Dreams That Matter
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Dreams That Matter
The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the General Endowment Fund of the University of California Press Foundation.
Dreams That Matter Egyptian Landscapes of the Imagination
Amira Mittermaier
University of California Press Berkeley
Los Angeles
London
University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu. University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 2011 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mittermaier, Amira, 1974–. Dreams that matter : Egyptian landscapes of the imagination / Amira Mittermaier. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-520-25850-1 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn 978-0-520-25851-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Dreams—Egypt. 2. Egypt—Religion. 3. Dream interpretation—Egypt. 4. Dreams—Religious aspects— Islam—case studies. 5. Ethnopsychology—Egypt. I. Title. bf1078.m485 2011 154.6'3096216—dc22 2010020056 Manufactured in the United States of America 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is printed on Cascades Enviro 100, a 100% post consumer waste, recycled, de-inked fiber. FSC recycled certified and processed chlorine free. It is acid free, Ecologo certified, and manufactured by BioGas energy.
Contents
List of Illustrations
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
On Transliterations and Translations Prelude
Introduction: Studying Dreams in Undreamy Times
xiii xv
1
1. Dream Trouble
31
2. Thresholds of Interpretation
54
3. Seeing the (In)visible
84
4. Poetry and Prophecy
112
5. The Ethics of the Visitational Dream
140
6. The Royal Road into the Unknown
173
7. Virtual Realities, Visionary Realities
201
Afterword: On the Politics of Dreaming
232
Notes
241
Glossary
265
Bibliography
269
Index
289
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Illustrations
1. Metaphorical dreams: hosting the World Cup in 2010
9
2. Shaykh Nabil at the threshold
59
3. Inside Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine
65
4. Shaykh Saläh al-Dïn al-Qüsï
113
5. A tomb’s opening, or its “eye”
145
6. Women visiting al-Sayyida Zaynab
155
7. Freud’s Traumdeutung in Arabic translation
178
8. Two psychologists interpreting dreams on television
197
9. A dream booklet sold on Cairo’s streets
210
10. “Allah” on a piece of bread
222
vii
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Acknowledgments
At some point during my fieldwork in Cairo, probably on a particularly hot, loud, and frustrating day, I jotted down a reminder in my notebook. I wrote that once back in New York—while sitting at my desk surrounded by the comfort of my home, with a cup of coffee next to me and my laptop in front of me—I shouldn’t forget what a pain fieldwork was at times. The traffic, the pollution, the mosquitoes, the heat, the tense political climate, and, maybe more than anything else, the many hours spent waiting for and running after people—all these frustrations, I insisted, should not be erased in my ethnography. Now, years later, sitting in my office at the University of Toronto, finalizing the last bits and pieces of the book that has grown out of my dissertation, and on my third cup of coffee today, I miss Cairo. Certainly not the everyday annoyances but the people I came to know, rely on, learn from, laugh with, and occasionally argue with. These are the people I want to thank first. That my assumptions and beliefs were repeatedly shaken up in the field I owe most to Shaykh Qusi and his community. I hope this book can stand as a small token of gratitude for their many stories, trust, and friendship. I also owe special thanks to Shaykh Mustafa for all the time he spent patiently answering my questions and for letting new questions arise through our conversations; to Shaykh Hanafi for introducing me to his vast library on dream interpretation and for sharing his thoughts on the art of interpreting dreams in the age of television; and to Shaykh Nabil for the many teas, yansüns, and coffees, for allowing me to witness his interpretive and counseling work, and for his sense of humor. Likewise, I am deeply grateful to Madame Salwa Alshebeny, who quickly became much more than an “informant.” I thank her for taking me to countless saint shrines in Islamic Cairo and the City of the Dead, for teaching me so much about the saints, and for distributing rice pudding at one of ix
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Acknowledgments
the shrines after I had passed my dissertation defense. Another informantturned-friend is Hassan Surour, who generously gave me of his time and who gracefully navigated being a friend, research assistant, and teacher all at once. Without Hassan’s company and his occasional attempts to help me come up with a clearer plan, fieldwork would have been more difficult, more alienating, and certainly less enjoyable. Egypt also would be an entirely different place for me without `Abdelnagy Sakout, who had the pleasant habit of showing up in Cairo whenever I was feeling discouraged. He and the entire Sakout family, both in Cairo and in Hurghada, have made Egypt feel like a second (or third) home to me. I further wish to thank my relatives Soheir Taraman, `Abd al-Aziz El Desouky, and Mohamed Abd El-Wahhab for their support and hospitality; Sahar Mansour for her cheerful friendship; Dr. Husayn `Abd al-Qadir for talking me through the local history of psychoanalysis; Rasha Badr and her family for the many meals and conversations; Walid Gharib and Huda al-Hussaini for helping me transcribe recordings; Khaled Sakout for introducing me to healers in Upper Egypt; Muhammad Gaber and Shaykh Hisham for our unforgettable hourlong conversations under the stars of Qurna; and `Umar El-Gendy for his patient but passionate explanations and for all the stories he has shared with me. For institutional support and for allowing me to escape occasionally into the shielded oasis that is the American University in Cairo, I thank Elizabeth Coker, Farouk Sendiony, and the late Cynthia Nelson. Guidance and inspiration throughout my years in graduate school at Columbia University (and beyond it) were provided by my dissertation adviser, Brinkley Messick, who first introduced me to the field of anthropology when I was an exchange student at the University of Michigan and who continuously renewed my excitement about the discipline in the years to come; Lila Abu-Lughod, who commented generously on chapter drafts and pushed me to think more carefully about the social life of dreams; Michael Taussig, whose work has long inspired me to marvel at the strangeness of the seemingly ordinary (and the ordinariness of the seemingly strange) and who widened my vision of what ethnographic writing can be; Brian Larkin, who nurtured and guided my deeper interest in the effects of mediation; and Vincent Crapanzano, who offered crucial input both through his close reading of my work and through his own writings. To all of them I am deeply grateful. Numerous colleagues and friends at Columbia University, the University of Toronto, and elsewhere helped me at various stages of this work. Among them are Hussein Agrama, Talal Asad, Deirdre de la Cruz, Narges Erami, Katherine P. Ewing, Nadia Fadil, Sherine Hamdy, Richard Kernaghan,
Acknowledgments
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xi
Michael Lambek, Andrea Muehlebach, Mara Naaman, Anthony Shenoda, Emilio Spadola, Steffen Strohmenger, and Jason Throop. Katie KilroyMarac, Pamela Klassen, and Joshua Dubler read the entire manuscript and gave me the invaluable gift of thinking through my materials with me. Jess Bier and William Christian Jr. went over the final draft with unimaginable care and attentiveness. Immensely helpful comments were also provided by Stefania Pandolfo, Charles Hirschkind, Dale Eickelman, and one anonymous reader. Finally, I wish to thank my editors at the University of California Press, Stan Holwitz, Emily Park, and Reed Malcolm. The research and writing of this book have benefited from the support of a number of institutions and grantors, including Columbia University, the Social Science Research Council, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, a Newcombe Doctoral Fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, a Mellon Fellowship in the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at Columbia University, a Connaught Start-Up Grant, and the University of Toronto. I thank all these institutions for their support. Related aspects of this study can be found in the International Journal of Middle East Studies (Mittermaier 2007), Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam (Mittermaier 2008), and After Pluralism: Reimagining Modes of Religious Engagement (see Mittermaier, forthcoming). Participants at the SIAS workshop “The Vision-Thing: Studying Divine Intervention,” held in Palo Alto in July 2007 and in Budapest in July 2008, as well as the audiences at the Kevorkian Center Research Workshop at New York University, the Anthropology Monday Seminar at the University of Chicago, the Human-in-Difference Workshop at Concordia University, the Social-Cultural and Linguistic Anthropology Discussion Series at the University of Toronto, the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, and UCLA’s Mind, Medicine, and Culture Discussion Group all offered critical feedback that helped me sharpen and refine my arguments. More than I can adequately express I am grateful to Alejandra Gonzalez Jimenez for her unfaltering support, her astute observations, and her thorough and patient engagement with my project. I also wish to thank my sister, Mona Hein, and brother-in-law, Dave Hein, for their support from afar and for accepting that I have found an intellectual home on this side of the Atlantic; my father, Dr. Norbert Mittermaier, who has nurtured my interest in philosophy for as long as I can remember; and my mother, Raifa Mittermaier, who offered invaluable help during my fieldwork and is the reason I am engaging with Egypt in the first place. Most of all, I thank my parents for believing in me throughout. It is to them that I wish to dedicate this book.
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On Transliterations and Translations
In a sense, this book consists of the traces of multiple translations: from dream experience to memory; from memory to telling; from telling to interpretation; from Arabic to English (sometimes with German in between); from handwritten scribbles (and occasionally drawings) to typed fieldnotes; from fieldnotes to multiple drafts to dissertation to even more drafts to book manuscript to the book that you are holding in your hands; from my interlocutors’ conceptual frameworks to my own and ultimately to those of my readers. Yet, following Walter Benjamin (1968b), one might say that my task in writing this book was not to translate my interlocutors’ stories into academic English but rather to decenter our conceptual frameworks through translating them into my interlocutors’ dream vocabularies. Benjamin cautions us against a domesticating kind of translation, one that too quickly seeks refuge in familiarity. Instead, he says, we should dwell in the sometimes uncomfortable space of in-betweenness. One way of reminding the reader of this in-betweenness is to transliterate certain terms instead of translating them. When transliterating from classical Arabic, I have largely adopted the system outlined in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. When transcribing from Egyptian colloquial Arabic, I modified the IJMES system slightly to convey a sense of colloquial speech, partly borrowing from the Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic by el-Said Badawi and Martin Hinds (1986). For the sake of readability, I have omitted diacritical marks, with the exception of the `ayn (`) and the hamza (´), for my interlocutors’ names (e.g., Rashid instead of Rashïd). For all other names I mark the `ayn, hamza, and long vowels only (e.g., al-Qardäwï instead of al-Qardäwï). Some names of well-known personalities, such as `Abd al-Nasser, place names, as well as terms with common English spellings, such as Qur´an, are preserved as such. xiii
xiv
/
On Transliterations and Translations
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Arabic are my own. Again attempting to retain as many traces as possible, I often give the English equivalent for key terms and provide the Arabic in parentheses. Frequently used Arabic terms are listed in the glossary. (The prefix al-, as in al-bätin, is a definite article; this term would be listed under the letter b.) For words that lose too much of their meaning in translation, I alternate between the Arabic term and an English approximation throughout the book. For Qur´anic verses, I generally use Muhammad Asad’s translations. Plurals of Arabic words are in most cases indicated by adding an s to the singular form, such as hadiths and shaykhs. All dates follow the Common Era. In order to protect my interlocutors’ privacy I have changed most names, with the exception of publicly known figures who spoke under the assumption that their names would be recorded, and with the exception of those who wanted to be named. Ultimately, regardless of whether the dreamers’ names are included, it is the dreams themselves (or rather their traces) that have a story to tell.
Prelude
An open space. It might be the desert. Men and women, maybe fifteen in total, dressed in strange khaki uniforms. I recognize them. They’re Shaykh Qusi’s followers. I watch as they take small metal tubes in their hands, raise them to their faces, and push them into their eyes, all the way in, until the tubes disappear. Their movements are gentle but determined. Only round, white, inward-turned eyeballs remain in the place where their eyes used to be. Next their shaykh hands them batteries, which they swallow. That’s why they see, I think. That’s the secret. Then I wake up and what I have witnessed stops making sense. How can one see more with one’s eyes closed or turned inward? I guess I understand these things better when I’m asleep. Maybe I’ve been in the field for too long. I jot down the dream in my notebook before it fades from my memory.
xv
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Introduction Studying Dreams in Undreamy Times
“The government used to steal our money,” Ahmad says with a sad smile on his face. “But today things are even worse. Today they steal our hope, too.” Ahmad works for the Ministry of Agriculture in a town on the Red Sea coast. He has a good position and a spacious office, but his income is still barely enough for him, his wife, and their four children to support themselves. It is May 2007, and Ahmad and I are sitting in a street café on an alley in downtown Cairo where plastic bags and dust are swirling through the air. On the wall behind me a cockroach is crawling, and I try unobtrusively to move my chair a little farther away from it. All around us young and middle-aged men are smoking shisha, some of them chatting but most sitting in silence.1 A veiled woman dressed in black is performing as a fire-eater in the middle of the alley, but no one seems to be paying attention to her. Ahmad suggests that one of these days I should count the number of people entering stores in downtown Cairo who leave with a shopping bag in their hands. It won’t be many, he predicts. People can’t afford to buy anymore; the only thing left is window-shopping. We are sipping heavy tea that is bearable only with an excessive amount of sugar. But the tea is not the only thing that is heavy; so is the atmosphere. Like Ahmad, many friends during the course of my visit will explain that economically, morally, and politically, Egypt is going through a crisis. Almost everyone I talk to feels helpless, hopeless, and outraged about the ongoing war in Iraq and about the emergency laws that interdict all expressions of discontent within Egypt itself.2 “We’re living a nightmare,” people say when I bring up the topic of dreams. Already during my fieldwork in 2003 and 2004 it had quickly dawned on me that these were not particularly dreamy times. Friends remarked that after the Iraq War started and Egypt’s economy fell into disarray, most 1
2
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Introduction
people would probably have little interest in talking about their dreams. Others warned that nobody would share significant dream-stories with me because nobody wanted to inform “the Americans” about Islam. Soon thereafter, in addition to the Iraq War, rising food prices overshadowed Egypt’s dream landscapes. If one has to wake up at three o’clock in the morning to stand in line in front of one of the bakeries that sell statesubsidized bread, little time is left for dreaming. This book is an attempt to think through the role of dreams in such undreamy times. It is also a belated response to my friend Ahmad, who is not only worried about his children’s and Egypt’s future but also seemed somewhat disappointed when I first told him about my research project. He shrugged his shoulders and said that he wasn’t very convinced by things you can’t touch. Dreams, he explained, are ay kaläm, “just talk.” While taking seriously such voices of doubt and skepticism, as well as the harsh reality that dreamers wake up to every morning, this book argues that certain dreams matter in present-day Egypt. They matter in the sense of having significance in people’s lives and, more literally, in the sense of having an impact on the visible, material world. They matter because they complicate the notion of a monolithic Islam, and they matter because they destabilize conventional understandings of the “real.” 3 Although skeptics such as Ahmad, Egyptian state officials, psychoanalysts, and Muslim reformist thinkers contest the importance of all dreams, religiously and politically meaningful dreams—and more personal ones as well—have by no means been erased from Egypt’s landscapes of the imagination. On the contrary, in recent years interest in Muslim dream interpretation has increased. Egyptians of various class and age backgrounds consult professional dream interpreters and use the istikhära prayer to invite divinely inspired dream-visions. Classical dream manuals are reprinted, and cheaper abridged versions are sold on Cairo’s streets and in its bookstalls, as are booklets that explain the nature of dreams from both an Islamic and a Freudian perspective. CD-ROMs, newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and TV shows all offer contemporary Egyptians ways to unravel the hidden meaning behind their dreams. Instead of reading this renewed interest in dreams as an escapism triggered by the nightmare that waking life has become, I suggest that my interlocutors’ dream-stories can open up critical spaces and possibilities.4 The kinds of dreams that I retell matter even (and maybe especially) in a time of war, emergency laws, and social disintegration not because they provide dreamers with a protective blanket of false consciousness or hallucinatory wish fulfillment, but because they insert the dreamer into a
Studying Dreams in Undreamy Times
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3
wider network of symbolic debts, relationships, and meanings. They place the dreamer in relation to the Divine, offer guidance, and enable a mode of being in the world that disrupts the illusion of the autonomous self-possessed subject, calling attention to in-betweenness and interrelationality instead.5 Like the widely used phrase in shä´ Alläh (God willing), dreams continually remind believers of their embeddedness in larger orders. While not all Egyptians experience or interpret dreams in this way, the ethical horizons opened up by some Egyptian dream-stories deserve our (and maybe also my friend Ahmad’s) attention. According to these stories, certain dreams have ethical dimensions because they involve transformative encounters with the dead, the Prophet Muhammad, the awliyä´, and, more broadly, an Elsewhere and the space of the Divine.6 Often dreamers are placed in social relationships in their waking worlds as well, be it through the telling, interpretation, or enactment of dreams. In rare cases, dreams or visions can be collectively experienced, or they can be invited through collective practices. By way of mapping out some of these relational aspects in space and time, my account of Egyptian dream theories, dream interpretations, and dream communities reclaims for the dream and visionary experience public and even political relevance. Ultimately, I suggest that a serious consideration of the ethical and political dimensions of dreaming requires not only thinking through the ethical possibilities of different imaginations, but also reconceiving the imaginary dimensions of ethics and politics.7 Dreams are never just about the dreamer. But neither is waking life. Significantly, by the terms imaginary and imagination I refer not to the made-up (as in “an imaginary friend”) or to fantasy, but to a broader range of meanings that encompass a variety of spaces, modes of perception, and conceptualizations of the real.8 More precisely, what enables the dream-stories that I retell is an understanding of the imagination (alkhayäl) that is not anchored in the individual subject but instead refers to an intermediary realm between the spiritual and the material, the Divine and the human, the dreamer and multiple Others, presence and absence. A related term is the barzakh, which in Islamic eschatology and in my interlocutors’ narratives primarily refers to a space in which the spirits of the dead dwell until Judgment Day. Drawing on a wider meaning, I use the barzakh also as an analytical tool that circumvents the rule of the either/or.9 Stefania Pandolfo (1997, 9) has likened the barzakh to the heterological space that can be opened up by true dialogue, and Vincent Crapanzano (2004, 6, 59) suggests that the barzakh can allow us to think of the space that lies between two or more ways of being in the world as a
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Introduction
constitutive space, as opposed to focusing exclusively on that which is. A barzakhian perceptive, as we might call it, ruptures binary outlooks and invites us to think beyond the present and the visible. It invites us to dwell on the in-between. I believe that a serious consideration of this in-between as an ethnographic object—one of discourse, practice, and contestation— and as an analytical tool can offer us insight into modes of being in the world that might not easily be intelligible from within rationalist, secular vocabularies but are nevertheless of political and ethical relevance to my interlocutors. Precisely because the seeing, telling, interpreting, and enacting of dreams is an unfamiliar form of ethical-political engagement, it can compel us to reconsider our assumptions about the imagination. My approach here builds on the work of Saba Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2006), who have both directed our attention to different states and experiences that believers cultivate within the context of the Islamic Revival, a movement that has been reshaping Egypt’s social landscapes since the 1970s. Encompassing within the “political” not only the realm of governments and states but also the activities of ordinary people shaping the conditions of their own collective existence (cf. Arendt 1998), both authors highlight the ways in which their ethnographic findings can intervene in our theoretical debates, problematizing, respectively, the feminist equation of agency and resistance, and the notion of the autonomous rational subject. Along similar lines, I am interested in how Egyptian dream-stories not only are affected by political conditions but are also themselves of political relevance in that they affect how people live in the world and how they relate to others. The resulting dream-stories might accordingly also complicate and reshape our analytical categories. The dream’s interrelational dimensions, for instance, can destabilize the persistent myth of the autonomous, liberal subject, and my interlocutors’ understandings of the imagination can rupture ratiocentric paradigms.10 Though indebted to Mahmood and Hirschkind, this work diverges from theirs in both fieldsite and argument. The practices described here show a side of the Islamic Revival that has less to do with mosque study groups, preachers, and sermons and more with saint shrines, the dead, and the barzakh. While the Islamic Revival has reintroduced the space of death into sermons, religious lessons, and everyday discourses, one crucial difference between the preachers in Hirschkind’s study and the dream interpreters I worked with is that the latter do not evoke the afterlife to instill fear; rather, they associate it with joyful encounters, dialogical exchanges, and sites of learning.11 Dream discourses, like certain Sufi practices, are
Studying Dreams in Undreamy Times
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dismissed by many reformist thinkers, but they are in a continuous if ambivalent dialogue with reformism and constitute a vibrant aspect of the Islamic Revival. Furthermore, my interlocutors’ dream-stories do not simply constitute yet another category of the visceral that can shape politics. By calling into question conventional parameters of the “real,” they invite a more radical rethinking of community and subjectivity. They exceed the logic of self-cultivation by allowing space for the prophetic, alterity, and elements of rupture. The self here does not simply cultivate particular states and experiences, it is also constituted by them. Ultimately, it is the dream’s agency that matters, more so than the dreamer’s.12 In this sense, my ethnographic materials complicate the paradigm of self-cultivation, resonating instead with attempts to think through a possible ethics beyond the self-contained subject (e.g., Butler 2005; Levinas 1969, 1991). As my interlocutors’ dream-stories frequently grapple with an alterity that remains radically inassimilable but that nevertheless compels and moves the dreamer, they might ultimately point us toward what Hent de Vries calls the “cultural resources—the semantic, figural, and argumentative archives—from which different concepts of hospitality, of understanding and welcoming the other as other . . . can be distilled, criticized, or imagined” (2001, 9). It might be objected that ethics in Western discourse, at least since the Enlightenment, has been almost by definition about encounters with Others and the dialogical dimensions of human existence. Yet two questions remain unanswered by such a definition. One concerns the role the Other is to play. Is the Other to be converted into sameness, to be tolerated, or to be engaged to the extent that one risks one’s own position in the encounter? Second, as Derrida (1995) reminds us, we need to ask about the other Others that are excluded in any particular ethical stance. Are Others that count only one’s neighbors, or are they also strangers? Are they only the living or also the dead? Are they necessarily human or could they also be spirits, ghosts, or dreams? My interlocutors’ narratives gesture not only beyond the boundaries of the autonomous individual subject but also beyond those of the visible social world. The Others that address, compel, and move my interlocutors include invisible beings, the dead, the Prophet, the saints, and what Derrida calls the “wholly other,” the Divine. The kinds of imagined communities that figure in my interlocutors’ stories exceed the secular imagined community of the nation-state. They draw on a very different understanding of the imagination, and they enable much broader communities. It is through dreams that such larger communities become imaginable and inhabitable.
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Introduction
Dreams in the Islamic Tradition Dreams hold a special place in the Islamic tradition. The Prophet Muhammad’s revelation experiences began in the form of dreams, and he supposedly asked his companions every morning what they had dreamed. Muslim dream interpretation finds its roots in the Qur´an, particularly the Yüsuf-sura, and even more so in the hadith literature.13 Although medieval Muslim literatures on divination through physiognomy, geomancy, palmistry, and other methods abound (Fahd 1966), only dream interpretation established itself as an orthodox discipline, and in medieval times the number of dream manuals even exceeded that of tafsïr (Qur´an interpretation) works (Lamoreaux 2002, 4). Classical and contemporary dream manuals generally divide dreams into three categories: dreams that are inspired by the devil or evil spirits (hulm);14 dreams that mirror the dreamer’s wishes and worries (hadïth nafsï); and divinely inspired dreams or visions (ru´yä).15 To underline the ru´yä’s prophetic potential, my interlocutors frequently referred to a hadith according to which the Prophet Muhammad announced in the mosque of Medina shortly before his death that once he was gone no form of prophecy would remain except for true dream-visions (al-ru´yä al-säliha).16 Since the Arabic term ru´yä can denote either waking visions or dream experiences, I generally translate it as “dream-vision.” To some extent the line between sleep and wakefulness is erased in this study, since it is of little relevance to many of my interlocutors.17 Dream manuals explain the ways to distinguish one type of dream from another, and occasionally dream interpreters are consulted for decisions regarding specific dreams. Ultimately, however, the categorization of dreams is always open to contestation, and what makes things even more confusing is that Egyptians frequently use the terms ru´yä and hilm (colloquial for hulm) interchangeably. To maintain some of the ensuing ambiguity, I occasionally use the term dream even when referring to what is taken to be a divinely inspired dream-vision. I also hope thereby to open up our thinking about the imagination writ large. While I am not interested in approaching the dream as a universal experience, I do believe that thinking through other imaginations has the potential to rupture and expand one’s own. Generally, however, this book is about not ordinary dreams but dreamvisions. Dreams of this kind are highly valued because they come to the dreamer as opposed to being produced by her. In the words of one Egyptian housewife, the ru´yä is a “dream in which God speaks to you (biykallimik).” Islamic traditions distinguish between literal and symbolic dream-
Studying Dreams in Undreamy Times
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visions. Whereas the former require no interpretation (because seeing the Prophet means seeing the Prophet), symbolic dreams need first to be decoded. In both cases, far from reflecting only past experiences, dreamvisions can foreshadow, or even bring about, future events. Accounts from the hadith, Sufi writings, biographical dictionaries, and historical works refer to dream-visions to explain why someone went here or there, waged a war, or founded a new school of thought. Without dreams, the call to prayer reportedly would not have come into existence in its present form; Aristotle’s works would not have been translated into Arabic; and Ibn al-`Arabï’s Fusüs al-Hikam (Seals of Wisdom) would never have been written. Historically, it seems, dreams mattered. And they matter too (though maybe differently) in a postcolonial, post-Freudian, post-Enlightenment, postreformist era. In the street café in downtown Cairo, Ahmad spoke to me of hopelessness, economic hardship, and war. Like him, many Egyptians today are primarily concerned with their waking lives. They care little about their dreams, and they insist that divinely inspired dream-visions are a thing of the past, that nowadays all dreams merely reflect the dreamers’ wishes and worries because people are too preoccupied with the hustle and bustle of their daily lives, and that all dream interpreters are charlatans. This partial devaluation of the dream can be understood within a larger context of (post)colonialism and modernization. Reforms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries restructured not only Egypt’s military, administration, schools, and urban spaces, but also forms of being in the world, subjectivities, and epistemologies. According to Timothy Mitchell (1988), one central effect of Egypt’s colonial reordering was the very appearance of order, the enframing of the world as a picture—an enframing that introduces a gap between signifier and signified and that runs counter to a different semiotics according to which dreaming of the Prophet means truly seeing the Prophet. As part of this larger reordering, “Islam” was rationalized, objectified, and functionalized, which meant eliminating those elements that now appeared disorderly, backward, or irrational. Reformist thinkers called for a this-worldly ethics by bracketing the metaphysical realm, the barzakh, and the afterlife, and by urging believers to focus on the socio-moral reform of society instead (Sirriyeh 1999; Smith and Haddad 2002). According to the underlying worldview, it is not the imaginary, the otherworldly that matters, but the visible, material world. Dream-visions do not fit neatly into reformist, rationalist, this-worldly versions of Islam. In the eyes of critics, dreams divert the “masses” from “reality.” Evoking the logic of chance, a female medical student explained
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to me that if someone dreams of a friend that she hasn’t seen in a long time and then she sees that friend two days later, she might think it’s the dream coming true, but really it’s just coincidence (sudfa). A young man in Islamic Cairo claimed that dream interpretation is forbidden (haräm), and a shop owner in his forties expressed pity when I asked him if he knew any dream interpreters. “I’m really sorry,” he said, “but those are all lies. Today when people want their dreams interpreted, they go to a psychologist. Dreams are all about psychological states (ahwäl nafsiyya) today. The rest is all fake; [Muslim dream interpreters] don’t know a thing.” When I brought up the long history of Muslim dream interpretation, he responded, “Today we have science (`ilm); back then we had ignorance (gahal).” When surveying Cairo’s billboards or watching commercials on Egyptian television, it is easy to succumb to the impression that dreams have been disenchanted and now simply serve to commodify certain life experiences; that metaphorical dreams have triumphed over literal ones. Dreampark is the name of a popular amusement park in Cairo, and Dreamland is that of a development project, promoted as “The Egypt of My Desires” (Mitchell 2002, 273). In Hurghada, a popular tourist destination on the Red Sea, signs remind those strolling by, “You are now in dreamland.” The dream, offered up for consumption and equated with fun and luxury, counterbalances the bleak reality of “real life,” but it is equally far removed from the prophetic and the Divine. No longer considered a form of moral guidance or expression, the dream has been turned into a material aspiration. Collapsed into fantasy, the imagination has become a marketing tool of tourism developers, Hollywood, and video games. Yet the same factors that seem to have disenchanted Egypt’s dream landscapes have also created new spaces for dreams and dream interpretations. The dream-vision today is not only a site of contestation, but also a site through which many ordinary Muslims encounter and engage with the Divine, with one another, and with the Islamic tradition. Paying close attention to intertexualities and heteroglossias (Bakhtin 1981), different chapters in this book describe how the Qur´an, hadith, psychological concepts like the “unconscious,” a modern optocentrism, and media metaphors have all (re)shaped the vocabulary of contemporary Muslim dreamers and dream interpreters.18 Reformist Islam, Western psychology, and the Internet have not simply flattened, standardized, or erased the dreamvision; they also enable and promote dream talk in new ways. People dream and interpret through their living worlds in Egypt, which includes television, cinema, computers, and all that comes with them in terms of the experience and conceptualization of reality. While medieval dream manu-
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Figure 1. Metaphorical dreams: hosting the World Cup in 2010, a wall poster in Cairo.
als are still in use, dreaming and dream interpretation are by no means remnants of the past. Dreaming is modern in Egypt. It should be noted that, somewhat parallel with the Islamic Revival, there has been a Coptic Revival of sorts in which visions and apparitions figure centrally. One of the most famous apparitions of the Virgin Mary worldwide took place in the Cairo neighborhood of Zaytoun in 1968. Two Muslim mechanics sighted the Virgin over the church’s dome from across the street, at first mistaking her for a young woman about to commit suicide. Subsequently millions of Egyptians and foreigners came to Zaytoun to see the Virgin, the Coptic Church officially confirmed the apparitions, and the Arab Socialist Union took control, organized parking around the church, and charged an entrance fee (Nelson 1973). Besides the famous apparition in Zaytoun, over the past thirty years thousands of Muslims and Christians have been reporting Marian apparitions in and around
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churches in Cairo, the Nile Delta, and Upper Egypt.19 While Muslim imaginations generally take less public forms, this book does not tell a story of loss, of the imagination’s continuous movement toward its own secularization, flattening, or internalization.20 Rather, I highlight how contemporary Muslim dream-stories are interwoven with the secular modern while at the same time always exceeding it. Empiricist and rationalist discourses often speak through my interlocutors just as their enchanted discourse speaks a part of the secular modern. How people inhabit the religious— both in their dreams and in their everyday life—is intrinsically messy. Women might go to mosque study groups where they are taught to be wary of dreams, and on their way home they might chat with their neighbors about what they dreamed last night. They might even have gone to the mosque in the first place because a dream-vision inspired them to do so. Only close ethnographic attention and attentive listening can offer insight into how dreaming and imagining are understood, contested, and reinvented in Egypt today. In my view, such attentive listening is the central task for any anthropology.
Anthropologies of Dreams “I see so plainly that there are no definitive signs by which to distinguish being awake from being asleep,” wrote Descartes, one of the fathers of the Enlightenment (1998, 60). The impossibility of distinguishing between dreaming and waking life was so disturbing to Descartes precisely because the two states had long been ontologically, epistemologically, and ethically separated in the West. The dream consequently became one of Descartes’s principal reasons for doubting the reliability of the senses and ultimately led him to reassert the superiority of rational thought. The circle was closed but a puzzling paradox remained: how does one know that it’s not all just a dream? Anthropological dream studies often seem to be triggered, or at least to be steadily accompanied, by the troubling phenomenon that Descartes had already struggled with: the porous line between the real and the imagined.21 Victorian anthropologist E. B. Tylor, who is credited with introducing the topic of dreams to the field of anthropology, claimed in his Primitive Culture (1871) that “primitives” are unable (or unwilling) to draw a distinction between dream and reality.22 As they take dead people, souls, and ghosts to be alive when they appear to them at night, the dream is the source of, and sustains, the primitives’ theory of animism: “Plain experience is there to teach it to every savage; his friend or his enemy is
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dead, yet still in dream or open vision he sees the spectral form which is to his philosophy a real objective being, carrying personality as it carries likeness” (Tylor 1970, 10). Tylor seems somewhat nostalgic for a time when the line between dream and waking life was less clear, yet in his view the “primitives” are mistaken. Like Tylor, Nietzsche claimed that because “savages” mistakenly take dreams to be a “second real world,” they believed in ghosts and gods “throughout many thousands of years” (1986, 16). Freud, too, was to state later on that primitives, children, and neurotics fail to distinguish between dream image and real image because they are at one in their attitude toward the dead (1950, 62). Based on their dream-experiences, Freud wrote, “primitives” and “peoples of antiquity” used to “project into the world as though they were realities things which in fact enjoyed reality only within their own minds” (1965, 38).23 The dream-wish is hallucinated and thus by definition both seemingly real and intrinsically unreal. Only the Other who lacks reason (for Tylor the primitive; for Freud also the child and the neurotic) fails to acknowledge the essential unreality of the dream. Civilized dreamers wake up and realize that it was only a dream. The porous line between dream and waking reality constitutes a principal reason for Descartes’s doubt and characterizes primitive dream beliefs for Nietzsche, Tylor, and Freud. It finds expression not only in ascribing to the Other the inability to distinguish between these two states, but equally in asserting that even this Other can draw such distinctions. Accordingly, the same epistemological anxiety is reflected in anthropologists’ attempts to refute E. B. Tylor’s thesis by proving that primitives actually do tell apart the real and the imagined. Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), Lévy-Bruhl in How Natives Think (1926), and J. S. Lincoln in The Dream in Primitive Cultures (1935) all asserted that primitives do in fact distinguish between perceptions that come to them in dreams and those that come while awake. Yet what is most real for the “primitives,” wrote Lévy-Bruhl (1926, 301), is precisely that which is least tangible. What matters to the so-called primitives, he argued, are affective resonances—what he called mystical participation. This, as Lincoln would add, does not contradict that primitives hold “a fine sense of reality” (1935, 30). The primitives are here redeemed; even they can overcome the confusion between dream and waking life. The insight that dreaming can be conceptualized in different ways and that it can be valued for different reasons was partially erased when the hegemony of psychoanalytic explanations began to make itself felt more
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strongly in anthropological dream studies. Malinowski, who viewed himself as a pioneer in the application of psychoanalytic theory to the study of “savage life,” argued that the scarcity of dreams among the nonrepressed Melanesians was due to the fact that dreams spring from unsatisfied sexual desire (1953, ix).24 In more recent studies the temptation lingers to uncover what is really going on in dreams collected in the field. Dreams of high school students in Papua New Guinea are accordingly related to anxieties that “are rooted in the unconscious so that many of their dreams present the universal features of the nightmare” (Epstein 1998, 210), and an account of dreams among the Arapesh of northeastern New Guinea concludes that “the behavior of the ghost [in a specific dream] is a fantasy of the dreamer which derives from unconscious negative attitudes felt toward the kinsman in life” (Tuzin 1975, 568). The hegemony and self-enclosed character of the psychoanalytic model leads to a dismissal of alternative logics, which are explained away as a form of false consciousness, allowing one anthropologist to claim that many cultures “do not admit that dreams are fantasies at all; rather [the Arapesh] take them to be literal experiences of the dreamer’s soul as it wanders on another plane of reality” (ibid. 563; emphasis added). Whenever ethnographic findings are taken as evidence for the universal applicability of Western theories, the Cartesian doubt is easily soothed, and alternative understandings of the imagination are habitually bracketed through the anthropologist’s account of the dream’s social, psychological, or compensatory functions. Instead of studying the effects and deflections of psychoanalytic theories and considering how ethnographic findings might open up such theories to new readings, anthropologists often seem tempted to reduce the dreams they encounter in the field to unconscious anxieties, conflicts, and wishes while disregarding the dreamers’ own interpretations or treating those interpretations as a separate phenomenon without real explanatory power. Yet the ways that dreams are defined, categorized, experienced, remembered, forgotten, told, written, performed, dismissed, interpreted, analyzed, invoked, and evoked varies historically and even within a single society. As Vincent Crapanzano (2001) reminds us, dreams cannot be separated from their conceptualization and theorization as these affect, if not the experience of the dream, then at least its reporting. Different dream concepts have different ethical, religious, political, and metaphorical implications. To appreciate the particularities of dreaming and to allow for multiple meanings, one needs to move beyond universalist assumptions about the real and the imagined. It is worth recalling in this context that the medieval Muslim thinker
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al-Ghazälï (d. 1111) addressed a dream problem very similar to the one Descartes was to struggle with a few centuries later.25 He posed the following question: “Do you not see . . . how, when you are asleep you believe things and imagine circumstances, holding them to be stable and enduring, and, so long as you are in that dream-condition, have no doubts about them?” (1994, 23). If one cannot distinguish between dream and sense experience, then how can one ever trust one’s senses? While Descartes would later solve the problem through the intervention of reason, alGhazälï complicated the line between dream and wakeful states by citing a prophetic saying that holds that we are all dreaming and awaken only when we die. He concluded that neither the senses nor reason could fully be trusted and that “whoever thinks that the understanding of things Divine rests upon strict proofs has in his thought narrowed down the wideness of God’s mercy” (24). Dreaming for al-Ghazälï is not to be tamed by human reason; it can itself be a path to truth. Al-Ghazälï’s openness to the possibility of divine inspiration runs counter to the Aristotelian (and later Freudian) notion that dreams are never divine messages because, in Aristotle’s words, it is “absurd to combine the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but merely people at random” (Gallop 1996, 107).26 Precisely because seemingly random people in contemporary Egypt claim to be receiving divinely inspired dreams, their stories rupture hierarchical power structures, ratiocentric paradigms, and psychoanalytic idioms all at once.
Beyond the Unconscious Psychoanalytically speaking, my fascination with the concept of divinely inspired dreams is probably easily explainable as my own reaction against psychoanalysis. As I was growing up in Bavaria, my German father worked as a psychiatrist and neurologist, and my Egyptian mother as a Jungian psychoanalyst and psychotherapist. For as long as I can remember, schizophrenia, depression, hallucinations, and patients’ life histories figured in our conversations over breakfast, lunch, and dinner—and so did dreams. I recall my early disappointment at the Jungian idea that regardless of whom one dreams about, all the characters in dreams are supposed to be just aspects of oneself. In the Freudian model, too, the dream seems to be all about the dreamer. Freud acknowledged that “there is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable—a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown” (1965, 143n), but for the longest time
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I found little space for this navel within Freud’s larger theory. In Islamic traditions, by contrast, dream-visions are valued precisely because they make possible the cognition of an outside reality, offering believers, in John Lamoreaux’s words, “a royal road that [leads] not inward but outward, providing insight not into the dreamer’s psyche but into the hidden affairs of the world” (2002, 4). Intrigued by this apparent tension between Elsewhere-oriented and psychoanalytic dream models, I wanted to explore what it means for dreamers in the world today to be extended outward as opposed to inward. Over time, I came to realize that the binary between Muslim and psychoanalytic dream models is misleading and that it is not helpful to use Freud as a figure whose claims somehow fail to stand up to the evidence provided by Egyptian dreams. Freud responded to particular dreams that were themselves shaped by a particular dream culture and by particular sociohistorical contexts, and he responded to epistemological concerns that were just as much about trance-like states, the uncanny, and telepathy as they were about “science.”27 His main goal was not to prove that humans are autonomous beings, but, on the contrary, to demonstrate that we are much less rational than we would like to believe. Freud thought that he, like Copernicus and Darwin before him, was fundamentally challenging the pride of humans by uncovering the illusory nature of notions such as free will and reason. When I occasionally contrast Egyptian stories with Freudian readings, my intention is therefore not to critique Freud. Most often in this ethnography “Freud” refers to particular understandings of his theories that circulate in Egypt or that shape anthropological dream studies, and occasionally, I assume, also my readers’ assumptions.28 Ironically, while Freud decentered the self-possessed, autonomous self, this self often gets reinscribed in psychologizing discourses. Following a reductive Freudian logic, or alternatively using the idea of false consciousness, observers of Egypt’s dream landscapes could easily hypothesize about causal relations between supposedly prophetic dream-visions and the contemporary political and social contexts in which these dreams occur and are told. Skeptics might argue that Egyptians seek refuge in imaginary encounters with the Prophet, the saints, and the dead; that dreamvisions and waking visions provide an escape from reality, a distraction that soothes the anxieties characteristic of modern times. One of the aims of this book is to show that such psychologizing and materialist explanations offer only two out of multiple interpretive frameworks and that they obscure, if not violently erase, many others. Instead of trying to unravel the “Egyptian mind” or the “Muslim
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unconscious,” I want to call into question the presumption that all dreams are inherently linked to the psyche. As Vincent Crapanzano points out, “much of what we in the West call psychological and locate in some sort of internal space (‘in the head,’ ‘in the mind,’ ‘in the brain,’ ‘in consciousness,’ ‘in the psyche’) is understood in many cultures in manifestly nonpsychological terms and located in other ‘spaces’ ” (1992, 142). The “unconscious” is itself historically constituted, and secular scientific worldviews more generally, while claiming to offer unmediated access to “nature,” are built on particular assumptions and sustained by particular power relations.29 When insisting on locating the dream’s origin inside the dreamer, one overlooks the possibility of other subjectivities, other dreams, and other imaginations. To move beyond psychologizing and functionalist explanations, or at least to recognize them as historically and geographically specific, we need to pay closer attention to the very processes through which dreamers and interpreters—as well as anthropologists—endow dreams with meaning. Accordingly, I did not go to Egypt with the goal of psychoanalyzing contemporary Egyptians; rather, I was interested in how they tell, understand, interpret, and live their dreams. Bracketing the hegemonic explanatory power of the “unconscious,” I take as a different point of departure a widened outlook that I call an anthropology of the imagination. Readers might object that sociocultural anthropology is always an anthropology of the imagination to the extent that it shows how reality is socially constructed. Even if we define the imagination more narrowly as having to do with what is largely imperceptible to the senses, many ethnographies deal with the imaginary precisely in this sense, be it in the form of ghosts (Kwon 2008; Mueggler 2001), spirit possession (Boddy 1989; Crapanzano 1980; Lambek 1993; Morris 2000), sorcery (Stoller 1989), the vanishing (Ivy 1995), or hope (Miyazaki 2006). What I add to this is a call for closer attention to different understandings of the imagination itself. An anthropology of the imagination, as I see it, should pay attention not simply to particular objects but also to other conceptualizations of the imagination. Needless to say, other imaginations—or any imagination, for that matter—cannot easily be pinned down. Objectifying an imagination ignores the fact that “the imagination” as an object is already removed from the elusive, prediscursive experiences that make up the imaginary, and it erases the debates, ambiguities, indifferences, and disagreements surrounding what the imagination is and what it entails. With these limitations in mind, I attempt to trace the landscapes of a particular imagination through attending to my interlocutors’ practices, stories, and vocabularies.
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Toward an Anthropology of the Imagination The imagination is omnipresent today. Ads and commercials continually encourage us to imagine faster cars, better-tasting beers, and more effective painkillers. Imaginary Maps, The Imaginary War, and Imaginative Management Control are the sort of titles that fill the shelves of North American bookstores. The nation-state has been described as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), self and society as constituted through the imagination (Appadurai 1996; Castoriadis 1987), and Western modernity as characterized by a particular “social imaginary” (Taylor 2004). The imagination’s seductive power is employed knowingly and effectively in advertising, and it is used just as frequently to introduce a utopian tone into political discourses.30 Yet what exactly do we mean when we speak or write about the imagination? Does the term mean anything at all? Or has it become empty—killed by overuse? Like history, the discipline of anthropology emerged within, and is bound up with, the Western rationalist tradition, which assumes that “the human is ontologically singular, that gods and spirits are in the end ‘social facts,’ that the social somehow exists prior to them” (Chakrabarty 2000, 16). Within this tradition, from Aristotle to Kant, the imagination has long been understood as a physiological image-making faculty that translates sense impressions into mental images.31 Whereas Plato warned against the imagination because it tempts mortals to mistake themselves for gods, Aristotle allowed phantasia a certain legitimacy, as it could aid practical reason. At the same time, the imagination was eyed with suspicion throughout the history of Western philosophy because it might not merely transmit images but could also play with sense impressions, creating images of nonexistent things—a danger that could be circumvented only by reason’s firm grip on the imagination. In the seventeenth century, Hobbes described the dangerous moment when the imagination breaks the link between the real and the perceived: “IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. . . . From [the] ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches” (1997, 23, 26). Hobbes, like Nietzsche, Tylor, and Freud, held that the belief in fantastic beings is caused by an imagination turned loose. The imagination, according to this view, is dangerous.
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A shift from, and reaction against, this attitude occurred in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the Romantic movement came to hail the imagination for its creative ability to generate ideas that cannot be expressed in any other form.32 Along with the imagination, the dream was endowed with new potential. In Rousseau’s writings, the dream (and particularly daydreaming) enables an authentic and free kind of thinking, and Novalis remarked that “our life is no dream; but it should and perhaps will become one” (quoted in Robertson 2001, 32). The creative capacity of the imagination came to be praised as the hallmark of the original genius, who could evoke mental visionary experiences by conjuring up unreal images, which were then expressed in art or poetry. Whether regarded with suspicion or acclaimed as the ultimate source of artistic creativity, the imagination is in both cases construed as a faculty anchored within the individual subject. Although there are important exceptions, the imagined has furthermore been equated with the unreal throughout much of Western history. This verdict became remarkably pronounced in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, according to whom the imagination is “an incantation destined to produce the object of one’s thought, the thing one desires, in a manner that one can take possession of it” (1963, 177). Thus, when I imagine Peter, an absent friend, said Sartre, my imagination, spurred by desire, conjures up an image of Peter. Yet even though the magical powers of my imagination make the absent present, they do so only in a mode of nothingness. Peter’s essential absence, his nothingness, remains. In one of his earliest writings, “Dream, Imagination, and Existence,” Michel Foucault suggests that because the dream involves a derealization of the self, it is “that absolute disclosure of the ethical content” (1986a, 52).33 Paradoxically, while the dream is a quintessentially lonely experience, for Foucault it is a key site through which the subject plunges into the cosmos. Foucault also revisits the question of Peter and insists on a crucial difference between image and imagination. 34 While the image only seemingly makes the absent present, the imagination succeeds in this very endeavor: “the image mimes the presence of Peter, the imagination goes forth to encounter him” (71). This happens not through confronting Peter in a mode of unreality, but rather through a process of “derealizing” or “absenting” oneself from a world in which it is no longer possible to encounter Peter. Thus, writes Foucault, “To imagine is not to actualize the fable of the little mouse, it is not to transport oneself into the world of Peter. It is to become the world where he is: I am the letter he is reading; I conjure myself from that look of attentive reader; I am the walls of
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his room that watch him from all sides and hence do not ‘see’ him. But I am also his gaze and his attentiveness, his dissatisfaction or his surprise before the letter. I am not absolute master of what he is doing, I am what he is doing, I am what he is” (68). Shifting our attention from what the imagination is to what it does, Foucault describes an erasure of the sharp line between subject and object, between the absent and the present. The imagination makes me what I imagine. The “like” is erased. Signifier and signified become one. In his essay, Foucault calls explicitly for an anthropology of the imagination, putting forth the uncommon thesis that the “dream is not a modality of the imagination; the dream is the first condition of its possibility” (1968a, 67). He argues that by psychologizing the dream and seeing it as a mere rhapsody of images, Freud deprived it of its privilege as a specific form of experience (43). As anthropologist Tullio Maranhão (2001) has suggested, Foucault’s essay might offer a more illuminating starting point for anthropological dream studies than theories that insist on the dream’s origin inside the human psyche and that make the dream contingent upon the existence of a specific kind of subject. Maranhão contrasts the mentalist Freudian dream model with Amerindian dream theories that assume “that the source of a dream is entirely external to the dreaming subject, who yet is virtually constituted by the dream content” (52). Similarly, Egypt’s dream-worlds do not posit an isolated, self-possessed dreamer. Whereas sometimes my interlocutors introduce their dream-stories with halimt-bi (I dreamed of), other times they say gä lï fi-l-manäm (it came to me in my dream . . . ), indicating that some dreams are above all encounters and not projections. The imagination that makes such encounters possible is al-khayäl, which, historically, referred to an incorporeal form or image (such as a mirror image, shadow, reflection in water, or an afterimage; Lane 1978, 835) but which many of my interlocutors associate with a prophetic mode of perception and a space replete with ethical insight. The imagined, according to their view, is not inherently unreal, but it is present and absent at the same time. It defies the either/or and closure. Shaykh Qusi, one of my key interlocutors, offered an explanation for what the imagination can do that resonates with Foucault’s version of the imaginary encounter with Peter: “If you imagine a friend, you can bring him into presence, even if he’s not here. You have to use your imagination. You have to imagine the Prophet and the Prophet’s companions. You imagine what they were like and what it was like to live at their time. Then, through your imagination, you make them real. They’re around you.” 35 For Shaykh Qusi, visions
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and visionary dreams are real imagined experiences. The Prophet and his companions are already around us, yet it is through the imagination that we can perceive them. They are already present, and they are made present through the imagination. Imagining here is not a creative act performed by an autonomous individual subject; it is more akin to a tuning-in. As the medieval Sufi thinker Ibn al-`Arabï (d. 1240) would say, it is the universe’s mode of self-disclosure. Or as Foucault would say (at least in his early essay), it is a mode of exploding the subject’s boundedness. Accordingly, some of my interlocutors distinguished carefully between imagination (al-khayäl) and fantasy (al-wahm). A Qur´anic healer defined the former as being an “image from the Real (süra min al-haqq),” whereas fantasy implies “if only (yä rayt).” The dream-vision comes from alkhayäl; an ordinary dream is related to fantasy. A dream-vision, the same healer explained, means “seeing something as if it were true—nay, it is true (ka´innu ha´ï´i bal huwa ha´ï´i).” Shaykh Qusi differentiated between imagination and fantasy the following way: “There’s a difference between fantasy and imagination. What’s the difference? Fantasy doesn’t refer to something real, but the imagination might. There are two kinds of imagination. [One is] the materialist kind, that of the unbeliever. Say, for example, the man who invented the car. He first imagined the car, and then he invented it. But the imagination was something from God. God had already decreed in his fate that a car would be invented with four wheels and a steering wheel. The other kind of imagination, that of the believer, lasts only a moment. It’s called divine inspiration.” Shaykh Qusi not only distinguishes between fantasy and imagination but also differentiates between two kinds of imagination: the materialist kind of the unbeliever and the divinely inspired kind of the believer. Yet significantly, even unbelievers who deem themselves inventive geniuses, in the shaykh’s view, only draw on what God has already ordained. The source of the imagination in both cases lies outside the human subject, but only believers recognize it to be so. The shaykh’s model turns upside down the views of Hobbes, Nietzsche, Tylor, and Freud, according to whom the “primitives” fail to recognize that all dreams originate within the dreamer. According to Shaykh Qusi, it is the unbeliever who fails to recognize the true order of reality. Accordingly, when I speak of the imagination in this ethnography, it needs to be understood as encompassing a wide range of meanings—in Shaykh Qusi’s view, everything from illusion to intuition to divine inspiration and even revelation. Of course, not all Egyptians hail the dream’s epistemological and ethical potentials, and often the imagination is collapsed into fantasy, so that
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even those recounting extraordinary mystical experiences might close with assertions such as, “But only God knows. I don’t believe in these things easily. But it wasn’t al-khayäl. I don’t run after mirages (saräb). It’s not fantasy (wahm). Something happened for real.” The man speaking these words had just told me about his visit to al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s shrine where, he felt, the saint reached inside his head, grabbed his brain, and turned it 180 degrees. After this miraculous encounter, the man said, his thinking was completely transformed. To assert the realness of this highly significant and transformative experience, he concluded that it was not an imagined encounter. It was not al-khayäl. Instead of reclaiming al-khayäl as a form of divine intervention, utterances of this kind associate it with fantasy and unreality. Tracing contradictory meanings of the imagination, this book attends to traces of a “secularization of the imaginal” (Corbin 1997, 20), or what Foucault calls “reason’s subjugation of non-reason” in modern times (1965, ix), while at the same time calling for a serious engagement with the ways in which dreams matter in people’s everyday lives. My call for a serious engagement should not be understood as a call for a return to the kind of anthropology that tries to capture the “native’s point of view.” First, there is no monolithic native’s point of view that could be captured. Far from presenting one single Egyptian position on dreams, I take the dream as a lens into the complicated, messy, and ongoing negotiation and remaking of “Islam” and “reality” in Egypt today. Second, the image of the anthropologist capturing the native’s point of view obliterates the very dialogue through which meaning is constituted, as well as the power relations inevitably at play in any encounter. As I hope to show, however, taking seriously one’s interlocutors’ dream-stories and being attentive to politics do not have to be mutually exclusive. A serious engagement with other imaginations, rather, is itself a political act.
Notes on Fieldwork Headed to trace Egypt’s landscapes of the imagination, I boarded a Cairobound plane at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport in early January 2003. Hours later, as the plane was descending, I gazed upon the vast sea of buildings that is commonly referred to as Cairo. Al-Qähira in Arabic, “the victorious one.” Clearly, it had been victorious; I had given in and returned. It was close to midnight, and minarets gleaming with green neon light dotted the city. Looking down from the plane, I recognized the Corniche, Nile bridges, and five-star hotels, and I had a vague sense of the location of the so-called City of the Dead, which I had spoken so confidently about
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during my proposal defense. I would go and find dream interpreters there, I had said. What had I been thinking? A seductive subject in theory, the dream is a frustrating object of ethnographic inquiry. Dreams are highly evasive, and they resist the anthropologist’s desire (and presumed obligation) to observe. It was a constant challenge during my fieldwork—a challenge that I hope to pass on in the form of this book—not just theoretically questioning the positivistic premise that the most visible is the most real, but actually suspending this premise to some extent while listening to my interlocutors’ stories. I tried to cultivate a mode of listening that does not presume to know better than my interlocutors what kind of experience the dream really is, while simultaneously trying not to forget that my interlocutors themselves might be skeptical and cynical at times; that they might say certain things for instrumental reasons; and that they might dismiss others’ accounts as made up or a form of false consciousness. Much of my time was spent talking about dreams, listening to dream interpretations, watching dream shows on television, and collecting dream manuals, both classical and contemporary. While always on the verge of invisibility, dreams have observable preludes and aftermaths. I visited saint shrines where interactions lead to and are inspired by dreams and visions; distributed food at shrines with a friend whenever she was instructed in a dream to do so; took part in dhikr rituals, which can culminate in collective or individual waking visions; and went book shopping with a Muslim dream interpreter. Often I spent time with friends, drinking tea, cooking, chatting, or going for walks. As the dreams that I describe are not contained within the night but affect and are affected by wakeful states, my fieldwork was never just about dreams but always also about everyday life. Besides bringing into play various dream-narratives, this book is based on fieldnotes, which I usually typed up at night, drawing on my memory and quotes and observations I had jotted down in my notebook during the day. On the few occasions when my interlocutors agreed to be recorded, the turning on of the recorder often marked a shift in language. From chatting informally and sharing anecdotes and personal experiences, they would switch to a more formal tone or even classical Arabic and provide what they considered to be the official scholarly discourse on whatever topic we had been talking about. The only exception might have been an elderly woman who willingly spoke her Prophet-dream into my recorder and who took great pleasure in the idea of her words traveling to Amrïka. Many others were suspicious of being recorded, and so, for the most part, I was confined to taking notes. Even note-taking at times bothered my
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interlocutors, particularly Sufi shaykhs, who claimed that I was not paying sufficient attention if I tried to write while listening. Writing is a way of arresting (habs) meaning and not of understanding, they would say. So often I merely listened and subsequently filled the pages of my notebook in cabs, on buses, at juice stands, in coffee shops, or while walking. At first it was not easy to get people to share their views on dreams, the afterlife, or the imagination, not least because I began my fieldwork shortly before the United States–led invasion of Iraq. In addition to a pervasive suspiciousness caused by the political developments in the region, I was faced with frequent inquiries into my own dream background. At times it seemed as if the entire validity of my project hinged on my having seen a divinely inspired dream-vision. If I was driven by an abstract interest in the topic, a platonic love for dreams, if I had come only to study them, then I was highly suspect. At best I was considered to be curious about things one can only understand through experience, and my project was doomed to failure. At worst, I was taken to be the victim and agent of an imperialist agenda concerned with decoding (and recoding) the “Arab mind.” On an especially difficult day of fieldwork, roughly two months into my stay, I called my mother in Germany and asked her if she could come to Egypt to vouch for my part-Egyptianness and trustworthiness. Luckily, she agreed immediately. Having grown up in Cairo, Qena, and Port Said, my mother had left Egypt at the age of eighteen for medical reasons. Although she had been returning for visits on a regular basis, our joint exploration of the field—our encounters with dervishes and dream interpreters, and our nights at mawlids, ecstatic celebrations of saints’ birthdays—revealed a side of Egypt that was as foreign to her as it was to me. Nevertheless, because of her personal, spiritual, and professional background, my mother was able quickly to break the ice with psychologists and Sufis alike, and her presence allowed Egyptians to place me and counterbalanced my affiliation with a U.S. institution. Once we had moved beyond the initial suspicions, almost everyone had a dream to tell or an opinion about why dreams should or shouldn’t matter. My exploration of the dreams’ various contexts, preludes, and aftermaths involved me in conversations with a wide range of people, including Sufis, dream interpreters, religious scholars, students, intellectuals, psychologists, and many laypersons. As the reader will have noticed, those with whom I spoke during my fieldwork I refer to as my “interlocutors” throughout this book. It is not only because of its unpleasant political connotations that I avoid the more commonly used term informants. I also want to emphasize that my conversations and relationships were more dia-
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logical than one-sidedly informative. The wide range of people who came to be my interlocutors is itself significant. Although some Egyptians claim that dreams matter only among members of the poor and working classes, only to women, or only in the countryside, I found that dreams were of relevance also to middle- and upper-class Cairenes, men and women alike. In talking with my interlocutors, I paid attention to what kinds of dream-stories they told, whom they told them to, when they told them, how they made sense of them, and how dreams moved them through the spaces of their daily lives. Additionally, I tried to listen for the stories that my interlocutors did not tell. There are multiple reasons for these silences. Most of my interlocutors were all too familiar with the stereotype of the quintessentially irrational Muslim and were careful not to reproduce it. One afternoon I was chatting about miracles with a relative, who is an imam and a member of the Shädhiliyya Sufi order. We had just marveled over how al-Shädhilï (d. 1285), the eponym of the order, had walked over the Red Sea to Medina when the imam suddenly paused and told me that such stories are good only for Friday sermons and mosque lessons, but not “to tell the Americans.” In writing about Islam I should proceed with rational arguments, he continued; otherwise they would say that Islam is all about superstitions (khuräfät). The problem here is not whether miracles occur or what kinds of dreams are dreamed. The problem is their articulation: when, where, how, why, and to whom such stories should be told. Additionally, silences about dreams and visions are related to the awareness that the actual experience always remains out of reach. As a number of people explained to me, by talking about one’s dream-visions one creates a metaphysical veil (hijäb) that prevents the seeing of further visions. A family friend in Luxor predicted that Sufis would share with me only theoretical insights into the importance of dream-visions without saying whether they themselves see dreams of this kind. Dreams constantly seemed suspended between secrecy and everyone having a story to tell. Fluctuating between revelation and concealment, they were both omnipresent and entirely evasive. As I ventured through Egypt’s elusive dream landscapes, four shaykhs— learned scholars and Sufi spiritual advisers—evolved as my guides and companions: Shaykh Nabil, Shaykh Qusi, Shaykh Hanafi, and a shaykh whom I call Shaykh Mustafa.36 As the following chapters repeatedly return to these four key interlocutors, I would like to introduce them briefly. Shaykh Nabil, skinny and feisty, is the protagonist of chapter 2 but is present throughout the book. When I met him he was close to sixty years old and for more than thirty years had been the guardian of the
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shrine in which Ibn Sïrïn (d. 728), the father of Muslim dream interpretation, lies buried. Himself a popular dream interpreter, Shaykh Nabil is very approachable, albeit somewhat enigmatic. He often sits at the shrine’s threshold, smoking shisha, seemingly lost in thoughts or prayers, observing the street and those passing by. Sometimes he remains in this pensive, meditative mood when visitors arrive; at other times he talks and jokes with them. When I was around, he would either play the role of a fatherly teacher or simply ignore me. I spent numerous days and evenings at the shrine, where I spoke to many of the people who visit Shaykh Nabil to seek his advice and to get their dreams interpreted. On one occasion, a woman invited me to come along to meet “her shaykh”—Shaykh Qusi. Shaykh Qusi is a cosmopolitan and highly educated spiritual leader. The first time I met him, I was immediately struck by his charismatic aura. Yet even though he is revered as a living saint and treated with much admiration and awe, the shaykh instantly put me at ease. He smoked Marlboros while we drank tea and chatted casually about Germany, the Prophet’s saintly descendants, and the nature of dream-visions. The shaykh told me that the invisible and the saints are “just like electricity: we don’t see them, but we see their effects.” As I came to learn more about the shaykh’s background, his liking for such analogies started making sense. Shaykh Qusi holds a graduate degree in chemistry from a Czech university, and he worked in the fields of geology and computer sciences in Egypt, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Besides coming from a hard-science and cosmopolitan background, Shaykh Qusi traces his ancestry to al-Imäm alHusayn, the Prophet’s grandson. He studied the authoritative texts of the Islamic tradition from an early age and says he was particularly influenced by al-Ghazälï, al-Qushayrï, Ibn Taymiyya, al-Bukhärï, and al-Tirmidhï. During his childhood in Upper Egypt he was introduced to a number of Sufi shaykhs, but for a large part of his life he was primarily preoccupied with actual electricity and chemistry, not their spiritual counterparts. This changed when he was subjected to a spiritual calling in Saudi Arabia. After that point disciples began gathering around him, and since the 1990s they have formed a community called al-Ashräf al-Mahdiyya (the Guided Honorables). Like Shaykh Qusi, many of his disciples are highly educated and fluent in English; they have university degrees and occupy influential positions in the army, ministries, banks, and large companies. The group holds biweekly hadras—gatherings during which a spiritual text is collectively recited—and it participates in many of Cairo’s mawlids. Subgroups meet in other Egyptian towns and abroad, including in Saudi Arabia and Australia.
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Although Shaykh Qusi and his disciples come from a more privileged socioeconomic background than Shaykh Nabil and his “clients,” they too follow a mystical path, and as I show in chapter 4, their community is to a large extent guided, shaped, and legitimated by dreams and waking visions. At times Shaykh Qusi seemed almost amused by the fact that I had stumbled upon such a central, highly charged mystical topic without having much of a spiritual background myself. The time I spent with the group has an intense and surreal quality in my memory—in part (but not only) because of the shaykh’s fondness for staying up until the early morning hours. Yet although Shaykh Qusi was always welcoming and willing to answer my questions, it was often difficult to reach him at the gatherings. His status as a living saint drew crowds who sought his blessings and advice, and after the group’s hadra he was usually shielded by assistants and ushered into a car that was waiting for him outside the mosque. A turning point in my fieldwork was the day Shaykh Qusi instructed his disciples that they should tell me about their own visionary experiences. I retell a number of their stories in this book. Others have shaped my understanding more implicitly. Often their stories moved me—not simply because of their highly significant content but also because of the excitement and deep conviction with which they were told and retold. Shaykh Hanafi is my third key interlocutor. He has become famous through a dream interpretation program on Egyptian television that figures centrally (albeit in its absence) in chapter 1. Many laypersons thought of Shaykh Hanafi as the quintessential dream expert, and friends of mine were highly impressed when I managed to speak to him in person for the first time. The shaykh comes from a Sufi background as well but also takes pride in his affiliation with al-Azhar, the official institutional voice of Sunni Islam. Al-Azhar, on the other hand, does not approve of the shaykh talking about dream interpretation at his workplace, so we usually met at the shaykh’s house at the outskirts of Cairo, often along with other visitors who would crowd the shaykh’s living room on his official “visiting days.” Shaykh Hanafi is very committed to his identity as a dream interpreter, and at one point he suggested that we should coauthor my book. I often had the feeling that he was frustrated that I had the means to write a book on Muslim dream interpretation while, from his perspective, I barely understand how the art of interpretation works. In spite of his frustration, the shaykh generally welcomed me, but he interacted with me more formally than the other shaykhs did. Often he spoke to me in classical Arabic, and occasionally he interjected that he was not sure what I was going to do with all this information and maybe I was a spy after all.
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My fourth key interlocutor, Shaykh Mustafa, is younger than the other shaykhs and less suspicious of me than Shaykh Hanafi. He is trained in social work and always seemed sincerely concerned with the well-being of the people who sought his advice. He studied the classical Islamic sciences, both at al-Azhar and privately with shaykhs, and when I began my fieldwork, he was the government-employed imam of a big Sufi mosque. Subsequently he was transferred to al-Azhar and, a few months later, to another large mosque that is tightly controlled by the government. At that point the shaykh and I started meeting in other public places because he felt that he was being watched at his workplace. He regretted his increasing physical alienation from the saints and told me that he appreciated the opportunity to talk openly with me about visionary and miraculous matters. I, in turn, appreciated the shaykh’s patience and his wide interests, which range from spirit possession to the Palestine-Israel conflict. Many ideas about religious imaginations in this book owe their elaboration to our long conversations. Although they belong to different strata of Egypt’s religious, economic, and social landscapes, all four shaykhs are involved with Sufism—itself neither a monolithic nor a static phenomenon, but one that a number of my interlocutors would characterize as a spiritual form of Islam in which love and the constant remembrance (dhikr) of God play a central role. Counter to Michael Gilsenan’s (1967) prediction, Sufi orders have not declined in Egypt but on the contrary have been expanding and attracting middle- and upper-class members, as well as reformist-minded Egyptians (Hoffman 1995). Working closely with my four key interlocutors and exploring with their help the imaginative repertoires of the Islamic tradition allowed me to move beyond the still-regnant opposition between orthodox Islam and Sufism that permeates scholarly writings as well as everyday discourse in Egypt. All four shaykhs referred to mystical, philosophical, and theological texts and occasionally explained relevant passages to me. At the same time, they would distinguish among three kinds of knowledge: knowledge passed down (naql), knowledge derived from the mind (`aql), and knowledge divinely inspired (`ilm ilähï). As a young Sufi from Luxor put it, true knowledge “does not come from lines (sutür) [in a book] but from hearts (sudür).” Shaykh Qusi, too, at times advised me to forget about books and instead rely on firsthand accounts of those well versed in the spiritual world, such as his disciples. As neither books nor rational thought could provide me with real insight into the imagination, the shaykhs were pleased with my anthropological interest in (narrativized) experience.
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Writing Dreams, Writing Ethnography A gap separates fieldwork and ethnography. And another one (or the same?) splits dream-experience and dream-telling. With the rare exception of when I dreamed of my interlocutors, I was presented with only representations of dreams. One could say, as Michael Gilsenan has with regard to miracles, that dreams are “made every day in cafés and conversations” (1983, 75). Although they are the central character of this book, the dreams themselves have a way of continuously escaping writing. They are the empty spaces between my words. Properly speaking, this is an ethnography of dream-tellings and dream interpretations, but never of the dreams themselves. While recognizing that dreams are elusive and evasive, my interlocutors are not necessarily opposed to subjecting dreams to writing. Written dreams appear in many texts of the Islamic tradition and Arabic literary genres, including the Qur´an, hadith, dream manuals, medieval Arabic autobiographies (Reynolds 2001), and diaries from as far back as the eleventh century (Makdisi 1956). My interlocutors occasionally write down their own dreams, either to preserve them for future readers or as a result of the requirements imposed by the mass mediation of dream interpretation. Some of the dream-stories in this book were presented to me already in writing, among them those that had been posted to the Web site for which Shaykh Nabil interprets dreams and those from the Book of Visions, a repository in which Shaykh Qusi´s followers record their visionary experiences. In my own text, dreams appear in different shapes: sometimes they are bounded by quotation marks; at other times they merge into their surroundings. Sometimes they are directly translated from Arabic; other times I retell them in my own words.37 I alternate among various modes of representation to highlight that, in the eyes of my interlocutors, the dream is not hermetically sealed off from the waking world. While dreams themselves remain out of reach and while it is never verifiable which dreams were really dreamed, I emphasize the dreams’ rhetorical force and their ethical effects. In my view, whether dream-stories are real, projected, or made up is the wrong question to ask. The dreams themselves—that is, the experiences that precede the narratives—cannot meaningfully be made the subject of an anthropological investigation, and they even elude the dreamers’ own narration. Although it can make a fundamental difference whether people believe that particular stories refer to something real according to their own standards, I hold that the anthropologist is not the ultimate arbiter of the “real,” and that the way this
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category is commonly used tends to erase other forms of relevance. Thus, even though skepticism is not the exclusive privilege of outside observers, I do not modify all accounts of dreams and visions by framing them as mere rhetorical claims. In other words, instead of saying, “Mona claimed to have seen the Prophet,” I might say, “Mona saw the Prophet.” Continuously modifying all vision accounts betrays a particular epistemological bias and obscures the fact that to many of my interlocutors, these experiences are no less real than my own encounters with them. Ultimately our inability to determine whether my interlocutors’ stories refer to something “real” is irrelevant to the fact that they are meaningful in their lives. What can be traced are the discursive, performative, ethical, and political effects of dreams and the realities that dreams bring into being. To remind the reader of the fact that the dream-tellings did not occur in a vacuum but were generally directed to me, I occasionally appear in the text as well. I offer neither an objective account nor a final interpretation but a retelling of my interlocutors’ stories and one particular perspective on them. Often during my fieldwork I was made keenly aware of my own reactions to, doubts about, and fascinations with the stories I heard, and at times I was reminded of the persistent limitations inherent in my assumptions. One of these moments was the morning when I woke up with two big scratches on my left cheek after dreaming of having gotten into a fight with Shaykh Qusi. I still do not know what this dream meant and I never told Shaykh Qusi about it, but being left with a physical mark left me puzzled and slightly disturbed by how deeply involved I had become with Shaykh Qusi’s community and how porous the line might indeed be between dream and waking life. Although experiences of this sort reminded me that the anthropologist is never fully in charge, this does not mean that I am merely a medium for my interlocutors’ dream-stories. In retelling their stories, I subject them to analytical perspectives of which my interlocutors would probably not always approve. Two fields of inquiry run throughout this book, continuously accompanying and inflecting each other. One concerns the politics that define and confine the imagination and the ideological contests over what constitutes “true Islam.” The other concerns the ethical, social, religious, and political implications of al-khayäl, a particular kind of imagination, as it is understood by those who cultivate it and put it into practice. Since these two fields are ultimately inseparable, I begin with the contested landscape in which my interlocutors’ dream-stories are situated. Chapter 1 opens with the interdiction of a popular dream interpretation program on Egyptian television and maps out the many voices and institutions trying to control
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dreams and dreamers. Chapter 2 turns from the logic of the either/or to the dialogical encounter between dreamer and interpreter. Shaykh Nabil, working at a threshold, leads the way into the in-betweenness that is central to this ethnography as a whole. Whereas Shaykh Nabil interprets all three kinds of dreams—psychologically explainable, devil-sent, and divinely inspired ones—in chapter 3 I zoom in on the ru´yä and address my interlocutors’ understandings of perception. By complicating the meaning of vision, this chapter aims to set up a place from which we can see my interlocutors’ dream-stories differently. Chapter 4 illustrates how the prophetic is at work in a particularly vibrant community of dreamers: that of Shaykh Qusi and his followers. My account of dream-tellings within this community highlights the ways in which the dream-vision is deeply intertwined with the textual tradition while simultaneously constituting an eruption of knowledge from an Elsewhere. Turning from Shaykh Qusi’s group to lay dreamers, chapter 5 describes how dreams move ordinary believers in their everyday lives. Dream-encounters can direct dreamers, serve as a fount of authority, and spill over the Egyptian state’s definition of “true Islam.” While they lie beyond the reach of the state’s disciplinary apparatus, they are themselves disciplining and sometimes coercive. Visitational dreams remind dreamers of their communal responsibilities and simultaneously constitute the underlying communities. In chapter 6 I revisit the practice of dream interpretation and address the impact that Western models of psychology have had on Egypt’s dream-landscapes. Through attention to interspaces and ambiguities, I show how both “Freud” and “Islam” are continuously remade. Like Western psychology, new media forms and technologies have opened up unprecedented spaces and languages for Egyptian dreams. I address some of their effects in the final chapter before revisiting the question of the dream’s political relevance in the afterword. Centrally, this book is an ethnography of Egypt’s dream landscapes and an invitation to rethink the imagination in and through anthropology. It traces dreaming as it is told, lived, cultivated, invoked, and interpreted in Egypt at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but also as it is erased, problematized, and disenchanted. Many of the dream-stories that I retell not only invite us to think beyond the self-possessed subject, they also push up against familiar understandings of “reality” and take us beyond a division of the world into rational/irrational, real/imagined, and either/or. My interlocutors’ dream practices allow us to consider the imagination and the dream in ways that exceed a narrow, imperializing psychoanalytic regime. The imagination that enables and emerges from their dream-stories is
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not simply fantasy, it is an in-between space, a barzakh, that shifts the attention from observable, material realities to the emergent, the possible, the prophetic, the visionary. Ultimately I believe that an anthropological engagement with such other imaginations, while an intellectual exercise, is one that bears the weight of ethical and political importance—especially at a time when governments both promise and steal hopes.
1. Dream Trouble But they are cutting off our dreams—dreams don’t mean much, they say, and proceed to make it so. . . . I can feel the Wiper wipe away the dream traces . . . fading like steps in windblown sand or snow. William Burroughs
Then he said: Why dreams? For that kind of stuff you have to go to Iran or maybe Morocco. They know more about this stuff. I said: But Egyptians dream too, don’t they? He said: Yes, but we dream of going out and of girls. fieldnotes, 1 February 2003
“Hey! Have you heard yet? A Saudi Arabian woman called in and said she saw the moon breast-feeding a boy, and the shaykh said this means the mahdï has been born.” If you’re in Cairo (and if you speak Arabic), most likely you will have heard—if not this version, then a slightly different one. Maybe the woman was not Saudi Arabian but Palestinian. Maybe she did not see the moon breast-feeding a boy, but herself breast-feeding the moon, or the moon being breast-fed by the sun. You might also have heard that the shaykh asked the woman to perform her ablutions and made her swear three times that she had neither lied nor exaggerated. Or that the shaykh cried upon hearing the dream. Regardless of which version you heard, you will be familiar with its central elements: a woman, a phone call, the moon, the shaykh, the mahdï . . . and a dream. The rumor was out and spreading throughout Cairo. While the dream had simply seemed strange, its interpretation was alarming and troublesome. Within a Sunni eschatological context, the mahdï is a savior who will restore true Islam at a time of decadence and decay immediately preceding Judgment Day.1 His birth is a serious matter: it indicates that the end of the world is near. In newspaper interviews, Shaykh Hanafi insisted that a dream of a breast-feeding moon would be absurd and lie “outside of rationality (khärig `an al-`aqläniyya).” He swore that neither had he been asked about this particular dream nor had he given this particular interpretation. Yet it mattered little how often the shaykh asserted that he, like everyone else, had learned about the supposed dream only from ran31
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dom people on the street and at work. “Bring me a single person who has seen me interpret the dream and not just heard about it,” Shaykh Hanafi protested again and again, but the repetitive chatter of the rumor drowned him out. As far as Cairo was concerned, the dream had been dreamed and Shaykh Hanafi had offered his troubling interpretation. Al-Azhar promptly issued a decree that interdicted the broadcasting of dreams and other metaphysical matters (al-ghaybiyyät) to “the masses.” Ru´ä, Shaykh Hanafi’s popular dream-program, was taken off the air. It was 22 January 2003. Having arrived only three weeks prior to this incident, I had been spending my days with friends and relatives, carefully testing the ground by broaching my research topic. Some of my friends marveled over the fact that two research foundations had given me thousands of dollars to study something as obscure and ephemeral as dreams and visions. Those more supportive of my project would either pull their copy of Ibn Sïrïn’s dream manual from one of their shelves or out of their bedside drawer or, alternatively, they would begin talking about Ru´ä. The TV program was recommended to me by a variety of people, ranging from a woman who sweeps the floors in the Sayyida Zaynab mosque to a medical student in the upper-class neighborhood of Medinat Nasser. Broadcast every Wednesday night on Egyptian national television, Ru´ä was a typical live call-in TV show. Viewers told their dreams via phone, and a young female moderator directed their requests for interpretation either to Shaykh Hanafi or to an Egyptian psychologist (a different one was invited to participate in the show every week). Many people commended Ru´ä as a perfect example of how Islam and modern science could successfully be brought together. For others it was an ongoing source of information. Instead of looking up symbols in classical dream manuals, by watching the show they would learn how to interpret their own dreams. Marwa, a twenty-one-year-old student from a lower-middle-class background, eagerly awaited Ru´ä every week, took detailed notes, and over the course of a year had composed her own little dream manual based on the shaykh’s mass-mediated interpretations. Like her, many of my friends were excited about the program, and I, in turn, found their excitement reassuring during those first few weeks of fieldwork. Ru´ä was a readily available conversation topic and set of field data, easily consumable and just as easily recordable. Or so I thought. The day came on which I was to watch Ru´ä myself for the first time. I settled onto a sofa in front of the television in the apartment that I was renting in Mohandeseen. I had inserted a videocassette into the recorder and sat waiting with a cup of Nescafé, notebook in hand. The evening
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passed, and Ru´ä was never broadcast. I called Marwa to find out what was going on. Maybe the shaykh is sick, she suggested, or maybe he’s traveling. But she sounded doubtful. It could also be the case that the program had simply been discontinued without any warning or explanation—a fate not uncommon for TV programs in Egypt. Marwa’s fears were confirmed when a few days later the rumor of the breast-feeding moon and the impending arrival of the mahdï began circulating, accompanied by the Azharite decree against mass-mediated dream interpretations. Ru´ä’s end was widely discussed on Cairo’s streets and in its print media. Everyone seemed to have an opinion about it, and my disappointment at the program’s cancellation soon gave way to the realization that it constituted an ideal “incitement to discourse.”2 Multiple religious and secular discursive regimes converged in the attempt to ban dream interpretation from the public sphere. Among Ru´ä’s loudest critics was the Egyptian state itself, which has a particular dislike for all “excessive” forms of Sufism and which draws legitimacy from its claim to protect the Islamic heritage (cf. Starrett 1998). While not an Islamic state per se and often attacked by its opponents as too secular, Egypt has a state mufti; mosques are subject to government inspection; al-Azhar was effectively placed under state control in 1961; and over the course of the twentieth century, reform laws were issued that prohibit specific ritual practices and that moved the administration of Sufi orders under the supervision of the Higher Council of Sufi Affairs. The latter, first established in 1903, exists to assure that Sufism remains within the confines of “true Islam” and free of ecstatic rituals and claims to ongoing forms of prophecy.3 Although the Egyptian state and al-Azhar are not always neatly aligned, in the debate around Ru´ä their positions overlapped.4 The Azharite decree stated that dream interpretation on television was dangerous “because it can cause confusion or anxiety (balbala) in the public opinion,” and the Ministry of Religious Affairs declared Ru´ä to be a form of “idle talk” and claimed that “there is nothing in the Islamic religion that confirms the idea of dream interpretation.”5 For this reason, the ministry insisted, the TV station should replace Ru´ä with a different program, which was to “deal with religion and morals instead of dream interpretation and intrusions into the Unknown (al-ghayb).”6 By way of the preposition instead of, dream interpretation was placed outside the realm of religion and morals. Al-Azhar and the state seemed to agree: dream interpretation is un-Islamic and only confuses the masses. State officials and religious scholars were joined on this issue by Western-trained professionals and liberal journalists. Whereas a number of psychologists had participated in Ru´ä, others had long rejected the
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program, complaining either that the shaykh always had the last word on the show, or worse: that he was a charlatan. One newspaper criticized Ru´ä for deflecting the public’s attention from “real, political issues,” and that at a time—shortly before the invasion of Iraq in 2003—when all Arabs should be keeping an eye on what was happening in the region. The staterun daily newspaper al-Gumhüriyya warned that in particular “illiterate and uneducated people” needed to be protected from the spreading of humbug and myths, and an Azharite publication expressed concern about the rumor of the mahdï arising right at a time when the Muslim community was facing such grave dangers.7 In the eyes of secular critics and religious scholars alike, dream talk is nothing but an opiate of the masses. It depoliticizes and numbs. Taking the Ru´ä debate as an entry point into the complex terrain of Egypt’s dream landscapes, this chapter introduces some of the players that continuously reshape these landscapes—not so much the more obvious ones such as dream interpreters and psychologists (to whom I turn in later chapters), but rather bureaucratic institutions, colonial forces, Orientalists, Saudi scholars, al-Azhar, Muslim Brotherhood members, and Muslim reformists. By reformists I mostly mean here thinkers associated with Salafism, a Sunni reform movement that emerged in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that aimed at overcoming a perceived stagnation through a return to the Islam of the salaf, the pious ancestors, and by proving Islam’s compatibility with rationality and modern science. While reformist rationalities do not abandon the prophetic, they bracket it by promoting the view that the Prophet Muhammad’s revelation experience was the final divine intervention and that, consequently, contemporary Muslims should rely on their minds instead of their dreams. In what follows, I first turn from the Ru´ä debate to another incident from my fieldwork that illustrates how reformist reason confines the imagination to a this-worldly social realm while foreclosing its metaphysical dimensions. The remainder of the chapter aims to contextualize these interdictions and separations by unraveling discourses around “charlatanry” and “superstition,” tracing the impact of the Orientalist stereotype of the irrational “Arab mind,” and describing a brief genealogy of reformist views on dreams. Muslim scholars have been discussing the relation between reason and revelation for many centuries,8 but the hyperrationalism of the Salafi reformers needs to be understood at least in part as a reaction to a modern European exaltation of scientific reason. Although the kind of rationality that is promoted by Muslim reformers is not simply a copy of modern European rationalities, like them, it insists on
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firm boundaries between the knowable and the Unknown, the real and the imaginary, the living and the dead. Instead of dwelling on the in-between, reformist reason insists on clear-cut boundaries.
Erasures of the Barzakh “But he’s dead,” the imam repeated. It seemed as though what he really wanted to say was, “Don’t you get it? He’s dead! Is that so hard to understand? Are you telling me you’re as ignorant as these folks who come here every day?” Here: Cairo’s City of the Dead, and more specifically the beautiful medieval mosque in which the famous legal scholar al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï (d. 820) lies buried. Here: where hundreds of Egyptians drop off letters or where letters arrive by mail, addressed to the long-deceased saintly scholar. Here: one of those places where I expected to hear marvelous dream-stories. How else could al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï respond to the letter writers but by appearing to them in dreams or waking visions? Besides being the founder of one of the four Sunni schools of law, alImäm al-Shäfi`ï was directly related to the Prophet Muhammad.9 He is revered as a saint in Egypt and believed to serve as a defendant on the hidden court of saints (al-mahkama al-bätiniyya). For decades Egyptians have been sending letters to the saint to ask for his help or intercession. Having read about the letters, I had come to the shrine to find out about the saint’s means of responding to these many requests.10 Since most of the visitors were absorbed in prayer or busy talking to the saint, I decided to ask the imam in charge of the mosque about al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s preferred mode of communication. Upon entering the imam’s office, I noticed Ibn Sïrïn’s dream manual on his desk, next to classical hadith and tafsïr works, and so, after having introduced myself, I quickly and confidently brought up the question of dream-visions. “I’ve heard that people write letters to al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï,” I said, “and I was wondering how he responds to them. Do people see him in their dreams?” The imam’s hospitable welcome gave way to a frown. “Al-Imäm alShäfi`ï is dead,” he said, “so how could anyone still see him?” To emphasize al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s absolute deadness, the imam used the harsh word mayyit (dead) instead of the gentler mutawaffi (passed away). He could also have said that the saintly legal scholar dwells in the realm of God’s mercy (fï rahmat Alläh), which would have implied that death is not an end but rather an awakening.
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I was thrown off by the imam’s response and began wondering whether Ibn Sïrïn fulfilled only a decorative function on his desk. If the imam had read the dream manual, he would know that seeing the dead in a dream can be quite informative. According to Ibn Sïrïn, when a dead person wears a crown or green clothes, this means that he is doing well in the afterlife. A dream in which the dead perform a good deed is a sign that one should do the same. Classical sources are full of stories that rely on dreamed communication between the dead and the living. The imam’s claim that the dead are unable to guide the living diverges not only from these classical sources, but also from the dream ethics adhered to by many Egyptians, who consider the visitational dream a real interlocutory possibility. According to them, dream-encounters are possible because the dead are in the barzakh, as are the spirits of the living while they are asleep or in a heightened spiritual state. Many dreamers and dream interpreters appreciate the barzakh as a dialogical in-between space, a space in which the living and the dead can meet. In what sense, then, does it matter that al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï is dead? And why would someone so dismissive of the intimate ties between believers and saints have chosen to work in such a saintly mosque? It dawned on me that this was turning into one of those absurd moments when anthropologists explain to their informants what they would have liked to hear from them. I couldn’t help it: “So he’s dead, but he’s still around, isn’t he? He’s still in the barzakh.” “So what if he is?” the imam responded. “How can he solve our problems down here from there?” “But . . . ,” I began again. The imam interrupted me: It’s wrong of people to write letters to al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï, complaining to him and asking for help. They do it only out of ignorance. Of course al-Imäm [al-Shäfi`ï] never responds to them. He’s dead, after all. How could he respond to them? How could he solve their problems for them? It’s wrong to turn to him for help. We are only to turn to God for help. [God said] “I am near” [Qur´an 2:186]. Seeking help through anyone else (al-tawassul) is not permitted. . . . Writing letters to someone like that is idolatry (shirk). . . . Luckily it has gotten less, the problem of people writing letters. One or two centuries ago people used to do it much more. Now they understand better. Because of science (`ilm) their minds are enlightened (yastanïr al-`uqül). And of course the mind tells you that it’s wrong. That he’s dead. That he won’t solve your problems for you.
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From a reformist point of view, the dead, including the Prophet and the awliyä´, are truly dead; mutual visits and conversations between the dead and the living are impossible. To underline this point, reformist thinkers often cite a Qur´anic verse stating that “behind those [who leave the world] there is a barrier [of death] (barzakh) until the Day when all will be raised from the dead” (23:100).11 According to reformist readings of this verse, the dead are strictly separated from the living until Judgment Day. The barzakh here is not an in-between space but a barrier. “So what if he is?” the imam responded when I referred to the saint’s presence in the barzakh. Al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï might be in that realm, but he cannot influence the lives of the living. So what? might be the best way to sum up what reformist reason more generally has to say about the possibility of truthful dream-visions. Such dreams exist in theory but no longer in practice. The dead are in the barzakh, but the living have no access to that realm. While dream-visions are not categorically denied, dreams cannot live up to the imperative of certitude that is embraced by reformist reason. The possibility of prophecy is accordingly not erased, but it is bounded. In the imam’s view, the fact that people write letters to a dead saint is a token of their ignorance, their lack of enlightenment. Instead of turning to a metaphysical Elsewhere for help, they should learn how to take their problems into their own hands. Like Ru´ä’s critics, the imam holds that expecting help from an Elsewhere leads to idle talk and confusion and that Islam should be swept free of all superstitious beliefs. Modern science in his eyes is not a token of secularism or Western imperialism but a tool for purifying Islam. Through it, all minds are to be enlightened. Gradually our conversation turned to more mundane matters. I learned that the imam had grown up in Upper Egypt, that he had studied in Saudi Arabia, that he greatly admired the orderliness that he associates with Germany, and that he had never chosen to work in al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s saintly mosque but the government had assigned him to it—maybe precisely because of his rationalistic stance. Of course, until all minds are “enlightened,” neither the Egyptian state nor its imams can prevent people from dreaming of saints or from writing letters to them. The most they can do is interdict dream programs on national television and ritually erase the material traces of the people’s “superstitions.”12 At al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s shrine, government officials collect and burn the believers’ letters on a weekly basis. In a gesture toward a brighter future, when all “ignorance” will be overcome, the people’s requests go up in smoke. Other times the letters fulfill an even more pragmatic purpose. The imam told me that before the letters are burned,
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he occasionally reads some of them to get a sense of people’s worries and concerns, which he then addresses in his Friday sermons. If, for instance, a number of the letters are about divorce, the sermon will include strategies for dealing with marital problems. In the imam’s opinion, he can provide concrete, religiously and scientifically sound advice; al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï cannot. He is dead and out of reach.
Of Charlatans and Superstitions Those who insist that they can communicate with the dead and those who ascribe too much value to their dreams are frequently labeled “superstitious” in Egypt. Muslim dream interpreters, in turn, are called charlatans. When superstitions or acts of charlatanry threaten to get out of hand, the boundaries of “true Islam” are enforced. Often the difference between acceptable and unacceptable practices is a matter of scope and audience. Just as saint veneration embarrasses state officials because of its highly visible nature, an article in the Egyptian weekly `Aqïdatï expressed outrage at the abuse of dream interpretation for the “tricking of simple people” and introduced the readers to a “proper” dream interpreter—one who recognizes her limits and remains within the boundaries of the private; one who interprets only for relatives, friends, and neighbors and does “not receive anyone, be it at home or at work or on the telephone in order to interpret. It is for those around [her].”13 Shaykh Hanafi’s televised interpretations, by contrast, were reaching an entire TV audience, and the announcement of the coming of the mahdï (and thus of the impending end of the world) concerned all Muslims, if not the world at large. The terms daggäl and sha`wadha are used widely in the Arabic media, the former meaning “swindler,” “cheat,” “imposter,” “quack,” or “charlatan,” and the latter “magic,” “humbug,” “swindle,” or “trickery.”14 Time and again friends warned me that I should choose my interlocutors carefully. Worried that I might represent Islam wrongly in the “West,” they urged me not to talk to dervishes, Sufis, elderly women, and those who make a “business” out of lying. A basic rule of thumb suggested by a young Egyptian woman was that “whoever tells you he’s a dream interpreter is a charlatan.” When Egyptians speak of charlatans, they generally refer to people who abuse their religion and make money by tricking others. Occasionally a Faustian contract with the devil or evil spirits is also implied. Terms such as charlatan derive their discursive force in part from how they group practices and beliefs. Dream interpretation is superstitious because it is just like reading the future in coffee cups, writing horoscopes, or using charms. A dream interpreter is a charlatan who financially exploits
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people just like those claiming to exorcise evil spirits. Categorizations of this sort manifest themselves in analogies drawn by journalists, in how books are arranged in bookstores, and also in what people assumed to be relevant for my project. Some handed me their booklets on zodiac signs when I brought up dreams; others spoke to me about magic spells, drew amulets, or took me to Qur´anic healers or zär rituals.15 Dreams were of little importance in these contexts, but somehow these spheres belonged together in the minds of my interlocutors. A study of “274 different kinds of superstitions,” conducted in 2003 by the National Center for Criminal and Social Research in Cairo, concluded that Egyptians have been spending a yearly amount of ten billion Egyptian pounds on “unraveling unknown matters (qirä´ät al-ghayb),” magic, and the treatment of spirit possession.16 Thousands, the research center reported, seek out charlatans in the hope of being healed, averting the evil eye or magical spells, or becoming pregnant. According to the report, the fees paid to charlatans range between ten pounds for less-known ones and ten thousand pounds for the most famous healers, who are frequented by Egyptians and visitors from the Gulf states alike.17 The research center claimed that currently about three hundred thousand charlatans are active in Egypt. Besides Egyptian newspapers, their counterparts in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states also reported on these findings. How is it possible, they asked, that Arabs spend more money on humbug than on education? Why are Egyptians so prone to falling for charlatanry? How has superstition taken hold of Egypt’s “collective mind (al-`aql al-jamä`ï)”? 18 Different answers were suggested. Some sociologists held the cinema and television responsible for portraying charlatanry in an increasing number of films. Such films, according to one journalist, exploit the masses’ ignorance and promote an escape to the supernatural instead of enculturing (tathqïf) and enlightening (tanwïr) people.19 Others came to the defense of the mass media and argued that films only portray what is already an eminent phenomenon in society, or merely show why it is wrong to go to a charlatan. Frequently Egyptian journalists correlated the resurgence of magic, humbug, and superstitions with political, economic, and social instabilities, arguing that historically, people turn to the supernatural especially during crises. Instead of taking the future into their hands, one journalist noted, the Arabs subject it to a “nonreal and nonmaterial world that is woven by the imagination of magicians, swindlers, and charlatans.”20 A newspaper from the Emirates blamed the increase in charlatanry on a feeling of despair, insufficient religious knowledge, and shortcomings in the educational structure.21
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While journalists, sociologists, and other experts were busy debating what has led to an increase in superstitious beliefs and charlatanry, they failed to consider a number of alternative questions. Instead of asking what has caused a turn to “superstitions,” one might ask, for instance, what all this talk about “superstition” signifies. In part the answer might be that the portrayal of “bad Muslims” helps to define and reaffirm the “good Muslims.”22 Additionally, as I suggest next, the categories of charlatanry and superstition need to be understood as outcomes of particular colonial histories. Although the distinction between experts and charlatans is not a modern phenomenon, and although the lines that are drawn today resonate with older binaries,23 they were intensified when colonizers’ and Orientalists’ accounts of the Muslims’ irrationality and illogicality fueled reformers’ calls to rid Islam of all superstitions. The lingering image of the muddled, illogical “Arab mind” haunts, so I believe, many contemporary debates about the contours of “true Islam.”
The “Arab Mind” A recurring trope in Orientalist and colonialist discourses insists that Islam is inherently irrational. Scottish Orientalist H. A. R. Gibb commented on the “aversion of the Muslims from thought-processes of rationalism” (1947, 7), and American Islamicist Duncan MacDonald (1911, 48) claimed that the “Orientals” have the creative imagination of a child and are therefore in need of missionaries. According to MacDonald, while Christianity managed to bring the unseen into history, Islam failed to do so and was therefore overpowered by the uncanny (cf. Pruett 1984). As Edward Said (1979) has pointed out, MacDonald and Gibb participated in an immense, intertextual web of meanings that constructs the Orient as Other and that intersects with and feeds into colonialist discourses. A typical colonialist take on the “Oriental mind” was offered by Lord Cromer, the first British viceroy of Egypt, who mused over how Egypt could best be brought out of its “semi-civilized condition.” While stating that he felt a deep sympathy for the Egyptian people, Lord Cromer explained that true understanding between Egyptians and Europeans was practically impossible because of a want of mental symmetry. In a chapter on the nature of Egyptians in his book Modern Egypt, Cromer juxtaposed the logical, scientific, curious, questioning European mind with the superstitious, fatalistic “muddle-headedness” of Egyptians. According to Cromer, the European is a “close reasoner” and “natural logician, albeit he may not have studied logic,” whereas the Arab’s mind, “like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry” (1908, 146). Although he noted that
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the Arabs perfected the science of dialectics and contributed to European thought in the eleventh and twelfth centuries through their teachings of Aristotelian philosophy, Cromer held that the contemporary Egyptian is inherently gullible and therefore “readily becomes the dupe of the magician and the astrologer. Even highly educated Egyptians are prone to refer the common occurrences of life to the intervention of some supernatural agency” (146f.). Similar discourses not only crop up today in the Arab press but linger also in other forms. One version of the trope of the irrational Muslim, Arab, or Oriental appears in Raphael Patai’s book The Arab Mind, which was first published in 1973 and has been used in U.S. military training camps in recent years.24 Patai explains that “what the Arab mind does is to elect purposely to give greater weight in thought and speech to wishes rather than reality, to what it would like things to be rather than to what they objectively are” (1983, 165). According to Patai, the Arabs are unable to grasp reality objectively and are therefore stuck in a fantasy world. He relates these mental incapacities to the Arabic speakers’ intoxication with eloquence, proneness to verbal exaggeration, tendency toward repetitiousness, and grammatical unconcern with time distinctions (44–72). More recently, the trope of the irrational or anti-rationalist Muslim reemerged in Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial speech in Regensburg, Germany, in September 2006—a speech in which the pope contrasted the intrinsic harmony between Christianity and Greek philosophy with the supposed view of Muslim scholars that God is absolutely transcendent and not bound by rationality. In response, a number of Muslim scholars pointed out that the pope had failed to address the relationship between God’s transcendent nature and human reason in the Islamic tradition, and that the use of one’s reason is a religious duty in Islam.25 Like the stereotype of the irrational Muslim, these counterarguments are nothing new. Muslim reformers have long been going to great lengths to prove that Islam is in fact a highly rational religion. What is overlooked by both those insisting on the inherent irrationality of Islam and those insisting on its inherent rationality is a realm that is neither rational nor irrational: the imagination.
Reformist Rationalities Muslim reformers are compelled to defend Islam against colonialist and Orientialist stereotypes. But they insist on the need to rely on rational thought also because of the powerful political and even revolutionary
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potential that can arise from claims to prophecy and divine inspiration. A famous historical example of a vision-inspired national heroine is Joan of Arc, who was executed for heresy in the fifteenth century after she had asserted that her visions of God told her to recover France from English domination. In the early twentieth century the Muslim reformist journal Al-Manär received a letter inquiring whether Joan of Arc should be considered a prophet. Rashïd Ridä, one of the key Salafi thinkers, responded that Joan of Arc was not a prophet because she never called her followers to a religion. He went on to explain that the French are a people easily moved by irrational factors, as proved by the example of Napoleon leading his troops into certain death by reciting poetry for them (1996, 42). Ridä later included the inquiry along with his response in The Muhammadan Revelation, a book centrally concerned with dislodging the Orientalist claim that Muhammad received only a “personal revelation,” that is to say, an inspiration that “flowed from his subliminal self, with its highly refined religious sensibilities, into his conscious mind” (3). While Ridä acknowledged that Muhammad’s prophecy started with dreams, he held that “visions are actually mental pictures that are open to interpretation, so that it is only the true prophet who is capable of distinguishing the true interpretation from the false” (22). Ridä confirmed the possibility of revelation in the form of dreams but simultaneously limited its accessibility to the Prophet. The Prophet’s revelation experience was more than a dream, and only he was able to recognize it as such. Ordinary believers’ dreams, by contrast, are always less than revelation. Ridä explained that Joan of Arc “was motivated by nervous energy which came about as a result of her anxiety over the political situation and as a result of her sentimental religiosity and belief in the legends that were popular in her times. All of this is quite common, and is shared by all those who claim to be the awaited Messiah, like Mohammad Ahmad in the Sudan, or the Bab in Iran, or Ahmad the Qadiani in India” (43). According to Ridä, Joan of Arc was not a prophet, but neither were the modern messianic leaders of Islam, such as Muhammad Ahmad, who proclaimed himself mahdï in Sudan in 1881 and declared a jihäd against the Ottoman rulers; Bäb, the founder of Babism in Iran (from which the Baha’i faith was later derived); and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who founded the Ahmadiyya movement in India in 1889. Ridä implied that all these messianic leaders were motivated by psychological anxieties, political instabilities, and prevalent beliefs that allowed them to imagine and present themselves as mahdï-like figures. Although Ridä was more conservative than other Salafi reformers and
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increasingly became influenced by Wahhabi thought, his suspicion against ongoing claims to prophecy resonates with a broader Salafi emphasis on reason and aspiration to certitude. Famous debates, such as that between the reformer al-Afghänï and the French historian Ernest Renan in 1883, or that between Muhammad `Abduh and the Christian Lebanese secularist Farah Antoun in 1902, centered precisely on the question of whether Islam is compatible with reason. In insisting that Islam is a highly rational religion, the Salafi reformers described it as distinct from Christianity, which, according to their account, has long embraced a belief in miracles. Ridä noted that whereas the concepts of reason, thought, consideration, and deliberation are absent from the Bible, the Qur´an mentions the word mind (`aql) more than fifty times (1996, 107). When Salafi thinkers emphasize Islam’s inherent rationality, they do not necessarily embrace European models of reason. As Talal Asad (2003, 221f.) has pointed out, it would be reductive to think that the reformers simply turned against manifestations of mysticism because they represented the irrationality that the European bourgeoisie disliked most about Islam.26 Far from exclusively being a colonial legacy, such a skepticism is prominent already in the writings of the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who, as Fritz Meier puts it, was “in favor of ‘Apollonian’ intellectual clarity and against all forms of ‘Dionysian’ rapture” (1999, 317), and who held against Sufis their unwarranted valuation of experience and exceptional states. While not denying the possibility that one might even see God in dreams and waking visions, Ibn Taymiyya warned that one should never consider dreams or visions binding and true in a way that would raise their status to that of the Qur´an and sunna. Ridä emphasized Islam’s high regard for the mind and, like Ibn Taymiyya, he rejected an overvaluation of mystical experience. Simultaneously he denounced the supposed rationality of Western Orientalists who claimed to be using a mode of critical analysis to disprove the divine origins of the Qur´anic revelation (1996, 49). While defending the historical occurrence of revelation, Salafi reformers were particularly skeptical of Sufi claims to divine inspiration. Ridä, `Abduh, and al-Afghänï were all involved in Sufi orders early in their lives and continued to express their respect for “true Sufism,” but they repeatedly denounced the aberrations of popular religious customs and wanted to outlaw what they considered to be excessive Sufi practices. One token of the reformers’ ambivalent attitude about Sufism is al-Manär wa-l-Azhar, a book that Ridä wrote toward the end of his life. In it he recalled a number of extraordinary mystical experiences that he himself underwent as a young man: he felt himself move outside his
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body while reading al-Ghazälï’s Revival of the Religious Sciences; he saw visions of future events; he was able to heal the sick through his prayers; and, during his involvement with the Naqshabandiyya order, he saw the Prophet, Abü Bakr, and a shaykh of his order in a state between sleeping and waking (Ridä 1933; cf. Sirriyeh 1999, 99). Although Ridä was impressed and moved by these experiences, he later came to reject them as inherently unreliable. He did so without resorting to European Enlightenment thought or modern scientific arguments. Instead of referring to his contemporaries Freud and Jung, he discarded supposed “dreams of the holy dead as mainly dreams of the unholy devils” (Sirriyeh 2000, 130). Interestingly, Ridä was not entirely consistent in devaluing the dream’s evidential potential. In his 1933 book he drew on a dream that a father of an acquaintance had seen and in which he questioned the great medieval Sufi master Ibn al-`Arabï about what happened to him after his death. Ibn al-`Arabï confessed in the dream that he led many people astray in his life because he was confused about the imaginal world (155).27 It is ironic that Ridä provided imaginary proof to disprove the importance of the imaginary realm. Apparently the evidential promise of dream-visions could be so compelling that even the rationalist reformer disregarded his own convictions when a dream fitted into his argument. In principle, however, Salafi reformers reject the dream’s prophetic and ethical potential. The reformers’ expulsion from Islam of whatever is seen as nonrational (i.e., the insistence on a rational Islam and the construction of “superstition” as an abject category) draws on rationalist trends in the Islamic tradition while simultaneously responding to Orientalist tropes of the quintessentially irrational Muslim. The resulting skepticism finds expression today not only in state-aligned institutions but also in oppositional religious movements.
Muslim Brotherhood Thinkers on Dreams Although “modernist” and “Islamist” trends are frequently juxtaposed in academic and journalistic writings, as far as dreams are concerned, state-aligned, modernist positions often converge and overlap with oppositional, “Islamist” ones. Salafi thought not only has permeated al-Azhar and Egypt’s official religious institutions,28 but it also is reflected in the epistemological stance adopted by thinkers affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has moved in and out of legitimacy since it was first founded in 1928 and today forms one of the strongest oppositional forces in Egypt. Hasan al-Bannä, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, stressed in
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his Risälat al-Ta`lïm (Thesis of Education) that Islam is a rational religion, a religion that “frees the mind (yuharrir al-`aql)” (1981, 358). He distinguished sharply between legitimate sources of knowledge (namely, Qur´an, sunna, science, and rational thought) and their deviant counterparts, and he denounced knowledge gained by way of dreams, divine inspiration, and premonitions. Al-Bannä’s take on dream-visions and divination was later echoed by Yüsuf al-Qardäwï, a key figure in the Islamic Revival movement, who was stripped of his Egyptian nationality because of his support for the Muslim Brotherhood and who currently lives in Qatar. In a book titled Islam’s Position on Divine Inspiration, Illumination, DreamVisions, Amulets, Divination, and Spells, al-Qardäwï explains that Hasan al-Bannä’s stance illuminates the movement’s position on “excessive Sufis who make of what they are inspired by in the waking state and what they see in their sleep a proof through which they justify their deeds and words as if it were the infallible revelation. They even have turned illumination, inspiration, and dream-visions into legal evidence (dalïl). This is a clear error and a big mistake” (1996, 11). Again, “excessive Sufis” are here criticized for overvaluing their experience and for mistaking their dream-visions for a form of revelation. Yet like Ridä, al-Qardäwï not only denounces “those who rely on dream-visions in their life as if they were revelation and wait in every matter for a dreamvision that will point them the right way,” but he also disagrees with those who deny the existence of dream-visions altogether: “There are people whose view is obscured [literally: whose veil is thick], like the materialists of our time and of all times and like the followers of the school of psychoanalysis. They deny the truthful dream-vision and see all dream-visions only as a reflection of what is in the psyche during the waking state or what is hidden in the basements of the inner mind, the unconscious” (ibid. 120). Whereas the imam in al-Imäm al-Shäfi`ï’s mosque drew on “modern science” to discard the masses’ “backward” beliefs, al-Qardäwï puristically aims at disproving the dream’s reliability from within the Islamic tradition. In opposition to materialists, empiricists, and psychoanalysts, he reaffirms the reality of dream-visions and asserts that divine inspiration and illumination do occur in the miracles of prophets and saints, to whom God might reveal some “hidden things of the unknown matters of the future” (ibid. 37). While not denying the theoretical possibility of dreamvisions, al-Qardäwï tries to contain their effectiveness. Dream-visions, he warns, can never qualify as evidence.29 He explains that if one learns through a dream that a specific witness has lied, or that money was stolen, or that water is impure, none of these findings matters in reality as even
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the Prophet always judged based on visible facts (al-zawähir) and not based on what God had revealed to him. Offering an example of what can happen when dreams are mistaken for evidence, al-Qardäwï cites an article from the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahräm, according to which a judge changed the date for local elections because of a dream-vision he had seen. “This way,” al-Qardäwï laments, “dream-visions have begun interfering in religion, politics, and all aspects of life” (120). In light of his distrust of the dream-vision’s epistemological and ethical potential, it is not surprising that al-Qardäwï responded to the Ru´ä debate in the form of a rhetorical question: “And why should we care about dream-visions? (fa-mä bälunä bi-l-ru´ä al-manämiyya).”30 In the wake of the debate a fatwa was also issued on Islam Online, a bilingual Web site initiated by al-Qardäwï, which urged Muslims not to “arrange their conditions and [not to] modify their states depending on these kinds of dream-visions. It is a dangerous slippery ground (mazlaq) that Muslims should not trust.” One of the Egyptian muftis involved in the collective issuing of the fatwa told me proudly that it was clicked on far more often than any other recent fatwa.
Saudi Critics Along with state-aligned and oppositional reformist voices coming out of Egypt, Saudi scholars have been expressing their disdain for dream interpretation, particularly in its mass-mediated forms. Saudi scholars are primarily associated with Wahhabism, a literalist reform movement that began in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century and that aims at the purification of Islam through a return to the Qur´an and the sunna while taking a strong stand against bid`a, saint worship, polytheism, and Sufism. Wahhabi thought has influenced some Salafi thinkers directly, and many Egyptian scholars have studied in Saudi Arabia; additionally, since the early 1960s the well-funded Muslim World League in Mecca has been sending Saudi-trained scholars into various parts of the Muslim world. Through these educational exchanges, by way of labor migration, television, the Internet, and print media, Wahhabi thought has been extending beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders, and I often found Egyptians quoting authoritative Saudi opinions that they had read in newspapers. Others complained of what could be called a “Saudification” of Islam. In 2003 `Abd al-`A zïz Äl al-Shaykh, the main mufti of Saudi Arabia, warned against the phenomenon of dream interpretation, which “is spreading widely in the name of Islam” on television and in newspapers and magazines, and which can lead to social unrest and cause “disputes and
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discords by bringing apart a woman and her husband, or a man and his relatives and friends.” He concluded that all Muslims should work together in closing the door before this “great evil (sharr `azïm).”31 In an article in an Emirati newspaper, published a few months after Ru´ä’s discontinuation, a Saudi scholar went a step further, claiming that even “the Prophet (peace and prayers be upon him) did not know how to interpret dreams. Dream interpretation on satellite channels is slander (iftirä´) against God. They talk about things that they know nothing about. They commit horrid mistakes in filling people with doubt and in confusing their lives in unprecedented ways. They should fear God!”32 Dream interpretation, once the only legitimate form of divination in Islam, has here become a great evil. The notion that not even the Prophet Muhammad knew how to interpret dreams diverges from standard hadith works, according to which the Prophet frequently interpreted his companions’ dreams. Since even he knew next to nothing of al-ghayb, the metaphysical realm of the Unknown, it is implied, regular believers should not dig into that dangerous realm either. To underline this point, critics of dream interpretation, and of divination more generally, frequently draw on the following Qur´anic verses: For, with Him [God] are the keys to the things that are beyond a created being’s perception (al-ghayb): none knows them but He. (6:59) Say: “None in the heaven or on earth knows the hidden reality (al-ghayb) save God.” (27:65) Say [o Prophet]: I do not say unto you, “God’s treasures are with me”; nor [do I say], “I know the things that are beyond the reach of human perception”; nor do I say unto you, “Behold, I am an angel”: I but follow what is revealed to me. (6:50)
Salafi and Wahhabi reformers do not dismiss al-ghayb, but they declare it to be inaccessible. In separating the knowable from the Unknown, they call for an exclusive reliance on verifiable knowledge. Since the Unknown is out of reach and the gate of prophecy is closed, the dream arises as an object that needs to be controlled and domesticated. According to reformist thinkers, dreams are at best a private matter but should play no role in the public, legal, or political realm.
Awakenings Faced with criticism from various sides, dream interpreters have been defending their work against the allegation that it is fraudulent, supersti-
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tious, or outdated. Countering the notion that dream interpretation is un-Islamic, they insist that it is part of, and legitimated by, the textual tradition. One dream interpreter from Upper Egypt who has appeared on a number of television shows asserted in June 2003, “dream interpretation is a lawful matter (amr shar`ï) that is proven in the Qur´an, the sunna, and the sayings of the ancestors (al-salaf).”33 Similarly, Shaykh Hanafi defended Ru´ä in an interview by insisting that “all [he had] said in this [TV] show were things in agreement with the Qur´an and the sunna. These things can be found in the depths of books.” 34 Unlike the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Affairs, which requested a religiously sound program “instead of” Ru´ä, dream interpreters assert that dream interpretation lies fully within the boundaries of the Islamic tradition, thus reclaiming for their work the status of orthodoxy. Already before the rumor about the mahdï dream erupted, Shaykh Hanafi had been asked in an interview whether dream interpretation was not a superstitious practice. He answered that dream interpretation is a divine gift and a science legitimized by Ibn Sïrïn and in the hadith. “The books of the sunna are filled with this kind of knowledge,” he said, “but people have become alienated from it.” 35 When talking to me, Shaykh Hanafi often emphasized his religious training, noting that by the age of ten he had memorized the Qur´an, that he had studied the classical Islamic sciences at al-Azhar, and that for forty years he had learned from a shaykh of the Bayyümï Sufi order. Subsequently he worked as a teacher, an imam, and in the field of da`wa; and when he started the TV program, he was an employee in the administrative office of al-Azhar’s professoriate. Whereas al-Azhar’s decree denounced dream interpretation as un-Islamic, Shaykh Hanafi tried to resituate his work within the scope of Azharite legitimacy. In a newspaper interview following Ru´ä’s discontinuation he claimed, “If I had said empty talk or sought refuge with delusions and charlatanry, no one would have let me; my colleagues at al-Azhar would have directed me onto the right path.”36 When I first met the shaykh, he highlighted his Azharite credentials along with the textual embeddedness of his interpretive work. He showed me the many books that he uses when dealing with dreams, among them the manuals of Ibn Sïrïn, Ibn Shähïn, and al-Näbulusï, hadith collections, classical works of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), al-Ghazälï’s and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzï’s writings, and Kitäb al-Hayawän, as well as more recent self-help literatures. Our subsequent meetings usually began with us comparing the newest books on dreams we had acquired. The shaykh took great pride in the bookcases that were being built in his living room
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during my fieldwork, and one day he introduced me to Zaynab, another visitor to his house, whom he commended for “reading everywhere and at all times.” After Zaynab had confirmed that reading is “more important to [her] than eating or sleeping,” Shaykh Hanafi asked her to take off her reading glasses so he could compare them with his own. He was proud that his were thicker. For Shaykh Hanafi, the size of his private library and the thickness of his glasses characterize him as a proper scholar and symbolize the textual grounding and legitimacy of dream interpretation. The point is therefore not that Muslim reformers are rational whereas dreamers and dream interpreters fall victim to, or intentionally embrace, irrationality. A quick glance into any of the classical dream manuals shows that Muslim dream interpretation is a highly complex, elaborate hermeneutical science with many rules and complicated techniques. It is also worth recalling in this context Shaykh Hanafi’s remark that a dream of a breast-feeding moon would lie “outside of rationality.” Shaykh Hanafi not only believes in the validity (and rationality) of dream interpretation but also asserts that dreams offering guidance or prophetic insight are themselves “rational.” For him, being a dream interpreter does not mean subscribing to irrationality, it means following a particular rationality that comes out of a complex textual tradition. This tradition, however, does not reject the imagination as reason’s Other, instead welcoming it as a mode of divine inspiration. While relying on his ever-growing library, Shaykh Hanafi believes that the art of dream interpretation is not something that can be learned or passed on easily. His work as a dream interpreter, he says, responds to a gift given to him by God. The shaykh legitimizes his practice by insisting that it is grounded in years of study and that it is a divine gift, both at once. In his view, precisely because TV programs like Ru´ä bring together scholarly knowledge and divine inspiration, they have an important role to play in society. Far from numbing the masses or distracting them from political matters, such programs can incite the viewers’ political imaginations. Sharply rejecting the claim that his program was brainwashing the masses, Shaykh Hanafi insisted that Ru´ä “does not spread superstitions and does not numb (yukhaddir) people. Counter to what some are claiming, it does not alienate [the viewers] from the difficult matters that the Muslim community is facing. It proceeds in the sphere of true and safe direction and the call for a reform of the self and the awakening of the Muslims. It incites them to hold on to their religion and to busy themselves with the worship of God and the issues of their community (umma).”37 For Shaykh Hanafi, far from being un-Islamic, dream interpretation is his duty as a Muslim.
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Although he denies ever having announced the coming of Judgment Day, he believes that his interpretations are ethically and politically awakening. Dream interpretation in his view exceeds distinctions between the public and the private, the psychological and the political. Even the dream of the breast-feeding moon could potentially have awakened Ru´ä’s viewers. While declared irrational by Shaykh Hanafi himself, the dream announced a radical change and simultaneously commented on the current state of affairs. Things were so bad in Egypt (or in the world at large) that the end was near. Aware of these implications, critics of the program warned that such dream talk could incite social unrest or fitna. The fact that dreams (or rather their interpretations) can be mobilizing has been proved by history. I referred earlier to Rashïd Ridä’s dismissal of different messianic leaders who claimed to be divinely inspired. Ridä could have used many additional examples. The founding of the Ottoman Empire was supposedly inspired by a dream seen by Osman. Shaykh Mansür, a shaykh associated with the Naqshabandiyya order in the northern Caucasus, had a dream of the Prophet in the late eighteenth century that convinced him to lead an anticolonial resistance movement. More recently, the insurrection in Mecca in 1979 was triggered by an eschatological expectation of the mahdï’s arrival that had been revealed to the insurgents’ leader by way of a dream-vision.38 Even some of the Western media’s favorite “Islamists,” like Bin Laden and Mullah `Omar, the founder of the Taliban movement, have claimed to have been inspired by dream-visions.39 Most of the dreamers and dream interpreters whom I came to know during my fieldwork do not aim at overthrowing governments or global powers. Dream interpretation for Shaykh Hanafi and his Egyptian colleagues speaks rather to everyday concerns with piety and virtue that, as Saba Mahmood and Charles Hirschkind have argued, are as much part of the Islamic Revival as are its more obviously political manifestations. As the examples in later chapters will show, dream-visions often direct dreamers to concrete actions such as visiting the saints, distributing alms, or joining a Sufi order. Practices and experiences of the imagination can have powerful ethical dimensions; they can shape lives and create communities. Dream interpreters accordingly often provide dreamers not only with an interpretation but also with a directive for how they are to live their life. While Shaykh Hanafi denounced the dream of the breast-feeding moon as irrational and while he is wary of making his interpretive work sound too political, he refers to his calling at times as a form of jihäd or da`wa. Jihäd in this context implies neither a holy war nor an inner spiritual struggle but a constant striving to heighten the Muslim community’s
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awareness and moral state. The term da`wa here refers to calling Muslims back to their religion and inciting them to adhere to the Qur´an and to follow the Prophet’s tradition. For interpreters like Shaykh Hanafi, and for those watching their programs, there exists a space even within a rationalized, reformed, postcolonial world in which the imaginary is not sealed off from the real. According to their view, dream interpretation does not distract Muslims from political realities, it is instead a call for a reform of the self, political awareness, and correct religious practice. It is a form of jihäd. Dream interpretation, then, is not numbing but, one might say, an “experiment in the technique of awakening” (Benjamin 1999a, 388). Far from being tied to superstition, the dream is here redeemed as a prophetic medium. And far from being a charlatan, the dream interpreter is a translator of ethical imperatives from an Elsewhere.
Conclusion Dreams are unreliable, say the Muslim reformers. Träume sind Schäume, we say in German. Dreams are nothing but foam. They might be bubbly and fun. They might reflect the whole spectrum of colors. They might seem substantial. Yet in reality they are only air: meaningless, fleeting, and inconsequential. At the moment the dreamer wakes up, the dream is devalued, dismissed, and generally forgotten. If they are merely foam, dreams have little to offer to dreamers in their waking lives. From a rationalistic and Muslim reformist perspective, the relationship between dream and wakeful time is marked by oppositional pairs: internal versus external, subjective versus objective, illusory versus real. Tracing the impact of such dichotomization, I began with an end in this chapter. Ru´ä’s discontinuation in January 2003 raised questions not only about the predictability of the coming of Judgment Day but also about the legitimacy of Muslim dream interpretation, particularly in its mass-mediated forms. The possibility, reliability, and relevance of dreamvisions were debated by al-Azhar, the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Affairs, Saudi scholars, journalists, sociologists, psychologists, laypersons, and at least one disappointed anthropologist and her friends. The Ru´ä debate is interesting not only for the answers that these various people and institutions provided but also for the very event of the debate. Rather than attempt to decide whether Shaykh Hanafi truly is an expert or a charlatan, or if dream interpretation is indeed part of the Islamic tradition or merely a form of superstition, I have examined how, why, by whom, and to what effect these questions were being discussed with such urgency.
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Ultimately, the debate points to a broader remapping of Egypt’s religious and imaginary landscapes. While seemingly trivial, Ru´ä’s end illustrates the dream’s precarious place within the continuously reconfigured fields of Islam, politics, and ethics in Egypt. Without necessarily drawing on the same arguments or sensibilities, Muslim reformists and secular professionals frequently converge in their criticism of “superstitions” and “charlatanry.” Although they form a somewhat uneasy alliance, both parties tend to banish the in-between and the possibility of communication with the dead, the unseen, and the Unknown. Concerned with certainty, reformists take rationality as the prime source of orderliness. Adopting the language of either/or, they divorce the political from the imaginary, the visible from the invisible, the dead from the living, and the dream from that which matters. Whether insisting on the irrationality or rationality of Islam, both secularists and reformists overlook an imagination that is neither rational nor irrational. This imagination is what dreamers and dream interpreters trade in, and it is the central focus of this ethnography. Why then, one might ask, begin a book on dreams and imaginations with the end of a dream interpretation program? I chose this beginning because a close look at the range of skeptical voices that aim to confine, discipline, and domesticate the dream allows for a better understanding of the charged political context in which the dream-stories in this book are situated and with which they are always already engaged. Attention to interdictions, to the work done by categories such as “superstition” or “charlatanry,” sheds light on what “true Islam” is supposed to look like in the eyes of the Egyptian state, modernists, and reformers, and it situates current debates within the context of larger histories of colonization. Another reason for beginning with contestations is that the perceived need to tame and depoliticize the dream reveals the dream’s ethical, political, and even revolutionary potential. Simply put, the continual assertion that dreams don’t or shouldn’t matter can tell us something about the extent to which they do matter. Al-Azhar’s concern with the broadcasting of dream interpretations “to the masses” is related to the fact that dreamvisions can move dreamers, their communities, and even entire societies. Precisely because dream-visions have these ethical-political dimensions, they trouble secularists. Because they promise a glimpse of the prophetic, they trouble this-world-oriented, rationalist reformers. And because they undermine hierarchies, they trouble the Egyptian state and scholars who claim the exclusive right to define Islam for Egypt’s citizens. Still, it could be argued that beginning with material conditions and
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political contestations gives in to the narrative conventions of secular storytelling. The danger of such a beginning is that it overdetermines a secular politics while obscuring the fact that before we are citizens, we all are dreamers. While the material and political context is crucial—at least for those of us trained in and by secular narrative conventions—it can lead us away from that which exceeds the secular modern, that which is never contained by it yet is always already a part of it. Dreams are not bubbles that float through the secular modern; they speak directly to, of, and within the modern. In this sense the perpetual attempts of the secular modern to erase its own dreamy sides attest not to the effectiveness of these attempts but to their ongoing failure. Although state officials, orthodox scholars, reformists, and rationalists try to banish dreams into the private sphere, dreams, like rumors, have a habit of spilling over. Yet while dreams frequently guide dreamers in their waking lives, their meaning is often not immediately transparent. This is why dreamers call in to TV shows such as Ru´ä or consult locally known dream interpreters. The next chapter is devoted to one such dream interpreter: the guardian of Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine. As we will see, not only state institutions but also dream interpreters discipline the dream. They do so not by enforcing the imperatives of a secular rational order but by subjecting the dream to the intricate rules of the Muslim tradition of dream interpretation. At the same time, dream interpreters claim not to have control over the dream but to translate its ethical imperative. They occupy an in-between space. Thus, the next chapter leads us from the either/or into the realm of the in-between. Shaykh Hanafi’s story, too, does not end where I left off earlier. Only a few months after Ru´ä had been discontinued, a journalist approached the shaykh and suggested that he record lectures on the Muslim tradition of dream interpretation and sell them on tapes and CDs. Banned from national television and eyed with suspicion by al-Azhar and the Egyptian state, the dream reemerged in other media. When I returned to Egypt a year later, Shaykh Hanafi had also found his way back onto Egypt’s television screens. He was now interpreting dreams on a privately owned Egyptian satellite television station, and this time he had done away with his colleague, the psychologist. My friend Marwa was happily following the shaykh’s new program, and she made me realize that not only do dream-stories circulate by way of satellite waves, but so do dreams. Marwa still takes notes on Shaykh Hanafi’s interpretations and occasionally, she told me, she redreams dreams that the shaykh has interpreted on the program. Dreams are tricky. They might be declared irrelevant, but they cannot easily be wiped away.
2. Thresholds of Interpretation The fragile lifeboat between this and that. Your words are the sails. William Burroughs
Ta`bïr [noun]: (1) interpretation (of dreams); (2) utterance (of feelings); (3) expression (in general, also artistic); (4) making cross over, making swim across adapted from Hans Wehr Dictionary
As many Egyptians will tell you, Muhammad Ibn Sïrïn was the most prominent Muslim dream interpreter of all time. Like Freud in other cultural terrains, he overshadows all that can possibly be said, thought, and written about dreams in Egypt today. Ibn Sïrïn’s mother was a slave of Caliph Abü Bakr, and his father was taken prisoner in Iraq during the first Muslim conquests and later freed by Caliph `Umar.1 Born in Basra, Iraq, in 654, Ibn Sïrïn was a pious yet reportedly eccentric cloth merchant and scholar who transmitted prophetic traditions and came to be described as a “man of great trustworthiness, who inspired confidence, [was] great and worthy, [and] well-versed in jurisprudence.”2 Besides being a merchant, scholar, and hadith transmitter, after his death in 728 Ibn Sïrïn retrospectively became best known for his skills in dream interpretation.3 Countless times during my fieldwork I was advised to read Tafsïr al-Ahläm (Interpretation of Dreams), a book supposedly written by Ibn Sïrïn that is available in most of Cairo’s bookstalls, next to cheaper, abridged paperback versions. The fact that Tafsïr al-Ahläm, as well as dozens of other dream manuals, might have been wrongly ascribed to Ibn Sïrïn and that numerous other Muslim scholars have written similar works has little impact on the current constellation of the Muslim tradition of dream interpretation, with which Ibn Sïrïn has practically become synonymous. Ibn Sïrïn is the Muslim Freud. And quite frankly, it always gave me a thrill to find a message from him on my answering machine. Who would be a better informant than the father of Muslim dream interpretation, dead or alive? Allü? Ibn Sïrïn. Kallimïnï! Beep. “Hello? [This is] Ibn Sïrïn. Call me,” my answering machine says. I pick up the phone and return Shaykh Nabil’s call. I tell him I’ll stop by shortly. While often dreading the thought of 54
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having to leave the house again after a long and tiring day out in the city, I could rarely resist the magnetic pull of Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine. Shaykh Nabil has been in charge of the small shrine for the past thirty years, and like Ibn Sïrïn, he is a popular dream interpreter. Although his overly enigmatic utterances and his occasional unwillingness to engage in any kind of conversation sometimes frustrated me, looking back I think of Shaykh Nabil as one of my most compelling interlocutors. When I first began my fieldwork, I had already learned of the shrine and its guardian through a passing remark in a German book on dreams in Islam, and—particularly in light of the erasures described in the previous chapter—I was enticed by the idea of a fixed fieldsite, a material location, that promised to counterbalance the ephemeral nature of dreams and dream-stories.4 After almost two months of futile attempts to locate the shrine’s site, I was strolling with Hassan, an Egyptian folklorist, through Cairo’s deserted alleys late one night when he casually remarked that one of these days we should pay a visit to Ibn Sïrïn as well. I was thrilled to have found someone at last who could take me to the shrine, and I was too excited to wait. So it was that very night that I first met Ibn Sïrïn. Shaykh Nabil—almost sixty years old, skinny, balding, and wearing a wrinkled but stylish shirt—was sitting at the shrine’s threshold, shisha in one hand and a glass of tea in the other. Hassan would later tell me that the fact that the shaykh was still at the shrine that night, even though it was long past midnight, was a sign indicating that Ibn Sïrïn was content with my research project. Shaykh Nabil welcomed Hassan and me into the shrine, ordered a round of tea from the neighboring street café, and gave us a brief lecture on Ibn Sïrïn’s background while evading all questions about his own work. He seemed friendly yet slightly suspicious. When I returned to the shrine a few days later, he received me more warmly and told me that he had seen a dream in which I was wearing a school uniform and he pushed me onto the “right path (al-sirät al-mustaqïm).” He explained that the dream meant that he should help me, and soon thereafter he began referring to me as Ibn Sïrïn’s student (talmïdha) and his own student. It seemed irrelevant to me whether the shaykh had really dreamed of me or the dream-story was only a rhetorical device. What mattered was that I felt more welcome at the shrine. And what intrigued me from the beginning was Shaykh Nabil’s relationship with Ibn Sïrïn. I was looking forward to learning from him and, through him, from Ibn Sïrïn. The relation between the two dream interpreters is a complex one, to say the least. Ibn Sïrïn died in the eighth century; Shaykh Nabil lives in the twenty-first century. Yet they are intimately connected. Depending
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on whom he talks to, Shaykh Nabil might emphasize his blood ties to Ibn Sïrïn’s mother, who supposedly came from the shaykh’s village or a neighboring village in Upper Egypt. This sometimes leads Shaykh Nabil to claim that he is directly related to Ibn Sïrïn’s family, which makes him an extension of Ibn Sïrïn, occasionally allowing for a full collapse of their identities (“Hello, this is Ibn Sïrïn”), and at other times for a partial identification (as “the little Ibn Sïrïn,” which is how an Egyptian magazine, alShabäb, refers to the shaykh; or “Shaykh Nabil Muhammad Ibn Sïrïn the Egyptian,” which is how Shaykh Nabil likes to sign his letters). Frequently the shaykh calls himself Ibn Sïrïn’s grandson and successor (hafïdu wa khaliftu). Spiritually inclined Egyptians do not take the claim to an actual blood relationship too literally. Hassan explained to me that Ibn Sïrïn is Shaykh Nabil’s “grandfather” just as al-Sayyid al-Badawï, a popular Sufi saint from the thirteenth century who is buried in Tanta, is a “father to all of us.” Regardless of his family history, by virtue of having been called upon to restore and open the shrine and through being in daily contact with “the shrine’s owner (sähib al-maqäm),” Shaykh Nabil is connected to Ibn Sïrïn and receives inspiration and knowledge through him. In a world not ruled by the laws of linear temporality and individual identity, Shaykh Nabil is Ibn Sïrïn, albeit a modernized version, as he himself likes to emphasize. He told me that he brings Ibn Sïrïn “up to date” by simplifying his interpretive approach for contemporary dreamers who lack the time and skills to deal with the complexities of the textual tradition. Through qiyäs, the legal and interpretive method of analogical reasoning, Shaykh Nabil decodes the meaning of symbols that Ibn Sïrïn could not have known about, such as computers, trains, and airplanes. As we will see in later chapters, Shaykh Nabil is also “modern” in the sense that he incorporates elements of Freud’s psychology into Ibn Sïrïn’s interpretive system and does not exclusively interpret face-to-face, but has widened his interpretive scope by using the phone and Internet. My account of Shaykh Nabil’s enactments of a somewhat marginalized interpretive tradition is intended to convey a sense of the nonmechanical nature of his interpretations; it shows the imagination at work. By describing everyday interactions in the shrine, I hope to enrich our understanding and appreciation of what I call an ethics of in-betweenness. By this I mean not simply an ethics arising from dialogical, face-to-face encounters but also an attitude of openness toward the (in)visible, the barzakh, the imaginary, and the emergent.5 It is an ethics that is about the process of interaction at least as much as it is about the outcome of that interaction. Shaykh Nabil’s work implies an understanding of interpretation that is
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not so much about getting from dream to meaning by the quickest route possible. What happens along the way is at least as important. This chapter, then, is about the inter- in interpretation. As such, it aims to set the tone for this book’s broader exploration of the barzakh, the in-between.
The Betwixt and Between of Dream Interpretation In his study of early Muslim dream literatures, John Lamoreaux suggests that historically, “dream interpreters [might] have competed with other religious specialists (saints, for instance, or jurists) for recognition as mediators between this world and the next, between the God who sends revelation and the humans who receive it” (2002, 11). Although dream interpreters are not formally recognized or sanctioned as religious experts, they, along with other mediating figures, relate divinely revealed knowledge to the here-and-now. Other such mediators include preachers, whose sermons “articulate the formal religious message of Islam with the needs of the community, its problems and its weltanschauung” (Antoun 1989, xiii); muftis, who function as “creative mediators of the ideal and the real of the shari`a” (Messick 1993, 151); judges; Sufi shaykhs; saints; and scholars.6 We might add to this list astrologers, diviners, healers, and numerologists. At times contending for interpretive authority with one another or with state representatives, all of these mediators translate between the Divine and human knowledge. The in-between, according to anthropologists, can be dangerous yet also full of utopian potentials (Douglas 1966; Gennep 1960; Stoller 2009). Victor Turner called the limen, or threshold, “a realm of pure possibility where novel configurations of ideas and relations arise” (1967, 97). Similarly, in the work of the medieval Muslim thinker al-Ghazälï, the dihlïz, an Arabized Persian word that originally referred to the space between door and house, functions as a “new locus of epistemic and political enunciation” (Moosa 2005, 49). Shaykh Nabil often literally sits at the shrine’s threshold or dihlïz. His wooden stool is inside the shrine; his feet, shisha, and tea table are outside. His work, too, involves a constant crossing over, a passing back and forth: the very act of interpretation occurs in an inter-space, a barzakh. Referring to dream interpretation in classical Arabic literature, the word ta`bïr literally means taking across or making cross over. Shaykh Nabil continuously carries words and images across the river that separates a dream from its meaning. Since this river can be treacherous, Egyptians often rely on a
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ferryman—a dream expert—to take them across. Not anyone will do. Occasionally I was warned that one should be careful whom one asks to interpret a dream because, according to a prophetic tradition, the first interpretation will always come true, regardless of its accuracy. Some skill is needed in interpreting dreams as what appears to be a dream-vision might in reality be the devil or evil spirits tricking one’s senses, and even the interpretation of a dream-vision requires expertise and experience, if not divine inspiration. Only those who are both divinely inspired and learned in the art of interpretation can ensure a safe journey from one shore to the other. The dihlïz, this creative yet dangerous space, the betwixt and between, is Shaykh Nabil’s home. As an interpreter he dwells in the space between dream and meaning, divine truth and human knowledge, the technical and the visionary, day and night, this and that. It is precisely its relation to in-betweenness that imbues Shaykh Nabil’s work with an ethical force and that aligns dream interpretation with prophecy. In present-day Egypt, more commonly than ta`bïr, the term tafsïr, generally associated with commentaries on the Qur´an, is used to refer to the interpretation of dreams.7 The latter term makes the dream-vision an object of interpretation parallel to the Qur´an, and to some extent one might think of dream interpretation as a shadow of Qur´anic exegesis, an interpretive subculture or enclave. Al-Ghazälï, in his Jawähir al-Qur´än, explicitly likens one hermeneutical process to the other: “Know indeed, that interpretation [of the Qur´an] is analogous to the science of interpreting dreams” (quoted in Moosa 2005, 76). Yet while Qur´anic exegesis is a fully orthodox science, dream interpretation is often eyed with suspicion in Egypt, and it is frequently called un-Islamic or at least outdated. When I asked a mufti at al-Azhar’s fatwa council about the legitimacy of dream interpretation, he told me in a slightly offended tone that “here at al-Azhar, we don’t interpret dreams.” It seems that in the past, dream interpretation held a more respected place in society. Ibn Khaldün lists it as one of the “sciences of the religious law” (1967, 367) and, according to al-Näbulusï, it was “the prime science since the beginning of the world, which the prophets and messengers did not cease to study and act upon” (quoted in Grunebaum 1966, 7). Classical and contemporary dream manuals generally refer to the prophet Yüsuf (Joseph) as the father of Muslim dream interpretation because, according to the Qur´an, God taught him the “interpretation of dreams (ta´wïl alahädïth),” and he subsequently interpreted the dreams of two prisoners and the pharaoh (12:101, 36, 43). Alternatively, the Prophet Muhammad
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Figure 2. Shaykh Nabil at the threshold of Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine.
is praised as the first Muslim dream interpreter, and his interpretations of specific dreams are recorded in hadiths. Abü Bakr, a companion of the Prophet and the first caliph, was known to interpret dreams, and so was Asmä´, Abü Bakr’s daughter. While in the early centuries principally specialists in hadith concerned themselves with dreams, by the tenth century also philosophers and mystics became engaged with the emerging tradition of Muslim dream interpretation, a tradition that furthermore came to be much influenced by Artemidorus’s Oneirocritica, a Greek work written in the second century and translated into Arabic in the ninth century. In the tenth century al-Khalläl composed a biographical dictionary titled Tabaqät al-Mu`abbirïn (The Classes of Dream Interpreters), no longer
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extant, which listed 7,500 exceptionally gifted dream interpreters, among them six prophets, thirteen of the Prophet’s companions, ten jurists, nine ascetics, eight authors of dream interpretation works, six philosophers, five physicians, three Jews, three Christians, three Zoroastrians, seven pagan Arabs, three magicians, and four experts in physiognomy. This wide array of early interpreters was gradually displaced by three scholars whose legacy came to stand in for the whole of Muslim dream interpretation: Ibn Shähïn (d. 1468), al-Näbulusï (d. 1731), and of course Ibn Sïrïn. The texts that are ascribed to al-Näbulusï and Ibn Sïrïn are the most widely used dream manuals in Egypt today. Both in their classical leatherbound editions and in the form of abridged paperback reprints, they generally consist of two sections: a theoretical introduction, which defines the different kinds of dreams, discusses relevant hadiths, explains interpretive strategies, and describes the interpreter’s duties; and a section that contains a list of dream symbols and their meanings. Ibn Sïrïn’s manual contains more than fifty sections with topics such as dreams of the angels, the Prophet’s companions, prayer, mosques, the dead, animals, birds, the sun and the moon, the sea, furniture, thirst, and traveling. Although the manuals seem to resemble dictionaries, interpretation is generally not understood as a mechanical process. One dream book explains that interpreters do not “resort to rigid literal interpretations as is commonly believed”; rather, dream interpretation is “an art and a science of its own” (Näbulusï 1999, 23). Consequently, besides providing lists of symbols and their meanings, most dream books also contain advice on what one should look for in a good interpreter, as well as subsections on the “good manners and rules needed by the interpreter” (e.g., Kishk 1995; Sayyid 1991). Drawing on guidelines from such contemporary texts, let us next consider the profile of the ideal Muslim dream interpreter.
A Textual Ideal Type According to numerous dream books that I bought on Cairo’s streets, dream interpretation happens through divine inspiration, yet it is also a proper science (`ilm) with complicated rules. While trading in the imagination, a good interpreter is no less steeped in Islamic textual traditions than other religious experts. The earliest Muslim dream manual that has survived in complete form, composed by Ibn Qutayba (d. 889), lists nine methods for interpretation: interpretation based on the name of objects appearing in the dream (ta´wïl al-asmä´), based on the characteristics associated with the objects (ta´wïl bi-l-ma`nä), by the Qur´an, by the hadith, by proverbs, through opposition or inversion (bi-l-didd wa-l-maqlüb),
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through increase or decrease (bi-l-ziyäda wa-l-naqs), based on what time the dream was seen (bi-l-waqt), and based on the dreamer’s concrete circumstances (Lamoreaux 2002, 29–31). To deal with this complex and multilayered grammar of dreams, according to contemporary publications, a dream interpreter roughly needs the skills of a religious scholar, a linguist, and a keen observer. Most dream books consider particularly important a profound familiarity with the Qur´an and hadith, because many symbols derive their meaning from these two sources. If a shirt is seen in a dream, the interpreter, drawing on a particular hadith, could take it to symbolize religion.8 Because of the Qur´anic verse “they [women] are as a garment for you [men], and you are as a garment for them” (2:187), a shirt can also signify a spouse, or it can point to a glad tiding because of the prophet Yüsuf’s utterance, “[And now] go and take this tunic of mine and lay it over my father’s face” (12:93). Sometimes knowledge of the field of Qur´anic interpretation is described as indispensable, because the dream-vision is itself a part of prophecy and thus intrinsically related to the Qur´an. Other books explain that the Qur´an and hadith need to be known because they constitute part of the dreamers’ culture (thaqäfa) and therefore shape their consciousness and ultimately their dreams. Besides being familiar with the key texts of the Islamic tradition, interpreters have to be experts in the Arabic language. A solid knowledge of the etymology of words, synonyms, and opposites enables the interpreter to draw analogies (qiyäs), to relate words to similar-sounding ones (tashbïh), and to derive meanings based on the words’ roots (ishtiqäq).9 The name Rashïd, for instance, can be interpreted as guidance (irshäd); marriage (jawäz) in a dream symbolizes the overcoming (tajäwuz) of obstacles. It is not enough to know classical Arabic with all its etymological and grammatical intricacies; interpreters should also keep abreast of common sayings and proverbs, as well as with the ways people express themselves— literally, as one dream book puts it, with “what runs on the people’s tongue (mä yajrï `alä lisän al-näs).” Additionally, the dream interpreter has to be an anthropologist or sociologist of sorts. He should be knowledgeable about prevailing social norms, about how people live, and about their environments, religious beliefs, and daily practices. (I use the male pronoun to stay close to the language of the dream booklets. I will shortly have more to say about the gendering of dream interpretation in Egypt today.) For a correct interpretation he also needs to know the dreamer’s age, gender, personality, profession, and social position. Thus, if the interpreter has never met the dreamer, then ideally a
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dream should not be interpreted. Supposedly, Ibn Sïrïn spent a good part of the day questioning dreamers about their background, type of work, and living conditions. As is illustrated by the following story that a dream interpreter told me, Ibn Sïrïn also relied on nonverbalized impressions: Once a man came to Ibn Sïrïn and asked him to interpret a dream in which he had seen himself perform the call to prayer (yu´adhdhin). Ibn Sïrïn interpreted the dream to mean that the man would go on the pilgrimage. Another man came and said he had dreamed that he was performing the call to prayer. Ibn Sïrïn interpreted the dream to mean that the dreamer would steal and his hand would be cut off. Both interpretations came true. Someone asked Ibn Sïrïn why he had interpreted the same dream in two different ways, and he responded, I saw in the face of the first man something good, and I interpreted it to mean that he would go on the pilgrimage based on the [Qur´anic] verse “Proclaim (adhdhin) thou unto all people the [duty of] pilgrimage” [22:27]. I saw the second man’s face as ugly and I took it to mean that he would steal based on the verse “A herald (mu´adhdhin) called out, ‘O you people of the caravan! Verily, you are thieves!’ ’’ [12:70]
According to this story, it is essential for interpreter and dreamer to meet face-to-face. Ibn Sïrïn did not simply listen to what the dreamers told him about their lives; he also looked into them through the skill of firäsa, an intuitive, divinely inspired knowledge that extends one’s sight beyond the visible. A dream interpreter’s acquired knowledge accordingly needs to be supplemented with—or rather, preceded by—a divine gift of inner sight. Dream books explain that the interpreter should be pious and virtuous (`afïf al-nafs), have pure morals, and be honest. He must care for the way he earns his living, what he eats, and what he drinks, and he must be a sincere and God-fearing person. The notion that it even matters what the dream interpreter eats and drinks is related to the belief that one’s visionary sight can be strengthened through spiritual practices, dhikr, and prayer, yet also through eating permissible (haläl) food. As the next chapter will show, the prerequisites for seeing truthful dream-visions thus partly overlap with the conditions for interpreting them. Embodied practices can strengthen the sight of both dreamer and interpreter. The interaction between dreamer and interpreter is scripted to some extent as well. When someone is about to tell a dream, the proper response is khayr in shä´ Alläh ([something] good, God willing). After hearing the dream, the interpreter should not answer right away but should undertake a period of reflection and contemplation. He is to focus on key symbols, and he needs to remember that a dream can sometimes mean its oppo-
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site, and that its interpretation might apply to someone other than the dreamer. Finally, as the following story from a contemporary dream book illustrates, the way in which an interpretation is delivered is also important: “Once a Caliph saw his teeth falling out in a dream. He called a dream interpreter and asked him about the meaning of his dream. The interpreter replied: ‘The entire family of my master will perish.’ The Caliph became upset, and he called for another interpreter and told him the dream. The second dream interpreter replied: ‘The dream of my master, the prince of the believers, is true, for he shall live the longest amongst his relatives.’ Immediately the Caliph embraced the man and rewarded him for his skill and tactfulness” (Akili 1992, xxiii). Both of the interpretations given in this story point toward the same future. Yet they provoke opposite reactions. As the story indicates, knowing how to interpret a dream is not enough; one also needs to know how to frame the interpretation. With these various guidelines in mind that characterize the ideal interpreter—pious, knowledgeable, virtuous, well-read, scholarly, linguistically skilled, divinely inspired, alert, and tactful—it is now time to return to Shaykh Nabil.
Becoming an Interpreter: Shaykh Nabil’s Life History In Egypt there are many laypersons, both male and female, who are known to be gifted dream interpreters. They might not fulfill all the prerequisites that are described in the literature and they might even be illiterate, but friends, relatives, and neighbors might seek them out because of their reputation. Additionally, there are full-time, and more publicly known, interpreters. All of the full-time interpreters whom I met or heard about in Egypt are male, and they are called shaykhs. As we move from the textual ideal type to Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine, the remainder of this chapter continues the story of Shaykh Nabil. Dreamers in Cairo who wish to speak to him generally take a microbus, bus, or taxi and get off around the Sayyida Nafïsa mosque. After paying al-Sayyida Nafïsa a quick visit, they continue their way down a little street known as Al-Ashräf Street. Al-Ashräf Street looks like hundreds of other unpaved streets and alleys in Cairo. It has a few outdoor cafés, which are frequented almost exclusively by men. The smell of freshly baked bread emanates from a small bakery. The street is somewhat narrow but eventually widens onto a square with a
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fruit and vegetable market. A number of mosques dot the street, and many cats lounge in the shade. Children play soccer. Vendors push wooden carts over the uneven ground. Mopeds race by. Small stores sell candy, writing utensils, groceries, spices, music, and tapes of the Qur´an. Faces start to become familiar after a short while. Greetings are called back and forth. Al-Ashräf Street is a small street after all, seemingly like any other small street in Cairo. Yet Al-Ashräf Street is special. For some, it is one of the most sacred streets in the entire city. As Shaykh Nabil likes to point out, practically anywhere in the street one stands on top of hundreds of dead people, since the entire area used to be a cemetery. The street runs through one of the most urbanized parts of the Southern Cemetery, a section of Cairo’s City of the Dead,10 and it hosts a considerable number of saint shrines, among them shrines belonging to relatives of the Prophet Muhammad such as al-Sayyida Sukayna, al-Sayyida Ruqayya, al-Sayyida `Atïqa, Muhammad al-Ja`farï, and Muhammad al-Anwar.11 Thus the name of the street: alashräf refers to the Prophet’s descendants. Although they are frequented by many visitors, the shrines here are calmer and more intimate than the larger, more widely known saints’ mosques in Cairo, such as those of alImäm al-Husayn, al-Sayyida Nafïsa, or al-Sayyida Zaynab. Many of my Egyptian friends had never heard of the street and its saintly inhabitants, yet those who visit them do so frequently and fervently. Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine is among the smallest shrines on the street. Entering through its low door and taking a step down, one finds oneself in a small, square room. In its middle stands a wooden enclosure (maqsüra), decorated with a chain of green lights; this surrounds the structure, covered with a black cloth with woven inscriptions, that represents the coffin and is referred to as such (täbüt). On its top, two large headpieces with green turbans frame a wooden Qur´an-holder on which an opened Qur´an rests. The turbans symbolize the two shaykhs who are buried in the shrine: Ibn Sïrïn, who died in Basra but who, according to Shaykh Nabil, is buried here in Cairo, and Shaykh `Abd al-Ghanï `Abdullah al-Baläsï, a less widely known saint. At times, I found it strange to think that I was spending hours sitting inside a tomb. But the presence of the dead can have very different effects— even within one and the same society. In preachers’ sermons and parents’ warnings to their children, death might evoke fear. In Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine, the presence of the dead contributes to a peaceful and joyous atmosphere.12 Whenever the birthday of Ibn Sïrïn or one of the other saints buried in the neighborhood approached, Shaykh Nabil’s eyes sparkled, and he spoke with
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Figure 3. Inside Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine.
excitement of the celebration that was about to happen. Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine is a place where people talk much about their dream-encounters with the dead, and where the dead feel very present. Yet they do not disrupt the shrine’s calm, festive, and lively atmosphere; they are an integral part of it. Shaykh Nabil has worked hard to turn the shrine into a welcoming, even cozy space. He has made the shrine a home of sorts—for himself, for the visitors, and for the dead. Around the wooden enclosure, the room’s tile floor is covered with a number of rugs. Over the years the shaykh has equipped the shrine with two telephones, a tape player, and two lockable boxes that are built into the wooden paneling and in which he keeps some books and personal belongings. Inside the central enclosure and around the walls, Shaykh Nabil has hung framed photographs of recently deceased religious personalities such as Shaykh Mutawallï al-Sha`räwï and Shaykh
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Sälih al-Ja`farï, the latter a Sudanese saint who became famous through his popular lessons at al-Azhar. Besides the photographs, a calendar and two clocks adorn the wall, as well as posters with hadiths, religious poems, and the family tree of ahl al-bayt. Over the small mihrab, in green paint and with yellow shading, Shaykh Nabil has written Allähu Akbar (God is great), the Prophet’s name, and the names of the first four caliphs: Abü Bakr, `Umar, `Uthmän, and `A lï. On other walls, in the same colors, one finds sayings that are popular among Sufis, such as “The one loves God who loves Husayn (ahabba Alläh man ahabba Husaynan),” and a poem composed by Hassän Ibn Thäbit, who lived at the Prophet’s time and wrote eulogies for him and who, according to Shaykh Nabil’s version of history, was Ibn Sïrïn’s father. With the exception of the rugs, the shrine is furnished with a single chair (which occasionally doubles as a table) in the corner facing the entrance and a low wooden stool right by the door on which Shaykh Nabil usually sits. For male visitors, plastic chairs are sometimes brought over from the neighboring coffee shop, which are placed in a half-circle outside the shrine’s door. Women are invited to go inside and sit on the floor a bit away from the entrance, so as to be protected from prying eyes.13 Shaykh Nabil frequently moves back and forth between inside and outside, but most often he sits right at the threshold. From there, he can keep an eye on the inside of the shrine, follow what is happening on the street, call out and return greetings, welcome visitors, and gaze at the façade of al-Sayyida Ruqayya’s nearby mosque.
“Al-Sayyida Ruqayya Wants You” Shaykh Nabil was born in Upper Egypt, in a village between Assiut and Luxor. He rarely speaks of his life before the moment of initiation, and on the few occasions when he does, he gives different and sometimes contradictory accounts of his childhood. Most times he describes it as a rather regular one: “I’m a normal, simple person (insän `ädi basït) from a poor family that is close to God.” Other times, he emphasizes the exceptional spirituality that pervades his family. Not only does his family history supposedly connect him to Ibn Sïrïn’s mother, but his own father, maternal uncle, and brother were also “hidden saints (min awliyä´ al-bätin).” Although no one knew of the father’s saintliness, he revealed himself to his son on his deathbed. Shaykh Nabil told me that he became diabetic from the shock and sadness that he experienced at that moment. Even when speaking of his saintly relatives, Shaykh Nabil usually stresses that he, in contrast to them, is a “normal person.” Only once did he suggest that his
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own childhood experiences might not have been that normal after all: “It started when I was young. I was seeing. I was seeing everything when I was young. Like that. But when I began telling people, it got less (ikhtaffat `annï). I began to understand.” What exactly Shaykh Nabil was seeing and what he began to understand, he does not say, because he has learned by now that one should not disclose what he calls “divine secrets (asrär ilähiyya).” What the shaykh might be hinting at, however, is that he was seeing the Prophet and the saints; that he had significant dream and waking visions; that his inner vision (basïra) at times overpowered his optical vision. The spiritual calling that he received later in his life was prefigured and announced through an early and extraordinary gift. For a while, Shaykh Nabil’s life progressed along more or less conventional lines. At some point he had to join the army, but he soon got out of it by pretending to be suicidal and deliberately cutting his wrists. Because of his experiences with the army, the shaykh says, he has no sense of belonging (intimä´) to his country at all. He worked in commerce, married, had a daughter, and later divorced his wife. In 1973, when he was thirty years old, his life changed drastically. A dream-vision commanded him to open Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine across the street from al-Sayyida Ruqayya’s mosque. Al-Sayyida Ruqayya was the daughter of `A lï, the fourth caliph, and she is one of Cairo’s patron saints. The precise circumstances of how she initiated Shaykh Nabil into being the guardian of Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine never became entirely clear to me. He told me that al-Sayyida Ruqayya’s mosque was always his favorite place in Cairo, and that he would visit it whenever he came to the city. Once he mentioned that at the time he was commanded to open the shrine, he had been living as a dervish in and around this particular mosque for a number of years. According to other versions of his life history, he was in Upper Egypt when the order (al-amr) came to him. Regardless of his physical location and lifestyle at that particular moment, Shaykh Nabil describes receiving the order as an all-transformative and life-altering experience. Ultimately, it was God who gave the order, yet it was delivered through al-Sayyida Ruqayya or, more precisely, through the “hidden court (al-mahkama al-bätiniyya),” composed of saints, who usually make their verdicts known by way of dream-visions. Shaykh Nabil remembers, “I saw in a dream-vision a gathering of alSayyida Zaynab, the Prophet, and his family (ahl al-bayt). They said, `Al-Sayyida Ruqayya wants you (`ayzzäk). [This is] the secret appointment (al-taklïf al-bätinï).’ [I said] ‘Why does she want me?’ They said, ‘Open your grandfather’s shrine!’ ” This short and rather simple dream-vision was recurrent, and Shaykh Nabil obeyed the order. He opened Ibn Sïrïn’s
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shrine, which, according to him, prior to that moment had been closed and was slowly deteriorating.14 Today Shaykh Nabil is not only the shrine’s guardian but also keeps Ibn Sïrïn’s work alive. Like the initial order that put him in charge of the shrine, the skill of dream interpretation came to him involuntarily. Again it was al-Sayyida Ruqayya who gave him what he calls a gift (`atä´), or the blessing of interpretation (na`mat al-ta´ wïl). Whereas Shaykh Nabil was initiated into the oneiric art by al-Sayyida Ruqayya, classical accounts of the formation of dream interpreters often describe a direct link between famous interpreters, or they trace a connection to the Prophet Muhammad or the prophet Yüsuf. As in Shaykh Nabil’s initiation story, such links do not have to consist of physical encounters, but they can occur in the realm of the barzakh. Ibn Sïrïn himself, according to classical sources, was informed of his calling through a dream encounter with the prophet Yüsuf: I dreamt that I entered the Friday mosque. With me were three older men and one handsome young fellow. I said to the young fellow: “Who are you?” He replied: “I’m Joseph [Yüsuf].” I said: “And who are these older men?” He answered: “My fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” I said: “Teach me what God has taught you.” . . . He then opened his mouth and said: “What do you see?” I replied: “Your tongue.” He opened his mouth further and said: “Look now! What do you see?” I said: “Your uvula.” He opened his mouth still further and said: “Look now! What do you see?” I said: “Your heart.” He then said: “Interpret [`abbir] and conceal nothing.” . . . When morning came, whenever anyone told me about a dream it was as if I could see it in the palm of my hand. (quoted in Lamoreaux 2002, 22f.)
Once Ibn Sïrïn was able to see Yüsuf’s heart, he had acquired the skill of interpretation. Not only had he learned the prophet’s innermost secret, but seeing beyond the visible and interpreting dreams are also two interrelated gifts. An alternative account of Ibn Sïrïn’s calling involves a slightly different version of the dream-encounter: “[Ibn Sïrïn] said: In a dream I saw Joseph the prophet over our prophet. To him I said: ‘Teach me the interpretation of dreams.’ He replied: ‘Open your mouth.’ This I did. He then spat into it. When morning dawned—behold, I was an interpreter of dreams” (ibid. 22). According to both versions, Ibn Sïrïn received the gift of dream interpretation directly from the prophet Yüsuf; the passing on of saliva symbolizes the transfer of knowledge. Although one could easily read these initiation stories and their contemporary counterparts with an eye to their legitimizing and authorizing function, such accounts also tell us something about how the gift of interpretation is conceptualized. Far
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from being simply a mechanical skill, the ability to interpret is a prophetic gift that is passed on to the interpreter-to-be by imaginary interlocutors, who might be dead but are still involved in the lives of the living. Just like the dreamer, the dream interpreter is embedded in a larger network of relations that exceed the visible boundaries of the social. At times, the bodily absorption of the skill of dream interpretation figures in present-day accounts as well. Shaykh Sayyid is a dream interpreter whose telephone number had been given to me by an employee at al-Azhar, insisting that the shaykh “interprets very well (biyfassar kwayyis khälis).” When I called Shaykh Sayyid, he answered, introducing himself as “Shaykh Sayyid Hamdï Ibrahïm, the dream interpreter (mufassir al-ahläm).” During our first meeting, Shaykh Sayyid told me that he had grown up in a small village between Qena and Luxor, and at the age of ten had dreamed that the prophet Yüsuf came to him and gave him a glass of milk to drink with the words, “This is dream interpretation.” After experiencing this dream, he knew how to interpret dreams and, according to his account, became famous for his interpretations when he was still a child. Later he hosted a weekly dream interpretation show on Dubai TV, and today he defines his profession explicitly as dream interpretation. When I met him, Shaykh Sayyid was living in Cairo, where he interprets dreams on television, in newspapers, and over the phone. Significantly, Shaykh Sayyid says that he does not rely exclusively on the gift he received at the age of ten. Dream interpretation, also in his view, brings together divine inspiration and mechanical rules. He told me that while at first he interpreted exclusively by intuition (fitra) and through divine inspiration (ilhäm), he later studied dream interpretation books. Among the texts he considers important are the classical writings of Ibn Shähïn, Ibn Sïrïn, and Ja`far al-Sädiq, as well as the hadith works by al-Bukhärï, Muslim, and al-Tirmidhï. In addition, he owns a number of contemporary paperback booklets on dreams and visions—similar to ones I had bought from street vendors—with titles such as Ta`bïr alManäm wa Tafsïr al-Ahläm (Dream Interpretation); al-Ru´ä wa-l-Ahläm (Visions and Dreams); Al-Mar´a fï Ta`bïr al-Manäm (Women in Dream Interpretation); Ru´ä al-Nabï fï Ahläm al-Sahäba (Visions of the Prophet in the Companions’ Dreams); Al-`Ilm wa Tafsïr al-Ahläm (Science and Dream Interpretation); Ahkäm Tafsïr al-Ru´ä wa-l-Ahläm fï al-Qur´än al-Karïm wa-l-Sunna (Rules for the Interpretation of Visions and Dreams in the Qur´an and the Sunna); and Ashhar al-Ahläm fï al-Tarïkh (The Most Famous Dreams in History). Like Shaykh Sayyid, Shaykh Nabil claims to have received his interpre-
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tive skills as a divine or saintly gift, but he too grounds his practice in specific texts. He is intimately familiar with Ibn Sïrïn’s work and often reads the Qur´an and other books that are popular among spiritually inclined Muslims in Egypt. As with other interpreters, divine inspiration and bookish learning are not mutually exclusive. In 1989, Shaykh Nabil published his own booklet on dream interpretation, which he distributed free of charge until he ran out of copies. Titled Ta´wïl al-Ahädïth: Nafahät min Maqäm Sïdï Muhammad bin Sïrïn Mufassir al-Ahläm (The Interpretation of Dreams: Fragrances from the Tomb of Muhammad Ibn Sïrïn the Dream Interpreter), it lists as its references the Qur´an, Ibn Sïrïn, Qisas al-Anbiyä´ (Stories of the Prophets), Ibn al-`Arabï’s Fusüs alHikam (Seals of Wisdom), al-Sha`ränï’s al-Tabaqät (Classes), Ibn Kathïr’s al-Bidäya wa-l-Nihäya (The Beginning and the End), Sigmund Freud’s al-Tahlïl al-Nafsï (Psychoanalysis), al-Imäm Mälik’s al-Muwatta (The Approved), and Muhammad Qutb’s Dalïl al-Hayrän fï Tafsïr al-Qur´än (Guide for the Perplexed in Qur´an Interpretation). While presumably familiar with these texts, when interpreting dreams or giving ethical advice Shaykh Nabil draws on divine inspiration that is delivered to him through the awliyä´ or Ibn Sïrïn. Ultimately, he told me, divine inspiration (ilhäm) is much stronger than studying (diräsa). Echoing Ibn Sïrïn’s initiation story, Shaykh Sayyid (at the age of ten) and Shaykh Nabil (at the age of thirty) both received the gift of interpretation from interlocutors who were no longer alive but with whom they could nevertheless interact in the space of the barzakh. Both consider it important to know the textual tradition, but they familiarized themselves with it only after having been initiated into the art of interpretation. The central role played by the prophet Yüsuf in Shaykh Sayyid’s story and by al-Sayyida Ruqayya in Shaykh Nabil’s story mirrors their respective locations within Egypt’s religious landscapes. Whereas Shaykh Sayyid thinks of himself as closely following the sunna, Shaykh Nabil is in touch with Cairo’s Sufis and dervishes. Shaykh Sayyid disapproves of mawlids because he thinks that they “are not of the sunna,” whereas Shaykh Nabil anticipates the mawlids with excitement, actively participates in them, and is in close contact with the awliyä´. Regardless of these differences, an overpowering moment of divine inspiration figures centrally in both interpreters’ trajectories. Of course, it also depends on the audience and intended effect what account dream interpreters give of their own becoming. Shaykh Sayyid might have carefully modeled his initiation story to mirror that of Ibn Sïrïn in order to ground his authority, and Shaykh Nabil’s story fluctu-
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ates depending on the interlocutory context. When I first heard the story of how al-Sayyida Ruqayya gave him the gift of interpretation, Shaykh Nabil, Hassan, and I were sitting in Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine, drinking tea and chatting. He recounted the story at a point when, I think, he had gained a basic trust that I was sincerely interested in his work. By contrast, in response to a rather cynical journalist who asked the shaykh once about the basis for his claim to be a dream interpreter, he said that he “found in [him] self the ability to interpret dreams for the people.”15 In responding to the journalist, Shaykh Nabil placed emphasis on an innate ability, on giftedness as opposed to a sudden gift. But when he is not speaking to a skeptical journalist and the entire readership of a popular weekly newspaper, he describes himself as an ordinary person who, at the age of thirty, was suddenly called upon by a saint to whom he feels particularly connected. Being turned into a dream interpreter is an instance of being acted upon, just as the dream-vision acts upon the dreamer. Shaykh Nabil’s experience of divine inspiration, moreover, is not limited to the two moments when he was instructed to open the shrine and when he was turned into a dream interpreter. As he describes it, every single moment of interpretation is infused with divine inspiration.
Inside Ibn SÏrÏn’s Shrine Shaykh Nabil lives close by, but according to his own estimate, he spends 80 percent of his time at the shrine. His work and spiritual state are intimately connected to Ibn Sïrïn’s baraka. As Madame Salwa, a frequent visitor to the shrine, put it, “Of course [Shaykh Nabil] is spiritual (rawhänï)! How could you not be if you sat in a place like this all day long?” Initiated into the art of interpretation by al-Sayyida Ruqayya and drawing on the shrine’s baraka, Shaykh Nabil continually carries meanings from the barzakh into the realm of language. There are days, especially particularly hot or cold ones, when few visitors come by. The shaykh then takes the Qur´an from inside the wooden enclosure and reads, or he leafs through religious books, smokes shisha, drinks tea, gazes out onto the street, or naps. Other times, the shrine is a place of constant comings and goings. It becomes especially crowded after the communal Friday prayer and on Sundays, al-Sayyida Nafïsa’s official visiting day, when those who come to her nearby mosque also visit the saints buried in its vicinity. Some of the people who come to Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine are regulars who have known Shaykh Nabil for a long time; others are referred to him by friends, colleagues, or relatives. Many end up
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sitting with the shaykh for one or two hours. Others stop by briefly, and still others only greet the shaykh politely, as they have come not to see him but to pay Ibn Sïrïn a visit. One time a middle-aged man entered the shrine without acknowledging Shaykh Nabil’s presence; he went straight to the maqsüra and sprinkled a bottle of rose water onto it. While others might have taken offense at the man’s seeming impoliteness and his failure to speak the proper greeting while entering the shrine, Shaykh Nabil did not seem to mind, and I had spent enough time with him at that point to assume that the man was probably carrying out an order that Ibn Sïrïn had delivered to him by way of a dream-vision. There is no single typical visitor to Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine, though probably more women come than men, and more middle-aged than particularly young or old people. Yet especially in terms of socioeconomic backgrounds, Shaykh Nabil’s clientele is remarkably heterogeneous. Among the people you might meet at the shrine is a wealthy woman who works for an Egyptian broadcasting station. She wears bright red lipstick and a black coat, and has a thin black shawl casually placed over her dyed hair. While most visitors arrive by foot, she takes a taxi down the unpaved street right to the shrine’s entrance. She has come for advice and frantically lets her misbaha, a string of prayer beads, glide through her fingers while talking to the shaykh. When her cell phone rings, she answers and carries on a long and loud conversation, half in French and half in Arabic. Another upper-class woman whom you might meet at the shrine will tell you that she was born in Egypt, lived in San Francisco for most of her life, but then returned to Cairo when she grew tired of living in the United States after 9/11. “I love it here,” she will say in English, euphorically; “I like the poor. They’re so much better than the rich.” Next to these upper-class visitors, you might encounter at the shrine an unmarried, veiled woman in her forties who spends her days issuing passports in a government office and occasionally comes after work to have her dreams interpreted. Another woman, who is here to inquire about a specific dream, complains that her husband wants to divorce her after only six months of marriage. A lawyer, who has known Shaykh Nabil since he first opened the shrine thirty years ago, sometimes stops by, as does a young man who is a member of the Burhäniyya Sufi order. Occasionally, a female dervish shows up; she seems disturbed and usually wears a man’s jacket that is a few sizes too big for her. Foreigners come by as well. The first one ever to start visiting the shrine was an Austrian convert to Islam, who used to teach German at al-Azhar University and now works for a German television station in Cairo. One time, Shaykh Nabil told me, an American woman came to the shrine, and they
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sat and talked until five o’clock in the morning. “She was a Sufi from the inside,” he said, “even though she wasn’t even Muslim.” I was yet another semiforeigner frequenting the shrine. One regular at the shrine during my fieldwork, Madame Salwa, sees many dream-visions. She has known Shaykh Nabil for a long time and (wrongly) believes that his father and grandfather were in charge of the shrine before him. When she sees a dream-vision, she prefers going to the shaykh in person and usually comes all the way from her house by way of bus, microbus, or taxi. The ride, depending on traffic, can take up to an hour. At other times, Madame Salwa’s husband, a police officer who worries about his reputation, forbids her to go to the saint shrines, Ibn Sïrïn’s included. Those days Madame Salwa gets her dreams interpreted over the phone, usually when her husband is out of the house. Even though she respects Shaykh Nabil as a dream interpreter, she disapproves of his joking and casual manner, particularly with the women who come to the shrine. The shaykh, by contrast, commends Madame Salwa for her spirituality and integrity and sometimes calls her “Ibn Sïrïn’s daughter.” Once he jokingly added that she will have to take over the shrine when he dies. Madame Samia, another regular, is an employee in the Department of Medicine at `A ïn Shams University. She is divorced and lives in `Abbassiya, together with her mother and daughter. She says that she likes “spiritual matters (al-rawhäniyyät)” and enjoys interpreting her colleagues’ dreams. A friend first introduced her to Shaykh Nabil when she had seen a “difficult dream (ru´yä sa`ba),” and he helped her understand its meaning. Contrasting the shaykh’s interpretations with her own, she told me, “of course, it’s different because he has divine inspiration, he has studied it, and it’s inherited (mawrüth).” After first meeting the shaykh, she began visiting him on a regular basis in the hope that he would teach her how to become a better interpreter herself. Although this desired apprenticeship never materialized, she keeps coming to see him because she appreciates his practical and ethical advice and because she likes the atmosphere at the shrine. She told me she was glad to be able to spend time outside her home, to watch and talk to people, occasionally even to meet people from other countries such as myself, to take part in the mawlids, and to hear the call to prayer resounding from the many minarets in the area. Madame Salwa, Madame Samia, the upper-class women, government employees, teachers, peasants, doctors, policemen, lawyers, Sufis, dervishes, workers, housewives, and the occasional anthropologist visit the shrine to ask for advice, complain, cry, laugh, pray, chat, and drink black tea, anise tea, or Turkish coffee. Although Shaykh Nabil is enigmatic at
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times, he is also a very approachable shaykh, different from the imams of government-run mosques, who are often more reserved. Additionally, Shaykh Nabil is a dream expert, and in most cases visitors come to him not just to chat but also to tell their dreams and learn of their hidden meanings.
The Telling of Dreams A dream’s narration is closely related to its coming true—at least according to a hadith that states, “a dream is hanging on a bird’s foot. When you tell it, it happens.”16 The dream is made real through interlocution, through language. Bad dreams are accordingly not to be told, or at best should be told in a bathroom so as to render them ineffective. By not telling a dream, its performative potential is contained. (The problem is, of course, that sometimes one learns only by telling a dream that it is devil-inspired.) To some extent, the dream-telling makes the dream, which might also explain why the Islamic tradition cautions so strongly against the telling of invented dreams. Those who lie about dreams will be gravely punished in the hereafter by being given an impossible task. A hadith warns, “Whoever claims to have had a dream which he actually did not have, will be ordered to make a knot between two barley grains which he will not be able to do” (Bukhärï 1979, no. 7042). This punishment is specified alongside the punishment for other sinners; on Judgment Day, molten lead will be poured into the ears of those who eavesdrop on other people’s conversations, and those who create or draw pictures will be ordered to put a soul into those pictures. Lying about one’s dreams is included in this list of sins because, as the Prophet is reported to have said, “the worst lie is that a person claims to have had a dream which he has not had” (no. 7043). In a different sense, the notion that narrated dreams are powerful is also underlined in the Qur´an, where Yüsuf is warned by his father not to tell his dream to his brothers so as not to evoke their envy. Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine is considered a safe place for telling dreams, and Shaykh Nabil is trusted as an interpreter. Sometimes visitors at the shrine mention their dreams in passing, after first having had tea and having exchanged a number of polite back-and-forths with the shaykh. Others begin right away: “Shaykh, I dreamed that . . . (shuft fi-l-manäm . . . ).” Although the conversations with Shaykh Nabil are seemingly casual, some skill is involved in narrating dreams in ways that will lend themselves to a meaningful interpretation. Just as Freudian patients supposedly dream Freudian dreams and Jungian patients Jungian ones, more generally the ways in which dreams are remembered and told (and maybe also dreamed) seem to adapt to specific horizons of expectation. I became keenly aware
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of this when, soon after I had met Shaykh Nabil, I told him about a dream of my own that had always seemed significant to me (it involves me saving a baby from drowning while everyone else simply watches). To my disappointment, Shaykh Nabil seemed still to be waiting for the important part of the dream once I had already finished telling it. When he realized that I had nothing to add, he offered platitudes in lieu of the eye-opening interpretation I was hoping for. I had told the shaykh my dream in Arabic, but I clearly did not speak the right language—a language that is learned by listening to others’ dreams and reading or hearing about dreams in the textual tradition. Shaykh Nabil’s clients are much more familiar with this language. Their dreams resonate. Unlike mine, theirs make sense. Although dream-stories have to fit specified schemes and meet certain expectations, they nevertheless belong to the dreamer. In Shaykh Nabil’s view, a dream says something about the dreamer just as much as it says something to the dreamer. For many, furthermore, dream-telling is a genre that allows them to talk about emotions and life circumstances that they might otherwise be less likely to discuss.17 There is nothing one cannot say as long as one is telling a dream, and frequently visitors to Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine not only recount their dreams but blend their dream-stories into an account of their waking problems and worries. When people talk about their dreams and worries, Shaykh Nabil listens, sometimes attentively, sometimes halfheartedly, sometimes impatiently, depending on his mood. Often he smokes shisha while the visitors are speaking. Occasionally he asks for clarifications, inquiring for instance about the names of people who appeared in the dream. More often, he merely listens. At times, dream narrations create a semiprivate space within the shrine’s public space; they evoke a sense of intimacy. Shaykh Nabil then draws closer to the visitors as they begin telling their dreams; other times, he leads them into the shrine if other people are sitting outside. There are exceptions to this norm of semiprivacy. Some have no problem with their dreams and the subsequent interpretations being audible to all those present. Two women, both likely in their forties, who came to the shrine one evening proceeded to speak loudly and clearly, even though a number of people were coming and going, and even though their dreams seemed slightly repulsive (to me, at least). The first woman spoke at length of a dream in which she went to the bathroom to defecate, and the other woman told us a surreal-sounding dream that featured ants crawling out of a hole in the wall, followed by cockroaches, and finally the Prophet. Other dreamers whisper their dreams or speak in a low voice. One afternoon, a woman who thought I wanted to become a dream interpreter
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myself asked me whether she could tell me a dream that she was too embarrassed (maksüfa) to tell the shaykh. In the dream—which she had seen while fasting, in a state of ritual purity, and after praying the morning prayer—she saw herself having intercourse with her sister’s husband, who is also her cousin. She seemed worried and uncomfortable. I tried to explain to her (as I did to many people) that I was not an aspiring interpreter, and I encouraged her to speak to the shaykh directly, assuring her that I had often heard him say that one should never be embarrassed about one’s dreams. The woman followed my advice and soon thereafter left the shrine greatly relieved, as Shaykh Nabil had interpreted the dream to be a glad tiding devoid of any sexual implications.
The Classification of Dreams As Vincent Crapanzano suggests, a dreamer’s interlocutors “have a special hold over the dream. They take possession of it. They give it fixity” (2001, 255). One way of giving fixity to a dream is to categorize it. Dream interpreters are expected to be particularly skilled in distinguishing among the three types of dreams, and some dreamers turn to them specifically to find out what kind of dream they have seen. When I asked Shaykh Nabil whether more people come to him with dream-visions than with ordinary dreams, he told me, “They come with everything. It’s a cocktail. They come with all three kinds: dream-visions, hadïth nafsï, and dreams from the devil. They don’t know what they have. It’s like when you go to the doctor. It’s the doctor who tells you what you have.” Just as a doctor arrives at a diagnosis based on specific symptoms, different clues help the interpreter distinguish among the three kinds of dreams. According to most dream interpreters I spoke to, a dream-vision is a short, flashlike image, whereas psychologically explainable and devil-induced dreams consist of a series of confused images. The dream-vision, according to Shaykh Nabil, is a clear “understood message (risäla mafhüma).” It is, so Shaykh Hanafi would say, “only one or two words.” A hadïth nafsï, by contrast, can be much longer and often leaves the dreamer confused. Someone likened the hadïth nafsï to an action film: it’s fast and in lots of colors. To determine what kind of dream was seen, the interpreter sometimes asks the dreamer whether she went to sleep in a state of purity, and whether she prays regularly and keeps up with her religious obligations. Additionally, inquiring about the dreamer’s feelings when she awoke can help determine what kind of dream was seen. If she felt calm and happy, it was probably a dream-vision; dreams that bring fear (khawf), fright (ru`b), and terror (faza`) are generally induced by the devil or a jinn. Such
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dreams make you grind your teeth, one dream interpreter explained to me; a dream-vision leaves you at peace. Finally, a dream-vision is generally remembered more clearly than a meaningless or devil-inspired dream. According to some scholars, the temporal context of the dream matters as well. Dreams seen during daybreak are more likely to be dream-visions; dreams seen in the winter or when rain is coming are probably meaningless. Shaykh Nabil disagrees with the view that dream-visions are bound to certain times or seasons. He holds that “God sends His messages whenever He wants.” Shaykh Nabil reacts differently to the three kinds of dreams. If the dream was (predominantly) a hadïth nafsï, he tells the dreamer what its cause might have been and what the dreamer should do about it. If it was induced by the devil, he instructs the dreamer to spit over her left shoulder three times and to seek refuge with God, as is recommended in a hadith. Devil-inspired dreams are thereby averted, and one should not give them any further thought. If the dream was divinely inspired, Shaykh Nabil presents an interpretation. Yet it is important that while the three categories are clearly distinguished in the textual tradition, in actual instances of interpretation Shaykh Nabil rarely draws clear-cut lines between them. Only dreams from the devil are unambiguously identified and categorized, while many others are handled as both originating within the dreamer and divine messages. As we will see in a later chapter, it is precisely this ambiguity that allows the shaykh to integrate psychological terms into his interpretation of prophetic dreams and, in turn, to expand the category of the prophetic to include even seemingly psychological dreams.
The Interpretation of Dreams In ancient Greek contexts, dream interpretation functioned as what Foucault calls “one of the techniques of existence” and as a “life practice” (1986b, 5). Similarly, Shaykh Nabil’s interpretations offer a form of ethical guidance; they direct the dreamer. Besides decoding the dream’s meanings, the shaykh often urges the dreamer to pray more, to become more diligent in worship, or to attend to familial duties. Like the dream-vision itself, the act of dream interpretation puts forth a moral imperative. This imperative is not always effective. Take the example of Layla, a thirty-five-year-old unmarried woman who works as an English instructor at al-Azhar’s Women’s College and who wears a full face veil (niqäb). Once Layla dreamed of her parents, who had passed away long before. In the dream, she noticed a beautiful dress on her father’s grave that, she thought, might have been a wedding dress. Her mother, who was alive in
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the dream, prevented her from reaching the dress. Layla learned from a dream interpretation book that both the symbol of the dress and the act of taking something from a grave indicate something positive (khayr), and she was troubled because her mother seemed to keep her from reaching this good. Layla figured that she was supposed to do something to appease her mother, who was apparently upset with her. But what was her mother trying to tell her? Why was she upset? Layla was reluctant to translate her dream into a concrete action, such as visiting her parents’ graves or distributing alms in their names. Since she knew about my research, she asked me to recommend a dream interpreter who might be able to tell her exactly what she needed to do. She was neither interested in talking to Shaykh Nabil because she “do[es] not like Sufis,” nor in talking to Shaykh Sayyid, whom she had seen on television and deemed not scholarly enough. In the end, she decided to call Shaykh Hanafi, the dream interpreter from Ru´ä whose Azharite affiliation she appreciated. Yet when she told the shaykh by telephone that many of her dreams come true, he responded that she must have a Christian jinn on her and asked her twice whether she really prays all the obligatory prayers. In part, this (mis)interpretation has to do with the technological mediation of dream interpretations, which I discuss in more detail in a later chapter. Had the shaykh met Layla in person, he probably would have offered a very different interpretation. Regardless, it was a strange experience for Layla, who is used to being categorized as ultrareligious because of the niqäb. She was rather dismayed by the whole experience and told me that she felt reaffirmed in her opinion that quite generally “dreams don’t matter.” Most dreamers, by contrast, seek out an interpreter’s expertise because they believe that their dreams contain an ethical message and because they want help with unraveling this message. In his interpretations, Shaykh Nabil usually focuses on key symbols, which he interprets etymologically or through reference to the Qur´an. Often the shaykh quotes the relevant Qur´anic verses, and his interpretations almost always correspond to those that are found in the texts ascribed to Ibn Sïrïn. Significantly, however, Shaykh Nabil does not resort to actual books, and he does not claim to “look up” symbols in his memory. Instead, he describes his interpretations as coming “from above, from the Divine Realm (min fü´, min `and Alläh).” Referring to the times when he interprets dreams on the phone, he explained to me, “When I talk on the phone, a state overcomes me (biygi-lï häl), and I say it. It’s not from me. The mind (al-`aql) doesn’t play a role in it.” The interpretations come through Shaykh Nabil, just as the dream-visions to which he responds have come through the dreamers.
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According to the shaykh’s own understanding, his interpretations go beyond a mechanical decoding of symbols in two ways. First, while the meaning of key symbols could seemingly also be looked up in a dream manual, he simultaneously transmits divinely inspired knowledge—knowledge that does not come from him. Second, his work not only extends upward to the Divine realm but also downward toward the material concerns of everyday life. In his interpretive work, Shaykh Nabil takes the dreamer’s life circumstances into account because, as he puts it, the “meaning goes back to the person who sees the dream.” He pays attention to what a man in a café in Cairo once described to me as asbäb al-ru´yä, the reasons or circumstances of the dream-vision. This term echoes the principle of asbäb al-nuzül, which embeds Qur´anic verses in the social-historical context in which they were first revealed. For Shaykh Nabil, imaginary and waking states are intimately connected. Not surprisingly, then, the shaykh’s work does not stop at the threshold between night and day.
Beyond Dream Interpretation Shaykh Nabil is not exclusively concerned with dreams; he also performs a number of other roles. People come to the shrine for all kinds of advice. Madame Samia’s daughter, for instance, once complained to the shaykh that a college friend of hers had exchanged rings with another student. She thought it was too early for them to get engaged, as they still had too many years left in college and subsequently would need time to save for an apartment and prepare for marriage. She wanted to know whether she was right and seemed content when Shaykh Nabil agreed with her moral judgment. Besides giving advice, Shaykh Nabil also heals visitors by making the sick or possessed recite invocations (du`ä´) after him. Others come to him with problems such as childlessness or financial trouble. For Shaykh Nabil, dream interpretation, which provides an inner calmness (räha), is only one way of “serving people (khidmat al-näs).” As he sees it, his work more broadly consists of “establishing peace between people, of [increasing] the good between them, and of directing them (al-isläh bayn al-näs wa-l-khayr baynahum wa-l-tawgïh).” One day when I arrived at the shrine, three women were talking to the shaykh about problems one of them was having with her fiancé. Shaykh Nabil, whom I had rarely seen so worked up, exclaimed that he wanted to go and beat the man with his shoes. He kept passing his shisha back and forth with the oldest woman, then he ordered coffee for all three, and when they had emptied their glasses, he shared the rest of his own coffee with them. The women slowly calmed down, the atmosphere relaxed, and they
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began joking about the problem that they had previously been so upset about. On a different day, a twenty-two-year-old man from the neighborhood showed up at the shrine. He had been taking hallucinatory drugs for seven years, now was partially paralyzed, and had spent some time in prison. Shaykh Nabil was familiar with the man’s history, and he knew that even hospitals for the poor would not admit him, or anyone for that matter, without the right connections (wasta). Step by step, he walked the young man through his options and tried to think of venues for help. I remember how impressed I was that day by the shaykh’s street smarts. Compared to his often very abstract interpretations and enigmatic explanations, his advice to the man was very down-to-earth, practical, and utterly realistic. Besides healing and giving religious, legal, moral, and practical advice, the shaykh at times also provides tangible material support. Material things, says Shaykh Nabil, are meaningless: “All that matters are the heart and the mind. Material things come and go.” The shaykh not only theoretically promotes this constant flow, but also participates in it on a daily basis. The current runs right through Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine, which, unlike other shrines, is not supported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is ahlï, privately run. To keep the shrine going, to pay for electricity as well as his own food and medicine, the shaykh relies on material help that comes to the shrine by way of its visitors. Although officially Shaykh Nabil claims not to take money for his interpretations (because “the recompense comes from God alone”),18 about half of the people who come to the shrine give some compensation. On rare occasions, wealthy upper-class visitors might give as much as fifty pounds (about ten dollars). Poorer visitors from Cairo or the countryside might place a twenty-five- or fifty-piaster bill (less than ten cents) in Shaykh Nabil’s hand as they leave the shrine. Not surprisingly, Shaykh Nabil often also hinted at ways in which I could help out, emphasizing my indebtedness to Ibn Sïrïn and assuring me, for instance, that paying the shrine’s phone bill would count as a pious deed. At times his requests annoyed me, but part of me was also happy to distribute some of my research funding to and, more important, through Shaykh Nabil. According to the shaykh, most of the money he receives is not for him or the shrine but gets passed on to those in need. “People these days are all in very difficult situations (shadä´id),” he says; “it’s even reflected in their dreams.” As the shaykh sees it, he takes from the rich and gives to the poor, thereby also helping the rich, as they perform a pious deed in giving the money. According to his view, he provides a middle point
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between the rich and the poor, a point where the good (al-khayr) meets. People from the neighborhood at times also receive food from Shaykh Nabil, especially during Ramadan and the mawlids that take place in the vicinity of the shrine. In a little side alley close to the shrine, Shaykh Nabil has constructed a room and set up a small, basic kitchen in which food is prepared during Ramadan, sometimes by the shaykh himself, but more frequently by others who want to make up for days of fasting that they or their relatives have missed. I spent hours in that kitchen with Madame Salwa cooking chicken, rice, mulukhiyya, and green beans while listening to her telling me stories from the Qur´an. Shaykh Nabil sometimes helped with the preparations, and generally he was in charge of distributing the food to the people from the neighborhood, who would come by in the late afternoon with plastic or metal bowls. The moments when the shaykh handed out the food always seemed to me intimately related to his work as a dream interpreter, although for a long time I could not quite put my finger on the connection. Now, looking back, I think that what unites these two acts—of distributing food and interpreting dreams—is that both are acts of mediation. Whether he inhabits the threshold between the visible and the invisible or that between rich and poor, Shaykh Nabil is a mediating point.
Conclusion Dreams cross multiple thresholds. Occurring in an experiential realm, a dream is translated every time it is remembered, told, retold, interpreted, and enacted. As certain dreams bring with them a moral imperative, the actual occurrence of what the dream prefigures or teaches already constitutes an interpretation and is sometimes referred to as such in Arabic. Saying that a dream “was interpreted (itfassar)” can accordingly mean simply that it came true. Other dreams need first to be rendered meaningful before the dreamer can react to the moral imperative they put forth. This is where the dream interpreter comes into the picture: as a translator, cultural broker, religious expert, and moral guide. My ethnographic portrait of Shaykh Nabil suggests that his interpretations are mechanical, prophetic, and attuned to the dreamers’ concrete life circumstances all at once. They are bound to the shaykh’s persona, physical location, and the legacy of classical interpretations, yet they are also flashlike, prophetic eruptions from an Elsewhere. While potentially therapeutic, the interactions at Ibn Sïrïn’s shrine differ from those someone would undergo while positioned on a Freudian couch—the new “holy site” for
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dreams, according to Ian Hacking (2001, 256). Rather than being oriented toward the past, dream-tellings and interpretations at the shrine point toward the future and embed believers in larger networks of meanings that exceed visible material and social worlds. The encounter with Shaykh Nabil is itself rarely confined to the act of dream-telling and interpretation, and the ethics of in-betweenness in the context of the shrine refers to more than the act of sailing across the river that separates a dream from its meaning. Tea is sipped, shisha smoked, gossip told, advice given, and money handed over. Hands are shaken, shoulders patted, prayers spoken, and healing invocations mumbled. Shaykh Nabil’s work is not confined to the ethereal realm; he also responds to very material concerns and gives very practical advice. The shrine is a place of multiple exchanges, not confined to but infused with tokens from the imaginary realm. Besides interpreting dreams, Shaykh Nabil offers moral and psychological guidance; he distributes food and money to those in need, and the shrine he guards provides a refuge from the harshness and boredom of everyday life. The shrine is a nexus of social relations. Dreamers meet other dreamers; they interact with Shaykh Nabil and Ibn Sïrïn; and they ponder their relationships with the saints buried in the neighborhood, as well as with the saints and the dead whom they encountered in their dreams. The shrine was a nexus of social relations for me as well. It is where I first met many of the dreamers whom I came to know during my fieldwork, and even the person who first introduced me to Shaykh Qusi’s community was originally met through Shaykh Nabil. In the next chapter, I pursue the theme of in-betweenness, turning from the in-between of interpretation to the in-between of the dream itself. More precisely, I leave behind the vast array of dreams that Shaykh Nabil deals with on a daily basis (a “cocktail,” as he says) and zoom in on the ru´yä, the divinely inspired dream or waking vision. Shaykh Nabil does not always draw a clear line between ru´yä and ordinary dream, between the rare, exceptional glimpse of divine inspiration and the welling up of unconscious feelings or wishes. In his view, even the most ordinary dreamers can receive the extraordinary gift of divine inspiration. Yet in turning from Shaykh Nabil’s rather fluid dream-worlds to more hierarchized ones, the issue of who can see what kind of dream or vision becomes more salient. Even if the Prophet appears in dreams, would he really visit just about anyone—illiterate housewives just as much as Sufi shaykhs? Precisely because dream-visions frequently involve visitations, theoretically anyone could claim to have experienced them. But while dream-visions seem to constitute a highly democratic medium of communication with the Divine,
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there is also much one can do to invite a dream-vision. Working through the seeming tension between divinely sent and yet self-cultivated states, the next chapter centers on three interrelated questions: How, according to my interlocutors, does one see the (in)visible? Who can see it? and How can anthropologists study what they themselves cannot see?
3. Seeing the (In)visible The universe that we’re stuck in is the one of our five senses. What we can feel, hear, touch, and so on. The challenge is to explode your body, to free yourself. Shaykh Qusi
He who dreams sleeps, but already he who dreams is he who sleeps no longer. He is not another, some other person, but the premonition of the other, of that which cannot say “I” anymore, which recognizes itself neither in itself nor in other. Maurice Blanchot
“If you open your eyes, you’ll see thousands,” said the Azharite shaykh. He was referring to thousands of angels, saints, and other (in)visible beings. Dressed in formal Azharite attire, the shaykh was a special guest that night at the mä´idat al-rahmän where Shaykh Qusi’s disciples were serving food to up to three thousand people, as they did on every evening throughout the month of Ramadan. The group’s mä´idat al-rahmän, literally a “table of the All-Merciful,” is one of the many spaces set up in Cairo during the month of fasting where food is given out when it is time to break fast to those in need or away from home. It was already dark, and most of the guests had finished their meal and were swiftly departing. Empty metal plates and bowls, previously filled with dates, broth, chicken, rice, okra, bread, and pickled vegetables, were left behind on the tables, mingling with green, blue, red, and yellow plastic cups. The time had come for Shaykh Qusi’s followers to shed their aprons, sit down, and eat. Afterward some members of the group, both men and women, gathered around the Azharite guest, and I pulled up a chair to join them. Sipping sugary tea, we leaned back and listened as the shaykh began talking about the lives of various prophets. I was just starting to feel sleepy when someone suddenly stood up and interrupted the shaykh. “We already know all that,” he said with a loud and determined voice. “Tell us about al-bätin. Tell us about the things we don’t see.” I leaned forward to see who had spoken those words. It was al-Sayyid Ahmad, one of Shaykh Qusi’s most devoted followers. Al-Sayyid Ahmad is a man with upper-class sensibilities and demeanors. He works for the Egyptian air force and usually wears expensive-looking suits at the gath84
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erings. Whenever a TV crew came to do a report on the group, he would likely be one of the people chosen to appear in front of the camera. I knew al-Sayyid Ahmad as a polite and soft-spoken man, and the rude way in which he had interrupted the guest startled me. Only later did I realize that asking the shaykh to speak of what “we don’t see” was in fact flattering and a sign of respect. Truly seeing, it implied, means knowing. Ordinary sight equals blindness. The knowledge that al-Sayyid Ahmad requested was not just any knowledge; it was knowledge of al-bätin. Referring to hidden, inner meanings, al-bätin is opposed to al-zähir, the obvious, surface meaning. The prophets’ lives, which the Azharite shaykh had been telling us about, are no secret. Imams refer to them during Friday sermons and on television; one can learn about them in mosque lessons, from books, and on the Internet. What al-Sayyid Ahmad was asking for was not a retelling of the already known (or the easily knowable), but a glimpse of the unknown, al-bätin, the invisible. His request rested on the assumption that al-bätin can be translated into language for those unable to perceive it. It might be invisible to most people, but it is not unspeakable. The Azharite shaykh hesitated. Then he revealed in a mysterious tone that the parking lot on which we were gathered was a place of baraka, a place of heightened spiritual power. Not only was it a blessed place, but even more: the Prophet was present, as were angels and the Prophet’s companions. There were thousands! As the shaykh spoke, I felt the listeners’ attention rise and the mood shift. His assertions were met with enthusiasm. Alläh, Alläh, Alläh, some exclaimed. Allähu akbar. Al-Sayyid Ahmad began to cry. The Azharite shaykh turned silent and looked at me for a moment, but our gazes did not meet. I did not see him seeing me; rather, he seemed to be looking through me, or maybe he was not looking at all, but only seeing. My gaze was not mirrored but deflected. The shaykh’s voice brought me back from the uncanny hall of shattered mirrors. “To see the thousands around us, you have to look with a sincere gaze (basïra mukhlisa),” he said with a subtle smile on his face. “Just open your eyes!” I opened my eyes more . . . nothing. I squinted and still did not see. For a moment I wondered whether the shaykh was mocking us, those unable to perceive the thousands surrounding us. So what if we all squint or open our eyes widely? We still would not see what the shaykh was seeing. A young Indonesian man was sitting next to me, and someone translated the shaykh’s words into English for him, placing particular emphasis on the Prophet’s presence. The young man turned up his eyeballs and moved them in a half-circle. “So he’s around now?” The self-appointed translator
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nodded and asked the young man whether he was able to see the Prophet, to which the latter replied faithfully, “No, I’m not at that stage yet.” The translator nodded again; he seemed content. Although the young man had optimistically hinted at the future possibility that he, too, might one day be seeing, his response acknowledged and reaffirmed the hierarchy reaching from those who are blind to those with complete vision. Opening one’s eyes apparently meant something other than the delicate muscular movement that pulls back one’s eyelids to expose the millions of ocular nerve endings to the material world. Far from inviting us to look more, the Azharite shaykh had advised us to look differently. By engaging with nonoptical understandings of sight, this chapter calls for a critical look at the method of observation. According to my interlocutors, an observing gaze misses out on entire orders of reality. Yet also, and significantly, training oneself to see in a different way is never enough. A “sincere gaze” can be cultivated, but central to my interlocutors’ larger imagination is the acknowledgment that the ru´yä might befall the subject as a radically unexpected event. This dimension necessitates thinking beyond the paradigm of self-cultivation. It assumes a more open and dialogically constituted subject, one who is not only an agent but also a patient who is acted upon.1 As my interlocutors see it, self-cultivation is never sufficient because the believer is always both subject and object of the experience, constituting the dream and constituted by it.
Beyond Observation “Each culture specifies what we should ‘expect to see’ when we see,” Michel de Certeau once noted (1983, 26). We are socialized to pay attention to certain things and not to others, to see in certain ways and not in others. Although anthropologists generally cannot study sense experiences in their unmediated form (assuming that unmediated experience even exists), they can examine narrative, performative, and discursive renderings of such experiences. The actual vision always escapes its theorization and narrativization, but we can assume that what people say about seeing and how and what they see are to some extent interrelated. It gets tricky, however, when one’s interlocutors claim to be seeing things that the anthropologist is unable to see. What was I to make of the thousands who were supposedly surrounding us that Ramadan night, but who were entirely invisible to me? The easiest way out of such a dilemma is to interpret all waking visions and apparitions as hallucinations, inventions, projections of wishes, or at best optical or technologically produced illusions. Such a move means
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ascribing absolute authority to one’s own observing gaze and, more generally, it means assuming that the anthropologist always sees (and knows) more than her informants. More rewarding in my opinion is to bracket readily available explanations, recognize the historical specificity of different modes of seeing, give close ethnographic consideration to other imaginations, and examine critically our own blind spots. Although seeing seems so natural that its historicity is easily overlooked, it is affected by historical transformations and has been understood in a variety of ways over the centuries. Ancient Greek vision theories centered on the question of whether something material issues from the object and enters into the eye (“intromission theory”), or the eye sends out rays that go forth to meet the object (“extramission theory”). Proponents of the former theory struggled to justify how the large replica of a mountain could fit into the eye, while their opponents tried to explain how rays originating in the eye could reach as far as the stars. A third theory, favored by Cicero, suggested that the air between eye and object is transformed into a receptive medium, so that the “air itself sees together with us” (Lindberg 1976, 9). After Greek philosophical, mathematical, and medical texts were translated into Arabic in the ninth century, Muslim scholars such as alKindï (d. ca. 866) and Hunayn ibn Ishäq (d. 873) adopted and further developed Greek optical models. The Arab philosophers’ theories then traveled back to Europe and eventually culminated in Kepler’s scientific discoveries of the “true” functioning of the eye at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Lindberg 1976). The eye, now conceptualized as the most reliable sense organ, came to play a central role in modernity, which accordingly is sometimes labeled ocularcentric.2 Anthropologists, too, subscribe to this ocularcentrism to the extent that the classical fieldwork method of “participant observation” reinforces the eye’s hegemony. Although many anthropologists have devoted their attention to nonobservable realms—to ghosts, spirits, hopes, dreams, and memories, but also to the market’s “invisible hand,” ideologies, utopias, and the nation-state—observation still looms large as a supposed gateway into other cultures.3 What the method of observation is believed to entail might be deducible from a 1954 essay called “The Nobility of Sight” by German philosopher and phenomenologist Hans Jonas. In response to the question why “since the days of Greek philosophy sight has been hailed as the most excellent of the senses” (1966, 135), Jonas proposes the following reasons: First, he says, sight favors Being over dynamic Becoming, as it is intrinsically less temporal than sound and touch and involves a sense of simultaneity by enclosing a wide field at once. Second, sight is detached,
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disengaged, and objective. While sound “intrudes upon a passive subject” and touch “has to go out and seek the objects in bodily motion and through bodily contact,” Jonas writes, “with sight, all I have to do is open my eyes, and the world is there, as it was all the time” (139, 143). Thus, in merely looking at an object, “neither I nor the object has so far done anything to determine the mutual situation. It lets me be as I let it be” (145). In Jonas’s model, both seeing subject and seen object are neutral, unengaged, passive, and effortless. This unengagedness, he concludes, is one of the properties of sight that make it noble and link it to objectivity and theoretical truth.4 Jonas’s essay represents a particular understanding of sight that stretches from Plato to Descartes and into the twenty-first century. It is an understanding that runs counter not only to other philosophical traditions (those, for instance, which do not favor being over becoming) but also to the concepts of many of my interlocutors. Already the widespread belief in an evil eye diverges from the notion that a gaze simply lets its object be. Further, contrary to Jacques Lacan’s remark that “it is striking, when one thinks of the universality of the function of the evil eye, that there is no trace anywhere of a good eye, of an eye that blesses” (1978, 115), Egyptians sometimes also described to me a blessing gaze. Sufis note that those who have reached a high spiritual state can guide others through their gaze and that they can project out baraka through it. The envious gaze, the blessing gaze, and what the Azharite shaykh called a “sincere gaze” all differ from the paradigmatic modern observing gaze that is praised by Jonas.
“Just as I See You Now” Other modes of sight can exist alongside and in tension with a hegemonic modern optical regime, complicating Karl Marx’s insight that “the forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present” (1961, 108).5 When my interlocutors speak about their visionary experiences, they frequently alternate between different understandings of sight, or they evoke different understandings simultaneously. Since they, too, live in a thoroughly ocularcentric world, they sometimes draw on an empiricist discourse, insisting that they “really saw” the Prophet, the saints, or the angels—“just as I see you now.” Bernd Radtke (1999) has made the related observation that while older forms of Sufism believed in encountering the Prophet spiritually, the belief in an encounter in flesh and blood is characteristic of more recent forms. For those who are trapped in a web of material interests, Shaykh Qusi explained to me, the invisible has to materialize in order to become perceptible. Today, he said, people believe only in material things; they want to witness everything for themselves:
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“If they can’t touch it, it’s not real.” A number of priests similarly pointed out to me that the Virgin has been appearing so frequently because people these days require visible, concrete evidence.6 Yet when believers speak of having seen the Prophet, the angels, or the Virgin “with their own eyes,” they do not simply reinscribe the eye’s hegemony, they simultaneously subvert it. In insisting on “open eyes,” the Azharite shaykh referred to a mode of imagining, an inner sight— a sight that draws on yet also disrupts ocularcentric understandings of perception. A number of my interlocutors explicitly critiqued empiricist paradigms that equate the visible with the real. They pointed out that the devil or jinn might trick one’s senses, or they referred to the material world as a “veil” that separates the human from the Divine. One dream interpreter described the reliance on the five senses as a rather mediocre path to knowledge: “The belief in material, tangible, perceptible, audible, visible, observable things,” he said, “is the belief of materialists, existentialists, socialists, heretics, and unbelievers alike.” Dream-visions, waking visions, and other spiritual modes of sight such as firäsa and ilhäm reach beyond the observable.7 They rely on a sincere gaze that is more attuned to the ephemeral, the not fully visible, the imaginary. According to my interlocutors, it is through the faculty of the imagination that one can gain access to the space of the imagination, the barzakh, that which is located between presence and absence. A “sincere gaze” looks beyond the either/or. Distinctions between inner and outer, visible and invisible, dream and sense perception are then no longer rigid but at best lie on a continuum. The Prophet, his companions, the angels, and the saints are visible to some but not to others. They are (in)visible.