Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
Edited by Gargi Bhattacharyya Aston University, UK
© Gargi Bhattacharyya 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Gargi Bhattacharyya has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Ethnicities and values in a changing world. 1. Ethnicity. 2. Social values. 3. Cultural relations. 4. Racism. I. Bhattacharyya, Gargi, 1964305.8-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bhattacharyya, Gargi, 1964Ethnicities and values in a changing world / by Gargi Bhattacharyya. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7483-2 (hardback) 1. Group identity. 2. Cultural pluralism. 3. Values. I. Title. HM753.B43 2009 305.8009’051--dc22 2009015714 ISBN: 978-0-7546-7483-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-7546-9775-6 (ebk.V)
Contents 1 Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism Gargi Bhattacharyya 2 Teaching Race and Racism in the 21st Century: Thematic Considerations Howard Winant
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Diaspora Conversations: Ethics, Ethicality, Work and Life 45 A conversation between Parminder Bhachu and Gargi Bhattacharyya
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Migrant Women’s Networking: New Articulations of Transnational Ethnicity Ronit Lentin
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‘The people do what the political class isn’t able to do’: Antigypsyism, Ethnicity Denial and the Politics of Racism without Racism Robbie McVeigh
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Violent Urban Protest – Identities, Ethics and Islamism Max Farrar
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Beliefs, Boundaries and Belonging: African Pentecostals in Ireland Abel Ugba
8 On Being a ‘Good’ Refugee John Gabriel and Jenny Harding 9 Narrating Lived Experience in a Binational Community in Costa Rica Carlos Sandoval García
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83 103
119 135
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10 Conclusion: Ethnicity and Ethicality in an Unequal World Gargi Bhattacharyya
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Index
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism Gargi Bhattacharyya
How do we know how to be good? How do we decide what we believe? How do we form our identities in a rapidly changing world? How do we achieve a sense of belonging and community against a barrage of global forces and influences? In recent years these questions have taken centre stage in a range of debates at both local and international levels. Questions of identity, ethics, values and community continue to animate the most violent of political contexts. Old questions about the articulation and enforcement of social values and the need to be connected to others continue to circulate, with a few positive responses to the central question of how can we live together? (See for example, Appiah, 2004; Benhabib, 2002; Parekh, 2000.) After the violent racial histories of the 20th century, there appeared to be a brief moment when the more optimistic of commentators dared to suggest a postracial future (Eze, 2001). No longer trapped in a world divided by the colour line or the formal racial states of earlier times, the racial politics of the 21st century promised to be more unpredictable than that of the 20th – although not necessarily less bloody or painful. Unfortunately, the longed-for post-racial future has emerged as a time of new forms of racialisation, often over-written by older and more familiar structures of racialised inequality. The twenty-first century seems destined to be riven by ethnic divisions and animated by ethnic performance, an unhappy outcome that can be seen in the first decade of this new century and the ethnically-inspired violence that has cut across conflicts in Darfur (Flint and De Waal, 2005), Kenya (Baldauf, 2008), Iraq, Indonesia (Sidel, 2006) and elsewhere. Although each of these recent conflicts has been shaped by the changing politics of its own context, each also represents a reassertion of absolutist notions of ethnic identity, albeit for a variety of politically expedient ends. Against this, this collection seeks to challenge the contention that ethnicity is static or that ethnicity necessarily represents traditional values and cultures. Instead, this volume considers how ethnicity is mobilised as a political identity in response to a changing world. This includes discussion of, among other
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things, the formation of religious communities, responses to media racism, the interplay between state racism and everyday choices, and the struggle of racialised communities to both be good and be seen to be good. The debate about ethnicity and values has taken place in a number of arenas, with slightly different directions and emphases. These debates range from: discussions of the philosophical conception of the other and our duty to this other (Benhabib, 2004); the ethical assertion and burden that is declared in any taking of identity and implications of this for our ability to live together in any kind of peaceable manner (Sen, 2006); the allegation that some ethnic identities are tied irretrievably to backward, violent and exclusionary values (Moller Okin, 1999); the suggestion that allegiance to some ethnic identities means an abdication of ethical judgement (Gove, 2006). This volume considers all of these assertions, in varying degrees. Some pieces, such as that by Howard Winant, argue that the ethical obligations that occur with the taking of ethnic identity also shape the responsibilities of scholars in the field. The majority of case studies here reveal the extent to which the ethical claims of ethnic identity are staged in response to popular demonisation or state racism. In some instances, as shown by Abel Ugba, this defensive response can itself take on a rhetoric of exclusion and judgement. A number of chapters describe the strategies that are employed by those facing exclusion, strategies that include reasserting the benefits and strengths of the ethical values of their ‘community’. However, overall, the pieces taken together reveal a world of changing and constantly renegotiated values. This process of ongoing negotiation unsettles the terms of some other recent debate about ethnicity and values. Ethnicity as an Expression of Values Much of the debate surrounding the issue of ethnicity and values implies that the world is divided into discrete groups of people who can be adequately described through ethnic naming. The allegation that some groups remain tied to practices and beliefs that cannot be reconciled with our ethical duty to each other rests on the belief that culture, in this sense, is stable, inherent in each member of the group and is immune to the appeals of reason or argument (for a summary of competing accounts of ethnicity, see Jenkins, 2008). This work argues that such a conception of ethnicity in the world transforms all human disagreement into inter-ethnic conflict. Although wary of the dangers of cliched constructivism, as described by Brubaker, overall this volume seeks to argue that ethnicity is deployed in part as an expression of values and a model of ethical practice. This does not assume a solidity to ethnic identity, or that the consolidation of ethnic identity is an inevitable outcome of ethnically framed social turbulence. In some of the instances discussed here the ethical claims of ethnic practice are linked to highly diverse groups (see, for example, pieces by Gabriel and Harding and by Sandoval-Garcia). The point is that the articulation
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism
of ethical judgement and values serves here as an explicit refutation of the racist allegation that some people have no values. More generally it can be argued that the performance of ethnicity is always a kind of ethical display, if we take the ethical to be a statement of intent about our relations to others. If ethnicity is above all an affirmation of groupness, then there must be a confirmation of sanctioned behaviour within the group and the demonstration that group norms can be observed. This is ethics as part of the lived contract of belonging. The display of ethnicity represents both that assertion of identity and a statement about way of life, sense of entitlement and manner of connection to others. The pieces in this volume span discussions of the manner in which marginalised or demonised groups take up the rhetoric of moral worth as an element of their resistance to the demeaning slurs of the dominant. This is a consideration of ethnicity as a response to changing circumstances and perceived threats and as a code for ethical behaviour. This can be seen through a range of recent examples. The much-discussed politicisation of religion represents one instance of this phenomenon and the manner in which social actors combine religion and politics and everyday contexts, including the mundane context of resisting the banality of everyday racism, could be regarded as a key indicator of the role of ethicality in ethnic articulation. It is worth noting that these forms of ethical assertion can accompany the re-emergence of exclusionary identities in both majority and minority communities. Ethical claims here have no necessary relation to practices of coexistence or tolerance. In fact, the strength of the ethical claim may be precisely its ability to divide the world into good and bad and to challenge notions of coexistence that appear unworkable. The volume as a whole seeks to place these developments within the wider context of adaptive and resurgent state racisms and the controversial and varied political mobilisation that has occurred around the concept of ‘diversity’. The question of divisions and antagonisms between minority ethnic communities inevitably has led to a reappraisal of analysis in this field. These are issues that are not easily confined to models of majority-minority relations or the formal mobilisation of ethnic nationalism (Kyambi, 2005). Instead, the debates around community cohesion have sought to acknowledge both structural inequality and the dangers of exclusionary identities (Worley, 2005; Eatwell, 2006) – although this discourse brings its own pitfalls, as outlined in pieces by Farrar and by Gabriel and Harding. Taken together, the pieces here share some common themes. Firstly, all contributors share an understanding of ethnicity in which the articulation of ethnic identity is an ongoing and creative process that can reveal innovative ethical codes. Although the influence of civilisational clash models of social understanding clearly impacts on everyday experience, contributors describe the manner in which those facing racism and exclusion take up the language of values and ethical codes in order to articulate less absolute and constraining models of identity. Such
Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
alternative articulations of value offer a critique of the idea that there are absolute divisions between cultures and serve to interrogate concepts of community cohesion and inter-ethnic interaction in a manner that can propose models of shared values that do not rely on static conceptions of identity. Alongside this, the pieces in this volume identify a framework for understanding the processes through which individuals create innovative ethical codes that inform their relations to others. Are Values Like ‘Glue’? Recent debates about national identity, belonging and community cohesion appear to be based on a conception of ethnicity as a static entity. This conceptualisation posits ethnic difference as a source of conflict in itself and, therefore, presents models of mediation and revamped nationalism as essential components of shared citizenship (Brown, 2006). This volume presents an alternative account of ethnicity as a mobile process that is under constant renegotiation. Such a conception of ethnicity calls into question models of community cohesion that present ethnicity as the source of antagonisms and differences that must be overcome and instead suggests that ethnicity is itself multiple and changing and is unlikely to be a basis for articulating shared values. The debate about modernity, reflexivity and post-traditional societies has been influential in recent analyses of contemporary society (see Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994). These debates raise key questions about the manner in which individuals conceive of ethicality and make day-today ethical choices. Individuals may not shape their lives according to so-called traditional values, however the conduct of everyday life continues to demand an understanding of ethicality and corresponding code of behaviour. These questions take on urgency in the current climate. We are undergoing a widespread re-examination of the nature and extent of our bonds to each other as human beings (Appiah, 2006) – be this in the form of debates about global poverty and global warming, terrorism and war or anti-social behaviour and community cohesion. Political debate, from the most violent and international to the most local, is focused on the question of how we define our ethical values and how these values shape our behaviour in relation to others. The concept of ethnicity is tied intimately to the idea of value – who we believe ourselves to be and how we choose to relate to others are issues that are shaped through the prisms of ethnicised cultures. This volume considers again these debates about the articulation of ethnic identity, the nature of our relation to each other and discussions of everyday ethics. This volume offers a review of recent reappraisals of the concept of ‘ethnicity’ and the accompanying insertion of ideas of belief and value in this discussion. Individual chapters consider how ethnic identities shift and adapt, in particular in response to the pressures of global forces. Overall it is argued that ethnic identities are improvised and reveal one method of retaining a narrative of ethical values in individual lives. Such narratives may
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism
utilise a variety of resources, ranging from those of traditional religion to those of popular culture. The textbook account of the term ethnicity suggests that this is a description of a conscious community (Jenkins, 2008). Whereas race is presented as an external imposition, a powerful categorisation that descends upon a group from the outside, ethnicity demands some degree of identification. If race is a practice that is done to us, ethnicity is something we do to ourselves, in part at least. It is this demand for active participation that makes ethnicity so susceptible to the claims of religion and belief. There is nothing new about the political mobilisation of religious identity (Hastings, 1997). It is true that in previous centuries religious divisions were not couched in terms of identity. However, many regions of the world have a long history of enacting social division through religion. The recent upsurge of interest in religious mobilisation appears to be a response to the perception that religion is becoming a more, not less, significant component of social division (Jurgensmeyer, 1993; Mandaville, 2007) and a particular concern in the West that political Islam represents a threat to global order and so-called western values. Pieces here consider the impact of this anxiety about religion (Farrar; Ugba), but the volume is framed around the more general issue of the impact of globalisation on the articulation of ethnic identities and the concurrent improvisation of ethnic identity that has become so familiar across locations. The Context of the Values and Ethnicity Debate In common with other locations, Britain has undergone a number of years of public debate about the nature and resilience of national identity. For example, Gordon Brown heralded his ascent to the role of British Prime Minister by giving a public lecture on the nature of Britishness. At the same time, the widespread critique of multiculturalism, much of it international and much of it implying that it is the British model which has failed, has given rise to an overenthusiastic reclaiming of national pride and heritage as the supposedly essential underpinning to a cohesive society. It has been suggested that it is the failure to articulate such a basis of commonality that is at the heart of Britain’s social problems, one of the major problems faced by British society today: the failure to produce a discourse that integrates various ethnic groups under the umbrella of a common British identity. (Ansari et al. 2008, 1)
Perhaps inevitably, these debates have become more heated and aggressive in the aftermath of the London bombings of 2005. This event, where four young British Muslim men carried out a series of deadly bomb attacks on London public transport, killing themselves in the process, has had a profound impact on British public debate. After this attack from within, there was a highly public expression
Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
of doubt about the viability or desirability of multicultural co-existence. With little reference to evidence, although in a continuation of earlier reports about the need for community cohesion, there was a widespread acceptance that British versions of multiculturalism were to blame, at least in part, for the emergence of British residents who wished to launch terrorist attacks at home. This was a critique of multiculturalism that suggested that the tolerance of difference allowed alien value systems to be nurtured undisturbed, with an outcome of serious divisions within the nation (for an extreme example of this argument, see Phillips, 2006). Predictably, this too continued a longer-running theme in policy debate. In Britain much of the public anxiety about national identity and the allegedly corrosive influence of multiculturalism has revolved around a sense of some more fundamental crisis, a suggestion that the very basis of civilised life may be under attack. Bannister summarises this as, the myth, articulated by successive generations of press and politicians, that the ‘British way of life’ is under threat by an unruly minority (Bannister et al., 2006, 919)
This account goes beyond narratives of ethnic belonging to include concerns about youth, disorder, public display and, that most nebulous and yet most anxiety-inducing of contemporary afflictions, anti-social behaviour. Alongside the attempted retrieval of national identity and culture, the dying days of Tony Blair’s government instituted an ill-considered ‘Respect’ agenda, explicitly targeting the varied incarnations of anti-social behaviour. This was not an initiative that sought to mobilise a politics of race, or, at least, not in any obvious sense. Those themes received plenty of government comment (and media releases) through initiatives to harden immigration control, to increase the punishment of immigration offenders, to celebrate prescriptive and narrow accounts of national culture and to enforce integration of minorities on terms that pandered to the prejudices of the majority. The Respect agenda was introduced alongside such explicitly racialised initiatives, but as a reminder that an unethical minority threatened majority values. the Home Office’s Respect Action Plan … seeks to empower majority groups to enforce respectability in public spaces of all kinds by removing forms of ‘intimidation’ and ‘tyranny’. (Bannister et al., 2006, 920)
The appeal to majority values is a tactic that can move between a variety of populist agendas, from law and order to anti-immigrant rhetoric. The extensive public concern and government campaign against antisocial behaviour operated through an appeal to a set of majority values that remained unspecified. What was important was the sense that this majority, silent, long-suffering, was under attack by an unruly minority. This sense that social problems were caused by an alien group and that the response should be to fight back from this besieged position
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism
worked to rally the electorate around a whole series of initiatives that purported to defend the majority against a dangerous and intrusive minority. The suggestion that majorities are under attack and that this requires a defence and consolidation of national identity has been echoed in a range of ‘crisis’ measures across Europe. Bertossi explains that this propagation of the idea that majorities are besieged has enabled a shift to the political right across Europe, Migrants and ethnic and religious minorities have been identified as an explanation for this integration crisis, to which governments have responded with a return to the national. National identity is therefore being set up as a form of ‘common belonging’ which is under threat from Islam and, at the same time, as a solution to the crisis of ‘common belonging’, which is particularly noticeable in the fact that themes which were traditionally held by far-Right parties have now become commonplace. (Bertossi, 2007, 6)
Bertossi goes on to explain that this reveals the tension between maintaining ideals of citizenship, a central plank in the mythologised self-conception of European culture that has emerged, increasingly, in response to shifts in the global status and internal composition of Europe, and other anxieties that the culture and status of majorities is being undermined as a result of these same changes. In short, the opposition between ‘national philosophies’ of citizenship and integration policies is being played out in three areas: a crisis in the national, but a resurgence of nationalist discourses to make sense of solidarity within globalised, plural societies; a crisis in ‘integration models’, but calls from minorities of immigrant origin for full access to substantial, first-class citizenship; and a crisis, in public opinion, in the sense of ‘common belonging’, but the use of immigration and Islam to make sense of a global crisis whose only political response that ‘pays’ is a return to national identity. (Bertossi, 2007, 6)
Although much of the mobilisation of majority anxiety has been focused on issues of ethnicity, nationhood and belonging, the sense of disruption arises from a larger array of changes, not least the unsettling impact of shifts in the global economy on the security and sovereignty of the nation. Bertossi suggests that the array of rediscovered popular nationalisms across Europe, in both minority and mainstream political parties, are an indication that electorates suffering from anxiety on many fronts, including those caused by the vagaries of the global economy, respond most readily to a return to the familiar terrain of exclusionary nationalism. The initial popular response to the enormity of global economic downturn seems to confirm this – with workers’ movements proclaiming their demand of ‘British jobs for British workers’ and parties across the political spectrum rushing to demonstrate their support of this principle and public battles about the necessity of ‘protectionism’ in many locations. The perceived dangers of the ethnic other and the allegedly unwise accommodations of ‘multiculturalism’ fold into this
Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
larger anxiety about global status, economic and political sovereignty and future well-being, yet simultaneously become the most recognisable short-hand for this generalised feeling of social unease. The Alleged Crisis of Multiculturalism Not all of the debate has been limited to Britain, or even to Europe or America. Perhaps in another indication of the inappropriate influence of American trends in social theory and policy (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999), Kuo writes of the takeup of the language of multiculturalism in Taiwan. However, she, also, is doubtful about the efficacy of the concept or practice. Is multiculturalism possible? At least, multiculturalism is conceived as an alternative vision of cultural strategy whose objective is to resist cultural supremacy and to focus on the equality of different representations among cultures. The concept of multiculturalism is much commented upon these days. Increasingly today, the rhetoric of multiculturalism is in the air, as evidenced by political debates and agendas. It has been considered as a capacious vehicle for presenting cultural diversity in a transnational society. (Kuo, 2003, 223)
The varied use of multiculturalism as a ‘capacious vehicle’ that can be transported across locations to meet the needs of any transnational society is connected to the return to nationalism for locations facing a sense of social crisis. In both instances, it is concepts of ethnic boundary and belonging that emerge as fixing techniques for other uncertainties. Modood and Ahmad suggest that the alleged crisis of multiculturalism, in fact, is a sign of a necessary reassessment of the relationship between majority and minority groups, particularly through a time of rapid social and economic change for many locations. In particular, they argue that a multiculturalism that does not encompass religion and religious identity cannot address the challenges of coexistence in our time. They ask whether there is a need to think again about what it is that, a dominant culture which aspires to be liberal, democratic and inclusive may require from minority cultures; whether we need a new extended concept of racism which can incorporate hostility against Muslims; and about the place of religion in the political culture and institutions. (Modood and Ahmad, 2007, 187)
Tariq Modood has argued for some time that concepts of racism and exclusion have failed to recognise the role of religion and religious identity. In particular, he has argued that there is a tension between the expressed values of secularism, which have increasingly been proclaimed as a central aspect of Western culture and even
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism
of liberal democracy, and the high levels of religious observance among minority communities in the West, in particular amongst Muslim communities (Modood, 2007). To Modood, this oversight is at the heart of multiculturalist crisis talk. Whereas earlier debates about the benefits of multicultural living could rely, to a large extent, on the active participation and gratitude of minority communities who expected no more than tolerance at best, the increasing politicisation of religious identity unsettles this framework. At worst, those expressing an allegiance to secular values may portray the proclamation of proud religious identity as itself another version of exclusionary supremacism. The imagined idyll of multicultural living had assumed that all participants would be persuaded, perhaps over time, to tolerate and perhaps even value each other. To this extent, even quite weak versions of multiculturalism adopt an ethical stance that prescribes the way of living that is presumed to be better for all. However, such a conception has relied on the assumption that assertions of group rights can be accommodated within egalitarian frameworks. As Modood and Ahmad argue, religious groups and Muslims in particular have not been regarded as participants in such quests for equality, In theory and in practice, then, while minority racial and ethnic assertiveness (not to mention women’s movements and gay pride) were encouraged by egalitarians, religious assertiveness, especially on the part of Muslims – when it occurred – was seen as a problem: not as a strand within equality struggles but as a threat to multiculturalism. (Modood and Ahmad, 2007, 189)
If multiculturalism has been in crisis, then this has been a result of the limitations of multicultural thinking. The emergence of Muslim minorities across western nations who are both observant and politicised tests the ability of a multiculturalism that assumes secularism to accommodate all groups. Modood and Ahmad argue that there must be a reconsideration of multiculturalism that can accommodate religious identity and create a framework for public life that can allow participation and entitlement for all, without demanding that groups prove their own multiculturalist credentials and without assuming that multiculturalism can become a new universalism that erases all difference. Some other critiques of the conceptual framework of multiculturalism have argued that this focus on cultural tolerance and appreciation cannot mediate difference and inequality in any meaningful way. McClennan argues that an excessive focus on the cultural makes multiculturalism unworkable, Some multiculturalists are militantly culturalist, believing that, to have any value, multiculturalism must involve the protection, and perhaps enhancement, of only the sort of entrenched national, ethnic and religious forms of life that have a manifestly profound and primary influence over their members. Apart from the risk of exaggerating the ‘grip’ that such cultures have on their participants, an obvious snare in this line of thinking is that within many strongly formative
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World cultures there is little scope for serious accommodation to the fundamental beliefs and practices of other, equivalent ‘deep’ cultures. That being so, multiculturalism itself would hold little promise of developing into a new metacultural ethic for our times; indeed multiculturalism might well be seen as a definite threat to strong cultures. (McClennan, 2001, 390 )
McClennan is sceptical about the overall social benefits of multiculturalism – in particular its ability to bring together groups with divergent views and values. As he suggests, the call to co-existence of a certain kind could itself come to be regarded as a cultural imposition and threat. In an echo of Modood and Ahmad, McClennan suggests that a multiculturalism that celebrates cultural autonomy and mutual tolerance, but cannot adapt to the political context shaping relations between minorities and majorities, will not be able to address the challenges of transnational societies. However, unlike Modood, McClennan disputes the assertion that cultural identity holds such a central role in contemporary life. Whilst it might be accepted that all human beings are in some significant way culturally formed and culturally located, the notion that everyone inhabits deep, coherent and relatively unchanging cultures is disputable. (McClennan, 2001, 390)
This view has brought together an unlikely alliance, including those who regard multiculturalism as a diversion from the continuing structural inequality and violence of many diverse societies, those who argue that granting such authority and solidity to something as changeable as culture gives undue power to selfappointed leaders of minority cultural groups at the expense of less enfranchised group members such as women and sexual minorities, and those who feel that multiculturalism has been used to undermine the shared value set that should underlie any national political community. All three viewpoints are united in the implication that multiculturalism and multiculturalists have been the cause of social unrest and injustice, albeit unwittingly. However, in the same debate, Peter McLaren defends critical multiculturalism against these allegations, arguing that multicultural wars in the US represented an important battle about access, entitlement and power, Multicultural education also represents an early initiative to counter brutal stereotypes of African Americans, Asians, and Latinos/as in school textbooks, to challenge the disproportionate placement of students of color in special education programs for ‘disturbed youth’, and to redress their lack of representation in the media, and in key sectors of the government. (McLaren, 2001, 410)
For McLaren, multiculturalism in both liberal and critical forms, represents a necessary corrective to the uncritical celebration of power and the powerful. As he puts it, multiculturalism,
Introduction: Ethnicities, Values and Old-fashioned Racism
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still serves as a counterweight to those expanding ranks of fundamentalists who herald the United States’ blameless passage from sanctuary for the Pilgrims to global capital’s Alpha Male as an act of Divine Providence. (McLaren, 2001, 410)
However, McLaren too discerns a reinvention of liberal multiculturalism as a new assertion of supremacism – the only acceptable human values in the world. Liberal multiculturalism needs to be understood often as having more to do with maintaining the residual Pax Romana fantasies of a blood-thirsty Cartesian imperialism – ‘I invade you therefore you exist’ ... than with defending the dream of ethnic pluralism under a sun umbrella festooned with happy face symbols. ... multiculturalism camouflages imperialist aggression and defends – through a particular species of American Chauvinism and moral sangfroid – the imperial domination of the West in various forms throughout our transculturalized planet. (McLaren, 2001, 413)
In the end, it seems, McClennan and McLaren converge in the view that multiculturalism is proving unequal to the challenges of globalised living. This disagreement about the place of multiculturalism in a globalised world uncovers a theme that informs much debate yet which is rarely addressed directly. In a confirmation of Kuo’s view that multiculturalism has come to be regarded as a technique for managing the challenges of transnational society, commentators in other fields have suggested that issues of ethnicity, identity and racism have become the nodal points between local debates about belonging and entitlement and an international arena divided by violent conflict and wars of exploitation. For some, this has been an opportunity to deride multiculturalism for bringing the excesses of ethnic wars into the space of the liberal democratic state – in a confirmation that some can never be inculcated in the values necessary for democratic freedoms. However, in contradiction to the demonisation of multiculturalism and the suggestion that this tolerance of difference has allowed the development of enemy aliens within the nation, others have argued that the violent tensions of contemporary political life must be understood within the framework of existing national identities. Writing of ‘the construction of modern jihadi terrorists’, Stuart Croft argues, they are part of British society, and take their cues from us: in their attitudes and behaviour, they are much more British than we British would like to believe. (Croft, 2007, 318)
There are two points to note here – those who claim to wage a religious war against the West from within both operate within the framework of values and cultural references of that space, a view that is echoed by Max Farrar in this volume, and their complaint is expressed in the terms of this shared culture.
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Despite the much repeated fantasy of the dangerous alien, those who are accused of attacking western culture and values are also its products, as seen in the oftenrepeated observations that Bin Laden has benefited from a western-influenced elite education, that what we know of the 9/11 bombers points to their deep immersion in so-called western culture and practices and that the 7/7 bombers were ordinary and unremarkable British lads, including among their number the son destined previously to take over the family fish and chip shop. It is the discomfort of this creeping realisation coupled with the framing of the War on Terror as a battle between them and us that has led to new distinctions of ethnic and national identity. Croft reminds us that, Prior to 9/11, no-one spoke of the category: ‘British Muslim’. It is a category entirely created by those attacks, by government, media and broader community responses. (Croft, 2007, 319)
Ethnicity and Politics Ethno-nationalism has been a key arena in which claims have been made about the connection between ethnicity and ethics. Although it can be argued that the modern notion of the nation-state already implies a connection between land, belonging and ethnicity, recent mobilisations for the claims of ethnic nationalism have led to a reinvigorated debate about these issues. The religious element of some of these mobilisations heightens the sense that ethnic belonging is a matter of (supposedly) ethical behaviour. The extensive discussion of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the array of conflicts that arose from that shift has suggested that we live in an era where religious and national identities blend into each other, where contemporary conflict plays out the violent tensions of a centuries-old historical conflict and that ethnic identity is made through this tortured memory, and where the violence of inter-ethnic struggles for nationhood comes to animate the global arena and international politics. There is, of course, a long-standing and extensive literature discussing the relationship between nationalist movements and religious identities (Hastings, 1997; Inglis et al., 2000). Coming to nationhood in a range of locations has been a process deeply connected to the expression of religion and a number of modern nations retain explicit or implicit reference to religious values in both the formal processes of nationhood and in everyday narratives of national belonging. Nations that have adopted an explicit prohibition on the public declaration of religion or adherence to official secularism or separation of church and state also include official narratives of shared values in public utterances on behalf of the state – this is the appeal to secular tolerance that the Hindu right can misappropriate to suggest that other religious traditions are alien to the Indian nation or the central role of the values of the Republic in the public life and political discourse of France.
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Despite the considerable scholarly and political attention that has been given to analysis of the resurgence of exclusionary nationalist movements, not least in terms of the possible threat to peace and stability of such movements, there has been little attention given to the influence of other strains of religious nationalism on the foreign policy decisions of ostensibly secular and non-racial states. Those who wish to reinsert a consideration of ethnicity and racism into the analysis of international relations have argued that all nationhood is ethno-national, despite the various developments that try to accommodate diverse groups within one nation (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004). The transformation of tests of blood and belonging into tests of supposed ethical belonging serves to translate the logic of foreign policy into domestic politics. Dangerous and Endangered Migrants To illustrate and extend these points, it is helpful to consider a recent instance of state utterances that are shaped explicitly through an appeal to moral mission. Recent developments in British law and public debate in the areas of prostitution and forced marriage have presented a strong moral argument for state intervention against the sexual exploitation of migrant and minority women. However, in both the detail of proposals and in the presentation by government, immigration control is the central focus and primary technique of intervention. In effect, immigration control is reframed as a form of ethical intervention, whether this is in the form of a ‘saving’ of trafficked women or a ‘protection’ of young people from ‘forced marriage’. Liz Fekete has commented on the (mis)use of feminism to legitimise state attacks on migrant and minority ethnic communities across Europe (Fekete, 2006). The public presentation of policy changes in the areas of prostitution and forced marriage in Britain could be seen as examples of harnessing alternative progressive ethical codes, such as the need to prevent sexual exploitation, for the purposes of immigration control. The overall message is, it seems, that government is stemming the tide of dangerous migrants – under the veil of an intervention against sexual exploitation. There is no doubt that sexual exploitation exists, and that it is widespread, including in minority and migrant communities. However, there also remains a question about the work that the claim of effective immigration control performs in this debate. Shared Values? Each Christmas in Britain the Queen issues an address to the nation at 3 pm – to allow completion of the festive lunch and to signal the beginning of television time. This ritual has a heavy element of self-parody, as, it could be argued, is true more generally of the mediatised Royalty of Britain. However, it remains an
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identifiable marker of banal nationalism and is an indication of official accounts of the year’s events and challenges. In response, Channel 4, an independent television channel, for a number of years has issued an alternative Christmas message, scheduled to compete with the BBC broadcast of the Queen. At some times this has been played for entertainment, at others speakers have been chosen to give voice to a key political issue of the day. For example, previous addresses have been given by Doreen Lawrence, mother of murdered black teenager Stephen Lawrence and Ru Paul, drag queen and media personality. In 2008, in a significant shift of focus and after a year of intensive international activity and threat in relation to the allegation that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities , President Ahmadinejad of Iran presented this alternative Christmas message. His message was to assert the shared morality defined through religions of the book. All Prophets called for the worship of God, for love and brotherhood, for the establishment of justice and for love in human society. Jesus, the Son of Mary, is the standard-bearer of justice, of love for our fellow human beings, of the fight against tyranny, discrimination and injustice. (Timesonline, 24 December 2008)
As UK commentators were quick to point out, this alternative Christmas message was most notable for its anodyne quality. This was almost a parody of War on Terror rhetoric. There is a familiar appeal to the shared roots of Abrahamic faiths. There is some speculation about what Jesus would have done, where he would have stood. If Christ were on Earth today, undoubtedly He would stand with the people in opposition to bullying, ill-tempered and expansionist powers. If Christ were on Earth today, undoubtedly He would hoist the banner of justice and love for humanity to oppose warmongers, occupiers, terrorists and bullies the world over. If Christ were on Earth today, undoubtedly He would fight against the tyrannical policies of prevailing global economic and political systems, as He did in His lifetime. (Timesonline, 24 December 2008)
Despite the all too obvious rhetorical moves of the Ahmadinejad statement, each aspect of its construction can be seen as a direct response to the moral claims made in defence of the War on Terror and the escalating demonisation of Iran in international arenas. If proof were needed of the existence of a shared framework of understanding and common values, this demonstration of similarity in structure of argument and rhetorical reference points should serve to remind us all that Bush and Ahmadinejad have inhabited a shared space of theatricalised international politics. Far from being unable to converse because of their radically opposed world views, these public pronouncements employ highly similar language. In the
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sphere of grand-standing, appealing to the shared and world-changing values of the Abrahamic faiths has become a standard indicator. Of course, Ahmadinejad’s address is most of all a response to a War on Terror rhetoric that assumes the moral centrality and superiority of western interpretations of right and religious obligation. The absolutist tendency of Bushisms throughout recent years has painted enemies as incarnations of evil, the ‘bad men’ who deserve to be detained indefinitely in Guantanamo. This continues the larger framing of the War on Terror in that it places morality at the centre of international affairs. However, as well as the abstract claims of good and evil, this has been a conflict or set of conflicts that has placed a particular focus on gender roles and sexuality. This discussion returns to these more particular debates about values, gender and sexuality and the manner in which such terms are circulated in the service of securitisation. A number of writers have commented on the misuse of feminist rhetoric in the War on Terror. Zillah Eisenstein designates this as a strategy of deploying sexual decoys in order to allow a continuation of the dehumanising practices of supremacist thinking, but under the cover of a veneer of gender equality or tolerance of sexual diversity (Eisenstein, 2007). Not for the first time, women, bodies and sexuality have taken on a heightened symbolic role and complex narratives have been constructed that link all three and in turn link this assemblage to the responsibilities and choices of states. In common with others (Eisenstein, 2007; Shepherd, 2006), I have argued that this utilisation of concepts of women’s place, proper bodies and free and unfree sexuality is not unique but that there are distinctive features in their take-up in our time (Bhattacharyya, 2008). The exploitation of an appeal to feminism, however insubstantial and uninformed such an appeal might be, is one aspect of this distinctiveness. The parallel narrative to this misuse of feminism is a demonisation of Islam that rests on key elements of alleged ‘extremism’: attitudes to women, homosexuality and sexual freedom, refusal of democratic culture in favour of authoritarianism and violence, intolerance towards other faiths, allegiance to a world-wide Islam and refusal of any local or national civic responsibility. In this context, there is a continuity between foreign policy, security talk and more local state initiatives that focus on the supposed cultural dangers of migrants when formulating policy responses. Black feminists have argued against this misappropriation of an idea of women’s rights for many years. In particular, the suggestion that an otherwise racist state may develop a sudden interest in defending the rights of black women when, and only when, such rights are threatened by the actions of black men has been critiqued (Mirza, 1997). However, in the absence of any sustained black feminist movement in the UK in recent years, the state and some women’s organisations have started, once again, to proclaim the need for authoritarian state intervention against the genderoppressive practices of some communities. At worst, this has taken the form of developing highly racialised forms of law, such as prohibitions against ‘forced marriage’. Amrit Wilson analyses this rediscovery of the ideology of ‘white men
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saving brown women from brown men’ as a symptom of the wider surveillance and criminalisation of black communities through the War on Terror (Wilson, 2007). Unfortunately, this critical stance, which was once much debated and respected in progressive circles in Britain, now appears to be almost unspeakable. The horror of ‘forced marriage’ has re-entered popular imagination and serves as an exciting counterpoint to the scare stories about terrorists under the beds. Forced Marriages – Symbolic Prohibition and the Politics of Race The issue of forced marriage has been highlighted as one of a number of key practices that exemplifies the alleged tension between multiculturalism and feminism (Moller Okin, 1999). In popular discourse, the repeated suggestion that these people behave in these despicable ways towards their women has been a central refrain in the discrediting of multiculturalism. However, as has been noted by Phillips and Dustin, forced marriage is not a practice that is defended in the name of any culture. although some form of arranged marriage is still practised in Britain’s minority communities (particularly those of South Asian origin), and some parents in these communities will have particularly strong expectations of filial obedience, none of their spokespeople claims forced marriage as part of their cultural or religious heritage. All officially share in its condemnation. Forced marriage then stands apart from other standard topics of multicultural debate, the issue being not so much whether public authorities have a right or responsibility to eliminate a particular practice, but how best to achieve this. (Phillips and Dustin, 2004, 533)
Despite the staged dilemma between the need to defend universal rights while respecting the identities of cultural minorities, this is not an instance of a cultural practice that a minority community wishes to defend and continue in resistance to the homogenising force of mass or majority culture. Instead, this is an example of a shared value – something that all parties agree is undesirable. The only issue of debate is whether the state should intervene and what the nature of that intervention should be. Given this context, my interest is in understanding why forced marriage continues to appear as an exemplary trope in discussions of failing multiculturalism. My argument is that forced marriage appears as a focal point of public debate and state activity around delegitimising multiculturalism precisely because it is an issue that cannot be defended as a cultural practice that defines community. Instead, this is an issue that allows space for the state to institute show-piece legislation with minimal controversy and present an appearance of disciplining unruly cultural minorities to a wider electorate.
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Despite the early pronouncements suggesting that attacks on Afghanistan were a response to the oppression of women, in recent years UK media has displayed a fitful and uneven coverage of issues of women’s rights in any community. In common with many other globalised media forms, UK media has increasingly presented women as hyper sexualised beings whose agency is best expressed through consumer activity. Mainstream press and television is characterised by a surfeit of reality shows, plastic surgery exposes, dieting and dating tips and an endless parade of transformative promises through makeovers, physical and mental challenges, canny shopping, psychological reflection and other highly commodified techniques of self. Inevitably, the shift to so highly individualistic an account of fulfilment shapes discussion of feminism and women’s rights (McRobbie, 2007). If some women in some communities or in some locations are regarded as oppressed, this tends to be presented as a lack of access to such consumer-based agency. Although these narratives are not so crass as to suggest any equation between freedom and shopping, the horrors of sexual exploitation, for example, in popular accounts become the tragedy of lost romance. Media accounts of forced marriage can fall into this framework. Forced marriage appears as a cruel parental response to separate young lovers, abduction steals victims away from the pleasures of girlhood, romance is crushed. Overall the press interest contrasts the barbaric cultural beliefs that disregard the feelings and freedom of women with the unspoken ideal of romantic choice, agency and the right to choose a life path. Whatever attempts are made to highlight an abuse of rights, popular presentation continues to perpetuate an opposition of free and unfree that is identified with West and East. Such an approach can be discerned even in statements from high-profile campaigners such as Jasvinder Sanghera, co-ordinator of a centre and help-line for women facing forced marriage and someone who has become a favourite interlocutor for government. In an article arguing that forced marriage will be the issue of 2009, because a tipping point has been reached, Sanghera’s own battle to escape a forced marriage is introduced as an old-fashioned clash of cultures – that is, a clash between backward migrant culture and liberal western values as opposed to the more recent suggestion of a clash between civilisations. Sanghera’s autobiography, Shame, published in 2007, became a bestseller because it so tellingly reflected the dilemmas of many teenage girls, born in liberal Britain but expected to follow suffocatingly strict Asian customs at home. ‘To my family I was wild, but I was just a teenager,’ she says. ‘I wanted to perm my hair and have a paper round to earn some money.’ But my parents had come from a village in India and they wanted to continue that life. We were told white people were dirty, we weren’t allowed to have white friends. But I loved everything about the white girls at school. They had what I wanted – freedom. (Sunday Times, 4 January 2009)
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This is a narrative that pre-dates multiculturalism – the young Asians caught ‘between cultures’, the exclusionary racism of the Asian community, the desire to enjoy the same freedoms as white friends. It is an agreeably complimentary account of ‘white’ culture as an object of aspiration and desire, a cause for understandable envy. There is no space to think about racism or the exclusions faced by migrants in such a story, because all of that is the cause of suffocation. Elements of this account remain in other contemporary discussions of forced marriage, but, increasingly, this is intertwined with a commentary on multiculturalism and the responsibilities of minority communities. It is in this context that Baroness Warsi, an Asian Muslim from Yorkshire who has been elevated to the House of Lords and the Conservative front-bench under David Cameron’s leadership, has called for such marriages to be treated as crimes to send a clear signal that they are intolerable. (Express, 11 March 2008)
The performance of such a statement by a high-profile right-wing Asian Muslim woman serves to restate one element of the ongoing case against multiculturalism – tolerance is not a social virtue in the face of practices that are intolerable. The use of ‘intolerable’ works to summon up this wider debate about the limits of tolerance and the politics of race that has been expressed through this formulation. Warsi goes on to expand her comment, ‘As a society we draw a line in the sand,’ she said. Baroness Warsi continued: ‘This is not a culturally sensitive issue, this is an abhorrent act which we must stand together on ...’ (Express, 11 March 2008)
A repeated theme in the popular demonisation of multiculturalism has been the suggestion that the good-natured tolerance of host societies has been abused and stretched to its limits by migrants and minorities who are addicted to backward and barbaric customs and who have no appreciation or respect for the values of liberal democracy. The line in the sand is the not-so-coded bottom-line beyond which the majority cannot be pushed, the place where spurious claims of cultural sensitivity no longer hold sway. This is a reassertion of the claims of majority values as the glue that can hold us together. Such assertions of the need for shared majority values to shape understandings of social responsibility have come from both major political parties in Britain and have served as both the respectable compromise that allows diversity within the limits of shared key values and an element of more strident protests against the impact of multiculturalism. This doubleness allows Warsi and others to express their concern that alien practices are overwhelming common values of decency and to remain within the boundaries of respectable politics, while others, with less invested in electoral consequences, can resurrect the more explicitly racist rhetoric of being swamped or invaded. The appeal to majority values – even the consensual appeal to that ‘which we must
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stand together on’ – becomes another coded reference to popular fears that the majority is under attack by migrant intrusion. The comment page that follows the web version of this article demonstrates how easily these connections are made. One comment combines racist venom with the observation that political parties pretend concern for the welfare of minority women only when they wish to distract attention from other issues, ‘You really are as stupid as you look and act ? Labour always bring up a touchy subject to take the heat of the real issue? they really dont give a monkeys about “forced marriages “ If you choose to follow 4th Century ideology then tough ! put up with it ! You chose the hard way ! stop whinging (muslim women) put up with it! MORE FOOL YOU – Posted by: BratislavaUK’
Another contribution blames the supposed multiculturalism that tolerates some cultural practices but not others, before asserting that immigration is the real issue for all parties. ‘WHY BOTHER 11.03.08, 4:59 pm If it’s ok to pay for his four wives then a Muslim man wouldn’t expect any opposition to him forcing his daughter into marriage. Why does the gov. think it can cherry pick which Muslim customs to turn a blind eye to. Wake up you labour scum ,they are living in and off Britain and should be forced to comply with British law. You could always prevent the entry of these unwanted husbands into our country, which let’s face it ,is the whole object of the excercise. Entry to benefit Britain and the gravy train that runs parallel to the Westminster one. – Posted by: thewarlord’
None of the comments engage with debates about forced marriage or express any concern for women suffering forced marriage. Another recognises the importance of the speaker’s identity – because this is seen to silence lobbyists for multiculturalism. Again this contribution argues that immigration is at the heart of this problem. if this statement had been made by anyone other than a muslim woman the bbc would have been crying racist and inflicting that awful chakrabati woman on us to tell us its there cultural right to marry their children (for that is what they are,children)of to their cousins,uncles,friends etc.in exchange for a dowrie
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World they get a teenage wife and a fistful of visas and benefit claim forms. if the new husband and his extended family were refused entry to the uk i think this practice might disappear overnight – Posted by: sexpistol’
Allowing for the strong possibility that such contributions are co-ordinated by groups who have an explicit interest in whipping up racism and transforming all political issues into debates about the dangers of immigration, it is still noteworthy that the debate about forced marriages can be framed as a problem of illegal immigration so easily. It is likely that the racist claims of commentators will be comprehended by readers immediately, and that the implicit message of the respectable call to stand together will be understood to be that we are standing together against alien practices and aliens who push us too far. Earlier David Cameron, young leader of the Conservative Party, had described the practice of forced marriage as ‘bizarre and unacceptable’ (Express, 21 February 2008). Cameron has worked hard to ‘detoxify’ his party, who still suffer from the negative legacy of Thatcherism. As a result, he has reinstated a ‘caring conservatism’, characterised by green sensibilities, a concern for social cohesion and a move away from racism, homophobia and other attitudes that had been associated with the ‘nasty party’, as the conservatives had been regarded previously. The appointment of Baroness Warsi to a frontbench position is itself a demonstration of this desire to alter the public image and audience of the party. However, Cameron, too, makes a decision to intervene in this debate in order to make a point about border control, He will commit a future Conservative government to a series of measures to tackle the problem - include a requirement that both would-be brides and grooms coming to Britain to get married and their partners in the UK are at least 21. British nationals going abroad to marry would have to register in the UK beforehand if they want their marriage to be recognised for immigration purposes.’ (Express, 21 February 2008)
Cameron’s proposals clearly borrow from other initiatives in Europe, such as the Danish requirement that both parties in a transnational marriage must be at least twenty-four years old. His suggestions also fall within the range of responses that Phillips and Dustin characterise as ineffective because discriminatory and therefore unlikely to foster co-operation among minority communities. After this article, the comment board included a discussion of whether Cameron was stealing policy from the BNP (British National Party – a far right party) and whether it was only the BNP who were willing to ‘stand up’ to such unacceptable practices. Anonymous comment boards in response to British media often display this descent into racism and it is impossible to judge the extent to which such discussion reflects more general opinion in Britain. However, in both of these examples
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comment-makers understand immediately that this is a story about immigration and the politics of race. The issue of forced marriage is so heavily racialised in popular (and policy) understanding that all interventions in this debate can be interpreted as statements about racial politics. Attempts by mainstream parties to demonstrate their commitment to upholding the supposed values of the majority in the most careful and coded of manners become replayed as weak echoes of the real resistance of racist parties. The assertion of the values of rights is understood as a comment on the need to safeguard national borders. Groups that adhere to alien practices threaten to corrupt the internal coherence of the nation – more than a threat to the rights of minority women, here forced marriage is redrawn as a threat to vulnerable white Britain. Intimately linked to this sense of purported threat is the much asserted foreignness of the practice. There are two levels to this. Firstly, the alleged adherence to forced marriage is taken as an indication of the failure of some communities to integrate, or even to adapt to their new homes. The fact that such homes are often far from new, and that forced marriage is alleged to take place not only among new migrants, only increases the force of condemnation. Continuing such practices is an indication that some people do not wish to stop being foreign, despite having opportunities to lose this hated status. Choosing not to integrate is regarded as a worse crime than failing to integrate. The allegation of forced marriage dramatises this refusal for public consumption. The other important sense of foreignness in accounts of forced marriage is the constant reference to overseas contacts. Although a marriage may be forced between any two parties, much of the public debate has assumed that British or British-based women are forced to marry overseas. Phillips and Dustin identify this trend as continuing in policy initiatives. They write that, Although A Choice by Right [government report examining the issue of forced marriage] had not presented forced marriage as an exclusively transcontinental affair, subsequent initiatives have largely focused on what is known as ‘the overseas dimension’. Two months after publication of the report, the Home Office and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) announced a joint action plan to ‘tackle the overseas dimension of forced marriage (Phillips and Dustin, 2004, 535)
Phillips and Dustin describe the concrete activity that has taken place through this initiative, including a community relations desk in the FCO’s consular division, collation of statistics, the strengthening of links with police forces overseas, and provision for female victims of forced marriage to be seen by trained female members of staff in overseas consulates (Phillips and Dustin, 2004, 535). These measures, all laudable, mirror other developments in policing and security. Over a period of time, with escalating intensity and political patronage with the advent of the War on Terror, transnational co-operation in key aspects of security practice has become a marker of participation in the civilised world. In
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relation to forced marriage, the focus on overseas marriage helps to transform the issue into one of border control. As Phillips and Dustin comment, such a focus implies that ‘families only set up these marriages in order to facilitate access to the UK’ (Phillips and Dustin, 2004, 545). Inevitably, such presuppositions lead to a discriminatory focus on migrant communities – it is marriages with overseas partners that are subject to scrutiny and suspicion and spouses from places of continuing migration that are likely to be questioned. This link to larger antiimmigration agendas compromises the effectiveness of initiatives against forced marriage, making it less likely that minority communities will be willing to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. It also confirms suspicions that even longsettled communities continue to be regarded as problematic immigrants (Wilson, 2007). Trafficked Women and the Impossible Test of Consent The figure of the trafficked woman forced into sexwork is unlike the representation of the victim of forced marriage in that one is regarded as absolutely foreign and with an uncertain agency in her own migration while the other is potentially British (if able to take up the freedoms of white girls) but also associated with a stigmatised minority group. Both tropes place women as the embodiment and carrier of dangerous foreign practices even as it is confirmed that it is women who suffer. In the UK, debates about the status of trafficked women have gained publicity in relation to changes in the legal framework around prostitution. Although there is a recognition that undocumented migrants are vulnerable to the exploitation of forced labour more generally (Commission on Vulnerable Employment, 2008), it is the indignity of sexwork that has captured public imagination. Television serials have focused on the underworld existence of the trafficked sexworker. Wellpublicised raids on massage parlours and brothels have highlighted the nationality and questionable immigration status of the women arrested (‘Sex slaves’ rescued in massage parlour raid, Telegraph, 1/10/2005). Anti-prostitution campaigners have publicised the horror of trafficked women who have been raped and then sold into prostitution, in order to influence wider debates about the future legal framework for sexwork (Cowling, 2008). As a result the phrase ‘trafficking’ has taken on a sexualised connotation in popular usage and far older terms, such as the ‘white slave trade’ (ignoring that many of those trafficked are not white), have returned to public debate. Jo Goodey summarises the misapprehension in popular debate about the ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ of the trafficked woman, The trafficked woman can be cast as innocent victim of evil transnational forces – but only if she has not ‘consented’ to enter prostitution, consent to work as a prostitute, as the UN protocol stipulates, is not an issue as women will not have consented to the ‘slave-like’ conditions under which they are held at their
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destination, nor will they have consented to the abuse they may incur en route. (Goodey, 2003, 420)
The debate about trafficked women returns all too easily to a discussion of innocent virgins or guilty whores – in popular debate, knowingly entering prostitution wipes out any concern for the treatment and welfare of migrant women. In practice, this uncertainty about who, in fact, is the offender and who is the victim has hampered initiatives against traffickers. Despite the manner of their entry, trafficked women have not been recognised as legitimate asylum-seekers. The POPPY project, who support women trafficked into prostitution, found that all of their clients who claimed asylum were refused, although 80% then went on to win their cases at appeal if supported by the project (Richards et al., 2006). One outcome of this policy is that potential witnesses against traffickers face deportation and are unlikely to testify. The sanctuary provided by a grant of asylum is critical for the protection of victims of trafficking for two reasons. First, it prevents the risk of repeat trafficking by not returning the victim to her country of origin. Second, it affords her the opportunity for a period of security, recovery and rehabilitation in the UK. This in turn enables her to become involved as a witness in criminal proceedings, and may make it more likely that she will be prepared to provide evidence against her traffickers. (Richards et al., 2006, 6)
The POPPY Project go on to explain the consequences of this approach, not least in the confusion felt by trafficked women. They argue that there is a central contradiction in viewing trafficked women as both ‘victims and potential witnesses’ and as committers of ‘immigration offences’ (Richards et al., 2006, 21). In relation to both interventions against forced marriage and attempts to save women trafficked into sexwork, the common theme is the return to issues of border control. Both issues embody particular fears about insecure borders – with overlapping anxieties about state sovereignty and cultural integrity combining to inform official responses. However, whereas forced marriage has been represented as an indication of the continuing threat to national integrity that resides within settled migrant communities, concerns about the exploitation of trafficked women seep into a different set of fears about leaky borders. Although the two issues have been connected indirectly in the formulation of UK government announcements and the wish to demonstrate an authoritarian kick against the exploitation of women, in wider debates trafficking has tended to be linked to a wider concern with transnational movement. Jo Goodey warns against this too easy association between trafficking and security. The connections that are readily made between migration, crime and security do not, on closer examination, provide a complete picture of the migration–crime experience. In particular, recent emphasis on the role played by (transnational)
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World organized crime (TOC) in human smuggling/trafficking has, arguably, overplayed the importance of organized crime and, in doing so, has allowed governments to legitimate their security efforts against this ‘new’ threat. (Goodey, 2003, 418)
Goodey is speaking generally of the move towards securitisation and the role played by particular depictions of people trafficking in legitimising the augmentation of state powers. However, the British instances discussed here fit this model very well. Jacqui Smith attempted as Home Secretary to revitalise a flagging interest in authoritarian state initiatives, with a well-planned media campaign that included a week of saturation coverage of new prostitution laws and laws against forced marriage (for an example, see Bindel, 2008). This comes on the back of an ongoing campaign to keep the fear of terrorism alive in a somewhat sceptical British public. It may be that Smith and others have reached the understandable conclusion that fears of immigration are a more reliable motivator of support for state authoritarianism than fears of terrorism. If so, this emphasis is echoed in the political responses of other nations, particularly in Europe. Friesendorf outlines the place that anti-trafficking initiatives occupy in a wider policy context. Actors’ motivations to ‘fight’ trafficking varies. Governments are primarily concerned about links between human trafficking and other forms of crime, such as money laundering, drug trafficking, the illegal weapons trade, and document forgery, as well as the risk of profits from human trafficking financing terrorist activities. These fears are exacerbated, particularly in wealthy countries, by concerns about illegal migration. (Friesendorf, 2007, 382)
In contrast to this, NGOs and campaigning groups argue that trafficking is a human rights violation and, Friesendorf argues controversially, ‘International organizations play a prominent role in anti-trafficking not least because of significant funding opportunities’ (382). He concludes his list of actors and factors with the point, moral outrage about sexual slavery and/or prostitution has also contributed to pushing human trafficking onto the security agenda. (Friesendorf, 2007, 382)
This appears to be the framework in which the UK has introduced the criminal offence of purchasing sex from a trafficked woman forced into sexwork – an offence that reinstates the division between the innocent and the guilty prostitute and which introduces a law that appears almost impossible to enforce. Allan Gibson, Head of the Metropolitan Police’s Human Trafficking Unit, has stated in evidence to the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, that it was very difficult even for police to estimate the numbers of women trafficked into the UK for prostitution or precisely which ones were working against their will. (Telegraph, 10 December 2008)
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The distinction between innocent and guilty prostitutes continues to render this law unworkable. Others view the overall proposals as increasing the potential dangers faced by prostitutes, without offering effective counter-measures that lessen sexual exploitation (Cowling, 2008). Instead, we see a resurrection of the figure of the dangerous foreign sexworker – this time as an embodiment of the violent exploitation of prostitution and as a confirmation that these luckless creatures are not part of the nation. If the goal is to persuade the British public that prostitution causes the trafficking of women, then, it seems, the government may also believe that erecting further barriers against the movement of undocumented women will end prostitution. Despite the apparent focus on the ‘demand side’, there is an implication that, once again, everything comes down to effective and unyielding border control. Trafficking represents a crisis because it reveals the fictionality of this central test of state sovereignty and power. The combination of this border anxiety and the complicated outrage about sexual slavery (as opposed to other forms of contemporary slavery or the dangers of sexwork that is not the result of trafficking) shows a particular set of anxieties on the part of a government that wishes to demonstrate both authoritarian intent and liberal values (of a sort). Petersen argues that the representation of the ‘Baltic’ sexworker similarly reveals particular political anxieties for Denmark. Overall Petersen argues that there is a tension between Danish commitments to extending co-operation with Baltic neighbours and defending its borders against the dangerous in-flow of foreign prostitutes, Here also the trafficked woman is central to public imagination, the debate over Baltic prostitution evolves around a construction of the prostituted subject as both gendered and ‘Baltic’. The gendered subject is constructed through a discussion of whether prostitution is forced or voluntary and whether the woman in question is responsible or a victim. The ‘Baltic’ element of this construction situates the subject within a particular symbolic geography and it provides a link to the realm of foreign policy. (Petersen, 2001, 214)
Petersen describes the construction of a particular public mythology of ‘Baltic’ prostitution in Denmark, and highlights the link between the media focus on this issue and wider fears of drug-trafficking and ‘Russian’ organised crime. In this context, the term ‘Baltic’ signals the particular boundary fears of the Danish state in this moment, at once eager to consolidate the potential benefits of greater co-operation with Baltic neighbours and simultaneously anxious that a shadow globalisation may overrun its borders. However this also represents an attempt to bolster increasingly fragile borders against the perceived threats of shadow globalisation, corrosive cultural difference and terrorist outrage. That these disparate folk demons should become so intertwined in both policy and popular representation is itself an indication of the particularity of this era of securitisation.
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Immigration Control as Determinant of All State Legitimacy In some accounts, immigration control retains its central role in the armoury of the state that wishes to demonstrate authority precisely because borders have become so uncontrollable. Although debate has moved on to reach the conclusion that nation-states do not crumble away in the face of global integration, there is also some agreement that previous markers of state sovereignty have undergone significant change, Assertive control of state borders, accompanied by much public fanfare, appears to have become an important demonstration of sovereignty. The transformation of initiatives against sexual exploitation into yet further reiterations of this border authority may be an attempt to inject additional authority into both projects. The unquestionable moral imperative to combat sexual slavery gives legitimacy to (yet another) augmentation of immigration control. The popular authoritarianism of anti-immigration initiatives enables the pursuit of policies against women’s exploitation, policies that may not garner a great deal of popular interest or support without the mobilising pull of xeno-racism. The wider context of War on Terror rhetoric gives credence to government initiatives against ‘foreign’ practices of sexual exploitation and allows an integration into the (more sexy and monied) field of security. All round, strident reassertions of the benefits of ‘our’ values and the requirement that migrants and minorities accommodate themselves to the ways of the majority are resurrected in the name of security, because the internal dissonance represented by the alien practices of foreign cultures threatens ‘our’ values, and in turn, undermines the basis of ‘our’ moral and political authority in local and international arenas. In the face of this need for a multi-level reassertion of authority, it does not seem to matter if the muchpublicised initiatives are ineffectual, poorly conceived or out of touch with the immediate concerns of those most affected. In the global battle of good and evil, western values confirm their status as ‘good’ – and the antipathy of many western citizens to migrants and foreigners is justified as no more than good moral sense. War on Terror and Racialising IR The War on Terror was heralded as a defence of western values but not on ethnic grounds. Much of the presentation by key players in the early days following 9/11 stressed the decidedly non-racial nature of the conflict (see Croft, 2006). This concerted disavowal of racism could be regarded as a central element of the public discourse of the War on Terror. Although much of the political controversy within national spaces has centred around the dangers represented by ethnic diversity in a time of terrorism, the over-arching narrative of the conflict has presented terrorism as an attack on multiculturalism and co-existence. The ability to tolerate and even celebrate diversity is presented as one of ‘our’ values. Such a claim greatly complicates the process of establishing a new racial enemy, because familiar methods of creating and consolidating racial mythologies must be framed
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as a defence of multicultural living. However, the pursuit of a series of highly racialised military campaigns that mobilise popular support through reference to the dangerous culture and values of the enemy (however often it is declared that the enemy is not Islam) and are conducted through the processes of dehumanisation familiar from other wars of occupation has created another version of the ‘racism without racism’ that Lentin and McVeigh identify as a new technique of the racial state. Much of this volume analyses the manner in which the components of this technique are translated to local contexts. In some instances, this includes explicit reference to a global context of conflict. More often, in the manner of legitimising all state interventions as aspects of an immigration control that seeks to exclude those who cannot or will not adhere to ‘civilised’ values, the chapters here describe how ideas of the uncivilised or of those with problematic or lesser values operate in particular examples of exclusion and demonisation. Some of the debates here about the relationship between values and ethnicity may appear parochial to some readers. In Europe there has been a period of intensive activity relating to such issues as national identity and culture, the apparent threat of alternative allegiances and belief systems and the impact of these differences on such diverse matters as the status of women, adherence to law and order and the cohesion of disadvantaged neighbourhoods. However, this range of concerns about the coherence of national communities in the face of (in fact quite longstanding) ethnic diversity reflects a particular moment in European political debate. Elsewhere similar issues have taken on their own local political colour (see Madan, 2009; Lindow and Perry, 2008). This volume does not attempt to compile a comprehensive overview of such developments across locations. However, each contribution seeks to use a particular case-study to suggest some transferable lessons for analysis of a world where the imputation of certain values to certain groups has become a theme of much local and global political life. This volume was being compiled as one section of the US population attempted to construct its own particular version of post-racial politics, while another struggled to defend racialised divisions using the language of racial equality. The presidential candidature of Barack Obama played out the question of ethnicity and values in a manner that linked debates about community cohesion at a local level and the possibility of diplomacy internationally. In popular debate, there has been an understandable and loudly proclaimed desire to view this event as the confirmation of our resolutely post-racial era. The ascent of Obama provided an opportunity for the discomfiture of anti-racism to be replaced by an insistently deracialised public rhetoric in which hope replaced any revisiting of long-held grievances about social and economic injustices. Some of the contributors in this volume identify a similar optimism and will to overcome the barriers of racism through the force of concerted good behaviour. However, at the same time, the accounts here of how racialised communities respond to demonisation and articulate alternative visions of values and human worth also confirm that the systematic disadvantage and everyday disrespect of old-fashioned racism persists in many locations. The challenge is to retain a critical
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perspective on racialised disadvantage while appreciating the impact of discourses of ethics, values and morality on the politics of race in many places. An Ethical Vision for Studying Race and Ethnicity This volume begins with a piece by Howard Winant arguing for the continuing need for an ethical vision for race and ethnic studies. Winant argues that we have been living through a crisis of racial meaning and that this presents a challenge for ‘racial pedagogy at the start of the 21st century’. He describes a world where the impact of anti-racist movements, patterns of globalisation with their accompanying flows of people, capital and information and the legacy of colonialism reshape racialised discourse. However, despite this tumultous backdrop, Winant argues for a focus on the matter of education and how race is discussed and taught. He explains the forces that have remade race and ethnic studies in recent years, including the tension between the global connectedness of a world where diaspora consciousness and critiques of contemporary imperialism compete with more localised conceptions of racial justice. Inevitably, these tensions feed into what Winant calls ‘the racial curriculum’, these shifts in social and political structures influence a debate about what the focus of investigation should be. Overall, Winant asserts the continuing need for a scholarship of conscience in relation to racism. Although there may be inevitable debates about the proper focus of study and the impact of wider social changes, it is important to defend the belief that some forms of knowledge are important as part as a larger project in pursuit of social justice. Parminder Bhachu suggests something similar to this, although she couches her analysis in different terms. For Bhachu, the project is to articulate and give space to the range and innovation of diaspora cultural production. In the face of limiting and sometimes demeaning representations of what diasporics can do or be, Bhachu describes the importance of creative interventions that extend dominant frames and both clear space for new kinds of articulation and show that racialised groups can show imagination and innovation in the expression of their identities, regardless of the narrowness of dominant accounts of their communities. Bhachu argues, forcefully, that a scholarship that does not extend what can be said and thought, that does not, in the manner of the cultural producers that she analyses have ‘an innovative edge ... not doing what has already been done before’, has little social value. In common with Winant, Bhachu also argues that scholars who study ethnic identities and relations or contemporary racisms continue to have a responsibility to produce accessible work that can change public perceptions. Otherwise, as she says succinctly, ‘you should just shut up’. Ronit Lentin argues that migrant women’s networks in Ireland represent a new articulation of ethnicity that operates through transnational and diasporic frames of reference. At the same time, she argues that Irish state racism has assumed gendered forms and that through this, migrant women have come to be hailed and persecuted as problematic mothers. Lentin is identifying the particular conjunction
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that arises between a reinvigorated state racism that mobilises popular support by adopting vigorously exclusionary tactics and the unlikely dialogue between such a state formation and the emerging networks of migrant women that at once build solidarity within and beyond Ireland and act as interlocutors to a state attempting to demonstrate mastery of both acceptable diversity and dangerous migrants. The piece argues that Ireland’s rapid economic growth through recent decades has led to an adoption of state strategies that confirm Ireland’s status as a racial state, one where the racialised categorisation of useful migrants, dangerous aliens and unwanted non-citizens is central to the exercise of state power. For Lentin, this is an indication of how racism can be absorbed into the workings of the liberal state. In a continuation of a long-standing demonisation of (some) mothers, the Republic of Ireland has deemed ‘non-national’ mothers as enemies of the state – no longer examples of the ethical care that human beings can offer to each other and instead regarded as producers of corrosive aliens who undermine the nation and its internal coherence. Migrant networks that work within state frameworks tread a difficult path between confirming a state machinery that divides migrants into good social assets and bad unwanted aliens and being able to challenge state racism through consolidating the power of their own networks. Abel Ugba also considers the emergence of new articulations of ethnic identity in Ireland, with a focus on Pentecostal churches and their role in African migrant communities. Ugba suggests that ‘by means of them African immigrants are making distinctive marks on Ireland’s socio-cultural landscape and inviting the majority society to acknowledge, cherish and debate ‘difference’. Ugba goes on to argue that these religious organisations also take a central role in linking African migrants to each other and to other groups and that the beliefs that shape Pentecostalism offer a particular repertoire of cultural values through which African migrants articulate their notions of self, of others and of society. This is, Ugba argues, in direct challenge to the dominant portrayal of Africans in Irish society. Instead of an account of ethnic belonging based on blood or land, Pentecostalism provides a framework to express self and belonging on the basis of values. This is occurring alongside an increase in levels of participation across religious groups, including mainstream Christian churches. Ugba argues, however, that the ‘most innovative and dramatic changes on Ireland’s socio-religious landscape in recent years is not the participation of immigrants in mainline churches but the birth and spread of immigrant-led religious groups’. He goes on to explain that Pentecostalism offers a mode of self-understanding that can challenge the demeaning and racist representation of Africans in Irish society. In opposition to the popular discourse that presents Africans as socially marginalised economic migrants, Pentecostal African migrants regard themselves as ‘agents of religious and social change’, sent to Ireland on a divine mission to re-sacralise an Irish society that has fallen into moral decay. The expression of religious identity serves as an ethical challenge to the lived popular values of the nation and a refusal to be contained in the racialised terms of the reference of the state.
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Robbie McVeigh analyses new waves of state attacks on gypsy communities across Europe and argues that these demonstrate the emergence of ‘novel forms of racism’. Both McVeigh and Lentin suggest that we are entering a phase where states adopt tactics of ‘racism without racism’, issuing statements of moral outrage against racism while developing increasingly draconian techniques of racialised exclusion and discrimination in state practices. At the same time, McVeigh argues, the interventions of state racism are presented as ‘being in the interests of the racialized’. This is linked to what McVeigh terms ‘ethnicity denial’, a process by which there is an official denial that some groups are constituted by ethnicity and, therefore, an assertion that such groups cannot be victims of racism. In these circumstances where states are developing novel forms of exclusionary racism, the issue of what ethnicity is, how it is defined and who can claim its label all become urgent questions in the formulation of anti-racist resistance. McVeigh argues that this can be seen in the continuing consequences of the denial of gypsy experiences of genocide, a denial that consolidates contemporary anti-gypsyism by reasserting that these people are not an ethnic community and therefore they cannot face antipathy on the grounds of ethnicity. The piece goes on to describe recent instances of this formulation in which explicitly racist anti-gypsy propoganda is defended as arising in response to the ethical failings of gypsies not their ethnic identity. This tactic has wider implications for all those seeking to combat racism, because it both reinstates the fiction that racism is an understandable and legitimate response based on ethical judgement and it disallows the claim of collective identity that can offer a rallying point against racist persecution. Carlos Sandoval-Garcia writes about La Carpio, an area of Costa Rica that embodies a range of social fears. This is a space of high unemployment and low incomes, regarded as dangerous home to crime and migrants, particularly to the much hated group, Nicaraguans. As Sandoval-Garcia writes, ‘the criminalisation of La Carpio, combined with its association with the immigrant population, has allowed words such as “migrant,” “Nica,” and “criminal” to become interchangeable’. This, the piece argues, is the space of abjection – where Costa Rican society can expel the unclean matter that it deems to be ‘not us’. This symbolism is increased by the location of a garbage dump at the entrance to the neighbourhood and plans to locate a water treatment plant nearby. The dirt and material excess of the city become associated with the poor and racialised community that inhabits this marginal site. This serves to confirm again that the urban segregation that is ‘the most apparent material reality through which stigmatisation occurs’. This stigmatisation translates into the everyday experience of residents, so that respondents describe their sense of shame at belonging to La Carpio and their reluctance to reveal where they live. However, others tell of how they have overcome this shame that is projected onto to them from all corners, and instead have come to view themselves as achieving autonomy, family and survival through affirmation of an ethical grounding that refuses the terms of their exclusion.
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John Gabriel and Jennifer Harding also describe the manner in which a stigmatised group seek to offer an alternative set of values. Their piece examines the life histories of a diverse group of refugees who were interviewed in London as part of a project designed to document the ‘positive’ contribution of refugee communities to the city. Gabriel and Harding identify the shortcomings of such an approach, including the reliance on positive representations as a counter to racism and the potential to reduce all migrants to ‘a shared set of virtuous characteristics’. In response to these issues, project participants developed an understanding of ‘contribution’ that referred to ‘both ‘achievement’, which inferred high status and recognition, and ‘participation’, which was worthy but low status’. In this piece, the researchers interrogate these concepts and their meaning in the lives of the respondents. They found that, perhaps inevitably, refugees were influenced by public debates about their ‘worth’ and included descriptions of mainstream ‘success’ such as qualifications and high status employment as well as recounting the sacrifices that they had made to ensure that their children had access to routes of mainstream success. However, alongside this apparent acceptance of the terms of mainstream concepts of worth, there is also a critique of inequality and injustice, including the injustices faced as a refugee. Respondents refer to wider sets of values that link their experiences in different locations and narrate a continuity of values between resisting oppression in their homelands and forging alliances as refugees in London. Gabriel and Harding explain that, far from being simply rebuttals of media and popular demonisation of refugees, the ‘transcripts present a more complex relationship to notions of ‘achievement’, ‘contribution’ and ‘virtue’. The accounts that arise celebrate a range of everyday survivals and achievements that must be understood in the context of family and community ties and a refusal of the limits implied by the category of ‘refugee’. Gabriel and Harding analyse this material to argue that proposals to enhance ‘community cohesion’ which assume that all will participate in a set of shared values and culture that is defined by the majority are not helpful. Instead of seeking to show that refugees are really ‘good’, our collective well-being may be better served by learning to appreciate the particular interpretations of ‘right’ that emerge through experience and social interaction. In his chapter, Max Farrar extends the debate about ethnicity and values to address some urgent questions of our time. He links recent concerns about the rise of Islamism (used in his piece as a short-hand for ‘that version of Islam which adopts an explicitly political agenda and espouses violence as its strategy for achieving power’). He proposes that instances of urban violence ranging from ‘riot’ to ‘terrorism’ should be understood as ‘violent urban protest’, not in order to detract from the seriousness of violence but in order to place such violence in historical context. Farrar outlines a history of recent violent urban protest in Britain and argues that the challenge is to uncover the ‘proto-politics’ that informs these events. Importantly, he argues for a distinction between terms such as ‘uprising’, which imply a conscious politics and programme, and ‘violent protest’, which can encompass both an embryonic political impulse and a decided refusal
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of the terms of reason or mainstream political engagement in favour of violence. Farrar argues that we must understand the long history of valorising political violence in Western political discourse if we are to make sense of contemporary urban violence, including acts of terrorism, and, in fact, this resort to violence marks a continuity between the ethical framing of Islamism and earlier modes of revolutionary thought. Overall, the volume demonstrates, again, the adaptability of racism. However, at the same time, the contributors to this volume consider the extent to which marginalised communities also engage in processes of attributing ethical value to the actions of themselves and others and the social consequences of these attributions. The question of what it is to be good continues to animate social activity – and although there are many interpretations in play, the suggestion that the world is divided into more and less deserving people who behave in differing ways continues to inform both state policies and everyday life. The chapters that follow consider the implications of this and whether there may, indeed, be other ways of living. References Appiah, Anthony (2004) The Ethics of Identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Appiah, Kwame Anthony (2006) Cosmopolitanism, Ethics in a World of Strangers, London, Allen Lane. Asari, Eva-Maria, Halikiopoulou, Daphne and Mock, Steven (2008) ‘British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 14:1, 1–28. Baldauf, Scott (2008) ‘Ethnic Violence: Why Kenya is not another Rwanda’, Christian Science Monitor 2/1/08. Bannister, Jon, Fyfe, Nick and Kearns, Ade (2006) ‘Respectable or respectful? (In)civility and the city’, Urban Studies, 43:5, 919–937. Beck, Ulrich, Giddens, Anthony and Lash, Scott (1994) Reflexive Modernization, Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge, Polity Press. Benhabib, Seyla (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Benhabib, Seyla (2004) The Rights of Others, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bertossi, Christophe (2007) French and British Models of Integration, Public Philosophies, Policies and State Institutions, COMPAS ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 46, University of Oxford, 2007. Bindel, Julie (2008) ‘Jacqui Smith: ‘We need men to think twice about paying for sex’, The Guardian, 20 November 2008.
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Bourdieu, Pierre and Wacquant, Loic (1999) ‘On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason’, Theory, Culture and Society, 16/1, pp. 41–58. Brubaker, Rogers (2004) Ethnicity without Groups, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Chowdhry, Geeta and Nair, Sheila (2004) Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations, New York, Routledge. Coakley, John (2003) The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, London, Routledge. Commission on Vulnerable Employment (2005) Hard Work, Hidden Lives, London, Commission on Vulnerable Employment. Croft, Stuart (2006) Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Croft, Stuart (2007) ‘British Jihadis and the British War on Terror’, Defence Studies, vol. 7, issue 3, pp. 317–337. Eatwell, Roger (2006) ‘Community cohesion and cumulative extremism in contemporary Britain’, The Political Quarterly, vol 77, no. 2 April–June 2006. Eisenstein, Zillah (2007) Sexual Decoys: Gender, Race and War in Imperial Democracy, London, Zed Books. Eze, Emmanuel C. (2001) Achieving our Humanity, New York, Routledge. Fekete, Liz (2006) ‘Enlightened Fundamentalism? Immigration, Feminism and the Right’, Race and Class, vol. 48, no. 1. Flint, J, and De Waal, A. (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War, London, Zed Books. Friesendorf, Cornelius (2007) ‘Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts against human trafficking in Europe’, Security Dialogue, 38(3), pp. 379–402. Goodey, Jo (2003) ‘Migration, crime and victimhood: Responses to sex trafficking in the EU’, Punishment and Society, 5(4), pp. 415–431. Gove, Michael (2006) Celsius 7/7, London, Phoenix. Hastings, Adrian (1997) The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Inglis, Tom, Mach, Zdislaw and Mazanek, Rafal (2000) Religion and Politics: East–West Contrasts from Contemporary Europe, Dublin, UCD Press. Jenkins, Richard (2008) Rethinking Ethnicity, London, Sage. Jurgensmeyer, Mark (1993) The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State, Berkeley, University of California Press. Kuo, Kelly Chien-Hui (2003) ‘A euphoria of transcultural hybridity: Is multiculturalism possible?’, Postcolonial Studies, 6:2, pp. 223–235. Kyambi, S. (2005) Beyond Black and White: Mapping New Immigrant Communities, London, IPPR. Lindow, Megan and Perry, Alex (2008) ‘Anti-Immigrant Terror in South Africa’, Time magazine, 20 May. Madan, Nitin (2009) ‘Anti-Immigrant Song’, Hindustan Times, 17 March 2009.
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McLaren, Peter (2001) Wayward multiculturalists, A reply to Gregor McLennan, Ethnicities, vol. 1(3), pp. 408–420. McLennan, Gregor (2001) Can there be a ‘critical’ multiculturalism?, Ethnicities, vol. 1(3), pp. 389–422. McRobbie, Angela (2007) ‘Top Girl?’, Cultural Studies, vol. 21, no. 4. Modood, Tariq (2007) Multiculturalism, Cambridge, Polity Press. Modood, Tariq and Ahmad, Fauzia (2007) ‘British Muslim Perspectives on Multiculturalism, Theory, Culture and Society’, Theory Culture Society 24; 187. Okin, Susan Moller (1999) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Petersen, Karen Lund (2001) ‘Trafficking in women: The Danish construction of Baltic prostitution’, Co-operation and Conflict 36(2), pp. 213–238. Phillips, Anne and Dustin, Moira (2004) ‘UK initiatives on forced marriage: Regulation, dialogue and exit’, Political Studies vol. 52, pp. 531–551. Phillips, Melanie (2006) Londonistan, How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within, London, Gibson Square. Richards, Sarah, Steel, Mel and Singer, Debora (2006) Hope Betrayed: An Analysis of Women Victims of Trafficking and their Claims for Asylum, London, Poppy Project. Sen, Amartya (2006) Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, New York, Norton Press. ‘Sex slaves’ rescued in massage parlour raid (2005) Telegraph newspaper, 1 October 2005. Sidel, John (2006) Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Summers, Deborah (2009) ‘Brown stands by British jobs for British workers remark’, Guardian 30/1/09. Troebst, Stefan and Daftary, Farjmah (2005) Radical Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Europe, Oxford, Berghahn Books. Wilson, Amrit (2007) ‘The forced marriage debate and the British state’, Race and Class 49(1), pp. 25–38. World Trade Organisation (2008) ‘Lamy warns against protectionism amid financial crisis’, 24 September 2008, www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/ sppl101_e.htm, accessed 13/3/09. Worley, Claire (2005) ‘It’s not about race. It’s about community’: New Labour and ‘community cohesion’, Critical Social Policy, vol. 25, no. 4 pp. 483–496.
Chapter 2
Teaching Race and Racism in the 21st Century: Thematic Considerations Howard Winant
Introduction This is a crucial moment for those of us who teach about race and racism. People, there’s a crisis of racial meaning going on out there. In the classic definition, a crisis is a situation in which ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born.’ Well, that’s the situation in which racial pedagogy finds itself at the start of the 21st century. There is a lot more at stake than just what we teach. What we teach is what people learn, and what they learn is what they know. Higher education curricula, taken as a whole, embody what is known in a given society at a given time. This certainly applies to curricula that deal with the complex subject of race: its history, theoretical and philosophical status, multiple manifestations in socioeconomic, political, and cultural relationships, embodiment in artistic production and in the toils of the human psyche, etc. Race is a big topic. Sociopolitical confusion, uncertainty, and anxiety about such a complex theme will be reflected in curricula focused upon it, and will be fostered in the hearts and minds of those students who seek knowledge about it. Such is the present situation in the academic treatment of race. It’s no secret that much of what is taught about race is outmoded, that ethnic studies departments are often riven by fierce controversies and antagonisms, and that in mainstream disciplinary settings too there is confusion: the postcivil rights era racial ethos has become ‘common sense’; decades of advocacy of ‘colorblindness,’ diversity, and multiculturalism have taken their toll. Space is Previously published in Howard Winant. New Racial Politics: Globalism, Difference, Justice, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. © 2003 Howard Winant. Also in Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society (Institute for Research in African-American Studies, Columbia University, vol. 6, nos. 3–4 (2004). Of course I don’t mean this in the Arnoldian sense in which culture is seen as ‘the best that has been known and thought’ (Arnold, 1921), for what is best and even what is known are subject to continuous contention. But the point that what is taught and learned in university represents the general summa of intellectual life in a given society – including all the debates and controversies being explored – remains valid, it seems to me.
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not available here for a full assessment of the conflicts and uncertainties besetting racial studies today, but it is at least possible to provide a glancing overview of the crisis. In what follows I first discuss the changing meaning and political dynamics of race at the start of the 21st century. Next I take note of the centrality of racial studies in the curriculum. I conclude with some notes, necessarily preliminary and sketchy, towards a new racial studies. The Changing Meaning and Political Dynamics of Race In the post-civil rights period, after decades of political and cultural conflict over the meaning of race and the persistence of structural racism in the US, the outlines of the country’s 21st-century racial crisis are beginning to emerge. New racial formations have developed from the processes of confrontation and accommodation, of conflict and reform that swept across much of the world over the past few decades. Changing racial dynamics are in part the effects of antiracist movements and of the achievement of democratic reform in the latter half of the 20th century. They are linked as well to new patterns of globalization, to the unsteady and unfulfilled postcolonial situation that obtains across the world’s South, and to the tremendous international flows of people, capital, and information around the planet. Here, however, I propose a narrower ‘take’ on the changing meaning of race, focused on what is to be taught and studied about race in the American university during the 21st century. These changes, I argue here, have set off a crisis in racial pedagogy. Generally speaking, the crisis comes from two sources. The first of these proceeds from the politics of post-civil rights era, from what I have called in other work ‘racial hegemony’ (Omi and Winant, 1994). As the US underwent a transition from the fairly explicit white supremacism and racial domination of the pre-civil rights era to the reform-based and incorporative logic of ‘colorblindness,’ diversity, etc. that had become the new racial ‘common sense’ sometime in the 1970s, racial studies had also to confront the newly emergent, hegemonic situation. To be sure, the old issues that had spawned the movement still remained highly salient: discrimination and white privilege, structural and cultural racism, etc. But because reform had occurred, because the incorporation of movement demands (and persons) had taken place, racial studies were beset with a host of new challenges: pedagogical, empirical, and theoretical. Just as fierce debates took place across the country about the supposed ‘declining significance of race,’ so too conflicts engulfed numerous academic departments, both mainstream discipline- and ethnic studies-based, over curricular content. The second source of crisis is linked to globalization. It may be seen in terms of national v. transnational perspectives on race. This debate of course had a long history, stretching back to controversies over slavery, conquest, and colonialism, and touching upon such complex issues as pan-Africanism (and other panethnic
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movements), nationalism, dependency, world-systems theory, and migration. Here I can offer only the most schematic characterization of this complex question. Briefly, the post-WWII world racial scene was shaped jointly by racial reform in the global North and decolonization in the global South, two processes that were themselves highly related. As this dual transition unfolded, racial politics became more global: a sustained period of nationalism linked anti-racist struggles in the US to anticolonial revolution, for example, and ‘internal colonialism’ theories enjoyed a significant vogue. Later, while civil rights reforms marginalized racial radicals in the US, postcolonial regimes also lost favor because they descended into corruption, dictatorship, brutal civil war, and new forms of dependency and neocolonial subordination. Complicating this huge transition in the US was burgeoning immigration to that country after its 1965 immigration reform – which was itself an important and often neglected piece of civil rights legislation. Finally, the ever-expanding quest by the US for global economic power – embodied in NAFTA, the WTO, and other forms of interventionism – began to cast transnational political economic issues in a newly racialized mold. This process reached new heights at the 2001 UN World Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa, where the US did its best to undermine and marginalize demands for global racial justice; new global racial politics have also inflected the Bush administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ and its Iraq intervention in various ways. Advancing globalization tends in general to internationalize the racial curriculum. For example, teaching about various racial diasporae is heightened: African, Chinese, Filipino, Dominican, and others. Even Afrocentrism – which in my view is largely an inchoate and retro effort to revive the black cultural nationalism of the late 1960s – in some measure works to direct greater attention to diasporic issues. At the same time the internationalization of the racial curriculum disturbs and alienates more locally- and nationally-oriented scholars whose commitments to specific racially-defined communities or to equality and justice is focused on domestic US racial conditions. This pattern of divergence and debate isn’t going away; it is driven by social structure itself. The US increasingly throws its weight around in the big world: neo-imperialism is the name of the game. And it does this at a historical moment when its own demographics are more nonwhite, more replete with recent immigrants from the global South, more diasporic in short, than ever before. At the same time domestic racial discontent is rising, as the US tears up its residual commitments to the welfare state, jams its prisons with more and more people of color, and exports poverty and unemployment as much as possible to the ghettos, barrios and reservations. All these tensions and conflicts flow inevitably into the racial curriculum. It seems apparent that these post-WWII racial transformations and upheavals, most centrally the reforms of the post-civil rights era and the onset of the racial ideology of ‘colorblindness,’ have unmoored the higher learning in America, racially speaking, A partial exception to this pattern was the belated but triumphant South African transition to racial democracy, but even this was fraught with difficulty.
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leaving faculty, students, and administrators (even those specializing in this area) uncertain as to what should be taught, and what is to be learned, about race and racism. The significance of race (‘declining’ or increasing?), the interpretation of racial equality (‘colorblind’ or color-conscious?), the institutionalization of racial justice (‘reverse discrimination’ or affirmative action?), and the very categories – black, white, Latino/Hispanic, Asian American, and Native American – employed to classify racial groups have all been called into question over recent decades. The paradigmatic approaches to studying these issues – both in traditional academic disciplines (my main focus here is on the social sciences) and in the widespread interdisciplinary programs that may be grouped under the ‘ethnic studies’ rubric – largely derive from sociopolitical and cultural conditions that have now been superseded, at least in part. Exclusion of critical race-oriented problematics from the curriculum and the disciplinary canons has largely ended, reflecting the transformation of the university setting from an apparatus of racial domination to one of racial incorporation. By the 1980s, many universities and colleges had made watchwords of the terms ‘diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism,’ although the practical meaning of this was debatable: as ‘diversity’ was being celebrated, affirmative action programs were coming under attack and racially-defined minority enrollments were decreasing. Did attention to racial and ethnic studies, whether proceeding from traditional disciplines or from the newer ethnic studies departments and programs, benefit from this new approbation, or was serious academic commitment to these areas of study being rendered symbolic in the newly dawning ‘post-civil rights,’ ‘colorblind’ era? More recently affirmative action has found new defenders, not in the relatively debilitated organizations and thinkers (myself included) who see themselves as carrying forward the movement’s legacy, but in such mainstream and often conservative sectors as large corporations and the military, whose spokespeople have argued that ‘diversity’ and upward mobility for racially-defined minorities are crucial to their organizations’ efforts to maintain market share and loyalty in the ranks. This situation, in which formerly radical democratic demands now serve to undergird elite power, at first seems highly ironic. It calls forth cynicism, and perhaps even mockery, of the movement’s legacy. But hold on there, my friends. When we look more deeply, we can see that every successful social movement realizes its goals by embedding them in the heart of the establishment, the power structure. That is what success means: lodging the arrows of your movement’s demands in the bosom of your antagonist, most often the state but sometimes corporations, cultural elites, or other power-wielding groups. These elites and state administrators generally come to understand that honey works better than vinegar: moderate reform/hegemony are strategically more effective in maintaining consensual rule than intransigence, repression, or domination could ever be (Gramsci, 1971, 182; Winant, 1994). At the same time, there is an implicit contradiction in the success that movements sometimes achieve. What Omi and I characterized as the political ‘trajectory’ of racially-based movements sets in here (Omi and Winant, 1994, 84–88). Achieving
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your goals as a movement involves becoming incorporated: again, within the state, the corporation, etc. Success means that ‘moderate’ versions of movement demands are accepted and institutionalized, while more radical versions (and voices) are marginalized, or worse. Winning counts; winning reforms can mean accomplishing great transformations in patterns of social injustice; it can mean bring the light of democracy to places where only the darkness of dictatorship existed before. But winning is also losing: it means that not only the state and power structure have made concessions, but that the movements that previously opposed them have compromised as well. In the aftermath of intense political conflict, when reforms have become institutionalized and movement opposition has waned, the political ‘trajectory’ reenters a period of abeyance. But during this period, uncertainty, doubt, and anger simmer: in cultural forums, in political organizations, in the ‘hood,’ and in the academy as well. How much did we (or previous generations) accomplish with all our movement blood, sweat, and tears? How much has changed, and how much remains the same? What new issues confront us now, in the age of ‘colorblindness’ and multiculturalism? The Centrality of Racial Studies in the Curriculum Whatever one’s answer to those questions, the evidence remains strong that approaches to teaching race and ethnicity have hewed closely to the political and cultural climate of the times. There has always – always! – been some version of ‘racial and ethnic studies’ in operation on American campuses. At one time there was racial theology; Drs Morton and Agassiz were once prominent racial authorities; Herbert Spencer and E.A. Ross had their day. When racial segregation, quotas on Jews, and immigration restrictions were in place, the predominant view was white supremacist, restrictive, and given to eugenicism. For a long time – let us say until the aftermath of WWII – the study of race was almost entirely a conversation among whites. Only in a few places – notably the HBCs – were racially-defined minorities even present in any significant number. In the mainstream and elite universities, only an occasional scholar, often beleaguered and derided, could make his voice (and it was almost inevitably a male voice) heard. Only in the 1960s, when students brought pressure on the universities to make changes – impelled by shifting demographics, social movements, and political changes at the national and even international levels – did the institutions finally respond. Only then were ethnic studies programs created and some measure of affirmative action instituted in hiring, admissions, etc. And often this came grudgingly and unevenly. Only in the 1970s, when ethnic studies programs were already in place and the problems of racial inequality and ethnic difference widely studied, did the histories, identities, and cultural varieties of the American ‘mosaic’ even begin to be treated with any degree of respect across the curriculum. What has happened in recent years? A notable stasis has developed: a gap may be opening up again, as has certainly occurred in the past. The teaching/learning
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strategies in place today at American institutions of higher learning developed in parallel with the racial and ethnic political and cultural milieux of the 1960s and 1970s. Now, more than three decades later, a new situation confronts this pedagogy, one for which it is unprepared. Such themes as hybridized identities, ethnically- and racially-based experience and ‘role-taking,’ generational shifts in specific groups and communities, global and national patterns of racial/ ethnic stratification, ethnonationalism and ethnoglobality, race/gender/class ‘intersectionality,’ and overlap and antagonism between racially- and ethnicallybased concepts of difference/identity/stratification, a new attentiveness toward ‘whiteness,’ and a resurgent interest in genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing,’ to name just a few (!) of the many issues that confront teaching and learning strategies in this area, seem to call for new investigation and new responses. Ironically, these new challenges are emerging at a moment when movement activity has waned, when ‘diversity’ commitments are under attack, and when new claims of meritocratism, postraciality, and ‘colorblindness’ are being advanced from numerous quarters (usually from the center-right, but sometimes even from the left or from liberal quarters, and sometimes from interventive courts and legislatures). It is no accident that debates over race/ethnicity on campus, conflict over the legacy of the civil rights movement, and discord within ethnic studies departments have become disturbingly familiar phenomena. Towards a New Racial Studies These large themes have been the subjects of a great deal of recent work, including my own (Winant, 2001). It is not my intention to address them all in the context of a single paper. Rather I offer a tentative list of emergent issues in racial studies. This is but a hint of some of the axes of promising new work being developed in ‘new racial studies.’ These are at least some of the issues given us by the new sociopolitical conditions we face in the 21st century. Consider the following themes: Diaspora/globality/migration as racialized processes Here I am thinking of contested borders and citizenships; the racial continuity of the North-South divide, as expressed in debt peonage, unequal exchange etc. Micro-macro racial linkages: Here I mean the zone where the whole comparative/ historical approach to race (the ‘macro’ stuff) meets the whole experience-based, identity/difference dimension of race (the ‘micro’ stuff). Means of communication/media as racial phenomena Here I mean the acceleration of culture contact as both (1) a diasporic (or if you prefer, ‘global’) organizational phenomenon: hip-hop in São Paulo, ‘one nation under a
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groove,’ the globalization of reggae, etc., as well as films, internet connections, etc.; and (2) a means of cultural domination, ‘appropriation,’ delocalization and thus disempowerment and suppression of people’s expressive needs. The legacies of conquest and slavery These can be seen, for example, in labor processes and ideologies, concepts of ‘freedom,’ local/national/global divisions of labor, state form, mobilizational and political capacity, and concepts of personal identity. Race and revolution This is an evident but under-explored connection visible, for example, in the historical legacy of the Haitian revolution; and in parallels between 19th-century decolonization in the Americas and 20th-century decolonization in Africa and Asia. Race and capitalism Here I mean the need for rethinking the world-system’s development as a racially instituted process; even old Karl Marx denounced ‘the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins.’ C.L.R. James’s (1989 [1938]) account of the sugar industry as foundational to industrialism, Du Bois’s (1977 [1935]) analysis of the US Civil War/ Reconstruction as a process of national (and global) realignment, Williams’s (1994 [1944]) work, and the huge contemporary literature on the economics of race need to be reintegrated into the curriculum; Race and democracy: Patterson’s concept of ‘freedom’ is premised on a thorough (though problematic) analysis of slavery (1982); abolitionism was a central factor in actualizing democracy and indeed propelling concepts of popular sovereignty forward (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Some signals of this complex of problems include: Du Bois’s (1935) account (again!) of the US Civil War/Reconstruction as a failed attempt to break the world-historical democratic bottleneck; and the continuing presence of racial dictatorship in the form of structural racism (Feagin, 2000), as evidenced in reparations controversies and lawsuits. In general continuing racial pluralism and the equalization of ‘life-chances’ across racial lines are effective indices of the presence of democracy. Race/gender as co-constitutive in modernity Here I mean sex-based enforcement of racial subjection and its consequences (like hybridization) in colonial and slavery-based settings, and the generalized subjection of women’s bodies in racial oppressions of the most varied types (Stoler, 2002);
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all of it carrying forward in one way or another to the postcolonial, ‘emancipated’ world; as well as sex-based resistance, women’s resistance, from then to now. Whiteness as a central theme What does it mean to think of whiteness as non-normalized? This is still a relatively new and difficult subject. What does it mean to see ‘white’ as a negative category? To experience whiteness as a beleaguered identity? How should we understand ethnicity within whiteness? Are whites a racial group? Is there white subjectivity in the same sense as there is black or Latino subjectivity? Regarding ethnicity When does it trump, and when does it get trumped by, race? Non-racialized subjects/groups are always racializable. Hitler’s goons had to make my dad pull down his pants to check if he was a Jew (my dad became a refugee from his native Vienna, made it to the US, and thus survived the Holocaust), but the fact that the Nazis couldn’t tell who was a Jew just by looking didn’t keep the Volkischer Beobachter from printing a hook-nosed caricature of ‘the Jew’ on every page. The Brits still racialize the Irish when they need to, and so did the Americans in the 19th century. The Bosnian Serbs racialized the Bosnian Muslims, reinterpreting an ostensibly religious distinction racially. The Hutus and Tutsis racialize each other; Jews and Arabs in Israel and Palestine (cousins whose languages and appearances deeply overlap) do the same. That’s going in one direction, from ethnicity to race. Going in the other direction, from race to ethnicity: in the liberal (and some radical) versions of anti-racism, race will become ethnicity, a more benign version of difference, by and by, when the age of sweet tolerance arrives. But in the meantime, what do we do with the persistence of ethnicity within racial categories, as noted above? What do we do when ethnic divisions become quasiracial chasms, as in Rwanda or Srebrenice? A Final Note This chapter is far from a fully worked-out program for the revitalization of the racial curriculum in the contemporary US academy. Adequately to formulate a ‘new racial studies’ pedagogy will require a much more systematic effort than is possible here. What is intended instead is an overview of at least some of the ‘thematic considerations’ (as this chapter’s title puts it) that would be involved in such an endeavor. I hope that this brief sketch will at least contribute to the effort to reinvent the racial curriculum as the 21st century advances. We must build on what we have accomplished thus far, and what our predecessors did in their time. But we cannot rest. Racial oppression is dynamic, ever-changing, adaptable and absorptive. That is what hegemony, racial hegemony, means in the 21st century: the
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ability to incorporate opposition, to neutralize critique, to ‘get beyond’ – and thus preserve – racism. Can we teach this to our students? Can we learn it ourselves? References Arnold, Matthew. ‘Preface,’ in Samuel Johnson, Lives of the Poets. London: Macmillan, 1921. Du Bois, W.E.B. Black Reconstruction: An Essay Toward a History of the Part which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880. New York: Atheneum, 1977 (1935). Feagin, Joe R. Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations. New York: Routledge, 2000. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, 1971. James, C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, 2nd ed. New York: Vintage, 1989 (1938). Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge, 1994. Stoler, Ann Laura. Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994 (1944). Winant, Howard. Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Winant, Howard. The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
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Chapter 3
Diaspora Conversations: Ethics, Ethicality, Work and Life A conversation between Parminder Bhachu and Gargi Bhattacharyya
Parminder Bhachu was born in Tanzania, and raised in Kenya and Uganda. She moved to Britain, South London in particular as a younger teenager. She trained as an anthropologist and held research posts at the Centre for Race and Ethnic Studies, Warwick University and the Institute of Education in London. She has published a series of highly influential books, including Enterprising Women: Ethnicity. Economy and Gender Relations, Twice Migrants: East African Sikh Settlers in Britain and Dangerous Designs: Asian Women Fashion the Diaspora Economies. Parminder has added a consistently innovative voice to debates in the field of diaspora studies, exploring the emergent cultural economies of globalization and migration, the leitmotivs of our times. Her scholarly work highlights the transformative role of multiple migrants as cultural and economic entrepreneurs who are generating the new frontiers of hybrid cultural expressions that are being forged in global markets. Her recent ethnography of globalization examined the cultural and commercial agency of migrant women and their diasporically assertive second generation daughters in London, the border crossing designers, style innovators and creators of new worldly economies. She explores these themes in depth from her own unique perspective of a diasporically-produced, multiply migrant citizen of Europe and the USA, who was born in Africa and is of Indian origins, and is now a highly localized New Englander of Massachusetts having spent half her adult life there, i.e. a border-crossing, melding, blending, responsive-to-the-moment multidisciplinary intellectual. She is a product of five countries located in four continents - Africa, Asia, Europe and now the USA. She was educated in eight schools in four countries by the age of 14. By her mid-30s, she had migrated ten times across both national and international borders. It is this perspective from which she looks at the world. These experiences bring a ‘diasporic’ depth to her scholarly work in a way that many scholars writing about movement, displacement and cultural production from a cultural studies perspective who comment on contemporary cultural products cannot. Their focus is almost entirely on the present and not on the longer term processes that are so critical in defining and determining the shape of contemporary diasporic cultural forms. The latter are as rooted in previous experiences of movement, as they are routed through their current locations of production. Parminder has lived in the multiple sites in which the diaspora cultures
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she writes about have been produced and reproduced and has also examined their historical sources, that is, the roots and routes through which diasporic creative work has been imagined and re-imagined by its cultural agents in previous works. In her recent work, she continues to interrogate these themes further both to increase our understanding of diasporic cultural production, and to develop deeper historical expertise about the impact of movement on the cultural practices of the diaspora. She is also one of a small number of British Asian women to have risen to prominence through the heated debates of the 1980s and the gradual establishment of race and ethnicity as legitimate topics of study in British, European and American contexts. Parminder moved to the United States in 1990 to take up a fellowship at UCLA and from there moved to Clark to take up an interdisciplinary Henry R. Luce Professorship in Cultural Identities and Global Processes, a position she held from 1991–2000. She lives and teaches in Massachusetts, USA, at Clark University but travels to Britain regularly. Her work continues to explore the dynamics and economic and cultural production of diasporic communities. Parminder Bhachu spoke to Gargi Bhattacharyya about her recent work on cultural producers, the context that informed her own intellectual development and the continuing relevance of a cultural politics of ethnic identity. GB: Your most recent work has examined the work of South Asian cultural producers. What is the understanding of ethnic identity that emerges from this fieldwork? PB: They spoke about the curbing of possibility, especially after 7/7 and all that, a closing down of the spaces where they could work. GB: Are all the people that you have been interviewing South Asian and did they all feel that 7/7 had that impact on them? Not just Muslim, but Sikh and Hindu as well? PB: No, no, everyone. GB: Did they say how they know? PB: Parv Bancil (UK-based South Asian playwright) talks about it. For example, you remember what they did with the BAFTA award winning drama Britz, the television drama series in two parts which was on Channel 4 in Britain. You see what the story is. These British Asian Muslims – siblings, one of them, the brother goes to join M15 and the other one, the sister, goes to Pakistan on an opposite trajectory and trains a suicide bomber. She returns to Britain and carries out her bombing mission successfully in a part of England, some part of London I think. This is the type of story they want.
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They [South Asian cultural producers] say that spaces that they had opened are essentially closed now. They (the television commissioning editors) want them to write about British Asians becoming terrorists and that is all they want – a reductionist and narrow vision of how Asians should be represented. So there has been this enormous curbing of creative possibility. It is like going backwards. You see, in the past anyone could write a play on arranged marriages and that was what was wanted – it is essentially the same DNA reproducing itself. PB: I don’t know if things are going to change with the election of Barack Obama. It has already started to change here in the US, certainly for blacks … in every domain they are looking for black representation, things are opening up for black communities. So now the cultural impact of 9/11 has been reduced – but I don’t know how that is going to change things for Asians and I don’t think things are going to change that significantly for Asians in the UK. I think deeply entrenched attitudes and mores persist and remain resilient. And of course they reproduce themselves and travel to settings outside Britain when people travel. For example, I was in Los Angeles and I was in the airport, I was with two relatives who live there. One of these guys was a commonwealth scholar, a prestigious award he won educated at Cal Tech in Pasadena. He is an eminent Sikh scientist, a professor at Southern California University. As a Sikh, he wears a turban and has a beard. At the airport, there was this English woman and she was looking for someone to help with her luggage. She looked round, and seeing he wears a turban, she came to him. She obviously assumed he was a porter who should carry her luggage. Only the English do this and often I. Think, they obviously think that we are all still coolies and should be carting their luggage around for them. The colonial attitudes still endure especially within certain class groups, though of course California is utterly confusing for so many Europeans, especially those from more homogenous communities, as it has such a range of many people of colour. They don’t expect to find this complex multi-ethnic population nor the enormous diversity, which is not easy to read if you come from relatively white homogenous communities in which you can dominate. They have not had the experiences familiar to minorities on a daily basis. The east coast is easier for most Europeans to decode as it feels more familiar and European. It is more comfortable for them and they are more at ease with it.
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GB: What about the lives of Asians in the US? PB: In the US it is a completely different racial trajectory. Here they think of South Asians as a model minority. Immigration was only opened up to allow in the most highly educated from India – so they only recruited the highest levels from India. It is a much more skewed immigration especially for communities that mushroomed after the mid-60s when immigration was opened up for the elite of India and Pakistan. Britain has a much more varied conception of its migrant population. Their class and migration experiences were and are more varied though of course in the US there is a wider range of classes then the model minority myth that is applied to South Asian communities. It is so common to see here in Massachusetts and in other places in the US that both partners are doctors, for example, and there are very successful [South Asian] communities here in a way that you don’t see in Britain despite the success of so many British Asians in many domains of life. However at the same time there are very poor South Asian communities in New York and San Francisco – in fact all over and their continuing struggles are forgotten. Life is very hard for them and their narratives do indeed get submerged through the focus on model minorities. GB: Barack Obama has had a strange impact on the imaginary of the political class in Britain – there is loads of stuff written here about this shift and someone wrote in one of the weekend papers that Obama is the most influential person in British politics. I think there is a fantasy about the great black hero who can redeem us all – and in the British political class a feeling that ‘if only we had one of those ...’ PB: I think that one of things is that they must have a frightened psyche. It means that they have to deal with a powerful man of colour - which they never had to deal with before, it reminds them that things are changing and not always in their favour. There is a new world out there in which the power dynamics are shifting. And of course there has been much talk here in the US and the British Press about the subdued rather dismissive celebration, in fact, the press referred to it as ‘snubbing’, of the British prime minister Gordon Brown’s official visit to the US this month. There were none of the high profile White House dinners, only ‘a working lunch’, nor were there special gifts to honour the ‘special relationship’ with Britain by the Obama administration. The relationship is no longer special as obvious from the return of Churchill’s bust which had been returned before the visit. I am especially interested in how the British academy which is largely closed to people of colour, even though there have some inroads especially in your generation of locally born British Blacks and Asians, deals with this.
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I am curious about disciplines like British Anthropology and the fields of race and ethnic relations which essentially study people of colour. How will they deal with a black man of power? It will be interesting to see how the public rhetoric gets sophisticated and elaborated to manage this development. You know what I mean, sophisticated thinkers and writers who can engage in the most anti-racist sounding rhetoric and language in their public discourses whilst actually being quite racist in their daily interactions and in perpetuating with tenacity their small highly defended power bases. I wonder if there will be any dent in the power structure and the knowledge producing circuits, perhaps there might be some space created in some peripheries. I doubt if there will be a fundamental shift in favour of opening up some creative spaces for people of colour to become powerful and influential producers of knowledge and as representers and interpreters of the contemporary experiences on their own terms. GB: I think in Britain there is a big difference between political and academic worlds in their responses, because for some reason British politics is still more open than British academia. Perhaps because politics retains some contact with popular feeling, but the academy does not feel that it has to respond to shifts in popular consciousness or sentiment at all. PB: I don’t think the academy is a powerful domain – it is just not a particularly powerful place to be in, unless perhaps if you are an economist or a lawyer who has access to circuits of power and can act as advisors and consultants to the power brokers of the world. I don’t think that any of the disciplines that we are involved in have any mainstream power. They might have influence, yes, but that is the limit of most academic writing – the spheres of influence are small indeed. Parminder spoke about moving to the US and the different reception of her work in the US and Britain at that time. PB: The reason I came out here is that my book Twice Migrants made enormous sense to Americans because it applied to so many American communities – settlers and immigrants – who have that experience of multiple migrations and many who do not have a myth of return and are not particularly home orientated, my central argument in the book that the multiply moved and often multiple sited people do not have a desire to return – that made a lot of sense here. This was a surprise to me. A couple of months before I was due to leave for UCLA in 1989, I gave a paper at London university. I was severely attacked for it by some Oxbridge male academics colluding with each other – a bandwagon. In this paper, I talked about the identities of Asian women as dynamic and fluid and liquid,
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as people in a global world who shared their sensibilities and cultural mores with the rest of the world in which people were continuously forming and imagining their lives. That these women were as much products of the local and regional British niches they occupied, as they were of the varied class positions and migration histories. I was saying that their multiple identities were complex and in flux – the ideas we are so used to hearing now – and that their worlds are not dominated by cultural conflict and arranged marriages and battles with the patriarchy. I was illustrating this by giving examples of some high profile women in the past who have been forgotten to point out that Asian women have been in a range of occupations and that their lives were about much more than the reductive ways in which they were defined through the ‘arranged marriages and the between two cultures model of cultural and ethnic pathology’ which was so pervasive at the time. I was exploring the stories of people like the famous academy award winning actress Merle Oberon, Mrs Alexandre Korda who had an Indian background, though she negated it in the Hollywood of that period, and also Noor Inayat Khan, the secret agent who was amongst the first women to be trained as a WAAF and Special operations and send to Nazi occupied France as a wireless operator. She wasn’t a known figure at that time though there is now a book on her called Spy Princess by Shrabani Basu and the film rights for the book have been bought, a script for which is being developed by Shyam Benegal. Her story was completely submerged. I found it captivating and found out about her through a 1950s book when I worked in a library as a school kid in the late 60s, my Saturday and holiday job. She was one of the most effective wireless operators and had sent critical information back to Britain but was betrayed by a double agent, captured and tortured very badly by the Nazis and posthumously awarded a George Cross and the Croix de Guerre with a gold star – the highest civilian honours in France and England for gallantry outside the battlefield. I was making a point that Asian women had been in a range of occupations and occupied varied class locations, that their ethnic identities were as mediated by the regional and local cultures they occupied in Britain as by their complex migration and settlement trajectories. And that Asian women should not be represented through the enormously reductive frames through which they were represented at the time. It was an attempt to represent Asian women in a complex and deeply nuanced manner to show that the complexity of their social, economic, cultural and political locations is reflected in their consumption styles and cultural sensibilities – as nuanced dynamic diasporic agents. After I had presented it, a key person in the audience who was very influential at that time completely trashed it like I had written nothing. It was very threatening to anthropologists of a certain ilk – the studied had become knowledge producers within their own circuits and the erstwhile
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studied subject was not reproducing the established and hegemonic frames of the master narratives and the subject was an Asian woman who was not going to go home – we were claiming our British Asian identities and representing them. Gurinder Chadha’s award winning documentary film I’m British but … had just been released and won the British Film Institute new Directors award as the best documentary. I wrote a section on that in the paper on the themes of the film as I had been to its opening in 1989 and also on Gurinder’s very innovative cutting edge hybrid personal style. She wore Doc Marten shoes, union jack socks, a leather bomber jacket, an embroidered Indian skirt with a duppata worn diagonally across the front and back and a bull dog on leash – the complex hybridiities encoded in her clothes were the themes of my paper. She was doing for film what I was doing in the academy. We were ahead of our time I think. I was so stunned by the attack which came from three men and all one after the other and it was aggressive and powerful. The message was how dare you even be present in this room- let alone speak and assertively. You know it is like being hit on the head by a group of people. Then someone said something in my favour and that gave me a couple minutes to gather myself to retaliate and reinforce my points. Afterwards my supervisor who happened to have watched this whole interaction and had cringed through it said to me that I really had something powerful here and that I must pursue it and more significantly his advice was that I needed to leave this country. And indeed it was that paper that brought me three job offers in America, one in Vancouver, Canada and two in the US one on the west coast in California and one east coast, during my 1990 fellowship year at UCLA. It was so obvious that what I was saying was important and challenging to their conceptions of Asian women – and that here was someone who was not afraid of the world. Before leaving Britain I had suffered a very serious attack. I think that generation, the first of locally produced children of immigrants who had made it to university and had entered peripheral academic domains i.e. most of us had soft money research positions, there really was no place for us to take up permanent university positions. The opportunity structure had not opened up for us nor was there any attempt to loosen it a little. In fact people were openly hostile especially when we became marketable and had many more fine academic credentials that were required for these positions i.e. books and top-rated excellent publications, plus research and administrative skills – many more than our white counterparts of that period. I use strong language but I really do think there was an attempt to kill us intellectually and I saw that happen to a few people. One had to have a great deal of confidence and courage to not allow oneself to be broken by the opposition which was often sophisticated and hard to fight
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and decode but its power and consequences were powerfully felt and in obvious ways. There was always and still is the role of the supporting secondary researchers, the ethnic fieldworkers – the primary information generators who do the donkey work and ‘penetrate minority communities’ the word that was used in my time but there still are no positions of command and control. I see projects on Asians and the diaspora are still lead by white researchers, often with very little experience of working with British Asians. They employ junior researchers of colour to do their slave and shit work as an academic friend of colour states, whilst they control the academic prestige work of publishing, trips to conferences abroad, that is all the public and institutional recognition that gets them their institutional promotion and pre-eminence. I am amazed at how much this white gaze persists and with stubbornness and virulent ruthlessness that goes especially with an anti-racist sounding sophistication that many of them can now engage, but which is often deeply racist if you really decoded the discourse and the actions in which they engage. One sees how superficially the opportunity structure has actually changed. Very little I think though there are some pockets of fluidity – power indeed endures and perpetuates itself through the new personnel of your generation in much the same way as in mine except that it was much more explicit in my time and in some ways easier to deal with. You knew where you stood – they could not stand your presence, full stop. And then to come here, it was wonderful – I felt I could develop my voice and discover that there are places that are nothing to do with Britain and in which British power, especially that of the academy is weak. At that time I got the fellowship at UCLA. I did not know what this UCLA thing was going to be, so I didn’t go for six months. I arranged to start later – and it turned out to be one of the most exciting years of my whole life. There were so many things going on that were so relevant to my work, and second and third generation Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Hispanics around who were resonating with it. I made so many exciting connections on a campus of UCLA which is referred to as University of Caucasians Lost amongst Asians. It was a perfect place for me after my very negative British experiences in the academy. There was none of the resistance that I was facing in Britain. In fact I felt and was told that my work represented the future and that I had the most ‘politically correct biography’ for the times. I felt that my cultural sensibilities and ways of being and viewing the world were becoming the modus Vivendi of the world, my deeply felt and deeply experienced biography of multiple migration across three continents and rooted cultural politics and experiences felt centrally relevant to people in a ‘university of Caucasians lost amongst Asians’. It was a reinforcing experience, an antidote that I really needed at the time when I felt battered by the British academy. Migration was good for me – it helped develop and
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assert my voice in a much more powerful way. At UCLA, I co-organized the first conference on the west coast on immigration and entrepreneurship, which resulted in a book with Ivan Light, a professor of sociology at UCLA who had offered me my fellowship and with whom I worked closely. I felt that thing that Barack Obama says, that I was relevant in the world, I felt that my biography, my experiences, all of that was important and relevant. And indeed, a multiple migrant, a man who is also product of three continents is now the leader of the US, a new kind of person with a new kind of politics and biographical experiences and who is creating the new licences of participation. All this has happened within less than two decades. In Kenya, a year or so before we left for London, I got an award at my primary school from Tom Mboya who was then a cabinet minister for economic planning and development in Kenyatta’s government for a good KPE (Kenya Preliminary Examination) result – the eleven plus type – more like a 12/13 plus in Kenya – the official examination that you needed to pass with high level grades to enter secondary school at the time- all the more so for Asians whose entry into secondary schools was being greatly restricted after independence. Mboya came to my school for the Prize giving ceremony. He was a Luo, the same tribe as Barack Obama’s father. He was educated at Ruskin College, Oxford, in the 1950s via a scholarship funded by the British Trade Union Congress. He was in Kenyatta’s generation and he initiated the Airlift Africa project which was funded by African American Students Foundation in the USA and which facilitated the education of Kenyan students at US universities in the late 50s and 60s. These American funded Tom Mboya scholarships, facilitated the education at University of Hawaii of Barack Obama senior in the early 60s. Tom Mboya opened up American universities for Kenyan Africans and some who were not from the powerful and influential Kikuyu tribes. And many of the leading US educated Kenyan figures who went on to become powerful political figures were exposed to the Pan Africanist movement and African American political figures and their politics in the USA. They took some of these political sensibilities back with them to struggle for Kenyan independence. The Luo were not always on good terms with the Kikuyu, a situation that applies till today as reflected in the recent leadership struggle between the current Prime Minister Raili Odinga, a Luo and President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, Kenya’s dominant power elite. The Luos were also much more socialist in orientation and committed to the trade union movement. One of the first trade union organizers in Kenya was Makhan Singh – he was a Sikh and spent time in jail as part of the generation of people with Kenyatta who
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went to prison for their anti- British activities. The freedom fighter Makhan Singh’s story, his organization of the trade union movement which was so critical to Kenya’s independence struggle and the general involvement of East African Asians in the decolonization process has yet to be properly told – it is a missing narrative in the history of African independence movements and also much elided by the writing on the struggles for independence. We hear little of these African Asian interventions many of which were critical. I think this is something that people directly from India do not understand, they are always saying that we have no love for the nation, we were not part of the independence struggle, but people of my brother’s generation and maybe older, we were part of the Kenyan independence struggle. India is not a point of reference for us, it is not even now. Of course we listened to Bollywood songs and all of that, but India was not an emotional reference point. I think what has been very good for me, and I really had to leave at that time, is that I am institutionally secure. It was very important for me that I got out and that people understood what I was about intellectually and that I had space to grow. I might not have thought about globalization, for example, unless I had come here to Clark to take up a professorship whose brief was to develop new curriculum around the themes of cultural identities and the rapid globalization that was in process in the early 90s. And it was so important to realize that there are places beyond Britain. But I also think it is a very big price to pay – because there [in Britain] you have enormous cultural capital especially if you are a product of that place. For example, I don’t drive as well here, especially in Boston which is a hard city to drive in and unlike American cities not well labelled. I am not naturally familiar with its cartography in a way I am in London where I lived since my early teens and so drive in organically. If you had seen me drive in London, I am like a tiger. You know I don’t feel lost because I know that Brixton is connected to Streatham etc., I have that cultural and unselfconscious geographic ease there. PB: I find the fact that I am a Sikh and I pray that is very significant, because I have to believe that God is on my side. I am not part of an established power structure which can open up my paths for me. I have to believe that some ‘higher powers’ will act in my favour. I was talking to a colleague at UCLA about his question to me: ‘why are you so vibrant?’ Apparently people who have a high level of well-being
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are people who have a belief that something beyond is helping them, it doesn’t have to be God, it could be Elvis Presley or angels or anything that is significant in your world to you. Melvin Pollner, an ethno methodologist who was at UCLA, who studied how people produce and sustain their sense of reality and community wrote about this in much of his work, the ways in which people code their everyday world and sustain realities as they understand them – the world of bubbles that we are all in and sustain – his famous book was Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday and Sociological Discourse (1987). GB: So you have to believe that you are chosen even if the world is telling you that you are not. PB: No, not that I am chosen but that despite the odds and, despite the negatively charged location I might find myself in, that there are forces beyond the power structures which might help one along – forces that the power structure has no control over and might indeed be much more powerful than the exerting power. So you see or imagine the world as coded in your favour even if the framework in which you might be located and its personnel might work against you or might be greatly restrictive. You remain optimistic and therefore vibrant at many levels because you know it will be fine for you and people like you because of all these positive nebulous forces out there. That is, you code reality in a positive way in the manner describe by Melvin Pollner. The discussion moved to questions about studying ethnicity in Britain and the increasing diversity of higher education. PB: There is more of a critical mass in your generation i.e. academics in their 30s and early 40s who are truly local, locally born and raised. They are not migrants but children of settlers who have come of age and into representation. In our case it was a very hard fight because the academy and its personnel were not used to people like us. We were new on the scene and not subcontinental elites who have been around at British universities for a more than 150 years, most of whom went back to their countries of origin, often in leadership positions once they acquired British credentials. They were no threat in fact they were celebrated as they were the elite of another country which the British elite could benefit from. We, on the other hand, were not going anywhere – we were locally produced progeny of immigrants in Britain and were going to stay. And we were much more powerfully politicized and racialized and also assertive of our British Asian and Black identities and also culturally confident, new ethnicities to use Stuart Hall’s term. In fact, in the end some of us did not end up having
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a space in the British academy and did indeed leave to make a life for ourselves elsewhere. My young British Asian academic friend says that it seems like there are a lot of jobs now but compared to the number of people looking for jobs, it is not enough. She always tells me that the opportunity structure has not opened up in the way that I think it has from the outside. But I don’t always understand the mindset of some of the younger scholars. I think they want to make a big theoretical breakthrough right away, there is a great deal of ambition which is good and they want to make a mark and fast and many of them write in this way that is so complex and difficult to understand especially those who want to impress by using obfuscating language. But who reads this stuff? And the academy is not such a powerful arena, or I should say it is a domain of weak power and therefore marginal. Yes in that way there is some peripheral power in a small way. But I am really really pleased they are emerging – they are the academic change agents of the present and future. Of course, there are people like X and Y [key figures in British race and ethnic studies who are also white but from marginal class locations] and so on who are critical – they create opportunities and support the younger generation of academics of colour – they are indeed trying to open up academic institutions and some have succeeded in small pockets. GB: British academia is just very small and when times are hard they don’t want to make space for people who are not like them – so there are lots of people on short-term contracts because that is where the expansion of the sector has taken place. PB: I always think that maybe because there are younger academics that are in positions of power in Britain that there might be more openings for a certain point of view. The difference is that in my generation there were no jobs to be had, whereas in your generation there is not a critical mass but some of you have jobs. GB: The great expansion of universities and the overall massification of the sector means that some of us are getting jobs, but it is still only some. Parminder spoke about her own family history and the impact that history has had on her understanding of the world. PB: My father died very quickly after coming to the UK. He came in 1967
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and in the space of 7 years he had had four heart attacks. He died in 1974. These were very racist times and life was hard for turban wearing Sikhs for whom jobs were not easy to find. Plus migration to a new land is very hard in your 50s. The thing is if you are a migrant, it takes a great toll. You know, I couldn’t be a migrant now, I did that it in my mid-30s but could not do it now. My father moved when he was 55 and it was too much. I think if you move you have to do it by late 30s max. GB: I also just think it is exhausting – even though I laugh at my parents and the way that their lives are apparently unplanned in every regard, I also have a huge admiration for their ability to do this huge thing and just up sticks and start again. PB: And when they moved, things were much harder. When I moved here [to the US] I used to speak to my mother twice a day on the telephone. But in their day they could not do that, it was a much more isolating experience. GB: Can you say something about what you think is so culturally distinctive about multiple migrations? PB: You don’t have a recognizable style – I think you are much more threatening. I think what they [dominant groups in the UK and US] have seen are all the directly migrant Indian elites. These people have all been around in all of these elite institutions forever. But I think we multiple migrants were a new kind of person in a sense. We were not going to go anywhere. In our personal style, our code-switching and cultural proficiency, we were locally produced. Indian elites are much more willing to be obsequious – their intellectual frame remains similar to that of the colonizer or one could say that there is stronger colonization of consciouness . Even someone like Rushdie, he is almost like a pet of the English elite – even though he has developed a new way of writing that expresses something different, he seems to live his life on their terms. I think the difference is at multiple levels, it is not just a style of thought, it is a style of clothes, a style of being. It is, as another very diasporic Jewish friend of mine Ilan Stavans, the eminent ‘king of Latin American’ culture states, a deep rooted way of life. It is harder to tame. It does not give into master narratives easily – it is resilient and much more independent having
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established itself in the case of multiple migrants in previous settings of settlement where it has honed its minority skills – rather the management of minority status – an expertise multiple migrants travel with and transfer rapidly in new settings of settlement. And in fact the people who are interesting in cultural production terms also display these characteristics. I think it is something about that diasporic experience that allows this innovation. It is not to do with a reproduction of elite narratives. It is to do with the creation of the new licences of participation and the new narratives of discovery as Basil Bernstein says in his work. They are bolder in bringing in the new on their own terms, the power of the diaspora to define the cultural world in new ways. GB: How and why did you become interested in cultural producers? I became interested in cultural producers because it moves on from some of the themes that I explore in Dangerous Designs which are also the long term themes of my work. In the same way, some of the designers I spoke to came from an East African background, although I didn’t know that at the time. The designers were referencing other cultural forms and at the same time that I was meeting these designers I was also meeting these other people who were involved in something else – these producers, musicians, artists. These people were working with the same aesthetic that I discuss in Dangerous Designs. That, the improvization, the ability not to only reframe what is already there, really applies to most of the people who I interview. East African Asians crop up in a lot of places. The pioneering group of people who started Bhangra music and gave it wider exposure, people like Kuljit Bhamra and the men who were part of the pioneering bands like Alaap were from this background. Freddie Mercury, aka Farrukh Bulsara, of the famous and supremely influential rock band Queen was another one, an Ismaili Muslim who was born Zanzibar. Also the actor who played Gandhi – Ben Kingsley – Krishna Bhanji whose father, also an Ismaili Muslim, was also from Zanzibar, the island off the coast of Tanzania. There are so many of them around and it is just invisible to us. That is also a part of my interest in cultural producers. I was writing on Gurinder Chadha [the film-maker and screen-writer] and all the connections played through. We are connected through the same networks – Bubby Mahil, the designer who is central to my book Dangerous Designs also designs clothes for Cherie Booth and also Gurinder’s clothes and was involved in making the costumes for Bride and Prejudice [a film by Gurinder Chadha], so it is all connected. So it actually follows that theme of following the progeny of
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multiple migrant and their diasporically mediated cultural roots and routes. They [East African Asians] are in so many domains that are not to do with literary production, that are not textual. Whereas the Bengalis and people from India control that arena of literary culture much more. GB: That is a really interesting distinction – why do you think that is? PB: The English language was used for much longer there than for a number of people who moved from east Africa. In the 1950s and 60s when India became independent English was such a prestige subject in the universities, from what I hear. So many people held English in such high esteem and majored in it at University, I am told. Many of the literary theorists from India have done English degrees, the high prestige subject for a certain generation of Indian elites. That must have to do with the power of the colonial legacies. I think their use of obfuscating language is way of showing the colonizers, look, we can work in your frame – it is a colonization of consciousness. Whereas the east Africans and the Europeans built east Africa together, they were both outsider groups who had to construct a life in a new land in which they were not the indigenous populations, even though one group had the stronger colonization drive. This situation was different in the Indian subcontinent where the Indians were indigenous to the land and the British came as outsiders to colonize and succeeded in doing so. In East Africa they ruled the place for a short time, so the colonization of the mind was not the same for East African Asians. In fact, the commercially orientated East African Asians had been in east Africa many hundreds of year before the European presence in East Africa – the Indians had been trading in the Indian ocean since 10th century or before. In fact they were bankers to the British in places like Zanzibar and Dar-es-salaam in Tanzania in the 19th century and there are some very interesting narratives of how their commercial banking and financial prowess was crushed as the British got better established in the 19th and early 20th centuries both in Kenya and Tanzania. So I think East African Asians emerge from a very different location to that of indigenous Indians who were colonized by the British in their own homeland. East African Asians were partners in the settlement of East Africa, though the British were the more ruthless colonial agents in a way that Indians never were. Their interests were commercial and in the case of the railway workers recruited in the late 19th century to build the Kenya Uganda railways, not commercial at all. They had become East Africans as workers and through socialization and birth in the East African countries which had become their diasporic homelands. They became settlers in copartnership with the British. They were never dominated by the British in the ways in which the hegemony and the colonial power of British Raj
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operated. This is a major difference in how colonization of the mind works – I think it was much more powerful in India where it was such a totally pervasive colonial force for more that 300 years, a long period in which they were able to sophisticate colonial rule through brown sahib agents as described in the 1835 Macaulay Minute on Indian Education to produce a class of Indians with English tastes who could act as an intermediary agent for the British to rule the Indian masses. I think there is a much more powerful absorption and transmission generationally of this colonial frame to which many Indians were powerfully socialized directly and through its legacies, hence the more pervasive remnants which I think are encoded and reflected in the more colonized psyches of subcontinental elites. I think there is a kind of cultural timidity [in the take-up of literary culture]. Diasporics have much less of that, and by diasporics I mean people who are multiply migrant, the older diasporics. GB: Are all the cultural producers that you interview British-based? PB: Yes – all of them are UK-based, and some are more influential and known widely. Their stuff is all over. Not all of them. Some of them are very committed to their communities, they are products of those communities and they are very devoted to those communities. They work in Punjabi theatre, poetry, Punjabi folk-songs. And some others, they want to make a mark beyond their domain but really their work does not allow that – poetry, Punjabi folk-songs – it’s a very different kind of cultural product. These forms are very viable and very vibrant, but they are not going to have a huge audience. GB: So are your respondents mainly working in mass media? PB: They are not all in mass media, although there are some. Gurinder [Chadha, the film-maker] is an obvious case but not all. The twin artists Rabindre and Amrit have reimagined miniature art through their Wirral bred British Asian lens . Then there are people who are playwrights whose work is essentially only known in Britain and then there are people like the architect who is a partner in Richard Roger’s innovative firm, Amarjit Kalsi who was a designer of Terminal 5 [of Heathrow Airport] and the Lloyds building. Some of them their work is only in Britain, but all of them have an innovative edge. I like their aesthetics, politics and creative courage to work on their own terms. It is not doing what has already been done before, they all contest and their background is what allows it.
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GB: Why did you choose to have everyone who was UK-based? PB: This is probably the last piece of work that I will do on Britain. It is part of the last phase of my London life and partly springs out of my previous work. It was the culmination of that phase of my work, the last phase of that work that is London-based. GB: How important was it to arrive in the US and start mixing with minority scholars who understood your work and experience immediately? How do you think that move has shaped your work? PB: I work in a place where a number of my colleagues are Jewish and what I would never have cottoned on to is how similar the experiences of British Asians are to all kinds of Jews. I don’t mean their experiences of the Holocaust and the virulent anti-Semitism that they have suffered for generations. I mean the nuanced and deep understanding of the experiences of marginality and discrimination and not being allowed ‘in’. I find they ‘get it’ in a way that many powerful groups just don’t and don’t want to. What I have found that I love is that the stuff I am writing about is applicable to so many groups. The kind of innovation that I am talking about was being done by African Americans and Jewish Americans, you know jazz, blues. In any kind of Jewish cultural production there is a lot of similarity and I am very attracted to that – because immigrants have formed some of the most influential cultural products, you know. Hollywood is almost an entirely immigrant product, Jewish people from eastern and central Europe and so on who contested the Anglo-Saxon establishment that ruled Hollywood prior to their arrival – they were a ‘foreign diasporic influence’ that made this such a globally influential and successful entertainment force (see the work of Catherine Portuges, 1998, ‘Accenting LA.: Central European in Diasporan Hollywood of the 1940s’ in Borders, Exile, Diasporas edited by Elazar Barkan and Marie-Denise Shelton). My first editor was Jewish – any opening I have ever had was through Jews. My first book, Twice Migrants, it was pushed by Debbie Spring who is Jewish. She pushed it over two years – then Verity Saifullah-Khan gave it a wonderful review and things took off. If I hadn’t had a Jewish editor it would never have happened. And then Basil Bernstein, who was then the Karl Mannheim Professor of Sociology of Education at London University’s Institute of Education, who played a critical role in getting me to become a principal investigator on
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a project which made me amongst the first Asian women to be principal investigators of research projects. Remember that before that we were all on research assistant contracts. So Jews and Americans – most of my chances came in that way. I found that in the first few years in the US I attracted a lot of people who had moved themselves. Now in my class more than half are people who have similar experiences, not the same trajectory, but other diasporas. GB: It seems that one of the things that you get from the US perspective is a way of appreciating the breadth and cultural ambition of South Asian cultural producers, which, frankly, I don’t think is recognized in Britain at all. PB: I don’t think it is recognized by many of the people who write in cultural studies either. Les [Back] always says to me that what I can bring to the public in a way that other people can’t is my understanding and experience because I have lived that life. I don’t think, for example, that this is something that my nieces and nephews would pick up on necessarily. Their generation is entirely British born and locally produced – the experiences of multiple migrations and multiple sited biographies are not theirs – they are more determined by their local experiences of race and class. I have been a multiple migrant and then I moved here and I have an understanding of what it was to be completely displaced. I knew no-one when I came to the US, I had one friend in Berkeley and I knew some people in Washington. I am the only member of my wider family who is here. There are no close relatives. That means that I am very attuned to what happens and I have an appreciation of how courageous you have to be to do these things. It gives you an understanding of how cultures are reproduced, of how the genes, the DNA of your cultural base, are constantly re-imagined and reproduced and how significant the context is and also how significant what you bring to that context is. GB: But going to the US also gave you intellectual affirmation in ways that were not happening in Britain – and one of the ways that you are talking about Asian cultural production is that you are comparing it with things like Hollywood, you are suggesting that it has that kind of cultural import potentially. PB: Yes … the birth of Hollywood, the birth of Jazz, Blues.
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I had already started thinking of those things and I think that is very significant – and I don’t think I would have necessarily picked up on that if I hadn’t been here and if I hadn’t moved myself. When I was looking at the cultural producers I was not trying to find multiply migrant people, I was looking at specific domains – but then you find that some of the most innovative people are from that background. Why is it that some of the most influential people are from that group? GB: All of these people that you have been interviewing, they are also trying to be cultural producers in this space where possibility has been shut down and people think they are coolies – do they talk about where ethnicity sits in their professional lives or their everyday lives? PB: They talk about their ethnicity all the time, it is the thing that defines them. Each and every one of them has had multiple experiences that confirm that this is what they are about. You cannot avoid it as a person of colour, the experience of race and ethnicity. In the case of the twin artists the fact that they innovated from Mughal miniatures meant that their work was not considered to be art. In Gurinder’s case, they wanted her to produce an account of bhangra that is very bland and not at all political. It was a fight for her to present it as an aspect of ethnic politics and an aspect that is very fundamental to the form. The case of Parv Bancil where they want him to write about Asians as terrorists – which is not at all what he wants to write. GB: Do they describe their choice to be cultural producers as part of that ethnic politics? There was a moment when cultural production was very explicitly considered to be central to ethnic politics for migrant communities in Europe – but that seems to have become so much more dispersed and you are talking about fields from art to architecture to financial advice. Does the idea of an ethnic cultural politics still fit? PB: Someone like Amarjit Kalsi, who wouldn’t describe himself as politically engaged overtly, you find his architectural aesthetic is very much to do with his diasporic roots, the use of repetition, his understanding of space, his family history as a man who belongs to the caste of builder, carpenter and engineers. These are all part of his diasporic inheritance which is significant in his designs. He [Kalsi] would not explicitly describe himself as defined by his ethnicity and the politics that goes with trying to push that sensibility and that identity – whereas theatre people are absolutely articulate about it, very explicit
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about it, for example explaining their problems with East is East and the abusive father and how Asian fathers are always portrayed as abusive. For someone like Amarjit Kalsi, his experience of being a racialized Briton produces a certain sensibility and the architecture that he produces has the codes of his experiences, but I don’t think that he would necessarily say that. GB: Why did you choose this group of cultural producers to interview? PB: I chose these people because I liked their work and I liked their politics, they were courageous in a way. It was also to do with networks that I had. But it is what Paul Gilroy says in one of his lectures here at Clark University in the mid-1990s – I work on what engages my imagination. I am interested in what are the creative processes through which people produce their work, how people think about you and how to extend the range of ways that people perceive you, their perception of what Asians and people of colour are about. I think that is critical otherwise what are you doing? You should just shut up.
Chapter 4
Migrant Women’s Networking: New Articulations of Transnational Ethnicity Ronit Lentin
Introduction In June 2004 the Irish government held a referendum on citizenship, in which nearly 80 per cent of the electorate voted in favour of rescinding the right to birthright citizenship for all children born in the island of Ireland regardless of their parentage. This right had prevailed since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. The Referendum means limiting automatic citizenship only to children born in Ireland who have one parent who is a citizen or is entitled to citizenship. The state based its argument in favour of the Referendum on the gendered claim alleging that migrant women were coming to Ireland to deliberately give birth to Irish citizens, and thus gaining residency rights for themselves and their partners. The Referendum followed the 2003 ‘Irish born child’ Supreme Court ruling, which withdrew the process whereby migrant parents in the Republic of Ireland had the right to apply to remain to give ‘care and company’ to their citizen children. This chapter has two parts. In the first part I argue that the state of the Republic of Ireland has created what Giorgio Agamben (2005) calls a ‘state of exception’, in which state racism combines with what Michel Foucault (2003) calls ‘biopolitics’, in a contemporary move from institutional to constitutional racism (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). My argument here is that state racism assumes gendered forms specifically targeting women migrants through their mothering role. Putting this in a wider historical context, I argue that while childbearing (Irish) women had always been central to articulations of nation ever since the establishment of the Republic of Ireland as a confessional state, the 2004 Citizenship Referendum Ronit Lentin is a senior lecturer in Sociology, director of the MPhil in Ethnic and Racial Studies, and founder member of the Trinity Immigration Initiative, Trinity College Dublin. She has published extensively on racism in Ireland, gender and racism, and IsraelPalestine. Among her books are Gender and Catastrophe (2007), Racism and Antiracism in Ireland (with Robbie McVeigh, 2002), Women and the Politics of Military Confrontation: Palestinian and Israeli Gendered Narratives of Dislocation (with Nahla Abdo, 2002), Race and State (with Alana Lentin, 2006), After Optimism: Ireland, Racism and Globalisation (with Robbie McVeigh, 2006), Performing Global Networks (with Karen Fricker, 2007), and Thinking Palestine (2008).
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shifted the control of women from ‘Irish’ (m)others to ‘non-national’ (m)others as subverting certainties of nation, state and citizenship. Throughout the chapter I conceptualize mothering as having a component of othering, which, as argued by Bhattarcharyya et al. (2002) has sexualized connotations, hence my use of brackets when discussing migrant (m)others. The second part is based on my current research with migrant women’s networks. Theorizing migrant networks as fluid forms of social association (Fuchs, 2001, 252), some nascent migrant women’s networks in Ireland have already become structured organizations which support migrant women locally and at the same time build up transnational ties of solidarity – with Irish, European and International groups – as they engage with global issues around gender, migration, citizenship and gendered violence. In doing so, some migrant networks, organized on putative ethnic ties, reinforce articulations of ethnic affiliation while at the same time staking new claims in their country of settlement. This practice of transnationalism moves away from a bi-national circulatory model which highlights migrants’ movements between two countries and privileges economic and political strategies spanning two nation-states rather than entertaining and developing the notion of a ‘rooted’ transnational mode of being. I focus in particular on AkiDwA – which begun as the African Women’s Network, and has expanded to include migrant women of other ethnic and national origins – and which, among its other activities, had been instrumental in campaigning against the exclusion of migrant parents of Irish citizen children from residency, by initiating and being an active member of the Coalition against Deportation of Irish Children (CADIC). My examination of AkiDwA’s work leads me to explore how migrant networks are able to negotiate their presence in a terrain which is powerfully marked by the powers of the state, and resist and extend the boundaries of ‘intercultural’ Ireland’s narrow articulations of race, ethnicity, citizenship and nation, creating new dimensions of transnational ethnicity and gender equality struggles. In postReferendum Ireland migrant networks are creating and demarcating relatively autonomous and empowering spaces of identity, belonging and solidarity which resist the state’s racialising violence. At the same time, they are moving in the dangerous minefield of Ireland’s ‘intercultural industry’ where they walk a thin line between co-option and ‘strategic essentialism’, which de Certeau terms as manoeuvres on ‘enemy territory’ through which individuals reappropriate the space (or fragments thereof) organized by the totalizing bio-powers of the state (de Certeau, 1984: xiv). Before proceeding, I want to stress that this chapter centres on the relations between the state and migrant networks in the Republic of Ireland, despite the obvious triadic theoretical link between the Republic, the North of Ireland and the Irish diaspora. As Robbie McVeigh (forthcoming) argues, ‘Most recent work on racism in Ireland or Irish racism might be characterized as Republic of Ireland studies. In this sense it is partitionist by default and rarely addresses the centrality of either the north or the Diaspora in the dynamics of Irish racism’, as will become apparent in my discussion of the implications of the Citizenship Referendum.
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However, as my current research concentrates on women migrants’ networking activities in the Republic, I have to make do with this theoretically short-sighted limitation (see Lentin and McVeigh, 2006). The Republic of Ireland: Racial State of Exception? The Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1995, 2005) draws on the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics to develop an argument about the tendency of modern states to withdraw legal rights and protection from specific populations. Michel Foucault argues in Society Must be Defended (2003) that whereas the pre-modern sovereign addressed his power to killing unwanted people, the modern state’s biopower is addressed to living beings, and, more specifically, to their mass – as population. Put simply, Foucault charts a difference between the sovereign power of the old territorial state (‘to make die and let live’) and modern biopower (‘to make live and let die’). If the old order exerted the right to kill, the new biopower aims to make the care of life the concern of state power, exercised by governmental technologies such as the hospital, the psychiatric clinic, the prison, and I would add, also the maternity ward, as well as the refugee camp, refugee hostel and direct provision asylum centre. The duty to defend society from itself (often articulated as the need to defend the body of the nation from migrant and indigenous others) means that the modern state can scarcely function without racism. Rather than serving one group against another, as theories of racism as competition for scarce resources would have it, race, Foucault argues, becomes a tool of state conservatism, a racism that society practices against itself. Developing Foucault’s ideas, Agamben argues that while biopower may be more marked in modern states, theorized by David Theo Goldberg (2002) as ‘racial states’, it has always existed as part of sovereignty. Although biopower peaked in Nazism’s concentration and extermination camps, Agamben updates the concept to the 21st century in relation to refugees in detention camps (and, I would add, reception centres) and ‘unlawful’ combatants in detention camps such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In each of these spaces ‘zones of exception’ are formed, where, like in the Nazi lagers, inmates exist in a zone of indistinction, both at the mercy of sovereign power and outside the protection of the law. Today, particularly after September 11 2001, ‘the state of exception comes more and more to the foreground as the fundamental political structure and ultimately begins to become the rule’ (Agamben, 2005, 10). As we have seen in the conduct of the war on Iraq, in states of exception the application of the law is increasingly suspended as different categories of people are reduced to what Agamben calls ‘bare life’ – the roman legal category of homo sacer (sacred man – he who can be killed at the sovereign’s whim yet cannot be sacrificed). See also Kundnani 2007 for a discussion of the new post 9/11 ‘global sovereignty’.
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In the wake of the Citizenship Referendum there is no longer any doubt that, like all modern nation-states, though in its specific form, the Republic of Ireland must be theorized as a ‘racial state’. Racial states, according to Goldberg (2002), each in its own way, exclude in order to construct homogeneity (which, according to Goldberg [2002, 16], denotes ‘heterogeneity in denial’), while appropriating difference through celebrations of the multicultural. The racial state is a state of power, asserting its control over those within the state and excluding others from entering its borders. Through seemingly innocuous mechanisms such as constitutions, the law, border controls, policy making, bureaucracy, census categorizations, but also invented histories and traditions, modern states are defined in terms of their power to exclude and include in racially ordered terms. Goldberg outlines two traditions of thinking about racial states. The first, naturalism, fixes racially conceived ‘natives’ as pre-modern, and naturally incapable of progress. The second, historicism, elevates Europeans over primitive or underdeveloped others as a victory of western progress (Goldberg, 2002, 43). Understood as the prerogative of white men of property, the racial state’s historicist progressivism aims, through amalgamation and assimilation, to assist its racial others to ‘undo their uncivilised conditions’. But beneath what seems like benevolent liberalism, historicism camouflages racism, and is ultimately about the ordering zeal of modernity (Goldberg, 2002, 92–3). According to Goldberg, the law – as a technology of racial rule – is central to modern state formation, promoting ethnoracial categorisation and identification and shaping national identities through legislating on immigration controls and citizenship rights, shaping race in legal terms, and threading it into the fabric of the social (Goldberg, 2002, 141–7). Bearing in mind the global context in mind of the Republic of Ireland’s recent economic and social transformations (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006), my argument is that the Republic of Ireland’s exponential economic prosperity during the 1990s and the early years of the current decade has led to its restructuring as an exclusive racist state. Labour migrants are articulated as crucial to ensuring ‘our’ continuing economic growth, while asylum seekers are increasingly prevented from landing to present their applications (Kelly, 2005), and undocumented non-EU migrants are allowed to exist precariously, if at all, and citizenship parameters are continually being re-defined. See Ní Shuinéar, 2002, and Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 11 for a discussion of racial naturalism and historicism in the Irish context. The proposed Immigration Residence and Protection Bill discussed below restricts the rights of asylum seekers and refugees (falling short of international standards) while cherry-picking ‘useful’ migrants. The Minister for Integration comments that ‘Ireland would have to “fight hard” to retain migrants at a time of global competition for skilled workers … For this reason, the Immigration Bill currently going through the dail will need to be amended, and in a fashion that explicitly makes us more attractive to immigrants’ (The Irish Times, 21 April, 2008).
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The 2004 Citizenship Referendum – which made jus sanguinis (blood-based citizenship) the principle upon which children born in Ireland are entitled to automatic citizenship (overturning 83 years of jus soli – soil-based citizenship entitlement, in place since the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922) – provides a starting point for analysing Ireland as a ‘racial state’, moving the focus of the analysis from institutional racism to constitutional racism. Furthermore, the situation where the state declares itself anti-racist while enacting increasingly draconian immigration legislation leads to ‘racism without racism’ (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 164). As McVeigh and I argue, rather than being generated by individual or institutional prejudice, or by extreme right-wing ‘new racism’ as in other European states, racism in the post ‘Celtic Tiger’ 21st century Republic of Ireland is absorbed into the very structure of the liberal state. Gendering Racism: Irish Woman and Nation Agamben’s theorization of the state of exception is compelling, though it is surprising that, like other state theorists, he engenders neither his theorization of the ‘state of exception’ nor his concept of ‘bare life’. In my own work on women Holocaust survivors, I have extended Agamben’s concept of homo sacer to include the female femina sacra – she whose life, but also sexuality and productivity stand at the mercy of the sovereign power of the racial state (Lentin, 2006). Following Bhattacharyya et al.’s (2002, 104) argument that the term ‘other’ always has sexualized connotations, and that the self is marked by casting out all that is other, including the disorder of sexual desire, my point here is that these categories are not only racialized, but also inescapably gendered. Not paying specific attention to the gender aspect of ‘the state of exception’ is surprising as Agamben does focus on the centrality of birth as a marker of citizenship entitlement (Agamben, 1995, 126). He cites Hannah Arendt (1979) who argues that in the system of nation-states, the so-called sacred and inalienable ‘rights of man’ (sic) ultimately lack protection at the moment in which they no longer take the form of rights of citizens. The term ‘nation’ derives from nascere (to be born), thus the passage from divinely authorized royal sovereignty to national sovereignty means that in the transformation of ‘subject’ into ‘citizen’, birth – or bare natural life as such – becomes the immediate bearer of sovereignty. This is implicated in the passage from jus soli (birth in a certain territory) to jus sanguinis (blood-based birth from citizen parents), hence the centrality, but also the ambiguity, of the notion of citizenship in modern political thought (Agamben, 1995, 128–9). This transition from jus soli to jus sanguinis citizenship was the main consequence of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, bringing the Republic See Siphathisiwe Maphosa (2007) on the gendered implications of reception centres as ‘zones of exception’ – zones in which women’s rights are suspended or endangered precisely because of their sexuality and migrancy status.
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of Ireland firmly into the family of racial states where full rights are reserved only for blood-based citizens. Indeed, as Zygmunt Bauman (2003) reminds us, birth is usually the only ‘natural’, no-questions-asked entry into the nation; yet by securing a victory in a referendum aimed at outlawing birth right citizenship for the children of migrant (m)others, the Irish state has broken this link between birth and nation. Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) theorize women as the producers of future generations and the symbolic tropes of nations, suggesting women are marked and controlled differently from men, despite universal claims to gender equality. As the nation-state makes nativity the foundation of its sovereignty, when they step outside ethno-national or moral boundaries (and when they are the producers of ‘racially undesirable’ others), women are banned as impure and transgressive (Yuval-Davis, 1997). This can be illustrated by the positioning of child-bearing migrant women in the lead up to the Citizenship Referendum in what became known as the ‘Irish born child’ controversy, which however was indelibly tied to the relationship between the states of Ireland, north and south (McVeigh, forthcoming), as my discussion demonstrates. The debates on immigrants’ citizenship and residency rights occasioned by increased in-migration since 1996 highlighted the fact that jus soli citizenship right was a consequence of the 1998 Constitutional amendment of Article 2 as part of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) on Northern Ireland. However, the GFA amendment also meant, as was ruled in the 1990 Fajujonu Supreme Court case, that migrant parents of children born in Ireland, and thus Irish citizens, had a claim to residency in the Republic of Ireland to provide ‘care and company’ to their citizen child. However, this ruling, which resulted in several thousand migrant parents gaining residency rights, was overturned in January 2003 when the Supreme Court ruled in the Lobe and Osayande appeal, that migrant parents (dubbed ‘nonnational’ parents by the state and its courts of law) no longer had a strong case to be allowed to remain in Ireland to bring up their children (Maddock and Mallon, 2003). The Lobe and Osayande case involved two families of Czech Roma and Nigerian origin respectively against whom deportation orders had been made. The parents claimed that their decision to remain resident was in their children’s best interest, yet the Supreme Court ruling privileged the State’s right to deport, and the ‘integrity of the asylum process’ over these citizen children’s rights (Mullally, 2005; Lentin, 2007). The ruling illustrates Agamben’s argument that refugees (or in this instance migrant parents of Irish citizen children, many of whom were asylum seekers) form an unstable category between ‘man’ (sic) and ‘citizen’. In this sense, the refugee (or the migrant parent) ‘is truly the “man of rights”… the first and only real appearance of rights outside the fiction of the citizen that always covers them over. Yet this is precisely what makes the figure of the refugee so hard to define politically’ (Agamben, 1995, 131). Media debates following the January 2003 Supreme Court ruling exposed a contradiction between articulations of nationality and citizenship. While the jus
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sanguinis-based rights to Irish citizenship allows up to third generation Irish emigrants to claim Irish citizenship (Lentin, 2007), the state was contesting the jus soli citizenship rights accorded to children of migrants and consolidated by the GFA insertion of Article 2 into the Constitution. It is worth remembering, however, how deeply the Referendum debates implicated the trialectic of the relationship between the Republic, the north and the Irish diaspora, as McVeigh demonstrates. For all the rhetoric about pressures on the Dublin maternity hospitals as discussed below, and concerns about pregnant migrant (m)others, the main reason for the Referendum was what became known as ‘the Chen case’. The government used the case of Mrs Chen, a Chinese national residing in the UK, who chose to have her baby in Northern Ireland, and who won a European Court recommendation to be allowed to reside in Britain having had an Irish citizen child (since prior to the GFA Amendment all children born on the island of Ireland had the right to Irish citizenship regardless of their parentage) (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 54). The Chen case, according to McVeigh (forthcoming), crystallized issues arising from GFA-related changes to the Irish Constitution which constitutionalized citizenship and nationality for the first time in a way that threatened the integrity of EU member state sovereignty and border control. It bears emphasis, however, that while the Chen case had almost no implications for the Republic of Ireland (since people who acquired Irish citizenship this way were living in the north and aspired to relocation elsewhere in the EU), it had huge implications for British and EU citizenship through British jurisdictional control of Northern Ireland. Citizenship guaranteed to people born in the north of Ireland through the GFA meant that Britain could not control its sovereignty. Yet this reality provoked a crisis for Irish, not British, nationality and citizenship. Moreover, the Irish State intervened in ways that profoundly undermined the GFA. Both Irish citizenship and the GFA were reconfigured profoundly by a situation (children born in Northern Ireland to non-EU citizen parents acquiring Irish citizenship) that had little immediate effect on the Republic of Ireland. In other words, the racialization of the Republic of Ireland, gendered as it is, can not be understandable only with reference to internal dynamics in the Republic of Ireland. Furthermore, my argument here is that ‘non-national’ women (a new euphemism for non-EEA migrants and a strange definition of ‘Irish citizenship’) became central to the public debates surrounding both the Irish citizen children crisis and the Citizenship Referendum, and thus signified new gendered racial configurations of 21st century Ireland. These debates illustrate not only the orchestrated moral panics about ‘floods of refugees’, but also the positioning of sexually active women as a danger to the state and ‘the nation’, a long standing claim made in relation to sexually active Irish (m)others having children out of wedlock. Indeed, Irish representations of ‘woman’ and ‘nation’ have been historically intertwined, with Ireland represented as ‘Dark Rosaleen’ and ‘Cathleen Ní Houlihan’, and with ‘Irish’ women seen as securing the ‘common good’ through their maternal roles and their ‘life within the home’ as articulated in Article 41.1 of the Constitution (Lentin, 1998; Meaney, 1993; Robinson, 2003). By contrast, in the Citizenship
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Referendum debates, ‘non-national’ (m)others were othered and posited by the state as subverting the nation and the ‘common good’ by (m)othering the next generations of Irish citizens. Thus political and media debates regarding migrant parents of Irish children and the Citizenship Referendum were not only racialized, but also profoundly gendered. This gendering was evident in media accounts describing migrant (m)others as ‘being pregnant on arrival’, and arriving in Ireland without booking a maternity hospital place (O’Doherty, 2003), positioning them as central to the racial configuration of the Irish state (Lentin, 2003; 2004; 2005). Furthermore, politicians accusing migrant (m)others of ‘flooding’ Dublin’s maternity hospitals illustrate what Etienne Balibar (1991, 217–8) describes as ‘crisis racism’, which in the context of the Citizenship Referendum, assumes gendered meanings, putting the blame for the Republic of Ireland’s over-burdened and under-staffed maternity services on migrant (m)others allegedly all arriving ‘at the last moment’ to have children-citizens in Ireland (even though the actual figures do not support such accusations). The racial state initially used the maternity discourse to tighten Irish citizenship laws, even though the directors of Dublin’s maternity hospitals firmly denied claims by the Minister for Justice that they had ‘pleaded with him to change the law on the citizenship issue’ (Reid, 2004). Moreover, the argument later shifted as the Minister admitted the maternity crisis was a ‘side issue’ and that the real issue was ‘the integrity of the Irish citizenship law’ (Brennock, 2004). Thus migrant (m)others were cast as the racial state’s scapegoats, described as intentionally subverting the integrity of Ireland’s citizenship laws, even though the Minister admitted that the increasing numbers of ‘non-national’ births were a symptom rather than a root cause. According to Foucault, biopower’s control of populations means that the nation is conceived as a ‘body’ and that state power becomes essential to the ‘life’ of the nation (this explains the utility of genocide in getting rid of ‘lives unworthy of living’ in order to protect the body of the volk). This argumentation is substantiated by Nira Yuval-Davis’s argument that as the nation is invested in women as carrying the burden of its representation, women’s bodies demarcate the symbolic and material boundaries of national, ethnic and religious collectivities while also being the sites for contesting these boundaries (Yuval-Davis, 1997, 45–6). Eithne Luibhéid (2004) argues persuasively that discourses and practices which target childbearing asylum seeking women have allowed the government of Ireland to reconstitute the Republic as a sovereign space while also generating new According to Dervla King (2004), despite government claims, no comprehensive figures were produced by the Dublin maternity hospitals on the residency status of the women who presented for delivery. King stresses the heterogeneity of immigrants into Ireland having babies here, including returning Irish emigrants, EU nationals, labour migrants, asylum seekers, refugees with status, students and spouses of non-EU nationals.
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modes of racialization and racial hierarchies. Not only do migrant (m)others ‘renationalize the nation’, they also reconstruct Irish heterosexuality, precisely when it has been deconstructed following the decriminalization of homosexuality and in relation to current debates on partnership rights of non-heterosexual partners (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 108). It is important to remember, however, that positioning ‘non-national’ (m)others as intentionally mothering the next generation of Irish citizens continues the insidious positioning of sexually active Irish women as a danger to themselves, to men, and to ‘the nation’, and as subverting traditional constructions of Irishness. As Fintan O’Toole (2003a) argues, stigmatizing ‘non-national’ (m)others continues a 200-year-old tradition of policing unwed ‘Irish’ (m)others by incarcerating them in ‘Magdalen Laundries’ where they were silenced and enslaved by church and state, powers that ‘had long been the focus of suppressed Irish national identity’, and whose moral authority in relation to everything to do with morality, sex, and the family had been tacitly accepted by successive Irish governments’ (O’Toole, 2003b). Indeed, focusing state attention on female reproduction has a long history in the Republic of Ireland, which Ailbhe Smyth (1992a), writing about the constitutional prohibition on abortion in relation to the 1992 ‘X case’, named ‘a police state’, where women with unwanted pregnancies were (and still are) forced to seek abortions in another jurisdiction. And, I would add, where ‘non-national’ (m)others, whose bodies demarcate the nation’s boundaries through giving birth to future Irish generations, are specifically targeted by the racial state when the boundaries of who is entitled to reside in its territory are at issue. To sum up, the debates relating to Irish citizen children and the Citizenship Referendum were both deeply gendered and marked a disavowal of racial harassment, assuming Irish ‘whiteness’ as unproblematic. Fintan O’Toole (2003b) made the only media comment on the racism implicit in the January 2003 Supreme Court ruling. His argument was that while Irish citizenship passes from one generation to another if the person is ‘white’, even if not residing in Ireland, it does not apply ‘in those foreign countries that we see as somehow not part of “us”’ (see Lentin, 2007). Declaring itself ‘raceless’ and anti-racist, the Irish state has enacted a series of integrationist policies, dubbed ‘interculturalism’ by contrast with French assimilationism and British multiculturalism. Racial states and their raceless extensions, Goldberg argues, ‘have maintained firm control over social resources by setting agendas for a wide range of social concerns’, including ‘the shape of immigration and so the demographic profile of the nation’ (Goldberg, 2002, 233). This serves to explain the impetus for the Citizenship Referendum. Having positioned the gendered, racialized migrant subject as the target of state redefinitions of citizenship and entitlements, I now move to repositioning migrant women as agents of resistance to state racialization, albeit bearing in mind, as Goldberg writes, that ‘raceless states set social agendas to which resistance is by definition a reaction’ (2002, 232).
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From ‘Irish Born Children’ to Migrant Women’s Networks: Do Migrant Women’s Networks Subvert or Reaffirm ‘Intercultural Ireland’? Despite everything, we walk tall … I think we are transforming Ireland. (Salome Mbugua, cited in McKay, 2008)
In July 2003, as migrant African (m)others of Irish citizen children started receiving deportation letters, Salome Mbugua, national director of AkiDwA – the African Women’s Network – contacted me and together we convened a group of representatives from Irish and migrant NGOs and founded the Coalition Against Deportations of Irish Children (CADIC) to campaign against the removal of the right of residency for migrant parents of Irish citizen children. CADIC campaigned for nearly two years during which the Minister for Justice consistently refused to consider any en masse regularization of the residency rights of migrant parents of Irish citizen children, whom the state categorized as ‘Irish born children’, thus racially differentiating them from all other children born in Ireland. The ruling had made 11,500 migrant parents candidates for deportation. Among the 341 people actually deported there were 20 Irish citizen children who were made to leave Ireland with their deported parents. In January 2006, six months after winning the Citizenship Referendum with a landslide majority of 78.9 per cent, the Minister reversed the ruling according to which migrant parents of children born in Ireland were not allowed to apply for residency. AkiDwA’s initiative brought about the subversion of one of the consequences of the racial state’s re-drawing the boundaries of Irish citizenship – granting residency rights, albeit temporarily, to migrant parents of citizen children. Interestingly, however, not unlike the writing out of history the participation of women in the Irish national struggle until the advent of Irish feminist history, AkiDwA’s pivotal role in CADIC’s success was initially written out of the history of this particular struggle, seen as led by white Irish NGOs such as The Children’s Rights Alliance and the Irish Council of Civil Liberties. Paradoxically, only when CADIC abandoned its campaigning role and became an advice and information service to migrant parents of citizen children, has AkiDwA’s role been acknowledged. The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform established a special section to deal with these children and their parents, under the heading IBC – Irish Born Children Section. The campaign’s success was, however, circuitous and arguably due to reasons which had nothing to do with humanitarian considerations but rather with the state’s reluctance to engage in costly legal proceedings. For a full account see Lentin and McVeigh (2006). The title of the group was changed from The Coalition against Deportation of Irish Children to The CADIC Coalition, erasing the origins of the campaign. At present, CADIC uses state definitions, and is no longer a campaigning group; the CADIC Coalition concentrates on providing ‘information on the IBC/05 Scheme renewal process for non-
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By redressing this omission and re-inserting AkiDwA as a central player in this campaign (see also Integrating Ireland, 2007a) I want to reinscribe migrant women as agents of resistance. More generally, I argue that the increasing influence of the integrationist agenda of Irish ‘interculturalism’ – based on the Canadian-style ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1994) – gives networks such as AkiDwA a role in a new migratory reality, which constructs new ethnicized spaces, yet at the same time aims to absorb them, as ‘the new Irish’, into the Irish intercultural consensus. Migrant networks, which are given a voice in the new integrationist agenda, supported by the appointment in 2007 of a Minister of State for Integration, comply by inscribing ‘integration’, rather than anti-racism, as central to their ‘strategic plans’, with the understanding that this is the only way to be funded and included in the intercultural conservation (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 184). This move from anti-racism to integration can also be understood as a consequence of an under-theorization of racism and anti-racism and signals the ultimate success of the racial state in disguising and normalizing its techniques of racialization by promoting the ‘elimination of racism’ and consequently by declaring the obsolescence of anti-racist discourses and struggles.10 As more women migrate, increasing numbers are establishing their own gendered migrant networks, transferring skills and resources and transforming notions of appropriate gender behaviour (De Tona and Lentin, 2006). While networks are fluid forms of social association (Fuchs, 2001, 252), some migrant women’s networks become structured organizations which support migrant women globally. Because women often send home a greater proportion of their income as remittances (UNFPA, 2006), and because they are often more inclined to invest in alternative networks, migrant women’s networking is much more than an attractive metaphor for describing transnational migrant organizations. Interestingly, Castells argues that global capitalism network society has resulted in the rise of networked modes of social life which are historically gendered: ‘new social relationships of production translate into a good fit between the “flexible woman” (forced to flexibility to cope with her multiple roles) and the network enterprise’ (Castells, 2000, 20). In the network society people need more than in the past to rely on networks; to find forms of togetherness that are more fluid, capable of countering the strains of dislocation, distance and uncertainty. ‘Networks’ thus come to describe new forms of ‘life-sharing’ which bear the markers of gendered modes of social interaction in as much as they rely on ‘form[s] of sociability and solidarity tested by millennia of living “underground”’ (Castells, 2000, 20).
Irish national parents of Irish citizen children granted permission to remain in the State under the Irish Born Children Scheme 2005 (IBC/05)’ (see www.iccsi.ie/resources/cadic. pdf). Interestingly, CADIC, like most groups campaigning against the Referendum, avoided using the word ‘racism’ in line with the government’s argument that the re-definition of citizenship was ‘anti racist’ (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006, 179). 10 I thank Elena Moreo for this comment.
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Indeed – probably due to their pre-migration activities with development organizations in their countries of origin – the term ‘network’ is often retained by women migrants’ diasporic organizations AkiDwA was started by a group of seven African women in 2001 when Salome Mbugua, originally from Kenya, felt that racist stereotypes against African migrant (m)others needed countering. The early meetings were aimed to heal the pains of migration: In the first meeting the seven of us shared our experiences and we realized that racism was a big issue in this country. And we said we have to do something, we have to speak out, we have to heal … and then we said if we are experiencing that, what about the other women. At this stage we said we restrict the group to only African women and if it works we can open to other women… we had one thing in common, we were out of our countries, we were in a new land where we experienced that loneliness and lack of support … (interview, 2005)
The seven African women were particularly concerned about the experiences of migrant (m)others during the Citizenship Referendum debates: At that time women were attacked verbally and some time physically. It was a time when the media portrayed a negative image of migrant women coming to this country to get children so that they can get their status … I was actually a victim of that attack myself, I was spat at and told ‘don’t bring another nigger into this country’; I was pregnant, so I could actually understand the experience of other women who didn’t have the courage to challenge or say something. So we said we would do something and when we started AkiDwA, people started knowing about AkiDwA and we were invited to make presentations. (interview, 2005)
AkiDwA members used their experience as development workers, businesswomen and social workers in their countries of origin to conduct a needs analysis, run training courses, go into schools and participate in seminars and conferences. Within a very short time, through a broad range of activities despite being insufficiently funded, AkiDwA has become the voice of African women in the Republic of Ireland. AkiDwA activities include providing support and information for African women, awareness raising programmes, education and training, combating domestic violence and providing individual support to gender-based violence, influencing state and local authority policy, cultural events. At the same time AkiDwA has been networking with other migrant women’s networks in Ireland and abroad and with state and NGO players in the Irish context. Mbugua defines AkiDwA as a ‘network of networks’, linking with regional and local networks of African women throughout Ireland, mostly defined by their ethnic origin (e.g. a Nigerian women’s group, a Yoruba women’s group), with other migrant women’s networks (e.g. The Women’s Group of the Islamic
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Cultural Centre of Ireland), and with Irish NGOs and statutory bodies (e.g. the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism, the Equality Authority, Women’s Aid). AkiDwA published Herstory, ten stories of women migrating (AkiDwA, 2006), conducted research into the experiences of African women in the labour market (AkiDwA, 2007), and into gender-based violence from an African perspective (AkiDwA, 2008). The intersection of gender and race underpins the group’s raison d’être for coming together, in that members do not want to be spoken for by either white women or African men (as expressed by the AkiDwA mission statement). New transnational networks of migrant women operating in 21st century Ireland signal networking processes beyond and across the home country / new country trajectory, as new transnational spaces of cross-national boundary alliances, some based on occupational status (e.g., the network of women domestic workers, or international nurses’ networks), others based on imagined ethnic origins. Thus, while AkiDwA constructs ‘Africa’ as its members’ common ethnic origin, across their national and ethnic heterogeneities, Salome Mbugua’s vision for AkiDwA reflects a broader agenda beyond putative ethnic connections: My vision for AkiDwA … as we are working on the networking, we are letting people know about AkiDwA, and we are saying that it’s mainly about women speaking out about issues that are affecting them… my vision is to see AkiDwA having a women’s centre… my hope is also that the issue of migrant women will be more visible in the Irish system. Because at the moment, it’s still very invisible … (interview, 2005)
It is worth remembering that while the networking activities of women migrants in Ireland owe to 21st century Ireland’s increasing globalization, where new forms of migration – labour, asylum and other – are shaping the re-racialization of Irishness in new ways, we also have a ‘racial state’ determined to construct an integrationist policy and declare its ‘intercultural’ intentions while at the same time restricting immigration. The 21st century Irish ‘interculturalism industry’ (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006: 164) has spawned new spaces for migrant-led networks, which, although mostly seriously under-funded and under-resourced, through incorporating their representatives in a variety of state and NGO fora, are being invited to take part in new conversations on integration and interculturalism. Thus, on the one hand, ‘old’ informal networking processes, like those engaged in by more established groups of migrants (such as Jewish, Italian or ‘old’ Chinese migrants) have not become part of the integration and intercultural conversations. On the other hand, newer, perforce more formal networking processes, like networks of domestic women migrants (facilitated through the Migrants Rights Centre Ireland), or African women migrants, are supported by the ‘intercultural industry’ through state, church and NGOs, bringing them into the integration and intercultural conversations about, inter alia, needs, discrimination, citizenship status and labour rights and
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entitlements, but also about gendered concerns such as violence against women, FGM, sexual discrimination, and the connections between migration, marriage and family reunification. Furthermore, the state and its social partners (for a critique of the Irish social partnership model see Allen, 2000; Lentin and McVeigh, 2006) have apportioned spaces for diverse migrant groups, constituted in cultural terms, in celebratory events such as Chinese New Year and Africa Day. The latter, according to the Minister for Integration Conor Lenihan (2008, 17), ‘gets bigger and better’, with a ‘significant attendance of Africans living in Ireland’. Yet Africans participating in the event in 2008, are seen by the Minister as contributing above all to ‘a levelheaded debate about aid and the perils of corruption undermining aid efforts’, and less to a serious discussion of African lives in contemporary Ireland. AkiDwA’s participation in the Africa Day celebrations was a seminar titled ‘African Women Creating and Celebrating Change’, addressed by two African women ambassadors. The seminar, hosted by Irish Aid, a Department of Foreign Affairs body, also saw the launch of AkiDwA’s publication on understanding gender-based violence. The AkiDwA seminar celebrated the contribution of African women to both Africa and Ireland; it was not about Irish foreign aid politics as envisaged by the Minister, pointing to the contested space into which migrant networks have to fit in order to partake in the integration conversation. The ambiguities of the integration agenda were highlighted by another contributor to the seminar, a solicitor specializing in migration issues, who powerfully denounced the legally endorsed mode of state violence in relation to family reunification issues, pointing to a deliberate state strategy of keeping migrant families apart. These ambiguities – recognizing AkiDwA’s as a legitimate interlocutor in the intercultural dialogue while refusing to extend the inclusion rhetoric to asylum seekers – was also highlighted in the certificate award ceremony for women who graduated from AkiDwA’s training courses which ended the proceedings. The majority of the asylum seeker women graduates were unable to collect their certificates as, since completing the course, they had been moved by the immigration authorities to other hostels outside the capital. Conclusion A poignant illustration of the contradictions between racelessness and the increasing Irish emphasis on ethnic diversity, albeit seen as ‘doing things our way’,11 and hiding a homogenizing impetus which, as Goldberg (2002) suggests is ‘heterogeneity in denial’, is the proposed Immigration, Residence and Protection 11 This was illustrated in a recent conflict between the Garda Siochana, the Irish police force, and the Sikh community when a Sikh recruit to the Garda reserve force has been disallowed to wear a turban while on duty. The Minister of Integration has backed up the police chief by saying that migrant police recruits must ‘do things our way’, pretending
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Bill. Among other things, this bill compels ‘non nationals’ (defined as non-EEA nationals, an interesting re-definition of the category ‘Irish national’) to carry identity cards at all times; prohibits foreign nationals to change their names, except where authorized; forbids foreign nationals to marry without first notifying the Minister for Justice;12 and forbids asylum seekers and holders of non-renewable residence to marry at all (Integrating Ireland, 2007b). Some of these prohibitions have clear gender implications, yet gender considerations are not a significant feature of the proposed legislation or of the opposition to the proposed bill. AkiDwA, together with several immigrant support groups and women’s rights groups, has again taken the lead in pointing this out and has been in the forefront of a submission regarding the proposed bill to the Dàil Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights. The submission focuses on Ireland meeting international legal obligations for female asylum seekers and refugees. It notes that gender related abuse and sexual violence may be traumatic and impact on women’s ability to present their asylum applications, and proposes that procedural and evidential barriers which may hinder women’s access to the asylum determination process be removed. The submission recommends following the UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991). Allaying government fears that a large number of applications might result from such guidelines, the submission notes that Canadian Immigration has provided for gender-based claims for over a decade yet Canada has not seen a huge rise in gender based asylum applications (Submission, 2008). This submission has indeed been the only document to discuss the gender implications of the proposed bill, and it could definitely become a focal point for a gendered campaign around issues of immigration, the redefinition of Irishness and (m)otherhood. I want to conclude by asking whether co opting representatives of migrant networks in state and municipal integrationist initiatives is a governmental technology which ultimately serves the de-linking by the state of continuing immigration restrictions from its declared aim to integrate those migrants already in Ireland. I want to further ask whether migrant networks succeed in ‘transforming Ireland’ and subverting the racial state – as AkiDwA’s initiatives in relation to migrant parents of Irish citizen children and to the new immigration bill illustrate. Or do these networks, in their struggle to integrate members into Ireland’s everchanging ethnoracial migratory reality, in fact re-affirm the racial state’s biopower, assisting it in claiming its commitment to racelessness, which, as Goldberg (2002) argues, grows out of the state’s self-promotion in the name of rationality and the recognition of ethnoracially heterogeneous states. Through their involvement with actual networking processes, but also through becoming increasingly integrated that the Garda are a secular police force, while in reality it celebrates a Catholic ethos (for a discussion see O’Toole, 2007). 12 According to The Irish Times, 21 April 2008, this requirement has been removed. See article ‘Lenihan to make 200 changes to his own immigration bill’, http://www.ireland. com/newspaper/frontpage/2008/0421/1208468936238.html.
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into coalitions, alliances and organizations in Ireland and beyond, key network organizers, such as Salome Mbugua, are helping their networks mature, while at the same time facilitating their cooptation into the new spaces of integration and diversity as ultimately determined by the racial state. References Agamben, Giorgio. 1995. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. State of Exception. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press. AkiDwA. 2006. Herstory: Migration Stories of African Women in Ireland. Dublin: AkiDwA. AkiDwA. 2007. Black African Women Accessing the Irish Labour Market. Dublin: AkiDwA. AkiDwA. 2008. Understanding Gender Based Violence: An African Perspective. Dublin: AkiDwA, web.mac.com/greville1/AkiDwA/Events_files/GenderViolence pdf . Allen, Kieran. 2000. The Celtic Tiger: The Myth of Social Partnership. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1979. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Balibar, Etienne. 1991. ‘Racism and crisis’, in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso. Bauman, Zygmunt. 2003. Liquid Love, Cambridge: Polity. Bhattacharyya, Gargi, John Gabriel and Stephen Small. 2002. Race and Power: Global Racism in the Twenty First Century, London: Routledge. Brennock, Mark. 2004. ‘McDowell changes argument on referendum’, The Irish Times, 9 April. Castells, Manuel. 2000. ‘Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society’, British Journal of Sociology, 51(1): 5–24. de Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, University of California Press. De Tona, Carla and Ronit Lentin. 2006. ‘Overlapping multi-centred networking: Migrant women’s diasporic networks as alternative narratives of globalization’, in Karen Fricker and Ronit Lentin (eds) Performing Global Networks. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. Foucault, Michel. 2003. Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76. London: Allen Lane. Fuchs, Stephen. 2001. Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Goldberg, David Theo. 2002. The Racial State. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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Integrating Ireland. 2007a. Looking Forward, Looking Back: Experiences of Irish Citizen Child Families. Written by Liam Coakley and Claire Healy. Dublin: Integration Ireland / CADIC Coalition. Integrating Ireland. 2007b. Information Leaflet on the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill. Dublin: Integrating Ireland, Immigrant Council of Ireland, MRCI, Irish Refugee Council, NASC. Kelly, Mark. 2005. Immigration-related detention in Ireland: A research report for the Irish Refugee Council, Irish Penal Reform Trust and Immigrant Council of Ireland. Dublin: Human Rights Consultants. King, Dervla. 2004. Immigration and Citizenship in Ireland. Dublin: The Children’s Rights Alliance. Kundnani, Arun. 2007. The End of Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britain, London: Pluto Press. Lenihan, Conor. 2008. ‘Africa Day gets bigger and better’, Metro Eireann, 29 May – 4 June, 2008: 17. Lentin, Ronit. 1998. ‘”Irishness”, the 1937 Constitution and women: a gender and ethnicity view.’ Irish Journal of Sociology, vol. 8: 5–24. Lentin, Ronit. 2003. ‘Pregnant silence: (En)gendering Ireland’s asylum space’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 37/3: 301-22. Lentin, Ronit. 2004. ‘Strangers and strollers: Feminist notes on researching migrant m/others’, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 27/4: 301–14. Lentin, Ronit. 2005. ‘Black bodies and “headless hookers”: Alternative global narratives for 21st century Ireland’, The Irish Review, no. 33: 1–12. Lentin, Ronit. 2006. ‘Femina Sacra: Gendered memory and Political Violence’, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 29/5: 463–473. Lentin, Ronit. 2007. ‘Illegals in Ireland, Irish illegals: Diaspora nation as racial state’, Irish Political Studies, vol. 22/4: 433–53. Lentin, Ronit and Robbie McVeigh. 2006. After Optimism? Ireland, Racism and Globalization. Dublin: Metro Éireann Publications. Luibhéid, Eithne. 2004. ‘Childbeaing against the state? Asylum seeker women in the Irish Republic’, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 27/4: 335–50. McKay, Susan. 2008. ‘Sisters act’, The Irish Times Magazine, 24 May, 2008: 20–1. McVeigh, Robbie. Forthcoming. ‘Racism in the Six Counties: Has Peace Made Us the Race Hate Capital of the World?’ in Sean O’Brien et al. (eds) Immigration and Race in the New Ireland, Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame Press. Maddock, John and Charles Mallon 2003. ‘10,000 parents of Irish babies to be deported’, The Evening Herald, 23 January. Maphosa, Siphathisiwe (2007) Negotiating exclusion: Experiences of African women in the asylum process, MPhil in Ethnic and Racial Studies dissertation, Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin. Meaney, Geraldine. 1993. ‘Sex and nation: Women in Irish culture and politics’, in Ailbhe Smyth (ed.) Irish Women’s Studies Reader. Dublin: Attic Press.
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Mullally, Siobhàn. 2005. ‘Defining the limits of citizenship: Asking the question “Who belongs?”’ Legal Studies, vol. 25/4: 578–600. Ní Shuinéar, Sinéad. 2002. ‘Othering the Irish (Traveller)’, in Ronit Lentin and Robbie McVeigh (eds) Racism and Anti-racism in Ireland. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications. O’Doherty, Gemma. 2003. ‘The right to citizenship’, The Irish Independent, 23 January. O’Toole, Fintan. 2003a. ‘The sisters of no mercy’, The Observer Arts, 16 February. O’Toole, Fintan. 2003b. ‘Law with a dangerous edge of racism,’ The Irish Times, 24 January. O’Toole, Fintan. 2007. ‘The choice is simple: all or nothing’ The Irish Times, 28 August, 2007. Reid, Liam. 2004. ‘Masters deny seeking change of status on non-nationals’, The Irish Times, 13 March. Robinson, Helen. 2003. ‘Becoming women: Irigaray, Ireland and visual representation’, in Tricia Cusack and Síghle Bhreathnach-Lynch (eds) Art, Nation and Gender: Ethnic Landscapes, Myths and Mother-figures. Aldershot: Ashgate. Smyth, Ailbhe. 1992. ‘The politics of abortion in a police state’, in Ailbhe Smyth (ed.) The Abortion Papers Ireland. Dublin: Attic Press. Submission to the Dàil Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights on the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill. 2008. Dublin: AkiDwA, Cairde, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Integrate Mallow, Integrating Ireland, Irish Family Planning Association, Mayo Intercultural Action, Migrant Rights Centre Ireland, Women’s Aid. Taylor, Charles. 1994. ‘The politics of recognition’, in David T. Goldberg (ed.) Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. The Irish Times. 2004a. ‘Mourners at funeral told not to listen to rumours’, 31 July. The Irish Times. 2004b. ‘President of Malawi moves to $100 million palatial residence’, 23 December. The Irish Times. 2007. ‘Thousands of couples get deportation notice letters’, 30 August. The Irish Times. 2008. ‘Lenihan to make 200 changes to his own immigration bill’, 21 April, http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/frontpage/2008/0421/1208 468936238.html. UNFPA. 2006. State of World Population 2006: A Passage to Hope. Women and International Migration. United Nations Population Fund. UNHCR. 1991. Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, Geneva: UNHCR, www.icva.ch/doc00000822.html. Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias. 1989. ‘Introduction’, in Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (eds) Woman-Nation-State. London: Macmillan. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender and Nation. London: Sage.
Chapter 5
‘The people do what the political class isn’t able to do’: Antigypsyism, Ethnicity Denial and the Politics of Racism without Racism Robbie McVeigh
When Councillor Gorgio Bettio called for Nazi methods to be used to ‘deal with’ foreigners in December 2007 in the context of rising antigypsyism in Italy (Popham, 2007), he shattered one of the last shibboleths of post-war European anti-racism. It was possible to openly admire Nazi policies on race once again and get away with it. His remarks presaged an ongoing assault on the Roma population in Italy as the Italian Government introduced draconian measures to address its ‘Roma Emergency’. Alongside violence against Roma and Travellers that is all too depressingly familiar, we also see novel forms of racism emerging in the context of contemporary antigypsyism across Europe. These are often examples of ‘racism without racism’ (Lentin and McVeigh, 2006: 17–18, 169–171). Increasingly states and governments and politicians eschew any identification with racism precisely at the point their actions become most racist. Moreover this racism without racism is presented as being in the interests of the racialized – in Italy anti-Traveller initiatives are not only not racist but also intended to ‘bring dignity back’ to the Traveller population. ‘If an immigrant commits a crime against an Italian, ten immigrants should be punished for it, following the method used in Nazi concentration camps: this is the recipe for racial harmony advanced by Giorgio Bettio, a town councillor in Treviso, near Venice. Mr Bettio belongs to the Northern League, the xenophobic north Italian party which advocates secession from the south, and his suggestion is in the League’s tradition of calculated racist outrage … Treviso’s Jewish community yesterday proposed joint legal action against Mr Bettio with the city’s Roma community, the main target of recent racist anger’ (Popham, 2007). In the British and Irish context, the term ‘Traveller’ includes Roma, Romanichals, Irish Travellers and Scottish Travellers. Following Hancock, the analysis accepts that the term ‘Gypsy’ is a racist one – albeit one adopted by some Travellers – and is consequently only used with scare quotes. Antigypsyism is the amalgam of ideology and practice which attaches to the racialized ‘Gypsy’ as routine targets of racism and genocide (Hancock, 2002: xvii–xxi).
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This situation connects with a specific phenomenon of ethnicity denial. This concept has reference to many groups but it assumes specific relevance with regard to racism against Travellers. Ethnicity denial is the implicit or explicit assertion that a given group is not an ethnic group. Its key consequence is the implication that those whose ethnicity is being denied cannot by definition experience racism or genocide. This is emblematic of a wider process of racism without racism – the growing tendency of governments to repudiate the language and ideology of racism while reproducing racial inequality and subordination in practice. Almost no one now wishes to be labeled ‘racist’, yet states and governments continue to reproduce institutional and constitutional racisms and to visit racist violence of the most brutal kinds upon their minority ethnic populations. In this context they must produce different strategies to allow them to be ‘non-racist’. Of course, hypocrisy remains a key tool but ethnicity denial is becoming an increasingly useful strategy towards this end. If the Italian Government is currently in the vanguard of ‘emergency’ mode antigypsyism in Europe, the Irish government is leading in the more sophisticated, though no less damaging strategy of ethnicity denial. For the last five years the Irish State has been actively denying the ethnicity of Irish Travellers (McVeigh, 2007a; 2007b). This policy has had profoundly negative implications for Irish Travellers in the Republic of Ireland. It has arguably done as much damage to Travellers in Ireland with a velvet glove of liberal ‘interculturalism’ as the iron fist of Italian ‘post-fascism’. When we juxtapose these parallel Irish and Italian situations, we begin to raise specific questions about ethnicity and morality in 21st century Europe. The Italian model reprises racist violence from the fascist period while the Irish model offers a more post-modern take on how to destroy an ethnic group. The Irish model is perhaps the purest form of ethnicity denial and offers a template for any state wishing to ‘get away with’ racism. It also provides a stark warning for anyone struggling against racism. In both Italy and Ireland the state remains adamant that it is not racist and that it is fully committed to equality for Travellers. Both governments square the circle between theory and practice on racism with ethnicity denial. This process also raises profound questions about the nature of ethnicity itself – until some notion of ethnicity has been constructed, it is difficult to deny that a group possesses it. Ethnicity – Between the Mandla ‘Conditions’ and Strategic Essentialism From one perspective ethnicity is an odd thing for any Traveller population to mobilize or organize around – ideas like empowerment and consciousnessraising appear more radical, more internationalist, more engaged. Why would any people struggling against racism choose to organize around the issue of ethnicity? ‘Ethnicity’ is not a term that trips off the tongue of most communities of resistance in Europe or North America. Yet ethnicity continues to matter – especially to those groups whose ethnicity is denied. Of course ethnicity is also a contested
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concept – the ethnicity defined by different academic and legal and human rights perspectives is often profoundly different. Different notions of ethnicity form a continuum between objective ‘essential conditions’ and subjective ‘self-identification’. The Mandla v Lee judgement remains the definitive attempt to ground the concept in objective standards (Mandla & Another v Lee [1983] IRLR 210, HL). This 1983 British court case addressed the nature of ethnicity as part of its examination of the scope of discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976 (Commission for Racial Equality 2008). The judgement found that the two ‘essential conditions’ of ethnicity are: (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance. The additional ‘relevant characteristics’ are: (3) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (4) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common literature peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community (Commission for Racial Equality, 2008). The Mandla focus on conditions is thus profoundly different from the selfidentification principle of ICERD and CERD: Having considered reports from States parties concerning information about the ways in which individuals are identified as being members of a particular racial or ethnic groups or groups, is of the opinion that such identification shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned. (CERD 1990)
Once the principle of self-identification is established, the argument can be made that ethnicity is only about ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 1985). In other words, in stark contrast with Mandla, this approach suggests that there are no ‘essential conditions’ of ethnicity. From this perspective, there is no definitive ‘cultural stuff’ at all, ethnicity is a political resource to be utilized by the group rather than a ‘thing-in-itself’. Even at its most subjective, however, the reality is that for strategic essentialism to work, there has to be something that makes collective identity and collective action more than arbitrary. With the CERD approach, the need for some ‘justification’ is retained allowing some interrogation of the case for ethnicity. This implies that arbitrary collectivities should not be able to self-identify as ethnic groups without reason. There is a crucial reason for this. Arguably ethnicity only Similarly, for Barth ethnicity is essentially dialectical. His focus is on the ethnic boundary and its maintenance, not the ‘cultural stuff’ the ethnic boundary encloses (Barth, 1969).
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became politically important in the context of Mandla v Lee decision because it offered protection from racism. Few people other than anthropologists and sociologists would be exercised about whether Travellers – or indeed Rastafarians or Muslims – constitute an ethnic group if this decision did not have practical consequences. Crucially ethnicity became the most permissive category in British race relations legislation. (In the legislation, ‘racial grounds’ ‘means any of the following grounds, namely colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins’). Following Mandla v Lee, if a group could ‘prove’ its ethnicity against the Mandla conditions, it had secured a place within the ambit of British state anti-racism. The group had ipso facto proved that it could – at least in theory – be the subject of racism. As we know Sikhs and Jews ‘passed’ while Muslims and Rastafarians ‘failed’. ‘Gypsies’ and Irish Travellers both also had to run the Mandla gauntlet. This of course seems quite obscene in the case of ‘Gypsies’ – they were, after all, already the survivors of genocide. Nevertheless, ‘Gypsies’ in 1988 (CRE v Dutton) and Irish Travellers in 2000 (O’Leary v Allied Domecq) had to pass the Mandla test. Arguably the way in which these different Traveller groups had to speak about ethnicity ‘proves’ a degree of ‘strategic essentialism’ – insofar as the Race Relations Act 1976 was and is an effective protection from racism, groups had to pass the Mandla v Lee test. But this is no different from the strategic essentialism of other ‘uncontested’ ethnic groups – it was British law – not the nature of their identity – that forced the examination. From this perspective ethnicity matters not so much because it is the chosen identity of communities struggling against racism but because it has become the key to protection from racism within both state and transnational institutions. But this also gives some sense of how important the practice of ethnicity denial was to become. Once it became possible to deny protection from racism through denying ethnicity at either national or international level, states had found a mechanism to facilitate racism and repudiate accusations of racism. This strategy of ethnicity denial is, of course, not only a recent phenomenon – it has a long European history. Moreover, this history is specifically important to Roma and Travellers because it was associated with genocide. While Travellers usually find themselves at the cutting edge of ethnicity denial, the phenomenon is not by any means confined to them. Thus internationally we find claims of the denial by Denmark of the identity and continued existence of the Inughuit as a separate ethnic or tribal entity: The Committee reiterates its previous concern regarding the delay in resolving the claims of the Inughuit with respect to the Thule Air Base. The Committee notes with serious concern claims of denials by Denmark of the identity and continued existence of the Inughuit as a separate ethnic or tribal entity… (CERD, 2002). Likewise the application of the Race Relations Act and Mandla v Lee decision itself has also involved forms of ‘ethnicity denial’ in a British context. The Dawkins v Crown Suppliers case denied protection to Rastafarians and other cases have denied protection to Muslims (Jones and Gnanapala, 2000: 53–55). Thus Islamophobia – perhaps the definitive form of racism for the 21st century – remains a non-racism in the context of the RRA.
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Travellers, Ethnicity and Genocide Denial The notion that Roma and Travellers should be regarded as something other than an ethnic group has a long pedigree. They have variously been described as ‘criminals’ or ‘vagrants’ or ‘hereditarily sick’ or ‘lives unworthy of life’ (Hancock, 2002). Moreover this repudiation of peoplehood has been central to both the genocide of Roma and Travellers and the denial of that genocide. Genocide denial either ‘questions’ or actively denies that a genocide has happened. Classically, of course, it challenges the historical fact that the Nazis systematically exterminated Jews and Travellers in Europe during the 1940s. After the end of the Second World War in 1945, Holocaust denial was promulgated by a small number of Nazis and Nazi sympathisers. Since the 1970s, however, it has become more widespread (Lipstadt, 1994; Shermer and Grobman, 2002). It has also become increasingly challenged. Holocaust denial is currently a crime in Austria, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Lithuania, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland (Guttenplan, 2002; Shermer and Grobman, 2002: 11). Travellers have specific place within the broader process of genocide denial for two reasons. First, antisemitic Holocaust denial usually denies other Nazi genocides like that of the Gypsies or African Germans alongside its denial of the Shoah or Jewish-specific dimensions of Nazi ideology and policy. (Holocaust deniers are unlikely to reject Nazi atrocities against Jews but accept them against Travellers.) Second, the genocide of Roma and other Travellers is routinely understated because some researchers and activists on the Shoah emphasize the ‘uniqueness’ of the genocide of the Jews. Novick (1999), for example, argues that portraying the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish catastrophe has the effect of diminishing the significance of other genocides. More specifically this can lead to a denial or at least a downplaying of the importance of the Porrajmos or the ‘Gypsy Holocaust’ (Hancock, 1991). For example, Lipstadt’s influential review of growing Holocaust denial contains only one reference to ‘Gypsies’ (Lipstadt, 1994: 174). Thus there is no discussion at all of Travellers or ‘Gypsies’ experience of genocide in Lipstadt’s debunking of Holocaust denial. As Ward Churchill suggests, ‘Denying the Holocaust is thereby reduced to an exercise in holocaust denial’ (1997: 31). Certainly Romani activists and intellectuals have made a very strong case for the specific inclusion of Roma experience (Rose, 1991; Hancock, 2001) and this has been supported by non-Romani scholars (Churchill, 1997; Finklestein, 2003). Other scholars, however, continue to deny that Travellers experienced either ‘Holocaust’ or genocide. Lewy, for example, suggests that Nazi crimes, ‘do not constitute genocide within the meaning of the genocide convention’ (Lewy, 2000: 223). Yet, as Hancock point outs, Raphael Lemkin (who coined the term genocide) had signaled the genocide of the ‘gypsies’ even before the end of World War II (Hancock, 2001: 123). Porrajmos is ‘great devouring’ in the Romani language.
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The Porrajmos therefore occupies a specific and contested space in the politics of genocide denial. It is usually actively denied by those who deny the Shoah, it is sometimes actively denied by some analysts of the Shoah and it is denied by omission by many others. Nevertheless it appears intellectually and morally untenable not to acknowledge Travellers as victims and survivors of the Nazism and therefore as one of the key subjects of the ‘Holocaust’. With stronger reason, the Nazi – and other Axis – treatment of Roma and Travellers should be regarded as a genocide. It follows, therefore, that denying this history is properly regarded as ‘genocide denial’. Nazi antigypsyism drew on a much longer tradition of both European and specifically German antigypsyism (Hancock, 1987; 1991). Hancock details how as early as 1890 a conference was organized in Germany on the Zigeunergeschmeiss ‘Gypsy scum’ and the military were empowered to regulate movements of Gypsies; in 1899, the ‘Central Office for Fighting the Gypsy Nuisance’ was established; in 1909 a policy conference on ‘The Gypsy Question’ was held, and the recommendation made that all Gypsies be branded for easy identification; in 1920 the notion of ‘lives unworthy of life’ appeared suggesting that Gypsies should be sterilized and eliminated as a people. By 1922 all Gypsies in German territories were to be photographed and fingerprinted and in 1926 a law was directed at controlling the ‘Gypsy plague’; this was followed by the creation of concentration camps to incarcerate ‘Gypsies’ in 1927 and by 1928 all ‘Gypsies’ were placed under permanent police surveillance (Hancock, 1991). All of this policy and practice developed under the Weimar constitution and before the Nazis assumed power. In this sense the Nazi movement towards Porrajmos after 1933 evidences continuity with established German antigypsyism as much as a radical shift towards genocide (Hancock, 1991). There are a series of specific works on the Porrajmos which detail the specific Nazi (and other fascist) anti-gypsy projects (Hancock, 2002: 34–51; Kenrick, 1995; United States Holocaust Museum, 2008). The Nazis sometimes treated Travellers as a ‘criminal’ anti-social class and sometimes as an inferior racial minority. ‘Gypsies’ were officially defined as non-Aryan by the Nuremberg laws of 1935, which also first defined Jews in this way; both groups were forbidden to marry
Thus, according to the UN Convention on Prevention of Genocide: [G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. More broadly it is possible to avoid the politics attached to including/excluding different groups from the term ‘Holocaust’ by using the concept of ‘genocide denial’ in the same substantive human rights analysis.
Antigypsyism, Ethnicity Denial and the Politics of Racism without Racism
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Germans. In 1936 a Central Office for Combatting the Gypsy Nuisance opened in Munich. This office became the headquarters of a national data bank on Gypsies. At the same time the Ministry of Interior directives for ‘Combating the Gypsy Nuisance’ authorized the Berlin police to arrest Travellers and take them to a new, special ‘Gypsy internment camp’ or Zigeunerlager established near a sewage dump and cemetery in the Berlin suburb of Marzahn. Similar camps appeared in many other German cities as well as in other countries under Nazi occupation. Gypsies were also labeled as ‘asocials’ by the 1937 Laws against Crime, regardless of whether they had been charged with any unlawful acts. In 1938 Himmler defined the issue as ‘a matter of race,’ discriminating ‘pure Gypsies’ from ‘part Gypsies’ similarly to the way in which Jews were categorized (Hancock, 2002: 40–1). The legal status of Gypsies and Jews was finally determined by an agreement removing both groups from the jurisdiction of any German court, ‘transferring all criminal proceedings concerning [Travellers] to Himmler [because] the courts can only feebly contribute to the extermination of these people’. The ‘final solution’ to the ‘Gypsy Plague’ was decided by the ‘Auschwitz Decree’ of December 1942 (Hancock, 2002: 44–5). This led to the transfer of Travellers to Auschwitz/Birkenau. By the end of the war, 15,000 of the 20,000 Roma and Travellers who had been in Germany in 1939 had died (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2009). Hundreds of thousands more were killed in the ‘great devouring’ under Nazism across Europe. The UNESCO estimate is 500,000 deaths (Novitch, 1984) while other commentators believe the numbers of Porrajmos dead to be far greater. After the Porrajmos – The Continuity of Denial Despite the horror of the WWII genocide of Roma and Travellers, however, widespread discrimination against Travellers continued in peacetime. Most outrageously the Federal Republic of Germany decreed that all measures taken against Roma and Sinti before 1943 were legitimate policies of state and were not subject to restitution. Incarceration, sterilization, and deportation were defined by the post-war German state as appropriate policies towards Travellers. Furthermore, Robert Ritter, the Nazi racial expert on Roma, retained his credentials and returned to his work in child psychology. The Bavarian police took over Ritter’s registry of Roma in Germany. It was not until 1982 that German chancellor Helmut Kohl formally recognized the fact of the Nazi genocide against Roma. (In other words, the German state formally practiced genocide denial toward the Roma for nearly forty years.) By 1982, of course, most of the Roma eligible for restitution under
The Nuremberg racial laws of September 15, 1935, (‘Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor’ and ‘Reich Citizenship Law’) did not explicitly mention Gypsies, but in commentaries interpreting these laws, Gypsies were included, along with Jews and ‘Negroes,’ as ‘racially distinctive’ minorities with ‘alien blood.’
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Ethnicities and Values in a Changing World
German law had already died (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2009). This specific denial of the genocide of European Roma and Travellers continued long after the war in many other countries as well. For example, in 1994 the Czech Government suggested that there were no living survivors of Lety, the Second World War Romani death camp in Bohemia. Paul Polansky, however, located more than one hundred Lety survivors living in the Czech Republic and documented their experience of the Porrajmos (Polanksy, 1998). In the midst of this kind of genocide denial, we find ideas about ‘Gypsy’ criminality routinely invoked. This is often explicitly connected to the denial of Traveller ethnicity. For example, in Austria: A ‘Central Office for the Fight Against the Gypsy Nuisance’ was established in Vienna in 1936. The first deportation order for Burgenland Roma to the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps was issued on 5 June 1938, two months after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. Thousands of Gypsies were exterminated in concentration camps between 1938 and 1943. They died through forced labour, ga