CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
by Gordon Marino
PART
I:
FROM
ix
PLATO
TO
KIERKEGAARD
1. PLATO Euihyphro, Crito, and Th...
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
by Gordon Marino
PART
I:
FROM
ix
PLATO
TO
KIERKEGAARD
1. PLATO Euihyphro, Crito, and The Republic: Book II
Nicomachean Ethics 3. EPICTETUS The Enchiridion 4. ST. AUGUSTINK City of God; Book XIX 5. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Summa Theologica: Question XCIV 6. THOMAS HOBBES Leviathan: Part I. Of Man, Part II. Of Commonwealth 7. DAVID HUME An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 8. IMMANUEL KANT Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals 9. JOHN STUART MILL Utilitarianism 10. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER Parerga and Paralipomena 11. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE On the Genealogy of Morality 12. SOREN KIERKEGAARD The Sickness Unto Death: Part II 2. ARISTOTLE
PART
II:
THE
85 107 119
I 34 149
188 225 2 56 274
299
MODERNS
Anthropology and the Abnormal 14. MARY MIDGLEY Trying Out One's New Sword 15. JKAN-PAUL SARTRE Existentialism and Human Emotion 16. PHILIP HALLIE From Cruelty to Goodness 1 3. RUTH BENEDICT
3 43
309 321 328 333
viii • Contents The Disparity Between Intellect and Character
17. ROBERT COLES 18.
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. Letter from a Birmingham Jail
19. J OHN RAWLS A Theory of Justice 20. ALASDAIB MACINTYRE
After Virtue
and Moral Education 23. SUSAN WOLF
Moral Saints
25. PETER SINGER 26. TOM REGAN
Rich and Poor
The Case for Animal Rights
DON MARQUIS
Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands
THOMSON
445 462
A Sand County Almanac: The Land Ethic
27. MICHAEL WALZER 28. JUDITII JARVIS
396
424
Mortal Questions
24. ALDO LEOPOLD
356
378
Caring A Feminine Approach to Ethics
21. NEL NODDINGS
2 2. THOMAS NAGEL
3 50
486 506 530 545
A Defense of Abortion
Why Abortion Is Immoral
567
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
607
PERMISSION CREDITS
609
INTRODUCTION Gordon Marino
T h e existentialists had one thing right. To live is to abide within the chilly coordinates of constant choice, choices about what to value, about how to live our lives, about ethics. A few years back, I was at the bedside of a friend dying a slow, painful death. T h e r e was no hope of a recovery and she was haunted by the concern that she would be gobbling up all of her children's resources by continuing in her agonizing half-life. Worse yet, she feared that by the time the flames of pain had finished with her, all of her good memories and her repository of loving feelings would be cinder. "What," she once said with a sigh, "could be more humiliating, what could be worse than not caring anymore about anything except being free of pain?" One night, she calmly asked me to hand her a bottle of sleeping pills. I thought for a long moment: If her end was going to be as bad as she imagined it, why not? But it felt too much like playing God, and I demurred. On my way to a party, I am accosted by an unkempt man who insists that he needs taxi fare to take his feverish baby to the emergency room. Maybe 1 should trust him and help him out, but then again, would I only be lending a hand to make myself feel better? But wait—what am I? Some kind of narcissist? What difference do my motives make to a potentially desperate individual?
x • Introduction My mother passed away a few years ago. She had a dear aid friend whom I started visiting. A bright, interesting, and kind nonagenarian, she very much looks forward to o u r chats. However, every time I go to see her, I have to pass through a long ward of Alzheimer's patients and, much as I am ashamed to admit it, the sight unnerves me. Between the grief triggered about my mother and my two-way passage through the unit of people who are here and yet not here, I invariably leave the nursing home so depressed that I am not much good to anyone else for about twenty-four hours. Should 1 continue to visit my mother's friend? Your friend has applied for a job and you are on the hiring c o m m i t tee. Objectively speaking, he is qualified but his application does not exactly jump to the top of the pile. Years ago, he helped you find a position. You know f r o m experience the glass-in-your-gut feeling of u n e m p l o y m e n t . Should you try to give his application a boost? Would that be fair? T h e r e is an ancient and much prized virtue called loyalty. How should we balance fairness and loyalty when they come into conflict?—and they willcome into conflict. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, the killing fields of Rwanda, the American harrowing machine of slavery, and the genocide of Native A m e r i c a n s are h u m a n beings beasts? H o w can the h o r d e of us be so easily c o r r u p t e d and transformed into murderers? Or take it one or two notches up from the moral abyss to the recent scandals on Wall Street and in the banking industry: H o w could all of these Ivy L e a g u e - e d u c a t e d businessmen and -women, stalwarts of their c o m munities, defraud people out of their life savings while sipping martinis in the Hamptons? Abstract, concrete, and in between, the questions about ethics abound. W h a t constitutes moral progress? W h a t criteria should we use to evaluate conduct? C a n I morally justify my actions? Should I do the so-called right thing if it is against my self-interest? W h a t is the right thing anyhow? Do good and evil exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of humans? Is ethics a body of knowledge? If so, how do we acquire this knowledge? From books? Experience? Both? T h e s e are some of the p r o b l e m s that fall within the purview of ethics and this collection. But what unites this family of concerns? W h a t is ethics?
Introduction • xi Some say that what we call ethics is nothing more nor less than custom. Listen to Herodotus. In Book T h r e e of his Histories, he writes: . . . I have no doubt that Cambyses was completely out of his mind; it is the only possible explanation of his assault upon, and mockery of, everything which ancient law and custom have m a d e sacred in Egypt. If anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of choosing from amongst all the nations in the world the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably—after careful considerations of their relative merits—choose that of his own country. Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best; and that being so, it is unlikely that anyone but a madman would mock at such things. T h e r e is abundant evidence that this is the universal feeling about the ancient customs of one's country. O n e might recall, for example, an anecdote of Darius. W h e n he was king of Persia, he s u m m o n e d the G r e e k s who h a p p e n e d to be present at his court, and asked t h e m what they would take to eat the dead bodies of their fathers. T h e y replied that they would not do it for any m o n e y in the world. Later, in the presence of the Greeks, and through an interpreter, so that they could understand what was said, he asked some Indians of the tribe called Callatiae, who do in fact eat their parents' dead bodies, what they would take to burn them. T h e y uttered a cry of h o r r o r and forbade him to mention such a dreadful thing. O n e can see by this what custom can do. In other words custom is king. Scholars have noted that both the word "ethics" and the term "morals," which are often used interchangeably, derive respectively f r o m the Greek and Latin words for "customs." O n e of Socrates's interlocutors in Plato's Republic holds that ethics is nothing more than m a n n e r s or conventions and as such it has no basis in nature. On this account, there is n o t h i n g sacred about the injunction not to lie, n o t h ing from on High d e m a n d i n g that we refrain from cruelty. For Socrates's antagonist and the throng who think like him, the only
xii • Introduction law with objective force is written into our pulse and instincts in the f o r m of an innate desire to p u r s u e our self-interests and to take care of those close to us. It is the idea of "family values" writ large. From this skeptical point of view, norms are socially constructed rules that t h e strong individual has to learn how to feign following so that he or she can at least appear to be just; but, a la Machiavelli, the appearance is all that matters, and only so that the strong person can get what he or she wants. T h a t ethics has no objective reality, no basis in nature, is half of the gist of the immortal Ring of Gyges myth (see page 40), again f r o m Plato's Republic. According to the story with which G l a u c o n regales Socrates, a shepherd happens upon a ring that renders him invisible when he rotates the facet inward. T h e shepherd m u r d e r s the king and marries his wife. Glaucon insists that any intelligent man who could slip such a ring u p o n his finger would and should do the same. And if ethics is in fact just custom, a matter of putting the fork on the left side, then maybe Glaucon is correct and there is no reason to refrain from cheating on our taxes and spouses. In what the philosopher Friedrich N i e t z s c h e would come to see as a sin against h u m a n nature, Plato's Socrates reasons that not only should we act justly with or w i t h o u t the magical ring, but that the righteous individual w h o is wrongly declared unjust and severely punished is happier than the scoundrel who bamboozles people and receives honors from the local chamber of commerce. H e r e the connection between good living (ethics) and the good life (eudaimonia. happiness) looms up and begins its long march through the history of reflections on ethics in the west. In philosophical parlance, Plato and Socrates were both objectivists and cognitivists. T h e y believed that G o o d n e s s exists i n d e p e n dently of the mores of a particular society and that we can c o m e to know it. Indeed, it was with this transcendent standard of the G o o d in mind that Socrates, the war hero and devoted citizen of his beloved Athens, twice risked his life in acts of civil disobedience. T h e r e are glaring problems with the ethics-equals-customs equation. It does not seem right to say that when we c o n d e m n slavery or torture we mean only that these practices are simply conventions that h ave gone out of favor. Moreover, customs and manners are by definition a matter of taste akin to "You like bread p u d d i n g and I
Introduction • xiii don't." C o m m o n wisdom has it that t h e r e is something m o r e p r o found at stake with matters moral. W h e n we complain that the greed of the champions of finance has w r o u g h t havoc on the American economy and working people, we mean something more potent than the actions of these m o n e y - m o n g e r s is not to our taste. W h a t e v e r ethics may be, it cannot be strictly identified with customs. N e v e r theless, moral and social life are inextricably bound together. As Alasdair M a c l n t y r e puts it: Moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberately do not write "because social life changes," for this might suggest that social life is one thing, morality another, and that there is merely an external contingent causal relationship between them. Moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive forms of social life. {After Virtue) But moral concepts are more than social mores; they also differ f r o m legal strictures. For the most part, except in the cases of certain types of crimes, the law is not concerned with intentions. T h e law does not care w h e t h e r or not you paid your taxes with bitterness or alacrity; it merely demands that you carry out or abstain from certain types of conduct. On most accounts of morals, the springs of your actions speak to the issue of the moral worth of your actions. T h e r e are, moreover, m a n y acts that would raise the brows of conscience but to which laws are indifferent, actions such as malicious gossip and failing to help the poor. Finally, the halls of history are h u n g with statutes that could only have been written by the devil. Consider some of the Nazi legislation or our own miscegenation laws of a mere sixty years ago. As T h o m a s Aquinas and his longdistance learning student, Dr. Martin L u t h e r King, Jr., taught, ethics provides a standard for the law. Legal strictures that do not measure up to that standard, and so poison rather than n u r t u r e life, are only simulacra of a law and as such call for acts of civil disobedience. Although there may be considerable overlap, ethics is neither law nor custom. W h a t e v e r else it may be, ethics is the study of oughts and of relationships; that is, of how we aught to relate to ourselves, ought to relate to others, and as of late, of how we ought to relate to the earth.
xiv • Introduction If t h e r e is a factual or descriptive side to this discipline, it inheres in trying to c o m p r e h e n d h u m a n nature so as to g u i d e it. T h e anthology before you is an assemblage of classical texts on the science of oughts. But before squeaking open the door to this collection, we might press: W h a t is the use of studying these relationships? Of becoming a student of the literature on ethics? In the first m o v e m e n t of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle responds to this very question: As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what is, but in order that we may become good without which result our investigation would be of no use) . . . Notice, Aristotle does not offer a preface of this ilk in any of his h u n dreds of other tracts. T h e end of the study of ethics should not be the mere acquisition of knowledge or an increased ability to debate about right and wrong. Instead, the study of ethics ought to transform us in some way. H o w so? W h a t kind of transformation am I alluding to? In his philosophical m a g n u m opus, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Soren Kierkegaard observed that he wrote to make life m o r e difficult for his readers. Almost the same could be said for a w o r t h while collection on ethics. My hope is that spending time in these pages will make our lives m o r e difficult by illuminating problems that used to fly u n d e r the radar of conscience. And while these r e a d ings should sharpen our moral insight, they should also enhance our lives. For as the great Stoic Seneca puts it, " H e who studies with a philosopher"—or, I think, with a book of philosophy—"should take h o m e with him some good thing every day; he should daily return h o m e a s o u n d e r man, or on the way to become sounder."
PART I F R O M PLATO TO K I E R K E G A A R D
CHAPTER 1
PLATO
In a sense there are two authors responsible for these three texts: Euthyphro, Crito, and the Republic. Plato composed the dialogues Euthyphro and Crito, but it is widely believed that the conversations that comprise these magisterial works of literature and philosophy were based on discussions that his teacher Socrates engaged in at the time of his trial and death. T h e Republic is a later production and though Socrates is the central character in this work, the views and arguments expressed therein are widely held to be those of Plato himself. Born in Athens in 469 B.C., Socrates revolutionized thinking to such a degree that most scholars regard him and the dialectical method he developed as the starting point of Western philosophy. Today the philosophers who preceded Socrates, such as Anaximander, Xenophanes, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are routinely grouped together u n d e r the heading "the Pre-Socratics."* Socrates never wrote a word, perhaps because he heHeved that one needed to appropriate one's thoughts on philosophical matters and that writing was merely an aid to rote memorization. 1 In the Golden Age of Athens, in which Socrates matured and
' F o r die most part, the reflections of these early sages were a combination of myth and natural science. 'See Plato's seventh letter on this issue.
4 • Plato flourished, the ability to persuade assumed n e w importance. T h e great city state was a d e m o c r a c y and in order to accrue power in this type of government you had to learn how to convince others of your opinion. Philosophical sparring was c o m m o n over questions such as: Are morals based in n a t u r e or in custom? Can v i r t u e be taught? T h o u g h a stonemason by trade, Socrates was an intellectual m a r tial artist by calling. He became both famous and infamous for p u b licly dissecting the reasoning of the powerful and elite, often making t h e m seem foolish in the eyes of the crowd gathered at these examinations. A cadre of admirers swirled around him and listened intently as he debated sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras. Socrates did not regard his skills of analysis as a tool for amassing power in the worldly sense, but rather as a means of ferreting out the truth. His thinking may have been that both the internal and external worlds are always shifting. In order to achieve some degree of stability, h u m a n s need to have a compass. T h e only reliable compass in the face of flux is reason and argument. Socrates is not alone a m o n g our moral philosophers in seeking this ballast within the self. In a way, Socrates had nothing to teach but a method. After all, he claimed only one piece of knowledge, namely, that he knew that he did not know anything. Paradoxically enough, it was on the basis of this self-awareness that the oracle at Delphi judged him to be the wisest person in the world. Plato, who was born in 4 2 8 / 4 2 7 B.C. and died in 347 B.C., was one of Socrates's informal students: informal because unlike the Sophists, Socrates accepted no fees and did not profess anything. As Aristophanes's brilliant play The Clouds reveals, there were citizens who believed that Socrates's style of questioning u n d e r m i n e d faith in the gods of the city, and it was for this lack of faith that Athens was being punished. Socrates was b r o u g h t up on charges of sowing doubts about the gods and of corrupting the youth. He was unsuccessful in his ironic self-defense and was executed by being forced to drink hemlock. O n e of the selections, Crito, is set in Socrates's prison cell as he awaits execution. Plato was surely p r e s e n t at his mentor's trial. A stern critic of democracy, Plato recognized the intimate bond between the health of the individual and that of t h e state. On his account, one needed to know the Good in order to steer the state in a good direction. T r y i n g
Ethics: The Essential Writing.r • 5 to put theory into practice, Plato, on more than one occasion, undertook the task of trying to transform upstart kings into philosophers. These adventures ended in disaster, making for a certain hidebound quality to Plato's late works. It is difficult to parse out the ethical positions of Socrates from those of his genial student, Both placed enormous emphasis on the relation between knowledge and moral goodness; so much so that it seems that Socrates, at least, held the extreme view that moral virtue is essentially knowledge. If you truly know the Good, you will do it. For him there is no weakness of the will. Also, as the renowned classicist Terence Irwin notes, Socrates seems to have held that we ought to lead a moral life whether or not such a life leads to happiness. Plato, in contrast, argues that the righteous life is not only good in itself but also a necessary condition of a eudaimonia or a happy life. These issues as well as the question of whether or not moral laws are customs or objective realities are taken up in the Ring of Gyges excerpt from Book II of the Republic.
EUTHYPHRO
PERSONS OV THE DIALOGUE
Socrates
Euthyphro
SCENE:—The Porch of the KingArchon EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in the porch of the King Archon? Surely you can not be engaged in an action before the king, as 1 am. SOCRATES: Not in an action, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use. EUTH: What! 1 suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I can not believe that you are the prosecutor of another. soc: Certainly not. EUTH: T h e n some one else has been prosecuting you? soc: Yes. EUTH: A n d w h o i s h e ?
soc: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and'he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown. EUTH: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. And what is the charge which he brings against you?
Euthyphro • 7 soc: W h a t is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that 1 am anything but a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of c o r r u p t i n g his young friends. And of this our m o t h e r the state is to be the judge. Of all o u r political men he is the only one w h o seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; he is a good husbandman, and takes care of the shoots first, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. T h a t is the first step; he will afterward attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor. EUTH: T hope that he may; hut I rather fear, Socrates, that the reverse will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the state in a sacred place. But in what way does he say that you c o r r u p t the young? soc: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that T am a poet or maker of gods, and that I make new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment. EUTH: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received, for the world is always jealous of novelties in religion. And I know that when I myself speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the f u t u r e to them, they laugh at me as a madman; and yet every word that 1 say is true. But they are jealous of all of us. I suppose that we must be brave and not mind them. s o c : T h e i r laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a m a t t e r of m u c h consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not care m u c h about this, until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry. EUTH: I have no desire to try conclusions with them about this, s o c : 1 dare say that you don't make yourself c o m m o n , and are not apt
8 • Plato to i m p a r t your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians know this; and therefore, as I was saying, if the Athenians would only laugh at me as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict. EUTH: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win mine, s o c : And what is your suit? and are you the p u r s u e r or defendant, Euthyphro? EUTH: I am p u r s u e r ,
s o c : Of whom? EUTH: You will think me mad when I tell you w h o m I am pursuing. soc: Why, has the fugitive wings? EUTII: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life. s o c : W h o is he? EUTH: M y f a t h e r .
SOC: Your father! good heavens, you don't m e a n that? EUTH: Yes.
s o c : And of what is he accused? EUTH: M u r d e r , Socrates. s o c : By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the c o m m o n herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man and have m a d e great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to this. EUTH: Indeed, Socrates, he must have m a d e great strides, soc: I suppose that the man whom your father m u r d e r e d was one of your relatives; if he had been a stranger you would never have t h o u g h t of prosecuting him. EUTH: I am amused, Socrates, ac your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself by proceeding against him. T h e real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, t h e n even if the m u r d e r e r is u n d e r the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him.
Euthyphro • 9 N o w the man who is dead was a poor d e p e n d a n t of m i n e who worked for us as a field laborer at Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. M e a n t i m e he had no care or t h o u g h t of him, being u n d e r the impression that he was a murderer; and that even if he did die there would be no great harm. And this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and h u n g e r and chains u p o n him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the m u r d e r e r and prosecuting my father. T h e y say that he did not kill him, and if he did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. T h a t shows, Socrates, how little they know of the opinions of the gods about piety and impiety, soc: G o o d heavens, Euthyphro! and have you such a precise knowledge of piety and impiety, and of divine things in general, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state, you are not afraid that you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father? EUTH: T h e best of E u t h y p h r o , and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from o t h e r men, is his exact knowledge of all these matters. W h a t should 1 be good for without that? soc: Rare friend! I think that T can not do better than be your disciple, before the trial with Meletus comes on. T h e n I shall challenge him, and say that 1 have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. N o w you, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge E u t h y p h r o to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you think that of him you o u g h t to think the same of me, and not have me into court; you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who is the real corruptor, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if M e l e t u s refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the i n d i c t m e n t from me to you, I
10 • Plato can not do better than say in the court that T challenged him in this way. EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I don't find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me. s o c : I know that, dear friend; and that is the reason why T desire to be your disciple. For 1 observe that no one, not even Meletus, appears to notice you; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you k n e w so well, and of murder, and the rest of them. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again, is not that always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious? EUTH: T O be sure, Socrates, soc: And what is piety, and what is impiety? EUTH: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any other similar c r i m e — w h e t h e r he be your father or mother, or some other person, that makes no d i f f e r e n c e — a n d not prosecuting t h e m is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of t h e t r u t h of what 1 am saying, which 1 have already given to others:—of the truth, I mean, of the principle that the impious, whoever he may be, o u g h t not to go u n p u n i s h e d . For do not m e n regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and even they admit that he b o u n d his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. T h i s is their inconsistent way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned, soc: M a y not this be the reason, E u t h y p h r o , why I am charged with i m p i e t y — t h a t I can not away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about t h e m approve of them, I can not do better than assent to your superior wisdom. For what else can I say, confessing as 1 do, that I know nothing of them. I wish you would tell me whether you really believe that they are true?
Euthyphro • 11 EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance, soc: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? T h e temples are full of them; and notably t h e robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro? EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you. soc: T dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a m o r e precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, W h a t is "piety"? In reply, you only say that piety is, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder? EUTH: And that is true, Socrates. s o c : I dare say, Euthyphro, but there are m a n y other pious acts. EUTH: T h e r e a r e .
soc: R e m e m b e r that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which m a d e the impious impious, and the pious pious? EUTH: I r e m e m b e r .
s o c : Tell me what this is, and then T shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may m e a s u r e the nature of actions, w h e t h e r yours or any one else's, and say that this action is pious, and that impious? EUTH: 1 will tell you, if you like, soc: I should very m u c h like. EUTH: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them, soc: Very good, E u t h y p h r o ; you have now given me just the sort of answer which I wanted. But w h e t h e r it is true or not I can not as yet tell, although I make no douht that you will prove the t r u t h of your words. EUTH: O f c o u r s e .
12 • Plato soc: C o m e , then, and let us examine what we are saying. T h a t thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious. Was not that said? EUTH: Yes, that was said. s o c : And that seems to have been very well said too? EUTH: Yes, Socrates, I think that; it was certainly said, soc: And further, E u t h y p h r o , the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences—that was also said? EUTH: Yes, that was said. SOC: And what sort of difference creates e n m i t y and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a n u m b e r ; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to calculation, and end t h e m by a sum? EUTH: T r u e .
soc: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly put an end to that difference by measuring? EUTH: T h a t is true. soc: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing-machine? EUTH: T O be sure. soc: But what differences are those which, because they can not be thus decided, make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that this happens when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Are not these the points about which, when differing, and unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, we quarrel, when we do quarrel, as you and I and all men experience? EUTH: Yes, Socrates, that is the nature of the differences about which we quarrel. soc: And the quarrels of the gods, noble E u t h y p h r o , when they occur, are of a like nature? EUTH: T h e y are.
s o c : T h e y have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if t h e r e had been no such differences—would t h e r e now?
Euthyphro • 13 EUTH: You are quite right. soc: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them? EUTH: Very true. soc: But then, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust; and they dispute about this, and there arise wars and fightings a m o n g them. EUTH: Yes, that is true. soc: T h e n the same things, as appears, are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? EUTH: T r u e .
soc: T h e n upon this view the same things, E u t h y p h r o , will be pious and also impious? EUTH: T h a t , 1 suppose, is true. soc: T h e n , my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered what I asked. For I certainly did not ask what was that which is at once pious and impious: and that which is loved by the gods appears also to be hated by them. And therefore, E u t h y p h r o , in thus chastising y o u r father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to C r o n o s or Uranus, and what is acceptable to H e p h a e s t u s but unacceptable to Hera, and t h e r e may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion. EUTH: But 1 believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a m u r d e r e r : there would be no difference of opinion about that, soc: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a m u r d e r e r or any sort of evil-doer o u g h t to be let off? EUTH: I should rather say that they are always arguing this, especially in courts of law: they c o m m i t all sorts of crimes, and t h e r e is n o t h i n g that they will not do or say in order to escape punishment, soc: But do they admit their guilt, E u t h y p h r o , and yet say that they o u g h t not to be punished? EUTH: N o ; t h e y do not.
s o c : T h e n there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? EUTH: Yes.
14 • Plato s o c : T h e n they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? EUTH: T r u e .
s o c : And the gods are in the same case, if as you imply they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say that they w r o n g one another, and others of t h e m deny this. For surely neither G o d nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of evil is not to be punished:—you don't mean to tell me that? EUTH: T h a t is true, Socrates, in the main. soc: But they join issue about particulars; and this applies not only to men but to the gods; if they dispute at all they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which some affirm to be just, others to be unjust. Is not that true? EUTH: Q u i t e true. s o c : Well then, my dear friend E u t h y p h r o , do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the Opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is p u t in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is p u t in chains before his corrector can learn from the interpreters what he o u g h t to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. H o w would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as you live. EUTH: T h a t would not be an easy task, although I could make the m a t t e r very clear indeed to you. s o c : I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to t h e m you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. EUTH: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me. soc: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. T h e r e was a notion that c a m e into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself "Well, and what if E u t h y p h r o does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I k n o w anything more of the n a t u r e of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still these distinctions have no bearing on the definition of piety
Euthyphro • 15 and impiety, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I don't ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods c o n d e m n and abominate such an action. But 1 will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of t h e m love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? EUTH: W h y not, Socrates?
soc: W h y not! certainly, as far as 1 am concerned, E u t h y p h r o . But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. EUTH: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious, soc: O u g h t we to inquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the m e r e statement on our own authority and that of others? EUTH: We should inquire; and 1 believe that the statement will stand the test of inquiry, soc: T h a t , my good friend, we shall know better in a little while. T h e point which I should first wish to u n d e r s t a n d is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods. EUTH: I don't u n d e r s t a n d your meaning, Socrates, soc: 1 will endeavor to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. And here is a difference, the nature of which you understand. EUTH: I think that I understand. s o c : And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves? EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? EUTH: N O ; that is the reason. s o c : And the same is true of that which is led and of that which is seen? EUTH: T r u e .
soc: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing in the state of being led
16 • Pla to because it is led, or in the state of being carried because it is carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is becoming because it comes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you admit that? EUTH: Y e s .
soc: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? EUTH: Y e s .
soc: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved Follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. EUTH: T h a t is certain. soc: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? EUTH: Y e s .
soc: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? EUTH: No, that is the reason. soc: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? EUTH: Y e s .
soc: And that which is in a state to be loved of the gods, and is dear to them, is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Then that which is loved of God, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things. EUTH: H O W do you mean, Socrates? soc: 1 mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved. EUTH: Y e s .
soc: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them. EUTH: T r u e .
soc: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same as that which is dear to God, and that which is holy is loved as being holy,
Euthyphro • 17 then that which is dear to G o d would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to G o d is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. Rut now you see that the reverse is t h e case, and that they are quite different f r o m one another. For one (-deocpiXeQ is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other ( 8 o i o v ) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. T h u s you appear to me, E u t h y p h r o , when T ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the e s s e n c e — t h e attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the n a t u r e of piety. And therefore, if you please, 1 will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what piety or holiness really is, w h e t h e r dear to the gods or not (for that is a m a t t e r about which we will not quarrel). And what is impiety? EUTH: I really do not know, Socrates, how to say what I mean. For somehow or other o u r arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to t u r n round and walk away, soc: Your words, E u t h y p h r o , are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or p r o p o u n d e r of them, you might say that this comes of my being his relation; and that this is the reason why my arguments walk away and won't remain fixed where they are placed. But now, as the notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move. EUTH: Nay, Socrates, 1 shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned, soc: T h e n 1 must be a greater than Daedalus; for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, 1 move those of other people as well. And t h e beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus to be able to detain t h e m and keep t h e m fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are indolent, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the n a t u r e of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labor. Tell me, then,—Is not that which is pious necessarily just? EUTH: Yes.
18 • Plato s o c : And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just only in part and not all pious? EUTH: 1 don't understand you, Socrates. s o c : And yet 1 know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of y o u r wisdom makes you indolent. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in u n d e r s t a n d i n g me. W h a t I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. T h e p o e t (Stasinus) sings— Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence. And T disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what 1 disagree? EUTH: By all m e a n s .
soc: 1 should not say that where t h e r e is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that m a n y persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear. EUTH: Very true. s o c : But w h e r e reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and s h a m e about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation. EUTH: N o d o u b t .
s o c : T h e n are we wrong in saying that w h e r e there is fear t h e r e is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence t h e r e is also fear. But t h e r e is not always reverence w h e r e t h e r e is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and n u m b e r is a more extended notion than, the odd. 1 suppose that you follow me now? EUTH: Q u i t e well. s o c : T h a t was the sort of question which I m e a n t to raise when asking w h e t h e r the just is the pious, or the pious t h e just; and w h e t h e r t h e r e may not be justice where there is not always piety; for justice is the m o r e extended notion of which piety is only a part, Do you agree in that? EUTH: Yes; that, 1 think, is correct-
Euthyphro • 19 soc: T h e n , now, if piety is a part of justice, T suppose that we inquire what part? If you had pursued the injury in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of n u m b e r the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a n u m b e r which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you agree? EUTH: Yes.
soc: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness; that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety; as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites. EUTH: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as t h e r e is the other part of justice which attends to men. soc: T h a t is good, E u t h y p h r o ; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have f u r t h e r information. W h a t is the m e a n i n g of "attention"? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is not that true? EUTH: Q u i t e true. soc: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses? EUTH: Yes.
soc: N o r is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman. EUTH: T r u e .
soc: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the an of attending to dogs? EUTH: Yes.
s o c : As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? EUTH: Very true. soc: And as holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro? EUTH: Yes.
soc: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of
20 • Plato that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not? EUTH: T r u e .
soc: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt? EUTH: Certainly, not for their hurt, soc: But for their good? EUTH: Of c o u r s e .
soc: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined as the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better? EUTH: No, no; that is certainly not my meaning, soc: Indeed, E u t h y p h r o , I did not suppose that this was your meaning; far otherwise. And that was the reason why I asked you the nature of this attention, because I t h o u g h t that this was not your meaning. EUTH: You do me justice, Socrates; for that is not my meaning, soc: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety? EUTH: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters, soc: 1 u n d e r s t a n d — a sort of ministration to the gods. EUTH: Exactly.
soc: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, tending to the attainment of some object—would you not say health? EUTH: Yes.
soc: Again, there is an art which ministers to t h e ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result? EUTH: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship, soc: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house? EUTH: Yes.
SOC: And now tell me, my good friend, about this art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion. EUTH: And that is true, Socrates.
Euthyphro • 21 soc: Tell me then, oh tell m e — w h a t is that fair work which the gods do by the help of us as their ministers? EUTH:.Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. soc: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them? EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth? EUTH: Exactly.
soc: And of the many and fair things which the gods do, which is the chief and principal one? EUTH: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. T h a t is piety, which is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction, soc: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But T see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me: else why, when we had reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me T should have learned of you by this time the nature of p i e t y Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily d e p e n d e n t on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing? KUTH: Y e s , I d o .
soc: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods? JIUTH: Yes, Socrates. soc: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving? EUTH: You understand me capitally, Socrates. soc: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore n o t h i n g which you say will be thrown away u p o n me. Please then to tell me, what is the n a t u r e of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
22 • Plato EUTH: Y e s , I d o .
SOC: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want? EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning, in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want. EUTH: Very true, Socrates. soc: T h e n piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another? EUTH: T h a t is an expression which you may use, if you like, soc: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. T h a t they are the givers of every good to us is clear; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them. EUTI-I: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from what they receive of us? soc: But if not, Euthyphro, what sort of gifts do we confer upon the gods? EUTH: What should we confer upon them, but tributes of honor; and, as I was just now saying, what is pleasing to them? soc: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them? EUTH: 1 should say that nothing could be dearer. soc: T h e n once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods? EUTH: N O doubt. soc: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle; and that is yourself: for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. I think that you must remember our saying that the holy or pious was not the same as that which is loved of the gods. Do you remember that? EUTH: I d o .
Euthyphro • 23 soc: And do you not see that what is loved of the gods is holy, and that this is the same as what is dear to them? ICUTH: T r u e .
soc: T h e n either we were wrong in that admission; or, if we were right then, we are w r o n g now. KUTH: I suppose that is the case. soc: T h e n we must begin again and ask, W h a t is piety? T h a t is an inquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I shall detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. For if you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have r u n such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too m u c h respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear E u t h y p h r o , and do not hide your knowledge. LCUTH: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now. soc: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety, so that I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. T h e n I might have proved to him that I had been converted by E u t h y p h r o , and had done with rash innovations and speculations, in which I had indulged through ignorance, and was about to lead a better life.
CRITO
PERSONS OF T H E DIALOGUE
Socrates
Crito
SCENE:—The Prison of Socrates SOCRATES: W h y have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite early? CRITO: Y e s , c e r t a i n l y ,
soc: What is the exact time? CR: T h e dawn is breaking. SOC: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in. CR: He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover, 1 have done him a kindness, soc: And are you only just come? CR: No, I came some time ago. soc: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me at once? CR: Why, indeed, Socrates, T myself would rather not have all this sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wondering at your peaceful slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in the calmness of your temperament; but never did 1
Crito • -?7 see t h e like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this calamity. soc: Why, Crito, w h e n a man has reached my age he ought not to be repining at the prospect of death. CR: And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes, and age does not prevent them f r o m repining, soc: T h a t may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour. CR: I c o m e to bring you a message which is sad and pain; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me. soc: What! I suppose that the ship has c o m e from Delos, on the arrival of which 1 am to die? CR: N o , the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be h e r e to-day, as persons who have c o m e from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life, soc: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day. CR: W h y do you say this? soc: I will tell you. 1 am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship? CR: Yes; that is what the authorities say. soc: But 1 do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow; this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep. CR: And what was the n a t u r e of the vision? soc: T h e r e came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates, The third day hence to Phthia shalt thou go. CR: W h a t a singular dream, Socrates! soc: T h e r e can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think. CR: Yes; t h e m e a n i n g is only too clear. But, Oh! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once m o r e to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give
26 • Plato money, but that T did not care. Now, can t h e r e be a worse disgrace than this—that T should be t h o u g h t to value m o n e y more than the life of a friend? For the m a n y will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused. SOC: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? G o o d men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they happened. CR: But do you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the m a n y must be regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the very greatest evil to any one who has lost their good opinion. s o c : T only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that they can do neither good nor evil: they can not make a man wise or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance. CR: Well, T will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates, w h e t h e r you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may get into trouble with t h e informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may h a p p e n to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to r u n this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say. s o c : Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one. CR: Fear not. T h e r e are persons who at no great cost are willing to save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you may observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their demands; a little m o n e y will satisfy them. My means, which, as 1 am sure, are ample, are at y o u r service, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, h e r e are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the T h e b a n , has b r o u g h t a sum of money for this very purpose; and C e b e s and m a n y others are willing to spend their money too. I say therefore, do n o t on that account hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; t h e r e
Onto
>7
are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. N o r can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I should say that you were betraying your children; for you might bring them up and e d u c a t e them; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will he small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their n u r t u r e and education. But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become one who professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when T reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our want of courage. T h e trial need never have come on, or might have been brought to another issue; and the end of all, which is the crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us, through cowardice and baseness, who might have saved you, as you might have saved yourself if we had been good for anything (for t h e r e was no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how disgraceful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as well as to you. Make your mind up then, or rather have your mind already m a d e up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to he done, which must be done, if at all, this very night, and which any delay will render all but impossible; T beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be persuaded by me, and to do as I say. soc: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and therefore we o u g h t to consider w h e t h e r these things shall be done or not. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which u p o n reflection appears to me to be the best; and now that this f o r t u n e has come u p o n me, I can not put away the reasons which I have before given: the principles which I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can find other and better principles on the
28 • Plato instant, I am certain not to agree with yon; no, not even if the power of the m u l t i t u d e could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the question? Shall 1 r e t u r n to your old a r g u m e n t about the opinions of men? some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were saying, are not to be regarded. N o w were we right in maintaining this before 1 was c o n d e m n e d ? And has the a r g u m e n t which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking;—in fact an a m u s e m e n t only, and altogether vanity? T h a t is what 1 want to consider with your help, Crito:—whether, u n d e r my present circumstances, the a r g u m e n t appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. T h a t argument, which, as 1 believe, is maintained by m a n y who assume to be authorities, was to the effect, as 1 was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. N o w you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are n o t going to die t o - m o r r o w — a t least, there is no h u m a n probability of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, w h e t h e r I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some m e n only, are to be valued, and other opinions, and the opinions of o t h e r men, are not to be valued. I ask you w h e t h e r I was right in maintaining this? CR: Certainly. SOC: T h e good are to be regarded, and not the bad? CR: Yes. soc: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil? CR: Certainly. soc: And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—-his physician or trainer, whoever that was? CR: Of one man only. soc: And he ought to fear the censure and w e l c o m e the praise of that o n e only, and not of the many? CR: T h a t is clear.
Crito • -?7 soc: And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other m e n p u t together? CR: T r u e . soc: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the m a n y who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil? CR: Certainly he will. soc: And what will the evil be, whither t e n d i n g and what affecting, in the disobedient person? CR: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil, soc: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, o u g h t we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence m o r e than all the rest of the world: and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice;—is t h e r e not such a principle? CR: Certainly there is, Socrates. s o c : T a k e a parallel instance:—if, acting u n d e r the advice of m e n who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by health and deteriorated by disease—when that has been destroyed, 1 say, would life be worth having? And that i s — t h e body? CR: Yes. soc: C o u l d we live, having an evil and c o r r u p t e d body? CR: Certainly not. soc: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body? CR: Certainly not. soc: M o r e honored, then? CR: Far more honored.
30 • Plato s o c : T h e n , my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has u n d e r s t a n d i n g of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.—Well, s o m e one will say, "but the many can kill us." CR: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer. SOC: T h a t is true: but still I find with surprise that the old a r g u m e n t is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. .And I should like to know w h e t h e r 1 may say the same of another p r o p o s i t i o n — t h a t not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued? CR: Yes, that also remains. soc: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable o n e — t h a t holds also? CR: Yes, that holds. SOC: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I o u g h t or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if 1 am clearly right in escaping, then 1 will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. T h e other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating children, are, as I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to p u t t h e m to d e a t h — a n d with as little reason. But now, since the a r g u m e n t has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying t h e m in money and thanks, or w h e t h e r we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation. CR: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed? soc: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either r e f u t e me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I o u g h t to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first position, and do your best to answer me.
Crito • -?7 cu: I will do my best. soc: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the t r u t h of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that? CR: Yes. soc: T h e n we must do no wrong? CR: Certainly not. soc: N o r when injured injure in return, as the m a n y imagine; for we must injure no one at all? CR: Clearly not. soc: Again, Crito, may we do evil? CR: Surely not, Socrates. soc: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many—is that just or not? CR: N o t just. soc: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him? CR: Very true. s o c : T h e n we ought not to retaliate or r e n d e r evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable n u m b e r of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed u p o n this point have no c o m m o n ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, w h e t h e r you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation n o r warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another
32 • Plato opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as f o r m e r l y I will proceed to the next step. CR: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind, s o c : T h e n I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a q u e s t i o n : — O u g h t a man to do what he admits to be right, or o u g h t he to betray the right? CR: He ought to do what he thinks right. Soc: Rut if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I w r o n g any? or rather do I not w r o n g those whom I o u g h t least to wrong? Do I not desert t h e principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? W h a t do you say? CR: I can not tell, Socrates; for I do not know. s o c : T h e n consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am about to play t r u a n t (you may call the p r o c e e d i n g by any n a m e which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: "Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are vou going by an act of yours to overturn u s — t h e laws and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?" W h a t will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? A n y one, and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence." Suppose I say that? CR: Very good, Socrates. s o c : "And was that our a g r e e m e n t with you?" the law would say; "or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?" And if I were to express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add: "Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to u r g e against those of us who regulate marriage?" N o n e , I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the system of n u r t u r e and
Crito • -?7 education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in c o m m a n d i n g your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply. "Well then, since you were brought into the world and n u r t u r e d and educated by us, can you d e n y in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is t r u e you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?—you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, 0 professor of t r u e virtue, say that you are justified in this? H a s a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than m o t h e r or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even m o r e than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with i m p r i s o n m e n t or stripes, t h e p u n i s h m e n t is to be e n d u r e d in silence; and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, b u t w h e t h e r in battle or in a c o u r t of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, m u c h less may he do violence to his country." W h a t answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not? CR: I think that they do. s o c : T h e n the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and n u r t u r e d and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we f u r t h e r proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has c o m e of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance,
34 • Plato he may go w h e r e he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the m a n n e r in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we c o m m a n d him. And he w h o disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an a g r e e m e n t with us that he will duly obey o u r commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give them the alternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer, and he does neither. T h e s e are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask, why is this? they will justly retort u p o n me that 1 above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. " T h e r e is clear proof," they will say, "Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless you were on military service; nor did you travel as other men do. N o r had you any curiosity to know o t h e r states or their laws: your affections did not go beyond us and o u r state; we were y o u r special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you; and this is the state in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the t r i a l — t h e state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you p r e f e r r e d death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us t h e laws, of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, r u n n i n g away and t u r n i n g your back u p o n the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen.
Crito • -?7 And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that t r u e or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito? M u s t we not agree? CR: T h e r e is no help, Socrates. soc: T h e n will they not say: "You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you m a d e with us at your leisure, not in any haste or u n d e r any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to .you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Laccdaemon or Crete, which you often praise for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. W h e r e a s you, above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a state that has no laws), that you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were not m o r e stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. N o t so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city. "For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? T h a t your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you flv to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, T h e b e s or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye u p o n you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a c o r r u p t o r of the laws is m o r e than likely to be c o r r u p t o r of the y o u n g and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to t h e m without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? W h a t you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best things a m o n g men. Would that be decent of you? Surely
36 • Plato not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's friends in Thessaly, w h e r e t h e r e is a great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the m a n n e r in which vou were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is—that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little m o r e life. Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of t e m p e r you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what?—earing and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And w h e r e will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and e d u c a t e them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer u p o n them? Or are you u n d e r the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the o t h e r world they will not take care of them? N a y ; but if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will. "Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have b r o u g h t you up. T h i n k not of life and children first, and of justice afterward, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as C r i t o bids. N o w you d e p a r t in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of t h e laws, but of men. But if you go forth, r e t u r n i n g evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have m a d e with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, thac is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and o u r brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito."
Crito • -?7 T h i s is the voice which I seem to hear m u r m u r i n g in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is h u m m i n g in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say. CR: 1 have nothing to say, Socrates. soc: T h e n let me follow the intimations of the will of God.
T H E REPUBLIC: BOOK I I
With these words 1 was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning For Glaucon, who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust? I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if 1 could. T h e n you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:— How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them? 1 agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied. Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results? Certainly, 1 said. And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?
The Republic: Book II • 39 T h e r e is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask? Because 1 want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice? In the highest class, I r e p l i e d , — a m o n g those goods which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of iheir results. T h e n the many are of another mind; they think that |ustice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class, a m o n g goods which are to be p u r sued for the sake of reward and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided. 1 know, I said, that this is their m a n n e r of thinking, and that this was the thesis which T h r a s y m a c h u s was maintaining just now, when lie censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him. 1 wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then 1 shall see whether you and I agree. For T h r a s y m a c h u s seems to me, like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their reward and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the c o m m o n view of them. Secondly, I will show that all m e n who practice justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am p e r plexed when I hear the voices of T h r a s y m a c h u s and myriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore 1 will praise the unjust life to the u t m o s t of my power, and my m a n n e r of speaking will indicate the m a n n e r in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?
40 • Plato Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any t h e m e a b o u t which a m a n of sense would oftener wish to converse. I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice. T h e y say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; hut that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid t h e one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree a m o n g themselves to have neither; h e n c e there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is t e r m e d by t h e m lawful and just. T h i s they affirm to be the origin and n a t u r e of justice;—it is a m e a n or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle p o i n t between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to he called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice. N o w that those who practice justice do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to be u n j u s t will best appear if we imagine s o m e t h i n g of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the just and unjust man to he p r o c e e d i n g along the same road, following their interest, which all natures d e e m to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. T h e liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to t h e m in the form of such a p o w e r as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian, According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; t h e r e was a great storm, and an earthquake made an o p e n i n g in the earth at t h e place w h e r e he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among o t h e r marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more t h a n h u m a n , and having n o t h i n g on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead
The Republic: Book II • 41 and reascended. N o w the shepherds m e t together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly r e p o r t about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he b e c a m e invisible to t h e rest of the c o m p a n y and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with t h e same r e s u l t — w h e n he turned the collet inward he became invisible, when outward he reappeared. W h e r e upon he contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court; where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a G o d among men. T h e n the actions of the just would be as the actions of t h e unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in 'their hearts that injustice is far m o r e profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as 1 have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice. E n o u g h of this. Now, if we are to f o r m a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is 110 other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let t h e unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just m a n entirely just; nothing is to be taken away
42 • Plato f r o m either of them, and both are to be perfectly furnished for t h e -work of their respective lives. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skillful pilot or physician, who k n o w s intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the u n j u s t make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he m e a n s to be great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for t h e highest reach of injustice is, to be d e e m e d just when you are not. T h e r e f o r e T say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the m o s t perfect injustice; t h e r e is to be no deduction, but we must allow h i m , while doing the most unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest r e p u t a t i o n for justice. If he have taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be o n e who can speak with effect, if any of bis deeds c o m e to light, and who can force his way where force is r e q u i r e d by his courage and strength, and command of m o n e y and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as yEschylus says, to be and not to seem good. T h e r e must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be h o n ored and rewarded, and then we shall n o t know whether he is just for rhe sake of justice or for the sake of honors and reward; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he m u s t be imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been p u t to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him cont i n u e thus to the h o u r of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. W h e n both have reached the u t t e r m o s t extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the h a p p i e r of the two.
CHAPTER 2
ARISTOTLE
Socrates was Plato's teacher and in turn Aristotle was the student of Plato. There will never be a more astonishing triumvirate. Taken together, these three thinkers form the cornerstone of Western philosophy. T h e youngest of three children, Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in Stagira, a town about 150 miles north of Athens. His father, N i c o machus, was a physician to Amyntas III, the king of Macedonia. At the time, the physician's art was a craft that was usually passed from one generation to the next. In all likelihood, Aristotle was trained in medicine and it is often suggested that his empirical bent and attention to detail have something to do with his being the son of a physician. When Aristotle was eighteen he traveled to Athens to study with Plato at the Academy. He remained there doing research and teaching for the next two decades. Aristotle left the Academy after Plato's death in 347 B.C. and for several years moved among the Greekislands and city-states teaching and collecting marine specimens. In 342 B.C., Philip of Macedonia summoned Aristotle to tutor his thirteen-year-old son, Alexander (later known as Alexander the Great). For a time, the man who was arguably the most brilliant philosopher of them all was occupied teaching a teenager who was soon to become one of the greatest military minds in the annals of history.
44 • Aristotle H o m e r ' s Iliad was an i m p o r t a n t part of the curriculum that Aristotle used with hi s charge and t h e r e is good reason to think that the fierce warrior king m a y have found a role model in the character of Achilles. After Philip's death, Alexander b e c a m e heir to the throne and thus began his world conquests. T h o u g h little is known about the relationship between Alexander and Aristotle, history has it that when Alexander was on his f a r - r e a c h i n g military expeditions, he would have biological samples sent back to his f o r m e r teacher. Aristotle returned to Athens and in 335 B.C. established the Lyceum, a school attached to the temple of Apollo Lyceus. This very well equipped center of learning boasted an e n o r m o u s library and became known as the Peripatetic School because Aristotle and his pupils were fond of walking as t h e y talked. In 323 B.C., Alexander the G r e a t died and a wave of antiMacedonian sentiment swept over Athens. Like Socrates, Aristotle was soon brought up on charges of impiety. As Aristotle was said to have put it, "I would not let the Athenians make t h e same mistake twice." Rather than go to trial, he fled to Chalais and died from a stomach ailment a few m o n t h s later (322 B.C.). He was sixty-two. T h e r e ate three ruling paradigms in ethics: deontological, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. T e r m e d for the G r e e k word for duty, deon, deontological ethics is anchored in rhe c o n c e p t of duty. According to this account, the consequences of an action are out of our control and, as such, are morally insignificant. In contrast, consequentialist theories hold that the results of an action d e t e r m i n e moral worth. T h e view espoused by Aristotle is the p r o t o t y p e of what is today classified as "virtue ethics." T h i s is a school of t h o u g h t that takes moral excellence or virtue to be the proper focus of reflection on ethics. For adherents of this position, rules for action are derivative of t h e virtues. A few ye a r s back, m a n y devout Christians were sporting green bracelets emblazoned with the letters W W J D , an acronym for "what would JesuS do." In other words, when in doubt, act as you believe Jesus would have acted. T h i s approach to t h e moral life is a p e r f e c t exam pie of virtue ethics, which instructs: Follow the model of the virtuous person. T h e r e is, of course, the p r o f o u n d problem: H o w do we know who the virtuous person is?
Ethics• The Essential Writings • 45 T h e following selection is from Books I, I T , and I T T of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a text dedicated to Aristotle's son, Nicomaclvus, and widely believed to be comprised from the lecture notes of his students. In this offering, Aristotle argues that happiness (eudaimonia) is the linal end of all h u m a n action. Since happiness is the bull's-eye of o u r endeavors, Aristotle believes that we would be well served by t h e effort to define our target. He considers and rejects the likely candidates of riches, honor, and health, but resolves that happiness is "an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue and if there is more than one form of virtue, in accordance with the best and most c o m plete." Aristotle maintains that there are two kinds of virtue: intellectual and moral. While the f o r m e r amounts to excellence in reasoning, moral virtue or what we might t e r m "character" is a stable disposition to act and feel in appropriate ways. Aristotle reasons that virtue is that which aids p r o p e r functioning. By his reckoning, excess and deficiency destroy function. Thus, virtue must be the mean in h u m a n action and feeling. For instance, the virtue of courage is a m e a n between cowardliness and rashness. Aristotle teaches that pleasures and pains are mirrors of our soul. T h a t which comes naturally to us is experienced as pleasurable and that which goes against o u r grain is felt to be painful. Accordingly, when virtue becomes a habit or second nature, its exercise will be experienced as pleasure. And so, the just individual will enjoy doing just deeds, whereas s o m e o n e who is in the process but has not yet acquired a just disposition might find it hard to keep his word when doing so is not in his i m m e d i a t e self-interest.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
BOOK ]
1. Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared* to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. W h e r e there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities
'Perhaps by Eudoxus.
Nicomachean Ethics • 57 themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned. 2. If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least to d e t e r m i n e what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall u n d e r this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of t h e sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science m u s t include those of the others, so that this end must be t h e good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of t h e state seems at all events something greater and m o r e complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term. 3. O u r discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. N o w fine and just actions, which political science investigates, admit of m u c h variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be t h o u g h t to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to m a n y people; for before now m e n have b e e n u n d o n e by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their
•r.ir • Aristotle courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of t h e same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each t y p e of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the n a t u r e of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. N o w each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. H e n c e a young man is not a p r o p e r h e a r e r of lectures on political science; for be is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, b u t its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge b u t action. And it makes no difference w h e t h e r he is y o u n g in years or youthful in character; the defect does not d e p e n d on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit. T h e s e remarks about the student; the sort of t r e a t m e n t to be expected, and the p u r p o s e of the inquiry, may be taken as o u r preface. 4. Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at s o m e good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the m a n y do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing,
Nicomachean Ethics • 49 like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another—and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; hut, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. N o w some* thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is self-suhsistent and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to he arguable. Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, "are we on the way from or to the first principles?" 1 T h e r e is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses—some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, w must begin with things known to us. H e n c e any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of I lesiod: Far best is he who knows all things himself; Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart Another's wisdom, is a useless wight. 5. Let us, however, r e s u m e our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without s o m e T h e Platonic School. Cf Rep. 511 D.
TO • Aristotle ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three p r o m i n e n t types of life—that just m e n t i o n e d , the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. N o w the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view f r o m the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the p r o m i n e n t types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honor; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is t h o u g h t to depend on those who bestow h o n o r rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something p r o p e r to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to p u r s u e honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honored, and a m o n g those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And p e r haps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honor, t h e end of t h e political life. But even this appears somewhat i n c o m plete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for t h e subject has been sufficiently treated even in the c u r r e n t discussions. T h i r d comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later. T h e life of m o n e y making is one u n d e r t a k e n u n d e r compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take t h e aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are ends; yet m a n y argum e n t s have been thrown away in s u p p o r t of them. Let us leave this subject, then. 6. We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is m e a n t by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by
Nicomachean Ethics • 51 friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends. T h e men who introduced this doctrine did not posit Ideas of classes within which they recognized priority and posteriority (which is the reason why they did not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers); but the term "good" is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and that which perse, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Idea set over all these goods. Further, since "good" has as many senses as "being" (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of G o d and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. F u r ther, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall u n d e r one category, e.g. of opportunity, for o p p o r t u n i t y in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the m o d e r a t e in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by "a thing itself," if (as is the case) in "man h i m s e l f " and in a particular man the account of m a n is one and the same. For insofar as they are man, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will "good itself" and particular goods, insofar as they are good. But again it will not be good any the m o r e for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day. T h e Pythagoreans seem to give a m o r e plausible account of the good, when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed.
52 - Aristotle But let us discuss these matters elsewhere; an objection to what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are p u r s u e d and loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to p r o d u c e or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether the f o r m e r are called good by reference to a single Idea. W h a t sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are p u r s u e d even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honors? Certainly, if we p u r s u e these also for the sake of s o m e t h i n g else, yet one would place t h e m a m o n g things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as s o m e t h i n g identical in t h e m all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But of honor, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. T h e good, therefore, is not some c o m m o n e l e m e n t answering to one Idea. But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like t h e things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in Other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present; for perfect precision about t h e m would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly with regard to the Idea; even if there is some one good which is u n i versally prcdicable of goods or is capable of separate and i n d e p e n d e n t existence, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable. Perhaps, however, some one m i g h t think it worth while to recognize this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; for
Nicomachean Ethics • having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know t h e m shall attain them. T h i s a r g u m e n t has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences; for all of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not probable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a c a r p e n ter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this "good itself," or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general thereby. For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of man, or p e r haps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals that he is healing. But enough of these topics. 7. Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. W h a t then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action. So the a r g u m e n t has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this even m o r e clearly. Since there are evidently m o r e than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if t h e r e is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if t h e r e are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. N o w we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else m o r e final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and t h e r e f o r e
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we call final w i t h o u t qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of s o m e t h i n g else. N o w such a t h i n g happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of s o m e thing else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if n o t h i n g resulted f r o m them we should still choose each of them), but we choose t h e m also for the sake of happiness, judging that by m e a n s of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself. From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. N o w by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing a m o n g others—if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. T h i s m i g h t perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the "well" is thought to reside in the f u n c tion, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a f u n c tion, m a y one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart
Nicomachean Ethics • 55 from all these? W h a t then can this be? Life seems to be c o m m o n even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. N e x t there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be c o m m o n even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. T h e r e remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as "life of the rational element" also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the m o r e p r o p e r sense of the term. N o w if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say "a so-and-so" and "a good so-and-so" have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, e m i n e n c e in respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case,] human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. But we must add "in a complete life." For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must p r e s u m ably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been well outlined, and that time is a good discoverer or p a r t n e r in such a work; to which facts the advances of the arts are due; for any one can add what is lacking. And we must also r e m e m b e r what has been said before and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so m u c h as is
56 • Aristotle appropriate to the inquiry. For a c a r p e n t e r and a g e o m e t e r investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well, that o u r main task may not be subordinated to m i n o r questions. N o r must we d e m a n d the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that thzfacthe. well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is the primary thing or first principle. N o w of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways. But each set of principles we must try to investigate in the natural way, and we m u s t take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning is t h o u g h t to be more than half of t h e whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by i t 8. We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. N o w goods have been divided into t h r e e classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and physical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. T h e r e f o r e our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by p h i losophers. It is correct also in that we identify t h e end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. A n o t h e r belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. T h e characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. N o w some of these views have been held by
Nicomachean Ethics • 57 many men and men of old, others by a few e m i n e n t persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, hilt rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects. With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference w h e t h e r we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without p r o d u c i n g any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the O l y m p i c G a m e s it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned b u t those who c o m p e t e (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life. T h e i r life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. N o w for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by n a t u r e pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. T h e i r life, therefore, has no f u r t h e r need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described* Happiness 'i e., be judges that virtuous actions are good and noble in the highest degree.
55 • Aristotle then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos— Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But pleasantest is it to win what we love. For all these properties belong to t h e best activities; and these, or o n e — t h e b e s t — o f these, we identify with happiness. Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the p r o p e r equipment. In m a n y actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and t h e r e are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man w h o is v e r y ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad c h i l d r e n or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue. 9. For this reason also the question is asked, w h e t h e r happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of s o m e divine providence or again by chance. N o w if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all h u m a n things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most god-like things; for that which is the prize and end of v i r t u e seems to be the hest thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed. It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care, But if it is better to be
Nicomachean Ethics • 59 happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that the facts should be so, since everything that d e p e n d s on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it d e p e n d s on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement. T h e answer to t h e question we are asking is plain also f r o m the definition of happiness; for it has been said to be a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind. Of t h e remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments. And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset; for we stated the end of political scicnce to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts. It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor horse nor any other of the animals happy; for none of t h e m is capable of sharing in such activity. For this reason also a boy is not happy; for he is not yet capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them. For t h e r e is required, as we said, not only complete virtue but also a complete life, since many changes occur in life, and all m a n n e r of chances, and the most p r o s p e r ous may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy. 10. M u s t no one at all, then, he called happy while he lives; must we, as Solon says, see the end? Even if we are to lay down this doctrine, is it also the case that a man i.r happy when he is dead?Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us w h o say that happiness is an activity? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if Solon does not m e a n this, but that one can then safely call a man blessed as being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, this also affords matter for discussion; for both evil and good are t h o u g h t to exist for a dead man, as m u c h as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honors and dishonors and the good or bad fortunes of children and in general of descendants. And this also presents a problem; for though a man has lived happily up to old
60 • Aristotle age and has had a death worthy of his life, m a n y reverses may befall his d e s c e n d a n t s — s o m e of them may be good and attain the life they deserve, while with others the opposite may be the case; and clearly too t h e degrees of relationship between them and their ancestors may vary indefinitely. It would be odd, then, if the dead man were to share in these changes and b e c o m e at o n e time happy, at a n o t h e r wretched; while it would also be odd if the fortunes of the descendants did not for sometime have some effect on the happiness of their ancestors. But we must r e t u r n to o u r first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it o u r present problem might be solved. N o w if we must see the end and only then call a man happy, not as being h a p p y but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something p e r m a n e n t and by no m e a n s easily changed, while a single m a n may suffer many turns of fortune's wheel. For clearly if we were to keep pace with his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be a "chameleon and insecurely based." Or is this keeping pace with his f o r t u n e s quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not d e p e n d on these, but h u m a n life, as we said, needs these as m e r e additions, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what constitute happiness or the reverse. T h e question we have now discussed confirms our definition. For no function of man has so much p e r m a n e n c e as virtuous activities (these are t h o u g h t to be m o r e durable even than knowledge of the sciences), and of these themselves the most valuable are more d u r a b l e because those who are happy spend their life most readily and most continuously in these; for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget them. T h e attribute in question,* then, will belong to the h a p p y man, and he will be happy t h r o u g h o u t his life; for always, or by p r e f e r e n c e to everything else, he will be engaged in virtuous action and c o n t e m p l a "Durability.
Nicomachean Ethics • 61 tion, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is "truly good" and "foursquare beyond reproach.'" N o w many events happen by chance, and events differing in importance; small pieces of good f o r t u n e or of its opposite clearly do n6t weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a multitude of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (for not only are they themselves such as to add beauty to life, but the way a man deals with them may be noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for they both bring pain with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines through, when a man bears" with resignation many great misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul. If activities are, as we said, what gives life its character, no happy man can b e c o m e miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and mean. For the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his c o m m a n d and a good shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the happy man can never b e c o m e miserable—though he will not reach blessedness; if he meet with fortunes like those of Priam. Nor, again, is he many-colored and changeable; for neither will he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary misadventures, but only by m a n y great ones, nor, if he has had m a n y great misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short time, but if at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained many splendid successes. W h y then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for s o m e chance period but t h r o u g h o u t a complete life? Or must we add "and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life"? Certainly the f u t u r e is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every "Simonides.
62 • Aristotle way final. If so, we shall call happy those a m o n g living m e n in whom these conditions are, and are to be, f u l f i l l e d — b u t hannv men. So m u c h for these questions. I I . T h a t the fortunes of descendants and of all a man's friends should not affect his happiness at all seems a very u n f r i e n d l y doctrine, and o n e opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the events that h a p p e n are n u m e r o u s and admit of all sorts of difference, and some c o m e m o r e near to us and others less so it seems a l o n g - n a y , an i n f i n i t e - t a s k to discuss each in detail- a genera] outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man's own misadventures have a certain weight and influence on life 0t hers are
, ' as Jt lighter, s o too t h e r e are differences a m o n g the misadventures of our friends taken as a whole and it makes a difference w h e t h e r rhe various sufferings befall the livmg or t h e dead (much m o r e even than w h e t h e r lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also must be taken into account; or rather perhaps, the fact that d o u b t is felt w h e t h e r the dead share in an^ good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, that even if anything w h e t h e r good or evil penetrates to them, it must be something weak and negligible, either in itself or for them or if not, at least it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to take away their blessedness from those who are. T h e good or bad fortunes of friends then seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy u n h a p p y nor to p r o d u c e any other change of the kind. 12. T h e s e questions having, been definitely answered, let us consider whether happiness is among the t h m g s that are praised or rather among the things that are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities. Everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain kind and is related s o m e h o w to something else; for we praise the just or brave man and in general both the good man and virtue itself because of the actions and functions involved, and we praise the strong man the good runner, and so on, because he is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good and important. T h i s is clear also from the praises of the gods; for it seems absurd that
Nicomachean Ethics • 63 the gods should be referred to our standard, but this is d o n e because praise involves a reference, as we said, to something else. But if praise is for things such as we have described, clearly what applies to the best things is not praise, but something greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do to the gods and the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so too with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it blessed, as being s o m e t h i n g m o r e divine and better. E u d o x u s also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good, it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised, and that this is what G o d and the good are; for by reference to these all other things are judged. Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result of virtue men tend to do noble deeds; but encomia are bestowed on acts, w h e t h e r of the body or of the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters is m o r e p r o p e r to those who have made a study of encomia; to us it is clear from what has been said that happiness is among t h e things that are prized and perfect. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for the sake of this that we all do all that we do, and the first principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and divine. 13. Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the n a t u r e of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness. T h e t r u e s t u d e n t of politics, too, is t h o u g h t to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the C r e tans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with o u r original plan. But clearly the virtue we must study is h u m a n virtue; for the good we were seeking was h u m a n good and the happiness h u m a n happiness. By h u m a n virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of s o u l But if this is so, clearly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes
64 • Aristotle or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body; and all the more since politics is m o r e prized and better than medicine; but even among doctors the best educated spend m u c h labor on acquiring knowledge of the body. T h e student of politics, then, must study the soul, and m u s t study it with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing; for f u r t h e r precision is perhaps something m o r e laborious than our purposes require. Some things are said about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions outside o u r school, and we must use these; e.g. that one e l e m e n t in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle. W h e t h e r these are separated as the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are distinct by definition but by nature inseparable, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle, does not affect the present question. Of the irrational e l e m e n t one division seems to be widely distributed, and vegetative in its nature, I m e a n that which causes nutrition and growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to full-grown creatures; this is m o r e reasonable than to assign some different power to them. N o w t h e excellence of this seems to be c o m m o n to all species and not specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are no better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect the dreams of good men are better than those of ordinary people. E n o u g h of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive faculty alone, since it has by its nature no share in h u m a n excellence. T h e r e seems to be also another irrational element in the s o u l — o n e which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we praise the rational principle of the continent m a n and of the incontinent, and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges them aright and toward the best objects;
Nicomachean Ethics • 65 but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle, which fights against and resists that principle. For exactly as paralyzed limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must n o n e the less suppose that in the soul too t h e r e is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. N o w even this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational p r i n c i p l e — and presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational principle. T h e r e f o r e the irrational element also appears to be twofold. For the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational p r i n ciple, but the appetitive, and in general the desiring e l e m e n t in a sense shares in it, insofar as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of "taking account" of one's father or one's friends, not that in which we speak of "accounting" for a mathematical property. T h a t the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation. And if this e l e m e n t also must be said to have a rational principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which has not) will be twofold, o n e subdivision having it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father. Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference; for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philosophic wisdom and u n d e r s t a n d i n g and practical wisdom being intellectual, liberality and t e m p e r a n c e moral. For in speaking about a man's character we do not say that he is wise or has u n d e r s t a n d i n g but that he is goodt e m p e r e d or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of state of mind we call those which merit praise virtues.
66 • Aristotle B o o k II 1. Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual a n d moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its n a m e ethikeh one that is formed by a slight variation from t h e word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that n o n e of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by n a t u r e can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by n a t u r e moves downward c a n n o t be h a b i t u ated to move upward, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downward, nor can anything else that by n a t u r e behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. N e i t h e r by nature, then, n o r contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are m a d e p e r f e c t bv 1 y habit. Again, of all the things that come to us by n a t u r e we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit t h e activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had t h e m before we used them, and did not c o m e to have t h e m by using them); but t h e virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we b e c o m e just by doing just acts, t e m p e r a t e by d o i n g temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. T h i s is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by f o r m i n g habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. Again, it is from the s a m e causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that'both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding s t a t e m e n t is
Nicomachean Ethics • 67 t r u e of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all m e n would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. T h e same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; s o m e men become temperate and g o o d - t e m p e r e d , others selfindulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise o u t of like activities. T h i s is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we f o r m habits of one kind or of another f r o m our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference. 2. Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to b e c o m e good, since o t h e r wise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must e x a m i n e the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these d e t e r m i n e also the nature of t h e states of character that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we must act according to t h e right rule is a c o m m o n principle and must be a s s u m e d — it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must be agreed u p o n beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we d e m a n d must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any m o r e than matters of health. T h e general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet m o r e lacking in exactness; for they do not fall u n d e r any art or precept but t h e agents t h e m selves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.
68 • Aristotle But though o u r p r e s e n t account is of this n a t u r e we must give what help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the n a t u r e of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain a m o u n t destroys the health, while that which is p r o p o r tionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of t e m p e r a n c e and courage and the other virtues. For the m a n who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his g r o u n d against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to m e e t every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains f r o m n o n e becomes selfindulgent, while the m a n who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; t e m p e r a n c e and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.' But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the same as those of their destruction, but also the s p h e r e of their actualization will be the same; for this is also t r u e of the things which are more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is p r o d u c e d by taking m u c h food and u n d e r g o i n g much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining f r o m pleasures we b e c o m e temperate, and it is when we have b e c o m e so that we are most able to abstain f r o m them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand o u r ground against t h e m we become brave, and it is when we have b e c o m e so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them. 3. We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his g r o u n d against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while t h e man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and
Nicomachean Ethics • 69 pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. H e n c e we o u g h t to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education. Again, if t h e virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. T h i s is indicated also by the fact that punishm e n t is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries. Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a n a t u r e relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be m a d e worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding t h e s e — e i t h e r the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going w r o n g in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished. H e n c e men* even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say "as one ought" and "as one ought not" and "when one o u g h t or ought not," and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that this kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary. T h e following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. T h e r e being three objects of choice and t h r e e of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is c o m m o n to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant. Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our ' P r o b a h l y Speusippus is referred to.
80 • Aristotle life. And we measure even o u r actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry m u s t he about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions. Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use Heraclitus' phrase, but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. T h e r e f o r e for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad. T h a t virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts f r o m which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts f r o m which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself—let this be taken as said. 4. T h e question might be asked, what we mean by saying that we must b e c o m e just by doing just acts, and t e m p e r a t e by doing t e m p e r a t e acts; for if m e n do just and t e m p e r a t e acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of g r a m m a r and of music, they are grammarians and musicians. Or is this not t r u e even of the arts? It is possible to do s o m e thing that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or at the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he has both done something g r a m m a t ical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself. Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in t h e m selves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, hut if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or t e m p e r a t e l y T h e agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose t h e m for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed f r o m a firm and u n c h a n g e a b l e character. T h e s e are not reckoned
Nicomachean Ethics • 71 in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the hare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result f r o m often doing just and t e m p e r a t e acts. Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the t e m p e r a t e man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does t h e m as just and t e m p e r a t e men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing t e m p e r a t e acts the t e m p e r a t e man; w i t h o u t doing these no one would have even a prospect of b e c o m i n g good. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will b e c o m e good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy, 5. N e x t we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds—passions, faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions. N o w neither the virtues nor the vices axe passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on t h e ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man
72
Aristotle who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for o u r virtues and our vices we u p r a i s e d or blamed. Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are m o d e s of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way. For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good n o r bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not m a d e good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before.
If, then, the virtues are neither passions n o r faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character. T h u s we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus. 6. We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be d o n e well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the, eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at r u n n i n g and at carrying its rider and at awaiting t h e attack of the enemy. T h e r e f o r e , if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well. H o w this is to h a p p e n we have stated already, but it will be m a d e plain also by the following consideration of the specific n a t u r e of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an i n t e r m e d i a t e between excess and defect. By the intermediate in t h e object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the interm e d i a t e relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little—and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if
Nicomachean Ethics • 73 ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten p o u n d s are too m u c h for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order sixpounds; for this also is perhaps too m u c h for the person who is to take it, or too little—too little for Milo,* too m u c h for the beginner in athletic exercises. T h e same is true of r u n n i n g and wrestling. T h u s a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the i n t e r m e d i a t e and chooses t h i s — t h e intermediate not in the object but relatively to us. If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well—by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the m e a n preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is m o r e exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both i n t e r m e d i a t e and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. N o w virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. T h e r e f o r e virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate. Again, it is possible to fail in m a n y ways (for evil belongs to *A famous wrestler.
84 Aristotle t h e class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in o n e way (for which reason also one is easy and the other diffic u l t — t o miss the mark easy, to hie it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the m e a n of virtue; For men are good in but one way, but bad in many. Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would d e t e r m i n e it. N o w it is a m e a n between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which d e p e n d s on defect; and again it is a m e a n because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. H e n c e in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme. But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for s o m e have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, s h a m e lessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, m u r d e r ; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. N o r does goodness or badness with regard to such things d e p e n d on c o m m i t t i n g adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of t h e m is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action t h e r e should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate t h e r e would be a m e a n of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as t h e r e is no excess and deficiency of t e m p e r a n c e and courage because what is i n t e r m e d i a t e is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned t h e r e is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are d o n e they are wrong; for in general there
Nicomachean Ethics • 75 is neither a m e a n of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean. 7. We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those which are general apply m o r e widely, but those which are particular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from our table. With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no n a m e (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in conlidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and p a i n s — n o t all of them, and not so much with regard to the p a i n s — t h e mean is temperance, the excess selfindulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call t h e m "insensible." With regard to giving and taking of m o n e y the m e a n is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At present we are giving a m e r e outline or summary, and are satisfied with this; later these states will be m o r e exactly determined.) With regard to money there are also other dispositions^—a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent m a n differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the m o d e of their difference will he stated later. With regard to honor and dishonor the mean is p r o p e r pride, the excess is known as a sort of "empty vanity," and the deficiency is u n d u e humility; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to p r o p e r pride, being concerned with small honors while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honor as one ought, and more than one
86 Aristotle ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name. T h e dispositions also are n a m e less, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition. H e n c e the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves s o m e t i m e s call the i n t e r m e d i a t e person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and s o m e t i m e s praise the ambitious man and sometimes t h e unambitious T h e reason of o u r doing this will be stated in what follows; but now let us speak of t h e r e m a i n i n g states according to the m e t h o d which has been indicated. With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the intermediate person g o o d - t e m p e r e d let us call the mean good t e m p e r ; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the m a n who falls short an inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascihility. T h e r e are also t h r e e other means, which have a certain likeness to one another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned with intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is exhibited in giving a m u s e m e n t , the other in all the circumstances of life. We must t h e r e f o r e speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all things the mean is praiseworthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame. N o w most of these states also have no names, but we m u s t try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the m e a n may be called truthfulness, while the pretense which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock m o d e s t y and the person characterized by it mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of a m u s e m e n t the i n t e r m e diate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state
Nicomachean Ethics • 77 is boorishness. With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person. T h e r e are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions; since s h a m e is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the modest man. For even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate, and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short o r i s not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest. Righteous indignation is a m e a n between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasures that are felt at the f o r t u n e s of our neighbors; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices. But these states there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we shall, after describing the other states distinguish its two kinds and say how each of t h e m is a mean, and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues. 8. T h e r e are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the i n t e r m e d i a t e to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, .and the liberal m a n prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the
78
Aristotle prodigal. H e n c e also the p e o p l e at the extremes push the interm e d i a t e m a n each over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and c o r r e s p o n d ingly in the other cases. T h e s e states being thus opposed to o n e another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate; for these are f u r t h e r f r o m each other than from the intermediate, as the great is f u r t h e r from the small and the small from the great than both are f r o m the equal. Again, to the i n t e r m e d i a t e s o m e extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other; now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest f r o m each other, so that things that are f u r t h e r apart are m o r e contrary. To the m e a n in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is m o r e opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is m o r e opposed to courage, and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but selfindulgence, which is an excess, that is m o r e opposed to t e m p e r ance. T h i s happens from two reasons, o n e being drawn f r o m the thing itself; for because o n e extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we o p p o s e not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. E.g., since rashness is t h o u g h t liker and n e a r e r to courage, and cowardice m o r e unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are f u r t h e r from t h e i n t e r m e d i ate are thought m o r e contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn f r o m the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves m o r e naturally tend seem m o r e contrary to the intermediate. For instance, we ourselves rend more naturally to pleasures, and h e n c e are m o r e easily carried away toward self-indulgence than toward p r o p r i e t y We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore selfindulgence, which is an excess, is the m o r e contrary to t e m p e r ance.
9. T h a t moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency and that it is such because its character is to
Nicomachean Ethics • 19 aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. H e n c e also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get a n g r y — t h a t is e a s y — o r give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble. H e n c e he who aims at the intermediate must first d e p a r t from what is the m o r e contrary to it, as Calypso advises— Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray* For of the extremes one is m o r e erroneous, one less so; t h e r e fore, since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as p e o p l e say, take the least of the evils; and this will be d o n e best in the way we describe. But we must consider the things toward which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to t h e contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as p e o p l e do in straightening sticks that are bent. N o w in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel toward pleasure as the elders of the people felt toward Helen, and in all circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean. But this is no d o u b t difficult, and especially in individual cases; for it is not easy to d e t e r m i n e both how and with whom
*Od. xii. 219 f. (Mackail's trans.). But it was Circe who gave the advice (xii 108), and the actual quotation is from Odysseus' orders to his steersman.
90 • Aristotle and on what provocation and how long one should he angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call t h e m g o o d - t e m p e r e d , but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call t h e m m a n l y T h e man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, w h e t h e r he do so in the direction of the m o r e or of the less, hut only the m a n who deviates m o r e widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes b l a m e w o r t h y it is not easy to d e t e r m i n e by reasoning, any m o r e than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things d e p e n d on particular facts, and the decision rests with p e r c e p tion. So much, then, is plain, that the i n t e r m e d i a t e state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes toward t h e excess, sometimes toward the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the m e a n and what is right.
BOOK I I I
1. Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on volu n t a r y passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the n a t u r e of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of h o n o r s and of punishments. T h o s e things, then, are t h o u g h t involuntary, which take place u n d e r compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is c o m p u l sory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which n o t h i n g is contributed by the person who is acting o r i s feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by m e n who had him in their power. But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and child r e n m his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated
Nicomachean Ethics • 81 whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are m o r e like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, "voluntary" and "involuntary," must be used with reference to the m o m e n t of action. N o w the m a n acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, b u t in the abstract p e r h a p s involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself. For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they e n d u r e something base or painful in r e t u r n for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to e n d u r e the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person. On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he o u g h t not u n d e r pressure which overstrains human n a t u r e and which no one could withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful sufferings; for the things that "forced" Euripides' A lem aeon to slay his m o t h e r seem absurd. It is difficult s o m e times to d e t e r m i n e what should be chosen at what cost, and what should be e n d u r e d in return for what gain, and yet m o r e difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not. W h a t sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that w i t h o u t qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. But the things that in themselves are involuntary, but now and in return for these gains are worthy of choice, and whose moving principle is in the agent, are in themselves involuntary,
f.'\2 • Aristotle but now and in return for t h e s e gains voluntary. T h e y are m o r e like voluntary acts; for actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts h e r e are v o l u n t a r y W h a t sort of things are to be chosen, and in r e t u r n for what, it is not easy to state; for t h e r e are m a n y differences in the particular cases. But if some one were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a compelling power, forcing us from without, all acts would be for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all m e n do everything they do. And those who act u n d e r compulsion and unwillingly act with pain, but those w h o do gets for their pleasantness and nobility do t h e m with pleasure; it is absurd to make external circumstances responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself r e s p o n sible for noble acts but the pleasant objects responsible for base acts T h e compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, t h e p e r s o n compelled contributing nothing. Everything that is d o n e by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it is only what produces pain and repentance that is »zvoIuntary, for the man who has done something owing to ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who repents is t h o u g h t an involuntary agent, and the man who does not r e p e n t may, since he is different, be called a not voluntary agent; for, since he differs f r o m the other, it is better that he should have a n a m e of his own. Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is d r u n k or in a rage is t h o u g h t to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of t h e causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. N o w every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men b e c o m e unjust and in general bad; but the term "involuntary" tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage—for it is not mistaken p u r p o s e that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that m e n are blamed), but ignorance of par-
Nicomachean Ethics • 83 ticulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their n a t u r e and number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to some one's safety), and how he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently). N o w of all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance people say "it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking," or "they did not know it was a secret," as Aeschylus said of the mysteries, or a man might say he "let it go off when he merely wanted to show its working," as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one's son was an enemy, as M e r o p e did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumice-stone; or one might give a man a d r a u g h t to save him, and really kill him; or one might want to touch a man, as people do in sparring, and really wound him. T h e ignorance may relate, then, to any of these things, i.e. ot the circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the most important points; and these are t h o u g h t to be the circumstances of the action and its end. Further, the doing of an act that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be painful and involve repentance. Since that which is d o n e u n d e r compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action, P r e s u m a b l y acts done by reason of anger or appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it m e a n t that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts
S4 • Aristotle that are due to a p p e t i t e or anger, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily? Ts not this absurd, when o n e and the same thing is the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe as involuntary the things one o u g h t to desire; and we o u g h t both to be angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g. for health and for learning. Also w h a r i s involuntary is t h o u g h t to be painful, but what is in accordance with appetite is t h o u g h t to be pleasant. Again, what is the difference in respect of involuntariness b e t w e e n errors c o m m i t ted u p o n calculation and those committed in anger? Both are to be avoided, but the irrational passions are t h o u g h t not less h u m a n than reason is, and therefore also the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are the man's actions. It would be odd, then, to treat t h e m as involuntary.
CHAPTER 3
EPICTETUS
Epictetus was a Stoic philosopher. Along with Epicureanism and Neoplatonism, Stoicism was one of the schools of thought that developed after the death of Aristotle and with the decline of Greek civilization. It was founded in Greece by Zeno (334-262 B.C.) and thrived for some seven hundred years. Zeno met his students on a stoa, which is the Greek word for "porch." Though there was no equivalent of the immortal geniuses of Plato or Aristotle among the Stoics, their impact on Rome and Christianity was profound. Anticipating natural law theorists such as Thomas Aquinas, the Stoics acknowledged a law above human law. And unlike the Greeks and Romans who held that you were either like them or a barbarian, the Stoics believed that everyone was a citizen of the world, part of the family of humankind. In that sense they presaged the notion of universal human rights. T h e most influential Stoic philosophers were Seneca, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, and the present author, Epictetus. Epictetus was born a slave circa A.D. 55 in Asia M i n o r His master, Epaphroditus, who served as a secretary to Nero, brought Epictetus to Rome and then sent him to study with the Stoic philosopher Gaius Musonius Rufus. Epictetus was manumitted sometime after Nero's death in A.D. 68 and he began to teach philosophy in Rome. After Domitian banished all philosophers from Rome in A.D. 93, Epictetus
86 • Epictetus packed up to northwestern Greece, where he set up a school in Nicopolis, in Epirus. After the death of Domitian, the former slave was free to return to R o m e b u t instead remained in Greece. E p i c t e t u s and his school b e c a m e extraordinarily famous. Elite f r o m all over the empire, including the e m p e r o r Hadrian and the f u t u r e historian Arrian, came to sit at his feet. Renowned as he was, E p i c t e t u s led the life of an ascetic, sleeping on a thin mat and owning few possessions. T h o u g h the facts and dates of his death are u n k n o w n , Epictetus perished around A.D. 135. Perhaps it had s o m e t h i n g to do with the intense political turmoil in the world in which they lived, but for the Stoics t h e r e was nothing more essential to the good life than peace of mind and f r e e d o m from fear and anxiety. E p i c t e t u s was not an academic philosopher. For him, philosophy was a f o r m of therapy. Tn that regard, he spoke of his school as a hospital for reasonable creatures frustrated from u n r e a sonable desires and expectations. T h e key to i n n e r peace and a pleasurable life is inscribed in the first lines of our text: Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions. T h e things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men. . . . We m u s t distinguish between what is and what is not in our control. W h e t h e r or not I am wealthy or famous is not in my ken, but w h e t h e r or not I am virtuous is m my control. For Epictetus, I cannot steer what happens, but with rigorous practice I can control my attitudes toward events. Knowing that there are laws of t h e cosmos and that e v e r y t h i n g happens in accord with these laws, I can train myself to
Ethics: The Essential Writings • 87 accept whatever comes to pass. This is of course the ancient ideal of amorfati, of learning to desire one's fate or destiny. For Epictetus, philosophy is not just a matter of acquiring knowledge. It is a knowledge that must be rehearsed again and again and integrated into our judgments. He reminds us: If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that belong to others to be your own. . . . Exercise, therefore, what is in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must necessarily be a slave. Epictetus's notion of inner freedom, that bars do not a prison make, has inspired many people in dire circumstances, such as Col. John Stockdale, who credited his study of Epictetus with helping him to survive seven horrid years in a North Vietnamese prison camp.
THE ENCHIRIDION Translated by Elizabeth Carter
1. Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions. T h e things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one. You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, and you will not be harmed. Aiming therefore at such' great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight tendency, toward the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would have both of these great things, along with power
The Enchiridion • 89 and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the f o r m e r too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and f r e e d o m are achieved. Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: w h e t h e r it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is n o t h i n g to you. 2. R e m e m b e r that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you will never incur anything to which you are averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or death, or poverty, you will be wretched Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not in our control, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in o u r control. But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only t h e appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation. 3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, r e m e m b e r to tell yourself of what general n a t u r e they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, r e m i n d yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or y o u r wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies. 4. W h e n you are going about any action, remind yourself what n a t u r e the action is. If you are going to bathe, picture to yourself
90 • Epictetus the things which usually happen in the bath: s o m e people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. T h u s you will m o r e safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." And in the same m a n n e r with regard to every other action. For thus, if any hindrance arises in bathing, you will have it ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state conformable to nature; and I will not keep it if T am bothered at things that happen." 5. M e n are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the t e r r o r consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. W h e n therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition u p o n others. S o m e o n e just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. S o m e o n e who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself. 6. Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be prideful and say, "I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful, and say, "I have a handsome horse," know that you are p r o u d of what is, in fact, only the good of the horse. What, then, is y o u r own? Only y o u r reaction to the appearances of things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear, you will be p r o u d with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own. 7. C o n s i d e r when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get water you may along the way a m u s e yourself with picking up a shellfish, or an onion. However, your thoughts and continual attention o u g h t to be bent toward the ship, waiting for the captain to call on board; you must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be t h r o w n into the ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you must run to the ship, leaving them,
The Enchiridion • 91 and regarding n o n e of them. But if you are old, never go far f r o m the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to c o m e in time. 8. D o n ' t d e m a n d that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen, and you will go on well. 9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is your choice. Lameness is a h i n d r a n c e to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as hindrances to something else, but not to yourself. 10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a p r o p e r use of it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not h u r r y you away along with them. 11. N e v e r say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "1 have r e t u r n e d it." Is y o u r child dead? It is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is not that likewise returned? "But he who took it away is a bad man." W h a t difference is it to you who the giver assigns to take it back? W h i l e he gives it to you to possess, take care of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel. 12. If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I n e glect my affairs, I'll have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with hunger, e x e m p t from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is better your servant should be had, than you unhappy. Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." W h e n you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he m a y not do what you want. But he is by no m e a n s of such i m p o r t a n c e that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance. 13. If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to external things. D o n ' t wish to be t h o u g h t to
92 • Epictetus know anything; and even if you appear to be somebody i m p o r tant to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your faculty of choice in a state c o n f o r m a b l e to nature, and at the same time acquire external things. Rut while you are careful about the one, you m u s t of necessity neglect the other. 14. If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that belong to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice," but s o m e thing else. But, if you wish to have your desires undisappointed th is is in your own control. Exercise, therefore, what is in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must necessarily be a slave. 15. R e m e m b e r that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought around to you? P u t out your hand and take y o u r share with moderation. Does it pass by you? D o n ' t stop it. Is it n o t yet come? D o n ' t stretch your desire toward it, b u t wait till it reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will eventually be a worthy p a r t ner of the feasts of the gods. And if you don't even take the things which are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, hut also of their empire. For, by doing this, Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine. 16. W h e n you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead, or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be p r e p a r e d to say, "It's not the accident that distresses this person, because it doesn't distress another person; it is the j u d g m e n t which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either. 17. R e m e m b e r that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the
The Enchiridion • 93 author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's. 18. W h e n a raven h a p p e n s to croak unluckily, don't allow the appearance to h u r r y you away with it, but immediately make the distinction to yourself, and say, " N o n e of these things are foretold to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or wife. But to me all omens are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is in my control to derive advantage from it." 19. You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own control to conquer. W h e n , therefore, you see anyone e m i n e n t in honors, or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, and to p r o n o u n c e him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own control, there will be no r o o m for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don't wish to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a c o n t e m p t of things not in our own control.. 20. Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle which represents these things as insulting. W h e n , therefore, anyone provokes you, be assured that it is y o u r own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you will m o r e easily c o m m a n d yourself 21. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death, and you will never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything. 22. If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself f r o m the very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear t h e m say, " H e is r e t u r n e d to us a philosopher all at once," and " W h e n c e this supercilious look?" Now, for your part, don't have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which appear best to you as one appointed by G o d to this station. For r e m e m b e r that, if you adhere to the same
94 • Epictetus point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterward admire you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule. 23. If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please anyone, be assured that you have ruined your s c h e m e of life. Be contented, then, in everything with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be t h o u g h t so likewise by anyone, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you 24. D o n ' t allow such considerations as these distress you. "I will live in dishonor, and be n o b o d y anywhere." For, if dishonor is an evil, you can no m o r e be involved in any evil by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours, then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after all, is this a dishonor? And how is it t r u e that you will be n o b o d y anywhere, w h e n you o u g h t to be somebody in those things only which are in your own control, in which you may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted."—What do you m e a n by unassisted? T h e y will not have money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. W h o told you, then, that these are a m o n g the things in our own control, and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he has not himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get t h e m with the preservation of my own honor and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own p r o p e r good that you may gain what is not good, consider how inequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honor? Rather assist me, then, to gain this character t h a n require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but my country, say you, as far as depends on me, will be unassisted. H e r e again, what assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And what signifies that? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with arms. It is e n o u g h if everyone fully performs his own. p r o p e r business. And were you to supply it with another citizen of h o n o r and fidelity, would not he be of use to it? Yes. T h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you,
The Enchiridion • 95 will 1 hold in the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your c o u n t r y when you are b e c o m e faithless and void of shame. 25. Is anyone preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a c o m pliment, or in being admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you o u g h t to be glad that he has gotten them; and if they are evil, don't be grieved that you have not gotten t h e m . And r e m e m b e r that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire things not in our own control, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For how can he who does not frequent the door of any [great] man, does not attend him, does not praise him, have an equal share with him who does? You are unjust, then, and insatiable, if you are unwilling to p a y the price for which these things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much is lettuce sold? Fifty cents, for instance. If another, then, paying fifty cents, takes the lettuce, and you, not paying it, go without them, don't imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has t h e lettuce, so you have the fifty cents which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it is for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive the other, you are insatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you don't like to praise; the not bearing with his behavior at coming in. 26. T h e will of n a t u r e may be learned from those things in which we don't distinguish from each other. For example, when our neighbor's boy breaks a cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These things will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup likewise is broken, you o u g h t to be affected just as when another's c u p was broken. Apply this in like m a n n e r to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? T h e r e is no one who would not say, "This is a h u m a n accident." but if anyone's own child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas 1 how
96 • Epictetus wretched am I!" Bin it should be r e m e m b e r e d how we are affected in hearing the same thing c o n c e r n i n g others. 27. As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so n e i t h e r does the nature of evil exist in the world. 28. If a person gave your body to any stranger he m e t on his way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no s h a m e in h a n d i n g over y o u r own mind to be confused and mystified by anyone who happens to verbally attack you? 29. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then u n d e r t a k e it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit; but not having t h o u g h t of the consequences, when some of them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would c o n q u e r at the O l y m p i c games." But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it is for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, w h e t h e r you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, nor sometimes even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your master, as to a physician. T h e n , in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate y o u r arm, turn your ankle, swallow dust, be whipped,'and, after all, lose the victory. W h e n you have evaluated all this, if y o u r inclination still holds, then go to war. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play like wrestlers, sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a t r u m p e t , and sometimes act a tragedy when they have seen and admired these shows. T h u s you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing at all. Like an ape, you m i m i c all you see, and one thing after a n o t h e r is sure to please you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered u p o n anything considerately, nor after having viewed the whole m a t t e r on all sides, or m a d e any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. T h u s some, when they have seen a p h i losopher and heard a man speaking like E u p h r a t e s (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the m a t t e r is, and what y o u r own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider y o u r shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different per-
The Enchiridion • 107 sons are m a d e for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? T h a t you can eat and drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you m u s t labor, you must get the better of certain appetites, m u s t quit your acquaintance, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything, in magistracies, in honors, in courts of judicature. W h e n you have considered all these things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, don't come here; don't, like children, be one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar's officers. T h e s e things are not consistent. You m u s t be one man, either good or bad. You m u s t cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar. 30. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Are you naturally entitled, then, to a good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep y o u r own situation toward him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not h u r t you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations. 31. Be assured that the essential p r o p e r t y of piety toward the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing "I and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow t h e m in all events, as p r o d u c e d hy the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse t h e m as neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself f r o m things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in our
98 • Epictetus own control to be either good or evil, when yon are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally f o r m e d to fly and abhor things that a p p e a r hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and a d m i r e those which appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should be happy about t h e person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to be happy about the hurt itself Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing empire to be a good m a d e Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, revile the gods. For w h e r e interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, carefid of piety likewise. But it is also i n c u m b e n t on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly manner, nor negligently, n o r sparingly, nor beyond his ability. 32. W h e n you have recourse to divination, r e m e m b e r that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is a m o n g the things not in o u r own control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder; then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterward, when any counsel is given you, r e m e m b e r what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect if you disobey. C o m e to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our duty to
The Enchiridion • 99 share the danger of a friend or of our country, we o u g h t not: to consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the t e m p l e t h e person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him. 3 3. Immediately prescribe some character and form of conduce to yourself, which you may keep both alone and in company. Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may, however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it, but not on any of the c o m m o n subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own conversation bring over that of your company to p r o p e r subjects; but, if you happen to be taken among strangers, be silent. Don't allow your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse. Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able. Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners. For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected, he who converses with him will be infected likewise. Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, house, family. But strike off and re)ect everything relating to show and delicacy. As far as possible, before marriage, keep y o u r s e l f pure from familiarities with women, and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfolly. But don't therefore be troublesome and foil of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself don't. , If anyone tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, don t
100 • Epictetus make excuses about what is said of you, but answer: " H e does not know my other faults, else he would not h a r e m e n t i o n e d only these." It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever t h e r e is a p r o p e r occasion for you to be there, don't appear m o r e solicitous for anyone t h a n for yourself; that is,' wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to c o n q u e r who is the conqueror, for thus you will m e e t with no hindrance. Rut abstain entirely f r o m declamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, don't discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what does not contribute to y o u r own amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck with the show Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any authors. n o r appear [at t h e m ] readily. But, if you do appear, keep your gravity and sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose. W h e n you are going to confer with anyone, and particularly of those in a superior station, represent to yourself how Socrates or Z e n o would behave in such a case, and you will not be at a loss to make a p r o p e r u s e of whatever may occur. W h e n you are going to any of the people in power, represent to yourself that you will not find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be opened to you; that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it is your duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], "It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a man dazed by external things. In parties of conversation, avoid a f r e q u e n t and excessive mention of your own actions and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an endeavor to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar manners, and, besides, m a y be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance! Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything of this sort happens, if there be a p r o p e r opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances that w a y
The Enchiridion • 101 or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be displeased by such talk. 34. If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some delay. T h e n bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you will enjoy the pleasure, and that in which you will r e p e n t and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will be glad and applaud yourself if you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in opposition to this how m u c h better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a victory. 35. W h e n you do anything from a clear j u d g m e n t that it o u g h t to be done, never s h u n the being seen to do it, even though t h e world should make a w r o n g supposition about it; for, if you don't act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure you wrongly? 36. As the proposition, "Either it is day or it is night," is extremely p r o p e r for a disjunctive argument, but quite i m p r o p e r in a conjunctive one, so, at a feast, to choose the largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of an entertainment. W h e n you eat with another, then, r e m e m b e r not only the value of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behavior which ought to be observed toward the person who gives the entertainment. 37. If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both m a d e an ill figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported. 38. W h e n walking, you are careful not to step on a nail or turn your foot; so likewise be careful not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety. 39. T h e body is to everyone the measure of the possessions p r o p e r for it, just as the foot is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move beyond it, you must
102 • Epictetus necessarily be carried forward, as down a cliff; as in the case of a shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a d u e measure, there is no bound. 40. W o m e n from f o u r t e e n years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by t h e men. T h e r e f o r e , perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place all their hopes. We should, therefore, fix o u r attention on making t h e m sensible that they are valued for the appearance of decent, modest and discreet behavior. 41. It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to be long in o u r exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal functions. T h e s e should be done incidentally and slightly, and o u r whole attention be engaged in the care of the understanding. 42. W h e n any person h a r m s you, or speaks badly of you, r e m e m b e r that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. T h e r e f o r e , if he judges f r o m a w r o n g appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if anyone should suppose a t r u e p r o p o sition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a person who reviles you, for you will say u p o n every occasion, "It seemed so to him." 43. E v e r y t h i n g has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it cannot. If your b r o t h e r acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried. 44. T h e s e reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "T am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better." T h e connection is rather this: "I am richer than you, therefore my property-is greater than yours"; "I am more eloq u e n t than you, t h e r e f o r e my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither p r o p e r t y n o r style.
The Enchiridion • 103 45. Does anyone bathe in a mighty little time? Don't say that he does it ill, but in a mighty little time. Does anyone drink a great quantity of wine? Don't say that he does ill, but that he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle from which anyone acts, how should you know if he acts ill? T h u s vou will not r u n the hazard of assenting to any a p p e a r ances but such as you fully comprehend. 46. N e v e r call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don't talk how persons o u g h t to eat, but eat as you ought. For r e m e m b e r that in this m a n n e r Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. x\nd when persons came to him and desired to be r e c o m m e n d e d bv him to philosophers, he took and- -recommended them, so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned c o n c e r n i n g philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have begun your business. For sheep don't throw up t h e grass to show the shepherds how m u c h they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the actions p r o d u c e d by t h e m after they have been digested. 47. W h e n you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small price, don't pique yourself u p o n it; nor, if you drink water, be saying u p o n every occasion, "I drink water." But first consider how much m o r e sparing and patient of h a r d ship the poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor, and bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; don't grasp statues, but, when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and tell nobody. 48. T h e condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either benefit or hurt f r o m himself, but from externals. T h e condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he expects all h u r t and benefit from himself. T h e marks of
104 • Epictetus a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing c o n c e r n i n g himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only which thwart the p r o p e r use of our own faculty of choice; the exertion of his active powers toward anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush. 49. W h e n anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to u n d e r s t a n d and i n t e r p r e t the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, "Unless C h r y s i p p u s had written obscurely, this person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To u n d e r s t a n d n a t u r e and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding C h r y s i p p u s does, I have recourse to him. 1 don't u n d e r s t a n d his writings. I seek, therefore, one to i n t e r p r e t them." So far t h e r e is n o t h i n g to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I admire n o t h i n g but merely the interpretation, what do I b e c o m e m o r e than a g r a m m a r i a n instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of H o m e r I interpret Chrysippus. W h e n anyone, t h e r e fore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse. 50. W h a t e v e r moral rules you have deliberately proposed to y o u r self. abide by t h e m as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. D o n ' t regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. H o w long, then, will you put off thinking yourself worthy of t h e highest improvements and follow the distincdons of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with which you o u g h t to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them.
The Enchiridion • 105 What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw u p o n that the delay of r e f o r m i n g yourself? You are no longer a hoy, but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, p u r p o s e to p u r pose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a proficient Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, r e m e m b e r that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off. Ry once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary preserved. T h u s Socrates b e c a m e perfect, improving himself by everything, attending to n o t h i n g but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates. 51. T h e first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie"; the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the origin of our obligation not to lie"; the third gives strength and articulation to the other two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration? W h a t is consequence? W h a t contradiction? W h a t truth? W h a t falsehood? T h e third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. Rut the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. Rut we act just on the contrary. For we spend all o u r time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right. 52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand: "Conduct me, Jove, and you, oh Destiny, Wherever your decrees have fixed my station." Cleanthes
• Epictetus "I follow cheerfully; and, did T not, Wicked and wretched, I must follow still Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." Euripides, Fragments And this third; "O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot." Plato's Crito and Apology
CHAPTER 4
ST. A U G U S T I N E
St. Augustine penned one of the first great autobiographies in the •Western tradition. His Confessions covers the first thirty-three years of his life and his journey from scoffing at Christianity to becoming one of the doctors of the Church. It is on the basis of this very candid self-study, and a biography by his friend and contemporary Bishop Possidius, that we know so many of the details of his remarkable life. Aurelius Augustine was born in November, A.D. 354, in the N o r t h African town of Tagaste (in what is now Algeria). Tagaste was a backwater of the disintegrating Roman Empire. Augustine's pagan father, Patricius, was a middle-class magistrate, and his mother, Monica, was a devout Christian consumed with the desire to see her son accept Christ as his savior. Augustine was first educated at home and then sent to school in the nearby town of Madaura, where he studied Greek and Latin. In his Confessions; Augustine complained that his parents were so filled with worldly ambition that they were more concerned about his academic success than his character. T h e r e may have been some truth to that accusation. Though in tight financial circumstances, his father was able to save enough money to send his gifted son to school in the city of Carthage. T h e paterfamilias, who was baptized on his deathbed, died soon after his son arrived in Carthage.
108 - St. Augustine In Carthage, Augustine took a c o n c u b i n e to whom he was very devoted. T h e two had one child, Adeodatus, who perished in childhood. Augustine studied philosophy and rhetoric. As a n i n e t e e n year-old student, he was spellbound by Cicero's dialogue Hortensius. T h i s work survives only in fragments but we know that it was i n t e n d e d to inspire a passion for philosophy and that it did for the y o u n g Augustine. He wrote, "Suddenly all the vanity that I had h o p e d in I saw as worthless, and with an incredible intensity of desire I longed after immortal w i s d o m " (Confessions, III, 4). At t h e time, Augustine found Christianity a tissue of problems. Taken literally, t h e r e were m a n y cases in which biblical figures seem to c o m m i t immoral acts. Moreover, the f u t u r e saint judged that Christianity failed to offer a sound explanation of the origins of evil. Augustine found cogent responses to this problem in the Persian religion of Manicheanism. Followers of Mani (A.D. 216-277), the M a n i c h e a n s believed that t h e r e are two c o m p e t i n g principles in the cosmos, light and darkness, or spirit and matter. T h e individual is a battleground between these primal forces. At the terminus of his studies, Augustine r e t u r n e d to Tagaste for a short time and then w e n t on to offer instruction in rhetoric and public speaking in Carthage. From there, and with the help of his p o w e r f u l network of M a n i c h e a n friends, he secured teaching positions in R o m e and Milan. As he moved from post to post, he was accompanied by his mother, Monica. A l t h o u g h he would b e c o m e a fervent believer, Augustine was well studied in the skeptical tradition and had a powerful propensity for doubt. E v e n before he left for Rome, he was beginning to have misgivings about the superstitions and metaphysics of the M a n i c h e a n system. In Milan he heard the silver-tongued preaching of Ambrose. A m b r o s e brought Christi an beliefs and N e o p l a t o n i s m together in a way that eased Augustine's intellectual qualms about Christianity. But Augustine was still a lustful man with a divided will, a man who once looked to God and said, "Give me chastity and continence, but not yet." However, t h e r e was no m o r e "not yet" after the s u m m e r of A.D. 386. At that time, he heard a childlike voice coming from his Milanese garden and telling him over and over again, "Take up and read." D u m b s t r u c k , the great interpreter interpreted these words to
Ethics: The Essential Writings • 109 mean that he should go and open his Bible. Augustine writes, "I seized, opened, and in silence read that section on which my eyes first fell (Rom. 13:13): ' N o t in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence.' No further would I read; nor needed I: for instantly at the end of this sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness of doubt vanished away." Thirty-two years old, Augustine was baptized by Ambrose at the Raster Vigil service in A.D. 387. In A.D. 391 he was ordained a priest and a few years later was appointed Bishop of Hippo. He remained Bishop for the next thirty-one years. During that interval, he was a whirl of activity, engaging in debates about heresy with the Donatists and the Pelagians. Augustine brought philosophical respectability to Christianity He wrote voluminously on such issues as the nature of God, evil, the soul, and free will. His two most famous works are his Confessions and the City of God. Augustine died in A.D. 430 with the Vandals literally at the gates of the city. T h e man who once bid God to take his time in saving him was canonized in 1298 and recognized as one of the four doctors of the Church. For Plato, everything that exists participates in the form of the Good. Thus, there is nothing that is not good (evil) that exists. Evil is an absence. Substitute God for Plato's form of the Good, and you have cracked the door open to Augustine's ethic. For Augustine there is nothing that is intrinsically good but God. As part of His creation, God's moral law is written into our hearts. Evil stems in part from a disorder in our hearts or desires. While we ought to love and desire God above all else, it is honor, health, or fame that we crave most. When the will submits to these unruly desires, we transgress. Augustine took the story of the fall of Adam quite literally and held that we were born valuing most what matters least. To listen to the Bishop of Hippo, righteousness requires the grace of God to help us reorder our desires.
C I T Y O F G O D : BOOK X I X
4. What, the Christians believe regarding the supreme good and evil, in opposition to the philosophers, who have maintained that the supreme good is in themselves If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say upon these points, and, in the first place, what its opinion regarding the supreme good and evil is, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live rightly. And thus it is written, "The just live by faith," for we do not as yet see our good, and must therefore live by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rightly, but can do SO only if He who has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray. As for those who have supposed that the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this life, and have placed it either in the soul or the body, or in both, or, to speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue, or in both; in repose or in virtue, or in both; in pleasure and repose, or in virtue, or in all combined; in the primary objects of nature, or in virtue, or in hoth—all these have, with a marvelous shallowness, sought to find their blessedness in this life and in themselves. C o n t e m p t has been poured upon such ideas by the Truth, saying by the prophet, "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" (or, as the Apostle Paul cites the passage, " T h e Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise") "that they are vain."
City of God: Book XIX • 111 For what flood of eloquence can suffice to detail the miseries of this life? Cicero, in the Consolation on the death of his daughter, has spent all his ability in lamentation; but how inadequate was even his ability here? For when, where, how, in this life can these primary objects of nature be possessed so that they may not be assailed by unforeseen accident? Is the body of the wise man exempt from any pain which may dispel pleasure, from any disquietude which may banish repose? T h e amputation or decay of the members of the body puts an end to its integrity, deformity blights its beauty, weakness its health, lassitude its vigor, sleepiness or sluggishness its activity—and which of these is it that may not assail the flesh of the wise man? Comely and fitting attitudes and movements of the body are numbered among the prime natural blessings; but what if some sickness makes the members tremble? what if a man suffers from curvature of the spine to such an extent that his hands reach the ground, and he goes upon all-fours like a quadruped? Does not this destroy all beauty and grace in the body, whether at rest or in motion? What shall I say of the fundamental blessings of the soul, sense and intellect, of which the one is given for the perception, and the other for the comprehension of truth? But what kind of sense is it that remains when a man becomes deaf and blind? where are reason and intellect when disease makes a man delirious? We can scarcely, or not at all, refrain from tears, when we think of or see the actions and words of such frantic persons, and consider how different from and even opposed to their own sober judgment and ordinary conduct their present demeanor is. And what shall I say of those who suffer from demoniacal possession? Where is their own intelligence hidden and buried while the malignant spirit is using their body and soul according to his own will? And who is quite sure that no such thing can happen to the wise man in this life? Then, as to the perception of truth, what can we hope for even in this way while in the body, as we read in the true book of Wisdom, "The corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presseth down the miijd that museth upon many things?" And eagerness, or desire of action, if this is the right meaning to put upon the Greek 5p|irj, is also reckoned among the primary advantages of nature; and yet is it not this which produces those pitiable movements of the insane, and those
112 - St. Augustine actions which we shudder to see, when sense is deceived and reason deranged? In fine, virtue itself, which is not among the p r i m a r y objects of nature, but succeeds to them as the result of learning, though it holds the highest place a m o n g h u m a n good things, what is its occupation save to wage p e r p e t u a l war with vices—not those that are outside of us, but within; not other men's, but our o w n — a war which is waged especially by that v i r t u e which t h e G r e e k s call aGMppOOUvri, and we t e m p e r a n c e , and which bridles carnal lusts, and prevents t h e m from winning the consent of the spirit to wicked deeds? For we must not fancy that there is no vice in us, when, as the apostle says, " T h e flesh Iusteth against the spirit"; for to this vice there is a contrary virtue, when, as the same writer says, " T h e spirit Iusteth against the flesh." "For these two," he says, "are contrary one to the other, so that you c a n n o t do the things which you would." But what is it we wish to do w h e n we seek to attain t h e s u p r e m e good, unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the spirit, and that t h e r e be no vice in us against which the spirit may lust? And as we cannot attain to this in the present life, however ardently we desire it, let us by God's help accomplish at least this, to preserve the soul from succumbing and yielding to the flesh that lusts against it, and to refuse o u r consent to the p e r petration of sin. Far be it f r o m us, then, to fancy that while we are still engaged in this intestine war, we have already found the happiness which we seek to reach by victory. And who is there so wise that he has no conflict at all to maintain against his vices? W h a t shall I say of that virtue which is called prudence? Is not all its vigilance spent in the d i s c e r n m e n t of good from evil things, so that no mistake may be admitted about what we should desire and what avoid? And thus it is itself a proof that we are in the midst of evils, or that evils are in us; for it teaches us that it is an evil to c o n sent to sin, and a good to refuse this consent. And yet this evil, to which p r u d e n c e teaches and t e m p e r a n c e enables us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by p r u d e n c e nor by temperance. And justice, whose office it is to r e n d e r to every man his due, whereby t h e r e is in man himself a certain just order of nature, so that the soul is subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul, and consequently both soul and flesh to G o d — d o e s not this virtue d e m o n s t r a t e that it is as yet rather laboring toward its end than resting in its finished work?
City of God: Book XIX • 113 For the soul is so much the less subjected to God as it is less occupied with the thought of God; and the flesh is so much the less subjected to the spirit as it lusts more vehemently against the spirit. So long, therefore, as we are beset by this weakness, this plague, this disease, how shall we dare to say that we are safe? and if not safe, then how can we be already enjoying our final beatitude? T h e n that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude is the plainest proof of the ills of life, for it is these ills which it is compelled to bear patiently. And this holds good, no matter though the ripest wisdom co-exists with it. And 1 am at a loss to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous that he cannot or ought not to endure them. But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that the supreme good can be found in this life, and that they can become happy by their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him make away with himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy. O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it? If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy? Or how can they say that these are not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude, and force it not only to yield, but so to rave that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up? For who is so blind as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from? And if they say we should flee from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride and acknowledge that it is miserable? Was it, I would ask, fortitude or weakness which prompted Cato to kill himself? for he would not have done so had he not been too weak to endure Cesar's victory. Where, then, is his fortitude? It has yielded, it has succumbed, it has been so thoroughly overcome as to abandon, forsake, flee this happy life. Or was it no longer happy? T h e n it was miserable. How, then, were these not evils which made life miserable, and a thing to be escaped from? And therefore those who admit that these are evils, as the Peripatetics do, and the Old Academy, the sect with Varro advocates,
114 - St. Augustine express a more intelligible doctrine; but theirs also is a surprising mistake, for they contend that this is a happy life which is beset by these evils, even though they be so great that he who endures t h e m should commit suicide to escape them. "Pains and anguish of body," says Varro, "are evils, and so much the worse in proportion to their severity; and to escape them you must quit this life." W h a t life, 1 pray? T h i s life, he says, which is oppressed by such evils. T h e n it is happy in the midst of these very evils on account of which you say we must quit it? Or do you call it happy because you are at liberty to escape these evils by death? What, then, if by some secret judgment of God you were held fast and not permitted to die, nor suffered to live without these evils? In that case, at least, you would say that such a life was miserable. It is soon relinquished, no doubt, but this does not make it not miserable; for were it eternal, you yourself would p r o n o u n c e it miserable. Its brevity, therefore, does not clear it of misery; neither ought it to be called happiness because it is a brief misery. Certainly t h e r e is a mighty force in these evils which compel a man—according to them, even a wise man—to cease to be a man that he may escape them, though they say, and say truly, that it is as it were the first and strongest d e m a n d of nature that a man cherish himself, and naturally therefore avoid death, and should so stand his own friend as to wish and vehemently aim at continuing to exist as a living creature, and subsisting in this union of soul and body. T h e r e is a mighty force in these evils to overcome this natural instinct by which death is by every means and with all a man's efforts avoided, and to overcome it so completely that what was avoided is desired, sought after, and if it cannot in any other way be obtained, is inflicted by the man on h i m self. T h e r e is a mighty force in these evils which make fortitude a homicide—if, indeed, that is to be called fortitude which is so t h o r oughly overcome by these evils, that it not only cannot preserve by patience the man whom it u n d e r t o o k to govern and defend, but is itself obliged to kill him. T h e wise man, I admit, ought to bear death with patience, but when it is in flicted by another. If, then, as these men maintain, he is obliged to inflict it on himself, certainly it must be owned that the ills which compel him to this are not only evils, but intolerable evils. T h e life, then, which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous, could never have been called happy, if the m e n who give it this name had condescended
City of God: Bonk XIX • 115 to yield to the truth, and to be conquered by valid arguments, when they inquired after the happy life, as they yield to unhappiness, and are overcome by overwhelming evils, when they put themselves to death, and if they had not fancied that the supreme good was to be found in this mortal life; for the very virtues of this life, which are certainly its best and most useful possessions, are all the m o r e telling proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are helpful against the violence of its dangers, toils, and woes. For if these are t r u e virtues—and such cannot exist save in those who have true piety—they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in the m a n y and great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe. For if not yet safe, how could it be happy? And therefore the Apostle Paul, speaking not of men without p r u d e n c e , temperance, fortitude, and justice, but of those whose lives were regulated by true piety, and whose virtues were therefore true, says, "For we are saved by hope: now hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it." As, therefore, we are saved, so we are m a d e happy by hope. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so is it with our happiness, and this "with patience"; for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there shall be no longer anything to endure. Salvation, such as it shall be in the world to come, shall itself be our final happiness And this happiness these philosophers refuse to believe in, because they do not see it, and attempt to fabricate for themselves a happiness in this life, based u p o n a virtue which is as deceitful as it is proud.
116 - St. Augustine CHAPTF.R I V
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the C r e a t o r of all nature is s u p r e m e l y good. But nature is not supremely and immutably good as is the C r e a t o r of it. T h u s the good in created things can he d i m i n ished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still, h o w ever m u c h it is diminished, s o m e t h i n g must remain of its original n a t u r e as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its "nature" cannot he destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. T h e r e is good reason, therefore, to praise an u n c o r r u p t e d thing, and if it were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless he all the more w o r t h y of praise. W h e n , however, a thing is c o r r u p t e d , its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. W h e r e there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. W h e r e there is evil, t h e r e is a corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if something of its being remains that cannot be f u r t h e r corrupted, this will then be an i n c o r r u p t i b l e entity [natura incorruptibilis\, and to this great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which it cannot be f u r t h e r deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. W h e r e f o r e corruption cannot consume the good w i t h o u t also c o n s u m i n g the thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater good if it c a n n o t be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and u n k n o w i n g can deny that it is Still good even when corrupted. W h e n e v e r a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is n o t h ing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist. 1 3. From this it follows that there is nothing to he called evil if t h e r e is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. W h e r e t h e r e is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. T h u s there can be no evil w h e r e there is no good.
City of God: Book XIX • 111 This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to m e a n that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that t h e r e is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good \omnis natura bonum est]. N o t h i n g evil exists in itself hwt only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the a r g u m e n t compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter." Moreover the Lord himself saith: "An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart." What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad m a n except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity insofar as he is a man, evil insofar as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls u n d e r the prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault with God's work, because man is an entity of God's creation. It also m e a n s that we are praising the defects in this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, insofar as it is an entity, is good. Insofar as it is defective, it is evil. 14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails to apply* No weather is both dark and bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. T h i s principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is not a ' T h i s refers to Aristotle's well-known principle of "the excluded middle "
118 - St. Augustine good. On the other hand, the good can exist w i t h o u t evil. For a man or an ange! could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. T h e s e two contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is evil, then the evil simply could not he, since it can have no m o d e in which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot be corrupted, because corruption is nothing m o r e than the deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not anything at all. T h e r e is no other source whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the case, then, insofar as a thing is an entity, it is unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a c o r r u p t i b l e entity, it still has no m o d e of existence except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by c o r r u p t i n g something good can c o r r u p t i o n inflict injury. 1 5. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not suppose that this denies o u r Lord's judgment: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruit." This cannot be, even as the T r u t h himself declareth: " M e n do not gather grapes from th