Curious Emotions
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Curious Emotions
Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research provides a forum for scholars from different scientific disciplines and fields of knowledge who study consciousness in its multifaceted aspects. Thus the Series will include (but not be limited to) the various areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, linguistics, brain science and philosophy. The orientation of the Series is toward developing new interdisciplinary and integrative approaches for the investigation, description and theory of consciousness, as well as the practical consequences of this research for the individual and society. Series A: Theory and Method. Contributions to the development of theory and method in the study of consciousness.
Editor Maxim I. Stamenov Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Editorial Board David Chalmers
Steven Macknik
Australian National University
Barrow Neurological Institute
Gordon G. Globus
George Mandler
University of California at Irvine
University of California at San Diego
Ray Jackendoff
Susana Martinez-Conde
Brandeis University
Barrow Neurological Institute
Christof Koch
John R. Searle
California Institute of Technology
University of California at Berkeley
Stephen Kosslyn
Petra Stoerig
Harvard University
Universität Düsseldorf
Earl Mac Cormac Duke University
Volume 61 Curious Emotions: Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action by Ralph D. Ellis
Curious Emotions Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action
Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ralph D. Ellis Curious Emotions : Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action / Ralph D. Ellis. p. cm. (Advances in Consciousness Research, issn 1381–589X ; v. 61) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Consciousness. 2. Emotions. 3. Motivation (Psychology) 4. Selforganizing systems. I. Title. II. Series. BF311.E483 2005 152.4--dc22 isbn 90 272 5197 5 (Eur.) / 1 58811 628 X (US) (Hb; alk. paper)
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© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents
Introduction 1. The enactive approach to affective intentionality 1 2. Some preliminary predictions of enactivism 9 3. The “curious” emotions 14 4. Conceptualizing action versus reaction 18 5. Plan of the book 21 Chapter 1 Preconscious emotional intentionality 1. Motivation, conscious emotion, and unconscious emotion 27 2. The murkiness of emotional intentionality 31 3. Aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles 33 4. The roles of sensation, interoception, and sensorimotor action imagery 42 Chapter 2 Motivated attention in action: How emotion creates conscious intentionality 1. Linear versus dynamical causal sequences in the brain 52 2. Conflicting theories with conflicting empirical predictions 57 3. The P300 ERP as an operational definition of perceptual consciousness 63 4. How the Mack and Rock data relate to the two types of hypotheses 63 5. The paradox of early and late selection 69 6. Attention and conscious processing 72 7. Further implications for the problems of attention and consciousness 73
1
25
47
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Chapter 3 Non-consummatory motivations: Extropy and “life wish” in the self-organization of emotion 1. Intertheoretic reduction and consummatory-drive reductionism 82 2. The notion of “extropy”: A non-reductive force? 89 3. The humanistic notion of “life wish” 95 4. A possible synthesis 99 Chapter 4 Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs as grounding specific emotions 1. Physiological evidence for non-consummatory motivation 104 2. Novelty, constraints to freedom, and the action-consciousness connection 115 3. The importance of extropy needs in higher mammals 124 4. Existential requirements for an adequate dynamical theory of emotion 125 5. Toward an integrated physiological and phenomenological account 128 Chapter 5 Varieties of extended self and personality 1. How emotion grounds the various senses of self 2. Why not an illusory-choice model? 142 3. The embodied self and the personality 150 4. How can there be knowledge of the self? 158
79
103
131 138
Chapter 6 Learning about emotions through the arts 1. An enactive dance form for the eye 171 2. Why does art move, and not just entertain? 176 3. Love and other non-consummatory motivations 181
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Table of contents
Chapter 7 Dynamical systems and emotional agency: A closer look 1. The causal power of dynamical systems 193 2. How can top-down systems avoid violating causal closure? 200 3. The emotional brain as an enactive system 207 4. Objections and responses 209
189
Conclusion
215
References
223
Index
233
Introduction
.
The enactive approach to affective intentionality
Enactive approaches to intentionality and consciousness propose that such mental processes as feeling, representation, and consciousness, including perceptual consciousness, can result only from a self-organizational system that in an important sense acts upon rather than only reacting to its environment, and one that appropriates, organizes, and replaces its own micro-constituents on an as-needed basis rather than being only a causal epiphenomenon that is built up from the interactions of the micro-constituents. “Enaction” in this context is meant to differ from mere “activity” by including some sort of primitive causal agency, and to define it requires delving into the distinction between living and nonliving systems in terms of their dynamical self-organization, which gives some systems a power to use their environment and their own constituents to maintain stable structure and function across exchanges of energy and materials. The term “enactive” was first used in this way by Varela et al. (1991), while simultaneously Newton was developing an “action theory of understanding” (Newton 1982, 1989a, 1996) and a “sensorimotor theory of cognition” (Newton 1993); during the same period, Ellis (1986, 1990, 1995) was proposing that consciousness depends on a self-organizing motivational process; Kauffman (1993), Kelso (1995) and others discussed below were developing the theory of self-organization along scientific lines; and Thelen and Smith (1996) applied this theory in developmental psychology. Meanwhile, Panksepp’s animal emotion studies (for example, Panksepp et al. 1984; Panksepp 1998, 2003) were revealing more and more that a number of relatively independent, unconditioned emotional brain systems are fueled by action-initiating circuits deep in the subcortex; and Ito (1993) and Schmahmann and his associates (for example, see Schmahmann 1997) were finding that the cerebellum, traditionally associated with coordinating action routines, also plays a vital role in emotional and higher cognitive processes (see also Courtemanche et al. 2002; Gottwald et al. 2003).
Curious Emotions
It is a short step from these observations that an enactive approach should offer a different understanding of the affective dimension from those that construe emotions and feelings as reactions to perceptual inputs combined with the interoception of internal body states. Damasio (2003) characterizes interoception as just another form of perceptual input originating from the viscera of the body. By contrast to this interoception-plus-associated-perceptual-imagery approach, the enactivist account holds that emotional feelings resemble other conscious states in that they are not constituted by a receiving and processing of inputs, but rather by initiating action patterns relative to actual or possible environmental affordances. Consciousness, for example, depends more on efferent than afferent enervation. By “efferent” in this context, I mean nervous impulses that travel away from the central nervous system’s most primary action-initiating centers – beginning with the feedback loop including the periaqueductal gray (PAG), thalamus and hypothalamus (Panksepp 2000a), from whence the developing action commands then spread through the cerebellum and its loops with the thalamus and hypothalamus (Haines et al. 1997), and eventually lead to a real or imaginary bodily action by activating the motor, premotor, and supplementary motor areas, which then (when disinhibited by the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate areas – see Faw 2003) relay the efferent commands to the body’s extremities. Afferent signals, by contrast, refer in this context to those signals that travel from the peripheral parts of the nervous system inward to the more central areas. It is now widely acknowledged that consciousness and genuine intentionality can never result from the afferent processing of perceptual inputs alone (Aurell 1984, 1989; Faw 2000; Mack & Rock 1998; Panksepp 1998; Posner & Rothbart 1992, 1998, 2000; Nikolaev et al. 2001; and others to be cited below). Indeed, I shall argue in agreement with Newton (1996) that we understand the world by anticipating how we could act upon it relative to organismic purposes. When the action affordances of environmental situations are anticipated, those anticipated affordances create the action imagery that grounds conscious understanding of the environment. This might also be called a “pragmatic” view, in the technical philosophical sense, but its affective implications are also paradoxically less “pragmatic” in the everyday sense, because it acknowledges that the system is motivated to maintain its patterns of enaction for their own sake, and not merely for instrumental reasons. This view is also consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s (1941, 1942) phenomenological account of the roles of the “body schema” and “body image” in consciousness. The body image is constituted by interoceptive and proprioceptive afferent information of the kind stressed by Damasio (2003). The
Introduction
brain forms this body image out of information received from the body. The body schema, by contrast, is based on sensorimotor action imagery of the kind recently studied by Jeannerod (1997). This imagery results from sending information rather than merely from receiving it. Merleau-Ponty was well aware that the “phantom limb” experience of amputees results primarily from the efferent action commands still being sent to the nonexistent limb. If intentionality is rooted in the action imagery of the body schema – enacted by efferent rather than afferent processes and originating more deeply in the midbrain and brain-stem – then the intentionality of emotion, its “aboutness,” is not exhausted by noting correlations between afferent interoceptions and their accompanying perceptual inputs. That would lead to construing the emotional organism as more reactive and less active than it actually is, and would lead to concretely different specific predictions about the affective life of animals. It also leads to a different phenomenological account of the meanings of feelings, and thus different decisions about how to act on them. Not only exploration, curiosity, play, and social bonding, I shall argue, but also fear and anger are better understood if organisms are endogenously motivated to act in certain ways and then use environmental conditions as action affordances, rather than behaving in those ways because of re-action to afferent stimulation from the environment combined with afferent interoception from their own viscera. To be sure, perception and interoception are important in the feeling of emotions, and like Damasio, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes them; but they cannot be regarded as the whole story. Major advances in the understanding of emotion have taken place in the past few years. But with a few notable exceptions (for example, Gendlin 1992a, b; Panksepp 1998), these advances have focused primarily on one half of the action-reaction system of the living organism. They have interpreted emotional content and feelings as resulting essentially from an interoceptive mapping of the body’s functions (Ben Ze’ev 2000, 2002; Damasio 1994, 1999, 2003; Griffiths 1997; LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1999). But interoception is essentially afferent, like the receiving of perceptual input through vision or audition. So what is left out of the interoception-plus-concurrent-imagery picture is a full enough basis for understanding the intentionality of feelings – what they are about. We understand that feelings are partly about our bodies and how they are faring; but we also need an account of how the feelings are about the world, about the ways we can or cannot act toward it, and about why we want to act in those ways. And it is here that we have fallen back on speculation and ad hoc hypothesis to fill in the gaps of our understanding. It is frequently hypothesized that
Curious Emotions
natural selection somehow made it “just so” that we have these particular emotional reactions, and then that classical conditioning causes us to learn new environmental associations to the old emotions. I agree that natural selection plays a role in the innate response patterns; but so does the nature of selforganization. And while classical conditioning plays some role in leading us to have the eventual emotional responses that adults have, there are more sophisticated mechanisms at work than mere classical or even instrumental conditioning – mechanisms relating to the nature of self-organizing systems. The action affordances of different environments enable different feeling processes partly because of endogenous aspects of organismic structure and function. We should not expect such complexity to be accounted for by simple stimulus generalization based on learning. An infinite number of combinations of environmental conditions can enable a given holistic self-organizational “basin of attraction,” or pattern into which the system is inclined to settle; yet not just any environmental conditions will do, and there are also an infinite number of combinations that can thwart a given holistic aim. Correlatively, careful phenomenological reflection can suggest that the “aboutness” of feelings is often considerably more complex than it initially appears to be, and that nuanced feelings often defy stock categorization. Kauffman (1993) points out that natural selection explanations become much more adequate when supplemented by an understanding as to why certain patterns of self-organization are better designed to maintain themselves across replacements of their components, and more robust with regard to the types of components and environmental conditions they are able to use. If natural selection explains the techniques of the famous knuckle ball pitcher Hoyt Wilhelm, by showing that he could not have survived in the Major Leagues without an effective knuckle ball, then self-organizational theory addresses in the present tense the actual mechanics of why the “knuckle balls” of our living systems should work in the kinds of patterns they do. The first three chapters of this book will explore this concept of selforganization from the standpoint of distinguishing living and genuinely active systems from non-living and merely reactive systems, showing that only the former are capable of emotional feelings, and that fully intentional emotions, whether conscious or not, actually ground and shape all other conscious states. One of the important implications of Kauffman’s analysis of self-organization for affective processes is that self-organization motivates not only homeostatic drive reduction, but also what I call “extropy” – the maintenance of a suitably complex and higher-energy pattern of overall activity for the organism. In my view, not only are many of the endogenous emotional systems described
Introduction
by Panksepp (1998) driven by extropy concerns – play, seeking/curiosity, nurturance/bonding, and even some aspects of sexual lust – but also Panksepp’s discussions of the roles of the periaqueductal gray (PAG) and generally of the upper brainstem in activating the system lead to an enactivist account of the intentionality of affect: the intentionality of feelings is better understood in terms of the actions they aim at, in relation to multiply-realizable environmental affordances, than in terms of the perceptual objects that are thought to cause or trigger the feelings. Again, interoception and perception combined give us only afferent information, when what is needed is efferent information – information about the complex patterns of actions that our organisms are trying to execute, using the environment in a fluid and multiply-realizable way. In fact, I shall argue that to view emotions and feelings as being caused by concurrent or even remembered or imagined external events is to fall into a serious misunderstanding – essentially, the oversimplifying distortion of the meaning of subjective events that Husserl (1913) calls the “natural attitude.” I.e., we try to apply to ourselves the same categories that are so successful in explaining causal relations between external objects in order to understand what “causes” us to feel the way we do, and then try to construe the resulting oversimplified and distorted causal account as the intentional meaning of the feeling. The classic example is the philosopher who, when asked how he felt about his wife, began by noticing the constant conjunction between certain feelings in himself and certain events in the environment, and at last concluded that there was a statistical probability that certain facts about his wife had caused certain feelings in himself. Clinical psychologists would call such a response “alexithymic” – unable to read the meaning of our own feelings. But to greater or lesser extents, we are all alexithymic in the same way as the philosopher in the example, because we fall victim to essentially the same mistake of reasoning. That is why the natural attitude is so “natural.” Antonio Damasio, in all his works, has offered a useful framework in which to understand emotional feelings essentially as reactions to interoception of internal body states associated with perceptual images. This is a valuable starting point for exploring the workings of the affective dimension, but it is only half the picture, and tends to lead either to oversimplified accounts of the intentional meanings of feelings, or to a dissatisfying silence on that score. My sympathy with a loved one, admiration for a sunset, or anger upon being cut off in traffic are not “about” my internal body states alone. At first glance, they appear as being about the loved one, the sunset, or the motorist who cut me off in traffic, but we cannot settle for such superficial, unanalyzed accounts of their meaning. Even these assumed intentional objects are often mislead-
Curious Emotions
ing, because the emotional life intends much more than what is immediately present in concurrent perception or imagination. The sunset may work as a symbol for the poignant finitude of the existential condition; the evil motorist may be only a symbol of all that oppresses and bullies me. The loved one may offer an opportunity to enact a highly complex energization of entire dimensions of my being. We have only begun to scratch the surface of understanding what our emotional feelings are telling us about how we are faring in our overall attempts to integrate the various motivational purposes that fit into the goal orientations of a complex, self-organizing system. The intentionality of feelings – what they are “about” – includes aims as well as environmental affordances and triggering objects. And many of these aims cannot be grasped within a simple stimulus-response framework that would treat conscious states merely as reactions to inputs and to the interoception of internal body states. On the contrary, many emotions and feelings have to do with aims that are active rather than reactive. In fact, it may well be that, as Newton (1989a) and Humphrey (2000) suggest, we are first motivated to perform actions, and then understand the independent reality of the external world in terms of the way it resists us. To define feeling too much in terms of interoception leads to confusion about the intentional meanings of both conscious feelings and unconscious emotions. As Salmela (2002) points out in agreement with Merleau-Ponty (1941), even unconscious affective processes often seem to have had intentional meaning prior to conscious reflection on them. To define feeling simply as the consciousness of emotions, and then to define emotions in turn as bodily processes available to interoception, blurs rather than clarifying this problem. Damasio, for example, defines feeling as interoceptive access to the bodily processes that constitute emotions; feeling, then, is the awareness/consciousness of an emotion which we simultaneously associate with some triggering image from the perceptual world or from perceptual imagination. But then the question arises: when we experience feelings, why are we so often un-aware of the body states that Damasio defines as emotions, and about which interoception is presumably informing the brain? If feeling is awareness of interoceptive information, then it should be impossible by definition to have feelings and remain unaware of the interoception. Damasio’s answer here, of course, is that we are often unaware or unconscious of the interoceptive information that our brains are receiving (Damasio 2003: 87ff.). But this explanation seems to straightforwardly contradict Damasio’s definition of feelings as the awareness of emotions. Damasio seems to want it both ways. He says that
Introduction
1. A feeling is consciousness/awareness of an emotion. 2. The consciousness/awareness of an emotion is the perception of a body state/body map (through proprioception/interoception). 3. The reason we usually are not aware of the body states/body maps of which our feelings (conscious emotions) are the awareness is that we are usually aware of them on an unconscious basis. Are 1, 2, and 3 logically consistent? Perhaps, if we are careful about what is meant by “unconscious awareness.” But even when we are consciously aware of our emotions, we do not seem to be consciously aware of most of the body states that constitute the emotion. In those cases where we have a conscious feeling, the question remains: If the emotion of which the feeling is the conscious awareness is a body state, then how can we be consciously un-aware of the body states of which the feeling is supposedly the awareness? To be sure, there is nothing wrong with saying that a feeling can include unconscious awareness of interoceptive information. The problem arises when Damasio wants to equate feeling with “knowing that” we have an emotion, and thus assume that the interoceptive information, plus the perceptual trigger with which it is associated, can add up to and exhaust the entire conscious content of the feeling. If this were so, then to empty the feeling of its consciousness of the bodily interoception should be to empty it of all consciousness whatever, except for the perceptual consciousness with which we associate it. But here again, we often do have feelings, and some understanding as to what they are “about,” without much consciousness of the interoceptive information that underlies them. Conversely, if the conjunction of interoception and perception were the whole story, then this information should tell us what our bodily system wants in relation to the given triggering event. But in many instances, we lack understanding as to why we feel the way we do toward the trigger, because we cannot focus clearly enough on what our bodies want to happen in all the various respects in which that particular trigger might be relevant. When we do gain such understanding, we often do so by shifting our attention away from mere interoception, and by paying attention to the efferent action affordances of the environment, which are multiply realizable. Part of the danger of modeling feeling as an “awareness” of interoceptive “information” from the body is that terms like “awareness” and “information” lend themselves to ambiguity, because they can be used in both a mental and a non-mental sense. Of course, the brain is “aware” of interoceptive data just as a billiard ball is “aware” of the angle and velocity of the ball striking it. But this
Curious Emotions
causal relation is not a mental or intentional relation. So, if we say that feelings are unconsciously aware of the body states that constitute emotions, then it turns out that the difference between feeling and emotion in Damasio’s theory really just depends on an extra layer of (often non-mental) “encoding” added to the original body states, but now at the cortical level. However, studies of event related potentials (ERPs) in the brain show that extensive cortical processing and encoding of information can occur absent any consciousness whatever (see Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; Runeson 1989; Shevrin 2001; and others to be cited later). Such an encoding does not lead to intentional (mental) content any more than, if someone were to replicate the face of George W. Bush on the side of Mount Rushmore, the mountain would then be “aware” of Bush. So the sense in which the brain is “aware” of emotions may or may not have anything to do with what the feelings are “about” in the conscious or intentional sense. To conflate this “awareness” with what the feelings are actually conscious of (or aware of in the intentional sense) creates confusion. It assumes, but does not clarify, the needed three-way distinction between (i) consciousness, (ii) unconscious yet mental or intentional “awareness,” and (iii) causal sequences that do not involve awareness in a meaningful sense because they do not involve “mentality” and “intentionality”. Once we sort out the meanings of these mentalistic terms, Damasio’s account seems to imply that emotions prior to being elevated to “feeling” status would not involve intentionality – a conclusion that I do not think Damasio himself would want to endorse. Correlatively, if we assume with Damasio that feelings are simply the interoceptive “awareness of ” emotions, which in turn are body states available to interoception, what is missing is a way to feel the aims of the feelings, since we cannot know these based merely on a constant conjunction of interoceptions with triggering objects. We then end up trying to get the “body image,” which is interoceptive and thus passive, to carry the weight of the “body schema,” which is enactive. I shall argue in this book, in agreement with Salmela and Merleau-Ponty, that unconscious emotions do already have intentional meaning, but that concurrent perceptual and imaginative objects, as well as interoceptive data, do not exhaust this intentional meaning. The intentional meaning has to do with the aims of self-organization, which are complex, relational, and oriented toward maintaining a pattern of self-initiated action, relative to available or potentially available environmental affordances. On this view, emotions are intentional – they are “about” some situation to which they refer – with or without any need for perceptual or interoceptive representations to accompany them. We do not cause emotions to have intentionality by associating them with a perceptual
Introduction
or interoceptive content of which we are already conscious. On the contrary, our consciousness of the world is rooted in the way we expect it to have affordances for possible actions, and those in turn are already motivated by the intentionality of emotion. To treat either emotions or feelings primarily as reactions to either internal or external inputs is therefore to put the cart before the horse. As Damasio himself has argued in his earlier work (Damasio 1994, 1999), it is precisely because emotions arise from the action proclivities of the organism (in my terms, the enactive self-organizing system; in Damasio’s terms, the action components of the “as-if body loop”) that there is a difference between conscious and nonconscious information processing to begin with. Information processing can be conscious only if it is motivated by organismic purposes, where “organismic” must be defined by distinction against “inorganic” or “merely reactive.” If feelings are in some sense conscious takes on emotion (I want to avoid oversimplifying here; feelings are not simply conscious emotions or consciousness of emotions, as we shall see), and if the emotions in turn have their intentional meanings in terms of organismic action proclivities, then the meanings of feelings too must include those action proclivities. Feelings will then be felt not only in relation to the interoception of body states, which is afferent, but also the efferent sending of action commands, which when inhibited lead to sensorimotor action imagery of the kind that Jeannerod (1997) and Newton (1982, 1996, 2000) discuss. Emotions tell us that we are being facilitated or thwarted in the complex patterns of activity that our total self-organizational organisms want to execute in order to achieve and maintain holistic balance at the appropriate level of energy and complexity.
. Some preliminary predictions of enactivism The enactivist and self-organizational approach to the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness and intentionality, during the approximate two decades since it began to be widely discussed, has already yielded a number of confirmed predictions. Six of these predictions are particularly relevant in exploring the meaning of affective processes, and will figure into the main arguments of this book. When the initial expositions of the theory were first proposed, as far back as Ellis (1986), Newton (1982, 1993), and Varela et al. (1991), none of these predictions had yet been confirmed, so the fact that they now have is intriguing:
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1. The working of mirror neurons (Gallese 1998; Rizzolatti & Gallese 1998; Stamenov & Gallese 2002) confirms that many of the same neural systems are activated when we observe another person performing an action as when we perform the action ourselves, and that it is the other person’s intention to achieve a specific goal that is mirrored, rather than the literal physical movement (Wohlschläger & Bekkering 2002). For example, an infant imitating an adult’s pointing her left hand to her left ear will point with the right hand to the left ear if the left hand is not available. These findings are consistent with and were predicted by Newton’s (1993, 1996) assessment of how we understand other people by initiating the corresponding goal-oriented action commands in ourselves and then inhibiting them, in order to imagine the corresponding actions in others. In effect, we empathize by imagining ourselves doing what the other is doing (Newton 1996: Chapter 6). Correlatively, this prediction is interrelated with the Jeannerod (1994) finding that action imagery involves many of the same neural correlates as executing the action, except that in the imagined action we inhibit the action command – a finding that was sketchy when the enactivist theory was developed (Ellis1986, 1990, 1995; Humphrey 1986; Newton 1993) but is highly consistent with the theory. What the mirror neuron findings add is that our understanding of others is facilitated by this kind of action imagery, just as Newton had proposed. Moreover, when we image an action, the action command does not simply stop; it continues being sent, but is inhibited at a certain point in the cortex. 2. The Mack and Rock (1998) inattentional blindness findings confirm the enactivist prediction (Ellis 1986, 1995) that a prior attentional act is required for perceptual consciousness. Equally important, in many of the standard experiments in the Mack and Rock study, there apparently is no implicit knowledge of the unattended material. I.e., in most of the experimental designs where lack of attention prevents consciousness of presented stimuli, subjects’ answers to questions about the unattended stimulus are no better than chance (Mack & Rock 1998: 13). This often neglected aspect of the Mack and Rock research is uniquely predicted by enactivism, and contradicted by reactivist views – in which consciousness and knowledge would consist primarily of a receiving and processing of inputs. A reactivist view of consciousness and mentality would entail that there should be implicit knowledge prior to motivated attention, given the usual assumption that information normally is extensively processed prior to any consciousness, and that intentional goal directedness (as in the unconscious action imagery emphasized by enactivism) should play little part
Introduction
in the processing. If consciousness really were a correlate only of the receiving and processing of the input, then there should be consciousness of the information even if we are not previously motivated to actively direct our attention to it. The implications of these inattentional blindness findings call for careful analysis, and they will be discussed extensively in this book, especially Chapter 2. 3. Evidence is increasingly mounting that, as Damasio (1999) summarizes, a necessary and sufficient condition for “core consciousness” is that the emotional brain areas be intact. Damasio points out that there is consciousness in many cases of akinetic mutism, but not in permanent vegetative states, because in the former case the damage is mostly cortical, whereas in the latter it is further down in the brain. While reactivist approaches can grant that emotional areas are necessary for consciousness (functioning as a “power switch” for the cortex), they cannot grant that activation of the emotional areas is a sufficient condition for consciousness, as will be discussed more extensively in the body of this text. The processing of received information is more cortical than subcortical, so on the theory that consciousness is a receiving and processing of information, we should expect that removal of the brain areas that process information would remove consciousness. But it does not. Instead, it only alters the content and sophistication level of the consciousness. 4. Recent research increasingly finds that the cerebellum is more involved in higher cognitive operations than previously thought (Duncan 2003; Schahmann 1999; Schmahmann et al. 2001); this is consistent with enactivism because the cerebellum coordinates movement, and enactivism predicts that fairly subtle action imageries must be initiated (and then inhibited) to produce specific enough imagery of the corresponding action affordances vis a vis the environment. 5. Monkeys trained to play computer games with joy sticks can then have their brains wired directly to the joy stick, and thus play the game without using their hands to move the joy stick (Donoghue 2002; Hatsopoulos et al. 2001; Serruya et al. 2002; Wu et al. 1993). At first, an electrical brain implant picks up on the brain signal that the monkey sends in order to move its hand; then later the monkey merely imagines moving its hand, and the electrical brain implant continues to pick up on the same brain activity. This would not be possible except that the neurophysiological correlates of moving one’s hand are very similar to the correlates of imagining moving one’s hand. To imagine moving one’s hand is to continue sending the action command while at the same time inhibiting it, thus produc-
Curious Emotions
ing an action image grounded in efferent rather than afferent signals, and based on the inhibition of the action command through the action of neurotransmitters like acetylcholine (Hess & Donoghue 1999). Moreover, imagining moving one’s hand while not actually moving it involves more rather than less activity than just moving the hand. It involves all the activity required to move the hand (although perhaps with reduced intensity at the cellular level), plus the activity required to inhibit the command. In the experiment with the monkeys moving the joy sticks, the monkeys have already performed enough neural activity to send a signal to move the stick prior to the point where a decision would be made to inhibit or not inhibit the action command. This is also consistent with the fact that more intelligent animals (for example, humans) can much more easily imagine doing an action while not actually doing it, since the frontal area so much further developed in higher primates allows much easier inhibition of an action command once it is initiated. 6. The primacy of the efferent over the afferent in conscious processing, which was theoretically proposed by Dennett (1969: 80), can now be empirically demonstrated because of the unexpectedly long delay between the occipital 100P-200N processing of perceptual information and the parietal 300P event-related potential (ERP). The numbers in ERP measures refer to the number of milliseconds after presentation of a stimulus to the retina, while the “N” and “P” refer to positive or negative electrical potential. Thus, when an unexpected stimulus is presented, the ERP data indicate that occipital processing, and also V-4 temporal lobe activation, normally considered to be the “sensory areas” for perception, can be fully developed, yet until there is a positive ERP in the parietal area at about 300 ms, the subject has no perceptual consciousness of the object. There appears to be no perceptual consciousness of an unexpected stimulus until this parietal 300P occurs, even though the processing in sensory cortex is pretty much completed at this point (Aurell 1989; Runeson 1989; Bachmann 2000). As will be discussed later in this book, anything like an approximately 100–200 ms delay from occipital processing to perceptual consciousness (signalled by the parietal 300P) is much too long to be accounted for by the mere spreading of neural activation from the occipital to the parietal areas – which are immediately adjacent – and thus is consistent with the Ellis (1990, 1995) hypothesis that the efferent, anterior/frontal and subcortical processes involved in mental imagery and attention must be activated before sensory cortex activity can result in consciousness. Emotional and action-initiating processes are triggered as early as 18–20 ms,
Introduction
and involve a very primitive reaction to the object’s action affordances and emotional meanings, prior to any occipital processing. The parietal 300P simply signals that a resonance has developed between this anterior and subcortical efferent “looking for” activity and the corresponding posterior afferent activity in sensory cortex. The fact that without the 300P there is no perceptual consciousness confirms that afferent receiving and processing of information do not add up to consciousness. This is further confirmed by recent findings that there is a very early frontal activation (at about 100 ms) when an unanticipated stimulus is presented (Aftanas et al. 2001; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002), which again is consistent with the prediction in Ellis (1990, 1995) that action affordances must be activated (normally including some frontal motor/premotor and anterior cingulate activation) before there is consciousness. If reactivism were true, the occipital activation should be the cause of the perceptual consciousness, and then the frontal activation would follow rather than preceding it. The details of the timing of these ERPs will be discussed further as we proceed. The significance of these findings for enactive versus reactive approaches to perceptual consciousness can be summarized by means of the contrasting pathways illustrated in Figure 1. Each of the predictions just listed will be discussed in more detail in this book. There are many more predictions from enactivism that have not yet been confirmed, but the fact that so many already have is certainly enough to warrant interest. Part of the value of predictions is that they reveal something of the “cash value” of theories. This cash value can also be seen by drawing distinctions between one theory and another in terms of the way they interpret the same set of known data. One of the main practical advantages of an enactivist framework, I believe, is the way it accounts for the “higher” or more complex emotions, which have been a major stumbling block for reactivist accounts, particularly in its behaviorist and consummatory-drive reductionist versions. Chapter 1 will attempt to paint in broad brush-strokes some of the theoretical differences that result from taking an enactive starting point for understanding affects.
Curious Emotions ENACTIVE VS. REACTIVE BRAIN SEQUENCING
Parietal lobe
Frontal lobe Occipital lobe
(Object)
Thalamus
Figure 1. The DOTTED line indicates the sequence of spreading activation consistent with the stimulus-response paradigm, with perceptual consciousness a passive reaction in each successive area to an initial stimulus input. The SOLID line indicates the sequence consistent with an ‘enactive’ view, in which emotional interests (including curiosity) pre-select for conscious attention images relevant to those interests. Frontal (especially cingulate) and parietal areas activate image schemas in response to limbic emotional signals, and attention is directed to occipitally processed visual data only to the extent that they resonate with the motivated image schemas.
. The “curious” emotions On the enactive model, many of the affective responses that can be considered as unconditioned ones – not dependent on prior conditioning – would have been assumed to be conditioned responses on the reactive account. This is because enactivism assumes that a self-organizing system not only must act on its own; it must do so in complex ways, to maintain its needed level and particular patterns of complexity and energy expenditure. Curiosity, play,
Introduction
love, inspiration, loneliness, despair, existential anxiety, lust for adventure, the thrill of intellectual stimulation, the demand for social cooperation and freedom from oppression, the quest for an overall sense that life is worth living – these “higher” (i.e., more complex) human emotions do not show up on most short lists of “basic” or “primary” (unconditioned) emotions. In fact, they are usually thought of as derivative through learning and socialization from more basic ones, such as anger, fear, joy, and sadness. The “short list” approach, then, assumes that only simple emotions can be unconditioned, and that complexity results from conditioning. Most of these simple schematizations of basic emotions are derived either from philosophical analysis (for example, Griffiths 1997; Ben Ze’ev 2000) or from the assumptions of behavioristic psychology and the lingering effects of a century of behaviorism (for example, Ekman 1999; Plutchik 1980). The most prominent way of explaining the higher emotions as derivative from the “basic” ones is to posit that the basic ones are hardwired responses to specific types of stimuli, and then either operant or classical conditioning leads to stimulus generalization or transfer, with punishment or reward based on satiation of comsummatory drives serving as reinforcement (LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1999). Mixtures and blends of the resulting responses then supposedly account for the more subtle and sophisticated affective processes (Plutchik 1980). But a century of intensified work based on these assumptions has brought us no closer to understanding the most interesting aspects of the human emotional life – the higher, presumably “secondary” emotions – than we were before. Indeed, it might be argued that we have backslid, because the behaviorist and neo-behaviorist mode of analysis has suffered from careless interpretations of phenomenological experience, in a way that oversimplifies the intentionality of even the most “basic” feelings. If we turn to actual neuropsychological studies of the way higher emotions are orchestrated in the emotional brain, as in the work of Anderson (2000), Damasio (1999), Panksepp (1998), or Watt (2000), we find a much more complex picture. Love, curiosity, separation distress, play, the need for freedom of movement, just as much as anger or fear, are innately rooted in systems of neural connections, anatomical structures, and neurotransmitter activities not only in the human brain, but even in the brains of the lowest mammals. These systems are not merely overlays of culture or learned responses. They are not derivative through associative learning either from consummatory drives or from simpler responses to specific hardwired stimuli, as is usually presumed to be true for “primary” emotions such as anger and fear.
Curious Emotions
The term “consummatory” can be used in at least two senses. Emotion researchers speak of an “appetitive phase” and a “consummatory phase” of motivated activity. But another interrelated but different sense of “consummatory” – the one relevant for our purposes – is the one used in traditional learning theories, where consummatory drives are usually thought of as motivating behaviors needed for the organism’s energy-efficient homeostasis, such as eating, drinking, and the chemical reactions involved in sexual consummation. The point at which the energy-efficiency needs of the organism are met, where homeostasis is regained, is presumably the point at which the motivational need or desire is “consummated.” The issue at stake for our purposes is that, increasingly, it appears that many of the “curious emotions” just listed, including highly social ones, are not geared merely toward energy-efficient homeostasis. On the contrary, they seem to seek higher levels of complexity and energy at which homeostasis is still possible – yet they still seem to be primary rather than derivative. This explosion of new physiological findings about the emotional brain has coincided with the emergence in philosophy of mind and psychology of new ways to think about the mind-body relationship. One now hears more and more about enactive (Varela et al. 1993; Ellis 1995; Newton 1996), or “embodied” (Clark 1997; Gallagher & Marcel 1999; Lethin 2002), or “dynamical systems” (Freeman 1988; Juarrero 1999; Thelen & Smith 1994) or “self-organizational” (Ellis 2000a, b; 2001a, b, c; 2002a, b, c) accounts of the relationship between consciousness and cognition. In all these new perspectives, consciousness is part of the organism’s attempts to use its environment in the service of purposeful organismic action. This is a reversal of the usual way of thinking about causes and effects in human psychology. Throughout the twentieth century, the stimulus-response paradigm was dominant. Emphasis was on the role of the stimulus as causing the response, given the previous state of the organism (including the results of its conditioning history). Since consciousness apparently required widely distributed global brain activity, it was traditionally assumed that consciousness must be the final step in a chain of causes and effects, the final response to a stimulus, with informationprocessing going on in the intervening steps. This led to epiphenomenalism, micro-reductionism, and what Natsoulas (1993, 2000) calls “appendage” theories of consciousness: Consciousness was considered to be a mere side effect of the real causal processes, which were at the micro-level. This epiphenomenalism would actually entail a hidden dualism, since if consciousness really had no causal power, then it would not be identical with any physical process that does have causal power.
Introduction
Emotion too suffered from this epiphenomenalist causal story, often resulting in an utter reversal of cause and effect. Since emotions and affects are supposedly “responses” to environmental conditions and events, it was thought that inputs must first be processed, at least to a considerable extent, and that this processing must then cause the resulting emotional responses. For example, Rolls (1999) argues that we must first process a perceptual stimulus before an emotional “response” can take place, and that the perceptual processing will be substantially independent of and prior to any emotional influences. Rolls’s reasoning, as I shall discuss in more detail later, is that perception of a food stimulus is not impaired by lack of hunger in an experimental animal. Thus in Rolls’s view perception and other cognitive processes must precede any emotional response. The enactivist, self-organizational kinds of approaches just mentioned would reverse this sequence. Emotions are aspects of the organism’s ongoing self-organizational activity, and these emotional processes drive the processing of information rather than being merely responses to it. Objects and events do not so much cause affective responses as they are used by the organism for its own emotional purposes. The Rolls example just mentioned does not capture this point because the interest in seeking out potentially useful environmental affordances, such as food items, is primarily a result of a general emotional system – Panksepp’s “seeking” system – and operates independently of whether the organism happens to be hungry at the time (see especially Panksepp 1998: Chapter 8). Our interest is always geared up to look for useful affordances. But Rolls is correct to point out that we cannot assume a simple oneto-one correspondence between a perceptual object, such as a food stimulus, and a unitary affective quality that would motivate attention to that stimulus, such as hunger. The intentionality of emotion is much more complex than this. The motorist who cuts in front of me is not simply or even primarily the intentional object of that momentary feeling of anger; on the contrary, he is used by me to express emotions that were already important for my total selforganizational purposes, and may frequently involve larger life issues than the trivial but powerfully triggering event of being cut off in traffic. To understand the real intentionality of an emotion or feeling requires exploring the way these total life events contribute to the affect. Following convention, I use the term “feeling” for conscious or preconscious registering of the affective quality of an emotion – where “preconscious” refers to processes able quickly to become conscious – although there will also be completely non-conscious aspects of the emotion itself that involve many
Curious Emotions
physiological processes not accessible in terms of a felt quality. In spite of the intuitive simplicity of these distinctions, however, the relationship between conscious and unconscious emotion is a good deal more complicated than this conventional usage might lead one to believe, as we shall soon see. Let’s now take a closer look at how an enactivist approach to affect and emotion might be worked out, beginning with the way some of the key concepts can be set forth in a self-organizational framework. Before going further, we should devote a little attention to developing preliminary definitions of some basic concepts needed for a coherent enactive approach to the affective sphere. As noted earlier, the most fundamental concept is the distinction between “action” and “mere reaction.”
. Conceptualizing action versus reaction To define what is meant by “action” as opposed to “mere reaction” is a difficult philosophical problem in its own right, including the puzzle of how our emotions enable “mental causation” to occur, so that the whole organism can purposely use its parts rather than being a mere summation of their separate mechanical reactions. Chapters 2 and 3 will flesh out the differences between action and mere reaction in some detail, but at this point a preliminary definition is in order. The recently elaborated concept of complex dynamical systems (Bunge 1979; Juarrero 1999; Kauffman 1993; Kelso 1995; MacCormac & Stamenov 1996; Monod 1971; Newton 2000; Prigogine 1996; Thelen & Smith 1994) can provide the necessary tools for such an understanding. Complex dynamical systems, in the terminology of these theorists, are structured so as to preserve certain continuities of behavior across exchanges of energy and materials with their environment. The more they must seek out and appropriate the replacement components to keep the pattern of organization going, the more clearly they fall within the category of “living” systems (Bertalanffy 1933; Bunge 1979; Monod 1971). The activities of living systems, then, are not merely built up through the accumulation and summation of the causal powers of their micro-constituents, although their behavior is consistent with normal causation at the micro level. I shall argue that there is also a causal power on the part of the whole system, to regulate – and in fact even to find and purposefully make use of – micro-components on an as-needed basis. Emotions are expressions of this self-organizational tendency, and this is why emotions can cause actions holistically rather than in partes extra partes fashion.
Introduction
The sense of “action” to which I am referring here is simpler than the more elaborate notion of the planned, deliberate actions of a conscious agent. What is more basic than, but presupposed by, action planning is the idea of a system that moves its own parts for the purposes of the whole, rather than merely being moved by its parts. The system must have the ability to rearrange its own components to maintain certain structural relations for the whole organism, and in the sense of “action” to which I am referring this power will not be a mere epiphenomenon, but rather will play a genuinely causal role. There is no need to worry that physical systems will fail to be “causally closed” (Kim 1992, 1993, 1998) on this analysis. Self-organizational theory does not contradict causal closure at the micro-level, as I shall explain in detail later. Each step in a reaction is causally necessary and sufficient for the next step, granted certain background conditions. But it is the system as a whole that monitors and adjusts the background conditions as required to render a given micro-level event causally efficacious for the outcomes needed to achieve the system’s overall objective, which is to keep acting in its own definitive pattern. Such a pattern obviously must be very complex in order to incorporate the right kinds of subsystems and interrelations of homeostatic feedback loops to achieve this kind of regulation of the causal conditions governing its own components. They must be at least as complex as a living cell. And they must be even more complex if they are to achieve enough intentional understanding of environmental action affordances to interpret disruptions of their own selforganizational patterns as indicative of some aspect of their overall relation to their environment. To think that environmental events cause organisms to act would be an oversimplification on the self-organizational view. As Bickhard (2000) emphasizes, organisms are always already acting on their own, unless they are dead, and discrete environmental events can only “disturb” the ongoing pattern of self-initiated action, so that a readjustment must be found somewhere in the pattern’s total configuration that can reorganize the parts of the organism as well as the environment, in order to maintain the general contour of the whole pattern of activity as nearly as possible. Sometimes this may mean radically changing the environment (as in fight), sometimes it may mean repositioning the organism vis a vis the environment (as in flight or as in turning away in disgust), and sometimes it may mean reorganizing the organism to find different ways to achieve the desired homeostatic patterns (as in cooperative agreements and other complex methods of getting around obstacles to freedom, or as in adjusting to tyranny by cultivating a mood of quietistic resignation). Any com-
Curious Emotions
bination of behaviors able to sustain the desired homeostatic patterns is as “natural” as any other. Just as emotional responses depend on a total self-organizational context, so do the emotional meanings of stimuli. We should not think of an emotion as just another type of conscious qualia caused by certain kinds of inputs, alongside perception, thought, and the proprioception and interoception of bodily sensations. Emotion is unique in that its qualia usually do not take specific inputs as their intentional objects, since they are always felt in relation to the action affordances of objects, and these will be different depending on the object’s relations to the ultimate aim, which is self-organizational and can be realized by a variety of combinations of conditions, both environmental and bodily. The ultimate aim is the establishment and maintenance of the animal’s definitive sequence of self-organizational patterns relative to the environment; the disruption of the pattern is assessed at the level of the whole, not in an isolated part. I do not mean to imply that, experientially, intrinsic value is not located outside of the organism and its aims – a philosophical problem to which we will return later. My point for now is that, even though perception and thought may uniquely identify a likely candidate as the environmental stimulus that is largely responsible for a disruption, the felt quality of the emotion itself is not this specific. One instance of anger initially seems just like any other instance of anger, whether it is caused by the motorist who cut in front of me, or whether the true cause of the anger is a general frustration with the way my career and love life are going, with the motorist’s behavior serving only as an opportunity to symbolize these feelings. The felt quality of the emotion does not pinpoint what the real disturbance is in the first casual or superficial glance. The emotion reveals that something is “off ” in the organism-environment relationship, and it reveals some general features of this “offness” in terms of action affordances – that something is confining or constricting my activity. I shall discuss later the ways we can and typically do explore the hidden nuances of a felt quality to get more specific information out of it, but this specific information is not obviously announced by a superficial reading of what an emotion initially seems to be triggered by – again, because the organism’s aims are holistic and thus must be understood in terms of a larger picture. Many people may feel that some emotions or feelings are not oriented toward action. For example, in basking in the calm beauty of a sunset, I may simply want to sit passively and sink it in. But in the sense of “action” we are using here – unified action initiated by a self-organizing entity as opposed to mechanical reaction to an external event – the presumed passivity of the reaction to the sunset is misleading. We may not know about all the internal
Introduction
activities that must be taking place in order to maintain the homeostatic patterns that are needed to subserve the pleasurable experience of the sunset, but they are taking place nonetheless. Moreover, as I shall argue in detail in later chapters, I would not be looking at the sunset in the first place had I not chosen to direct my gaze in that direction. The experience of the sunset is being chosen and appropriated by the organism as a whole because it facilitates rather than thwarting the self-organizational structures of activity with which it resonates. If something were a little “off ” in any of the activities within the total homeostatic system, then different environmental conditions would be needed to facilitate regaining the proper balance. This need might be consciously experienced as boredom, or simply as an interest in directing attention to some other object or activity. This point remains applicable even in the aesthetic experience of artworks. In fact, the aims served by the experience of art are especially revealing about the relation between emotions and their intentional objects, because in the experience of art we are forced to take seriously the ambiguity of object affordances in terms of our emotional use of them, many of which are preconscious until we explicate them with the help of the perceptual object. To further clarify this distinction between conscious and preconscious intentionality will be the central focus of the first chapter.
. Plan of the book This book will focus on the interconnections between self-organization and the intentionality of conscious experience, and the ways in which emotion and the motivation for attention-direction can enter into this relation. In thinking about the intentionality of action, there should be careful consideration of the contributions of action theory, and the ways action can relate to the forming of the understanding of intentional contents (as in Clark 1997; Ellis & Newton 1998a, 2000a, b; Gallagher & Jeannerod 2002; Humphrey 2000; Juarrero 1999; Newton 1996). This kind of analysis seems crucial in laying the foundation for an intentionality of affective consciousness grounded in the intentionality of action. In my view, to make sense of these interconnections, there also needs to be discussion of the way the active rather than passive nature of emotional intentionality connects with the notion of self-organization. A good source for exploration of this dimension can be found in Stuart Kauffman’s work, and other authors who use self-organization and/or dynamical systems to ground a difference between purposeful action (as in biological organisms) and mere reaction (as in machines). These elements, combined with careful attention to
Curious Emotions
phenomenology (as it relates to neuroscience and analytic philosophy of mind) can form the basis of a systematic attempt to show how emotional consciousness is grounded in an organically self-organizing system that acts to preserve and express its patterns of organization. We then find that many emotions once considered as responses to stimuli, such as fear and anger, can now be thematized as the body’s attempt to get rid of or get around impediments to its already ongoing activity. If this dynamical framework goes all the way down to the most basic emotions, then the distinction between higher and lower emotions cannot be drawn by reducing the former to the latter by means of learning schemes or socialization processes. Instead, the higher emotions will be more complex “attractors,” or patterns of organization into which the system’s endogenous dynamical rhythms motivate it to shift, and in which it strives to remain as long as maintenance of the total system requires it. Nor can the emotions be neatly reduced to elaborately elongated schemes for the attainment of chemical homeostasis. It is true that dynamical systems seek homeostasis, but they also seek to maintain suitably complex and highenergy basins of attraction to fit the life trajectories that various life forms set for themselves, because of the specific ways in which they are self-organized (Juarerro 1999; Prigogine 1996). This interesting fact, that animals do not seem to want merely to satiate consummatory drives, but also seem to intrinsically value adventure, playfulness, and curiosity, will be one of the pivotal issues to be explored throughout this book. A theory as to why there would be such important non-consummatory motivations and emotions will be spelled out in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. But certain groundwork must be established first. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the way an enactive approach affects our conceptualization of the basic terms used in discussions of affect and emotion, and our understanding of the intentional meaning as well as the underlying neurophysiology of affective feelings. Since the action/reaction distinction is a pivotal point in this re-conceptualization, Chapters 2 and 3 will then develop an overall concept of self-organization that is capable of making sense of the notion of action in the most fundamental sense (as distinguished from mere reaction), and will show how a capacity for action in this sense allows holistic motivations to cause our bodies to move in executing useful actions. Chapter 2, specifically, will investigate the interrelations of emotion and the imagery associated with emotional intentionality, by taking its cue from the phenomena of inattentional blindness and selective attention and inattention. Emotion will emerge as a determinant rather than just a response to our consciousness of the world – a fundamental component of any conscious experience. Chapter 3 will examine the way gen-
Introduction
uine mental causation and self-initiated volition, as opposed to mere systems of piecemeal reactions, become possible from the self-organizational standpoint. After this groundwork has been established, Chapter 4 will then develop the idea of non-consummatory motives as specific emotional applications of dynamical systems theory, and will ground an understanding of the “higher” affects as related to the organism’s needs vis a vis three types of conditions: (1) “extropic” (i.e., non-consummatory); (2) homeostatic; and (3) boundary protection conditions, viewing all three types of conditions as necessary features of complex dynamical systems. Chapter 5 will show how this emotions system grounds the various senses of self. Chapter 6 will then combine this analysis with the previous discussions of non-consummatory affects, taking some clues from the arts and from psychotherapy, and exploring some “existential” issues that arise from awareness of the challenges facing the problems of the self-world relationship in general, which are of crucial concern to very intelligent beings. These issues include the problems of death, powerlessness, social alienation and oppression, and the need to experience the value of being per se with enough intensity to justify life’s struggles. Here the complicated relationship between an emotion, its intentional objects, and related imagistic triggers will become more clear. Finally, Chapter 7 will show how emotion serves to organize experience into the structure of a self in the sense of personality. Not only primitive agency is made comprehensible by the phenomenon of self-organization, since organisms act rather than merely react, but also it can be seen how reflection-capable subjectivity and overarching unity of the flow of experience within a coherent personality structure become possible through the pattern of motivated attention progressions in the stream of experiences.
Chapter 1
Preconscious emotional intentionality
While the felt quality of an emotion cannot be relied upon to pinpoint a specific environmental object as what it is “about,” it would also be a mistake to say that emotional qualia per se do not have intentional objects until we cognitively interpret the cause of the qualia. Salmela (2002) expresses the essential problem here very incisively, taking issue with the view of many cognitivists (for example, Ben Ze’ev 2000) that a feeling has no intentionality until we cognitively assess its cause. According to Ben Ze’ev, we know that we are in love because we feel certain sensation-like feelings such as butterflies in the stomach, and then cognitively associate a certain person with that feeling, noticing that we have the feeling whenever the person is present. Salmela’s objection is that a feeling of butterflies in the stomach would not be identified as love, or indeed as any emotional feeling, unless it already contained an intentional reference even at the pre-cognitive level. It could just as well be an upset stomach or a feeling of dizziness. We can identify it as an emotional feeling, rather than dizziness or an upset stomach, because we sense precognitively that it already refers to something beyond itself. We sense that it indicates something about our relation to some aspect of our environment. When we reflect on an emotional feeling, we do not add the intentionality to it as a side-effect of the reflection; we discover that it already had an intentional reference. There must already be an intentionality inherent in the feeling, by virtue of which our judgment as to which aspects of a situation are the referents of the feeling can ever hope to be either correct or incorrect. This point can also be seen in a more mundane, empirical way: We react to an emotional stimulus more quickly than we can even cognitively register the content of the object by means of perceptual processing. The hippocampalcerebellar-hypothalamic loops that instigate action begin as early as 18 ms after presentation of an unexpected stimulus (Haines et al. 1997), whereas the occipital lobe does not process the visual identity of the unanticipated object until at least 200 ms later (Aurell 1989). When we then reflect on why we feel the way we do, the feeling reveals itself as already having been intentionally directed to the action affordances of an object or environmental situation. For exam-
Curious Emotions
ple, an infant does not need to learn the fear of heights, because the edge of a precipice affords falling. The fear reaction is signalled by neurotransmitter activity (glutamate, monoamines, and other neuropeptides) in a circuit including the lateral amygdala to medial hypothalamus to PAG and pons, prior to perceptual and intellectual processing (Panksepp 1998; LeDoux 1996). Damasio (1999) also emphasizes that emotional responses occur earlier in the processing stream than perceptual and intellectual ones. It might be objected that the initial pre-cognitive response was only a mechanical effect, not an intentional one. But in order for the mechanical effect to take place, the organism had to already preconsciously understand something about the action affordances of the environmental conditions. Otherwise the action would be to no avail. While it is true that initial pre-cognitive actions toward objects are very general and amorphous, in order to maintain real-time flexibility that will increase efficacy, the fact remains that the actions initiated at the precognitive level are not completely off base. We sense threat preconsciously and tense up, prior to cognitive understanding (or misunderstanding) of the nature and source of the threat. The intentionality is there. When I “displace” feelings onto a motorist who cuts me off, I know on some level that many other frustrating issues in my life are lurking in the background, and this is why I tense up when the motorist cuts me off. The subsequent identification of the motorist as the cause and the intentional object of my anger is only a cognitive deception. In a sense, as Gendlin (1992a, b) says, the body knows better, and this is why beating up the motorist usually does not satisfy the emotion. The affective impact of environmental conditions (past, present, or anticipated) need not be slowed down by their subtlety or intricacy. The internal complexity of a land mine does not prevent it from going off immediately when tripped. A particular insult may be only the tip of the iceberg of the emotion’s intentionality, and to beat up the person who insulted me may therefore miss the point. Not only would the feeling not achieve its aim; I also might not achieve the limited aim of understanding what the emotion is trying to tell me about my situation, which is the intentionality of the feeling. In order to allow an appropriate role for preconscious emotional intentionality, we must distinguish emotions from motivations without thereby equating the emotions with conscious feelings. Up to this point, the terms “emotion” and “motivation” have occurred repeatedly, and we have acknowledged the possibility of both conscious and unconscious emotions. However, motivation should not be equated simply with unconscious emotion. The relationship between these concepts is considerably more complex than that, as the next section will discuss.
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
.
Motivation, conscious emotion, and unconscious emotion
An old riddle asks how many psychiatrists are needed to change a light bulb. The answer: only one, but the light bulb must genuinely want to change. A psychiatrist can motivate a patient to move, or to change, but not in the way that a light bulb is moved or changed. Simply to push against something with a mechanical force is not necessarily a motivation, no matter how complex the mechanism that transmits, processes, or transforms the force into the object’s resulting motion. What, then, is the difference between motivation and mere movement? The self-organizational approach provides a clear way to make this distinction. We can speak of a system’s being motivated only in cases where the self-organizing system’s self-initiated aims toward maintaining its ongoing patterns of activity are necessary to supply the force for the movement. Since a light bulb is not a self-organizing system, and has no self-initiated aims, the usual psychiatric methods cannot motivate it, although as a last resort the psychiatrist can physically move the bulb. When a patient with high blood pressure takes medication to control the problem, he does not motivate his blood vessels to relax, but only causes them to relax. But when someone’s heart beat speeds up while making a play in an athletic game, it does so because the player is motivated. The player in our example may not realize until after the play is over that he felt nervous that he might not have been able to complete the play successfully, and that this nervousness was reflected in the increase in his heart rate and blood pressure. Yet the nervousness is properly referred to as an emotion rather than just a motivation. An emotion, as we saw earlier, can be present even though we are not conscious of it. The difference between a motivation and an emotion cannot be simply that an emotion is a conscious motivation, or the conscious result of a motivation. In that case, there would be no such thing as an unconscious emotion. In fact, we cannot even say that motivations lack an intentional understanding of the organism-environment relationship at some basic level, whereas emotions have such an understanding. There is a non-conscious sense of “understanding” in which even a plant can acquire, process and act on information about its environment, so in this sense even a plant has some simple understanding of the action affordances of its environment. If the light is not in the direction in which the plant has been growing, it changes the direction of growth to achieve self-organizational aims. But there is something about plants that we want to say precludes attributing “emotions” to them. How, then, can
Curious Emotions
we define precisely the difference between a motivation, an emotion, and any other biochemical process? To some extent, the way we make this distinction might be an arbitrary terminological convention, but here is the way I shall distinguish them in this book: An emotion is a process through which an organism monitors, in a coherent, unified way, how well it is doing in achieving and maintaining the various motivated patterns in its overall state, and forms a sense of what needs to be done vis a vis the environment in order to achieve or maintain the particular self-organizational balance that is motivated. For example, the feeling of fear alerts the organism that its bodily boundaries are in danger of penetration or injury, while anger means that freedom may be constrained. The motivations at stake here are the needs for freedom, security, and boundary integrity; these motivations could be present in organisms without emotion or consciousness, such as amoebae. To attribute emotion to an amoeba would seem clearly to be an anthropomorphism, but amoebae do behave in motivated ways. By contrast, emotions such as fear, in organisms sophisticated enough to be capable of such emotions, help them to monitor how they are doing with respect to freedom and boundary needs. This knowledge can then be used to make more complex decisions than an amoeba could make. By virtue of even a vague knowledge of how we are doing with respect to freedom and boundary needs, we also can form some sense of what kind of action needs to be taken. If there is a cue suggesting that our movement is about to be impeded, or that our boundary integrity is in danger of being violated, then it prereflectively makes emotional “sense” to move in a different direction. How an organism learns to recognize such cues is a complex story depending on empirical details which should not be presupposed by the mere definition of the word “emotion.” Definitions should leave empirical questions as open as possible, so that different claims can compete while sharing common definitions of terms, facilitating communication and debate. Suffice it to say for now that emotions can alert the organism that something is either going well or not going so well with respect to the organism’s motivating needs and values (its “motivations”), and there are certain environmental affordances that can serve as cues indicating, at least tentatively, that something may be “off.” For example, suppose the cue in question is a set of images suggesting that we are at a great height. Before an infant even knows what it is like to fall from a great height, it will instantly and instinctually recoil from such height, if the cues are sufficiently registered (Panksepp 1998: 215). But given what we saw earlier about the timing of brain events, we can assume that the fact that height affords falling is registered more quickly than the cortex can process enough
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
perceptual data to consciously identify the perceptual details of what we are looking at – a chasm for example. As soon as the most vague, minimal cues as to the action affordances of the chasm reach the thalamus (where they will be minimally processed and relayed to both perceptual and emotional brain areas), the organism already senses that something is “off ” and begins gearing up for possibly vigorous action to shift its momentum away from the direction of the chasm. This sensing of the holistic “offness” of the organism-environment relationship vis à vis the organism’s motivations (in this case, the motivation to preserve boundary integrity and control of its own movements) is already an emotion – fear – prior to the completion of perceptual and intellectual processing. If organismic motivations are already present prior to forming emotions to indicate how well we are doing with respect to them, then it is necessary to distinguish the terms “motivation” and “emotion.” Some organisms can have motivations and act on them without emotions. Even amoebae can readjust their behavior to restore homeostasis, given the right environmental conditions. To be motivated requires only that a system be self-organizing and complex enough to regulate its patterns of organization, readjusting its behavior in relation to the environment. In organisms incapable of emotion, the needed readjustment is an automatic aspect of the self-organizational pattern, although the environmental adaptiveness of individual organisms at this level is minimal (more extensive adaptation depending, for them, on genetic mutations and gradual evolutionary changes). An emotion, on the other hand, is a higher order phenomenon. In this case the organism does not only behave automatically to restore homeostasis. To be sure, it may respond quickly, but it also maintains a lingering sense of what is “off ” in the organism-environment relationship (“off ” with respect to self-organizational aims). The availability of this information makes possible not only a long range decision as to what is the best course of action, but also a balancing and prioritizing of the various motivations within the system. The more complex the self-organizing system, the more different ways there will be to balance disparate motives. This follows from the fact that complex dynamical systems, by definition, can rearrange elements of their subsystems to maintain a higher level pattern. They can appropriate and replace components as needed, can readjust the background conditions needed for various micro-level causal sequences, and can use multiple shunt mechanisms and feedback loops to ensure massive overcausation of the multiply realizable homeostatic aim. So when the balance of the whole is disrupted, the system must monitor the state of the whole in order to decide which of the many sub-
Curious Emotions
systems can best be re-adjusted – for example, the fear system, leading to hiding or relocation of the organism, or the anger system, leading to a getting rid of environmental impediments. The definitions being used here allow for the possibility of motivation without emotion. This does not preclude, however, that emotions themselves can motivate. There is nothing incoherent or nonsensical about making the claim that an emotion such as compassion, having been felt as an emotion, can then motivate kind behavior. To say this is only to say that the organism then wants to act in a kind way, and further environmental events can then either impede or facilitate the kind behavior, leading to still further emotions which may then motivate still further actions. Given the above definition of emotion, most people would want to allow for unconscious as well as conscious emotion, although powerful emotions do normally have a strong tendency to break into conscious awareness. It makes sense to acknowledge unconscious emotion, not just because the organism behaves in ways that are analogous to conscious emotion, but because it actually has information about what needs to be changed in the organism-environment system to satisfy the motivations reflected in the emotion. The athletic player who unconsciously “tenses up” understands that there is danger of making an error, and understands this in relation to the central aim of making the correct play, without having to pay conscious attention to what he is feeling (or to be more precise, not-feeling). This distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion might sometimes even be a distinction of degrees. The player in the example may actually have been slightly conscious of his nervousness before becoming fully aware of it, even though most of his consciousness was taken up with other things. In the same way, in Armstrong’s (1973) famous example of the truck driver whose driving is all unconscious, there may actually be a minimal level of consciousness of the cognitive decisions involved in driving, as Faw (2002), Natsoulas (2001), and Newton (2001) have suggested. But there is more to an unconscious emotion than a mere motivation. The emotion includes a balancing of the competing demands of the subordinate motivations of a number of sub-systems, and an overall sense of how this balance can relate to the environment.
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
. The murkiness of emotional intentionality Many theories of the higher affects – i.e., affects that are more complex than the simple ones on the “short lists” – not only assume that specific triggering stimuli are both the causes and the intentional objects of emotional responses, but also postulate that the intentionality of a feeling or emotion can be equated with the subject’s cognitive identification of its cause – that this determination is added by means of a cognition after the proprioceptive or interoceptive quality of the feeling is present. According to these “cognitivist” theories, I would feel certain bodily sensations and then theorize as to what environmental circumstances might have caused me to feel that way (Ben Ze’ev 2000). It is assumed that, the more complicated the cognitive assessment becomes in this interpretive process, the further removed will be the affect from the “basic” emotions from which it is derivative. For example, on the cognitivist account, I may feel a subtle combination of fear, anger, and sadness, and cognitively figure out that what I am feeling is resentment against someone who sharply criticized my work. According to the cognitivist approach to higher affects, elaborate intellectual and rational processes are necessary to determine the intentional referents of higher affects, and this is what makes them different from the “basic” emotions, which are hardwired to accompany specific types of objects and do not require such complicated intellectual processes. But we have already begun to see that unconditioned emotions can reveal complex information about the organism-environment relationship prior to cognitive assessments, and in all cases the emotional response is already underway before we have even processed the perceptual event presumed to trigger it. Cognitivism would have to be modified in this and a number of other respects in order to remain consistent with recent findings about the mammalian emotional brain. In the cognitivist framework, identifying the causes of our own feelings is essentially like any other inductive reasoning process. But this view has some strange consequences. The usual intellectual process of first associating two simple events with each other and then reasoning inductively that one must be the cause of the other would seem to be an abnormal way to determine the intentional “aboutness” of emotions and feelings – as in the case of the alexithymic’s feelings toward his wife. There are two main problems with positing an inductive reasoning process as the way we interpret the intentionality of emotions and feelings. In the first place, the “aboutness” of emotions cannot be as simple as a one-to-one correspondence between an immediate object and an interoceptive qualia; if the aims of emotions are self-organizational, the emotion will have its mean-
Curious Emotions
ing only in terms of a larger context, and the aim could just as effectively be achieved by adjusting other elements of the larger self-organizational picture as by taking a specific action toward a specific object. Anger, for example, might be about deep and complicated life frustrations, not about the trivial insult that triggers it. Love can be expressed through altruistic behavior or writing music as much as by sexual activity. In the second place, in order to assess whether a given object qualifies as the intentional object of an emotion or feeling, we must be able to compare it somehow with the felt quality itself to determine whether it does or does not resonate. If the intentionality of the feeling were not already implicit in the felt quality itself, then there would be no basis for such a comparison, and we could never know how we feel. If emotion were not pre-cognitively intentional, then a feeling of love might just as well be dizziness or an upset stomach. A mere conjunction between such feelings and some perceptual object cannot support an intentional or “aboutness” relation. In concert with my basic principle that emotions aim toward holistic selforganizational purposes, rather than toward specific environmental events, I shall argue that the higher affects do not result from an intellectual and cortically driven interpretation of discrete environmental “causes” of our feelings. If the aim of an emotion is to re-establish a holistic organizational balance in a complicated and interrelated set of organismic activities, then as Gendlin (1992a, b) suggests, the organism must already have a felt sense of the direction in which it is trying to move before identifying any specific object as helpful or hurtful toward that end; and whether an object is helpful or hurtful will have to be assessed in terms of the body’s holistic sense of its total life situation, not just in terms of what is going on in the environment at the immediate present moment. Lacking such a felt sense in the emotion itself, it would be impossible to know whether a given environmental circumstance resonated with the feeling in the way needed to qualify as the feeling’s intentional object. Moreover, assessing what is wrong will not be nearly as simple or straightforward as identifying a perceptual object. If what immediately presents itself in perception is the motorist cutting in front of me, this does not mean that the motorist cutting in front of me is simply what the emotion is really about, or what causes it, or what the emotion aims primarily to change. In many cases, if not all, beating up the motorist will leave the underlying anger and frustration intact, because he is not what they are really “about.” In this more complicated kind of case, to determine what the emotion is really about will require that I delve into the emotion itself as directly felt, so as to see whether the motorist’s cutting in front of me can qualify as an adequate
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
explanation of it. But meanwhile, as Gendlin (1980 1992a, b, 1998) stresses, the felt quality of the emotion must have a fine-tuned specificity; otherwise I would not be able to identify its intentional object by reference to that specificity. Thus the aboutness of the emotion cannot result from attributing an object to it, but on the contrary we can know which objects are associated with the emotion only by reference to the intentional aboutness already present in the emotion. We must already have a sense of what the objectives are in relation to which an object or complex of environmental conditions presents itself as helpful or thwarting – if not, we could never figure out by means of cognitive activities what an emotion really wants to happen – i.e., what its aims are. Even in these more complicated cases, there are methods of getting at the murky holistic intentional referents of emotional feelings, many of which are initially unconscious. But before discussing this problem, it is vital to recognize some further conceptual distinctions, especially the distinctions between the aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles of affective experiences.
. Aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles On the self-organizational view, the precognitive emotion knows that it is about something, but the aboutness is vague and general; the felt sense has not yet pinpointed exactly what it is about, although it knows generally what kind of issue is involved. In the example involving the motorist, constriction of my projected patterns of activity is clearly a major issue; I am prevented from moving ahead in a chosen ongoing direction. But at the point when the motorist is perceived as the object, the cognitive assessment is no closer to identifying the real object than is the precognitive felt sense, although a careful following through with an appropriate self-questioning process can draw out the intentionality that is implicitly present in the felt sense. It will do so not through perception, logical reasoning, or any other “cognitive” process (in the corticocentric sense that cognitivism would suggest), but by listening more carefully to the felt sense and observing what kinds of images and symbols tend to pull it up more intensely. Gendlin (1992a) suggests that when we do carefully direct our attention to the felt sense itself rather than the objective event that triggered it, we can then notice that certain imaginings tend to relax or satisfy the feeling in a more holistic way than others. For example, if the image of telling off my boss and quitting my job suddenly produces a shift in the felt sense of the anger, and if at this point the image of the motorist no longer pulls up the intensity of
Curious Emotions
it, I then know that it is not really directed at the motorist, but instead the motorist’s behavior was only a convenient symbol for pulling up the feeling. This can be recognized still more decisively by the fact that, as soon as I realize that the feeling is really more about my job than about the motorist, I no longer even feel very angry at the motorist. The image of the motorist no longer even presents itself as a primary object of the feeling, and this image no longer pulls up the feeling very intensely. When I form the image of his cutting me off, I no longer want to fight or kill him. The images that initially pull up a feeling are not usually the same ones that finally satisfy it in the sense of relaxing its tension. This way of getting at the implicit intentionality of feelings will be explored more fully as we proceed. Gendlin (1980) calls it “focusing”: we pull an affective quality into better focus so as to get at its meanings. How would I know to entertain this image of telling off my boss and quitting my job to begin with? Again, this can be inferred from careful observation of the quality of the felt sense itself. For example, I may notice that the point at which the feeling becomes most sharply intensified is when I remember how the motorist arrogantly ignored me when I tried to block his move. It is a short step from this observation to realize that thinking of anyone arrogantly ignoring my efforts in this way pulls up the same felt quality with the same intensity – and that the most important example of a person who seems to do this is my boss. But the image of the motorist cutting his car in front of me is more vivid and simple than any physical image of my boss, so it works better at pulling up the feeling and calling it to my attention. It may even turn out, in some instances, that what is really “arrogantly ignoring” me is not the individual, my boss, but a complicated abstraction – my entire profession, including the way it is organized, the way it prevents the changes I want to promote, by means of ignoring new proposals and intricate organizational methods that ensure that such new proposals will be very difficult to make themselves heard. In that case, it may be that what my preconscious felt sense of the situation needed was a simpler example consisting of a symbolizing vehicle to help me make conscious contact with the preconscious felt sense – the vivid physical image of a specific individual motorist cutting in front of me and arrogantly ignoring my attempts to block him, rather than the complicated and amorphous “system” or “situation” that is the real problem. Further exploration, then, may reveal that the boss, like the motorist, is only a symbolization vehicle for explicating the sense of a much more complicated environmental situation in relation to which self-organizational aims will need to work themselves out, in some one of many possible ways. As the intentional meaning of the felt sense develops, the affective response to the trig-
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
gering event can also change; now it is not the motorist’s insulting behavior that bothers me, but the fact that he was oblivious to my very existence. I was too insignificant to qualify even for a personal insult. So far, I have argued that identifying the object or the cause of an affective feeling is no simple matter. Ironically, it is the cognitivists who seem most strongly to agree with this point, insisting that a feeling per se does not identify its cause, i.e., that we must add the causal interpretation in thought after we have felt the feeling. In some ways, this viewpoint is in agreement with the selforganizational point that qualia do not pinpoint specific objects, but instead refer to general action affordances of the environment in relation to the organism’s holistic condition. But the reason the qualia cannot pinpoint the object is not because cognitive processes are better able to do so; it is because the real object of the emotion is not as specific to begin with as the cognitive processes initially take them to be. Cognitively, it may seem that the motorist who cut me off caused my anger; in reality, his behavior was only a convenient vehicle (no pun intended) through which to express an anger that was already present on an unconscious basis, an anger whose aims and objects have nothing to do with the motorist who cut me off. The emotion would have been just the same had the motorist not cut me off. It would have found some other occasion to express itself. The motorist’s behavior is being used as a symbol, just as an artist might use the image of a dog in a painting as a symbol of the idea of fidelity. The important point is that removing cognition from emotion does not leave mere interoceptive sensation. If emotion were merely interoceptive sensation plus cognition, then the “what it’s like” content or qualia of emotions would be fully given in interoception. What is missing in such accounts, as Watt (2000) points out, is precisely the valence that emotions attribute to a given situation, which again is seldom reducible to the mere interoception and proprioception of pain stimuli coming from the viscera or other parts of the body. Most of us know the difference between a negative emotion and a stomach ache. If emotional feelings were merely perception plus interoception, then it would be impossible to distinguish between an emotional feeling and the delivery of a perceptual-like signal from the periphery or the viscera of the body – i.e., proprioceptive or interoceptive sensation. It is true that emotions typically involve interoception, but they also involve much more than that. It is possible through certain types of anaesthetics and damage to nervous tissues (for example, the nociceptors) to dissociate proprioceptive or interoceptive pain sensations from their evaluative valence, so that we know we are in pain, and clearly receive the signal telling us that our hand is burning – without feeling the pain as consciously hurting (Newton 1989b; Damasio 1999). What is most
Curious Emotions
interesting about this phenomenon is that we will spontaneously withdraw the hand, even though the pain does not consciously “hurt.” So there is an intentionality there in the pain, even though the type of nociceptors that deliver the evaluative component of the pain sensation may be incapacitated. Before pain achieves a conscious status, we have already initiated actions to deal with it. Many might try to write off this preconscious intentionality as a kind of pseudo-intentionality, since it might be explainable as a merely mechanical and meaningless causal response. But we cannot escape the fact that, when I feel afraid of a snake, before I realize cognitively that what has been presented is a snake or even a threatening object, and before the object is even visually processed, the emotion is already taking actions to avoid the snake, very similar to the actions that will be continued even after the image of the snake has become conscious. What is revealed in the phenomenological reflection on the fear of the snake is not that a mechanical interaction with the snake is taking place, about which I now begin to feel a certain emotion. What is revealed is that the emotion was already being felt, and is now moving from a prereflective to a reflective status. In the process, the what-content of its intentionality may become more sophisticated, or simply different, but it does not acquire intentionality per se at this point. It only modifies a pre-existing felt sense and intentional content of the experience. Damasio makes this notion of prereflective emotion do a great deal of work in his theory of consciousness. How can an emotion already have intentionality prior to perception and cognition? As Jarvilehto (1997) points out, a situation’s action affordances can be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of intellectual processing of inputs, because the success or failure of our own attempts to act in certain ways – which is determined essentially through efferent nervous activity (signals sent outward to the body’s action systems) – can yield information about the environment, and this can be done even without processing of perceptual inputs, which requires afferent nervous activity (signals received from nervous areas earlier in a processing stream). Jarvilehto’s argument is that even without the afferent input, merely efferent activity, essentially by itself (with the help only of efferent copy, or feedback indicating that the body’s own moving parts have received the efferent commands), can in principle reveal information about the environment; that is, it can reveal its action affordances, which can even be used to construct a working map of the environment. Not much perceptual detail is needed to reveal very general contours of environmental obstructions or facilitations. Moreover, as the ERP (event related potential) data discussed earlier clearly show, the activity that tells the organism generally what kind of action it wants to do are more quickly accessible than any
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
perception. The resulting knowledge of action affordances is not precise or certain, and in actually existing organisms it is always supplemented by perceptual and cognitive assessments. But if emotion is self-organizational, then its qualities will be felt more efferently than afferently. This is why the knowledge that something is “off ” in the organism-environment relation is vague and murky. It reveals a holistic imbalance without specifying exactly what is causing the imbalance. Nonetheless, it has an amorphous sense of what general type of action is likely to be relevant. This remains true despite the fact that such vaguely and intuitively determined actions sometimes must be taken swiftly and decisively. The intentionality of a feeling is complex, murky, and holistically contextual. Correlatively, intentionality, whether conscious or preconscious, must involve more than simply reacting causally to a stimulus. Husserl (1913) emphasized this distinction between psychophysical causes of experiences and intentional objects of experiences, as do contemporary consciousness theorists such as Gillett and McMillan (2001). In the thinking of the classical phenomenologists (Husserl 1913; Merleau-Ponty 1941, 1942), intentionality is an “aboutness” relation, where the subject is the individual whose mental act is taking place, and the object is what this act is focused on; yet the “what” that is focused on here may not be the same as the psychophysical cause of the experience. They thus emphasize that we should not confuse the psychophysical cause either with what the experience is “about”or with the perceptual object at that moment. This is especially the case in the realm of the intentionality of emotion, where the psychophysical cause may be only a trigger for an emotion, and not at all what the emotion is really “about” – as in the example of the motorist who cuts me off. The intentional object(s) of a feeling may be distinguishable from both perceptual and imaginative objects, as well as from the physiological or environmental causes of the feeling. What a feeling is really about (its intentional object or objects) can be completely different from the physical workings of the brain (its causes), but also will not necessarily be the same as the perceptual and imaginative objects that are concurrent with the feeling. For example, a jogger with high blood pressure may experience feelings of agitation caused by physiological changes, while his perceptual intentional object at that moment is a barking dog. He may then form the imaginative intentional object of a dog that once bit him. Here we have both a psychophysical cause (high blood pressure) and an imaginative intentional object (the past dog) neither of which is to be confused with the perceptual dog that is present (the dog that is barking now). Neither the imaginative nor the perceptual object may play much of a role in the real intentionality of the emotion; it may be, for example, that the
Curious Emotions
jogger was thinking a few moments earlier of an argument with his wife that occurred weeks before, which contributed to the raising of his blood pressure, and primed him to look for an object for irritable emotional expression. The barking dog at that point may not even be a primary cause of the emotion, but only a long-sought opportunity to act out an emotion that was already present, but at a preconscious level. Generally, the aim of any emotion is distinguishable from the psychophysical events that trigger it, because the aim can be achieved by means of a variety of adjustments, and is more general than any specific action in relation to a specific object; the aim, again, is to maintain a self-organizational pattern of self-initiated and ongoing activity, with the specific object functioning only as a helpful or thwarting element that may be appropriated for the organism’s purposes, or may be difficult to appropriate for those purposes. The jogger in our example has his motivational reasons for not wanting to re-open the argument with his wife or dwell on his lingering anger at her: all things considered, the obnoxious little barking dog serves as a better symbolization vehicle to help concretize the feelings. To be sure, the image of the barking dog plays a role in helping to get the feelings “pulled up” into consciousness, but it is not primarily what they are about. A more mundane example of this principle can be found in the experience of abnormal subjects, such as in bipolar syndrome. It is a truism that the bipolar will find something in the environment to regard as the cause and intentional object of depression or elation – for example, the death of a favorite movie star. Someone may think that this dynamic characterizes only abnormal cases, and that “normal” people really can easily and unambiguously identify the objects of their emotions with the perceptual objects that are simultaneous with the feeling of the emotions. In my view, that would be an abnormal case. We all frequently use current objects as opportunities to explore and unfold continuing emotional processes. What is atypical is the rare case where a simple object, such as a snake, elicits a hardwired emotional response, such as fear. Even in that case, we observe that a “swamp-wise,” seasoned snake handler feels no fear around snakes, although he behaves cautiously. This is not to deny that certain situations are initially hardwired to elicit certain emotions. We come into the world primed to look for a smiling face and to be pleased when we see one (Baresi & Moore 1996; Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993), and we initially fear heights (Panksepp 1998). These “initialized settings” in our emotional constitution are very helpful in the care of the young, and thus evolutionarily adaptive. In fact, some specific conditions, such as extreme height, will always signal unmitigated danger, and only in the most abnormal cases will
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
those initialized settings ever be overwritten. But, generally speaking, it is most adaptive, in an intelligent and discriminative being, for the initial settings to be flexible. Not only learning, but also the natural patterns of maturation will change them in accordance with what works best for the changing patterns of organization of the developing organism. But again, the intentional meaning signaled by an emotion relates to an aim that in principle is always multiplyrealizable for a self-organizational structure, and it would actually be maladaptive for such a structure to become locked into a one-to-one correspondence between a particular stimulus and a particular response. It has been suggested that successful jazz musicians have a much better recovery rate from heroin addiction than the average addict (Hentoff 1973). Hentoff ’s explanation, consistent with Rollo May’s (1962) conceptualization of anxiety, is that a person whose addiction is only a small part of an ongoing life project, which is experienced as meaningful enough to be worth the hard recovery work, will have a better chance of getting through the necessary anxiety adequately. The temptation of even the intense pleasure of heroin is experienced differently, depending on its context in a holistic selforganizing movement toward larger aims and purposes that are strongly desired by the organism. Correlatively, still another advantage of the self-organizational approach, which allows the organism to act rather than just react, is that one kind of action consists of changing the pattern of functioning to one that is better. Complex self-organizing beings can change their overall structure – in conscious beings, this would mean personality change (discussed later in this book) – because part of what self organization means is that the system can rearrange the background conditions needed to facilitate a certain pattern’s happening; if so, then the system can also decide to rearrange the background conditions in such a way that a different pattern can occur, and then can seek out and appropriate the micro-level causal elements needed to make the new pattern occur. The way the self-organizing system changes its patterns is the same as the way it maintains an existing one – by actively appropriating the needed causal substrata to make it happen. Of course, this requires breaking the inertia of the existing pattern, but we humans do this all the time: Later I shall discuss a fundamental tendency in complex self-organizing systems toward “extropy,” or higherenergy basins of attraction, which differ from (and sometimes conflict with) consummatory drive-reduction, and which ground the exploratory, curiosity, nurturing, play, and social interaction tendencies in complex organisms, engaged in for their own sake and not just as means toward consummatory drive reduction.
Curious Emotions
An example of self-initiated pattern change is the “Fartlek” method of training for running, in which we alternate running fast and slow, gradually increasing the distance of the fast segments. Most amateur runners incline toward just the opposite method – to start with the same distance they have always run, and gradually increase the speed, but without much success, because the body naturally lapses into the old patterns of slower running, since the body remains in its old metabolic patterns. What works better is to increase the speed for a shorter distance, and then gradually increase the distance. The body is always willing to temporarily vary the way it functions, so we can take advantage of this willingness by getting the body into the habit of doing something it previously did only sporadically, and it learns to execute the more elementary capabilities (e.g., metabolizing sugar, delivering oxygen to the tissues) at different times and in different contexts from before. As a result, the body learns to shift into a new pattern of metabolism to support the new demands placed on it. After training in this way, the metabolism is generally increased. By the same token, we can train the body to change its patterns so that we no longer have nicotine cravings, no longer need the afternoon “high” from eating sugar, etc. This interconnects with a favorite point of moral philosophers, for example Aristotle, who emphasize the importance of habit – that we can apply the principles of psychological habit change to ourselves to change our personalities. This of course trumps Kant’s “ought implies can” in the ethical domain, because we can learn to do things that we previously could not do, if we re-train ourselves. Such self-retraining occurs primarily in humans because humans have more vivid imagination for non-existent states of affairs. We can imagine our own selves as enacting patterns that they do not now enact, and then calculate how to get ourselves into those new patterns. Thus we tend to hold humans morally responsible in spite of their predetermined psychological dispositions, whereas it would be absurd to hold lower animals morally responsible in this way. Our predetermination prepares us for the ability to change when required. More concretely, action imagery can consist of patterns of action in which we have not yet engaged, just as sensory imagery can depict sensory patterns that we have not yet seen. Having imagined a pattern of activity that would be better for one reason or another, we can then imagine what internal and external conditions would have to be rearranged to get us into the imagined action pattern. Dynamical systems make room for this kind of system change and not only for system maintenance. In self-organizing systems, one small change, if it occurs in the right place, can shift the whole system into a completely different pattern. In conscious beings, for example, the small component in question
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
could be a tacit presupposition that previously had been unexamined. In such cases, the trigger for system change can often be that some small component of the pattern turns out not to be any longer workable, and as a result the whole pattern goes into crisis and is finally perceived to be inadequate as a whole. In dynamical systems, the very removal of a component of the earlier pattern can automatically shift a system into a different pattern; if the resulting pattern then is not a very desirable one from the standpoint of “meta-emotional” evaluation, then humans are able to use their vivid capacity for imagination to find a better version of the new pattern. A complex dynamical system is flexible, and this flexibility extends to its ability to use objects to symbolize complex emotional situations. This is why it is so important to distinguish between the intentional object of a feeling and a perceived or imagined object that serves only as a symbolization vehicle – but at the same time we must remember that the true intentional emotional object of a feeling should not be confused with its physical cause. While the cause of an emotion may not be the same thing as what the emotion is about, or its intentional object, there is still a sense in which what makes an emotion “fully intentional” is that we correctly or incorrectly associate it with certain environmental components of its causation, as Salmela (2002) suggests. Damasio (1999) points out that all consciousness involves imagery of some sort (not just visual or auditory, but also proprioceptive, interoceptive, and sensorimotor imagery, and not only vivid but also muddled and truncated imagery). So it may well be that attributing a causal story to the emotion plays the role of explicating the emotion in the sense that it provides imagery that can pull up and intensify the felt sense of the emotion. Consider the case where the imagery that we entertain in explicating an emotion is known not to be its cause – for example, when a certain piece of music evokes feelings that we learn, as we explore them, are about serious life issues such as death and powerlessness. The music is not what causes us to have these despairing feelings, and we know this, yet the music serves to allow us a very usable medium through which to explore and explicate those feelings. In another case, I may have a certain feeling that I can “pull up” into full awareness by thinking of the Dutch boy trying to hold back the water with his finger in the hole in the dyke. The image only serves as an effective symbol to help pull up the feeling – it is not what the feeling is about. Even if it serves as a metaphor for what the feeling is about, this is only because I have made it serve in this way; other images could also have been used. In such cases, the image is known not to be the cause of the feeling, but just the reverse: I have chosen the image
Curious Emotions
because it worked well in pulling up and allowing me to focus attention on that felt sense. This last point is not meant to imply that the selection of the objects that trigger a felt sense is merely arbitrary. On the contrary, most images cannot work to trigger a given feeling. But neither does this imply that an image that initially succeeds in triggering a specific affective quality is simply what the affect is “about,” regardless of its total contextualization in the aim-directed life of the organism in relation to complex and variable environmental constraints. How, then, are specific objective triggering images relevant in the intentionality of emotion? And more generally, what is the role of imagery in making emotions conscious? The next section will explore these questions.
. The roles of sensation, interoception, and sensorimotor action imagery If a triggering image does not necessarily need to represent what an emotion is about, then what is the role of imagery in making emotions fully conscious? In my view, the key question here is whether the imagery involved is merely sensory imagery, associated with a causal story, combined with proprioceptive/interoceptive imagery, revealing the tingles, chills, and stomach churnings of the emotion’s felt quality, or whether on the contrary emotions also require sensorimotor action imagery. Whether Damasio is right or not in claiming that imagery is necessary for consciousness, it seems obvious from the critique of cognitivism that to have emotions requires more than just interoception, and more than sensory imagery, and more than a combination of the two. This would suggest that there is another type of imagery, beyond either interoception or sensation, that is important for emotion. This other kind of imagery is sensorimotor imagery. It differs from proprioceptive and interoceptive imagery in a way that is crucially important for our purposes. Whereas proprioception and interoception are characterized by a passive receiving of information from the periphery or from the viscera, sensorimotor imagery requires that the organism, acting out of its self-organizational aims, initiate an action command and deliver this action command to other parts of its nervous system (Jeannerod 1997). When the action command is inhibited, sensorimotor imagery results. We do not have to act in order to have action imagery. On the contrary, as Jeannerod shows, when we actually perform an action, we do not pay much if any conscious attention to the action imagery. It is when we inhibit the
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
motor command that we are most fully conscious of the action image as a mental image. While action imagery is clearly distinguishable from sensory or interoceptive imagery – for example, because it involves a cortically inhibited efferent signal, whereas sensation and interoception involve afferent signals – it can also be argued that for sensation, proprioception, or interoception to rise to the level of consciousness requires that action imagery already have been present, at least in the preconscious sense that an inhibited action command has been sent. For example, tracking of subcortically originated neurotransmitter activity shows that this activity must precede perceptual or cognitive consciousness. We have already seen that event related potentials (ERPs) and other brain activity measures show that emotional brain areas are activated earlier than perceptual processing areas even in perceptual and imaginative consciousness (Aftanas et al. 2001; Aurell 1989; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002). Moreover, the perceptual processing does not lead to consciousness of the object unless the emotional areas have already been activated, and unless they in turn activate brain areas associated with attention, such as frontal and anterior cingulate areas (Bernstein et al. 2000). And, as already noted, contemporary work on the cerebellum (Schmahmann 1997; Schmahmann et al. 2001) shows that the cerebellum, traditionally associated with motor routines, is a necessary way-station in this process, so that even conscious perception and cognitive skills depend on certain kinds of action commands being elaborated by the cerebellum, even though those action commands will be inhibited and quickly modified during the course of a perceptual experience. This notion that emotion and motivation ground all other forms of consciousness, including perceptual consciousness, is one of the most controversial claims of contemporary enactivism, and the entire next chapter will be devoted to supporting it. What I am arguing for here is an extension of Newton’s (1996) “action theory of intentionality,” where the understanding of a perceptual object involves imagining, at least at a preconscious and habituated level, how I could act in relation to the object in various ways. I understand that a baseball is moving toward my head, in the first analysis, because I can imagine catching it, hitting it, or ducking out of the way of it. Only later do I notice that it has seams and is green and yellow. To imagine green or yellow, in turn, means to imagine myself performing certain actions (in this case, actions of the anterior cingulate and frontal activity that constitutes paying attention to color phenomena, along with the appropriate vibrations of the retina and firing of the frontal eye fields). I may not know that I am performing all these actions, but I am doing so nonetheless. In artificial situations that restrain these actions,
Curious Emotions
such as the experimental paradigms of the Mack and Rock (1998) inattentional blindness studies mentioned earlier, we can see that failure to initiate these action commands results in lack of perceptual consciousness. Informally, we can notice the same effect when we fail to pay attention to a TV commercial, and thus do not consciously register it even though we are looking in the direction of the TV. In short, we must actively do much more than merely open our eyes in order to be conscious of visual information. This point will be explored much further in the next chapter. Emotional intentionality differs from the intentionality of other forms of experience in part because the roles of cause and effect are just the reverse of those other forms. Emotion is a barometer of the body’s dynamical activity, not just through interoception/proprioception, but through whether or not actions can be performed consistently with the patterns of activity in which the organism wants to engage. We know whether we are performing an action effortfully or effortlessly partly through proprioception (afferent feedback), but we also know this difference through the quality of sensorimotor imagery. Emotions deliver causal impact to other systems, and imagery comes about by means of the emotions’ directing attention to the imagery. It is a mistake to think of emotions as on the receiving end of the inputs of an information processing machine. They are on the sending end of the information, and what they send partly determines the feedback that we get from the external input sources; they propose, and the external input sources dispose, not the other way around. At the same time, I shall argue that there must be sensory or interoceptive imagery (in addition to sensorimotor action commands) in order for an emotion to become fully conscious. The reason is that we often can act without any consciousness intervening at all. So in some way it seems that sensory, proprioceptive, and interoceptive imagery are necessary for the full consciousness of emotion, yet the emotion itself tends to select and direct attention toward this imagery, based on its own action commands. Emotions are already ongoing, at least at a preconscious level, before the imagery based on the input from the triggering environmental event is processed. The emotions result from the ongoing activity of a dynamical system, and this activity is not caused by inputs, but only disturbed by them. When we are not aware of what is disturbing our emotional activity, or have no imagistic hypotheses about it, our emotion remains at a preconscious level. But when we entertain relevant imagery, this allows us to pull up the emotion into full awareness. This claim that emotion directs and is presupposed by other conscious states is, as I have said, a controversial one. Let’s proceed, then, to a full defense
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
of it, which is presented in the next chapter. Then in subsequent chapters we can explore the way a dynamical systems analysis can affect our understanding of the workings of specific emotional systems.
Chapter 2
Motivated attention in action How emotion creates conscious intentionality
The enactive approach begins with the thesis that affective intentionality must be understood as grounded in the system’s motivations to act, which can be as complex as the dynamical patterns they are meant to maintain. If this thesis is true, it follows that emotions are not merely responses to given stimuli, but actively seek out usable environmental affordances; thus the same emotion can be realized in relation to a wide variety of alternative environmental conditions. Moreover, if the needs of a complex dynamical system determine the aims of the organism, the emotions will monitor how well the total organism is doing in relation to its entire environmental situation, including aspects that are not immediately present. This means that the intentional objects of emotions are not as specific as those of other conscious states, such as perception, imagination, and logical thought – and that the intentionality of emotion is murky, open-ended and ambiguous because the aims of emotions are holistic and multiply realizable. This would be a somewhat unsatisfying state of affairs for those who wish to study specific emotional processes unless we can establish a framework for the ways in which emotions and their intentional objects interrelate and interact. This chapter will argue in effect that the relation of an affect to its intentional “aboutness” is almost the reverse of what the stimulus-response and information-processing models might suggest. Emotions are not responses to stimuli, but instead are ongoing, holistically motivated processes that attempt to use environmental affordances to further their self-organizational aims, which are built up in complex ways from the various needs that arise for living organisms in maintaining their relatively stable patterns of activity. Affective processes select environmental objects because of their possible affordances, and then process them to greater or lesser extents as determined by the continuing analysis of their utility valences. This implies, ultimately, that motivation determines the focus of attention and must be in play in order for those attended contents to come into sharp consciousness. This is a controversial issue, but it is necessary to confront it
Curious Emotions
in order to understand the relationship between emotion and its intentional objects in the right way. I shall argue here that the entire brain is organized around the principle that motivation drives all other conscious processes rather than merely responding to their resulting contents. In fact, I want to argue that the essential difference between conscious and non-conscious information processing is that the former necessarily is “enactive,” whereas non-conscious information processing may often be largely “reactive.” And this, in conjunction with certain considerations about the way the brain works, implies the even more radical thesis that there can be no intentional consciousness without motivation. Let’s begin with the perceptual contents of consciousness. We saw earlier that Rolls insists that we must first process perceptual signals, at least to some extent, before we can respond emotionally to them, and that this early processing is not dependent on the organism’s motivational state. However, the Mack and Rock (1998) extensive studies of inattentional blindness suggest that there is no conscious perception unless attention is first directed toward a stimulus in order to see what is there. It is not merely that perceptual stimulation can cause attention, but just the reverse seems to be true: if an attentional act is not first executed, perceptual contents do not attain the status of consciousness, and we are not aware of what we have seen – nor is it processed as fully as it would be if we were conscious of it. Failure to see objects within the visual field because attention is otherwise occupied, or “inattentional blindness,” can therefore be a rich source for rethinking the relationships between attentional mechanisms and motivational processes, and can also be relevant to the most basic aspects of the attempts to develop theories of consciousness in general – i.e., to understand the differences between conscious and non-conscious information processing. The Mack and Rock inattentional blindness findings are highly consistent with theories in which the property of consciousness arises from endogenously generated, motivationally directed “actions,” defined in contrast to mere “reactions” to the corresponding information processing. Correlatively, the inattentional blindness findings are less reconcilable with other types of theories of consciousness, which I shall generically term “reactive” theories. When already involved in a visual task requiring attention, subjects fail to see briefly presented visual elements extraneous to the attentional task in contexts where they normally would be seen. In most of these cases (and this is an oft-neglected fact in discussions of inattentional blindness), Mack and Rock cannot even detect any better-than-chance “implicit perception” knowledge about the unseen object. The main exception to this rule involves certain
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
trials in which meaningful words are presented as the unattended stimulus; in those cases, but seemingly only in those cases, subjects have better than chance knowledge of the object presented although they do not consciously see it. Of course, the failure to detect implicit perception in most of the experimental contexts reported does not prove that there is none, but the fact that Mack and Rock explicitly look for an implicit perception effect in such contexts and yet fail to find it cannot be overlooked. The inattentional blindness effect is consistent across a variety of different research designs reported by Mack and Rock. In a typical experimental design, the subjects are asked to determine which arm of a cross is longer than the other, and then while they are involved in this task a small image is presented in various places within or near this zone of attention, for a short time in the neighborhood of 200–250 ms. In many of the experimental paradigms, most subjects fail to see the extraneous image, even though control subjects (whose attention is not otherwise occupied) consistently see it quite clearly. Except for the trials involving meaningful words as priming stimuli (which will be discussed below), “when asked to pick out the critical stimulus from an array of alternatives, their performance did not differ from chance” (Mack & Rock 1998: 13, italics added). I.e., subjects exhibiting inattentional blindness in most instances did not even show implicit knowledge of the unseen stimulus, at least as far as Mack and Rock could detect. Again, this does not necessarily mean that there is no implicit perception, but the explicit failure to detect it must be taken into account. One might ask whether the statement that perceptual consciousness requires attention is a mere tautology, since “in this book, the term attention is used to refer to the process that brings a stimulus into consciousness” (Mack & Rock 1998: 25). But what is being said is actually quite substantive and surprising: A fuller definition of attention is that “to look and try to find something is to attend to the array in which it might be present and to intend to see it” (Mack & Rock 1998: 5). Attention is an act that can lead to perception rather than just following from it. Thus “attention, when otherwise engaged, must be captured before perception can occur” (Mack & Rock 1998: 18, italics added). The surprising finding, then, is that we must always pay attention to something before we can consciously see it. The attention is a precondition for the conscious perception rather than merely a result of it. This does not mean that our attention cannot be involuntarily attracted to something; but there seem to be surprisingly few types of objects that can attract attention when otherwise occupied – for example, an extremely large object, a fairly large moving object, or a cartoon of a smiling face. Interestingly,
Curious Emotions
neither a similar frowning or neutral face, nor a small moving object attracts the subject’s attention when otherwise occupied. This would seem to imply that pre-perceptual categories and mechanisms are involved in controlling the direction of attention, no matter how seemingly passive it is. These findings are intriguingly consistent with an enactive theory of consciousness, in which emotional activation of subcortical and anterior brain areas is necessary before conscious information processing can occur. According to enactivists, when the motivation to pay attention is missing, there can be virtually complete occipital activation with no perceptual consciousness; the organism must motivatedly search its environment (as reflected in anterior and subcortical brain activity) before visual stimulation of occipital areas can lead to consciousness (Aftanas et al. 2001; Aurell 1984, 1989; Bernstein et al. 2000; Panksepp 1998; Watt 1998, 2000). On the enactive view, the element of consciousness, above and beyond mere nonconscious data processing, is contributed by brain areas associated with the organism’s motivational interest in processing certain kinds of environmental stimuli while ignoring others. The idea that attention is motivated, of course, is not new in psychology, nor is the view that limbic and subcortical emotional processes play a role in directing attention. What is uniquely a prediction of enactive theories is that no consciousness can occur without motivated attention – that cortical activity produces only nonconscious information processing which can become conscious only in the case where emotional processes lead to a motivated attentive act. Enactivism is thus in contrast to the thinking of many investigators, who assume that the consciousness of higher cognitive contents, such as perception and logical thinking, is subserved primarily by cortical brain areas, while affective consciousness is subserved by subcortical and limbic activity, and that motivational activity is not a precondition for conscious perception and thought, except in the somewhat trivial sense that the needed neurotransmitters and energy sources must be released into the cortex to produce arousal. On this view, the subcortex functions like a power switch for the cortex, and as long as the power is supplied to the cortex in one way or another (for example, it might be possible to experimentally deliver it by artificial means), no further subcortical activity would be necessary for consciousness. This would constitute an extremely modular approach, where different brain areas subserve different forms of consciousness. An extreme modularity of perceptual, intellectual and affective states of consciousness would thus contradict the enactivist account of the effects of subcortical and limbic functions on all forms of consciousness, including conscious perception and attention. The modu-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
lar cognitivist model also overlooks evolutionary trends that would tend to set up a critical relationship between higher and lower systems, where the laterdeveloped systems would be an incremental addition to and modification of the earlier. Without an incremental evolutionary perspective, the brain may not be seen as a fully integrated system. Some authors explicitly hold an extreme version of this modular view with respect to the relations between emotional and perceptual processes (Gazzaniga 2000; Rolls 1999; LeDoux 1996), while others believe there is not yet enough evidence to decide whether the reactivist or the enactivist approach to cognitive and perceptual consciousness is warranted, arguing that this remains an open question (Faw 2000). Some go so far as to argue that not only are motivational brain processes not essential to consciousness, but just the reverse – that it is the cortical cognitive processes that supply the element of consciousness over and above the subcortical functions, which themselves are unconscious until the cortex plays its role (Jackendoff 1996; LeDoux 1996). This would be the extreme antithesis of the enactive view, if we assume that the subcortical and limbic systems are important monitors of the body’s selforganizational tendencies. We shall see increasingly throughout this book that self-organization is at the heart of the distinction between enactive and reactive mechanisms. An enactivist theory of the relationship between consciousness and the brain predicts the Mack and Rock findings, since enactivism implies that motivated attention, either voluntary or involuntary, is needed for consciousness. One reason such theories have been slow in gaining acceptance has been an absence of conclusive empirical evidence of the kind that Mack and Rock present. Contrary to enactive theories, it is often assumed that perceptual consciousness is passively caused, primarily in the cortex (and in corticothalamic loops) by input from the perceptual object rather than being caused by the organism’s own self-regulated activity, which enactivists believe determines the motivation for the direction of attention. The reactivist position would view the substrates of perceptual consciousness as the same brain processes that subserve the corresponding perceptual information processing – primarily cortical areas looping with the thalamus in response to perceptual input. While most investigators of the thalamus grant that the “thalamocortical loops” can do nothing absent brainstem influences, they see the brainstem role in “higher” cognitive, perceptual, and conscious functions primarily as one of arousing and activating the brain areas involved in producing these forms of consciousness. It is true, of course, that there can be selection and extensive processing of a food stimulus, for example, without this selection’s being driven at an early
Curious Emotions
processing stage by hunger, and that we can be conscious of the food stimulus in the absence of hunger (Rolls 1999). But this does not mean that motivational processes more broadly construed do not affect selection for conscious attention at an early stage, especially if we view Panksepp’s “seeking” system in the brain as a motivational system that can direct attention toward interesting, meaningful, or potentially useful objects. This point will be discussed further as we proceed. The possible connection between inattentional blindness and enactivism is suggestive because, if attention must be engaged before contents can register in consciousness, then there may well be a subcortical and limbic mechanism that drives attention independently of the processing of the input, and such a mechanism could well be a necessary precondition for consciousness, always resulting at least partly from an endogenous aspect of organismic functioning, connected with the regulatory actions of emotional brain areas. This is highly consistent with enactive theories of consciousness and, as we shall see in a moment, it is quite at odds with a reactive and extremely modular view of the various conscious and cognitive functions. The next section will define some key concepts for clarifying how the predictive implications of enactive theories are in sharp contrast to the predictions that would follow from other theories. Then later in the chapter, we can examine in some detail how these predictions of enactive theories are borne out par excellence by the inattentional blindness phenomenon as investigated by Mack and Rock, in combination with certain well established neurophysiological findings.
.
Linear versus dynamical causal sequences in the brain
Even if the Mack and Rock data are consistent with an enactive theory of consciousness, the more interesting question is whether these data would necessarily be inconsistent with other types of theories. To answer this question, we need to work from a clear definition of what is meant by “enactive” theories, such that it can be inferred exactly what empirical predictions follow from enactive theories, and moreover whether these predictions are positively inconsistent with the predictions of other theories (which we can simply call “reactive” theories). And this will require a somewhat specific explanation of the differences between the causal structures of enactive and reactive theories, as well as a clear physiological fleshing out of the kinds of brain mechanisms
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
that would reflect these different causal accounts, even though many of the details of these mechanisms await further neurophysiological research. When I use the term “enactive,” I do not mean to commit myself to all of the specific baggage of Varela et al. (1993), Humphrey (2000), Clark (1997), or any other particular enactive theorist. My purpose is to capture the sense in which certain theories posit that consciousness must result only from “actions” of an organism, and cannot result from mere “reactions.” This distinction could get us enmeshed in thorny philosophical discussions of the nature of causation, but the simplest way to ground the distinction is in terms of the causal structure of self-organizing systems. “Actions” in this sense are performed only by self-organizing entities, and serve the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of preserving the organism’s pattern of self-organization. Earlier we defined “self-organizing” patterns to mean patterns for which a system has a strong tendency to seek out and find causal substrata, so that if one set of environmental conditions is not conducive to that particular pattern of activity, the system is likely to seek out some other set of conditions that is conducive to it. A self-organizing system initiates actions geared toward using the environment as needed to keep the system going in its definitive patterns. For example, animals seek environmental elements needed to maintain homeostasis. Reactions, by contrast, are explainable without any reference to selforganizational structure, even if the reaction is taking place in a self-organizing entity. For example, a knee-jerk reflex is a reaction, because, even though it takes place in a self-organizing entity, the entity does not initiate the action. To be sure, the reflex also may be used by the organism for its generally selforganizational purposes, but the reflex itself is merely a reaction, not an action in the sense intended here. Actions are behaviors that require reference to the entity’s self-organizing structure for their causal explanation, such as in the regulation of bodily temperature, where many readjustments of many systems will be accomplished if necessary to achieve the aim. It will be useful for our purposes here to distinguish between a selforganizing causal structure and a “purely linear” causal structure. By a linear causal sequence, I mean one in which a certain antecedent is both necessary and sufficient for its consequent under certain stipulated background conditions, as in flipping a switch. It is true, as we shall see in a moment, that self-organizational causal structures are composed of many linear ones; but not all complex systems of linear causal sequences result in self-organizational structures. What precisely, then, is required for a self-organizational causal structure?
Curious Emotions
A process is explainable “purely” in terms of a certain combination of linear causal sequences if it does not need to posit any principle other than those to explain why the process has the properties that it has. The knee-jerk reaction would be an obvious example of such a purely linear causal reaction. By a “selforganizational” causal structure, by contrast, I mean one in which, if a certain linear causal sequence is not available to support the continued existence of the system’s definitive patterns of activity, then there is a strong tendency for the system to readjust some of its functions so that alternative causal mechanisms can be used for that purpose. A light switch is not a self-organizing mechanism because, if the appropriate switch is not flipped, the light cannot alter any of its other activities in order to ensure that some alternative mechanism will allow it to come on. Even a light with two alternative switches is not self-organizing in this sense, because, if neither switch is flipped, the system can neither cause a switch to be flipped by means of a readjustment of the light’s other activities, nor can the light rearrange its other activities to find another way to come on. Even a thermostat, as normally constructed in heating and cooling systems, is not self-organizing in this sense: While it is true that the system’s reaction to a given temperature will tend to feed back and maintain the same temperature, the overall structure of the system is not determined by a need to alter any of its activities in order to ensure continuity; the same preconditions are always required for a turning on (or turning off) of the circuit, and the definitive organization of the thermostat is guaranteed without its having to find an alternative way to turn the heat on or off in order to maintain that. By contrast, a living organism’s maintenance of a constant temperature is self-organizing, because when the temperature gets too hot or too cold, the organism must systematically readjust many other activities throughout the system in order to maintain the temperature, and if it does not do so, the survival of the definitive structure of the system as a whole is threatened. (Obviously, it is possible in principle to construct a self-organizing thermostat, because many living organisms are, among other things, thermostats. But thermostats as normally constructed are not self-organizing; it is not necessary for them to be self-organizing in order to produce the results they do.) It is not necessary for our purposes here to decide whether the selforganizational vs. “purely linear” distinction is a sharp distinction or can be one of degrees. One could perhaps think of borderline cases, as suggested by Kauffman (1993). These definitions also do not presuppose that a selforganizational system is not completely made up of linear mechanisms; but how the linear mechanisms fit together determines whether the system is selforganizing or not. If it is not self-organizing, we can speak of it as being “purely
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
linear” – i.e., the explanation of the properties of the system is exhausted by citing the linear sequences that make it up. In a self-organizing system, by contrast, not only does each causal outcome require antecedents that are necessary and sufficient for it under the given background conditions (i.e., linear causal sequences), but the system can also change background conditions as needed to find alternative antecedents for a needed outcome if this is necessary for the continuation of the definitive patterns that make up the entity. Any metabolic system in living organisms involves multiple shunt mechanisms that are classic examples of this kind of self-organization (Monod 1971; Kauffman 1993). While living organisms are classic examples of self-organizing systems, they are not the only examples. Ecosystems, social systems, and even crystal formations can be self-organizing. It is not necessary for our purposes here to go into the differences between living and nonliving self-organizing systems, although this topic has been discussed at length in many contexts (Kauffman 1993; Ellis 2000d; Ellis & Newton 2000a). The controversial question for our purposes is not so much whether such self-organizing systems exist, but rather whether consciousness, and specifically conscious attention, is dependent on the real-time action of a self-organizational mechanism, as opposed to resulting from a purely linear mechanism already in place within the self-organizing biological organism. Obviously, there is nothing about the notion of a purely linear causal sequence that prevents its outcome from requiring the participation of two or more separate events as its causal antecedents. For example, if both A and B are needed to cause C, the sequence “(A&B) → C” (where “→” indicates causation) is still linear, as long as C is not self-organizing. There can also be loops and shunt mechanisms in purely linear sequences. For example, consider the following causal sequence A → (B or C), B → D, C → E, (D or E) → F
There is nothing about this causal sequence that would preclude its being a purely linear one. ‘A → C → E’ is one line of causation, ‘A → B → D’ is another line, and ‘D or E → F’ is the last step in the linear chain of causation. There can also be loops in which causal outcomes feed back to enhance the antecedents for furthering the same type of reaction, and in which the enhancement of a signal can feed back to cause still more antecedents for still further reactions of the same kind – i.e., circular causation in which A → B → A → B etc.
Curious Emotions
This is still a purely linear causal sequence, in the sense we are using, because each step presupposes only the prior step as a necessary and sufficient antecedent, given the background conditions under which the causal relations obtain, and none of the steps necessarily must have a self-organizing structure in order for this type of loop to occur. For example, the fact that there are corticothalamic loops in the processing of sensory information prior to consciousness does not decide between an enactive and a reactive theory of consciousness. The corticothalamic loops may be explainable in purely linear terms, involving loops of linear reactions, without any reference to the self-organizing structure of the system. But according to an enactive theory, to cite purely linear causal reactions needed for the processing of perceptual input would not be enough to explain why the information achieves a conscious status without additional reference to the self-organizing structure of the system – for example by positing that the emotions, which flow from the organism’s self-organizing needs, must be part of the causal input into the determination of the pattern of information processing in any instance where that information is to achieve a conscious status (especially if a generalized “curiosity,” triggered more by certain classes of inputs than others but endogenous in origin, is a motivating emotional process, as Panksepp 1998: Chapter 8, believes it is). The enactive type of theory does not deny linear explanations of elements of a system, but rather embeds them into the larger self-organizational structure, which will use different combinations of linear mechanisms to maintain its overall pattern by routinely rearranging the background conditions necessary for a given linear causal sequence to obtain. If (as enactive theories posit) consciousness must always be an action (in the sense opposed to mere reaction), then each state of consciousness will be preceded by some preconscious self-organizing activity on the part of the organism. Given the purposeful nature of self-organizing processes in living systems posited by enactive theory, this self-organizing activity will attempt to make the resulting conscious state a useful one for the organism’s purposes, and thus will exert a selective effect. Specifically with regard to attention, an enactive theory will predict that self-organizing processes – which connect to cognitive function via subcortical emotional brain areas – will influence the direction of attention prior to conscious awareness of the attended object by means of a motivated direction of attention. As I have already mentioned, the notion of motivated selection for attention is by no means a new or radical idea; what is a specific claim of enactive theories is that no consciousness can occur without motivated attention.
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
A completely reactive theory, at the other extreme, will posit that conscious states, at least in principle, could exist outside the context of a self-organizing system, and without the actions of such a system (again in the sense opposed to mere reaction) influencing the quality, properties, content, or attentional focus of the conscious states in question; moreover, such self-organizational actions would not be needed in order for such states to be conscious. Since all mechanisms in a completely reactive theory are explainable by means of the interaction of the mechanical system’s hardwiring and the inputs it receives, it should be entirely consistent with reactivism that consciousness could occur as a reaction to the stimulus inputs without any motivatedly selective attention.
. Conflicting theories with conflicting empirical predictions The differences between the predictions of the two types of theories are complicated by the fact that, even though reactive theories do not require that consciousness be a property of self-organizing systems, they do not preclude this either. In fact, living organisms contain both active and reactive components, and it is quite natural to assume that, if cognitive functions require complexity, then the most complex interconnecting sets of mechanisms – mammalian brains with their billions of interconnected cells – would be the best candidate for a naturally occurring information processing machine, regardless of whether such processing resulted from the enactive or from the reactive aspects of the organism. It might be held, for example, that conscious information processing results from a complicated series of purely linear mechanisms wired up in a certain sequence, like an electronic motherboard. In fact, the causal structures of the two types of theories may at first seem deceptively similar. In the reactive model, I (input) causes R (the response that subserves consciousness), and may presuppose P (some physiological preconditions for R). That is, Given P, I → R
In the enactive model, P (rather than I) causes R, while the nature of R (i.e., some of its quality and content) is influenced in some ways by I. That is, Given I, P → R
The difference between these two causal accounts may seem subtle or even nebulous. But the kind of “P” at work in the first formula does not completely overlap with the “P” in the second. In the first formula, which describes the
Curious Emotions
reactive causal story, the “P” that is presupposed is much more cortical than in the second one, which reflects the enactive story. In the enactive formula, the “P” is a system of subcortical-cerebellar-limbic loops that are always in the process of gearing the organism up to act upon its environment, and selectively seeking out inputs that seem potentially relevant to those general action proclivities. If a sudden environmental change is relevant in an unexpected way, the motivational system must quickly readjust to gear up for a completely different kind of action, and thus must look for other perceptual cues than the ones it was initially looking for – leading to a shift in early selection for attention. But whether the stimulus fits what was anticipated or is radically different, the system that directs attention in potentially useful directions is largely activated before the stimulus is perceptually processed. So, in spite of a superficial similarity, the two types of theories require a significantly different causal structure to bring about consciousness. In enactive theories, consciousness can result only from an organism’s motivated action, whereas in reactive theories the fact that consciousness occurs in selforganizing creatures results only from the fact that such creatures are complex enough to subserve consciousness. On the enactive view, perceptual consciousness, like any other form of consciousness, is an action that the organism executes, not merely a chain reaction that it undergoes. Not even a chain reaction that includes feedback loops can be conscious unless it results from prior self-organizing actions. This essential difference gives rise to major differences in the empirical predictions for the two types of theories – predictions for which, as we shall see, the Mack and Rock work is extremely relevant. For the enactive type of theory, if an instance of information processing X can occur either consciously (XC) or unconsciously (XU), the difference between XC and XU cannot be explained purely in terms of the extent or intensity with which X is processed in the chain reaction components of the system – in the occipital lobe, for example. On the contrary, there must be some self-organizational process P1 which is present in the case of XC, and absent in the case of XU. One might express this by saying XU + P1 = XC
I.e., the difference between XU and XC is not merely that the gain of some physiological process P is turned up in the case of XC. Instead, there are unique physiological processes P1, in the case of XC, which are lacking in the case of XU. This is not to deny that there will also be some self-organizing preconditions, P2, for XU itself; nonetheless, there will be some additional self-organizing process, P1, that is necessary for XC, but not for XU. A reac-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
tive theory would not predict this. On the contrary, in a reactive theory, the difference between XC and XU is not dependent on any difference between P1 and P2, but rather on a difference in the way X is processed in the two instances. In more concrete terms, according to an enactive approach, subcortical and limbic emotional processes, which are self-organizing, will necessarily be different in the cases of XU and XC, and one such set of differences is likely to be the subcortically orchestrated motivation to direct conscious attention in ways useful for the organism’s purposes. To the extent that attention is an organismically self-organizing action, it will determine a difference between a perceptual consciousness XC and a corresponding unconscious processing, XU. So an enactive account should predict that an input can cause occipital processing in the absence of these motivational mechanisms, but will not cause consciousness of the perceptual stimulus – i.e., will not cause XC. A fuller fleshing out of this prediction of enactive theories is that the manner and extent of the processing of X will also be partly determined by selforganizing actions of the brain’s emotional system in accordance with overall organismic purposes. Thus the same P1 that determines the difference between XC and XU will also serve as an early gating mechanism that will tend to favor potentially useful or emotionally interesting information for more extensive processing. This means that emotional brain processes will exercise an early selection function for incoming stimuli, while those same emotional brain processes, at a later point in their activity, also will determine whether the information that is processed acquires a conscious status. In effect, whether X will ever attain a conscious status will already have been largely determined at an early stage of processing. Extremely reactive theories of consciousness would predict just the opposite – that whether X is selected for conscious attention is determined only very late in processing, after a great deal of primary perceptual cortex processing and encoding has already occurred. Paradoxically, the Mack and Rock implicit perception findings themselves suggest that there is evidence for very late selection, at least for some types of stimuli (meaningful words). That subjects show an implicit knowledge of stimuli that never reached conscious attention seems to suggest that much processing has already occurred prior to attention. We shall return to this issue. But first, I should point out that all of this can be put more in experimental terms more familiar to the way the neuroscience literature would address the same problem. Rolls (1999), as mentioned earlier, shows that a specific motivation process such as hunger exerts only a late selection effect on the perceptual processing of food stimuli. But this is different from showing that no motivational processes
Curious Emotions
exert an early selection effect here. Obviously, physiological arousal is a motivational process that affects early processing, and as we saw earlier, Panksepp (1998) shows how arousal is affected by a general emotional “seeking” system in the brain. Arousal, of course, is not selective attention, but the seeking system does have its own selective tendencies with regard to environmental affordances. So the question is not whether brainstem emotional systems exert an early selection function or not. The question is whether it would be possible for there to be conscious attention to a perceptual object without such an early selection effect, and whether the early selection is merely a generalized arousal, or on the contrary plays a role in determining which objects are allowed into consciousness. On the enactive view, both early and late selection mechanisms will be operative, and both will be controlled by the same subcortical and limbic emotional processes. On the reactive view, by contrast, selection for conscious attention will be late, and this late selection will be determined by mechanisms that are primarily cortical (involving also corticothalamic loops), and which occur not as a prerequisite for the extensive processing of X, but as a consequence of it. Here again, reactive theories can grant that this cortical functioning might presuppose some self-organizational subcortical activity, such as a general cortical arousal state that is needed for either XC or XU; but the cortical process does not presuppose any special subcortical processs that determine the difference between XC and XU, and which thus would also exert an early selection effect. Early selection processes would include subcortical motivational aspects according to enactivism, whereas reactivism would reject this assumption, insisting that the same brain areas that process X are the ones that subserve the consciousness of X. One may wonder whether the category of “reactive theory” has now become an empty category or a straw man. Can the difference between P1 (the self-organizational preconditions for the conscious information processing) and P2 (the self-organizational preconditions for the corresponding unconscious information processing) really be that important? Remember that something counts as a P1 precisely if it is a prerequisite for XC (the consciousness of X) without being a prerequisite for XU (the unconscious processing of information X). If a P1 is subcortical and exerts an early selection effect on conscious attention, this would mitigate against an extremely modular view of the brain substrates of different kinds of conscious states. We have already seen examples of prominent neurophysiologists who take widely divergent views on this “modularity” problem, some clearly falling within the reactivist camp, others leaving the question open, and still others
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
taking an enactivist position. Although enactive approaches are currently becoming more fashionable, it would still be a mistake to think that the category of “reactive” theories has become an empty category or a straw man. There are two respects in which the distinction is still crucial: 1. Some theories explicitly endorse reactivism by insisting that consciousness in principle could be attributed to a suitably constructed digital or connectionist computer with the right kinds of feedback loops. Almost any AI system that attempts to build consciousness into a system that is not biological will be a reactivist system by the definition we are using here. (The single exception would be an AI system that uses components that are not “biological” in the sense of being composed of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen, but nonetheless are biological in the sense that they are organized in the way that biological systems are, with self-maintaining and self-organizing structures that act rather than merely reacting; for example, see Bickhard 2000.) There are also still many theories of consciousness that content themselves with feedback loops as a precondition of consciousness, rather than requiring that consciousness presupposes self-organization (for example, see Dennett 1991). A feedback loop can be a simple linear system, and need not be self-organizing. Moreover, there are theorists, like Jackendoff (1996), who insist that consciousness only passively reads off the information processing that has already occurred at an unconscious level by means of discrete transmissions of information that work in the same way that an artificial computing system would work. 2. Perhaps more prominently, there are many theories that, while not explicitly defending a reactivist position, do want to remain neutral as to whether information is processed reactively or enactively in conscious functions. Besides those who explicitly criticize or reject enactivist thinking (for example, Boyce 1998; Nunn 2001), there are those who formulate theories of consciousness in such a way as to allow consciousness equally well in reactive or enactive systems. This would include many of the most prominent theorists of consciousness, such as Dennett (1991) and Pylyshyn (1973). Even Searle did not take his enactivist turn until very recently (see Searle 2000). So part of my point here is to convince even such “agnostic” theorists that they no longer seriously need to hold open the possibility that a purely reactive system could have the property of consciousness. One might expect that at least theorists of emotion would subscribe to an enactivist position, since the emotions are a main link between the holistic homeostasis of the body and the workings of cognition. But even emotion
Curious Emotions
theories are often formulated as if emotional responses could be purely reactive rather than originally initiated by the active expression of the organism’s endogenous self-organizational purposes. A classic example is the difference between the way LeDoux (1996) and Panksepp (1998) understand the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying anger and fear. For Panksepp, anger is clearly enactive; an organism becomes angry because something gets in the way of its self-initiated patterns of activity; the binding of an infant’s limbs produces the purest possible symptoms of anger. By contrast, LeDoux speaks of the anger response as if it could be passive, i.e., caused by a purely linear series of channels through which certain inputs resulting from certain types of stimuli finally cause certain chemicals and electrical transmissions to be delivered to the amygdala. While Panksepp agrees that these chemicals and electrical effects are delivered pretty much as LeDoux claims (with modest differences not relevant to our purposes here), Panksepp does not believe that the immediate reactive response is the whole story; the delivery of the electro-chemical effect yields a given affective response only if embedded in an elaborate network of independent neurophysiological contextualizations: Consider the example of a man burglarizing a house who suddenly hears a noise outside: the same stimulus that triggers fear in such a context may not produce fear in the same subject while visiting that same house as a guest. The organism’s ongoing self-initiated activity is a precondition for stimuli to produce the affective responses they do. While Panksepp’s approach is highly consistent with enactivism, and largely inconsistent with reactivism, LeDoux’s approach is at least as compatible with reactivism as with enactivism, and in fact encourages researchers to emphasize a focus on the reactive aspects of emotional responses and to de-emphasize focusing on the enactive variables that also determine our responses. Part of the reason for this difference is that LeDoux takes a more modular view while Panksepp takes a more embedded view of the functions of these structures and connectivities. As a result, LeDoux treats the amygdala as the substrate of anger, whereas Panksepp insists that the PAG – an action-initiating brain area – actually plays a greater role in anger feelings, and that the role of the amygdala is to learn which stimuli to associate with those feelings. Thus Bickhard (2000) is not addressing straw men when he argues that it makes a difference whether we think of stimuli as causing a response where there was no response, or whether we think of them as modulating or modifying a response that was already taking place in the organism, as caused by its own endogenous self-organizational tendencies.
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
. The P300 ERP as an operational definition of perceptual consciousness A standard way of operationalizing the point at which perceptual information attains a conscious status is to look for a P300 parietal event-related potential (ERP) following presentation of a novel stimulus (for example, see Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002; and others to be cited below). As we saw earlier, there can be virtually complete occipital processing, but until and unless the P300 parietal ERP occurs, the subject is not conscious of seeing the presented stimulus. So a good way to operationally define the question as to whether enactive processes affect the structure of information processing prior to the point at which they become conscious would be to determine whether they affect the structure of processing in the brain activities that occur prior to the P300. Because the correlation between the P300 and the onset of perceptual consciousness of a novel stimulus has been somewhat reliably observed, I shall use it as an auxiliary assumption in assessing the implications of the inattentional blindness effect. I also assume that the emotional brain areas function to preserve the selforganizing interests of the organism. There is strong evidence that the PAG and midbrain respond to important homeostatic imbalances by altering neurotransmitter functions, especially neuropeptidurgic activity, and that the resulting distributions of neurotransmitter levels play an important role in readying the organism for both learned and instinctual action patterns whose tendency is to restore the initial imbalance (Panksepp 1998; Damasio 1999; Watt 2000; Faw 2000). In essence, the emotional brain works in the interest of maintaining the self-organizing integrity of the organism. While “emotion” and “motivation” are different, as noted earlier, there is an important sense in which the activity of the emotional brain motivates the organism to act in the interest of maintaining the integrity of self-organizing patterns. The emotional activities result from a self-organizational causal sequence and, according to enactive theories, are present only in organisms capable of action, not in those capable only of reaction.
. How the Mack and Rock data relate to the two types of hypotheses If the preconscious steps that process incoming information function independently of self-organizational effects of the emotional brain areas, then a purely reactive theory of consciousness might seem possible. Consciousness
Curious Emotions
would just result from a sufficient intensification of the preconscious mechanisms, which would be linear (which is not to deny that they may involve feedback loops and shunt mechanisms). On the other hand, if the action of the emotional brain areas does affect the ways in which information is processed (beyond serving as a mere power switch), then a purely reactive theory of consciousness would be impossible, because in that case consciousness could not occur without presupposing some functioning that is enactive rather than reactive, and which is uniquely necessary for consciousness – i.e., functioning that is geared toward achieving the emotional purposes of the organism. For example, if attention is controlled at an early stage of processing by emotional brain areas, then attentive consciousness itself presupposes some functioning that is enactive rather than reactive, and therefore attentive consciousness cannot be explained as the final outcome of a series of reactive steps in the processing of sensory input, unless those steps are also influenced by enactive processes prior to reaching the level of consciousness. Furthermore, if consciousness can occur purely as a result of those same enactive processes, without any perceptual input, then consciousness would be completely the result of this enactive process, and the reactive processes that are also present when we do receive perceptual input would have no part in determining whether the information processed achieves a conscious status or not; they would only affect the content of the information that gets processed, not whether or not it is conscious To many researchers and theorists, as we have already noted, this enactive story is questionable or even unacceptable, essentially because a reactive account would be consistent with the following seemingly plausible scenario: Visual input causes processing steps to occur first in the thalamus, then in the occipital lobe, and then a series of causal loops occur between the thalamus and the occipital lobe, where each of these loops is a series of purely linear (non-self-organizing) causal sequences. When the occipital processing has led to sufficiently enhanced neural firing, subsequent linear causal sequences lead to a pattern of parietal (and perhaps also frontal) firing (for example, the P300), and this later-stage firing is tantamount to consciousness of the relevant perceptual input. Consciousness is merely the last stage of a chain reaction. Such a story might even include the caveat that a certain level of general physiological arousal is presupposed as a background condition for the intensity of neural activation needed for consciousness. But, given physiological arousal as a minimal background condition that can generally be assumed in awake organisms, the consciousness of a perceptual datum, according to a reactive theory, would be completely caused by the sequence of causal steps that constitute processing of the perceptual input. Correlatively, essentially the same
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
information processing might sometimes even be possible in the absence of the level of arousal needed for consciousness, but in that case it would occur on a nonconscious basis. On this view, the toning of the cortex through general arousal would be analogous to the volume control of a stereo speaker. If the speaker volume is turned all the way down, this does not change the encoding pattern with which signals are processed in all the other stereo components before the final signal reaches the speaker. What happens in the speaker is still clearly a causal outcome of what happens in the other components – it is not one of the causal inputs into the other components’ behavior. Are the Mack and Rock results compatible with this type of theory? When combined with some well-known and fairly non-controversial physiological findings, I think they are not, at least if we take them as indicating what Mack and Rock themselves say they indicate – that attention must be directed before there can be perceptual consciousness, and that in many instances there is not even implicit knowledge of the unattended stimulus. If, as Mack and Rock put it, “attention . . . must be captured before perception can occur” (even if we take “perception” in this context to refer only to conscious perception), it follows that the only way the perception itself could be purely reactive would be if attention did not itself already presuppose an enactive causal process – i.e., if attention were not motivated by the homeostatic needs of the organism to maintain self-organizational balances. In more concrete physiological terms, perception could be reactive only if it were not the case that all conscious attention is causally affected by emotional brain activity (which we have assumed responds to self-organizing causal structures of the living organism). Assuming a parietal P300 event-related potential as an operational measure of conscious awareness of a newly presented stimulus, is it possible that perceptual processing prior to the P300 (as depicted in Figure 2) is not affected by the motivational purposes of the organism? If the processing prior to the P300 were not affected by motivational factors that control selection for attention, then there should always be implicit knowledge of any perceptual input that proceeds up to but does not include the P300, since in that case the information would already have been almost completely processed prior to the conscious awareness indicated by the P300. Whether the P300 (and correlative consciousness of the object) occurred or not would be decided too late to impact the extent to which the information is processed. Thus any information that is processed as far as the P300 should cause implicit knowledge regardless of whether the P300 occurs or not.
Curious Emotions SEQUENCE OF ACTIVATIONS IN RESPONSE TO UNEXPECTED STIMULUS P300 (Moment of Consciousness) Parietal lobe
200ms. (Disinhibition of Action Command) Motor cortex 20–200 ms (Inhibition of Motor Command = Sensorimotor Action Image)
N200 ERP (Mismatch Negativity) Occipital lobe
(Object)
P100 ERP (Perceptual processing) Cerebellum 20 ms ERP (Initiation of Motor Commands)
Thalamus
Hippocampus 18 ms ERP (Motivational Activation)
Figure 2. Note that ERP numbers indicate number of ms after input stimulates the retina. The figure indicates that emotional activation, initiation of tentative motor commands, and forming of action imagery all precede the perceptual consciousness of an unexpected stimulus that correlates with the P300 ERP.
Equivalently, we can ask whether or not motivational factors that control selection for attention affect the processing of information prior to the point when the subject becomes consciously aware of the specific perceptual input corresponding to the consciousness. If there were no such motivational effects, then again the processing should occur in about the same way prior to the consciousness of the object with or without such effects – and thus there should be
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
knowledge of the processed stimulus, if processed this far, regardless of whether we are conscious or unconscious of it. Mack and Rock do not find this implicit knowledge except under very special circumstances, and even then the implicit knowledge is very limited, and lends itself to an enactive explanation. For example, they find implicit knowledge with preconscious meaningful words, but not with nonsense syllables. This would be explainable on an enactive basis; meaningful words are more likely to be useful for the organism’s survival and well-being than nonsense syllables. Why did Mack and Rock not find implicit perception with other (less meaningful and less motivationally relevant) kinds of critical stimuli, such as geometrical shapes or nonsense syllables? Granted, it may be that the subjects did have implicit knowledge, and the Mack and Rock methods simply failed to confirm its presence. But even if this were the case, we would still have to ask: Why did the same tests that do reveal implicit knowledge for some types of stimuli fail to reveal similar implicit knowledge for other types? If a reactive theory were true, then the amount of implicit perception that occurs when we are not conscious of a stimulus would simply be a function of the amount of sensory processing that has occurred – occipital and other visual-cortex systems for visual stimuli, for example – and this in turn would be determined by the effects of the stimulus itself, in interaction with the brain mechanisms that are already in place. So meaningful images would not show greater implicit perception than meaningless ones, if the amount of sensory processing is the same. With the enactive theory, on the other hand, visual data would not be processed as much when not evaluated as potentially useful in some way for the organism’s purposes; so the brain mechanisms would have to do something active in order to select an input for attention at a relatively early point in the processing of the various inputs available, otherwise it would not be processed far enough for either attention or consciousness. An enactive theory can allow that there could also be some later selection from among those stimuli that had made it through the early selection process. To be sure, a reactive theorist could also insist that there can be early selection because the organism may be classically conditioned, for example, to be more receptive to some stimuli than others – in which case the organism would not have to do anything active in order to make itself receptive to selected stimuli. I.e., the fact that an acquired physiological state is a precondition for an input to cause a response is perfectly compatible with reactivism, because even in reactive theories, the physiological precondition could have gotten the way
Curious Emotions
it is in a variety of ways, including past learning. Such a precondition, however, would tend to be rigid and inflexible. But the response here is that, in an enactive theory, there can be virtually complete sensory area processing – for example, occipital processing – without consciousness, and furthermore the consciousness is not contributed by anything caused by the sensory processing itself. Given a certain level of sensory processing, if there is no P300 and beyond, then there is no consciousness, while at the same time the P300 is not caused by the sensory processing itself, because the time delay from occipital to parietal processing (about 1/4 second according to Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; and others cited earlier) is too great to be explained by a direct spreading of activation within such a close proximity. Instead, the enactivist explanation is that the P300 must be caused by independent subcortical activity in interaction with the sensory processing. Some processing occurs unconsciously prior to the P300, yet the P300 is not caused merely by that processing, but also is caused directly, in a separate causal stream, by endogenous subcortical motivational activity looping with anterior attention mechanisms. These include anterior cingulate as well as frontal activity (Balconi 2003; Damasio et al. 2000; Posner & Rothbart 1998). The more enactive a theory is, the more it holds that attention functions to select items that are useful for the organism’s purposes, guided by preconscious brain processes, and in ways that are subject to organismic flexibility rather than rigidly hardwired. Rigidly hardwired selective processes can easily be explained in reactive terms, but early selection mechanisms that are flexible and subject to purpose-directed organismic modulations are more difficult. The more reactive a theory is, the more it holds that attention is caused by the stimulus itself in connection with the organism’s hardwiring. Enactive theories allow both for very early and for late selection – the former because emotional processes must already be active in selection before much sensory processing has occurred; the latter because, even though emotional processes can be activated very quickly (18–20 ms), the emotionally initiated neurotransmitters (especially the neuropeptides) are very slow in spreading, so it is useful to be able to have information already processed and ready for later selection if needed. But without early selection, there would be too much processing going on, and the organism would be directionless in its seeking activities. By contrast, with the exception of some rigidly hardwired early selection, reactive theories favor late selection, because attention itself must be caused by the processing that has already occurred. Thus attention will occur late, when the processing is substantially complete. This view can be attenuated by intro-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
ducing feedback loops into the chains of reactive processing, but in a reactivist view, if attention selection occurs at an early point in these loops, then the earlier attention mechanisms must be very rigid and not related to whether the processing is conscious. Conscious attention, by contrast, consequently can result only from late selection on the reactive view, since consciousness must be one of the later causal results of the processing: When we are conscious of data, we have already extensively processed them. What is novel about the Mack and Rock studies is precisely that, when we consciously direct our attention toward one task, irrelevant stimuli tend not to be processed readily unless they are (1) emotionally salient (for example, the smiling face); (2) meaningful (for example, the written words that yield implicit perception; the smiling face, too, may be a meaningful “icon,” at least in Western cultures); or (3) types of objects that the organism is strongly habituated or even hardwired to select in terms of very gross properties, such as loud noises, very large moving objects, sudden bright lights, etc. A reactive theory will not easily allow that mechanisms (1) and (2) can determine early selection, since this kind of selection requires some sort of teleological mechanism whereby the organism guides its own perceptual processes as dictated by emotional purposes, rather than having them occur in reaction to stimuli. It requires that a response have occurred prior to the stimulus, and that the response determines the stimulus at least as much as the other way around. What is especially important for enactive theories is that consciousness occurs only as a result of such a response that precedes the input corresponding to the intentional object of the consciousness
. The paradox of early and late selection Mack and Rock find it “paradoxical” that an unattended meaningful word, such as “snow,” is not seen when presented for 200 ms, yet in subsequent stem-completion tasks, implicit perception occurs, suggesting late selection for attention, after extensive unconscious processing. This is indeed a paradoxical finding, because the experiments using meaningless shapes or nonsense syllables suggest earlier selection, since in these cases the objects that are not attended to do not seem to be seen, even implicitly, as far as Mack and Rock can detect. In these cases, the subjects’ knowledge of the image presented “did not differ from chance” (Mack & Rock 1998: 13). The resolution of this paradox must involve acknowledging that there is both early and late selection for attention, as Posner and Rothbart (1992, 2000)
Curious Emotions
have suggested. The idea that there are both early and late selectional gating processes for stimuli relevant to the organism’s purposes is not a new one, and has been defended by Triesman (1964) and many others. What Posner and Rothbart propose is that anterior subcortical motivational and emotional mechanisms determine early selection; posterior attentional mechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals that have penetrated the early selection “gates”. Finally, if the data survive early selection gating and corticothalamic enhancement, then anterior-limbic looping processes (which are both subcortical and cortical) motivatedly activate image schemas (Johnson 1987; Newton 1996) that resonate with the posterior nonconscious processing; at that point, consciousness occurs. Now, there are arguments pro and con as to whether consciousness occurs at a particular point in time (for example, see Dennett 1991); but we do know, because of the ERP data cited above, that visual consciousness of a newly presented stimulus does not occur until a P300 parietal ERP is registered. “Image schemas” in this context refer to proprioceptive and sensorimotor routines based on action affordances suggested by an initial Gestalt impression presupposing only early thalamic awareness of the relevant perceptual input, prior to perceptual processing in sensory areas such as the occipital and temporal lobes, and assessed in terms of emotional feeling tones associated with the general impression of a given Gestalt through past learning. Since emotions and action commands can be unconscious when not associated with action imagery and/or perceptual/interoceptive imagery, image schemas do not seem to be conscious until they give rise to further processing, such as visual, auditory, or proprioceptive/sensorimotor imagery (Newton 1996). The more meaningful the data, from the standpoint of the organism’s overall motivational purposes at the given moment, the more the organism will be primed to allow the data through the “gating” mechanisms of the thalamus and anterior cingulate, which in turn are sensitive to the organism’s emotional needs through extensive connections to limbic and midbrain emotional areas. The fact that there can be extensive processing and encoding of data without attention corresponds to the physiological finding that there can be virtually complete occipital activation with no perceptual consciousness (Aurell 1989), and that the anterior cingulate must be activated in cases of voluntary attention, while both thalamic and limbic (including posterior cingulate) control of corticothalamic loops appear to be important for involuntary attention (Bernstein et al. 2000; Posner & Rothbart 1992, 1998). These physiological events would map well onto a phenomenological situation in which, if the given stimulus is anticipated as important for motivational purposes, then its
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
signal is more likely to be enhanced via corticothalamic loops as preselected by the thalamus in cooperation with the brainstem because of categories of utility dictated by the organism’s emotional purposes. Thus, for motivationally “primed” stimuli, there is extensive occipital or temporal-lobe processing even prior to the direction of conscious attention. But for meaningless or motivationally insignificant stimuli, this processing will be considerably less, because the preselective (i.e., early selection) mechanism of thalamic “gating” (or the “extended reticular thalamic activating system” gating discussed by Newman & Baars 1993; and Watt 2000) will control corticothalamic loops in such a way as to minimize the enhancement of those signals. This would also explain the anomaly we considered in Chapter 1 as to why, on presentation of a novel and unexpected stimulus, there is approximately a 1/4-second time delay between almost complete occipital activation and the more anterior cortical activation necessary for consciousness of the object, particularly the parietal P300 electrical potential that corresponds to perceptual consciousness (Aurell 1989; McHugh & Bahill 1985; Runeson 1974; Srebro 1985). As noted earlier, at the rate neural impulses normally spread in the brain, one would expect a neural impulse to be able to travel somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 to 20 meters in 1/4-second. Obviously, more is required than simply a spreading of activation from the occipital to the parietal lobe. Before we are conscious of a visual stimulus, other brain areas must be activated, including more anterior areas such as the anterior cingulate and the frontal and parietal lobes, and this activation must take place in response to input from emotional brain areas. In view of the 1/4-second delay, it seems very unlikely that these more frontal areas are activated in response to the occipital lobe’s activity at all. Instead, it seems likely that the organism must purposely activate the frontal and parietal areas to “look for” emotionally important categories of objects which the thalamus has already alerted the organism might be relevant, and this “looking for” activity must already have begun the forming of visual or conceptual image schemas (including proprioceptive and sensorimotor imagery associated with possible action affordances) prior to any occipital activity’s having any effect on our perceptual consciousness (since at this point the impulse has not yet spread from the occipital to the parietal and more frontal areas). For example, meaningful items in the environment (such as the smiling face) would attract more attention than meaningless ones because the organism is “pre-tuned” to be on the lookout for meaningful early clues that an object is worth paying attention to.
Curious Emotions
It seems therefore that the frontal-parietal-cingulate activation must take place at least as early as the perceptual consciousness signalled by the P300; the frontal-parietal-cingulate pattern must therefore play an important role in determining whether any given perceptual input will even register in consciousness, i.e., will be attended to. Moreover, the emotional areas that precipitate this frontal-parietal-cingulate activity appear to be essentially the same ones that determine whether a stimulus will make it through the preselective corticothalamic gating process that determines whether it will even be fully processed and encoded in the primary perceptual area (for example, the occipital lobe) to begin with. In effect, the perception of a stimulus can occur in conscious attention only if it can make it through two different selection processes – an early and a late one – and both these processes are controlled subcortically in terms of the motivational purposes of the organism. We have already seen that this is equally true in voluntary or involuntary attention, and even in cases of complete frontal lobectomy. In all these cases the emotional brain systems still play a selective gating role in accordance with general motivational purposes, by means of subcortical control of neurotransmitters and by the resonance between limbic (or ERTAS) and posterior cortical activity (Damasio 1994; Watt 1998, 2000; Faw 1997, 2000); otherwise, information processing would be no different in conscious than in unconscious instances, and all knowledge would be merely implicit knowledge. It would therefore appear likely that there is both early and late selection, which map into the brain areas just discussed to make us become conscious of a perceived object in three stages: (1) Preselective gating is determined by motivational categories of utility, mainly subcortical and anterior. (2) Corticothalamic looping enhances, processes, and encodes stimuli once they penetrate the initial gating. (3) Resonance is achieved between the anterior attentional mechanism and posterior processing, leading to consciousness; for a novel stimulus, this total sequence of events requires about 1/3-second to elapse (Aurell 1989) from the time a novel stimulus is first presented, and results in the parietal P300 ERP discussed earlier.
. Attention and conscious processing The third of the three stages just listed – resulting in consciousness and the parietal P300 potential – should not be regarded as a trivial ancillary as far as processing of information content is concerned. In the first place, the information processing is likely to be structured differently depending on whether it is
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
conscious or unconscious. In the former case, subcortical and anterior brain regions play a very active role in gating prior to the transformation and encoding of perceptual information. This is reflected in the Mack and Rock failure to detect implicit perception for meaningless and motivationally insignificant stimuli. And secondly, it should not be forgotten that, even in cases where priming has occurred, although there is nonconscious processing and retention of information, this processing and retention are not nearly as complete as they are for conscious perception; this difference is reflected in the Mack and Rock findings just as in any other blindsight or implicit perception experiment (for example, Weiskrantz 1986). Thus consciousness is not what Natsoulas (1993) has called a mere “appendage” to information processing that could just as well have occurred without consciousness. In physiological terms, this means that we should not regard the processing and encoding of information content as a completely posterior activity, and then regard the anterior direction of attention as merely bringing into consciousness the information that has already been completely processed. Information processing has both a different structure and a different efficiency depending on whether it has been done consciously or only unconsciously. Thus data of a kind that in principle could be relevant to the organism’s needs will be more likely to be processed, even below the conscious level (hence the implicit perception effect in the trials using meaningful words, which does not seem to similarly manifest itself in trials using meaningless images or nonsense syllables). At the same time, the organism will be more likely to direct conscious attention to kinds of data that are important for its purposes, unless distracted by attention to another task that, for the moment, is considered still more important. And attention will be “pulled” by items emotionally important to the organism’s overall purposes. Thus a newborn infant shows attention to a smiling face (Barresi & Moore 1996; Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993), just as the Mack and Rock subjects’ attention was pulled toward the image of a smiling face (but not by a neutral or scrambled one) even when their attention was previously occupied.
. Further implications for the problems of attention and consciousness There would seem to be several important philosophical and neuroscientific implications of these differences in the structuring of conscious and nonconscious processing. (1) A state of consciousness appears to involve global brain activity, and thus cannot be highly localized; if this is true, then it would fol-
Curious Emotions
low that logical thinking in humans, which is more effective when done on a conscious basis, cannot be highly localized (Ellis 1995). We have seen that even the intentional contents about which we reason require widely distributed activity if they are to be entertained in consciousness. Thus everyday logical inferences must be even more complex activities involving widely distributed brain areas, not merely highly localized transformations. (2) It would seem a safe prediction that consciousness will occur only in organisms capable of purpose-directed, emotionally motivated direction of attention, and this is a function of emotional brain areas; i.e., consciousness cannot be a function of a modular brain area or system that relates to the subcortex only as a “powerswitch” (Ellis & Newton 1998b, 2000a, b). (3) Resolution of the traditional mind-body problem will very likely hinge on understanding the causation of the motivational dimension of consciousness in self-organizational terms – for example, as in dynamical systems theory (Kauffman 1993; Mac Cormack & Stamenov 1996) – rather than in linear stimulus-response terms, yet at the same time, a dynamical systems account will not be likely to do the job adequately unless it addresses itself to the role of emotional and motivational processes. Thus, on the one hand, the phenomenological datum that a conscious decision to raise my hand plays a causal role can be made consistent with the fact that the physical movement of the arm is sufficiently explainable as resulting completely from physical causal antecedents (Ellis 1995, 1999a, b, 2000a, b; Wegner 2003). These two facts can be reconciled if the motivation to raise the hand can be framed as an endogenous, active process rather than a passive response to inputs, and the concept of self-organization makes the needed active/passive distinction possible, as we saw earlier. (4) Consciousness is not just an extra layer added onto a mechanism that could have occurred in the same way without consciousness. Instead, information is processed very differently depending on whether consciousness is involved – both because different brain mechanisms are needed for conscious processing, and because the information is processed differently when consciousness guides the direction of the process (Natsoulas 1993). We could go into more detail analyzing just how far the brain can go toward processing data as a result of “automatic pilot” corticothalamic loops, and at what point a conscious direction of attention is required for further processing. Bickle et al. (1999) and Bernstein et al. (2000) go further into the physiological aspects of this question. Their findings indicate that (1) both weak and strong visual stimuli are processed at least as far as occipital area V-1, although (2) the excitatory-inhibitory interactions will adjust the intensity with which the signal arrives even so far as V-1, with the more salient stimulus being en-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
hanced up to a certain optimal point, and the less salient one dropping to a minimal level but not entirely dropping out. (3) This difference in strength primes V2-forward for further processing of the more salient stimulus. (4) Not only the anterior cingulate, but also brainstem areas (controlling acetylcholine, norepinephrine, serotonin, and histamine) affect how the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) functions, with its inhibitory effect. Those subcortical effects are also emotional effects on the way signals are selected for more or less processing (Panksepp 1998; Damasio 1999). However, the general question remains as to whether anterior brain areas are really necessary for involuntary attention. Faw’s (2000) response is that the degree of consciousness of whatever stimulus is there is determined at least as much by the level of subcortical (and emotionally determined) flooding with neurotransmitters, noradrenalin, etc., even without frontal control – a more basic level of cortical arousal. At the same time, Faw is careful to distinguish two different issues: (1) Degree of consciousness, which can generally be determined by cortical arousal at the more basic arousal level just mentioned; and (2) selective attention/inattention, which is a separate function in addition to mere cortical arousal. Faw’s distinction is similar to Damasio’s (1999) distinction between “core consciousness” and higher content-processing functions in that arousal relates to whether or not there is consciousness and wakefulness, whereas selective attention affects the content of the consciousness. Thus when the monkeys in the Gallant et al. (1998) studies casually look out at an emotionally neutral scene, their V-1 areas are found to be largely quiet with only a few “hot spots” in exploring the scene. Here we see the arousal versus selective attention distinction, with plenty of consciousness (from arousal) but not much selectivity (due to little difference in the salience or motivational value of stimuli). However, there are also two more primitive ways in which organismic purposes can “preselect” for attention prior to the signal enhancement that results from occipital-thalamic loops. One primitive way this preselection can occur is simply through association of stimuli with emotions through past learning, which would cause an emotionally important stimulus to trigger increased general arousal. The arousal would then excite the processing of that stimulus, which would lead to further inhibition of processing of other stimuli. If LeDoux (1996) is right, this would be largely an amygdala function. Still another primitive kind of attentive preselection mechanism in the service of motivational purposes is that, simply through natural selection, our organisms would be wired in such ways as to be always especially sensitive and alert toward the types of stimuli that are likely to be important for our sur-
Curious Emotions
vival – peripheral motion, intense signals, the unexpected, etc. There would not need to be any presently existing emotional mechanism for this; natural selection would have already taken care of it. Yet it would be a way in which we would be geared up to selectively attend to emotionally important stimuli. But the more interesting way in which subcortical emotional purposes direct attention occurs in the case where we have to selectively attend, inhibiting competing signals, because this is the case where consciousness comes into play. Even monkeys that are just generally looking out at a neutral scene are being motivated by curiosity (Panksepp 1998), and are tacitly giving that curiosity priority over weaker competing emotions that, if they became strong, would override the generalized curiosity and direct attention only to items that look specifically interesting, such as bananas. In that sense, they are making a kind of selection. Thus the organism is always sensitive to the possibility of having its attention redirected, even when no particular salient stimulus has presented itself – and if it were not, as the Mack and Rock findings suggest, there would be no consciousness of any object. On the one hand, Mack and Rock want to say that attention determines whether we see something at all, but on the other hand they say that the data are already extensively processed, and only then do we determine what gets attended to. The resolution of this paradox requires consideration of emotional brain functions, which shows that there is both early and late selection. All stimuli reaching the occipital lobe are processed somewhat extensively whether attended to or not, but at the same time, prior to this processing, there has already been considerable difference in the degree to which potentially motivationally important versus unimportant stimuli as well as salient versus non-salient stimuli are processed, and those differences are determined quite early, through TRN inhibition prior to complete V1 processing, and also through anterior cingulate direction of voluntary attention, which already precedes the differentiation in processing between the attention-grabbing and less attention-grabbing stimuli. In that sense, there seems to be both early and late selection for attention. The remainder of this book will explore more specifically the way selforganizational purposiveness expresses itself through the human motivational and emotional dimensions. The next two chapters will develop a selforganizational account of specific emotions and emotional systems. The first step is to examine more closely the way the demands of self-organization are manifested in phenomenal experience and in the physiology of emotion, because one of those demands is not generally recognized in the context of its applications to emotion and motivation – the demand for a suitably complex
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
and high-energy basin of attraction, which I call “extropy.” This tendency toward extropy expresses itself in terms of many primary yet non-consummatory emotions, such as curiosity and the needs for exploration, play, and social relationships.
Chapter 3
Non-consummatory motivations Extropy and “life wish” in the self-organization of emotion
One of the most exciting implications of understanding emotions in terms of the action capacities of complex dynamical systems is that, if such systems can reorganize their own micro-components and subsystems to maintain basins of attraction at preferred levels of energy and complexity, then it becomes comprehensible why non-consummatory motivations such as exploration, play and nurturance could result from a tendency of complex dynamical organisms toward higher-energy attractors, and are not as easily explainable as are consummatory motives purely in terms of energy-efficient homeostasis. In consummatory satiation, chemical needs such as in hunger or thirst are the driving forces, pushing toward consumption of chemical resources needed for homeostasis. But homeostasis can be achieved at both higher and lower energy levels. In this chapter, I shall define “extropy” as the tendency of some complex self-organizing systems to prefer higher- over lower-energy basins of attraction in some contexts. The lower-energy basins, however, can be convenient paths to energyefficient homeostasis within component subsystems, which is the driving force of consummatory needs. I shall argue that extropic motives differ from the purely homeostatic ones – i.e., those which seek a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis – in that the extropic ones resist the complacence that would follow from consummatory satiation if energy efficiency were the only ultimate aim. Non-consummatory motives, while maintaining homeostasis, can fundamentally conflict with consummatory ones by pushing toward higher-energy attractors in the interest of maintaining complex structural patterns for the overall system. Thus my argument is that extropy is an independent demand alongside homeostasis. Then in the next chapter, which builds on the concepts developed in this one, we can finally integrate these theoretical conclusions into more specific neurophysiological and phenomenological emotional investigations. This
Curious Emotions
analysis will show that there is actually a fairly large number of irreducible emotional-motivational aims, centering around three main types of needs: Extropic, homeostatic, and boundary-protection needs, conceptualized around these three basic dimensions of complex dynamical systems. Let’s begin by confronting an important reality of emotion studies, which inevitably must be multi-disciplinary. Intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, the view that psychological and biological processes are ultimately explainable in terms of atomic-level chemical and physical processes, is not as fashionable as it once was, but its main impact continues to be felt in the ever-present temptation toward what I shall call a “micro-reductionist” approach to motivation and emotion – the notion that all motivations are ultimately reducible to the effects of a thermodynamic energy-consumption system that could be equated on the psychological level with primary consummatory drives. Moreover, there are strong philosophical reasons for believing that the sciences collectively must tell a coherent, and thus a unitary story about reality; it can thus be argued, with Bickle (1992, 1998, 2002), that all sciences must be reducible to one basic science, which tells the story of how the most elementary phenomena – atoms, forces, etc. – interact. Such a view would suggest a reduction of all the phenomena of the brain sciences to basic chemistry and physics. Now if emotion studies are to have any hope of rooting themselves in a constructive multidisciplinarity, including the concerns of psychotherapy, philosophy, and the arts and humanities as well as the hard sciences, it is crucial to show that a solid grounding of psychology and biology in the more mechanistic formulas of chemistry does not entail a reduction of the total self-organizing system to a mere summation of the effects of its micro-constituents, yet also does not ignore the requirement for unity of all the sciences – i.e., does not deny a grounding of brain processes in basic chemistry. Self-organizational processes, as I have already argued, involve causal dynamics that are not confined to the effects of the micro-constituents of the complex system. Part of the importance of this point is that science does not demand rejection of humanistic and existential suggestions that some primary or intrinsic motives seek to avoid the complacence and stagnation in which all motivation would ultimately revolve around the achievement of a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis of micro-processes, and thus of mere comfort or satiety, with the latter explainable presumably in terms of the energy conservation demands of the organism. I shall refer to the postulated non-satiationdriven primary or unconditioned motives as “non-consummatory” ones. As we have noted, many emotion theorists have already rejected the notion that energy conservation is foundational for all other bodily functions.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
Such non-consummatory emotions and motivations do not contradict the possibility of intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, from psychology all the way down to thermodynamic chemistry and subatomic physics, although they do require a theory of self-organization in complex systems for the comprehension of their physical basis. My thesis is that not only do complex selforganizing systems seek homeostasis (which already entails “negentropic” as well as entropic functions), but moreover they also sometimes seek “extropy,” which I define as a system’s positive preference for higher-energy over lowerenergy basins of attraction, even in many instances where either type of basin could serve the purposes of homeostatic energy-efficiency equally well. Exploratory, play, social bonding and nurturance subsystems in the brain are correlated on the physiological side with the “extropic” tendencies of complex systems, and on the phenomenological side with an endogenous and unconditioned tendency toward increased intellectual and emotional stimulation (up to some optimal point), and at the most complex human level a need for existential meaning, i.e., for the experience of the value of being per se, whose achievement in humans is sought through personal relationships, ethical values, and meaningful life activities including those that express creativity. The problem here is to reconcile viewpoints that have tended to be at crosspurposes. On the one hand, hard scientists want to ground the higher-level sciences of psychology and biology in chemistry, especially given the influence of the biomedical model in psychiatry; and this makes consummatory-drive reductionism attractive as a convenient way to connect thermodynamic energy systems with the biological systems that give rise to our emotions and motivations. On the other hand, there is the phenomenology of life experience, which seems to call for a richer system of motivations and emotions, to account for the preference for kinds of meaning that do not seem reducible to the satiation of the thermodynamic bodily system’s needs for energy consumption, such as getting something to eat or drink. I believe the notion of self-organization in complex systems can reconcile these two antitheses in such a way that the advantages of both can be preserved. On the humanistic side, human emotions need not be reduced to a complex system of means toward the end of satisfying simplistic consummatory needs. And on the hard-scientific side, the ideal of intertheoretic reduction can be maintained, at least as a way to open the possibility of dialogue between disciplines focusing on different levels of organization, so that different sciences and other disciplines concerned with human consciousness and emotion are not condemned to work in isolation or at cross purposes to each other.
Curious Emotions
.
Intertheoretic reduction and consummatory-drive reductionism
Human emotion and motivation have been viewed in notably divergent ways by the hard sciences and the humanities during the past century. That a placid, cud-chewing way of being is not the optimum for humans has been emphasized by literature and the arts, which have cross-fertilized with humanistic and self-actualization psychology and phenomenology, and are substantially congruent on this point with the ego psychologists, the object relations theorists, and the later Freud (beginning with Beyond the Pleasure Principle). According to Freud, there must be some instincts that tend to resist the attainment of satiety, because in his view consummatory satiation resulted literally from the energy-efficiency rather than the energy-expenditure needs of the organism, and in his later years he saw serious problems with reducing all motivation to the energy-efficiency needs. He therefore sought to conceptualize some drive or instinct whose tendencies would run contrary to the purely satiation-driven instincts, which result from the chemical tendency to move toward what Freud loosely called “inertia” (1925/1959: 68) – a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis. Part of the problem he saw with thinking of all behavior as in the service of consummatory satiation is that, in principle, if the energy-efficiency demands were the only motives, yet had been met, then the organism would not be motivated to do anything. Another aspect of the problem was that to make complete satiation the goal would lead toward a condition in which “the aim of all life is death” (Freud 1925/1959: 70). Freud means this aphorism literally. If a system were driven only toward the relative electrostatic stabilization of the molecules in successive steps of its various feedback loops – toward Freud’s “inertia,” a state of satiety and restfulness where the organism is not motivated by any further need – then the real motive of the satiation phase of nervous activity would be to maximize energyefficiency, i.e. to satisfy each molecule’s demands for electrostatic free energy reduction, insofar as possible given the initial structure of the system with its requirements for homeostatic balance in and between its interconnected chemical feedback loops. For example, when hydrogen reacts with chlorine to form HCl, the driving force is that the lone electron in the outer electron shell of the hydrogen atom tends to reduce its energy level by filling the lower-energy space available in the outer electron shell of the chlorine atom. By sharing the electron, both atoms reduce their energy level. Metabolic processes are built up from chains and loops of these electrostatically reductive reactions. The consummatory drives
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
thus seem to be motivated by a need to “consume” the chemicals and physical conditions needed to fuel this more basic free-energy reduction process. To be sure, it would then be up to the organism to avoid entropy, by replenishing the energy thus used up, spending part of it in activity designed to appropriate still more energy. But, as far as the satiation of consummatory drives is concerned, Freud realized that the most efficient way to achieve a completely sated condition with fulfillment of all chemical demands within the drive system would be suicide. A dead person’s drives have all been reduced, and all the chemical components that were pushing the system to reduce their free energy have done so quite effectively. Thus Freud, like many other humanists, looked for a way to conceive of some sort of emergent elan vital or life force, some principle of self-actualization or primary drive toward inherently self-motivated activity that would make it intrinsically rewarding for the organism to counteract the tendency toward submolecular free energy reduction, as opposed to relying on intrinsically unrewarding behaviors for this purpose. The later Freud thought he had found such a principle in the sexual instincts, although earlier he had tried to view sexual desire in purely consummatory terms. Freud was well aware that consummatory satiation does not lead to a reduction in the total amount of free energy within the organismic system, but just the opposite. It leads to an acquisition of energy to be stored for future use. He continually refers to the concept of homeostasis, the balance between energy-storage and energy-expenditure functions. But he also saw that homeostasis is usually meant as the most energy-efficient way possible to maintain balance between the forward and backward reactions of all its interrelated feedback loops – and this implies that the homeostatic balance is maintained with the lowest possible level of energy expenditure necessary to obtain the new energy needed to meet the organism’s energy-conservation needs. This continual push toward energy-efficiency in the sense of gravitating toward a minimal energy level is what led to Freud’s notion of the “death instinct,” which he thought needs a countervailing force – such as his new way of conceptualizing eros as a drive toward increasing the energetic activity of the organism – to postpone the final entropy of death. Unfortunately, Freud would have needed a more adequate theoretical foundation in terms of complex dynamical systems – and perhaps clearer philosophical analyses – to make this notion of conflict between “death instinct” and “life wish” into a coherent account. But the contrast between Freud’s “life wish” and the drive toward energy efficiency (which grounds the “death instinct”) can be clearly formulated if we imagine a dynamical system
Curious Emotions
exchanging energy with its environment while maintaining a continuity in its pattern of activities at a certain level of complexity. Homeostasis is the system’s way to maintain balance between inflow and outflow of energy. “Extropy,” on the other hand, is the system’s tendency to push both inflow and outflow to a higher level, while still keeping them in balance. By contrast to this notion of an elan vital that would strive to counterbalance the complacence of energy-efficient homeostasis, modern physiology and empirical psychology have tended toward an opposite view, which I shall call “micro-reductionism” (see also Ellis 1995). According to this viewpoint, the only ultimate driving force of organic processes is the same as for inorganic ones – the tendency to reduce the free energy of the most basic constituents of the system, its atoms, as much as possible given the initial structure of the system with its various feedback loops. This tendency is reflected in the electrostatic interactions of the molecules in the system, and its ultimate net result is a tendency toward the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis – the push toward a maximally energy-efficient condition that corresponds to Freud’s “death instinct.” The inorganic chemistry principle that all atoms seek to reduce the free energy of their electrons is what would render possible intertheoretic reduction in the sciences (Bickle 1992), if indeed such an ideal is possible. But to make this free energy reduction principle the only explanatory principle – the approach that I am calling “micro-reductionism” – is to ignore the effects of self-organization in complex systems. We have already seen reasons to believe that self-organizational effects are among the most prominent features of biological organisms (Kauffman 1993; Monod 1971). This point will be developed still further as we proceed. Even the nervous system itself is often explained in micro-reductionist terms as governed by a free energy reduction principle. For example, the tissues of a frog or eel respond electrically (Restak 1984: 30ff.; Ornstein & Thompson 1984: 77ff.), showing that the interactions of their molecules are governed by the tendency of their atoms to gravitate toward electrostatic free energy reduction. Long chains of molecules acting to move closer to neutrality by passing off spare electrons in this way to neighboring molecules constitute nervous impulses, whose ultimate driving force is the submolecular tendency toward free energy reduction. The fact that neurotransmitters play a role in conveying the charges from one neuron to another by means of submolecular electrostatic chemical reactions does not alter this basic principle. It is against this micro-reductionism that I wish to argue here – not against intertheoretic reduction in the sciences per se. My point is that even the most rigorously scientific accounts of the biological organism lead to a richer sys-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
tem of emotions and motivations than the consummatory-drive reductionism that, to many motivational theorists, would be suggested by a tendency toward maximal energy-efficiency of the organism’s non-consummatory behavior. I take behaviorism and other learning theories that posit consummatory needs as primary to be classic examples (Hull 1952; Spence 1956; Rolls 1999). These theories explain rewards that are not “consummatory” (in the sense of allowing the organism to consume materials and physical conditions needed for maximally energy-efficient homeostasis) by relegating the non-consummatory rewards to the status of secondary reinforcements learned by association with the primary consummatory ones. If the characterization I am sketching here of micro-reductionism sometimes sounds like a caricature, it is only because the most extreme versions of micro-reductionism bring out its motivational implications all the more sharply. Micro-reductionism favors the reduction of negentropic (or anti-entropic) processes to more basic entropic ones at a lower level of organization. “Entropy” is usually defined as a thermodynamic system’s tendency toward randomness; but this randomness itself is a corollary of free energy reduction. Thus entropy itself can be defined in terms of the tendency of electrostatic interactions to occur that bring the atoms and molecules of the system to their lowest possible energy level; the electrons of the atoms are brought to the innermost available electron shell, where the electron is required to expend less energy to remain, as in the hydrogen-chlorine reaction resulting in HCl. Not only does intertheoretic reduction strongly urge this view, but molecular biologists have in fact been fairly successful in explaining the interactions of molecules in terms of inorganic oxidation-reduction and other such electrostatic energy-reductive chemical reactions (see Baker & Allen 1968; Campbell 1987; Monod 1971). According to the micro-reductionist account, the satiation of consummatory drives is explainable in terms of such submolecular electrostatic free energy reduction mechanisms, even though the overall effect of these drives (e.g., hunger) is to cause the organism to act in ways that continually increase the energy available to the system. This may seem like simply an incoherent claim to those not accustomed to reducing organic processes all the way down to their lowest chemical level. It may seem that the paradigm reward activity is to eat, which increases rather than reducing the free energy within the system, by converting the energy into ATP. But the microreductionist explanation is that the ATP reaction itself is composed of successive steps of chemical reactions, and each of these steps is caused by the tendency of the atoms of the molecules to reduce their free energy, which in turn leads to each successive
Curious Emotions
step. The overall effect for a complex organism is not to incline it toward complete entropy, but only to incline it toward the lowest possible expenditure of energy necessary to maintain a homeostatic balance between its endergonic and exergonic reactions. In thermodynamic terms, whether energy is consumed or acquired in a thermodynamic reaction depends on whether the reaction is endergonic (resulting in an energy gain for the system) or exergonic (resulting in an energy loss or reduction of free energy). In the Krebs energy cycle that animals use, like every respiratory cycle, and every inhibitory feedback cycle in general, it is initially the tendency for unstable chemicals (e.g., ions) to seek reduction of the free energy of atoms by getting their electrons into more stable energy shells (e.g., neutralization of ions) – an exergonic reaction – that gets the process going. But then, because of the way the system is organized, this leads to further reactions whose end result is that more potential energy is harnessed for the system (“endergonically”) by converting ADP to ATP (whose phosphate bonds are very easily broken; this is why ATP has so much potential energy). Meanwhile, the resulting ionization of iron from FE+2 to FE+3 that occurs in this reaction makes for further instability, and the FE+3 seeks an additional electron to convert it back to FE+2, which it takes from other elements (an exergonic reaction), which in turn starts the energy cycle all over. To fuel the process, of course, the organism must continually engage in foodacquiring behavior. But this “negentropic” behavior’s purpose, presumably, is to feed the entropic phase of the cycle, whose rewarding quality can be explained through reference to the demand of the micro-components (atoms) for free-energy reduction. The net result of this whole cycle of activity is a continuing harnessing of energy captured from food sources in the form of ATP. Yet each step of the reaction is driven by the tendency for that step to reduce free energy by getting electrons into less energetic electron shells by means of electrostatic free energy reduction. And this implies that, in net terms, the acquisition of new energy to fuel the reactions will also be carried out as energy-efficiently as possible, i.e., at the lowest energy level compatible with the homeostatic balance between endergonic and exergonic reactions. Thus everything is derivative from the principle that “As electrons are transferred they fall from higher to lower energy levels. . . . The drop in the potential energy levels of the electrons is the energy-releasing mechanism” (Baker & Allen 1968: 110–111). Or, to quote another standard textbook, “As a reaction proceeds toward equilibrium, the free energy of the mixture of reactants and products decreases. . . . To move away from equilibrium is nonspontaneous; it is an endergonic process that can oc-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
cur only when an outside energy source pushes the reaction ‘uphill”’ (Campbell 1987: 99–100). At the same time that the whole metabolic process is driven at each step of its reactions by a tendency to seek free energy reduction at that step, and attempts at each step to move closer to equilibrium, the process cannot be allowed to reach equilibrium, or else the whole system would collapse into metabolic stagnation, and thus die. This does not happen because the ATP and other terminal products are continually used up to fuel further organismic activities, other chemical reactions that are outside of the metabolic loop. It is assumed that natural selection has favored the survival of organisms that happened to be structured so that some of the energy diverted from the ATP cycle is used to fuel food-acquisition activity to replenish the cycle to prevent entropy or death. For example, Rolls (1999) relies almost completely on natural selection for this explanatory purpose. This micro-reductionist account is perfectly consistent with the fact that no bodily system can ever reach the state of equilibrium toward which the free energy reduction tendency would lead if unimpeded. On the micro-reductionist view, this is because there are loops of reactions in which one chain of steps, each pushing toward maximal free energy reduction in its components, is inhibited by reactions engendered by some of its own products. Also, movement toward equilibrium in one subsystem is opposed by that of other subsystems. The most energy-efficient level at which all these loops and subsystems can be held in balance is usually defined as homeostasis. On the micro-reductionist view, homeostasis results when the forward chemical reaction in a feedback loop is balanced with the reactions in the opposite direction, so that the loop cannot collapse into entropy at either end of the loop. The same result is obtained when opposing subsystems reach this balance. Opposing chains of reactions, whether in different parts of a feedback loop or in different subsystems, are halted in their movement toward entropy at just the right point to maintain a constant cycling of reactions. In order to maintain homeostasis in any system or in the organism as a whole, the organism must behave in such ways as to input the right reactants into the system at the right times. (The organism of course allows for some flexibility in meeting these needs by providing numerous shunt mechanisms in its feedback loops.) Behavior is therefore prompted by a deviation from homeostasis. If there were no possibility of any deviation from homeostasis, then on the micro-reductionist account there would be no behavior. So the fact that the organism must behave so as to continually achieve “negentropy” does not contradict the micro-reductionist’s motivational as-
Curious Emotions
sumption that the satiation or consummatory phase of the cycle corresponds, at the lowest level of organization, to reactions in which the micro-constituents in the system – the atoms – are reducing their free energy and moving toward entropy. There must be just enough negentropy (and no more than necessary) to maintain the most energy-efficient possible homeostasis. Microreductionists thus tend to assume that the non-consummatory phase of the life cycle is not primarily rewarding, but consists of acquisition of further energy sources to fuel the free energy reduction demands of the micro-constituents of the consummatory process. That animals’ natural tendencies toward play, exploration, and curiosity do not seem to fit this energy-conservation paradigm is merely a Kuhnian anomaly in need of further explanation for the micro-reductionist type of theory. It can be handled in several ways – by assuming that such activities, which do not lead directly to energy acquisition, do indirectly lead to it, and thus are “secondarily” reinforcing (Hull 1952); or that natural selection favored organisms with such behaviors, even though they are not intrinsically rewarding (LeDoux 1996); or that the system simply falls short of its attempts at energy-efficiency, so that the activities in question, which burn energy that was previously acquired, are sometimes necessary for the reduction of free energy since the previously acquired energy must be burned off in some way (Spence 1956). In sum, according to micro-reductionism, organisms are driven ultimately by a demand for free energy reduction at each micro-step in the satiation phase (which is entropic) within a cycling organism-environment system whose overall effect is to continue replenishing the energy available to the system; the system then again uses up that energy by tending toward entropic energy reduction of micro-components in the satiation phase of the cycle. Presumably, the consuming of substances and conditions leading to submolecular free-energy reduction within components of the system, and in net terms an energy-efficient level of chemical activity (and thus a lowest-possible energy level compatible with homeostasis) is intrinsically rewarding, and in conscious organisms is experienced as pleasurable. Many micro-reductionists are then tempted to take the next step and adopt a consummatory reductionism as their entire drive theory, in which the satiation of any primary (unconditioned) drive moves certain parts of the organism’s system (i.e., certain atoms and molecules) closer to the lowest possible energy level compatible with homeostasis, given the structural constraints of the system. On this extreme version of consummatory reductionism, the only primary motivations are the ones that aim to “consume” the resources needed to achieve the satiation of these
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
maximally energy-efficient homeostatic conditions. According to this view, except for acquired secondary reinforcements, the organism would not behave at all if the consummatory drives were completely satiated. It is this step that Freud was reluctant to take. This is why Freud believed that, in the absence of some contrary, non-consummatory kind of drive, all life would be dominated ultimately by a “death instinct.”
. The notion of “extropy”: A non-reductive force? There is an entire variable that this discussion of electrostatic reduction has not accounted for. The whole system can continue its energy-harnessing and energy-reducing cycle either very close to the equilibrium point (where very little energy would be harnessed, but also very little would be used), or it can veer very far from equilibrium, while continuing the same homeostatic cycle. How far the system tends to veer from equilibrium while maintaining homeostasis is determined not by the fact that each step seeks electrostatic reduction, but by a property of the overall structure of the system, with all of its interrelated feedback loops and embryological tendencies to develop and maintain such structures. It has now been suggested by some theorists of the self-organization of dynamical systems (e.g., Kauffman 1993; Alexander & Globus 1996; Anderson & Mandell 1996) that these structural properties can create “constraints” on the possibilities open in terms of electrostatic reactions at the lowest level of organization. The constraints do not change any of the principles of the way the electrostatic reactions occur, but simply constrain the initial arrangement of feedback loops that determine whether a given reaction will be inhibited, catalyzed, etc. at a given point in the cycle. The possibility that homeostasis can be achieved at either lower or higher energy levels can lead to a further principle (independent of the instrumental need for “negentropic” acquisitive behavior), which in this book I am calling “extropy” – a motivational tendency that operates in conjunction with electrostatic reduction within homeostasis, but which can sometimes conflict with the movement toward reduction of free energy at any given step of a reaction. Extropy would therefore conflict, in some instances, with the tendency to satiation of electrostatic needs toward which subsystems at lower levels of organization are trying to pull. A simple example might be the conflict between a runner’s interest in finishing a race and the fatigue, thirst, and breathlessness pulling him in the opposite direction.
Curious Emotions
“Extropy” as I am defining it here is not reducible to mere “negentropy.” Even consummatory satiation requires negentropic activity of the organism to replenish its consummatory energy supplies; otherwise, it would not get the consummatory satiation. Indeed, all organismic processes, whether consummatory or not, involve negentropy, which is completely explainable in terms of relationships between micro-components by means of traditional thermodynamic concepts. The negentropic activity is geared toward maintaining homeostasis between energy consumption and energy replenishment. But what I want to suggest is more – that some organismic processes in some organisms (e.g., as discussed below, in mammals at least) involve an additional principle, which is what I am calling “extropy.” The point is that homeostasis can be maintained at various alternative energy levels and degrees of complexity, which correspond to various alternative basins of attraction (some higher-energy and more complex than others). Extropy is the preference for the higher-energy, more complex ways of maintaining homeostasis over the lowerenergy, less complex ones. If there ever is such a tendency in complex systems, it would not necessarily be reducible to mere negentropy, because an organism can maintain homeostasis equally well at greater or lesser levels of extropy, and all of those ways of maintaining homeostasis involve negentropy. Consummatory as well as non-consummatory motivations involve negentropy, which is necessary for homeostasis. But as I shall argue later in agreement with Panksepp (1998), only behaviors like seeking, curiosity, play, and some aspects of social bonding are motivated by a tendency to prefer maintaining this homeostasis via higher energy basins of attraction by preference over lower energy ones – i.e., even when the behavior is not indirectly reducible to the consummatory needs. Consummatory and non-consummatory motivations thus can be thought of as different ways of maintaining homeostasis – the consummatory ones being motivated toward basins that are at the lowest possible level of energy necessary for replenishing the energy needed for the tissue satiation; the nonconsummatory ones are at basins that are at a higher energy level than necessary for that purpose. “Consummatory” motives can be thought of as motives whose gratification involves replenishment of energy for consumption within organismic tissues. Non-consummatory motives then would be the ones that involve energy expenditure not for the purpose of replenishing energy for consumption by organismic tissues. For example, animals do not play in order to replenish energy consumed by tissues within the organism in a way necessary for homeostasis (Panksepp 1998). They seem to be motivated to play, i.e., burn energy, essentially for the joy of doing it, even though it does not necessarily
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
lead to replenishment of energy consumed by bodily tissues (e.g., acquiring food). I.e., it is not necessary, for the purpose of maintaining homeostasis per se, to engage in all of the high-energy activities involved in play, pure exploration, etc. While it is true that natural selection makes it advantageous for animals to have seeking and play systems that in turn make consummatory satiation indirectly more likely, the fact remains that the individual organism is not motivated toward consummatory satiation alone. Cats, for example, often would rather hunt than eat. To be sure, an extropic emotion may be triggered by a homeostatic imbalance. The hypothalamic-brainstem system serves to monitor such imbalances, which serve as signals that the organism’s total self-organizing system may be deviating from the preferred overall patterns, including the preferred degree of extropy. For example, when the body has been sleeping (i.e., settling into a very low-energy basin of attraction), norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin imbalances will eventually be triggered by a brainstem mechanism (Panksepp 1998: 109ff.) and will signal the brain that some action should be taken to get the body aroused (i.e., into a higher-energy basin). This signal occurs in the form of a homeostatic imbalance, but the reason the imbalance occurs in the first place is that the whole bodily system has settled into a low-energy basin for too long to allow its definitive holistic pattern to be maintained without a change of energy level; the holistic need to shift into the higher-energy basin then leads to the homeostatic imbalance in the subsystem of the brainstem. The brainstem subsystem is really acting as a barometer for the total dynamical system’s need to maintain its structure by reorganizing its micro-components into a higher energy basin. Some organisms are structured so as to crave more extropy than others, even though homeostasis could be achieved with less extropy. A three-month infant will begin to explore its environment in some minimal ways even though its needs for comfort, security, and nurturance could well be met simply by continuing to eat and sleep in the same pattern that served it so well for the first three months (Thelen & Smith 1994). During these first three months, the homeostatic needs were served at a very low level of extropy. But at a certain point, maturation leads to new patterns of brain organization in which the thalamus is triggered to sense that something is wrong if there is not enough exploratory activity. Here again, although the signals that indicate the disturbance are the immediate results of homeostatic imbalances within a subsystem – the hypothalamic-brainstem subsystem, which senses the chemical results of too little brain activity – the craving for more brain activity would not need to be there in order to serve the purposes of homeostasis. The infant
Curious Emotions
has matured into a structure in which the same homeostasis that could have been served by less exploratory activity is now served by more of it. Another way of looking at this point is to remember that the demands for extropy do not contradict the organic- and ultimately inorganic-chemistry principles that govern the micro-components of the system. The system is merely structured in such a way that it often prevents the fulfillment of energy reduction for the micro-components except by means of a settling into different basins of attraction at different energy levels, and systems that are structured in very complex ways make it impossible to achieve homeostasis in a subsystem without seeking a higher degree of extropy than the one that happens to obtain at the time. So the failure of homeostasis in one subsystem – for instance, the hypothalamic-brainstem neurotransmitter activities that regulate sleep and wakefulness – may signal a failure of a suitable degree of extropy for the entire organism. As another example, a person on vacation might find it quite pleasant to just sit around and eat cookies for the first few days. At some point, the hypothalamic-brainstem subsystem will alert the organism that something is off: there is too much energy being consumed and not enough complexity of activity. Here again, the signal for this condition is that increased dopamine, norepinephrine, and other activity-inducing neurotransmitters are released. The organism wants to exist at a higher degree of complexity, which requires a higher energy level. But the interesting point for our purposes is that some types of animals will reach this point earlier than others, because their organisms are structured in such a way as to demand extropy more frequently. Cats can sit around for hours doing nothing – a feat that is very difficult for a fully awake human. It is not merely that every organism wants extropy simply as a means to the end of homeostasis; rather, some organisms want extropy for its own sake more than others, even though homeostasis can be achieved at many different levels of extropy. So the fact that a failure of extropy may be signaled by a homeostatic imbalance should not be taken as implying that extropy is only a means toward the ultimate end of homeostasis. Extropy is the demand to find homeostasis by means of various different basins of attraction reflecting various different energy levels. It is also true that natural selection favored organisms with exploratory systems and other extropic tendencies, for at least three main reasons: (1) Such organisms are more likely to find food in the course of their extropic exploratory activity. (2) Such organisms are likely to be more intelligent because of their curiosity and seeking orientation. And (3) they are likely to learn
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
things incidentally in the course of their play and exploration that will help them survive. But the fact that extropically-orientated behavior may have provided a selection advantage does not erase the fact that, for the individual organism, extropic behavior (play, seeking, etc.) is not derivative from consummatory motivations by means of reinforcement of primary consummatory drives, which would make the extropic behavior into a mere secondary reinforcement. On the contrary, the extropic behaviors seem to be primarily reinforcing in organisms at our evolutionary level. I.e., they are reinforcing regardless of whether they are necessary for us to maintain energy-efficient homeostasis, or even the best way to do so. They are one way of maintaining homeostasis, while at the same time satisfying a primary motivation to maintain the homeostasis at a suitably complex and high-energy basin of attraction. It is tempting to tacitly assume that negentropy is the highest level of organismic activity that is compatible with the lowest level of scientific explanation, i.e., the inorganic-chemistry/subatomic-physics level, and therefore that anything that does not fit that level of explanation is unscientific. Since the existence of negentropy in the behavior of organisms can be explained by positing that it consists of merely instrumental behaviors in the service of primarily consummatory motives, micro-reductionists of the Twentieth Century tended to assume that the notion of a primarily non-consummatory motive is incompatible with a scientific understanding of how our systems work. They assumed that all behavior is explainable as derivative directly or indirectly from consummatory motives, and that no other type of primary motivation is consistent with our understanding of the lowest level of scientific explanation. Thus those who are prone toward the ideal of intertheoretic reduction in the sciences often want to think that all apparently non-consummatory reinforcements are only secondary reinforcements, learned through reinforcement of primary drives, which are consummatory. It is true, of course, that one way to respond to micro-reductionism here would be simply to deny that intertheoretic reduction in the sciences is possible. But my point is that it is not necessary to deny this in order to establish that some behavior is primarily non-consummatory. One advantage of leaving open the question of intertheoretic reduction is that, when accounts at one level of science can be made at least compatible with what is going on at another level (even though this is not always possible – e.g., quantum theory does not seem compatible with relativity theory), our understanding at both levels is often enhanced. The explosion of biochemical manipulation of behavior and affect through drugs is an example of such intertheoretic bridging, although of
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course the appropriateness of the practical application of such treatments must always be carefully evaluated. The maintenance of homeostasis can be accomplished at higher or lower energy levels, and some organisms are organized in such a way that they prefer to do it in more complex patterns, and thus at the higher energy levels, a good percentage of the time. But even in these organisms, there are ups and downs, where we sometimes feel a need to pull ourselves out of the lethargy of too much dull comfort, even though the dull comfort itself might be quite consummatorily satisfying. But this point also needs to be compatible with what we think when we put on our “scientific” hats. Within the respiratory energy cycle, there can be lengthy digressions (as in primates) where huge amounts of energy are diverted to other purposes, and then replaced by making more ATP later; or there can be fewer digressions (as in lower animals and plants), where less energy is diverted to other purposes, and so less energy needs to be replaced by making more ATP. Thus animals, for example, need to use aerobic respiration to fuel all these additional energy digressions, whereas plants can use anaerobic respiration, which yields less energy, but is perfectly adequate for plants, because they need less energy for other purposes. Plants remain closer to equilibrium than animals, and we primates deviate further away from it than lower animals. What extropy is explicitly opposed to is not homeostasis, but simply stasis per se. It could thus be argued that extropy requires considerable complexity in a system to counteract a tendency to settle into conditions too close to equilibrium. Many theorists would be content to grant that extropy is opposed to energy conservation, not because there is an independent extropic tendency in very complex dynamical systems, but simply because natural selection, operating separately from the mechanisms and motives of any individual organism, created conditions favorable to the survival of beings whose subsystems just happen to inhibit each other’s basic aims, so that such systems would be forced to subsist in a state very far from equilibrium. For example, such a view might agree with Schopenhauer (1956) that it would be better from the standpoint of the individual organism if sexual satisfaction could be attained without the complexities of courtship, bonding, and commitment to offspring, but natural selection has engineered our bodies in such a way that we cannot get the personal satisfaction desired except by making certain individual sacrifices in the interest of the species. I.e., we are structured so that we instinctually feel compelled to do things contrary to our individual best interests in order to get what we want – the satiation of our consummatory needs.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
But this kind of “just so” explanation leaves many unanswered questions about how such systems could ever come about – what its tangible mechanism is. In a similar way, we might explain how a certain baseball pitcher throws an extremely effective knuckle ball by pointing out that he would not have survived in the Major Leagues without a good knuckle ball. At a certain level of theorizing, this is true, but it does not explain the real mechanism of the knuckle ball. It is at this more tangible level of explanation that the theory of complex dynamical systems is needed for an understanding of extropic motivational tendencies that are not reducible to energy-efficient homeostasis alone. Such an independent principle would seem to call for a further dimension of motivational explanation besides consummatory reductionism. Even though consummatory reductionism allows that there can be an overall gain of systemic energy through endergonic reactions and feedback loops, and that complete equilibrium is always unattainable (until the system dies), it still holds that at each step the system is only doing whatever it can to move as close to equilibrium as it can – somewhat like a donkey chasing an unattainable carrot that has been permanently dangled in front of its face. On this microreductionist account, systems would presumably push, in net terms, toward the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis. If there is an extropic principle, it would oppose or counteract the tendency to reduce free energy, by allowing the system to be driven not only by components outside of the system as they pursue their own exergonic aims, but also by the extropic structure of the system itself, which causes it to go out and actively seek to appropriate components that can serve to maintain it. This notion of extropy opens questions that we must now try to answer. How can it be linked to motivation and emotion at the phenomenological level? How can it be grounded in specific neurophysiological findings, and at the same time integrated into a plausible and applicable scientific theory of self-organization in complex systems? To move first toward an answer to the first of these questions, let’s return momentarily to Freud’s “death instinct” problematic.
. The humanistic notion of “life wish” Freud from 1925 sought a principle very similar to what we are calling “extropy,” and expressed increasing doubts about the possibility of explaining all drives as derivative from the tendency toward free energy reduction in the elec-
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trostatic behavior of the chemical components of the organism. Freud regarded the sexual instincts as anti-reductive in the sense just mentioned: The sexual instincts. . . operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their function, to death; and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them and the other instincts. . . . One group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach the final aim of life [i.e., death] as swiftly as possible; but when a particular state in the advance has been reached, the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the journey. (Freud 1925/1959: 74–75)
The behavioral and motivational tendencies of which Freud speaks here (sexual “instincts”) presumably would occur at a higher level of organization than the chemical reactions that make up the system. In general, some such motivational principle would be consistent with the notion of “extropy,” even if the “sexual instincts” turn out to be the wrong place to look for it. Even though each reaction seeks to minimize free energy at that particular step, the complexity of the system’s organization can sometimes oppose this aim in net terms, and can seek to settle into more complex and thus higher energy basins of attraction by preference over simpler and lower-energy ones. The organism can then prefer energizing, exploratory, or playful behaviors over those that would lead to consummatory satiation and rest; and it often shows this preference even when we are tired or hungry, as during the grueling last quarter of a football game. If the very structure of a suitably complex system favors extropy in this sense, then exploration, play, nurturance, and other non-consummatory pleasures are primary reinforcers, not derivative through learning from the purely consummatory drives or from association of such behaviors with pleasures and pains at a simpler level of organization. Otto Rank (1924) and Rollo May (1969) developed this view more fully in terms of what Rank referred to as the “life wish” and the “death wish,” with a correlative “life fear” and “death fear,” whose conflicting tendencies make for the more existentially meaningful aspects of the emotional life, such as a desire to explore, to create novelty, and to actualize the more interesting potentialities of the self even if at the expense of considerable discomfort or pain. Abraham Maslow (1974) consolidated and popularized what we might term this “anti-consummatory-reductionist” way of thinking by positing two entirely different motivational tendencies, the “deficiency” motivations and the “actualization” motivations – the latter resulting from the expression of selforganizing tendencies in an explicitly neo-Aristotelian sense. Maslow credits Aristotle with the insight that “pleasure” is not always a matter of consum-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
ing something (filling a “deficit”) or achieving any end state, but rather can be enjoyed as an active and self-motivated process of expressing the natural tendencies of one’s own pattern of being, even if at the expense of the reduction of consummatory drives. Maslow’s antithesis builds on Robert White’s definition of a drive as a “physiological deficit external to the nervous system, and perceived by the nervous system as noxious” (White 1959: 298). For Maslow, not all motivations are driven by “physiological deficits external to the nervous system” nor by the fear of any form of “noxious” outcome. White’s view may be still more extreme: His argument is that the notion of a “non-consummatory” drive makes no sense by this definition of “drive”; if a drive refers to a deficit external to the nervous system, then all drive-reductive motivations are “deficiency”-driven in Maslow’s sense. Thus the notion of a self-actualization motivation could consist only of a non-drive-reductive tendency per se – in a sense, an even more radical notion than Maslow’s. White’s definition of “drive” highlights the tendency of consummatory reductionism to think of motivations and emotions as arising from the organism’s needs. The needs in turn are for ways to rectify a bodily situation that has moved too far from equilibrium. Without food, for example, there is nothing to fuel the Krebs energy cycle, and as a result, its initial reactants and final products are too far from equilibrium. The “deficit” involved is a deficit of something that could help the system move closer to equilibrium, even though complete equilibrium can never be reached, since some of the terminal products of the energy cycle would be directed for other purposes than to inhibit its initial step. The humanistic attitude toward consciousness and emotion has regarded drive-reductivism as inadequate to address the complex moral issues and questions about ultimate meaning that conscious beings face – not because there is so much more yet to be learned about the various ways that “basic” emotions can be mixed and modified, but because if the “basic” emotions themselves are consummatory-drive reductive in the sense just discussed, then in principle no non-reductive tendency can ever be derived from them. Humanism also has tended to shy away from equating consciousness in general with its physical substrata, because folk psychology, like phenomenology, suggests that empirical observations alone cannot tell us what it is like to experience another’s consciousness directly (Husserl 1913; Ellis 1986). This principle was later discovered by analytic philosophers of mind under the title “the knowledge argument” (Jackson 1986): If consciousness were literally the same as its physical substrata, then complete knowledge of the substrata should constitute
Curious Emotions
complete knowledge of what the consciousness feels like to its subject; but it does not. How to resolve this problem remains an open question for physicalism, and further reinforces the humanists’ alienation from physicalist accounts of the emotions, if “physical” is taken to mean “empirically observable.” More generally, existential and phenomenological approaches are intent on avoiding Husserl’s (1913) “natural attitude,” which was discussed in our introduction. Importantly, Husserl distinguished intentional objects in consciousness from physical objects in the world that we may theorize to be the causes of the brain events that can affect our intentional consciousness. The objects of which we are conscious – i.e., phenomena as they appear to us – are not necessarily the same as the physical objects as they would exist independently of us, and it is quite arguable that they are never the same (Hutto 2000); yet, according to Husserl, naturalistic physiology and psychology tend to conflate physical and intentional objects, speaking as if it were self-evident that a stimulus “caused” the perceptual consciousness of it, and as if an emotional stimulus simply “caused” an emotional response. The resulting theory made human beings into robots or zombies (Chalmers 1995) whose responses are merely passive reactions to an input without any causal power attributed to the intervention of subjectively experienced intentional meanings (Jackendoff 1996; Ellis 1996a). Existentially oriented philosophers and psychologists therefore tended to gravitate to the view that physiological psychology could never adequately connect with the higher moral and intellectual lives of people, and would inevitably produce pictures of human nature too simplistic and brutish to satisfy the philosophical concern with meaning in life, or to accurately reflect the subtlety and richness of emotional meanings. In effect, we now have two opposite views of human motivation. The “drive reductive” view, for which physiology and behavioral science have amassed a vast array of evidence, holds that the aims of life are reducible to a roundabout way for the micro-elements of the system to reduce their energy level even though they must inadvertently re-energize the system as a whole in order to do so, and this reduction to the most energy-conservative means of achieving homeostasis is experienced as pleasure or the reduction of pain. What we think of as high-minded ideals are really only twitches of a satiation-driven nervous system. In the consummatory-reductionist scheme, any increase of physiological arousal that is not somehow in the service of drive reduction must be contrary to the real intentional aims of the system, since the latter are only epiphenomena of the push toward electrostatic energy reduction in the ultimate micro-components of the system.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
The “self-actualization” view, on the contrary, is championed by ordinary folk psychology, phenomenology, artists, writers, literary critics, existential philosophers, and many practicing clinical psychologists. It holds that we have a fundamental interest in acting in such ways as to pull ourselves out of the dull comforts of consummatory satiation, and that a complete reduction to complacence would lead to an existentially meaningless and amoral somnambulism, a “wasteland” suitable only for T. S. Eliot’s “hollow men.” Is there a way to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints within a scientifically respectable yet existentially meaningful framework?
. A possible synthesis The gap between these scientific and humanist traditions has recently narrowed. Philosophy of mind, for its part, has begun to realize that information processing is not the same thing as consciousness (Chalmers 1995), and that emotional purpose and agency are essential to “enacting” consciousness (rather than merely “reacting” to input) by driving information processing in terms of the self-organizational structure of the living organism (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1993; Ellis 1995, 1999a, 1999b; Newton 1996; Damasio 1999; and others to be discussed below). Very new physiological evidence that does not reveal the emotions as geared merely toward consummatory satiation (Freeman 1987; Panksepp 1998; Watt 1998; Damasio 1999) and new philosophical movements within the philosophy of mind, such as the “enactive” movement, make possible a reconciliation between the long-diverging paths of physiology and phenomenology. The key to bridging the gap is a concept of self-organization. In a complex self-organizing system, the overall process is organized in such a way as to appropriate and replace its own needed substrata rather than merely being caused by their discrete interactions. This view has roots in Merleau-Ponty’s (1942) notion of psychophysical forms as well as the thinking of developmental biologists in the early twentieth century attempting to understand why an organism imposes its own patterns of organization on the material that serves as its component parts (e.g., see Bertalanffy 1933/1962). Kauffman (1993) and other recent dynamical systems theorists have synthesized this tradition into a coherent theoretical framework. Any self-organizing system has a number of basins of attraction toward which it tends, and which one it chooses is determined by the best way to maintain coherence within the system given environmental perturbations. I have argued here, with Kauffman, that in some instances, given a sufficiently complex sys-
Curious Emotions
tem, a higher-energy basin is preferable over a lower one – thus giving the system a tendency not only toward homeostasis, but also toward extropy; if the energy efficiency of homeostasis within a subsystem, or the system as a whole, is allowed to go too far, the system will not deviate far enough from equilibrium at either end of its feedback loops, and the result is death and disintegration of the system (Kauffman 1993; Newton 2000). The reason is that, if the pattern of activity that is constantly appropriating and replacing its components can occur only at fairly high energy levels, then these are the energy levels that the system will continually readjust its micro-components and subsystems to maintain. The dynamical systems way of thinking does not disregard the push toward free energy reduction, but adds a self-organization principle to it, as an additional fact that must be accounted for. Discrete causal sequences (Kim’s “causal closure”) presuppose background conditions, and a self-organizing system is able to rearrange the background conditions so that the overall pattern can be subserved by alternative causal sequences at the micro-level (a kind of multiple realizability where the choice of realizers is determined by the structure of the larger system). This way of thinking can make sense of Jackson’s above-mentioned “knowledge argument,” because a self-organizing system acts on its own component materials and on the environment rather than merely passively reacting to them. It is easy to see why one person cannot enact another’s self-organizing patterns, and therefore cannot feel the other’s sensations or other conscious states even though these may all be observable physical processes. When the scientist Mary observes another person’s brain processes, she reacts to them consciously by enacting her own brain processes. So the subjective experience that the objective observations reveal to her is what it is like to enact her own processes – not what it is like to enact the other’s. Even though this enactment may be completely physical, what it is like is not empirically observable by someone who merely reacts to it. The self-organizing process in this case is not reduced to the sum of the externally observable components, because what it is like to enact such a process may not be observable from an external perspective, given that it organizes its empirically observable components and not just the other way around (Ellis 1999a, b, 2000a, b, d). The “what it’s like” component is the way things can appear only to the system initiating the action commands that are presupposed by any consciousness. The observing scientist also initiates action commands, which subserve her own consciousness of what is happening, but these are not the same action commands being initiated by the subject of the experiment.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
Obviously, not all physical phenomena can be observed from just any perspective. For example, the location and velocity of an electron cannot be observed from the same position. A rainbow appears in full color from one perspective, but only as particles of moisture reflecting white light from another. It may be that even though the components of a conscious system may be externally observable, certain aspects of their complex interrelations can be observed only from within the system. Even empirical observation depends ultimately on the subjective enactment of an experiencer, which itself does not seem to be observable from an external perspective. Yet the subjective enactment can also have some causal relevance, because it is a structural pattern that acts to appropriate its own future micro-components. In sum, a complex self-organizing system appropriates and replaces component elements, not just for the purpose of maintaining the complex homeostasis of its various chemical processes, but in some instances also for the purpose of gravitating toward higher energy basins of attraction by preference over lower-energy basins. Again, this is because maintaining the pattern across multiply realizable component-readjustments entails maintaining the energy levels necessary to that pattern. This makes possible a convergence between physiology and views of motivation that are not consummatory-drive oriented, such as those of Rank (1924) and Maslow (1974), who are at pains not to reduce human beings to complacent, robot-like creatures with no fundamental interests beyond avoiding hunger, thirst, and other discomforts. The next chapter will discuss the convergences that are now possible between physiology and these more humanistic and existential approaches to emotion, given that many motivations are primarily non-consummatory and not driven toward satiation of needs definable purely at the micro-level.
Chapter 4
Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs as grounding specific emotions
The previous chapter developed the notion of extropy as a tendency in very complex organisms toward settling into higher-energy by preference over lower-energy basins of attraction. We saw that there are many advantages in viewing this extropic tendency as independent of the push toward energyefficient homeostasis, and that it could help clarify the distinction between consummatory and non-consummatory motivations. To distinguish between satiation of simple homeostatic needs on the one hand, and on the other hand the self-energization and the non-consummatory energy-expenditure that occur in general arousal, curiosity, exploration, nurturance, play, and many aspects of mating activities, can help immensely in understanding the “higher” human emotions – many of which are in the list just cited. We shall see that the higher emotions are not learned through reinforcement of the consummatory ones, nor merely indirect means to consummatory gratification, and are not merely the results of a socialization process. On the contrary, they are just as fundamental in the constitution of animals at a high degree of complexity as are the consummatory motives. In this chapter, we shall not only flesh out the neurophysiological and phenomenological emotional correlates of the requirements for extropy and homeostasis in complex animal systems, but also add an additional requirement – the need for boundary protection. A self-organizing system needs to maintain itself within secure boundaries, although the boundaries are osmotic and interactive with the environment (De Preester 2002). In the self-organizational framework, emotions are identified in terms of the aims and activities of the organism rather than in terms of specific perceptual or proprioceptive triggering stimuli. But environmental conditions can be either facilitative or thwarting toward self-organizational aims. Internal conditions too can be either facilitative or thwarting. For example, physical fatigue does not facilitate exploratory behavior, but thwarts it. So, given the three types of aims in the most complex organisms – homeostasis, extropy, and bound-
Curious Emotions
ary protection – and given that any of these three aims can be facilitated or thwarted by either internal or external conditions, we can roughly classify all primary emotions in terms of regularly occurring affective qualities that go with the thwarting or facilitation of each of the three types of motives by either internal or external constraints. For example, anger directs itself primarily toward external conditions that thwart boundary protection needs and that relate indirectly to boundary protection. Love is directed toward specific others who facilitate the expression of the social bonding, play and/or nurturance motives, which are extropic. Separation distress is directed toward environmental conditions – loss of experienced connection or contact – that deprive us of the expression of these motives, thus thwarting them. For each of the three basic requirements of the system, both internal and external conditions can make positive and negative contributions. So any list of “basic” emotions must include more than the usual four or six. Any variation in any of the facilitative or thwarting aspects of either internal or external conditions for any of the three basic types of self-organizational needs will stimulate an unconditioned (thus “basic”) emotional response. We must begin by laying some basic neurophysiological and phenomenological groundwork. First, we need to see how the notion of “extropy” in complex systems can be correlated with empirical evidence about human and higher-animal emotional systems.
.
Physiological evidence for non-consummatory motivation
Recent physiological and neuropsychological accounts of emotion are more sophisticated than the simplistic hedonistic-behaviorist theories of the past. Physiologists of emotion like Panksepp (1998), Watt (1998, 2000), Freeman (1987) and Damasio (1999) speak of many physiological emotional tendencies that have nothing to do with the motivation to reduce consummatory impulses – emotions geared toward play, exploration, bonding, empathy, and other non-consummatory activities that cannot be derived from learning based on reinforcement in terms of consummatory drives. “Consummatory” in this context means oriented toward filling a “deficit” that stands in the way of energy-efficient homeostasis through submolecular energy-reduction. In non-consummatory behavior, there is no prior deficit, but simply the desire to engage in patterns of activity consistent with a complex system’s tendency to maintain an optimal level of both homeostasis and “extropy.”
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
Freud’s concern with this point parallels Kauffman’s later distinction between open thermodynamic systems at the edge of chaos on the one hand, and closed and “frozen” systems on the other: A closed or frozen system moves quickly toward death. As Newton (2000) explains, In closed systems, isolated from the environment, the group [of entities] eventually succumbs to entropy: the interactions are random and the group is in a state of stable equilibrium – a state that does not change with time. In open systems, by contrast, there are three general possibilities with regard to order. First, the system could become chaotic: the interactions within the system could occur with increasing randomness. The system would eventually reach total entropy, or equilibrium with the environment, and disintegrate because of environmental invasions (such as when a leaf decomposes in a compost heap). When an organism is at equilibrium with the surroundings, it is dead. The second possibility is that the system could be frozen in a single state in which interactions cease altogether (a diamond is such a system). Third, the system could reach a sustained, nonequilibrium state of homeostasis, in which stability of the system as a whole is maintained by means of continual adjustments to environmental perturbations. (Newton 2000: 92–93)
Freud, however, if he spoke the language of dynamical systems, would want to go a step further. He would ask whether all nonequilibrium systems maintain homeostasis with the lowest possible energy expenditure compatible with homeostasis, or whether some systems prefer higher-energy basins of attraction over lower-energy ones that are equally capable of maintaining homeostasis. On my interpretation of Freud’s later view, he would prefer the latter alternative. Let’s look at some neurophysiological data that are consistent with this idea. Panksepp’s research on the physiology of emotion suggests that the mammalian organism is organized to self-trigger its own energization mechanisms. “The basic waking mechanisms of the brain do not require sensory input from the body to sustain arousal” (131). Specifically, “[NE, DA, and Serotonin] neurons contain internal pacemaker mechanisms to maintain spontaneous activity requiring no incoming influences. . . . Clearly these brain systems control holistic aspects of brain functioning rather than discrete behavioral processes” (109–110). Thus emotions in Panksepp’s view intend holistic balance, not discrete chemical reactions or rigid behavioral outcomes. The behavior of laboratory animals may sometimes seem rigid, but only when an animal’s choices have been artificially constrained to the point of excluding all but one useful behavior for the organism’s overall purposes. When Pavlov’s dogs’ options were continually constrained to this extent, they became “neurotic” (Pavlov’s
Curious Emotions
word) and thus “no longer useful for our purposes” (Pavlov 1929). According to Panksepp, “Psychiatric disorders result from neurochemical imbalances (i.e., lack of regulation) among many transmitter systems as opposed to a pathology in a single one, so there may be many ways to restore overall balance” (117). Panksepp also regards “seeking” as endogenous and spontaneous, not derivative from learning and reinforcement. “The extended lateral hypothalamic (LH) corridor [with ascending DA circuits and descending glutamaturgic circuits]. . . responds unconditionally [i.e., without any previous learning or conditioning] to homeostatic imbalances. . . . This harmoniously operating neuroemotional system drives and energizes many mental complexities that humans experience as persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation seeking, and, in the presence of a sufficiently complex cortex, the search for higher meaning” (145). Thus there is physiological evidence for the emergence of non-consummatory activity as an intrinsically (as opposed to instrumentally) valued activity of the organism. Panksepp goes on to emphasize that “this is a diametric reversal of traditional behaviorist thinking. . . . The affective state [that serves as reinforcer in some instances]. . . is not simply ‘pleasure’ but a highly energized state of psychic power and engagement with the world” (147–150). While “pleasure” and “reinforcement” are not synonymous for behaviorists, any behaviorist learning theory must presuppose a distinction between consummatory and instrumental behavior; the non-behaviorist element in Panksepp’s system is that there are entire categories and systems of complex behavior that do not involve, even indirectly, any “consummatory” reward in the sense we have been discussing. It is true that Panksepp does not distinguish the homeostatic motives from an explicitly conceptualized extropic dimension thematized in terms of dynamical systems theory. But Panksepp’s opposition to behaviorism calls for such a distinction, because without it, the distinction between consummatory and non-consummatory motivations itself remains unclear. This problem will be discussed more completely later in this section. The empirical research of Panksepp and his associates into the brain correlates of mammalian emotions relates patterns of mammalian emotional behavior to widely-distributed yet clearly distinguishable brain systems, based on multiple measures of brain activity, assessments of neurotransmitter activity, and neurological symptoms. The theoretical organization of the findings postulates seven distinct brain systems, subserving seven different motivationalbehavioral tendencies in the mammalian organism. Each brain system emphasizes a different combination of brain regions and a different combination of neurotransmitter pathways, and is initiated by brainstem and limbic mon-
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
itoring of the organism’s deviation from homeostasis. These systems can be initiated also by sudden hypothalamic and thalamic deviations that can be caused by amygdala, hippocampus, basal forebrain, and brainstem responses to both conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. At some risk of oversimplification, the seven motivational systems can be summarized as follows (I follow Panksepp’s convention of designating the systems with uppercase letters): 1. The seeking system (which Panksepp earlier had called the expectancy system) energizes the body toward exploratory and generally appetitive behaviors; this brain system emphasizes a circuit from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to lateral hypothalamus, and heavily relies on dopamine and glutamate. 2. The rage system, from the medial amygdala to bed nucleus of stria terminalis and medial hypothalamus to periaqueductal gray (PAG), emphasizing Substance P and ACh activity. 3. The fear system, from central and lateral amygdala to medial hypothalamus to PAG and pons, with neurotransmitter activity emphasizing glutamate, monoamines and many neuropeptides (e.g., DBI, CRF, and CCK). 4. The nurturance/sexuality system, from the bed nucleus of stria terminalis to medial amygdala to preoptic hypothalamus to PAG, using steroids, vasopressin, oxytocin, and prolactin. 5. The separation distress/social bonding system, from the bed nucleus of stria terminalis to dorsomedial thalamus to preoptic hypothalamus to PAG, also including in primates the anterior cingulate and anterior thalamus, relying on opioids, CRF, and acetylcholine, as well as many of the same neurotransmitters used in the nurturance/sexuality system. 6. The play system, from midbrain central gray to posterior thalamus, relying extensively on opioids and acetylcholine. 7. The consummatory pleasure system, from PAG to hypothalamus, relying more extensively on opioids, as regulated by GABA, than do the non-consummaotry pleasures of the seeking and play systems. It is important to note that the seven basic brain systems are relatively independent of each other, in the sense that none of them is learned through conditioning by association with reinforcement of any of the others; thus only the last of the seven conforms to the assumption of early drive theorists that all behavior must be learned by association with consummatory reinforcement or association with physical pain. The seeking system seems especially resistant to that assumption, and is reminiscent of the “exploratory” drives and drives toward “mastery” proposed by revisionist drive theorists who wanted to reject
Curious Emotions
the assumption that the organism would remain completely passive if not stimulated toward the acquisition of pleasure and satiation. There is a considerable likelihood that the seeking system is foundational for all the other systems. Panksepp’s way of approaching the causal mechanisms underlying the basic emotional systems is a “neuroevolutionary” one rather than a behaviorist one; i.e., mammalian behavior patterns evolved because they tended to be conducive to the survival of the species in the long run, even when some of the tendencies do not increase the pleasure or happiness of the individual organism. Accordingly, Panksepp’s analysis is strikingly at odds with several assumptions that many physiologists of emotion, still influenced by the legacy of behaviorism, tend to make without argument or evidence. He explicitly rejects the assumption that all behavioral tendencies are derivative through learning from the consummatory drives or association with pain. According to Panksepp, much activity is primitively non-consummatory (in the sense we have been using), and is instinctually and innately driven by the play, seeking, social bonding, and nurturance systems. Thus we cannot assume that all motivational tendencies are somehow geared toward directly or indirectly maximizing the pleasure of the behaving organism. We behave in certain patterns, not necessarily because doing so makes us happy, but because the natural selection process caused our brains to be organized in certain ways. Panksepp in no way means to deny, however, that failure to conform to instinctual motivational tendencies will cause emotional pain. For example, failure to explore the environment will cause a feeling of frustration or painful restlessness. But exploration itself is not derivative from any consummatory drive or from indirect associations through learning with simple physical pain. Rolls (1999) argues on the contrary that natural selection would favor a situation where behaviors that favor survival and reproduction would also increase pleasure or reduce pain for the organism. But this argument is circular. If we were to assume that the only behaviors in which organisms are motivated to engage are the ones that increase their level of pleasure, then Rolls would be correct in reasoning that natural selection would favor linking pleasure with survival value in all instances, so that the same behaviors that enhance survival would also enhance pleasure. On the other hand, suppose we do not assume a priori that organisms are always and only motivated to do things that enhance their level of pleasure. Then there would be no reason to think that linking pleasure with survival value would be the only way to motivate organisms to engage in behaviors that enhance their survival. In that case, some behaviors with survival value would be motivated by a desire for pleasure, and some would be motivated by other instinctually based tendencies that do not necessarily lead
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
to pleasure. This question as to whether there are genuinely non-hedonistic motivations will be considered in more detail in a later chapter. The difference between consummatory drives and non-consummatory (Panksepp uses the term “appetitive”) tendencies is that the two kinds of motives use different brain systems and different neurotransmitters. For example, consummatory pleasure relies at least as heavily on the use of morphine-related brain chemicals as it does on dopamine (DA), whereas seeking and play rely much more on DA, norepinephrine (NE) and acetylcholine (ACh) activity. Furthermore, stimulation of different parts of the consummatory and appetitive components of the hypothalamus will lead to activation of different kinds of brain chemistries, with correspondingly different kinds of gratifying behavioral tendencies and different extended brain system activations. The consummatory-pleasure nuclei of the hypothalamus (which rats self-stimulate in some of Panksepp’s research) is more morphine-reliant and vegetative/satiation-oriented; the completely different non-consummatory-pleasure, or active-engagement area of the hypothalamus (which also induces rats to self-stimulate) is more DA- NE- and ACh-reliant and activity/energization-oriented. The fact that some behaviors, such as seeking, play, and nurturance, are engaged in for their own sake leads Panksepp to reject the common assumption that emotional responses are simply caused by perceived stimuli. In Panksepp’s system, the mammalian organism is inherently motivated to engage in certain patterns of behavior, independently of the effects of any stimuli; the stimuli that do present themselves can then either facilitate or get in the way of the behavior patterns that have already been self-initiated. Many brain systems are activated by the PAG or the closely associated VTA (ventral tegmental area) of the upper brain stem; self-initiated action circuits of many kinds can be traced back to this area, and correlatively it spreads tentacle-like efferents to other brain systems. The classic symptoms of anger, for example, are produced by binding the arms of an infant, because the infant is already motivated to move in patterns that require freedom for arm movements. The initiation of this movement involves PAG and pontine activity. Part of the novelty of this approach is therefore that it sees behavior as self-motivated and self-energizing, rather than as passively responding to inputs. As another example, the brain has its own basic waking mechanism and does not require sensory input from the body to sustain arousal (Panksepp 1998: 131). This way of assessing the causal mechanisms of emotional behavior allows the organism to be seen as the agent of its own actions rather than as a pas-
Curious Emotions
sively reacting machine. Panksepp’s model suggests a self-organizing view of information processing in living beings rather than one in which each input is merely transformed into an output in piecemeal and automaton-like fashion. The movements of the organism are initiated, coordinated, energized, and integrated by the whole animal working as the agent of its activity. There is an obvious objection that could be raised against this way of thinking. Much hinges on the distinction between consummatory and nonconsummatory motives, since a central claim is that non-consummatory behavioral tendencies such as the play, nurturance, and seeking systems are not derived through learning from indirect association with any consummatory reward. However, sophisticated behaviorist theories, which Panksepp explicitly rejects, could explain this kind of finding by granting that exploratory behavior, play, nurturance, etc. can function as primary reinforcers in a behaviorist learning system. Now traditional drive theorists can posit that there are primary drives toward exploration, mastery, etc.; but deprivation of the environmental conditions needed to satisfy these drives can be conceived of as needs; and it could therefore be argued that all behavior is still in the interest of fulfilling a need or correcting some stimulus deficit. From this point of view, it may not be so clear how Panksepp’s causal story is really different from a traditional consummatory drive theory (where even exploration is an attempt to “consume” the conditions needed to reduce the drive) – or indeed from a behaviorist learning theory in which the range of primary reinforcers is left suitably diverse. Panksepp could respond that the difference between consummatory and non-consummatory behavior is apparent from the difference in the brain systems and the neurotransmitters that subserve them. We get consummatory pleasure when we stimulate a certain part of the hypothalamus, whereas other parts produce the different pleasurable reactions associated with arousal, through DA and NE activity. But a sophisticated behaviorist can easily grant that there are different brain systems and chemical bases for different primary reinforcement consummations, while still viewing them all as consummatory. A “consummatory drive” consists simply of any chemical deficit that needs to be filled, and the filling of the deficit is pleasure. But if we accept the independence of the extropic tendency of the most complex animal systems, we can then sharpen the distinction between Panksepp’s system and those behaviorist learning theories in which complex, self-motivated behaviors are merely secondary reinforcers, derivative through learning from consummatory rewards. The difference between these two approaches has important implications for the way we understand the causal
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
structures of mammalian and especially human behavior. For example, it seems obvious that not everything we humans are motivated to do is rewarding in the sense that it necessarily maximizes our consummatory pleasure, even indirectly. Also, there is a difference between the kinds of energy systems involved in a placid, merely satiation-seeking organism, and one that inherently seeks adventure, newness of experience, and complexity even when this tendency requires moving to a higher-energy biochemical pattern that can throw off the satiety of dull comfort. There are important psychological implications, as Freud discovered in his later work. To many drive-reductively oriented psychologists and physiologists, especially those committed to intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, it may seem strange that we would be motivated to seek extropy at all. The reason is that all motivated systems have self-organizing structures and are complex enough to prefer higher-level basins of attraction, as aspects of the definitive pattern to be maintained. The fact is that, even if each of our smallest subsystems (e.g., molecules) seeks the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis, the whole still