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rea son in history
Claudia M. Schmidt
t h e p e n n s y lva n i a s tat e u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s u n i v e r s i t y pa r k , p e n n s y lva n i a
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Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Schmidt, Claudia M. David Hume : reason in history / Claudia M. Schmidt. p.
cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-271-02263-9 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Hume, David, 1711–1776. I. Title.
B1498 .S32 2003 192—dc21
2003005468
Copyright © 2003 The Pennsylvania State University All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA 16802-1003
It is the policy of The Pennsylvania State University Press to use acid-free paper. Publications on uncoated stock satisfy the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Material, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
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Contents Preface and Acknowledgments vii List of Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 1 Ideas 13 2 Demonstration 43 3 Probable Reasoning 69 4 Metaphysics 107 5 Skepticism 137 6 The Passions 161 7 Human Action 195 8 Moral Theory 223 9 Political Theory 261 10 Economics 299 11 Aesthetics 315 12 Religion 339 13 History 377 Conclusion 415 Bibliography 429 Index 453
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To Hartland and Ada Schmidt parents extraordinaire
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Preface and Acknowledgments In preparing this study, I have beneWted from the insights, suggestions, and encouragement of a number of individuals. It is a great pleasure to acknowledge them here. This book had its origins in a dissertation at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California, under the careful and enthusiastic direction of Claude Welch, who Wrst inspired my interest in Hume. I also received valuable comments on the original dissertation from Vincent Guagliardo at the Graduate Theological Union, Martin Jay at the University of California at Berkeley, and Donald Livingston at Emory University. My study of Hume was greatly enriched by their perspectives from the Welds of theology, intellectual history, and philosophy. The manuscript of this book was expanded and improved at the University of Iowa. My work there on this project was enhanced by conversations with my colleagues among the faculty and graduate students, including Panayot Butchvarov, Evan Fales, Brian Hutchinson, Todd Ryan, and Kathleen Schmidt. I received valuable comments on the content of various chapters from Phillip Cummins, David Stern, and Richard Fumerton. I would also like to thank Günter Zöller, now at the University of Munich, for encouraging me to explore Hume’s relation to subsequent developments in German philosophy. I presented papers based on the material in Chapter 3 at the PaciWc Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1993, the Twentieth International Hume Conference in Ottawa in 1993, the History and Philosophy of Science Reading Group at the University of California at Davis in 1994, and the Iowa Philosophical Society in 1994. The central argument of the project was presented in papers at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion in 1991, and at the Midwest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy in 1996. I would like to thank the participants at these meetings, and colleagues with whom I have discussed Hume at other scholarly events, for their comments and conversation; especially Dorothy Coleman, Lorne Falkenstein, Roger Gallie, Daniel Garber, Alan Charles Kors, Rhoda Kotzin, Manfred
vii
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viii
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Preface and Acknowledgments
Kuehn, William Edward Morris, David Owen, Terry Pinkard, Wade Robison, John Stewart, Paul Teller, Spencer Wertz, and R. Neil Wood. I have been very fortunate to work with Sanford Thatcher at Pennsylvania State University Press, who has overseen many excellent works in philosophy and intellectual history. I would also like to thank James Noxon, Frederick Whelan, and David Fate Norton, the readers for Penn State Press, for their many stimulating and encouraging comments. This book has been much improved as a result of their suggestions and criticisms. Special thanks are due Andrew Lewis, my copyeditor, and Jennifer Smith, at Penn State Press, for their careful and discerning work with the manuscript. The Wnal draft of this book was written in the wonderfully congenial and collegial setting of the philosophy department at Marquette University. I would like to thank my colleagues, especially Howard Kainz, Juliana Laumakis, Ginger Lee, Matthew Pierlott, Tom Prendergast, Gregory Schulz, William Starr, and Tim Yoder, for giving me welcome opportunities to develop material included in the introduction, the Wnal two chapters, and the conclusion. I am especially grateful to Marquette University for a Faculty Development Award, to the philosophy department for research support, and to Paul Shinkle and Carrie PefXey, my research assistants, for their help in reviewing the citations system and bibliography. I would also like to thank Michael Wreen and James South for their advice on the Wnal preparation of the manuscript. This book is dedicated to my parents, Hartland and Ada Schmidt, who, as members of the faculty in chemistry and creative writing at the University of California at Riverside, Wlled our family life with an enthusiastic commitment to the liberal arts, and prepared me for the rewards and challenges of pursuing an exciting project across interdisciplinary boundaries. They provided invaluable support for my work on Hume through their constant interest and encouragement, and I am happy to thank them at last for waiting so patiently for its fruition.
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Abbreviations A critical edition of Hume’s philosophical, political, and literary works, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, is being published by Oxford University Press under the supervision of Tom L. Beauchamp, David Fate Norton, and M. A. Stewart. The texts in this edition are also provided in the student editions in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series. I have cited the OPT editions of Hume’s Treatise and Abstract, and the Clarendon editions of the Enquiries, according to the reference system for both editions as indicated below. In each case, I have also cited the page number in the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions of these works as indicated. Other texts by Hume are cited in standard editions, according to the reference system indicated below. I have listed any additional editions of Hume’s works that are referred to in this study in the bibliography under his name. a
An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature. In A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 403– 17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. a1 Paragraph a p.2 Preface, paragraph
a [sbn]
An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature. In A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, second edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, 641–62. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
cmh
“David Hume’s ‘An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour.’” Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner. Modern Philology 45 (1947): 54–60. cmh 1 Page number
dnr
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited by Norman Kemp Smith. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947. dnr 1.2 Part, page number dnr ph.1 Pamphilus to Hermippus, page number ix
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x
e
.
Abbreviations
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985; revised edition 1987. e et.1 Essay title, page number e Var.1 Variant, page number e Av Of Avarice e bg Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic e bp Of the Balance of Power e bt Of the Balance of Trade e cl Of Civil Liberty e Co Of Commerce e cp Of the Coalition of Parties e dm Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature e dt Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion e El Of Eloquence e Ep The Epicurean e ew Of Essay Writing e fp Of the First Principles of Government e ic Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth e im Of Impudence and Modesty e In Of Interest e ip Of the Independency of Parliament e is Of the Immortality of the Soul e jt Of the Jealousy of Trade e lm Of Love and Marriage e lp Of the Liberty of the Press e Mo Of Money e mp Of Moral Prejudices e ms Of the Middle Station of Life e nc Of National Characters e oc Of the Original Contract e og Of the Origin of Government e pa Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations e pc Of Public Credit e pd Of Polygamy and Divorces e pg Of Parties in General e pgb Of the Parties of Great Britain e Pl The Platonist e po Of Passive Obedience e pr That Politics may be reduced to a Science
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Abbreviations
e ps e ra e rc e rp e rw e Sc e se e sh e sr e st e St e Su e Ta e Tr ehu
.
xi
Of the Protestant Succession Of ReWnement in the Arts Of Some Remarkable Customs Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences A Character of Sir Robert Walpole The Sceptic Of Superstition and Enthusiasm Of the Study of History Of Simplicity and ReWnement in Writing Of the Standard of Taste The Stoic Of Suicide Of Taxes Of Tragedy
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition. Edited by Thomas L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. ehu 1.2 Section, paragraph ehu Ind.1 Index, page number ehu Int.1 Introduction, paragraph
ehu [sbn] An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Third edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. em
“Hume’s Early Memoranda, 1729–1740: The Complete Text.” Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner. Journal of the History of Ideas 9 (1948): 492–518. em 2 Page number
epm
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition. Edited by Thomas L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. epm 1.2 Section, paragraph epm a.1.2 Appendix, appendix number, paragraph epm d.1 “Dialogue,” paragraph epm Ind.1 Index, page number epm Int.1 Introduction, paragraph
epm [sbn]
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Third edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
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xii
.
Abbreviations
fe
“An Early Fragment on Evil.” Edited by M. A. Stewart. In Hume and Hume’s Connexions, edited by M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright, 165–68. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
h
The History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to The Revolution in 1688. 6 vols. Edited by William B. Todd. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983. h 1.2.3 Volume, chapter, page number h 1.App.2.3 Volume, appendix, appendix number, page number h 1.NoteA.2 Volume, note, page number h 1.Var.2 Volume, variant, page number
l
The Letters of David Hume. 2 vols. Edited by J. Y. T. Greig. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932. l 1.2 Volume, page number
lg
A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner and John Valdimir Price. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967. lg 2 Page number
lw
“Letter to the Authors of the Critical Review Concerning the Epigoniad of Wilkie.” In The Philosophical Works of David Hume, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, vol. 4, 425–37. London: Longmans, 1874. lw 2 Page number
ml
“My Own Life.” In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller, xxxi–xli. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985; revised edition 1987. ml i Page number
nhr
Natural History of Religion. Edited by H. E. Root. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956. nhr 1.2 Section, page number nhr Int.1 Introduction, page number
nl
New Letters of David Hume. Edited by Raymond Klibansky and Ernest Campbell Mossner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954. nl 1 Page number
op
“A Dissertation on the Passions” [“Of the Passions”]. In The Philosophical Works of David Hume, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4:139–66. London: Longmans, 1874. op 1.1.1 Section, paragraph, page number
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Abbreviations
.
xiii
po
“Of the Poems of Ossian.” In David Hume: Philosophical Historian, edited by David Fate Norton and Richard H. Popkin, 390–400. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. po 1 Page number
rh
“Review of Robert Henry’s History of Great Britain.” In David Hume: Philosophical Historian, edited by David Fate Norton and Richard H. Popkin, 377–88. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. rh 2 Page number
t
A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. t 1.2.3.4 Book, part, section, paragraph t Adv.1 Advertisement to Books 1 and 2 t Adv.3 Advertisement to Book 3 t App.1 Appendix, paragraph t Int.1 Introduction, paragraph
t [sbn]
A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Second edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
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Page 1
David Hume has long been recognized as one of the most profound, creative, and widely inXuential thinkers in the history of modern philosophy. His writings range from epistemology and metaphysics, through discussions of the principles of explanation in the human sciences, to moral theory, political theory, economics, aesthetics, and history. Indeed, during his life and for much of the following century, Hume was more widely known for his writings in economics and history than as a philosopher. However, beginning with his contemporaries such as Reid and Kant, philosophers throughout Europe gradually came to regard Hume’s philosophical system as a compelling challenge to the preceding tradition. Over the next two centuries, his works would become a point of reference and a resource for such diverse developments as the idealist tradition in nineteenth-century Germany, the empiricist tradition in nineteenth-century Britain, and both the phenomenological and analytic movements in twentieth-century philosophy. Indeed, Hume has been perpetually rediscovered, either as a source of unappreciated insights or as a target of criticism, by almost every subsequent movement in the Western philosophical tradition. In light of Hume’s inXuence and importance, it is surprising to Wnd that there have been very few attempts to develop a systematic examination and interpretation of his thought as a whole, including his contributions to the various humanistic 1
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David Hume: Reason in History
and social scientiWc disciplines, as well as to philosophy. The only direct examples are two studies by Laing and Laird, both from the 1930s, and an introductory study by J. V. Price, originally published in 1968 and updated in 1991.1 Several more recent works, such as those by Livingston, Baier, Danford, and Herdt, have sought to present a uniWed account of a number of themes in his thought, although without the explicit order of a systematic survey. On the other hand, the Cambridge Companion to Hume provides an overview of his contributions to different Welds of inquiry, in essays by different authors which reXect recent developments in the study of Hume, but without attempting to provide a uniWed interpretation of his thought.2 This study is intended to address this lacuna in the literature. It is intended for several types of readers. First, it is offered to beginning students of Hume, as an introduction to the depth and range of his thought, and to the main debates over his thought in the secondary literature. Next, it is directed to those scholars in various disciplines outside philosophy who are interested in Hume’s inXuence in the history and methodology of their own Welds. Third, it is offered to specialists in other areas of philosophy, as an overview and synthesis of recent developments in Hume scholarship. Finally, I hope that this study will also be of interest to specialists in the study of Hume, as an attempt to combine a systematic survey of his thought with a distinctive interpretation of his project. In contrast to many approaches to the interpretation of his philosophy, I argue that Hume presents a constructive account of human reason or, in other words, an account of the elements and principles of human cognition, by which he intends not only to explain but also to justify and improve our reasonings in both the natural and human sciences. At the same time, he also seeks to establish the limits of human reason and the principles governing its subordination to the passions in the activities of human life. Finally, I also argue that he seeks to trace what we today call the social and historical dimensions of human consciousness. This appears in his consideration of how our concepts, beliefs, emotions, and even standards of judgment in different areas of inquiry are shaped by our experience, both in our individual histories and through our participation in the life of a community. In undertaking this project I am accepting the challenge proposed in 1941 by Norman Kemp Smith in his Philosophy of David Hume, and reafWrmed by Mossner in the Wnal edition of his biography of Hume and Baier in her study of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. This is Kemp Smith’s call for a study of Hume “in all his manifold activities: as philosopher, as political theorist, as economist, as historian, and as man of letters,” with the hope that “Hume’s philosophy, as the attitude of mind which found for itself 1. Laing, David Hume; Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature; and Price, David Hume. 2. Norton, Cambridge Companion to Hume.
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Introduction
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these various forms of expression, will then have been presented, adequately and in due perspective, for the Wrst time.”3 The history of the interpretation of Hume is an important part of the history of modern philosophy, since many subsequent philosophers have used his writings, often rather loosely, as a point of reference for their own creative inquiries and achievements.4 Alongside this reception, which would merit a study in its own right, the scholarly interpretation of Hume has developed in a series of overlapping stages, through which he has been regarded variously as a skeptic, as a positivist or a narrow empiricist, and as a more broadly constructive philosopher. The skeptical interpretation of Hume Wrst appeared in several of the earliest reviews of his philosophical writings and has persisted from the eighteenth century to the present.5 The earliest of his major critics, Thomas Reid, the leading Wgure among the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, charged Hume with presenting “a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary.”6 Kant rejected the supposed refutation of Hume by his Scottish contemporaries, but also regarded Hume’s thought as skeptical and destructive in its tendency, since Hume overlooked the “positive harm” that would arise from depriving human reason of its “most important vistas.”7 In his 1874 edition of Hume’s writings, Thomas Green argued that Hume, by pursuing the Lockean theory of ideas to its ultimate conclusion, ended by declaring knowledge to be impossible.8 This skeptical interpretation was reafWrmed through much of the twentieth century, for example by Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, and D. C. Stove. During the Wrst part of the twentieth century, Hume was also regarded as a forerunner of the version of empiricism known as logical positivism. Indeed, the leading Wgures among the logical positivists, both on the Continent and in England, identiWed Hume as one of the main predecessors of their movement.9 Other commentators on Hume, such as G. E. Moore and John Laird in 3. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, vii–viii; Mossner, Life of David Hume, vii; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, viii–ix. 4. James Fieser has assembled a valuable collection of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reactions to Hume in his multivolume Early Responses to Hume. On the reception of Hume’s work by his British contemporaries, and on Hume’s response to their criticisms, see Somerville’s Enigmatic Parting Shot. On Hume’s inXuence in German philosophy, see especially Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense Philosophy in Germany; Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Hume in der Deutschen Aufklärung; Waszek, Scottish Enlightenment; and Murphy, Hume and Husserl. 5. Mossner, Life of David Hume, 117–33 and 286–300. 6. Reid, Works, 1: 95. 7. Kant, Prolegomena, 8n, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 4:258n. 8. Green, Hume and Locke, 2. 9. See especially Hahn, Neurath, and Carnap, “The ScientiWc Conception of the World,” 304; and Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 31 and 54–55.
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David Hume: Reason in History
the early twentieth century, along with more recent Wgures such as Farhang Zabeeh, Antony Flew, Robert Anderson, David Pears, and Georges Dickers, have regarded Hume as a leading representative of a more general empiricism in philosophy. A third approach to the interpretation of Hume is the allegation that he does not present any consistent philosophical position. This view again appears among his earliest critics, such as James Beattie, another Scottish Common Sense philosopher, who denounced the “paradoxes” in Hume’s philosophy.10 This view is also echoed by Selby-Bigge in his 1894 introduction to the Enquiries: “Hume’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine. . . . This makes it easy to Wnd all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all.”11 This criticism has also been directed against Hume by John Laird, Jonathan Bennett, and Antony Flew. The most elaborate version of this approach is presented by John Passmore, who rejects the wholesale application of the prevailing traditional labels to Hume’s thought, but then applies them to its allegedly conXicting aspects. Hume thus becomes in different respects a positivist, a phenomenalist, a skeptic, and so on.12 This approach to Hume, or indeed to any author, is, however, open to the objection that the critic is simply giving up any sustained effort to trace the underlying unity in the thought of his author, or to view his entire body of writings as a coherent project. The single most inXuential challenge to these interpretations of Hume as a skeptic, as a positivist, or as fundamentally incoherent, was developed by Norman Kemp Smith, especially in his Philosophy of David Hume. According to Kemp Smith, Hume criticized the prevailing conceptions of reason in order to emphasize the role of feeling and “natural belief” in both cognition and morality. On this view, Hume sought to establish “the thorough subordination—by right, if not always in actual fact, of reason to the feelings and instincts,” by showing that we must rely on feeling and belief, rather than reason, in “all the really ultimate issues” of life. Kemp Smith also interprets Hume’s account of our ideas of causality, the existence of external objects, and personal identity as a doctrine of “natural beliefs,” or beliefs that arise from “the ultimate instincts or propensities which constitute our human nature.” Indeed, he identiWes this 10. Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 18. 11. Selby-Bigge, “Editor’s Introduction,” vii. 12. Passmore, Hume’s Intentions. For a postmodern defense of this approach, see Parusnikova, “Against the Spirit of Foundations,” 1–17.
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as “the most essential, and perhaps the most characteristic doctrine in Hume’s philosophy.”13 Kemp Smith’s “naturalistic” interpretation of Hume has been further developed by Hendel, Stroud, Wright, and Mounce, while others such as MacNabb, Penelhum, Fogelin, Pears, and Waxman have sought to distinguish the elements of skepticism and naturalism in Hume’s thought. The continuing value of Kemp Smith’s approach lies in his attempt to develop a broadly constructive interpretation of Hume’s philosophy, and his emphasis on the continuity between Hume’s epistemology and his moral philosophy. However, there are several difWculties in Kemp Smith’s approach and in his “naturalistic” interpretation of Hume’s philosophy. The Wrst of these is his emphasis upon the words “nature,” “natural,” and “natural belief.” Hume himself does not use the phrase “natural belief,” and while he often uses the word “nature” in contexts that might seem to support Kemp Smith’s interpretation (cf. t 1.4.1.7, 1.4.1.12, 1.4.7.9 [sbn 183, 187, 269]), he gives the term “nature” no emphasis comparable to his typographical emphasis on such words as “custom” and “habit” (t 1.3.8.10 [sbn 102]; cf. ehu 5.5 [sbn 43]). Indeed, Hume frequently calls attention to the ambiguity of the word “natural,” in order to indicate that it has little or no explanatory value without further speciWcation or qualiWcation (t 3.1.2.7–10 [sbn 473–75]; epm App.3.9 [sbn 307]).14 Kemp Smith also overlooks Hume’s account of the principles of probable or scientiWc reasoning, as we will see in Chapter 3, and therefore gives an inadequate view of the role of critical reXection in Hume’s account of human cognition. His “subordination thesis” has also been challenged as a misrepresentation of the relation between “reason” and “feeling” in Hume’s thought.15 Finally, although he explores the relation between Hume’s epistemology and his moral theory, Kemp Smith does not extend the scope of his discussion to Hume’s writings in other areas of philosophy and intellectual inquiry. Since the early twentieth century, a number of studies have challenged these prevailing approaches to the interpretation of Hume, and have indicated some of the directions in which an alternative approach to the constructive interpretation of his philosophy might be developed.16 These challenges have become increasingly prominent in the last forty years, especially since the middle of 13. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 84–86 and 545. 14. For these and other criticisms of Kemp Smith, see Lenz, “Hume’s Defense of Causal Inference,” 169–70; Hearn, “Norman Kemp Smith,” 3–7; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 57–67; Norton, David Hume, 3–20; Agassi, “Smith’s Term ‘Naturalism,’” 92–96; and Gaskin, Hume’s Philosophy of Religion, 108–19. Mounce provides a discussion of several different uses of the term “naturalism” in Hume’s Naturalism, 1–14, though I am not convinced that either Mounce’s “Scottish naturalism” or his “scientiWc naturalism” correspond to Kemp Smith’s conception of Hume’s naturalism. 15. See especially Norton, David Hume, 17–20 and 208–38. 16. Some of these valuable earlier studies of Hume include those by Mary Shaw Kuypers, Ralph Church, Constance Maund, William Gordon Ross, and Rachael M. Kydd.
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David Hume: Reason in History
the 1970s. The contributors to this trend, such as John Stewart, Páll Árdal, Nicholas Capaldi, Duncan Forbes, Annette Baier, Fred Wilson, David Fate Norton, Peter Jones, Donald Livingston, John Danford, Jennifer Herdt, Don Garrett, David Owen, and Dale Jacquette, have pursued new investigations into almost every aspect of Hume’s philosophy, and also into the relation between his philosophy and the other areas of his thought.17 I will refer frequently to these and other studies throughout this book. Finally, several recent studies have even regarded Hume’s philosophy and his larger intellectual project as anticipations of the so-called postmodern movement in contemporary thought. Hume’s afWnity to postmodernism has been traced especially in his account of the tension between skepticism and naturalism; in his move from philosophy to the study of history, literature, and politics; in his criticism of earlier approaches to establishing normative principles for cognition and action; and in his use of irony, multiple perspectives, and other playful devices in his writings.18 In this book I argue, drawing upon many of these recent studies, that Hume’s philosophy can be understood more accurately and completely as an examination of “reason in history,” or as an account of the historical dimension of rationality. This unifying theme will become apparent through a systematic study of his account of the elements of human cognition and the standards of justiWcation in the different areas of human life and thought. In the Wrst Wve chapters I examine Hume’s account of cognition, with particular attention to the formation of abstract ideas and their relation to language; the principles of philosophical probable reasoning; the role of imagination in our ideas of space, time, causation, external existence, and personal identity; and his defense of “moderate,” “mitigated,” or “academic” skepticism. In the remaining eight chapters I consider his application of these principles to the study of human nature, and to our reasonings in what we now call the various humanistic and social-scientiWc disciplines. Throughout this study I call attention to Hume’s consideration of the inXuence of social context and historical tradition on the various aspects of human thought and consciousness, such as the formation of abstract ideas, the use of language, the acquisition of beliefs, the formulation 17. Waxman criticizes the naturalizing tendency in recent Hume scholarship and seeks to reafWrm the skeptical implications of Hume’s philosophy; see Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 1–23 and 266–79. However, he then calls attention to Hume’s constructive view of the contribution of the human mind to the constitution of its objects and also acknowledges Hume’s transition from an examination of the individual mind in Book 1 of the Treatise to the social context of the passions and morality in Books 2 and 3. 18. See Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, and Parusnikova, “Against the Spirit of Foundations,” 1–17. For an interpretation of Hume’s literary career in a postmodern style, see Christensen, Practicing Enlightenment. Hume’s philosophy has also been regarded as an alternative to both modernism and postmodernism; see Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, 383–407; Danford, Problem of Reason, 14–25; and Williams, Cultivated Reason.
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of the standards of scientiWc judgment, the directing of the passions toward various objects, and the development of moral, political, aesthetic, and religious traditions. I also consider his account of the principles by which various aspects of human life are to be explained as products of human nature in general, of a particular cultural and historical tradition, or of critical reXection. Hume frequently afWrms his intention to establish the principles of the “sciences,” or the various intellectual disciplines. In the introduction to the Treatise he expresses dismay over the “present imperfect condition of the sciences,” where “there is nothing which is not the subject of debate.” He then proposes to reassess all of the other areas of human inquiry by beginning with the “science of man,” since by explaining the principles of human nature “we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.” He even suggests that “Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion” must ultimately be established on the foundations provided by the “science of man,” although the Treatise is more particularly directed toward the subjects belonging to “moral philosophy,” including “Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics” (t Int.2–6 [sbn xiii–xvi]; cf. a p.3 [sbn 643–44]).19 In the Wrst “Advertisement,” which was published with the Wrst two volumes of the Treatise, he describes the general plan of this work: beginning with a study of the understanding and the passions, and then proceeding to morals, politics, and criticism (t Adv.1 [sbn xii]). He echoes this plan in the concluding sections of both Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise, in which he considers our motives for intellectual inquiry as a transition to his topics in the rest of the Treatise (t 1.4.7.12–15, 2.3.10.1–12 [sbn 270–74, 448–54]). Similarly, he concludes the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding with a summary of the principles of reasoning that belong to the different natural and human sciences (ehu 12.26–34; cf. 8.18 [sbn 163–65; cf. 90]). He further examines the principles of explanation in the human sciences in his essays, in his writings on religion, and in the History of England. Hume’s contributions to what we would now identify as the various academic disciplines are important, not only for the development of these disciplines, but also as a sustained effort to explore the implications of philosophical inquiry for understanding the methodological foundations of the sciences. In this respect, he calls attention to the signiWcance and value of philosophy for understanding the methodological principles of the individual academic disciplines. 19. In eighteenth-century English usage, “natural philosophy” refers to what we now call the natural sciences, while “moral philosophy” refers to the “human sciences,” or what we now call the humanities and social sciences. Indeed, the subsequent German distinction between the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften is itself derived from Mill’s related distinction between the “natural” and “moral” sciences. See Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, 57.
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David Hume: Reason in History
The arrangement of this study will reXect the general order in which Hume’s philosophical arguments are developed, and in which his major works were written and published.20 At least in Hume’s case, the sequence of his writings also provides a convenient structure for the systematic organization of his thought.21 I will accordingly advance from his initial analysis of ideas at the beginning of the Treatise (Chapter 1) to his works in religion and history (Chapters 12 and 13). In Chapters 1 through 5, I consider Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics, as these include in his account of ideas, demonstrative reasoning, causal reasoning, the traditional topics of metaphysics, and the various types of skepticism. These topics are addressed in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature, in his anonymously published Abstract to the Treatise of Human Nature, and in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine his account of the passions in Book 2 of the Treatise and the dissertation “Of the Passions,” and his analysis of human action in Book 2 of the Treatise and in the Wrst Enquiry. In Chapters 8 and 9, I turn to his moral and political theories, as these are developed in Book 3 of the Treatise, in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and in his essays.22 In Chapters 10 through 12, I consider Hume’s economic theory, as presented in the Political Discourses and other essays; his aesthetic theory, especially in the essays “Of Tragedy” and “Of the Standard of Taste”; and his various discussions of religion in the Wrst Enquiry, the Natural History of Religion, the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and in his political and historical writings. Finally, in Chapter 13, I examine his various discussions of historical method, and his approach to the writing of history, especially in his six-volume History of England. In the conclusion I provide a summary of the relation between history and reason in Hume’s thought by considering his view of the historical dimension of human consciousness. I then 20. For a bibliography of Hume’s works and their publication history from the original editions through 1937, and of translations and responses, see Jessop, Bibliography, 5–43. A more recent and complete catalog of Hume’s works, mainly of the editions which appeared during his own lifetime, is included in Ikeda, David Hume, 1–181. On the chronology of Hume’s manuscripts, see Stewart, “Hume’s Manuscripts,” 267–314. 21. For valuable biographies of Hume, see Greig, David Hume; Mossner, Life of David Hume; and Streminger, David Hume: Sein Leben und sein Werk. 22. Hume published a collection (his Wrst) of Wfteen essays, Essays, Moral and Political, in 1741; a second collection of twelve essays in 1742; and a collection of three essays in 1748. Additional essays were published in the Political Discourses in 1752 and the Four Dissertations of 1757. Most of these essays were included, with the two Enquiries, in his collected Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. This collection, in one, two, or four volumes, was Wrst published starting in 1753, and then reissued in a series of revised editions until the posthumous edition of 1777. The essay section in this collection was given the subtitle “Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary” after 1758. Hume retitled several of his essays, withdrew some from publication, and added others over the course of these editions. He also wrote two essays, “Of Suicide” and “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” which were circulated but not published under his name during his lifetime because of their controversial treatment of religious topics. See Jessop, Bibliography, 5–42; Eugene Miller, “Foreword,” xi–xviii; and Ikeda, David Hume, xvi–xvii.
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consider some of the implications of my interpretation of Hume for understanding his relation to a variety of later discussions, including subsequent developments in German philosophy, recent discussions within analytic philosophy concerning the social and historical dimensions of human cognition, and current discussions of the Enlightenment and modernity across the academic disciplines. Readers of Hume are often bewitched, or bedeviled, by a variety of interpretive problems arising from the literary artistry and subtlety of his writings, including not only the complexity of his prose but also his frequent uses of irony and the dialogue form.23 Indeed, several recent studies have called attention to the dialectical character of many passages in his writings. These include not only the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the coda entitled “A Dialogue” at the end of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and the Epicurean dialogue in Section 11 of the Wrst Enquiry, but also his juxtaposition of voices and opinions in many of his political and philosophical essays, and even his dramatic progression in the Treatise of Human Nature from an examination of the principles of the human mind, through the darkness of total skepticism, to a renewed enthusiasm for his further inquiries into the passions, morals, and political theory.24 I address many of the resulting issues of interpretation as they arise. Most notably, I argue in Chapters 3 and 12 that Philo should be regarded as the main spokesman in the Dialogues for Hume’s general philosophical view; and, in Chapter 5, that Hume intends to provide a constructive account of human cognition in the concluding section of Book 1 of the Treatise. I also emphasize the consistency of his thought over the course of his literary career, although I consider some of the changes in presentation between his writings, especially from the Treatise to the two Enquiries. Since Hume’s intellectual interests are reXected in his correspondence with his friends and fellow literati, I also occasionally cite his letters. However, it is important to note that Hume tended to adjust the tone and content of each letter according to its intended reader, and that he generally valued goodwill and courtesy over argument and persuasion in written exchanges with his friends, and even with his critics.25 I will accordingly indicate if he seems to be treating a given topic either more circumspectly or more candidly in a letter than in his published writings, by considering the style of the letter, and the nature of his relationship with the recipient. 23. On Hume’s literary style and its relation to his philosophical concerns, see Price, The Ironic Hume; Christensen, Practicing Enlightenment; and Box, Suasive Art of David Hume. 24. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 34–59, and Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, 97–100, 137–40, and 168–71; Baier, Progress of Sentiments; Rorty, “From Passions to Sentiments,” 165–79; Immerwahr, “Hume’s Essays on Happiness,” 307–24; Malherbe, “Hume and the Art of Dialogue,” 201–23. 25. For examples, see his letters to his friend Hugh Blair in 1761 (l 1.348–51), and also to his critic George Campbell in 1762 (l 1.360–61).
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David Hume: Reason in History
This study is intended to provide a uniWed and constructive interpretation of Hume’s thought in his various writings. Since this is in itself a demanding project, I have not attempted to criticize or evaluate Hume’s arguments, at least to the extent that is usual among contemporary philosophers in studies of their predecessors. On the other hand, I would argue that attempts to understand historical texts in philosophy can and should be directed, not only toward evaluating arguments and tracing the history of issues which are currently popular in philosophy, but also toward discovering new perspectives and new problems that might have been overlooked by previous commentators. Accordingly, in the present study I show that many misleading interpretations of Hume’s project, both in its details and in its overall character, have become entrenched in the subsequent philosophical tradition. I hope that a renewed consideration of the unity and constructive character of Hume’s thought, and of the history of its interpretation, will in itself be a useful and valuable contribution to discussions in contemporary philosophy. I have not attempted to provide a systematic account of the background and sources of Hume’s thought in the works of his predecessors, or a systematic overview of Hume’s inXuence in the history of philosophy.26 I also have not discussed extensively his own social, intellectual, and cultural context, beyond what is required for considering the theoretical signiWcance of his remarks concerning contemporary life and various current events in Europe, Great Britain, and Scotland.27 In other words, although I explore Hume’s approach to history, including the study of human cognition, emotion, and volition within their historical context, I am approaching these topics by examining the principles formulated by Hume for pursuing these inquiries. While these principles were indeed developed in the context of his own time, place, and intellectual tradition, Hume intended them to be applicable to the study of human nature in any culture, by anyone who is willing to share the intellectual commitments he defends. I will approach the explanation and interpretation of his philosophy in this spirit. I have been perpetually encouraged, delighted, and challenged in preparing this book by the Xourishing community of Hume scholars. It is regrettably no longer possible, if indeed it ever was, to consult every publication that would be relevant to a general study of this nature. I have therefore referred mainly to 26. The editors of the Clarendon and Oxford Philosophical Text editions of Hume’s writings have provided valuable references to many of Hume’s sources and predecessors. See the notes and editorial apparatus by David Fate Norton and Mary Norton in the OPT edition of the Treatise, and by Tom Beauchamp in the Clarendon and OPT editions of the two Enquiries. 27. For recent studies of Hume’s immediate intellectual context in eighteenth-century Scotland, see Sher, Church and University; Allan, Virtue, Learning, and the Scottish Enlightenment; and Wood, Scottish Enlightenment. For an eminently readable history of Scotland during this period, including economic, political, cultural, and intellectual developments, see Herman, How the Scots Invented the Modern World.
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those works (and they are many) that I have found to be especially important in the development of my own thinking about Hume, without attempting to provide a comprehensive survey of the secondary literature on every topic included here. I hope that these references will provide a valuable point of departure for readers who wish to pursue any of the topics in my study, or to contest some aspect of my interpretation of Hume. Finally, a word on the title of this study. The phrase “reason in history” was introduced by Hegel in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and was adopted either by Hegel or by his editor, Johannes Hoffmeister, as the subtitle for Hegel’s introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of history, apparently to summarize their underlying theme.28 Hume and Hegel are often regarded as representing the extreme poles of empiricism and idealism, although Hegel was actually inXuenced by Hume’s historical writings in at least one important respect, as we will see in Chapter 13. However, many recent studies have observed that Hume and Hegel are among the relatively few philosophers who were deeply interested in the study of history, and in pursuing the connections between history and philosophy.29 In this study I hope to show that Hume, like Hegel, seeks to develop a constructive account of human reason, and that Hume, like Hegel, also locates the activity of human reason in history, although his style in approaching these topics is clearly different from that of his successor. I have, therefore, freely borrowed my subtitle from the realm of Hegelian discourse, since the phrase “reason in history” also expresses what I regard as the unifying theme in Hume’s thought.
28. See the selection from Hegel’s Encyclopedia in Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, 277 (§549), and Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 1. 29. See Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 2 and 36; Rorty, “From Passions to Sentiments,” 169; and Williams, Cultivated Reason, 26.
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Hume introduces his examination of the “nature and principles of the human mind” in the Treatise with an account in Book 1, Part 1 of the “origin, composition, connexion, abstraction, &c” of our ideas, which he identiWes as “the elements of this philosophy” (t 1.1.2.1, 1.1.1.1, 1.1.4.7 [sbn 8, 1, 13]). Hume’s analysis of ideas has often been taken to reXect an atomistic, passive, and individualistic account of the human mind.1 In this chapter I show that Hume attempts not only to identify the contents of our mental states but also to characterize the different intentional states in which we apprehend this content. I also examine his account of the various activities of the mind, as these appear in our abilities to recall, compare, distinguish, rearrange, connect, and combine the ideas we derive from sensations, in order to formulate fanciful images, abstract ideas, and judgments. In addition, I argue that Hume recognizes the inXuence of social and historical existence on our formation and application of abstract ideas, by indicating that these operations are facilitated in the individual, and coordinated among individuals, as they learn the language of a particular community. Finally, I show that Hume presents both of the “Wrst principles” in his “science of human nature”—that ideas are copies of impressions, and that 1. See Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences, 210–11; Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 255–66; Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 18–52; and Pears, Hume’s System, 16–30 and 114–15.
13
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the imagination is able to rearrange our ideas—as principles of analysis which we should apply conjointly in order to trace the genealogy of our complex ideas, including ideas which are signiWed by various philosophical terms.
perceptions Hume introduces the term “perception” in the Treatise to designate the contents, or constituent elements, of human consciousness. He initially states that “nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions,” and later adds that “the only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions,” since these alone are “immediately present to us by consciousness” (t 1.1.1.1, 1.2.6.7, 1.4.2.47 [sbn 1, 67, 212]). Hume also describes a perception as an “object of our thought,” or an “object” in the primary sense of the term. He distinguishes an object in this sense, as the content of any conscious state, from “external objects,” which are supposed to have a continued existence apart from the mind, but are known to us only “by those perceptions they occasion” (t 1.2.6.2–7 [sbn 66–67]). Among our perceptions he includes all of the sensory, affective, and cognitive modiWcations of the human mind, such as “the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking” (t 3.1.1.2; cf. 1.3.7.5n20, 1.4.2.7 [sbn 456; cf. 96–97n1, 190]). Finally, he argues that individual perceptions may be regarded as “substances,” at least according to the deWnition of a “substance” as whatever may be “consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately,” and has “no need of any thing else” to support its existence (t 1.4.5.5 [sbn 233]). As we will see in Chapter 4, Hume eventually seeks to show that our ideas of external objects and of the self are produced by the mind through its various activities in combining our perceptions, and that we have no foundation or justiWcation for these ideas apart from the constructive activity of the imagination. Next, Hume divides our perceptions into “impressions” and “ideas,” which he initially states are distinguished from each other by the different “degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind.” Of these, impressions are generally more forceful and lively, and include “all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their Wrst appearance in the soul,” while ideas are the “faint images” of these in our “thinking and reasoning.” However, Hume also concedes that our impressions and ideas may in some cases “very nearly approach to each other” in vividness. Thus, for example, “in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul” our ideas may resemble impressions in their vivacity, while on the other hand our impressions may at times become “so faint and low” that we cannot distinguish them from ideas. Here, in addition to his quantitative distinction between impressions and ideas
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in terms of their degrees of vivacity, Hume appears to endorse a qualitative distinction between the types of conscious states in which we respectively apprehend impressions and ideas, which we recognize as “the difference betwixt feeling and thinking” (t 1.1.1.1 [sbn 1–2]). This qualitative distinction is more explicitly indicated in the Abstract, where he states that “when we feel a passion or emotion,” or the inXuence of external objects on our senses, our perception is called an “impression,” while “when we reXect on a passion or an object which is not present, this perception is an idea” (a 5 [sbn 647]). Here he suggests that we can recognize a difference in the subjective quality of our conscious states between our immediate apprehension of a sensation or emotion and our reXective apprehension of the same sensation or emotion when it is represented by an idea. This reference to the two types of intentional states involved in our apprehending of perceptions, either as impressions or as ideas, anticipates his account of belief, in contrast to the imagination, as a distinctive “manner” of conceiving ideas, as we will see later in this chapter (cf. t 1.3.7.7 [sbn 629]).2 Hume further divides our impressions, or feelings, into “impressions of sensation” and “impressions of reXection.” An “impression of sensation” is one that “strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other” (t 1.1.2.1 [sbn 7–8]). He later divides our impressions of sensation into three apparent types: impressions of shape, motion, and solidity, which we generally regard as qualities of external objects; impressions of color, taste, smell, heat, and cold, which we commonly attribute to objects but which modern philosophers regard as modiWcations of the mind arising from the inXuence of external objects; and impressions of pleasure and pain, which everyone regards as mental states rather than qualities of external objects (t 1.4.2.12 [sbn 192]). By contrast, “impressions of reXection” include the “passions, desires, and emotions,” which arise in the mind in response to our ideas of pleasurable or painful sensations (t 1.1.2.1 [sbn 7–8]). In the Wrst Enquiry Hume characterizes this division of our impressions as a distinction between “outward” and “inward” sensations: a view echoed by Philo’s observation in the Dialogues that the “materials” of human thought include the ideas derived from “internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses,” which together comprise “the whole furniture of human understanding” (ehu 2.9 [sbn 22]; dnr 3.156). 2. This account of Hume’s description of the different “manners” in which we conceive our ideas, as an attempt to describe the distinct “phenomenological” qualities of different intentional states, is developed especially by Waxman; see Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 18. See also Butler, “Hume’s Impressions,” 122–36. Stevenson argues that in Hume’s view self-consciousness is a product of the phenomenological feelings of vivacity and of an easy transition in our perceptions; see “Humean Self-Consciousness Explained,” 95–129.
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Finally, Hume introduces a distinction between “simple” and “complex” perceptions, which he applies to both impressions and ideas. Of these, simple perceptions “admit of no distinction nor separation,” while complex perceptions may be “distinguish’d into parts” (t 1.1.1.2 [sbn 2]). Unfortunately, Hume’s characterization of simple perceptions is almost immediately obscured by his rather haphazard presentation of his own examples, and by an ambiguity in his account of two apparent ways in which ideas may be “distinguished” or “separated” by the mind. In his initial example, Hume identiWes the “colour, taste, and smell” of an apple as simple impressions of sensation, since these qualities are “not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other” (t 1.1.1.2 [sbn 2]). Here and elsewhere he apparently identiWes the idea of a quality, such as a particular color, as a “simple idea” (cf. t 1.1.7.7n5 [sbn 637]). Next, referring to our idea of a winged horse, he indicates that the imagination can separate and rearrange our ideas of the spatially extended parts of complex impressions. In this context he argues that “there are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable,” so that “wherever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation,” in this case by imagining part of one type of animal body as separated from that type of animal and attached to another (t 1.1.3.4 [sbn 10]). Finally, he describes the union of color and shape in a visual impression, for example in our view of a globe of white marble, as a “simplicity” (t 1.1.7.18 [sbn 25]). In these cases he apparently characterizes Wrst the qualities of a complex perception, then the parts of a complex perception, and Wnally a given combination of qualities in our perception of an external object, as simple perceptions. While the parts of an animal body can clearly be imagined as existing separately from that body, and as attached to another object, Hume’s analysis becomes less straightforward when he considers the senses in which the qualities of complex perceptions can be “distinguished” from each other. In the discussion of abstract ideas with which he concludes the presentation of his theory of ideas, he reafWrms the principle “that all ideas, which are different, are separable,” and further identiWes what is “separable” with what is “distinguishable.” He then argues that although we cannot separate certain types of qualities, such as color and shape, from each other in a literal sense as separate impressions or images, we can recognize and consider these as separate qualities by comparing one perception to another and attending to their resembling or contrasting qualities: an activity he calls a “distinction of reason.” In his example, we cannot distinguish the color of a marble globe from its shape by forming separate images of its color or shape. However, we can distinguish color and shape from each other, and from the object as a whole, in a Wgurative sense through a distinction of reason, by directing our attention toward various resemblances and
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differences between our perception of the globe and our perceptions of other objects (t 1.1.7.17–18 [sbn 24–25]). A “distinction of ideas” is thus distinguished from the “real difference” which subsists between those perceptions we can imagine as existing separately (t 1.2.6.6 [sbn 67]). Interestingly enough, while he denies in Part 1 that we can imagine the qualities of color and shape as existing separately, in Part 4 he afWrms that even though “the colour, taste, Wgure, solidity, and other qualities, combin’d in a peach or melon, are conceiv’d to form one thing,” the mind recognizes these qualities as “different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other.” In this context he even maintains that since each quality is “a distinct thing from another,” every quality “may be conceiv’d to exist apart, and may exist apart,” not only from a supposed substance, but also from every other quality (t 1.4.3.5–7 [sbn 221–22]). In order to provide a clearer reconstruction of Hume’s account of simple perceptions, or those perceptions which are really separable, we may turn to his discussion of our ideas of space and time in Part 2. Here he identiWes the minimal points of color and texture which appear in our sensory Weld as simple perceptions, by describing our minimum possible impressions of color and texture as “simple and uncompounded,” and our ideas of these points as “perfectly simple and indivisible” (t 1.2.1.4–5 [sbn 28]).3 These points have one quality, a color or texture, but no shape; and our perception of a colored or textured shape is actually a complex perception made up of these indivisible points (cf. t 1.2.2.9 [sbn 32]). Hume subsequently characterizes various other uniform but nonspatial impressions, such as pure sounds, tastes, and smells, as simple (t 1.1.7.7n5; cf. 1.2.3.10, 1.4.2.12–16, 1.4.5.10–14 [sbn 637; cf. 36, 191–94, 235–39]), along with various passions (t 2.1.2.1, 2.2.1.1 [sbn 277, 329]). However, it would seem, according to his analysis, that if we attribute simplicity to minimum visible and tangible points in space, we should also attribute simplicity to nonspatial perceptions only as they appear in minimal temporal points of awareness, since one moment in the continuing awareness of a sound or a passion can presumably be separated from another by the imagination.4 As we have seen, Hume initially argues that color and shape cannot be separated from each other by “thought and imagination,” but only through a “distinction of reason” (t 1.1.7.3, 1.1.7.17–18 [sbn 18, 24–25]). However, in Part 2 he maintains that minimal visible points can only be seen or imagined as points of color, although he does not offer any speciWc evidence that we can recognize the color of a minimum visible point (cf. t 1.2.3.4–5 [sbn 34]). 3. See Hawkins, “Simplicity, Resemblance and Contrariety,” 25; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 60–64; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 11–55 and 181–83; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 43–128. 4. See Hawkins, “Simplicity, Resemblance and Contrariety,” 25.
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According to this analysis, minimal points of color seem to be simple perceptions that can be perceived and imagined separately, although they can also be combined in the complex perception of a colored shape. By contrast, our idea of a particular shape is a complex idea, which we can only formulate, as a distinction of reason, by comparing the distribution of colored or textured points in a variety of complex perceptions. On this reconstruction of Hume’s view, simple perceptions would thus consist in those minimal points of color and texture, and those momentary appearances of uniform nonspatial qualities such as sounds, smells, and passions, which we can perceive separately, and imagine as existing separately, from other spatially or temporally minimal perceptions.5 Finally, Hume also maintains that we can recognize various resemblances and differences even between our simple perceptions, thereby indicating that we may identify different aspects of these uniform perceptions through distinctions of reason, even though these aspects cannot be perceived or imagined as existing separately from a perception. These recognizable aspects of our simple perceptions include the hue or saturation of colors, the pitch or volume of sounds, and the painful or pleasurable character of our passions (t 1.1.7.7n5; cf. 2.1.4.3 [sbn 637; cf. 283]). This ambiguity in Hume’s use of the terms “distinguishable,” for either a “real” distinction or a “distinction of reason,” introduces a surreptitious difWculty into the two maxims of analysis he claims to derive from his “second principle” concerning the activity of the imagination. These are, that “whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination,” and conversely that “whatever objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are also different” (t 1.1.3.4, 1.1.7.3 [sbn 10, 18]). In light of the present discussion, we should be prepared to distinguish between those perceptions, such as minimum visible points, which are “really” distinguishable and separable, or can be perceived or imagined as existing separately, and those qualities of our perceptions, such as the shape of a spatially extended object or the pitch of a sound, which can we can attend to and identify by a distinction of reason, but which cannot be perceived or imagined as existing separately (cf. t 1.2.6.6 [sbn 67]). We should accordingly always consider whether he intends to identify a real distinction or a distinction of reason in order to understand his application of these maxims in any particular case.6 5. For other discussions of Hume’s conception of simplicity, see Hawkins, “Simplicity, Resemblance and Contrariety,” 24–38; Russow, “Simple Ideas and Resemblance,” 342–50; Hausman, “Simple/Complex Distinction,” 424–28; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 42–46; Cummins, “Hume on Qualities,” 49–88; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 60–64; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 11–55 and 181–83; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 57–65. 6. For a general discussion of Hume’s separability principle, see Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 58–75.
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Next, Hume calls attention to the “great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas,” which “appear always to correspond to each other.” Here he Wnds that all of our ideas resemble our impressions of sensation or reXection, and that all of our impressions may be represented by ideas. However, since we may formulate complex ideas that do not exactly resemble any of our complex impressions, he traces this correspondence to resemblances between simple ideas and the simple impressions that make up our complex impressions. We may thus form a complex idea of “the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies,” by imaginatively rearranging the simple ideas of color and texture in the complex ideas derived from our complex impressions of golden objects, rubies, pavements, and walls (t 1.1.1.3–4 [sbn 2–3]; cf. ehu 2.2–9 [sbn 17–22]). Hume also maintains that we cannot formulate a simple idea unless it has been preceded by a resembling simple impression. In other words, simple ideas are “images of our impressions” (t 1.1.1.11 [sbn 6]). Here he appeals to the “constant experience” of his readers, in our own memories of the impressions from which we have derived our simple ideas of various qualities, and our observations of how others appear to acquire these ideas from impressions. For example, we Wnd that none of us can form a “just idea” of the Xavor of a pineapple until we have tasted one, and we agree that a person who has been blind from birth cannot formulate the idea of a color (t 1.1.1.8–9 [sbn 4–5]).7 As the “Wrst principle” in his “science of human nature,” Hume thus asserts “that all our simple ideas in their Wrst appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (t 1.1.1.12, 1.1.1.7 [sbn 7, 4]; cf. ehu 2.5 [sbn 19]). We may therefore summarize Hume’s account of the derivation of our perceptions in the following terms. The initial contents of human consciousness are impressions of sensation, which may then give rise to ideas, or remembered images of these sensations. These ideas may, in turn, give rise to another set of impressions: the passions, or impressions of reXection. Finally, we may also formulate ideas of the passions, as well as “secondary ideas” of our preceding ideas, ideas of these ideas, and so on (t 1.1.1.11 [sbn 6–7]). After this preliminary analysis, Hume assigns the task of studying human sensations, considered as physiological processes, to the natural philosopher or scientist, while including the study of ideas and the passions in his own project 7. Hume considers one possible exception to this principle: the alleged fact that we would be able to imagine a particular shade of color, such as a “missing shade of blue,” when confronted by a gap in a sequence of shades of that color in our visual Weld, even if we had never seen that shade before (t 1.1.1.10 [sbn 6]; sbn 2.8 [sbn 20–21]). However, he evidently regards this as a unique case that does not subvert his copy principle. For several of many attempts to explain and assess this counterexample, see Russow, “Simple Ideas and Resemblance,” 342–50; Williams, “Is Hume’s Shade of Blue a Red Herring?” 83–99; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 50–52; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 61–62.
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as a moral philosopher (t 1.1.2.1, 2.1.1.2 [sbn 7–8, 275–76]). With the study of sensation set aside, he concludes that in order to examine the “nature and principles of the human mind” we should reverse the method that might at Wrst seem to be the most natural and obvious, by presenting “a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions” (t 1.1.2.1 [sbn 8]). He accordingly devotes Book 1 to an examination of our ideas, before turning in Books 2 and 3 to our impressions of reXection, or the passions and the moral sentiments. Hume’s Wrst principle, which is often referred to as his “copy principle,” has been widely described and criticized as an “imagist” theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is determined by its conjunction with a mental image. For example, Flew has denounced Hume’s “uncritical assumption that ideas, conceived as mental images, must play an essential part in the signiWcant employment of words,” and that “no word can be employed meaningfully unless the user either has, or is disposed to have, appropriate imagery.”8 Other critics of Hume have argued that this theory of linguistic meaning cannot be applied to many of the terms in his own philosophical system, and have suggested that Hume departs almost immediately from his “ofWcial theory.”9 In later sections of this chapter I will show that, although he indeed maintains that the use of a general term is always accompanied by imagery, Hume does not simply reduce the meaning of a word to the ability to frame an individual image, and that he does not identify the meaningful use of a word with the production of a complete, distinct, and positive image of the designated object. This discussion will require us to consider his account of abstract ideas and general terms, which he presents in the concluding section of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise, and his remarks concerning language in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise and in the second Enquiry. I will return to these subjects after considering his account of the creative activity of the mind, as this is reXected in the formation of complex ideas and in the associating of our ideas.
m e m o r y a n d i m a g i nat i o n After his initial survey of our perceptions, Hume identiWes memory and imagination as the two mental operations by which an impression that has been “present with the mind” can appear again as an idea (t 1.1.3.1 [sbn 8–9]). 8. Flew, David Hume, 20. See also Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 22–23; Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 222–34; Hunter, “Concepts and Meaning,” 148–49; Pears, Hume’s System, 16–30; and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 5–34. A further discussion of this interpretation is provided by Jacquette in David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 206–21. 9. See Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 205–9 and 279–84; Stroud, Hume, 8–10 and 17–41; and Ayer, Hume, 32–33.
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Hume presents “the liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideas” as the “second principle” in his science of human nature (t 1.1.3.4 [sbn 10]). In the Enquiry he adds that nothing might seem “more unbounded than the thought of man,” which is able to combine “incongruous shapes and appearances” beyond the limits of reality, although it cannot create images without preceding impressions, or in violation of the principle of contradiction (ehu 2.4 [sbn 18]). The imagination when deliberately used to produce novel images is called “fancy,” and this activity is especially apparent in “the fables we meet with in poems and romances,” where nature is “totally confounded, and nothing mention’d but winged horses, Wery dragons, and monstrous giants” (t 1.1.3.4 [sbn 10]; cf. cmh 56–60). However, in the course of the Treatise Hume also presents the imagination as the faculty by which we are able to separate, connect, and combine our ideas in the formulation of concepts and judgments (t 1.1.4.1–2, 1.1.6.2, 1.1.7.3–15; cf. 1.3.7.5n20 [sbn 10–11, 16, 18–24; cf. 96–97n1]), and to extend our ideas of space and time beyond the arrangement of our immediate impressions of sensation (t 1.2.5.14–19, 1.2.5.29 [sbn 58–60, 65). Indeed, he identiWes a further activity of the imagination by observing that “the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it,” so that once the mind has embarked “in the train of observing an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible” (t 1.4.2.22; cf. 1.2.4.24 [sbn 198; cf. 48]). Hume had already described this activity of the imagination in his early manuscript, “An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour,” in which he observes “of the human Mind” that whenever it is “smit with any Idea of Merit or Perfection beyond what its Faculties can attain,” it immediately runs “quite wide of Nature” and generates new passions, objects, desires, laws of nature, and even principles of conduct (cmh 57).10 As we will see, in his philosophical writings Hume argues that this propensity of the imagination produces our ideas of geometric equality, empty space, empty time, causal connections, the continued existence of external objects, and a continuing personal identity. Indeed, he eventually describes the various activities commonly attributed to human understanding as arising from the “general and more establish’d properties of the imagination,” in contrast to the “trivial suggestions of the fancy” (t 1.4.7.7; cf. 1.4.4.1, 2.3.9.10 [sbn 267; cf. 225, 440]). Hume accordingly maintains that the mind, by the power of the imagination, 10. M. A. Stewart has argued, based on the paper, handwriting, and content, that Hume wrote this essay between 1730 and 1734, and most probably in 1731, when he was around twenty; see “Hume’s Manuscripts,” 267–76. In this account Stewart is challenging Mossner’s speculation that this essay was written around 1725 when Hume was a fourteen-year-old student; see Mossner’s introduction to “David Hume’s ‘An Historical Essay,’” 54–60, and Life of David Hume, 46–47. Stewart also indicates that there are a number of errors in Mossner’s transcription of this essay.
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“has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases” (t App.2 [sbn 623–24]). In the Enquiry he describes the imagination as the “creative power of the mind,” by which it engages in “compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials” that are afforded us by our impressions (ehu 2.5 [sbn 19]).11 In his view, the imagination includes, not only the derivative power of fanciful invention, but also the constitutive activity of the mind in its production of a variety of complex ideas that appear to be fundamental to our ordinary cognition.12 While Hume frequently asserts that “nothing is more free” than the imagination (t 1.1.4.1 [sbn 10]; cf. App.2 [sbn 623–24]; ehu 5.10 [sbn 47]), this freedom of the imagination is problematic in the larger context of his system in several respects. First, many of the activities of the imagination, such as the extrapolation of extension in space and time, or the attribution of a causal relation to two events, occur without any deliberate intention on the part of the subject. Second, even the creative fancy is inXuenced by principles of association, although Hume maintains that these principles do not necessarily determine the course of our thoughts, but only act as “a gentle force, which commonly prevails” (t 1.1.4.1 [sbn 10]). On the other hand, he later argues that we must regard the activities of the mind as subject to necessity in the same way as are the voluntary actions of the human body (t 2.3.1.3, 2.3.2.2 [sbn 399–400, 408–9]). I will return to this topic in Chapter 7, where I show that, on Hume’s view, our belief in the necessity of human action depends upon our recognition of a regular conjunction between the actions and character of an individual from the perspective of an external observer. However, this point of view is not available to us in any attempt to trace the sequence of ideas in the mind. Accordingly, the question whether human mental activity is to be regarded as free or determined remains unresolved within Hume’s system. For now, however, we may merely take note of his preliminary assertion that the imagination is limited only by the principle of contradiction and by the materials provided by our impressions, and that we have a subjective feeling of freedom in our imaginative activities of separating, connecting, and combining our ideas. Although Hume gives equal status in the Treatise to the copy theory of ideas and to the freedom of the imagination, as the basic principles in his science of human nature, the activity of the imagination has received considerably less attention in the secondary literature. This general emphasis on the copy theory has led many of his commentators to regard Hume’s view of the mind as 11. For various discussions of Hume on the imagination, see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World; Wilbanks, Hume’s Theory of Imagination; Brand, Hume’s Theory of Moral Judgment, 9–37; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 58–84; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 11–40; and Owen, Hume’s Reason. 12. In this respect Hume anticipates Kant’s distinction between the reproductive and the productive activities of the imagination; see the Critique of Pure Reason, 257 (b 152) and 273–74 (a 141–42 / b 181).
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essentially passive. This view has been challenged especially by Robert Paul Wolff, who argues that Hume began by assuming “that empirical knowledge could be explained by reference to the contents of the mind alone,” but arrived at the “profound discovery that it was the activity of the mind, rather than the nature of its contents,” which must be examined in order to account for the “puzzling features of empirical knowledge.” However, on Wolff’s view, Hume’s “theory of mental activity” is found mainly in his references to “dispositions” or “propensities” of the mind, and must be extracted from “the associationism and copy theory of ideas in which it is embedded.” By contrast, Fred Wilson Wnds a more direct theory of mental activity in Hume’s discussion of the process of causal inference.13 As I have indicated here, Hume offers an even more explicit theory of mental activity in his account of the imagination, which he presents as a counterpart to his account of the receptivity of the mind, as this is articulated in his copy theory of the relation between impressions and ideas.14 Hume’s attempt to characterize the distinction between memory and imagination proceeds through several stages of development in the Treatise. He initially describes the ideas of memory as more “lively and strong” than ideas arising from the imagination; but then adds that memory, unlike imagination, is strictly tied to the “order and position” of a preceding set of perceptions (t 1.1.3.1–3 [sbn 9]). He later reafWrms the superior force and vivacity of memory, and identiWes this as the distinguishing characteristic of belief, while also observing that a faint memory may be mistaken for a product of the imagination, and a vivid Wctitious image for a memory (t 1.3.5.5; cf. 1.3.10.5–9 [sbn 85–86; cf. 120–23]). However, he then describes the contrast between belief and the imagination as a difference in the “manner” in which we conceive our ideas, although he again presents this as a difference of force and vivacity (t 1.3.7.5 [sbn 96–97]).15 Finally, he concedes that there may be “a little ambiguity in those words strong and lively,” and suggests that memory may be characterized by a distinctive “action of the mind in the meditation” or “a 13. See Wolff, “Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity,” 99–100, and Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 8–110. 14. See also Biro, “Hume’s New Science of the Mind,” 33–63, and Wood, “Hume, Reid and the Science of the Mind,” 119–39. 15. Hume uses the word “belief” for a variety of our intentional states (cf. t 1.3.13.19 [sbn 153–54]). These include our conception of an idea as a product of memory rather than imagination (t 1.3.5.6–7 [sbn 86]); our conception of one object as the cause or effect of another (t 1.3.2.15, 1.3.8.8–11 [sbn 78, 101–3]); our assent to propositions concerning matters of fact which we regard as justiWed by probable reasoning, including historical as opposed to Wctional narratives (t 1.3.7.3, 1.3.10.10 [sbn 95–97, 631]); our acceptance of the causal maxim (t 1.3.3.9, 1.3.8.14–15 [sbn 82, 104–7]); and our conception of the distinct and continued existence of external objects (t 1.4.2.1–2, 1.4.2.43–57 [sbn 187–88, 209–18]). However, he offers his direct discussion of belief mainly with reference to memory, particular causal connections, and probable judgments; and I have drawn upon his reXections in all three contexts in order to trace the development of his view, since they seem intended to apply to all of these cases.
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certain je-ne-sçai-quoi, of which ’tis impossible to give any deWnition or description, but which every one sufWciently understands” (t 1.3.8.15–16 [sbn 105–6]). Hume develops this formulation in several additions made to Book 1 in its Appendix, in which he describes belief variously as a “peculiar feeling or sentiment,” and also as a distinctive “manner” in which an idea is conceived. However, he now confesses that “when I wou’d explain this manner, I scarce Wnd any word that fully answers the case, but am oblig’d to have recourse to every one’s feeling.” While he had initially sought to describe this feeling as “a superior force, or vivacity,” he is now dissatisWed with that account, and traces the distinction between belief and imagination instead to a difference in the “feeling or manner of conception” of the idea (t App.2–9, 1.3.7.7 [sbn 623–27, 629]). This allows us to distinguish more effectively between genuine belief and the vivacity produced by “poetical enthusiasm,” since the ideas aroused by a “poetical description” may be more vivid, but are “different to the feeling from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment” (t 1.3.10.10 [sbn 630–32]). Indeed, in the corresponding passage in the original text of the Treatise he refers to the vivacity conferred upon an idea by the poetic imagination as a “counterfeit belief” (t sbn 123).16 In the Appendix he even describes his initial claim in the Treatise that “two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity” as an “error.” Instead, he now states that “there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms,” but are more accurately described as “their different feeling” (t App.22 [sbn 636]). In the Abstract he argues that belief is “nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit” (a 27 [sbn 657]). In the Enquiry he describes the “sentiment” of belief as a “feeling or manner of conception,” or an “act of the mind,” which he cannot explain or deWne. However, he has attempted to indicate this, through what he now calls an analogy, by describing belief as “a more vivid, lively, forcible, Wrm, steady conception of an object” than an idea provided by the imagination alone (ehu 5.12 [sbn 49]). In these passages Hume gradually replaces his contrast between memory and imagination as a quantitative difference in their degrees of force and vivacity, with a qualitative difference in the “feeling” or “manner of conception” of our ideas in cases of belief as opposed to imagination, although he Wnds that he is unable to describe this any further, and can only invite his readers to recognize this feeling from their own understanding of the term “belief.”17 16. This phrase occurs in a paragraph which is marked by Hume in the appendix for replacement with a longer discussion of poetry, in which he refers more moderately to the effect of poetry as “the mere phantom of belief” (t 1.3.10.10–12 [sbn 630–32]). See Norton and Norton, “Substantive Differences,” 252–53. 17. See Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 18–19, 27–42, and 62–63, as well as Butler, “Hume’s Impressions,” 122–36; Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 57–58; Brand, Hume’s Theory of Moral
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Hume also considers the apparent role of judgment, or the understanding, in distinguishing memory from imagination. This is seen, for example, in his initial statement that the ideas of the memory correspond to the original “order and form” of our impressions (t 1.1.3.2 [sbn 9]), and also in his remarks that we may distinguish between history and the “Wctions of poetry” by means of probable reasoning (t 1.3.10.12 [sbn 630–32]). In these passages he suggests that the difference between an idea arising from memory and an idea arising from the imagination is to be found, not in any qualities of our subjective conceptions of these ideas, but in our judgment of their relation to an external and public reality. However, he maintains that the distinction between memory and imagination cannot ultimately rest on such judgments, since we cannot compare the ideas arising from our memory to the actual succession of our perceptions in the past in order to determine whether their arrangement is “exactly similar” (t 1.3.5.3 [sbn 85]). Noxon and Johnson have both argued that Hume is defending a strictly introspective or phenomenological account of the difference between memory and imagination, as opposed to an epistemic account, in his appeals either to “force and vivacity,” or to the “manner” in which we conceive our ideas, as the criterion for recognizing an idea as a memory.18 Flage, on the other hand, proposes that Hume is describing two separate criteria that we recognize as individually necessary, but only conjointly sufWcient conditions for determining whether any particular idea arises from memory rather than imagination. These two criteria are the subjective quality of the idea and a judgment regarding its probable correspondence to an external reality. This judgment arises, however, not from a comparison of our present ideas to the original impressions, but from a comparison of our purported memories with our other present perceptions, with the reported memories of others, and with written documents.19 On Flage’s interpretation, Hume’s account of memory would correspond, in its implicit structure, to his “two deWnitions of a cause,” in which he distinguishes between the subjective determination of the human mind that initially gives rise to our causal beliefs and the principles of judgment through which we evaluate these beliefs (t 1.3.14.31 [sbn 169–70]; ehu 7.29 [sbn 76–77]), as we will see in Chapter 4.20
Judgment, 49–53; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 57, 76–83, and 142–52; and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 147–74. On the role of Hume’s account of belief in his mitigated skepticism, see Norton, “How a Sceptic May Live Scepticism,” 119–39. 18. Noxon, “Remembering and Imagining the Past,” 270–95; Johnson, “‘Lively’ Memory and ‘Past’ Memory,” 343–59. 19. Flage, “Remembering the Past,” 236–44. 20. See also Falkenstein, “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism,” 29–72.
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t h e a s s o c i at i o n o f i d e a s Although he repeatedly afWrms the freedom of the imagination, Hume also Wnds that the imagination is generally “guided by some universal principles,” or associating qualities, “by which one idea naturally introduces another.” As he indicates in the Enquiry, we discover through introspection and conversation that ideas usually present themselves “with a certain degree of method and regularity,” not only in our “serious thinking or discourse,” but also in our “wildest and most wandering reveries.” Hume identiWes three qualities of our perceptions that appear to facilitate the “connexion or association of ideas,” which he also calls the “principles of union or cohesion” among our simple ideas: “resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect” (t 1.1.4.1–6 [sbn 10–12]; ehu 3.1–3 [sbn 23–24]). Hume characterizes the association of ideas as “a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural” (t 1.1.4.6 [sbn 12–13]), and several of his critics have accordingly regarded his theory as a “mechanistic” account of mental operations.21 However, Hume maintains that we should not regard the association of ideas as “an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination,” nor conclude “that without it the mind cannot join two ideas,” since “nothing is more free than that faculty.” Instead, we should regard the three principles of association merely as “as a gentle force, which commonly prevails” (t 1.1.4.1 [sbn 10]). He later states that these principles are “neither the infallible nor the sole causes of an union among ideas,” since the mind has “a very irregular motion in running along its objects, and may leap from the heavens to the earth, from one end of the creation to the other, without any certain method or order” (t 1.3.6.13 [sbn 92]). In comparing the association of ideas to mechanical forces in the physical world, Hume may have been less concerned with any detailed analogy than with calling attention to his use of the theory of association as a fundamental principle for explaining the operations of the human mind. In the introduction to the Treatise Hume calls attention to recent advances in the natural and moral sciences, and proposes to contribute to an emerging “science of man” by discovering the principles of the human mind (t Int.4–10 [sbn xv–xix]). He later asserts in the Abstract that “if any thing can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an inventor,” it is “the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy” (a 35 [sbn 661–62]). In the course of the Treatise Hume accordingly appeals to the association of 21. The mechanistic interpretation of Hume’s theory of ideas was established especially by Thomas Reid: see his Works, 1: 386–88; and Kallich, Association of Ideas, 235–36. See also Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 71–76 and 223–26; and Wolff, “Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity,” 104–5.
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ideas to explain such mental operations as the formation of abstract ideas, our judgments of causation and identity, the generation of the passions, and the development of rules in social and political life. Hume gives less explicit attention to the theory of association in his later works. He refers to this theory only sparingly in the two Enquiries. Indeed, in his Wnal edition of the Wrst Enquiry he shortened Section 3, “Of the Association of Ideas,” by more than three quarters of its original length, leaving a mere three paragraphs (ehu 3.1–3 [sbn 23–24]). The deleted part, which Hume apparently came to regard as an unnecessary digression, examines the principles of association in literary composition, and includes a valuable discussion of narratives in epic poetry and history, as we will see in Chapters 11 and 13 (ehu 3.4–18).22 Several of Hume’s commentators have regarded his lack of later attention to his theory of association as an indication that Hume eventually rejected it, and have even used this claim as the basis for speculations concerning the development of his thought. For example, according to Kemp Smith, Hume developed his theory of association in order to explain the passions and moral sentiments, and then attempted to extend it into his discussion of ideas, only to become dissatisWed with its results in this domain, which led him to abandon the theory of association as a unifying principle for his “science of man.” By contrast, Noxon argues that Hume developed his copy theory and his theory of association as principles of philosophical and psychological analysis respectively, and that he combined these projects in the Treatise but attempted to separate them in his later works. Among these, the Wrst Enquiry is concerned with philosophy rather than psychology, and hence does not require any extensive reference to the theory of association.23 However, while Hume does not explicitly present the theory of association in his later writings as a unifying theme of his philosophy, he continues to appeal to this theory as a basic explanatory principle throughout his works. This is especially evident in the Wrst Enquiry, where he reafWrms his account of association, and again identiWes causation, resemblance, and contiguity as principles of association among our ideas (ehu 3.1–3, 5.14–20 [sbn 23–24, 50–54]). He also returns to this theory in the second Enquiry, where he argues that our ideas of utility in particular actions and objects, and accordingly our ideas of their moral and aesthetic qualities, arise through the association of ideas (epm 5.14, 5.38 [sbn 218, 225]). We also encounter implicit references to the principles of association in his later writings. For example, in the Natural History of Religion Hume traces the origins of polytheism to the “universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves” and to ascribe 22. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 131–36. 23. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 239–55 and 530–40; Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development, 19–25.
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“malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us.” In other words, we have a tendency to attribute emotions and intentions to any being, force, or event in nature which has caused us pleasure or displeasure, on the basis of their resemblance in this regard to human actions (nhr 3.29). The principle of resemblance also gives rise the central concern of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: the argument presented by Cleanthes that the “Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man,” based on the resemblance of the universe as a whole to the products of human design (dnr 2.143). We may also trace the principles of contiguity and causation in Hume’s composition of the main narrative in the History of England, and the principle of resemblance in his appendices concerning social, economic, and cultural history, as these reXect his discussion of the principles of literary and historical composition in the Wrst Enquiry (cf. ehu 3.4–18).
r e l at i o n s , s u b s ta n c e s , a n d m o d e s After considering the natural or spontaneous principles of association, Hume turns to “those complex ideas, which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning,” which he divides into “relations, modes and substances” (t 1.1.4.7 [sbn 13]). In his survey of these complex ideas in sections 5 and 6, and his examination of our ideas of both species and qualities in section 7, Hume in effect develops his own version of the list of categories, or the forms of predication, which serve to structure our judgments. However, this continuity with the traditional Aristotelian discussion of the categories is obscured by Hume’s characterization of judgments as “complex ideas,” and even as “perceptions” (t 1.1.4.7, 3.1.1.2 [sbn 13, 456]). Indeed, in a later footnote Hume rejects any absolute distinction between the cognitive activities of “conception,” “judgment,” and “reasoning,” and maintains that all of these may be regarded as “particular ways of conceiving our objects.” On the other hand, he indicates here and elsewhere in the Treatise that a judgment may be more speciWcally characterized as a proposition that afWrms or denies a state of affairs (t 1.3.7.5n20 [sbn 96–97n1]; cf. 1.3.9.3–4, 2.3.3.6, 2.3.10.2, 3.1.1.9 [sbn 108, 415–16, 448–49, 458]). Hume begins by distinguishing two senses of the word “relation.” The Wrst of these is apparent in the ordinary sense of the word, and refers to the natural principles of association, or to those qualities “by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other.” By contrast, relations in the second sense are discovered through philosophical reXection, and include those qualities according to which “even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them.” In
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other words, “philosophical” relations are those principles by which we compare ideas through understanding and judgment, although these principles are themselves ultimately derived from the spontaneous principles of association. Hume further develops this distinction in his two deWnitions of a cause, as we will see in Chapter 3 (t 1.1.5.1–2; cf. 1.3.14.31 [sbn 13–14; cf. 170]).24 While we discover the natural relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation by tracing the spontaneous activities of the imagination in the association of our ideas, Hume argues that we may identify the different philosophical relations by considering the different ways in which we may compare particular ideas or objects. Through this principle he identiWes seven philosophical relations: these are resemblance, identity, location in time or space, quantity, the degrees of any quality, contrariety, and causation (t 1.1.5.3–9 [sbn 14–15]). Later in the Treatise Hume argues that, “strictly speaking,” a relation is not a property in the objects or ideas themselves, but arises “merely from the comparison, which the mind makes betwixt them” (t 1.2.4.21 [sbn 46]). However, he maintains that objects themselves stand in relations of contiguity and succession to each other “independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding” (t 1.3.14.28 [sbn 168]), and that relations between complex perceptions are founded “on some common quality” among those perceptions (t 1.4.5.11; cf. 1.1.7.7n5 [sbn 236; cf. 637]). In Hume’s view, a relation appears to be a distinctive type of complex idea that is conceived by the imagination by comparing resembling sets of perceptions, as discovered through the principle of resemblance, which is a natural principle of association among our ideas. We attend to the quality in which these sets of perceptions resemble each other, and identify this quality, or relation, through a “distinction of reason.” Finally, by this distinction of reason we formulate a complex idea of this relation as an independent principle of comparison, which we may then apply to sets of perceptions that are not immediately associated together by the spontaneous principles of our imagination. Several of Hume’s critics have cited his discussion of relations as an example of his alleged tendency to confuse logical with psychological explanation.25 However, Hume is attempting to articulate this very distinction by presenting “natural” relations as the psychological principles that appear to direct the association of our ideas, and “philosophical” relations as the principles of comparison and judgment that may be applied to ideas even where there is no spontaneous connection between them in the imagination.26 He develops this 24. On Hume’s theory of relations, see Hausman, “Hume’s Theory of Relations,” 255–82; Van Steenburgh, “Hume’s Ontology,” 164–72; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 10–13, 46–51, and 78–84; and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 79–81. 25. See Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 23–28, and Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 250–51. 26. See Hausman, “Hume’s Theory of Relations,” 255–82.
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initial distinction between the psychological principles of association and the logical principles of judgment further in his account of probable reasoning and his two deWnitions of a cause, as we will see in Chapter 3. Several of Hume’s critics have also argued that he cannot account for the idea of a relation in the context of his theory of ideas.27 However, Hume speciWcally identiWes our idea of a relation as a type of “complex idea,” apparently the idea of a set of qualities belonging to a set of perceptions, which we formulate through a distinction of reason by comparing several resembling sets of perceptions (t 1.1.4.7 [sbn 13]).28 In Book 1, Part 3, Hume returns to his discussion of philosophical relations in order to develop a further classiWcation of the various types of judgment. Here he indicates that four of these philosophical relations—resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and proportions in quantity—depend solely upon the ideas that we are comparing to each other, and may not be altered while these ideas remain the same. The Wrst three—resemblance, contrariety, and degrees of quality—are “discoverable at Wrst sight,” or are directly recognized as they “strike the eye, or rather the mind” in the immediate appearance of our ideas: a recognition which Hume, following Locke, calls “intuition.”29 The fourth, “proportions in quantity or number,” may in some cases also recognized by intuition, but in other cases may require the type of reasoning which we call “demonstration” (t 1.3.1.1–2 [sbn 69–70]). By contrast, the other three relations between our ideas—identity, location in time and space, and causation— may be changed without changing the ideas themselves. Two of these, identity and location, are discovered directly through the activity of the senses in “perception.” Accordingly, it is only the Wnal relation, causation, which can lead us beyond whatever is immediately present to our senses (t 1.3.2.2 [sbn 73–74]). From his seven philosophical relations, Hume therefore identiWes only two, numerical proportions and causation, as possible subjects of “reasoning.” Later in the Treatise he divides the “operations of human understanding” into two, “the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matters of fact.” In the Enquiry he identiWes “all the objects of human reason or enquiry” more simply as “Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact” (t 3.1.1.18 [sbn 463]; ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). I will consider these two types of reasoning in Chapters 2 and 3. 27. See Annand, “Hume’s Theory of Relations,” 581–97, and Gotterbarn, “How Can Hume Know Philosophical Relations?” 133–41. 28. For a similar account of Hume’s derivation of the concept of a relation, see Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 104, and Costa, “Hume on the Very Idea of a Relation,” 71–94. Bertrand Russell presented an inXuential argument that a resemblance theory of concepts, such as that offered by Hume, cannot account for relations, and thus cannot justify its own appeal to the relation of resemblance: see Problems of Philosophy, 95–97. For a defense of the resemblance theory against this criticism, see Aaron, Theory of Universals, 153, and Price, Thinking and Experience, 23–26. 29. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 530–39 (4.2.1–4.3.4).
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Hume also includes our ideas of substances and modes, along with our ideas of relations, among “the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning.” Here he argues that our ideas of modes or substances are in every case really “a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them.” The idea of a substance is the idea of a “principle of union” among a collection of contiguous or causally related qualities: an idea which is extended by the imagination to produce the “Wction” of an “unknown something in which they are supposed to inhere,” as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5. Similarly, the idea of a mode is the complex idea of an activity or condition made up of a combination of qualities, either in a set of objects, as in Hume’s example of a dance, or within a single object, as in the example of beauty (t 1.1.4.7, 1.1.6.2–3 [sbn 13, 15–17]).30 In this discussion of our ideas of natural relations, philosophical relations, modes, and substances, Hume anticipates his themes in the rest of the Treatise. In Part 2 he considers the development of our philosophical conceptions of time and space from the natural relation of contiguity. In Part 3 he compares the natural relation of causation to the philosophical idea of causation. In Part 4 he examines the idea of identity and its relation to the idea of a substance, and then applies his analysis to two types of objects that are often regarded as substances: the mind and external objects. Finally, although he does not appeal to his analysis of modes in this context, he considers our ideas of various modes in Books 2 and 3: including the passions in Book 2—insofar as these are expressed in the observable states and behavior of human beings and animals—and also our idea of virtue, with comparisons to our idea of beauty, in Book 3.
abstract ideas As we have seen, Hume’s preliminary discussion of impressions and ideas has frequently been criticized for identifying linguistic meaning with the purely subjective production of mental images. However, in this section I show that this objection emerges from a misreading of his “Wrst principle” or copy theory of ideas, combined with a tendency to overlook the rest of his theory of ideas in Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise, especially his account of abstract ideas in section 7.31 Hume presents his discussion of “abstract or general ideas” as a further contribution to the discussion in modern philosophy of whether abstract ideas are 30. Hume’s discussion of substances and modes is derived from Locke’s analysis: see Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 163–66 and 288–318 (2.12 and 2.22–23). For a critical discussion of Hume’s brief remarks concerning modes, see Glouberman, “Hume on Modes,” 32–50. 31. For a further criticism of the imagist interpretation of Hume’s theory of ideas, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 206–21.
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“general or particular in the mind’s conception of them.” Abstract ideas, or what we might call concepts, are ideas that represent a number of objects as belonging to a particular type.32 According to the “receiv’d opinion,” as attributed especially to Locke, these ideas are “general” in their very conception, which, on Hume’s view, entails that they must either include “all possible sizes and all possible qualities” of the various individual objects which they represent, or else “no particular one at all.” Hume agrees with the general rejection of the Wrst view as requiring us to afWrm, implausibly, “an inWnite capacity in the mind.” However, he also rejects the second view, since he maintains that “the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degree of each” (t 1.1.7.1–3 [sbn 17]).33 As an alternative to both of these theories, Hume endorses Berkeley’s argument that “general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex’d to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signiWcation.” Indeed, he describes this as one of the “greatest and most valuable” recent discoveries in the “Republic of Letters” (t 1.1.7.1 [sbn 17]). He then offers a further defense of this “new system,” by describing the process through which ideas, which are “in themselves individual,” are abstracted by the mind “from every particular degree of quantity and quality” and applied “beyond their nature” to become “general in their representation” (t 1.1.7.16, 1.1.7.6–7, 1.1.7.2 [sbn 24, 20, 17]).34 According to Hume, the formation of an abstract idea, or more speciWcally, in the Wrst instance, the idea of a species or a type of object, begins when we observe a “resemblance among several objects” as they appear to us.35 This discovery of a resemblance leads us to apply the same “name” or “general term” to all of these individual objects, in spite of the differences we may notice among their other attributes, and to develop a “custom” of associating this term with any other objects in which we notice this resemblance. Once this association is established, any consideration of this word “raises up an individual idea,” along with the custom of applying the name to various other resembling objects, through which we “keep ourselves in a readiness” to produce further images and recall “any other individual one, for which we may have occasion,” as we might 32. I am using the word “concept” here, both as a convenient term to cover what Hume calls separately “abstract ideas” and “distinctions of reason,” and to highlight the continuity between Hume’s treatment of abstract ideas and subsequent discussions of the logical function and psychological content of concepts, without however attempting to consider any of these later theories in any detail. I am especially indebted in this regard to Price, Thinking and Experience, and Heath, “Concept,” 177–80. 33. See Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 409–20 (3.3). 34. See Berkeley’s introduction to his Principles of Human Knowledge, in his Works, 2:25–40. See also Ushenko, “Hume’s Theory of General Ideas,” 236–51, and Bradshaw, “Berkeley and Hume,” 11–22. 35. On the issues involved in Hume’s account of resemblance, see Hawkins, “Simplicity, Resemblance and Contrariety,” 24–38; Russow, “Simple Ideas and Resemblance,” 342–50; Brand, Hume’s Theory of Moral Judgment, 9–17; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 46–50 and 81–82; Cummins, “Hume on Qualities,” 49–88; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 62–64; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 18–19 and 146.
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be prompted “by a present design or necessity.” In other words, after we have formulated a particular image, as an instance of the species which is indicated by the term, this customary association “readily suggests any other individual” if we pursue “any reasoning, that agrees not with it.” Thus, even though only one image may be immediately present to the mind “in fact” at a given moment, many others are present “in power,” and may be recalled through the “custom” of “surveying them” on the basis of their relevant resemblance. In Hume’s example, the general term “triangle” might initially bring to our mind the image of an equilateral triangle, but if we proceed to consider the proposition that all of the angles in a given triangle are equal, we are likely to form the image of an isosceles or a scalene triangle as counter-evidence. A particular image may even be associated with different general terms, and may thus be regarded as a particular instance of different concepts, according to the different resemblances that we may discover among various images. Hume concludes that “a particular idea becomes general by being annex’d to a general term,” or a term “which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recals them in the imagination” (t 1.1.7.7–10 [sbn 20–22]; cf. 1.2.3.5 [sbn 34]; ehu 12.15, 12.20n34 [sbn 154–55, 158n1]). According to Hume, abstract ideas are thus a function of the imagination, in its activities of associating the various ideas arising from our impressions according to the natural principle of resemblance “in such an imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life,” collecting images of resembling objects “with a view to that resemblance,” and associating these images with a general term.36 These general terms and their associated concepts may then be used in “reXection and conversation.” Hume indeed describes the propensity of the human imagination to associate our ideas with each other according to the various resemblances we discover between them, and to exhibit these whenever they are “necessary or useful” for our thinking and reasoning, as “a kind of magical faculty in the soul,” which may be “most perfect in the greatest geniuses” but is also an inexplicable power in every individual (t 1.1.7.7, 1.1.7.15 [sbn 20, 23–24]). Hume therefore identiWes an abstract idea, or a concept, not merely with the ability to frame a particular image, but with the “custom,” or disposition, to recall a set of resembling images, not only with a view toward their resembling qualities, but also with a recognition of the range of variation among their other 36. Sedivy has criticized Hume for regarding both the relation of similarity between the images in a resemblance class and the representational function of any single image in a resemblance class as immediately or “objectively” given to the mind prior to any interpretation: see “Hume, Images, and Abstraction,” 117–33. However, Hume accounts for this activity of interpretation by considering the selective attention we direct toward the resembling qualities, which he calls a “view to that resemblance” as it serves the “purposes of life,” characterizing our intentional state when we use a single image to represent a concept or a set of resembling images (t 1.1.7.15, 1.1.7.7 [sbn 23, 20]).
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qualities. This custom is expressed subjectively in the ability to apply the term to appropriate objects, to compare images of these objects to each other, and to use these terms and images in our silent reasoning. This disposition can also be expressed outwardly, in actions that exhibit the ability to recognize a resemblance among objects and to use the term that has been conventionally established within a linguistic community to designate those objects. Hume thus appears to indicate that the meaning of a general term is not a particular image, but the use of this term to designate a set of resembling qualities among a set of objects; although this usage of the term is always accompanied by the subjective production of a particular image in the mind of the person who is using or considering the term.37 Hume’s theory of abstract ideas therefore anticipates Kant’s account of the “schema” of an empirical concept, as a “rule” according to which the imagination supplies images of empirical objects, and Price’s characterization of a concept as a “recognitional capacity,” which may be expressed in various types of private mental activity and public behavior.38 We have already encountered Flew’s criticism of Hume’s alleged assumption in the Wrst section of the Treatise that “ideas, conceived as mental images, must play an essential part in the signiWcant employment of words.” A similar criticism has been presented by Ayer, who observes that although we might expect to Wnd a theory of reference in Hume’s account of abstract ideas, we Wnd instead that “here, more than anywhere else, he is handicapped by the false assumption that the use of a concept consists in the framing of an image.”39 In the present discussion I have indicated that this interpretation is at least subject to qualiWcation, since Hume does not identify abstract ideas simply with the framing of any particular image, but rather with the capacity to recall any one of a number of resembling images. A further examination of his argument, and his examples of various types of ideas, will show that Hume does not always require us to frame a complete and direct image in order to use a concept or a general term meaningfully, although he maintains that the use of a concept or a general term will always involve the framing of some relevant image. As we have seen, Hume initially characterizes ideas as the “faint images” of impressions (t 1.1.1.1 [sbn 1]). He uses the further phrases “clear idea” (t 1.1.6.1 [sbn 15]), “distinct idea” (t 1.2.1.5 [sbn 28]), and “just idea” (t 1.1.1.9 [sbn 5]) in order to designate an idea which is the complete and direct image of a preceding impression. However, he also observes that we can 37. See Zartman, “Hume and the ‘Meaning of a Word,’” 255–60; Tienson, “Hume on Universals and General Terms,” 311–30; and Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 72–84. 38. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 273–74 (a 141 / b 180); Price, Thinking and Experience, 34–36, 260. For a related discussion of Hume’s abstract ideas as “habitudes of comparison,” see Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 85–105. 39. Ayer, Hume, 31–32.
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use many concepts and general terms without any distinct and complete images of any particular example of the type of object in question. Indeed, Hume maintains that many of our ideas are “so obscure, that ’tis almost impossible even for the mind, which forms them, to tell exactly their nature and composition” (t 1.2.3.1 [sbn 33]; A 7 [sbn 648]). As we will see, this obscurity is in his view the source of much of the confusion in our reasoning, especially in philosophy; and he therefore indicates that the analysis of concepts is among the Wrst tasks of philosophical inquiry. I have shown that Hume distinguishes between “ideas” or particular images and “abstract ideas” or concepts, in which the latter are understood as dispositions to associate a set of resembling images with each other and with a general term, and to consider any of these images as they might be required in our thinking. Hume develops this distinction further in several passages in which he rejects the requirement that we must frame a clear image in order to understand and use a given word correctly. In his initial account of complex ideas, he observes that even a person who has visited Paris cannot expect to formulate “such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions” (t 1.1.1.4 [sbn 3]). He later indicates that “every one, who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning” will agree that “we do not annex distinct and compleat ideas to every term we make use of,” since for example “in talking of government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are compos’d.” In spite of this, however, we are able to “avoid talking nonsense,” and to distinguish between true and false statements concerning these concepts, through the “custom” of attributing “certain relations” to these abstract ideas: a custom which “still follows the words” in our reasoning (t 1.1.7.14 [sbn 23]). In both of these cases, including the idea of a named individual, such as the city of Paris, and the abstract idea of a mode such as “negotiation” or “government,” we presumably produce particular images, but images which are only partial and incomplete illustrations of the concept, while holding ourselves in readiness to produce other images which might be required by the progress of our reasoning. Hume therefore indicates, with Price, that we often use “scrappy” images in our thinking, rather than a complete and distinct image of the object in question.40 Hume considers another type of general term that we may use and understand, without forming a distinct and complete image corresponding to the term, in his account of “distinctions of reason.”41 Here he argues that, in 40. See Price, Thinking and Experience, 306. 41. Hume’s account of “distinctions of reason” arises from preceding discussions in early modern philosophy; see Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (i.62), in Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 1:214–15, and Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 38 (i.5).
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addition to the concept of a species, we can also formulate the concept of a quality, by attending to the particular respects in which individual objects may resemble or differ from each other. Thus, in his example, we develop the concepts of colors and shapes by comparing a globe of white marble to “a globe of black marble and a cube of white,” where we Wnd “two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem’d, and really is, perfectly inseparable.” Eventually, “after a little more practice of this kind,” we are able to “distinguish the Wgure from the colour,” and to identify these and other qualities or aspects of objects “according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible” (t 1.1.7.18; cf. 1.2.3.5 [sbn 25; cf. 34]). In other words, we can attend to a resembling quality, such as shape, when we notice this among several objects, even if we cannot form the complete and distinct image of that quality apart from an object in which it subsists; or, more accurately, from certain other qualities with which it is conjoined.42 As we have seen, Hume even indicates that we can attend to the different aspects of simple ideas by comparing them to other simple ideas, even though we cannot form separate images of the different aspects of simple ideas (t 1.1.7.7n5 [sbn 637]). As a further type of idea which is designated by a word that can be used meaningfully even without a distinct image corresponding to the idea, Flage has called attention to Hume’s occasional references to the distinction, originally found in Locke, between a “just” or “positive” idea and a “relative” idea.43 While “just” ideas are direct images of preceding impressions, Hume indicates that “relative” ideas may be formed without a preceding impression by an inference or an imaginative extrapolation from other previously given impressions.44 For example, he argues that the closest we can reach “towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d speciWcally different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects” (t 1.2.6.9 [sbn 68]). Hume also describes our ideas of “power” and “cause” as relative ideas (ehu 7.29n17 [sbn 77n1]). Flage suggests that Hume might have used the notion of a “relative idea” in order to account for our idea of the missing shade of blue (t 1.1.1.10 [sbn 5–6]) and the thousandth part of a grain of sand (t 1.2.1.3 [sbn 27]). We might even apply this distinction to Hume’s observation that “we cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without having actually tasted it” (t 1.1.1.9 [sbn 5]). In 42. See Salmon, “Central Problem,” 299–499; Butts, “Husserl’s Critique of Hume’s Notion of Distinctions of Reason,” 213–21; Butler, “Distinctiones Rationis,” 165–76; Tweyman, “Hume on Separating the Inseparable,” 30–42; Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 49–58; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 94–105; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 58–75; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 58–61. 43. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 296 (2.23). 44. Flage, “Hume’s Relative Ideas,” 55–73; David Hume’s Theory of Mind, 42–51; and “Relative Ideas Re-Viewed,” 138–55. See also Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 81–84 and 155–56, and FrascaSpada, Space and the Self, 14.
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discussing this example, it would seem that Hume is implicitly conceding that we may form a “relative idea” of the distinctive Xavor of a pineapple from the testimony of others and from our previous discovery that different types of fruit have different Xavors, although we can only derive a “just idea” of the Xavor of a pineapple from the impression of its taste. In his discussion of complex ideas, abstract ideas, distinctions of reason, and relative ideas, Hume therefore indicates that, although all of our ideas are ultimately derived from our impressions, we are also able to develop various types of abstract ideas or concepts that are not distinct and complete images of particular impressions. Instead, these are dispositions to generate particular images, to attend to certain characteristics of these images, and to produce other images as illustrations of a concept, under the guidance of a general term that is applied to that type of object, mode, or quality. This term therefore becomes useful in our reasoning by allowing us to draw inferences from the resemblances we have observed among various objects. Finally, as I show in the next section, Hume suggests that a general term usually acquires its meaning through its conventional assignment to a concept, or in other words to a set of objects on the basis of a set of resembling qualities, in a given linguistic community. Many critics of Hume’s “imagist” theory of meaning have overlooked these additional dimensions of the theory of ideas, including his discussion of abstract ideas and language. For example, Flew refers to Section 7 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise only to suggest that Hume has failed, even here, to develop an account of meaning, while claiming to have discovered in Berkeley’s late work, the Alciphron, a more satisfactory view of meaning as determined, not by private images, but by the public use of language. Here Flew has overlooked Hume’s references in section 7 and elsewhere to the public character of language and its implications for the meaning of a word.45 Similarly, Bennett and Dicker have both criticized Hume’s “meaning-empiricism” without referring to his account of general terms and abstract ideas.46 Hume appeals to his analysis of abstract ideas in order to account for the origin of the various ideas that are generated by the imagination to provide the structure for our ordinary experience, and which are among the central concerns of philosophers. As we have seen, he introduces relations, modes, and substances as complex ideas; and he explains our ideas of modes and substances as “nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assign’d them,” by which we are enabled to recall the collection. We thus Wnd that the abstract idea of a substance is the idea of “an unknown something” in which a set of qualities “are supposed to inhere,” 45. See Flew, “Was Berkeley a Precursor of Wittgenstein?” 153–63, and David Hume, 20. 46. Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 222–353, and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 5–34.
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while the idea of a mode is the idea of a complex quality which is dispersed either among a number of objects or within a single object (t 1.1.6.2–3 [sbn 16–17]). Hume also presents our ideas of spatial extension and temporal duration as abstract ideas, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 4 (t 1.2.3.4–7 [sbn 34–35]). Finally, in a footnote in the Appendix to the Treatise and in a 1740 letter to Francis Hutcheson, he indicates that the very concept of a “simple idea” is itself formulated through a distinction of reason, or an activity of comparison through which we recognize and identify “simplicity” as a resembling aspect of certain images (t 1.1.7.7n5 [sbn 637]; l 1.39).
language Hume’s account of the “general terms” we use to designate our concepts is among the very few brief and widely dispersed passages in his writings in which he is directly concerned with language. In these, however, he sets forth a view of language that is interesting in itself, and also provides the background for his further treatment of terms belonging to different domains of human discourse and activity.47 As we have seen, Hume indicates that we use general terms in our “reXection,” or silent reasoning, where they not only revive the “custom” of considering a number of individual images, but also allow us to pursue a series of inferences concerning their qualities. In a letter to Joseph Spence in 1754 concerning the blind poet Thomas Blacklock, Hume observes that “we always think in some language, viz. in that which is most familiar to us” (l 1.201).48 In this reference to the role of language in human thought, Hume rejects the view that Hacking attributes to the early modern philosophers, at least from Hobbes and Descartes to Berkeley, that human thinking or “mental discourse” consists in the production of images, in contrast to our public discourse, which is dependent upon language.49 In his discussion of abstract ideas Hume indicates that general terms are useful for conversation as well as reXection (t 1.1.7.2 [sbn 18]). Hume’s earliest 47. For further studies of Hume’s view of language, see Árdal, “Convention and Value,” 51–68, and “Language and SigniWcance,” 779–83; Jones, Hume’s Sentiments, 136–48; Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 91–111; Wilson, “Hume and Derrida on Language and Meaning,” 99–121; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 31–32; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 183–93. 48. Hume continues in this letter that it is “but too frequent to substitute words instead of ideas,” or to use words in our thinking and discourse without the appropriate positive image, as Blacklock does in referring to different colors, which he associates with different emotions on the basis of the works of other authors. In the terms of my analysis above, Blacklock would appear to have a relative idea of colors, as concepts which represent the usual emotional effect of an object on human beings. 49. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, 15–25. See also Price, Thinking and Experience, 306.
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reference to language in the Treatise is concerned with what appears to be universal among different languages. Here he suggests that his theory of association might help explain why languages “so nearly correspond to each other,” since, in considering the often similar concepts which are indicated by different terms in different languages, we Wnd “nature,” or the natural principles of association, “in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one” (t 1.1.4.1 [sbn 10–11]; cf. ehu 3.1 [sbn 23]). However, in Book 3 and again in the second Enquiry Hume calls attention to the social and historical dimension of language by observing that languages are “gradually establish’d by human conventions,” and that “speech and words and language are Wxed, by human convention and agreement” (t 3.2.2.9 [sbn 490]; epm App.3.9 [sbn 306]). This suggests that we may account for the use of different terms in different languages, even for a concept that is pointed out to us through the natural principles of association, by considering the development of each term within its particular linguistic community. Hume’s account of the conventional character of words, combined with his account of the role of language in abstract ideas or concept formation, seems to indicate that general terms receive their customary association with a set of resembling objects through a process of mutual accommodation among a number of speakers, and that a conventionally established term may then be adopted as a sign for the corresponding concept by anyone who learns the language.50 Indeed, he observes much later, in a letter to Baron Mure of Caldwell in 1767, that in learning a living language “the continual Application of the Words and Phrazes teaches at the same time the Sense of the Words and their Reference to each other” (l 2.157). These indications of the social and historical development of language are further reXected in Hume’s account of the development of moral and aesthetic terms, which we use to establish a common point of view transcending the perspective of any individual speaker, as I will show in Chapters 8 and 11. This view of language also provides the context for his occasional references to terms that reXect, not the resemblances among natural objects which might be apparent to all human beings, but the intellectual, institutional, and cultural history of a speciWc community, as in the cases of political, legal, and religious terminology (cf. epm 3.40–41 [sbn 201–2]). Hume’s interest in the history of a speciWc word, in the context of a particular cultural tradition, appears especially in his reXections concerning the use of the word “liberty” in English political discourse, which we will consider in Chapter 9. Finally, with this discussion of Hume’s reXections concerning language, we may return to his Wrst principle, in order to consider its general signiWcance for 50. See Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 73.
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his philosophical system. As we have seen, many commentators have regarded Hume’s Wrst principle, or his copy theory of ideas, as a criterion for the signiWcance of a word, which is taken to identify the meaning of a word with an idea that is the direct image of an impression, and to assert that any word which cannot be shown to be associated with such an idea is meaningless. This view is based especially upon his own proposed application of the copy principle to the evaluation of philosophical terminology in Section 2 of the Wrst Enquiry: “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to conWrm our suspicion” (ehu 2.9 [sbn 22]). This stark assertion appears to express the expectation that many, if not most, traditional terms in philosophy will fail the test of derivability from our impressions, if this test requires that any meaningful term must designate a complete and distinct idea, or image, which is a direct copy of some particular impression (cf. A 7 [sbn 648–49]). However, when we consider Hume’s own application of this test to various philosophical terms, in both the Treatise and the Wrst Enquiry, we Wnd that in most cases Hume actually does not reject a term as meaningless if it does not designate a set of positive ideas or distinct images. Instead, he generally traces the process by which the imagination produces the concept designated by the term, while conceding that the term may be used meaningfully, even though its meaning must be speciWed as including the activity of the imagination as well as certain types of preceding impressions. For example, in his Wrst application of the derivability test within the Treatise he speciWcally challenges “those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each,” to identify an impression of either sensation or reXection from which this idea is derived. Since no one can identify such an impression, he rejects any characterization of the concept of a substance as a “clear idea,” or the direct image of a distinct impression. Instead, he asserts that we have “no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.” He thus maintains that our idea of any particular substance is really the complex idea of a particular bundle of qualities, and that the abstract idea of a substance is the concept of this type of bundle-relation among a series of contiguous and causally related qualities. However, even in this passage he concedes that a term referring to a bundle of qualities may still be useful in reasoning and conversation, as long as we understand this as a reference to a bundle of qualities united by the imagination and do not pursue any speculations regarding an “unknown something” apart from the sensible qualities of an object (t 1.1.6.1–2 [sbn 15–16]).
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In the rest of Book 1 of the Treatise Hume frequently appeals to the test of derivability in order to explain our ideas of space, time, external existence, causation, necessary connection, and the self, usually to demonstrate that these are complex rather than simple ideas, which can only be derived from simple impressions through the activity of the imagination (t 1.2.3.8–10, 1.2.6.8, 1.3.2.12–16, 1.4.6.1–3 [sbn 32–37, 68, 77–78, 251–52]). He appeals to this principle again in the Wrst Enquiry, especially in restating his account of the idea of a necessary connection between a cause and its effect (ehu 7.30 [sbn 78–79]). However, in all of these cases, we will see that he rarely rejects any of our everyday or philosophical terms if these cannot be shown to designate “clear ideas,” or the distinct images of particular impressions. Instead, Hume applies his Wrst principle to traditional philosophical terms in order to explain the derivation of the concepts they signify from our impressions and from the activity of the imagination; and to develop a critique of the metaphysical speculations that may arise when these concepts are mistakenly regarded as the direct images of distinct impressions. In a more considered and accurate statement of this project, he declares it to be more likely that terms such as “power,” “force,” and “necessary connexion” may in many cases “lose their true meaning by being wrong apply’d, than that they never have any meaning,” and he invites us to see “if possibly we can discover the nature and origin of those ideas, we annex to them” (t 1.3.14.14 [sbn 162]). Hume’s intention, in applying the test of derivability to philosophical terms, is thus to discover the sources of their associated concepts, whenever possible, in our inward and outward sensations and in the activity of our imagination, in order to specify the content and limitations of these concepts for the purposes of reasoning. In other words, Hume’s application of his Wrst principle is intended to promote a more accurate understanding of our concepts, especially our philosophical concepts, by attempting to trace their genealogy (cf. t 1.2.3.1–3 [sbn 33]).51 This project of clarifying the meaning of philosophical terms by tracing their derivation from sensation and the imagination is reXected in Hume’s concern for the proper deWnition of the terms that are used in philosophical discourse. In the Treatise he describes the process of deWnition as the activity by which we “Wx the meaning of the word” in order to establish “the compass of that collection” which we intend to designate by that general term (t 1.1.7.10 [sbn 22]). He later observes that since the main obstacle to advances in the “moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms,” we should attempt, wherever possible, to “Wx” their “precise 51. For a similar account of Hume’s method and intentions in applying the copy principle to philosophical concepts, see Wilson, “Association, Ideas, and Images in Hume,” 255–74, and Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 55–57 and 74–75. See also Hoy, “Genealogical Method,” 20–38.
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meaning” (ehu 7.2–3 [sbn 61–62]). This advice is especially valuable for discouraging philosophers from their tendency to “encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern” (epm App.4.1 [sbn 312]; cf. dnr 12.217–19). He indeed calls attention to a number of “verbal disputes” in philosophy concerning words such as “identity,” “liberty,” “natural,” and “virtue,” and attempts to set these aside by articulating the deWnitions implicit on either side of these controversies (t 1.4.6.7–21, 2.3.2.1–8, 3.1.2.7–10, 3.3.4.1–5 [sbn 255–62, 407–12, 473–75, 606–10]).52 He also criticizes the common tendency of philosophers to offer a circular deWnition of a term by using a synonym for that term in the deWnition, rather than providing an account of the derivation of the concept that is designated by the term (t 1.3.14.4 [sbn 157]). Thus, while it is common for us in ordinary discourse “after the frequent use of terms, which are really signiWcant and intelligible, to omit the idea, which we wou’d express by them” and preserve only “the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure,” we must distinguish this relatively innocuous tendency from the “frequent use” by philosophers “of terms, which are wholly insigniWcant and unintelligible,” but are imagined “to be on the same footing with the precedent, and to have a secret meaning, which we might discover by reXection.” This appears in the use of such terms as “faculty and occult quality,” by which the “antient” or Scholastic philosophers attempted to explain the sources of the various qualities in objects, and only succeeded in restating the problem (t 1.4.3.10 [sbn 224]). In Hume’s view, a deWnition is therefore the analysis of the concept, or an account of the distinguishing set of resembling qualities among the collection of objects which is signiWed by a given general term. This should ultimately be “an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them” (ehu 7.4 [sbn 62]), although it seems that, in his view, a deWnition may also include an account of the mental activities through which these ideas are related to each other, as we indeed see in his second deWnition of a cause (t 1.3.14.35 [sbn 172]). He thus uses the copy principle and the principle of the activity of the imagination in order to trace the derivation of our concepts, and to establish the precise deWnition of our terms, rather than using the copy principle as the criterion for simply accepting or rejecting them.
52. See also Henze, “Linguistic Aspect of Hume’s Method,” 116–26; Morrisroe, “Linguistic Analysis,” 72–82; and Jones, Hume’s Sentiments, 142–48.
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In Book 1, Part 3 of the Treatise, Hume opens his discussion of the different types of reasoning, which give rise to judgments of “knowledge and probability,” by considering the four philosophical relations, identiWed as “objects of knowledge and certainty.” In the Wrst Enquiry, he calls these “Relations of Ideas.” Of these relations, he gives particular attention to mathematical relations, as the only type of relations among our ideas that can be determined through a process of reasoning, which he calls in this case “demonstration” (t 1.3.1.2 [sbn 70]; ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). Hume’s distinction between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” has exerted an important and pervasive inXuence in the subsequent history of philosophy (ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). In the Wrst place, this distinction is often regarded as a predecessor of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. In it’s turn, Kant’s distinction was reformulated in the twentieth century as a principle for the demarcation and classiWcation of meaningful statements by the logical positivists, who also appealed to Hume’s distinction as an earlier formulation of this principle. In this chapter I show that Hume’s “relations of ideas” do not include analytic judgments in the Kantian sense, or formal relations among propositions as these are considered in deductive logic. While Hume does discuss conceptual and logical relations, he does not include these among what he calls “philosophical 43
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relations.” Instead, he generally identiWes mathematics as the only type of demonstrative reasoning.
r e l at i o n s o f i d e a s Hume identiWes four of his philosophical relations—resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and proportions in quantity or number—as relations that depend “entirely on the ideas, which we compare together.” Among these, the Wrst three are discovered through “intuition,” or the immediate comparison of our ideas, since we recognize resemblance, contrariety, and different degrees of a quality “at Wrst sight,” as they appear to “the eye, or rather the mind,” without any activity of reasoning. The fourth philosophical relation, proportions in quantity or number, is also judged in some cases immediately through intuition, as when we are considering only a small number of objects or merely approximate proportions. However, we may also discover numerical relations, often more exactly, through the “artiWcial” methods of mathematical reasoning, which Hume refers to as “demonstration.” For example, we may apply demonstrative reasoning to our idea of a triangle to Wnd that its internal angles are equivalent to two right angles (t 1.3.1.1–3 [sbn 69–70]).1 According to Hume’s classiWcation, these four relations are the only sources of “knowledge and certainty” in the strict sense. In his subsequent distinction between the two types of “reasoning,” in mathematical reasoning and causal inferences, he applies the term “certainty” only to the assurance arising from mathematical reasoning, and introduces the terms “proof” and “probability” for the different levels of assurance that may attend our causal inferences, as we will see in Chapter 3 (t 1.3.1.2, 1.3.11.2 [sbn 69–70, 124]).2 In the Enquiry he identiWes judgments concerning relations of ideas as “intuitively or demonstratively certain.” However, the only examples of judgment concerning the relations of ideas he offers in this context are propositions belonging to “the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic” (ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant distinguishes between “analytic” and “synthetic” statements, and identiWes the problem of accounting for the possibility of synthetic a priori statements as the central problem in metaphysics. Kant is often held to have formulated this distinction, at least in part, as a restatement of Hume’s distinction in the Enquiry between “relations of ideas” 1. For a further examination of Hume’s account of intuition and demonstration, and its historical antecedents, see Norton, “Editor’s Introduction,” I24–I26, and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 83–112. 2. For the history of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, or between certainty and probability, see Hacking, Emergence of Probability; Shapiro, Probability and Certainty; and Franklin, Science of Conjecture.
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and “matters of fact.”3 This view is supported by Kant’s characterization in the Prolegomena of the issue of explaining and justifying our synthetic a priori judgments as a general formulation of the problem that Hume had raised in his analysis of causation.4 Kant argues that Hume overlooked the general formulation and the signiWcance of his own question because he mistakenly considered mathematical judgments to be analytic rather than synthetic.5 As a result of Kant’s analysis, Hume’s distinction between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” has often been identiWed with Kant’s own distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Finally, as a result of this identiWcation, Hume’s classiWcation has also been regarded as an antecedent of the twentieth-century formulation of this distinction. For example, A. J. Ayer refers to Hume’s account of “relations of ideas” as including “the a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics,” which according to Ayer are “necessary and certain only because they are analytic.”6 More recently, however, a number of studies have challenged both the identiWcation of Kantian “analytic judgments” with Humean “relations of ideas” and Kant’s own claim that Hume considered mathematical propositions to be analytic statements.7 In this section I will show that Hume actually regards his examples of mathematical statements as synthetic rather than analytic, according to the Kantian use of these terms. I will also show that his relations of ideas do not include relations either among concepts, as disclosed through analysis, or between propositions, as exhibited through deductive logic. Kant initially characterizes an analytic judgment as a proposition in which the predicate concept “belongs to” or is “(covertly) contained” in the concept of the subject. Accordingly, this type of judgment explicates the subject by breaking it “by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in it.” By contrast, a synthetic judgment serves to amplify the concept 3. For a valuable account of other historical antecedents for Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, see Beck, Essays on Kant and Hume, 80–100. 4. Kant could not read English, and could thus have been only indirectly acquainted, if at all, with the contents of the Treatise. The two Enquiries, as well as many of Hume’s essays and the History of England, were readily available in German and French translations: see Jessop, Bibliography, 5–43, and Ikeda, David Hume, 1–181. On the question of Kant’s direct and indirect acquaintance with Hume’s writings, see Wolff, “Kant’s Debt,” 117–23; Kuehn, “Kant’s Conception of ‘Hume’s Problem,’” 175–93; and Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Hume in der Deutschen Aufklärung, 174–98. 5. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 225–26 (b 127–28), 654–58 (b 760–69 / b 788–97), and Prolegomena, 10–12 and 15–23, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 4: 260–62, 266–70. 6. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 31. For two versions of this interpretation of Hume, see Zabeeh, Hume, 1–5 and 67–94, and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 35–60. 7. See Reinach, “Kant’s Interpretation of Hume’s Problem,” 161–88; Atkinson, “Hume on Mathematics,” 127–37; Beck, Essays on Kant and Hume, 80–100; Gotterbarn, “Kant, Hume and Analyticity,” 274–83; Coleman, “Is Mathematics for Hume Synthetic a Priori?,” 113–26; Steiner, “Kant’s Misrepresentations of Hume’s Philosophy of Mathematics in the Prolegomena,” 400–410; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 125–28.
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of the subject by adding to it “a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and which no analysis could possibly extract from it.”8 For example, Kant identiWes the statement that “all bodies are extended” as an analytic proposition, since extension is already included in the concept of “body.” On the other hand, the proposition that “some bodies are heavy” attributes to “some bodies” a predicate that does not already belong to the concept of body, and is thus synthetic.9 Kant then argues that mathematical statements are synthetic, and presents this conclusion as a discovery that had hitherto eluded all the “analysts of human reason,” including Hume, who indeed recognized the problem of accounting for our synthetic a priori judgments in the case of causation, but who mistakenly believed that mathematical judgments were analytic, and thereby failed to recognize the larger signiWcance of the problem of synthetic a priori judgments.10 In order to evaluate Kant’s interpretation of Hume, we may begin by comparing Hume’s references to conceptual analysis with Kant’s account of analytic judgments, and then turn to Hume’s references to the ampliative character of mathematical propositions. Hume states that it is impossible to “deWne,” or to analyze, a simple idea, and maintains that we can only render these “precise and determinate to our intellectual view” by attending to “the impressions or original sentiments” from which they are copied. On the other hand, we may give a more determinate account of our complex ideas, including concepts, “by deWnition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them” (ehu 7.4 [sbn 62]).11 For example, he offers an analysis of the concept of a cause in his deWnition of causation as a natural relation: “A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other” (t 1.3.14.31 [sbn 170]). However, Hume then distinguishes between those propositions in which we state the analysis of a concept and those in which we amplify a given concept, and also gives several mathematical propositions as examples of ampliative statements. For example, in the Treatise he argues that while mathematicians 8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 141 (a 6–7 / b 10–11). Many, though not all, of Kant’s commentators regard this as the decisive characterization of this distinction among his several formulations, which thus has priority over the condition that analytic statements are statements of identity or justiWed by the principle of contradiction. See, for example, Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 73–78. 9. Kant, Prolegomena, 16, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 4:266–67. 10. Kant, Prolegomena, 18, 20, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 4:268, 272–73; see also the Critique of Pure Reason, 143–44 (b 14) and 146–47 (b 19–20). 11. In Hume’s usage, the “deWnition” of a term or an idea is often what we would call the analysis of a concept, although he refers in other contexts to the process of stipulative deWnition in which we establish or “Wx” the meaning of a term (sbn 7.4 [sbn 62]; cf. t 1.1.7.10 [sbn 22]). For a further discussion of Hume’s conception of a deWnition, see Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 102–4.
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“pretend they give an exact deWnition” of a straight line “when they say, it is the shortest way betwixt two points,” this proposition expresses “the discovery of one of the properties of a right line,” rather than “a just deWnition of it.” Instead he argues that our idea of a straight line is the idea of a “particular appearance,” or more accurately the imagined appearance of a Wctional standard, which we may consider without recognizing that a line which has this appearance is also the shortest distance between two points. He also notes that we can imagine the appearance of straightness in a line which is considered merely in itself, while the concept of the shortest distance between two points requires us to compare our image of one line with our images of other lines (t 1.2.4.26 [sbn 49–50]). Kant later uses the same proposition, “that the straight line between two points is the shortest,” as an example of a synthetic judgment, since “my concept of the straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality.”12 At the end of the Enquiry Hume explicitly distinguishes a mathematical proposition from the analysis of a concept. In this example, he argues that the relation between the hypotenuse and the other two sides of a right triangle cannot be known merely by analyzing these concepts; that is, even if these terms are “ever so exactly deWned, without a train of reasoning and enquiry.” By contrast, the relation between property and injustice, at least according to his use of these terms, may be determined simply by analysis, since “to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to deWne the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property.” Accordingly, this proposition is “nothing but a more imperfect deWnition” (ehu 12.27 [sbn 163]). Hume refers to several other examples of supposedly informative propositions, which are really tautologies, as statements that “mean nothing,” since they do not contain both a subject and a predicate, and as “identical” propositions which give us “no insight” (t 1.4.2.26, 1.4.5.31 [sbn 200, 249]; cf. ehu 4.21 [sbn 37]). In these examples, Hume distinguishes the analysis of a concept from the discovery of any additional properties of the objects included under the extension of the concept, including properties that are discovered through mathematical demonstration. He offers several examples of mathematical propositions as informative statements that do not arise simply from the deWnition of the initial terms, including an example that would later be presented by Kant as an example of a synthetic judgment. Turning to a more recent interpretation of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, we may consider Ayer’s claim that Hume’s “relations of ideas” include the relations among propositions that can be exhibited through the deductive methods of formal logic. Here, in opposition to Ayer’s 12. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 145 (b 16); cf. Prolegomena, 19, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, 4:269.
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view, we Wnd that Hume presents only one of his four relations of ideas, the relation of quantity, as a relation that is susceptible to reasoning, while the other three are recognized immediately through intuition, without any process of reasoning. In other words, Hume does not present any of his three nonmathematical philosophical relations as relations discovered through deductive reasoning.13 This is clearly evident in the cases of resemblance and difference in degree, which are immediately recognized in comparing two ideas. However, Hume also describes “contrariety” as a relation apprehended immediately through intuition, apart from any activity of reasoning: and this description might call for a more detailed examination, since contrariety might seem to pertain more properly to propositions and to the principles of deductive reasoning. Hume’s account of contrariety is often regarded as one of the most obscure passages in his account of relations.14 In his brief discussion in the Treatise he states only that “no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence.” He later adds that “no real objects are contrary” in the strict sense of the term (t 1.1.5.8, 1.4.5.30; cf. 1.3.15.1 [sbn 15, 247; cf. 173]). In the Enquiry he describes what might appear to be the separate relation of “contrast or contrariety” as a relation that combines the relations of causation and resemblance, and in which when “two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other” (ehu 3.16n6 [sbn 24n4]). Elsewhere he uses the word “contrariety” to describe a relation between two principles, conditions, or objects when the Wrst tends to supplant or destroy the second. He then describes the two members of such a pair as “contrary” to each other (t 1.4.2.52, 2.1.2.3, 2.3.9.16–17 [sbn 215–16, 278, 442–43]). Hume also indicates that the recognition of a contrariety between two objects is an empirical discovery, arising from the observation of causal relations. For example, “Wre and water, heat and cold, are only found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of their causes or effects” (t 1.1.5.9 [sbn 15]). However, he also uses the phrases “contradiction,” or “contradiction in terms,” to describe a proposition or a conjunction of two propositions that entails a formal contradiction (t 1.1.7.4, 1.4.2.3 [sbn 19, 188]). Finally, a false mathematical statement is “inconceivable” in that it implies a contradiction, in contrast to a false statement concerning a matter of fact or an empirical relation, which can be conceived as distinctly as a true statement and does not imply a contradiction (t 1.2.4.11, 1.3.6.1, 1.3.7.3 [sbn 43, 86–87, 95]; ehu 4.1–2, 12.28 [sbn 25–26, 164]). It is thus 13. On the contrast between Hume’s account of demonstrative reasoning and recent accounts of deductive reasoning, see also Owen, Hume’s Reason, 1–6, 85–112. 14. On Hume’s account of contrariety, see Atkinson, “Hume on Mathematics,” 127–37; Gotterbarn, “Kant, Hume and Analyticity,” 274–83; Coleman, “Is Mathematics for Hume Synthetic a Priori?,” 113–26; Hawkins, “Simplicity, Resemblance and Contrariety,” 24–38; Imlay, “Hume on Intuitive and Demonstrative Inference,” 31–47; Cohen, “Contrariety and Causality in Hume,” 129–39; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 140–52.
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“an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.” For example, since we can formulate “the idea of a golden mountain,” we may conclude “that such a mountain may actually exist.” On the other hand, the concepts of certain empirical objects or states of affairs may entail each other necessarily, since “we can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible,” or as implying a contradiction (t 1.2.2.8 [sbn 32]; cf. a 11 [sbn 650]; ehu 4.2 [sbn 25–26]). Similarly, the Wgures “round” and “square,” when attributed to the same object at the same time, are “contrary and incompatible” (t 1.4.5.25 [sbn 244]).15 Hume thus maintains that there is nothing beyond the power of our thought and imagination “except what implies an absolute contradiction.” Accordingly, he argues that any attempt to demonstrate the necessity of a cause must show that the opposite of the supposed effect in any given case is “a formal contradiction” and hence cannot be imagined (ehu 2.4 [sbn 18]; t 1.3.9.10 [sbn 111]). Benjamin Cohen argues that many of the apparent inconsistencies in this discussion can be dissolved if we recognize that Hume is working with two separate conceptions of contrariety. According to Cohen’s interpretation, the contrariety that Hume presents as a “relation of ideas” is what we might call the “logical contrariety” of a formal contradiction. On the other hand, Hume’s descriptions of objects or states as “contrary” to each other are cases of “empirical contrariety,” based on our experience that one of them tends to cause the nonexistence of the other.16 However, in considering both types of contrariety, either as a relation of ideas or as an empirical relation, we should also recall Hume’s classiWcation of contrariety, not only among the four philosophical relations which are objects of “knowledge and certainty,” but also among the three of these which are “discoverable at Wrst sight,” and fall more properly “under the province of intuition than demonstration” (t 1.3.1.2 [sbn 70]). In other words, the contrariety that Hume describes as a relation of ideas is a relation that we recognize immediately in comparing our ideas, and not one that is discovered through a process of demonstration. I would suggest that in his discussion of the relation of contrariety Hume is identifying the principle of contradiction as a principle that is known immediately through intuition, in our very consideration of the ideas of existence and nonexistence, or the afWrmation and negation of a proposition. However, he does 15. For a discussion of Hume’s use of the term “inconceivable,” and his view of the relation between psychological impossibility, or unimaginability, and the logical impossibility of a formal contradiction, see Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth, 69–86; Stroud, Hume, 46–50; and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 140–43. 16. Cohen, “Contrariety and Causality in Hume,” 129–39.
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not regard the use of the principle of contradiction in the context of a deductive as contributing, per se, to the discovery of any relation among these propositions, or among their constituent concepts, which can be called a “relation of ideas” in his terms, since these are recognized immediately through intuition. It is also interesting to note that in his survey of the seven philosophical relations Hume includes identity, not among his relations of ideas, but among the relations we discover through experience. However, he is not using the word “identity” for the logical principle a=a, which he describes elsewhere as the principle that “an object is the same with itself,” but rather for the relation that may subsist between an impression at one moment and an impression at another, which is the basis for our idea of the continuous existence of an external object through time. A judgment of identity is, in this sense, an empirical discovery, or a judgment of fact, whose origin we will consider in Chapter 4 (t 1.4.2.26–28; cf. 1.1.5.4, 1.3.2.2 [sbn 200–201; cf. 14, 73–74]). Finally, we may consider Hume’s own references to formal logic, or the science of deriving propositions by necessary inferences from other propositions. As we have seen, Hume identiWes the “artiWcial” procedures of mathematical reasoning as “demonstration,” and appears to characterize mathematical inferences as the only type of demonstrative reasoning (t 1.3.1.2–7, 2.3.3.2 [sbn 70–72, 413–14]; ehu 2.27–28 [sbn 163–65]). Indeed, while he often refers to instances of other deductive reasoning apart from mathematics, Hume never provides any direct treatment of the principles of formal logic, and does not include deductive relations among his “relations of ideas.” Hume’s references to deductive reasoning appear in a variety of contexts. At the end of the Wrst Enquiry he denounces all of the “pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number,” as nothing but “sophistry and illusion” (ehu 2.27 [sbn 163]). However, Hume appeals to syllogistic reasoning himself on at least two occasions. One example appears in a letter of 1751 to his friend Gilbert Elliot, a theist who was sympathetic to the design argument. Here, in the course of explaining his approach to moral philosophy, Hume considers the various types of reasoning that are appropriate to different subjects, and observes of metaphysics and theology that “nothing there can correct bad Reasoning but good Reasoning: and Sophistry must be oppos’d by Syllogism” (l 1.151). The other appears in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, where Philo argues by means of a syllogism that we do not have any satisfactory idea of the divine attributes and operations, and offers this as an example of “just reasoning” which agrees with “sound piety” (dnr 2.142–43).17 17. For an attempt to develop a Humean theory of syllogistic reasoning, see Echelbarger, “Hume on Deduction,” 351–65.
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Apart from these passages, which may be partly conciliatory or ironic in their application of syllogistic reasoning to theology, Hume appeals more directly to the principles and operations of formal logic, both in developing his own arguments and in evaluating those of others. We have seen that he occasionally appeals to the principle of contradiction, or rejects a statement or an argument as a “contradiction in terms,” for example if it leads to the “Xattest of all contradictions, viz. that ’tis possible for the same thing both to be and not to be” (t 1.1.7.4; cf. 1.3.9.10, 1.4.2.3 [sbn 19; cf. 111, 188]; ehu 2.4 [sbn 18]). He also distinguishes a genuinely informative proposition from one that states the analysis of a concept: the latter is a disguised tautology, or an “identical” proposition which gives “no insight” (t 1.4.5.31 [sbn 249]; ehu 4.21 [sbn 37]). Hume occasionally extends his use of the phrase “demonstration” beyond the process of mathematical reasoning to deductive inferences from propositions according to the principles of formal logic. He thus observes that, unlike the various degrees of probability which we attribute to inductive inferences, demonstrative reasoning must be either “just” and “irresistible,” or else “a mere sophism” which can have “no manner of force” (t 1.2.2.6 [sbn 31]). He also rejects any attempt to offer a “demonstration” of the necessity of a cause as “fallacious and sophistical” (t 1.3.3.4 [sbn 80]; cf. ehu 4.18 [sbn 35]). Finally, in presenting his own account of probable reasoning as a new departure in “logic,” he notes that the word “logic” had previously been used for the study of the principles of deductive reasoning, or “the operations of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations” (a 4 [sbn 646–47]; cf. t Int.5, 1.3.15.11 [sbn xv–xvi, 175]). Of course, Hume is famous for arguing against any of the prevailing attempts among his predecessors and contemporaries to show that either causal judgments or normative judgments may ultimately be established through demonstration, as we will see in Chapters 3 and 8. On the other hand, Hume does not entirely exclude deductive reasoning from either domain, and several of his commentators have indeed argued that he requires, and even seeks to establish, a place for deductive reasoning in both our causal and our moral judgments.18 This claim is supported by a footnote in the Wrst Enquiry, where he appears to acknowledge that deductive reasoning plays an important role in many areas of human thought, if it is applied to premises that are ultimately derived from “observation and experience” (ehu 5.5n8 [sbn 43–45n1]).19 Several commentators have suggested that in excluding “demonstrative reasoning” from judgments of fact and value, Hume is in fact restricting the term 18. See Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 30–34; Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 270–71; and Cottle, “Justice as ArtiWcial Virtue,” 457–66. 19. This discussion challenges the view that Hume is a thoroughgoing “critic of formal logic,” which has been set forth in Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 12–13 and 18–41, and echoed in Zabeeh, Hume, 81–94.
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“demonstration” to one speciWc type of deductive argument: a valid argument from premises which are recognized as necessarily true. On this view, a “demonstration” would be a deductive argument from premises that are established through intuition.20 Hume is accordingly denying that the causal powers of objects, or the moral qualities of actions, can be established through a deductive argument from intuitively established premises; in other words, from relations of resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, or proportions in quantity. We will return to the question of the possibility of demonstrative reasoning concerning facts or morals in Chapters 3 and 8. In summary, Hume does not regard either those judgments in which we state the analysis of a concept, or judgments that we derive from other propositions through deductive reasoning, as stating per se a “relation of ideas.” Instead, his relations of ideas are those relations—including resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and numerical proportions—which we recognize by intuition in the immediate comparison of our ideas; although in the fourth case our intuition may also be assisted by the methods of demonstrative reasoning belonging to mathematics. In other words, he restricts any “reasoning” concerning relations of ideas to the domain of mathematics. Next, we have seen that although he includes mathematical relations among his relations of ideas, Hume presents his own examples of mathematical propositions as synthetic rather than analytic, or as stating an informative discovery rather than an analysis of the initial concept, even though a mathematical discovery is established a priori by a demonstration from intuitively recognized relations.21 Finally, although he appeals to the principles of deductive reasoning, and offers some reXections concerning the nature of concepts, Hume does not develop an explicit account either of the analysis of concepts or of deductive reasoning as it applies to relations among propositions.22
m at h em at i c s In the introduction to the Treatise Hume observes that even mathematics, natural science, and natural religion “are in some measure dependent on the science 20. See Stove, Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism, 35–36; Belshaw, “Hume and Demonstrative Knowledge,” 141–62; and Owen’s discussion of this interpretation in Hume’s Reason, 87–112. Stove also claims that Hume regards deductive arguments as the only “reasonable” arguments, overlooking Hume’s own account of the different degrees of probability and reasonable belief attending our causal judgments, as we will see in Chapter 3. 21. For further views of Hume on intuition and demonstrative reasoning, see Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 140–56, and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 1–6 and 85–112. 22. Hume’s only direct discussion of propositions appears in his footnote concerning the traditional division of “acts of the understanding” into “conception, judgment and reasoning,” in which he argues that judgments
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of man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judg’d of by their powers and faculties” (t Int.4 [sbn xv]). He examines several aspects of the mathematical or “demonstrative sciences” (t 1.4.1.1 [sbn 180]) from this perspective, including the concept of number, the necessity of mathematical reasoning, the foundations of geometry, the principles of statistical probability, and the role of mathematical reasoning in the activities and concerns of human life. In fact, Hume’s interest in mathematics, and also his difWdence in pursing this subject, are reXected in the greatest known loss among his writings. This lost manuscript was an essay on “some Considerations previous to Geometry & Natural Philosophy,” or “the metaphisical Principles of Geometry,” which he described in a 1755 letter to his London publisher, Andrew Millar, and intended to publish with the Four Dissertations in 1757. However, as he informed Millar’s junior associate and successor William Strahan in a letter of 1772, he withdrew it from the projected volume after Philip Stanhope, a respected but unpublished amateur mathematician, persuaded him “that either there was some Defect in the Argument or in its perspicuity; I forget which” (l 1.223, 2.253). Unfortunately, Hume did not preserve this manuscript, although his papers include two anonymous essays on geometry that are not in his handwriting, and whose relation to the lost essay can only be conjectured by comparison to his known writings and other contemporary texts.23 In the Treatise Hume argues that the concept of numerical equality is derived from our discovery that we can establish one-to-one correspondences between sets of objects, so that “when two numbers are so combin’d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal.” This activity of directing our attention toward the correlation of the units in different sets of objects enables us to develop our concepts of speciWc numbers, apparently through a distinction of reason, to serve as “a precise standard” by which we can judge relations of equality and proportion (t 1.3.1.5 [sbn 71]).24 In the strict sense, Hume maintains that “existence in itself belongs only to unity,” or to individual objects, “and is never applicable to number, but on account of the unites, of which the number is compos’d.” However, unity may also serve as “a Wctitious denomination, which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together,” so that “twenty men,” or the whole earth, do not always require two distinct ideas, and that all of these may actually be regarded as ways of conceiving an object (t 1.3.7.5 n20 [sbn 96–97n]). See Echelbarger, “Hume on Deduction,” 351–65, and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 75, 91n16, 99, 103, 156, and 167–68. 23. See Mossner, Life of David Hume, 321–22 and 665, and Gossman, “Two Unpublished Essays,” 442–49. 24. Hume’s derivation of the concept of number is cited by Frege as an anticipation of his own theory: see Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, 73 (§63); and Boolos, “Saving Frege from Contradiction,” 137–51. For an intriguing account of the implications of Hume’s critique of inWnite divisibility for recent developments in mathematical logic, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 284–303.
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or even the entire universe “may be consider’d as an unite” (t 1.2.2.3 [sbn 30–33]). In the Enquiry he argues that “the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar,” and he identiWes this resemblance as the source of the precision and intricacy of mathematical reasoning (ehu 12.27 [sbn 163]). Finally, he argues that we recognize numerical equality immediately through intuition in the case of “very short numbers,” while in other cases we must compare numbers “in a more artiWcial manner” by using the techniques of mathematical reasoning (t 1.3.1.3 [sbn 70]). Hume indicates that mathematical reasoning enables us to form concepts of very large numbers. Indeed, he describes this process in terms which suggest that our idea of a large number is a relative idea, by stating that whenever we consider “any great number, such as a thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it, but only a power of producing such an idea, by its adequate idea of the decimals, under which the number is comprehended,” although this limitation is “never felt in our reasonings” (t 1.1.7.12 [sbn 22–23]). Similarly, he maintains that the human mind cannot produce “a full and adequate conception of inWnity,” although he seems to allow that we can formulate a relative idea of inWnity, which is indicated in his own use of the word with the expectation that it will be understood by others (t 1.2.1.2; cf. 1.2.2.2 [sbn 26; cf. 29–30]). As we have seen, the concept of number gives us a “precise standard” of equality that we may apply in our mathematical reasonings beyond our intuitive recognition of the most obvious relations of equality between small quantities. Since algebra and arithmetic are directly concerned with relations between numbers, Hume describes these in the Treatise as “the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty” (t 1.3.1.5 [sbn 71]). In the Enquiry he concludes in similar terms that “the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number,” which are thus “the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration” (ehu 12.27 [sbn 163]). Hume offers several apparently competing accounts of the necessity that we attribute to mathematical demonstrations. In the Treatise he argues that all the apparent types of necessity arise from a “determination of the mind.” Accordingly, “the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones,” like the necessity which we attribute to causation, lies “only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas” (t 1.3.14.23 [sbn 166]). However, in assenting to a conclusion which is reached through intuition or demonstration, the mind “not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas.” By contrast, in our causal judgments “this absolute
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necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question.” In other words, it is impossible “to conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration,” since a demonstration, unlike a causal judgment, implies “the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different” (t 1.3.7.3, 1.3.6.1 [sbn 95, 87]). As an example, he argues in the Enquiry that a false conclusion in mathematics, such as “the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10,” cannot even be “distinctly conceived” (ehu 12.28 [sbn 164]). Finally, Philo observes in the Dialogues that although a naive observer might regard a numerical regularity as the product of chance or human contrivance, any “skilful algebraist” recognizes it as “the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers” (dnr 9.191). In several of the preceding passages, Hume appears to be arguing that the necessity of a mathematical demonstration arises from the apparent psychological impossibility of imagining any other conclusion. However, this interpretation also requires several important qualiWcations. First, he describes the determination of the mind in assenting to mathematical propositions as an intentional state in which the mind is “necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner” (t 1.3.7.3 [sbn 95]). He thus describes our assent to a mathematical proposition as a distinctive intentional state that is comparable to, but different from, our manner of conceiving causal relations, since it carries with it the impossibility of assenting to the opposite. Also, Philo states in the Dialogues that the mind is determined to assent to a mathematical proposition, or any other intuitively recognized relation, by the nature of the mathematical ideas and relations themselves (dnr 9.191). By contrast, in the case of causation, as we will see in Chapter 3, Hume argues that the necessity we attribute to our judgments arises through custom, or the repeated observation of similar instances, a process that does not operate in the case of demonstrative reasoning. The necessity of mathematical reasoning is therefore one instance of the determination of the mind through its activity of intuition. In our mathematical judgments, intuition operates either through immediate recognition or through the methods of demonstrative reasoning, by which we recognize and compare the numerical correspondences that we discover in sets of objects, and the numerical concepts that we form by attending to these correspondences (cf. t 1.1.5.6, 1.3.1.3–5 [sbn 14–15, 70–71]). He maintains, however, that relations, including mathematical relations, are not perceived directly as qualities of objects or sets of objects, but are instead formulated by the mind as complex ideas by comparing sets of objects, and then extended as principles for further judgments in which we compare or connect objects. Accordingly, the necessity of a mathematical demonstration lies only in the distinctive “act of the understanding” in which we compare our ideas of numbers (t 1.3.14.23
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[sbn 166]), even though the “truth” of a mathematical judgment, or indeed of any proposition concerning a relation of ideas, consists in “the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider’d as such,” or in the conformity of our judgment “to the real relations of ideas” (t 2.3.10.1–2, 3.1.1.9 [sbn 448, 458]). Among the mathematical disciplines, Hume devotes the most attention to geometry, or “the art, by which we Wx the proportions of Wgures” (t 1.3.1.4 [sbn 70]).25 These reXections begin in the Treatise with his criticism of the “doctrine of inWnite divisibility” and his defense of minimum sensible points, which he presents, not only as the background for his discussion of our ideas of time and space, but also as a contribution to the “foundation of mathematics” (t 1.2.1.1, 1.4.2.22 [sbn 26, 198]). In contrast to the prevailing opinion that space and time are inWnitely divisible, and building again upon Berkeley’s argument, Hume argues that space and time are composed of indivisible parts, which he calls “atoms” or “points” in the case of space, and “moments” in the case of time (t 1.2.1.1–2, 1.2.2.4, 1.2.3.15, 1.2.4.8–33, 1.4.5.9 [sbn 26–28, 31, 38–39, 42–53, 235]).26 This analysis is often regarded as one of the most obscure and implausible in Hume’s writings. However, I hope to show, here and in Chapter 4, that Hume presents a coherent and intriguing view of the impressions and cognitive dispositions that give us our ideas of space and time (cf. ehu 12.18–20 [sbn 156–58]).27 Hume Wrst attempts to prove that the imagination must eventually reach “a minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division.” He then argues that since these ideas are derived from impressions of sensation, our impressions of visible and tangible shapes must also be composed of minimum visible and tangible points (t 1.2.1.2–5 [sbn 26–28]). First, Hume attempts to show that our ideas, or images, of extended objects cannot be inWnitely divisible. Here he maintains that since the mind can never attain a “full and adequate conception of inWnity,” it cannot accommodate the individual ideas of the “inWnite number of parts” which, according to the prevailing doctrine, make up a Wnite extension.28 Accordingly, if we reject an 25. For discussions of Hume’s account of geometry, see Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, 64–83; Zabeeh, Hume, 137–43; Van Steenburgh, “Hume’s Geometric ‘Objects,’” 61–68; Newman, “Hume on Space and Geometry,” 1–31; Wright, Sceptical Realism, 85–122; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 115–24; Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 79–107; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 123–56; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 131–303. 26. Berkeley’s version of this argument appears in his New Theory of Vision, §54 and §§80–88; see Berkeley, Works, 1:191 and 204–6. See also Bayle, “Zeno of Elea,” note G, in Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, 359–72. For a further account of the historical context of this discussion, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 3–39. 27. For two recent and valuable reassessments of Hume’s analysis of the foundations of geometry, see Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity. 28. For a discussion of the structure and implications of Hume’s criticism of the concept of inWnity, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 284–303.
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“inWnite capacity of the mind,” we must recognize that any division of our ideas ultimately ends in images that are “perfectly simple and indivisible.” In a thought-experiment to illustrate this argument, Hume invites us to agree that we cannot divide our image of a very small object, such as a grain of sand, into even as few as twenty smaller parts before we reach the limit of what we can distinguish by the imagination. To help us imagine a minimum visible point, he argues that if we were to look at “a spot of ink upon paper” and then move backward, its “image or impression” would become perfectly indivisible at the moment before it vanishes from our visual Weld (t 1.2.1.2–4; cf. 1.2.4.7 [sbn 26–27; cf. 42]).29 Next, after showing that our ideas of extended objects in space are not inWnitely divisible, Hume maintains that our impressions of objects as extended in space cannot be inWnitely divisible either. Hume’s Wrst argument for this conclusion, beyond an appeal to evidence of the receding ink-spot, is formulated as a deduction from his copy theory of the relation between impressions and ideas. This inference moves from the premise, which has already been established, that the imagination must stop at the idea of a minimum point in dividing the image of a visible or tangible object, to the conclusion that the impressions from which they are copied also cannot be divided beyond a minimum. Accordingly, he asserts that “wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects,” all of the “relations, contradictions and agreements” that apply to our ideas must also apply to their objects; in other words, to the impressions from which we derive our ideas. He then argues that since (1) “our ideas are adequate representations of the most minute parts of extension,” since (2) “whatever appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible and contradictory” if it is attributed to our impressions, and since (3) our ideas of extension cannot be divided inWnitely, we must conclude (4) that our impressions of extension, and thus (5) extension itself, cannot be inWnitely divisible. In a similar move from what is impossible in conceiving our ideas, to what is impossible for our impressions, he argues that any Wnite extension that is inWnitely divisible would contain an “inWnite number of parts.” However, this assertion is evidently contradictory, since an inWnite series of parts when joined together would produce an inWnite extension. He concludes that our impressions, and our ideas, of Wnite extensions must be composites of the impressions or ideas of minimum visible or tangible points (t 1.2.2.1–3 [sbn 29–31]). In developing his positive account of our idea of space, Hume observes that the minimum points of our perception of extension in space are given to 29. For a detailed analysis and defense of Hume’s spot-of-ink thought-experiment, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 43–128.
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us through vision and touch. We may thus describe these points as minimum visible and tangible points, or minimal points of “colour and solidity” (t 1.2.3.15; cf. 1.2.4.3 [sbn 38; cf. 40]).30 He identiWes these minimum points of spatial perception with mathematical points, or the fundamental units in the composition of a geometrical Wgure. Accordingly, in describing these as sensible points, he challenges the general conception of a mathematical point as a “nonentity,” which he argues would be useless in the imaginative construction of a geometrical Wgure (t 1.2.2.9–10, 1.2.3.14, 1.2.4.3 [sbn 32–33, 38, 40]). Indeed, Hume appeals to the deWnitions of Euclidean geometry to defend his doctrine of minimum points against the doctrine of inWnite divisibility. According to the Euclidean system, “a surface is deWn’d to be length and breadth without depth: A line to be length without breadth or depth: A point to be what has neither length, breadth nor depth.” However, Hume maintains that these deWnitions are “perfectly unintelligible upon any other supposition than that of the composition of extension by indivisible points or atoms,” since we cannot imagine the “terminations” of a solid in a surface, a surface in a line, or a line in a point, unless these terminations are composed of indivisible points (t 1.2.4.8–14 [sbn 42–44]). In order to understand Hume’s rejection of inWnite divisibility in time and space, and his defense of minimum sensible points, it will be helpful to consider what he evidently does not mean by these arguments. First, as we have seen, he repeatedly afWrms that we may engage in demonstrative reasonings involving very large numbers, and very small fractions, even beyond the range of our immediate intuition of numerical relations (t 1.1.7.12, 1.2.1.3, 2.3.10.2–4 [sbn 22–23, 27, 449–50]). However, although we may perform any of an inWnite variety of arithmetical calculations, and may further claim to apply these to an extension in space beyond the reach of our senses, such a calculation is neither a literal division of an object in space, nor a precise division of the object in the imagination. If this calculation is accompanied by images of the division of this object, as it apparently must be on Hume’s view, the imagination can exhibit this process only as the division of a sensible object, composed of indivisible points, in an imaginary spatial Weld, corresponding to the spatial Weld of perception. Any supposed division of an object in space beyond the reach of our faculties of vision and touch is therefore actually an exercise of arithmetical reasoning, which may also be associated with the division of an image by the imagination. However, such a division can never be carried out 30. Many recent studies have argued that for Hume these points of color and solidity are the ultimate simple impressions of vision and touch; see, for example, Cummins, “Hume on Qualities,” 49–88; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 42–46; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 60–64; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 11–55.
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by the imagination in an exact correspondence with the divisions that are performed in the mathematical calculation.31 Hume also accepts the contemporary scientiWc evidence indicating “that there are bodies vastly more minute than those, which appear to the senses,” although he maintains that any such imperceptible bodies cannot be properly described as “inWnitely more minute” (t 1.2.4.24 [sbn 48]). He thus argues, for example, that the view through a microscope gives “parts to impressions, which to the naked eye appear simple and uncompounded, and advances to a minimum, what was formerly imperceptible.” He also rejects the view that our images of minute bodies are vastly “inferior” to the images of everyday objects, maintaining instead that when we form the image of a very tiny body, such as “the smallest atom of the animal spirits of an insect a thousand times less than a mite,” we are in effect “enlarging our conceptions,” rather than imagining something smaller than a sensible image. In other words, even our idea of an entity that is too small to be perceived by our senses is depicted by the imagination as a complex visible or tangible impression in the imagined counterpart of our sensory Weld. Thus, in considering the “thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand,” we may indeed formulate “a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions,” but cannot form images of these parts that are different in the same proportions from the image representing the original grain (t 1.2.1.3–5 [sbn 27–28]).32 In a later elucidation of this argument, Hume maintains that “the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points,” and that, for an object to be visible, it must coincide with a certain number of visible points in this Weld. Accordingly, a very small object must be magniWed, and a very large object must be reduced, in order to appear in its entirety within this Weld of vision (t 1.3.9.11 [sbn 112]). Finally, Hume does not regard the indivisible points of space and time as distinguishable and measurable in themselves, or useful as a basis for exact measurements. Indeed, he rejects the deWnition of geometric equality as the correspondence of mathematical points, since the minimum points which compose any lines or surfaces are “so minute and so confounded with each other, that ’tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number” (t 1.2.4.19; cf. 1.2.4.24, 1.2.4.31 [sbn 45; cf. 48, 638]). He also initially rejects the interpretation of his theory as a “system of physical points,” since “a real extension, such as a physical point is suppos’d to be, can never exist without parts” which 31. For a similar interpretation of Hume’s argument as an account of perceptual space and its relation to geometry, see Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 116–23, and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 43–303. 32. Hume’s distinction between the images and concepts of very small objects is developed in Newman, “Hume on Space and Geometry,” 1–31, and in Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 11–55. For a contrasting view of Hume’s discussion, see Franklin, “Achievements and Fallacies,” 85–101.
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are “different from each other,” and would accordingly be “distinguishable and separable by the imagination” (t 1.2.4.3 [sbn 40]). He apparently reverses his terminology in the course of his writings by observing, even later in the Treatise, that the eye always sees “an equal number of physical points” (t 1.3.9.11 [sbn 112]). Similarly, in the Enquiry he maintains that “whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points,” which he now identiWes as those “parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination.” These “physical points” would appear, by this deWnition, to be what he called “mathematical points” in Book 1 of the Treatise (ehu 12.18n33 [sbn 156n1]).33 The most promising approach to understanding Hume’s account of indivisible visible and tangible mathematical points is to regard this as a discussion of the composition, Wrst of extended objects in space, then of space itself, and Wnally of our ideas of geometrical Wgures. First, Hume argues that our image of any extension in space is composed of the images of a number of minimum visible and tangible points. However, we do not ordinarily imagine these separately, although the idea of a minimum visible point can indeed be isolated through a thought-experiment by imagining the receding ink-spot. Next, on the basis of the copy principle, he argues that these minimal ideas must be regarded as copies, or images, of those minimum visible and tangible points that are given to us as impressions. He concludes that our impression of an extended object must be composed of a number of minimum visible and tangible points, although we cannot distinguish these from each other by vision or touch, apart from any artiWcial exercises which are designed to isolate a minimum impression. Next, Hume argues that our apparent idea of space in general, including empty space, is actually derived from our minimal impressions of visible and tangible points, by an imaginative projection of the arrangement that we discover among these points. Thus, even our idea of empty space is composed of ideas of minimum points of extension (cf. t 1.2.4.1–2, 1.2.5.1–29 [sbn 39–40, 53–65]). I will return to this argument in Chapter 4, where I will examine Hume’s account of our ideas of space and time in greater detail. Finally, Hume maintains that our fundamental concepts in geometry, including our ideas of a point, line, and surface, are all composed of ideas of minimum points, corresponding to the minimal points of sensation. As we have 33. Frasca-Spada suggests that Hume is distinguishing his minimal points in the Treatise from both physical and mathematical points: see Space and the Self, 30–32 and 42. However, it seems likely, in light of his appeal to the deWnitions of Euclidean geometry, that Hume is presenting his account of minimum visible and tangible points as an alternative account of mathematical points (cf. t 1.2.2.7, 1.2.4.3–4, 1.2.4.14 [sbn 32, 38, 40]). For a similar reading of Hume, see Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 158–68; cf. 109–10 and 116–20.
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seen, he further argues that our concepts of geometrical Wgures are derived, through distinctions of reason, by our comparing of the composite objects of perception (t 1.1.7.17–18 [sbn 24–25]). He then suggests that the imagination extends the ideas which we derive from attending to various aspects of the objects of sensory experience in order to develop our images of ideal geometrical Wgures and ideal standards for their relations. However, he still maintains that our ideas of these relations, such as equality or congruity between Wgures, and the straightness of a line, are “far from being exact and determinate, according to our common method of conceiving them,” since “the ultimate standard of these Wgures is deriv’d from nothing but the senses and imagination” (t 1.2.4.29 [sbn 50–51]). This analysis appears especially in his account of our ideas of equality and of a straight line. Hume begins with the concept of equality in geometry, or of equal extension, in contrast to numerical equality. He dismisses several possible sources for our judgments of congruity, such as those appealing to an equal number of points, or to an exact correspondence of parts, since he maintains that the senses cannot discern the individual points from which any given extension is composed (t 1.2.4.18; cf. 1.2.4.24, 1.2.4.31 [sbn 45; cf. 48, 638]). Instead, “the only useful notion of equality, or inequality” between geometrical Wgures “is deriv’d from the whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects” (t 1.2.4.22 [sbn 637]). In forming this concept, we begin with a rough idea of equality that is derived from the “general appearance” of approximately congruent dimensions between objects. This preliminary judgment may then be corrected through “review and reXection,” either by a direct “juxtaposition of the objects,” or, if this is not convenient, through the artiWcial use of “some common and invariable measure, which being successively apply’d to each, informs us of their different proportions.” Every comparison is, in its turn, “susceptible of a new correction, and of different degrees of exactness, according to the nature of the instrument, by which we measure the bodies, and the care which we employ in the comparison.” In judging the dimensions of ordinary objects we generally adopt “a mix’d notion of equality,” which combines “the looser and stricter methods of comparison.” However, the imagination reWnes our concept of equal measurement by its propensity “to proceed . . . with any action, even after the reason has ceas’d, which Wrst determin’d it to begin.”34 The imagination is thus impelled by its own momentum to continue past the “mix’d notion” of equality which is given through the senses and intuition, and to posit a supposed continuation of the process of correction, extending even to the supposed comparison of bodies that are “vastly more minute than those, 34. Price has characterized this propensity very effectively as the “inertia” of the imagination; see Hume’s Theory of the External World, 54–59.
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which appear to the senses.” Through this impetus we arrive at the concept of “some imaginary standard of equality,” which we assume can be applied beyond the limits of our visual and tactile sensations, even though this imaginary correction of our judgments beyond the reach of any observation “is a mere Wction of the mind; and useless as well as incomprehensible.” Hume therefore concludes that we can only achieve “an obscure and implicit notion of a perfect and entire equality” between two Wgures in space, although he also regards this Wctional notion as a very natural product of the human imagination (t 1.2.4.23–24, 1.2.4.22; cf. 1.2.4.31, 1.4.2.22 [sbn 47–48; 637; cf. 38, 198]; A 29 [sbn 658–59]).35 Hume offers a similar account of our concept of a “right” or a straight line. Here he argues that while the difference between a curved and a straight line might seem immediately evident to the senses and imagination, it is “impossible to produce any deWnition of them, which will Wx the precise boundaries between them,” or to provide an “exact method” for distinguishing between them. In other words, it is impossible for us to either describe or recognize a perfectly straight line. However, in spite of this we may form “a distant notion of some unknown standard to these objects” through the imaginative activity of “correcting the Wrst appearance by a more accurate consideration, and by a comparison with some rule, of whose rectitude from repeated trials we have a greater assurance.” In this way we develop “the loose idea of a perfect standard to these Wgures, without being able to explain or comprehend it” (t 1.2.4.25 [sbn 49]). However, he maintains that the “the original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance,” which we observe in certain lines, even though we cannot determine whether any particular visible line is really or only approximately straight (t 1.2.4.30 [sbn 52]). While Hume does not consider any other geometric concepts, he could presumably provide a similar account of our ideas of regular polygons and other geometrical Wgures, as Wctional constructions arising from the tendency of the imagination to develop a perfected image of the Wgures we perceive in nature. Finally, we may subject the relations between these constructions to exact calculation in the context of a numerical system of measurement, even though we can never exactly measure the objects of sensation (cf. t 1.1.7.8–10, 1.1.7.17–18, 1.3.1.1 [sbn 21–22, 24–25, 69]). Hume accordingly rejects the view held by many philosophers that the ideas belonging to mathematics and geometry “are of so reWn’d and spiritual a nature” that they must arise, not from the imagination, but from some “pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone 35. See Traiger, “Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions,” 381–99; Brand, Hume’s Theory of Moral Judgment, 22–27; and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 119–23.
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capable.” He then criticizes the tendency of such philosophers to use “this notion of some spiritual and reWn’d perceptions” given to the pure intellect as a justiWcation for many of our other abstract ideas, instead of recognizing that all of our ideas arise from our impressions of sensation and reXection (t 1.3.1.7 [sbn 72]). Finally, with this discovery that our fundamental concepts in geometry are “so loose and uncertain,” since they arise from sensation and imagination, Hume challenges the claim that we can attain any “infallible assurance,” not only for the most “intricate and obscure propositions” of geometry, but even for its “most vulgar and obvious principles.” For example, he criticizes the attempt to prove that two straight lines cannot share a common segment, or that there is only one straight line between two points, since, while we may regard the opposite opinions as “obviously absurd, and repugnant to our clear ideas,” we might indeed Wnd it easier to imagine that two lines approaching each other “at the rate of an inch in twenty leagues” share a common segment rather than a single point where they contact each other. Indeed, Hume traces our belief in the Euclidean parallel postulate, neither to intuition nor to demonstration, but to the supposed difWculty of imagining any other conWguration of geometrical Wgures in perceptual space (t 1.2.4.30, 1.3.1.5–6 [sbn 51–52, 71–72]). Hume’s discussion of the parallel postulate might thus be regarded as an indirect contribution to the emerging contemporary discussion over the problem of proving the parallel postulate, which would eventually lead to the development of non-Euclidean geometry: since he distinguishes any conclusions which might be reached through demonstrative reasoning from the question of whether any alternative view is, or could be, achieved by the imagination in its conWguration of the material provided by the senses.36 Hume concludes in the Treatise that since its Wrst principles are derived “merely from appearances,” geometry can never reach “greater exactness in the comparison of objects or ideas, than what our eye or imagination alone is able to attain,” and thereby “falls short of that perfect precision and certainty, which are peculiar to arithmetic and algebra.” In this respect, geometry is an “art” rather than a science, although it still improves upon “the imperfect judgments of our senses and imagination” (t 1.3.1.4–6 [sbn 70–72]). On the other hand, in the Enquiry he offers the calculation of the relation between the sides of a right triangle as an example of the exactness and perfection we may attain in our mathematical demonstrations (ehu 4.1, 12.27 [sbn 25, 163]). Flew has accordingly suggested that in writing the Enquiry Hume is renouncing his earlier view of geometry as an inexact and imperfect science, and is instead 36. A German contemporary of Hume, G. S. Klügel, appears to have been the Wrst mathematician to assert, in 1763, that Euclid’s parallel postulate cannot be proved and is only supported by the judgment of our senses. See Trudeau, Non-Euclidean Revolution, 154.
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“restoring pure geometry to its place” alongside arithmetic and algebra. Flew also claims that in the Treatise Hume is entirely concerned with pure mathematics, and that he only considers applied mathematics in the Enquiry.37 In response to Flew’s reading, I would suggest that in the Treatise Hume is tracing the inexact character of geometry to its character as an applied discipline, or its function in measuring and comparing the objects of perception. In this regard he contrasts geometry to the cognitive process, which he also considers in the Treatise, of exact calculations concerning imaginatively constructed or idealized geometrical Wgures (t 1.3.1.1–4, 1.3.14.23 [sbn 69–70, 166]). On this view, Hume’s references to exact calculations in geometry, in both the Treatise and the Enquiry, refer to the arithmetical calculation of relations between the parts of imaginatively postulated geometrical Wgures, which belongs to pure geometry (cf. ehu 12.27 [sbn 163]).38 However, elsewhere in the Enquiry Hume attributes the precision of geometry, surprisingly, not merely to the demonstrations arising from its concepts and deWnitions, but also to the clarity of its objects as these may be presented to the senses. Even here, however, he maintains that it is the “ideas” of geometrical Wgures that are “clear and determinate,” and between which the smallest differences are “immediately perceptible” (ehu 7.1–2 [sbn 60–61]). He also states in the Enquiry that the propositions of geometry would still maintain their “certainty and evidence,” even if there were no perfect circles or triangles in nature (ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). Here again he thus appears to be presenting our ideas of geometrical Wgures as imaginative constructions, which we use as images to accompany the process of demonstrative reasoning, rather than as direct copies of the Wgures that we have attended to in natural objects. Hume also considers the distinction and relation between pure and “mixed” or applied mathematics more directly in the Enquiry. More speciWcally, he argues that the incorporation of geometry into natural philosophy cannot give us any knowledge of “ultimate causes” in nature, since any use of “mixed mathematics” in the natural sciences already requires us to assume “that certain laws are established by nature in her operations.” Once we have accepted this premise, the “abstract reasonings” of mathematics may then be used “either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their inXuence in particular instances” by enabling us to calculate “any precise degree of distance and quantity.” Thus, while geometry may assist us in applying a law of motion, by giving us the dimensions “of all the parts and Wgures, which can enter into any species of machine,” the discovery of this law “is owing merely to experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step 37. Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 61–62. 38. For a related account of the two types of geometry in the Treatise, see Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 136.
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towards the knowledge of it” (ehu 4.13 [sbn 31]).39 Indeed, in the History of England Hume especially praises Galileo as the Wrst to apply geometry, “together with experiment,” to the natural sciences (h 5.App.4.153). In addition to the basic principles of arithmetic and geometry, Hume also considers the concepts and principles involved in the calculation of statistical frequencies, or what he calls the “probability of chances,” as background for his discussion of causality and probable reasoning. Hume describes “chance” as “the negation of a cause,” or a “perfect and total indifference” of the mind in its expectation of any particular event. However, he then argues that in considering a procedure for generating a random series of events within a given range of possibilities, such as multiple tosses of numbered dice, the mind can be inXuenced, by its recognition of any factors that might indicate a “superior combination of chances,” to predict the relative frequencies of various outcomes, even apart from any judgments regarding the causal forces impinging upon the particular events in the series. For example, if we consider “a dye, that has four sides mark’d with a certain number of spots, and only two with another,” we expect that a series of tosses will turn up the Wrst Wgure with greater frequency than the second Wgure. He explains this expectation by arguing that “the impulses belonging to all these sides must re-unite in that one Wgure, and become stronger and more forcible by the union,” so that the combined ideas of the Wrst are “superior to those of the latter” (t 1.3.11.1–6, 1.3.11.13 [sbn 124–26, 130]; cf. ehu 6.2–3 [sbn 56–57]). In considering a series of random casts, we therefore expect the Wgure depicted on four sides to appear more frequently than the Wgure on the other two sides, because the combined ideas of four instances gives greater force and vivacity to our idea of this Wgure than to our idea of the other. Hume’s account of our assessment of statistical frequencies might seem to be another example of his supposed tendency to reduce the criteria of belief and judgment to the force and vivacity of our ideas. However, here again he appears to distinguish between a phenomenological and an epistemic account of justiWcation in his references to “calculations concerning chances,” in which he suggests that we may also give an objective formulation to these subjective degrees of expectation by a demonstrative calculation of statistical probabilities (t 1.3.4.5, 1.3.11.10 [sbn 125, 128]). While he does not offer any more detailed account of the methods of statistical calculation, Hume might have presented this as another “artiWcial” procedure belonging to mathematics, arising through another imaginative projection from our ordinary observation, and 39. Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 62–64, and “Did Hume Distinguish Pure from Applied Geometry?” 96–100; Newman, “Hume on Space and Geometry,” 1–31; Flew, “Hume on Space and Geometry,” 62–65; and Newman, “A Rejoinder,” 66–69.
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formulated as a set of arithmetical principles for calculating the appearance of speciWc patterns in various sequences of random events.40 Hume therefore suggests that the mathematical sciences ultimately arise from our intuitive recognition of proportions in quantity and number, which initially applies to the objects that are given to us through sensation and reproduced as images, and is then extended beyond the range of our immediate intuition through our formulation and application of the “artiWcial” procedures of demonstrative reasoning, and the “Wctional” or imaginatively projected ideas of perfect Wgures and exact relations in geometry. Finally, once they are deWned, these concepts and procedures allow us to generate a system of propositions that we recognize as demonstratively necessary. We may conclude by considering Hume’s account of the place of mathematics in human life. In considering the motives for various types of intellectual inquiry, he notes that the pleasure associated with mathematical demonstrations cannot proceed from the demonstration itself, since in difWcult cases of mathematical reasoning “the pleasure is very inconsiderable, if rather it does not degenerate into pain.” Instead, our interest in a mathematical demonstration arises from our delight in exercising, or recognizing, the “genius and capacity” involved in the demonstration, and from anticipating the usefulness of the result. We thus Wnd that “nothing can be more curious, as well as useful” than tracing numerical relations (t 2.3.10.2–3 [sbn 449]; ehu 12.27 [sbn 163]). Hume also argues that mathematical reasoning is “useful in all mechanical operations,” and indeed “in almost every art and profession,” although its usefulness only becomes apparent when it “directs our judgment concerning causes and effects,” either in the operations of nature or in different types of human activity (t 2.3.3.2 [sbn 413–14]). Finally, in the Treatise, Hume also considers the social context, as well as the historical dimension, of mathematical inquiry. Here he notes that no “algebraist nor mathematician” can ever become “so expert in his science, as to place entire conWdence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it,” or to regard it as more than “a mere probability.” However, his conWdence in his discovery increases “every time he runs over his proofs,” and is further reinforced “by the approbation of his friends,” until it is Wnally “rais’d to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and applauses of the learned world” (t 1.4.1.1 [sbn 180]). Thus, even though we may indeed regard numerical relations as necessary in themselves, Hume suggests that, in practice, our conWdence in any particular instance of demonstrative reasoning rests upon probable reasoning, 40. Hacking overlooks Hume’s references to the possibility of objective methods of statistical calculation: see Emergence of Probability, 176–85, and “Hume’s Species of Probability,” 21–37. For a more thorough analysis of Hume’s discussion, see Gower, “Hume on Probability,” 1–19. See also Daston, Classical Probability, 198–203.
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since we can only reach a high level of probable assurance that we have carried out a particular demonstration accurately: a probable assurance that is strengthened by the evidence provided by repeated calculations and by intersubjective conWrmation. In other words, he calls attention here to the objective character of mathematical relations as indicated by their repeatability, to the historical development of human mathematical knowledge, and to the role of a community of researchers in conWrming new developments in the world of learning.
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3
Probable Reasoning
The most prominent and inXuential of Hume’s philosophical arguments is his analysis of causation, which he develops both in the longest division of the Treatise and as the central argument in the Abstract and the Wrst Enquiry. However, Hume initially presents this analysis in the Treatise within a discussion of “knowledge and probability,” whose further dimensions have received considerably less attention in the secondary literature. Hume’s circuitous treatment of probable reasoning in both the Treatise and the Enquiry may indeed have encouraged incomplete readings of his argument. In Book 1, Part 3 of the Treatise he begins with a preliminary analysis of our idea of causation, including our idea of the necessary connection between a cause and its effect, in Sections 2–10; then turns to the role of probability in our judgments of causation in Sections 11–13; returns to the idea of a necessary connection in Section 14; and then completes his discussion of philosophical probable reasoning in Section 15. In the Wrst Enquiry he presents his analysis of causation in Sections 4–7, including a brief discussion of probable reasoning in Section 6; and then considers philosophical probable reasoning, almost incidentally, in his reXections concerning the reasoning ability of animals (Section 9), and concerning the evaluation of testimony (Section 10). In this chapter I restore Hume’s analysis of the causal relation to its original context in his account of probable reasoning. 69
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c au s at i o n Hume describes three of his seven philosophical relations in the Treatise as depending on “information from experience,” or in the Enquiry as concerned with “matters of fact.” In the Treatise he identiWes two of these, identity and location, as immediately apparent to the senses through “perception rather than reasoning.” By contrast, causation is the only relation concerning matters of fact and existence in which “the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses” to discover “existences and objects, which we do not see or feel” (t 1.3.1.1, 1.3.2.2–3 [sbn 69, 73–74]; ehu 4.1 [sbn 25]). He therefore identiWes two types of “reasoning” in human cognition: demonstrative reasonings about numerical relations; and “probable reasoning,” or what he also calls “moral reasoning,” concerning causes and effects (t 1.3.6.5–6, 1.3.8.12, 1.3.14.17 [sbn 89, 103, 163]; ehu 4.18, 7.1–3 [sbn 35, 60–62]).1 Causal inferences play a central role in human thought and activity, since all of our reasonings in the “conduct of life” arise from this source, along with “all our belief in history,” and indeed “all philosophy, excepting only geometry and arithmetic” (a 10 [sbn 650]; cf. t 1.3.9.4 [sbn 108]; ehu 5.6–8, 7.29 [sbn 44–46, 76]). However, Hume indicates that the study of our causal inferences had been “little cultivated” thus far in philosophy (ehu 4.3 [sbn 26]). He accordingly presents his analysis of causation, both as a contribution to contemporary discussions in philosophy and as a foundation for his own further inquiries into the moral or human sciences. Hume has already introduced causation as both a natural and a philosophical relation in Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise (t 1.1.4.1, 1.1.5.9 [sbn 11, 15]). His project in Part 3 of Book 1, and in the corresponding Sections 4–7 of the Wrst Enquiry, is to provide an account of the origin of our idea of causation, beginning with causation as a natural relation, and then proceeding to causation as a philosophical relation. In accordance with his copy principle, Hume approaches the problem of accounting for the origin of our idea of causation by seeking to discover the “primary impression, from which it arises” (t 1.3.2.4 [sbn 74–75]). He then argues that the idea of causation does not arise directly through either perception or intuition, since we do not perceive causality through our senses as a distinctive quality of any object, nor can we discover any causal relations merely by considering or comparing our ideas of any objects. On the contrary, the imagination can always separate the idea of any cause from the idea of its effect, and there is “no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider 1. For a discussion of these two types of “reasoning,” or inference, and their importance in Hume’s thought, see Owen, Hume’s Reason.
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these objects in themselves” (t 1.3.2.5, 1.3.6.1 [sbn 75, 86–87]; ehu 4.6–13 [sbn 27–32]).2 Next, Hume presents his analysis of the causal relation, initially as it appears in cases of direct mechanical causation between physical objects, although he also eventually applies his analysis to “moral” causes, or to the passions and human action (t 1.3.2.16, 1.3.14.33, 1.3.15.11 [sbn 78, 171, 175]). In a case of physical causation, such as one billiard ball striking another and causing it to move, the causal relation essentially includes two natural relations which are directly given to us through perception: conjunction in space and conjunction in time, or “contiguity and succession” (t 1.3.2.6–9, 1.3.14.19 [sbn 75–76, 164]; cf. A 9–10 [sbn 649–50]; ehu 4.7–10, 7.6 [sbn 28–30, 63]).3 However, since we often regard objects as contiguous and successive without regarding one as the cause of the other, as in an accidental conjunction, Hume then Wnds that we attribute a further quality, which we call “necessity,” to the causal relation between two objects. Accordingly, he identiWes the “necessary connexion” between a cause and its effect as the distinctive characteristic of the causal relation. Finally, he presents the task of tracing our idea of a necessary connection, and its derivation from our impressions, as the central problem in attempting to account for the idea of causation (t 1.3.2.11–13 [sbn 77–78]; cf. 1.3.14.1–36 [sbn 155–72]; ehu 7.1–30 [sbn 60–79]). With this statement of his problem in the Treatise, Hume then postpones his attempt to Wnd the impression that is the source for our idea of necessity until after he has considered two separate but related sets of questions: Wrst, why we believe that any object which begins to exist must always have a cause; and second, why we infer the connection between a particular cause and its effect, and why we believe in it and consider it to be necessary (t 1.3.2.13–15 [sbn 77–78]). In the Enquiry he again defers his discussion of our idea of a necessary connection, this time until he has considered our general expectation that the future will resemble the past (ehu 4.14–23 [sbn 32–39]; cf. t 1.3.6.4–11 [sbn 88–92]), and the nature and sources of our particular causal inferences (ehu 5.3–22 [sbn 42–55]). In the Treatise Hume turns next to the assertion that is often called the Causal Principle, which is our belief that every event must have a cause. 2. Although Hume usually refers to the relata of a causal relation as “objects,” many of his examples can also be described as involving two events, such as the movements of two billiard balls. He indeed refers to both objects (t 1.3.2.5–16 [sbn 75–94]; a 8 [sbn 649]; sbn 4.6–13 [sbn 27–32]) and events (t 1.3.12.4–25 [sbn 131–42]; a 11 [sbn 650]; sbn 7.26–28 [sbn 73–75]) in the course of his investigation, and his examples often indicate that he may be using the terms interchangeably (cf. a 9 [sbn 649–50]). See Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 118, and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 69 and 111–12. 3. In the Enquiry Hume drops any explicit reference to spatial contiguity, although he may be implicitly conXating spatial contiguity and temporal succession by describing an effect as one object that “follows” another (sbn 7.6, 7.29 [sbn 63, 76–77]). See Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 112–13.
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However, he argues that this principle is “neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain,” since in contrast to the universality and necessity that we ascribe to the relations discovered through intuition and demonstration, we can always, in our imagination, separate our idea of a particular cause from our idea of its effect. For this reason, we may conclude that “every demonstration, which has been produc’d for the necessity of a cause, is fallacious and sophistical.” Hume argues instead that our belief in the universality and necessity of causation arises from the accumulated force of many individual causal inferences. This accordingly brings us to the second question, concerning the nature and sources of our particular causal inferences (t 1.3.3.1–9; cf. 1.3.14.13, 1.3.14.35 [sbn 78–82; cf. 161–62, 172]). In both the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume considers another apparent presupposition of our causal judgments. This principle, which is now generally called the Uniformity Principle or Principle of Induction, is our general expectation that the future will resemble the past, or in other words “that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same” (t 1.3.6.4 [sbn 89]). Like the Causal Principle, the Uniformity Principle cannot be derived from either intuition or demonstration, since there is “no contradiction” implied by stating “that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects.” Indeed, a different course of events can always be “distinctly” conceived by the imagination, since we can imagine a future in which all of the causal relations of the past and present have been replaced by an entirely new set of causal relations. We also Wnd that the Uniformity Principle cannot be derived from experience, since the argument that the uniformity of past experience can be used to predict the uniformity of future experience itself rests upon the expectation that the future will resemble the past, and thus cannot be used to establish this principle. Instead, Hume argues that our expectation of a continuing uniformity in nature is a “supposition,” which is produced by the cumulative inXuence of our individual causal inferences on our imagination (ehu 4.18 [sbn 35]; a 14 [sbn 652]; cf. 4.14–20 [sbn 32–36]; t 1.3.6.4–11, 1.3.8.13 [sbn 88–92, 104]).4 After considering the Causal Principle in the Treatise, and the Uniformity Principle in both texts, Hume turns in both the Treatise and the Enquiry to consider the origin and nature of our individual causal judgments. In contrast to any supposed arguments from either intuition or perception, he now argues 4. For recent discussions of Hume on the Causal Principle and the Uniformity Principle, see especially Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 141–50, 173–91; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 82, 86–91, and 126–29; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, especially 70–84 and 140–93; and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 73–89 and 133–53.
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that we can only infer a causal relation between two objects through “experience.” This consists in our observation and memory, not merely of a single instance of contiguity and succession between a pair of objects, but also of the “constant conjunction” between many pairs of similar objects. Experience in this sense, or repeated observation, leads us to expect objects of the second type to follow objects of the Wrst type in the future (t 1.3.6.2–3, 1.3.14.16–21 [sbn 87–88, 163–65]; cf. ehu 5.4, 11.30 [sbn 42, 148]; dnr 2.149). We thus have “no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoin’d together,” and this “constant conjunction” gives these and similar objects “an union in the imagination,” even though we cannot Wnd any reason for this regular connection beyond observation (t 1.3.6.15 [sbn 93]; cf. ehu 5.8–9 [sbn 46–47]). Hume further argues that the experience of a constant conjunction between similar sets of objects tends to give us, not only an idea of their conjunction, but also a “belief,” or expectation, that we will perceive conjunctions between similar types of objects in the future. Our immediate impression of an object of the Wrst type therefore evokes, both an idea of an object of the second type, and the expectation that an impression of an object of the second type will either precede or follow our impression of the object of the Wrst type, in the same order as in our experience of similar pairs of objects in the past. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Hume moves from characterizing “belief” as a superior “force and vivacity” in our conception of particular ideas, to describing belief as a “peculiar feeling or sentiment,” and Wnally as a distinctive “manner” in which we conceive our ideas (t 1.3.7.1–8, t App.2 [sbn 93–98, 628–29, 623–24]; ehu 5.10–13 [sbn 47–50]). Whatever may be the best description, he maintains that our belief in a causal relation between two objects arises from the inXuence of a series of “past impressions and conjunctions” on the imagination. Since “we call every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion,” Hume concludes “that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv’d solely from that origin” (t 1.3.8.10 [sbn 102]). In the Enquiry he maintains in similar terms that all inferences from experience are derived from “custom or habit,” which produces “a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding” (ehu 5.5 [sbn 43]). Next, Hume argues that custom, or the frequent observation of a conjunction between sets of resembling objects, acts upon the imagination to produce a new impression of reXection, which he calls a “determination” of the mind. Once we have repeatedly observed a similar conjunction between similar pairs of objects, we discover that “upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant,” and to form the idea of this
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usual attendant in the “stronger light” of our belief or expectation that an object of this type will follow the Wrst object. Hume identiWes this internal impression, or determination of the mind, as the impression which is the source of our idea of a necessary connection between a cause and its effect (t 1.3.14.1 [sbn 156]). Finally, Hume observes that since the human mind has a tendency to “spread itself on external objects,” or to project “any internal impressions, which they occasion” onto them, we generally suppose this necessity to lie “in the objects we consider, not in our mind” (t 1.3.14.25 [sbn 167]). In concluding his analysis, he maintains that “necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects,” and even that it is impossible for us “to form the most distant idea of it, consider’d as a quality in bodies” (t 1.3.14.22 [sbn 165–66]; cf. ehu 7.26–30 [sbn 73–79]). Hume presents his analysis of causation especially in response to the attempts among both “antient and modern philosophers,” including the Scholastics, the Cartesians, and Locke, to trace the “efWcacy of causes” to a distinctive “power” or causal force, which is either found in matter itself, or imparted to matter by a divine being. These philosophers have referred to this type of force by a variety of synonymous terms, such as “efWcacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality.” In response, Hume argues that any “just idea” of such a force must arise from an impression of sensation, which would be distinctly given to us in the perception of objects. Since we do not directly perceive such powers when we observe causal conjunctions between objects, he concludes that these terms have been introduced “without any clear and determinate ideas,” and then used to formulate circular deWnitions of each other (t 1.3.14.3–6, 1.3.14.14 [sbn 156–58, 162]; cf. A 26 [sbn 656–57]; ehu 7.29n17 [sbn 77–78n1]). On the other hand, he appears to distinguish this empty idea of a general power that operates in all instances of causation from the idea of a particular but unknown causal power in a natural object. This is seen in his further observation that “there may be several qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call these power or efWcacy,” this choice of words will be “of little consequence to the world.” However, if we attempt to use these terms to “signify something, of which we have a clear idea,” we are “led astray by a false philosophy,” as when we transfer “the determination of the thought to external objects, and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them; that being a quality, which can only belong to the mind that considers them” (t 1.3.14.27 [sbn 168]). Hume also anticipates an objection to his analysis of causation: the assertion that causal relations are “operations of nature” which must be “independent of our thought and reasoning.” However, in response to this criticism he maintains that, according to his account, we repeatedly observe similar objects in similar relations of contiguity and succession to each other: objects and relations which
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are “independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding.” On the other hand, “if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these objects,” we attribute a quality to them which we cannot derive from external observation, but only “from what we feel internally in contemplating them” (t 1.3.14.28 [sbn 168–69]). Hume was obliged to answer several further misinterpretations of his account of causation through the course of his career. In 1745, during his unsuccessful candidacy for the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, he found himself charged with “opinions leading to downright Atheism, chieXy by denying this Principle, That whatever begins to exist must have a Cause of Existence.” He responded in his anonymously circulated Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh by describing this charge, not only as an “extravagant” interpretation of his writings, but also as theologically misguided (lg 21–26). Similarly, in a letter of 1754 to John Stewart, he states that “I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only maintain’d, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source” (l 1.187). These debates with Hume over the objectivity and necessity of the causal relation have been echoed by more recent controversies over the interpretation of his argument. On the one hand, many commentators have held that Hume presents a regularity theory, in which he analyzes the causal relation as a constant conjunction between resembling objects while denying any objective causal powers to objects in nature, and then supplements this theory with a separate psychological theory of the origin of our concept of causation.5 On the other hand, Hume’s theory of causation has also been regarded as a subjective version of the necessity theory, in which causal relations are distinguished from accidental regularities by a distinctive type of necessity, which, however, is found only in the mind, as an impression arising from the repeated observation of a conjunction between similar objects.6 In contrast to this disjunction, Beauchamp and Rosenberg have argued that Hume combines a regularity theory with a modiWed necessity theory in what he intends to be a single and uniWed theory of causation.7 This debate turns especially upon various possible interpretations 5. See especially Robinson, “Hume’s Two DeWnitions of ‘Cause,’” 129–47, and Mackie, Cement of the Universe, 3–28. For discussions of this interpretation, see Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 13–24; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 12–13; and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 110–32. 6. See Church, Hume’s Theory of the Understanding, 81–85; Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 91–92; and Stroud, Hume, 88–92. See also Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 10, 13, and 25–28. 7. Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 3–32. See also Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 76–117; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 11–22 and 33–41; and Falkenstein, “Hume’s Answer to Kant,” 331–60.
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of Hume’s concluding two deWnitions of a cause, and thus of the causal relation, which I will consider below. Finally, several recent studies have sought to argue that Hume is a causal realist, who attributes objective causal powers to objects even while conceding that we might not be able to formulate any adequate idea of these powers.8 We will consider Hume’s apparent attribution of “secret powers” to natural objects in a later section of this chapter. At the end of Section 14 Hume returns to his original problem in Book 1, Part 3 of the Treatise, which is to provide “an exact deWnition of the relation of cause and effect.” However, since we may consider causation “either as a philosophical or as a natural relation,” he argues that we may formulate two deWnitions of a cause, which differ only by “presenting a different view of the same object” (t 1.3.14.30–31 [sbn 169–70]). He then presents his two deWnitions, which we may refer to respectively as the “philosophical” and the “natural” deWnition of a cause. The Wrst to be stated by Hume is the philosophical deWnition, which he formulates in the following terms: “We may deWne a cause to be ‘An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter.’” He then presents the natural deWnition of a cause: “A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other” (t 1.3.14.31; cf. 1.3.14.35 [sbn 170; cf. 172]). In the Enquiry Hume presents a modiWed restatement of these deWnitions without any explicit reference to the distinction between natural and philosophical relations, and adding to his Wrst deWnition the otherwise unexplained counterfactual condition that “where, if the Wrst object had not been, the second never had existed” (ehu 7.29 [sbn 76–77]).9 Hume’s philosophical deWnition thus apparently reduces causation to a set of relations between objects, while his natural deWnition apparently reduces causation to an impression in the mind, which is produced by the imagination as a result of certain types of observations. In other words, Hume appears to distinguish between an objective conception of causation, as a relation between pairs of objects which are regularly conjoined with each other in space and time; and a subjective conception of causation, in which the impression of one object determines the mind to expect the other (t 2.3.2.4 [sbn 409]). 8. See Wright, Sceptical Realism, 2–3 and 123–86; Strawson, Secret Connexion, 1–5 and 10–15; and Costa, “Hume and Causal Inference,”141–59, and “Hume and Causal Realism,” 172–90. See also Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 155–67. For a critical response to this interpretation, see Winkler, “The New Hume,” 52–87, and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 191–99. See also the essays in Read and Richman, The New Hume Debate. 9. For a discussion of Hume’s view of the counterfactual implications of causal statements, and various approaches to this in the literature, see Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 17–18.
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Many commentators have sought to assess these two proposed deWnitions of causation, and to determine their relation to each other.10 For example, J. A. Robinson observes that these deWnitions are neither equivalent in meaning nor coextensive in their domain, and then argues that Hume intended only the Wrst of these to be his genuine deWnition of a cause: a view which seems to support the interpretation of Hume’s analysis as a regularity theory of causation.11 However, others such as Church and Waxman have argued that Hume intended the second formulation to be his actual deWnition of a cause, which would seem to support the modiWed necessity theory.12 We may evaluate these proposals by returning to Hume’s characterization of the two types of relations. As we have seen, in Part 1 he characterizes a natural relation as a principle of association among our ideas, and a philosophical relation as a principle of comparison which may be applied to our ideas even without the preliminary mediation of a spontaneous association (t 1.1.5.1 [sbn 13]).13 In applying this distinction to his analysis of causation, Hume states that although causation is indeed “a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction,” it is only “so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it” (t 1.3.6.16; cf. 1.1.5.9 [sbn 94; cf. 15]). Hume therefore maintains that the very possibility of formulating any particular causal inferences, according to the deWnition of causation as a philosophical relation, depends on our disposition to regard certain sets of objects as joined by a necessary connection, and to believe that these objects will continue to appear together in that order. This disposition is derived from a habit produced by the repeated observation of such conjunctions between similar pairs of objects, as indicated in the deWnition of causation as a natural relation. I conclude that Hume’s two deWnitions should be regarded as descriptions of two aspects of any genuine and recognized causal relation: a subjective disposition to conceive of objects which are given under certain conditions as related in a certain manner, and an objective set of relations among objects that tends to give rise to this disposition when it is observed. Hume’s two deWnitions must 10. See Robinson, “Hume’s Two DeWnitions of ‘Cause,’” 129–47; Richards, “Hume’s Two DeWnitions,” 148–61; Hausman, “Hume’s Theory of Relations,” 255–82; Robison, “Hume’s Causal Scepticism,” 156–66; Stroud, Hume, 88–92; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 3–32; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 83–84 and 185–86; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 12–17; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 96–117 and 250 n. 5; and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 110–16. 11. Robinson, “Hume’s Two DeWnitions of ‘Cause,’” 129–47; Mackie, Cement of the Universe, 3–4; Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 114–15. 12. See Church, Hume’s Theory of the Understanding, 81–86, and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 185–86. See also Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 16. 13. A valuable account of the Hume’s two deWnitions of a cause and of the various possible interpretations of his argument is provided by Garrett in his Cognition and Commitment, 96–101.
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therefore be combined in order to produce his complete analysis of the concept of a cause.14 There are a number of grounds in Hume’s writings, both explicit and implicit, for regarding his two deWnitions of a cause as two parts of a complete deWnition. In the Treatise he introduces his two deWnitions by stating his intention to present an “exact” or a “precise deWnition of cause and effect,” and also maintains that his two deWnitions differ only by providing “a different view of the same object” (t 1.3.14.30–31 [sbn 169–70]). In the Enquiry he offers his two deWnitions as the products of two types of “experience,” one looking outward and the other inward (ehu 7.29; cf. 8.27 [sbn 76–77; cf. 97]). The most compelling implicit reason for regarding these two formulations as parts of a complete deWnition is that, while the separate deWnitions are neither equivalent nor coextensive, the deWnition that is produced by combining them designates the set of genuine causes that are also recognized by a human observer. This combined deWnition then provides the standard by which any other supposed causes are to be judged. Taken in itself, the Wrst deWnition of a cause reXects our ability to form the concept of causation as a relation that subsists between two objects apart from the human mind, but does not account for our ability to recognize any particular causal relation. On the other hand, the second deWnition of a cause, when considered in isolation, also applies to any objects which we mistakenly regard as causes, in what Hume himself calls our “unphilosophical” judgments of causation (cf. t 1.3.13.1–20 [sbn 143–55]). When considered separately, Hume’s two deWnitions may be applied respectively to any supposed unobserved causes on the one hand, and to spurious causes on the other. Neither of these, according to Hume’s view, can be described as a cause in the most accurate and complete sense. However, these two deWnitions may be combined to produce a deWnition of a genuine and humanly recognized cause: An object of a given type whose instances are constantly conjoined in space and followed in time by an object of another type; in a series of conjunctions which, through repeated observations, determine the mind of a human observer to expect that any object of the Wrst type will be similarly conjoined with an object of the second type. I would suggest that this deWnition, which designates the intersection of the domains that are circumscribed by Hume’s two deWnitions, represents the “exact deWnition of a cause” which is never explicitly stated in his discussion, but appears to be its implicit conclusion.15 14. Two further and more extensive attempts to reconstruct Hume’s theory of causation from these two deWnitions are presented by Beauchamp and Rosenberg in Hume and the Problem of Causation, and by Wilson in Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference. 15. For related arguments, see also Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 98–99, and Stroud, Hume, 88–94. However, Garrett also argues that Hume’s two deWnitions may both be interpreted objectively or subjectively, and are thus coextensive as long as they are considered according to the same interpretation: see Cognition and Commitment, 109.
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Hume’s two deWnitions, understood as parts of a complete deWnition of a cause, may also be regarded as indicating the several stages in the development of this concept in the human mind. First, the regular observation of a conjunction between objects produces a determination of the mind to expect instances of one to follow instances of the other. Next, the mind notices the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and succession between these objects by reXecting upon the sources of this determination in its remembered observations. Finally, the mind comes to regard these objective relations as the standard for its judgments of causation, and as the guiding principle of empirical explanation. Thus, our ability to identify the set of relations that constitute a cause, according to the philosophical deWnition, is derived from an associative tendency of the mind as indicated by natural deWnition, although the mind can reverse this order by recognizing that our disposition to regard various objects as causally related arises from our observation of certain relations between them, which it then regards as existing prior to and apart from its own activity. The philosophical deWnition of causation is therefore a statement of the observable set of relations between objects whose repeated appearances are the source of our natural causal associations, and also states the standard by which we may evaluate our judgments concerning causal relations once we have observed or supposed a conjunction between any two objects.16 I will examine Hume’s further account of the relative assessment and justiWcation of our causal judgments in the next section of this chapter. Although the word “custom” occupies a central place in Hume’s account of the causal relation and of our causal judgments, it has received little direct attention in the secondary literature. I will therefore conclude this section by considering several of his further references to custom, before proceeding to his account of probable reasoning. In Book 1 of the Treatise and in the Wrst Enquiry Hume uses the word “custom,” often interchangeably with “habit,” for an acquired disposition of thought in the individual mind. He thus observes that contiguity inXuences the imagination “by long custom” (t 1.1.4.2 [sbn 11]), and that we may develop the “custom” of applying the same word to a number of resembling images (t 1.1.7.7–11 [sbn 20–22]). In his analysis of causation he argues that our inferences from an object to its cause or effect are “not determin’d by reason, but by custom or a principle of association,” since we may call “every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or 16. I agree here with Waxman that Hume’s philosophical relation of causation is parasitic upon the natural relation, although I would also argue that once the philosophical conception of causation is derived from reXection upon the natural relation of causation, it may then be used to guide us in reconstructing the sources of our particular causal inferences, and even in discovering other causal relations. See Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 83–84 and 185–86.
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conclusion” (t 1.3.7.6, 1.3.8.10 [sbn 97, 102]). In the Abstract he adds that “we are determined by custom alone to suppose the future conformable to the past” (a 15 [sbn 652]). Similarly, in the Enquiry he argues that causal inferences are derived from “custom or habit,” and that inferences from experience “are effects of custom, not of reasoning” (ehu 5.5 [sbn 43]). He thus maintains that our idea of any particular causal relation, our belief in the Causal Principle or the necessity of causation in general, and our belief in the Uniformity Principle or that the future will resemble the past, are ultimately all derived from a custom or disposition of the mind which is instilled by repeated experience. Many of Hume’s critics have found his assertions concerning the role of custom in our causal inferences to be skeptical, dismissive, and even despairing. For example, G. E. Moore attributes to Hume the view that we have “no better foundation than custom for any conclusion whatever as to facts which we have not observed” and asks if we can be said “really to know any fact, for which we have no better foundation than this?” Similarly, Kemp Smith denounces the “excessive emphasis upon custom” in the Wrst book of the Treatise, and asks how Hume can justify his apparent distinction between the vulgar and the wise if “custom is king” in all matters of fact, although he later attributes to Hume the view that experience and reXection rather than custom are the ultimate arbiters in our causal judgments. Finally, Karl Popper argues that Hume’s reduction of discoveries in the natural sciences to “custom” or “habit” is an unacceptable view, since on the contrary “We do not act upon repetition or ‘habit,’ but upon the best tested of our theories,” which we accept for “good rational reasons.”17 As we will see in the next section of the present chapter, these criticisms have overlooked Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning, in which he considers the constructive role of custom in forming the rules for probable reasoning. Before turning to this discussion, however, we may consider several of his additional references to the operation of “custom” in our causal judgments, to see that these are neither uniformly dismissive nor even very pessimistic in their assessment of our ability to pursue causal inferences. In the Treatise Hume observes that the human mind initially develops “a kind of system” from “impressions or ideas of the memory,” such that “every particular of that system,” when “join’d to the present impressions, we are pleas’d to call a reality.” However, once the mind is able to connect its ideas “by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect,” it develops “a new system, which it likewise digniWes with the title of realities.” While the Wrst system is “the object of the memory and senses,” the second system is the object of judgment, in which the range of our cognition is extended “beyond the reach 17. Moore, “Hume’s Philosophy,” 356; Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 387 and 95; cf. 382–88 and 539–40; and Popper, Objective Knowledge, 91 and 95.
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of the senses and memory” to the historical past and to distant parts of the universe (t 1.3.9.3–4 [sbn 108]). In the Wrst Enquiry he praises custom as “the great guide of human life,” which alone “renders our experience useful to us,” since without its inXuence “we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses,” and would never learn “how to adjust means to ends,” or how to use our natural abilities in order to produce any effects. Without custom we would thus reach “an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation” (ehu 5.6 [sbn 44–45]; cf. a 16 [sbn 652]). Finally, in his index to the Enquiry he characterizes “Custom or Habit” both as “the Source of experimental Reasoning” and as “the great Guide of Life” (ehu Ind.308).18 These passages indicate Hume’s own assessment of the constructive role of custom in our experimental or scientiWc reasoning. We will explore his justiWcation for this positive assessment of custom in the next section by considering his account of philosophical probable reasoning.
philosophical probable reasoning Hume’s analysis of causation is initially presented within his discussion of “probability,” which he develops especially in Sections 11–13 and 15 of Book 1, Part 3 of the Treatise (cf. t 1.3.1.1, 1.3.2.1 [sbn 69, 73]), and reafWrms, though perhaps less directly, in his later writings. In this discussion Hume considers the principles of experimental or scientiWc reasoning, not only as a part of his theoretical philosophy, but also as the basis for his account of the methodological principles of the various empirical disciplines he considers elsewhere in his writings. Hume embarks upon this topic in the Treatise by noting that other philosophers have divided the activities of human cognition into the “comparison of ideas” and “arguments from causes or effects,” and have identiWed this distinction as the difference between “knowledge and probability” (t 1.3.11.2; cf. 1.3.1.1 [sbn 124; cf. 69]). However, he then proposes to add a further distinction between various levels of assurance in our judgments concerning matters of fact, since “in common discourse we readily afWrm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv’d as a superior kind of evidence.” For example, it would appear ridiculous to say “that ’tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye,” although we indeed have “no farther assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us.” As 18. In this index entry and the other passages cited here, Hume echoes Butler’s description of probability as “the very guide of life,” in Butler’s introduction to his Analogy of Religion, xlix. See also Connon, “Naturalism of Hume Revisited,” 142.
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we have seen, Hume has already reserved the words “knowledge” and “certainty” for “the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.” He now suggests that we distinguish between “proofs” and “probabilities,” in order to indicate the “several degrees of evidence” in our causal judgments. First, he applies the word “proof” to any judgments concerning causes and effects which are “entirely free from doubt and uncertainty,” even though these judgments arise in the same way as causal judgments which we regard with less assurance.19 Next, he recommends that we should apply the word “probability” to any causal judgments which are “still attended with uncertainty.” Finally, he recommends a further distinction between the “probability of chances,” or the relative likelihood of any given outcome in a random series of events from a speciWed range of possibilities, and the “probability of causes,” or causal reasonings which have not yet attained the level of a proof (t 1.3.11.1–2, 1.3.12.1 [sbn 124–25, 130]). Hume occasionally refers to our judgments concerning the probability of causes as “probable reasonings” (t 1.3.6.6, 1.3.8.12, 1.3.14.17; cf. 1.3.9.19n22 [sbn 89, 103, 163; cf. 117n1 and 371n1]).20 I will accordingly adopt this phrase to characterize his account of causal reasoning, since we are now more likely to use the term “probability” for what he calls the “probability of chances.”21 After a brief discussion of the probability of chances, which we have already considered in Chapter 2, Hume turns in the Treatise to his more sustained discussion of the different degrees of assurance which attend our causal judgments. First, drawing upon his preceding account of causation, he argues that since the “habit” which produces our idea of a particular causal relation arises from the “frequent conjunction of objects,” the idea of a particular causal relation acquires an increased force “from each instance, that falls under our observation.” In other words, while a single observed conjunction between two objects may have “little or no force,” each observation of a conjunction between similar objects strengthens our idea of the causal relation between them, leading our judgment through “several inferior degrees” of “presumption or probability,” until it may eventually arrive at the “full assurance” of a proof (t 1.3.12.2 [sbn 130–31]). 19. For the use of the word “proof” in seventeen- and eighteenth-century English in a variety of contexts, including law and historical scholarship, see Gower, “Hume on Probability,” 4n6, and Shapiro, Probability and Certainty, 173–75. 20. Hume moved and expanded the footnote cited here in a page added to the Treatise after printing and before binding. See Norton and Norton’s notes to the relevant passages in the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the Treatise (t 1.3.9.19n22, 2.2.7.6), and Norton and Norton, “Substantive Differences,” 252. 21. Hacking suggests that Hume’s contribution to the history of probability is limited to his statement of the “sceptical problem of induction.” In this study I have indicated that Hume also distinguishes between statistical calculation and inductive reasoning; and that he considers what Hacking calls the “analytical problem of induction” concerning the evaluation of evidence. See Hacking, Emergence of Probability, 176–85, and “Hume’s Species of Probability,” 21–37.
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A perfectly uniform experience would lead us directly, through a series of resembling observations, to this complete assurance. However, Hume Wnds that we are frequently confronted by an “imperfect experience,” or an experience in which “one observation is contrary to another” and “causes and effects follow not in the same order,” or in which the resemblance is weak and amounts only to an “analogy” (t 1.3.12.3–4, 1.3.12.25 [sbn 130–31, 142]). In the case of contrary causes, we Wnd that while indeed “Wre has always burned, and water suffocated every human creature” according to universal laws which have never admitted any exceptions, other causes appear “more irregular and uncertain.” We thus Wnd that rhubarb has neither “always proved a purge, or opium a soporiWc to every one, who has taken these medicines” (ehu 6.4 [sbn 57–58]). The unreXective or “vulgar” observer might attribute such a contrariety to some irregular or eccentric behavior in the cause. However, since philosophers recognize that there might still be a “vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness,” they are prepared to attribute such inconsistencies to the “secret operation of contrary causes” (t 1.3.12.5 [sbn 132]). Whatever its source, however, this inconsistency in our experience undermines the assurance of our judgment, and diminishes our belief in a causal relation between the two objects. A series of observations often presents us with cases of both similarity and “contrariety,” and belief is a “compounded effect” arising from the superior strength and vivacity of the accumulated consistent evidence as opposed to the contrary evidence, arising from “all the different events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past” (t 1.3.12.3, 1.3.12.14–18 [sbn 131, 135–37]; ehu 6.4 [sbn 58–59]). Similarly, the experience of only a few examples of resembling conjunctions, or a series of conjunctions with only a weak resemblance to each other, confers less vivacity upon our idea of a causal connection between the objects (t 1.3.12.2, 1.3.12.24 [sbn 130–31, 142]). On the other hand, we attain a “proof” when the conjunction between events “is found by experience to be perfectly constant,” and when the object “exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience” (t 1.3.13.19 [sbn 153]). These three imperfections of limitation, contrariety, and dissimilarity in our experience produce the various levels of belief, and the corresponding gradations between proofs and probabilities, in our judgments concerning matters of fact. After this account of the conditions that determine the different degrees of assurance in our probable reasoning, Hume considers the justiWcation of our causal judgments, or the process by which we distinguish between “philosophical” and “unphilosophical” forms of probable reasoning. This appears especially in his account of general rules, and their role in our causal judgments.22 22. The importance of “general rules” in Hume’s philosophy has been especially emphasized by Hearn in “General Rules in Hume’s Treatise,” 405–22, and “General Rules and the Moral Sentiments,” 57–72. See
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In this crucial discussion, Hume observes that certain types of probable reasoning are considered by philosophers to be “reasonable foundations of belief and opinion,” and suggests that we may accordingly distinguish between “philosophical” and “unphilosophical” forms of probable reasoning (t 1.3.13.1–20 [sbn 143–54]; cf. ehu 10.4 [sbn 110]; dnr 2.147). We are engaged in “unphilosophical” probable reasoning whenever we are inXuenced by circumstances that tend to diminish the force and vivacity of our idea of the cause, as this would be indicated by the philosophical deWnition of a cause; or whenever the idea of another object is allowed to exercise a relatively greater inXuence on our imagination (t 1.3.13.1–20; cf. 1.2.5.21 [sbn 143–54; cf. 60–62]). For example, we may Wnd ourselves making unphilosophical probable judgments “when we have not observ’d a sufWcient number of instances, to produce a strong habit; or when these instances are contrary to each other; or when the resemblance is not exact, or the present impression is faint and obscure; or the experience in some measure obliterated from the memory; or the connexion dependent on a long chain of objects” (t 1.3.13.19 [sbn 154]). Among the “unphilosophical species” of probable reasoning, Hume includes reasoning from “general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call prejudice.” For example, the opinion among his British contemporaries that “an Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity” had attained such force that, “tho’ the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain’d such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason” (t 1.3.13.7 [sbn 146–47]). On the other hand, Hume also argues that general rules play a central role in our causal judgments, and that even these hasty generalizations proceed “from those very principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend.” As we have seen, all of our causal judgments arise from a custom in the mind, produced by repeated observations of a conjunction between similar sets of objects. This custom then receives cognitive expression in our implicit or explicit formulation of a general rule afWrming the regular conjunction between objects or events of these types. However, in observing a series of conjunctions we often Wnd “a complication of circumstances, of which some are essential, and others superXuous,” and the latter often exercise a greater inXuence than the former over the imagination (t 1.3.13.8–9 [sbn 147–48]). Hume argues that we may correct our propensity to regard a more immediate and vivid object as the cause of an event, in place of the cause that would be indicated by his philosophical deWnition, through “a reXection on the nature also Vanterpool, “Hume’s Account of General Rules,” 481–92, and Brand, Hume’s Theory of Moral Judgment, 38–65.
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of those circumstances.” Indeed, these reXections lead us to formulate a set of general rules “by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects,” based upon what we discover about “the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects.” These rules allow us to distinguish “accidental circumstances from the efWcacious causes,” so that, for example, if we Wnd that an effect “can be produc’d without the concurrence of any particular circumstance,” we conclude that this circumstance is not part of the cause, “however frequently conjoin’d with it.” In other words, we may evaluate the rash impulses of our imagination by appealing to “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding,” which we recognize and codify as the “establish’d principles of reasoning.” Hume concludes that while general rules may often lead us into “a very unphilosophical species of probability,” it is only by following other general rules “that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities” and instead engage in the philosophical or scientiWc form of probable reasoning (t 1.3.13.9–12 [sbn 147–50]). Hume therefore argues that the human mind tends to codify the customary associations arising from its repeated experience of similar conjunctions by forming general rules concerning these conjunctions, and tends to be guided by these rules in its expectation of future conjunctions. In this view, the difference between unphilosophical and philosophical probable reasoning arises neither from the inXuence of general rules in the former but not in the latter case, since general rules are required for all of our causal reasonings, nor from the inXuence of custom in the former but not in the latter case, since “all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom” (t 1.3.13.11 [sbn 149]). Instead, philosophical probable reasoning itself arises from custom, although in an “oblique and artiWcial manner,” through our formulation of the rules, or methodological principles, which enable us to “reason with knowledge and reXection” from our past experience in our own causal judgments (t 1.3.8.14, 1.3.12.13 [sbn 104–5, 135]). Accordingly, the philosophical standards of causal judgment are themselves generalizations from experience, or rules that we formulate and prescribe to ourselves in order to guide our reasonings and counteract the effects of prejudice and other unphilosophical forms of causal judgment. Finally, Hume completes his account of philosophical probable reasoning in Section 15, by suggesting that since it is possible for all objects to be causes or effects of each other, “it may be proper to Wx some general rules, by which we may know when they really are so,” and then offering his own list of “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (t 1.3.15.1–2; cf. 1.3.13.11 [sbn 173; cf. 149]). Hume presents eight principles for judging causes and effects. Four of these are already indicated by his philosophical deWnition of a cause, arising from our
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reXection upon causation as a natural principle of association. Of these, the Wrst two state the conditions of each individual conjunction: (1) “The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time,” and (2) “The cause must be prior to the effect.” The third and fourth rules specify the conditions of a repeated conjunction and a resemblance between the pairs of objects: (3) “There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect,” followed by (4) “The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause.” The Wfth and sixth rules guide us in applying the Wrst four to those cases in which we discover an inexact resemblance between the objects, by directing us to trace any similarities or differences between their effects to speciWc properties in these objects. Accordingly, (5) “where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them,” while (6) “The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ.” Finally, in the seventh and eighth rules Hume directs us to trace any change in an object, or in its effects, to a concurrence between several causes. Thus (7) “When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause,” we should regard this as a “compounded effect” produced by a combination of effects arising from different parts of the cause; while (8) “an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without any effect” should not be regarded as the “sole cause of that effect,” but must be assisted by “some other principle, which may forward its inXuence and operation” (t 1.3.15.3–10 [sbn 173–74]).23 Accordingly, in Rules 1 through 3 Hume prescribes the conditions of temporal succession and spatial contiguity as principles for judging causal relations; while in 4 to 7 he prescribes the principle of resemblance, and also analyzes partial resemblances between objects as resemblances between their qualities, further directing us to consider these resembling qualities and their regular conjunctions in order to improve the accuracy of our causal judgments. As we have seen, Hume identiWes resemblance both as a natural principle of association among our ideas, and as a philosophical relation by which we may compare ideas (t 1.1.4.1–2, 1.1.5.2–3 [sbn 11, 14]). He also regards the natural disposition to recognize resemblances as the source of our ability to form abstract ideas, including distinctions of reason (t 1.1.7.7–18 [sbn 20–25]). In his account of our idea of causation, he presents the natural disposition to recognize resemblances as the basis for our further ability to develop the custom of expecting one object to follow another object (t 1.3.6.1–7 [sbn 86–90]; ehu 4.14–23 [sbn 32–39]). However, he also notes that superWcial resemblances are 23. For a further discussion of Hume’s rules for judging causes and effects, see Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, especially 33–75, and Falkenstein, “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism,” 29–72.
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an obvious source of unphilosophical probable reasoning; and therefore describes resemblance as the most fertile source of errors and mistaken reasonings among the three principles of association (t 1.2.5.21; cf. 1.3.13.9–11 [sbn 61; cf. 147–49]). In his rules for judging causes and effects Hume accordingly prescribes several principles intended to facilitate the evaluation of resemblances in our causal judgments. In Rule 4 he directs us to extend our judgments concerning causal relations from objects we have observed to other objects “of the same kind.” However, in Rules 5 and 6 he considers the many cases in which the resemblance between objects is not exact, and directs us to trace any similarities or differences among their effects to those particular qualities in which they resemble or differ from each other (t 1.3.15.7–8 [sbn 173–74]). He therefore indicates that scientiWc inquiry may attempt to discover the causal capacities in objects, if these are regarded as observable qualities which are correlated with observable effects, rather than as the hidden and unknown sources of this correlation (cf. ehu 4.20–21 [sbn 36–38]). Hume’s account of resemblance and its role in philosophical probable reasoning is also reXected in the many references to analogical reasoning in his writings. In the Treatise he argues that although an exact resemblance between objects is the most effective basis for judging causal relations, we may also accept the “probability deriv’d from analogy” if we recognize that “the reasoning becomes proportionably more or less Wrm and certain” according to the degrees of resemblance (t 1.3.12.25; cf. 1.3.13.8 [sbn 142; cf. 147]). In the Enquiry he includes analogy, along with observation and experience, among the principles of reasoning used in the natural sciences. Indeed, he notes in this text that all causal reasonings “are founded on a species of analogy,” and are improved in their evidential force “in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance” (ehu 4.12, 9.1 [sbn 30, 104]). Finally, in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume develops a sustained examination of analogical reasoning, especially through the discussion between Cleanthes and Philo. In Part 2 Philo argues that we cannot suppose that the divine perfections have “any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature,” while Cleanthes claims to argue “by all the rules of analogy . . . that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man.” Philo then states, as a general principle, that whenever we depart from an exact resemblance between the objects, we also “diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty” (dnr 2.142–44). Through the rest of the Dialogues Philo then attempts to show that the defense of philosophical theism by Cleanthes rests upon an imperfect analogy, which does not convey a very high degree of probability to his conclusion (dnr 2.150–53, 6.170–72, 7.180, 12.216–19; cf. ehu 11.1–30 [sbn 132–48]).
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In presenting his eight rules for judging causes and effects, Hume therefore indicates that the philosophical form of probable reasoning is characterized by extensive observations, accurate judgments of contiguity and succession, acuity in recognizing resemblances and in distinguishing between the qualities of resembling objects, and the ability to develop consistent generalizations concerning the effects arising from these qualities (cf. t 1.3.13.8–12 [sbn 147–50]; ehu 4.11–12, 9.5n20 [sbn 30, 107n1]). Hume concludes his examination of the rules for causal reasoning with a declaration that “here is all the logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning,” adding however that this list might not be necessary for his readers, “but might have been supply’d by the natural principles of our understanding.” He recommends these rules for both natural and moral philosophy, although he also notes that while these rules are “very easy in their invention,” they may also be “extremely difWcult in their application,” especially in the moral or human sciences, “where there is a much greater complication of circumstances,” and the “views and sentiments, which are essential to any action of the mind” are especially difWcult to discover (t 13.15.11 [sbn 175]). In the introduction to the Treatise Hume observes that “the sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas,” and identiWes “Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics” as the main projected topics of the Treatise (t Int.5; cf. Adv.1 [sbn xv–xvi; cf. xii]). In this context, “logic” appears to include the general study of human cognition, as well as the study of the principles of cognitive justiWcation. In the Abstract Hume presents a clearer view of his project in Book 1 of the Treatise, as contributing to the discussion of “logic” among contemporary European philosophers, including an account of the principles of empirical justiWcation: The celebrated Monsieur Leibnitz has observed it to be a defect in the common systems of logic, that they are very copious when they explain the operations of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations. In this censure, he comprehends The Essay concerning Human Understanding, Le Recherche de la verité, and L’Art de penser. The author of the Treatise of Human Nature seems to have been sensible of this defect in these philosophers, and has endeavoured, as much as he can, to supply it. (a 4; cf. 28 [sbn 646–47; cf. 657]) Hume is therefore deliberately following a new contemporary usage by applying the word “logic” to the principles of experimental or scientiWc reasoning.
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He also indicates in this passage from the Abstract that he is presenting his account of the principles of probable reasoning in order to Wll a recognized need in contemporary philosophy, a need that had not yet been satisWed by Locke, Malebranche, the Port Royal Logic, by Leibniz himself, or by any eighteenthcentury author.24 Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning may thus be regarded as a contribution to the ongoing discussion of probability and scientiWc reasoning among his predecessors and contemporaries.25 Hume’s account of the rules for judging causes and effects also belongs to the history of British reXection concerning the principles of scientiWc method. Their most direct antecedents are Newton’s four “Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy,” stating the principles of simplicity, analogy, generalization, and observation.26 Hume indeed paraphrases the second of these rules, formulated by Newton as “to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes,” not only as his fourth rule for judging causes and effects in the Treatise, but also in the second Enquiry as “where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances,” which he identiWes here as “newton’s chief rule of philosophizing” (epm 3.48 [sbn 204]).27 In its turn, Hume’s list anticipates Herschel’s account of the principles of scientiWc reasoning and Mill’s canons of induction, although Hume’s list was not as well known or as inXuential as theirs.28 Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning in the Treatise is also reXected and developed elsewhere in his philosophical writings, and indeed provides the basis for his “system of the sciences,” by setting forth the principles of investigation which apply to all of the natural and human sciences (t Int.6 [sbn xvi]). In the Treatise itself, Hume initially announces his intention to apply the method of “experimental philosophy,” which had been developed in natural philosophy or the natural sciences, to “moral subjects.” In both the natural and the moral sciences, this method involves observing the variety of effects arising from objects in “different circumstances and situations,” using “careful and exact experiments,” and then endeavoring “to render all our principles as 24. Hume is referring here to the “Preliminary Dissertation” in the Theodicy: see Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften, 6: 67–68 (§28 and §31), and Theodicy, 90 and 92. In England, Joseph Butler described probability in 1736 as a part of “the subject of Logic” that “has not yet been thoroughly considered.” See Butler, Analogy of Religion, l. 25. For histories of this discussion, see Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty; Hacking, Emergence of Probability; Shapiro, Probability and Certainty; Ferreira, Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt; Daston, Classical Probability; and Franklin, Science of Conjecture. 26. Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 2: 398–400. 27. See Force, “Hume’s Interest in Newton and Science,” 166–216. 28. Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, 143. See also Blake, Ducasse, and Madden, Theories of ScientiWc Method, 144–52, and Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, 325–87.
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universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes” (t Int.7–8 [sbn xvi–xvii]). Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning is also reXected in the set of “corollaries” to his two deWnitions of a cause, in which he states, for example, that all causes are of the same kind, and that there is no distinction between moral and physical necessity (t 1.3.14.32–36 [sbn 170–72]). He also implicitly afWrms this analysis in the concluding sections of both Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise, where he defends the principles of critical reXection against both skepticism and dogmatism (t 1.4.7.12–15, 2.3.10.1–12 [sbn 270–73, 448–54]). In the Wrst Enquiry Hume offers a shortened account of probability in Section 6, without any direct consideration of the rules for judging causes and effects (ehu 6.1–4 [sbn 56–59]). However, in a footnote to Section 9 he afWrms his earlier distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical probable reasoning by considering the characteristics of human reasoning which help explain why human beings “so much surpass animals in reasoning,” and also why “one man so much surpasses another.” These include the ability to draw upon an extensive experience, to consider the context of an event, to pursue a long chain of reasoning, to recognize analogies and form accurate rules, to distinguish relevant from irrelevant circumstances, and to consult the experience of others through “books and conversation” (ehu 9.5n20 [sbn 107n1]). Immediately after this, in Section 10, “Of Miracles,” he observes that a “wise man . . . proportions his belief to the evidence.” We should accordingly follow this principle by accepting uniform experience as a “proof,” while balancing the “opposition of experiments and observations” in cases of conXicting evidence, to reach a probable judgment concerning the cause of any event (ehu 10.4 [sbn 110–11]). Again, as the narrator of the dialogue in Section 11, he endorses the principle that experience should be “the only standard of our judgement” in all questions of fact, and commends his friend for applying this principle to the design argument (ehu 11.24, 11.12–15; cf. 11.26n31, 11.30 [sbn 142–43, 136–38; cf. 145n1, 148]). Finally, in Section 12 he defends “mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy” as the outlook of the “just reasoner,” who recognizes that “philosophical decisions are nothing but the reXections of common life, methodized and corrected” (ehu 12.24–25 [sbn 161–62]). Hume offers a further defense of philosophical probable reasoning in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, through the character of Philo. At the beginning of the Dialogues, Philo defends a moderate skepticism that acknowledges the “uncertainty and narrow limits of reason.” He then observes that the moderate skeptic who “philosophises” on natural or moral subjects will recognize that even in ordinary life we continually advance “in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning,” and that any expansion of our experience will enable us to render our principles more “general and comprehensive” (dnr 1.134). In
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his subsequent debate with Cleanthes he examines the principles of experimental reasoning, especially the use of analogy (dnr 2.144; cf. 2.147). This application of the principles of probable or scientiWc reasoning distinguishes Philo not only from Demea, who is not especially interested in the methods of the empirical sciences, but also from Cleanthes, whose arguments concerning the existence and nature of God, according to Philo, rest upon weak analogies. Hume appeals to several of his individual rules for judging causes and effects elsewhere in his writings, although without explicitly referring to his list of rules in the Treatise. As we have seen, he rephrases Rule 4, not only in the second Enquiry as Newton’s chief rule, but also in the Treatise as the principle “that like objects, plac’d in like circumstances, will always produce like effects” and in the Dialogues as “like effects prove like causes,” which Philo simply calls “the experimental argument” (t 1.3.8.14 [sbn 105]; dnr 5.165). Hume also appeals to Rule 5 in several contexts, for example in his attempt to reduce the causes of pride and humility “to a lesser number,” and to Wnd “something common, on which their inXuence depends” (t 2.1.4.1 [sbn 282]; cf. ehu 1.2, 4.12 [sbn 6, 30–31]). He also appeals to Rule 6 by noting that “when the absence of an object or quality removes any usual or natural effect, we may certainly conclude that its presence contributes to the production of the effect” (t 2.2.8.20 [sbn 380]). In addition, earlier in the Treatise he describes Rule 8, or the principle that a completely static object requires the assistance of another principle to produce any effect, as “an establish’d maxim both in natural and moral philosophy” (t 1.3.2.7 [sbn 76]). Hume’s account of probable reasoning has until recently received relatively little attention in the secondary literature.29 Many of his commentators have overlooked his account of general rules, and of the rules for probable reasoning, often while criticizing Hume for failing to offer any standards for rational or justiWed belief.30 Others have considered some more limited aspect of this discussion without recognizing its larger context in his thought.31 For example, Stove has insisted that Hume is an inductive skeptic, who believes that “all predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.” However, Stove also confesses in an appendix that he is puzzled by Hume’s account of general rules, and never mentions his rules for probable reasoning.32 29. Several earlier exceptions to this observation include Church, Hume’s Theory of the Understanding, 213–17; MacNabb, David Hume, 84–100; and Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 51–64. 30. See Hendel, Studies; Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 106–7, and David Hume, 14–15, 52–60, and 109–21; and Stroud, Hume. 31. See, for example, Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, 91–92 and 139–43; Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 99–102, 382–88; Ayer, Hume, 70–74; Wright, Sceptical Realism, 161 and 226–33; Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism, 60–63; Pears, Hume’s System, 96–97; and Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 188–99 and 220–26. 32. Stove, Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism, 30–34 and 118–25. For a similar criticism of Stove, see Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 93–94.
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The last several decades have seen a more extensive consideration of Hume’s treatment of philosophical probable reasoning, beginning with two articles by Thomas Hearn on his account of general rules.33 Hume’s discussion of general rules and the rules for probable reasoning has since been increasingly recognized as a central theme in his theoretical philosophy.34 In addition, many further studies have turned to the role of general rules in other areas of his thought, especially in his moral, political, and aesthetic theories.35 Finally, an increasing series of studies, including those by Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Wilson, Garrett, and Falkenstein, have called attention to the constructive role of Hume’s rules for judging causes and effects in his account of scientiWc reasoning, challenging the view that Hume is a skeptic about induction.36 In light of these studies and the preceding discussion, we may therefore reconsider several criticisms of Hume that have been prevalent since the early decades of the twentieth century. First, many of his critics have charged that Hume cannot distinguish justiWed from unjustiWed belief, or science from superstition. For example, Bertrand Russell states that Hume “started out with a belief that scientiWc method yields the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” and ended “with the conviction that belief is never rational, since we know nothing.” Similarly, Flew maintains that according to Hume’s own “ofWcial position” there cannot be any question “of better or worse reasoning about matters of fact,” since nothing in his philosophy enables us “to choose in point of rationality between science and superstition.” Finally, Bennett argues that according to Hume causal beliefs “cannot be supported by reasons,” and are therefore “unreasonable.”37 A similar criticism appears in the allegation that Hume does not distinguish logic from psychology. In an inXuential statement of this view, Kemp Smith has argued that in Hume’s account “psychology, as exposing the mechanisms through which belief is causally produced, usurps upon logic, as deWning the conditions under which it can be intelligently regulated.” This view is echoed by Passmore, in his claim that Hume rejects the contrast between normative logic and descriptive psychology, so that “‘Right reasoning’ has no legislative force” in his philosophy. Similarly, Flew criticizes Hume for attempting to replace logical standards with “psychologically based discriminations between the 33. See especially Hearn, “General Rules in Hume’s Treatise,” 405–22. 34. See Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development, 81–90; Capaldi, David Hume, 44–48, 110–17, and 125–29; and Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 54–100. 35. See, for example, Jones, Hume’s Sentiments; Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life; Whelan, Order and ArtiWce; and Baier, Progress of Sentiments. 36. Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, 33–170; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 111–241; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 76–117, 142–62, and 226–27; Falkenstein, “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism,” 29–72; Owen, Hume’s Reason, 197–223. For a critical discussion of this interpretation, see Penelhum, David Hume, 107–13. 37. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 671; Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 79; Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 300.
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somehow commendable products of Wrm and durable principles of the understanding and the less worthy results of Xightier and more capricious propensities,” and then concludes that he “fails to achieve complete consistency in this heroic but misguided enterprise.”38 A further charge, that Hume is a skeptic about induction, has been developed especially by Popper. While Popper agrees with Hume that there is no ultimate justiWcation for reasoning from experience, he rejects what he considers to be Hume’s attempt to formulate a psychological solution to the problem of induction as resting upon a naive theory of habit and repetition, but without providing any account of scientiWc testing.39 In another version of this criticism, Stove accuses Hume of confusing the recognition that inductive inferences are not deductive arguments, with the separate and unfortunate view that such inferences are “unreasonable,” in his alleged acceptance of the hidden “deductivist thesis” that “all invalid arguments are unreasonable.”40 Finally, Russell argues that Hume’s “self-refutation of rationality” led to a “great outburst of irrational faith,” and to the “growth of unreason” from the nineteenth to at least the middle of the twentieth century, which Russell describes as “a natural sequel to Hume’s destruction of empiricism.” Popper also testiWes to these alleged consequences by stating that Hume reduced knowledge to “rationally indefensible belief,” and thus to “irrational faith.”41 In this chapter I have shown, on the contrary, that although Hume rejects any absolute a priori or a posteriori justiWcation for our causal judgments, he also attempts to establish a relative distinction between “philosophical” and “unphilosophical” probable reasoning, by arguing that we may be guided in our causal judgments by a set of rules for judging causes and effects, which we develop through reXection upon our ordinary causal judgments. I have also shown that he presents these principles of probable reasoning as a system of inductive logic, in contrast the spontaneous psychological principles of association, and that he recommends this set of rules as the basis for distinguishing science from superstition. Hume therefore provides us with the principles for evaluating and correcting our causal judgments, and for excluding both superstition and rationalism from our empirical knowledge in the natural and human sciences.42 38. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 387; Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 19; cf. 18–41; Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, 265. 39. Popper, Logic of ScientiWc Discovery, 27–34, and Objective Knowledge, 3–7, 23–24 and 85–101. 40. Stove, Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism, 27–45 and 49–52. See also Glossop, “In Defence of David Hume,” 59–63, and Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 77 and 93–94. 41. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 673; Popper, Objective Knowledge, 5. 42. Garrett and Dicker have both recently argued that Hume distinguishes between the absolute justiWcation of induction itself through rational argument and the relative justiWcation of the standards of reasoning that we formulate within the context of our inevitable presupposition of the legitimacy of induction.
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I maintain that Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning should be regarded as a key to his writings. That is, Hume initially provides a general account of the nature, origin, and justiWcation of the principles of scientiWc reasoning, and their application to various subjects within the natural and human sciences. He then applies these rules in his own further inquiries into psychology, the social sciences, ethics, aesthetics, history, and religion. In other words, I have shown here that Hume develops a critical, constructive, and consistent defense of the principles of scientiWc inquiry, against the various portrayals of him as a thoroughgoing skeptic by Russell, Popper, and Stove; as an uncritical naturalist by Kemp Smith and Stroud; and as an inconsistent philosophical mongrel by Flew, Bennett, and Passmore. On the other hand, Hume’s endorsement of the principles of philosophical probable reasoning is also circumscribed by his commendation of intellectual modesty: a recommendation arising from his skeptical arguments, as these are presented especially in Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise. We will consider the skeptical dimension of Hume’s epistemology in Chapter 5. Since many of these criticisms of Hume’s philosophy turn on the use of words related to “reason,” it will be useful to conclude this section by considering some of the individual terms from this family used by Hume and by his critics.43 In his most general use of the terms “reason” and “reasoning,” Hume characterizes “all kinds of reasoning” as consisting in “nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other.” He later states that “reason is the discovery of truth or falshood,” or in other words the “agreement or disagreement” of our judgments, “either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact” (t 1.3.2.1, 3.1.1.9; cf. 2.3.10.2 [sbn 73, 458; cf. 448]). He accordingly divides the two types of “reasoning” into mathematical demonstrations and causal judgments (cf. t 1.3.11.2, 2.3.3.1–10 [sbn 124, 413–18]; ehu 4.1–4, 4.18 [sbn 25–27, 35]). Elsewhere, however, Hume applies the terms “reason” and “reasoning” to more speciWc types of mental activity, in usages that are often at variance with each other, although even this seeming carelessness still reXects a consistent pattern. First, he applies the term “reasoning” to the activity of causal inference, On this view, we may regard particular causal judgments as more or less justiWed or rational, relative to the principles of philosophical probable reasoning, even if the practice of induction cannot be ultimately justiWed by either demonstrative or probable arguments. See Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 91–95, and Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 75–76 and 91–98, along with Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, 256–58, and Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 19. 43. For further discussions of Hume’s own use of the word “reason” and related terms, see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 7; Árdal, “Some Implications,” 91–106; Norton, David Hume, 208–38; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 94–95; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 5 and 33; and Owen, Hume’s Reason.
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in his references to “probable reasoning,” to “reasonings from causes or effects,” to “reasonings from causation,” and to “reasonings concerning existence” (t 1.3.8.12, 1.3.4.1, 1.3.7.3, 1.3.14.36 [sbn 103, 82, 95, 172]; cf. ehu 4.1–4, 4.14–18 [sbn 25–27, 32–35]). On the other hand, he also asserts that our causal inferences are ultimately dependent, not upon “reasoning,” but on custom and experience (t 1.3.6.4–8, 1.3.14.31, 1.3.14.36 [sbn 88–90, 170, 172]; ehu 4.5–11, 5.4–5 [sbn 27–30, 42–43]). Finally, he also argues that we are never “determin’d by reason” in our judgments concerning causes and effects, that causal judgments never arise from “reasonings a priori,” and that our causal judgments are “not founded on reasoning” (t 1.3.6.4 [sbn 88–89]; ehu 4.6, 4.15 [sbn 27, 32]). Many of Hume’s critics have overlooked these variations in his usage, and have further interpreted his claim that causal inferences are not “determin’d by reason” as asserting that these inferences can never be “rational.” However, these readings have overlooked his own description of philosophical probable reasoning as a “reasonable” foundation for belief and opinion, and his presentation of the rules for probable reasoning as the principles of “logic” which can be applied in our reasonings concerning causes and effects, in order to counteract the inXuence of prejudice and other unphilosophical forms of probable reasoning (t 1.3.13.1, 1.3.15.11 [sbn 143, 175]). In order to establish a relatively uniWed terminology for discussing Hume’s thought, which is also consistent with his own usage, I would Wrst recommend following his usage by applying the verb form “reasoning” both to processes of causal inference and to mathematical demonstration. However, I would recommend limiting our use of the noun “reason” to the faculty that performs the a priori activity of mathematical demonstration, and also perhaps (as indicated in Chapter 2) of valid deduction from self-evident principles. Accordingly, in Hume’s view a causal judgment is a type of “reasoning” or inferential process, which however ultimately arises, not from “reason,” but from the inXuence of repeated observation upon the imagination. Finally, Hume’s rejection of the view that our causal inferences are founded upon reason is often taken to deny that our causal judgments can be “rational.” However, this overlooks his own preferred use of the word “reasonable” for those causal inferences which conform to the standards of philosophical probable reasoning, since he states that these inferences provide us with “reasonable foundations of belief and opinion” (t 1.3.13.1 [sbn 143]). Elsewhere Hume occasionally uses the word “rational” as a synonym for “reasonable,” for example in referring to “rational arguments” and to philosophers who are “rational and modest” (t 1.4.1.12 [sbn 186]; ehu 4.12 [sbn 30]). However, he also uses the word “rational” for the ability to use language or to engage in any kind of inferential process, as in referring to “rational discourse” and to the “rational
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faculties” of a hypothetical Wrst human being (ehu 4.4, 4.6 [sbn 27]). I would recommend that, in considering or applying Hume’s account of philosophical probable reasoning, we should describe any conclusions supported by a preponderance of evidence, according to his standards of scientiWc judgment, as “reasonable” rather than “rational,” especially since the former term preserves the more modest tone of Hume’s analysis.
nat u r a l s c i e n c e s Although Hume was primarily interested in the general principles of cognition and in the moral or human sciences, he also took a sustained interest in “natural philosophy” or the natural sciences.44 Indeed, he served from 1751 until the early 1760s as joint secretary of the Edinburgh Philosophical Society, an association devoted to advancing the study of the natural sciences in Scotland.45 His responsibilities in this capacity are reXected most notably in his 1762 letter to Benjamin Franklin acknowledging the receipt of Franklin’s paper on a new method of “preserving houses from thunder” (l 1.357–58). Hume’s own contributions to the natural sciences were largely indirect, consisting mainly in his attempt to account for the fundamental concepts and principles of reasoning in the modern natural sciences, and to locate these within the larger context of human cognition.46 Thus, although he excludes the natural sciences from the domain of his inquiry in the Treatise, Hume maintains that even natural philosophy depends upon the “science of man” for the examination and justiWcation of its Wrst principles (t Int.4; cf. 1.1.2.12, 1.2.5.4 [sbn xv; cf. 8, 55]). At the beginning of the Treatise Hume notes that in the natural sciences, unlike the moral sciences, we may arrange our experiments “purposely” and even “with premeditation” by placing an object in a particular situation and observing the results (t Int.7, Int.10 [sbn xvi–xvii, xix]). Later, in describing the application of his rules for judging causes and effects to natural subjects, he argues that every “phænomenon in nature” is “compounded and modify’d by so many different circumstances,” that in order to discover causes and effects in nature “we must carefully separate whatever is superXuous, and enquire by new experiments, if every particular circumstance of the Wrst experiment was essential to it” (t 1.3.15.11 [sbn 175]). 44. For Hume’s background and interest in the natural sciences, see Barfoot, “Hume and the Culture of Science,” 151–90, and Force, “Hume’s Interest in Newton and Science,” 166–216. See also Emerson, “Science and Moral Philosophy,” 11–36. 45. Mossner, Life of David Hume, 257–58. 46. For a survey of Hume’s contribution to the development of the philosophy of science, see Rosenberg, “Hume and the Philosophy of Science,” 64–89.
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Once we have acquired relatively extensive experience in judging causes and effects, Hume argues that we may be able to base new judgments on the observation of a few events or even a single event. In other words, he Wnds that both in scientiWc investigation and in ordinary life we often attain knowledge of a particular cause “merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superXuous circumstances,” or that we may even justiWably “build an argument on one single experiment, when duly prepar’d and examin’d” (t 1.3.8.14, 1.3.12.3 [sbn 104, 131]; cf. ehu 9.5n20 [sbn 107n1]). He later refers to the Baconian conception of an experimentum crucis, or a single experiment that “points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity” (epm 5.17 [sbn 219]). This argument for the evidential value of a single, well-designed scientiWc experiment qualiWes his observation that we can never build a causal argument on “one instance or experiment” (ehu 7.27 [sbn 74]). A controlled experiment in the context of an established habit of causal expectation isolates a single variable as the only possible cause of the effect in question, and gives the idea of this variable an extra force and vivacity. On the other hand, in his later rejection of miracles and his criticism of the design argument Hume maintains that we cannot derive any causal inferences from a succession of events in which either the objects or their conjunctions are considered to be unique (ehu 10.12–13, 11.30 [sbn 114–16, 148]; dnr 2.149). Hume offers a more direct account of the purpose and methods of the natural sciences in the Wrst Enquiry. Here he argues that the goal of the study of nature is “to reduce the principles, productive of natural phænomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes” by reasoning from “analogy, experience, and observation” (ehu 4.12 [sbn 30–31]). However, these advances require not only a successful use of the appropriate techniques but also the ability to recognize and to compare unexpected phenomena and operations in nature. We thus Wnd that the greatest obstacle to progress in the investigation of nature is “the want of proper experiments and phænomena, which are often discovered by chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by the most diligent and prudent enquiry” (ehu 7.2 [sbn 61]). Although he rejects the claim that we have an impression, or a positive idea, of a general causal power in nature, which operates in all instances of causation, Hume notes in the Treatise “that there may be several qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted,” and adds that “if we please to call these power or efWcacy, ’twill be of little consequence to the world” (t 1.3.14.27 [sbn 168]). However, it is not entirely clear what he means by “qualities” in this passage. On the one hand, these might be qualities with which we are as yet unacquainted because they lie beyond the present range of
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our observation, although we may presume that these as-yet unobserved qualities also belong to objects and are regularly conjoined with certain effects. On the other hand, he might be identifying the causal tendencies of objects as “powers” in a positive sense, and then denying that we can attain any knowledge of these powers apart from constant conjunctions between the observable qualities of objects. In this case, if we are attempting to discover the “original and ultimate principle” that binds the cause of every phenomenon to its effect, we will be “disappointed” to learn that “this connexion, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves,” as a determination of the mind arising from custom (t 1.4.7.5 [sbn 266–67]). In his later works Hume refers more freely and frequently to the possible operation of “secret powers” in nature, apparently as the hidden active qualities in objects which enable them to produce their effects. He thus states in the Enquiry that nature allows us “only the knowledge of a few superWcial qualities of objects,” while concealing “those powers and principles, on which the inXuence of these objects entirely depends.” This conclusion arises from our recognition that we cannot discover any ultimate reason why bread should provide nourishment, or why a moving body should continue to move, even though “we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers.” Hume even apparently suggests that we may formulate a concept of the “ultimate springs and principles” in nature connecting qualities to their effects, although these supposed powers are “totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry,” since they are not given directly through our senses, and since there is no known “connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers” that we can discover beyond the bare observation of a constant conjunction between qualities and effects (ehu 4.16, 4.12, 4.21 [sbn 32–33, 30–31, 36–37]). In other words, in attributing a causal relation to two objects that have been regularly conjoined in our experience, we suppose there to be “some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other,” and which operates “with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity” (ehu 7.27 [sbn 75]). On the other hand, Hume brackets this discussion of hidden powers in the Enquiry by a pair of footnotes, in which he argues that the concept of a power, like that of a cause, is merely a relative idea, since both refer entirely “to an effect, or some other event constantly conjoined with the former.” We accordingly have no idea of a power apart from “the unknown circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is Wxed and determined,” and no means of observing a power apart from its effects, or of characterizing a power other than in terms of these effects (ehu 7.29n17; cf. 4.16n7 [sbn 77n1; cf. 33n1]). For example, Hume argues that our concept of inertia arises from our repeated observations of the fact “that a body at rest or in motion continues
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for ever in its present state, till put from it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself.” However, in characterizing inertia as a “power,” we can “only mark these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power,” just as “when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active power” (ehu 7.25n16 [sbn 73n1]). Hume anticipates this analysis of the idea of a “power” in the Treatise, where he renounces any attempt to explain how motion can occur in a plenum, since this would require an explanation of “the nature of bodies” and the “secret causes of their operations” that would extend beyond the scope of his project and even perhaps “beyond the reach of human understanding.” Instead, we can never claim to know anything about bodies “otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses” (t 1.2.5.26 [sbn 64]). Several recent studies have cited Hume’s references to these “secret powers” in objects as evidence that he defends a version of causal realism, or the view that causal regularities arise from antecedently existing powers in objects, although he believes that these powers are inaccessible to human inquiry and that we only attribute them to objects on the basis of the regular conjunctions we observe between them. By contrast, the critics of this interpretation have called attention to Hume’s sustained rejection of any claim that we have a positive idea of causal powers in objects, arguing instead that his references to the “secret powers” of objects actually express the relative idea, either of some deeper and as-yet unobserved qualities in objects, or of the causal relation itself.47 I contend that in Hume’s view the idea of a causal power is a relative idea that we derive as a secondary projection, from our primary projection of a necessary connection onto objects that have been regularly conjoined in our experience.48 In this secondary projection, we locate the source of the causal connection within the objects themselves, thereby producing a useful theoretical construct for scientiWc inquiry and explanation. For example, we attribute an inertial or gravitational force to the objects themselves, and then treat these 47. For proponents of this interpretation, see Wright, Sceptical Realism, 2–3, 123–86, and Strawson, Secret Connexion; as well as Costa, “Hume and Causal Inference,” 141–59, and “Hume and Causal Realism,” 172–90. See also Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 155–67. For critics of this view, see Winkler, “The New Hume,” 52–87, and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 191–99. Additional essays on this discussion are included by Read and Richman in The New Hume Debate. Falkenstein provides a further discussion of criticisms of the idea of “causal powers” in both Hume and Kant, in “Hume’s Answer to Kant,” 331–60. 48. Here I am expanding upon the account by Livingston, who is often included among those who interpret Hume as a causal realist, but whose reading of Hume is, I believe, closer to the interpretation that I have indicated here. However, in contrast to Livingston, I would regard Hume’s discussion as a direct and deliberate treatment of the use of theoretical language in the natural sciences. See Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 155–60.
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forces as subject to calculation, even though the empirical content of this idea of a power or force is derived solely from our observation of regular conjunctions between the qualities of objects.49 In other words, in Hume’s view a “causal power” is the tendency of similar sensible qualities in a given type of object to be constantly conjoined with a certain type of effect, and a “secret” causal power can only be the supposed imperceptible ground of this tendency in the cause; although “we cannot form the most distant conception” of this power apart from the tendency of a certain quality to produce a certain effect (ehu 4.16 [sbn 33]).50 Finally, even though we do not have any cognitive access to causal powers, if these are understood as the ultimate grounds of efWcacy within objects, Hume maintains that, by using the rules for judging causes and effects, we may advance in identifying those qualities within various objects which are regularly conjoined with particular effects. That is, we may hope to discover the causal tendencies of particular objects and their qualities, or their tendencies to produce particular effects, through scientiWc inquiry. He accordingly concludes that “no philosopher, who is rational and modest,” will ever claim “to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which produces any single effect in the universe.” Instead, the natural philosopher or scientist attempts to correlate observed effects in nature with the qualities of objects, and to reduce these correlations to the least possible number, which are thereby identiWed as the most general causes in nature. Indeed, Hume provisionally suggests that “elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature” (ehu 4.12 [sbn 30–33]; cf. t Int.8 [sbn xvii]). In this section I have considered Hume’s application of the experimental method to the natural sciences. This application is further illustrated by his reXections concerning various important developments in the history of modern science, including the history of scientiWc reasoning, which are scattered throughout his writings.51 49. I thus agree with Winkler as cited above, in his response to Strawson, Livingston, and Costa, that our belief in causal powers is not regarded by Hume as a “natural belief” which is either inevitable or necessary for the activities of human life. However, Hume appears to regard the relative idea of a causal power as useful and perhaps even inevitable within the context of scientiWc enquiry, where we are drawn to explain an instance of causation in terms of a causal power, or an idea of “the unknown circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is Wxed and determined” (sbn 7.29n17 [sbn 77n1]). 50. For a similar treatment of Hume’s view of dispositions, see Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 22–33. 51. For a discussion of Hume’s references to the history of science, see Wertz, Between Hume’s Philosophy and History, 89–112. For a discussion of Hume in relation to Kuhn and Lakatos, see Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 142, 152–53, and 343–86.
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Hume’s references to the history of science begin with the Copernican revolution in astronomy. Hume argues that Copernicus developed the heliocentric model of the solar system, not merely to account for new data, but also to formulate a simpler theory of planetary motion. In other words, the Copernican system arose in part from the application of the principle of simplicity, or the maxim “that nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end.” By contrast, the Ptolemaic astronomers had “contriv’d such intricate systems of the heavens, as seem’d inconsistent with true philosophy,” by inventing “a new principle to every new phænomenon, instead of adapting it to the old” (dnr 12.214; t 2.1.3.7 [sbn 282]; cf. e Sc.164–65). In the introduction to the Treatise Hume describes the development of “experimental philosophy” since the seventeenth century, especially in England, and gives particular credit to Francis Bacon for introducing the experimental method into natural philosophy (t Int.7 [sbn xvii]). However, in the History of England he notes that Bacon “pointed out at a distance the road to true philosophy,” but did not recognize the possibilities in applying mathematics to physics and astronomy, and was in this respect “inferior to his cotemporary Galileo” and “perhaps even to Kepler.” Hume then departs momentarily from his national history in order to describe Galileo’s contribution to the revival of geometry and to praise his achievement as “the Wrst that applied it, together with experiment, to natural philosophy” (h V.App.4.153). Hume includes a further discussion of Galileo in the Dialogues, in the context of a discussion of the principles of simplicity and analogy. Here Philo appeals to the example of Galileo, who sought to demonstrate “that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances.” More speciWcally, Galileo sought to show that the moon is similar “in every particular” to the earth, and that both are similar to the planets, allowing scientists “to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other” (dnr 2.151). In his essay “Of the Middle Station of Life,” Hume indeed identiWes Galileo, along with Newton, as two Wgures in the history of philosophy who appear “so far to excel all the rest, that I cannot admit any other into the same Class with them” (e ms.550). In the History of England Hume also considers the discovery by Harvey of the circulation of the blood, as well as the founding of the Royal Society, and the achievements of its members. He gives particular attention to Robert Boyle, not only for his discoveries in pneumatics, chemistry, and hydrostatics; but also for contributing to the general rise of “mechanical philosophy,” which “by discovering some of the secrets of nature, and allowing us to imagine the rest, is so agreeable to the natural vanity and curiosity of men” (h 6.62.153–54; h 6.71.540–41). Finally, in the History of England Hume singles out Isaac Newton as “the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of
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the species.”52 He especially praises Newton for being “cautious in admitting no principles but such as were founded on experiment; but resolute to adopt every such principle, however new or unusual.” Thus, while Newton seemed to “draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature,” he also revealed the “imperfections” of mechanical philosophy, and thereby restored “her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain” (h 6.71.541). In the Enquiry he further praises Newton for leading astronomy beyond merely describing the movements of the heavenly bodies by discovering “the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed” (ehu 1.15 [sbn 14]). In addition to Newton’s rules for scientiWc reasoning, which we have considered above, Hume offers several further reXections concerning the Newtonian method. For example, he criticizes both the Cartesian philosophers and some of Newton’s followers for maintaining that all motion should be attributed to the direct action of the deity, since “it was never the meaning of Sir isaac newton to rob second causes of all force or energy.” Indeed, Newton proposed the existence of “an etherial active Xuid to explain his universal attraction,” although recognizing with his characteristic caution and modesty that this was “a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experiments” (ehu 7.25n16 [sbn 73n1]; cf. lg 28–29). Hume presents his own attempts to explain the idea of a vacuum as consistent with “the Newtonian philosophy,” which maintains “a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity” (t 1.2.5.26n12 [sbn 639]). Many studies have examined Newton’s inXuence on Hume, and have offered different interpretations of this inXuence.53 The simplest of these is the argument that Hume sought to extend the principles and discoveries of Newtonian physics to the moral sciences by developing a mechanistic account of perceptions and of human action.54 However, I would argue that Hume’s philosophy should instead be regarded as an attempt to examine and justify the foundations of Newtonian physics by tracing its explanatory principles and its central concepts of space, time, causation, and external objects to their origins in sensation and imagination. Hume’s philosophy may thus be regarded as one among a number of attempts, including those of Reid and Kant, to formulate a philosophical account of the principles of Newtonian science. Finally, Hume also attempts to apply the resulting Newtonian principles of explanation to the distinctive 52. For an inventory and discussion of Hume’s various references to Newton, see Force, “Hume’s Interest in Newton and Science,” especially 169–78. 53. For various discussions of Hume’s “Newtonianism” see Capaldi, David Hume, 49–70; Hurlbutt, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argument; Barfoot, “Hume and the Culture of Science,” 151–90; Force, “Hume’s Interest in Newton and Science,” 181–206; McIntyre, “Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences,” 3–18; and Sapadin, “Note,” 337–44. 54. See, for example, Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 53–76 and 549–53.
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types of description and explanation that are required in moral philosophy or the human sciences, as we will see in subsequent chapters of this study.55 Hume even calls attention in the Dialogues to the value of studying the history of science. Here Philo observes “the modern system of astronomy is now so much received by all enquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded.” Accordingly, although we might initially be inclined to treat the works of earlier scientists as a “mere curiosity,” it is useful “to study the Wrst writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side, in order to render them popular and convincing.” He especially encourages his companions to read the works of Galileo, in order to appreciate the discoveries which, by their own time, were taken for granted as the foundations of modern physics and astronomy (dnr 2.150–51). Finally, it might not be amiss to note that although Hume was not a practicing scientist, his writings seem to have been important inXuences for several crucial lines of development in the history of the modern natural sciences. For example, his imaginative account in the Dialogues of various theories by which we might explain the apparent order in nature not only anticipates the development of evolutionary theories in nineteenth-century geology and biology, but may indeed have inXuenced Charles Darwin through his grandfather, the eccentric poet and scientist Erasmus Darwin (dnr 6.170–81).56 In addition, Hume’s account of space and time in the Treatise was cited by Albert Einstein as an important inXuence on his thought.57
testimony Hume applies his account of philosophical probable reasoning not only to the natural sciences but also, and indeed more extensively, to the explanation of human action, as we will see in later chapters. However, in concluding this chapter, I would like to consider his preliminary reXections in Book 1, Part 3 of the Treatise concerning the role of human testimony in our causal reasonings. Hume includes the beliefs arising from human testimony within the system of reality that rests upon causal judgments. For example, we may develop “an 55. McIntyre has indeed argued that one of Hume’s main targets in metaphysics as well as ethics was Samuel Clarke, and that Hume was challenging Clarke’s interpretation and application of Newtonian principles. See McIntyre, “Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences,” 3–18. On the other hand, Russell regards Hume’s challenge to Clarke as also a challenge to Newtonianism: see “Hume’s Treatise,” 108–9. 56. See Monteiro, “Hume, Induction and Natural Selection,” 299–301. 57. See Einstein, Autobiographical Notes, 51, and Zabeeh, Hume, 1–2.
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idea of rome,” and a belief in its history, through the ideas which we receive “from the conversation and books of travellers and historians” (t 1.3.9.4 [sbn 108]). More speciWcally, once we have acquired “a conWdence in human testimony,” we can expand our individual experience by receiving further information through “books and conversation” (ehu 9.5n20 [sbn 107n1]). However, he also observes that testimony may exercise an unphilosophical inXuence over causal reasoning, through the natural tendency among human beings toward “credulity, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others.” Indeed, our trust in human testimony “arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes.” However, while experience is “the true standard of this, as well as of all other judgments,” we also Wnd in human beings “a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported,” arising partly from our delight in novelty and partly from our sympathy with others. This even extends to include reports “concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation” (t 1.3.9.12 [sbn 112–13]; cf. 2.1.11.9 [sbn 320]; ehu 10–16 [sbn 117]). In order to help us counteract this unphilosophical tendency toward credulity, Hume advises us to develop principles for the evaluation of human testimony. He accordingly directs us to consider such factors as the number, reliability, and motives of the original witnesses, and of any subsequent participants in the chain of transmission (t 1.3.4.2, 1.3.13.5 [sbn 83, 145–46]; ehu 10.5–8 [sbn 111–13]). Thus, although human testimony is a legitimate and valuable source of information concerning matters of fact, it is also subject to typical forms of distortion and error; and should be evaluated according to the principles of judgment appropriate to the moral sciences, derived from the standards of philosophical probable reasoning. We will consider Hume’s general account of the interpretation of human action in Chapter 7, and his more particular account of the principles which should govern the evaluation of human testimony in Chapter 13. Hume also introduces the subject of education in his discussion of human testimony. Here he notes that an idea which is frequently brought before the mind through an external inXuence gradually acquires a “facility and force” until it comes to maintain itself “by its Wrm hold and easy introduction” against any new and unusual ideas. This tendency, especially when reinforced by sympathy, accounts for the inXuence of “education,” by which “all those opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustom’d from our infancy” have become so deeply rooted that it seems almost impossible “by all the powers of reason and experience, to eradicate them.” Indeed, Hume speculates “that upon examination we shall Wnd more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education,” outweighing the opinions “owing either to abstract reasoning or experience.” However, since its precepts are “frequently contrary to reason,” and since education is “an artiWcial and not
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a natural cause,” its inXuence is often neglected by philosophers, even though it is built “on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects” (t 1.3.9.16–19 [sbn 115–17]). In other words, the convictions arising from education are derived from human testimony, and are subject to the same principles of critical evaluation as any form of testimony, although the critical evaluation of the presuppositions established in childhood is especially difWcult for most of us, as a result of the combined inXuence of long habit and the remembered sympathies of childhood with our teachers and caregivers. However, Philo suggests in the Dialogues that the inXuence of education is “much diminished” in the modern world, since people now enjoy “a more open commerce of the world” and have learned to “compare the popular principles of different nations and ages” (dnr 1.139). Hume presents a more consistently optimistic view of education in his moral and political writings. For example, later in the Treatise he argues that “private education and instruction” play a crucial role in developing respect for the principles of justice, since our parents recognize “that a man is the more useful, both to himself and others, the greater degree of probity and honour he is endow’d with,” and that these principles “have greater force, when custom and education assist interest and reXection” (t 3.2.2.26 [sbn 500]). In the Essays he argues that moral conduct arises, not from the precepts of philosophy or religion, but instead from “the virtuous education of youth” through “wise laws and institutions” (e pg.55). Finally, with this preliminary treatment of Hume’s account of testimony and education, we may return brieXy to his discussion of custom. In this chapter we have seen that custom occupies a central place in his account of philosophical probable reasoning. Many studies of Hume’s social and political philosophy have also emphasized the role of custom in these areas of his writings.58 Indeed, several authors have described Hume’s account of custom as one of the central constructive and unifying themes in his philosophy.59 In light of our larger interest here in the social and historical aspects of Hume’s thought, we may wish to consider whether the word “custom” does indeed perform this unifying function. As we have seen, in his general analysis of human cognition Hume tends to use the word “custom” in the strictly individualistic sense, which, as he indicates, is synonymous with “habit” (cf. t 1.3.8.10 [sbn 102]; ehu 5.5 [sbn 43]). Hume also occasionally uses the word “custom” to refer to an established social or cultural practice, although he generally restricts this usage to his moral 58. Bryson, Man and Society, 124–25, 156–59, 243, and 267; Acton, “Prejudice,” 323–36; and Swingewood, “Origins of Sociology,” 169–70. 59. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 276; Whelan, Order and ArtiWce, 333; Phillipson, Hume, 148; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 32 and 288.
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philosophy and studies of history and social life (t 3.2.10.9n82 [sbn 559n2]; epm d.43–50 [sbn 339–40]; e rc.366–76). Indeed, he often refers in this sense to the “manners and customs” of a particular culture or a period in history (epm d.18 [sbn 330]; e st.246, e Mo.290). However, Hume himself does not develop any connection between “custom” in the individualistic sense and in its social and cultural sense, and indeed appears to separate these two uses from each other deliberately in his various writings. Accordingly, Kemp Smith’s attempt to conXate these two senses of “custom” in Hume’s usage, by contrasting a causal inference derived from custom, as the “heavy Xy-wheel” which tends to perpetuate the beliefs of a society, to the inferences derived from reXective reasoning, is a distortion of Hume’s usage and his argument.60 However, while Hume does not speciWcally use the word “custom” as a unifying theme in his writings, he later expands upon his initial account of general rules, in order to consider the social processes by which we develop the rules that govern various types of social activity. This appears especially in his discussion of “artiWces” and “conventions,” in Book 3 of the Treatise and in the second Enquiry, which we will consider in Chapter 8. Hume’s later discussion of the development of artiWces or conventions might invite us to consider the possibility that the rules for probable or scientiWc reasoning also emerge through a process of social coordination. As we have seen, he describes the history of these rules indirectly, in his account of the development of the methodological principles of modern science by its leading Wgures. In other words, Hume calls attention to the historical dimension of probable reasoning, not only by discussing testimony and education, but also in his references to the development of the standards of critical reXection in the modern natural sciences, which will be applicable to both the investigation of nature, and the explanation of human action and the evaluation of human testimony.
60. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 386; cf. 383–88, and 539–40.
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Metaphysics
In the initial presentation of his theory of ideas, Hume identiWes perceptions, including impressions of sensation, impressions of reXection, and ideas, as the contents of all our conscious states. In the course of the Treatise Hume argues that the principles of traditional metaphysics, or the ideas which serve to structure our ordinary experience, including our ideas of space, time, causation, external existence, and personal identity, are constructed by the mind through various types of imaginative extrapolation from our impressions of sensation and reXection. In the Abstract and the Wrst Enquiry Hume focuses his attention upon the idea of causation, and sharply curtails or even dispenses with his analysis of our ideas of space, time, external existence, and personal identity. In this chapter I will consider Hume’s analysis of our ideas of space and time in Book 1, Part 2 of the Treatise, and our ideas of external existence and personal identity in Book 1, Part 4. This order of presentation, and indeed Hume’s own organization of Book 1, might seem to be problematic, since not only space and time, but also external existence and even personal identity are presuppositions of his analysis of causation. More speciWcally, Hume argues that the idea of causation is superimposed upon sets of external objects by the mind as a result of its memory of a series of conjunctions in space and time between similar objects.1 1. For a further discussion of Hume’s order of presentation, see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 6–8, 17–18, and 116–17.
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I have already provided a preliminary consideration of Hume’s account of our idea of space in Chapter 2, in relation to his discussion of geometry. However, I have postponed his treatment of space and time to the present chapter in order to trace the continuity between this theory and his analysis of our ideas of external objects and the self. I will consider his examination of the preceding systems of metaphysics and the various forms of skepticism in Chapter 5.
s pa c e a n d t i m e In Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise Hume initially presents spatial and temporal contiguity as natural relations, and relative locations in space and time as philosophical relations that are given directly through observation (t 1.1.4.1, 1.1.5.5, 1.3.2.1–2 [sbn 11, 14, 73–74]). He examines our “abstract ideas” of space and time in Part 2 (t 1.2.3.5–6 [sbn 34–35]). Many of Hume’s critics have regarded his analysis of space and time as obviously unsatisfactory, or indeed even as incoherent.2 I contend, however, that Hume provides a thoughtful and intriguing account of the origin of our ideas of time and space, as arising from the mind’s recognition of the arrangement of its perceptions in inner and outer experience. As we have already seen in Chapter 2, Hume argues that our ideas of space and time, and therefore also space and time themselves, are composed of indivisible parts he calls “points” and “moments.” However, he also argues that these indivisible parts of space and time must be Wlled with something perceptible in order to be either perceived or imagined. First, the “atoms” occupying the minimal points of space must be colored or solid, and hence visible or tangible. For their part, the indivisible moments of time must be Wlled with “some real object or existence” drawn from “our perceptions of every kind,” including not only our inner and outer impressions, but also our ideas (t 1.2.3.5–7, 1.2.3.17 [sbn 34–35, 39]). In applying his Wrst principle to our abstract ideas of space and time, Hume Wnds that these ideas do not arise from any “primary distinct impression” that is either “mix’d up” with other impressions or can appear to the mind apart from any other impression (t 1.2.3.10; cf. 1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.28 [sbn 36–37; cf. 33, 64–65]). Instead, he argues that our ideas of space and time arise from the ideas of extension and duration, which we in turn derive, as distinctions of reason, by comparing the arrangements, or what he calls the “manner of appearance,” which we discover among our perceptions (t 1.2.3.4–5, 1.2.3.10 [sbn 34, 37]). 2. For surveys of recent assessments of Hume on space and time, see Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 81–107, and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 57–58. See also Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 11–13.
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Through the propensity of the imagination to continue its operation, we then project our ideas of extension and duration beyond any immediate series of perceptions, in order to formulate our abstract ideas of space and time.3 First, in considering the origin of our idea of space, Hume argues that our impressions of sensation, for example in the visual appearance of a table, do not provide a separate impression of extension, but present themselves merely as “impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner.” However, when we compare this collection of colored points to various other collections of colored points in our visual Weld, we are able to overlook their differences in color and formulate an abstract idea of extension founded “merely on that disposition of points, or manner of appearance, in which they agree.” In addition, we discover a resemblance between the arrangement of these colored points and our impressions of touch, since the latter are “found to be similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts” (t 1.2.3.4–5 [sbn 34]). The concept of extension is thus formulated through a distinction of reason, in which we attend to a speciWc type of resemblance: a resemblance in the conWguration or “manner of appearance,” Wrst among, and then also between, our visual and tactile sensations (cf. t 1.4.2.11–12, 1.4.5.9 [sbn 191–92, 235]). Next Hume turns to the idea of time, which is derived from the concept of duration.4 Here he argues that time never appears to the mind as an impression, either alone or in the perception of any unchanging object. Instead, the idea of time is conveyed to the mind “by some perceivable succession of changeable objects,” and “arises altogether from the manner, in which impressions appear to the mind.” For example, “Wve notes play’d on a Xute give us the impression and idea of time,” not indeed as a separate perception, but when the mind, through a distinction of reason, “takes notice of the manner, in which the different sounds make their appearance.” The abstract idea of this arrangement, or this succession of different perceptions, is the concept of duration (t 1.2.3.7–10; cf. 1.2.5.28, 1.4.2.29 [sbn 35–37; cf. 64–65, 200]). While the idea of spatial extension arises from the arrangement of only our visual and tactile sensations, our idea of temporal duration arises from “the succession of our perceptions of every kind,” including “ideas as well as impressions, and impressions of reXection as well as of sensation.” Accordingly, the idea of time “comprehends a still greater variety than that of space,” and is “for ever present with us” in the continuous series of perceptions in our minds. 3. For studies of Hume’s account of our idea of space and time in the context of his general theory of ideas and cognition, see Church, Hume’s Theory of the Understanding, 57–64; Maund, Hume’s Theory of Knowledge, 210–26; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 116–17; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 52–57 and 168–69; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self; Falkenstein, “Space and Time,” 179–201; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 43–128. 4. On Hume’s examination of time, see Johnson, “Time and the Idea of Time,” 205–19, and Costa, “Hume, Strict Identity, and Time’s Vacuum,” 1–16.
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In other words, the idea of time is more encompassing than the idea of space, and is also more immediately and continually present to the mind (t 1.2.3.6, 1.2.5.29 [sbn 34–35, 65]). Hume thus presents our ideas of extension and duration as abstract ideas, or concepts, in which we associate a general term with many particular images of extended or changing objects, according to the resemblances that we discover in the “manner of their appearance.” However, these abstract ideas of extension and duration are always represented in the mind by some particular image which has “a determinate quantity and quality” (t 1.2.3.4–6 [sbn 34–35]). Since our ideas of space and time do not arise directly from distinct impressions, but are merely ideas “of the manner or order, in which objects exist,” Hume argues that we cannot form any image of space apart from material objects, or any image of time apart from a succession of changing objects. In other words, we cannot formulate a positive idea of either empty space or empty time. However, the claim that “we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible” seems to be contradicted, not only by our apparent experiences of both observing and imagining spaces between bodies, but also by the arguments of many natural scientists, who claim that we must presuppose the idea of empty space in order to account for the motion of bodies (t 1.2.4.2, 1.2.5.1–4, 1.2.5.24 [sbn 39–40, 53–55, 63]). Hume responds to the apparent arguments for the possibility, and the existence, of a vacuum by arguing that our idea of empty space is derived from our idea of extension. According to his analysis, I develop the idea of empty space only by seeing or touching separated bodies, and Wnding that I can place other bodies between them, or move my hand from one to the other. Since the supposed empty distance between bodies can be converted into a composition of extended points by receiving another body, and since this distance affects the senses in ways that are similar to the distance of an extended body, Hume concludes that the idea of empty space is derived from the idea of extension by an association of ideas, according to the natural relations of causation and resemblance. Accordingly, our idea of empty space, such as the space in an empty room, is a “Wctitious distance,” or the merely derivative idea of an invisible and intangible gap in an arrangement of visible and tangible objects, which we regard as capable of receiving other objects (t 1.2.5.21–23 [sbn 61–62]).5 Hume initially concludes this argument in the Treatise by disavowing any intention to explain how material objects can be separated by invisible and intangible distances that have the capacity to receive other bodies. Indeed, he describes this as a question that lies outside his own investigation, and even 5. See also Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 49 and 54–57; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 157–93; and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity, 57–99.
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beyond the range of our experience and understanding, since we can never know any of the properties of bodies “otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses” (t 1.2.5.26; cf. 1.2.5.3, 1.2.5.23–26 [sbn 64; cf. 54–55, 62–64]). He expands upon this in a footnote added in the Appendix, where he notes that if we seek to move beyond the “appearances of objects to our senses,” and to discover the “real nature and operations” of these objects, our efforts are likely to end in “scepticism and uncertainty.” He applies this argument in particular to the question of whether the apparent space between bodies must be Wlled with some type of body in order to account for separation and motion. In response, he states that “the Newtonian philosophy” asserts the existence of a vacuum only by afWrming that bodies may be so distributed as to receive other bodies between them. However, at least in his view, Newtonian physics does not attempt to determine whether the intervening distance is Wlled with “something or nothing,” or to describe “the real nature of this position of bodies,” apart from their effects on our senses (t 1.2.5.26n12 [sbn 638–39]).6 Similarly, Hume argues that we cannot derive an idea of empty time, or of “time without a changeable existence,” either from a distinct impression of time, or by observing an unchanging object. Instead, we apply the concept of duration to a static object only through a “Wction,” by regarding this object as coexisting with a changing object, or in other words, a changing series of perceptions, such as the moving hands of a clock. We also regard an unchanging object as capable of changing in a given period of time, and we recognize that the qualities of a static object vary in our memory in the same degrees as those of a changing object. Our idea of time thus arises from a succession of changing perceptions and can be applied to an unchanging object only “by a Wction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is suppos’d to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects” (t 1.4.2.29; cf. 1.2.5.29 [sbn 200–201; cf. 65]). Although he maintains that we cannot formulate a positive idea of empty space or empty time, Hume concedes that we may apply our concepts of extension and duration to the apparent spaces between bodies and to unchanging objects. He describes these extrapolated ideas of extension and duration in both cases as a “Wction,” or an idea produced by the inertial propensity of the imagination when it projects the ideas derived from our impressions, including the abstract idea of the manner of their distribution, beyond the arrangement of a given set of sensible points or a given succession of perceptions (t 1.2.3.11, 1.2.5.23, 1.4.2.29 [sbn 37, 62, 200–201]). 6. On the relation of Hume’s argument to various discussions among his predecessors and contemporaries, see Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 157–93, and Jacquette, David Hume’s Critique of InWnity.
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Finally, Hume also considers our systematic extrapolation and application of these “Wctitious” ideas of extension and duration through various types of reasoning. For example, he Wnds that we project our ideas of space and time beyond the range of our perceptions through causal reasoning, which gives us information concerning “such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory” (t 1.3.9.4 [sbn 108]). He also identiWes location in space and time as philosophical relations, or relations in which we judge the relative situations of objects by “an inWnite number of comparisons, such as distant, contiguous, above, below, before, after, &c.” We may even divide extension and duration into units and use these to measure and to calculate extensions in space and time according to the philosophical relation of “proportions in quantity or number,” although Hume maintains that “we ought not to look for the utmost precision and exactness” in these applications of mathematical reasoning to extended objects (t 1.1.5.6, 1.3.1.2, 1.2.4.17 [sbn 14–15, 70, 45]). Hume accordingly indicates that, by engaging in causal reasoning and using various systems of measurement, we can extend our ideas of extension and duration beyond our direct Weld of perception in order to situate other inferred objects within a continuous spatial and temporal framework (cf. t 1.2.1.5 [sbn 28]). He thus interprets the Newtonian conceptions of absolute time and space, not as positive ideas of empty time and space, but rather as imaginative extrapolations of our concepts of extension and duration into unfolding Welds of possible perception, which we project in order to accommodate any objects whose existence we may infer beyond the immediate range of our senses (cf. t 1.2.5.23–29, 1.2.5.26n12 [sbn 62–65, 638–39]).7 After his analysis of our ideas of space and time in Book 1, Hume also considers the inXuence of space and time on the human passions in Book 2 of the Treatise. In this context he examines various characteristics of space and time from the standpoint of human existence, such as the division of time into past, present, and future (t 2.3.7.1–2.3.8.13 [sbn 427–38]). We will return to this discussion in Chapter 6, in which we will consider the human passions and the human attitude of concern within a physical and social environment.
external existence The longest section in Book 1 of the Treatise is devoted to our idea of the existence of external objects. In this chapter I consider Hume’s analysis of our ordinary idea of external existence in Part 4, Section 2, and its relation to his 7. See Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 174–77; Kuhns, “Hume’s Republic,” 73–95; and Wright, Sceptical Realism, 100–105.
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earlier account of our ideas of existence and substance. In the next chapter I will turn to his critical assessment of the ordinary idea of external existence and his discussion of the alternative proposals offered by the “antient” and “modern” systems of philosophy, as presented in Sections 2–4. As we have seen, Hume maintains that “nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas,” and that “the only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions,” since only these are “immediately present to us by consciousness” (t 1.2.6.7, 1.4.2.47 [sbn 67, 212]).8 He even indicates that perceptions may be identiWed as substances, according to the deWnition of a substance as whatever may be “consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately” and has “no need of any thing else” to support its existence (t 1.4.5.5; cf. 1.4.5.24, 1.4.6.3 [sbn 233; cf. 244, 252]).9 In Part 2 Hume further characterizes a perception as an “object of thought,” or simply as an “object,” and distinguishes an object in this sense from “external objects,” which are known to us “only by those perceptions they occasion” (t 1.2.6.2–7 [sbn 66–67]). However, in the course of Book 1 he also uses the word “object” noncommittally, or even with a deliberate equivocation, for both perceptions and external objects (cf. t 1.1.5.1–10, 1.2.3.1–17 [sbn 13–15, 33–39]). He Wnally explains this apparent ambiguity in Part 4. Here he notes that the “vulgar,” among whom he includes “almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives,” identify their perceptions with external objects and suppose “that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence” (t 1.4.2.38 [sbn 206]; cf. ehu 12.6–8 [sbn 151–52]).10 He then stipulates that he will distinguish in his philosophical analysis between an “object,” or an external object, and a “perception.” However, he warns us that when he is considering our ordinary idea of external existence, he will revert to the undifferentiated usage of the vulgar by supposing that there is “a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or perception” (t 1.4.2.31; cf. 1.4.2.46 [sbn 202; cf. 211]).11 8. For two valuable discussions of Hume’s account of perceptions, see Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, especially 150–53, and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 210–22. 9. For different assessments of this assertion, see Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 67–71, and Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 280–81 and 307–8. Since Hume repeatedly asserts the autonomy of perceptions in similar terms (cf. t 1.4.2.39, 1.4.6.16 [sbn 207, 259–60]), I would regard this characterization of perceptions as a serious proposal. I indeed agree with Bricke that Hume is distinguishing between two uses of the word of “substance”: the traditional use of this term for a substratum, and his use of this term for a perception. See Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 59–62. 10. In Part 3 Hume distinguishes the “wise,” or those who rely on philosophical probable reasoning, from the “vulgar,” who often do not (t 1.3.13.12 [sbn 150]). However, in Part 4 he uses the term “vulgar” interchangeably with “common” and “popular” for the opinions of the “generality of mankind,” including “all of us, at one time or other,” in contrast to the opinions we reach through philosophical reXection (t 1.4.2.31, 1.4.2.36, 1.4.2.56–57 [sbn 202, 205, 217–18]). 11. For a further discussion of Hume’s usage, see McRae, “Nature of Mind,” 150–67.
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Indeed, he maintains that it is impossible for us to conceive of any external objects as “any thing but exactly the same with perceptions” (t 1.4.2.56; cf. 1.2.6.6–9 [sbn 218; cf. 67–68]). Hume presents a separate discussion of the idea of existence in Book 1, Part 2. Here he notes that we might expect to derive the concept of existence directly from our impressions and ideas, since all of these are “conceiv’d as existent.” However, he argues that we encounter several problems in attempting to explain our idea of existence. First, the idea of existence is not derived from any distinct impression that attends every perception. Next, we cannot derive the idea of existence by comparing a perception that exists to a perception that does not exist, since every perception, as such, necessarily exists. Instead, Hume argues that the idea of existence is already itself the same as “the idea of what we conceive to be existent” (t 1.2.6.2–4; cf. App.2 [sbn 66–67; cf. 623]).12 However, at the end of this discussion Hume distinguishes between the idea of existence that applies to our perceptions, which I will call “absolute existence,” and the idea of “external existence,” or the existence which we attribute to external objects. Here he argues that although we cannot formulate a positive idea of anything which would be “speciWcally different from ideas and impressions,” we can form a “relative idea” of the existence of external objects, by which we do not suppose these objects to be “speciWcally different” from our perceptions, “but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations” (t 1.2.6.1–9 [sbn 66–68]). That is, we regard external objects as continuing to exist apart from our perceptions, or as composed, in effect, of unobserved and connected perceptions. Hume considers this “relative idea” of external existence in Part 4 and elsewhere in his writings in terms that reinforce the contrast between external existence and his account of absolute existence in Part 2. In the Wrst Enquiry he argues that “whatever is may not be,” and “the non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence.” As a result, two propositions afWrming its existence or nonexistence are equally intelligible, even though only one can be true; and the existence of any being “can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect,” which are “founded entirely on experience” (ehu 12.28–29 [sbn 164]). Similarly, the relative idea of external existence seems to be reXected in Cleanthes’ claim that “whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as 12. Wilson argues that, in Hume’s view, the idea of existence is not a distinction of reason but a speciesconcept, which applies to all of our perceptions but is not derived either from a separate impression or from a quality in which they resemble one another. See Wilson, “Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence,” 167–201. For other attempts to explain Hume’s arguments on the concept of existence, see Cummins, “Hume on the Idea of Existence,” 61–82; Tweyman, “Some ReXections,” 137–49; and Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 108–16.
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non-existent,” and that there is no being “whose non-existence implies a contradiction” (dnr 11.189). We will return to Hume’s account of the concept of existence and of external existence in the course of the present section. In Part 4 Hume examines the causes of our ordinary belief in the existence of “body,” or external objects.13 He begins by dividing our idea of external existence into two constituent ideas: the idea of a “continu’d existence” of objects, when they are not immediately present to the senses, and of an “existence distinct from the mind and perception.” He then divides the idea of distinct existence into two further ideas: those of their “situation” and “relations,” or “their external position as well as the independence of their existence and operation” (t 1.4.2.2; cf. 1.4.2.23, 1.4.2.44 [sbn 188; cf. 199, 210]). Next, Hume examines the three possible sources for the ideas of continued and distinct existence: the senses, reason, and imagination. First, the senses cannot provide the idea of the continued existence of an object, since it is precisely the interrupted character of our sensations that initiates the problem of continued existence, and since the continued existence of objects could only be given through the senses if we suppose that the senses continue to operate “even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation,” which is a “contradiction in terms.” Nor can the senses give us any idea of the distinct existence of objects, since sensations do not indicate in their immediate appearance whether they are the representations of external objects or merely subjective states of consciousness (t 1.4.2.3–4 [sbn 188–89]). Second, Hume argues that our ideas of continued and distinct existence cannot arise from reason. Here he appeals to the evidence provided by children, common people, and even animals, who all believe in the continuing and distinct existence of body, but do not have a sophisticated ability to reason. On the contrary, reason shows us, through “a very little reXection and philosophy,” that “every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted, and dependent on the mind” (t 1.4.2.44, 1.4.2.14 [sbn 210, 193]; cf. ehu 12.8–16 [sbn 151–55]). Here Hume is referring to the evidence put forward by many ancient and modern philosophers, and also by contemporary natural scientists, to show that our impressions of sensation appear to be relative to the condition of our sense organs, nerves, and “animal spirits.” Hume refers to several of these observations, including the discovery that we can induce double vision by pressing our eyeballs, or recognizing the effects of distance or illness on our sensations (t 1.4.2.45; cf. 1.4.4.3–4 [sbn 210–11; cf. 226–27]). Several critics have objected that Hume is begging the question here, since his argument allegedly requires us to presuppose the continued 13. The most thorough discussion of this analysis is Price’s study, Hume’s Theory of the External World. Several valuable recent studies include Pears, Hume’s System, 152–97; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 238–65; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 84–98; and Collier, “Filling the Gaps,” 155–70.
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existence and distinct operation of our sense organs and nervous system when we are not perceiving them.14 However, Hume’s larger argument does not rest upon the supposition of the distinct and continued existence of our sensory apparatus, since his main concern is to argue that perceptions are dependent on the mind or consciousness, prior to any determination regarding the existence of body, including my own body. On Hume’s view, our scientiWc belief in the continued and distinct existence of our sensory apparatus arises from the same principles as our vulgar and philosophical beliefs in the existence of external objects, since I regard even my own body as an object that is exterior to my mind, and since I learn about the interior of my own body through the study of other human bodies. In this passage Hume is merely noting that once we have accepted the existence of an external and internal sensory apparatus, scientiWc reasoning shows us that our sensations are correlated to the observed states of this apparatus. Hume further argues that we cannot derive our belief in external objects from causal reasoning, since causal reasoning only arises from the conjunction of two observed objects and leads us to expect the conjunction of similar observable objects. This type of inference can never lead us beyond the Weld of observation to infer the existence of an unobserved object from the appearance of a perception, since we cannot observe a conjunction between an unobserved object and a perception (t 1.4.2.14, 1.4.2.47 [sbn 193, 212]). Having eliminated the senses and reason as candidates, Hume provisionally concludes that our idea of the distinct and continued existence of sensible objects must be “entirely owing to the imagination” (t 1.4.2.14 [sbn 193]). To trace the role of the imagination in producing our idea of external existence, Hume suggests that we should begin by reconsidering the apparent division of our impressions into two types. The Wrst includes “our pains and pleasures, our passions and affections,” while the second contains those other impressions, including “colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold,” along with “Wgure, bulk, motion and solidity.” Of these two types of impressions, we regard the former as “internal and perishing” and the latter as qualities of external objects. Next, in a more differentiated account of the second set of impressions, Hume notes that the “vulgar” believe that the secondary qualities of color, taste, and sound, as well as the primary qualities of shape, solidity, and motion, have a “distinct continu’d existence,” while philosophers ascribe a distinct and continued existence only to primary qualities (t 1.4.2.12, 1.4.2.15–16; cf. 1.4.4.3–4 [sbn 192, 194; cf. 226–27]; ehu 12.15 [sbn 154–55]). However, he notes that sounds, tastes, and smells, while “commonly regarded by the mind 14. For discussions of this passage, see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 7–9 and 115–20; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 220–21 and 254–62; and Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 264–65.
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as continu’d independent qualities,” appear, in contrast to color and shape, “not to have any existence in extension, and consequently cannot appear to the senses as situated externally to the body” (t 1.4.2.9; cf. 1.4.6.13 [sbn 191; cf. 258]). Finally, neither the vulgar nor philosophers attribute a continued distinct existence either to pains and pleasures, or to the passions (t 1.4.2.12 [sbn 192]). In a later discussion of nonspatial objects Hume argues, against the view he attributes to many other metaphysicians, “that an object may exist, and yet be no where,” and even that “the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner.” Among these nonspatial objects or perceptions he includes tastes, smells, and sounds; desires, passions, and moral reXections; and indeed “all our perceptions and objects, except those of the sight and feeling.” He then argues that the impressions of taste and smell cannot exist in a “local conjunction” with extended objects, and that our idea of this conjunction arises indirectly from other relations. That is, we attribute taste or smell to an object when we discover that a conjunction between an extended object and certain organs of our body regularly produces a speciWc impression of taste or smell in that organ. The imagination is led by these relations of contiguity and causation to suppose a “conjunction in place” between the smell or the Xavor and the extended object. We therefore suppose that the taste of an olive exists in the object; and even that this Xavor exists “in such a manner, that it Wlls the whole without extension,” yet also subsists “entire in every part without separation” (t 1.4.5.10–13; cf. 1.4.2.10, 2.1.5.6 [sbn 235–38; cf. 191, 287]). In response to Hume’s assertion that neither the vulgar nor philosophers attribute a continued distinct existence to the passions (t 1.4.2.12; cf. 1.4.2.20 [sbn 192; cf. 195]), Price has argued that we often regard our passions as continuing to exist even after an interruption. This view is also afWrmed by Hume in his own discussion of the passions, where he attributes to human beings “certain calm desires and tendencies,” which produce “little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation.” Indeed, he argues that such a disposition tends to operate as a “settled principle of action” or a “predominant inclination of the soul,” although its inXuence can be interrupted by a momentary passion (t 2.3.3.8– 2.3.4.1 [sbn 417–19]). Hume also describes the “characters and disposition” of a person as a set of tendencies in that person “that is durable or constant,” since it is made up of “durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct” (t 2.3.2.6, 3.3.1.4 [sbn 411, 575]). Price describes this theory of affective dispositions, which Hume appears to presuppose in his later discussion, as an “introspective naive realism,” corresponding to the perceptual naive realism of the vulgar, and suggests that Hume can also account for our belief in latent affective traits on the basis of his analysis of our idea of continued
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existence.15 However, Price’s suggestion that this application of Hume’s theory must also entail the distinct existence of the passions seems less plausible, since an affective disposition would presumably have a continued existence within the mind, and not apart from it.16 Indeed, Hume’s analysis of the passions calls attention to an interesting problem in his account of external existence, which is his failure to explain the concept of “distinct existence.” As we have seen, Hume argues that our idea of the “existence of body” consists in the ideas of continued, external, and independent existence, with the second and third together comprising the idea of distinct existence. That is, we regard something with an independent external existence as distinct “from the mind and perception” (t 1.4.2.2 [sbn 188]). However, Hume also recognizes that we often attribute a continued and independent, although not an external, existence to many of our sensations (such as tastes, smells, and sounds), and a continued, but not an independent or external, existence to some of our impressions of reXection (for example, to our calm passions or dispositions).17 In other words, although we attribute a continued existence to many impressions apart from those which we regard as distributed in space, we attribute external existence only to impressions of color and touch, through a process which Hume has indeed already considered in his account of our idea of extension. Accordingly, it would seem that in Part 4, Hume is actually presenting an account of our idea of the continued existence, and perhaps also the independent existence, of any entity, which might be either mental or corporeal; while his account of our idea of external or corporeal existence is instead presented in Part 2. Hume appears to recognize this later in Part 4, in noting that the imagination cannot attribute spatiality to any perceptions “except those of the sight and feeling” (t 1.4.5.10 [sbn 235–36]; cf. ehu 12.15 [sbn 154]). Indeed, Hume surreptitiously replaces his analysis of externality in Part 4 with an account of the independence of body, thereby abandoning any more speciWc discussion of spatiality, at least in this context (t 1.4.2.4–5, 1.4.2.9–10 [sbn 189, 191]). Finally, as Hume himself indicates, any account of our belief in external existence, even in the external existence of the objects of sight and touch, must include an account of the self to which these objects 15. Hume’s account of the enduring existence of affective mental dispositions might also be applied to our cognitive abilities, such as reason and the imagination, when we regard these as faculties that have a continued existence even when we are not using them (cf. t 1.4.2.2, 1.4.2.32–35 [sbn 188, 202–4]). 16. See Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 27–29 and 69–70; cf. 19–20. For further views of the status of mental dispositions in Hume’s philosophy, see Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 46–58; Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 296–300; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 170–71; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 36; and Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 157–93. 17. We can apparently imagine that a passion could have an independent as well as a continued existence, if a passion can be imagined as intruding itself from outside into the conscious life of an individual, for example in certain types of alleged psychic abilities. However, we need not require Hume to consider this possibility, since it does not belong to our everyday understanding of the passions.
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are exterior. This requires either an account of the mind, which Hume has not yet provided, or an account of the idea of our own body, which must apparently be explained in the same terms as our idea of any other corporeal object (t 1.4.2.4–10 [sbn 189–91]).18 With this consideration of the problem of independence and externality we may now turn to the central concern of Hume’s discussion: his account of our idea of the continued existence of objects. First, Hume argues that in many of our attributions of continued existence to objects we are guided by a “peculiar constancy” among our impressions, whenever these present themselves “in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruptions in my seeing or perceiving them.” As examples of constancy, or of exact resemblance among the perceptions in an interrupted series, we may consider “these mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye,” along with “my bed and table, my books and papers,” which “when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after Wnd them return upon me without the least alteration” (t 1.4.2.18 [sbn 195–96]). As we will see, this exact resemblance between our interrupted perceptions leads us to regard these perceptions as “individually the same,” even though they are different from each other, and to further suppose the continued existence of these perceptions even when we do not perceive them (t 1.4.2.24 [sbn 199]). Second, we often attribute a continued existence to objects on the basis of a series of perceptions that do not exactly resemble each other. In these cases Hume Wnds that the changes in the series of perceptions “preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other,” providing the foundation for “a kind of reasoning from causation” which also produces the idea of continued existence. In his example, my visual impressions of the merry blaze in my Wreplace might be very different after I have been away from the room for an hour. However, I attribute a continued existence to the Wre because I remember a certain sequence of changing perceptions during an interval of time similar to the one that elapsed while I was away (t 1.4.2.19 [sbn 195]). This recognition 18. Pears also objects to Hume’s account of distinct existence, though for different reasons. According to Pears, Hume mistakenly attributes to the vulgar the view that “the object of his perception” has a continued and independent existence, but not an existence in physical space. This interpretation can be criticized on several grounds. First, Hume includes externality in our idea of distinct existence, and also argues that the vulgar believe that their perceptions exist as objects in space: or externally, as well as independently from the mind. Next, while Pear asserts that the vulgar, according to Hume, do not ask themselves whether their “objects” are physical or mental, Hume evidently maintains that the vulgar do indeed identify a subset of their perceptions with physical objects, and do not regard these perceptions as mind-dependent entities (t 1.4.2.12–13, 1.4.2.31, 1.4.2.36, 1.4.2.40–41 [sbn 192–93, 202, 205, 207–9]). Hume thus is not committed to the view that the idea of external existence entails belief in the double existence of perceptions and objects. Instead, on his view, the vulgar believe in the external existence of certain perceptions as external objects, but not in the double existence of perceptions and objects. See Pears, Hume’s System, 155–67.
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of a coherence among our perceptions, arising from our projection of a remembered causal sequence onto an interrupted series of perceptions, enables us to form an idea of, and belief in, a changing world as the cause of our individual impressions. This allows me to account for the movement of a messenger through the door and into the room behind me, and for the arrival of a letter written to me by a friend in a foreign country and delivered by means of “posts and ferries.” We are thus led to suppose “the effects and continu’d existence” of objects according to our “memory and observation,” and to “connect their past and present appearances” according to the changes we have found by experience “to be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances.” As a result, we regard the world “as something real and durable,” which continues to exist even when not present to our senses (t 1.4.2.20 [sbn 195–97]; cf. ehu 12.7–8 [sbn 151–52]). Hume argues that the imagination produces our idea of the continued existence of external objects by generating a “supposition” or “Wction,” which extends our idea of an object beyond our immediate perceptions (t 1.4.2.29, 1.4.2.36, 1.4.2.43 [sbn 200–201, 205, 209]). He presents this supposition as another product of the inertial propensity of the imagination, whose activity he has traced in our idea of an exact standard of equality in geometry (t 1.4.2.22; cf. 1.2.4.23–26 [sbn 198; cf. 47–49]). In attributing external existence to a constant series of interrupted perceptions, the mind is attempting to resolve a conXict between their exact resemblance, which gives us an idea of their perfect identity, and the real difference between them that arises from their interruption. To overcome this conXict, the imagination disguises the interruption by supposing its perceptions to be connected by “a real existence, of which we are insensible.” Similarly, in observing a coherent series of changes in an interrupted series of perceptions, we discover that this coherence is “much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have a continu’d existence” (t 1.4.2.22–24 [sbn 198–99]). This supposition of a continued existence acquires the character of a “belief” through the combined forcefulness of the individual impressions of sensation, enhanced by the lively satisfaction we receive from uniting our “broken impressions.” Finally, once we have developed the propensity to attribute a continuing existence to a series of impressions, we tend to ascribe persistence to similar sequences of perceptions, even before we have had a comparable experience of their constancy or coherence. In these cases the resemblance we discover between various constant and coherent sequences among our perceptions become “a source of reasoning and analogy,” which enables us to attribute “the same qualities to the similar objects” (t 1.4.2.24, 1.4.2.42 [sbn 199, 208–9]). In sum, the constancy or coherence we discover among our successive impressions arouses the inertial “propension” of the imagination and leads it to
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generate a “Wction” by which we regard these sequences of impressions as objects that continue to exist even when the series is interrupted (t 1.4.2.36 [sbn 205]).19 Finally, Hume adds that our belief in the “distinct or independent existence” of objects apart from the mind is a “necessary consequence” of our belief in their continued existence. In his own words, this belief appears “wherever the mind follows its Wrst and most natural tendency,” even though “the doctrine of the independent existence of our sensible perceptions is contrary to the plainest experience” (t 1.4.2.44 [sbn 210]). Here he is echoing his initial assertion that the continued and the distinct existence of objects will mutually entail each other. However, he now apparently reduces “distinct” to “independent” existence, thereby implicitly conceding, as I have suggested, that he has not speciWcally explained our idea of external or spatial existence in Part 4 (t 1.4.2.2; cf. 1.4.5.10 [sbn 188; cf. 235–36]). We may now return to Hume’s general account of our idea of existence. As we have seen, Hume suggests that the idea of existence in the strict sense, or what I have called the absolute idea of existence, is derived from the existence of our perceptions, which, however, cannot be compared to any nonexistent perceptions. He then argues that we can only form a “relative idea” of the existence of external objects, or of objects “suppos’d speciWcally different from our perceptions,” when we “attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations” than we attribute to perceptions themselves (t 1.2.6.9 [sbn 68]). In Part 4 he shows that this “relative idea” of external existence arises from the imagination, which attributes durations and connections to our perceptions by supposing that they continue to exist when they are not perceived, or by supposing that they are connected to unperceived impressions. Through these propensities, the imagination produces our idea of an external object and our belief in its existence. Once we have formulated the relative idea of an external object, Hume indicates that we may also develop the idea of a nonexistent external object, or an object that does not have the appropriate set of connections to the objects we believe to exist, as well as the idea of an unobserved object. We may formulate the idea of a nonexistent object in two ways. First, the idea of a nonexistent object may be a deliberate product of the creative fancy, in which case it is not an object of belief. Second, the idea of a nonexistent object may be an extrapolation from a series of impressions that, upon a more careful or a complete survey, does not display a very compelling constancy or coherence, in which case we regard our initial belief in the object as mistaken. In cases of the latter type, 19. Price has proposed a more streamlined version of Hume’s argument by suggesting that constancy and coherence are both types of “gap-indifference,” with constancy as the limiting case of coherence; see Hume’s Theory of the External World, 37–38 and 59–71.
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in which we mistakenly believe in the existence of some particular external object, we have allowed our imagination to be guided by our hasty judgments of the causal relations between our perceptions: judgments which we may correct by appealing to the philosophical principles of causal reasoning. In other words, Hume argues that we may draw inferences from “the coherence of our perceptions,” to distinguish, for example, between those impressions conjured by poetry or madness, and those which we should regard as real objects, by relying upon “reXection and general rules” (t 1.3.5.2, 1.3.10.11 [sbn 84, 631]). According to Hume’s analysis, we thus rely on causal reasoning, not only to attribute external existence to a changing series of impressions, but also to distinguish those sequences of perceptions we identify as external objects from those sequences we regard as Wctions or illusions (cf. t 1.2.6.9, 1.4.2.45, 1.3.10.11–12 [sbn 68, 210–11, 632]). Similarly, we can account for our idea of and our belief in an unobserved object, such as an object distant in space or remote in time, as a further supposition produced by the imagination, under the guidance of analogy and causal reasoning, to explain a set of present perceptions (t 1.3.9.4 [sbn 108]).20 Hume argues that causal reasoning cannot be the source of our idea of external existence, since we cannot perceive any cause of our perceptions that is separate from our perceptions (t 1.4.2.21 [sbn 197–98]). However, we rely upon the habit of causal reasoning in order to form the idea of any particular changing object, to distinguish a real object from an illusion, and to posit the existence of unobserved objects. Hume is accordingly referring to external existence, or the relative idea of existence, when he claims that “whatever is may not be,” and when he asserts that the existence of a being “can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect” which are “founded entirely on experience” (ehu 12.29 [sbn 164]; cf. dnr 11.189). Hume concludes that this activity of the imagination in producing a “supposition” or a Wction is the source of our common or vulgar idea of separate and enduring objects, which “are seen, and felt, and become present to the mind,” and are considered to be “sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential change” (t 1.4.2.40 [sbn 207–8]; cf. ehu 12.8 [sbn 151–52]). However, he argues that this opinion of the continued and distinct existence of our perceptions as external objects is shown by “a very little reXection and philosophy” to be false (t 1.4.2.44 [sbn 210]). These arguments have led philosophers develop a distinction between perceptions and objects: a distinction which Hume examines at the end of his discussion, and which I will consider in Chapter 5. 20. See Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 164–75 and 216, and Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 41–70.
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In concluding this section I would like to examine two key principles in Hume’s account of our idea of external existence: the concept of identity, and the concept of a Wction. Hume introduces the concept of identity in Part 2 as a philosophical relation that we Wrst ascribe, “in its strictest sense,” to “constant and unchangeable objects,” and then also, in a derivative sense, “to every being, whose existence has any duration” (t 1.1.5.4 [sbn 14]). He further includes identity among those relations of fact immediately given to the senses (t 1.3.2.1–2 [sbn 73–74]). In Part 4 he offers a more detailed analysis of the concept of identity, as a relation that we attribute to external objects and our own mind. He initially argues that a single object or perception can give rise only to an idea of “unity,” and rejects the use of the word “identity” for the supposed relation of an object to itself, since the alleged proposition that “an object is the same with itself” does not include a distinct subject and predicate, and would accordingly “mean nothing.” On the other hand, we cannot derive the concept of identity from a “multiplicity” of objects, since the mind regards each object as a separate individual. The concept of identity therefore cannot be derived either from one perception or object, or from a collection of these (t 1.4.2.26–27; cf. 1.4.6.6 [sbn 200; cf. 253–54]). In order to account for our idea of identity, and its relation to both unity and number, Hume returns to his account of time. As we have seen, in Part 2 Hume argues that the concept of duration is derived from a changing succession of perceptions, and then attributed to unchanging objects by a “Wction of the imagination.” He now suggests that this Wction, when applied to an uninterrupted sequence of unchanging objects, produces the concept of identity, in which we regard a number of distinct momentary perceptions as a single object enduring through time. In our attributions of identity we accordingly judge, in effect, that “the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent in another.” In other words, identity is “a medium betwixt unity and number,” or more properly “either of them, according to the view, in which we take it,” since in our attributions of identity we regard a multiplicity of perceptions as forming a unity through a “suppos’d variation of time” (t 1.4.2.29–30 [sbn 200–201]). Hume argues that we may attribute identity “in its strictest sense,” or “perfect identity,” only to “constant and unchangeable objects,” or in other words, to a perception enduring through time without an interruption or a change. This would presumably be an uninterrupted view of an unchanging object (t 1.1.5.4, 1.4.2.33; cf. 1.4.6.6 [sbn 14, 203; cf. 254]). However, we also have the propensity to ascribe identity to an interrupted succession of exactly resembling perceptions, and even to successive perceptions that do not resemble each other very closely but are regularly conjoined in certain ways. In other words,
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the imagination continues the same “smooth and uninterrupted progress” when it recognizes “a succession of related objects” as in considering “the same invariable object,” and tends to confuse “the succession with the identity” (t 1.4.2.34 [sbn 203–4]). He accordingly states that all the objects “to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness” consist in a succession of perceptions that are related to each other by “resemblance, contiguity, or causation” (t 1.4.6.7 [sbn 255]).21 This type of identity, which we attribute to objects from an interrupted series of resembling perceptions, or a coherent series of changing perceptions, may be called “imperfect” identity (t 1.4.6.9 [sbn 256]). Finally, Hume considers the principles by which we attribute this “imperfect” identity to changing objects. First, we generally attribute a continued identity to any “mass of matter” after a very small part has been added or removed, usually distinguishing a small change from a change in the identity of an object “by its proportion to the whole.” Thus, in his examples, “the addition or diminution of a mountain wou’d not be sufWcient to produce a diversity in a planet,” although a change in “a very few inches wou’d be able to destroy the identity of some bodies.” Next, we regard a “mutual dependence,” or a “reciprocal relation of cause and effect,” within a series of perceptions, even in their “actions and operations,” as grounds for attributing identity. This is especially apparent in the case of organic bodies, which we regard as maintaining their identity through a series of changes even while “their form, size, and substance” are “entirely alter’d,” and even when the body does not preserve “one particle of matter, or Wgure of its parts the same.” Finally, we may also regard the human ability to direct each in a series of changing objects toward a “common end or purpose” as a basis for attributing identity to a sequence of perceptions as a single object. This is evident, for example, in the case of “a ship, of which a considerable part has been chang’d by frequent reparations.” Indeed, Hume Wnds that many attributions of identity are determined by human artiWces or conventions as these apply to a causal sequence. This appears, for example, when we say, after an old brick church has fallen into ruin, that “the parish rebuilt the same church of free-stone, and according to modern architecture,” even though “neither the form nor materials are the same, nor is there any thing common to the two objects, but their relation to the inhabitants of the parish.” We may even consider a “republic or commonwealth” to maintain its identity through all of the “incessant change of its parts,” including not only
21. Price has argued that, on Hume’s account, even the identity of a supposedly unchanging and uninterrupted object arises from our attribution of duration to a series of spatial minima and/or temporal minima: see his Hume’s Theory of the External World, 46–50, and also Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 203–7.
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new generations of inhabitants, but also changes in its “laws and constitutions” (t 1.4.6.9–13, 1.4.6.19 [sbn 255–58, 261]).22 In cases of very close resemblance and very familiar causal relations in a sequence of perceptions, Hume argues that the constitutive activity of the imagination “almost universally takes place,” producing a spontaneous agreement among human observers in our judgments of identity (t 1.4.2.29 [sbn 201]). In other cases our attributions of identity require a more specialized experience with similar objects, and judgments drawn through philosophical probable reasoning concerning the regular sequence of changes in this type of object under various conditions. In other words, an Indian prince would not judge a pool of ice to be identical to a pool of water without experience of the tendency of water to freeze in cold temperatures (cf. ehu 10.10 [sbn 113–14]). Finally, in attributing identity to objects on the basis of human purposes, or human conventions, we must apply the standards of identity that are implicitly recognized for that type of object within the life of a community, or even explicitly prescribed by an institution, as in the case of a ship or a parish church. However, Hume observes that we do not always have a precise standard in every case for determining the identity of the object through every possible change; and for this reason he concludes that many of our disputes over the identity of an object might seem to be “merely verbal,” although the parties in these disputes appeal to the philosophical concept of identity insofar as “the relation of parts gives rise to some Wction or imaginary principle of union” (t 1.4.6.21; cf. 1.4.6.7 [sbn 262; cf. 255]).23 Hume thus indicates that we may develop standards for attributing identity to certain types of objects according to our philosophical or scientiWc principles of probable reasoning, and in some cases according to the social conventions that govern the attribution of identity to certain types of objects (cf. 1.3.10.11–12 [sbn 631]). That is, we appeal to the philosophical principles of probable reasoning to distinguish those products of the imagination which are “permanent, irresistible, and universal” from those which are “changeable, weak, and irregular,” or the “trivial suggestions of the fancy” from the “general and more establish’d properties of the imagination” that we call the “understanding” (t 1.4.4.1, 1.4.7.7 [sbn 225, 267]). Our concept of identity is, therefore, a construction of the imagination, which we may judge to be applicable to an object in any given case according to the standards of critical reXection provided by Hume in his account of probable reasoning and his later discussion 22. See Noxon, “Senses of Identity,” 367–84, and Ashley and Stack, “Hume’s Theory of the Self and its Identity,” 239–54. 23. On the linguistic and philosophical aspects of Hume’s account of identity, see Penelhum, “Hume on Personal Identity,” 213–39; Robison, “In Defense of Hume’s Appendix,” 89–99; and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 324n22. See also Henze, “Linguistic Aspect of Hume’s Method,” 121.
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of the conventional standards for various types of judgment in social and political life.24 Hume introduces the concept of a Wction in Book 1, Part 2, where he observes that our ideas “always represent the objects or impressions, from which they are deriv’d, and can never without a Wction represent or be apply’d to any other.” His example in this context is the idea of duration, which arises from a series of changing perceptions but is also applied to unchanging objects (t 1.2.3.11; cf. 1.2.5.29 [sbn 37; cf. 65]). We also apply a Wctitious extension to distances between objects, even though this distance is not Wlled with visible or tangible objects (t 1.2.5.23 [sbn 62]). Our supposed idea of a standard of equality in geometry is also “a mere Wction of the mind,” along with our supposed ideas of precise colors or musical notes, by which we suppose that we can judge “an exact comparison and equality beyond the judgments of the senses” (t 1.2.4.24 [sbn 48–49]). In Part 4 Hume again argues that we can apply the idea of time to an unchanging object “only by a Wction of the imagination” (t 1.4.2.29 [sbn 200– 201]). He also describes our idea of an object when it does not appear to the senses as the “Wction of a continu’d existence” (t 1.4.2.36; cf. 1.4.2.42, 1.4.6.6–7 [sbn 205; cf. 209, 254–55]). In other words, the idea of continued existence is a Wction produced by the imagination in order to unite a series of related but interrupted perceptions. As we will see, the identity of the mind is also a “Wctitious” identity, which is produced by the imagination in order to unite our remembered perceptions as a subjective succession (t 1.4.6.15; cf. 1.4.6.21 [sbn 259; cf. 262]). Many commentators have regarded Hume’s account of Wctions as a skeptical, dismissive, or despairing conclusion to his analyses of space, time, external existence, and personal identity. This is reXected, for example, in Bennett’s statement that, according to Hume, the vulgar belief in external objects is merely “another worthless Wction.”25 Other studies have suggested that Hume intends to present a more positive view of Wctions, as the principles by which the imagination constructs both the physical and the mental world, and even the social world with its “Wctional” artiWces and conventions, which we will consider in later chapters.26 Hume himself presents a multileveled approach to the question of whether and in what sense the Wction of external existence is justiWed as a principle of 24. For further discussions of Hume’s view of the relative justiWcation of our judgments of identity, see Price, Hume’s Theory of the External World, 139–40, 144, 160–64, and 215–17; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 119–21; and Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 214–15. 25. Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 349. 26. See Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 90–98; Sokolowski, “Fiction and Illusion,” 189–225; Traiger, “Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions,” 381–99; and Baier, “Hume’s Account of Social ArtiWce,” 757–78. See also Whelan, Order and ArtiWce, 17, 58, 98–101, 131–34, and 308–9, and Strawson, Secret Connexion, 49–67.
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cognition. First, he repeatedly states that this Wction is “really false,” and that we can only extend an idea beyond our immediate perceptions by an “error” or “mistake” of the imagination (t 1.4.2.43–44, 1.4.6.6–7 [sbn 209–10, 254– 55]). He reafWrms this assessment in considering the skeptical implications of his analysis, which we will consider in Chapter 5. However, Hume also maintains that these Wctions are “very natural” and “almost universally take place,” leading Kemp Smith and others to describe them as spontaneous, unreXective, and unavoidable “natural beliefs” (t 1.2.4.24, 1.4.2.29 [sbn 48, 201]).27 On the other hand, although any attribution of external existence involves a Wction of the imagination, Hume argues that we may distinguish dreams, hallucinations, and poetic images from the objects of sensation and memory. In other words, we may apply the standards of causal reasoning in order to judge which of these apparent external objects possess “truth and reality” (t 1.3.10.6 [sbn 121–22]; cf. 1.3.5.4, 1.3.10.10–12 [sbn 85, 630–32]; ehu 5.10–13 [sbn 47–50]). Accordingly, when we judge the spatial and temporal location of objects, their identity through time, and even the identity of a human person, we are guided not merely by the promptings of the imagination, but also by the philosophical or scientiWc principles of causal reasoning. In this respect Hume regards the Wctions of space and time, external existence, and personal identity not merely as unavoidable and nonrational beliefs arising from the imagination, but also as principles of judgment whose application in every individual case is subject to critical evaluation and correction. Finally, several critics have objected to Hume’s account of Wctions by arguing that Hume cannot account for the idea of a Wction within his “copy theory” of ideas. For example, Williams has criticized Hume’s account of Wctions as a departure from the copy theory, while Traiger has instead suggested that “what is commonly called Hume’s theory of impressions and ideas ought to be called the theory of impressions, ideas, and Wctions.”28 However, I would argue that, on Hume’s view, the idea of a Wction is the idea of that propensity of the imagination by which we attribute extension to an empty distance, duration to unchanging objects, continued existence to an interrupted series of perceptions, and the unity of belonging to a single mind to a series of perceptions. On this view, the derivation of the idea of a Wction is parallel to the derivation of the idea of a necessary connection between a cause and its effect. According to Hume, the idea of a necessary connection is derived from an impression of necessity, which is itself a disposition of the mind, arising in this case from a custom or habit produced by repeated observations. We then project our idea of this necessity onto sets of objects or sequences of events, which we regard as 27. Kemp Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, 124–27, 454–58, and 485–87. 28. Williams, “Hume’s Criterion of SigniWcance,” 290–91; Traiger, “Impressions, Ideas, and Fictions,” 381. See also Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 261.
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necessarily connected to one another (t 1.3.14.22 [sbn 165–66]). Similarly, our idea of a Wction, such as the Wction of external existence, is an idea of the felt propensity of the mind to posit a series of unperceived perceptions, or an unperceived object, to connect our perceptions. Here again, the idea arises from the disposition of the mind to project the products of the imagination outward, and to suppose, in this case, the independent existence of a series of perceptions which we then call the object.29 This view is reXected in Hume’s assertions that we have “no idea” of space, time, external objects, or the self, if these are supposed to arise from any positive image derived from any particular impression (cf. t 1.2.3.16, 1.2.5.28, 1.4.5.6, 1.4.6.1–2 [sbn 39, 64, 234, 251–52]). However, we may form relative ideas of various arrangements of our perceptions, as these arrangements are projected beyond our perceptions by the imagination.30
personal identity In Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise Hume also presents an account of our idea of the mind or self. He returns to the topic of personal identity in the Appendix, where he appears to direct a searching criticism against his earlier analysis, although the precise nature and extent of his later reservations are matters of considerable controversy. In the course of his discussion, Hume distinguishes between the analysis of personal identity “as it regards our thought or imagination,” and personal identity as it pertains to “our passions or the concern we take in ourselves.” He addresses the Wrst question in Book 1, while apparently deferring his discussion of “our identity with regard to the passions” to Book 2 (t 1.4.6.5, cf. 1.4.6.19 [sbn 253; cf. 261]). I will consider Hume’s account of the self as an object of our thought and imagination in the remainder of this chapter, and his account of the self as the subject of passion and volition in Chapters 6 and 7.31 Hume introduces his analysis by rejecting the view that we can receive any impression of the self through our senses, or indeed that the senses “can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects.” On the contrary, the question of personal identity is among the most abstruse in philosophy, and can only be addressed through “the most profound metaphysics” (t 1.4.2.6 [sbn 189–90]). He then anticipates his later argument that “what we call a mind, is 29. See Wilbanks, Hume’s Theory of Imagination, 80–84, and Wright, Sceptical Realism, 106–7. 30. See Flage, “Hume’s Relative Ideas,” 65. 31. For additional discussions, see Penelhum, “Hume on Personal Identity,” 571–89; Noxon, “Senses of Identity,” 367–84; Ashley and Stack, “Hume’s Theory of the Self and Identity,” 239–54; Vesey, Personal Identity; Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind; Pears, Hume’s System, 120–51; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 122–28; Biro, “Hume’s New Science of the Mind,” 47–58; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 203–37; Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 285–310; and Stevenson, “Humean Self-Consciousness Explained,” 95–129.
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nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions” which are “united together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Finally, external objects are said to become “present to the mind” when they attain “such a relation to a connected heap of perceptions,” as to inXuence these perceptions “very considerably in augmenting their number by present reXections and passions, and in storing the memory with ideas” (t 1.4.2.39–40 [sbn 207]).32 Next, Hume responds to those philosophers who “pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds,” and that we cannot account for our perceptions without some “material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere.”33 Here he reafWrms his earlier argument that we have no impression or idea of a substance apart from our perceptions nor of either a material or an immaterial substance in which these perceptions are supposed to inhere. However, he also adds that we may describe perceptions themselves as substances, according to the deWnition of a substance as “something which may exist by itself,” since perceptions are “distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence” (t 1.4.5.2–5 [sbn 232– 34]; cf. 1.1.6.1–2 [sbn 15–16]; e is.591–92). In presenting his constructive account of our idea of personal identity in Section 6, Hume begins by rejecting the popular belief among philosophers that “we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.” On the contrary, he claims on the basis of introspection that we cannot Wnd any single, constant, and invariable impression of a self among our perceptions; and thus do not have “any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain’d.” Instead, he reports that “when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other,” such as “heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,” and can never catch “myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any thing but the perception.” Accordingly, while a few metaphysicians might claim to discover a separate impression of themselves, he ventures to afWrm for himself and the rest of the human species that we are each of us “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, 32. Waxman has indeed argued that Hume’s account of personal identity is a necessary presupposition for his complete account of external existence, although this is obscured by his order of presentation in the Treatise; see Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 238–44. 33. McIntyre and Russell both argue that the most immediate target of Hume’s criticism of the view of the soul as an immaterial substance is Samuel Clarke. See McIntyre, “Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences,” 3–18, and Russell, “Hume’s Treatise and the Clarke-Collins Controversy,” 95–115.
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and are in a perpetual Xux and movement.” In order to account for the idea of the self, we must therefore explain our propensity “to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our lives” (t 1.4.6.1–5 [sbn 251–53]). Hume’s main focus in his discussion of personal identity, both in the original text and in the Appendix, is upon the idea of the mind. As indicated above, he argues that the mind consists entirely in a sequence of perceptions that are distinguishable and separable from each other. Since we cannot discover any “real bond” or “real connexion” between our perceptions, he argues that it is the imagination which attributes identity to the mind, based on the relations of resemblance and causation that we discover within this sequence of perceptions (t 1.4.6.16 [sbn 259–60]).34 However, Hume’s account of the inXuence of these relations on this activity of the imagination is rather obscure, and indeed he himself appears to have become dissatisWed with his own analysis, judging by his reconsiderations in the Appendix. In the original text of Section 6 Hume Wrst argues that our memory-images resemble our past perceptions, and that “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions” in our train of thought conveys the imagination from one to the other, giving the entire sequence the appearance of identity. While we are only able to discover these resemblances among our own perceptions, he argues that we would also recognize these resemblances if we could “see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle.”35 Next, he reminds us of his earlier argument that “impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas, and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions,” in what we regard as a series of causal relations. Accordingly, “the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions” which are “link’d together by the relation of cause and effect.” Finally, memory is the faculty that discloses both the succession of our perceptions and the relations of resemblance and causation between them. Hume therefore maintains that memory “not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production,” and should thus be regarded as the “source of personal identity” (t 1.4.6.18–20 [sbn 260–62]). 34. Hume excludes contiguity from his account of mental identity as having “little or no inXuence in the present case” (t 1.4.6.17 [sbn 260]). Waxman has accordingly noted that the spatial contiguity of perceptions seems irrelevant to Hume’s account of the identity of the mind: see Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 228. However, since the natural relation of contiguity includes both spatial and temporal contiguity (t 1.1.4.1 [sbn 11]), we may still ask why Hume does not consider the possible inXuence of the temporal contiguity of perceptions in contributing to the identity of the mind, especially given the importance of memory in his theory. This application of the principle of temporal association might indeed have anticipated Kant’s account of time as the form of inner sense, including empirical self-consciousness. 35. See Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 85–91, and Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 326n29.
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Hume accordingly maintains that the identity we ascribe to the mind is “only a Wctitious one.” The imagination initially applies this identity to a given series of changing perceptions (t 1.4.6.15 [sbn 259]). However, to disguise any interruptions in this series of perceptions, we then extend this Wction by supposing the existence “of a soul, and self, and substance,” which is supposed to be endowed with a “perfect identity and simplicity” (t 1.4.6.6, 1.4.6.1; cf. 1.4.6.22 [sbn 254, 251; cf. 263]). This supposition is reXected especially in the doctrine of the soul as an immaterial substance, which Hume has already criticized in Section 5. By contrast, he maintains that our successive perceptions alone “compose” or “constitute the mind,” and that apart from these perceptions we have no idea “of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos’d” (t App.20, 1.4.6.4 [sbn 635, 253]; cf. A 28 [sbn 657–58]; dnr 2.146, 4.158–59). However, this concept of the mind, as a system of perceptions disclosed by memory, does not yet give us our complete idea of personal identity. Although we derive the idea of our identity from our remembered perceptions, we also extend this idea to include “the identity of our persons beyond our memory.” Indeed, we regard this extension as including the greater part of our lives. In order to account for this extended concept of personal identity, Hume argues that once we have developed an idea of our mind from the memory of our successive perceptions, we continue to trace “the same chain of causes” beyond the direct reach of our memory. This allows us to project the “identity of our persons” through many other “times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed.” In other words, we suppose our continuing identity, during those intervals of time which we do not remember, through causal reasoning, by which we judge that we were probably present during various past events which we judge to have occurred from the evidence now available to us. In this extension of our idea of personal identity, Hume concludes that memory accompanied by causal reasoning “does not so much produce as discover personal identity” (t 1.4.6.20 [sbn 261–62]). We may also ask whether Hume includes the idea that we each have of our own bodies in his account of personal identity. One response to this question is suggested by Ayer’s statement that Hume “equates personal identity with the identity of the mind, and deWnes this without any reference to the body.”36 In Book 2 of the Treatise, Hume alludes to the discussion among his predecessors over whether the body should be regarded “as a part of ourselves” or “as something external” (t 2.1.8.1 [sbn 298]). He presents his own view earlier in Book 1, Part 4, by arguing that although we might expect to discover through the 36. Ayer, Hume, 51. See also Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 92–94; Flew, David Hume, 3–5 and 90–108; and Pears, Hume’s System, 121, 129–34, and 145–49.
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senses that “our own body evidently belongs to us,” and that many other objects are “exterior to the body,” we discover upon a more careful consideration that “properly speaking, ’tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses.” Our idea of our own body is an idea of an object which we perceive through our senses, and must be explained in the same way as our idea of any other external object (t 1.4.2.9 [sbn 190–91]). This body, which we regard as a corporeal object through sensation, causal reasoning, and imaginative supposition, presumably provides a further ground for the attribution of personal identity. This is because we suppose that the body continues to exist during an interval of publicly measured time, through the interruptions of our perception and memory, as in sleep or other periods of unconsciousness. We are also led by causal reasoning to attribute a series of changes to this body, such as its development from infancy to maturity (t 1.4.6.20, 1.4.6.3, 1.4.6.12 [sbn 261–62, 252, 257]). Hume also considers the problem of the apparent interaction between the mind and body. In Section 5 he endorses the view that thought and extension are “wholly incompatible, and never can incorporate together into one subject.” More speciWcally, thought can never exist in a “local conjunction” with extension, since thought is not given to us as distributed in space. Accordingly, he rejects the view of “materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension” (t 1.4.5.7, 1.4.5.11–15 [sbn 234–35, 236–39]). On the other hand, we also discover, through observation and causal inference, that various types of impressions are conveyed to the mind by the organs of our body, that our capacity to receive impressions is inXuenced by the condition of the body, and that it is interrupted by sleep and terminated by death (t 1.4.2.12, 1.4.2.45, 1.4.5.12, 1.4.6.3 [sbn 192, 210–11, 237, 252]; e is.596–98). In addition, we discover constant conjunctions between our perceptions and the movements of objects, and also between our thoughts and the movement of our own bodies. Hume argues that these constant conjunctions are the necessary and sufWcient conditions for afWrming both the possibility and the actuality of a causal interaction between thought and matter, as in the case of any other causal connection, even if we cannot explain this conjunction at any deeper level. In other words, although “thought and motion are different from each other,” we also Wnd that they are “constantly united,” and may conclude “that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception,” (t 1.4.5.30 [sbn 248]). Through our experience of their constant conjunction, we also Wnd that thought and volition may be the causes of physical action, as we will see at greater length in Chapter 7 (t 1.4.5.30, 2.3.1.1–4 [sbn 248, 399–401]; ehu 8.1–36, 12.29n35 [sbn 80–103, 164n1]; dnr 4.160).37 37. For a further discussion of this argument, see Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 25–45, and Cummins, “Hume as Dualist and Anti-Dualist,” 47–55.
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Hume therefore provides us with the materials for regarding our idea of our own bodies as a product of the imagination, which is produced in the same way as our idea of any other external object. However, he also indicates that we discover, through causal reasoning, that this body has a distinctive relation to the remembered succession of perceptions which constitutes our mind. In particular, we Wnd that our sensations arise from the organs of the body, and that our volitions can cause various actions of the body.38 Hume returns to this discussion in Book 2, in which he considers our ideas of the various qualities of our minds and bodies, along with our experience and our conception of voluntary action. Hume’s reXections concerning personal identity in the Appendix have been regarded by many commentators as a retraction of his analysis of personal identity in the original text of the Treatise.39 However, while his later reXections are perhaps even more obscure than his original account of the relations between our perceptions, Hume’s departure in the Appendix from his earlier discussion may be less extreme than suggested by many of his critics. In the original text Hume assures his readers that “the intellectual world,” or the mind, “tho’ involv’d in inWnite obscurities, is not perplex’d with any such contradictions, as those we have discover’d in the natural,” in considering our idea of external existence (t 1.4.5.1 [sbn 232]). However, in the Appendix he admits that “upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity,” he Wnds himself “involv’d in such a labyrinth” that he doubts his ability to defend a consistent position. While he reafWrms his argument against “the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being,” he now questions his earlier account of the “principle of connexion” that is supposed to bind our perceptions and give us an idea of their “real simplicity and identity.” He still maintains that “no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding,” and instead that “we only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another.” However, he is apparently dissatisWed with his failure to provide a more speciWc account of “the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness,” and is unable to offer any satisfactory theory of these principles. He is thus left with two allegedly inconsistent propositions, “that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives 38. For more on the role of the body in Hume’s account of personal identity, see Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 130–42; Frasca-Spada, Space and the Self, 194–98; Williams, Cultivated Reason, 129–66; and Stevenson, “Humean Self-Consciousness Explained,” 120–22. 39. See Pears, “Hume on Personal Identity,” 289–98, and Hume’s System, 135 and 145–47; along with Dicker, Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics, 31–32. For other assessments, see McIntyre, “Is Hume’s Self Consistent?” 79–88; Robison, “In Defense of Hume’s Appendix,” 89–100; Bricke, Hume’s Philosophy of Mind, 95–98; Swain, “Being Sure of One’s Self,” 107–19; Loeb, “Causation,” 219–31; Waxman, “Hume’s Quandary Concerning Personal Identity,” 233–53; and Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 163–86. Garrett also includes an excellent survey of various recent approaches to the interpretation of the Appendix.
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any real connexion among distinct existences” (t App.10, App.20–21 [sbn 633, 635–36]). The problem for his readers is to Wnd what he means here by a “real connexion,” and why he now regards his initial failure to give an account of this connection as a difWculty for his analysis. In his original discussion, Hume did not appeal to a strict connection between our perceptions to account for personal identity, instead presenting the relations of resemblance and causation as the “uniting principles” which lead the imagination to formulate the idea of personal identity. He even reminds us that all our judgments of causation, even those that contribute to our idea of personal identity, rest on a “customary association of ideas” rather than any “real connexion” (t 1.4.6.16 [sbn 259–60]). Hume never explains why he has come to regard the absence of any explanation of the “real connexion” between our perceptions as a difWculty for his earlier theory of mental identity. However, it seems evident that in the Appendix he is acknowledging the inadequacy of some aspect of his general theory of perceptions, including their relations according to the natural principles of association, for supporting a satisfactory theory of the mind. Several commentators have suggested that in recognizing a problem in his analysis Hume is anticipating Kant’s theory of the transcendental unity of apperception, in which we Wnd the unity of the mind to be presupposed by any activity of combining perceptions according to any principles of relation. This comparison is perhaps supported by Hume’s own indication that the “self or person” may be characterized as “that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference” (t 1.4.6.2 [sbn 251]).40 Whatever might be the precise character of the difWculty that he is attempting to address in the Appendix, it seems clear that Hume does not regard this difWculty as a threat to his larger philosophical argument in the Treatise. As we have seen, he initially hopes that his account of the mind will not be “perplex’d” with such contradictions as those in his discussion of external existence (t 1.4.5.1 [sbn 232]). While he abandons this hope in the Appendix, he also reminds his readers that this new difWculty is only another of the many “contradictions, and absurdities” which have already been “abundantly supplied” in the Treatise (t App.10 [sbn 633]). Hume is therefore cheerfully prepared to accommodate the difWculty he has discovered in his analysis of personal identity, whatever this problem might be, within his larger philosophical project. We will consider his further account of the implications of these contradictions for his philosophical project in the following chapter, where we will turn to his discussion of skepticism. 40. See Robison, “Hume on Personal Identity,” 181–93; Waxman, “Hume’s Quandary Concerning Personal Identity,” 244–45, and Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 326–27n32; and Brook, Kant and the Mind, 192–94. See also Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 169–71.
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We have thus seen that in Book 1, Part 4 Hume extends his account of the philosophical principles of probable reasoning in order to account for the standards by which we determine the distinct and continued existence of external objects, the identity of the mind, and the relation of the mind to a particular body. These judgments of identity involve an imaginative extrapolation beyond our perceptions and are therefore “false” in the strict sense, but they may also be more or less justiWed individually, according to the relations of resemblance and causation we discover between our perceptions, as directed by the rules for judging causes and effects, and in some cases by the standards of identity established in the culture and institutions of a community. In other words, Hume defends the relative legitimacy and value of our standards of identity for persons and objects, both in ordinary life and in the natural and human sciences.41 However, Hume’s analysis of external existence and personal identity, along with his further reXections concerning causal reasoning, are all presented within the larger context of his discussion of skepticism in Part 4. In order to defend the present interpretation of his analysis as a constructive account of human cognition, we must therefore turn to his discussion of the various forms of skepticism, and their relation to our everyday opinions and to various systems of philosophy.
41. Several commentators have indeed described Hume’s account of the identity and nature of physical objects as a version of critical realism that is intended to provide a justiWcation for the modern natural sciences. See especially Wright, Sceptical Realism; along with Wilson, “Was Hume a Subjectivist?” 247–82; “Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to the Senses?” 49–73; and Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 90–98. For a discussion of this view, see Livingston, “A Sellarsian Hume?” 281–90; Wilson, “Hume’s Critical Realism,” 291–96; and Winkler, “The New Hume,” 52–87.
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Skepticism
Hume’s overarching theme in Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise is his account of skepticism, which he explicitly introduces in the Wrst two sections, develops along with a consideration of different systems of philosophy in the next four sections, and completes in the seventh section. This examination of skepticism, and his Wnal characterization of his own philosophical position, is the culmination of his account “Of the understanding” in Book 1, and the point of departure for his further inquiries belonging to the moral or human sciences in Books 2 and 3. He later reafWrms these skeptical arguments in the Abstract and the Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, offers a further account of the different types of skepticism in Section 12 of the Wrst Enquiry, and introduces skepticism in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as the starting point for his examination of natural theology. Hume’s consideration of skepticism was immediately recognized as a central theme in his writings, and the skeptical implications of his philosophy were highlighted in the earliest reviews and discussions of his works.1 The subsequent interpretation of Hume’s philosophy has been dominated by discussions of the nature and extent of his skepticism. Many critics have echoed 1. See Mossner, Life of David Hume, 116–33, 225–27, 294–300, and 577–88; as well as Hume’s response to an anonymous critic in his Letter from a Gentleman (lg 3–4, 17–21).
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his earliest reviewers by regarding Hume as an extreme skeptic.2 However, an increasing number of studies have argued that Hume is presenting a version of skepticism that is not intended to subvert our reasonings in the sciences and in ordinary life, but rather to explain the principles of cognition presupposed by these reasonings, and to examine their limitations, while also considering the practical context and the purposes of human cognition.3 In this chapter I show that Hume consistently defends a moderate version of skepticism, in contrast to the alternatives of both extreme skepticism and uncritical naturalism.4 I also consider his assessment of the implications of mitigated skepticism for our investigations in the natural and human sciences.
extreme skepticism Many readers of Book 1 of the Treatise have attempted to identify skeptical arguments prior to Hume’s explicit discussion of skepticism in Part 4. However, Hume himself refers to skepticism only once in the original text of Parts 1–3. This reference appears in Part 3, where, in considering our ability to correct judgments arising from general rules by judgments according to other general rules, he notes that “the sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason” (t 1.3.13.12 [sbn 150]).5 In the introduction, where he is inviting his prospective readers to accompany him in his “metaphysical reasonings,” he even states that an aversion to metaphysics among professed scholars can arise only from “the most determin’d scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence” (t Int.3 [sbn xiv]).6 Finally, in a footnote on the Newtonian theory of space added to Part 2 in the Appendix, he remarks that nothing is more suited to Newtonian philosophy “than a modest 2. See the Introduction and Chapter 3 of this book. 3. See Norton, David Hume; Wright, Sceptical Realism; Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life and Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium; Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism; Tweyman, Scepticism and Belief; Pears, Hume’s System, vii–viii; Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 57–59 and 287–88; Penelhum, David Hume, 1–38; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 5–18 and 266–79; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 204–5 and 232–41; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 193–94; and Falkenstein, “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism,” 29–72. Note, however, that these studies do not agree in their speciWc interpretations of the relation between Hume’s skeptical arguments and his constructive philosophical or scientiWc views. 4. My approach here has been inXuenced by Livingston’s argument that Hume’s various discussions of skepticism have a dialectical structure which we may trace as an unfolding progression in his various texts: see Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 9–59, 272–84; and Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, 17–52. See also Coleman, “Hume’s Dialectic,” 139–55; Waxman, Hume’s Theory of Consciousness, 18 and 266–79; and Williams, Cultivated Reason, 21–60. 5. Hume does not explicitly describe his analysis of our idea of causation as “sceptical” until the Wrst Enquiry (sbn 4.1, 5.1 [sbn 25, 40–41]). 6. For a discussion of Hume’s strategy in his depiction of skepticism in the Introduction to the Treatise and the Conclusion of Book 1, see Cummins, “Hume’s DifWdent Skepticism,” 43–65.
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scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity” (t 1.2.5.26n12 [sbn 639]). Hume’s Wrst explicit discussion of skepticism emerges in Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise, which is entitled “Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy.” In Section 1 he considers “scepticism with regard to reason,” or the skeptical implications of his examination of probable reasoning; and in Section 2 he turns to “scepticism with regard to the senses,” or the skeptical implications of analyzing our idea of external existence. In the next three sections he considers the prevailing systems of ancient and modern philosophy, including the ancient doctrine of substance and accident, the modern doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, and modern approaches to the doctrine of the soul, and seeks to expose their unrecognized skeptical implications. Finally, he develops his own version of skepticism in the “Conclusion of this book,” where he explores the effects of these skeptical arguments in the intellectual and emotional life of a philosopher and establishes the point of departure for his further study of human nature in Books 2 and 3. Hume begins his discussion of skepticism in Part 4, Section 1, by considering the skeptical implications of his analysis of demonstrative and probable reasoning in Part 3. First, in the case of demonstrative reasoning, he argues that although the rules of mathematical reasoning may in themselves be “certain and infallible,” we Wnd through experience that in applying these rules “our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error.” We must therefore evaluate any conclusion reached through demonstrative reasoning by a further judgment of its probable accuracy, according to “our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the simplicity or intricacy of the question.” In other words, we may consider our efforts in demonstrative reasoning as “a kind of history,” and compare those occasions in which “our understanding has deceiv’d us” to others when its testimony was “just and true,” in order to identify the causal circumstances that tend to inXuence our mathematical reasonings. On the basis of this experience we may even develop procedures for improving the accuracy and assurance of our mathematical reasonings, such as “artiWcial” accounting methods, repeated calculations, and submitting our conclusions to other skilled mathematicians for checking and conWrmation. However, all of these methods can only serve to enhance the probable accuracy of our mathematical reasonings. Hume concludes that, in practice, the “knowledge” arising from demonstrative reasoning actually “resolves itself,” or “degenerates,” into probability (t 1.4.1.1–4 [sbn 180–81]). With this account of the merely probable character even of our mathematical judgments, considered as the products of human cognitive activity, Hume returns to the different degrees of assurance in our causal reasonings
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(cf. t 1.3.12.1–20 [sbn 130–55]). As a further and alarming “species of probability,” he now argues that each of our probable judgments is subject to “a new uncertainty” derived from the weakness of our faculties of judgment. In other words, from our experience in reasoning we each recognize that we have committed “many errors in the past, and must still dread the like for the future.” Hume accordingly argues that every causal judgment is subject to a further judgment concerning its probable accuracy as a particular operation of our understanding, which, even if one can ascribe it a high degree of probability, still weakens the probability of the original judgment. Next, since the second judgment is also an operation of the understanding, it is attended by a similar doubt, and requires a further judgment of its probable accuracy. This leads us to an inWnite regress, in which each judgment further diminishes the probability of the original judgment. Accordingly, Hume maintains that the force of the original evidence for any particular opinion is diminished by every successive evaluation of our own cognitive activity: a process that, by “all the rules of logic,” must eventually produce “a total extinction of belief and evidence” (t 1.4.1.5–6 [sbn 181–83]; cf. 1.4.7.7 [sbn 267–68]; ehu 12.17–23 [sbn 155–59]).7 However, if asked whether, in presenting this argument, the author is revealing himself as “one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood,” Hume answers that “neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion.” Instead, we Wnd that “nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel.” Accordingly, after one or two judgments of this diminishing probability, our cognition becomes “forc’d and unnatural,” and our assurance of this inWnite regress is weakened “in proportion to the efforts, which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning.”8 In other words, “nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable inXuence on the understanding.” By contrast, the “dogmatical” pretensions of reason, if pursued consistently, lead to an extreme skepticism that would subvert not only these dogmatic pretensions, but also the skeptical arguments arising 7. For discussions and criticisms of this argument, see Raynor, “Hume’s Scepticism,” 103–6; Imlay, “Contrasting Themes,” 121–33; Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism, 17–20; DeWitt, “Hume’s Probability Argument,” 125–36; Morris, “Hume’s Scepticism About Reason,” 39–60; Johnson, Mind of David Hume, 230–38; Dauer, “Hume’s Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” 211–29; Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 222–28; Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 242–68; and Owen, Hume’s Reason, 175–96. 8. In Part 3 Hume examines a similar argument, that a consideration of the causal chain in the transmission of historical testimony seems to diminish our belief in any historical event to the vanishing point. However, he argues that this decay of belief is counteracted by the extra vivacity generated by the resemblances between our ideas of the successive “printers and copists” whom we imagine as comprising this chain of transmission (t 1.3.13.4–6 [sbn 144–46]). See Wilson, Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 249–53; and DeWitt, “Hume’s Probability Argument,” 125–36.
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from these pretensions, as well as undermining ordinary human understanding. Fortunately, nature breaks this cycle and allows us to return to “common judgments and opinions.” Hume concludes that neither he, nor anyone else, can seriously be a member of “that fantastic sect” which supposedly defends “total scepticism.” His own purpose in developing these arguments is rather to reinforce his conclusion that all causal reasonings arise from custom, and that “belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.” In other words, “the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho’ he asserts, that he cannot defend his reason by reason” (t 1.4.1.7–1.4.2.1 [sbn 183–85]).
philosophical systems We have already considered Hume’s account of our ordinary or “vulgar” idea of external existence. In the middle of Part 4, Section 2, he offers a philosophical criticism of the popular view, and in Sections 3 and 4 he considers two contrasting theories in the history of philosophy concerning the nature and qualities of bodies. These theories are the doctrine of substance and accident in the “antient” or the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, and the “modern” theory of primary and secondary qualities. Hume argues that both of these systems arise from the same principles of the imagination as the ordinary idea of external existence, and are subject to the same and further criticisms. As we have seen, Hume argues that the vulgar tend to “confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continu’d existence to the very things they feel or see.” For them, “those very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear,” are the “true objects,” and they are not ready to believe “that this pen or paper, which is immediately perceiv’d, represents another, which is different from, but resembling it” (t 1.4.2.14, 1.4.2.31 [sbn 193, 202]; cf. ehu 12.8 [sbn 151–52]). This identiWcation of perceptions with objects, combined with the general tendency of the imagination to disguise any interruptions and changes in a series of perceptions, leads the vulgar to develop the Wction of a distinct and continued existence. This is the idea of external existence maintained by “the unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind,” which includes “all of us, at one time or another” (t 1.4.2.36 [sbn 205]). However, Hume reminds us that we may challenge this ordinary view of external existence through “a very little reXection and philosophy,” based on various experiences such as inducing double vision by pressing our eyes, or considering the effects of distance on vision. Such experiments indicate that these perceptions, which we identify as objects in our vulgar moments, are instead “dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits,”
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and do not have “any distinct or independent existence” (t 1.4.2.44–45 [sbn 210–11]; cf. t 1.4.4.3–4 [sbn 226–27]; ehu 12.6–9 [sbn 151–52]). Philosophers thus agree that “nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions,” and further, that everything which appears before the mind “is interrupted, and dependent on the mind” (t 1.2.6.7, 1.4.2.14 [sbn 67, 193]). In other words, philosophers recognize that the Wction of external existence is “really false,” and arises from an “error” or “mistake” of the imagination (t 1.4.2.43, 1.4.6.6–7 [sbn 209–10, 254–55]).9 However, although philosophers have denied the distinct and continued existence of our perceptions, they are reluctant to give up entirely the idea of continued existence. Instead, to accommodate these competing impulses toward afWrming both the dependence and the continuity of our perceptions, philosophers have developed a distinction between perceptions and objects. On this view, perceptions are “interrupted, and perishing, and different at every different return,” while objects are thought to be “uninterrupted, and to preserve a continu’d existence and identity.” These philosophers then maintain that our perceptions are caused by objects, and that perceptions resemble the objects which produce them. This philosophical theory is identiWed by Hume as the hypothesis of a “double existence of perceptions and objects” (t 1.4.2.46 [sbn 211]; cf. ehu 12.11 [sbn 152–53]). In spite of its apparently philosophical credentials, however, Hume argues on several grounds that this “new system” of double existence is “only a palliative remedy” that has “no primary recommendation, either to reason or to the imagination.” First, this theory cannot arise from sensation or causal reasoning, since we can never observe any causal relations between our perceptions and supposed but unperceived objects. Second, as a product of the imagination, the Wction of the separate object is less immediate than the ordinary supposition of the vulgar that “our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv’d” (t 1.4.2.46–48 [sbn 211–13]). Indeed, Hume argues that the theory of a double existence of perceptions and objects is ultimately derived from the ordinary or vulgar or idea of the continued existence of our perceptions, as this is generated by the imagination. As we have seen, the theory of double existence arises from the discovery by philosophers of the “dependence and interruption” of our perceptions, and the 9. Collier has argued that Hume’s skeptical conclusions regarding the conXict between the philosophical analysis of our perceptions and the propensity of our imagination in the analysis of our idea of external existence arises from Hume’s failure to recognize that the activity of the imagination is justiWed by completing a series on the basis of memory to produce the “best Wt.” However, it seems to me that the central point in Hume’s analysis, whether compelling or not, is that any theory of the imaginative generation of a supposed perception to Wll a gap in a sequence is opposed to the philosophical account of a perception as dependent on the mind, or in other words as existing only when present to consciousness. See Collier, “Filling the Gaps,” 155–70.
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impulse to suppose the existence of continuous objects as the source of these perceptions. However, Hume argues that in positing a separate object, the philosopher is adopting the ordinary supposition of “an independent and continu’d existence,” which has taken “such deep root in the imagination, that ’tis impossible ever to eradicate it,” since it appears to be “natural and obvious.” Although in moments of “calm and profound reXection,” we may indeed set aside the vulgar conception of the distinct and continued existence of our perceptions by recognizing that our perceptions are Xeeting and depend on the mind, the imagination reasserts itself when we “relax our thoughts,” and leads us to suppose the existence of a continuing object separate from our perceptions. This hypothesis of a double existence allows philosophers to satisfy the demands of both “reXection and fancy” by enabling us to assign the interruption and continuation respectively to “different existences,” in other words “the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects” (t 1.4.2.51–52 [sbn 214–15]). Since it is impossible for us to develop a genuine idea of objects that are different from our perceptions, Hume describes these supposedly separate objects as “a new set of perceptions,” which are invented by philosophers to accommodate their ideas of independent and continuous existence (t 1.4.2.56 [sbn 218]). In other words, we develop the theory of double existence only after we have accepted “the common hypothesis of the identity and continuance of our interrupted perceptions,” or the ordinary idea of a separate object which continues to exist in spite of the interruptions in our perceptions (t 1.4.2.46 [sbn 211]).10 This “new Wction” of a double existence seeks to reconcile the Xeeting perceptions disclosed by reason with the idea of an enduring object produced by the imagination. In other words, the philosophical system is “the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac’d by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other.” The doctrine of double existence allows us to “set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands” (t 1.4.2.52 [sbn 215]). However, this system perpetuates the errors of the popular system by supposing entities that continue to exist when they are not perceived. Even more egregiously, the philosophical system “at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition” by summarily inventing “a new set of perceptions,” which are supposed to exist even though they are not perceived, and are further supposed, without any evidence, to resemble and cause our perceptions (t 1.4.2.56 [sbn 217–18]). After this general discussion of the philosophical system of double existence, Hume considers two theories in the history of philosophy concerning the 10. For a further discussion of Hume’s view of the dependence of philosophical systems on common opinion, see Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 9–33, and Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, 17–52. See also Williams, Cultivated Reason, 21–60.
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nature of objects, in order to show that both of these theories are products of the activity of the imagination. These are the “antient” doctrine of substances and the “modern” theory of primary and secondary qualities.11 As we have seen, Hume includes modes and substances, along with relations, among the “complex ideas” he identiWes earlier in the Treatise as “the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning.” He then argues that we have “no idea” of a substance or a mode, apart from “a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assign’d them.” Accordingly, the idea of a substance is really the idea of a “principle of union” between a number of causally related qualities, although it is commonly extended to include the “Wction” of an “unknown something, in which they are suppos’d to inhere.” Similarly, the idea of mode is the idea of a set of qualities in an individual, such as those comprising beauty, or the idea of a condition supervening upon a collection of individuals, such as a dance. In any given case, our ideas of a “substance” or a “mode” are thus derived by the imagination from simple ideas. However, these ideas are then extended by the imagination into ideas of a supposed external object and its qualities, which are further supposed to be distinguishable from each other (t 1.1.4.7, 1.1.6.1–2 [sbn 13, 15–17]; cf. e is.591). Hume turns more speciWcally to what he calls the “antient” system of philosophy, or the theory of substance and accident in the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, in Part 4. Here he argues that the idea of substance was developed by philosophers in order to accommodate the conXicting demands of the philosophical discovery that our idea of a particular body arises from a collection of sensible qualities, and the impulse of the imagination to regard such a collection of sensible qualities as a “compound object” that continues to maintain its identity even after changes in these qualities. Philosophers in the “antient” or peripatetic tradition have supposed the existence of an “unintelligible something” which is “perfectly homogeneous in all bodies,” and have called this “substance, or original and Wrst matter.” Next, these philosophers have developed the idea of a “substantial form” as the principle of individuation, and the source for the particular qualities of each species of object. Finally, this tradition has characterized the perceived qualities of objects as “accidents,” and has supposed that these must be supported by a substance, which is their “subject of inhesion.” Hume maintains that this system is “entirely incomprehensible,” since it depends upon the “unintelligible chimera” of a “substance.” However, he also argues that this theory has “a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature,” since it arises from the same principles as our ordinary 11. For a systematic reconstruction of Hume’s view of the history of philosophy, see Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, especially 80–101 and 119–42.
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idea of external objects. In other words, the “Wctions of the antient philosophy,” which may seem to be “unreasonable and capricious,” are products of the same activity of the imagination as our ordinary conception of external existence (t 1.4.3.1–8 [sbn 219–22]). Hume applies a similar analysis to the Scholastic treatment of causation. In this case he argues that the idea of “occult qualities” in objects, as the sources of their causal powers, arises from the discovery by philosophers that we cannot identify any causal powers in objects merely by examining their “nature and qualities.” This discovery is then combined with the popular view that there must be a “natural and perceivable connexion” between the qualities of an object and its effects. Accordingly, instead of developing causal explanations by observing regular conjunctions between similar objects, the peripatetic philosophers have argued “that any phænomenon, which puzzles them, arises from a faculty or an occult quality,” thereby forestalling “all dispute and enquiry upon the matter.” Hume concludes that nature “has not neglected philosophers more than the rest of the creation,” but provides them “a consolation amidst all their disappointments and afXictions,” consisting principally “in their invention of the words faculty and occult quality” (t 1.4.3.8–10 [sbn 222–24]; cf. dnr 4.162–63). Philosophers in the Scholastic tradition are also “guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination” to explain various natural operations as arising from “sympathies, antipathies, and horrors of a vacuum.” The peripatetics, like children and poets, thus tend to personify external objects and their qualities, although this is hardly an appropriate activity for philosophers (t 1.4.3.11 [sbn 224–25]; cf. nhr 3.29–30). Hume’s criticism of the “antient” system of philosophy is consistent with the attack on Scholastic philosophy by the Cartesian and Lockean traditions in modern philosophy. However, in the next two sections Hume applies his analysis of our idea of external existence to several of the central doctrines of “modern” philosophy, including the Cartesian theory of the soul as an immaterial substance, and the theory of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, as this arose from modern physics and was afWrmed by both Descartes and Locke. In Section 5 Hume extends his criticism of the idea of a substance to various attempts by modern philosophers to prove the existence of the soul, as the “material or immaterial” substance in which our perceptions are supposed to inhere. Here he initially argues that we do not require a substratum to account for the existence of our perceptions, since these are immediately given to us without any indication of a supposed ground of inhesion. Indeed, perceptions may themselves be regarded as substances, according to the deWnition of a substance as “something which may exist by itself” (t 1.4.5.1–5 [sbn 232–34]). He then examines the “infamous” doctrine proposed by Spinoza that there must
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be “one simple substance in the universe” which is “the support or substratum of everything.” In a rather mischievous turn, however, he argues that this “hideous hypothesis” is an inevitable consequence of the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, as this is defended by most theologians, leading both Spinoza and his critics to a “dangerous and irrecoverable atheism” (t 1.4.5.17, 1.4.5.25, 1.4.5.19, 1.4.5.26 [sbn 240–41, 244–45]). However, the focus of Hume’s discussion of “modern philosophy,” as this is presented in Section 4, is the modern theory of matter and its primary and secondary qualities. In this section Hume initially distinguishes between those principles of the imagination which appear to be “permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes,” and those which are “changeable, weak, and irregular,” such as the operation of the imagination in generating the Wctions of Scholastic philosophy. The principles of the Wrst type are “the foundation of all our thoughts and actions,” without which “human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin.” By contrast, the second type are neither unavoidable, necessary, nor even useful in the conduct of ordinary life. In an echo of his distinction in Part 3 between the philosophical and unphilosophical forms of probable reasoning, he concludes that the former principles of the imagination are “receiv’d by philosophy, and the latter rejected” (t 1.4.4.1; cf. 1.3.13.1, 1.3.13.13 [sbn 225; cf. 143, 150]). Modern philosophers might agree that the ancient Wctions are the products of principles that “however common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature.” However, these philosophers have supposed their own theory to be “entirely free from this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and consistent principles of the imagination” (t 1.4.4.2 [sbn 226]). Hume therefore sets out to examine the modern system in order to consider whether there are any grounds for this conWdence. Hume divides all our sensory impressions into three types: (1) “the Wgure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies,” which modern philosophers identify as primary qualities; (2) “colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold,” which they identify as secondary qualities; and (3) “pains and pleasures, that arise from the application of objects to our bodies.” Philosophers agree with the vulgar that pains and pleasures are “merely perceptions,” which are Xeeting and dependent on the mind. In contrast to pleasures and pains, the vulgar believe that the impressions identiWed as primary and secondary qualities both have “a distinct continu’d existence.” This view is partially rejected by modern philosophers, who place secondary qualities “on the same footing” with pain and pleasure, while agreeing with the vulgar that the primary qualities of “Wgure, bulk, motion and solidity” have a distinct and continuous existence in external objects (t 1.4.2.12 [sbn 192–93]). In response to this view, however, Hume maintains that we cannot develop any idea of primary qualities apart from
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perceptions of secondary qualities, and that the differences between these two types of qualities arise neither from sensation nor from reason, but from the imagination (t 1.4.2.13 [sbn 192]). According to Hume, the modern system of philosophy is based on the “fundamental principle” that secondary or sensible qualities, including “colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold,” are “nothing but impressions in the mind” which are “deriv’d from the operation of external objects,” but do not have “any resemblance to the qualities of the objects.” This conclusion arises from the discovery that the secondary qualities we attribute to objects are found to vary with the circumstances or condition of the perceiver. Accordingly, if we assume that all of our impressions resemble a quality in the object, we are obliged to accept the incoherent view that every object possesses a set of mutually exclusive qualities. On the other hand, if we reject this view, but have no reason to single out any particular impressions as resembling actual qualities of the object, we must conclude that our impressions of secondary qualities are merely “internal existences” arising from causes “which no ways resemble them.” This is the view that has been adopted by modern philosophers. Finally, once we have rejected the external existence of secondary qualities, we are left with the primary qualities of “extension and solidity,” and their modiWcations such as “Wgure, motion, gravity, and cohesion,” as “the only real ones, of which we have any adequate notion” (t 1.4.4.3–5 [sbn 226–27]). In criticizing this theory, Hume draws upon the argument developed by Berkeley and others to show that primary qualities can be reduced to secondary qualities, and are accordingly also dependent upon the mind.12 More speciWcally, he argues that the theory of primary and secondary qualities leads to “the most extravagant scepticism” concerning external objects, since if we maintain that sensible qualities are “merely perceptions,” we cannot conceive of anything else, even including primary qualities, which could possess “a real, continu’d, and independent existence” (t 1.4.4.6 [sbn 228]). He defends this claim through an analysis of three primary qualities: motion, extension, and solidity. First, the idea of motion depends on the idea of a body that is moving, and may therefore be resolved into extension and solidity. However, as he has shown in Part 2, the idea of extension itself arises from sensations of vision and touch, or from the perceptions of “colour or solidity.” Since modern philosophy has excluded color “from any real existence,” we must suppose that our concept of extension arises from the idea of solidity. However, in the Wnal stage of his argument, Hume shows that we cannot formulate any idea of solidity without 12. See Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (i.9–15), in Works, 2:44–47; and Three Dialogues (First Dialogue), in Works, 2:187–94. This argument was originally stated by Simon Foucher in response to Malebranche, and further developed by Bayle in his article “Pyrrho,” note B. See Bayle’s Historical and Critical Dictionary, 197–98, and the editorial notes by Popkin in this edition.
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already having an idea of extended objects. First, he rejects the initially plausible view that our idea of solidity arises directly from the sensation of touch, arguing that the sense of touch only provides impressions of texture and resistance, which do not represent any further qualities of external objects. Next, he indicates that we attribute solidity to any bodies that are supposed to exert pressure against each other and to exclude each other from their respective locations. That is, the idea of solidity requires the idea of an encounter in space and time between two bodies, which are both supposed to maintain a distinct and continued existence. This idea of external existence, as we have seen, is ultimately an imaginative projection from the arrangements of visible and tangible objects. However, since these secondary qualities have been excluded from our analysis, Hume maintains that the modern system leaves us “no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity.” We therefore have no positive idea of matter in the modern sense, since any attempt to describe the primary qualities of matter either “returns in a circle” or relies upon an appeal to secondary qualities (t 1.4.4.7–10 [sbn 228–29]). Hume therefore concludes that the modern system of philosophy cannot claim to be any more plausible than the Scholastic system, since “instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them” (t 1.4.4.6 [sbn 228]). Hume states his preliminary answer to extreme skepticism in Section 2 by observing that the skeptic must acknowledge the existence of the external world, even if this belief cannot be supported by any philosophical arguments, since “nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations.” Thus, although we may investigate the causes that lead to our belief in the existence of body, we cannot investigate whether body exists or not, since “that is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings” (t 1.4.2.1 [sbn 187]). However, once he has criticized both the popular and philosophical theories of external existence, Hume reconsiders the apparently skeptical implications of his argument. Although he had begun this analysis “with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses,” he now Wnds instead that, “to be ingenuous, I feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment,” and “more inclin’d to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination, than to place in it such an implicit conWdence.” First, considering our ordinary idea of external existence, we must deny that “such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system.” However, the theory of double existence not only arises from the same
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principles but absurdly “at once denies and establishes the vulgar supposition,” Wrst by rejecting the distinct and continued existence of perceptions, and then by inventing unperceived “objects” to which we may attribute these qualities (t 1.4.2.56 [sbn 218]). Accordingly, it is “impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses,” and “a profound and intense reXection on those subjects” only leads to a skeptical doubt that is “a malady, which can never be radically cur’d.” Hume concludes that “carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy,” and he is now prepared to rely entirely upon these, trusting, whatever may be his or his reader’s opinion at this present moment, “that an hour hence he will be perswaded there is both an external and internal world” (t 1.4.2.57 [sbn 218]). Hume provides the following summary of the skeptical implications of the system of modern philosophy: Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that perswade us of the continu’d and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu’d and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. (t 1.4.4.14 [sbn 231]; cf. 1.4.7.4 [sbn 265–66]; ehu 12.9–16 [sbn 152–55]) The Wctions of the peripatetic tradition, and presumably the Wction of double existence in modern philosophy, allow philosophers to “set themselves at ease,” and arrive by an illusion “at the same indifference, which the people attain by their stupidity, and true philosophers by their moderate scepticism” (t 1.4.3.10 [sbn 224]). Hume therefore introduces “moderate scepticism,” which he also describes as the opinion of “true philosophers,” as an alternative not only to extreme skepticism, but also to the various types of “false” or “dogmatical” philosophy in both the ancient and modern traditions (t 1.4.3.9–10, 1.4.7.13–14; cf. 1.4.1.12, 1.4.7.15 [sbn 222–24, 271–73; cf. 187, 274]).
m o d e r at e s k e p t i c i s m Hume concludes his discussion of the “sceptical and other systems of philosophy” in Part 4, and indeed his general discussion of the understanding in Book
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1 of the Treatise, with the “Conclusion of this book” in Section 7, in which he traces the intellectual and emotional progress of the philosopher through the various types of skepticism.13 Since Section 7 is narrated as an introspective monologue, this section has often been regarded as the autobiographical account of a personal crisis that Hume passed through while confronting the skeptical implications of his own philosophy.14 On this reading, Hume’s monologue is a continuation of his description, in a letter he drafted to a physician in 1734, of the various physical and psychological complaints arising from his philosophical studies in his early twenties (l 1.12–18; cf. ml xxxiii).15 In contrast to this reading, I would argue on several grounds that Hume is adopting the literary structure of a confession, not for direct and spontaneous self-expression, but rather to guide his readers through an expected series of intellectual and emotional reactions to his skeptical arguments. His purpose is to secure their concurrence to the mitigated skepticism with which he ends the conclusion, and which also provides the basis for his further inquiries in Books 2 and 3. First, Section 7 is not an excerpt from a private diary, but a discourse that has been crafted for publication, as a coherent and integral part of a larger work. Next, we will see that Hume’s initial account of the various stages of skeptical despair is carefully balanced by his discussion of the remedies provided by nature, which tend to support his moderate skepticism. He also frames his expression of skeptical despair by statements of his intention to continue his larger project of developing the science of man in the Treatise. These appear at the end of Section 6 (t 1.4.6.23 [sbn 263]), and in the concluding pages of Section 7 (t 1.4.7.12–15 [sbn 270–74]). In other words, in Section 7 Hume considers not only the intellectual and emotional difWculties arising from his skeptical arguments but also their apparent resolution; and he explores not only the theoretical but also the emotional and practical basis for further intellectual inquiry, which he reafWrms in its concluding pages. Hume’s strategy in Section 7, leading to his Wnal afWrmation of moderate skepticism, has been obscured by those commentators who have focused their attention upon his preliminary 13. Baier regards this concluding section as a microcosm of book 2 and indeed a key to the Treatise as a whole: see Progress of Sentiments, 1–27. 14. This autobiographical interpretation of Treatise 1.4.7 appears in Hendel, Studies, 251; Mossner, Life of David Hume, 115–16; Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development, 14, 22; and Siebert, Moral Animus, 170–74. 15. It seems to me that in this letter Hume is describing the symptoms, both physical and psychological, of excessive studying and a lack of recreation, as he himself suggests in citing the remedies from which he has already beneWted. The most distressing psychological symptom he reports is a difWculty in concentrating, which he fears might jeopardize his intellectual pursuits. The only indication of any melancholy following from the content of his studies is his reference to a tendency toward moral self-examination that he had already renounced by the time of writing this letter. Hume does not express any melancholy arising from his recent unspeciWed discoveries in theoretical philosophy, but rather a pleasurable excitement in his project. For discussions of this letter to an unnamed physician see Greig, David Hume, 76–83; Mossner, Life of David Hume, 66–88; and Stewart, “Hume’s Manuscripts,” 270–76.
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account of the crisis of extreme skepticism, while overlooking the details of its resolution.16 Hume begins by pausing, in the wake of his skeptical arguments and before continuing on to “those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before me,” in order “to ponder that voyage, which I have undertaken,” requiring “the utmost art and industry to be brought to a happy conclusion.” Since he now recognizes “the wretched condition, weakness, and disorder” of his cognitive faculties, he compares himself to a traveler who after many dangers is determined “to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel,” and is almost resolved to surrender and “perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present,” rather than venturing into the unbounded expanse ahead (t 1.4.7.1 [sbn 263–64]). In addition to the despair produced by recognizing his intellectual condition, the skeptical thinker is also “affrighted and confounded” by the “forlorn solitude, in which I am plac’d in my philosophy.” Indeed, he feels like “some strange uncouth monster” who is expelled from all human society, since he has not only separated himself from the unthinking crowd, but exposed himself to the contempt and ridicule of other philosophers (t 1.4.7.2 [sbn 264–65]). In this state of melancholy, Hume reviews the skeptical arguments set forth in the earlier sections of Part 4.17 Here he reminds us that that probable reasoning tends to subvert itself by diminishing our conWdence in each of our particular judgments (t 1.4.7.7 [sbn 267]), that we cannot discover any causal powers in nature (t 1.4.7.5 [sbn 266–67]), that “memory, senses, and understanding” are all “founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas” (t 1.4.7.3 [sbn 265]), and that causal reasoning and belief in external existence are directly contrary to each other (t 1.4.7.4 [sbn 266]). We are saved from “total scepticism” only by that “singular and seemingly trivial property of the fancy,” which makes it difWcult for us to sustain these “remote views of things” for any length of time (t 1.4.7.7 [sbn 267–68]). However, this conclusion is not immediately consoling to the philosopher, who appears to be confronted with a perpetual choice of accepting or rejecting all “reWn’d and metaphysical” reasonings, which must lead in either case to renouncing any pretensions to the consistent use of reason, and consequently all science and philosophy. In other words, the philosopher is left with no choice “but betwixt a false reason and none at all” (t 1.4.7.7 [sbn 268]). The “intense view” of these contradictions and imperfections in his own reason leaves the 16. See Popkin, “Critique of Pyrrhonism,” 62–70, and Wilson’s response in Hume’s Defence of Causal Inference, 242–44 and 327. On this view of Treatise 1.4.7 as providing philosophical guidance to the reader, see also Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life, 37–39; Box, Suasive Art of David Hume, 96–111; and Baier, Progress of Sentiments, 1–27. 17. For a more detailed analysis of Hume’s skeptical arguments in the Treatise as summarized here, see Garrett, Cognition and Commitment, 208–32.
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philosopher “in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty” (t 1.4.7.8 [sbn 268–69]). However, nature does not abandon the skeptical philosopher, but provides a cure even for this “philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind,” or providing “some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras.” These solitary remedies are enhanced by the natural inXuence of human sociability: “I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot Wnd in my heart to enter into them any farther” (t 1.4.7.9 [sbn 269]). The previously isolated and distraught thinker is now “absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life,” and is tempted to burn all his books and papers in his resolution “never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.” However, this impulse arises from his “spleen and indolence,” and is eventually dispelled by calm reXection and the gradual return of a “serious” but “good-humour’d disposition”: “At the time, therefore, that I am tir’d with amusement and company, and have indulg’d a reverie in my chamber, or in a solitary walk by a riverside, I feel my mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclin’d to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation” (t 1.4.7.11–12 [sbn 270]). Refreshed by these intervals of sociability and solitary reXection, the philosopher gradually Wnds that he “cannot forbear having a curiosity” regarding various topics of intellectual inquiry, such as the principles by which we judge truth and falsehood, good and evil, beauty and deformity, the causes of the passions, and the nature of government. Indeed, he is troubled to Wnd that he has been formulating these judgments without knowing the principles upon which he proceeds. He is also distressed by the “deplorable ignorance” of the learned world regarding these principles, and wishes to contribute to the education of humanity, and to enjoy the reputation and honor that would arise from these endeavors. These, at least, are the sentiments that “spring up naturally in my present disposition,” so that if he were to banish them by any other pursuit or distraction “I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure.” Hume accordingly presents the sentiments of curiosity, benevolence, and ambition, which have now superseded his intellectual melancholy, as “the origin of my philosophy” (t 1.4.7.12 [sbn 270–71]).18 18. David Owen argues that, on Hume’s view, our approval of philosophical probable reasoning follows the same principles as our approval of the virtues: its results are useful or agreeable, or both, to the self or others. See Owen, Hume’s Reason, 217–23.
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Next, he reafWrms the value of philosophical or scientiWc reasoning for those thinkers who have passed through the dark night of total skepticism to this renewed interest in intellectual pursuits. Here he writes that it is almost impossible for the human mind to rest “in that narrow circle of objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action.” However, since we may be tempted by the even bolder systems of superstition, he suggests that we should instead follow the “safest and most agreeable” principles in our abstruse inquiries, including the methods by which we attempt to assign “new causes and principles to the phænomena, which appear in the visible world.” In other words, he recommends philosophy in preference “to superstition of every kind or denomination.” More speciWcally, he advises us to pursue a “just” philosophy, which encourages only “mild and moderate sentiments,” and by which we may hope to establish “a system or set of opinions,” which, even if we cannot know them to be true, “might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination.” He describes this as the view of the “true sceptic,” who is “difWdent of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction,” and distinguishes this view not only from the “false and extravagant” forms of systematic philosophy, but also from the view of the extreme skeptic, who is led by his “doubts and scruples” to abandon philosophy (t 1.4.7.13–15 [sbn 271–73]). Hume has already identiWed the outlook of “true philosophers” with “moderate scepticism” (t 1.4.3.10 [sbn 224]), and he now identiWes this as the view of the “true sceptic,” which he defends as the conclusion of his examination of the understanding (t 1.4.7.14–15 [sbn 273–74]). With this conclusion, Hume also reafWrms his larger project as stated in the introduction to the Treatise. As a newly revealed moderate skeptic, he now hopes to “contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge” by showing his readers that “Human Nature is the only science of man,” thereby giving “a different turn to the speculations of philosophers, and pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction” (t 1.4.7.14 [sbn 273]). He also implicitly anticipates his moderate skepticism in the introduction, by indicating that once we have attained the “utmost extent of human reason” in applying the experimental method to the study of human nature, we may rest contented with our conclusions, even though we are “perfectly satisfy’d in the main of our ignorance,” and cannot provide any further reason for our “most general and reWn’d principles, beside our experience of their reality” (t Int.9 [sbn xviii]).19 Finally, Hume turns from this supposed personal journey to offer an invitation to those who have accompanied him thus far: “If the reader Wnds himself 19. For a further discussion of Hume’s strategy in his presentation of skepticism in the Introduction to the Treatise and in the Conclusion of Book 1, see Cummins, “Hume’s DifWdent Skepticism,” 43–65.
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in the same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future speculations. If not, let him follow his inclination, and wait the returns of application and good humour” (t 1.4.7.14 [sbn 273]). We have accordingly seen that Hume concludes his account of the different systems of skepticism and philosophy in Book 1 of the Treatise by defending a version of skepticism that concedes the cogency of the arguments of extreme skepticism, and also recognizes the inXuence of “nature” in breaking their force, but moves beyond extreme skepticism and uncritical naturalism by defending the standards of critical judgment that emerge from our reasonings in the sciences, and ultimately from our reasonings in ordinary life. This afWrmation of scientiWc judgment, in the context of moderate skepticism, is already anticipated in the introduction, where he presents the application of the “experimental method” to human nature as the basis for an examination of the principles of investigation in both the natural and human sciences. He then carries out this project in the Treatise, by examining the principles of probable or scientiWc reasoning in Book 1, and by applying these principles in Books 2 and 3 to psychology, moral theory, and political theory. Hume’s characterization of his own view as “moderate scepticism” is further reXected in the various shorter works in which he summarizes and defends the Treatise. In the Abstract he describes his philosophy as “very sceptical,” by which he means that it “tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding.” In his Wrst identiWcation of extreme skepticism with the ancient Pyrrhonian school, he adds that philosophy would leave us “entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it,” and that we employ our reason “only because we cannot help it” (a 27 [sbn 657]). In the Letter from a Gentleman Hume rejects the characterization of his philosophy as “universal Doubt” or Pyrrhonian skepticism, which it is “impossible for any Man to support.” Instead he maintains that “Modesty then, and Humility, with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties,” are the appropriate and enduring results of his skeptical arguments (lg 19). Hume’s defense of moderate skepticism also pervades the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In the opening section of the Enquiry he suggests that while abstract philosophy might seem to be “the inevitable source of uncertainty and error,” we may also cultivate a “true metaphysics” by examining the nature of human understanding, in contrast to the various forms of “abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon” which have become “mixed up with popular superstition,” and also to a skepticism which is “entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action” (ehu 1.11–14 [sbn 11–14]). He later calls attention to the skeptical implications of his analysis of causation by presenting his argument that causal beliefs are not founded on reason as “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding” (Section 4), and then describes his
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view that these beliefs arise from habit as a “Sceptical Solution of these Doubts” (Section 5). He also presents this solution as consistent with the view that he now calls “academic or sceptical philosophy” (ehu 4.1, 5.1 [sbn 25, 40]). In the concluding Section 12 of the Wrst Enquiry, “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,” Hume develops a systematic account of different versions of skepticism. Here he distinguishes between antecedent or Cartesian skepticism, consequent or Pyrrhonian skepticism, and mitigated or academic skepticism. He then considers the implications of these philosophical positions for scientiWc inquiry, and ends with a defense of mitigated skepticism.20 First, Hume describes Cartesian skepticism as “a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy,” which has been proposed as a “sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement.” This type of skepticism recommends “an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties,” and then attempts to establish the reliability of our faculties through a “chain of reasoning” from “some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful.” Hume argues that even if we could discover such a principle, we would never be able to advance beyond it except by those very faculties whose reliability had been called into question. A complete antecedent skepticism is thus unattainable and would be incurable. However, he endorses a moderate version of Cartesian doubt, which recommends a careful examination of our presuppositions and the stages in our reasoning, as a valuable maxim for philosophical and scientiWc investigation (ehu 12.3–4 [sbn 149–50]). Next Hume considers “excessive” skepticism, which he attributes to the Pyrrhonian tradition. This type of skepticism is “consequent to science and enquiry,” and is propounded “when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties,” or at least their inability to reach any satisfactory conclusions “in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed.” Accordingly, extreme skepticism challenges all of the apparent evidence of our senses, and casts the “maxims of common life” into the same doubt as “the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology” (ehu 12.5, 12.21–34 [sbn 150, 158–65]). Hume illustrates this type of skepticism by recalling many of the skeptical arguments that he had already presented in the Treatise, including his paradoxical conclusions regarding space and time, and his analysis of our idea of external existence (ehu 12.6–23 [sbn 151–59]). 20. Many studies have indicated that Hume has confused the two classical traditions of “Pyrrhonian” and “academic” skepticism, perhaps by relying upon Bayle’s depiction of Pyrrho as an extreme skeptic and Cicero’s moderate version of academic skepticism. See Popkin, “Critique of Pyrrhonism,” 53–98; Raynor, “Hume’s Scepticism,” 105–6; Norton, David Hume, 266–69 and 277–79; Penelhum, David Hume, 23; and Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium, 7–11.
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Once again, however, Hume Wnds that while it might be impossible to refute this extreme type of skepticism, its inXuence tends to be dispelled by the “more powerful principles of our nature,” whenever we leave our speculations and are confronted “by the presence of real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments.” In other words, the “great subverter” of Pyrrhonian skepticism is “action, and employment, and the occupations of common life” (ehu 12.21 [sbn 158–59]). In addition, as the “chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism,” Hume maintains that its principles cannot offer any enduring beneWt to society, since if they were to prevail “all discourse, all action would immediately cease,” and people would remain in a “total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisWed, put an end to their miserable existence.” The only lasting effect of Pyrrhonism is to demonstrate “the whimsical condition of mankind,” since we are obliged to “act and reason and believe,” even though we are unable to provide any ultimate cognitive justiWcation for these activities (ehu 12.23 [sbn 159–60]). Finally, Hume offers his own defense of “academical” skepticism, in contrast to both Cartesian and Pyrrhonian skepticism, as the culmination of his argument in the Enquiry. In his analysis of causation Hume has already recommended “academic or sceptical philosophy,” which calls for “doubt and suspence of judgement,” and encourages us to impose “very narrow bounds” on our inquiries by renouncing “all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice.” He thus advises us to oppose both the “lofty pretensions” and the “superstitious credulity” of human cognition, and limit our inquiries to “common life,” or the realm of action and scientiWc pursuits (ehu 5.1 [sbn 41]). In Section 12 Hume argues that this “mitigated scepticism, or academical philosophy” arises from Pyrrhonian skepticism, when the doubts of the latter are, “in some measure, corrected by common sense and reXection.” This type of skepticism is “thoroughly convinced of the force of the pyrrhonian doubt,” and recognizes that only the “strong power of natural instinct” can free us from this doubt, while also afWrming the usefulness and value of the reasonings arising from this instinct within common life. Accordingly, academic skepticism tends to moderate the tendency toward dogmatism in human reasoning, and to promote the degree of “doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.” This philosophy recommends that we conWne our inquiries “to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding,” and encourages us to develop “a correct Judgement,” which avoids “all distant and high enquiries” and instead limits itself “to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience.” In other words, the academic skeptic recognizes that “philosophical decisions are nothing but the reXections of common life, methodized and corrected” (ehu 12.24–25 [sbn 161–62]).
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Hume concludes his account of academic skepticism by offering a survey of the “proper subjects of science and enquiry,” which are disclosed through a study of the “natural powers of the human mind” and our experience in the “reXections of common life.” These subjects are divided into mathematics, which is the only proper object of “knowledge and demonstration,” and the various natural and moral sciences founded upon “moral” or causal reasoning, including certain approaches to ethics, aesthetics, and perhaps theology (ehu 12.25–34 [sbn 163–65]). Hume therefore maintains that mitigated or academic skepticism supports our inquiries in the demonstrative, natural, and human sciences, as these investigations emerge from the systematic correction and extension of our reasonings in ordinary life, or from “daily practice and experience” (ehu 12.25 [sbn 162]). In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume develops a further discussion of skepticism by juxtaposing the views of his three characters. First, Cleanthes rejects skepticism in order to defend the use of reason, both in general and especially in natural theology. Next, Demea defends a version of negative theology that appeals to skepticism in order to justify its reliance upon revelation against the pretensions of natural theology. Finally, Philo defends a more limited account of reason and its proper use in natural philosophy, while developing a skeptical critique of natural theology. In Part 1 of the Dialogues Philo apparently endorses Demea’s view that the education of young people should help them recognize what Philo calls the “weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason,” as these appear in the “errors and deceits” of our senses, and also in the contradictions arising from our ideas of “matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion.” In response, Cleanthes challenges the extreme version of skepticism which he believes Philo to be mischievously defending, since Philo has not renounced his senses and experience in the ordinary activities of life, but rather exhibits “the Wrmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour.” Indeed, Cleanthes argues that it is impossible for anyone to maintain a “total scepticism” in thought and conduct for even a few hours: since “external objects press in upon him: Passions solicit him: His philosophical melancholy dissipates,” and even the violent distortion of his natural inclinations “will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism” (dnr 1.131–32, 1.137). Philo responds to Cleanthes’ criticism of extreme skepticism by defending a moderate, mitigated or academical version of skepticism, as presented in the Treatise and the Enquiry. He initially concedes that “to whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men,” and is not obliged to give any reason for this other than the “absolute necessity” of doing so. However, Philo argues that the
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philosophical skeptic may continue his investigations even beyond the immediate concerns of ordinary life, by general inquiries into “natural or moral subjects.” The skeptic is encouraged in this pursuit by Wnding that “every one, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy,” since from our childhood and throughout our lives, we are all continually advancing “in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning.” Philo maintains that “what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind,” and that we may expect “greater stability, if not greater truth” from philosophy than from our reasonings in common life only by “its exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding.” We may accordingly investigate “trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism” by appealing to “common sense and experience,” against the objections that might arise from “very subtile and reWned” reasonings. However, we have no evidence from either experience or common life that can support the arguments of natural theology, since its objects are “too large for our grasp,” and its arguments “run wide of common life” (dnr 1.134–35). Philo’s project through the rest of the Dialogues is to apply the standards of experience and common life to natural theology, in order to show that its conclusions are not supported by philosophical probable reasoning. For example, since we have little or no evidence of the general “œconomy of a universe,” we can imagine “no conjecture” concerning the origin of evil “however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be erroneous.” The proper aim of human understanding is to be “sceptical, or at least cautious,” in admitting of any hypothesis, “much less, of any which is supported by no appearance of probability” (dnr 11.205). This is the view of “philosophical sceptics,” who, “from a natural difWdence of their own capacity,” are prepared to suspend judgment concerning such extraordinary and sublime topics as the divine attributes. Philo concludes that one who has been “seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will Xy to revealed truth with the greatest avidity.” He ends the discussion in the Dialogues by asserting provocatively that “to be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the Wrst and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian” (dnr 12.227–28). Hume’s 1742 essay “The Sceptic” is less useful as a direct expression of his views for two reasons. First, this essay is more directly concerned with human motives and conduct than with metaphysical and epistemological issues. Second, the four essays in the set, which also includes “The Platonist,” “The Stoic,” and “The Epicurean,” are written in assumed voices rather than as direct expressions of the views of their author, in order to illustrate the relation between different philosophical views and different types of human temperament. However, we may note that the speaker in this essay is criticizing the pretensions of philosophers, while afWrming that human beings are almost
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entirely guided by their individual “constitution and temper,” rather than by reasoning. Indeed, rather than defending extreme skepticism, he afWrms that there seems to be “a real, though often an unknown standard, in the nature of things” which determines the truth or falsity of our judgments concerning matters of fact (e Sc.169, 164).21 We may therefore trace a dialectical development between two types of skepticism in each of Hume’s philosophical works. The Wrst is the total, “excessive,” or “Pyrrhonian” version of skepticism, which emerges as the inevitable consequence of our philosophical reasonings, but is subverted by the propensities of the imagination and the activities and concerns of common life. The second is the moderate, mitigated, or “academical” version of skepticism, which Hume identiWes in the Treatise as the view of “true sceptics” and “true philosophers,” and which Philo calls “philosophical scepticism.” This view recognizes the legitimacy of the arguments of extreme skepticism, and acknowledges the inXuence of nature in breaking their force. However, it also recommends a new role for philosophy: the articulation of the principles of critical reXection that we rely upon in our ordinary reasonings. Hume defends this version of skepticism in Book 1 of the Treatise, in the Abstract, in the Wrst Enquiry, and in the Dialogues through the character of Philo. In other words, he presents moderate or mitigated skepticism as the outcome of his examination of human cognition, and defends this view as his own philosophical position and as the basis for his further inquiries.22 With these reXections we may return to the various interpretations of Hume’s philosophy that have emerged from the ongoing discussion of his skepticism. First, those who regard his philosophy as a version of extreme skepticism have emphasized his examination of the arguments that support extreme skepticism, while overlooking his conclusions concerning the inXuence of nature and common life in breaking their force, or dismissing these conclusions as a half-hearted addition to his discussion. In its turn, the naturalistic interpretation calls attention to the role of “nature” in subverting the skeptical arguments and providing us with unreXective and unavoidable beliefs about the world. However, at least in Kemp Smith’s version, this interpretation tends to overlook Hume’s account and his relative justiWcation of the standards of probable or scientiWc reasoning, and its importance for his further inquiries into the 21. For a further account of Hume’s “mitigated scepticism” in his various writings, and of the consistency of his conclusions, see Norton, “How a Sceptic May Live Scepticism,” 119–39. For a further discussion of “The Sceptic,” see Williams, Cultivated Reason, 19, 33–34, 44, and 61–91. 22. This interpretation suggests that Hume is contributing to the tradition of constructive or mitigated skepticism in early modern Europe that has been identiWed and traced especially by Richard Popkin, a continuity that is obscured by Popkin’s emphasis on the Pyrrhonian and naturalistic interpretations of Hume. See Popkin, History of Scepticism, 129–50, and High Road to Pyrrhonism; along with Van Leeuwen, Problem of Certainty; Norton, David Hume, 208–38; and Ferreira, Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt.
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science of man. By contrast, I have shown that Hume intends to move beyond both extreme skepticism and uncritical naturalism by providing an account of the standards of critical reXection that may be applied in the natural and human sciences, as these emerge from the systematic examination of our ordinary concepts and reasonings. I have also shown that he presents this philosophical position as the view of the moderate or mitigated skeptic who is engaged in studying the presuppositions and principles of human cognition. With this conclusion, which has emerged from a study of Book 1 of the Treatise and Hume’s related writings, we may turn in the rest of this study to consider his application of these principles to various dimensions of hum