who wants to enter the United States is, you are not welcome here. We are aware that some of the designations made today may be challenged in court. Due process under the law affords this opportunity. But we’re also confident that the designations are fully justified, and I would note that they have the concurrence of both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury. I want to emphasize, as well, that our review of organizations under the anti-terrorism law is ongoing. Other groups may be designated at any time. The steps we are taking today of cracking down on fundraising for terror and of banning terrorists from our shores are steps we urge other countries to take within their jurisdiction. By steadily reducing the habitat in which terrorism thrives, we can hope to make terrorists first an endangered species, and ultimately, an extinct one. SOURCE: http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/971008.html

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1999 … I welcome this opportunity to testify concerning U.S. efforts to counter the forces of international terror. As you know, the President has designated

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the Department of State as the lead agency for coordination of our counterterrorism policy and operations abroad, while the FBI is the lead agency for countering terrorism in the United States. So I am delighted to be here with my colleagues, Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh. Their presence reflects the fact that the battle against terror requires effective coordination within our own government and between our government and law-abiding nations around the globe. It also requires a partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States … I look forward to the opportunity today to build on our partnership and to explore with you the many dimensions to our strategy. In my statement, I will provide an overview of the international threat and discuss our diplomatic actions, policies, plans, and resource needs. The Attorney General and the Director will then bring you up to date on the wide range of law enforcement, technology, crisis management and other initiatives that are underway. We will each discuss the Five-Year Interagency Counter-terrorism and Technology Crime Plan. This Plan serves as a baseline strategy for coordinating our response to terrorism in the United States and against American targets overseas. The Subcommittee has received copies of the Plan, which was crafted under the leadership of the Attorney General. The Threat … If you look at the statistics, you will see that the number of terrorist incidents worldwide is declining. This reflects the diplomatic and law enforcement progress we have made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for them to operate. It reflects, as well, the improved political climate that has diminished terrorist activity in places such as Northern Ireland and Central America. But you would not be conducting this hearing, Mr. Chairman, if the dangers posed by international terrorism had declined. Tragically, they have not. Last August, I had the sad honor of bringing back to U.S. soil the bodies of Americans who perished in the embassy bombing in Kenya. Like the members of our armed forces who died in foreign conflicts, these Americans went in harm’s way for our country. But there is a difference—for they were not combatants in a war as we have long understood that term. They were casualties, instead, of a new kind of confrontation that looms as a new century is about to begin. In this struggle, our adversaries are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because there, American dominance is well established. They may resort, instead, to weapons of mass destruction and the cowardly instruments of sabotage and hidden bombs. As we know from explosions over the past decade in Africa, the Khobar apartment complex, the World Trade Center and Pan Am 103, these unconventional threats endanger both Americans and others around the world. Accordingly, we must be vigilant in protecting against the terrorist triple threat posed, first, by the handful of countries that actively sponsor terrorism; second, by long-active terrorist organizations; and third, by loosely affiliated

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extremists such as, among others, Osama bin Laden, who has urged his followers to kill Americans when and wherever they can. Our strategy must be long-term. The Five-Year Plan is only the beginning. Certainly, no single arrest or shutdown of a terrorist operation will be sufficient. The advance of technology has given us new means to counter terrorists. But it has also enabled terrorists to develop more powerful weapons and to travel, communicate, recruit, and raise funds on a global basis. It is essential, therefore, that we work closely with others. The perpetrators of terror include persons from a wide variety of creeds, cultures and countries. And their criminality has claimed victims almost everywhere, from Jerusalem to Japan, Tanzania to Turkey, and Oklahoma City to Sri Lanka. To counter this plague, law-abiding peoples everywhere must close ranks to detect, deter, prevent and punish terrorist acts. It is not enough for Americans to be concerned only about attacks against Americans. We must reach out to all those victimized or threatened by terror. The victims of the attacks orchestrated in Africa by Osama bin Laden, after all, were predominately African, including many practitioners of Islam. Terrorism is a highly indiscriminate form of violence. It must be opposed not simply as a matter of national interest, but as a fundamental question of right and wrong. Fighting Back Following the embassy attacks last August, President Clinton ordered military strikes to disrupt terrorist operations and deter new bombings. The message he conveyed is that, in this battle, we will not simply sit back and wait. We will take the offensive. We will do all we can to limit terrorist movements, block terrorist funds and prevent terrorist acts. As the President’s decision demonstrated, we will not hesitate, where necessary, to use force to respond to or defend against acts of terrorism. But force is only one element in our strategy. Every day, in every part of the world, we use a full array of foreign policy tools in our zero tolerance campaign against international terror. For example, we place the highest priority on measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands. This imperative is on our agenda with virtually every nation and figures in almost every major meeting I have. We constantly exchange information with friendly governments concerning terrorist activities and movements, thereby preventing attacks and facilitating arrests. We work with other agencies and other countries to strengthen screening procedures and increase intelligence sharing on visa applications. We are expanding our Anti-terrorism Training Assistance Program, which has already instructed more than 20,000 law enforcement officers from more than 90 countries, in subjects such as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue and crisis management. We are engaged, through the State Department-chaired Technical Support Working Group, in a vigorous research and development program to improve our ability to detect explosives, counter weapons of mass destruction, protect

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against cyber sabotage and provide physical security. In the technological race with terror, we are determined to gain and maintain a decisive strategic edge. We are making use of the Terrorism Information Rewards program to encourage persons to come forward with information to prevent acts of terrorism and apprehend those who commit them. We impose economic sanctions against state sponsors of terror. Currently, the seven governments on this list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. And both domestically and internationally, we are working to strengthen the rule of law. The Rule of Law At home, we have changed our statutes to block the financial assets of terrorist groups, prevent them from raising funds in the United States, and allow us to bar foreigners who support such groups. Around the world, we couple law enforcement with diplomacy in order to bring suspected terrorists before the bar of justice. As the Subcommittee knows, we have done this successfully in the World Trade Center case, the CIA killings and to a very considerable extent, in the Africa embassy bombings—which triggered a worldwide manhunt for bin Laden and his associates in murder. I cannot leave the subject of bringing terrorists to justice without highlighting the tragic case of justice delayed with respect to the bombing more than a decade ago of Pan Am flight 103. As Senators know, we have challenged the Government of Libya to meet its pledge to deliver the two suspects in that case for trial in the Netherlands under Scottish law. This approach has been approved by the Security Council and is supported by Arab and African regional organizations. It is an approach that is reasonable and fair and that has been on the table now for more than six months. I would like to take this opportunity once again to urge Libya to deliver the suspects for trial and thereby gain suspension of the UN sanctions. If this does not occur by the time those sanctions come up for Security Council review later this month, we will seek additional measures against the Qaddafi regime. Our effort to strengthen the rule of law against terrorism is global. At its heart is the message that every nation has a responsibility to arrest or expel terrorists, shut down their finances and deny them safe haven. As we stressed in the aftermath of the murders in Kenya and Tanzania, terror is not a legitimate form of political expression and it is certainly not a manifestation of religious faith. It is homicide, plain and simple. It is right for nations to bring terrorists to justice and those who do so should be recognized and rewarded appropriately. It is wrong to finance terrorist groups, whether or not specific contributions are for terrorist purposes. It is cowardly to give terrorist groups money in return for not being targeted. It is irresponsible simply to look the other way when terrorists come within one’s jurisdiction. And it fools no one to pretend that terrorist groups are something they are not. Consider the words of Hezbollah’s Sheik Hassan Nasrallah shortly after the Wye accords were signed: ‘‘I call on any Palestinian who has a knife, a hand grenade, a gun, a machine gun or a small bomb to go out during these few

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weeks and kill the Israelis and the Accord.’’ He also called for the assassination of Chairman Arafat. Some say Hezbollah is not terrorist, because it has a political agenda. But that is sophistry. As long as it advocates indiscriminate violence and assassination, it is terrorist. The same is true of other groups, such as Hamas, the PKK, and Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers. For each, the decision to use terror was a choice it did not have to make. Law-abiding nations must unite in helping them realize that the choice they have made is wrong. In this connection, I was very disappointed that Germany failed to make good on the recent opportunity to prosecute Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the terrorist PKK; and that Italy and Turkey were unable to find an alternative way to ensure he was brought to justice. Instead of determination, this opportunity was greeted with hand wringing and vacillation. Ocalan has left Italy and his current whereabouts are unknown. We call upon any nation into whose jurisdiction Ocalan comes to cooperate in ensuring that he stands trial for his alleged crimes. Diplomatic Force Protection The measures we take to provide physical protection for our diplomatic personnel overseas play a major role in our strategy for countering terror. In the aftermath of the embassy bombings last August, I established Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Admiral William Crowe, to investigate and recommend improved security systems and procedures. I received their report last month and will be submitting a formal response this spring. As you probably know, Mr. Chairman, the Boards found that the security systems and procedures followed by the two embassies involved were in accord with State Department policy. In both cases, the terrorists were prevented from penetrating the perimeter of the post. In neither case, did U.S. employees or members of the military breach their duty. The Boards did, however, identify what they termed ‘‘a collective failure’’ by the Executive and Legislative branches of our government over the past decade ‘‘to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.’’ According to the report, ‘‘We must undertake a comprehensive and longterm strategy … including sustained funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for increased security personnel and for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats.’’ I feel strongly that in order to have a viable security construction program, we need a long-term commitment of resources. The President’s request proposes that this be done by advanced appropriations. We have been able to work together on such arrangements in the past and I hope very much that we will able to do so in this case. Conclusion Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a word about coordination. This Subcommittee has stressed the need for U.S. agencies to work together in

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responding to the terrorist threat, and you are absolutely right. The Five-Year Plan will help. So has the President’s designation of a National Coordinator for Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. And I have the highest confidence in the State Department’s own new coordinator for counterterrorism, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Mike Sheehan. Personally, I am in frequent contact with my colleagues here at the table, Attorney General Reno and FBI Director Freeh, and with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and other key officials regarding the full range of anti-terrorism issues. I think we work together well and are getting better at it every day. One reason is that the President has made it clear through both his policies and statements that this issue is the Administration’s highest priority—internationally and domestically. That is true for a host of compelling substantive reasons. But I suspect it is true for another reason as well. Over the past six years, on too many occasions, the President has had the job of comforting the loved ones of those murdered and maimed by terrorists. I know from my own experience—it is an impossible task. After the last hand has been held, and the last words of condolence offered, all you can really do is vow that everything within your power will be done to prevent similar tragedies. That is the vow of this Administration this morning. And I suspect it is fully embraced by the members of this Subcommittee and by the American people. SOURCE: http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990204b.html

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Written Statement Submitted to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request for Foreign Operations, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2000 EXCERPTED My message is straightforward. I ask you to fully fund the foreign operations portion of the President’s national security budget request … events overseas have an impact on our citizens here at home, on our security, our jobs, our environment, even the safety of our streets and schools. The President’s Fiscal Year 2001 request for Foreign Operations is $15.09 billion, as part of a total international affairs budget of roughly $22.75 billion. This includes a broad array of programs and initiatives administered by four cabinet departments and more than a dozen agencies. It covers everything from supporting peace in the Middle East to interdicting drugs; from curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to the Peace Corps; and from promoting U.S. exports to responding to humanitarian disasters.… Our International Programs Help Make Americans More Secure The Cold War is over and our nation is strong, but our citizens continue to face grave dangers. These include terrorists who target Americans, possible

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conflicts in key regions, drug traffickers, and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles that can deliver them. … The military deterrent provided by our armed forces and the technological edge they enjoy are indispensable. But we will sleep better and be safer if our deterrent never has to be used. The job for our diplomats, then, is to create a political environment in which serious military threats to our country are less likely to arise. Another area where resources are required to protect our interests is in responding to the threat posed by international terror. Because of our military strength, potential enemies may try to attack us by unconventional means, including terrorist strikes and the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. Although the number of terrorist strikes has declined in recent years, the severity of such strikes has increased. In countering these threats, we must be prepared at home and overseas. That is why we are taking strong security measures and—at President Clinton’s direction—improving our planning for emergency response. Through our diplomacy and training programs, we help friendly governments to improve border security and share information about those suspected of being affiliated with terrorist networks. We gather information to advise and warn Americans. We strive to forge international agreements and cooperation that will leave terrorists with no place to run, hide, operate or stash their assets. We do all we can to bring suspects before the bar of justice, as we have in several major cases, including the sabotage of Pan Am 103, and the tragic 1998 bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa. This year, we are proposing in the President’s budget the creation of a dedicated Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training. This Center will help us to improve the skills of foreign security personnel who are on the front line of defense at airports, diplomatic missions and other facilities frequented by Americans overseas. We believe this Center should be located in the Washington, D.C. area, in order to foster interaction between the foreign security officials we train and our own security and law enforcement personnel. This will also enable us to consolidate our training programs, thereby streamlining management and improving the environment for training. SOURCE: http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000413-wr.html

UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE TIMOTHY E. WIRTH Undersecretary of State Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the Department of State, Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, March 1, 1994 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today as part of your review of the terrorism situation a year after the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. That attack, Mr. Chairman, brought home the threat that international terrorism poses to American citizens and interests. It also reminds us that

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terrorism insidiously undermines America’s goals for the expansion of democracy, free and open trade and sustainable development throughout the world. These are vital interests in a world relieved of the twin burdens of totalitarianism and state-run economies. Unhappily, even positive change can brings devastating dislocations. They, in turn, can bring frustration and resentment. Civil and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are dramatic examples. Our goal, and that of our friends and allies, is to shorten this period of turmoil. For terrorists, however, these dislocations are a godsend: poor and frustrated people are more easily seduced by radical ideologies; fledgling democracies are more vulnerable to manipulation. These dislocations give terrorists opportunities to achieve their goals: to overthrow governments, both democratic and otherwise, and to destabilize economies. In Egypt, tourism is a profitable target; terrorist attacks magnified by instant international media coverage are undermining a major source of Egypt’s foreign exchange. The PKK has now expanded its target list in Turkey to tourist facilities. The Provisional IRA regularly sets off bombs that bring the city of London to a standstill. In Algeria, terrorists have added a gruesome new dimension—slitting the throats of innocent foreigners in order to drive away foreign investment. The World Trade Center attack brought these tactics to our shores. The threat to Americans’ freedom to travel or to work abroad is even greater. It is a threat to our economy as well as to the security of our citizens. In short, terrorism remains a threat and, in some areas, poses a brand new threat to the United States and the world community. Congress should know that the Clinton administration will fight terrorism on every front, both at home and abroad. During the past year, as in the past two decades, we have focused our efforts on the role of state sponsorship of terrorism. Perhaps the most encouraging consequence of the iron curtain’s collapse has been the loss of assistance to terrorist organizations from countries of the former Warsaw Pact. International terrorism would not have flourished as it did during the past 20 years if it had not been for the funding, training, safehaven, and logistical support provided to terrorists by sovereign states. For this reason, working closely with our allies, we seek to increase the pressure on states which continue to support or sponsor terrorism and to make them pay the cost if they persist. Our principal tool for doing so remains the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. We recently completed a review of that list and decided to maintain it as revised when we added Sudan last August. State Sponsors Briefly, Iran remains the most dangerous sponsor and the greatest source of concern. A number of murders in Germany, Turkey, Switzerland and Italy can be laid at its door. Iran’s surrogate, Hizballah, was responsible for the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in early 1992. Iran opposes the Middle East peace process and it arms and funds rejectionist groups who espouse violence.…

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We conduct an active dialogue with our principal allies seeking to raise the cost to Tehran of its support for terrorism and to ensure that Iran hears the same message from all of us. A long-term objective is to harmonize export policies to Iran. A great deal more work needs to be done. We are concerned at Germany’s invitation to Iran’s Minister of Intelligence for bilateral talks and over France’s release of two Iranians sought for murder in Switzerland. Last year, we added Sudan to the terrorism list because it knowingly gives safe haven to a number of international terrorist groups, including the notorious Abu Nidal organization. Although we have no conclusive evidence that Sudan has itself participated in or sponsored terrorist actions, we believe that Sudan-based organizations have perpetrated acts of terrorism in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. International sanctions have hampered—but have not eliminated—Iraq’s ability to conduct international terrorism. An Iraqi scientist was murdered in Amman and Iraqi agents have sabotaged trucks carrying relief supplies to the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, killing innocent aid workers. Despite new international sanctions, Libya has not complied with UN security council demands that it surrender the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and cooperate with the French in investigating the bombing of UTA Flight 772. The past year has seen continued maneuvering by Libya to avoid compliance but our message is constant; there is no compromise on the issue of justice.… Syria continues to support groups which carry out terrorist attacks against its neighbors, Israel and Turkey. President Clinton raised the subject of terrorism with President Assad at their January meeting in Geneva. We will continue to press Damascus for satisfaction on this issue. Cuba and North Korea have not been tied directly to acts of international terrorism for some time. In Cuba’s case, that appears to be more a factor of its disastrous economic situation and loss of soviet support. Nevertheless, Castro has never disavowed his ideological defense of terrorism as a legitimate political tool. Although our current bilateral problems with North Korea are dominated by its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has demonstrated both a capability and willingness to engage in large scale terrorism whenever it chooses. Future Trends The World Trade Center bombing highlighted a new development that can complicate the fight against terrorism. The attack, in which six Americans died and more than one thousand were wounded, was carried out by a small group of individuals with limited technical skills and without apparent connections to a foreign state or organized terrorist group. Another recent development is the appearance of Afghan mujahedin fighting in a number of unrelated conflicts. The mujahedin are a potential body of recruits for groups advocating a violent, radical, agenda. We continue to monitor closely any terrorist spill-over from the wars in Bosnia or the former Soviet Union as well as the ongoing terror in Northern Ireland and South Africa. I would like to highlight the point that we do not, I repeat, do not regard resurgent Islam as the next ‘‘ism’’ confronting the west or world peace. The

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administration believes that such thinking is dangerously wrong and rejects the drawing of lines of confrontation between the West and the Islamic world. Our concern is with the religious extremists who resort to violence no differently than the secular terrorists of the last two decades. The horrible attack in Hebron on February 25 underscores the danger from religious extremists. As Secretary Christopher said Friday, we condemn in the strongest terms this abhorrent act of terrorism. The parties to the peace process must not permit this violent act—or the violent response to it—to deter them from the path of peace. Just as Friday’s massacre in a Hebron mosque was aimed at the peace process, the recent church bombing in Lebanon seems clearly aimed at Lebanon’s reconciliation process. The extremists have a common purpose—to promote division, strife and war. They must not and will not be allowed to succeed. U.S. Policy Mr. Chairman, we believe the basic U.S. policy of no concessions, pressure on state sponsors and application of the rule of law is a sound one. In regard to the last point, I want to emphasize that regardless of the political claims of terrorists, their actions are in violation of domestic and international law and should be treated as criminal by the world community. Last July we demonstrated the validity of this concept. The hijacker of an EgyptAir flight to Malta, an attack which caused the death of 60 people including an American woman, now faces trial here in Washington. Muhammad Ali Rezaq was released from a Maltese prison before completing his jail term. We tracked him through Africa and, in a textbook model of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation, secured his rendition to U.S. authorities. International cooperation has been excellent in vigorous enforcement of the new UN Security Council sanctions on Libya, achieved in concert with France and the UK. But, we will not rest until the actual perpetrators are turned over for trial in the U.S. or Scotland. The families and friends of those who died in this heinous attack deserve no less. UN Security Council Resolution 883 broke important new ground by freezing selected Libyan assets and banning the sale of many categories of oil industry equipment. However, if Libya continues to defy the United Nations, we will seek new sanctions. Looking to the future, we seek new mechanisms to cooperate on terrorism with the European Union and its law-enforcement arm, Europol. As the Europeans develop their own information sharing capabilities, we will participate in the exchange of information on terrorism, as well as organized crime and drug trafficking. We will cooperate in monitoring and preventing fund raising efforts for terrorists, money laundering schemes, and the expansion of front companies. This complements the existing intensive program of bilateral exchanges on the terrorist threat with the major European nations. Unilateral U.S. Steps While international cooperation is essential, the U.S. government also takes unilateral steps to combat terrorism and protect its citizens. We have worked with other federal agencies on a fully coordinated presidential decision directive outlining the national program for combating terrorism. This PDD will

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build on ten years’ experience in fighting terrorism. All agencies have agreed on this PDD. We hope it will go to the president for final approval shortly. We will continue to seek congressional support for important programs such as anti-terrorism assistance training and counterterrorism research and development. I believe that the anti-terrorism training offered to our friends who face a terrorist threat abroad has made a significant contribution to the decline in the lethality and number of terrorist incidents world-wide. Training provided by the ATA program has revolutionized airport security arrangements. The quality of our training program is well recognized and in high demand worldwide. We are asking for $15.2 million for the ATA program in FY 1995. I urge your support for this program, which has trained literally thousands of civilian police forces in almost a hundred countries, many of whom also protect Americans abroad. I also believe that the Department’s Terrorism Information Rewards Program, which can pay a reward of up to $2 million for information that helps in the fight against terrorism, has prevented terrorist attacks and has thus saved lives.… In addition, the State Department manages a national counterterrorism research and development program which is jointly funded by the Departments of State and Defense. Three million dollars is earmarked for international projects involving NATO and major non-NATO allies. Research funded through this program identified a chemical agent to help detect plastic explosives. This led, in turn, to Senate ratification in November of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection. This Convention requires manufacturing nations to include in their plastic explosives a chemical agent that helps the detection of the plastic explosives by machines or trained dogs.

SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN L. POWELL Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony at the Budget Hearing Before the Senate Budget Committee, 2002 International Affairs Budget, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2001 EXCERPTED I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you to present the President’s submission for 2002 for the International Affairs budget. In January, at my confirmation hearing, I told the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that President Bush would be a leader who faithfully represents to the world the ideas of freedom and justice and open markets. The President has many ways he can do this, many different methods with which he can show the world the values of America, and the prosperity and peace those values can generate. For example, the President meets with other heads of state here in Washington and he travels to summit meetings in the course of the year, and as you know, he has a Secretary of State who travels for him as well. I returned

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two weeks ago from visits to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the West Bank and Brussels, all in one four-day period of time. Such trips by the Secretary of State, such actions by the President, show our engagement in the world. But the most important method by which the President shows America to the world, the most important method by far, is through the thousands of people who labor away at such representation every day of the week, in almost every country in the world. I am, of course, speaking of our frontline troops in the State Department, as well as those here in America who support them. I’m talking about the Foreign Service Officers, the Civil Service employees and the Foreign Service Nationals who make up the Department of State. Theirs is the daily grind of foreign policy, punctuated by the thrill and excitement of diplomatic success, ranging from the minor to the sublime, from the courteous handling of a visa application to the inking of a treaty curtailing nuclear weapons. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I want to say to you that there are no finer people chipping away at tyranny, loosening the bonds of poverty, pushing the cause of peace and freedom, on the US Government payroll. We should be very proud of what those fellow Americans of ours are doing for the cause of freedom. And in my few weeks in the Department, both during the transition period and now as Secretary of State, it has become something of a mystery to me, a mystery that we’re going to clear up, as to how they have been able to do such a good job with such scarce resources over the years. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, it really is less than one percent of the overall budget. If you would ask the average group of Americans, they would think that what we spend on foreign affairs, international affairs and for the State Department is 10, 15 percent. But it isn’t. It’s only one percent. And I submit to you and to the Members of this committee that we get a pretty good return on that investment, but it is an investment that should grow if we want to see peace and freedom and wealth creation throughout the world grow in this 21st century. My hope is that in this first year of the Bush Administration the Congress will work with us to continue the progress that we have seen in the last year on improving the resource situation of the State Department. We have so much more to do. And in the budget that I am presenting to you this morning on behalf of President Bush, I think I can demonstrate that we are making improvements that are needed, improvements that will benefit the American people and will benefit the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. The increases that we are showing in this budget—and what I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is just touch on some of these major increases and then let you see the full text for the record, and you can examine it at your leisure. But in the interest of time, let me just touch on the highlights. With respect to the foreign operations of the Department, you’ll see a major increase for international narcotics and law enforcement, one of the great problems of our time. And of the $948 million total in this account, $217 million go for the base programs, 162 of that for global counternarcotics programs, and 55 million for transnational anti-crime efforts, including trafficking, $731 million for the Andean regional initiative.

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You recall that we had Plan Colombia. That is now being expanded into an Andean regional initiative, so we take into account some of the spillover that could occur from Plan Colombia, and to show that we are investing in all the countries of the Andean region so that the spillover doesn’t move the drug growing, the coca growing, from one nation to another nation. We have to make sure we have a regional approach, and this investment will do that. Secondly, military assistance to provide defense articles and training for Israel or the Europe Partnership for Peace countries, which allow these nations that used to be behind the Iron Curtain to become more integrated with Western ideas and Western thought. There is $1.3 billion in our overall blueprint with respect to enhanced security of our embassies, of our facilities, perimeter security, to make sure that the wonderful men and women we send overseas to work have assurance that the facilities that we are placing them in to work are secure. And not just the embassy itself, but other facilities within the capital of the country that we’re in, and also a special effort to make sure we’re doing everything we can to protect families as well. Overseas infrastructure increases are also within this increase for the Commerce-State-Justice appropriation. I think you will get a remarkable return on your investment. I think we are in a new age where the Department of State performs a responsibility for national security that is equal to that of the Defense Department—different in many ways, but the cutting edge of our national security activities really is represented by what our men and women of the Department of State do around the world, and we should be proud of how well they do it. SOURCE: https://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/1247.htm

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony on Counterterrorism Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2001 AS DELIVERED Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a very great pleasure to be here, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. And, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman—all—and the most distinguished panel you have put together, Senator Gregg, and I do appreciate the opportunity. Mr. Chairman, members of the group, the committee, I am pleased to testify before you on the subject of terrorism and I applaud this initiative to continue the dialogue on how America can improve its response to terrorism. At the Department of State, we welcome your interest and your past work in this area, including creating the concept of the Administration’s Five-YearPlan—an action to which we have contributed. Let me begin my testimony by talking about the United States’ response to international terrorism and the State Department’s role as lead federal agency in this effort. Our embassies, run by our ambassadors who are the President’s personal representatives, constitute our first line of defense against terrorism. They

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provide a critical early warning system alerting us to threats against our interests. Moreover, our diplomats deliver a consistent message on terrorism to foreign governments, reinforce that message with practical support to the willing, and we mobilize the international community to isolate, through political and economic pressure, those who support or use terrorism. In international fora, as well as in our bilateral relations, we work to create an environment intolerant of terrorism, and to isolate those who threaten us, our friends, our allies, and who terrorize innocent people and threaten innocent people everywhere in the world. The State Department also serves as the focal point for informing American citizens abroad about potential dangers and threats, and warning them when appropriate. We are constantly watching the trends and watching the intelligence to judge when such public announcements and travel warnings are necessary. In addition to these efforts, the Department is a leading member of the Counterterrorism Security Group, which regularly tracks threats and develops coordinated tactics to combat international terrorism. This interagency body serves as an excellent means of keeping open the lines of interagency communication. Members and their staffs meet often, train together, exchange information, and work together to ensure that their various responsibilities and programs are closely coordinated and act as force multipliers. We work closely with other agencies on a number of other programs that are important to our counterterrorism efforts: First, the Terrorist Interdiction Program, led by the State Department, is an important interagency effort to increase host nation capacity to prohibit terrorists from traveling through those host countries. The Department’s Anti-terrorism Assistance program draws on the expertise of many agencies in training foreign nations in better anti-terrorism techniques. The Technical Support Working Group, chaired by State, is an outstanding example of interagency coordination. This group’s goal is to improve the technical capabilities available to combat terrorism. We share the results of the group’s research with domestic first responders. For example, the explosive disrupter developed within this program is now a standard part of the equipment package of many American police bomb squads. In going after terrorist fund raising, we work closely with the intelligence community and the Justice and Treasury Departments to identify and designate foreign terrorist organizations and to take measures to discourage contributions to illicit charities and front companies. Our Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism now includes officers detailed from the FBI and the CIA to ensure better interagency coordination—both day-to-day, as well as in an emergency situation. In addition to our prevention efforts, we must also enhance our actual defenses against terrorism as well as our response capabilities. To protect our installations overseas, our first line of effort is again our ambassadors and their country teams. As we have seen in Nairobi, Dar Es Salaam, Sanaa, Quito, and Manila—to name only a few posts—our Chiefs of Mission, our Ambassadors, are responsible

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for coordinating the actions of the agencies that work within our embassies to defend against and, when defense fails, to respond to terrorist acts. With the exception of those people directly under the authority of a regional military CINC, Commander in Chief, our Chiefs of Mission are responsible for all official Americans working on behalf of the American people, whether they are Legal or Defense Attach´es, Intelligence Officers, or Foreign Service Officers or Civil Service Officers. The State Department also leads the Foreign Emergency Support Team, FEST team, which is deployed to serve as an ambassador’s consultative and support unit in response to a terrorist attack or sometimes in anticipation of a potential threat. In the past year, this team has been deployed to such far reaches as Manila, Aden, and Quito. With respect to an actual terrorist incident, this interagency team, led by experienced State Department professionals, plays a crucial role in our response. It helps us ensure that those first days, weeks, and often months after the incident are focused on accomplishing the daunting tasks of securing American lives and assets, taking good care of the people involved, working intimately with the host government to ensure that justice is served, and keeping Washington informed on critical developments. The State Department also provides excellent physical security for our missions around the world, and we are trying to do an even better job, as I have testified before this committee previously. Our Diplomatic Security corps is watching threats around the clock to ensure that American officials based or traveling abroad are secure. And as you may recall from my budget testimony, we are going to hire more of these professionals with the money that is now in the President’s budget request for 2002. Also from my budget testimony, you know the pace at which we are approaching embassy construction and refurbishment and that this is an additional element of our defense against terrorism. So America’s international defense and response capabilities are clearly defined, coordinated, and functioning well. We are working closely with our government interagency partners here and abroad. We are constantly reviewing and exercising our response capabilities to ensure they continue to address changing needs. We have already taken steps to strengthen coordination with domestic efforts. Most recently we did this by participating in TOPOFF, an exercise in which senior government officials trained to respond to a weapons of mass destruction terrorist event. Although the international response was a limited portion of this domestically-focused scenario, we were ready to respond and gear up the State Department activities in such a case. TOPOFF participation also helped us to identify the international issues associated with a domestic terrorist weapon of mass destruction incident. We are continuing to work with the Department of Justice on future exercises. We also serve on Joint Terrorism Task Forces in several domestic locations, such as Los Angeles and New York. This effort, strongly supported by the Congress—and I thank the Congress for that support—strives to maximize communication among enforcement and intelligence agencies.

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And I know that this larger matter of interagency coordination is of particular interest to you, Mr. Chairman, and to other members of this committee; so let me take a moment and highlight some other additional efforts that we are taking to improve cooperation and effectiveness: The leaders of our Foreign Emergency Support Teams head interagency exercises at least twice a year to ensure that our teams are ready for different and changing types of emergency response needs, ranging from airplane hijackings to nuclear blackmail. The composition of the team depends on the incident and includes specialists such as FBI hostage negotiators and forensic experts, or WMD consequence management planners. State Department officials, both in Washington and abroad, regularly train for emergency response in an interagency environment. We strive to maintain a high level of readiness in our Washington-based taskforces and international emergency action response capabilities. Our Diplomatic Security people constantly review their extensive programs with other law enforcement agencies and activities to ensure that they develop and maintain the best possible capability to protect our official people and facilities overseas and to ensure that we are adequately protecting Americans abroad. Before I wrap up and take your questions, let me touch briefly on two other important aspects of our counterterrorist efforts. First, at the State Department we believe that affording the best possible protection to American citizens is our duty, wherever those citizens may work or travel overseas. But we cannot succeed in this effort without the support and cooperation of foreign governments. These governments bear the primary responsibility within their borders for preventing terrorism, protecting our citizens, responding to terrorist attacks, and investigating attacks against Americans. It is also through the cooperation of foreign governments that we have extradited and rendered to American justice thirteen wanted terrorists since 1993. This is another compelling element of proof of why our diplomatic corps is so crucial to the fight against terrorism. And secondly, the State Department needs resources to continue its leadership role overseas and to provide for the safety of American citizens and assets abroad. Whether we are training foreign officials who will serve as protection around our embassies, or training ourselves to respond to, say, a biological attack, or getting our message out through active public diplomacy, it takes money. We need the dollars to do so effectively. We remain the front line of prevention, defense, and response, but cannot perform effectively if we do not have adequate financial support. Since I have already given you my budget testimony, I will leave it at that. Mr. Chairman, America’s international counterterrorism capability is strong. At all levels of government, we meet regularly, train together, share information, and use our resources as force multipliers. At the same time, we are working to build a stronger bridge between our international and domestic counterterrorism efforts. As the lead federal agency in dealing with terrorism overseas, the State Department stands ready to accomplish the mission. Does that mean we are

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going to thwart or successfully defend against every terrorist act? Of course not. That is not possible. But it does mean that we are doing all that is humanly possible to prevent and defend against terrorist acts directed at our citizens, workers, and facilities and, those efforts failing, to pursue the terrorists until they appear in court to answer for their criminal acts. And there is another important point to make here, Mr. Chairman. Americans do not want to hunker down in their embassies and their consulates and await the next attack, as inevitable as that next attack may in fact be. That outlook is against all that we stand for. It is against the very spirit of our people. Terrorism is a part of the dark side of globalization. However sadly, it is a part of doing business in the world—business we as Americans are not going to stop doing. Indeed, if we adopted a hunkered down attitude, behind our concrete and our barbed wire, the terrorists would have achieved a kind of victory. We don’t want to avoid controversial causes, nor shrink from our fullest responsibilities overseas, nor slow or cut back on our overseas travel or the flow of our citizens throughout the wider world. After all, our citizens are our best ambassadors. At the end of the day, what America is to the world is not only what we say or do, it is who we are. And we are not helmeted giants huddling in our bunkers awaiting the enemy. We are entrepreneurs, artists, businesspeople, and diplomats, as outgoing, as extroverted a people as any the world has ever seen. And we must remember that in combating terrorists we are dealing with criminals. But that does not mean—it does not mean—that we let them have their way. We need to keep these things in mind as we craft our counterterrorism efforts and the public diplomacy associated with them. We will continue to strengthen our cooperation with those fighting terrorism domestically. We know also that we can improve further our interagency integration and cooperation so that we have the most effective government team possible, whether operating in a preventive or defensive mode or responding to another terrorist act. And we are working diligently, Mr. Chairman, to improve that interagency integration and cooperation. This program has the President’s highest priority and it has my highest priority and my personal support. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/2780.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony at the Budget Hearing Before the Senate Budget Committee, 2002 International Affairs Budget, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2001 (https://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2001/1247.htm).

4 Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism AMBASSADOR ROBERT B. OAKLEY Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Director, Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, ‘‘International Terrorism: Current Trends and the U.S. Response,’’ Before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on the Judiciary, May 15, 1985 … In order to be responsive to all the concerns raised in your letter of invitation and provide as complete a picture as possible, this presentation is divided into four general topics, stated as the following questions. ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥

What are the current trends in terrorism? How is the U.S. Government organized to deal with the threat? What unilateral actions can we realistically consider? What have we been doing to increase international cooperation in this fight?

Current Trends Rather than recite statistics in great detail, I believe it would be more useful to review the trends as we see them developing over the next few years. First, terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the international political landscape for the rest of this century. Despite the intensified efforts we and other governments are undertaking, I believe that terrorism will not easily disappear. It will increasingly be a part of our daily lives for many reasons. ¥ A worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes weapons available more easily to terrorist groups. ¥ Mass communications assure instantaneous publicity for terrorist acts. ¥ Travel is becoming increasingly easier between different countries. ¥ Border controls are diminishing, particularly in Europe.

In addition, we should recognize that weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare

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potentially too costly, and terrorism is, therefore, viewed by several countries as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies. Second, the problem for the United States is likely to continue to be external to the United States, not internal; and the threat against U.S. interests abroad is likely to increase proportionately to the increase of total incidents. Incidents within the United States, especially externally inspired terrorism, have been decreasing—together representing less than 1% of the world total— because of the effective work of the FBI, generally tighter control at U.S. points of entry, and aversion by the American people to foreign-inspired violence. The potential threat inside the United States is real, but our current efforts appear likely to keep it to a minimum. At the same time, U.S. citizens and U.S. interests have been consistently the target of 30%–35% of worldwide terrorist attacks, although the percentage appears to have dropped in 1984, when there was a record number of incidents. Most other countries with a terrorist problem must deal largely with an internal threat—the PIRA [Provisional Irish Republican Army] in the United Kingdom, M-19 in Columbia, or the Red Army Faction in the Federal Republic of Germany. Only a limited number of other countries—France, Turkey, Israel, and Jordan—must consider serious internal and external threats. Third, terrorist attacks are likely to be increasingly violent. The number of casualties and fatalities has generally grown with the number of incidents. During both 1983 and 1984, approximately one-third of the number of casualties were fatalities. If one looks over the tactical trends over the past ten years—seizing of Embassies and suicidal car bombs, actions which were previously unknown—we must recognize that there are likely to be further grotesque developments in the future. Fourth, a broader spectrum of citizens will be the victims of terrorist attacks. Prominent public figures will remain the focus, but there are more victims from nonofficial circles. Comparing the victims of terrorist attacks in 1984 with those in 1983, one can see that diplomats and military personnel are a declining share of the total, while businessmen, journalists, and even clergymen are increasingly the targets of attacks. Fifth, there is a wide range of groups with separate interests involved in terrorist activities. Today, we are dealing with groups such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, the radical Shiites in the Middle East, Shining Path in Peru, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Some groups such as the Shia have arrived on the scene recently, while others—such as the Palestinians, ASALA, and some of the leftists, separatists, and anarchists in Europe—have been around for a considerable period of time. Looking back to the scene in the United States 15 years ago, we talked about violence by the Black Panthers, the Weather Underground, and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Just as these groups have disappeared from the terrorist scene, and, in fact, the nature of the threat in the United States has changed, we must recognize that the groups and nations involved today in international terrorism could change in the coming years as a result of effective actions against them, new social conditions, and changes in leadership. We must remain vigilant and take strong steps but must also be careful to

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avoid overacting and creating new generations of terrorists in response to perceptions of our actions. Sixth, open societies will remain the principal targets of terrorists, but no societies are immune. Open, and particularly democratic societies, are vulnerable to terrorism, on the one hand, because the terrorists might succeed more easily in bringing the democratic state to its knees, on the other, because overreactions by the democratic state to the threat could destroy the open nature of the society. We should recognize, however, that the means which are increasingly available to the opponents of democratic states are also available to the opponents of dictatorships. An example of this threat has emerged recently in Bulgaria, where there were several attacks during recent months, probably committed by the minority Turkish population. During 1984, the Soviet Union ranked seventh on the terrorist victim list. We must work to ensure that all states, regardless of their political systems, are aware that terrorism is a threat to all forms of organized society. Seventh, responses from governments to terrorist attacks will tend to ebb and flow with events. Shortly after the Beirut bombing of our Embassy, there was a great outcry for action in the United States which fostered the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism and other important provisions aimed at combating terrorism. In London, following the shooting of the British policewoman from the window of the Libyan Embassy, there was a cry of outrage against Libyan terrorism. Similarly, in Europe, after the discovery of collaboration among leftist terrorist groups and assassinations of prominent figures in France and Germany, there was a rash of cooperative measures among the European states. A few months later, when we have tried to talk with the British about stronger joint actions against the Libyans or with the Europeans about strengthening cooperation, the normal bureaucratic reasons for inaction have again dominated the dialogues. The Current International Terrorist Scene. Let’s look in more detail at the international terrorist scene. The Middle East has become the primary source of international terrorism, accounting for about 35% of all incidents. But international travel has permitted the export of Middle Eastern terrorism elsewhere. There are two main categories of Middle Eastern terrorists: First, fanatical Palestinians who have split off from the mainline PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] led by Arafat and often have direct support of Libya and Syria; and Second, Shia zealots residing in many Arab countries, especially Lebanon, who are inspired, trained and often armed, financed, and, to varying degrees, guided by Iran. The targets of Middle East terrorism fall principally into four groups: ¥ Israel; ¥ Western governments and citizens, particularly France and the United States ¥ Moderate Arab governments and officials, including the mainline PLO as well as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; and ¥ Critics of radical regimes, particularly Libyans, who are targeted by their own governments.

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While the Middle East might be the source of most terrorism, Europe is the location of the largest number of incidents, ranging from 36% to 53% of the total during each of the past 5 years. Nearly 25% of these incidents, however, are of Middle Eastern origin. Indigenous European terrorists consist of: ¥ Elements of ethnic groups, such as Corsicans, Basques, Croatians, and Armenians, which have been fighting for autonomy or to redress reputed grievances; in particular, the Armenian groups which have waged a deadly and relentless campaign both here in the United States and in Europe against Turkish interests in an effort to establish an Armenian state. ¥ Leftist groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy, Direct Action in France, Red Army Faction in Germany, the CCC [French acronym for the Fighting Communist Cells] in Belgium, Grapo in Spain, and November 17 in Greece; and ¥ Of special note, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the PIRA, which is both ethnic and leftist. It is the most deadly of all European groups, having killed some 50 people in 1984. This group should be distinguished from the IRA [Irish Republican Army] of earlier days.

For many years, these groups pursued their separate targets independent of each other, but a new phenomenon developed during late 1984 among some of the European leftist groups. Aside from an apparent increase in mutual logistical and propaganda support, groups in Germany Belgium and France all attacked NATO-related targets over a period of several months. This resurgence accounted for most of the increase in the total number of incidents in Europe during the past year. There was a lull at the end of the hunger strike by jailed terrorist in Germany, followed by a rash of incidents preceding the annual summit meeting in Bonn. Experts expect that we will see similar outbreaks in future months. Latin America is the third great center of terrorist incidents, accounting for approximately 20% of the events worldwide. Social, economic, and political turmoil have served to prolong existing patterns of insurgency which have assumed terrorist dimensions in some countries, particularly Columbia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. While there is little spillover into Latin America from terrorism in the Middle East, and Europe, Cuba and Nicaragua have continued to terrorist activities in other countries with insurgency operations. In addition, Italian and possibly other leftist terrorists have found refuge in Nicaragua. A new threat, narco-terrorism, has grown in Latin America during the past year. It is potentially dangerous because it combines drug criminals with political terrorists and guerrillas. In response to intense U.S. pressure against drug bosses, traffickers have struck against U.S. officials, U.S. businessmen, and cooperating officials of their own countries. This problem has been most serious in Columbia. A separate word should be added about state sponsorship of terrorist activities. Certain countries—most importantly Iran, Syria, Libya, and Cuba—are increasingly important factors in global terrorism. Iran has become the major culprit, aiming to further its goals of establishing fundamentalist Shiite regimes patterned after its own elsewhere in the Muslim world and reducing, at the same time, U.S. influence. In 1983 there were about 50 attacks which could be tied to Iran; in 1984, about 60 attacks. France and the United States

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are the main Iranian targets. Evidence of increasing Iranian terrorism includes active recruiting and training of Muslims from the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Asia and the apprehension of operatives recently in Spain, France and Italy. The Libyans appear to have been involved in about 25 incidents last year, up from the previous years. Most Libyan terrorism is directed at Libyan residents in other countries who are opponents of President Qadhafi. Other incidents include the mining of the Red Sea and plots against President Mubarak of Egypt and the leaders of Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia. Several terrorist attacks against Jordanian targets in Jordan and Europe during the past year are undoubtedly the responses of the Syrian Government to the diplomatic moves of King Hussein, particularly in relation to the PLO. Damascus seems to use surrogate radical Palestinian groups to carry out these attacks. U.S. Policy This background makes it clear that a tremendous effort is required merely to hold one’s own, much less put an end to international terrorism, and that this effort must be international, not merely by our government. No matter what our commitment and capability may be, we cannot succeed alone when the threat originates abroad and strikes abroad where other governments necessarily have a major responsibility. U.S. policy is direct. We will make no concessions to terrorists. We pay no ransoms, nor do we permit releases of prisoners or agree to other acts which might encourage additional terrorism. We make no changes in U.S. policy because of terrorists’ threats or acts. If U.S. personnel are taken hostage or endangered, we are prepared to consider a broad range of actions appropriate to the threat. We encourage other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism. Finally, we are determined to act in a strong manner against terrorists without surrendering our basic freedoms or endangering our democratic principles. Organization of the U.S. Government to Counter Terrorism. In our country, the leadership of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz and the strong support of Congress are providing both the means and the political will to combat terrorism. This leadership and congressional support need to be continued, with no diminution of will, priority, or resources by either the executive or legislative branches. Even with such a sustained U.S. Government commitment, unless and until other governments are willing and able to make the same commitment, the unfavorable trend experienced last year cannot be reversed. Without this international cooperative effort, the terrorists and those behind them will continue to be successful, which will encourage others to utilize terrorism to achieve their own political and ideological goals. In National Security Decision Directive 30 the President designated the Department of State with the lead interagency role in combating terrorism outside the United States. The Inter-departmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by State, provides the forum for the major departments and agencies involved in combating terrorism to meet regularly and share ideas, draw conclusions, and make recommendations on policy and programs. The permanent

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members include the Vice President’s office, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Justice (which has interagency responsibility for domestic terrorism), the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Other agencies are invited when there is an agenda item of direct interest to them. The IG/T provides a single point where the various departments and agencies can address questions and make proposals. The conclusions and recommendations of the IG/T which cannot be implemented at the level of the IG/T participants are forwarded to the NSC for further action. There are four officially established working groups of the IG/T: Technical Support (and R&D [research and development]), Exercises, Training Assistance, and Public Diplomacy. ¥ The Technical Support Group, co-chaired by the Departments of Defense and Energy and including representatives of all agencies doing R&D work in counterterrorism, provides a forum for the exchange of information and the establishment of priorities through specialized subgroups. ¥ The Exercise Committee focuses on crisis management exercises which involve interagency coordination as well as cooperation with other governments. ¥ The Training Assistance Group has members from the State, DOD, CIA and DEA as appropriate. Its role is to ensure that there is no duplication of effort in the U.S. Government training programs in participating countries. ¥ The Public Diplomacy Group, with representatives from State, United States Information Agency, the FBI, and DOD, is a new effort to coordinate, systematize, and improve on-going efforts by several agencies to increase public understanding of the threat of terrorism and the importance of intense efforts to resist the threat.

We have strong leadership at the State Department in the struggle to oppose terrorism and improve security preparedness abroad. The Secretary of State has this subject very much on his mind and makes clear in his daily meetings on security that it must also be on the minds of everyone else at State. He does the same for our ambassadors and diplomatic personnel abroad. He is leading a government wide effort to promote international awareness and cooperation to address the common threat and convince other governments to work closely with us to counter, deter, and eventually end terrorism. Under Secretary for Management, Ron Spiers oversees and coordinates all this activity for the Secretary of State. Organizationally, the chain of command is clear. Reporting to the Under Secretary are: the Office of Security—which is primarily responsible for the physical security of our people and facilities overseas—and the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning— which is primarily responsible for designing measures to fight terrorism and promoting cooperation with other countries against terrorism. The Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, known in the bureaucracy as M/CTP, deals with the problems of international terrorism from two levels: first, in its coordinating role within the Department of State

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and, second, in its similar role as head of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The M/CTP [rule] as spelled out to the Inman commission [headed by retired Admiral Bobby Inman] in October 1984 include[s] ¥ To develop and recommend policies to deal with terrorism and to represent the Department of State in interdepartmental considerations on this subject; ¥ To conduct liaison with other governments on international terrorism policy; ¥ To receive and review all intelligence materials from the intelligence agencies pertaining to terrorist threats and to take action as appropriate; ¥ To work with the Director of INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] to ensure improved collection, coordination of assessments, and full utilization of intelligence community resources; ¥ To ensure that terrorism alerts are provided on a timely basis to overseas posts, to approve all such alerts, and to monitor Embassy responses to such alerts; ¥ To work with the Assistant Secretary for Administration and the Deputy for Security in setting physical security policies and practices relevant to terrorist threats, including coordination with other government agencies; and ¥ To ensure the adequacy of Embassy emergency action plans.

Coordination Within the U.S. Government. The IG/T and its working groups provide a formal framework for coordination within the U.S. Government. There are other actions we have taken recently to augment coordination in other areas. We have promoted closer collaboration between U.S. military and civilian authorities overseas. We have opened channels of communication about threats or incidents between Embassies and military posts overseas and initiated steps to increase coordination of the emergency planning functions between the Embassies and the U.S. military command units with local responsibility. Most importantly, we have also improved intelligence coordination on terrorist subjects. Within the United States, several members of the intelligence community have established 24-hour watches on international terrorism. State’s watch center includes the latest communications equipment for sharing information with the other watch centers. We are computerizing the information on terrorists for easier access. We have created a special caption on State Department telegraphic messages to speed up distribution of all traffic to all interested offices in the U.S. Government. Finally, we have established a coordinate interagency system for the preparation and transmission of threats alerts to posts overseas. A sound structure exists within the State department and through its role as head of the IG/T to ensure effective coordination of our activities to combat terrorism outside the United States. The IG/T offers not only a formal mechanism for coordination through its periodic meetings and the activities of its working groups but also the important informal ties which permit easy communications at the time of a crisis. The IG/T, however, is a policy body, not a structure for crisis management. Each member has separate interests and responsibilities and becomes involved in a crisis depending upon the circumstances.… Generally, for terrorist incidents which occur outside the United States, State, Defense, NSC, and the CIA are the principal participants.

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Operation of Coordinating Mechanisms. Let us examine in more detail what happens when a terrorist incident occurs overseas and how the coordinating mechanisms operate. When a serious incident occurs, such as a bombing, a hijacking, or an armed attack, the 24-hour watch centers of the interested agencies alert the interested offices within their agencies. If the incident occurs at night, the watch would alert the duty officers for these offices, who would make additional alerts within their offices. If the incident seemed sufficiently serious, the heads of separate offices in the State Department, in consultation with each other, might request the establishment of a task force within State’s Operations Center to monitor developments, establish contact with other agencies and posts overseas, and coordinate all State Department actions. Such task forces were set up recently with the September 20 bombing of our Embassy in Beirut, the hijacking of the Kuwait Airline flight to Iran, and the escape of Jeremy Levin from his captors in Lebanon. The position as head of task forces is generally shared by the M/CTP and the responsible bureau in the Department. Such task forces can be set up quickly and be operational as soon as the fist participants show up in the Operations Center. The other agencies might constitute their own working groups, as appropriate, during the early hours of a crisis. The working groups or task forces of the separate agencies continue their internal coordinated watches for the duration of the crisis. The first interagency contact might occur shortly after the incident has broken. It is generally in the form of a phone conversation between members of the IG/T, who would assess the situation and note the actions that their departments are considering. Each department has its separate responsibilities and its separate assets which contingency planners automatically begin considering at the outset of an incident. The Defense Department might look at the U.S. units in the area and our capability for a military response, while the State Department considers host government efforts to deal with the crisis, the threat to Americans in the area, the liaison with families of the victims and the press. For most incidents, coordination can be handled through regular phone conversations between IG/T members from State, Defense, and the other involved agencies. Questions about the deployment of force to resolve a crisis might be discussed informally, at first, among the IG/T members and followed up at meetings organized through the National Security Council, but approval for any action comes from the highest levels of each agency and the White House. U.S. Actions Against Terrorism Any discussion of actions against terrorists brings to mind Secretary Shultz’s statement of October 25, 1984, when he said that ‘‘… our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks …’’ We should not look upon these words as a definition of how we might respond to each future terrorist incident but, rather, as opening further the range of actions for consideration in the fight against terrorism. Unlike the FBI in its role as the lead agency for domestic terrorism, we do not have the same jurisdiction to take action overseas. While the use of force

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presents one variation of additional activities, we should recognize that there are other active measures, covert and overt, which should be included as options. The statement serves as a warning to terrorists and their supports that we have the will and ability to act. As in all conflict situations, there are a wide range of actions, short of all-out warfare, which might resolve problems. I would like to turn to an exploration of these possible actions, dividing them into two categories: actions we might take unilaterally and actions we might take along with other countries. Unilateral Actions. There are a number of actions the United States has taken and has been considering on a basis to deal with the international terrorist threat. They range from strictly defensive protective measures to our military capabilities. ¥ First, improving physical security at our Embassies and missions around the world has the highest priority. Using existing resources plus those additional resources plus those made available already, as well as those additional resources being requested by the security supplemental of FY [fiscal year] 1985, the Department has acted to reinforce the buildings, upgrade security equipment, and augment guard forces at the most highly threatened posts around the world. ¥ Second, we are upgrading the emergency planning capabilities at every Embassy. Each post is required to prepare an ‘‘emergency action plan’’ for any threats or emergencies it might face. These plans are updated every two years. Each Embassy has an Emergency Action Committee which is responsible for managing terrorist incidents and coordinating security precautions among separate U.S. Government agencies within the country. Just as the military tests its capacity to respond to a crisis through a series of exercises, we have begun a similar program to test the ability of our Embassies. Using a compressed time series and a program designed for the problems of the post, a visiting team simulates a hijacking, a bombing, or an assault on the Embassy. This program, which began in 1983, will test the capabilities of about two dozen of our Embassies in high-threat areas during 1985. ¥ Third, we are sensitizing employees to the dangers posed by international terrorism. As noted previously, the Secretary had demonstrated a personal interest in changing the mentality of Foreign Service regarding terrorism. This is demonstrated by daily meetings on terrorism and security issues when he is in Washington and his inspection of posts overseas upon arrival in a foreign country. We offer seminars on countering terrorism to all U.S. Government employees going overseas and require all State Department employees to participate in these seminars. ¥ Fourth, we are seeking to increase cooperation with American businesses operating overseas. The Threat Analysis Group of the Office of Security in Washington and the regional security officers at posts overseas encourage contact with the private sector on security issues. The Secretary announced in February the formation of the Overseas Security Advisory Council, where public sector officials will meet to exchange information on security issues and make recommendations for closer operational cooperation. ¥ Fifth, we have promoted legislation within our country, which strengthens our defenses, implements, our international obligations under antiterrorism conventions, and provided stricter punishment for perpetrators of terrorist acts. During the 1984 session, Congress passed the security supplemental, which appropriated additional funds for enhanced security programs, from our exercise program, and for a new program to pay money as rewards for information on terrorists. The

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Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 included provisions against murderfor-hire and other areas, which have assisted in the antiterrorist fight. Other legislation implemented in the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage and the UN convention against taking hostages. We examined the possibilities for major new legislation initiatives for the 1985 session and concluded that no such initiatives were called for at this time. We recognize the importance of close cooperation with legislative branch and will be looking continuously for new areas for collaboration. Sixth, we are controlling trade with states which are supporters of terrorism. Pursuant to its authority to control the export of defense articles and defense services under Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department, as matter of policy, does not permit such exports to any of the five countries—Cuba, Libya, Syria, Iran, and South Yemen—designated as states which support terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. The Export Administration Act aims at restricting the export of goods or technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential or would enhance the terrorist support capabilities of the designated states. Other trade controls against terrorist states are difficult to establish because exporters would oppose them, viewing the controls as a form of harassment which would cost them sales and encourage countries to turn to other suppliers. Seventh, we seek to exercise controls over the travel to the United States by suspected terrorists and the movement of diplomats from states which support terrorists. We are able to prevent the issuance of a visa or the admittance at the port of US entry of suspected terrorists through the worldwide visa lookout system, which contains an applicant’s name with a special indicator code noting what further action, is necessary. For government employees and certain other categories of citizens from Libya, Iran, and Cuba who seek to enter the United States, a request for an advisory opinion is forwarded to Washington, which results in a complex series of name checks and, eventually, an instruction to the post of inquiry. Time and geographic restrictions on travel within the United States can be written into the visa for officials of such countries who must travel to the United States, for example, for business at the United Nations. Eighth, better intelligence is clearly one of the most important keys to a more effective counter-terrorism strategy. But terrorism poses a special kind of challenge in terms of both collection and analysis. To be useful, it must be acted upon. Thus, there is often a hard choice to make between concealing our sources and taking advantage of our knowledge. We have put more emphasis on collecting intelligence of terrorism by all agencies operating overseas. Good intelligence will give us the advance warning of pending attacks, information about movements of suspected terrorists, and the ability to preempt an attack by such means as obstructing the route of the attackers or moving the target to another location. Ninth, we are prepared to provide supplementary personnel for Embassy staff at the time of an incident. For an ongoing incident, we have the ability to dispatch an additional security officer, intelligence officer, or specialist on the psychology of terrorists or hijackings. We also can dispatch teams composed of intelligence and military experts to the site of an incident to support our Embassy or efforts of a local government to deal with a problem. Tenth, we have the capability to act militarily at the time of a severe crisis when it is determined that important US national interests are at stake. Under Secretary [of Defense for Policy Fred] Ikle has provided some information about our capabilities in this area, but I am sure the committee understands that much of this information is very sensitive.

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These steps represent a wide range of areas for action, which we have taken or are capable of taking. In consideration of the more active options, there is an inherent dilemma for a superpower in responding to terrorist threats and attacks through force. On the one hand, we must be willing to consider the whole range of options and be perceived by terrorists and their supporters as an effective opponent if we are ever to deal successfully with the problem; but, on the other hand, we must weigh carefully the consequences of our actions. Effective action requires good intelligence about the terrorists and where they might be. We must consider the likelihood of success of our action and balance it against the costs of failure, the threat to innocent victims, and the possible public outcry against our actions. We must examine the moral implications of our actions as well as relevant domestic and international legal considerations. If we do not have the support of the host government for our military actions, we must weigh the likely reaction of our allies—whose bases we might have used for the operation—and any response from our adversaries in terms of additional advantages they might seize on a global level or in the state where we have acted. Selecting the appropriate response to each terrorist act raises many questions. We should not consider it a sign of weakness that a terrorist act might occur without a U.S. military response. We must remember that we are a superpower with global interests and responsibilities, and we must recognize that, in many cases, the disadvantages of military action from the global perspective might outweigh the advantages. This does not mean that we are either unable or unwilling to act forcefully but, rather, that in most circumstances other sorts of actions might be more appropriate than a military response. Israel is frequently cited as a nation which knows how to deal effectively with terrorists, but even key Israeli ant-terrorist experts have acknowledged publicly that the use of force cannot, by itself, solve the terrorist problem. The U.S. policy and practice is to consider as broad range of measures as possible and not to rely too heavily on any single one. In considering this range of actions, we must look beyond what we might be prepared to do unilaterally to deal with the threat, to what we might do in concert with other states. Increasing International Cooperation Multilateral vs. Bilateral Actions. Common action against terrorism should be considered in both the multilateral and the bilateral context. Looking first at the possibilities for multilateral actions, there are two types: universal actions, generally under the auspices of the United Nations, and those actions by small groups of like-minded states working together. There are several examples of global treaties covering terrorist issues. The Hague convention on aircraft hijacking mandates severe penalties for the seizure or attempted seizure of an aircraft in flight and requires extradition of the hijacker or submission of the case for prosecution. The Montreal convention on aircraft sabotage creates similar obligations regarding acts which endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight. There are also separate UN conventions covering murder, kidnapping, and other attacks against diplomats and the taking of hostages. The obligations under these conventions are, again,

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generally similar to those of the Hague convention. The existing international conventions are important because of the moral force they offer, but their effectiveness is, at present, severely limited by the lack of viable enforcement mechanisms. One can recognize instantly that these conventions have not halted hijackings, crimes against diplomats, or hostage taking. Some nations have not acceded to the conventions, others may have done so only with reservations, and still others refrain from honoring the agreements they ratified. The present international environment creates special difficulties for international agreement on any subject. International discussions such as those at the United Nations and its specialized agencies have frequently become bogged down in peripheral issues and special interests, such as the participation of certain states and groups in the meeting. Despite possible problems, we must recognize the moral force of these conventions, work toward their effective implementation, and be on the lookout for new areas for international cooperation. Agreements among smaller numbers of like-minded states generally present great opportunities for cooperation, at present, than international conventions. During recent years, the United States has looked to the summit seven1 industrial states for closer cooperative measures against terrorism. Terrorism has been a topic of discussion among the summit seven leaders, the foreign ministers, and the experts’ group specially established to consider counter terrorism initiatives. Following the summit sessions, there have frequently been communiqu´es condemning terrorism and providing direction for further areas of cooperation. Special attention has been given at the summits to aircraft hijacking, specifically through the Bonn declaration of 1978, which provides for concerted sanctions against states that fail to take appropriate legal action against hijackers. The Bonn declaration led to sanctions against Ariana Afghan Airlines in 1982. During 1985, one of the summit topics was the tie between narcotics traffickers and terrorists. Developing effective cooperative measures, even among like-minded states such as the summit seven, presents numerous difficulties. Some states are unwilling to share information in a multilateral forum that they might be willing to share bilaterally. Each state faces a different sort of terrorist problem and naturally thinks in terms of its own interest when dealing with others. There is, however, a general consensus among the seven to seek systematized bilateral cooperation in such a way as to have the practical effects similar to those of a collective approach but avoiding the major obstacles faced by global initiatives. The United States will continue to pursue closer cooperation in the framework of the summit seven, look for other possible initiatives among other like-minded groups of states, and consider new UN-related initiatives, but we will believe that the best possibilities at present for cooperation lie with closer bilateral ties. Advantages of Bilateral Cooperation. Bilateral cooperation overcomes many of the problems inherent in multilateral efforts. Dealing with single countries and specific areas of cooperation, we have been able to work out 1 Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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understandings that we have not been able to reach when a broader number of countries have sought to work together. We are pursuing such bilateral initiatives with the goal of eventually building them into a framework of multistate bilateral cooperation. As could be expected, we are able to work most closely with counties which are our closest allies. We have been pursuing closer bilateral cooperation through a number of channels. Collaboration to combat terrorism is regularly an agenda item for discussion with high-level visitors to the United States and for senior American officials traveling abroad. Interagency delegations of experts have visited foreign capitals for in-depth bilateral talks with their counterparts on the many aspects of the antiterrorist struggle, ranging from better intelligence and better to physical security, to more effective anti-hijacking measures and how to close legal loopholes. One delegation, composed of public and private sector representatives, has visited key Middle Eastern and South Asian air centers to discuss better security. Each Embassy has been instructed to follow up on these visits and pursue other measures which will lead to closer cooperation. Better intelligence is a key to more effective action against terrorism. We must be prepared to consider sharing information and analyses with other governments, since the biggest threat to our interests occur outside the United States where we must look to others as the first line of action. Intelligence can be shared more candidly and usefully on a bilateral basis than through any multilateral forum. Specific areas for intelligence cooperation in dealing with terrorism include: ¥ Agreeing to a higher priority on terrorism between the services; ¥ Sharing data on incidents, suspected, suspected terrorists, and the movement of terrorist groups; and ¥ Conducting immediate consultations at the time of an incident.

The Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program has provided the U.S. Government with a vehicle to train and exchange experiences with friendly foreign governments on the practical aspects of counter terrorism. The legislation establishing the program has enabled the State Department to provide this important assistance to the same civilian forces which must carry the brunt of the fight against terrorists and the protection of our business, diplomatic, and military installations and personnel. Since the program began in April 1984, we have established active exchange and training programs with 20 foreign governments in all areas of the world. By the end of 1985, we expect at least seven additional governments beyond those already participating. There will be a total of perhaps 1,000 foreign officials who will have participated in the program by the end of the year from countries as diverse as Italy, Egypt, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Columbia. There are other areas for bilateral and possibly multilateral cooperation currently under consideration. We are looking at mutual ways in which ways in which we might penalize and deter states which are sponsors of terrorism. Before proceeding in this area, there must be an agreement about which states support terrorism and a plan to convince local economic interests of the importance of possible trade restrictions. We are talking about measures to

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counter the misuse of diplomatic privileges, but we must recognize that any steps which we take to monitor diplomatic shipments more intrusively, could work against our interests because acts we take could be reciprocated by others. We are discussing joint measures to provide better protection for diplomatic missions. In this area, we generally receive more support from foreign governments in protecting our missions than we can provide because of the separate policing responsibilities in various American cities. Conclusion To recapitulate, the terrorist threat will be with us for the foreseeable future. The main threat to Americans will come overseas, particularly in the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe. The U.S. government is wellorganized and coordinated to meet this threat, and we have clear policy guidelines. We appreciate the strong support of the Congress in this area. To counter the threat, we have available to us a broad spectrum of action, ranging from defensive measures to deterrents and punishment. But the possible cost of superpower action in this arena must be carefully weighed against the potential benefits. Each case must be considered on its merits, and failure to act or react should not be considered a sign of weakness. We are working closely with international organizations, our summit seven allies, and bilaterally to tighten our defenses and deter terrorism. But, despite our best efforts, we will not always succeed and, given the nature of the problem, you will be far more aware of our failures than our successes.

AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER, III Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Practical Measures for Dealing with Terrorism,’’ Address Before the Discover Conference on Terrorism in a Technological World, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1987 Today I would like to discuss how our government is working to suppress terrorism. The problem is global, but it presents a special problem for those of us who live in democratic countries. We face this special problem because terrorism’s most significant characteristic is that it despises and seeks to destroy the fundamentals of Western democracy—respect for individual life and the rule of law Terrorism is very real, the numbers are sobering. ¥ Last year there were almost 800 incidents of international terrorism. ¥ The citizens and property of over 80 countries were the victims or targets of international terrorist attacks. ¥ International terrorist activity in 1986 caused almost 2,000 casualties.

For me terrorism has a personal side. There are memorial plaques in the State Department lobby listing the names of American diplomats who died in

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the line of duty since 1776. When I joined the Foreign Service 20 years ago, there were 81 names on those plaques. All but four died from earthquakes, plagues, and other nonpurposeful causes. But in the last 20 years, 73 additional names have been added to these plaques—Americans serving in U.S. diplomatic missions. In other words, for the first 172 years of our nation’s existence, we in the Foreign Service lost a member to violent, purposeful death about every 40 years. Since I joined, we have averaged one such loss about every 90 days. These facts, listed on plaques not 50 yards from my office, are a constant reminder of the rise of terrorism in the past two decades. But this rise is not uncontested. The U.S. Government, working on its own and in coordination with friendly states, actively pursues coordinated strategies to suppress terrorism at home and abroad. Our strategy stresses practical measures to identify, track, apprehend, prosecute, and punish terrorists. Additionally, we are working to impose diplomatic, economic, and—where all else fails—military burdens on states supporting terrorism. Practical Measures Against Terrorists Let me say a word first about these practical measures. Identification of terrorists is the first and perhaps most difficult step. If we are to prevent terrorist attacks, if we are to apprehend those responsible, we must know several things: ¥ Which groups are we dealing with? What are their immediate and longer term operational plans? Their political goals? How violence prone are they? Do they carry out their threats? Where are their bases of operation? ¥ Who are the members? How and why were they recruited? What are their nationalities, ages, motivations? Are they prone to suicide attacks? How well armed and trained are they?

Putting this information together is slow, expensive, frustrating, and difficult. Groups secretive by nature change their names, rearrange their internal loyalties and groupings, and change bases with frustrating frequency. This makes terrorist groups extremely difficult to penetrate. The information which comes to us is almost invariably fragmentary. In bits and pieces we pick up the gist of a meeting, a name, a pseudonym, a photograph, a sample of a bomb. Intelligence analysts, the unsung heroes of counterterrorism, work with these fragments to convert them into information we need. Today we are gathering and sharing more data on terrorists with allies and other friendly countries. We and our allies have developed a number of practical measures in this field. For example, our government has drawn up lists of known and suspected terrorists and circulated these lookout lists among friendly governments. Every day I read dozens of cables indicating that intelligence about terrorists has been passed to us, that we are passing information to other countries, and that our friends are sharing with each other. While we can never know enough, the effects of these measures are gratifying. Frequently, the understanding which emerges from pooled intelligence is

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greater than the sum of its parts. This synergistic effect makes the world safer for all of us. Second, once identified, a terrorist must be located and tracked. At international borders terrorists may be required to produce identification and subject themselves and their baggage to search. Border crosses are thus a weak spot for terrorists and an opportunity for us. Just last week, Mohammed Hamadei, who is suspected of involvement in the TWA Flight 847 hijacking, was arrested as he attempted to enter West Germany through Frankfurt airport. At almost the same time, another man was captured by Italian authorities while attempting to smuggle explosives into Milan. To exploit this terrorist vulnerability, we must also combat the fraudulent use of travel documents by terrorists. The passports of many countries are often easy for a sophisticated forger to supplicate or alter. The terrorists who attacked the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985 used passports Libya confiscated from Tunisian guest workers. The problem becomes even more difficult when governments issue authentic travel documents to terrorists, as Syrian authorities did in the case of Nizar Hindawi, the man convicted of trying to bomb an El Al 747 in London last year. The U.S. Government is working now to make the travel documents we issue more secure, and we are cooperating with other countries to share information about false travel documents. Third, we and our allies must resolve to act forcefully on the information we have obtained by apprehending terrorists. Apprehending terrorists is inherently more dangerous than capturing common criminals. Terrorists are frequently better armed and usually more prepared to shoot than either common criminals or civilian police. The infamous terrorist Carlos managed to kill two French policemen because they thought they were dealing with a common criminal. Capturing terrorists, therefore, requires not only well-coordinated intelligence but policemen armed more like soldiers—or soldiers fulfilling functions more like those of police. Crisis management experts and specially equipped and trained forces are needed. Here, too, we have developed practical means of cooperation. Our government provides training and equipment to nations which are trying to deal with terrorism. Since 1984, more than 4,000 people from over 40 countries have participated in our counterterrorism assistance programs. This training pays off. On one recent occasion airport personnel in an Asian country became suspicious of some travelers because of their age, nationality, itinerary, and spending habits. When the suspicions were brought to our attention, we moved quickly to work with the airline and the security forces of three foreign countries to monitor this group’s movements throughout their travels. The fourth practical measure is prosecution of captured terrorists, a seemingly obvious step too often not taken. Prosecuting terrorists in the face of terrorist threats tests political will. Recently, we have been encouraged by the actions many countries have taken to prosecute terrorists in spite of these threats. In prosecution, too, we have a program for cooperating with friendly countries. The United States provides forensic and other technical experts to assist

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other countries in their pretrial investigations. Through mutual assistance legal treaties, we make witnesses or other evidence available. At the same time, we are working with other countries to strengthen our extradition treaties. Even so, problems remain. We still see too many tacit agreements whereby terrorists are permitted free transit of or residence in a country in return for not attacking the host country’s interests. Bringing terrorist to justice—punishing them—is the final step in the process of fighting terrorists. Merely thwarting them is not enough, for if the guilty can know no fear, then the innocent can know no rest. Happily, the rule of law is asserting itself more and more. We see fewer terrorists released without trial. The Italians last year tried and convicted the Achille Lauro hijackers. In October and November, the British and West German Governments tried and convicted terrorist for the attempted El Al bombing and the actual bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Society in Berlin. Other important terrorists’ trials are coming up in Madrid, Ankara, Paris, Rome, and Vienna. These prosecutions must continue. There is nothing, no case study, no example, to suggest that there is any permanent advantage in treating terrorists as other than criminals. We may be seeing the results of these measures. Our preliminary figures show that international terrorist incidents in 1986 were at about the same level as 1985—a considerable change from previous years which saw annual increases of 30%–40%. Moreover, terrorist incidents of Middle Eastern origin in Europe dropped almost 70% last year. State Support of Terrorism While our activities with allies to identify, track, and apprehend, prosecute, and punish terrorists show progress, the progress is more difficult and slower against one particular class of terrorist: those enjoying the support of a sovereign nation. With the help of a friendly state, a terrorist has capacities he lacks if he has to act on his own, especially as a fugitive. ¥ When a terrorist obtains travel and identification documents from a country, it becomes harder to identify and track him. When Nizer Hindawi went to London to blow up the El Al flight, he carried an authentic Syrian service passport issued to him. ¥ A terrorist who enjoys the patronage of a state has a ready source of weapons and a means to transport them. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from search by international convention, and the baggage handlers at state-owned airlines don’t interfere when told not to examine a particular parcel. Nizer Hindawi’s bomb was brought into England by Syria’s official airline. ¥ Countries like Libya, Syria, and Iran make a terrorist’s work easier by providing a place to train. It is not easy for a terrorist operation alone, especially if he is a fugitive, to find an isolated location where he can learn to fire automatic weapons, assemble and detonate explosives. ¥ Financial support from state sponsors allows terrorists to spend more time on operations because they need not rob banks or traffic in drugs to raise money. ¥ States can provide terrorists with refuge, an important support. Safe houses allow terrorist a rest from extraordinary strains of life underground. Being able to live

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The state giving these benefits to terrorists receives value in return. ¥ A group of state-supported terrorists costs less per year than a company of regular soldiers. But the terrorists can do much more to intimidate another state. ¥ Using surrogates makes it easier for the sponsoring state to deny responsibility for actions which, if undertaken overtly, could lead to war. ¥ Through terrorism a small state or leader can attract the attention, if not the respect, of the world. We know Qadhafi’s name not because of the ‘‘wisdom’’ in his ‘‘Green Book,’’ but because of his support for terrorism.

Fighting Terrorism Together It is important that we complement our practical measure against terrorists with actions against the states which sponsor them. We must work with friendly states to make it clear that we will not conduct business as usual with states supporting terrorism. Simply put, the community of nations must increase the political, economic, and, yes, perhaps even the military costs of helping terrorists until the sponsoring states cannot afford to pay them any longer. Here, too, we are beginning to see progress. Over the past year, there has been a growing political consensus among European governments that more has to be done. The Europeans have made nearly a dozen major statements or agreements concerning measures against countries supporting terrorism. These include reducing the size of the diplomatic missions from countries supporting terrorism and declarations that terrorists’ attacks can never be justified and are a disservice to any political cause. Specifically, in the last 60 days, Britain broke diplomatic relations with Syria, the United Sates withdrew its ambassador to Damascus, and the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would stop its development aid to Syria. Additionally, the European Community announced a series of economic, political, diplomatic, and security-related measures against Syria. Why? Clear sponsorship of terrorists, proven in open court. We have also seen increasing cooperation in our efforts to drive home this message to Colonel Qadhafi. Last summer West European governments expelled more than 100 so-called Libyan diplomats and businessmen. This heavy blow to Libya’s terrorist infrastructure in Europe, combined with the tightened security measures at airports and elsewhere, undoubtedly placed a role in sharply reducing Libyan-related terrorist incidents after May. Indeed, preliminary figures for 1986 show a substantial decline in the number of terrorist incidents which we can identify as being conducted on behalf of a state. Conclusion Looking to the future, I cannot assure you a world free of terrorism any more than I can offer a world free of crime or poverty. I can assure you that your government is working internally, bilaterally, and multilaterally to reduce

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terrorism to the absolute minimum. There is reason to be optimistic. If the terrorists have not gone away, neither have we left the field to them. ¥ Cooperation with friendly governments on practical measures to combat terrorism is growing. ¥ There have been significant displays of coordinated multilateral actions against states sponsoring terrorism in recent months. ¥ The rule of law is at work. In London and Berlin, public trials have resulted in stiff sentences for terrorists. And more trials are coming up.

Suppressing terrorism will be neither quick nor easy. But I know our strategies of coordination on the police, intelligence, and diplomatic levels are working and showing results. We will face setbacks. But I am convinced that we, the people of the world’s democracies, will prevail over those who would, through terror, take from us the fruits of two centuries of political progress.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Terrorism and the Rule of Law,’’ Address Before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, April 23, 1987 … I would like to discuss our strategy to combat terrorism and, particularly, our efforts to bring the rule of law to bear against terrorists. Terrorism has continued to plague governments and peoples all over the world. Last year, there were almost 800 incidents of international terrorism, affecting citizens and property of over 80 countries. In 1986, terrorists caused almost 2,000 casualties. America’s Counterterrorism Strategy In the face of these grim statistics, though, let me stress that we are not sitting still. We have an active strategy to combat terrorism and one which we believe is beginning to show results. Our strategy rests on three pillars. ¥ The first is that we will not make concessions to terrorists. ¥ The second is to bring pressure on states supporting terrorism. ¥ The third is developing practical measures designed to identify, track, apprehend, prosecute, and punish terrorists.

Our government believes that a policy of no concessions is the best way to discourage terrorist acts. For if terrorists can gain their objectives through terror one time, they will be encouraged to repeat terror in the future. President Reagan has stated that sending arms to Iran was a mistake and will not be done again. It is clear that a policy of firmness has the overwhelming support of the American people. It has been long-standing U.S. Government policy that we will talk to anyone who might be able to effect the safe release of Americans held hostage. That remains true. Speaking with hostage holders does not mean, however,

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that we will make concessions which would only further encourage terrorists to undertake such acts in the future. The second aspect of our counter-terrorism strategy is to put pressure on states which support terrorism. State support of terrorism represents a special danger. In accordance with the law, the Secretary of State has identified five countries as states which support terrorism—Syria, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and South Yemen. Our aim is to raise the economic, diplomatic, and—if necessary—the military costs to such states to a level which they are unwilling to pay. Over the past year, there has been important progress in developing these pressures—not only by America but also by our allies. In April, after our attack on Libyan terrorist sites, the Europeans took strong steps against Libya, including dramatically reducing the size of Libyan diplomatic establishments. And, in the fall, we and the Europeans invoked limited sanctions on Syria after British and German courts proved Syrian complicity in terrorist attacks. The third pillar, seeking practical measures to combat terrorism, is one of the most effective elements of our strategy. In attempting to identify terrorists, we work with a number of governments to facilitate intelligence sharing and the circulation of ‘‘lookout’’ lists. As terrorists are identified, we can begin to track them, especially as they attempt to cross international borders. Even the most democratic states can require detailed identification and conduct very thorough searches at border points. This is a terrorist vulnerability we are trying to exploit. For example, a Lebanese terrorist and principal suspect in the TWA 847 hijacking, Mohammed Hamadei, was arrested as he attempted to smuggle explosives into Germany in January. Finally, we work with friendly governments to assure that once apprehended, terrorists are brought to justice through prosecution and punishment. Over the past year, the role of the rule of law in combating terrorism has expanded. It is this particular element of our policy that I would like to address today. Terrorists Are Criminals Perhaps the most important development in the fight against terrorism in the past year has been the renewed determination on the part of the world’s democracies to get tough with terrorists and to apply the rule of law to terrorism. Time and again over the past months, terrorists have been arrested, brought to trial, and received long sentences for the crimes they have committed. In October, a British court sentenced Nizar Hindawi to 45 years in jail for his attempt to blow up an El Al flight. In November, West Germany found Ahmad Hasi and Farouk Salameh guilty of bombing the German-Arab Friendship Society, which injured nine people. They were sentenced to 14 and 13 years imprisonment, respectively. And just two months ago, French courts convicted Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, a leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, to life imprisonment for his role in the assassinations of U.S. and Israeli diplomats. For Western democracies, the firm hand of the law is the best defense against terrorism. Democratic nations must treat terrorists as criminals, for to do otherwise legitimizes terrorists not only in their own eyes but in the eyes of others.

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Let me deal briefly with the problem of defining terrorism. There are as many definitions around as there are definers. Some people argue that no matter how heinous the crime, if the cause is justified, the act cannot be terrorism. This attitude, though only serves to confound the fight against terrorism. As Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation puts it: If cause is the criterion, only to the extent that everyone in the world can agree on the justice of a particular cause is there likely to be agreement that an action does or does not constitute terrorism.

Instead of focusing on the cause, therefore, our government focuses on the terrorist act itself, for it is the act which ultimately distinguishes the criminal. Our government believes that terrorist acts have certain characteristics. They are premeditated and politically motivated. They are conducted against noncombatant targets and usually have as their goal trying to intimidate or influence a government’s policy. It is by their acts that terrorists indict themselves as criminals. All nations have criminal statutes to deal with criminals, and it only makes sense that all states should apply their existing statutes to terrorists. Terrorist Threats to the Rule of Law Terrorists despise democracy because democracy cherishes that which terrorists seek to destroy: the sanctity of the individual and the rule of law. There are two main categories of terrorist threat to our legal systems. First, there are indigenous, or domestic, terrorists who seek to provoke governments into extralegal excesses and, hence, to undermine political support for democratically elected regimes. Precisely because the rule of law is so fundamental to safeguarding a free citizen’s basic rights, terrorists frequently attack the rule of law in general and legal institutions specifically. There are many cases of this kind of threat: ¥ In November 1985, guerrillas belonging to the M-19 movement seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia, and held it for more than 27 hours. The targets of this attack were the judges who were rendering verdicts for extradition of drug traffickers. By the time the incident was over, 90 people were dead, including 12 Supreme Court judges. ¥ Last September, when jurors in France were threatened with terrorist retaliation and refused to show up at criminal hearings, a jury of magistrates had to be established in order that terrorist prosecutions would not be thwarted. ¥ In Spain, ETA [Basque Fatherland and Freedom] terrorists have attacked Spanish magistrates. And in Portugal, terrorists have made threats against jurors in the trial of Portuguese terrorists. In Italy, judges have been a favorite target of the Red Brigades.

The second major category of threat comes from transnational terrorists, those who travel from one country to another to commit terrorist acts. Often their objective is to coerce foreign governments into compromising their legal ethics. The events surrounding the Abdallah arrest and trial in France are a good example of this phenomenon. Shortly after French security services imprisoned

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Abdallah in Paris, his colleagues initiated a bloody series of bombings in downtown Paris. Bombs exploded in crowded stores, at cafes, on the sidewalks during rush hour traffic. Many innocent people died or were wounded as a result. The intent was to force the French Government into releasing Abdallah, thereby thwarting French efforts to bring this terrorist to justice. Fortunately, the tactic did not work. It was a victory for the French legal system and the rule of law. Today the German Government is facing a similar attempt at blackmail at the hands of other Middle East terrorists. In January, the Germans arrested the terrorist Hamadei, accused of being one of the hijackers of TWA 847 and the brutal murderer of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem. Shortly after his arrest in Germany, two Germans were snatched off the streets of Beirut, apparently by associates of Hamadei. They are holding them hostage there, demanding the release of Hamadei. We have formally requested the Federal Republic of Germany to extradite Hamadei to the United States for trial on murder and hijacking charges. We hope the German legal system will prove as invulnerable to terrorist blackmail as France’s was last fall. We must preserve the integrity of our judiciaries in dealing with terrorism. We must treat terrorists as we would other criminals. We acknowledge that it may be difficult not to capitulate to terrorists’ demands. But to give in only encourages additional terrorist acts—once terrorists see that they can get away with their crimes, they will commit more. Strengthening Domestic Legislation Against Terrorism In the face of rising terrorism over the past two decades, democratic nations have not stood still. The United States and our allies abroad have strengthened our legal systems to deal with terrorism, both through improved domestic procedures and through international agreements. In the United States, we have strengthened statutes covering crimes most typically committed by terrorists. The anticrime bill of 1984 makes certain acts of overseas terrorism, such as hostage taking and aircraft sabotage committed anywhere in the world, crimes punishable in U.S. Federal courts. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986 provides the U.S. Government with several important legal tools for combating terrorism. ¥ It provided U.S. jurisdiction over terrorist crimes committed against Americans overseas. This landmark provision gives us the legal right to prosecute in the United States terrorists who murder or violently attack Americans abroad. ¥ The act also established a counter-terrorism witness protection fund, so that the United States may reimburse other governments for costs related to security for those who come forward to provide testimony or evidence in terrorist cases. ¥ It increased funding for the protection of our diplomats and embassies overseas from terrorist attack. ¥ The act further enhanced support for the State Department’s rewards program, initially created in 1984, whereby the Department offers substantial cash awards to anyone who provides information leading to the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. To date, we have established rewards totaling $1.1 million for five major terrorist incidents.

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Other countries have also strengthened their domestic judicial systems against terrorism. Almost all our allies have adopted laws which improve their ability to prosecute terrorists for crimes related to aircraft hijacking and sabotage, attacks on diplomats, hostage taking, and theft of nuclear materials … Strengthening International Conventions on Terrorism Improving the domestic legal framework for combating terrorism is an important step in bringing the law to bear on this problem. Just as important are efforts of the international community to expand the international legal regime for combating terrorism. The United States and many of our allies are parties to a number of international conventions covering terrorist acts, including the Hague Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Montreal Convention on Civil Aviation Safety, the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Convention on Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, and the Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Materials. These conventions and the laws implementing them provide important legal authority to prosecute international terrorists. They form the basis of our charges pending against Mohammad Hamadei. And the Hague Convention obligates the Germans either to extradite or prosecute him. There has been encouraging progress in specialized international organizations to combat terrorism. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has undertaken a number of measures in the wake of the Achille Lauro hijacking and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer. In September 1986, the IMO adopted new security guidelines to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews onboard ships. In November, the IMO Council began consideration of a joint Austrian-Egyptian-Italian draft international convention to outlaw various acts like hijacking a ship and to obligate states to prosecute or extradite offenders. In the air security area, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is working on a Canadian proposal to expand the language of existing international conventions to include broader protection for airports. Furthermore, the ICAO meets regularly to consider improvements to its security regulations for aviation and airports. In another legal arena, the United States is renegotiating our bilateral extradition treaties to strengthen our ability to seek the extradition of terrorists. Many of these existing treaties contain a so-called political exception clause which could protect terrorists and other criminals from extradition if the host government determines that the crime was of a political nature. We have been working hard to limit this clause by revising our extradition treaties. Our supplementary extradition treaty with Great Britain was ratified last year. We have since concluded agreements with Germany and Belgium. All of this work is beginning to pay off. Democratic nations are exercising the rule of law, and with encouraging frequency. For example: ¥ Early this year, a Canadian court sentenced to life imprisonment two Sikh terrorists who conspired to blow up a New York-to-London Air India flight in 1986.

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¥ Last month in Italy, a Lebanese terrorist, Bashir al-Khodir, was sentenced to 13 years in prison following his arrest at a Milan airport for carrying explosives and detonators hidden in Easter eggs and pictures frames. ¥ In March, the Japanese Supreme Court upheld the death penalty for two terrorists convicted in a 1971–75 series of bombings that killed eight and injured 187. The court also upheld earlier rulings for two others convicted in the bombings: one received life imprisonment and the other an 8-year prison term.

More terrorists will be brought to justice in 1987, as important trials are scheduled to take place in Austria, Italy, Malta, Pakistan, Spain, and Turkey. The recent steps taken by the world community to improve the legal framework to fight terrorism are having a measurable effect. Some previous efforts became bogged down in some of the near-metaphysical discussions which terrorism provokes. For example, I am not surprised that the 1972 UN document entitled ‘‘Measures To Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism, and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievances and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt To Effect Radical Changes’’ seemed to have little effect in stemming the rise of terrorism. Are Terrorists Warriors? So the rule of law, which treats terrorist acts as criminal acts and terrorists as criminals, is beginning to work. But precisely because they fear the rule of law, terrorists have often tried to slip away from being called criminals by claiming to be warriors instead. Terrorists, and often their sympathizers invoke the banal phrase that ‘‘terrorism is the poor man’s war.’’ By this argument, terrorists are presented as merely soldiers, forced by circumstances into an unconventional mode of conventional war but, nonetheless, entitled to the same privileges extended to ‘‘lawful combatants.’’ But even the internationally accepted rules of war provide no hiding place for terrorists. The Geneva conventions on rules of war outlaw nearly every act of terrorism. For example: ¥ The rules of war define combatants and grant civilians who do not take a part in hostilities immunity from deliberate attack. A terrorist who attacks innocent civilians at an airport clearly violates this rule. ¥ The rules of war prohibit taking hostages. Terrorists in Lebanon holding Americans and other hostage clearly violate this rule of war. ¥ The rules of war prohibit violence against those held captive. Freed American hostages have told of repeated beatings by their captors. ¥ The rules of war require combatants to wear uniforms or insignia identifying their status. Terrorists identify themselves only after they have committed their crimes and, in fact, almost always conceal their true identities during their criminal acts.

Do terrorists adhere to the rules of war? Consider their actions during the attempted hijacking of a Pan American plane in Karachi last fall. The terrorists stormed the airplane full of civilians. They killed two of them at the outset in

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cold blood. They held the rest hostage. They beat some passengers. At the end of the incident, the terrorists tried to conceal their identity and escape by mixing in with their victims. In short, this incident, typical of other terrorist incidents, shows that terrorists do not act like warriors; they behave like criminals. In the chaos of war, soldiers may violate laws. Our own forces have been guilty of crimes, and we have punished them for it. The key point is that there are legal norms applicable even in war. So even if we were to dignify terrorists with the term ‘‘warriors,’’ it would not excuse in any way their criminal acts. Indeed, one possible definition of a terrorist act is an act committed in peacetime which, if committed in wartime, would be considered a violation of the rules of war. Using the Law Against States Supporting Terrorism One of the more dangerous developments in terrorism in the past few years has been the emergence of state support. Several states—notably Libya, Syria, and Iran—have funded, trained, and provided logistical support for terrorists to further their foreign policy goals. This kind of support greatly complicates the job of fighting terrorism. States can provide easy money, weapons, and explosives to terrorists. We have found that some states have used their embassies, diplomats, and official airlines to pass money, weapons, instructions, maps, and official passports to terrorists. When the United States has identified a particular state engaged in supporting terrorism, we have tried to impose a series of measures to make the leaders of that country realize that their support for terrorism carries a high cost. Take the case of Libya. We decided years ago that Colonel Qadhafi was engaged in supporting terrorists. We suspended diplomatic relations. We imposed economic sanctions by reducing the amount of oil and other products that we imported from that country. Ultimately, after years of economic and political sanctions and in the face of clear evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorist acts, we had to resort to military action. Many people, including some of our allies, questioned the legality of our action. But the law amply justified our action. Under customary international law, a state is responsible for acts of force, whether they are carried out by the state’s own armed forces or other agents. That state is also responsible if the act of force is conducted from its own territory by terrorists or others whose activities the host state should have prevented. In other words, every state has a duty to every other state to take appropriate steps to ensure that its territory is not used for such purposes. But if a state like Libya does not exercise this fundamental international obligation, then the state which has been injured has the right to use a reasonable and proportionate amount of force in times of peace to eliminate the breach. This right is established by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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When a state like Libya trains or assists terrorists, allows them to use its territory, or fails to prevent them from operating against other states from its territory, then the state is liable to the states that have been attacked. Conclusion Today I’ve given you an outline of how we should look at the problem of terrorism, its threat to our legal system, and how we are trying to deal with that threat. We are beginning to see a shift on the part of the world’s democracies: we are witnessing a shift from the ‘‘year of the terrorist’’ to the ‘‘year of the terrorist trials.’’ The rule of law is beginning to take hold. And that is the point I would like to leave you with. We must treat terrorists as criminals. To do other wise is to afford them a political exception they do not deserve. Even in the face of direct attacks against our legal systems, we must persevere, as the French have recently done and as we hope the Germans will soon do. Most importantly, though, we must continue to use the law. We must continue arresting terrorists, prosecuting them, and punishing them. President Reagan has warned terrorists: ‘‘You can run, but you can’t hide.’’ We have the legal authority to back up his warning, and we must make good on it.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics,’’ Address Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, Florida, November 4, 1987 A recent Roper poll asked Americans to name topics on which they wished the government to take action. Terrorism was named more often than nuclear arms reductions or Middle East peace. It has become the number one foreign policy issue for many Americans. Clearly, the people are demanding action. And in the finest American tradition, they want action right now. Today I want to describe how our government is responding to the terrorist threat. Dealing With Terrorism Is a Long-Term Problem In spite of the impression that many of us have, terrorism is not something new. Yes, within the past 20 years we have experienced many different kinds of terrorism, and we have seen terrorism live and in color in our living rooms. But terrorism has been around for centuries. The group whose name gives us our word for assassin arose in Persia about 900 years ago and later flourished in Syria. The Assassins recognized that a tiny group of men prepared to die during their attack could paralyze a larger foe and that the fear of such attacks could give them power beyond their size. During the Napoleonic wars, partisan forces pushed carts laden with explosives into the ranks of soldiers, causing significant damage. By the late 19th century, the telegraph, newspapers, and rising literacy led Russian anarchists to recognize the shock value of violence. They referred to their terrorist attacks as ‘‘propaganda by the deed.’’

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Given the persistence of terrorism over centuries, it is unreasonable to think we can eliminate it. But we can, and must, take vigorous action to limit terrorism. And the signs are that, after an initial period of uncertainty, the West is finally getting its antiterrorist act together. 1970s: On the Defensive When modern terrorism burst on the scene 20 years ago, the international community, especially in the United Nations, reacted in a befuddled fashion. The West lacked a strategy and was on the defensive against both domestic and international terrorism. There are a number of reasons for this passivity: ¥ Many of the world’s nations had recently emerged from colonialism; in some cases, they considered terrorists as fellow revolutionaries who would soon join them in the community of nations. ¥ The Vietnam War increased anti-American sentiment around the world and led to an intellectual environment in which anti-U.S. activism was easier to justify. ¥ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevailing political and intellectual climate in many Western countries promoted an extraordinary tolerance of violent political action. This allowed terrorists to demand and receive public attention not just for their acts but for their ‘‘causes.’’ Terrorist acts—including kidnapping, kneecapping, and murder—acquired an aura of romance and adventure. ¥ In the Middle East, Israel’s stunning success in a preemptive strike in response to threats of war by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan altered the perception of Israel as a microstate struggling against the odds. It also shattered the hopes, nourished by some Palestinians, that the front-line Arab states would destroy Israel and, by military force, create a Palestinian state. ¥ Finally, the tremendous growth in air travel and television in the 1960s gave terrorists increased mobility, more vulnerable targets, and a ready-made worldwide audience for the acts.

The West Develops a Counterterrorist Strategy By the end of the 1970s, the outrage at terrorist acts slowly began to turn the tide of opinion in the West. Increasingly, people realized that nothing justified what they were seeing. Perhaps more than anything, the ever-expanding circle of targets for terrorist attack brought about change. People and governments began to realize that terrorists could and would attack anyone, including erstwhile sympathizers. Here in America, the taking of our Tehran embassy catalyzed public opinion and led to demands for effective government action. As a result of these changes, the West began to develop a clear, overall strategy to deal with terrorism and the supporting tactics necessary to implement that strategy. Action on two levels was needed: the development of political will to counter terrorism and the allocation of more resources to the fight. Political Vision and Political Will We must avoid the temptation of taking the total elimination of terrorism as our goal. We can no more to eradicate terrorism than we can eradicate crime.

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The West’s strategic objective must be to reduce terrorism to a level at which it no longer dominates world policy. We can achieve this objective with a firm, concerted counterterrorism effort sustained over 5–7 years. How? By making the general political, economic, and psychological climate in which terrorists operate more hostile. The targets of any counterterrorist measure, therefore, are not particular terrorists or groups but the community of nations and the overall political environment. The key element in developing a counterterrorist strategy is the development of political vision and the political will to carry out the fight. And to nurture the development of political will, the West had to change the whole dynamic of the international discussion of terrorism. We had to get away from the defensive, muddled reaction to terrorist violence of the early 1970s and reassert, clearly and decisively, democracy’s willingness to fight terrorism. We had to shift the public debate on terrorism from understanding ‘‘root causes’’ to condemning the crimes terrorists commit. Specific Measures The West has adopted a number of specific measures to pursue our strategic objective. For example, until recently, the international political environment made it relatively easy for terror-supporting states like Libya, Syria, and Iran to operate against the West. A major element of our counterterrorism policy, therefore, is to put pressure on states that support terrorism. If the West can make it clear that supporting terrorists is unacceptable international behavior, then terrorists will be denied important financial, military, and other support from state supporters. Another important measure we have developed in our overall strategy is applying the rule of law to terrorists. Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions like murder, kidnapping, and arson, and countries have laws to punish criminals. So a major element of our strategy has been to delegitimize terrorists, to get society to see them for what they are—criminals—and to use democracy’s most potent tool, the rule of law, against them. A third measure is expanded international discussion of terrorism. The United States has made terrorism an important issue in our overall bilateral relations, including with the Soviet Union, and in multilateral forums like the United Nations. By repeatedly pressing the issue with non-Western nations, we seek a truly global front against terrorism. Counterterrorist Measures Succeeding These counterterrorist measures are beginning to succeed. In a major show of collective political will last year, the nations of Western Europe took a series of concerted actions to close down Libya’s terrorist infrastructure of embassies, ‘‘businessman,’’ and ‘‘students.’’ These actions, combined with the U.S. military strike against terrorist facilities in Libya, led to a decline in Libyansupported terrorism. Indeed, we have detected Libyan involvement in only five terrorist incidents in 1987. Qadhafi no longer openly brags about his use of terrorism. Most important, the political environment was shifted. The Europeans at long last had taken decisive action against a terrorist state. That was a major breakthrough in the development of a Western counterterrorist strategy.

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In a similar way, last November, we and the European Community (EC) imposed sanctions on Syria after Syrian officials were proven to have supported specific terrorist operations. These steps were possible only because the countries of Europe had set the pattern of responding to state terrorism with their earlier measures against Libya. Again, the political environment had shifted. Again, we had success. Syria in June expelled Abu Nidal, a notorious Palestinian terrorist. As a result of concerted Western pressures, terrorists are finding it harder to get refuge and overt support. The Abu Nidal Organization was expelled from Iraq in 1983 and from Syria in 1987. In Eastern Europe, efforts have been made to disrupt a network of enterprises of the Abu Nidal Organization. Newspaper stories about the terrorist links of a Syrian family named Qassar, notorious for arms trafficking with terrorists, have led to action against them by several European countries in 1987, notably in Spain where they maintained a political headquarters in Marbella. Moreover, during the past decade, the West has elaborated an international legal structure grounded in bilateral and multilateral agreements to extradite or prosecute terrorists for their crimes. The first steps in an international legal framework were taken in the early 1970s with the Hague convention on airline hijacking. Since then, further agreements have been reached in Montreal and at summit meetings of the seven leading industrialized nations in Tokyo, Bonn, and Venice. In spite of Lenin’s insistence that the revolutionary must never abandon terrorism, the Soviet Union now says that is opposes ‘‘all terrorism.’’ While the Soviet definition of terrorism can be convoluted from our point of view, they have specifically condemned some recent acts of terrorism, including the Pan American Flight 073 takeover in Karachi and a grenade attack last year on Israeli soldiers near the Western Wall in Jerusalem. And the Soviets have played a helpful role in drafting new counterterrorist conventions on maritime and airport safety. Finally, where earlier attempts to cope with terrorism in the United Nations deteriorated into endless apologies for terrorists, in 1985 and 1986 the United Nations passed important resolutions condemning terrorism and hostage-taking. So we have made a real start this decade in changing the overall environment in which the terrorists must act. Responsible countries have joined a new consensus against terror and have taken concrete steps. No one of these measures by itself will solve the problem or reduce terrorism to a tolerable level. However, these and other measures, relentlessly pursued over time, will achieve our strategic objective. Development of Tactics: More Resources Just as the West had to fortify its collective political will before it could develop a coherent counterterrorist strategy, so it had to dedicate greatly increased resources to antiterrorism before our tactics could succeed. The strategy demands will; the tactics demand money. Our tactical objective is to confound and thwart terrorists—to reduce their options and make their operations more complicated and perilous.

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For the most part, antiterrorist tactics are measures that better protect the most likely targets from terrorist attacks. How do they work? In much the same way as you protect your home from burglars. Putting heavy dead-bolt locks on your doors, a bar on sliding glass doors, and keeping a dog or installing a burglar alarm will not stop a truly professional thief willing to run substantial risks. But each of them reduces the likelihood of a break-in at your home. Taken together, they can achieve your purpose—protecting your property, lowering your insurance rates, and increasing your peace of mind. In contrast to counterterrorist measures, antiterrorist steps are largely defensive in nature and can be unilateral or taken in concert with others. The difference, if I may extend my analogy, is between stronger locks and an aggressive policy of pursuing and jailing burglars. More Resources Contribute to Success One of the most important developments in the 1980s has been the public outrage throughout the world with terrorist violence. This strong public reaction has pressured politicians to make money more available to the antiterrorist fight here and abroad. These new resources form the hard core of our revitalized antiterrorist tactics. Not surprisingly, the police and intelligence agencies first dedicated these new resources to the fight against domestic terrorists. So not surprisingly, the first successes of antiterrorist measures were seen at home. In Italy, anger at the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro led to actions which shattered the old Red Brigades. In Germany, the Baader-Meinhof gang was broken through aggressive intelligence collection and vigorous law enforcement. The same happened in French efforts to counter Action Directe and in Belgium with the Fighting Communist Cells. Just 2 weeks ago, Spanish and French officials, acting together, dealt an important blow to the Spanish terrorist group ETA [Basque Fatherland and Freedom]. As nations developed better tactics for dealing with their homegrown terrorists, they have recently turned their attention to international cooperation. For example, the countries of the European Community have established the so-called Trevi Group made up of ministers of justice and interior. The Trevi Group has considerably expanded police and intelligence cooperation among the 12 EC members. For example, the ministers now regularly produce an agreed assessment of the terrorist threat facing the EC countries. And they have specific information on the movements and operating methods of terrorists. INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization], which has resisted dealing with terrorism because of its political overtones, finally began coordinating information on terrorism in 1985 at U.S. request. Our FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], for instance, can now notify the INTERPOL secretariat of arrest warrants we have out on terrorists. INTERPOL then sends the names by alert to all of its member countries. Specific antiterrorist measures developed by the West include: ¥ Near universal screening of all airline passengers for metallic objects, so that terrorists can no longer stroll aboard a flight with a pistol or bomb in their pockets;

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¥ Tighter security at diplomatic installations so that an attack on an embassy is likely to require the attackers to absorb casualties, thereby making an attack less likely; ¥ ‘‘Watch lists’’ of terrorists for border police to stop terrorists entering countries; and ¥ Measures to sow dissension within terrorist groups through black and gray covert operations.

Tactical Measures Succeeding As we have had success in developing and implementing a counterterrorist strategy, now our tactical measures are showing signs of working. Take, for example, the question of air travel. Over the past 15 years, the international community has developed an extensive set of antiterrorist, defensive measures to protect air travelers. Before these steps, there were 18–20 hijackings each year, with substantial casualties and damage. Last year, there were only two hijackings—the fewest since we started recording figures 20 years ago. Similarly, there has been a significant decline in terrorist attacks on our diplomatic establishments. The ‘‘watch lists’’ we have developed are in the hands of border police in many countries. Border police are becoming much more attentive to suspicious travelers, too. As a result, terrorists run considerable risks crossing international borders. In January, two Lebanese terrorists were arrested on successive days trying to smuggle explosives into Italy and Germany. Finally, because of increased attention to antiterrorism by Western governments, terrorist groups can no longer be sure they have not been penetrated by Western intelligence agencies. And as countries dedicate more resources to the fight against terrorism, they are catching and prosecuting increasing numbers of international terrorists. ¥ In London, Nezar Hindawi received a life sentence for his attempt to blow up an El Al plane. ¥ In Paris, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah received a life sentence for his role in the murders of a U.S. Army attach´e and an Israeli diplomat. ¥ In Germany, a Lebanese terrorist named Hamadei faces air piracy and murder charges for his role in the TWA 847 hijacking. ¥ In New York City, Mohammed Atta, an Abu Nidal terrorist, awaits extradition to Israel to face murder charges arising from fire bombing and machine-gunning of a bus. ¥ In Washington, D.C., a Lebanese terrorist named Fawaz Younis awaits trial on the hostage-taking charges arising from the hijacking of Jordanian Airlines Flight 401 in June 1985. ¥ Just 2 weeks ago in Madrid, a Palestinian terrorist was sentenced to 47 years in prison for directing the June 1986 bombing attempt against an El Al airliner.

As with the strategic steps mentioned earlier, no single tactical measure, or even group of measures, will solve the problem. But the cumulative effect of the measures helps achieve our strategic purpose. Conclusion Terrorism has by no means disappeared from the world scene. It is an ancient problem that will be with us for the foreseeable future as terrorists constantly revise and adapt their methods of attack.

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However, newspaper headlines about spectacular terrorist attacks are gradually being replaced by brief press reports on terrorist trials. This is attributable to the important gains the West has made in recent years. We have developed a coherent strategy to reduce terrorism. With a fortified political will, we are changing the overall political environment, making it less benign to terrorism. We have succeeded in pressuring states that sponsor it, and we have strengthened the legal framework for punishing terrorists. We have also developed effective tactical measures to supplement our overall strategy, such as tightening security at obvious targets. Our counterterrorism policy is showing signs of success. If it is pursued over time, I am confident we can usher in an era when international terrorism is no longer a dominant subject on the international agenda.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Countering Terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s,’’ Address Before the George Washington University Conference on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., November 22, 1988 Today I would like to talk to you about U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Reasonable observers have questioned, continue to question, and will likely go on questioning the effectiveness of our government’s counterterrorism effort. It is not hard to see why. After all, the Iran-contra affair dealt a blow to our credibility. Nine Americans are still held hostage in Lebanon. And according to the State Department’s own statistics, 1987 was the bloodiest year for terrorist incidents since we began compiling such figures. This year, attacks on U.S. targets are running 31% above their 1987 levels; while incidents for 1988 are running about 4% above 1987. So it is certainly fair to question the effectiveness of our country’s counterterrorism policy. Let me suggest to you, however, that these data do not reflect a failed policy. Rather, they are evidence that terrorism is now and will be a persistent international problem. We cannot expect completely to eradicate terrorism. But we can aim to reduce significantly terrorism’s status on the international agenda. And I believe our policy is moving toward that goal. U.S. Counterterrorism Policy American counterterrorist policy stands on three solid pillars. First, we will not accede to terrorist demands. We will not pay ransom, pardon convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist demands. In other words, we will make no deals. But we will talk to anyone authoritative, anywhere, anytime about the welfare and unconditional release of our hostages. Second, we have taken the lead in pressuring states which support terrorist groups and use terrorism as part of their foreign policy. We have shown these states that they will be penalized for support terrorism. The United States will not tolerate their aiding and abetting terrorist groups by

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supplying them with weapons, money, passports, training bases, and safehouses. Third, we are imposing the rule of law on terrorists for their criminal actions. Good police work is catching terrorists, and they are being brought to trial. The United States now has on the books a law which enables our law enforcement agencies to better combat terrorism. Popularly called a ‘‘long arm’’ statute, the law makes it a federal crime to kill, injure, threaten, detain, or seize an American citizen anywhere in the world in order to compel a third person or government to accede to a terrorist’s demands. U.S. Policy: How Is It Working? So we have a clear and comprehensive counterterrorist policy. How is it working? Let us look first at the ‘‘no concessions’’ element of our policy. Obviously, this element of our policy was damaged by the Iran-contra affair. However, for the past 2 years, the President has made it crystal clear to Iran and others our government’s steadfast commitment to the no deals principle. No country, no group should believe there is gain in trying to blackmail the United States. Based on my own meetings with counterterrorism officials and experts from other countries and in this country, we have largely recovered the credibility lost by the Iran-contra affair. The international counterterrorism community understands our position, and there is strong bipartisan support here for our policy of firmness in dealing with terrorists. We have enjoyed an important measure of success on the second ingredient of our policy—pressuring states supporting terrorism. Some of the more notorious state supporters have attempted—publicly at least—to distance themselves from terrorism. Our 1986 airstrike on Libya’s terrorist camps was the watershed event in the world’s fight against terrorist supporting states. European nations followed our lead against Libya by imposing political, economic, and security measures against the Qadhafi regime. European Community members expelled more than 100 Libyan ‘‘diplomats’’ and restricted the movements of other Libyan ‘‘diplomatic’’ and ‘‘consular’’ personnel. These moves severely damaged Libya’s European network dedicated to supporting international terrorism. Qadhafi learned that his support for international terrorism would not be cost free. And he changed his behavior, which, after all, was the objective of our attack. Libya’s involvement in terrorism declined from 19 incidents in 1986 to 6 in 1987. Syria, another long-time supporter of terrorism, felt the pressure of our counterterrorism strategy also. In late 1986, British and West German courts established Syrian complicity in terrorist attacks in London and West Berlin. Together with Great Britain, the United States joined an international campaign employing diplomatic sanctions to convince Syria to reduce its links to terrorist groups. These efforts worked. In 1985, Syria was implicated in 34 terrorist incidents but in 1986 only 6. In 1987, a year after our pressures, we detected Syria’s hand in only one incident. Moreover, Syria expelled the violent Abu Nidal organization in June 1987—a major victory for our counterterrorist policies.

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This pillar of U.S. Government policy may not force these nations to cease entirely their support for terrorist groups. Indeed, both Libya, and Syria continue to provide such support. But a concerted, vigorous Western strategy does make them move more cautiously and become more circumspect. The third and final element of our tripartite program—using the rule of law against terrorist and encouraging others to do the same—is maturing into a potent weapon for two basic reasons. First, there has been a sea change in international attitudes toward terrorists. Second, governments have decided to provide law enforcement agencies the resources necessary to deter terrorism. Not long ago, many usually responsible countries granted terrorists dispensation for their crimes. Ironically, terrorists were perceived as victims of those vague forces called ‘‘oppression’’ and ‘‘imperialism’’—victims, or worse, romantic adventurers whose behavior should be indulged. No longer is this true. Terrorists began to lose this international indulgence as they widened their circle of targets in the late 1970s. In some instances, they even attacked sympathizers and supporters. The shock of such actions turned indulgence to revulsion. And as popular disgust mounted, politicians finally insisted on action to counter the terrorists. Law enforcement agencies were given the resources to do their jobs. National police departments now have the surveillance gear, the communications equipment, and the money for overtime to gather intelligence and to track and arrest terrorists. As a result, more and more terrorists are being brought to trial and convicted. ¥ Two weeks ago, a Maltese court sentenced the sole surviving terrorist in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to 25 years imprisonment—the maximum sentence under Maltese law. The surviving hijacker belonged to the Abu Nidal organization. ¥ Last month, a Sudanese court passed the death sentence on five Palestinian terrorists for their attack this year on Khartoum’s Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club. These five were also members of the Abu Nidal organization. ¥ Also last month, a French court convicted in absentia the notorious Fatah terrorist Colonel Hawari to 10 years, the maximum allowed under French law, for complicity to transport arms, ammunition, and explosives and for criminal associations. ¥ A West German court is currently trying Muhammad Hamedei, a Lebanese terrorist implicated in the 1985 TWA hijacking which resulted in the murder of an innocent American seaman. ¥ In Greece, authorities will soon decide on Muhammad Rashid’s extradition to this country where he is wanted for planting a bomb in 1982 on a Pan Am airliner. His extradition to the United States would be an important indication of Greece’s adherence to its states policy of combating terrorism. ¥ And here in Washington, D.C., Fawaz Younis, a Lebanese terrorist, will go on trial next year for holding American citizens hostage when he led the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight.

So, the United States has a policy in place and it works. But we cannot become complacent.

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The Threat Remains Terrorists still have the means to outrage us, to force our attention to them, and to strike almost anywhere in the world. As we look at the threat environment today, we identify three particular threats in the period just ahead. And as we look into the next decade, we have some additional concerns. Let me address both sets of issues. Radical Palestinian Groups. Our first immediate concern is the likely increase in radical Palestinian terrorism. This May, terrorists from the radical Palestinian group, the Abu Nidal organization, used machine guns and grenades to attack a Sudanese hotel and club frequented by foreign visitors. Two months later, Abu Nidal terrorists struck again attacking the Greek passenger ship City of Poros with grenades and machine guns. Just last month, West German police arrested members of another radical Palestinian group. The PFLPGC [Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine-General Council], before they could carry out a terrorist attack. And recently, other violent fanatical Palestinian groups, including Abu Musa and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, publicly proclaimed their intention to step up their terrorist effort against Israel. Combining a deep, visceral hostility toward the West with cold-blooded terror, these radical Palestinian groups receive financial, logistical, and weapons support from Syria and Libya. They are responsible for some of the most vicious terrorists operations on record. Although Israel is their main target, Israel is not their only target. These groups represent an ongoing international danger. Libya. Libya’s continued—even growing—involvement in terrorist is our second concern. After 2 years of relative quiet. Qadhafi is becoming more active. Instead of using Libyan citizens, he is increasingly using surrogates to implement his terrorist attacks. We have indications that Libya is augmenting its assistance to and enhancing its relationship with such terrorist groups and the Abu Nidal organization, the Japanese Red Army, and the Provisional IRA [Irish Republican Army]. In the last 3 years, the relationship between Tripoli and the vicious Abu Nidal organization has intensified. Abu Nidal is now based in Tripoli, and Libya provides most of its funding. One of the Abu Nidal organization terrorists who attacked the City of Poros carried a Libyan passport. The weapons used in that attack were from Libya’s military inventory. The April 14 attack on the USO club in Naples, in which one American and four Italians were killed, was conducted by the Japanese Red Army. It took place on the anniversary of the U.S. attack on Libya, and the attackers proclaimed their solidarity with Libya. Qadhafi has obviously calculated that if he can hide his hand well enough, the West will not respond. He may be right. At the exact moment we detect increased Libyan activity, a number of European countries are responding to a ‘‘charm offensive’’ launched by Qadhafi by improving relations with him. We may inadvertently be sending Qadhafi the message that it is not acceptable to directly commit terrorism, but that there is no price for using surrogates. Terrorism in the Andes. The final item on our short list of immediate concerns is terrorism in the Andean countries—Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and

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Bolivia—and the increasing danger posed by the narcoterrorists. We do not read or hear much about terrorism in these countries, but terrorist acts against American facilities and personnel are becoming more disturbing. Because of economic and political influence in Latin America, the United States is an obvious target for groups like the National Liberation Army in Columbia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) in Ecuador, and far-left groups in Bolivia—groups aiming to undermine foreign investment so as to create economic chaos in their own countries. So far this year, Colombian terrorist groups have carried out more than 70 anti-U.S. attacks—almost half of all terrorist attacks against U.S. targets worldwide. Almost all of these attacks were against U.S. oil company facilities. And all four major Colombian terrorists groups have received arms and training from Cuba and reportedly aid from Libya. Looking at Peru, a modest decline in violent anti-U.S. activity does not truly reflect the considerable level of violence there. Since 1980, when the Sendero Luminoso launched its terror campaign, more than 12,000 people have been killed, and more than $10 billion in material losses has been registered. Sendero began targeting foreign interests about a year ago. Several recent attacks have been made on U.S. interests. In Ecuador, the small but deadly Alfaro Vive group has been contained by the Ecuadorian Government. Although weakened, these urban terrorists are still capable of violent and coordinated action, especially when they receive help, as they have in the past, from the better organized Colombian terrorist groups. Bolivia, until recently, had largely avoided the terrorist problems plaguing its neighbors. Now some elements of the far left are preparing and carrying out terrorists activities. Examples of the growing threat level in this Andean country include the recent bombing attempt on Secretary Shultz’s motorcade. But the predominant threat in Bolivia comes from drug traffickers. Narcoterrorism is on the rise throughout the Andes. Drug traffickers have always used terrorist tactics to suit their purpose, but now they are frequently working together with terrorist groups. Bit-time narcotics dealers offer Latin American terrorist groups financial backing in exchange for the terrorists attacking the drug traffickers’ enemies. And the U.S. Government is at the top of the drug dealers’ enemies list. Terrorism in the 1990s These three issues—radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libya, and Andean terrorism—will certainly demand our attention for the rest of the 1980s. But what of the next decade? Should we anticipate changes in strategy or tactics by terrorists? Are there any trends we should be alert to? You have all read or heard apocalyptic stories of terrorists building their own nuclear weapons. Yet, most experts agree that nuclear terrorism presents less potential danger than terrorist resorting to less dramatic, but no less potent, means of mass destruction—such as chemical weapons or by exploiting more sophisticated technologies. Terrorists have noted the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in Afghanistan and during the Iran-Iraq war provoked little public outrage. They have seen increased deterrent measures around their traditional

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targets—airports, embassies, and government buildings. These favored terrorist targets are no longer easy marks. And equally important, the international media have been relatively restrained lately in reporting on terrorist outrages. Some terrorist groups might decide, therefore, to welcome the new decade by upping the ante—by using chemical weapons to gain attention. A number of states which support terrorism have chemical weapons in their arsenals. Recently, Libya acquired a very substantial capacity to make chemical weapons. We also believe terrorists will make greater use of high technology in their attacks. To take on example, the Provisional IRA, which has contact with Middle Eastern groups and Libya, has become expert in building bombs with long-delay timing devices; bombs which can be set to explode in days rather than hours. The IRA placed such a bomb in their 1985 attempt on [British] Prime Minister Thatcher. We also expect that terrorists will make more use of modern plastic explosives. These are much more powerful than traditional explosives like dynamite and TNT. And they are much more difficult to detect with current technology. Libya has already shipped several tons of a Czech plastic explosive called SEMTEX used in devastating attacks in Northern Ireland. Priorities for the New Administration What are the lessons from the 1980s for the new Administration? ¥ Firmness and persistence must continue as the hallmarks of this country’s counterterrorism effort. Only a sustained, relentless effort will suppress terrorism. So we must maintain the patience of discipline to allow our current policy to work for the next period. ¥ We should be confident enough not to cut deals with hostage-takers. ¥ States supporting terrorism must be exposed to the sunlight. When necessary, international sanctions, including military force, should be imposed on these states to make them behave as responsible members of the world community. ¥ To further international cooperation against terrorist-supporting states, we should expand our cooperation with Latin American, East Asian, and African countries. Terrorism is not limited to the Middle East or Europe. ¥ Let us buttress the rule of law as a tool by having Congress pass the ‘‘Terrorist Alien Removal Act.’’ The proposed legislation, drafted by the Justice Department, would expedite procedures for deporting alien terrorists found in the United States. To further reinforce our law enforcement tactics, we and our allies should agree to share as much information on terrorists as possible. Complementing this effort, U.S. Government agencies need to work more closely in permitting access to data bases on terrorism. Ideally, within the U.S. Government and with our allies, we should all be working from a central data base. By enhancing the flow of data among and between ourselves and our allies, we can make it easier to track and eventually apprehend terrorists. ¥ On a less visible level, there will continue to be a place in the fight against terrorists for covert action. Terrorist groups draw strength from their small size and secrecy. This inherent strength is also a weakness which we can exploit by making them doubt their cadre’s loyalty and making them worry about Western infiltration. ¥ We need to combat terrorists’ use of high technology. This means being willing to expend time and money for research and development (R&D) activities. For

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most of our agencies, counterterrorism R&D projects simply do not cross above the budgetary cut line. ¥ To deal with this problem, we have created a national counterterrorism R&D program for which the State Department annually seeks funds. Unfortunately, the amount of funds appropriated by Congress of the national counterterrorism R&D program is shrinking at an alarming rate. I hope the new Administration and the new Congress will restore this vital program to a high priority.

We, too, can put new technologies to work. Progress in miniaturization has permitted the development of more accurate sensors better able to detect explosives and hazardous gases. Research into DNA technology is providing forensic scientists with the biological tools to determine whether a specimen comes from a specific individual. Refinements in computer software are enhancing our ability to gather and analyze information. Conclusion No one can promise a world free of terrorism. But, through hard-earned experience, our country has developed a policy which is showing signs of success against the terrorists. They know we are serious. States which in the past routinely supported terrorists are now more cautious in their actions. Terrorists once caught are being put on trial and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. No longer are they being allowed to slip quietly away. Our successes should encourage confidence that the tide is turning our way—that we are on the right path. We must understand, however, that suppressing terrorism will not be easy. We still have a long and difficult struggle before us. With heightened vigilance, clear thinking, and steady discipline, I am confident that we can prevail. SOURCE: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2143_v89/ai_7465113

AMBASSADOR MORRIS D. BUSBY Ambassador Morris D. Busby, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Counter-Terrorism in the 1990s,’’ Address to the International Seminar on Maritime and Port Security, Miami, Florida, January 3, 1990 Today I would like to discuss U.S. counter-terrorism policy and our priorities for the 1990s. Terrorism is still very much with us. In just over 1 year we have seen the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 killing 230 people, 170 people were killed in the bombing of UTA [Union des Transports Aeriens] Flight 772 and 110 more in the recent bombing of a Colombian Avianca flight, Lt. Col. William Higgins was lost under grotesque circumstances in Lebanon, eight Americans are still held hostage in Lebanon, and five other Americans fell to assassins’ bullets in the Philippines and Bolivia. U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy We cannot expect to completely eradicate terrorism. It is now, and will remain, a persistent international problem. But we can, through our policies,

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reduce significantly the impact terrorism has on international life. We can make the terrorist’s vicious work more difficult, and we can make it more costly for those states that continue to support terrorism. Our counterterrorism policy was initially developed during the 1970s. The basic principles remain as valid today as when first articulated. First, we will not accede to terrorist demands. We will not pay ransom, release convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist demands; in other words, ‘‘no deals.’’ Obviously, this aspect of our policy was damaged by the Iran-contra affair. That was a mistake, but for the past 3 years we have made crystal clear our steadfast commitment to the ‘‘no deals’’ principle. No country, no group, should believe there is gain in trying to blackmail the United States. Let me add an important, but little understood point—‘‘no deals’’ doesn’t mean ‘‘no talking.’’ As we have consistently said, we will talk to anyone authoritative any time about the welfare and unconditional release of our hostages in Lebanon. But we will not reward the hostage takers and place others at risk by ‘‘buying’’ their freedom. Second, we will continue to pressure states that support terrorist groups and use terrorism as a tool of their foreign policy. We want to convince such states that support for terrorists leads only to economic and political isolation, whereas turning away from these illegal and immoral practices will enable them to reenter the community of nations. Terrorist groups can’t operate effectively without weapons, money, passports, training bases, and safehouses. And all too often, these essential items come from governments. We will not turn a blind eye to these activities. Where we have evidence, we will penalize these states with all means at our disposal and urge others to do the same. At the same time, as President Bush said in his inaugural speech—referring to Iran’s influence over those who hold Americans hostage—‘‘Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered. Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on.’’ There are signs that our policies are working. Some of the more notorious state supporters of terrorism have recently—publicly at least—attempted to distance themselves from terrorism. Our 1986 airstrike on Libya’s terrorist camps was a watershed event. European nations followed our lead by imposing political, economic, and security measures against the Qadhafi regime. They expelled more than 100 Libyan operatives and restricted the movements of others. Qadhafi learned that support for international terrorism is not cost-free and now professes to have changed his behavior, which after all is the objective of our policy. He has recently renounced terrorism and claims to no longer be supporting terrorism. We welcome this changed rhetoric and have called on him now to dismantle his terrorist apparatus, expel Abu Nidal and other terrorists to whom he has given sanctuary, close the training camps in Libya, and end funding for terrorist groups. This will be a true test of his intention. Syria, another long-time supporter of terrorism, may also be rethinking its support for terrorism. In late 1986, British and West German courts established Syrian complicity in terrorist attacks in London and West Berlin. Together with Great Britain, the United States joined an international campaign

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employing diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions to convince Syria to reduce its links to terrorist groups. These efforts have produced results. In 1985, Syria was implicated in 34 terrorist incidents, in 1986 only six. In 1987, we detected Syria’s hand in only one incident and none during the past 2 years. Syria also expelled the violent Abu Nidal Organization in June 1987. Yet Syria continues to harbor terrorists. The PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command] is headquartered in Damascus. The Japanese Red Army and other terrorist groups operate freely in Syrian-dominated Lebanon, openly provided with arms and supplies through Syria. There is no question that Syria, like Libya, bears responsibility for the activities of the groups it harbors. They should shut them down if they expect us to believe their antiterrorist rhetoric. Looking at Iran, this country continues to support terrorism from the Middle East to Europe. And there is every indication that this is state policy. President Bush has clearly opened the door to better relations, but until Iran acts to abandon its policy of supporting terrorism and hostage taking, there will be no possibility of an improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. It would be an exaggeration to claim that U.S. Government policy has caused these terrorism-supporting nations to cease their support for international terrorist groups entirely. We believe they continue to provide such support. But we are modifying their behavior, and concerted, vigorous Western action does make them move more cautiously. The third element of our policy is imposing the rule of law on terrorists. Terrorists are neither freedom fighters nor romantic warriors; they are criminals. We have on the books laws which give our law enforcement agencies powerful tools to combat terrorism. Popularly called the ‘‘long arm’’ statutes, these laws make terrorist acts committed overseas against Americans federal crimes. Without infringing on the sovereignty of others, it gives us the ability to act against terrorists in our own courts when we can. This element of our program is maturing into a potent weapon for two basic reasons. There has been a sea change in international attitudes toward terrorists. Not long ago, many usually responsible countries granted terrorists dispensation for their crimes. Terrorists were considered victims of ‘‘oppression’’ and ‘‘imperialism’’—victims or, worse, romantic adventurers whose behavior should be indulged. Fortunately, no longer is this true. As terrorists widened their circle of targets in the late 1970s, they lost this international indulgence. In some instances, they even attacked their sympathizers and supporters. The shock of their brutal actions turned indulgence to revulsion. As popular disgust mounted, governments took strong action to counter the terrorists. Today, more and more terrorists are being brought to trial and convicted. ¥ One year ago a Maltese court sentenced the sole surviving terrorist in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to 25 years imprisonment—the maximum sentence under Maltese law. ¥ In late 1988, a French court convicted in absentia the notorious Fatah [the military arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization] terrorist Colonel Hawari to 10 years in prison for complicity to transport arms, ammunition, and explosives

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and for criminal association. Hawari’s sentence was the maximum allowed under the French law. Last February a court in Switzerland sentenced a Lebanese terrorist to life imprisonment for hijacking an Air Afrique flight the previous year. Last May a West German court sentenced Lebanese terrorist Muhammad Hamadei to life imprisonment for hijacking, hostage taking, and the murder of an innocent American seaman. Last March in Washington, D.C., a court sentenced Lebanese terrorist Fawaz Younis to 30 years for hijacking a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight in 1985 and for taking hostages, including American citizens. Just last month, terrorist trials took place in Paris and in Stockholm. In Paris an operative of the May 15 Middle Eastern terrorist group was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other charges for his involvement in a series of bombings in that city and in London during 1983–85. In Stockholm four members of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front were sentenced to terms up to life imprisonment for their bombing campaign in 1985–86 in Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.

So our policies are sound, and, step by step, we are having success. But terrorists still have the means to strike at us, outrage us, and force our attention on them. As we look to the 1990s, let me outline three areas of immediate concern. Areas of Concern In Latin America the use of terrorist tactics by narcotics traffickers and insurgent groups in this region is disturbing and on the rise throughout the Andes. In the past these groups have used terrorist tactics from time to time to suit their purposes. But now we see big-time narcotics dealers turning to terrorism to further their criminal enterprises. And we see classic insurgent or terrorist groups turning to drug trafficking to finance their activities. In Colombia the drug cartels have unleashed an unprecedented wave of assassinations and bombings in a ‘‘war’’ against Colombia’s democracy. Almost daily, drug cartel murder squads bomb newspaper offices, kill journalists, and assassinate judges. Last year Colombian narcotics traffickers and insurgent groups carried out more than 70 attacks aimed at American interests. In recent months we have seen a civilian aircraft bombed with all aboard killed and the destruction of the headquarters building of the security police leaving over 60 dead in that beleaguered country. President Barco and the Colombian Government have responded strongly. Colombia and its people have the full support of our government and all Americans. We are giving significant assistance to the Colombians and will continue to do so. In Peru the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso are a serious threat. Sendero Luminoso waged a brutal but unsuccessful effort to sabotage the municipal elections last November. Because of the Sendero terror, over 400 municipal officials have resigned during the last 2 years. Since 1980, when the Sendero Luminoso launched its terror campaign, more than 15,000 people have been killed. In Ecuador the small but deadly Alfaro Vive group has been contained by the Ecuadorean Government. Although weakened, these urban terrorists are still

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capable of violent and coordinated action, especially when they receive help—as they have in the past—from the better organized Colombian terrorist groups. Bolivia until recently had largely avoided the terrorist problems plaguing its neighbors. Now some groups are preparing and carrying out terrorist activities. There was a bombing attempt on Secretary [of State] Shultz’s motorcade in August 1988, last May two American Mormon missionaries were assassinated in La Paz, and the U.S. Embassy was recently bombed. And in El Salvador, the insurgent Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) apparently miscalculated its own strength in launching its November offensive in San Salvador, losing many of its members. The FMLN has frequently resorted to terrorism against its own people. The FMLN has also targeted Americans. Four U.S. Marine Embassy guards and two American businessmen were among the dead in 1985 when FMLN gunmen machinegunned patrons at an outdoor caf´e. The FMLN was also responsible for killing a U.S. Navy military adviser in 1983. In another area of the world, the Philippines, we face another perilous challenge. The communist party’s New People’s Army (NPA) has frequently employed terrorism throughout its 20-year insurgency. In 1989, the NPA resumed targeting official Americans for assassination. Three Americans have been killed in the past year. In April, Vietnam War hero and former prisoner of war Col. James ‘‘Nick’’ Rowe was fatally ambushed while driving to work in Manila, and in September, during Vice President Quayle’s official visit to the country, two Department of Defense civilian contractors were similarly killed near Clark Air Base. The NPA views the United States as its enemy and seeks to drive the U.S. military presence from the country. We fear its attacks on unarmed personnel will continue. And, finally, radical Palestinian groups still represent an ongoing international danger. Combining a deep, visceral hostility toward the West with coldblooded terrorism, these groups are responsible for some of the most vicious terrorist acts on record. We should expect these groups to remain active. These issues—narcoterrorism in Latin America, terrorism in the Philippines, and Middle East terrorism—will certainly command our attention for the next few years. But there are other concerns. You have all read or heard apocalyptic stories of terrorists stealing or building their own nuclear weapons. This is the stuff of paperback thrillers. Most experts would agree that nuclear terrorism presents less of a potential danger than use of less dramatic, but no less potent means of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons or by exploiting more sophisticated technologies. Terrorists have undoubtedly noted that the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in Afghanistan and during the Iran-Iraq war seemed to provoke little public outrage. With increased security around their traditional targets— airports, embassies, government buildings—these favored terrorist targets are no longer easy marks. And, equally important, the international media have been relatively restrained lately in reporting on terrorist outrages, thus denying them the public stage they wish. Some terrorist groups might decide that these factors call for a new, more terrible approach, perhaps even the use of chemical weapons. A number of states that support terrorism have such weapons in their arsenals, and the technology is not difficult to acquire or develop.

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We also anticipate that terrorists will make greater use of high technology in their attacks. To take one example, the Provisional IRA [Irish Republican Army], which has contact with Middle Eastern groups and Libya, has become expert in building bombs with long-delay timing devices, bombs which can be set to explode in days rather than hours. The IRA placed such a bomb in their 1985 attempt on [British] Prime Minister Thatcher at a seaside hotel during a party conference. And the recent assassination in Germany of Alfred Herrhausen used a particularly sophisticated device. Terrorists have been and will continue to make use of modern plastic explosives. These are much more powerful than traditional explosives like dynamite and TNT. And they are much more difficult to detect with current technology. Libya has already shipped several tons of a Czech plastic called Semtex to the Provisional IRA in recent years. And the IRA has used Semtex to devastating effect in Northern Ireland. The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 and last year’s downing of UTA 772 may signal another change in terrorist tactics: A move away from the hijackings of the 1980s toward a more deadly strategy of simply killing large numbers of people by bombing commercial aircraft. Response to Challenges How should we respond to these challenges? Firmness and persistence must continue as the hallmarks of our country’s counter-terrorism effort. Only a sustained, relentless effort carried out over a period of years will suppress terrorism. We must maintain the patience and discipline to allow our current policy to work through the next decade. And we must be confident enough not to cut deals with hostage takers or other terrorists. States supporting terrorism must be exposed to the sunlight. When necessary, international sanctions, including military force, should be imposed on these states to convince them that support for terrorism has a high cost and induce them to behave as responsible members of the world community. To further international cooperation against terrorist supporting states, we must expand our cooperation with Latin American, East Asian, and African countries. Terrorism is not limited to the Middle East or Europe. During the past year, we have discussed terrorism with the Soviet Union as one of the transnational issues that we raise whenever the two sides meet. The Soviets have taken a more constructive approach recently and have condemned specific terrorist acts, but there is still much room for improvement. We will continue to press the Soviets to take concrete steps to make it more difficult for international terrorists to operate. To further reinforce our law enforcement tactics, we and our friends must expand our sharing of information on terrorists as much as possible. To do so, we need closer cooperation, both on the policy and technical level. We already work very closely with our allies. As more countries join in the fight to eradicate terrorism, we must broaden our group until the terrorists and their supporters have no place to hide. On a less visible level, there will continue to be a place in the fight against terrorists for military and covert action. There are legitimate tools which we should use with discretion, but no one should doubt that we will employ these means to combat the terrorist threat.

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We need to combat the terrorists’ use of high technology. This means being willing to expend the time and money for research and development (R&D) activities. In the United States, counter-terrorism R&D projects simply do not cross above the budgetary cut line for many of our government agencies. This must be remedied. To deal with this problem, we have created a national counter-terrorism R&D program for which the State Department annually seeks funds. Unfortunately, the amount of funds appropriated by Congress for this purpose is never enough. We are working to increase funds for this vital program and make it a high priority. We, too, can put new technologies to work. Progress in miniaturization has permitted the development of more accurate sensors better able to detect explosives and hazardous gases. Improved devices will make it easier to detect plastic explosives such as those used in recent airline bombings. Research into DNA technology is providing forensic scientists with significant biological tools. Refinements in computer software are enhancing our ability to gather and analyze information. Terrorism, as we all know far too well, is an almost endless series of shifting tactics and differing targets. We have been largely successful in dealing with the threat posed by hijacking, for example, but now our efforts must address midair sabotage, which appears to be the current tactic of choice for terrorists. The U.S. and other governments are working on a number of initiatives to help improve the security of air and sea travel. Our initiatives include: ¥ The development of sophisticated equipment to detect plastic explosives. ¥ Many of the nations represented at this conference are cooperating in a multination effort to develop an international agreement that will require the introduction of ‘‘taggants’’ into all plastic explosives which will make them easier to detect. ¥ The United States has supported the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) efforts to encourage worldwide implementation of its recommendations aimed at preventing unlawful acts against passengers and crews. These measures were a U.S. initiative developed in a response to the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking. The IMO, with U.S. Government support, is currently sponsoring regional seminars to encourage implementation of these measures. ¥ Effective training is also a crucial ingredient in improving security against terrorism. The United States offers training to many nations each year in antiterrorism skills, including aviation and maritime security.

No one can promise a world free of terrorism. But through hard-earned experience our country has developed a policy which is showing signs of success against the terrorists. They know we are serious. States which in the past routinely supported terrorists are now more cautious in their actions. Terrorists, once caught, are being put on trial and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. No longer are they being allowed to slip quietly away. Our successes should encourage confidence that the tide is turning our way—that we are on the right path. We must understand, however, that suppressing terrorism will not be easy. We still have a long and difficult struggle before us. With heightened vigilance, clear thinking, and steady discipline, I am confident that we can prevail.

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Ambassador Morris D. Busby, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to House Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, April 18, 1991 Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to describe our efforts to deal with the threat of international terrorism, especially the threats directed against civil aviation. The Department of State is responsible for leading the U.S. government’s efforts to counter terrorism overseas. This is accomplished largely through the policy coordinating committee on counter-terrorism (PCC/CT). We chair this group, which includes representatives from 11 different agencies and departments having terrorism-related responsibilities. This process served us well during the recent crisis as we worked to counter the threat posed by Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Mr. Chairman, there has been some commentary recently that the terrorist threat during the Gulf crisis was overblown. The fact is that Iraq and its terrorist allies did attempt terrorist actions against the U.S. and the other coalition states. And perhaps I could address the subject you raised in your letter of invitation in that context, with a particular emphasis on aviation security. In some cases the terrorists were successful. But, by and large, we countered their operations. One of our primary concerns from August 2 onward was that Iraq or terrorists working on Iraq’s behalf would attempt a terrorist ‘‘spectacular’’ such as an act of aviation sabotage. In response we stepped up our contingency planning, implemented countermeasures, and issued advisories to Americans living or traveling abroad. Regarding the travel advisory program, U.S. government policy requires the dissemination of information to the general public regarding specific and credible overseas terrorist threats which cannot be countered. I would like to emphasize that there is no ‘‘double standard’’ between information available to government officials and the general public when the threat applies to both private citizens and government officials. We do not issue ‘‘government only’’ advisories. We advised the public repeatedly, based on the information we had, of the threat of terrorist actions by Iraq beginning in August and continuing through the war. We provide advice to travelers on destinations to avoid and other proscriptive measures that they could take to help minimize the risk. We attempted to build—both domestically and overseas—a partnership between the government and the public to confront and counter the threat. Our initial objective was to deter Iraq from actually undertaking any such attacks. We publicly emphasized that we would hold Saddam Hussein ‘‘personally responsible’’ for acts of terrorism directed against the U.S. or other coalition states. On another front, shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. government began to implement comprehensive additional security measures to counter the threat posed by Iraqi-sponsored terrorism. Government installations considered at risk were ‘‘hardened’’ and in some cases temporarily closed. We also drew down the numbers of personnel we had posted to some areas.

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Aviation Security Our initiatives also included a number of steps in order to minimize the risk of an act of aviation sabotage or hijacking. As the risk of hostilities continued to increase in the fall of 1990 we began a program of aviation security improvements, many of which reflected the new authorities granted by the aviation security improvement act of 1990 (ASIA). Effective international coordination and maintenance of strict security standards is needed to counter the threat posed to civil aviation by international terrorists. Strong security is required in many nations if civil aviation is to be safe. Otherwise terrorists will try to exploit weak links. The ASIA assigned the person in my position responsibility for the coordination of all international aviation security activities within the Department of State. Working through the PCC/CT process, we tested and refined our existing crisis management procedures for civil aviation. We looked at our communications capabilities, security procedures, and response mechanisms. We worked with a number of agencies on this program, but our partnership with the FAA was of greatest importance. Early on, the FAA developed a comprehensive set of aviation security contingency plans for both domestic and international aviation. We in turn made arrangements with the embassies and host government authorities in many areas of the world to support the emergency assignment of FAA security personnel who were dispatched once hostilities began. Beginning in the autumn, we began an extensive exchange of information with our major aviation partners on the security countermeasures the FAA planned to impose in the event of hostilities. As hostilities loomed close, in the first week of January I led a team to the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. During this trip, General Steele and I had comprehensive discussions with these governments which resulted in agreement in every country on the measures we would take if war broke out. I am convinced that our contingency planning helped insure that security countermeasures were implemented quickly, effectively and comprehensively. The program worked very well. Not only the five nations we visited, but all of the coalition nations, participated in a major strengthening of civil aviation security procedures which countered effectively the threat presented by Iraqisponsored or directed terrorism. During the entire Gulf War, there were nearly 200 terrorist incidents directed against coalition interests, a rate three to four times the ‘‘average.’’ Turkish terrorists killed one American in Turkey during Operation Desert Storm and killed another and seriously injured a third after the ground war ended. However, there was not a single act of aviation sabotage or hijacking. Virtually all of the major security countermeasures remain in effect. The coalition states recognize that the threat of terrorism continues, even if there is now a cease-fire. Countering the threat of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism also required many other steps beyond developing aviation security plans. Among these were: — The expulsion of Iraqi diplomats, intelligence operatives and others believed involved in terrorism. The United States and many other nations cooperated in an effort which resulted in the expulsion of more than 200 Iraqi diplomats or intelligence operatives before or during the war.

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— Another 500 suspicious persons were ordered out of various nations or put Under close scrutiny. — Our military strategy involved a concerted effort to disrupt the command and control systems of Iraq. Not only were the military channels disrupted, but the diplomatic systems were neutralized. This severely limited Iraq’s ability to authorize, coordinate or plan terrorist operations. — We reduced our vulnerabilities, particularly at isolated diplomatic posts, by bolstering security and reducing staff and dependents. We limited our staffs in many embassies only to those personnel essential to U.S. efforts to prosecute the war or to provide essential consular support to Americans. — Security countermeasures—not just for civil aviation—were raised to extraordinary levels. — Years of work to improve police and intelligence exchanges among governments, and to build an international consensus against terrorism, proved successful. — Crisis management preparations, including table top exercises developed by my office and a comprehensive approach to managing acts of terrorism within the context of an ongoing war, improved our capabilities to respond effectively when fighting began.

Post War Period Even though there is a cease-fire in place and Iraq has been required to renounce terrorism as a condition of the UN-imposed cease-fire, we cannot and will not let our guard down. We will continue our efforts to strengthen aviation security. A key feature in this effort is an initiative to improve international security through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Working with the other members of the Summit 7, we have agreed to press together for major changes to international aviation security standards. Another initiative is the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, recently negotiated in ICAO. I had the honor of signing this convention on March 1 in Montreal. When in force, it will require that manufacturers of plastic explosives include a chemical marker which will make the detection of such explosives easier, using existing technologies. This conventional will, as it becomes effective, improve our ability to detect concealed bombs of the type used to blow up Pan Am flight 103. We would also like to take this opportunity to note that the administration submitted to Congress last month proposed legislation to implement the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation and the 1988 International Maritime Organization Treaty for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The implementing legislation included in the anti-terrorism sections of the proposed Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991. We urge congressional action this year. Bilaterals Mr. Chairman, you asked about the progress in negotiating bilateral security articles. This is another element in our continuing effort to insure effective civil aviation security. In 1986, the Department launched an initiative to include strong security articles in bilateral agreements with our aviation partners.

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We have reached agreement on bilateral aviation security articles with 57 countries, including practically all our major aviation partners. Countries that have agreed to security articles in the past 12 months include Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece and Costa Rica. We are actively negotiating on bilateral aviation security articles with 14 other nations. (The next one is to be signed is with Bulgaria on April 24.) We think this is an effective program and we will continue to pursue it. R&D The State Department also coordinates the national CT R&D program which was begun in FY 1986 to fill the gaps in existing research, and to prevent duplication of efforts. We bring together scientists and managers from the government agencies that have a role in CT R&D, through the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). The TSWG today functions as one of the subcommittees of the PCC/CT which I mentioned earlier. Participation in the TSWG is broad, with more than 20 agencies or offices represented. The national CT R&D program funds research on projects that are judged critical to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts but that are not being funded by an individual agency as part of their mission. The program gives priority to projects which would be useful to more than one government agency. The Office of Technological Assessment recently praised the CT R&D program, especially for taking the lead in funding research projects to counter chemical and biological threats. We also have funded research on developing better equipment for detecting explosives and developing safer, more reliable, and more sophisticated equipment for use by our military and civilian counter-terrorist forces in resolving hijackings or other terrorist incidents. For fiscal year 1992, the State Department is requesting $3 million for the program. And for the first time as part of our efforts to meet the funding needs for the program, the Department of Defense has agreed to request $7 million as part of its FY 1992 budget. I’d like to also mention two other State Department programs which have a bearing on aviation security. Our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program helps the security forces of friendly nations improve their capabilities for preventing and coping with terrorism. Aviation security is a major focus of the program. Aviation security is a major focus of the program. The Aviation Security Improvement Act passed last year allows us to provide training at the recipient country’s own airport instead of bringing their officials to the U.S. This will help improve the effectiveness of such training. For FY 1992, we are requesting $15 million for ATA. The administration also has a rewards program which allows us to pay up to $2 million for information leading to the prevention or resolution of an act of international terrorism directed against U.S. interests overseas or the prosecution of persons who committed such an offense. The U.S. airline industry and the Airlines Pilots Association have offered to match the U.S. government’s rewards in the case of aviation related incidents, thus raising the potential maximum reward to $4 million in such cases. To replenish the

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administration’s fund, the State Department is requesting a $1 million appropriation for FY 1992. Mr. Chairman, I believe this gives an indication of the broad scope of our efforts to counter the menace of international terrorism. In fighting terrorism, every day without a major incident is considered a good day. But in this business we always have to worry about tomorrow. We recognize that there is not time for complacency.

AMBASSADOR THOMAS E. MCNAMARA Ambassador Thomas E. McNamara, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights, Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 12, 1993 Thank you for providing me this opportunity to share with you the Department of State’s views on trends in international terrorism. 1992 in Review 1992 saw one of the largest one-year decreases in the number of international terrorist incidents since the U.S. began keeping such statistics in 1968. International terrorist attacks declined during 1992 to 362, the lowest level in 17 years. This is 40 percent fewer than the 557 incidents recorded in 1991, a figure that was inflated by a spate of low-level incidents at the time of the Persian Gulf War. More importantly, the number of incidents in 1992 was far below the range of 650–700 incidents per year during the mid-1980s. Despite the decline in the number of overall incidents, however, U.S. citizens and property remain the principle targets of terrorists throughout the world. Nearly 40 percent of last year’s incidents were directed at U.S. targets. Fortunately, U.S. casualties were the lowest ever. Two Americans were killed, and one was wounded during 1992, as opposed to seven dead and 16 wounded the previous year. The deadliest international terrorist attack during the year occurred on March 17 when a powerful truck bomb destroyed the Israel Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The blast leveled the embassy and severely damaged a nearby church, school, and retirement home. Twenty-nine persons were killed and 242 wounded. Islamic Jihad, a cover name for the Iranian-sponsored group Hizballah, subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack, and authenticated its claim by releasing a videotape of the embassy taken during surveillance prior to the bombing. This is another in an all-too-long list of criminal involvement by Iran; whether directly or through surrogates, in terrorism. As during the preceding three years, Latin America saw more international terrorism in 1992 than any other region. Anti-foreign attacks in that region were predominantly against American targets, although more Israelis and Argentines died as a result of the embassy bombing. Leftwing terrorism, particularly in Europe, is in decline. Ethnic and separatist groups in Europe, Latin

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America, South Asia, and the Middle East were active last year, however, and are a continuing concern. The Future The massive changes in the last several years in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are among the most important in this century. As it is often the case, however, change—no matter how positive on balance—often has some undesired consequences. Such is the case in this instance. Violence and long-suppressed ethnic conflicts have risen in a number of areas of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, causing massive human suffering. Unfortunately, terrorism is often a by-product of such conflicts. We need to monitor them carefully in the future to be prepared to deal with any terrorist consequences. In this regard, I can report that we are working with the several governments in the region to counter the threat potentially posed by terrorism. In a number of nations, laws and domestic security services have been democratized. Many of them are cooperating with Western governments, including the United States, to improve their antiterrorism capabilities. Another area of great concern is North Africa and the Middle East. There has been a disturbing, recent emergence of new, radical groups that engage in terror to enhance their political agenda. Such groups present new challenges to both national governments and the international community. Many have adopted extremist Islamic ideologies. Let me state what should be obvious to all: Our problem is not with Islam. It is with those who use violence and terror to advance their political objectives. While terrorist incidents are fewer than several years ago, the threat continues to be significant. We cannot drop our guard. Just as we are facing the contemporary threat, we must continue to be vigilant to detect and counter emerging threats before they pose a major risk to U.S. national interests. U.S. Policy I believe strongly that the main reason for this steady decline has been the growth of international cooperation in recent years. States are more and more willing to cooperate, and less tempted to make separate deals with terrorist organizations. The U.S. has been the leader in urging such cooperation, and in fighting separate deals. We have succeeded in focusing attention on those aspects of the issue that are critical to success: the ending of state sponsorship, the strengthening of the rule of law, the refusal to reward terrorists through concessions, and the strengthening of measures to thwart terrorist acts. The central pillar of our policy is pressuring state sponsors of terrorism to end their support. State sponsorship of terrorism occurs when a government provides weapons, training and training sites, intelligence support, funding, travel documents, safe havens from prosecution, and similar assistance. This enhances the threat and lethality of international terrorist groups. In the end, without a territory to operate from, and the facilities that only a state can provide, terrorists are vulnerable to effective law enforcement.

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We have been successful in putting greater pressure on these states—most notably on Iraq and Libya. We have also benefited from the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Recent revelations from the files of those regimes demonstrate what we suspected for many years: Some of these states were sponsoring terrorism against the West. In our recently completed review of state sponsorship we determined that six nations—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria—continue to qualify as state sponsors. Two other nations—Pakistan and Sudan—remain under review as possible additions to the list of state sponsors. None of those state sponsors has completely abandoned the terrorist option, nor severed ties to terrorist surrogates. The Iranian regime has practiced state terrorism since it took power in 1979; it is currently the deadliest state sponsor and has achieved a worldwide reach. Syria retains close ties to several groups that have engaged in international terrorism, and allows them to train in territory it controls and have offices in Damascus. Saddam has exercised the terrorism option against regime opponents and U.N. officials and Western relief workers in Iraq. Libya continues to allow terrorist groups to operate in its territory, and Cuba and North Korea have not yet cut all links to terrorists. Increasingly, governments have been willing to stand up and be counted as opponents of terrorism and, importantly, to assist in countering terrorism. We saw this clearly during Operation Desert Storm when Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure was disrupted by aggressive actions by many nations. The United Nations Security Council condemnation of Libya for the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, and the passage of landmark U.N. Security Council resolutions 731 and 748, are the latest and most significant indication of this changed attitude. UNSC Resolution 748 imposed sanctions which include a complete cut-off of air service to and from Libya, an embargo on the provision of aviation spare parts and a similar provision concerning military equipment, spare parts and services to Libya, and a requirement that nations reduce the number of Libyan diplomats serving at overseas missions. These sanctions are effective in almost all cases and potential violations are acted upon quickly by the U.S. Until Libya complies fully with the requirements imposed by the Security Council, these sanctions will remain in place. We are considering with our allies, Britain and France, for the current sanctions can best be strengthened to force Libyan compliance. The efforts of the United States and other nations to strengthen the rule of law and to apply the law to terrorists are another key element of our policy. Increasingly, terrorist have been identified, tracked, apprehended, prosecuted, and punished for their crimes. The United States, for example, cooperated successfully with Greece in the trial of Mohammed Rashid, who was accused of the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am aircraft. Ten years after this bombing, Rashid was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy jail term in Athens, Greece. We also strengthen the rule of law by helping improve the judicial and law enforcement capabilities of other nations that may be victims of terrorist acts. Through training provided under the Department of State’s antiterrorism assistance program, we have improved the ability of other governments to

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preempt, to investigate, and to prosecute terrorists. In 1992, more than 1,125 senior officials from 25 countries received such training, bringing the total number of persons trained in the program to about 14,000 from 75 nations. World Trade Center Before discussing the State Department’s role in the investigation of the World Trade Center bombing, I want to express my condolences to the families of the victims, and assure them of the commitment of all of us at the Department of State to bring those guilty to justice. Even though our role in domestic terrorist incidents is limited, I will comment briefly on what we do in such cases to assist the investigators. All embassies have been tasked to report aggressively any information they may acquire concerning the bombing so the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York can have the benefit of whatever information or ideas may be available overseas. The Department is also responding to specific tasking from the Task Force concerning investigative leads that require action overseas. The Department has experience in investigating car bombings and we are sharing that knowledge with the on-scene investigators in New York. Representatives of the Department are participating in the investigation, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has provided the Task Force specialized vapor detection equipment that can help identify explosive compounds. In addition, the Intelligence Community is undertaking an intensive, retrospective review of U.S. intelligence to find any information that is potentially useful to the investigation. Mr. Chairman, the investigation is still in its early stages and is centering on the collection of forensic evidence. Furthermore, lead responsibility for this investigation rests with the FBI and the New York Police Department, working through their Joint Terrorism Task Force. As this is an on-going criminal investigation, I cannot comment further on it, or speculate as to whether this bombing may represent an act of international terrorism. The same is true regarding the possible role of various international terrorists. Mr. Chairman, at the same time, let me be clear: If a foreign terrorist group or state is determined to have been involved in any fashion in the World Trade Center bombing, we will not rest or be satisfied until those responsible are brought to justice. There is no higher obligation of government than the protection of its citizens. I can assure you that this is the view of the President, the Secretary, and all of us in the Department. Next Steps Before ending my testimony; however, I would like to discuss steps for which we seek Congressional support. After the December 1988 destruction of Pan Am 103 by a plastic explosive bomb, the U.S. and key European nations agreed to identify chemical marking agents which could be incorporated into plastic explosives during the manufacturing stage in order to make these explosives detectable. Our aim was to develop an international agreement which would help deter terrorists

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and help prevent bombings using plastic explosives. Emerging from this effort is the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Purposes of Detection, which was completed in Montreal in 1991, and which has been signed by the U.S. and 45 other nations. The U.S. Army has completed technical testing, much of which was initially funded by the State Department’s Counterterrorism Research and Development Fund, to ensure that the required changes to U.S. plastic explosives will have no adverse environmental, occupational health or national security implications. Based on these tests, the Army is prepared to begin producing plastic explosives incorporating the marking chemical as of January 1994. The Executive Branch will be submitting the Convention for Senate ratification in the near future. We will also be seeking Congressional approval for related implementing legislation. We hope that we can work closely with you and the Committee for expedited approval of implementing legislation. In addition, the Department will again seek Congressional passage of implementing legislation for two important counterterrorism treaties: The 1998 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation and the 1998 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. These treaties extended the ‘‘prosecute or extradite’’ principle to attacks on airports or maritime targets to help prevent repetitions of incidents such as the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport attacks and the 1986 hijacking of the Achille Lauro passenger liner. The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaties in 1989, but approval of the implementing legislation was delayed since it was incorporated into the Omnibus Crime Bill.… Mr. Chairman, despite progress and successes, the threat of terrorism, particularly state-sponsored terrorism, is still serious. Our response must and will be to maintain our vigilance, increase our capabilities, and further develop cooperation to help ensure the safety of Americans and American interests throughout the world.

AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. WILCOX, JR. Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, June 29, 1995 Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the current trends in international terrorism and to describe the efforts of the Clinton Administration to deal with this threat. The Oklahoma City bombing on April 19 and the killing of two U.S. officials in Karachi on March 8 reminded all Americans that our country is still threatened by both domestic and international terrorism. First, let me review current trends in international terrorism and update information in our publication, ‘‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’’ for 1994, which was published in April.

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On the positive side of the ledger, there has been a pattern of decline in the number of acts of international terrorism. We counted 321 such incidents in 1994, compared to 431 in 1993 and 665 in 1987, the peak year for international terrorism. In the first three months of 1995, we have recorded 160 such attacks, but nearly 100 were relatively minor incidents in Europe attributed to the PKK, a Kurdish group. Let me suggest some reasons for the decline in the incidence of international terrorism. — First, terrorists have been deterred by the strengthening over the years of U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts. International cooperation against terrorism has grown. — Second, the fall of the old Soviet Union has weakened many traditional, radical, revolutionary terrorist groups. — Third, the Arab-Israeli peace process, notwithstanding a vicious rear-guard action by some terrorist elements to undermine it, has largely ended or reduced the level of support for terrorism against Israel by all but a few Middle Eastern states.

While these are positive trends, there are negative developments that make the overall threat of international terrorism very serious. Indeed statistics by themselves are not a reliable index of the terrorism threat, as one or two major attacks can have a greater impact than a large number of non-fatal attacks. — Notwithstanding the decline in the number of acts of international terrorism overseas, casualties are trending upward. Major attacks such as the Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings, the bombing of the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, and the gas attack on the Tokyo subways, suggest a tendency by terrorists to inflict higher casualties and to attack less protected civilian targets. — The Tokyo subway attacks highlight two additional dangers: ¥ They demonstrate that terrorist attacks involving materials of mass destruction have become a reality. ¥ The Tokyo attacks also vividly demonstrate the potential of terrorism by deviant cults or psychotic elements, who are more difficult to detect and deter in advance than previously known groups with more conventional political agendas. — International terrorists today are increasingly mobile, sophisticated, and technologically proficient in explosives and weaponry. Using computers, cellular telephones, and encryption systems, they are a more elusive target for law enforcement and intelligence efforts. And they pose an increasing danger, not only to innocent human beings, but to the fragile information, financial, and transportation systems on which modern society depends. — Although Israel, the Palestinians, and many Arab states are moving toward peace in the Middle East, Islamic extremist groups, including HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah, are using terror to undermine this process. Although they have not succeeded and until last week there had been a relative lull for several months, these groups remain a potent threat. — Islamic extremist groups are also waging a campaign of violence and terror in the Middle East and elsewhere, creating turmoil in Egypt, Algeria and Pakistan.

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The attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt while visiting Ethiopia Monday showed the determination of these groups. — Other Islamic extremist elements, such as associates of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef who was involved in the World Trade Center bombing and plots to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific, and who are apparently not backed by any State, are still a menace. These elements, which claim to act on behalf of Islam, are in fact a deviant minority. Rejected by mainstream Islamic communities and governments, they betray the tenets of Islam, which, like the other great world faiths, preaches peace and opposes violence. — Finally, although State sponsorship of terrorism has declined in recent years due to U.S. and international pressure, more needs to be done to restrain those states which give aid and comfort to terrorists.

Iran, the most active state sponsor of terrorism today, continues to provide direction and support to terrorist groups, including Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran also provides support to terrorist groups which oppose Israel and the peace process. Iran continues to assassinate dissidents abroad, and it has not withdrawn the Fatwah against the novelist Salman Rushdie. President Clinton’s decision to halt all U.S. trade with Iran and to bar U.S. companies from any involvement in the Iranian oil sector is an example of the pressure which we think is needed to persuade Iran to change its policies. We hope other nations will follow suit and do more themselves. As President Clinton said Monday in his San Francisco speech marking the 50th anniversary of the United Nations: ‘‘If nations and groups are not willing to move away from the delivery of death, we should put aside short-term profits for the people in our countries to stop their conduct.’’ Iraq’s ability to instigate terror has been curbed by U.S. and U.N. sanctions, however Saddam Hussein’s regime has continued to murder dissidents and attack foreign relief personnel in Northern Iraq. Terrorism by Libya has been sharply reduced by UN sanctions imposed after the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772. Libya still defies its obligation to hand over the indicted perpetrators of these crimes, but we will not rest until they are brought to justice. Sudan, North Korea, Cuba and Syria are the other nations we have named as state sponsors. We have no evidence of Syrian Government direct involvement in acts of international terrorism since 1986. Following Secretary Christopher’s recent visit to the region, there is new reason for optimism that the Syrian-Israeli talks will advance. In the meantime, we continue to urge Syria to banish terrorist groups which still maintain a presence in Syrian-controlled territory. Until this problem is resolved, Syria will stay on our list. Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention some other elements of the Administration’s counterterrorism policy which we are energetically pursuing. First, we believe in strengthening the rule of law as a prime weapon against terrorism. The counterterrorism legislation pending in Congress is part of this effort. Meanwhile, State, Justice and the FBI are working together on a daily basis with foreign counterparts to forge strong law enforcement cooperation against terrorists.

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Today, in contrast to a decade ago, more and more nations are following our example of treating terrorism as a crime, for which there can be no political justification. More governments have also adopted our policy of no deals with terrorist to buy them off. And more governments are arresting and prosecuting terrorists, or extraditing them. The recent extradition to the United States of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Ahmed Yousef by Pakistan, and the rendition of Abdul Hakim Murad by the Philippines are examples of effective law enforcement cooperation. There is also a growing body of international law against terrorism. In 1986, there were five international treaties and conventions pledging governments to act against various kinds of international terrorism. Today there are eleven. The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program is also an effective tool for improving counterterrorism capabilities of other governments. We are grateful, Mr. Chairman, for your Committee’s active interest and support for the ATA program. We also appreciate the Congress’s continued support for our counterterrorism research and development program, which is adapting science and technology to the fight against terrorism. As terrorists become more sophisticated and innovative, this program, including the cooperative R&D arrangements we have with the UK, Israel, and Canada, becomes increasingly important. Our overseas counterterrorism effort, coordinated by my office, is a well integrated, dedicated effort in which all agencies pull together in a vital common task. Besides the FBI, Justice, CIA and the Department of Transportation, our superbly trained U.S. military counterterrorism elements, whom we rely on in emergency situations, are also a key member of our counterterrorism team. On June 22, the President signed a Presidential Decision Directive, PDD 39, which reaffirms and strengthens our already successful interagency coordination process. Mr. Chairman. In closing, I want to stress that our counterterrorism effort abroad depends, not only on the activities I have described, but on a vigorous, engaged U.N foreign policy across the board, and adequate supporting resources. — Terrorism is often a product of festering political, and ethnic conflicts. Without active U.S. efforts to help resolve these conflicts, terrorism is likely to increase. — The hopelessness and despair of chronic poverty and economic failure in poor societies also provides a fertile climate for terrorism. This is another reason why an active, well-funded U.S. development assistance program must continue. — In short, a successful U.S. and international campaign against terrorism demands continued U.S. engagement, in every area of international affairs. It also needs U.S. resources to sustain the broader relationships with foreign governments that are vital to cooperation against terrorism. Only with such a continued commitment can we maintain the fight against terrorism. SOURCE: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: For text, see http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm and related information in chapter 27, Key Documents.

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Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks Before the Denver Council on Foreign Relations, Denver, Colorado, September 12, 1996 The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not, alas, bring forth the ‘‘End of History’’ or a new dawn of world peace and harmony. Instead, this change brought into sharper focus serious global problems and threats. You’ve heard the list before: ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, untenable population growth, international crime, and terrorism. All these global issues directly affect our well being and security. They therefore have high priority in the foreign policy agenda of the Clinton Administration, in addition to the more traditional threats. Perhaps none of these issues has caused Americans more anxiety than terrorism. Terrorism, which we define as politically motivated violence against noncombatants, is an ancient evil, and American interests have been targeted by terrorists abroad for years. But now, the threat seems to loom larger, perhaps because the threat of conventional war against the U.S. has declined, and because we’ve recently been struck by two major terrorist acts at home—the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings. Two recent bombings of our forces in Saudi Arabia, the TWA 800 disaster— although we don’t yet know its cause—and the pipe bomb at the Atlanta Olympics. It is a paradox that although terrorism kills relatively few people, compared to other forms of violence, and although the statistical probability of any of us being killed by terrorists is minuscule, we are preoccupied by terrorism, and our government and others pay extraordinary attention to combating it. Let me suggest some reasons why. First, terrorism provokes deep fear and insecurity—more than other forms of violence. Terrorists strike innocent civilians, often randomly, and without warning. We think we can protect ourselves against other forms of violence, but we feel defenseless against terrorists. Terrorists know this, and they seek to use intimidation to impose their political or other agendas. Killing is only a means to that end. By creating fear and panic, terrorists try to extort concessions or to weaken and discredit governments by showing they are unable to protect their citizens. Terrorism is also used as low cost strategic warfare, sometimes by rogue states using surrogates, and sometimes by groups motivated by ideology, religion or ethnicity, to overthrow governments and change the course of history. Terrorists also use violence in a less focused way to express protest and rage, to advance messianic and fanatic religious agendas, and for even more obscure pathological reasons. One can argue that terrorism has failed historically, as a strategic weapon. But that’s no cause for comfort. There is no doubt that it has caused great damage to American interests and those of our friends around the world. For example, terrorism has prolonged the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the North Ireland conflict for decades. Real progress toward peace making in

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these struggles has come only when terrorism has been renounced and its practitioners marginalized. Terrorism also has a high economic cost. The U.S. government alone spends about $5 billion a year to guard against terrorism, at home and abroad, and these costs will doubtless rise.… Terrorism can also cripple entire economies. For example, in Egypt two years ago by targeting a few tourists, terrorists almost shut down the vitally important tourist industry for many months. Technology has also added to the terrorist threat. In 1605, the terrorist Guy Fawkes planted 29 barrels of explosives in a plot to blow up King James and the British Parliament. Today, a small explosive device in a purse could achieve the same effect. And bomb making recipes are readily available on the internet. Terrorists use computers, cellular phones, and encryption software to evade detection, and they have sophisticated means for forging passports and documents. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang, who were recently convicted for a plot to blow up twelve U.S. airliners over the Pacific, used all these tools. Even more dangerous is the specter that terrorists will turn to materials of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear, to multiply casualties far beyond traditional levels. The sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic Japanese sect, in the Tokyo subway last year showed that the threat of chemical terrorism is now a reality. And the willingness of some fanatic or crazed terrorists to commit suicide while carrying out attacks makes terrorism using weapons of mass destruction an even more sinister threat. Finally, terrorism today is far more devastating than in the past because of the mass media. No story plays better, or longer, than a terrorist attack. Today’s media, especially television, multiply the fear effect of terrorism. By vividly conveying its horror. And this greatly increases our collective sense of vulnerability. The terrorists, of course, know this. And they seek to exploit media coverage to put us and our governments on the psychological defensive. Now let’s look at the current trend in terrorism, who are today’s terrorists? And what is the U.S. Government doing to combat them, and put them on the defensive, where they belong. I’ll focus on international terrorism, for which the State Department is the lead agency, whereas the FBI takes the lead on domestic terrorism. First, the trend. There is good news and bad. The actual number of international terrorist incidents has declined in recent years, from a high of 665 in 1987 to an average between three and four hundred in recent years. There are various reasons for this positive trend: — The Soviet Union and almost all of the many revolutionary terrorist groups it supported are now history; — After fifty years of war and terrorism, Arabs and Palestinians are struggling for peace. The PLO has renounced terrorism, and most Arab states have also condemned it unequivocally; — Only a few rogue states continue to sponsor or support terrorism.

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— There is a growing international consensus today that killing innocents for political reasons is absolutely unacceptable, whatever the motivation or cause; and — There is a corresponding willingness by the majority of states to crack down on terrorists by all means available, especially by using the law to combat terrorism.

But there is also a negative side of the ledger. Notwithstanding the commitment of the Palestinian and Arab mainstream to peace in the Middle East, groups like HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad last year carried out a vicious rear guard campaign of bombings in Israel in an effort to defeat the peace process. — And an Israeli terrorist assassinated Prime Minister Rabin for the same purpose. — Iran, notwithstanding U.S. efforts to contain it through sanctions, continues to use terrorism as a weapon of foreign policy to kill dissidents and disrupt the peace process. — And Libya, although UN sanctions have curtailed its terrorism abroad, still defies the UN’s mandate to deliver two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103 at Lockerbie to a British or U.S. court for trail. — Exploitation of religion by terrorists may also be on the upsurge. In previous decades, most terrorist groups were secular, but more and more terrorist today claim to act on behalf of religion, especially Islam. Some are part of organized groups such as HAMAS, the Lebanese Hizballah, and the Egyptian Gamaat. Others are ad hoc Islamic elements, such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef’s gang, many of whom received training in Afghanistan. — Exploitation of religion for political purposes, and violence, is an age old phenomenon. It is important to remember that all religions have produced deviant and dangerous fringe groups, and Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, preaches peace and non-violence. Terrorists who claim to speak for Islam are abusing their faith, and they are increasingly condemned throughout the Islamic world.

Finally, let me say a few words about what the United States is doing to combat terrorism. I’m happy to confirm that we are doing a lot. — First, our policy is to seek out relentlessly and punish terrorists wherever they may be, using the combined assets of U.S. law enforcement, diplomacy, and intelligence. Our ability to bring to justice the World Trade Center terrorists, the conspirators, including Sheikh Abdul Rahman, who planned to blow up the Holland tunnel, the UN and federal buildings in New York, and the gang who plotted to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific, are major success stories. — Second, we make no concessions to terrorists. We refuse to bow to demands for political concessions or ransom. — Third, we designate states that sponsor terrorism, impose economic sanctions, and ask our friends to do likewise. In a recent speech in Stuttgart, directed to our European allies, Secretary Christopher said ‘‘working together against State Sponsors or terrorism is an imperative, not an option … Our principled commitment to free trade simply does not oblige us to do business with aggressive tyrannies like Iran and Libya. We must join forces on effective multilateral measures to deny thee rogue regimes the resources they crave.’’2

2

See http://www.fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_96/dos960906.htm.

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— Fourth, we stress the rule of law in dealing with terrorists, and insist that terrorism is an unmitigated crime, whatever its motives or causes. By strengthening U.S. laws against terrorism, as President Clinton has done, and aggressively promoting international treaties and conventions against terror, of which there are now ten, we have led a worldwide trend to use the law as our most effective tool against terrorists. — Fifth, we have superb military assets for use, when in rare cases the situation demands. — Sixth, since terrorists operate in the dark, we are investing heavily in collection and analysis of intelligence. — Seventh, the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has trained over 18,000 foreign government officials from over 80 countries in counterterrorism techniques and aviation security through our Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. — Eighth, we also have a strong program of research and development in counterterrorism technology, especially in explosives detection. — Ninth, this week the President proposed a $1 billion package of additional counterterrorism measures that will enhance aviation security, increase the number of law enforcement agents, and improve their forensic capabilities. — Tenth, and finally, cooperation with other states is indispensable to stop terrorists, as terrorism becomes increasingly transnational. For this reason, President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have given high priority to counterterrorism in our diplomatic agenda. We consult with dozens of governments annually, and we promote multilateral action, such as the Sharm el-Sheikh Peacemaking Summit and follow-up counterterrorism meetings in Washington, and the recent G-7 ministerial conference on terrorism in Paris.…

We can be proud of the successes we’ve achieved, using these policies and tools. But we can’t be complacent, since terrorism is a dynamic, moving target. Also, and perhaps most important, we can’t rely just on tough, focused counterterrorism efforts if we are to reduce the threat of terrorism. We need a larger, comprehensive effort to maintain U.S. foreign policy leadership and engagement, across the board—and this I emphasize—we also need the resources needed to sustain it. Terrorism often emerges from the breeding grounds of political, economic and ideological conflict. And it is often a product of poverty and despair. In the past half-century, the United States has led the way in addressing these problems around the world. But our leadership, and our ability to mobilize international support to resolve conflicts, reduce threats of all kinds, and build confident relationships, has required resources. Today, I’m sorry to say, the resources we commit to for our international affairs are in sharp decline.… We rank 21st among the wealthiest countries in the world in the percentage of our wealth we give to foreign aid. By trying to pursue our foreign affairs on the cheap, we are risking U.S. leadership and compromising our interests. I fear we are living off capital, and if this trend continues, U.S. interests, including our ability to reduce the threat of violence and terrorism, are bound to suffer. America’s overall security interests require, therefore, not just the policies and activities we have in place to put terrorists out of business and behind

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bars, and not just the superb military forces we have, but adequate resources to support a vigorous, engaged foreign policy leadership role, across the board. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960912.html

AMBASSADOR MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN Ambassador A. Michael Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., June 15, 2000 AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the National Commission on Terrorism Report, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.3 This is an important report and addresses very serious issues. We welcome the report, produced by a very distinguished commission, as a thoughtful contribution to our ongoing mission, which is to seek more effective means of countering international terrorism and protecting our citizens and interests around the world. I believe our exchange of views with you today will also contribute to this mission. Let me say at the outset that I completely support the core objective of the Commission Report: to improve the tools we have to combat terrorism, and to ensure that we use these tools as effectively as possible. As Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I have felt acutely responsible for strengthening our capabilities by making our tools more dynamic and effective. In this effort, I find myself in strong sympathy with the thrust of many of the Commission’s recommendations … Indeed, we are moving forward already in some of the areas discussed in the Commission report. Let me address some of the key issues and recommendations that relate directly to the work we are doing at State. Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Commission observes that it is necessary to sustain credibility and dynamism in the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) process, and I am committed to doing just that—not only with regard to FTOs, but with all of our counterterrorism policy tools. Congress has given us a very effective tool in the Secretary’s authority to designate FTOs. Designations under the 1996 law criminalize financial support to a FTO, require U.S. financial institutions to block funds of FTOs and their agents, and render representatives and certain members of the FTO ineligible for visas and admission to the United States. State leads this work in consultation with the Departments of Justice and Treasury and with the intelligence community. In 1997, we designated 30 organizations as FTOs, allowing us to deter terrorist fundraising more effectively. As important, the FTO list has

3

See http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html.

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proved invaluable as a diplomatic tool to stigmatize and punish terrorist groups and their supporters around the world. In 1999, we re-designated 27 FTOs (designations expire after 2 years unless renewed), dropped three groups, and added Usama Bin Ladin’s alQaida organization. Dropping three FTOs (the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Khmer Rouge, and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front of Chile) from the list sent an important signal that if you are out of the terrorism business by the standards of U.S. law, you will be dropped from the list. EDITOR’S NOTE: See 1999 FTO List http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/ 2682.htm#designation.

Because of the significance of FTO designations and because they can be challenged in court, the designation process is painstaking and we are very careful about assembling the evidence that goes into making the case. A single designation consumes hundreds of hours of work carried out by my staff as well as by lawyers and analysts from Justice, Treasury, and the intelligence community. Because of the quality of this effort, we have won all court challenges (for example from the MEK and LTTE) to our designations, thereby further bolstering the credibility of the FTO process. But sustaining credibility and dynamism in the FTO process is an ongoing challenge, constrained mainly by limited personnel resources. We constantly review and assess various potential groups for addition to the list of FTOs— this can be done at anytime, not just every two years. I have directed my staff to review some 10 to 12 new groups before the year is out.… State Sponsors/‘‘Terrorism List’’: I made a special effort in my introduction to this year’s Patterns of Global Terrorism report to highlight the importance of injecting dynamism into another of our policy tools: the process of designating state sponsors. The Commission’s fundamental observations on sharpening diplomatic tools such as the ‘‘Terrorism List’’ are on the mark, and this is part of my strategy. We need to take into account all relevant considerations in connection with moving states onto or off of the list, and we also need to explore whether it would be appropriate in any cases to identify states as ‘‘not fully cooperating’’ rather than as state sponsors of terrorism if doing so was warranted by the facts and would advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives. On March 30, the Secretary decided to keep the seven state sponsors on the list, including, of course, Iran and Syria. But we pointedly noted in Patterns that designation of states is not permanent. A primary goal of our counterterrorism policy is to get states out of the terrorism business and move them off that list. We do this by engaging them on what they need to do to end support for terrorism and pressing them to take those steps. Our talks with North Korea and Sudan are a case in point. We are, at the same time, committed to maintaining sanctions on Iran and Syria—and all other state sponsors—until they have moved out of the terrorism business. The Commission’s report offers recommendations that could be useful in making our work more effective. I have been considering what intermediate steps could be taken to give state sponsors a clearer look at how they might

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‘‘graduate’’ off the list. It may be possible that in appropriate cases state sponsors could step off the state sponsor list and be left only on the ‘‘not fully cooperating’’ list, with an eye toward stepping off of that list when they fully cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. There are many technical legal issues of how the laws on state sponsorship and ‘‘not fully cooperating’’ are structured, but I agree that we should be able to use these tools more effectively … Pakistan and Greece: The Commission suggests that the Administration consider Greece and Pakistan as candidates for the ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ designation, under the 1996 law.… Pakistan … has not been designated under this law. However, it continues to be under serious and constant review—as it must be for our process to be truly dynamic and effective. As the Commission’s report notes, and as we have noted in Patterns, Pakistan’s record on terrorism remains mixed. I have no illusions about what is negative in the record, and I emphasized this in Patterns when describing the shift in the locus of terrorism to South Asia. Despite significant and material cooperation in some areas—particularly arrests and extraditions—Pakistan also has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory. But the areas of cooperation are real, and we are still in the game to make more progress. Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism and understands that this threat undermines its own security. It is in our interest that they move in the right direction, and we want to use the right tools to help them to keep the pressure on terrorists. We are looking hard at current developments and continue to be intensively engaged with Pakistan on improving cooperation, most recently with the President’s and Under Secretary Pickering’s travel to Pakistan to reinforce tough messages on terrorism and other key concerns. We have a lot more to do, but we see that our engagement is beginning to yield progress. If that changes, we of course would respond using the tool most appropriate to the situation. But at the moment we do not believe that designating Pakistan as ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ is appropriate. On Greece, Secretary Albright has made it clear that we are not considering sanctions against the Greek Government. The situation of Greece is difficult, and we have offered our perspective in Patterns in sharp detail. The Commission’s report concludes that Greece—a friend and NATO ally—must do better in the fight against terrorism. Our embassy in Athens is working closely and cooperatively with the Greek Government to bring to justice the killers of five U.S. Mission employees since 1975. I visited Athens last summer for extended discussions on terrorism with a number of Greek officials. Since that time, they have taken several initiatives, including reorganizing their counterterrorism unit with more money and resources, and initiating a public dialogue on the problem of terrorism. We have also signed a mutual legal assistance treaty, which the Greeks have already ratified … The murder of British Military Attach´e Stephen Saunders in Athens on June 8 is one more sad entry on a long list of unsolved acts of terrorism. This tragic event demonstrates that much work remains to be done if Greece is going to achieve success against the deadly ‘‘17 November’’ group and other terrorists.

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In addition, a safe and secure Olympics in Greece is a goal we and the Greek Government share.… The Commission has also addressed a key issue regarding the ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ designation: whether the additional sanctions that are imposed by this designation—banning arms sales—make sense or would be effective. In fact, this raises the larger, most important question: whether the tools we have, in the context of ongoing engagement, are adequate or appropriate for the task of improving our position in the global effort against terrorism. One could argue that we currently have limited options at our disposal when we seek to pressure nations to address terrorist threats within and across their borders. The National Commission’s report recognizes this, as illustrated by its recommendation to ban countries ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ with the U.S. from participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. At the moment it is not clear to us that the Visa Waiver Pilot Program is an appropriate vehicle for pursuing our counterterrorism objectives; it may not be a sufficiently flexible or welltargeted tool. The Commission’s idea is useful in that it provokes discussion on how Congress and the Administration could work together in developing more flexible, calibrated counterterrorist policy tools—tools that give us more options than we have now. All nations are not alike, and thus the mix of diplomatic tools used need not be alike. There are a number of other sanctions that could be useful in exerting pressure on various nations to counter terrorist threats more effectively. A preferred approach is to authorize the President to choose from a menu of sanctions, such as denial of Export-Import bank assistance or U.S. Government procurement opportunities. Whether or not these types of sanctions would be effective in countering terrorism is unclear. But the point is that this is a discussion we should be having, and the Commission’s report is a good start.… Disruption of Financing: State concurs with the Commission’s assessment that one of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. We have already made this a priority and are working hard through various means to disrupt the financing of terrorism. I have already outlined for you how we actively employ the legal tool of designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Another step the Administration has taken to disrupt the financing of terrorists is to levy sanctions through executive action. In 1995 the President issued Executive Order 12947, which blocked not just financial but also material assets of twelve Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, as well as senior officials of these groups.… last year the President issued Executive Order 13129, imposing sanctions on the Afghan Taliban. This action deepened the international isolation of the Taliban and limited its ability to support terrorist groups and activities. We are also disrupting the financing of terrorism through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. I held numerous bilateral consultations last year, especially in the Gulf states, to address the threat posed by Usama Bin Laden and other terrorists.… We will continue to encourage countries to examine their own laws and counterterrorist tools to ensure that they are doing all they can. We have also urged nations to be more aware of the possibility that terrorists are

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using NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) as ways to conceal their fundraising and other activities. … [L]ast year the U.S. worked with the G-8 and UN member states to achieve consensus in the General Assembly on the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. This landmark convention provides for extensive international cooperation on disrupting the financing of terrorists.… We will continue to move forward on these fronts. As part of our AntiTerrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we have developed a training program for foreign financial and banking officials.… Furthermore, we are working with the G-8 on developing practical ways to implement the new UN convention drawing upon relevant experience in countering money laundering. Resources: Let me close by saying a few words about resources, and more specifically the need for full funding of all of our counterterrorist programs. For example, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which helps friendly governments acquire counterterrorist skills, is a pillar of our counterterrorism efforts. Obtaining full funding, however, is always a struggle. The Administration requested $38 million for the ATA program in FY 2001. However, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s markup of the Foreign Operations bill recommends only $30 million. That’s a cut of 22%. It is even $3 million below the amount Congress appropriated in FY 2000, which also was a ‘‘tight’’ year. We cannot counter the terrorist threat alone—it depends on cooperation with other nations, and ATA is a vital tool that gives us access and improves these countries’ capacity. Also troubling is the difficulty in securing funding for a Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). The Administration has requested funding for such a center in order to consolidate ATA and other security training at a location near Washington, where foreign officials could work more effectively with U.S. Government officials and security specialists. As most training recipients are foreign officials taking part in the ATA program, we requested funding in the ATA part of Foreign Operations. But the Senate’s Foreign Operations bill does not include the funding. Moreover, the accompanying report says that because the money goes for bricks and mortar, it should be funded in the Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) bill. Not surprisingly, the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee did not include any funding for CAST in its markup last week.… I have spoken to many Members and staffers about CAST and have found broad support.… I understand the difficulties and concerns involved, but the bottom line is that CAST should be funded. It is critical to future counterterrorism cooperation with other countries. International cooperation, antiterrorism training, action to counter terrorist fundraising, designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations—these and other counterterrorism initiatives … are crucial to the safety and security of our country’s citizens and assets. … [W]henever there is a major terrorist incident, everyone demands that we ‘‘do something.’’ But when the images and fear fade away, it becomes frustratingly difficult in the next year to get the funding for programs that protect our citizens in tangible ways.

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The bottom line is that, to fight terrorism effectively, the State Department needs the resources to do so. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000615_sheehan_terr orism.html.

Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Drugs, Terrorism, and Crime,’’ Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by the convergence of drugs, terrorism and organized crime. Terrorism is a Crime Mr. Chairman, in looking at the broad picture of narcotics, terrorism and international crime, we should start with the basic fact that terrorism itself is a crime, not a political statement. Hijacking aircraft, kidnapping innocent people, and bombing busses, buildings or ships are all forms of a crime, which must be viewed separately from the so-called ‘‘cause’’ that prompts some people to commit this crime. This is a long-standing U.S. policy, one that is shared by the international community and demonstrated in a dozen international conventions and treaties. Bad Neighborhoods Attract Bad People Terrorists tend to live, operate, and derive support from the lawless corners of the world, including the jungles of Colombia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, to name a few. Narcotraffickers and drug producers, like international criminals, also seek out those corners of the world where their behavior will not be subject to government control or punishment. So it is not surprising that there is often an overlap between those that engage in terrorism and those engaged in other internationally unacceptable behavior. Funding—Diversified Funding Sources Many terrorist organizations have engaged in low-level local crime to finance their activities. Some groups, such as the IRA and now defunct German Red Army Faction raised money ‘‘the old fashioned way,’’ such as robbing banks. The Kurdish terrorist group (PKK) engaged in extortion against Turkish Kurdish workers and businessmen. And groups throughout the world … have taken hostages to obtain ransom money from the victims’ families or employers. Historically, many terrorist groups, especially in the Middle East, looked to state sponsors of terrorism for funding. This source of funding has decreased significantly in the last couple of decades. With the exception of Iran—which continues to actively support groups that seek to undermine the Middle East peace process—terrorist states provide very limited funding to terrorist groups or individuals. Hizballah, the major international terrorist group operating in

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Lebanon, receives most of its financing from Iran. CIA Director George Tenant has testified before Congress that Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Given the overall decrease of state financial support, and in some cases because of the nature of their organization, terrorists have looked to alternative sources of funding, which have included narcotics production and trafficking. Some terrorists have developed loose mutually beneficial relationships with drug traffickers to support both the terrorists and drug traffickers’ interests. That said, I would caution against thinking that international terrorism generally is dependent upon funds from drug trafficking or international crime. There have been reports that some individuals involved in Middle East terrorism have profited from the drug trade through Lebanon. But most terrorist groups or their supporters are not dependent on drug revenues … They usually have a ‘‘diversified portfolios’’ of fundraising. Sources include their ideological supporters, money siphoned off of legitimate and illegitimate charities, legitimate companies that are used to generate profits and transfer funds for terrorist groups, and ordinary crime, such as extortion and robbery. Let me turn now to two cases in which drug trafficking does significantly impact terrorism, Colombia and Afghanistan. In both cases, there is a convergence of terrorists, drug producers and traffickers, and other criminal activity. Most importantly, there also is a lack of governmental control. This lack of control and rule of law is what allows these criminals to converge, and sometimes cooperate, in certain corners of the world. Colombia—Convergence of Terrorism and Narco-Trafficking Colombia is the strongest example of what is meant by the phrase ‘‘narco terrorism,’’ and where the drug trade is a major factor. In the guerrilla and paramilitary controlled areas of Colombia, a cycle of terrorism and narcotrafficking has spiraled into a mutually dependent relationship. The terrorists and paramilitaries gain funding from the drug-traffickers who, in turn, look to these illegal armed groups for ‘‘protection.’’ Major actors include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations and the Colombia self defense forces, or AUC. The FARC recently sought to establish a monopoly over the commercialization of the cocaine base across Colombia. We have seen evidence that the FARC is now involved in the export of cocaine. In a November 29 statement, the Department’s press spokesman, Richard Boucher, noted that since late 1999, Mexican and Colombian officials have exposed a major link between the Mexican drug cartel and the FARC. Evidence shows FARC guerrillas supplied cocaine to the cartel in exchange for cash and possibly weapons. Meanwhile, the Colombian paramilitary groups are not only funding themselves, but trying to hit the FARC where it hurts by aggressively attempting to establish control over the prime coca and heroin-growing areas currently controlled by guerrillas. Paramilitary leader, Carlos Castano, frankly acknowledges that the narcotics trade provides the bulk of the paramilitaries’ financing.

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During a recent trip to Colombia, I was taken aback by the ‘‘kidnapping industry’’ that has developed. Kidnapping has increased every year since 1990 to its current level of more than 3,000 persons a year—half the world total. Since the early 1980’s, the FARC has been responsible for kidnapping 30 Americans. Thirteen were either killed or remain unaccounted for, representing a 43% mortality rate.… The kidnapping problem has become so severe that local criminals are even now kidnapping people and transferring them to the FARC, which in turn extorts money—and a profit for themselves—from families and businesses. These criminal activities help finance their attacks against the country’s electric grid and oil pipeline, affecting local as well as American commercial interests. The paramilitaries have not only targeted Americans or American businesses; they also routinely kill scores of civilian non-combatants suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers. Afghanistan Let me now turn to Afghanistan, a country that has been at the heart of our counterterrorism efforts throughout my tenure as Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The Taliban’s control over most of Afghanistan has resulted in a haven of lawlessness, in which terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals live with impunity. The Taliban naturally benefits from the resources brought in by these sources, and thus has little incentive to change their own or their ‘‘guests’’ behavior. Afghanistan is different from Colombia in that it harbors terrorists with an international reach, including Usama bin Ladin, indicted for masterminding the attack on our embassies in East Africa in 1998. While we do not have full information on who planned and carried out the attack on the USS Cole, we do know that numerous people immediately left Yemen for Afghanistan, the safe haven where they could hide out with little fear of Taliban intervention. At the same time, in recent years, Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the world’s largest producer of illicit opium, which is refined into heroin. The narcotics production and trafficking victimize the population of Afghanistan and attack the political stability of the entire region. The Wider Impact Terrorists and drug traffickers rely heavily on a wide international network to keep them in business. This is why the impact of the threat of terrorism— like the scourge of drugs—is impacting a wider area, including the neighboring Central Asian Republics. Our Efforts We are pursuing a number of initiatives to counter the international terrorist threats I discussed. In Afghanistan, we will continue to put political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Taliban to make them realize that they will not be an accepted

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member of the international community until they comply with internationally accepted norms on terrorism. The U.S. is encouraging the international community to help Afghanistan’s neighbors build their national capacities to fight terrorism and the drug trade and its corrosive effects. In dealing with the Colombia problem, the Department supports Plan Colombia, a balanced strategy the Administration designed to deal with the country’s multiple problems. This large scale program includes economic assistance and the aerial eradication of drugs. On the counterterrorism side, my office and our antiterrorism assistance (ATA) program are looking specifically at breaking the kidnapping industry through increased training and logistical support to Colombian police and judiciary. We will also renew other ATA training to Colombia. Implementing the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provisions against terrorist fund raising, the State Department, after a careful review of the records, has currently designated or redesignated 29 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Designations require extensive Administrative records and my office has been looking at additional groups for possible designation. We worked with other nations in drafting the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, which the President recently submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent.… In a related initiative, the Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program is working with the Justice Department, FBI and Treasury, to develop training courses for foreign officials in detecting and curbing terrorist fund raising activities and money flows.… We are working with individual countries and through the UN to improve regional cooperation against drugs, organized crime and terrorism. My office, working with the Department’s ATA program has held two regional conferences since June 1999 focused on South Asia and Central Asia terrorism. We also helped conduct an OAS conference to encourage regional cooperation and also helped support security efforts for the Sydney Olympics. We hope to expand the ATA program in the future and develop and expand policy-related and training programs to foster cooperation on a regional basis to counter conventional threats and weapons of mass destruction. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) oversees an extensive worldwide program to counter narcotics trafficking and transnational crime. INL led the Department’s contribution to developing the President’s International Crime Strategy, which includes expanding the membership of the Financial Action Task Force and taking other steps to strengthen international efforts against money laundering. INL also helps train foreign officials in the latest law enforcement techniques as well as respect for human rights. No Magic Solutions Mr. Chairman, in these efforts to counter terrorist fund raising, whether from narcotics, criminal activities or contributions, there are no magic solutions, easy legislative remedies, or other quick fixes.

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We have to keep up the diplomatic and political pressure, bolster our allies’ will and capability to help, and maintain strong diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and training components. The key to this is strong political will and commitment of resources. We appreciate Congress’ continued support for these counterterrorism efforts. SOURCE: http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2000_h/001213sheehan.htm.

5 Attorney General Janet Reno Attorney General Janet Reno, Department of Justice Press Briefing, Fiscal Year 1997 Budget, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1996 ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: This budget is about building on progress, and fighting drugs, and fighting crime, and fighting terrorism, and in fighting illegal immigration. We are asking Congress today for $18.6 billion in Fiscal Year 1997, a 13.7 percent increase over last year’s budget. This increase underscores President Clinton’s commitment to fighting crime, even as he submits a plan to balance the budget in seven years. At home and abroad, we face the terrorist threat. This budget pledges new resources to help prevent terrorist acts, and to make terrorists pay for what they do. The budget funds 108 new FBI agents to maintain our aggressive counterterrorism initiatives at home and abroad. We have also requested $9.7 million for the counterterrorism fund established in response to the Oklahoma City bombing. The fund is used to reimburse other agencies for the cost of countering, investigating and prosecuting domestic and/or international terrorism, and to finance reward payments. The money can also be used to restore offices destroyed or damaged in the Oklahoma City bombing, or other domestic or international acts of terrorism. Finally, we have made historic progress in securing our borders, and upholding our immigration laws, after years of neglect. We are seeing real results, but again, we must build on the progress we have made. This budget provides a 16 percent increase for INS, and continues our commitment to a firm and equitable immigration policy that enforces the rule of law at our borders and in the American work place. That’s a more than 100 percent increase since 1993, when we began to implement President Clinton’s comprehensive immigration strategy. On the border we will be able to hire 700 more border patrol agents, 150 new immigration inspectors, and purchase more equipment such as border

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sensors and infrared scopes, to continue to build on successful programs like Operation Hold-the-Line, Operation Safeguard, and Operation Gatekeeper. SOURCE: http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1996/0319.sp EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see Attorney General Janet Reno’s Statement Before the House of Representatives Committee Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, March 11, 1999 (http://www. usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/aghouse031199.htm).

Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement at the Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Paris, France, July 30, 1996 President Clinton sent me to Paris today to meet with my fellow ministers to press forward aggressively against terrorism in concert with the Group of Eight. Recent tragedies throughout the world show how much these steps are needed and I want to express our deepest sympathy to the families and friends of all those from France and other nations represented here today who have lost their lives in these events. We will vigorously pursue every lead and every fact and we will leave no stone unturned until we determine the cause of the TWA tragedy. To avoid distraction from the general action plan we have adopted today, and to avoid jeopardizing ongoing investigations, I will not comment further at this time on such investigations. We value the cooperation we have found among the nations who share our concerns. I’d like to thank the government and people of France for hosting this important and productive meeting. Today’s meeting follows last month’s Summit in Lyon. There President Clinton called upon the leaders of the [Group of] Eight to come up with an aggressive plan to combat terrorism. At today’s meeting, the United States proposed—and the other seven nations agreed with—a number of steps to strengthen the ability of the international community to stop terrorism before it happens—and to respond more effectively when it does. Those steps will make a difference. First, we agreed on new measures to protect mass transportation from terrorism: ¥ We have asked the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to implement tough international standards for bomb detection and tighter security procedures at international and domestic airports. ¥ To provide stronger investigative tools for tracking down and catching terrorists, the Eight agreed to develop standards for more complete and accurate passenger and cargo manifests, ‘‘terrorist-proof’’ vehicle identification numbers, and new methods for marking and tracing explosives to help investigators. We are already developing explosives-tracing technology and we pledge to share our research and regulations. ¥ At our urging, transportation safety experts from the Eight will meet in Washington soon to follow up on meeting these goals.

Second, in view of the growing threat, we called for development of a new international convention on terrorist bombings, and the Eight agreed. While current international agreements outlaw attacks on air transportation, airports,

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and maritime navigation, incredibly, no similar agreement outlaws other terrorist bomb attacks, such as attacks on ground transportation. The Eight nations agreed with the U.S. proposal that legal experts meet this fall to begin drafting a terrorist bombing treaty. At these meetings, we will urge that the treaty require states to make such bombings crimes wherever they occur and agree to either put those responsible on trial or turn them over to other countries to be tried there. Third, we obtained the agreement of the Eight to develop means of lawful government access to and decoding of scrambled or coded communications transmitted by terrorists. The U.S. has called on the OECD, which is currently working on the problem, to finish by February. Fourth, the Eight adopted the U.S. proposal to call on all parties to the biological weapons convention to make it a crime for individuals to use or possess biological weapons. We urged all nations to act on this issue as soon as possible. Fifth, we agreed to speed up and share research and development regarding explosives detection methods, and to strengthen domestic controls over the manufacture and sale of explosives. We also agreed on other recommendations of critical importance, such as measures to prevent terrorist fund-raising; to promote cooperation in controlling borders and returning fugitives; to urge nations to impose severe and certain sentences and prevent abuse of political asylum by terrorists. I have asked the FBI to study the creation of a terrorism forensic science database. We will report the results of this study, which will be finished in 90 days, to the other member nations’ police agencies. After consultation with those nations, we will consider how to move forward. This database will be a clearinghouse for forensic evidence, such as fingerprints, related to terrorist incidents. This conference has shown us that terrorism must be every nation’s concern—and that we stand united in our desire to defeat it. We have committed to seek out and stop terrorists who move silently across borders, applying their trade on innocent people. Terrorism is designed to send a loud message from a small voice—to drive proud nations to alter their course in tribute to invisible tyranny. Today we have stood together, resolute in our determination to refuse to let this happen. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/reno.html

Attorney General Janet Reno, Address to the America-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Conference on ‘‘Shaping the Future,’’ Arlington, Virginia, June 12, 1998 ATTORNEY GENERAL RENO: … About two months ago, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder and Acting Assistant Attorney General, Bill Lann Lee sat down with members of the Arab American Muslim communities to talk about issues of mutual concern. That meeting was extremely helpful for the Justice Department, for we need to talk honestly about problems, about differences in our perspective

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between the government and your community, and about solutions we can pursue together. We may have disagreements from time to time, but we share so much common ground in the importance of community and family, equal treatment under the law, and firm but fair law enforcement. The Justice Department is staunchly committed to ensuring that all Americans are treated in a fair and just manner. I hope that you will agree that after this meeting that we have entered a new era of dialogue between the Department and the Arab and Muslim communities. I am personally committed to this effort. Together, we need to build a lasting relationship with trust and understanding as the hallmark of that relationship, with an ability to communicate together and say what is on our minds. One area where we can work together is on fostering a greater understanding of the importance of diversity in this country, of the importance of eliminating racial bigotry and stereotypes … We must redouble our efforts to ensure that equal justice under the law means the same thing in minority communities as it does in the larger community. The keystone to justice is the belief that the legal system treats all fairly. And when people have the feeling that they are not being treated fairly, they call to question the rule of law. Now, there will be issues about which we have disagreement. Use of confidential evidence in INS proceedings is one. But disagreement should not rise to the level of fear or distrust of the government. We are reviewing our work every month to ensure that we apply procedures fairly and appropriately. And we want to be able to dialogue with you and communicate with you to obtain any evidence, to follow any leads that indicate that we are not adhering to these precepts. It is going to be important in obtaining this dialogue. I recognize that the Arab-American community feels that there are examples of stereotyping. There is a direct link between false perceptions of the Arab-American community and acts of harassment. And I think we should acknowledge that and look at what we can do. The FBI has recently been designated the point of contact for—has recently designated a point of contact within each regional office to create a relationship with community groups including the Arab and Muslim community. And we hope that you will join and ensure that this contact, this liaison is not just a matter of greeting each other over a cup of coffee at a community meeting, but that it is real, actual dialogue that can improve the working relationship. Finally, I would like to address an additional concern that has often been raised to me. And that is passenger screening for airline flights. At the request of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice conducted a pre-implementation civil rights review of the computerized passenger screening system known as CAPS that the FAA has begun to implement. We were guided by recommendations by a civil liberties panel to ensure that the criteria used in the system were not based on constitutionally suspect categories, such as race, ethnicity, religion or national origin.

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We were concerned, as you were, about allegations that Arab-American passengers were targeted for additional security measures and treated in a discriminatory and disrespectful manner. We needed to ensure a more objective system. The CAPS system is presently being implemented, and the Civil Rights Division will conduct a first implementation review. The Division has recently reached out to the Department of Transportation regarding the review and to solicit any complaints that they may have. I urge you to utilize the Department of Transportation’s complaint process. It is a real process, and the department is committed to it. Those complaints and how they are handled will be part of our post-implementation review. SOURCE: http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1998/0612ag.htm

Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Justice Department Oversight, May 5, 1999 Targeting Domestic Terrorism The Department of Justice has taken steps to prevent and prepare for the threat of terrorism in the United States, and to prosecute those who commit such heinous acts. Under its role as the designated lead agency for domestic terrorism, the FBI and the Department are taking steps to ensure that state and local communities are prepared in the event of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We convened a meeting last August to get input and expertise from our federal agency partners in this effort, the Departments of Energy, Defense, Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency and FEMA, as well as from state and local first responders. We have proposed the establishment of the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) to coordinate federal domestic preparedness activities and to serve as a clearinghouse for information to state and local first responders. Working in conjunction with other federal agencies, the NDPO will act as a single point of contact for first responders to access information about and receive assistance from the multitude of federal domestic preparedness programs. We have also looked to the state and local responder community to provide us valuable input throughout our planning efforts. In the proposed NDPO effort, an advisory committee of state and local authorities will be the bridge between the federal planning team and the states and local emergency response and health care community. We also established a Center for Domestic Preparedness in Fort McClellan, Alabama, to train state and local emergency personnel. To date, we have helped train 500 emergency personnel at this new facility, and we have provided $12 million to metropolitan areas for emergency equipment needed to respond to terrorist incidents. Additionally, at the direction of the Congress, we have prepared a Five-Year Counter Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan (Five-Year Plan) which was

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submitted on December 30, 1998. The Five-Year Plan serves as a baseline strategy to combat terrorism in the United States and against Americans abroad. I am committed to working with Congress and with other federal agencies to continue to develop this plan. SOURCE: http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agjudic050599.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see Attorney General Janet Reno’s Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, February 4, 1999 (http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimo ny/1999/agappro020499.htm).

Attorney General Janet Reno, Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, February 29, 2000 Since 1993, funding for Department of Justice programs has grown by 92 percent, including a $3 billion increase for grants to state and local criminal justice agencies. The overall increase in funding has paid for additional federal agents and prosecutors, put cops on the beat in our neighborhoods, expanded prison capacity, provided new crime-solving tools, improved technology, funded innovative approaches to fighting crime, worked to secure our Nation’s borders, and helped to train and equip first responders to address the threat of terrorism. The President’s FY 2001 budget request includes $23.4 billion for the Department—an increase $1.8 billion above FY 2000—to combat gun violence, enhance community law enforcement, curb the cycle of drugs and crime, battle cyber crime, respond to the threat of terrorism, secure our borders, and fund new prisons. Counterterrorism and Foreign Counterintelligence Preventing terrorism and thwarting foreign espionage are among the most serious challenges facing our Nation today. The Department of Justice is the lead federal agency in the fight against terrorism. Your Subcommittee has worked with us to provide the necessary tools to address this threat and to ensure that the Department is able to carry cut this very important responsibility. In FY 2000, with your support, we established the National Domestic Preparedness office (NDPO). You also provided significant guidance in the development of a blueprint laying out NDPO’s role as a central coordinating office and information clearinghouse for federal assistance programs to state and local communities with the goal of integrating and streamlining government assistance. Our blueprint represents a deliberate, conservative effort that people will understand and support. You also helped us to establish the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, within the Office of Justice Programs, and to develop a process for equipping and training state and local first responders to prepare them to handle a terrorist incident.

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The FY 2001 budget request builds on the infrastructure that is now in place in the Department to address terrorism and includes a $119.6 million increase to fight terrorism and combat hostile intelligence activities. We are requesting an increase of $15 million for the Counterterrorism Fund, established in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, bringing the total 2001 request for the Fund to $25 million. This funding is used to address unforeseen expenses incurred in countering, investigating or prosecuting terrorism; to finance reward payments; and to restore the operational capacities of offices damaged by terrorist acts. Our FY 2001 request includes funding for some of the most important activities that the FBI will undertake in the future. Included are increases of $35.3 million for the counterterrorism/counterintelligence activities of the FBI. Specifically, we are asking for $19.1 million and 138 positions to enhance the FBI’s ability to conduct national security investigations and thwart hostile intelligence services operating in the United States; $3.1 million and 55 intelligence analysts to engage in strategic intelligence analyses; $5 million to continue counterterrorism research and development related to explosives detection and forensic science; $3.5 million for Weapons of Mass Destruction preparedness activities, including $2.9 million for a chem/bio helpline and hotline; $2.9 million to support state and local bomb technician training at the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; $1.1 million to plan and provide security for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games to he held in Salt Lake City … Identifying threats to our national security is a unique federal responsibility, and one which the FBI must be equipped to meet. With your help, I am hopeful that we can come out of this appropriations process leaving the FBI well equipped to meet the challenges terrorism presents. Assuring that we are able to respond to threats of terrorism whenever and wherever they occur must include providing the FBI with adequate prosecutor expertise in the Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorneys’ offices. Balance is critically important in the criminal justice system. The very best agent or investigator will find his efforts thwarted if unable to request and receive specialized legal support in times of crisis. I cannot stress too strongly how important it is that increased resources for law enforcement agencies be accompanied by resources for our important litigation responsibilities as well. Without sufficient litigation support, the system will break down. Securing Our Borders The Immigration and Naturalization Service is charged with enforcing immigration laws by securing our Nation’s borders from illegal immigration and expediting the legal flow of commerce and people into the United States. The FY 2001 budget request for INS supports the immigration goals and strategies of improving customer service, facilitating legal immigration while deterring illegal immigration, and removing criminal and other illegal aliens from the United States. The FY 2001 budget request seeks a total of $4.8 billion for immigration-related activities. For the Border Patrol, we are requesting an increase of $52 million to add 430 new Border Patrol agents. These new agents will bring Border Patrol

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staffing to more than 9,800 agents by the end of the fiscal year, representing an increase of about 147 percent over the 1993 staffing level of 3,965 agents. The 2001 request recognizes the difficulties INS encountered in recruiting agents in a tight labor market and seeks an additional $69.9 million for a Border Patrol and Immigration Inspector Pay Reform package. Our Border Management request includes an increase of $20 million to support force-multiplying technology efforts by expanding the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System. This technology provides agents with the ability to monitor the border from remote sites, thus increasing the efficiency and safety of our agents. In addition, $22.3 million is requested for 269 Immigration Inspectors to staff 3 new ports of entry in Texas, to handle increased workload associated with the expedited removal process at land ports of entry, and to provide additional staff at international airports. For Border Patrol construction, we are seeking an additional $51.3 million to construct and maintain Border Patrol stations and sector headquarters to accommodate the growth that has occurred in the Border Patrol. SOURCE: http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/2000/reno22900.htm

6 The Intelligence Community CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Director William Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘The Practice of International Terrorism Has to be Resisted by All Legal Means,’’ Address Before the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 17, 1985 We must not become confused about the difference between insurgency and terrorism. An insurgency openly uses armed conflict as a means for seeking concessions from a dictatorial or totalitarian government that denies peaceful forms of change. This can readily be distinguished from a group that attacks a democratic society, a legitimate government, by hostage-taking, and by suitcases filled with explosives on board airlines full of innocent people. And we must make that distinction clear in our minds. It is vital when dealing with the whole process of subversion of existing governments to recognize that state-supported terrorism is intended to destabilize and undermine other governments. Now let me talk for a few moments on this question. How do we cope with these small bands of highly-trained people? Most of them are fanatics, ready to give up life itself to do their evil work, and increasingly sophisticated as they move around the world crossing borders with officially and professionally prepared papers. As they travel they know they will have no trouble getting weapons, explosives, and whatever else they need near the site of their intended attack. They know, too, that they will be able to find protection and sanctuary prearranged for them. We can combat this only with the highest professionalism, dedication, diligence, and commitment. We need to know and understand the various terrorist groups—their style and operating methods, their support structures, their training camps which sprout up around the world. This is a task of continuing collection and analysis of intelligence in which the civilized nations of the world need to cooperate closely. We need to provide security and protection for our people and facilities. We need to provide the most advanced security and police methods. But against a threat which can move so quickly, widely, and quietly none of us can do it alone.

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With increasing tempo and effectiveness we are developing a worldwide counter-terrorist network. It is made up of the intelligence, security, and police organizations of certain nations. They exchange intelligence and share data banks. They work together operationally, provide training and technical capabilities to the less advanced of their number, undertake surveillance and other intelligence assignments for each other, report their findings, transmit alerts and warnings, and join in responding and defending against terrorist threats. That is really where it has to be done. No one nation is going to be able to do it by itself. It has to be done in a broadly collaborative way, close day-to-day collaboration and cooperation between the intelligence services, security service, and police services of nations around the world. Now, terrorist groups are very tough nuts for intelligence to crack. That is almost self-evident. They are small, not easily penetrated, and their operations are closely held and compartmented. Only a few people in the organization are privy to specific operations, they move quickly, and place a very high premium on secrecy and surprise. Yet prompt reporting and follow-up action does frequently forestall terrorist incidents. The most common example is forewarning to U.S. and foreign embassies or other institutions of actual threats, or strong indications of planning, for attacks on institutions and individuals. The usual response to this kind of knowledge is heightened alert, increase in protective measures, or change in plans and schedules which frequently disrupts the terrorist’ plan and results in a failure or a decision not to make the attempt. Recently, for example, intelligence on a threatened hijacking of a foreign commercial airliner combined with police work resulted in a change of travel plans which prevented the intended hijacking. In other instances, in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, U.S. officials and businessmen directly targeted by terrorists have been temporarily removed from their posts. On several occasions, warning and detailed intelligence has directly assisted foreign authorities in capturing terrorists and thwarting their evil programs. Sharing of intelligence on terrorist plans and the whereabouts of known or suspected terrorists is another way these services can assist each other. So this process of cooperation does work and is productive. On the other hand, it does produce many false alarms. The volume of threat reporting has almost invariably escalated dramatically in the wake of a headline-making terrorist incident. At such a time, some individuals seek to market information that they know has become saleable. At the same time, our own intelligence collectors are energized by major terrorist events to ferret out any information—even seemingly marginal details—concerning possible planning for attacks that could threaten U.S. lives and property. The flip side of that is that when such threat reporting rises, more reports of dubious credibility tend to make it through the system that normally would filter them out. And this can also produce false confirmations so it’s a very delicate process of handling and sifting out these reports. We’ve made rather good progress, I believe, in developing a system for very rapid communication within and between governments, to gather assessments, have reports tested by intelligence experts throughout our government and others, and pass conclusions and assessments along quickly to the point of threat.

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Now, let me turn briefly to the question of policy. What is our policy in dealing with terrorism? Well, the practice of international terrorism has to be resisted by all legal means. State-sponsored terrorist acts or threats or hostile acts and their perpetrators or sponsors must be held accountable. Whenever we obtain evidence that an act of terrorism is about to be mounted against our interests or our friends, we will take measures to warn and protect our citizens, property and interests, and our friends and allies as well. Terrorism is a common problem for all democratic nations and we must work intensely with other countries to eliminate this threat to our free and open society. This is the fundamental long-term challenge and commitment. We will use every possible diplomatic and political avenue to persuade those now practicing and supporting terrorism, or who assist in acts of state-sponsored and organized terrorism, that they will be appropriately exposed and condemned in every available forum. That’s the sort of broad perspective and attitude toward this phenomenon. Our own government is now engaged in large-scale efforts to improve the physical security of our diplomatic missions and overseas facilities. Training programs are now mandatory for sensitizing our diplomatic-military personnel to the nature of the terrorist threat. And steps that every individual can take to improve personal protection from terrorist attack are being drilled into people. We are working closely with many other governments to improve the quality and quantity of security that is provided to our personnel abroad. We work with local governments to improve their capabilities whenever possible. And we are expanding our own capability to provide additional protection to foreign diplomats and dignitaries who visit us here in our own country. That is at the security level, protective level. Now on the response level, the United States does not use force indiscriminately. But we must be free to consider an armed strike against terrorists and those who support them, where elimination or moderation of the threat does not appear to be feasible by any other means. We face very difficult and sensitive problems in choosing appropriate instruments and responses in each case. Yet we cannot allow this to freeze us into paralysis. That’s exactly what the terrorists now expect and would like us to do. Just as we will not bargain—and that, as you know, has been for some years our declared policy—we will respond when the circumstances are appropriate and we have the necessary information. We cannot and will not abstain from forcible action to prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist acts where the conditions justify—the knowledge justifies— the use of force. Many countries, including the United States, have the specific force and capability we need to carry out operations against terrorist groups. If we do not use the capability where its use is clearly justified, we lose both the direct benefits of action and the deterrent value of having the capability to retaliate. And we need that deterrent. We cannot permit terrorist groups or their sponsors to feel they can make free and unopposed use of violence against us. We must demonstrate our will to meet a terrorist’s challenge with measured force, applied quickly, whenever the evidence warrants. We cannot permit terrorists and their sponsoring states to feel that we are inhibited from responding or that our response is going to be so bogged down in interminable consultations or debates that we, in fact, do not really have a deterrent.

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International terrorism is the ultimate abuse of human rights. We should be prepared to direct a proportional military response against bona fide military targets of those states which direct terrorist actions against us. And we need not insist on absolute evidence that the targets were used solely to support terrorism. Nor should we need to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that a particular element or individual in that state is responsible for specific terrorist acts. There is today, for example, sufficient evidence that radical Shia terrorists are responsive to Iranian guidance, and receive Iranian support on a constant basis, for us to hold Tehran responsible for their attacks against U.S. citizens, properties, and interests. Now the legitimacy of using force against terrorism depends on our also making strong efforts to deal with this threat by means short of force. Physical security, training, diplomatic efforts, the improvement of institutions for sharing our resources and knowledge with other countries, the force of law, all these measures must also be applied in integrated fashion and they must be applied as rigorously as possible. We must continue to improve our ability to wield all the elements of national power—political economic, diplomatic, military, informational—against the scourge of terrorism. In my view, Western nations have, on the whole, been weak in applying economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions and measures to check state terrorism. Sanctions, when exercised in concert with other nations, can help to isolate, weaken, or punish states that sponsor terrorism. Too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking further terrorism. Economic sanctions and other forms of countervailing pressure impose costs and risks on nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are not to suffer even greater costs down the road. Examples of how the international community can move in concert are the 1973 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation—a concerted measure taken to deal with the hijackings of the early 1970’s, [known as] the Montreal Convention, and the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.1 The international community needs to put teeth in existing agreements of this sort by severely punishing violations—and many nations have been slow on this. And today there are still additional initiatives that might be taken bilaterally and multilaterally if we are to deal with this problem effectively. For example, we should review international treaties and agreements that define diplomatic privilege to identify standards of diplomatic practice and behavior which need to be and which should be vigorously enforced. We may need new international measures to counter misuse of diplomatic privileges for states sponsoring terrorist activities. Although the issue of extradition is dealt with bilaterally under normal circumstances, terrorism violates all civilized norms and we should think about 1 For text of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), done at Montreal on September 23, 1971, see 24 UST 565. For text of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on December 17, 1979, and entered into force January 6, 1985, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November 1979), 1457–1463.

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developing international treaties whereby persons who commit terrorist acts against citizens of signatory states could be routinely extradited. Moreover, individuals who use false passports and other documentation and have crossed international boundaries should be detained and an investigation begun to determine the purpose of the travel. Rules also should exist whereby individuals known to be involved in terrorism can be prevented from entering any signatory state. And there are other such measures that can be taken to tighten up on the scrutiny, the investigation, and the protection against this activity. It would be an important signal to those nations who have signed existing counter-terrorism conventions and agreements if other nations which have not yet signed proceeded to ratify them. Five European nations, for example, have yet to ratify the Strasbourg Convention on the suppression of terrorism.2 The reality, the bottom line, is that terrorism aims at the very heart of civilization. We have no realistic choice but to meet it, and that means head on. Nothing else will work. And the aim of the terrorist and the ultimate objective for those who sponsor, train, and supply terrorists is to undermine our values, to shatter our self-confidence, and to thwart our response. In the absence of a national will to fight terrorism at its roots, we must be content only to cope with terrorism’s effects—not its cause. And that will not be enough. But a strong beginning has been made. Parliaments have begun to authorize funds, and governments to establish effective counter-terrorism units. They’re increasingly working closely together, and intelligence and security services are developing new capabilities and improving their methods and performance. A conference such as this goes far to air the very tough and difficult issues … In dealing with terrorism, strong public attention will be needed to focus meaningful action by our government and others in response to this threat.…

Director James Woolsey, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Terrorism in America,’’ Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C., April 21, 1993 … I appear today to describe one of the most significant current threats to the United States and its allies—international terrorism. The World Trade Center Bombing brought home to Americans the horror of terrorist violence, a horror that has long been an almost every day occurrence in many areas of the world. In 1992, there were 362 international terrorist attacks around the globe, and although this number represents the lowest annual total since 1975, the attacks killed 93 people and wounded 636 others. And these figures do not even include casualties arising out of the terrorist— out of terrorist acts with no international dimension. The United States remains the single-most important target for international terrorists, and we are of course concerned that the recent World Trade

2 For text of European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, done at Strasbourg on January 27, 1977, see ibid., Vol. 15, No. 6 (November 1976), 1272–1276.

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Center bombing may lead terrorists to conclude that operations on US soil are not as difficult as they once thought. Today I’ll focus most of my remarks on state-sponsored terrorism. I’ll then briefly address two other issues—the growing potential for terrorism triggered by ethnic conflict and for terrorism inspired by violent religious extremism. I begin with state-sponsored terrorism because it is the most important component of the international terrorism problem. The reasons for this are obvious—money and power. Nation-states make terrorists more lethal and more ambitious. There are six countries on the State Department’s list of state sponsors—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea—and while statesponsored terrorism has decreased in recent years, none of the countries on this list has forsworn terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Each can readily conduct or sponsor international attacks, and each maintains ties to violent groups. Let me give you a country-by-country assessment of where we stand. Iran is by far the most active and dangerous state sponsor. Indeed, despite the overall decline in state-sponsored terrorist attacks, Iranian-backed attacks have become more common. While some in the media frequently depict a moderate or a pragmatic post-Khomeini Iran, Tehran and its surrogates have carried out more than 35 terrorist acts since Rafsanjani was elected president in July 1989. At least 20 of these occurred in 1992. For example, Tehran continues to call for the murder of British author Salman Rushdie, claiming that Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa, or religious decree, demanding Rushdie’s death cannot be rescinded. Indeed, in late 1992, Iran increased the bounty for killing Rushdie. Iran’s agents also stalk and murder Iranian oppositionists abroad. We’re confident, for example, that Tehran arranged for the murders of a leading opposition politician gunned down in Rome this year; an anti-regime Iranian poet, struck down in Bonn in 1992; and four members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, killed in a Berlin restaurant in 1992. In fact, an Iranian national is among those now under arrest for the latter four murders. Further, under President Rafsanjani, Tehran has strengthened ties to radical Palestinian terrorists who share Iran’s long-term goal of destroying Israel. Iran, for example, provides substantial support to several factions of the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine general command, and the increasingly militant Palestinian fundamentalist group, Hamas. The Iranian leadership also has publicly endorsed violence by religious extremists in North Africa. In July of ‘92, for example, Tehran applauded the assassination of Algerian President Boudiaf. Tehran supports Lebanese Hezbollah, both financially and militarily. In large part, because of this support over the past decade, Hezbollah now poses a greater threat to US and Western interests than any other Middle Eastern terrorist group. Since its founding in 1983, Hezbollah has been responsible for attacks that have killed 262 Americans, including those who died in the suicide car bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. In 1982, Hezbollah destroyed Israel’s embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 242. After Iran, Iraq is the next most active state patron of terrorism. Baghdad currently focuses its efforts on northern Iraq, where it directs attacks against individuals and facilities supporting international relief efforts. In addition,

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Baghdad and its surrogates are attacking Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Shias who oppose Saddam Hussein’s regime. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has largely refrained from terrorism outside its borders. Multinational counterterrorist efforts before and during the war weakened Baghdad’s terrorist infrastructure and it has not been entirely rebuilt. Still, Iraq is able to attack outside its homeland, and we continue to assess carefully reports of Iraqi involvement in such attacks. We believe Baghdad’s security services, for example, murdered an emigr´ ´ e Iraqi scientist in Jordan last December. In addition, Baghdad still sponsors in varying degrees three well-known terrorist groups—the Abu Nidal terrorist organization, Abu Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front. As for Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea, they are not now directly involved in international terrorist attacks. None, however, has irrevocably abandoned the terrorist option. Libya has reduced its terrorist profile to stem pressure from the UN sanctions imposed as a result of Tripoli’s involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103. Colonel Qadhafi has razed or partially dismantled some terrorist training facilities in Libya, he has expelled some terrorists from the country, and he has pledged to abolish government institutions involved in terrorism. But these steps, so far, are cosmetic. Libya’s international terrorist infrastructure remains intact, and Qadhafi can resume terrorist operations at his whim. Turning to Syria, we have not linked Damascus to any international terrorist act since 1986. The country does, however, grant safe haven in Syria and Syrian-controlled Lebanon to several terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine general command. Cuba and North Korea also have abstained from direct involvement in international terrorist attacks for several years, but Havana still provides limited training and assistance to several South American groups that use terrorism, and Pyong Yang gives sanctuary to members of the Japanese Red Army and seeks to expand contacts with radical Palestinians. Sudan and Pakistan, while not yet on the State Department’s list of state sponsors, are on the brink. Last January the US warned each of these countries that it could soon be listed. Since 1989, Sudan has welcomed a growing number of well-known terrorist and violent religious extremist groups, groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, the Abu Nidal organization, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. The Khartoum regime is also hosting religious extremists from Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, and this pro-terrorist atmosphere in Sudan is underscored by Iran’s decision to send as its ambassador to Khartoum a man who participated in the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and who helped nurture the growth of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s. As for Pakistan, it has supported the Kashmiri and Sikh groups, which have been waging long-running insurgencies against India’s central government. The Kashmiris and Sikhs have found safe haven and other support in Pakistan while forcefully redressing grievances against New Delhi. Let me turn briefly to another potential source of terrorism: terrorism arising out of the brutal regional and ethnic conflicts that have become so prominent in the first years after the Cold War.

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The many new conflicts around the globe are fertile ground for extremists willing to attack innocent people to advance their goals. Recent events in the former Yugoslavia graphically illustrate the type of conflict that can breed terrorism. In this region, there are, as you know, historic cultural and religious tensions among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The attacks of the Bosnian Muslims have aroused strong emotions and elicited material support, reportedly including funding and ordnance from others in the Mideast. We also see ethnic and religious conflict in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and the Caucasus. And although most of these conflicts have not yet spawned international terrorist acts, their savagery suggests that some of the combatants might out of desperation use any means available to stave off final defeat. Finally, I must point out the increasing use of violence by religious extremist groups in the Mideast, a trend that also worries us. While most such groups have not yet directly targeted US interests, several have attacked governments friendly to the United States such as those of Algeria and Egypt, and senior Iranian officials and Tehran’s media organizations are funneling propaganda to the rest of the Islamic world that the United States is a great Satan whose policy is to oppress Muslims. Unfortunately, terrorism conducted by both states and groups remains a serious and largely unpredictable threat to US citizens and US interests. I can certainly not assure you that we can prevent all acts of international terrorism. I can assure you, however, that we will continue vigorously to monitor and combat the terrorist threat.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Director Louis J. Freeh, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prepared Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, March 12, 1997 … I welcome this opportunity to discuss the policy of the administration on counterterrorism, to describe the threat of terrorism in the United States, and to bring you up-to-date on how the FBI is using the counterterrorism resources Congress has provided over the pastes several years to address this problem. The protection of our nation and its people against the threat of terrorism, by individuals and groups operating from home and abroad, is one of the highest priorities of the administration. As a nation, we must stand firm in our resolve against terrorism. We must not allow those who would resort to acts of terrorism to succeed in influencing the policies and actions of our government by tearing apart the very fabric of American society. United States Policy on Terrorism The government’s policy to fight terrorism is articulated in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, ‘‘U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism.’’ This policy, signed by President Clinton on June 21, 1995, makes it clear that the national

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policy of the United States is to regard acts of terrorism as both a threat to national security and a criminal act, and to respond vigorously to all such acts on our territory or against our citizens wherever they occur. EDITOR’S NOTE: The policy is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39. htm.

The United States is also committed to strengthening the ability of the international community to prevent acts of terrorism before they occur and to respond more effectively to acts of terrorism when they do occur. There are four major cornerstones through which the government’s policy on terrorism is to be implemented. These are: ¥ To reduce the vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism; ¥ To deter terrorist acts before that occur; ¥ To respond to terrorist acts that do occur, including apprehension and punishment of terrorists and management of the consequences of terrorist acts; and ¥ To develop effective capabilities that address the threat posed by nuclear, chemical, or biological materials or weapons.

Within the scope of these four cornerstones, PPD-39 sets out the roles and responsibilities of the many agencies involved in the government’s counterterrorism effort. Interagency coordination and cooperation are key factors underlying the principles upon which PDD-39 is built and are the path to its success. Nature of the Terrorist Threat Based upon this policy of treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law, the United States is one of the most visible and effective forces in identifying, locating, and apprehending terrorists here and overseas. At the same time, this policy invites the possibility of reprisals. To help put this into perspective, I would like to discuss the nature of the terrorist threat—both international and domestic—that our nation faces today. International Terrorist Threat International terrorism against the United States is that which is foreign based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States, or whose activities transcend national boundaries. The threat posed specifically by foreign terrorists has increased in the past thee years and will continue for the foreseeable future. The current international terrorist threat to the United States government, its people, and its interests can be divided into three major categories: (1) state sponsors of international terrorism, (2) formalized terrorist groups, and (3) loosely-affiliated international Islamic extremists. State-Sponsored Terrorism The first major threat to Americans comes from state sponsors of international terrorism. State sponsors include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. In recent years, terrorist activities by Cuba and North

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Korea appear to have declined, due primarily to the deteriorating economic situations in both countries. However, the activities of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Libya have continued. These state sponsors continue to view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Past activities included direct terrorist support and operations by official state agents. Following successful investigations which have identified the activities of state agents involved in terrorism, state sponsors now generally seek to conceal their support of terrorism by relying on surrogates to conduct actual operations. State sponsors, however, continue to remain engaged in anti-western terrorist activities by funding, organizing, networking, and providing other support and instruction to many extremists. A classic example of state sponsored terrorism was the attack on Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, which killed 270 people. Two Libyan intelligence operatives, Lamen Fhimah and Abdel al-Megrahi, were indicted for their role in the attack. Formalized Extremist Groups The second major international terrorist threat to the United States is posed by formalized extremist groups. These autonomous organizations have their own infrastructures, personnel, financial arrangements, and training facilities. They are able to plan and mount terrorist campaigns overseas, and support terrorist operations inside the United States. Extremist groups such as Lebanese Hizballah, the Egyptian al-Gamat alIslamiyya, and the Palestinian Hamas have placed supporters inside the United States who could be used to support an act of terrorism here. Hizballah is one of the most dangerous of these groups. Hizballah has staged numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck-bombing of the United States embassy and the United States Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the United States embassy annex in Lebanon in 1984. Elements of the group were also responsible for the kidnapping and detention of United States hostages in Lebanon. International Radical Fundamentalists The final major international terrorist threat to the United States stems from loosely-affiliated Islamic terrorists, such as the World Trade Center bombers and Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. These extremists are neither surrogates of, nor strongly influenced by, any one nation. They have the ability to tap into a variety of official and private resource bases in order to facilitate terrorist acts against unite states interests. Loosely-affiliated extremists may pose the most urgent international terrorist threat to the United States at this time since they are relatively unknown to law enforcement. They have the ability to travel freely, obtain a variety of identities, and recruit like-minded sympathizers from various countries and/or factions. Some of these extremists in the United States are developing or experimenting with advanced communications, electronic mail, and the internet. For example, supporters of Shayke Omar Abdel Rahman solicited monies for

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his defense through the internet during his trial for the planned multiple attacks against New York City landmarks and United States government facilities. Revolutionary and Insurgent Groups Revolutionary and insurgent groups continue to operate in South and Central America and other locations. These groups have been responsible for kidnappings of American business representatives, religious missionaries, and tourists, as well as other crimes. However, at this time, it does not appear that these groups represent a major terrorist threat to the United States government or its interests. Domestic Terrorism Threat Domestic terrorist groups are those which are based and which operate entirely within the United States, or its territories, and whose activities are directed at elements of the United States government or its civilian population. The threat posed by domestic terrorist groups has remained significant over the past several years. Domestic terrorist groups represent interests spanning the full political spectrum, as well as social issues and concerns. FBI investigations of domestic terrorist groups are not predicated upon social or political beliefs; rather, they are based upon planned or actual criminal activity. The current domestic terrorist threat primarily comes from right-wing extremist groups, militia groups, Puerto Rican terrorist groups, and special interest groups. Right-Wing Extremist Groups A basic philosophical tenet of many right-wing extremist groups is a belief in the superiority of the white race and that blacks, Jews, and other ethnic minorities are inferior racially, mentally, physically, and spiritually. Much of their philosophy flows from a racist, anti-Semitic religion known as ‘‘Christian Identity.’’ Christian Identity teaches that white non-Jews are God’s chosen race and that Jews are the offspring of Satan. Many right-wing extremist groups also espouse anti-government sentiments. These groups refer to the federal government as the Zionist occupation government and claim that it is controlled by Jewish interests. A number of right-wing groups also believe that the federal government is bent on stripping constitutional rights from individual citizens of the United States. In an attempt to live apart from ‘‘inferior people,’’ some right-wing groups advocate creating a separate nation from the five states comprising the northwest region of the United States—Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Right-wing extremist groups believe that either an economic and/or social collapse which will bring about the biblical Armageddon is imminent. Therefore, they routinely engage in survivalist and/or paramilitary training to ensure the survival of the white race and/or United States. Among the right-wing extremist groups operating in the united states are: the Army of Israel, the Aryan Nations, the Texas Aryan Brotherhood, the

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California Militia, the Viper Militia, the Mountaineer Militia, the Republic of Texas, Our One Supreme Court, the Texas Constitutional Militia, the Utah Free Militia, the North Idaho Militia Group, and the Freemen. Militia Groups Since 1992, the United States has experienced an exponential growth of militia groups. While the majority of militia members are law-abiding citizens, there is a small percentage of members within militia groups who advocate and conspire to commit violent criminal acts. Of particular concern to the FBI is the potential for militias to be infiltrated by extremists who seek to exploit militias and their members in order to further their own terrorist agendas. While militia groups are often multi-racial, they are predominately white. They generally view themselves as ‘‘sovereign’’ citizens who are exempt from the laws and regulations of the United States government. Militia members often subscribe to the theory that the federal government is in a conspiracy with the United Nations that would result in the creation of a one-nation world government, or new world order. This one-world government would use foreign troops in the United States to seize all privately owned weapons and imprison and execute patriotic militia members. Many militia groups advocate stockpiling weapons and explosives and conducting paramilitary training as part of their preparation for what they believe will be an inevitable armed conflict with the government. Some militia groups openly advocate the overthrow of the federal government. Militia members and cells are engaged in a wide variety of criminal activity, such as the illegal sale and purchase of automatic weapons, issuing threats against federal and elected officials, the illegal transportation of explosives, bombings, destruction of government property. And the filing of spurious lawsuits designed to harass law enforcement, elected officials, and others, as well as to disrupt the courts. Some militia members engage in fraudulent financial schemes to raise funds. Others have committed armed robberies of banks and armored cars. I want to emphasize, again, that FBI investigations of militia groups are predicated upon violations of federal law and are not based upon members’ lawful exercise of their first or second amendment rights. Puerto Rican Terrorist Groups Although the last terrorist incident involving Puerto Rican terrorist groups was a bombing in Chicago in December 1992, these groups continue to be of concern. Between 1982 and 1994, approximately 44 percent of the terrorist incidents committed in the United States and its territories were attributed to Puerto Rican terrorist groups. Efforts are continuing to locate fugitives still at large from these incidents. Further, several incarcerated members of Puerto Rican terrorist groups are due to be released from prison in 1998. Puerto Rican terrorist groups believe the liberation of Puerto Rico from the United States justifies the use of violence to obtain that objective. These groups characterize their terrorism activities as ‘‘acts of war’’ against invading forces and, when arrested, they consider themselves to be ‘‘prisoners of war’’

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who must be treated as such according to the Geneva Convention. Clandestine behavior and security are of utmost importance in these group’s activities. … Among the acts committed by these groups are murders, armed robberies of banks and armored carriers, thefts of weapons, bombings of United States government buildings, and bombings of United States military facilities. These groups also target federal and local government officials. The EPB-Macheteros has been the most active and violent of the Puerto Rico-based terrorist groups since it emerged in 1978. The FALN (armed forces for Puerto Rican national liberation) is a clandestine terrorist group based in Chicago which emerged in the 1970’s. The MLN (Movement of National Liberation) is the ‘‘above ground’’ support group and political arm of the FALN. The MLN is the major fundraiser for the FALN. Among the business ventures are a bakery and a newspaper. Special Interest Terrorist Groups Special interest terrorist groups engage in criminal activity to bring about specific, narrowly-focused social or political changes. They differ from more traditional domestic terrorist groups which seek more wide- ranging political changes. It is the willingness to commit criminal acts that separates special interest terrorist groups from other law-abiding groups that often support the same popular issues. By committing criminal acts, these terrorists believe that they can force various segments of society to change attitudes about issues considered important to them. The existence of these types of groups often does not come to law enforcement attention until after an act is committed and the individual or group leaves a claim of responsibility. Membership in a group may be limited to a very small number of co-conspirators or associates. Consequently, acts committed by special interest terrorists present unique challenges to the FBI and other law enforcement. Unfortunately, these types of terrorist acts are growing more prevalent. An example of special interest terrorist activity is the February 2, 1992, arson of the mink research facility at Michigan State University. Rodney Coronado, a member of the Animal Liberation Front, pled guilty to arson charges on July 3, 1995. The Animal Liberation Front is a militant animal rights group founded in England in 1976. Assessing the capabilities of international and domestic terrorist groups to inflict harm on American citizens and the United States government is critical to developing the capabilities and strategies needed to implement the four cornerstones that are embodied by PDD-39. FBI Roles and Responsibilities … PDD-39 establishes the roles and responsibilities for the many government agencies that are involved in the government’s counterterrorism response. PDD-39 defines these roles and responsibilities within the context of the four cornerstones through which the government’s policy on terrorism is to be implemented. In many instances, PDD-39 reaffirmed roles and responsibilities set out in earlier executive orders and by federal statutes.

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PDD-39 also established new roles and responsibilities based on the assessment of the current terrorism threat to the United States, especially in light of the dramatic changes resulting from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the communist bloc. It is within this framework that I would like to talk about the FBI’s counterterrorism roles and responsibilities. Reducing Our Vulnerabilities In general, PDD-39 confers upon the heads of all Executive Branch Departments and Agencies the responsibility of ensuring that their personnel and facilities, and the people and facilities within their jurisdiction, are fully protected against terrorism. PDD-39 further directs the Attorney General, in her role as the Chief Law Enforcement Officer, to chair a Cabinet Committee to review the vulnerability to terrorism of government facilities in the United States and the nation’s critical infrastructure. She was also directed to make recommendations to the President and the appropriate cabinet member or agency head regarding the findings of the Committee. … [I]n response to this tasking, the Attorney General established the Critical Infrastructure Working Group which included representatives from the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. In July 1996, the President issued an Executive Order on critical infrastructure protection that established an Interim Infrastructure Protection Task Force. The purpose of the task force is to identify and improve coordination of existing infrastructure protection efforts throughout the government until the completion or development of a comprehensive national policy and strategy for critical infrastructure protection. The FBI was selected to chair the task force. The department has submitted a notification to the committee that advised of the FBI’s intent to use prior year counterterrorism funding to support the infrastructure protection task force. Additionally, PDD-39 confers upon the FBI the responsibility for reducing vulnerabilities by an expanded counterterrorism program. Deterring Terrorism The United States government seeks to deter terrorism through public diplomacy, by reducing terrorist capabilities at home and abroad, and by seeking the return of indicted terrorists to the United States for prosecution. Responding to Terrorism To develop and coordinate the government’s response to international and domestic terrorism, the president has established lead agency responsibilities among the various departments of the executive branch. The president reaffirmed the Department of Justice as the overall lead agency domestically. In addition to being responsible for the prosecution of terrorists that violate United States law, the department is responsible for the development and implementation of policies addressing domestic terrorism. For foreign incidents, the Department of State is the lead agency.

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The President reaffirmed the FBI as the lead agency for investigating terrorist acts planned or carried out by foreign or domestic terrorist groups in the United States or which are directed at United States citizens or institutions abroad. Effective response and coordination obviously requires good interagency support and coordination. The PDD directed the establishment of rapidly deployable interagency emergency support teams to respond to terrorist incidents. The: Department of State is given responsibility for leading and managing the Foreign Emergency Support Team in foreign incidents. The FBI is designated as being responsible for the Domestic Emergency Support Team in domestic incidents. Both teams are to include modules for specific types of incidents, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical threats. Other responsibilities of the FBI, consistent its existing authorities, are to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist groups and activities, and to disseminate internal threat warnings. Finally, to facilitate in Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement cooperation, the FBI has been directed to establish a Domestic Counterterrorism Center. Weapons of Mass Destruction The acquisition, proliferation threatened or actual and use of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group or individuals constitutes one of the gravest threats to the United States. The government’s policy recognizes that there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the United States. The FBI is working closely with the Department of Defense to carry out other authorized weapons of mass destruction programs, such as Nunn-Luger. We are actively undertaking initiatives to employ all necessary measures, assets, and resources to achieve these objectives. During the past year, the FBI has implemented several new initiatives to meet this challenge. These initiatives are not conducted in a unilateral manner, but with the FBI working with many other United States government agencies and state and local agencies to coordinate crisis and consequence management. These initiatives involve the FBI’s role in the interagency community to assist in the training of law enforcement and emergency responders throughout the United States; to issue and update contingency plans for FBI field offices and other crisis and consequence management agencies; to participate in interagency exercise, to create the Domestic Emergency Support Team; and to implement the Joint Department of Defense/FBI International Training Initiative in the former Soviet Union. Special Events Management The FBI plays a major role in the intelligence and security planning for many special events occurring within the United States, such as the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, and Presidential Inaugurations.

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These events routinely receive a high degree of visibility both domestically and internationally. As such, these events represent potential targets for acts of terrorism in which the resulting consequences could cause significant harm to either United States national interests or international political stability. Counterterrorism Resources PDD-39, as well as other Executive Orders and Federal Statutes, has served as the blueprint for developing the various counterterrorism initiatives and funding proposals that have been generously supported by the committee. In developing these initiatives, I have sought to address not only counterterrorism investigative requirements, but also certain critical infrastructure capabilities of the FBI that allow our investigators and analysts to perform their jobs. Establishing and maintaining an effective counterterrorism capability within the FBI requires a careful balance between investigative resources and related information, technology, and forensic support services. SOURCE: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/ss970513f.htm

P ar t Tw o U.S. P OLICY P OST –S EPTEMBER 11, 2001 President Bush’s statements and speeches range from the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when his speeches attempted to reassure the nation, to his statements at the end of 2006, when the Global War on Terrorism became increasingly intertwined with the growing controversy over the continued presence of American troops in Iraq. From his very first speech to the nation on the night of 9/11, the president sounded a theme he has continued to use with variations since then, that ‘‘America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.’’ Chapter 7 includes President Bush’s speech to Congress a few days later, September 20, 2001, during which he began laying the groundwork for military operations to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan unless they turned over Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda fellow terrorists. ‘‘They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate,’’ the President said. He also sounded a warning that would become an administration theme, that ‘‘nations must choose. They are with us, or they’re with the terrorists.’’ His October 7 address to the nation formally announced that military strikes had been launched against the Taliban regime. In his first post-9/11 State of the Union Address to Congress, on January 29, 2002, President Bush emphasized that Iraq supports terror and has plotted to develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. During his June 1, 2002, graduation speech to West Point, the President outlined reasons for taking action against Saddam Hussein. In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union Address, he used his now famous ‘‘axis of evil’’ phrase, saying that Iran, North Korea, and Iraq ‘‘constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.’’ Chapter 9, containing former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speeches, includes the February 5, 2003, speech to the United Nations during which Powell described the administration’s evidence that Iraq was trying to develop nuclear weapons. Some of the specific intelligence information used by Secretary Powell was later discredited. Another key document is President Bush’s May 1, 2003, ‘‘Mission Accomplished’’ speech, which he delivered after the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces,

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when he flew to the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln to declare that ‘‘major combat operations in Iraq have ended.’’ As the Iraqi insurgency developed, and terrorist attacks took place elsewhere in the world, the president’s September 7, 2003, address to the nation declared that ‘‘we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure.’’ A general theme, as expressed in a September 16, 2004, campaign speech in St. Cloud, Minnesota, was ‘‘We’re staying on the offensive. We’re striking terrorists abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home.’’ In an October 6, 2005, speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush said of the struggle against terrorists: ‘‘[W]e will never back down, never give in, and never accept anything less than complete victory.’’ A year later, in a September 29, 2006, speech as support for the war in Iraq lagged, he stressed that America had to deal vigorously with the challenge of fighting terrorism, saying, ‘‘This is the call of a generation, to stand against the extremists and support moderate leaders across the broader Middle East, to help us all secure a future of peace.’’ Vice President Cheney’s November 22, 2005, speech to the American Enterprise Institute laid out the Bush administration’s thesis that terrorists were emboldened by President Reagan’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon after the U.S. Marine barracks was hit by a truck bomb in 1983, killing 241 marines; by the Clinton administration’s withdrawal from Somalia 10 years later when a Black Hawk helicopter was downed and 19 soldiers died; and by later attacks against American targets when the U.S. took little or minimum military action. In a June 26, 2006, CNN interview, Vice President Cheney reiterated that ‘‘we have to stay the course.’’ Chapter 7 includes the president’s December 20, 2006, address, which he opened with a prepared statement on Iraq that included the statement ‘‘we’ll change our strategy and tactics to meet the realities on the ground.’’ In chapter 10, Secretary of State Rice’s December 5, 2005, departure remarks before flying to Europe defended U.S. policy against European complaints that the United States was engaged in improper renditions of terrorist suspects captured overseas. In chapter 12, former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld addressed the role of the media in the terrorism conflict in a February 17, 2006, speech to the Council of Foreign Relations. In chapter 13, Attorney General Ashcroft’s speeches begin with his October 18, 2001, testimony that advocated the enactment of what was later called the USA PATRIOT Act, which provided more legal tools against terrorists. Also on the domestic front, chapter 16 contains the April 13, 2005, testimony by Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff on the use of risk management to set priorities for strategy and allocation of resources. EDITOR’S NOTE: The speeches and statements containing material on Iraq, legal issues, and other subjects should be read in conjunction with the documents in Part Three, which is organized by specific topics.

7 President George W. Bush President George W. Bush, Statement to the Nation, September 11, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America—with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could. Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency response plans. Our military is powerful, and it’s prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and Washington, D.C. to help with local rescue efforts. Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks. The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which had to be evacuated today are reopening for

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essential personnel tonight, and will be open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business, as well. The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance. America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism. Tonight, I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: ‘‘Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.’’ This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world. Thank you. Good night, and God bless America. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html

President George W. Bush, Remarks During Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, The Cabinet Room, September 12, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: I have just completed a meeting with my national security team, and we have received the latest intelligence updates. The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won’t be able to run for cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won’t be able to hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe. But they won’t be safe forever. This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination.

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This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win. The federal government and all our agencies are conducting business. But it is not business as usual. We are operating on a heightened security alert. America is going forward, and as we do so, we must remain keenly aware of the threats to our country. Those in authority should take appropriate precautions to protect our citizens. But we will not allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms. This morning, I am sending to Congress a request for emergency funding authority, so that we are prepared to spend whatever it takes to rescue victims, to help the citizens of New York City and Washington, D.C. respond to this tragedy, and to protect our national security. I want to thank the members of Congress for their unity and support. America is united. The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html

President George W. Bush, Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: We are here in the middle hour of our grief. So many have suffered so great a loss, and today we express our nation’s sorrow. We come before God to pray for the missing and the dead, and for those who love them. On Tuesday, our country was attacked with deliberate and massive cruelty. We have seen the images of fire and ashes, and bent steel. Now come the names, the list of casualties we are only beginning to read. They are the names of men and women who began their day at a desk or in an airport, busy with life. They are the names of people who faced death, and in their last moments called home to say, be brave, and I love you. They are the names of passengers who defied their murderers, and prevented the murder of others on the ground. They are the names of men and women who wore the uniform of the United States, and died at their posts. They are the names of rescuers, the ones whom death found running up the stairs and into the fires to help others. We will read all these names. We will linger over them, and learn their stories, and many Americans will weep. To the children and parents and spouses and families and friends of the lost, we offer the deepest sympathy of the nation. And I assure you, you are not alone. Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on

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the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing. Our purpose as a nation is firm. Yet our wounds as a people are recent and unhealed, and lead us to pray. In many of our prayers this week, there is a searching, and an honesty. At St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York on Tuesday, a woman said, ‘‘I prayed to God to give us a sign that He is still here.’’ Others have prayed for the same, searching hospital to hospital, carrying pictures of those still missing. God’s signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his purposes are not always our own. Yet the prayers of private suffering, whether in our homes or in this great cathedral, are known and heard, and understood. There are prayers that help us last through the day, or endure the night. There are prayers of friends and strangers that give us strength for the journey. And there are prayers that yield our will to a will greater than our own. It is said that adversity introduces us to ourselves. This is true of a nation as well. In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice. Inside the World Trade Center, one man who could have saved himself stayed until the end at the side of his quadriplegic friend. A beloved priest died giving the last rites to a firefighter. Two office workers, finding a disabled stranger, carried her down sixty-eight floors to safety. A group of men drove through the night from Dallas to Washington to bring skin grafts for burn victims. Our unity is a kinship of grief, and a steadfast resolve to prevail against our enemies. And this unity against terror is now extending across the world.1 SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html

President George W. Bush, ‘‘Islam Is Peace,’’ Remarks at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., Washington, D.C., September 17, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: … We’ve just had a—wide-ranging discussions on the matter at hand. Like the good folks standing with me, the American people were appalled and outraged at last Tuesday’s attacks. And so were Muslims all across the world. Both Americans and Muslim friends and citizens, tax-paying citizens, and Muslims in nations were just appalled and could not believe what we saw on our TV screens. These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith. And it’s important for my fellow Americans to understand that. 1 Also see Radio Address to the Nation, September 15, 2001 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html.

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The English translation is not as eloquent as the original Arabic, but let me quote from the Koran, itself: In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule. The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war. When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace. And that’s made brothers and sisters out of every race—out of every race. America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect. Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don’t represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they should be ashamed of that kind of behavior. This is a great country. It’s a great country because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do. They’re outraged, they’re sad. They love America just as much as I do.… SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html

President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001 EXCERPTED … In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people. We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground—passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight. We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers—in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own. My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union—and it is strong. Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

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And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo, … or moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America. Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause—so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics—a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader—a person named Osama bin Laden—are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. Afghanistan’s people have been brutalized—many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for

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owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of Afghanistan—after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid—but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are selfappointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.

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Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me—the Office of Homeland Security. And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend—Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come. These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows. Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I’ve called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud. This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded —with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all.

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The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what—we’re not going to allow it. Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith. I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it. Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency. We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike. We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America’s economy, and put our people back to work. After all that has just passed—all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them—it is natural to wonder if America’s future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world. Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us. Our nation— this generation—will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We’ll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass … I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

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The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we’ll meet violence with patient justice—assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/2010920-8.html

President George W. Bush, Q&A on Afghanistan During Photo Opportunity with King Abdullah of Jordan, The Oval Office, September 28, 2001 Q. Mr. President: Have you had any chance to study the long and difficult conflict that the Russians had in Afghanistan? And if so, what, if anything, did you learn that might be helpful in the conflict you have coming ahead? PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, one of the things we will do is enforce the doctrine, part of the doctrine that says, if you harbor a terrorist, you’re just as guilty as a terrorist. And in my speech to the nation I laid out the conditions that we expect the current government of Afghanistan to follow. I am fully aware of the difficulties the Russians had in Afghanistan. Our intelligence people and our State Department people are also fully aware. It is very hard to fight a conventional war—a guerrilla war with conventional forces. And we understand that. That’s why I have explained to the American people that the new war on terror is going to be a different war. It will be fought on a variety of fronts. It will be fought on a financial front; it will require the best of intelligence and the sharing of intelligence. There may or may not be a conventional component to it. … [S]ometimes people will be able to see what we do on the television screens. Other times the American people won’t be able to see what we’re doing. But make no mistake about it; we’re in hot pursuit. We’re going to enforce the doctrine. We’re going to be diligent and patient and determined to bring people to justice and to rout out terrorist activity around the world. And so there have been lessons learned in the past, and our government is very aware of those lessons. Q. Mr. President, what’s your reaction to word today that the Taliban says it has now located Osama bin Laden and has delivered an invitation to him to leave the country? PRESIDENT BUSH: … First, there is no negotiations with the Taliban. They heard what I said. And now they can act. And it’s not just Mr. bin Laden that we expect to see and brought to justice; it’s everybody associated with his organization that’s in Afghanistan. And not only those directly associated with Mr. bin Laden, any terrorist that is housed and fed in Afghanistan needs to be handed over. And finally, we expect there to be complete destruction of terrorist camps.

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That’s what I told them; that’s what I mean. And we expect them—we expect them to not only hear what I say, but to do something about it. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010928-4.html

President George W. Bush, Meeting with Congressional Leaders, The Oval Office, October 2, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: I want to thank the leaders of the Congress for coming down for breakfast this morning. We had a really good discussion, starting with the progress we’re making on the war against terrorism. I briefed the members about the fact that we’re beginning to make progress in freezing assets … of the al Qaeda organization. I also talked about that the net we’re casting is wide and strong, that we’ve put together an international coalition that is impressive and that the members of that coalition are staying steady. It is my desire to make sure that, as this war unfolds, that the leaders of both the Senate and the House are fully informed of what the government is doing. I can’t think of a better way to conduct foreign policy than to consult regularly with the leadership. Q. Mr. President, is the time running out on the Taliban regime? Are you prepared, sir, to recognize the Palestinian state as a part of a broader Middle East peace process, itself? THE PRESIDENT: The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right to Israel to exist is respected. But first things first, when it comes to the Middle East, we’ve got to get to … the Mitchell Accord. Senator Mitchell put together a viable blueprint that most of the world agrees with is a necessary path to ultimately solving the problems of the Middle East. And we are working diligently with both sides to encourage the reduction of violence so that meaningful discussions can take place. Secondly, there is no time table for the Taliban, just like there are no negotiations. I have said that the Taliban must turn over al Qaeda organization living within Afghanistan, and must destroy the terrorist camps. And they must do so, otherwise there will be a consequence. There are no negotiations, there’s no calendar. We’ll act on our time, and we’ll do it in a manner that not only secures the United States as best as possible, but makes the freedom in the world more likely to exist in the future. Q. Out of this terror on September 11th comes fear. Many Americans are still gripped with this fear, and they’re buying gas masks in exuberant numbers. And they’re also looking to—for anthrax vaccinations. What do you say to those people? Is their fear warranted? THE PRESIDENT: I say that America ought to be on alert, but we need to get back to business. That’s why I’m opening up Reagan Airport. That’s why we had Cabinet members get on commercial airlines over the weekend. The good news is, is that some of the load factors on American airlines looked like they increased over the weekend. Americans know their government is doing everything they can to disrupt any terrorist activity that may occur. We’re

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following every lead, we’re interrogating every possible suspect. We’re on full alert in America. But the good news is, Americans also realize that in order to fight terrorism, they’re going to go about their lives in a normal way. And Americans are. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011002-1.html

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on Afghanistan, October 6, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. Today I want to update Americans on our global campaign against terror. The United States is presenting a clear choice to every nation: Stand with the civilized world, or stand with the terrorists. And for those nations that stand with the terrorists, there will be a heavy price. America is determined to oppose the state sponsors of terror. Yet we are equally determined to respect and help the men and women those regimes oppress. Our enemy is not the Arab world. Many friendly Arab governments are, themselves, the targets of extremist terror. Our enemy is not Islam, a good and peace-loving faith, that brings direction and comfort to over one billion people, including millions of Americans. And our enemy is not the people of any nation, even when their leaders harbor terrorists. Our enemy is the terrorists themselves, and the regimes that shelter and sustain them. Afghanistan is a case in point. Its Taliban regime has made that nation into a sanctuary and training ground for international terrorists—terrorists who have killed innocent citizens of many nations, including our own. The Taliban promotes terror abroad, and practices terror against its people, oppressing women and persecuting all who dissent. The Taliban has been given the opportunity to surrender all the terrorists in Afghanistan and to close down their camps and operations. Full warning has been given, and time is running out. The Afghan people, however, are the victims of oppression, famine and misrule. Many refugees from that unfortunate nation are on the move, and sadly, many Afghans are on the verge of starvation. America respects the Afghan people, their long tradition and their proud independence. And we will help them in this time of confusion and crisis in their country. America has long been the largest source of food and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. This week I announced an additional $320 million in aid to the Afghan people, to those within Afghanistan and those who have fled across borders. Despite efforts by the Taliban to disrupt these critical aid shipments, we will deliver food and seeds, vaccines and medicines by truck, and even by draft animals. Conditions permitting, we will bring help directly to the people of Afghanistan by air drops. In the struggle ahead, we will act in accordance with American ideals. We’re offering help and friendship to the Afghan people. It is their Taliban rulers, and the terrorists they harbor, who have much to fear. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011006.html

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President George W. Bush, Address Announcing Military Strikes Against the Taliban, October 7, 2001 THE PRESIDENT: … On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. We are joined in this operation by our staunch friend, Great Britain. Other close friends, including Canada, Australia, Germany and France, have pledged forces as the operation unfolds. More than 40 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and across Asia have granted air transit or landing rights. Many more have shared intelligence. We are supported by the collective will of the world. More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your country. None of these demands were met. And now the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. Initially, the terrorists may burrow deeper into caves and other entrenched hiding places. Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice. At the same time, the oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan. The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith. The United States of America is an enemy of those who aid terrorists and of the barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name. This military action is a part of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries … Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril. … We’re a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.

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We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today’s military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear. I know many Americans feel fear today. And our government is taking strong precautions. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies are working aggressively around America, around the world and around the clock. At my request, many governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport security. We have called up Reserves to reinforce our military capability and strengthen the protection of our homeland. In the months ahead, our patience will be one of our strengths—patience with the long waits that will result from tighter security; patience and understanding that it will take time to achieve our goals; patience in all the sacrifices that may come. Today, those sacrifices are being made by members of our Armed Forces who now defend us so far from home, and by their proud and worried families. A Commander-in-Chief sends America’s sons and daughters into a battle in a foreign land only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer. We ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. They are dedicated, they are honorable; they represent the best of our country. And we are grateful. To all the men and women in our military—every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every coastguardsman, every Marine—I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty. The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, World Congress Center, Atlanta, Georgia, November 8, 2001 EXCERPTED THE PRESIDENT: … We meet tonight after two of the most difficult—and most inspiring —months in our nation’s history. We have endured the shock of watching so many innocent lives ended in acts of unimaginable horror. We have endured the sadness of so many funerals. We have faced unprecedented bioterrorist attack delivered in our mail. Our nation faces a threat to our freedoms, and the stakes could not be higher. We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill—kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We’ve seen that type of hate before—and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it.

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This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims. This enemy tries to hide behind a peaceful faith. But those who celebrate the murder of innocent men, women, and children have no religion, have no conscience, and have no mercy. We wage a war to save civilization, itself. We did not seek it, but we must fight it—and we will prevail. This is a different war from any our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different countries. And this is a war that must be fought not only overseas, but also here at home. We’ve added a new era, and this new era requires new responsibilities, both for the government and for our people. The government has a responsibility to protect our citizens—and that starts with homeland security. The first attack against America came by plane, and we are now making our airports and airplanes safer. We have posted the National Guard in America’s airports and placed undercover air marshals on many flights. I call on Congress to quickly send me legislation that makes cockpits more secure, baggage screening more thorough, and puts the federal government in charge of all airport screening and security. The second attack against America came in the mail. We do not know whether this attack came from the same terrorists; we don’t know the origin of the anthrax—but whoever did this unprecedented and uncivilized act is a terrorist. To coordinate our efforts we’ve created the new Office of Homeland Security. Its director, my good friend and former Governor, Tom Ridge, reports directly to me—and works with all our federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector on a national strategy to strengthen our homeland protections. For example, the Coast Guard has taken on expanded duties to protect our shores and our ports. The National Guard has increased—an increased role in surveillance at our border. We’re imposing new licensing requirements for safer transportation of hazardous material. We’ve passed a new antiterrorism law which gives our law enforcement officers the necessary tools to track terrorists before they harm Americans. A new terrorism task force is tightening immigration controls to make sure no one enters or stays in our country who would harm us. We are a welcoming country, we will always value freedom—yet we will not allow those who plot against our country to abuse our freedoms and our protections. Our enemies have threatened other acts of terror. We take each threat seriously. And when we have evidence of credible threats, we will issue appropriate alerts. A terrorism alert is not a signal to stop your life. It is a call to be vigilant— to know that your government is on high alert, and to add your eyes and ears to our efforts to find and stop those who want to do us harm.

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… [I]n the long run, the best way to defend our homeland—the best way to make sure our children can live in peace—is to take the battle to the enemy and to stop them. I have called our military into action to hunt down the members of the al Qaeda organization who murdered innocent Americans. I gave fair warning to the government that harbors them in Afghanistan. The Taliban made a choice to continue hiding terrorists, and now they are paying a price. I’m so proud of our military. Our military is pursuing its mission. We are destroying training camps, disrupting communications, and dismantling air defenses. We are now bombing Taliban front lines. We are deliberately and systematically hunting down these murderers, and we will bring them to justice. We are at the beginning of our efforts in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is only the beginning of our efforts in the world. No group or nation should mistake Americans’ intentions: Where terrorist group exist of global reach, the United States and our friends and allies will seek it out and we will destroy it. After September the 11th, our government assumed new responsibilities to strengthen security at home and track down our enemies abroad. And the American people are accepting new responsibilities, as well. … In the face of this great tragedy, Americans are refusing to give terrorists the power. Our people have responded with courage and compassion, calm and reason, resolve and fierce determination. We have refused to live in a state of panic—or a state of denial. There is a difference between being alert and being intimidated—and this great nation will never be intimidated. … Since September the 11th, many Americans, especially young Americans, are rethinking their career choices. They’re being drawn to careers of service, as police or firemen, emergency health workers, teachers, counselors, or in the military. And this is good for America. Many ask, what can I do to help in our fight. The answer is simple. All of us can become a September the 11th volunteer by making a commitment to service in our own communities. So you can serve your country by tutoring or mentoring a child, comforting the afflicted, housing those in need of shelter and a home. You can participate in your Neighborhood Watch or Crime Stoppers. You can become a volunteer in a hospital, emergency medical, fire or rescue unit. You can support our troops in the field and, just as importantly, support their families here at home, by becoming active in the USO or groups and communities near our military installations. We also will encourage service to country by creating new opportunities within the AmeriCorps and Senior Corps programs for public safety and public health efforts. We’ll ask state and local officials to create a new modern civil defense service similar to local volunteer fire departments, to respond to local emergencies when the manpower of governments is stretched thin. We will find ways to train and mobilize more volunteers to help when rescue and health emergencies arise. Americans have a lot to offer, so I’ve created a task force to develop additional ways people can get directly involved in this war effort, by making our homes and neighborhoods and schools and workplaces safer. And I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists.

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Our citizens have new responsibilities. We must be vigilant. Obviously, we must inspect our mail, and stay informed on public health matters. We will not give in to exaggerated fears or passing rumors. We will rely on good judgment and good, old common sense. We will care for those who have lost loved ones, and comfort those who might at times feel afraid. We will not judge fellow Americans by appearance, ethnic background, or religious faith. We will defend the values of our country, and we will live by them. We will persevere in this struggle, no matter how long it takes to prevail. Above all, we will live in a spirit of courage and optimism. We’ve defeated freedom’s enemies before, and we will defeat them again. We cannot know every turn this battle will take. Yet we know our cause is just and our ultimate victory is assured. We will, no doubt, face new challenges. But we have our marching orders: My fellow Americans, let’s roll. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/5998.htm

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002 EXCERPTED As we gather tonight, our nation is at war, our economy is in recession, and the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the state of our Union has never been stronger. We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression. The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay. And terrorist leaders who urged followers to sacrifice their lives are running for their own. Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst fears, and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our enemies’ hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world. What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan’s camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.

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Thanks to the work of our law enforcement officials and coalition partners, hundreds of terrorists have been arrested. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it. Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld— including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed— operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities. While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines, helping to train that country’s armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American, and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia. My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf. But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will. Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

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We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch—yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch. We can’t stop short. If we stop now—leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked—our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight. Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we’ll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy. It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month—over $30 million a day—and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them. We need to replace aging aircraft and make our military more agile, to put our troops anywhere in the world quickly and safely. Our men and women in uniform deserve the best weapons, the best equipment, the best training—and they also deserve another pay raise. My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades—because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay. The next priority of my budget is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons. America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home. My budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and other deadly diseases. We’ll increase funding to help states and communities train and equip our heroic police and firefighters. We will improve intelligence collection and sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States. Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many ways, better. Knowledge gained from bioterrorism research will improve

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public health. Stronger police and fire departments will mean safer neighborhoods. Stricter border enforcement will help combat illegal drugs. And as government works to better secure our homeland, America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/2002012911.html

President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point, Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002 EXCERPTED In defending the peace, we face a threat with no precedent. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger the American people and our nation. The attacks of September the 11th required a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men. All of the chaos and suffering they caused came at much less than the cost of a single tank. The dangers have not passed. This government and the American people are on watch, we are ready, because we know the terrorists have more money and more men and more plans. The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power. For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. … the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act. Our security will require the best intelligence, to reveal threats hidden in caves and growing in laboratories. Our security will require modernizing domestic agencies such as the FBI, so they’re prepared to act, and act quickly,

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against danger. Our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. The work ahead is difficult. The choices we will face are complex. We must uncover terror cells in 60 or more countries, using every tool of finance, intelligence and law enforcement. Along with our friends and allies, we must oppose proliferation and confront regimes that sponsor terror, as each case requires. Some nations need military training to fight terror, and we’ll provide it. Other nations oppose terror, but tolerate the hatred that leads to terror— and that must change. We will send diplomats where they are needed, and we will send you, our soldiers, where you’re needed. All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants. We will lift this dark threat from our country and from the world. Because the war on terror will require resolve and patience, it will also require firm moral purpose … Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong. Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong. There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it. As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the peace. We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war … Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not. More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge—thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace. Generations of West Point officers planned and practiced for battles with Soviet Russia. I’ve just returned from a new Russia, now a country reaching toward democracy, and our partner in the war against terror. Even in China, leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only lasting source of national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political freedom is the only true source of national greatness. When the great powers share common values, we are better able to confront serious regional conflicts together, better able to cooperate in preventing the spread of violence or economic chaos. In the past, great power rivals took

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sides in difficult regional problems, making divisions deeper and more complicated. Today, from the Middle East to South Asia, we are gathering broad international coalitions to increase the pressure for peace. We must build strong and great power relations when times are good; to help manage crisis when times are bad. America needs partners to preserve the peace, and we will work with every nation that shares this noble goal. When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes. A truly strong nation will permit legal avenues of dissent for all groups that pursue their aspirations without violence. An advancing nation will pursue economic reform, to unleash the great entrepreneurial energy of its people. A thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society can prosper while denying opportunity to half its citizens. Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, in liberation they celebrate. America has a greater objective than controlling threats and containing resentment. We will work for a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003 EXCERPTED There are days when our fellow citizens do not hear news about the war on terror. There’s never a day when I do not learn of another threat, or receive reports of operations in progress, or give an order in this global war against a scattered network of killers. The war goes on, and we are winning. To date, we’ve arrested or otherwise dealt with many key commanders of al Qaeda. They include a man who directed logistics and funding for the September the 11th attacks; the chief of al Qaeda operations in the Persian Gulf, who planned the bombings of our embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole; an al Qaeda operations chief from Southeast Asia; a former director of al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan; a key al Qaeda operative in Europe; a major al Qaeda leader in Yemen. All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. Many others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way—they are no longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies. We are working closely with other nations to prevent further attacks. America and coalition countries have uncovered and stopped terrorist conspiracies targeting the American embassy in Yemen, the American embassy in

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Singapore, a Saudi military base, ships in the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits the Gibraltar. We’ve broken al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Milan, Madrid, London, Paris, as well as, Buffalo, New York. We have the terrorists on the run. We’re keeping them on the run. One by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice. As we fight this war, we will remember where it began—here, in our own country. This government is taking unprecedented measures to protect our people and defend our homeland. We’ve intensified security at the borders and ports of entry, posted more than 50,000 newly-trained federal screeners in airports, begun inoculating troops and first responders against smallpox, and are deploying the nation’s first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack. And this year, for the first time, we are beginning to field a defense to protect this nation against ballistic missiles. I thank the Congress for supporting these measures. I ask you tonight to add to our future security with a major research and production effort to guard our people against bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield. The budget I send you will propose almost $6 billion to quickly make available effective vaccines and treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague. We must assume that our enemies would use these diseases as weapons, and we must act before the dangers are upon us. Since September the 11th, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked more closely than ever to track and disrupt the terrorists. The FBI is improving its ability to analyze intelligence, and is transforming itself to meet new threats. Tonight, I am instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location. Our government must have the very best information possible, and we will use it to make sure the right people are in the right places to protect all our citizens. Our war against terror is a contest of will in which perseverance is power … Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation. America is making a broad and determined effort to confront these dangers. We have called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm. We’re strongly supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency in its mission to track and control nuclear materials around the world. We’re working with other governments to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, and to strengthen global treaties banning the production and shipment of missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction. In all these efforts, however, America’s purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we’re asking them to join us, and many are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. [Applause.]

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Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people. Different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we continue to see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction, and supports terror. We also see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death as they speak out for liberty and human rights and democracy. Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own government and determine their own destiny—and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom. On the Korean Peninsula, an oppressive regime rules a people living in fear and starvation. Throughout the 1990s, the United States relied on a negotiated framework to keep North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons. We now know that that regime was deceiving the world, and developing those weapons all along. And today the North Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek concessions. America and the world will not be blackmailed. America is working with the countries of the region—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship. The North Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions. Our nation and the world must learn the lessons of the Korean Peninsula and not allow an even greater threat to rise up in Iraq. A brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States. Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons—not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and for the opinion of the world. The 108 U.N. inspectors were sent to conduct—were not sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of California. The job of the inspectors is to verify that Iraq’s regime is disarming. It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened. The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax—enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn’t accounted for that material. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed it. The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin—enough to

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subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn’t accounted for that material. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed it. Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them—despite Iraq’s recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them. From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide. The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving. From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves. Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to intimidate witnesses. Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations. Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview. Real scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say. Intelligence sources indicate that Saddam Hussein has ordered that scientists who cooperate with U.N. inspectors in disarming Iraq will be killed, along with their families. Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate, or attack. With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region. And this Congress and the America people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.

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Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes. Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option. The dictator who is assembling the world’s most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages—leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained—by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning. And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country—your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation. The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country, and our friends and our allies. The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraqi’s legal— Iraq’s illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups. We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him. We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all. If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means—sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military—and we will prevail. And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi people food and medicines and supplies—and freedom.2 SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html

2 See White House Fact Sheet released with the speech ‘‘Protecting Americans from the Threat of Bio-Terrorism: A Key Initiative in the President’s 2003 State of the Union Message’’ at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/protecting.html.

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President George W. Bush, Address at the FBI on New Terrorist Threat Integration Center, February 14, 2003 EXCERPTED THE PRESIDENT: … Across the world we are tracking and confronting and defeating international terror. Within our own country, we’re taking unprecedented measures to protect the American people against a serious and continuing danger. There is no such thing as perfect security against a hidden network of coldblooded killers. Yet, abroad and at home, we’re not going to wait until the worst dangers are upon us. We continue to be in a state of war. But we’re making progress. And today I want to talk about the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which will help us meet the challenges of war; will help us do everything we can to say clearly to the American people, we’re working overtime to protect you; we’re doing everything in power to make sure the homeland is secure. We’ve got agencies at every level meeting threats. We’ve got people standing watch 24 hours a day. Perseverance is power in this war. Determination is essential in this war. We will persevere. And it doesn’t matter how long it takes. See, that’s the nature of the country that we live in. We owe it to our citizens to protect us within the Constitution that we’re all sworn to uphold, and we will do that. We’re not only doing everything here at home, but we’re doing everything we can abroad. Let me first tell you this: we’re winning the war on terror. We’ve hauled in thousands of terrorists. They’re captured. They’re off the street. They’re not a problem. Like number were not as lucky.… We’re dismantling al Qaeda one person at time. There used to be a kind of a brain trust of these people. And slowly, but surely, we’re bringing them to justice. We’re at war in a different kind of war. It’s a war that requires us to be on an international manhunt. We’re on the hunt. It’s a war that causes us to need to get the enemy on the run. We got them on the run. And it’s just a matter of time before we bring them to justice. This war requires us to understand that terror is broader than one international network, that these terrorist networks have got connections—in some cases, to countries run by outlaw dictators. And that’s the issue with Iraq. When I speak about the war on terror, I not only talk about al Qaeda, I talk about Iraq—because, after all, Saddam Hussein has got weapons of mass destruction and he’s used them. Saddam Hussein is used to deceiving the world and he continues to do so. Saddam Hussein has got ties to terrorist networks. Saddam Hussein is a danger, and that’s why he will be disarmed—one way or the other. All our successes in the war on terror depend on the ability of our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to work in common purpose. In order to better protect our homeland, our intelligence agencies must coexist like they never have before. In order to hunt the terrorists down one by one, our intelligence agencies must cooperate fully with agencies overseas. Under the leadership of Directors Tenet and Mueller, the CIA and the FBI have improved

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their communications and cooperation. These agencies are now quicker to share intelligence with each other. And we’ve enhanced an overseas coordination, as well. When you read in the newspapers that a European country has hauled in parts of a poison network, it’s important to understand that the reason they were able to do so is because we shared intelligence, that we’re cooperating, that this vast network of freedom-loving countries is intact and real and the message is either you’re with us or the terrorists—and it still stands. The increased cooperation of the CIA and FBI counterterrorism operations has proven to be one of the greatest advantages in this war on terror. Under the leadership of Bob Mueller, the FBI has been transforming itself since September the 11th. It has no greater priority than preventing terrorist attacks against America. The Bureau has assigned more than 1,800 agents to counterterrorism. That’s a 40 percent increase than prior to September the 11th. In other words, this agency now understands that we’re at war and the first responsibility of an incredibly important agency, the FBI, is to prevent the enemy from hitting us and hurting us … We’re also strengthening the counterterrorism efforts by forming partnerships across all levels of the government. It’s important for our fellow citizens to know that there is great cooperation between the federal government and the state government and the local governments. We form what’s called joint terrorism task forces throughout our country, which bring together dedicated officials at all levels of government. Not only is the cooperation better between the CIA and the FBI, not only is the cooperation better between intelligence-gathering services all around the world, but our cooperation at the federal, state and local level is unprecedented. And it needs to be—because we fight a ruthless enemy. The FBI is expanding the terrorist identification system so that 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies will be better able to identify known or suspected terrorists in near real-time. Local police officers will be able to access federal terrorism information from their squad cars. We will continue to work with Congress to make sure that the budgets reflect the new reality of the 21st century. That’s why I requested $500 million of additional money for training preparedness equipment, technical assistance for state and local law enforcement. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center marks another crucial advance in meeting the threats of this time. This joint effort across many departments of our government will integrate and analyze all terrorist threat information, collected domestically and abroad in a single location. And that’s an important advance. The goal is to develop a comprehensive picture of terrorist activity. When the center is fully operational, it will fully house a database of known and suspected terrorists that officials across the country will be able to access and act upon. I’m pleased that … George Tenet and Bob Mueller will take the next important steps in assembling their counterterrorism resources, both operational and analytical, and locate them in a single facility with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The new Department of Homeland Security will be a full partner in this center. The department will act to identify and reduce our vulnerabilities to terrorism, and coordinate with the FBI to ensure the

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threat information is quickly disseminated. All of these efforts will formalize a new spirit of cooperation that began 15 months ago. The American people need to know that we’re collecting a lot of information and we’re going to share it in a way that enables us to do our jobs that you expect us to do; that we’re going to use the best information technologies available to not only make sure information flows freely at the federal level, but flows from this data bank of information to local law enforcement officials. It will enable us to make sure that we do everything we can to win the war on terror at home. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-5.html

President George W. Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln, At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California, May 1, 2003 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. Admiral Kelly, Captain Card, officers and sailors of the USS Abraham Lincoln, my fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country. In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment— yet, it is you, the members of the United States military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your country and for each other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free. Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before. From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker. Marines and soldiers charged to Baghdad across 350 miles of hostile ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history. You have shown the world the skill and the might of the American Armed Forces. This nation thanks all the members of our coalition who joined in a noble cause. We thank the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, who shared in the hardships of war. We thank all the citizens of Iraq who welcomed our troops and joined in the liberation of their own country. And tonight, I have a special word for Secretary Rumsfeld, for General Franks, and for all the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States: America is grateful for a job well done. The character of our military through history—the daring of Normandy, the fierce courage of Iwo Jima, the decency and idealism that turned enemies into allies—is fully present in this generation. When Iraqi civilians looked into the faces of our servicemen and women, they saw strength and kindness and goodwill. When I look at the members of the United States military, I see the best of our country, and I’m honored to be your Commander-in-Chief.

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In the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities, while enemy leaders who started the conflict were safe until the final days. Military power was used to end a regime by breaking a nation. Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war; yet it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent. In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear. We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We’re bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous. We’re pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We’ve begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of sites that will be investigated. We’re helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq. The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 —and still goes on. That terrible morning, 19 evil men—the shock troops of a hateful ideology—gave America and the civilized world a glimpse of their ambitions. They imagined, in the words of one terrorist, that September the 11th would be the ‘‘beginning of the end of America.’’ By seeking to turn our cities into killing fields, terrorists and their allies believed that they could destroy this nation’s resolve, and force our retreat from the world. They have failed. In the battle of Afghanistan, we destroyed the Taliban, many terrorists, and the camps where they trained. We continue to help the Afghan people lay roads, restore hospitals, and educate all of their children. Yet we also have dangerous work to complete. As I speak, a Special Operations task force, led by the 82nd Airborne, is on the trail of the terrorists and those who seek to undermine the free government of Afghanistan. America and our coalition will finish what we have begun. From Pakistan to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, we are hunting down al Qaeda killers. Nineteen months ago, I pledged that the terrorists would not escape the patient justice of the United States. And as of tonight, nearly one-half of al Qaeda’s senior operatives have been captured or killed.

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The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We’ve removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more. In these 19 months that changed the world, our actions have been focused and deliberate and proportionate to the offense. We have not forgotten the victims of September the 11th—the last phone calls, the cold murder of children, the searches in the rubble. With those attacks, the terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war is what they got. Our war against terror is proceeding according to principles that I have made clear to all: Any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country, and a target of American justice. Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world—and will be confronted. And anyone in the world, including the Arab world, who works and sacrifices for freedom has a loyal friend in the United States of America. Our commitment to liberty is America’s tradition—declared at our founding; affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms; asserted in the Truman Doctrine and in Ronald Reagan’s challenge to an evil empire. We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in a peaceful Palestine. The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty. The United States upholds these principles of security and freedom in many ways—with all the tools of diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and finance. We’re working with a broad coalition of nations that understand the threat and our shared responsibility to meet it. The use of force has been— and remains—our last resort. Yet all can know, friend and foe alike, that our nation has a mission: We will answer threats to our security, and we will defend the peace. Our mission continues. Al Qaeda is wounded, not destroyed. The scattered cells of the terrorist network still operate in many nations, and we know from daily intelligence that they continue to plot against free people. The proliferation of deadly weapons remains a serious danger. The enemies of freedom are not idle, and neither are we. Our government has taken unprecedented measures to defend the homeland. And we will continue to hunt down the enemy before he can strike. The war on terror is not over; yet it is not endless. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide. No act of the terrorists will change our purpose, or weaken our resolve, or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations will press on to victory.

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Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home. And that is your direction tonight. After service in the Afghan— and Iraqi theaters of war—after 100,000 miles, on the longest carrier deployment in recent history, you are homeward bound. Some of you will see new family members for the first time—150 babies were born while their fathers were on the Lincoln. Your families are proud of you, and your nation will welcome you. We are mindful, as well, that some good men and women are not making the journey home. One of those who fell, Corporal Jason Mileo, spoke to his parents five days before his death. Jason’s father said, ‘‘He called us from the center of Baghdad, not to brag, but to tell us he loved us. Our son was a soldier.’’ Every name, every life is a loss to our military, to our nation, and to the loved ones who grieve. There’s no homecoming for these families. Yet we pray, in God’s time, their reunion will come. Those we lost were last seen on duty. Their final act on this Earth was to fight a great evil and bring liberty to others. All of you—all in this generation of our military—have taken up the highest calling of history. You’re defending your country, and protecting the innocent from harm. And wherever you go, you carry a message of hope—a message that is ancient and ever new. In the words of the prophet Isaiah, ‘‘To the captives, ‘come out,’—and to those in darkness, ‘be free.’’’ Thank you for serving our country and our cause. May God bless you all, and may God continue to bless America. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, The White House, Washington, D.C., September 7, 2003 EXCERPTED Nearly two years ago, following deadly attacks on our country, we began a systematic campaign against terrorism. These months have been a time of new responsibilities, and sacrifice, and national resolve and great progress. America and a broad coalition acted first in Afghanistan, by destroying the training camps of terror, and removing the regime that harbored al Qaeda. In a series of raids and actions around the world, nearly two-thirds of al Qaeda’s known leaders have been captured or killed, and we continue on al Qaeda’s trail. We have exposed terrorist front groups, seized terrorist accounts, taken new measures to protect our homeland, and uncovered sleeper cells inside the United States. And we acted in Iraq, where the former regime sponsored terror, possessed and used weapons of mass destruction, and for 12 years defied the clear demands of the United Nations Security Council. Our coalition enforced these international demands in one of the swiftest and most humane military campaigns in history. For a generation leading up to September the 11th, 2001, terrorists and their radical allies attacked innocent people in the Middle East and beyond,

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without facing a sustained and serious response. The terrorists became convinced that free nations were decadent and weak. And they grew bolder, believing that history was on their side. Since America put out the fires of September the 11th, and mourned our dead, and went to war, history has taken a different turn. We have carried the fight to the enemy. We are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes of its influence, but at the heart of its power. This work continues. In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly—yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security. The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism. The terrorists thrive on the support of tyrants and the resentments of oppressed peoples. When tyrants fall, and resentment gives way to hope, men and women in every culture reject the ideologies of terror, and turn to the pursuits of peace. Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat. Our enemies understand this. They know that a free Iraq will be free of them—free of assassins, and torturers, and secret police. They know that as democracy rises in Iraq, all of their hateful ambitions will fall like the statues of the former dictator. And that is why, five months after we liberated Iraq, a collection of killers is desperately trying to undermine Iraq’s progress and throw the country into chaos. Some of the attackers are members of the old Saddam regime, who fled the battlefield and now fight in the shadows. Some of the attackers are foreign terrorists, who have come to Iraq to pursue their war on America and other free nations. We cannot be certain to what extent these groups work together. We do know they have a common goal—reclaiming Iraq for tyranny. Though their attacks are localized, the terrorists and Saddam loyalists have done great harm. They have ambushed American and British service members—who stand for freedom and order. They have killed civilian aid workers of the United Nations—who represent the compassion and generosity of the world. They have bombed the Jordanian embassy—the symbol of a peaceful Arab country. And last week they murdered a respected cleric and over a hundred Muslims at prayer—bombing a holy shrine and a symbol of Islam’s peaceful teachings. This violence is directed not only against our coalition, but against anyone in Iraq who stands for decency, and freedom and progress. There is more at work in these attacks than blind rage. The terrorists have a strategic goal. They want us to leave Iraq before our work is done. They want to shake the will of the civilized world. In the past, the terrorists have cited the examples of Beirut and Somalia, claiming that if you inflict harm on Americans, we will run from a challenge. In this, they are mistaken.

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Two years ago, I told the Congress and the country that the war on terror would be a lengthy war, a different kind of war, fought on many fronts in many places. Iraq is now the central front. Enemies of freedom are making a desperate stand there—and there they must be defeated. This will take time and require sacrifice. Yet we will do what is necessary, we will spend what is necessary, to achieve this essential victory in the war on terror, to promote freedom and to make our own nation more secure. Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future. First, we are taking direct action against the terrorists in the Iraqi theater, which is the surest way to prevent future attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi people. We are staying on the offensive, with a series of precise strikes against enemy targets increasingly guided by intelligence given to us by Iraqi citizens. Since the end of major combat operations, we have conducted raids seizing many caches of enemy weapons and massive amounts of ammunition, and we have captured or killed hundreds of Saddam loyalists and terrorists. So far, of the 55 most wanted former Iraqi leaders, 42 are dead or in custody. We are sending a clear message: anyone who seeks to harm our soldiers can know that our soldiers are hunting for them. Second, we are committed to expanding international cooperation in the reconstruction and security of Iraq, just as we are in Afghanistan. Our military commanders in Iraq advise me that the current number of American troops— nearly 130,000—is appropriate to their mission. They are joined by over 20,000 service members from 29 other countries. Two multinational divisions, led by the British and the Poles, are serving alongside our forces—and in order to share the burden more broadly, our commanders have requested a third multinational division to serve in Iraq. Third, we are encouraging the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people. Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will depart as liberators. Right now Iraq has its own Governing Council, comprised of 25 leaders representing Iraq’s diverse people. The Governing Council recently appointed cabinet ministers to run government departments. Already more than 90 percent of towns and cities have functioning local governments, which are restoring basic services. We’re helping to train civil defense forces to keep order, and an Iraqi police service to enforce the law, a facilities protection service, Iraqi border guards to help secure the borders, and a new Iraqi army. In all these roles, there are now some 60,000 Iraqi citizens under arms, defending the security of their own country, and we are accelerating the training of more. Iraq is ready to take the next steps toward self-government. The Security Council resolution we introduce will encourage Iraq’s Governing Council to submit a plan and a timetable for the drafting of a constitution and for free elections. From the outset, I have expressed confidence in the ability of the Iraqi people to govern themselves. Now they must rise to the responsibilities of a free people and secure the blessings of their own liberty. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/23897.htm

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President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 20, 2004 EXCERPTED THE PRESIDENT … As we gather tonight, hundreds of thousands of American servicemen and women are deployed across the world in the war on terror. By bringing hope to the oppressed, and delivering justice to the violent, they are making America more secure. We’ve not come all this way—through tragedy, and trial and war—only to falter and leave our work unfinished. Americans are rising to the tasks of history, and they expect the same from us. In their efforts, their enterprise, and their character, the American people are showing that the state of our union is confident and strong. Each day, law enforcement personnel and intelligence officers are tracking terrorist threats; analysts are examining airline passenger lists; the men and women of our new Homeland Security Department are patrolling our coasts and borders. And their vigilance is protecting America. … Our greatest responsibility is the active defense of the American people. Twenty-eight months have passed since September 11th, 2001—over two years without an attack on American soil. And it is tempting to believe that the danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting—and false. The killing has continued in Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Riyadh, Mombasa, Jerusalem, Istanbul, and Baghdad. The terrorists continue to plot against America and the civilized world. And by our will and courage, this danger will be defeated. Inside the United States, where the war began, we must continue to give our homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to defend us. And one of those essential tools is the Patriot Act, which allows federal law enforcement to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets. For years, we have used similar provisions to catch embezzlers and drug traffickers. If these methods are good for hunting criminals, they are even more important for hunting terrorists. Key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year. The terrorist threat will not expire on that schedule. Our law enforcement needs this vital legislation to protect our citizens. You need to renew the Patriot Act. As part of the offensive against terror, we are also confronting the regimes that harbor and support terrorists, and could supply them with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The United States and our allies are determined: We refuse to live in the shadow of this ultimate danger. The first to see our determination were the Taliban, who made Afghanistan the primary training base of al Qaeda killers. As of this month, that country has a new constitution, guaranteeing free elections and full participation by women. Businesses are opening, health care centers are being established, and the boys and girls of Afghanistan are back in school. With the help from the new Afghan army, our coalition is leading aggressive raids against the surviving members of the Taliban and al Qaeda …

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Since we last met in this chamber, combat forces of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Poland and other countries enforced the demands of the United Nations, ended the rule of Saddam Hussein, and the people of Iraq are free. Having broken the Baathist regime, we face a remnant of violent Saddam supporters. Men who ran away from our troops in battle are now dispersed and attack from the shadows. These killers, joined by foreign terrorists, are a serious, continuing danger. Yet we’re making progress against them. The once all-powerful ruler of Iraq was found in a hole, and now sits in a prison cell. Of the top 55 officials of the former regime, we have captured or killed 45. Our forces are on the offensive, leading over 1,600 patrols a day and conducting an average of 180 raids a week. We are dealing with these thugs in Iraq, just as surely as we dealt with Saddam Hussein’s evil regime. … Last January, Iraq’s only law was the whim of one brutal man. Today our coalition is working with the Iraqi Governing Council to draft a basic law, with a bill of rights. We’re working with Iraqis and the United Nations to prepare for a transition to full Iraqi sovereignty by the end of June. As democracy takes hold in Iraq, the enemies of freedom will do all in their power to spread violence and fear. They are trying to shake the will of our country and our friends, but the United States of America will never be intimidated by thugs and assassins. The killers will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom.… Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better. Last month, the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all of his regime’s weapons of mass destruction programs, including a uranium enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Colonel Qadhafi correctly judged that his country would be better off and far more secure without weapons of mass murder. Some in this chamber, and in our country, did not support the liberation of Iraq. Objections to war often come from principled motives. But let us be candid about the consequences of leaving Saddam Hussein in power. We’re seeking all the facts. Already, the Kay Report identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations. Had we failed to act, the dictator’s weapons of mass destruction programs would continue to this day. Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on Iraq would have been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations and encouraging defiance by dictators around the world. Iraq’s torture chambers would still be filled with victims, terrified and innocent. The killing fields of Iraq—where hundreds of thousands of men and women and children vanished into the sands—would still be known only to the killers. For all who love freedom and peace, the world without Saddam Hussein’s regime is a better and safer place. Some critics have said our duties in Iraq must be internationalized. This particular criticism is hard to explain to our partners in Britain, Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, the Netherlands Norway, El Salvador, and the 17 other countries that have committed troops to Iraq. As we debate at home, we must never ignore the vital contributions of our international partners, or dismiss their sacrifices.

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From the beginning, America has sought international support for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support. There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country. We also hear doubts that democracy is a realistic goal for the greater Middle East, where freedom is rare. Yet it is mistaken, and condescending, to assume that whole cultures and great religions are incompatible with liberty and self-government. I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom. And even when that desire is crushed by tyranny for decades, it will rise again. As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and our friends. So America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the greater Middle East. We will challenge the enemies of reform, confront the allies of terror, and expect a higher standard from our friend. To cut through the barriers of hateful propaganda, the Voice of America and other broadcast services are expanding their programming in Arabic and Persian—and soon, a new television service will begin providing reliable news and information across the region. I will send you a proposal to double the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy, and to focus its new work on the development of free elections, and free markets, free press, and free labor unions in the Middle East … Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. In the last three years, adversity has also revealed the fundamental strengths of the American economy. We have come through recession, and terrorist attack, and corporate scandals, and the uncertainties of war. And because you acted to stimulate our economy with tax relief, this economy is strong, and growing stronger. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html

President George W. Bush Discusses America’s Leadership in the Global War on Terror, Remarks at the Roswell Convention and Civic Center, Roswell, New Mexico, January 22, 2004 EXCERPTED [M]ake no mistake about it, the enemy attack affected America. It affected the way I think about foreign policy because we can no longer take gathering threats for granted. If we see a threat gathering overseas, the lesson of September the 11th says, we must pay attention to it. We just can’t—and if it gets so bad, we’ve got to do something about it. We cannot assume that oceans protect us anymore. It affected our psychology in America. It also affected the economy. And things were beginning to get okay, and all of a sudden, the

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attack came and it hurt us. It hurt us bad. But we recovered because America’s strong. We recovered because the American people are strong. I remember talking to the country after September the 11th, and reminding people that this would be a different kind of war we faced. Sometimes you’d see action, and sometimes you wouldn’t; that we’d be on a manhunt to find the terrorists who destroyed us. It would require a different kind of attitude about chasing these people down. I also knew that time would pass and people would take the comfortable position of saying the dangers had passed, as well. That’s just not reality. I wish it was reality, but it’s not reality. My job as your President is to be realistic, be open-eyed, to understand the lessons of September the 11th, 2001; to understand there’s terrorists who still plot against us. By our will, by our steadfast determination, by our courage, we will prevail in the war—first war of the 21st century. In the United States, where the war begun, we will continue our vital work to protecting American people, by protecting our ports and borders and safeguarding infrastructure, preparing for the worst … I can’t tell you how pleased I am with the coordination now between the federal government, the state government, and local governments for preparing our homeland. I’m going to submit a budget to Congress next month, which will include spending of $30 billion for homeland security. That’s—more than $30 billion— almost three times the amount that we were spending prior to September the 11th, 2001. I think it’s very important for the country to understand the Patriot Act … An important part of fighting the war on terror. It’s essential that the FBI and the CIA be able to share information if you want to whip the terrorists. See, it’s a different kind of war. We’re in a different era. We need to view law differently. We’ll always protect our Constitution and safeguard individual rights, but our law enforcement, those who collect information and share information and [are] expected to act on information, must be able to talk together. Many of the tools in the Patriot Act have been used by law enforcement to chase down embezzlers and criminals. It is essential that those same tools be used in fighting against terrorists. We’re in a different era. The Patriot Act is going to expire. The Congress needs to renew it, for the sake of fighting the war on terror. We’ll protect the homeland. The best way to protect America, however, is to go on the offensive, stay on the offensive, and bring the terrorists to justice. I laid down a doctrine early on and said, if you harbor a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, if you hide a terrorist—you’re just as guilty as the terrorist. One of the lessons that people can pick up in this part of the world is when you say something, you better mean it. That’s particularly true in diplomacy. If you say something you better mean it; I meant it. And the Taliban found out what we meant. Afghanistan was the primary training base for al Qaeda. That’s where the killers were learning the skills necessary to destroy innocent life. And we gave the Taliban a chance and then they, of course, rejected—rejected the ultimatum I laid out. And so they no longer exist, thanks to the United States military and our friends and allies.

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I made a tough decision, with the Congress’ support, to remove Saddam Hussein from power. And we did. And the world is safer. America is more secure and the world is more free, because we got rid of Saddam Hussein. This brutal dictator attacked his neighbors, used weapons of mass destruction against his own people, plotted, was devious. He tortured Iraqis. We discovered mass graves of thousands of men and women and children. He had torture rooms for somebody who spoke out against him. Saddam Hussein was found in a hole, hiding. Saddam Hussein, the once all-powerful tyrant who used his brutal dictatorship to intimidate and destroy lives, will no longer be able to do so in Iraq. He sits in a prison cell. And the Iraqi people are free. Fifty-five of the top officials, former officials in that regime—of the 55, 45 have been captured or killed. The other 10 have got to be nervous. They’re out there—they’re out there trying to shake our will. See, these people are murderers. They’ll take innocent life to try to convince others that freedom isn’t worth it. They will kill indiscriminately—they don’t care who—to try to shake our confidence, to try to get in the heads of the American people. They don’t understand America. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040122-6.html

President George W. Bush, Terrorism-Related Remarks from the 2004 Bush Administration Campaign Speech, St. Cloud, Minnesota, September 16, 2004 EXCERPTED This election will also determine how America responds to the continuing danger of terrorism. Since the terrible morning of September the 11th, 2001, we fought the terrorists across the Earth—not for pride, not for power, but because the lives of our citizens are at stake. Our strategy is clear—we’re defending the homeland, we’re transforming our military, we’re strengthening the intelligence services. We’re staying on the offensive. We’re striking the terrorists abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home. We’ll work to advance liberty around the world, in the broader Middle East and elsewhere, and we’ll prevail. We will prevail. Our strategy is succeeding, it’s succeeding. Four years ago, Afghanistan was the home base of al Qaeda, Pakistan was a transit point for terrorists, Saudi Arabia was fertile ground for fund-raising for the terrorists, Libya was pursuing—secretly pursuing nuclear weapons, Iraq was a gathering threat, al Qaeda was largely unchallenged as it planned attacks. Because we acted, because we led, the government of a free Afghanistan is fighting terror, Pakistan is capturing terrorist leaders, Saudi Arabia is making raids and arrests, Libya is dismantling its weapons programs, the army of a free Iraq is fighting for freedom, and more than three-quarters of al Qaeda’s key leaders and associates have been brought to justice. We have led, many have joined, and America and the world are safer.

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This progress involved careful diplomacy, clear moral purpose, and some tough decisions. And the toughest came on Iraq. We knew Saddam Hussein’s record of aggression, and his support for terror. We knew his long history of pursuing and even using weapons of mass destruction. We knew he was the sworn enemy of America, and we knew that after September the 11th our country must think differently. We must take threats seriously, before they fully materialize. In Saddam Hussein, we saw a threat. I went to the United States Congress. They looked at the same intelligence I looked at. They remembered the same history I remembered. And they came to the conclusion that I came to: Saddam Hussein was a threat. And they voted to authorize the use of force. My opponent looked at the same intelligence. And when they said, show of hands for the authorization of force, he said, yes. Before the Commander-inChief commits troops into harm’s way, we must try all options. I was hoping diplomacy would work. I went to the United Nations. The United Nations looked at the same intelligence I looked at. They concluded Saddam Hussein was a threat. They voted by 15 to nothing in the U.N. Security Council for Saddam Hussein to disclose, disarm or face serious consequences. I believe when bodies say something, they better mean it. I believe when a President speaks, he better mean what he says. Saddam Hussein ignored the demands of the free world again. As he had for over a decade, he wasn’t interested in what the free world had to say. As a matter of fact, he systematically deceived inspectors that were sent into his country. So I have a choice to make at this point in time, diplomacy isn’t working. Do I forget the lessons of September the 11th and trust a madman, or do I take action to defend this country? Given that choice, I will defend America every time. Because we acted to defend ourselves, because we acted in our self interest, more than 50 million people in Iraq and Afghanistan are now free.… You know, it wasn’t all that long ago in Afghanistan where young girls won’t allowed to go to school because the Taliban was so backward and so barbaric that they wouldn’t allow for education for young kids; that their mothers were taken to the public square and whipped sometimes in sports stadiums and killed, because they wouldn’t toe their line. Today, over 10 million citizens—three short years after the Taliban has been removed—10 million citizens, 41 percent of whom are women, have registered to vote in the upcoming presidential elections. It’s unbelievable. In Iraq, there’s ongoing acts of violence. This country is headed toward democracy. There’s a strong Prime Minister in place. They have a national council. And national elections are scheduled for January. It wasn’t all that long ago that Saddam Hussein was in power with his torture chambers and mass graves. And today, this country is headed towards elections. Freedom is on the march. And that helps us in America because free societies don’t export terror. Free societies are hopeful societies, which leads to peace. Free societies will join us in fighting the terrorists, instead of harboring them. No, we’re standing with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq—it’s not only in our self-interest to do so, but when America gives its word, America will keep its word under my administration.

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Our mission is clear in Afghanistan and Iraq. We’ll help these new leaders to train their armies so citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq can do the hard work of protecting their people against a few who would try to destroy the hopes of the many. We’ll help them get their elections. We’ll get them on the path of stability and democracy as quickly as possible, and then our troops will return home with the honor they have earned. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040916-6.html

President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives, The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2005 EXCERPTED In the three and a half years since September the 11th, 2001, we have taken unprecedented actions to protect Americans. We’ve created a new department of government to defend our homeland, focused the FBI on preventing terrorism, begun to reform our intelligence agencies, broken up terror cells across the country, expanded research on defenses against biological and chemical attack, improved border security, and trained more than a halfmillion first responders. Police and firefighters, air marshals, researchers, and so many others are working every day to make our homeland safer, and we thank them all. Our nation, working with allies and friends, has also confronted the enemy abroad, with measures that are determined, successful, and continuing. The al Qaeda terror network that attacked our country still has leaders—but many of its top commanders have been removed. There are still governments that sponsor and harbor terrorists—but their number has declined. There are still regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction—but no longer without attention and without consequence. Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all—and we will stay on the offensive against them, until the fight is won. Pursuing our enemies is a vital commitment of the war on terror—and I thank the Congress for providing our servicemen and women with the resources they have needed. During this time of war, we must continue to support our military and give them the tools for victory. Other nations around the globe have stood with us. In Afghanistan, an international force is helping provide security. In Iraq, 28 countries have troops on the ground, the United Nations and the European Union provided technical assistance for the elections, and NATO is leading a mission to help train Iraqi officers. We’re cooperating with 60 governments in the Proliferation Security Initiative, to detect and stop the transit of dangerous materials. We’re working closely with the governments in Asia to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and nine other countries have captured or detained al Qaeda terrorists. In the next four years, my administration will continue to build the coalitions that will defeat the dangers of our time.

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In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they will be the recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom. Our enemies know this, and that is why the terrorist Zarqawi recently declared war on what he called the ‘‘evil principle’’ of democracy. And we’ve declared our own intention: America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. The United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies. They seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression, in which a tiny group of brutal, self-appointed rulers control every aspect of every life. Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace. That advance has great momentum in our time—shown by women voting in Afghanistan, and Palestinians choosing a new direction, and the people of Ukraine asserting their democratic rights and electing a president. We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story. The beginnings of reform and democracy in the Palestinian territories are now showing the power of freedom to break old patterns of violence and failure. Tomorrow morning, Secretary of State Rice departs on a trip that will take her to Israel and the West Bank for meetings with Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas. She will discuss with them how we and our friends can help the Palestinian people end terror and build the institutions of a peaceful, independent, democratic state. To promote this democracy, I will ask Congress for $350 million to support Palestinian political, economic, and security reforms. The goal of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace, is within reach—and America will help them achieve that goal To promote peace and stability in the broader Middle East, the United States will work with our friends in the region to fight the common threat of terror, while we encourage a higher standard of freedom. Hopeful reform is already taking hold in an arc from Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain. The government of Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining their future. And the great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East. To promote peace in the broader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder. Syria still allows its territory, and parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the region. You have passed, and we are applying, the Syrian Accountability Act—and we expect the Syrian government to end all support for terror and open the door to freedom. Today, Iran

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remains the world’s primary state sponsor of terror—pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve. We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment program and any plutonium reprocessing, and end its support for terror. And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you. Our generational commitment to the advance of freedom, especially in the Middle East, is now being tested and honored in Iraq. That country is a vital front in the war on terror, which is why the terrorists have chosen to make a stand there. Our men and women in uniform are fighting terrorists in Iraq, so we do not have to face them here at home. And the victory of freedom in Iraq will strengthen a new ally in the war on terror, inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, bring more hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of our children and grandchildren. We will succeed because the Iraqi people value their own liberty—as they showed the world last Sunday. The terrorists and insurgents are violently opposed to democracy, and will continue to attack it. Yet, the terrorists’ most powerful myth is being destroyed. The whole world is seeing that the car bombers and assassins are not only fighting coalition forces, they are trying to destroy the hopes of Iraqis, expressed in free elections. And the whole world now knows that a small group of extremists will not overturn the will of the Iraqi people. At the recommendation of our commanders on the ground, and in consultation with the Iraqi government, we will increasingly focus our efforts on helping prepare more capable Iraqi security forces—forces with skilled officers and an effective command structure. As those forces become more self-reliant and take on greater security responsibilities, America and its coalition partners will increasingly be in a supporting role. In the end, Iraqis must be able to defend their own country—and we will help that proud, new nation secure its liberty. … We will not set an artificial timetable for leaving Iraq, because that would embolden the terrorists and make them believe they can wait us out. We are in Iraq to achieve a result: A country that is democratic, representative of all its people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend itself. And when that result is achieved, our men and women serving in Iraq will return home with the honor they have earned. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., March 8, 2005 Twice in six decades, a sudden attack on the United States launched our country into a global conflict, and began a period of serious reflection on America’s place in the world. The bombing of Pearl Harbor taught America that unopposed tyranny, even on far-away continents, could draw our country

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into a struggle for our own survival. And our reflection on that lesson led us to help build peaceful democracies in the ruins of tyranny, to unite free nations in the NATO Alliance, and to establish a firm commitment to peace in the Pacific that continues to this day. The attacks of September the 11th, 2001 also revealed the outlines of a new world. In one way, that assault was the culmination of decades of escalating violence—from the killing of U.S. Marines in Beirut, to the bombing at the World Trade Center, to the attacks on American embassies in Africa, to the attacks on the USS Cole. In another way, September the 11th provided a warning of future dangers—of terror networks aided by outlaw regimes, and ideologies that incite the murder of the innocent, and biological and chemical and nuclear weapons that multiply destructive power. Like an earlier generation, America is answering new dangers with firm resolve. No matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult the task, we will fight the enemy, and lift the shadow of fear, and lead free nations to victory. Like an earlier generation, America is pursuing a clear strategy with our allies to achieve victory. Our immediate strategy is to eliminate terrorist threats abroad, so we do not have to face them here at home. The theory here is straightforward: terrorists are less likely to endanger our security if they are worried about their own security. When terrorists spend their days struggling to avoid death or capture, they are less capable of arming and training to commit new attacks. We will keep the terrorists on the run, until they have nowhere left to hide. In three and a half years, the United States and our allies have waged a campaign of global scale—from the mountains of Afghanistan, to the border regions of Pakistan, to the Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, to the plains of North Central Iraq. The al Qaeda terror network that attacked our country still has leaders, but many of its top commanders have been removed. There are still governments that sponsor and harbor terrorists, but their number has declined. There are still regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction—but no longer without attention and without consequence. Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all. We will stay on the offensive against them, until the fight is won. In this war on terror, America is not alone. Many governments have awakened to the dangers we share and have begun to take serious action. Global terror requires a global response, and America is more secure today because dozens of other countries have stepped up to the fight. We’re more secure because Pakistani forces captured more than one hundred extremists across the country last year, including operatives who were plotting attacks against the United States. We’re more secure because Britain arrested an al Qaeda operative who had provided detailed casing reports on American targets to senior al Qaeda leaders. We’re more secure because German authorities arrested extremists who were planning attacks against U.S. and coalition targets in Iraq. We’re more secure because the Philippines’ new Anti-Terrorism Task Force has helped capture more than a dozen terrorist suspects—including seven members of al Qaeda and affiliated networks. We’re more secure because Poland is leading a 15-nation multi-national division in Iraq, and forces from 23 countries have given their lives in the struggle against terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans. The entire world has an urgent interest in the progress, and hope, and freedom in the broader Middle East. The advance of hope in the Middle East requires new thinking in the region. By now it should be clear that authoritarian rule is not the wave of the future; it is the last gasp of a discredited past. It should be clear that free nations escape stagnation, and grow stronger with time, because they encourage the creativity and enterprise of their people. It should be clear that economic progress requires political modernization, including honest representative government and the rule of law. And it should be clear that no society can advance with only half of its talent and energy—and that demands the full participation of women. The advance of hope in the Middle East also requires new thinking in the capitals of great democracies—including Washington, D.C. By now it should be clear that decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy. It should be clear that the advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors. It should be clear that the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in free societies. And our duty is now clear: For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East. Encouraging democracy in that region is a generational commitment. It’s also a difficult commitment, demanding patience and resolve—when the headlines are good and when the headlines aren’t so good. Freedom has determined enemies, who show no mercy for the innocent, and no respect for the rules of warfare. Many societies in the region struggle with poverty and illiteracy, many rulers in the region have longstanding habits of control; many people in the region have deeply ingrained habits of fear. For all these reasons, the chances of democratic progress in the broader Middle East have seemed frozen in place for decades. Yet at last, clearly and suddenly, the thaw has begun. The people of Afghanistan have embraced free government, after suffering under one of the most backward tyrannies on earth. The voters in Iraq defied threats of murder, and have set their country on a path to full democracy. The people of the Palestinian Territories cast their ballots against violence and corruption of the past. And any who doubt the appeal of freedom in the Middle East can look to Lebanon, where the Lebanese people are demanding a free and independent nation. In the words of one Lebanese observer, ‘‘Democracy is knocking at the door of this country

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and, if it’s successful in Lebanon, it is going to ring the doors of every Arab regime.’’ Across the Middle East, a critical mass of events is taking that region in a hopeful new direction. Historic changes have many causes, yet these changes have one factor in common. A businessman in Beirut recently said, ‘‘We have removed the mask of fear. We’re not afraid anymore.’’ Pervasive fear is the foundation of every dictatorial regime—the prop that holds up all power not based on consent. And when the regime of fear is broken, and the people find their courage and find their voice, democracy is their goal, and tyrants, themselves, have reason to fear. History is moving quickly, and leaders in the Middle East have important choices to make. The world community, including Russia and Germany and France and Saudi Arabia and the United States, has presented the Syrian government with one of those choices—to end its nearly 30-year occupation of Lebanon, or become even more isolated from the world. The Lebanese people have heard the speech by the Syrian president. They’ve seen these delaying tactics and half-measures before. The time has come for Syria to fully implement Security Council Resolution 1559. All Syrian military forces and intelligence personnel must withdraw before the Lebanese elections, for those elections to be free and fair. America and other nations are also aware that the recent terrorist attack in Tel Aviv was conducted by a radical Palestinian group headquartered in Damascus. Syria, as well as Iran, has a long history of supporting terrorist groups determined to sow division and chaos in the Middle East, and there is every possibility they will try this strategy again. The time has come for Syria and Iran to stop using murder as a tool of policy, and to end all support for terrorism. In spite of attacks by extremists, the world is seeing hopeful progress in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. There is only one outcome that will end the tyranny, danger, violence and hopelessness, and meet the aspirations of all people in the region: We seek two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living sideby-side in peace and security. And that goal is within reach, if all the parties meet their responsibilities and if terrorism is brought to an end. Arab states must end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, stop their support for extremist education, and establish normal relations with Israel. Israel must freeze settlement activity, help the Palestinians build a thriving economy, and ensure that a new Palestinian state is truly viable, with contiguous territory on the West Bank. Palestinian leaders must fight corruption, encourage free enterprise, rest true authority with the people, and actively confront terrorist groups. The bombing in Tel Aviv is a reminder that the fight against terrorists is critical to the search for peace and for Palestinian statehood. In an interview last week, Palestinian President Abbas strongly condemned the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv, declaring, ‘‘Ending violence and security chaos is first and foremost a Palestinian interest.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘We cannot build the foundations of a state without the rule of law and public order.’’ President Abbas is correct. And so the United States will help the Palestinian Authority build the security services that current peace and future

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statehood require: security forces which are effective, responsive to civilian control, and dedicated to fighting terror and upholding the rule of law. We will coordinate with the government of Israel, with neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan, and with other donors to ensure that Palestinians get the training and equipment they need. The United States is determined to help the parties remove obstacles to progress and move forward in practical ways, so we can seize this moment for peace in the Holy Land. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, James S. Brady Briefing Room, March 16, 2005 Q. Mr. President, the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq once had 38 countries contributing troops. And now that number has fallen to 24. And yesterday, Italy said that it was going to start pulling out some forces in September. How can you keep the coalition from crumbling? And is it time to think about a timetable for pulling out some U.S. troops, given that the Iraqi parliament was seated today, and you’re making progress in training some forces? THE PRESIDENT: Well, actually I called Silvio Berlusconi on another matter … but he brought up the issue of Italian troops in Iraq and said, first of all, he wanted me to know that there was no change in his policy, that, in fact, any withdrawals would be done in consultation with allies and would be done depending upon the ability of Iraqis to defend themselves. And I said, are you sure I can say this to the press corps that will be wanting to know what took place in our conversation? He said, absolutely. So I think what you’re going to find is that countries will be willing— anxious to get out when Iraqis have got the capacity to defend themselves. And that’s the position of the United States. Our troops will come home when Iraq is capable of defending herself. And that’s generally what I find to be the case when I’ve talked to other allies on this issue. And we’re making progress. I’ve talked to General Casey quite frequently. And he keeps us abreast of the progress being made. One of the things— one of the issues in terms of Iraqi troops being able to defend their country is the ability to stand up chains of command. I think I’ve shared this with you before, and it’s still an issue that they’re working on. There’s officer training schools, plus the ability for a command to go from a civilian government to a military chain of command, down to the lower ranks of troops. And there’s positive signs that have taken place in the development of the Iraqi security forces, and there’s still work to be done. Our allies understand that. But I say ‘‘anxious to come home,’’ every—nobody—people want their troops home, but they don’t want their troops home if it affects the mission. We’ve gone—we’ve made a lot of progress. It’s amazing how much progress has been made, thanks in large part to the courage of the Iraqi people. And when I talk to people, most understand we need to complete the mission. And completing the mission means making sure the Iraqis can defend themselves.

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Q. So you don’t think it’s crumbling, the coalition? THE PRESIDENT: No, quite—quite to the contrary, I think the coalition is— has been buoyed by the courage of the Iraqi people. I think they’ve been pleased and heartened by the fact that the Iraqis went to the polls and voted and they’re now putting together a government, and they see progress is being made. And I share that sense of enthusiasm about what’s taking place in Iraq. Q. Mr. President, can you explain why you’ve approved of and expanded the practice of what’s called rendition, of transferring individuals out of U.S. custody to countries where human rights groups and your own State Department say torture is common for people under custody? THE PRESIDENT: The post-9/11 world, the United States must make sure we protect our people and our friends from attack. That was the charge we have been given. And one way to do so is to arrest people and send them back to their country of origin with the promise that they won’t be tortured. That’s the promise we receive. This country does not believe in torture. We do believe in protecting ourselves. We don’t believe in torture.… Q. As Commander-in-Chief, what is it that Uzbekistan can do in interrogating an individual that the United States can’t? THE PRESIDENT: We seek assurances that nobody will be tortured when we render a person back to their home. Q. Mr. President, are you trying to send a message to the IRA by not inviting Gerry Adams and the other Northern Ireland politicians tomorrow? THE PRESIDENT: I talked to Bertie Ahern about this and—at the EU, and he just asked who was coming to the events, which—I said, you are, for certain. And we wanted to make sure that we honored those in civil society in Ireland who are contributing positively to the peace process. And that’s what we’ll be doing on this particular trip. It’s very important that people understand that the parties must renounce violence. There’s a—the Good Friday Agreement laid out the way forward for peace in Northern Ireland, and this administration and our government strongly supports those steps. But tomorrow’s message will be, we want to thank those in civil society who are working hard to achieve a peaceful resolution. Q. By inviting the widow—the sisters, rather, of this man who was killed … THE PRESIDENT: That’s part of the statement—a very strong part of the statement. And I’m looking forward to meeting these very brave souls. They’ve committed themselves to a peaceful solution. And hopefully, their loved one will not have died in vain. I mean, out of the—hopefully, some good will come out of the evil perpetuated on this family. Q. Mr. President, yesterday you said that Hezbollah could prove it is not a terrorist organization by laying down arms and supporting peace. How willing and flexible, and under what conditions are you able to, as you promote democracy in the Middle East, encourage parties like Hezbollah to discontinue the use of terrorism as a tactic? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think—let me make sure that you put my answer into full context. I first said that Hezbollah is on the terrorist list for a reason:

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because they have killed Americans in the past, and they—they’re a violent organization. And the question was about Lebanon, and let me take a step back, if I might, on this question, because it’s important for the American people to understand our policy. Our policy is this: We want there to be a thriving democracy in Lebanon. We believe that there will be a thriving democracy, but only if—but only if— Syria withdraws not only her troops completely out of Lebanon, but also her secret service organizations, intelligence organizations—not secret service, intelligence organizations. I am concerned, and the world should be concerned that the intelligence organizations are embedded in a lot of government functions in Lebanon, and there needs to be a complete withdrawal of those services in order for there to be a free election. And we will—this government will work with a—elected leaders of a free, truly free Lebanon, and [we are] looking forward to it. Q. Mr. President, you faced a lot of skepticism in the run-up to the Iraq war, and a lot of criticism for miscalculating some of the challenges of postwar Iraq. Now that the Iraq elections seem to be triggering signs of democratization throughout the broader Middle East, do you feel any sense of vindication? THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I fully understand that as long as I’m the President I will face criticism. It’s like part of the job. Frankly, you wouldn’t be doing your job if you didn’t occasionally lay out the gentle criticism. I welcome constructive ideas as to how we might do our job better. So that doesn’t bother me. And, therefore, since it doesn’t bother me and I expect it, I don’t then seek vindication. … People are constantly evaluating somebody’s standing in history, a President’s standing in history, based upon events that took place during the presidency, based upon things that happened after the presidency, based upon—like in my case, hopefully, the march of freedom continues way after my presidency. And so I just don’t worry about vindication or standing. The other thing, it turns out, in this job you’ve got a lot on your plate on a regular basis, you don’t have much time to sit around and wander, lonely, in the Oval Office, kind of asking different portraits, how do you think my standing will be? I’ve got a lot to do. And I like to make decisions, and I make a lot of them. But, you know, look, the people who deserve the credit in Iraq are the Iraqi citizens that defied the terrorists. Imagine what it would be like to try to go vote thinking that there could be a suicide bomber standing next to you in line, or somebody would lob a shell or a mortar at you. The courage of the Iraqi citizens was just overwhelming, I thought. It’s easy for us to vote. The question is, what it would be like to vote if you were fearful for your life.… Now, there’s a lot of work to be done, and I’m sure there will be some opinions about what takes place during the next nine months, as the constitution is written, and whether or not the elections move forward as smoothly as some think they should … It’s important for people in that region to see what is possible in a free society. And I firmly believe that the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan—I believe there will be a Palestinian state; I believe we’ll be able to convince Syria to fully withdraw, or else she’ll be isolated—fully withdraw from Lebanon, or else she’ll be isolated—I believe those examples will serve as

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examples for others over time. And that will lead to more peace. And that’s what we want. Q. Mr. President, do you also think it will lead to America’s reputation being restored? Earlier this week you brought Karen Hughes back at ambassador rank to address the question of antipathy to America around the world … particularly the Muslim world. What does that entail? THE PRESIDENT: Well, it entails a couple of things.… It entails people understanding why we do things we do. You know, for example, there was—I think we had the image of wanting to fight Muslims—the United States stood squarely against a religion, as opposed to a society which welcomes all religions. And, in fact, we’re fighting a handful of people relative to the Muslim population that wanted to—I used to say—hijack the religion. People need to understand we’re a compassionate nation and we care deeply about suffering, regardless of where people live. And the—you know, President Clinton and President Bush 41 did a fine job of helping the world see the great compassion of America when they went on the—went on their trips in the areas ravaged by the tsunamis. It is very important for us to have a message that counteracts some of the messages coming out of some of the Arab media—some of it coming out, partly, because of our strong and unwavering friendship with Israel. You know, Israel is an easy target for some of the media in the Middle East, and if you’re a friend of Israel, you become a target. And since we’re not going to abandon our alliance with Israel, there’s a—there was some churning in the press, and there was some unhelpful things being said. And so part of that is to make sure people understand the truth. And that is, in this particular issue, you bet we’re going to stand by Israel. But we also believe the Palestinians have the capability of self-governance in a truly democratic state that will live side-byside with the Israelis in peace. And so Karen is going … I applaud Secretary Rice’s decision to include Karen in the process. I thought that was very wise of her to call upon Karen’s talents. And Dina Powell, from my office, an Egyptian American, is also going over, leaving the White House compound to work with Karen, because she believes deeply in the American experience, in American values, and wants to share those values with people around the world. And, you know, I think when people also see, Carl, that we do what we say we’re going to do—for example, that we helped feed the hungry and that we believe all folks should be free and that women should have an equal say in society. I think when people see we actually mean that, and then when it comes to fruition, it will help people around the world better understand our good hearts and good nature. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050316-3.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas, April 12, 2005 … This weekend we marked the two-year anniversary of the liberation of Baghdad. Coalition forces crossed more than 350 miles of desert to get there,

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pushing through dust storms and death squads. They reached the Iraqi capital in 21 days, and that achievement will be studied for generations as the fastest armored advance in military history. The coalition assault was rapid, and it wasn’t easy. The enemy hid in schools and hospitals. They used civilians as human shields. Yet our troops persevered. We protected civilian lives while destroying the Republican Guard’s Medina Division, pushing through the Karbala Gap, capturing Saddam International Airport, and, on April 9th, we liberated the Iraqi capital. The terrorists have made Iraq a central front in the war on terror. Because of your service, because of your sacrifice, we are defeating them there where they live, so we do not have to face them where we live. Because of you, the people of Iraq no longer live in fear of being executed and left in mass graves. Because of you, freedom is taking root in Iraq. Our success in Iraq will make America safer, for us and for future generations. In my liberation message to the Iraqi people, I made them a solemn promise: ‘‘The government of Iraq, and the future of your country, will soon belong to you.’’ I went on to say: ‘‘We will help you build a peaceful and representative government that protects the rights of all citizens. And then our military forces will leave.’’ From the beginning, our goal in Iraq has been to promote Iraqi independence—by helping the Iraqi people establish a free country that can sustain itself, rule itself, and defend itself. And in the last two years, Iraqis have made enormous progress toward that goal. Iraqis have laid the foundations of a free society, with hundreds of independent newspapers and dozens of political parties and associations, and schools that teach Iraqi children how to read and write, instead of the propaganda of Saddam Hussein. Iraqis have laid the foundation of a free economy, with a new currency and independent central bank, new laws to encourage foreign investment, and thousands of small businesses established since liberation. The troops from Fort Hood have done their part. In Baghdad, soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division launched Operation Adam Smith, and the new generation of Iraqi entrepreneurs you helped nurture will create jobs and opportunities for millions of their fellow citizens.… An Iraqi special tribunal has been established that will try senior leadership, including Saddam Hussein. He will get the trial that he did not afford his fellow citizens when he was in power. Slowly but surely, the land that gave civilization the first written code of law is now restoring the rule of law, and setting the example for people across the Middle East. Iraqis have laid a solid foundation for democratic self-government. The world watched in awe as the Iraqi people defied the car bombers and assassins to cast their votes in the country’s first free and democratic election in decades.… There’s a lot of hard work ahead. The Iraqi people face brutal and determined enemies. But Iraqis are also determined, and they have the will to defeat the insurgency. The soldiers and police of a free Iraq learned on election day they can face down the insurgents, and they learned they can prevail. The Iraqi people now have confidence that the soldiers and police of a free

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Iraq have the courage and resolve to defend them. The Iraqi security forces are fighting bravely for the future of their country, and in the last six months alone, more than 800 have given their lives in the struggle. As Iraq’s new government assumes increasing responsibility for the stability of their country, security operations are entering a new phase. Iraq security forces are becoming more self-reliant and taking on greater responsibilities. And that means that America and its coalition partners are increasingly playing more of a supporting role. Today, more than 150,000 Iraqi security forces have been trained and equipped, and for the first time, the Iraqi army, police and security forces now outnumber U.S. forces in Iraq. Like free people everywhere, Iraqis want to be defended and led by their own countrymen. We will help them achieve this objective so Iraqis can secure their own nation. And then our troops will come home with the honor they have earned. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050412.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the Naval Academy Commencement, Navy Marine Corps Memorial Stadium, Annapolis, Maryland, May 27, 2005 Today, I’m going to talk about our strategy for victory in this war, what we’ve accomplished to make our nation more secure, your crucial role in this struggle, and why we need you to fight the war on terror and transform our military at the same time. In the 21st century, America will be prepared to answer any challenge, and defeat any adversary. Our nation is pursuing a clear strategy for the war on terror: We’re using every available tool to disrupt terrorists and their organizations. We are taking the fight to the enemy abroad so we do not have to face them here at home. We’re denying the terrorists sanctuary, and making clear that America will not tolerate outlaw regimes that provide safe haven and support to terrorists. We’re using all elements of national power to deny terrorists the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons they seek. We will not allow mass murderers to gain access to the tools of mass destruction. And we’re stopping terrorists from achieving their ideological victories they seek, by working to spread the hope of freedom and reform across the broader Middle East. We understand that free nations do not support terrorists or invade their neighbors. We understand to make the world more peaceful and our country more secure, we will advance the cause of liberty. Thanks to the men and women of the United States military, our strategy is working—we are winning the war on terror. Since September 11, 2001, we’ve removed brutal regimes in Kabul and Baghdad that supported and harbored terrorists. We helped launch Afghanistan and Iraq on the path to lasting freedom by liberating over 50 million people. Both these nations have now chosen their leaders in free elections, and their courage is inspiring democratic reformers across the broader Middle East to rise up and claim their liberty. To stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, we broke up the world’s most dangerous nuclear trading network. We convinced Libya’s leader

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to give up his country’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs, as well as his long-range ballistic missiles. Two years ago, we launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, an effort supported by 60 nations to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction … We have gone after al Qaeda and other terrorists with relentless determination, disrupting their communications, planning, training, and financing. We have put the enemy on the run, and now they spend their days avoiding capture … And we will stay on their trail. The best way to protect our citizens is to stay on the offensive. In the last few weeks, we’ve dealt the enemy a series of powerful blows. In Afghanistan, we brought to justice scores of terrorists and insurgents. In Pakistan, one of Osama bin Laden’s senior terrorist leaders, a man named al-Libbi, was brought to justice. In Iraq, we captured two senior operatives of the terrorist Zarqawi. And in recent days, our forces have killed or captured hundreds of terrorists and insurgents in Baghdad and Western Iraq and near the Syrian border. Difficult and dangerous work remains. Suicide bombers in Iraq are targeting innocent men, women and children, hoping to intimidate Iraq’s new leaders, and shake the will of the Iraqi people. They will fail. Iraqis are determined, and our strategy is clear: We will train Iraqi forces so they can take the fight to the enemy and defend their own country, and then our troops will come home with the honor they have earned. In this time of unprecedented dangers, we need you to take on two difficult missions at once: We need you to defeat the terrorists who want to destroy what we stand for and how we live. And at the same time, we need you to transform our military for the 21st century, so we can deter and defeat the new adversaries who may threaten our people in the decades ahead. The lesson of September 11th is clear: new dangers can arrive on our shores without warning. In this era of surprise, we cannot know for certain who might attack us, or where, or when. But we can anticipate how we might be attacked, and we can transform our capabilities to defend our citizens and deliver justice to our enemies. To meet the threats of the 21st century, we are developing new technologies that will make our forces faster, lighter, more agile, and more lethal. In our time, terrible dangers can arise on a short moment anywhere in the world, and we must be prepared to oppose these dangers everywhere in the world. Since taking office, my administration has invested $16 billion to build transformational military capabilities. We’ve requested an additional $78 billion for these efforts over the next four years. We’ve invested $240 billion in research and development, so we can build even more advanced capabilities in the decades ahead. We requested $275 billion for these efforts over the next four years. These investments will help us keep the peace by redefining war on our terms. And so long as I am your President, you will have the very best equipment and the resources you need to get the job done. We’re also harnessing advances in information technology, such as undersea surveillance systems, to provide our forces with near total battle space awareness.… technological advances will put unprecedented agility, speed, precision, and power in your hands, and you will use them to protect the American people in the dangerous decades ahead.

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Technology changes the balance of war in another important way: We can now strike our enemies with greater effectiveness, at greater range, with fewer civilian casualties. In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a nation, and that means terrorists and tyrants can no longer feel safe hiding behind innocent life. In the 21st century, we can target the guilty and protect the innocent, and that makes it easier to keep the peace. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050527.html

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, May 31, 2005 EXCERPTED Q. Mr. President, since Iraq’s new government was announced on April 28th, more than 60 Americans and 760 Iraqis have been killed in attacks. Do you think that the insurgency is gaining strength and becoming more lethal? And do you think that Iraq’s government is up to the job of defeating the— defeating the insurgents and guaranteeing security? THE PRESIDENT: I think the Iraq government will be up to the task of defeating the insurgents. I think they dealt the insurgents—I think the Iraqi people dealt the insurgents a serious blow when they—when we had the elections. In other words, what the insurgents fear is democracy, because democracy is the opposite of their vision. Their vision is one where a few make the decision for many, and if you don’t toe the line, there’s serious consequences. … I believe the Iraqi government is going to be plenty capable of dealing with them, and our job is to help train them so that they can. I was heartened to see the Iraqi government announce 40,000 Iraqi troops are well-trained enough to help secure Baghdad. That was a very positive sign. It’s a sign that they—they, the Iraqi leaders, understand they are responsible for their security, ultimately, and that our job is to help them take on that responsibility. So I’m pleased with the progress. I am pleased that in less than a year’s time, there’s a democratically elected government in Iraq; there are thousands of Iraqi soldiers trained and better equipped to fight for their own country; that our strategy is very clear in that we will work to get them ready to fight, and when they’re ready, we’ll come home. And I hope that’s sooner, rather than later. But, nevertheless, it’s very important that we complete this mission, because a free Iraq is in our nation’s long-term interests. A democracy in the heart of the Middle East is an essential part of securing our country and promoting peace for the long run. And it is very important for our country to understand that. A free Iraq will set such a powerful example in a neighborhood that is desperate for freedom. And, therefore, we will complete the mission and support this elected government. Q. Thank you, sir. Mr. President, recently, Amnesty International said you have established ‘‘a new gulag’’ of prisons around the world, beyond the reach of the law and decency. I’d like your reaction to that, and also your assessment of how it came to this, that that is a view not just held by

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extremists and anti-Americans, but by groups that have allied themselves with the United States government in the past—and what the strategic impact is that in many places of the world, the United States these days, under your leadership, is no longer seen as the good guy. THE PRESIDENT: I’m aware of the Amnesty International report, and it’s absurd. It’s an absurd allegation. The United States is a country that is—promotes freedom around the world. When there’s accusations made about certain actions by our people, they’re fully investigated in a transparent way. It’s just an absurd allegation. In terms of the detainees, we’ve had thousands of people detained. We’ve investigated every single complaint against the detainees. It seemed like to me they based some of their decisions on the word of—and the allegations—by people who were held in detention, people who hate America, people who had been trained in some instances to disassemble—that means not tell the truth. And so it was an absurd report. It just is. And, you know—yes, sir. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050531.html

President George W. Bush, Address to Nation on Iraq and the War on Terror, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 28, 2005 Some of the violence you see in Iraq is being carried out by ruthless killers who are converging on Iraq to fight the advance of peace and freedom. Our military reports that we have killed or captured hundreds of foreign fighters in Iraq who have come from Saudi Arabia and Syria, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Libya and others. They are making common cause with criminal elements, Iraqi insurgents, and remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime who want to restore the old order. They fight because they know that the survival of their hateful ideology is at stake. They know that as freedom takes root in Iraq, it will inspire millions across the Middle East to claim their liberty, as well. And when the Middle East grows in democracy and prosperity and hope, the terrorists will lose their sponsors, lose their recruits, and lose their hopes for turning that region into a base for attacks on America and our allies around the world. Some wonder whether Iraq is a central front in the war on terror. Among the terrorists, there is no debate. Hear the words of Osama Bin Laden: ‘‘This Third World War is raging’’ in Iraq. ‘‘The whole world is watching this war.’’ He says it will end in ‘‘victory and glory, or misery and humiliation.’’ The terrorists know that the outcome will leave them emboldened, or defeated. So they are waging a campaign of murder and destruction. And there is no limit to the innocent lives they are willing to take. We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who exploded car bombs along a busy shopping street in Baghdad, including one outside a mosque, … sent a suicide bomber to a teaching hospital in Mosul. We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who behead civilian hostages and broadcast their atrocities for the world to see. … The only way the terrorists can succeed is if we forget the lessons of September the 11th, if we abandon the Iraqi people to men like Zarqawi, and if

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we yield the future of the Middle East to men like Bin Laden. For the sake of our nation’s security, this will not happen on my watch. … Rebuilding a country after three decades of tyranny is hard, and rebuilding while at war is even harder. Our progress has been uneven, but progress is being made. We’re improving roads and schools and health clinics. We’re working to improve basic services like sanitation, electricity, and water. And together with our allies, we’ll help the new Iraqi government deliver a better life for its citizens. In the past year, the international community has stepped forward with vital assistance. Some 30 nations have troops in Iraq, and many others are contributing non-military assistance. The United Nations is in Iraq to help Iraqis write a constitution and conduct their next elections. Thus far, some 40 countries and three international organizations have pledged about $34 billion in assistance for Iraqi reconstruction. More than 80 countries and international organizations recently came together in Brussels to coordinate their efforts to help Iraqis provide for their security and rebuild their country. And next month, donor countries will meet in Jordan to support Iraqi reconstruction. Whatever our differences in the past, the world understands that success in Iraq is critical to the security of our nations. As German Chancellor Gerhard Schr[€ o]der said at the White House yesterday, ‘‘There can be no question a stable and democratic Iraq is in the vested interest of not just Germany, but also Europe.’’ … Finally, we have continued our efforts to equip and train Iraqi security forces. We made gains in both the number and quality of those forces. Today Iraq has more than 160,000 security forces trained and equipped for a variety of missions. Iraqi forces have fought bravely, helping to capture terrorists and insurgents in Najaf and Samarra, Fallujah and Mosul. And in the past month, Iraqi forces have led a major anti-terrorist campaign in Baghdad called Operation Lightning, which has led to the capture of hundreds of suspected insurgents. Like free people everywhere, Iraqis want to be defended by their own countrymen, and we are helping Iraqis assume those duties. The progress in the past year has been significant.… To complete the mission, we will continue to hunt down the terrorists and insurgents. To complete the mission, we will prevent al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists from turning Iraq into what Afghanistan was under the Taliban, a safe haven from which they could launch attacks on America and our friends. And the best way to complete the mission is to help Iraqis build a free nation that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself. So our strategy going forward has both a military track and a political track. The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists, and that is why we are on the offense. And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. We’ve made progress, but we have a lot of—a lot more work to do. Today Iraqi security forces are at different levels of readiness. Some are capable of taking on the terrorists and insurgents by themselves. A large number can plan

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and execute anti-terrorist operations with coalition support. The rest are forming and not yet ready to participate fully in security operations. Our task is to make the Iraqi units fully capable and independent. We’re building up Iraqi security forces as quickly as possible, so they can assume the lead in defeating the terrorists and insurgents. Our coalition is devoting considerable resources and manpower to this critical task. Thousands of coalition troops are involved in the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces. NATO is establishing a military academy near Baghdad to train the next generation of Iraqi military leaders, and 17 nations are contributing troops to the NATO training mission.… To further prepare Iraqi forces to fight the enemy on their own, we are taking three new steps: First, we are partnering coalition units with Iraqi units. These coalitionIraqi teams are conducting operations together in the field. These combined operations are giving Iraqis a chance to experience how the most professional armed forces in the world operate in combat. Second, we are embedding coalition ‘‘transition teams’’ inside Iraqi units. These teams are made up of coalition officers and non-commissioned officers who live, work, and fight together with their Iraqi comrades. Under U.S. command, they are providing battlefield advice and assistance to Iraqi forces during combat operations. Between battles, they are assisting the Iraqis with important skills, such as urban combat, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques. Third, we’re working with the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense to improve their capabilities to coordinate anti-terrorist operations. We’re helping them develop command and control structures. We’re also providing them with civilian and military leadership training, so Iraq’s new leaders can effectively manage their forces in the fight against terror. The new Iraqi security forces are proving their courage every day. More than 2,000 members of Iraqi security forces have given their lives in the line of duty. Thousands more have stepped forward, and are now training to serve their nation. With each engagement, Iraqi soldiers grow more battlehardened, and their officers grow more experienced. We’ve learned that Iraqis are courageous and that they need additional skills. And that is why a major part of our mission is to train them so they can do the fighting, and then our troops can come home. I recognize that Americans want our troops to come home as quickly as possible. So do I. Some contend that we should set a deadline for withdrawing U.S. forces. Let me explain why that would be a serious mistake. Setting an artificial timetable would send the wrong message to the Iraqis, who need to know that America will not leave before the job is done. It would send the wrong message to our troops, who need to know that we are serious about completing the mission they are risking their lives to achieve. And it would send the wrong message to the enemy, who would know that all they have to do is to wait us out. We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed, and not a day longer. Some Americans ask me, if completing the mission is so important, why don’t you send more troops? If our commanders on the ground say we need

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more troops, I will send them. But our commanders tell me they have the number of troops they need to do their job. Sending more Americans would undermine our strategy of encouraging Iraqis to take the lead in this fight. And sending more Americans would suggest that we intend to stay forever, when we are, in fact, working for the day when Iraq can defend itself and we can leave. As we determine the right force level, our troops can know that I will continue to be guided by the advice that matters: the sober judgment of our military leaders. The other critical element of our strategy is to help ensure that the hopes Iraqis expressed at the polls in January are translated into a secure democracy. The Iraqi people are emerging from decades of tyranny and oppression.… The challenge facing Iraqis today is to put this past behind them, and come together to build a new Iraq that includes all of its people. … As Iraqis grow confident that the democratic progress they are making is real and permanent, more will join the political process. And as Iraqis see that their military can protect them, more will step forward with vital intelligence to help defeat the enemies of a free Iraq. The combination of political and military reform will lay a solid foundation for a free and stable Iraq. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the FBI Academy, FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia, July 11, 2005 In London last Thursday terrorists killed dozens of commuters and wounded hundreds more. Americans know what it’s like to be attacked on our own soil. Our hearts go out to the many innocent people in London who suffered terrible injuries, and we pray for the families mourning the loss of loved ones. In this difficult hour, the people of Great Britain can know the American people stand with you. I was with the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Tony Blair, at the G8 summit in Scotland when the terrorists struck his homeland. The contrast could not have been more vivid. We were there to discuss ways to make the world a better and more compassionate place; and in the London, the terrorists were killing innocent men and women in cold blood. These attacks were barbaric, and they provide a clear window into the evil we face. These kind of people who blow up subways and buses are not people you can negotiate with, or reason with, or appease. In the face of such adversaries there is only one course of action: We will continue to take the fight to the enemy, and we will fight until this enemy is defeated. The terrorists … believe that the world’s democracies are weak, and that by killing innocent civilians they can break our will. They’re mistaken. America will not retreat in the face of terrorists and murderers. And neither will the free world. As Prime Minister Blair said after the attacks in London, ‘‘Our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people.’’ The attack in London was an attack on the civilized world. And the civilized world is united in its resolve: We will not yield. We will defend our freedom.

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Our nation has no greater mission than stopping the terrorists from launching new and more deadly attacks.… To accomplish this vital mission, we have a comprehensive strategy in place. We’re working to protect the homeland. We’re working to improve our intelligence so we can uncover terrorist plots before they unfold. And we’re staying on the offensive. We’re fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and across the world so we do not have to face them here at home. To protect the American people, we continue to take extraordinary measures to defend the homeland. We created a new Department of Homeland Security. We’re posting Homeland Security personnel at foreign ports and strengthening airport and seaport security. We’re instituting better visa screening for those entering the United States. We’re working to prevent potential terrorists from coming across our borders and violating our immigration laws. We’re protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure—our bridges and tunnels, our transportation systems, our nuclear power plants and water treatment facilities, and the cyber networks that keep our government and our economy running. We’ve provided more than $14 billion over the last four years to train and equip local first responders. In all, we’ve more than tripled funding for homeland security since 2001. We’re working tirelessly to protect the American people and to prevent new terrorists attacks … … Staying a step ahead of this enemy and disrupting their plans is an unprecedented challenge for our intelligence community. We’re reforming our intelligence agencies to meet the new threats. We’ve established a new National Counterterrorism Center where we are bringing together all the available intelligence on terrorist threats. We’re sharing intelligence across all levels of government—the federal level, the state level, and the local level. We’re working with our allies to share information, and to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Thanks to the hard work of hundreds in our intelligence community, we have stopped a number of grave threats to the American people. Together with our allies, we uncovered and dismantled Libya’s nuclear program. We worked with Pakistan and other nations to shut down the world’s most dangerous nuclear trading network. And since September the 11th, our coalition has disrupted a number of al Qaeda terrorist plots, arrested al Qaeda operatives here to case specific U.S. targets, and caught others trying to sneak into our country. Our enemy is constantly studying our defenses and adapting its own tactics, so we must constantly strengthen our capabilities. And that’s why I appointed a bipartisan commission, led by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Senator Chuck Robb. I asked them to give me an unvarnished look at our intelligence capabilities and our intelligence successes, as well as analyze our intelligence failures. Two weeks ago, after careful review, I approved 70 of the commission’s recommendations for implementation. One of the new steps we’re taking is the creation of the National Security Service within the FBI, to more completely integrate the Bureau’s work with the intelligence community. The purpose of this change is to strengthen the FBI, so it not only investigates terrorist crimes after they happen, but the FBI can be more capable to stop the terrorist acts before they happen … The FBI

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has deployed its personnel across the world, in Iraq and Afghanistan and other fronts in the war on terror. FBI agents are questioning captured terrorists and uncovering information that will help prevent new attacks on our homeland. Here in America, the FBI has helped break up terrorist cells and financing networks in California, in Oregon, Illinois, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, Florida and other states. And one of the important tools federal agents have used to protect America is the Patriot Act. I call on Congress to reauthorize the 16 critical provisions of this act that are scheduled to expire at the end of this year. The terrorist threats against us will not expire at the end of this year, and neither should the protections of the Patriot Act. In the war on terror, Iraq is now a central front. The terrorists fight in Iraq because they know that the survival of their hateful ideology is at stake. They know that as freedom takes root in Iraq, it will inspire millions across the Middle East to claim their liberty, as well. And when the Middle East grows in democracy and prosperity and hope, the terrorists will lose their sponsors. They’ll lose their recruits. They will lose their hopes for turning that region into a base of attacks against America and our allies. The stakes in Iraq are high, and no one knows the stakes better than our troops. An American battalion commander in Iraq put it this way in an email: ‘‘I know that most of you are probably asking if our presence here and loss of human life are worth it. We’re here for a purpose. And if not now, when will we stand up to the terrorists that are sick enough to do these things in God’s name?’’ Our troops see the progress the Iraqi security forces have made. Captain Glenn Colby of the Rhode Island National Guard says that when he arrived in Iraq over a year ago, the Iraqi police were afraid to go outside their building. Recently, he says, the soldiers were on patrol when the Iraqi police charged past them in hot pursuit of insurgents. He says of the Iraqi police, ‘‘Now you see them everywhere. You see them at checkpoints on the streets; you see them on patrol; you see them stand and fight.’’ … The leaders of the new Iraqi military see the progress. The Iraqi general in charge of his country’s elite special forces puts it this way: Before, ‘‘the Americans were taking the lead and we were following.’’ Now, he said proudly that his forces were taking the lead. We are working for the day when the entire Iraqi army can say the same thing. Our coalition will help Iraqis so they can fight the enemy on their own. And then American forces can come home to a proud and grateful nation. We know that the terrorists will not be defeated by force of arms alone. Iraqis need a strong military to engage the enemy. But just as important is a strong and secure democracy that will provide an alternative to the terrorists’ ideology of hate. So Iraqis are hard at work building the institutions of a free society. The heart of our strategy is this: Free societies are peaceful societies. So in the long run, the only way to defeat the ideologies of hatred and fear, the only way to make sure our country is secure in the long run, is to advance the cause of freedom. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050711-1.html

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President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Military Officers Association, Washington, D.C., September 5, 2006 The terrorists who attacked us on September the 11th, 2001, are men without conscience—but they’re not madmen. They kill in the name of a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs that are evil, but not insane. These al Qaeda terrorists and those who share their ideology are violent Sunni extremists. They’re driven by a radical and perverted vision of Islam that rejects tolerance, crushes all dissent, and justifies the murder of innocent men, women and children in the pursuit of political power. They hope to establish a violent political utopia across the Middle East, which they call a ‘‘Caliphate’’—where all would be ruled according to their hateful ideology. Osama bin Laden has called the 9/11 attacks—in his words—‘‘a great step towards the unity of Muslims and establishing the Righteous … [Caliphate].’’ This caliphate would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all current and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. We know this because al Qaeda has told us. About two months ago, the terrorist Zawahiri—he’s al Qaeda’s second in command—declared that al Qaeda intends to impose its rule in ‘‘every land that was a home for Islam, from [Spain] to Iraq. He went on to say, ‘‘The whole world is an open field for us.’’ These radicals have declared their uncompromising hostility to freedom. It is foolish to think that you can negotiate with them. We see the uncompromising nature of the enemy in many captured terrorist documents. Here are just two examples: After the liberation of Afghanistan, coalition forces searching through a terrorist safe house in that country found a copy of the al Qaeda charter. This charter states that ‘‘there will be continuing enmity until everyone believes in Allah. We will not meet [the enemy] halfway. There will be no room for dialogue with them.’’ Another document was found in 2000 by British police during an anti-terrorist raid in London—a grisly al Qaeda manual that includes chapters with titles such as ‘‘Guidelines for Beating and Killing Hostages.’’ This manual declares that their vision of Islam ‘‘does not … make a truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it.’’ The confrontation … calls for … the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.’’ Still other captured documents show al Qaeda’s strategy for infiltrating Muslim nations, establishing terrorist enclaves, overthrowing governments, and building their totalitarian empire.… bin Laden and his allies are absolutely convinced they can succeed in forcing America to retreat and causing our economic collapse. They believe our nation is weak and decadent, and lacking in patience and resolve. And they’re wrong. Osama bin Laden has written that the ‘‘defeat of … American forces in Beirut’’ in 1983 is proof America does not have the stomach to stay in the fight. He’s declared that ‘‘in Somalia … the United States [pulled] out, trailing disappointment, defeat, and failure behind it.’’ And last year, the terrorist

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Zawahiri declared that Americans ‘‘know better than others that there is no hope in victory. The Vietnam specter is closing every outlet.’’ bin Laden and his terrorist allies have made their intentions as clear as Lenin and Hitler before them. The question is: Will we listen? Will we pay attention to what these evil men say? America and our coalition partners have made our choice. We’re taking the words of the enemy seriously. We’re on the offensive, and we will not rest, we will not retreat, and we will not withdraw from the fight, until this threat to civilization has been removed. Imagine a world in which they were able to control governments, a world awash with oil and they would use oil resources to punish industrialized nations. And they would use those resources to fuel their radical agenda, and pursue and purchase weapons of mass murder. And armed with nuclear weapons, they would blackmail the free world, and spread their ideologies of hate, and raise a mortal threat to the American people. If we allow them to do this, if we retreat from Iraq, if we don’t uphold our duty to support those who are desirous to live in liberty, 50 years from now history will look back on our time with unforgiving clarity, and demand to know why we did not act. I’m not going to allow this to happen—and no future American President can allow it either. America did not seek this global struggle, but we’re answering history’s call with confidence and a clear strategy. Today we’re releasing a document called the ‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.’’ This is an unclassified version of the strategy we’ve been pursuing since September the 11th, 2001. This strategy was first released in February 2003; it’s been updated to take into account the changing nature of this enemy. This strategy document is posted on the White House website— whitehouse.gov. EDITOR’S NOTE: The strategy document is available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nsct/2006/ and also listed in chapter 27, Key Documents).

Our strategy for combating terrorism has five basic elements: First, we’re determined to prevent terrorist attacks before they occur. So we’re taking the fight to the enemy. The best way to protect America is to stay on the offense. Since 9/11, our coalition has captured or killed al Qaeda managers and operatives, and scores of other terrorists across the world. The enemy is living under constant pressure, and we intend to keep it that way— and this adds to our security. When terrorists spend their days working to avoid death or capture, it’s harder for them to plan and execute new attacks. We’re also fighting the enemy here at home. We’ve given our law enforcement and intelligence professionals the tools they need to stop the terrorists in our midst. We passed the Patriot Act to break down the wall that prevented law enforcement and intelligence from sharing vital information. We created the Terrorist Surveillance Program to monitor the communications between al Qaeda commanders abroad and terrorist operatives within our borders. If al Qaeda is calling somebody in America, we need to know why, in order to stop attacks. … over the last five years, federal, state, and local law enforcement have used those tools to break up terrorist cells, and to prosecute terrorist operatives and supporters in New York, and Oregon, and Virginia, and Texas, and

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New Jersey, and Illinois, Ohio, and other states. By taking the battle to the terrorists and their supporters on our own soil and across the world, we’ve stopped a number of al Qaeda plots. Second, we’re determined to deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and terrorists who would use them without hesitation. Working with Great Britain and Pakistan and other nations, the United States shut down the world’s most dangerous nuclear trading cartel, the AQ Khan network. This network had supplied Iran and Libya and North Korea with equipment and know-how that advanced their efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. And we launched the Proliferation Security Initiative … the greatest threat this world faces is the danger of extremists and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.… Third, we’re determined to deny terrorists the support of outlaw regimes. After September the 11th, I laid out a clear doctrine: America makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror, and those that harbor and support them, because they’re equally guilty of murder. Thanks to our efforts, there are now three fewer state sponsors of terror in the world than there were on September the 11th, 2001. Afghanistan and Iraq have been transformed from terrorist states into allies in the war on terror. And the nation of Libya has renounced terrorism, and given up its weapons of mass destruction programs, and its nuclear materials and equipment. Over the past five years, we’ve acted to disrupt the flow of weapons and support from terrorist states to terrorist networks. And we have made clear that any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be an enemy of civilization. Fourth, we’re determined to deny terrorist networks control of any nation, or territory within a nation. So, along with our coalition and the Iraqi government, we’ll stop the terrorists from taking control of Iraq, and establishing a new safe haven from which to attack America and the free world. And we’re working with friends and allies to deny the terrorists the enclaves they seek to establish in ungoverned areas across the world. By helping governments reclaim full sovereign control over their territory, we make ourselves more secure. Fifth, we’re working to deny terrorists new recruits, by defeating their hateful ideology and spreading the hope of freedom—by spreading the hope of freedom across the Middle East. For decades, American policy sought to achieve peace in the Middle East by pursuing stability at the expense of liberty. The lack of freedom in that region helped create conditions where anger and resentment grew, and radicalism thrived, and terrorists found willing recruits … The experience of September the 11th made clear, in the long run, the only way to secure our nation is to change the course of the Middle East. So America has committed its influence in the world to advancing freedom and liberty and democracy as the great alternatives to repression and radicalism. We’re taking the side of democratic leaders and moderates and reformers across the Middle East. We strongly support the voices of tolerance and moderation in the Muslim world. We’re standing with Afghanistan’s elected government against al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants that are trying to restore tyranny in that country. We’re standing with Lebanon’s young democracy against the foreign forces that are seeking to undermine the country’s sovereignty and independence. And we’re standing with the leaders of Iraq’s unity

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government as they work to defeat the enemies of freedom, and chart a more hopeful course for their people. This is why victory is so important in Iraq. By helping freedom succeed in Iraq, we will help America, and the Middle East, and the world become more secure. During the last five years we’ve learned a lot about this enemy. We’ve learned that they’re cunning and sophisticated. We’ve witnessed their ability to change their methods and their tactics with deadly speed—even as their murderous obsessions remain unchanging. We’ve seen that it’s the terrorists who have declared war on Muslims, slaughtering huge numbers of innocent Muslim men and women around the world. We know what the terrorists believe, we know what they have done, and we know what they intend to do.… this time we’re not waiting for our enemies to gather in strength. This time, we’re confronting them before they gain the capacity to inflict unspeakable damage on the world, and we’re confronting their hateful ideology before it fully takes root. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the War on Terror at the National Endowment for Democracy, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., October 6, 2005 EXCERPTED The images and experience of September the 11th are unique for Americans. Yet the evil of that morning has reappeared on other days, in other places—in Mombasa, and Casablanca, and Riyadh, and Jakarta, and Istanbul, and Madrid, and Beslan, and Taba, and Netanya, and Baghdad, and elsewhere. In the past few months, we’ve seen a new terror offensive with attacks on London, and Sharm el-Sheikh, and a deadly bombing in Bali once again. All these separate images of destruction and suffering that we see on the news can seem like random and isolated acts of madness; innocent men and women and children have died simply because they boarded the wrong train, or worked in the wrong building, or checked into the wrong hotel. Yet while the killers choose their victims indiscriminately, their attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil, but not insane. Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism. Whatever it’s called, this ideology is very different from the religion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. These extremists distort the idea of jihad into a call for terrorist murder against Christians and Jews and Hindus—and also against Muslims from other traditions, who they regard as heretics. Many militants are part of global, borderless terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, which spreads propaganda, and provides financing and technical assistance to local extremists, and conducts dramatic and brutal operations like September the 11th. Other militants are found in regional groups, often

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associated with al Qaeda—paramilitary insurgencies and separatist movements in places like Somalia, and the Philippines, and Pakistan, and Chechnya, and Kashmir, and Algeria. Still others spring up in local cells, inspired by Islamic radicalism, but not centrally directed. Islamic radicalism is more like a loose network with many branches than an army under a single command. Yet these operatives, fighting on scattered battlefields, share a similar ideology and vision for our world. We know the vision of the radicals because they’ve openly stated it—in videos, and audiotapes, and letters, and declarations, and websites. First, these extremists want to end American and Western influence in the broader Middle East, because we stand for democracy and peace, and stand in the way of their ambitions. Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, has called on Muslims to dedicate, quote, their ‘‘resources, sons and money to driving the infidels out of their lands.’’ Their tactic to meet this goal has been consistent for a quarter-century: They hit us, and expect us to run. They want us to repeat the sad history of Beirut in 1983, and Mogadishu in 1993—only this time on a larger scale, with greater consequences. Second, the militant network wants to use the vacuum created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against non-radical Muslim governments. Over the past few decades, radicals have specifically targeted Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, and Jordan for potential takeover. They achieved their goal, for a time, in Afghanistan. Now they’ve set their sights on Iraq … The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front in their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror. Third, the militants believe that controlling one country will rally the Muslim masses, enabling them to overthrow all moderate governments in the region, and establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia. With greater economic and military and political power, the terrorists would be able to advance their stated agenda: to develop weapons of mass destruction, to destroy Israel, to intimidate Europe, to assault the American people, and to blackmail our government into isolation. Some might be tempted to dismiss these goals as fanatical or extreme. Well, they are fanatical and extreme—and they should not be dismissed. Our enemy is utterly committed. As Zarqawi has vowed, ‘‘We will either achieve victory over the human race or we will pass to the eternal life.’’ And the civilized world knows very well that other fanatics in history, from Hitler to Stalin to Pol Pot, consumed whole nations in war and genocide before leaving the stage of history. Evil men, obsessed with ambition and unburdened by conscience, must be taken very seriously—and we must stop them before their crimes can multiply. Defeating the militant network is difficult, because it thrives, like a parasite, on the suffering and frustration of others. The radicals exploit local conflicts to build a culture of victimization, in which someone else is always to blame and violence is always the solution. They exploit resentful and disillusioned young men and women, recruiting them through radical mosques as the pawns of terror. And they exploit modern technology to multiply their destructive power. Instead of attending faraway training camps, recruits can now

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access online training libraries to learn how to build a roadside bomb, or fire a rocket-propelled grenade—and this further spreads the threat of violence, even within peaceful democratic societies. The influence of Islamic radicalism is also magnified by helpers and enablers. They have been sheltered by authoritarian regimes, allies of convenience like Syria and Iran, that share the goal of hurting America and moderate Muslim governments, and use terrorist propaganda to blame their own failures on the West and America, and on the Jews. These radicals depend on front operations, such as corrupted charities, which direct money to terrorist activity. They’re strengthened by those who aggressively fund the spread of radical, intolerant versions of Islam in unstable parts of the world. The militants are aided, as well, by elements of the Arab news media that incite hatred and antiSemitism, that feed conspiracy theories and speak of a so-called American ‘‘war on Islam’’—with seldom a word about American action to protect Muslims in Afghanistan, and Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq. Some have also argued that extremism has been strengthened by the actions of our coalition in Iraq, claiming that our presence in that country has somehow caused or triggered the rage of radicals. I would remind them that we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001—and al Qaeda attacked us anyway. The hatred of the radicals existed before Iraq was an issue, and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse. The government of Russia did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom, and yet the militants killed more than 180 Russian schoolchildren in Beslan. Over the years these extremists have used a litany of excuses for violence— the Israeli presence on the West Bank, or the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, or the defeat of the Taliban, or the Crusades of a thousand years ago. In fact, we’re not facing a set of grievances that can be soothed and addressed. We’re facing a radical ideology with inalterable objectives: to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the killers—and no concession, bribe, or act of appeasement would change or limit their plans for murder. On the contrary: They target nations whose behavior they believe they can change through violence. Against such an enemy, there is only one effective response: We will never back down, never give in, and never accept anything less than complete victory. Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy teaches that innocent individuals can be sacrificed to serve a political vision. And this explains their cold-blooded contempt for human life. We’ve seen it in the murders of Daniel Pearl, Nicholas Berg, and Margaret Hassan, and many others. In a courtroom in the Netherlands, the killer of Theo Van Gogh turned to the victim’s grieving mother and said, ‘‘I do not feel your pain—because I believe you are an infidel.’’ And in spite of this veneer of religious rhetoric, most of the victims claimed by the militants are fellow Muslims. When 25 Iraqi children are killed in a bombing, or Iraqi teachers are executed at their school, or hospital workers are killed caring for the wounded, this is murder, pure and simple—the total rejection of justice and honor and morality and religion. These militants are not just the enemies of America, or the enemies of Iraq, they are the enemies of Islam and the enemies of

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humanity. We have seen this kind of shameless cruelty before, in the heartless zealotry that led to the gulags, and the Cultural Revolution, and the killing fields. Like the ideology of communism, our new enemy is dismissive of free peoples, claiming that men and women who live in liberty are weak and decadent. Zarqawi has said that Americans are, quote, ‘‘the most cowardly of God’s creatures.’’ But let’s be clear: It is cowardice that seeks to kill children and the elderly with car bombs, and cuts the throat of a bound captive, and targets worshipers leaving a mosque. It is courage that liberated more than 50 million people. It is courage that keeps an untiring vigil against the enemies of a rising democracy. And it is courage in the cause of freedom that once again will destroy the enemies of freedom. Iraq Some observers look at the job ahead and adopt a self-defeating pessimism. It is not justified. With every random bombing and with every funeral of a child, it becomes more clear that the extremists are not patriots, or resistance fighters—they are murderers at war with the Iraqi people, themselves. In contrast, the elected leaders of Iraq are proving to be strong and steadfast. By any standard or precedent of history, Iraq has made incredible political progress—from tyranny, to liberation, to national elections, to the writing of a constitution, in the space of two-and-a-half years. With our help, the Iraqi military is gaining new capabilities and new confidence with every passing month. At the time of our Fallujah operations 11 months ago, there were only a few Iraqi army battalions in combat. Today there are more than 80 Iraqi army battalions fighting the insurgency alongside our forces. Progress isn’t easy, but it is steady. And no fair-minded person should ignore, deny, or dismiss the achievements of the Iraqi people. Some observers question the durability of democracy in Iraq. They underestimate the power and appeal of freedom. We’ve heard it suggested that Iraq’s democracy must be on shaky ground because Iraqis are arguing with each other. But that’s the essence of democracy: making your case, debating with those who you disagree—who disagree, building consensus by persuasion, and answering to the will of the people. We’ve heard it said that the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds of Iraq are too divided to form a lasting democracy. In fact, democratic federalism is the best hope for unifying a diverse population, because a federal constitutional system respects the rights and religious traditions of all citizens, while giving all minorities, including the Sunnis, a stake and a voice in the future of their country. It is true that the seeds of freedom have only recently been planted in Iraq—but democracy, when it grows, is not a fragile flower; it is a healthy, sturdy tree. Some observers also claim that America would be better off by cutting our losses and leaving Iraq now. This is a dangerous illusion, refuted with a simple question: Would the United States and other free nations be more safe, or less safe, with Zarqawi and bin Laden in control of Iraq, its people, and its resources? Having removed a dictator who hated free peoples, we will not stand by as a new set of killers, dedicated to the destruction of our own country, seizes control of Iraq by violence.

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There’s always a temptation, in the middle of a long struggle, to seek the quiet life, to escape the duties and problems of the world, and to hope the enemy grows weary of fanaticism and tired of murder. This would be a pleasant world, but it’s not the world we live in. The enemy is never tired, never sated, never content with yesterday’s brutality. This enemy considers every retreat of the civilized world as an invitation to greater violence. In Iraq, there is no peace without victory. We will keep our nerve and we will win that victory. … We’re encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform, to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights and choices of their own people. We’re standing with dissidents and exiles against oppressive regimes, because we know that the dissidents of today will be the democratic leaders of tomorrow. We’re making our case through public diplomacy, stating clearly and confidently our belief in self-determination, and the rule of law, and religious freedom, and equal rights for women, beliefs that are right and true in every land, and in every culture. As we do our part to confront radicalism, we know that the most vital work will be done within the Islamic world, itself. And this work has begun. Many Muslim scholars have already publicly condemned terrorism, often citing Chapter 5, Verse 32 of the Koran, which states that killing an innocent human being is like killing all humanity, and saving the life of one person is like saving all of humanity. After the attacks in London on July the 7th, an imam in the United Arab Emirates declared, ‘‘Whoever does such a thing is not a Muslim, nor a religious person.’’ The time has come for all responsible Islamic leaders to join in denouncing an ideology that exploits Islam for political ends, and defiles a noble faith. Many people of the Muslim faith are proving their commitment at great personal risk. Everywhere we have engaged the fight against extremism, Muslim allies have stood up and joined the fight, becoming partners in a vital cause. Afghan troops are in combat against Taliban remnants. Iraqi soldiers are sacrificing to defeat al Qaeda in their own country.… SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/200510063.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Chicago, Illinois, May 22, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: … This Saturday in Baghdad, the new Prime Minister of Iraq announced a national unity government. This is a free government under a democratic constitution, and its formation marks a victory for the cause of freedom in the Middle East. In three elections last year, millions of Iraqis cast their ballot in defiance of the terrorists. And now they have a government of their own choosing under a constitution that they drafted and they approved. As this new unity government takes office, it carries with it the hopes of the Iraqi nation, and the aspirations of freedom-loving people across a troubled region.

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The unity government has strong leaders that will represent all of the Iraqi people. I called them this weekend to congratulate them. I thanked them for being courageous and strong and standing for the belief that liberty will help transform their troubled nation. The new government is led by Prime Minister Maliki. He’s a Shia. He’s an Iraqi patriot who for years was part of the resistance to Saddam Hussein. He’s shown courage and wisdom by surrounding himself with strong leaders who are committed to serving all the people … The Iraqi people are blessed to have a leader like Prime Minister Maliki, and I’m proud to call him, ally and friend. The government is still a work in progress, and overcoming longstanding divisions will take time. Iraq’s new leaders know they have a great deal of work ahead to broaden the base of their government and to unite the people. They also understand that representing all Iraqis and not just narrow sectarian interests, they will be able to make a decisive break with the past and make a future of progress and opportunity for all their people a reality. The unity government must now seize its moment and pursue a common agenda for the future. This weekend, Prime Minister Maliki laid out his plan for a new Iraq. He promised to work for a sovereign Iraq that will assume responsibility for the security of its people. He committed himself to a free Iraq that will uphold international standards of human rights and respect the role of women in Iraqi society. He pledged to work for a prosperous Iraq that welcomes foreign investments and accelerates reconstruction and lays the foundations for economic growth and opportunity. He declared he would lead a transparent Iraq, where government is open and accountable, and corruption is not tolerated. And he vowed to work for a peaceful Iraq that is the enemy of terror, a friend to its neighbors, and a reliable partner in the community of nations. The unity government opens a new chapter in the relationship between the United States and Iraq. The new Iraqi government does not change America’s objectives or our commitment, but it will change how we achieve those objectives and how we honor our commitment. And the new Iraqi government—as the new Iraqi government grows in confidence and capability, America will play an increasingly supporting role. To take advantage of this moment of opportunity, the United States and our coalition partners will work with the new Iraqi government to adjust our methods and strengthen our mutual efforts to achieve victory over our common enemies. … Iraqis are determined to chart their own future. And now they have the leadership to do it. And this unity government deserves American support, and they will have it. Our nation has been through three difficult years in Iraq. And the way forward will bring more days of challenge and loss. The progress we’ve made has been hard-fought, and it’s been incremental. There have been setbacks and missteps—like Abu Ghraib—that were felt immediately and have been difficult to overcome. Yet we have now reached a turning point in the struggle between freedom and terror. The terrorists did not lay down their arms after three elections in Iraq, and they will continue to fight this new government. And we can expect the

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violence to continue, but something fundamental changed this weekend. The terrorists are now fighting a free and constitutional government. They’re at war with the people of Iraq. And the Iraqi people are determined to defeat this enemy, and so are Iraq’s new leaders, and so is the United States of America. For most Iraqis, a free, democratic and constitutional government will be a new experience. And for the people across the broader Middle East, a free Iraq will be an inspiration. Iraqis have done more than form a government; they have proved that the desire for liberty in the heart of the Middle East is for real. They’ve shown diverse people can come together and work out their differences and find a way forward. And they’ve demonstrated that democracy is the hope of the Middle East and the destiny of all mankind. Q. Good morning, Mr. President. My name is Robert Carter from Toronto, Canada, and my question is regarding border restrictions between our two countries. Given the impact on tourism, do you feel that it’s necessary to continue increasing border restrictions between Canada and the U.S.? THE PRESIDENT: What he’s referring to is, right after 9/11, the Congress passed legislation that said there will be a new—a border—an identification card between—travel between our countries. And you can understand why our nation reacted the way—I hope you can understand the way our nation reacted the way we did after 9/11. I mean, we were—we analyzed all aspects of our security. We were—we said we were going to do everything we can within the law to protect ourselves. And Congress passed some new laws to make sure that we knew who was coming in the country and who was leaving the country. And I supported those laws. And now we’re working with your government to make sure that the identification cards that will be used between our two borders are compatible not only with our needs, but your needs. I spoke to Prime Minister Harper about this subject. He’s very aware and worried about a identification card that would be difficult to get into the hands of Canadians and it would make it difficult for Canada to continue to attract conventions. And so to answer your question, yes, we ought to have a system that is compatible with both our countries’ needs. Q. If we were to be attacked by a biological weapon, or if there was an outbreak of the avian flu, would we be prepared? THE PRESIDENT: Good question. We are working to be prepared … … [The] first step is to recognize that it’s a possibility and start preparing, which we’re doing at the federal level. Yes, we’ve got a good strategy—now, whether or not it would work to perfection, you hope you never have to find out. One of the classic cases—one of the classic dilemmas we’re trying to resolve is that most—it’s against the law to put federal troops in to enforce the law. It’s posse comitatus, you know? I’m not a lawyer, but nevertheless, that’s what the lawyers tell me. However, states can use their Guard to do law enforcement activities. And the fundamental question is, if there’s an event big enough, should the federal government be able to prevent state authority—should there be an automatic declaration of a state of emergency that will enable me to rally federal troops to keep the law? We haven’t resolved that issue yet, but that’s one of the dilemmas on a catastrophic event that ends up exceeding the boundaries of—that would make it

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not a local event. But we’re working hard on it. We’ve spent a lot of time on pandemic flu, which, by the way, has got the same—a biological attack would have the same applications as to how you—how do you isolate the incident, how do you isolate the spread of disease, how do you rally local authorities to make the right decisions about public facilities.… SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060522-1.html

President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 27, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: … This is the first class to arrive at West Point after the attacks of September the 11th, 2001. Each of you came here in a time of war, knowing all the risks and dangers that come with wearing our nation’s uniform. And I want to thank you for your patriotism, your devotion to duty, your courageous decision to serve. America is grateful and proud of the men and women of West Point. West Point has adapted to prepare you for the war you’re about to enter. Since the attacks of September the 11th, 2001, this Academy has established a new Combating Terrorism Center, a new minor in Terrorism Studies, with new courses in counter-insurgency operations, intelligence, and homeland security, and winning the peace. West Point has expanded Arabic language training, has hired new faculty with expertise in Islamic law and culture, brought in members of the 101st and 82nd Airborne to train you and share their experiences on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan. And each of you endured grueling Saturday training events where you practiced identifying IEDs, conducting convoy operations and running checkpoints. By changing to meet the new threats, West Point has given you the skills you will need in Afghanistan and Iraq—and for the long war with Islamic radicalism that will be the focus of much of your military careers. This Academy went through a similar period of change six decades ago, at the end of World War II. Some of West Point’s greatest graduates—men like Eisenhower and Bradley, Patton and MacArthur—had just brought our nation victory in Europe and Japan. Yet, almost immediately, a new threat appeared on the horizon—the threat of Imperial Communism. And West Point, like America, had to prepare for a long struggle with a new adversary, one that would require the determination of generations of Americans. In the early years of that struggle, freedom’s victory was not obvious or assured. In 1947, communist forces were threatening Greece and Turkey, the reconstruction of Germany was faltering, mass starvation was setting in across Europe. In 1948, Czechoslovakia fell to communism; France and Italy appeared to be headed for the same fate, and Berlin was blockaded … In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon … and weeks later, communist forces won their revolution in China … And in the summer of 1950, seven North Korean divisions poured across the border into South Korea.… Fortunately, we had a President named Harry Truman, who recognized the threat, took bold action to confront it, and laid the foundation for freedom’s victory in the Cold War.

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President Truman set a clear doctrine. In a speech to Congress, he called for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, and announced a new doctrine that would guide American policy throughout the Cold War. He told the Congress: ‘‘It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’’ With this new doctrine, and with the aid to back it up, Greece and Turkey were saved from communism, and the Soviet expansion into Southern Europe and the Middle East was stopped. President Truman acted boldly to confront new adversaries. When Stalin tested America’s resolve with a blockade of Berlin, President Truman launched the Berlin Airlift … … In Asia, his administration led the effort to help Japan change from a nation that had launched a surprise attack on America into a thriving democracy and a steadfast ally. In Europe, he launched the Marshall Plan … By the actions he took, the institutions he built, the alliances he forged and the doctrines he set down, President Truman laid the foundations for America’s victory in the Cold War.… Today, at the start of a new century, we are again engaged in a war unlike any our nation has fought before—and like Americans in Truman’s day, we are laying the foundations for victory. The enemies we face today are different in many ways from the enemy we faced in the Cold War. In the Cold War, we deterred Soviet aggression through a policy of mutually assured destruction. Unlike the Soviet Union, the terrorist enemies we face today hide in caves and shadows—and emerge to attack free nations from within. The terrorists have no borders to protect, or capital to defend. They cannot be deterred—but they will be defeated. America will fight the terrorists on every battlefront, and we will not rest until this threat to our country has been removed. While there are real differences between today’s war and the Cold War, there are also many important similarities. Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian aims. Like the Cold War, our enemies are dismissive of free peoples, claiming that men and women who live in liberty are weak and lack the resolve to defend our way of life. Like the Cold War, our enemies believe that the innocent can be murdered to serve a political vision. And like the Cold War, they’re seeking weapons of mass murder that would allow them to deliver catastrophic destruction to our country. If our enemies succeed in acquiring such weapons, they will not hesitate to use them, which means they would pose a threat to America as great as the Soviet Union. Against such an enemy, there is only one effective response: We will never back down, we will never give in, and we will never accept anything less than complete victory. In this new war, we have forged new alliances, and transformed old ones, for the challenges of a new century. After our nation was attacked, we formed the largest coalition in history to fight the war on terror. More than 90 nations are cooperating in a global campaign to dry up terrorist financing, to hunt down terrorist operatives, and bring terrorist leaders to justice. Nations like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that once turned a blind eye to terror are now

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helping lead the fight against it. And since September the 11th, 2001, our coalition has captured or killed al Qaeda managers and operatives in over two dozen countries, and disrupted a number of serious al Qaeda terrorist plots, including plots to attack targets inside the United States. Our nation is more secure because we have rallied the world to confront this threat to civilization. The greatest threat we face is the danger of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. To confront this danger, we launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, a coalition of more than 70 nations that are working together to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction … from falling into terrorist hands. And building on the legacy of Harry Truman, we launched the most dramatic transformation of the NATO Alliance since its founding in 1949. Working with allies, we created a new ‘‘NATO Response Force’’ that will allow NATO to deploy rapid reaction forces on short notice anywhere in the world. And together we transformed NATO from a defensive alliance focused on protecting Europe from Soviet tank invasion into a dynamic alliance that is now operating across the world in the support of democracy and peace. In this new war, we’ve undertaken the most sweeping reorganization of the federal government since the start of the Cold War. We created a new Department of Homeland Security … the new Director of National Intelligence … transformed the FBI into an agency whose primary focus is stopping terrorism, and reorganized the Department of Justice to help us meet this new threat. We passed the Patriot Act, which broke down barriers that prevented law enforcement and intelligence agencies from sharing vital information on terrorist threats. At the Department of Defense, we created a new Northern Command responsible for homeland defense, a new Strategic Command responsible for defending America against long-range attacks. We transformed the Special Operations Command, more than doubling its budget, adding thousands of new troops, and making it the lead command in the global war on terror. And we’re undertaking the largest transformation of the Army in more than a hundred years. Since the turn of the last century, the Army has been organized around the division structure designed by Napoleon. Today, we’re replacing that division structure with a 21st century Army built around ‘‘modular’’ brigade combat teams that will be interchangeable and available to work for any division commander. These brigades will make our Army faster and lighter, and more agile and more lethal—and it will make you more effective in the defense of freedom. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060527-1.html

President George W. Bush Meets with Supporters of the U.S. Military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Roosevelt Room, June 26, 2006 EXCERPTED There’s an organization called America Supports You. I would hope my fellow citizens would like on the webpage, AmericaSupportsYou.mil, to determine how you can help support our troops if you so desire. I would urge Americans

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to do that, and around the table are leaders of the different organizations that make up this umbrella group. We’ve heard from people that are helping families of the wounded. We’re talking to people who are using their position in different fields, like the entertainment field, to go over and provide hope for our troops. We’re talking to moms and wives of those who have volunteered to serve our country. … I told the folks here that the politics in Washington can be rough. But make no mistake about it, I am determined to succeed. And we will implement a plan to achieve victory, which is necessary, and that they need to tell the troops that no matter how tough it looks here in the nation’s capital, that I know we’re doing the right thing, and I know we will win. Q. Mr. President, General Casey saw you on Friday, and it’s been reported that he’s talked about withdrawing two brigades from Iraq by this year. Can you tell us what he recommended to you? THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I did meet with General Casey, and I met with him because it’s very important for me, as well as Secretary Rumsfeld, to meet with our commander on the ground. I’ve told the American people our commanders will be making the decisions as to how to achieve victory, and General Casey, of course, is the lead person. So we had a good visit with him. And we talked about a lot of things. The first thing we talked about was the joint operations with the Iraqi forces to secure Baghdad and how that’s going. We talked about the actions we’re taking in Ramadi … [W]e’re trying to make sure Ramadi does not become a safe haven for al Qaeda. And so he explained to me the tactics on the ground, what we’re doing to secure that city and to run the al Qaeda-types out. We talked about the Iraqi training mission. And as you well know, our standards are, as Iraqis stand up, the coalition will be able to stand down. We talked about that kind of progress. But in terms of our troop presence there, that decision will be made by General Casey, as well as the sovereign government of Iraq, based upon conditions on the ground. And one of the things that General Casey assured me of is that, whatever recommendation he makes, it will be aimed toward achieving victory. And that’s what we want. And victory means a free government that is able to sustain itself, defend itself; it’s a government that will be an ally in the war on terror. It’s a government that will be able to fight off al Qaeda and its desires to have a safe haven. And so I did visit with General Casey, and I came away once again with my trust in that man. I’ve told the people here around the table that the decisions that I will make will be based upon the recommendations of people like General George Casey. Q. Sir, several news organizations have reported about a program that allows the administration to look into the bank records of certain suspected terrorists. My questions are twofold: One, why have you not gone to Congress to ask for authorization for this program, five years after it started? And two, with respect, if neither the courts, nor the legislature is allowed to know about these programs, how can you feel confident the checks and balances system works? THE PRESIDENT: Congress was briefed. And what we did was fully authorized under the law. And the disclosure of this program is disgraceful. We’re at

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war with a bunch of people who want to hurt the United States of America, and for people to leak that program, and for a newspaper to publish it does great harm to the United States of America. What we were doing was the right thing. Congress was aware of it, and we were within the law to do so. The American people expect this government to protect our constitutional liberties and, at the same time, make sure we understand what the terrorists are trying to do. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the government be robust in tracing money. If you want to figure out what the terrorists are doing, you try to follow their money. And that’s exactly what we’re doing. And the fact that a newspaper disclosed it makes it harder to win this war on terror. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060626-2.html

President George W. Bush Discusses Foreign Policy During a Visit to the State Department, Washington, D.C., August 14, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: Today I met with members of my national security team, both here at the State Department and at the Pentagon.… During those discussions we talked about the need to transform our military to meet the threats of the 21st century. We discussed the global war on terror. We discussed the situation on the ground in three fronts of the global war on terror—in Lebanon, and Iraq, and Afghanistan. Friday’s U.N. Security Council resolution on Lebanon is an important step forward that will help bring an end to the violence. The resolution calls for a robust international force to deploy to the southern part of the country to help Lebanon’s legitimate armed forces restore the sovereignty of its democratic government over all Lebanese territory. As well, the resolution is intended to stop Hezbollah from acting as a state within the state. We’re now working with our international partners to turn the words of this resolution into action. We must help people in both Lebanon and Israel return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives without fear of renewed violence and terror. America recognizes that civilians in Lebanon and Israel have suffered from the current violence, and we recognize that responsibility for this suffering lies with Hezbollah. It was an unprovoked attack by Hezbollah on Israel that started this conflict. Hezbollah terrorists targeted Israeli civilians with daily rocket attacks. Hezbollah terrorists used Lebanese civilians as human shields, sacrificing the innocent in an effort to protect themselves from Israeli response. Responsibility for the suffering of the Lebanese people also lies with Hezbollah’s state sponsors, Iran and Syria. The regime in Iran provides Hezbollah with financial support, weapons, and training. Iran has made clear that it seeks the destruction of Israel. We can only imagine how much more dangerous this conflict would be if Iran had the nuclear weapon it seeks. Syria is another state sponsor of Hezbollah. Syria allows Iranian weapons to pass through its territory into Lebanon. Syria permits Hezbollah’s leaders to operate out of Damascus and gives political support to Hezbollah’s cause.

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Syria supports Hezbollah because it wants to undermine Lebanon’s democratic government and regain its position of dominance in the country. That would be a great tragedy for the Lebanese people and for the cause of peace in the Middle East. Hezbollah and its foreign sponsors also seek to undermine the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Hezbollah terrorists kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Hamas kidnapped another Israeli soldier for a reason. Hezbollah and Hamas reject the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. Both groups want to disrupt the progress being made toward that vision by Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas and others in the region. We must not allow terrorists to prevent elected leaders from working together toward a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East. The conflict in Lebanon is part of a broader struggle between freedom and terror that is unfolding across the region. For decades, American policy sought to achieve peace in the Middle East by promoting stability in the Middle East. Yet the lack of freedom in the region meant anger and resentment grew, radicalism thrived and terrorists found willing recruits. We saw the consequences on September the 11th, 2001, when terrorists brought death and destruction to our country, killing nearly 3,000 of our citizens. Some say that America caused the current instability in the Middle East by pursuing a forward strategy of freedom, yet history shows otherwise. We didn’t talk much about freedom or the freedom agenda in the Middle East before September the 11th, 2001; or before al Qaeda first attacked the World Trade Center and blew up our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s; or before Hezbollah killed hundreds of Americans in Beirut and Islamic radicals held American hostages in Iran in the 1980s. History is clear: The freedom agenda did not create the terrorists or their ideology. But the freedom agenda will help defeat them both. Some say that the violence and instability we see today means that the people of this troubled region are not ready for democracy. I disagree. Over the past five years, people across the Middle East have bravely defied the car bombers and assassins to show the world that they want to live in liberty. We see the universal desire for liberty in the 12 million Iraqis who faced down the terrorists to cast their ballots, and elected a free government under a democratic constitution. We see the universal desire for liberty in 8 million Afghans who lined up to vote for the first democratic government in the long history of their country. We see the universal desire for liberty in the Lebanese people who took to the streets to demand their freedom and helped drive Syrian forces out of their country. The problem in the Middle East today is not that people lack the desire for freedom. The problem is that young democracies that they have established are still vulnerable to terrorists and their sponsors. One vulnerability is that many of the new democratic governments in the region have not yet established effective control over all their territory. In both Lebanon and Iraq, elected governments are contending with rogue armed groups that are seeking to undermine and destabilize them. In Lebanon, Hezbollah declared war on Lebanon’s neighbor, Israel, without the

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knowledge of the elected government in Beirut. In Iraq, al Qaeda and death squads engage in brutal violence to undermine the unity government. And in both these countries, Iran is backing armed groups in the hope of stopping democracy from taking hold. The message of this administration is clear: America will stay on the offense against al Qaeda. Iran must stop its support for terror. And the leaders of these armed groups must make a choice: If they want to participate in the political life of their countries, they must disarm. Elected leaders cannot have one foot in the camp of democracy and one foot in the camp of terror. … we’ll continue to support reformers inside and outside governments who are working to build the institutions of liberty. We’ll continue to confront terrorist organizations and their sponsors who destroy innocent lives. We’ll continue to work for the day when a democratic Israel and a democratic Palestine are neighbors in a peaceful and secure Middle East. Q. Despite what you’ve just said, there is a perception, a global perception, certainly in the Arab media and in many Western media, as well, that Hezbollah is really a winner here because they have proven that they could, as a guerrilla force, withstand the Israeli army. They have been the sole source of humanitarian aid to many of the Lebanese people in the south. So they’ve improved their position politically within Lebanon, and militarily, and globally. They’ve gotten an aura of being able to stand up for so long against Israel. How do you combat that, and the perception that we settled for less than we originally wanted in the U.N. resolution, a less robust force? And what actions can the United States or this international force take if Iran, for instance, tries to rearm Hezbollah? THE PRESIDENT: Yes. First of all, if I were Hezbollah I’d be claiming victory, too. But the people around the region and the world need to take a step back and recognize that Hezbollah’s action created a very strong reaction that, unfortunately, caused some people to lose their life, innocent people to lose their life. But on the other hand, it was Hezbollah that caused the destruction. People have got to understand—and it will take time … for people to see the truth—that Hezbollah hides behind innocent civilians as they attack. What’s really interesting is a mind-set—is the mind-sets of this crisis. Israel, when they aimed at a target and killed innocent citizens, were upset. Their society was aggrieved. When Hezbollah’s rockets killed innocent Israelis they celebrated. I think when people really take a look at the type of mentality that celebrates the loss of innocent life, they’ll reject that type of mentality. And so, Hezbollah, of course, has got a fantastic propaganda machine and they’re claiming victories and—but how can you claim victory when at one time you were a state within a state, safe within southern Lebanon, and now you’re going to be replaced by a Lebanese army and an international force? And that’s what we’re now working on, is to get the international force in southern Lebanon. None of this would have happened, by the way, had we—had 1559, Resolution 1559 been fully implemented. Now is the time to get it implemented.… SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060814-3.html

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President George W. Bush, Press Conference, White House Conference Center Briefing Room, August 21, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: … America is making a long-term commitment to help the people of Lebanon because we believe every person deserves to live in a free, open society that respects the rights of all. We reject the killing of innocents to achieve a radical and violent agenda. The terrorists and their state sponsors, Iran and Syria, have a much darker vision. They’re working to thwart the efforts of the Lebanese people to break free from foreign domination and build their own democratic future. The terrorists and their sponsors are not going to succeed. The Lebanese people have made it clear they want to live in freedom. And now it’s up to their friends and allies to help them do so. Q. More than 3,500 Iraqis were killed last month, the highest civilian monthly toll since the war began. Are you disappointed with the lack of progress by Iraq’s unity government in bringing together the sectarian and ethnic groups? THE PRESIDENT: No, I am aware that extremists and terrorists are doing everything they can to prevent Iraq’s democracy from growing stronger. That’s what I’m aware of. And, therefore, we have a plan to help them— ‘‘them,’’ the Iraqis—achieve their objectives. Part of the plan is political; that is the help the Maliki government work on reconciliation and to work on rehabilitating the community. The other part is, of course, security. And I have given our commanders all the flexibility they need to adjust tactics to be able to help the Iraqi government defeat those who want to thwart the ambitions of the people. And that includes a very robust security plan for Baghdad. … I hear a lot of talk about civil war. I’m concerned about that, of course, and I’ve talked to a lot of people about it. And what I’ve found from my talks are that the Iraqis want a unified country, and that the Iraqi leadership is determined to thwart the efforts of the extremists and the radicals and al Qaeda, and that the security forces remain united behind the government. And one thing is clear: The Iraqi people are showing incredible courage. There’s a lot of people—good, decent people, saying, withdraw now. They’re absolutely wrong. It would be a huge mistake for this country. If you think problems are tough now, imagine what it would be like if the United States leaves before this government has a chance to defend herself, govern herself, and listen to the—and answer to the will of the people. Q. Iran has indicated that it will defy the U.N. on nuclear enrichment. It’s been holding military exercises, sending weapons and money to Hezbollah. Is Tehran’s influence in the region growing, despite your efforts to curb it? THE PRESIDENT: … Iran is obviously part of the—part of the problem. They sponsor Hezbollah. They encourage a radical brand of Islam. Imagine how difficult this issue would be if Iran had a nuclear weapon. And so, therefore, it’s up to the international community, including the United States, to work in concert to—for effective diplomacy. And that begins at the United Nations Security Council. Q. … You’ve continually cited the elections, the new government, its progress in Iraq, and yet the violence has gotten worse in certain areas. You’ve

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had to go to Baghdad again. Is it not time for a new strategy? And if not, why not? THE PRESIDENT: … the Pentagon is constantly adjusting tactics because they have the flexibility from the White House to do so. Q. I’m talking about strategy— THE PRESIDENT: The strategy is to help the Iraqi people achieve their objectives and their dreams, which is a democratic society. That’s the strategy. The tactics—now, either you say, yes, its important we stay there and get it done, or we leave. We’re not leaving, so long as I’m the President. That would be a huge mistake. It would send an unbelievably terrible signal to reformers across the region. It would say we’ve abandoned our desire to change the conditions that create terror. It would give the terrorists a safe haven from which to launch attacks. It would embolden Iran. It would embolden extremists. No, we’re not leaving. The strategic objective is to help this government succeed. That’s the strategic—and not only to help the government—the reformers in Iraq succeed, but to help the reformers across the region succeed to fight off the elements of extremism. The tactics are which change. Now, if you say, are you going to change your strategic objective, it means you’re leaving before the mission is complete. And we’re not going to leave before the mission is complete. I agree with General Abizaid: We leave before the mission is done, the terrorists will follow us here. And so we have changed tactics. Our commanders have got the flexibility necessary to change tactics on the ground, starting with Plan Baghdad. And that’s when we moved troops from Mosul into Baghdad and replaced them with the Stryker Brigade, so we increased troops during this time of instability. Q. You keep—you keep saying that you don’t want to leave. But is your strategy to win working? Even if you don’t want to leave? You’ve gone into Baghdad before, these things have happened before. THE PRESIDENT: If I didn’t think it would work, I would change—our commanders would recommend changing the strategy. They believe it will work. It takes time to defeat these people. The Maliki government has been in power for less than six months.… Obviously, I wish the violence would go down, but not as much as the Iraqi citizens would wish the violence would go down. But, incredibly enough, they show great courage, and they want our help. And any sign that says we’re going to leave before the job is done simply emboldens terrorists and creates a certain amount of doubt for people so they won’t take the risk necessary to help a civil society evolve in the country. This is a campaign—I’m sure they’re watching the campaign carefully. There are a lot of good, decent people saying, get out now; vote for me, I will do everything I can to, I guess, cut off money is what they’ll try to do to get our troops out. It’s a big mistake. It would be wrong, in my judgment, for us to leave before the mission is complete in Iraq. Q. When you talked today about the violence in Baghdad, first you mentioned extremists, radicals, and then al Qaeda. It seems that al Qaeda and foreign fighters are much less of a problem there, and that it really is Iraqi versus Iraqi. And when we heard about your meeting the other day with experts and so forth, some of the reporting out of that said you were frustrated, you were

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surprised. And your spokesman said, no, you’re determined. But frustration seems like a very real emotion. Why wouldn’t you be frustrated, sir, about what’s happening? THE PRESIDENT: I’m not—I do remember the meeting; I don’t remember being surprised. I’m not sure what they meant by that. Q. About the lack of gratitude among the Iraqi people. THE PRESIDENT: Oh. No, I think—first of all, to the first part of your question, if you look back at the words of Zarqawi before he was brought to justice, he made it clear that the intent of their tactics in Iraq was to create civil strife. In other words, look at what he said. He said, let’s kill Shia to get Shia to seek revenge, and therefore, to create this kind of—hopefully, a cycle of violence. Secondly, it’s pretty clear that at least the evidence indicates that the bombing of the shrine was an al Qaeda plot, all intending to create sectarian violence. No, al Qaeda is still very active in Iraq. As a matter of fact some of the more—I would guess, I would surmise that some of the more spectacular bombings are done by al Qaeda suiciders. No question there’s sectarian violence, as well. And the challenge is to provide a security plan such that a political process can go forward.… Look, eventually Iraq will succeed because the Iraqis will see to it that they succeed. And our job is to help them succeed. That’s our job. Our job is to help their forces be better equipped, to help their police be able to deal with these extremists, and to help their government succeed. Q. But are you frustrated, sir? THE PRESIDENT: Frustrated? Sometimes I’m frustrated. Rarely surprised. Sometimes I’m happy. This is—but war is not a time of joy. These aren’t joyous times. These are challenging times, and they’re difficult times, and they’re straining the psyche of our country. I understand that. You know, nobody likes to see innocent people die. Nobody wants to turn on their TV on a daily basis and see havoc wrought by terrorists. And our question is, do we have the capacity and the desire to spread peace by confronting these terrorists, and supporting those who want to live in liberty? That’s the question. And my answer to that question is, we must. We owe it to future generations to do so. Q. Mr. President, as you have reminded us a number of times, it was Hezbollah that started the confrontation between Israel and Lebanon. But you were supportive of the holding off of any kind of cease-fire until Israel had a chance to clear out the Hezbollah weapons. By all accounts, they did not exactly succeed in doing that. And by all accounts, the Lebanese army, as it moved into southern Lebanon, had a wink-and-a-nod arrangement with Hezbollah not to disturb anything, to just leave things as they are, a situation not unknown in the Middle East. Do you demand that the peacekeeping force, if and when it gets up and running, disarm Hezbollah? THE PRESIDENT: The truth of the matter is, if 1559, that’s the United Nations Security Council resolution number, had been fully implemented, we wouldn’t be in the situation we were in to begin with. There will be another resolution coming out of the United Nations giving further instructions to the international force. First things first, is to get the rules of engagement clear, so that the force will be robust to help the Lebanese.

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One thing is for certain—is that when this force goes into help Lebanon, Hezbollah won’t have that safe haven, or that kind of freedom to run in Lebanon’s southern border. In other words, there’s an opportunity to create a cushion, a security cushion. Hopefully, over time, Hezbollah will disarm. You can’t have a democracy with an armed political party willing to bomb its neighbor without the consent of its government, or deciding, well, let’s create enough chaos and discord by lobbing rockets. And so the reality is, in order for Lebanon to succeed—and we want Lebanon’s democracy to succeed—the process is going to—the Lebanese government is eventually going to have to deal with Hezbollah. Q. But it’s the status quo if there’s no disarming. THE PRESIDENT: Not really. I mean, yes, eventually, you’re right. But in the meantime, there will be a—there’s a security zone, something to—where the Lebanese army and the UNIFIL force are more robust, [the] UNIFIL force can create a security zone between Lebanon and Israel. That would be helpful. But, ultimately, you’re right. Your question is, shouldn’t Hezbollah disarm, and ultimately, they should. And it’s necessary, for the Lebanese government to succeed. … [W]e want the Siniora government to succeed. Part of our aid package is going to be help strengthen the army of Lebanon. Q. A lot of the consequences you mentioned for pulling out (of Iraq) seem like maybe they never would have been there if we hadn’t gone in. How do you square all of that? THE PRESIDENT: I square it because, imagine a world in which you had Saddam Hussein who had the capacity to make a weapon of mass destruction, who was paying suiciders to kill innocent life, who would—who had relations with Zarqawi. Imagine what the world would be like with him in power. The idea is to try to help change the Middle East. Now, look, part of the reason we went into Iraq was—the main reason we went into Iraq at the time was we thought he had weapons of mass destruction. It turns out he didn’t, but he had the capacity to make weapons of mass destruction. But I also talked about the human suffering in Iraq, and I also talked the need to advance a freedom agenda. And so my question—my answer to your question is, is that, imagine a world in which Saddam Hussein was there, stirring up even more trouble in a part of the world that had so much resentment and so much hatred that people came and killed 3,000 of our citizens. You know, I’ve heard this theory about everything was just fine until we arrived, and kind of ‘‘we’re going to stir up the hornet’s nest’’ theory. It just doesn’t hold water, as far as I’m concerned. The terrorists attacked us and killed 3,000 of our citizens before we started the freedom agenda in the Middle East. Q. What did Iraq have to do with that? THE PRESIDENT: What did Iraq have to do with what? Q. The attack on the World Trade Center? THE PRESIDENT: Nothing, except for it’s part of—and nobody has ever suggested in this administration that Saddam Hussein ordered the attack. Iraq

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was a—the lesson of September the 11th is, take threats before they fully materialize. Nobody has ever suggested that the attacks of September the 11th were ordered by Iraq. I have suggested, however, that resentment and the lack of hope create the breeding grounds for terrorists who are willing to use suiciders to kill to achieve an objective. I have made that case. And one way to defeat that—defeat resentment is with hope. And the best way to do hope is through a form of government. Now, I said going into Iraq that we’ve got to take these threats seriously before they fully materialize. I saw a threat. I fully believe it was the right decision to remove Saddam Hussein, and I fully believe the world is better off without him. Now, the question is how do we succeed in Iraq? And you don’t succeed by leaving before the mission is complete, like some in this political process are suggesting. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see President Bush’s Address to the American Legion National Convention, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 31, 2006 (http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060831-1.html)

President George W. Bush Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror, Cobb Galleria Centre, Atlanta, Georgia, September 7, 2006 I have come here to Atlanta to continue a series of speeches marking the fifth anniversary of the September the 11th, 2001 attacks … Today I’ll deliver a progress report on the steps we have taken since 9/11 to protect the American people, steps we’ve taken to go on the offense against the enemy, and steps we are taking to win this war on terror. In Atlanta, you know the pain of terrorism firsthand. This summer, you marked the 10th anniversary of the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park. That was the act of one madman. Next Monday is the fifth anniversary of an attack on our nation, and on that day, we awoke to a new kind of terrorism. Instead of a localized strike, we faced multiple attacks by a network of sophisticated and suicidal terrorists. In the years since, we’ve come to learn more about our enemies—we learned more about their dark and distorted vision of Islam. We learned about their plan to build a radical Islamic empire stretching from Spain to Indonesia. We learned about their dream to kill more Americans on an even more devastating scale.… Over the past five years, we have waged an unprecedented campaign against terror at home and abroad, and that campaign has succeeded in protecting the homeland. At the same time, we’ve seen our enemies strike in Britain, Spain, India, Turkey, Russia, Indonesia, Jordan, Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries. We’ve seen that the extremists have not given up on their dreams to strike our nation. Just last month, police and intelligence officers from Great Britain, with the help of the United States and other allies … foiled a suicide plot to blow up passenger planes on their way to the United States. Many Americans look at these events and ask the same question: Five years after 9/11, are we safer? The answer is, yes, America is safer. We are safer

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because we’ve taken action to protect the homeland. We are safer because we are on the offense against our enemies overseas. We’re safer because of the skill and sacrifice of the brave Americans who defend our people. Yet five years after 9/11, America still faces determined enemies, and we will not be safe until those enemies are finally defeated. One way to assess whether we’re safer is to look at what we have done to fix the problems that the 9/11 attacks revealed. And so today I’ll deliver a progress report. The information about the attacks in this report is largely drawn from the work of the 9/11 Commission and other investigations of the terrorist attacks. I’ll begin by looking back at four key stages of the 9/11 plot, the gaps in our defenses that each stage exposed, and the ways we’ve addressed those gaps to make this country safer. In the first key stage of the 9/11 plot, al Qaeda conceived and planned the attacks from abroad. In the summer of 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa from Afghanistan … [a]nd declared war on the United States. A month later, the Taliban seized control of Kabul, and formed an alliance with al Qaeda. The Taliban permitted bin Laden to operate a system of training camps in the country, which ultimately instructed more than 10,000 in terrorist tactics … With his fellow al Qaeda leaders, Osama bin Laden used his safe haven to prepare a series of attacks on America and on the civilized world. In August 1998, they carried out their first big strike—the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, which killed more than 200 people and wounded thousands. Shortly after the embassy bombings, bin Laden approved another attack. This one was called ‘‘the planes operation.’’ Our intelligence agencies believe it was suggested by a fellow terrorist named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—or KSM. KSM’s plan was to hijack commercial airliners and to crash them into buildings in the United States.… The ‘‘planes operation’’ would become the 9/11 plot—and by the middle of 1999, KSM was at work recruiting suicide operatives to hijack the airplanes. The first stage of the 9/11 plot exposed serious flaws in America’s approach to terrorism. Most important, it showed that by allowing states to give safe haven to terrorist networks that we made a grave mistake. So after 9/11, I set forth a new doctrine: Nations that harbor or support terrorists are equally guilty as the terrorists, and will be held to account. And the Taliban found out what we meant. With Afghan allies, we removed the Taliban from power, and we closed down the al Qaeda training camps. Five years later, Taliban and al Qaeda remnants are desperately trying to retake control of that country. They will fail. They will fail because the Afghan people have tasted freedom. They will fail because their vision is no match for a democracy … because they are no match for the military forces of a free Afghanistan, a NATO Alliance, and the United States of America. Our offensive against the terrorists includes far more than military might. We use financial tools to make it harder for them to raise money. We’re using diplomatic pressure, and our intelligence operations are used to disrupt the day-to-day functions of al Qaeda. Because we’re on the offense, it is more difficult for al Qaeda to transfer money through the international banking system. Because we’re on the offense, al Qaeda can no longer communicate

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openly without fear of destruction. And because we’re on the offense, al Qaeda can no longer move widely without fearing for their lives. I learned a lot of lessons on 9/11, and one lesson is this: In order to protect this country, we will keep steady pressure, unrelenting pressure on al Qaeda and its associates. We will deny them safe haven; we will find them and we will bring them to justice. In the second key stage of the 9/11 plot, KSM and bin Laden identified, trained, and deployed operatives to the United States. According to the 9/11 Commission, two of the first suicide hijackers to join the plot were men named Hazmi and Mihdhar. KSM’s plan was to send these two men to infiltrate the United States and train as pilots, so they could fly the hijacked planes into buildings. Both operatives attended a special training camp in Afghanistan, and then traveled to Malaysia and Thailand to prepare for their trip to America.… And from Thailand, the two men flew to Los Angeles in January 2000. There they began carrying out the plot from inside our nation. They made phone calls to planners of the attack overseas, and they awaited the arrival of the other killers. Our intelligence community picked up some of this information. CIA analysts saw links between Mihdhar and al Qaeda, and officers tracked Mihdhar to Malaysia.… Yet, at the time, there was no consolidated terrorist watchlist available to all federal agencies, and state and local governments. So, even though intelligence officers suspected that both men were dangerous, the information was not readily accessible to American law enforcement—and the operatives slipped into our country. Since 9/11, we’ve addressed the gaps in our defenses that these operatives exploited. We’ve upgraded technology; we’ve added layers of security to correct weaknesses in our immigration and visa systems. Today, visa applicants like Hazmi or Mihdhar would have to appear for face-to-face for interviews. They would be fingerprinted and screened against an extensive database of known or suspected terrorists. And when they arrived on American soil, they would be checked again to make sure their fingerprints matched the fingerprints on their visas. Those procedures did not exist before 9/11. With these steps we made it harder for these—people like these guys to infiltrate our country. Nine-Eleven also revealed the need for a coordinated approach to terrorist watchlists. So we established common criteria for posting terrorists on a consolidated terrorist watchlist that is now widely available across federal, state, and local jurisdictions.… By putting terrorists’ names on a consolidated watchlist, we’ve improved our ability to monitor and to track and detain operatives before they can strike. Another top priority after 9/11 was improving our ability to monitor terrorist communications.… At my direction, the National Security Agency created the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Before 9/11, our intelligence professionals found it difficult to monitor international communications such as those between the al Qaeda operatives secretly in the United States and planners of the 9/11 attacks. The Terrorist Surveillance Program helps protect Americans by allowing us to track terrorist communications, so we can learn about threats like the 9/11 plot before it is too late.

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Last year, details of the Terrorist Surveillance Program were leaked to the news media, and the program was then challenged in court. That challenge was recently upheld by a federal district judge in Michigan. My administration strongly disagrees with the ruling. We are appealing it, and we believe our appeal will be successful. Yet a series of protracted legal challenges would put a heavy burden on this critical and vital program. The surest way to keep the program is to get explicit approval from the United States Congress. So today I’m calling on the Congress to promptly pass legislation providing additional authority for the Terrorist Surveillance Program, along with broader reforms in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. When FISA was passed in 1978, there was no widely accessible Internet, and almost all calls were made on fixed landlines. Since then, the nature of communications has changed, quite dramatically.… In the third key stage of the 9/11 plot, the rest of the 19 al Qaeda operatives arrived in the United States.… During this stage, law enforcement and intelligence authorities failed to share the insights they were learning about the 9/11 plot. For example, an FBI intelligence analyst working at the CIA came across information that raised her suspicions about Hazmi and Mihdhar. But she did not relay her concerns to FBI criminal investigators because of a wall—or ‘‘the wall’’ that had developed over the years between law enforcement and intelligence. … [T]hroughout the government, there was an assumption that law enforcement and intelligence were legally prohibited from sharing vital information. At one point, key officials from the CIA, the intelligence branch of the FBI, the criminal branch of the FBI were all sitting around the same table in New York, but they believed that ‘‘the wall’’ prohibited them from telling each other what they knew about Hazmi and Mihdhar, and so they never put the pieces together. By the summer of 2001, intelligence about a possible terrorist attack was increasing. In July, an FBI agent in Phoenix noted that a large number of suspicious men were attending flight schools in Arizona. He speculated that this activity might be part of a bin Laden plan to attack inside the United States. The following month, the FBI Field Office in Minneapolis began an investigation into Moussaoui. He was soon arrested on immigration charges, and Minneapolis agents sought a FISA warrant to search his computer. FBI Headquarters turned them down, saying that the case did not justify a FISA request because there was not enough intelligence tying Moussaoui to a foreign power. The FBI later learned that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan—but the information didn’t arrive until September the 13th. It is clear, after 9/11, something needed to be done to the system, something needed to be changed to protect the American people. And it is clear to me that this started with transforming the FBI to ensure that it would effectively and quickly respond to potential terrorists’ attacks. And so now the top priority of the FBI, since 9/11—the culture of that important agency, full of decent people, has changed. The top priority is to protect the American people from terrorist attack. The Bureau has hired large numbers of counterterrorism agents and analysts. They’re focusing resources on what they need to

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do to protect America. They created a unified National Security Branch to coordinate terrorist investigations. They expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces. And the Bureau is submitting more FISA requests in terrorist cases. In other words, they understand the challenge. And the FBI is changing to meet those challenges.… At every level, America’s law enforcement officers now have a clear goal—to identify, locate, and stop terrorists before they can kill people. Since the attacks, we’ve also worked with Congress to do something about that wall that prevented intelligence and criminal investigators from talking to each other. The wall made no sense. It reflected an old way of thinking. And so I called upon Congress to pass … legislation that would tear down the wall … called the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act has increased the flow of information within our government and it has helped break up terrorist cells in the United States of America.… We created the National Counterterrorism Center, where law enforcement and intelligence personnel work side-by-side in the same headquarters. This center hosts secure video teleconferences every day that allow for seamless communication among the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies … We created the position of the Director of National Intelligence to operate the intelligence community as a single unified enterprise. We set up the Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains the government’s master list of suspected terrorists, and helps get this information in the hands of state and local law enforcement. Today, a police officer who stops a driver for a routine traffic violation can access terrorist watchlists and be automatically directed to the Terrorist Screening Center if there’s a match. We’ve learned the lessons of September the 11th. We’re changing how people can work together. We’re modernizing the system. We’re working to connect the dots to stop the terrorists from hurting America again. The fourth and final stage of the 9/11 plot came on the morning of the attack. Starting around 6:45 A.M., the 19 hijackers, including Hazmi and Mihdhar, checked in, cleared security, and boarded commercial jets bound for the West Coast. Some of the hijackers were flagged by the passenger prescreening system. But because the security rules at the time focused on preventing bombs on airplanes, the only precaution required was to hold the operatives’ checked baggage until they boarded the airplane. Several hijackers were also carrying small knives or box cutters, and when they reached the security checkpoints, they set off metal detectors. The screeners wanded them, but let them board their planes without verifying what had set off the alarms. When the flights took off, the men hijacked each plane in a similar way—they stabbed or subdued the pilots and crew, they seized control of the cockpit and they started flying the airplane.… We have taken many steps to address the security gaps that the hijackers exploited that morning. We created the Transportation Security Administration to ensure that every passenger and every bag is screened. We increased the number of federal air marshals on domestic and international flights. We trained and authorized thousands of pilots to carry firearms. We hardened cockpit doors to prevent terrorists from gaining access to the controls. We merged 22 government agencies into a single Department of Homeland

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Security, and tripled spending for homeland security on our airlines, on our ports, and our borders and other critical areas. We will continue to provide the resources necessary to secure this homeland. Even if all the steps I’ve outlined this morning had been taken before 9/11, no one can say for sure that we would have prevented the attack. We can say that if America had these reforms in place in 2001, the terrorists would have found it harder to plan and finance their operations, harder to slip into the country undetected, and harder to board the airplanes and take control of the cockpits, and succeed in striking their targets. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060907-2.html

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, Reserve Officers Association, Washington, D.C., September 29, 2006 I want to speak to you today about the struggle between moderation and extremism that is unfolding across the broader Middle East. At this moment, terrorists and extremists are fighting to overthrow moderate governments in the region, so they can take control of countries and use them as bases from which to attack America and from which to impose their hateful ideology. This is the challenge of our time. This is the call of a generation, to stand against the extremists and support moderate leaders across the broader Middle East, to help us all secure a future of peace. This week in Washington, I met with two courageous leaders who are working for peace—President Karzai of Afghanistan, and President Musharraf of Pakistan. These leaders understand the stakes in the struggle—in the ideological struggle of the 21st century. They understand the stakes from a personal perspective, as well, since the extremists have tried to assassinate them. They are courageous people. They have seen the destruction that terrorists have caused in their own country, and they know this, that the only way to stop them is to work together and to stay on the offense. By standing with brave leaders like these, we are defending civilization itself, and we’re building a more peaceful world for our children and grandchildren. Five years ago, Afghanistan was ruled by the brutal Taliban regime. Under the Taliban and al Qaeda, Afghanistan was a land where women were imprisoned in their own homes, where men were beaten for missing prayer meetings, where girls couldn’t even go to school.… Under al Qaeda and the Taliban, Afghanistan was a terrorist safe haven and a launching pad for the horrific attacks … on September the 11th, 2001. After 9/11, America gave the leaders of the Taliban a choice. We told them that they must turn over all the leaders of al Qaeda hiding in their land. We told them they must close every terrorist training camp and hand over every terrorist to appropriate authorities. We told them they must give the United States full access to the terrorist training camps, so they could make sure they were no longer operating. We told them these demands were not up for negotiation, and that if they did not comply immediately and hand over the terrorists, they would share in the same fate as the terrorists.

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I felt these were reasonable demands. The Taliban regime chose unwisely— so within weeks after the 9/11 attacks, our coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom. By December 2001, the Taliban regime had been removed from power, hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters had been captured or killed, and the terrorist camps where the enemy had planned the 9/11 attacks were shut down. We did what we said we were going to do. We made our intentions clear. We gave the Taliban a chance to make the right decision. They made the wrong decision, and we liberated Afghanistan. … It’s in our interests that we help this young democracy survive and grow strong. We helped them build security forces they need to defend their democratic gains. In the past five years, our coalition has trained and equipped more than 30,000 soldiers in the Afghan National Army—and at this moment, several thousand more are in training at a Kabul Military Training Center.… Our coalition has also trained about 46,000 members of the Afghan National Police. The training of the Afghan police has not gone as smoothly as that of the army. The police have faced problems with corruption and substandard leadership. And we’ve made our concerns known to our friends in the Afghan government. When we see a problem, we adjust, we change. And so this year, President Karzai’s government announced a new team to lead the National Police. As the police become more capable, and better led, and more disciplined, they will gain legitimacy and they will earn the respect of the Afghan people. The army and police are good fighters. At this moment, more than 21,000 American troops and more than 20,000 personnel from 40 countries are deployed in Afghanistan. In the summer of 2003, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force—it’s called ISAF, in Afghanistan—NATO’s first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Other nations besides the United States understand the importance of helping this young democracy survive and thrive and grow. Since then, NATO has expanded ISAF from a small force that was operating only in Kabul into a robust force that has taken responsibility for security in nearly 60 percent of the country. And this week, NATO announced that it would take over security operations in all of Afghanistan in the coming weeks. Under the plan, the U.S. will transfer 12,000 of our troops that are now serving in the country to the NATO force, while the rest will remain under coalition command and continue anti-terrorist operations across the country. We saw the effectiveness of NATO forces this summer, when NATO took responsibility from the United States for security operations in Southern Afghanistan. The Taliban saw the transfer of the region from the United States to NATO control as a window of opportunity. They saw it as an opportunity to test the will of nations under than the United States.… So the Taliban massed an estimated 800 to 900 fighters near Kandahar to face the NATO force head on. And that was a mistake. Earlier this month, NATO launched Operation Medusa. Together with the Afghan National Army, troops from Canada, and Denmark, and the Netherlands, and Britain, and the United States engaged the enemy—with operational support from Romanian, and Portuguese, and Estonian Forces. According to NATO

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Commanders, NATO forces killed hundreds of Taliban fighters. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, General Jones, a United States Marine, says this about the NATO operation in Southern Afghanistan: ‘‘The Taliban decided to make a test case of this region. And they paid a very heavy price for it.… [The operation sent a] signal to the insurgents [that] NATO forces would not back down.’’ The operation also sent a clear message to the Afghan people: that NATO is standing with you … The people from NATO must understand that they’re helping a young democracy defend itself and protect its people. And in so doing, they’re helping to lay the foundation of peace in the ideological struggle of the 21st century The NATO deployment has begun to bring security and reconstruction to a region that had previously had little, and has allowed the United States and Afghan forces to stay on the offense. And so we launched another major offensive in the East called Operation Mountain Fury. The operation is … aimed at clearing out enemy safe havens in five Afghan provinces—including three provinces bordering Pakistan. The operation is being led by about 4,000 Afghan forces, and supported by about 3,000 of our finest. As Afghan and coalition forces clear out the enemy, then we will follow up with reconstruction assistance—so we can improve the quality of life for local Afghans, and help extend the authority of the central government to distant areas of the country. … [T]he enemy understands what we’re doing, and they don’t like it. That’s why they’re reacting the way they’re reacting. They understand that the arrival of Afghan and coalition forces in the region means that the government is beginning to win the hearts of the people. In many of these regions, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and drug traffickers, and criminal elements have enjoyed free reign. There hasn’t been any countervailing force to their presence. … [T]hey do more than just fight our forces. They destroy schools and they destroy clinics; they do everything in their power to intimidate local folks. The enemies of a free Afghanistan are brutal and they’re determined—and we’re not going to let them succeed. NATO, and coalition, and Afghan forces will continue to fight the enemy. We will stay on the offense, and we’re going to help this government of President Karzai bring a better life to his people. To bring a better life to the Afghan people, our coalition and NATO forces have deployed 23 Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan. These teams are important because we’re talking about a country that has been torn apart because of war over the years. The teams are led by Sweden, and Norway, and Germany, and Hungary, and Italy, and Spain, and Lithuania, and Canada, and Britain, and the Netherlands, and the United States. And these teams are bringing security and reconstruction assistance to distant regions of the country. And to link the distant regions to the capital, we’ve got a strategy —it’s called building roads. This is a country that is in dire need for transportation. And since the liberation of Afghanistan, we’ve provided more than $4.5 billion for reconstruction throughout the country. We’re helping with electricity, and irrigation, and water, and sanitation, and other necessities. Our coalition is working with President Karzai to strengthen the institutions of … Afghanistan’s young democracy. We understand that the institutions

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must be strengthened and reformed for democracy to survive. And one of the areas most in need of reform is the nation’s legal system. Recently, President Karzai took important steps to strengthen the rule of law, when he appointed a new Attorney General and judges to serve on Afghanistan’s Supreme Court. Our coalition is helping his government institutionalize these changes. Italy, for example, is helping to train Afghan judges, and prosecutors, and public defenders, and court administrators so all Afghans can receive equal justice under the law. And from the beginning, our actions in Afghanistan have had a clear purpose—in other words, our goals are clear for people to understand—and that is to rid that country of the Taliban and the terrorists, and build a lasting free society that will be an ally in the war on terror. And from the beginning, the American people have heard the critics say we’re failing—but their reasons keep changing. In the first days of Operation Enduring Freedom, the critics warned that we were heading toward a ‘‘quagmire.’’ And then when the Taliban fell, and operations began in Iraq, the critics held up the multinational coalition in Afghanistan as a model, and said it showed that everything we were doing in Iraq was wrong. And now some of the critics who praised the multinational coalition we built in Afghanistan claim that the country is in danger of failing because we don’t have enough American troops there. Five years ago, another country that faced a choice was Pakistan. At the time of 9/11, Pakistan was only one of three nations that recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda had a large presence in Pakistan. There was a strong radical Islamic movement in that country. Some of the 9/11 hijackers were housed and trained in Pakistan. Pakistan’s future was in doubt—and President Musharraf understood that he had to make a fundamental choice for his people. He could turn a blind eye and leave the people hostage to the extremists, or he could join the free world in fighting the extremists and the terrorists. President Musharraf made the choice to fight for freedom, and the United States of America is grateful for his leadership. Within two days of the September the 11th attacks, the Pakistani government committed itself to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border, to share intelligence on terrorist activities and movements, and to break off all ties with the Taliban government if it refused to hand over Bin Laden and the al Qaeda. President Musharraf’s decision to fight the terrorists was made at great personal risk. They have tried to kill him as a result of his decision … President Musharraf’s courageous choice to join the struggle against extremism has saved American lives. His government has helped capture or kill many senior terrorist leaders. For example, Pakistani forces helped capture Abu Zubaydah—a man we believe to be a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden. Pakistani forces helped capture another individual believed to be one of the key plotters of the 9/11 attacks—Ramzi bin al Shibh. Pakistani forces helped capture the man our intelligence community believes masterminded the 9/11 attacks—Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Once captured, these men were taken into custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. The questioning of these and other suspected terrorists provided information that helped us protect the American people. They helped

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us break up a cell of Southeast Asian terrorist operatives that had been groomed for attacks inside the United States. They helped us disrupt an al Qaeda operation to develop anthrax for terrorist attacks. They helped us stop a planned strike on a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, and to prevent a planned attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, and to foil a plot to hijack passenger planes and to fly them into Heathrow Airport and London’s Canary Wharf. Were it not for the information gained from the terrorists captured with the help of Pakistan, our intelligence community believes that al Qaeda and its allies would have succeeded in launching another attack against the American homeland. Our close cooperation with the government of Pakistan has saved American lives—and America is grateful to have a strong and steadfast ally in the war against these terrorists. President Musharraf understands that the terrorists hide in remote regions and travel back and forth across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And so we’re helping his government establish stronger control over these border areas. We are helping him to equip the nation’s paramilitary Frontier Corps that is policing the border regions. The United States is funding the construction of more than 100 border outposts, which will provide Pakistani forces with better access to remote areas of the country’s western border. We’re providing high-tech equipment to help Pakistani forces better locate terrorists attempting to cross the border. We are funding an air wing with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft … And as we work with President Musharraf to bring security to his country, we’re also supporting him as he takes steps to build a modern and moderate nation, that will hold free and fair elections next year. In an address to his fellow citizens earlier this year, President Musharraf declared this: ‘‘We have to eliminate extremism in our society. It will eat us up from within. So it is my appeal to all of you to shun extremism. Adopt the path of moderation … we will eliminate this extremism in our society and then Pakistan will be considered a moderate, developed country.’’ President Musharraf has a clear vision for his country as a nation growing in freedom and prosperity and peace. And as he stands against the terrorists and for the free future of his country, the United States of America will stand with him. In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, America has strong allies who are committed to rooting out the terrorists in their midst … On Wednesday night, I had dinner with Presidents Musharraf and Karzai at the White House. We had a long and we had a frank conversation about the challenges we face in defeating the extremists and the terrorists in their countries, and providing the people of these two nations an alternative to the dark ideology of the enemy. We discussed the best ways to improve intelligence sharing so that we can target and eliminate the leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban. We resolved to strengthen the institutions of civil society in both countries. We agreed on the need to support tribal leaders on both sides of the border. By helping these local leaders build schools, and roads, and health clinics, we will help them build a better life for their communities, and strengthen their hand against—to fight against the extremists. It was clear from our

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conversation that our three nations share the same goals: We will defeat the Taliban, we will defeat al Qaeda, and the only way to do it is by working together. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-3.html

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on the National Intelligence Estimate and Iraq, September 30, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: Today I want to talk to you about a matter of national security that has been in the news—the National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism. The NIE is a classified document that analyzes the threat we face from terrorists and extremists. Parts of this classified document were recently leaked to the press. That has created a heated debate in our Nation’s capital, and a lot of misimpressions about the document’s conclusions. I believe the American people should read the document themselves and come to their own conclusions, so I declassified its key judgments. The National Intelligence Estimate confirms that we are up against a determined and capable enemy. The NIE lists four underlying factors that are fueling the extremist movement: first, long-standing grievances such as corruption, injustice, and a fear of Western domination; second, the jihad in Iraq; third, the slow pace of reform in Muslim nations; and fourth, pervasive anti-Americanism. It concludes that terrorists are exploiting all these factors to further their movement. Some in Washington have selectively quoted from this document to make the case that by fighting the terrorists in Iraq, we are making our people less secure here at home. This argument buys into the enemy’s propaganda that the terrorists attack us because we are provoking them. Here is what Prime Minister Tony Blair said this week about that argument: ‘‘This terrorism isn’t our fault. We didn’t cause it. It’s not the consequence of foreign policy.’’ Prime Minister Blair is right. We do not create terrorism by fighting terrorism. The terrorists are at war against us because they hate everything America stands for, and because they know we stand in the way of their ambitions to take over the Middle East. We are fighting to stop them from taking over Iraq and turning that country into a safe haven that would be even more valuable than the one they lost in Afghanistan. Iraq is not the reason the terrorists are at war against us. Our troops were not in Iraq when terrorists first attacked the World Trade Center in 1993, or when terrorists blew up our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or when they bombed the USS Cole, or when they killed nearly 3,000 people on September the 11th, 2001. Five years after the 9/11 attacks, some people in Washington still do not understand the nature of the enemy. The only way to protect our citizens at home is to go on the offense against the enemy across the world. When terrorists spend their days working to avoid capture, they are less able to plot, plan, and execute new attacks on our people. So we will remain on the offense until the terrorists are defeated and this fight is won. In my recent speeches, I’ve said we are in the early hours of a long struggle for civilization, and that our safety depends on the outcome of the battle in Iraq. The National Intelligence Estimate declares ‘‘perceived jihadist

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success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.’’ It also says that ‘‘Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.’’ Withdrawing from Iraq before the enemy is defeated would embolden the terrorists. It would help them find new recruits to carry out even more destructive attacks on our Nation, and it would give the terrorists a new sanctuary in the heart of the Middle East, with huge oil riches to fund their ambitions. America must not allow this to happen. We are a Nation that keeps its commitments to those who long for liberty and want to live in peace. We will stand with the nearly 12 million Iraqis who voted for their freedom, and we will help them fight and defeat the terrorists there, so we do not have to face them here at home. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060930.html

President George W. Bush, Meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, The White House, December 7, 2006 PRESIDENT BUSH: … I just had a good visit with Prime Minister Tony Blair.… I appreciate your clear view that we are confronted with a struggle between moderation and extremism. And this is particularly evident in the broader Middle East. I talked about my recent trip to Jordan, where I talked to Prime Minister Maliki. I briefed the Prime Minister on my visit with His Eminence, Mr. Hakim, one of the major political players in Iraq. We discussed the report I received yesterday from the Iraq Study Group, a report chaired by Secretary of State—former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. I told the Prime Minister I thought this was a very constructive report. I appreciated the fact that they laid out a series of recommendations, and they’re worthy of serious study. I also updated the Prime Minister on the reviews that are being conducted by the Pentagon and the State Department and our National Security Council. I talked to him about the consultations I’m having with the United States Congress. We agree that victory in Iraq is important; it’s important for the Iraqi people, it’s important for the security of the United States and Great Britain, and it’s important for the civilized world. We agree that an Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself and sustain itself as an ally on the war on terror is a noble goal. The Prime Minister and I seek a wide range of opinions about how to go forward in Iraq, and I appreciate your opinions and your advice. The increase in sectarian attacks we’re seeing in and around Baghdad are unsettling. It has led to much debate in both our countries about the nature of the war that is taking place in Iraq. And it is true that Sunni and Shia extremists are targeting each other’s innocent civilians and engaging in brutal reprisals. It’s also true that forces beyond Iraq’s borders contribute to this violence. And the Prime Minister put it this way, he said, ‘‘The violence is not an accident or a result of faulty planning. It is a deliberate strategy. It is the direct result of outside extremists teaming up with internal extremists—al Qaeda

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with the Sunni insurgents, and Iran with the Shia militia—to foment hatred and to throttle, at birth, the possibility of a non-sectarian democracy.’’ … The primary victims of the sectarian violence are the moderate majority of Iraqis—Sunni and Shia alike—who want a future of peace. The primary beneficiaries are Sunni and Shia extremists, inside and outside of Iraq, who want chaos in that country so they can take control and further their ambitions to dominate the region. These Sunni and Shia extremists have important differences, yet they agree on one thing: the rise of free and democratic societies in the Middle East where people can practice their faith, choose their leaders, and live together in peace would be a decisive blow to their cause. And so they’re supporting extremists across the region who are working to undermine young democracies.… In Iraq, they support terrorists and death squads who are fomenting sectarian violence in an effort to bring down the elected government of Prime Minister Maliki. In Lebanon, they’re supporting Hezbollah, which recently declared its intention to force the collapse of Prime Minister Siniora’s democratically-elected parliament and government. In Afghanistan, they’re supporting remnants of the Taliban that are seeking to destabilize President Karzai’s government and regain power. In the Palestinian Territories, they are working to stop moderate leaders like President Abbas from making progress toward the vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. In each of these places, radicals and extremists are using terror to stop the spread of freedom. And they do so because they want to spread their ideologies—their ideologies of hate—and impose their rule on this vital part of the world. And should they succeed, history will look back on our time with unforgiving clarity and demand to know, what happened? How come free nations did not act to preserve the peace? Prime Minister Blair and I understand that we have a responsibility to lead and to support moderates and reformers who work for change across the broader Middle East. We also recognize that meeting this responsibility requires action. We will take concerted efforts to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East. Prime Minister Blair informed me that he will be heading to the Middle East soon to talk to both the Israelis and the Palestinians. And I support that mission. I support the mission because it’s important for us to advance the cause of two states living side by side in peace, and helping both parties eliminate the obstacles that prevent an agreement from being reached. And your strong leadership on this issue matters a lot. We’ll support the democratic government of Prime Minister Maliki as he makes difficult decisions and confronts the forces of terror and extremism that are working hard to tear his country apart. Britain and America are old allies, and the Prime Minister and I are strong friends. But Britain and America aren’t standing together in this war because of friendship. We’re standing together because our two nations face an unprecedented threat to civilization. We’re standing together to prevent terrorists and extremists from dominating the Middle East. We stand together to prevent extremists from regaining the safe haven they lost in Afghanistan, a safe haven from which they launched attacks that killed thousands …

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We stand together because we understand the only way to secure a lasting peace for our children and grandchildren is to defeat the extremist ideologies and help the ideology of hope, democracy, prevail. We know the only way to secure peace for ourselves is to help millions of moms and dads across the Middle East build what our citizens already have: societies based on liberty that will allow their children to grow up in peace and opportunity. It’s a tough time. And it’s a difficult moment for America and Great Britain. And the task before us is daunting. Yet our nations have stood before in difficult moments. Sixty-five years ago this day, America was jolted out of our isolationism and plunged into a global war that Britain had been fighting for two years. In that war, our nation stood firm. And there were difficult moments during that war, yet the leaders of our two nations never lost faith in the capacity to prevail. We will stand firm again in this first war of the 21st century. We will defeat the extremists and the radicals. We will help a young democracy prevail in Iraq. And in so doing, we will secure freedom and peace for millions, including our own citizens. PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: … Thank you also for the clarity of your vision about the mission that we’re engaged in at the moment, which is a struggle between freedom and democracy on the one hand, and terrorism and sectarianism on the other. And it’s a noble mission, and it’s the right mission, and it’s important for our world that it succeeds. And so the question is, how do we make sure that it does, indeed, succeed? And in respect of Iraq, I, like you, welcome the Baker-Hamilton study group. It offers a strong way forward. I think it is important now we concentrate on the elements that are necessary to make sure that we succeed, because the consequences of failure are severe. And I believe this is a mission we have to succeed in and we can succeed in. Q. Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, neither of you has shown much doubt about your Iraq policies. Do you acknowledge that your approach has failed, as Baker-Hamilton suggests? And are you willing to engage directly with Syria and Iran and pull out most combat forces by early 2008, unless there’s unexpected circumstances? PRESIDENT BUSH: The thing I liked about the Baker-Hamilton report is it discussed the way forward in Iraq. And I believe we need a new approach. And that’s why I’ve tasked the Pentagon to analyze the way forward. That’s why Prime Minister Blair is here to talk about the way forward, so we can achieve the objective, which is an Iraq which can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself, and be an ally in the war on terror. And the Baker-Hamilton report did some very interesting things. First, it shows that Republicans and Democrats can work together to achieve—to come up with a strategy to achieve an objective, something the American people don’t think is possible to happen. In other words, they’ve seen elections, and they saw all the bitterness and finger-pointing and name-calling and wonder whether or not we can work together on this important cause. And I believe we can.… And so that’s why I’m sitting down with the members of Congress to say to both Republicans and Democrats, this is an important cause. It’s important

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for our security; it’s important to help lay the foundations for peace, and I want to hear your ideas. And I thought the report did a good job of showing what is possible. Congress isn’t going to accept every recommendation in the report, and neither will the administration. But there’s a lot of very important things in the report that we ought to seriously consider. … [T]he idea of having an international group is an interesting idea. We’ve already got the compact, and I think the Baker-Hamilton report suggests that we broaden the compact beyond just economic measures. But one thing is for certain, when people—if people come to the table to discuss Iraq, they need to come understanding their responsibilities to not fund terrorists, to help this young democracy survive, to help with the economics of the country. And if people are not committed, if Syria and Iran is not committed to that concept, then they shouldn’t bother to show up. Thirdly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is important to have—is important to be solved. I’m committed to a two state solution. I believe it is in Israel’s interest and the Palestinian people’s interest to have two states living side by side for peace.… And there are two notable obstacles. One, one is the prisoner; and secondly, is for there to be a unity government that recognizes the principles of the Quartet, with which Israel can negotiate. And we want to help. And so I view this as a very important way forward, important concepts. And the American people expect us to come up with a new strategy to achieve the objective which I’ve been talking about and which is laid out in the Baker-Hamilton report. Q. Mr. President, the Iraq Study Group described the situation in Iraq as grave and deteriorating. You said that the increase in attacks is unsettling. That won’t convince many people that you’re still in denial about how bad things are in Iraq, and question your sincerity about changing course. PRESIDENT BUSH: It’s bad in Iraq. Does that help? Q. Why did it take others to say it before you’ve been willing to acknowledge for the world— PRESIDENT BUSH: In all due respect, I’ve been saying it a lot. I understand how tough it is. And I’ve been telling the American people how tough it is. And they know how tough it is. And the fundamental question is, do we have a plan to achieve our objective? Are we willing to change as the enemy has changed? And what the Baker-Hamilton study has done is it shows good ideas as to how to go forward. What our Pentagon is doing is figuring out ways to go forward, all aiming to achieve our objective. Make no mistake about it, I understand how tough it is, sir. I talk to families who die. I understand there’s sectarian violence. I also understand that we’re hunting down al Qaeda on a regular basis and we’re bringing them to justice. I understand how hard our troops are working. I know how brave the men and women who wear the uniform are, and therefore, they’ll have the full support of this government. I understand what long deployments mean to wives and husbands, and mothers and fathers, particularly as we come into a holiday season. I understand. And I have made it abundantly clear how tough it is. I also believe we’re going to succeed. I believe we’ll prevail. Not only do I know how important it is to prevail, I believe we will prevail. I understand

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how hard it is to prevail. But I also want the American people to understand that if we were to fail—and one way to assure failure is just to quit, is not to adjust, and say it’s just not worth it—if we were to fail, that failed policy will come to hurt generations of Americans in the future. And as I said in my opening statement, I believe we’re in an ideological struggle between forces that are reasonable and want to live in peace, and radicals and extremists. And when you throw into the mix radical Shia and radical Sunni trying to gain power and topple moderate governments, with energy which they could use to blackmail Great Britain or America, or anybody else who doesn’t kowtow to them, and a nuclear weapon in the hands of a government that is—would be using that nuclear weapon to blackmail to achieve political objectives—historians will look back and say, how come Bush and Blair couldn’t see the threat? That’s what they’ll be asking. And I want to tell you, I see the threat and I believe it is up to our governments to help lead the forces of moderation to prevail. It’s in our interests. Q. You mentioned Iran and Syria as part of this regional effort. Are you willing to engage with them directly as the report—as the report recommends? And back to the issue of the troops, is it possible to get them out of Iraq by early 2008, as the report talks about? And when do you hope to have this report? PRESIDENT BUSH: You mean, when—when do I hope to announce the strategy, is that what you’re talking about? After I get the reports. And BakerHamilton is a really important part of our considerations. But we want to make sure the military gets their point of view in. After all, a lot of what we’re doing is a military operation. I want to make sure the State Department is able to help us analyze the strategy to make sure that we’ve got the right political emphasis, not only inside Iraq but outside Iraq. … [L]et me talk about engaging Iran. We have made it clear to the Iranians that there is a possible change in U.S. policy, a policy that’s been in place for 27 years, and that is that if they would like to engage the United States, that they’ve got to verifiably suspend their enrichment program. We’ve made our choice. Iran now has an opportunity to make its choice. I would hope they would make the choice that most of the free world wants them to make, which is there is no need to have a weapons program; there is no need to isolate your people; there’s no need to continue this obstinance when it comes to your stated desires to have a nuclear weapon. It’s not in your interest to do so. And should they agree to verifiably suspend their enrichment, the United States will be at the table with our partners. It’s really interesting to talk about conversations with countries—which is fine; I can understand why people speculate about it—but there should be no mistake in anybody’s mind, these countries understand our position. They know what’s expected of them. There is—if we were to have a conversation, it would be this one, to Syria: Stop destabilizing the Siniora government. We believe that the Siniora government should be supported, not weakened. Stop allowing money and arms to cross your border into Iraq. Don’t provide safe haven for terrorist groups. We’ve made that position very clear.

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And the truth of the matter is, is that these countries have now got the choice to make. If they want to sit down at the table with the United States, it’s easy—just make some decisions that will lead to peace, not to conflict. Q. Combat troops out by early 2008, is that— PRESIDENT BUSH: One of the things the report did mention, and I think you’ve said it in your comment, if conditions so allow. And we want our combat troops out as quick as possible. We want the Iraqis taking the fight. But it’s very important to be—as we design programs, to be flexible and realistic. And as the report said—I don’t—got the exact words, but it was along the lines of depending upon conditions, I believe is what the qualifier was. And I thought that made a lot of sense. I’ve always said we’d like our troops out as fast as possible. I think that’s an important goal. On the other hand, our commanders will be making recommendations based upon whether or not we’re achieving our stated objective. And the objective, I repeat, is a government which can sustain, govern, and defend itself—free government of Iraq that can do that—and will be an ally in this movement—against this movement that is threatening peace and stability. And it’s real. Q. Mr. President, you have said that you have the Baker-Hamilton report, you also have the—you’re waiting to hear from the Pentagon, you’re waiting to hear from the State Department. This report was prepared by a bipartisan group, the only one you’ll get. Secretary Baker has a special relationship with the family. Should this report not get extra consideration? Does it not carry more weight than any of the others? PRESIDENT BUSH: That’s an interesting question. It’s certainly an important part of our deliberations, and it was certainly an important part of our discussions this morning. Some reports are issued and just gather dust. And truth of the matter is, a lot of reports in Washington are never read by anybody. To show you how important this one is, I read it, and our guest read it. The Prime Minister read—read a report prepared by a commission. And this is important. And there are some—I don’t think Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton expect us to accept every recommendation. I expect them—I think—I know they expect us to consider every recommendation, Jim. We ought to pay close attention to what they advise. And I told them yesterday at our meeting that we would pay close attention, and would seriously consider every recommendation. We’ve discussed some of their recommendations here at this press conference. And we are—we will spend a lot of time on it. And I—and so you ask its relative importance. I’d call it a very important report, and a very important part of our working to a new approach, a new way forward in Iraq. Q. Mr. President, the Iraq Study Group said that leaders must be candid and forthright with people. So let me test that. Are you capable of admitting your failures in the past, and perhaps much more importantly, are you capable of changing course, perhaps in the next few weeks? PRESIDENT BUSH: … I do know that we have not succeeded as fast as we wanted to succeed. I do understand that progress is not as rapid as I had hoped. And therefore, it makes sense to analyze the situation and to devise a set of tactics and strategies to achieve the objective that I have stated.

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And so if the present situation needs to be changed, it follows that we’ll change it if we want to succeed. What’s really interesting is the battle has changed in Iraq from the rejectionists and former Baathists and definitely foreign fighters who have entered the country that were trying to destabilize the new government to one that Mr. Zarqawi stated clearly—he said, look, let’s kill Shia in order to create enough chaos and confusion and doubt of the government, and set off a sectarian battle. And he succeeded in that extent. He didn’t succeed at avoiding us, but he did succeed at starting off sectarian strife. And now the fundamental question is, what strategy is necessary to deal with this type of violence? We’ll continue after al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will not have safe haven in Iraq. And that’s important for the American people to know. We’ve got special operators, we’ve got better intelligence. And al Qaeda is effective at these spectacular bombings, and we’ll chase them down, and we are, along with the Iraqis. The strategy now is how to make sure that we’ve got the security situation in place such that the Iraqi government is capable of dealing with the sectarian violence, as well as the political and economic strategies, as well. So, yes, I think you’ll see something differently, because it’s a practical answer to a situation on the ground that’s not the way we like it. You wanted frankness—I thought we would succeed quicker than we did, and I am disappointed by the pace of success. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061207-1.html

President George W. Bush, Interview, The Washington Post, December 20, 2006 This 25-minute interview was conducted yesterday in the Oval Office by Washington Post staff writers Peter Baker, Michael A. Fletcher, and Michael Abramowitz. EXCERPTED PRESIDENT BUSH: Listen, a couple of things before we get going. Obviously, I’ve been thinking about—and talking to a lot of people about—the way forward in Iraq and the way forward in this ideological struggle. I want to share one thought I had with you, and I’m inclined to believe that we do need to increase our troops, the Army, the Marines. And I talked about this to [Defense] Secretary [Robert M.] Gates, and he is going to spend some time talking to the folks in the building, come back with a recommendation to me about how to proceed forward on this idea. I want to give him a little time to get his feet on the ground. And so I’ll be addressing this after consultations with him. I just want to share that with you before we get going. You’re talking about troops in Iraq, not— No, I’m talking about overall size. —overall size of the Army. Do you have a rough idea how much— I’m going to wait for Secretary Gates. As I say, I’m inclined to believe it’s important and necessary to do so. The reason why is, it is an accurate reflection that this ideological war we’re in is going to last for a while, and that

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we’re going to need a military that’s capable of being able to sustain our efforts and to help us achieve peace. So you’ve not made a decision about Iraq, per se, about what to do— I have not, Mike, I have not. And we’ll spend some more time—Secretary Gates, as he indicated, is going to head to the region at some point in time. I need to talk to him when he gets back. I’ve got more consultations to do with the national security team, which will be consulting with other folks. And I’m going to take my time to make sure that the policy, when it comes out, the American people will see that we are—have got a new way forward to achieve an important objective, which is a country that can govern, sustain and defend itself. And one thing that will be clear is that I want the American people to know that—and the Iraqi people to know that—we expect the Iraqi people to continue making hard choices and doing hard work necessary to succeed, and our job is to help them do so. Are we winning in Iraq, in your estimation? You know, I think an interesting construct that General [Peter] Pace uses is, ‘‘We’re not winning, we’re not losing.’’ There’s been some very positive developments. And you take a step back and look at progress in Iraq, you say, well, it’s amazing—constitutional democracy in the heart of the Middle East, which is a remarkable development in itself. I think one of the—obviously, the real problem we face is the sectarian violence that needs to be dealt with. So part of my policy review is how do we deal with that in a way that then enables the Iraqi people to live in a more secure society so that the government can prove its worth to the people—saying, we can help you. And one of the main functions of government is to provide security for its people. Our job is to help the Iraqis provide that security. And I’ll come forward with a plan that will enable us to achieve that objective. There’s other threats, by the way. It’s a multiple-front war, if you really think about it. You got Shia discord in the south; you’ve got Sunni attacks, much of that—many of them are caused by al-Qaeda. A lot of them, former Baathists and regimists who are angry that Saddam is no longer in power, and they are a source of conflict in al-Anbar province. And we’ve got a very robust effort—I said the other day something that, I guess, people didn’t pay that much attention to—but for October and November and the first week of December, our actions on the ground have—as a result of action on the ground, we killed or captured nearly 5,900 people. My point in making that point is our troops and coalition troops are on the offense in a lot of areas. And then the third area of conflict, the one that gets a lot of attention, as it should, is the sectarian violence taking place in Baghdad. And I fully understand that we’ve got to help the Iraqis deal with that. So my thinking is—and a lot of our strategy sessions revolve around how best to deal with this problem, and how best to help the Iraqis deal with it. And I’ve got some more work to do, and I’ll come forth at the appropriate time and explain the way forward to the country. Given the election results, is increasing the troop level in Iraq even a viable possibility or option?

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Yes, Mike, all options are viable. —given the political will out there? Well, all options are viable. I think what the people want is—they want a couple of things. They want to see Democrats and Republicans work together to achieve a common objective, and they want us to win in Iraq. A lot of people understand that if we leave Iraq, there will be dire consequences—in other words, if we leave before the job is done. There are some, a fair number of people, who say, ‘‘Get out now.’’ So I view the election results as people are not satisfied with the progress being made in Iraq and expect to see a different strategy to achieve an important objective. But the election results seemed [to indicate that] people wanted to bring the venture in Iraq to closure. That seemed to be the strong lesson. And what indications are there that you’re actually listening to that sentiment? Oh, Mike, look, I want to achieve the objective. I think the American people—I know the American people are very worried about an external threat and that they recognize that failure in Iraq would embolden that external threat, and they expect this administration to listen with people, to work with Democrats, to work with the military, to work with the Iraqis to put a plan in place that achieves the objective. There’s not a lot of people saying, ‘‘Get out now.’’ Most Americans are saying, ‘‘We want to achieve the objective.’’ But there are a lot of people who are saying, ‘‘Let’s get out with a phased deployment over a certain period of time.’’ If they felt—if that leads to victory, it needs to be seriously considered. And I’m considering all options and listening very carefully to a lot of good people who have got different opinions about how to proceed. Can we come back to General Pace’s formulation about winning, not losing? You said October 24th, ‘‘Absolutely, we’re winning.’’ And I wanted to— Yes, that was an indication of my belief we’re going to win. Look, I’ve got four constituencies I speak to on a regular basis; one is the American people, who are justifiably frustrated at the progress in Iraq. And they expect the commander in chief and the people in Washington to support our troops. Supporting our troops not only means good equipment, good [pay], good housing—it also means a plan that helps achieve the objective. The second constituency is the enemy.… The enemy wants to know whether or not the United States has the will to stay engaged in this ideological struggle. They don’t believe we do. That’s what they say. And I believe that’s what they believe. The third group of people I speak to are the Iraqis. They wonder whether the United States has got the will to help them achieve their objectives. That’s what they wonder. The leaders I have talked to wonder whether or not—what the elections mean, or what the Baker-Hamilton commission means, or what changing [former defense] secretary [Donald H.] Rumsfeld means—that’s what they wonder. But in the back of their mind, they’re saying, ‘‘Are they going to leave us again?’’ And that’s an important question for them to have answered, because in order to make difficult choices and to take risk for peace, they’re going to have to be assured that they’ll get support. This is a group of people that have had their hopes dashed in the past.

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And the fourth group is the military. Our troops wonder whether or not our country supports them, and they do. They wonder whether or not the mission and the sacrifice and the toil that they’re making is worth it. And they need to know from the commander in chief: Not only is it worth it, but I strongly support them and believe that their work will lead to victory. That’s what I believe. Some of the supporters of the war and you from the beginning have begun to ask the question publicly: Was it, in fact, the idea that turned out not so great, or the execution that turned out not so great? The idea of? The idea of the war in the first place, and the— I’ve never really asked that question. I believe it’s justifiable and necessary. Obviously, the war has not—the results on the ground haven’t happened as quickly as I hoped, and part of this review process is to develop new strategies and tactics so that we can expedite success. Look, I of all people would like to see the troops come home. But I don’t want them to come home without achieving our objective, because I understand what happens if there’s failure. And I’m going to keep repeating this over and over again, that I believe we’re in an ideological struggle that is—that our country will be dealing with for a long time. Can I ask you a question about history? Yes. President Lincoln fired a number of his generals in the Civil War until he found Grant … Why haven’t you fired any generals? And does the fact that you haven’t fired generals suggest that you are satisfied with the military strategy that they have pursued? We’re reviewing the strategy, because it has—the results aren’t—we haven’t achieved the results as quickly as we wanted—precisely what the secretary of defense said, by the way. And the chain-of-command issues are issues that percolate up through the Pentagon. And there is a clear chain of command that I adhere to, and I think it’s important for the commander in chief to do just that. I’ve often talked about how it’s important to trust the judgment of the military when they’re making military plans as the key advisers to the president, as opposed to the president determining the tactics on the ground, which has happened in previous wars. And so I’m a strict adherer to the command structure. But isn’t there a point in which you say, ‘‘We screwed up the amount of troops we need there, we screwed up the WMD, someone ought to pay a penalty for that’’? There is a constant review of the commanders, and I support that constant review. And to the extent that people think they can do—somebody can do a better job, those recommendations will come forward. I’d like to come back to your first statement, because I’d like to expand a little bit. You talked about the size of the military. Colin Powell said on a Sunday show that the Army was nearly broken. Do you believe that’s true? And, if so, do you feel responsible for that? Do you— I heard—we have been transforming our Army to make it lighter, more lethal and easier to move, and that transformation has been very important.

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Secondly, we have been changing our force posture around the world to reflect the threats of the 21st century, and that has been a very important reform. I also believe that the suggestions I’ve heard from outside our government, plus people inside the government—particularly, the Pentagon—that we need to think about increasing our force structure makes sense, and I will work with Secretary Gates to do so. He’s going to come back and report— So is our Army nearly broken, or not? The people that would know best are those in the Pentagon. I haven’t heard the word ‘‘broken,’’ but I’ve heard the word ‘‘stressed.’’ I know that we need to—and my budgetary requests will reflect what a lot of people in Congress have been saying and in the Pentagon, and that is we need to reset our military. There’s no question the military has been used a lot. And the fundamental question is, will Republicans and Democrats be able to work with the administration to assure our military and the American people that we will position our military so that it is ready and able to stay engaged in a long war, and this ideological struggle? SOURCE: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/19/ AR2006121900886_pf.html

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, Indian Treaty Room, December 20, 2006 THE PRESIDENT: This week I went to the Pentagon for the swearing-in of our nation’s new Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates. Secretary Gates is going to bring a fresh perspective to the Pentagon, and America is fortunate that he has agreed to serve our country once again. I’m looking forward to working with him. Secretary Gates is going to be an important voice in the Iraq strategy review that’s underway. As you know, I’ve been consulting closely with our commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategy in Iraq, and on the broader war on terror. One of my top priorities during this war is to ensure that our men and women wearing the uniform have everything they need to do their job. We have an obligation to ensure our military is capable of sustaining this war over the long haul, and in performing the many tasks that we ask of them. I’m inclined to believe that we need an increase in the permanent size of both the United States Army and the United States Marines. I’ve asked Secretary Gates to determine how such an increase could take place and report back to me as quickly as possible. Two thousand and six was a difficult year for our troops and the Iraqi people. We began the year with optimism after watching nearly 12 million Iraqis go to the polls to vote for a unity government and a free future. The enemies of liberty responded fiercely to this advance of freedom. They carried out a deliberate strategy to foment sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shia. And over the course of the year, they had success. Their success hurt our efforts to help the Iraqis rebuild their country. It set back reconciliation; it kept Iraq’s

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unity government and our coalition from establishing security and stability throughout the country. We enter this new year clear-eyed about the challenges in Iraq, and equally clear about our purpose. Our goal remains a free and democratic Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself, and is an ally in this war on terror. I’m not going to make predictions about what 2007 will look like in Iraq, except that it’s going to require difficult choices and additional sacrifices, because the enemy is merciless and violent. I’m going to make you this promise: My administration will work with Republicans and Democrats to fashion a new way forward that can succeed in Iraq. We’ll listen to ideas from every quarter; we’ll change our strategy and tactics to meet the realities on the ground. We’ll never lose sight that on the receiving end of the decisions I make is a private, a sergeant, a young lieutenant or a diplomat who risks his or her life to help the Iraqis realize a dream of a stable country that can defend, govern and sustain itself. The advance of liberty has never been easy, and Iraq is proving how tough it can be. Yet, the safety and security of our citizens requires that we do not let up. We can be smarter about how we deploy our manpower and resources; we can ask more of our Iraqi partners, and we will—one thing we cannot do is give up on the hundreds of millions of ordinary moms and dads across the Middle East who want the hope and opportunity for their children that the terrorists and extremists seek to deny them, and that’s a peaceful existence. Q. Mr. President, less than two months ago at the end of one of the bloodiest months in the war, you said, ‘‘Absolutely we’re winning.’’ Yesterday you said, ‘‘We’re not winning, we’re not losing.’’ Why did you drop your confident assertion about winning? THE PRESIDENT: My comments—the first comment was done in this spirit: I believe that we’re going to win; I believe that—and by the way, if I didn’t think that, I wouldn’t have our troops there. That’s what you got to know. We’re going to succeed. My comments yesterday reflected the fact that we’re not succeeding nearly as fast as I wanted when I said it at the time, and that conditions are tough in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad. And so we’re conducting a review to make sure that our strategy helps us achieve that which I’m pretty confident we can do, and that is have a country which can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself. You know, I—when I speak, like right now, for example—I’m speaking to the American people, of course, and I want them to know that I know how tough it is, but I also want them to know that I’m going to work with the military and the political leaders to develop a plan that will help us achieve the objective. I also want our troops to understand that—that we support them; that I believe that tough mission I’ve asked them to do is going to be accomplished, and that they’re doing good work and necessary work. I want the Iraqis to understand that we believe that if they stand up, step up and lead, and with our help we can accomplish the objective. And I want the enemy to understand that this is a tough task, but they can’t run us out of the Middle East, that they can’t intimidate America. They think they can.

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They think it’s just a matter of time before America grows weary and leaves, abandons the people of Iraq, for example. And that’s not going to happen. What is going to happen is we’re going to develop a strategy that helps the Iraqis achieve the objective that the 12 million people want them to achieve, which is a government that can—a country that can sustain itself, govern itself, defend itself, a free country that will serve as an ally in this war against extremists and radicals. Q. If you conclude that a surge in troop levels in Iraq is needed, would you overrule your military commanders if they felt it was not a good idea? THE PRESIDENT: That’s a dangerous hypothetical question. I’m not condemning you, you’re allowed to ask anything you want. Let me wait and gather all the recommendations from Bob Gates, from our military, from diplomats on the ground; I’m interested in the Iraqis’ point of view; and then I’ll report back to you as to whether or not I support a surge or not … Q. Would you overrule your commanders— THE PRESIDENT: The opinion of my commanders is very important. They are bright, capable, smart people whose opinion matters to me a lot. Q. You have reached out to both Sunni and Shia political leaders in recent weeks, and now there’s word that the Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani is supporting a moderate coalition in Iraq. Has the U.S. reached out to him? How important is he in the equation moving forward? And what do you say to people who say more troops in Iraq would increase the sectarian split and not calm things down? THE PRESIDENT: Well, I haven’t made up my mind yet about more troops. I’m listening to our commanders; I’m listening to the Joint Chiefs, of course; I’m listening to people in and out of government; I’m listening to the folks on the Baker-Hamilton commission about coming up with a strategy that helps us achieve our objective. And so … hypothetical questions, I’m not going to answer them today. I’m not going to speculate out loud about what I’m going to tell the nation, when I’m prepared to do so, about the way forward. I will tell you we’re looking at all options. And one of those options, of course, is increasing more troops. But in order to do so, there must be a specific mission that can be accomplished with more troops. And that’s precisely what our commanders have said, as well as people who know a lot about military operations. And I agree with them that there’s got to be a specific mission that can be accomplished with the addition of more troops before I agree on that strategy. Secondly, whatever we do is going to help the Iraqis step up. It’s their responsibility to govern their country. It’s their responsibility to do the hard work necessary to secure Baghdad. And we want to help them. Thirdly, I appreciate the fact that the Prime Minister and members of the government are forming what you have called a moderate coalition, because it’s becoming very apparent to the people of Iraq that there are extremists and radicals who are anxious to stop the advance of a free society. And therefore, a moderate coalition signals to the vast majority of the people of Iraq that we have a unity government, that we’re willing to reconcile our differences and work together, and in so doing, will marginalize those who use violence to achieve political objectives.

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And so we support the formation of the unity government and the moderate coalition. And it’s important for the leader Sistani to understand that’s our position. He is a—he lives a secluded life, but he knows that we’re interested in defeating extremism, and we’re interested in helping advance a unity government. Q. In the latest CBS News poll, 50 percent of Americans say they favor a beginning of an end to U.S. military involvement in Iraq; 43 percent said, keep fighting, but change tactics. By this and many other measures, there is no clear mandate to continue being in Iraq in a military form. I guess my question is, are you still willing to follow a path that seems to be in opposition to the will of the American people? THE PRESIDENT: I am willing to follow a path that leads to victory, and that’s exactly why we’re conducting the review we are. Victory in Iraq is achievable. It hasn’t happened nearly as quickly as I hoped it would have. I know it’s—the fact that there is still unspeakable sectarian violence in Iraq, I know that’s troubling to the American people. But I also don’t believe most Americans want us just to get out now. A lot of Americans understand the consequences of retreat. Retreat would embolden radicals. It would hurt the credibility of the United States. Retreat from Iraq would dash the hopes of millions who want to be free. Retreat from Iraq would enable the extremists and radicals to more likely be able to have safe haven from which to plot and plan further attacks. And so it’s been a tough period for the American people. They want to see success. And our objective is to put a plan in place that achieves that success. I’m often asked about public opinion. Of course, I want public opinion to support the efforts. I understand that. But I also understand the consequences of failure. And, therefore, I’m going to work with the Iraqis and our military and politicians from both political parties to achieve success. I thought the election said they want to see more bipartisan cooperation; they want to see us working together to achieve common objectives. And I’m going to continue to reach out to Democrats to do just that. Q. … Mr. President, Lyndon Johnson famously didn’t sleep during the Vietnam War, questioning his own decisions. You have always seemed very confident of your decisions, but I can’t help but wonder if this has been a time of painful realization for you as you, yourself, have acknowledged that some of the policies you hoped would succeed have not. And I wonder if you can talk to us about that. Has it been a painful time? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. The most painful aspect of my presidency has been knowing that good men and women have died in combat. I read about it every night. My heart breaks for a mother or father, or husband or wife, or son and daughter; it just does. And so when you ask about pain, that’s pain. I reach out to a lot of the families, I spend time with them. I am always inspired by their spirit. Most people have asked me to do one thing, and that is to make sure that their child didn’t die in vain—and I agree with that—that the sacrifice has been worth it. We’ll accomplish our objective; we’ve got to constantly adjust our tactics to do so. We’ve got to insist that the Iraqis take more responsibility more quickly in order to do so. But I—look, my heart breaks for them, it just does, on a regular basis.

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Q. But beyond that, sir, do you question your own decisions? THE PRESIDENT: No, I haven’t questioned whether or not it was right to take Saddam Hussein out, nor have I questioned the necessity for the American people—I mean, I’ve questioned it; I’ve come to the conclusion it’s the right decision. But I also know it’s the right decision for America to stay engaged, and to take the lead, and to deal with these radicals and extremists, and to help support young democracies. It’s the calling of our time. And I firmly believe it is necessary. And I believe the next President, whoever the person is, will have the same charge, the same obligations to deal with terrorists so they don’t hurt us, and to help young democracies survive the threats of radicalism and extremism. It’s in our nation’s interest to do so. But the most painful aspect of the presidency is the fact that I know my decisions have caused young men and women to lose their lives. Q. A question about the Iraq Study Group Report. One of the things that it recommends is greater dialogue, direct talks with Syria and Iran. James Baker himself, Secretary of State under your father, says that it’s a lot like it was during the Cold War when we talked to the Soviet Union. He says it’s important to talk to your adversaries. Is he wrong? THE PRESIDENT: Let me start with Iran. We made it perfectly clear to them what it takes to come to the table, and that is a suspension of their enrichment program. If they verifiably suspend—that they’ve stopped enrichment, we will come to the table with our EU3 partners and Russia, and discuss a way forward for them. Don, it should be evident to the Iranians, if this is what they want to do. … I read the Foreign Minister said the other day that, yes, we’ll sit down with America, after they leave Iraq. If they want to sit down with us, for the good of the Iranian people, they ought to verifiably suspend their program. We’ve made that clear to them. It is obvious to them how to move forward. The Iranian people can do better than becoming—than be an isolated nation. This is a proud nation with a fantastic history and tradition. And yet they’ve got a leader who constantly sends messages to the world that Iran is out of step with the majority of thinkers, that Iran is willing to become isolated—to the detriment of the people. I mean, I was amazed that, once again, there was this conference about the Holocaust that heralded a really backward view of the history of the world. And all that said to me was, is that the leader in Iran is willing to say things that really hurts his country and further isolates the Iranian people. My message to the Iranian people is you can do better than to have somebody try to rewrite history. You can do better than somebody who hasn’t strengthened your economy. And you can do better than having somebody who’s trying to develop a nuclear weapon that the world believes you shouldn’t have. There’s a better way forward. Syria—the message is the same. We have met with Syria since I have been the President of the United States. We have talked to them about what is necessary for them to have a better relationship with the United States. And they’re not unreasonable requests. We’ve suggested to them that they no longer allow Saddamists to send money and arms across their border into Iraq to

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fuel the violence—some of the violence that we see. We’ve talked to them about—they’ve got to leave the democrat Lebanon alone. Q. Part of the process of looking at the way forward could reasonably include considering how we got to where we are. Has that been part of your process? And what lessons—after five years now of war, what lessons will you take into the final two years of your presidency? THE PRESIDENT: Look, absolutely, Jim, that it is important for us to be successful going forward is to analyze that which went wrong. And clearly one aspect of this war that has not gone right is the sectarian violence inside Baghdad—a violent reaction by both Sunni and Shia to each other that has caused a lot of loss of life, as well as some movements in neighborhoods inside of Baghdad. It is a troubling, very troubling, aspect of trying to help this Iraqi government succeed. And therefore, a major consideration of our planners is how to deal with that, and how to help—more importantly, how to help the Iraqis deal with sectarian violence. There are a couple of theaters inside of Iraq, war theaters. One, of course, is Baghdad, itself, where the sectarian violence is brutal. And we’ve got to help them—we’ve got to help the Maliki government stop it and crack it and prevent it from spreading, in order to be successful. … Secondly, is the battle against the Sunnis—Sunni extremists—some of them Saddamists, some of there are al Qaeda, but all of them aiming to try to drive the United States out of Iraq before the job is done. And we’re making good progress against them. It’s hard fighting, it’s been hard work, but our special ops teams, along with Iraqis, are on the hunt and bringing people to justice. There’s issues in the south of Iraq, mainly Shia-on-Shia tensions. But primarily, the toughest fight for this new government is inside of Baghdad. Most of the deaths, most of the violence is within a 30-mile radius of Baghdad, as well as in Anbar Province. In other words, a lot of the country is moving along positively. But it’s this part of the fight that is getting our attention. And, frankly, we have—it has been that aspect of the battle, toward a government which can defend and govern itself and be an ally in the war on terror, where we have not made as much progress as we’d have hoped to have made. Success in Iraq will be success—there will be a combination of military success, political success and reconstruction. And they’ve got to go hand-in-hand. That’s why I think it’s important that the moderate coalition is standing up. In other words, it’s the beginning of a political process that I hope will marginalize the radicals and extremists who are trying to stop the advance of a free Iraq. That’s why the oil law is going to be a very important piece of legislation. In other words, when this government begins to send messages that we will put laws in place that help unify the country, it’s going to make the security situation easier to deal with. On the other hand, without better, stronger security measures, it’s going to be hard to get the political process to move forward. And so it’s—we’ve got a parallel strategy. So when you hear me talking about the military—I know there’s a lot of discussion about troops, and there should be. But we’ve got to keep in mind we’ve also got to make sure we have a parallel political process and a reconstruction process going together concurrently with a new military strategy.

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I thought it was an interesting statement that Prime Minister Maliki made the other day about generals, former generals in the Saddam army, that they could come back in, or receive a pension. In other words, he’s beginning to reach out in terms of a reconciliation plan that I think is going to be important. I had interesting discussions the other day with provincial reconstruction team members in Iraq. These are really brave souls who work for the State Department that are in these different provinces helping these provincial governments rebuild and to see a political way forward. And one of the things that—most of these people were in the Sunni territory, that I had talked to, and most of them were very anxious for me to help them and help the Iraqi government put reconciliation plans in place. There’s a lot of people trying to make a choice as to whether or not they want to support a government, or whether or not their interest may lay in extremism. And they understand that a political process that is positive, that sends a signal, we want to be a unified country, will help these folks make a rational choice. And so it’s a multifaceted plan. And absolutely, we’re looking at where things went wrong, where expectations were dashed, and where things hadn’t gone the way we wanted them to have gone. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-1.html

8 Vice President Richard B. Cheney Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement, Annapolis, Maryland, May 24, 2002 … The United States has entered a struggle of years—a new kind of war against a new kind of enemy. The terrorists who struck America are ruthless, they are resourceful, and they hide in many countries. They came into our country to murder thousands of innocent, unsuspecting men, women, and children—including 14 graduates of this Academy. There is no doubting they wish to strike again, and are working to acquire the deadliest of all weapons. Against such enemies, America and the civilized world have only one option: Wherever terrorists operate, we must find them where they dwell stop them in their planning and one by one bring them to justice. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime and al-Qaida terrorists have met the fate they chose for themselves. And they got their first look at the new methods and capabilities of the American military—of military power that cannot and will not be evaded. When the campaign began in October, there were warnings that the obstacles would be extreme—and they were. Here, after all, was a landlocked country with a forbidding, mountainous terrain, and winter setting in. The enemy force was widely scattered, but well armed, protected by deep caves, and skilled in guerilla tactics. Added to that was the sheer mileage between our forces and the objective. We responded to these obstacles with a combination of tactics and technology that marked a turning point in modern warfare. The success of our coalition forces has shined very brightly in our Naval task forces, with unprecedented cooperation and integration from the operational to tactical levels. Operation Enduring Freedom assembled the largest naval task force since World War Two. Tomahawk missiles, precision-guided munitions, and tons of ordnance fell upon our enemies and their assets all day, all night, in all weather, around the clock. Our unmanned Predator aircraft gave commanders

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a clear and immediate picture of conditions on the ground, allowing for swift and timely strikes. Overwhelming air power, much of it off our carriers, removed the need for large stationary forces on land. Within three weeks after the campaign began, Special Ops were on the ground—going to the far corners of Afghanistan meeting with tribal leaders forming them into military units and leading them into combat. Small teams of Navy SEALS scoured the countryside, engaging enemy holdouts, designating targets by laser, and calling in precision air strikes from hundreds of miles away. All of this represents a dramatic advance in our ability to engage and defeat an adversary. The Persian Gulf War showed the tremendous effect of precision-guided munitions. Yet that technology was the exception, making up only a small percentage of munitions fired. In Afghanistan, the majority of our munitions were precision-guided—making our strikes far deadlier for the enemy, and far less so for innocent civilians. In the Gulf War, air tasking orders with targeting assignments were written at headquarters in Saudi Arabia, then flown out to carriers and given to the pilots. This time, targeting assignments were transmitted directly to pilots by special forces near the targets themselves. In the Gulf War, naval expeditionary forces were part of a feint and the supporting attack. In Afghanistan, naval expeditionary forces opened the conventional ground war by establishing a forward-operating base 450 miles inland—more than twice the distance that previous military doctrine considered supportable. The combination of advantages already seen in this conflict—precision power from the air, real-time intelligence, special forces, the long reach of Naval task forces, and close coordination with local forces—will only become more vital in future campaigns. The war on terror has accelerated changes in thinking and strategy that were already in the making. President Bush has often spoken of how America can keep the peace by redefining war on our terms. That means that our armed services must have every tool to answer any threat that forms against us. It means that any enemy conspiring to harm America or our friends must face a swift and certain and devastating response. As we transform our military to meet the challenges of the new century, sea power will remain central to American strategy. Able to move freely around the world’s oceans, our naval forces can project great power from over the horizon against targets both at sea and far inland. Our carrier groups allow the commander in chief to commit forces while retaining flexibility. With ships and submarines, often already in place around the globe, we can dispatch precision air strikes, launch sea-based rockets and missiles, deploy SEALS and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces by day or night, from close by or from a distance. The Navy and Marine team can do all of this, while fighting alongside the Army and Air Force to deliver the full measure of U.S. military capability. And we have found new ways to use our sea power. The carrier USS Kitty Hawk deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom, without most of her air wing, to serve as a staging platform for British and American special forces—thus creating a base invulnerable to the asymmetric threats posed

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by terrorists or by terror regimes. At the same time, sea power allows us to protect our interests overseas to provide a stabilizing presence and on short notice to deliver humanitarian relief. In your careers, Naval operations will be every bit as important, if not more so, than they were in the last century. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-25.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 The danger to America requires action on many fronts all at once. We are reorganizing the federal government to protect the nation against further attack. The new Department of Homeland Security will gather under one roof the capability to identify threats, to check them against our vulnerabilities, and to move swiftly to protect the nation. At the same time, we realize that wars are never won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy. We will take every step necessary to make sure our country is secure, and we will prevail. Much has happened since the attacks of 9/11. But as Secretary Rumsfeld has put it, we are still closer to the beginning of this war than we are to its end. The United States has entered a struggle of years—a new kind of war against a new kind of enemy. The terrorists who struck America are ruthless, they are resourceful, and they hide in many countries. They came into our country to murder thousands of innocent men, women, and children. There is no doubt they wish to strike again, and that they are working to acquire the deadliest of all weapons. Against such enemies, America and the civilized world have only one option: wherever terrorists operate, we must find them where they dwell, stop them in their planning, and one by one bring them to justice. The combination of advantages already seen in this conflict—precision power from the air, real-time intelligence, special forces, the long reach of Naval task forces, and close coordination with local forces represents a dramatic advance in our ability to engage and defeat the enemy. These advantages will only become more vital in future campaigns. President Bush has often spoken of how America can keep the peace by redefining war on our terms. That means that our armed services must have every tool to answer any threat that forms against us. It means that any enemy conspiring to harm America or our friends must face a swift, a certain and a devastating response. … The President has asked Congress for a one-year increase of more than $48 billion for national defense, the largest since Ronald Reagan lived in the White House. And for the good of the nation’s military families, he has also asked Congress to provide every person in uniform a raise in pay. We think they’ve earned it. In this war we’ve assembled a broad coalition of civilized nations that recognize the danger and are working with us on all fronts. The President has made very clear that there is no neutral ground in the fight against terror.

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Those who harbor terrorists share guilt for the acts they commit. Under the Bush Doctrine, a regime that harbors or supports terrorists will be regarded as hostile to the United States. The Taliban has already learned that lesson, but Afghanistan was only the beginning of a lengthy campaign. Were we to stop now, any sense of security we might have would be false and temporary. There is a terrorist underworld out there, spread among more than 60 countries. The job we have will require every tool at our means of diplomacy, of finance, of intelligence, of law enforcement, and of military power. But we will, over time, find and defeat the enemies of the United States. In the case of Osama bin Laden—as President Bush said recently—‘‘If he’s alive, we’ll get him. If he’s not alive—we already got him.’’ But the challenges to our country involve more than just tracking down a single person or one small group. Nine-eleven and its aftermath awakened this nation to danger, to the true ambitions of the global terror network, and to the reality that weapons of mass destruction are being sought by determined enemies who would not hesitate to use them against us. It is a certainty that the al Qaeda network is pursuing such weapons, and has succeeded in acquiring at least a crude capability to use them. We found evidence of their efforts in the ruins of al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. And we’ve seen in recent days additional confirmation in videos recently shown on CNN—pictures of al Qaeda members training to commit acts of terror, and testing chemical weapons on dogs. Those terrorists who remain at large are determined to use these capabilities against the United States and our friends and allies around the world. As we face this prospect, old doctrines of security do not apply. In the days of the Cold War, we were able to manage the threat with strategies of deterrence and containment. But it’s a lot tougher to deter enemies who have no country to defend. And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States. The case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of our country, requires a candid appraisal of the facts. After his defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam agreed under to U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 to cease all development of weapons of mass destruction. He agreed to end his nuclear weapons program. He agreed to destroy his chemical and his biological weapons. He further agreed to admit U.N. inspection teams into his country to ensure that he was in fact complying with these terms. In the past decade, Saddam has systematically broken each of these agreements. The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago. These are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam can hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond. On the nuclear question, many of you will recall that Saddam’s nuclear ambitions suffered a severe setback in 1981 when the Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor. They suffered another major blow in Desert Storm and its aftermath.

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But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we’ve gotten this from the firsthand testimony of defectors—including Saddam’s own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam’s direction. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon, we cannot really gauge. Intelligence is an uncertain business, even in the best of circumstances. This is especially the case when you are dealing with a totalitarian regime that has made a science out of deceiving the international community. Let me give you just one example of what I mean. Prior to the Gulf War, America’s top intelligence analysts would come to my office in the Defense Department and tell me that Saddam Hussein was at least five or perhaps even 10 years away from having a nuclear weapon. After the war we learned that he had been much closer than that, perhaps within a year of acquiring such a weapon. Saddam also devised an elaborate program to conceal his active efforts to build chemical and biological weapons. And one must keep in mind the history of U.N. inspection teams in Iraq. Even as they were conducting the most intrusive system of arms control in history, the inspectors missed a great deal. Before being barred from the country, the inspectors found and destroyed thousands of chemical weapons, and hundreds of tons of mustard gas and other nerve agents. Yet Saddam Hussein had sought to frustrate and deceive them at every turn, and was often successful in doing so. I’ll cite one instance. During the spring of 1995, the inspectors were actually on the verge of declaring that Saddam’s programs to develop chemical weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles had been fully accounted for and shut down. Then Saddam’s son-inlaw suddenly defected and began sharing information. Within days the inspectors were led to an Iraqi chicken farm. Hidden there were boxes of documents and lots of evidence regarding Iraq’s most secret weapons programs. That should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself. To the dismay of the inspectors, they in time discovered that Saddam had kept them largely in the dark about the extent of his program to mass produce VX, one of the deadliest chemicals known to man. And far from having shut down Iraq’s prohibited missile programs, the inspectors found that Saddam had continued to test such missiles, almost literally under the noses of the U.N. inspectors. Against that background, a person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq, and then our worries will be over. Saddam has perfected the game of cheat and retreat, and is very skilled in the art of denial and deception. A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow ‘‘back in his box.’’ Meanwhile, he would continue to plot. Nothing in the last dozen years has stopped him—not his agreements; not the discoveries of the inspectors; not the revelations by defectors; not criticism or ostracism by the international community; and not four days of bombings by the U.S. in 1998. What he

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wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms. Should all his ambitions be realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle East, for the United States, and for the peace of the world. The whole range of weapons of mass destruction then would rest in the hands of a dictator who has already shown his willingness to use such weapons, and has done so, both in his war with Iran and against his own people. Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the world’s oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail. Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors—confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth. … There is no basis in Saddam Hussein’s conduct or history to discount any of the concerns that I am raising this morning. We are, after all, dealing with the same dictator who shoots at American and British pilots in the no-fly zone, on a regular basis, the same dictator who dispatched a team of assassins to murder former President Bush as he traveled abroad, the same dictator who invaded Iran and Kuwait, and has fired ballistic missiles at Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, the same dictator who has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism for the better part of two decades. In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation, and consultation with our allies. I know our president very well. I’ve worked beside him as he directed our response to the events of 9/11. I know that he will proceed cautiously and deliberately to consider all possible options to deal with the threat that an Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein represents. And I am confident that he will, as he has said he would, consult widely with the Congress and with our friends and allies before deciding upon a course of action. He welcomes the debate that has now been joined here at home, and he has made it clear to his national security team that he wants us to participate fully in the hearings that will be held in Congress next month on this vitally important issue. We will profit as well from a review of our own history. There are a lot of World War II veterans in the hall today. For the United States, that war began on December 7, 1941, with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the near-total destruction of our Pacific Fleet. Only then did we recognize the magnitude of the danger to our country. Only then did the Axis powers fully declare their intentions against us. By that point, many countries had fallen. Many millions had died. And our nation was plunged into a two-front war resulting in more than a million American casualties. To this day, historians continue to analyze that war, speculating on how we might have prevented Pearl Harbor, and asking what actions might have averted the tragedies that rate among the worst in human history.

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America in the year 2002 must ask careful questions, not merely about our past, but also about our future. The elected leaders of this country have a responsibility to consider all of the available options. And we are doing so. What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness. We will not simply look away, hope for the best, and leave the matter for some future administration to resolve. As President Bush has said, time is not on our side. Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action. Now and in the future, the United States will work closely with the global coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And the entire world must know that we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our freedom and our security. As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: ‘‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action.’’ If the United States could have preempted 9/11, we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we will, no question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes. I am familiar with the arguments against taking action in the case of Saddam Hussein. Some concede that Saddam is evil, power-hungry, and a menace—but that, until he crosses the threshold of actually possessing nuclear weapons, we should rule out any preemptive action. That logic seems to me to be deeply flawed. The argument comes down to this: yes, Saddam is as dangerous as we say he is, we just need to let him get stronger before we do anything about it. Yet if we did wait until that moment, Saddam would simply be emboldened, and it would become even harder for us to gather friends and allies to oppose him. As one of those who worked to assemble the Gulf War coalition, I can tell you that our job then would have been infinitely more difficult in the face of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein. And many of those who now argue that we should act only if he gets a nuclear weapon, would then turn around and say that we cannot act because he has a nuclear weapon. At bottom, that argument counsels a course of inaction that itself could have devastating consequences for many countries, including our own. Another argument holds that opposing Saddam Hussein would cause even greater troubles in that part of the world, and interfere with the larger war against terror. I believe the opposite is true. Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab ‘‘street,’’ the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘‘sure to erupt in joy in the

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same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’’ Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The reality is that these times bring not only dangers but also opportunities. In the Middle East, where so many have known only poverty and oppression, terror and tyranny, we look to the day when people can live in freedom and dignity and the young can grow up free of the conditions that breed despair, hatred, and violence. In other times the world saw how the United States defeated fierce enemies, then helped rebuild their countries, forming strong bonds between our peoples and our governments. Today in Afghanistan, the world is seeing that America acts not to conquer but to liberate, and remains in friendship to help the people build a future of stability, self-determination, and peace. We would act in that same spirit after a regime change in Iraq. With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that troubled land all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to live their own lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at a Town Hall Meeting, John Q. Hammons Convention Center, Joplin, Missouri, August 11, 2004 If you reflect back on January 20th, of 2001, when we were sworn in that day, the planning for the attack of 9/11 was already well underway. Most of the terrorists had already been recruited. Many of them had been through the training camps in Afghanistan, where they trained to kill Americans. Some of them were already in the United States. They’d raised the money. They’d been planning that attack since 1996, five years before. It took them that long to get all the pieces put together. But they’re very patient. They’re absolutely lethal, and once they put their mind on a target like that, they operated according to their timetable, not ours or anybody else’s. But all the planning for 9/11 was well underway. We also had a situation in Afghanistan where the Taliban had taken over, and had turned Afghanistan into a training camp for terrorists, into a safe haven for terrorists—specifically for the al Qaeda organization. So there were thousands of them there, including Osama bin Laden, the leader. And they had turned out sometime in the late ’90s, between 1997 and about 2000, they’d trained—20,000 terrorists had gone through those camps, and then spread back out around the world to some 60 different countries, including here in the United States, where they set up terror cells.

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In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was in power. He’d started two wars. He had provided safe haven and sanctuary for terrorists for many, many years. He was paying $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers. He provided a home for al Qaeda, and for Abu Nidal … he’d also obviously developed and used weapons of mass destruction in the past, both against the Iraqis and the Iranians. And we had a couple of other developments in that part of the world that were not public at the time that were very important. The A.Q. Khan network was in business. Mr. Khan was a Pakistani, a man who had acquired and then developed the technology to develop nuclear weapons. He knew how to acquire the uranium feedstock, to design the centrifuges to enrich the uranium, and he had a weapons design. And he had, in fact, been the father of the Pakistan nuclear program. And once he completed that task, he had diverted this whole network to his own purposes. And he was selling nuclear weapons technology to North Korea, to Iran, and to Libya. Moammar Ghadafi in Libya was spending millions of dollars to acquire this capability and was well on his way. Once that whole process had been completed, he would have been in possession then of nuclear weapons. He wasn’t there yet, but he was working on it. We also had a situation in the fact that the terrorists had learned two unfortunate lessons, if you will, at our expense in the prior period of time before we were sworn in. They’d learned, first of all, that they could strike at the United States with relative impunity—because they had, repeatedly. And the best response we usually came up with was to treat each attack as some kind of criminal enterprise. We’d go after the individuals who’d launched the attack. Sometimes we’d catch them, put them in prison. But we never really reached behind the individuals to look at the networks that had undertaken these attacks. Of course, we’d been hit in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983, when we lost 241 Marines, when they blew up the barracks; 1993, first attack on the World Trade Center; 1996, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; 1998, the East Africa Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya; 2000, the USS Cole—a whole sequence of attacks, most of which had gone unanswered, or the answer had been a law enforcement response. Once we fired off a few cruise missiles at a training camp in Afghanistan. But from the standpoint of the terrorists, they could strike us, and there was no real penalty to be paid. And the second lesson they’d learned was that if they hit us hard enough, they could change our policy—because they had. After we got hit in Lebanon in 1983, in relatively short order we pulled out of Lebanon completely. In 1993, in Mogadishu—there, they killed 19 of our soldiers, and within a matter of weeks, we’d withdrawn all of our forces from Somalia. And so those two lessons—if you hit the U.S., and you won’t be struck in return; and if you hit the U.S., and you can change U.S. policy if you do it—and that was sort of the set of circumstances that were out there when we were sworn in. And then the attack of 9/11 came, and, of course, it changed everything. I think everybody came to realize at that moment that we were, in fact, at war—that we’d been at war for some time. Our enemies knew it; we didn’t. We hadn’t really as a nation come to grips with that basic fundamental proposition.

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But 9/11 changed everything in the sense that it forced us to think anew about our enemies, about who our enemies were, about the kind of threat we faced as a nation, about what kind of strategy we needed to pursue to be able to safeguard our nation from those attacks. The President made a very basic, fundamental decision that very first night after the attacks. And that was that henceforth, we would hold accountable those—not only the terrorists, but also those who supported terror. If a state or a government provided safe harbor or sanctuary, or financing, or training or weapons to a terrorist organization, they would be deemed just as guilty of the terrorist act as the terrorists themselves. They [the terrorists] are also prepared to use weapons of mass destruction if they can ever get their hands on them. And the worst proposition we face today by way of a threat is the possibility of an al Qaeda cell in the middle of one of our own cities with a biological agent, like smallpox, maybe, or a nuclear weapon of some kind that they would be prepared to detonate. And there’s nothing to restrain them. There’s no reason why they wouldn’t use that kind of capability once they get their hands on it. Our old strategies from the Cold War worked great against the Soviets, but the whole concept of deterrence means nothing when you’re talking about an al Qaeda terrorist who is prepared to die for Allah, and whose purpose here is to take as many people with him as he possibly can—primarily Americans. That’s the kind of adversary we’re faced with here for the foreseeable future. It doesn’t take large numbers of them. Nineteen hijackers, we saw what they could do on 9/11 when they killed 3,000 of our people in a couple of hours on a beautiful September morning without any provocation whatsoever. Part of the debate that we’ll be dealing with this years is over this question of when is it appropriate to use U.S. military force, when are we justified in moving aggressively against a sponsor of terror, or a group of terrorists, or of taking military action, if that’s what is called for, in order to defend the United States. There are those who believe we should never be preemptive, that we should never take that first step. But when you consider the threat, when you consider the consequences of failing to deal with the threat might, in fact, be the destruction of one of our own cities, then I think it begins to put things in perspective—that it’s absolutely essential to do exactly what the President has done, which is to say that United States will not wait for the next attack. We’re not going to stand by and let somebody take a shot at us before we respond. We’ve put them on notice now that if you have aspirations to hit the U.S., you will be struck … Q. … How can America be expected to defeat terrorism when we have to fight based on a set of rules and the terrorists don’t? THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, a set of rules—maybe you can clarify that. Q. From hiding in mosques—we can’t really attacks mosques, to even from door-to-door, things we do over here with the ACLU and that kind of thing on civil rights? THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, that’s an interesting question because we do want to take whatever steps are necessary to be able to defeat the terrorists. We’ve done such things, for example, as enact the Patriot Act, which allows us

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to do a more effective job of going after, investigating, and prosecuting terrorists. But basically, what we did there wasn’t to invent new legal tools, so much as take ones that were already being used, for example, against drug traffickers, and apply those over in the terrorism field. And we need to take extraordinary steps to do everything we can to defend the country. I think we’ve done that to a large extent in creating the Department of Homeland Security. So we’ve done a lot of that. The cautionary note is there’s a line out there someplace that it’s hard to define, but it is a line you don’t want to cross over that would, in effect, where the government would become so onerous, so heavy handed, would intrude so deeply in the lives of all of us, that the terrorists would win without ever firing a shot. You don’t want that to happen either. So it calls for real judgment and balance. I think it’s important for us as we fight terror also to do as the oath of office the President and I took when we were sworn in, support and defend the Constitution of the United States. So you got to find your way forward here to marshal the resources and defend the nation to take those steps necessary to defeat the terrorists, but at the same time not sort of lock down the country so tight that we fundamentally change our way of life, which is, after all, one of the objectives of the terrorists. We don’t want that to happen either. And I think we can do it. I’m an optimist about it. That doesn’t mean that there won’t be tough days ahead. I think there will be. That doesn’t mean there won’t be more attacks on the United States. We know they’re out there trying to get at us. It doesn’t mean we won’t have to be committed with troops overseas, or that we won’t take casualties … SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040812.html EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see speech Vice President Cheney’s Remarks at a Kobach Breakfast, Overland Park, Kansas, August 24, 2004 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2004/08/20040824-3.html).

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at a Town Hall Meeting, Radisson Quad City Plaza, Davenport, Iowa, August 24, 2004 … What we found, obviously, as of 9/11, when we were struck that morning and lost some 3,000 Americans, the deadliest attack that ever occurred on American soil, we obviously discovered that we were in a situation that was dramatically different from what had gone before. It forced us to think in new ways about national security strategy. We had gone through the period of the Cold War, for example, based on a strategy of deterrence that we could persuade the Soviets never to attack the United States by holding at risk those things that the Soviets valued, in terms of their basic real estate and their national security. Those concepts have no meaning when you talk about al Qaeda. There’s nothing you can hold at risk to keep al Qaeda from launching attacks against the United States. We were faced with a whole new set of concerns, and that strategy that had worked so well during the Cold War simply

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didn’t have much bearing when it came time to protect the United States against the new threat. What we’ve done since then, obviously, is we’ve spent a lot of time and effort at strengthening our defenses here at home, and creating the Department of Homeland Security, at passing the Patriot Act that gave our law enforcement people more tools to use in prosecuting terrorists, recently set up Project BioShield. This will give us better defenses against a potential attack with biological weapons, a number of steps to strengthen our defenses, but what the President recognized, which was an absolutely crucial decision, was that there’s no such thing as a perfect defense, that we can have a defense that is successful 99.9 percent of the time, but that the terrorists potentially armed with deadlier weapons than any we’ve ever had used on us before, potentially armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons—because we know they’re trying to acquire that kind of capability—those terrorists could, in fact, do devastating harm to the United States if they’re successful only one-tenth of 1 percent of the time. And it was that basic, fundamental decision—some people have come to refer to as the Bush doctrine—that was vital, I believe, in terms of having a successful strategy. I don’t think we can defend the United States going forward from this point on if we’re prepared only to use military force after we’re attacked. We’ve already been attacked. In Iraq, of course, not only is Saddam Hussein no longer in power today, he’s in jail, which is where he ought to be. I don’t want to underestimate the difficulty of the task in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ve got a lot of tough days ahead of us. There will be good days and bad days. But we’re making significant progress. We’re moving in the right direction. And if we can establish free governments, democratically elected governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can begin to fundamentally change the dynamics in that part of the world that have generated the dynamic, or the forces, if you will, that have produced the terrorists that have launched attacks not only against New York and Washington, but also Casablanca, and Madrid, and Mombassa, and Bali, and Jakarta, and Istanbul, and Riyadh, and so many other cities around the world since 9/11. That’s what we’re all about. Not only did we succeed there, of course, but when Colonel Ghadafi in Libya saw us succeed against Saddam Hussein, five days after we arrested Saddam, Colonel Ghadafi went public and said he was going to give up his aspirations to have nuclear weapons. And all of that material now, the weapons design, the uranium feedstocks, the centrifuges to enrich the uranium, it’s all under lock and key down at Oak Ridge, in Tennessee. And, of course, the network that Mr. A.Q. Khan had established is now out of business. Mr. Khan is under house arrest in Pakistan. And his suppliers are no longer in the business of supplying nuclear weapons technology to outlaw regimes around the world—a very significant set of accomplishments. And we’ve now managed for nearly three years to avoid another attack. But we should not underestimate the dedication and determination of our enemy. They’re still out there. They’re doing what they can to find ways to launch attacks against the United States. There’s reason to believe they’d like to try to do here what they’ve done so many other places around

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the world, and try to influence, if you will, the outcome of the political process … SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040824-4.html EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see Remarks by Vice President Cheney at a Victory 2004 Rally, Kettering High School, Waterford, Michigan, August 24, 2004 (http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040824-7.html).

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terrorism, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., November 22, 2005 My remarks today concern national security, in particular the war on terror and the Iraq front in that war. Several days ago, I commented briefly on some recent statements that have been made by some members of Congress about Iraq. Within hours of my speech, a report went out on the wires under the headline, quote, ‘‘Cheney says War Critics Dishonest, Reprehensible,’’ end quote. One thing I’ve learned in the last five years is that when you’re vice president you’re lucky if your speeches get any attention at all. But I have a quarrel with that headline, and it’s important to make this point at the outset. I do not believe it is wrong to criticize the war on terror or any aspect thereof. Disagreement, argument and debate are the essence of democracy … On the question of national security, feelings run especially strong. And there are deeply held differences of opinion on how to best protect the United States and our friends against the dangers of our time. Recently my friend and former colleague Jack Murtha called for a complete withdrawal of American forces now serving in Iraq, with a drawdown to begin at once. I disagree with Jack and believe his proposal would not serve the best interest of this nation. But he’s a good man, a Marine, a patriot, and he’s taking a clear stand in an entirely legitimate discussion. Nor is there any problem with debating whether the United States and our allies should have liberated Iraq in the first place. Here, as well, the differing views are very passionately and forcefully stated. But nobody is saying we should not be having this discussion or that you cannot reexamine a decision made by the president and the Congress some years ago. To the contrary, I believe it is critical that we continue to remind ourselves why this nation took action and why Iraq is the central front in the war on terror and why we have a duty to persevere. What is not legitimate and what I will again say is dishonest and reprehensible is the suggestion by some U.S. senators that the president of the United States or any member of his administration purposely misled the American people on prewar intelligence. Some of the most irresponsible comments have come from politicians who actually voted in favor of authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein.

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Available intelligence indicated that the dictator of Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and this judgment was shared by the intelligence agencies of many other nations, according to the bipartisan Silberman-Robb commission. All of us understood, as well, that for more than a decade, the U.N. Security Council had demanded that Saddam Hussein make a full accounting of his weapons programs. The burden of proof was entirely on the dictator of Iraq, not on the U.N. or the United States or anyone else. And he repeatedly refused to comply throughout the course of the decade. Permit me to burden you with a bit more history. In August of 1998, the U.S. passed a resolution urging President Clinton to take appropriate action to compel Saddam to come into compliance with his obligations to the Security Council. Not a single senator voted no. Two months later in October of ’98, again without a single dissenting vote in the United States Senate, the Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. It explicitly adopted as American policy supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and promoting an Iraqi democracy in its place. And just two months after signing the Iraq Liberation Law, President Clinton ordered that Iraq be bombed in an effort to destroy facilities that he believed were connected to Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programs. By the time Congress voted to authorize force in late 2002, there was broadbased, bipartisan agreement that the time had come to enforce the legitimate demands of the international community. And our thinking was informed by what had happened to our country on the morning of September 11th, 2001. As the prime target of terrorists who have shown an ability to hit America and who wish to do so in spectacular fashion, we have a responsibility to do everything we can to keep terrible weapons out of the hands of these enemies. And we must hold to account regimes that could supply those weapons to terrorists in defiance of the civilized world. As the president has said, terrorists and terror states do not reveal threats with fair notice, in formal declarations. And responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. In a post-9/11 world, the president and Congress of the United States declined to trust the word of a dictator who had a history of weapons of mass destruction programs, who actually used weapons of mass destruction against innocent civilians in his own country, who tried to assassinate a former president of the United States, who was routinely shooting at allied pilots trying to enforce no-fly zones, who had excluded weapons inspectors, who had defied the demands of the international community, whose regime had been designated an official state sponsor of terror and who had committed mass murder. Those are the facts. Although our coalition has not found WMD stockpiles in Iraq, I repeat that we never had the burden of proof; Saddam Hussein did. We operated on the best available intelligence gathered over a period of years and within a totalitarian society ruled by fear and secret police. We also had the experience of first Gulf War, when the intelligence community had seriously underestimated the extent and progress Saddam had made toward developing nuclear weapons.

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Finally, according to the Duelfer report, Saddam Hussein wanted to preserve the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction when sanctions were lifted. And we now know that the sanctions regime had lost its effectiveness and been totally undermined by Saddam Hussein’s successful effort to corrupt the oil-for-food program. The flaws in the intelligence are plain enough in hindsight. But any suggestion that prewar information was distorted, hyped or fabricated by the leader of the nation is utterly false. In the war on terror we face a loose network of committed fanatics found in many countries, operating under different commanders. Yet the branches of this network share the same basic ideology and the same dark vision for the world. The terrorists want to end American and Western influence in the Middle East. Their goal in that region is to gain control of a country so they have a base from which to launch attacks and to wage war against governments that do not meet their demands. For a time, the terrorists had such a base in Afghanistan under the backward and violent rule of the Taliban. And the terrorists hope to overturn Iraq’s democratic government and return that country to the rule of tyrants. The terrorists believe that by controlling an entire country, they will be able to target and overthrow other governments in the region and to establish a radical Islamic empire that encompasses a region from Spain across North Africa through the Middle East and South Asia all the way to Indonesia. They have made clear as well their ultimate ambitions: to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction, to destroy Israel, to intimidate all Western countries and to cause mass death in the United States. Some have suggested that by liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein we simply stirred up a hornet’s nest. They overlook a fundamental fact: We were not in Iraq on September 11th, 2001, and the terrorists hit us anyway. The reality is the terrorists were at war with our country long before the liberation of Iraq and long before the attacks of 9/11. And for many years, they were the ones on the offensive. They grew bolder in the belief that if they killed Americans, they could change American policy. In Beirut in 1983, terrorists killed 241 of our servicemen. Thereafter, the United States withdrew from Beirut. In Mogadishu in 1993, terrorists killed 19 American soldiers. Thereafter, the U.S. withdrew its forces from Somalia. Over time the terrorists concluded that they could strike America without paying a price, because they did repeatedly: the bombing at the World Trade Center in 1993, the murders at the Saudi National Guard Training Center in Riyadh in 1995, the Khobar Towers in 1996, the simultaneous bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and, of course, the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. Believing they could strike us with impunity and that they could change U.S. policy, they attacked us on 9/11 here in the homeland, killing 3,000 people. Now they’re making a stand in Iraq, testing our resolve, trying to intimidate the United States into abandoning our friends and permitting the overthrow of this new Middle Eastern democracy.

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Recently, we obtained a message from the number two man in Al Qaida, Mr. Zawahiri, that he sent to his chief deputy in Iraq, the terrorist Zarqawi. The letter makes clear that Iraq is part of a larger plan of imposing Islamic radicalism across the broader Middle East, making Iraq a terrorist haven and a staging ground for attacks against other nations. Zawahiri also expresses the view that America can be made to run again. In light of the commitments our country has made, and given the stated intentions of the enemy, those who advocate a sudden withdraw from Iraq should answer a few simple questions: Would the United States and other free nations be better off or worse off with Zarqawi, bin Laden and Zawahiri in control of Iraq? Would we be safer or less safe with Iraq ruled by men intent on the destruction of our country? It is a dangerous illusion to suppose that another retreat by the civilized world would satisfy the appetite of the terrorists and get them to leave us alone. In fact, such a retreat would convince the terrorists that free nations will change our policies, forsake our friends, abandon our interests whenever we are confronted with murder and blackmail. A precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would be a victory for the terrorists, an invitation to further violence against free nations and a terrible blow to the future security of the United States of America. So much self-defeating pessimism about Iraq comes at a time of real progress in that country. Coalition forces are making decisive strikes against terrorist strongholds and more and more they are doing so with the Iraqi forces at their side. There are more than 90 Iraqi army battalions fighting the terrorists along with our forces. On the political side, every benchmark has been met successfully, starting with the turnover of sovereignty more than a year ago, the national elections last January, the drafting of the constitution and its ratification by voters this last month and, a few weeks from now, the election of a new government under that new constitution. The political leaders of Iraq are steady and courageous, and the citizens, police and soldiers of that country have proudly stepped forward as active participants and guardians in a new democracy: running for office and speaking out, voting and sacrificing for their country. Iraqi citizens are doing all of this despite threats from terrorists who offer no political agenda for Iraq’s future and wage a campaign of mass slaughter against the Iraqi people themselves, the vast majority of whom are fellow Arabs and fellow Muslims. Day after day, Iraqis are proving their determination to live in freedom, to chart their own destiny and to defend their own country. And they can know that the United States will keep our commitment to them. We will continue the work of reconstruction. Our forces will keep going after the terrorists and continue training the Iraqi military so that Iraqis can eventually take the lead in their country’s security, and our men and women can come home. The United States of America is a good country, a decent country, and we are making the world a better place by defending the innocent, confronting the violent and bringing freedom to the oppressed.

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We understand the continuing dangers to civilization. And we have the resources, the strength and the moral courage to overcome those dangers and lay the foundations for a better world. SOURCE: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-11_22_05_Cheney. html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terror, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., January 4, 2006 Our coalition has also put tremendous effort into standing up the Iraqi security forces, and we’ve come a great distance over the past year. More and more, coalition forces have Iraqis at their side, helping to clear out terrorists, and then staying in the area to maintain the peace. We’re helping build an Iraqi force that is sharp and well equipped, and this was vital to the success of last month’s elections. There are over 100 Iraqi combat battalions fighting the terrorists, along with our forces today. More than a dozen military bases our coalition used to occupy have been turned back to the Iraqis. Gradually, Iraqi forces are taking control of more and more territory, and as they undertake further missions on their own, confidence is growing within the country and more intelligence tips are coming in from the Iraqi people themselves. As the Iraqi army gains strength and experience, and as the political process advances, we’ll be able to decrease troop levels without losing our capacity to defeat the terrorists. We will stand firmly with Iraq’s leaders as they establish the institutions of a unified and a lasting democracy. On the political track, every benchmark has been met successfully—starting with the turnover of sovereignty a year and a half ago, national elections last January, the drafting of the constitution last summer, and the ratification of that constitution by voters in October, and, of course, most recently, the election of a new government under that constitution in December. The political leaders of Iraq are steady. They’re courageous, and the citizens, police and soldiers of that country have proudly stepped forward as active participants and guardians in a new democracy—running for office, speaking out, voting and sacrificing for their country. When I met with Prime Minister Jaafari in Baghdad, he pointed the voter turnout figures for the national elections, three of them in 2005—around 59 percent in January, some 63 percent in October, and approximately 70 percent turnout in December. Iraqi citizens have done all of this despite threats from terrorists who offer no political agenda for Iraq’s future, and wage a campaign of mass slaughter against the Iraqi people themselves, the vast majority of whom are fellow Muslims. Day after day, month after month, Iraqis have proven their determination to live in freedom, to chart their own destiny, and to defend their country. And they can know that the United States will keep our commitment to them. We will continue the work of reconstruction. Our forces will keep going after the terrorists, and continue training the Iraqi military, so that Iraqis can eventually take the lead in their country’s security and our men and women can

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come home. We will succeed in this mission, and when it is concluded, we will be a safer country here in the United States, as well. The President and I believe that the victory of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will be an inspiration to democratic reformers in other lands. In the broader Middle East and beyond, America will continue to encourage free institutions, individual liberty, and tolerance because these are the ideas and the aspirations that overcome ideologies of terror and violence and can turn societies to the pursuit of peace … Wartime conditions are, in every case, a test of military skill and national resolve. But this is especially true in the war on terror. Four years ago, President Bush told Congress and the country that the path ahead would be difficult, that we were heading into a long struggle, unlike any we have ever known. All this has come to pass. We have faced, and are facing today, enemies who hate us, who hate our country, and who hate the liberties for which we stand. They dwell in the shadows, wear no uniform, and have no regard for the laws of warfare, and feel unconstrained by any standard of morality. We’ve never had a fight like this—and those of us in positions of responsibility have a duty to wage a broad-scale effort for the sake of the nation’s freedom and our security. That effort includes a home front, with a great deal of urgent and difficult work and needed to persevere. In his speech to Congress after 9/11, President Bush said that the United States would, and I quote, ‘‘direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.’’ The Congress of the United States backed him up in full, authorizing the President to defeat an enemy that had already slipped into our country and waged a horrific attack that killed 3,000 innocent, unsuspecting men, women, and children on 9/11. The President also signed the Patriot Act, which removed the artificial barrier that used to exist between law enforcement and intelligence, and gave federal officials the ability to pursue terrorists with the tools they already use against drug traffickers and other kinds of criminals. That law has helped us to disrupt terrorist activity, to break up terror cells within the United States, and to protect the lives of Americans. We look forward to a renewal of the Patriot Act in 2006, because that law has done exactly what it was intended to do, and this country cannot afford to be without its protections. Another vital step the President took in the days following 9/11 was to authorize the National Security Agency to intercept a certain category of terrorist-linked international communications. There are no communications more important to the safety of the United States than those related to al Qaeda that have one end in the United States. If we’d been able to do this before 9/11, we might have been able to pick up on two hijackers who subsequently flew a jet into the Pentagon. They were in the United States, communicating with al Qaeda associates overseas. But we did not know they were here plotting until it was too late. If you recall, the report of the 9/11 Commission focused criticism on our inability to cover links between terrorists at home and terrorists abroad. The

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authorization the President made after September 11th helped address that problem in a manner that is fully consistent with the constitutional responsibilities and legal authority of the President and with the civil liberties of the American people. The activities conducted under this authorization have helped to detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks against the American people. As such, this program is critical to the national security of the United States. … SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060104-2.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 2006 Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., March 7, 2006 To prevail in this fight, we must understand the nature of the enemy. As Israelis have seen so many times, and as America experienced on September 11th, 2001, the terrorist enemy is brutal and heartless. This enemy wears no uniform, has no regard for the rules of warfare, and is unconstrained by any standard of decency or morality. We are dealing with enemies who plot and plan in secret, then attempt to slip into a country, blend in among the innocent, and kill without mercy. This enemy has a set of beliefs—and we saw the expression of those beliefs in the rule of the Taliban. They seek to impose a dictatorship of fear, under which every man, woman, and child lives in total obedience to a narrow, hateful ideology. This ideology rejects tolerance, denies freedom of conscience, and demands that women be pushed to the margins of society. Such beliefs can be imposed only through force and intimidation, so those who refuse to bow to the tyrants will be brutalized or killed—and no person or group is exempt. The terrorists have targeted people of every nationality and every religious faith, including Muslims who disagree with them. The war on terror is a fight against evil; victory in this war will be a victory for peaceful men and women of every religious faith. This enemy also has a set of clear objectives. The terrorists want to end all American and Western influence in the Middle East. Their goal in that region is to seize control of a country, so they have a base from which to launch attacks and wage war against governments that do not meet their demands. The terrorists believe that by controlling one country, they will be able to target and overthrow other governments in the region, and ultimately to establish a totalitarian empire that encompasses a region from Spain, across North Africa, through the Middle East and South Asia, all the way around to Indonesia. They have made clear, as well, their ultimate ambitions: to arm themselves with chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons; to destroy Israel; to intimidate all Western countries; and to cause mass death here in the United States. Some might look at these ambitions and wave them off as extreme and mad. Well, these ambitions are, indeed, extreme and they are mad. They are

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also real, and we must not wave them off. We must take them seriously. We must oppose them. And we must defeat them. Over the last several decades, Americans have seen how the terrorists pursue their objectives. Simply stated, they would hit us, but we would not hit back hard enough. In Beirut in 1983, terrorists killed 241 Americans, and afterward U.S. forces withdrew from Beirut. In 1993 we had the killing of American soldiers in Mogadishu, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Then came the attack on the Saudi National Guard Training Center in Riyadh in 1995; the killings at Khobar Towers in 1996; the attack on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and, of course, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. With each attack, the terrorists grew more confident in believing they could strike America without paying a price—and indeed, believing that if they killed enough Americans, they could change American policy. So they continued to wage those attacks—making the world less safe and eventually striking the United States in our homeland on September 11th. And we’ve seen the work of terrorists in many attacks since 9/11—in Jerusalem, Riyadh, Casablanca, Istanbul, Karachi, Mombassa, Bali, Jakarta, Najaf, Baghdad, London and Madrid. The terrorists have declared war on the civilized world. And America will lead the civilized world to victory. We have a strategy of our own in this fight. First, we are absolutely determined to prevent attacks before they occur, and so we are on the offensive against the terror networks. At home and with coalition partners abroad, we’ve broken up terror cells, tracked down terrorist operatives, and put heavy pressure on their ability to organize and plan attacks. Second, we are determined to deny safe haven to the terrorists. Since the day our country was attacked, we have applied the Bush Doctrine: Any person or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and will be held to account. Third, we are working to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to keep those weapons out of the hands of killers. In the post-9/11 world, the United States and our allies are determined: we will not live at the mercy of terrorists or regimes that could arm them with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. This requires that we deal with threats before they fully materialize. Fourth, we are determined to deny the terrorists the control of any nation, which they would use as a home base and a staging ground for terrorist attacks against others. That is why we continue to fight Taliban remnants and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. That’s why we are working with President Musharraf to oppose and isolate the terrorist element in Pakistan. And that is why we are fighting the Saddam remnants and terrorists in Iraq. Our strategy in Iraq is clear, our tactics will remain flexible, and we’ll keep at the work until we finish the job. For that reason, our strategy for victory in the war on terror has a fifth and crucial element: Across the broader Middle East, we will work to replace hatred and resentment with democracy and hope. Supporting political freedom and peaceful change in a troubled part of the world is a long-term commitment. And we already know that the work will be

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difficult. Yet there is no alternative. On 9/11, the United States learned that problems boiling in a far-off region of the world could lead directly to a sudden and murderous attack right here on our own soil. For decades in the Middle East, millions of people have known nothing but dictatorship and heavy-handed rule—resulting in misery, bitterness, and the ideologies of violence. If we simply accept the status quo, that region will be a source of conflict and mounting violence for this generation and beyond. As Americans, we have faith in democracy, but no illusions. We know that it takes time and effort and patience for democratic values and free institutions to take hold, and the greater Middle East has a long way to go. The promise of democracy rests ultimately on free elections and the ability of free peoples to hold accountable those who govern them —but that is only the beginning. A functioning democracy requires institutions that endure beyond a single vote. Democracy requires the protection of minority rights, religious liberty, equality before the law, freedom of expression, and an inclusive society in which every person belongs. And those who win elections have a duty to nurture institutions and laws that serve the peaceful aspirations of their people. Such duties now belong to the newly elected government in the Palestinian territories. I recognize that the outcome of last month’s election has caused some to question whether democracy is truly the way toward peace in the Middle East. They argue that, by promoting democratic change, we are actually destabilizing the region and undermining hopes for peace. I believe that’s a faulty argument. For one thing, it’s hard to claim that you get lasting stability and peace by denying people a voice in their own government. In fact, the denial of legitimate means of expressing dissent is one of the causes of extremism in the Middle East. For decades, many thought it was worth tolerating oppression for the sake of stability in that region. But we were only buying time as problems multiplied, and demagogues stirred resentment, and the ideologies of violence took hold. We must make a clean break with that history of failed policy. By helping the peoples of that region gain the freedom to express their views, to have open debate, and to choose their own leaders, we have a better chance of defeating the radicalism that threatens us all. An alternative to democratic rule is command and control by a tiny elite. That’s unfortunately what we have seen for much of the past decade in the Palestinian territories—and we’re still living with the legacy of corruption, broken promises, abject poverty, the collapse of the rule of law and, ultimately, the outbreak of a terrorist campaign on Israel’s doorstep. The Hamas candidates pledged to fight corruption and to improve social services, and they’ll be held to that standard by the Palestinian people. If the leaders of Hamas desire the help of America and the international community to build an independent, prosperous Palestinian state, then the way forward is very clear. The Palestinian government must recognize Israel’s right to exist. And Hamas must renounce terror and dismantle the infrastructure of terror. One thing is certain: The United States will not be a party to the establishment of a Palestinian state that sponsors terror and violence.

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Nearly four years ago President Bush committed himself to the vision of two states, living side by side in peace and security. At the same time, he made it clear: There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. … Over the past four years, other free nations have risen in the broader Middle East. America will remain on the side of democratic reformers, and the reformers are on the side of history. Across that region, the political dialogue has been transformed—and politicians, scholars, students, and men and women from every walk of life are talking about freedom, equal rights, and accountable institutions of government. One leader in Lebanon said: ‘‘When I saw the Iraqi people voting, it was the start of a new Arab world … The Syrian people, the Egyptian people, all say that something is changing. The Berlin Wall has fallen. We can see it.’’ SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060307-1.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at a Rally for Expeditionary Strike Group One, The USS Bonhomme Richard, San Diego, California, May 23, 2006 … the greatest danger to civilization is the prospect of a terror network, on its own or with the help of an outlaw regime, acquiring weapons of mass destruction—and thereby gaining the power to kill hundreds of thousands, and to blackmail entire nations. In the face of such enemies, we have to consider a few basic questions: First, whether to confront them on our terms, or on their terms; second, whether to face them on their territory, or our territory; and third, whether to wage this war on offense or defense. America and the civilized world have made our decision: Wherever terrorists operate, we will find them where they dwell, stop them in their planning, and bring them to justice. We will stay on offense and stay in the fight until the fight is won. It’s a large effort, because the terror network has cells in countries all over the world. Yet bit by bit, by diplomacy, through intelligence cooperation, police work, and the spread of democratic institutions, we are acting to shrink the area in which the terrorists can operate freely. We have also enforced a doctrine that is understood by all: Governments that support or harbor terrorists are complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. We gave ultimatums to the brutal regimes led by the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. And when those regimes defied the demands of the civilized world, we acted to remove them from power and to liberate their people. The nature of the terrorist enemy—hidden, diffuse, secret in their movements, asymmetrical in their tactics—creates a different kind of security environment. And a military that was designed for the mid-to-late 20th century must now become a force that is more adaptable, more agile, and more lethal in action. As we transform the military we’re going to build upon traditional advantages such as our technological superiority, our ability to project force across great distances, and our precision strike capabilities.

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We’re going to stress rapid reaction and reward new thinking, breaking down old information stovepipes, and placing greater emphasis on jointness of operations. At the same time, we’re keeping our eye on the fundamentals, and one of those is sea power. Naval operations are every bit as important, if not more so, than they were in the last century. Nothing takes the place of a naval task force, able to enter any ocean, project great force from over the horizon, and keep terrorists from disrupting the sea lanes or using the ocean to transport operatives or weapons. Sea power allows the Commander-in-Chief to commit forces while retaining flexibility. With ships in place, we can fire precision strikes, launch sea-based rockets and missiles, deploy SEALS and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces by night or day, from close by or from a distance. Expeditionary Strike Groups are essential in this new security environment, because they are so highly mobile and so adaptable. With ESGs, we have great offensive capability, expanded operational reach, a maritime interdiction force without equal, and an even better intelligence-gathering network. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-6.html EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see a similar speech by Vice President Cheney at a rally for Expeditionary Strike Group 8, Norfolk, Virginia, Naval Base, July 2006 (http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060707-7.html).

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, May 26, 2006 You are the first class to enter the Academy following the attacks of 9/11. And I’m guessing that more than a few of you were inspired to military service by that attack on our country. In these four years, the war on terror has influenced the course of study at our service academies, and it will define much of your career leading American sailors and Marines. To prevail in this fight, we must understand the nature of the enemy that threatens America and the civilized world. It is as brutal and heartless as any we have ever faced. This enemy … is unconstrained by any standard of decency or morality. They … target the defenseless, and rejoice at the death of innocent, unsuspecting human beings. This enemy has a set of beliefs—and we saw the expression of those beliefs in the rule of the Taliban … Such beliefs can be imposed only through force and intimidation, so those who refuse to bow to the tyrants will be brutalized or killed—and no person or group is exempt. This enemy also has a clear set of objectives. The terrorists want to end all American and Western influence in the Middle East. Their goal in that region is to seize control of a country, so they have a base from which to launch attacks and wage war against governments that do not meet their demands. The terrorists believe that by controlling one country, they will be able to target and overthrow other governments in the region, ultimately to establish a totalitarian empire that encompasses a region from Spain, across North Africa,

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through the Middle East and South Asia, all the way to Indonesia. They have made clear, as well, their ultimate ambitions: to arm themselves with chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons; to destroy Israel; to intimidate all Western countries; and to cause mass death here in the United States. Some might look at these ambitions and wave them off as extreme and mad. Well, these ambitions are extreme and mad. They are also real, and we must not wave them off. We must take them seriously. We must oppose them. And we must defeat them. Over the last several decades, Americans have seen how the terrorists pursue their objectives. To put it in very basic terms, they would hit us, and we would not hit back hard enough. For many years prior to 9/11, we treated terror attacks against Americans as isolated incidents, and answered—if at all—on an ad hoc basis, and never in a systematic way.… With each attack, the terrorists grew more confident in believing they could strike America without paying a price and believing that if they killed enough Americans, they could change our policy. So they continued to wage those attacks—making the world less safe and eventually striking us here in the homeland on September 11th and killing 3,000 of our fellow citizens. Because our coalition has stood by our commitment to the Afghan and Iraqi peoples, some 50 million men, women, and children who lived under dictators now live in freedom. Afghanistan is a rising democracy, with the first fully elected government in its 5,000-year history. Iraq has the most progressive constitution and the strongest democratic mandate in the Arab world.… We will help them on this journey because we are a nation that keeps its word. And we know that when men and women are given the power to determine their own destiny, the ideologies of violence and resentment will lose their appeal, and nations will turn their energies to the pursuit of peace. In an enterprise as vast as the war on terror, victory requires that we use every element of our national power. The terrorists view the entire world as a battlefield. And those of us in positions of responsibility must do everything we can to figure out the intentions of an enemy that likely has combatants inside the United States today. We live in a free and open society, and the terrorists want to use those very advantages against us. And so we have an urgent duty to learn who they are, what they are doing, and to stop them before they act. For this reason, in the aftermath of 9/11 President Bush authorized the National Security Agency to intercept a certain category of terrorist-linked international communications. The purpose is very simple to state: If people inside the United States are communicating with al Qaeda, they are talking to the enemy—and we need to know about it. The Terrorist Surveillance Program is highly classified and carefully limited. The program was improperly revealed to the news media, some of which now describe it as domestic surveillance. That is not the case. We are talking about international communications, one end of which we have reason to believe is related to al Qaeda or to terrorist networks. It’s hard to think of any category of information that could be more important to the safety of the United States. The Terrorist Surveillance Program is fully consistent with the constitutional responsibilities and the legal authorities of the President. And the

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program is conducted in a manner that fully protects the civil liberties of the American people. The President has made clear … from the outset, both publicly and privately, that our duty to uphold the law of the land admits no exceptions in wartime. As he has said, ‘‘We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.’’ In addition, the entire program is reconsidered and reauthorized by the President himself every 45 days. He has reauthorized it more than 30 times since September 11th because our nation faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and related organizations. Key members of Congress, from both political parties, have received more than a dozen briefings on the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The reason I know this is that I’m the one who presided over most of those briefings. Above all, I can tell you that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is absolutely essential to the security of the United States. If you’ll recall, the 9/11 Commission focused criticism on the nation’s inability to uncover links between terrorists at home and terrorists overseas. The term that’s used is ‘‘connecting the dots’’—and the fact is that one small piece of data might very well make it possible to save thousands of lives. And the very important question today is whether or not we’ve learned all the lessons of September 11th. In the decade prior to 9/11, this country spent more than $2 trillion dollars on national security. Yet we lost nearly 3,000 Americans at the hands of 19 men with box cutters and plane tickets. In the case of al Qaeda we are not dealing with large armies we can track, or uniforms we can see, or men with territory of their own to defend. Their preferred tactic, which they boldly proclaim, is to slip into this country, blend in among the innocent, kill without mercy and without restraint. They have intelligence and counterintelligence operations of their own. They take their orders from overseas. They are using the most sophisticated communications technology they can get their hands on. Since 9/11 they have successfully carried out attacks in Casablanca, Jakarta, Mombassa, Bali, Riyadh, Baghdad, Istanbul, Madrid, London, Sharm al-Sheikh and elsewhere. Here in the U.S., we have not had another 9/11. But while the enemies that struck us may be weakened and fractured, they are still lethal and still desperately trying to hit us again. They hate us, they hate our country, and they hate the liberties for which we stand. They have contempt for our values. They doubt our strength. And they believe that America will lose our nerve and let down our guard. We’re all grateful that this nation has not had another day like September 11th. Obviously, no one can guarantee that we won’t be hit again. But the relative safety of these years did not come about by accident. We’ve been protected by sensible policy decisions, by decisive action at home and abroad, and by round-the-clock efforts on the part of people in the armed services, law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security. Every day the President of the United States makes decisions based on the intelligence briefing he received that morning. The information in that briefing is critical to assessing risks, and to allocating security assets inside the homeland and far beyond. Throughout our military, intelligence has a daily, indeed hourly, influence on the movement of ships and subs, fighter and bomber missions, and orders given to those commands at the tip of the spear.

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Gathering the best information, and getting it into the hands of the war fighter, means that your work is more effective, your maneuvers are more safe, and the nation you serve is more secure. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060526-4.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks and Q&A at the Gerald R. Ford Journalism Prize Luncheon, The National Press Club, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2006 Q. Are we winning the war on terror? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I believe we are. I think we’ve made significant progress if you look back over the last nearly five years now. 9/11, obviously, was a watershed event for us. After 9/11, we adopted a very aggressive strategy that involved a range of activities, but most especially going after the terrorists wherever we could find them on their ground, going after states that sponsored terror, given the fact that the biggest threat now is the possibility of an al Qaeda cell armed with a nuclear weapon or a biological agent in the middle of one of our own cities, the WMD issue. And it has been very important. Going after the financial networks, where I think we’ve made significant progress, cooperation with intelligence agencies of other nations, as well, too. I look at the broad sweep of events over that period of time and several things stand out. First of all, the fact—I define this as sort of a key ingredient of getting the locals into the fight, that is to say the United States cannot all by itself succeed everyplace unless we’ve got friends and allies willing to participate in the venture. Certainly, we did that in Afghanistan when we went in and toppled the Taliban government in short order with the help of Afghans who participate in that conflict. We’ve done it in places like Pakistan, where the government of Pakistan signed on. It has been a good ally. We’ve captured and killed more al Qaeda in Pakistan than just about any place else in the world. It has happened in Saudi Arabia and is happening now in Iraq where we’ve gone in, taken down regimes that were safe havens for terrorists, or that we had reason to believe were an integral part of the problem, and, of course, moved aggressively then in Afghanistan and Iraq to stand up new democracies to train their own forces. And that process goes forward. The other point I’d make in connection with the global war on terror is the fact that it has been nearly five years now and we haven’t been hit again. Nobody can promise that we won’t be hit. We know that organizations are still out there, that in addition to al Qaeda, there are al Qaeda wannabees. There have been attacks around the world since 9/11 in places like London and Madrid and Istanbul and Casablanca and Mombasa and Tunisia and Jakarta and Bali and many, many other places. But the fact of the matter is, we’ve been safe and secure here at home. That’s not an accident. It didn’t happen just because we got lucky. I think there’s a great temptation on the part of some people to believe that 9/11 was a one-off affair and it will never happen again, but that’s not the case.

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One of the reasons—several reasons I think why we have been successful up until now is that we’ve gotten extremely aggressive at taking the battle to the enemy overseas, but secondly also because we’ve taken some measures here at home that have been instrumental in collecting the intelligence we need to be able to disrupt attacks against the United States and to protect the lives of Americans. And there I would point to such things as the Patriot Act and the terrorist surveillance program. Obviously, there’s been some controversy in connection with those, but the terrorist surveillance program has been very important. We’ve engaged in a debate about the wisdom of the program and whether or not it’s legal, but it clearly is legal, we believe. It is consistent with the Constitution. It is a program that is reviewed personally by the President every 45 days. He renews it only after he’s been assured by our lead intelligence officials, by the Defense Department, and assured by the Attorney General of the United States that it fully complies with the laws of the land—then and only then does he renew that act. But I think that combination of things—very aggressive campaigns overseas in key areas, as well as the extraordinary measures we’ve taken to defend the nation here at home are in no small part responsible for the fact that we have not been hit again since 9/11. Again, let me emphasize, nobody can promise that we won’t be hit again, but I think we’ve had significant success primarily because of decisions that the President, coupled with the enormous and tremendously courageous performance of our military, our intelligence people and a lot of others involved in the effort. Q. Do you think that you underestimated the insurgency’s strength? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think so. I guess if I look back on it now, I don’t think anybody anticipated the level of violence that we’ve encountered. I guess the other area that I look at, in terms of an area where I think we were faced with difficulties we didn’t anticipate was the devastation that 30 years of Saddam’s rule had wrought, if you will, on the psychology of the Iraqi people. Very, very hard to go from the way they were forced to live for a long period of time to a situation in which they have the opportunity for self-government, for setting up and operating their own free and democratically-elected society. That’s a huge transition to make. And if I look back on something that I underestimated, it would be the extent to which that society had been damaged by that series of events that had occurred over 30 years during Saddam’s rule, up to and including the 1991 uprising where so many Iraqis rose up against the regime, and then were slaughtered by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Q. This comes as no surprise, this being a press club, I do have several press questions for you. The Bush administration worries that disclosures of classified information may have damaged national security. Can you cite a time in U.S. history when a press disclosure has genuinely damaged national security? THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I do believe that there need to be secrets. I think there are things that the federal government does in the national security arena that need to be off limits. And I think the fact of the matter is that there have been stories written that are damaging, if you will, from the standpoint of national security. I would—obviously, I can’t get into any operational

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details. One of the frustrations that exist with this debate is that you cannot go out and talk about current operations with the press in order to try to explain to everybody why that particular piece of information needs to say secret. Let me just say that there have been examples that I am aware of where we’ve had discussions of ways in which al Qaeda communicates, for example, and because of those conversations they no longer communicate that way, and we’ve lost the ability in some cases to be able to intercept important communications. I can think of one situation recently that had to do with a story that appeared in one of our major newspapers. It dealt with certain technical countermeasures that we were considering with respect to how we would deal with a certain type of a problem. And within five days of the publication of that story, there were posted ways to deal with that and to neutralize our activities on one of the jihadist websites. That was about five days from publication in a major U.S. news outlet until it was on a jihadist website—advice, in effect, on how to counter what our military wanted to do in a particular area. Now that strikes me as a pretty straightforward, direct example of why it is important that there be secrets. I think oftentimes in the past, there’s no question, the executive branch has probably overdone it with respect to classification. On the other hand, the assumption on the part of some of the press that it doesn’t matter if it’s classified, they have every right to print absolutely anything they want, and they are the final judges, I think that’s a mistake. I think if somebody is asked by the—say, the President of the United States or a senior administration official who is in a position of authority and has some knowledge in the area to withhold on a particular story, they need to give that serious thought. And I think that … one of the problems we have is that oftentimes as a government we’re perceived by other governments overseas, people we have to work with, intelligence services who need to have confidence in our ability to keep a secret, find it difficult to work with us because the United States has oftentimes demonstrated an inability to maintain the security of classified information. So it’s the problem. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060619-10.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by John King, CNN, The Vice President’s Residence, June 26, 2006 Q. The Democrats will put on the floor of the Senate today a proposal—they don’t have the votes—but they say this administration’s policy in Iraq has failed. And the leading Democratic proposal would say, let’s have a partial withdrawal—they call it a redeployment—and then require the administration to put forward a plan. Now, they say this is not cut and run, it’s not retreat, but they say three years and three months later, it is time for the administration to tell the Iraqi government you cannot have this indefinite American security blanket. You need to do a better job of preparing your own people to take over security, what’s wrong with that?

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THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, it’s wrong in many respects, John. First of all, they’re wrong. We are making significant progress. We’ve had major success on the political front in terms of three national elections last year by the Iraqis. They’ve stood up a brand new government under a new constitution for the first time ever. We’ve got a quarter of a million Iraqis now in uniform, equipped, trained, in the fight. So there has been significant progress made with respect to what’s going on in Iraq. What the Democrats are suggesting basically you can call it withdrawal, you can call it redeployment, whatever you want to call it, basically it’s—in effect, validates the terrorist strategy. You got to remember that the Osama bin Laden types, the al Qaeda types, the Zarqawi types that have been active in Iraq are betting that ultimately they can break the United States’ will. There’s no way they can defeat us militarily. But their whole strategy—if you look at what bin Laden has been saying for 10 years—is they believe they can, in fact, force us to quit, that ultimately we’ll get tired of the fight, that we don’t have the stomach for a long, tough battle, and that we’ll pack it in and go home. If we were to do that, it would be devastating from the standpoint of the global war on terror. It would affect what happens in Afghanistan. It would make it difficult for us to persuade the Iranians to give up their aspirations for nuclear weapons. It would threaten the stability of regimes like Musharraf in Pakistan and the Saudis in Saudi Arabia. It is—absolutely the worst possible thing we could do at this point would be to validate and encourage the terrorists by doing exactly what they want us to do, which is to leave. Q. … You say validating and encouraging the terrorists, the Democrats say they’re tired of validating what they view as a failed policy. And as you know some Democrats want to go even further. Senator Kerry wants to have a complete withdrawal within a year or so. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Right. Q. Jack Murtha, an old friend of yours, with whom you have sparred recently in the House, he says, look, when President Reagan realized the policy in Beirut was failing, he withdrew the troops. Call it cut and run if you will. When President Clinton realized the policy in Somalia was failing, he withdrew the troops. Again, some might say cut and run. He says this war is costing $8 billion a month, $300 million a day, there’s no end in sight. And forgive me, but he says, you don’t have a plan, so let’s not have more kids killed. THE VICE PRESIDENT: He’s wrong. I like Jack Murtha. He’s a friend. We did a lot of business together in the past when I was Secretary of Defense and he was chairman of defense appropriations sub-committee. But the instances he cites, Beirut in ’83, Somalia in ’93 is what bin Laden cited back in 1997 and ’98. He made speeches where he, in effect, argued that the Americans didn’t have the stomach for a fight, that ultimately the terrorists would win, al Qaeda would win. And he’s cited as evidence of that, what happened in Beirut in 1983 and Somalia in 1993. That’s my point. The fact of the matter is that we are in a global conflict. It’s not just about Iraq. It’s—we’ve seen attacks around the world from New York and Washington, all the way around to Jakarta and Indonesia over the course of the last

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five years. Our strategy that we adopted after 9/11 of progressively going after the terrorists, going after states that sponsor terror, taking the fight to the enemy has been crucial in terms of our being able to defend the United States. I think one of the reasons we have not been struck again in five years—and nobody can promise we won’t—but it’s because we’ve taken the fight to them. And if Jack Murtha is successful in persuading the country that somehow we should withdraw now from Iraq, then you have to ask what happens to all of those people who’ve signed up with the United States, who are on our side in this fight against the radical extremist Islamic types of bin Laden and al Qaeda. What happens to the 12 million Iraqis who went to the polls last December and voted in spite of the assassins and the car bombers? What happens to the quarter of a million Iraqis who’ve gotten into the fight to take on the terrorists? The worst possible thing we could do is what the Democrats are suggesting. And no matter how you carve it, you can call it anything you want, but basically it is packing it in, going home, persuading and convincing and validating the theory that the Americans don’t have the stomach for this fight. Q. Well, you disagree with the Democrats’ plan, but they are stepping into a political environment in which the American people—clearly, some have anger, some have dissatisfaction, some have doubts about this war and the administration’s plan for this war. Fifty-four percent of the American people say it’s a mistake; 55 percent say things are going badly in Iraq; 53 percent in our polling say the American people actually support a timetable. Why is it that the administration has failed to articulate to the American people then? The American people don’t think you have a plan, sir. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, they’re wrong. We do have a plan. It’s there for anybody who wants to take a look at it. The Democrats have repeatedly made this charge. It’s simply not the case. There is a good plan in place. We are making significant progress, but this is a long-term fight. I think there are a lot of people out there— Q. Let me—let me jump in. One other point here, is it wrong—you say it’s wrong to publicly set a timetable. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes. Q. And I understand the argument for that. You’d cue off—tee the terrorists off to what you’re going to do. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Absolutely. Q. Has the Iraqi government been told privately you need to meet certain bench marks, training your troops, improving security by a date certain because the American people are not going to pay for this forever? THE VICE PRESIDENT: No, I think they know full well that we are expecting them to take on more and more responsibility. It’s one of the reasons the President went to Baghdad recently. In all of our conversations with them, they know what we’re trying to do, and they’ve stepped up to that task and that responsibility. The fact of the matter is, obviously, we’ve lost a lot of people, which you wish you hadn’t lost anybody. But the heavy casualties are being taken by the Iraqis. There are a lot more Iraqis being—becoming casualties in this conflict at present because they are now in the fight. Again, I

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come back to the basic proposition: What happens in the global war on terror if the United States bails out in Iraq? And that’s exactly what withdrawal is. You’re going to take your troops out before the conflict is over with. You’re not going to complete the mission—if we follow the Democrats’ advice. And in fact, we will have set up a situation in which the al Qaeda types can win. They have a plan to establish a caliphate that stretches from Spain all the way around to Indonesia, to kick the Americans out of the Middle East, to destroy Israel, to take down most of those regimes in that part of the world. And they will do anything they can to achieve that objective. But ultimately what they’re betting on is that we don’t have the stomach for the fight, and we cannot afford to validate that strategy. We can win. We are winning, but we’ve got to stay at it. Q. In the political debate over the war, even your friends say that you have given the Democrats a couple of doozies by saying early on ‘‘we would be greeted as liberators,’’ by saying about a year ago, ‘‘the insurgency was in its lasts throes.’’ I know factually you have said you stand by those statements based on the circumstances at the time. You’re not new to this game. You’ve been in national politics for 30 something years. In the political environment, do you wish you could take those words back? THE VICE PRESIDENT: No, I think that, in fact, we are making very significant progress. There’s no doubt in my mind but we’re going to win. We will prevail in Iraq. We will prevail in Afghanistan. And I think the evidence is there for anybody who wants to look at it. With respect to the overall course of the campaign, I think it’s been very successful. With respect to this question of liberation, we have, indeed, liberated 50 million people—25 million in Afghanistan from the rule of the Taliban; 25 million in Iraq from the rule of Saddam Hussein, two of the worst regimes in modern times, a very, very significant achievement. But we have to stay the course. It does not make any sense for people to think that somehow we can retreat behind our oceans, leave the Middle East, walk away from Iraq, and we’ll be safe and secure here at home. 9/11 put the lie to that. … If we pull out, they’ll follow us. It doesn’t matter where we go. This is a global conflict. We’ve seen them attack in London and Madrid and Casablanca and Istanbul and Mombassa and East Africa. They’ve been on a global basis involved in this conflict, and it will continue whether we complete the job or not in Iraq. Only it’ll get worse. Iraq will become a safe haven for terrorists. They’ll use it in order to launch attacks against our friends and allies in that part of the world. Q. You acknowledged this past week that the administration and you personally underestimated the strength of the insurgency. Q. As you know even friends of the administration, supporters of this war have criticized the administration saying not enough troops were sent in at the beginning. You have a unique perspective on it. You were the Defense Secretary in the first Gulf War. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes. Q. You’re the Vice President now. In the first Gulf War, it was the Powell Doctrine: If you’re going to put U.S. troops at risk, do so in overwhelming

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numbers with overwhelming force so that there is no doubt. Secretary Rumsfeld prefers the leaner force, a more mobile force. As history looks at this, is one early lesson that the Powell Doctrine trumps the Rumsfeld Doctrine? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don’t think so. I think you’ve got to look at each individual circumstance and figure out what makes sense in terms of the kinds of forces you need to bring to bear, what your enemy is capable of, what your goals and objectives are. I think you have to be very careful about generalizing from one conflict to the next. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060622-8.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, Reno, Nevada, August 28, 2006 I know some have suggested that by liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein, we simply stirred up a hornet’s nest. They overlook a fundamental fact: We were not in Iraq on September 11th, 2001, and the terrorists hit us anyway. As President Bush has said, the hatred of the radicals existed before Iraq was an issue, and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse. The terrorists regard the entire world as their battlefield. That is why al Qaeda has operatives in Iraq today. And they believe they can frighten and intimidate America into a policy of retreat. I realize, as well, that some in our own country claim retreat from Iraq would satisfy the appetite of the terrorists and get them to leave us alone. But the exact opposite is true. Time and again over the last generation, the terrorists have targeted nations whose behavior they believe they can change through violence. In fact such a retreat would convince the terrorists, once again, that free nations will change our policies, forsake our friends, and abandon our interests whenever we are confronted with violence and blackmail. They would simply draw up another set of demands, and instruct Americans to act as they direct or to face other murders. A precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would be a victory for the terrorists, an invitation to further violence against free nations, and a ruinous blow to the future security of the United States. In our own country, we take democratic values seriously—and so we always have a vigorous debate on the issues. That’s part of the greatness of America, and we wouldn’t have it any other way. But there is a difference between healthy debate and self-defeating pessimism. We have only two options in Iraq—victory or defeat. And this nation will not pursue a policy of retreat. We will complete the mission, we will get it done right, and then we will return with honor. Before we took down Saddam Hussein’s regime, President Bush said the United States would not permit another dictatorship to rise on the ruins of the old one. And today, Iraq has the most progressive constitution and the strongest democratic mandate in the entire Arab world. Iraq’s political leaders are steady and courageous, and the citizens, police, and soldiers have stepped forward as active participants and guardians of the new democracy—running

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for office, speaking out, voting by the millions, and sacrificing for the future of their country. Iraqi citizens are doing all of this despite threats from terrorists who offer no political agenda for Iraq’s future and wage a campaign of mass slaughter against the Iraqi people themselves—the vast majority of whom are fellow Arabs and fellow Muslims. As Prime Minister Maliki said on his recent visit to Washington, his country has gone ‘‘from a one-party state, ruled by a small elite, to a multi-party system where politics is the domain of every citizen and parties compete at all levels.’’ And Iraqis have firmly chosen ‘‘hope over fear; liberty over oppression; dignity over submission; democracy over dictatorship.’’ America is helping Iraq on this journey, because we are a nation that keeps its word. And we know that when men and women are given the power to determine their own destiny, the ideologies of violence and resentment will lose their appeal, and nations will turn their energies to the pursuit of peace. By standing with our friends, we are making a better day possible in the broader Middle East. By supporting democracy, we serve both the ideals and the security of our nation. And the brave Americans on duty in this war can be proud of their service for the rest of their lives. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060828-4.html EDITOR’S NOTE: The deleted section contains virtually identical language on the terrorism surveillance program contained in Vice President Cheney’s May 26, 2006, commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Satellite Interview by WFLA-TV, 9th Congressional District Open Seat Candidate Gus Bilirakis, Tampa, Florida, October 19, 2006 Q. … The plan to have put more troops into Baghdad to suppress the violence there seems to have backfired in that it seems to only be providing more targets for the terrorists. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the fact is that we’ve had more troops engaged in Baghdad because that’s where the biggest threat is. Most of the country is in relatively good shape at this stage. The vast majority of provinces, things are fairly normal. The main struggle has, in fact, been in Baghdad in recent weeks. And there is a significant troop presence there. And that’s why I think you see most of the conflict generated there. But this is a very important mission. And it’s very important that we complete the task. We’ve made significant progress in Iraq. We’ve had three elections now, a new constitution written. This government has only been in power about five months. They’ve still got a lot of work to do, and we don’t want to stay a day longer than necessary, but we do want to make sure we get the job done. And it’s very important that we complete the transition that we’ve started in Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s regime to a new democratically elected government, that we get enough Iraqis trained and equipped so they can provide for their

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own security and they’re capable of taking care of their own needs and requirements. And the world will be much safer for it. Q. Yes, sir, but having stationed so many additional troops in the city has just—as far as our perception, the American people’s perception, along with the statistics—has simply provided the terrorists an opportunity to kill more Americans, and the violence has escalated, not decreased as a result of our additional presence there. THE VICE PRESIDENT: But I think one of the things you got to look at here is what’s the enemy up to. They can’t beat us in a stand-up fight. They’ve never been able to. What they’re betting on is that they can break our will, that is to say they based on prior experience, based on Beirut in 1983, when we lost 241 Marines and then withdrew after that suicide attack; or Mogadishu in 1993, where we lost 19 men in a battle there and shortly thereafter withdrew our forces; looking at those lessons and the lessons of the ’90s, the terrorists have concluded that if they kill enough Americans, they can change U.S. policy. And I think they’ve worked very directly to try to influence public opinion here at home. You can look at their websites and see that that’s exactly what they’re all about. And the level of conflict we’re seeing there now I believe is very much based upon that proposition that they’re trying to break the will of the American people. Q. Yes, sir. But the purpose of putting additional troops there was to reduce the violence, and instead it has gone up. Therefore, it would seem that our tactic to increase our force in Baghdad has not worked. In fact, it seems to be failing. THE VICE PRESIDENT: You can’t defeat the enemy by withdrawing from them. You can only defeat them by taking them on, and that’s exactly what our troops are doing. Q. Well, taking them on—my sources in Kabul in Afghanistan have told me that a lot of our troops are being kept inside the wire, so to speak, so that they will not come under attack. If, in fact, my sources are correct, how can we hope to defeat the Taliban, the increasing—the resurgence of the Taliban there, if our people are staying inside the base? THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I’d disagree with that assessment. What we’ve got in Afghanistan is a situation in which NATO has now moved in a major way. NATO has taken on major responsibility. We’ve got U.S. forces as part of that NATO force, but we’ve got representatives there, troops there from virtually every country in NATO, under NATO command. And they are doing a superb job. And they are, in fact, engaged in continuing conflict with the Taliban. And it will take a while to finish the conflict there, as well, too. But look at all we’ve accomplished. We have, in fact, had the first national elections under a new constitution in the 5,000-year history of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai now is the President, a good man, doing very well. They’ve got a newly elected parliament in place. We’ve got some 70,000 troops now that have been trained that are actively in the field, Afghan forces that are actively participating in the struggle. And eventually, they’ll be able to take on responsibility for that themselves. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061019-11.html

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Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by Scott Hennen, WDAY, at Radio Day, The Vice President’s Office, The White House, October 24, 2006 Q. … As I reflect on our previous conversations, much of the focus has been on the enemies we face in this war on terror. And in the five years since 9/11, I’d like you to reflect for a moment and rate the performance of the administration. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the basic proposition is, of course, that we’ve gone more than five years now without another attack inside the homeland. On the day after that attack back in ’01, if somebody had put that proposition to you, I don’t think anybody would have been willing to bet we could go five years without an attack. There have been attacks around the world since then from Madrid to Jakarta, in Indonesia. There have been several attempts, obviously, to try and launch attacks here in the United States. The ones launched against us have all been intercepted, disrupted. They’ve all failed. And that’s not an accident. It’s because the President made some sound decisions, and we put in place some very important programs that let us collect intelligence against the enemy, to find out what they’re up to, and then use that intelligence to defend the nation, so it has been—I think that piece of it has been a great success. Q. So with those accomplishments, why is there a debate as we head two weeks into an election about whether or not we’re safer? THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the—a lot of folks, obviously, don’t want to focus on the threat. To spend all your days worrying about that next attack is something that’s difficult for people to adjust to. And I think there are some folks out there who say, well, it was just a one-off affair. It will never happen again. Those of us who bear some responsibility for the security of the nation, on the other hand, look at it and say, next time, they could, in fact, have far deadlier weapons that they did last time, that the ultimate threat is a group of terrorists in one of our cities with a nuclear weapon, and that would cause more casualties that we lost in all the wars we’ve fought in the 230-year history of the Republic. So it is a huge problem, and periodically, I think people are reminded of it. But as long as things are going along swimmingly, and there hasn’t been another attack, it’s hard, I suppose, for us to get credit for what hasn’t happened in a sense. Q. Are the terrorists trying to influence our election in your view? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think they’re very much aware of our political calendar here, I really do. And when you see the kinds of things that happened this year, for example, when the Democratic Party in Connecticut purged Joe Lieberman, in effect, drummed him out of the party on the grounds that he had supported the President in the global war on terror, that sends a message to the terrorists overseas that their basic strategy of trying to break the will of the American people may, in fact, work.

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Osama bin Laden has talked about it. He believes firmly that we don’t have the stomach for the fight long-term, that if you kill enough Americans you can change American policy … Q. I’ve heard from a lot of listeners … and I’ve talked to as many who want an increased military presence in Iraq as want us out, which seems to be the larger debate, at least coming from the left—cut and run, get out of there. One fax said, when you talk to the Vice President, ask him when shock and awe is coming back to Iraq. Let’s finish the job once and for all. And terrorist interrogations and that debate is another example. And I’ve had people call and say, please, let the Vice President know that if it takes dunking a terrorist in water, we’re all for it, if it saves American lives. Again, this debate seems a little silly given the threat we face, would you agree? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I do agree. And I think the terrorist threat, for example, with respect to our ability to interrogate high value detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, that’s been a very important tool that we’ve had to be able to secure the nation. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided us with enormously valuable information about how many there are, about how they plan, what their training processes are and so forth, we’ve learned a lot. We need to be able to continue that. Q. Would you agree a dunk in water is a no-brainer if it can save lives? THE VICE PRESIDENT: It’s a no-brainer for me, but for a while there, I was criticized as being the Vice President ‘‘for torture.’’ We don’t torture. That’s not what we’re involved in. We live up to our obligations in international treaties that we’re party to and so forth. But the fact is, you can have a fairly robust interrogation program without torture, and we need to be able to do that … Q. There’s a firestorm going on right now in the media. Our callers today are very upset about it. CNN elected to air a video they received from an insurgent group in Iraq, and it is essentially a propaganda piece where they have followed around a sniper who ultimately ends up killing a member of our U.S. armed forces. Should CNN have aired that video? THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don’t think so. I think all it does is encourage them to do more. The media has an obligation I think to conduct themselves in a way that doesn’t make the situation worse, obviously. Now, we have a free press, and that’s an important value in our society, and we care very deeply about it. And I don’t want to suggest anything other than a free press. But there’s a question of responsibility, too, if in fact, they allow themselves to be manipulated, as I think in this particular case, it would look as though a terrorist organization did, in fact, try to manipulate CNN. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061024-7.html

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at the Federalist Society’s National Convention, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2006 From the morning of 9/11, we have assumed, correctly, that more strikes would be attempted against us. So we have made a tremendous number of

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changes to harden the target and to better prepare the nation to face this kind of emergency. We established the Department of Homeland Security to give us a comprehensive approach, instead of a patchwork effort among diffuse and duplicative agencies. We created the position of Director of National Intelligence, to better coordinate the government’s 16 different intelligence components. We’ve reformed the FBI to make fighting terrorism its primary mission. We’ve made unprecedented improvements in port security, and major public health investments to ensure early warning and rapid response to any attack with biological agents. To guard against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we’ve created a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and worked with other governments in the most intensive counter-proliferation effort the world has ever known. And we’ve already seen results. Some years ago, the A.Q. Khan network was operating internationally to disperse weapons parts, uranium feed stocks, centrifuges for enrichment, weapons designs and nuclear technology. We tracked and exposed the activities of that network, and it has now been shut down. These years have also been a period of reform at the Pentagon. We have a new Northern Command to guard the American people, a new Strategic Command to counter long-range strikes, and a Special Operations Command redesigned to wage a new kind of war. At the same time, we’ve kept at the work of military transformation begun the day we arrived here—retooling the entire military to make it faster, more agile, more lethal in action. And all this vital work has been carried out under the steady hand of one of the great public servants of the age, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Shortly after 9/11, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, Congress also passed the Patriot Act. This law removed an unnecessary wall between law enforcement and intelligence personnel. They can now talk with one another, share information that could well prevent future attacks inside the country. The Patriot Act also gives federal agents investigating terrorism the same tools they use in fighting street crime and fraud. The Patriot Act was written, and it is enforced, with careful regard for the civil liberties of the American people. The President signed a renewal of the act that contains no fewer than 30 additional protections of civil liberties. He created, by executive order, the President’s Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil Liberties. And working with Congress, he has created the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, of which Ted Olson is now a member. The President has made very clear that as we fight for our principles, our first responsibility is to live by them. And no country in the world takes civil liberties more seriously than the United States of America. We take with equal seriousness the requirements of justice and due process. And even before 9/11, federal agents and prosecutors were acting aggressively to hold terrorists to account. The record, built up over more than a decade, is exemplary. Superb public servants have marshaled the evidence to convict the men who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, and the shoe bomber Richard Reid, and the 9/11 co-conspirator Moussaoui, and groups of terror suspects from Buffalo, New York and all the way to Portland, Oregon. … On the morning of September 11th, we saw that the terrorists need to get only one break, need to be right only once, to carry out an attack. We have to

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be right every time to stop them. So to adopt a purely defensive posture, to simply brace for attacks and react to them, is to play against lengthening odds, and to leave the nation permanently vulnerable. To protect America, we must understand that the fight against terror is not, primarily, a law enforcement operation. It is a war. Wars have winners and they have losers. And this is a war the United States is determined to win. We’ll win this war by staying on the offensive—carrying the fight to the enemy, going after them one by one if necessary, going after those who could equip them with even more dangerous technologies. In these five years we have broken up terror cells, tracked down terrorist operatives, and put heavy pressure on their ability to organize and to plan attacks. We have applied the Bush Doctrine—that any person or government supporting, protecting, or harboring terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and will be held to account … … Defeating the terrorists in Iraq is essential to overcoming the advance of extremism in the broader Middle East. As we help Iraq’s unity government to defeat common enemies, we build the peace and stability that will help make our own country more secure. There’s still tough work ahead, and as the enemy switches tactics we will do the same. As General Pace has put it, ‘‘From a military standpoint, every day is reassessment day.’’ We will be flexible. We’ll do all we can to adapt to conditions on the ground. We’ll make every change needed to do the job. The key is to get Iraqis into the fight, and we’ll continue training local forces so they can take the lead in defending their own country. America is going to complete our mission; we’re going to get it done right; and then we’ll bring our troops home with victory. As we persevere in the central front in the war on terror, Americans need to know that our government is bringing the same focus to every other front of the war. And there is, of course, a special urgency to our efforts to figure out the intentions of the enemy. We live in a free and open society, and the terrorists want to use those very qualities against us. So we must act in dead earnest to learn who they are and what they are doing, and stop them before they can act. To this end, in the days following 9/11, the President authorized the National Security Agency to intercept a certain category of terrorist-linked international communications. On occasion you will hear this called a domestic surveillance program. That is more than a misnomer; it’s a flat-out falsehood. We are talking about international communications, one end of which we have reason to believe is related to al Qaeda and to terrorist networks. And in a post-9/11 world, it’s hard to think of any category of information that could be more important to the safety of the United States. … A federal district court in the state of Michigan … ruled three months ago that the NSA program violated the Constitution and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The court found, among other factors, that warrantless surveillance of terrorist-related communications would cause irreparable injury to the American Civil Liberties Union and other plaintiffs. As a remedy, the district court granted a permanent injunction—in other words, ordered the President of the United States to cease all activities under the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed that injunction, and the government is now waging a forceful appeal on the merits. President Bush and I have complete confidence that the district court’s ruling will be reversed. We’re confident because the Terrorist Surveillance Program rests on firm legal ground. The Joint Authorization to Use Military Force, passed by Congress after 9/11, provides more than enough latitude for these activities. Therefore the warrant requirements of the FISA law do not apply to this wartime measure. And the program falls squarely within the constitutional powers of the President. Every appellate court to rule on this issue has recognized inherent presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to counter threats directed at the country from abroad. The district court’s opinion— which The New York Times called ‘‘careful and thoroughly grounded’’—did not distinguish any of those prior federal decisions. Nor, indeed, did the district court even cite those decisions. The district court also held that the Terrorist Surveillance Program violates the doctrine of separation of powers. We, of course, disagree and expect to prevail on that issue as well. But since we’re on the subject of separation of powers, one conclusion is hard to escape: the Michigan district court’s decision is an indefensible act of judicial overreaching. SOURCE: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061117-11.html

9 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2002 EXCERPTED SECRETARY POWELL: … I am pleased to appear before you to testify in support of President Bush’s budget request for FY 2003. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, before I go into the specifics of the budget request for the State Department and Related Agencies, that President Bush has two overriding objectives that our foreign policy must serve before all else. These two objectives are to win the war on terrorism and to protect Americans at home and abroad. This Administration will not be deterred from accomplishing these objectives. I have no doubt that this subcommittee and the Congress feel the same way.… A sizeable part is related to accomplishing these two objectives. As many of you will recall, at my first budget testimony to this committee last April, I told you that what we were requesting for FY 2002 represented a significant increase in the Department’s resources for that fiscal year. I told you also that such an increase was a good start, that it was the first fiscal step in our efforts to align both the organization for and the conduct of America’s foreign policy with the dictates of the 21st Century. And you heard my testimony and you responded, and we are grateful. Because of your understanding and generosity, we have made significant progress. We will make even more in FY 2003. The President’s discretionary request for the Department of State and Related Agencies for FY 2003 International Affairs is $8.1 billion. These dollars will allow us to: ¥ Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the right work force. The budget request includes $100 million for the next step in the hiring process we began last year. With these dollars, we will be able to bring on board

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Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy 399 more foreign affairs professionals and be well on our way to repairing the large gap created in our personnel structure and, thus, the strain put on our people by almost a decade of too few hires, an inability to train properly, and hundreds of unfilled positions. By FY 2004, we hope to have completed our multi-year hiring effort with respect to overseas staffing—to include establishing the training pool I described to you last year that is so important if we are to allow our people to complete the training we feel is needed for them to do their jobs. Continue to upgrade and enhance our worldwide security readiness—even more important in light of our success in disrupting and damaging the al-Qaida terrorist network. The budget request includes $553 million that builds on the funding provided from the Emergency Response Fund for the increased hiring of security agents and for counterterrorism programs. Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities. The budget request includes over $1.3 billion to improve physical security, correct serious deficiencies that still exist, and provide for security-driven construction of new facilities at high-risk posts around the world. Mr. Chairman, we are right-sizing, shaping up and bringing smarter management practices to our overseas buildings program, as I told you we would do last year. The first change we made was to put retired General Chuck Williams in charge and give him assistant secretary equivalent rank. Now, his Overseas Building Operations (OBO) has developed the Department’s first long-range plan, which projects our major facility requirements over a five-year period. … General Williams is making all of our facilities, overseas and stateside, more secure. By the end of FY 2002, over two-thirds of our overseas posts should reach minimal security standards, meaning secure doors, windows, and perimeters. We are also making progress in efforts to provide new facilities that are fully secure, with 13 major capital projects in design or construction, another eight expected to begin this fiscal year, and nine more in FY 2003. Continue to meet our obligations to international organizations—also important as we pursue the war on terrorism to its end. The budget request includes $891.4 million to fund U.S. assessments to 43 international organizations, active membership of which furthers U.S. economic, political, security, social, and cultural interests. Continue to meet our obligations to international peacekeeping activities. The budget request includes $726 million to pay our projected United Nations peacekeeping assessments … Continue and also enhance an aggressive effort to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our educational and cultural exchange programs, and international broadcasting. The budget request includes $287 million for public diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our regional and functional bureaus. These resources help to educate the international public on the war against terrorism and America’s commitment to peace and prosperity for all nations. The budget request also includes $247 million for educational and cultural exchange programs that build mutual understanding and develop friendly relations between America and the peoples of the world. These activities help build the trust, confidence, and international cooperation necessary to sustain and advance the full range of our interests. Such activities have gained a new sense of urgency and importance since the brutal attacks of September. We need to teach more about

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America to the world. We need to show people who we are and what we stand for, and these programs do just that. Moreover, the budget request includes almost $518 million for International Broadcasting, of which $60 million is for the war on terrorism to continue increased media broadcasts to Afghanistan and the surrounding countries and throughout the Middle East. These international broadcasts help inform local public opinion about the true nature of al-Qaida and the purposes of the war on terrorism, building support for the coalition’s global campaign.

Mr. Chairman, on the subject of public diplomacy let me expand my remarks. The terrorist attacks of September 11 underscored the urgency of implementing an effective public diplomacy campaign. Those who abet terror by spreading distortion and hate and inciting others, take full advantage of the global news cycle. We must also use that cycle. Since September 11, there have been over 2,000 media appearances by State Department officials. Our continuous presence in Arabic and regional media by officials with language and media skills, has been unprecedented. Our international information website on terror is now online in seven languages. Internet search engines show it is the hottest page on the topic. Our 25-page color publication, ‘‘The Network of Terrorism,’’ is now available in 30 languages with many different adaptations, including a full insert in the Arabic edition of Newsweek. ‘‘Right content, right format, right audience, right now’’ describes our strategic aim in seeing that U.S. policies are explained and placed in the proper context in the minds of foreign audiences. I also serve, ex officio, as a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the agency that oversees the efforts of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to broadcast our message into South Central Asia and the Middle East. With the support of the Congress, our broadcasting has increased dramatically since September 11. We have almost doubled the number of broadcast hours to areas that have been the breeding grounds of terrorists. The dollars we have requested for international broadcasting will help sustain these key efforts through the next fiscal year. Mr. Chairman, all of these State Department and Related Agencies programs and initiatives are critical to the conduct of America’s foreign policy. Some of you know my feelings about the importance to the success of any enterprise of having the right people in the right places. If I had to put one of these priorities at the pinnacle of our efforts, it would be our hiring efforts. We must sustain the strong recruiting program we began last year—with your support and the support of the Congress as a whole. … We doubled the number of candidates for the Foreign Service Written Examination—and this year we will give the exam twice instead of just once.… … We must also focus on taking care of those Americans who conduct it, as well as the many thousands of Foreign Service Nationals who help us across the globe. These are an extraordinary group of people, Mr. Chairman. For example, our sixty Afghan employees in Kabul worked diligently to maintain and

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protect our facilities throughout the 13 years the Embassy was closed. They worked at considerable personal risk and often went months without getting paid. They even repaired the chancery roof when it was damaged by a rocket attack. This is the sort of diligence and loyalty that is typical of our outstanding Foreign Service Nationals. Our whole team at State is vital to mission accomplishment—Foreign Service, Civil Service, and Foreign Service Nationals. The dollars you helped to provide us last year allowed us to make our team more cohesive and more effective. We want to continue that process. Mr. Chairman, one message that the tragic events of September 11th and the days that followed have made very clear is that American leadership in international affairs is critical. Out on the front lines of diplomacy, we want a first-class offense for America. As a soldier, I can tell you that quality people with high morale, combined with superb training and adequate resources, are the key to a first-class offense. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/8655.htm

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Report, Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, Washington, D.C., April 24, 2002 EXCERPTED … We have had remarkable success over the past seven months in the war on terrorism, especially in Afghanistan, and we are beginning to see some success in the Philippines, in Yemen, and elsewhere. And behind the courageous men and women of our armed forces, behind the stepped up law enforcement efforts, and behind the increased scrutiny of and action against terrorist financial networks, has been the quiet, steady course of diplomacy. As a result, we have reshaped a good part of South Asia—a new U.S.Pakistan relationship, a reinvigorated U.S.-India relationship, a new Interim Authority in Kabul, and the Taliban and the terrorists dead, in jail, or on the run. We are also forming important new relationships with the nations of Central Asia and helping friends and allies fight the scourge of terrorism from the marble-floored banks of Europe to the forested-gorges of Georgia. … Over the past year, Mr. Chairman, I believe the broader tapestry of our foreign policy has become clear: to encourage the spread of democracy and market economies, to lift up countries that want to be part of that expansion, and to bring more governments to the understanding that the power of the individual is the power that counts. And when evil appears to threaten this progress, America will confront that evil and defeat it—as we are doing in the war on terrorism. In weaving this tapestry, we have achieved several successes: With regard to Russia, President Bush has defied some of our critics and structured a very strong relationship …

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The way that Russia responded to the events of September 11 was reflective of this positive relationship. Russia has been a key member of the antiterrorist coalition. It has played a crucial role in our success in Afghanistan, by providing intelligence, bolstering the Northern Alliance, and assisting our entry into Central Asia. As a result, we have seriously eroded the capabilities of a terrorist network that posed a direct threat to both of our countries. The job is not complete yet—as our continuing operations in Afghanistan and our justbeginning Train and Equip operations in Georgia clearly demonstrate—but we are making headway. There are certain shared interests that we have with China and we have emphasized those interests. They are regional and global interests, such as China’s accession to WTO, stability on the Korean Peninsula, and combating the scourge of HIV/AIDS. On such issues we can talk and we can work out ways to cooperate. There are other interests where we decidedly do not see eye-to-eye, such as arms sales to Taiwan, human rights, religious freedom, and non-proliferation. On such issues we can have a dialogue and try to make measurable progress. But we do not want the interests where we differ to constrain us from pursuing those where we share common goals. And that is the basis upon which our relations are going rather smoothly at present. That, and counterterrorism. … China has helped in the war against terrorism. Beijing has also helped in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and we hope will help even more in the future. As we improved our relationship with China, Mr. Chairman, we also reinvigorated our bilateral alliances with Japan, The Republic of Korea, and Australia. Nowhere has this been more visible than in the war on terrorism— where cooperation has been solid and helpful. Prime Minister Koizumi immediately offered Japan’s strong support, within the confines of its constitution. And he is working to enhance Japan’s capability to contribute to such global and regional actions in the future.… … [O]ur alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) has also been strengthened by Korea’s strong response to the war on terrorism and by our careful analysis of and consultations on where we needed to take the dialogue with the North. President Bush has made it very clear that we are dissatisfied with the actions of North Korea; in particular that the North continues to develop and sell missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction.… Further south, the Australians have been exceptional in their efforts to support the war on terrorism. Heavily committed in East Timor already, Australia nonetheless offered its help immediately and we have been grateful for that help, including the great Australian soldiers who have helped us on the ground in Afghanistan. The people of Australia are indeed some of America’s truest friends. Another foreign policy success is the improvement we have achieved in our relations with Europe. In waging war together on terrorism, our cooperation has grown stronger. NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time ever on September 12. Since then, the European Union has moved swiftly to round up terrorists, close down terrorist financing networks, and improve law enforcement and aviation security cooperation.

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I also believe we have been successful in bringing the Europeans to a calmer level of concern with respect to what was being labeled by many in Europe ‘‘unbridled U.S. unilateralism.’’ Notwithstanding the recent reaction in parts of Europe to President Bush’s State of the Union Address, to U.S. actions on steel imports, and to undocumented and even at times egregiously wrong press reports about imminent U.S. military action against Iraq, I still believe this to be true. There was significant concern among the Europeans earlier last year that because we took some unilateral positions of principle for us that somehow the U.S. was going off on its own without a care for the rest of the world. Early in the Administration, this was particularly true with respect to the Kyoto Protocol. So we set out immediately to correct this misperception. Beginning with President Bush’s speech in Warsaw, his participation in the G-8 meetings and the European Union summit, our extensive consultations with respect to the new strategic framework with Russia, and culminating in the brilliant way in which the President pulled together the coalition against terrorism, I believe that we demonstrated to the world that we can be decisively cooperative when it serves our interests and the interests of the world. But we have also demonstrated that when it is a matter of principle, we will stand on that principle. In his first year in office President Bush has shown the international community who he is and what his Administration is all about. That is an important accomplishment—and one that is appreciated now everywhere I go. People know where America is coming from and do not have to doubt our resolve or our purpose. They may not always agree with us, but they have no doubt about our policy or our position. We want to ensure that this policy clarity and this firmness of purpose continue to characterize our foreign policy. … [W]e are using a comprehensive approach, along with our friends and allies, to tackle WMD elsewhere, an approach that includes export controls, non-proliferation, arms control, missile defenses, and counter-proliferation. There are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better than to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD. Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme. In fact, terrorism, Mr. Chairman, is another example of this Administration’s principled approach. Anyone who adopts for political purposes the intentional killing of innocent men, women, and children as they try to go about their everyday lives is going to be opposed by America. That is that. There should be no doubt about this commitment or in the understanding of this commitment. All people of every faith and every nation should stand unalterably opposed to such killing. … To be sure, there are some dark clouds moving in over Latin America, and one of the darkest looms over Colombia where a combination of narcoterrorism and festering insurgency threatens to derail the progress the Colombians have made in solidifying their democracy. But, Mr. Chairman, our counterdrug and development efforts in Colombia are not enough. It has become increasingly clear that our goal with respect to Colombia must be to help that democratic nation preserve and strengthen its

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democracy while ensuring greater respect for basic human rights. An end to the present conflict—peace—is essential to our accomplishing that goal. We must work with the Colombians to create the conditions where peace is possible. To that end, we are seeking the necessary authorities to provide enhanced intelligence sharing, additional training, and more equipment—all geared toward a security mission that is broader than the current counterdrug focus … We have made it clear and will continue to make it clear that the Government of Colombia must also fully commit to this task. No amount of additional U.S. assistance will be sufficient to turn the tide unless Colombia dedicates more of its own resources to this task and commits decisively to a policy of establishing state authority and effective security for its people. I also want to emphasize that we work with the Colombians to ensure respect for human rights. There is no trade off between our work with Colombians on human rights and elimination of the terrorist threat … I have just returned from the Middle East. I met with key leaders in Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as with Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia—and of course I met with Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat. … Recent events have taken an enormous toll in lives lost, families shattered, economic activity frozen and mounting humanitarian distress. An additional cause of tension is the ongoing threat posed by attacks by Hezbollah and others across the United Nations’ recognized Blue Line. It was for that reason I traveled to Beirut and Damascus to underscore the President’s strong message to all parties to exercise restraint. In my consultations with our international partners during the ten days of my travel, and with our Arab friends and Israelis and Palestinians … I found broad support for a comprehensive strategy as a way forward. Confronting and ending terrorism are indispensable steps on the road to peace. In my meetings with Chairman Arafat I made it clear that he and the Palestinian Authority could no longer equivocate. They must decide as the rest of the world has decided that terrorism must end. Chairman Arafat must take that message to his people. He must follow through with instructions to his security forces. He must act to arrest and prosecute terrorists, disrupt terrorist financing, dismantle terrorist infrastructure and stop incitement. Mr. Chairman, for the Palestinian people and leaders of the Palestinian Authority, the question is whether violence and terrorism can be renounced forever and whether their sights can be set squarely on peace through negotiations. For the people and leaders of Israel, the question is whether the time has come for a strong, vibrant State of Israel to look beyond the destructive impact of settlements and occupation, both of which must end, consistent with the clear positions taken by President Bush in his April 4th speech. Israelis should look ahead to the promise held out by the region and the world of a comprehensive, lasting peace. For the Arab peoples and their leaders, the question is whether the promise and vision of Crown Prince Abdullah’s initiative can be transformed into a living reality. It is important that artificial barriers between states fall away, and

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distorted and racist images disappear from the media and from public discourse. For the people and leaders of the international community, the question is how we can help both sides solve the deep problems they face. Mr. Chairman, with regard to other challenges in this region, Iraq comes next on our list. That country remains a significant threat to the region’s stability. We are working at the UN and elsewhere to strengthen international controls on Iraq. In the last year, we successfully stopped the free fall of sanctions and began to rebuild United Nations Security Council consensus on Iraq. The UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1382 in November, committing itself to implement the central element of ‘‘smart sanctions’’ by the end of next month—and I believe we are going to make it. This central element, or Goods Review List (GRL), identifies materials UNSC members must approve for export to Iraq and ensures continued supervision and control over dual-use goods. Its implementation will effectively lift economic sanctions on purely civilian trade and focus controls on arms, especially WMD. This will further strengthen support for UN controls by showing the international community that Saddam Hussein, not the UN and not the U.S., is responsible for the humanitarian plight of the Iraqi people. We have achieved agreement with the Russians on the substance of the GRL and are now finalizing processes for implementing the list and working on a UNSC Resolution for adopting it. At the end of the day, we have not ruled out other options with respect to Iraq. We still believe strongly in regime change in Iraq and we look forward to the day when a democratic, representative government at peace with its neighbors leads Iraq to rejoin the family of nations. With regard to other challenges, we have a long-standing list of grievances with Iran, from concerns about proliferation, to that country’s continued sponsorship of terrorism, to Iranian meddling in Afghanistan in a way unhelpful to the Interim Authority in Kabul. Of late, we have been very clear in communicating to Teheran that its support for terrorism must stop and that what is needed in Afghanistan is help, not meddling. If Iran renounced terrorism, if it supported the Interim Authority, I am convinced that we would be able to talk to Iran, that we would be able to have a reasonable conversation with Iranian leaders. With respect to the situation in Afghanistan, for example, I believe we can demonstrate to them that it is not in their interest to destabilize the government that they helped to create in Bonn. The other issues will be more difficult; but I do believe constructive talks with Iran on Afghanistan are possible. Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. In January, I was in Tokyo to join the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and Japan in hosting the Afghan Donor Conference. The conference helped to ensure that a wide range of countries will help the Afghans rebuild their country. The United States pledged almost $297 million at the conference and others pitched in accordingly. The total pledged at this point is around $4.5 billion with more than $1.8 billion for the first year. But the heavy lifting with respect to Afghanistan is only just beginning. We have helped the Afghans remove the oppressive Taliban regime from their

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country. We have destroyed the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, with American, British, and other troops fighting the remnants as we speak. We have made possible the delivery of humanitarian aid, including massive amounts of food. We have avoided the wholesale starvation that many predicted. Moreover, we have helped the people of Afghanistan establish a multi-ethnic Interim Authority in Kabul, led by Chairman Karzai. One of its ultimate goals is to oversee an agreed process, now begun with district selections of representatives who will help determine the composition of the Loya Jirgas that will lead to a broad-based Afghan government—one that represents all the people of the country, people of every background and region, women as well as men. In June the Emergency Loya Jirga will complete the process of creating a transitional administration, the next step toward our ultimate goal of a fully democratic Afghanistan. Many of our key allies and partners are contributing to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul to help ensure a secure environment for Mr. Karzai to build a new Afghanistan. We want to do everything possible to prevent the rise of any alternative power to the Interim Authority and Transitional Administration, until a permanent government can be established and begin to take care of this challenge on its own. A budget for the Interim Authority has been established and funded. The Authority is beginning to meet payrolls. Police and other Afghan officials are being paid. Schools are opened. Reconstruction has begun, to include the beginning of a new national police and military. Roads are being opened … Much remains to be done and admittedly a lot of what remains will be difficult to accomplish. But we believe that at long last Afghanistan is on a positive track. Mr. Chairman, I know that you are aware of the nature of the challenge we confront in Afghanistan. You understand what is needed to reconstruct this country and that foremost of all what is needed is a long-term commitment by the international community. If we can ensure such a commitment, and if we can achieve proper accountability in the use of the donor funds, then I believe there is a good chance of making significant progress in bringing a new future to Afghanistan—and ending the days of warlordism and political chaos that bred the Taliban and made a fertile ground for terrorists. And as reconstruction begins in Afghanistan, the war against terrorism continues. As President Bush said in his State of the Union Address, ‘‘What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning.’’ The administration is working together in new ways never before envisioned. And that’s what this effort is going to require. FBI, CIA, INS, Treasury, State, the Attorney General and Justice Department, and others, are all coming together. This campaign is transnational, cross-border, even global in a way we have never contemplated. We are operating in several areas right now. For example, in Yemen we are working with President Ali Abdallah Salih to uproot the al-Qaida network there. In the Philippines, we are working with President Arroyo to assist that country in combating its terrorists, the Abu Sayyaf—who as you know hold two American citizens as hostages. We are also deploying a small force to Georgia to assist President Shevardnadze in getting a handle on a tough area in his country—an area that has

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spawned and harbored terrorists in the past. These troops will help train and equip Georgian forces in counterterrorism techniques and methods. With respect to any new major use of military force in the war on terrorism, we have not made any recommendation to the President and the President has made no decision as yet with respect to such use of force. But there are many other actions that are taking place—actions of a law enforcement, political, diplomatic, financial, and intelligence-sharing nature. Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier a sizable portion of the President’s budget request is dedicated to these counterterrorism efforts, as you will see as I turn to the specific priorities of our budget request for Foreign Operations. The President’s FY 2003 request for Foreign Operations is a little over $16.1 billion. These dollars will support the continuing war on terrorism, the work we are doing in Colombia and the Andean region at large, our efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, essential development programs in Africa, the important work of the Peace Corps and the scaling up of that work, and our plan to clear arrearages at the Multilateral Development Banks, including the Global Environment Facility. War on Terrorism To fight terrorism as well as alleviate the conditions that fuel violent extremism, we are requesting an estimated $5 billion. In addition to the initiatives outlined in our budget request for the State Department and Related Agencies, this funding includes: ¥ Foreign assistance—$3.6 billion for economic and security assistance, military equipment, and training for front-line states and our other partners in the war on terrorism. This includes— ¥ $3.4 billion from Foreign Operations accounts such as the Economic Support Fund, International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Freedom Support Act. ¥ $88 million for programs in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to reduce the availability to terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. Ongoing programs engage former weapons scientists in peaceful research and help prevent the spread of the materials expertise required to build such weapons. ¥ $50 million to support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in activities designed to counter nuclear terrorism and implement strengthened safeguards; and $15 million to allow us to respond quickly and effectively to unanticipated or unusually difficult non-proliferation projects or opportunities. ¥ $69 million for counterterrorism engagement programs, training, and equipment to help other countries fight global terror, thereby strengthening our own national security. ¥ $4 million for the Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance to provide training and other necessary expertise to foreign finance offices to halt terrorist financing.

… In the FY 2003 budget request there is approximately $140 million available for Afghanistan, including repatriation of refugees, food aid, demining, and transition assistance. I know that President Bush, the Congress, and the American people recognize that re-building that war-torn country will

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require additional resources and that our support must be and will be a multiyear effort. Moreover, as I said earlier, we do not plan to support reconstruction alone and we will seek to ensure that other international donors continue to do their fair share. At the Virginia Military Institute last week, President Bush made very clear what he wants to do for Afghanistan.… The President said that ‘‘by helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall.’’1 Mr. Chairman, in addition to what I have given you with respect to the President’s budget request for FY 2003, I want to give you the main priorities for our supplemental request for FY 2002. But first let me tell you how grateful we are at the Department for the efforts of this subcommittee and the House subcommittee to get us the $1.5 billion in crucial Emergency Response Fund foreign operations funding to address the immediate post-September 11 needs. That was just the start though. We are asking for $1.6 billion supplemental funding for FY 2002. This amount includes $322 million for the Department. These dollars will address emergent building and operating requirements that have arisen as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, including reopening our mission in Kabul, Afghanistan; reestablishing an official presence in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and increasing security and personnel protection at home and abroad. That leaves about $1.3 billion for foreign operations. These funds—added to the request we have made for FY 2003 for the Front Line States (FLS)— are primarily to: ¥ Deter and prevent acts of international terrorism ¥ Provide vitally needed military equipment, training and economic assistance to our friends and allies ¥ Expand respect for human rights and judicial reform in the FLS ¥ Provide a significant and immediate impact on displaced persons in the FLS ¥ Support civilian reintegration of former combatants and reestablish law enforcement and criminal justice systems ¥ Provide economic and democracy assistance, including help with political development, health care, irrigation and water management, media development, community building and infrastructure improvements, and economic and civil society reform.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, these supplemental dollars for foreign operations in FY 2002 will be directed at draining the swamp in which terrorists thrive and at insuring the long-term success of Operation Enduring Freedom. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/9685.htm

1 See ‘‘President Outlines War Effort,’’ Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, April 17, 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html.

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Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council on Iraq WMD, New York, New York, February 5, 2003 EXCERPTED SECRETARY POWELL: … This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Last November 8, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27, ‘‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.’’ And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq’s declaration of December 7 ‘‘did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.’’ My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq’s involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis’ behavior, Iraq’s behavior, demonstrate that

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Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you’re about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq’s elite military unit, the Republican Guard. [The tape is played.] AUDIO SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed ElBaradei is coming, and they know what he’s coming for and they know he’s coming the next day. He’s coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things. But they’re worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it’s something they should not have, something that should not be seen. The general was incredulous: ‘‘You didn’t get it modified. You don’t have one of those, do you?’’ ‘‘I have one.’’ ‘‘Which? From where?’’ ‘‘From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company.’’ ‘‘What?’’ ‘‘From Al-Kindi.’’ ‘‘I’ll come to see you in the morning. I’m worried you all have something left.’’ ‘‘We evacuated everything. We don’t have anything left.’’ Note what he says: ‘‘We evacuated everything.’’ We didn’t destroy it. We didn’t line it up for inspection. We didn’t turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. ‘‘I will come to you tomorrow.’’ The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity. Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16th. On January 20th, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took place just last week, on January 30. [The tape was played.] AUDIO SECRETARY POWELL: Let me pause again and review the elements of this message. ‘‘They are inspecting the ammunition you have, yes?’’ ‘‘Yes. For the possibility there are forbidden ammo.’’ ‘‘For the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo?’’

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‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there. Remember the first message: evacuate it.’’ This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind. You go a little further into this message and you see the specific instructions from headquarters: ‘‘After you have carried out what is contained in this message, destroy the message because I don’t want anyone to see this message.’’ ‘‘Okay.’’ ‘‘Okay.’’ Why? Why? This message would have verified to the inspectors that they have been trying to turn over things. They were looking for things, but they don’t want that message seen because they were trying to clean up the area, to leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there and the inspectors can look all they want and they will find nothing. This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two isolated events. Quite the contrary, this is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called ‘‘a Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams.’’ Think about that. Iraq has a highlevel committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq’s disarmament—not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs. The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq’s Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein’s son, Qusay. This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Sa’di, an advisor to Saddam. In case that name isn’t immediately familiar to you, General Sa’di has been the Iraqi regime’s primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It was General Sa’di who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Sa’di’s job is not to cooperate; it is to deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing. We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last November, the regime had decided to resume what we heard called ‘‘the old game of cat-and-mouse.’’ For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this Council on December 7th. Iraq never had any intention of complying with this Council’s mandate. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq’s permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq’s prohibited weapons. Iraq’s goal was to give us in this room, to give those of us on this Council, the false impression that the inspection process was working.

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You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration ‘‘rich in volume’’ but ‘‘poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence.’’ Could any member of this Council honestly rise in defense of this false declaration? Everything we have seen and heard indicates that instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing. My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources. Orders were issued to Iraq’s security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussein’s own office, to hide all correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents left which would connect you to the OMI. We know that Saddam’s son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam’s numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Ba’ath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq’s nuclear program. Tell me, answer me: Are the inspectors to search the house of every government official, every Ba’ath Party member and every scientist in the country to find the truth, to get the information they need to satisfy the demands of our Council? Our sources tell us that in some cases the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives? Where did they go? What is being hidden? Why? There is only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors. Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this Council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities.

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Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, poring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate, to our imagery specialists. Let’s look at one. This one is about a weapons munitions facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up with the additional four chemical weapons shells. Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone. It’s been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of December as the UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing. This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji. As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and electronics. I would call my colleagues’ attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities. In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November of 2002, just when the inspections were about to resume, this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples. At this ballistic missile site on November 10th, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components. At this biological weapons-related facility on November 25th, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared—something we almost never see at this facility and we monitor it carefully and regularly. At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared, along with a truck-mounted crane, to move missiles. We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites. Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I’ve just highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We don’t know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites so Iraq knew that they would be coming. We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?

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Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take all of this equipment? Why wasn’t it presented to the inspectors? Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a better sense of what’s being moved before, during and after inspections. This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441. Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons; they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons, as required by Resolution 1441. The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections announced publicly and announced ominously, that, ‘‘Nobody is ready’’ to leave Iraq to be interviewed. Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with UN inspectors was committing treason. Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq’s list was out of date and contained only about 500 names despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names. Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us. Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would face if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is punishable by death. Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates 1441. In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the Special Security Organization to receive counter-intelligence training. The training focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead inspectors. Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries. For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there. On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist and he was sent into hiding. In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house arrest—not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein’s guest houses.

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It goes on and on and on. As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of Resolution 1441. The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work. My colleagues, Operative Paragraph 4 of UN Resolution 1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false statements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute—the facts speak for themselves—shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation. We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test, to give Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration and would they, early on, indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test. They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of this Operative Paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable. Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in UN Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately. This issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq’s non-compliance before we, as a Council, we as the United Nations say, ‘‘Enough. Enough.’’ The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world. First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think there are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry, to pry an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit—about this amount. This is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a teaspoonful of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers just from an amount, just about this quantity that was inside of an envelope. Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax. But UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. And that is my third point. And

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it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents such as their R-400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented. Dr. Blix told this Council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock then that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons. One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War. Although Iraq’s mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. 12 technicians died from exposure to biological agents. He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim holy day, Thursday night through Friday. A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers. A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars. Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier. We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these mobile facilities. Here you see both truck and rail-car mounted mobile factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical features required by such facilities is highly detailed and extremely accurate. As these drawings, based on their description show, we know what the fermentors look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know how they fit together, we know how they work, and we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted.

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As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily—either by moving ordinary looking trucks and rail-cars along Iraq’s thousands of miles of highway or track or by parking them in a garage or a warehouse or somewhere in Iraq’s extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers. We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few—perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day. It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of capabilities. Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. A dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings. By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs. Now Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production facilities. We know from Iraq’s past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq’s research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox. The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets.… In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed, evidence that was required by the international community. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of this and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM’s 1999 report on the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare, no country

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has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents. If we consider just one category of missing weaponry, 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq War, UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be on the order of a thousand tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. Dr. Blix has quipped that, ‘‘Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to know what you did with it.’’ We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don’t have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for. Third point, Iraq’s record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program. We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously or on a dime. This dual-use infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial and then back again. These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections at such facilities, would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built in alibi. Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons. For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State Establishment. Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq’s chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs. That’s the production end of Saddam’s chemical weapons business. What about the delivery end? I’m going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called ‘‘Al Musayyib,’’ a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture.

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Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it’s not just the photo and it’s not an individual seeing the photo. It’s the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case. This photograph of the site taken two months later, in July, shows not only the previous site which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity. To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted communications and human sources who are in a position to know the facts. Iraq’s procurement efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor. Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of human agents? With Iraq’s well-documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don’t. And I don’t think you will either after you hear this next intercept. Just a few weeks ago we intercepted communications between two commanders in Iraq’s Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make sure the other guy hears clearly to the point of repeating it so that it gets written down and completely understood. Listen. (Transmission.) AUDIO SECRETARY POWELL: Let’s review a few selected items of this conversation. Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is misunderstood. ‘‘Remove.’’ ‘‘Remove.’’ ‘‘The expression.’’ ‘‘The expression.’’ ‘‘The expression. I got it.’’ ‘‘Nerve agents.’’ ‘‘Nerve agents.’’ ‘‘Wherever it comes up.’’ ‘‘Got it, wherever it comes up.’’ ‘‘In the wireless instructions.’’ ‘‘In the instructions.’’ ‘‘Correction, no, in the wireless instructions.’’ ‘‘Wireless, I got it.’’ Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the

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senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was. ‘‘Nerve agents.’’ ‘‘Stop talking about it.’’ ‘‘They are listening to us’’ ‘‘Don’t give any evidence that we have these horrible agents.’’ But we know that they do and this kind of conversation confirms it. Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan. Let me remind you that—of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently—this discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg. The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg? (VIDEO) SECRETARY POWELL: Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again—against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t be passing out the orders if he didn’t have the weapons or the intent to use them. We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons. A source said that 1,600 death-row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victims’ mouths, and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein’s humanity—inhumanity has no limits. Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons. To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that in 1991 the inspectors searched Iraq’s primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time, and they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. But, based on defector information, in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein’s lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion. We estimate that this illicit program cost the Iraqis several billion dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst case assessments that had been made before the war. In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a crude

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nuclear weapon, in violation of Iraq’s UN obligations. Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise and he has a bomb design. Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component: sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher. Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an old army trooper. I can tell you a couple things. First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so. Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including in the latest batch an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications? Why would they continuing refining the specification, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? The high-tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium. In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That’s the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq’s gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War.

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This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq’s attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq. People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material. He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear scientists. It is noteworthy that over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraq’s top nuclear scientists, a group that the government-controlled press calls openly his ‘‘nuclear mujaheddin.’’ He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress toward what end? Long ago, the Security Council, this Council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind. Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq’s ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein’s goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands, of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his borders. While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers. We know from intelligence and Iraq’s own admissions that Iraq’s alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samoud II and the Al-Fatah, violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this Council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems. UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally imported 380 SA-2 rocket engines. These are likely for use in the al-Samoud II. Their import was illegal on three counts: Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface-to-surface missiles; and finally, as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit. Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December, after this Council passed Resolution 1441. What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles. As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and

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the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one of the left is used for shortrange missiles. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And in the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27th last year. According to Iraq’s December 7th declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq’s newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here. Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq’s December 7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this circle and so that its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers, unrefueled and on autopilot— violative of all of its obligations under 1441. The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq’s UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or, if transported, to other countries, including the United States. My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq’s continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on, and that has to do with terrorism. Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it’s the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world. Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifadah. And it’s no secret that Saddam’s own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s. But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder.

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Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants. Zarqawi, Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialties, and one of the specialties of this camp, is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp. The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch—imagine a pinch of salt—less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There is no cure. It is fatal. Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region. After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today. Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al-Qaida affiliates based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months. Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida. These denials are simply not credible. Last year, an al-Qaida associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was ‘‘good,’’ that Baghdad could be transited quickly. We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because they remain, even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates, include the poison cell plotters. And they are involved in moving more than money and material. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide. From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us, the State Department and the Agency for International Development, we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that day, the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his

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associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi’s activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier. Now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large, to come and go. As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi’s terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. According to detainees Abu Atiya, who graduated from Zarqawi’s terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks. Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested.… We know about this European network and we know about its links to Zarqawi because the detainees who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network. Three of those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins. The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence again proved him right. When the British unearthed the cell there just last month, one British police officer was murdered during the destruction of the cell. We also know that Zarqawi’s colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi’s network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins. We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades-long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida. We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service. Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida’s appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist alQaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida’s attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

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Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam’s former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery. From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaida organization. Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction. And the record of Saddam Hussein’s cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999 and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel. Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it. This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of al-Qaida’s training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand from his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Muhammad Atif, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help. Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq. The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abdallah al-Iraqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses. Abdallah alIraqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal. With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take their place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a web of lies. When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.

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… For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows: intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world’s most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition. We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world. My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continue defiance of this Council. My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance. We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the Senate Budget Committee, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2003 EXCERPTED FROM PREPARED TESTIMONY Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you to testify in support of the President’s International Affairs Budget for Fiscal Year 2004. Funding requested for FY 2004 for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies is $28.5 billion. The President’s Budget will allow the United States to: ¥ Target security and economic assistance to sustain key countries supporting us in the war on terrorism and helping us to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

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¥ Launch the Millennium Challenge Account—a new partnership generating support to countries that rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom; ¥ Strengthen the U.S. and global commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS and alleviating humanitarian hardships; ¥ Combat illegal drugs in the Andean Region of South America, as well as bolster democracy in one of that region’s most important countries, Colombia; and ¥ Reinforce America’s world-class diplomatic force, focusing on the people, places, and tools needed to promote our foreign policies around the world.

The CEO Responsibilities: State Department and Related Agencies The President’s FY 2004 discretionary request for the Department of State and Related Agencies is $8.497 billion. The requested funding will allow us to: ¥ Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the right work force. The budget request includes $97 million to complete the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative by hiring 399 additional foreign affairs professionals. Foreign policy is carried out through our people, and rebuilding America’s diplomatic readiness in staffing will ensure that the Department can respond to crises and emerging foreign policy priorities. This is the third year of funding for this initiative, which will provide a total of 1,158 new staff for the Department of State. ¥ Continue to upgrade and enhance our security worldwide. The budget request includes $646.7 million for programs to enhance the security of our diplomatic facilities and personnel serving abroad and for hiring 85 additional security and support professionals to sustain the Department’s Worldwide Security Upgrades program. ¥ Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities. The budget request includes $1.514 billion to fund major security-related construction projects and address the major physical security and rehabilitation needs of embassies and consulates around the world. The request includes $761.4 million for construction of secure embassy compounds in seven countries and $128.3 million for construction of a new embassy building in Germany. ¥ Meet our obligations to international organizations. Fulfilling U.S. commitments is vital to building coalitions and gaining support for U.S. interests and policies in the war against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The budget request includes $1 billion to fund U.S. assessments to 44 international organizations, including $71.4 million to support renewed U.S. membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). ¥ Continue to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our educational and cultural exchange programs, and international broadcasting. The budget request includes $296.9 million for public diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our regional and functional bureaus. These resources are used to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics and broaden dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.

The U.S. is successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism on a number of fronts. We are providing extensive assistance to states on the front lines of the anti-terror struggle. Working with our international partners bilaterally and through multilateral organizations, we have frozen more than $110 million

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in terrorist assets, launched new initiatives to secure global networks of commerce and communication, and significantly increased the cooperation of our law enforcement and intelligence communities. Afghanistan is no longer a haven for al-Qaeda. We are now working with the Afghan Authority, other governments, international organizations, and NGOs to rebuild Afghanistan. Around the world we are combating the unholy alliance of drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the internal stability of countries. We are leading the international effort to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of those who would do harm to us and others. At the same time, we are rejuvenating and expanding our public diplomacy efforts worldwide. The FY 2004 International Affairs budget provides approximately $4.7 billion in assistance to the Frontline States, which have joined with us in the war on terrorism. This funding will provide crucial assistance to enable these countries to strengthen their economies, internal counter-terrorism capabilities and border controls. Of this amount, the President’s Budget provides $657 million for Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million for Pakistan, $255 million for Turkey, $136 million for Indonesia, and $87 million for the Philippines. In Afghanistan, the funding will be used to fulfill our commitment to rebuild Afghanistan’s road network; establish security through a national military and national police force, including counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics components; establish broad-based and accountable governance through democratic institutions and an active civil society; ensure a peace dividend for the Afghan people through economic reconstruction; and provide humanitarian assistance to sustain returning refugees and displaced persons. United States assistance will continue to be coordinated with the Afghan government, the United Nations, and other international donors. The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program will continue to provide frontline states a full complement of training courses, such as a course on how to conduct a post-terrorist attack investigation or how to respond to a WMD event. The budget will also fund additional equipment grants to sustain the skills and capabilities acquired in the ATA courses. It will support as well in-country training programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17620.htm

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004 EXCERPTED The President’s FY2005 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $31.5 billion, broken down as follows: ¥ Foreign Operations—$21.3 billion ¥ State Operations—$8.4 billion

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¥ P.L. 480 Food Aid—$1.2 billion ¥ International Broadcasting—$569 million ¥ U.S. Institute of Peace—$22 million

Mr. Chairman, the President’s top foreign policy priority is winning the war on terrorism. Forty-eight percent of the President’s budget for foreign affairs directly supports that priority by assisting our allies and strengthening the United States’ diplomatic posture. For example: $1.2 billion supports Afghanistan reconstruction, security and democracy building, and more than $5.7 billion is provided for assistance to countries around the world that have joined us in the war on terrorism, and $3.5 billion indirectly supports the war on terrorism by strengthening our ability to respond to emergencies and conflict situations. Moreover, $190 million is aimed at expanding democracy in the Greater Middle East, in part to help alleviate the conditions that spawn terrorists. In addition, $5.3 billion is targeted for the President’s bold initiatives to fight HIV/AIDS and create the Millennium Challenge Corporation, both of which will support stability and improve the quality of life for the world’s poor—and, again, help to relieve conditions that cause resentment and despair.… Winning the War on Terrorism Winning on the battlefield with our superb military forces is just one step in defeating terrorism. To eradicate terrorism, the United States must help create stable governments in nations that once supported terrorism, go after terrorist support mechanisms as well as the terrorists themselves, and help alleviate conditions in the world that enable terrorists to bring in new recruits. To this end, in FY2005 the State Department and USAID will continue to focus on the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, support our coalition partners to further our counterterrorism, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, and expand democracy and help generate prosperity, especially in the Middle East. Support for Our Coalition Partners As part of the war on terrorism, President Bush established a clear policy to work with other nations to meet the challenges of defeating terror networks with global reach. This commitment extends to the front-line states that have joined us in the war on terrorism and to those nations that are key to successful transitions to democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our assistance enables countries cooperating closely with the United States to prevent future attacks, improve counter-terrorism capabilities and tighten border controls. As I indicated earlier, the FY2005 Budget for International Affairs provides more than $5.7 billion for assistance to countries around the world that have joined us in the war on terrorism, including Turkey, Jordan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines. U.S. assistance has also resulted in unparalleled law enforcement and intelligence cooperation that has destroyed terrorist cells, disrupted terrorist

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operations and prevented attacks. There are many counterterrorism successes in cooperating countries and international organizations. For example: ¥ Pakistan has apprehended more than 500 al Qaeda terrorists and members of the Taliban through the leadership of President Musharraf, stronger border security measures and law enforcement cooperation throughout the country. ¥ Jordan continues its strong counterterrorism efforts, including arresting two individuals with links to al Qaeda who admitted responsibility for the October 2002 murder of USAID Foreign Service officer Lawrence Foley in Amman. ¥ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has endorsed an ambitious transformation agenda designed to enhance its capabilities by increasing deployment speed and agility to address new threats of terrorism. ¥ Colombia has developed a democratic security strategy as a blueprint for waging a unified, aggressive counterterror-counternarcotics campaign against designated foreign terrorist organizations and other illegal, armed groups.

The U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies and friends have made significant advances against the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah which was responsible for the Bali attack in 2002 that killed more than 200 people. In early August 2003, an Indonesian court convicted and sentenced to death a key figure in that bombing. Since September 11, 2001, 173 countries have issued orders to freeze the assets of terrorists. As a result, terror networks have lost access to nearly $200 million in more than 1,400 terrorist-related accounts around the world. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other multilateral development banks have also played an important role in this fight by strengthening international defenses against terrorist finance. While progress has been made attacking terrorist organizations both globally and regionally, much work remains to be done. The FY2005 President’s Budget strengthens our financial commitment to our coalition partners to wage the global war on terror. Highlights of the President’s request include $700 million for Pakistan to help advance security and economic opportunity for Pakistan’s citizens, including a multi-year educational support program; $461 million for Jordan to increase economic opportunities for Jordanian communities and strengthen Jordan’s ability to secure its borders; and $577 million for Colombia to support President Uribe’s unified campaign against drugs and terrorism. New public diplomacy efforts including the Partnerships for Learning (P4L) and Youth Exchange and Study (YES) initiatives have been created to reach a younger and more diverse audience through academic and professional exchange programs. In FY2005, the P4L and the YES programs, funded at $61 million, will focus more on youth of the Muslim world, specifically targeting non-traditional, non-elite, often female and non-English speaking youth. U.S. broadcasting initiatives in the Middle East encourage the development of a free press in the American tradition and provide Middle Eastern viewers and listeners access to a variety of ideas. The U.S. revamped its Arabic radio broadcasts in 2002 with the introduction of Radio Sawa, which broadcasts to the region twenty-four hours a day. As a result, audience size for our Arabic broadcasting increased from under 2 percent in 2001 to over 30 percent in

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2003. Based on this successful model, the U.S. introduced Radio Farda to broadcast to Iran around the clock. Building on this success, the FY2005 President’s Budget Request provides over $70 million for Arabic and Persian radio and television broadcasts to the Middle East. In early 2004, the United States will launch the Middle East Television Network, an Arabic language satellite network that will have the capability of reaching millions of viewers and will provide a means for Middle Easterners to better understand democracy and free market policies, as well as the U.S. and its people. Border Security Prior to September 11, 2001, the State Department’s consular officers focused primarily on screening applicants based on whether they intended to work or reside legally in the United States. In deciding who should receive a visa, consular officers relied on State Department information systems as the primary basis for identifying potential terrorists. The State Department gave overseas consular officers the discretion to determine the level of scrutiny that should be applied to visa applications and encouraged the streamlining of procedures. Today, Consular Affairs at the State Department, working with both Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services at the Department of Homeland Security, are cooperating to achieve our goals more effectively by sharing information and integrating information systems. The Department of State has invested substantial time, money, and effort in revamping its visa and passport process as well as its provision of American Citizen Services. The Department has more than doubled its database holdings on individuals who should not be issued visas, increased training for all consular officers, established special programs to vet applications more comprehensively, increased the number of skilled, American staff working in consular sections overseas, and improved data-sharing among agencies. The State Department, along with the Department of Homeland Security, is currently developing biometrics, such as fingerprints, digital photographs or iris scans, for both visas and passports in order to fulfill requirements of the Patriot and Border Security Acts and the International Civil Aviation Organization. As a part of the State Department’s efforts to screen visa applicants more effectively, and in particular to ensure that a suspected terrorist does not receive a visa to enter the United States, we will be an active partner in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The TSC, established in December 2003, will maintain a single, consolidated watchlist of terrorist suspects to be shared with Federal, state, local and private entities in accordance with applicable law. The Department of State will also participate in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), a joint-effort aimed at reducing the potential of intelligence gaps domestically and abroad. To achieve our goal of secure borders and open doors, in FY2005 the State Department plans to expand the use of biometrics to improve security in the visa and passport processes; more effectively fill gaps worldwide by hiring people with specific skills including language expertise; improve and maintain all consular systems; and more broadly expand data sharing with all agencies with border control or immigration related responsibilities. The budget in FY2005

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includes $175 million for biometric projects including photographs and fingerprints to comply with Border Security and Patriot Acts. The Border Security program underwent a PART analysis in the development of the FY2004 and FY2005 budgets and this budget request reflects the results of those analyses. The Department is moving ahead on program management improvements that clearly link to the Department of Homeland Security goals related to visa policy. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/29253.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: Also see President Bush’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2005, and Secretary of State Powell’s Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 12, 2004 (http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record. cfm?id=220374).

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Interview with Barry Schweid and George Gedda of the Associated Press, September 10, 2004 MR. SCHWEID: 9/11, an anniversary at hand again. Is America safer now, do you think, than it has been? SECRETARY POWELL: 9/11 was a great tragedy for our nation. It was a great tragedy for the world. I am pleased to say that we have not seen another incident, anything like 9/11. We’ve not been struck by terrorists since 9/11, so certainly the last three years have been an indication that we are safer. But we are still in a threatening environment. There are still people who want to strike the United States. As a result of the President’s effort and his leadership, we have put in place a Homeland Security Department, we have tightened up our borders, we have a better idea who’s coming into the country. We know how to use the information that we get to raise alert levels and take other precautions that protect our nation. And so, in that regard, we are safer, I believe. We are also safer in that we have eliminated the Taliban as a functioning group in Afghanistan. We have a government that is getting ready for presidential elections in Afghanistan coming up on the 9th of October. And al-Qaida no longer finds safe haven in that part of the world. Iraq has seen a dictator removed and it is no longer a source of that kind of activity, even though we still have challenges there. So, in that sense, I think we are safer. At the same time, the world has to continue to fight terrorism. We see terrorism in places like Beslan in Russia. We see what happened in Jakarta the other day, a bomb against the Australian Embassy. So while I think the nation clearly is safer, we have to remain vigilant and we have to realize that there are people out there who mean us ill, and they have to be fought and they have to be defeated. MR. SCHWEID: It’s obviously a worldwide problem, but is—many, many years ago, and she was virtually laughed at by think-tankers, Claire Sterling wrote many, many years ago about the notion of a network of terrorists, that it really is—that they’re interlocked, they’re interlaced. Do you—

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SECRETARY POWELL: Some clearly are interlocked. I mean, al-Qaida is a worldwide organization and JI is active in Asia and other parts of the world. What we want to make sure is that they don’t become any more interlocked than they might be now. And that’s why we focus not only just on military action and police action, but law enforcement, financial activities, getting into their information networks, their financial network, computer networks. Any means by which they might connect with one another, we are after to make sure that it doesn’t become that kind of worldwide network. MR. SCHWEID: What are they after, besides chaos and hurting people? SECRETARY POWELL: They are after, first and foremost, making a statement through the destruction and killing of innocent people. And they have abandoned civilized means of making your opinion known. They reject democracy, they reject openness and they resort to the killing of innocent people. There can be no justification for what happened in Russia the other day, last week, where young students on their first day of school, showing up with flowers and pencil boxes to learn, suddenly are put at risk and then are killed by the hundreds. There’s no excuse for that. There can be no political justification. There is no religious justification. This is evil and terror staring us right in the face and it’s the kind of evil and terror that we saw perpetrated against us three years ago on 9/11. And it must be fought. It must be resisted. There can be no compromise in this battle. MR. GEDDA: Bin Laden’s face has not been seen on television since 2001. I don’t know whether you would attach any significance to that. You have no inkling as to why almost three years have passed since he has appeared? SECRETARY POWELL: No, I don’t know why. I don’t know where he is and I don’t know his state of health. I don’t know. We believe he is still alive. I can’t prove that. But he clearly is hiding as best he can. He is on the run. He is not popping up on television and he is not showing himself in a way that he could be captured. The whole world is after him for being a criminal and for being a terrorist and for being a murderer, so he is doing everything he can to stay hidden. MR. GEDDA: How much of a difference would his death or capture make? SECRETARY POWELL: I don’t know. We have done a great deal of damage to the al-Qaida network. A large percentage of the senior leadership of al-Qaida has been killed or captured. But it does have the capacity to regenerate itself at lower levels, but they are not as accomplished and experienced as those who have been taken out. If he were to be taken out, would that destroy al-Qaida? I think it would be a very, very serious blow against al-Qaida. I cannot tell you, though, that there would not be others who would try to take his place. But the top leadership of al-Qaida has been very badly damaged through capture and death over the last three years. MR. GEDDA: You were enthusiastic about the Future of Iraq project two years ago. Almost nothing has been heard about it since then, and—but you praised it at the time, you thought it was a good idea for the postwar reconstruction. I hear it’s gathering dust, the outcome of this. Are you disappointed in that it never seemed to be acted upon after the war? SECRETARY POWELL: Well, the Future of Iraq study was a one-year effort led by the State Department, but it was an interagency effort. And we also

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brought in outsiders from think tanks, from universities and elsewhere, and it was a very good piece of work. It was made available to the Coalition Provisional Authority. It was made available to Mr. Jay Garner, General Jay Garner, before that. Parts of it have been used and that body of information is here. We’re using it. As you know, we have an office within our Near Eastern Bureau that is working closely with Ambassador Negroponte and many of the people in that office worked on the Future of Iraq study. So it still gives us insight as to things that have to be done with respect to reconstruction, with respect to the political process, and materials are available, both to the office here as well as to Ambassador Negroponte. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36076.htm

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PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

E VOLUTION OF U.S. C OUNTERTERRORISM P OLICY VOLUME 2

Edited by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft Foreword by Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policy / compiled by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-0-275-99529-4 (set : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-275-99531-7 (vol 1 : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-275-99533-1 (vol 2 : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-0-313-34692-7 (vol 3 : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—United States—History. 2. Terrorism—Prevention— United States—History. 3. Terrorism—Prevention—Government policy— United States—History. 4. Civil defense—United States. 5. National security—United States. I. Title: Evolution of United States counterterrorism policy. II. Alexander, Yonah. III. Kraft, Michael, 1937– HV6432.E86 2008 2007028388 363.3250 170973—dc22 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2008 by Yonah Alexander and Michael B. Kraft Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007028388 ISBN: 978-0-275-99529-4 (set) 978-0-275-99531-7 (vol. 1) 978-0-275-99533-1 (vol. 2) 978-0-313-34692-7 (vol. 3) First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Volume 2 Contents Foreword by Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan Preface

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PART TWO: U.S. POLICY POST–SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (Continued from Volume 1) 10. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, The President’s Fiscal Year 2006 International Affairs Budget, Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, May 12, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Symposium, Capital Hilton, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with Barbara Slavin and Ray Locker of USA Today, Washington, D.C., November 28, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe, Andrews Air Force Base, December 5, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘The Promise of Democratic Peace,’’ Op-Ed in The Washington Post, December 11, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, CNN Interview with Wolf Blitzer, Washington, D.C., December 19, 2005

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘Realizing the Goals of Transformational Diplomacy,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2006 448 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit After Meeting, Cairo, Egypt, February 21, 2006 451 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to Edward R. Murrow Journalism Program Participants, Loy Henderson Auditorium, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2006

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with the New York Times Editorial Board, New York, New York, September 25, 2006

460

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2006

469

11. Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism

475

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor

475

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Terrorist Threats Against America,’’ Testimony to the Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C., September 25, 2001

475

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘The Global War Against Terrorism: A Way Ahead,’’ Address to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., October 23, 2002

479

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, ‘‘International Terrorism: The War Continues,’’ Remarks at the 20th Anniversary Conference of the International Security Management Association, Boston, Massachusetts, June 9, 2003

484

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security and Director, Office of Foreign Missions, ‘‘Diplomacy: The Key to Success in the Global War on Terror,’’ Remarks to the Pacific Council of International Policy’s Annual Conference, Los Angeles, California, November 13, 2004

487

Ambassador J. Cofer Black

490

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘The International Terrorism Threat,’’ Remarks to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, March 26, 2003

490

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘Combating Global Terrorism,’’ Remarks to the Eighth Annual Conference and General Meeting of the International Association of Prosecutors, Renaissance Washington Hotel, Washington, D.C., August 11, 2003

498

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘9/11 Commission Recommendations,’’ Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2004

501

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Remarks to the Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce, Fairfax County, Virginia, September 30, 2004

506

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton

507

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Update,’’ Testimony Before the House

Contents

vii

International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, October 27, 2005

507

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, Remarks at the Royal United Services Institute, Conference on Transnational Terrorism, London, England, January 16, 2006

512

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, Interview on the Charlie Rose Show, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2006

515

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, ‘‘Government-Private Partnership Key to Defeating Terrorism,’’ Speech at the 2006 International Counterterrorism Conference: Public and Private Partnerships, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2006

522

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, ‘‘The Changing Face of Terror: A Post 9/11 Assessment,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., June 13, 2006

526

12. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

533

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘‘A New Kind of War,’’ Published in the New York Times, September 27, 2001

533

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘‘Beyond Nation Building,’’ Remarks at the 11th Annual Salute to Freedom, Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum, New York, New York, February 14, 2003

534

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony Prepared for Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington, D.C., March 23, 2004

537

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks to the Newspaper Association of America/American Society of Newspaper Editors, J.W. Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2004

543

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement, Michie Stadium, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 29, 2004

545

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘‘Using Media to Fight Terror,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, February 17, 2006

546

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Admiral Giambastiani, ‘‘U.S. Must Go ‘All the Way’ to Counter Terrorism,’’ Department of Defense News Briefing, The Pentagon, March 23, 2006

551

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks at the Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November 9, 2006

554

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Farewell Parade, The Pentagon, December 15, 2006

556

13. Attorney General John Ashcroft Attorney General John Ashcroft, Transcript of News Conference with FBI Director Mueller, October 16, 2001

559 559

viii

Contents Attorney General John Ashcroft, Press Conference on Arrests, October 18, 2001

561

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference, October 25, 2001

563

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request, Remarks Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, February 26, 2002

566

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Transcript of News Conference, National Security Coordination Council, Department of Justice Conference Center, March 5, 2002

568

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Transcript of News Conference—SEVIS, Department of Justice Conference Center, May 10, 2002

569

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry–Exit Registration System, June 6, 2002

571

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks to the Department of Defense Regarding the Transfer of Abdullah Al Muhajir (Born Jose Padilla) as an Enemy Combatant, June 10, 2002

573

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the U.S. Attorneys Conference, New York, New York, October 1, 2002

574

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, Department of Justice, February 10, 2003

577

Attorney General John Ashcroft, ‘‘The War Against Terrorism: Working Together to Protect America,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, March 4, 2003

579

Attorney General John Ashcroft, ‘‘Preserving Life and Liberty,’’ American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2003

583

Attorney General John Ashcroft, End of the Year Address to the Department of Justice, December 10, 2004

586

14. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales

587

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Statement Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Science and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies, March 1, 2005

587

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority, February 6, 2006

589

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, March 7, 2006

596

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Opening Remarks at the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee

Contents

ix

on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2006

602

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the Justice Department Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2006

602

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh on Stopping Terrorists Before They Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of Prevention, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, August 16, 2006

604

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the JAG Corps Leadership Summit, Lake Buena Vista, Florida, October 23, 2006

607

15. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge

611

Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, Remarks at the Northeast Pennsylvania Regional Counterterrorism Task Force Symposium, Lake Harmony, Pennsylvania, September 21, 2004

611

Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and Terrorist Threat Integration Center Director John Brennan, Transcript of Press Conference on Media Availability, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2004

612

Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, Remarks at the Cargo Security Summit, Washington, D.C., December 16, 2004

615

16. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff

619

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2005

619

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Testimony Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2005

623

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Second Stage Review Remarks, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, D.C., July 13, 2005

632

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 75th Anniversary Celebration, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, October 1, 2005

640

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, G-8 Summit and Related Issues, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C., June 9, 2006

643

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference, Boston, Massachusetts, October 16, 2006

647

x

Contents

PART THREE: COUNTERTERRORISM BY TOPICS AND ISSUES

651

17. Threats

653

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, February 2, 1999

654

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, February 2, 2000

656

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on the Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World, February 7, 2001 659 Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Council Officer for South Asia, ‘‘Fighting International Terrorism: Beyond September 11,’’ Address at the College for William and Mary, November 28, 2001

661

Carl W. Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, ‘‘Current and Projected Threats to the National Security of the United States,’’ Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2002

667

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2002

671

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, ‘‘The Worldwide Threat 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003

677

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Global Threats 2003,’’ Statement for the Record: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Armed Services Committee, February 12, 2003

684

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, ‘‘The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 24, 2004

687

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, ‘‘Worldwide Threat: Converging Dangers in a Post-9/11 World,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 2002

694

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘al Qaeda: The Threat to the United States and Its Allies,’’ Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., April 1, 2004

700

Contents

xi

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘9/11 Commission Report Recommendation: Denying Sanctuary to Terrorists,’’ Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Los Angeles, California, August 6, 2004

706

Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, ‘‘Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005

712

Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, ‘‘The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Approach to Today’s Most Serious National Security Threat,’’ Prepared Remarks to the Capitol Hill Club, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2006

716

General Michael V. Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,’’ Statement for the Record Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, November 15, 2006

721

18. Intelligence

727

Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, U.S. Air Force, Director of the National Security Agency, Opening Remarks at the Partnerships for Combating Terrorism Forum, March 4, 2002

728

Jim Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director of Operations, Address to Duke University Law School Conference, April 11, 2002

730

CIA Spokesman Bill Harlow, Statement on the CIA’s Counterterrorism Efforts, September 19, 2002

733

Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the Joint Congressional Intelligence Committee, Washington, D.C., October 1, 2002

734

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Written Statement Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002

738

Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., U.S. Air Force (Retired), Director NIMA, Statement Before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, October 17, 2002

754

Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, U.S. Air Force, Director, National Security Agency, Central Security Service, Statement Before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, October 17, 2002

755

xii

Contents Winston P. Wiley, Chair, Senior Steering Group, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Homeland Security, Testimony Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, February 28, 2003

760

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Event, May 14, 2004

761

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, ‘‘Tomorrow’s FBI: Changing to Meet New Challenges,’’ Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, June 22, 2004

762

Ambassador J. Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘‘9/11 Commission Recommendation: Counterterrorism Analysis and Collection,’’ Testimony Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., August 4, 2004

765

John E. McLaughlin, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 9/11 Commission Findings, August 17, 2004

766

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on Intelligence Legislation, December 4, 2004

768

Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 17, 2005

768

Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement on the WMD Commission Report, March 31, 2005

770

President George W. Bush Discusses the WMD Commission Report, Dwight D. Eisenhower Executive Office Building, March 31, 2005

771

Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, Remarks to CIA Employees, September 22, 2005

772

Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte and Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, Announcement Establishing the National Clandestine Service, October 13, 2005

775

Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, Op-ed ‘‘Loose Lips Sink Spies,’’ New York Times, February 10, 2006

776

Director of Intelligence John A. Kringen, Op-ed ‘‘How We’ve Improved Intelligence Minimizing the Risk of ‘Groupthink’,’’ Washington Post, April 3, 2006

777

John Scott Redd, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Statement for the Record Before the House Armed Services Committee, April 4, 2006

778

President George W. Bush Discusses the NSA Surveillance Program, Diplomatic Reception Room, May 11, 2006

781

General Michael V. Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan,’’ Statement for the Record Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, November 15, 2006

782

Contents

xiii

19. Iraq

787

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘‘The Global Fight Against Terrorism: Status and Perspectives,’’ Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, February 8, 2003

788

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, The Oval Office, March 19, 2003

791

Attorney General John Ashcroft, ‘‘Success and Strategies in the Effort to Liberate Iraq,’’ Prepared Remarks, April 17, 2003

792

Attorney General John Ashcroft, ‘‘Leadership in the Cause of Liberty,’’ Robert H. Krieble Lecture, Heritage Foundation, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 24, 2003

793

President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi, Press Conference, The Rose Garden, The White House, September 23, 2004

794

President George W. Bush, Radio Address, November 13, 2004

800

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The White House, January 26, 2005

801

President George W. Bush Congratulates Iraqis on the Election, January 30, 2005

802

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview on Al-Iraqiya with Karim Hamadi, Baghdad, Iraq, November 11, 2005

803

President George W. Bush Outlines Strategy for Victory in Iraq, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, November 30, 2005

804

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, An Overview of International Support for Iraqi Democracy on the Eve of the December 15, 2005, Elections, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., December 13, 2005

809

President George W. Bush, U.S. Strategy in Iraq, Kentucky International Convention Center, Louisville, Kentucky, January 11, 2006

813

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Remarks at a Rally for the Troops at Charleston Air Force Base, Charleston, South Carolina, March 17, 2006

816

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by Bob Schieffer, CBS News Face the Nation, CBS News Washington, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2006

818

President George W. Bush Discusses the Global War on Terror, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., April 10, 2006

820

President George W. Bush Discusses Recent Visit to Iraq by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Rose Garden, May 1, 2006

821

President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Joint Press Conference, The East Room of the White House, Washington, D.C., May 25, 2006

822

xiv

Contents President George W. Bush, Statement on the Death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Rose Garden, Washington, D.C., June 8, 2006

829

President George W. Bush, Surprise Visit to Iraq, Meets with Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad, Videoconference with Camp David Participants, June 13, 2006

830

President George W. Bush, Saturday Radio Address on Iraq, June 17, 2006

831

President George W. Bush, Press Conference at 2006 U.S.-EU Summit, Zeremoniensaal Hall, Hofburg Palace, Vienna, Austria, June 21, 2006

832

Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Interview by John King, CNN, The Vice President’s Residence, June 22, 2006

833

President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, Press Conference, The East Room, The White House, July 25, 2006

836

President George W. Bush, Radio Address, October 21, 2006

840

President George W. Bush, Press Conference, The White House, October 25, 2006

842

Ambassador David Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2006

853

President George W. Bush, Statement on the Saddam Hussein Verdict, TSTC Airport, Waco, Texas, November 5, 2006

857

20. Legislation

859

Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick, Testimony Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, April 11, 1995

860

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Opening Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., May 3, 1995

868

Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick, Statement Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Concerning the Clinton Administration Counterterrorism Initiative, May 3, 1995

871

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, May 4, 1995

874

Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick, Remarks at the Anti-Defamation League’s National Leadership Conference, Washington, D.C., April 23, 1996

876

President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996

880

Summary of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S.735 Public Law No: 104-132, April 24, 1996

882

Contents

xv

Kenneth R. McKune, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Statement Before the Senate Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, February 24, 1998

883

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks at Press Briefing with FBI Director Mueller, FBI Headquarters, September 27, 2001

886

President George W. Bush, Remarks by the Signing of the PATRIOT Act, Antiterrorism Legislation, October 26, 2001

887

Attorney General John Ashcroft, U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony Before the Committee on the Judiciary, June 5, 2003

888

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 20, 2004

890

President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing H.R. 4567, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2005, October 18, 2004

893

President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Washington, D.C., December 17, 2004

893

Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Address to the National Association of Counties Legislative Conference, Washington, D.C., March 7, 2005

895

President George W. Bush, Radio Address on Legislation, September 16, 2006

897

President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the SAFE Port Act, Eisenhower Executive Office Building, October 13, 2006

898

President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, The East Room, The White House, October 17, 2006

900

John B. Bellinger III, State Department Legal Advisor, The Military Commission Act of 2006, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2006

901

Foreword Counterterrorism is a discipline propelled by events that have not yet happened. It involves speculating on possible threats, undertaking measures to prevent them, fortifying our defenses, and bolstering our capability to respond to and recover from an attack. In short, counterterrorism practitioners try to predict the future and then attempt to change it. But to do so, looking back is just as important as looking forward. Particularly now, when counterterrorism efforts have been so greatly expanded and so frequently misguided, an evaluation of our own practices is crucial. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, the exhaustive collection that follows, is an invaluable tool in crafting the most effective strategies for preventing future terrorist attacks and protecting Americans. Throughout my career in counterterrorism, I have always held that analyzing past terrorist attacks and plots is one of the most effective ways to assess future threats. Case studies of attacks by groups like al Qaeda reveal their modus operandi, methodology, and capability—vital indicators of what their future ambitions may be. And just as there is no greater lens into the intent of terrorists than their history, our own counterterrorism track record holds invaluable insights into what does and does not work. Only through a thorough selfassessment of our past efforts to stop terrorism can we divine the most effective policies going forward. This book lays the foundation for that assessment. The laws, policies, and speeches collected in Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy catalog the scope of American counterterrorism initiatives for the past three decades. These documents are raw history—the artifacts of our ongoing struggle against terrorism. For many Americans, it is a fight that began in September of 2001. But as these volumes show, the genesis came long before. Beginning in the early 1970s, we see the first real recognition of the terrorist threat by America’s national security establishment, then preoccupied by traditional interstate conflict and counterinsurgency. The growing frequency and urgency of the policies that follow in the next three decades reflect the increasing focus on terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s up to the post-9/11 era, when it became the driving force behind America’s national security policy. But it is not only our own history contained here. By telling the story of our historical fight against terrorism, our counterterrorism policies present a perspective on the evolution of terrorism itself. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy begins with a 1972 speech by President Nixon broadly addressing the terrorist threat and then proposes legislative prescriptions outlining

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Foreword

specific, even arcane, counterterrorism tools. The increasing complexity of the policies reveals an adaptation to an evolving and ever more dangerous enemy. Terrorism is both provoked and sustained by development, technological progress, and globalization. As the world becomes smaller, the ability of the terrorist to communicate, travel, raise and transfer money, and obtain or develop weaponry is enhanced. This has extended the global reach of terrorist groups and magnified their lethality. As terrorists became more cunning, more mobile, and more dangerous, the means used to fight them followed suit. The reader will discern obvious patterns in the intensity of U.S. counterterrorism initiatives. The documents presented here demonstrate only sporadic, reactive attention to terrorism before 9/11. Those of us who devoted our careers to counterterrorism watched in frustration as the institutional focus of the U.S. government locked onto terrorism in the weeks and months following an attack, but inevitably faded as time passed. In this sense, this collection also offers a view of the pre-9/11 world, during which time terrorism occasionally emerged as a foreign policy headache but would reliably return to the back burner, second to the more traditional challenges posed by the Soviet Union or China. This book also archives the work of those individuals within the federal government whose focus on counterterrorism never wavered. In doing so, these documents will answer questions on the minds of Americans who rightly wonder what their government was doing to protect them against terrorism in the pre-9/11 era. Though terrorism was never the national priority it should have been, there were dedicated public servants who did everything they could to prevent attacks. The policies contained in these pages are a testament to those who strove to stop terrorist groups despite bureaucratic hurdles and, when they failed, worked relentlessly to refine their policies to prevent future attacks. Terrorism is a conflict that will be with us for decades to come. If we are to fight terrorism effectively, we must engage in constant, rigorous analysis—not only of terrorist groups, but also of our own efforts to fight them. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy will be the cornerstone of that effort. In an age in which counterterrorism demands so much of our attention and resources, this book is especially important. Since 9/11, there has been an unprecedented expansion of counterterrorism initiatives, many of which have been a waste of valuable time and money. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is a monumental first step toward righting those well-intended but ultimately ineffective policies. We will continue to struggle against terrorist groups, and they will succeed in attacking us again. I am confident, however, that this tremendous resource will go a long way toward ensuring that, over time, our counterterrorism efforts will become effective enough that they are no longer needed. Ambassador (Ret.) Michael A. Sheehan New York City October 2007 MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN served as coordinator for counterterrorism at the State Department from 1998 to 2000, with the rank of ambassador. He later became assistant secretary for peacekeeping operations at the United Nations and served as deputy commissioner for counterterrorism in the New York City Police Department. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the New York University Center for Law and Security and has also taught at the U.S. Military Academy’s Center for Counterterrorism at West Point.

Preface The speeches, statements, and testimony contained in these three volumes provide an overview of publicly enunciated U.S. government counterterrorism policies, analysis, and programs. These selections contain many documents that have been collected over the years by the editors and are no longer readily available. They predate the Internet and postings on various Web sites and, as a result, were only slightly edited. Where URLs are available for documents, they are included at the end of the items. These documents were, at times, heavily excerpted to eliminate duplicative or irrelevant sections. In many cases, terrorism-related comments were only part of much broader speeches. In other instances, such as speeches, somewhat duplicative phrases were left in where their inclusion provide richer context or include slight changes in terminology. The links provided were those available at the time this manuscript went to press and it is possible that some URLs are no longer accessible. This compilation is by no means all inclusive—the massive volume of terrorism-related statements, especially since the transformative events of the September 11 attacks and the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, prohibits the inclusion of all available documents. Every effort was made, however, to include the most useful statements, speeches, and testimony for both the general reader and as a resource for researchers. The time period covered in the various chapters extends from the Nixon administration to the end of 2006. Because of space limitations, with a few exceptions, we did not include material from daily press briefings by the State Department and other agencies but instead focused on formal testimony and speeches, which usually were precleared and vetted through the Office of Management and Budget’s clearance process. For the same reason, the full texts of useful documents such as Executive Orders were not included; however, their titles and URLs are listed in the Key Documents (chapter 27). Our intent is to provide leads and references for readers who are interested in more detailed research. We note that because of the relationship between the subject matter in various chapters, it is useful to read these chapters together. For example, the chapters covering President George W. Bush (chapter 7) and Vice President

xx

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Richard B. Cheney (chapter 8) include material related to the Iraq chapter (chapter 19). The Threats chapter (chapter 17) should be read alongside both the Intelligence chapter (chapter 18) and the statements by the various Department of State Coordinators for Counterterrorism (chapter 11). The Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Financial chapters (chapters 20–22) also are interrelated. We hope these documents will further the understanding of the development of U.S. counterterrorism policies and provide a context for understanding the crucial terrorism problems facing the United States and other countries.

10 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, The President’s Fiscal Year 2006 International Affairs Budget, Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, May 12, 2005 EXCERPTED FROM PREPARED TESTIMONY The President’s FY 2006 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals $33.6 billion. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Members of this Committee for their support and leadership in the passing the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental.… The supplemental international affairs funding of $5.8 billion will ensure that we are able to respond speedily and effectively to the needs of our steadfast coalition partners in the War on Terror, to newly elected governments in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Ukraine who need our stabilizing assistance to move forward with reforms, to those seeking democracy assistance in Belarus and Lebanon, and to the men, women and children uprooted by war, as in Sudan, or swept up in natural disasters, such as the recent East Asia tsunami. The supplemental funds will also cover the extraordinary security and support costs of operating our current embassy in Baghdad, and the construction of a secure new embassy compound for our mission, as well as $60 million for the security and operations of our embassy in Kabul. … I will begin my testimony on the FY 2006 Budget Request with an overview of President Bush’s foreign policy mission, which we seek this Committee’s support to advance. In the long term, as President Bush said, ‘‘The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.’’ Through diplomacy, the United States can create new possibilities for freedom and fresh hope across the globe. We must deal with the world as it is, but we do not accept it as it is. In places like

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Afghanistan and Ukraine, Iraq and the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Georgia, people’s desire for freedom and a better future is redefining what many thought possible in these societies. President Bush has charged the men and women of the Department of State with helping to create a balance of power in the world that favors human liberty, and that is exactly what we are doing. Together with our democratic partners around the world, we are advancing a forward strategy of freedom. Our cooperation with international partners is dramatically evident in Afghanistan, where last month I saw first-hand the progress that country has made towards stability, reconstruction, and democracy. The Presidential election last year was an inspiration to the world. Next September, Afghanistan’s citizens, men and women alike, will again go to the polls, this time to elect a parliament. Afghanistan still faces many challenges, including the narcotics trade that could undermine its strides on so many fronts. We are committed to a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy and a long-term reconstruction strategy because we believe in the future of a new, democratic Afghanistan— an Afghanistan that is no longer a haven for terrorists and tyrants, but a partner in security and freedom. To build on the positive momentum in Afghanistan, President Bush has requested nearly $1.1 billion in total U.S. funding, including $956 million in foreign assistance support. This money will be used to invest in security, health, education, clean water and free market infrastructure, which together create conditions for sustained growth, opportunity, and to continue the fight against drugs. This is also a very important year for Iraq, as the Iraqis write their constitution and hold national elections in December. When President Bush traveled to Europe in February, he and his counterparts not only turned the page on Iraq, they wrote a new chapter. All 26 NATO allies are now contributing to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. The European Union announced its willingness to co-host an international conference with the United States to encourage and coordinate international support for Iraq. We have followed up on this initiative with the European Commission, the European Parliament, EU Member States, other countries around the world, and the Iraqi Government. Today, in the midst of a tough security situation, Iraqis at all levels— from the town council in Fallujah to the President of the country—are engaging in the democratic process and they need and deserve our support. For Iraq, President Bush has requested $457 million of support for FY 2006, including $360 million to continue work already begun under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. These monies would be targeted towards helping the new Iraqi leadership create a functioning democracy and a justice system governed by the rule of law. This funding also will help the Iraqi government deliver basic services to its people, collect revenues, generate jobs and develop a free market system capable of joining the global economy. We and our democratic allies are putting the power of our partnership to work not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but all across the Broader Middle East and North Africa. Efforts to encourage democratization, economic reform, the growth of civil society and opportunity for all through education are critical to shaping a stable and prosperous future for this strategically important

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region. Recognizing this, through the G-8 we have established the Forum for the Future—a new partnership between the democratic world and nations of this vast region, and we are committed to ensuring that the Forum plays a central role in advancing indigenous reform efforts in this vast region extending from Morocco to Pakistan. In early March in London, I participated in an important conference of major donors, including regional states, to help the Palestinian people advance their political, security and economic reforms and build infrastructure for selfgovernment. The World Economic Forum in Jordan is expected to give further impetus to political and economic reform in the region. The path of reform in the Broader Middle East will be difficult and uneven. Freedom’s work is the work of generations. But it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred. Of course, the process of reform in the broader Middle East is not detached from what must happen between the Israelis and Palestinians toward realizing President Bush’s vision of an independent Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with the State of Israel. The Palestinian elections, and the Israeli withdrawal plan for Gaza and parts of the West Bank, have created a unique opportunity for peace. In fact, when I met with both Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas they had the same opening line: This is an opportunity for peace we must not miss. President Bush has announced an additional $350 million to help the Palestinians build infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next two years, including the $150 million in the FY 2006 budget. I’d like to thank the Congress for supporting the President’s efforts by providing the $200 million included in the FY 2005 Supplemental. This is an important show of support for President Abbas. Our FY 2006 budget request also contains $2.5 billion in assistance to Israel, which continues our longstanding strategic partnership and supports regional democracy and security. Even as we work with allies and friends to meet the great challenge of advancing freedom and peace in the broader Middle East and North Africa, we will seize other important opportunities to build a world of peace and hope. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46137.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Symposium, Capital Hilton, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2005 Today, the greatest challenges that we face emerge more from within states than between them—from states that are either unable or unwilling to apply the rule of law within their borders. In a world where threats pass even through the most fortified boundaries, weak and poorly governed states enable disease to spread undetected and corruption to multiply unchecked and hateful ideologies to grow more violent and more vengeful. As the fate of nations grows ever more connected, our challenges are unprecedented, but our purposes are clear: Where weaker governments possess the will but the lack of means to enforce the rule of law, we must empower

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them with the strength of our partnership. And where autocrats still rule by coercion of the state rather than by the consent of the governed, we must support the rights of their oppressed citizens, wherever they raise their voice for equal justice and lawful government. Where the rule of law is undermined by government corruption, we are offering incentives for honest and transparent behavior. Anti-corruption is one of the key standards of our Millennium Challenge Account initiative, an initiative that rewards good governance and the fight against corruption. And in just the past year, the Millennium Challenge Corporation has signed new development compacts with five countries that are worth hundreds of billions of dollars to those countries, each of which involves significant political and legal reforms. Where the rule of law is flouted by immoral rulers and war criminals, we are helping citizens to operate international tribunals and special courts of justice. The United States helped to launch such efforts in Rwanda and Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia. And we continue to support all people who seek justice for their nations by lawfully trying the criminals who ravaged them. Finally, where the rule of law is emerging from decades of tyranny, the United States is helping newly democratic peoples to liberate themselves. In Afghanistan, we have dedicated more than $62 million since the fall of the Taliban to build new courthouses, to train new judges and to reform the nation’s regulatory system. To help the Afghan people enforce the rule of law themselves, we have also trained 32,000 new police officers who are now patrolling the streets of that country as well as its highways and its borders. And in Iraq, we have committed approximately $1 billion to train and equip the men and women of Iraq’s new national police force to better protect and serve their fellow citizens. We have spent nearly $400 million to strengthen the rule of law across all of Iraq, helping the Iraqi people to reform their system of legal education, to secure their country’s many courtrooms and to frame their new democratic constitution. These judicial reforms are enabling the Iraqi High Tribunal to begin holding fair trials for the leaders of the Baathist regime, including Saddam Hussein himself. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/56708.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with Barbara Slavin and Ray Locker of USA Today, Washington, D.C., November 28, 2005 MR. LOCKER: I’d like to ask you about the EU developments today. There was one of—an EU minister saying there may be sanctions on some of the member nations for hosting what they call the secret CIA prisons there. How has this situation in the last couple weeks complicated your job in dealing with some of the European countries? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I’ve been very clear, as have other members of the Administration, that we are fighting a war on terror, that there are demands of that that we have to meet, that we have to meet in order to protect not just ourselves but to protect others. Unfortunately, Europe has had its share now of terrorist incidents, in Spain and in Great Britain. And so we are all working

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together through law enforcement cooperation, intelligence cooperation, to try and produce the very best outcome to protect innocent citizens. And I think that is what we have to keep our eye on. MS. SLAVIN: Let me ask you a couple other questions about Iraq and alQaida and so on. As a result of the war and occupation, Iraq now has become a base for al-Qaida, and Iran has also been strengthened in some ways. How does the United States draw down forces and extricate itself from Iraq without further strengthening al-Qaida and Iran? SECRETARY RICE: Well, Barbara, I don’t actually agree with the premise, so let me go back to the premise of the question. First of all, on Iran, Iran is a state with whom we—with which we have numerous problems: terrorism, democracy in Iran, a nuclear program that everybody’s concerned about. But I am not at all certain that the geo-strategic circumstances of Iran have improved with a democratizing, pro-Western Afghanistan on one border and a democratizing, non-theocratic but Shia-majority Iraq on another border. So I question the premise that somehow Iran has been strengthened. Secondly— MS. SLAVIN: Well, al-Qaida certainly is doing a booming business lately. SECRETARY RICE: Well, al-Qaida was doing a booming business since the mid-1990s and finally al-Qaida is actually being challenged. And al-Qaida is being challenged and of course they are recruiting and coming out and fighting, but they are at least now being challenged. And if you want to talk about how you deal with a specific al-Qaida cell on Monday of next week, that’s one thing; but if you want to talk about how you eliminate the ideology of hatred that produced al-Qaida and will produce more al-Qaidas unless you eliminate it—how you get, in other words, to a permanent peace—then you have to have a different kind of Middle East than the one that produced the ideology of hatred that made those people fly airplanes into buildings. So an Iraq that is a fundamental pillar of a different kind of Middle East may indeed go through a period of time in which al-Qaida is a presence in Iraq. But if you read Zawahiri, if you read Zarqawi, they know that the political process that is underway in Iraq is, in fact, their worst nightmare. That’s why they threatened Iraqi citizens and then 8.5 million of them went out and voted in January. That’s why they threatened Iraqi citizens and 10 million went out and voted for the referendum. And that’s why they’re still threatening Iraqi citizens. Because they know that the political process is ultimately going to be the death knell for their activities there. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57414.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe, Andrews Air Force Base, December 5, 2005 Good morning. We have received inquiries from the European Union, the Council of Europe, and from several individual countries about media reports concerning U.S. conduct in the war on terror. I am going to respond now to those inquiries, as I depart today for Europe. And this will also essentially

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form the text of the letter that I will send to Secretary Straw, who wrote on behalf of the European Union as the European Union President. The United States and many other countries are waging a war against terrorism. For our country this war often takes the form of conventional military operations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Sometimes this is a political struggle, a war of ideas. It is a struggle waged also by our law enforcement agencies. Often we engage the enemy through the cooperation of our intelligence services with their foreign counterparts. We must track down terrorists who seek refuge in areas where governments cannot take effective action, including where the terrorists cannot in practice be reached by the ordinary processes of law. In such places terrorists have planned the killings of thousands of innocents—in New York City or Nairobi, in Bali or London, in Madrid or Beslan, in Casablanca or Istanbul. Just two weeks ago I also visited a hotel ballroom in Amman, viewing the silent, shattered aftermath of one of those attacks. The United States, and those countries that share the commitment to defend their citizens, will use every lawful weapon to defeat these terrorists. Protecting citizens is the first and oldest duty of any government. Sometimes these efforts are misunderstood. I want to help all of you understand the hard choices involved, and some of the responsibilities that go with them. One of the difficult issues in this new kind of conflict is what to do with captured individuals who we know or believe to be terrorists. The individuals come from many countries and are often captured far from their original homes. Among them are those who are effectively stateless, owing allegiance only to the extremist cause of transnational terrorism. Many are extremely dangerous. And some have information that may save lives, perhaps even thousands of lives. The captured terrorists of the 21st century do not fit easily into traditional systems of criminal or military justice, which were designed for different needs. We have to adapt. Other governments are now also facing this challenge. We consider the captured members of al-Qaida and its affiliates to be unlawful combatants who may be held, in accordance with the law of war, to keep them from killing innocents. We must treat them in accordance with our laws, which reflect the values of the American people. We must question them to gather potentially significant, life-saving, intelligence. We must bring terrorists to justice wherever possible. For decades, the United States and other countries have used ‘‘renditions’’ to transport terrorist suspects from the country where they were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can be questioned, held, or brought to justice. In some situations a terrorist suspect can be extradited according to traditional judicial procedures. But there have long been many other cases where, for some reason, the local government cannot detain or prosecute a suspect, and traditional extradition is not a good option. In those cases the local government can make the sovereign choice to cooperate in a rendition. Such renditions are permissible under international law and are consistent with the responsibilities of those governments to protect their citizens.

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Rendition is a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism. Its use is not unique to the United States, or to the current administration. Last year, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet recalled that our earlier counterterrorism successes included ‘‘the rendition of many dozens of terrorists prior to September 11, 2001.’’ — Ramzi Youssef masterminded the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and plotted to blow up airlines over the Pacific Ocean, killing a Japanese airline passenger in a test of one of his bombs. Once tracked down, a rendition brought him to the United States, where he now serves a life sentence. — One of history’s most infamous terrorists, best known as ‘‘Carlos the Jackal,’’ had participated in murders in Europe and the Middle East. He was finally captured in Sudan in 1994. A rendition by the French government brought him to justice in France, where he is now imprisoned. Indeed, the European Commission of Human Rights rejected Carlos’ claim that his rendition from Sudan was unlawful.

Renditions take terrorists out of action, and save lives. In conducting such renditions, it is the policy of the United States, and I presume of any other democracies who use this procedure, to comply with its laws and comply with its treaty obligations, including those under the Convention Against Torture. Torture is a term that is defined by law. We rely on our law to govern our operations. The United States does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances. Moreover, in accordance with the policy of this administration: — The United States has respected—and will continue to respect—the sovereignty of other countries. — The United States does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one country to another for the purpose of interrogation using torture. — The United States does not use the airspace or the airports of any country for the purpose of transporting a detainee to a country where he or she will be tortured. — The United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured. Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons will not be tortured.

International law allows a state to detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities. Detainees may only be held for an extended period if the intelligence or other evidence against them has been carefully evaluated and supports a determination that detention is lawful. The U.S. does not seek to hold anyone for a period beyond what is necessary to evaluate the intelligence or other evidence against them, prevent further acts of terrorism, or hold them for legal proceedings. With respect to detainees, the United States Government complies with its Constitution, its laws, and its treaty obligations. Acts of physical or mental torture are expressly prohibited. The United States Government does not authorize or condone torture of detainees. Torture, and conspiracy to commit torture, are crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may occur in the world.

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Violations of these and other detention standards have been investigated and punished. There have been cases of unlawful treatment of detainees, such as the abuse of a detainee by an intelligence agency contractor in Afghanistan or the horrible mistreatment of some prisoners at Abu Ghraib that sickened us all and which arose under the different legal framework that applies to armed conflict in Iraq. In such cases the United States has vigorously investigated, and where appropriate, prosecuted and punished those responsible. Some individuals have already been sentenced to lengthy terms in prison; others have been demoted or reprimanded. As CIA Director Goss recently stated, our intelligence agencies have handled the gathering of intelligence from a very small number of extremely dangerous detainees, including the individuals who planned the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and many other murders and attempted murders. It is the policy of the United States that this questioning is to be conducted within U.S. law and treaty obligations, without using torture. It is also U.S. policy that authorized interrogation will be consistent with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture, which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The intelligence so gathered has stopped terrorist attacks and saved innocent lives—in Europe as well as in the United States and other countries. The United States has fully respected the sovereignty of other countries that cooperate in these matters. Because this war on terrorism challenges traditional norms and precedents of previous conflicts, our citizens have been discussing and debating the proper legal standards that should apply. President Bush is working with the U.S. Congress to come up with good solutions. I want to emphasize a few key points. — The United States is a country of laws. My colleagues and I have sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. We believe in the rule of law. — The United States Government must protect its citizens. We and our friends around the world have the responsibility to work together in finding practical ways to defend ourselves against ruthless enemies. And these terrorists are some of the most ruthless enemies we face. — We cannot discuss information that would compromise the success of intelligence, law enforcement, and military operations. We expect that other nations share this view.

Some governments choose to cooperate with the United States in intelligence, law enforcement, or military matters. That cooperation is a two-way street. We share intelligence that has helped protect European countries from attack, helping save European lives. It is up to those governments and their citizens to decide if they wish to work with us to prevent terrorist attacks against their own country or other countries, and decide how much sensitive information they can make public. They have a sovereign right to make that choice. Debate in and among democracies is natural and healthy. I hope that that debate also includes a healthy regard for the responsibilities of governments to protect their citizens.

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Four years after September 11, most of our populations are asking us if we are doing all that we can to protect them. I know what it is like to face an inquiry into whether everything was done that could have been done. So now, before the next attack, we should all consider the hard choices that democratic governments must face. And we can all best meet this danger if we work together. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘The Promise of Democratic Peace,’’ Op-Ed in The Washington Post, December 11, 2005 Soon after arriving at the State Department earlier this year, I hung a portrait of Dean Acheson in my office. Over half a century ago, as America sought to create the world anew in the aftermath of World War II, Acheson sat in the office that I now occupy. And I hung his picture where I did for a reason. Like Acheson and his contemporaries, we live in an extraordinary time— one in which the terrain of international politics is shifting beneath our feet and the pace of historical change outstrips even the most vivid imagination. My predecessor’s portrait is a reminder that in times of unprecedented change, the traditional diplomacy of crisis management is insufficient. Instead, we must transcend the doctrines and debates of the past and transform volatile status quos that no longer serve our interests. What is needed is a realistic statecraft for a transformed world. President Bush outlined the vision for it in his second inaugural address: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’ This is admittedly a bold course of action, but it is consistent with the proud tradition of American foreign policy, especially such recent presidents as Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan. Most important: Like the ambitious policies of Truman and Reagan, our statecraft will succeed not simply because it is optimistic and idealistic but also because it is premised on sound strategic logic and a proper understanding of the new realities we face. Our statecraft today recognizes that centuries of international practice and precedent have been overturned in the past 15 years. Consider one example: For the first time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable. Major states are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war. To advance this remarkable trend, the United States is transforming our partnerships with nations such as Japan and Russia, with the European Union, and especially with China and India. Together we are building a more lasting and durable form of global stability: a balance of power that favors freedom. This unprecedented change has supported others. Since its creation more than 350 years ago, the modern state system has always rested on the concept of sovereignty. It was assumed that states were the primary international actors and that every state was able and willing to address the threats emerging from its territory. Today, however, we have seen that these assumptions no longer hold, and as a result the greatest threats to our security are defined more by

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the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones. The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods and information traverse the globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism can inflict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states. Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc. Weak and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons. Our experience of this new world leads us to conclude that the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power. Insisting otherwise is imprudent and impractical. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our security interests and our democratic ideals does not reflect the reality of today’s world. Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present challenges. In one region of the world, however, the problems emerging from the character of regimes are more urgent than in any other. The ‘‘freedom deficit’’ in the broader Middle East provides fertile ground for the growth of an ideology of hatred so vicious and virulent that it leads people to strap suicide bombs to their bodies and fly airplanes into buildings. When the citizens of this region cannot advance their interests and redress their grievances through an open political process, they retreat hopelessly into the shadows to be preyed upon by evil men with violent designs. In these societies, it is illusory to encourage economic reform by itself and hope that the freedom deficit will work itself out over time. Though the broader Middle East has no history of democracy, this is not an excuse for doing nothing. If every action required a precedent, there would be no firsts. We are confident that democracy will succeed in this region not simply because we have faith in our principles but because the basic human longing for liberty and democratic rights has transformed our world. Dogmatic cynics and cultural determinists were once certain that ‘‘Asian values,’’ or Latin culture, or Slavic despotism, or African tribalism would each render democracy impossible. But they were wrong, and our statecraft must now be guided by the undeniable truth that democracy is the only assurance of lasting peace and security between states, because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within states. Implicit within the goals of our statecraft are the limits of our power and the reasons for our humility. Unlike tyranny, democracy by its very nature is never imposed. Citizens of conviction must choose it—and not just in one election. The work of democracy is a daily process to build the institutions of democracy: the rule of law, an independent judiciary, free media and property rights, among others. The United States cannot manufacture these outcomes, but we can and must create opportunities for individuals to assume ownership of their own lives and nations. Our power gains its greatest legitimacy when

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we support the natural right of all people, even those who disagree with us, to govern themselves in liberty. The statecraft that America is called to practice in today’s world is ambitious, even revolutionary, but it is not imprudent. A conservative temperament will rightly be skeptical of any policy that embraces change and rejects the status quo, but that is not an argument against the merits of such a policy. As Truman once said, ‘‘The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred.’’ In times of extraordinary change such as ours, when the costs of inaction outweigh the risks of action, doing nothing is not an option. If the school of thought called ‘‘realism’’ is to be truly realistic, it must recognize that stability without democracy will prove to be false stability, and that fear of change is not a positive prescription for policy. After all, who truly believes, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the status quo in the Middle East was stable, beneficial and worth defending? How could it have been prudent to preserve the state of affairs in a region that was incubating and exporting terrorism; where the proliferation of deadly weapons was getting worse, not better; where authoritarian regimes were projecting their failures onto innocent nations and peoples; where Lebanon suffered under the boot heel of Syrian occupation; where a corrupt Palestinian Authority cared more for its own preservation than for its people’s aspirations; and where a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein was free to slaughter his citizens, destabilize his neighbors and undermine the hope of peace between Israelis and Palestinians? It is sheer fantasy to assume that the Middle East was just peachy before America disrupted its alleged stability. Had we believed this, and had we done nothing, consider all that we would have missed in just the past year: A Lebanon that is free of foreign occupation and advancing democratic reform. A Palestinian Authority run by an elected leader who openly calls for peace with Israel. An Egypt that has amended its constitution to hold multiparty elections. A Kuwait where women are now full citizens. And, of course, an Iraq that in the face of a horrific insurgency has held historic elections, drafted and ratified a new national charter, and will go to the polls again in coming days to elect a new constitutional government. At this time last year, such unprecedented progress seemed impossible. One day it will all seem to have been inevitable. This is the nature of extraordinary times, which Acheson understood well and described perfectly in his memoirs. ‘‘The significance of events,’’ he wrote, ‘‘was shrouded in ambiguity. We groped after interpretations of them, sometimes reversed lines of action based on earlier views, and hesitated long before grasping what now seems obvious.’’ SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57888.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, CNN Interview Wolf Blitzer, Washington, D.C., December 19, 2005 Q. You were the National Security Advisor right after 9/11 when the President authorized this extraordinary decision to go ahead with surveillance, eavesdropping on Americans and others making international phone calls and faxes or e-mails without getting court orders. How did that decision come about?

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SECRETARY RICE: The President … authorized the National Security Agency to collect information on a limited number of people with ties to al-Qaida in order to be able to close the gap, the seam, between the domestic territory of the United States and foreign territory. One of the clear findings of the 9/11 Commission was that our intelligence agencies were looking outward, our law enforcement agencies were looking inward, and a gap had developed; we didn’t know the connection between what people with terrorist ties inside the United States were doing to what people who were terrorists or might be planning terrorist operations, outside the country were doing. And so the President made that decision and he did it on the basis of his constitutional authority under Article II and other statutory authorities. I think the Attorney General spoke to those legal issues earlier. And he did it to protect the country because these days, after September 11th, we recognized and he recognized, as the one with real responsibility for protecting the country, that if you let people commit the crime then thousands of people die. So you have to detect it before it happens. Q. But there was a mechanism—still is a mechanism—that’s been in place since 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISA court, to go ahead and get this kind of authority with a court warrant. Why not use that? SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, the FISA act, as you said—1978, very different circumstances imagined at the time. FISA has been principally for longer term monitoring. It has been capable of helping us when we have been principally concerned with the activities of people who might be acting on behalf of a foreign government. You can imagine that those are often longerterm matters. But the kind of agility that is needed in order to detect rather than to monitor, as the President talked about today, the President needed to draw on these other authorities, and he has. Q. But even within the FISA act there are extraordinary circumstances that would allow the wiretap, the surveillance, to begin, and then within 72 hours you could still go and get the warrant. SECRETARY RICE: Well, let’s just say that these people, these networks, these shadowy networks which are not associated with countries, they are stateless, not stable targets, are pretty agile themselves. And so in order to give our intelligence agencies the kind of agility that they need in order to detect—and I want to say once again the President has a constitutional responsibility to protect the country. That means physically. It also means to protect the civil liberties of Americans under the Constitution. And he, of course, has both responsibilities and takes both very seriously, and so that’s why this was done with thorough levels of review. It has to be reauthorized every 45 days. It was briefed to Congress numerous times, or to relevant congressional officials numerous times. And so the President and his advisors felt this was the best way to give him the ability as—under his responsibilities as Commander-inChief to defend the country. Q. Because you know history. You’re a student of history. You know the history of the abuses of this kind of domestic spying going back to the ’60s and ’70s. I mean, the Supreme Court made a decision—it was a 9 to nothing—1972, United States v. U.S. District Court. Lewis Powell, the Justice, wrote this: ‘‘Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the

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inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent.’’ You remember the spying on Dr. Martin Luther King and other Americans who were opposed to the war in Vietnam, and national security considerations were then justified for that kind of surveillance. And then Powell went on to say that the Fourth Amendment protects Americans—and let me read specifically from what he wrote—9 to nothing decision—‘‘From unreasonable searches and seizures and that free— and freedom cannot be’’—and then he said, ‘‘and that freedom cannot be properly guaranteed if domestic security surveillances are conducted solely at the discretion of the Executive Branch.’’ SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, the President is more than aware of the civil liberties concerns and that is why this has been structured in such a very limited and controlled way with multiple layers of oversight, with lawyers of Justice and of the National Security Agency overseeing briefings to Congress. It is also why, as the Attorney General spoke to earlier, the President is drawing on existing authorities under the Constitutional statute. We also have to note, Wolf, that it is limited in scope, limited to people who are associated with or with ties to al-Qaida. Q. How do you know these people are associated with al-Qaida? SECRETARY RICE: Wolf, I’m not going to get into the program. But let’s just remember that in 2001 we experienced what it meant to not know what conversations were going on inside the country that were connecting to terrorists plotting outside the country. We learned what that produced. And it produced the kind of devastation that we had on September the 11th. And so the President has an obligation to try and close that seam and that is what he’s done with this program. Q. Let’s talk a little bit about Iraq. The war that’s ongoing right now—the aftermath of the elections, which by all accounts were smooth, last week, some 10 million Iraqis voted. How concerned are you, though, that the Shiites, the Kurds, the Sunnis, that at some point down the road this country could simply break apart into civil war? SECRETARY RICE: Well, there are all kinds of difficulties in a change in this historic circumstance, but everything that I see with the Iraqis is that they are going to the polls and voting to try and have a unified country in which all of their interests can be realized. Now clearly, Wolf, Iraq was drawn along the fault lines between Sunni and Shia Islam, the Kurds thrown into the mix and you have Turkomen and other groups as well, and so it’s a complex political environment with many different interests. But they now have in the constitution, a constitution which will likely and should be amended, a vehicle by which people can have their interests represented through politics and compromise rather than through violence. And this is a very important change for a country that’s always done it through repression and violence. It’s not going to be easy. But every indication is that the only people who really are talking about civil war are people like Zarqawi. You don’t hear Iraqi leaders talking about civil war or threatening civil war. You hear them talking about how you work across sectarian lines. And while no one should underestimate the difficulty,

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everyone should at least give them a chance and a sense of confidence that they know that a future in which they work together is going to be one better than one in which they break apart. Q. The President last night said the U.S. and its coalition partners, friends in Iraq, were winning. Would you say at this point that the insurgency is in its last throes? SECRETARY RICE: I would say that the insurgency has been dealt several blows, most especially when almost 70 percent of the people go out and vote and say that they intend to determine their future in that course rather than through violence. That is a blow to the insurgency because an insurgency cannot exist, cannot thrive, without the basis of popular support. And that popular support is now moving to the political arena and not to the insurgency. That Sunnis voted in the numbers that they did is extraordinary. And I think we learned something else very important. While it is true that Sunni leaders told people to boycott the elections in January, and they did, therefore dealing themselves out of the political process, they came back in huge numbers. But we also learned that there may have been some intimidation and fear associated with the desire—the decision of some Sunnis not to participate even in January. So I think there’s a real chance now for the Iraqis to take this opportunity to build a unified and democratic state. Q. How worried should Israel be about threats from Iran and its new President? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I think everybody ought to be worried about an Iranian President who says these outrageous things and then expects the world to somehow trust Iran with nuclear technologies that could lead to a nuclear weapon. That really says it all. I think that Ahmadi-Nejad has somehow crystallized the issue with these statements that he’s made. The EU-3 will continue their work to try to find a diplomatic solution. I have to say I haven’t seen anything that suggests that the Iranians want a solution that would be satisfactory to the rest of the world. But it is important also not just to speak about the nuclear program but about Iranian support for terrorism, support for terrorism that undermines Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinians, that undermines the Lebanese people—as Syria has left, but Iran continues to support the violent activities of the Hezbollah—and the kind of activity in which Iran has engaged against its neighbor in Iraq. And so we need to take a hard look at the external behavior of Iran and also at a state that is going in the wrong direction in terms of political pluralism and participation of its people. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/58285.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘‘Realizing the Goals of Transformational Diplomacy,’’ Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2006 EXCERPTED FROM PREPARED TESTIMONY The President’s FY 2007 International Affairs Budget for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $35.1 billion.

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President Bush also plans to request supplemental funding to support emergency, one-time programs that are essential to the success of some of our highest foreign policy priorities. This money will do more than support our diplomacy; it will strengthen our national security. America today is a nation at war. We are engaged in a long conflict against terrorists and violent extremists. Across the world, the members of our Foreign Service, Civil Service, and our Foreign Service Nationals are advancing America’s diplomatic mission, often working in dangerous places far away from their friends and loved ones. Our nation’s men and women in uniform are also shouldering great risks and responsibilities. They are performing with courage and heroism, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice to secure our way of life. Today, I want to recognize these courageous public servants and their families, who endure long periods of service abroad and painful separation with fortitude. America’s enemies remain eager to strike us again, but our actions in the past four years have weakened their capability. Our diplomacy plays a vital role in defeating this threat. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to offer an overview of the current mission of the men and women of the State Department—a mission that we have called transformational diplomacy. A New Diplomacy for a Transformed World In his Second Inaugural Address, President Bush laid out the vision that leads America into the world: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’ The President’s vision stems from the recognition that we are living in an extraordinary time, one in which centuries of international precedent are being overturned. The prospect of violent conflict among great powers is more remote than ever. States are increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war. Peoples in China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil are lifting their countries and regions to new prominence. Democratic reform has begun in the Middle East. And the United States is working with our democratic partners in every region of the world, especially our hemispheric neighbors and our historic treaty allies in Europe and Asia, to build a true form of global stability: a balance of power that favors freedom. … The greatest threats today emerge more within states than between them, and the fundamental character of regimes matters more than the international distribution of power. It is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in today’s world. Our diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together. So I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this way: To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is a strategy rooted in partnership, not paternalism—in doing things with other people,

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not for them. We will use America’s diplomatic power and our foreign assistance to help foreign citizens better their own lives, build their own nations, transform their own futures, and work with us to combat threats to our common security, including the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Practicing Transformational Diplomacy Faced with such extraordinary challenges, we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes, and we must empower our people to practice transformational diplomacy.… In the past year, we have begun making changes to our organization and our operations that will enable us to advance transformational diplomacy. We are forward-deploying our people to the cities, countries, and regions where they are needed most. We are starting to move hundreds of diplomats from Europe and Washington to strategic countries like China, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. We are giving more of our people new training and language skills to engage more effectively with foreign peoples. We are enabling our diplomats to work more jointly with America’s servicemen and women. And I have announced that I am creating a new position of Director of Foreign Assistance. This reform will transform our capability to use foreign assistance more efficiently and more effectively to further our foreign policy goals, to bolster our national security, to reduce poverty, and to improve people’s lives around the world. Public Diplomacy We have heard the legitimate criticisms that have been made of our public diplomacy, and we are rethinking how we do business. I have stressed that public diplomacy is the responsibility of every single member of our diplomatic corps, not just our public diplomacy specialists. One idea we are beginning to implement is the creation of forward-deployed, regional public diplomacy centers. These centers, or media hubs, will be small, lean operations that work out of our embassies or other existing facilities, enabling us to respond quickly to negative propaganda, to correct misinformation, and to explain America’s policies and our principles. The $351 million that we seek will be essential for us to continue revitalizing our public diplomacy. To complement our public diplomacy, we must ensure that America remains a welcoming place for all tourists, students, and businesspeople, while at the same time protecting our homeland from terrorists and criminals who would exploit our open society to do us harm. The State Department, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, has taken new steps in the past year to realize the President’s vision of secure borders and open doors through information technology. Our request of $1.1 billion will fund the Border Security Program and enable us to hire 135 new consular officers and passport staff to meet the growing demand of foreign citizens seeking to travel to America, while maintaining our fundamental commitment to serve every American citizen when they go abroad.… we are seeking $474 million to support our educational and cultural exchanges, which increase mutual understanding between our citizens and the peoples of the world.

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Defeating Terror and Advancing Liberty We are requesting $6.2 billion to strengthen the coalition partners … in the fight against terrorism. Our assistance empowers our partners to practice more effective law enforcement, police their borders, gather and share essential intelligence, and wage more successful counterterrorism operations. In many states, our assistance will also help to bolster thriving democratic and economic institutions reducing the societal schisms that terrorists exploit for their own ideological purposes. Our FY 2007 request includes, among others, $739 million for Pakistan, $560 million for Colombia, $154 million for Indonesia, $457 million for Jordan, and $335 million for Kenya. Essential to winning the war on terrorism is denying our enemies the weapons of mass destruction.… Our diplomacy cannot focus on non-proliferation alone; we must also develop new tools and new policies of counter-proliferation: actively confronting and rolling up the global networks involving rogue states, outlaw scientists, and black market middlemen who make proliferation possible. We are building on the achievements of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. We are working to stop Iran and North Korea from succeeding in their quest for weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to do everything in our power to deny terrorists access to the world’s most dangerous weapons, including threatening conventional weapons like MANPADS. The FY 2007 budget proposes to increase funding for our State Department’s efforts to help countries fight the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials. These requirements are essential and immediate, but our vision must look beyond present horizons.… Building State Capacity. We must do all we can to anticipate and prevent the emergence of failed states that lead to humanitarian crises, serious regional instability, and havens for terror and oppression that threaten our security. On September 11, we were attacked by terrorists who had plotted and trained in a failed state, Afghanistan. Since then, we have spent billions of dollars and sacrificed precious lives to eliminate the threat and liberate the brutally repressed people of Afghanistan. We must use all the tools and resources available not only to prevent future failed states, but to help nations emerging from conflict and war to become responsible, democratic states. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61209.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit After Meeting, Cairo, Egypt, February 21, 2006 FOREIGN MINISTER GHEIT: (In Arabic. Via interpreter) … I have met with Dr. Rice for about maybe an hour. During this last hour, we covered a wide range of issues, regional issues as well as the last results of the Palestinian elections as well as the situation both in Iraq and Lebanon as well as we discussed the issue of Syria. So we basically covered a wide range of regional issue. In addition to that, we also covered range of issues on the bilateral Egyptian-U.S. relations.…

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SECRETARY RICE: … And we did talk about Iran and about the need indeed for the international community to remain united in insisting that Iran take a reasonable course in terms of the development of civil nuclear power. We did talk about the Palestinian territories and I want to thank Egypt for its leadership in having discussions with the people who will now—Hamas, who will be the new Palestinian government, to make clear that the international community expects that any Palestinian government will have to meet certain requirements of governing, which means a dedication to peace, a dedication to the agreements that the Palestinians have signed onto before. Obviously, you can’t have peace if you don’t recognize the other partner, and therefore the recognition of Israel’s right to exist. And the need to renounce terror, because Egypt has been a leader in this region for peace, a leader in this region for cooperation among all states of the region, including with Israel, and Egypt is therefore an important voice at this time of choice and change for the Palestinian people. Eight months ago, I came here to Egypt to speak in Cairo about reform and about democracy in the Middle East. I said at that time that Egypt, which has so often led this region in times of decision, needed to be an important voice in leading this region again as it faces questions of democracy and reform. Egypt is a great country and I believe fundamentally that Egypt has a great future. It has a young population that I think will insist and demand economic and political change in this country. … There have been disappointments and setbacks as well, and we have talked candidly about those because the United States comes to discuss these issues as a friend, not as a judge. We can’t judge Egypt. We can’t tell Egypt what its course can be or should be. But as a friend, we want to see an Egypt that is fully developing politically and along the lines of reform as well. And so we’ve discussed the future of reform. We will continue to discuss the future of reform. We will continue to discuss candidly problems and progress in that reform. But this is a country of greatness and this region needs this country to be at the center of positive change. Q. Mr. Minister, regarding Hamas, do you think that Arab states should refrain from giving aid directly to any Hamas-led government? And Madame Secretary, if different tactics emerge, particularly perhaps over giving aid, how will you maintain a united front in the international community to stick to the principles that you’ve laid out in the Quartet? SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, I think that there is remarkable agreement in the international community on a certain practical set of requirements for governing in the Palestinian territories. If the … new Palestinian government lead by Hamas is going to be able to meet the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a peaceful life, for a better life, for a life in which there is economic development, it goes without saying that you cannot have one foot in the camp of terror and the other foot in the camp of politics. You have to renounce violence. You have to be willing to live up to the obligations that Palestinians have taken over the last more than a decade for a cooperative relationship with Israel, and for a commitment to peace. We are all committed to the roadmap and we expect any Palestinian government to be committed to the roadmap. I think we have very solid

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agreement on that. We also agree that it is going to be important to try and meet the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people. It’s very easy to talk about the governments and the diplomats and all of the things that we’re doing, but there are Palestinian people whose lives, in a sense, are in the balance here and we want to be responsive to their humanitarian needs. And finally, we are going to support the interim government of Mahmoud Abbas until there is a government named and we expect to—we, I think, agree with Egypt that that must be done. Q. (Inaudible.) SECRETARY RICE: Well, we all hope that there’s going to be a Middle East one day in which the security situation is such that no one has to worry about weapons of mass destruction. The issue right now is that Iran needs to live up to the expectations of the international community. I want to just make one other point. This is not about civil nuclear power for Iran. Iran would like to make this a debate about their right to civil nuclear power. We’re not questioning civil nuclear power. They can have it. They just can’t have enrichment and reprocessing capability because no one trusts them with that very important technology which could lead to a bomb. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61811.htm EDITOR’S NOTE: For additional comments on Middle East situation, also see Secretary Condoleezza Rice Remarks with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 22, 2006 (http://www.state. gov/secretary/rm/2006/61910.htm).

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to Edward R. Murrow Journalism Program Participants, Loy Henderson Auditorium, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2006 UNDER SECRETARY HUGHES: Good afternoon to all of you. I am Karen Hughes, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. My office oversees all of our exchange programs, such as the one that you’ve been participating in. And I happen to believe that our exchange programs have been America’s single most effective public diplomacy tool over the last 50 years because people get to come here and see for themselves … In putting together this program, we decided to save the very best for last. We wanted to offer you an opportunity to hear directly from and to ask questions of our country’s leading foreign policy official. So it’s now my privilege to introduce and welcome our Secretary of State and my friend, Condoleezza Rice. SECRETARY RICE: … I mostly want to answer questions, so I just want to say a few words about why we think this is such an important program. We have long thought that if the United States could engage people to people, whether it is journalists to journalists or university student to university student or business person to business person, that that was really a very firm

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foundation for friendship among peoples and also a very firm foundation for American support for democracy around the world. And I just want to say that democracy takes many different forms around the world. It takes different forms that are consistent with religious and cultural traditions. American democracy is not like Japanese democracy. Japanese democracy is not like Brazilian democracy. And none of those will be like the democracies that will rise up in the Middle East. But the important point is that in all of those democracies, the essential fact is that those who are governed have the right to choose those who govern them and those who are governed have the right to hold those accountable who govern them. And there is no more important institution in making certain that citizens can hold their leaders responsible and accountable than a free press. And that is why it is so important that you are here. Q. (Via interpreter.) I am asking a question on behalf of the Middle East and North Africa. Why did the United States and the Administration went back in their commitment to democratic reform and prefer to continue to support oppressive regimes? Are you convinced that the Arab people are not prepared for democracy and don’t you think that this policy in the Middle East could backfire, such as what happened to Hamas, which is elected democratically, according to the observers and American observers themselves? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I would say that the United States under President Bush has been completely for democratic regimes and has actually told both our friends—told our friends as well that we expect them to move toward more democratic governance. There have been some positive developments in this regard; for instance, in Lebanon, where the United States has been very actively engaged with France and with others in getting Syria out so that Lebanon can move on its democratic path. We have encouraged and supported the reforms in Morocco, in Jordan, in places where there is progress toward a more pluralistic, more democratic system. We have urged the Egyptians to keep going. Now, we’ve had disappointments in Egypt because after declaring the need for a presidential multiparty—or multi-candidate presidential elections and then multiparty parliament elections, there is no doubt that the elections on the parliamentary side were disappointing, particularly the third round. And we’ve been outspoken about that. In Saudi Arabia, we have—we know that not every country begins in the same place, but I myself have stood next to the Saudi Foreign Minister and said that I think women in Saudi Arabia should have the right to vote. And so the United States has been quite outspoken. Now, as to the Palestinians, it was the President who has talked about a Palestinian state and we said after the elections that the elections in Palestinian territories had been free and fair and we accept that. The only thing that the world is asking of Hamas is that it now govern in a way that is indeed in accordance with the aspirations of its people. And the aspirations of its people for a better life can only be met through peace. It is not possible, and Arab states like Egypt are telling Hamas exactly this, that it is not possible to have a peace process in which you refuse to recognize the right of the other party to exist, in which you will not renounce violence and in which you will not

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accept the roadmap, which is the internationally accepted way to a peaceful resolution. For 60 years, the United States did not speak out for democratic development in the Middle East. But President Bush has spoken out for democratic development in the Middle East. We are continuing to speak out on it and we are telling our friends and our foes alike that we think people ought to have the right to express themselves, and once they’ve expressed themselves, those governments then need to govern democratically. Q. (Via interpreter.) I’m from Oman and I have two questions on behalf of the Arab group and the Gulf. The first question is: You have talked about the spreading of democracy in the Middle East but doesn’t the United States believe that there are dictatorships in the Middle East and therefore they are preventing the American project of spreading democracy in this very vital and volatile region? The second question: How does the United States look at the major financial support that is coming Hamas’s way from the Arab and Islamic world at a time when the United States and Western Europe refuse to support any financial aid to Hamas, which is considered by the United States and Europe as a terrorist organization? In addition to the American vision, looking at Hezbollah and classifying it as a terrorist organization at a time when Hezbollah is trying to defend and liberate to occupy Lebanese territories? The last point: Does the United States intend to strike at Iran to stop its nuclear program? Thank you. SECRETARY RICE: … Let me start with yes, there are still dictatorships in the Middle East; yes, there are still authoritarian governments in the Middle East; and it’s our view that they have to change, that the only way that you can govern in the modern—in modern times and fully be respectful of your people and get the creativity of your people is to govern democratically. And we’ve said that time and again. We fully understand that it’s not going to happen overnight in every country. And we fully understand because of our own experience in the United States that democracy is not easy. But if you look at the places where the United States has had a more direct impact, we have supported elections and democratic processes in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories, and we respect the choices of those people. We then want their governments to govern democratically and in a way that recognizes that you can’t have one foot in violence and one foot in politics. As to Hamas, well, yes, they’ve gotten some pledges. But I would just note that the financial situation of the Palestinian Authority is not a very good one and the—Hamas is going to need to govern in a way that it can have a cooperative relationship with Israel. The fact is that those economies are too intertwined to do otherwise. If it’s the $50 million from Iran, I think the Palestinian budget is about $190 million a month. Just to give you a scale. I do think Hamas is going to have to find a way to make its peace with the international community. Now, we cannot fund and will not fund a Palestinian government that does not recognize the Quartet principles: recognition of Israel’s right to exist and so forth. We are funding, however, very extensively humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people because we do not have an argument with the

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Palestinian people. So we are continuing to fund aid to refugees. We’re continuing to fund food assistance. We’re continuing to fund democracy assistance in the Palestinian territories. We’re funding some health and education assistance. So it’s our view very strongly that we should continue to fund the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people, but Hamas has got to make a choice. If it is going to govern, it is going to have to govern on internationally acceptable standards and that means that you renounce violence and terrorism. You don’t, after innocent people have been killed, say, ‘‘Well, that was legitimate.’’ That isn’t, simply, the way that the world works. Finally, the President’s been very clear that there’s been a lot of wild speculation, as he called it, about Iran. We are on a diplomatic course. We believe that if the world is really united in its response to Iran, that we will get Iran to change its ways. And I just want to make one point. We, again, have no argument with the Iranian people. We also have no argument that if Iran wants civil nuclear power, Iran should have civil nuclear power. But Iran has to have that civil nuclear power without having access to the technologies that can allow Iran to build a nuclear weapon, because the world does not trust Iran with that technology, given the 18 years of covering up what they were doing at Natanz, the facility for reprocessing and enriching. But I want to be very clear; we have no desire to isolate the Iranian people. Iran is a great culture. The Iranian people are a great people. We want more Iranian students, more Iranian athletes, more Iranian musicians to come to the United States, to come to Europe. This is a problem that the Iranian regime has with the international system, not the Iranian people. Q. Hi. I’m representing the East Asia and the Pacific group. It’s made up of 14 very different countries so we’ve tried to pose a question that will be pertinent to most of the countries in that group. There’s a feeling that since the Bush Administration came to power that it has created more conflict and that it doesn’t understand the local context of many different countries in our region. What specifically will the U.S. Government do to show there are mutual benefits in U.S. foreign policy to countries in our part of the world? SECRETARY RICE: Well, thank you. Let me first comment on the issue that the view is that we’ve created more conflict. There is no doubt that there was a threat that had been growing for some time, the terrorist extremist threat that had been growing for some time, that had been launching attacks here and there, that suddenly exploded on September 11th in a way that mobilized the United States to try and literally fight the war on terror with all of our national means. That is absolutely true, that before 2001 we were not—we did not ignore the terrorist threat after our embassy was bombed in Kenya and Tanzania or after the Cole was bombed or after—or blown up. But we didn’t mobilize ourselves to deal with that threat. As we have mobilized to deal with that threat, it is true that we are confronting a threat. And in confronting that threat, in a sense, they are fighting back. And so the sense that there is more conflict in the world, I think is more that we are finally actually taking on this threat which was underneath and hidden and bombing innocents here and bombing innocents there.

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But let’s remember what that threat looks like. This is an extremist force that blows up a nightclub in Bali, killing many Indonesians and Australians; that blows up a Palestinian wedding party in Jordan; that takes hostage a school in Beslan and kills hundreds of Russian children; that blows up a subway in London and therefore kills innocent people just trying to get to work, or a subway in Madrid, just innocent people trying to get to work; or that flies airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on a fine September day. That’s the threat. These are not people who are doing this and cause collateral damage. These are people who are actually intending to kill civilians—a wedding party, a nightclub, a metro stop, the World Trade Building—intending to kill innocent civilians. And so they have to be fought. Now, the conditions may vary and that’s why we have local partners in the fight on terrorism. So when we are trying to help with what has happened in Indonesia, it is through cooperation, intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation with Indonesia or cooperation in—counterterrorism cooperation with Singapore. It’s not as if the United States comes in to Indonesia or into London or into Afghanistan and says we’ll do it our way. We have local partners who really do guide the way that we fight the counterterrorism fight. But we are all in this together and the reason that I gave you this long list of places around the world—and I could keep going—where the terrorists have struck is that they’re not just striking at the interests of the United States. So if we’ve stirred up conflict, they didn’t just go after us; they’re going after each and every one of you as well. … [W]e do have local partners who fully understand their local circumstances and we provide training and intelligence and sometimes equipment so that the front lines are really being manned by police forces and intelligence forces and in some cases military by those countries. Q. … I am representing the Turkish-speaking community and U.S. was committing to support Turkey in terms of PKK terrorism, especially in northern Iraq. But Turkey repeatedly asked to support in terms of terrorism, fighting against terrorism, and about a military—possible, probable military action against PKK, which U.S. didn’t do so far, at least for Turkey’s [inaudible]. And in the recent times Turkey has invited Hamas leaders and it was quite controversial for U.S. So if we should really expect anything in terms of fighting against terrorism in terms of PKK terror in the near future? And what message will you convey to Ankara during your visit in coming weeks? Thank you. SECRETARY RICE: … Turkey is a country that’s undergoing a lot of change.… we’ve been very clear that PKK is a terrorist organization. We’ve also been very clear that we do not want the territory of northern Iraq to be used for PKK or other terrorist operations against Turkey. We have engaged Iraqis in this effort, as well as we have a trilateral mechanism, security mechanism between the United States, Turkey, and Iraq to try and deal with the terrorist threat there. It’s true that Iraq is still a place in which there is considerable instability and it’s difficult to deal with all of the threats simultaneously, but we remain committed to the pledge that Iraq’s territory should not be used as a platform

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for terrorism. We share information and intelligence and try to help, to the degree we can, with the PKK. As to the broader relationship with Turkey, though, and what Turkey does in terms of its policies, Turkey is a sovereign country. We asked only one thing, that when Turkey met with Hamas, that there be a strong message to Hamas that they need to accept the conditions, the requirements of the Quartet, of the international community, and I believe that that message was indeed delivered. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64969.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at the 88th Annual American Legion Convention, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 29, 2006 Because we’ve gone on the offense, America is safer, but we are not yet safe, as we’ve seen just recently with the foiled terror plot in London. We know that every day, each and every day, violent extremists are plotting new ways to do us harm. And we know that now and for many years to come, America and our allies will be engaged in a long war, a war that we can and must win. Today, five years after the attack on our nation, people still differ about what September 11th called us to do. On the one hand, if you focus only on the attacks themselves and believe that they were caused by 19 hijackers supported by a network called al-Qaida, operating from a failed state, Afghanistan, then the response can be limited. But if you believe, as I do, and as President Bush does, that the root cause of September 11th was the violent expression of a global extremist ideology, an ideology that thrives on the oppression and despair of the Middle East, then we must seek to remove this source of terror by helping the people of that troubled region to transform their countries and to transform their lives. We must be very clear about this broader struggle: Yes, it is a war, but a war of completely new and different dimensions. It is a struggle between the vast majority of moderate Muslims, who desire peace and freedom from oppression, and a small minority of violent extremists that will do whatever it takes to further their ideology of hatred and injustice. … [A]s we learned on that fateful day, America’s stake in this struggle is very clear: The security of our citizens is inextricably linked to the success of freedom and moderation and, yes, democracy in the Middle East.… Five years ago, who could have imagined that a vibrant debate about democratic reform and economic reform and social reform would be raging in every country of the Broader Middle East, a debate not about whether to proceed with reform, but how to proceed? Who could have imagined the positive changes we have already witnessed in places as different as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and Morocco, and Jordan? Sure, there have been many setbacks and step backs in each of these cases, but the steps forward are also taking place. Advancing the work of democracy, the daily effort to build effective institutions through which all of a country’s citizens can experience justice and exercise power equally, this is a longer and far harder process. And it is made even

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more difficult because the moderate citizens of the Middle East face violent enemies who are determined to reverse the gains of democracy. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is terrorizing the Afghan people and trying to stop their democratic progress. But we and our NATO allies are helping the Afghan people, their government, and their army fight them and beat them back. In Lebanon, the radical leaders of Hezbollah launched a war against Israel to undermine the moderate Lebanese Government and to put at risk the lives of the Lebanese people. But now, we and the international community are helping this young democracy to strengthen and to expand its sovereign authority. In the Palestinian territories, radical elements of Hamas are holding an Israeli soldier hostage, as well as the aspirations of the Palestinian people and their leaders. And of course, in Iraq, we see the same struggle being played out daily, as terrorists and sectarian militias seek to strangle the promise of peace and unity and democracy. … We’ve all seen stories about Iraq, some positive and inspiring; others, indeed many, that are disheartening and frustrating to hear. I know that Americans are concerned about the course and the future of Iraq. On the one hand, Americans want desperately to succeed in Iraq. They want to do whatever it takes to achieve victory. But on the other hand, there are unsettling questions. Is success possible? Is it really worth the effort? Do the Iraqi people really want to live together in peace and freedom, the peace and freedom for which our troops have sacrificed so much. Or do they desire a darker path, somehow, of violence? Ladies and Gentlemen: I am here today to tell you that I am confident that Iraq, Iraqis, and America will succeed. When you speak with our fellow citizens who are serving in Iraq and when you ask them why they fight, why they are optimistic and inspired to conduct their mission, I am sure that most of them give you the same answer that I hear from troops when I speak to them, and from members of our diplomatic corps, and other civilians who are there risking their lives in Iraq. Most of these men and women say that what motivates them to do their job every day is the overwhelming hope that they witness in the Iraqi people and the tremendous sacrifices that Iraqis themselves are bearing to realize that hope. Most Iraqis want what all people want. They want freedom from coercion and oppression, safety from violence and injustice, opportunities for a better life for themselves and for their children. They what a future of peace and moderation for their country, as do the leaders they freely elected in December, who are now serving at great personal risk in Iraq’s national unity government. To a small number of extremists in Iraq, however, this vision of a moderate, democratic future is an existential threat, because it is one in which their ideology of sectarian hatred will find no support. So these terrorists and these militias resort to unthinkable acts of brutality to drag the country into civil strife and to destroy the hopes of their fellow Iraqis. They target innocent civilians making a religious pilgrimage. They murder people with a certain first name, because it signifies a sectarian difference. And they lay bombs on soccer fields to murder young children, because games like soccer are deemed ‘‘idolatrous.’’

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Though the risks to their lives are clear and present, though, Iraqis of every sect and every ethnicity, carried forward in their hope—and they are pulling together to make a new Iraq succeed. Despite rocket attacks and campaigns of terror, they are building water treatment facilities and laying new roads, and preparing to open classrooms for the start of a new school year. And of course, despite intimidation and assassination and the murder of their friends and loved ones, Iraqis volunteer by the tens of thousands for the new Iraqi Army. And when they find themselves in a fight against terrorists and militias, I am told by our military people that they do not cower and run; they join the battle and they fight until that battle is won. Now in Iraq, we are helping them with a strategy of ‘‘clear, hold, and build.’’ It means that with Iraqi forces in the lead and with our strong support, areas are cleared from terrorists and militia control. And this difficult, yet promising work that you are witnessing in Baghdad right now is a part of that effort. Second, we are helping the Iraqi government to hold the areas we have cleared together; most importantly, by supporting Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s plan for national reconciliation. That plan got a significant boost over the weekend when 100 of Iraq’s tribal leaders signed a ‘‘pact of honor,’’ declaring that they would do what they could to stop the sectarian killings that have plagued Iraq. Finally, we are helping the government and the people of Iraq to rebuild their country. The keystone of this effort is a compact which will rally new international support for Iraqi reconstruction as the Iraqi government proceeds with democratic and political reform. Ladies and gentlemen, this strategy can succeed and it will succeed, but if we quit before the job is done, the cost of failure will be severe; indeed, immeasurable. If we abandon the Iraqi people, before their government is strong enough to secure the country, then we will show reformers across the region that America cannot be trusted to keep its word. We will embolden extremist enemies of moderation and of democratic reform. We will leave the makings of a failed state in Iraq, like that one in Afghanistan in the 1990s, which became the base for al-Qaida and the launching pad for the September 11th hijackers. And we should not assume for one minute that those terrorists will not continue to come after the American homeland. That is why President Bush calls Iraq a central front in the war on terror. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/71636.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with the New York Times Editorial Board, New York, New York, September 25, 2006 SECRETARY RICE: I think we can go right to questions. I might just make one point, which is that I think that this summer in the Middle East with the events in Lebanon actually sharpened, in some ways, what really is going on in the Middle East, the kind of sharpening between extremist forces and moderate forces. And what will be interesting and important is how that plays out over the next, now, probably several years. But on the one side, clearly, the

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moderate Arab states, Saudi, Egypt, Jordan, the weak but democratizing moderates in Iraq, Lebanon—and by that, I mean Maliki, Siniora, Abu Mazen in the Palestinian Territories; and then on the other side, Hezbollah, Hamas, and really supported by Iranian influence and sort of Syrian transit. I think it really did lead to a kind of sharpening of this contradiction, if you will, between the extremist forces and the moderate forces and I think that’s going to play out in very interesting ways over the next several years. But I just wanted to make that point. Q. How does that translate into a policy in terms … of the understanding that the forces are—how they’re aligned. SECRETARY RICE: … I hope that it means that you’re going to see much stronger support for some of these moderate, young, relatively still weak democratic forces. I thought that the meeting that we had on the Iraqi Compact was a sort of sign of that, the fact that the Saudis put up a billion-and-a-half dollars in no time for the Lebanese Government, I think, to counter Iranian influence. I think that if the Palestinians can find a way to arrange their internal affairs, you might have the kind of international support, particularly from the region that really has been lacking for them, and I mean political support, economic support. That could be quite important because for the first time, I think that you see these moderate forces seeing their own interests threatened in very important ways. It explains, of course, why Saudi, with Jordan and Egypt, said what they did when Hezbollah made the attack, despite the fact that it was difficult for them to sustain that position. So it’s just an interjectory comment to say that, as very often happens out of something as dramatic as the events in Lebanon, forces start rearranging themselves in international politics and I think one of the things that will be incumbent on us is to try and strengthen those forces and transport moderation with a coalition of states that might be—might have great interest in doing that. Q. At the risk of sounding like Tim Russert or something, I have to ask about the April NIE, which, as you know, concluded that on balance, the war in Iraq has made the threat of terrorism worse rather than ameliorated it. And two things; first of all, do you think that that is true? And second of all, if it’s not true, what’s wrong with the NIE? SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, I think both John Negroponte and the White House make clear that this is a bigger and broader NIE than the selective quotation from it would suggest. There are other things in the NIE too which give a somewhat more complex picture of what’s going on in the war on terror. Let me put it that way. And the unfortunate thing about dealing with leaks of classified information is that you’re confronted with either deciding that you’re going to try and declassify everything from which something is selectively leaked, in which case, you’ll have nothing that’s classified, or trying to simply deal with the argument. So let me, instead of talking about what is or is not in the NIE, talk about the argument, which is not the first time that this argument has been heard. It’s not an argument that is unique to this specific leak from the NIE. We’ve heard this argument from any number of experts and scholars and so forth.

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The first point … is that it should be no surprise to anyone that as you choose to confront terrorists in a pretty aggressive and offensive way, that they will do everything that they can to fight back, including finding new sources and new excuses for recruitment. That should surprise no one. So at one point, the excuse for recruitment was our forces in Saudi Arabia. You need to know that of course, al-Qaida makes no distinction between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq in their recruiting. They have even tried to latch on to what may be attitudes about Sudan. So there are plenty of excuses and plenty of arguments as to why people ought to go and fight these so-called Western forces. They didn’t need Iraq to do that. They attacked us on September 11th before anybody had even thought of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. And they have attacked in places where the countries were involved in Afghanistan, they’ve attacked in places where the countries aren’t involved anywhere. They’ve attacked without regard to what your policies happen to be. Now let me speak to the Iraq issue specifically. It is also true that Zarqawi, when he reemerged in Iraq, and let me say reemerged because he was there before the war, had a strategy of trying to make Iraq a focal point for al-Qaida and a focal point for a new Jihad in Iraq. There’s no doubt about that. In fact, we’ve revealed all kinds of things about his communications between—the communications between him and the al-Qaida leadership, things that were found on his computer about trying to recruit Iraqis to his al-Qaida fold. His second plan was to create tension, indeed, conflict between Sunnis and Shia and to, in effect, unleash sectarian violence. So to a certain extent, he had some success with both of those strategies. But the first of those, that is, trying to bring Iraq into the al-Qaida struggle and make it a central focal point, because after all, Iraq is a great center of civilization and therefore, symbolic as well as an actual haven—would be symbolic as well as an actual haven from his point of view; it’s produced a backlash. It’s produced a serious backlash among Sunnis, among Sunni tribes. That’s one reason we’ve been able to fight effectively in places like Fallujah. Zarqawi didn’t walk in one day and give himself up. People helped us get him, which was part of this backlash. And so to the degree that there was an effort to make Iraq a central part of this, I think it has produced a backlash. Now the final point; yes, you’re confronting them and they will recruit and they will do everything that they can to bring new people to the cause. And it may well be that in the short term, more people will come to the cause; not because of Iraq, but because of the broadening of the war on terror and the kind of very aggressive way in which we’re fighting it. But the question I would have is, then what’s the alternative? Do you not do things that you think will help you in the war on terror because it may recruit a few more people to a Jihad that has already plenty of people to begin with? I don’t see the argument that Iraq, in and of itself, is the reason that you have a radicalization of some places. There are many arguments for that. And what you have to have is policies which fight that radicalization, so that’s a longwinded way of saying that I think this is a very complex set of arguments and a kind of bumper sticker, ‘‘Iraq has made it harder to fight the war on terror,’’ I think is simply not true.

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Q. Well, then how do you think the democratization of Iraq is going? I mean, without the sort of—I think all of us know the litany of the number of elections they’ve had and how many people have got to vote and that’s not a small thing.… But also I think everybody, several people here have been there within the last six months or so and I don’t think any of us who have came away with a great uplifting sense of optimism about the situation on the ground. SECRETARY RICE: Well, look. It’s very difficult because this very new political system, which by the way, is something of a miracle in itself that they actually have this political system in place, a constitution, a legislature that functions, a presidency that functions, a government that functions. But this very young system is under a lot of pressure, particularly from terrorists and from sectarian violence. There’s no doubt about that. But I think that they have a way forward that, if they follow it and if they accelerate it and do it more quickly, will allow that political system to actually begin to overcome those challenges. What do they have to do? They really do have to follow this national reconciliation plan and get moving on it. They have some very key issues like federalism, like debaathification, like how oil revenues are going to be shared, that are at the political root of the disagreement. And when they come to the bargain, their grand bargain about how the various interests of the various parties are going to be represented on those big issues, I think they’ll have the political framework, then, from which to separate those who are engaged in sectarianism purely for the purpose of sectarianism. Secondly, I think they do have to continue to increase their security force strength and they are currently looking at enhancing the strength of the army, vis-`a-vis the police, because the army is accepted as a national institution. And that’s one of those adjustments that I think is going to actually turn out to be very important. And third, they do have to do something about the militias and the death squads and by all reports, the interior ministry is a much better and stronger and more integrous interior ministry, but it needs stronger political support from the factions, which goes back to the first point. I think when the factions are satisfied with the political bargain, you’re going to see more support for doing the kinds of things that they need to do. So yeah, it’s very, very tough going, but I think in time, you will see the political system which is, in place, able to absorb some of those challenges. They’re going to have violence for a long time, but the question is, is it violence that threatens the stability of the government or not? And I think they’re going to be able to move to a place where they continue to have violence, but it doesn’t threaten the stability of the government. Q. Just to follow up on that, you know, from what our reporting on the ground sees, there have been two sets of issues. You’re talking about national reconciliation in terms of Sunni and Shia, but yet the Shia internal division also appears to be a huge block to actually cracking down the militia. So we hear that Maliki doesn’t mean—you know, half of the community isn’t on block to take politically difficult and potentially damaging measures because the Shia are our big—you know, thumb in the militia and the security forces. It just feels like it’s a kind of weak and divided government. And while we all understand that the institutions are new, we’re not seeing those hopeful

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signs that—that’s coming down in a way that would allow admittedly difficult measures. SECRETARY RICE: You know, I—no, I don’t disagree that the divisions among the Shia are problematic in this regard, but in some ways, it’s preferable to such a strong Shia block that you have a Shia-Kurd, Shia-Sunni, SunniKurd problem. So it is, in a strange way, showing itself to be a little bit self-regulating, though, so that when you get this big push by the—it’s scary for the federalization and people aren’t quite ready for it, it gets pulled back, they get an agreement on how to move forward on constitutional reform over an extended period of time. The Kurdish flag incident ends up making— having the Kurds pull back; there is some kind of self-regulating mechanism between these parties that is operating. The Iraqis believe and our people on the ground believe that one of the answers to getting to the place that the Prime Minister can take some of these more difficult decisions is that he can’t be in a position of, on the one hand, having divisions in the Sunni—Shia community and on the other hand, not having figured out what the bargain is going to be with the others. That’s why he’s putting so much time into trying to resolve these big problems. If you think about it, when you resolve something like the oil question, a lot of the questions about federalism become less salient. And with that becomes less salient the need to be able to ‘‘defend,’’ by force of arms, certain political positions. And so I recognize that it’s not a panacea, but I think one thing at a time for them and the first thing is to do something about this political bargain. They are having some success in Baghdad with the Baghdad security program. There’s no doubt about that. And the great bulk of the country is actually operating pretty well. I think everybody was very concerned that Baghdad could not be a place of great violence and couldn’t become the center of a kind of violent political struggle because it’s the capital and there’s so much at stake there. And so changing the environment in Baghdad is extremely important. It’s why we put so much effort into this Baghdad Security Plan with them. Q. I’m having trouble making the link between the Shiite militias—you know, the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army and any kind of—I mean, it dignifies them to say that they’re fighting over the terms of federalism or— you know, they seem to be conducting—a pattern of—thugs. SECRETARY RICE: No, there are a lot of thugs. There are a lot of thugs. Q. And yet, they are directly linked to the two largest parties in the Shiite block. And so what is the mechanism by which the Shiite block can marginalize them? SECRETARY RICE: But there are—by the way, there are also a lot of thugs who are being taken down. I mean, there’s a heavy criminal element as well that’s being taken down in a lot of these security operations. They’re the kind of militias that belong to the parties, including Badr’s militia. And the reason that the political bargain is important and that all of these issues get—need to get resolved and put into a package is that it’s on that basis that you’re also going to have to have agreement that you’re going to have to begin to really disarm some of these militias.

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So it’s part—that issue is, I think, a part of this political bargain. It’s not separate from it. It’s a part of the political bargain. But as long as people have not come to agreement on, kind of, what the central political deal looks like, you’re going to continue to have lots of reasons, some of it just making excuses, some of it real, for the impulse to be to separate into well-guarded, well-defended political corners. And you’ve got to bring people out of those political corners into a center and I think that’s what Maliki has understood and why he’s putting so much effort in that direction. Q. You spoke about the Lebanon War as a kind of clarifying moment and I was wondering if you also thought it was some kind of a miscalculation on the part of Israel, in the sense that it didn’t go as well as had hoped, it seems to be endangering Olmert’s government, it seems to be endangering Siniora’s government. And while on some level, I think you’re right, that it sort of forces you to look at the world in a particular way, it also created circumstances which are not all that favorable to what we’re trying to do. Am I wrong? SECRETARY RICE: I’ll tell you something. Lebanon had come to a standstill politically well before the Hezbollah attack. I think you could make an argument that after the war, things had begun to move, some of them sideways, some of them forward, but they have begun to move. Q. To move backwards? SECRETARY RICE: I’m not sure that anything has begun to move backwards. I’ll give you just an example. Lebanon had to have—the Lebanese Government had to have two votes about UNIFIL forces and so forth. The first time Amal had split from Hezbollah, if you remember six months ago when the Shia ministers walked out and they couldn’t even hold a meeting, this is a fairly remarkable thing, that you actually now have a split in that Shia block, which I think may allow for a new governing consensus, which is why I think you see Nasrallah out in the streets first saying, ‘‘Well, if I had known, I wouldn’t have done what I did and if I had known there were going to be one percent, I wouldn’t have’’—and then saying, ‘‘No, no, I would have done it,’’ and then trying to get people into the streets. I actually think they’re a little bit off balance as to what the new political configuration is going to do. It is very fragile and one thing that we really have to keep an eye on is intimidation and possibly even attempts at assassination of figures associated with March 14th and the moderate consensus.… The other thing is despite ups and downs and fits and starts, the fact that the Lebanese Government is—and the Lebanese army is extended throughout the country is a major achievement. The state within a state is not of the same character. Now I would be the first to say that—you know, Hezbollah is by no means disabled in the south, but their circumstances are different in the south than they were prior to this war. Q. … what was your reaction to Colin Powell’s criticism of the interrogation and detention policies and such? Did you think what he said was disloyal for a former Secretary of State? SECRETARY RICE: No. He’s a private citizen. I think he can—I think he felt strongly about it. He’s a private citizen. I don’t happen to agree with him and—you know, I am the one who’s out defending the United States at this point in time. And I can tell you I just spent a whole lot of time with

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Europeans. I think we spent about half a minute on this issue. You know, so I think you can overstate—oh yeah, about—well, maybe a minute-and-a-half at the meeting with the Europeans. I think they understand several things. The first is that you have got to have—that information is the long pole in the tent in the war on terror. Whatever you want to say about prior to September 11th, we were totally in the dark as to what was happening in this country and the connections between people outside this country and inside this country, in the dark. And so nobody is going to want to be in that position again. It’s why surveillance is important. It’s why interrogation within our treaty obligations and within our laws, but against hardened criminals who have been—hardened terrorists who have been trained to withstand interrogation techniques. It’s why you need to use legal treaty compliance, but tough methods to get information. Because if you don’t, you are inviting another attack. Now I believe very strongly that that can all be done in a way that people understand that the United States is both a rule of law country and following those laws. And in this case, I thought it got rather misrepresented. Nobody was trying to rewrite the Geneva Conventions. The point was Common Article 3 is extremely vague, extremely vague. And when you have a vague statute, you need to be able to interpret it through something. And it is not unusual that countries, particularly the United States, choose to interpret their international obligations through their own laws. So that was the point of this. If you’re going to have a statute, then how do you interpret it? You interpret it through U.S. law. Q. But it’s been interpreted through U.S. law for 50 years. SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, and the problem is that not until now have we encountered the specific kinds of problems that we have with enemy noncombatants that are trained to withstand interrogation techniques and who have real time, immediate information that will result in the deaths of thousands of innocents if you don’t get that information. And so the professionals who run these programs asked only one thing. Don’t tell us you’ll give us a get-out-of-jail free card if we do something illegal. That’s not how we want to operate. We want to know what is legal and— Q. There have been a couple of reports about Usama bin Laden in the last few days. One is that he died of natural causes. The other was—Karzai was on CBS yesterday saying that he’s in Pakistan. I wonder if you think he’s alive and if he’s in Pakistan and what do you know about that. SECRETARY RICE: Well, I have no reason to believe he’s not alive. Let me put it that way. I don’t know where he is. I do know that there are people who spend every waking hour worrying about where he is and trying to track and trying to follow the intelligence. And it’s the kind of thing—you saw it with Zarqawi. You know, all of a sudden it comes together and it happens. And I think you just—until then close isn’t good enough. You just have to keep pursuing it. But it brings me to a larger point and a little bit goes back to where we started. You know, there are two ways to look at what happened or what our strategy had to be after September 11th. And I think what is at the root of what is the relationship of Iraq to the war on terror is that debate is at the core of it.

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On the one hand, I think there is—everybody agrees that you have to take al-Qaida down as an organization—the people who did 9/11. And while Usama bin Laden is very important and we’re pursuing it, taking down their field generals is awfully important. I mean, the Khaled Sheikh Mohammeds, the Ramzi bin Al-Shibs. And you see that by taking down the operational field generals you actually stop attacks. And you have to keep doing that because they regenerate, but they regenerate with less experience and less, you know, battle-worn veterans with each generation that you take down. Secondly, you obviously have to deal with their safe haven and so overthrowing the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan I think there’s a general understanding that that’s very important to the war on terror. The third question though is: Is that all that you need to do to win the war on terror? And some people—I should add of course homeland security issues and what you can do to protect yourself on the defense, which is where the intelligence is important and the information and surveillance and so forth. All of that is an important part of the war on terror, but is that enough? And for me, I think I know for the President and others, it’s not. Because there will be future al-Qaidas and there will be future jihadist movements unless you go and begin to change the very nature of the place from which they came, what spawned them to begin with. And that’s where the strategy on the broader Middle East and democratization and in fact Iraq as the kind of linchpin of that different Middle East, because nobody can imagine a different Middle East with Saddam Hussein in it. Whatever you think about the war, I doubt you’d find very many people who say, oh yeah, you can have a different kind of Middle East with Saddam Hussein still sitting there firing at your airplanes and threatening Kuwait and making weapons of mass destruction as we thought because you don’t have transparency into what he’s doing. That Middle East is always going to be one that is malignant and difficult as long as Saddam is there. Now, for us, a Middle East in which Iraq transforms and becomes an example of a national unity government in which Shia are not oppressed but in fact even though they are the majority are able to live in harmony with others in their region is also a very important model for how Sunni and Shia deal with each other in the Middle East. So it comes to whether or not you think you really have to go at the basic character of the Middle East. And I happen to think that that’s right. And so even if there’s a short-term effect of Iraq as mobilizing, as it did for Zarqawi, people to fight the jihad there, I think there’s a reason that they mobilized to fight it there. They get it. They understand that an Iraq that is transformed is the end of their particular ideology in the Middle East, in the center of the Middle East, and that the Middle East is going to go in a quite different direction. If I could just say one thing kind of historically because—and please, I don’t mean to try to make an exact analogy here. But Europe fought for more than a hundred years in wars from the Napoleonic wars all the way through to World War I, drew us into their balance of power war. We left. They rearranged the deck chairs in their balance of power war, and 30 years later we were back fighting again.

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At the end of World War II though, they didn’t rearrange the deck chairs in a balance of power. What they did was to change the basic structure and you got a democratic Germany, you got NATO, Germany and France never fought again and Europe was at peace, and we haven’t been back to war in Europe—the Balkans notwithstanding—since. In a sense, I think that’s how you have to think about the Middle East. You’ve got to now change the structure there so that you create an environment in which you’re not going to have these extremist forces, these jihadist forces, the financing of terrorism, the madrasas that are running wild, the authoritarian governments that don’t permit political space for moderate forces so that all of the politics takes place in the radical mosques. Unless you deal with that problem, you’re going to continue to have a very formidable jihadist movement, whether it calls itself al-Qaida or something else. And it will take time to transform that, but you’d better get about doing it. And I think that’s really the debate that we’re seeing. Q. And Iraq was the center—epicenter of that, in your view? SECRETARY RICE: Iraq— Q. None of what you said really had anything to do with Iraq. SECRETARY RICE: No, it has a great deal to do with Iraq. Q. But you could say—you said—I mean, you described Saddam. You could use that same description to describe half a dozen Middle Eastern— Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran— SECRETARY RICE: No, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran have not—did not draw the United States into two wars in the Gulf within a period of 12 years. Saddam Hussein had ambitions for the region, married to a lot of wealth, married to a penchant for the development of weapons of mass destruction which he once used, and a willingness to use his power to annex his neighbors, which you would not associate with either Syria or Saudi Arabia, and not even with Iran. You know, but memories are short but there’s a reason that we went to war in 1991 against Saddam Hussein. It was his ambitions in the region starting with Kuwait and moving forward. The other—so you overthrow this particular threat in the region and you create space for a different kind of Iraq, much like you overthrew Germany’s Hitler and created space for a different kind of Germany. That’s the point. Q. … If changing the basic character of the Middle East is the sort of bedrock rationale for getting rid of Saddam and for the war, looking back, do you wish that that case had been made more publicly in real time? Do you think the American people would have been for a war waged on that rationale? And do you have any, you know, second thoughts or regrets that Saddam’s WMD issue was sold so heavily rather than this more measured explanation that you put forward today? SECRETARY RICE: Yeah, let me not confuse the sequence and I probably have in the way I’ve just talked about this. We went to war against Saddam Hussein because of the threat that he posed to the region, the repeated refusal to deal with the Security Council resolutions and the threat that he was developing with his great wealth of WMD that he could then use in support of his ambitions. So that was the reason. That was the rationale. That was the rationale that we gave to the American people.

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By the way, it was never just WMD. I can remember saying to people, you know, the Russians have 25,000 times more WMD than Saddam Hussein, but I’m a lot more worried about a rudimentary nuclear weapon with Saddam Hussein than all the SS-18s that the Russians can— So it was a combination of his ambitions and his volatility with his WMD. So it was the threat of Saddam Hussein. Now, you have to look beyond, though, once you’ve removed that threat. What do you intend to champion in its place. And, there were those who said to us, ‘‘just replace a strong man with a strong man.’’ Just a strong man without Saddam’s ambitions. A strong man who’ll agree, ‘‘I’ll never build weapons of mass destructions, and I won’t invade Kuwait, and I’ll take the star off my flag that says Kuwait is part of Iraq,’’ and be satisfied with that. But we took a different course, which was that from the very beginning, to insist that once the United States and the coalition won the war that we would work for democratic national unity government in Iraq and lay in place a process to do that. That’s the core of the argument about what a changed Iraq could mean to a changed Middle East. … Do I wish that we had had a better and broader articulation of the supporting rationale, yes, in retrospect, absolutely. Because, I think it was sort of the nature of the UN process, where we were going for the Hans Blix updates every day and everybody was focused on where was the VX gas and where was the mustard gas and why wouldn’t he answer the questions and what was on his declaration that the WMD issue got separated from the broader issue of who was Saddam Hussein and what did he mean to the region and what would his continued presence in the region refusing to deal with all of these obligations that he had undertaken in 1991, what would that mean to the region. SOURCE: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/73105.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2006 Q. On this fifth anniversary of 9/11, there’s a story on the front page of The Washington Post that says that the hunt for Usama bin Laden, quoting one U.S. source, has gone ‘‘stone cold.’’ ‘‘The clandestine U.S. commandos whose job is to capture or kill Usama bin Laden have not received a credible lead in more than two years. Nothing from the vast U.S. intelligence world— no tips from informants, no snippets from electronic intercepts, no points on any satellite image—has led them anywhere near the al-Qaida leader, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials.’’ Is that true? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can’t speak to the specifics of that, Wolf. I can tell you that the United States and its Pakistani allies, its Afghan allies, are on the hunt for him and will continue to be on the hunt for him. But in part it is because he is in apparently very remote areas. He doesn’t communicate apparently very much and it is not easy to track someone who is determined to hide in very remote areas.

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But al-Qaida is not just Usama bin Laden and so despite the fact that we will continue to press for his capture to bring him to justice, the bringing down of al-Qaida’s field generals like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, this has been critical to the fact that we’ve been able to prevent attacks on the American homeland. And of course that’s the most important issue here. Q. This new videotape, old video actually, that was released the other day on Al Jazeera showing Usama bin Laden with some of the al-Qaida hijackers, what do you make? What’s your interpretation of this videotape? SECRETARY RICE: Well, it’s a little hard to interpret. I do know that one of the people the President mentioned, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, was there apparently either after the fact talking about 9/11 or prior to 9/11, filling Usama bin Laden in on the details. It just shows that these lieutenants who were very important to the plotting and planning of September 11th are being brought to justice. But I can’t speak to al-Qaida’s motivation for releasing a five-yearold tape at this point in time. Q. Let me read to you from the Senate Intelligence Committee report that came out this week, which I’m sure you’ve looked through. Among other things it says this: ‘‘Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted unsuccessfully to locate and capture Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi.’’ The report goes on to say: ‘‘According to debriefs of multiple detainees, including Saddam Hussein and former Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz and captured documents, Saddam did not trust al-Qaida or any other radical Islamist group and did not want to cooperate with them.’’ This is in stark contrast to some of your statements and presidential statements in recent weeks, months and years. SECRETARY RICE: You started out with a very important modifier: postwar intelligence says. Do we have better access now to understand what Saddam Hussein may have been doing so we can question Saddam Hussein, question Tareq Aziz, question his intelligence officers? Of course. But did we have the ability to get that kind of information before he was brought down? The fact is, nonetheless, before he was brought down, Iraq had been designated a state sponsor of terror going back into the ’90s. The Abu Nidal organization operated out of there. We know that Zarqawi ran a poisons network in Iraq. We know too that he ordered the killing of an American diplomat from Iraq. And we know that in testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence at the time, and as a matter of fact even in the 9/11 report, that contacts between al-Qaida and Iraq had been going on going back for more than a decade. So was Iraq involved with terror? Absolutely Iraq was involved with terror. Were they a danger to make alliances with people who wanted to hurt us? Absolutely. We are learning more about the nature of those terrorist ties now that we have access to people who we couldn’t have possibly had access to before the invasion of Iraq. Q. Because specifically on the connection between Saddam Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by U.S. forces earlier in the summer, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, I want to play what you told Larry King on

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February 5th, 2003 and more recently what the President himself said only last month. Listen to these two clips: ‘‘There is no question in my mind about the al-Qaida connection. It is a connection that has unfolded, that we’re learning more about as we are able to take the testimony of detainees, people who were high up in the al-Qaida organization.’’ ‘‘There is evidence of a connection to al-Qaida affiliates and al-Qaida.’’ That was what the President said in 2004. I want to play more recently what he said on August 21st, only a couple of weeks ago at his news conference. Listen to this: ‘‘I square it because imagine a world in which you had a Saddam Hussein who had the capacity to make a weapon of mass destruction, who is paying suiciders to kill innocent life, who would—who had relations with Zarqawi.’’ All right, now that’s the sensitive point. The Senate Intelligence Committee report says flatly he had no relations with Zarqawi; in fact, he saw Zarqawi as an enemy of the Iraqi regime. SECRETARY RICE: The information on which—about what the President is talking, about which the President is talking, is that Iraq was a state sponsor of terror, that we know; that Zarqawi operated a poisons network in Iraq, that we know; that he ordered the killing of an American diplomat from Iraq and indeed had money come to him in order to do that, that we know. We get in— Q. But Zarqawi and Saddam Hussein were in a battle. SECRETARY RICE: I don’t think—first of all, let’s take for a grain of salt the notion—with a grain of salt the notion that somehow Zarqawi and Saddam were in some kind of pitched battle. Q. That’s what the report says. SECRETARY RICE: No, what the report concludes is that some have testified that Saddam Hussein did not trust Zarqawi and that he was trying to find him. As I said, we are learning more as we have access to these people. But the fact is that Iraq was a state sponsor of terror and what the President is talking about and what we’ve all been concerned about, were all concerned about, was this nexus between one of the most dangerous figures in the Middle East, Saddam Hussein, who had taken that region to war twice in a very short period of time, causing more than a million lives in the Iran-Iraq War and putting 300,000 of his own people in mass graves. That link, his love of weapons of mass destruction, someone who had actually used them against his own people, the link between Saddam Hussein, a dangerous figure, terrorists who he clearly harbored like Abu Nidal and his animosity for the United States [inaudible] in a post-September 11th world, letting that nexus remain in the middle of the world’s most volatile region was not in the U.S. interest and the world is better off without him. Q. There are several other countries on the State Department list of state sponsors of terror, including Syria and Cuba and Iran, North Korea, and the United States has not gone to war and to depose their leaders. SECRETARY RICE: Well, but Saddam Hussein was special in this case. This is somebody against whom we went to war in 1991. Q. But wasn’t he contained, with hindsight? SECRETARY RICE: No, I simply don’t buy this argument, no.

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Q. Contained in that box? SECRETARY RICE: Absolutely not. This is somebody who was with high prices of oil, by the way not as high as they are now, was continuing to build his arsenal, somebody against whom the sanctions regime had clearly broken down. You can’t read the reports of the Oil-for-Food scandal and think that the Oil-for-Food sanctions were somehow constraining Saddam Hussein, somebody who continued to fly—continued to shoot at our pilots as they tried to fly no-fly zones to keep him from attacking his own people or attacking his neighbors, someone who was paying money to suicide bombers to launch attacks on Israel. This is a dangerous man and it was time to get rid of him. Q. So looking back with hindsight—obviously all of us are smarter with hindsight—no weapons of mass destruction, absolutely no connection to the 9/11 plot from Saddam Hussein; is that right? SECRETARY RICE: Well, it depends on how you think about 9/11. I think we’ve all said Saddam Hussein, as far as we know, had no knowledge of, no role in, the 9/11 plot itself. But if you think that 9/11 was just about alQaida and the hijackers, then there is no connection to Iraq. But if you believe, as the President does and as I believe, that the problem is this ideology of hatred that has taken root, extremist ideology that has taken root in the Middle East, and that you have to go to the source and do something about the politics of that region, it is unimaginable that you could do something about the Middle East with Saddam Hussein sitting in the center of it threatening his neighbors, threatening our allies, tying down American forces in Saudi Arabia. We are in much better shape to build a different kind of Middle East with Saddam Hussein gone. Q. So you have no regrets about going to war against Saddam Hussein? SECRETARY RICE: Oh no, absolutely not. I think it is one of the most important historical decisions that an American President has taken in decades and it is the right decision because when there are threats like that in a volatile region you should take care of them and give yourself a chance for a better future. Q. The same Senate Intelligence Committee report says that the intelligence that you were getting, your Administration, the U.S. Government, from Ahmed Chalabi, one of the Iraqi exile leaders, and his Iraqi National Congress, much of that was fabricated and phony involving the weapons of mass destruction. SECRETARY RICE: Well, the same intelligence report says that it seems to have had, whatever fabricated evidence there was, seems to have had relatively little effect on the Central Intelligence documents that the President was relying on, the National Intelligence Estimate, the work that he got from the Director of Central Intelligence. Let’s remember. You know, people have short memories. There were very tough sanctions on Saddam Hussein. Why? Because the entire world worried about his weapons of mass destruction, because he continued to lie to weapons inspectors, because he created conditions in which they had to leave in 1998. President Clinton ordered in 1998 strikes against Iran because—or Iraq because of these— Q. But we now know, and correct me if I’m wrong, that he was telling the truth when he said he didn’t have weapons of mass destruction.

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SECRETARY RICE: Well, what we do know also from other reports is that he was retaining certain kinds of capabilities, that he never lost his intention to build these weapons of mass destruction. And I think this will unfold over time, but when you ask, given what we knew at the time, was it right to take him down? Absolutely. Given what we know now, was it right to take him down? Absolutely. Q. So you’re still saying that. I want you to listen to what Senator Jay Rockefeller, the Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Democrat from West Virginia, said in releasing this Senate