Dante and the Empire

American University Studies

Series II Romance Languages and Literature

Donna Mancusi-Ungaro

Vol. 49

Dante and the Empire

PETER LANG New York • Bern • Frankfurt am Main • Paris

PETER LANG New York • Bern • Frankfurt am Main • Paris

Dante and the Empire focuses on Dante's concept of a world-state and explores the sources for his novel interpretation of human civilization and destiny. It offers a new look at controversial passages in the Monarchia and a fresh comparison with important verses which reflect Dante's political experience in the Divine Comedy. Consistency between the poem and the treatise on monarchy is emphasized while traditional readings of the influences of Aristotle, Augustan Rome, Averroes, and Aquinas are reevaluated. Mancusi-Ungaro also addresses philological problems, namely three cases of textual ambiguity in the Monarchia which contribute to Dante's originality and an understanding of his use of philosophical allegory.

I I 3

i f

Donna Mancusi-Ungan

73

Dante and the Empin

Donna Mancusi-Ungaro is a graduate of Vassar College and received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Romance Languages and Literatures from Harvard University. Her field of interest is Italian Studies, specifically Dante and Italian cinema. She was awarded the "Dante Prize" of the Dante Society of America. She has published several articles on Italian film and regularly reviews for Italian Quarterly's "Dante Shelf." Professor Mancusi-Ungaro is a member of the Italian Department at Rutgers University in New Brunswick.

i

4*2;

m

lbs;

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mancusi-Ungaro, Donna Dante and the Empire. (American university studies. Series II, Romance languages and literature; vol. 49) Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Dante Alighieri, 1265-1321—Political and social views. 2. Dante Alighieri, 1265—1321. Divina commedia. 3. Dante Alighieri, 1265-1321. Monarchia. I. Title. II. Series PQ4422.M36 1987 851'. 1 86-20028 ISBN 0-8204-0337-7 ISSN 0740-9257

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek Mancusi-Ungaro, Donna: Dante and the empire / Donna Mancusi-Ungaro. New York ; Bern ; Frankfurt am Main : Lang, 1987. (American university studies ; Ser. 2, Romance languages.and literature ; Vol. 49) ISBN 0-8204-0337-7 NE: American university studies /02

© Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.. New York 1987

6

/

All rights reserved. Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm, xerography, microfiche, microcard, offset strictly prohibited. Printed by Weihert-Druck GmbH, Darmstadt (West Germany)

To Robert and Mom and Dad

Contents

Preface Acknowledgments Note on Texts Used

ix xi xiii

INTRODUCTION PARTI

PART II

1

DANTE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

11

-The Monarchia and the Commedia Philosophy and the City "Florentinus et exul immeritus" Henry VII of Luxemburg "Renovatio imperil Romani" The Imperial City The Monarchia as Political Philosophy The Commedia as Political Theology

13 24 31 38 44 50 54 66

THE GOAL OF THE HUMAN RACE

81

Aristotelian Teleology and the Function of the Human Race 83 Aristotle's Politics and a View of the WorldState 94 Dante and Thomas Aquinas on the End of Mankind 105 PART III

THE UNITY OF MANKIND The Multitude of Mankind and the Question of Averroiatic Collectivism

i

f

127 ....

vu

Peace as the Means to the Collective End .. 150 The Essential Guarantee: Monarchy 165 The Individual within the Multitude 171

Preface

APPENDIX SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT MANKIND'S END Function and End Highest End or Final End? "Vis ultima" and "Potentia"

181 182 185 188

Bibliography

191

Index ,

199

We have stated, then, what nature is and what exists by nature and according to nature. As far as trying to prove that nature exists, this would be ridiculous, for it is evident that- there are many such things; and to try to prove what is evident through what is not evident is a mark of a man who cannot judge what is known through itself from what is known not through itself. That this can take place is clear; for a man born blind may form syllogisms concerning colors, but such a man must be using mere names without conceiving the corresponding things. Aristotle, Physics II, 1 (Book B, 193a 2-9)

Dante's political philosophy is based on his understanding of human civilization and the end or function of mankind in this world. Is the human race numerically one, a unity absorbing individual autonomy, a "real" common state existing as a universal political partnership in which all human beings equally share? Or is mankind a mere name which has no universal substance corresponding to it, but which is used to signify the continuous and near eternal fellowship of civilization to which all men naturally belong by virtue of their human and rational nature and in which they participate as individuals? Dante was well versed in the various dissertations on man's nature composed by Aristotle, Averroes, Aquinas and the other great philosophers of the past. The purpose of this study is to inquire into Dante's personal concept of the Empire or "human civilization"—what he termed humana civilitas in his political dissertation on Monarch}/. It argues the consistency between the spiritual and temporal ends of man and aims to define Dante's VHl

IX

I political ideas both contained in his famous poem, the Comme- dia, and expressed in more philosophical writings apart from it. The Dante of the Monarchia may usually be seen as the blind man in the above passage from Aristotle's Physics—the worldly philosopher trying to theorize about happiness in this life for the whole of mankind while ignoring the Christian emphasis on individual salvation and personal interpretations of happiness through faith. His sight is restored only and finally when he undergoes the personal spiritual experience related in the Cornmedia. The "journey" to the afterlife reveals to him the corruptibility of the worldly life in which Dante, like the ^atin Averroist Siger of Brabant, syllogized "invidiosi veri"—blind, unseen truths—about human nature, temporal happiness, and political order. But the "poet" of the philosophical treatise is one with the "philosopher" of the spiritual poem, and a closer look at both works reveals how Dante could see well beyond the limited horizons of his fellow men. This book is organized into three major sections through which to understand Dante's view of man, mankind, and the political structure of a world-city. Part I focuses on Dante's political philosophy, his contemporary political world, and his concept of temporal happiness as expressed in the Commedia and Monarchia. Part II seeks to understand the AristotelianThomistic tradition of political philosophy that Dante grew up with and out of in order to formulate his original interpretation of the goal of human civilization. The third part analyzes Dante's most novel and controversial interpretation, namely his definition of the function and unity of mankind. His view finds its seeds in another form of Aristotelianism, and Part III is precisely a new look at the Averroistic-like notion of a collective multitude of the human rational potential which Dante saw as the perpetuating basis of human civilization and the necessary jurisdiction of universal monarchy. The Appendix following Part III addresses some philological problems, namely three cases of textual ambiguity which contribute to the controversy and originality of Dante's interpretation of mankind's end.

Acknowledgments

The pivotal role of the Monarchia in Dante's life and in medieval political theory has puzzled and fascinated me since I was first introduced to Dante. Professors Dante Delia Terza and Nicolae Iliescu of Harvard University especially encouraged my pursuit of this interest, and I would like to thank them for awarding me a grant from the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard to complete my research in Italy. Special thanks go to Professor Charles Kesler of Claremont-McKenna College for his insight and criticism. For their enduring confidence and assistance, my deepest appreciation is for my parents and my husband, Robert Hart, who has been the most patient and supportive of all. Rutgers University New Brunswick, N.J. Fall, 1985

D.M.-U.

XI

Note on Texts Used

References to and citations from Dante's own works are taken from the following editions: Dantis Alagherii Epistolae: The Letters of Dante, translated and edited by Paget Toynbee, Second edition with Appendix by C.G. Hardie (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966). The Divine Comedy, edited by Giorgio Petrocchi, translated and with Commentary by Charles S. Singleton, 6 Vols., Bollingen Series LXXX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Monarchia, edited by Pier Giorgio Ricci, National Edition of the Societa dantesca italiana (Verona: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1965). Le Opere di Dante, nuova edizione sotto gli auspici della Fondazione Giorgio Cini, diretta da Vittore Branca, Francesco Maggini, e Bruno Nardi (Firenze: Le Monnier): // Convivio, with commentary by G. Busnelli and G. Vandelli, second edition revised by Antonio Quaglio, Vols. IV and V (1968, 1964). De situ et forma aque et terre, translated and edited by Giorgio Padoan, Vol. VIII (1968). De vulgari eloquentia, translated and edited with commentary by Aristide Marigo, third edition revised by Pier Giorgio Ricci, Vol. VI (1968). Rime, edited by G.R. Ceriello (Milano: Rizzoli, 1952). The following editions and translations into English have also been used: The Divine Comedy, translated and with commentary by John Sinclair, 3 Vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso, translated by Allen Mandelbaum (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, 1982, 1984). Monarchy and Three Political Letters, translated and edited by Donald Nicholl and Colin Hardie (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954).

X1U

Monarchia e le epistok politiche, translated and with commentary by Gustavo Vinay (Firenze: Sansoni, 1950). Monarchia, Epistole politiche, edited by Francesco Mazzoni (Torino: Edizioni RAI, 1966). On Monarchy, translated by Philip Wicksteed in Medieval Political Philosophy, edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

Introduction

The following editions of Aristotle's works are regularly referred to: De anima, translated by J.A. Smith (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968). De anima, Books II and III, translated and with notes by D.W. Hamlvn (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1977). Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Sir David Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966). Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1975). Metaphysics, translated by W.D. Ross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972). Physics, translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1969). Politics, translated by Emest Barker (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968). Politics, translated by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library Series, Vol. XXI (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972). Politics, translated by T.A. Sinclair (New York: Penguin Books, 1977). The following editions of St. Thomas Aquinas' works are regularly referred to: De regimine principum, translated by G.B. Phelan as On Kingship (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949). Summa contra gentiles, translated by James Anderson as On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). Summa theologica, translated by Thomas Gilby, O.P. (Oxford: Blackfriars edition, 1975).

XIV

Dante the poet, spiritual pilgrim, and passionate exponent of the potential of faith has always upstaged Dante the philosopher and political theorist. His originality in reinterpreting the Roman ideal of government has not been overlooked, but his political role has been relegated to a lesser office just as the so-called "minor works" have been demoted before the divine poem. Understandably and justifiably, new and more perceptive translations and studies of the Comedy appear each year while Dante's philosophical writings on ethics, politics, and poetry are referred to only in the citations. After all, the Comedy represents the triumphant synthesis of timeless, spiritual inspiration and poetic craftsmanship, and Dante affords unlimited interpretations as the most translatable of poets. But the Convivio, the Monarchia, and even the De vulgari eloquentia—

Dante's philosophical trilogy—are regarded, indeed disregarded, as didactic exercises in medieval dialectic which soon after circulation saw their twilight. During Dante's exile, the potential helmsmen of spiritual and temporal order were corrupted or powerless, not to mention the growing autonomy of the communes and city-states. The Papal See had begun its Babylonian course in Avignon, and the imperial throne was as good as empty. Thus Dante's rationalistic studies of universal language, his concepts of universal order and morality, and his interpretation of the two goals of mankind under the direction of the secular Monarch and the Roman Pope appeared outmoded, unfeasible, and decidedly medieval. Many readers of Dante conclude that he abandoned demonstrative thinking to take note of revealed spiritual truth.

The philosophical works, save for the Monarchia, were in fact left unfinished as Dante, the poet of love, turned to his masterpiece in terza rima. This book offers a reconsideration of Dante's philosophy, namely his political philosophy which is to be seen as the fundamental ideology of man's destiny behind Dante's vision in verse. The basic premise upon which this reconsideration rests is the coincidence of political, intellectual, and spiritual ends in Dante's view of happiness, and the contextual consistency and affinity between the aforementioned trilogy of philosophical writings and the Divine Comedy, in particular, between the Monarchia and the poem. Elements which superficially oppose themselves, such as logic and emotion, philosophy and religion, and especially treatise and poetry, are uniquely integrated in Dante's world view. The universal community necessary to temporal happiness is, for example, patterned upon the very institution it demands to be independent of theoretically. Dante's reasoned, comprehensive analysis of human nature, history, happiness, communication, and political life— the Convivio—was, in fact, conceived as a prose commentary of philosophical canzoni, the De vulgari as a prose commentary on poetry itself, and the Monarchia as a philosophical explanation of a political ideal deeply believed in that was also of divine orchestration. And of course in the Vita nuova, we have impassioned poetry about love presented within a rationalized, deductive framework. Hence, Dante has been called both a "poetic philosopher" and a "poet of the intellectual life."1 We must not speak of a "crucial change of heart" or "conversion" between Dante's treatises and the poem in which he was a scribe to his soul. 2 Dante's philosophical works are likewise imbued with a practical purpose to share beliefs and enlighten others within the respublica Christiana on the pursuit of happiness. And concomitantly, the Commedia is as much a product of Dante's political and intellectual foundation as it is a tale of the redemption of a faithful spirit. The focus of this study is the Monarchia, Dante's three-part treatise in Latin on universal Empire. The treatise is to be seen

as the complement in prose to the poem, a complement in praise of politics to the ethics in poetry. That an ethical purpose is at the base of the Comedy, Dante says in his dedication letter to Can Grande della Scala: 'The branch of philosophy to which the work is subject, in the whole as in the part, is that of morals or ethics."3 Dante follows Aristotle's conclusion in the Ethics that the conditions for human happiness depend on good laws and therefore on the science of politics.4 Thus he listed moral philosophy (ethics and politics) above metaphysics in his classification of the sciences and defined it as the science just this side of the study of God which directs all the others.5 Aristotle defined happiness as right moral action, activity according to virtuous behavior. Dante similarly derives his version of happiness in the Monarchia. from the Aristotelian link between personal and political well-being, between virtue in the human-soul-aiid in Hie uty. Dante's isTn JactTmajor voice" wifhin the tradition"ofclassical political philosophy initiated by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and carried on by the Arabs, Jews, and Christian commentators into the sixteenth century. Political philosophy is best defined as the search for knowledge of the principles of ethics and of the right order of human affairs.6 Virtually all of Dante's writings deal with moral philosophy, that is, the nature of human happiness, communication, and social order. They were intended to affect and benefit the masses, even if some of these works, by the nature of their medium, were comprehensible only to the "lovers of truth" or the faithful. Dante's political order itself, however, makes accessible the conditions for beatitude to all men. In nearly every work, Dante presumes to reveal truths never before explored by anyone else. He is most explicit about this in the De vulgari and the Monarchia, as well as his magnanimous service of illuminating the path of truth for those blinded or struggling in the shadows. These truths, including the most useful one about world Monarchy, are outlined for Dante's fellow men as an act of caritas, inspired by the same "love that moves the heavens." Dante's special mission in the Commedia is equally unique and charitable. He shouts his own personal

story as homo viator across the highest peaks. As he extends the individual end to all of mankind, so he transcribes the classical ideal of the cHv_bgyond all traditional, political boundaries. Dante's purpose in sharing his^STpenencesI his wisdom, and his understanding of happiness is selfless and obedient to the human desire to find the truths and guidelines by which to live justly, freely, and according to the will of God. His political prescription of universal Monarchy comes from a humanistic sense of reform, a belief in the renewability of the peace enjoyed by the Roman Empire and the order inherent in the universal Church, and a reinterpretation of mankind's unique trait and common bond of the rational imperative. While Augustan Rome is his model for active politics in practice, Christianized Aristotelianism is his paradigm for a theory of politics based on all men's desire to know. Throughout his exposure to both the disputations of philosophy and religious training in the Franciscan and Dominican schools, Dante sought compatibility between reason and faith, between the teachings of the church and of government. To avoid conclusions of a "double truth" nature, wherein logic iind revelation prove conflicting truths, Dante reasserted an Aristotelian duplicity within man: the human soul is both "intellective" and "divine" in interpreting how man should |live7jro_seejk_thejruth in order to live a better life is indeed iman's natural andlnnatejdesire.~He"can eitfteTrationalize the , truth or accept it on faith. Scripture confirmed the sublime pursuit of knowledge by the human rational soul, for in being most human, that is, by reasoning, man is most like God: "Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom."£ For Dante, truth was one thing to be pursued either philosophically or spiritually, either through the syllogistic rationalizations of dialectic or through the inspired medium of poetry. The difference, then, between his philosophical writings and the Divine Comedy is not between reason and theology or between two different truths, but rather, as one scholar has observed, betweerj "good proselind great poetry.11'9 Ejoth the Monarchia and \he~Commedia address the 'republic: ul the faithful," and

both see the practical, political requirements of temporal happiness—liberty, peace, mutual service, and the pursuit of truth—as analogous to the end of eternal beatitude. "The treatise communicates to men for whom political matters are ancillary to faith, the poem to men who accept faith as the beginning of the road to salvation and as prior to mundane law, justice, and citizenship."10 Just as the Comedy's aim is to bring all lost or errant Christian souls to a "state of happiness," the Monarchia is totally devoted to the practical well-being of everyjiuman J^ng_who ever lived. Its title might have been nioFe appropriately "The Secret of Human Civilization" or "On the Happiness of Mankind," for the political recipe for temporal and spiritual harmony which it expounds is thoroughly integrated with an analysis of why man is on this earth. At the heart of Dante's cosmological politics is the axiom that all men in all generations and parts of the world, by virtue of their humanitas, are fellow citizens within a single human community. We would identify this community as "mankind" or "the human race" itself. Dante's translation in the political treatise tej^iiuma^ajavilitas;" in the poem it is rrtost~frequently "umana specie" QX-Simply "nomo." The ideal regime that he proposed and defended was world Monarchy which would have the whole human race as the body politic. His design for peace and happiness in this world was a rebirth of the supreme jurisdiction that was Rome. This political ideal became enhanced and intertwined with his global, spiritual vision of eternal order in the Comedy. Dante's venturesome use of synecdoche assumes that heavenlike conditions of universal peace are needed for humana civilitas to achieve happiness, since only in a state of quietude or leisure individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and is happy. Life after death is therefore depicted as an Empire with God as the munificent monarch, a spiritual and moral counterpart to the earthly world-state ruled by a single, most just Emperor.11 The Pope's jurisdiction is strictly spiritual, indeed Christian. But both

Christian and non-Christian—all men—are under the allencompassing political, human aegis of the Emperor. The present inquiry into Dante's concept of mankind's purpose and his political thesis that human civilization itself can be assured only through a single world regime, sees the Monarchia as the central prose work in Dante's search for the truth of the right order of human affairs. Regardless of the critical efforts to determine during what specific years and on what occasion Dante may have composed his monograph, the text represents the possibility of mankind's salvation by political means sub specie aeternitatis. Dante originally set forth his ideas on the Empire in his political letters and in the fourth book of the Convivio following a discussion of what constitutes nobility. That his political thinking had extended from Florence to all of Italy, and indeed, the known world, is also evident in the De vulgari's investigation into the common language of all human society. In embittered exile, Dante saw both the insta- N bility and selfishness of small-scale city ancTparty politics and J the unauthorized strong arm of the Church meddling in \ f political life. Thut> he d«vult'd~himsi»irtcrpromoting a campaign \J , >' whereby a single, secular, and absolute government over the entire world, independent of the Church and papacy and directly ordained by God would reestablish the right path for man's decaying moral destiny and social order. The Monarchia is the solution to the world problems of corruption, injustice, and violence; it is the prooi of secular order for a fallible y Christian world. IP**" ^ Qtsws^-W All of Dante's works reflect a consistent view of the universality of the human condition. Dante's view that all men "(as in .'; :-'(' "omnium hominum" in the introduction to the Monarchy) are fundamentally and ultimately equal to one another because of their intellect and will, and that they, therefore, share the same final destiny of living according to God's will, permeates all of his writings. The Convivio collects together all men who by their human, rational nature desire to reason and learn at a communal "banquet of philosophy." The Commedia's story of an individual's straying from the right path of Christian virtue and

ultimate reentry intojhe fellowship of those who follow God has always served a^an Everyman model for all those who fail yet want toliegood. Even in the Vita nuova, Dante's realization of tRenRuiriah ties of reason and emotion among men makes him want to share his experience of Beatrice with the whole world. Likewise, the Monarchia bases its argument for world government on the collective, universal goal of the human race which is the exercise, growth and actuality of the potential for intellection that all human beings have. Because of this consistent theme of the universal nature of men, Dante's treatise on Monarchy must be read in light of the practical community affording human happiness and Aristotelian virtue sketched in the Convivio and the author's vision of man's immortal rewards and punishments depicted in the poem. To determine what is unique and audacious about Dante's political program as it is presented in the Monarchia, it is necessary to concentrate on the first book of the treatise and in particular, chapter three. For here, in the classical tradition of speculative inquiry, the author spells out the collective goal of humana civilitas and argues his original thesis that its achievement is the object and responsibility of the Emperor. Almost irrespective of practical implementation, Dante proves dialectically, through a series of rigid syllogisms often enthymematic, that the Empire is necessary for the well-being of the world. It alone can secure human happiness indefinitely. It alone can guarantee the conditions of peace essential to this happiness, namely the actualization of mankind's intellectual powers. A supreme ruler whose power is second only to God's must oversee that the body politic performs its distinctive human function in order for God's will to be done. Book Two of the Monarchia takes its direction from the first book's conclusion which states that the only time in history when the world enjoyed universal peace, human civilization fluorished, and the human race possessed the "ultimate truth" was during the reign of Caesar Augustus. His government was most completely at peace and free from corruption because it provided the "fullness of time" during which Christ was born.

The political and spiritual were then completely independent yet mutually beneficial. The Roman Emperor is therefore exalted as the supreme legal ruler in the second book, for the Roman Empire alone was legitimized and ordained by God to have universal jurisdiction and receive Christ. The Empire must therefore remain Roman, or at least manifest itself as a repristination of Roman order. In the third book, Dante reinforces the separation of powers and proves that the authority of the world Monarch is not derived through an intermediary but directly from God. The intermediary implied is, of course, the Pope whose power, it is similarly argued, also derives from God but is independent of the Emperor's. In terms of political jurisdiction, the direction of human society, and the administration of laws organized to guide and protect man in his search for temporal felicity, the Emperor's power is in fact greater than the Pope's on earth. The Roman Prince is the ultimate "guardian of the earth," the "curator orbis."12 The Pope's jurisdiction is solely religious, and though a spiritual responsibility may be more reverential, the political Monarch's power is absolute in terms of regulating all life on earth, securing peace and arbitrating judgment among all men. In terms of political philosophy, the Emperor rules the temporal world, and the Pope rules only the spiritual within the temporal world. God, of course, is the Prime Mover of this two-part temporal world and the Emperor of the eternal world. The imperial claim to universal jurisdiction was in direct contrast to the "plenitude of power" that the medieval papacy had already claimed and been exercising. Statesman--Pope Innocent III, for example, said the Empire belonged to the Apostolic See as a result of the Translatio in the ninth century. He proudly defended his office's ultimate right to correct and coerce by ecclesiastical censure. Still a century later, Pope Boniface VIII, Dante's arch-enemy and the one most responsible in his opinion for corrupting papal management and the necessary division of world order, proclaimed universal papal monarchy in his dictatorial encyclical Unam sanctam. 8

Dante's interpretation of secular Monarchy virtually excluded the Pope from exercising any temporal power. Dante's desire to return to a classical political structure of the past and~to^e^e?me~tTTe~T^ and State reflects a unique and original approach to dealing with Human problems. He is not advocating a new social and political order. Yet the ways in which he concludes the exigency of Monarchy and rationalizes the special activity of the human race present us with an object of study as intriguing and perplexing as his poetry. Notes 1 Marsilio Ficino, "Prohemio sopra la Monarchia di Dante," ed. P. Shaw, Studi danteschi, Vol. 51 (1978), p. 327. Patrick Boyde, Dante Philomythes and Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 1, respectively. 2 Francis Fergusson, Dante (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), p. 87. Rocco Montano, Comprendere Dante (Napoli: G.B. Vico, 1976), p. 29, respectively.

» Epistolae X, 16.

* Convivio I, xi, 18, 21; IV, xvii, 5. Nicomachean Ethics 1123a 34ff. s Convivio II, xiv, 14-18. «• Leo Strauss and J. Cropsey, eds. History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 1-6. 7 Cf. Aristotle, De aninta III, 5, 430a 23. 8 Ecclesiasticus 14:20. Cf. Aquinas, prologue to the Suniina contra gentiles. " Boyde, p. 39. 10 Larry Peterman, "Dante and Happiness," Medievalia et Humanistica, New Series, Number 10 (1981), p. 93. " Paradiso XII, 40; XXXII, 117. 12 Monarchia HI, xv, 11.

Parti Dante's Political Philosophy

The Monarchia and the Cotnmedia Dante's journey through the eternal world made immortal in the poetry of the Divine Comedy is the overwhelming spiritual experience in the soul of a fallible and restless man who finds self-fulfillment and peace in transcending his human limitations and absorbing the conflagration of the divine. But as everyone knows, the poem is also a medieval encyclopedia or tapestry of contemporary drama, artistic imagination, customs, history, philosophic inquiry and political intrigues. In fact, the j temporal framework and political message are so strong that \ Dante is considered first and foremost by some of his more ' renowned eulogizers1 as "pop* nf *+*<* roniHn wwM," "fhg f central man of all t h ? w r ^ H " ar>H " r i t i 7 Q T i nar>tf>" who 9vpn at. the summit of his spiritual contemplation of God Almighty is i primarily concerned _ with—the socio=political welfare of the Jiuifianjivorld, the transient municipal tragedies of the here and now, the pettylnjustices ot his own" nlnes'alCTIrienRbreftrlne government___ \~. One usually looks to the Monarchy for the dearest expression of Dante's political masterplan and almost just as quickly dismisses it as having given way to the more mature reconsideration of the ordering of all human sotiety in the Comedy. The ideal of the Empire is at once a futuristic conception and a retrospective paragon whose time is not right since the dty of vile Florentines seems to command all of Dante's worldly interest even in the final chapters of the Paradiso. Traditional studies of Dante's political ideas have identified his advocation of a revival of the Roman ideal of imperium and his Aristotelian notion of the natural foundation of politics, but have denied any innovation on his part.2 Similar ideas on the distinction of secular and papal authority, they, argue, were expressed by such contemporary or near contemporary thinkers as Enghelbert of Admont, John of Paris and St. Thomas Aquinas. The medieval separation of powers derives from the sixth century 13

Gelasian theory of the relationship between regnum and sacerdotium. Explications of universal peace, universal law and even a common citizenship of the whole of human society which inhabits the earth—the Orbis terrae—had been put forth by St. Augustine in the City of God a century before Gelasius. Dante's theory is typical of medieval thought, for it shares bits and pieces of others' ideas of political order in its attempt to determine a more perfect one. Although the standard critical interpretations acknowledge that political justice and a well-ordered civil life remained equally as important to Dante's understanding of the universe as his faith in divine providence, they insist that the temporary solutions of the political treatise were ultimately contradicted and surpassed by the Comedy.3 The poem offers a spiritual pilgrimage as a way other than moral philosophy, a way which looks beyond the temporal to the eternal role of human civilization. This view argues that the Monarchia's belief in the autonomy of the two powers and the ability of the temporal authority to lead men to happiness is redirected in the poem where the ideal of a renewed Church is realized and where the spiritual power is shown to dominate the secular even on earth. Recently, some have set out to prove that philosophy and poetry are "coterminous" in the Divine Comedy, and others have declared that it is above all a political poem.4 Still, this has not helped the Monarchy and its analysis of world government from taking a back seat to the spiritual inspiration of the poem. The greatest influence on the poet is revealed to be that of Scripture, having won out over Aristotelianism, Averroism, Neoplatonism and even orthodox Thomism. The uncertain dating of the Monarchia lays open the debate as to whether the works were actually composed simultaneously or at different creative phases. Unfortunately the text itself helps us little in determining when it was written and for what specific occasion, if any. There are no precise historical events or names referred to. That similar expressions are used or the same classical authors are cited as in other works gives no indication as to which work first employed them. It is possible 14

that the treatise augured Henry VTI's expedition into Italy from 1310 to 1313. The Count of Luxemburg was the first Holy Roman Emperor since Frederick II in 1250 to assume imperial authority within Italy. Given the letters written to the people of Italy and Henry himself, encouraging the Emperor's descent, many have assessed the treatise on Monarchy as a doctrinal confirmation of Henry's authority. However, there is insufficient evidence to disprove that it could have been written, like the De situ et forma, as a timeless, philosophical document in the final years of Alighieri's life. In fact, if we accept as Dante's own the parenthesis in the twelfth chapter of Book I, which refers to the mention of free will already made in the Paradiso (Canto VII), then we have proof that the treatise was at least contemporary with the Comedy's last canticle, if not indeed composed after it.5 And most scholars date the Paradiso after 1317. Even those who believed the Monarchy belongs to Dante's last years insist, nevertheless, upon a "conversion," a "discontinuity of ideas," a "moment of crisis" before undertaking the last canticle.6 What needs to be exposed in order to prove the compatibility between the treatise and the poem is Dante's subtle yet unique interpretation of human civilization as the basis of the Empire, and of political society as the basis of human life. The more interesting studies about Dante and politics are, therefore, those which recognize the strong similarities between the Monarchia and the Commedia. Chief among these is Michele Barbi, who, while recognizing an evolution in Dante's thought, emphasizes the continuity of the same politico-religious problem pondered in all of Dante's works.7 This "problem" concerns the proper goal of life for man. Wrestling against the Thomistic doctrine that there is but one end, which is happiness in eternal life, Dante maintained belief in a two-fold end and expressed this most clearly in the concluding paragraph of the Monarchia: Duos igitur fines providentia ilia inenarrabilis homini proposuit intendendos: beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; et beatitudinem

15

vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligj datur. (Mon. Ill, xv, 7) Unerring Providence has therefore set man to attain two goals: the first is happiness in this life, which consists in the exercise of his own powers and is typified by the earthly paradise; the second is the happiness of eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of the divine countenance (which man cannot attain to of his own power but only by the aid of divine illumination) and is typified by the heavenly paradise.

The same objectives for temporal life and eternal life—intellection and divinity—are paramount in the Comedy. "I don't know how one can see contradictions between the poem and the Monarchy/' states Barbi.8 This consistency is maintained because Barbi claims that Dante's main political concern in his life was not the Empire, but the Empire and the Church: two sides of one same problem. It is just that Empire is emphasized in the treatise, while the Divine Comedy treats both sides equally.9 Edward Williamson's findings also emphasize the continuity in the moral/political outlook of the Monarchy and Comedy.10 His explanation of Virgil's "crowning and mitring" Dante at the threshold of earthly paradise helps to prove this. Dante's achievement, rewarded by Virgil, is the equivalent of reaching earthly happiness. Dante has regained the virtuous path of right order in the soul delineated by Aristotle in the Ethics. He has reached the first of the two distinct goals he identified in the Monarchia and the one to which he devoted the bulk of the treatise. This is the intellectual end taught by moral philosophy which can "even be attained by a virtuous pagan," living according to the dictates of ethics.11 The summit of Purgatory then is allegorically the philosophical accomplishment of the Monarchia.

Ernest Fortin's study goes even further in showing how the Monarchy and Comedy complement one another. In his opinion, the political metaphor is paramount also in the Paradiso. The congregation of the blessed enjoys happiness in an imperial 16

city which has the form of a grandiose Roman amphitheater, not unlike the Coliseum.12 At the center, God governs directly, honored by the hosts of angels who are at once princes expressing their loyalty to the Emperor. The scene mirrors the Monarchy's vision of a renewed Roman Empire and the achievement of the spiritual goal which is the enjoyment of the divine vision. For Francesco Mazzoni, the Monarchy's two ends of man determine the "fundamental allegory" of the heated problem which addressed every aspect of human history throughout the Middle Ages—the problem of Church and State.13 Indeed, the Monarchy presents the fundamental allegory of the poem; it is "the part to the whole." The Comedy does not "surpass" the Monarchy; it is a greater work only from a conceptual and gnosiological point of view. Mazzoni rejects the notion of a crisis between the two works and says instead that there is a "full circularity" of shared ideas and sentiments between the two. 14 How can such a disparity exist among students of Dante, some all but deducing that the Monarchia is his final word on politics, completely compatible with the Comedy, others insisting that the treatise is but a small product of an early phase in the poet's life when he ventured off the right path to pursue science and philosophy? That this disagreement can be so strong is a tribute to Dante's ingegno, to his mastery of allegory even in the formal treatise. In much the same way that Dante camouflages the literal truth about the "here and now" beneath his journey "there and then" in the Comedy, he buffers his stern warning to the Church to keep its hands out of state affairs in the Monarchy. The concerns of the Monarchy are human reason, social order, and imperialism, while the concerns of the poem are these as well as faith, eternal order and Christianity. In the Comedy, Dante is warning man to learn from his experiences and direct his will and his reason toward right-ordered love. The Monarchy teaches the same things while at the same time urging a specific, practical and timely reform: it warns the Pope to mind his own business. 15 Some have described the Comedy's 17

purpose in words which equally describe the Monarchy's aim. It was written primarily "to condemn the corruption of the contemporary political world and suggest possible remedies/'16 Many have discussed the different levels of meaning in Dante's poetry. Singleton's classic study follows Dante's explanations in both the Convivio and his letter to Can Grande.17 There are four levels of meaning, and we usually distinguish between two kinds of allegory, that of poets and that of theologians. To recount the well-known definition, the former is a two-fold allegory that holds as truth the meaning underlying the "bella menzogna" or beautiful fiction of the literal base. The allegory of theologians, on the other hand, is a four-fold allegory which expresses truth also in the first or literal sense. Both of these methods of interpretation are applied to the Commedia. When approaching Dante's philosophical works, we would also do well to try to determine a third type of allegorical interpretation which has only been hinted at. This may be called the "allegory of philosophers."18 Like the allegory of theologians, philosophical allegory considers the literal level or first reading true according to faith. Beneath this is hidden the second meaning, that is, the moral or ethical teaching/and the more important one, true according to philosophy. The literal-religious truth is intended for the majority of readers. The philosophical truth is Dante's more intellectual and more valuable message, intended for a more select group of sympathizers to his personal, ethical and political convictions. What Dante was revealing through the allegory of philosophers was not a double truth, that is, a philosophical truth in contradiction to one derived from revelation or faith. Rather he was teaching the same message but in two different ways. In the case of the Monarchia, he reveals therefore the duplex nature of man and the two ends of man, one that the mass of Christian readers would understand in terms of faith, and the other which the elite interpreters of philosophy, especially political philosophy, would identify with. Dante could justify his unique claims and otherworldly threats and promises in 18

the Comedy because they were the result of sacrosanct revelation and divine authoritization. In the Monarchy, however, and in political exile Dante could not aver imperial preferences without risking persecution by the Church, even though his arguments were logically sound. For the Church, there could only be the one truth according to faith. Therefore Dante conveyed his philosophical ideas through rhetorical expertise—irony, apparent contradiction, deliberate obscurity, and double meaning. Above all, he perfected the technique of "dissimulation," the attribution of two meanings to a single thought, one apparently orthodox for the general public, and the other pregnant with criticism and reformative suggestions to be deciphered by his allies in philosophy. Much like a strategic battle plan or a double-edged sword, dissimulation is a most useful, indeed necessary, rhetorical figure "when words are directed to one party and their meaning to another."19 This camouflaging maneuver has been recognized in the Commedia, wherein there are often two hidden meanings, the first a kind of "red herring," the second the allegorical truth. The red herring is hidden, but easily deciphered, to better distract the reader's attention from the deeper, more important mystery.20 This first hidden meaning is "consciously a fiction, but a fiction about things believed to be essentially as therein presented—a belief based on the . . . intelligence of the poet."21 If we apply this "allegory of philosophers" to the Monarchia, we can justify Dante's two-fold truth about the two ends of man, one philosophical, one spiritual. There is a double entendre in the claim of the texfs conclusion regarding the Empire and the Papacy and in particular the act of reverence owed the Pope by the Emperor. That the latter owes the former the respect owed a father by his son seemed to leave open "a door through which the ecclesiastics could once more invade the political territory."22 This supposed subordination of the temporal power to the Pope is the spiritual token for the masses whose faith guides them to accept revealed religion without question. The deeper, philosophical truth, which demonstrates the autonomy and providential right of the Empire, is for the "philoso-

19

phers"—those few who by the gift of their intellect can pursue that truth of political philosophy.23 If Dante scholarship has overlooked the importance of the Monarchia, it must partially be attributed to Dante's successful dissimulation. He undoubtedly rallied support for those imperialists who wanted to reduce the Pope's authority in the political sphere. And in doing so he insulted the papacy by assigning such a "Catholic" power to the Emperor. It is indeed remarkable that the Church did not censor the treatise until well after its author's death. Pope John XXII commissioned a formal refutation of the Monarchia during Lodovico il Bavaro's attempt to restore the Empire in 1327, but it was not until the sixteenth century that the work was banned from circulation. Dante's rather patronizing cover-up of the unorthodox concepts he was advocating was nonetheless successful. Obviously the way we interpret Dante's words and allusions determines what labels we ascribe to him, what schools of criticism we identify with, what relationship among his works we decide to be most reasonable, and what role we believe political philosophy played in his commitment to the Christian Church. In any case, that the same concerns are explored in both the Monarchia and the Comedy is indisputable. Furthermore, Dante's firm commitment to the intentions of classical political philosophy remained unswayed throughout his life. The Monarchia's conclusions are pursued by a man endowed with a love of truth and a very great interest in the welfare of posterity.24 Likewise, the Comedy is written by one "to whom it has been given to know what is best in our nature" for the benefit of future generations.25 Both works were conceived not for a speculative end but for practical actions.26 And both offer Rome at once Imperial and Christian as the model community for man. Man's two ends defined in the final paragraphs of Dante's work on politics correspond to the dual nature of the Roman Empire glorified in the Rose of Paradise: just and pious, political and spiritual, of this world and without end. Blessedness in this life and the blessedness of eternal life, delineated at the end of the Monarchia, are the goals of the Commedia where 20

the former is completely integrated into the latter. This is because Dante's journey is set within the realm of eternal life. Theoretically, Dante felt, the former end is realizable in this life. Man can find felicity in this world in the Aristotelian sense, and the Monarchia proceeds to ascertain this claim; the text is not concerned with the second end. Rather the second end is the subject of the Comedy. Dante's spiritual experience recorded in the poem is the unique documentation of the realization of the second end, the only end recalled by the blessed souls in Paradise. Here Dante realizes for the first time, too, that the means to achieve the end of happiness on earth are the criteria for eternal reward or punishment. His prophetic mission, therefore, becomes a didactic one—to convince the world "upon his return" that its citizens should prepare themselves to realize the spiritual while they are still of this world. The blessedness of eternal life must be prepared for in this life through faith, although it is fully achieved only in the afterlife. Virtuous temporal living is a necessary requirement for admission to happiness after death. Thus, through his vivid depictions in the Commedia, Dante teaches that those who disregard spiritual preparation (faith) in this life, or do not at least make it equally as important as human activity (reason), will go the way of God's judgment and be condemned in Hell. Those who strive, however, to follow God and work to conform this world in the image of Paradise both in terms of having faith and fully exercising rationalistic capabilities will be the beneficiaries of God's mercy in Purgatory and eventually of His glory in Paradise. Faith is the gradual, voluntary obedience to God's will effected through human reason and free will. Indeed, it is faith which is responsible for making the end in this life into a "means" for that end in eternal life. In the temporal world, then as well as in the Monarchia, we may speak of two ends or at least a two-fold end.27 Man's end becomes one in any case in the Commedia and in the world of the blessed souls after death. The dual aspect is also figured in the griffin, "one person in two natures," who leads the procession in the earthly paradise.28 As Christ, who is therein symbolized, is both human and 21

divine, so Rome is depicted as one city with two suns, the Empire and the Church equally illumined by God. The political symbolism of the imperial city rings strong in the Monarchia where the notion of man as citizen of this world predominates. In the Commedia Dante is brought beyond wordly concerns to recognize the more spiritual role of man as a pilgrim traveling toward his eternal resting place.29 Dante makes it dear, however, that this resting place is an idealized Rome where all men are dtizens. Indeed Christ is a dtizen there: "quella Roma onde Cristo e romano."30 Beatrice welcomes Dante to become a dtizen in a dty of blessed souls.31 The symbolism of the dty with all its political connotations of justice and natural order is central to Dante's view of man. We are placed upon this earth to partidpate in political sodety, in a dty, ideally in a "world-dty," for we are all fellow dtizens by virtue of our human and intellectual nature. Perhaps this conviction is best illustrated by the encounter between Dante and Charles Martel in the Heaven of Venus. Charles calls the God-willed "dty" that man is born into the "foundation which Nature lays."32 Rhetorically he asks Dante, "Would it be worse for man on earth if he were not a dtizen?" "Yes," Dante replies. "And for this I ask no proof."33 The world-dty on earth envisioned by Dante was the Empire. The world-dty in Heaven was the Empyrean. The terms themselves are conceptually so close that they suggest interchangeability. Both are seen as two sides of one coin—the ideal polis for mankind reflects and is reflected in God's eternal empire. If only mortals would practice the virtues exalted in Paradise, then they would enjoy perfection in their dties on earth as there is in heaven. But because men stray from the right path, the dues of the world are also corrupt. Ravenna thrives as a haven for the politically corrupt Polenta family, Bologna for panderers; in Padua, usurers reign, Pisa is indeed a new Thebes, and Dante's native Florence was Hell itself: avaridous, proud and cleft by obstinate political disunity like mangled Mohammed in the ninth malebolgia. While Dante's Purgatory is usually seen as the opposite of Hell both figura22

tively and morally, it is his depiction of Paradise—the ideal imperial dry of harmony, justice and good-will—which is the absolute antithesis of the violence and fraud that reigned in the world during Dante's lifetime. Dante's despair over this evil around him and the injustice done him as well as his own sense of sin brought him to the dark forest. The forest is dearly a metaphor for the corrupt dty. Florence in particular becomes a "microcosmic image of a much larger human sphere."34 Dante's personal salvation from the horrible place by admission into Purgatory and finally the Empyrean was to serve as a model for all men in the troubled world. He explains in the letter to Can Grande that the poem's purpose is to teach men how they might leave their state of misery and be brought to a state of happiness.35 As man is above all a social and political animal, so the Comedy is primarily a political poem. In the very mouth of Ludfer we find political sinners along with Judas, and in the Rose we have Henry VII's throne next to Adam's and Mary's. The Comedy as a whole and the Paradiso in particular, convey the same philosophical and political allegory of the Empire and the Church as the Monarchia. The celestial kingdom whose glorious dtizens are portrayed enjoying everlasting peace is the paragon of right political order which Dante so yearned for on earth. Papal interference was the root of all sodal evil and error and Dante argues as much against it in the Monarchia and Commedia as he celebrates political action, social order and divine will on earth and in heaven. The repentant, individual wretched soul is likened to corrupt human sodety willing to make amends, wanting to know the truth about how to live. And Dante's deliverance through the Church in Paradise parallels the political health which could be restored on earth by the renewal of Rome's imperial legacy. Furthermore, the very destiny of mankind, that is, the glorification of knowledge, that which can lead man to truth and salvation, is at the heart of both the poem and the political treatise. The only difference between the Monarchia and the Commedia is one of genre. 23

Philosophy and the City Dante's appraisal of his native Florence ran the gamut from affectionate reverence to passionate revilement The Baptistery which nurtured him eventually deluded and betrayed him. But "the most beautiful and most famous daughter of Rome/' as Florence is extolled in the Convivio, remained proud, prosperous, and independent despite her favorite son's efforts to champion the Empire. As we are seeking to understand Dante's bearing in the tradition of classical political philosophy, we would do well to draw a comparison between his relationship with Florence and that of the founder of political philosophy—Socrates—with his native Athens. Both Dante and Socrates inquired into the basic truths about human nature and civil society, both were passionately concerned with the restoration of the sanitas patriae, the political health of their native cities, and both were victims of fabricated accusations exercised to cast them out of their birthplaces. While Dante was not convicted of impiety nor of corrupting the young, he was expelled for holding opinions contrary to those of the city's rulers—the Blacks who in 1301 were rising to power. What is more, the remedy for human infirmity advocated as optimal by Socrates and designed to go hand in hand with the external, political, and temporal reformation of Dante, was an internal, personal, and spiritual commitment as can be seen in Dante's Commedia and a careful reading of Plato's Republic.

Dante's view of human society was primarily Aristotelian, whereby the aim of political life is the fulfillment of human needs, specifically the natural human inclination to improve civilization with the rational instinct. This philosophy was grounded in the questions of sociability and happiness raised by Socrates, and these questions remained the central ones for Aristotle. Philosophy in its original sense meant the attempt to ascend from the realm of popular opinion to the realm of truth by exercising one's moral and intellectual virtues. Political philosophy, as we have said, was specifically the pursuit of 24

knowledge about human society, ethics, and the origins of the city. This meant perforce an understanding of human interaction, communication, and a questioning of the justice of the city's existing laws.36 For Socrates and the Greeks, the city or polis was considered the most perfect political structure for social organization, the only ambience in which men could realize their ends and attain happiness. Self-sufficiency, the principal objective of the Greek polis, was achievable only with other men and women. The diversity of talent, which would naturally result by several families coming together, would enable the city not only to provide for the basic necessities of life, but to permit "the good life." If the citizens were able to develop their individual potentials, they would achieve perfection—this being to live well and virtuously rather than merely to live. It was Socrates' life that was devoted to the questions about human achievement, and his condemnation and death that most emphatically posed the problem of the relationship between the philosopher and the city: the philosopher is a man who loves and serves the truth, while the city is ruled by dominant opinion, often the religion of the masses, usually sanctioned by the city's laws.37 Can the city tolerate a man who teaches the truth when the truth can be harmful to the city and its rulers? How can the philosopher live in the city if the very act of philosophizing endangers him? Certain cities in our own age have yet to harmonize society and its dissenters. Dante's fate illustrated once more that the answers to these questions were problematic.JEx^aUsicux.from his beloved Florence represented the most bitter punishment anH^piiniuTTmmliration imaginable to Dante, especially since such a sentence was unjustly imposed upon him for having supported political policies he believed to be in his compatriots' best interest. These comparisons with Socrates are helpful in that they characterize the kind of tradition of which Dante became a part. His Monarchia was at once the culmination of his reaction against the city, and the ultimate expression of his reformative proposals for the city. It was the city which expatriated Dante— 25

as it did in even more final terms for Socrates. It was the city which failed to secure peace for its citizens. And it was the city's betrayal of its own natural limitations and proper objectives which was responsible for the succession of unremitting territorial rivalries that divided and enfeebled Italy. Yet it was Dante's belief in the original perfection of the city, the ideal and abstract concept of the polis, which marks his conception of all of mankind as citizens of a universal civitas. Just as the Greeks determined that civilization was possible only within the polis, so Dante reasoned that humana civilitas could be achieved solely through the world city. It is in this respect that we may cite what d'Entreves had noted but in a different, literal context, namely that the "core" of Dante's political philosophy remained essentially "civic."38 A spirit of municipal patriotism indeed underlies Dante's political Weltanschauung envisioned in both the Monarchia and the Commedia. The prospect of a world Empire, Dante's ideal political prescription, was as much a medieval reaction in opposition to the rising Renaissance city-state of Florence as it was a stubborn, diehard exaltation of her founder—Rome. More original and audacious than his concept of Monarchy, which is fundamentally in accordance with the conventional medieval defense of Empire, is Dante's metaphysical view of humana civilitas as the basis of imperium.39 The innovation lies in the novel utilization of Aristotle's political system. Dante's Monarchy is a "world-city," indeed the World-City, for the entire world is conceived of as a single political community which, by definition, of course radically enlarges and alters the Aristotelian polis. Modelled largely after the historical Roman imperium, Dante's ideal might be described as the Romanized cosmopolis. It should serve the same ends of living well and cultivating human intellectual development as does the polis, only on a much grander scale and according to both a metaphysical and ethical imperative. Whereas the polis seeks selfsufficiency for the sake of a good active life, humana civilitas is for the purpose of leading at once an active political life and a speculative one. 26

In the Ethics, Aristotle distinguished between contemplative life and politics, between theoretical science and practical science. He thereby determined that the former aim at speculation—the acquisition of knowledge of the good and of the world in which we live—and the latter aim at applying and organizing this wisdom toward the activity of living a good life. This traditional distinction categorizes "politics" as the highest active or practical science of the good life and incorporates the development of moral virtues for right living within the polis. In contrast, speculation in its highest form is "metaphysics," a theoretical science, best achieved in isolation of human society which is considered to be disruptive to contemplation.40 Similarly in the Politics, there is a distinction between the virtue of action (moral virtue plus practical wisdom) and the virtue of thought (theoretical wisdom).41 According to Dante, the peace which the Monarch alone secures results in the coincidence of the aims of speculation and political action. Rather than carried on in isolation of politics as required by Aristotle, speculation is dependent upon political means for Dante. Political unity and its prerequisite, universal peace, are necessary conditions to the operation of the human race which is the acquisition of knowledge through the human possible intellect. This is best illustrated by Dante's discussion of political liberty in Monarchia I, xii, 8 which is not derived from the Politics or Ethics but the Metaphysics: "To be free means 'self-dependence, and not dependence on another,' as the Philosopher maintains in the Metaphysics." Only under a universal Monarch is mankind self-dependent and therefore free and therefore capable of fulfilling its speculative and practical end in peace and in unity. Aristotle's definition of the contemplative life of the individual is reinterpreted by Dante and becomes the ideal of the whole human race in an active political framework. Where in the Politics, Aristotle emphasizes the coordination of the individual citizens' interests and specific contributions within the polis, the division and distribution of the diversified work force, and the distinctive natures among humans, in the Metaphysics it is the common measure for all men—human intellect—which is nat27

urally the object of study. Dante's interpretation, determines that the operation of the human race then is based on man's common and unique capacity to reason through the possible intellect. In order to activate wholly this potential, mankind must be completely unified and at peace under universal Monarchy. Dante's interpretation of Monarch-ruled human society is "universalized" in a way found only in Aristotelian democracy, and not Aristotelian monarchy. As such, Dante brings about the unusual convergence of the aims of two Aristotelian political systems: monarchy and democracy, the former being the best of the true forms of government, the latter a perverted form.42 In the Politics, political freedom is chiefly found in a democracy, a perverted form of government in which all rule and are governed in turn, and which implies unstructured living as one likes. Ironically, Dante is in agreement with Aristotle that democracy is a deviant form of government, but he maintains that the fundamental principle found within it (freedom) is a goal to be enjoyed under monarchy. Differently, in the Metaphysics, freedom is the goal of the individual who strives to gain wisdom for his own sake (speculation) and not for the purpose of using this knowledge or effecting change in the community of others (political action). Men pursued knowledge in order to know and not for any utilitarian end. . . . For it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently when we do not seek it [knowledge] for the sake of any other advantage, but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake. (Metaphysics 1,2 982b 10-25)

The liberty of the Metaphysics is "at odds" with the freedom of the Ethics and Politics and is not meant to be part of the active or practical life of the polis, which Dante in fact intends. Nor is the individual speculative freedom of the Metaphysics supposed 28

to be applicable to an aggregate of individuals such as "mankind" (even if Dante conceives of the human race "realistically" as an individual entity and not merely nominally). This unusual interpretation is all the more novel as we realize that Dante reads the Metaphysics as a source of authority for his political proof. He thus appears to have rejected the Aristotelian distinction between thought (metaphysics) and action (politics), and, in a manner which is used to describe Alfarabi's departure from Aristotle regarding this very same point, he "incorporates the theoretical virtues within a human or political framework."43 For Dante politics aims at both speculation and action, and the best political regime, Monarchy, alone can permit the conditions for the activity of the highest theoretical science (metaphysics). Aristotle separates knowledge of the good (speculation) from its application to political life. Dante does not. In the Ethics, Aristotle explains that self-sufficiency will be found in the highest degree in contemplation: study is "selfregarding" and the only activity pursued for its own sake. 44 Because man has the unique capacity for sense perception and thought, life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking, i.e. making active the potential for thought. Man's perfection is found in the exercise of his intellect, and philosophic investigations are therefore necessary to determine the purposes and ends he is to strive for and the means by which he in turn can best reach these. Indeed a man engaged in the pure and tranquil pursuit of philosophy may attain a higher degree of happiness than anyone else, however, no practical or "otherregarding" gain will be had because of the failure to implement the acquired wisdom. 45 And yet, isolation from the company of others is unnatural since man is a social and political being by nature. "Surely knowing about excellence or virtue is not enough; we must try to possess it and use it," says Aristotle.46 The meaning here is that a capacity makes sense only in terms of the activity in which it results and which makes it what it is. Aristotle concludes the Ethics stating that as far as politics is concerned, "the end is not to study and attain knowledge of 29

the particular things to be done, but rather to do them."47 Happiness consists in the contemplation of how one shall live, but the very activity of living a good life is the end of politics. Politics by nature is "other-regarding" for Aristotle. Contemplation for Dante is likewise best achieved in the political state. Although the science of metaphysics is distinct from praktike in Aristotle's categorization and distinction of the sciences, the theoretical basis for the acquisition of knowledge and its direct application or extension into politics (that is to say, having speculation incorporated within political science), is a concept present in the Aristotelian identification of ethics with politics. Interestingly, the same conclusion of the Ethics, that capacity is relative to its activity, is reached in the Metaphysics: The objective of a thing is its first principle, and the objective of coming-into-being is the end. And activity is the end, and for its sake do we acquire the capacity: animals do not see in order to have sight, but they have sight in order to see. (Metaphysics VIII, 8 1050a 8)

Regarding the capacity of the human intellect, politics may be seen as the extension and activity of metaphysics. Dante saw and built precisely upon this connection. Man philosophizes in order to live happily. Mankind is created in order to carry out its proper activity of contemplation as well. If man's perfection is the exercise of his intellectual potential, and because man is socio-political and requires a political community to be active, it follows that the political community is necessary for the perfection of all mankind's intellectual capacity. Dante's monarchical cosmopolis is necessary for humana civilitas. World government according to Dante thus stems from this metaphysical intention and proposes to incorporate all of mankind, uniquely characterized by the capacity to reason, within a single political framework. Providing the conditions of liberty, unity, and peace (there is no cause for strife if the human species is directed toward a single end), Dante's world Monarchy guarantees that the whole of mankind achieve its end of humana 30

civilitas and is therefore necessary to the well-being of the world. Dante basically equated philosophy and political life and saw the acquisition of knowledge about the nature of human affairs as the happy end of mankind. He thus argued that man's temporal destiny and salvation were reachable by political means, although his plan extended far beyond the classical form of political association and uniquely founded itself upon the identification of man's particular capacity delineated in Aristotle's Metaphysics.48 To sum, that which is unprecedented in Dante is a metaphysical proof of a political system: the notion of humana civilitas as the "keystone in demonstrating the function and necessity of the universal Empire."49 In other words, Dante determined that the activity of wisdom was "other-regarding" and political—in contrast to Aristotle. As a result of this assumption, Dante conceived of the continuous satisfaction of the human desire to know through a common capacity of the intellect among men in a way that absorbed and went beyond the personal needs of individual souls and indeed flirted with heretical Averroism. Dante's citation of Averroes, Aristotle's Commentator par excellence, in support of his claim for the universal and perpetual operation of humana civilitas (Monarchia I, iii) exposed himself to accusations of heresy. Averroes' theory of the possible intellect precludes the immortality of the individual soul within the human multitude. This theory and Dante's interpretation of it will be discussed in detail in Part HI. Dante's version of Empire thus absorbed and went beyond the individual political partnerships which are subordinate to it (e.g. the family, the village, and so forth). The Greek polis is thereby distorted by Dante and endowed with a function totally inconceivable to the men who first described it. "Florentinus et exul immeritus" All of Dante's political and philosophical writings that survive him are the fruits of his undeserved exile from the city of 31

Florence. "Exul immeritus" is what Dante calls himself no fewer than^five^ times in his letters^50 In the Convivio (I, iii, 4) and in the De vulgari eloquentia (I, vi, 3) he refers explicitly to the "pena d'essilio" which he endures unjustly. Even in his inquiry De situ et forma, Dante alerts his reader to his forced wanderings in Mantua and Verona (sections I and XXIV). And in the Comedy, the numerous dire prophecies of Dante's lot culminate in Cacdaguida's forecast of the arrow's pain shot by the "bow of exile."51 There is no doubt that the Monarchia, too, was written after Dante's sentence of banishment in 1302, and yet this is the only work in which there is no explicit personal reference to his punishment. His most dispassionate work, the Monarchia represents Dante's clearest statement of his most passionate concerns brought about by and contemplated during his exile: the political peace of Florence, the restoration of right order and justice for all of Italy, and the freedom of the will of all men to live in harmony with one another according to God's plan and will.52 For a subjective expression of these concerns, we must focus on Dante's letters which, by their nature, directly address the personal and political issues of exile, strife and corruption in Florence and Italy, and the hoped for deliverance from these conditions through the Empire. Specifically, the letter to the "most iniquitous Florentines" (letter VI), the less accusatory one to the princes and peoples of Italy (number V), and those to the Emperor Henry and the Italian cardinals (letters VII and VIII) incorporate all three levels of Dante's political concern: the city, Italy as a nation, and the Empire—with his wrath for the city of Florence at the core. The first of three letters written on the occasion of Henry of Luxemburg's imperial descent into Italy (September or October 1310), the letter to the princes and peoples of Italy reveals an optimistic and jubiliant state of mind over the advent of what Dante considers will be the renewal of the reign of justice. The emphasis here is on the right and glory of the office of the Emperor, and the facts offered as proof that the Empire was willed by God and history recall the same arguments of the 32

Monarchia. The letter admits of some need of supplication, however, to certain peoples (undoubtedly the Florentines) to recognize this right of the Roman Prince. Dante's personal passion is expressed by his numerous cries to rejoice over the peace so near at hand and his steadfast conviction that Henry is the renewed Augustus indeed. A complete change of temperament to anger, anxiety, and amazement pervades the letter to the vile Florentines of March 31,1311. Within only five months of when it seemed very sure that the major cities in Italy would yield to Henry's campaign, Florence had become the center of all the forces in opposition to the Emperor. Dante's language is violently reprimanding, almost panicked over what horrible consequences might result if Florence continued her obstinacy for independence of the Empire and the "new Rome." Addressing his fellow citizens with utter disdain, Dante all but denies his Florentine heritage. The Florentines are the "most foolish of the Tuscans," the "most wretched offshoot of Fiesole," disowned by Dante mainly because of their disloyalty to Rome. Dante warns of the sufferings, destruction, and exile the Florentines will endure in the same terms with which he will be advised of hit own sad fate in the Comedy. He draws a comparison between Florence and ancient Saguntum, a coastal town of Spain and ally of Rome. When the town was attacked by Hannibal, initiating the Second Punic War, it resisted—and suffered great losses—for more than nine months rather than break its commitment to Rome.53 Dante avows that Florence will endure the same horrors and losses as Saguntum because of her disloyalty to Rome. Of course Dante's principal purpose in his letter to the Florentines is to convince them to welcome Henry and to acknowledge the Empire. Affirming the singularity and unanimity of the humana civilitas, Dante expresses the absurdity that there be one polity ("civilitas") of Florence and another of Rome. In his letter to Henry VII, dated April 17,1311, Dante reveals the duplicity of his feelings for his native city. On the one hand, he is one of Tuscans everywhere who yearn for peace; on the 33

other he is more accusatory of and disgusted with his fellow Florentines in this letter than anywhere else. Dante spares no patience with Henry himself who is respectably chided for tarrying so long in the northern provinces of Italy. Specifically, Dante is feverishly crying for Henry to get himself to the heart of Tuscany whose "tyrant" gets stronger with every passing day. Florence is the root of all the evil and dissension and division within Italy, the center of all the most horrible assaults against the Empire. With one heartfelt, almost deluded final cry, Dante tells Henry: "Florence—canst thou be unaware?—is the name of this baleful pest."54 Dante's letter to the Italian cardinals (letter VIII, dated May or June 1314) presupposes and assails a condition of confusion and rivalry in Rome, now bereft of both her luminaries. Pope Clement V is dead; Henry's campaign was ended with his death several months before. Dante's emphasis is on the Church and on the hope that the Conclave will elect a Roman pope, but his consistent belief in the need for two equal and independent authorities for man remains unchanged. His concern for Florence is temporarily superceded now by his anxiousness that at least the Papal See be restored to Rome from Avignon. Rome is the "common source of civility" for Italians and "the whole body politic now in pilgrimage on earth."55 This letter more than the others maintains the argument of the Monarchia that Rome is the center of the Church and the "Empire of the world" (VIII, 2). Florence, daughter of Rome, is temporarily eclipsed by a more pressing concern. Dante's adverse feelings about Florence surface again in a letter to a Florentine friend (number IX). Dante not "only expresses most vehemently his contempt in exile for the Florentines who wronged him, but also his unfailing love for his native city. Written in the spring of 1315, the letter is a reply to a friend who had inquired about the possibility of having Dante's sentence pardoned. But while Dante's yearning to see again his beautiful San Giovanni was great, his pride in refusing to submit to the humiliating pardoning process of oblation was greater.56 34

Dante's prowess as a poet, philosopher, and "preacher of justice" as he calls himself in this letter, was recognized by no one as proudly as himself. The awareness of his special mission for posterity's "friends of philosophy and the truth"—entrusted to him in the poem by Cacciaguida and Beatrice because of his prowess—is present also in this fervent letter to a fellow Florentine. In fact, a close reading of the letter points up further similarities with Cacciaguida's premonition which might shed some light on the dating of the Paradiso.ilnjhe last canticle's final cantos,_Dante indeedJbecDmes a^preachenofjustice-arid a "contempiator ofJhei mostprecious. truths// He learns to "gaze uponfheTace of the sun and the stars" elsewhere than in Florence.57 Florence would always remain^ however, Jhe most pleasant place on earth for Dante^ w h o i n theXte vulgari raUonaJizecLthat Tie suffered ur^ust exile forjiayujigJpved her top much.:58 Yet in this same work, he concludes that there must be more "noble and delightful cities and regions than Florence and Tuscany." In fact, here for the first time Dante describes himself first not as a Tuscan, but as a "citizen of the world."59 In his discussion with Cacciaguida in the Paradiso, Dante refers to the city by the Arno as his "loco piu caro." And even after Dante has traversed the planetary heavens and transcended in heaven's imperial court, he fails not to evince one last hope that he might enter beloved Florence again—and with his honor intact.60 While his personal wish was never satisfied, p f less^ hpr^djunselfishly for the eventual healii^gjjusjrity. By whatever means, he prayed that peace and justice be reestablished and that liberty be secured for the Florentine citizens. 61 Dante's subsequent cries for unity among all Italians in the De vulgari and in advocacy of the Empire in the fourth book of the Convivio, the Monarchia, and in the Comedy have the welfare of the city and especially of Florence most at heart.62 His bitter irony most emphatically conveys this concern in the invective of Purgatorio VI against servile Italy, neglecter of the Empire and thus betrayer of her own people. Without an Emperor, Italy is like a ship without a pilot, a riderless and unbridled 35

horse. So unlike the shades Sordello and Virgil who embraced as compatriots ''only at the sweet name of their city" Mantua, Italy knows no sense of comraderie or peace without imperial guidance. Dante thus assails Albert I of Austria and his father Rudolf I of Hapsburg as Emperors in name only for having neglected Italy and left Rome widowed and alone. Italy is the very "giardin de lo imperio/' and hence it goes without saying that "Fiorenza" is the most precious, most pivotal flower in that garden.63 The invective proceeds, in fact, to mock Florence explicitly: Fiorenza mia, ben puoi esser contenta . . . tu ricca, tu con pace e tu con senno!". . . vedrai te somigliante a quella inferma che non pud trovar posa in su le piume . . . . (Purgatorio VI, 127, 137, 149-150) O my Florence, you may indeed rejoice . . . you rich, you at peace, you so wise! . . . you will see yourself like the sick w o m a n w h o cannot find repose upon the d o w n . . . .

Later in the heaven of Venus, Dante reiterates his attack on Florence—the flower termed derogatively "pianta" of Lucifer— through the personage of Folquet de Marseille: La tua citta, che di colui e pianta che pria volse le spalle al suo fattore e di cui e la 'nvidia tanto pianta, produce e spande il maledetto fiore c'ha disvtate le pecore e li agni, perd che fatto ha lupo del pastore. (Paradiso IX, 127-132) Your city—which was planted by him who first turned his back on his Maker, and whose envy has been so bewept—produces and scatters the accursed flower that has caused the sheep

36

and the lambs to stray, because it has made a wolf of the shepherd.

The avaricious papacy is identified as the spoiler of the flower (Florence), having been corrupted itself by the florin (/7il maledetto fiore"). More than the German emperors' disregard, Dante saw the papacy as the major obstacle to the Empire's institution of justice. The papacy not only interfered in political matters and turned Florence against the Empire, but led astray all of modern society because of selfishness and greed. Clr&d for material riches, "cupiditas" is the opponent of justiceinjhe "Monafcfuartfie foot of all[ evil. In the Commedia, Purgatorio XXXII

demonstrates this corruption by and of the papacy most graphically through the transformations of the chariot of the Church. The tree of justice and goodness to which the chariot is joined becomes a "pianta dispogliata" because of the desecrations or calamities of the Church. The most horrible of these depict popes in general committing the seven deadly sins and in particular the popes of Dante's time exchanging favors with the detested royal house of France, again mixing Church and State. The tree of justice here, "la pianta," if we subscribe to the allegory of philosophers, signifies Florence, the once just and good city despoiled by papal greed, corruption and political intrigue, and the neglect of the Empire. As in Aristotle's system of justice to which Dante subscribes, cupidity, desiring more than one's share, is the great obstacle to justice.64 Because the Emperor's jurisdiction knows no bounds and his power is limitless and independent of the Pope's, the Emperor has nothing else to desire.65 Hence there can be no cupidity. Since the Emperor can have no cause for greed, he is the purest embodiment ("sincerissimus subiectus") among mortals of both justice and judgment.66 During Dante's lifetime, Florence was predominantly Guelph and supported the Pope. There had been some brief interludes when Guelph power there was threatened by the Ghibellines. In 1248, for example, the Guelphs were expelled with the aid of Frederick II, in 1260 the Ghibellines were 37

victorious at Montaperti, in 1280 there was again a partial repatriation of the Ghibellines, and in 1300 the Black Guelph leader Corso Donati was expelled with his supporters.67 On June 24, 1300 the priors of Florence, with Dante among them, banished in fact the leaders of the White Guelph faction as well in an attempt to rid the city of division. Those exiled included Dante's friend and fellow poet Guido Cavalcanti. Florence retained her Guelph persuasion with Pope Boniface and Charles of Valois returning Donati's Blacks surreptitiously to power. Dante was in fact expelled as a result of this ultimate Guelph triumph. Yet Florence uniquely preferred autonomy to choosing party sides. Her refusal of allegiance also to Henry VII or any emperor for that matter was more a statement of her independence than an indication of her submission the papacy.68 Dante's attempt to persuade Florence to support his preferred political authority was as much an attempt to restore and protect this characteristic independence and sovereignty as it was a reprobation of papal control. The spirit of factionalism with its alternating exodus of fuorusciti and repatriation of these exiled leaders was detrimental to the power and supremacy of either party, to the peace of Florence, and especially to the universality that the imperialists would have hoped to acquire. However, the spirit of municipal patriotism which filled Dante in no way contradicted the universality or the limitlessness of imperial jurisdiction he wished for. Rather, it was essential to the imperial cause. The Aristotelian notion of the polis was central to Dante's vision of the Empire as a world-city. Henry VII of Luxemburg If Dante thought a world-city modelled on the Florence of old was the ideal, just city, surely Henry VII was the ideal, just man to rule it. Probably nothing illustrated this need of civil support as clearly as Henry's imperial campaign of which Dante was the most avid exponent. Henry was the "heir of ancient Rome called to universal rule to the end of bringing peace and justice to all the peoples of the earth."69 In the 38

tradition of Caesar, Charlemagne, and Frederick II, Henry of Luxemburg was raised to the imperial throne in late November 1308, and officially ended the period of interregnum which had left the imperial saddle empty since the death of Frederick II in 1250. Though Frederick was succeeded by his son Conrad IV and his illegitimate son Manfred, who maintained the Hohenstaufen cause in southern Italy and Sicily, neither was elected or crowned Emperor.70 Frederick, known to his supporters and critics alike as "stupor mundi," was the last Emperor of the thirteenth century to be crowned so. Dante, too, considered Frederick "ultimo imperadore de li Romani, ultimo dico per respetto al tempo presente" in the Convivio IV, iii, 6, even though he eventually condemned him in the Inferno among the epicureans and heretics. In fact, the proud legend which succeeds Frederick reports that he refused to be crowned by Pope Honorius III in 1220; rather he himself took the crown from the altar and placed it upon his own head. From 1273 to 1308, the three German rulers Rudolf I, Adolf of Nassau, and Albert I restored the kingship well north of Italy but were delinquent south of the Alps. They were never crowned as Emperors. We have seen how angrily Dante rebuked these kings for their failure to make the transalpine expedition. With similar anxiety, he exorted Henry VII to come south from the Lombard cities where he was delaying and concentrate on Florence, the bulwark of imperial opposition.71 Henry crossed the Alps in October 1310 to go to Rome to participate in the traditional ceremony of coronation. Lombardy received him with joyous expectation, and Milan proudly crowned him with the iron crown on January 6, 1311. In the spring, however, the atmosphere changed. Gascon Clement began his devious and turncoat manipulations with French Philip the Fair, and rebellion broke out in the northern Italian cities which had originally promised military aid and financial subsidy. As Dante observed, Henry dawdled in the north trying to get the Lombard communes again under his sway. Indeed, he might have been more successful taking his advocate's advice and entering Florence immediately. Not until 39

September of that year did Henry manage to subjugate Brescia, the fulcrum of northern resistance. In December and January, he made his way through Romagna in triumph, but in the spring of 1312, Henry received a double blow: his strongest supporters Cremona and Parma turned on him, and Clement V, the Avignonese pope who had urged the Italian expedition and invited Henry to Rome, also turned on him and opposed the coronation at St. Peter's. This is the famous "inganno del Guasco" Cacciaguida refers to in Paradiso XVII, 82. Henry was crowned in the Lateran instead on June 29, and even on this joyous day, papal protesters sent a shower of missies through the windows emphasizing the severe loss of momentum in the imperial campaign.72 Among the financial and administrative difficulties which beleagured Henry's operations, the Emperor was forced to ally himself with the Ghibellines in order to gain ground against the Guelph city-states. In documents and letters, his name is found as "Henry of Luxemburg," "Emperor of the Germans," "King of the Ghibellines"—an example of the unwillingness throughout Italy to recognize and approve of his true universal non-faction aim in the tradition of Rome.73 Henry himself avoided using the partisan designations "Guelph" and "Ghibelline" but his splintering methods often intensified factionalism and eventually resulted in the fragmentation of his crusade. By the time Henry was ready to move into Florence, it was too late, and she was too independent. The entire Tuscan league in fact was the greatest financial power in Europe, "their bills of credit easily surpassing the chests of gold which Henry brought over."74 Self-assured and self-sustained, Florence, the would-be key to Henry's success, was the very "nerve-center" of the forces resolved not to be dominated by the program which Henry stood for.75 She was the epitome, the prime example of the budding city-state, the independent "Signoria" which rose in opposition to any renewal of imperialism. Like the other cities Henry tried to woo and free from division, her own autonomous sovereignty was responsible for his defeat. The growth of the city-state system was simply too strong, too fast-moving, 40

and too successful for the individual communes to direct their support to the centralized imperial order. To subscribe to the revived Hohenstaufen concept of "universality, absolute sovereignty, and sacredness," which itself was derived from the imperial system of ancient Rome, signified for the Florentines a regression to feudalism, a return to an antiquated political order, and a primitive repudiation of the new political phenomenon of independent communities. Though Henry came to Italy, as opposed to directing her in absentia from the north, his measures were warily observed in Florence as having little sincere care for Italy, as had been the case with his predecessors. Moreover, Henry's efforts throughout Tuscany could not succeed because of the opposition of the papacy there to his concept of imperium and "its determination to support the communes in their resistance to the Empire."76 During the vacancy of the Empire, the Church through Pope Boniface VIII instituted its own form of imperialism—papal supremacy in the exercise of plenitudo potestatis. In word and deed, this nepotist pontiff imposed his personal power via the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church. From the theoretical ordinance versus bull war with France's Philip IV, he emerged victorious with the condescending "Ausculta fili" (December, 1301) and the assertive Unam sanctam (November, 1302). Boniface declared "there are two swords, a spiritual one and a temporal one," and both are "in the power of the Church."77 Citing I Corinthians 2:15 where Paul witnesses that "the spiritual man judgeth all things and he himself is judged by no man," Boniface concluded "therefore, we declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff."78 De facto, Boniface engineered the military and administrative triumph of his Guelph and Black followers in Florence. In fact, most of the communes in the rest of Tuscany were Guelph and supported him. In contrast, even though the Ghibelline communes such as Pisa and Genoa generally welcomed Henry and supported the crusade of the Empire, they did not want their provincial, 41

''customary political forms tampered with" and would not ally themselves with Henry as the Guelphs had with Boniface.79 Though these cities shared the convictions of the Empire, they did not like the idea of being engulfed by a "supra-national institution" whose goals did not necessarily "coincide with their best interests" or which might deny their regional customs or particular achievements.80 In his plan to head and coordinate a vast imperial network throughout Italy, Henry was building only a house of cards. He rode from city to city, province to province, campaigning for support, either by force or by art. But as soon as he had won over a papal city or quelled a faction uprising and moved on to another challenge, the former acquisitions would crumble or riot or be courted back by proponents of the papal cause. If Henry foresaw such erosions and delegated his authority through an imperial vicarship with the hope of maintaining and defending the imperial policies he himself had instituted, often such power and prestige went to the heads of these deputies and they would organize once more the kind of self-governed little stronghold that Henry had just finished converting. Ironically, Henry's imperial actions and claims fostered the very growth of the independent signori. The historian Bowsky writes: Thus the Italian expedition of Dante's long awaited "alto Arrigo" (1310-1313) strengthened and spread the signory throughout imperial Italy. In his search for support and financial assistance Henry of Luxemburg legitimized the positions of many signori.and helped them increase the size and effectiveness of their lordships, while his appointments to imperial offices made it possible for other men to become signori. By 1313 the signory was the dominant form of government in Lombardy and was taking hold in Tuscany and even papal Romagna. The action of the empire had worked as a catalyst, hastening and re-enforcing a process that had already begun before it became the object of imperial policies.81

Henry was often forced to distribute large gifts of money in order to be assured of support in an uncommitted city, but then he would find the support sadly wanting once he departed the bribed city. Gradually his financial resources became severely 42

threatened, but as Bowsky explains, "no desires for economizing could interfere with the necessity for rewarding certain important persons" or for soliciting the military service of others.82 The sad results of Henry's politics testify to his managerial inadequacy. Whatever administrative measures he undertook were ill-fated and failed to enable him to reconcile and harmonize his universal mission, in the Christian-Roman tradition, with the smaller, flourishing city-states. The monarch who had come "to end partisan conflict and warfare became embroiled in it" because the many, strong, individual cities of Italy did not see solution to their woes in the Empire.83 Ironically, no one "talked more about unity and nationhood, and had less" than the independent Italian principalities "full of tyrants."84 By the strong and independent Signoria of Florence, Henry was seen as one of the worst of these tyrants. Henry was in sum a victim of the shifting tide in Europe. Though Dante argued he had come before his time (Paradiso XXX, 137), in effect his idealism was now outdated and at the mercy of shifty, more powerful and independent monarchs such as Philip of France and Robert of Naples. Henry is justifiably remembered in jurist history for two documents which ascertained and proclaimed the basic plan of his program. His first encyclical, Constitutio contra haereticos et sacrilegos, was issued on the day of his Roman coronation and emphasized the Christian sanctity of his monarchy. It declared in words which made the same imperial claims as Dante's Monarchy and ironically echoed Boniface's Xlnam sanctam, "All men and kingdoms ought to be subject to the Emperor" and argued in direct opposition to the papal bull that the Church could claim jurisdiction only "in spiritualibus."85 Its author's universal authority was part of the unbroken continuity of the imperium Romanorum and his power was a gift sent directly from God. The second document is the first of two promulgated as the "Pisan Constitutions" in April, 1313. This Edict on the Crime ofLese Majesty was another imperial equivalent of the papal bull and reminiscent of Dante's Monarchia as well, speaking of the Roman Empire "in whose peace rested the order of the world" 43

and whose "divine command" required that every human spirit be subject to the Roman prince.86 Despite his desire for imperial hegemony as a means to unity and peace, Henry's defenses were unable to overcome the extreme vulnerability of his audacious and theoretically appealing enterprise. Furthermore, the imperialist visions of the independent, secular new Rome which would actualize itself independently of any ecclesiastical jurisdiction, almost naively ignored the really influential authority enjoyed and exercised by the Church. Perhaps the false story which circulated following Henry's death illustrates most effectively how the papacy and Church were responsible for his failure. Although his death was probably the result of malaria contracted en route to Rome, rumor had it that Henry's Dominican confessor poisoned the wafer given him for communion at the coronation. The most honorable eulogy afforded Henry, if not the Monarchia, is certainly Dante's passage in the Paradiso describing "l'alto Arrigo." There in the yellow brilliance of the Eternal Rose is the crowned throne of the true emperor who was to "set straight Italy before she was ready" (Paradiso XXX, 137-138). "Renovatio imperii Romani" The renovatio of the Holy Roman Empire proved to be a practical failure in the example of Henry of Luxemburg. In the early triumphant months of his campaign, however, as well as in the calm, reflective atmosphere of its aftermath, several political philosophers other than Dante still felt that the Empire was a viable solution or at least a theoretical possibility for peace and unity. Often the pro-imperial claims rose out of efforts to disprove the pro-papal arguments of the Donation of Constantine and the Translatio of the Empire by the popes. The former was in fact an eighth century forgery based on the fifth century legend of St. Sylvester which said that the Emperor Constantine handed over all imperial rights and power to the Roman Church after Pope Sylvester cured him of leprosy and influ44

enced the Emperor's conversion to Christianity.87 The Translatio was a ninth century argument that the papacy had brought back the Empire from east to west, from where Constantine had taken it back to Rome, and from the Greeks to the Germans via Charlemagne. Thus it was the Pope's responsibility to invest the Emperor at his Roman coronation.88 Jordan of Osnabruck's Tractatus magistri de praerogativa Romani Imperii emerged this way. Written in 1280, Jordan pleaded for the Gelasian imperative, specifically that mankind and Christendom be maintained independently through the Germanic imperium within the Roman Church.89 He pleaded not for Germany's sake, in opposition to the French monarchy, but to preserve Christendom in general, whose charge God had given to the German people. Alexander of Roes was a canon serving Cardinal Jacobus Colonna who also defended the Empire in a German setting. His Memoriale de Prerogativa Imperii Romani of 1281 argued for an explicit separation of Church and State.90 The Franciscan Enghelbert of Admont wrote in support of a universal monarchy rather than single, independent kingdoms such as France or Germany. The similarities between Enghelberf s treatise and Dante's Monarchia are especially striking. Both believed that the aim of the Empire was universal peace, and that this peace must be maintained for the common good. Both defended the legality of the Roman Empire and felt that there should be no universal Empire without universal Christianity. Enghelbert envisioned the state as a "human organism" where the soul or king rules the body, and the citizens are the various body parts with diverse functions and working for a unified purpose.91 While this last idiom is not original and derived from John of Salisbury's Polycraticus of the twelfth century as well as Aristotle, the personal interpretations of Dante and Enghelbert are unusually close. Enghelbert composed the De regimine principum in 1290 and the De ortu, progressu, et fine Romani Imperii in 1310. In his De potestate regia et papali, the Dominican John of Paris presented his theory of kingship which also shows some smilarities with Dante's view. John, however, strenuously 45

opposed universal monarchy, but argued for the separation of powers, emphasizing that the Pope had no right to interfere in temporal affairs. John's definition of kingship is basically Aristotelian-Thomistic, and his treatise was written in 1303 in the interest of the French monarchy.92 He claimed the Church's right to temporal possessions was due to lay grants that any other authority could acquire, and not to a divine scheme. Furthermore, a temporal king has full authority in his realm from legislation to taxation of priests—something vehemently denied by the Church and especially Pope Boniface in his bull Clericos laicos of 1296.

Another imperialist who subscribed to the Aristotelian definition of monarchy as the ideal regime was the Pavian jurist Johannes Branchazolus. He wrote his On the Beginning and Origin and Power of the Emperor and the Pope in 1312 for Henry VII.

He argued that both spiritual and temporal powers were of divine origin but claimed that an elected Emperor in the tradition of Rome did not need to be crowned by the Pope.93 Because of actual contests between Church and State, such as the rivalry between Pope Boniface and Philip the Fair, and the manipulation of Henry's imperial campaign by Pope Clement, medieval political theorizing gradually changed from idealistic philosophy to dated political documentation and occasioned definitions much like the papal bulls. One of the most realistic political treatises in favor of monarchy was Pierre Dubois' De recuperatione terrae sanctae of 1308. He entrusted total capability and authority for securing the peace of the Christian world to the Kingdom of France. Shortly after Dante's death, Marsilus of Padua composed the influential Defensor pads, the most radical prescription for a secular political system. Marsilius too saw the papacy as the efficient cause of civil strife, and his natural indeed biological basis of the human community which submitted religion and the priesthood to its legal jurisdiction became campaign propaganda for the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria in 1326. Many assume that Dante's Monarchia emerged on the occasion of or as the result of a particular imperial enterprise— Henry VII's expedition through Italy.94 Whether actually com46

posed during the early successful months when Henry's "living justice" made imperium a "living reality" or whether the treatise was written to justify imperialism after the King of the Romans died, cannot be securely determined.95 In either case, Dante saw Henry as carrying on and being part of that historical, imperial tradition whose history is unfolded by Justinian in Paradiso VI. Under Aeneas, the Roman emperors, Constantine, Charlemagne, and even Frederick II, the Empire represents the same "viva giustizia" which in the heaven of Jupiter is revealed to be illuminated directly by the Eternal Justice of Divine Grace.96 The treatise betrays no specifics of persons and place though, and is written as a rather timeless theory on the truth of Monarchy. Because of some specific classical citations and references to the papacy, some have wanted to place it between the April 1311 letter to Henry and the twenty-eighth canto of the Inferno. In the letter Dante proudly recalls the words of Curio to Julius Caesar in his own appeal to Henry to come to Florence, He cites Lucan's Pharsalia where Curio appealed to Caesar and urged him to attack his native Rome. In the Inferno, verses 94-102, Dante very differently condemns Curio's advice to the ruler as "bold speech" and advocating sedition.97 The Monarchia would seem to share the sympathy of the letter, for Dante's advice in the treatise is wholeheartedly in favor of Empire. However, there is no direct reference to Henry or specific strategy advised such as a campaign through Tuscany. Indeed the reference to Henry in the Paradiso, to be seated in the universal imperial throne, is more akin to the universal theme of the treatise. The Monarchia betrays no resentment against the papacy either, specifically Clement V whom some speculate was su*jj alive at the time of the Monarchy's composition and still pivotal in Henry's outcome. Similar animosity is outspoken as early as Inferno HI where Dante sees Celestine V, dead less than a year after Henry, among the "cattivi e sciaurati." Clement of course is ridiculed as the lawless shepherd in Inferno XIX, 82ff who never entered Rome as Pope and during whose pontificate the papal see was wrongly removed to Avignon (1309). In response 47

to these specific attacks, we note that Dante is always careful to distinguish between the person and the office in his criticism. For example, he repeatedly scorns Boniface the man Gaetani, perhaps most bitterly by envisioning him in the earth holes of the Simonists along with Clement (Inferno XIX). However, Dante expresses horror at the outrage against Boniface the Pope when assaulted by the French Philip's hitmen at Anagni (Purgatorio XX). Thus Dante's damnation of Celestine's "great refusal" and the Gascon pope's greed are directed against the persons and not the Vicar of Christ. No such specific condemnations occur in the Monarchy. In universal terms, it concentrates on the necessity that there be two powers to direct man's dual end and two administrators of such powers. But while the jurisdiction of the one must not interfere with the administration of the other, Dante articulates that the Emperor must show a special respect to the Pope whose authority is "in spiritualibus." Speculation is naturally high since after a three-book proof of the necessity of legal, secular authority for the wellbeing of the world, Dante would end his treatise with such a specific deference to the Church. Supporters of papal supremacy in Dante's time and his subsequent followers who submit the philosophical treatise to the loftier spiritual poem have nearly all the proof they need in this one passage. The original element in defense of the equality and importance of the Monarchia is, however, that Dante treated imperium as essential to human civilization itself. The Church may stand independently and with special authority, but political life would be inexistent without universal Monarchy. Dante proves this syllogistically in the tradition of classical political philosophic inquiry. The Monarchia is an argument in syllogisms which must be understood in light of the classical treatises on truth. Right from the outset, Dante addresses himself to a love of truth ("amor veritatis"). His task points immediately to philosophy rather than religion ("quedam divina") and specifically to political philosophy upon which we may both speculate and act ("speculari sed etiam operari"). That which is unprecedented ("intemptas") is not an exposition of medieval rhetoric on 48

caesaropapism but the unpolitical, syllogistic, indeed metaphysical proof that Monarchy is necessary to enable the intellectual growth of men. 98 Dante's political focus evolves from a civic concern and the Aristotelian notion of a polis as a virtuous and mutually satisfying partnership. He extends this to envision an imperium, but the fundamental purpose of Aristotelian politics is not changed significantly. In terms of its natural origin, proper function, nature of self-sufficiency and goal, Dante's cosmopolis is the classical Greek polis writ large. His theories of course recall Polybius and his novel treatment of applying Greek political theory to the realities of the Roman state. But whereas Polybius did not see that the "real mainspring of Rome's imperial success lay . . . in her flexibility and capacity for growth," Dante applied this very potentiality to the Greek state." Greek tradition identified the ideal state with immobility and evolution with the threat of disorder, but Dante threw off these preconceptions for his idea of a cosmopolis. World government was to be in charge of fulfilling the capacity of the human race to understand and to organize itself in order to find happiness on earth. Furthermore, Dante subscribes fundamentally to the medieval theory of Empire which is a desire to see the classical Roman Empire revived to secure political salvation and curb the evil greed of the popes. In medieval Italy, imperial Ghibellinism grew in opposition to and as an extension of the more municipal Guelphism. Dante's imperial system sees some parallels with Ghibellinism but goes well beyond it too. His view in the Monarchia is of a near mystical, ideal secular government independent of the equal right and responsibility of the spiritual order. His message to the citizens of the world is the natural articulation of his political philosophy which argues the supremacy of secular politics in this life. The Monarchia does not go into any detail about how the spiritual world of man should be governed, but only describes how man's human, physical, intellectual, and political life should be nurtured. Though this ideal was indemonstrable practically as evidenced by Henry VII, it was a 49

physical achievement of the past which Dante sincerely believed renewable. Universal monarchy is his last word on politics and his final suggestion for the solution of both global and municipal disorder. The last chapter of the treatise hints not at physical superiority of the power which guides man's spiritual life, but at its gnosiological magnitude because it is the direction of one's soul which ultimately determines one's eternal condition. However, in the Monarchy, man's religious life is not more important than his natural concerns. Indeed his spiritual direction is not an issue. Only in the Commedia does Dante teach that one's faith enriches one's political and intellectual life by suggesting a more enduring end. The Imperial City While man is on earth he lives as a political animal, a citizen, each person carrying on his or her own proper function within the community of human society just as Aristotle theorized in the first books of the Ethics and the Politics. That on earth Dante felt there should be a universal city with its roots in the Aristotelian polis is unquestionable. As we have seen, the clearest statement on the nature of the ideal city is found in Dante's conversation with Charles Martel, good brother of greedy Robert of Naples, in the heaven of Venus (Paradiso VIII, 115 ff.). Charles explains that the social order must be made up of different natures and functions: "si vive/ diversamente per diversi offici." And as a corollary to the diverse roots of nature, he says that the success of the temporary city depends upon the natural foundation and independence of its separate authorities. If these offices are not properly filled, if the natural seeds are planted out of their proper regions, then there is ill result. This is precisely what has caused the instability and corruption currently on earth, says Charles: Ma voi torcete a la religione tal che fia nato a cignersi la spada e fate re di tal ch'e da sermone; onde la traccia vostra e fuor di strada. (Paradiso VIII, 145-148)

50

But you wrest to religion one born to gird on the sword, and you make a king of one that is fit for sermons; so that your track is off the road.

If there is not order and equality with the powers of authority and subsequent peace, then none of the citizens is able to fulfill his or her natural operation nor can the whole community find happiness on earth. The sword should not be joined to the crook, but the one power should fear the other. This discussion reiterates the lesson taught by Marco Lombardo at the very center of the Commedia. Because the leadership of men has gone awry, the world is "pregnant and overspread with iniquity" (Purgatorio XVI, 60). The imperial saddle is unmounted, and the Pope has wrongly assumed the powers over temporal affairs that rightly belong to the Emperor. The Emperor alone must guide the civitas peregrinans with respect to temporal goods. Instead the people see their sole guide—the Pope—"snatch only at that good whereof they are greedy" (Purgatorio XVI, 101). Ten cantos following Dante's meeting with Charles Martel, he enjoys the ideal vision of the imperial Eagle and the ideal justice which should and could exist on earth were Marco's and Charles' lessons heeded. Dante prays that the ill example on earth be corrected to ensure the prosperity of the earthly city. Just as God is the sole ruler in heaven—the "imperador che la su regna," whose universal "impero ne l'empireo del" commands in all parts—so the Emperor must be the sole ruler of the human flock on earth.100 Dante's ideal vision of politics is that the heavenly city be reproduced on earth. The Pope's responsibility is merely to guide the spiritual life of men alongside the Emperor. It is the Emperor who coordinates the notion of order in diversity expressed by Charles and Justinian. In Paradise, Dante looks beyond the petty worries of civic factionalism and the Church-State conflict. And there is only one final destination, a single heavenly city which he sees as the spiritual counterpart of the earthly city. The heavenly city coordinates the two communities, or 51

rather the single world community under the two orders. The poem thus tells the story of spiritual conversion in an individual soul and of his restored faith in the City of God. It is also a study and final understanding of God's justice which had seemed so disorderly and unfair in its manifestations on earth. It is a practical lesson for a concerned citizen if the model of divine authority were followed to see what could exist in the world. But above all the Comedy is a personally and politically inspired, didactic program of social order—built as much on Aristotle's model as the divine example of the City of God— designed to rid the temporal world of corruption and establish universal peace. Hence Dante's mention of Florence as the starting point of his journey: io, che al divino da l'umano, a l'etterno dal tempo era venuto, e di Fiorenza in popol giusto e sano. . . . (Paradiso XXXI, 37-39) I, who to the divine from the human, to the eternal from time had come, and from Florence to a people just and sane. . . .

The Comedy thus conveys the same purposes of the Monarchia with the added sphere of the papacy. That the office of the Empire must be filled and executed is the foremost worldly concern of both the poem and the treatise. The journey of the poem is the "altro viaggio" that Dante must take for the salvation of mankind. Perhaps it is indeed another medium in terms of the philosophical medium of the Monarchy. Dante had prayed that Henry would be the one to "drizzare Italia," to restore on earth the lost justice and lacking peace. With this dream unsatisfied and the earth still divided and bending toward evil, he composed the rationally sound Monarchia as living proof of the Aristotelian-inspired truth that Monarchy is essential to peace and salvation. He also created the Commedia in which he argues the same truth at once as a 52

philosophical poet and a spiritually inspired prophet for mankind. Here he relates his testimony to the consequences of those who failed to follow the right plan and to the rewards of those who lived according to faith in the earthly city. Dante speaks for the plight of the living world ("nostra vita") which at the beginning of the poem is the corruption of the dark forest. Upon reaching the near fulfillment of his journey to God's kingdom, Beatrice welcomes the pilgrim to "nostra citta" in the Rose (Paradiso XXX, 130)—so different from Dante's or this world's "citta pianta." This is the ideal, indeed spiritual patria which is the ultimate goal and good for all men after death. In fact it is patterned after the most holy city at its most peaceful moment: "quella Roma onde Cristo e romano" (Purgatorio XXXII, 102). Here Dante will become after death an eternal citizen in the City of God, "sanza fine cive." By these words used to describe eternal citizenship in Paradise, we are reminded of course of St. Augustine's description of the heavenly City: "Deus unus et verus nee metas rerum nee tempora ponit. Imperium sine fine dabit" (De Civitate Dei I, 2C, 29). There is a nearly identical passage in the Aeneid where Jupiter describes Rome's historical dominion without end (Aeneid I, 279). Dante had in fact previously cited Virgil's passage in the Conmvio (IV, iv, 12) in his discussion of the Roman right to imperial power, that Roman right which embodies the justice of the imperial Eagle in Dante's heaven of Jupiter. Accordingly, in the dark forest, Virgil says to Dante that not here (on earth), but up there in Paradise ("la su") is God's city and "lofty seat." Accordingly still, Dante describes Henry's throne within that true city as the "great seat" within the Rose (Paradiso XXX, 133). Henry is granted this honor because of his right as a Roman Emperor, because since Frederick's death, there had been no ruler who could even discern "the tower" as Marco Lombardo says, let alone the full city, other than Henry. Thus Beatrice's final words to Dante in the poem show the poet's concern that earthly politics mirror God's imperial and perfect realm. They also reveal the poet's 53

anguish over the papacy's continuing efforts to thwart the divine plan for Monarchy on earth. E 'n quel gran seggio a che tu li occhi tieni . . . sederaTalma, . . . de l'alto Arrigo. . . . E fia prefetto nel foro divino allora tal, che palese e coverto non andera con lui per un cammino. (Paradiso XXX, 133-144) And in that great chair whereon you fix your eyes . . . shall sit the s o u l . . . of the lofty Henry. . . . And such a one will then be prefect in the divine forum who openly and secretly will not go" with him along one same road.

The earthly city and the heavenly city are as parallel for Dante as the themes in the Monarchia and the Commedia. Humana civilitas—the perfect flourishing of human civilization—in the Monarchia is in fact the groundwork for the ideal community of souls in Paradise. Dante insists upon the plausible actuality of such a society on earth because of the flourishing of the Roman Empire. And Cacciaguida's reminiscences about society at the time of his birth—a "cosi riposato, bello viver di cittadini, fida rittadinanza, e dolce ostello"— indicate that yet another period of similar tranquillity existed in the more recent past (Paradiso XV, 130-132). The Monarchia as Political Philosophy The Monarchia is written in the approach of political philosophy and is based on the premise that reason alone—the study of philosophy and the acquisition of knowledge about human justice—is the sufficient means for man to understand his particular nature and what constitutes his purpose in life. The 54

Monarchia teaches that mankind can ascend to the state of temporal perfection, figured by the earthly paradise in the Commedia, by his natural powers, his reason, and by his intellectual virtues. This goal is the Aristotelian equivalent of temporal felicity, the virtuous life in accordance with reason, defined as Happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. In terms of Christian ideology, it is the recovery of human justice or the original state of Grace enjoyed by man before the Fall. The rule of reason over the other powers of man consists in "due operation according to the [cardinal] virtues proper to man, these being the moral (and intellectual) virtues, all acquired virtues."101 The Monarch is the overseer, the teacher of these human virtues. This definition is understood through and based upon Charles Singleton's explanation of the "ladder" of original justice—that is, the original state of Grace. This state was "a means given to man [by God] by which he could 'ascend' to the appointed goal so far above and beyond his own natural powers of attainment."102 Original justice was lost, however, through Original Sin. Subsequently, God conceded to permit man to regain the state of Grace via another ladder— the "three-sectioned ladder" of personal justice, which entails the complete subjection of man to the grace of Christ, and a complete subjection of man's reason to faith.103 The first and lowest level of the three-tiered ladder of personal justice is the subjection of the body to the soul. The second or middle level is "human" justice, i.e. operation according to the human, acquired, cardinal virtues. The third and highest level is "transhuman" justice, i.e. "perfect subjection of man to God" which "consists in due operation according to the theological [or infused] virtues."104 In the Comedy, Virgil allegorically represents the guidance of reason and philosophy to lead mankind—impersonated in the man Dante—to Eden and Beatrice. It has been said that in the Monarchia, "Virgil" or philosophy waits for no Beatrice, that is, the symbol of grace and love. The human or intellectual, acquired virtues are not attained until "sanctifying grace and charity are given."105 But Beatrice's role may have its parallel in 55

the illumination of grace by the Emperor described at the end of the Monarchia: philosophy, impersonated in the man the Emperor, is "luce pateme gratie illustrates," enlightened by the paternal grace of the Pope. Similarly in the poem, the four cardinal virtues are given to Dante only at the summit of Purgatory when they dance as handmaidens to Beatrice. The acquisition of human justice or the achievement of man's temporal goal, then, enjoys the sanction of grace. In the Monarchia, after all, the Emperor's authority is given him directly by God. And in the Commedia, Virgil's direction is illuminated by God's grace. The higher goal of eternal happiness is transhuman justice and it is achieved through the guidance of St. Bernard in the poem and through revealed religion and the Church in this life. Transhuman justice is the acquisition of the theological and infused virtues and is not touched upon in the Monarchia. In both the Monarchia and the Comedy, Dante addresses an audience in a state of political disorder and spiritual bewilderment. All of those who fail to attain human justice because of the misdirection or misuse of their rational nature fail to reach the temporal goal of happiness and are condemned after death according to God's justice in Hell ("giustizia li sdegna;" in Inferno III, 50). Those who set transhuman justice as their goal and have faith in the eternal city benefit from God's mercy in Purgatory and Paradise. Indeed the intellectual virtues and knowledge acquired through reason and philosophy are a prerequisite to the achievement of the theological virtues and eternal peace acquired through spiritual revelation and faith. The transhuman level of divine justice can only be reached after the human intellect has been sufficiently prepared with the knowledge of the limitations of human reason. In his encounter with the Eagle, Dante explains how he is preparing his own intellect for the dictum of faith ("m'apparecchio ad ascoltar"). In the Monarchia, there is no specific example of what ill would befall the human race if there were not universal Monarchy other than a general indication of the chaos and disunity bemoaned in Dante's warning "O genus humanum" 56

at the close of Book I. The two works—the Monarchia and the poem—then, might be more simply understood in terms of merely a two-sectioned ladder teaching human and transhuman justice respectively. The human level is achieved through philosophy primarily, but also with grace. The transhuman level is achieved through spiritual revelation primarily, but also after the intellect has been sufficiently prepared with knowledge of the limitations of human reason. In the poem, Dante indeed declares through the persona of the Eagle: "A questo regno non sali mai chi non credette 'n Cristo" {Paradiso XIX, 103-104). The Monarchia teaches only the former justice, while the Comedy teaches both. The Comedy is also written in the approach of political philosophy, recognizing the importance of philosophy in preparing the individual soul to move beyond the knowlege of human and divine things toward a total union with God. Specificially the first two canticles demonstrate the results of the rational journey of life. The Inferno depicts the punishment for failure to subject body to soul and passion to reason, and the Purgatory reveals the rewards for rediscovering the purity of Adam. The pilgrimage up the mountain signifies "the purification of man in a philosophic, not a theologico-sacramental, sense."106 Dante emerges atop Mount Purgatory free, upright, and whole, reborn morally and prepared ethically to rise to the stars of Paradise. He is tantamount to all of what mankind can be in the Monarchia—the full actuality of all of the intellectual capabilities of man. The Comedy represents a reconciliation between political philosophy and revealed religion, and represents indeed a second teaching ("per documenta spiritualia") in addition to the first teaching ("per philosophica documenta") which the Monarchy described. The ideal political community envisioned by Dante is in fact a Christian world-city enjoying peace and achieving human justice. Like Adam before the Fall, Dante is "both species and individual" spontaneously, a man and the whole human race; hence he is "entitled to receive the insignia of his universal and sovereign status, crown and mitre."107 57

Kantorowicz gives the clearest, most secular interpretation of how Dante represents the supreme achievement of the human race in the poem. When Dante crosses the flames of the terrace of love, "the curse of mankind was conquered, without the intervention of the Church and its sacraments, by the forces of intellect and supreme reason alone, forces symbolized by the pagan Virgil who, with regard to the individual Dante, took the place and the functions entrusted to the Emperor with regard to the whole human race."108 Earthly paradise, then, is equivalent to the transcendentalized Rome, to the ideal world-city or Romanized cosmopolis of the Monarchia, and Dante, with his intellectual, rational potential thoroughly sated there, represents the ideal body politic of humana civilitas united under the Empire. Man has a dual nature, political and spiritual: the epitome of the former is human justice; that of the latter, transhuman justice or the enjoyment of the theological virtues. The Cornmedia teaches not so much the supremacy of the latter but that the latter is the final resting place. It recognizes of course that God is also the founder of human justice, and that human justice is man's natural end. This two-fold approach is consis^ tent with the dose of the Monarchia. In the Monarchia, Dante declares himself part of the illustrious company of philosophers who were first to make discoveries in their respective fields for the benefit of the public and posterity. In much the same way as he is "sesto tra cotanto senno" in Limbo, Dante ranks himself along with Euclid, Aristotle, and Cicero in the treatise.109 Just as he has been enriched by the ancients, Dante will demonstrate ("ostendere") for the sake of his followers some truths not yet pursued by anyone else. Precisely, he will reveal in detail three truths about temporal Monarchy for the benefit of the world corresponding to the proofs of the three books. And yet, unlike the fellow pioneers he has just praised, who sought truths without the expectation of glory or immediate recompense, Dante suspects he will surely win the palm of prompt earthly recognition. Dante's self-proclaimed fame is accepted in the 58

Monarchia as it is sanctioned by Cacciaguida in the Paradiso. Dante vaunts his particular capacities in a manner which resembles the mercenary ambition of the publicists he is indirectly criticizing.110 Yet he writes on behalf of no employing patron, nor for self-interest. We may safely assume that he writes in the spirit of public reform as did Cicero who praised Socrates as the "first to call philosophy down from the heavens" and into the cities and homes of men.111 Like Cicero, Dante felt that the welfare of the commonwealth was the responsibility of all men ("omnium hominum"), not just of the few wise. The aspect of chosen mission should be emphasized in Dante's endeavor, not his pride. His theoretical inquiry quickly reveals its practical side (Book I, chapter 2): Dante's subject is political, one which falls "within our control" ("nostre potestati subiacentia"), and hence, we can do something about it actively. The Monarchia becomes a practical vehicle, an exhortative platform, which, if not explicit marching orders for Henry VII, is a cry to all of Italy to fill the empty imperial saddle. That Dante undertook this role as herald, campaigner and prophet in the Monarchia is as acceptable as it is in the Commedia.

Book I sets out to prove according to deductive reasoning, the necessity of Monarchy for the world's welfare. Its timeless demonstration of the indispensability of a single, secular governing power in the world covers its practical and contemporary urgency as a timely solution to the specific political ills of Trecento Italy. These ills eventually reveal themselves in Book HI, due largely to the interference of the Pope in secular politics ("virtus auctorizandi regnum nostre mortalitatis est contra naturam Ecclesie" Book III, chapter 14), as well as to the absence of the Emperor. Through a series of syllogisms, Dante concludes that there must be a single, secular world-ruler or Emperor to restore peace, unity and justice, and to insure proper moral direction, freedom and authority on earth. Man has two goals in this life: 1) a secular one, to live a good and virtuous life, and 2) a spiritual one, to prepare himself spiritually for the ultimate good of eternal life. To direct man toward

these two separate and distinct goals, there need be two separate and distinct guides—the Emperor and the Pope. And these two guides receive their authority independently and directly from God (Book HI). Those, says Dante, who doubt the right or ability or success of the Emperor to guide man toward the first goal and to insure the well-being of the world need only to look at some illustration in history—the birth of Christ during the reign of Emperor Augustus. History proved with Chrisfs birth under single world-rule that the world was then in a supreme state of well-being, a state of happiness not enjoyed since the Fall of our first parents. Historic fact ("experientia memorabilis"), Dante concludes in the final chapter of Book I, confirmed concretely what all his preceding rational arguments demonstrated abstractly: that Empire or Monarchy is necessary for the well-being of the world. Consequently, the imperial throne must not remain unoccupied. In Book II, Dante reveals the truth that the Roman people acquired world-rule by right. He determines this to be so not only by the "light of human reason" but also by the "radiance of divine authority" (Chapter I). Rome's nobility, legislation for the common good, military prowess, and leadership were sufficiently distinctive and strong that she rightly won the "crown of justice"—that which recalls the "crown and mitre" of Dante's Purgatorio—God's gift of temporal supremacy. For the unbelievers, God caused miracles and provided signs for the Roman people which confirmed His authorization of their claim to rule—their "mission" to rule the world as a chosen people. Various Roman writers recorded these divine signs and the several military successes and virtuous deeds which give us evidence of Rome's rightful acquisition of secular authority. Dante uses these records as the principles on which to base his theoretical conclusion. Empire is by right and in its origin Roman, and it must remain so. It is, therefore, the duty of Rome to reinstitute the Emperor because the world's welfare necessarily depends upon him. Furthermore, divine providence dictates that Rome's mission is to host the world Emperor. 60

The third book of the Monarchia is less successful in terms of proceeding according to logical argument. There are no real syllogistic proofs, and Dante's claim that the Emperor's authority comes directly from God is based on a series of legendary or allegorical rationalizations, such as the metaphor of the sun and moon for Pope and Emperor (the moon does not owe its existence to the sun although the sun may enhance its operation) and the Donation of Constantine (even if the Empire did "donate" itself to Pope Sylvester, he had no right to accept it). In the third book Dante uses his refutation of the authority of the Donation of Constantine to thrash out at three sets of adversaries: the temporal rulers and political publicists who oppose the Empire, the Decretalists, and the Supreme Pontiff himself. These opponents are responsible for improperly extending the charge of the Emperor's temporal power to the Pope and for claiming that the Emperor enjoyed only a delegated power. Dante argued that the Pope's responsibility is to guide men spiritually—not to advise or direct them in the ways of political virtue. Instead, it is the duty—and the right—of the Emperor to direct mankind in the virtuous ways of life, to direct men in secular politics. Because the temporal goal to which the Emperor directs mankind is chronologically anterior to the spiritual goal to which men are directed by the Pope, Dante concedes a minimal degree of "subjectiveness" (with the unfortunate choice of words, "subiaceat" Chapter HI, xiii) on the part of the Emperor. After all, happiness in the attainment of the former goal is "somehow ordered" ("quodammodo ordinetur") to the happiness of the latter goal. However, Dante makes it very dear that unless mankind is free, unified, and enjoys the fruits of universal peace in this life under the auspices of a single, secular authority, it will be obstructed from realizing the first goal—let alone the second one. It is the second goal (achieved through the successful guidance of the Pope) which is, in fact, dependent upon the first goal (achieved through the successful guidance of the Emperor). For happiness in this life—that is, achieving human justice and living according to the moral and intellectual virtues—the direction of the Emperor 61

and philosophy is necessary and sufficient. The Emperor receives his authority directly from God, and he alone is capable of insuring the well-being of the world. Upon reading his conclusion, we realize that the demonstration of Dante's political truths is faithful to the approach of political philosophy. For he asserts that the Pope (by spreading the teachings of sacred Scripture) prepares mankind spiritually for eternal life, while the Emperor (by serving as the example of justice—the highest moral virtue) unites the multitude of mankind to live virtuously in peace, thereby securing happiness in this life. The Emperor and the philosopher coincide in the Monarchia, and his philosophical, rational, and virtuous authority is alone capable of guiding, protecting, and making man happy in this life. ~~ The Comedy does not interfere with or contradict this temporal order. While Virgil unquestionably leads Dante to Beatrice in the Comedy, and while the human justice he teaches Dante to acquire is unquestionably "ordered to" the transhuman justice that Beatrice teaches, the Comedy is written, as is the Monarchia, in the approach of political philosophy. It, too, teaches that philosophy alone is capable of illuminating the understanding of political and temporal things. It is not written exclusively in the approach of political theology which is based on the position that the highest political teaching is contained in revelation and which requires divine Law to illuminate fully the understanding of temporal things.112 Rather, the Commedia teaches that reason, in accordance with grace and faith, is sufficient for leading a full and virtuous temporal life to recover human justice. It also teaches that the full light of grace is necessary for man to achieve the highest level of justice, transhuman justice. It is this light of grace, beyond philosophy, that is essential for spiritual redemption of the individual in eternal life, and thus for securing the second, final goal of man's happiness. There is no contradiction between what is believed in the Comedy and what is rationalized in Monarchia. The experience of Paradise goes beyond philosophy. Dante's ascent 62

to the stars and the shaking of the mountain convey the acquisition of transhuman justice. They demonstrate the results of the faithful journey through life. The souls in Paradise have transcended any dependence on reason to be one with God. Already in Purgatory, however, the souls are cleansed of their sins and of their attachment to material goods and worldly philosophy. They have the assurance—not the logical or demonstrable assurance, but the security guaranteed by faith—of reaching the "vera citta" of Paradise. These souls are certain of seeing the beatitude of eternal life which is the ultimate object of their human nature. They will pass beyond worldly felicity to the happiness of knowing God. The actual process of "passing beyond humanity" ("trasumanar") which is the reaching of transhuman justice cannot be described in words, Dante informs us at the beginning of the Paradiso. He therefore uses the example of Glaucus' transformation to godliness to describe his rising above worldliness through God's grace with Beatrice. Dante's two-fold teaching of knowledge to human justice and of faith to eternal felicity is in agreement with the Thomistic notion of the "primacy of the intellect." This is the Christian assertion of the initial operation of the intellect in the movement of the human soul in its journey to God.113 To reach the spiritual good requires a dual movement, a duality of "process" and "fulfillment." Accordingly, Dante's goal is achieved (a) through his journey toward God, that is, through the attainment of knowledge of human things and limitations (process through the intellect) and (b) through the actual union of his soul with God (fulfillment as a result of faith) which takes place in the final cantos of the Paradiso. Dante identifies the terms "intelletto ed amore" in the first canto of the Paradiso. These become "senno" and "affetto" in Paradiso XV. The intellectual goal of temporal happiness must precede the spiritual one of eternal fulfillment. . This dual procedure is eventuated via the two faculties of the rational or intellective soul: intellect and will. The intellect (in 63

Dante's case his sight, his vision) first "discerns" the object (hence the intellect's primacy); subsequently, the will (in Dante's case, his love and faith) moves him to "join with" the object: "anima conjungatur Deo per intellectum et affectum," explains Thomas Aquinas.114 Likewise, human justice is acquired through man's reason; transhuman justice (the Celestial Paradise) is achieved through the will yielding to faith. The total recovery of original justice is what is sought in the flight through the Heavens and fulfilled with the fellowship of blessed souls in Celestial Paradise. Virgil leads Dante to Earthly Paradise, which is as far as the natural light of reason can guide man ("piu oltre non discerno," says Virgil). Dante's faith in" Beatrice's love is then required to guide Dante to Celestial Paradise. And in fact, St. Bernard, representing the full impact of lumen gloriae, is finally required to escort Dante in the fulfillment of his transhumanization and in the experience of his union with God. The Monarchia in no way contradicts this second teaching of the Commedia, i.e. the Paradiso. It simply stops short of it. In the teaching of the Monarchia,, the Emperor does not unquestionably lead to the Pope; philosophy does not unquestionably lead to revelation; and reason is not unquestionably ordered to faith. Instead, both sides of each parallel authority are equal. Philosophy works in accordance with revelation; reason is side by side with faith, because men who live according to virtue (these being the cardinal or intellectual virtues) are and must be guided by grace. In the Monarchia, "it is nowhere required that the attainment of the first goal.be a first step toward the attainment of the second goal. . . . One simply does not pass from the one goal to the other."115 The Monarchia is concerned solely with the first goal of the blessedness of this life. In the Commedia, obviously, one does. It is a Christian poem and at the close of Purgatorio XXVII, Dante passes into the guiding hands of Beatrice where his will ("arbitrio") may now move toward what his intellect ("senno") has sufficiently discerned: 64

libero, dritto e sano e tuo arbitrio, e fallo fora non fare a suo senno. (Purgatorio XXVII, 140-141) Free, upright and whole is your will, and it would be wrong not to act according to its pleasure.

The full acquisition of human justice in Dante's soul is made clear by the word "dritto" alone. At the beginning of the journey the "diritta via" was lost, but upon entrance into the earthly paradise, the soul is made upright once more. Although the Monarchia stops short of the Commedia and studies the acquisition of human rectitude in mankind as oppposed to the spiritual fulfillment within individual souls (transhuman justice), the groundwork for this journey, including Dante's understanding of the primacy of the intellect, is to be found in the philosophical treatise. What Dante comes to understand as the wholeness of his individual soul made free and upright, is equivalent to the total fulfillment of human potential ("tota simul in actu") by the human race described in the Monarchia. The Aristotelian process of potency and act, the natural condition of motus ad formam, represented and reinterpreted in the Monarchia as the intellectual perfection of humana civilitas, is parallel to the Christian duality of process and fulfillment, the spiritual achievement of perfection represented and reinterpreted in the Comedy as Dante's journey to salvation and to the repossession of justice. But whereas the salvation of the personal soul through Christ could only apply to Christian believers, philosophic self-redemption "was within the grasp of all men—including Scythians and Garamantes mentioned in the Monarchia."116 In the Monarchy, Dante speaks of an identity of proper function and goal for human civilization, or at least of a confusion of means and end. The terms "finis" and "operatio" are in fact interchangeable in I, iii as will be illustrated later (see Appendix). In the Commedia regarding the Christian notion of process and fulfillment in the soul, there is not an identity, 65

but a "duality" of actions, two separate actions chronologically distinct in time and execution. The Comtnedia's "primacy of the intellect" (process) discerning what the will eventually moves toward might be compared to the "capacity to apprehend by means of the possible intellect" that characterizes mankind's potential in the Monarchy. Dante is not concerned with the direction of man's spiritual will or religious faith in the Monarchy, however. The multitude of mankind fulfilling its proper temporal function is the result of a logical necessity, the process of the intellect alone and not a personal desire or "will" beyond intellecting. For this reason, Dante can successfully equate the "operation" of the multitude of mankind with its "end," for actualizing man's capacity for wisdom is the goal of man in this world. Dante is dealing with the faculty of the intellect alone in the Monarchy, for this faculty alone is involved in mankind's proper function in life. The Emperor's responsibilities and expertise do not extend beyond secular politics and temporal virtues, and therefore, there is no reason to speak of an end or responsibility in the afterlife. That may be left to the Pope as surely Dante would have demonstrated if he had written an additional, coordinate treatise, Pontificatio. Instead he chose to write the Comedy and conclude it with the Paradiso which, in its own right, is a kind of "proof" of the necessity of Christian guidance resting on the articles and principles of Christian faith. The Paradiso celebrates the capacity of individual souls to reach fulfillment through the grace and glory of God and Christian faith, and well beyond the philosophical and political guidance of the universal Monarch. With the Paradiso, the former end of mankind becomes completely integrated into the single end of personal salvation. Mankind as a whole may achieve temporal happiness, but, alas, not eternal beatitude. The Commedia as Political Theology In the Monarchic Dante conceived of the world as a single community with its citizen-parts working together to satisfy the needs of the whole group, to perform their individual functions 66

in pursuit of the aggregate end. The Monarch is imposed as a necessary guarantor of peace which is necessary to this collective functioning. In the Purgatorio, Marco Lombardo summarizes what Dante argued in the treatise: the Monarch is the guardian of the human laws which bridle men's passions: "convenne legge per fren porre; convenne rege aver." Indeed, because of man's vulnerable nature, it is necessary to have two guides, two "suns" metaphorically, the Emperor as a guide in secular virtue, the Pope as a spiritual guide. Marco's discourse immediately precedes the central cantos of the entire poem, where Dante and Virgil philosophize about God's love and reflect on the love of philosophy. Marco answers Dante's anxious questions about political philosophy and the loss of virtue among men, citing men's needful bits and curbs. Because of the Original Sin, man is as easily lured to the right side of moral and spiritual virtue as he is to evil by the devil's hook. What is more, the disintegration of the separation of powers corrupts the offices of the ruler and the shepherd. With ill-guidance, the people are led astray. Thus Dante cries for the imperial saddle to be filled and warns of the anarchy which would result if there were no one to "put his hand" upon the bridling laws. And as the Emperor is necessary as a check of corruption and to guarantee peace in temporal politics, so is the Pope necessary as the figurehead of spiritual guidance. In the Comedy, the defense of the shepherd of the Church is quite different, however, from that of the Emperor in the political treatise. It is Beatrice who explains the role of the Pope in her exhortation to Christians in the Paradiso: . . . siate fedeli, e a rid far non bieci, . . . Siate, Cristiani, a muovervi piu gravi: non siate come penna ad ogne vento, e non crediate ch'ogne acqua vi lavi. Avete il novo e '1 vecchio Testamento, e '1 pastor de la Chiesa che vi guida; questo vi basti a vostro salvamento. (Paradiso V, 65; 73-78)

67

Be faithful, and with that be not perverse, . . . Be graver, you Christians, in moving. Be not like a feather to every wind, and think not that every water may cleanse you. You have the New Testament and the Old, and the Shepherd of the Church, to guide you: let this suffice for your salvation.

Beatrice speaks to individual Christians and her message is not a rationalized one. It is based solely on faith. In this passage, the Pope is seen as the Vicar of Christ, God's direct representative on earth and guide for man's spiritual life. The importance of the Church continues through the story of salvation through Christ in Canto VII of the Paradiso. The Church of Christ is God's gift to man, God's way to restore man to his full life of transhuman justice lost through the Fall. The Pope's guidance, like the coming of Christ Himself, was established to make man sufficient to uplift himself again, i.e. to the state of Grace. Beatrice details that there are actually two ways, "due vie" used by God to correct human nature, these being mercy and truth.117 Surely these paths refer also to the two authorities of the Empire and the Church. What is more, the Empire has the responsibility of defending the Church. After all, the Empire under Augustus provided the atmosphere of peace for Christ's birth. While the Church should never be entrusted with the responsibility of regulating men's public lives, it was endowed with that of guaranteeing man's ultimate happiness. Just as the Pope and Emperor, then, complement one another, so philosophy is a necessary complement to revelation. The Paradiso is Dante's answer to the insufferable questions about God's vengeance and rewards, and it transcends his faith in the political solution of the here and now. Indeed some have interpreted that Dante's confusion of the mission of a man (the Emperor) with that of Christ might be the error for which Beatrice rebukes Dante in Canto XXXI of the Purgatorio."8 Dante doesn't abandon hope in the necessity and coming of the political Empire but he does seem to shift his sights from the Roman model of the past, sorely needed and expected for 68

the present, to an unknown ruler of spiritual proportions who will come one day in the future. Witness the Veltro prophesied by Virgil who will come to reestablish the fullness of time on earth and the DXV announced by Beatrice. The temporal Monarch must come because the Eagle of the Empire, the sacrosanct sign of God's justice and proof of God's actual representation on earth of political right, must continue its mission of establishing justice on earth. Indeed, in particular, the cantos of the lovers of justice on earth (Paradiso XIX-XXI), where Dante encounters the image of the Eagle, are the essence of his shift from reason to faith, from political philosophy to political theology. It is the teaching of this political manifestation which is responsible for his final understanding of the human condition. Through the Empire is God's justice reflected on earth. As early as Purgatorio III, however, Dante is taught by Virgil, whom the medieval world considered herald of the Empire, to realize that the Empire and human reason are not the means to eternal beatitude depicted in the Paradiso. "Be content with the quia," with reason, to find happiness in this life. To fulfill man's second goal, he needs religion and faith and the guidance of the Church. Indeed he needs the experience of the journey illustrated in the Comedy. The Paradiso proceeds to teach that man's intellect cannot lead him to salvation but that revelation with reason will lead mankind to transhuman justice. Li si vedra cid che tenem per fede, non dimostrato, ma fia per s£ noto a guisa del ver primo che l'uom crede. (Paradiso II, 43-45) There that which we hold by faith shall be seen, not demonstrated, but known of itself, like the first truth that man believes.

One will achieve this goal if one maintains his faith in life everlasting and in happiness beyond the temporal sphere. Because 69

of this very faith which remained but dimly lit in Dante's soul at the beginning of his journey, Beatrice excuses him for the error for which she earlier rebuked him. She herself realizes: Parere ingiusta la nostra giustizia ne li occhi d'i mortali, 6 argomento di fede e non d'eretica nequizia. {Paradise IV, 67-69) For our justice to seem unjust in mortal eyes is argument of faith, not of heretical iniquity.

She recognizes that Dante's philosophical inquiries were the result of a desire to reconcile faith and philosophy; her understanding of his eagerness pardons Dante of the philosophic boldness of the Monarchia, the boldness which similarly condemned Curio in the Inferno, because the repented Dante realizes . . . che gia mai non si sazia nostro intelletto, se '1 ver non lo illustra di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia. (Paradiso IV, 124-126) . . never can our intellect be wholly satisfied unless that Truth shine on it, beyond which no truth has range.

Accordingly, Beatrice pardons Dante through God's mercy and the special dispensation of the Holy Church. Dante's spiritual journey is his penance, evidence of his faith beyond worldly things. Dante is again rebuked, however, for his impertinent inquisitiveness about God's justice in the heaven of Jupiter by the very souls who followed God's justice on earth. These souls collectively make up the "sign" of the Empire which for Dante 70

represents the symbol of unity in mankind. Accordingly, Dante asks the Eagle for an explanation to the problem of the universality of salvation. Why is it that a virtuous man without sin, whose only shortcoming is to be born without a knowledge of Christ, must be condemned? The Eagle's reply to Dante representing mankind is an "outburst against man's very pride and presumption in asking any such question in the first place."119 "Who do you think you are to ask such questions?" retorts the Eagle to Dante's inquiry about God's decision to condemn. Here again Dante is made aware of the insufficiency of human reason, of its inability to understand about Divine Judgment. Man's vision simply cannot of its own nature be capable of understanding. Only faith in God's righteousness resolves such mysteries. Gradually Dante's questions are considered, and the Eagle identifies the Christian faith as that which rewarded with salvation the souls who under other circumstances would have been condemned. These are, for example, the souls of Trajan and Ripheus who, though pagans, believed in Christ to come and met the requirements, so to speak, for salvation. Nevertheless, Dante's full understanding is left unsatisfied at this point in his journey and his "plea to God to make His justice intelligible is met, in the main, by an assertion of its inscrutability."120 The Eagle is unquestionably a reminder of the universality of Empire advocated in the Monarchia, not only because of its political nature, but because its form portrays the unity of humana civilitas, knowing all that mankind can know. In addition, it is a manifestation of the ultimate subordination of all things to God's will as it too sets its gaze upon the Light of Paradise. Bergin observes that in most encounters in the Comedy, Dante meets a multitude of souls, and then from his multitude an individual emerges to speak to the Pilgrim.121 In the Eagle of Justice, however, multitude and individual merge as it speaks as one soul to Dante about salvation. This singular image represents the unity of mankind which Dante once thought could be assured only in God's Empire on earth. Here 71

he learns "how dear it costs not to follow Christ" and how limited this knowledge truly is. Only when Dante's desire for eternal bliss is fulfilled in the Empyrean is his thirst for knowledge quenched and man's full capacity for understanding actualized. Even there his rhetoric requires the inscrutabilityjrf ourjfaith in accepting wliat Dante leadle"i> UuougFTnislinistiatiicaiis. For example, Dante says, "I believe I saw God"—"presunsificcarlo viso," "la forma universal di questo nodo credo ch'i' vidi."122 One who has been to the kingdom of God, as Dante, and returns to this world has not the power to relate completely the things seen. So declares Dante in the opening canto of the Paradiso. The reader of the J2Pjeju.mju^jMtherefore be a jrfgrim himselfLand have taith to ..accept what Dante saw as true.^ In this spiritual teaching, Dante's Commedia, in particular the Paradiso, becomes a manifestation of political theology, wherein revealed religion or faith is shown to be the only guidance for man in this world to truth and happiness.JDivme justice must be_ established on earth if man wants to find a remedyTcTthe world's infirmity. Human motivation and philosophy alone cannot purify the spirit for entrance into the City of God; only the will ("sol voler") can do this.123 The lesson taught by the Eagle, although a political symbol, is perhaps the most important theological lesson in the whole Comedy, that of personal and spiritual salvation. Through the Imperial Eagle, Dante learns also of the urgency with which God's righteousness must be restored and mirrored on earth, the means being universal Monarchy. Dante prays the secure and joyful kingdom embodied in the paradisiacal Empire may be copied and calm the tempest on earth. Dante uses different images to convey the sense of disorder and disunity on earth. One of these is used both in the Monarchia and the poem, and illustrates the contrast between worldly confusion and heavenly harmony. The image of the "threshing floor" or market place of earth ("aiuola" in Italian, "areola" in Latin) is invoked in the Monarchia as the ground where the Roman Prince is called to establish peace and unity. 72

ut scilicet in areola ista mortalium libere cum pace vivatur. (Monarchia III, xv, 12) His task is to provide freedom and peace for men as they pass through the testing-time of this world.

Similarly, Dante looks down from Paradise upon this testing place where mortals are made so fierce with one another {Paradiso XXII, 151). The world has become the market place of life where men fight to buy and sell happiness in the form of material goods. Political society has corrupted partnership and so each man in the earthly city has less happiness the more divided these goods become. "Through partnership, the share is made less," explains Virgil in Purgatorio XV, 50ff. "L'aiuola" has a second, more simple meaning, that of small garden or "flowerbed." The metaphor of the world has even more significance if we reconsider Dante's description of Italy in Purgatorio VI. He called Italy the "garden of the Empire" and alluded to Florence, heiress of Rome which is also known as Flora, as the central flower in that garden. The whole planet of earth then may be reduced to the metaphor of a single city corrupted by pride, envy, and avarice, just like Florence. Conversely to political society, in the heavenly city the more citizens there are to share the good of God's love, the richer each soul becomes. In the Paradiso, Dante reveals how the truest form of happiness is to be found in the City of God and in the acquisition of transhuman justice. There, all citizens— Guelphs, Ghibellines, and Florentines alike—may find the harmony, justice, and peace that Dante so earnestly sought to secure in the world-government of this world. Notes 1 Respectively, Erich Auerbach, Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt (Berlin: V. der Gruyter, 1919); John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, quoted in W. Anderson, Dante the Maker (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 3; Thomas Bergin, A Diversity of Dante (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969), p. 44.

73

2 For example, A. P. d'Entreves, Dante as a Political Thinker (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 75 ff.; Donald Nicholl, introduction to Monarchy (London: Weidenfeld, 1954), pp. vii-viii. 3 The following critics emphasize a difference in attitude between the treatise and the Comedy and tend to lump the former together with the doctrinal De vulgari and the philosophical Convwio all abandoned for the poem: En'enne Gilson, Dante and Philosophy, translated by David Moore (Gloucester Peter Smith, 1968), pp. 278-279; Bruno Nardi, Saggi di filosofia dantesca (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1967), pp. 255 ff.; J. Goudet, Dante et la politique (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1969), pp. 190-191; Colin Hardie, "A Note on the Chronology of Dante's Political Works," in Monarchy (London: Weidenfeld, 1954), pp. 117-121, among others. 4 George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante and Goethe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1910), p. 89; Giovanni Cecchetti, "An Introduction to Dante's Divine Comedy" in Approaches to Teaching Dante's "Divine Comedy," Carole Slade, ed. (New York: Modem Language Association, 1982), p. 42, among others. 5 The interpolation runs: "sicut in Paradiso Comediae iam dixi" (Mon. I, xii, 6). Cf. note by P. G. Ricd in definitive edition, Societa dantesca italiana. ' For example, Kenelm Foster, The Ttoo Dantes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 158-166,196-197, 239 ff. Cf. A. E. Quaglio, "Sulla cronologia e il testo della Divina Commedia," in Cultura e Scuola, Vols. 13-14 (1965), pp. 241-245. See also Francesco Ercole, "Le tre fasi del pensiero politico di Dante," in Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, suppl. 19-21 (1921), pp. 481 ff. 7 Michele Barbi, Problemi fondamentali per un nuovo commento della Divina Commedia (Firenze: Sansoni, 1956), pp. 26, 52. •Ibid. • Ibid., pp. 106-107. 10 Edward Williamson, "De beatitudine huius vite," Dante studies, Vol. LXXVI (1958). 11 Ibid., p. 9. Cf. the discussion of the crown and the mitre in Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 487-495. 12 E. L. Fortin, Dissidence et philosophic au moyen dge (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1981), pp. 124-125. 13 Francesco Mazzoni, "Teoresi e prassi in Dante politico," in Monarchia (Torino: Edizione RAI, 1966), pp. lxxxvii-xcii. 14 Ibid., p. xcv. 15 Fortin must be credited with the following quip delivered at a conference on medieval political philosophy at Harvard University, May 1981: "Dante doesn't want the Pope to go out of business, just mind his own business!" " Cecchetti, p. 43. 17 See Charles Singleton's classic work Commedia: Elements of Structure (Cambridge, Mass!: Harvard University Press, 1954) and reconsiderations by R. H. Green, "Dante's 'Allegory of the Poets' and the Medieval Theory of Poetic Fiction," Comparative Literature IX (1957) and Aleramo Lanapoppi, "La Divina Commedia: allegoria 'dei poeti' o allegoria 'dei teologi'?" Dante Studies LXXXVI (1968). 18 Fortin, pp. 77-93. Fortin cites others who have alluded to Dante's philosophical allegory. '» Convwio HI, x, 6-8.

74

20

P. Guiberteau quoted in Fortin, p. 147. « B. Stambler, Dante's Other World (New York: 1957), p. 69. 22 Marjorie Reeves, "Marsilio of Padua a n d Dante Alighieri," in Perspectives of Political Philosophy, Vol. 1, edited by James D o w n t o n a n d David Hart ( N e w York: Holt, Rinehart a n d Winston, 1971), p . 303. 23 Cf. Letter to Can Grande (Epistolae X, 2) in w h i c h Dante m a k e s t h e distinction between the "common herd" ("grex" and "vulgus") and those "who have vigor of intellect and reason" ("Intellectu ac ratione vigentes"). 24 Monarichia I, 1. 25 Epistolae X, 2; Cf. Paradiso XXX1I1, 7 2 . 26 Monarchia I, 11 a n d Epistolae X, 16. 27 In the last chapter of the treatise (III, xv, 7) Dante says there are "duos fines" ("beatitudine huius vite" and"beatitudine vite ecterne"); shortly thereafter (III, xv, 10) he says man's end is a "duplex finis," implying that it is a single yet "two-fold" end. 28 Purgatorio XXX, 8 1 . » Barbi, p. 106. 30 Purgatorio XXXII, 102. 31 "Nostra titta" in Paradiso XXX, 130. 32 Paradiso VIII, 143. 33 Paradiso VIII, 115-117. 34 Cecchetti, p . 44. 35 Epistolae X, 15. 36 Strauss and Cropsey, pp. 1-6. 37 Ibid. A l s o L. Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957). Cf. Republic IV, 445c-449a; V. 475d-480a. Cf. Politics HI, 4 , 1276b 16-1277b 33; III, 6 1278b 6-1279b 10. 38 d'Entreves, pp. 10-11. 39 Ibid., p. 45. d'Entreves agrees that Dante's "doctrine of justice, of freedom of law, of concordia, are all consonant with medieval philosophical and legal argumentation." « Ethics VI in general and X.8 1178b 5ff. 41 Harry Jaffa, "Aristotle," History of Political Philosophy, ed. by Strauss and Cropsey, p. 127. 42 Ethics VIII, 10. 43 Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. xii-xiii. 44 Ethics X, 7 1117a 26-35. 45 Ethics X, 8 1179a 3 0 . Jaffa, p . 128 identifies t h e activity of w i s d o m as"selfregarding" a n d n o t "other-regarding." * Ethics X, 9 1179b 1. 47 Ibid. 48 Larry Peterman is the only scholar as far as I k n o w w h o has s e e n a link b e t w e e n the Monarchia and Aristotle's Metaphysics, although h i s article "Dante's Monarchia a n d Aristotle's Political Thought," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, Vol X (1973), centers more o n t h e comparison b e t w e e n Dante's discussion of unity in I, xii and t h e "best m a n " in HI, xi and Aristotle's notion of "the o n e " in the Metaphysics. Where t h e Pope a n d t h e Emperor are reducible to t h e c o m m o n denominator of " m a n " a n d h i s particular faculty to reason, this too derives from t h e discussion in the Metaphysics o n the capacity for thought which is c o m m o n to man. Dante's Emperor (his best m a n ) is

75

"denoted b y a capacity that exists in all m e n , " says Peterman, p p . 37-40; this is his intellect w h i c h at once distinguishes o n e m a n from another m a n a n d at the s a m e time serves as a unifying measure for the h u m a n species as a w h o l e . The capacity to reason can group together "all m e n qua m e n " a n d qua a single body. Dante m a y faithfully follow Aristotle's teleology, but h e alters Aristotle's political system. A s Peterman says, "Aristotle's distinction b e t w e e n contemplative and political life . . . disappears in t h e Monarchia, w h e r e ruling virtue is more in line w i t h the theoretical life depicted in t h e Physics and Metaphysics than the practical life depicted in the Ethics and Politics" (p. 23). *•> d'Enrreves, p. 47. 90 In t h e b o d y of letter II to t h e C o u n t s Oberto a n d G u i d o d a Romena a n d in t h e titles of his letters to Cino da Pistoia (III), to the Princes and Peoples of Italy (V), to the iniquitous Florentines (VI), a n d to t h e Emperor Henry VII (VII). 91 Paradiso XVII, 27, 55-57. Cacciaguida, Dante's ancestor encountered in t h e Heaven of Mars, likens Dante's exile to the case of falsely blamed Hippolytus whose stepmother had him expelled from Athens. Cf. the other prophecies of Dante's fate by Ciacco, Farinata, Vanni Fucci, Brunetto Latini, and Sordello. 92 Vinay, p. xxxi, argues that the Monarchia "non e affatto calma" against what G. Solan says in "11 pensiero politico di Dante," Rivista storica italiana, Vol. XL (1923), p. 408 and what A. Solmi argues in "La Monarchia di Dante," Nuova antologia (1935), p. 323 who presuppose the "calma dottrinale" of the work, written in a period of relative "calma poHtica." I, too, must bear witness to the calm formality of the treatise, although I wish to point out that the De vulgari, similarly formal is its genre and linguistic vehicle, nevertheless reflects Dante's personal anxiety in exile in I, vi. It would appear, then, that the lack of anxiety and fervor in the treatise is not necessarily due to the objectiveness of its form alone, but has to do with the time of its composition and the author's resolute faith in the Imperial solution. » See Toynbee, p. 72, n. 1. » Epistolae VII, 7. » Epistolae VIII, jlO, 11. 56 Cf. Inferno XIX, 17. Toynbee, p. 154, n. 4, explains the ceremony of "oblatio" for c o n d e m n e d political offenders. It involved wearing a sack-cloth a n d a paper mitre a n d offering oneself to the Baptist. Dante's friend had suggested the oblation as a m e a n s of obtaining amnesty. 57 There are additional similarities b e t w e e n letter IX and Cacciaguida's prophecy in Paradiso XVII. Generally, in both t h e letter a n d t h e canto Dante refers to h i s m a k i n g manifest t h e fruits of his labor and study. Specifically, h e speaks of t h e w r o n g d o n e him, h e refers to his far-reaching fame and honor, a n d h e alludes to his w a n d e r i n g s in exile through other cities with t h e image of eating t h e bread of others—bread w h i c h m a y taste salty because received a s alms. ** De vulgari eloquentia I, vi, 3. »7Wd. *° See Paradiso XXV, 1-9 where Dante reflects on "il bello ovile" from which he is shut out. *« Cf. Epistolae I to Cardinal Niccolo da Prato in which Dante explains that the civil war between his White partisans and the Blacks was waged with the sole intent of restoring peace and civil rights. d'Entreves, p. 32, notes that in this early phase of exile (the letter is dated in the spring of 1304), Dante still respected papal authority over the

76

city's politics, and in fact was willing to trust the ability of the addressee, emissary of Pope Benedict XI, to bring about peace and order. a From the De vulgari, I am thinking specifically of the passage which describes the "vulgare illustre" as "curiale" in I, xviii, 5. d'Entreves, appendix, p. 76-97, has provided the best interpretation of the phrase "gratioso lumine rationis" in this passage, which is the feature that unites the people of Italy in this language. Dante's first mentions of imperium are in the Convivio IV, iv, v, and ix. 63 The relationship of Florence to R o m e a n d the garden of the Empire i s m a d e m o r e interesting if w e consider William A n d e r s o n ' s explanation of a Roman tradition, Dante the Maker (Boston: Routledge a n d Kegan Paul, 1980), p . 452, n. 48: " W h e n t h e R o m a n s founded a dry they would give it a common name, a sacral name, and a secret name. In the case of Rome herself, the common name was Roma, the sacral name was Flora, and the secret name was Amor, an anagram of Roma. . . . The sacral name of Flora gives a new origin for the naming of Florence and enhances the Florentines' view of their city as the heiress of Rome." 64 In I, xi D a n t e refers the reader to the fifth b o o k of t h e Ethics w h e r e in fact Aristotle talks about the different kinds of justice and the proper distribution of things. See V, 1-4 and especially 1131b 25. 65 Monarchia I, xi. ** Monarchia I, xiii, 8. 67 Ferdinand Schevill, Medieval and Renaissance Florence, Vol I ( N e w York: Harper and Row, 1963), p p . 102-104. 68 d'Entreves, p. 22 and p. 104, n. vii, provides the drafts of protest against Emperors Rudolf I a n d Henry VII which assert "che mai per niuno signore i Fiorentini inchinarono le c o m a . " «• Schevill, p. 182. 70 Manfred w a s killed in the Ghibelline defeat at Benevento in 1266 b y France's Charles of Anjou. Dante encounters his soul o n the shores of the Antepurgatory a m o n g the excommunicated. 7 > See Epistolae VII to Henry, written April 17,1311. For the background o n Frederick II a n d Henry VII, I have consulted Thomas C. Van Q e v e , The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982), p p . 1-7, 130-157; William Bowsky, "Dante's Italy: A Political Dissection" in The Historian, Vol. XXI (1958), p p . 82-100; Bowsky, "Florence and Henry of Luxemburg, King of the Romans: The Rebirth of Guelfism" in Speculum, Vol. XXXHI (April, 1958), p p . 177-203; Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), p p . 107-211. ™ Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy, p. 167. »Ibid., p . 111. 7 « Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. II, edited b y C W. Previte-Orton (CambridgeCambridge University Press, 1977), p . 781. 75 Schevill, p. 184. 76 Van Cleve, pp. 3, 130. 77 T h e s e bulls are reproduced i n The Crisis of Church and State: 1050-1300, e d i t e d b y Brian T i e m e y (Englewood Cliffs, N e w Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p p . 180-189. 78 Unam sanctam, in t h e above edition, p . 189. Philip could only retaliate w i t h physical violence and sent his minister Guillaume de Nogaret to commit the "outrage at Anagni." Boniface's successor Clement V pardoned Philip and declared in the decree of April 1311 (Tierney, p. 192) that the king's assertors "were not impelled by any

77

preconceived malice . . . but acted out of an estimable, just and sincere zeal and from the fervor of their Catholic faith." " Bowsky, Henry VII, pp. 153-154. 80 Bowsky, "Dante's Italy," p. 88. « Ibid., p. 94. 82 Bowsky, Henry VII, p. 171. 83 /Md., p. 210. 84 Barbara W . T u c h m a n , A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century ( N e w York: Ballanrine Books, 1979), p . 248. Cf. Purgatorio VI, 124-125. •» Bowsky, Henry VII. p p . 167-168. 86 Ibid., p p . 181-182. T h e s e c o n d Pisan Constitution w a s the Declaration Who is a Rebel and prepared Henry's s u b s e q u e n t accusation of Robert of A n j o u a s a rebel of t h e Empire. Edward Armstrong, "L'ideale politico di D a n t e " in Biblioteca storico-critica delta letteratura dantesca, Vol. XI (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1899), p . 13 reproduces t h e text of t h e Edict. 87 Walter U l l m a n n , The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1970), p. 80. Dante in several instances denounced the Donation. See in particular Monarchia III, x, 4-6 and Purgatorio XXXII, 124-129. 88 Robert Folz, The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the 5th to the 14th Century, translated by S. Ogilvie (London: Arnold, 1969), p. 86. •» Charles Mcllwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 272-273. 90 Charles Davis, Dante and the Idea of Rome (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 65. •» Ibid., pp. 69-71. 92 John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power, translated and with commentary by Arthur Monahan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), introduction. w Bowsky, Henry VII, pp. 185-186. 94 This is also Boccaccio's report. 95 S e e Vinay, Hardie, a n d Umberto C o s m o , A Handbook to Dante Studies, translated by D. Moore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1950), pp. 105-113 for studies on the date of composition. 96 In Paradiso VI, 88 and 121 Dante uses "viva giustizia;" in Paradiso XIX, 68, "giustizia viva." 97 Hardie, p. 118. Curio is one of only three Romans condemned in the Inferno. 98 Ernst Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, translated by Willard Trask, Bollingen Series XXXVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973V P- 86 explains that Dante's boast is typical of the topos of originality in the exordium. Cf. Paradiso II, 7. P. G. Ricci, "Dante e l'impero di Roma" in Atti del Convegno di Studi (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1965), p. 138 explains the meaning of Dante's originality. He interprets that Dante claimed to resolve all the problems which concern the esse of Empire—its being and operation. Other writers concerned themselves with specific problems about Empire, while Dante desired to review all possible aspects of Empire "ponendo per la prima volta in luce le radici di una verita da molti accettata ma da nessuno dimostrata."

100 Inferno I, 124ff. Cf. the "alto seggio" of God with the "gran seggio" of Henry referred to in Paradiso XXX, 133. 101 Charles Singleton, "Crossing Over into Eden," in Journey to Beatrice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 254-287. See also Kantorowicz, pp. 264, 480ff. for an explanation of infused and acquired virtues. 102 S i n g l e t o n , Ibid., p . 2 5 4 . 103 Kantorowicz, p. 474, explains how through Adam all of mankind failed in Eden and, as one, lost original justice. Again as one, that is through Christ, all mankind regained God's grace. He claims that this concept of unity influenced Dante's concept of humana civilitas, which as one intellecting community seeks to fulfill itself and reach human justice in this life. 104 Singleton, "Crossing Over into Eden," p. 265. 105 Ibid., p . 2 6 5 . 106 Kantorowicz, p. 485. ™ Ibid., p . 4 9 3 . '«• Ibid., p . 4 8 9 . 109 Inferno IV, 102 where Dante is part of the "schiera" of classical poets; in Limbo, Dante is not part of the group of scholars—the "spiriti magni" of the "nobile castello"—but merely gazes in awe upon them in the company of the poets. 110 Dante scorned the various Papal and Imperial publicists such as Pierre Dubois or Giles of Rome who campaigned for their patrons in exchange for promotions. 111 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V, iv, translated by J. E. King (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), Loeb Classical Liberary Series. 112 Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, editors, Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (New York: The Free Press, 1967), introduction, p. 11. 113 The primacy of the intellect is explained by St. Thomas in the Summa theologica la Hae, q. 101; in the Contra gentiles III, 25; and in the Sentences IV; his doctrine is reviewed by Singleton in "The Allegorical Journey" in Journey to Beatrice, pp. 9-12 and notes 13-19. All references to the Summa theologica are to the Blackfriars edition (London, 1975); those to the Summa contra gentiles are to the edition of James Anderson (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). 114 Summa theologica la Hae, q. 101. 115 Singleton, "Crossing Over into Eden," p. 266. 1)6 Kantorowicz, p. 471. 117 Paradiso VII, 85 ff. Singleton, Commentary to line 103, p. 143, translates the "universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas" of Psalm 24:10 as "mercy and justice," the two fords through which the dignities lost by Adam's sin could be regained. 118 Dante acknowledges his turning away from Beatrice after her death to "le presenti cose," temporal things of false pleasure, lines 34-36. Cf. d'Entreves, p. 51. 119 Singleton, Commentary to Paradiso XIX, lines 79-81. 120 Kenelm Foster, "Paradiso XIX" in Dante Studies, Vol. XCIV, pp. 71-90. 121 Thomas Bergin, Perspectives on the "Divine Comedy" (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1970), pp. 21-24. '» Paradiso XXXIII, 76, 82, 92. 123 Purgatorio XXI, 61.

"Frank Waibank, "Polybius and the Roman State," in Perspectives on Political Philosophy, Vol. I, Downton and Hart, p. 197.

78

79

Part II The Goal of the Human Race

Aristotelian Teleology and the Function of the Human Race Humana civilitas is Dante's definition of the whole of human civilization wherein all men exercise their instinctive desire to know. Dante's discussion of the nature of humana civilitas is concentrated in Book I of the Monarchia, and in particular chapter iii. He makes reference to the concept of "all men" throughout the treatise with a variety of other terms: "humana universitatis" or "universalitas," "homines in tanta multitudine/' "humana societas/' indeed "res publica." The synonym most frequently used, however, is simply "genus humanum."1 All of these denote the world community or genus of humankind which as a unit possesses the unique faculty of reason and therefore can be protected under the philosophical guidance of universal Monarchy. The understanding of humana civilitas is problematic because Dante at once treats it "realistically" as a specific entity (the human race which has both a goal and a purpose) and "nominally" as the intangible productivity of the human race (civilization itself). In Book I, chapter iii, Dante very carefully proves that the actualization of man's unique capacity for intellectual growth is the "virtue" or nature of human civilization, and the object of Dante's universal Monarchy. Dante considered "the human race" a political partnership similar to "the family," "the village," and all the other Aristotelian political associations formed of men. He also attributed to the human race some sort of substance or at least personality, in order to have it, like all other creatures, aim at some end or good. In fact he argues that the purpose of the human race is the final end or highest good on earth because it is pursued for its own sake. This end is "happiness" on earth, and it is pursued naturally for the sake of all mankind. That every thing or choice is ordered toward a goal or "finis" which is the "good" and that every thing has a proper function or "operatio" by means of which to reach this end, is the basis of 83

Dante's cosmology and political philosophy, both steeped in Aristotelian tradition.2 In the Ethics, Aristotle explained, "The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work or function," virtue being the "best state" of any entity.3 What is more, "the highest good must be something final. Thus if there is only one final end, this will be the good we are seeking."4 Aristotle's principle of motus ad formam, of operatio ad finem,

is the basis of his analysis of the virtues, of happiness, and of the mere nature of things. His ethical system based on proper functions and ends is presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. To reach its end is that which encourages something to action and which becomes the efficient cause of such action.5 Happiness is the highest end or good achievable and since politics is the master science, the goal of politics is the highest good attainable by action. By virtue of its final causality, the city-state (polis) is the clearest illustration of Aristotle's teleology. In tracing the origins of the polis, the Philosopher looks always to the end; when examining the individual parts (family, village, and so forth), he does so with respect to the completed whole— the perfect or self-sufficing city. In the order of final causality, the polis is the end or consummation (formam) to which all the other partnerships move. In the Politics, too, Aristotle writes that the nature of a thing consists in its end; "for what each thing is when its growth is completed we call the nature of that thing."6 That the end of a thing is a "process toward nature as a form" (motus ad formam), is shown in still simpler terms in the Physics. Nature (as a process] is not related to nature [as a form] in the same way, for from something the growing object proceeds to something or grows into something. Into what does it grow? Not into that from which it begins, but into that toward which it proceeds. Thus it is the form that is nature. (Physics 11,1 193b 15-20)

Regarding an entity's purpose, Aristotle concludes, "That which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything 84

disorderly: for nature is everywhere the cause of order." Whatever nature forms is therefore "made for the sake of an end." 7 Hence while every city comes into existence for the sake of life (self-sufficiency), it exists for the good life. The good life or happiness is the city's final end, perfection, or nature.8 Dante adapts Aristotle's argument of final causality and political teleology to his system of political order in the Monarchia and enhances it with the Ethics' provision of a proper function or natural operation for each partnership described in Ethics Book I, vii. An operation is not instituted for the sake of a creature but rather whatever is produced into being exists to carry on some kind of operation: . . . sed quicquid prodit in esse est ad aliquam operationem. (Monarchia I, iii, 3)

. . . whatever is brought into existence has some purpose to serve.

This axiom stems from the Aristotelian-Thomistic principle that God and nature make nothing in vain which Dante has in fact just cited.9 For Dante, the nature of a creature ("essentie creata"), such as man, derives its raison d'etre from its function. It does not derive its nature from its end as it does for Aristotle.10 The end of a thing merely determines what the function will be. Thus, to use Dante's own example from I,ii,8, both use the same "materials" but differently: wood is shaped in one way to build a house and in another to build a ship. Dante in fact interchanges the terms "finis" and "operatio" so as to make Aristotelian teleology serve his own end of asserting the exigency of the Empire. His proof rests on the argument that the human race, still another created essence, is produced to carry on its own specific activity. The goal of mankind becomes happiness in this life in III, xv, 7 which, he adds, consists in the operation of intellection.11 The specific activity, then, of a creature determines its nature and perfection. The creature exists to fulfill its proper activity, 85

and in fulfilling this function it reaches its particular end. What the proper operation of a thing is, Dante says in I, iii, 5, becomes clear if its capacity or "ultimum de potentia" is known. In other words, all things have a particular capacity which must be fulfilled, or potential which must be reached. The process of activating this capacity or fulfilling the potential is a thing's proper operation. The state of actualization or completion—perfection—is its end, its final cause. The end of a thing for Dante, like Aristotle, is the goal of goodness. For Dante as a Christian, it is even more: the object of perfection is to be most like God (Monarchia I, viii, 3).12 Dante determines that the capacity of humana civilitas is the potential for reasoning, for learning through the possible intellect. Its function is the actualization of this capacity—the act of "exercising the intellect" or more simply, acquiring wisdom. The total acquisition of all human knowledge—knowing everything there is to know about the nature of man—is the end of human civilization. This action is pursued as an end in itself; intellection is desirable for its own sake, for speculation is the "highest good for which God brought mankind into being" ("optimo ad quod humanum genus Prima Bonitas in esse produxit" in I, iii, 10). Because philosophizing is not pursued for the sake of something else, it is the final end of mankind.13 This function is "civilization." It is the state of happiness depicted in the earthly paradise in the Purgatorio: "beatitudinem scilicet huius vite . . . per terrestrem paradisum figuratur" (Monarchia III, xv, 7). Dante concludes that the pursuit of knowledge, "philosophy," is mankind's goal on this earth. The ultimate end or nature of the whole of human civilization, then, is the same as its function. In the introduction to the Ethics, Aristotle had already provided for this confusion by explaining that a certain difference is found among ends. In some cases, the function or activity ("energeia") is the end; in others, the end is a product or achievement ("ergon") resulting from the action.14 The Philosopher gives the following illustration: the end of the art of horsemanship is riding (an activity), while the end of the art 86

of bridlemaking is a bridle (a product). Where the end lies beyond the action, the product is naturally superior to the activity. However, "the ends of the master arts" (the activity of horsemanship, for example), are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends or products such as bridles, since the latter are pursued or produced for the sake of the former.15 As for the end of man, which involves his "rational element," there is also a distinction to be made: reason has two senses, 1) the receptibility or potential for sense perception (dynamis) snared with brutes and 2) the "life" or activity (energeia) of the rational element.16 In contrast to and extending past the mere sensitive aspect shared with every animal, man uniquely represents the "life" of the rational element. The activity, as opposed to the mere possession, of the faculty of reasoning has the greater claim of being the proper function of Aristotelian man.17 For Dante, the activity or energeia is the proper end of the whole of mankind. Individual men mere have the dynamis, the capacity for learning through the rational element or, what he calls, the possible intellect. The "life" or energeia of the possible intellect is the collective function of the whole of Dante's humanum genus. In Dante, while the dynamis may be man's nature as well as part of mankind's nature, clearly the energeia or actualization of this potential requires the united performance of the whole human species. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquant particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum redud non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur. . . . {Monarchia I,iii,8) And because this potentiality cannot wholly and at once be translated into action by one man, or by any one of the particular communities listed above, mankind has to be composed of a multitude through which this entire potentiality can be actualized.

The end of human civilization, that is, the realization of all the 87

intellectual potential of the human race, can only be reached by a universal action, by the coordinated activity of all men. Such coordination requires the political unification of all the citizens of the world into a single world-city. Thus with subtle and syllogistic procedure, Dante "radically enlarges and alters" Aristotle's political ideal with his conception of an allencompassing cosmopolis made up of the multitude of the human race.18 His Monarchy is a "world-city," indeed the world-city, for the entire human race exists under a single political authority. Aristotle does not conceive of a political partnership larger than the polis, let alone of a function or end for it. Indeed, Aristotle argues against a state with a great population because it is difficult if not impossible to be well and lawfully governed.19 In Monarchia I, iii Dante draws an analogy between the particular parts of the human body and the various kinds of political institutions, also based on Aristotle's hierarchy of ends described in the Ethics I, 7. As the thumb has an end, so has the individual citizen; as the hand has an end, likewise the institution of the family; similarly the arm and the village, and the whole man and the city. Yet here the Aristotelian image breaks down, for the institutions which come after the city, namely the kingdom and the whole human race, have no corresponding body part or specific group of individuals analogous to them. In Monarchia I, v Dante uses the same list of communities and individuals, from man to kingdom and identifies the director or ruler of each. At least here he speaks of the several inhabitants within a kingdom and their end, but similarly flounders in his analogy for the whole of mankind. His model's largest political partnership is the city. But larger than the city and beyond any parallel to man is the grandiose conception of the world-po/is, the Empire of human civilization. The step beyond Aristotle to the kingdom ("regnum") was made by Dante in the Convivio Book IV. The kingdom is composed of a union of cities and introduced so that many citizens could enjoy "vicenda e fratellanza" with one another necessary to their arts and defenses.20 In fact Dante says that in 88

order to put a stop to wars and litigations, the whole earth should be one kingdom with one ruler: Conviene di necessitade tutta la terra, e quanto a l'umana generazione a possedere e dato, essere Monarchia, cioe uno solo principato, e uno prencipe avere. (Convivio TV, iv, 4J

The world Monarch would ensure peace among all kingdoms and subjects and keep them happy within the confines of their individual principates. As a captain directs his ship's course and the duties of its minor officers, so must one Emperor direct all subordinate political communities (IV, iv, 6). Dante reminds us that we see similar ultimate authority exercised in armies and even in religious orders. We should therefore see this universal and irrefutable authority exercised in the political sphere with the Emperor "being the law" for all men (IV, iv, 7). The roots for the conception of the kingdom, dedicated to socialization and the exchange of ideas and materials, are found in the Politics. The roots for the whole world unified as a single political entity, free and at peace, are not. Selfsufficiency, practical manageabilty, prevented the success of any association larger or smaller than the city in Aristotle's judgment. In the Monarchia, the world kingdom of kingdoms is imbued with the power and significance of Aristotle's polis in that they both comprise and transcend all of the subordinate associations in terms of highest good sought and desire for self-sufficiency and peace. They are both sorts of a "Russian doll"—a totality which encompasses the ends of the smaller associations. Yet Dante's concept so far transcends that of Aristotle that there is really no parallel between them. Furthermore, contrary to the traditional, superficial interpretation of Dante's politics, a careful reading shows that Dante's imperial plan is not at all derived from the Philosopher's political system; it indeed openly rejects it. Dante's claim that mankind has a special end in this life, 89

which will give man happiness, and that under universal Empire it possesses the means to reach that temporal goal, was a philosophic truth rather difficult to reconcile with the traditional teachings of the Church. The Church of course maintained that true happiness was to be enjoyed only in Eternity, and that any destination in the temporal world could not constitute the good life. The medieval Church demanded and disciplined that a Christian life must be preparation for life everlasting. The natural desires and pleasures of man were to be forsaken for a higher end. Christian writers could not therefore subscribe to certain philosophic truths, interpreted as pagan ethics, if they wanted to avoid excommunication for heresy. Aquinas indeed spent his life trying to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy and Christian doctrine and insisted that the manifestations of reason were willed by God and led to Him. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence. Therefore the final cause of the universe must be the good of the intelligence, and that is truth. . . . Of all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the most perfect. . . . [According to the Book of Wisdom], The desire of wisdom shall lead to an everlasting life. . . . ' The final happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth. (Summa contra gentiles I, 1,2,37)

Nevertheless some of Thomas' greatest writings were listed with the papal index of condemned literature. But what was the true truth? What if the authority of Aristotle contradicted the authority of Scripture? Thomas claimed that reason is the recourse to which all are obliged to assent, but admitted that "in the things of God, natural reason is often at a loss" (S. contra gentiles I, 2). Thus it was not uncommon for medieval writers to interpret their sources rather loosely and according to their particular personal beliefs. They mastered the art of dissimulation, mistranslated and misquoted—often deliberately—and saw various levels of meaning in all things as we have noted above.21 Dante himself, of course, gives a lengthy discourse on allegory and the principles of interpretation in the Convivio.72 Aquinas con90

eluded that "the natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true; it is impossible to think of their being otherwise. Nor again is it possible to believe that the tenets of faith are false. . . . //23 Even this solution of a double truth was unacceptable to ecclesiastical authority because Scripture took precedence over all observations or scientific claims. As Randall notes, with this attitude, it is understandable how sources and authorities "could be bent to any position, and the mind left free."24 Dante's "disloyalty" to the Philosopher and his concept of the polis was undoubtedly to make him compatible with theology and to show that what Aristotle considered part of the natural order of things was perforce in accord with God's plan, God being the author of nature. But given Dante's bitter resentment of the Papacy, he chose not even to make certain concessions to the spiritual authority of the Church. While Dante certainly did not want to conflict with matters of faith, his political concept of the human race serving philosophy, and his argument for the powerful repristination of the Roman Empire, were in conflict with the theocratic system willed by the Pope. If in the Convivio Dante's example of ultimate authority in religion was out of deference to the Church, in the Monarchia, at least in the first book's proof of the need of the Empire, there is no such recognition. Paramount was the complete autonomy of the Empire from the Church, and Dante was not about to mention the authority his Empire was to be independent of. Dante's novel use of Aristotle is to show that the exercise of the function of the human race requires world government, not a universal Church. Nevertheless, as Wilson writes, the universal Church provided him with a living model for his desired unity among men: the only "universal and unified community" that existed at the time was a community "essentially supernatural and religious: the Church, or, if one prefers, Christendom."25 Dante "borrowed" from the Church its "ideal of universal Christendom" and Aristotelianized or "secularized" it by expanding Christendom even farther to include men 91

of all religions and all nations. In Monarchia I,xv he speaks of the "unity of wills" and the unified state of concord of mankind having the properties usually associated with Christendom. Other examples used to prove the indivisible faith of the indivisible Church have been "transferred" to the indivisible world Empire.26 The guidance of man's spiritual life was not Dante's concern in his political treatise. His conception of a universal regime perhaps owes something to the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church and the theory of papal plenitudo potestatis in civil life, but it comes into existence for reasons almost in contradiction to it, and certainly with jurisdiction independent of it. While Dante was affected by the universalism of the Church and anxious to see a similar centralization of political authority and unification of peoples, he was concerned with maintaining men's essential distinctions and characteristics which differentiate them from one another and which combine to form a complex whole. 27 The unity he desired to see must not presuppose uniformity in order to include all things men are capable of. Thus the "unity of wills," though one in itself, "like other forms, becomes multiplied through the multiplicity of the matter on which it is impressed."28 In other words, individual men are different.28 It is the responsibility of the Monarch to coordinate the different natures of men and the various ideas potentially contained in the whole intellectual scope of the human race. For support of this heterogeneous base of politics, Dante looked again to Aristotle who emphasized that men are not homogenous in terms of the potential for and acquisition of the virtues.29 He realized that no temporal system should be "so unified that it can put aside the most crucial political differences, i.e. moral differences."30 While certain instincts are common to all men, they do not have the same capacities nor do they perform activities with the same degree of skill or success. Therefore, uniformity is not to be encouraged in politics either, said Aristotle, for the best regime is one that represents different political natures: 92

The state consists not merely of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a state out of men who are all alike. . . . Excessive unification is a bad thing in a state. . . . Since then a greater degree of self-sufficiency is to be preferred to a lesser, the lesser degree of unity [uniformity] is to be preferred to the greater. (Politics H, 1 1261a 24ff)

The general idea of differentiation in men, of multiformity of characteristics, which ultimately equal out to form a balanced whole, is expressed through different examples in the Politics and Ethics. Throughout the Ethics Aristotle speaks of different kinds of friends (Books VIII-IX), of different kinds of justice (II,IV), of different political systems (VIII). Similarly, in the Politics he criticizes Plato's communally owned property, for example (11,3), and in general takes great pains to detail all the possible individual kinds and types of courts (IV,6), constitutions (111,7), classes (IV,2), and all the other differentiae of birth, wealth, merit, and virtue (in, 13-IV, 3). As he stated in the Ethics (V,5) Aristotle repeats in the Politics (11,1) that it is the perfect balance between its different parts ("reciprocal equality") that keeps a city in being. Similarly, Dante's world of harmony from Aristotelian diversity is to include all kinds of men, be they diverse by the results of the stars or the peculiar characteristics of the earth's regions such as the Scythians and Garamantes.31 Dante also speaks of the diversification of whole, incorporate groups—those born to be rulers and those born to be ruled, this being another cue from the Philosopher.32 And yet these interpretations are hardly within the limitations of the Aristotelian political system either. Dante changes Aristotle to suit his own purposes; he uses Aristotle as a spring board, borrows from the Aristotelian teleological system, and goes beyond its limitations. In this sense, his use is virtually a misuse of the Philosopher, or misrepresentation of him. Hardly the result of carelessness, however, these improper attributions are deliberate. When Dante speaks of human society and its intellectual capacity, he parallels Aristotle's hierarchy of political partnerships primarily 93

to show that the solution for world disorder can no longer base itself upon classical political science. Because of their different views regarding political partnership, Aristotle's and Dante's views of mankind are also necessarily divergent.

to an ideal, self-sufficing political partnership well beyond the scope of the ideal city-state. The most famous and controversial of these is from the Politics Book VII and commends the freedom and high political development attained by the Greek people, hinting indeed at their capacity for world government.

Aristotle's Politics and a View of the World-State Aristotle's Politics is a comparative study of social institutions. It is a documentary of the various kinds of civic republics or small states existing in his day in the inner Mediterranean belt. The work is not a singular treatise but rather a collection of different essays assembled by the author or perhaps by a student or subsequent editor.33 Aristotle observed the one hundred and sixty or so active examples of the polis "scattered over the Greek mainland and the maritime area of the Greek dispersion."34 In the Politics, he chronicled the various characteristics of each, noting in conclusion the common social and economic interests which made them all similar to one another and the resources which made them each autonomous. He studied them to discover whether it was possible to attain or speculate upon a systematic view of the ideal regime and of society.35 In fact, "society" and "the city" were identical notions for Aristotle. Ostwald notes that the Greek language used the same term "polis" to mean both things.36 Essential in each of these republics was an inclination toward moral perfection, legal regulation, and social order. Aristotle concluded that the ideal city-state is one of limited size, large enough to be self-sufficing, yet small enough to be capable of constitutional government.37 Similarly, the ideal polis must be diverse enough to provide the necessary functions— food, art, arms, revenue, religion, and most importantly, "a power of deciding what is for the common interest, and what is just in men's dealings with one another."38 The polis must be sufficiently unified and controlled to avoid conflict and imbalance within itself as well.39 There are a number of passages in Aristotle's writings, however, which have suggested to some that he speculated as 94

Having spoken of the number of citizens, we will proceed to speak of what should be their character. This is a subject which can be easily understood by anyone who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world. (Politics VII,7 1327b 1-33; my italics)

The significance of this passage has been much debated.40 Some feel it is an isolated instance, probably added by some transcriber, for it expresses a view entirely in contradiction with the ideal state which, as Aristotle had explained a few passages earlier, should be properly limited in size. Witness the following: A great city is not to be confused with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have reputation for good government have a limit of population. . . . For law is order, and good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly. (Politics VII,4 1326a 25-31)

Others attach more weight to it, assuming that Aristotle was influenced by and alluded to his pupil Alexander the Great's 95

sweeping imperial victories. Another concludes that the passage indeed represents "the culmination of his political philosophy."41 Assuming we accept Aristotle's authorship as authentic, the passage clearly alludes to his seeing beyond the polis— and favorably. But whether or not it betrays a sympathetic inclination for a world-state it reveals some thought about the problems or potentials raised by the pan-Hellenic trend. The potential for Greek unity was realized, after all, by the victories of Philip of Macedon and Alexander, Hegemons of the Persian and Greek Empires.42 Most students of Aristotle feel that although he may have been intuitively aware of the potential of the Greek people to achieve political unity and universal jurisdiction, nonetheless, he did not expand his theories to speculate on a more grandiose constitution or social empire. Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander and friend of Antipater, both of whom carried on extensive military campaigns analogous to the imperial Macedonian policy.43 Alexander's mission to "harmonize mankind" was attempted de facto through interracial marriage, intra-empire commerce, and common military service between Persians and Macedonians.44 And yet, while Alexander was planning "an empire in which he should be equally lord of the Greeks and Persians," Aristotle was still teaching the theory of the polis in the Lyceum.45 In political philosophy, the cosmopolis was not theorized until the later Hellenistic period in the writings of Zeno and the Stoics. Zeno's plan for a "world-state embracing all humanity" was laid down in his Republic.*6 Though the work is not known directly to us, Plutarch evidently reported Zeno's idea of uniting under a single cosmos of all men, be they Greek or Persian, city folk or rural. Plutarch wrote: Men should not live their lives in so many civic republics, separated from one another by different systems of justice; they should reckon all as their fellow-citizens, and there should be one life and one order (cosmos), as it were of one flock on a common pasture feeding in common under one joint law.47

96

Such a practice of fusing municipalities as in Dante's regnum or union of cities, for example, was directly contrary, however, to the ideal of the polis. Most historians agree that Aristotle "could never have considered the disappearance of the citystate as something possible or desirable."48 As another historian writes, "Aristotle is just as far from longing for a unity of the Greeks as Plato is: both are seeking their Ideal State in the same sphere in which they saw Greek states in reality: wholly and exclusively as Polis, as the single and small State."49 Dante's ideal for a world-state in the Monarchia is based not on regimes existing in his own day as with Aristotle, but precisely on a speculative alternative to them. His idea of the common multitude generating humana dvilitas owes something to Zeno's cosmos, perhaps, Romanized into a cosmopolis, rather than to this uncharacteristic passage of Aristotle. And yet Dante may well have been acquainted with this and other passages hypothesizing a world-city in order to regularly cite his master's authority. Would that we had proof of his familiarity with a unique letter, more than likely of Aristotle's authorship, entitled "On Colonies." It is addressed to Alexander and describes the importance of intra-empire commerce, race fusion, and homonoia. Homonoia was the Greek idea of the unity of mankind, translated best as "concord," or "a being of one mind together."50 S.M. Stern's investigative study of the letter argues Aristotle's sympathy for a world-state and points out several comparative passages and themes in Aristotle's, Averroes', and Roman writings on the Greeks which deal with the notions of universal government, thought, and peace. None of these passages have been compared to Dante's Monarchia and yet the similarities are striking. Dante's cixrilitas, of course, goes beyond the polis to include all mankind, insisting upon mankind's intellectual unity and homogenous capacity to reason. Dante identifies the unifying element of all men to actualize humana civilitas, while Aristotle places emphasis on subordinate and independent civic republics, and heterogenous ones at that. When Dante uses 97

"civilitas," he means to describe the nature of the order which not only subordinates all the other partnerships, but in fact, "transforms" them into equal parts of a new whole.51 Humana civilitas is not merely a name for that fixed body within an established hierarchy, that largest possible grouping of men this side of the whole universe. It eclipses the basically Aristotelian summation of individual and more or less self-sufficient communitates and is the consummation of all of them. Much more than a mere "nominal" term, civilitas is infused with concrete connotations of a functioning network similar to the polis in Aristotle, but which looks to a goal or end totally beyond the visibility of Aristotelian humanism. It is also beyond the religious limitations of the universal Church. Dante feels that the great multitude of the universe is held together, divine order notwithstanding, through its own proper "function," that is, through the natural desire of all men to understand what constitutes happiness. Treating "human civilization" in this way, that is, almost as a precise and independent entity which can be considered "alive" and of complex constitution, we are reminded and impressed by another "pregnant" passage in the Politics which hints at the collective political organization of mankind. For it is possible that the many, no one of whom taken singly is a good man, may yet taken all together be better than the few, not individually but collectwely, in the same way that a feast to which all contribute is better than one given at one man's expense. For where there are many people, each has some share of goodness and intelligence, and when these are brought together, they become as it were one multiple man with many pairs of feet and hands and many minds. . . . And it is this assembling in one what was before separate that gives the good man his superiority over any individual man from the masses. . . . There is no reason why in a given case we should not accept and apply this theory of the collective wisdom of the multitude. {Politics 111,6 1281b 1-25; my italics)

It is more likely that in this passage and not in the one hinting at Greek hegemony that Dante found a basis for his totality of 98

individuals in collaboration. For Dante, "mankind was not like was a totality of subjects alike in species and in destiny."52 In fact, we saw that for all mankind, Dante chose no parallel in his analogy of body parts and political groups. Nevertheless, he may have found his starting point for this totality in Aristotle's genetic analysis of the polis as presented in the Ethics (1,7 and VIII,12) and in the Politics (III). Humana civilitas, and similarly the polis, is the common store to which each individual contributes differently and in varying degrees, yet equally according to his proportionate capacity and for a unified purpose. As reason is that which distinguishes one man from another and yet is the unifying element of all men, so each individual citizen contributes his personal rational potential. The acquisition of total knowledge constitutes the end of the human species as a whole, and in fact this goal is assurable only in political life. But as Aristotle separates the acquisition of this knowledge from the application of it to political life, Dante does not. For Dante humanity can only be unified within the political sphere—specifically under world government. The end of mankind is understood in terms of the proper operation it has to perform; the acquisition of knowledge of how to live happily is understood in light of the end of directly applying this information to the good life. While comparing the similarities and differences between Dante's and Aristotle's views on the world-state, we should observe some other points regarding the controversial passage quoted earlier from Politics VII. First, although it is "hidden remarkably well in a participial clause," the claim to potential world rule by the Greeks cannot be dismissed as incongruent with Aristotle's political philosophy.53 Contrary to its being a unique episode, there is an additional paragraph, also in Book VII, which admits to the possibility of absolute and universal sovereignty. Aristotle writes: Yet on the strength of these decisions [that happiness is an activity and power must be based on virtue], it means that the highest good is to be

99

the master of the world, since thus one would have the power to compass the greatest number and the noblest kind of actions. . . . For the best thing is most to be desired, and to do well is the best thing. . . . When one man is superior in virtue. . . it becomes right to serve him and just to obey him. . . . If happiness is an activity, then the active life will be the best both for any state as a whole community and for the individual. (Politics VII, 3 1325a 35ff.; my italics)

Now Aristotle is aware that unlimited power is not likely to be used only for good purposes and therefore qualifies that the possessor of supreme power must also be of the highest moral virtue possible.54 Nevertheless, we see his mind receptive to the notion of a world ruler whom those meant to be ruled ought to follow and obey, were he ever to come to power. The absolute sovereign must be "superior in virtue" and have the "capacity of performing the best actions" without being despotic. But even if he must take power violently, so long as he is of the highest virtue, then he will make it manifest that happiness is doing well and the life of action is the best life for individuals and mankind collectively. Aristotle is perhaps skeptical of the implementabilty of world government, but nonetheless does discuss the conditions for it. To give world government order would surely be a task for divine power which holds the universe together, where to be sure we do find order and beauty conjoined with size and multiplicity. (Politics VII,4 1326a 34-36)

The similarities between this view and Dante's lead to another point we should make here. We should introduce the question—if only to dismiss it—asked by Allan Gilbert, "Had Dante read the Politics of Aristotle?"55 Because most of Dante's references to Aristotle's Politics are either misquoted, incorrectly cited, or not identified at all, Gilbert suggests that Dante was only very casually acquainted with the text and never saw or studied the work itself in any direct translation or commen100

tary, such as that by Aquinas. Because there is a greater similarity between his referrals to the Politics and those found in Giles of Rome's De regimine principum, rather than to the text of the Politics itself, Gilbert concludes that Dante never saw the actual work of Aristotle, but rather Giles' version. Furthermore, Aquinas' commentary on the Politics ended in the middle of the third book, another alleged reason for inaccessibility to Dante. When we consider Dante's deliberate disloyalty to the Ethics, we are reluctant to conclude that he was not familiar with the Politics, at least through the commentaries. After all, Peter of Auvergne did complete Thomas' commentary, and William of Moerbeke provided the Latin translation (albeit the only one in circulation) of the complete text in 1260, well before Dante was born.56 Gilbert's article reviews the references to the Politics in the Monarchia and Convivio, and notes that "there is not one in which the number of the book appears." Furthermore, he claims that only one of these instances is a direct quotation with no significant alterations.57 And yet a careful reading reveals that there are several other correctly quoted citations including one in which Dante is supposed to have misrepresented the Philosopher.58 For example, look at Dante's presentation of his major premise in Book I, chapter ii. In attempting to identify the universal end of humana civilitas, Dante says that if there is such an end, then it will serve as the first principle of his inquiry and will make clear all the derivative propositions which follow: IUud igitur, siquid est, quod est finis universalis civilitatis humani generis, erit hie principium per quod omnia que inferius probanda sunt erunt manifesta sufficienter. (Monarchia I,ii,8)

This syllogistic reasoning most definitely finds its source in the Ethics 1,2 where Aristotle identifies the good as the fundamental principle and aim of his investigation of social and political matters.59 "Thus if there is only one final end, this will be the good we are seeking." The procedure is also in the preliminary 101

statements in Book I of the Politics and in Book III which inquires as to the end of a city. As we saw through the Ethics, it appears that Dante represented Aristotle sufficiently correctly when he so chose, but in other instances deliberately changed things for his own purposes. Dante used Aristotle for his specific arguments. Gilbert says that Dante misinterprets Aristotle and faults him for this. For example, in Monarchia I,xii, Dante observes, "Thus the Philosopher says in his Politics that 'under a perverted form of government a good man is a bad citizen, while under a right form a good man and a good citizen are identical.'" Gilbert notes that Aristotle did not exactly say this, but instead that even in the best regime there are good citizens who are not good men. Indeed the virtue of a good man and of a good citizen cannot be the same. The virtues coincide only in a "regime which admits to citizenship those capable of being good men and capable of ruling, either alone or in conjunction with others."60 Now Dante's "poor scholarship" is the result of his confusion—his intentional confusion—of a good regime with the best regime which is Monarchy. To discuss the different kinds of regimes and determine the best was not Dante's purpose as it was Aristotle's. This is a moot point, a moot discussion. Dante takes it as a given that Monarchy is the best form of government and proceeds to prove that it is the only one which can guarantee the well-being of the world, for it is the only form in which men can be both good citizens and good men. This confusion of Monarchy with a good regime is similar to his blurring of the distinction between Empire and Monarchy at the beginning of the treatise, and to his interchangeability of function and end, of metaphysics and politics. In the Aristotelian tradition, Empire is not a good form of government because of its unmanageability, while Monarchy is. Dante attempts to show that Empire is good by equating the two terms and describing the Roman Empire, proven as the best by virtue of God's decree, as if it were an example of Monarchy. In fact he does not speak of the "imperator" in the 102

Monarchia, as he did in the Convivio, but only as the "monarcha." Gilbert observes that Dante inherited the misrepresentation of Aristotle from Giles' De regimine which also misquotes Aristotle and uses the same words as they appear in the text of the Monarchia: that the virtue of a good citizen is the same as the virtue of a good man in a right form of government. We must note that Dante does not speak, however, of the "virtue" of one or of the other in this paragraph. He does not say "virtus boni civis," but instead simply "bonus civis." Thus the words are not so similar as Gilbert indicates, nor is this fact sufficient as proof that Dante got his idea from Giles alone and not directly from his master. It is without doubt that Dante knew at least Aquinas' commentary on the Politics which is faithful to Aristotle's text distinguishing between the virtue of a good man and that of a good citizen. Aquinas' text is also faithful to the statement that one capable of ruling can be both a good citizen and a good man. The ruler's virtue, however, cannot be the same as that of the bad citizen in a bad regime, yet this is precisely what Dante interprets, namely that in a bad regime, a good man is a bad citizen. In his concluding paragraph, Gilbert claims that Dante was foremost a poet and only secondarily a scholar. His argument that Dante did not read the Politics is primarily based on the fact that the text was poorly distributed among medieval scholars. Furthermore, there were no versions of it from the Arabic, unlike the Ethics and other Aristotelian works, and, as we have said, William of Moerbeke's translation was the only one available. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that Dante was unacquainted with the Politics. Furthermore, Fortin claims that there were no fewer than six commentaries available in Dante's time.61 The so-called "misquotations" are more likely intentional examples of a sort of dissimulation or "poetic license" made to suit an original purpose. Where Dante is faithful to the text, if not indeed to a view characteristic of Aristotle, is in his general view of happiness 103

and the end of man. Aristotle makes the following definition of happiness in Book VII of the Politics: it is whatever consists in doing well, be it self-directed or other-directed, so long as it is "action toward the highest good."62 This action need not be always concerned with our relations with other people; indeed speculation, the most self-regarding activity, is deserving more than anything else of the name of active because it is pursued for its own end. In any case, the same way of life which is best for individuals—the active life of speculation—must inevitably be the best also for states and for all mankind.63 Dante may have taken the "end of the state" farther than Aristotle intended it to go, certainly as far as the traditional polis is concerned. And yet if Aristotle himself considered the possibility of a world state and an end for all of mankind in the Politics, then it is likely indeed that Dante knew the work well and was in fact faithful to its author. Regarding the ordering structure for humana civilitas, it seems that the influence of the ideal polis described in the Politics is minimal. Instead the plan for a totality of ends combined in the end of the human race is derived primarily from the teleology of the Ethics and the discussion of the good. The same conclusion of the Politics about the highest good for man is presented in the opening chapters of the Ethics: The highest good attainable by action is happiness, the end of man, and it has to do with doing well and living according to the'moral virtues. And the conclusion of the Ethics is that happiness is not only to be found in the individual as in the city, and therefore within a political framework, but it is concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation: "The activity of our intelligence constitutes the complete happiness of man" (X,7 1177b 24). Aristotle had realized that to put an end to a potentially endless series of ends in the first book of the Ethics, he had to isolate a single one of them definable as the good. The good, that which is most desirable for its own sake, is the end which would give direction and a destination to all the other ends. And he says that a detailed discussion of the good belongs more properly to a different branch of philosophy, namely 104

"first philosophy" or metaphysics.64 Dante is in accordance with the necessity to define one total end as authoritative and similarly determines that the highest good of man has to do with the perfection of his privileged possession: his rational nature. But where Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical life, Dante allows for the activity of wisdom to be fulfilled within practical life. Aristotle assigns pure contemplative activity to the gods: "the activity of the divinity which surpasses all others in bliss must be contemplation;" it is "continuous and self-sufficient." Pure intellection is some single good which exists "absolutely in itself and by itself and it evidently is something which cannot be realized in action or attained by man.65 Happiness in political life on the other hand is a good attainable by action; it is the activity of the practical and moral virtues; it is living the good life. For Dante, the highest good of speculation can be attained by man, i.e. through the multitude of all men, mankind, and indeed must be achieved within the world-city. This achievement is what makes man's task similar to God: it is almost a "divine task" as Dante says in the Monarchia I,iv. The exercise of the intellect requires politics, and the acquisition of knowledge is both the proper function and highest good of all men in this life. Carrying on the rational process is the equivalent to living well, to producing humana civilitas. Mankind is assured of performing this action only if all men are submitted to a single governing power within a world state. Dante and Thomas Aquinas on the End of Mankind Thomas' inquiries serve as a bridge between Aristotelian philosophy and the medieval political view of Empire that Dante supported. And like Dante, Aquinas argued philosophically and without appeal to theological principles that man's nature required a civil society in which to satisfy his needs. St. Thomas follows the Aristotelian doctrine that man is a "political animal," but he modifies it in accordance with the exigencies of Christian philosophy. The fact that man operates not by 105

instinct, but by reason makes social organization indispensable. In fact in Thomas' Commentary on the Politics he adds the qualifier "social": "Man is by nature a social and political animal." Thomas sees the phenomenon of "association" or the pleasure in social intercourse essential to the basic and natural coming together of men strictly for reasons of communal need and self-sufficiency. For Aristotle, partnership (the first coupling between man and woman) is by nature political. Aristotle implies that man is by nature also a social animal, needing other men to live happily and fully. This is explained in his description of friendship in the eighth book of the Ethics. And that sociability grows out of the primal and natural political partnership is never doubted: "The state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life."66 For Aristotle, then, man is first and foremost a political animal and ultimately a social animal. Men have a natural desire for life in society, even when they have no need to seek each other's help. Nevertheless, common interest is a factor in bringing them together, since the interest of all contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed the chief end of the state both corporately and individually, but men form and continue to maintain this kind of association for the sake of life itself. (Politics HI,6 1278b 20-30)

Later in 111,9 Aristotle qualifies that the city is not merely a community dwelling in the same place, preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. Instead certain conditions of kindness and reciprocal well-being distinguish and characterize the polis. But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only; . . . virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name. . . . It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, . . . [but it] is a community of families and aggregations of families in tuell-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. . . . The will to live together is friendship.

106

The end of the state is the good life. . . . Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. (Politics 111,9 1280a 31-1280b5 35; my italics)

Now Aquinas agrees that the end of society—in his terms, the end of the perfect communitas—is the good life. He uses the expression "living virtuously" to make his definition in accordance with Aristotle's qualification "for the sake of noble actions." But for Aquinas, man is first and foremost a social, humanistic animal, seeking eventually political order to facilitate sociability. The evidence for this lies in the fact that only those who render mutual assistance to one another in living well form a genuine part of an assembled multitude. (De regimine principum I,xiv,106)

Aquinas specifically uses the term "the good life" ("totum bene vivere") in his hierarchical breakdown of political order in the Summa theologica. Clearly the household comes midway between the individual person and the state or realm, for just as the individual is part of the family, so the family is part of the political community. Accordingly, as ordinary prudence, which rules the life of the individual is distinct from political prudence, so should domestic prudence be distinguished from either. . . . The final purpose of a domestic management is the good life as a whole within the terms of family intercourse. (Ha Hae 50.3; my italics)

The propensity for social organization exists because of man's peculiar possession of the capacity to reason and thereby to realize his needs and communicate them. In his Commentary on the Politics, most of his explications regarded the special social property of reason possessed by man: "He who is lacking in reason and incapable of communicating, seems to be foreign

Id7

to the human race. . . . It is from the power of reason that men are ruled by reasonable laws" and have the power to communicate.67 And still, since "Nature does nothing in vain/' men have speech and language with which to communicate with one another "as regards the useful and harmful, the just and the unjust, and other such things. . . . Communication is what makes a household and a city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and political animal."68 By domestic, Thomas qualifies that man is the most "gregarious" of animals; men "desire to live with one another and not be alone."69 There is a great common benefit in the sharing of social life for both "living well" and "aiding and preserving each other against the dangers that threaten life." Also in the Commentary on the Ethics, Aquinas emphasizes that political order is the result of reason. All human beings are ordered to an end and achieve their ends through their proper operations: "All human operations are by nature subject to reason."70 Thomas in fact opens his Commentary with a reference to the beginning of Aristotle's Metaphysics that "wisdom is the highest perfection of reason whose characteristic is to know order." Man alone is endowed with the capacity to speak and communicate beyond mere necessities for socialization. It was this emphasis on the interrelationship between sociability and man's unique gift of reason which attracted Dante and which suggested yet another authority for his interpretation of political order based on the specific unifying characteristic of all men. The common and natural desire of all men to acquire knowledge is the basis of Dante's politics. For Dante, because man uniquely possesses reason and the ability to articulate his thought through language, he is first and foremost a rational animal, and subsequently social and political. Dante, too, begins his Convivio, which inquires into man's political nature, with the same reference to the Metaphysics that all men naturally desire to know. Because of the facility found in political association of meeting the ends which reason dictates, man subsequently lives according to some governing power, and Dante argues that this must be universal Monar108

chy. Dante's word "compagnevole" in the Convivio for Aristotle's "political" animal is a change from the Latin "civile" found in Aquinas' commentary and Moerbeke's version. Dante says man requires the family and the village and all the other partnerships because of his instinct to share and communicate. Likewise, universal Monarchy is needed by man "a sua sufficienza." Let us look more closely at Thomas' view of society and the extent to which Dante follow it. Thomas articulates man's inherent social character hinted at by Aristotle and emphasizes the convivial, interractive aspect of the community in both the De regimine principum, his principal political work, and the Summa theologica. In the latter, he speaks of man as both a "social and political animal," for whom it is natural to live in a group (la Ilae 72.4). Life in the society of many puts an emphasis on mutual good. Man was intended to "collaborate rationally" because he alone is capable of expressing feelings which come as a result of socializing, he explains in the former (1,1,7). Man alone is aware of a "quality of life," and while he is capable, illumined solely by his reason, of aspiring independently to a virtuous end, it is because of his rational faculty that he is aware of the greater facility in reaching this end in the company of others (De regimine 1,1,5-6). In the Summa chapters on the virtue of justice, for example, Thomas presents his ideas on collaboration and civility in the human community. Since man is by nature a social being, there is a natural indebtedness of one person to another in regard to those things without which life together in society could not be maintained. People could not live with one another were there not a mutual trust that they were being truthful to one another. (Ila Ilae 109.3; my italics)

And in the chapter on friendship, Aquinas recalls this same virtuous quality and adds another. As has been stated, because man by nature is a social being, in common

109

decency he owes plain truth to others, since without this, human society could not survive. But even as men cannot live together without truthfulness, neither can they without agreeableness, since, as Aristotle remarks, 'No one can put up with the gloomy or disagreeable man all day long.' [Ethics IV,6]. Thus a person is bound by a certain natural debt in decency to get along amicably with others. (Ila Hae 114.2; my italics)

It is in the De regimine principum that Thomas most fully details the cooperative and social aspects of the ideal civil community, although this is not a general treatise on his political theory. He is offering advice on kingship to a finite, Christian political community—the Cypriote kingdom of Hugh II in the mid-thirteenth century. Nevertheless, his 'fundamental idea of the "social multitude" lends itself to indeterminate significance, to his general theory of civil society, applicable to all generations at all times. He too calls for a "division of labor" and "collaborative efforts" within the multitude of men (1,1,5-6). In the political community, there are many varied types of men with distinct skills—some "physically strong, others who are intellectually keen, and still others who are fearless" (1,1,7). Both Aristotle and Aquinas are confident that nature will always "furnish" these different persons. The unifying principle of this "diversification of capacities" is an innate sense of sociability perculiar to man: the individual works for the common good of the lot, while the many work for the benefit of each individual.71 All individual efforts of men are made to meet specific communal aims, of which the main one for Aristotle is to live in accordance with virtue—to live the good life. The main one for Aquinas, however, is by means of the good life to "attain divine fruition."72 Man's political life is the complement to the life endowed for him by God in both Aquinas' and Dante's view. Aquinas articulates this point most succintly in the Summa contra gentiles (III, 48) asserting that man's ultimate happiness is not in this life but "consists in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life." Man's natural desire 110

on earth is to prepare for this ultimate happiness, and so he finds ways to avoid sickness and misfortune, seeking to live according to "perfect virtue." He attempts to arrive at a full understanding of truth by a "movement of inquiry" towards perfection, but cannot obtain this full knowledge until he, as the angels, sees God in Heaven. And so man lives his daily natural life in speculation and in action upon deeds of virtue "in a human way." These pursuits and activities are best carried out within the political framework outlined in the De regimine. Man . . . has a natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his life only in a general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles.

The development from mere subsistence into living for the sake of noble actions—that is, the good life in accordance with virtue—is the single, all-encompassing end of Aquinas' earthly communitas and also of Aristotle's polis. Aquinas simultaneously maintained that man had a supernatural destiny which, in effect, made the goals of this life transitory and relatively less important. For both Aristotle and Aquinas it is understood that one man alone is incapable of attaining the knowledge of all things necessary to his welfare because individual reason is insufficient. Reason merely impels the individual to seek his own particular good through the means which are proper to him. Beyond himself, man needs other men to come to "know" this good life.73 As Aquinas articulates: It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist his fellows, and different men may be occupied in seeking. . . to make different discoveries—one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that. (De regimine 1,1,6)

111

The unification of these discoveries is the "order" or political unity of Thomas' communitas and the "common store" in Aristotle's polis. This order is introduced when a multitude of individuals is grouped as one body with a common interest. This orderly variety of things is an end itself for Aristotle and a means to an end for Aquinas. Says the latter, "Society is obviously nothing else than the unification of men for the purpose of performing some one thing in common."74 Individuals may differ according to what is proper to each of them, but they are united "by what they have in common."75 For Aquinas, sociability lends itself secondarily to political organization to secure the good life, while for Aristotle the primary natural impulse toward partnership is by definition political. For both philosophers, formal unification beyond mere coupling presupposes a separate but not necessarily natural agent—that is to say, some artificial governing power essential to unity. This power impels toward the common good of the many, over and above that which impels toward the particular good of each individual.76 The common end—virtuous living in a political community—comes therefore out of the concentration of efforts within the community, and the whole group is necessary so that a grand and common end may be met. Aristotle saw political life, be it monarchy, constitutional government, or oligarchy, as the directive, governing power for all the other endeavors of men. Aquinas is a bit unclear as to whether his temporal governing power is a pushing agent (something which directs the multitude) or a drawing object (a role model of goodness and virtue itself to be mirrored). In any case, he observes that secular rulership will be right and just if, as a result of it, the separate accomplishments of a multitude of free men will be ultimately ordered toward their common good and virtuous well-being. Thomas argued that the preserver of unity in a society is peace (De regimine 1,2,17). Later in this same work he elaborates that the "unity of man is brought about by nature, while the unity of a multitude, which we call peace, must be procured through the efforts of the ruler" (1,15,118). like Dante, Aquinas

112

makes the establishment of peace a prerequisite of virtuous living and virtuous action, and the objective of the ruler. Thomas' teleology is a bit imprecise as he attempts to support his Christian belief in the single eternal end of man with Aristotelian arguments that emphasize individual diversity within the polis. On the one hand, he identifies the end of the individual as being equal to that of the whole community. This reflects his desire to be consistent with Christian philosophy arguing that all things are the same under the Creator and aim toward eternal bliss. On the other hand, he wishes to avoid compromising his master authority and insists that the ultimate of the multitude—the end of the state—is other than the individual's. Indeed the common end of the community (virtuous action by many) is more important than that of individual men. Aquinas seems to indicate a double truth, a double end, one for the individual as citizen and one for him as man. He insists, like Aristotle, that man is not capable of self-fulfillment without the political community, but this is in so far as he is a citizen. In more frequent other cases, however, and often in terms which contradict this assertion, Thomas is explicit about a qualitative difference among the ends of man, and between them and those of society. This implies that man's individual redemption and personal immortality are incomparable to the goals of the secular community. And yet Aquinas nowhere makes clear this distinction as his successor, Dante, does so carefully, risking indeed excommunication for arguing that happiness can be secured in this life. When claiming that the ends of individuals are equal to those of the community, it is strictly based on political philosophy, that man must integrate himself into society else he has no independent significance apart from the state. The welfare of the community is itself the ultimate secular desire implicit in each individual. The end of individual man is the same as the common end of society. This universalizing secular equivalency suggests that regardless of the differences among individuals, there are no significant ones in their ends within society.

113

The common good is the end or purpose of individual persons living in the community, as the good of the whole is that of each part. (Summa theologica Ha Ilae 58.9)

Aquinas suggests this equivalency also in the Summa contra gentiles.

whole to a part. The individual is not only a part of the whole but also a means to the end of the whole, for the end is a common one which encompasses the individual ends of each member. The relationship is a circular one, for the good of the whole is also a means to the ends of each of its parts, the parts being the individual citizens.

But it is natural for man to be a social animal, and this is shown by the fact that one man alone does not suffice for all the things necessary to human life. So, all the things without which human society cannot be maintained are naturally appropriate to man.

As a part and the whole are identical in a sense, so too, in a sense that which is of the whole is also of a part. Accordingly when something is given to each from the goods of the community, each in a way receives what is his own.

(111,129,5)

(Ha Hae 61.6)

One critic, in defense of Aquinas' universalism explains that this doctrine of community does not imply a "clash" between the ends of the citizen and the state in which the communal end takes precedence. On the contrary, it implies the "final identity of those ends in the divine plan."77 These perforce are temporal ends which God determines. In other words, he who seeks the common good of the multitude consequently seeks his own good. This notion is repeated in still other paragraphs of the Summa theologica. For example, in discussing the nature of prudence, which clearly regards the common good of the multitude and not merely the private individual good, Thomas asserts: He who pursues the common good thereby pursues his own good, and for two reasons. First, because the proper good of the individual cannot exist without the common good of the family or state, or realm. . . . Second, that since a person is part of a household or state, he ought to esteem that good for him which provides for the benefit of the community.

In passages of the Summa theologica and the treatise On Kingship, therefore, according to Thomas, the ultimate aim of each individual is the same as that of the community, and this is meant to be in accordance both with the notion of Christian universalism and with Aristotelian political philosophy that the citizens work toward their own good by contributing to the city. In other cases, Thomas is explicit about a kind of qualitative difference, a "difference in kind" among ends, even within a single communitas. Implying that the perfection and destiny of the human race are different from those of the individual was, of course, at variance with Christian dogma. The common good of the state ["comune dvitan's"] and the particular good of the individual person differ, not just quantitatively as the large and the little, but in kind ["formalem"]; the meaning of the common good is other than that of an individual good, as the meaning of a whole is not that of a part. (Ha Hae 58.7)

(Ha Ilae 47.10)

Later, in the discussion on the two kinds of justice within the community—commutative and distributive—Thomas explains the "two-fold relationship" of one part to another and of the 114

In these instances, Thomas is quick to indicate that men can fulfill themselves only without the state, in the afterlife, and that the state is merely a remedial measure as Augustine had suggested or at least a preventative one to keep men in check; 115

Because of their differences, men must adapt themselves to the common good in this life. Noting the equation between "active qualities" ("species habituum") and their ultimate "objective interests" ("diversitatem objecti") Thomas explains: The significance in anything that is done for the sake of an end is looked a t . . . in light of that end. Hence from their being related to different ends, active dispositions or virtues are rendered specifically distinct. Now the good of the individual, of the family, and of the state or nation are different sorts of end. (Ha Hae 47.11)

The state is an organism composed of families and groups which not only differ in size but "specifically," that is, according to other criteria, interests, etc. The common welfare is different in nature from that of the individual in that the individual's well-being is subordinate to that of the whole. Later in the same question of the Summa as above, Thomas replies: Different ends, even when subordinated one to another set up different interest* and disciplines; . . . Likewise the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the people, nevertheless this does not prevent the difference between them from setting up a specific difference between the virtues they call for. What does follow is that the virtue engaged with the furthest end is superior and commands all the other virtues. (Ila Hae 47.11)

Thomas emphasizes here a difference in kind or a cumulative distinction between an individual end and that of the community. He realizes, it is true, that the common good or end in relation to that of a single member is described as being "more divine" ("divinius" in Ila Ilae 31.3), "higher than" ("melius" in Ha Ilae 47.10), indeed "surpassing the individual good of one person" ("praeminet bono singulari unius personae" Ila Hae 58.12). As the good of the people is greater than that of the individual, the divine end is greater than the good of the 116

people. When Thomas expounds this differentiating argument in the Summa contra gentiles, he cites Aristotle saying, "The good of a people is more godlike than the good of one individual" (11,42,3). He insists upon the natural distinction among ends, and he states succinctly that in general the good of the whole is better than the good of each part.78 . . . Since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, the best maker is not he who diminishes the good of the whole in order to increase the goodness of some of the parts; a builder does not give the same relative value to the foundation that he gives to the roof, lest he ruin the house. (11,42,16)

However, Aquinas always tries to imply that the political good life according to human virtues is commensurate with the ultimate spiritual aim of man's knowledge of Christ, while being subject to it. Thomas seems unable to reconcile Aristotelian diversity with Christian unity in his "political" writings unless he separates the province of religion from the province of politics. He indeed hints at a double end for man which Dante of course articulates. He does this even though he claims that "all things are directed to one end, which is God" (Summa contra gentiles 111,17). The communitas is the most perfect framework for man's goals but as it is part of the grander kingdom of God, it is vastly inferior to it as well. The distinction stems from a difference of focus with Aristotelian happiness directed to this life and with Christian happiness directed to eternal life. Temporal happiness, of course, was the only one that Aristotelian politics dealt with and knew of or at least placed within the political sphere. In this life, men are endowed with a diversification of capacities, "grades of goodness" as Aquinas calls them, and a differentiation of one from another regarding human will. "Perfection in the universe," Thomas says in another work called the Sentences, is obtained essentially and precisely through this diversification and "purification."79 117

An angel is superior to a stone. But a universe of angels and stones is better than one made solely of angels. . . . A universe in which there was no evil would not be of so great goodness as our actual one; and this for the reason that there would not be in this assumed universe so many different good natures as there are in the present one, which contains both good natures free from evil as well as some conjoined with evil; and it is better to have the combination than to have one only. {Sentences 44,1,2)

Thus for order in this life, Aquinas relied upon Aristotle's unification in political order, explaining in the De regimine (1,1,8) that nature furnishes some "agency to take care of what appertains to the common weal." The state and our present system, he rationalizes, are in effect precisely because there is evil in the universe. Given original sin, the state, originating through divine providence, must serve to restrain and assure men of achieving self-sufficiency. Diversification of capabilities and tasks, and basic heterogeneity in the human race secure this. Diversification is a natural phenomenon imposed by God "which details the various compartments of man's life in such a way that nothing necessary to human existence is ever lacking."80 In other words, Aquinas introduces the Christian element of God's will as the ultimate governing power of men's actions. It becomes evident that the occasions of Aquinas' contradictions arise in his attempt to reconcile the Aristotelian ruler with the Christian notion of God's ruling providence. Men have different desires and attributes but also ones in common. The discussion of the diversity of things is continued in the central chapters of the Summa contra gentiles. His argument in 11,45—his best argument as far as compromising the two divergent ways of thought is concerned—is that diversity among created beings exists because of God's intention to find a perfect likeness to Himself. . . . Created things cannot attain to a perfect likeness to God according to only one species of a creature. . . . There would not be a perfect likeness of God in the universe if all things were of one grade of being.

118

For this reason, then, there is distinction among created things: that by many, they may receive God's likeness more perfectly than by being one. (11,45,2-3)

Aquinas thus approves both diversification and unity in one interpretation, suggesting that life according to "noble actions" and "for mutual well-being" must be life according to God's will. Men are distinctive to produce a self-supporting political community. They have reason in common and a desire to fulfill God's will in common which determines their ultimate happiness. However in this life, virtuous political life is directly related to man's ultimate purpose which is to know God^ Thomistic man cannot achieve ultimate happiness within the political structure described by Aristotle. Nor does Aquinas / entertain the possibility of any other solution such as a universal secular community proposed by Dante in which at least all human knowledge can be obtained. The notion of Empire is not compatible with Aquinas who envisioned neither any kind of earthly ruler nor universal community. Nevertheless, Aquinas defends Aristotle who is seen by the Church as an intruding pagan in a world changed by revealed truth. He looked upon Aristotle's philosophy as compatible with Christianity: the naturally derived polis was, after all, a product of the divine hand. This general background of social and political order in the world directed to living well and virtuously and ultimately to come to know God is inherited by Dante. The traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic ideal of "the good life" is interpreted by him as humana civilitas. Dante, as a good Christian, never denies that the governing power which best promotes humana civilitas rules through "Him alone who is the ruler of all things spiritual and temporal." The concluding paragraph of the Monarchia consents that our mortal happiness is "in some way" ("quodammodo") ordered for the sake of immortal beatitude, although he is even more vague than Aquinas in explaining how. The specific structure which directs mankind in this pursuit, 119

however, is not faithfully inherited by Dante. His idea, first of all, of including all men in a single political partnership is not born of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. His idea of a collective bank of all human knowledge acquired in this life finds its seeds in another branch of Aristotelianism, a decidedly heretical interpretation for the medieval theologians. Dante's view of man as a rational animal may derive from Aquinas but his understanding of what makes man seek others to fulfill human needs shares the interpretation of Averroes, the socalled great Commentator of Aristotle's works, as will be explained in Part III. Furthermore common decency and amicability are not qualities mentioned by Dante as necessary to the proper functioning of any community in the political hierarchy he outlines. Only whatever insures universal peace and subsequently humana civilitas is considered as essential ("per quod optime"). For Aristotle, the grand and common end of man is happiness in this life. For Thomas, in this life actions should be directed to the common good; the grand and common end of man is the union with God known as spiritual beatification. For Dante, the grand and common end is largely a combination of both of these, in the form of one end with a dual nature: 1) the realization of the natural rational needs of man and 2) the striving for God in this life which becomes a full realization only in the afterlife. While Aristotle and Aquinas suggest that Monarchy or single rule government is to be preferred practically over other forms of rule in maintaining this order, they do not conceive of the implementability of world rule. Furthermore, Dante asserts that Monarchy is not only to be preferred practically, but it is rationally necessary for the well-being of the entire universe. Monarchy becomes the guarantee and necessary cause of happiness. Humana civilitas is the final cause. Dante equates "Empire" with "Monarchy," the latter a good form of government in Aristotelian-Thomistic terms, the former a perverted form for this tradition, or one not even entertained. Aquinas' theory of a cooperative society, as expressed in the De regimine principum, lends itself to a general teaching about 120

civil society. Aquinas viewed the political purpose in a community as part of a greater whole—a Christian purpose. To do this he had to see the city not solely as an institution arising naturally of men but as a phenomenon instituted by God for a spiritual purpose beyond this life. Dante's secularization of all men under universal rule subordinated both social and religious elements ordering all mankind according to its primary rational capability endowed by God. Aristotle saw man first and foremost as political seeking other men to secure needs in a common store. Aquinas saw him first as a social being whose desire for God, represented in Christian goodness and kindness, is best fostered in a political community. And Dante reveals that the most basic characteristic of all men—their natural, human capacity to reason—unifies mankind in the intrinsic desire to know all things about human nature and put them to action in a political organism. Thomas believed in the separation of powers; temporal and spiritual powers were derived independently and directly from God. Yet his is a view of the orthodox state in which the state exists to serve the spiritual. Though he did not envision or support the Empire, Thomas conceived of the perfect community assimilating both the Aristotelian view of civil society and the supernatural aims of the universal Church. In accordance with this, he was sympathetic to the interference of the Church into politics and determined that it was in the power of the Church to "release those bonds of allegiance to the state which are founded on nature," and not vice-versa.81 Dante rejected this because it was inimical not only to the peace of mankind but also to the flourishing of humana civilitas.

Although Dante sought compatibility between faith and Aristotelian philosophy as did Aquinas, his arguments for political life risked heresy even more than the saint's. In the Commedia as well as the Monarchia Dante concludes in antithesis to Thomas that the well-being of the whole political world is not only to be pursued but is indeed achievable through the dual leadership of the Pope and the Emperor. Dante looked to Aquinas' reading of Aristotle for a Christian view of the state, 121

but even this fell short of his concept of political organization which needs be based on man's reason rather than his sociability. Thomas' authority, however, approved Dante's conclusions as to the Monarch's unifying hand over men's diverse natures. Notes 1 A significant term is also "Romanus populus" which might be yet another name for Humana cwilitas because of the universal justice entrusted to the Romans. Of course in the discussion of the proper activity of the genus humanus, it is emphasized that no one man or family or nation is capable of carrying out the function of civilization as a whole. The Roman people of Book II—those particular people who lived during the several yet specific centuries of the flourishing of the Roman Empire—do not alone comprise Humana civilitas. Instead Imperial Rome symbolizes for Dante the only time when all the world enjoyed universal peace; God made the Romans a chosen people and entrusted them with the right to enjoy the hegemony of the world. "Roman" is the symbolic term used to describe all men under universal Monarchy. The Roman world-city of all men is precisely that—people of all religious persuasions and nations are of necessity included. "Roman" becomes the universal, similar to "man" and "human." If all the world were under the single aegis of the universal Emperor, then all the citizens of the world would of necessity be "Roman" or "imperialized" in much the same way that all men are "mortal" or all men are "rational" human beings. 2 Bruno Nardi, Dal "Convivio" alia "Commedia" (Roma: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1960), pp. 26-29 reminds us of the great variety of interpretations for the tradition of "Aristotelianism" which spread through Europe from the thirteenth through the sixteenth centuries. Dante's Aristotelianism similarly is varied and eclectic, representative of St. Thomas, the Dominican Remigio de' Girolami, the Franciscan Pier di Gian Olivo, Taddeo Alderotti (Bolognese transcriber of the Ethics from Latin to Italian), Albertus Magnus (the originator of the Latin Averroist movement in Italy), Siger of Brabant, and in great part, Averroes himself. » Ethics VI,2 1139a 16. * Ethics 1,7 1097a 28-30. 5 Cf. Metaphysics IX,8 1050a 6-23: "Everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, a'nd the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired." * Politics 1,1 1252b 8. ' Physics 11,8 1992; VUI,1 252a 11. • Politics 1,1 1253a 9. » ". . . quod Deus et natura nil otiosum facit," says Dante in I, ii. Cf. Aristotle's "But nature creates nothing that has not its use" in De caelo 1,4 271a 34. Cf. Physics 11,8 199b 33 and Metaphysics 1,9 991a 8 in which Aristotle criticizes the uselessness of Platonic "Ideas" which do not move and have therefore no purpose. Nardi, Dal "Convivio" alia "Commedia", pp. 38-42 notes that in their commentaries on the Metaphysics, Averroes,

122

Albertus and Thomas all agree that even angels, the "pure intelligences," and the heavens are always in motion or "in perpetual act else they would be "indarno," "ociosae," or "sanza operatione." Cf. Monarchia I,x,2; II,v,20; Convivio UI,xv,8-9; IV,xxiv,10; Paradiso IV, 126-132; VIII, 113-114. 10 Dante is careful to add the qualification "creata" to distinguish the essence of a creature from the essence of the Creator, for simply "being" may not coincide with function except in the case of God and the angels—known as pure activity or operation ("atto pure"). Simply "being" cannot be the end proposed by God for a creature either, for if the coincidence "essentia-esse" were to occur in creatures as well as God, there would be a "duplication" of divinity which is impossible. Cf. Vinay, pp. 18-19, notes 11

"Beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que in operatione proprie virtutis consist!t." Aristotle calls the "actuality" or "actualization" of a thing's potential its end. "Entelecheia" is the Greek word for actuality, "telos" for end which in Latin corresponds most closely to "perfectum." See Ostwald, Ethics glossary, p. 315: "It means 'final' not only in the sense that an end has been reached and completion attained, but also in that this completion constitutes a perfection. . . . To render the term in various contexts, 'complete,' 'final,' 'perfect' are used." See also Vinay, p. 19, n. 6 and Nardi pp. 66-68 who writes, ". . . ogni cosa e 'accline' per sua natura a occupare il posto che nel disegno divino del mondo le e assegnato, (Cf. Par. I, 109), si da quietare il natural desiderio che ogni cosa ha di assomigliare a Dio." 13 See Metaphysics 1,2 982b 15ff. where Aristotle calls knowledge the speculative science that is pursued as the only "free science" because it exists for its own sake. 14 Ethics 1,1 1094a 5. "Energeia" is the process toward nature as a form which we saw described in the Physics. Ostwald, glossary, p. 306, gives the following definition: "The noun energeia, 'activity,' 'active exercise,' does not occur in Greek literature before Aristotle. The adjective energos, however, is found in the meaning of 'active,' 'at work. . . . ' In its widest sense, energeia denotes the state of being busy or active, regardless of whether the activity has a palpable result (as it does, for example, in the case of a craftsman) or whether it is self-contained (as, for example, the activity or active exercise of seeing, hearing, etc.). . . . In a narrower and more technical sense, energeia ('actuality') is the opposite of dynamis ('potentiality')." "Ergon" according to Ostwald, p. 307, is in its literal and most basic meaning "work," both in a "functional sense, e.g. the 'work' of a hammer is to drive in nails, and in the concrete sense in which we speak of the 'works' of a poet, sculptor, or craftsman. Accordingly, the term has to be translated differently in different contexts. In using 'product,' we take that word in a slightly wider sense than good English usage permits; for Aristotle also calls, for example, health the 'ergon' of medicine. In other contexts, translations such as 'result,' or 'achievement' are more appropriate. The antonym of this would be 'argon,' a double-entendre, which means literally 'without function'. . . but colloquially to denote a'loafer'or a'good-for-nothing.'" Cf. Ostwald, p. 16, n. 27. 15 Ethics 1,1 1094a 16. '* Ethics 1,7 1098a 4-5. •7 Ethics 1,7 1098a 7. 114 Larry Peterman, "An Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia" in Interpretation. Vol. HI, n. 2 (1972), p. 172 notes the enlargement of the polis but does not articulate the concept of the cosmopolis. 12

123

» Politics VI1.4 1326a 5-1326b 8. Convwio IV,iv,2. 2 ' Cf. Fortin, pp. 145-147. 22 Convivio II, 1. Cf. Epistolae X. 23 Summa contra gentiles 1, vii. 24 of Monarchia II,vi,6; Cf. I,xiv,5-7; Cf. Paradiso VI, 124-126, VIII, 118-123. 32 MwMrcfcifl I,v; Cf. Po/i/ics 1,2. 33 Ernest Barker, introduction to a n d translation of Aristotle's Politics (Oxford: T h e Clarendon Press, 1968), p. lix. 34 Ibid., p . xlvii. Barker n o t e s that the largest of t h e s e civic republics h a d a n area o f one thousand square miles, but most of them were of one hundred square miles or less. 39 Dante, too, calls his treatise a "sort of speculative inquiry." 36 Ostwald, p. xxiv. 37 Politics VII, 4 1326a 5-1326b 25. * Politics VII, 8 1328b 5 - 1 5 . » Politics VII, 8 1328b 1 5 - 2 1 . 40 S e e S.M. S t e m , Aristotle and the World-State (London: Cassirer, 1968), p p . 2 8 - 5 3 . «> R. Weil, Aristote et I'histoire, cited i n S t e m , p . 4 8 . 42 It is interesting to n o t e w h a t D a n t e s a y s about t h e s e Emperors in the Monarchia II, viii. H e hails Alexander, King of the Macedonians, w h o c a m e nearest of all Emperors ("maxime o m n i u m propinquins") to w i n n i n g t h e palm of Monarchy. But according t o Divine Providence, God "snatched Alexander from the race" for Imperial control over all the world. T h e h e g e m o n y that the Greeks could have aspired to i s not w h a t Dante m e a n s b y imperium; what decided t h e prize of world rule for t h e R o m a n s a b o v e all others w a s divine decree or judgment ("divino iudicio"). Nevertheless, the extension and authority s u g g e s t e d in the Politics passage w o u l d b e similar in structure to Dante's universal Monarchy. 43 Barker, p . 296, n. 2, says of the "pregnant" passage in VII, 7 that "the reference here w o u l d naturally s e e m to be a reference to the Macedonian policy, inaugurated b y Philip of Macedon at t h e Congress of Corinth i n 338 B.C., of combining the*Greek states in a political and military alliance. This w a s t h e policy continued b y Alexander and b y Antipater." 44 Henry d e Mauriac, "Alexander the Great and the Politics of Homonoia," Perspectives in Political Philosophy, Vol. I ( N e w York: Holt, 1971), p p . 173-176. 45 Barker, p . lix. •* Ibid.; S t e m , p . 6 1 . 47 Plutarch, quoted in Ibid. Barker also notes, p . lx, note 1, "The Greek 'cosmos' h a s the double s e n s e of order and universe; t h e Greek 'nomos' h a s t h e double s e n s e of pasture and l a w . " *» Stern, p. 44. 20

124

49

V. Ehrenburg, Alexander and the Greeks, p . 65 quoted in Stern, p . 50. William Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XIX (1933), p. 4. 51 Peterman, "An Introduction to Dante's De Monarchia," p . 23. 52 Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, Vol. I ( N e w York: Alfred Knopf, 1954), p p . 213-214. Lewis also says that this totality answers to a "separated, universal soul." The example of the feast in the above passage from the Politics also recalls Dante's description of the sharing of God's love in Paradise where the greater the partnership, the more abundant the love, a n d the richer each soul-sharing becomes (Purgatorio XV, 55-57). A similar ideal of partnership is wanting o n earth where instead each citizen's portion of the g o o d is lessened b y greed and disunity. The feast of God's love can b e restored o n earth only through universal Monarchy. Cf. of course also the philosophic feast of the Convwio. 53 Stem, p. 52. 54 That kingship may be perverted into tyranny as a result of too much jurisdiction is a real fear for Aristotle. Ethics VIII, 10; Politics V, 10. This is not s o for Dante, for if the universal Monarch p o s s e s e s everything, h e can w a n t for nothing, a n d therefore greed cannot threaten his power. 55 Allan Gilbert, "Had Dante Read the Politics of A r i s t o t l e r PMLA, Vol. XLHI (1928). 56 E. Fortin, introduction t o A q u i n a s ' C o m m e n t a r y i n Medieval Political Philosophy, p . 297. 57 Gilbert, p p . 602-610, refers t o Monarchia I,v,5. 58 Dante's citation i n U,v,7 of the Politics 1,5 1252 1. Gilbert s a y s Aristotle d i d n o t u s e the w o r d s "expedient" a n d "right," but in fact h e did. 5» Ethics 1,2 1094b 10. Cf. 1,4 1095a 32. 60 Harry Jaffa, "Aristotle" i n History of Political Philosophy, p . 100. 61 Fortin, introduction to Aquinas' Commentary, p . 297. « Politics VIL3 1325b 15ff. « Politics, loc. cit., VII, 3 1325b 32ff. « Ethics 1,6 1094b 30. *» Ethics X,8 1178b 23. Cf. X,7 1177a 21-27. «• Politics 1,2 1252b 28-30. 67 Aquinas, Commentary o n t h e Politics, p . 305. «Ibid., p p . 310-311. •» Ibid., p . 329. 70 Aquinas, Commentary o n t h e Ethics, p . 275. 71 De regimine principum, 1,1,14-15; 2,17-19. Cf. Thomas' "diversification of capacities" in t h e De reg. prin. a n d h i s "diversification of m e n for diverse tasks" i n t h e Quaestiones quodlibetales VH, 17, quoted in Dino Bigongiari, editor. The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas ( N e w York: Hafner Press, 1957), p . ix, w i t h D a n t e ' s " d i v e r s a s o p e r a t i o n e s " i n Monarchia II,v. Cf. Paradiso VIII. 72 Bigongiari, p . xxxiii. 73 G.B. Phelan, editor, De regimine principum (Toronto: T h e Pontifical Institute o f Medieval Studies, 1949), p. 4, n. 3, notes that the source of this teaching is not from Aristotle only, but also from Avicenna, and in particular from his commentary on the De anima V,l. Avicenna writes: "Man's actions possess certain properties which proceed from his soul and are not found in other animals. The first of these is that man's being in which he is created could not last if he did not live in society. Man is not 50

125

self-sufficient. O n e man w o u l d b e unable to acquire all these necessaries of life if h e were alone. H e can d o so, however, in society where o n e bakes the other's bread and the latter w e a v e s the former's clothes." 74 Aquinas, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, HI, quoted in Bigongiari, pp. x-xi. 75 De regimine principum 1,1,6. Cf. Aristotle's statement in the Politics 111,4 1278b 25: "Men are united by their c o m m o n interests." 76 Ibid., Cf. Ethics w h e r e Aristotle says the g o o d of the state is greater than t h e g o o d of the individual, e v e n if t h e e n d is t h e same for m e n a n d states a n d mankind. 77 Lewis, p . 212. 78 In the question o n original sin (Summa theologica Ha Ilae 83.1), T h o m a s again states that t h e " c o m m o n good, takes precedence over t h e individual g o o d . " T h e w o r d s are repeated verbatim in the Contra gentiles 111,71,1. A n d following this in 111,71,8, w e read: "Other things, particularly lower o n e s , are ordered to man's g o o d as a n e n d . " Cf. De regimine 1,9,70: "The g o o d of the multitude is greater than a n d more divine than the g o o d of o n e m a n . " In the Summa Ila Ilae 47.10, to support h i s conclusions that the individual g o o d is lesser than and for the benefit of the c o m m o n g o o d , T h o m a s quotes Paul's letter t o t h e Corinthians 1,13:5: Here it i s illustrated that charity, a s a n analogy, "seeketh n o t its o w n g o o d , " but in its unselfishness, that of others. Paul urges that it is best t o regard t h e g o o d of t h e many a n d n o t one's o w n . For the " m a n y , " T h o m a s u s e s "muln'tudo." Gilby, in the Blackfriar's edition of t h e Summa notes, p. 3 2 , that "multitudo" d o e s not m e a n "population" but "all those responsibly b o u n d to association under a c o m m o n purpose and l a w . " 79 Bigongiari, p . xi. 80 Quaestiones quodlibetales VII, 17 quoted in Bigongiari, p. 109. 81 Summa theologica Ha Ilae 60.6.

126

PART III The Unity of Mankind

•f

1

The Multitude of Mankind and the Question of Averroistic Collectivism

J A.

A

'

:

r'

The Monarchia offers Dante's most clear and formal expression of his life-long campaign for the restoration of the Empire. His design for a rebirth of the majesty that was Rome was born of the belief that all men in all generations and parts of the world, by virtue of their human, rational nature, are fellow citizens within a single human, political community. By this "community," he intended the whole human race. The ideal regime that he proposed to direct this community was a world-Monarchy which would have the whole of mankind as the body politic. Universal Empire was necessary, according to Dante, to the very well-being of humanity whose purpose or "proper function" in this life is to promote civilization or, in other words, actualize the human intellectual potential for acquiring knowledge. The end of mankind is the exercise of the faculty of reason, the realization of the capacity to acquire wisdom, the pursuit of philosophy—civilization itself. Aside from asserting the independence of the Empire from papal control, it was Dante's view of the multitude of mankind, which he called humana civilitas, that provoked most of the criticism he received from theologians. The Dominican Guido Vernani's accusation that Dante held a heresy-tainted view of the human race began the book's long history of persecution by the Church.1 Dante claimed that the activity or bringing into act of humanity's potential may take place only through the multitude of generations of human beings: "necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur" he says in Monarchia I,iii. Similarly, there must be a multitude of things generated in order to realize the whole of prime matter: "necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime semper sub actu sit" (I,iii). The alternative for this claim, Dante argued, was that potentiality exist separately, which is impossible: potentiality is 129

within every man, and it is impossible for anything of necessity to exist merely potentially (I,iii). The notion of a common capacity for thought in men, made active only if the entire human race exercised every potentiality of the human intellect, led some critics immediately to speculate that Dante was in effect implying the existence of a non-corporeal intellectual "bank" for all men and therefore denying the personal immortality of individual souls. The concept that the multitude of mankind is necessarily comprised of generations and generations of human beings led others to infer that Dante was also assuming the eternity of the world and the eternity of the human species. This necessarily implied the denial that God created the world. According to the Church, these propositions were some of the most heretical claims made by Averroes and his medieval followers, the Latin Averroists. The fact that Dante specifically named Averroes and asserted that the Commentator was in agreement with his view of mankind seemed to seal the charge of sympathizing with beliefs contrary to the Church's teaching: "Et huic sententie concordat Averrois in comento super hiis que De anima" (i,iii). The reference is to the Commentary on Aristotle's treatise On the Soul in which Averroes interpreted the Philosopher's definition of the potential or possible intellect and its representation in man.. The extent of Dante's debt to Averroes is controversial and has been difficult to determine. Just why this commentary is mentioned in the Monarchy and what constitutes Dante's knowledge or interpretation of the dangerous view of the possible intellect, are questions so subtle that virtually the whole controversy of Dante's politics, the basis for his advocation of the Empire, rests on these few lines in his political work. Our purpose here is to reexamine the metaphysical basis of Dante's view of humanity in his treatise on the Empire and to see just how Dante meant to utilize Averroes' unique proof of "monopsychism," or human thought capacity. Vernani was the first to accuse Dante of advocating, like Averroes, that there was one possible intellect for all men. This 130

was one of four errors according to the Dominican that Dante made in Book I of the Monarchy. In his presumptive assertion, Dante was allegedly going against both natural philosophy and moral philosophy. Besides, the Church taught that the possible intellect is not a separate substance, nor is it one for all men. Obviously Vernani's critical eye was intolerant to assume with a first reading of Averroes' name that Dante was necessarily in complete agreement with the Commentator. Even those who would later admit to Dante's being influenced by the notion of a unified intellectual spirit, recognized that for any Christian the intellect must be individualized, and the human species is not eternal as it was created by God. Rather the human race began with Adam and will finish with the Last Judgment, what Dante calls the "consumazione del celestiale movimento" in the Convivio n,xiv, according to faith. By quoting Averroes, Dante—deliberately to be sure— wished to indicate some sort of connection between the former's image of the possible intellect and his own. Many have rationalized that Averroes' concept of the possible intellect as a single, intellectual substance drew an image for Dante of a | / unified human race. The human race could be treated as a single entity, capable of realizing at every moment its special aim: it could possess at all times every intellectual thought imaginable. This was the secular model of universalism which some say Dante sought to parallel and compare with the institution of the Church. Since Christendom was the only organization which thought to encompass a multitude of persons, Dante attempted a combination of religious order and philosophical order, suggesting a sort of laicized Church, a universal community boasting the allegiance of every single human being.2 While Dante cannot clearly be labeled an heretical Averroist, Latin or otherwise, for never is there proof that he was "at variance" with Christian faith, surely his inspiration, his "starting point" as Gilson terms it, is found in Averroism. But Gilson assumes that Averroes' necessary subordination of the religious order to the philosophical order must have been intolerable to Dante and his political Averroism 131

was but a passing phase.3 Furthermore, he fails to realize that Dante saw, as did Ariftotle and Averroes, the potential for thought in man a far greater unifier than Christendom. The Church as we have seen, could not boast allegiance of every human citizen, and, more importantly, the third book of the Monarchia is devoted to severing every historical and jurisdiction tie of the Empire to the Church. The exeniplum of the Roman Empire, praised and justified by the will of Divine Providence in the second book of the Monarchy, is a more likely paradigm for Dante's universal community, although the need to prove that Rome's acquisition of world power was rightful because of her victory in contests and by ordeal belies even its natural jurisdiction over all men. It appears instead that Dante's explanation in the first book of the treatise recognizes a firmer basis for the unity of mankind than Christianity or historical Rome, namely the human potential for thought. This is why Dante cites Averroes whose belief in a singular psyche for all human beings confirmed for Dante what was the only common denominator for the human race, irrespective of faith or time or place—the possession of the rational faculty. Averroes' collective "thought bank" was a perfect model for Dante's political organization of men. Furthermore, both Averroes and Aristotle maintained that the human species is organized according to a rational hierarchy based on the differing degrees of intellectual potential in each individual. At the end of Monarchy I,iii, Dante quotes the passage from Aristotle's Politics where this notion is expressed, concluding: "men of superior intellect naturally rule over others." Because Qf this key Aristotelian, political notion, Dante's vision of a single human community was not a combination of Averroes's possible intellect and the universal Church as Gilson and others had suggested. Rather it is the combination of the ideas of his possible intellect with the superiority of the Emperor and the monarchical form of government expressed by Aristotle. The unifying political power of the Supreme Prince was essential to the coordination and singular action of the human race. The 132

belief in the existence of a political superman was another accusation of heterodoxy called by Vernani. A review of pure Averroistic doctrine as expounded in the Arab's commentary on the De anima suggests something else we should consider regarding Dante's citation. Not only was Vernani's reading not sufficiently scrutinizing, but also Dante's interpretation of and reference to the Commentator's analysis appears curiously inaccurate. Averroes' famous commentary on the De anima III,v altered the Philosopher's definition of the potential or possible intellect as represented in man. Aristotle had maintained that man's capacity to reason was illuminated by an abstract force or entity present within the individual soul called the "agent Intellect." He did not make any conclusions regarding the form or means of manifestation of this capacity that is illuminated. Averroes in his interpretation, understood * , his master to mean that the agent Intellect was an entity separate j *• from souls which illuminates from above. Moreover, Aristotle had implied, in Averroes' opinion, that also the illuminated possible intellect was a separate substance and one for all persons. Dante in turn says that his view of the necessity of the multitude is supported by that of Averroes, in so far as it is impossible for potency to exist separately: "aliter esset dare potentiam separatem, quod est inpossibile." Yet isn't this claim—that the possible intellect be wholly separate and independent of the body—the key position of the Averroistic theory of the intellect? To make matters simple, the answer is "Yes," but if we take Dante at his word and if we detail Averroes' interpretation, we realize that this is not what Dante is claiming. The capacity within men granted by Averroes was a mere "passive intellect" ("intellectus passivus"), a "simple disposition to receive the intelligible forms which come to it from the separate agent Intellect."4 This passive intellect is "imagination." Imagination is entirely corporeal and therefore perishes with the body at death. In order to cause thinking in the individual, the agent Intellect illumines this passive intellect and the contact of these two gives rise to a third one called the 133

"material intellect" ("intellectus materialis"). The material intellect is also known as the "possible intellect" ("intellectus possibilis"), and it is pure human intellectual potentiality. The term "material" was misleading, "concerning the nature of the thing in question, for the 'material' intellect is in no way corporeal."5 For Averroes, the possible or material intellect was a substance separate from individual souls, one for all mankind, and in some way united with the unique, separate agent Intellect. Dante in turn said that his view of the necessity of a "multitude of human beings" to actualize human intellectual potentiality was supported by this view of the possible intellect fashioned by Averroes. Dante's recall, at least on this point, was correct. He shows a complete understanding of Averroes' doctrine which says that while the possible intellect is one separate substance for all men, it is impossible for this potency to exist separately— separately, that is, from the agent Intellect. To repeat, the possible intellect does exist apart from the individual body for Averroes, and it is common for all men, ungenerable and incorruptible. The necessary conclusion of all this, which made Averroes the target of upholders of Christian dogma, is the denial of immortality in the individual soul. While there is a continuity between this separate possible intellect and the particular soul of every individual man, an individual's immortality for Averroes cannot be the immortality of an intelligible substance capable of surviving the death of the body. All that is eternal or capable of perpetuation in the individual belongs to the agent Intellect by full right and is immortal only by [the agent Intellect's] immortality.6

Furthermore, as receptive of cognition, the possible intellect is called "material," not because it is corporeal (which it is not) but because, like matter, it is pure potentiality. . . . It is perhaps not a substance really separate from the agent Intellect. . . . This separate intellect (both material and agent) is the same for all men. 7

134

Thus in I,iii of the Monarchia, Dante has identified support of Averroes in only half the issue. He concurs that the possible intellect and the agent are one, and it is impossible for them to exist apart from one another. But nowhere does he aver a denial of individual immortality. What he did was summarize Averroes' viewpoint all too abruptly for Vemani's liking. It isi / true he omits quite a few syllogistic premises in his brevity but\ his conclusion is not compromising. The remaining question to be examined is Dante's view of the substance of the possible intellect. Does it exist separately from individuals as it does for Averroes? Is there a single intellectual capacity common to all men? There is no question that Dante felt that all human beings, by their human nature, shared a similar potential for acquiring wisdom. He speaks of the "order" in Aquinas, the "common store" in Aristotle and details the homogeneity of a world-city to which individuals must contribute according to their distinct and diverse rational capabilities. If all men over all generations contributed to a kind of "pool of wisdom"—a kind of memory bank of knowledge— as they contribute to the political community, then it would follow that this pool be some kind of growing common record of civilization that survives the body. This is what Dante implies in his argument for the necessity of a multitude of things which can be generated from prime matter. He is discussing a function of the whole of mankind, a capacity common to the entire human species as the guiding principle in his inquiry. His philosophical proof that all individual men i must be coordinated and unified to carry out this function ^ dwells not on the part but looks always to the end. What the "ultimate end of human society as a whole" is constitutes the universal political subject and object of Dante's inquiry. Invoking the authority of philosophy in inquiring as to the end of society of the happiness in this life was enough to give Vernani the right to charge Dante with heresy. But it was Dante's intention in his speculative inquiry to give a philosoph- j 7 ical proof of something which he also accepted on faith. 135

The extent of Dante's debt to Averroes is rendered difficult to determine because of his brevity and because of what appears to be a misrepresentation of terms. When Dante says that there must be a multitude of beings generated in order to realize the whole potential of the human race, he leaves out a few important syllogistic premises before he concludes that Averroes concurs in his judgment. When Dante meant to identify some intellectual element particular to individual men, it is likely that he intended to say "passive" where he says or has the reader understand "possible": men learn through the "passive" intellect, not the "possible." Recent editors of the Commentary on the De anima warn that Averroes himself vacillates on certain identifications and leaves the status of the intellect "very obscure."8 Averroes after all claimed that this passive intellect was imagination and perished with the body. In addition, for Aristotle, the only part of the soul said to be incorruptible is the agent Intellect, the cause of actualization of the potentialities of the soul. He, too, was undefinitive as to whether the agent was part of the individual soul or entirely separate from the body. Had Dante said instead that man's common intellectual capacity is the "passive" intellect, it would have gotten him off the heresy hook, since such an assertion does not preclude the incorruptibility of the individual soul. On the other hand, we know that the opportunity for mistaken identification or alternative interpretation was clearly present to medieval writers and the interchangeability of terms was a stylistic practice not uncharacteristic of the poet. Dante may have deliberately misrepresented his source to disguise the fact that he indeed did uphold controversial philosophical opinions similar to the "double truth" theory. At the very least he could have been applying the system for reading and interpreting Biblical texts to his secular medium as he had done with profane poetry. Or rather was Dante's consistent word on this topic what we find in the Purgatorio through the explanation of Statius regarding the generation of man?

. . . quests tal punto, che piu savio di te fe gia errante, si che per sua dottrina fe disgiunto da l'anima il possibile intelletto, perch6 da lui non vide organo assunto. (Purgatorio XXV, 62-66)

. . . this is such a point that once it made one wiser than you to err, so that in his teaching he separated the possible intellect from the soul because he saw no organ assumed by it.

That one "piu savio" than Dante is, of course, none other than the Commentator himself whom Dante, while recognizing the excellence of his speculative mind, nevertheless places in Limbo along with Aristotle and the other great philosophical spirits. In any case, Dante clearly assigns in the Monarchia the means and process of the actualization of each man's receptivity to reason to and only to the multitude of all mankind. Each individual's function is to contribute to the communal end of the multitude. In communion with other men, each individual participates in a great and coordinated division of labor in order to accomplish the one universal task of humanity. Even if Dante's view of a unified intellect could be exonerated of an unorthodox association with Averroes' view, as regards the denial of personal immortality, his assumption that the whole of mankind could be eternal through its coordinated t, action of intellectualizing unquestionably has Averroistic im-' plications. This was in fact the third grave error cited by Guido Vernani. The proper function of the human race, according to Dante in I,iv, is to actualize continually and at all times the human potential for thought. To describe how this intellectual power of individual men must be activated through the collectivity and mutual exercising of the possible intellect of all men combined in the human race, scattered over all parts of the 137

136

\

Y

V.

V

globe through all time, Dante uses the terms "simul in actum" and "semper sub actu." Similar to the angels, eternally intellectual, separate substances who speculate and who are continuously intellectualizing ("intelUgere . . . sine interpolatione/' "sempiterne"), the multitude of men must always and without pause exercise their rational capacity to assimilate wisdom. Men must "agere atque facere" continuously as their end (I,iii,10). All men must engage in either matters of action which are governed by political prudence or in matters of production which are governed by art. Both of these activities are extensions of speculation and wisdom, called by Dante the highest good that God has designed for the human race. In this way only is the natural desire that all men by nature have "to know" satisfied. That men naturally have this desire is affirmed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics and echoed by Dante in the introduction to the Convivio. Man's full and perfect temporal beatitude is the continual satisfaction of this desire for knowledge. The never-ending intellectual function of angels is thus equated to that of the unified totality of the human race. The implications of these affirmations sound very familiar to two propositions condemned as Averroistic heresies by the Bishop of Paris in 1277: 1) "that an angel does not understand anything new" and 2) "that the separated substances (angels) in so far as they have a single appetite, do not change in their operation."9 Thomas Aquinas similarly addressed the question of the angels' continuous speculation and similarly verges on Averroism in the Summa contra gentiles (11,4-5). The movement of the heavenly bodies is always continuous. Therefore, the act of understanding exercised by separate substances is continuous and perpetual ("non intercisa"). . . . If the proper operation of a heavenly body, namely, its movement is continuous, for all the more reason will the proper operation of separate substances, namely, iunderstanding, be continuous.

Recognizing the precarious approximation to intolerable claims, Thomas goes on to clarify that the angels are eternal 138

only in so far as they do not stop thinking; they do, of course, pass from one thought to another. In his words, "there is a certain succession of understanding." An acquitting qualification is not to be found in Dante's text, however, and indeed Guido Vernani accused the equation of "esse" and "intelligere" in the separate spiritual substances of being an "intolerabilis error"—the last of four in Book I of the Monarchia. According to Vernani, only in God ("purus actus") can pure essence coincide with intellection. In Paradiso XXIX, 33, however, Dante is blatantly dear that God created the angels to be pure act or form without matter, for their powers are always in operation. These substances were "cima nel mondo" occupying the most subliminal place in the universe. Thomas' words for uninterrupted action ("non intercisa") and Dante's expression for performance without pause ("sine interpolatione") might be compared with what Dante says a few verses later in the Paradiso. Queste sustanze, poi che fur gioconde de la faccia di Dio, non volser viso da essa, da cui nulla si nasconde: perd non hanno vedere interciso da novo obietto, e perd non bisogna rememorar per concetto diviso. (Paradiso XXIX, 76-81)

These substances, since first they were gladdened by the face of God, have never turned their eyes from It, wherefrom nothing is concealed; so that their sight is never intercepted by a new object, and therefore they have no need to remember by reason of interrupted concept.

The angels here are without interruption, engaged in the pure act of intelligizing and knowing all things as was Dante himself when gazing fixedly at the unity and trinity of God: 139

Cosi la mente mia, tutta sospesa, mirava fissa, immobile e attenta, e sempre di mirar faceasi accesa. (Paradiso XXXIII, 97-99) Thus my mind, all rapt, was gazing, fixed, motionless and intent, ever enkindled by its gazing.

Elsewhere the angels are described as "pure active intelligence." In the third book of the Convivio, Dante says they are "fixed" when looking at the divine Sapienza in his second canzone. Again in chapter xiii of Book III, he repeats "le intelligenze separate questa donna mirino continuamente," "donna" being knowledge. Earlier in the Banquet, II, iv, Dante identified the angels as the substances which carry on the eternal speculative or contemplative life in the heavens. Their never-ending function which is to gaze at God is something human intelligence cannot do because of man's "sensitive" needs. The angels' speculative intellect deals with universals. Men, Dante says, whose practical intellect deals with particulars, may fashion themselves in the image of these celestial bodies. They may cease their participation in politics and art and pursue the life of strict philosophical meditation. In this they have free choice, free will. The few who do choose this path are more like God, or at least more like the angels—always intelligizing, possessing not a passive intellect like most men, but an active contemplative intellect.10 It is this active contemplative or "agent Intellect" of God—at one with the angels— which mixes with the passive intellect of men. Here, in the Convivio, Dante accurately identifies the "passive" intellect as that which is proper to men. And like Averroes, its combination with the agent Intellect produces the active potential of human intellect. When an individual man is involved thus in the complete act of speculation or philosophizing, then his intellectual desire is temporarily satisfied, according to Dante ("appagato"), and he has reached human happiness. 140

In the Monarchia, men need not choose between an active political life and one of contemplation: it is possible to do both, indeed the political life is necessary for speculation. Furthermore, the intellective power of men includes both speculative and practical aspects. His speculative inquiry is indeed directed towards action: "Cum ergo materia presens politics s i t . . . non ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur" (I,ii,6-7). Hence Dante can speak of mankind's "almost divine task" ("fere divinum") in I,iv. The task of angels is always intellectualizing, being always in act. Mankind has this speculative power or capacity which also is always in act through the working together of all men. If man's intellect deals with particulars, then the sum total of the intellectualizing of all men would give knowledge of universals. Averroes, too, in his Commentary on the De anima suggests this capability of men to be divine in that some men—the philosophers—acquire divine knowledge. While this kind of thought transcends the intellectual capacity of the ordinary individual, Averroes, nevertheless, considered it "immanent in the human race."11 In sum, the continuous uninterrupted "action" of speculation or knowledge acquisition, which characterizes the angels' essence thinking and gazing at "la Sapienza" and which is the same essence when Dante is before the Godhead, determines their eternity. In this there is no denial of personal immortality. Yet it would follow that if the human race could be politically organized under universal Empire and coordinated to fulfill its human task of thinking, then it could achieve the continuous act of uninterrupted speculation via the common pool of the possible intellect. Thus the human community would be pure active intelligence and eternal here on earth as the angels and other blessed souls are in Paradise. It would seem that even if Dante had defended himself against the accusation of denying individual immortality, he would be guilty of the other Averroistic assumption of the eternity of the world and the human race. His description of the multitude of the human race "always" and "at once" actualizing the possible intellect in order to be like the angels who are pure intellect without 141

interruption is hardly an "imprecisione verbale" as one of Dante's defenders has said, and indeed smacks of a bit of Averroism as did Vernani attest.12 Dante emphasizes the collective character of the multitude saying that mankind's end is perfected through one multipartite action channelled toward one end or purpose. Est ergo aliqua propria operatio humane universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine ordinatur; ad quam quidem operationem nee homo unus, nee domus una, nee una vicinia, nee una civitas, nee regnum particulare pertingere potest. (Monarchia, I,iii,4) From this it follows that there must be some particular function proper to the human species as a whole and for which the whole species in its multitudinous variety was created; this function is beyond the capacity of any one man or household or village, or even of any one city or kingdom.

Vernani felt that this too was heresy; namely that humana civilitas was capable of reaching its ultimate end in this life. Not only do all men (a single man as well as the whole human race) pursue the same end—eternal beatitude—but also this "visio et fruitio summe veritatis et summe bonitatis" may not occur in this life, argued the Dominican. Dante's investigation at this point, however, concerns not the spiritual end of eternal happiness to which Vernani refers. The section specifically inquires as to man's rational capacity in this life, and Dante is following the guiding principle of his argument, namely that the whole of mankind does have some particular endowment, just as any single man has or any village or kingdom. In fact, the final line of I,ii clears Dante of Vernani's accusation, for he himself notes that it would be absurd ("stultum") to suppose that there are different ends for this and that division of men and no one end for us all. This statement, of course, can have a double entendre which Vernani may have seen through. Dante could be meaning it as absurd that there is not one end for us all as a group or species; on the other hand it could 142

signify it is absurd to think that there is not one end, the same end, to which each and all of us is or are directed. The one purpose for us all in this life that Dante is investigating is made clear in the introduction to I,iv as the function of the particular group—the whole human race, taken as the whole of mankind. It is precisely to bring to act at all times the potential of the human intellect: "actuare semper totam potentiam intellectus possibilis." Only the temporal end is in question here. The spiritual end is reserved for the afterlife. Nevertheless, to assume that all the good that is possible for man consists in the intellectual virtues was yet another proposition condemned by the Church in 1277. Dante's mention of Averroes in the Monarchia recalls a similar citation, also pertaining to the De anima Commentary which might shed some light on the question of Dante's Averroism. In the Convivio IV,xiii, Dante writes: Ben puote ancora calunniare l'awersario dicendo che, awegna che molti desiderii si compiano ne lo acquisto de la scienza, mai non si viene a 1'ultimo: che e quasi simile a la 'mperfezione di quello che non si termina e che e pur uno. Ancora qui si risponde, che non e vero cid che si oppone, cioe che mai non si viene a 1'ultimo: che li nostri desiderii naturali, si come di sopra nel terzo trattato e mostrato, sono a certo termine discendenti: e quello de la scienza e naturale, si che certo termine quello compie, awegna che pochi, per male camminare, compiano la giornata. E chi intende lo Commentatore nel terzo de YAnima, questo intende da lui.

The paragraph discusses the ordering of natural desires to their respective ends, specifically the human desire for knowledge. That man's natural inclination is toward perfection, i.e. knowledge of all things ("venire a 1'ultimo") is without objection. One need only refer to the opening lines of the Convivio to have proof of this. That man can succeed in fully satisfying this innate desire is however questioned, and therefore Dante refers us to the great doubt he himself proposed in Convivio III,xv as to whether the knowledge of all things can be had in 143

human life and whether knowledge can make a man happy ("se la Sapienza possa fare l'uomo beato"). How could this be, Dante had asked, if intellectual knowledge cannot reveal certain things, such as the knowledge of God? Man desires to know all things which include a knowledge of God. How can man be blessed if he fails to fulfill this desire in this life? The doubt is resolved via a realization that the graspability of a thing is measured according to the capacity of the one who desires. We may desire only those things which our capacity permits us to attain. In other words, if total human knowledge is desired within the human race by some persons, then it must be attainable at least by some persons in this world at some point in time. This is why Dante cites Averroes in the fourth book of the Convivio, namely to explain that indeed only a few persons succeed individually in the full attainment of knowledge in this life ("awegna che pochi compiano la giornata"). The majority of people, because of evil misguidance ("per male camminare")—and we must intend the same lack of guidance described by Marco Lombardo—do not succeed and do not reach human perfection. What Averroes discusses in his Commentary on the De anima, Book III, concerns the continuity or "copulatio" of the agent Intellect with the passive intellect in men. The result is, as we have said, to bring about the possible intellect, to make this capacity of men actualized. In this operation, some may, according to Averroes, achieve perfection ("et quam mirabilis assimilatur Deo in haec perfectio"). Averroes is not the only one to marvel that but a few persons achieve this intellectual perfection of the contemplative life. John of Jandun, noted exponent of Latin Averroism, also acknowledges in his Commentary on the De anima that few individuals satisfy fully the natural desire to know. The Arab Avempace as well as the Latin Averroists taught, for example, that it was possible for man to actuate all of his potential intellect in this life, although few reach such perfection. In fact St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Ethics 1,1 explains that "those few who do reach 144

knowledge," albeit that little which man can acquire in this life, do so only with great study and invention. Of course for Averroes the "few" who acquire total knowledge are the philosophers, the "falasifa," who are responsible for interpreting the religious law for the masses. Philosophy for Islam came to grips with revealed religion by treating religion as the imitation of philosophy, as an imaginative representation to the majority of men who did not have the capacity for genuine knowledge. Religious law was for the multitude; faith was the only guide they could understand. Philosophy was reserved for the philosophers, a sort of intellectual elite who could rise above mass opinion to the realm of truth.13 Dante seems to have borrowed also this belief from Arab philosophy. Dante speaks of two groups of privileged or '1)630'." In the Convivio and the Monarchia they are the philosophers, those individuals who have found intellectual happiness in this life. These continue to be nourished in this life by human knowledge ("lo pane de le angeli" in I,i; III,xiii). Dante extols the philosophers as capable of knowing all things in the Convivio I,i. They are the "pochi bead" who "a l'abito da tutti desiderato possano pervenire." In contrast is the multitude of persons "innumerable quasi" who "di questo cibo sempre vivono affamati." The food is the bread of angels who continuously have wisdom. Oh beati quelli pochi che seggiono a queila mensa dove lo pane de li angeli si manuca! e miseri quelli che con le pecore hanno comune cibo! (Convivio I,i)

In the Commedia, blessed are not only those who have perfected human wisdom but also those who have achieved eternal happiness through God's grace. These two kinds of blessedness had in fact already been delineated in the conclusion of the Monarchia. In the Inferno, Dante encourages the few who have "li intelletti sani" to reach out to try and understand the ethical and political message hidden beneath the strange verses of his tale of redemption {Inferno IX, 61-63). In the Purgatorio, those 145

few who have survived the temporal cruel sea with him as well as the faithful multitude, he invites to strain their eyes toward eternal truth and to set out upon the waters of the spiritual truth—waters never travelled by mortals and described in the Paradiso.14 Voialtri pochi che drizzaste il collo per tempo al pan de li angeli, del quale vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo, metter potete ben per l'alto sale vostro navigio, servando mio solco dinanzi a I'acqua che ritorna equale. (Paradiso II, 10-19) You other few who lifted up your necks betimes for bread of angels, on which men here subsist but never become sated of it, you may indeed commit your vessel to the deep brine, holding to my furrow ahead of the water that turns smooth again.

All the others, the multitude who have neither faith nor philosophy are cautioned to return to shore in their less seaworthy vessels: O voi che siete in piccioletta barca, desiderosi d'ascoltar, seguiti dietro al mio legno che cantando varca, tomate a riveder li vostri liti: non vi mettete in pelago, che forse, perdendo me, rimarreste smarriti. (Paradiso II, 1-6)

O you that are in your little bark, eager to hear, following behind my ship that singing makes her way, turn back to see again your shores. Do not commit yourselves to the open sea, for perchance, if you lost me, you would remain astray.

146

The image of the vessel coming to port is present also in the Monarchia in the final chapter, accompanied by and enhanced by the Averroistic image of the select few who, if at all, at least with greatest difficulty, can achieve temporal happiness. Et cum ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci, et hii cum difficultate nimia, pervenire possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pads tranquillitate quiescat, hoc est illud signum ad quod maxime debet intendere curator orbis, qui dicitur romanus Princeps. . . . (Monarchia IH,xv)

None would reach this harbor—or, at least, few would do so, and only with the greatest difficulty—unless the waves of alluring cupidity were assuaged and mankind were freed from them so as to rest in the tranquillity of peace; and this is the task to which that protector of the world must devote his energies who is called the Roman Prince.

Because of Averroes' teaching on the possible intellect, Dante was convinced that not only an intellectual elite could enjoy the fruits of philosophy on their own but in fact the whole human race could enjoy perfection in the possession of universal knowledge in this life under the Empire. It is the task of the Emperor to direct the will of those searching for intellectual happiness through philosophy. In his total absence of greed and presence of justice, the Emperor could unite the multitude of mankind and effect the totality of actualizing the human possible intellect. The Pope, on the other hand, is responsible only for guiding the faithful to God and preparing Christian men for eternal life. In the Monarchia's conclusion, Dante adds that man's spiritual perfection is had in the transhuman experience of knowing God in the afterlife. In this life, happiness is exercising the rational element "que in operatione proprie virtutis consistit. . . per phylosophica documenta." In eternal life, it is the quenching of the thirst for God "que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino adiuta . . . et per documenta spiritualia que humanum ratione transcendunt" (IH,xv). Eter147

nal beatitude is finally reaching "haec perfectio divina maxima"—the final port in the grand sea of life. Dante's desire, of course, is to emphasize the equal importance of the two groups of blessed ones while dwelling on a discussion of the former. In this, he does use Averroes as his starting point the way Aristotle set the groundwork for his idea of the world-po/is. From the Averroistic notions of philosophy as powerful as religion and of a collective yet monopsychic intellect for man, Dante draws his scheme for world order. Man's insatiable desire for wisdom is inherent in his nature, universal and manifested from one generation to the next. Dante shocked his readers with a direct referral to Averroes in support of his already dangerous statement, namely that a multitude of men is essential to keep always in act the possible intellect. Yet his intention was never to contradict the revelations of faith. Like Averroes and Thomas Aquinas, Dante felt that his philosophical conclusions could be made independent of religion.15 His final paragraphs of the Monarchia attest to this respect of faith and desire for its compatibility with philosophy. But Dante clearly considered himself one of the select few capable of philosophizing and of interpreting divine law for the masses. Dante did not write a psychological treatise on the soul, nor did he propose a philosophy of mind based on the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. He does, however, believe in the equal rational potential of all men and in their inherent desire for unified political organization. He proposes a kind of social metaphysics for the human race. The monopsychism described by the Commentator merely offered him an obvious model to which to compare his unification of man's potential and end. Aristotle had stated that man's desire for knowledge was natural and that omniscience was what man could strive to obtain. Averroes sought to reinforce the acquisition of knowledge of all things by many individuals in the world through the singular guidance of the agent-possible Intellect. Dante took this notion one step further advocating the political protection, guidance, and guarantee for this acquisition by the Emperor 148

through universal Monarchy. The direction of the one supreme Prince was necessary so that human civilization could carry out its proper function and reach its universal temporal end. The Empire was simply essential to the well-being of the world and the human species. Dante never declares outrightly a belief in the unicity of intelligence—Averroes' key and characteristic proposition for which he is best remembered. Nor does Dante claim anywhere specifically another Averroistic principle, that the human species is eternal. Nevertheless, these propositions are accepted as truths at the basis of his philosophical proof of the need of Empire. Dante believed that the multitude of mankind must always be intellectualizing in order for its proper work not to be in vain. There must and always will be human beings thinking in order to acquire universal wisdom, mankind's end. Averroes had fashioned his idea for a never-ending, cyclical succession of individuals, which ensured the continuation of the species, if not the very immortality of it, from the words of his master, Aristotle. Aristotle speaks of the "coming-to-be" and the "passingaway" of things in the De generatione et corruptione. This

phenomenon has unfailing continuity: it is necessarily cyclical (1,3; 11,4,10-11). There always is a "generator" which causes the uninterrupted, continuous, never-failing passing-away of "this" and the coming-to-be of "that." In some cycles, the same individual continually recurs, as in the case of showers and air. In the case of men and animals, however, the same individual does not come-to-be a second time. Such individuals, says Aristotle, do not "return upon themselves." Rather only the same species or specific form is "eternally represented in the succession of its perishing individual embodiments." Also in the Physics VIII, 1250b 10-252b 5, Aristotle says there always has been and there will always be movement—a sort of unending, eternal repetition within the temporal order. Averroes, in turn, applied this proposition to the question of human knowledge for his Commentary on the De anima. For Averroes: 149

a succession of individuals furnishing the data of knowledge insures the continuity of knowledge to the material (possible) intellect; through the repeated presentation of data by now one, now another of the transient passible (individually passive) intellects, it provides a replica in time and in matter of the eternal knowledge of a separated substance. Individuals may come and go, but philosophy will never cease. Since there will always in some part of the world be some human beings with their possible intellects, philosophical principles will always be possessed by the material (possible) intellect.16

likewise, Dante found in the Averroistic possible intellect of men their unifying capacity and end in this life. That the possible intellect is one for all men and that a multitude of generations of human beings will enable the whole of mankind to acquire universal knowledge, are givens at the heart of Dante's view of Empire and humanity. That there is a regenerative pool of human wisdom, a growing record of humana civilitas, is history itself. Peace as the Means to the Collective End Citing Aristotle's Ethics that leisure is essential if a man is to acquire wisdom, Dante assumes likewise that in the quietude and tranquillity of peace all of mankind is in the best position to cany out its proper work of contemplation (Monarchia I,iv,2). "Sedendo et quiescendo" is the expression he uses to describe the leisure needed for this intellectual growth or "perfection" in men which was a commonplace of medieval thought. In fact, in the Physics, Aristotle writes of this calmness or "settling down" in the soul which comes with the acquisition of knowledge: It is not a becoming or alteration: for the terms 'knowing' and 'understanding' imply that the intellect has reached a state of rest and come to a standstill, . . . for the possession of understanding and knowledge is produced by the soul's settling down out of the restlessness natural to it. (Physics VII,3 246b 10-20; my italics)

150

In addition to the existence of the multitude of men in collaboration, Dante presents the second essential condition for the flourishing of humana civilitas, namely universal peace. The exigency of this state grows in Dante's presentation of it. He first explains in I,iv that universal peace is the greatest of all things ordained for or ordered toward our happiness in this life via a series of Biblical references: "pax" was the good news which rang out to the shepherds from on high, "pax" to all men was proclaimed by the heavenly host, "pax" to all was the salutation of the Lord which became customary for His disciples and for Paul in his greetings. Dante does not use such expressions as "oportet" or "necesse est" to present peace as an absolutely essential stipulation (as he did for the multitude and for the Monarch). Rather he suggests that a condition of peace would bring the human race most expediently to its proper task. He uses the expressions: "libenime atque facillime/' "optimum eorum," "per quod melius, ymo per quod optime." Finally he stresses the significance of peace by calling it the best means through which our work arrives at its final end of acquiring knowledge. In conclusion to the syllogism series, Dante uses the word "necessarium" to say that it was necessary to establish this condition as the basis or standard of subsequent argument. "Necessarium," however, does not modify the condition of peace, but another premise in his syllogism. While all texts agree that peace is treated as the means to both man's and mankind's end, and not as an end in itself, there is some ambiguity as to how it is a means, because of a small textual equivocation: the relative pronoun "quia." Ex hiis ergo que dedarata sunt patet per quod melius, ymo per quod optime genus humanum pertingit ad opus proprium; et per consequens visum est propinquissimum medium per quod itur in illud ad quod, velut in ultimum finem, omnia nostra opera ordinantur, quia est pax universalis, que pro prindpio rationum subsequentium supponatur. (Monarchia I,iv,5-6; my italics)

151

This argument shows us what is the better, indeed the very best means available to mankind for fulfilling its proper role; and also what is the most direct means of reaching that goal to which all our doings are directed—universal peace. This will serve as the basis for our subsequent argument.

Ricci, editor of the definitive edition of the Monarchia, notes that all manuscripts have "quia" except for some which have "quod."17 He says that Witte, Bertalot, and Rostagno (and also Vinay, I find) use "quod" for the simple reason that the "means" of which Dante speaks is precisely universal peace, and "quod" modifies "medium." But it is obvious, says Ricci, that Dante should not want to repeat what he has just said a few lines earlier, namely that universal peace is the most excellent means of securing our happiness. Rather he wishes to show in greater detail that not only does each man, taken singularly, reach his highest aim most readily through a condition of calm, but so does also all of humanity taken as a complex whole. 18 In peace, the ultimate goal of the collective multitude of all men can be accomplished as each one attempts to actualize his own individual intellectual potential. This would follow directly with the reasoning that the sum total of knowledge of each particular, with which the human intellect deals, is equivalent to or brings about knowledge of the universals by which the multitude resembles the angels and God. The "naturality" of man's socio-political condition determines that he contribute to the political community in order to assist his fellow citizens and in return receive the assistance of the community. Hence in I,v, Dante traces the cumulative expansion of the purposes of the different political partnerships from the "bene vivere" of the household to the "commoda auxiliatio" of the village, to the "bene sufficienterque vivere" of the city, and finally to the "bene sufficienterque vivere cum maiori fiducia seu tranquillitatis" of the kingdom. This end is then proportionately expanded further to the whole human race. If a kingdom's purpose is similar to a city's: self-sufficiency and interaction with a stronger bond of 152

peace, surely mankind's concern for peace to promote its goal is greater still. There are relatively few references to peace throughout the rest of the text. In I,xi,4 Dante refers back to his previous demonstration that to live in peace is the optimal condition for man and adds that justice is the most powerful promoter of peace. Furthermore, charity will most greatly give force to justice—so that the greater the charity, the more justice, and, although he does not declare it, we may assume, the more peace. Finally in I,xvi Dante laments that a state of universal peace and tranquillity among mortals, when the Imperial office was able to promote the goal of mankind, was had only once before in history—under the aegis of the Emperor Augustus. With Augustus alone there was perfect monarchy and the world was restful ("quietum"). Paul called this most happy state a "fullness of time" ("plenitudinem temporis") when indeed the world (just like the soul in Aristotle's Physics) experienced a "settling down." Human civilization flourished, and indeed the Son of God took on human form for the salvation of man. This was the same time when "tutto '1 del voile redur lo mondo a suo modo sereno" which Justinian describes in the Paradiso.19 The "viva giustizia" which in the heaven of Mercury inspires Justinian is the same promoter of peace in the Monarchia, that by which Augustus "puose il mondo in tanta pace, che fu serrato a Iano il suo delubro."20 To this time of universal peace Dante makes his principal referral in Monarchia II,v. He proves that the Roman people were pursing the end of right by seeking the good of the commonwealth, since they "drove off all greed" ("omni cupiditate summota") and preferred universal peace with liberty. Then, not until the final chapter of the entire treatise (III,xv) does Dante remark of the tranquillity of peace in which all men must be calmed by the Emperor so that a free human race can settle safely in port. His thrice-mentioned account of peace here is in the form of a reserved supplication to the Roman prince who alone as curator of the world could impart the useful 153

teachings of liberty and peace to the multitude of men and guarantee their welfare. It appears likely that Dante read and was also influenced by Thomas' interpretation of peace in the De regimine. In 1,2,17 Thomas writes: 'The welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace/' Finding his source in Aristotle, Aquinas is discussing the purpose of government and the aims of the rulers. He uses the analogies of a pilot who preserves his ship and a physician who heals a sick man to illustrate that it is indeed the duty of any ruler to direct his aim "towards securing the welfare of that which he undertakes to rule." Interestingly, Thomas was misled by the Latin translation of the Ethics, used as the source of these analogies. Evidently, in tracing back to Aristotle the idea that peace is the chief social good, the Latin text of William of Moerbeke translated the Greek "eunomia" as peace.21 The significance of "eunomia" is, however, "law and order" or "good laws well obeyed" as Aristotle states: We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman [or ruler] whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. (Ethics 111,3 1112b 11-15; my italics)

In the De regimine principum, Aquinas writes: The chief concern of the ruler [Aristotle's statesman] of a multitude t . . is to procure the unity of peace. It is not even legitimate for him to deliberate whether he shall establish peace in the multitude subject to him, just as a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal the sick man encharged to him. . . . (1,2,17; my italics)

Thomas expands his text and consequently William's misinterpretation of "peace" for "law and order" saying: "The more 154

efficacious a government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be." The idea of unity was closely linked in medieval thought to the idea of peace, finding its support in the Greek notion of "homonoia." As we have seen for the emperors Philip and Alexander, homonoia was primarily a political concept and designated the quality of "being of the same mind" or "thinking in harmony."22 In fact, homonoia was apparently a frequent "catchword" among Greek writers ever since the fifth century B.C.23 It had a two-fold significance: national concord (peace among the Greek states at war) and social concord (peace within the individual civic republics). In Book IX of the Ethics, Aristotle uses homonoia in just this two-fold way to describe the character of unanimity in decision-making among citizens directed both to their immediate common interest and to alliances or matters of action with neighboring states. "Unanimity [homonoia] seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life" (Ethics IX,6 1167b 1-4). It is understandable for William of Moerbeke to have thought that Aristotle intended this mood of concord in Book III of the Ethics. Aquinas must have assumed likewise, and Dante, too, inherited the mistranslation. For it is surely reasonable and convincing to theorize that it is as much a ruler's duty to ensure peace and concord among citizens as it is to establish law and order for them. In fact it can be traced through the writings of many ages and cultures, including the Egyptian, Sumerian, and Babylonian that kings and monarchs were praised for establishing peace. "Even the Assyrian kings, notorious for their cruelty in war" dreamed of universal conquest so that the world would then be free from strife.24 In Israel, too, the eschatalogical writings of the prophets including Micah and Isaiah envisaged that all men might dwell in peaceful habitation under the reign of the Messiah and would "beat their swords into pruning-knives."25 Among the early Greeks, Homer, Hesiod, and Empedocles nostalgically longed for peace although without envisioning 155

attainment under some future leader. After the rise to preeminence of Athens and Sparta, the state sought expansion with a more unified/ centralized political order primarily for the purpose of securing peace for its citizens. In the Laws, Plato, for example/ argues that war and military education are not ends in themselves but are to be pursued for the sake of eventual peace.26 Similarly Aristotle in the Politics argues that the citizens of the state should be prepared for defense and capable of leading a life of action and war, but effective leadership should make peace and leisure the cardinal aims of all legislation bearing on war.27 Beyond the state, however, the daring political vision of a medieval world-state ensuring universal and perpetual peace has no parallels in classical Greek literature.28 Nevertheless/ the notion of all peoples united by a common interest in their own preservation/ freedom, and peace, perhaps even as equal citizens under one ruler, was present in the writings of many fifth century B.C. Hellenic authors and of the Stoics as well. 29 If not specifically found in Greek literature, certainly the military campaigns of Philip of Macedon and especially of Alexander the Great, as we have seen, were directed toward organizing a confederation of all men in their conquered territories. Whether or not by "all men" Alexander meant all races and all nations or merely all Greeks, his imperial program was aimed at ensuring peace for all persons included in it. Since a unified government would put an end to warring factions and, at least, internal conflict, the citizens could live in security and dedicate themselves to "the good life": the enjoyment of culture, studying philosophy, improving their education and bodily welfare. With peace there came almost necessarily material prosperity and intellectual growth. It is well known how much Aristotle linked leisure with peace, and action with war in the Ethics. In the concluding book, he assesses that political and military actions are directed toward establishing eventual leisure, for they themselves are "unleisurely" and are not chosen for their own sake, but rather 156

for the final end—the activity of our intelligence or philosophical meditation. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. (Ethics X,7 1177b 4-5)

If in Ethics 111,3 Aristotle expresses the ruler's duty as the establishment of law and order (eunomia), in Ethics X,7 this duty is not only to ensure peace (homonoia) but also to train the subjects in the proper use of leisure so that they may know what to do in times of peace, namely pursue happiness through speculation. All of this lends itself to a comparison with Dante's concept of peace, although Aristotle is primarily concerned with the establishment of peace within the polis. Furthermore Aristotle writes with the understanding that such periods of calm, given the bitter and frequent attacks for territorial expansion, would be intermittent and lying in defensive wait of the next upheaval. This, too, would reflect the war-torn conditions in which Dante lived. In any case, that peace is a means—and the principal one at that—to the end of contemplation and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge/ is the same conclusion of both authors. While an argument may be made that Aristotle/ and not only his pupil Alexander, conceived of at least panHellenic unity and hegemony (if not the unity of mankind), there is no proof that he believed in or suggested any means for the attainment of perpetual and universal peace. In addition, Aristotle yearns for no future Golden Age, nor does he speak nostalgically of peace in the remote past as does Dante in referring to Augustus' reign or the future coming of the Veltro. In the late Hellenistic period and in the Roman Republican era of the first century B.C., major writers spoke of the remote Roman past and recalled nostalgically great past glories. Dicaearchus, a Peripatetic philosopher, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the society of his times by remembering 157

and setting up as a model those times when men "experienced no wars or conflicts with each other" and they enjoyed "good health, peace, and friendship."30 Cicero, through the character of Scipio Africanus the Younger, praised Numa Pompilius as the king who restored the prosperity to life it had enjoyed under Romulus. Pompilius implanted in [the citizens of Rome] a love for peace and tranquillity, which enable justice and good faith to flourish most easily, and under whose protection the cultivation of the land and the enjoyment of its products are most secure.31

Thus Numa reigned for thirty-nine years "in pace concordiaque" securing for his people the two elements which most conspicuously contribute to the stability of a State: religion and the spirit of tranquillity ("dementia"). The catalogues of exempla virtutis of other Roman writers of the first century B.C. revealed that they were "incorrigible laudatores temporis acti, with their rhetorical gaze fixed nostalgically upon a quasi-mythical earlier period of antique virtue, religion, simplicity, and poverty, which had given way in their own age to ostentation, debauchery, and the horrors of civil war."32 And not only examples of conduct but also models for peace were the noble Etruscans and the heroes of the Roman republic between the second and fifth centuries B.C. But perhaps the most influential expression of a longing for peace with the hope of its future realization, indeed the "expectation of a new cosmic order," for Dante was found in the Sibylline books and in the writings of Virgil. Possibly under the influence of the Biblical concept of the Messianic Age, the oracles announced that: God will send a king from the sun, who will save the whole world from unhappy war. . . . The earth will no more tremble with heavy sighs of woe, nor will war nor dearth be upon earth; . . . but a great peace will fall upon all the lands and king shall be friend to king until the end of time and the immortal in the starry heaven shall proclaim a common law for men all over the earth.33

158

The time prophesied is the last age in the circuit of the Cumaean Sibyl—the Golden Age—to be renewed after the Silver, Bronze, and Iron Ages have passed. Virgil ushers in this new cycle of the centuries in his fourth Eclogue, the so-called "Messianic Eclogue," announcing the beginning of a new glorious order under the consulship of his protector, Caius Asinius Pollio: Ultima Cumaei venit iam carminis aetas; magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo. iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Satumia regna; iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto. . . . ac toto surget gens aurea mundo. . . . (Eclogue IV, 4-9)* Now is come the last age of the song of Cumae; the great line of the centuries begins anew. Now the Virgin returns, the reign of Saturn returns; now a new generation descends from heaven on high. . . . and a golden race [springs] up throughout the world.

The vision of the return of the Virgin Justice and of Saturn, father of Jupiter, is Virgil's forecast of the pax Romana, to be brought to the world under the Imperial rule of Augustus. He envisages conditions when the herds shall be friends to the lions and every land shall bear fruits. His celebration of the birth of Pollio's son was looked upon as the fulfillment of the prophecies of Micah and Isaiah, and regarded from the fourth well through the sixteenth century A.D. as the prediction of the coming of Christ. ille deum vitam accipiet divisque videbit permixtos heroas et ipse videbitur illis, pacatumque reget patriis virtutibus orbem. (Eclogue IV, 15-17) He shall have the gift of divine life, shall see heroes mingled with gods, and shall himself be seen of them, and shall sway a world to which his father's virtues have brought peace.

Similarly in the sixth book of the Aeneid, Virgil shows to Aeneas 159

through the personage of his father Anchises, the joyous Elysian fields, whence will come Augustus Caesar to restore the Golden Age. hie vir, hie est, tibi quern promitti saepius audis, Augustus Caesar, Divi genus, aurea condet saecula qui rursus Latio regnata oer arva Satumo quondam, super et Garamantas et Indos proferet imperium. . . . (Aeneid VI, 791-795)35 This [man], this is he, whom thou so oft nearest promised to thee, Augustus Caesar, son of a god, who shall again set up the Golden Age amid the fields where Saturn once reigned, and shall spread his empire past Garamant and Indian. . . .

In the following lines of Anchises to his son, Virgil again "has in mind the beneficent rule of Augustus, who brought peace to the world, and then {o that peaceful world gave the blessings of law and order/'36 Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento (hae tibi erunt artes) padque imponere morem, parcere subiectus et debellare superbos.

peace in his mentions of peace throughout the Monarchia. The very lines above are used by Dante to illustrate in H,vi,9 that the Roman Empire was ordained by God to rule by nature, indeed over the whole world. And the portentous lines from the fourth Eclogue are cited three times by Dante: once in Book I of the Monarchia (xi,l) to support his theory that the world is most well-ordered ("optime dispositus") when justice is at its strongest; again in his letter to Henry VII when he likens the Emperor's descent into Italy to the rising of the chosen and long awaited Titan (Sun-God) when many rejoiced the return of Justice; and a third time through the person of Statius in Purgatorio XXII, 70-72 to pay tribute to Virgil for his prescience and most sincere faith in the future Empire under Augustus. While most of his contemporary Roman writers looked to the past paragons of republican heroics, Virgil looked to the future Roman Imperial mission. Thompson writes of the "altissimo poeta:" Uniquely among Romans, he had an almost Judeo-Christian view of history as a divinely determined process, with its telos the Augustan prindpate as a sort of millennium. In his imagination, the republican heroes form part of a much larger, forward-looking process than envisaged by any other thinker of classical antiquity; and with Dante, they will assume a role in the providential course of Christian history.37

Remember thou, O Roman, to rule the nations with thy sway—these shall be thine arts— to crown Peace with Law, to spare the humbled, and to tame in war the proud.

If Virgil's words were the fulfillment of the Old Testament prophets, then the reign and accomplishments of Augustus were the fulfillment of the poet's premonition. The Emperor's erection of the Ara pads in Rome heralded the new order of peace. Under his Empire, the doors of the passage of Janus were kept shut indeed three times, signifying peace.38 The world rejoiced Augustus' rule as one historian recounts:

With these prophetic words, Virgil makes both peace and law and order the object of the ruler. And as such, Dante makes this "order" (in the form of "rule," "liberty," at times "justice") go hand in hand with

Providence . . . has crowned out life's order by sending Augustus . . . in order to put an end to war and set everything aright. . . . He now appeared fulfilling all our hopes, . . . land and sea rest in peace, and the rities flourish through lawful order, concord, and welfare.39

(Aeneid VI, 851-853)

160

161

Plutarch, who lived under the Emperor's pax Romana, undoubtedly instilled his Life ofZeno and Life of Alexander with inventive descriptions which echo these conditions in his own period.40 Twelve centuries later, Dante assumed this dual Virgilian role of prophet and proclaimed especially in his political letters.41 He was to be the herald of the "second Augustus"— none other than "dementissimus" Henry VII—whom Dante believed was to be the new and second Caesar. Dante believed that the time was right for the reflourishing of human civilization as it had been under the pax Romana Imperii: there was the existence of the multitude, carrying on the multitude of proper functions, and this multitude was hungry for a state of universal peace. Dante could now rightfully hail the coming of the second Augustus who could and would guarantee the conditions of peace once again and the flourishing of humana civilitas. Dante proclaimed in his letter to the Princes and Peoples of Italy: 'Ecce nunc tempus acceptable/ quo signa surgunt consolationis et pads. Nam dies nova splendescit ab ortu Auroram demonstrans, quae iam tenebras diutumae calamitatis attenuat; . . . (Epistolae V,l) Behold now is the accepted time, wherein arise the signs of consolation and peace. For a new day is beginning to break, revealing the dawn in the East, which even now is dispersing the darkness of our long tribulation.

In a tone and with vocabulary unmistakably reminiscent of Virgil's fourth Eclogue, Dante rejoices in the appearance of the peaceful Sun (Titan) and revival ("revirescet") of justice in his letter to the Princes. Dante expresses not without sarcasm for the traditional symbols of Empire and Church, the moon and the sun, that the elected one of God, the embodiment of justice and solace to the world, Henry is the "minor" luminary who may lend his light where the spiritual ray is insufficient.42 In the sixth letter to the vile Florentines, Henry is the object and 162

fulfillment of Isaiah's prophecy: "surely he hath borne our griefs and carried away our sorrows." And in the seventh letter to Henry himself, Virgil's sibylline exultation to Pollio is explicitly employed. Here Dante, also on behalf of others, thanks the most kind Imperial Majesty for returning to Italy the venerable Tarpeian standard—the Imperial Eagle—and for reinstituting the reign of Justice. Within this letter, the tone changes, for Dante is disturbed by the Emperor's delay in northern Italy. In fact Dante scolds him for this tarrying and urges him to make soon for Florence so that he may then take his place upon the now empty Imperial throne. Henry failed to take Florence, and as a result he failed his truest and most avid supporter. He died in the summer of 1313, denounced ironically as a savage tyrant by Dante's fellow Florentines.43 With his death and that of Pope Clement V the following spring, Rome was now bereft of both her lights. Depressed but not deluded, Dante wrote to the men of the Church (Letter VIII to the Cardinals of Italy), the cause of the double "eclipse" in his estimation. He scolded them for their neglect and their abandonment of the Church (VIII,4) and set himself up as "one lone, pious voice" (VIH,6) to summon them to the common "source of their civility" (VIII, 10) to fight for "the whole body politic now in pilgrimage on earth" (VIII, 11) and no longer against it. Despite his despair at Henry's falling short, Dante could not lose his belief and faith that there eventually would be deliverance from this Babylon and that it would be in the form of peaceful imperium. And just as Virgil had prophesied in the Eclogue the first Augustus as the "temporal precursor of the first descent of Christ," Dante has Virgil prophesy the second Augustus—the Veltro—as nuntius populi of the eventual second coming of the Prince of Peace.44 In the introductory canto of the Commedia, Virgil tells Dante that the Veltro will come and will deal a painful death to the malicious she-wolf, the embodiment of the vice mirrored in the Papacy. The general function of this Emperor is to root out avarice, bring down pride, and cast away envy through the diffusion of universal peace on a universal 163

scale. His "special function" is to disjoin the crook from the sword, to reestablish a separation of powers. In the Monarchia, still no Veltro has come but he is similarly prophesied as necessary, as ineluctable. Although the third book of the political treatise deals with the problems of Church and State, Dante seeks solution primarily for temporal ills and strictly through the latter. But at the time of the writing of the Monarchia, peace was not yet established let alone capable of being maintained. In the Commedia, Dante believes through faith that the Veltro and peace will come. In the Monarchia, he attempts to prove through syllogistic reasoning that they must come. He is guided in this belief by a faith of a different kind, that in logic. Through a series of given or "subassumed" syllogistic analogies, Dante proves that there must be a universal state, there must be a universal Emperor, and as a result there will be universal peace, somewhere and somewhen.45 Charles Davis supports this view, influenced so by Dante's reading of Virgil: Dante, it seems clear, was looking for a second Augustus, or rather the second Augustus, and not just any righteous Emperor. Augustus had banished the wars caused by cupidity itself. . . . Dante's vision of history was therefore both archaic and eschatological. It looked back to an idealized past . . . and it looked forward to the restoration of the empire and church under the long prophesied ruler of the Christian and Roman peoples who would defeat the temporarily triumphant forces of evil and foreshadow the final victory of the heavenly emperor Christ.4*

Whether the Veltro would come as a result of faith or logic, his coming was inevitable. And likewise he would bring universal peace. Dante in the Monarchia, then, assumes the prophetic role of Virgil in the Commedia. And in addition to looking ahead as did Virgil in the Aeneid, Dante models his vision on the past paragon of Empire, Rome. Both nostalgic and futuristic, Dante's vision of peace entrusts its preservation and perpetuation to universal Monarchy. 164

The Essential Guarantee: Monarchy

While William of Moerbeke may have confused eunomia with homonoia, Virgil exhorted his ruler to impose law and order upon the people, peace notwithstanding. Similarly, the ideals of "law" and "order" saturate the Monarchia, and the power of right rule treated therein is immeasurable. Unifying authority is the sine qua non, the "mechanistic" agent without which all individual parts of humana civilitas would not survive. And such power must be singular, executed by the "best man" and for the purpose of directing the many to their communal end. Using Aristotle as his authority, Dante states: quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum regulare seu regere, alia vero regulari seu regi. (Monarchia I,v,3) . . . when several things are directed towards a single end it is necessary for one of them to act as director or ruler and for the others to be directed or ruled.

Humana civilitas has an individual end and accordingly must be regulated by a singular power. It is not merely of the next, higher, more self-sufficient political association of men, but is the one which is inclusive of all the others. It is the universe which is ordered to God. The unifying aspect of the authority of the Emperor is what Dante repeatedly emphasizes: "harmony is best achieved by one principle only, by one Prince" (I,vii,3). And following in I,viii,3 Dante emphasizes again unity and oneness: Sed genus humanum maxime Deo assimilatur quando maxime est unum. . . . Sed tune genus humanum maxime est unum, quando toto unitur in uno. But mankind is most like God when it enjoys the highest degree of unity. . . . But mankind is most one when the whole human race is drawn together into complete unity.47

165

The specific and final function of Dante's Monarch is not so much imposing order as it is in maintaining peace and guaranteeing it. By maintaining order, he ensures peace and the proper functioning of each individual part. As for the "destiny" of each of the parts, Dante looks to the whole. The destiny of all mankind is achieved not in the individual but in the whole of mankind, through the human race at large. And of course this objective of universal wisdom is modelled on Averroes and not the Greek idea of unity. For Averroes the instrument responsible for activating the human potential is the codirective (agent-productive and possible-material) intellect which "transforms" human thinking so that it reaches perfection, i.e. wisdom or civilization. For Dante the instrument responsible for activating the human potential intellect of the multitude, so that men work together in society, is the Monarch. Citing Aristotle's explanation in the Metaphysics that the instrument itself must be "something itself already in act" ("per tale existens actu"), Dante writes: Nichil igitur agit nisi tale existens quale patiens fieri debet; propter quod Phylosophus in hiis que De simpliciter ente [Metaphysics]: 'Omne' inquit 'quod reducitur de potentia in actum, reducitur per tale existens actu;' quod si aliter aliquid agere conetur, frustra conatur. (Monarchia I,xiii, 3-4) Therefore nothing can act unless it has the quality that is to be transferred to the patient, on which account the Philosopher in the Metaphysics writes: The movement from potentiality to act takes place by means of something already in act.' Any attempt to act in another manner would prove vain.

By "something in act," Dante implies "something which has already reached perfection," and accordingly, he means the Monarch, the best man, the "minister omnium," the one who alone can lead the world. He is the supreme prince who knows all and wants for nothing. For Aristotle, the "something in act" needn't be quite so perfect, although it is something better and 166

"more valuable" than the potency.48 He says in the section quoted by Dante: For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something and is the same species as it. (Metaphysics IX, 8 1049b 24-29)

For Averroes, the "human mind" is transformed by the external intellect: the agent-Irttellect, which unlike a part of mankind that may be lacking in wisdom, is omniscient and "semper intelligit."49 For Dante the agent is God through His minister the Emperor. In fact, one asks, if mankind has within itself the capacity to think always, and this is its function, why is the Monarch really necessary? It is true that this question seems to reflect an inherent inconsistency, since Dante has just finished presenting his logical argument outlining mankind's task and the nature of its realization which should come about in spite of the Monarch. Nevertheless, Dante addresses the entire first book of his treatise to this question. For in effect mankind's temporal task is twofold: contemplation and applying that wisdom to successful community living, as illustrated by the second book of the treatise with the optimal model of the Roman civilization. In energizing the intellect, mankind achieves the highest human virtues and prepares itself for the move beyond human justice to knowledge of God. If all of mankind achieves its intellectual destiny, it is because the Monarch has coordinated the diverse collection of human wills beyond speculation to proper action. Dante calls for the Monarch to be the continual triggering agent, or as he says in the Convivio, the "cavalcatore de la umana volontade." He must guide the multitude not so much in always thinking, for this it will do of its own accord, but in applying human wisdom properly so that all men may 167

continue to live in peace. Only in a world at peace can mankind satisfy all its needs. The Monarch is the epitome of the highest virtues and satisfied needs, and only the Monarch can guarantee peace. Life in a political community is not only essential to human perfection but also, as Aquinas, too, had realized, more pleasant and practical: an isolated man simply cannot secure what he needs for survival.50 Also it is easier to practice a trade with a view to others' needs; furthermore if a man is skilled in one art without having to be competent in other areas that other men can work at, then his performance in that one art will be better. Dante proposes the necessity of the Monarch, perfect individually in the human virtues, as the "something in act" which can extend to the multitude the moral principles of his perfection. While Dante agrees that one man or one village is not capable of assuring that mankind's temporal perfection be achieved, he assumes with unfailing insistence that there can exist one man, the Monarch, who has reached perfection and can rule the rest of the temporal community.51 Vernani was the first to wonder how such a superman could possibly exist, one who "debet excellere et excedere in virtute totam multitudinem subditorum."52 If such a man were to exist, he would exceed the whole human race in moral virtue and in prudence. Dante is saying "preposterously," according to the Dominican, that the human race is the Son of God if he ascribes such qualities to the Monarch. Only Christ could be so endowed with the power and mercy described for the Monarch. Dante's first attempt to resolve this discrepancy comes at the end of I,iii and is based on the Aristotelian axiom that men of superior intellect naturally rule over others. Aristotle's notion of a single principle expressed in the tenth book of the Metaphysics of having one outstanding faculty or entity ruling all subordinate others, becomes a recurring theme in subsequent chapters. In Book I, chapter v, for example, Dante says when several things are directed toward a single end, it is necessary for one of them to act as director. He gives as 168

examples which dominate all others, the intellectual faculty in the soul, the "paterfamilias," the mayor and the king. In chapter vi, he tells how all the parts of an army are subject to the commanding officer. In chapter vii, he writes that the harmony of the whole universe is brought about by a single, unifying principle. In chapter viii, we read of the whole human race drawn together into complete unity under one Prince. In chapters ix through xiv, Dante writes of the subjection of the son to the father in a family, of man to the heavens, of order to justice, and finally of the several, different laws of nations to the general common law of the universal kingdom. In the concluding chapters of Book I, Dante notes the exigency of unity: the best is that which is most one—"optimum quod est maxime unum" (I,xv,2). Multiplicity is the root of all evil, plurality the contrary of all good. How negative is a multiplicity of things is expressed in Dante's almost unexpected invective against the human race, which has turned itself into a manyheaded beast lusting after a diversity of things: O genus humanum, quantis procellis atque iacturis quantisque naufragiis agitari te necesse est dum, bellua multorum capitum factum, in diversa conaris! (Monarchia I,xvi,4) O humanity, in how many storms must you be tossed, how many shipwrecks must you endure, so long as you turn yourself into a many-headed beast lusting after a multiplicity of things!

Obviously Dante does not deny the multiple variety of ways in the human race by which the potential intellect may be realized, but rather he argues that the multitude of all men must channel the diverse capacities toward one willing potential strength ("virtus volitiva potentia" in I,xv,7). Since his proposition is subject to individual whim and the right of every man to refuse to submit to the idea of community, he imposes the office of the Monarch. Men are influenced by their adolescent passions and seductive delights and they need direction, as Marco Lombardo explains too. This is why the Monarch is 169

necessary despite the intrinsic character of the human soul to seek the good and to acquire knowledge. Nature does nothing in vain and cannot be frustrated. Nevertheless, Dante wishes to impose an Averroistic "guarantee" to the potential of mankind and he concludes that nature should not be frustrated. The Monarch is the guaranteeing "agent" of the functioning of the human race ordained by God. Because some persons will not sacrifice themselves and their individual, different capacities to the communal destiny of the collective community, nature provides that there be one ruler over the multitude. For Dante, living in a world community is "the equivalent of achieving this actualization [of wisdom] in that the community as a whole would achieve what the individual cannot."53 Thus through a universal Monarchy, Dante attempts to reduce personal destiny to the destiny of mankind, so that individuals as individual citizens would achieve an actualization of wisdom and fulfill their basic needs for learning via the multitude. With the Monarch as a built-in "check" or "curb" against individual selfishness and divergent political factionalism, the world would be rid of discord and could live in peace. And this condition of peace would most closely represent the state in which the ideal of active contemplation can best be had. But the optimistic beginning of Book I is threatened by a cry of almost giving up at the end of I,xvi. Despite God's plan, Dante must admit to the vulnerability of individual men to chance, change, and super-rational causes. Despite this "check," the impermanence of things hints if not at the failure of Dante's scheme, at least at the unlikely realization of such a Utopia. Dante retains his faith in Empire but realizes his treatise may be set up only as an illustrative theoretical ideal after all. And so Virgil, herald of the Roman Empire which did bring peace to this world and happiness in this life, must show Dante the "other way," that "other Empire," that "other Rome" which can without fail restore unity and peace to mankind. This is the Commedia, similarly a treatise of universal Monarchy. Still confident that the "Monarch" will come, whatever his nature, both Dante and Virgil must resign themselves to the fact 170

that until he does come, there will be no peace or happiness for anyone in this life, and man will not be able to satisfy his need and desire to know. Thus man must shift his faith from the temporal Monarch to the Emperor who reigns on high. "The other way" is the pilgrimage of the humbled Christian in this life through the guidance not only of philosophy, but also the theological virtues to come to know God at least in the afterlife. This other way is journeyed by Statius who reveals to Dante that it is the individual's immortality and not that of the collective multitude of all mankind which is most good. Ironically, the "select few" become not the philosophers but other "seekers of truth." The saved and blessed souls become parts of a new eternal and collective multitude, but it is a fellowship into which members have entered as individuals by their own free will and through faith, and not through a communal, inevitable, temporal, and rational function. In any case, the Pope is portrayed as but a figurehead entrusted with the task of providing spiritual guidance and faith in the afterlife. His authority does not extend into political life, indeed into temporal affairs of any kind. If the Emperor cannot be in existence, then men must look to God directly for moral guidance toward living a virtuous and just life on earth. The Pope, albeit a great authority for Christendom, has no jurisdiction or business in non-religious affairs. The Individual Within the Multitude Dante's cry for unity which climaxes at the end of the first book of his political treatise brings immediately to mind the similar invective against enslaved Italy in Purgatorio VI. His attack of humanity, now fragmented and dispicable for its lack of concord, parallels that of wretched Italy which enjoys peace in none of its provinces. Ahi serva Italia, di dolore ostello, nave sanza nocchiere in gran tempesta, non donna di provincie, ma bordello! . . .

171

e ora in te non stanno sanza guerra li vivi tuoi, Tun l'altro si rode di quei ch'un muro e una fossa serra.

It trembles here when some soul feels itself pure so that it may rise or set . out for the ascent, and that shout follows.

(Purgatorio VI, 76-78; 82-84) Ah, servile Italy, hostel of grief, ship without pilot in great tempest, no mistress of provinces, but brothel! . . . And now in you your living abide not without war, and of those whom one wall and one moat shut in, one gnaws at the other.

This assault continues for over seventy lines, citing Florence and Rome as specific offenders which have turned Italy into a vicious beast that recalls the one of many heads lusting after a multiplicity of things in the Monarchia. Similarly, the invective is an ironic contrast to the concept of unity repeated in several chapters of Book I in much the same way the Purgatorio assault breaks with the "minute and touching demonstration of the unitive power of the political community illustrated in the loving embrace between Virgil and Sordello."54 Sordello embodies the notion of universal, social harmony that Dante cries for in the Monarchia. He is the "emblem of political unity, played against its contrary, discord and fragmentation."55 Dante sought to secure world unity and peace through the common characteristic of humankind. Yet he came to realize the impracticality of his ideal not only through the actual failure of Henry VII's campaign, but also through the strength of personal faith over philosophy. This realization is expressed to us through the lesson he learns from Statius in the Commedia.56 Dante inquired of Statius what was the cause for the trembling of the Mountain of Purgatory that he sensed. Statius replies: Tremaci quando alcuna anima monda sentesi, si che surga o che si mova per salir su; e tal grido seconda. (Purgatorio XXI, 58-60).

172

It is the ascent of an individual soul whose will feels itself graced to rise to a better threshold that shakes the mountain. And it is with this explanation that Dante sees the significance of personal and individual destiny which in the Monarchia is subordinated to or subsumed by the collective destiny of all of mankind. For despite the guarantee of the Monarch whose duty is to guide all souls to one earthly end, Dante realizes that there will always be some individuals who will not yield to this guidance and who will therefore thwart the communal end. Therefore all the human virtues will not be attained, and the whole will be imperfect. The souls in Paradise, however, are by their spiritual nature citizens of one city, of a fellowship which suffers no such deficiencies, no disunity, no cupidity. Every soul enters on his own free will; every part therefore is necessarily and unconditionally given to the common cause. It is a smaller community whose individual citizens are personally made happier as new and diverse individuals are drawn to share a common bond. In the Monarchia, such unification would have had in part to be by force, an imposed collectivism, in the form of a kind of "political Averroism" because of the restraint of the all-powerful Monarch. This political collectivism cannot be and is not Dante's last word on human destiny, even if it is his last one on politics.57 Merlan adds: "Admirable as the individual may be who voluntarily subordinates himself to a collective," it would have been "revolting" to sacrifice pro bono publko and deny one's personal destiny and immortality at the same time. 58 This makes an interesting parallel with Statius' praise of Virgil as one who profited not himself but sacrificed himself, and made wise those who followed him (Purgatorio XXH, 68-69). Can this be what indeed separates Virgil, relegated with the mass to limbo, from Statius who as an individual soul ascends the Mountain? Virgil's "prodigality" in teaching others is con173

trasted with the "avarice" of Statius in declaring his faith in this life.59 Statius was taught by Virgil's model to correct his immoderation. Statius does not sacrifice himself to the multitude following philosophy on earth, but individually, almost selfishly, indeed avariciously, makes the choice to join another, ironically, more elect multitude in heaven. Virgil is a lesser soul in the hierachy of God's salvation; and Statius, like the Eagle who warns of the consequences of straying from God, is the key figure, the prime example of this lesson. "In spite of all the passionate interest which Dante takes in politics, it is only the salvation of the single soul which he describes as a world shaking event."60 Thus Virgil is Dante's prophet of the Empire; Statius is Dante's model of individual salvation. Somewhere between the Monarchia and the canto of Statius, Dante comes to realize the impracticality and disillusionment of political universalism and its intrinsic limitation, surpassed by Christian individual redemption. Despite the greater masses involved in the political goal achieved through the Empire, the few who realize in this life the eternal goal and bond of spiritual happiness achievable through Christian faith are the ones who truly understand man's nature and how man should live. Dante realizes by the end of the Monarchia that man's natural desire cannot be satisfied in this life, and that only God can give the universal peace whose security Dante had entrusted to a temporal Monarch. By God alone, Creator of the Monarch and the Pope, can mankind be brought together in peace and unity temporally and eternally. The Monarchia does not ultimately present a political program which could be instituted practically, but a wish for peaGe and a desire to see all men joined together in pursuit of a common cause. But individual human beings recognize their specific capacities, assess their particular ambitions, and direct their personal wills according to that very factor which Dante believed would make them uniform and united. The Monarchia begins with the concept of "all men" and ends with "gubernator," but this is the ruler who is Ruler of all things temporal and spiritual. This is the truth that Dante never minimized nor 174

denied: the one true Monarch for all men in this life as in the other, must be He who moves the sun and the other stars. Notes 1

According to Boccaccio's Trattatello in laude di Dante, the Monarchia rallied support among Imperialists around 1327 with the expedition to Italy of the German prince Lodovico il Bavaro. Fearing the restoration of the Ghibelline party and renewed interest in Dante's treatise because of this campaign. Pope John XXII encouraged the Dominican Guido Vemani da Rimini to write a refutation of the treatise. His De reprobatione Monarchiae was composed between 1327 and 1334. Pope John also ordered his cardinallegate in Bologna, Bertrando del Poggetto, to burn the Monarchia in the public square of the city in 1329. The treatise was placed on the Papal Index of prohibited texts in 1554 and was not removed until 1881. Only in 1921, on the six hundredth anniversary of the Poet's death, was a Papal encyclical issued in praise of all Dante's works. The De reprobatione is reproduced in Nevio Matteini, // piu antico oppositore politico di Dante: Guido Vernani da Rimini, Collana di storia della filosofia, Vol. 6 (Padova: Milani, 1958). 2 Gilson, pp. 166-171, 214-224. Cf. Kantorowicz, pp. 463ff. > Gilson, p. 171. 4 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 224-226. * Ibid. 6 Ibid., p. 645, n. 23. 7 Ibid. 8 D. Hamlyn, editor, De anima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 140. Hamlyn adds "Aristotle provides no grounds here for any kind of belief in personal immortality. The part of the soul which is said to be eternal is a rather abstract entity which has only a metaphysical role to play as a necessary condition of the functioning of the soul. Its status in the soul is somewhat like that of God." In the text of the De anima, Aristotle says that the agent Intellect is in the soul; this is the opposite of what Averroes says. The agent is the cause of actualization, says Aristotle, of the potentialities of the soul. Dante of course would disagree with this, for his agent Intellect is God. Cf. Beatrice Zedler, "Averroes on the Possible Intellect," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXV (1951), p. 164. Averroes makes the following contradictions throughout his Commentary on the De anima: 1) that the intellect is both active or productive (agent) and passive or potential (possible or material); 2) that the intellect is both of the individual (who has the receptivity) and not of him (there is no specific organ for it); 3) that it is one for all men but in a certain way "joined to a disposition which exists in us" and therefore "accidentally" many; 4) that die agent and material (or possible) are not two entirely separated substances but neither are the terms "agent" and "material" interchangeable synonyms (the intellect is one with two aspects, he also says); and finally 5) it is eternal and yet corruptible. » The notorious "219 Propositions" were condemned in 1277 as doctrines contrary to the Christian faith by Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris. They are translated and reproduced by E. Fortin and P. O'Neill in Lerner and Mahdi's Medieval Political

175

Philosophy, pp. 335-354. The ones in question are numbers 48 and 52 (respectively 76 and 69 in the "Original List"). 10 Cf. Monarchia I, iv where Dante quotes Hebrews 11:7, "Thou has made him a little lower than the angels." 11 Philip Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The Hague: Nijoff, 1963), p. 87. 12 Vinay, p. 22, n. 15. 13 Averroes also speaks of the "elect few" in various parts of his Commentary on Plato's Republic. In sections 25 and 26, he says there are two ways that lead to God: one of them is through speech (spreading the word of the Prophet through the philosophers), and the other through war (conquering lands and converting them; the Law of Islam should extend "as far as the Red and the Black," said Mohammed). In these two ways similarly are the "virtues brought about in the souls of political humans, the 'multitude/ " that is, either through "rhetorical and poetical arguments" or in "the way applied to enemies, foes, i.e. the way of coercion and chastisement by blows." The first way is used in presenting the theoretical sciences to the multitude; the "elect few" (philosophers), however, learn the theoretical sciences in "the true ways," these being through demonstrative arguments. Says Averroes, "In teaching wisdom to the multitude, (Plato] used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they [the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations: either they can know [the speculative truths] through demonstrative arguments, or they will not know them at all. The first [situation] is impossible [for the multitude]. The second is possible—since it is fitting that everyone obtain as much of human perfection as is compatible with what is in his nature to obtain of this and with his preparation for it." Lemer, in the introduction to this text (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. xxv-xxvi, adds that "the multitude comes to know the speculative truths through belief, not through knowledge." At the end of section 60, Averroes adds that the teaching of the philosophers is by demonstrative arguments..In section 65, he explains that the "attainment of all or most of (the human perfections] is possible for only some people, while nature limits the others [the multitude] to something different than the fulfillment of the perfections." We conclude from this that the second kind of humans "are lorded over and the first kind lord it." This same message from the Politics is what Dante precisely refers to at the end of I,iii, that men of superior intellect naturally rule over others. The few philosophers rule over the multitude, and of these, the best man is the Emperor. 14 Purgatorio VTII, 9. « Cf. Averroes' Decisive Treatise, Determining What the Connection is Between Religion and Philosophy, reproduced in Lemer and Mahdi's Medieval Political Philosophy, pp. 163-186. »• Zedler, p. 173. " Ricci, p . 44. "P" is the famous late Trecento (dated 20 July 1394) codex Palatino lat. 1729 in the Vatican. "M" is the Cinquecento manuscript (XXX 239) in the National Library in Florence. 18 Ibid. A problem is raised with Ricci's interpretation here, namely if Dante is not repeating what h e has just said in lines 10-12, then it would seem h e is reiterating lines 4-8 in I,iv namely that what is good for individual man is necessarily good also for all mankind. » Paradiso VI, 55-56: "When all Heaven willed to bring the whole world to its o w n state of peace." When Dante meets the soul of Justinian at the e n d of canto V in the

176

Paradiso, h e describes the "figure santa" as hiding himself in his o w n brightness. Singleton comments, p . I l l , that "chiusa chiusa" describes the "nestling d o w n " of the soul in its o w n increased splendor (Commentary to the Paradiso). In this state of total rest, the soul is most happy. 20 Paradiso VI, 80-81: "set the world in such peace that Janus' temple w a s locked." Sir William Smith, Smaller Classical Dictionary ( N e w York: Dutton and Company, 1958), p . 163 informs that the gate or covered passage dedicated to Janus, guardian deity of gates, is always erroneously referred to as the Temple of Janus. Closed only in peace time, it w a s locked three times during Augustus' reign, while it had been closed o n l y twice before during the whole period of the Republic. 21 Phelan, editor, De regimine principum, p. 11. n.2. 22 Tarn, p. 4. See Part II, p. 97, n. 50 above. See also Ostwald, p. 309. 23 Stern, p. 37. Another political "catchword" was "koine eirene" or "common peace" related especially to national affairs. Philip of Macedon used it to describe the confederation of Greek states in the Corinthian league. "Ibid., p. 35. 25 Micah IV,3 and Isaiah 11,4. 26 Plato, Laws 628c. T. Pangle's edition ( N e w York: Basic Books, 1980). 27 Politics VII, 2 1325a 11; 14 1333a 35. 28 Stern, p p . 39-41. 29 Ibid. For example, Sophocles writes: "There is o n e h u m a n race. A single d a y brought u s all forth from our father and mother. N o m a n is b o m superior to another. But o n e man's fate is a d o o m of unhappy days, another's is success; and o n another the yoke of slavery's hardship falls." 30 Dicaearchus, Life of Hellas, quoted in S t e m , p p . 60-61. 31 Cicero, De re publica II, xiv, 25-27, translated by C. W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977). 32 David T h o m p s o n , "Dante's Virtuous Romans" in Dante Studies Vol. XCVI (1978), p. 149. T h o m p s o n ' s study is a "testimony to the conservative temper of R o m a n literature." H e s h o w s that e v e n the catalogues of exempla virtutis of the R o m a n s of t h e fourth century A . D . (those of Augustine a n d the poet Claudian, for example) a s w e l l as those in Dante's Convwio and Monarchia d o n o t include a n y o n e after Julius Caesar, and most are from a g o o d deal earlier. 33 S t e m , p p . 62-63. 34 Virgil, Eclogue IV, translated b y H . R . F a i r d o u g h , L o e b Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), p p . 502-503. 35 Virgil, Aeneid, translated b y H.R. F a i r d o u g h , Loeb Classical Library ( C a m b r i d g e , Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), Vols. I a n d II. *• F a i r d o u g h , Ibid., Vol. I, p . 566, n . 2 . 37 Thompson, p . 149. 38 See n. 20 above. 39 W. Dittenberger, Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones, n. 458, quoted in Stem, p . 63. 40 Plutarch's account of Zeno's ideal is based o n Zeno's Republic (see above, Part II, p. 96, n. 47). It is thought that this version of o n e life and o n e order is based o n the conditions under Augustus. Likewise inspired is the account of Alexander "Happy is he w h o sees the resplendence of that day w h e n m e n will agree to constitute o n e rule and o n e kingdom." Quoted in Stem, p p . 63-65, notes 1-3. 41 Perhaps Dante felt that as Augustus had "wrapped the world in peace for twelve

177

years" (Epistolae V, 9), it was right that the second Augustus wrap the world in peace twelve centuries hence. 42 Epistolae V, 10. Dante of course rejects this s y m b o l i s m completely a n d refers to t w o equal lights in Monarchia 111,4 and in Purgatorio XVI. 43 According to D i n o Compagni's chronicles. S e e Toynbee's A p p e n d i x to the edition of Dante's Letters, p. 221. 44 S e e Charles T. Davis, "Dante's Vision of History," Dante Studies, Vol. XC11I (1975), p p . 154-155. 45 It is possible to refer to the entire Monarchia a s an "enthymematic sorites"—a l o n g series of syllogisms (sorites), often blemished with s u b a s s u m e d or missing premises. 46 Davis, "Dante's Vision of History," p . 158. 47 A q u i n a s similarly e m p h a s i z e s in t h e De regimine 1,2,17: " N o w it is manifest that w h a t is itself one can m o r e efficaciously bring a b o u t unity than several. . . . Wherefore the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many. . . . Union is necessary; every natural governance is governance by one. In the multitude of bodily members there is one which is the principal mover . . . and among the powers of the soul one power presides. . . . Among bees there is one king and in the whole universe there is one God. Every multitude is derived from unity." (My italics). 48 Metaphysics IX, 9 1051a 4. Cf. Physics VIII, 1 241b 25: "Everything that is in m o t i o n must be moved by something." 49 Merlan, p . 87. Merlan warns u s not to identify t h e " h u m a n m i n d " with t h e "individual m i n d " but rather with the "collective m i n d " of the multitude, i m m a n e n t in the h u m a n race. N o w w h i l e Averroes s e e m s t o say that there i s spatial a n d temporal infinity in t h e h u m a n collective mind, a n d there is n o notion of progress or future improvement, h e is nonetheless unclear as t o t h e m e a n i n g of " s e m p e r intelligit." Merlan analyzes, p p . 50 ff., that this continuation of actuation is achieved either 1) through the "endless succession of generations" indicating a cumulative result, or 2) "in every m o m e n t " because s o m e w h e r e , s o m e o n e will b e thinking. In his characteristic way, Averroes within the same section gives both meanings, speaking of the eternity of the h u m a n species and infinity of time at o n e point, and of the various parts of the globe w h e r e separate thinkers and knowers may be, at another. Furthermore, there is a contradiction between the eventual satisfaction of this destiny (in o n e w a y or another, "somewhere and somewhen") by the whole and Averroes' expression of regret that only a few persons (the philosophers) achieve full knowledge. This contradiction is present also in Dante w h o takes for granted h i s definition of mankind's e n d (and the guaranteed satisfaction of it because it is an operation which is always carried on) and yet believes in a system of special privileges for those w h o most sincerely a n d completely devote themselves to philosophy in peaceful coexistence. 50 Cf. Dante's example of the isolated man from Indus, born without k n o w l e d g e of Christ and therefore the opportunity to become part of the Christian fellowship (Paradiso XIX, 70ff.). 91 Cf. what Aquinas says of Aristotle's "wise m a n " in the introduction to his Commentary o n the Ethics in Medieval Political Philosophy, p. 274: " A s the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, it is the business of the wise man to order. The reason for this is that w i s d o m is the highest perfection of reason, w h o s e characteristic is to k n o w order." Cf. also Plato's Republic IV, 434a-435b: The most important art for men w h o want to live the good life is to possess knowledge and the ability to convey knowledge to others. The city must have a "monopoly of w i s d o m . " This m a y be

178

achieved through the coordination and collaboration of the crafts of the citizens-artists w h o s e works are d o n e for the benefit of all the members of the city. 52 Vemani, De reprobatione Monarchiae in Matteini, p . 98, lines 6-7. 53 Merlan, pp. 92-93, and n. 2. The complexity and extraordinary character of Dante's Monarch g o e s b e y o n d a n y temporal direction envisioned by Averroes. The C o m m e n tator's "guarantee-mover" present in the "person" of the agent-Intellect is n o w h e r e near as concrete or realizable a s Dante's Monarch s e e m s initially to b e , although Dante's ideal Monarch is surely of superhuman character. 54 Irma Brandeis, The Ladder of Vision: A Study of Dante's "Comedy" ( N e w York: Doubleday, 1960), p . 84. 55 Teodolinda Barolini, "The Poetry of Politics in Dante's Comedy," PMLA, Vol. 9 5 (1979), p . 395. 56 It is Statius of course w h o teaches Dante about the development of the individual soul, its formation a n d nutrition. A n d it is Statius w h o reminds Dante that Averroes' lack of Christian faith regarding the infusion of life into the h u m a n soul m a d e him err in his w r o n g explanation of the possible intellect (Purgatorio XXV, 62-66). 57 Merlan, p p . 96-97. M Ibid. 59 See Ernest Fortin, "Dante and Averroism," Actas del V° Congreso de FUosofia Medieval, Vol. II (Madrid, 1979), pp. 742-746. Also Fortin, Dissidence et philosophic au moyen Age, pp. 130ff. *° Merlan, p. 93.

179

Appendix Some Questions About Mankind's End What is Dante's most innovative and significant claim in Book I—the proprium opus (or function or end) of humana civilitas—becomes often muddled through the great number of equivocations, alterations, or "imprecisioni verbali" that he evidently makes in interpreting Aristotle's principle of motus ad formam. At times he seems to change a word or expression deliberately and one wonders at his intention. At others one could almost accuse him of poor scholarship because of omissions and ambiguities. We have spoken throughout this study of the art of dissimulation, philosophical allegory, and the evidence of deliberate misquotation on Dante's part to alter a source or aver an unorthodox claim for his own particular philosophic purposes. His implementation and theorization of symbol and allegory have become so notorious that the piece in which he discusses these most fully, his famous letter to Can Grande della Scala in which he dedicates the Paradiso, has indeed been accused of being a forgery. The possible presentation of "double truths," or unorthodox claims, cannot be tolerated by the majority of Dante scholars who see him primarily as the great Christian poet, interpreter of a near Scriptural message for mankind. And yet of course Dante did experience all of these phases and levels in his thinking and writing in his political and philosophical works as well as his great poem. In this section I would like to point out three cases of textual ambiguity in the first book of the Monarchia which, in my opinion, are intended precisely as techniques to cover up his implication of double truths explored in his magnanimous attempt to determine how we should live. These are 1) the interchange of "finis" and "operan'o" in I,iii; 2) the confusion 181

between "ultimus" and "optimus" in I,iii and I,v; and 3) the inconsistency in significance of "vis ultima" and "potentia" in I,iii and I,iv. Function and End

In lines 1 and 16 of I,iii, Dante specifies that his purpose is to investigate the "ultimus finis" of humana civilitas; in line 19 his purpose, rather, is to investigate its "operatio." Preceding this in I,ii, Dante declared that in practical matters, which we can not only speculate about but also act upon, the end is the action: . . . non solum speculari sed etiam operari possumus: et in hiis non operatio propter speculationem, sed hec propter illam assummitur, quoniam in talibus operatio est finis. (Monarchia I,ii,5; my italics)

eleganza" usually—may be not an error or careless oversight on Dante's part, but rather a particular characteristic of his style. Accordingly, in I,ii,5 Dante omits "est" and leaves it up to the reader to interpret whether the operatio of exercising the potential intellect is the proper and final finis of mankind. In the case of politics, something in which we may actively take part, we speculate on as well, because in such matters the function is "of" the end, "in relation to" the end, "finis" being in the genitive case here. In another passage (II,vi,6) Dante uses the same word "finis" and explicitly gives it the same significance of "operatio." Et quia ad hunc finem natura pertingere non potest per unum hominem, cum multe sint operationes necessarie ad ipsum, que multitudinem requirunt in operantibus, necesse est naturam producere hominum multitudinem ad diversas operationes ordinatorum. (my italics)

. . . not only can we speculate about them, but also we can do something about them. In these, action is not subordinate to speculation but speculation is for the sake of action, because the aim in such matters is the action.

Ricri's definitive edition, however, omits the "est" to read: "quoniam in talibus operatio finis," and thus, there is not a clear-cut equation of terms. Ricci points out the "embarassment" of the ellipsis or omission in question: "operatio est finis" is "indubbiamente piu normale e tranquilla."1 Nonetheless, he feels that Dante more than likely intended to omit "est," not precisely equating "end" and "function" but intimating only some dependency of the one upon the other. Dante is, after all, breaking with Aristotle on this point. Ricci notes prior to this section that the Monarchia is laden with ("brulica di") such ellipses, some of which are often formidable.2 Furthermore, the several passages in which these omissions occur throughout the text (and are found obviously completed and corrected by some editor or transcriber) lead to the conclusion that the ellipsis—a "preziosa e ricercata 182

And since nature cannot attain this end by means of one man alone, (because the tasks involved are many, and require a multitude of people to perform them) nature needs to produce a multiplicity of men each fitted for a different task.

Here Dante says humana civilitas cannot reach its finis through the action of one man alone; rather a multitude of men destined to various tasks ("operationes") is necessary to reach the end. Rather than choose a closer synonym—"meta," for example, "propositum," or even "ultimum" used repeatedly in I,iii—the end is designated by "operatio." That the interchange of these two terms is intentional here is indubitable if we observe the influential passage of Aristotle's Ethics and Dante's interpretation of it in the Monarchia. Or as eye, hand, foot and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? (Ethics 1,7 1097b 30-33; my italics)

183

. . . quemadmodum est finis aliquis ad quern natura produdt pollicem, et alius ab hoc ad quern manum totam, et rursus alius ab utroque ad quern brachium, aliusque ab omnibus ad quern totum hominem. . . . (Monarchiq I,iii,2; my italics) . . . Nature forms the thumb for one end and the whole hand for another, and the arm for yet another, whilst each of these ends is different from that to which the whole man is destined.

The word used by Aristotle for "function" is "ergon" which, despite an active connotation, is best translated as "work" or "achievement." Dante's version is almost a verbatim transcription of the Ethics except for his substitution of the word "finis" to signify "function." The Latin translation of William of Moerbeke uses "finis," but in talking about the activity of the rational element uses "operatio" faithfully to the Ethics. Dante uses "finis" for both, assuming that the activity of the intellect is desirable for its own sake, as Aristotle had said of happiness in the Metaphysics. "Intelligence," along with pleasure and virtue are means to the end of happiness, for it is through these that we are happy, said Aristotle in Ethics 1,7. Dante says nothing about happiness here or a greater or more final end beyond the aim to acquire wisdom. To "intellectualize" or make active the possible intellect is alone the end. Aristotle had said also that if the action is a means to an end, then the product "ergon" is superior to and preferred to the activity "energeia."3 Aristotle makes the same distinction between exercise and product as actuality in the Metaphysics. And while in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product follows (e.g. from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building), yet none the less the act is in the former case the end and in the latter more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and is, at the same time as the house. Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is

184

being woven . . . ; but where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject. . . . (Metaphysics IX,8 1050a 24-35)

The question regarding Dante is what does he consider to be the product or result from the activity of exercising the intellect? Why is there no distinction between the activity of thinking ("tota simul in actum reduci") and the thinking agent (humana civilitas or the multitude)? It would appear that there is no product or application expected as a result of thinking and that the essence of the human race is thinking. Its end is indeed its activity. This would be in accord with the theme of the Metaphysics, as opposed to the Ethics, which suggests the superiority of the application of thinking to the mere exercise of thinking.4 Highest End or Final End?

Another set of ambiguously interchangeable terms in I,iii is used to describe the kind of end sought by the whole multitude. Dante's interchangeable use of "optimus" and "ultimus" is confusing. One wonders what is the difference between some part of the hierarchy of political partnerships and the last of them or the composite of them. In I,iii, Dante says that there is an end for each thing and all things, from man to the family, to the village, and finally ("denique") for the final political entity: the human race.9 . . . sic alius est finis ad quern singularem hominem, alius ad quern ordinat domesticam comunitatem, alius ad quern viciniam, et alius ad quern civitatem, et alius ad quern regnum, et denigue optimus ad quern universaliter genus humanum Deus ecternus arte sua, que natura est, in esse producit. (I,iii,2; my italics) Similarly the end towards which the individual's life is directed is different from that of the family community; the village has one end, the dry another and the kingdom yet another; and last of all there is the

185

end that the eternal God has established for the whole human race by means of nature, which is the mode of his art.

He does not detail just what each end is except in the case of mankind, and this he summarizes also at the beginning of I,iv: the "proper work" of humanity is to exercise continually the possible intellect first for its own sake and secondarily toward action. In I,v he details the specific end of each of the other entities and determines also that one member of each must rule over itself: "oportet unum eorum regulare seu regere" (I,v,3). The finis of a household is "domesticos ad bene vivere preparare," directed by the "paterfamilias;" that of a village is "commoda tarn personarum quam rerum auxiliatio," directed by the "commissioner;" that of a city is "bene sufficienterque vivere/' directed by the "mayor;" and finally ("denique") that of a kingdom is the same as that of a city, only "cum maiori fiducia seu tranquillitatis/' directed by the king. This series is directly from the Politics: Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, . . . the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants. . . . When several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. . . . When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. . . . Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. (1,2 1252b 9-35; my italics)

The initial comparison of texts points up a similar establishment of a qualitative difference between the ends of individual men and individual partnerships (parts) on the one hand and that of the polis and human race (for Dante) on the other hand (whole). Dante explains that the whole man is produced by 186

nature for a purpose distinct ("alius") from those of his parts but not contrary to them. Likewise, the whole human race is brought into being for an end other than that of individual man, and we assume that this, too, is not contrary to man's end. At first we see Dante's basic faithfulness to his master and recognize his concept of the world-city as the most complete community to which all the other partnerships move. Each step has its own individual purpose but these steps are ultimately channelled to the highest nature of all mankind—the exercise of all the rational potential of all men. Indeed, in I,vi Dante writes, "The order within a part has as its end the order of the whole, which brings it to perfection. Hence the goodness of the order amongst the parts does not surpass the goodness of the total order; in fact the reverse is true." 6 This would be in accordance with what Aristotle says in that the Politics, namely that subsidiary groups (households, villages, etc.) as well as the highest political group (the polis) are ordered to an end, this being the good which they seek: "The state or political community . . . aims at good in a greater degree [degree of higher quality] than any other, and at the highest good—the common good."7 The city, in the order of final causality, is prior to the individual in the logical sense that "the whole is of necessity prior to the part": its remotest origins are the coupling together of man and woman for the continuation of the species, and the union of ruler and ruled for the sake of security.8 Aristotle echoes these remarks in the Ethics, qualifying that the bonum commune is better and more divine than the good of the individual.9 Also in Dante's text the end of the "universaliter genus humanum" is "optimus" with respect to the subordinate ends of the lesser political partnerships: at the beginning of I,iii its end is the "optimus ad quern;" at the end of I,iii it is the "optimo ad quod". Upon closer examination, it appears that the end of the humanum genus is not the end to which all the other partnerships move, but rather the one upon which they all depend. It is not formed as the final one of all other groups but is the result of the totality of all of them. While the family, for example, has 187

both an end in itself (to be a family and secure the family's immediate needs) and a function with respect to the other partnerships, this is not true of the human race whose proper end is specifically the action of all the other groups. Its end is cumulatively greater, not qualitatively better, subsuming all subordinate ends of groups lesser merely in population and in the number of services provided. Dante had said in I,iii that the end of one group is other than ("alius") that of another, yet he does not say that each one in the progression must be qualitatively greater than the proceeding one. If the end of a kingdom is the same as that of a city, save for a greater bond of peace, then it would follow that the end of the whole human race is also the same, except for still a greater bond of peace. To describe the end of the human race, in fact, some editions use the more or less non-descriptive adjective "ultimus" instead of "optimus."10 It should be emphasized that within twenty-four lines in I,iii Dante uses "ultimus" in some form or another no fewer than six times. The end of the human race is therefore also other than that of any of the other partnerships but this is not to say that Dante intended its end to be different from the ends of individual men. Vernani accused Dante of ascribing to humanity a finis "alius et diversus" from that of individual man. However, the "et diversus" does not appear in any manuscript of the Monarchia, and in fact Dante intended that the end of the whole human race was to be the same as all the others in their totality. It is "other" because it is not like any single one of them but requires the functioning of all other subordinate parts together in order to reach fulfillment. "Vis ultima" and "Potentia"

The guiding principle ("principium directivum") of Dante's inquiry dwells on the capacity of humana civilitas specifically on the "ultimum de potentia," as this expression is repeated three times. Recalling the duality "potency-act" in Aristotle, the means to one's end is this capacity or potential. In I,iii Dante wishes to discover what is the ultimate potentiality of the human race in order to determine its function. 188

Ultimate potentiality carries with it not some significance of finality or limitation but rather of "vis" or "power," and in fact Dante uses "vis ultima" as an interchangeable term for "potentia." "Capacity" is the usual translation for "potentia;" in some cases, it is translated as "proprieta."11 Because "vis" or "power" is used also to describe this attribute, it would seem that "power" is the better translation for "ultima potentia;" "potentia" after all in English may be translated as "potency" and "power." For Dante, the ultima potentia of humanity is intellective power or virtue: he says "potentia sive virtus intellectiva" in I,iii,8. This is a concept which extends beyond a qualification of goodness (rendered with "optimus") and certainly beyond any individual ends. The proprium opus of humana civilitas is to keep this force or power continually active or energized so that the human race may fulfill its proper function regarding the possible intellect. The connotation of "power" would be much greater than "capacity," then, and would indicate the tremendous weight that Dante gives to the function of the human race which indeed Vernani found so shocking. Appendix Notes 1 Ricci, p. 138, note for I,ii,6. Cf. I,ii,8: "quod est finis" where Ricci says, "Piacerebbe l'ellissi di 'est'. . . ma come scacciare il sospetto che si tratti di un'isolata omissione?" Indeed three manuscripts omit "est": "B" mid-Trecento codex latino folio 437 in Berlin; "L" Medici text of the second half of the Quattrocento in the Laurentian Library; and "Q" small Settecento pamphlet in the National Library in Florence. See also pp. 7-19 of Ricci's edition for a more detailed description of the eighteen existing manuscripts. 2 Ibid., pp. 134-135, note for I,i,4. • 3 See above, Part II, p. 86, note 14. Actuality may be designated either by "energeia" if the action is the end or by "ergon" if the end is something apart from the exercise— a product or achievement. What Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics IX,8 1050a 21-24 is of utmost importance for Dante: "For the action is the end," says Aristotle," and the actuality is the action. And so even the word 'actuality' is derived from 'action,' and points to the complete reality." 4 Cf. De anima 11,4 415a 22ff. where Aristotle says that the "functioning of a living body is the end for which it exists and for which nature uses it;" the soul's activity "thinking" is the cause of life and that which makes men knowers. 5 Note that in I,iii "denique" accompanies the last entity or partnership "mankind" and in the list in I,v it accompanies the lesser one "kingdom."

6

Monarchia l,vi,l. Politics 1,1 1252a 3-6 8 Politics 1,1 1253a 18ff. ' Ethics 1,2 1094b 5-10. 10 Witte, Rostagno, and Vinay among others use "ultimus." Ricci prefers "optimus. 11 Vinay translates "vis ultima" as "proprieta specifica." 7

Bibliography

For bibliographical information on the editions of Dante's works used and for the works by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas referred to directly in the text, please refer to the NOTE ON TEXTS USED following the preface. Anderson, William. Dante the Maker. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. Aquinas, St. Thomas. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Translated by Beatrice Zedler. Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, Number 19. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968. Armstrong, Edward. "L/ideale politico di Dante." Biblioteca storico
190

191

Bergin, Thomas. Dante. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. . A Diversity of Dante. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969. . Perspectives on the "Divine Comedy". Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970. Bigongiari, Dino. Essays on Dante and Medieval Culture. Firenze: Olschki, 1964. , editor. The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Hafner Publishing, 1957. Bonaini, Francesco, editor. Ada Henrici VII romanorum imperatoris et monumenta quaedam alia suorum temporum. Florence: Typis Galileii Cellini, 1877. Bowsky, William. "Dante's Italy: A Political Dissection." The Historian, Vol. XXI (1958). . "Florence and Henry of Luxemburg, King of the Romans: The Rebirth of Guelfism." Speculum, Vol. XXXIII (April, 1958). -. Henry VII in Italy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960. Boyde, Patrick. Dante Philomythes and Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Brandeis, Irtna. The Ladder of Vision: A Study of Dante's "Comedy". New York: Doubleday, 1960. Capitani, Ovidio. "Monarchia: U pensiero politico." Cultura e Scuola, Anno IV, numero 14 (Volume speciale per le celebrazioni del VII centenario della nascita di Dante), 1965. Cappa-Legora, Antonio. La politico di Dante e di Marsilio di Padova. Roma: Casa editrice nazionale, 1906. Carmignani, Giovanni. "Dante e il libro della Monarchia." La Monarchia, translated by Marsilio Ficino. Torino: Societa editrice della Biblioteca, 1844. Chiappelh, Luigi. "Dante in rapporto alle fonti del diritto." Archivio storico italiano, Vol. XLI (1908). . "Sulla eta del De Monarchia." Archivio storico italiano, Vol. XLHI (1909). . "Ancora su Dante e il diritto romano." Ciornale dantesco, Vol. XX (1912). . Vita e opere giuridkhe di Cino da Pistoia. Pistoia: Fratelli Bracali, 1881. Chiaudano, Mario. "Dante e il diritto romano." Giornale dantesco. Vol. XX (1912). Chierici, Joseph. L'Aquila d'oro nel cielo di Giove. Roma: Istituto Grafico Tiberino, 1962. • H grifo dantesco. Roma: Istituto Grafico Tiberino, 1967. Chiurlo, U. "Le idee politiche di Dante e di Petrarca." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XVI (1908). Cicero, Marcus TulJius. De re publica. Translated by C.W. Keyes. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967. . Tusculan Disputations. Translated by J.E. King. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Cipolla, Carlo. II trattato del "De Monarchia" di Dante Alighieri e I'opuscolo "De potestate . regia et papali" di Giovanni da Parigi. Torino: Clausen, 1892. Colonna, Egidio (Giles of Rome). De ecdesiastka potestate. Translated by Richard Scholz. Weimar: Nachfolger, 1929. . De regimine principum. Translated by F. Corazzini. Firenze: Le Monnier, 1938. Copleston, Frederick, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol. II. New York: Doubleday, 1950. Cosmo, Umberto. A Handbook to Dante Studies. Translated by David Moore. Oxford: BlackweUs, 1950. Curtius, Ernst. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Translated by Willard Trask. Bollingen Series XXXVI. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. D'Ancona, Alessandro. // "De Monarchia". Firenze: Sansoni, 1906.

192

Da Prati, Pino. La politico e la filosofia nella "Monarchia" di Dante. San Remo: Edizioni grafiche Bracco, 1958. David, Marcel. La souverainete et les limites juridiques du pouvoir monarchiaue du IXe au XVe siecle. Paris: Dolloz, 1954. Davis, Charles Till. Dante and the Idea of Rome. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957. . Dante's Italy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984. . "Dante's Vision of History." Dante Studies, Vol. XCII (1975). Dazzi, Manlio. // Mussato preumanista: 1261-1329. Vicenza: Pozza, 1964. De Angelis, Antonio. // concetto d'imperium e la communitd sopranazionale in Dante. Milano: Giuffre, 1965. De Mauriac, Henry. "Alexander the Great and the Politics of Homonoia." Perspectives in Political Philosophy, Vol. I, edited by James Downton and David Hart. New York: Holt, 1971. D'Entreves, A. Passerin. Dante as a Political Thinker. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965. . Dante politko e altri saggi. Torino: Einaudi, 1955. . The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939. . Natural Law. An Introduction to Legal Philosophy. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1951. -, editor. Selected Political Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by J.G. Dawson. Oxford: BlackweUs, 1948. De Stefano, Antonio. La cultura alia cortcdi Federko II imperatore. Palermo: F. Ciuni, 1938. . L'idea imperiale di Federko II. Firenze: Sandoni, 1927. Di Marco, Ercole. La questione romana in Dante. Roma: Tipografia agostiniana, 1925. DupreVTheseider, E. L'idea imperiale di Roma nella tradizione del medio evo. Milano: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, 1942. Egidi, Piero. La storia medievale. Roma: Fondazione Leonardo per la cultura italiana, 1922. Ercole, Francesco. "Medioevo e rinascimento nella dottrina politica di Dante." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XXIV, serie 2 (1921). . "Le tre fasi del pensiero politico di Dante." Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, Vol. suppl. 19-21 (1921). . // pensiero politko di Dante. Vols. I and II. Milano: Alpes, 1928. -. Sulla genesi e sul contenuto del trattato della "Monarchia" di Dante. Milano: Remo Sandron, 1923. Fakhry, Majid. A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia Press, 1920. Fergusson, Francis. Dante. New York: Macmillan, 1966. . Dante's Drama of the Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. . Trope and Allegory. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1977. Figgis, John N. The Divine Right of Kings. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Flori, Ezio. Dell'idea imperiale di Dante. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1921. Folz, Robert. The Concept of Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Centuries. Translated by S.A. Ogilvie. London: Arnold, 1969. Fortin, Ernest. "Dante and Averroism." Actas del V" Congreso de Filosofia Medieval, Vol. II (Madrid, 1979). . "Dante and the Structure of Philosophical Allegory." Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1: Sprache und Erkenntnis in Mittelalter. Berlin: A. Zimmermann, 1981.

193

. Dissidence et philosophie au moyen &ge. Cahiers d'Etudes Medtevales, No. 3. Montreal: Bellarmin, 1981. Foster, Kenelm. "Paradiso XIX." Dante studies, Vol. XCIV (1976). . The Tivo Dantes and Other Studies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. . and Patrick Boyde, 'editors. Cambridge Readings in Dante's "Comedy". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Gierke, Otto von. Political Theories of the Middle Age. Translated by F. Maitland. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Gilbert, Allan. Dante's Conception of Justice. Druham: Duke University Press, 1925. . "Had Dante Read the Politics of Aristole?" PMLA, Vol. XLIII, series 2 (1928). Gilby, Thomas, O.P., editor. Philosophical Texts of St. Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960. Gilson, Etienne. Dante and Philosophy. Translated by David Moore. New York: Peter Smith, 1968. . History of Christian Philosophy in the Middles Ages. New York: Random House, 1955. Goudet, J. Dante et la politique. Paris: Aubier^Montaigne, 1969. Grabmann, Martin. Der lateinische Averroismus des 13 Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung. Munich: Oldenburg, 1931. — . Studien fiber die Einfluss der Aristotelischen Philosophie auf die Mittelalterlichen Theorien uber das Verhaltnis von Kirche und Stoat. Munich: Beck, 1934. Green, R.H. "Dante's 'Allegory of the Poets' and the Medieval Theory of Poetic Fiction." Comparative Literature, Vol. IX (1957). Grimberg, Carl. Au coeur du Moyen &ge. Brussels: Histoire universelle, 1963. Hill, Bennett, editor. Church and State in the Middle Ages. New York: John Wiley, 1970. Inguagiato, V. "La monarchia universale contemplata nel sesto cielo." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XX (1912). Ivry, Alfred. "Towards a Unified View of Averroes' Philosophy." Philosophical Forum, Vol. 4 (1972). Jaffa, Harry. "Aristotle." History of Political Philosophy, edited by L. Strauss and J. Cropsey. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972. John of Paris. On Royal and Papal Power. Translated and with commentary by A. Monahan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Jordan, E. "Dante et la theorie romaine de l'Empire." Nouvelle revue historique du droit francais et etranger, Vol. 45 (1921). Kantorowicz, Ernst H. The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Kern, Fritz. Humana civilitas: Eine Dante-Untersuchung. Leipzig: Koehler, 1913. * . Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages. Translated by S.B. Chrimes. Oxford: Blackwells, 1939. Lanapoppi, Aleramo. "La Divina Commedia: allegoria 'dei poeti' o allegoria 'dei teologi'?" Dante studies. Vol. LXXXVI (1968). Landogna, Francesco. "Imperium e Regnum italicum nel pensiero di Dante." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XXIX (1926). Lenkeith, Nancy. Dante and the Legend of Rome. London: Warburg Institute, 1952. Lemer, Ralph and Muhsin Mahdi, editors. Medieval Political Philosophy. New York: The Free Press, 1967. Lewis, Ewart. Medieval Political Ideas. Vol. I. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954.

194

Limentani, U. The Mind of Dante. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being. New York: Harper and Row, 1960. Maccarrone, Michele. "II terzo libro della Monarchia." Studi danteschi. Vol. XXXIII (1955). Mahdi, Muhsin. Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. Mandonnet, Pierre, O.P. Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au XHIe siecle. Vol. I Louvanin: Institut superieur de philosophie de l'Universite, 1911. Mariani, U. "La posizione di Dante tra i teologi deU'impero." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XXX (1927). . Chiesa e stato nei teologi agostiniani del secolo XIV. Toma: Edizione di storia e letteratura, 1957. Mastrobuono, Antonio. Essays on Dante's Philosophy of History. Firenze: Olschki, 1979. Matteini, Nevio. // piu antico oppositore politico di Dante. Guido Vemani da Rimini. Includes Vernani's text De reprobatione Monarchiae. Collana di storia della filosofia, Vol. 6. Padova: Milani, 1958. Mazzotta, Giuseppe. Dante, Poet of the Desert. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Mcllwain, Charles. The Growth of Political Thought in the West. New York: Macmillan, 1932. Mclntire, C.T., editor. God, History, and Historians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Meozzi, Antero. "I trattati politici di Guido Vernani e Dante Alighieri." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XXX (1927). Merlan, Philip. Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idees. The Hague: Martin Nijoff, 1963. Montano, Rocco. Comprendere Dante. Napoli: Vico, 1976. • Suggerimenti per una lettura di Dante. Napoli: Conte, 1956. Muresu, Gabriele. Dante politico. Nuovi classici Paravia, 16. Torino: Paravia, 1979. Mussato, Albertino. Sette libri inediti del De gestis Italicorum post Henricum Caesarem Vll. Edited by Luigi Padrin. Venice: Regia Deputazione veneta, 1903. Nardi, Bruno. "L'Averroismo di Sigieri e Dante." Studi danteschi. Vol. XXII (1938). . "H concetto dell'impero." Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, Vol. LXXVIII (1921). . Dal "Convivio" alia "Commedia". Roma: Institute storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 1960. . Dante e la cultura medievale. Bari: Laterza, 1949. . "Discussioni dantesche." L'Alighieri, Vol. VI (1965). . "Note alia Monarchia di Dante." Studi danteschi, Vol. XXVI (1942). . "Saggio di commento alia Monarchia." LAlighieri, Vol. VII (1966). • Saggi di filosofia dantesca. Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1967. ' e note d* critica dantesca. Napoli: Ricciardi, 1966. Novati, Francesco. "Nuovi studi su Albertino Mussato." Giornale storico della letteratura italiana, Vols. VI-VI1 (1884-1885). Parodi, E.G. "La data della Commedia." Studi romanzi, Vol. Ill (1905). . "Del concetto dell'impero in Dante e del suo Averroismo." Bollettino della societa dantesca italiana, Vol. XXVI (1919). . Poesia e storia nella "Divina Commedia". Napoli: Perrella, 1921.

195

Patroni, Giovanni. "Storia e miti di Roma e di Grecia nella Commedia di Dante." Studi per Dante, Vol. III. Conferenze tenute a cura del comitato milanese della Societa dantesca italiana. Milano, 1935. Pegis, Anton, editor. Basic Political Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vols. I and II. New York: Random House, 1944. Peterman, Larry. "Dante and Happiness." Medievalia et Humanistica, New Series, No 10 (1981). . "Dante's Monarchy and Aristotle's Political Thought." Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, Vol. X (1973). . "An Introduction to Dante's De Monarchic." Interpretation, Vol. Ill, n. 2 (1972). Petronio, Giuseppe. Bonifacio VUl. Lucca: Lucentia, 1950. Pierrobono, Luigi. "La croce e l'aquila e il loro significato nella Divina Commedia." Giornale dantesco, Vol. XXX (1927). . "Dante e Roma." Giornale dantesco. Vol. XXXIII (1930). Plato. Laws. Translated and edited by T. Pangle. New York: Basic Books, 1980.. . Republic. Translated and with notes by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1968. Previte-Orton, C.W., editor. Cambridge Medieval History. Vols. I and II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Quaglio, A.E. "Sulla cronologia e il testo della Divina Commedia." Cultura e Scuola, Vols. 3 and 4 (1965). Randall, John H. The Making of the Modern Mind. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Reade, W.H.V. "Dante Vision of History." Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXV. London: Milford, 1939. . "The Political Theory of Dante." De Monarchia, edited by E. Moore. London: The Clarendon Press, 1916. Reeves, Mariorie. "Marsilio of Padua and Dante Alighieri." Perspectives of Political Philosophy, Vol. I, edited by J. Downton and D. Hart. New York: Holt, 1971. Renan, Ernest. Averroes et I'Averroisme. Paris: Durand, 1852. Ricci, Pier Giorgio. "Dante e l'impero di Roma." Atti del convegno di studi. Celebrazioni del VII centenario della nascita di Dante, 1965. Riesenberg, Peter. Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought. New York: Columbia Press, 1956. Roibiecki, John. The Political Philosophy of Dante Alighieri. Washington: Salve Regina Press, 1921. Santayana, George. Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante and Goethe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910. Schevill, Francesco. Medieval and Renaissance Florence. Vols. I and II. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Silverstein, Theodore. "On the Genesis of De Monarchia II, v." Speculum, Vol. XIII (1938). . "The Throne of the Emperor Henry in Dante's Paradise and the Medieval Conception of Christian Kingship." Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XXXII (1939). Singleton, Charles S. "Commedia: Elements of Structure." Dante Studies # 1 . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. . "Journey to Beatrice." Dante Studies #2. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967.

196

Slade, Carole, editor. Approaches to Teaching Dante's "Divine Comedy". New York: Modern Language Association, 1982. Smith, Sir William. Smaller Classical Dictionary. New York: Dutton, 1968. Solan, Gioele. "II pensiero politico di Dante." Rivista storica italiana, Vol. XL (1923). Solmi, Arrigo. "Dante e l'ltalia." Studi per Dante, Vol. HI. Conferenze tenute a cura del comitato milanese della Societa dantesca italiana. Milano, 1935. . "La Monarchia di Dante." Nuova Antologia (1935). . "Stato e chiesa nel pensiero di Dante." Archivio storico italiano, Vol. LXXIX (1921). . // pensiero politico di Dante. Firenze: La Voce, 1922. Stambler, Bernard. Dante's Other World. New York: New York University Press, 1957. Stern, S.M. Aristotle on the World State. London: Cassirer, 1968. Stocchi, Manlio. "Monarchia: testo e cronologia." Cultura e Scuola, Anno IV, numero 14. Volume speciale per le celebrazioni della nascita di Dante, 1965. Strauss, Leo. What is Political Philosophy? Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959. and Joseph Cropsey, editors. A History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972. Strayer, Joseph. Western Europe in the Middle Ages. New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1955. Sumner, B.H. "Dante and the Regnum italicum." Medium Aevum, Vol. I (1932). Tarn, William. "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind." Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XIX 1933. Thompson, David. Dante's Epic journeys. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. . "Dante's Virtuous Romans." Dante studies, Vol. XCVI (1978). . Dante and the Idea of Rome. Alberquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971. Tierney, Brian, editor. The Crisis of Church and State: 1050-1300. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Tout, T.F. The Empire and the Papacy: 918-1273. London: Rivingston, 1906. Tuchman, Barbara. A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century. New York: Ballantine, 1979. Ullmann, Walter. The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages. London: Methuen, 1970. . A History of Political Thought in the Middle Ages. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965. . Medieval Papalism. London: Methuen, 1949. Van Cleve, Thomas. The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972. Van Steenberghen, Ferdinand. Aristotle in the West. Translated by Leonard Johnston. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954. . Les oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger di Brabant. Brussels: Palais des Academies, 1938. Vento, Sebastiano. La filosofia politico di Dante del "De Monarchia". Torino: Bocca, 1921. Vinay, Gustavo. Interpretazione della "Monarchia" di Dante. Firenze: Le Monnier, 1962. . "II punto sulla Monarchia di Dante." Cultura e Scuola, Anno I, numero 2 (1962). Virgil. Aeneid. Translated by H.R. Fairclough. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. . Eclogues. Translated by H.R. Fairclough. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971. Zedler, Beatrice. "Averroes on the Possible Intellect." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXV (1951). Zingarelli, Nicola. Dante e Roma. Roma: Loescher, 1895.

197

Index Aeneid (Virgil), 53, 159-160, 164 allegory and allegorical interpretation, 16-20, 23, 24, 37, 55, 90, 181 Aquinas, St. Thomas, vii, 13, 63-64, 85, 90, 91, 101, 103, 105-122, 135, 138-139, 144, 148, 154-155, 168; Thomism, viii, 14, 15, 46; and Aristotle, 153-157 Aristotle: teleology in Ethics, 65, 83-94, 104, 113, 123 n. 12 and 14, 181182; view of happiness, 3, 7, 21, 24, 29-30, 55, 83-84, 85, 103, 105, 111, 117-119; and St. Thomas Aquinas, 153-157; and Averroes, 129-150; political system, political philosophy, vii, 3-4, 13, 16, 24, 26-31, 37, 38, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 83-106, 107-114, 117-122, 132, 148, 165, 168; Aristotelianism, viii, 4, 14, 20, 122 n. 2; Works, see De anima, Ethics, Politics, etc. Augustine of Hippo, St., 14, 53 Augustus, Emperor, 4, 7, 8, 33, 60, 68, 153, 159, 160, 161-162, 163, 164 Aweroes: collective multitude, viii, 120, 129-150, 166, 167, 170; nature of man, viii, 97; Dante's citation of, 31, 120, 130-131, 133-138, 143145; Aweroism, vii-viii, .14, 31, 130-138, 141-142, 144, 173; Commentary on Plato's Republic, 176 n. 13; Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, 130, 133, 141, 143, 144, 149; and Aristotle, 129150 Barbi, Michele, 15-16 Beatrice, 35, 53, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 6768, 69, 70; in Dante's Vita Nuova, 7,22 Bible and Scripture, 4, 14, 41, 90, 91, 136, 151, 155, 157, 159, 161, 163 Boniface VIII, Pope, 8, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46,48

Cacciaguida, 32, 35, 40, 54, 59 Can Grande delta Scala, letter to (Epist. X), 3, 5, 18, 23, 181 Charles Martel, 22, 50-51 Charles of Valois, 38 Christ, 7-8, 21-22, 53, 55, 57, 60, 65, 68, 71, 117, 168 Church, Christian: 1, 4, 6, 9, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20-23, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44-46, 48, 51, 53, 58, 67-68, 70, 90, 91, 92, 98, 119, 121, 129, 130, 131, 143, 162, 163, 164; plenitudo potestatis, 8, 41, 43, 48, 92 city {polis): role of, 3, 4, 22-28, 31, 32, 36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 49, 50-53, 84-85, 88, 89, 94-99, 102, 104, 106, 108, 111-113, 119, 121, 148, 152, 157, 186 ff; notion of World-City, viii, 5-6, 17, 20, 22-23, 26, 30, 35, 49, 50-53, 57-58, 66, 88, 97, 99, 135, 148, 156, 173, 187; diversity of talents within the city, 25, 27, 50, 51, 66, 92-93, 99, 110, 117-122 passim, 135, 137, 167, 169 Clement V, Pope, 34, 39, 40, 46, 47, 48, 163 Commedia, La (The Divine Comedy) (Dante): references to, viii, 1-3, 4, 5, 6-7, 14, 15, 16-23 passim, 24, 26, 32, 33, 37, 50, 51, 52, 54-59, 62, 64, 65, 66-73, 121, 145, 163, 164, 165-171; political nature of, 2, 3, 5, 13-16, 22-23, 57; comparisons with Monarchia, viii, 1-6, 13-23, 26, 35, . 40, 52-53, 54-59, 62, 64-73, 121, 174; (see also Inf., Purg., Par.) Convivio, II (The Banquet) (Dante), 1, 2, 6, 7, 18, 24, 32, 35, 39, 53, 88, 89, 91, 101, 103, 108, 109, 131, 138, 140, 143-144, 145, 167 Dante Alighieri: chronology of works, 2-3, 14, 15. 17, 31-35, 47; exile, 1, 6, 19, 25, 31-35, 38 199

200

De anima (Aristotle), 4, 130, 133, 141, 143, 144, 149 De generation (Aristotle), 149-10 De situ et forma aque et terre (Dante), 15, 32 De vulgari eloquentia (Dante), 1, 2, 3, 6, 32, 35 Donation of Constantine, 44, 61 double truths, 4, 18-19, 90-91, 113, 135, 136, 181 Dubois, Pierre, 46 Eagle (I'Aquik in Commedia), 51, 53, 56, 57, 69, 70-72, 163, 174 earthly paradise (Eden), 16, 21, 55, 58, 65,86 Eclogue, fourth (Virgil), 159-162 Empire (Monarchy), vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7, 8, 13-17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 2829, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44-50 passim, 52, 56, 58, 60, 61, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 83, 85, 88, 91, 92, 102, 105, 109, 119, 120, 121, 129, 130, 141, 147, 148, 149, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165-171, 174 Emperor (Monarch), 1, 5-9, 17, 19, 20, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 44-50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 89, 92, 102-103, 121, 122, 132, 147, 148, 151, 153, 162, 163, 165, 167-171, 173, 174 Enghelbert of Admont, 13, 45 d'Entreves, A. Passerin, 26 Epistolae (letters) (Dante): Epist. X to Can Grande, see Can Grande; Epist. VII to Henry VII of Luxemburg, 15, 32-34, 47, 161; all others, 6, 15, 32-35, 47, 161-163 Ethics, Nicomachean (Aristotle), 3, 16, 26-30, 50, 55, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93112, passim, 144, 150, 154, 156-157, 183-185, 187 Florence, 6, 13, 22, 23, 24-26, 31-38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 52, 73, 163, 172 Frederick II, 15, 37, 39, 47, 53 Fortin, Ernest, 16, 103 Gelasius and Gelasian theory, 14, 45 Gilbert, Allan, 100-103

Index

Gilson, Etienne, 91, 131-132 goals of man and mankind, vii-viii, 16, 7, 15-17, 18, 19, 20-23, 28, 3031, 48, 53, 55-57, 59-64, 69, 83-90, 99, 111, 119, 142, 147-148, 152, 165, 181 ff. Guelphs and Ghibellines, 37-38, 40, 41, 42, 49, 73 Henry VII of Luxemburg, Emperor, 15, 23, 32-34, 38-44, 46-47, 49, 52, 53-54, 59, 161, 162, 163, 172; letter to, see Epistolae heresy, and Dante, 121, 129-139, 142150 passim humana civilitas (human civilization, human race, mankind), vii-viii, 5, 7, 14, 15, 26, 30-31, 33, 48, 54, 58, 65, 71, 83, 86, 87, 97-100, 101, 104, 119, 120, 121 n. 1, 129, 135, 142, 149, 150, 151, 153, 162, 165, 181182, 185 ff. Infemo (Hell), 21, 22, 56 Inferno (Commedia), 39, 47, 48, 56, 57, 70, 145 Innocent III, Pope, 8 Italy, 6, 26, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 41, 59, 171-172 John XXII, Pope, 20 John of Paris, 13, 45-46 Jordan of Osnabruck, 45 justice, human and transhuman, 5, 23, 32, 35, 37, 51, 52, 54-66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 114, 159, 160 Justinian, 51, 153 Kantorowicz, Ernst, 58 letters of Dante, see Epistolae Lewis of Bavaria (Lodovico il Bavaro) 20, 46 Marco Lombardo, 51, 53, 67, 144, 169 Marsilius of Padua, 46 Metaphysics (Aristotle), 27-31, 108, 138, 166-167, 168, 184-185 Monarchia (Monarchy) (Dante), vii-viii, 1-9, 13-23, 25-35, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46-50, 52, 54-66, 70-73, 83, 85-86, 87, 88-89, 91, 92, 97, 101, 102-103, 105, 119, 121, 129-154, 161, 164, 165-171, 172, 173, 174, 181-189;

Index

date of composition, 6, 14-15, 32, 46-47, 52, 164 papacy, 2, 6, 19, 20, 37, 38, 41, 44, 4550 passim, 52, 91 papal encyclicals, 8, 41, 43, 46 Paradise, 16-17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 62-64, 71, 73, 141, 173 Paradiso ( Commedia), 13, 15, 16, 23, 35, 36, 40, 43, 44, 47, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 59, 63, 66, 67-68, 70, 72, 73, 139, 140, 146, 153, 181 peace, 4, 5, 7, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35-38, 43, 44, 45, 51, 52, 67, 68, 72, 112, 121, 150-164, 166, 168 Philip IV (the Fair), King of France, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48 Physics (Aristotle), vii-viii, 84, 149, 150, 153 Plato, 3, 24, 93, 97, 156 Politics (Aristotle), 27, 28, 50, 84, 89, 93-112, 94, 95, 98, 99-105, 106107, 132, 156, 186, 187 Pope, aegis of, 1, 5-9, 17, 19, 20, 34, 37, 44-50, 51, 56, 59-61, 64, 66, 67-68, 121, 147, 171, 174 possible intellect, 27, 28, 30, 66, 86, 87, 130-150, 166, 183 ff. Purgatory, Mount of, 16, 21, 22, 23, 56, 57, 63, 172-174 Purgatorio (Commedia), 35, 36, 37, 48, 51, 53, 57, 60, 64-65, 67, 68, 69, 73, 86, 136-137, 145, 161, 171-173, 174 rational faculty, viii, 4, 7, 9, 24, 27, 30,

201

54, 55, 66, 87, 99, 108, 121, 129, 130, 132, 133, 137-138 Roman Empire, 1, 4, 5, 8, 13, 17, 20, 23, 26, 33, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 53, 54, 60, 68, 72, 91, 102, 129, 132, 147, 153, 157, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170 Rome, 4, 5, 8, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 53, 58, 60, 132, 158, 160, 161, 164, 170, 172 separation of powers, 2, 5-9, 13-14, 15, 17, 19-20, 22-23, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44-50 passim, 51, 59-62, 66, 67, 91, 92, 119, 121, 129, 132, 147, 164, 171 Siger of Brabant, viii Singleton, Charles, 18, 55 ff. Socrates, 3, 24-26, 59 speculation, 26-31, 48, 86, 104-105, 135, 140, 141, 167 Statius, 136, 161, 171, 172, 173-174 syllogisms, logical demonstration, vii, 1, 4, 7, 31, 48-49, 58, 59, 60, 62, 66, 85, 88, 101, 135, 136, 151, 164 Translatio, 8, 44-45 Vemani, Guido (Dominican, author of De reprobatione Monarchiae), 129, 130-133, 135, 137, 139, 142, 168, 175 n. 1, 188, 189 Virgil, 16, 36, 53, 55, 56, 58, 62, 64, 67, 69, 73, 158, 159-164, 165, 170, 172, 173-174 Vita Nuova (Dante), 2, 7

American University Studies

Series II Romance Languages and Literature

Donna Mancusi-Ungaro

Vol. 49

Dante and the Empire

PETER LANG New York • Bern • Frankfurt am Main • Paris

PETER LANG New York • Bern • Frankfurt am Main • Paris