DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CP Cavendish Publishing Limited
London • Sydney
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Deborah Lockton, LLB, M Phil Deputy Head, Department of Law De Montfort University, Leicester Professor Richard Ward, LLB, Solicitor Head of Department of Law De Montfort University, Leicester
CP Cavendish Publishing Limited
London • Sydney
First published in Great Britain 1997 by Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, Wharton Street, London WC1X 9PX. Telephone: 0171-278 8000 Facsimile: 0171-278 8080 E-mail:
[email protected] Visit our Home Page on http://www.cavendishpublishing.com
© Lockton, D, Ward, R, 1997
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except under the terms of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK, without the permission in writing of the publisher.
Lockton, Deborah J Domestic Violence: Text and Materials I. Title II. Ward, Richard 344.1052555 ISBN 1 85941 136 3
Printed and bound in Great Britain
PREFACE
This book is the culmination of a research project into domestic violence in Leicestershire. The aim of the project was to look at the responses of the civil and criminal justice agencies to allegations of domestic violence and to compare the findings with those of other research projects into the incidence of, or reform to, domestic violence. We conducted an investigation into the allegations of domestic violence cited in applications for orders made to Leicester county court over a six-month period, the orders sought and the orders obtained, followed by a verification study of the responses of individual police officers in Leicestershire to a questionnaire. The purpose was to ascertain the perceptions of such officers to such incidents and the training they had received. Since we conducted the study of the Leicestershire police, the force has changed its policy and its training. The law on domestic violence changed during the course of writing this text. The Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill was withdrawn and eventually became the Family Law Act 1996. Part IV of the Act which deals with domestic violence should come into force during the currency of this text and thus Chapter 3 deals with the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978 and the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 as the present law. It is expected that Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 will come into force in October 1997. This book would not have been possible without the help and assistance of a great many people. We were given a great deal of cooperation by the staff of Leicester county court, both in the initial study and the follow-up study 12 months later. We also had unstinting help and cooperation from the Leicestershire Police, who distributed the questionnaires and responded quickly to any queries we raised. Cavendish Publishing exercised a great deal of patience when, after we had agreed to write the book, we discovered it was Parliament’s intention to introduce legislation in this area, and the problems suffered by the Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill held up the delivery of the manuscript. Finally, we must thank Sarah and Keith who accepted the loss of our company with their usual encouragement and support. Despite all of this help, the responsibility of the text, and any error or omissions is ours. The law is stated as at 30 June 1997. Deborah Lockton Richard Ward Leicester, July 1997
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Sage Publications Ltd for permission to reproduce Table 5.1 in Edwards, S, Policing ‘Domestic’ Violence, 1989, p 164. Grateful acknowledgment is also made to St George’s Hospital Medical School, University of London, Section of Forensic Psychiatry for permission to use examples from a paper given at the Domestic Violence Conference in October 1995. Grateful acknowledgment is also made to Routledge for permission to reproduce extracts from the Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, entitled ‘Domestic Violence applications: an empirical study of one court’ (JSWFL 17(1) 1995: 67–86). Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders but if any have been inadvertently overlooked, the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.
vii
CONTENTS
Preface Acknowledgments Table of Cases Table of Statutes
v vii xiii xix
1 THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTRODUCTION NEW PROBLEM?
1 1 2
2 WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? INTRODUCTION THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 Physical assault 2 Sexual violence 3 Threats of violence 4 Psychological abuse 5 Emotional consequences WHY DON’T WOMEN LEAVE? 1 Severity and frequency of violence 2 Experience with and exposure to violence as a child 3 Education, occupation, number and age of children THE REASONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 Pathological factors 2 Social factors 3 Cycles of violence 4 The feminist explanation
7 7 7 7 12 15 16 18 20 20 21 22 25 26 27 29 30
3 CIVIL PROTECTION BEFORE 1997 INTRODUCTION STATUTORY APPLICANTS 1 The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 2 The Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 3 The Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 REMEDIES 1 Non-molestation and exclusion, Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 2 Personal protection orders and ouster orders under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978
33 33 35 35 37 38 41
ix
41 44
Domestic Violence ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
45 47
4 PROTECTION AFTER 1997 INTRODUCTION THE APPLICANTS 1 Applicants for occupation orders 2 Applicants for non-molestation orders 3 Applications by third parties THE ORDERS 1 Occupation orders Section 33 – orders where the applicant is entitled or has matrimonial home rights Section 35 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled former spouse and respondent former spouse is entitled Section 36 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled cohabitant or former cohabitant and the respondent is entitled Section 37 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled spouse or former spouse and the respondent is non-entitled Section 38 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled cohabitant or former cohabitant and the respondent is non-entitled Additional provisions 2 Non-molestation orders 3 Amendments to the Children Act 1989 EX PARTE ORDERS ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 1 Powers of arrest 2 Warrant for arrest UNDERTAKINGS PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT 1997 ADEQUATE PROTECTION AT LAST? 1 Housing victims 2 Do occupation and non-molestation orders provide adequate protection? 5 THE POLICING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTRODUCTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: OFFENCES AND POWERS 1 Physical violence Unlawful force Intent 2 Non-physical violence
x
49 49 50 50 56 58 58 58 58 63 64 66
66 67 67 68 71 73 73 75 76 76 79 79 80 87 87 89 90 91 95 95
Contents 3 Harassment, molestation and stalking 4 Sexual offences 5 Police powers Powers of entry to property Arrest THE POLICING ROLE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 1 Circular 60/90 2 Home Affairs Committee 3 Home Office Research Study 4 The Leicestershire Study
Experience in dealing with domestic violence incidents Definitions of domestic violence 5 Police responses to domestic violence Information Attitudes Actions at the scene 6 Arrest The use of arrest powers Enforcement of powers of arrest contained in civil orders Pro-arrest approaches 7 Training 8 Domestic Violence Officers (DVOs) and Units (DVUs) 6 PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE 1 The decision to prosecute Attitudes of the CPS The victim’s interests and wishes Victim co-operation The offence charged BAIL EVIDENCE 1 Burden and means of proof 2 Competence and compellability 3 The process of giving evidence 4 Preparation for the trial 5 Reluctant testimony 6 Use of out-of-court statements 7 Suspect evidence SENTENCE DEFENCES FOR ‘VICTIMS’ 1 Self-defence
xi
96 101 101 101 103 106 106 108 109 110
111 113 114 115 116 121 123 123 125 127 129 132 137 137 137 138 141 141 143 144 146 146 147 150 151 151 153 161 162 163 164
Domestic Violence 2 Provocation Was this person provoked? Was the reaction reasonable? 3 Diminished responsibility Appendix I – Family Law Act 1996 Appendix II – Protection from Harassment Act 1997 Index
xii
165 166 170 174 177 203 213
TABLE OF CASES
A and W, Re [1992] Fam 182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55, 57 Adeoso v Adeoso [1980] 1 WLR 1535 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36, 53 Ansah v Ansah [1977] Fam 138 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 Atkin v DPP (1989) Cr App R 199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 Attorney General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; [1981] 2 All ER 1057 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 Baker v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWLR 451 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 Bedford v R [1988] AC 130; [1987] 3 All ER 425 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 Brown v Secretary of State for Social Security (1994) The Times, 7 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854; [1972] 2 All ER 1297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 Burnett v George [1992] 1 FLR 525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 Burris v Azandani [1995] 4 All ER 802 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34, 35 Clarke v DPP [1995] Crim LR 846 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39, 51 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 DPP v Camplin [1978] 2 All ER 168 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 DPP v Little [1992] 1 All ER 299 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 All ER 161 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Duo v Osborne [1992] 2 FLR 425 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Ewer v Ambrose (1825) 3 B & C 746 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 545 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Galan v Galan [1985] FLR 905 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 George v George [1986] 2 FLR 347 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 All ER 492 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 xiii
Domestic Violence H (minors) (sexual abuse: standard of proof), Re [1996] 1 All ER 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Harrison v Lewis [1988] 2 FLR 339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Holmes v DPP [1946] 2 All ER 124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 Horner v Horner [1982] 2 All ER 495; [1982] Fam 90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41, 68 Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 Hughes v Holley (1987) 151 JP 533 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 Humberside County Council v B [1993] 1 FLR 257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 FLR 350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41, 68 Kendrick v Kendrick [1990] 2 FLR 107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 1 QB 727; 3 All ER 669 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34, 39, 57, 96, 98 Lavin v Albert [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 All ER 878 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 Lindley v Rutter [1981] 1 QB 128; [1980] 3 WLR 660 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105 McCann v Wright [1996] 1 All ER 204; [1995] FLR 579 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36, 46, 96 McLean v Burke [1982] 3 FLR 70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 McLeod v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1994] 4 All ER 553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Middleweek v Chief Constable of Greater Merseyside [1990] 3 WLR 481; [1990] 3 All ER 662 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105 Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Neill v North Antrim Magistrates’ Court [1992] 4 All ER 846 . . . . . . . . . . . . .154–56, 160 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the RUC [1997] 1 All ER 129 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129 O’Neill v Williams [1984] FLR 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Palmer v R [1971] AC 814; [1971] 1 All ER 107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 Parkin v Norman [1983] QB 92; [1982] 2 All ER 583 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97, 102 Parris v Parris [1974] Fam Law 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 Patel v Patel [1988] 2 FLR 179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33, 34, 53 Percy v DPP [1995] 3 All ER 124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 Pidduck v Molloy [1992] 2 FLR 202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Practice Note [1978] 2 All ER 1056 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42, 127 Practice Note [1981] 1 All ER 224 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127 Practice Note (Domestic Violence: Powers of Arrest) [1981] 1 WLR 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
xiv
Table of cases Practice Note (Injunctions: Ex Parte Applications) [1978] 1 WLR 925 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 R v Acton Justices, ex p McMullen (1990) 92 Cr App R 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154, 155 R v Ahluwalia [1992] All ER 889 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167–69, 171–74 R v Andrews [1987] 1 All ER 513 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 R v Ashford Magistrates’ Court, ex p Hilden (1992) 96 Cr App R 93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 R v Baines [1987] Crim LR 508 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 R v Beck [1982] 1 WLR 461 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Bedi and Bedi (1991) 95 Cr App R 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 R v Bishop [1975] QB 274 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Britzman [1983] 1 WLR 350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Brown [1962] 2 All ER 1328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 All ER 75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93, 94 R v Buchanan (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 R v Burstow (1997) 1 Cr App R 114 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 R v Butterworth (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 674 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174 R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 R v Carrington (1993) 99 Cr App R 376 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 R v Case [1991] Crim LR 192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 R v Caseeram (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 R v Caswell [1984] Crim LR 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93, 95 R v Chief Constable for Devon and Cornwall, ex p CEGB [1982] QB 458; [1981] 3 All ER 826 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 R v Cole (1989) 90 Cr App R 478 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96 R v Cousins [1982] QB 526 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 R v Cutts [1987] Fam Law 311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 R v Da Silva [1990] 1 All ER 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 R v Davies [1975] 1 All ER 890 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 R v Davies (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 R v Day (1841) 9 C & P 722 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v Dearn (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 527 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166 R v Dragic (1996) (unreported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 R v Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172
xv
Domestic Violence R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166–70 R v Easton [1995] 3 All ER 730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Fantle [1959] Crim LR 584 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 R v Fenton (1975) 61 Cr App R 261 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174 R v Field [1993] Crim LR 456 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158, 160 R v Grafton [1995] Crim LR 61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159, 160 R v H [1995] 2 All ER 865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 All ER 383 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 R v Hudson (1912) 2 KB 464 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172 R v Ireland [1997] 1 All ER 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 R v Jennings and Miles [1995] Crim LR 810 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 R v Jones (1923) 17 Cr App R 117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Keilty (1995) (unreported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 R v Kennedy [1992] Crim LR 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 R v Khan (1986) 84 Cr App R 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 R v Knowlden (1983) 77 Cr App R 94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Kowalski [1988] Crim LR 124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 R v Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v Larter and Castleton [1995] Crim LR 75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v Linekar (1994) The Times, 26 October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v Lobell [1957] 1 All ER 734 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 R v Lockley (1995) 2 Cr App R 554 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158, 159 R v Lovell [1990] Crim LR 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Makanjuola [1995] 3 All ER 730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Martin (1996) (unreported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155, 156 R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v McCarthy [1992] 2 NZLR 530 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 R v McInnes [1971] 3 All ER 295 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165 R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282; [1954] 2 All ER 529 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46, 93 R v M’Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 R v Moore [1992] Crim LR 882 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 R v Morhal [1995] 3 All ER 659 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171 R v Munroe (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 408 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 R v Murphy, Wiseman and Mason [1992] Crim LR 883 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 R v Newall [1980] Crim LR 576 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172 R v Nicholas [1994] Crim LR 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 R v Oatridge (1992) 94 Cr App R 367 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 xvi
Table of Cases R v O’Callaghan (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 All ER 443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v P [1991] 3 All ER 337 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 R v Pestano [1981] Crim LR 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 R v Pitt [1982] 3 All ER 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 R v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v R [1991] 4 All ER 481 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13, 101 R v Rock [1994] Crim LR 843 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 R v Savage; R v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 4 All ER 698 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91, 95 R v Scarlett [1993] 4 All ER 629 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 R v Setz-Dempsey (1994) 98 Cr App R 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154, 160 R v Simpson [1957] Crim LR 815 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 R v Smith [1997] Crim LR 614 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .162 R v Swindon (1995) (unreported) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 R v Thompson (1976) 64 Cr App R 96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 R v Thornton [1992] All ER 306 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167, 170 R v Thornton (No 2) (1996) 2 Cr App R 108 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168, 170, 173, 174 R v Tower Bridge Magistrates’ Court, ex p Lawlor (1990) 92 Cr App R 98 . . . . .154, 155 R v Tyagi (1986) The Times, 21 July . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 R v Wallwork (1958) 42 Cr App R 153 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 R v Whitehead (1886) LR1 CCR 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92 R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93, 94 R v X, Y and Z (1989) 91 Cr App R 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 R v Z [1990] 2 All ER 355 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 Ratten v R [1972] AC 378 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 Richards v Richards [1984] AC 174 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35, 38, 39, 41–43, 47, 49, 55, 57 Smith v Chief Superintendent, Woking Police Station (1983) 76 Cr App R 234 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Spencer v Camacho [1983] 4 FLR 662 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 1 All ER 1115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 T v T [1963] 2 All ER 746 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Thomas v Sawkins [1935] 2 KB 249; [1935] All ER 655 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102
xvii
Domestic Violence W v K [1988] Fam Law 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 White v White [1983] Fam 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146
xviii
TABLE OF STATUTES
Adoption Act 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 Bail Act 1976 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 3A(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 s 5B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Sched 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Children Act 1989 . . . .49, 50, 55, 56, 61, 68 s 1(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 s 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55, 57 s 10(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 s 31(2)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 s 31(2)(b)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 s 31(2)(b)(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 s 38A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69, 71, 75 s 38A(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 s 38A(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 s 38A(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 s 38A(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 38A(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 38A(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 38B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 38B(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 38B(3)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 39(3A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71, 75 s 44A(2)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44A(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 44A(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 44B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 44B(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 44B(3)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 44(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44(1)(a)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44(1)(a)(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 s 44(1)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Sched 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63
xix
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 Civil Evidence Act 1968 s 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 s 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 s 1(f)(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 Criminal Justice Act 1982 s 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Criminal Justice Act 1988 s 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 s 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141, 143, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159 s 23(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155, 158 s 23(1)(ii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 s 23(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153, 154, 158 s 23(2)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154, 160 s 23(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153, 154, 158 s 23(3)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154–56 s 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143, 152, 156–59 s 24(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156, 158 s 24(1)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 s 24(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 s 24(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 s 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154, 158–60 s 25(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 s 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154, 158–60 s 32A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 s 32(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 s 33A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 s 33(2A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 Sched 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Criminal Justice Act 1991 s 1(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 s 1(2)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163
Domestic Violence Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 27(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 27(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 s 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 s 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144, 162 s 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142, 143 s 51(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142 s 51(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 s 51(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 s 51(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 s 142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35, 41 s 1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 s 1(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35, 36, 40 s 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36, 45, 46 s 2(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 s 2(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 s 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 s 18(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Family Law Act 1996 . . . .1, 33, 35, 49–51, 54, 56, 57, 62, 79, 80 Part IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49, 51, 85, 116 ss 30–32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 s 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51, 59 ss 33–38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 ss 33–41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49, 50 s 33 . . . . . . . . . .53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 69 s 33(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 s 33(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 s 33(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 s 33(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57, 59 s 33(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 s 33(3)(c)–(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 33(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 s 33(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59, 60 s 33(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60, 63, 66 s 33(6)(a)–(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 33(6)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 s 33(6)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 s 33(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60–62, 64, 66 s 33(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 s 33(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 ss 35–38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53, 55 s 35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 63–65, 69 s 35(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63, 64 s 35(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63, 64 s 35(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63, 64 s 35(5)(a)–(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 35(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 s 35(6)(a)–(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 35(6)(a)–(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 35(6)(e)–(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 35(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 35(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 35(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 35(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 35(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 64–67, 69
Criminal Law Act 1967 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164 Criminal Law Act 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152 s 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 s 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160 s 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 Sched 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 ss 2–2E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 37–39, 44–47, 50, 56, 73, 85 ss 16–18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 s 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 s 16(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44, 50 s 16(2)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 s 16(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 s 16(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 s 18(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 s 88(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 35–37, 39, 41–47, 51, 56, 60, 67, 68, 71, 73, 85
xx
Table of statutes s 36(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 36(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 36(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64, 65 s 36(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 s 36(6)(a)–(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 s 36(6)(e)–(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 s 36(6)(e)–(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 s 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 66, 69 s 37(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 37(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 37(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 37(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 66, 67, 69 s 38A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 s 38(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 38(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 38(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 s 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 s 40(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 s 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 s 41(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 s 42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49, 50, 57, 100 s 42(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 68 s 42(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 s 42(2)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 s 42(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 s 42(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 s 42(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 s 43 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55, 57 s 43(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 s 43(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55, 57 s 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54, 57 s 44A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 s 45(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 s 45(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72, 73 s 45(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 s 45(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 s 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 46(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 46(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 46(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 s 46(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76, 104 s 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74, 75, 79 s 47(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73, 74, 103 s 47(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74, 75 s 47(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75, 104, 105 s 47(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75, 104 s 47(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
s 47(10)–(12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 48(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 s 52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 s 59(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50, 59 s 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58, 116 s 60(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 s 60(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 s 62 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53, 56, 57, 77 s 62(1)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52, 53 s 62(1)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 s 62(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56, 68 s 62(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 s 62(3)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 s 62(3)(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52, 54 s 62(3)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 s 62(3)(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 s 62(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 s 63(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53, 61 s 63(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 Sched 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50, 68 Homicide Act 1957 s 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .165, 166 Housing Act 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 s 189 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80 Indecency with Children Act 1960 . . .150 Interpretation Act 1978 Sched 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Justice of the Peace Act 1861 . . . . . . . . .104 Limitation Act 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 . . . . . . . . .46 s 5A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 s 33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 s 97A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
xxi
Domestic Violence Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 . . . . . . . . . .3 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 . . . . . . . . .44 s 1(2)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 s 2(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 s 23A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 s 25(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 . . . . . . . . .51 Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 . . . . .35, 38, 44, 47, 49, 51, 73, 85 s 1(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 s 1(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 s 1(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43, 47, 60, 67 s 1(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 s 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Offences against the Person Act 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91, 98 s 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 s 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91, 95 s 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91, 93–96, 102 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101, 102 s 17(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 s 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103, 104 s 24(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 24(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 24(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 24(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103, 104 s 25(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 25(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 25(3)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 s 25(3)(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 s 47(1A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 s 69 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 s 80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148 s 80(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 s 80(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 s 80(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35, 76, 77, 84, 98, 102 s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77, 100 s 1(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 s 1(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 s 1(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77, 99 s 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78, 99, 100 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78, 79, 100 s 3(4)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 s 3(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 s 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78, 99, 100 s 4(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 s 4(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 s 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78, 79, 100, 116 s 5(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78, 100 s 5(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 s 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 s 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129 Protection of Children Act 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 Public Order Act 1986 s 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96, 97 s 4A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97, 98 s 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97, 98 s 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Sexual Offences Act 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . .150 s 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 s 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 s 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 s 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 s 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 s 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 Sexual Offences Act 1967 s 54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 Tattooing of Minors Act 1969 . . . . . . . . .92 Vagrancy Act 1824 s 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 s 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 s 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137
xxii
CHAPTER 1
THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION This book is about domestic violence. The choice of the phrase is deliberate and introduces the problems of terminology in this area. A variety of phrases have been used to describe such violence. Lorna Smith1 states: ‘Domestic violence, family violence, domestic disputes, spouse abuse, wife abuse, battered wives, battered women ... There is a plethora of terms which are used, sometimes interchangeably, to describe the same phenomenon. Often they serve to confuse rather than clarify.’ Many of these phrases, however, concentrate on a marital relationship between the victim and perpetrator of the violence. The phrase ‘domestic violence’, on the other hand, denotes a much wider form of relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. It is important from the outset, however, to establish the boundaries of the phrase for the purposes of this text. ‘Domestic’ can signify a large number of interfamilial relationships but the primary context of this book is the violence occurring, or alleged to have occurred, between married or cohabiting partners, or those who have been in an intimate relationship with the perpetrator. We do not, primarily, intend to examine other interfamilial violence within the text, but wish to concentrate on the responses to domestic violence in the narrow sense defined above by both the civil and the criminal justice system. For the purposes of this text, therefore, the term ‘domestic’ refers only to couples in intimate heterosexual relationships, as, until the coming into force of the Family Law Act 1996, couples in lesbian or homosexual relationships have limited protection. ‘Violence’ is taken to mean emotional and psychological abuse, threats of violence (whether to person or property), harassment, sexual violence, and physical violence against the person or property. In this respect we have adopted, to a large extent, the definition given by the Law Commission:2 The term ‘violence’ itself is often used in two senses. In its narrower meaning it describes the use or threat of physical force against a victim in the form of assault or battery. But in the context of the family, there is also a wider meaning which extends to abuse beyond the more typical instances of physical assault to include any form of physical, sexual or psychological molestation or harassment which has a serious detrimental effect upon the health and well__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2
Smith, Domestic Violence (1989), Home Office Research Study 107, London: HMSO, p 1. Law Commission Working Paper No 207, Domestic Violence and the Occupation of the Family Home (1992), London: HMSO, para 2.3. 1
Domestic Violence being of the victim, albeit that there is no violence involved in the sense of physical force ... The degree of severity of such behaviour depends less upon its intrinsic nature than upon it being part of a pattern and upon its effect on the victim.
Although Morris3 is clearly correct to stress that the phrase domestic violence hides who is the perpetrator and who is the victim, the phrase does denote the fact that the victim has been subjected to a criminal act. Mirlees-Black4 says that 11% of women report some degree of physical violence in their relationships. Zorza5 states that in the United States violence to women accounts for one-fifth of all hospital emergency room cases. The National Crime Victimisation Survey in the United States estimated that during each year between 1987 and 1991, on average women were the victims of more than 572,000 violent crimes committed by an intimate and 20% of all female victims who were or had been married to the perpetrator reported being the victim of three or more assaults in the six months prior to the survey.6 In a national survey conducted in Canada in 19937 29% of women reported at least one incident of violence by their partners or ex-partners. These statistics show that in the incidents of domestic violence monitored, the victim has suffered an assault at the hands of the perpetrator and thus has been the victim of a criminal act. By using the phrase ‘domestic violence’ the criminality of behaviour of the perpetrator is emphasised.
NEW PROBLEM? Domestic violence is not a new problem, but one which has only attracted attention comparatively recently. Dobash and Dobash8 maintain that husbands have used violence against their wives for centuries as an assertion of their prerogative as a husband. They note that as far back as the 15th century, communities would take action against violent husbands, but also note that action was rarely, if ever, taken against those husbands who were important members of a community and that in all cases the community would only react to particularly severe violence, lesser violence being __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3 4 5 6 7 8
Morris, Women, Crime and Criminal Justice (1987), Oxford: Blackwell. Mirlees-Black, ‘Estimating the extent of domestic violence: findings from the 1992 British Crime Survey’ (1995) Research Bulletin 37: 1–19. Zorza, ‘The criminal law of misdemeanour domestic violence, 1970–90’ (1992) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 83(1): 46–72. Buzawa and Buzawa, ‘Introduction’ in Buzawa and Buzawa (eds) Do Arrest and Restraining Orders Work? (1996), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp 1 and 2. Statistics Canada, ‘Wife assault: the findings of a national survey’ (1994) Juristat Service Bulletin 14(9) March. Dobash and Dobash, ‘Community response to violence against wives: charivari, abstract justice and patriarchy’ (1981) Social Problems, 28,5, 563–81. 2
The Extent of Domestic Violence condoned. In English law a husband had a right to ‘chastise’ his wife. In 1765, Blackstone observed ‘the lower rank of people still clung to their ancient privilege and courts of law still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty in any gross misbehaviour’.9 Smith notes that only after pressure was exerted by socially prominent women such as Caroline Norton and Frances Power Cobb did the law step in to provide a remedy for beaten wives in the form of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878, which gave magistrates the power to grant a separation order and maintenance to a wife whose husband had been convicted of aggravated assault and where her future safety was in peril. It was only in 1974, after the publication of a book by Erin Pizzey,10 that the extent of the problem of domestic violence came to the attention of both the legislature and the public. 11 Pizzey’s book was influential in the establishment of the House of Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage,12 which itself led to the passage of both the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 and the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978. However, Pizzey’s book also led to increased academic interest and awareness in the area of domestic violence and thus more detailed monitoring of the extent and type of domestic violence experienced by victims. The true extent of such violence is, however, still unknown, a fact acknowledged by all working in this area. The reasons for this are manifold. Many researchers note that domestic violence is underreported to the police although there is a discrepancy amongst researchers as to the amount of under-reporting, which varies from 98% 13 to 29%. 14 Edwards15 also noted that only 12% of all reported cases of domestic violence were made the subject of a crime report and four-fifths were later not officially recorded as a crime.16 Localised research can give an indication of the extent of domestic violence, but the nature of the research may again come up against problems of under-reporting. This book is the culmination of a research study into domestic violence in Leicester. The study firstly analysed the number and nature of cases heard by Leicester County Court during a sixmonth period in 1991, supported by a short verification study 12 months later. This was followed by a study of operational officers in the Leicestershire police force to determine attitudes and responses to domestic violence __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
9 Smith, op cit, p 4. 10 Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (1974), Harmondsworth: Penguin. 11 As acknowledged by Freeman, Violence in the Home (1979), Farnborough: Saxon House and others. 12 HC 553–11 (1974–75), London: HMSO. 13 Dobash and Dobash, Violence Against Wives (1979), New York: Free Press. 14 Pahl (ed), Private Violence and Public Policy (1985), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 15 Edwards, ‘Police attitudes and dispositions in domestic disputes: the London study’ (1986) Police Journal 230– 41. 16 For reasons for this see Edwards, Sex, Gender and the Legal Process (1996), London: Blackstone Press, Chapter 4. 3
Domestic Violence incidents. The responses of the police are analysed in Chapter 5. Our initial 1991 study17 (hereafter referred to as the Leicestershire study) over a sixmonth period, into applications to Leicester county court for a remedy in cases of domestic violence revealed 299 cases. This, however, would seem to be the tip of the iceberg, as figures from the Leicestershire police force for 1995/96 reveal 5,144 reports of domestic violence18 and research does not suggest a massive surge in the number of reported cases since 1991. It is also difficult to draw general conclusions from individual research. National studies into this area have only been carried out in the United States in 1980 and 1986 by Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz (1980) and Straus and Gelles (1986). The survey took a representative sample of 2,143 couples in 1975. The investigators found 16% of those surveyed reported domestic violence in the year of the survey, while 28% reported violence at some stage during the relationship.19 The survey delineated types of violence ranging from throwing something to using a knife or gun. The survey revealed that in relation to ‘severe’ violence, defined as ‘punching, biting, kicking, hitting with an object, beating up, threatening or using a knife or a gun’, 6% of couples had experienced it in the year preceding the survey and almost 13% during their marriage. On the basis of the figures, Straus et al estimated that almost three million Americans had been subjected to severe violence.20 Data from the US Department of Justice in 1984 revealed that the yearly incident rate of domestic violence was 1.5 per 1,000 people in the population, although this figure represented all persons aged 12 or over involved in violence in the home and thus would also include sibling and adolescent abuse.21 More recent surveys indicate that, despite greater public awareness, the problem is still vast. In Britain, Mooney22 reports that 25% of women reported experiencing domestic violence and 10% reported experiencing domestic violence in the last 12 months. Mirlees-Black,23 analysing the 1992 British Crime Survey, reported that 46% of all violent incidents against women were domestic incidents. In cold figures, 46% of 990,000 (nearly half a million) estimated assaults on women could be classified as domestic, of which 100,000 occurred at home. One hundred and twenty women were murdered by their partners in 1991, representing 41% of all women murdered. In the United States, according to the FBI in 1992, 15% of all murders, where the relationship __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Jones, Lockton, Ward and Kashefi, ‘Domestic violence applications: an empirical study of one court’ (1995) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 17(1): 67–86. For an explanation of the research see below, p 38 and following pages. Leicestershire Constabulary Domestic Violence Annual Report 1995/96. Gelles, Family Violence (1987), Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, p 37. Smith, op cit, p 12. Gelles, op cit, p 38. Mooney, The Hidden Figure: Domestic Violence in North London (1993), London: Islington Council. Mirlees-Black, op cit. 4
The Extent of Domestic Violence between the victim and the murderer was known, were committed by a person in an intimate relationship with the victim.24 Furthermore, in FBI statistics for 1980–91, over 50% of women murdered over the age of 18 were murdered by an intimate.25 Research has also acknowledged that, in addition to the immense personal costs of domestic violence, there are huge social and financial costs to society as a whole. An Australian analysis in 199326 estimated that the cost of a violent 10-year relationship in terms of hospital visits, police call-outs and court applications, would be approximately £29,000. Domestic violence is a problem within society as a whole. The problems of under-reporting of incidents has been noted above, but even on published figures, women form the majority of victims of violent crime committed by intimates. The adequacy of both the civil and criminal law to deal with the perpetrators of this crime is the subject of this book.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
24 Buzawa and Buzawa, op cit, p 3. 25 Carmody and Williams ‘Wife assault and perceptions of sanctions’ (1987) Violence and Victims, 2(1), 25–38. 26 Changing the Landscape: Ending Violence – Achieving Equality (1993), Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women. 5
CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
INTRODUCTION Domestic violence characteristically includes acts of physical and mental cruelty progressing from a slap or shove, to a punch or kick, and to the more extreme manifestations of violence, in suffocation, strangulation, attempted murder and murder. The prefix ‘domestic’ serves to neutralise the full horror, viciousness and habituation of the violence ...1
The behaviour that is commonly called domestic violence can take on a variety of different aspects. It can be physical assault, sexual abuse, threats of either, or psychological abuse. It usually continues for years before the victims take action (if they do) and, on some occasions, it results in the death of either the victim or the perpetrator. It is not confined to any one socio-economic group nor can it be said that it is caused by any one factor. Furthermore, its practice is extensive. It is necessary to look at some of the manifestations of violence within what should be a loving relationship to fully understand the horror to which victims are subjected and the need for adequate protection to be provided by both the civil and the criminal justice systems.
THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
1 Physical assault When a perpetrator of domestic violence is prosecuted the accounts of the violence suffered by the victim come into the public domain and most readers are horrified by what they read. It was stated in Chapter 1 that in England in 1991, 120 women were murdered by their partners, representing 41% of all women murdered, but murder is the ultimate violence and other cases come to court where the victim has been subjected to horrific violence and survived. For example, in R v Davies2 as the result of an attack with a hammer by her husband, the wife suffered a fractured nose, jaw and eye cavity which necessitated the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2
Edwards, Sex, Gender and the Legal Process (1996), London: Blackstone Press, p 180. (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 97. 7
Domestic Violence removal of her eyeball. In R v Casseeram3 the husband, after attempting to strangle his wife, poured petrol over her and ignited it, resulting in her suffering 17% burns. In R v Dearn4 the husband tied a piece of electrical cord around his wife’s neck for at least five minutes, resulting in irreparable brain damage. These are just some of the more public examples of domestic violence.5 It would be easy to assume that these are isolated incidents, given that often such cases do not reach court. These cases are, however, the very tip of the iceberg. Many studies have been conducted with victims of domestic violence in an attempt to discern the nature and seriousness of the attacks. Dobash and Dobash6 quote from some of the stories told by women. They give examples from a mass of research, including their own7 and that of Kelly.8 Below are just four examples: He once used a stick, he hit me once with a big fibreglass fishing pole, six foot long. And he just went whoosh, he gave me such a wallop with that. I had a mark ... right down my back. I thought my back had broke. (Dobash and Dobash) Each one got harder and harder ... one time he hit me so hard on the back of the head that he broke his own hand. (Kelly) The elbow was all lying open, the top of my legs was lying open ... gashes all over. (Dobash and Dobash) I was used and abused, battered stupid and nearly strangled. I passed out, had my hair torn out of my head. I was actually pulled along the street by my hair. I’ve had my ear stitched, my nose fractured, my jaw fractured. I still remember the doctor saying you must have a jaw like a professional boxer.9
Doctor Gillian Mezey in a conference paper entitled ‘Characteristics of Women Who Kill’10 described the physical violence encountered by 11 women who were eventually prosecuted for the killing of their abuser. She says: The women were beaten with fists, punched, kicked and assaulted with a variety of weapons and implements including cricket and baseball bats and bicycle tubes. They were smashed over the head with saucepans, bottles and cans and beaten with belts or ropes. They were pinned down, held in headlocks and headbutted ... We were struck by the frequency with which women were strangled by their partners, often to the point of losing __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3 4 5 6 7
(1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 384. (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 527. Quoted in Edwards, op cit, pp 182–83. Dobash and Dobash, Women, Violence and Social Change (1992), London: Routledge, pp 2– 4. Dobash and Dobash, ‘The nature and antecedents of violent events’ (1984) 24 British Journal of Criminology 3, 269–88. 8 Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (1988), Oxford: Polity Press. 9 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 8. 10 Domestic Violence: The Victim and the Perpetrator, Conference at St George’s Hospital Medical School, October 1995.
8
What is Domestic Violence? consciousness. This seemed an extremely effective way of establishing immediate control and dominance over the woman, of intimidating her and crushing any prospect of dissent or resistance. It did not leave visible bruises, it could not be easily detected, it was quiet and it didn’t attract the attention of neighbours or the children.
Mezey also mentions electrocution, attempted drowning in the bath to the loss of consciousness, burning with cigarettes or irons and being doused with scalding liquids. Edwards11 conducted a survey of women in refuges in England, Scotland and Wales in 1986. She had 70 responses which showed, among other things, the types of physical violence to which the respondents had been subjected. The table of those responses is shown below:
Table 1 Forms of spousal violence experienced by women in UK refuges Experience of various forms of abuse
Form of Violence
One form
Two or three More than Total responses forms three forms No %
With open hand With clenched fist (punch) With feet (kick or stamp) With objects (eg stick) With piece of furniture (eg chair) With knife With bottle or other glass Other (sexual or mental)
1 9 nil nil nil nil nil 3
18 24 16 7 6 nil 3 1
19 24 22 21 21 13 12 11
38 57 38 28 27 13 15 15
Total responses Total respondents
13 13
75 29
143 28
231 70
54 81 54 40 38 18 21 21
Reproduced with the permission of Sage Publications Ltd 12 from Edwards Policing ‘Domestic’ Violence (1989)
She further states that 81% of her respondents had sustained extreme physical violence, including several types of abuse, and 84% had experienced varying degrees of physical violence over a period of years. She concludes: ‘Women’s typical experience of violence, then, was being punched, kicked and beaten with an object.’13 These findings are similar to those of the Islington Crime Survey,14 which found that 74.5% of victims of domestic violence had been __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
11 12 13 14
Edwards, Policing ‘Domestic’ Violence (1989), London: Sage Publications. Ibid, p 164, Table 5.1. Ibid. MacLean, Jones and Young, Preliminary Report of the Islington Crime Survey (1986), London: Centre for Criminology, Middlesex Polytechnic. 9
Domestic Violence grabbed or punched, 92% punched or slapped, 56.9% kicked and 19.7% assaulted with a weapon. The Leicestershire study, conducted in 1991, analysed the affidavits of applicants and tabulated the types of physical violence cited in the applications for civil remedies and their frequency. As can be seen below, this virtually replicates the data from previous surveys.15
Table 2 Types of violence
Punching Kicking Choking/strangling Slaps Throwing across room Pushing/shoving Hitting Using a weapon Hair pulling Dragging across room Hitting with object Throwing objects at applicant Headbutting Pushing against wall Throwing downstairs Biting Burning Hitting head on ground Jumping on Pushing head through glass Stabbing Pinching Sexual abuse Other violence
Civil % No
Family % No
Domestic % No
58 45 32 16 16 19 10 13 10 10 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 10 33
55 28 40 22 32 33 29 12 22 11 12 14 9 11 5 2 4 13 8 4 14 33
60 43 26 34 20 22 23 8 16 10 11 7 6 7 6 2 1 12 4 1 4 1 9 33
[18] [14] [10] [5] [5] [6] [3] [4] [3] [3] [1] [1] [1] [2] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [3]
[51] [26] [37] [20] [30] [31] [27] [11] [20] [10] [11] [13] [8] [10] [5] [2] [4] [12] [7] [4] [13]
[66] [48] [29] [38] [22] [24] [26] [9] [18] [11] [12] [8] [7] [8] [7] [2] [1] [13] [4] [1] [4] [1] [10]
(The percentages are calculated out of those who were basing their applications on physical violence and who also specified the nature of that violence. The figures are 31 in the civil files, 93 in the family files and 111 in the domestic files.)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
15 Jones, Lockton, Ward and Kashefi, ‘Domestic violence applications: an empirical study of one court’ (1995) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 17(1) 67–86 at 76. 10
What is Domestic Violence? Such manifestations of domestic violence are worldwide. Harrell and Smith16 conducted studies into restraining orders granted to complainants in two jurisdictions in the United States. Their tabulation of the types of violence cited by applicants shows a remarkable similarity to that found in Edwards’ study and our own. If we take all of the evidence presented above we can see a commonality across different countries, regions and years. Punching, kicking, slapping, strangulation, and the use of weapons are all common forms of domestic violence. In addition, all the research indicates that such incidents of violence are not isolated, but that victims are subjected to years of abuse. Dobash and Dobash17 quote examples of women who have endured 15 and 20 years of physical violence. Mezey18 states: ‘Most women [in the survey] had been subjected to violence and abuse over many years (six women described violence for more than eight years, eg Sophie for 11 years, Barbara for 16 years and Jane for 22 years.’ Edwards19 says that in her 1986 survey, 84% of the respondents had suffered violence which extended over several years. In our own research we identified the periods of abuse from the affidavits, as shown in the table below.20
Table 3 Periods of abuse %
Civil No
Family % No
Domestic % No
One day Days Weeks Months Years Not known
1 11 25 5
2 26 60 12
5 2 15 76 21
4 2 13 64 17
4 3 8 27 68 12
3 2 7 22 56 10
Total
42
100%
119
100%
122
100%
It can be seen from the Leicestershire study that in the majority of cases the abuse had lasted for years, the shortest number of years being two and the __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
16 Harrell and Smith, ‘Effects of restraining orders on domestic violence victims’ in Buzawa and Buzawa (eds) Do Arrest and Restraining Orders Work? (1996), Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p 214. 17 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 4. 18 Op cit. 19 Edwards, op cit, n 11, p 164. 20 Jones et al, op cit, p 74. 11
Domestic Violence longest number being 36. All the commentators mentioned also note the serious physical and emotional consequences of such abuse. Dobash and Dobash21 quote: I had treatment for a fractured skull and I lost a child in a miscarriage due to violence. [The worst aspects of the experience of battering are]: Feeling so ill and tired after the beatings, and so useless, I couldn’t face people with the marks on my body.
Mezey states that three of the women in her survey sustained broken bones and one had her teeth broken. In our own research we analysed the injuries sustained by the applicants as shown below:22
Table 4 Injuries sustained by applicants
Bruising/cuts Bleeding Temporarily unable to walk Broken bones Miscarriage Concussion Burst eardrum Other injuries
Civil %
Family %
Domestic %
64 15 6 15 3 3 18
69 13 1 8 2 1 32
60 11 3 10 3 1 1 24
In these cases 20% across all three jurisdictions had needed treatment for their injuries, including hospitalisation.
2 Sexual violence Research has shown that domestic violence is often manifested not only in physical assault but sexual abuse as well. Frieze23 found that physical violence was often associated with sexual violence. Kelly’s interviews with victims 24 give detailed accounts of the extent and nature of the sexual violence, in addition to physical violence, to which the women had been subjected. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
21 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 3. 22 Jones et al, op cit, p 77. 23 Frieze, ‘Investigating the causes and consequences of marital rape’ Signs (1983), vol 8, no 3, pp 532–53. 24 Kelly, op cit. 12
What is Domestic Violence? Mezey 25 states that all of the women in her survey had been subjected to non-consensual intercourse, but that they were generally reluctant to class this in the same category as other forms of sexual abuse. In other words, it appears that many victims separate rape from other forms of sexual abuse. It would be easy to conclude that this is because, until 1991 and the case of R v R,26 nonconsensual sexual intercourse within marriage was not capable of being rape. This was based on the statement of Sir Matthew Hale27 that by marriage the wife consented to intercourse and that consent could not be withdrawn. Although the marital exemption to rape was removed by R v R, Hoff 28 has suggested that it was not the law that prevented victims from perceiving nonconsensual intercourse in marriage as rape, but the fact that many of these women regard sex as their marital duty. Forced sexual acts other than intercourse could, however, be subject to criminal prosecution before the removal of the marital exemption. Prior to the House of Lords ruling in R v R, other cases before the court had involved nonconsensual sexual acts not involving intercourse.29 In many cases the fact that the acts had taken place in situations where the wife had consented in the past made it virtually impossible to prove lack of consent (although in Kowalski30 the Court of Appeal said that the presumption of the wife’s consent to intercourse by virtue of the marriage ceremony did not extend to consent to oral sex). Thus, even where an allegation of a criminal offence had been made, a conviction would be difficult to obtain. Where the forced acts are accompanied by threats and violence, it is more difficult to show consent, but Gelles31 points out that the victims often consider the assaults and threats to be the violence, rather than the sexual act itself. But, of course, in law the violence stems from the lack of consent and not the sexual act itself (see Chapter 5). Hoff 32 states: [The women’s] accounts of violence reveal that the men often forced themselves sexually on the women. Only occasionally, though, did the women refer to such sex under duress as rape, even when specifically asked ‘Did he rape you?’ Generally, the women espoused several traditional values regarding the wife’s role including the notion that sex is a duty a wife owes to her husband.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
25 26 27 28 29
Mezey, op cit. [1991] 4 All ER 481. A History of the Pleas of the Crown (1836). Hoff, Battered Women as Survivors (1990), London: Routledge. Cf R v Caswell [1984] Crim LR 111, R v Kowalski [1988] Crim LR 124, T v T [1963] 2 All ER 746, all cases involving spouses. For further discussion see Chapter 5, below. 30 Op cit. 31 Gelles, Family Violence (1987), Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, p 144. 32 Hoff, op cit, p 58. 13
Domestic Violence Gelles33 comments on research conducted through 40 Rape Crisis Centres in America in 1975.34 This research discovered that all of the women who reported being forced to have sex with their husbands gave in to their husband’s demands rather than be violently forced. Edwards35 recounts an incident where a victim participant in a conference later confided in her that she had endured forced sex to prevent further beatings and protect her children from violence. It would appear, therefore, that in many cases victims will endure sexual intercourse as the lesser of two evils. In our own study in 1991, when we analysed the affidavits as to the type of violence alleged, it can be seen from Table 2 above that sexual abuse was mentioned in a sizeable proportion of cases across all three jurisdictions in the county court, the highest being in the family jurisdiction. For our research purposes, the term ‘sexual abuse’ was defined as any behaviour of a sexual nature not consented to by the applicant. The numbers shown in Table 2 show that in our restricted study nearly one in 10 of the victims had been subjected to sexual violence – in the majority of cases what the applicant described as rape. These examples show that often physical violence includes rape within the dictionary definition and, since the ruling in R v R, the legal definition, but there is a need to dispel the perceptions of the victims and persuade them that non-consensual sex is another form of violent abuse which has nothing to do with passion. Many writers view rape as an attempt by men to exercise power over women.36 Gelles37 theorises that the more resources an individual has the more power he has; therefore, the individual with less resources will use force to obtain power. In the case of violent partners, they use the violence as a means of dominating the victim, to counteract the fact that they are poorly educated, unemployed or inarticulate. Thus it is an assertion of power and control. Forced sexual activity, therefore, is another form of control. Nonconsensual intercourse is, however, only one aspect of the sexual violence38 described by victims. In our study, other forms of sexual abuse were mentioned such as the ripping-off of clothes and forcing applicants to indulge in sexual activity such as dressing up and acting out fantasies. Mezey 39 describes some of the experiences of the women in her survey in detail. They include buggery, insertion of objects (including a loaded shotgun), forced enactment of hard-core pornography and caning, in addition to the victims __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
33 34 35 36
Gelles, op cit, n 31, p 142. Seites ‘Marital rape: dispelling the myth’ (unpublished). Edwards, op cit, n 11, p 189. Cf Bart, Rape doesn’t end with a kiss (1975), Viva 39–42, 100–2; Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (1975), New York: Simon and Shuster; Dobash and Dobash, op cit; Seites, op cit. 37 Gelles, op cit, n 31, p 140, quoting from Goode, ‘Force and violence in the family’ (1971) Journal of Marriage and the Family 33: 624–36. 38 See below, Chapter 5. 39 Mezey, op cit. 14
What is Domestic Violence? being held or tied down and subjected to physical and verbal abuse during intercourse. She states: Sexual abuse was described by most women as the most extreme and distressing of their experiences, through which their partner could assert total power and control over them, achieve maximum humiliation and destroy their very soul.
She further states that sexual assault is associated with much higher levels of psychological disturbance than other forms of violence, including post traumatic shock syndrome.
3 Threats of violence For victims who have been regularly beaten, threats can inject just as much terror as the actual act. Many victims, therefore, live a life of constant fear. Edwards40 says that this is the most typical way a man will keep a woman in subjugation. The case law shows many examples of threats to kill.41 Other studies show that threats are constantly used in the ‘typical’ domestic violence situation. Mezey42 talks of ‘objects being smashed and destroyed – windows, crockery, the television and the deliberate destruction of anything that was particularly precious to them’. Hoff43 gives an example of a victim who had kerosene poured over her and then her husband threatened to light it. The following day, when she refused to cook his dinner, he beat her. After she had received medical attention, he told her ‘I should have killed you ... don’t mess with me or I’ll do it again’. Harrell and Smith44 interviewed 355 women who had filed for restraining orders in America. Apart from analysing the acts of violence experienced by the women in their study, they also analysed the threats of violence or property damage which had occurred. In their study, 26% of applicants had been threatened with bodily harm, 17% had received threats of harm to their children and 16% had had property destroyed before them. Our own study conducted a similar exercise in relation to the applicants to Leicester county court. The results are shown below.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
40 Edwards, op cit, n 11. 41 Cf R v Munroe (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 408; R v O’Callaghan (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 187; R v Butterworth (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 674. 42 Mezey, op cit. 43 Hoff, op cit. 44 Harrell and Smith, op cit. 15
Domestic Violence
Table 5 Threats of violence
Threatening to assault Threatening to kill Threatening to abuse sexually Threat of assault if relationship ended Threatening to return Threatening to harm or remove children Threatening to damage property
Civil % No
Family % No
Domestic % No
43 26 -
[18] [11] -
38 31 2
[45] [37] [2]
48 41 2
[59] [50] [2]
7 5
[3] [2]
7 2
[8] [2]
17 5
[21] [6]
17 14
[7] [6]
15 3
[17] [4]
16 8
[19] [10]
A comparison of the two sets of findings shows that in the Leicestershire study threats of physical harm occurred in almost twice as many cases as in Harrell and Smith’s research, the highest number of incidents in the domestic jurisdiction. The number of incidents where the children were threatened was about the same, although the destruction of property was more prevalent in our study than in that of Harrell and Smith. It is interesting to note that both studies were undertaken in the same year (1991) and in each the acts described were taken from affidavits and not as a result of direct questions. In other words, these are the acts described by the victims themselves.
4 Psychological abuse If we accept that domestic violence is a way of achieving domination and control, it follows that the perpetrators will use other methods, in addition to threats or physical or sexual assault, to ensure the subjugation of their victims. Many researchers, including ourselves, have found this to be so. Mezey45 says that in her survey the psychological abuse suffered by the women: consisted of insults and humiliation, purposeful distancing of the woman from friends, family and all potential sources of external help. The men exerted extraordinary control over the women’s behaviour, thoughts, feelings, what she wore, where she went, whom she saw, as well as over the family’s resources. They were constantly being humiliated and diminished, told that they were dirty and ugly, that they smelled.
Hoff’s accounts from victims frequently include name calling, being told they were stupid or frigid (to justify sexual abuse). Harrell and Smith isolated the __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
45 Op cit. 16
What is Domestic Violence? types of psychological abuse described by the victims in their sample. All of the acts described show how the perpetrators wish to control the women they abuse. In 50% of cases the women were not allowed out of the house and in 5% of cases they were not allowed to work. If the woman did work, harassment at her workplace would also occur. Mezey notes that in her study only one woman was working; the others were not allowed to work by their partners. She also notes that by the end of the relationship the women were virtually treated as slaves, their compliance being needed to show commitment and loyalty to their partners. Isolating victims by not allowing them to work and controlling their contact with the outside world seems common to all the research in this area.46 Edwards47 cites an interview she conducted with a victim: He is insanely jealous and possessive ... He won’t let me go out to socialise, take driving lessons, go to keep fit classes, he won’t let me do anything, it leads to arguments.
In addition, such social isolation creates economic dependency, making it difficult for the victim to leave, and, in the men’s eyes, ‘justifies’ the treatment of the woman as his property. Many victim accounts in the studies mentioned above talk of violence occurring because the meal was not cooked right, or was late, or the house was dirty/untidy. It appears that by ‘keeping’ these women, the perpetrators expected, in return, perfection at home and if it did not occur, a beating would be the logical consequence, enforcing the victim’s feelings of uselessness and lack of self-worth. In addition to economic control, the research cites other examples of psychological abuse. Table 6 (page 18) shows the acts of psychological abuse mentioned in the affidavits in our study.48 Such acts were also mentioned by the applicants in the study by Harrell and Smith. Constant phoning, following, and harassment in public all appear from the studies conducted to be common forms of abuse. This form of harassment may be the result of sexual jealousy, pathological jealousy being identified as a characteristic in violent perpetrators.49 Mezey states that 81.8% of her sample mentioned their partners’ pathological jealousy and persistent accusations of infidelity. The control of the women in terms of not allowing them to work or leave the house on their own was to prevent any contact with other men. One husband forced his wife to have an abortion because he was convinced that the child she was carrying was not his. Another would hide in the loft and try to ‘catch her out’, frequently searching her clothes and belongings for ‘evidence’. A third regularly used to examine his partner internally to ensure her fidelity and refused to allow a male doctor to attend __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
46 47 48 49
Cf Mezey, Hoff, Dobash and Dobash, Edwards, and Gelles. Edwards, op cit, n 11, p 162. Jones et al, op cit, p 78. See below. 17
Domestic Violence
Table 6 Types of psychological abuse and harassment Civil No
%
Family No
Not accepting relationship ended 38
[16]
20
[23]
43
[52]
Insistence on speaking to applicant 33
[14]
14
[16]
27
[33]
%
Domestic % No
Persistent phoning
21
[9]
4
[5]
10
[12]
Following around
17
[7]
4
[5]
13
[16]
-
-
2%
[2]
4%
[5]
45
[19]
15
[18]
21
[26]
Forced entry into applicant’s home 38
[16]
12
[14]
22
[27]
Smashing of household items
24
[10]
24
[28]
41
[50]
Smashing windows
10%
[4]
5%
[6]
14%
[17]
Name calling
41%
[17]
42%
[50]
33%
[40]
Emotional abuse
17%
[7]
36%
[45]
24%
[29]
Unwanted letter writing Insistence on being let into A’s home
her during her pregnancies, resulting in two of her three children being born at home, without medical help. Pathological sexual jealousy is, perhaps, the most dangerous example of all domestic violence because research suggests that male sexual jealousy often leads to spousal homicide. Daly and Wilson 50 conclude: ‘In every society for which we have been able to find a sample of spousal homicides, the story is basically the same. Most cases arise out of the husband’s jealous, proprietary, violent responses to his wife’s (real or imagined) infidelity or desertion.’ Chimbos 51 found a similar pattern in a Canadian study of convicted men and women. In his study he found that the murder came after ‘a history of quarrels, usually about sexual jealousy and possessiveness’.52
5 Emotional consequences The physical results of domestic violence have already been discussed. It is easy to see broken bones, broken teeth, burns, bite marks and bruises. What is not easy to see, however, is the psychological effects of being a victim of __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
50 Daly and Wilson, Homicide (1988) New York: Aldine De Gruyter, p 202; cited in Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 7. 51 Chimbos, Marital Violence: A Study of Interspouse Homicide (1978), San Francisco: R & E Research Associates. 52 Ibid, p 67. 18
What is Domestic Violence? repeated, long-term domestic abuse, although the psychological effects of long-term violence have, to some extent, been brought into the public arena with the introduction of the ‘battered woman’s syndrome’ discussed below. Most victims of violence, however, do not kill their abusers, and research conducted with victims can give us some insight into the mental torment they suffer in addition to the physical injuries they receive. Southall Black Sisters, in giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee said: ... [W]omen arrive in varying stages of depression. They exhibit signs of confusion, guilt, shame and insecurity. The depression can sometimes be acute, bordering on mental illness. Some women actually suffer a breakdown as a direct result of violence and harassment. A large number of them have actually contemplated or attempted suicide.53
Examples of the above are prevalent throughout the literature. The victim interviewed by Edwards above said: He tries to destroy my confidence, my pride and my dignity. I used to look after myself and I used to have a pride in my appearance, but now I mean look at me. It is because of what he has done to me, just because of what he has done to me ...
Low self-esteem is frequently cited by victims. Hoff54 quotes some of the comments from victims in her survey: ‘I felt totally disgusted with myself’; ‘I started to believe his put downs ...’; ‘I hated myself for living with him’. Interviews with victims also show that they live a life of terror. In our research, a large number of the affidavits mentioned the fear the violence had caused in the applicant. This is shown by the table below.55
Table 7 Effects of violence/harassment on applicants
Feared for their safety Feared for their children Feared for their life Depressed or nervous breakdown Had become physically ill
Civil %
Family %
Domestic %
93% 21% 14% 2% -
91% 39% 29% 19% 6%
96% 34% 29% 12% 7%
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
53 Edwards, op cit, n 1, p 222. 54 Hoff, op cit, p 38. 55 Jones et al, op cit, p 78. 19
Domestic Violence Dobash and Dobash56 quote from detailed research into the fear victims suffer. ‘The fear of not knowing what he would do – I feared for my life’; ‘I remember the tension of becoming aware that I had to notice what I was saying all the time, to make sure I didn’t offend him. I had become afraid of him’; ‘I realised I was under terrible strain the whole time ... I’d go into a blind panic about what side the spoon had to be on.’ Often the stress and the tension manifests itself in the form of physical illness. In Mezey’s sample, most women were being treated for symptoms of anxiety, insomnia, and depression and 63.6% were receiving psychotropic drugs from their doctors. In our study, as seen in Table 7, 25% of the applicants in the family jurisdiction had suffered depression, a nervous breakdown or had become physically ill as the result of the violence they had suffered; the corresponding percentages in the domestic and civil jurisdictions were 19% and 2% respectively. Much of the research also indicates that often victims consider or attempt suicide as a result of their ordeals. In Mezey’s group 45.5% had attempted suicide and other research demonstrates that frequently victims contemplate suicide, often only being deterred because of their fears for the safety of their children if they succeeded.57
WHY DON’T WOMEN LEAVE? In 1976 Gelles conducted a study of victims of domestic violence entitled ‘Abused wives: why do they stay?’.58 His research focused on four specific factors, to assess the impact of those factors on a victim’s decision whether or not to seek external help. The factors he identified were: (1) the severity and frequency of violence; (2) experience and exposure to violence in one’s family of orientation; (3) education and occupation of the wife, number of children and age of oldest child; and (4) external constraint on the actions of the victimised wife.59 He analysed three of these in detail.
1 Severity and frequency of violence Gelles identified that the more severe the violence the more likely that the victim would seek outside help. Of his eight victims who experienced severe violence, five divorced their husbands, two sought police help and one sought __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
56 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 3. 57 Cf Dobash and Dobash, Hoff, Buzawa and Buzawa. 58 Gelles, ‘Abused wives: why do they stay?’ (1976) Journal of Marriage and the Family 38: 659–68, reproduced in Gelles, Family Violence, op cit, p 108. 59 Ibid, p 112. 20
What is Domestic Violence? counselling. Of the nine who were pushed, shoved or had objects thrown at them, only one had divorced her husband and one had sought police help, the other seven doing nothing at all. He also found a correlation between the frequency of the violence and the external help sought. Of those victims struck once, less than half had sought external help, but of those struck monthly all had sought help and of those struck weekly, 83% had sought outside intervention. He also identified that women who were hit daily or weekly were more likely to seek police intervention, whereas those struck monthly were more likely to seek a divorce. His explanation for this divergence in the help sought is that women who suffer frequent violence feel that they need immediate protection and fear the response of the perpetrator should they seek divorce or legal separation, whereas those struck less frequently gradually see less point in staying in the relationship. These are, however, his own conclusions and are not based on any interviews with the victims themselves. Pagelow’s research in 198160 did not support Gelles’s conclusions in respect of the severity and frequency of violence and the decision to stay or leave. Pagelow’s research, however, was with occupants of shelters and thus did not look at women who had stayed in abusive relationships and not sought external intervention.
2 Experience with and exposure to violence as a child The previous research of Gelles 61 and of Straus 62 found that there is a correlation between experience of violence in childhood, either as a victim or a spectator, and the experience of violence as an adult. In his 1976 research, Gelles found that of the 54 women who never saw their parents fight violently, 46% were victims of domestic violence themselves, while 66% of the 12 women who had observed interparental violence became victims. Furthermore, Gelles concluded that the more frequently a woman was struck as a child, the more likely she was to become a victim of violence by her husband. It must be noted, however, that the numbers in Gelles’s 1976 survey were small and that, although other writers have suggested a correlation between childhood experiences of violence and violence as an adult, these theories are open to criticism.63 Furthermore, in Mezey’s sample only 36.4% had witnessed significant parental violence and only one woman had been physically abused as a child. Gelles concluded that although the predominant mode of intervention by those women who had observed parental violence __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
60 Pagelow, Women-Battering: Victims and their Experiences (1981), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 61 Gelles, The Violent Home (1974), Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 62 Straus, ‘Ordinary violence, child abuse and wife beating: what do they have in common?’ in Finkelhor et al (eds) The Dark Side of Families (1983), Beverley Hills: Sage Publications. 63 See below, p 30. 21
Domestic Violence was divorce or separation, these women were only slightly more likely to seek intervention than women who had not observed such violence. Of those women who had not observed parental violence, there was no predominant method of intervention. In addition, the fact that a woman was the victim of childhood violence appears to have no bearing on her decision whether to seek help or not.
3 Education, occupation, number and age of children Gelles looked at this factor on the basis that it would affect the resources the wife had. He had a hypothesis that the fewer the resources at her disposal, the less able the wife is to seek outside help. As a result of his research, he concluded that the variable which best distinguishes women who seek external intervention from those who do not is having employment. Only 25% of those victims who did not seek help were employed, whereas 50% of those who called the police or social services, or sought a divorce or separation had a job at the time. He stated that the less economically dependent a wife is on her husband, the more likely she is to seek help. Furthermore, working gives her another view of life and the ability to see the violence as abnormal within the family structure. He also discovered that women with teenage children were more likely to seek help than those with younger children. These women said that they sought help once their children were old enough to get involved in the violence, suggesting the help was sought to protect the children rather than themselves. Gelles also noted that neither the educational background of the victim, nor the number of children in the family, in itself affected whether the woman sought help or not, although the combined factors of low educational achievement and lack of a job meant the woman was less likely to seek external intervention.64 Gelles’s original research was conducted some 20 years ago, and since then much more research has been conducted into why victims decide to stay or leave. Gelles’s research left many questions unanswered and, in particular, did not answer the question he raised in the title of his article ‘Why do abused wives stay?’. He concentrated on whether they would seek external intervention, rather than looking at the outcome of that intervention on whether they left or stayed. One of the more publicised theories as to why victims of domestic violence remain with perpetrators is the theory of ‘learned helplessness’ developed by Lenora Walker 65 and from which she developed the ‘battered woman syndrome’. Her theory is that women who are the victims of repeated violence have feelings of self-blame, low concepts of self-worth, and suffer __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
64 This conclusion is supported by Pagelow’s research, op cit, n 60. 65 Walker, ‘Battered women and learned helplessness’ (1978) 2 Victomology 525–26. 22
What is Domestic Violence? from despair, depression and anxiety. Due to the repeated assaults they feel that they cannot control what is happening or what will happen and therefore feel that they are helpless to prevent further violence. Hoff,66 in her interviews with victims, explored the concept of ‘learned helplessness’ and how far it related to a ‘cycle of battering’.67 Helplessness denotes women as passive recipients rather than people who can make decisions and seek help. She therefore asked the women in her study if, during the years of violence, they thought of themselves as helpless. While their responses to some extent supported Walker’s theory, Hoff points out that although these women said that they felt helpless, they pointed to factors such as lack of physical strength or support from friends or external agencies as some of the factors which made them feel so. As Hoff says: Despite their desperate situations and the difficulty in identifying sources of aid, the women were hardly helpless. Generally, they were always scheming about how to stop the battering, eg by examining their own behaviour or ways of escaping the situation, by considering how they could get and keep some money. They took steps to please their mates and to satisfy their demands; they protected and took care of their children ... Their accounts also reveal that they actively defended themselves and that when they did not, it was not necessarily because they felt helpless; rather, they had learned that a worse beating or other negative consequences would ensue.68
In Mezey’s research, most of the women had left their abuser on at least one occasion and virtually all of the women had sought help from the criminal and civil justice system. As such they were not helpless at the beginning of the relationship, but as all the attempts to prevent the violence failed, they became more passive, hopeless and despairing. Hoff criticises the concept of ‘learned helplessness’ because there is a danger of concentrating on the victim’s psychological characteristics alone rather than recognising that a multiplicity of other factors, such as lack of support from friends or other external agencies, can mean that the woman is helpless, that is there is no help available to her. In Hoff’s survey, all the women had eventually left their partners after repeated violence. Their reasons for remaining so long, along with experiences of women who did not leave, serve to give some explanation why women stay. Hoff asked the question ‘why did you stay after the first incident of violence?’. The responses were varied but demonstrated common themes. All of the women loved their partners and made excuses for their behaviour. All showed a commitment to making the relationship work and, if there were children involved, felt that they would be unable to succeed as single parents. In addition, Hoff found that the women had a certain acceptance of male __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
66 Hoff, op cit, pp 64–66. 67 Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984), New York: Springer. 68 Hoff, op cit, p 64. 23
Domestic Violence authority and power, although not the authority to use violence. She notes that Dobash and Dobash69 link the view of male authority with the teachings of the church and other social institutions, which encourage wives to keep the family together and project a positive image of her partner to the outside world, irrespective of his behaviour towards her. If one examines the views expressed by the women in Hoff’s research, we can see that they felt that it was their responsibility to hold the family together and to support their partners. Leaving was further complicated by the fact that often they had no money, nowhere to go, and children to consider. In addition, many women said that their partners had blamed them for the violence (in one case, a counsellor asked the woman what she had done to provoke her husband) and often showed remorse after the first beating. Thus practical considerations, coupled with the victim’s self-blame for the violence and her commitment to making the relationship work, all contributed to these women remaining after the first experience of violence. After the first violent incident, Hoff says that the following scenario evolves: Man hits woman; she is shocked; he is remorseful and promises never to do it again; she believes him, acts on the basis of her commitment to make the marriage work and stays with her partner. Although he is probably sincere in his promise not to hit her again, at an unconscious level the fact that she stays with him despite the violence, symbolises for him a certain licence to repeat the violence. After the second incident of violence, the woman is even more condemned – including by her mate – for her ‘stupidity’ and ‘weakness’ in accepting the violence. Not only is the vicious circle closed, but there is little or no condemnation of the men for failing to keep their promises, and frequently indifference to the violence itself by the police or other public officials. Thus, the stage is set for repeated, chronic violence.70
While this reveals the common cycle, it does not explain why the cycle evolves in the first place. Why, then, did the women in Hoff’s survey stay for so long after the violence became repeated? Again the responses to Hoff’s question reveal common themes: economic dependency, child care responsibilities, a commitment to the relationship and the sense of failure are mentioned again and again. What comes through most particularly is that the women had been socialised into the traditional role of the woman as the successful wife and mother, who, as a result of that role, had a responsibility to nurture the family and keep it together. In addition there was a fear of reprisals if they did leave. This fear is not unjustified. Barnard et al71 discovered that 57% of women killed by their spouses or cohabitees had recently left them. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
69 Dobash and Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy (1979), New York: Free Press. 70 Hoff, op cit, p 44. 71 Barnard, Vera & Vera, and Newman, ‘Till death us do part: a study of spouse murder’ (1982) Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 10(4), 271–80. 24
What is Domestic Violence? Mezey, in her study of women who killed their violent partners, analysed why the women were still with their partners at the time of the killings. 90.9% had tried to leave on at least one occasion and 45.5% had made more than one attempt. Their reasons for returning are similar to those given by the women in Hoff’s research: economic dependency, a commitment to the relationship, nowhere to go. In addition, one woman, having left five times, the last time for two years, discovered that her partner was abusing the son she had been forced to leave behind and returned for his sake. Another woman was traced to where she was hiding and terrorised into returning. The women in Mezey’s survey returned and ultimately killed their abusers; those in Hoff’s survey eventually left. What makes a victim of repeated violence finally decide to leave? This is where the responses differ widely, demonstrating that the eventual decision to leave is based on circumstances unique to the individual situation. Fear of being killed, fear of being driven to suicide, fear for the children, an acknowledgment that the violence will not stop, a particular beating, being beaten when pregnant, were all mentioned as the reason the decision was made. However, in addition, these women need social and financial support to overcome the reasons for not leaving sooner. This to some extent explains why some women leave after only a few years and others after many. As Mezey shows, the adequacy or otherwise of the support systems will also often determine whether the woman returns. What the research demonstrates is that the victims of domestic violence all have common reasons for remaining with their violent partners but that their reasons for leaving the relationship (if they do) are diverse and are dependent upon the support available from external agencies. In many cases these support systems are inadequate. One of the women in Mezey’s group had taken out two injunctions against her husband, both of which were broken, leading to more violence. Another brought charges of GBH. These were dropped, although her husband was imprisoned for unrelated property offences for three years and, on his release, began a campaign of retributive violence. Lack of adequate protection from the criminal and civil law, lack of shelter space, lack of adequate housing, and lack of money all imprison these women and allow the ‘cycle of battering’ to continue.
THE REASONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Gelles states:72 ‘The last two decades of research on the various aspects of family violence are in agreement on one major point – there are a multitude of factors associated with violence in the home.’ __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
72 Gelles, Family Violence (1987), Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, p 40. 25
Domestic Violence He continues, however, that researchers have consistently found the following factors related to various aspects of domestic violence: (1) the cycle of violence – the intergenerational transmission of violence; (2) low socio-economic status; (3) social and structural stress; (4) social isolation and low community embeddedness; (5) low self-concept; and (6) personality problems and psychopathology. Much of the research into why domestic violence occurs has been summarised by Jenny Clifton,73 Lorna Smith,74 and Gill Hague and Ellen Malos.75 All argue that research in this area has identified a number of factors which can lead to family violence. These can be categorised into pathological factors, social factors and cycles of violence. In addition there is the feminist explanation of violence.
1 Pathological factors Early research in this area focused on pathological factors rather than cultural or social influences. Faulk76 and Gayford77 argue that men who abuse their wives are mentally ill or disturbed. Gayford’s theories were based on a study of 100 women at the Chiswick Women’s Aid Refuge which concluded that the men who battered their partners were pathologically jealous, badly brought up, spoiled and indulged as children and incapable of looking after themselves. This research, however, has since been criticised on methodological grounds.78 Pizzey79 describes violent partners as psychopaths and many other writers quote examples of the perpetrator exhibiting pathological jealousy.80 Research has examined the pathology of the victim. Some writers have even suggested that female victims have caused the __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
73 Clifton, ‘Factors predisposing family members to violence’ in Violence in the Family – Theory and Practice in Social Work (1982), Edinburgh: HMSO, pp 25–32. 74 Smith, Domestic Violence (1989) Home Office Research Study 107, London: HMSO, pp 24–29. 75 Hague and Malos, Domestic Violence: Action for Change (1993), Cheltenham: New Clarion Press, pp 54–62. 76 Faulk, ‘Men who assault their wives’ (1974) Medicine, Science and the Law, 14, pp 180–83. 77 Gayford, ‘Wife battering: a preliminary survey of 100 cases’ (1975) British Medical Journal, pp 194–97. 78 Wilson, The Existing Research into Battered Women (1976), London: National Women’s Aid Federation. 79 Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (1974), Harmondsworth: Penguin. 80 Cf Gelles, The Violent Home, op cit; Dobash, Dobash et al ‘ Wife beating: the victims speak’ (1978) 2 Victimology, and incidents quoted in Hoff, op cit. 26
What is Domestic Violence? violence to themselves. Gayford81 says that some of the women in his survey were not feminine, that is they did not display what he perceived to be typical feminine behaviour characteristics. Storr 82 states that often nagging, aggression or over-submissiveness can cause domestic violence and that some victims will unconsciously use these to provoke violence. Even Pizzey and Shapiro83 suggested that in some cases women want to be hit and therefore provoke violence, arguing that many women leave one violent relationship only to enter another. Pagelow84 points out, however, that many of the characteristics in victims identified by some writers are contradictory, as demonstrated above in Storr. Andrews85 found little evidence to suggest that victims left one violent relationship to enter another. Furthermore, Smith86 points out that much of the research identifying pathological characteristics has been based on small unrepresentative samples and thus should not be used to generalise, as there has been no research which looks at families with no history of violence in order to identify whether the above characteristics are also present in non-violent families. Sommers, Barnes and Murray,87 however, have criticised the view that mental disorders play little part in domestic violence. They found that certain factors could be isolated to predict violence, for example being young and achieving high scores on Eysenck’s Psychoticism Scale, the Neurotiscism Index and the McAndrew Scale. Furthermore, O’Leary88 discovered in his sample that men who batter exhibit certain personality disorders. George considers that such factors have been dismissed, losing ground to later-developed social and feminist theories. He argues ‘we need to re-examine partner abuse in the light of what the neurosciences can tell us of such behaviours’.89
2 Social factors Criticism of research in this area which focused only on pathological characteristics looks at violence as a response to a variety of social factors. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
88 89
Gayford, op cit. Storr, Human Aggression (1974), Harmondsworth: Penguin. Pizzey and Shapiro, ‘Choosing a violent relationship’ (1981) New Society, 23 April, p 133. Op cit. Andrews, Violence in Normal Families. Paper presented at the Marriage Research Centre Conference on Family Violence, April 1987. Smith, op cit, p 24. Somers, Barnes and Murray, ‘Alcohol consumption, alcohol abuse, personality and female perpetrated spouse abuse’ (1992) Journal of Personality and Individual Differences 13, quoted in George, ‘Riding the donkey backwards: men as the unacceptable victims of domestic violence’ (1994) The Journal of Men’s Studies, vol 3, no 2, pp 137–59. O’Leary, ‘Through a psychological lens. Personality traits, personality disorders and levels of violence’ in Gelles and Loseke (eds), Current Controversies in Family Violence (1993), Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp 7–30. George, op cit, p 149, nn 8, 7. 27
Domestic Violence Clifton, for example, identifies that some writers have suggested that stressinducing factors such as unemployment can lead to violence and have observed an increase in violence in times of high unemployment. Our own research showed that, on average, arguments about money preceded the violence in 5% of cases. Stress can lead to an increase in alcohol consumption and thus, it is argued, explain the higher incidents of domestic violence committed when the perpetrator is drunk. In Gayford’s study over 50% of the women in his sample said that their husbands were drunk once a week. Roy90 found that just over a third of perpetrators in his survey had a drink problem. Again in the Leicestershire study, drink was cited as a factor in 36% of cases in the family jurisdiction of the court and 38% of cases in the domestic jurisdiction, this being the most common factor cited in our sample. Furthermore, in the Leicestershire Constabulary Domestic Violence Annual Report 1995/96, alcohol was cited as a contributory factor to the violent incident in 36% of cases (1,874 incidents out of a total of 5,144 reported). It should be noted, however, that research shows that drink is often the result of other factors and thus a contributory factor to violence rather than the cause. As Smith says ‘alcohol provides “the Dutch courage”’.91 Further research looks to social structural explanations for violence.92 Such research looks to expectations of men created and defined by society as a whole. For example, traditional stereotyping paints the man as successful, the breadwinner, the head of the household, and the dominant partner. By contrast, women are perceived as the homemakers, the subservient partner. Any threat to this order can therefore lead to violence. Harris and Bologh93 surveyed a small sample of 34 men. Fifty per cent were from working class occupations, the rest from middle or upper middle class occupations (Harris and Bologh definitions). The working class group espoused the views expressed above and felt that their wives should be kept in line, seeing themselves as head of the household and expecting obedience from their wives in return for financial support. Harris and Bologh concluded that these men sought supremacy at home to compensate for their low status occupations and that such supremacy asserted their male worth. However, although these views were not shared by those from middle and upper middle class occupations, in that such respondents sought egality at home, pressures of their jobs meant that they could not fulfil this role to the extent of their expectations and their frustrations in trying to be a successful worker __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
90 Roy, ‘Four thousand partners in violence: a trend analysis’, in Roy (ed) The Abusive Partner (1982), New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 91 Smith, op cit, p 30. 92 Cf Straus, ‘A sociological perspective on the causes of family violence’ in Green (ed) Violence and the Family (1980), Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; Steinmetz and Straus, Violence in the Family (1974), New York: Harper and Row; Gelles, ‘An exchange/control social theory’ in Finkelhor et al (eds) The Dark Side of Families, op cit. 93 Bologh, ‘The dark side of love: blue and white collar wife abuse’ (1985) 10 Victomology, 242–52, quoted in Smith, op cit. 28
What is Domestic Violence? and partner led to frustration which resulted in violence. O’Brien94 argues that, in respect of those with working class occupations, the threat to the husband’s status within the relationship by, for example, the wife achieving more in the workplace or acquiring a higher status than himself, can lead to violence to reassert the dominance of the male as the superior partner. Although this could be seen as an explanation of violence where the husband is in a working class occupation, it fails to explain adequately violence in other classes of society, which, even Harris’s small sample above demonstrates, makes up a sizeable proportion of all domestic violence as a whole. Dobash and Dobash95 give examples which demonstrate that domestic violence is not a problem confined to lower socio-economic groups. They cite the cases of John Fedders, one of President Reagan’s high-ranking legal officials, who had beaten his wife for 18 years96 and of the trial of a wealthy New York lawyer, Joel Steinberg, who was convicted of the murder of his adopted daughter, the transcripts of the trial revealing a catalogue of abuse against his female partner, including a ruptured spleen and minor brain damage. They also cite a case reported in 1989 of a retired vicar who bludgeoned his wife to death over a period of two hours because he was having trouble with his radio reception. Again the trial revealed a catalogue of abuse during 46 years of marriage. These examples reveal that the cause of domestic violence cannot be ascribed to the frustrations of a low status occupation.
3 Cycles of violence The cycle of violence theory suggests that violence is a learned response in childhood which continues into adult behaviour, thus leading to generations of violent adults within a particular family or community. The theory further argues that the response to violence in childhood differs between the sexes. Boys learn to be violent and girls learn to be passive victims. The boy witnessing violence between his parents becomes a violent partner in front of his children who in turn become violent partners in front of their children and so on. The girl, seeing her mother as a victim of violence, chooses a violent partner and herself becomes the victim. The cycle of violence theory thus suggests that violent behaviour can be learned as either a witness or a victim of violence, so creating a ‘norm’. Straus 97 first identified a possible causal link between childhood experience of violence and violence in adulthood, but the studies which are __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
94 O’Brien, ‘Violence in divorce-prone families’ (1971) 33 Journal of Marriage and the Family 692. 95 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6. 96 Ibid, p 5. 97 Straus, op cit, n 62. 29
Domestic Violence mainly quoted in relation to this correlation are those of Gayford (above) and Gelles.98 Clifton criticises both pieces of research as inconclusive, as there is a lack of clarity of the extremes of violence observed nor whether it is the experience of the perpetrator or victim which has the impact. It has already been noted that Gayford’s research has been criticised by Wilson on methodological grounds. That research found that 40% of the husbands of the victims had been subjected to or had witnessed violence in childhood and 20% of victims reported such experiences. This leaves 60% of perpetrators who had been neither victim to nor witnesses of violence. Likewise, Gelles found that 50% of his sample who had witnessed violence as children became violent as adults, while 50% did not, whereas of those who had not experienced violence in childhood, 40% became violent adults. Therefore, while there is some evidence that behaviour can be learned, the theory does not adequately explain why, as in Gelles’s research, 40% of his group who had not experienced violence in childhood became violent adults. Hague and Malos state: The theory rests ultimately on assumptions about the natural aggressiveness of boys and men, and the passivity of girls and women. This kind of explanation also loses force if violence, and violence against women in particular, is both very common and often accepted by the whole of society ... One possible reason for [the theory’s] popularity is that it seems to suggest that those men who attack their wives or partners, and those women who experience violence, are not ‘people like us’ – but rather belong to a special deviant group of ‘violent families’, who are completely different from the rest of us.99
The theory, therefore, does not provide an adequate explanation for the extent of domestic violence within society today. All that can be said is that experiencing violence as a child, either as a witness or a victim, may, in some cases, lead to an acceptance of violence as a norm, but it is suggested that this is only a contributing factor.
4 The feminist explanation The basis of feminist explanations of domestic violence is that it reflects the inequality of power between males and females in society. Dobash and Dobash100 use the concept of patriarchy to explain this. This consists of two elements: the structural, that is social structures which delineate women’s subordinate role in society, and the ideological, that is the socialisation process that ensures acceptance of this. Buzawa and Buzawa101 sum up the tenets of this theory as: __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
98 99 100 101
Gelles, The Violent Home, op cit. Hague and Malos, op cit, p 58. Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 7, quoted in Smith, op cit, p 26. Buzawa and Buzawa, Domestic Violence: the Criminal Justice Response (1990), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 30
What is Domestic Violence? Women in this model have historically been seen as chattel, unable to manage their own affairs without the strong leadership of an authoritarian family patriarch. The patriarch, in turn, traditionally had the right to enforce male standards of accepted ‘feminine’ behaviour through whatever means necessary, including force.102
This model makes women economically dependent upon their male partners and therefore powerless.103 Pahl104 talks of the assumptions about marriage and the subordinate role of the woman within it, identifying the importance of the allocation of control of the household budget. During her research she found that control over money was seen as a method of controlling wives, so emphasising the dominant role of the male in the relationship. The issue of male dominance and control is emphasised in other studies. Roy105 found that the four most common factors preceding violence were arguments over money, jealousy, sexual problems and alcohol. Dobash and Dobash106 state: The four main sources of conflict leading to violent attacks are the men’s possessiveness and jealousy, men’s expectations concerning women’s domestic work, men’s sense of the right to punish ‘their’ women for perceived wrongdoing, and the importance of men maintaining or exercising their position of authority.
Buzawa and Buzawa107 state that this link between violence towards women and sexual inequality is supported by cross-cultural studies. They quote from Levinson, who conducted a study of 90 small-scale societies worldwide in 1989.108 He found family violence rare or non-existent in 16 of them. In these societies he found that, in addition to a cultural philosophy of peaceful coexistence, spouses enjoy sexual equality. This is reflected in joint decisionmaking in household and financial matters. Smith, citing Morash,109 argues that there is a similarity between the arguments of those who support the social structural explanations and the feminist explanations of domestic violence, although the two groups use different models on which to construct their theories. Straus, for example, agrees that the male dominant society of the western world permits
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
102 Ibid, p 18. 103 Cf Schecter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggle of the Battered Women’s Movement (1982) Boston, MA: South End Press. 104 Pahl, op cit. 105 Roy, op cit. 106 Dobash and Dobash, op cit, n 6, p 4. 107 Buzawa and Buzawa, op cit, n 101, p 19. 108 Levinson, Family Violence in Cross Cultural Perspective (1989), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 109 Smith, op cit, p 28. 31
Domestic Violence husband-wife violence. 110 Feminist writers, for example Dobash and Dobash, have noted the relevance of family history, the use of alcohol, etc as factors which can contribute to violence. The above theories try to find a cause and thus an explanation for domestic violence. It has already been noted that many of the theories isolate the same factors, while grafting those factors onto different models. What all of these theories demonstrate, however, is that there is no one sole cause, one single factor nor one ideal model which adequately explains the reasons for the extent of domestic violence across the whole spectrum of society today. As George has said:111 If we are to develop a cogent theory of the causes of family violence we need to integrate and define the interplay between the social, psychological, and physiological factors. Rather than assume we have all the answers by focusing only on the social (eg issues of power in relationships) or the psychological (eg the need to dominate), we must look at all the possibilities.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
110 Straus, ‘A sociological perspective on the prevention and treatment of wife beating’ in Roy (ed) The Battered Woman, op cit, n 67. 111 George, op cit, p 149. 32
CHAPTER 3
CIVIL PROTECTION BEFORE 1997
INTRODUCTION Although the most common manifestation of domestic violence is physical assault, which is a criminal offence, there are many reasons why victims of such violence may wish to use the civil rather than the criminal law. Such reasons were given by the Women’s Aid Federation of England when giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee:1 From the point of view of the woman experiencing the abuse, it may seem preferable to apply for protection in the civil courts rather than to give evidence in a criminal prosecution of her partner. Firstly the process seems to be more under her control: she instructs the solicitor, who will represent her in court, or will instruct a barrister on her behalf. Secondly in most cases the hearing will be in a closed court or in the Judge’s chambers, and there will be no publicity. Thirdly, her partner will not acquire a criminal record, which could hamper his employment prospects and hence indirectly affect the economic situation of the woman and her children.
Prior to the introduction of statutory protection beginning in 1976, victims had only two forms of civil protection at their disposal. These two forms of protection co-existed alongside the statutory protection and will continue to protect those parties not covered by the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996. If proceedings are pending between the parties, the court has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction in those proceedings restraining the assailant from molesting, assaulting or interfering with the applicant. These proceedings are between married parties, for example for judicial separation or divorce. In respect of unmarried parties there lies an action in tort. Until recently, however, English law did not recognise a tort of harassment or molestation per se, and thus an injunction between unmarried parties would only be issued to support an existing legal or equitable right. Furthermore, this right could not be protected by issuing an injunction restraining a defendant from being in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s property. In Patel v Patel 2 a father-in-law originally obtained a non-molestation injunction against his son-in-law which prevented the defendant from molesting the plaintiff, trespassing on the plaintiff’s property or approaching within 50 yards of the property. The exclusion from the area was later deleted by a county court judge, an action __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2
Home Affairs Committee 1992–93, HC 245, Domestic Violence, vol 11, Memoranda of Evidence, Cmnd 2269, London: HMSO, p xxxiv. [1988] 2 FLR 179. 33
Domestic Violence upheld by the Court of Appeal which held that a defendant could only be excluded from an area if a tort had been or was likely to be committed. Merely being within the vicinity of the property was not a tort. Furthermore, Waterhouse J held that there was no tort of harassment.3 A later Court of Appeal, however, held that an injunction would be issued if the conduct complained of amounted to another tort such as trespass or conduct which was calculated to impair the plaintiff’s health (Burnett v George4). The Court of Appeal in Khorasandjian v Bush5 developed the law further. In this case the parties had never cohabited and the plaintiff lived with her parents. The conduct complained of consisted of unwanted phone calls. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction despite the fact that the plaintiff had no proprietary interest to protect. Dillon LJ, referring to Waterhouse J in Patel, stated that he found it difficult to say that there was no tort of harassment, particularly as the court in Patel had issued a non-molestation injunction. While appearing to accept that a tort of harassment exists, however, Khorasandjian did not deal with the problem of exclusion from an area in which the dwelling house of the plaintiff was situated. The issue of exclusion zones was raised on appeal in Burris v Azadani.6 In that case the defendant appealed against a sentence of imprisonment imposed for breach of an exclusion zone contained in an non-molestation injunction. The defendant argued that the judge had no jurisdiction to impose an exclusion zone and, given that his only breaches of the injunction had been to cycle past the plaintiff’s property, he should not have been imprisoned because such conduct was not tortious. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the judge had no jurisdiction to impose an exclusion zone. The Court of Appeal stated that in other areas of law, the courts had developed powers to issue an injunction to protect the interests of the plaintiff even where the conduct restrained was not, in itself, unlawful, for example in the granting of Mareva injunctions. Bingham MR regarded Patel as a case correctly decided, where the court had to balance the interests of the plaintiff against those of the defendant. In that case it was clear that tortious action on the part of the defendant was not reasonably apprehended and thus it was not reasonable to restrain the freedom of the defendant by the imposition of an exclusion zone. In Burris, however, there was reasonable apprehension of future tortious conduct, ie harassment, and thus the exclusion zone was necessary to protect the plaintiff. Schiemann LJ, while agreeing with the Master of the Rolls, was more cautious. Although impliedly accepting a tort of harassment, he stressed that the imposition of the exclusion zone was acceptable in the case because it was imposed in an interlocutory ex parte __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
3 4 5 6
Ibid, p 182. [1992] 1 FLR 525. [1993] 1 QB 727. [1995] 4 All ER 802.
34
Civil Protection before 1997 injunction, suggesting that his Lordship might have reached a different conclusion if the application had been for a final order. It would appear that, since Burris, victims of molestation not falling within the categories of persons afforded statutory protection before the Family Law Act 1996, and those victims who will still be excluded from the 1996 legislation, despite an enlarged category of protected persons,7 will now be protected from harassment. In addition, a victim will be able to secure greater protection in that the court can exclude the harasser from an area in which the victim resides. Whether Burris limits this power to interlocutory ex parte injunctions has yet to be seen, but the Protection from Harassment Act 19978 should clarify the situation. Although research suggests that the problem of violence within domestic relationships is not a recent one, it was only after the publication of Erin Pizzey’s book9 that a House of Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage was established in 1975. The report of this committee10 provided the basis and impetus for legislation in the form of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (DVMPA) 1976. Section 1 of the Act allows the court to issue non-molestation and exclusion orders to protect victims of domestic violence. This Act was later supplemented by ss 16–18 of the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act (DPMCA) 1978, which gives magistrates powers to issue personal protection orders and ouster orders. In addition, the House of Lords’ decision in Richards v Richards11 introduced a third form of statutory protection by applying the provisions of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 to domestic violence victims.
STATUTORY APPLICANTS 1 The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 Although at first glance it would appear that the availability of remedies in civil law to protect victims of domestic violence were more than adequate prior to the enactment of the FLA 1996, the reality is very different. The DVMPA 1976, according to s 1, applies to married applicants and to cohabitees who are ‘living with each other in the same household as husband and wife’ (s 1(2)), but although Parliament recognised for the first time that unmarried partners are as much in need of protection as their married __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
7 8 9 10
See below, Chapter 4. See below, Chapter 4. Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (1974), Harmondsworth: Penguin. House of Commons Select Committee on Violence in Marriage, Report, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices HC 553-11 (1974–75) London: HMSO. 11 [1984] AC 174. 35
Domestic Violence counterparts, the phrase ‘living together in the same household as husband and wife’ is not without its difficulties of interpretation. The DVMPA 1976 was intended to apply to those parties who were living together ‘on a stable basis’.12 The DVMPA 1976 protects married partners irrespective of whether they are living together or not, and in Adeoso v Adeoso13 the Court of Appeal held that the words in s 1(2) were intended to describe the nature of the couples’ relationship and not their living arrangements at the time of application. However, the wording of s 1(2) causes problems in the not uncommon situation where the unmarried victim has moved out of the shared home to escape the violence. A literal interpretation of the section would have nullified the protection, so a series of Court of Appeal decisions laid down the rule that the DVMPA 1976 applied if the parties were living together at the time of the incident which caused the applicant to leave.14 There remains the problem, however, that given that the DVMPA 1976 was designed to facilitate immediate short-term protection, the longer the parties have lived apart, the less likely that the Act can be invoked, and it is problematic whether it can be invoked to restrain violence committed after the parties have ceased to live together. In Harrison v Lewis15 for example, it was held that there was no jurisdiction when the assault occurred nine months after the parties had separated. Furthermore, a perpetrator can only be excluded from the matrimonial home or an area in which the matrimonial home is situated. The inadequacy of the wording of the DVMPA 1976 was addressed by the Court of Appeal in McCann v Wright16 where the court interpreted the provisions in a purposive way. The case involved a cohabitant who had moved out of the shared accommodation to live with her mother. She obtained a non-molestation injunction against the defendant one month after she had left, on the basis of his conduct towards her after her departure. The court found no problem in interpreting s 2(2) in a purposive way. While authority17 had already decided that an injunction could be issued based on violence complained of while the parties were living together as husband and wife, there was no authority stating that the court had jurisdiction in respect of violence committed after the parties had ceased to live together, although Donaldson MR in Duo v Osborne18 and Pidduck v Molloy19 suggested that s 2 be extended to include former spouses and former cohabitants. In essence, this is what the Court of Appeal did in McCann, by protecting the victim against __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Official Report (HC), Standing Committee F, 30 June 1976, col 5, Jo Richardson MP. [1980] 1 WLR 1535. Cf McLean v Burke [1982] 3 FLR 70; O’Neill v Williams [1984] FLR 1. [1988] 2 FLR 339. [1995] FLR 579. See above, n 14. [1992] 2 FLR 425. [1992] 2 FLR 202. 36
Civil Protection before 1997 violence committed by her ex-cohabitant after they had ceased to live together. Furthermore, the court imposed an exclusion zone on the defendant to exclude him from an area where her mother’s house was situated. The section has caused other difficulties. Despite the dicta of Donaldson MR above, it does not appear to protect the victim who is divorced from her assailant and no longer living with him. Cumming-Bruce J in White v White20 said: ‘I think it unlikely that after decree absolute a situation of such urgency should arise between the parties ... which made it necessary to contemplate the use of a power of arrest annexed to an injunction, pursuant to the 1976 Act.’ Furthermore, given that to invoke protection a couple have to be ‘living together as man and wife’, it does not protect victims in other forms of domestic relationships such as those merely sharing living accommodation as friends or family, or those living in homosexual or lesbian relationships. This is because the section is interpreted literally. Thus although cohabitees had statutory protection for the first time, many other victims are excluded from the provisions of the DVMPA 1976 and are forced to rely on the criminal law or on remedies in tort. Children are also protected under the DVMPA 1976. Section 1(b) allows the court to restrain the respondent from molesting a child who is living with the applicant. The interpretation placed on the word ‘molest’ is discussed below. Although the definition of child includes anyone below the age of 18, the requirement that the child has to be living with the applicant restricts the courts’ protection, and thus if the child has only stayed with the applicant on a temporary basis it is doubtful whether the court can issue an injunction for the child’s benefit. It is also doubtful whether the court can protect a person who is over the age of 18 but who is a child in relation to the applicant or respondent in the sense that he or she is the son or daughter of the party.
2 The Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 The position in relation to applicants under the DPMCA 1978 is even more restrictive. The DPMCA 1978 only applies to spouses (s 16) and gives no protection to couples living outside of marriage, thus excluding cohabitees, family members or divorced couples. While children can be protected, s 16(2)(b) only gives a remedy in respect of a ‘child of the family’. Section 88(1) defines that phrase as comprising a child of both of the parties to the marriage or any other child who is treated by both parties as a child of the family, other than a foster child placed with them by the local authority or a voluntary organisation. This is a much more restrictive provision than the equivalent __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
20 [1983] Fam 54 at 63. 37
Domestic Violence ‘child living with the applicant’ under the DPMCA 1976, for although it protects children of the parties, stepchildren and those children that the parties have privately fostered, it does not protect any other child who is living with the applicant and who is the victim of harassment or violence at the hands of the respondent.
3 The Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 The introduction of the Matrimonial Homes Act (MHA) 1983 into the arena of domestic violence by the House of Lords in Richards, although giving further statutory support to victims, again only applies to those with a matrimonial home defined in its strictest sense, ie married couples. Furthermore, the Act only applies if both spouses are entitled to occupy the home by virtue of a legal estate vested in them jointly or by virtue of a contract or enactment, or if one spouse has a statutory right to occupy the matrimonial home by virtue of s 1(1). The MHA 1983 was designed to deal with the occupation rights of the parties rather than with their physical protection, and as such does not allow the court to do other than declare, enforce, prohibit or suspend the operation of those rights vis-à-vis the spouses (ss 1(2), 1(9) and 9). The operation of the existing legislation was the subject of the Leicestershire study.21 The aim of the project was an investigation into the use of domestic violence legislation and an identification of the type of applicant, the characteristics and nature of cases involving allegations of domestic violence and the remedies obtained. The research into the operation of the courts was conducted over a six-month period and by necessity concentrated on county court jurisdiction, as in the particular region where the research was conducted, applications in the magistrates’ court were virtually nonexistent (one application in the 12 months prior to the research period). Such a discovery supports earlier research by the London Strategic Policy Unit22 that solicitors prefer the jurisdiction of the county court, despite the fact that the magistrates’ courts are generally speedier, cheaper and can grant additional orders such as maintenance. Both the research conducted by the London Strategic Policy Unit and that of Parker in 198523 suggest that this is because solicitors have more confidence in county court judges and that there is a feeling that magistrates, being involved in criminal cases, require a higher standard of proof. Murch et al24 found that solicitors frequently favoured the __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
21 Jones, Lockton, Ward and Kashefi, ‘Domestic violence applications: an empirical study of one court’ (1995) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 17(1) 67–86. 22 London Strategic Policy Unit, Police Response to Domestic Violence (1986), Police Monitoring and Research Unit Briefing Paper 1. 23 Parker, ‘The legal background’ in Pahl (ed) Private Violence and Public Policy (1985), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 24 Murch et al, The Overlapping Family Jurisdictions of the Magistrates’ Courts and County Courts (1987) Bristol: Sociological Centre for Family Studies, University of Bristol. 38
Civil Protection before 1997 magistrates for personal protection orders when speed was the important factor. Our regional survey, however, did not show this. Furthermore, Home Office statistics reveal a decline in applications under the DPMCA 1978 since a peak of 8,700 in 1984, in that there were 1,642 applications under that Act in 1993 compared with 20,462 applications under the DVMPA 1976. One aspect of the research was an analysis of the circumstances of the applicants who applied to the court. During the six-month study there were 283 cases involving different applicants. These cases were further classified by reference to the jurisdiction of the court into family, civil and domestic cases. Family jurisdiction identified those cases where a remedy in respect of domestic violence was sought as part of divorce or judicial separation proceedings. Civil jurisdiction identified cases where a remedy was sought based on the court’s jurisdiction in tort (the research being conducted prior to the decision in Khorasandjian v Bush), and domestic jurisdiction identified those applicants using the provisions of the DVMPA 1976. During the research period the majority of the applicants seeking a remedy were women (97.5% in family cases, 98% in both civil and domestic cases). Of 283 applicants, 119 used the family jurisdiction, 42 used the civil jurisdiction and 122 used the DVMPA 1976. Of those invoking statutory protection, 32 (26%) were spouses. This means that of all the applicants in the study, 151 were married to the perpetrator of the violence and yet only 21.19% chose to use the jurisdiction of the court under the DVMPA 1976, while the rest (78.81%) relied on the court’s ancillary jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings. There may be explanations for this choice of jurisdiction which the research did not reveal – for example, the applications in the family jurisdiction may have been the last of a series of applications, those previous applications having been made under the DVMPA 1976; the applicant may have decided to divorce the perpetrator because of the violence and had not felt in need of protection until the proceedings; the particular court in the study was unsure of its jurisdiction in relation to spouses under the DVMPA 1976 since the decision in Richards. What the research does indicate, however, is that in 1991 the DVMPA 1976 was not being used extensively by those parties it was specifically enacted to protect. This supports the comment by Lord Salmon in Davis v Johnson 25 that the Act was ‘hurried through Parliament to provide urgently needed first aid for “battered wives”’. Less speed might have produced more adequate protection. Analysis of the rest of the applicants reveals that 59.5% in the civil jurisdiction and 50% in the domestic jurisdiction were former cohabitants. This represented 86 (30.39%) of all applicants during the research period. While a large number of these applicants used the DVMPA 1976, 61 (21.07%) were outside the protection of the statute and were forced to rely on the __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
25 [1979] AC 264, at 340. 39
Domestic Violence court’s tort jurisdiction. The Law Commission (reporting prior to the recent cases discussed above) in its Working Paper No 11326 said of actions in tort: This is not wholly appropriate in the context of domestic violence because the main object of the tort system is financial compensation and in most cases this will either not be available or will reduce the resources otherwise used to maintain the family.
The statistics from the research indicate that the problems of interpreting s 1(2) of the DVMPA 1976 forced victims to use a jurisdiction recognised by the Law Commission in 1989 as totally inappropriate. This is particularly significant when looking at the numbers of cohabitees who used the legislation. Only 23 (19%) of all applicants using the DVMPA 1976 were living with the perpetrator at the time of application, providing strong evidence that in a large number of cases the victim leaves the family home to escape the violence. The consequences of such a move on the legal remedies available have already been noted. Of the remaining applicants using the civil and domestic jurisdiction in the research period, seven (4.27%) were former spouses, four using the civil jurisdiction and three using the domestic jurisdiction, and 12 (6.10%) were former sexual partners who had never cohabited. These 12 used the civil jurisdiction only. The relationship to the respondent was not known in one case in the civil jurisdiction (2.4%) and three cases in the domestic jurisdiction (2.5%). The number of applicants in the research study (283) were taken over a six-month period. Statistics taken from the later research conducted with the police force in the same area, however, indicate that this is only the tip of the iceberg in relation to the number of victims of domestic violence. In 1994, the police recorded 4,467 incidents of domestic violence. This had risen to 4,943 reported incidents during 1995, an increase of 10.7%.27 It will be seen in Chapter 5 that the definition of domestic violence in the policy of Leicestershire police force which participated in the research is much wider than existing or former sexual partners, and the vast difference between the figures of the court applicants and domestic violence incidents involving the police highlights the fact that many victims are excluded from or choose not to seek the protection of the court. It could be hazarded that in some cases this is probably because the victim has no locus to apply for court protection.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
26 Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (1989), London: HMSO, para 2.9. 27 Leicestershire Police Constabulary, Domestic Violence Annual Report 1995/6. 40
Civil Protection before 1997
REMEDIES In Richards Lord Scarman observed: The statutory provision is a hotchpot of enactments of limited scope passed into law to meet specific situations or to strengthen the powers of specified courts. The sooner the range, scope and effect of these powers are rationalised into a coherent and comprehensive body of statute law, the better.28
It has already been noted that different applicants obtain protection under different pieces of legislation, and that those who do not fall within the restricted statutory definitions can only rely on the jurisdiction in tort. However, in addition to each piece of legislation protecting different classes of victim, the remedies available under the different statutes and the circumstances in which those remedies can be granted differ widely, depending upon which statute is invoked.
1 Non-molestation and exclusion, Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 Under s 1 of the DVMPA 1976 the court has the power to grant an injunction containing one or more of the following provisions: (a) restraining the other party from molesting the applicant; (b) restraining the other party from molesting a child living with the applicant; (c) excluding the other party from any part of the matrimonial home or from a specified area in which the matrimonial home is situated; (d) requiring the other party to permit the applicant to enter and remain in the matrimonial home.
Molestation is given a wide interpretation. In Johnson v Walton29 it was held that there must be an intention to cause distress or harm, but once intention is established, various decisions have held that the word includes pestering, annoying, following around and any other form of harassment.30 Barron,31 however, notes that injunctions are rarely granted in practice without evidence of physical violence. The power to exclude the other party is wide, allowing the court to exclude from part of the home, or to grant total exclusion, including from an area in which the matrimonial home is situated. Given that exclusion orders are intended to provide a short-term remedy and allow the applicant time to find alternative accommodation or commence __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
28 29 30 31
[1984] 2 All ER 807 at 818. [1990] 1 FLR 350. Cf George v George [1986] 2 FLR 347; Horner v Horner [1982] 2 All ER 495. Barron, Not Worth the Paper (1990), Women’s Aid Federation, England. 41
Domestic Violence other proceedings,32 a Practice Note of 197833 states that a court should normally impose a time limit of three months on its operation, although persistent breach of the injunction allows a court to grant it for an indefinite period.34 Judicial statistics, however, reveal that in practice, exclusion orders are granted infrequently. In 1994 there were 25,034 applications under the DVMPA 1976. Of these, 24,566 non-molestation orders were granted and 3,946 exclusion orders.35 Again, although it would appear that the powers under the DVMPA 1976 are wide, the reality is different. The DVMPA 1976 does not mention physical violence and thus gives the court power to grant an injunction where the applicant has suffered psychological violence only. Although Lord Scarman said obiter in Richards that he felt physical violence must have taken place before an exclusion order could be granted, Lord Justice Purchas in Galan v Galan36 said this was not necessary, although there has to be a real threat of violence or disturbance. Barron,37 has already noted the reluctance of judges to grant an injunction where there has been no violence. There are further problems in relation to exclusion orders. Although an exclusion order removes the perpetrator from the home, it has already been seen that the 1978 Practice Note said that normally this should only be for three months. While this may appear to be a long time, in reality it does not give the applicant a great deal of time to find alternative accommodation. Furthermore, while the court can exclude the respondent from an area in which the home is situated, it cannot protect the applicant in relation to her place of work etc, unless it happens to be close to the former matrimonial home, nor can it exclude from the applicant’s new home if she has left the matrimonial abode, thus limiting the effect of any non-molestation order. In addition, the orders only remove the respondent and prevent molestation. The orders cannot require the respondent to leave the home habitable for the applicant, and therefore there is the risk that if the applicant moves back into the home, it will be devoid of furniture and cooking facilities, although academic opinion suggests that removal of such items would amount to molestation of the applicant.38 Powers are also limited in respect of the unmarried applicant who is not a joint tenant or joint mortgagor, in that the court cannot order the landlord or mortgagee to accept payment from the occupant, thus putting the applicant at risk of eviction should the respondent _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Op cit. [1978] 2 All ER 1056. Spencer v Camacho [1983] 4 FLR 662. Judicial Statistics 1981–94. [1985] FLR 905. Op cit. Bromley, Family Law (1992), 8th edn, London: Butterworths, p 167. 42
Civil Protection before 1997 withhold payment of the rent or mortgage. In addition, although the Act itself lays down no criteria that the court should consider before making the exclusion order, Lords Brandon, Diplock and Bridge stated in Richards that the criteria which should be considered when suspending occupation rights under the MHA 1983 should also be considered when excluding under the DVMPA 1976. In other words, judges issuing such orders under the DVMPA 1976 have to consider the criteria listed in s 1(3) of the MHA 1983, namely the parties’ conduct, the parties’ needs and financial resources, the children’s’ needs and all the circumstances of the case. As such, judges exercising their discretion under the DVMPA 1976 have had that discretion restricted. It can be seen, therefore, that the House of Lords’ decision in Richards amounted to a restriction on the powers of the county court in the operation of the DVMPA 1976. The judgment in its entirety has attracted much criticism.39 These criticisms have been reiterated and expanded in the Law Commissions’ Working Paper on Domestic Violence and the Occupation of the Matrimonial Home.40 In particular, the Working Paper criticised the application of the MHA 1983 criteria to exclusions under the DVMPA 1976, arguing that such application failed to take into account the different situations in which exclusion may be sought and that the criteria, which were originally enacted in 1967, did not take into account the very significant developments which had taken place since then and thus failed to give adequate protection against violence because conduct had to be weighed against other factors. As such the criteria did not recognise that priority should be given to protecting the victim rather than preventing hardship to the respondent.41 In addition the ratio of Richards, that the interests of the children are one factor to be considered rather the the predominant factor, means that there is a risk that children’s’ welfare will not be considered and goes against the general trend of the law to give first consideration to the welfare of any children under the age of 18 (s 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973 as amended by s 3 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984). The Working Paper raised two other criticisms against the application of the MHA 1973 criteria to applications under the DVMPA 1976. If an ouster injunction is sought during marital breakdown where divorce proceedings have already begun, then the judge is required to make a decision on the conduct of the respondent which may have been the basis of the petition under s 1(2)(b) of the MCA. Thus the judge is making findings of fact for one purpose in advance of the hearing of the same issue for another purpose. This type of situation invariably impedes any chance of reconciliation the parties may have as it leads to protracted battles in relation to allegations of _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
39 Cf, Eekalaar, ‘The emergence of children’s rights’ (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161. 40 (1992) No 207, London: HMSO. 41 Parker, op cit. 43
Domestic Violence behaviour. This was commented upon by Stamp LJ in Parris v Parris,42 who stated that he deplored the use of hearings to exclude as a pre-trial battle on the allegations of behaviour which would be raised in the divorce hearing. Finally, the Working Paper found that the MHA 1983 criteria are not easily applicable to cohabitants. The criteria, for example, do not direct a court to consider the relative property rights of the parties. Whereas under the MHA 1983 the court can adjust those rights where the parties are married, and the court has the power under the MCA 1973 on judicial separation or divorce to adjust property rights, neither statute applies to cohabitees. Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of the remedies under the DVMPA 1976, a discussion would not be complete without some analysis of the remedies actually applied for and granted under the jurisdiction. In the Leicestershire study, a detailed analysis was undertaken of the remedies applied for and obtained across the three jurisdictions. In relation to applications under the DVMPA 1976, 46.4% (51) of applicants applied for nonmolestation plus ouster plus exclusion orders, 44.5% (49) applied for nonmolestation plus exclusion and 8.2% (9) applied for non-molestation only. Of those who applied for three orders, only 33% (17) obtained them, leaving 77% of applicants with a mixture of orders and undertakings, the next highest number of successful applicants obtaining non-molestation and exclusion orders, 17% (9) and 14% (7) obtaining a non-molestation order only. What is perhaps of concern is that of those who applied for three orders, 31.4% (16) obtained undertakings or a mixture of orders and undertakings. Powers of arrest cannot be attached to undertakings, thus rendering enforcement difficult. Where the applications were for a non-molestation order and exclusion order, however, the success rate was much higher, with 61% (30) of applicants obtaining both orders, 10% (5) obtaining a non-molestation order only and the remainder obtaining a mixture of orders and undertakings. This still left 28.6% (14) with a non-molestation undertaking, again with no possibility of a power of arrest. Of those who applied for a non-molestation order only, 67% (6) were successful, the remaining 33% (3) obtaining undertakings.
2 Personal protection orders and ouster orders under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 Under s 16(2) of the DPMCA 1978, the magistrates’ court has the power to issue the following: (a) an order that the respondent shall not use, or threaten to use, violence against the person of the applicant; __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
42 [1974] Fam Law 77. 44
Civil Protection before 1997 (b) an order that the respondent shall not use, or threaten to use, violence against the person of a child of the family.
Under subsection (3): Where on an application for an order under this section the court is satisfied: (a) that the respondent has used violence against the person of the applicant or a child of the family; or (b) that the respondent has threatened to use violence against the person of the applicant or a child of the family and has used violence against some other person; or (c) that the respondent has in contravention of an order made under subsection 2 above threatened to use violence against the person of the applicant or a child of the family, and that the applicant or a child of the family is in danger of being physically injured by the respondent (or would be in such danger if the applicant or child were to enter the matrimonial home) the court may make one or both of the following orders, that is to say: (1) an order requiring the respondent to leave the matrimonial home; (2) an order prohibiting the respondent from entering the matrimonial home.
A comparison with the powers which the county courts possess under the DVMPA 1976 shows that the powers under the DPMCA 1978 are limited in three respects. Firstly, even if the magistrates are convinced that the applicant is in danger, they have no jurisdiction to issue an order if the respondent has not used or threatened violence against the applicant or child. Secondly, given the wording of the section that the order must prohibit violence against the person of the applicant or child, no order can be granted to protect against psychological violence or other forms of molestation, including violence against property. Thirdly, as has already been noted, the class of parties protected is much more restricted and the section only applies to married couples and children of the family.
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS In addition to normal contempt powers, enforcement of injunctions issued under the DVMPA 1976 is provided by the power in s 2. This allows a judge to attach a power of arrest to an injunction where the respondent has caused actual bodily harm to the applicant or child concerned and the court considers that he is likely to do so again. The power of arrest allows a constable to arrest if he has reasonable cause to suspect that the respondent is in breach of any of the provisions of the injunction. By s 18(1) magistrates can also attach powers of arrest to orders granted by s 16 if they are satisfied that the respondent has physically injured the applicant or child. To this extent the powers of the magistrates could be said 45
Domestic Violence to be wider than those of the county court, which can only attach such a power where the respondent has caused actual bodily harm to the applicant or child. R v Miller 43 held that physical injury included psychological conditions as well as bruises, lacerations and other injuries. In the case of both the DVMPA 1976 and the DPMCA 1978 the power of arrest is seen as exceptional rather than routine, and thus a Practice Note issued in 198144 states that a three-month time limit should normally be imposed on its operation, although in McCann v Wright a power of arrest was issued for 12 months. Much criticism has been levelled at the power of arrest contained in s 2 of the DVMPA 1976. It has already been noted that a power can only be granted where there has been actual bodily harm and there is a risk of further violence, although the Court of Appeal in Kendrick v Kendrick45 stated that this would be satisfied if the applicant had suffered injury to her state of mind, as long as there was evidence that the applicant had suffered a real change in her psychological condition. Such a power, however, can only be attached to an injunction restraining the respondent from using violence, or an exclusion order. As such, it cannot not be attached to an order restraining the respondent from molesting the applicant generally if the order does not restrain him from using violence, nor can it be attached to an undertaking given by the respondent. Moreover, under both the DVMPA 1976 and the DPMCA 1978, even if a power of arrest is granted, it gives the police a discretion to arrest for a suspicion of a breach of the order’s provisions. It is not mandatory that arrest takes place. It is within the authors’ experience that the misjudgment of a constable in not arresting has led to the murder of an applicant by a respondent. The Working Paper raised further criticisms on the application of the powers of arrest in the county and magistrates’ courts. It noted (paras 5.12, 5.13) that there was a significant difference between the two main Acts’ powers to remand the respondent after his appearance in court following arrest. If arrested under the DVMPA 1976 the judge cannot remand the respondent, but if arrested under the DPMCA 1978 the court can remand in custody or on bail under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. The Working Paper (para 5.14) also noted that powers of arrest are issued in a relatively small number of cases, despite the fact that the Select Committee had strongly argued that injunctions could not be properly enforced unless the police had the power of arrest46 and despite the fact that there is some evidence from the
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
43 44 45 46
[1954] 2 QB 282. Practice Note (Domestic Violence: Powers of Arrest) [1981] 1 WLR 27. [1990] 2 FLR 107. Op cit, vol 1, para 45. 46
Civil Protection before 1997 USA and Canada that arrest in domestic violence cases often prevents reoffending.47 The Leicestershire study examined success rates of applications for powers of arrest under the DVMPA 1976. Of the 49 applicants who applied to have such a power attached, 57.1% were successful, although there was a greater success rate when the application was made ex parte (67.7% of all the applications as opposed to 20% where the application was made on notice). In relation to jurisdiction under the MHA 1983, failure to comply with an order can lead to a committal for default, but the court has no specific jurisdiction to attach a power of arrest and the power to attach such a power to injunctions under the DVMPA 1976 does not apply to actions under the MHA 1983 which result in orders (see the Working Paper para 5.9). A power of arrest can, however, be attached to an injunction issued in other family proceedings, for example divorce or judicial separation. Our research showed that there was a relatively high success rate of applications for powers of arrest in the family jurisdiction of the court. Of the 32 applications made, 53.1% were successful, although again the highest success rate was for those applications made ex parte (83.3% of the total applications for such powers in the family jurisdiction). This figure dropped to 22.2% when the application was made on notice.
ADEQUATE PROTECTION? It can be seen from the discussion above that the existing law has moved some way in giving protection to victims of domestic violence but that there is an incoherence between the different pieces of legislation. The DVMPA 1976 was probably the most far-reaching given that it protects both married and unmarried partners, but problems of interpretation and the Richards decision has meant that its operation has become restricted. The DPMCA 1978 has always been restricted in its application and, as evidenced by the authors in their own research, has almost fallen into disuse in some regions. Ancillary jurisdiction in family proceedings allows the court to protect the married victim and attach powers of arrest, but this means that the victim has to take such proceedings, to many a drastic measure to obtain respite from violence. The MHA 1983, while allowing a court to suspend, etc, occupation rights does not allow adequate enforcement of the order, and the introduction by Richards of the criteria in s 1(3) to cases of exclusion under the DVMPA 1976 is seen as
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
47 Torgbor, ‘Police intervention in domestic violence – a comparative view’ [1989] Fam Law 195. For an alternative view see Buzawa and Buzawa, Do Arrest and Restraining Orders Work? (1996), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 47
Domestic Violence an undue restriction on the discretion of the county courts and inappropriate, particularly in its application to cohabitants. In short, the present protection for victims of domestic violence is indeed a ‘hotchpot’ which very few victims understand and which is susceptible to failing in its very aim of providing a remedy to battered women.
48
CHAPTER 4
PROTECTION AFTER 1997
INTRODUCTION In 1995 the government introduced the ill-fated Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill. The original Bill was intended to replace the ‘hotchpot of enactments of limited scope’1 with a single enactment providing remedies available in the High Court, county court and magistrates’ court. The Bill sought to remedy some of the perceived defects in the existing legislation noted in Chapter 3, but political opposition and a campaign led by the Daily Mail led to the Bill’s withdrawal. In 1996, the government introduced the Family Law Bill. This Bill was more far-reaching than its predecessor. The long title states: An Act to make provision with respect to: divorce and separation; legal aid in connection with mediation in disputes relating to family matters; proceedings in cases where marriages have broken down; rights of occupation of certain domestic premises; prevention of molestation; the inclusion in certain orders under the Children Act 1989 of provisions about the occupation of a dwelling house; the transfer of tenancies between spouses and persons who have lived together as husband and wife; and for connected purposes.
Thus the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996, which received Royal Assent on 4 July 1996, attempts to deal with a whole range of family matters, one of which is protection for the victims of domestic violence. The provisions are intended to come into force in October 1997. The provisions relating to domestic violence are contained in Part IV of the FLA 1996, which is entitled Family Homes and Domestic Violence. Sections 30–32 re-enact, to a large extent, the provisions of the Matrimonial Homes Act (MHA) 1983, the rest of Part IV providing specifically for victims of domestic violence. The FLA 1996 provides two remedies – the occupation order2 and the nonmolestation order.3 While jurisdiction rests in a variety of courts, magistrates’ courts cannot make an occupation order where there is a dispute between the parties as to entitlement to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate, interest, contract or enactment giving the right of occupation, unless it is unnecessary _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
1 2 3
Per Lord Scarman, Richards v Richards [1984] 2 All ER 807, at 818. Sections 33–41. Section 42. 49
Domestic Violence to determine the question of occupation rights to deal with the application or make the order.4 Murphy5 argues that magistrates should not be entitled to make such significant orders, whether occupation rights are disputed or not. He notes that the Law Commission6 took the view that, ‘though there was a danger involved, it should nonetheless be sacrificed to the greater good of “promoting the general objective of developing a unified family jurisdiction”’.7 He states, however, that the Commission gave undue weight to the fact that magistrates had similar powers under the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act (DPMCA) 19788 and points out that the power of the magistrates to oust a perpetrator was restricted to situations where there was violence, or a threat of such and violence to another, or where the respondent had broken a personal protection order (see Chapter 3). The power is much less restricted under the FLA 1996. Sections 33–41 state who can apply for an occupation order and the provisions that can be contained therein. Such an order regulates the occupation rights of the applicant and respondent. In contrast to the pre-1997 law, the class of potential applicants for such orders is much wider, and further the court has the power to include provisions within the order in relation to maintenance, outgoings, contents etc. By s 42, a non-molestation order is an order containing one or both of the following provisions: prohibiting the respondent from molesting a person associated with him, or prohibiting the respondent from molesting a relevant child. Schedule 6 of the FLA 1996 provides important amendments to the Children Act 1989, allowing the court to exclude the respondent from the home where the child resides or an area in which that home is situated, when making an emergency protection or interim care order.
THE APPLICANTS 1 Applicants for occupation orders The class of applicant who can apply for occupation orders and nonmolestation orders differ. In relation to occupation orders, applicants are restricted to entitled persons where the respondent is an associated person, former spouses, cohabitants or former cohabitants. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
4 5 6 7
Section 59(1). ‘Domestic violence: the new law’ (1996) MLR (59:6) 845. Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home (1992) Law Com No 207, London: HMSO, para 5.4. At p 846. 50
Protection after 1997 It will be noted that the FLA 1996 introduces new terminology. An entitled person is one who has a right to occupy. By analogy an non-entitled person has no such right. The original 1995 Bill contained the same distinctions. These followed the recommendations of the Law Commission which felt that the purpose of an occupation order where the applicant has no right to occupy is short-term protection, in contrast to an order where the applicant has such a right, where the order often establishes the occupation of the matrimonial home on a longer-term basis.9 The original Bill, however, caused a furore of criticism from its opponents because it did not distinguish between married and unmarried non-entitled applicants and allowed unmarried non-entitled applicants to exclude an entitled respondent from his home. The fact that this was the position under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (DVMPA) 1976, as confirmed in Davis v Johnson10 did nothing to appease the criticism, and the original Bill was withdrawn. Its 1996 successor, therefore, divides non-entitled applicants into former spouses, cohabitants and former cohabitants, the court having regard to different criteria where the parties have cohabited and never married. It could be questioned, however, given that the purpose of Part IV of the FLA 1996 is protection for victims of domestic violence, whether the marital status of the applicant should be a consideration. An entitled person under s 33(1)(a) is a person who has a right to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate, interest, contract or enactment giving a right to occupy or a person who has matrimonial home rights in relation to a dwelling house. Matrimonial home rights replace the old rights of occupation under the MHA 1967 and 1983. The concept is found in s 30 which provides that where one spouse is entitled to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of a beneficial estate, interest, contract or enactment giving rights of occupation, and the other spouse is not so entitled, the spouse not so entitled has a right to remain in occupation or a right to enter and occupy a dwelling house which was or was intended to be the matrimonial home. It will be seen that these rights are the same as under the old law, in that they can only be acquired by spouses. There is, however, one important amendment. The court will be able to grant matrimonial home rights in relation to a house which was intended to be the couple’s home. Where the applicant is an entitled person, an occupation order can be made against a respondent who is a person associated with the applicant in respect of a dwelling house which is or was intended to be their home.11 Thus the FLA 1996 introduces a further new concept, that of the associated person. Such a concept is fundamental to this part of the FLA 1996, not only in relation to occupation orders for entitled applicants, but also in relation to nonmolestation orders discussed below. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
9 Para 4.7. 10 [1979] AC 264. 51
Domestic Violence The definition of associated persons is found in s 62(3) which provides that persons are associated if: (a) they are or have been married to each other; (b) they are cohabitants or former cohabitants; (c) they live or have lived in the same household, otherwise than merely by reason of one of them being the other’s employee, lodger or boarder; (d) they are relatives; (e) they have agreed to marry each other (whether or not that agreement has been terminated); (f) in relation to any child they are both persons who are parents of that child or they have or have had parental responsibility for that child; (g) they are parties to the same family proceedings.
Furthermore, by s 62(5) where a child has been adopted or freed for adoption, two persons are associated with each other if one is the natural parent or grandparent and the other is the child or any person who has adopted the child or has applied for an adoption order, or with whom the child has been placed for adoption. Cohabitants are defined as ‘a man and a woman who, although not married to each other, are living together as husband and wife’. 12 The definition of former cohabitants is construed accordingly, but does not include those cohabitants who have subsequently married each other.13 The inclusion of former spouses as applicants is to be welcomed, as their exclusion from the present legislation is a serious omission and fails to recognise that a divorced victim may be as much in need of protection as a married victim, particularly if the violence was the reason for the divorce. Likewise, the inclusion of former cohabitants will prevent the somewhat tortuous interpretation given to the phrase ‘are living together’ under the existing statutory provisions and commented upon in Chapter 3. Section 62(3)(c) considerably widens the class of applicants and to some extent adopts the recommendations of the Law Commission that persons in a relationship akin to a family relationship should also be protected. The intention is to extend the class of applicant to those sharing a household, but who are not within a relationship which is similar to that of husband and wife. In relation to the term ‘household’ the Law Commission said:14 The crucial test is the degree of community of life which goes on. If the parties shut themselves up in separate rooms and cease to have anything to do with each other, they live in separate households. But if they share domestic chores
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
12 Section 62(1)(a). 13 Section 62(1)(b). 14 Para 3.21. 52
Protection after 1997 and shopping, eat meals together or share the same living room, they are living in the same household, however strained their relations may be.
Relative is defined by s 63(1): (a) the father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, grandmother, grandfather, grandson or granddaughter of that person or of that person’s spouse or former spouse; or (b) the brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew (whether of the full blood or of the half blood or by affinity) of that person or of that person’s spouse or former spouse.
Again this definition is to be welcomed and will protect victims of violence who, until the passing of the FLA 1996, had to rely on the previous restricted tort jurisdiction.15 Section 62(3)(e) also introduces a new class of applicant in the shape of couples who are engaged or have been engaged. The limitations of these definitions, however, are also apparent. First, given the definition of cohabitant in s 62(1)(a), a victim of violence living in a lesbian or homosexual relationship will only be protected by an occupation order if he or she has an entitlement to occupy the dwelling house where they live.16 The wording of the rest of the provisions allowing a court to grant an occupation order is couched in the terms of spouse, former spouse, cohabitant and former cohabitant17 and thus by the restrictive definition in s 62 will exclude the homosexual victim who has no right to occupy. This particular restriction seems absurd, given that the same victim will be able to apply for a non-molestation order discussed below. As Murphy notes18 in respect of ss 35–38: the right to apply derives from a former affective bond between the applicant and the respondent rather than – in the case of s 33 – a proprietary interest. But the applicant from a same-sex relationship will also have enjoyed an affective bond with the respondent. Furthermore, even beyond this similarity, it is just as likely that a homosexual couple shared other responsibilities – such as the payment of bills. Why then does the Act draw such a cruel distinction and afford appreciably less protection to homosexuals?
Second, the definition of cohabitants in s 62(1)(a) does not avoid the problems of the present legislation in that the definition talks of a couple ‘living together as man and wife’. Should the courts adopt the broad view taken of the present provisions in Adeoso v Adeoso19 this adoption of the present definition will at least protect those heterosexual couples who share accommodation but who would, for the purposes of divorce, be considered to be living apart under _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
15 16 17 18
Cf Patel v Patel [1988] 2 FLR 179 and Chapter 3, above. Section 33. Sections 33–38. Op cit, p 852. 53
Domestic Violence s 2(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The definition still, however, fails to protect those living in the same household (other than children under the age of 18) who have no rights of occupation and who have never had a sexual relationship with the respondent, by not allowing those persons the more effective (some would argue) protection of removing the perpetrator of the violence. Third, the same is true of relatives, in that the applicant must have an entitlement to occupy to apply for an occupation order. Thus the parents living in the home of their child and spouse or partner will still have no protection in the form of excluding the perpetrator of violence if they have no entitlement to occupy that home. These provisions, therefore, seem to put property rights before the protection of victims from violence. Fourth, while the FLA 1996 protects couples who are or have been engaged, the limitations within the Act are apparent. Such applicants, as in the cases above, must have an entitlement to occupy before they can apply. If, however, the applicant has never lived in the property with the respondent, and so cannot come within the provisions of s 62(3)(b) or (c) she will have to show an agreement to marry. By s 44 this means evidence in writing of the existence of an agreement to marry, the gift of an engagement ring, or a ceremony entered into by the parties in the presence of witnesses. It is suggested that these restrictions are fraught with problems. What will be sufficient to constitute evidence in writing has yet to be seen. Whether letters referring to the engagement, newspaper announcements, wedding invitations will be sufficient will be a matter of interpretation for the court. The second form of evidence, the ring, will, it is suggested, also cause problems, in that the ring may no longer exist or there may be a dispute as to the meaning of the giving of the ring, or the parties could not afford a ring. The final evidence is, it is suggested, highly unusual, as it denotes a formal ceremony in front of witnesses (and thus presumably excluding an engagement party) of a sort uncommon in this country. Furthermore, the definition is much more restrictive than the recommendation of the Law Commission which recommended that among those protected should be: [P]eople who have been boyfriend and girlfriend in a romantic relationship ... we envisage that there would be some degree of mutuality and some participation in consensual sexual activity, although not necessarily amounting to sexual intercourse.20
By not adopting the Law Commission recommendation, the FLA 1996 is excluding from protection those victims of violence who have never shared a common household with the perpetrator and have never agreed to marry – the typical boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. Evidence suggests that this will exclude a not inconsiderable number of domestic violence victims. Buchan _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
20 Para 3.24. 54
Protection after 1997 and Edwards in a 1991 survey in Streatham21 found that 52% of domestic violence victims fell into the boyfriend/girlfriend category which would not satisfy the definition of associated persons. Fifthly, the protection afforded to children, on the face of it, appears comprehensive, particularly with the amendments to the Children Act 1989 discussed below. Closer examination, however, reveals that the protection may not be adequate in certain cases, as acknowledged by Murphy.22 An abused child will be able to show that she is an associated person by s 62(3)(d), but is unlikely to have rights of occupation by virtue of a beneficial interest etc. Even in the rare cases where the child has such rights, the leave provisions in s 43 may make the granting of an order difficult. There are no criteria in s 43(2) by reference to which the court must exercise its discretion in granting leave. Murphy suggests that there are two conceivable approaches. First, the court may use the criteria listed in s 33 and ss 35–38. Although different criteria apply in those sections, certain of them are common, ie the housing needs and resources of the parties and relevant child, the financial resources of the parties, the likely effect of the order on the health, safety or well-being of the parties or relevant child and the conduct of the parties in relation to each other. Conversely, the court may use the welfare principle in s 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. The problems inherent in this second approach are apparent. The welfare principle only applies when looking at issues relating to the upbringing of a child. Lord Hailsham in Richards v Richards 23 refused to hold that an ouster order was an order relating to the child’s upbringing. Furthermore, in an analogous provision relating to leave applications for s 8 orders under the Children Act 1989,24 it has been held that the welfare principle does not apply.25 Given the number of occasions when a child will have occupation rights, and the problems which could attach to leave applications by such children, it means that generally the responsibility for excluding the abuser to protect the child will fall on an adult or the local authority. The adult will have to obtain an occupation order, and thus fall within the class of applicant for such an order, ie an entitled person, spouse, former spouse, cohabitant or former cohabitant. The local authority will have to apply for the new exclusion provisions when seeking an emergency protection order or an interim care order. In neither case can it be argued that this gives adequate protection to a class of victim who must be more vulnerable than most. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
21 Buchan and Edwards, Adult Cautioning for Domestic Violence (1991), Police Requirements Support Unit, Home Office Science and Technology Group. 22 Op cit, pp 850–51. 23 Op cit, p 815. 24 Section 10(8). 25 Re A and W [1992] Fam 182. 55
Domestic Violence Finally, the FLA 1996 does not protect those parties who have entered into a religious ceremony of marriage, the formalities of which are not recognised by English law, who do not then cohabit. Such parties do not fall within the definition of associated persons in s 62, whether there is an entitlement to occupy or otherwise. It will be apparent from the discussion above that the ostensibly wide class of applicant for an occupation order under s 33 is restricted to the applicant who is entitled and who is an associated person in relation to the perpetrator of the violence. The FLA 1996, however, does allow applications from nonentitled applicants, but these are limited to a former spouse with no entitlement to occupy where the other has that right (s 35); a cohabitant or former cohabitant who has no entitlement where the other has such an entitlement (s 36); a spouse or former spouse where neither has an entitlement to occupy (s 37) and a cohabitant or former cohabitant where neither has an entitlement (s 38). Thus the FLA 1996 excludes a wide range of potential applicants because of their lack of property rights. The non-entitled child, homosexual partner, relative or fiancé(e), all in what could be described as a close family relationship with the violent respondent, will be unable to remove the respondent from the home which he alone has the entitlement to occupy. It again appears that protection for the victims of violence has been overshadowed by the protection of property rights.
2 Applicants for non-molestation orders Although the class of potential applicants for occupation orders may be restrictive, the class of applicant who may apply for a non-molestation order is less so. By s 42(1) an order may be made preventing the molestation of a person associated with the respondent or a relevant child. The definition of associated person has been discussed above. The definition of relevant child is given in s 62(2). That section states that a relevant child is: (a) any child who is living with or might reasonably be expected to live with either party to the proceedings; (b) any child in relation to whom an order under the Adoption Act 1976 or the Children Act 1989 is in question in the proceedings; and (c) any other child whose interests the court considers relevant.
The FLA 1996 gives protection to a wide class of children and does not restrict protection to children of the family as the DPMCA 1978 does, preferring the more liberal definition in the DVMPA 1976. The FLA 1996, however, goes further than the 1976 legislation, in that it covers children who might reasonably be expected to live with either party, those to whom an order under the Adoption Act or Children Act is in question and any other child whose interests may be affected. Again, however, closer examination of the FLA 1996 reveals its limitations. 56
Protection after 1997 It has already been noted that, where the child herself wishes to apply, the Act by s 43(1) provides that a child under the age of 16 may not apply for any order without the leave of the court. Given that it is unlikely that a child of that age would be an entitled person, applications by children for occupation orders will be comparatively rare. Section 42, however, has no such restrictions in relation to non-molestation orders and, given that a child is an associated person, it is likely that the courts will hear applications by children for such orders, particularly in the situation where the other parent is reluctant to act on their behalf. The problems relating to the leave requirements in s 43(2) in relation to occupation orders have been discussed. It could be suggested, however, that the problems emanating from Richards and the application of the welfare principle will not arise in relation to leave applications for non-molestation orders, as it could be argued that nonmolestation is an issue relating to the child’s upbringing.26 Whatever criteria the courts adopt, the leave requirement will create delay in granting an order. While s 43 is obviously adopting the analogy of the Children Act in respect of applications for s 8 orders, an application by a child for a non-molestation (or occupation) order under the FLA 1996 is different. A child seeking such orders presumably will be doing so as protection against abuse. While it is accepted that there must be some limitation on actions by children, in reality the provision will create delay in granting protection to a victim who will be particularly vulnerable by virtue of that fact that he or she is a child. Secondly, it has already be noted that the protection for fiancé(e)s is limited if they have never cohabited, given the definition of agreement to marry in s 44. There are further limitations in relation to former fiancé(e)s in that they cease to be eligible to apply for either an occupation or nonmolestation order three years after the termination of the agreement (ss 33(2) and 42(4)). While this will leave the applicant with normal property law remedies in relation to occupation, it starkly leaves the former fiancé(e) with no statutory protection against physical or mental abuse. There is evidence in the case law that molestation can last for years.27 This will leave the victim with a remedy in tort where the abuse is physical, but where the abuse is nonphysical the available remedies are less certain, as seen in Chapter 3. Furthermore, by losing the protection of the statute, the victim also loses the more effective enforcement of a power of arrest (see below). Thirdly, the position of the applicant who has undergone a ceremony of marriage not recognised in English law is equally disadvantaged under the non-molestation provisions as under the occupation order provisions. As already noted, such an applicant would not be an associated person under s 62 and thus would be prohibited from applying for a non-molestation order. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
26 Although note Re A and W. 27 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669. 57
Domestic Violence Finally, it does not protect the victim who is being molested by the former spouse or cohabitant of partner, as again the victim and molester are not within the definition of associated persons.
3 Applications by third parties Although the Law Commission recommended that third parties should be able to apply for orders on behalf of victims, such a move was resisted by the government until a last minute opposition amendment which is now s 60. Section 60(1) and (2) provide: (1) Rules of court may provide for a prescribed person, or any person in a prescribed category, (a ‘representative’) to act on behalf of another in relation to proceedings to which this part applies. (2) Rules made under this section may, in particular, authorise a representative to apply for an occupation order or for a non molestation order for which the person on whose behalf the representative is acting could have applied.
The rules may further lay down conditions upon which a representative may make an application to the court and the considerations the court must take into account when determining if and how to exercise its powers. The insertion of this provision is a recognition that the victim of domestic violence often feels unable to act because of the repercussions that action may provoke and is a welcome addition to the available protection. How it will work in practice has yet to be seen. The most obvious third party who could take action on behalf of a victim will be the police, although s 60 allows for parties other than the police to act as representatives. The effectiveness of the rules, however, will depend on the willingness of the police to take on this new role, a willingness which may be questionable28 and, more importantly, on the availability of resources.
THE ORDERS 1 Occupation orders Section 33 – orders where the applicant is entitled or has matrimonial home rights The applicants for s 33 orders are those who are entitled to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate or interest or contract, or by virtue of any enactment giving the right to occupy, or who have matrimonial home rights. The definition _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
28 See Chapter 5, below. 58
Protection after 1997 given to matrimonial home rights in s 30 means that where the one spouse is entitled to occupy and the other has no such rights, the spouse without those rights will have matrimonial home rights. Thus s 33 applicants will be those with a right to occupy by virtue of an estate etc and a spouse. The occupation order can only be made in relation to a dwelling house which is or has been their home, or was at any time intended to be their home. This means, therefore, that the problems of the previous legislation, in that there was no protection for a victim in relation to property which had never been, nor was ever intended to be, the matrimonial home, still exist. Thus if a victim flees the violence and moves into other accommodation, the only remedy under the legislation will be a non-molestation order. As noted above, however, the respondent has to be a person associated with the applicant and therefore there is no requirement that the parties are married or are cohabitants. The potential limitations on the definition of associated persons have already been discussed. By s 33(1) the applicant may apply to the court for an order containing any of the provisions listed in subsections (3), (4) and (5), although by subsection (2) if the applicant is associated with the respondent by virtue of an agreement to marry, no application can be brought under the Act more than three years after the agreement has terminated. The main provisions are contained in subsection (3) which provides that an order may: (a) enforce the Applicants' entitlement to remain in occupation as against the other person (‘the respondent’); (b) require the respondent to permit the applicant to enter and remain in the dwelling house or part of the dwelling house; (c) regulate the occupation of the dwelling house by either or both parties; (d) if the respondent is entitled as mentioned in subsection (1)(a)(i), prohibit, suspend or restrict the exercise by him of his rights to occupy the dwelling house; (e) if the respondent has matrimonial home rights in relation to the dwelling house and the applicant is the other spouse, restrict or terminate those rights; (f) require the respondent to leave the dwelling house or part of the dwelling house; or (g) exclude the respondent from a defined area in which the dwelling house is included.
There are two further powers under s 33. By subsection (4) the court, can as part of the order, declare that the applicant is entitled or has matrimonial home rights. This provision allows the court to declare entitlement where there is a dispute. The jurisdiction to so, however, is limited. By s 59(1) a magistrates’ court is not competent to entertain any application, or make any order, involving any disputed question as to a party’s entitlement to occupy by virtue of a beneficial estate, interest, contract or enactment giving the right
59
Domestic Violence of occupation, unless it is unnecessary to determine the question in order to deal with the application. This limitation on the magistrates’ court powers reflects the view of the Law Commission as noted earlier. Further, by subsection (5) and (8), if the applicant has matrimonial home rights and the respondent is the other spouse, the court can include a provision that those rights are not terminated by the death of the other spouse or the termination of the marriage if, in all the circumstances, it is just and reasonable to do so. This will protect those applicants who have rights of occupation by virtue of being a spouse of an entitled person, and whose rights would normally terminate when she ceases to be a spouse. The criteria the court must consider when making an order are contained in subsection (6). This provides that the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including: (a) the housing needs and housing resources of each of the parties and of any relevant child; (b) the financial resources of the parties; (c) the likely effect of any order, or of any decision by the court not to exercise its powers under subsection (3), on the health, safety or well-being of the parties and of any relevant child; and (d) the conduct of the parties in relation to each other and otherwise.
At first sight this appears to replicate, to a large extent, the provision in s 1(3) of the MHA 1983 which applied to orders under that Act and the DVMPA 1976.29 Two parts of subsection (6) are, however, very different from the old law. Subsection (6)(c) requires the court to balance the effect of an order, or no order, on the health, safety or well-being of the parties and any relevant child. It is submitted that while the definitions of health and safety will cause few problems, the definition of well-being is fraught with interpretative pitfalls. Further, subsection (6)(d) requires the court to consider the conduct of the parties in relation to each other and otherwise. This is, it is submitted, a much wider test than that under the s 1(3) of the MHA, although, as in the case of its 1983 predecessor, no one factor should carry more weight than another. Subsection 33(7) creates a mandatory duty to make an order in certain circumstances. The subsection provides: If it appears to the court that the applicant or any relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the respondent if an order under this section containing one or more of the provisions mentioned in subsection (3) is not made, the court shall make the order unless it appears that– (a) the respondent or any relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm if the order is made; and _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
29 See Chapter 3, above. 60
Protection after 1997 (b) the harm likely to be suffered by the respondent or child in that event is as great as, or greater than, the harm attributable to conduct of the respondent which is likely to be suffered by the applicant or child if the order is not made.
This requires the court to make an order if it is established that the applicant or child is likely to suffer significant harm by the conduct of the respondent unless it can be shown that as great or greater harm is likely to be suffered by the respondent or child if the order in favour of the applicant is made, ie a balance of harm test. This balance of harm test was recommended by the Law Commission, which recognised that under the old law, the court was sometimes forced to choose between the interests of an adult and the interests of a child. The Law Commission stated of this balance of harm test ‘where there is a risk of significant harm to a child, the duty to make an order will come into operation and the child’s welfare will effectively become the paramount consideration’.30 How will this work in practice? Subsection (7) will come into play if the court feels that the applicant or child has suffered significant harm. By s 63(1) harm is defined in terms of the definition in the Children Act 1989. Thus: harm– (a) in relation to a person who has reached the age of eighteen years, means ill-treatment or the impairment of health; and (b)
in relation to a child, means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development;
‘health’ includes physical or mental health; ‘ill-treatment’ includes forms of ill-treatment which are not physical and, in relation to a child, includes sexual abuse.
Further, by s 63(3), the term significant in relation to a child has the same meaning as under the Children Act 1989, that is a comparison of the child’s health or development with that which could reasonably be expected of a similar child. This raises a variety of issues. Given the explicit definition of ill-treatment in s 63(1), could it be argued that sexual abuse of an adult is not ill-treatment for the purposes of the Act? It is to be hoped that this is not the interpretation placed upon the section by the courts. Second, while there is a definition of significant for the purposes of looking at the harm done to the child, this is not the case in relation to a person over the age of 18. In relation to the term used in the Children Act 1989, the court in Humberside County Council v B 31 approved the dictionary definition of ‘considerable, noteworthy or important’. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
30 Para 4.34. 31 [1993] 1 FLR 257. 61
Domestic Violence Whether the same interpretation will apply under the FLA 1996 in relation to adults has yet to be seen. If the court decides that the applicant or relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm, this must be due to the conduct of the respondent before the duty to make an order comes into effect. Thus, if the applicant or child are suffering harm as a result of the respondent’s conduct and significant harm from another source, the first part of subsection (7) is not made out. Should the applicant satisfy the court in relation to the first part of the subsection, the court is then required to use the balance of harm test. Here the wording is complex. If on the test, the harm suffered by the applicant or child is greater than that which would be suffered by the respondent or child on the making of the order, the court is under a statutory duty to make the order in favour of the applicant. If, however, by making the order, the child or respondent will suffer harm which is at least as great as that suffered by the applicant or child, there is no duty to make the order, but the court would still have the discretion to do so. Let us consider this example. The applicant is suffering violence at the hands of her husband. This violence is also affecting the emotional development of their child. The applicant has a boyfriend who is also violent. If her husband is removed it is likely that her boyfriend will move into the dwelling house with her and the child. If the court makes an occupation order against her spouse and her boyfriend moves in, the harm suffered by her child will presumably be as great as that suffered when her husband was around, thus there is no duty on the court under subsection (7) to make the occupation order. This would not impair the court’s discretion to make an order anyway, but, it is submitted, given that the court is under no duty to make an order because to do so would cause as great a harm to the child as making no order, it is unlikely that the court would exercise its discretion. In other words, when the court does not make an order under subsection (7) because of the harm that order would cause a child, it is unlikely that it will exclude under any other provision. Where the harm will be suffered by the respondent, it is submitted that this must also be significant harm before the balance of harm test comes into operation, given that the harm suffered by the respondent must be as great or greater than the significant harm suffered by the applicant or relevant child. Should an order be made, s 33(10) deals with its duration. Although there is no statutory time limit, as in the case of occupation orders sought by other applicants discussed below, subsection (10) provides that an order should be made for a specified time, or until the happening of a specified event or until a further order. Thus although not restrained by a time period, the court must still specify the end of the order.
62
Protection after 1997
Section 35 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled former spouse and respondent former spouse is entitled The applicants for s 35 orders will be non-entitled former spouses where the respondent former spouse is entitled. Subsections (3) and (4) specify the provisions the order must contain in certain circumstances and are thus mandatory. Subsection (3) applies when the applicant is in occupation and the order must contain a provision giving the applicant the right not to be evicted or excluded by the respondent for the duration of the order and prohibiting the respondent from doing so. If the applicant is not in occupation, subsection (4) provides that the court must give the applicant the right to enter and occupy the dwelling house and require the respondent to permit the applicant to exercise that right for the duration of the order. By subsection (5) the court may insert provisions in relation to the occupation rights of the respondent, including exclusion. Subsection (5)(a)–(d) is identical to the provisions in s 33(3)(c)–(f). It has already been seen that when there is an application under s 33, the court is required to consider a variety of factors in s 33(6) in order to decide if and how to exercise its discretion. The same is true of an order under s 35, but given that the applicant for a s 35 order will be non-entitled, the factors the court must consider are different. Further, the court is required to consider one set of factors when considering if an order should be granted and additional considerations when deciding if any of the further provisions in subsection (5) should be inserted. Subsection (6)(a)–(d) is identical to s 33(6)(a)–(d) and the problems discussed above will equally apply to s 35 orders. Section 35(e)–(g) introduces additional factors the court must consider. These are: (e) the length of time that has elapsed since the parties ceased to live together; (f) the length of time that has elapsed since the marriage was dissolved or annulled; and (g) the existence of any pending proceedings between the parties– (i) for an order under section 23A or section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (property adjustment orders in connection with divorce proceedings etc); (ii) for an order under paragraph 1(2)(d) or (e) of Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 (orders for financial relief against parents); or (iii) relating to the legal or beneficial ownership of the dwelling house.
It would appear that the court is being required to look at the reality of the situation in that if it is some time since the relationship broke down and there are existing proceedings which may be more appropriate to deal with the issues relating to the dwelling house, the court can decide not to grant an occupation order.
63
Domestic Violence Should the court decide to grant a s 35 order after considering all the criteria above, then it must insert the provisions in either subsection (3) or (4). It has a discretion, however, whether to insert any of the additional provisions in subsection (5) (subject to subsection (8) below) and to aid the court it must have regard to the factors in subsection (7). This requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances, including those in subsection (6)(a)–(e). In other words, having first considered these factors in relation to whether to grant an order, the court is required to return to them to decide whether to include any discretionary provisions in relation to the respondent’s occupation rights. By subsection (8), if the court makes a s 35 order and it appears that if a subsection (5) provision is not included the applicant or relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the respondent, the court must include a subsection (5) provision unless, on the balance of harm test discussed, in relation to s 33(7), the respondent or relevant child is likely to suffer as great or greater harm if the provision is included. By subsection (9) and (10), a s 35 order can only be made for a period of six months, although it can be extended on more than one occasion for a further specified period not exceeding six months. It ceases on the death of either party. By subsection (13), any payment of outgoings by the applicant in occupation, shall be treated as if paid by the entitled spouse.
Section 36 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled cohabitant or former cohabitant and the respondent is entitled Section 36 does not distinguish between those applicants who are cohabitants and those who are former cohabitants. The overriding consideration of the court when looking at occupation orders in respect of parties who live or have lived together outside of marriage is found in s 41(2). This provides that the court must have regard to the fact that the parties have not given each other the commitment involved in marriage. The reason for this provision is obvious when looking at the history and eventual downfall of the 1995 Bill and appears to be directing the court to treat such cases differently to those between spouses or former spouses. The wording, however, is unfortunate. It assumes that parties only show commitment to each other by marrying and fails to take into account that the parties may be unable to marry for a variety of reasons. How it will be interpreted by the courts has yet to be seen but the wording suggests that the unmarried parties will warrant less protection because of the lack of commitment demonstrated by their failure to marry. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) are identical to the corresponding subsections in s 35 and create a duty on the court to include certain provisions in subsection (3) or (4) when an order is made, with a discretion to include one or more of the additional provisions in subsection (5). The difference between the two sections, however, is in the criteria the court must consider when deciding to exercise its power to make an order.
64
Protection after 1997 The factors the court must consider when making an order under s 36 are contained in subsection (6). To some extent they replicate the provisions of s 35(6), with necessary adjustments as s 35 deals with spouses or former spouses and s 36 deals with unmarried parties, thus there is no mention in s 36(6) of proceedings under the MCA 1973, for example. However, s 36(6) has additional factors the court must consider. These are found in subsection (6)(e)–(h). They are: (e) the nature of the parties’ relationship; (f) the length of time during which they have lived together as husband and wife; (g) whether there are or have been any children who are children of both parties or for whom both parties have or have had parental responsibility; (h) the length of time that has elapsed since the parties ceased to live together.
These provisions indicate that the court is required to make a judgment as to the real nature of the parties relationship and on the basis of its conclusions decide, given the nature of the relationship, whether an occupation order should be granted. Further differences between the situation when the applicant is a spouse or former spouse and where the applicant is not married to the respondent can be seen when the court considers whether to include a subsection (5) provision. The court must have regard to the matters in subsection (6)(a)–(d) and the balance of harm test found in s 36(8). However, unlike the previous sections, if the court feels that the applicant or relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the respondent if a subsection (5) provision is not included, this is a factor for the court to consider. It is not mandatory that the court inserts the provision. This is a very clear distinction in relation to the protection given to entitled and married applicants and those who are unmarried. Again we must await judicial interpretation of the provision, and it is hoped that where, on the balance of harm test, the applicant or child will suffer as great or greater harm than the respondent, a subsection (5) provision will be inserted. It is perhaps significant, however, that this provision would seem to indicate that the unmarried applicant and non-marital child is entitled to lesser protection because of their relationship with the respondent. As with s 35 orders, s 36 orders must be limited to six months but, unlike s 35 orders, can be extended once only for a period of up to six months. Again, therefore, the cohabitant applicant has less protection than her former married counterpart, in that her counterpart in theory has unlimited protection, but because the applicant under s 36 is unmarried, her protection will cease after a maximum of 12 months. The provisions in s 35 relating to payment of outgoings on the dwelling house are replicated in s 36.
65
Domestic Violence
Section 37 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled spouse or former spouse and the respondent is non-entitled This section applies where neither the applicant spouse nor former spouse, nor the respondent, is entitled. One of the parties must, however, be in occupation of the dwelling house (s 37(1)(a)) which is or was the matrimonial home. If neither party is in occupation an order cannot be granted. The powers of the court are contained in subsection (3). This provides that the court may: (a) require the respondent to permit the applicant to enter and remain in the dwelling house or part of the dwelling house; (b) regulate the occupation of the dwelling house by either or both of the spouses; (c) require the respondent to leave the dwelling house or part of the dwelling house; or (d) exclude the respondent from a defined area in which the dwelling house is included.
Subsection (4) states that the criteria in s 33(6) and (7) apply to the exercise of the court’s powers under this section. In other words the court is required to look at housing and financial needs and resources of the parties and relevant child, the effect of any decision of the court on the health, safety or well-being of the parties or relevant child and the conduct of the parties. Furthermore, the balance of harm test applies, requiring the court to grant an order unless the harm suffered by the respondent or relevant child is likely to be as great or greater than that likely to be suffered by the applicant or child if the order is not made. These provisions are discussed above. By s 37(5) an order must be limited to six months, but may be extended on one or more occasions for a further specified period not exceeding six months.
Section 38 – orders where the applicant is a non-entitled cohabitant or former cohabitant and the respondent is non-entitled This section applies where neither party is entitled and one party is in occupation of the dwelling house where they live or lived together as husband and wife. The court, by subsection (3), can make an order with the same provisions as contained in s 37(3) above. In deciding how to exercise its discretion the court is required to consider the criteria in subsection (4) and (5). Subsection (4) lists the same criteria as s 37(4). The difference between the two sections, however, is that the balance of harm test in subsection (5) is merely a factor for the court to consider and there is no requirement to make an order, if applying the test the applicant or relevant child will suffer as great or greater harm than the respondent or relevant child if an order is made. It will be remembered that the same question must be considered when an order is sought under s 36 (cohabitant or former cohabitant applicant with no existing right to occupy where the respondent is entitled) and likewise under 66
Protection after 1997 that section there is no duty on the court to make an order if the applicant satisfies the balance of harm test. The difference, however, between s 38 and s 36 is that under the latter the court must take into account additional criteria such as the nature of the parties’ relationship, the length of the relationship, children, the length of time since the parties lived together and the existence of any other proceedings (s 36(6)(e)–(i)). These criteria are not replicated in s 38. By s 38(6) an order under this section is limited to a period not exceeding six months and may be extended once only for a further period not exceeding six months. Thus the maximum length of the order will be 12 months.
Additional provisions Section 40 allows the court to insert additional provisions into certain occupation orders. Where either the applicant or respondent is entitled to occupy the court can insert provisions relating to the repair and maintenance of the dwelling house; the discharge of outgoings; the payment of rent to the excluded party, if that party, apart from the order, would be entitled to occupy; and the possession, use and security of the furniture and contents. In addition, where the parties are cohabitants or former cohabitants, by s 41 the court must have regard to the fact that the parties have not given each other the commitment involved in marriage, as discussed above. In deciding whether to include any of the s 40 provisions, the court must have regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties and the financial obligations they have or are likely to have in the foreseeable future (s 40(2)). Any provision inserted will cease to have effect when the order ceases to have effect. These provisions are similar to those contained in the s 1(3) of the MHA 1983. There are, however, important differences. These provisions apply equally to cohabitants, which was obviously not the position pre-1997. Furthermore, the court now has additional powers in respect of the contents of the dwelling house, and can require the excluded respondent to leave the house habitable. It should be noted, however, that the provisions can apply to either party and thus the court could provide that the applicant going into occupation allows the respondent the use of certain contents. These provisions adopt the recommendations of the Law Commission.32
2 Non-molestation orders The concept of non-molestation orders is not new. As seen in Chapter 3 the court under the DVMPA 1976 has the power to issue non-molestation
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
32 Op cit, paras 4.38 and 4.40. 67
Domestic Violence injunctions, and molestation is given a wide interpretation under that Act.33 The Law Commission recognised the wide definition of molestation under the 1976 Act, which included serious pestering or harassment.34 The Commission considered whether there should be a statutory definition of molestation but concluded that such was not necessary given that the lack of definition had not caused problems. Section 42(1) defines a non-molestation order as an order containing either or both of the following provisions: (a) provision prohibiting a person (‘the respondent’) from molesting another person who is associated with the respondent; (b) provision prohibiting the respondent from molesting a relevant child.
By subsection (2) such an order may be granted in the course of family proceedings or as a free-standing application. In addition, subsection (2)(b) allows a court to make an order of its own volition in any family proceedings ‘for the benefit of any other party to the proceedings or any relevant child’. This would appear to allow the court to grant an order in favour of a person who is not associated with the respondent, although given the definition of a non-molestation order in subsection (1), it is submitted that this is not how it will be interpreted. By subsection (3), family proceedings include proceedings where the court has made an emergency protection order (EPO) under the Children Act 1989 containing an exclusion requirement (discussed below). This means that in addition to excluding the abuser for the duration of the EPO, the court can also grant a non-molestation order in favour of the child. Note, however, there is no such specific power where an exclusion provision is contained in an interim care order. This is because such proceedings are family proceedings under s 62(2) of the Act. Subsection (5) provides that in deciding whether to exercise its discretion, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the applicant, any other person for whose benefit the order would be made, or any relevant child. The problems which may occur in the definition of well-being have been noted above.
3 Amendments to the Children Act 1989 Section 52 and Schedule 6 of the FLA 1996 amend the Children Act 1989 to allow the court to exclude the abuser of a child when making an EPO or an interim care order. Such provisions adopt the recommendations of the Law Commission35 which felt that there should be some mechanism to protect the _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
33 Cf Horner v Horner [1982] Fam 90; Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 FLR 350. 34 Para 3.1. 35 Paras 6.15–6.22. 68
Protection after 1997 abused child other than taking the child out of the family environment. The recommendations stressed that the sole purpose of the order should be shortterm protection for the child and this is reflected in the amendments, as it should be noted at this stage that the court has no power to exclude an abuser at the final order stage. The absence of this power, while at the same time adopting the recommendations, seems strange. It is unlikely that anyone would argue with the proposition that under the provisions of the old law, whilst removal of the child would ensure its protection, it could be argued that such provisions in effect ‘punished’ the child for being a victim. It also had the effect of taking the child away from any support systems within the family unit. Removal of the abuser, and enabling the child to remain in a familiar family environment, would seem to be a sensible solution and will help the child to mend both physically and emotionally. The Law Commission, however, stated that in the longer term, the property rights of adults had to play a part. Thus, while short-term protection is now provided for, in the long term the occupation rights of the abuser may take priority. Furthermore, the granting of temporary relief during an application by a local authority for an EPO or interim care order will give another adult, for example the non-abusing parent, or, in some cases the child himself, the opportunity to apply for a longer-term order excluding the abuser, so obviating the need for a care order. As such, the provisions appear to be placing the responsibility for longer-term protection of the abused child in the hands of the associated person, rather than exclusively in the hands of the local authority. Two further general points should be noted before examining the particular provisions in detail. First, a provision excluding the abuser forms part of an EPO or interim care order and is not a substitute for either of those orders. In practice this means that the local authority will still have parental responsibility in relation to the abused child, and thus the power to remove the child, should there be a potential risk to that child’s safety during the currency of the order. Second, unlike the occupation orders elsewhere in the Act which can be used to remove a violent respondent, there is no requirement that a party to whom the exclusion provision relates must be associated with the abused child. Should a non-abusing adult, or the child, wish to go for longer-term protection in the form of an occupation order under ss 33, 35, 36, 37 or 38, the abuser must, however, be an associated person. This means that should the exclusion provision relate to a nonassociated person, the only long-term protection that can be granted for the child will be a care order. Section 38A of the Children Act 1989 will allow a court to include an exclusion requirement in an interim care order. Such a power will exist where the court is satisfied that the threshold criteria in s 31(2)(a) and (b)(i) exist and further:
69
Domestic Violence (a) that there is reasonable cause to believe that, if a person (‘the relevant person’) is excluded from a dwelling house in which the child lives, the child will cease to suffer, or cease to be likely to suffer, significant harm; and (b) that another person living in the dwelling house (whether a parent of the child or some other person)– (i) is able and willing to give to the child the care which it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him; and (ii) consents to the inclusion of the exclusion requirement (s 38A(2)).
It is clear that the provision envisages a two-stage process. The court must first have decided to make an interim care order and thus must be satisfied that the threshold criteria have been made out. The section, however, does not give the court a power to make an exclusion requirement where the threshold criteria have been made out because the child is beyond parental control under s 31(2)(b)(ii). Once the court has decided to make an interim care order, it can only include an exclusion requirement if the conditions in subsection (2) are made out. This means that there must be reasonable cause to believe that removal of the relevant person will mean that the child will cease to suffer, or cease to be likely to suffer significant harm. In other words it allows the court to remove the cause of the significant harm. Given that to satisfy the threshold criteria, the court must be satisfied that the significant harm suffered or likely to be suffered by the child is attributable to the parental care the child has received, it is submitted that in cases of physical and sexual abuse this first part of s 38A(2) will not be difficult to make out. However, the court cannot make the exclusion requirement unless there is another person in the dwelling house who is prepared to look after the child and who consents to the exclusion requirement being made. Unless both of these criteria are satisfied, the court cannot exclude and it is likely that the child will be removed. By subsection (3) an exclusion requirement is any or all of the following: (a) a provision requiring the relevant person to leave a dwelling house in which he is living with the child; (b) a provision prohibiting the relevant person from entering a dwelling house in which the child lives; and (c) a provision excluding the relevant person from a defined area in which a dwelling house in which the child lives is situated.
As noted before, there is no requirement that the relevant person is associated with the child. Further, the provisions are wide enough to include a person who does not live in the dwelling house with the child. The exclusion requirement can last for a shorter period than the interim care order (subsection (4)). This period can be extended on more than one occasion by the court on an application to vary or discharge the interim order. The requirement will cease to have effect when the interim order ceases to 70
Protection after 1997 have effect, or if the local authority remove the child for a continuous period of more than 24 hours (subsection (10)). The person to whom the exclusion requirement relates may apply for a variation or discharge of the requirement even though they may not be entitled to apply for a variation or discharge of the interim care order (s 39(3A)). Section 44A of the Children Act 1989 will allow a court to include an exclusion requirement in an EPO. The process by which this happens is the same as in relation to interim care orders. The court will first have to satisfy itself that the requirements in s 44(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Children Act 1989 are satisfied and thus makes an EPO. The EPO may then contain an exclusion provision if: (a) ... there is reasonable cause to believe that, if a person (‘the relevant person’) is excluded from a dwelling house in which the child lives, then– (i) in the case of an order made on the ground mentioned in section 44(1)(a), the child will not be likely to suffer significant harm, even though the child is not removed as mentioned in section 44(1)(a)(i) or does not remain as mentioned in section 44(1)(a)(ii); or (ii) in the case of an order made on the ground mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c) of section 44(1), the enquiries referred to in that paragraph will cease to be frustrated ... (s 44A(2)(a).
In addition, as with interim care orders, there must be a person who is willing to take care of the child and who consents to the requirement being made. The provisions relating to the length of the requirement, when it ceases and variation and discharge are the same as s 38A.
EX PARTE ORDERS Under the pre-1997 law, statute did not state when orders should be granted ex parte. When the DVMPA 1976 first came onto the statute books, a large number of injunctions, particularly non-molestation injunctions, were granted ex parte. This led to a Practice Note being issued in 197836 which noted the concern of the President about the increasing number of applications being made ex parte which should have been made on two days clear notice to the other side. The Practice Note went on to say: ‘An ex parte application should not be made, or granted, unless there is a real immediate danger of serious injury or irreparable damage. A recent examination of ex parte applications shows that nearly 50% were unmeritorious.’
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
36 Practice Note (Injunction: Ex Parte Applications) [1978] 1 WLR 925. 71
Domestic Violence The result of this was a reduction in the grant of ex parte injunctions generally,37 a reluctance reflected in the attitude of the Council of Circuit Judges which gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee stating ‘it is a fundamental principle of natural justice that a court should not grant an order which involves a person’s civil liberties and rights without giving them the opportunity to be heard’.38 It should be noted, however, that in our own research in 1991, this reluctance was less apparent, in that on analysing the percentages of final orders granted after an ex parte application, 48.6% were successful in the civil jurisdiction, 26.5% in the family jurisdiction and 42.6% in the domestic jurisdiction. This might suggest that in all of these cases, the court felt that there was ‘a real immediate danger of serious injury or irreparable damage’ or that the particular court took a different view of when ex parte applications should be granted. The Law Commission approved the judgment of Lord Justice Ormrod in Ansah v Ansah39 where he stated that it was essential, in the administration of justice, for the court to have a power to intervene immediately and without notice, but that this power should only be exercised ‘in an emergency when the interests of justice or the protection of the applicant or child clearly demands immediate intervention by the court’. The Law Commission recommended that the power to act immediately should be retained but that there should be statutory guidelines as to the exercise of the power to ensure consistency between different courts. 40 Our own research indicated a difference in the attitudes of judges in one county court and it has already been said that the particular court appeared to allow a high percentage of ex parte applications. Under the DPMCA 1978, magistrates have similar powers to make expedited orders without notice to the respondent where ‘there is imminent danger of physical injury to the applicant or child’ (s 16(6)). Statutory guidelines applying to all courts should prevent the inconsistency feared by the Law Commission. By s 45(1) of the FLA 1996, the court may grant an ex parte occupation or non-molestation order ‘where it considers that it is just and convenient to do so’. There are, however, statutory guidelines in s 45(2) which the court must consider before making its decision. In addition to having regard to all the circumstances, the court must have particular regard to: (a) any risk of significant harm to the applicant or a relevant child, attributable to conduct of the respondent if the order is not made immediately; (b) whether it is likely that the applicant will be deterred or prevented from pursuing the application if an order is not made immediately; and _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
37 See Edwards, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (1996), London: Blackstone Press, p 217. 38 Home Affairs Committee (1992–93) 3rd Report, 1992–93, Domestic Violence, Vol 11, Memoranda of Evidence, HC 245-11, Cmnd 2269, London: HMSO, pxxxvii. 39 [1977] Fam 138. 40 Op cit, para 5.7. 72
Protection after 1997 (c) whether there is reason to believe that the respondent is aware of the proceedings but is deliberately evading service and that the applicant or relevant child will be seriously prejudiced by the delay involved– (i) where the court is a magistrates’ court, in effecting service of the proceedings; or (ii) in any other case, in effecting substituted service.
How these provisions will be interpreted has yet to be seen. The definition of significant harm has already been discussed. Case law will give us the interpretation of ‘seriously prejudiced’. By s 45(3), when a court makes an ex parte order it must give a return date to enable the respondent to make representations. By s 45(4), if an ex parte order is granted the length of that order is part of the computation of the length of the final order, so that the final order is deemed to begin at the date the ex parte order began. While there is a power to grant ex parte EPOs,41 nothing in s 44A gives guidance as to whether an exclusion requirement can be made ex parte. Furthermore, s 38A is silent as to whether an exclusion requirement in an interim care order can be made ex parte. It is thus debatable whether such a power exists and, if it does, whether the court should have regard to the criteria in s 45(2).
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 1 Powers of arrest In Chapter 3 the power of the court to attach a power of arrest under the present law was discussed. The frequency of the use of that power was also discussed in that chapter. It can be seen, therefore, that the power to attach a power of arrest differs between the DVMPA 1976 and the DPMCA 1978, and further that no such power exists under the MHA 1983. The present law, therefore, does not lead to consistency. The FLA 1996 seeks to remedy this inconsistency. By s 47(2), where the court has made an occupation or non-molestation order, if it appears to the court that the respondent has used or threatened to use violence against the applicant or relevant child, it shall attach a power of arrest to one or more provisions of the order unless the court is satisfied that the applicant or child will be adequately protected without the power of arrest being attached. Substantial differences can be noted between the present law and the FLA 1996. First, under the present law the power to attach a power of arrest is discretionary, whereas s 47(2) makes it clear that it is mandatory to attach a _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
41 Family Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 1991, r 4(4). 73
Domestic Violence power of arrest in certain circumstances. Second, under the present law a power of arrest can only be attached if the respondent has caused the applicant or child actual bodily harm and is likely to do so again (s 2(1) of the DVMPA 1976) or has physically injured the applicant or child and is likely to do so again (s 18(1) of the DPMCA 1978). Under the 1996 legislation, the court can attach a power of arrest because the respondent has threatened or used violence, so appearing to relax the existing test. However, there is still a need to take into account the future actions of the respondent. This is the case under the present law and will continue to be so under the FLA 1996 which requires the court to attach the power of arrest unless it is satisfied that the applicant or child will be adequately protected without it. This must, it is submitted, require the court to look at the likelihood of future attacks and the risk to the applicant or child. Furthermore, the 1996 legislation, although relaxing the criteria somewhat, still requires violence before a power of arrest can be attached. Third, the present law only gives the protection of the power of arrest to spouses or cohabitants. Section 47 of the FLA 1996 allows the power to be attached to an occupation or non-molestation order which can be granted to an applicant who is associated with the respondent; a group, it has already been noted, which is very wide. Section 47(2) creates a duty on the court to attach a power of arrest to ‘one or more provisions of the order’. Thus it is clear that the court must specify the parts of the order the power attaches to, and, given that the court must attach such a power in certain circumstances, presumably the court will have complied with its statutory duty if it attaches the power to only one provision. Section 47(3) provides that subsection (2) does not apply where the court makes an ex parte order. The court, however, may attach a power of arrest to one or more provisions of an ex parte order if it appears to the court: (a) that the respondent has used or threatened to use violence against the applicant or relevant child; and (b) that there is a risk of significant harm to the applicant or child, attributable to the conduct of the respondent, if the power of arrest is not attach to those provisions immediately.
The difference between the power when making a final order and an ex parte order is immediately apparent. Whereas attachment of a power of arrest is mandatory where a final order has been granted, it is discretionary when an ex parte order is made. Further, the criteria the court must consider before attaching a power of arrest are different. When a final order is made the court must, on the evidence, decide whether the parties will be adequately protected without the power. Under subsection (3), however, the court is much more restricted, in that it has to have concluded that there is a risk of significant harm from the respondent if the power is not attached immediately. It would appear, therefore, that if the risk of significant harm is in the future rather than immediate, no power can be attached, although, of course, it could
74
Protection after 1997 be attached to the final order. Whether the court can make an ex parte exclusion requirement in an interim care order or an EPO is questionable as discussed above. If such a power exists, presumably the criteria in subsection (3) will apply. The effect of a power of arrest is found in s 47(6), which says that when a power is attached to a provision in an order, a constable may arrest without warrant a person he has reasonable cause to suspect to be in breach of such a provision. It has already been stated in Chapter 3 that the discretionary nature of a power of arrest under the present law can lead to further injury to the victim. Furthermore, the exercise of the discretion under the present law by Leicestershire police will be discussed in Chapter 5. The amendments made to the Children Act 1989 allow a magistrate or judge to attach a power of arrest to an exclusion requirement made in an interim care order or EPO (subsection 38A(5) and 44A(5)). The effect of such a power is the same as the exercise of the power under s 47 (subsection 38A(9) and 44A(9)). Presumably, the criteria the court must have regard to when issuing a power of arrest under s 47 will apply equally to a power attached to an exclusion requirement, although neither s 38A nor s 44A make this clear.
2 Warrant for arrest Under the pre-1997 law, the High Court and the county court have no way of using the police to enforce orders unless a power of arrest is attached. The magistrates’ courts, on the other hand, have a power to involve the police as they can issue a warrant where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent has disobeyed an order. The disparity between the court powers was commented upon by the Law Commission, 42 which recommended that magistrates’ powers should also be given to the High Court and county courts. This recommendation is to be found in s 47(8) of the FLA 1996 which provides that where a court has not attached a power of arrest, or has only attached a power of arrest to certain provisions, if the applicant feels that the respondent has not complied with the order the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the respondent, if it has reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has failed to comply with the order (s 47(9)). When a respondent is arrested, either by the exercise of a power of arrest or a warrant, the relevant judicial authority may remand in custody or on bail (s 47(10)–(12)), or, by s 48, may remand for a medical report, where there is reason to suspect that the respondent is ‘suffering from mental illness or severe mental impairment’ (s 48(4)). Such a remand may be for no longer than three weeks if the respondent is committed to custody or four weeks if he is on bail. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________
75
Domestic Violence
UNDERTAKINGS In Chapter 3 the use of the court of undertakings under the pre-1997 law, and the effect of an undertaking on the enforcement powers of the court was discussed. The use of the court of undertakings under the present law is extensive.43 The power of the court to accept undertakings is reproduced under the FLA 1996 in respect of any order the court may make. By s 46(1), the court can accept an undertaking in an application for a non-molestation or occupation order and by ss 38B and 44B of the Children Act 1989, the court will have the power to accept undertakings where it has the power to include an exclusion provision in an interim care order or EPO. The court cannot attach a power of arrest to an undertaking (ss 46(2), 38B(2) and 44B(2)); however, the provisions of s 46 and those of ss 38B and 44B of the Children Act 1989 are different. By s 46(3), a court cannot accept an undertaking in any case where it would attach a power of arrest to an order, in essence where the respondent has used or threatened to use violence against an applicant or relevant child, and those parties cannot be adequately protected without a power of arrest being attached to the appropriate order. Such a restriction does not, however, appear in ss 38B or 44B of the Children Act 1989. This may mean, in reality, given that the court must attach a power of arrest in certain circumstances, that the use of undertakings under the FLA 1996 will be considerably less than under the present law.44 Although no power of arrest can be attached to an undertaking, the FLA 1996 states that an undertaking is enforceable as if it were an order of the court (s 46(4)). Similar provisions are contained in the amended Children Act 1989 (ss 38B(3)(a) and 44B(3)(a)). It should follow, therefore, that an undertaking can be enforced by the issue of a warrant for arrest. Whether this is the way the provisions will be interpreted has yet to be seen, but, if so interpreted, the present problems of enforcement should to a large extent be alleviated, in that the court will have the power order the arrest of a respondent who is in breach of either an order or an undertaking. The reluctance of the courts at present to grant a power of arrest has been noted, however. If this reluctance also extends to the issue of warrants, while the potential enforcement powers will be wide, their effectiveness may in reality be severely curbed.
PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT 1997 The FLA 1996 gives protection, either in the form of occupation orders to those with property or matrimonial home rights or in the form of non_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
43 Bird, Domestic Violence – The New Law (1996), Bristol: Jordans, p 59: Edwards, op cit, pp 216–17. 44 See, however, the arguments against this view by Kewley, ‘Remedies for the victims of domestic violence’ (1996) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 1. For a criticism of Kewley see Murphy, op cit, n 126, pp 859–60. 76
Protection after 1997 molestation orders, but only where the respondent is a person who is associated with the applicant within the meaning of s 62. While appearing to be a wide definition, the limitations within the section have already been discussed, leaving some victims unprotected by the statute. Although the remedies in tort have been greatly expanded recently45 this still leaves the victim in a less favourable position than those protected by the statute with regards to the enforcement of any injunction granted under that jurisdiction. The Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 1997 has been specifically enacted to protect persons from harassment and similar conduct. It will therefore provide protection for those persons who do not fall within the ambit of the FLA 1996 and who, until the Act comes into force, have to rely on the courts’ jurisdiction in tort. The PHA 1997 creates criminal offences and provides civil remedies for victims of harassment. The criminal liability thus created is discussed later.46 Section 1 prohibits harassment. It states: (1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct– (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. (2) For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.
The statute, therefore, specifically prohibits harassment, but does not define what constitutes harassment. Dictionary definitions include words such as ‘distress’, ‘trouble’ and ‘worry’ and there is no reason to suppose that harassment will not be given that definition. Should this definition be adopted, however, it is narrower than the definition of molestation, although harassment under the PHA 1997 will constitute molestation for the purposes of the FLA 1996.47 Moreover, it should be noted that a person will only harass another by ‘pursuing a course of conduct’.48 It would thus appear that a oneoff act will not fall within the definition regardless of the distress, trouble or worry it may cause the victim. What amounts to a course of conduct is also not defined, but presumably, given the purpose of the legislation, conduct on two occasions will fall within the definition. Section 1(3) provides, however, that a course of conduct does not amount to harassment if, in the particular circumstances, the pursuit of the conduct was reasonable. How this will be interpreted has yet to be seen. It could be argued that any course of conduct _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
45 46 47 48
See Chapter 3 above. See below. See p 68. Section 1(1).
77
Domestic Violence which causes distress or worry can never be reasonable, but given the phrase ‘in the particular circumstances’ a court can look at the reason behind the conduct. Thus, if the defendant feels that his conduct is welcomed by the other, this would not constitute harassment unless a reasonable person would know that this is not the case. Should harassment be established the civil remedies are found in s 3. This allows the court to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment, award damages for anxiety or financial loss caused by the harassment and require the defendant to attend a course of counselling, if it appears just and appropriate to do so, for the purpose of persuading him not to harass the victim or anyone else in the future. Section 6 provides that the Limitation Act 1980 does not apply to any action in damages brought under s 3. In addition, s 5 allows the court, of its own volition when sentencing or otherwise dealing with a person convicted of an offence under ss 2 or 4, to issue a restraining order prohibiting the defendant from pursuing further conduct which amounts to harassment or will cause fear of violence, in order to protect the victim. There is no statutory time limit on the length of the injunction or the time limit. Breach of an injunction issued under s 3 or a restraining order issued under s 5, without reasonable excuse, is an offence,49 punishable on conviction on indictment of imprisonment of up to five years and/or a fine and on summary conviction of imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine.50 The PHA 1997 strengthens the existing protection in tort for those victims not covered by the FLA 1996 and is therefore to be welcomed. The differences in the two pieces of legislation should be noted, however. Obviously, the PHA 1997 does not provide remedies in the form of occupation orders. This could be a problem where, for example, the harasser lives in the same building as the victim but in a different household (for example where one building houses a number of flats). Furthermore, if the ordinary and natural meaning is given to the word harassment, it would appear that it is narrower than the definition of molestation adopted by the courts over the years51 and thus certain conduct which could be prohibited by a non-molestation order will not constitute harassment and a victim who is not associated with the defendant will only have a tortious remedy. In addition, ss 3 and 5 of the PHA 1997 state that the term of any injunction or order shall restrain the defendant from pursuing conduct which amounts to harassment and it is questionable if the court can restrain a defendant from entering an area in which the home or workplace is situated. On the other hand, should harassment be proved, the enforcement of remedies for the victim under the PHA 1997 is arguably more _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
49 Section 3(4)(b) and s 5(5). 50 Section 3(7) and s 5(6). 51 See Chapter 3 above. 78
Protection after 1997 effective than under the FLA 1996. Under s 47 of the FLA 1996, a court must attach a power of arrest to a non-molestation order if the respondent has used or threatened to use violence against the applicant or relevant child, unless it is satisfied that the applicant or child will be adequately protected without the power being attached. Section 47, therefore, requires violence or the threat of it before the jurisdiction to attach a power of arrest arises and, even if that is established, the court may decide that the applicant or child will be adequately protected without such a power being attached. On the other hand, if an injunction or restraining order issued under ss 3 or 5 of the PHA 1997 is broken without reasonable excuse, this is a criminal offence punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. While allowing the court some discretion, this is less than that contained in the FLA 1996.
ADEQUATE PROTECTION AT LAST? It is clear from the previous discussion that the FLA 1996 deals, in part, with the perceived inadequacies of the present statutory provisions which exist to protect victims of domestic violence. The powers in the new Act to grant orders against a much wider group of people, to attach powers of arrest and issue warrants for arrest, amount to more comprehensive protection than before. In addition, the PHA 1997 will give more effective protection to a wide group of victims by strengthening the remedies available by making breach of an injunction issued under the Act a criminal offence. It is still questionable, however, whether the Acts will provide adequate protection for certain victims – those of domestic violence. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, the government missed an opportunity to amend housing legislation to ensure that such victims had ready access to alternative accommodation. Second, research in the United States suggests that occupation and non-molestation orders (the remedies under the FLA 1996), even if coupled with powers of arrest, may not provide the protection victims need.
1 Housing victims The Scottish Code of Guidance on Homelessness pointed out: The fact that a woman has an interdict (injunction) ordering her partner not to molest her nor enter the home they formerly shared does not necessarily mean that it is safe for her to return to that home – experience has shown that some people are not deterred by an interdict.52
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
52 Para 2.11.b, quoted in Murphy, op cit, p 854. 79
Domestic Violence In other words, agencies working in the area of domestic violence recognise that, without alternative accommodation, a court order will often give little protection to a victim. The FLA 1996 made no substantive amendments to the housing legislation, and thus victims of domestic violence will still only be a priority need if they can show vulnerability on the basis of ‘old age, mental illness or handicap or other physical disability or other special reason’.53 It could be argued that victims of domestic violence are in priority need by virtue of ‘special reason’ and the Code of Guidance issued by the Department of the Environment54 suggests that this is the case. It is clear, however, that not all local authorities interpret the provision in this way.55 Murphy gives two possible reasons for this. First, the Code is not binding on local authorities. Second, although the law now accepts that the phrase domestic violence encompasses more than just physical violence, this is not how local authorities interpret either the Housing Act or the Code.56 Previous discussion has shown that without alternative accommodation, women will often not take action to protect themselves for fear of reprisals against themselves or their children. By amending the Housing Act to require local authorities to regard victims of domestic violence, in its wider sense, as a priority need, the changes introduced by the 1996 Act could have been made much more effective.
2 Do occupation and non-molestation orders provide adequate protection? The essence of the FLA 1996 is to give the court the power to issue occupation and non-molestation orders in many more situations than the existing legislation allows. It is clear from both the recommendations of the Law Commission and the Act that these powers are seen as the effective way of protecting victims of domestic violence. While the Act is not without its flaws, perhaps a more fundamental question must be asked. Are occupation and non-molestation orders the best form of protection for such victims? Research conducted in the United States in 1990 by Klein and in 1991 by Harrell and Smith57 suggests that such remedies do little to provide long-term protection for domestic violence victims. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
53 Section 189 of the Housing Act 1996. 54 Homelessness – Code of Guidance for Local Authorities, London: HMSO, 1995. 55 See for example Malos and Hague, Domestic Violence and Housing: Local Authority Responses to Women and Children Escaping Violence in the Home (1993), Bristol Women’s Aid Federation, quoted by Murphy, op cit, n 85, p 860. 56 Thornton, ‘Homelessness through relationship breakdown: the Local Authorities’ response’ (1989) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 67, quoted in Murphy, op cit, p 860. 57 Klein, ‘Re-abuse in a population of court restrained male batterers’ and Harrell and Smith, ‘Effects of restraining orders on domestic violence victims’ in Buzawa and Buzawa (eds), Do Arrest and Restraining Orders Work? (1996), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 80
Protection after 1997 In the majority of jurisdictions in the United States, the issue of civil orders is the chief means of protecting domestic violence victims.58 Klein studied a total of 663 cases where a restraining or protective order had been issued to victims of domestic violence. The number in Harrell and Smith’s study was 355, this number coming from two jurisdictions representing 50% of the petitions filed. In both studies the analysis was of cases which involved abuse by a male against a female who was or had been in an intimate relationship with the abuser. Both studies sought to analyse the effectiveness of a civil order in preventing further violence. Klein’s research consisted of an analysis of the court records in each case and further tracking of the abuser for two years. Harrell and Smith’s research consisted of interviewing victims who had filed petitions for restraining orders, three months and 12 months after the order was granted. In both pieces of research, a substantial proportion of petitioners had lived with the abuser named in the order but had ceased to live with him at the time of the application. These proportions were over a third in Klein’s study and nearly half in Harrell and Smith’s. As Klein states: In other words, a significant number of these women had taken significant steps to protect themselves prior to coming to court to request the RO. This finding suggests that their continued abuse may not result so much from their inability to act as from the tenacity of their abusers to pursue them.59
Both studies looked at re-abuse rates after the issue of the restraining order. Both pieces of research found that a high proportion of abusers re-abused despite the restraining order. Klein found that 48.8% of abusers in his study re-abused within the two years after the issue of the order,60 Harrell and Smith found a higher reabuse rate of 60% within the 12 months following the issue of the order.61 Harrell and Smith analysed the abuse reported by the women on the applications for restraining orders. They subdivided the abuse into four categories: severe violence, which included, inter alia, acts such as kicked, bit or punched her, choked or strangled her, forced sex, threats to kill, threats with a weapon; other violent acts, which included slapping, pushing, throwing things; threats of violence/property damage, which included threats to children or others, taking money, destruction of property; and psychological abuse, which included making her stay at home, keeping her away from work, stalking her, harassing her.62 Their analysis reveals that in the 12 months after the issuing of the restraining order, 29% of the women reported re-abuse consisting of acts of severe violence, 24% reported re-abuse consisting of acts of other _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
58 59 60 61 62
Klein, op cit, p 192. Op cit, p 198. Op cit, p 199. Op cit, p 223. Op cit, p 216. 81
Domestic Violence violence, 43% reported re-abuse consisting of threats of violence and acts of property damage, and 57% reported persistent psychological abuse. Of the total number of women in the study, 212 had a permanent restraining order and 143 a temporary order (lasting 14 to 21 days). Harrell and Smith found no statistical difference in re-abuse rate between those abusers who were subject to a temporary order and those subject to a permanent order, except in the case of psychological abuse, where they found that women with permanent orders were significantly less likely to suffer such re-abuse.63 Klein’s study did not detail the type of re-abuse suffered. He did discover, however, that when looking at those re-abusers arrested, 49.19% were arrested for assault or assault and battery, with or without a weapon. He also found that re-abuse was more likely in the 30 days following the issue of the order, and that the risk of re-abuse dropped progressively during the first year.64 Both pieces of research attempted to analyse predictors to forecast further abuse after the issue of the restraining order. Harrell and Smith looked at the severity of the incident that led to the court order and the history of abuse, the personal characteristics of the woman and man and their relationship, and the response of the criminal justice system.65 They concluded that the severity of the incident which led the woman to seek a court order did not act as a predictor for re-abuse after the order, but that a history of severe abuse prior to the order indicated that re-abuse was more likely. In their sample, more than 20% of the women reported severe violence in the 12 months preceding their applications and almost all the women reported multiple types of abuse. They also discovered that severe prior abuse was significantly related to severity of re-abuse in the year after the restraining order, and other violent acts predicted similar violent acts. Put another way, if re-abuse occurred, it was likely to be of a similar nature to that occurring before the order was granted. Furthermore, persistence of abuse was an indicator of re-abuse, although the length of the history of abuse was not. Harrell and Smith further found that certain case characteristics related to the probability of re-abuse after the order. They measured the resistance of the abuser at the hearing to the order being granted. A high level of resistance at the hearing was seen to significantly increase the probability of a recurrence of severe violence, threats and property damage, and psychological abuse. They state: ‘... it is important to note that strenuous objections voiced by the men should be treated seriously as a warning that abuse may continue.’66 Other case characteristics could be identified as predictors of re-abuse. They found that women who lived with the abuser were significantly less _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
63 64 65 66
Op cit, p 228. Op cit, p 200. Op cit, p 228. Op cit, p 231. 82
Protection after 1997 likely to suffer re-abuse than women who had left. In addition, women without children were less likely to suffer from re-abuse than those who had children living with them, although it was noted that the re-abuse consisted of violent acts or threats or property damage and usually occurred around visitation rights. In Harrell and Smith’s study, personal characteristics of the woman or the abuser did not affect the probability of re-abuse. They further analysed the response of the police and the courts to restraining order violations. Harrell and Smith felt that this was important as they discovered that if the police arrested the man at the time of the incident that led to the court order, the likelihood of severe violence in the following year was diminished, in that the odds of severe violence in cases where an arrest was made was less than half that of cases where no arrest occurred.67 Arrest, however, had no effect on other types of abusive acts: This finding indicates that although men named in restraining orders continue their abuse, they are less likely to commit acts of serious violence when an arrest has been made. The implication is that aggressive arrest policies reduced the severity of future abuse, but not the likelihood that abuse would be reported.68
Klein’s research, after looking at the probability of re-abuse, also analysed whether any predictors could be identified from his study. He found that in his research group, the only significant predictors were age, prior criminal history and court-ordered contact provisions. Arrest of the abuser, the existence of prior restraining orders, and whether the order was temporary or permanent did not predict re-abuse.69 Furthermore, he found re-abuse rates did not differ between couples who continued to live together and those who did not. In respect of age, Klein found that younger abusers re-abuse more than older abusers and that those abusers without criminal histories or those whose the last arrest was more than 15 years before the restraining order was issued, re-abused less than those with prior active criminal histories. Furthermore, those abusers with more prior complaints on their record were more likely to re-abuse than those with fewer. This pattern was replicated where the abuser’s prior criminal history was drugs or alcohol-related or involved crimes against persons other than the applicant for the restraining order. When looking at court-ordered contact, Klein found that only between abusers with no prior record was there any significant difference in the incidents of re-abuse. Where the abuser had a prior history of abuse or criminal activity, there was no appreciable difference in re-abuse rates: ‘In
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
67 Op cit, p 233. 68 Ibid. 69 Op cit, p 200. 83
Domestic Violence other words, abusers with longer prior criminal records re-abused regardless of differences in the specifics of the court RO provisions.’70 What can be concluded from these two research projects? Both studies, conducted over three jurisdictions in America, show that domestic violence is a continual threat which is not, in the main, prevented by court orders. Harrell and Smith’s research tells us a variety of things. Arrest of an abuser before a court order is obtained seems to prevent a repetition of serious violence but has no impact on the continuance of other abusive behaviour. Subject to this, the type of re-abuse which will occur is often the same as the abuse which led to the order being granted. If the woman no longer lives with the abuser, the risk of re-abuse is higher, as is the case where the woman has children living with her. The severity of the incident leading to the order is not indicative of re-abuse, but past history of abuse is. If we compare these findings with those of Klein, certain patterns emerge. Klein found that re-abuse was more likely to occur where the abuser was young, did not live with the victim, and had an existing record of abuse and/or criminal activity. He concludes: ‘It may be that most male abusers do not have criminal records, but the vast majority brought to court by their victims for ROs do.’71 He supports this conclusion by referring to other research of batterers which reveals that most have prior criminal records.72 In addition, in his study one-third of the abusers had prior restraining orders against the same victim. He further concludes that not only did the majority of abusers in his study have prior criminal records, but the reabuse rate was the same as reoffending rates for other types of offence when compared to the reoffending rate of all men on probation in Massachusetts. He warns, however that male abusers are the more dangerous because they have, in the main, prior histories of violence with a ready access to their victims, particularly as the court in his study routinely granted visitation rights to the victim’s children. Taking the two research studies together, there would appear to be evidence that court orders alone will provide only temporary relief for the majority of victims of domestic violence. Furthermore, both pieces of research indicate that in many cases there are certain characteristics which may indicate to the court those respondents who are likely to re-abuse their victim. Given the evidence above, will the new legislation provide greater protection for victims than at present? The PHA 1997 is aimed at protecting victims of harassment who have not lived in the same household as the _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________
70 Ibid. 71 Op cit, p 202. 72 Dunford, Huizinga Elliot, ‘The role of arrest in domestic assault: the Omaha police experiment’ (1990) Criminology, 28(2), 183–206; Hirschel, Hutchinson, Dean, ‘The failure of arrest to deter spousal abuse’ (1992) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 29(1), 7–34; Sherman, Berk, ‘The specific effects of arrest for domestic assault’ (1984) American Sociological Review, 49, 261–72; Sherman, Schmidt, Rogan, Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas (1992), New York: Free Press. 84
Protection after 1997 harasser. Some of these victims may have had an intimate relationship with their harasser and thus may be classed as domestic victims. As such, the power to issue injunctions enforceable by criminal sanctions for breach is much more effective than the existing law. The FLA 1996, Part IV of which was enacted specifically to protect victims of domestic violence within the definition adopted by this book, would appear at first sight to give much greater protection to those victims. The FLA 1996 protects a much wider group of victims than is the case under the DVMPA 1976, DPMCA 1978 or the MHA 1983. Furthermore, the new provisions create a statutory duty to grant an order and issue a power of arrest in certain circumstances. This is vastly different from the present law. However, evidence from the research in America would suggest that these changes alone, while providing short-term protection, will not prevent further violence, in many cases shortly after the issue of the order. How could the provisions of the FLA 1996 be made more effective? If we look back to Klein and Harrell and Smith’s studies, certain case characteristics will predict the likelihood of an order being broken. Taking the studies together, it could be said with some certainty that the following characteristics indicate future abuse: (a) younger abusers; (b) abusers separated from their victim; (c) a history of persistent violence against the victim; (d) children living with the victim; (e) previous criminal convictions within the last 15 years; (f) strong resistance to an order being granted by the respondent at the hearing. If all of this information were available to judges, magistrates and the police – if, for example, details of the history of the abuse were given to the court, the respondent’s criminal record was admissible and the behaviour of the respondent at the hearing was taken into account – it could lead to more effective remedies being granted. In such cases where a number of the predictors were present, if judges invariably issued an order with a power of arrest attached, it would reduce the risk of future re-abuse. Furthermore, if the police were given such details when a power of arrest was attached to an order, and were required to arrest when an order was breached and the predictors were present, this could also reduce re-abuse. In addition, if, when arrested, the perpetrators were remanded in custody, this might reinforce the message that violence of any kind is a crime and will be treated as such. The above additional protection needs to be complemented with the provision of alternative accommodation and short-term safe places for victims to go. Re-abuse can only occur if the abuser can find his victim. The failure to impose a statutory duty on local authorities to rehouse domestic violence
85
Domestic Violence victims, plus inadequate funding of refuges, means that, in the majority of cases, court orders can only provide very short-term safety, leaving the victim at risk of re-abuse. The cases described earlier in this text show that often the victim leaves, only to return to the abuser because there is nowhere else to go. No law can adequately protect a victim who has to return to her abuser, or whose abuser can return to the place where he knows she is living. Stricter enforcement of court orders, with imprisonment for breach, coupled with alternative and safe accommodation can go a long way to giving long-term protection. None of the additional protection discussed above can be effective without adequate training for all of those involved in domestic violence. Representatives, judges, magistrates and the police need to be educated to look beyond the facts of the particular incident which brought the complainant to court. Only when the whole history of the case is used to decide the remedies to be imposed can the law say that it is doing all it can to give adequate protection to victims of the violence known as domestic.
86
CHAPTER 5
THE POLICING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION So far we have concentrated on the powers and responses of the courts to domestic violence incidents, and to allegations of such violence. However, police actions and attitudes are crucial to the question of whether the law provides adequate protection against, and appropriate remedies for, domestic violence. It could be argued that this is obvious, or ought to be so, given the function of the police, for a variety of reasons. First, the police are the initial point of contact in many, though not all, incidents of domestic violence, real or alleged. How responses are made, and the content of those responses, determines the effectiveness of the protection, irrespective of whether that protection is achieved through the criminal or civil process. In short, the police act as ‘gatekeepers’.1 Secondly, the nature of the police response may determine the whole approach taken to the incident and problem. It is the police who decide whether inquiries are initiated and pursued, and if so in what form or with what vigour. The immediate response, in terms of speed and type, will be driven primarily by considerations that focus on criminal justice issues, namely, the preservation of the peace, the investigation, detection and prevention of offences, and the acquisition of evidence to secure convictions. Indeed, the police are ‘the key to the whole criminal justice system’.2 However, it by no means follows that a criminal justice focused response is one that the alleged victim, or members of his or her family, wish. It may not be necessary, or even in their interests.3 Thirdly, the actions of the police are crucial to the successful operation of the prosecution process. Success in prosecuting perpetrators of domestic violence is crucial to the effectiveness of the law as a deterrent against domestic violence, although the police are not, in this context, the only contributor to the success or otherwise of the prosecution process. In particular the role played by the Crown Prosecution Service should be noted.4 Police actions cannot, of course, be considered in isolation. They reflect and are based on systems, attitudes and perspectives which determine what __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4
See Stanko, Women Policing and Male Violence: International Perspectives (1989), London: HMSO, p 55. Association of Chief Police Officers, in evidence to Home Affairs Committee (1992–93), 3rd Report, Domestic Violence, Vol 1, Report, HL 2 45–41, HMSO, para 13. See below, p 127. See below, p 137. 87
Domestic Violence actions, if any, are taken. All of these interact. As Edwards observes,5 ‘police conduct is not only the product of individual police attitudes, but is also constructed in accordance with formal rules which provide the legal ratification for much of what they do’. In reality what occurred has, in the past, effectively amounted to a public/private law dichotomy. Although the police are comfortable with, and respond to, issues defined in terms of a criminal justice response, matters that are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as ‘domestic’ may attract different responses. These responses may be coloured by value judgments made about the victim, about his or her behaviour, about the alleged offender, and by judgments as to class and race which are stereotypical, and which shape attitudes.6 In recent years these attitudes and problems have been increasingly explored and researched. The ‘classic’ (and now, perhaps, historic) police reaction to domestic violence is, of course, well-known and well-recognised, and typically involved three characteristics. These were identified by Buzawa and Buzawa7 as follows: (a) relatively few of the potential number of domestic violence cases were ever formally addressed by the police, the majority being screened out; (b) the lack of a desire by police to get involved in family or domestic disputes; (c) a strong, sometimes overwhelming bias, against making arrests. This summary strongly reflects the findings of Edwards,8 and the evidence tendered to the Home Affairs Committee 3rd Report.9 The inadequacies of these reactions have now been recognised and criticised.10 This in turn led to a governmental response, in the form of Home Office Circular 60/90. That circular recommended a more interventionist approach to the policing of domestic violence, and greater inter-agency co-operation. Chief Police Officers were ‘asked to ensure that all police officers involved in the investigation of cases of domestic violence regard as their overriding priority the protection of the victim and the apprehension of the offender’, and the circular identified __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5
Edwards, Policing Domestic Violence: Women, The Law and The State (1989), London: Sage Publications, p 81. 6 Ibid, p 92. Cf Sanders, Personal Violence and Public Order: The Prosecution of ‘Domestic Violence’ in England and Wales [1988] 16 International Journal of Sociology of Law 359. 7 Buzawa and Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response (1996), 2nd edn, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, p 37. 8 1989, op cit. 9 1993, op cit. 10 See: Buzawa and Buzawa, op cit; Edwards (1989), op cit; Hamner, Radford and Stanko, Women, Policing and Male Violence: International Perspectives (1989), London: Routledge; Morley and Mullender, Preventing Domestic Violence to Women (1994), Police Research Group Prevention Series, paper 48, London: HMSO. For a review of the literature, see Smith, Domestic Violence 1989, Home Office Research Study No 107, London: HMSO.
88
The Policing of Domestic Violence some 13 specific areas requiring action. The detail of this, the responses to it and its impact are discussed later in this chapter.11 In considering the appropriateness of police responses to domestic violence, their wider role should not be overlooked or minimised. It has already been noted that the police are the organisation often most likely to be immediately called upon by a victim of domestic violence. Circular 60/90 stressed the role the police play, or should play, in liaising with other agencies and voluntary bodies so as to ensure that arrangements exist for referring victims of domestic violence to sources of long-term support, and thus ensure that they are supported through the pre-trial process if the criminal justice process is in fact instigated. The police also play a crucial role in crime prevention. The Association of Chief Officers of Police believed that domestic violence should ‘increasingly form part of crime prevention strategy’.12 It is because of this overall context that the police role is crucial. In part this turns on the attitudes of individual officers and the operational policies adopted as well as on the existing legal framework. However, the performance of this role may also depend upon the answer to the simple question: what is domestic violence?
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: OFFENCES AND POWERS Any discussion of attitudes or responses to domestic violence begs the question: what is meant by this term? In the criminal justice context, domestic violence is not a legal term of art, but one which is of importance in terms of police powers and practices. The definition of domestic violence for the purposes of this text has already been seen,13 but is less important than that used by the police themselves, either in determining the extent of legal power to intervene, or in determining how cases should be handled. Circular 60/90 marked a watershed in that it set in train a process of change in approaches to training and attitudes to the policing of domestic violence. Any policing system which seeks to identify special concerns and procedures in domestic violence cases depends for its efficacy upon those operating and working within that system recognising that the subject matter does, in fact, fall within those concerns and procedures. The Home Affairs Committee defined domestic violence as any form of physical, sexual or emotional abuse which takes place within the context of a close relationship,14 although it concentrated its consideration on the issues of __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
11 12 13 14
See below, p 106. Home Affairs Committee, 3rd Report, op cit, paras 39–43. See above, p 1. Op cit, para 2, an approach also adopted by Grace, Policing Domestic Violence (1995), Home Office Research Study 139, London: HMSO. 89
Domestic Violence the policing of inter-partner (or ex-partner) violence. One example of a specific police force definition of domestic violence was found by the authors during a study of responses to domestic violence by Leicestershire Constabulary.15 The definition adopted by that force at the time of that survey was: ‘Any incident of violence or aggression where the alleged offender is known to the victim through an existing or previous domestic relationship.’ The definition has changed since the date of that survey. The Leicestershire force currently define domestic violence as:16 Any incident of violence or aggression whether that be physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse of an individual by a family member, partner or ex-partner in an existing or previous domestic relationship regardless of gender or sexual orientation.
Both definitions concentrate on the nature of the relationship between complainant and assailant, and are broad enough to include relationships where the persons involved do not cohabit, and never have. Thus the Leicestershire Domestic Violence Annual Report for 1995/96 identified some 18% of all domestic violence incidents for that year as occurring between noncohabiting boyfriend and girlfriend. This concentration on the nature of the relationship rather than the circumstances of the violence is not, in the context of the policing role, crucial. The police role operates within the context of criminal law and of police powers which apply irrespective of the nature of the relationship. These offences and powers are discussed below, and are potentially wide enough to encompass the widest forms of violence, whether actual or threatened, physical or psychological, sexual or non-sexual, and whether the violence is offered to adult or child, partner or ex-partner.
1 Physical violence Non-consensual physical violence is recognised as unlawful by the criminal law, subject to limited defences, and gives rise to a wide range of potential criminal offences. Which offence, or offences, are relevant and appropriate will depend on the nature of the harm suffered, its extent, or the intention of the perpetrator. These offences, or reasonable suspicion of any of them, will also trigger a range of police powers that will facilitate the policing of domestic violence. All of these offences involve assault or battery. An assault is any act by which a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
15 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Leicestershire study’. For details of this study, see below, p 110. 16 See Leicestershire Constabulary: Domestic Violence, Annual Report 1995/96. 90
The Policing of Domestic Violence immediate and unlawful force. 17 A person is guilty of a battery if he intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to the body of another person.18 Thus a criminal offence will have been committed in cases of either actual or apprehended force. The actual offences that may arise range from murder or manslaughter, in cases of unlawful killing, attempted murder and the various non-fatal assaults recognised by the law, either under the Offences against the Person Act (OPA) 1861 or at common law. In the context of domestic violence, the main non-fatal offences against the person (other than specifically sexual offences)19 are as follows: (a) 1861 Act, s 18: it is an offence, punishable with life imprisonment, for a person unlawfully and maliciously to wound20 or cause grievous bodily harm21 to any person by any means whatsoever with intent, inter alia, to do grievous bodily harm. (b) 1861 Act, s 20: it is an offence, punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, to unlawfully and maliciously wound or cause grievous bodily harm. (c) 1861 Act, s 47: it is an offence, punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, to commit an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In addition, at common law assault22 (‘common assault’) or battery (‘common battery’) is also an offence, punishable by six months’ imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale,23 or both. It will be clear from the above that, in the context of domestic violence, the key issues are whether the force used was unlawful, and whether it was intentional.
Unlawful force Force will not, generally, be unlawful if it has been undertaken with consent. An individual can consent to acts that would otherwise amount to assaults or __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
17 R v Savage; R v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 4 All ER 698. For a definition of ‘force’ see Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 1 All ER 1115: ‘the application of energy to an object’. 18 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439. 19 See below, p 101. 20 To constitute a wound, the inner and outer skin must have been broken: M’Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635. 21 Grievous bodily harm means harm which is ‘really serious’: DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 All ER 161. 22 Which for this purpose includes a battery: DPP v Little [1992] 1 All ER 299. 23 The standard scale of fines applies only to offences which are only triable summarily. The meaning of the standard scale is that given by s 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and Sch 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978. When this book went to press the standard scale was as follows: Level 1 £200; Level 2 £500; Level 3 £1,000; Level 4 £2,500; Level 5 £5,000. 91
Domestic Violence batteries, provided that consent was not obtained by duress24 or fraud.25 However, there are limits. First, if the victim is so young or mentally disordered as not to be able to comprehend the nature of the act committed, apparent consent will be vitiated.26 Arguably, this will include situations where a partner is tied, hit or otherwise physically subjected to force (eg by the use of objects, substances, or by tattooing27 or piercing) in circumstances where ostensible consent exists but where, because of alcohol or substance abuse, that partner is totally incapable of understanding what is occurring.28 Such cases are likely to be extreme and uncommon, for mere intoxication will be insufficient to vitiate consent. A clear distinction exists in reality between consent, compliance and control. Domestic violence and sexual crime is often underpinned by a desire on the part of the perpetrator to exert power or control.29 No consent exists in law unless it is genuine, and various factors have been held to vitiate apparent consent. Thus rape is committed where the apparent consent is procured by personal violence or threats of personal violence,30 by fraud as to the nature of the act31 or the identity of the actor,32 or because of the mental incapacity of the complainant. ‘Compliance’ raises more difficulties because, although there is apparent consent, that consent may not in any sense be genuine. In R v Olugboja33 the Court of Appeal, in dismissing an appeal against a conviction for rape, drew a distinction between consent and submission. A person who submits in law does not necessarily consent. A person may submit to sexual intercourse, or other conduct, for a variety of reasons that go beyond the range of traditional factors set out above as vitiating consent in rape. Arguably, this is true not only in the law of rape, but generally, and not confined to consent in the law of rape. Despite doubts from some commentators,34 the way seems clear for courts to take a view on the concept of consent that reflects the power and control dynamics that characterise domestic violence situations. Further, there are limits as to what a person can consent to in law. Save in certain limited situations, an individual cannot consent to the infliction of _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
24 R v Day (1841) 9 C & P 722. 25 See, in the context of rape, R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340. 26 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 All ER 492. See, generally, Card, Cross and Jones, Criminal Law (1995) 13th edn, London: Butterworths, pp 177–78. 27 Tattooing of a person under 18, other than by a doctor for medical reasons, is unlawful and therefore cannot be consented to: Tattooing of Minors Act 1969. 28 Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50. 29 See above, p 16. 30 R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311. 31 R v Williams [1923] 1 KB 340. 32 R v Linekar (1994) The Times, 26 October. 33 [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 All ER 443. See also R v Larter and Castleton [1995] Crim LR 75. 34 See Card, Cross, Jones, Criminal Law, op cit, p 238. 92
The Policing of Domestic Violence actual bodily harm.35 This is an important issue in the domestic context. There may be pressures to consent to extremes of conduct, whether sexual or otherwise. Clearly, issues arise as to genuiness of any purported consent,36 and the limits the law imposes are therefore crucial in striking a balance between prohibiting conduct that is not in the public interest, whilst refraining from legal interference in the private, consensual activities of individuals. This raises difficult issues. In R v Wilson37 Russell LJ observed that ‘consensual activity between husband and wife, in the privacy of the matrimonial home is not, in our judgment, normally a proper matter for criminal investigation, let alone criminal prosecution’. The key word here is ‘normally’. Respect for private and family life is, of course, an internationally recognised right under Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 38 and that surely includes respect for individual preferences, whether sexual or otherwise. The law recognises, however, that there are limits. The question is: where are these limits to be drawn? The rule that an individual cannot consent to actual bodily harm has been clearly stated. In R v Donovan39 the appellant, in private, beat a girl aged 17 for the purposes of sexual gratification, with her consent. The act was considered to have about it an aggressive element. The Court of Appeal held that consent was immaterial: the conduct was unlawful. The rule is based on questions of public interest in prohibiting actual bodily harm where there is no good reason for it. Clearly, good reason exists for consent to bodily contact in sport, within limits, or for consent to medical treatment. The question remains as to how much further the law should go. This was the issue before the House of Lords in R v Brown,40 where the House had to consider the legality of sadomasochistic acts between consenting male homosexuals. The appellant, who had been convicted of assaults occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 47 of the OPA 1861, had willingly participated in acts of physical violence, including genital torture, for the sexual pleasure created or stimulated by the giving and receiving of pain. No permanent injury was suffered. These activities, which were videotaped, occurred in private. The majority of the House, in dismissing the appeals against conviction, concluded that consensual sado-masochistic homosexual encounters which occasioned actual bodily harm were unlawful, consent notwithstanding. This was because public policy required that society be protected by criminal sanctions against a __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
35 For the meaning of this term see R v Miller [1954] 2 KB 252; [1954] 2 All ER 529, where it was said that this meant any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim, being more than transient or trifling. ‘Harm’ is a synonym for ‘injury’: R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552. 36 See above, p 92. 37 [1996] 3 WLR 125. 38 See Wadham, Consent to Assault (1996) 146 NLJ 1812; cf Bradwell, op cit, p 1670. 39 [1934] 2 KB 498; see also A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; [1981] 2 All ER 1057. 40 [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 All ER 75. 93
Domestic Violence cult of violence which contained the danger of the proselytisation and corruption of young men. By contrast, the minority considered the case to raise the issue not of violence but of the criminalisation of private sexual conduct. Lord Mustill perceived cogent public policy reasons why the courts should not intervene in circumstances of this type. The ratio decidendi of Brown is uncertain. It could be confined to the narrow issue of sexual violence in homosexual cases. Indeed, Russell LJ in Wilson41 specifically noted that the certified question in Brown related only to a ‘sadomasochistic encounter’ and that it was not an authority for the general proposition that consent is no defence to a charge involving a s 47 assault. Clearly, however, Brown cannot, and should not, be confined to homosexual conduct, and the principle in issue arguably goes beyond the sexual, sadomasochistic context. In Wilson the appellant had been convicted of a s 47 assault, having, at his wife’s instigation, branded his initials on her buttocks with a hot knife. In quashing the conviction, the Court of Appeal considered that there was no evidence that what the appellant did was any more dangerous or painful than tattooing, that there was no aggressive intent and that it was not in the public interest that such consensual activity between husband and wife in the privacy of the matrimonial home should be a matter for criminal investigation or prosecution. The appropriate place to draw the line is uncertain. Wilson could be viewed simply as a tattooing case, albeit one of an amateur nature, but is unlikely to be so confined. ‘Aggression’ is not a helpful concept to introduce into the analysis, because it begs the question to be answered. An assault is by nature ‘aggressive’ in the sense of being without consent, or, at any rate, consent recognised as valid by the law. If what is meant is to be judged by the motive of the aggressor, that re-introduces into the law concepts of ‘hostility’ that have been rejected as playing no part in the legal test.42 The matter is surely one of public policy, and public policy alone. In Brown the House of Lords regarded what had occurred as ‘physical torture’, with ‘obvious dangers of serious personal injury and blood infection’. The Law Commission has suggested43 that consent should not be a defence to any assault that occasions a ‘serious disabling injury’. Such a formulation would permit those who wish to genuinely consent to sado-masochistic acts to do so. However, it should be remembered that a ‘life of abuse leaves some women incapable of linking a physical relationship to anything other than pain’.44 The issue is crucial to the striking an appropriate balance between _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
41 [1996] 3 WLR 125. 42 See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, per Robert Goff LJ, approved in F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1989] 2 All ER 545. 43 Consent and Offences Against the Person (1994), Law Commission Working Paper No 134, London: HMSO. 44 Bradwell, op cit, p 1670. 94
The Policing of Domestic Violence legitimate private activity and legal condemnation of violence occurring in a domestic context. This balance can perhaps better be struck by focusing on the question of real consent45 rather that the acceptability or otherwise of the conduct.
Intent There must be intent to cause the actus reus of the relevant offence. That is not, however, the same as requiring intent to cause the consequence that in fact arises. Providing the act intended was unlawful, the resulting consequences are immaterial for a common assault or battery, or assaults under ss 20 or 47 of the OPA 1861. Thus, if a man throws his pint of beer over his partner he is criminally liable if the glass slips from the hand and causes more severe injury than intended.46 By contrast if he believes (reasonably) that he has the right to do what he is doing, because of perceived consent, then no assault is committed provided the act is one which the law recognises as one for which consent may in fact be given.
2 Non-physical violence An assault or battery does not necessarily involve apprehended or actual physical harm.47 Domestic violence may thus go beyond physical assault and involve non-physical ‘violence’. In Smith v Chief Superintendent, Woking Police Station48 the defendant had been convicted of an offence under s 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824, which provides that ‘Every person being found ... in any enclosed ... garden for any unlawful purpose shall be deemed to be a rogue and vagabond’. He had entered the garden of a private house and looked through the windows of the house occupied by the victim. The court found that he intended to frighten the woman, and thus there was an assault for the purpose of s 4. He intended to assault her thereby causing her fear and shock. ‘Fear and shock’ may amount to an assault, but do not necessarily constitute actual bodily harm. In R v Chan-Fook49 it was held that ‘actual bodily harm’ may include injury to any part of the body, internal organs, the nervous system and the brain, and includes psychiatric injury, although not emotion such as fear, distress or panic. However, in R v Ireland50 the appellant was convicted of three counts of s 47 actual bodily harm, offences which arose as a result of the appellant making a large number of unwanted telephone __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
45 46 47 48 49 50
See above, p 92. See the facts of R v Savage; R v Parmenter, op cit. R v Savage; R v Parmenter, above. (1983) 76 Cr App R 234. [1994] 2 All ER 552. [1997] 1 All ER 112. 95
Domestic Violence calls to the women complainants. Commonwealth authority already existed to confirm that threats made over the telephone constituted an assault,51 and in this case the medical evidence established that each of the women had suffered significant psychological symptoms as a result of the silences that followed their answering the telephone. The medical symptoms suffered included palpitations, breathing difficulties, cold sweats, anxiety, inability to sleep, tearfulness, stress and a nervous skin condition. The conduct complained of was held by the Court of Appeal to constitute actual bodily harm for the purposes of s 47. Thus, the criminal law already regulates some conduct that falls under the heading of ‘harassment’. The making of unwanted telephone calls, the ‘stalking’ of an individual causing fear and subsequent physical or psychological harm, and other similar conduct may each fall to be regarded as an assault. However, not all forms of harassment will amount to assault, and the other statutory offences must therefore be considered.
3 Harassment, molestation and stalking Each of these can amount to domestic violence. A typical non-molestation order issued by a civil court 52 might restrain a person from ‘using or threatening violence against the applicant; pestering, harassing, molesting or interfering with her; communicating with her save through solicitors; loitering outside a specific place and from the applicant’s home’.53 Some but not all of these could constitute an assault. Most are capable of falling within the scope of the civil remedy potentially available since the decision of the Court of Appeal in Khorasandjian v Bush.54 However, such conduct is often already a criminal offence, as well as amounting to conduct that may give rise to the preventative powers in respect of breaches of the peace.55 The key offences are those contained in the Public Order Act 1986, as amended. Section 4 makes it an offence, inter alia, for a person– (a) to use towards another threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, (b) to distribute or display to another person any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or another by any person, or to provoke the _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
51 52 53 54 55
Baker v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWLR 451. See also, now R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576. See above, p 67. These were the main terms of the order issued in McCann v Wright [1995] 2 FLR 579. [1993] QB 727. For discussion of this, see above, p 34. See above, p 104. 96
The Policing of Domestic Violence immediate use of unlawful violence against that person or another or whereby that person is likely to believe that such violence will be used or is likely that such violence will be provoked.
By s 4A it is an offence for any person, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress– (a) to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress.
By s 5 it is an offence for any person– (a) to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the sight or hearing of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress.
These provisions are extremely broad and capable of dealing with most conduct commonly described as ‘harassment’ or ‘stalking’. For the purposes of s 4, the conduct or words have to be used ‘to another’.56 This is frequently the case, but in any event this limitation does not apply to a s 4A or s 5 offence. What is ‘threatening, abusive or insulting’ is to be decided in the light of the ordinary and natural meaning of those words.57 So, too, is ‘violence’. It is, of course, insufficient that conduct or words give rise to anger, distress or disgust.58 However, it is difficult to imagine many forms of conduct occurring in the context of domestic violence that do not fall within the definitions of the actus reus of the s 4, s 4A or s 5 offence. Certainly, the following of an individual, the repetitive standing outside a dwelling or the making of unwanted telephone calls will frequently be regarded by the ‘recipient’ as threatening, and these offences clearly cover abusive or insulting words or gestures. By contrast, other forms of behaviour may be less clear-cut. Examples might include the deposit of excrement through a letter-box, or the deposit of the body of a dead animal in a front garden. Further, s 4A and s 5 each deal with ‘disorderly’ behaviour, if intended or likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The term ‘disorderly’ is vague,
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
56 Atkin v DPP (1989) Cr App R 199. 57 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854; [1972] 2 All ER 1297. 58 Parkin v Norman [1983] QB 92. 97
Domestic Violence and although courts have on occasion attempted a definition,59 it is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning.60 It is, ultimately, a question of fact. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes, in its definition, ‘violating moral order, constitutional authority or recognised rule; lawless; unruly’ and ‘constituting a nuisance’. It is difficult to conceive of more vague terms, and they are certainly wide enough to encompass diverse forms of unacceptable, but nonviolent conduct, for example the making of unwanted and repeated telephone calls, the taking of unwanted photographs, the sending of unwanted flowers or pizzas. However, these offences have two distinct limitations. The first is that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used by, or engaged in by, a person inside a dwelling,61 and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or another dwelling. Thus, typically, threats made inside the matrimonial home will not constitute an offence under the 1986 Act, even if heard by a neighbour in an adjacent dwelling. By contrast the same threats shouted from the street or garden to the dwelling, or vice versa, or telephone calls from a call box or public house, would be. However, this is not a significant limitation in the scope of the criminal law or police powers. Such conduct will often amount to another offence under the OPA 1861, or amount to a breach of the peace. Secondly, the requisite intent must exist. By s 6 of the 1986 Act, the person must intend his conduct to be threatening, abusive or insulting or, in the context of s 4A or s 5, to be disorderly, or be aware that it may be one of these. In most cases this will be so, judged in the light of the overall context, but there may be instances where the requisite intent is lacking because the person honestly believes that he is assisting another person, or that his attentions are welcomed or appreciated. In this context, new statutory provisions that extend the criminal law and police powers have been introduced in the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 1997. The provisions that relate to extension of the civil law have already been noted. 62 The PHA 1997 was introduced to implement the _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
59 See, eg Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437, where Turner J, in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, said: ‘Disorderly conduct ... is conduct which, while sufficiently ill-mannered, or in bad taste, to meet with the disapproval of well-conducted and reasonable men and women, is also something more – it must ... tend to annoy or insult such persons as are faced with it – and sufficiently deeply or seriously to warrant the interference of the criminal law.’ 60 Clarke v DPP [1995] Crim LR 846. 61 ‘Any structure or part of a structure occupied as a person’s home or as any other living accommodation’: s 16 of the 1986 Act. Quaere, whether this includes the common parts of premises in multiple occupation: see, generally, Card & Ward: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, 1994, Bristol: Jordans, p 388. 62 See above, p 77. For the pre-existing position in tort, see Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727. For analysis, see Davey: Protecting victims of domestic violence and harassment (1996) 8 Child and Family Law Quarterly 269. 98
The Policing of Domestic Violence proposals set out in a government Consultation Paper63 which proposed the creation of two new criminal offences, as well as new civil processes, and a clear interaction between civil and criminal processes. The PHA 1997 deals with ‘harassment’ but does not define it. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary suggests terms such as ‘trouble’, ‘vex by repeated attack