Defence under Thatcher Andrew M. Dorman Foreword by Michael Clarke
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Defence under Thatcher Andrew M. Dorman Foreword by Michael Clarke
Southampton Studies in International Policy Published in association with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton General Editor: Dilys M. Hill Other academic members of the editorial board: Ralph Beddard, John Oldfield, Kendrick Oliver, John Simpson This series was established in 1986 to encourage the publication of multidisciplinary studies of those public policies with significant international components or implications. Areas of special interest include arms control and defence policies, environmental policies, human rights, maritime and space issues, Third World development questions and the European Union. Selected titles: Lisbeth Aggestam and Arian Hyde-Price (editors) SECURITY AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE Exploring the New Agenda Wyn Q. Bowen THE POLITICS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION Andrew Dorman DEFENCE UNDER THATCHER David H. Dunn THE POLITICS OF THREAT Minutemen Vulnerability in American National Security Policy Tony Evans US HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS Paul S. Herrnson and Dilys M. Hill (editors) THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY The First Term, 1992–96 Dilys M. Hill, Raymond A. Moore and Phil Williams (editors) THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY An Incomplete Revolution? Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams (editors) THE BUSH PRESIDENCY Triumphs and Adversities Mark F. Imber THE USA, ILO, UNESCO AND IAEA Politicization and Withdrawal in the Specialized Agencies John Simpson and Darryl Howlett (editors) THE FUTURE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Joanna Spear CARTER AND ARMS SALES
Antonio Varsori (editor) EUROPE, 1945–1990s The End of an Era?
Southampton Studies in International Policy Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71493–8 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Defence under Thatcher Andrew M. Dorman Lecturer in Defence Studies Department of Defence Studies King’s College London
Foreword by Michael Clarke
© Andrew M. Dorman 2002 Foreword © Michael Clarke 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0-333-94709-6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dorman, Andrew M., 1966Defence under Thatcher / Andrew M. Dorman ; foreword by Michael Clarke. p. cm. – (Southampton studies in international policy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-333-94709-6 1. Great Britain–Military policy. 2. Great Britain–Defenses. 3. Thatcher, Margaret–Military leadership. 4. Great Britain–Politics and government–1979- I. Title. II. Series. UA647.D736 2001 355’.033541’09048–dc21 2001054890 10 11
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire
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Contents Foreword
vi
Acknowledgements
xi
Glossary
xii
1 Introduction
1
2 British Defence Policy in May 1979
16
3 Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981
32
4 John Nott, January 1981–January 1983
63
5 Michael Heseltine, January 1983–January 1986
100
6 George Younger, January 1986–July 1989
129
7 Conclusions
155
Notes
164
Select Bibliography
198
Index
214
v
Foreword It is commonplace to say that UK defence policy now exists in a context that was barely imaginable 10 or 15 years ago; commonplace, but not quite true. In fact, Western policy-makers constantly imagined the present circumstances, but no one quite believed it could ever happen. The Cold War came to an end in a way that seems to have granted all our dearest wishes simultaneously and in full. The superiority of the liberal capitalist model of social and economic organization over the socialist bloc economies eventually communicated itself to the peoples of the East, and the legitimacy of their own governments simply withered away in a very short time. The Cold War was ‘won’ by the West without a shot being fired; the authorities in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and then East Germany simply stood by while people manufactured their own transformation in travelling to the West, reuniting families, opening up businesses and in 1989 literally pulling down the Berlin Wall. The Soviet Union collapsed from within and dissolved itself in a way that was remarkable for its very peacefulness. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War three European states went out of business – East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union itself – to be replaced by some 17 other states made up of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Baltic States and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Within months of the disappearance of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia began to fragment in what has proved to be a decade of violent dissolution. But this violence – though extreme in itself – has been largely contained; it has not proved to be structurally important to the security of the rest of Europe. Five states have replaced the former Yugoslavia and it may still split into two more again, depending upon the final outcomes in Kosovo and Montenegro. So at the end of the Cold War four European states collapsed and, so far, 22 states have replaced them. Almost all of the new states, one way or another, want integration into the Western, liberal capitalist camp. We have witnessed an essentially peaceful transition from one era to the next of quite remarkable proportions. What greater triumph could there be for the policy of containment, first articulated in 1947? The Cold War is over, the West unambiguously won it without making concessions, the West’s defence forces did their job by preparing for a war they never had to fight, and the considerable vi
Foreword vii
adjustment problems they now face – downsizing defence forces, reorienting policy, enlarging NATO and the European Union – are all the symptoms of success. As structural problems go, they are greatly preferable to those we might have faced in different circumstances. If the picture has changed so much for defence forces in Western countries then it is not surprising that some major adjustments were undertaken during the 1990s. A more key question, which is less often asked is why our defence forces have not changed a great deal more since the end of the Cold War? Why are we in the process of making marginal readjustments to military machines, which are essentially still Cold War armed forces? This problem is more manifest for some European allies than others. Germany is in a crisis of reform and its armed forces, so potent during the Cold War, are languishing expensively within a political and organizational framework, which bears little relation to Germany’s current security concerns. The UK comes out better than most in any consideration of reform, and the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 tidied up a number of ad hoc rationalizations of the previous years and established a thoughtful and imaginative framework for future defence policy evolution. Nevertheless, the UK still finds itself with formations and weapon systems – and inherited numbers of certain systems – which owe a great deal more to the Cold War legacy than the ambiguous security environment in which we now find ourselves, or that which was articulated in the Strategic Defence Review itself. The critics have a good point when they ask why UK defence policy has not changed even more over the last decade, but there are sensible and compelling answers to this question even though there is validity in the criticism. Defence is not only driven by external factors but internal ones as well. Like any major department of government, or sector of industry, ‘defence’ is something of an abstraction – a convenient shorthand to express a complex aggregation of interests and policies. The internal dynamics of any defence policy are at least as important as its external environment and cannot simply be written off as bureaucratic politics or vested interests at play. True, such elements certainly exist, sometimes in large measure, but the drivers of defence policy are almost always more complex than simple characterizations such as this. Defence is relatively unique in the business of government in having two distinct faces. In peacetime it has to manage itself efficiently and accountably and plan for a prudent future in the manner of any other government department. In war, it must operate quite differently, act to mobilize national resources and win, even at high cost. And in condi-
viii Foreword
tions that exist between war and peace, such as in operations in the former Yugoslavia, where ‘peace support’ and ‘enforcement’ are required, the defence establishment must do both simultaneously. Defence is the only department of government which – as an intrinsic part of its planning – knows that some of its employees are likely to be killed or injured in the implementation of its policies. Though some of the special pleading which comes from parts of the defence establishment – we must maintain an indigenous industry in this or that weapon system, and so on – is less than convincing, the fact remains that there is something special about the role which defence plays in national life and the way policy has to be articulated for it. The importance of understanding the internal dynamics of any policy has been well understood since the late 1960s. A rich literature in foreign policy analysis and defence policy has grown up in recent decades and become part of the accepted wisdom of policy analysis in general. More suprisingly, however, this literature has less to say about day-to-day policy-making than about crises and policy-making in decisive moments. It is inevitable that analysts will be interested in all of the factors affecting policy during periods of high drama. But an understanding of policy processes is more rewarding when the dynamics of humdrum and undramatic policy are studied. Normality tells us more than crises about real policy-making and the deeper processes by which it works. After all, crises, by definition, force decision systems to work in more streamlined and selective ways which break with normal rhythms of policy-making: the deeper truths concerning the dynamics and rhythm of policy lie in normal decision-making. Andrew Dorman’s study deliberately takes the decade from 1979–1989 as the focus for considering these deeper and more enduring dynamics of defence policy-making. To be sure, the 1980s were filled with dramatic incident, but we could not know then quite how the 1990s would change the very structures on which our previous policy was based. The decade began with Francis Pym as Secretary of State for Defence and encompassed the Falklands War, the peace movement that focused on cruise missiles in the UK, the Westland issue which nearly ended Mrs Thatcher’s premiership prematurely, the outbreak of the ‘new Cold War’, the ascendancy of the new right in both the UK and the United States, and the first real indications that the Eastern bloc was crumbling from within. The decade ended with George Younger as Minister of Defence having witnessed the tenures of John Nott and Michael Heseltine in between who both attempted major defence reforms en route.
Foreword ix
This was the decade of Thatcherism and the Prime Minister had a strong public image on all defence questions. But her influence on the Ministry of Defence was less than might at first appear, and this study looks at the interrelationships between the Prime Minister and successive ministers of defence as a way of understanding her variable influence on policy and the importance of defence policy structures among both civil servants and the Service Chiefs. Equally importantly, Andrew Dorman examines the decision cycles which different groups and individuals tended to work within, since defence during normal periods is dominated by medium and long-term decision-making, given the long lead times involved in training, equipment procurement, and planning. But politicians live within short decision-making cycles for the most part, and this was clearly the case with Mrs Thatcher and in her relationships with Francis Pym, John Nott, Michael Heseltine and George Younger. Each of her ministers of defence was different in their managerial approach and each enjoyed, or suffered, a different type of relationship with her. Just as we might ask why the end of the Cold War has not brought about more changes in UK defence policy, so we might ask why a Prime Minister as forceful and committed as Mrs Thatcher, governing for the whole of the decade in question, did not have more effect on the direction and management of defence policy-making itself. The answers lie within this study. Some elements of Thatcherism had more impact than others. The policy of privatization did affect equipment procurement in some significant ways even if it did not much influence longer-term decisions regarding the nature of new equipment which was deemed necessary. Michael Heseltine’s management strategies did affect the prevailing culture of the Ministry of Defence and asserted more than ever the principle of political and civil control over the military in the implementation of policy. But neither Mrs Thatcher nor her ministers were successful in gaining much leverage on the medium to long-term strategies pursued by the individual services, or the judgement of officials as to how prudent policy should be pursued in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, arms control or the internal politics of NATO. For all the assertiveness of Thatcherism on defence and external affairs, Mrs Thatcher herself was backed into a number of policy decisions she found difficult to acknowledge in public, and her ministers of defence were unable to get hold of the conundrum that effective peacetime management has got to allow for effective wartime mobilization. Generally speaking, defence can do one at the expense of the other, but can rarely be effective in both roles simultaneously.
x Foreword
Defence cannot get away scot free, however, simply because of the specialness of its role in national politics and the tasks it seeks to perform. Health and social services are not permitted to maintain large, underused resources or build in heavy redundancy to their capabilities just in case there is a massive epidemic or a sudden surge in social demand which was not anticipated. If defence seeks to justify its peacetime inefficiencies by reference to its wartime requirements, or vice versa, then it must do so in detail and accountably to Parliament and the public. Nevertheless, analysts do no service to government in general by not recognizing the particular nature of defence decisionmaking and the range of possibilities, which have to be covered. The dynamics of defence policy are sufficiently different to those of other aspects of government to require closer and more special study. Andrew Dorman’s work makes a considerable contribution to this ambition and provides a fascinating and insightful picture of the routine realities of defence policy-making during a period of ‘normality’. At the time it seemed more than mere normality – one small war, anti-nuclear protests, the rollercoaster ride of Thatcherism. But from our perspective now, we see how normal it really was. It was that decade before the world as we knew it was dismantled as completely and dramatically as the Berlin Wall itself was torn down, while border guards looked on in quizzical bemusement. MICHAEL CLARKE Centre for Defence Studies King’s College, London
Acknowledgements There are numerous people I would like to thank for their help in the research and preparation of this book. First, I owe a large debt to Stuart Croft as both my doctoral supervisor and friend for his advice and support over the last decade. Special thanks go to Adrian Randall at the University of Birmingham for organizing funding for my doctorate, and to Mike Clarke, David Dunn, Bill Park and Terry Terriff for their advice and encouragement at various stages of this project and to Barbara Slater for preparing the final product for publication. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance provided by David Nicholls and Tony Mason, together with all those who kindly allowed me to interview them. Without their help this project would have not been possible. Finally I would like to thank my wife Anne, for her constant encouragement and support.
xi
Glossary 1SL AAC AEW ALARM APC ARRV ASR AST ASW BAOR Br CAS CDS CGS CND COMNORTHAG CSA DACU DCDS(OR) DIS DPWP DOAE DROPS EFA FCO FOFA FY GDP GIUK GLCM HCDC HSF IEPG IFV INF
First Sea Lord or Chief of the Naval Staff Army Air Corps Airborne Early Warning Air Launched Anti-radar Missile Armoured Personnel Carrier Armoured Recovery and Repair Vehicle Air Staff Requirement Air Staff Target Anti-submarine warfare British Army of the Rhine British Chief of the Air Staff Chief of the Defence Staff Chief of the General Staff Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Commander NATO’s Northern Army Group Chief Scientific Adviser Defence Arms Control Unit Deputy-Chief of the Defence Staff (Operational Requirements) Defence Intelligence Staff Defence Programme Working Party Defence Operational Analysis Establishment Demountable Rack Off-load Pick-up System European Fighter Aircraft Foreign and Commonwealth Office Follow-on Forces Attack Fiscal Year Gross Domestic Product Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Ground-launched Cruise Missile House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Home Service Force Independent European Planning Group Infantry Fighting Vehicle Intermediate-range nuclear forces xii
Glossary xiii
LPD LSL LTC LTDP MBFR MBT MCMV MINIS MP MPA MOD NATO OD OMG OPV PES PUS PWR RAF RAuxAF RDJTF RFA ROF SACEUR SACLANT SALT SAM SDP SOSUS SRMH SSK SSBN SSN STOVL TOW US VCNS V/STOVL WEU
Landing Pad Dock Landing Ship Logistics Long Term Costings Long Term Defence Programme Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks Main Battle Tank Mine Countermeasures Vessel Management Information System for Ministers Member of Parliament Maritime Patrol Aircraft Ministry of Defence North Atlantic Treaty Organization Overseas and Defence Committee – Subcommittee of the Cabinet Operational Manoeuvre Group Offshore Patrol Vessel Public Expenditure Survey Permanent Under-Secretary Pressurized Water Reactor Royal Air Force Royal Auxiliary Air Force Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Royal Fleet Auxiliary Royal Ordnance Factory Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Surface-to-air missile Social Democratic Party Sound Surveillance System Single Role Minehunter Conventionally powered attack submarine Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine Nuclear powered attack submarine Short take-off and vertical landing Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided Missile United States Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff Vertical/short take-off and vertical landing Western European Union
1 Introduction
Background The premiership of Margaret Thatcher from 1979 to 1990 witnessed major transformations in international and domestic politics. In 1979 the East–West relationship appeared to be in a state of terminal decline.1 Yet by August 1990, the Berlin Wall, so long the symbol of East–West conflict, had been breached and the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were co-operating with the United Kingdom in a wider coalition confronting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At home, the wide-scale privatization of state industries, the huge growth in share ownership, trade union reform, changes in taxation and the high level of unemployment were just some of the features associated with the ‘Thatcher legacy’. Within this context of both international upheaval and domestic change British defence policy emerged from its traditional post-war position of relative inconsequence to become one of the key issues at the 1983 and 1987 general elections.2 The resurgence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the decision to acquire the Trident system, the Falklands War, the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) at Greenham Common and Molesworth, the Westland saga and the Nimrod AEW3 cancellation were just some of the more memorable issues associated with Conservative defence policy. This heightened public awareness of defence issues can be attributed to six principal factors, which will be considered in turn: 1. The rise of Thatcherism; 2. Ronald Reagan’s presidency of the United States, 1981–88; 1
2 Defence under Thatcher
3. The end of the domestic defence consensus and the emergence of the Social Democratic Party (SDP); 4. The economic down-turn of the early 1980s; 5. The outbreak of the Second Cold War; and 6. Changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) doctrine. The rise of Thatcherism While defence has always been ‘the cut of last resort’ to the Conservatives,3 Margaret Thatcher, with her openly vehement opposition to the Soviet Union, went considerably further than any of her predecessors in eulogizing the need for defence.4 This was somewhat surprising given her political background, which contained little to suggest that such a change in emphasis would occur. She had not previously held any of the great offices of state. Instead her ministerial experience had been in pensions and education, which meant that when she became leader of the Conservative Party she was scarcely known outside Britain.5 In January 1976 she pledged the party to ‘shaking the British public out of a long sleep’ in order to confront the threat posed by the Soviet Union.6 This earned her the nickname ‘Iron Lady’ from the Soviet official news agency Tass.7 It was a title she cultivated and which brought her into immediate conflict with her shadow Foreign Secretary.8 The rhetoric, however, remained unchanged and continued for at least the first half of her time in office. This reflected Thatcher’s emergence from within the ‘New Right’.9 Her personal ascendancy within policy-making led to a shift in the balance of government spending between the various departments, with the Ministry of Defence (MOD) becoming one of the chief beneficiaries.10 However, her other policy goal was the arrest of Britain’s long-term economic decline. This brought about a dichotomy of policies in which it appeared that she could never decide whether she wanted to be remembered in history as the ‘Iron Lady’ or the ‘Iron Chancellor’.11 Jordan and Richardson have referred to this tension as her clear ‘policy theory’.12 On the one hand there was the requirement for significant defence expenditure, while on the other hand there was an emphasis on reducing government expenditure.13 It was hardly surprising that the defence budget remained a constant target for her Treasury team.14 The achievement of rapid economic growth not only required a reduction in public expenditure but also the de-regulation of industry and the encouragement of entrepreneurship. This required the widespread privatization of state industries, a significant reduction in
Introduction 3
the size of the Civil Service, management reforms within the remaining Civil Service to make it more dynamic, changes to industrial policy and trade union reform. Since the MOD was the biggest department in central government and the largest employer of Civil Service manpower it was inevitably at the forefront of these changes. Defence therefore became immersed in the internal conflicts of Thatcherism.15 Ronald Reagan’s presidency, 1981–88 Reagan’s rhetoric and actions raised considerable concern, particularly within the peace movement in Britain. In stark contrast to his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, Reagan had a clearly defined view of the world in which he viewed détente as a weapon that had been used against the United States. He felt that the Soviet Union was the ‘the focus of evil in the modern world’.16 America needed to reassert its leadership and rebuild its economic and military strength to deal with the Soviet Union.17 The new administration embarked upon a significant defence improvement programme18 and the issue of the arms race re-emerged within the context of the peace movements in Britain.19 However, Reagan’s initial Cold War rhetoric and antipathy towards arms control,20 and his decision significantly to increase US spending on defence aroused great concern within British domestic public opinion. His off-hand comments about the feasibility of a limited nuclear war increased this and provided further impetus to CND’s campaign to remove all nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom.21 The end of the domestic defence consensus and the emergence of the SDP Defence issues had always been a cause of discord within the Labour Party.22 The post-war political consensus between the political parties on defence policy had started to fracture by the early 1970s, although this situation did not become apparent until 1979.23 Callaghan’s succession to Wilson as Prime Minister in 1976 appeared to mark the consolidation of the right wing’s hold upon the Labour Party and the preservation of the cross-party consensus. However, his handling of the ongoing Polaris improvement programme (Chevaline), and the secretive manner in which he initiated studies into the future replacement of Polaris, indicated that the Labour Party was divided on defence matters.24 As détente was replaced by the Second Cold War, support for unilateralism grew within the Labour Party. This resurgence was reflected in the election of Michael Foot as Labour leader in 1980 and
4 Defence under Thatcher
the widespread support for Tony Benn in his contest for the deputy leadership.25 This schism contributed significantly to the creation of the SDP in 1981 by a breakaway group of Labour Members of Parliament (MPs) and ex-MPs. They rapidly gained the allegiance of the majority of Labour’s specialist defence speakers. Their emergence and subsequent alliance with the Liberals was particularly important for defence when the Labour Party adopted unilateral nuclear disarmament as party policy. Those that remained in the multilateralist right wing of the Labour Party found themselves temporarily marginalized and frequently at odds with their party’s defence policy.26 This division within Labour, and a similar one that emerged between the SDP and the Liberals, allowed defence to become a key issue which the Conservatives could use to their political advantage. It became a litmus test ‘they [the Conservatives] saw it [defence] as a crucial issue because it skewered both the opposition parties with one shot. It got Labour, who were notoriously unreliable on defence, and then you have this funny alliance thing that didn’t know what it wanted to be.’27 This belief within the Conservative Party was reinforced in 1982 by the so-called ‘Falklands factor’, which dramatically restored the Conservative Party’s domestic standing.28 Thus the Conservatives encouraged the general public to use defence as a means of evaluating the reliability of the different political parties with notable success in the 1983 and 1987 general elections. The economic down-turn of the early 1980s The Thatcher administration came to power with the expressed objective of restoring Britain’s economic position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Its entry into office in 1979 could not have been at a more appropriate time for testing its commitment to monetarism. In his autobiography Nigel Lawson recalled that ‘we had come to office at a time when the UK economic cycle had peaked and was about to turn down – as for that matter was the world economy – and it would have been much easier to have deferred our attack on the deficit (and indeed on inflation via higher interest rates). But we consciously decided to press ahead, because deferment can become a way of life.’29 Many felt that to do otherwise would merely have repeated the mistake they believe Heath made in abandoning the Selsdon Park policies in 1971.30 These monetarist policies led to a rapid rise in unemployment, the bankruptcy of a considerable number of businesses and the raising of taxes, which resulted in a 6 per cent fall in the Gross Domestic Product
Introduction 5
(GDP) in 1980.31 Nevertheless, despite all the government constraints on public expenditure and the staunch monetarist stance taken, from Fiscal Year (FY) 79–80 to FY 85–86 defence expenditure rose roughly in line with the government’s commitment to NATO of 3 per cent per annum in real terms.32 Not surprisingly the rising defence budget and lack of government measures towards alleviating the worst effects of the high unemployment caused divisions within the Cabinet.33 This led to Labour calls for changes in the government’s spending priorities and increased the prominence given to defence within the political arena. The outbreak of the Second Cold War Since the end of the Second World War Britain’s defence policy had been based on four interlinked assumptions: the hostility of the Soviet Union; the importance of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States; the preservation of the nuclear deterrent; and the ability to influence decisions on the world stage.34 By the mid-1970s three of these four assumptions were being reconsidered while the fourth, the nuclear deterrent, was the subject of a secret update. The special relationship was seen as less important as British foreign and defence policy increasingly focused on Europe rather than the wider world.35 This trend was clearly shown in the 1975 Defence White Paper, which announced the final withdrawal of forces from ‘East of Suez’ (excluding Hong Kong) and also from the Mediterranean.36 In it the Labour government expressed broad satisfaction with the existing East–West situation in Europe and their hope that the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks would lesson the threat posed by the Soviet Union and help to reduce the strain on the British economy.37 This was taken a step further in the 1976 paper, which stated that NATO was as much an instrument of détente as defence and then went on to express the hope that détente was permanent.38 However, the hopes surrounding the negotiations on force reductions were quickly quashed with the failure to agree on even the statistical data to be used in the negotiations. Western concern grew about what the real motives of the Soviet Union were, particularly after the CIA revised its estimates of Soviet military spending.39 This view was reinforced by Soviet involvement in the Third World.40 This led key government figures, such as the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, to shift the government’s focus towards the continuing Soviet military buildup from late 1976 onwards.41 They therefore agreed to NATO’s call for an increase in its members’ defence budgets in May 1977.42
6 Defence under Thatcher
Changes in NATO doctrine The signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement in 1972 marked the formal recognition of strategic equivalence between the superpowers. For Britain and its European allies it increased their concern about the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee.43 These doubts were reinforced by the modernization of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces, which threatened to undermine NATO’s plans to escalate any conventional conflict in Europe to the tactical or theatre nuclear level.44 To compound this issue, improvements to Soviet conventional forces simply increased NATO’s dependence upon the US guarantee. These fears were exacerbated by what Lynn Davis has described as President Carter’s ‘inept handling of the neutron bomb affair’45 which led the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, to conclude that Europe needed to obtain security guarantees that were not subject to the whims of US domestic politics.46 Consequently, senior NATO officials began to place increasing emphasis upon the need for conventional and theatre nuclear force improvements and advocated an increase in members’ defence budgets.47 This led to NATO’s adoption of a long-term defence programme (LTDP) in 1978, which incorporated a commitment to improving NATO’s conventional forces and, more controversially, its theatre nuclear weaponry.48 This led to the decision to deploy 160 GLCMs in Britain, which, together with the subsequent British decision to purchase the Trident system, provided a focus for the resurgence of the peace movement in Britain. Also of concern to the peace movement, but the subject of far less overt opposition, was the subsequent shift in NATO’s war-fighting strategy during the 1980s to a more offensively oriented approach. On the Central Front the adoption of the ideas of ‘follow-on forces attack’ and ‘air-land battle’ signified a return to manoeuvre warfare and NATO’s preparedness to use offensive action in its defence.49 This was matched at sea with a strategy which involved the forward deployment of NATO’s US strike carriers into the Norwegian Sea.50 These were both viewed within the peace movement as dangerously provocative and likely to increase the chances of accidental war breaking out. Conclusions These six factors all had a significant role in increasing the public’s awareness of defence issues during the 1980s. They have also left a lasting impression of the way in which defence policy evolved during this period, which is misleading. This study shows that there were a
Introduction 7
considerable number of other factors that had an effect. Nonetheless, their influence upon public opinion and therefore policy-makers should not be underrated and they made a considerable contribution to the importance given to defence during the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Their composition is also significant. They include both domestic and international factors, which shows that defence policy is not formulated purely in terms of either the international or domestic environment. Both influence it and the relationship between the two fluctuates over time. This conclusion therefore refutes one of the basic assumptions of traditional realism – that defence policy is governed solely by external factors.51 The six factors can also be subdivided between structural and agency influences. The first two can be identified as agency influences (Thatcher and Reagan) and the last four as structural factors (SDP, economic down-turn, outbreak of Second Cold War and NATO strategy).52 This indicates that the traditional structural view of policy evolution in Britain is open to question.
Approach taken in this study What do we mean by British defence policy? To answer this question it is necessary to establish what is meant by the term ‘defence policy’ as applied to the state. ‘Policy’ is a commonly used label for various fields of governmental activity and involvement, such as economic policy and foreign policy, but in this usage the definition can, at best, be described as vague. Most writers would agree that there is some degree of correlation between policy and decision. Policy is an ongoing process, which involves the formulation and subsequent implementation of a series of decisions or non-decisions rather than merely a single decision.53 It is closer to Wallace’s broader definition of ‘a stable set of attitudes, an implicit or explicit plan or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions’.54 While decisions are associated with the decision-maker, policy has a greater ambit and involves multiple interactions among individuals and groups. Consequently, any study of policy must go beyond the examination of a single decision or decision-maker and encapsulate a series of decisions and non-decisions involving a number of actors. The term ‘defence’ also presents its own problems of definition. Defence ministers and defence ministries are relatively new phenomena, often in fact merely re-titled ministers of war and war ministries. Defence also incorporates both offensive and defensive connotations.
8 Defence under Thatcher
Defence policy therefore revolves around the potential or threatened use of force by one state either in response to the reciprocal action of another or others or as an initiator of such action. Not only does defence policy have to be developed within the international environment in which a state finds itself, it also involves ‘domestic decisions related to the provision of human resources which make up the units of force’.55 The requirements of defence policy have to compete for the resources of government just like any area. In an ideal world the formulation of a defence policy would involve some form of evaluation of the threats facing the state, an assessment of the required response to meet these different threats, a political decision on which threats should be dealt with and the manner of such a response. This would lead to the creation and maintenance of the requisite armed forces. However, defence policy-makers do not operate in an ideal world. Defence policy, because of its very centrality, is inevitably cloaked in a veil of secrecy in even the most liberal democracy. Policy-makers have to operate with incomplete information and with the knowledge that the action of one state will lead to reappraisal by others. This ‘action–reaction’ phenomenon has led to the ‘security dilemma’, ‘a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend automatically (i.e. regardless of intention) to lead to rising insecurity for the other states, as each interprets its own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening’.56 Consequently, Britain, like other states, has had to try and develop a system for formulating policy and overseeing its implementation, which takes into account the fact that such policies influence the actions of other states while acknowledging the internal domestic constraints that confront it. Inevitably, such a system requires a variety of different groups to work together in order to produce some form of collective solution to these problems. In this they are confronted by a number of inherent structural problems. The provision of armed forces, especially since the end of the Second World War, is a long-term process involving the research, development and production of equipment together with the requisite training of individuals. In contrast, changes in threat assessment require short-term changes, as yesterday’s ally becomes tomorrow’s opponent, and vice-versa. Defence policy therefore never starts with a clean sheet. Instead the policy-maker is invariably constrained by a system of values, a web of international commitments, and by domestic pressures that impose a degree of caution on any attempt to change policy. Previous defence decisions will have led to the creation
Introduction 9
of force structures and an armoury of weapons, either in existence or under construction, which will have to be incorporated within existing and future policy.57 In summary, British defence policy is a combination of several factors. First, the formal declaratory policy line espoused by government through its own defence publications, speeches of leading government figures, and policy statements of the various alliances of which Britain is a member. Second, the strategic policy indicated by the various military doctrines adopted by Britain’s armed services, together with the geographical area and manner in which those forces were deployed. Third, the procurement policy reflected in the purchasing decisions emanating from the MOD.58 The defence policy-making process remains a direct reflection of the interrelationship of declaratory, strategic and procurement policy overseen by the MOD, since in the words of Harry S. Truman, ‘strategy, programs, and budget are all aspects of the same basic decisions’.59 This book seeks to examine the evolution of defence policy within the MOD during the period 1979–89. It focuses on the dynamics of both policy formulation and policy implementation within the MOD at the highest level, taking into account the political context, both domestic and international, in which defence policy was created. An analytical framework is used in which the various actors are classified within three different time-cycles as a means of understanding their goals and priorities and which areas of policy they were most able to influence. The interaction of these time-cycles will be the main focus for explaining defence policy within the MOD. It will also address three other questions: first who were the main actors and how did they interact in this process? Second, how did defence fit into both the domestic and foreign political environments? Third, to what extent was defence policy affected by the management changes put through during the Thatcher administration? These will be considered at the end of each chapter. This book approaches the study of the defence policy process by examining a period of time, 1979–89, rather than a particular moment. While this time span cannot cover a single decision (such as the Trident programme) in full, it does mark a period of continuity with the same political party and Prime Minister in government. The period therefore reflects the manner in which the MOD operated with the simultaneous formulation and implementation of different decisions. The analysis focuses upon the elite upper levels of management within the MOD and its equivalent within Whitehall. While at the
10 Defence under Thatcher
elite level the protagonists involved relied on positional papers and background briefs from more junior officials and serving officers, it was only at this top level that policy issues were discussed and resolved, with the full input of the various groups within the MOD. At the elite level, however, the various groups and individuals involved operate along lines more akin to Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model of conflict and competition than power elite lines.60 Consequently, a ‘bureaucratic-elite’ approach has been taken to cover this bargaining and friction. This approach allows an examination of discussion at the ministerial level between departments, and at Cabinet and at the inter-group level within the MOD. It does not take account of intra-group discussions over such issues as what information should be included in the brief of the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) for a particular issue. This would be beyond the scope of the study and is itself subject to the problems of assessing the relative importance of individual contributions. However, all the service personnel and civil servants interviewed had experience of working at a more junior level and were consulted on this. The study also seeks to take into account the influence of individuals on the policy process in order to provide them with their appropriate recognition, and as a means of understanding the unofficial lines of communication upon which Whitehall functions. Having identified the approach to be taken it is important to realise that ‘within the Government machine, military, political and Civil Service perceptions and priorities differ, assigning different weights to the short and the long term and to the political versus the military reality’.61 This study makes the assumption that one of the main reasons for the divergent outlooks of the different actors was the contrasting time-cycles in which they operated. As a result, the various actors have been subdivided into the time-cycle in which they operated to facilitate a more rigorous understanding of policy evolution. Defining the time-cycles This book suggests that there were three basic cycles in operation within the MOD: the short-term cycle, looking ahead up to two years; the medium-term cycle, covering the two–ten year range; and the longterm outlook extending beyond ten years. Short-term cycle The actors principally focusing on short-term considerations are ministers. According to Hennessy, ministers are confronted with the
Introduction 11
problem that once in office they have four basic tasks to perform: first, to implement the policies they were elected on; second, to retain support within the House of Commons and ensure that the government sees out the full life of Parliament; third, to mobilize consent among the electorate for these policies and retain support from the interest groups close to the party; and finally, to retain support within the Cabinet, taking into account their own career paths.62 In undertaking these tasks they are constrained by the fact that as ministers they are ill prepared for their posts. ‘If their party has just won an election they may go to the ministry they shadowed in opposition. If they do, policy preparation will have been sketchy: party research capacities in opposition are very limited, with little access to Whitehall data, and ideas are worked up by ill-paid juniors or academics in their spare time.’63 If they are already in office and are transferred, they are presented with an entirely new brief for which they acquire responsibility. Ministers feel, indeed are, exposed and vulnerable. They need and want public success and to stand well with their colleagues; they struggle to avoid failure, blame and humiliation. Avoiding blame and seeking credit are major concerns for ministers, more attractive than power itself, which is a means to credit, status and comfort. These concerns, added to department concern for status and territory, are basic forces in British government.64 Not surprisingly there is a tendency for ministers to have a strong departmental focus, especially since they often feel judged by their ability to promote their department’s policies and increase its budget. When put in charge of a spending department, such as the MOD, ministers tend to feel that they have a justifiable case for an increase in the expenditure of their department. In this view they have the ready support of their department. This situation is compounded by the fact that ‘ministers are visiting amateurs in their departments, unlikely to stay for more than two years, and under strong competing demands for their time and attention – from Cabinet, Parliament, constituency, and delegations of interest groups and foreigners’.65 Those seeking to scale the ministerial ladder to higher office have little time in which to make a positive impact in their department. Long-term planning does not produce the results that are likely to be recognized in the short term, and the system of rapid ministerial turnover therefore encourages ministers to take a more short-term approach to the decisions before them.
12 Defence under Thatcher
Between 1979 and 1989 there were four different Secretaries of State for Defence. In a department as demanding as the MOD, this posed considerable problems for the individual ministers in getting up to speed while trying to undertake the other tasks for which they were responsible.66 The various Defence Secretaries approached the situation differently. All, however, found themselves in conflict with the Treasury team and other departments, the former anxious to limit public spending and the latter to increase their own share of the budget. In all this, the role of the Prime Minister was vital. Mastering a department as large and powerful as the MOD requires the continual support of the Prime Minister. This could not always be guaranteed, since Thatcher had firstly to ensure her position, both within the Conservative Party and in the country at large. In the end, prime ministerial control of the Cabinet agenda and the decision of who to hire and who to fire could substantially undermine a minister’s position within a department. Within the Cabinet, defence issues, because of their sensitivity and the technical brief required, were mostly discussed in the Overseas and Defence Committee (OD) following which decisions were rubberstamped by the full Cabinet.67 It was at the OD, in particular, that the other key ministerial players outside the MOD were involved, such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary and Minister responsible for Trade and Industry, who looked to the political implications, both personal and collective, of the decisions before them. Medium-term cycle The majority of actors operated in the medium term, concentrating their attention either upon the balance of resources in the programme as set out in the long-term costings (LTCs), the balance of power within the ministry or the balance of power of the ministry vis-à-vis the other departments of state. The individual Service Chiefs had three main concerns. The first was the protection of their major replacement programmes and the continued preservation of their service’s ‘share’ of the defence budget. In reality this meant that they were concerned with the LTCs in years four–ten rather than in the immediate three years, which had already been largely apportioned and allocated. The second was to try and maximize the service’s control over policy and procurement decisions and block any expansion of the central staff’s role. The third was to increase service input into future strategy reviews.
Introduction 13
Within the Defence Staff, successive Chiefs of the Defence Staff (CDSs) aspired to raise the influence of the Defence Staff in planning defence policy. The whole role of the CDS, particularly with regard to the relationship with the Chiefs of Staff and their right of access to the Secretary of State and Prime Minister, remained an ongoing bone of contention as successive CDSs increased their authority over the Service Chiefs during this period. Within the ranks of the senior civil servants within the MOD two main concerns existed. First, they sought to increase their influence over ministers at the military’s expense. This was usually justified on the grounds of their alleged greater impartiality and ability to see the whole picture. In this battle, control of the budget was vital. Second, they sought to defend the MOD’s budget from their equivalents in other departments of state, particularly the Treasury. The other major actor within the medium term was the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). It was responsible for the threat assessment process and sought to provide an ongoing three–seven year outlook of the likely threats to the United Kingdom, since that was the normal time required for a target state to develop a new capability.68 Inevitably such assessments not only influenced overall policy but also impinged upon deployment and procurement policies. Long-term cycle The time taken to develop and produce a weapon system, together with its operational life, resulted in a procurement process which could last well over 30 years. Two main groups of actors looked beyond the ten years of the LTCs and concentrated their attention upon future procurement requirements. First, the service planners were responsible for developing future operational requirements. Their assessment of Britain’s future capability requirements forced them to make certain assumptions about the state of the world and Britain’s place within it more than ten years hence. Then they had to estimate what were the main threats to British interests, what capabilities they were likely to have, and how Britain’s armed forces would be expected to deal with them. Only then could the operational requirements (OR) staff begin to formulate the requirements which industry would attempt to meet. In this process the inputs of the DIS and the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) were also important, the former in providing the intelligence assessments of the likely capabilities and development programmes of the identified enemy state, and the latter reviewing the technical feasibility of the proposed solutions.
14 Defence under Thatcher
Second, Britain’s defence industry had to look ahead and consider how the replacement cycle fitted into their production plans. Such development programmes took a considerable amount of time and required specialist expertise to implement. Since the necessary expertise could not be created overnight industries needed to preserve design teams and core manufacturing skills within the workforce. This enabled them to avoid the peaks and troughs at any stage in the production cycle and they aimed to achieve a constant level of demand for their research and production capabilities. Technological improvements also encouraged management to look ahead and assess the future skill deficiencies and obsolescence within their current workforce. Note on time-cycle definitions It should be noted that the allocation of a particular actor to a timecycle within this study is not fixed and due consideration has to be given to situations where individual actors were forced to take a different cyclical outlook because of circumstances existing at the time. For example, as the end of the financial year approached the prospects of a budget surplus or deficit drew in the Service Chiefs to make further procurement or programme cutback recommendations. The time limits that define short term, medium term and long term are also subject to fluctuation, based on the criteria that dictate them. For example, as an election drew nearer the length of the short-term cycle for ministers contracted. Chapter outlines As this book has taken a methodological approach, which emphasizes structural and agency influences upon policy, the chapters have been divided into the periods of office of the various Secretaries of State for Defence. However, since defence policy is an ongoing process it is first necessary to provide the historical context in which the various actors approached defence policy in May 1979. Chapter 2 therefore sets the scene in May 1979 by establishing how British defence policy evolved since the end of the Second World War. Chapter 3 examines the period from the Conservative’s entry into office in May 1979 to the replacement of Pym by Nott in January 1981. The period began with the major Conservative commitment to defence and talk about returning East of Suez and ended shortly after Pym’s threatened resignation over proposed defence reductions. Chapter 4 covers Nott’s attempts to deal with this mismatch. It analyses how the
Introduction 15
1981 defence review was undertaken and the changes that were made after its publication before considering the impact of the Falklands War upon the reappraisal of Nott’s proposals. Chapter 5 covers the period of Heseltine in office from January 1983 to January 1986. It marked the high point for defence spending under the Conservatives and the period of most profound managerial change within the MOD. It ends with Heseltine’s dramatic resignation during the Westland crisis. Chapter 6 encapsulates Younger’s time in office until July 1989. Starting with the aftermath of Heseltine’s resignation, the period covers the impact of the end of the 3 per cent commitment and the worsening problem of matching resources to commitments both before and after the 1987 general election. The conclusion undertakes a comparative study of the conclusions drawn from the time-cycle approach within each chapter, drawing in appropriate theoretical material. It then examines the book’s three secondary questions before considering how the findings of this study can be developed further and utilized in other areas.
2 British Defence Policy in May 1979
No government starts with a blank sheet of paper on which to draft out its defence policy, and this chapter sets out the context in which it stood in May 1979. The period from 1945 to 1979 was one of immense change in British defence policy. By 1979 only a few vestiges of what was once the world’s largest empire remained. Europe, rather than the Empire, had become the focus of British foreign and defence policy. Within this transformation four interlinked assumptions remained consistent throughout the period. These were the hostility of the Soviet Union, the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, the creation and maintenance of a nuclear deterrent, and the ability to influence decisions on the world stage.69 That these assumptions would continue to underpin British defence policy was inevitable given the position with which Britain was confronted in 1945. Historically Britain had not viewed itself as a European power and had sought to prevent war by maintaining an equilibrium of forces on the Continent.70 This concern with maintaining the ‘balance of power’ in Europe led to frequent shifts in allegiance in favour of the weaker power bloc. In 1945, with the single exception of the Soviet Union, Britain was the only large European power to have survived the war relatively intact. Germany was physically divided, while France and Italy remained economically crippled and politically divided. It was Britain, therefore, which had to confront the situation of an Eastern Europe dominated by a Soviet military and political presence.71 From the time of its inception the enigma of the Soviet Union had been a consistent problem for successive British governments. Fear of the Soviet Union began to rise even before the end of the Second World War as the allies sought to agree the peace.72 Events after the 16
British Defence Policy in May 1979 17
war only reinforced these concerns and led the former Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to refer to an ‘Iron Curtain’ dividing Europe in two as early as 1946.73 This perception of the Soviet threat increased during the late 1940s. In security terms the Soviet Union was a Euro-Asiatic land power which relied on immense reserves of manpower to provide for its defence. The country’s historical experience of invasion and the resulting devastation of its own lands contributed to its commitment to maintaining significant land and air forces in Eastern Europe. In contrast, Britain’s defence had relied on naval domination of the seas around its shores. If the Soviet Union was the most likely enemy, the Royal Navy was of limited use against a power which could only be confronted on land. This situation was exacerbated by the changes that had occurred in warfare in the twentieth century. In the First World War, German airship and bomber raids had shown that Britain was no longer immune from direct attack, while the U-boat campaign had threatened to starve Britain out of the war.74 This experience had been repeated during the Second World War in the German aerial offensive on Britain, particularly between 1940 and 1941, and the continual danger presented by the UBoats.75 However, the development of the atomic bomb finally demonstrated the potential for a single bomber to destroy a city and fulfil the claims of the early air power theorists.76 As a densely populated state the threat of atomic attack was particularly disconcerting for Britain. Britain’s management of this situation after 1945 was undermined by its own financial insecurity.77 While successive British governments felt the need for military deterrence against the Soviet Union the support of the United States remained a paramount consideration. Britain’s relations with the United States were therefore a major determinant of British defence policy. The other determinant underlying defence policy was Britain’s wider world role. In 1945 Britain was one of the three leading world powers and considered itself as such. This is clear from the 1948 defence estimates: ‘the United Kingdom, as a member of the British Commonwealth and a Great Power, must be prepared at all times to fulfil her responsibility not only to the United Nations but also to herself’.78 While not a superpower in its own right, Britain’s military and civilian presence throughout the world, particularly within the Empire, led many to assume that the world role would continue, particularly given the relative inexperience of the United States in many regions.79 Between 1945 and 1979 this assumption was undermined and led to the withdrawal from the Empire. Its importance for this
18 Defence under Thatcher
study lies in the manner in which it waned, for the vestiges of this underlying assumption continued to have an impact upon British defence policy in the later 1970s and beyond.80
The time-cycles For this chapter only, the short-term cycle has been excluded because the political environment in which the current defence team finds itself, together with the immediate fiscal realities of the current and subsequent years, inevitably dictates it. It therefore falls within the ambit of the next chapter to establish how this cycle affected the situation after May 1979. Medium-term cycle For the services the 1970s had been a period of retrenchment. The Labour government’s announcement that it would adhere to NATO’s 3 per cent target, at least until 1980–81, appeared to indicate the beginning of a period of stability for the defence programme. This was welcomed, but the delays, postponements and cancellations of the 1970s had led the services to weigh their programmes heavily towards the latter years of the LTCs. It meant that a considerable number of major weapons programmes had already been planned and little room remained within the LTCs to fund additional defence programmes or cope with any significant cost overruns. The LTC system was far from ideal. Although it covered a period of ten years only the first of these was agreed with the annual Treasury budget. The next four years were based on the Public Expenditure Survey (PES) forecast which only gave an indication of the government’s future intentions, while the last five years were based purely on the MOD’s own estimates of the amounts that it was likely to receive. Consequently, the further down the LTCs the planners went the more inaccurate their estimates were likely to be. The situation was made worse by the poor performance of industry in delivering programmes on time and to cost. According to one senior civil servant All our experience was that there was a systematic over-optimism within the system and we would spend … 10–20 per cent less than we forecasted to do. So what we used to do was to take all these forecasts and centrally adjust them with block adjustments as they were called. These said that you all think you are going to spend this amount of money but we know you won’t so we are going to knock
British Defence Policy in May 1979 19
off, let us say 10 or 15 per cent. We, therefore, always had a programme that was always bigger than the available amount of cash and which was matched by these block adjustments. Each year we spent roughly the amount of cash, which we had forecast in this very sophisticated system …81 This meant that within the MOD different budgeting and planning assumptions were made from those agreed with industry, particularly in terms of contract price and delivery schedule.82 Given that most major programmes involved research at the edge of existing knowledge, precise cost estimates were impossible. This situation was complicated by the time delays within the system often necessitating the revision of specifications.83 The LTCs were therefore subject to constant readjustments as estimates were updated resulting in further delays to existing programmes. The services shared two common approaches to procurement. First, they prioritized the purchase of weapons platforms rather than the expense of weapons systems. They never purchased a complete weapons package because the various elements of the package would then be dependent upon each other within the LTC process. This led to different in-service dates for weapons and their platforms and the requirement to retrofit the weapons platforms during extended periods of maintenance.84 Second, they generally felt the post-war trend towards concentrating decision-making within the Central Staffs to be unwise. All felt that the Chiefs of Staff Committee was the appropriate forum for discussing defence issues while procurement decisions should be left to the individual services.85 The Royal Navy in May 1979 The 1975 Defence Review86 had not been nearly so far-reaching for the navy as for the other two services. The end of the periodic deployment of a major task force East of Suez was largely symbolic and the withdrawal from the Mediterranean had an impact on overall fleet numbers, but naval policy still remained dominated by its four NATO wartime roles. Debates within the navy centred upon how the component parts of the navy could contribute to fulfilling these tasks and which should have priority.87 The first NATO role was the containment of Soviet surface and subsurface forces in their northern bases. This involved the forward deployment of NATO submarines and was dominated by the navy’s submariners. They planned to change the overall composition of the
20 Defence under Thatcher
submarine force, favouring the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) at the expense of its conventional counterpart (SSK). They hoped to increase SSN numbers from 11 to 20 within the existing force levelof 27 to 28 boats (excluding the Polaris SSBNs). The navy had already embarked on the construction of a new class of SSNs, the Trafalgars, and planned to order these at the rate of one every 16 months so that it could reach its goal by the end of the 1990s.88 Such a force required a significant increase in the number of available nuclear refit streams and a programme was already in hand to extend this capability within the Royal dockyards.89 To supplement the SSNs, and maintain an overall force size of 27 to 28 boats, a pre-feasibility study into a new class of SSKs had begun, with provision made towards the end of the LTCs for an initial purchase. Until these entered service it was assumed that the existing SSK force would remain in service in order to preserve the size of the existing submarine fleet. The second role was the reinforcement of northern Norway using the reconfigured 3 Commando Brigade, together with its Dutch attachment, by the navy’s specialized amphibious warfare vessels. Support for this role in the long term already looked uncertain following the Labour government’s decision to delete the replacements for the two assault ships (LPDs) from the LTCs in 1975.90 Nevertheless, in the medium term the preservation of this force looked secure with consideration being given to the conversion of a surplus Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) into an amphibious transport to enhance the existing capability.91 The third role was that of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) support for NATO’s strike fleet of US aircraft carriers. This gave the navy the important role it sought and allowed it to justify the maintenance of a significant fleet. The navy’s contribution centred upon the provision of an ASW oriented aircraft carrier group together with supporting submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. Although the 1966 decision to abandon the next generation of aircraft carrier seemed to mark the end of fixed-wing aviation within the Fleet Air Arm,92 the situation was partly altered by the decision to equip the three new small Invincibleclass aircraft carriers with Sea Harriers.93 By 1979 the first of these had begun sea trials with a further two in the course of construction. In the interim, HMS Hermes, then acting as an anti-submarine warfare carrier, was earmarked to receive suitable modifications to carry Sea Harriers pending the arrival of the third Invincible. The fourth role was the direct defence of reinforcement shipping bringing supplies from North America to the European mainland,
British Defence Policy in May 1979 21
together with the protection of reinforcements being deployed from the United Kingdom. These two tasks involved the use of the majority of the surface fleet, the Fleet Air Arm, the remaining RN submarines and the RAF’s 18 Group. The fourth role centred upon the provision of destroyers and frigates to conduct convoy protection for shipping carrying reinforcements from North America to Western Europe. Within the surface ship fraternity the Type 42 air defence destroyer and the Type 22 anti-submarine warfare frigate were the main programmes. The three orders just prior to the 1979 general election brought Type 42 destroyer numbers to 14 either completed or in the course of construction.94 Type 22 orders by this stage amounted to six with plans for at least six more.95 To complement these vessels, and as a result of various delays in ordering new units throughout the 1970s, the older Leander-class frigates were undergoing substantial and costly mid-life upgrades to prolong their lives and bring them up to the standard of the Type 22s.96 The commercially designed Type 21 frigates purchased in the 1970s as a stopgap measure were also scheduled for upgrading in the late 1980s.97 This upgrade policy required a considerable dockyard refit capability and concern already existed about whether the Royal dockyards were capable of meeting the high workload currently allocated to them.98 To support the surface fleet a new class of 12 one-stop replenishment ships was planned to begin entering service towards the end of the 1980.99 These ships would be faster than previous RFAs in order to allow them to remain with the aircraft carrier group. This would eliminate the need for escorts to protect a separate underway replenishment group and release them for use as convoy escorts.100 These RFAs would introduce the idea of a warship receiving all its supplies from one auxiliary, rather than from several smaller specialized ships, at a lower cost. Their increased size would allow them to carry and operate four to five longer-range helicopters, thereby significantly improving the ASW capability of the Royal Navy destroyer-frigate groups.101 Subsumed within these debates lay the provision of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent based on four Polaris SSBNs. In order to retain the ability to strike at Moscow (the so-called Moscow criteria) this system was in the process of having its warhead updated under the secret Chevaline programme.102 By 1979 the Polaris force had been responsible for the strategic nuclear deterrent for a decade. Given the projected life span of a nuclear-powered submarine there was now a pressing need to consider a replacement system. This had already begun outside the Cabinet committee system when a few ministers set in train two
22 Defence under Thatcher
studies, one on the international implications and the other on the alternative systems. The secretive nature of these provisional studies meant that no allocation was made within the LTC for a replacement system and this was to have significant programme implications once a decision was made. The Royal Navy had a considerable building programme built into the LTCs, which reflected the influence of the various groups within the navy. A number of senior naval officers were concerned about the extremely high cost of purchasing such sophisticated ships and questioned the viability of building the number required to maintain the strength of fleet.103
The British Army in May 1979 As with the navy, the 1975 Defence Review had led the army largely to abandon its remaining out-of-area capabilities.104 As a result, the army concentrated on its part in the wartime defence of the Central Front and its peacetime commitment to Northern Ireland. Less emphasis was given to its other NATO roles, such as home defence or the provision of forces to the UK Mobile Force. The review had brought about the elimination of the brigade level of command as a means of improving the weapons-to-men ratio at reduced cost. A consequence of this was the re-organization of 1 (Br) Corps from a three divisional force, each comprising two heavy brigades of four armoured regiments/mechanized infantry battalions, to four smaller divisions, each of five larger armoured regiments/mechanized infantry battalions, together with a field force of three infantry battalions for the protection of BAOR’s lines of communication.105 In wartime its role on the Central Front was to fight an attritional delaying action as part of NATO’s Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). Its divisions were to be deployed with two forward on the Inner-German border and the other two behind. The defence plan consisted of a number of defence lines with the forward divisions retreating through the rear divisions as each line was penetrated until the corps ceased to exist as a fighting unit whereupon recourse to battlefield nuclear weapons would occur.106 The new divisional structure soon began to pose considerable command and control problems for the divisional commanders who had to control five or more battle groups.107 Consequently, the expedient of introducing task force headquarters between the division and battalion/regiment levels of command in wartime to cover for the lost
British Defence Policy in May 1979 23
brigades was quickly adopted, although this solution was far from satisfactory. These headquarters remained ad hoc and lacked the cohesion that a peacetime existence would have instilled. As a result, there was considerable discussion within the army about how this situation could be resolved.108 At the same time the lessons of the Israeli experiences in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 had begun to filter into the thinking within the British Army with the result that army doctrine came under scrutiny. The use of small highly mobile command headquarters by the Israelis, together with the adoption of a mobile war of manoeuvre in defence, had a profound affect on those who examined the battle.109 Linked into this debate was the potential impact of emerging technologies and NATO’s goal of raising the nuclear threshold.110 The army was far more manpower intensive than either the air force or the navy. This meant that a smaller percentage of the defence budget allocated to land forces was actually spent on equipment in comparison to sea or air forces. Consequently, the impact of short-term cutbacks throughout the 1970s on equipment purchases had a disproportionate effect. The result was a significant level of equipment obsolescence and an army with the reputation for being one of the worst equipped in Germany.111 In response, a substantial modernization programme had been initiated covering the full plethora of army equipment. From the army’s point of view the most important programme was the re-equipping of its armoured divisions to counter the significant improvements made in Soviet land forces.112 Increases in the size and capability of Soviet armoured forces raised questions about the size and quality of the existing tank force. An enlargement of the war reserve by purchasing an additional batch of 77 Chieftains was under consideration.113 Further ahead lay the question of replacing the existing Chieftain fleet. With the collapse of the Anglo-German feasibility studies into a new main battle tank a national programme, dubbed MBT-80, had begun, with entry into service planned for the late 1980s.114 It was planned to equip this with the recently developed Chobham armour, which offered vastly superior protection at a reduced weight. This meant that MBT-80 could be a much more heavily armoured tank than the existing Chieftain, with improved mobility.115 However, waiting for MBT80 meant delaying the entry of Chobham armour into service. This not only had implications for the military balance on the Central Front, but also threatened the potential loss of valuable exports, as the secret of Chobham armour was shared with Britain’s NATO partners who
24 Defence under Thatcher
would be in a position to install it into their own new tanks and sell these overseas before MBT-80 entered service.116 Closely linked to the replacement tank programme was a new fleet of armoured personnel carriers. Here the domestically developed MCV-80 (which became Warrior) and the US Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) were in direct competition with each other. Both offered the ability to engage light armoured vehicles on the battlefield with their cannon. The latter’s gun had the advantage that it was stabilized, which made it far more accurate when fired on the move and it also had the ability to engage enemy tanks with its TOW launcher.117 Improvements to Soviet mechanized forces also highlighted weaknesses in the existing artillery force. A major replacement programme was already underway. The heavier 155 mm FH-70 howitzer had begun to replace the 105 mm light gun in those regiments committed to the reinforcement of the BAOR. In the medium term it was planned to rectify the lack of firepower provided by the 105 mm Abbot selfpropelled gun by replacing it with the collaborative SP-70 under development with West Germany and Italy. Also under consideration for deployment in the late 1980s was the US Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), which looked as though it would be ideally suited to the task of breaking up tank concentrations at long range.118 For air defence the army relied upon the towed Rapier system, which had only recently entered service with the air defence regiments. The problem of deploying the system with the mobile armoured units was already acknowledged and a tracked alternative was already in the process of development for the Shah of Iran.119 However, the cost of the system was viewed as prohibitive and no plans existed for its purchase. Instead, consideration was being given to the acquisition of a mobile anti-aircraft gun, which could accompany the mobile armoured units, while the Rapier system provided for the defence of static units.120 The army also deployed a first generation man-portable surface-to-air (SAM) system, the Blowpipe, to complement Rapier, and a second generation system, the Javelin, was under development. The Army Air Corps (AAC) was further ahead in its equipment transformation. The Anglo-French Gazelle was in the process of delivery as a replacement for the Sioux in communications, reconnaissance and training roles. Of more significance was the introduction into service of the Lynx, equipped to carry eight HOT anti-tank missiles.121 This represented a significant transformation in capability compared to the existing Scout helicopter. However, it was still a modification of an existing airframe to the role rather than a specialist attack helicopter.
British Defence Policy in May 1979 25
Partly as a result of the division command and control problems there were a number of projects in the design stage concerned to control various elements during battle and allow them to communicate with one another. The army had already begun to introduce the new Sultan, the first purpose-built tracked armoured command vehicle to enter service, as well as the Clansmen family of tactical radios.122 The Wavell intelligence system was scheduled to follow in 1980 with the BATES battlefield artillery targeting engagement system and the Ptarmigan tactical communications system planned for service in the mid- to late 1980s. For the army the 1980s promised to be a period of transformation as it replaced the vast majority of its equipment, which dated back to the 1960s. The new command and control equipment promised to revolutionize its ability to fight on the modern battlefield. These changes were not without considerable cost and the army’s high command were determined that their equipment budget would be protected from any cutbacks. At the same time there was an undercurrent of change within army thinking which had yet to fully emerge and influence the future direction of land operations.
The Royal Air Force in May 1979 The Royal Air Force (RAF) was beginning the most expensive replacement programme in its history. By the end of the 1980s it planned to dispose of the majority of its current aircraft and have a front-line filled largely with new aircraft. Despite this, RAF doctrine was set to remain unchanged, and was principally governed by its NATO commitments and by the RAF’s continuing determination to maintain its independence as a service. The Air Force Board was determined to retain a balanced force capability and rejected any notion of role specialization.123 It sought to contribute aircraft to the entire range of NATO activities and dismissed any suggestion that the navy could take over any of the maritime functions performed by the air force, or that the army should take control of the air force’s support helicopter fleet. Nevertheless, while the board’s goals were to at least maintain force levels in all six areas of capability (strike, offensive support, air defence, maritime, support and helicopter lift) priority remained with the fast jet roles, that is, strike, offensive support and air defence.124 The RAF’s strike aircraft composed a mixture of Jaguars, Vulcans and Buccaneers. Although the Jaguar had only recently entered service in
26 Defence under Thatcher
both the strike and offensive support roles, it had a number of shortcomings, particularly in terms of range and lack of an all-weather capability.125 It had entered service as a stopgap solution in order to allow the Phantoms to be switched to the air defence role.126 While the Vulcans and Buccaneers had better range and all-weather capabilities they were both showing signs of age. Their replacement, the new ground-attack version of the Tornado (GR1), promised to transform the strike capability of the RAF through its advanced avionics and the various weapons programmes that were planned to equip it. The Tornado GR1 had been designed and produced as a collaborative venture with the West Germans and the Italians and the RAF had been forced to accept certain performance limitations to achieve an agreed specification. This meant that the Tornado GR1 had a significantly reduced range compared to both the aircraft it was replacing. To offset this, nine VC10 aircraft were earmarked for conversion to the tanker role to supplement the existing force of Victor K2 tankers.127 The RAF also hoped to retain a reduced number of Vulcan squadrons equipped with an undefined air-launched cruise missile in the long-range strike role rather than rely solely on the Tornado.128 A mixed force of Harrier GR3s and Jaguar GR1s performed the offensive support. Both were the subjects of a feasibility study into a future tactical combat aircraft that was scheduled for entry into service in the early 1990s.129 Meanwhile, it was hoped to overcome the deficiencies in weapons load and range in the existing Harrier force by re-winging the whole fleet rather than collaborating with the Americans in the development of the AV-8B.130 The state of Britain’s air defences was the subject of some of the most scathing criticism directed at the Labour government by the Conservatives prior to the 1979 general election.131 Britain’s air defences had never recovered from the cutbacks imposed during the 1957 Defence Review.132 These, together with the RAF’s responsibility for fleet air defence,133 meant that the RAF’s fighter force was largely deployed to defend the US/UK strike bases in East Anglia and, in theory at least, defend the fleet in northern waters. NATO’s decision in 1967 to introduce the strategy of flexible response led to a revision of this.134 However, priority was given to RAF forces deployed in West Germany, which meant that the need to improve Britain’s air defences was delayed.135 The deployment of the Backfire and Fencer aircraft by the Soviet Union during the 1970s underlined the vulnerability of the United Kingdom to conventional air attack.136 A significant modernization programme was started, covering aircraft,
British Defence Policy in May 1979 27
surface-to-air missiles, radar systems, the protection of RAF airfields and the command and control network but the delay meant there was little actual visible improvement by 1979.137 The shortage of front-line aircraft led to the idea of a ‘fighter gap’ emerging in the late 1970s which would not begin to be relieved until the entry of the air defence version of the Tornado (F2) in the mid-1980s to replace the Lightnings and Phantoms. This weakness, and the political fallout from it, led the Air Force Board to consider various remedies to deal with this deficiency, including the leasing of fighter aircraft from the United States.138 Ever since the incorporation of the Royal Naval Air Service within the newly created RAF in 1918 the RAF’s control of maritime air assets had been a source of friction with the Royal Navy. By 1979 the shorebased elements were grouped together within the RAF’s 18 Group and consisted of three principal assets.139 First, there were the Buccaneer aircraft equipped with Martel air-to-surface missiles for the surface strike role. In conjunction with the SSNs these aircraft were viewed by the Admiralty as the principal means of containing the Soviet surface fleet as well as striking at the bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet. With the decommissioning of the navy’s last fixed-wing aircraft carrier a second squadron of aircraft in this role was in the process of forming (No. 216).140 It was envisaged that Tornado GR1s equipped with the new British Aerospace P-3T (Sea Eagle) anti-ship missiles would replace them by the mid-1980s.141 Second, there were four front-line squadrons and one training squadron equipped with Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft (Nimrod MR1). To the Air Force Board these aircraft, together with the navy’s SSNs, represented the most efficient means of combating the increasing Soviet submarine threat. The Board felt that emphasis should be given to these rather than to the navy’s surface fleet.142 They were concerned about the size of the existing Nimrod MR1 force, and the decision to convert 11 Nimrod MR1s to the AEW role, instead of purchasing Boeing E-3As as the RAF High Command hoped, meant that there was no longer a surplus of Nimrod airframes. Any expansion would require the reopening of the Nimrod production line at a considerable cost.143 Meanwhile, the existing force continued to receive an upgrade, which incorporated the Searchwater radar. Linked to the purchase of additional Nimrod aircraft was the third maritime asset. A single Vulcan squadron was tasked with the role of surface search in order to monitor the deployment of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Despite the planned phasing-out of Vulcans in the
28 Defence under Thatcher
strike role, the Air Force Board envisaged that they would continue in the maritime role for some time to come. However, they would need replacing in the foreseeable future and reopening the Nimrod production line could furnish suitable replacements. With the reduction of half of its transport fleet in the 1975 Defence Review the RAF found itself overstretched. As a partial remedy, half of the Hercules fleet were scheduled to receive an extension designed to increase their cargo capacity.144 The RAF had started to introduce the new Hawk aircraft in the advanced trainer role while replacement alternatives for the ageing Jet Provost basic trainers were under consideration. The helicopter support fleet had always tended to be the area last to receive funding and first to lose it. This was no more evident than in the purchase of Chinook helicopters in the medium-support role. This requirement had first been stated 14 years before an order was placed in 1978 when the RAF made use of a significant under spend.145 From the army’s point of view the results of this lack of prioritization was the inadequate provision of support helicopters and a preference for control over this force.146 This led to increased calls within the army for the transfer of the support helicopter force to the army. The replacement of the Wessex/Puma force was under consideration with a substantial purchase envisaged in the late 1980s.
Long-term cycle For a significant part of British manufacturing industry, defence related work remained one of the major sources of revenue. The domestic market had been dominated by British industry, which was keen to prevent any further increase in the foreign manufacturers’ share of defence spending. Successful arms sales were mainly achieved where the equipment had already been tried and tested in British service and it was to the MOD that industry looked for its first orders to cover its research and development costs and promote sales.147 This situation seemed set to continue. Industry was concerned to avoid change since the existing cost-plus method of contracting helped not only to fund their research and development at virtually no risk but also provided a guaranteed profit. There was a growing trend towards collaboration, principally with Britain’s European partners. The RAF tended to be most associated with this because of its involvement in some of the larger collaborative projects and because its leadership recognized that this was a particularly good method of preserving programmes within the LTCs.148 The expe-
British Defence Policy in May 1979 29
rience of industries associated with the army’s programme were mixed. The FH-70 artillery programme had been a success and it was hoped that this success would be transferred into the SP-70 self-propelled howitzer project. But the attempt to develop a collaborative main battle tank had failed.149 Industry had been very successful in obtaining a large number of overseas orders for British products, particularly from the Shah of Iran, but the fall of the Shah in 1978 had led to the cancellation of a large number of contracts by the new Iranian regime and the ramifications of this were not yet fully appreciated.150 For the navy, the shipyards and their associated suppliers had had far less involvement in collaborative programmes. The construction of hulls did not obtain any benefit from collaboration and consequently the main area for shared effort resided in the weapons systems. Here the navy had been far more circumspect than the other services with the vast majority of products continuing to be produced on a solely national basis. Naval concern with the Soviet submarine threat led to significant sums being invested in anti-submarine warfare especially in the detection of submarines.151 A significant research emphasis was placed upon surface acoustic arrays that would, in co-operation with the planned medium-sized helicopter, allow the detection and destruction of Soviet submarines at far greater ranges than had previously been possible. This promised to provide an offset to the increasing capabilities of Soviet submarines and formed the basis of the Sea King replacement programme begun in 1978.152 The major part of the army’s equipment programme was scheduled for the 1980s. Beyond that period consideration centred upon how the battlefield would look and what type of weapons systems would be needed.153 One area of particular interest was that of obtaining a realtime picture of what was happening 10–30 miles behind the battle line and identifying where the enemy troop and armoured concentrations were. This linked in to the whole question of emerging technologies and involved, in particular, the munitions developments for the MLRS considered by the army in the long term.154 The air force had a number of air staff targets (ASTs) and air staff requirements (ASRs) being formulated at this time. Long-term policy centred on reducing the number of aircraft types with each requirement aspiring to replace two or more other aircraft.155 AST-403 sought to replace the Harrier and Jaguar aircraft in the offensive support role.156 This target incorporated the requirement for at least a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL), if not a vertical/short take-off
30 Defence under Thatcher
and landing (V/STOL), capability. Not surprisingly, given the size and complexity of this programme, the RAF began to look for collaborative partners within Europe.
Conclusions Following the decision largely to withdraw from East of Suez in 1968, declaratory policy remained largely unchanged between 1968 and 1979. None of the subsequent governments were particularly interested in altering this aspect of policy with the result that strategic nuclear deterrence, and the continental and maritime commitments to NATO were consistently emphasized at the expense of home defence and the out-of-area role. Defence policy took a back seat in government thinking until the latter half of the 1970s when concern about the Soviet threat convinced the government to agree to NATO’s 3 per cent commitment and the long-term defence programme. The strategy to implement these roles was largely left to the services, who let their NATO missions dominate their thinking. They had seen many changes over the previous 30 years and they wanted to focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Europe. What they wanted was a period of stability in defence planning matched by the prospect of real growth in the budget.157 They were therefore opposed to any move towards changing this, although within the navy and the army there were some who questioned whether they had the right strategy, structure and equipment to implement declaratory policy. All the services had suffered cutbacks during the 1970s and were keen to recover some of the ground lost.158 This had led to a bulking out of the LTCs by the services to meet their requirements. If the programme could not be sustained then this raised fundamental questions about the direction of military strategy and declaratory policy. In opposition the Conservatives had been scathing of Labour’s defence policy. In their election campaign they argued for the need for adequate support of Britain’s armed forces. The short, medium and long-term cycles therefore appeared to be moving in the same direction in May 1979, but this was an illusion. The ideological outlook of the new government ensured that it would become involved in the direction and management of the service programmes. The size and scale of MOD involvement in industry and government meant that defence could not be ignored by those within the Conservative Party who wished to introduce the monetarist ideas only hinted at in their
British Defence Policy in May 1979 31
election manifesto. Moreover, as the subsequent chapters will show, the new administration was unable to ensure that the requisite resources were available to support the LTCs. While the new government sought to stress the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need for increased defence expenditure, the onset of economic recession meant that they were confronted with some hard decisions.
3 Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981
Introduction The new Conservative government was greatly welcomed by the MOD in May 1979 because they promised to be strong on defence and there appeared to be firm support within the Conservative Party and the Cabinet on this issue.159 This perception was reinforced by Francis Pym’s appointment as Secretary of State for Defence. In the words of one former civil servant ‘he was welcomed because he was a good decent shire MP, which I think the military like. He was a man of great integrity and not out for a sort of quick political fix … and you got a good ministerial team with Geoffrey Pattie etcetera. So things were quite chirpy.’160 What was less apparent was the thinking that lay behind Pym’s appointment. Thatcher’s first Cabinet was composed of many of her shadow Cabinet, including a significant number who would subsequently be labelled ‘wets’.161 It was not until the 1981 reshuffle that the Cabinet began to be dominated by those with a greater political affiliation to her. In 1979, she chose to put those that were in her Cabinet in the key economic posts, which left defence free for someone beyond her immediate circle.162 Pym had been shadow Foreign Secretary163 and the press had identified him as a possible successor to her as leader of the Conservative Party.164 His move to defence, rather than to the Foreign Office, was a clear demotion from what he might have expected. In his autobiography Heseltine noted ‘I passed Francis Pym on my way in, he was looking dejected, having been offered the Ministry of Defence when he had had his heart set on the Foreign Office.’165 For Thatcher this move had two advantages. Firstly, it kept Pym in the Cabinet and therefore subject to the rules of Cabinet which prevented public dissent. Secondly, the MOD was a post 32
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 33
with a considerable workload and this would reduce the impact he could have within Cabinet on other issues.166 This chapter will examine Francis Pym’s time in office. It has been subdivided into two periods to help highlight the ways in which changes in circumstance impacted upon defence policy. The periods are: 1. The application of ideology, May 1979–April 1980 2. The impact of recession, May 1980–January 1981
The application of ideology: May 1979–April 1980 The short-term cycle There was little initial difference in outlook between Pym and Thatcher over defence policy and the MOD had not been identified as an area for early reform. Both adopted the traditional Conservative emphasis on the maritime commitment and Britain’s role East of Suez. 167 Thatcher made this clear in a meeting with senior naval officers when she indicated her intention to shift defence policy towards a traditional one based on maritime forces. However, she recognized that in the short term the continental commitment had to be accepted as a means of ensuring that the US retained its ground forces in Europe.168 In contrast, Pym thought the solution lay in terms of a greater West German commitment in the Atlantic in order to allow the Royal Navy to deploy to the Indian Ocean.169 In general, the new defence team, with the support of the Prime Minister, sought to implement their election promises and achieve rapid and politically visible short-term improvements to Britain’s armed forces. Partly this was political. In opposition the Conservatives had lambasted the previous Labour government and they did not want to leave themselves open to similar criticism, but there was also genuine concern about the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Three areas had, in particular, been identified: service pay, the state of Britain’s air defences and the role of reserve forces.170 In the background lay consideration of the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent. The new government was keen to retain the deterrent and was aware that a decision was needed about a replacement system. However, there was no real view from the defence team about what capabilities the deterrent should have, other than essentially to maintain the status quo and base it on Polaris.171
34 Defence under Thatcher
The medium-term cycle The navy’s thinking remained dominated by its four NATO tasks. The one area of major debate concerned the protection of the transatlantic convoys. Improvements in Soviet submarine technology, particularly the introduction of long-range cruise missiles, and the diminishing number of escorts raised the issue of how best to protect the reinforcement convoys. Admiral Train, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), suggested that NATO should shift its convoy routes southwards along the Tropic of Cancer at the extreme range of Soviet naval aviation and as far away as possible from Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula. This would force Soviet submarines to pass through the GIUK gap and minimize their time on station to a few days.172 But it also meant increasing the transit time for NATO convoys by four days and concentrating the limited forces available for close escort on the Massindi/Madeira Islands to the Channel ports leg of the journey. Within the Royal Navy this proposal caused lively debate and division.173 The existing policy was somewhat contradictory. The construction programme emphasized the building of highly capable ships, which were then regularly updated. These were notionally equipped to operate and survive in the GIUK gap but it meant that there were insufficient ships available to provide the required number of escorts. Two world wars had taught the Royal Navy that it needed to provide close escorts for the entire journey, supplemented by other forms of convoy protection such as patrols along the GIUK gap. The construction programme therefore encouraged a shift towards Train’s ideas while historical experience suggested that such a move would be wrong and the programme should be changed. This led the Commander-in Chief Fleet, together with the Controller of the Navy and the navy minister, to argue for the adoption of a mixed fleet of first and second-class units in order to meet the navy’s deficit in ship numbers and provide the requisite close escorts.174 They suggested that a number of more austere vessels be designed and purchased as complements to the existing programme:
Submarines Destroyers Frigates MCMVs
First class Trafalgar – SSNs Type 44 Type 22 Hunts
Second class SSKs – Type 2400 Type 42 Type 23 SRMH and River-class
Opinion within the Admiralty Board was divided. The idea had been tried in the 1950s with the building of the second rate Type 14 and
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 35
Type 81 frigates, but it had proved unsatisfactory and production shifted to the general purpose Leander-class frigates. Moreover, less capable ships were implicitly more expendable in wartime, which had significant implications for the morale of their crews and the matter remained unresolved. The Army’s High Command placed its emphasis upon the defence of the Central Front in wartime and its peacetime internal security role in Northern Ireland. They were not interested in taking on any additional roles or commitments. The implementation of the revised army structure following the 1975 Defence Review had been completed and the problems associated with it were already the source of ongoing disagreement within the army. One view was that the best solution was to retain the existing structure with all its faults rather than have the turmoil of further change. The other school considered that the structure was impossible to operate in wartime and that a further reorganization had to occur. The new divisional structure depended upon the timely arrival of UK-based regulars and reservists to bring all the armoured divisions up to strength.175 Improvements in Soviet mobilization times raised concern about the feasibility of a successful Soviet short-warning attack occurring before Britain’s reinforcements had arrived.176 At the tactical level the new larger armoured regiment and mechanized infantry battalions were found to be too unwieldy for effective control within the confines of the North German Plain.177 While opinion within the army was divided on the army’s structure and its strategy for fighting the war in Europe, there was uniform support for the army’s equipment programme and particularly the needs of 1(Br) Corps. Protecting these against further cutbacks remained the principal concern and any improvements were welcomed. For the air force the main objective was to keep the equipment programme on track and prevent any challenge to the air force’s independence.178 The equipment scheduled to enter service was earmarked largely as replacements for existing hardware. No real consideration was being given to changing the philosophy behind its use. The air force was not looking to find new roles or change its doctrine with the result that the idea of equipping the Vulcan as a cruise missile carrier was merely under consideration.179 However, support for this, as a replacement for Polaris, was noticeably absent.180 For the air force the one area in need of change was in the use of reserve forces but even this remained limited. With an increased threat posed to RAF bases from Soviet Spetsnatz forces in wartime, the Chief
36 Defence under Thatcher
of the Air Staff (CAS) hoped to make a greater use of reservists to protect the RAF’s UK bases in wartime.181 However, CAS did not envisage the return of reservists to the flying role and was more concerned to staunch the outflow of aircrew from the service. Long-term cycle Within the long-term cycle the ongoing programmes remained largely unaffected by the change in government, with one exception. The new government placed far greater emphasis upon exports and the need to bear in mind the potential for overseas sales when developing new equipment.182 The focus for the navy and army was largely concentrated on their medium-term programmes, although the navy’s debate about first and second-line vessels led to design work for all these second-class units being undertaken, with little change being made to existing designs. The air force was concerned about the replacement of its fleet of Harrier and Jaguar aircraft. The Harrier’s lack of range and weapons pylons severely restricted its operational potential and the air force wanted to increase both its range and bomb load whilst retaining its STOVL capability. The Jaguar had only been introduced as a stopgap measure to release Phantoms for the air defence role and a replacement capable of operating in all weathers was needed.183 These requirements were combined as part of a general air force policy of reducing the overall types of platform and discussions with Britain’s European partners were initiated to fulfil what was designated AST.403.184 The interaction of the time-cycles, May 1979–April 1980 The government’s support for the East of Suez role immediately brought it into conflict with all three services. The build-up of Soviet forces in Europe, and the European focus that emerged out of the defence reductions from 1968 onwards, discouraged the services from considering the East of Suez role. All three felt that their forces were stretched enough and did not wish to earmark forces to this additional task. It was perhaps surprising that the navy did not seek to encourage the government’s desire to move away from the continental commitment towards a more maritime oriented East of Suez role. The wounds of the 1966 Defence Review were still evident and the navy’s leadership were not looking to be drawn into a direct confrontation with the other two services.185 More fundamental was the change within the navy in favour of its NATO roles. This had led to a change in the rela-
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 37
tive influence of the different parts of the navy away from those associated with the power projection role. With the services looking to protect their programmes and force structures in the medium term, Pym and his defence team sided with the military view on East of Suez. No significant policy change was implemented although there were a few nominal concessions. The navy did agree to increase its periodic deployment of individual units beyond the NATO region and to put a task force together every couple of years.186 The subsequent Iran-Iraq War led to the creation of the Armilla Patrol and the permanent deployment of Royal Navy forces in the Gulf again. The air force used the East of Suez argument to reinforce its existing requirements for additional tanker aircraft and the conversion of nine VC-10 aircraft to the tanker role was approved.187 The one major impact of the defence team’s East of Suez emphasis was on army plans. The army wanted to revise the role of the Parachute Regiment into an air-mobile, anti-tank force capable of dealing with the new Soviet development, the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG), on the Central Front.188 The government’s emphasis on East of Suez led them to conclude that the implementation of these plans was unrealistic within the existing political climate. The government was unlikely to agree to the loss of the parachute battalion notionally earmarked to the out-of-area role. Instead the army chose to continue the policy of keeping one parachute battalion within 6 Field Force as the out-of-area force and it firmly rejected the suggestion that the brigade level of support should be reintroduced into the Parachute Regiment so that an Independent Parachute Brigade could be reformed. With the short and medium-term outlooks in conflict both the military and the Conservative defence team accepted a status quo compromise. Despite the intransigence of the three services and the compromises reached with the defence team, the East of Suez issue refused to go away because of the Prime Minister’s support for it. This was given greater prominence following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and Mrs Thatcher began to press for a British contribution to the US Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).189 In this she had the support of the US and active consideration was given to assigning a parachute battalion to the RDJTF. However, nothing actually came of the proposals. Surprisingly, in the discussions that followed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) role was limited. However, it did provide an indication of the reduced role the FCO would play in defence matters during this administration.
38 Defence under Thatcher
There was a noticeably rapid response to the three areas that the Conservatives had criticized Labour on: service pay; the weakness of Britain’s air defences; and the failure to use the reserves properly. Within a week of entering office the Conservatives adopted in full the recommendations of the pay review board. According to one senior official they had little choice. The situation had reached crisis point where something had to be done. ‘The main thing we were hoping for, and indeed expected, was a comparable level of Service pay right across the board with civilian pay which, under the Labour administration, became seriously depressed to the point and, if it had occurred 50 years before, and certainly 100 years before, there would have been a mutiny.’190 This pay award immediately caused problems within the Cabinet. From the start the Treasury team attempted to cap the defence budget, but they were forced to accept that the Treasury and not the MOD would meet the initial pay rise. The Treasury had little option. The size of the increase meant that if it had come out of the existing defence budget then there would have had to be significant cutbacks elsewhere. This was politically unacceptable for the new government. However, instead of increasing the MOD budget to compensate for the additional payments the Treasury chose to find the increase out of its own reserves. The reasoning was simple: when it came to working out the 3 per cent increase in the defence budget for the subsequent fiscal year this amount could be excluded.191 Despite the rapidity with which the pay award was put through, the ramifications of low pay and poor conditions could not be immediately resolved. Manpower shortages forced the government temporarily to reduce individual naval and army units.192 This was embarrassing for the government, although they could place the blame on the previous administration. The navy sought to ease the government’s position by relegating the ships to the newly reformed standby squadron, which allowed the government to continue to count them within the navy’s effective strength. For the navy there were two advantages. First, it allowed the navy to retain some ships that already had new vessels earmarked to replace them and thus increased the navy’s strength in escorts. Second, by retaining these ships in service the government implicitly agreed that they would have to be replaced again, which made the increase permanent.193 The army and air force approaches was different. The army chose temporarily to lose an infantry company in the worst affected battalions rather than to disband entire battalions. This was a better solution
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 39
for the army since its units were manpower rather than equipment oriented, which meant that it was easier to bring existing units up to strength than to resurrect units once they had been lost. The main problem for the air force was a shortage of aircrew and it already operated with a reduced aircrew-aircraft ratio.194 If it retained squadrons in service then there was the possibility of the aircraft-aircrew ratio dropping below NATO’s minimum requirements, which would have been deeply embarrassing for the government. Simply disbanding squadrons would have let the government avoid the situation, but again would have been embarrassing. This forced the government to consider how to rectify this problem and led them to adopt the air force’s solution. This was to purchase additional Hawk trainers and expand the number of training units supplying aircrew, thereby increasing the RAF’s overall strength. There was an additional carrot for the government. If these Hawk aircraft were equipped as reserve fighters then the government would also be able to highlight its commitment to Britain’s air defences. Having criticized the state of Britain’s air defences the Conservatives sought rapid measures to improve the situation. With the agreement of the air force a package of measures was announced in July 1979.195 These included equipping part of the Hawk training fleet with air-to-air missiles as a means of increasing the fighter strength in the short term. This not only gave these aircraft a wartime role and the government the means to show its commitment to defence, it also had a long-term implication. It meant that when these aircraft were replaced their successors would have to have an air defence capability. The defence team also sought to obtain a greater share of NATO funds and announced the decision to construct hardened aircraft shelters in the United Kingdom.196 These qualified for NATO’s Physical Protection Programme funding if a number of measures were undertaken. As a result, the Bloodhound squadron in Germany was withdrawn to the United Kingdom to help meet the requirements.197 This gave the Bloodhound a far more significant role than it had in Germany and justified the air force’s examination of a successor. They obtained approval to begin collaborative studies with the French and Germans on a future ground-to-air missile system.198 In themselves the improvements made to Britain’s air defences were insufficient politically. The government therefore forced the RAF to reinvestigate the practicality of either creating a third Lightning squadron using aircraft held in storage or leasing American F-15 or F-4 aircraft on a short-term basis to fill the ‘fighter gap’.199 While the quickest solution was to use the Lightnings in store there were problems.
40 Defence under Thatcher
These were already earmarked to maintain the existing force in operation until the entry of the Tornado F2 into service. Creating a third squadron would result in the entire fleet of Lightning aircraft running out of airframe life before the Tornado F2 entered service.200 The leasing option also had problems attached. It was doubtful whether the US Air Force had any F-15s spare. There were F-4s available but their lack of compatibility with the RAF’s existing fleet would have had considerable cost implications for such a small improvement.201 The Air Force Board reiterated its preferred option of accelerating and enlarging the Tornado F2 programme while accepting a period of risk. It recognized that any increase in front-line squadron strength, albeit temporary, was perfectly acceptable as long as it was not at the expense of an existing programme. Their reasoning was that once inaugurated the government would find it politically difficult subsequently to abandon this measure without a considerable loss of face at home and abroad. In the medium term the aircraft involved would need replacing and the RAF would effectively receive a long-term increase to its air defence fighter force. Bringing the Tornado F2 programme forward would also free funds in the latter years of the LTCs for other programmes, assuming the cost of this did not come from other air force programmes, and the air force was planning to have the AST.403 on stream at this point. The government subsequently announced its decision to form a third Lightning squadron and that it was considering bringing the Tornado F2 programme forward.202 With an increase in the Lightning force, thought was given to an increased Tornado F2 purchase by converting the order for the last 20 Tornado GR1s to the fighter variant.203 This would provide the necessary aircraft for increasing the RAF’s fighter strength while still providing sufficient Tornado GR1s to replace the existing Vulcan, Buccaneer and Canberra force. The short-term political needs of the government had forced it to acquiesce to the air force’s medium-term plans to increase the overall size of the Tornado F2 force by ultimately replacing the third Lightning squadron with additional Tornado F2s. Neither government or RAF mentioned the problem of finding aircrew for the new squadron. It was an issue neither wished to raise. In fact, for the air force it provided further reason for expanding their training capacity and purchasing additional Hawk trainers. The government also emphasized the importance of Britain’s reserve forces and sought to give them a more prominent role. They represented a relatively inexpensive means of gaining significant political
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 41
capital by increasing British armed forces and using forces that had hitherto been largely neglected. The navy’s response was to let the government push through the formation of a Royal Naval Reserve Air Branch204 and it placed more emphasis on the mine counter-measures role capability by giving the reservists their own vessels. Trials with two converted trawlers had already validated this idea, which dovetailed into the high–low force idea circulating within the navy. An initial reserve force of 12 boats was planned to provide one for each of the reserve divisions.205 In the army the reserve forces had a far more significant role to play. The government’s wish that the reserves be given a more prominent role gave the army an opportunity to try and tackle the problem of improved Soviet mobilization times. The army suggested, and it was readily accepted by the government, that improvements should be made to the mobilization procedures, which would reduce by half the time taken to mobilize the reserves. The government also announced an annual bounty scheme as a means of keeping track of regular reservists.206 To equip them, a number of purchases were announced, including a £20m order for Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to equip the Territorial Army units deployed to Germany in wartime.207 The emphasis on reservists fitted into the CAS’s desire to counter the growing threat posed to RAF bases in Britain.208 The formation of the first three Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF) ground defence squadrons was announced, tasked with airfield defence against Soviet special forces.209 Plans were prepared to expand this number significantly if the trial proved successful. However, any question of the defence team considering an airborne role for the reserve forces was firmly blocked by the air force, despite Conservative backbench support for such a measure.210 In general the government sought to find short-term measures that could improve the services capabilities. Pym’s first move was to try and ascertain what the services needed to achieve this. The Chiefs of Staff were somewhat reticent in their response, which reflected their concern about the impact of short-term changes on their existing programmes. Instead of replying with an immediate wish list, they simply asked how much extra money was available so that they could apportion it between the three services, rather than haggle over what would be the optimum defence purchase with this additional money. In reply the government reiterated its request for a breakdown of force requirements and this issue circulated around the MOD for some time with no formal resolution.211
42 Defence under Thatcher
Informally the issue was addressed as the three services individually sought to tie in their programmes to the government’s aim of making short-term improvements. For the navy this was harder to achieve. The previous Labour government had ordered a significant number of ships just prior to the election.212 This meant that the ‘actual flow of these ships coming, or the quota of ships due to come, was already pretty full and was making it difficult to add money without overstuffing the programme’.213 To keep the SSN programme on stream the order for a third Trafalgar-class boat was announced.214 Resort was made to the state-owned merchant shipping yards and an order was placed for a seabed operations vessel from Scott Lithgow to help keep that yard in operation pending future RFA orders.215 Recourse was also made to the private dockyards and orders for the first two of a new class of offshore patrol vessel (OPVs) from Hall Russell were confirmed.216 The defence team sought to leave the debate about the army’s structure with its attendant political pitfalls alone. The idea of restoring the brigade level of command was rejected since it would have left the government open to accusations of merely increasing the number of army headquarters while neglecting the front line. Instead ministerial approval was given to attempts to deal with the problems of command and control of the new armoured divisions by establishing the Task Force headquarters in peacetime rather than leave them ad hoc or restoring the brigade level of command.217 The government also announced that the army would undertake Exercise Crusader 80, a significant reinforcement exercise undertaken in Germany in 1980, which would help to establish the extent of the problem.218 At the regimental/battalion level the idea of converting some of the armoured reconnaissance regiments to armoured regiments was rejected.219 Such a move would have highlighted the shortage of main battle tanks prior to the introduction of MBT-80 and undermined the existing divisional structure. Overall, government support tended to be with the more conservative elements within each service, as long as these elements helped to show that the government was making individual improvements. From the start of the new government’s time in office the General Staff’s emphasis upon the MBT-80 tank programme received its full support. ‘The Government attach the greatest importance to the timely introduction of the Army’s new main battle tank MBT-80, which remains its first priority equipment, and good progress is being made with the project definition.’220 However, these studies had already
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 43
begun to slip so that by April 1980 the project was not even referred to in the defence estimates.221 At the same time concern with the increasing threat posed by Soviet forces raised the issue of whether there were sufficient British tank forces in the existing fleet. The Army Board were in favour of a further purchase of 77 Chieftain tanks as an interim measure to bring the war maintenance reserve of 1 (Br) Corps up to strength.222 However, this decision became embroiled in the Iranian cancellation of its arms purchases from Britain. The 300 Shir-1s manufactured for the Iranians by ROF (Royal Ordnance Factory) Leeds were rapidly sold to Jordan but the Shir-2, then under construction, presented a problem. Although designed for desert warfare it incorporated the new Chobham armour which not only limited where it could be sold but made it superior to the Chieftains the army were proposing to purchase.223 With little prospect of selling these tanks elsewhere ROF Leeds was confronted with the prospect of no work until the MBT-80 programme was produced. Given that the in-service date for this was already slipping into the 1990s the government was faced with the prospect of making significant redundancies while preparing ROF for privatization. This would not make it an attractive package for investors and would leave the government open to criticism. Since unemployment was rising and the government was emphasizing the size of the Soviet tank inventory it was difficult for them to justify the loss of tank production facilities.224 The defence team therefore put the Chieftain order on hold while it rapidly reappraised the situation. In the debate on the Conservatives’ first defence estimates a package of army improvements was announced. These included an interim purchase of an additional 48 M109 self-propelled guns to help remedy the poor state of 1 (Br) Corps’ artillery in the short term.225 This order was satisfactory to both the government in the short term and the army in the medium term. The government was able to gain political capital from this package of improvements during the defence debate. For the army it posed no threat to the existing SP-70 programme, since these guns were earmarked to increase the size of gun batteries rather than replace existing weaponry. In fact the new M109 order implied a commitment to the purchase of more SP-70s than then currently planned in the medium term. The purchase of an unspecified number of MLRS was also announced,226 together with a further order for 14 Lynx helicopters.227 For the air force the Tornado programme remained the key programme. Apart from its air defence improvements the air force hoped
44 Defence under Thatcher
to use what additional funds were available to reopen the Nimrod production line and purchase an additional batch of maritime reconnaissance aircraft.228 These would offset those earmarked for conversion to the AEW role and allow a slight increase in the force. Ultimately this would then allow the air force to replace the maritime-tasked Vulcans with additional Nimrods. However, approval was not received during this period. The future strategic nuclear deterrent was discussed but the defence team gave no consideration to any change in nuclear strategy. They merely looked at the existing requirement to satisfy the Moscow criteria (the ability to successfully strike at the Soviet capital) and endorsed that.229 This was somewhat surprising, given the comparative freedom that the Conservatives had to discuss nuclear matters compared to Labour, and perhaps reflected an increasing concern with the unilateralist trend among public opinion. The three services also endorsed this view, much to the dismay of others within the MOD who hoped to broaden the debate.230 No strategic review was undertaken of the capability requirements at either the strategic or sub-strategic levels.231 Although no decision was formally announced, opinion quickly settled upon the Trident C4 system, which had already been recommended during Callaghan’s studies.232 The idea of equipping the Vulcan with cruise missiles was left unanswered. The air force was quite content to retain these aircraft in service as long as they did not interfere with the introduction of the Tornado GR1 into service and the Vulcans remained a peripheral programme.232 In the meantime, the existence of the Polaris improvement programme, Chevaline, was announced. This served to further intensify the divisions within the Labour Party over the nuclear deterrent, which emerged during the spring defence debate when a considerable number of Labour MPs voted against the defence estimates.234 Many within Labour’s multilateralist wing felt that this was a deliberate act by the government to exploit the division within the Labour Party and divert attention from the government’s deeply unpopular economic policy.235 While the defence team, with the support of the Prime Minister, were making initial improvements to Britain’s military forces they were confronted by opposition from the Treasury team which was to have a subsequent impact upon the medium and long-term cycles. From the beginning the Treasury sought to cap the defence budget: My Treasury team and I fought hard to avoid a commitment to increase NATO expenditure annually by three per cent more than
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 45
the rate of inflation. Before the election, Ian Gilmour had loyally declined to commit the party to this. But after the election it was Francis Pym who took over the defence portfolio, and he was (wrongly) advised that the party was already committed to the NATO target. We challenged this at a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, and we lost, with Margaret on the wrong side.236 This was the first of a string of early defence victories over the Treasury with Thatcher adopting her ‘Iron Lady’ rather than ‘Iron Chancellor’ outlook. The MOD was also favoured by an increase in its cash limit at a time when the other government departments had their cash limits reduced.237 Nevertheless the Treasury did fight back and managed to base the new cash limit on the low base line of the 1979/80 out-turn of expenditure, which had been depressed by an unusually large under-spend that year due to slips in major projects, instead of from the estimated cost of the existing Labour programme. This resulted in the new Government’s programme being put on a lower and increasingly divergent level of funding from Labour’s projected growth line, reducing the Chiefs expectations by some £1,400m over a four-year period.238 Despite these early conflicts with the Treasury the Chiefs of Staff managed to get Pym to agree to very positive planning assumptions being taken within the LTCs. These included the view that there would be 3 per cent growth for the years until FY 85–86 and a 3 per cent increase in real terms after that.239 This meant that the government’s short-term and the services’ medium-term hopes looked on paper as though they could be accommodated but the reality of these assumptions were already open to question within the MOD.240 Moreover, Thatcher’s initial enthusiasm and support for defence rather than her Treasury team was tempered by her early experience of the purchase of the Stingray torpedo. It had severely overrun its projected costs and raised questions in her mind about the efficiency of the MOD.241 This would subsequently cause Pym problems when he sought her support in his ongoing battle with the Treasury and, more importantly, make her less sympathetic to the Royal Navy when it came to the Nott review. Conclusions The government entered office with the expressed aim of shifting overall policy towards a more maritime, East of Suez outlook in the
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short term. This view was directly opposed by all three services who were concerned about the impact of such a shift in orientation on their defence programmes and strategy in the medium term. With medium and short-term cycles at loggerheads no change occurred as Pym accepted the services argument and only nominal gestures were made to the East of Suez role. Thatcher was unhappy at Pym’s acceptance of the status quo but, without the support of her defence team, she was unable to alter the existing declaratory policy or shift military strategy away from its NATO focus. However, her ongoing moves towards the American RDJTF forced the army to abandon its plans for the Parachute Regiment and ensured that this retained a limited airborne capability for the out-of-area role. This left a gap in the army’s capabilities to which they would later return. The Conservatives entered office with three areas of defence they particularly wanted to see improved. The issue of service pay united both the government and the services and the increases were put through. However, the Treasury team were aware of the implications of this for overall government expenditure and managed to limit the increase in defence spending by the clever use of its reserves. This had implications for the LTCs as pay rises continued to increase at a faster rate than the defence budget. Improvements to the United Kingdom’s air defences were dictated by the requirements of the medium-term cycle. The RAF accepted the arming of the Hawk trainers because it suited them, while the government’s aim of creating an additional fighter squadron in the short term was used to increase the air force’s strength in the medium term. It was also able to use the short-term political needs of the defence team to get approval for initial studies on a long-term replacement for Bloodhound. Without such a move the future of the missile looked uncertain. The government’s emphasis on the better use of reserves was seized upon by the army to try and remedy the concern they had about Soviet mobilization rates. Mutually supporting medium-term and short-term cycles’ objectives led to a number of measures being rapidly taken, with a number of defence orders announced to support them. The navy and the air force differed in their level of opposition to reservists as aircrew, the result being the creation of reserve aircrew for the navy but not for the air force. Both were willing to use reservists in other areas and this allowed the government to announce the formation of the first RAuxAF ground defence squadrons and the plan to purchase minesweepers for the Royal Naval Reserve.
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 47
In all these cases the outcome was largely dictated by the services’ medium-term outlook. The defence team were able to get issues or items onto the defence agenda but they were unable to determine their outcome. When the defence team did not push for an issue to be addressed, such as the assumptions underpinning the Polaris replacement programme, the subject was not addressed. This would seem to confirm that the services already had their agenda set out within their strategies and the LTCs and did not need to be proactive in determining policy. The Conservatives did little actually to change the balance between the services or between the elements within the individual services. Their concern had largely been with the visible short-term improvement to the British armed forces. They were only partially successful because the services failed to state what their requirements actually were. Nevertheless, it did provide them with some political capital with which to attack the increasingly unilateralist Labour Party. Most prominent in all this was the announcement of the existence of the Chevaline programme, which did much to undermine the more prominent multilateralists within the Labour Party who had served within the previous government. The government’s enthusiasm for the East of Suez role did not lead to any significant change in policy or redistribution of resources between the services. However, it did allow the services to use the exercise to further entrench themselves within their NATO tasks.
The impact of recession: May 1980–January 1981 Short-term cycle FY 80–81 was to prove to be one of the most difficult for the Conservatives.242 Although the defence team’s priorities remained unchanged events forced them to modify their approach. The MOD’s initial honeymoon period came to a rapid end during the spring of 1980. ‘By the winter of 1979–80, less than a year after Margaret Thatcher’s government took office, it was in the grip of economic crisis, raging inflation and rising unemployment.’243 With the onset of a world recession and a rise in the value of sterling, British industry found its markets abroad and at home diminishing. The businesses involved in defence initially employed their under-utilized staff to fulfil their defence contracts. This resulted in a marked improvement in the delivery time of equipment and services to the MOD.244 The inbuilt buffer within the LTCs of around 20 per cent,245 which allowed
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for the difference between the negotiated delivery dates and actual delivery dates, suddenly became a liability as contracts were fulfilled on time and in some cases early. This position was unheard of, and a rapid outflow of funds from the MOD followed, resulting in the MOD exceeding its cash limits for FY 79–80 by £200m.246 Under pressure from the Treasury the defence team were forced to agree that this deficit would be made up in the following year. But the outflow looked set to continue and the defence team were presented with the prospect of having to find funds for what they had actually contracted for that year, rather than what was planned for in the LTCs, less the buffer. The short-term view focused on managing this situation and the effects of the Iranian cancellation of its arms agreements with Britain.
Medium-term cycle All three services were adamant that their existing programmes were essential for the maintenance of British defence policy but all recognized that some cutbacks were inevitable. Their principal objective lay in minimizing the impact upon their respective service. All were aware of the damage caused to their individual services by the ongoing cutbacks of the previous 15 years. They differed only in the tactics they proposed to use. With its outlook fixed on preserving its existing roles and procurement plans the navy adopted the widest range of tactics to preserve its core elements. It sought to forestall a review for as long as possible. Cancellations to its peripheral programmes and delays to its core interests were accepted, but it was not prepared to see its main building programmes compromised in the long term or reductions made to the overall size of the fleet. Initially the army’s approach was similar and it sought to trim its peripheral programmes. However, with a smaller overall equipment budget, greater emphasis was given to cuts in training, although this had significant implications for the retention of personnel. Where major cutbacks were required the preservation of 1 (Br) Corps remained the main priority. The air force was also concerned about the implications of cuts to its major programmes, especially the Tornado. It generally adopted similar methods to the navy, but with one major exception. It decided that pressing for an enlarged training capability was no longer viable within the existing budget, and it was more prepared to accept short-term
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 49
reductions in its front-line strength to preserve its longer-term programmes. The determining factor was the preservation of the Tornado programme within the LTCs. Long-term cycle With the debate within the navy focusing on the issue of a high–low mix of units there was a shift in long-term thinking towards the lower end as the influence of the new Navy Minister, Commander-in-Chief Channel and Controller of the Navy came into play. Platform numbers rather than weapon systems increasingly became the paramount determinant of navy thinking and the Type 23 design emerged as a very austere frigate whose main role initially was to carry the new towedarray sonar for the detection of Soviet submarines at long range.247 The approach to the new SSK was different and reflected the navy’s willingness to seek other solutions. The decision was taken to make the design more suitable for export by enlarging it and to obtain savings through quantity production.248 The army’s long-term thinking remained largely unchanged while the air force continued to increase collaboration as the main mechanism it could use to protect its major programmes. The interaction of the time-cycles Pym preferred to avoid making significant policy changes so he argued in favour of raising the MOD’s cash limit.249 At the same time he formed the Defence Programme Working Party (DPWP) to let the military manage the problem confronting the MOD. He felt they were best equipped to make the appropriate defence decisions.250 The result was a DPWP manned and run by the Central Staffs but with senior civilian staff on it. This reflected an internal boost for the Central Staffs position vis-à-vis the individual services with whom they liaised. The DPWP and the defence team agreed that this ‘mini-review’ should leave service pay alone. All three services were still suffering from the outflow of key personnel and stemming this remained the first priority. Moreover, it was extremely unlikely that the government would accept the political fall-out from such a solution. Increases of 17–20 per cent for officers and 15–17 per cent for soldiers were therefore announced in April 1981.251 This further exacerbated the fiscal pressure on the defence budget since the previous pay increase had been funded out of Treasury reserves. The navy was the most over-committed and eventually accepted reductions of £1.8bn from its share of the LTCs.252 This was achieved
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through several means. Preference was given to the sacrifice of weapons, rather than platforms since these were more likely to be reinstated within the LTCs if the economy picked up. As a result, the Sea Dart redesign and the Sea Skua mid-life update programmes were axed.253 Plans to convert RFA Tarbatness to the amphibious role were abandoned because this remained a peripheral task whose long-term future was already in doubt following the earlier loss of the LPD replacements.254 RFA Tarbatness was instead earmarked for sale so that the income could be used to relieve the cash flow pressure on the MOD.255 The navy had already bulked out the LTCs with ships that they did not expect to get, as a cushion against future cuts.256 So orders for a number of destroyers and frigates were lost, together with those for the first four minehunters for the reserves, the first three of six new survey ships, and a second batch of ten Sea Harriers.257 The minehunter decision was potentially the most embarrassing for the government given its emphasis upon the reserves, and represented a gamble by the navy that it would, in fact, be subsequently reinstated. The survey ships, like RFA Tarbatness, were of secondary importance and could be sacrificed, while the Sea Harriers were an attrition batch, which could be reinstated if funds subsequently became available. In contrast, the importance of the SSN programme led to the order for the fourth Trafalgar SSN being delayed by only six months so that the costs would begin in the next financial year.258 The replacement of the navy’s old RFA tankers was an obvious area for delay or cancellation. Instead the navy chose to find a new financing mechanism to begin replacing its old RFA tankers. It arranged a deal whereby a series of tankers were built at Cammell Laird for civilian owners who then chartered them on a long-term basis to the navy.259 This meant that the costs of the new vessels would be spread over the full life of the ships rather than being concentrated in their early years. To the defence team it was appealing and imaginative, allowing the navy to build rather than cancel orders. Moreover, it provided work for Cammell Laird in a time of recession. For the navy the decision was more significant. Cammell Laird was the only shipyard besides Barrow with experience of producing nuclear submarines.260 It was clear to the navy before the decision to acquire the Trident system was officially announced that it needed to keep the Cammell Laird workforce intact if it wanted to maintain the existing SSN programme intact while it built the new SSBNs. The Trident announcement followed in July 1980 and indicated that the first order was expected within 18 months.261 The number of boats
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 51
to be purchased remained undecided, with four seen as the minimum and five a possibility. If a fifth boat were ordered this would allow the navy to maintain two boats at sea at all times, whereas four boats in service meant that for part of the time only one boat was at sea. The lack of decision reflected the lack of strategic debate. The navy found five boats appealing because of the redundancy they provided while the Treasury wanted three to minimize the cost, particularly as there was no budgetary provision within the LTCs to take account of the projected £5bn cost.262 The army programme initially suffered at the margins. Orders for logistic support road vehicles were slowed down, and restrictions were placed on training levels to save on fuel and ammunition costs. This ministers allowed, despite the criticism they had levelled at the previous government about similar measures. Exercise Crusader 80 was, however, protected. For the defence team it was symbolic of their commitment to defence and would be politically embarrassing to cancel, while to the army it would help settle the disputes about the future of 1 (Br) Corps. Escalating costs and slippage in the planned in-service date forced the government to announce the cancellation of MBT-80. This left the army with the choice of continuing with the Chieftain, pending its replacement with a new design sometime in the 1990s, or partially replacing it with a modified Shir-2 tank. The Army Board, under pressure from the government and aware that a future Chieftain replacement might also be cancelled, opted to order a batch of these tanks, calling them Challenger, for entry into service in the mid-1980s.263 It was initially envisaged that these would re-equip one of the four armoured divisions at an estimated cost of £300m.264 Ultimately, the Army Board accepted that the Challenger would replace half of BAOR’s tank force, but only on the understanding that the government would agree to the replacement of the remainder being subject to review, rather than accepting an all Challenger fleet at the outset.265 Although this order did not completely replace the lost work, it did place the ROFs on a sound financial footing in the short to medium term in preparation for its subsequent privatization. For the army it represented the only way for it to guarantee that it remain in the armoured warfare business. The Challenger directly affected the replacement of the army’s FV432 armoured personnel carrier (APC), which was announced at the same time.266 The Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) had pushed for the acceptance of the American Bradley because it had TOW anti-tank missiles, which gave it an ability to destroy enemy tanks. Both the ViceChief of the General Staff and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS)
52 Defence under Thatcher
were against equipping their new infantry carrier with anti-tank missiles. For them the APC’s role was merely that of a battlefield bus and to equip it for anti-tank missions would lead to the blurring of the division between APC and tank, thereby undermining the role of the tank. The decision went before the Minister for Defence Procurement who opted for Warrior, justifying his decision on the need to preserve jobs in Wolverhampton.267 The higher than expected cost of the new APC, the acquisition of the Challenger and the decision to purchase the Trident C-4 system led to a reduction in the order for Warriors from 1800–2000 to approximately 1000.268 This meant that the army would have to retain the FV-432 in a number of roles pending replacement by an additional order for Warrior or an alternative vehicle some time in the future. The air force, like the navy, was also concerned about the implications of cuts to its major programmes, especially the Tornado. Consequently it adopted methods similar to the Royal Navy with the result that the government’s emphasis on air defence and the reserves were early casualties. The air force lost any enthusiasm it had for increasing Lightning squadron numbers when the costs became apparent.269 To try and placate the defence team the RAF suggested that the existing Lightning Training Flight should form the basis of a wartime squadron rather than create a new squadron. It also halted its plans to create further RAuxAF ground defence squadrons270 and delayed indefinitely the purchase of new aircraft for its communications fleet, despite significant pressure placed upon it for such an order from British Aerospace (BAe) who were searching for a launch customer for their new Jetstream aircraft.271 Other cuts were needed and the air force opted to accept a big reduction in the training area despite a 13 per cent shortage of fast jet pilots.272 Instead aircrew shortages were accepted and the decision was taken to rectify this problem over a longer time frame.273 This led to the abandonment of plans for an additional batch of Hawk trainers. These cuts ran the risk of allowing the aircrew–aircraft ratio to fall below the NATO minimum and reinforced the need to avoid forming the third Lightning squadron. The temporary grounding of the Buccaneer fleet with metal fatigue helped the RAF’s predicament.274 Indicative of the quest for short-term savings was the fact that no attempt was made to expand the front-line strength of other aircraft types to compensate for the Buccaneer grounding. To protect the Tornado programme further the ALARM anti-radar missile programme was temporarily cancelled.275 Here the air force, like the navy, axed other weapons programmes instead of platforms, since
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 53
they were easier to reinstate, or platforms that had replacements on order that could not be cancelled, such as the Tornado programme. The requirement to offset the Trident C-4 costs led the RAF to agree to the DPWP’s decision to cancel the joint Harrier/Jaguar replacement AST.403.276 The search for European partners had proven unsuccessful with none interested in the stipulated STOVL capability. Instead the RAF decided to seek separate replacements for these aircraft. AST.411 was hurriedly written as a Harrier replacement with the American AV8B in mind. Entry into service was planned for the mid to late 1980s. A new AST.403 was written to replace the Jaguar in the long term. The delay in replacing the Jaguar gave the air force cause for concern since it meant that the Jaguar would have to remain in service for far longer than was thought desirable. Meanwhile, the Buccaneer, an aircraft considered by many to be more capable, was scheduled to be phased out of service with the Tornado’s arrival.277 While the DPWP sought to relieve the pressure on the LTCs in the short to medium term the defence team were forced to impose a moratorium for three months to try and reduce the outflow of cash from the MOD.278 The government was forced to make significant reductions in training and fuel as a short-term remedy.279 These decisions reflected the government’s willingness to allow short-term cuts to be managed by a service so that their medium-term programmes could be preserved. In July 1980 the Cabinet also agreed to implement Treasury demands for a £4bn reduction in the planned government expenditure for FY 80–81.280 While more or less united in their agreement that cutbacks were necessary, the Cabinet remained deeply divided over which departments should suffer the brunt of the reductions, with each spending minister seeking to justify why their department should be excluded from the exercise.281 For Pym the experience of the mini-review, together with the moratorium had led him to draw a number of conclusions. ‘As the consequence of significant cuts and the weight of decisions to implement them became more evident so too did the assessment that to carry them through would make no political, military or economic sense; the exercise fizzled.’282 This position was supported by the army’s first large-scale bolstered exercise for a number of years in September 1980. Not only did the results of this exercise appear to give credence to the army’s claim that it had been starved of funding but it also bolstered the belief within the leadership of all three services that further cuts would make no military sense.283 This view they conveyed to Pym who agreed with them.284
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By the autumn the allocation of £2bn of Treasury reductions was still not agreed.285 According to Geoffrey Howe, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury ‘had two prime targets for savings of more than £500m each: defence procurement costs and welfare benefits. I saw the Ministry of Defence as recidivist over-spenders. Programme after programme exceeded budgeted cost.’284 The Treasury received an unfavourable response from the defence team with the result that the situation came before Cabinet. In this confrontation the uncompromising support for defence from the Prime Minister, which had existed in June 1979, vanished. Her experience of the Stingray torpedo programme left her with the belief that the government was not getting value for money from the MOD. The result was considerable Cabinet disagreement over the level of defence cuts. Pym summoned the Conservative Backbench Committee on Defence to brief them and obtain their support and the suggestion that Pym was prepared to resign over the issue was leaked to the press.287 While on the side of the Treasury, Thatcher was concerned about whether Pym would resign. Pym’s position as a potential threat to her leadership meant that some form of compromise agreement had to be reached. This became especially true for Thatcher when support for Pym’s position within the Cabinet became more apparent.288 Pym had prepared his case and mobilized the Chiefs of Staff into exercising their right of an audience with the Prime Minister to express their concern.289 Thatcher was forced to back down from her support for the Treasury and defence reductions of less than £200m for FY 80–81 were agreed. This meant a reduction from 3 to 2.5 per cent in the growth of the defence budget in real terms. Pym made no real attempt to provide a justification for the reductions in military terms and instead left it to the Treasury team to substantiate the cuts to Parliament.290 The services were again asked to put the requisite reductions together. For the major actors involved within the MOD, it was a question of when and by whom a review would take place, and as a result the last few months of Pym’s time in office led to a considerable amount of jockeying for position. While the services ostensibly sought to make the reductions called for under the mini-review, they tried to ensure that they protected their major programmes from any subsequent review. Within the Central Staff the work of the DPWP had provided the Secretary of State for Defence with the type of information that he needed from a tri-service standpoint. It reinforced the Central Staff’s view that they were best suited to conduct the forthcoming review and
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 55
they began to make initial studies into this as a prelude to taking the leading role. According to one official, Mason, the CSA, concluded that the co-ordination of weapons programmes, involving both weapon systems and platforms was at best erratic and at worst non-existent.291 Mason had therefore decided to confront the problem and undertake a review of the capabilities required from Britain’s armed forces to meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union and then to re-evaluate the best way of obtaining those capabilities rather than to advise each service individually on its replacement programmes. His report was forwarded to Pym, raising the profile of the CSA. This would subsequently become important during the Nott review. The navy abandoned its expansion plans and sold or scrapped a number of ships early, including the ASW/commando carrier HMS Bulwark. It also disposed of the majority of ships already in the standby squadron, including the heavy repair ship HMS Triumph.292 While this represented an about turn on earlier naval policy it provided a ready means of making the short-term savings required without having a significant effect upon the active fleet. The early retirement of a number of labour-intensive ships had the added benefit of freeing naval personnel for posting to the new ships about to enter service at a time of continued personnel shortages. Since the majority of these vessels had already been replaced in the active fleet these actions did not have a major effect on the naval programme in the medium term. Rather they represented the navy’s acknowledgement that it could not discreetly increase the size of the fleet. The one exception was the scrapping of the heavy repair ship whose role before being placed in reserve had been that of servicing the navy’s warships East of Suez. The loss of this ship represented a loss of capability and a practical undermining of the Conservatives’ East of Suez outlook. The reductions were, however, deeply embarrassing for the government, especially in the light of their argument that the Trident C-4 purchase would have no effect on conventional forces. It caused some within the navy to question the need for Trident and to raise the issue of whether a cruise missile equipped SSN force would be better. This would have been cheaper if the existing Moscow criteria were abandoned but the government vetoed this. Also, the Navy Board as a whole was not prepared to promote such an option.293 For the army Exercise Crusader 80 had been significant. It had shown that the divisional structure was unworkable and the regiment/battalion size was ill suited to war on the Central Front.
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Although the reservists had been deployed in time they generally arrived exhausted and not ready for battle. This encouraged the army to consider the forward deployment of more of the regular forces. In contrast, the government wanted to reduce BAOR down from its existing size of 59 000 to the treaty minimum of 55 000 as a reduction of the burden on Britain’s foreign exchange reserves. According to a senior official it was Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall who sought out the PUS to discuss the potential cuts to BAOR prior to taking command of 1 (Br) Corps. They agreed that he would manage a reduction in personnel to the treaty minimum without undermining capability.294 The army were therefore spared significant reductions in the short term, although the cost of training and other consumables remained restricted for the remainder of the financial year. The RAF chose to accelerate the disbandment of its two Canberra reconnaissance squadrons and the Vulcan B2 fleet ahead of their replacement, the Tornado GR1, on the grounds of diminishing capability.295 The government accepted that it would have to risk a significant reduction to its front-line strength for a period of several years, despite the increased threat posed by the Soviet Union.296 Hidden within this was the decision to delete the Vulcan maritime reconnaissance aircraft from service and reassign their tasks to the Nimrod aircraft already in service.297 This meant that air force hopes of reopening the Nimrod production line all but disappeared. This policy did have three benefits for the air force. First, the phasing out of manpower-intensive aircraft before their replacements had entered service helped to alleviate the chronic shortage of aircrew that still confronted the service.298 Second, the air force did not have to find the funds to run these programmes side by side, thereby alleviating some of the pressure on their budget.299 Third, in making these reductions now it would be harder for a new Secretary of State for Defence to argue for additional reductions from the air force without impacting upon the Tornado programme and thereby upsetting Britain’s collaborative partners. For the defence team the measures were harder to justify, particularly as they followed the announcement of the acquisition of the Trident C-4 system.
Summary The second phase of Francis Pym’s time as Secretary of State for Defence saw the DPWP and the individual services managing the defence overspend of the previous financial year. This represented the
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 57
complete dominance of the medium-term cycle in managing all three dimensions of defence policy – declaratory, strategic and procurement – within the constraints imposed by the short-term financial pressure on the defence budget. The result was the undermining of many of the government’s initial short-term policy goals. The East of Suez concept was largely buried, apart from the occasional statements from the Prime Minister. This was clear from the decision to scrap HMS Triumph, a core unit if the navy intended to sustain a significant presence East of Suez for any length of time. The air force retained those elements of the government’s air defence emphasis that suited them. The clearest example of this was the cancellation of plans to create a third Lightning squadron while leaving in place the idea of bringing forward and increasing the purchase of Tornado F2s. It was also evident in the temporary abandonment of the expansion plans for the RAuxAF while continuing the Bloodhound replacement studies. Politically this meant that the government’s window of vulnerability remained open while the air force was able to implement their medium and long-term plans for air defence. The air force’s downplaying of the reservists’ role was matched by the navy. The cancellation of the first four minesweepers and the wholesale scrapping of the Standby Squadron were politically embarrassing for the government, especially when it was asserting that the acquisition of Trident would have no impact on Britain’s conventional forces. By way of contrast the army kept in place its reservist reforms because they suited its mobilization requirements and reserve forces had a far greater role to play in army thinking. The two major areas on which the defence team was able to have an impact in the procurement area were the acquisition of the Trident C-4 system and the army orders for Challenger and Warrior. These decisions were both in line with mainstream thinking within the navy and army respectively. The nearest the defence team came to overturning the services was in the decision to purchase Challenger. The loss of defence sales to Iran had significant industrial ramifications that became apparent during this period. The government might well have forced through the tank purchase if the army had not seen the advantage of accepting Chobham equipped Challengers. The other area of influence for the defence team was in its formation of the DPWP. After taking advice Pym formed the DPWP with members of the Central Staff rather than letting the individual services run the review process. While in this situation the DPWP worked
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closely with the three services and the decisions largely reflected individual service priorities it did set a precedent for future reviews that Nott would be able to utilize. Pym’s most important impact upon defence lay in his staunch protection of his budget during the last half of 1980. With the Treasury team under Howe in search of significant savings Pym successfully fended off their argument for significant defence reductions and through threatening to resign forced the Prime Minister to back the defence team rather than her Treasury team. This meant that the medium-term cycle remained dominant for a few months more but it was evident to those involved that the situation was unsustainable. The government in the short term needed to exert more control over the defence budget and bring it more into line. The result for Pym was his removal from the post of Secretary of State for Defence on the grounds that a ‘tougher’ minister was needed to knock the military lobbyists into line.300 The relative lack of involvement of the defence team in making key strategic and procurement decisions was not only due to the style in which Pym ran the MOD. It also reflected the lack of influence of the Labour opposition on defence issues. The large-scale revolt against the defence estimates and the subsequent announcement of the government’s decision to purchase Trident exacerbated further the divisions within the Labour Party and led it increasingly towards unilateralism. With this trend the Labour defence team were increasingly isolated within the party,301 which reduced their impact upon the government. The ramifications for Labour’s role in opposition were not fully apparent to those involved but what they did at this point in time was to allow defence policy to operate free from the short-term influence of party politics.
Conclusions The Conservative government came to power in 1979 committed to a steady improvement in the state of Britain’s defences. Such a policy ‘conformed to a traditional Conservative priority, and it took shape with a pledge, in line with a general NATO policy, to increase defence spending by three per cent in real terms’.302 The defence team and Thatcher spoke of shifting declaratory policy away from NATO and making significant short-term improvements to Britain’s defence capabilities, the reality was somewhat different.
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 59
During the initial honeymoon period the three cycles were largely in alignment with one another with the medium-term cycle controlling the general trends within defence policy. The government’s short-term aspirations were incorporated into the services’ existing plans where appropriate or gently ignored where they did not conform. Once the MOD began to suffer from the onset of the recession a number of changes had to be made to the existing programme in order that the MOD remained within its budget. This brought the medium and short-term programmes into direct conflict with one another. Pym’s willingness to let the military manage the problem ensured that the medium-term cycle dictated the adjustments to the programme, much to the embarrassment of the government, which saw the loss of the third Lightning squadron and later on the scrapping of the standby squadron. The interaction of the long-term and medium-term cycles remained unchanged throughout both periods as they continued to head in the same direction dictated by the services. Pym’s time as Secretary of State for Defence can therefore be referred to as ‘short and supervisory rather than inspirational’.303 He clearly felt that he was there to represent the department’s interests within Cabinet and was content to allow the officials within the department to have a considerable say in determining overall defence policy. His management style clearly puts him within Bruce Headey’s ‘policy legitimator’ category.304 The result was that little substantive change actually occurred in declaratory policy while the procurement priorities of the MOD and the military strategies used were left firmly in the hands of the military. This clearly suited officials within the MOD and the three services were able to exert considerable control over the policy process Who were the main actors and how did they interact in this process? Pym and his defence team had less of an impact than might have been expected in either period. This was predominantly due to his lead, which gave the services a greater influence than they perhaps should have expected, but the structure of the defence team also encouraged this. The three junior ministers were each attached to a particular service. They were expected not only to support their respective service line but also the collective goals of the defence team. This had the potential to place them in a contradictory position. However, Pym’s leadership style led them to side with their own service and promote its interests. The next chapter will show that with a change of leadership style these contradictory demands would cause problems and lead to the resignation of the navy’s junior minister, Keith Speed.
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The dominant actors within the MOD throughout this period remained the Service Chiefs. Each protected their own service and during a period of growth this caused little friction. Once the MOD was confronted by the requirement for cutbacks they tended to argue more but were clearly aware of the political scene and compromised with one another. This allowed the DPWP to agree quite significant reductions. Internal debates within the services were left alone by the defence team; they wanted to avoid political embarrassments, although Speed, the navy minister, was one of those pushing for a high–low mix of forces. The civilian staff had less of an impact and where they tried to influence the policy debate, such as over the issue of replacing Polaris or the Warrior purchase, they were largely ineffectual because the defence team were content to let the military dominate defence policy. The Defence Staff shared the civilian staff’s aim of further centralizing defence policy and the creation of the DPWP comprising military and civilian staff drawn from the Central Staff was indicative of the ongoing shift in the balance of power within the MOD away from the services. Thatcher’s influence over the MOD was also limited. Her views on East of Suez were clear but she was unable to bring about a change of policy. Her most significant contribution lay in her support of the defence budget from her own Treasury team. This reflected her ‘Iron Lady’ image rather than the ‘Iron Chancellor’ one, which tended to emerge in subsequent years. Her one major confrontation with Pym led to her backing down and the MOD being spared the bulk of the cutbacks planned for it by the Treasury. How did defence fit into both the domestic and foreign political environments? Domestic politics had a limited role to play. The increasing disharmony within the Labour Party over defence issues gave the government greater freedom to take the decisions it wanted to with little damage to its political standing. There were exceptions, for example the future of the ROF Leeds led to a fundamental rethink about the army’s tank procurement plans while the Warrior purchase was decided by the need to preserve employment in Wolverhampton. These were entirely on the procurement side of defence policy, and military strategy and declaratory policy remained untouched. External influences on British defence policy were largely negative. For example, concern with the improvements made to Soviet conven-
Defence under Pym, May 1979–January 1981 61
tional forces prevented a significant shift in declaratory policy away from the continental commitment in favour of an East of Suez involvement. SACLANT’s shift of NATO’s convoy routes had a bearing on the internal naval debate about the future composition of the fleet but did not define the debate. How was defence policy affected by the management changes put through during this period? Although the Conservatives’ election campaign had included management reform within the Civil Service the appointment of Pym as Secretary of State for Defence indicated that the MOD was not one of the departments scheduled for early change. Thatcher hoped that individual ministers would undertake the reform process but, as a policy legitimator, Pym was unlikely to push through significant changes and she must have been conscious of this. Nevertheless, during Pym’s time in office there were some changes detectable in the margins, which would have a more profound bearing on the MOD later on. Sir Derek Raynor was brought into the new government and launched a number of studies that looked at the efficiency of various parts of government.305 These had an indirect impact upon the MOD, highlighting a number of potential areas for personnel savings. However, they did not have a significant effect upon the management of the MOD, despite Raynor’s previous experience of working for the MOD. They showed that substantial change needed to be undertaken by ministers rather than by an outside body. This would prove more significant later on when Thatcher had cause to consider future defence ministers. Perhaps of more significance was Thatcher’s early experience of the MOD’s procurement system in the shape of the Stingray torpedo programme. As previously mentioned this programme had suffered from a considerable overspend and the Conservatives felt obliged to continue with it. It nevertheless left Thatcher with a very poor impression of the MOD’s efficiency and encouraged her to put a minister into the MOD who was more ideologically in line with her thinking on management reform. There was a marked shift in favour of defence sales and this led to a number of existing programmes being altered. For example, the new SSK design was enlarged to attract overseas sales and thus reduce overall unit cost to the MOD. Of more long-term significance was the move towards incorporating export considerations within future operational requirements. The shift towards an export emphasis not only
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altered the way in which programmes were developed but it also had a profound affect upon the procurement programme when these sales fell through. For example, the dependency of a number of defence firms on their sales with Iran had significant repercussions on the procurement aspect of policy once these fell through. The most obvious result was the army’s decision to purchase the Shir-2s and thus keep ROF Leeds in operation. The government had also come into office with the policy of privatization contained within its manifesto. Although there were no significant defence privatizations during Pym’s time in office the preparations for them began almost as soon as he entered office. This had a direct impact on the procurement side. The army’s tank programme was the first obvious example of this.
4 John Nott, January 1981–January 1983
Introduction The January 1981 Cabinet reshuffle was Thatcher’s only attempt at putting one of her inner circle in a position to try and exert control over the MOD.306 Both Thatcher and Howe considered that Nott, with his experience as a former Gurkha officer and his firm commitment to Conservative monetarist policies, would be able to achieve the twin goals of improving the capabilities of Britain’s armed forces at a reduced cost.307 Nott shared the belief of the Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party that capabilities could be improved without necessarily increasing the defence budget by introducing greater efficiency and more rigorous prioritization. He believed that the way in which the MOD functioned and the problem of inter-service rivalry severely impacted upon the defence planning process and led to sub-optimization in decision-making.308 However, he fundamentally differed from Thatcher in two important respects. First, he was a sceptic about the nuclear programme and had been the sole member of the Cabinet to vote against the Trident acquisition, much to her surprise.309 The significance of this was diminished by the fact that any change to nuclear policy would have to pass through the OD subcommittee of the Cabinet, which included the Prime Minister. The second area of divergence was more problematic for the Prime Minister since it covered the essential question of where the focus of defence policy should be. Nott viewed Britain as a medium-sized power, which needed to avoid costly defence commitments and concentrate upon improving its economic and trading performance. Defence policy needed to focus first on the home base, and second on support for the North Atlantic Alliance to achieve this. He was not interested in the idea of East of Suez, which he felt to be a 63
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luxury that Britain could ill afford. This clearly placed him at odds with Thatcher’s own view. Nott’s position also differed from his predecessor. ‘He didn’t have the strength of a very powerful, large Foreign Secretary, which is normally something upon which a Defence Secretary depends on very heavily … Carrington was instinctively worried about this very analytical approach to defence priorities.’310 Carrington’s successor at the FCO was Francis Pym, Nott’s predecessor at the MOD. Nott was therefore more dependent upon his relationship with the Prime Minister for support than either his predecessor or his successors.
The initial review: January–March 1981 Short-term cycle Nott inherited an overspend from the previous financial year of £200m and a likely overspend of £400m for FY 80–81, despite Pym’s imposition of the moratorium and the mini-defence review.311 Nott immediately sought to address this but stressed that ‘talk of apocalyptic choices between key defence tasks is wide of the mark, but we must, over the next year or so, look realistically at our programmes in order to match them to the resources that may be available.’312 His view of the MOD’s inefficiency was soon reinforced when he began to examine the LTC process in more detail. He felt that LTCs were based on the unrealistic premise of an indefinite 3 per cent increase in real terms and he was amazed at the buffer factor.313 He concluded that the financial pressure on the LTCs, based upon these assumptions, had not been alleviated by Pym’s reductions and that unless the economy was suddenly to achieve significant and sustained growth, the programme would not be fully met within the resources that the MOD was likely to receive. Moreover, the LTCs did not include a provision for the acquisition of Trident.314 Having drawn these initial conclusions Nott obtained support from the OD to undertake a review of the defence programme, rather than a full-blown defence review. This would bring the programme and resources available closer into line and he initially hoped that the Chiefs of Staff Committee would play the leading role.315 Medium-term cycle The services anticipated further cutbacks and greeted Nott’s appointment with some trepidation.316 Despite the reductions agreed with the
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 65
DPWP the naval programme remained the most over-extended of the three services in the LTCs. The Admiralty Board was well aware of this and was confronted by the task of explicitly presenting the distinct importance of their NATO defence roles. The importance of the provision of anti-submarine warfare support to NATO’s strike fleet and the protection of the transatlantic reinforcement depended upon any conflict in Europe lasting long enough for these forces to become involved. In the view of the Admiralty Board the maritime and continental commitments were interwoven and could not be separated. They were dependent upon each other.317 The continental and maritime were not interdependent to the army, the former could be singled out. The majority of the army’s high command believed their role to be deterrence and, in the event of war, to delay the advancing Soviet forces for as long as possible in order to give the Western political leadership time to either find a diplomatic solution or decide to use nuclear forces.318 None then believed that NATO could successfully fight an extended conventional battle. The area of contention lay in how long the battle would last before nuclear weapons became involved, with many doubting that the reinforcement convoys would have any role at all. The air force felt more secure than the other services. Their contributions to UK air defence and NATO’s theatre nuclear deterrent (Vulcan B2s) were politically difficult to cut back and clearly part of home defence – Nott’s first priority. As far as the other air force assets were concerned it had a general advantage over the other services. With forces committed to both the continental and maritime commitments the air force leaders could justify the importance of both roles. Moreover, a number of its aircraft could be shifted between these roles as required. While there was some disquiet within the army about the RAF’s ownership of the support helicopters, the navy’s attitude to the RAF was different. The RAF had strong support from the navy in their maritime role and the navy was keen to avoid any inter-service confrontation over the control of these assets. 319 To the navy the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) were as important as surface ships and submarines in combating the Soviet submarine arm. The naval staff considered that only by the use of all three elements could these submarines be contained. 320 The RAF’s Buccaneer force was the only long-range strike platform capable of use against Soviet surface forces and harbours and the navy would support their retention.
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Long-term cycle The high–low capabilities mix of ship design remained the basis for naval planning. Following the cutbacks announced by Pym there was pressure to finalize the Type 23 frigate design so that the first orders could be announced and the requirements for the AORs completed. The Type 23 was to be an austere frigate equipped with a light gun, Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, ASW torpedoes, the new towed-array sonar and helicopter landing and refuelling facilities. It represented a minimum frigate with no defence against air attack and the design compromises needed to ensure that it did not exceed its target price of £70m were already causing concern.321 Hope remained within the Admiralty Board that the Type 44 air defence destroyer would still be built in limited numbers as the highend element of the air defence destroyer spectrum. With the projected improvements to Soviet aviation and submarine-launched cruise missiles these ships, together with the ongoing Type 42 programme, would play an important role in the area air defence role. With the split of the original AST.403 into a Harrier replacement (AST.411) and the Jaguar replacement (revised AST.403) the air force wanted to formulate the exact requirements for the new AST.403 so that it could be discussed with BAe, collaborative partners agreed and the research and development programme signed. Interaction of the time-cycles Nott’s first step was to revise the basis upon which the LTCs were prepared and the defence planners were instructed to adopt the assumption in the LTCs of an annual increase of 3 per cent in real terms until FY 85–86, with nil growth beyond that.322 He abandoned the buffer system, which in his view was the primary cause of the budgetary overruns for the previous two years, and argued that the MOD should instead be able to plan its budget more accurately, especially in the early years of the LTCs. To facilitate the review process he arranged for a day away with the Chiefs of Staff and the CDS at Greenwich to discuss the pressure on the defence programme. As part of his strategy, he intentionally avoided specifying the amount he wished to save and instead asked for suggestions of areas in which savings could be made. This, he reasoned, was the most efficient means of obtaining them. The Chiefs of Staff were less than forthcoming in their response and stated, as an opening gambit, that no further reductions to their programmes, beyond those announced in January 1981 should be made.323 In part this was a result
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 67
of the air force’s experience during the 1975 review. Unlike the other two services the RAF had volunteered to make a series of cutbacks to reduce the defence burden and then found that it was still expected to take an equal share of subsequent cutbacks.324 Nott needed imaginative answers but the three services assumed that they would simply be told the level of defence cutbacks and then they would work out proposals to implement these reductions in conjunction with the DPWP.325 The navy was particularly concerned by Nott’s approach at Greenwich. He questioned the very assumptions upon which the naval programme was based which caused deep alarm within naval circles.326 This reinforced their view that he had preconceived ideas and that he ‘seemed to have difficulty in grasping the significance of surface ships’.327 The navy therefore encouraged the other services to continue the united front opposing any additional cuts. The one area that the navy was responsible for that Nott did not challenge was the Trident C-4 decision. In this area Nott’s earlier reservations about the strategic nuclear deterrent were overcome and he became a firm supporter of the Trident programme.328 The key question here was over the number of submarines that would be purchased. Despite their fears about other parts of their programme the navy continued to argue the case for five boats, one more than the current Polaris force, in order to ensure that two would always be on station and thus improve the survivability of the deterrent.329 The Treasury opposed this. However, since the major costs of this programme would not actually begin to occur until the late 1980s, no immediate decision was required and none was taken.330 In contrast to the navy, the CGS decided to offer Nott a suggestion for army savings after Greenwich. He believed that such a bid was needed to show the army’s willingness to pursue all avenues for cost savings and avoid the most severe cutbacks.331 He was confronted by considerable hostility from those within the General Staff who considered that this move would merely encourage such reductions. Nevertheless, the Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant-General Sir Derek Boorman, suggested withdrawing 1 (Br) Corps from its 65 km sector of the Central Front and re-fashioning it into a smaller, twodivisional armoured reserve force.332 Such a cutback would ultimately provide the long-term expenditure reductions that the government wanted, but in the short term the costs of implementing it would be considerable. Moreover, the concept of troop redundancies would be politically unacceptable for the Conservatives during a period of heightened tension with the Soviet Union as well as posing serious
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problems for the supply of troops for Northern Ireland in peacetime. The redundant troops in Germany would have to be returned to Britain and bases found to house them. This would have serious implications for other government departments, such as Health and Education, since the social services that the MOD provided in Germany would not have to be met by the MOD once these units were redeployed to the UK. This would encourage the relevant ministers to oppose such changes in Cabinet and support the maintenance of the army in Germany.333 Such a reduction would also have a significant impact on NATO. First, it would bring Britain into conflict with its treaty obligation to maintain 55 000 troops in Germany. Second, the withdrawal of 1 (Br) Corps into reserve would leave a crucial 65 km segment of the Central Front uncovered which no other NATO member appeared willing or able to fill.334 Such a step would also set a precedent that the United States might follow and undermine the rationale of shared risk upon which NATO was based. At the same time the new Commander of 1 (Br) Corps, Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, suggested a major reorganization of 1 (Br) Corps to adhere to the 55 000 limit agreed with the PUS. This involved moving from a four-divisional two-brigade structure plus a field force to a more orthodox three-division, three-brigade structure. Each armoured regiment would also be reduced in size by removing one tank from each platoon. This would make them more manageable in wartime and allow two armoured reconnaissance regiments to be converted to armoured regiments.335 With an increase in the number of armoured regiments Bagnall could increase the concentration of tanks in the forward two divisions with the third division receiving the Challenger tanks when they entered service. This allowed emphasis to be given to fully manning the two forward divisions. The third division would contain the two remaining brigades and be supplemented by the addition of a UK-based infantry brigade in wartime. These views neatly dovetailed into Nott’s concern about a short warning attack and allowed a manpower reduction within BAOR, consisting largely of the fourth division’s headquarter’s staff.336 The air staff also chose to break ranks and ‘very cleverly drafted a paper saying that UK air defence was inadequate and submitted it shortly before the review. It was a very clever thing to do and no Secretary of State was going to be unaffected.’337 The government had gained significant political capital from its criticisms of Labour’s neglect of this area and could not afford to be seen to be making cuts. Moreover, this fitted into Nott’s first priority of home defence.
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 69
Nott was therefore presented with the need to make substantial savings but without any imaginative solutions. In searching for savings, Nott’s first inclination was to look at the East of Suez role, despite the Prime Minister’s desire to earmark forces permanently to the US proposed multinational rapid deployment force.338 However, the need for her support and the relatively low cost of Britain’s East of Suez forces in comparison to those committed to NATO meant that the prime areas for savings open to Nott were in either the continental or maritime commitments to NATO. Nott, with CDS’s encouragement, did argue for a special Treasury subvention to cover the replacement of Polaris but this was not forthcoming.339 As far as forces committed to the Central Front were concerned both ‘Bramall [CGS] and Beetham [CAS] had the clearly defined NATO force levels onto which they could hook the Army’s and RAF’s orders of battle, and they had little difficulty in defining their tasks to Nott’s satisfaction.’340 The basing of aircraft in Germany remained an issue. The air force was merely obliged to maintain an air force of undefined size in Germany and the withdrawal of some aircraft from Germany remained an option that would have been far less contentious than the reduction of 1 (Br) Corps or the size of the navy’s surface fleet. Nott was, in fact, keen to bring these aircraft back. However, this would have involved removing aircraft from their fully equipped airfields in Germany and either expanding existing operational air bases in Britain or upgrading some of the disused airfields that remained in the MOD’s ownership.341 Such a move was costly in the short term and would have had a severe impact on the range of targets within Eastern Europe that could be targeted in wartime, unless either the German bases were retained for wartime use or the RAF’s tanker fleet significantly increased. Nott therefore agreed early on that the air force in Germany was better left alone. With the services divided the CDS’s role became vital to Nott as a means of obtaining the balanced view he expected. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin’s ability to perform this task was, however, weakened by the limitations imposed on him. He was only allowed to present the collective view of the Service Chiefs rather than his own. So when the Service Chiefs were divided he had little of substance to present. Nott was unimpressed by this and failed to take into account the dilemma facing the CDS.342 Lewin, the CDS, had been the major architect of the fleet’s development during the late 1970s while First Sea Lord (1SL) and was well aware of its role and purpose. Yet, as an admiral, he had to be seen to be taking a broader defence view and could not be seen to be
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siding with the navy. The result was that Lewin felt that he ‘couldn’t give Leach (1SL) the support he deserved’.343 As a result of the impasse between the services, the CDS and Nott, the work of the ‘Capabilities’ group, which included the CSA (Professor Sir Ronald Mason) and the Deputy-Chief of the Defence Staff (Operational Requirements) (Lieutenant-General Sir Maurice Johnston), had a much greater influence than it might otherwise have had. The Capabilities group submitted their revised report to Nott at the end of February just after the Greenwich meeting. The report, which relied heavily upon the analyses of the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE), rejected the logic behind the navy’s re-equipment programme, arguing that the programme failed to deal with the increasing anti-ship missile threat to warships while they were conducting antisubmarine warfare.344 These ideas linked into Nott’s own view345 and raised further doubts in his mind about the reality of transatlantic reinforcement reaching Europe in time to influence the outcome of a war on the Central Front. With the aid of the Capabilities group Nott altered the weighting of SACLANT’s suggestions. Nott concluded that Soviet submarines could most efficiently be countered by emphasizing the defence of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) choke-point through which Soviet submarines would have to travel to get at the trans atlantic shipping. Following this idea to its logical conclusion Nott argued that the resources devoted to providing surface escort and hunter groups in the eastern Atlantic should be concentrated at this choke-point to make the most efficient use of the increased kill ratio that the GIUK choke-point provided.346 For the surface fleet to operate along the GIUK choke-point required a significant self-defence capability. This meant that warships, with average lives of 20–25 years, needed substantial mid-life updates to cope with the improvements to Soviet missile technology. This required the preservation of a considerable dockyard refit capability and absorbed a large proportion of funds earmarked for dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. Using statistics worked out by the DOAE, the Capabilities group argued that a combination of Nimrod MPAs and SSNs would provide far more effective platforms for hunting Soviet submarines in the GIUK gap than surface ships, and that this was where the naval budget should be geared.347 There were two weaknesses in this argument, one of which the navy failed to detect and the other Nott chose to ignore. The navy did not realize that the study assumed that the American Sound Surveillance
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 71
System (SOSUS) in Iceland would remain operational during the conflict and provide Soviet submarine location information to the Nimrod force. With this knowledge the Nimrods were more effective than the navy’s surface ships in countering Soviet submarines but without it they were less efficient.348 The navy did question the assumption that war would begin before the Soviet submarines passed through the GIUK gap. If the Soviets chose to delay then the barrier concept was an embarrassing white elephant with no submarines to counter in the first week of war while NATO’s convoys were decimated. For Nott the Capabilities study had further appeal. If naval expenditure were adjusted to reflect this revised strategy the number of escorts needed to escort convoys from Madeira to the Channel could be reduced. With fewer ships the update programme could be abandoned and a shorter replacement cycle adopted, allowing further savings, particularly if replacements were the new cheaper Type 23 frigates that the navy had been developing. Such savings would significantly reduce the heavy overhead costs of the Royal dockyards on the naval budget. This would have the benefit of removing a large amount of money from the forward plans, the goal of Nott’s review, without affecting capability. It would also reduce the overall number of civil servants employed by the MOD (dockyard workforce) and thus achieve an additional manifesto pledge. Whether Nott had any preconceived ideas about where the reductions should fall is the subject of some debate among the key participants. The result was the same. He presented the Chiefs of Staff with a single sheet of paper on 16 March 1981 (this became known as the Bermudagram)349 which ‘came as a bombshell, they had not expected a Secretary of State to act so decisively, and so quickly to their detriment. On one side of the paper were guidelines for Britain’s defence policy in the future and on the other side figures for the three services over the next ten years.’350 In part the paper reflected Nott’s desire to move away from the conflictual nature of the MOD. It made two basic assumptions. First, that that the British armed forces should be geared towards combating the threat posed by the Soviet Union and that this threat was predominantly in Europe. This followed along lines that had developed over the past 20 years and was not particularly revolutionary. Second, that such a war would involve little or no warning, and that it would be a short, intense war. The paper indicated that the sea–air function would be substantially affected and that the defence of the home base should become a priority. It advocated a reduction in the navy’s share of the defence budget by the end of the 1980s from 29 to 25 per cent,351 despite the inclusion
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of the new Trident programme within the navy’s budget. It meant an additional £7600m being removed from the navy’s building programme within the LTCs.352 According to one senior official Trident was included in the navy’s budget for two reasons. ‘First it was entirely political, it was to demonstrate in overall cash terms that ships, submarines and the ocean navy had not depreciated that much. The other was perfectly legitimate … to make certain that the management of the whole programme was very tight because if you knew that if you let that programme run out of control it was two less destroyers, you’d have a large incentive to prevent it running out of control.’353 From a budgetary point of view the paper attempted to dispense with the inherent financial friction within the LTCs, which had so often led to conflict between the various cycles. Nott had himself felt a prisoner of these LTCs without a budget of his own in which to try and exert some of his own preferences. He decided that in future a small budget of several hundred million pounds would be available annually to the Secretary of State of Defence to use on his own initiatives.354 It was perhaps not surprising that the services were united in their response to Nott’s proposals. All three saw threats to their weapons programmes, with the navy the worst affected, but more importantly, in the long term, they were concerned with the increasing prominence of the Central Staff and civilian advisers in the decision-making process. In particular, they were well aware of the prominent role of the CSA in influencing Nott and, unlike earlier defence reviews, the services established an implicit understanding not to undermine each other’s case.355 The subsequent twelve weeks witnessed their attempts to alter the process while Nott and the Capabilities group sought to consider the full implications of the paper on the LTCs. Meanwhile the 1981 defence estimates were published in April as a holding statement. These gave little indication of the drastic nature of the review underway or of the opposition within the MOD to various parts of it. Nott knew that the support of the Prime Minister was vital if his paper was to form the basis of government defence policy. In her visit to the United States and subsequent trip to the Gulf region in March 1981 Thatcher had again spoken of British involvement in the new RDJTF.356 This placed her at loggerheads with thinking within the MOD and the 1981 defence estimates qualified her remarks by expressly stating that the ‘reinstatement of the former military presence “East of Suez”, whatever the arguments for and against, is no longer a political or economic possibility’.357 However, Nott needed her support, especially in the light of the backlash that was already emerg-
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 73
ing within the MOD. He therefore announced plans for a small logistical stockpile of army equipment for limited operations outside NATO, the acquisition of station-keeping equipment for the Hercules fleet in order to restore an assault parachute capability, and the re-tasking of a second parachute battalion to the parachute role.358 The political and financial cost of this change in policy was not significant but the benefits were. To Thatcher, Nott’s proposals not only promised to produce the savings that she wanted, but were also presented with a clear rationale which allowed her to argue that the measures were more a movement of funding between areas than a series of defence cuts.359 This made the review far easier for her to defend within the Conservative Party and in Parliament, although its emphasis on the land–air component rather than the sea–air component was not her preferred solution. The constraints imposed by Britain’s treaty commitments and the need to avoid any action that might undermine the Atlantic Alliance meant that this was the obvious solution if the strategic deterrent was to be maintained and she accepted this. She also supported the emphasis on home defence and the improvements to Britain’s out-of-area capabilities announced in April, while her earlier experience of the torpedo procurement decisions had already left her with a negative view of the navy.360 Opposition within Nott’s own defence team quickly became apparent and reflected Nott’s lack of consultation with it. Speed, the junior navy minister, was asked to resign by Thatcher, despite Nott’s protestations, following a constituency speech in which he implicitly attacked one of Nott’s principal advisers, the CSA, over his role in the review.361 Once on the backbenches Speed rapidly became one of Nott’s principal public critics and provided ample ammunition to the Conservative backbenchers concerned with the defence reductions.362 This increased Nott’s dependency upon the support of the Prime Minister to carry through his review while Thatcher’s overruling him over Speed further soured their relationship. To assist him, and reduce opposition, she decided not to find an immediate replacement for Speed.363 This left the navy without a junior minister to help organize their response or raise issues through the next few critical months. With the support of the Prime Minister, Nott was able largely to ignore the protests from the Conservative backbenches. Even the clutch of Conservative MPs whose constituencies were adversely affected by the decision to close Chatham Dockyard proved to be far less of a problem than he first feared.364
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Nott was also fortunate in the timing of his defence review. Ten days after the Bermudagram started to be circulated within the MOD the formation of the SDP was announced on 26 March 1981.365 Although it started with only four members it rapidly attracted the majority of the Labour Party’s main defence speakers.366 Their move to the SDP effectively removed them from the defence debate, albeit temporarily. Those that stayed in the Labour Party lost their position of influence within Labour’s shadow defence team as the Tribunite wing of the party took control.367 This meant that an inexperienced opposition front bench faced Nott and he was able to continue his review with little concern for domestic political factors. The services were therefore left to themselves to respond to Nott’s proposals. While the army and air force agreed that a co-ordinated response was needed, they were aware of the Prime Minister’s support for Nott. If the cutbacks were not found here, they would have to be found elsewhere in the defence budget.368 The Chiefs of Staff eventually agreed to exercise their prerogative and saw the Prime Minister in the presence of Carrington and Nott at the beginning of June 1981 just before the official publication of the review.369 Their opposition was noted, but it had little impact because reductions were the priority. The divisions within the Chiefs of Staff Committee of which Nott had previously been so critical now worked in his favour. No agreed collective alternative saving was offered. The CDS could not openly support the navy’s case, no matter how justified he thought it was, because he was an admiral.370 He therefore tried the tack of arguing for delay, pending the scheduled NATO review of its force levels, but he was unsuccessful in this because of the government’s short-term need for the savings.371 Ultimately, even he had to agree that no other solution was practical if the criteria on which the review process was based remained the same.372 For the navy the consequences of these conclusions were immediate, with substantial cutbacks throughout its fleet and manpower savings of one-third to a quarter. This meant that the destroyer and frigate numbers were to be reduced from the mid-60s to low-30s or even the high-20s.373 With the abandonment of the need for surface ships to operate in the GIUK gap the Type 44 air defence destroyer programme and at least two more Type 42 air defence destroyers were immediately cancelled.374 The Type 22 anti-submarine warfare frigate programme was also terminated on the grounds of cost. Instead the smaller and cheaper Type 23 programme would be accelerated with the order planned to occur within 12–18 months.375 Emphasis was now to be placed upon MPAs and SSNs maintaining a barrier patrol, but reduc-
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 75
tions were still to be made here, though not to the extent of those faced by the surface fleet. Thus SSN numbers, instead of rising to 20 as planned, were now set at 17.376 With such a substantial reduction in destroyer and frigate numbers the expensive policy of providing substantial mid-life updates for surface ships could be abandoned, with a commensurate reduction in the number and size of the Royal dockyards. As Rosyth was busy with Polaris work Nott decided to close Gibraltar and Chatham, and substantially to run down Portsmouth.377 Overall submarine numbers would remain unchanged but with an increased order for cheaper Type 2400 SSKs to compensate for the fall in SSN orders. However, the dockyards closure programme immediately impacted upon the SSN force. Shutting Chatham meant closing its two nuclear refit streams while Devonport was still having problems bringing its first stream on-line. This meant that HMS Dreadnought, the first British SSN, had to be decommissioned because there was nowhere available to refit it, thus resulting in a temporary reduction in SSN numbers.378 The idea of refurbishing the Cammell Laird yard in order to build SSNs to cover the period of the Trident programme was also quietly abandoned, and the navy decided to stop ordering SSNs during this time.379 Cammell Laird or Scotts would build the new SSKs instead. Nott queried the need for the amphibious warfare vessels,380 and on the advice of the Capabilities group, took the decision that the LPDs would be retired when they next became due for a refit. Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Sir Maurice Johnston had, in particular, been keen to use aircraft to transport the UK/NL amphibious force to Norway, rather than slow vulnerable amphibious warfare vessels, but to save money it was decided to use civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries in wartime instead. Scrapping the smaller landing ship logistics (LSL) was considered, but they were useful in their other role of transporting army reinforcement units to the European mainland and were retained.381 The navy’s aircraft carrier programme was allowed to continue with the completion of the remaining two Invincible-class vessels. However, the adoption of the barrier technique for anti-submarine warfare raised questions about their role. Nott decided to retain only two in service in order to ensure that one would always be available for the out-of-area role, which he felt they were more suited to.382 The move was partly aimed at appeasing Thatcher but the retention of two carriers also represented a partial sop to the navy. This meant that one Invincible-class ship, together with HMS Hermes, could be sold and the requirement to
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form a third air group abandoned, with the Sea Harriers already purchased for this role being released to serve as the attrition reserve. Despite his belief in the vulnerability of the surface ship to anti-ship missiles, Nott also endorsed the construction of a new class of one-stop replenishment ships (AORs). These were to be equipped with a helicopter complement of five to six Sea Kings as a means of off-loading some of the helicopter servicing requirements that would otherwise have needed to be included within the design of the new Type 23s.383 This decision placed severe limitations on the operation of the Type 23. Although the navy expected to suffer cutbacks the Admiralty Board was surprised at the degree of change and the conclusions drawn.384 Nott was equally surprised by their response. He assumed that the navy would want control of the Nimrod MPA force and was prepared to consider this, but the Admiralty Board was united in avoiding any sort of power play with the RAF.385 In part the navy’s avoidance of such a move was based on awareness of its own lack of experience in manning large multi-engine fixed-wing aircraft and the willingness of the RAF to let the navy have an overall say in the Nimrod’s mission tasking. However, their main concern was not to appear divided from the other services. Instead, the navy sought to undermine the basic tenets upon which the review was based, highlighting the multi-faceted nature of the maritime commitment in peacetime as well as wartime. They attacked the flaws in the barrier concept with little success. Nott could not afford to accept their arguments no matter how flawed the navy made the barrier concept look. The navy also attempted to broaden the debate about its role to include their peacetime work but this was disregarded. Nott had no other option but to make cuts in the naval programme if declaratory policy was to remain unchanged and Britain was to continue to meet all her treaty obligations. While maintaining a united front with the other services the navy sought to tackle Nott’s proposals in three ways. First, it encouraged the various MPs and trade union officials to voice their concerns about the likely employment implications resulting from these proposals at a time of rapidly rising unemployment. Second, it sought to broker a number of alternatives with John Nott, and third, the navy encouraged its service counterparts in the other NATO countries, principally the United States, to voice their own concerns through their national governments.386 The mobilization of MPs and trade unions had little effect. The navy therefore put forward a number of proposals. These included the scrap-
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 77
ping of HMS Endurance, HMS Britannia and the LPDs and disbanding the Royal Marines. The savings made here would then be used to restore some of the reductions to the surface and sub-surface fleet. The motives for these suggestions were mixed. The loss of the ice patrol ship, HMS Endurance, was of little real concern to the MOD. It had been kept in service on the request of the FCO as a trip-wire protection for the Falkland Islands although it possessed little military capability. Nott agreed to scrap her, despite the protestations of the FCO,387 since she represented to him the epitome of what he was trying to avoid, a weapons platform with few weapons. By way of contrast the Royal Yacht represented too large a status symbol for the Conservatives to accept her demise while the savings made would have been relatively minor compared to those required. The navy’s proposal to scrap the LPDs and to disband the Royal Marines was an attempt to abandon one of the navy’s NATO roles. The choice to scrap the LPDs pre-empted the longer-term decision that had already been made not to replace them, which also undermined the need to retain specialist amphibious troops. The disbandment of the Royal Marines would provide the majority of the required manpower reductions. However, Nott had no intention of ending the commitment to the Northern Flank since this would bring him into conflict with his NATO counterparts, particularly the Americans, as well as Conservative backbench opinion. Neither could the task be passed to the army, which had no comparable Arctictrained unit. Within NATO, and especially the United States, there was considerable concern about the proposed defence reductions.388 It was difficult for the other NATO members, especially the Europeans, to criticize Britain when Britain’s contribution remained significantly larger in proportion to national wealth than virtually all of them. Moreover, the planned defence budget still remained closer to NATO’s 3 per cent commitment than the majority of the other European NATO states. Nevertheless, concern was expressed over the reductions to the surface fleet since Britain’s contribution to the Eastern Atlantic represented about 70 per cent of the total force. As a result, Nott came under significant pressure to reduce the cuts to the surface fleet from his fellow NATO Defence Ministers when they met in May 1981.389 In particular, the United States Navy was keen to have these reductions rescinded, otherwise it would have to try and fill the void, and Nott was reminded of Britain’s commitment not to cut its conventional forces when it signed up for the Trident C-4 system.390
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Nott came away from the meeting concerned that he would have to try and appease his NATO colleagues by maintaining a higher escort force of around 50 ships.391 He knew that the 1SL would not have been particularly concerned about finding ways to cover his embarrassment so he approached the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS), Admiral Sir William Staveley, with the problem. Staveley suggested resurrecting the standby squadron concept by keeping some of the now surplus Leander-class frigates at a lower state of readiness. This would allow Nott to advise his NATO contemporaries that the numbers had not been so heavily cut. Instead adjustments were made to readiness levels and Nott decided to take this option.392 For Staveley the move allowed the navy to retain these ships in the short term while in the medium term he believed that once funding became easier – which he assumed would be the case when the economy improved – they could then be restored to the active fleet.393 Moreover, by retaining them in the standby squadron Nott implicitly accepted that they would have to be replaced. Thus Staveley had effectively managed to restore them in the long term. The failure of the Chiefs of Staff visit to the Prime Minister led Leach, the 1SL, to exercise his right as head of the navy to see her.394 Here he broke with the collective gambit that the Chiefs had so far practised post-Bermudagram and, in Nott’s presence, argued that the way to make major savings was to bring the army back to the UK. To fund such an exercise he proposed the temporary diversion of £1–2bn from the air force and navy budgets to meet the costs of providing for the new bases in the UK and provision for transport facilities to send the units back in wartime.395 This was rejected since it not only breached Britain’s treaty obligations, but also failed to achieve the short-term savings that Thatcher and Howe were particularly keen to achieve. Moreover, it would have had a detrimental impact upon the navy and the air force in the short term, which would have left the government open to scathing criticism both at home and abroad at a time when it was in a particularly weak position. The BAOR reorganization put forward by Bagnall went ahead. The brigade and divisional adjustment, matched to a reduction in the size of the regiments and battalions, allowed a redistribution of the tank fleet and the conversion of two armoured reconnaissance regiments to armoured regiments.396 The changed configuration of the armoured regiments also meant that the Challenger purchase would allow four rather than two regiments to be equipped and thus allow for two further armoured reconnaissance regiments to be converted to full
John Nott, January 1981–January 1983 79
armoured regiments. Nott also announced plans to introduce the tracked Rapier system into service.397 This programme, like the Challenger, had initially been developed as a result of an order for the Shah of Iran.398 Although the army had previously stated that there was no requirement for the weapon its introduction linked into Bagnall’s plans for a mobile defence, which needed the air defence batteries to accompany the battle groups. But the main reason for the army receiving the equipment was political. Throughout the spring of 1981 the government had been working on the flotation prospectus of BAe, the producer of Rapier.399 This order not only helped to cover the production deficit that had resulted from the loss of the Shah’s order but also ensured that BAe’s order book in this area looked healthy when it came to BAe’s flotation shares. Nott also agreed to go ahead with the entry of the MLRS into service in the mid-1980s upon the recommendations of the Capabilities group. However, this programme and the SP-70 were to be delayed by a further year to help reduce the financial pressures on the early years of the LTCs to which the purchase of tracked Rapier had contributed.400 The army did suffer some reduction to its manpower, but not to the extent of the navy. By way of compensation Nott announced a significant expansion in the size of the Territorial Army from 70 000 to 86 000.401 Their use, and the use of the headquarters units returning to the UK from Germany, remained unclear. The increase in the army’s reserves was largely political but they also represented a token gesture by the government to the army given the reduction in regular personnel. Politically these issues did not need to be addressed in the short term and the army was too preoccupied to consider their role in the medium term. The government again considered the air defence and reserve issues. The air force was the service that prospered most from the Nott review and, in particular, he gave emphasis to the air defence role. He sought to increase the number of air defence squadrons by retaining two Phantom squadrons in service after their replacement by the Tornado F2, increasing the number of Hawk aircraft converted to a wartime air defence role from 36 to 72, and retaining the option to convert the order for the last 20 Tornado GR1s to the F2 variant.402 The Phantom retention reflected a clear answer to the CAS’s note. The decision to stop the expansion of the RAuxAF ground defence squadrons was also rescinded and their numbers were to be expanded from three to six squadrons.403 The air force remained concerned about the extension of the Jaguar’s service life caused by the delays to AST.403 and suggested retaining the
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Buccaneers in service in the maritime strike role.404 The Tornado GR1s earmarked for this role, together with those allocated to replace the UK-based Jaguar reconnaissance squadron and the two Canberra reconnaissance squadrons, could be then be used to replace the five Jaguar squadrons deployed in Germany instead.405 This allowed the RAF’s forces in Germany to be substantially enhanced at the cost of the nonreplacement of the Canberras and thus get around the Tornado’s range limitations.406 There was an additional long-term advantage to the air force. The surplus Jaguars from Germany would then provide sufficient aircraft to maintain the Coltishall Wing in operation until AST.403 entered service.407 This gave the air force more time to overcome Nott’s lack of enthusiasm for the Jaguar replacement programme408 and tied into BAe’s interest in developing an experimental aircraft as a fore runner to a combat aircraft to fulfil this task. In addition, the maintenance of two Buccaneer squadrons in service required the retention of a substantially larger pool of these aircraft. This, together with the enlarged Jaguar pool, meant that the RAF had the aircraft available to create squadrons rapidly should the financial climate alter. Moreover, by retaining the Buccaneer in service into the 1990s there was the implicit assumption that it would need to be replaced in the future, presumably by an additional batch of Tornadoes. To meet AST.411 Nott announced an order for 60 AV-8Bs to replace the Harriers in Germany,409 thereby underpinning his Central Front emphasis. This left the UK-based Harrier forces unmodernized, and the RAF hoped to announce a further order to replace these aircraft.410 Lost within this reorganization of the air force’s front line was the RAF’s sub-strategic role. Plans to equip the Tornado GR1s with cruise missiles to help offset the loss of the Vulcan B2s were quietly dropped.411 Effectively they would be replaced by the US GLCMs scheduled for deployment to the UK as part of NATO’s theatre nuclear modernization programme. As far as the air component of the barrier concept was concerned both Nott and the RAF wanted to concentrate funds on the Central Front and home defence and were less inclined to divert funds to the maritime role. This was despite rhetoric to the contrary. While Nott announced that all 34 Nimrod MR1s would be upgraded, residual hopes of reopening the Nimrod production line to increase the frontline strength finally died. To help protect the Buccaneer force the air force also abandoned plans to equip the Nimrods with an anti-ship missile.412 Nott agreed, which was somewhat surprising given his aspiration to emphasize weapons systems rather than platforms, and
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reflects the true lack of emphasis on the barrier-control concept within Nott’s thinking. Summary Nott had a significant impact upon all three aspects of defence policy, although this was not what he originally set out to do. His focus was on procurement and ensuring that the revised programme could be afforded within the LTCs, but the opposition that he found forced him to reconsider declaratory policy to a limited extent and, more profoundly, to re-examine and involve himself in the military strategy. Thus the need to make savings in the defence programme acted as the catalyst for change and this brought the short and medium-term cycles into conflict with one another. While declaratory policy remained largely unchanged it is somewhat ironic that the Secretary of State for Defence with least preference for the East of Suez concept ended up taking a number of measures to enhance it. Nott’s position of vulnerability forced him to adopt measures to ensure support from the Prime Minister in the short term and resulted in some improvements being made to this capability. The medium-term cycle within the MOD and services continued to oppose this but conceded ground to Nott, since it was a minor aspect within the review process. The major change within declaratory policy was the assumption that the MOD should concentrate solely on deterring a short-warning attack on the Central Front. This led to the government’s acceptance that the maritime dimension to Britain’s NATO commitment would have to be reduced in order to support the independent nuclear deterrent, home defence and the protection of the Central Front in Germany. This went against the Prime Minister’s wishes, but she recognized the inherent logic within Nott’s argument and fully supported him in his analysis both within and outside the Conservative Party. Naturally enough the navy were most affected by this outlook. They were severely hampered in their opposition to Nott’s proposals by the loss of Speed and the failure to provide a replacement, the weakness of the Labour opposition caused by the significant desertions to the new SDP, and by the dilemma the CDS found himself in. They were also undermined by the papers submitted by the other services prior to the Bermudagram and the influence of the Capabilities group. All these factors led Nott to impose considerable change upon both the navy’s strategy and procurement plans while the other two services were largely left to manage their own programmes. Moreover, by focusing
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on one service rather than all three Nott was able to get his review through with relatively little opposition. The result was a fundamental review of the manner in which the navy undertook its four NATO missions. Nott utilized the advice of the Capabilities group to push through the barrier-control concept. This allowed him to make substantial reductions to the navy’s programme within the LTC process while giving him a means to legitimize his action. The navy’s attempts at undermining this were inevitably doomed because Nott could not afford to abandon the rationale behind his review. The short-term cycle had to succeed to meet the budgetary target and therefore the medium-term cycle could only influence at the fringes. The navy were more successful in getting their NATO allies to press for changes to the review and this, together with their own compromises, led to the partial restoration of the destroyer and frigate strength through the use of the standby squadron once again. In contrast, the army was allowed to undertake their structural change within 1 (Br) Corps, which brought about a dramatic transformation in its composition. This would subsequently allow its new commander to undertake a major review of the military strategy that underpinned it. The army merely had to ensure that it reduced its forces deployed in Germany to their treaty limits and that the front line was not seen to suffer as a consequence of the reorganization. The air force was not required to change its strategy at all. In fact it was allowed to take the initiative and reallocate the Tornado deployment plans to take account of the increased service life expected for the Jaguar. Thus the long-term considerations of the air force about replacing the Jaguar and medium-term concerns about the Tornado’s range led to a significant reorientation of its force deployments and allowed it to retain the Buccaneer in service. This move was similar to the navy’s use of the standby squadron as a means of obtaining implicit governmental approval for further procurement. Most change occurred in procurement. Nott’s adoption of the barrier concept allowed the naval programme to be significantly reduced and resulted in the loss of a significant part of the navy’s future building programme. Through all this the Trident programme remained unchallenged, except for the US concerns about its impact on the conventional forces which helped the navy to restore some of its frigates. The army suffered some delays to its programmes but these were relatively minor. The one significant alteration was the decision to purchase tracked Rapier to help in the sale of BAe. Not surprisingly the army readily accepted this interference. The air force programme remained
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largely unchanged although the retention of two Phantom squadrons and the Buccaneer force represented an implicit government commitment to their replacement.
From publication to the Falklands War, July 1981–April 1982 Short-term cycle Having managed to get his review agreed the main goals for Nott were to oversee its implementation and manage the defence portfolio on a more routine basis. He assumed that having undertaken this review the MOD could expect a period of stability while it adjusted to the new policy. Any demands for further reductions would simply undermine what had been achieved and destabilize the whole process.413 Nott drew a number of lessons from the defence programme review. The resignation of Speed highlighted the divided loyalty that the junior service ministers had within the existing structure and he sought to address this by making them functional rather than service orientated. He was also concerned by the relative impotence of the CDS’s position and he wanted to rectify this and allow the CDS to offer advice to ministers in his own right.414 Medium-term cycle Having fought to alter the defence review before it was published the navy continued, in the period after its publication, to try and reduce the impact on the naval programme and fleet composition. It still sought to overturn some of the decisions made, such as the loss of the third aircraft carrier and the LPDs, and to modify those decisions it could not change. As the Type 23 had now become the principal surface programme the navy sought to shift its design ethos away from a simple frigate to a more balanced ship capable of defending itself from all threats.415 The navy also sought to take advantage of the government’s emphasis on home defence and improve its own minewarfare capabilities.416 The army was principally concerned with the protection of its existing programme from any revision to the defence review and to enact the changes to 1 (Br) Corps that Nott had agreed to. A number of issues remained unaddressed. The reintroduction of the brigade level of command in 1 (Br) Corps had implications for British forces deployed in the UK, while the expansion of the reserves needed to be considered and incorporated within the army’s strategy. Finally, the re-equipment
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programme promised to offer enhanced capabilities to the army, which needed to be carefully considered particularly in the light of improvements to Soviet conventional forces.417 The air force looked to introduce the Tornado into service and its protection remained their prime focus. Having actually been a net beneficiary from the Nott review, air force chiefs were concerned not to lose any of the ground they had gained. They also wanted to restore some of the equipment with which they had planned to equip the new Tornado but which had been axed as part of the DPWP’s mini-review in 1980.418
Long-term cycle With the entry of the Sea Harrier into front-line service the navy began to consider improvements that could be made to the design resulting from the operational experience to date and the improvements to Soviet maritime aviation. These improvements were designed to allow the ‘aircraft to fulfil its role until the late 1990s’ and studies of a followon platform were initiated.419 The introduction of the TOW-armed Lynx helicopters into service led the army to commence a study into a specialized attack helicopter for use on the Central Front.420 The air force still wanted to progress with AST.403 and obtain government approval for discussions with potential collaborative partners, while BAe wanted support for its P.110 demonstrator aircraft.421
Interaction of the time-cycles Almost immediately after the results of the review process were announced in Parliament the Cabinet was presented with Treasury demands for further public spending reductions to levels below those formally announced in March 1981.422 At the same time various government departments made bids for an extra £6.5bn beyond that agreed for the next financial year.423 The resulting Cabinet meeting (July 1981) was a partial setback for the monetarists, with the Treasury failing to achieve anywhere near its desired level of reductions. This was not only important in terms of the preservation of the defence budget. During the Cabinet discussions Nott was one of the most significant defectors from the monetarist position.424 He was not prepared to see defence forced to accept a further reduction in its budget since this would have made a mockery of his review and given support to his critics’ arguments that the process was entirely Treasury driven.
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This led to a cooling of the close relationship between Nott and Thatcher and goes some way to explaining the various concessionary steps that he started to make towards an aggrieved navy, despite the continuing problems in the defence budget. His isolation from Thatcher, and lack of support from the Conservative backbenches, left him vulnerable to criticism but his concessions aimed at appeasing this audience were only partial.425 He would not countenance a reconsideration of the decision to sell one of the Invincible-class aircraft carriers, despite the 1SL’s best endeavours426 and an agreement was reached to sell HMS Invincible to the Australians in February 1982. Nott did, however, promise the navy that it could keep all the proceeds of the £175m sale of HMS Invincible,427 despite the budgetary constraints that the MOD was suffering from in the current financial year. The navy also attempted to save the LPDs, despite their suggestion during the review that these be scrapped. The 1SL managed to get Nott to visit an LPD in Portsmouth on one of his few visits to the field.428 Having been forewarned by the 1SL, the LPD’s commander put on a show which strongly emphasized the role LPDs could play in disaster relief and service assisted evacuations of UK nationals. On his return Nott asked the cost of their retention, which he subsequently approved.429 In this he was heavily encouraged by the VCNS who took the short-term lifeline of a reprieve for these ships with the hope that replacements could be reinstated into the LTCs at a latter date.430 However, Nott delayed announcing this decision so that they could be offered as a bargaining chip with the Americans in negotiation for the Trident D-5 system.431 As Nott insisted that the Type 23 would become the navy’s principal surface combatant the navy pushed through changes in its design to enhance its capabilities. They justified this on the basis of export potential, which appealed to Nott and Thatcher. This led to a lengthening of the hull by 15 m in order to allow for the provision of a hangar for Sea King-type operations, the incorporation of the Sea Wolf surface-to-air missile system and a second main engine. As a result, the estimated cost rose to £90m.432 These changes caused the whole programme to be delayed, much to the embarrassment of Nott. His promise that the number of destroyers and frigates would remain at 50 became a political issue and the source of some concern to Conservative backbenchers. Despite the immediate financial pressure that the MOD’s budget was under he was compelled to order a further Type 22 frigate in February 1982 using the pretext that the shipyard had offered a £6m saving.433
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Reagan’s election as President of the United States led to a significant arms build-up by the United States. As part of this the US government decided to phase out the Trident C-4 system and procure the Trident D-5 system instead.434 For the MOD this presented a major problem since it would, if the plans remained unchanged, begin to bring the C4 system into service just as the Americans phased theirs out. This would have forced the MOD to meet the cost of retaining the C-4 repair and replacement facilities. The MOD had experienced this situation already when it had found it necessary to manufacture replacement rocket motors for the Polaris force.435 The general view within the MOD was therefore to move with the US to the D-5 system. However, a shift from the C-4 to the D-5 system would not only increase the procurement costs, but also provide a far greater nuclear strike capability than Britain actually wanted.436 This would provide useful political capital for the growing CND as well as the opposition parties. The latter would be able to highlight the impact on Britain’s conventional forces of the recent defence review. Nevertheless, the decision in favour of the D-5 system was made because the government felt it had little alternative and it led to severe criticism.437 The change in system had some benefits. It pushed the peak expenditure years further on, from the late 1980s to early 1990s, and left unallocated funds within the LTCs for the late 1980s. The move to the D-5 system also resulted in an increase in the hull size of the new submarines.438 This proved to be the final encouragement towards adopting the new PWR-2 reactor439 as well as the decision to incorporate a new sonar suite. Both of these contributed to the increased cost of the overall decision and the question of ordering a fifth boat was quietly dropped. Such a move had the support of the Admiralty Board who realized that the cost of a fifth boat would have had to be found from within the naval budget together with the two crews for the submarine from within a shrinking manpower pool.440 Having decided to opt for the D-5 system the British government was then faced with the problem of obtaining the agreement of the US administration for such a move so soon after the defence review that the US opposed. Fortunately this proved easier than envisaged. According to one senior official ‘we went into the negotiations with a clearly agreed British negotiating position. The Americans went in fighting savagely with each other all the way, State Department and Pentagon trying to score points all the time, a quite extraordinary performance.’441 This made the negotiations easier, but the British contingent was still concerned about what level of research and development
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costs they would have to contribute. The D-5 system was not fully developed and they feared that they would effectively have to sign a blank cheque over which they had no control. They therefore set out to fix the contribution figure.442 The British delegation was helped by the Pentagon’s desire for Britain to retain certain assets. The British agreed to man a number of Rapier batteries in the UK guarding US air bases, to retain a military presence in Belize, which Britain had not in fact intended leaving, and to retain the LPDs. For the navy the US insistence on the retention of the LPDs would help them in their argument for providing replacement ships in the long term. The switch to the D-5 system therefore guaranteed the LPD’s long-term future at the cost of a fifth Trident boat. For the army their reforms and Nott’s priorities largely overlapped and allowed them to continue the reorganization process. The brigade structure was reintroduced to units based in Britain to retain compatibility throughout the army. Nott did not object to the increase in the number of headquarters units while the opposition chose to use Trident as the focus of their criticisms of the government.443 The government’s emphasis on home defence and the use of reserves was brought together so that more regulars could be released to fight in Germany.444 To facilitate this Nott announced the formation of the Home Service Force (HSF). This aimed to give those individuals who were too old for the Territorial Army the chance to play a role in the home defence of the United Kingdom by forming HSF companies earmarked for guard duty of key strategic points. An initial manpower target was set at 4500.445 They represented a minor inconvenience to the army, who chose not to object, and instead focused on the return of a divisional headquarters from Germany. The government’s continued emphasis on the role of the reserves led the army to suggest that a reserve division be created using the divisional headquarters relocated from Germany, based on one regular and two reserve brigades.446 In wartime it would provide for the rear security of 1 (Br) Corps and allow 3rd Armoured Division to concentrate on the main battle.447 To the government it gave the reserves a far more prominent role in the defence of Germany than they had previously and allowed the defence team to show its commitment to the Central Front. The freeing of 3rd Armoured Division from rear security allowed the commander of 1 (Br) Corps, Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, to begin to change the way it functioned. He advocated a shift away from a static attritional style battle towards a far greater use of manoeuvre and began to set these changes in place.
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A number of further cutbacks had to be implemented to avoid overspending in FY 81–82. These were primarily directed at the air force, which had previously been a net beneficiary of the review. Despite protests from the air force, Tornado deliveries were slowed down in order to spread the costs of the programme over a longer period.448 This meant that the period between phasing out the Vulcan and Canberra and the entry into service of their replacement was increased, while the upgrade of Britain’s air defences through the introduction of the Tornado F2 was also delayed. In March 1982 the JP-233 runway denial weapon for the Tornado was also deferred by a few months, with the result that it would have to enter service sometime after the Tornado. Thus the Tornado would initially have to make do with ordinary iron bombs,449 something that the CSA had been trying to prevent with his encouragement for the review of policy. In the long term, overcoming Nott’s opposition to AST.403 remained an air force priority. The BAe designed P.110 proposal continued to attract the attention of the RAF’s high command, which gave encouragement to the programme, but unsuccessfully sought to obtain Nott’s support.450 Nott also implemented the management lessons of the review process, and the army and air force junior ministers were given functional responsibilities.451 This meant that the services would no longer have a service minister, which reinforced the influence of the Central Staff at the expense of the individual services. Nott also announced a change to the CDS’s status in November 1981.452 In future the CDS would be allowed to proffer his own views when they differed from the collective views of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, or when the Chiefs of Staff Committee was unable to reach a consensus view. The future reality was that the CDS would become the first port of call for Nott when he wanted military advice.
Summary The period from the publication of the Defence Review to the outbreak of the Falklands War witnessed comparatively little friction between the cycles in comparison to the period that had preceded it. Declaratory policy remained unchanged. Home defence continued to receive greater prominence and the HSF was created in response to the short-term political cycle rather than any army need for such a force. The most significant change to strategy lay in the creation of the fourth reserve division to protect the 1 (Br) Corps line of communications. Here the army exploited the government’s aspiration to give the
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reserves a more prominent role and the availability of the divisional headquarters resulting from the reorganization of 1 (Br) Corps. Its ramifications for the future conduct of war on the Central Front were not clear at this stage nor were the full implications of changes to army doctrine apparent. In terms of procurement the navy benefited to a limited extent from Nott’s vulnerability within the Conservative Party and growing isolation from Mrs Thatcher. This meant they were able to alter the Type 23 specification quite considerably to move it from a low to a highcapability unit as well as obtaining an order for an extra Type 22. They were also able to retain the LPDs in service. They were less successful in overturning some of the more fundamental decisions of the review, such as the sale of the third aircraft carrier to Australia. Nevertheless, they had made considerable progress compared to the initial proposals of the Bermudagram. The switch from Trident C-4 to D-5 was forced upon the government by the new US administration. The change in warhead configuration was accepted but no consideration was given as to how strategy should be altered to accommodate this. Instead it was assumed that this would remain merely a Polaris replacement. However, the cost of the Trident system, already a political hot potato, led the navy and government to abandon plans for a fifth boat. The army’s procurement programme remained unchanged but the air force’s did not. Despite being the major beneficiary of the defence procurement review the air force bore the brunt of the short-term financial restrictions required to keep the MOD within its spending limits for the existing financial year. The air force’s hope that it could put some of its lost weapons systems back into the LTCs had to be abandoned as the Tornado programme was delayed to alleviate the immediate financial crisis that the MOD found itself in.
The impact of the Falklands: June 1982–January 1983 Short-term cycle The Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands, and the subsequent war with Britain, resulted in a three-month hiatus within the MOD. Among the early casualties of the war was the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, who resigned and was replaced by Pym. Nott offered to resign but the Prime Minister, who felt she could not afford to lose two important Cabinet members at such a moment, persuaded him to
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stay.453 However, Nott let it be known that he would not seek reelection to Parliament and as a result, his position within the MOD was severely weakened. He effectively acted as a caretaker overseeing the new Defence White Paper, which resulted from the Falklands War. The war involved the dispatch of a large, balanced naval task force headed by two aircraft carriers, and the conduct of a major amphibious operation, led by the two LPDs, over 8000 miles from the United Kingdom.454 It was unusual in that the navy, Royal Marines and the army played the major roles while the air force was left the main task of providing logistical support. Consequently, Nott tried to prevent an overemphasis being placed on Britain’s future involvement in similar type operations outside NATO and tried to reiterate the importance of the Soviet threat to Europe.455 As soon as the conflict began the Treasury opened up its reserves. Once the war was over the Treasury was concerned to minimize the costs of the war and prevent the MOD using it as a means of obtaining a significant increase in its defence budget. In contrast Nott wanted to ensure that none of the costs of the war were met by the existing defence budget. The Falklands War had a tremendous impact upon the domestic political situation: the Prime Minister and government’s popularity soared and the MOD’s position of power and influence vis-à-vis the other departments of state rose temporarily.456 The emergence of the ‘Falklands factor’ did much to restore the government’s political standing among the electorate and this lesson was not lost on either the Conservatives or the opposition parties. Medium-term cycle The war resulted in a new battle over the review. According to Leach: Hardly had the cease-fire been signed when all the internecine bickering on Defence Review cuts recurred in strength. Or stronger, because now the Army, Air Force and the Treasury were fearful that the Navy, having fought a highly successful war but suffered not inconsiderable losses in ships and demonstrated critical shortcomings in equipment, would mount a recovery bandwagon which could only be at the expense of the others.457 For the services the outlook was mixed. They all sought to get their losses replaced with the best available equipment before the Treasury managed to cap expenditure. This encouraged them to spend as
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quickly as possible rather than to consider their priorities. They also sought to substantiate their existing or hoped for programmes, basing their requests upon the post-Falklands defence scenario which was likely to require a more significant military presence in that region and perhaps elsewhere. Long-term cycle For the navy the losses incurred raised issues about the future design of ships. While the Type 23 could be modified in the medium term, in the long term the navy needed to consider what ship would replace the existing Type 42 air defence destroyers given the hostility of Nott and Thatcher to this type of ship. The Sea King replacement programme remained under development and would soon need approval for its development to go ahead. This raised the issue of whether it should be produced by Westland on their own or in conjunction with partners.458 Studies into the replacement of the remainder of the Chieftain tanks continued with no significant progress. The problem lay in its timing, which did not tie in with the replacement programmes of any of Britain’s major allies.459 The air force’s concern to press ahead with AST.403 remained and the weakened position of Nott gave the air force a potential opening. The possible retention of Phantom aircraft after the introduction of the Tornado F2 into service raised the issue of what aircraft would replace the remaining five Phantom squadrons (two in the UK, two in Germany and the new Falklands squadron). Interaction of the time-cycles The 1982 Defence White Paper, published almost immediately after the Falklands War had ended, was a holding statement while the lessons of the conflict were considered. In the defence debate that followed Nott was able to take account of Treasury weakness and confirm that all equipment would be replaced without recourse to the existing defence budget.460 However, the Treasury had already started to try and limit the costs of this. Its first measure was to manage the additional expenditure separately from the defence budget so that it was not subject to NATO’s 3 per cent increase. The July defence debate provided the first indication of a change in defence priorities. This reflected Nott’s weakness within the defence policy process. To placate Conservative backbench calls for the immediate ordering of replacement ships Nott announced an order for a
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ninth Type 22 frigate, due to delays in the Type 23 and his need to be seen to be ordering something.461 Nott repeatedly pointed out the uniqueness of the conflict and that it should not be allowed to have a disfiguring effect on Britain’s long-term defence planning. However, to Thatcher it confirmed the need for an out-of-area capability,462 while those on the Conservative backbenches and the Labour opposition pointed to the damage done by the Nott review and called for its reversal. With this political debate ongoing all three services sought to emphasize their out-of-area role to justify new programmes. The navy successfully pushed for the retention of the third aircraft carrier in order to ensure that two such vessels would be available for operations in the future rather than the existing one.463 However, the navy did not canvass the reinstatement of the third air group. The VCNS believed that this was unlikely to be successful.464 Instead, the navy resigned itself to using the training squadrons as the basis of the third air group in wartime and accepted that the other two air groups would have to suffer an increased tempo of operations in peacetime. The loss of four warships and an RFA presented the Treasury with a significant bill and the Treasury sought to place limitations upon their replacements.465 The warships lost comprised two Type 42 air defence destroyers and two commercially designed Type 21 frigates. The Treasury team campaigned that four relatively cheap Type 21 frigates or the new Type 23 frigates should replace these.466 The navy, in contrast, would have preferred to replace the Type 42s with similar ships and the two frigates with the Type 22 frigates to maintain the existing balance in the fleet. They argued that the Type 21 was out of production and the design of the Type 23 had not been finalized. However, the way in which the modern Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield was lost meant that this warship was not politically acceptable and the Admiralty Board decided to take the pragmatic step of campaigning for four new Type 22s to an enhanced design.467 Nott supported the navy and announced orders for four new Type 22 frigates, three of which would incorporate a 4.5 inch gun and a point-defence missile system to take account of some of the lessons learnt. Nott confirmed that the lost LSL, RFA Sir Galahad, would be replaced with an order expected for 1983 and the damaged RFA, Sir Tristram, would be returned to the UK with the aim of repairing her.468 To meet the requirement to a destroyer/frigate presence in the South Atlantic in support of the retained HMS Endurance Nott agreed to the navy’s request to maintain four of the frigates scheduled for the
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standby squadron in service until at least 1985 together with three frigates previously earmarked for scrapping.469 This, the navy hoped, would become an indefinite extension as part of the aim of retaining the eight ships scheduled for the standby squadron within the active fleet.470 The need to requisition and convert a merchantman to provide a repair facility helped the navy in its campaign for the reconsideration of the provision for sea-going heavy repair facility within the fleet.471 This it couched in terms of the out-of-area role and Nott agreed to acquire the ship. The switch from the Trident C-4 to D-5 system also allowed the plans for the SSN programme to be finalized. Nott announced plans to order SSN-17 later in the fiscal year, SSN-18 to follow in the subsequent fiscal year and SSN-19 hopefully before the order for the first Trident boat.472 This would give a force of 18 SSNs and implied a return to the navy’s goal of 20 boats. While the navy sought to increase the number of active destroyers and frigates it remained constrained by a lack of manpower and Nott’s fixing of the number of escorts at 50. The Admiralty Board could only hope to change this once Nott was replaced. In the meantime it began to look at ways to release some of the manpower tied up in shore billets to crew the additional ships. As a result of manpower constraints the navy was forced to consider the contracturalization of certain functions. Thus the navy was the first service really to begin to implement some of the Conservatives’ reform ideas previously applied to local government. For the army the main preoccupations remained Germany and Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, they did campaign for improvements to the out-of-area role beyond those originally planned. This represented a complete reversal of their 1979 policy of blocking such changes. We intend further to improve the airborne and other capabilities of 5 Infantry Brigade for out-of-area operations. It already has two parachute battalions, an infantry battalion and engineer support. To these we have just added an armoured reconnaissance regiment and in the course of next year we will add an artillery regiment, an Army Air Corps squadron and certain logistic units.473 The government also began to consider the formation of a rapid deployment division based on this brigade and 3 Commando Brigade for out-of-area operations. One area of weakness that the Falklands War had highlighted was in the field of electronic warfare and an urgent programme was initiated
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to rectify this deficiency.474 For the air defence of the Falkland Islands the army and air force obtained an order for an additional 24 Rapier units.475 The army took advantage of this and purchased an additional batch of the tracked variant of the Rapier system, which it deployed to Germany, and deployed some of its towed Rapier units to the Falklands. Thus, the army was able further to improve the portability of its air defence capability in Germany by using the Falklands as a reason for a further Rapier buy. The air force again pushed ahead with its programme to fit in-flight refuelling probes throughout its fleet of aircraft. The Nimrod, Hercules and VC-10 fleet all received probes over the next few years. In addition, the need to provide increased tanker support and a strategic lift capability to the Falklands was used to justify the purchase of widebodied aircraft for conversion to the tanker/transport role. Under pressure from the government the RAF purchased six surplus TriStar aircraft from British Airways for conversion to the tanker/transport roles to assist its privatization, rather than their preferred option of McDonnell-Douglas DC-10s.476 The Falklands War had highlighted a number of weaknesses within the weapons systems used by the air force. The attempts to close the runway at Port Stanley had only been partially successful and this reinforced the need for the JP-233 runway denial system then in the course of development. The problem of attacking Argentinean radar systems had also been revealed and the programme to develop an anti-radar system was revived and put out to tender.477 An order for at least 12 extra Phantoms to provide cover for the deployment of an air defence squadron to Port Stanley was agreed. This meant that the Air Force Board had at last managed to achieve its target of three extra fighter squadrons, even if one had to be stationed in the South Atlantic in peacetime. The government’s retention of the Phantom squadrons in the United Kingdom and Germany meant that a sizeable replacement batch of fighter aircraft was now needed and had been implicitly agreed. The air force’s support for BAe’s P.110 was an initial step towards replacing the Jaguar and Phantom aircraft. In his weakened position within the MOD Nott agreed to help fund this private demonstrator on the stipulation that this did not mean that a future European combat aircraft would evolve from it.478 The RAF High Command were happy to accept this since it meant that the programme had at last been generated and that they could then try and increase the momentum behind it under the next Secretary of State for Defence.
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To Nott the Falklands experience also reinforced his belief that the role of the CDS needed to be enhanced so that he could tender independent advice and act as the principal military adviser to the government.479 The result was a further shift to the Central Staff just as the services began to reassert their position beyond the remit imposed by the defence review. Summary In many ways this final period of Nott’s time at the MOD marked the watershed of his review. The assumptions underpinning the entire rationale of the review were undone by events in the South Atlantic and this completely undermined his position within the MOD. It allowed the services, and in particular the navy, to capitalize on his and the Treasury’s weakness and partially restore, and in some cases enhance, their preferred programmes. The timing of the conflict could not have been better for the navy and the 1SL seized the opportunity to protect his service.480 However, in a future period of financial stringency many of the assumptions and arguments upon which the review was based remained valid and could be revisited by a future Secretary of State. This was reinforced by the further shift of power within the MOD from the services to the Central Staff, especially with the reorientation of the department ministers onto a functional basis. Consequently, the medium-term cycle had become more vulnerable to interference from the short-term political and budgetary cycle than had occurred before, as decisions would increasingly be shifted from the individual services to the Central Staff. Nevertheless, the period witnessed the medium-term cycle reestablishing its authority within the defence planning process. This was most evident in Nott’s surrender to the air force over AST.403. While declaratory policy remained essentially unchanged, the navy was able to begin the shift in its strategy away from the barrier concept and the army continued its revolution in thinking and structure within 1 (Br) Corps. The services were also able to exert authority over their procurement plans. For example, the navy were able to alter the design of the Type 23 from a very austere frigate to a balanced ASW-oriented frigate on the high capabilities end of the spectrum. The period shows that only when the Secretary of State for Defence was particularly strong and continued to have the support of the Prime Minister could the short-term political cycle dominate the policy process.
96 Defence under Thatcher
Conclusions Thatcher’s attempt at putting one of her close circle in charge of the MOD was only partially successful. Nott succeeded in pushing a number of measures through the MOD aimed at curbing the defence budget in the short term without adversely affecting the Conservatives’ electoral standing. He managed to change the overall power balance within the ministry to the advantage of the Central Staff at the expense of the services. Both these measures had her support, but the close relationship that existed between Nott and Thatcher at the start of his time at the MOD had noticeably cooled by the time he left. This led to a number of his early controversial decisions, which she had fully endorsed, being undermined as he sought to broaden his support within the wider Conservative Party. The services found that their programmes and doctrines initially came under close scrutiny but the changes that were initiated ultimately underwent significant revision. Thus Nott’s attempts to abandon the traditional division of the defence budget between the services and adopt a more functional approach to defence were only partially successful. This was most clearly evident in the case of the Royal Navy, which managed largely to preserve the overall balance of the fleet despite the initial radical recasting envisaged by Nott. For the first part of Nott’s time in office the short-term cycle appeared in the ascendancy to an extent unmatched during Pym’s years at the MOD. The medium-term cycle soon reasserted itself through various manoeuvres of the three services. Yet even this appeared to be merely based on short-term expediency rather then a medium-term outlook. Where Nott was most successful was in altering the relative balance of power within the medium-term cycle. This was most evident in the redefinition of the CDS’s role, which reflected a shift in power from the services to the Central Staff. More importantly and less noticeable was the role of the Capabilities group which combined both service and Civil Service personnel. Nott’s successor was able to use this momentum to continue to shift the power base within the MOD away from the services towards the Central Staff and thus implement elements of his own agenda. Nott’s time in office revealed how the MOD reacted to having a policy initiator with the firm support of the Prime Minister as Secretary of State for Defence. Nott was a stark contrast from Pym and this was clearly reflected in the early impact that he had upon the MOD. Yet, even if the Falklands War had not occurred, it seems likely that, as his time in office increased, he would have had less and less of an impact
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as the various actors within the MOD adapted to their minister. While the Nott review threatened to have a significant impact upon the Royal Navy there had already been a number of revisions to the original plan prior to April 1982. This would imply either that a policy initiator loses impetus over time or that the system adapts to the ministerial style over time and reduces the minister’s ability to initiate policy change or that a combination of the two takes place. Who were the main actors and how did they interact in this process? Nott remained a key actor within the MOD throughout his time in office. Because of the changes he wanted to put through, his relationship with the Prime Minister was critical. He was able to undertake the initial review but was forced to make concessions to the out-of-area concept. Once this relationship had begun to decline he was left isolated within the Conservative Party and vulnerable within the MOD, which forced him to make concessions and effectively reduced his ability to alter the three strands of policy. With Nott initiating policy the remainder of the defence team played a relatively minor role. Speed’s resignation had relatively little impact and was indicative of the lack of involvement of the rest of the defence team in the review process. Likewise the Foreign Secretary had little impact despite Carrington’s best efforts in preserving the ice-patrol ship HMS Endurance. Within the MOD the role of the Capabilities group was crucial in providing Nott with the rationale behind his reductions in the naval budget. This represented a significant shift in the power balance away from the services to the Central Staff, despite the limitations placed upon the CDS during the review. Moreover, Nott was able to reinforce this shift by altering the CDS’s role vis-à-vis the Service Chiefs. The Service Chiefs found their dominant position within the policy process temporarily undermined by the new Defence Secretary. The shift in the balance of funding undermined their unity and the army and air force accepted the proposed reductions. The army and air force effectively undermined this unity before Nott formulated the Bermudagram. The navy’s initial naivety left it open to Nott’s emphasis on the barrier concept and it was only in its subsequent dealings with Nott that it was able to start to undermine decisions made earlier. This was most evident in the size of the destroyer and frigate force, which shifted from a low 30s or high 20s to 50 by the time of the publication of the Defence White Paper.
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How did defence fit into both the domestic and foreign political environments? Throughout the review process Labour’s lack of impact was telling. Nott was fortunate in both the timing of the creation of the SDP and in Labour’s shift towards unilateralism which undermined its ability to influence the government on defence policy. Instead, the political debate focused almost entirely on the morality of nuclear weapons. The emergence of the SDP complicated the political scene and the Conservatives were conscious that they should not leave themselves vulnerable to the SDP or Labour on defence. However, at least in the early stages of the SDP, the move of so many of Labour’s principal defence speakers to the SDP meant that there was a defence vacuum within Parliament during the crucial stages of the review. The ability of the trade unions and Conservative backbenchers to influence the defence review was noticeably lacking. With the support of the Prime Minister, Nott was able effectively to ignore both these pressure groups. However, once the support of the Prime Minister began to diminish Nott was forced to start to placate the Conservative backbenches.481 This meant that the current fiscal year reductions that he had to make for FY 81–82 were levied at the air force rather than the navy, although this represented a token gesture at best. There was greater pressure from within NATO, and especially from the United States, over the review. This caused Nott to modify some of his policies and precluded him from taking the option put forward by Boorman of significantly reducing 1 (Br) Corps. Thus the destroyer and frigate numbers were increased through the use of the standby squadron and BAOR was not reduced below 55 000. The most significant influence was the US decision to change from the Trident C4 to D-5 system without consulting the British. This forced the government to completely rethink its Trident purchase. The fifth boat was effectively lost as a result and the future of the LPDs secured in its place. How was defence policy affected by the management changes put through? Nott originally planned to reform the MOD’s management structure once he had dealt with the programme review.482 This took longer than he anticipated and, by the time he had finished, his close relationship with the Prime Minister had cooled. This made it harder for him to push through the planned changes. As a result, his structural changes largely centred around increasing the CDS’s power at the
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expense of the individual Service Chiefs. In this he was able to exploit the divisions between the Service Chiefs to ensure his changes went through. The most significant change was the reorganization of the junior ministers. Instead of being assigned to a particular service they were now role-orientated, taking up responsibility for either procurement or personnel. This had a profound effect upon the Service Chiefs. It brought them more to the fore in the bargaining within the MOD since they could no longer choose to leave this to their respective minister. It also ensured that the defence team were able to speak with one voice within the MOD and avoid putting junior ministers in the difficult position of attempting to serve different masters. Nott was able to do less about reforming the actual procurement process, although if the Falklands War had not occurred this might have been different. As a result, when the Prime Minister looked for a successor, one of the basic requirements was an interest in procurement and management reform. Nevertheless, Nott’s imposition of manpower reductions, particularly on the navy, would later force all three services to look at alternative methods of purchasing goods and services. He had, therefore, laid much of the groundwork for his successor to carry on and undertake the management reforms that the Prime Minister argued were necessary across Whitehall. Nott was also able to support the privatization process as the first defence companies began entering private ownership in 1981.483 Thus, the army was encouraged to reconsider its attitude towards the purchase of tracked Rapier while the air force were forced to purchase TriStars from British Airways, rather than the DC-10s that they preferred. This use of defence procurement to help ensure the successful privatization of state industries became even more open in the subsequent years, and resulted in considerable political criticism from the opposition benches.
5 Michael Heseltine, January 1983–January 1986
Introduction Thatcher had two main requirements for Nott’s successor. First, the need for an effective communicator to counter the influence of CND on public opinion. Second, the willingness to implement a far more businesslike approach within the MOD than had previously been the case.484 Heseltine excelled in both criteria. His oratorical gifts were well known at Conservative Party conferences, and Thatcher liked his management style,485 which ‘she saw as an abject lesson to those of us who appeared to be interested only in policy’.486 He shared her belief that the funds necessary for defence improvements could be generated through greater efficiency within the MOD.487 However, the relationship between them remained distant and his appointment to the defence post promised to remove a thorn from her side on domestic issues.488 She felt that at the Department of the Environment he had been far more concerned with being ‘Minister for Merseyside’ than in local authority finance or in finding an alternative to the rating system.489 At the MOD he would be held responsible for a significant, but time-consuming, portfolio, which had the potential significantly to reduce his popularity within the Conservative Party if he were forced to undertake any cutbacks. She had therefore managed again to give the MOD to the minister she felt was most likely to mount a challenge to her leadership.490
The years of plenty: 1983–84 Short-term cycle Although Heseltine did not want to take on defence or expect to remain there for any length of time, he had little choice but to accept 100
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the promotion. He viewed the appointment as a stepping-stone in his quest to become Prime Minister and made that clear to his immediate advisers within the MOD.491 He had no previous interest or experience in foreign or security issues,492 but as a committed European, and with a deep interest in trade and industry, he found three areas in which he could immerse himself: Firstly, he was extremely interested and very effective in some of the political issues that the programme represented. Secondly, he was extremely interested in the organization of the Ministry of Defence, both in the programmes area and elsewhere, and I suspect that he felt that if you could get the organization right then you would be able to do more than it actually could. The third area which he became extremely interested in, and which ultimately led to his resignation, was the industrial area, and in particular, the position of British industry and British industrial interests vis-à-vis the United States in one area and the Europeans in the other.493 The first two offered him a means of consolidating his political reputation as an ‘administrator and organizational ideas’ man and his name regularly appeared before party members and the wider electorate.494 Apart from being Prime Minister he also wanted to become the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ‘and organize what he saw as a Japanesestyle industrial policy’.495 The MOD effectively offered him this experience through its close links with industry, particularly through the nationalized companies involved in the defence field. The appeal of this was enhanced by Britain’s history of defence collaboration with Europe, which fitted neatly into Heseltine’s pro-European agenda.496 Heseltine was therefore content to devote his energies into these areas. He was not particularly interested in declaratory policy or the military strategy aspects of defence policy, which he largely left alone.
Medium-term cycle Heseltine’s move to defence coincided with the turnover of staff within the Chiefs of Staff. Bramall, the new CDS, had experienced the uncertainty and cutbacks of the Nott review whilst CGS and therefore immediately embarked upon a series of papers on future strategy in order to try and pre-empt another financially-driven defence review.497 Like previous CDSs, Bramall felt that the services needed to re-establish their influence upon declaratory policy in order to underpin their military
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strategies and procurement programmes. Not surprisingly he was in favour of increasing the power of the CDS vis-à-vis the individual services as part of the ongoing centralization of defence policy-making. In this he had the support of the new PUS, Clive Whitmore, who continued the traditional Civil Service line of arguing for greater civilian control over policy-making.498 With a new Secretary of State for Defence the navy had two main priorities. First, to ensure that orders were rapidly placed for ships lost during the Falklands War before they became subsumed within the existing programme; and second, they wanted to overturn the general conclusions of the Nott review. In particular, they wanted to abandon the barrier concept, increase the number of destroyers and frigates and support the US Navy’s new strategic vision. 499 This centred on NATO moving away from fighting a defensive battle in the Atlantic towards an offensive-based strategy in which the US aircraft carriers acting in concert with each other would deploy to the Norwegian Sea. The army remained preoccupied by the Central Front and protecting its equipment programme. As the Commander of NATO’s Northern Army Group (COMNORTHAG), Bagnall wanted to get his new thinking adopted at the operational level. He was concerned with Soviet doctrine changes and, in particular, the creation of the concept of Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMGs). As a result, he wished to reduce the emphasis placed within the command on forward defence and get NORTHAG to think about fighting at the army group level rather than merely attempting to co-ordinate its four component corps (of which 1 (Br) Corps was one).500 He also wanted to resurrect the army’s plan of creating a mobile anti-tank force capable of dealing with Soviet OMGs in conjunction with similar allied units.501 For the air force the wide-scale int