Curious Emotions
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Curious Emotions
Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research provides a forum for scholars from different scientific disciplines and fields of knowledge who study consciousness in its multifaceted aspects. Thus the Series will include (but not be limited to) the various areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, linguistics, brain science and philosophy. The orientation of the Series is toward developing new interdisciplinary and integrative approaches for the investigation, description and theory of consciousness, as well as the practical consequences of this research for the individual and society. Series A: Theory and Method. Contributions to the development of theory and method in the study of consciousness.
Editor Maxim I. Stamenov Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Editorial Board David Chalmers
Steven Macknik
Australian National University
Barrow Neurological Institute
Gordon G. Globus
George Mandler
University of California at Irvine
University of California at San Diego
Ray Jackendoff
Susana Martinez-Conde
Brandeis University
Barrow Neurological Institute
Christof Koch
John R. Searle
California Institute of Technology
University of California at Berkeley
Stephen Kosslyn
Petra Stoerig
Harvard University
Universität Düsseldorf
Earl Mac Cormac Duke University
Volume 61 Curious Emotions: Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action by Ralph D. Ellis
Curious Emotions Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action
Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ralph D. Ellis Curious Emotions : Roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action / Ralph D. Ellis. p. cm. (Advances in Consciousness Research, issn 1381–589X ; v. 61) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Consciousness. 2. Emotions. 3. Motivation (Psychology) 4. Selforganizing systems. I. Title. II. Series. BF311.E483 2005 152.4--dc22 isbn 90 272 5197 5 (Eur.) / 1 58811 628 X (US) (Hb; alk. paper)
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© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents
Introduction 1. The enactive approach to affective intentionality 1 2. Some preliminary predictions of enactivism 9 3. The “curious” emotions 14 4. Conceptualizing action versus reaction 18 5. Plan of the book 21 Chapter 1 Preconscious emotional intentionality 1. Motivation, conscious emotion, and unconscious emotion 27 2. The murkiness of emotional intentionality 31 3. Aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles 33 4. The roles of sensation, interoception, and sensorimotor action imagery 42 Chapter 2 Motivated attention in action: How emotion creates conscious intentionality 1. Linear versus dynamical causal sequences in the brain 52 2. Conflicting theories with conflicting empirical predictions 57 3. The P300 ERP as an operational definition of perceptual consciousness 63 4. How the Mack and Rock data relate to the two types of hypotheses 63 5. The paradox of early and late selection 69 6. Attention and conscious processing 72 7. Further implications for the problems of attention and consciousness 73
1
25
47
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Chapter 3 Non-consummatory motivations: Extropy and “life wish” in the self-organization of emotion 1. Intertheoretic reduction and consummatory-drive reductionism 82 2. The notion of “extropy”: A non-reductive force? 89 3. The humanistic notion of “life wish” 95 4. A possible synthesis 99 Chapter 4 Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs as grounding specific emotions 1. Physiological evidence for non-consummatory motivation 104 2. Novelty, constraints to freedom, and the action-consciousness connection 115 3. The importance of extropy needs in higher mammals 124 4. Existential requirements for an adequate dynamical theory of emotion 125 5. Toward an integrated physiological and phenomenological account 128 Chapter 5 Varieties of extended self and personality 1. How emotion grounds the various senses of self 2. Why not an illusory-choice model? 142 3. The embodied self and the personality 150 4. How can there be knowledge of the self? 158
79
103
131 138
Chapter 6 Learning about emotions through the arts 1. An enactive dance form for the eye 171 2. Why does art move, and not just entertain? 176 3. Love and other non-consummatory motivations 181
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Table of contents
Chapter 7 Dynamical systems and emotional agency: A closer look 1. The causal power of dynamical systems 193 2. How can top-down systems avoid violating causal closure? 200 3. The emotional brain as an enactive system 207 4. Objections and responses 209
189
Conclusion
215
References
223
Index
233
Introduction
.
The enactive approach to affective intentionality
Enactive approaches to intentionality and consciousness propose that such mental processes as feeling, representation, and consciousness, including perceptual consciousness, can result only from a self-organizational system that in an important sense acts upon rather than only reacting to its environment, and one that appropriates, organizes, and replaces its own micro-constituents on an as-needed basis rather than being only a causal epiphenomenon that is built up from the interactions of the micro-constituents. “Enaction” in this context is meant to differ from mere “activity” by including some sort of primitive causal agency, and to define it requires delving into the distinction between living and nonliving systems in terms of their dynamical self-organization, which gives some systems a power to use their environment and their own constituents to maintain stable structure and function across exchanges of energy and materials. The term “enactive” was first used in this way by Varela et al. (1991), while simultaneously Newton was developing an “action theory of understanding” (Newton 1982, 1989a, 1996) and a “sensorimotor theory of cognition” (Newton 1993); during the same period, Ellis (1986, 1990, 1995) was proposing that consciousness depends on a self-organizing motivational process; Kauffman (1993), Kelso (1995) and others discussed below were developing the theory of self-organization along scientific lines; and Thelen and Smith (1996) applied this theory in developmental psychology. Meanwhile, Panksepp’s animal emotion studies (for example, Panksepp et al. 1984; Panksepp 1998, 2003) were revealing more and more that a number of relatively independent, unconditioned emotional brain systems are fueled by action-initiating circuits deep in the subcortex; and Ito (1993) and Schmahmann and his associates (for example, see Schmahmann 1997) were finding that the cerebellum, traditionally associated with coordinating action routines, also plays a vital role in emotional and higher cognitive processes (see also Courtemanche et al. 2002; Gottwald et al. 2003).
Curious Emotions
It is a short step from these observations that an enactive approach should offer a different understanding of the affective dimension from those that construe emotions and feelings as reactions to perceptual inputs combined with the interoception of internal body states. Damasio (2003) characterizes interoception as just another form of perceptual input originating from the viscera of the body. By contrast to this interoception-plus-associated-perceptual-imagery approach, the enactivist account holds that emotional feelings resemble other conscious states in that they are not constituted by a receiving and processing of inputs, but rather by initiating action patterns relative to actual or possible environmental affordances. Consciousness, for example, depends more on efferent than afferent enervation. By “efferent” in this context, I mean nervous impulses that travel away from the central nervous system’s most primary action-initiating centers – beginning with the feedback loop including the periaqueductal gray (PAG), thalamus and hypothalamus (Panksepp 2000a), from whence the developing action commands then spread through the cerebellum and its loops with the thalamus and hypothalamus (Haines et al. 1997), and eventually lead to a real or imaginary bodily action by activating the motor, premotor, and supplementary motor areas, which then (when disinhibited by the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate areas – see Faw 2003) relay the efferent commands to the body’s extremities. Afferent signals, by contrast, refer in this context to those signals that travel from the peripheral parts of the nervous system inward to the more central areas. It is now widely acknowledged that consciousness and genuine intentionality can never result from the afferent processing of perceptual inputs alone (Aurell 1984, 1989; Faw 2000; Mack & Rock 1998; Panksepp 1998; Posner & Rothbart 1992, 1998, 2000; Nikolaev et al. 2001; and others to be cited below). Indeed, I shall argue in agreement with Newton (1996) that we understand the world by anticipating how we could act upon it relative to organismic purposes. When the action affordances of environmental situations are anticipated, those anticipated affordances create the action imagery that grounds conscious understanding of the environment. This might also be called a “pragmatic” view, in the technical philosophical sense, but its affective implications are also paradoxically less “pragmatic” in the everyday sense, because it acknowledges that the system is motivated to maintain its patterns of enaction for their own sake, and not merely for instrumental reasons. This view is also consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s (1941, 1942) phenomenological account of the roles of the “body schema” and “body image” in consciousness. The body image is constituted by interoceptive and proprioceptive afferent information of the kind stressed by Damasio (2003). The
Introduction
brain forms this body image out of information received from the body. The body schema, by contrast, is based on sensorimotor action imagery of the kind recently studied by Jeannerod (1997). This imagery results from sending information rather than merely from receiving it. Merleau-Ponty was well aware that the “phantom limb” experience of amputees results primarily from the efferent action commands still being sent to the nonexistent limb. If intentionality is rooted in the action imagery of the body schema – enacted by efferent rather than afferent processes and originating more deeply in the midbrain and brain-stem – then the intentionality of emotion, its “aboutness,” is not exhausted by noting correlations between afferent interoceptions and their accompanying perceptual inputs. That would lead to construing the emotional organism as more reactive and less active than it actually is, and would lead to concretely different specific predictions about the affective life of animals. It also leads to a different phenomenological account of the meanings of feelings, and thus different decisions about how to act on them. Not only exploration, curiosity, play, and social bonding, I shall argue, but also fear and anger are better understood if organisms are endogenously motivated to act in certain ways and then use environmental conditions as action affordances, rather than behaving in those ways because of re-action to afferent stimulation from the environment combined with afferent interoception from their own viscera. To be sure, perception and interoception are important in the feeling of emotions, and like Damasio, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes them; but they cannot be regarded as the whole story. Major advances in the understanding of emotion have taken place in the past few years. But with a few notable exceptions (for example, Gendlin 1992a, b; Panksepp 1998), these advances have focused primarily on one half of the action-reaction system of the living organism. They have interpreted emotional content and feelings as resulting essentially from an interoceptive mapping of the body’s functions (Ben Ze’ev 2000, 2002; Damasio 1994, 1999, 2003; Griffiths 1997; LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1999). But interoception is essentially afferent, like the receiving of perceptual input through vision or audition. So what is left out of the interoception-plus-concurrent-imagery picture is a full enough basis for understanding the intentionality of feelings – what they are about. We understand that feelings are partly about our bodies and how they are faring; but we also need an account of how the feelings are about the world, about the ways we can or cannot act toward it, and about why we want to act in those ways. And it is here that we have fallen back on speculation and ad hoc hypothesis to fill in the gaps of our understanding. It is frequently hypothesized that
Curious Emotions
natural selection somehow made it “just so” that we have these particular emotional reactions, and then that classical conditioning causes us to learn new environmental associations to the old emotions. I agree that natural selection plays a role in the innate response patterns; but so does the nature of selforganization. And while classical conditioning plays some role in leading us to have the eventual emotional responses that adults have, there are more sophisticated mechanisms at work than mere classical or even instrumental conditioning – mechanisms relating to the nature of self-organizing systems. The action affordances of different environments enable different feeling processes partly because of endogenous aspects of organismic structure and function. We should not expect such complexity to be accounted for by simple stimulus generalization based on learning. An infinite number of combinations of environmental conditions can enable a given holistic self-organizational “basin of attraction,” or pattern into which the system is inclined to settle; yet not just any environmental conditions will do, and there are also an infinite number of combinations that can thwart a given holistic aim. Correlatively, careful phenomenological reflection can suggest that the “aboutness” of feelings is often considerably more complex than it initially appears to be, and that nuanced feelings often defy stock categorization. Kauffman (1993) points out that natural selection explanations become much more adequate when supplemented by an understanding as to why certain patterns of self-organization are better designed to maintain themselves across replacements of their components, and more robust with regard to the types of components and environmental conditions they are able to use. If natural selection explains the techniques of the famous knuckle ball pitcher Hoyt Wilhelm, by showing that he could not have survived in the Major Leagues without an effective knuckle ball, then self-organizational theory addresses in the present tense the actual mechanics of why the “knuckle balls” of our living systems should work in the kinds of patterns they do. The first three chapters of this book will explore this concept of selforganization from the standpoint of distinguishing living and genuinely active systems from non-living and merely reactive systems, showing that only the former are capable of emotional feelings, and that fully intentional emotions, whether conscious or not, actually ground and shape all other conscious states. One of the important implications of Kauffman’s analysis of self-organization for affective processes is that self-organization motivates not only homeostatic drive reduction, but also what I call “extropy” – the maintenance of a suitably complex and higher-energy pattern of overall activity for the organism. In my view, not only are many of the endogenous emotional systems described
Introduction
by Panksepp (1998) driven by extropy concerns – play, seeking/curiosity, nurturance/bonding, and even some aspects of sexual lust – but also Panksepp’s discussions of the roles of the periaqueductal gray (PAG) and generally of the upper brainstem in activating the system lead to an enactivist account of the intentionality of affect: the intentionality of feelings is better understood in terms of the actions they aim at, in relation to multiply-realizable environmental affordances, than in terms of the perceptual objects that are thought to cause or trigger the feelings. Again, interoception and perception combined give us only afferent information, when what is needed is efferent information – information about the complex patterns of actions that our organisms are trying to execute, using the environment in a fluid and multiply-realizable way. In fact, I shall argue that to view emotions and feelings as being caused by concurrent or even remembered or imagined external events is to fall into a serious misunderstanding – essentially, the oversimplifying distortion of the meaning of subjective events that Husserl (1913) calls the “natural attitude.” I.e., we try to apply to ourselves the same categories that are so successful in explaining causal relations between external objects in order to understand what “causes” us to feel the way we do, and then try to construe the resulting oversimplified and distorted causal account as the intentional meaning of the feeling. The classic example is the philosopher who, when asked how he felt about his wife, began by noticing the constant conjunction between certain feelings in himself and certain events in the environment, and at last concluded that there was a statistical probability that certain facts about his wife had caused certain feelings in himself. Clinical psychologists would call such a response “alexithymic” – unable to read the meaning of our own feelings. But to greater or lesser extents, we are all alexithymic in the same way as the philosopher in the example, because we fall victim to essentially the same mistake of reasoning. That is why the natural attitude is so “natural.” Antonio Damasio, in all his works, has offered a useful framework in which to understand emotional feelings essentially as reactions to interoception of internal body states associated with perceptual images. This is a valuable starting point for exploring the workings of the affective dimension, but it is only half the picture, and tends to lead either to oversimplified accounts of the intentional meanings of feelings, or to a dissatisfying silence on that score. My sympathy with a loved one, admiration for a sunset, or anger upon being cut off in traffic are not “about” my internal body states alone. At first glance, they appear as being about the loved one, the sunset, or the motorist who cut me off in traffic, but we cannot settle for such superficial, unanalyzed accounts of their meaning. Even these assumed intentional objects are often mislead-
Curious Emotions
ing, because the emotional life intends much more than what is immediately present in concurrent perception or imagination. The sunset may work as a symbol for the poignant finitude of the existential condition; the evil motorist may be only a symbol of all that oppresses and bullies me. The loved one may offer an opportunity to enact a highly complex energization of entire dimensions of my being. We have only begun to scratch the surface of understanding what our emotional feelings are telling us about how we are faring in our overall attempts to integrate the various motivational purposes that fit into the goal orientations of a complex, self-organizing system. The intentionality of feelings – what they are “about” – includes aims as well as environmental affordances and triggering objects. And many of these aims cannot be grasped within a simple stimulus-response framework that would treat conscious states merely as reactions to inputs and to the interoception of internal body states. On the contrary, many emotions and feelings have to do with aims that are active rather than reactive. In fact, it may well be that, as Newton (1989a) and Humphrey (2000) suggest, we are first motivated to perform actions, and then understand the independent reality of the external world in terms of the way it resists us. To define feeling too much in terms of interoception leads to confusion about the intentional meanings of both conscious feelings and unconscious emotions. As Salmela (2002) points out in agreement with Merleau-Ponty (1941), even unconscious affective processes often seem to have had intentional meaning prior to conscious reflection on them. To define feeling simply as the consciousness of emotions, and then to define emotions in turn as bodily processes available to interoception, blurs rather than clarifying this problem. Damasio, for example, defines feeling as interoceptive access to the bodily processes that constitute emotions; feeling, then, is the awareness/consciousness of an emotion which we simultaneously associate with some triggering image from the perceptual world or from perceptual imagination. But then the question arises: when we experience feelings, why are we so often un-aware of the body states that Damasio defines as emotions, and about which interoception is presumably informing the brain? If feeling is awareness of interoceptive information, then it should be impossible by definition to have feelings and remain unaware of the interoception. Damasio’s answer here, of course, is that we are often unaware or unconscious of the interoceptive information that our brains are receiving (Damasio 2003: 87ff.). But this explanation seems to straightforwardly contradict Damasio’s definition of feelings as the awareness of emotions. Damasio seems to want it both ways. He says that
Introduction
1. A feeling is consciousness/awareness of an emotion. 2. The consciousness/awareness of an emotion is the perception of a body state/body map (through proprioception/interoception). 3. The reason we usually are not aware of the body states/body maps of which our feelings (conscious emotions) are the awareness is that we are usually aware of them on an unconscious basis. Are 1, 2, and 3 logically consistent? Perhaps, if we are careful about what is meant by “unconscious awareness.” But even when we are consciously aware of our emotions, we do not seem to be consciously aware of most of the body states that constitute the emotion. In those cases where we have a conscious feeling, the question remains: If the emotion of which the feeling is the conscious awareness is a body state, then how can we be consciously un-aware of the body states of which the feeling is supposedly the awareness? To be sure, there is nothing wrong with saying that a feeling can include unconscious awareness of interoceptive information. The problem arises when Damasio wants to equate feeling with “knowing that” we have an emotion, and thus assume that the interoceptive information, plus the perceptual trigger with which it is associated, can add up to and exhaust the entire conscious content of the feeling. If this were so, then to empty the feeling of its consciousness of the bodily interoception should be to empty it of all consciousness whatever, except for the perceptual consciousness with which we associate it. But here again, we often do have feelings, and some understanding as to what they are “about,” without much consciousness of the interoceptive information that underlies them. Conversely, if the conjunction of interoception and perception were the whole story, then this information should tell us what our bodily system wants in relation to the given triggering event. But in many instances, we lack understanding as to why we feel the way we do toward the trigger, because we cannot focus clearly enough on what our bodies want to happen in all the various respects in which that particular trigger might be relevant. When we do gain such understanding, we often do so by shifting our attention away from mere interoception, and by paying attention to the efferent action affordances of the environment, which are multiply realizable. Part of the danger of modeling feeling as an “awareness” of interoceptive “information” from the body is that terms like “awareness” and “information” lend themselves to ambiguity, because they can be used in both a mental and a non-mental sense. Of course, the brain is “aware” of interoceptive data just as a billiard ball is “aware” of the angle and velocity of the ball striking it. But this
Curious Emotions
causal relation is not a mental or intentional relation. So, if we say that feelings are unconsciously aware of the body states that constitute emotions, then it turns out that the difference between feeling and emotion in Damasio’s theory really just depends on an extra layer of (often non-mental) “encoding” added to the original body states, but now at the cortical level. However, studies of event related potentials (ERPs) in the brain show that extensive cortical processing and encoding of information can occur absent any consciousness whatever (see Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; Runeson 1989; Shevrin 2001; and others to be cited later). Such an encoding does not lead to intentional (mental) content any more than, if someone were to replicate the face of George W. Bush on the side of Mount Rushmore, the mountain would then be “aware” of Bush. So the sense in which the brain is “aware” of emotions may or may not have anything to do with what the feelings are “about” in the conscious or intentional sense. To conflate this “awareness” with what the feelings are actually conscious of (or aware of in the intentional sense) creates confusion. It assumes, but does not clarify, the needed three-way distinction between (i) consciousness, (ii) unconscious yet mental or intentional “awareness,” and (iii) causal sequences that do not involve awareness in a meaningful sense because they do not involve “mentality” and “intentionality”. Once we sort out the meanings of these mentalistic terms, Damasio’s account seems to imply that emotions prior to being elevated to “feeling” status would not involve intentionality – a conclusion that I do not think Damasio himself would want to endorse. Correlatively, if we assume with Damasio that feelings are simply the interoceptive “awareness of ” emotions, which in turn are body states available to interoception, what is missing is a way to feel the aims of the feelings, since we cannot know these based merely on a constant conjunction of interoceptions with triggering objects. We then end up trying to get the “body image,” which is interoceptive and thus passive, to carry the weight of the “body schema,” which is enactive. I shall argue in this book, in agreement with Salmela and Merleau-Ponty, that unconscious emotions do already have intentional meaning, but that concurrent perceptual and imaginative objects, as well as interoceptive data, do not exhaust this intentional meaning. The intentional meaning has to do with the aims of self-organization, which are complex, relational, and oriented toward maintaining a pattern of self-initiated action, relative to available or potentially available environmental affordances. On this view, emotions are intentional – they are “about” some situation to which they refer – with or without any need for perceptual or interoceptive representations to accompany them. We do not cause emotions to have intentionality by associating them with a perceptual
Introduction
or interoceptive content of which we are already conscious. On the contrary, our consciousness of the world is rooted in the way we expect it to have affordances for possible actions, and those in turn are already motivated by the intentionality of emotion. To treat either emotions or feelings primarily as reactions to either internal or external inputs is therefore to put the cart before the horse. As Damasio himself has argued in his earlier work (Damasio 1994, 1999), it is precisely because emotions arise from the action proclivities of the organism (in my terms, the enactive self-organizing system; in Damasio’s terms, the action components of the “as-if body loop”) that there is a difference between conscious and nonconscious information processing to begin with. Information processing can be conscious only if it is motivated by organismic purposes, where “organismic” must be defined by distinction against “inorganic” or “merely reactive.” If feelings are in some sense conscious takes on emotion (I want to avoid oversimplifying here; feelings are not simply conscious emotions or consciousness of emotions, as we shall see), and if the emotions in turn have their intentional meanings in terms of organismic action proclivities, then the meanings of feelings too must include those action proclivities. Feelings will then be felt not only in relation to the interoception of body states, which is afferent, but also the efferent sending of action commands, which when inhibited lead to sensorimotor action imagery of the kind that Jeannerod (1997) and Newton (1982, 1996, 2000) discuss. Emotions tell us that we are being facilitated or thwarted in the complex patterns of activity that our total self-organizational organisms want to execute in order to achieve and maintain holistic balance at the appropriate level of energy and complexity.
. Some preliminary predictions of enactivism The enactivist and self-organizational approach to the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness and intentionality, during the approximate two decades since it began to be widely discussed, has already yielded a number of confirmed predictions. Six of these predictions are particularly relevant in exploring the meaning of affective processes, and will figure into the main arguments of this book. When the initial expositions of the theory were first proposed, as far back as Ellis (1986), Newton (1982, 1993), and Varela et al. (1991), none of these predictions had yet been confirmed, so the fact that they now have is intriguing:
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1. The working of mirror neurons (Gallese 1998; Rizzolatti & Gallese 1998; Stamenov & Gallese 2002) confirms that many of the same neural systems are activated when we observe another person performing an action as when we perform the action ourselves, and that it is the other person’s intention to achieve a specific goal that is mirrored, rather than the literal physical movement (Wohlschläger & Bekkering 2002). For example, an infant imitating an adult’s pointing her left hand to her left ear will point with the right hand to the left ear if the left hand is not available. These findings are consistent with and were predicted by Newton’s (1993, 1996) assessment of how we understand other people by initiating the corresponding goal-oriented action commands in ourselves and then inhibiting them, in order to imagine the corresponding actions in others. In effect, we empathize by imagining ourselves doing what the other is doing (Newton 1996: Chapter 6). Correlatively, this prediction is interrelated with the Jeannerod (1994) finding that action imagery involves many of the same neural correlates as executing the action, except that in the imagined action we inhibit the action command – a finding that was sketchy when the enactivist theory was developed (Ellis1986, 1990, 1995; Humphrey 1986; Newton 1993) but is highly consistent with the theory. What the mirror neuron findings add is that our understanding of others is facilitated by this kind of action imagery, just as Newton had proposed. Moreover, when we image an action, the action command does not simply stop; it continues being sent, but is inhibited at a certain point in the cortex. 2. The Mack and Rock (1998) inattentional blindness findings confirm the enactivist prediction (Ellis 1986, 1995) that a prior attentional act is required for perceptual consciousness. Equally important, in many of the standard experiments in the Mack and Rock study, there apparently is no implicit knowledge of the unattended material. I.e., in most of the experimental designs where lack of attention prevents consciousness of presented stimuli, subjects’ answers to questions about the unattended stimulus are no better than chance (Mack & Rock 1998: 13). This often neglected aspect of the Mack and Rock research is uniquely predicted by enactivism, and contradicted by reactivist views – in which consciousness and knowledge would consist primarily of a receiving and processing of inputs. A reactivist view of consciousness and mentality would entail that there should be implicit knowledge prior to motivated attention, given the usual assumption that information normally is extensively processed prior to any consciousness, and that intentional goal directedness (as in the unconscious action imagery emphasized by enactivism) should play little part
Introduction
in the processing. If consciousness really were a correlate only of the receiving and processing of the input, then there should be consciousness of the information even if we are not previously motivated to actively direct our attention to it. The implications of these inattentional blindness findings call for careful analysis, and they will be discussed extensively in this book, especially Chapter 2. 3. Evidence is increasingly mounting that, as Damasio (1999) summarizes, a necessary and sufficient condition for “core consciousness” is that the emotional brain areas be intact. Damasio points out that there is consciousness in many cases of akinetic mutism, but not in permanent vegetative states, because in the former case the damage is mostly cortical, whereas in the latter it is further down in the brain. While reactivist approaches can grant that emotional areas are necessary for consciousness (functioning as a “power switch” for the cortex), they cannot grant that activation of the emotional areas is a sufficient condition for consciousness, as will be discussed more extensively in the body of this text. The processing of received information is more cortical than subcortical, so on the theory that consciousness is a receiving and processing of information, we should expect that removal of the brain areas that process information would remove consciousness. But it does not. Instead, it only alters the content and sophistication level of the consciousness. 4. Recent research increasingly finds that the cerebellum is more involved in higher cognitive operations than previously thought (Duncan 2003; Schahmann 1999; Schmahmann et al. 2001); this is consistent with enactivism because the cerebellum coordinates movement, and enactivism predicts that fairly subtle action imageries must be initiated (and then inhibited) to produce specific enough imagery of the corresponding action affordances vis a vis the environment. 5. Monkeys trained to play computer games with joy sticks can then have their brains wired directly to the joy stick, and thus play the game without using their hands to move the joy stick (Donoghue 2002; Hatsopoulos et al. 2001; Serruya et al. 2002; Wu et al. 1993). At first, an electrical brain implant picks up on the brain signal that the monkey sends in order to move its hand; then later the monkey merely imagines moving its hand, and the electrical brain implant continues to pick up on the same brain activity. This would not be possible except that the neurophysiological correlates of moving one’s hand are very similar to the correlates of imagining moving one’s hand. To imagine moving one’s hand is to continue sending the action command while at the same time inhibiting it, thus produc-
Curious Emotions
ing an action image grounded in efferent rather than afferent signals, and based on the inhibition of the action command through the action of neurotransmitters like acetylcholine (Hess & Donoghue 1999). Moreover, imagining moving one’s hand while not actually moving it involves more rather than less activity than just moving the hand. It involves all the activity required to move the hand (although perhaps with reduced intensity at the cellular level), plus the activity required to inhibit the command. In the experiment with the monkeys moving the joy sticks, the monkeys have already performed enough neural activity to send a signal to move the stick prior to the point where a decision would be made to inhibit or not inhibit the action command. This is also consistent with the fact that more intelligent animals (for example, humans) can much more easily imagine doing an action while not actually doing it, since the frontal area so much further developed in higher primates allows much easier inhibition of an action command once it is initiated. 6. The primacy of the efferent over the afferent in conscious processing, which was theoretically proposed by Dennett (1969: 80), can now be empirically demonstrated because of the unexpectedly long delay between the occipital 100P-200N processing of perceptual information and the parietal 300P event-related potential (ERP). The numbers in ERP measures refer to the number of milliseconds after presentation of a stimulus to the retina, while the “N” and “P” refer to positive or negative electrical potential. Thus, when an unexpected stimulus is presented, the ERP data indicate that occipital processing, and also V-4 temporal lobe activation, normally considered to be the “sensory areas” for perception, can be fully developed, yet until there is a positive ERP in the parietal area at about 300 ms, the subject has no perceptual consciousness of the object. There appears to be no perceptual consciousness of an unexpected stimulus until this parietal 300P occurs, even though the processing in sensory cortex is pretty much completed at this point (Aurell 1989; Runeson 1989; Bachmann 2000). As will be discussed later in this book, anything like an approximately 100–200 ms delay from occipital processing to perceptual consciousness (signalled by the parietal 300P) is much too long to be accounted for by the mere spreading of neural activation from the occipital to the parietal areas – which are immediately adjacent – and thus is consistent with the Ellis (1990, 1995) hypothesis that the efferent, anterior/frontal and subcortical processes involved in mental imagery and attention must be activated before sensory cortex activity can result in consciousness. Emotional and action-initiating processes are triggered as early as 18–20 ms,
Introduction
and involve a very primitive reaction to the object’s action affordances and emotional meanings, prior to any occipital processing. The parietal 300P simply signals that a resonance has developed between this anterior and subcortical efferent “looking for” activity and the corresponding posterior afferent activity in sensory cortex. The fact that without the 300P there is no perceptual consciousness confirms that afferent receiving and processing of information do not add up to consciousness. This is further confirmed by recent findings that there is a very early frontal activation (at about 100 ms) when an unanticipated stimulus is presented (Aftanas et al. 2001; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002), which again is consistent with the prediction in Ellis (1990, 1995) that action affordances must be activated (normally including some frontal motor/premotor and anterior cingulate activation) before there is consciousness. If reactivism were true, the occipital activation should be the cause of the perceptual consciousness, and then the frontal activation would follow rather than preceding it. The details of the timing of these ERPs will be discussed further as we proceed. The significance of these findings for enactive versus reactive approaches to perceptual consciousness can be summarized by means of the contrasting pathways illustrated in Figure 1. Each of the predictions just listed will be discussed in more detail in this book. There are many more predictions from enactivism that have not yet been confirmed, but the fact that so many already have is certainly enough to warrant interest. Part of the value of predictions is that they reveal something of the “cash value” of theories. This cash value can also be seen by drawing distinctions between one theory and another in terms of the way they interpret the same set of known data. One of the main practical advantages of an enactivist framework, I believe, is the way it accounts for the “higher” or more complex emotions, which have been a major stumbling block for reactivist accounts, particularly in its behaviorist and consummatory-drive reductionist versions. Chapter 1 will attempt to paint in broad brush-strokes some of the theoretical differences that result from taking an enactive starting point for understanding affects.
Curious Emotions ENACTIVE VS. REACTIVE BRAIN SEQUENCING
Parietal lobe
Frontal lobe Occipital lobe
(Object)
Thalamus
Figure 1. The DOTTED line indicates the sequence of spreading activation consistent with the stimulus-response paradigm, with perceptual consciousness a passive reaction in each successive area to an initial stimulus input. The SOLID line indicates the sequence consistent with an ‘enactive’ view, in which emotional interests (including curiosity) pre-select for conscious attention images relevant to those interests. Frontal (especially cingulate) and parietal areas activate image schemas in response to limbic emotional signals, and attention is directed to occipitally processed visual data only to the extent that they resonate with the motivated image schemas.
. The “curious” emotions On the enactive model, many of the affective responses that can be considered as unconditioned ones – not dependent on prior conditioning – would have been assumed to be conditioned responses on the reactive account. This is because enactivism assumes that a self-organizing system not only must act on its own; it must do so in complex ways, to maintain its needed level and particular patterns of complexity and energy expenditure. Curiosity, play,
Introduction
love, inspiration, loneliness, despair, existential anxiety, lust for adventure, the thrill of intellectual stimulation, the demand for social cooperation and freedom from oppression, the quest for an overall sense that life is worth living – these “higher” (i.e., more complex) human emotions do not show up on most short lists of “basic” or “primary” (unconditioned) emotions. In fact, they are usually thought of as derivative through learning and socialization from more basic ones, such as anger, fear, joy, and sadness. The “short list” approach, then, assumes that only simple emotions can be unconditioned, and that complexity results from conditioning. Most of these simple schematizations of basic emotions are derived either from philosophical analysis (for example, Griffiths 1997; Ben Ze’ev 2000) or from the assumptions of behavioristic psychology and the lingering effects of a century of behaviorism (for example, Ekman 1999; Plutchik 1980). The most prominent way of explaining the higher emotions as derivative from the “basic” ones is to posit that the basic ones are hardwired responses to specific types of stimuli, and then either operant or classical conditioning leads to stimulus generalization or transfer, with punishment or reward based on satiation of comsummatory drives serving as reinforcement (LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1999). Mixtures and blends of the resulting responses then supposedly account for the more subtle and sophisticated affective processes (Plutchik 1980). But a century of intensified work based on these assumptions has brought us no closer to understanding the most interesting aspects of the human emotional life – the higher, presumably “secondary” emotions – than we were before. Indeed, it might be argued that we have backslid, because the behaviorist and neo-behaviorist mode of analysis has suffered from careless interpretations of phenomenological experience, in a way that oversimplifies the intentionality of even the most “basic” feelings. If we turn to actual neuropsychological studies of the way higher emotions are orchestrated in the emotional brain, as in the work of Anderson (2000), Damasio (1999), Panksepp (1998), or Watt (2000), we find a much more complex picture. Love, curiosity, separation distress, play, the need for freedom of movement, just as much as anger or fear, are innately rooted in systems of neural connections, anatomical structures, and neurotransmitter activities not only in the human brain, but even in the brains of the lowest mammals. These systems are not merely overlays of culture or learned responses. They are not derivative through associative learning either from consummatory drives or from simpler responses to specific hardwired stimuli, as is usually presumed to be true for “primary” emotions such as anger and fear.
Curious Emotions
The term “consummatory” can be used in at least two senses. Emotion researchers speak of an “appetitive phase” and a “consummatory phase” of motivated activity. But another interrelated but different sense of “consummatory” – the one relevant for our purposes – is the one used in traditional learning theories, where consummatory drives are usually thought of as motivating behaviors needed for the organism’s energy-efficient homeostasis, such as eating, drinking, and the chemical reactions involved in sexual consummation. The point at which the energy-efficiency needs of the organism are met, where homeostasis is regained, is presumably the point at which the motivational need or desire is “consummated.” The issue at stake for our purposes is that, increasingly, it appears that many of the “curious emotions” just listed, including highly social ones, are not geared merely toward energy-efficient homeostasis. On the contrary, they seem to seek higher levels of complexity and energy at which homeostasis is still possible – yet they still seem to be primary rather than derivative. This explosion of new physiological findings about the emotional brain has coincided with the emergence in philosophy of mind and psychology of new ways to think about the mind-body relationship. One now hears more and more about enactive (Varela et al. 1993; Ellis 1995; Newton 1996), or “embodied” (Clark 1997; Gallagher & Marcel 1999; Lethin 2002), or “dynamical systems” (Freeman 1988; Juarrero 1999; Thelen & Smith 1994) or “self-organizational” (Ellis 2000a, b; 2001a, b, c; 2002a, b, c) accounts of the relationship between consciousness and cognition. In all these new perspectives, consciousness is part of the organism’s attempts to use its environment in the service of purposeful organismic action. This is a reversal of the usual way of thinking about causes and effects in human psychology. Throughout the twentieth century, the stimulus-response paradigm was dominant. Emphasis was on the role of the stimulus as causing the response, given the previous state of the organism (including the results of its conditioning history). Since consciousness apparently required widely distributed global brain activity, it was traditionally assumed that consciousness must be the final step in a chain of causes and effects, the final response to a stimulus, with informationprocessing going on in the intervening steps. This led to epiphenomenalism, micro-reductionism, and what Natsoulas (1993, 2000) calls “appendage” theories of consciousness: Consciousness was considered to be a mere side effect of the real causal processes, which were at the micro-level. This epiphenomenalism would actually entail a hidden dualism, since if consciousness really had no causal power, then it would not be identical with any physical process that does have causal power.
Introduction
Emotion too suffered from this epiphenomenalist causal story, often resulting in an utter reversal of cause and effect. Since emotions and affects are supposedly “responses” to environmental conditions and events, it was thought that inputs must first be processed, at least to a considerable extent, and that this processing must then cause the resulting emotional responses. For example, Rolls (1999) argues that we must first process a perceptual stimulus before an emotional “response” can take place, and that the perceptual processing will be substantially independent of and prior to any emotional influences. Rolls’s reasoning, as I shall discuss in more detail later, is that perception of a food stimulus is not impaired by lack of hunger in an experimental animal. Thus in Rolls’s view perception and other cognitive processes must precede any emotional response. The enactivist, self-organizational kinds of approaches just mentioned would reverse this sequence. Emotions are aspects of the organism’s ongoing self-organizational activity, and these emotional processes drive the processing of information rather than being merely responses to it. Objects and events do not so much cause affective responses as they are used by the organism for its own emotional purposes. The Rolls example just mentioned does not capture this point because the interest in seeking out potentially useful environmental affordances, such as food items, is primarily a result of a general emotional system – Panksepp’s “seeking” system – and operates independently of whether the organism happens to be hungry at the time (see especially Panksepp 1998: Chapter 8). Our interest is always geared up to look for useful affordances. But Rolls is correct to point out that we cannot assume a simple oneto-one correspondence between a perceptual object, such as a food stimulus, and a unitary affective quality that would motivate attention to that stimulus, such as hunger. The intentionality of emotion is much more complex than this. The motorist who cuts in front of me is not simply or even primarily the intentional object of that momentary feeling of anger; on the contrary, he is used by me to express emotions that were already important for my total selforganizational purposes, and may frequently involve larger life issues than the trivial but powerfully triggering event of being cut off in traffic. To understand the real intentionality of an emotion or feeling requires exploring the way these total life events contribute to the affect. Following convention, I use the term “feeling” for conscious or preconscious registering of the affective quality of an emotion – where “preconscious” refers to processes able quickly to become conscious – although there will also be completely non-conscious aspects of the emotion itself that involve many
Curious Emotions
physiological processes not accessible in terms of a felt quality. In spite of the intuitive simplicity of these distinctions, however, the relationship between conscious and unconscious emotion is a good deal more complicated than this conventional usage might lead one to believe, as we shall soon see. Let’s now take a closer look at how an enactivist approach to affect and emotion might be worked out, beginning with the way some of the key concepts can be set forth in a self-organizational framework. Before going further, we should devote a little attention to developing preliminary definitions of some basic concepts needed for a coherent enactive approach to the affective sphere. As noted earlier, the most fundamental concept is the distinction between “action” and “mere reaction.”
. Conceptualizing action versus reaction To define what is meant by “action” as opposed to “mere reaction” is a difficult philosophical problem in its own right, including the puzzle of how our emotions enable “mental causation” to occur, so that the whole organism can purposely use its parts rather than being a mere summation of their separate mechanical reactions. Chapters 2 and 3 will flesh out the differences between action and mere reaction in some detail, but at this point a preliminary definition is in order. The recently elaborated concept of complex dynamical systems (Bunge 1979; Juarrero 1999; Kauffman 1993; Kelso 1995; MacCormac & Stamenov 1996; Monod 1971; Newton 2000; Prigogine 1996; Thelen & Smith 1994) can provide the necessary tools for such an understanding. Complex dynamical systems, in the terminology of these theorists, are structured so as to preserve certain continuities of behavior across exchanges of energy and materials with their environment. The more they must seek out and appropriate the replacement components to keep the pattern of organization going, the more clearly they fall within the category of “living” systems (Bertalanffy 1933; Bunge 1979; Monod 1971). The activities of living systems, then, are not merely built up through the accumulation and summation of the causal powers of their micro-constituents, although their behavior is consistent with normal causation at the micro level. I shall argue that there is also a causal power on the part of the whole system, to regulate – and in fact even to find and purposefully make use of – micro-components on an as-needed basis. Emotions are expressions of this self-organizational tendency, and this is why emotions can cause actions holistically rather than in partes extra partes fashion.
Introduction
The sense of “action” to which I am referring here is simpler than the more elaborate notion of the planned, deliberate actions of a conscious agent. What is more basic than, but presupposed by, action planning is the idea of a system that moves its own parts for the purposes of the whole, rather than merely being moved by its parts. The system must have the ability to rearrange its own components to maintain certain structural relations for the whole organism, and in the sense of “action” to which I am referring this power will not be a mere epiphenomenon, but rather will play a genuinely causal role. There is no need to worry that physical systems will fail to be “causally closed” (Kim 1992, 1993, 1998) on this analysis. Self-organizational theory does not contradict causal closure at the micro-level, as I shall explain in detail later. Each step in a reaction is causally necessary and sufficient for the next step, granted certain background conditions. But it is the system as a whole that monitors and adjusts the background conditions as required to render a given micro-level event causally efficacious for the outcomes needed to achieve the system’s overall objective, which is to keep acting in its own definitive pattern. Such a pattern obviously must be very complex in order to incorporate the right kinds of subsystems and interrelations of homeostatic feedback loops to achieve this kind of regulation of the causal conditions governing its own components. They must be at least as complex as a living cell. And they must be even more complex if they are to achieve enough intentional understanding of environmental action affordances to interpret disruptions of their own selforganizational patterns as indicative of some aspect of their overall relation to their environment. To think that environmental events cause organisms to act would be an oversimplification on the self-organizational view. As Bickhard (2000) emphasizes, organisms are always already acting on their own, unless they are dead, and discrete environmental events can only “disturb” the ongoing pattern of self-initiated action, so that a readjustment must be found somewhere in the pattern’s total configuration that can reorganize the parts of the organism as well as the environment, in order to maintain the general contour of the whole pattern of activity as nearly as possible. Sometimes this may mean radically changing the environment (as in fight), sometimes it may mean repositioning the organism vis a vis the environment (as in flight or as in turning away in disgust), and sometimes it may mean reorganizing the organism to find different ways to achieve the desired homeostatic patterns (as in cooperative agreements and other complex methods of getting around obstacles to freedom, or as in adjusting to tyranny by cultivating a mood of quietistic resignation). Any com-
Curious Emotions
bination of behaviors able to sustain the desired homeostatic patterns is as “natural” as any other. Just as emotional responses depend on a total self-organizational context, so do the emotional meanings of stimuli. We should not think of an emotion as just another type of conscious qualia caused by certain kinds of inputs, alongside perception, thought, and the proprioception and interoception of bodily sensations. Emotion is unique in that its qualia usually do not take specific inputs as their intentional objects, since they are always felt in relation to the action affordances of objects, and these will be different depending on the object’s relations to the ultimate aim, which is self-organizational and can be realized by a variety of combinations of conditions, both environmental and bodily. The ultimate aim is the establishment and maintenance of the animal’s definitive sequence of self-organizational patterns relative to the environment; the disruption of the pattern is assessed at the level of the whole, not in an isolated part. I do not mean to imply that, experientially, intrinsic value is not located outside of the organism and its aims – a philosophical problem to which we will return later. My point for now is that, even though perception and thought may uniquely identify a likely candidate as the environmental stimulus that is largely responsible for a disruption, the felt quality of the emotion itself is not this specific. One instance of anger initially seems just like any other instance of anger, whether it is caused by the motorist who cut in front of me, or whether the true cause of the anger is a general frustration with the way my career and love life are going, with the motorist’s behavior serving only as an opportunity to symbolize these feelings. The felt quality of the emotion does not pinpoint what the real disturbance is in the first casual or superficial glance. The emotion reveals that something is “off ” in the organism-environment relationship, and it reveals some general features of this “offness” in terms of action affordances – that something is confining or constricting my activity. I shall discuss later the ways we can and typically do explore the hidden nuances of a felt quality to get more specific information out of it, but this specific information is not obviously announced by a superficial reading of what an emotion initially seems to be triggered by – again, because the organism’s aims are holistic and thus must be understood in terms of a larger picture. Many people may feel that some emotions or feelings are not oriented toward action. For example, in basking in the calm beauty of a sunset, I may simply want to sit passively and sink it in. But in the sense of “action” we are using here – unified action initiated by a self-organizing entity as opposed to mechanical reaction to an external event – the presumed passivity of the reaction to the sunset is misleading. We may not know about all the internal
Introduction
activities that must be taking place in order to maintain the homeostatic patterns that are needed to subserve the pleasurable experience of the sunset, but they are taking place nonetheless. Moreover, as I shall argue in detail in later chapters, I would not be looking at the sunset in the first place had I not chosen to direct my gaze in that direction. The experience of the sunset is being chosen and appropriated by the organism as a whole because it facilitates rather than thwarting the self-organizational structures of activity with which it resonates. If something were a little “off ” in any of the activities within the total homeostatic system, then different environmental conditions would be needed to facilitate regaining the proper balance. This need might be consciously experienced as boredom, or simply as an interest in directing attention to some other object or activity. This point remains applicable even in the aesthetic experience of artworks. In fact, the aims served by the experience of art are especially revealing about the relation between emotions and their intentional objects, because in the experience of art we are forced to take seriously the ambiguity of object affordances in terms of our emotional use of them, many of which are preconscious until we explicate them with the help of the perceptual object. To further clarify this distinction between conscious and preconscious intentionality will be the central focus of the first chapter.
. Plan of the book This book will focus on the interconnections between self-organization and the intentionality of conscious experience, and the ways in which emotion and the motivation for attention-direction can enter into this relation. In thinking about the intentionality of action, there should be careful consideration of the contributions of action theory, and the ways action can relate to the forming of the understanding of intentional contents (as in Clark 1997; Ellis & Newton 1998a, 2000a, b; Gallagher & Jeannerod 2002; Humphrey 2000; Juarrero 1999; Newton 1996). This kind of analysis seems crucial in laying the foundation for an intentionality of affective consciousness grounded in the intentionality of action. In my view, to make sense of these interconnections, there also needs to be discussion of the way the active rather than passive nature of emotional intentionality connects with the notion of self-organization. A good source for exploration of this dimension can be found in Stuart Kauffman’s work, and other authors who use self-organization and/or dynamical systems to ground a difference between purposeful action (as in biological organisms) and mere reaction (as in machines). These elements, combined with careful attention to
Curious Emotions
phenomenology (as it relates to neuroscience and analytic philosophy of mind) can form the basis of a systematic attempt to show how emotional consciousness is grounded in an organically self-organizing system that acts to preserve and express its patterns of organization. We then find that many emotions once considered as responses to stimuli, such as fear and anger, can now be thematized as the body’s attempt to get rid of or get around impediments to its already ongoing activity. If this dynamical framework goes all the way down to the most basic emotions, then the distinction between higher and lower emotions cannot be drawn by reducing the former to the latter by means of learning schemes or socialization processes. Instead, the higher emotions will be more complex “attractors,” or patterns of organization into which the system’s endogenous dynamical rhythms motivate it to shift, and in which it strives to remain as long as maintenance of the total system requires it. Nor can the emotions be neatly reduced to elaborately elongated schemes for the attainment of chemical homeostasis. It is true that dynamical systems seek homeostasis, but they also seek to maintain suitably complex and highenergy basins of attraction to fit the life trajectories that various life forms set for themselves, because of the specific ways in which they are self-organized (Juarerro 1999; Prigogine 1996). This interesting fact, that animals do not seem to want merely to satiate consummatory drives, but also seem to intrinsically value adventure, playfulness, and curiosity, will be one of the pivotal issues to be explored throughout this book. A theory as to why there would be such important non-consummatory motivations and emotions will be spelled out in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. But certain groundwork must be established first. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the way an enactive approach affects our conceptualization of the basic terms used in discussions of affect and emotion, and our understanding of the intentional meaning as well as the underlying neurophysiology of affective feelings. Since the action/reaction distinction is a pivotal point in this re-conceptualization, Chapters 2 and 3 will then develop an overall concept of self-organization that is capable of making sense of the notion of action in the most fundamental sense (as distinguished from mere reaction), and will show how a capacity for action in this sense allows holistic motivations to cause our bodies to move in executing useful actions. Chapter 2, specifically, will investigate the interrelations of emotion and the imagery associated with emotional intentionality, by taking its cue from the phenomena of inattentional blindness and selective attention and inattention. Emotion will emerge as a determinant rather than just a response to our consciousness of the world – a fundamental component of any conscious experience. Chapter 3 will examine the way gen-
Introduction
uine mental causation and self-initiated volition, as opposed to mere systems of piecemeal reactions, become possible from the self-organizational standpoint. After this groundwork has been established, Chapter 4 will then develop the idea of non-consummatory motives as specific emotional applications of dynamical systems theory, and will ground an understanding of the “higher” affects as related to the organism’s needs vis a vis three types of conditions: (1) “extropic” (i.e., non-consummatory); (2) homeostatic; and (3) boundary protection conditions, viewing all three types of conditions as necessary features of complex dynamical systems. Chapter 5 will show how this emotions system grounds the various senses of self. Chapter 6 will then combine this analysis with the previous discussions of non-consummatory affects, taking some clues from the arts and from psychotherapy, and exploring some “existential” issues that arise from awareness of the challenges facing the problems of the self-world relationship in general, which are of crucial concern to very intelligent beings. These issues include the problems of death, powerlessness, social alienation and oppression, and the need to experience the value of being per se with enough intensity to justify life’s struggles. Here the complicated relationship between an emotion, its intentional objects, and related imagistic triggers will become more clear. Finally, Chapter 7 will show how emotion serves to organize experience into the structure of a self in the sense of personality. Not only primitive agency is made comprehensible by the phenomenon of self-organization, since organisms act rather than merely react, but also it can be seen how reflection-capable subjectivity and overarching unity of the flow of experience within a coherent personality structure become possible through the pattern of motivated attention progressions in the stream of experiences.
Chapter 1
Preconscious emotional intentionality
While the felt quality of an emotion cannot be relied upon to pinpoint a specific environmental object as what it is “about,” it would also be a mistake to say that emotional qualia per se do not have intentional objects until we cognitively interpret the cause of the qualia. Salmela (2002) expresses the essential problem here very incisively, taking issue with the view of many cognitivists (for example, Ben Ze’ev 2000) that a feeling has no intentionality until we cognitively assess its cause. According to Ben Ze’ev, we know that we are in love because we feel certain sensation-like feelings such as butterflies in the stomach, and then cognitively associate a certain person with that feeling, noticing that we have the feeling whenever the person is present. Salmela’s objection is that a feeling of butterflies in the stomach would not be identified as love, or indeed as any emotional feeling, unless it already contained an intentional reference even at the pre-cognitive level. It could just as well be an upset stomach or a feeling of dizziness. We can identify it as an emotional feeling, rather than dizziness or an upset stomach, because we sense precognitively that it already refers to something beyond itself. We sense that it indicates something about our relation to some aspect of our environment. When we reflect on an emotional feeling, we do not add the intentionality to it as a side-effect of the reflection; we discover that it already had an intentional reference. There must already be an intentionality inherent in the feeling, by virtue of which our judgment as to which aspects of a situation are the referents of the feeling can ever hope to be either correct or incorrect. This point can also be seen in a more mundane, empirical way: We react to an emotional stimulus more quickly than we can even cognitively register the content of the object by means of perceptual processing. The hippocampalcerebellar-hypothalamic loops that instigate action begin as early as 18 ms after presentation of an unexpected stimulus (Haines et al. 1997), whereas the occipital lobe does not process the visual identity of the unanticipated object until at least 200 ms later (Aurell 1989). When we then reflect on why we feel the way we do, the feeling reveals itself as already having been intentionally directed to the action affordances of an object or environmental situation. For exam-
Curious Emotions
ple, an infant does not need to learn the fear of heights, because the edge of a precipice affords falling. The fear reaction is signalled by neurotransmitter activity (glutamate, monoamines, and other neuropeptides) in a circuit including the lateral amygdala to medial hypothalamus to PAG and pons, prior to perceptual and intellectual processing (Panksepp 1998; LeDoux 1996). Damasio (1999) also emphasizes that emotional responses occur earlier in the processing stream than perceptual and intellectual ones. It might be objected that the initial pre-cognitive response was only a mechanical effect, not an intentional one. But in order for the mechanical effect to take place, the organism had to already preconsciously understand something about the action affordances of the environmental conditions. Otherwise the action would be to no avail. While it is true that initial pre-cognitive actions toward objects are very general and amorphous, in order to maintain real-time flexibility that will increase efficacy, the fact remains that the actions initiated at the precognitive level are not completely off base. We sense threat preconsciously and tense up, prior to cognitive understanding (or misunderstanding) of the nature and source of the threat. The intentionality is there. When I “displace” feelings onto a motorist who cuts me off, I know on some level that many other frustrating issues in my life are lurking in the background, and this is why I tense up when the motorist cuts me off. The subsequent identification of the motorist as the cause and the intentional object of my anger is only a cognitive deception. In a sense, as Gendlin (1992a, b) says, the body knows better, and this is why beating up the motorist usually does not satisfy the emotion. The affective impact of environmental conditions (past, present, or anticipated) need not be slowed down by their subtlety or intricacy. The internal complexity of a land mine does not prevent it from going off immediately when tripped. A particular insult may be only the tip of the iceberg of the emotion’s intentionality, and to beat up the person who insulted me may therefore miss the point. Not only would the feeling not achieve its aim; I also might not achieve the limited aim of understanding what the emotion is trying to tell me about my situation, which is the intentionality of the feeling. In order to allow an appropriate role for preconscious emotional intentionality, we must distinguish emotions from motivations without thereby equating the emotions with conscious feelings. Up to this point, the terms “emotion” and “motivation” have occurred repeatedly, and we have acknowledged the possibility of both conscious and unconscious emotions. However, motivation should not be equated simply with unconscious emotion. The relationship between these concepts is considerably more complex than that, as the next section will discuss.
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
.
Motivation, conscious emotion, and unconscious emotion
An old riddle asks how many psychiatrists are needed to change a light bulb. The answer: only one, but the light bulb must genuinely want to change. A psychiatrist can motivate a patient to move, or to change, but not in the way that a light bulb is moved or changed. Simply to push against something with a mechanical force is not necessarily a motivation, no matter how complex the mechanism that transmits, processes, or transforms the force into the object’s resulting motion. What, then, is the difference between motivation and mere movement? The self-organizational approach provides a clear way to make this distinction. We can speak of a system’s being motivated only in cases where the self-organizing system’s self-initiated aims toward maintaining its ongoing patterns of activity are necessary to supply the force for the movement. Since a light bulb is not a self-organizing system, and has no self-initiated aims, the usual psychiatric methods cannot motivate it, although as a last resort the psychiatrist can physically move the bulb. When a patient with high blood pressure takes medication to control the problem, he does not motivate his blood vessels to relax, but only causes them to relax. But when someone’s heart beat speeds up while making a play in an athletic game, it does so because the player is motivated. The player in our example may not realize until after the play is over that he felt nervous that he might not have been able to complete the play successfully, and that this nervousness was reflected in the increase in his heart rate and blood pressure. Yet the nervousness is properly referred to as an emotion rather than just a motivation. An emotion, as we saw earlier, can be present even though we are not conscious of it. The difference between a motivation and an emotion cannot be simply that an emotion is a conscious motivation, or the conscious result of a motivation. In that case, there would be no such thing as an unconscious emotion. In fact, we cannot even say that motivations lack an intentional understanding of the organism-environment relationship at some basic level, whereas emotions have such an understanding. There is a non-conscious sense of “understanding” in which even a plant can acquire, process and act on information about its environment, so in this sense even a plant has some simple understanding of the action affordances of its environment. If the light is not in the direction in which the plant has been growing, it changes the direction of growth to achieve self-organizational aims. But there is something about plants that we want to say precludes attributing “emotions” to them. How, then, can
Curious Emotions
we define precisely the difference between a motivation, an emotion, and any other biochemical process? To some extent, the way we make this distinction might be an arbitrary terminological convention, but here is the way I shall distinguish them in this book: An emotion is a process through which an organism monitors, in a coherent, unified way, how well it is doing in achieving and maintaining the various motivated patterns in its overall state, and forms a sense of what needs to be done vis a vis the environment in order to achieve or maintain the particular self-organizational balance that is motivated. For example, the feeling of fear alerts the organism that its bodily boundaries are in danger of penetration or injury, while anger means that freedom may be constrained. The motivations at stake here are the needs for freedom, security, and boundary integrity; these motivations could be present in organisms without emotion or consciousness, such as amoebae. To attribute emotion to an amoeba would seem clearly to be an anthropomorphism, but amoebae do behave in motivated ways. By contrast, emotions such as fear, in organisms sophisticated enough to be capable of such emotions, help them to monitor how they are doing with respect to freedom and boundary needs. This knowledge can then be used to make more complex decisions than an amoeba could make. By virtue of even a vague knowledge of how we are doing with respect to freedom and boundary needs, we also can form some sense of what kind of action needs to be taken. If there is a cue suggesting that our movement is about to be impeded, or that our boundary integrity is in danger of being violated, then it prereflectively makes emotional “sense” to move in a different direction. How an organism learns to recognize such cues is a complex story depending on empirical details which should not be presupposed by the mere definition of the word “emotion.” Definitions should leave empirical questions as open as possible, so that different claims can compete while sharing common definitions of terms, facilitating communication and debate. Suffice it to say for now that emotions can alert the organism that something is either going well or not going so well with respect to the organism’s motivating needs and values (its “motivations”), and there are certain environmental affordances that can serve as cues indicating, at least tentatively, that something may be “off.” For example, suppose the cue in question is a set of images suggesting that we are at a great height. Before an infant even knows what it is like to fall from a great height, it will instantly and instinctually recoil from such height, if the cues are sufficiently registered (Panksepp 1998: 215). But given what we saw earlier about the timing of brain events, we can assume that the fact that height affords falling is registered more quickly than the cortex can process enough
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
perceptual data to consciously identify the perceptual details of what we are looking at – a chasm for example. As soon as the most vague, minimal cues as to the action affordances of the chasm reach the thalamus (where they will be minimally processed and relayed to both perceptual and emotional brain areas), the organism already senses that something is “off ” and begins gearing up for possibly vigorous action to shift its momentum away from the direction of the chasm. This sensing of the holistic “offness” of the organism-environment relationship vis à vis the organism’s motivations (in this case, the motivation to preserve boundary integrity and control of its own movements) is already an emotion – fear – prior to the completion of perceptual and intellectual processing. If organismic motivations are already present prior to forming emotions to indicate how well we are doing with respect to them, then it is necessary to distinguish the terms “motivation” and “emotion.” Some organisms can have motivations and act on them without emotions. Even amoebae can readjust their behavior to restore homeostasis, given the right environmental conditions. To be motivated requires only that a system be self-organizing and complex enough to regulate its patterns of organization, readjusting its behavior in relation to the environment. In organisms incapable of emotion, the needed readjustment is an automatic aspect of the self-organizational pattern, although the environmental adaptiveness of individual organisms at this level is minimal (more extensive adaptation depending, for them, on genetic mutations and gradual evolutionary changes). An emotion, on the other hand, is a higher order phenomenon. In this case the organism does not only behave automatically to restore homeostasis. To be sure, it may respond quickly, but it also maintains a lingering sense of what is “off ” in the organism-environment relationship (“off ” with respect to self-organizational aims). The availability of this information makes possible not only a long range decision as to what is the best course of action, but also a balancing and prioritizing of the various motivations within the system. The more complex the self-organizing system, the more different ways there will be to balance disparate motives. This follows from the fact that complex dynamical systems, by definition, can rearrange elements of their subsystems to maintain a higher level pattern. They can appropriate and replace components as needed, can readjust the background conditions needed for various micro-level causal sequences, and can use multiple shunt mechanisms and feedback loops to ensure massive overcausation of the multiply realizable homeostatic aim. So when the balance of the whole is disrupted, the system must monitor the state of the whole in order to decide which of the many sub-
Curious Emotions
systems can best be re-adjusted – for example, the fear system, leading to hiding or relocation of the organism, or the anger system, leading to a getting rid of environmental impediments. The definitions being used here allow for the possibility of motivation without emotion. This does not preclude, however, that emotions themselves can motivate. There is nothing incoherent or nonsensical about making the claim that an emotion such as compassion, having been felt as an emotion, can then motivate kind behavior. To say this is only to say that the organism then wants to act in a kind way, and further environmental events can then either impede or facilitate the kind behavior, leading to still further emotions which may then motivate still further actions. Given the above definition of emotion, most people would want to allow for unconscious as well as conscious emotion, although powerful emotions do normally have a strong tendency to break into conscious awareness. It makes sense to acknowledge unconscious emotion, not just because the organism behaves in ways that are analogous to conscious emotion, but because it actually has information about what needs to be changed in the organism-environment system to satisfy the motivations reflected in the emotion. The athletic player who unconsciously “tenses up” understands that there is danger of making an error, and understands this in relation to the central aim of making the correct play, without having to pay conscious attention to what he is feeling (or to be more precise, not-feeling). This distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion might sometimes even be a distinction of degrees. The player in the example may actually have been slightly conscious of his nervousness before becoming fully aware of it, even though most of his consciousness was taken up with other things. In the same way, in Armstrong’s (1973) famous example of the truck driver whose driving is all unconscious, there may actually be a minimal level of consciousness of the cognitive decisions involved in driving, as Faw (2002), Natsoulas (2001), and Newton (2001) have suggested. But there is more to an unconscious emotion than a mere motivation. The emotion includes a balancing of the competing demands of the subordinate motivations of a number of sub-systems, and an overall sense of how this balance can relate to the environment.
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
. The murkiness of emotional intentionality Many theories of the higher affects – i.e., affects that are more complex than the simple ones on the “short lists” – not only assume that specific triggering stimuli are both the causes and the intentional objects of emotional responses, but also postulate that the intentionality of a feeling or emotion can be equated with the subject’s cognitive identification of its cause – that this determination is added by means of a cognition after the proprioceptive or interoceptive quality of the feeling is present. According to these “cognitivist” theories, I would feel certain bodily sensations and then theorize as to what environmental circumstances might have caused me to feel that way (Ben Ze’ev 2000). It is assumed that, the more complicated the cognitive assessment becomes in this interpretive process, the further removed will be the affect from the “basic” emotions from which it is derivative. For example, on the cognitivist account, I may feel a subtle combination of fear, anger, and sadness, and cognitively figure out that what I am feeling is resentment against someone who sharply criticized my work. According to the cognitivist approach to higher affects, elaborate intellectual and rational processes are necessary to determine the intentional referents of higher affects, and this is what makes them different from the “basic” emotions, which are hardwired to accompany specific types of objects and do not require such complicated intellectual processes. But we have already begun to see that unconditioned emotions can reveal complex information about the organism-environment relationship prior to cognitive assessments, and in all cases the emotional response is already underway before we have even processed the perceptual event presumed to trigger it. Cognitivism would have to be modified in this and a number of other respects in order to remain consistent with recent findings about the mammalian emotional brain. In the cognitivist framework, identifying the causes of our own feelings is essentially like any other inductive reasoning process. But this view has some strange consequences. The usual intellectual process of first associating two simple events with each other and then reasoning inductively that one must be the cause of the other would seem to be an abnormal way to determine the intentional “aboutness” of emotions and feelings – as in the case of the alexithymic’s feelings toward his wife. There are two main problems with positing an inductive reasoning process as the way we interpret the intentionality of emotions and feelings. In the first place, the “aboutness” of emotions cannot be as simple as a one-to-one correspondence between an immediate object and an interoceptive qualia; if the aims of emotions are self-organizational, the emotion will have its mean-
Curious Emotions
ing only in terms of a larger context, and the aim could just as effectively be achieved by adjusting other elements of the larger self-organizational picture as by taking a specific action toward a specific object. Anger, for example, might be about deep and complicated life frustrations, not about the trivial insult that triggers it. Love can be expressed through altruistic behavior or writing music as much as by sexual activity. In the second place, in order to assess whether a given object qualifies as the intentional object of an emotion or feeling, we must be able to compare it somehow with the felt quality itself to determine whether it does or does not resonate. If the intentionality of the feeling were not already implicit in the felt quality itself, then there would be no basis for such a comparison, and we could never know how we feel. If emotion were not pre-cognitively intentional, then a feeling of love might just as well be dizziness or an upset stomach. A mere conjunction between such feelings and some perceptual object cannot support an intentional or “aboutness” relation. In concert with my basic principle that emotions aim toward holistic selforganizational purposes, rather than toward specific environmental events, I shall argue that the higher affects do not result from an intellectual and cortically driven interpretation of discrete environmental “causes” of our feelings. If the aim of an emotion is to re-establish a holistic organizational balance in a complicated and interrelated set of organismic activities, then as Gendlin (1992a, b) suggests, the organism must already have a felt sense of the direction in which it is trying to move before identifying any specific object as helpful or hurtful toward that end; and whether an object is helpful or hurtful will have to be assessed in terms of the body’s holistic sense of its total life situation, not just in terms of what is going on in the environment at the immediate present moment. Lacking such a felt sense in the emotion itself, it would be impossible to know whether a given environmental circumstance resonated with the feeling in the way needed to qualify as the feeling’s intentional object. Moreover, assessing what is wrong will not be nearly as simple or straightforward as identifying a perceptual object. If what immediately presents itself in perception is the motorist cutting in front of me, this does not mean that the motorist cutting in front of me is simply what the emotion is really about, or what causes it, or what the emotion aims primarily to change. In many cases, if not all, beating up the motorist will leave the underlying anger and frustration intact, because he is not what they are really “about.” In this more complicated kind of case, to determine what the emotion is really about will require that I delve into the emotion itself as directly felt, so as to see whether the motorist’s cutting in front of me can qualify as an adequate
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
explanation of it. But meanwhile, as Gendlin (1980 1992a, b, 1998) stresses, the felt quality of the emotion must have a fine-tuned specificity; otherwise I would not be able to identify its intentional object by reference to that specificity. Thus the aboutness of the emotion cannot result from attributing an object to it, but on the contrary we can know which objects are associated with the emotion only by reference to the intentional aboutness already present in the emotion. We must already have a sense of what the objectives are in relation to which an object or complex of environmental conditions presents itself as helpful or thwarting – if not, we could never figure out by means of cognitive activities what an emotion really wants to happen – i.e., what its aims are. Even in these more complicated cases, there are methods of getting at the murky holistic intentional referents of emotional feelings, many of which are initially unconscious. But before discussing this problem, it is vital to recognize some further conceptual distinctions, especially the distinctions between the aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles of affective experiences.
. Aims, objects, triggers, and symbolization-vehicles On the self-organizational view, the precognitive emotion knows that it is about something, but the aboutness is vague and general; the felt sense has not yet pinpointed exactly what it is about, although it knows generally what kind of issue is involved. In the example involving the motorist, constriction of my projected patterns of activity is clearly a major issue; I am prevented from moving ahead in a chosen ongoing direction. But at the point when the motorist is perceived as the object, the cognitive assessment is no closer to identifying the real object than is the precognitive felt sense, although a careful following through with an appropriate self-questioning process can draw out the intentionality that is implicitly present in the felt sense. It will do so not through perception, logical reasoning, or any other “cognitive” process (in the corticocentric sense that cognitivism would suggest), but by listening more carefully to the felt sense and observing what kinds of images and symbols tend to pull it up more intensely. Gendlin (1992a) suggests that when we do carefully direct our attention to the felt sense itself rather than the objective event that triggered it, we can then notice that certain imaginings tend to relax or satisfy the feeling in a more holistic way than others. For example, if the image of telling off my boss and quitting my job suddenly produces a shift in the felt sense of the anger, and if at this point the image of the motorist no longer pulls up the intensity of
Curious Emotions
it, I then know that it is not really directed at the motorist, but instead the motorist’s behavior was only a convenient symbol for pulling up the feeling. This can be recognized still more decisively by the fact that, as soon as I realize that the feeling is really more about my job than about the motorist, I no longer even feel very angry at the motorist. The image of the motorist no longer even presents itself as a primary object of the feeling, and this image no longer pulls up the feeling very intensely. When I form the image of his cutting me off, I no longer want to fight or kill him. The images that initially pull up a feeling are not usually the same ones that finally satisfy it in the sense of relaxing its tension. This way of getting at the implicit intentionality of feelings will be explored more fully as we proceed. Gendlin (1980) calls it “focusing”: we pull an affective quality into better focus so as to get at its meanings. How would I know to entertain this image of telling off my boss and quitting my job to begin with? Again, this can be inferred from careful observation of the quality of the felt sense itself. For example, I may notice that the point at which the feeling becomes most sharply intensified is when I remember how the motorist arrogantly ignored me when I tried to block his move. It is a short step from this observation to realize that thinking of anyone arrogantly ignoring my efforts in this way pulls up the same felt quality with the same intensity – and that the most important example of a person who seems to do this is my boss. But the image of the motorist cutting his car in front of me is more vivid and simple than any physical image of my boss, so it works better at pulling up the feeling and calling it to my attention. It may even turn out, in some instances, that what is really “arrogantly ignoring” me is not the individual, my boss, but a complicated abstraction – my entire profession, including the way it is organized, the way it prevents the changes I want to promote, by means of ignoring new proposals and intricate organizational methods that ensure that such new proposals will be very difficult to make themselves heard. In that case, it may be that what my preconscious felt sense of the situation needed was a simpler example consisting of a symbolizing vehicle to help me make conscious contact with the preconscious felt sense – the vivid physical image of a specific individual motorist cutting in front of me and arrogantly ignoring my attempts to block him, rather than the complicated and amorphous “system” or “situation” that is the real problem. Further exploration, then, may reveal that the boss, like the motorist, is only a symbolization vehicle for explicating the sense of a much more complicated environmental situation in relation to which self-organizational aims will need to work themselves out, in some one of many possible ways. As the intentional meaning of the felt sense develops, the affective response to the trig-
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
gering event can also change; now it is not the motorist’s insulting behavior that bothers me, but the fact that he was oblivious to my very existence. I was too insignificant to qualify even for a personal insult. So far, I have argued that identifying the object or the cause of an affective feeling is no simple matter. Ironically, it is the cognitivists who seem most strongly to agree with this point, insisting that a feeling per se does not identify its cause, i.e., that we must add the causal interpretation in thought after we have felt the feeling. In some ways, this viewpoint is in agreement with the selforganizational point that qualia do not pinpoint specific objects, but instead refer to general action affordances of the environment in relation to the organism’s holistic condition. But the reason the qualia cannot pinpoint the object is not because cognitive processes are better able to do so; it is because the real object of the emotion is not as specific to begin with as the cognitive processes initially take them to be. Cognitively, it may seem that the motorist who cut me off caused my anger; in reality, his behavior was only a convenient vehicle (no pun intended) through which to express an anger that was already present on an unconscious basis, an anger whose aims and objects have nothing to do with the motorist who cut me off. The emotion would have been just the same had the motorist not cut me off. It would have found some other occasion to express itself. The motorist’s behavior is being used as a symbol, just as an artist might use the image of a dog in a painting as a symbol of the idea of fidelity. The important point is that removing cognition from emotion does not leave mere interoceptive sensation. If emotion were merely interoceptive sensation plus cognition, then the “what it’s like” content or qualia of emotions would be fully given in interoception. What is missing in such accounts, as Watt (2000) points out, is precisely the valence that emotions attribute to a given situation, which again is seldom reducible to the mere interoception and proprioception of pain stimuli coming from the viscera or other parts of the body. Most of us know the difference between a negative emotion and a stomach ache. If emotional feelings were merely perception plus interoception, then it would be impossible to distinguish between an emotional feeling and the delivery of a perceptual-like signal from the periphery or the viscera of the body – i.e., proprioceptive or interoceptive sensation. It is true that emotions typically involve interoception, but they also involve much more than that. It is possible through certain types of anaesthetics and damage to nervous tissues (for example, the nociceptors) to dissociate proprioceptive or interoceptive pain sensations from their evaluative valence, so that we know we are in pain, and clearly receive the signal telling us that our hand is burning – without feeling the pain as consciously hurting (Newton 1989b; Damasio 1999). What is most
Curious Emotions
interesting about this phenomenon is that we will spontaneously withdraw the hand, even though the pain does not consciously “hurt.” So there is an intentionality there in the pain, even though the type of nociceptors that deliver the evaluative component of the pain sensation may be incapacitated. Before pain achieves a conscious status, we have already initiated actions to deal with it. Many might try to write off this preconscious intentionality as a kind of pseudo-intentionality, since it might be explainable as a merely mechanical and meaningless causal response. But we cannot escape the fact that, when I feel afraid of a snake, before I realize cognitively that what has been presented is a snake or even a threatening object, and before the object is even visually processed, the emotion is already taking actions to avoid the snake, very similar to the actions that will be continued even after the image of the snake has become conscious. What is revealed in the phenomenological reflection on the fear of the snake is not that a mechanical interaction with the snake is taking place, about which I now begin to feel a certain emotion. What is revealed is that the emotion was already being felt, and is now moving from a prereflective to a reflective status. In the process, the what-content of its intentionality may become more sophisticated, or simply different, but it does not acquire intentionality per se at this point. It only modifies a pre-existing felt sense and intentional content of the experience. Damasio makes this notion of prereflective emotion do a great deal of work in his theory of consciousness. How can an emotion already have intentionality prior to perception and cognition? As Jarvilehto (1997) points out, a situation’s action affordances can be assessed, at least to some extent, independently of intellectual processing of inputs, because the success or failure of our own attempts to act in certain ways – which is determined essentially through efferent nervous activity (signals sent outward to the body’s action systems) – can yield information about the environment, and this can be done even without processing of perceptual inputs, which requires afferent nervous activity (signals received from nervous areas earlier in a processing stream). Jarvilehto’s argument is that even without the afferent input, merely efferent activity, essentially by itself (with the help only of efferent copy, or feedback indicating that the body’s own moving parts have received the efferent commands), can in principle reveal information about the environment; that is, it can reveal its action affordances, which can even be used to construct a working map of the environment. Not much perceptual detail is needed to reveal very general contours of environmental obstructions or facilitations. Moreover, as the ERP (event related potential) data discussed earlier clearly show, the activity that tells the organism generally what kind of action it wants to do are more quickly accessible than any
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
perception. The resulting knowledge of action affordances is not precise or certain, and in actually existing organisms it is always supplemented by perceptual and cognitive assessments. But if emotion is self-organizational, then its qualities will be felt more efferently than afferently. This is why the knowledge that something is “off ” in the organism-environment relation is vague and murky. It reveals a holistic imbalance without specifying exactly what is causing the imbalance. Nonetheless, it has an amorphous sense of what general type of action is likely to be relevant. This remains true despite the fact that such vaguely and intuitively determined actions sometimes must be taken swiftly and decisively. The intentionality of a feeling is complex, murky, and holistically contextual. Correlatively, intentionality, whether conscious or preconscious, must involve more than simply reacting causally to a stimulus. Husserl (1913) emphasized this distinction between psychophysical causes of experiences and intentional objects of experiences, as do contemporary consciousness theorists such as Gillett and McMillan (2001). In the thinking of the classical phenomenologists (Husserl 1913; Merleau-Ponty 1941, 1942), intentionality is an “aboutness” relation, where the subject is the individual whose mental act is taking place, and the object is what this act is focused on; yet the “what” that is focused on here may not be the same as the psychophysical cause of the experience. They thus emphasize that we should not confuse the psychophysical cause either with what the experience is “about”or with the perceptual object at that moment. This is especially the case in the realm of the intentionality of emotion, where the psychophysical cause may be only a trigger for an emotion, and not at all what the emotion is really “about” – as in the example of the motorist who cuts me off. The intentional object(s) of a feeling may be distinguishable from both perceptual and imaginative objects, as well as from the physiological or environmental causes of the feeling. What a feeling is really about (its intentional object or objects) can be completely different from the physical workings of the brain (its causes), but also will not necessarily be the same as the perceptual and imaginative objects that are concurrent with the feeling. For example, a jogger with high blood pressure may experience feelings of agitation caused by physiological changes, while his perceptual intentional object at that moment is a barking dog. He may then form the imaginative intentional object of a dog that once bit him. Here we have both a psychophysical cause (high blood pressure) and an imaginative intentional object (the past dog) neither of which is to be confused with the perceptual dog that is present (the dog that is barking now). Neither the imaginative nor the perceptual object may play much of a role in the real intentionality of the emotion; it may be, for example, that the
Curious Emotions
jogger was thinking a few moments earlier of an argument with his wife that occurred weeks before, which contributed to the raising of his blood pressure, and primed him to look for an object for irritable emotional expression. The barking dog at that point may not even be a primary cause of the emotion, but only a long-sought opportunity to act out an emotion that was already present, but at a preconscious level. Generally, the aim of any emotion is distinguishable from the psychophysical events that trigger it, because the aim can be achieved by means of a variety of adjustments, and is more general than any specific action in relation to a specific object; the aim, again, is to maintain a self-organizational pattern of self-initiated and ongoing activity, with the specific object functioning only as a helpful or thwarting element that may be appropriated for the organism’s purposes, or may be difficult to appropriate for those purposes. The jogger in our example has his motivational reasons for not wanting to re-open the argument with his wife or dwell on his lingering anger at her: all things considered, the obnoxious little barking dog serves as a better symbolization vehicle to help concretize the feelings. To be sure, the image of the barking dog plays a role in helping to get the feelings “pulled up” into consciousness, but it is not primarily what they are about. A more mundane example of this principle can be found in the experience of abnormal subjects, such as in bipolar syndrome. It is a truism that the bipolar will find something in the environment to regard as the cause and intentional object of depression or elation – for example, the death of a favorite movie star. Someone may think that this dynamic characterizes only abnormal cases, and that “normal” people really can easily and unambiguously identify the objects of their emotions with the perceptual objects that are simultaneous with the feeling of the emotions. In my view, that would be an abnormal case. We all frequently use current objects as opportunities to explore and unfold continuing emotional processes. What is atypical is the rare case where a simple object, such as a snake, elicits a hardwired emotional response, such as fear. Even in that case, we observe that a “swamp-wise,” seasoned snake handler feels no fear around snakes, although he behaves cautiously. This is not to deny that certain situations are initially hardwired to elicit certain emotions. We come into the world primed to look for a smiling face and to be pleased when we see one (Baresi & Moore 1996; Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993), and we initially fear heights (Panksepp 1998). These “initialized settings” in our emotional constitution are very helpful in the care of the young, and thus evolutionarily adaptive. In fact, some specific conditions, such as extreme height, will always signal unmitigated danger, and only in the most abnormal cases will
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
those initialized settings ever be overwritten. But, generally speaking, it is most adaptive, in an intelligent and discriminative being, for the initial settings to be flexible. Not only learning, but also the natural patterns of maturation will change them in accordance with what works best for the changing patterns of organization of the developing organism. But again, the intentional meaning signaled by an emotion relates to an aim that in principle is always multiplyrealizable for a self-organizational structure, and it would actually be maladaptive for such a structure to become locked into a one-to-one correspondence between a particular stimulus and a particular response. It has been suggested that successful jazz musicians have a much better recovery rate from heroin addiction than the average addict (Hentoff 1973). Hentoff ’s explanation, consistent with Rollo May’s (1962) conceptualization of anxiety, is that a person whose addiction is only a small part of an ongoing life project, which is experienced as meaningful enough to be worth the hard recovery work, will have a better chance of getting through the necessary anxiety adequately. The temptation of even the intense pleasure of heroin is experienced differently, depending on its context in a holistic selforganizing movement toward larger aims and purposes that are strongly desired by the organism. Correlatively, still another advantage of the self-organizational approach, which allows the organism to act rather than just react, is that one kind of action consists of changing the pattern of functioning to one that is better. Complex self-organizing beings can change their overall structure – in conscious beings, this would mean personality change (discussed later in this book) – because part of what self organization means is that the system can rearrange the background conditions needed to facilitate a certain pattern’s happening; if so, then the system can also decide to rearrange the background conditions in such a way that a different pattern can occur, and then can seek out and appropriate the micro-level causal elements needed to make the new pattern occur. The way the self-organizing system changes its patterns is the same as the way it maintains an existing one – by actively appropriating the needed causal substrata to make it happen. Of course, this requires breaking the inertia of the existing pattern, but we humans do this all the time: Later I shall discuss a fundamental tendency in complex self-organizing systems toward “extropy,” or higherenergy basins of attraction, which differ from (and sometimes conflict with) consummatory drive-reduction, and which ground the exploratory, curiosity, nurturing, play, and social interaction tendencies in complex organisms, engaged in for their own sake and not just as means toward consummatory drive reduction.
Curious Emotions
An example of self-initiated pattern change is the “Fartlek” method of training for running, in which we alternate running fast and slow, gradually increasing the distance of the fast segments. Most amateur runners incline toward just the opposite method – to start with the same distance they have always run, and gradually increase the speed, but without much success, because the body naturally lapses into the old patterns of slower running, since the body remains in its old metabolic patterns. What works better is to increase the speed for a shorter distance, and then gradually increase the distance. The body is always willing to temporarily vary the way it functions, so we can take advantage of this willingness by getting the body into the habit of doing something it previously did only sporadically, and it learns to execute the more elementary capabilities (e.g., metabolizing sugar, delivering oxygen to the tissues) at different times and in different contexts from before. As a result, the body learns to shift into a new pattern of metabolism to support the new demands placed on it. After training in this way, the metabolism is generally increased. By the same token, we can train the body to change its patterns so that we no longer have nicotine cravings, no longer need the afternoon “high” from eating sugar, etc. This interconnects with a favorite point of moral philosophers, for example Aristotle, who emphasize the importance of habit – that we can apply the principles of psychological habit change to ourselves to change our personalities. This of course trumps Kant’s “ought implies can” in the ethical domain, because we can learn to do things that we previously could not do, if we re-train ourselves. Such self-retraining occurs primarily in humans because humans have more vivid imagination for non-existent states of affairs. We can imagine our own selves as enacting patterns that they do not now enact, and then calculate how to get ourselves into those new patterns. Thus we tend to hold humans morally responsible in spite of their predetermined psychological dispositions, whereas it would be absurd to hold lower animals morally responsible in this way. Our predetermination prepares us for the ability to change when required. More concretely, action imagery can consist of patterns of action in which we have not yet engaged, just as sensory imagery can depict sensory patterns that we have not yet seen. Having imagined a pattern of activity that would be better for one reason or another, we can then imagine what internal and external conditions would have to be rearranged to get us into the imagined action pattern. Dynamical systems make room for this kind of system change and not only for system maintenance. In self-organizing systems, one small change, if it occurs in the right place, can shift the whole system into a completely different pattern. In conscious beings, for example, the small component in question
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
could be a tacit presupposition that previously had been unexamined. In such cases, the trigger for system change can often be that some small component of the pattern turns out not to be any longer workable, and as a result the whole pattern goes into crisis and is finally perceived to be inadequate as a whole. In dynamical systems, the very removal of a component of the earlier pattern can automatically shift a system into a different pattern; if the resulting pattern then is not a very desirable one from the standpoint of “meta-emotional” evaluation, then humans are able to use their vivid capacity for imagination to find a better version of the new pattern. A complex dynamical system is flexible, and this flexibility extends to its ability to use objects to symbolize complex emotional situations. This is why it is so important to distinguish between the intentional object of a feeling and a perceived or imagined object that serves only as a symbolization vehicle – but at the same time we must remember that the true intentional emotional object of a feeling should not be confused with its physical cause. While the cause of an emotion may not be the same thing as what the emotion is about, or its intentional object, there is still a sense in which what makes an emotion “fully intentional” is that we correctly or incorrectly associate it with certain environmental components of its causation, as Salmela (2002) suggests. Damasio (1999) points out that all consciousness involves imagery of some sort (not just visual or auditory, but also proprioceptive, interoceptive, and sensorimotor imagery, and not only vivid but also muddled and truncated imagery). So it may well be that attributing a causal story to the emotion plays the role of explicating the emotion in the sense that it provides imagery that can pull up and intensify the felt sense of the emotion. Consider the case where the imagery that we entertain in explicating an emotion is known not to be its cause – for example, when a certain piece of music evokes feelings that we learn, as we explore them, are about serious life issues such as death and powerlessness. The music is not what causes us to have these despairing feelings, and we know this, yet the music serves to allow us a very usable medium through which to explore and explicate those feelings. In another case, I may have a certain feeling that I can “pull up” into full awareness by thinking of the Dutch boy trying to hold back the water with his finger in the hole in the dyke. The image only serves as an effective symbol to help pull up the feeling – it is not what the feeling is about. Even if it serves as a metaphor for what the feeling is about, this is only because I have made it serve in this way; other images could also have been used. In such cases, the image is known not to be the cause of the feeling, but just the reverse: I have chosen the image
Curious Emotions
because it worked well in pulling up and allowing me to focus attention on that felt sense. This last point is not meant to imply that the selection of the objects that trigger a felt sense is merely arbitrary. On the contrary, most images cannot work to trigger a given feeling. But neither does this imply that an image that initially succeeds in triggering a specific affective quality is simply what the affect is “about,” regardless of its total contextualization in the aim-directed life of the organism in relation to complex and variable environmental constraints. How, then, are specific objective triggering images relevant in the intentionality of emotion? And more generally, what is the role of imagery in making emotions conscious? The next section will explore these questions.
. The roles of sensation, interoception, and sensorimotor action imagery If a triggering image does not necessarily need to represent what an emotion is about, then what is the role of imagery in making emotions fully conscious? In my view, the key question here is whether the imagery involved is merely sensory imagery, associated with a causal story, combined with proprioceptive/interoceptive imagery, revealing the tingles, chills, and stomach churnings of the emotion’s felt quality, or whether on the contrary emotions also require sensorimotor action imagery. Whether Damasio is right or not in claiming that imagery is necessary for consciousness, it seems obvious from the critique of cognitivism that to have emotions requires more than just interoception, and more than sensory imagery, and more than a combination of the two. This would suggest that there is another type of imagery, beyond either interoception or sensation, that is important for emotion. This other kind of imagery is sensorimotor imagery. It differs from proprioceptive and interoceptive imagery in a way that is crucially important for our purposes. Whereas proprioception and interoception are characterized by a passive receiving of information from the periphery or from the viscera, sensorimotor imagery requires that the organism, acting out of its self-organizational aims, initiate an action command and deliver this action command to other parts of its nervous system (Jeannerod 1997). When the action command is inhibited, sensorimotor imagery results. We do not have to act in order to have action imagery. On the contrary, as Jeannerod shows, when we actually perform an action, we do not pay much if any conscious attention to the action imagery. It is when we inhibit the
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
motor command that we are most fully conscious of the action image as a mental image. While action imagery is clearly distinguishable from sensory or interoceptive imagery – for example, because it involves a cortically inhibited efferent signal, whereas sensation and interoception involve afferent signals – it can also be argued that for sensation, proprioception, or interoception to rise to the level of consciousness requires that action imagery already have been present, at least in the preconscious sense that an inhibited action command has been sent. For example, tracking of subcortically originated neurotransmitter activity shows that this activity must precede perceptual or cognitive consciousness. We have already seen that event related potentials (ERPs) and other brain activity measures show that emotional brain areas are activated earlier than perceptual processing areas even in perceptual and imaginative consciousness (Aftanas et al. 2001; Aurell 1989; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002). Moreover, the perceptual processing does not lead to consciousness of the object unless the emotional areas have already been activated, and unless they in turn activate brain areas associated with attention, such as frontal and anterior cingulate areas (Bernstein et al. 2000). And, as already noted, contemporary work on the cerebellum (Schmahmann 1997; Schmahmann et al. 2001) shows that the cerebellum, traditionally associated with motor routines, is a necessary way-station in this process, so that even conscious perception and cognitive skills depend on certain kinds of action commands being elaborated by the cerebellum, even though those action commands will be inhibited and quickly modified during the course of a perceptual experience. This notion that emotion and motivation ground all other forms of consciousness, including perceptual consciousness, is one of the most controversial claims of contemporary enactivism, and the entire next chapter will be devoted to supporting it. What I am arguing for here is an extension of Newton’s (1996) “action theory of intentionality,” where the understanding of a perceptual object involves imagining, at least at a preconscious and habituated level, how I could act in relation to the object in various ways. I understand that a baseball is moving toward my head, in the first analysis, because I can imagine catching it, hitting it, or ducking out of the way of it. Only later do I notice that it has seams and is green and yellow. To imagine green or yellow, in turn, means to imagine myself performing certain actions (in this case, actions of the anterior cingulate and frontal activity that constitutes paying attention to color phenomena, along with the appropriate vibrations of the retina and firing of the frontal eye fields). I may not know that I am performing all these actions, but I am doing so nonetheless. In artificial situations that restrain these actions,
Curious Emotions
such as the experimental paradigms of the Mack and Rock (1998) inattentional blindness studies mentioned earlier, we can see that failure to initiate these action commands results in lack of perceptual consciousness. Informally, we can notice the same effect when we fail to pay attention to a TV commercial, and thus do not consciously register it even though we are looking in the direction of the TV. In short, we must actively do much more than merely open our eyes in order to be conscious of visual information. This point will be explored much further in the next chapter. Emotional intentionality differs from the intentionality of other forms of experience in part because the roles of cause and effect are just the reverse of those other forms. Emotion is a barometer of the body’s dynamical activity, not just through interoception/proprioception, but through whether or not actions can be performed consistently with the patterns of activity in which the organism wants to engage. We know whether we are performing an action effortfully or effortlessly partly through proprioception (afferent feedback), but we also know this difference through the quality of sensorimotor imagery. Emotions deliver causal impact to other systems, and imagery comes about by means of the emotions’ directing attention to the imagery. It is a mistake to think of emotions as on the receiving end of the inputs of an information processing machine. They are on the sending end of the information, and what they send partly determines the feedback that we get from the external input sources; they propose, and the external input sources dispose, not the other way around. At the same time, I shall argue that there must be sensory or interoceptive imagery (in addition to sensorimotor action commands) in order for an emotion to become fully conscious. The reason is that we often can act without any consciousness intervening at all. So in some way it seems that sensory, proprioceptive, and interoceptive imagery are necessary for the full consciousness of emotion, yet the emotion itself tends to select and direct attention toward this imagery, based on its own action commands. Emotions are already ongoing, at least at a preconscious level, before the imagery based on the input from the triggering environmental event is processed. The emotions result from the ongoing activity of a dynamical system, and this activity is not caused by inputs, but only disturbed by them. When we are not aware of what is disturbing our emotional activity, or have no imagistic hypotheses about it, our emotion remains at a preconscious level. But when we entertain relevant imagery, this allows us to pull up the emotion into full awareness. This claim that emotion directs and is presupposed by other conscious states is, as I have said, a controversial one. Let’s proceed, then, to a full defense
Chapter 1. Preconscious emotional intentionality
of it, which is presented in the next chapter. Then in subsequent chapters we can explore the way a dynamical systems analysis can affect our understanding of the workings of specific emotional systems.
Chapter 2
Motivated attention in action How emotion creates conscious intentionality
The enactive approach begins with the thesis that affective intentionality must be understood as grounded in the system’s motivations to act, which can be as complex as the dynamical patterns they are meant to maintain. If this thesis is true, it follows that emotions are not merely responses to given stimuli, but actively seek out usable environmental affordances; thus the same emotion can be realized in relation to a wide variety of alternative environmental conditions. Moreover, if the needs of a complex dynamical system determine the aims of the organism, the emotions will monitor how well the total organism is doing in relation to its entire environmental situation, including aspects that are not immediately present. This means that the intentional objects of emotions are not as specific as those of other conscious states, such as perception, imagination, and logical thought – and that the intentionality of emotion is murky, open-ended and ambiguous because the aims of emotions are holistic and multiply realizable. This would be a somewhat unsatisfying state of affairs for those who wish to study specific emotional processes unless we can establish a framework for the ways in which emotions and their intentional objects interrelate and interact. This chapter will argue in effect that the relation of an affect to its intentional “aboutness” is almost the reverse of what the stimulus-response and information-processing models might suggest. Emotions are not responses to stimuli, but instead are ongoing, holistically motivated processes that attempt to use environmental affordances to further their self-organizational aims, which are built up in complex ways from the various needs that arise for living organisms in maintaining their relatively stable patterns of activity. Affective processes select environmental objects because of their possible affordances, and then process them to greater or lesser extents as determined by the continuing analysis of their utility valences. This implies, ultimately, that motivation determines the focus of attention and must be in play in order for those attended contents to come into sharp consciousness. This is a controversial issue, but it is necessary to confront it
Curious Emotions
in order to understand the relationship between emotion and its intentional objects in the right way. I shall argue here that the entire brain is organized around the principle that motivation drives all other conscious processes rather than merely responding to their resulting contents. In fact, I want to argue that the essential difference between conscious and non-conscious information processing is that the former necessarily is “enactive,” whereas non-conscious information processing may often be largely “reactive.” And this, in conjunction with certain considerations about the way the brain works, implies the even more radical thesis that there can be no intentional consciousness without motivation. Let’s begin with the perceptual contents of consciousness. We saw earlier that Rolls insists that we must first process perceptual signals, at least to some extent, before we can respond emotionally to them, and that this early processing is not dependent on the organism’s motivational state. However, the Mack and Rock (1998) extensive studies of inattentional blindness suggest that there is no conscious perception unless attention is first directed toward a stimulus in order to see what is there. It is not merely that perceptual stimulation can cause attention, but just the reverse seems to be true: if an attentional act is not first executed, perceptual contents do not attain the status of consciousness, and we are not aware of what we have seen – nor is it processed as fully as it would be if we were conscious of it. Failure to see objects within the visual field because attention is otherwise occupied, or “inattentional blindness,” can therefore be a rich source for rethinking the relationships between attentional mechanisms and motivational processes, and can also be relevant to the most basic aspects of the attempts to develop theories of consciousness in general – i.e., to understand the differences between conscious and non-conscious information processing. The Mack and Rock inattentional blindness findings are highly consistent with theories in which the property of consciousness arises from endogenously generated, motivationally directed “actions,” defined in contrast to mere “reactions” to the corresponding information processing. Correlatively, the inattentional blindness findings are less reconcilable with other types of theories of consciousness, which I shall generically term “reactive” theories. When already involved in a visual task requiring attention, subjects fail to see briefly presented visual elements extraneous to the attentional task in contexts where they normally would be seen. In most of these cases (and this is an oft-neglected fact in discussions of inattentional blindness), Mack and Rock cannot even detect any better-than-chance “implicit perception” knowledge about the unseen object. The main exception to this rule involves certain
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
trials in which meaningful words are presented as the unattended stimulus; in those cases, but seemingly only in those cases, subjects have better than chance knowledge of the object presented although they do not consciously see it. Of course, the failure to detect implicit perception in most of the experimental contexts reported does not prove that there is none, but the fact that Mack and Rock explicitly look for an implicit perception effect in such contexts and yet fail to find it cannot be overlooked. The inattentional blindness effect is consistent across a variety of different research designs reported by Mack and Rock. In a typical experimental design, the subjects are asked to determine which arm of a cross is longer than the other, and then while they are involved in this task a small image is presented in various places within or near this zone of attention, for a short time in the neighborhood of 200–250 ms. In many of the experimental paradigms, most subjects fail to see the extraneous image, even though control subjects (whose attention is not otherwise occupied) consistently see it quite clearly. Except for the trials involving meaningful words as priming stimuli (which will be discussed below), “when asked to pick out the critical stimulus from an array of alternatives, their performance did not differ from chance” (Mack & Rock 1998: 13, italics added). I.e., subjects exhibiting inattentional blindness in most instances did not even show implicit knowledge of the unseen stimulus, at least as far as Mack and Rock could detect. Again, this does not necessarily mean that there is no implicit perception, but the explicit failure to detect it must be taken into account. One might ask whether the statement that perceptual consciousness requires attention is a mere tautology, since “in this book, the term attention is used to refer to the process that brings a stimulus into consciousness” (Mack & Rock 1998: 25). But what is being said is actually quite substantive and surprising: A fuller definition of attention is that “to look and try to find something is to attend to the array in which it might be present and to intend to see it” (Mack & Rock 1998: 5). Attention is an act that can lead to perception rather than just following from it. Thus “attention, when otherwise engaged, must be captured before perception can occur” (Mack & Rock 1998: 18, italics added). The surprising finding, then, is that we must always pay attention to something before we can consciously see it. The attention is a precondition for the conscious perception rather than merely a result of it. This does not mean that our attention cannot be involuntarily attracted to something; but there seem to be surprisingly few types of objects that can attract attention when otherwise occupied – for example, an extremely large object, a fairly large moving object, or a cartoon of a smiling face. Interestingly,
Curious Emotions
neither a similar frowning or neutral face, nor a small moving object attracts the subject’s attention when otherwise occupied. This would seem to imply that pre-perceptual categories and mechanisms are involved in controlling the direction of attention, no matter how seemingly passive it is. These findings are intriguingly consistent with an enactive theory of consciousness, in which emotional activation of subcortical and anterior brain areas is necessary before conscious information processing can occur. According to enactivists, when the motivation to pay attention is missing, there can be virtually complete occipital activation with no perceptual consciousness; the organism must motivatedly search its environment (as reflected in anterior and subcortical brain activity) before visual stimulation of occipital areas can lead to consciousness (Aftanas et al. 2001; Aurell 1984, 1989; Bernstein et al. 2000; Panksepp 1998; Watt 1998, 2000). On the enactive view, the element of consciousness, above and beyond mere nonconscious data processing, is contributed by brain areas associated with the organism’s motivational interest in processing certain kinds of environmental stimuli while ignoring others. The idea that attention is motivated, of course, is not new in psychology, nor is the view that limbic and subcortical emotional processes play a role in directing attention. What is uniquely a prediction of enactive theories is that no consciousness can occur without motivated attention – that cortical activity produces only nonconscious information processing which can become conscious only in the case where emotional processes lead to a motivated attentive act. Enactivism is thus in contrast to the thinking of many investigators, who assume that the consciousness of higher cognitive contents, such as perception and logical thinking, is subserved primarily by cortical brain areas, while affective consciousness is subserved by subcortical and limbic activity, and that motivational activity is not a precondition for conscious perception and thought, except in the somewhat trivial sense that the needed neurotransmitters and energy sources must be released into the cortex to produce arousal. On this view, the subcortex functions like a power switch for the cortex, and as long as the power is supplied to the cortex in one way or another (for example, it might be possible to experimentally deliver it by artificial means), no further subcortical activity would be necessary for consciousness. This would constitute an extremely modular approach, where different brain areas subserve different forms of consciousness. An extreme modularity of perceptual, intellectual and affective states of consciousness would thus contradict the enactivist account of the effects of subcortical and limbic functions on all forms of consciousness, including conscious perception and attention. The modu-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
lar cognitivist model also overlooks evolutionary trends that would tend to set up a critical relationship between higher and lower systems, where the laterdeveloped systems would be an incremental addition to and modification of the earlier. Without an incremental evolutionary perspective, the brain may not be seen as a fully integrated system. Some authors explicitly hold an extreme version of this modular view with respect to the relations between emotional and perceptual processes (Gazzaniga 2000; Rolls 1999; LeDoux 1996), while others believe there is not yet enough evidence to decide whether the reactivist or the enactivist approach to cognitive and perceptual consciousness is warranted, arguing that this remains an open question (Faw 2000). Some go so far as to argue that not only are motivational brain processes not essential to consciousness, but just the reverse – that it is the cortical cognitive processes that supply the element of consciousness over and above the subcortical functions, which themselves are unconscious until the cortex plays its role (Jackendoff 1996; LeDoux 1996). This would be the extreme antithesis of the enactive view, if we assume that the subcortical and limbic systems are important monitors of the body’s selforganizational tendencies. We shall see increasingly throughout this book that self-organization is at the heart of the distinction between enactive and reactive mechanisms. An enactivist theory of the relationship between consciousness and the brain predicts the Mack and Rock findings, since enactivism implies that motivated attention, either voluntary or involuntary, is needed for consciousness. One reason such theories have been slow in gaining acceptance has been an absence of conclusive empirical evidence of the kind that Mack and Rock present. Contrary to enactive theories, it is often assumed that perceptual consciousness is passively caused, primarily in the cortex (and in corticothalamic loops) by input from the perceptual object rather than being caused by the organism’s own self-regulated activity, which enactivists believe determines the motivation for the direction of attention. The reactivist position would view the substrates of perceptual consciousness as the same brain processes that subserve the corresponding perceptual information processing – primarily cortical areas looping with the thalamus in response to perceptual input. While most investigators of the thalamus grant that the “thalamocortical loops” can do nothing absent brainstem influences, they see the brainstem role in “higher” cognitive, perceptual, and conscious functions primarily as one of arousing and activating the brain areas involved in producing these forms of consciousness. It is true, of course, that there can be selection and extensive processing of a food stimulus, for example, without this selection’s being driven at an early
Curious Emotions
processing stage by hunger, and that we can be conscious of the food stimulus in the absence of hunger (Rolls 1999). But this does not mean that motivational processes more broadly construed do not affect selection for conscious attention at an early stage, especially if we view Panksepp’s “seeking” system in the brain as a motivational system that can direct attention toward interesting, meaningful, or potentially useful objects. This point will be discussed further as we proceed. The possible connection between inattentional blindness and enactivism is suggestive because, if attention must be engaged before contents can register in consciousness, then there may well be a subcortical and limbic mechanism that drives attention independently of the processing of the input, and such a mechanism could well be a necessary precondition for consciousness, always resulting at least partly from an endogenous aspect of organismic functioning, connected with the regulatory actions of emotional brain areas. This is highly consistent with enactive theories of consciousness and, as we shall see in a moment, it is quite at odds with a reactive and extremely modular view of the various conscious and cognitive functions. The next section will define some key concepts for clarifying how the predictive implications of enactive theories are in sharp contrast to the predictions that would follow from other theories. Then later in the chapter, we can examine in some detail how these predictions of enactive theories are borne out par excellence by the inattentional blindness phenomenon as investigated by Mack and Rock, in combination with certain well established neurophysiological findings.
.
Linear versus dynamical causal sequences in the brain
Even if the Mack and Rock data are consistent with an enactive theory of consciousness, the more interesting question is whether these data would necessarily be inconsistent with other types of theories. To answer this question, we need to work from a clear definition of what is meant by “enactive” theories, such that it can be inferred exactly what empirical predictions follow from enactive theories, and moreover whether these predictions are positively inconsistent with the predictions of other theories (which we can simply call “reactive” theories). And this will require a somewhat specific explanation of the differences between the causal structures of enactive and reactive theories, as well as a clear physiological fleshing out of the kinds of brain mechanisms
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
that would reflect these different causal accounts, even though many of the details of these mechanisms await further neurophysiological research. When I use the term “enactive,” I do not mean to commit myself to all of the specific baggage of Varela et al. (1993), Humphrey (2000), Clark (1997), or any other particular enactive theorist. My purpose is to capture the sense in which certain theories posit that consciousness must result only from “actions” of an organism, and cannot result from mere “reactions.” This distinction could get us enmeshed in thorny philosophical discussions of the nature of causation, but the simplest way to ground the distinction is in terms of the causal structure of self-organizing systems. “Actions” in this sense are performed only by self-organizing entities, and serve the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of preserving the organism’s pattern of self-organization. Earlier we defined “self-organizing” patterns to mean patterns for which a system has a strong tendency to seek out and find causal substrata, so that if one set of environmental conditions is not conducive to that particular pattern of activity, the system is likely to seek out some other set of conditions that is conducive to it. A self-organizing system initiates actions geared toward using the environment as needed to keep the system going in its definitive patterns. For example, animals seek environmental elements needed to maintain homeostasis. Reactions, by contrast, are explainable without any reference to selforganizational structure, even if the reaction is taking place in a self-organizing entity. For example, a knee-jerk reflex is a reaction, because, even though it takes place in a self-organizing entity, the entity does not initiate the action. To be sure, the reflex also may be used by the organism for its generally selforganizational purposes, but the reflex itself is merely a reaction, not an action in the sense intended here. Actions are behaviors that require reference to the entity’s self-organizing structure for their causal explanation, such as in the regulation of bodily temperature, where many readjustments of many systems will be accomplished if necessary to achieve the aim. It will be useful for our purposes here to distinguish between a selforganizing causal structure and a “purely linear” causal structure. By a linear causal sequence, I mean one in which a certain antecedent is both necessary and sufficient for its consequent under certain stipulated background conditions, as in flipping a switch. It is true, as we shall see in a moment, that self-organizational causal structures are composed of many linear ones; but not all complex systems of linear causal sequences result in self-organizational structures. What precisely, then, is required for a self-organizational causal structure?
Curious Emotions
A process is explainable “purely” in terms of a certain combination of linear causal sequences if it does not need to posit any principle other than those to explain why the process has the properties that it has. The knee-jerk reaction would be an obvious example of such a purely linear causal reaction. By a “selforganizational” causal structure, by contrast, I mean one in which, if a certain linear causal sequence is not available to support the continued existence of the system’s definitive patterns of activity, then there is a strong tendency for the system to readjust some of its functions so that alternative causal mechanisms can be used for that purpose. A light switch is not a self-organizing mechanism because, if the appropriate switch is not flipped, the light cannot alter any of its other activities in order to ensure that some alternative mechanism will allow it to come on. Even a light with two alternative switches is not self-organizing in this sense, because, if neither switch is flipped, the system can neither cause a switch to be flipped by means of a readjustment of the light’s other activities, nor can the light rearrange its other activities to find another way to come on. Even a thermostat, as normally constructed in heating and cooling systems, is not self-organizing in this sense: While it is true that the system’s reaction to a given temperature will tend to feed back and maintain the same temperature, the overall structure of the system is not determined by a need to alter any of its activities in order to ensure continuity; the same preconditions are always required for a turning on (or turning off) of the circuit, and the definitive organization of the thermostat is guaranteed without its having to find an alternative way to turn the heat on or off in order to maintain that. By contrast, a living organism’s maintenance of a constant temperature is self-organizing, because when the temperature gets too hot or too cold, the organism must systematically readjust many other activities throughout the system in order to maintain the temperature, and if it does not do so, the survival of the definitive structure of the system as a whole is threatened. (Obviously, it is possible in principle to construct a self-organizing thermostat, because many living organisms are, among other things, thermostats. But thermostats as normally constructed are not self-organizing; it is not necessary for them to be self-organizing in order to produce the results they do.) It is not necessary for our purposes here to decide whether the selforganizational vs. “purely linear” distinction is a sharp distinction or can be one of degrees. One could perhaps think of borderline cases, as suggested by Kauffman (1993). These definitions also do not presuppose that a selforganizational system is not completely made up of linear mechanisms; but how the linear mechanisms fit together determines whether the system is selforganizing or not. If it is not self-organizing, we can speak of it as being “purely
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
linear” – i.e., the explanation of the properties of the system is exhausted by citing the linear sequences that make it up. In a self-organizing system, by contrast, not only does each causal outcome require antecedents that are necessary and sufficient for it under the given background conditions (i.e., linear causal sequences), but the system can also change background conditions as needed to find alternative antecedents for a needed outcome if this is necessary for the continuation of the definitive patterns that make up the entity. Any metabolic system in living organisms involves multiple shunt mechanisms that are classic examples of this kind of self-organization (Monod 1971; Kauffman 1993). While living organisms are classic examples of self-organizing systems, they are not the only examples. Ecosystems, social systems, and even crystal formations can be self-organizing. It is not necessary for our purposes here to go into the differences between living and nonliving self-organizing systems, although this topic has been discussed at length in many contexts (Kauffman 1993; Ellis 2000d; Ellis & Newton 2000a). The controversial question for our purposes is not so much whether such self-organizing systems exist, but rather whether consciousness, and specifically conscious attention, is dependent on the real-time action of a self-organizational mechanism, as opposed to resulting from a purely linear mechanism already in place within the self-organizing biological organism. Obviously, there is nothing about the notion of a purely linear causal sequence that prevents its outcome from requiring the participation of two or more separate events as its causal antecedents. For example, if both A and B are needed to cause C, the sequence “(A&B) → C” (where “→” indicates causation) is still linear, as long as C is not self-organizing. There can also be loops and shunt mechanisms in purely linear sequences. For example, consider the following causal sequence A → (B or C), B → D, C → E, (D or E) → F
There is nothing about this causal sequence that would preclude its being a purely linear one. ‘A → C → E’ is one line of causation, ‘A → B → D’ is another line, and ‘D or E → F’ is the last step in the linear chain of causation. There can also be loops in which causal outcomes feed back to enhance the antecedents for furthering the same type of reaction, and in which the enhancement of a signal can feed back to cause still more antecedents for still further reactions of the same kind – i.e., circular causation in which A → B → A → B etc.
Curious Emotions
This is still a purely linear causal sequence, in the sense we are using, because each step presupposes only the prior step as a necessary and sufficient antecedent, given the background conditions under which the causal relations obtain, and none of the steps necessarily must have a self-organizing structure in order for this type of loop to occur. For example, the fact that there are corticothalamic loops in the processing of sensory information prior to consciousness does not decide between an enactive and a reactive theory of consciousness. The corticothalamic loops may be explainable in purely linear terms, involving loops of linear reactions, without any reference to the self-organizing structure of the system. But according to an enactive theory, to cite purely linear causal reactions needed for the processing of perceptual input would not be enough to explain why the information achieves a conscious status without additional reference to the self-organizing structure of the system – for example by positing that the emotions, which flow from the organism’s self-organizing needs, must be part of the causal input into the determination of the pattern of information processing in any instance where that information is to achieve a conscious status (especially if a generalized “curiosity,” triggered more by certain classes of inputs than others but endogenous in origin, is a motivating emotional process, as Panksepp 1998: Chapter 8, believes it is). The enactive type of theory does not deny linear explanations of elements of a system, but rather embeds them into the larger self-organizational structure, which will use different combinations of linear mechanisms to maintain its overall pattern by routinely rearranging the background conditions necessary for a given linear causal sequence to obtain. If (as enactive theories posit) consciousness must always be an action (in the sense opposed to mere reaction), then each state of consciousness will be preceded by some preconscious self-organizing activity on the part of the organism. Given the purposeful nature of self-organizing processes in living systems posited by enactive theory, this self-organizing activity will attempt to make the resulting conscious state a useful one for the organism’s purposes, and thus will exert a selective effect. Specifically with regard to attention, an enactive theory will predict that self-organizing processes – which connect to cognitive function via subcortical emotional brain areas – will influence the direction of attention prior to conscious awareness of the attended object by means of a motivated direction of attention. As I have already mentioned, the notion of motivated selection for attention is by no means a new or radical idea; what is a specific claim of enactive theories is that no consciousness can occur without motivated attention.
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
A completely reactive theory, at the other extreme, will posit that conscious states, at least in principle, could exist outside the context of a self-organizing system, and without the actions of such a system (again in the sense opposed to mere reaction) influencing the quality, properties, content, or attentional focus of the conscious states in question; moreover, such self-organizational actions would not be needed in order for such states to be conscious. Since all mechanisms in a completely reactive theory are explainable by means of the interaction of the mechanical system’s hardwiring and the inputs it receives, it should be entirely consistent with reactivism that consciousness could occur as a reaction to the stimulus inputs without any motivatedly selective attention.
. Conflicting theories with conflicting empirical predictions The differences between the predictions of the two types of theories are complicated by the fact that, even though reactive theories do not require that consciousness be a property of self-organizing systems, they do not preclude this either. In fact, living organisms contain both active and reactive components, and it is quite natural to assume that, if cognitive functions require complexity, then the most complex interconnecting sets of mechanisms – mammalian brains with their billions of interconnected cells – would be the best candidate for a naturally occurring information processing machine, regardless of whether such processing resulted from the enactive or from the reactive aspects of the organism. It might be held, for example, that conscious information processing results from a complicated series of purely linear mechanisms wired up in a certain sequence, like an electronic motherboard. In fact, the causal structures of the two types of theories may at first seem deceptively similar. In the reactive model, I (input) causes R (the response that subserves consciousness), and may presuppose P (some physiological preconditions for R). That is, Given P, I → R
In the enactive model, P (rather than I) causes R, while the nature of R (i.e., some of its quality and content) is influenced in some ways by I. That is, Given I, P → R
The difference between these two causal accounts may seem subtle or even nebulous. But the kind of “P” at work in the first formula does not completely overlap with the “P” in the second. In the first formula, which describes the
Curious Emotions
reactive causal story, the “P” that is presupposed is much more cortical than in the second one, which reflects the enactive story. In the enactive formula, the “P” is a system of subcortical-cerebellar-limbic loops that are always in the process of gearing the organism up to act upon its environment, and selectively seeking out inputs that seem potentially relevant to those general action proclivities. If a sudden environmental change is relevant in an unexpected way, the motivational system must quickly readjust to gear up for a completely different kind of action, and thus must look for other perceptual cues than the ones it was initially looking for – leading to a shift in early selection for attention. But whether the stimulus fits what was anticipated or is radically different, the system that directs attention in potentially useful directions is largely activated before the stimulus is perceptually processed. So, in spite of a superficial similarity, the two types of theories require a significantly different causal structure to bring about consciousness. In enactive theories, consciousness can result only from an organism’s motivated action, whereas in reactive theories the fact that consciousness occurs in selforganizing creatures results only from the fact that such creatures are complex enough to subserve consciousness. On the enactive view, perceptual consciousness, like any other form of consciousness, is an action that the organism executes, not merely a chain reaction that it undergoes. Not even a chain reaction that includes feedback loops can be conscious unless it results from prior self-organizing actions. This essential difference gives rise to major differences in the empirical predictions for the two types of theories – predictions for which, as we shall see, the Mack and Rock work is extremely relevant. For the enactive type of theory, if an instance of information processing X can occur either consciously (XC) or unconsciously (XU), the difference between XC and XU cannot be explained purely in terms of the extent or intensity with which X is processed in the chain reaction components of the system – in the occipital lobe, for example. On the contrary, there must be some self-organizational process P1 which is present in the case of XC, and absent in the case of XU. One might express this by saying XU + P1 = XC
I.e., the difference between XU and XC is not merely that the gain of some physiological process P is turned up in the case of XC. Instead, there are unique physiological processes P1, in the case of XC, which are lacking in the case of XU. This is not to deny that there will also be some self-organizing preconditions, P2, for XU itself; nonetheless, there will be some additional self-organizing process, P1, that is necessary for XC, but not for XU. A reac-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
tive theory would not predict this. On the contrary, in a reactive theory, the difference between XC and XU is not dependent on any difference between P1 and P2, but rather on a difference in the way X is processed in the two instances. In more concrete terms, according to an enactive approach, subcortical and limbic emotional processes, which are self-organizing, will necessarily be different in the cases of XU and XC, and one such set of differences is likely to be the subcortically orchestrated motivation to direct conscious attention in ways useful for the organism’s purposes. To the extent that attention is an organismically self-organizing action, it will determine a difference between a perceptual consciousness XC and a corresponding unconscious processing, XU. So an enactive account should predict that an input can cause occipital processing in the absence of these motivational mechanisms, but will not cause consciousness of the perceptual stimulus – i.e., will not cause XC. A fuller fleshing out of this prediction of enactive theories is that the manner and extent of the processing of X will also be partly determined by selforganizing actions of the brain’s emotional system in accordance with overall organismic purposes. Thus the same P1 that determines the difference between XC and XU will also serve as an early gating mechanism that will tend to favor potentially useful or emotionally interesting information for more extensive processing. This means that emotional brain processes will exercise an early selection function for incoming stimuli, while those same emotional brain processes, at a later point in their activity, also will determine whether the information that is processed acquires a conscious status. In effect, whether X will ever attain a conscious status will already have been largely determined at an early stage of processing. Extremely reactive theories of consciousness would predict just the opposite – that whether X is selected for conscious attention is determined only very late in processing, after a great deal of primary perceptual cortex processing and encoding has already occurred. Paradoxically, the Mack and Rock implicit perception findings themselves suggest that there is evidence for very late selection, at least for some types of stimuli (meaningful words). That subjects show an implicit knowledge of stimuli that never reached conscious attention seems to suggest that much processing has already occurred prior to attention. We shall return to this issue. But first, I should point out that all of this can be put more in experimental terms more familiar to the way the neuroscience literature would address the same problem. Rolls (1999), as mentioned earlier, shows that a specific motivation process such as hunger exerts only a late selection effect on the perceptual processing of food stimuli. But this is different from showing that no motivational processes
Curious Emotions
exert an early selection effect here. Obviously, physiological arousal is a motivational process that affects early processing, and as we saw earlier, Panksepp (1998) shows how arousal is affected by a general emotional “seeking” system in the brain. Arousal, of course, is not selective attention, but the seeking system does have its own selective tendencies with regard to environmental affordances. So the question is not whether brainstem emotional systems exert an early selection function or not. The question is whether it would be possible for there to be conscious attention to a perceptual object without such an early selection effect, and whether the early selection is merely a generalized arousal, or on the contrary plays a role in determining which objects are allowed into consciousness. On the enactive view, both early and late selection mechanisms will be operative, and both will be controlled by the same subcortical and limbic emotional processes. On the reactive view, by contrast, selection for conscious attention will be late, and this late selection will be determined by mechanisms that are primarily cortical (involving also corticothalamic loops), and which occur not as a prerequisite for the extensive processing of X, but as a consequence of it. Here again, reactive theories can grant that this cortical functioning might presuppose some self-organizational subcortical activity, such as a general cortical arousal state that is needed for either XC or XU; but the cortical process does not presuppose any special subcortical processs that determine the difference between XC and XU, and which thus would also exert an early selection effect. Early selection processes would include subcortical motivational aspects according to enactivism, whereas reactivism would reject this assumption, insisting that the same brain areas that process X are the ones that subserve the consciousness of X. One may wonder whether the category of “reactive theory” has now become an empty category or a straw man. Can the difference between P1 (the self-organizational preconditions for the conscious information processing) and P2 (the self-organizational preconditions for the corresponding unconscious information processing) really be that important? Remember that something counts as a P1 precisely if it is a prerequisite for XC (the consciousness of X) without being a prerequisite for XU (the unconscious processing of information X). If a P1 is subcortical and exerts an early selection effect on conscious attention, this would mitigate against an extremely modular view of the brain substrates of different kinds of conscious states. We have already seen examples of prominent neurophysiologists who take widely divergent views on this “modularity” problem, some clearly falling within the reactivist camp, others leaving the question open, and still others
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
taking an enactivist position. Although enactive approaches are currently becoming more fashionable, it would still be a mistake to think that the category of “reactive” theories has become an empty category or a straw man. There are two respects in which the distinction is still crucial: 1. Some theories explicitly endorse reactivism by insisting that consciousness in principle could be attributed to a suitably constructed digital or connectionist computer with the right kinds of feedback loops. Almost any AI system that attempts to build consciousness into a system that is not biological will be a reactivist system by the definition we are using here. (The single exception would be an AI system that uses components that are not “biological” in the sense of being composed of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen, but nonetheless are biological in the sense that they are organized in the way that biological systems are, with self-maintaining and self-organizing structures that act rather than merely reacting; for example, see Bickhard 2000.) There are also still many theories of consciousness that content themselves with feedback loops as a precondition of consciousness, rather than requiring that consciousness presupposes self-organization (for example, see Dennett 1991). A feedback loop can be a simple linear system, and need not be self-organizing. Moreover, there are theorists, like Jackendoff (1996), who insist that consciousness only passively reads off the information processing that has already occurred at an unconscious level by means of discrete transmissions of information that work in the same way that an artificial computing system would work. 2. Perhaps more prominently, there are many theories that, while not explicitly defending a reactivist position, do want to remain neutral as to whether information is processed reactively or enactively in conscious functions. Besides those who explicitly criticize or reject enactivist thinking (for example, Boyce 1998; Nunn 2001), there are those who formulate theories of consciousness in such a way as to allow consciousness equally well in reactive or enactive systems. This would include many of the most prominent theorists of consciousness, such as Dennett (1991) and Pylyshyn (1973). Even Searle did not take his enactivist turn until very recently (see Searle 2000). So part of my point here is to convince even such “agnostic” theorists that they no longer seriously need to hold open the possibility that a purely reactive system could have the property of consciousness. One might expect that at least theorists of emotion would subscribe to an enactivist position, since the emotions are a main link between the holistic homeostasis of the body and the workings of cognition. But even emotion
Curious Emotions
theories are often formulated as if emotional responses could be purely reactive rather than originally initiated by the active expression of the organism’s endogenous self-organizational purposes. A classic example is the difference between the way LeDoux (1996) and Panksepp (1998) understand the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying anger and fear. For Panksepp, anger is clearly enactive; an organism becomes angry because something gets in the way of its self-initiated patterns of activity; the binding of an infant’s limbs produces the purest possible symptoms of anger. By contrast, LeDoux speaks of the anger response as if it could be passive, i.e., caused by a purely linear series of channels through which certain inputs resulting from certain types of stimuli finally cause certain chemicals and electrical transmissions to be delivered to the amygdala. While Panksepp agrees that these chemicals and electrical effects are delivered pretty much as LeDoux claims (with modest differences not relevant to our purposes here), Panksepp does not believe that the immediate reactive response is the whole story; the delivery of the electro-chemical effect yields a given affective response only if embedded in an elaborate network of independent neurophysiological contextualizations: Consider the example of a man burglarizing a house who suddenly hears a noise outside: the same stimulus that triggers fear in such a context may not produce fear in the same subject while visiting that same house as a guest. The organism’s ongoing self-initiated activity is a precondition for stimuli to produce the affective responses they do. While Panksepp’s approach is highly consistent with enactivism, and largely inconsistent with reactivism, LeDoux’s approach is at least as compatible with reactivism as with enactivism, and in fact encourages researchers to emphasize a focus on the reactive aspects of emotional responses and to de-emphasize focusing on the enactive variables that also determine our responses. Part of the reason for this difference is that LeDoux takes a more modular view while Panksepp takes a more embedded view of the functions of these structures and connectivities. As a result, LeDoux treats the amygdala as the substrate of anger, whereas Panksepp insists that the PAG – an action-initiating brain area – actually plays a greater role in anger feelings, and that the role of the amygdala is to learn which stimuli to associate with those feelings. Thus Bickhard (2000) is not addressing straw men when he argues that it makes a difference whether we think of stimuli as causing a response where there was no response, or whether we think of them as modulating or modifying a response that was already taking place in the organism, as caused by its own endogenous self-organizational tendencies.
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
. The P300 ERP as an operational definition of perceptual consciousness A standard way of operationalizing the point at which perceptual information attains a conscious status is to look for a P300 parietal event-related potential (ERP) following presentation of a novel stimulus (for example, see Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; Damasio et al. 2000; Federmeier & Kutas 2002; and others to be cited below). As we saw earlier, there can be virtually complete occipital processing, but until and unless the P300 parietal ERP occurs, the subject is not conscious of seeing the presented stimulus. So a good way to operationally define the question as to whether enactive processes affect the structure of information processing prior to the point at which they become conscious would be to determine whether they affect the structure of processing in the brain activities that occur prior to the P300. Because the correlation between the P300 and the onset of perceptual consciousness of a novel stimulus has been somewhat reliably observed, I shall use it as an auxiliary assumption in assessing the implications of the inattentional blindness effect. I also assume that the emotional brain areas function to preserve the selforganizing interests of the organism. There is strong evidence that the PAG and midbrain respond to important homeostatic imbalances by altering neurotransmitter functions, especially neuropeptidurgic activity, and that the resulting distributions of neurotransmitter levels play an important role in readying the organism for both learned and instinctual action patterns whose tendency is to restore the initial imbalance (Panksepp 1998; Damasio 1999; Watt 2000; Faw 2000). In essence, the emotional brain works in the interest of maintaining the self-organizing integrity of the organism. While “emotion” and “motivation” are different, as noted earlier, there is an important sense in which the activity of the emotional brain motivates the organism to act in the interest of maintaining the integrity of self-organizing patterns. The emotional activities result from a self-organizational causal sequence and, according to enactive theories, are present only in organisms capable of action, not in those capable only of reaction.
. How the Mack and Rock data relate to the two types of hypotheses If the preconscious steps that process incoming information function independently of self-organizational effects of the emotional brain areas, then a purely reactive theory of consciousness might seem possible. Consciousness
Curious Emotions
would just result from a sufficient intensification of the preconscious mechanisms, which would be linear (which is not to deny that they may involve feedback loops and shunt mechanisms). On the other hand, if the action of the emotional brain areas does affect the ways in which information is processed (beyond serving as a mere power switch), then a purely reactive theory of consciousness would be impossible, because in that case consciousness could not occur without presupposing some functioning that is enactive rather than reactive, and which is uniquely necessary for consciousness – i.e., functioning that is geared toward achieving the emotional purposes of the organism. For example, if attention is controlled at an early stage of processing by emotional brain areas, then attentive consciousness itself presupposes some functioning that is enactive rather than reactive, and therefore attentive consciousness cannot be explained as the final outcome of a series of reactive steps in the processing of sensory input, unless those steps are also influenced by enactive processes prior to reaching the level of consciousness. Furthermore, if consciousness can occur purely as a result of those same enactive processes, without any perceptual input, then consciousness would be completely the result of this enactive process, and the reactive processes that are also present when we do receive perceptual input would have no part in determining whether the information processed achieves a conscious status or not; they would only affect the content of the information that gets processed, not whether or not it is conscious To many researchers and theorists, as we have already noted, this enactive story is questionable or even unacceptable, essentially because a reactive account would be consistent with the following seemingly plausible scenario: Visual input causes processing steps to occur first in the thalamus, then in the occipital lobe, and then a series of causal loops occur between the thalamus and the occipital lobe, where each of these loops is a series of purely linear (non-self-organizing) causal sequences. When the occipital processing has led to sufficiently enhanced neural firing, subsequent linear causal sequences lead to a pattern of parietal (and perhaps also frontal) firing (for example, the P300), and this later-stage firing is tantamount to consciousness of the relevant perceptual input. Consciousness is merely the last stage of a chain reaction. Such a story might even include the caveat that a certain level of general physiological arousal is presupposed as a background condition for the intensity of neural activation needed for consciousness. But, given physiological arousal as a minimal background condition that can generally be assumed in awake organisms, the consciousness of a perceptual datum, according to a reactive theory, would be completely caused by the sequence of causal steps that constitute processing of the perceptual input. Correlatively, essentially the same
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
information processing might sometimes even be possible in the absence of the level of arousal needed for consciousness, but in that case it would occur on a nonconscious basis. On this view, the toning of the cortex through general arousal would be analogous to the volume control of a stereo speaker. If the speaker volume is turned all the way down, this does not change the encoding pattern with which signals are processed in all the other stereo components before the final signal reaches the speaker. What happens in the speaker is still clearly a causal outcome of what happens in the other components – it is not one of the causal inputs into the other components’ behavior. Are the Mack and Rock results compatible with this type of theory? When combined with some well-known and fairly non-controversial physiological findings, I think they are not, at least if we take them as indicating what Mack and Rock themselves say they indicate – that attention must be directed before there can be perceptual consciousness, and that in many instances there is not even implicit knowledge of the unattended stimulus. If, as Mack and Rock put it, “attention . . . must be captured before perception can occur” (even if we take “perception” in this context to refer only to conscious perception), it follows that the only way the perception itself could be purely reactive would be if attention did not itself already presuppose an enactive causal process – i.e., if attention were not motivated by the homeostatic needs of the organism to maintain self-organizational balances. In more concrete physiological terms, perception could be reactive only if it were not the case that all conscious attention is causally affected by emotional brain activity (which we have assumed responds to self-organizing causal structures of the living organism). Assuming a parietal P300 event-related potential as an operational measure of conscious awareness of a newly presented stimulus, is it possible that perceptual processing prior to the P300 (as depicted in Figure 2) is not affected by the motivational purposes of the organism? If the processing prior to the P300 were not affected by motivational factors that control selection for attention, then there should always be implicit knowledge of any perceptual input that proceeds up to but does not include the P300, since in that case the information would already have been almost completely processed prior to the conscious awareness indicated by the P300. Whether the P300 (and correlative consciousness of the object) occurred or not would be decided too late to impact the extent to which the information is processed. Thus any information that is processed as far as the P300 should cause implicit knowledge regardless of whether the P300 occurs or not.
Curious Emotions SEQUENCE OF ACTIVATIONS IN RESPONSE TO UNEXPECTED STIMULUS P300 (Moment of Consciousness) Parietal lobe
200ms. (Disinhibition of Action Command) Motor cortex 20–200 ms (Inhibition of Motor Command = Sensorimotor Action Image)
N200 ERP (Mismatch Negativity) Occipital lobe
(Object)
P100 ERP (Perceptual processing) Cerebellum 20 ms ERP (Initiation of Motor Commands)
Thalamus
Hippocampus 18 ms ERP (Motivational Activation)
Figure 2. Note that ERP numbers indicate number of ms after input stimulates the retina. The figure indicates that emotional activation, initiation of tentative motor commands, and forming of action imagery all precede the perceptual consciousness of an unexpected stimulus that correlates with the P300 ERP.
Equivalently, we can ask whether or not motivational factors that control selection for attention affect the processing of information prior to the point when the subject becomes consciously aware of the specific perceptual input corresponding to the consciousness. If there were no such motivational effects, then again the processing should occur in about the same way prior to the consciousness of the object with or without such effects – and thus there should be
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
knowledge of the processed stimulus, if processed this far, regardless of whether we are conscious or unconscious of it. Mack and Rock do not find this implicit knowledge except under very special circumstances, and even then the implicit knowledge is very limited, and lends itself to an enactive explanation. For example, they find implicit knowledge with preconscious meaningful words, but not with nonsense syllables. This would be explainable on an enactive basis; meaningful words are more likely to be useful for the organism’s survival and well-being than nonsense syllables. Why did Mack and Rock not find implicit perception with other (less meaningful and less motivationally relevant) kinds of critical stimuli, such as geometrical shapes or nonsense syllables? Granted, it may be that the subjects did have implicit knowledge, and the Mack and Rock methods simply failed to confirm its presence. But even if this were the case, we would still have to ask: Why did the same tests that do reveal implicit knowledge for some types of stimuli fail to reveal similar implicit knowledge for other types? If a reactive theory were true, then the amount of implicit perception that occurs when we are not conscious of a stimulus would simply be a function of the amount of sensory processing that has occurred – occipital and other visual-cortex systems for visual stimuli, for example – and this in turn would be determined by the effects of the stimulus itself, in interaction with the brain mechanisms that are already in place. So meaningful images would not show greater implicit perception than meaningless ones, if the amount of sensory processing is the same. With the enactive theory, on the other hand, visual data would not be processed as much when not evaluated as potentially useful in some way for the organism’s purposes; so the brain mechanisms would have to do something active in order to select an input for attention at a relatively early point in the processing of the various inputs available, otherwise it would not be processed far enough for either attention or consciousness. An enactive theory can allow that there could also be some later selection from among those stimuli that had made it through the early selection process. To be sure, a reactive theorist could also insist that there can be early selection because the organism may be classically conditioned, for example, to be more receptive to some stimuli than others – in which case the organism would not have to do anything active in order to make itself receptive to selected stimuli. I.e., the fact that an acquired physiological state is a precondition for an input to cause a response is perfectly compatible with reactivism, because even in reactive theories, the physiological precondition could have gotten the way
Curious Emotions
it is in a variety of ways, including past learning. Such a precondition, however, would tend to be rigid and inflexible. But the response here is that, in an enactive theory, there can be virtually complete sensory area processing – for example, occipital processing – without consciousness, and furthermore the consciousness is not contributed by anything caused by the sensory processing itself. Given a certain level of sensory processing, if there is no P300 and beyond, then there is no consciousness, while at the same time the P300 is not caused by the sensory processing itself, because the time delay from occipital to parietal processing (about 1/4 second according to Aurell 1989; Bachmann 2000; and others cited earlier) is too great to be explained by a direct spreading of activation within such a close proximity. Instead, the enactivist explanation is that the P300 must be caused by independent subcortical activity in interaction with the sensory processing. Some processing occurs unconsciously prior to the P300, yet the P300 is not caused merely by that processing, but also is caused directly, in a separate causal stream, by endogenous subcortical motivational activity looping with anterior attention mechanisms. These include anterior cingulate as well as frontal activity (Balconi 2003; Damasio et al. 2000; Posner & Rothbart 1998). The more enactive a theory is, the more it holds that attention functions to select items that are useful for the organism’s purposes, guided by preconscious brain processes, and in ways that are subject to organismic flexibility rather than rigidly hardwired. Rigidly hardwired selective processes can easily be explained in reactive terms, but early selection mechanisms that are flexible and subject to purpose-directed organismic modulations are more difficult. The more reactive a theory is, the more it holds that attention is caused by the stimulus itself in connection with the organism’s hardwiring. Enactive theories allow both for very early and for late selection – the former because emotional processes must already be active in selection before much sensory processing has occurred; the latter because, even though emotional processes can be activated very quickly (18–20 ms), the emotionally initiated neurotransmitters (especially the neuropeptides) are very slow in spreading, so it is useful to be able to have information already processed and ready for later selection if needed. But without early selection, there would be too much processing going on, and the organism would be directionless in its seeking activities. By contrast, with the exception of some rigidly hardwired early selection, reactive theories favor late selection, because attention itself must be caused by the processing that has already occurred. Thus attention will occur late, when the processing is substantially complete. This view can be attenuated by intro-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
ducing feedback loops into the chains of reactive processing, but in a reactivist view, if attention selection occurs at an early point in these loops, then the earlier attention mechanisms must be very rigid and not related to whether the processing is conscious. Conscious attention, by contrast, consequently can result only from late selection on the reactive view, since consciousness must be one of the later causal results of the processing: When we are conscious of data, we have already extensively processed them. What is novel about the Mack and Rock studies is precisely that, when we consciously direct our attention toward one task, irrelevant stimuli tend not to be processed readily unless they are (1) emotionally salient (for example, the smiling face); (2) meaningful (for example, the written words that yield implicit perception; the smiling face, too, may be a meaningful “icon,” at least in Western cultures); or (3) types of objects that the organism is strongly habituated or even hardwired to select in terms of very gross properties, such as loud noises, very large moving objects, sudden bright lights, etc. A reactive theory will not easily allow that mechanisms (1) and (2) can determine early selection, since this kind of selection requires some sort of teleological mechanism whereby the organism guides its own perceptual processes as dictated by emotional purposes, rather than having them occur in reaction to stimuli. It requires that a response have occurred prior to the stimulus, and that the response determines the stimulus at least as much as the other way around. What is especially important for enactive theories is that consciousness occurs only as a result of such a response that precedes the input corresponding to the intentional object of the consciousness
. The paradox of early and late selection Mack and Rock find it “paradoxical” that an unattended meaningful word, such as “snow,” is not seen when presented for 200 ms, yet in subsequent stem-completion tasks, implicit perception occurs, suggesting late selection for attention, after extensive unconscious processing. This is indeed a paradoxical finding, because the experiments using meaningless shapes or nonsense syllables suggest earlier selection, since in these cases the objects that are not attended to do not seem to be seen, even implicitly, as far as Mack and Rock can detect. In these cases, the subjects’ knowledge of the image presented “did not differ from chance” (Mack & Rock 1998: 13). The resolution of this paradox must involve acknowledging that there is both early and late selection for attention, as Posner and Rothbart (1992, 2000)
Curious Emotions
have suggested. The idea that there are both early and late selectional gating processes for stimuli relevant to the organism’s purposes is not a new one, and has been defended by Triesman (1964) and many others. What Posner and Rothbart propose is that anterior subcortical motivational and emotional mechanisms determine early selection; posterior attentional mechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals that have penetrated the early selection “gates”. Finally, if the data survive early selection gating and corticothalamic enhancement, then anterior-limbic looping processes (which are both subcortical and cortical) motivatedly activate image schemas (Johnson 1987; Newton 1996) that resonate with the posterior nonconscious processing; at that point, consciousness occurs. Now, there are arguments pro and con as to whether consciousness occurs at a particular point in time (for example, see Dennett 1991); but we do know, because of the ERP data cited above, that visual consciousness of a newly presented stimulus does not occur until a P300 parietal ERP is registered. “Image schemas” in this context refer to proprioceptive and sensorimotor routines based on action affordances suggested by an initial Gestalt impression presupposing only early thalamic awareness of the relevant perceptual input, prior to perceptual processing in sensory areas such as the occipital and temporal lobes, and assessed in terms of emotional feeling tones associated with the general impression of a given Gestalt through past learning. Since emotions and action commands can be unconscious when not associated with action imagery and/or perceptual/interoceptive imagery, image schemas do not seem to be conscious until they give rise to further processing, such as visual, auditory, or proprioceptive/sensorimotor imagery (Newton 1996). The more meaningful the data, from the standpoint of the organism’s overall motivational purposes at the given moment, the more the organism will be primed to allow the data through the “gating” mechanisms of the thalamus and anterior cingulate, which in turn are sensitive to the organism’s emotional needs through extensive connections to limbic and midbrain emotional areas. The fact that there can be extensive processing and encoding of data without attention corresponds to the physiological finding that there can be virtually complete occipital activation with no perceptual consciousness (Aurell 1989), and that the anterior cingulate must be activated in cases of voluntary attention, while both thalamic and limbic (including posterior cingulate) control of corticothalamic loops appear to be important for involuntary attention (Bernstein et al. 2000; Posner & Rothbart 1992, 1998). These physiological events would map well onto a phenomenological situation in which, if the given stimulus is anticipated as important for motivational purposes, then its
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
signal is more likely to be enhanced via corticothalamic loops as preselected by the thalamus in cooperation with the brainstem because of categories of utility dictated by the organism’s emotional purposes. Thus, for motivationally “primed” stimuli, there is extensive occipital or temporal-lobe processing even prior to the direction of conscious attention. But for meaningless or motivationally insignificant stimuli, this processing will be considerably less, because the preselective (i.e., early selection) mechanism of thalamic “gating” (or the “extended reticular thalamic activating system” gating discussed by Newman & Baars 1993; and Watt 2000) will control corticothalamic loops in such a way as to minimize the enhancement of those signals. This would also explain the anomaly we considered in Chapter 1 as to why, on presentation of a novel and unexpected stimulus, there is approximately a 1/4-second time delay between almost complete occipital activation and the more anterior cortical activation necessary for consciousness of the object, particularly the parietal P300 electrical potential that corresponds to perceptual consciousness (Aurell 1989; McHugh & Bahill 1985; Runeson 1974; Srebro 1985). As noted earlier, at the rate neural impulses normally spread in the brain, one would expect a neural impulse to be able to travel somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 to 20 meters in 1/4-second. Obviously, more is required than simply a spreading of activation from the occipital to the parietal lobe. Before we are conscious of a visual stimulus, other brain areas must be activated, including more anterior areas such as the anterior cingulate and the frontal and parietal lobes, and this activation must take place in response to input from emotional brain areas. In view of the 1/4-second delay, it seems very unlikely that these more frontal areas are activated in response to the occipital lobe’s activity at all. Instead, it seems likely that the organism must purposely activate the frontal and parietal areas to “look for” emotionally important categories of objects which the thalamus has already alerted the organism might be relevant, and this “looking for” activity must already have begun the forming of visual or conceptual image schemas (including proprioceptive and sensorimotor imagery associated with possible action affordances) prior to any occipital activity’s having any effect on our perceptual consciousness (since at this point the impulse has not yet spread from the occipital to the parietal and more frontal areas). For example, meaningful items in the environment (such as the smiling face) would attract more attention than meaningless ones because the organism is “pre-tuned” to be on the lookout for meaningful early clues that an object is worth paying attention to.
Curious Emotions
It seems therefore that the frontal-parietal-cingulate activation must take place at least as early as the perceptual consciousness signalled by the P300; the frontal-parietal-cingulate pattern must therefore play an important role in determining whether any given perceptual input will even register in consciousness, i.e., will be attended to. Moreover, the emotional areas that precipitate this frontal-parietal-cingulate activity appear to be essentially the same ones that determine whether a stimulus will make it through the preselective corticothalamic gating process that determines whether it will even be fully processed and encoded in the primary perceptual area (for example, the occipital lobe) to begin with. In effect, the perception of a stimulus can occur in conscious attention only if it can make it through two different selection processes – an early and a late one – and both these processes are controlled subcortically in terms of the motivational purposes of the organism. We have already seen that this is equally true in voluntary or involuntary attention, and even in cases of complete frontal lobectomy. In all these cases the emotional brain systems still play a selective gating role in accordance with general motivational purposes, by means of subcortical control of neurotransmitters and by the resonance between limbic (or ERTAS) and posterior cortical activity (Damasio 1994; Watt 1998, 2000; Faw 1997, 2000); otherwise, information processing would be no different in conscious than in unconscious instances, and all knowledge would be merely implicit knowledge. It would therefore appear likely that there is both early and late selection, which map into the brain areas just discussed to make us become conscious of a perceived object in three stages: (1) Preselective gating is determined by motivational categories of utility, mainly subcortical and anterior. (2) Corticothalamic looping enhances, processes, and encodes stimuli once they penetrate the initial gating. (3) Resonance is achieved between the anterior attentional mechanism and posterior processing, leading to consciousness; for a novel stimulus, this total sequence of events requires about 1/3-second to elapse (Aurell 1989) from the time a novel stimulus is first presented, and results in the parietal P300 ERP discussed earlier.
. Attention and conscious processing The third of the three stages just listed – resulting in consciousness and the parietal P300 potential – should not be regarded as a trivial ancillary as far as processing of information content is concerned. In the first place, the information processing is likely to be structured differently depending on whether it is
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
conscious or unconscious. In the former case, subcortical and anterior brain regions play a very active role in gating prior to the transformation and encoding of perceptual information. This is reflected in the Mack and Rock failure to detect implicit perception for meaningless and motivationally insignificant stimuli. And secondly, it should not be forgotten that, even in cases where priming has occurred, although there is nonconscious processing and retention of information, this processing and retention are not nearly as complete as they are for conscious perception; this difference is reflected in the Mack and Rock findings just as in any other blindsight or implicit perception experiment (for example, Weiskrantz 1986). Thus consciousness is not what Natsoulas (1993) has called a mere “appendage” to information processing that could just as well have occurred without consciousness. In physiological terms, this means that we should not regard the processing and encoding of information content as a completely posterior activity, and then regard the anterior direction of attention as merely bringing into consciousness the information that has already been completely processed. Information processing has both a different structure and a different efficiency depending on whether it has been done consciously or only unconsciously. Thus data of a kind that in principle could be relevant to the organism’s needs will be more likely to be processed, even below the conscious level (hence the implicit perception effect in the trials using meaningful words, which does not seem to similarly manifest itself in trials using meaningless images or nonsense syllables). At the same time, the organism will be more likely to direct conscious attention to kinds of data that are important for its purposes, unless distracted by attention to another task that, for the moment, is considered still more important. And attention will be “pulled” by items emotionally important to the organism’s overall purposes. Thus a newborn infant shows attention to a smiling face (Barresi & Moore 1996; Meltzoff & Gopnik 1993), just as the Mack and Rock subjects’ attention was pulled toward the image of a smiling face (but not by a neutral or scrambled one) even when their attention was previously occupied.
. Further implications for the problems of attention and consciousness There would seem to be several important philosophical and neuroscientific implications of these differences in the structuring of conscious and nonconscious processing. (1) A state of consciousness appears to involve global brain activity, and thus cannot be highly localized; if this is true, then it would fol-
Curious Emotions
low that logical thinking in humans, which is more effective when done on a conscious basis, cannot be highly localized (Ellis 1995). We have seen that even the intentional contents about which we reason require widely distributed activity if they are to be entertained in consciousness. Thus everyday logical inferences must be even more complex activities involving widely distributed brain areas, not merely highly localized transformations. (2) It would seem a safe prediction that consciousness will occur only in organisms capable of purpose-directed, emotionally motivated direction of attention, and this is a function of emotional brain areas; i.e., consciousness cannot be a function of a modular brain area or system that relates to the subcortex only as a “powerswitch” (Ellis & Newton 1998b, 2000a, b). (3) Resolution of the traditional mind-body problem will very likely hinge on understanding the causation of the motivational dimension of consciousness in self-organizational terms – for example, as in dynamical systems theory (Kauffman 1993; Mac Cormack & Stamenov 1996) – rather than in linear stimulus-response terms, yet at the same time, a dynamical systems account will not be likely to do the job adequately unless it addresses itself to the role of emotional and motivational processes. Thus, on the one hand, the phenomenological datum that a conscious decision to raise my hand plays a causal role can be made consistent with the fact that the physical movement of the arm is sufficiently explainable as resulting completely from physical causal antecedents (Ellis 1995, 1999a, b, 2000a, b; Wegner 2003). These two facts can be reconciled if the motivation to raise the hand can be framed as an endogenous, active process rather than a passive response to inputs, and the concept of self-organization makes the needed active/passive distinction possible, as we saw earlier. (4) Consciousness is not just an extra layer added onto a mechanism that could have occurred in the same way without consciousness. Instead, information is processed very differently depending on whether consciousness is involved – both because different brain mechanisms are needed for conscious processing, and because the information is processed differently when consciousness guides the direction of the process (Natsoulas 1993). We could go into more detail analyzing just how far the brain can go toward processing data as a result of “automatic pilot” corticothalamic loops, and at what point a conscious direction of attention is required for further processing. Bickle et al. (1999) and Bernstein et al. (2000) go further into the physiological aspects of this question. Their findings indicate that (1) both weak and strong visual stimuli are processed at least as far as occipital area V-1, although (2) the excitatory-inhibitory interactions will adjust the intensity with which the signal arrives even so far as V-1, with the more salient stimulus being en-
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
hanced up to a certain optimal point, and the less salient one dropping to a minimal level but not entirely dropping out. (3) This difference in strength primes V2-forward for further processing of the more salient stimulus. (4) Not only the anterior cingulate, but also brainstem areas (controlling acetylcholine, norepinephrine, serotonin, and histamine) affect how the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) functions, with its inhibitory effect. Those subcortical effects are also emotional effects on the way signals are selected for more or less processing (Panksepp 1998; Damasio 1999). However, the general question remains as to whether anterior brain areas are really necessary for involuntary attention. Faw’s (2000) response is that the degree of consciousness of whatever stimulus is there is determined at least as much by the level of subcortical (and emotionally determined) flooding with neurotransmitters, noradrenalin, etc., even without frontal control – a more basic level of cortical arousal. At the same time, Faw is careful to distinguish two different issues: (1) Degree of consciousness, which can generally be determined by cortical arousal at the more basic arousal level just mentioned; and (2) selective attention/inattention, which is a separate function in addition to mere cortical arousal. Faw’s distinction is similar to Damasio’s (1999) distinction between “core consciousness” and higher content-processing functions in that arousal relates to whether or not there is consciousness and wakefulness, whereas selective attention affects the content of the consciousness. Thus when the monkeys in the Gallant et al. (1998) studies casually look out at an emotionally neutral scene, their V-1 areas are found to be largely quiet with only a few “hot spots” in exploring the scene. Here we see the arousal versus selective attention distinction, with plenty of consciousness (from arousal) but not much selectivity (due to little difference in the salience or motivational value of stimuli). However, there are also two more primitive ways in which organismic purposes can “preselect” for attention prior to the signal enhancement that results from occipital-thalamic loops. One primitive way this preselection can occur is simply through association of stimuli with emotions through past learning, which would cause an emotionally important stimulus to trigger increased general arousal. The arousal would then excite the processing of that stimulus, which would lead to further inhibition of processing of other stimuli. If LeDoux (1996) is right, this would be largely an amygdala function. Still another primitive kind of attentive preselection mechanism in the service of motivational purposes is that, simply through natural selection, our organisms would be wired in such ways as to be always especially sensitive and alert toward the types of stimuli that are likely to be important for our sur-
Curious Emotions
vival – peripheral motion, intense signals, the unexpected, etc. There would not need to be any presently existing emotional mechanism for this; natural selection would have already taken care of it. Yet it would be a way in which we would be geared up to selectively attend to emotionally important stimuli. But the more interesting way in which subcortical emotional purposes direct attention occurs in the case where we have to selectively attend, inhibiting competing signals, because this is the case where consciousness comes into play. Even monkeys that are just generally looking out at a neutral scene are being motivated by curiosity (Panksepp 1998), and are tacitly giving that curiosity priority over weaker competing emotions that, if they became strong, would override the generalized curiosity and direct attention only to items that look specifically interesting, such as bananas. In that sense, they are making a kind of selection. Thus the organism is always sensitive to the possibility of having its attention redirected, even when no particular salient stimulus has presented itself – and if it were not, as the Mack and Rock findings suggest, there would be no consciousness of any object. On the one hand, Mack and Rock want to say that attention determines whether we see something at all, but on the other hand they say that the data are already extensively processed, and only then do we determine what gets attended to. The resolution of this paradox requires consideration of emotional brain functions, which shows that there is both early and late selection. All stimuli reaching the occipital lobe are processed somewhat extensively whether attended to or not, but at the same time, prior to this processing, there has already been considerable difference in the degree to which potentially motivationally important versus unimportant stimuli as well as salient versus non-salient stimuli are processed, and those differences are determined quite early, through TRN inhibition prior to complete V1 processing, and also through anterior cingulate direction of voluntary attention, which already precedes the differentiation in processing between the attention-grabbing and less attention-grabbing stimuli. In that sense, there seems to be both early and late selection for attention. The remainder of this book will explore more specifically the way selforganizational purposiveness expresses itself through the human motivational and emotional dimensions. The next two chapters will develop a selforganizational account of specific emotions and emotional systems. The first step is to examine more closely the way the demands of self-organization are manifested in phenomenal experience and in the physiology of emotion, because one of those demands is not generally recognized in the context of its applications to emotion and motivation – the demand for a suitably complex
Chapter 2. Motivated attention in action
and high-energy basin of attraction, which I call “extropy.” This tendency toward extropy expresses itself in terms of many primary yet non-consummatory emotions, such as curiosity and the needs for exploration, play, and social relationships.
Chapter 3
Non-consummatory motivations Extropy and “life wish” in the self-organization of emotion
One of the most exciting implications of understanding emotions in terms of the action capacities of complex dynamical systems is that, if such systems can reorganize their own micro-components and subsystems to maintain basins of attraction at preferred levels of energy and complexity, then it becomes comprehensible why non-consummatory motivations such as exploration, play and nurturance could result from a tendency of complex dynamical organisms toward higher-energy attractors, and are not as easily explainable as are consummatory motives purely in terms of energy-efficient homeostasis. In consummatory satiation, chemical needs such as in hunger or thirst are the driving forces, pushing toward consumption of chemical resources needed for homeostasis. But homeostasis can be achieved at both higher and lower energy levels. In this chapter, I shall define “extropy” as the tendency of some complex self-organizing systems to prefer higher- over lower-energy basins of attraction in some contexts. The lower-energy basins, however, can be convenient paths to energyefficient homeostasis within component subsystems, which is the driving force of consummatory needs. I shall argue that extropic motives differ from the purely homeostatic ones – i.e., those which seek a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis – in that the extropic ones resist the complacence that would follow from consummatory satiation if energy efficiency were the only ultimate aim. Non-consummatory motives, while maintaining homeostasis, can fundamentally conflict with consummatory ones by pushing toward higher-energy attractors in the interest of maintaining complex structural patterns for the overall system. Thus my argument is that extropy is an independent demand alongside homeostasis. Then in the next chapter, which builds on the concepts developed in this one, we can finally integrate these theoretical conclusions into more specific neurophysiological and phenomenological emotional investigations. This
Curious Emotions
analysis will show that there is actually a fairly large number of irreducible emotional-motivational aims, centering around three main types of needs: Extropic, homeostatic, and boundary-protection needs, conceptualized around these three basic dimensions of complex dynamical systems. Let’s begin by confronting an important reality of emotion studies, which inevitably must be multi-disciplinary. Intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, the view that psychological and biological processes are ultimately explainable in terms of atomic-level chemical and physical processes, is not as fashionable as it once was, but its main impact continues to be felt in the ever-present temptation toward what I shall call a “micro-reductionist” approach to motivation and emotion – the notion that all motivations are ultimately reducible to the effects of a thermodynamic energy-consumption system that could be equated on the psychological level with primary consummatory drives. Moreover, there are strong philosophical reasons for believing that the sciences collectively must tell a coherent, and thus a unitary story about reality; it can thus be argued, with Bickle (1992, 1998, 2002), that all sciences must be reducible to one basic science, which tells the story of how the most elementary phenomena – atoms, forces, etc. – interact. Such a view would suggest a reduction of all the phenomena of the brain sciences to basic chemistry and physics. Now if emotion studies are to have any hope of rooting themselves in a constructive multidisciplinarity, including the concerns of psychotherapy, philosophy, and the arts and humanities as well as the hard sciences, it is crucial to show that a solid grounding of psychology and biology in the more mechanistic formulas of chemistry does not entail a reduction of the total self-organizing system to a mere summation of the effects of its micro-constituents, yet also does not ignore the requirement for unity of all the sciences – i.e., does not deny a grounding of brain processes in basic chemistry. Self-organizational processes, as I have already argued, involve causal dynamics that are not confined to the effects of the micro-constituents of the complex system. Part of the importance of this point is that science does not demand rejection of humanistic and existential suggestions that some primary or intrinsic motives seek to avoid the complacence and stagnation in which all motivation would ultimately revolve around the achievement of a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis of micro-processes, and thus of mere comfort or satiety, with the latter explainable presumably in terms of the energy conservation demands of the organism. I shall refer to the postulated non-satiationdriven primary or unconditioned motives as “non-consummatory” ones. As we have noted, many emotion theorists have already rejected the notion that energy conservation is foundational for all other bodily functions.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
Such non-consummatory emotions and motivations do not contradict the possibility of intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, from psychology all the way down to thermodynamic chemistry and subatomic physics, although they do require a theory of self-organization in complex systems for the comprehension of their physical basis. My thesis is that not only do complex selforganizing systems seek homeostasis (which already entails “negentropic” as well as entropic functions), but moreover they also sometimes seek “extropy,” which I define as a system’s positive preference for higher-energy over lowerenergy basins of attraction, even in many instances where either type of basin could serve the purposes of homeostatic energy-efficiency equally well. Exploratory, play, social bonding and nurturance subsystems in the brain are correlated on the physiological side with the “extropic” tendencies of complex systems, and on the phenomenological side with an endogenous and unconditioned tendency toward increased intellectual and emotional stimulation (up to some optimal point), and at the most complex human level a need for existential meaning, i.e., for the experience of the value of being per se, whose achievement in humans is sought through personal relationships, ethical values, and meaningful life activities including those that express creativity. The problem here is to reconcile viewpoints that have tended to be at crosspurposes. On the one hand, hard scientists want to ground the higher-level sciences of psychology and biology in chemistry, especially given the influence of the biomedical model in psychiatry; and this makes consummatory-drive reductionism attractive as a convenient way to connect thermodynamic energy systems with the biological systems that give rise to our emotions and motivations. On the other hand, there is the phenomenology of life experience, which seems to call for a richer system of motivations and emotions, to account for the preference for kinds of meaning that do not seem reducible to the satiation of the thermodynamic bodily system’s needs for energy consumption, such as getting something to eat or drink. I believe the notion of self-organization in complex systems can reconcile these two antitheses in such a way that the advantages of both can be preserved. On the humanistic side, human emotions need not be reduced to a complex system of means toward the end of satisfying simplistic consummatory needs. And on the hard-scientific side, the ideal of intertheoretic reduction can be maintained, at least as a way to open the possibility of dialogue between disciplines focusing on different levels of organization, so that different sciences and other disciplines concerned with human consciousness and emotion are not condemned to work in isolation or at cross purposes to each other.
Curious Emotions
.
Intertheoretic reduction and consummatory-drive reductionism
Human emotion and motivation have been viewed in notably divergent ways by the hard sciences and the humanities during the past century. That a placid, cud-chewing way of being is not the optimum for humans has been emphasized by literature and the arts, which have cross-fertilized with humanistic and self-actualization psychology and phenomenology, and are substantially congruent on this point with the ego psychologists, the object relations theorists, and the later Freud (beginning with Beyond the Pleasure Principle). According to Freud, there must be some instincts that tend to resist the attainment of satiety, because in his view consummatory satiation resulted literally from the energy-efficiency rather than the energy-expenditure needs of the organism, and in his later years he saw serious problems with reducing all motivation to the energy-efficiency needs. He therefore sought to conceptualize some drive or instinct whose tendencies would run contrary to the purely satiation-driven instincts, which result from the chemical tendency to move toward what Freud loosely called “inertia” (1925/1959: 68) – a maximally energy-efficient homeostasis. Part of the problem he saw with thinking of all behavior as in the service of consummatory satiation is that, in principle, if the energy-efficiency demands were the only motives, yet had been met, then the organism would not be motivated to do anything. Another aspect of the problem was that to make complete satiation the goal would lead toward a condition in which “the aim of all life is death” (Freud 1925/1959: 70). Freud means this aphorism literally. If a system were driven only toward the relative electrostatic stabilization of the molecules in successive steps of its various feedback loops – toward Freud’s “inertia,” a state of satiety and restfulness where the organism is not motivated by any further need – then the real motive of the satiation phase of nervous activity would be to maximize energyefficiency, i.e. to satisfy each molecule’s demands for electrostatic free energy reduction, insofar as possible given the initial structure of the system with its requirements for homeostatic balance in and between its interconnected chemical feedback loops. For example, when hydrogen reacts with chlorine to form HCl, the driving force is that the lone electron in the outer electron shell of the hydrogen atom tends to reduce its energy level by filling the lower-energy space available in the outer electron shell of the chlorine atom. By sharing the electron, both atoms reduce their energy level. Metabolic processes are built up from chains and loops of these electrostatically reductive reactions. The consummatory drives
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
thus seem to be motivated by a need to “consume” the chemicals and physical conditions needed to fuel this more basic free-energy reduction process. To be sure, it would then be up to the organism to avoid entropy, by replenishing the energy thus used up, spending part of it in activity designed to appropriate still more energy. But, as far as the satiation of consummatory drives is concerned, Freud realized that the most efficient way to achieve a completely sated condition with fulfillment of all chemical demands within the drive system would be suicide. A dead person’s drives have all been reduced, and all the chemical components that were pushing the system to reduce their free energy have done so quite effectively. Thus Freud, like many other humanists, looked for a way to conceive of some sort of emergent elan vital or life force, some principle of self-actualization or primary drive toward inherently self-motivated activity that would make it intrinsically rewarding for the organism to counteract the tendency toward submolecular free energy reduction, as opposed to relying on intrinsically unrewarding behaviors for this purpose. The later Freud thought he had found such a principle in the sexual instincts, although earlier he had tried to view sexual desire in purely consummatory terms. Freud was well aware that consummatory satiation does not lead to a reduction in the total amount of free energy within the organismic system, but just the opposite. It leads to an acquisition of energy to be stored for future use. He continually refers to the concept of homeostasis, the balance between energy-storage and energy-expenditure functions. But he also saw that homeostasis is usually meant as the most energy-efficient way possible to maintain balance between the forward and backward reactions of all its interrelated feedback loops – and this implies that the homeostatic balance is maintained with the lowest possible level of energy expenditure necessary to obtain the new energy needed to meet the organism’s energy-conservation needs. This continual push toward energy-efficiency in the sense of gravitating toward a minimal energy level is what led to Freud’s notion of the “death instinct,” which he thought needs a countervailing force – such as his new way of conceptualizing eros as a drive toward increasing the energetic activity of the organism – to postpone the final entropy of death. Unfortunately, Freud would have needed a more adequate theoretical foundation in terms of complex dynamical systems – and perhaps clearer philosophical analyses – to make this notion of conflict between “death instinct” and “life wish” into a coherent account. But the contrast between Freud’s “life wish” and the drive toward energy efficiency (which grounds the “death instinct”) can be clearly formulated if we imagine a dynamical system
Curious Emotions
exchanging energy with its environment while maintaining a continuity in its pattern of activities at a certain level of complexity. Homeostasis is the system’s way to maintain balance between inflow and outflow of energy. “Extropy,” on the other hand, is the system’s tendency to push both inflow and outflow to a higher level, while still keeping them in balance. By contrast to this notion of an elan vital that would strive to counterbalance the complacence of energy-efficient homeostasis, modern physiology and empirical psychology have tended toward an opposite view, which I shall call “micro-reductionism” (see also Ellis 1995). According to this viewpoint, the only ultimate driving force of organic processes is the same as for inorganic ones – the tendency to reduce the free energy of the most basic constituents of the system, its atoms, as much as possible given the initial structure of the system with its various feedback loops. This tendency is reflected in the electrostatic interactions of the molecules in the system, and its ultimate net result is a tendency toward the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis – the push toward a maximally energy-efficient condition that corresponds to Freud’s “death instinct.” The inorganic chemistry principle that all atoms seek to reduce the free energy of their electrons is what would render possible intertheoretic reduction in the sciences (Bickle 1992), if indeed such an ideal is possible. But to make this free energy reduction principle the only explanatory principle – the approach that I am calling “micro-reductionism” – is to ignore the effects of self-organization in complex systems. We have already seen reasons to believe that self-organizational effects are among the most prominent features of biological organisms (Kauffman 1993; Monod 1971). This point will be developed still further as we proceed. Even the nervous system itself is often explained in micro-reductionist terms as governed by a free energy reduction principle. For example, the tissues of a frog or eel respond electrically (Restak 1984: 30ff.; Ornstein & Thompson 1984: 77ff.), showing that the interactions of their molecules are governed by the tendency of their atoms to gravitate toward electrostatic free energy reduction. Long chains of molecules acting to move closer to neutrality by passing off spare electrons in this way to neighboring molecules constitute nervous impulses, whose ultimate driving force is the submolecular tendency toward free energy reduction. The fact that neurotransmitters play a role in conveying the charges from one neuron to another by means of submolecular electrostatic chemical reactions does not alter this basic principle. It is against this micro-reductionism that I wish to argue here – not against intertheoretic reduction in the sciences per se. My point is that even the most rigorously scientific accounts of the biological organism lead to a richer sys-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
tem of emotions and motivations than the consummatory-drive reductionism that, to many motivational theorists, would be suggested by a tendency toward maximal energy-efficiency of the organism’s non-consummatory behavior. I take behaviorism and other learning theories that posit consummatory needs as primary to be classic examples (Hull 1952; Spence 1956; Rolls 1999). These theories explain rewards that are not “consummatory” (in the sense of allowing the organism to consume materials and physical conditions needed for maximally energy-efficient homeostasis) by relegating the non-consummatory rewards to the status of secondary reinforcements learned by association with the primary consummatory ones. If the characterization I am sketching here of micro-reductionism sometimes sounds like a caricature, it is only because the most extreme versions of micro-reductionism bring out its motivational implications all the more sharply. Micro-reductionism favors the reduction of negentropic (or anti-entropic) processes to more basic entropic ones at a lower level of organization. “Entropy” is usually defined as a thermodynamic system’s tendency toward randomness; but this randomness itself is a corollary of free energy reduction. Thus entropy itself can be defined in terms of the tendency of electrostatic interactions to occur that bring the atoms and molecules of the system to their lowest possible energy level; the electrons of the atoms are brought to the innermost available electron shell, where the electron is required to expend less energy to remain, as in the hydrogen-chlorine reaction resulting in HCl. Not only does intertheoretic reduction strongly urge this view, but molecular biologists have in fact been fairly successful in explaining the interactions of molecules in terms of inorganic oxidation-reduction and other such electrostatic energy-reductive chemical reactions (see Baker & Allen 1968; Campbell 1987; Monod 1971). According to the micro-reductionist account, the satiation of consummatory drives is explainable in terms of such submolecular electrostatic free energy reduction mechanisms, even though the overall effect of these drives (e.g., hunger) is to cause the organism to act in ways that continually increase the energy available to the system. This may seem like simply an incoherent claim to those not accustomed to reducing organic processes all the way down to their lowest chemical level. It may seem that the paradigm reward activity is to eat, which increases rather than reducing the free energy within the system, by converting the energy into ATP. But the microreductionist explanation is that the ATP reaction itself is composed of successive steps of chemical reactions, and each of these steps is caused by the tendency of the atoms of the molecules to reduce their free energy, which in turn leads to each successive
Curious Emotions
step. The overall effect for a complex organism is not to incline it toward complete entropy, but only to incline it toward the lowest possible expenditure of energy necessary to maintain a homeostatic balance between its endergonic and exergonic reactions. In thermodynamic terms, whether energy is consumed or acquired in a thermodynamic reaction depends on whether the reaction is endergonic (resulting in an energy gain for the system) or exergonic (resulting in an energy loss or reduction of free energy). In the Krebs energy cycle that animals use, like every respiratory cycle, and every inhibitory feedback cycle in general, it is initially the tendency for unstable chemicals (e.g., ions) to seek reduction of the free energy of atoms by getting their electrons into more stable energy shells (e.g., neutralization of ions) – an exergonic reaction – that gets the process going. But then, because of the way the system is organized, this leads to further reactions whose end result is that more potential energy is harnessed for the system (“endergonically”) by converting ADP to ATP (whose phosphate bonds are very easily broken; this is why ATP has so much potential energy). Meanwhile, the resulting ionization of iron from FE+2 to FE+3 that occurs in this reaction makes for further instability, and the FE+3 seeks an additional electron to convert it back to FE+2, which it takes from other elements (an exergonic reaction), which in turn starts the energy cycle all over. To fuel the process, of course, the organism must continually engage in foodacquiring behavior. But this “negentropic” behavior’s purpose, presumably, is to feed the entropic phase of the cycle, whose rewarding quality can be explained through reference to the demand of the micro-components (atoms) for free-energy reduction. The net result of this whole cycle of activity is a continuing harnessing of energy captured from food sources in the form of ATP. Yet each step of the reaction is driven by the tendency for that step to reduce free energy by getting electrons into less energetic electron shells by means of electrostatic free energy reduction. And this implies that, in net terms, the acquisition of new energy to fuel the reactions will also be carried out as energy-efficiently as possible, i.e., at the lowest energy level compatible with the homeostatic balance between endergonic and exergonic reactions. Thus everything is derivative from the principle that “As electrons are transferred they fall from higher to lower energy levels. . . . The drop in the potential energy levels of the electrons is the energy-releasing mechanism” (Baker & Allen 1968: 110–111). Or, to quote another standard textbook, “As a reaction proceeds toward equilibrium, the free energy of the mixture of reactants and products decreases. . . . To move away from equilibrium is nonspontaneous; it is an endergonic process that can oc-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
cur only when an outside energy source pushes the reaction ‘uphill”’ (Campbell 1987: 99–100). At the same time that the whole metabolic process is driven at each step of its reactions by a tendency to seek free energy reduction at that step, and attempts at each step to move closer to equilibrium, the process cannot be allowed to reach equilibrium, or else the whole system would collapse into metabolic stagnation, and thus die. This does not happen because the ATP and other terminal products are continually used up to fuel further organismic activities, other chemical reactions that are outside of the metabolic loop. It is assumed that natural selection has favored the survival of organisms that happened to be structured so that some of the energy diverted from the ATP cycle is used to fuel food-acquisition activity to replenish the cycle to prevent entropy or death. For example, Rolls (1999) relies almost completely on natural selection for this explanatory purpose. This micro-reductionist account is perfectly consistent with the fact that no bodily system can ever reach the state of equilibrium toward which the free energy reduction tendency would lead if unimpeded. On the micro-reductionist view, this is because there are loops of reactions in which one chain of steps, each pushing toward maximal free energy reduction in its components, is inhibited by reactions engendered by some of its own products. Also, movement toward equilibrium in one subsystem is opposed by that of other subsystems. The most energy-efficient level at which all these loops and subsystems can be held in balance is usually defined as homeostasis. On the micro-reductionist view, homeostasis results when the forward chemical reaction in a feedback loop is balanced with the reactions in the opposite direction, so that the loop cannot collapse into entropy at either end of the loop. The same result is obtained when opposing subsystems reach this balance. Opposing chains of reactions, whether in different parts of a feedback loop or in different subsystems, are halted in their movement toward entropy at just the right point to maintain a constant cycling of reactions. In order to maintain homeostasis in any system or in the organism as a whole, the organism must behave in such ways as to input the right reactants into the system at the right times. (The organism of course allows for some flexibility in meeting these needs by providing numerous shunt mechanisms in its feedback loops.) Behavior is therefore prompted by a deviation from homeostasis. If there were no possibility of any deviation from homeostasis, then on the micro-reductionist account there would be no behavior. So the fact that the organism must behave so as to continually achieve “negentropy” does not contradict the micro-reductionist’s motivational as-
Curious Emotions
sumption that the satiation or consummatory phase of the cycle corresponds, at the lowest level of organization, to reactions in which the micro-constituents in the system – the atoms – are reducing their free energy and moving toward entropy. There must be just enough negentropy (and no more than necessary) to maintain the most energy-efficient possible homeostasis. Microreductionists thus tend to assume that the non-consummatory phase of the life cycle is not primarily rewarding, but consists of acquisition of further energy sources to fuel the free energy reduction demands of the micro-constituents of the consummatory process. That animals’ natural tendencies toward play, exploration, and curiosity do not seem to fit this energy-conservation paradigm is merely a Kuhnian anomaly in need of further explanation for the micro-reductionist type of theory. It can be handled in several ways – by assuming that such activities, which do not lead directly to energy acquisition, do indirectly lead to it, and thus are “secondarily” reinforcing (Hull 1952); or that natural selection favored organisms with such behaviors, even though they are not intrinsically rewarding (LeDoux 1996); or that the system simply falls short of its attempts at energy-efficiency, so that the activities in question, which burn energy that was previously acquired, are sometimes necessary for the reduction of free energy since the previously acquired energy must be burned off in some way (Spence 1956). In sum, according to micro-reductionism, organisms are driven ultimately by a demand for free energy reduction at each micro-step in the satiation phase (which is entropic) within a cycling organism-environment system whose overall effect is to continue replenishing the energy available to the system; the system then again uses up that energy by tending toward entropic energy reduction of micro-components in the satiation phase of the cycle. Presumably, the consuming of substances and conditions leading to submolecular free-energy reduction within components of the system, and in net terms an energy-efficient level of chemical activity (and thus a lowest-possible energy level compatible with homeostasis) is intrinsically rewarding, and in conscious organisms is experienced as pleasurable. Many micro-reductionists are then tempted to take the next step and adopt a consummatory reductionism as their entire drive theory, in which the satiation of any primary (unconditioned) drive moves certain parts of the organism’s system (i.e., certain atoms and molecules) closer to the lowest possible energy level compatible with homeostasis, given the structural constraints of the system. On this extreme version of consummatory reductionism, the only primary motivations are the ones that aim to “consume” the resources needed to achieve the satiation of these
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
maximally energy-efficient homeostatic conditions. According to this view, except for acquired secondary reinforcements, the organism would not behave at all if the consummatory drives were completely satiated. It is this step that Freud was reluctant to take. This is why Freud believed that, in the absence of some contrary, non-consummatory kind of drive, all life would be dominated ultimately by a “death instinct.”
. The notion of “extropy”: A non-reductive force? There is an entire variable that this discussion of electrostatic reduction has not accounted for. The whole system can continue its energy-harnessing and energy-reducing cycle either very close to the equilibrium point (where very little energy would be harnessed, but also very little would be used), or it can veer very far from equilibrium, while continuing the same homeostatic cycle. How far the system tends to veer from equilibrium while maintaining homeostasis is determined not by the fact that each step seeks electrostatic reduction, but by a property of the overall structure of the system, with all of its interrelated feedback loops and embryological tendencies to develop and maintain such structures. It has now been suggested by some theorists of the self-organization of dynamical systems (e.g., Kauffman 1993; Alexander & Globus 1996; Anderson & Mandell 1996) that these structural properties can create “constraints” on the possibilities open in terms of electrostatic reactions at the lowest level of organization. The constraints do not change any of the principles of the way the electrostatic reactions occur, but simply constrain the initial arrangement of feedback loops that determine whether a given reaction will be inhibited, catalyzed, etc. at a given point in the cycle. The possibility that homeostasis can be achieved at either lower or higher energy levels can lead to a further principle (independent of the instrumental need for “negentropic” acquisitive behavior), which in this book I am calling “extropy” – a motivational tendency that operates in conjunction with electrostatic reduction within homeostasis, but which can sometimes conflict with the movement toward reduction of free energy at any given step of a reaction. Extropy would therefore conflict, in some instances, with the tendency to satiation of electrostatic needs toward which subsystems at lower levels of organization are trying to pull. A simple example might be the conflict between a runner’s interest in finishing a race and the fatigue, thirst, and breathlessness pulling him in the opposite direction.
Curious Emotions
“Extropy” as I am defining it here is not reducible to mere “negentropy.” Even consummatory satiation requires negentropic activity of the organism to replenish its consummatory energy supplies; otherwise, it would not get the consummatory satiation. Indeed, all organismic processes, whether consummatory or not, involve negentropy, which is completely explainable in terms of relationships between micro-components by means of traditional thermodynamic concepts. The negentropic activity is geared toward maintaining homeostasis between energy consumption and energy replenishment. But what I want to suggest is more – that some organismic processes in some organisms (e.g., as discussed below, in mammals at least) involve an additional principle, which is what I am calling “extropy.” The point is that homeostasis can be maintained at various alternative energy levels and degrees of complexity, which correspond to various alternative basins of attraction (some higher-energy and more complex than others). Extropy is the preference for the higher-energy, more complex ways of maintaining homeostasis over the lowerenergy, less complex ones. If there ever is such a tendency in complex systems, it would not necessarily be reducible to mere negentropy, because an organism can maintain homeostasis equally well at greater or lesser levels of extropy, and all of those ways of maintaining homeostasis involve negentropy. Consummatory as well as non-consummatory motivations involve negentropy, which is necessary for homeostasis. But as I shall argue later in agreement with Panksepp (1998), only behaviors like seeking, curiosity, play, and some aspects of social bonding are motivated by a tendency to prefer maintaining this homeostasis via higher energy basins of attraction by preference over lower energy ones – i.e., even when the behavior is not indirectly reducible to the consummatory needs. Consummatory and non-consummatory motivations thus can be thought of as different ways of maintaining homeostasis – the consummatory ones being motivated toward basins that are at the lowest possible level of energy necessary for replenishing the energy needed for the tissue satiation; the nonconsummatory ones are at basins that are at a higher energy level than necessary for that purpose. “Consummatory” motives can be thought of as motives whose gratification involves replenishment of energy for consumption within organismic tissues. Non-consummatory motives then would be the ones that involve energy expenditure not for the purpose of replenishing energy for consumption by organismic tissues. For example, animals do not play in order to replenish energy consumed by tissues within the organism in a way necessary for homeostasis (Panksepp 1998). They seem to be motivated to play, i.e., burn energy, essentially for the joy of doing it, even though it does not necessarily
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
lead to replenishment of energy consumed by bodily tissues (e.g., acquiring food). I.e., it is not necessary, for the purpose of maintaining homeostasis per se, to engage in all of the high-energy activities involved in play, pure exploration, etc. While it is true that natural selection makes it advantageous for animals to have seeking and play systems that in turn make consummatory satiation indirectly more likely, the fact remains that the individual organism is not motivated toward consummatory satiation alone. Cats, for example, often would rather hunt than eat. To be sure, an extropic emotion may be triggered by a homeostatic imbalance. The hypothalamic-brainstem system serves to monitor such imbalances, which serve as signals that the organism’s total self-organizing system may be deviating from the preferred overall patterns, including the preferred degree of extropy. For example, when the body has been sleeping (i.e., settling into a very low-energy basin of attraction), norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin imbalances will eventually be triggered by a brainstem mechanism (Panksepp 1998: 109ff.) and will signal the brain that some action should be taken to get the body aroused (i.e., into a higher-energy basin). This signal occurs in the form of a homeostatic imbalance, but the reason the imbalance occurs in the first place is that the whole bodily system has settled into a low-energy basin for too long to allow its definitive holistic pattern to be maintained without a change of energy level; the holistic need to shift into the higher-energy basin then leads to the homeostatic imbalance in the subsystem of the brainstem. The brainstem subsystem is really acting as a barometer for the total dynamical system’s need to maintain its structure by reorganizing its micro-components into a higher energy basin. Some organisms are structured so as to crave more extropy than others, even though homeostasis could be achieved with less extropy. A three-month infant will begin to explore its environment in some minimal ways even though its needs for comfort, security, and nurturance could well be met simply by continuing to eat and sleep in the same pattern that served it so well for the first three months (Thelen & Smith 1994). During these first three months, the homeostatic needs were served at a very low level of extropy. But at a certain point, maturation leads to new patterns of brain organization in which the thalamus is triggered to sense that something is wrong if there is not enough exploratory activity. Here again, although the signals that indicate the disturbance are the immediate results of homeostatic imbalances within a subsystem – the hypothalamic-brainstem subsystem, which senses the chemical results of too little brain activity – the craving for more brain activity would not need to be there in order to serve the purposes of homeostasis. The infant
Curious Emotions
has matured into a structure in which the same homeostasis that could have been served by less exploratory activity is now served by more of it. Another way of looking at this point is to remember that the demands for extropy do not contradict the organic- and ultimately inorganic-chemistry principles that govern the micro-components of the system. The system is merely structured in such a way that it often prevents the fulfillment of energy reduction for the micro-components except by means of a settling into different basins of attraction at different energy levels, and systems that are structured in very complex ways make it impossible to achieve homeostasis in a subsystem without seeking a higher degree of extropy than the one that happens to obtain at the time. So the failure of homeostasis in one subsystem – for instance, the hypothalamic-brainstem neurotransmitter activities that regulate sleep and wakefulness – may signal a failure of a suitable degree of extropy for the entire organism. As another example, a person on vacation might find it quite pleasant to just sit around and eat cookies for the first few days. At some point, the hypothalamic-brainstem subsystem will alert the organism that something is off: there is too much energy being consumed and not enough complexity of activity. Here again, the signal for this condition is that increased dopamine, norepinephrine, and other activity-inducing neurotransmitters are released. The organism wants to exist at a higher degree of complexity, which requires a higher energy level. But the interesting point for our purposes is that some types of animals will reach this point earlier than others, because their organisms are structured in such a way as to demand extropy more frequently. Cats can sit around for hours doing nothing – a feat that is very difficult for a fully awake human. It is not merely that every organism wants extropy simply as a means to the end of homeostasis; rather, some organisms want extropy for its own sake more than others, even though homeostasis can be achieved at many different levels of extropy. So the fact that a failure of extropy may be signaled by a homeostatic imbalance should not be taken as implying that extropy is only a means toward the ultimate end of homeostasis. Extropy is the demand to find homeostasis by means of various different basins of attraction reflecting various different energy levels. It is also true that natural selection favored organisms with exploratory systems and other extropic tendencies, for at least three main reasons: (1) Such organisms are more likely to find food in the course of their extropic exploratory activity. (2) Such organisms are likely to be more intelligent because of their curiosity and seeking orientation. And (3) they are likely to learn
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
things incidentally in the course of their play and exploration that will help them survive. But the fact that extropically-orientated behavior may have provided a selection advantage does not erase the fact that, for the individual organism, extropic behavior (play, seeking, etc.) is not derivative from consummatory motivations by means of reinforcement of primary consummatory drives, which would make the extropic behavior into a mere secondary reinforcement. On the contrary, the extropic behaviors seem to be primarily reinforcing in organisms at our evolutionary level. I.e., they are reinforcing regardless of whether they are necessary for us to maintain energy-efficient homeostasis, or even the best way to do so. They are one way of maintaining homeostasis, while at the same time satisfying a primary motivation to maintain the homeostasis at a suitably complex and high-energy basin of attraction. It is tempting to tacitly assume that negentropy is the highest level of organismic activity that is compatible with the lowest level of scientific explanation, i.e., the inorganic-chemistry/subatomic-physics level, and therefore that anything that does not fit that level of explanation is unscientific. Since the existence of negentropy in the behavior of organisms can be explained by positing that it consists of merely instrumental behaviors in the service of primarily consummatory motives, micro-reductionists of the Twentieth Century tended to assume that the notion of a primarily non-consummatory motive is incompatible with a scientific understanding of how our systems work. They assumed that all behavior is explainable as derivative directly or indirectly from consummatory motives, and that no other type of primary motivation is consistent with our understanding of the lowest level of scientific explanation. Thus those who are prone toward the ideal of intertheoretic reduction in the sciences often want to think that all apparently non-consummatory reinforcements are only secondary reinforcements, learned through reinforcement of primary drives, which are consummatory. It is true, of course, that one way to respond to micro-reductionism here would be simply to deny that intertheoretic reduction in the sciences is possible. But my point is that it is not necessary to deny this in order to establish that some behavior is primarily non-consummatory. One advantage of leaving open the question of intertheoretic reduction is that, when accounts at one level of science can be made at least compatible with what is going on at another level (even though this is not always possible – e.g., quantum theory does not seem compatible with relativity theory), our understanding at both levels is often enhanced. The explosion of biochemical manipulation of behavior and affect through drugs is an example of such intertheoretic bridging, although of
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course the appropriateness of the practical application of such treatments must always be carefully evaluated. The maintenance of homeostasis can be accomplished at higher or lower energy levels, and some organisms are organized in such a way that they prefer to do it in more complex patterns, and thus at the higher energy levels, a good percentage of the time. But even in these organisms, there are ups and downs, where we sometimes feel a need to pull ourselves out of the lethargy of too much dull comfort, even though the dull comfort itself might be quite consummatorily satisfying. But this point also needs to be compatible with what we think when we put on our “scientific” hats. Within the respiratory energy cycle, there can be lengthy digressions (as in primates) where huge amounts of energy are diverted to other purposes, and then replaced by making more ATP later; or there can be fewer digressions (as in lower animals and plants), where less energy is diverted to other purposes, and so less energy needs to be replaced by making more ATP. Thus animals, for example, need to use aerobic respiration to fuel all these additional energy digressions, whereas plants can use anaerobic respiration, which yields less energy, but is perfectly adequate for plants, because they need less energy for other purposes. Plants remain closer to equilibrium than animals, and we primates deviate further away from it than lower animals. What extropy is explicitly opposed to is not homeostasis, but simply stasis per se. It could thus be argued that extropy requires considerable complexity in a system to counteract a tendency to settle into conditions too close to equilibrium. Many theorists would be content to grant that extropy is opposed to energy conservation, not because there is an independent extropic tendency in very complex dynamical systems, but simply because natural selection, operating separately from the mechanisms and motives of any individual organism, created conditions favorable to the survival of beings whose subsystems just happen to inhibit each other’s basic aims, so that such systems would be forced to subsist in a state very far from equilibrium. For example, such a view might agree with Schopenhauer (1956) that it would be better from the standpoint of the individual organism if sexual satisfaction could be attained without the complexities of courtship, bonding, and commitment to offspring, but natural selection has engineered our bodies in such a way that we cannot get the personal satisfaction desired except by making certain individual sacrifices in the interest of the species. I.e., we are structured so that we instinctually feel compelled to do things contrary to our individual best interests in order to get what we want – the satiation of our consummatory needs.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
But this kind of “just so” explanation leaves many unanswered questions about how such systems could ever come about – what its tangible mechanism is. In a similar way, we might explain how a certain baseball pitcher throws an extremely effective knuckle ball by pointing out that he would not have survived in the Major Leagues without a good knuckle ball. At a certain level of theorizing, this is true, but it does not explain the real mechanism of the knuckle ball. It is at this more tangible level of explanation that the theory of complex dynamical systems is needed for an understanding of extropic motivational tendencies that are not reducible to energy-efficient homeostasis alone. Such an independent principle would seem to call for a further dimension of motivational explanation besides consummatory reductionism. Even though consummatory reductionism allows that there can be an overall gain of systemic energy through endergonic reactions and feedback loops, and that complete equilibrium is always unattainable (until the system dies), it still holds that at each step the system is only doing whatever it can to move as close to equilibrium as it can – somewhat like a donkey chasing an unattainable carrot that has been permanently dangled in front of its face. On this microreductionist account, systems would presumably push, in net terms, toward the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis. If there is an extropic principle, it would oppose or counteract the tendency to reduce free energy, by allowing the system to be driven not only by components outside of the system as they pursue their own exergonic aims, but also by the extropic structure of the system itself, which causes it to go out and actively seek to appropriate components that can serve to maintain it. This notion of extropy opens questions that we must now try to answer. How can it be linked to motivation and emotion at the phenomenological level? How can it be grounded in specific neurophysiological findings, and at the same time integrated into a plausible and applicable scientific theory of self-organization in complex systems? To move first toward an answer to the first of these questions, let’s return momentarily to Freud’s “death instinct” problematic.
. The humanistic notion of “life wish” Freud from 1925 sought a principle very similar to what we are calling “extropy,” and expressed increasing doubts about the possibility of explaining all drives as derivative from the tendency toward free energy reduction in the elec-
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trostatic behavior of the chemical components of the organism. Freud regarded the sexual instincts as anti-reductive in the sense just mentioned: The sexual instincts. . . operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their function, to death; and this fact indicates that there is an opposition between them and the other instincts. . . . One group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach the final aim of life [i.e., death] as swiftly as possible; but when a particular state in the advance has been reached, the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the journey. (Freud 1925/1959: 74–75)
The behavioral and motivational tendencies of which Freud speaks here (sexual “instincts”) presumably would occur at a higher level of organization than the chemical reactions that make up the system. In general, some such motivational principle would be consistent with the notion of “extropy,” even if the “sexual instincts” turn out to be the wrong place to look for it. Even though each reaction seeks to minimize free energy at that particular step, the complexity of the system’s organization can sometimes oppose this aim in net terms, and can seek to settle into more complex and thus higher energy basins of attraction by preference over simpler and lower-energy ones. The organism can then prefer energizing, exploratory, or playful behaviors over those that would lead to consummatory satiation and rest; and it often shows this preference even when we are tired or hungry, as during the grueling last quarter of a football game. If the very structure of a suitably complex system favors extropy in this sense, then exploration, play, nurturance, and other non-consummatory pleasures are primary reinforcers, not derivative through learning from the purely consummatory drives or from association of such behaviors with pleasures and pains at a simpler level of organization. Otto Rank (1924) and Rollo May (1969) developed this view more fully in terms of what Rank referred to as the “life wish” and the “death wish,” with a correlative “life fear” and “death fear,” whose conflicting tendencies make for the more existentially meaningful aspects of the emotional life, such as a desire to explore, to create novelty, and to actualize the more interesting potentialities of the self even if at the expense of considerable discomfort or pain. Abraham Maslow (1974) consolidated and popularized what we might term this “anti-consummatory-reductionist” way of thinking by positing two entirely different motivational tendencies, the “deficiency” motivations and the “actualization” motivations – the latter resulting from the expression of selforganizing tendencies in an explicitly neo-Aristotelian sense. Maslow credits Aristotle with the insight that “pleasure” is not always a matter of consum-
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
ing something (filling a “deficit”) or achieving any end state, but rather can be enjoyed as an active and self-motivated process of expressing the natural tendencies of one’s own pattern of being, even if at the expense of the reduction of consummatory drives. Maslow’s antithesis builds on Robert White’s definition of a drive as a “physiological deficit external to the nervous system, and perceived by the nervous system as noxious” (White 1959: 298). For Maslow, not all motivations are driven by “physiological deficits external to the nervous system” nor by the fear of any form of “noxious” outcome. White’s view may be still more extreme: His argument is that the notion of a “non-consummatory” drive makes no sense by this definition of “drive”; if a drive refers to a deficit external to the nervous system, then all drive-reductive motivations are “deficiency”-driven in Maslow’s sense. Thus the notion of a self-actualization motivation could consist only of a non-drive-reductive tendency per se – in a sense, an even more radical notion than Maslow’s. White’s definition of “drive” highlights the tendency of consummatory reductionism to think of motivations and emotions as arising from the organism’s needs. The needs in turn are for ways to rectify a bodily situation that has moved too far from equilibrium. Without food, for example, there is nothing to fuel the Krebs energy cycle, and as a result, its initial reactants and final products are too far from equilibrium. The “deficit” involved is a deficit of something that could help the system move closer to equilibrium, even though complete equilibrium can never be reached, since some of the terminal products of the energy cycle would be directed for other purposes than to inhibit its initial step. The humanistic attitude toward consciousness and emotion has regarded drive-reductivism as inadequate to address the complex moral issues and questions about ultimate meaning that conscious beings face – not because there is so much more yet to be learned about the various ways that “basic” emotions can be mixed and modified, but because if the “basic” emotions themselves are consummatory-drive reductive in the sense just discussed, then in principle no non-reductive tendency can ever be derived from them. Humanism also has tended to shy away from equating consciousness in general with its physical substrata, because folk psychology, like phenomenology, suggests that empirical observations alone cannot tell us what it is like to experience another’s consciousness directly (Husserl 1913; Ellis 1986). This principle was later discovered by analytic philosophers of mind under the title “the knowledge argument” (Jackson 1986): If consciousness were literally the same as its physical substrata, then complete knowledge of the substrata should constitute
Curious Emotions
complete knowledge of what the consciousness feels like to its subject; but it does not. How to resolve this problem remains an open question for physicalism, and further reinforces the humanists’ alienation from physicalist accounts of the emotions, if “physical” is taken to mean “empirically observable.” More generally, existential and phenomenological approaches are intent on avoiding Husserl’s (1913) “natural attitude,” which was discussed in our introduction. Importantly, Husserl distinguished intentional objects in consciousness from physical objects in the world that we may theorize to be the causes of the brain events that can affect our intentional consciousness. The objects of which we are conscious – i.e., phenomena as they appear to us – are not necessarily the same as the physical objects as they would exist independently of us, and it is quite arguable that they are never the same (Hutto 2000); yet, according to Husserl, naturalistic physiology and psychology tend to conflate physical and intentional objects, speaking as if it were self-evident that a stimulus “caused” the perceptual consciousness of it, and as if an emotional stimulus simply “caused” an emotional response. The resulting theory made human beings into robots or zombies (Chalmers 1995) whose responses are merely passive reactions to an input without any causal power attributed to the intervention of subjectively experienced intentional meanings (Jackendoff 1996; Ellis 1996a). Existentially oriented philosophers and psychologists therefore tended to gravitate to the view that physiological psychology could never adequately connect with the higher moral and intellectual lives of people, and would inevitably produce pictures of human nature too simplistic and brutish to satisfy the philosophical concern with meaning in life, or to accurately reflect the subtlety and richness of emotional meanings. In effect, we now have two opposite views of human motivation. The “drive reductive” view, for which physiology and behavioral science have amassed a vast array of evidence, holds that the aims of life are reducible to a roundabout way for the micro-elements of the system to reduce their energy level even though they must inadvertently re-energize the system as a whole in order to do so, and this reduction to the most energy-conservative means of achieving homeostasis is experienced as pleasure or the reduction of pain. What we think of as high-minded ideals are really only twitches of a satiation-driven nervous system. In the consummatory-reductionist scheme, any increase of physiological arousal that is not somehow in the service of drive reduction must be contrary to the real intentional aims of the system, since the latter are only epiphenomena of the push toward electrostatic energy reduction in the ultimate micro-components of the system.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
The “self-actualization” view, on the contrary, is championed by ordinary folk psychology, phenomenology, artists, writers, literary critics, existential philosophers, and many practicing clinical psychologists. It holds that we have a fundamental interest in acting in such ways as to pull ourselves out of the dull comforts of consummatory satiation, and that a complete reduction to complacence would lead to an existentially meaningless and amoral somnambulism, a “wasteland” suitable only for T. S. Eliot’s “hollow men.” Is there a way to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints within a scientifically respectable yet existentially meaningful framework?
. A possible synthesis The gap between these scientific and humanist traditions has recently narrowed. Philosophy of mind, for its part, has begun to realize that information processing is not the same thing as consciousness (Chalmers 1995), and that emotional purpose and agency are essential to “enacting” consciousness (rather than merely “reacting” to input) by driving information processing in terms of the self-organizational structure of the living organism (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1993; Ellis 1995, 1999a, 1999b; Newton 1996; Damasio 1999; and others to be discussed below). Very new physiological evidence that does not reveal the emotions as geared merely toward consummatory satiation (Freeman 1987; Panksepp 1998; Watt 1998; Damasio 1999) and new philosophical movements within the philosophy of mind, such as the “enactive” movement, make possible a reconciliation between the long-diverging paths of physiology and phenomenology. The key to bridging the gap is a concept of self-organization. In a complex self-organizing system, the overall process is organized in such a way as to appropriate and replace its own needed substrata rather than merely being caused by their discrete interactions. This view has roots in Merleau-Ponty’s (1942) notion of psychophysical forms as well as the thinking of developmental biologists in the early twentieth century attempting to understand why an organism imposes its own patterns of organization on the material that serves as its component parts (e.g., see Bertalanffy 1933/1962). Kauffman (1993) and other recent dynamical systems theorists have synthesized this tradition into a coherent theoretical framework. Any self-organizing system has a number of basins of attraction toward which it tends, and which one it chooses is determined by the best way to maintain coherence within the system given environmental perturbations. I have argued here, with Kauffman, that in some instances, given a sufficiently complex sys-
Curious Emotions
tem, a higher-energy basin is preferable over a lower one – thus giving the system a tendency not only toward homeostasis, but also toward extropy; if the energy efficiency of homeostasis within a subsystem, or the system as a whole, is allowed to go too far, the system will not deviate far enough from equilibrium at either end of its feedback loops, and the result is death and disintegration of the system (Kauffman 1993; Newton 2000). The reason is that, if the pattern of activity that is constantly appropriating and replacing its components can occur only at fairly high energy levels, then these are the energy levels that the system will continually readjust its micro-components and subsystems to maintain. The dynamical systems way of thinking does not disregard the push toward free energy reduction, but adds a self-organization principle to it, as an additional fact that must be accounted for. Discrete causal sequences (Kim’s “causal closure”) presuppose background conditions, and a self-organizing system is able to rearrange the background conditions so that the overall pattern can be subserved by alternative causal sequences at the micro-level (a kind of multiple realizability where the choice of realizers is determined by the structure of the larger system). This way of thinking can make sense of Jackson’s above-mentioned “knowledge argument,” because a self-organizing system acts on its own component materials and on the environment rather than merely passively reacting to them. It is easy to see why one person cannot enact another’s self-organizing patterns, and therefore cannot feel the other’s sensations or other conscious states even though these may all be observable physical processes. When the scientist Mary observes another person’s brain processes, she reacts to them consciously by enacting her own brain processes. So the subjective experience that the objective observations reveal to her is what it is like to enact her own processes – not what it is like to enact the other’s. Even though this enactment may be completely physical, what it is like is not empirically observable by someone who merely reacts to it. The self-organizing process in this case is not reduced to the sum of the externally observable components, because what it is like to enact such a process may not be observable from an external perspective, given that it organizes its empirically observable components and not just the other way around (Ellis 1999a, b, 2000a, b, d). The “what it’s like” component is the way things can appear only to the system initiating the action commands that are presupposed by any consciousness. The observing scientist also initiates action commands, which subserve her own consciousness of what is happening, but these are not the same action commands being initiated by the subject of the experiment.
Chapter 3. Non-consummatory motivations
Obviously, not all physical phenomena can be observed from just any perspective. For example, the location and velocity of an electron cannot be observed from the same position. A rainbow appears in full color from one perspective, but only as particles of moisture reflecting white light from another. It may be that even though the components of a conscious system may be externally observable, certain aspects of their complex interrelations can be observed only from within the system. Even empirical observation depends ultimately on the subjective enactment of an experiencer, which itself does not seem to be observable from an external perspective. Yet the subjective enactment can also have some causal relevance, because it is a structural pattern that acts to appropriate its own future micro-components. In sum, a complex self-organizing system appropriates and replaces component elements, not just for the purpose of maintaining the complex homeostasis of its various chemical processes, but in some instances also for the purpose of gravitating toward higher energy basins of attraction by preference over lower-energy basins. Again, this is because maintaining the pattern across multiply realizable component-readjustments entails maintaining the energy levels necessary to that pattern. This makes possible a convergence between physiology and views of motivation that are not consummatory-drive oriented, such as those of Rank (1924) and Maslow (1974), who are at pains not to reduce human beings to complacent, robot-like creatures with no fundamental interests beyond avoiding hunger, thirst, and other discomforts. The next chapter will discuss the convergences that are now possible between physiology and these more humanistic and existential approaches to emotion, given that many motivations are primarily non-consummatory and not driven toward satiation of needs definable purely at the micro-level.
Chapter 4
Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs as grounding specific emotions
The previous chapter developed the notion of extropy as a tendency in very complex organisms toward settling into higher-energy by preference over lower-energy basins of attraction. We saw that there are many advantages in viewing this extropic tendency as independent of the push toward energyefficient homeostasis, and that it could help clarify the distinction between consummatory and non-consummatory motivations. To distinguish between satiation of simple homeostatic needs on the one hand, and on the other hand the self-energization and the non-consummatory energy-expenditure that occur in general arousal, curiosity, exploration, nurturance, play, and many aspects of mating activities, can help immensely in understanding the “higher” human emotions – many of which are in the list just cited. We shall see that the higher emotions are not learned through reinforcement of the consummatory ones, nor merely indirect means to consummatory gratification, and are not merely the results of a socialization process. On the contrary, they are just as fundamental in the constitution of animals at a high degree of complexity as are the consummatory motives. In this chapter, we shall not only flesh out the neurophysiological and phenomenological emotional correlates of the requirements for extropy and homeostasis in complex animal systems, but also add an additional requirement – the need for boundary protection. A self-organizing system needs to maintain itself within secure boundaries, although the boundaries are osmotic and interactive with the environment (De Preester 2002). In the self-organizational framework, emotions are identified in terms of the aims and activities of the organism rather than in terms of specific perceptual or proprioceptive triggering stimuli. But environmental conditions can be either facilitative or thwarting toward self-organizational aims. Internal conditions too can be either facilitative or thwarting. For example, physical fatigue does not facilitate exploratory behavior, but thwarts it. So, given the three types of aims in the most complex organisms – homeostasis, extropy, and bound-
Curious Emotions
ary protection – and given that any of these three aims can be facilitated or thwarted by either internal or external conditions, we can roughly classify all primary emotions in terms of regularly occurring affective qualities that go with the thwarting or facilitation of each of the three types of motives by either internal or external constraints. For example, anger directs itself primarily toward external conditions that thwart boundary protection needs and that relate indirectly to boundary protection. Love is directed toward specific others who facilitate the expression of the social bonding, play and/or nurturance motives, which are extropic. Separation distress is directed toward environmental conditions – loss of experienced connection or contact – that deprive us of the expression of these motives, thus thwarting them. For each of the three basic requirements of the system, both internal and external conditions can make positive and negative contributions. So any list of “basic” emotions must include more than the usual four or six. Any variation in any of the facilitative or thwarting aspects of either internal or external conditions for any of the three basic types of self-organizational needs will stimulate an unconditioned (thus “basic”) emotional response. We must begin by laying some basic neurophysiological and phenomenological groundwork. First, we need to see how the notion of “extropy” in complex systems can be correlated with empirical evidence about human and higher-animal emotional systems.
.
Physiological evidence for non-consummatory motivation
Recent physiological and neuropsychological accounts of emotion are more sophisticated than the simplistic hedonistic-behaviorist theories of the past. Physiologists of emotion like Panksepp (1998), Watt (1998, 2000), Freeman (1987) and Damasio (1999) speak of many physiological emotional tendencies that have nothing to do with the motivation to reduce consummatory impulses – emotions geared toward play, exploration, bonding, empathy, and other non-consummatory activities that cannot be derived from learning based on reinforcement in terms of consummatory drives. “Consummatory” in this context means oriented toward filling a “deficit” that stands in the way of energy-efficient homeostasis through submolecular energy-reduction. In non-consummatory behavior, there is no prior deficit, but simply the desire to engage in patterns of activity consistent with a complex system’s tendency to maintain an optimal level of both homeostasis and “extropy.”
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
Freud’s concern with this point parallels Kauffman’s later distinction between open thermodynamic systems at the edge of chaos on the one hand, and closed and “frozen” systems on the other: A closed or frozen system moves quickly toward death. As Newton (2000) explains, In closed systems, isolated from the environment, the group [of entities] eventually succumbs to entropy: the interactions are random and the group is in a state of stable equilibrium – a state that does not change with time. In open systems, by contrast, there are three general possibilities with regard to order. First, the system could become chaotic: the interactions within the system could occur with increasing randomness. The system would eventually reach total entropy, or equilibrium with the environment, and disintegrate because of environmental invasions (such as when a leaf decomposes in a compost heap). When an organism is at equilibrium with the surroundings, it is dead. The second possibility is that the system could be frozen in a single state in which interactions cease altogether (a diamond is such a system). Third, the system could reach a sustained, nonequilibrium state of homeostasis, in which stability of the system as a whole is maintained by means of continual adjustments to environmental perturbations. (Newton 2000: 92–93)
Freud, however, if he spoke the language of dynamical systems, would want to go a step further. He would ask whether all nonequilibrium systems maintain homeostasis with the lowest possible energy expenditure compatible with homeostasis, or whether some systems prefer higher-energy basins of attraction over lower-energy ones that are equally capable of maintaining homeostasis. On my interpretation of Freud’s later view, he would prefer the latter alternative. Let’s look at some neurophysiological data that are consistent with this idea. Panksepp’s research on the physiology of emotion suggests that the mammalian organism is organized to self-trigger its own energization mechanisms. “The basic waking mechanisms of the brain do not require sensory input from the body to sustain arousal” (131). Specifically, “[NE, DA, and Serotonin] neurons contain internal pacemaker mechanisms to maintain spontaneous activity requiring no incoming influences. . . . Clearly these brain systems control holistic aspects of brain functioning rather than discrete behavioral processes” (109–110). Thus emotions in Panksepp’s view intend holistic balance, not discrete chemical reactions or rigid behavioral outcomes. The behavior of laboratory animals may sometimes seem rigid, but only when an animal’s choices have been artificially constrained to the point of excluding all but one useful behavior for the organism’s overall purposes. When Pavlov’s dogs’ options were continually constrained to this extent, they became “neurotic” (Pavlov’s
Curious Emotions
word) and thus “no longer useful for our purposes” (Pavlov 1929). According to Panksepp, “Psychiatric disorders result from neurochemical imbalances (i.e., lack of regulation) among many transmitter systems as opposed to a pathology in a single one, so there may be many ways to restore overall balance” (117). Panksepp also regards “seeking” as endogenous and spontaneous, not derivative from learning and reinforcement. “The extended lateral hypothalamic (LH) corridor [with ascending DA circuits and descending glutamaturgic circuits]. . . responds unconditionally [i.e., without any previous learning or conditioning] to homeostatic imbalances. . . . This harmoniously operating neuroemotional system drives and energizes many mental complexities that humans experience as persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation seeking, and, in the presence of a sufficiently complex cortex, the search for higher meaning” (145). Thus there is physiological evidence for the emergence of non-consummatory activity as an intrinsically (as opposed to instrumentally) valued activity of the organism. Panksepp goes on to emphasize that “this is a diametric reversal of traditional behaviorist thinking. . . . The affective state [that serves as reinforcer in some instances]. . . is not simply ‘pleasure’ but a highly energized state of psychic power and engagement with the world” (147–150). While “pleasure” and “reinforcement” are not synonymous for behaviorists, any behaviorist learning theory must presuppose a distinction between consummatory and instrumental behavior; the non-behaviorist element in Panksepp’s system is that there are entire categories and systems of complex behavior that do not involve, even indirectly, any “consummatory” reward in the sense we have been discussing. It is true that Panksepp does not distinguish the homeostatic motives from an explicitly conceptualized extropic dimension thematized in terms of dynamical systems theory. But Panksepp’s opposition to behaviorism calls for such a distinction, because without it, the distinction between consummatory and non-consummatory motivations itself remains unclear. This problem will be discussed more completely later in this section. The empirical research of Panksepp and his associates into the brain correlates of mammalian emotions relates patterns of mammalian emotional behavior to widely-distributed yet clearly distinguishable brain systems, based on multiple measures of brain activity, assessments of neurotransmitter activity, and neurological symptoms. The theoretical organization of the findings postulates seven distinct brain systems, subserving seven different motivationalbehavioral tendencies in the mammalian organism. Each brain system emphasizes a different combination of brain regions and a different combination of neurotransmitter pathways, and is initiated by brainstem and limbic mon-
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
itoring of the organism’s deviation from homeostasis. These systems can be initiated also by sudden hypothalamic and thalamic deviations that can be caused by amygdala, hippocampus, basal forebrain, and brainstem responses to both conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. At some risk of oversimplification, the seven motivational systems can be summarized as follows (I follow Panksepp’s convention of designating the systems with uppercase letters): 1. The seeking system (which Panksepp earlier had called the expectancy system) energizes the body toward exploratory and generally appetitive behaviors; this brain system emphasizes a circuit from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to lateral hypothalamus, and heavily relies on dopamine and glutamate. 2. The rage system, from the medial amygdala to bed nucleus of stria terminalis and medial hypothalamus to periaqueductal gray (PAG), emphasizing Substance P and ACh activity. 3. The fear system, from central and lateral amygdala to medial hypothalamus to PAG and pons, with neurotransmitter activity emphasizing glutamate, monoamines and many neuropeptides (e.g., DBI, CRF, and CCK). 4. The nurturance/sexuality system, from the bed nucleus of stria terminalis to medial amygdala to preoptic hypothalamus to PAG, using steroids, vasopressin, oxytocin, and prolactin. 5. The separation distress/social bonding system, from the bed nucleus of stria terminalis to dorsomedial thalamus to preoptic hypothalamus to PAG, also including in primates the anterior cingulate and anterior thalamus, relying on opioids, CRF, and acetylcholine, as well as many of the same neurotransmitters used in the nurturance/sexuality system. 6. The play system, from midbrain central gray to posterior thalamus, relying extensively on opioids and acetylcholine. 7. The consummatory pleasure system, from PAG to hypothalamus, relying more extensively on opioids, as regulated by GABA, than do the non-consummaotry pleasures of the seeking and play systems. It is important to note that the seven basic brain systems are relatively independent of each other, in the sense that none of them is learned through conditioning by association with reinforcement of any of the others; thus only the last of the seven conforms to the assumption of early drive theorists that all behavior must be learned by association with consummatory reinforcement or association with physical pain. The seeking system seems especially resistant to that assumption, and is reminiscent of the “exploratory” drives and drives toward “mastery” proposed by revisionist drive theorists who wanted to reject
Curious Emotions
the assumption that the organism would remain completely passive if not stimulated toward the acquisition of pleasure and satiation. There is a considerable likelihood that the seeking system is foundational for all the other systems. Panksepp’s way of approaching the causal mechanisms underlying the basic emotional systems is a “neuroevolutionary” one rather than a behaviorist one; i.e., mammalian behavior patterns evolved because they tended to be conducive to the survival of the species in the long run, even when some of the tendencies do not increase the pleasure or happiness of the individual organism. Accordingly, Panksepp’s analysis is strikingly at odds with several assumptions that many physiologists of emotion, still influenced by the legacy of behaviorism, tend to make without argument or evidence. He explicitly rejects the assumption that all behavioral tendencies are derivative through learning from the consummatory drives or association with pain. According to Panksepp, much activity is primitively non-consummatory (in the sense we have been using), and is instinctually and innately driven by the play, seeking, social bonding, and nurturance systems. Thus we cannot assume that all motivational tendencies are somehow geared toward directly or indirectly maximizing the pleasure of the behaving organism. We behave in certain patterns, not necessarily because doing so makes us happy, but because the natural selection process caused our brains to be organized in certain ways. Panksepp in no way means to deny, however, that failure to conform to instinctual motivational tendencies will cause emotional pain. For example, failure to explore the environment will cause a feeling of frustration or painful restlessness. But exploration itself is not derivative from any consummatory drive or from indirect associations through learning with simple physical pain. Rolls (1999) argues on the contrary that natural selection would favor a situation where behaviors that favor survival and reproduction would also increase pleasure or reduce pain for the organism. But this argument is circular. If we were to assume that the only behaviors in which organisms are motivated to engage are the ones that increase their level of pleasure, then Rolls would be correct in reasoning that natural selection would favor linking pleasure with survival value in all instances, so that the same behaviors that enhance survival would also enhance pleasure. On the other hand, suppose we do not assume a priori that organisms are always and only motivated to do things that enhance their level of pleasure. Then there would be no reason to think that linking pleasure with survival value would be the only way to motivate organisms to engage in behaviors that enhance their survival. In that case, some behaviors with survival value would be motivated by a desire for pleasure, and some would be motivated by other instinctually based tendencies that do not necessarily lead
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
to pleasure. This question as to whether there are genuinely non-hedonistic motivations will be considered in more detail in a later chapter. The difference between consummatory drives and non-consummatory (Panksepp uses the term “appetitive”) tendencies is that the two kinds of motives use different brain systems and different neurotransmitters. For example, consummatory pleasure relies at least as heavily on the use of morphine-related brain chemicals as it does on dopamine (DA), whereas seeking and play rely much more on DA, norepinephrine (NE) and acetylcholine (ACh) activity. Furthermore, stimulation of different parts of the consummatory and appetitive components of the hypothalamus will lead to activation of different kinds of brain chemistries, with correspondingly different kinds of gratifying behavioral tendencies and different extended brain system activations. The consummatory-pleasure nuclei of the hypothalamus (which rats self-stimulate in some of Panksepp’s research) is more morphine-reliant and vegetative/satiation-oriented; the completely different non-consummatory-pleasure, or active-engagement area of the hypothalamus (which also induces rats to self-stimulate) is more DA- NE- and ACh-reliant and activity/energization-oriented. The fact that some behaviors, such as seeking, play, and nurturance, are engaged in for their own sake leads Panksepp to reject the common assumption that emotional responses are simply caused by perceived stimuli. In Panksepp’s system, the mammalian organism is inherently motivated to engage in certain patterns of behavior, independently of the effects of any stimuli; the stimuli that do present themselves can then either facilitate or get in the way of the behavior patterns that have already been self-initiated. Many brain systems are activated by the PAG or the closely associated VTA (ventral tegmental area) of the upper brain stem; self-initiated action circuits of many kinds can be traced back to this area, and correlatively it spreads tentacle-like efferents to other brain systems. The classic symptoms of anger, for example, are produced by binding the arms of an infant, because the infant is already motivated to move in patterns that require freedom for arm movements. The initiation of this movement involves PAG and pontine activity. Part of the novelty of this approach is therefore that it sees behavior as self-motivated and self-energizing, rather than as passively responding to inputs. As another example, the brain has its own basic waking mechanism and does not require sensory input from the body to sustain arousal (Panksepp 1998: 131). This way of assessing the causal mechanisms of emotional behavior allows the organism to be seen as the agent of its own actions rather than as a pas-
Curious Emotions
sively reacting machine. Panksepp’s model suggests a self-organizing view of information processing in living beings rather than one in which each input is merely transformed into an output in piecemeal and automaton-like fashion. The movements of the organism are initiated, coordinated, energized, and integrated by the whole animal working as the agent of its activity. There is an obvious objection that could be raised against this way of thinking. Much hinges on the distinction between consummatory and nonconsummatory motives, since a central claim is that non-consummatory behavioral tendencies such as the play, nurturance, and seeking systems are not derived through learning from indirect association with any consummatory reward. However, sophisticated behaviorist theories, which Panksepp explicitly rejects, could explain this kind of finding by granting that exploratory behavior, play, nurturance, etc. can function as primary reinforcers in a behaviorist learning system. Now traditional drive theorists can posit that there are primary drives toward exploration, mastery, etc.; but deprivation of the environmental conditions needed to satisfy these drives can be conceived of as needs; and it could therefore be argued that all behavior is still in the interest of fulfilling a need or correcting some stimulus deficit. From this point of view, it may not be so clear how Panksepp’s causal story is really different from a traditional consummatory drive theory (where even exploration is an attempt to “consume” the conditions needed to reduce the drive) – or indeed from a behaviorist learning theory in which the range of primary reinforcers is left suitably diverse. Panksepp could respond that the difference between consummatory and non-consummatory behavior is apparent from the difference in the brain systems and the neurotransmitters that subserve them. We get consummatory pleasure when we stimulate a certain part of the hypothalamus, whereas other parts produce the different pleasurable reactions associated with arousal, through DA and NE activity. But a sophisticated behaviorist can easily grant that there are different brain systems and chemical bases for different primary reinforcement consummations, while still viewing them all as consummatory. A “consummatory drive” consists simply of any chemical deficit that needs to be filled, and the filling of the deficit is pleasure. But if we accept the independence of the extropic tendency of the most complex animal systems, we can then sharpen the distinction between Panksepp’s system and those behaviorist learning theories in which complex, self-motivated behaviors are merely secondary reinforcers, derivative through learning from consummatory rewards. The difference between these two approaches has important implications for the way we understand the causal
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
structures of mammalian and especially human behavior. For example, it seems obvious that not everything we humans are motivated to do is rewarding in the sense that it necessarily maximizes our consummatory pleasure, even indirectly. Also, there is a difference between the kinds of energy systems involved in a placid, merely satiation-seeking organism, and one that inherently seeks adventure, newness of experience, and complexity even when this tendency requires moving to a higher-energy biochemical pattern that can throw off the satiety of dull comfort. There are important psychological implications, as Freud discovered in his later work. To many drive-reductively oriented psychologists and physiologists, especially those committed to intertheoretic reduction in the sciences, it may seem strange that we would be motivated to seek extropy at all. The reason is that all motivated systems have self-organizing structures and are complex enough to prefer higher-level basins of attraction, as aspects of the definitive pattern to be maintained. The fact is that, even if each of our smallest subsystems (e.g., molecules) seeks the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis, the whole still must be self-maintaining, so that for one system to gravitate toward energy-efficient homeostasis often prevents another from achieving it, and therefore the system as a whole is organized so as to prevent any subsystem from completely achieving it. This was the way Rank (1924) and the later Freud set up their “conflict” theories of motivation – i.e., theories in which conflict between the organism’s own basic motivations are inevitable. In such conflict theories, what keeps the organism going is that it cannot achieve one set of aims without creating new demands in another. Perhaps a more up to date formulation would be that, within the context of a self-organizing supersystem, there are phases that the supersystem often shifts into such that the subsystems can reach homeostasis only at a fairly high energy level, and therefore the system has to prevent any of them from settling into complete energy-efficiency. Such a highly energized state might be viewed as a “bifurcation” of the two lower-level attractors, in order to integrate their conflicting needs into a more coherent synthesis, able to avoid thwarting the demands of one attractor in order to sustain another. If everything were dictated by the tendencies that the most fundamental processes normally exhibit when not subsumed within a complex dynamical system – the inorganic chemical reactions that make up the organic reactions (e.g., chlorine reacting with hydrogen) – then those systems at that inorganic level would seek the lowest energy level compatible with homeostasis. But they could actually reach equilibrium only if operating outside the context of a self-organizing system (Kauffman 1993).
Curious Emotions
The conflict between homeostasis and the need for extropy is not a priori unavoidable, as it would be if entropy and homeostasis were equivalent terms. But the two tendencies will often tend to come into conflict, because the most energy-efficient ways to achieve homeostasis so often tend to be the ones that are most directly micro-reductive, and that enhance a subsystem’s proximity to equilibrium – eating, drinking, resting, sexual orgasm, etc. The play of young animals, for example, consumes considerably more energy than would be consumed by eating, yet with substantially less payoff in terms of any consummatory drive reduction with which the animal could associate the play behavior due to past learning. The desire to play is instinctual, and not contingent on past rewards. It is well established, for instance, that chickens literally would rather peck than eat (Wolfe & Kaplon 1941) – i.e., they prefer food that requires some effortful searching and pecking over food that is delivered to them with no effort required on their own part. It has also been known for some time that rats will cross an electrical grid for the reward of being allowed to explore new territory (Dashiell 1925; Nissen 1930), that monkeys will solve complex problems in exchange for being allowed to look out the window (Harlow 1950; Montgomery 1955), and that rats will run on a treadmill for the sole reward of being allowed to press a bar (Kagan & Berkun 1954). It is true, of course, that instinctual hardwiring toward playful behavior has a general selective advantage, since many survival skills are developed through play; but the animal does not know this in advance, and thus its playful behavior is not contingent on the rewards that much later will follow very indirectly from the playful learning. The animal values the play intrinsically – for its own sake – rather than instrumentally. One might say that rats at play, or in their seeking or nurturant modes, operate from a type of enjoyment that is more Aristotelian than modern: For Aristotle, pleasure is taken in the process of actively exercising one’s capacities, rather than in the achievement of a static end state. For the athlete, for example, the value of winning is partly instrumental – to provide a game structure to make possible the playing of the game, and also to earn the privilege of playing again tomorrow. The athlete not only plays in order to win, but also wins in order to play. The playing activity is valued intrinsically, for its own sake. The same is true for experimental rats, in spite of their considerable domestication. It is often assumed that emotions are simply reactions to discrete stimuli – that an insult causes anger, which in some sense basically intends behavior automatically geared toward the infliction of injury (unless repressed or sublimated). On the self-organization view, by contrast, the aim of all emotions is
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
to maintain or restore homeostasis at a suitable level of extropy, and the relevance of discrete stimuli is merely that they perturb the organism’s already ongoing intentions. The behavior of the organism is self-moving, and objects either facilitate or get in the way of that ongoing movement, with consequent adjustments intended to preserve homeostasis within extropy. But it is incumbent on the self-organization theorist to work out the behavioral details of this approach for specific responses like fear and anger. In order to do so, we must make the notion of self-organization itself more physiologically concrete. When the brainstem emotional systems, with the help of the thalamus and hypothalamus, register that the complex self-organizing system of the body has either deviated from homeostasis (for example as in hunger or thirst), or has settled into a state too close to equilibrium (as when the organism has been sleeping for too long), the neurotransmitter nuclei in the midbrain, pons, medulla, and other emotional areas release neurotransmitters that are then propagated along neural fibers to the cerebellum, motor cortex, hypothalamus and thalamus to gear up the brain to command the body to take action (Faw 2000; Damasio 1999). Still other brain areas – the amygdala, cerebellar cortex, thalamocortical loops, and supplementary motor area – are used to compute what kind of action is likely to be effective in restoring the desired balance (Schmahmann 1997). For example, disgust motivates the organism to distance itself from the object with the chemical properties that disturb its own homeostatic chemical patterns. Any sudden environmental change will trigger at least some of these action-oriented emotional responses to a greater or lesser extent (Faw 2000). But most sentient organisms are structured so that specific kinds of changes will trigger them more than others. In very sophisticated animals, such as mammals, new stimuli can be conditioned to trigger these responses to an extreme extent, and the organism can pre-tune itself to be either hypervigilant or relatively oblivious to the same stimulus at different times, depending on subtle environmental contextualizations. For example, the same noise that will trigger an intense fear response for someone burglarizing a house may not trigger any fear for that same person if he is merely a guest in that same house (see Ellis 2000d). LeDoux (1996) shows that, when a sudden novel stimulus is presented, the amygdala is the first brain area to get input screened by the thalamus (see also Damasio 1999; Goleman 1995). Like the amygdala, the hippocampus is also activated very early after presentation of a novel stimulus, showing enough activity to produce an event related potential at least as early as 18 ms after presentation of even an unanticipated stimulus (Faw 2000). The cerebellum also
Curious Emotions
has been shown to be activated at about 20 ms (Woodruff-Pak 1997). This subcortical activity occurs long before the visual cortex can determine the identity or specific features of the unanticipated stimulus. Visual processing of a novel stimulus occurs somewhere between 100 and 200 ms after presentation, and we are not conscious of such an object until about 300 ms (Coles et al. 1990; Aurell 1989). Long before this cortical processing occurs, the amygdala produces a startle response to anything that does not feel either familiar or like “good” novelty. Notice the important role of the “feeling of familiarity” here. I argued in Questioning Consciousness (1995: Chapter 6) that a feeling of familiarity is essential to explicit recognition or recall memory. The amygdala is immediately adjacent to the hippocampus, which is especially sensitive to whether things feel familiar. So a mature, psychologically healthy person’s amygdala will not be startled by something that feels familiar or like good novelty, because the hippocampus always already knows what feels familiar, and the amygdala is primed only to produce the startle response to what does not feel familiar (or like good novelty). But consider a person without good hippocampus training – e.g., someone whose parents’ behavior was so completely unpredictable that they acted playful and loving one minute and brutally angry the next, for no discernable reason: this person’s amygdala will continually produce a startle response to things that are perfectly familiar, because even familiar things are unpredictable. In this person’s infancy, the familiar was almost as likely to pose a sudden threat as was the unfamiliar (Zachar 2000). The person’s amygdala therefore cannot be discriminating and make use of the hippocampus’s ability to read situations that feel either familiar or like good novelty. We see, then, that when and how a basic anger or fear response will be triggered by a given stimulus is always already contextualized in terms of the dynamical interrelations of various organismic systems operating within a total project of maintaining homeostasis within extropy. All of the recent physiological observations discussed in this section lend themselves to a self-organizational description based on the often conflicting tendencies toward an energy-efficient homeostasis on the one hand and extropy on the other. In the normal course of experience, contrary to the presumptions of many behavioristically influenced and consummatory-drive oriented theorists, environmental novelty is often craved because of our desire for extropy. But as Freud and Rank were ahead of their time in noticing, this craving for novelty, adventure, unpredictability, and higher-energy forms of experiencing often conflicts with our desire for homeostatic energy-efficiency,
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
satiation, predictability, and Freud’s “inertia,” toward which our consummatory drives toward dull comfort would impel us if not counterbalanced.
. Novelty, constraints to freedom, and the action-consciousness connection Any newly presented stimulus consists of a change, yet since the organism desires to maintain continuity in its successful patterns of homeostasis, it seems reasonable to assume that the basic physiological emotional tendencies are always addressed essentially to the issue of novelty in one way or another. Since any change could pose a threat to homeostasis, fear and anger are directed negatively at sudden new stimuli. But feelings toward novelty can be positive as well as negative. Panksepp’s fundamental “seeking” tendency positively craves novelty. These emotional interests toward novelty work in conflicting ways. Since our chemical self-organizing systems are motivated toward preserving homeostasis but without lapsing too much into inertia, it follows that we want to seek out novelty as a way to increase extropy (see Ellis 1986); but at the same time, novelty can be a threat to the integrity of the system, especially vis a vis maintaining homeostasis. Here again, extropy and homeostasis, though not always in conflict, are different motivational tendencies, because homeostasis can be achieved at either a higher- or a lower-energy basin of attraction. Since the hippocampus is especially sensitive to familiarity versus novelty, and is adjacent to the amygdala, it makes sense that boundary protection activities, as in anger and fear, will be triggered by unusual or suddenly changing environmental conditions (which lack a feeling of familiarity), and that the resulting emotional systems will be activated very quickly. Since the amygdala and hippocampus are the earliest areas to be alerted by the thalamus receiving new input, the organism will be pre-tuned to look for subtle patterns of unfamiliarity and novelty, which are picked up sensitively with the help of the hippocampus, long before perceptual processing is developed occipitally. The organism can initiate action commands in relation to patterns of familiarity or novelty (for example, potentially threatening affordances) before the physical properties of an object can be analyzed (LeDoux 1996). But there are also good novelties that are sought (curiosity, exploration), and the hippocampus, thalamus, and amygdala surely will be much involved in those cases as well. This prediction is consistent with Panksepp’s (1998) finding that the play system uses many of the same brain areas as the fear and anger systems, but
Curious Emotions
with subtle pretuning for patterns of novelty with negative affect and very different actions. The brain systems in which homeostatic and extropic chemical issues for the organism as a whole are translated into neural (electrochemical) ones – primarily, the brain-stem/midbrain/limbic system – facilitate the emergence of self-organization, if sufficiently complex, into consciousness; this process requires efferent commands directed toward action affordances, as we saw in Chapter 2. According to Jeannerod (1994), action commands when inhibited give rise to action imagery. Action itself may also require “action imagery” just prior to initiating the movement (Libet 2000), but we are relatively more conscious of those images when the movements are not actually executed. Since understanding an object in consciousness requires at least implicitly understanding its action affordances (Newton 1996), this kind of action imagery is implicitly present in all consciousness, and ultimately must be emotionally motivated by the organism’s general desire for homeostasis at a suitably extropic energy level. Consider verbal thoughts, for example, which according to Joseph (1982) and Tucker (1981) are a truncated form of imagined speech, with the action commands to the Broca speech area inhibited by prefrontal activity. If Broca’s area is damaged, the person may still be able to imagine speaking, and thus think silent verbal thoughts, but if Wernicke’s area is damaged, the action command will already have been garbled by the time it reaches Broca’s area. This notion that all consciousness presupposes action commands will be further developed in the next chapter. Besides extropy and homeostasis, there is a third fundamental concern for any motivated being. Any self-organizing entity, if it is to remain an entity, must protect the boundaries within which it is free to act in its preferred patterns. Fear and anger responses are not simply blindly and automatically caused by the presentation of a stimulus; they are caused by the organism’s attempts to continue its desired activity patterns into the future, as modified by perturbations in the environmental conditions needed to do so. We have already seen that the classic paradigm of anger, as measured by all its various physiological indices, is produced when the arms and legs of an infant are bound (Panksepp 1998). The purpose of the organism in this case is not to inflict injury or destruction, but simply to break free. The movements toward which the organism is energized consist of pushing, lashing out, or flailing around. The same behaviors are observed any time the infant’s free, self-directed movement is opposed or impeded. It is interesting to note that this same response gives infants the ability to swim (Dalton 2000); the inability to breathe, perhaps the most confining of all feelings, triggers the flailing behavior. As a young animal
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
develops, this general lashing out may lead to destruction or warding off of a predator. Later, the movements involved in breaking free may take on symbolic functions, so that an adult may express anger by behaving as if in the position of a confined infant. It is especially important to realize that the predatory behavior of animals does not develop as a modification of this infantile anger response, but rather from two separate instinctual systems, the seeking and the play systems (Panksepp 1998). An animal hunting is not distracted by angry symptoms, but is focused, controlled, gracefully poised, and in a state of appetitive enjoyment reminiscent of its play with other young animals of its own species. When play or hunting leads the animal into situations that threaten or confine it, on the other hand, then anger may be evoked as a secondary appendage to the initial playful and seeking motives. In many instances, the prey is unthreatening enough that no such anger responses need be evoked. At the beginning of the hunting behavior, at least, the animal’s motives are similar to those in play with other young animals of its own species – strengthened of course by hunger but not requiring hunger per se – until the final kill, which behaviorally already resembles an eating or consuming behavior. Given these boundary-protection needs, sudden environmental change not only can be positive, negative, or neutral depending on contextualization, but it can also be both intrinsically rewarding and threatening, because the organism has potentially conflicting aims – maintaining complexity at relatively high levels of energy, which systematically are preferred over lower levels of complexity, but at the same time maintaining homeostasis and protecting the boundaries of its inner-directed activity against injury or confinement – conditions that interfere with the organism’s ongoing activity toward homeostasis at a suitable level of extropy. Chronic “thrill seekers” are especially aware of these conflicting emotional responses to shocking, sudden changes. Moreover, each of the conflicting tendencies can be either facilitated or opposed by environmental conditions, which can threaten the boundaries of activities in the service of both homeostasis and extropy, or can offer useful affordances for them. Extropy can be facilitated by interesting environmental conditions free of constraint, or it can be opposed by conditions that do constrain the desired pattern of activity. And the need for homeostasis can be opposed by environmental insult to the integrity of the organism, especially by violating its boundaries to cause injury or illness; or this same need can be facilitated by the environment when it offers sustenance and conditions conducive to rest.
Curious Emotions
The interactions of these organismic and environmental variables means that a sufficiently complex living organism (one that is a highly complex dynamical system) will tend to exhibit at least three fundamental motivational needs, based on three inescapable overall purposes of the system: (1) extropy, (2) protection of the boundaries for its activities, and (3) homeostasis. It is difficult to separate (2) and (3) conceptually, since in a sense there must first be boundaries before homeostasis becomes an issue. For this reason, boundary issues have a special status: The “inside/outside” distinction does not yet apply to it, since without boundaries there is no meaningful inside or outside. So, while extropy and homeostasis can be either facilitated or thwarted by either internal or external conditions, boundary needs must be met before this internal/external distinction is possible. Nonetheless, it seems inescapable that organisms do have boundary protection needs, and even after those have been met there are still homeostatic and extropic concerns to be addressed in the interest of self-organizational balance and maintenance of sufficient complexity. Correlatively with these three purposes, there is a natural tendency of the organism to seek novelty and complexity, as a way of affirming the intrinsic value of its activity itself (not just instrumental value toward accomplishing other aims, such as tension reduction). But the organism also tends to avoid having freedom constricted/imprisoned (which involves our agency and makes us angry if too constrained – the object is to break out of the constriction). Constriction prevents us from freely acting to seek expression of active tendencies. Thus anger is a boundary-protection issue. Protecting the boundaries of the organism leads also to fear or suspicion of novelty. Physiologically as well as phenomenologically, there are very close interrelations between fear and anger (Panksepp 1998). Independently of these extropic and boundary issues, there is simultaneously also a desire for consummatory pleasure/comfort which, as we have seen, is also equilibrium-driven and homeostatic (by contrast to playful enjoyment of our activity per se, which is extropic). The three types of self-organizational demands – extropy, boundary protection, and homeostasis – are interdependent and not neatly separable. Each of these overall tendencies can further be divided according to (a) internal and (b) external conditions that affect their expression, and these effects can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the affordances presented by the relevant conditions (internal or external) are facilitative or thwarting. Based on this division, we can construct a list of categories of affects that reflect motivations that will influence the behavior of any highly complex dynamical organism, as summarized in Table 1.
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
Table 1. Affects in conscious organisms relative to self organizational needs Safety, Confidence, Comfort (if boundaries fluid yet secure) BOUNARY NEEDS
vs. Anxiety, Anger, Fear, Traumatic Pain (if boundaries not fluid and secure)
Grounds a relative distinction of INTERNAL CONDITIONS
EXTROPIC NEEDS
PURELY HOMEOSTATIC NEEDS
Seeking, Inspiration Curiosity (if int. conditions good) vs. Lethargy (if int. conditions bad) [dependent on earlier int./ext. relations] Satiety (if int. conditions good) vs. Appetitive Desire – Hunger, Thirst, Illness Symptoms, etc. (if int. conditions bad) [dependent on earlier int./ext. relations]
vs.
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS Play, Bonding, Exploration (if int./ext. relations good) vs. Restlessness, Ennui, Separation Distress (if int./ext. relations bad)
Pleasurable Stimulation (if int./ext. relations good) vs. Disgust, Dissatisfaction (if int./ext. relations bad)
The table indicates that when internal conditions are facilitative of meeting extropy needs, the resulting motivational tendencies are seeking, curiosity, or feelings of inspiration. When internal conditions are thwarting toward extropy needs, the result is lethargy. When external conditions are facilitative with respect to extropy, the results are bonding, play, lust, nurturance, etc. And so forth for the other needs, conditions, and motivational tendencies. Of course, we must always remember that internal conditions always already have been affected by earlier external ones, and avoid the temptation toward an oversimplified internal/external antithesis. From a phenomenological point of view, anyone can introspect what it is like to be on a continuum (1) somewhere between inspiration/curiosity and lethargy; (2) between playfulness and restlessness, and/or between some form of empathy and loneliness; (3) between courage/confidence on the one hand, and anxiety on the other; (4) between a feeling of safety on the one
Curious Emotions
hand, and anger or fear on the other; (5) between wellness/satiation on the one hand and sickness/consummatory dissatisfaction on the other; and (6) between peripheral pleasure and peripheral pain. Feelings like sickness, wellness, peripheral pleasure and peripheral pain often are not thought of as emotions, and sometimes debates rage as to whether such qualia should be classified as emotions (for example, Aydede 2001; Ben Ze’ev 2002; Goldstein 2002). Some people prefer to separate all the felt senses directly associated with homeostatic needs (for instance, hunger, pain, physical pleasure) from the truly “emotional” qualia. For similar reasons, when Watt (for example, 2000) summarizes Panksepp’s emotional brain systems, he lists only six of the brain systems – omitting the seventh system that was included in my listing earlier, the consummatory pleasure system. But technically, if these valenced qualities can be monitored at a conscious level, and have self-organizational aims, they too are aspects of “emotional” systems, strictly speaking, and even those who do not define them as emotions do treat them at least as important motivations; in fact, pleasure and pain are the paradigmatic motivators in most psychological research involving reinforcement. The main reason for discounting pleasure and pain as emotions is that their qualia are often highly localizable, are usually peripheral, and often seem to lack intentional objects external to the perceiving subject. Even when they are not peripheral, they still may not be counted as “emotions” because they are such obviously “physical” feelings, lacking in intentional reference beyond the body itself, whereas emotional qualia at least seem to their subjects to be about external events. So while peripheral pains are too localizably received from specific areas to count as emotions, general feelings of illness are lacking in external intentional referents. Generalized “emotional” pain, however, would seem to present the same problems. And we have argued that the intentionality of emotions is usually not immediately obvious, or to be equated with a simple perceived object or event concurrent with the emotion and which happens to trigger the emotion. The trigger can be quite distinguishable from what the emotion is “about.” What really identifies emotions is not that they have immediately obvious objects, but that they have aims in relation to environmental affordances, many of which are not immediately obvious. Perhaps the best argument against regarding pain and pleasure as emotions is that they seem completely afferent. But in fact, the afferent delivery of pain signals through nociceptors is only the best understood aspect of pain. As Damasio (1999), Newton (2000) and Watt (2000) suggest, the less understood aspects involve how the brain evaluates the signals in terms of their good or bad valences. Here again, if there were no more than afferent nervous activity
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
going on, we would neither be conscious of pain nor use it as a guide to action, as I have argued throughout. This point will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 5. In any event, if someone prefers to eliminate such qualia as peripheral pain and pleasure, general wellness, and illness from inclusion under the term “emotion,” I have no quarrel with such exclusions. There are different systems of definitions, and the important point for our purposes here is to describe and understand the dynamics of emotional and motivational phenomena. The mechanisms of all the qualia listed in the table are quite similar, and obviously have motivational significance. For any of these qualia to be felt requires contextualization in a self-organizational system, as I have already stressed. And, like other emotions, feelings of sickness, wellness, pain, lethargy, etc., help the organism to monitor how well it is doing in relation to its ultimate aim, which is to maintain the system’s ongoing pattern across replacements of microcomponents and other adjustments to its environment. All these processes are oriented toward organismic action. When we classify the most universal emotions of complex animals in terms of an explicitly self-organizational perspective, it is the aims and activities of the organism, rather than any presumed constant association with particular environmental objects, that delineates each kind of emotional system. The hardwiring of endogenous emotional systems is not linked to specific objects, except insofar as specific objects are especially prone to trigger organismic action affordances in terms of the aims already underway because of the organism’s own patterns and structures of action. Fear, for example, may be triggered by a variety of objects, and there is no need to learn to be afraid of one object because it has been associated through classical conditioning with some other object that already elicited fear, due to association with a still earlier fear-evoking object, tracing all the way back to original unconditioned fearful objects such as heights or snakes – or to objects that once caused an unconditioned response to sheer physical pain. Any kind of object that suddenly gets in the way of the organism’s ongoing projected aims by constricting or threatening to constrict the organism’s boundaries can trigger either anger or fear, depending on what kind of action the organism initially imagines taking to remove the threat or remove itself from the threat. From this perspective, even fear and anger are expressions of the selforganizing activity of an agent-directed organism, rather than passive, mechanical reactions caused by a stimulus. The organism must be already in a motivated and self-directed movement of activity in order for this freedom of movement then to be thwarted or constricted. Novelty is therefore both good
Curious Emotions
and bad for the organism. “Bad” novelty is, initially, any novelty that interferes with the ongoing self-organizing activity – i.e., that does not present good affordances for it. Then, very quickly, the novel stimulus either becomes confining, in such a way that it affords “pushing against” or breaking out of the confinement (hence anger and frustration); or it remains “uncanny,” just as if it were still completely novel and unexpected, as if we were seeing it afresh, and we remain immobilized (hence fear, terror, or anxiety). Phylogenetically, this tendency originally came about because, in a dangerous situation where any move could kill the organism, it is best for it not to move, until it figures out what is going on. Thus both fear and anger are preceded by a more fundamental “startle” response (Panksepp 2000). Some situations stick us in that “uncanny” mode, because we continue to be unable to determine what action to take. So then our own immobility is what feels confining. The confinement of our own fear may later lead to an anger which then breaks us out of the confinement and leads to energized action. Thus a major difference between fear and anger is that anger means feeling confined by something external and wanting to break free, whereas fear is feeling confined by our own immobility in contending with a threatening novelty. The difference is in whether the confinement is self-initiated or object-initiated, although both may be responses to a similar object. In general, bad novelty feels confining, in one way or another. Whether in fear or in anger, confinement constricts a self-organizing freedom of movement, which is a precondition for either response. It is important not to oversimplify here. We all too often assume that those emotions that are most universally experienced are the “basic” ones, and that all the others are “derivative” from them. But this is not a logical inference. The properties shared by all members of a certain class are not the ones from which we can derive other properties those members may possess. All baseballs have stitches and are spherical, but it does not follow that all other properties of baseballs are derivative from these. There are many and various different emotions that feel confining when our freedom to realize complex action potentials are not afforded by the environment, and these include grief and separation distress. In these cases, the experienced lack (Lacan’s “missing object”) constricts us. For example, many people in the grips of grief feel almost as if they cannot breathe. Thus it is not counterintuitive that Panksepp classifies separation distress as a separate “panic” system in the brain. When an important human relationship facilitates a subject’s being in a more interesting, higher-energy basin of attraction, the withdrawal of that love object also
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
means constriction of the organism’s normal set of self-organizing activities, especially at the level of brain functioning. One of the effects of love is that it enables the subject to value being per se more intensely. One of the reasons why empathy with a conscious being whose structure is interesting is a positively valued experience is that it inspires the subject with a feeling that being a conscious being per se is a fun and valuable thing to do. Infants whose exploratory drives have not yet developed are utterly dependent on empathy with a caretaker for this kind of value experience, and therefore if deprived of empathic interaction can die of marasmus even though their consummatory needs are met (Spitz & Wolf 1946). Loss of a love object withdraws this “being-valuing” action affordance; the subject can no longer as intensely value its own activity, and seeks a less active, lower-energy basin of attraction, lapsing into lethargy and depression. In the case of older children and adults who have already developed other extropic dimensions such as exploration and play, separation distress will be experienced as a negative affective situation, and the desire to live, still pronounced in other subsystems, feels constricted by this very lethargy, so that those subsystems force the experience of restless anxiety and a feeling of painful tension and confinement (for further discussion of this point, see Ellis 1996b: 81–95). Even though bad novelty can trigger fear, anger, or separation distress, it is equally true that good novelty can feel liberating – it presents affordances consistent with the body’s ongoing desire to keep flowing in natural patterns, but to increase the energy level while doing so. Thus anger and fear, just as much as joy or play, intend the organism’s self-initiated activity toward maintaining a self-organizing pattern, and are not just causal reactions to external stimuli. This is an important point for integrating physiology with existential emotional issues, because it allows anger and fear to be conceived of in terms of the organism’s already ongoing activity, rather than as causal reactions to an external stimulus. In this way, we can make phenomenological sense of what it is that the organism wants, as correlated with its basic selforganizational structure, rather than simply regarding anger and fear as either arbitrary causal reactions, or as tendencies derived through learning from consummatory drives. The intentional aim of every emotion is to continue the pattern of self-directed activity whose purpose is to maintain the organism’s overall active pattern of being.
Curious Emotions
. The importance of extropy needs in higher mammals The higher we go on the evolutionary scale (and also the more consciousness there is), the more the organism wants to deviate far from equilibrium and find more extropic basins of attraction that can also facilitate homeostasis. Each organism has many basins it can settle into, and it was advantageous for a hunting/gathering creature to develop a tendency to prefer the higher energy (seeking and playful) ones. This is the genetic hand we are dealt with regard to physiological emotional tendencies. We have a natural tendency to prefer extropy, but that tendency often can conflict with the preference for homeostasis, and the basic physiological emotional tendencies are complex ways of addressing these internally-conflicting concerns. Of course, an inherent desire to explore, a sense of general curiosity, and a need for intellectual stimulation, even when such activities do not lead to consummatory reward, are going to be selectively favored for survival in a hunting and gathering gene pool. An important existential parameter addressed by this concept is also the need not just to achieve whatever it is we value, but also to affirm the value of what we value – to feel that it is valuable. If we did not feel inspired to exercise our capacity for the realization of our activity at more extropic basins of attraction, we would lapse into lower energy ones. Thus the feeling of inspiration – the Aristotelian valuing of our own activity for its own sake, for the sheer interest of it – correlates with the release of DA and NE, which are neurotransmitters that facilitate efferent action commands and make us feel more conscious, more “alive” and, quite literally, more awake. Hence the power of caffeine addiction, which directly stimulates the release of NE, and indirectly of DA. In order to exist at our most extropic basins of attraction, we must feel that doing so is worthwhile, i.e., we must feel “inspired.” Lists of “basic emotions” that do not include the need for something like a feeling of inspiration are therefore too impoverished to be applicable to the motivational structure of highly complex self-organizing animals. Even a dog or cat can feel inspired or, on the contrary, generally lethargic and uninterested in its environment. In an extreme case, we have already discussed the fact that marasmus infants can die even though all their consummatory needs are met (Spitz & Wolf 1946). There are entire categories of human activity whose purpose is not to attain that which we value, but to intensify our sense that whatever it is we value is valuable, through a feeling of inspiration. Religion, love, and the arts are examples of such “value-affirming” as opposed to “value-achieving” activities. Love, for example – the valuing of another being as an intrinsic rather than
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
merely instrumental value – is an existential need, called for by the interactive structure of our being, as well as a basic physiological tendency of the brain. Love in its various forms presents another being who is novel as opposed to boring (in terms of moment to moment lack of predictability compared with one’s own predictability) and liberating as opposed to confining, yet not threatening the way some novel stimuli are. We vicariously experience the other as someone whose being-structure would be interesting to enact, and we try to do so as nearly as possible through empathy. Correlatively, in love we experience the other as extremely valuable, so that an existential sense that the overall struggle is worthwhile can be served. The behaviors of love are often meant to enhance the experience of this inspiration rather than only to achieve the outcomes posited as valuable by the value feelings that are intensified in the process (for a more elaborate discussion of this point, see Ellis 1996b).
. Existential requirements for an adequate dynamical theory of emotion We have seen that there are three aim-oriented issues involved in being a complex self-organizing being, all stemming from the fact that our basic tendency, in order to be what we are, is to act out our own unique pattern of being in ways that maintain both extropy and homeostasis: 1. We need extropy. This means that we need to have novelty, because novelty affords extropic activity. It also implies that we need to find ways to further concretely embody our conscious states so as to amplify them, which entails symbolization. I.e., we feel conscious states more intensely when we express them concretely. For example, uttering eulogies intensifies grief, caressing a loved one or singing love songs intensifies the feeling of love, and clenching the fists intensifies anger. Similarly, we grasp our general felt sense of a situation more vividly when we try to put it into words. This need for symbolization in turn leads to speech, art forms, and relations to others, so that we can have media through which to symbolize and thus amplify the activities of our being (see Ellis 1986, 1996b, 2000d). 2. We need to protect the boundaries of our being, since to be is to be within certain boundaries. This means that we become startled and thus freeze at the unfamiliar or uncanny. We then need to further process the unfamiliar so that it ceases to be uncanny, which entails imagery of action affordances in relation to the threatening object, and in many instances symbolization
Curious Emotions
activities which can further refine the threatening situation’s meaning. This often may include expressing our symbolizations to others, in the interest of further clarification and amplification of our consciousness of what is going on; and of course we finally need to either get away from or destroy the uncanny thing, which fundamentally threatens our freedom of action, and thus requires a self-energizing to break out of the confinement either of our own immobilizing fear, or of the dominance of the predator (as in anger). 3. We need to reduce our chemical imbalances, so as to achieve homeostasis. This implies that we need predictability/familiarity in the environment, and not just novelty/adventure. This need in turn entails a need for further clarification of what it is that we need and want, which again leads to imagery/symbolization, and to cooperative arrangements with others to meet the needs, since cooperation is one of the main ways mammals are adapted to meet them. This process then often leads still further to feelings of being motivated to form social bonds. Correlatively with (1), we need to experience the project of achieving all these goals as one that has value per se, rather than as meaningless and pointless. I.e., we need to feel that being what we are (or being anything) is worthwhile or has value – that the entire project of being is worth the effort. This implies the need for an object that affords play (extropic homeostasis) – and the only completely adequate object for this purpose is another conscious being. We then need imagistic symbolization to amplify our experience of the value of the playaffording object, i.e., the other person (which can mean expressing our feeling of the value to others, or just to ourselves); and we need to act in relation to the valued object, in such a way as to amplify our experience of its value – which leads to friendship, respect, loyalty, and many other social emotions. In this way, the entire realm of object relations, in the sense used by object relations theorists, can be grounded not only in existential phenomenology, but also in physiology and a basic understanding of complex dynamical systems. Phenomenological experiencing of emotion can be correlated, given a detailed enough account, with what complex self-organizing (homeostasiswithin-extropy-craving) beings need, in chemical terms. The need for extropy correlates with what Panksepp (1998) calls the brain’s seeking system (curiosity, boredom, vigilance, enthusiasm for activity), which also interrelates with the play system, and also the wakefulness and arousal system. These tendencies cause the total self-organizing system to try to use norepinephrine, dopamine and other such chemicals to amplify the complexity and activity level of the sys-
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
tem. Hence the need for social relations, because other conscious beings afford novelty and unpredictability within safety. The need for homeostasis correlates with the consummatory pleasure– pain system, which when combined with the other needs leads to social integration of pleasure–pain issues through the brain’s play, lust and nurturance systems (and in less direct ways to other social emotions). Political, economic and professional activities are complex attempts to harmonize all these disparate motives. Thwarting of the freedom of movement in the resulting activities may again result in frustration of the more basic aim to engage in patterns of activity consistent with the organism’s whole self-organizational structure, which can trigger very basic feelings such as fear or anger, but now in relation to complex social conditions such as political or economic oppression. The need for secure boundaries and freedom of activity within those boundaries correlates with the startle response to “bad” novelty, which leads to enaction of either the fear or anger systems as ways to self-energize and reassert freedom of action (unconfined by the bad novel stimulus, whose effect is to constrict and prevent free activity). Given the complex physical, economic and professional relations just mentioned, the anger and fear systems can be triggered by events that are much simpler than their true intentional referents, which must be contextualized in the realm of these more complex political and economic arrangements. Events such as motorists cutting in front of us are routine examples that occur on an everyday basis. The need to experience the project of being as worth the effort (the need for inspiration) is a further elaboration of the arousal and seeking systems, and correlates with Panksepp’s separation distress (or what Panksepp also calls the “panic”) system, which is the negative manifestation of a love system, also including lust and nurturance (utilizing release of oxytocin in the brain for females, and oxytocin, vasopressin, and prolactin for males), as well as friendship and play (combining oxytocin and prolactin with energizing DA, NE, and other neurotransmitters). Ultimately, we need others in relation to whom we can fully express what we are – which is just as fundamental and existential a need as eating or protecting one’s boundaries. The failure to achieve this aim can result in depression, which correlates with chemical imbalances of the total system, but ultimately stems from a failure to energize the system at a high enough level of extropy, since the value of doing so needs to be felt in order to motivate it. Thus dogs act listless and disoriented when they fail to get the kind of play, social interaction, and even obedience training that they want (being such an extremely cooperative
Curious Emotions
species). Death through marasmus in human infants is the clearest instance of total failure of this system. Although we speak of self-organizing systems as having a “tendency” to appropriate whatever physical elements are needed to keep the system going in its preferred patterns, and readjusting to a different basin of attraction to compensate for changes in the environment, we should of course remember that maintaining a complex self-organizing system is not at all easy, and requires the cooperation of several different extraneous mechanisms, such as the gifts we inherit through long and hard natural selection, as well as conscious planning and good luck in terms of environmental conditions – and even then, of course, the project is ultimately doomed to eventual failure. Even a tiny disruption of the evolutionary legacy, such as a stroke, can make the project impossible – and probably in almost all instances the best we can do is to come close to achieving all the elements for the total extropic-homeostatic balance that is desired. The complexities resulting from anticipation of this ultimate failure in death affects the most intelligent organisms in such an important way that the need to appreciate the value of being per se, as instantiated in beloved others and experienced through positive relations with others, becomes still further pronounced than it would be in an animal unintelligent enough simply to live in the present moment without concern about death and other conditions of finitude. This leads to a further intensification of many kinds of love experiences in humans. Not only is love not merely derivative from more elementary needs such as sexual pleasure, but in fact sexual lust can be a relatively mild impulse compared with the impassioned turbulence of love when intensified by the larger existential need to affirm the value of being through a sense of inspiration, which is further exaggerated by existential understanding of the limits of human life in all dimensions of finitude, including the finitude of the human life span (Ellis 1996b).
. Toward an integrated physiological and phenomenological account The tendency of the most complex self-organizing systems toward extropy is a good candidate for explaining the “seeking” and “play” systems – so important in the conflict between consummatory drive reductionism and the “higher” or “existential” emotions – from a self-organizing perspective. We have seen that novelty is a preperceptual category that is always recognized by the emotional limbic system prior to perceptual processing (LeDoux 1996; Damasio 1999). The first instantaneous response to real novelty – novelty of
Chapter 4. Homeostasis, extropy, and boundary needs
a kind for which we are completely unprepared by the immediately preceding context – is a startle reflex, which has basic emotional-brain ramifications. Then, as the novel stimulus has time to be processed further, if it continues to be novel in a bad way (in a way that does not present self-actualizing affordances), the startle response quickly evolves into a mild fear response, i.e., freezing. Natural selection serves well enough as an explanation for this form of organization: We are better off doing nothing when any wrong move could mean death. Subsequently, the freezing becomes a confinement, and confinement then provokes either flight, or a kind of energized rage response, either of which breaks us out of the frozen startle response and equips us for action. On the other hand, if the novel stimulus presents good novelty (self-actualizing action affordances), then the seeking and play systems go into action. We can thus correlate existential issues with Panksepp’s seeking, play, rage, and fear systems. With regard to his lust, nurturance and separation distress systems, all three of these brain systems activate social emotions involving empathy (and thus utilization of oxytocin and prolactin circuits in the brain) although separation distress does so in a negative way. These systems too can be given existential accounts. In order to actualize ourselves, we need to be in interaction with others – this is the nature of mammals (and of intensely conscious beings as conceived of in existential terms). When not in interaction with others, either directly or indirectly, it may become impossible for us to be what we are; our self-organizing systems cannot maintain themselves, and we feel the resulting failure of both homeostasis and extropy. “Lust” and “nurturance” are similar to each other both physiologically (Panksepp 1998) and phenomenologically (Ellis 1996b); they involve actualizing one’s being through empathy with another, and experiencing the value of being as instantiated in the other through empathy. Sex too (which is not really necessary for reproduction, in lower species) evolved hand in hand with these tendencies toward empathy. This does not explain, of course, why sex gives pleasure – that explanation would be more elementary, having to do with achieving chemical homeostasis. What the need for higher value experience explains is why we are the kind of beings that associate sexual reproduction with empathy in the first place – why we connect the sexual pleasure with the perception of other beings of the opposite sex (in a way that empathizes with them) rather than, say, thinking about algebraic equations or of nothing at all while ejaculating. (The evolutionary reason, of course, is that beings that thought about algebraic equations while ejaculating didn’t reproduce themselves as well, and thus didn’t compete well with those who thought empathically about other beings while doing it). With-
Curious Emotions
out this empathic dimension, we have acute distress, because we either cannot be what we are, or we cannot see the full value of being what we are (or of being anything at all) – which is a frequent precursor to depression (Panksepp 1998: 274). Even the courtship behavior of sub-mammalian species, such as birds, often exhibits elaborate imitative routines very suggestive of empathy. Understanding why we need others to actualize our being requires understanding the structure of the self or personality, which is a higher-order pattern of progressing from one conscious state to another: A personality can be identified by the pattern in the directions of those changes, which is a style of being, rather than by a mere listing of which conscious states are experienced; we might all experience them all, at various times (Ellis 1986). So to be what we are, we have to relate to others who will allow the right kind of pattern of progression from one state to the next, in addition to allowing progressions that generally afford extropy within homeostasis. For each individual, different patterns will be required to achieve these ends, since the ends themselves have to do with complex structures of dynamic change. In sum, we have now seen considerable evidence that contemporary neurophysiology of the emotions does not require a simplistic egoistic-hedonist and consummatory-drive-reductivist view of the emotional life, but is generally consistent with the demands of existentialists and self-actualization psychologists. The key to reconciling physiology with these higher-order ways of seeing the meaning of emotions is to approach the physiology underlying consciousness itself in terms of complex self-organizing systems that seek extropic basins of attraction as well as homeostasis.
Chapter 5
Varieties of extended self and personality
As I type at the computer, I am aware that the word “I” in this self-reference can mean a variety of different things. It can mean the conscious awareness or “subjectivity” in which the texture of the computer keys is felt and the meanings of ideas are entertained. As Kant pointed out, the existence of this subjective “I” does not require that I continually reflect on myself as the subjective dimension of every objective content (every object of perception, thought, etc.). It is enough that the subjective dimension is always potentially available to reflection. But even this one sense of “I” has many variations, depending on which philosophers one reads. Sartre (1937) famously disagreed with Kant and Husserl as to whether there is such an entity as “I,” other than just another constructed object within the field of other objects of consciousness. In a different sense, “I” can also mean the primitively “agentic” ability to move my own fingers in a purposeful way, for example as I type these words on the keyboard (Gallagher & Marcel 1999; Marcel 2003). One advantage of this sense of “I” is that it can refer to my self while asleep, since even then the organism continues to engage in self-organizational activity toward the holistic purpose of balance and integration within the complex pattern of activity that is being maintained across replacements and readjustments of its substrata. But to say that this sense of “I” is a meaningful one that really refers to something is not necessarily to deny the existence of the self in the other sense – the “subject of experience” sense that Kant and Husserl talk about. Instead, it raises the interesting question as to whether both senses of “I” refer to different aspects or capacities of the same single entity or not. I shall return to this question later in this chapter. Besides these two senses, there is also the “I” in the sense of my body as an object – for example, the fingers that I can see as they type and the face I can see in the mirror. This concretely instantiated object, my body, which can be studied in various ways by scientists, is a normal referent of the term “I” that is not rendered nonsensical by the fact that, in the first two senses mentioned above, I could still be “myself ” even if my hands were amputated or if my face were reconstructed so that I could serve as a Sadaam Hussein body-double.
Curious Emotions
It is an open question whether, as Bergson affirmed and Aristotle denied, I would still be the same “I,” in some sense, even if all the micro-components of my system were replaced. In fact, we must question to what extent I remain the same “I” from one moment to the next, as not only the contents of my thoughts and the molecules of my body are replaced, but also the patterns of activity in which they engage. This question leads to still another commonly used sense of “I” – the concept of that which provides the continuity from one moment to another. Against the temptation to define a person simply as the Humean “bundle” of thoughts and sensations that occur in one body, there is the problem that, if everyone could entertain pretty much the same thoughts and feelings at various times, then they would all have the same personality, or would be duplicates of the same person. But this seems counterintuitive. Instead, there seems to be a personality that endures across the changes of momentary states, and does not even depend on whether or not I entertain one or another particular momentary state. In some sense, I would still be the same person even if I had not experienced the pain of hitting my foot on a chair this morning. This “person” or “personality” sense of “self ” seems to be predicated more on the pattern that influences the direction of change from one state to another than it does on what the particular states are. I shall call this dimension the “person,” to distinguish it from the above senses. But one of the challenges facing this notion of “person” is whether in fact there is any such thing, and I believe the self-organizational approach to emotion is in a good position to elaborate how such a notion can be coherent. Another important distinction whose neglect could lead to a great deal of confusion is the difference in meaning between “self ” and “sense of self.” That is, having a self may be different from sensing this self. For example, some phylogenetically low-ranking animals may have selves, at least in some of the above senses, but not sense that they have them. By distinguishing the meanings of these terms, I do not mean to foreclose the question as to whether the two terms may or may not always describe the same entity, or be subserved by many of the same brain processes. The terms Clark Kent and Superman have clearly different meanings, but it happens that they describe different aspects of the same entity. Anytime we sense something, it is logically possible that the object of the sensing could have existed without being sensed. The sensing that I have a left arm is not the same thing as having a left arm. I could have a left arm without sensing that I have one, or in rare instances even sense that I have one without actually having one. The same goes for the self; a “sense of self ” cannot be auto-
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
matically equated with the self that is sensed in this sensing. As we shall see, this point holds true even for the most sophisticated and complex concepts of an “extended self.” In each case, it is simply a logical point that sensing something is not the same thing as having it or being it. Some people might want to collapse this distinction a priori on the grounds that the meaning of “self ” is inherently subjective. To be a self is to be a sensing being, and to sense anything is to be a self – at least in one sense of the word “self.” But even in this particular sense, it does not follow that to be a self is the same thing as to have a sense of myself. It is logically possible that I could be a sensing being, yet be engaged in sensing things other than myself. In that case, I might have a self, but not have a sense of self. Conversely, I might sense myself as being something other than what I actually am. Also, the meaning of “sense of self ” will vary, depending on which meaning of the term “self ” is in play. Among the various meanings of the term, at least several are probably applicable to something that is real, as opposed to socially or personally constructed, although they may describe different features that in most normal instances will all apply to the same organism. We can distinguish different aspects of the “self ” in the sense of primitive agency, discussed earlier – the simple ability to move rather than just be moved. A slightly more complex variation on this concept of capacity for self-movement is the idea that my will is the source of the movement. While asleep, for example, my body performs many minimally agentic actions in the sense that they are dynamical and robust rearrangements of many micro-constituents geared toward the organism’s balancing of various self-organizational purposes; yet I do not will my body to do any of those primitively agentic things. So what one might call the “ownership” of the primitive actions that one deliberately “wills” (Marcel 2003) may describe a “self ” that is very primitive, but not as primitive as the mere ability to move per se. I shall refer to this meaning of self as the “ownership” of actions. One of the problems it raises is the problem of mental causation. Because of this problem, many have decided (falsely, in my view) that the power of a willed choice to cause motion in one’s own body is entirely illusory (Wegner 2002). I shall return to this problem. I believe the “action ownership” aspect of the self is closely related to Panksepp’s idea of a “core self.” Panksepp makes essentially the argument that the core self means agency, in both the most primitive sense and in the sense of “owning” the willed actions. In his view, this very primitive agentic “core self ” is rooted in the PAG and upper brainstem, based on observations suggesting that this brain area initiates action in the interest of the organism’s motivations. This includes the notion of primitive agency, but adds a more subjective
Curious Emotions
component with the feeling that a unified subjective entity, my core self, initiates the actions in question. Panksepp also links this point with his emphasis on the idea that the emotional systems are necessary for all forms of consciousness. He suggests in several places (1998, 2000, 2002) that the “core self ” may be necessary for a self in all other senses – including any capacity for subjective reflection or even subjectivity per se (these two phenomena are distinct, by the way, because subjectivity per se constitutes a “self ” in one sense even if not reflected upon). According to Panksepp, this would entail that any subjective consciousness, including the capacity to reflect on it, would be inseparably linked with a more basic capacity for agency. Therefore, it would necessarily have to be true that other forms of subjective consciousness are derivative from the core self ’s motivation to act and to generate sensorimotor action imagery. For example, if, as I have argued, there can be no perceptual consciousness as a function of the visual cortex without this consciousness somehow being necessarily a part of an action routine (or of a motivation to act or action imagery of some sort), then Panksepp’s claim that very primitive PAG-brainstem selfregulation is the root of the core self in the sense of owned primitive agency would be a very likely hypothesis. The self in some of the senses we have just distinguished seems to be more basic or primitive than the others, so the question arises as to whether they are dependent on the “core self ” as defined by Panksepp (similar to and certainly including “primitive agency”), and whether some result from overlays of planning, cognition, self-consciousness, or other mental activities added to primitive agency. If it is true that there can be no consciousness without at least unconscious action imagery, then even the subjective self – the “subject of experiences” – would as a consequence be dependent on the core self or the primitive agent. I have already argued that forms of subjective consciousness that are not commonly viewed as emotion – for example, perceptual consciousness – are necessarily dependent on emotion, motivation, and action-initiation (which may then be inhibited) in order to be experienced subjectively. If this were not the case, then we could have the ability to experience subjective consciousness in some forms (for example, subjective consciousness of perceptual objects) without a major contribution from the emotional brain areas. But evidence is mounting that consciousness is dependent on the core self ’s motivated actioninitiating capacity, and it seems that the emotional brain areas do play a major role in all forms of consciousness. One of the most coherent cases for the enactive view of this dependence of the subjective self on agency is made by Natika Newton in Foundations of
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
Understanding (1996). The central purpose of her book is to show that the essential difference between the “knowledge” of computers (for example, Searle’s Chinese room) and conscious humans (for example, a person speaking Chinese) is that humans can act and plan actions, whereas computers only react. She then tries to show that all forms of consciousness, from perception to thought to our understanding of other people, are rooted in our ability to perform basic actions, and to grasp the action affordances of environmental situations and objects; our abstract thoughts are ways of incorporating environmental affordances into possible action schemas in more and more complicated ways. I also argued for Newton’s enactive thesis in Questioning Consciousness (1995) and earlier in this book on the grounds that it fits the ERP data we have discussed here. The subject’s consciousness of a suddenly presented novel stimulus is not merely a result of sensory processing, but also presupposes complicated subcortical emotional activation that is not dependent on the perceptual processing that goes on simultaneously. Thus, without the emotional activations, there would be no perceptual consciousness, although there might be blindsight or implicit knowledge. And of course the notion that the core self is rooted in primitive agency is explicitly built into the groundbreaking work by Varela et al. (1991), The Embodied Mind, which systematically advanced the “enactive” theory of consciousness. What, then, must be added to the core self or primitive agent in order to constitute the extended self that we think of ourselves as being in daily life? That question depends partly on what aspects of self-functioning are meant to be included in the extended self. As already noted, whichever meaning is at issue should not run together “self ” with “self-representation” as if they were the same thing; if the distinction is made between a self and a representation of the self, then an additional problem is highlighted: we can have subjective perceptual consciousness, and in a sense the subject of this consciousness could be a “self,” whether it then reflects on itself or not. So here again, if subjectivity is a “self,” then this subjectivity is necessarily dependent on emotion and agency. But if “self ” is meant to refer to a being that is capable of self-reflection, not all subjects will be selves in this latter sense. For example, given the anatomical and behavioral similarities of cats’ and dogs’ brains to our own, it is very likely that these animals have consciousness. But they cannot interpret the image of themselves in the mirror as themselves, and it is difficult to think of any behavioral indication that these animals can reflect on themselves. Certainly, it is entirely logically possible for something to be a subject of experience without being able to reflect on itself. This would simply mean that it can be conscious of the
Curious Emotions
outer world and some aspects of its own body and interoceptive sensations, but not be able to reflect on itself as a whole. Still another “self ” that many current authors discuss is the sense of a “higher-order” or “social” self, which many equate with a “constructed” or “narrative” self. This notion of a narrative or constructed self is only a very recent one, and one that may already be going out of fashion among the postmodernist philosophers and literary critics who advanced it. But aside from this constructivist conception, there is also a traditional notion of self in the sense of “person” or “personality,”discussed by personalist philosophers such as Bergson, as well as Husserl and Aristotle, and of course by many psychologists under the rubric of “personality theory.” Husserl, for example, thinks of personality (the “psychophysical subject” discussed in his Lectures on Phenomenological Psychology) as a stable way of organizing subjective experiences. I.e., anyone could experience any given state of consciousness, so what makes one person a different “personality” from another is that he organizes the flow of states into a pattern that is unique to him. Sartre, as noted above, argued against such a possibility, but part of what Sartre ignores is that this difference in ways of directing the stream of experiences could be attributable (in agreement with Panksepp’s PAG/core self thesis) to the way emotions and motivations dictate the direction of attention at each subsequent moment in the stream. The higher-order pattern formed in the overall motivationally directed stream of consciousness could then be different for each different personality. So another meaning of “self ” is the idea of the unified “person,” which provides a continuity and unique character to the pattern in which different items in the stream of consciousness unfold. Many people could have pretty much the same experiences, yet they still would not have the same personality. If common sense inclines us to think of ourselves as equivalent with this “person” aspect of the self, we are also naturally prone to equate ourselves with what appears at first to be a completely different kind of self – the self in the sense of the “subject of experience,” mentioned above. It is quite possible, as various philosophers throughout history have thought (e.g., Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and the phenomenologists), that every state of consciousness has a subjective dimension and an objective referent, and that the possibility of subjectivity per se is the self. I.e., wherever there is consciousness, there is a “self ” that has or executes this consciousness. So subjectivity itself would constitute a “self,” at least in one of its most important functions, regardless of what kind of narratives or constructions are lain over that “self.” Here again, to be a self and to have reflective knowledge of the self that one is are two different things that should be distinguished. So there are several notions of “self ”
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
that are not equivalent with anything that is constructed from socially learned categories, narratives, etc. If we sense ourselves both as subjects and as persons, then at least our common sense experience would seem to suggest that there should be a way to unify these two concepts: on the one hand, the subjective component of every experience that always stands ready to be reflected upon (this would be the standard Kantian definition of the “ego”), and on the other hand the “person” or “personality” in the sense of organizational unity across time. The latter would be a higher-order and partly social self, but not merely a constructed or narrative one, because the subject need not construct any narrative in order simply to direct attention in certain unique patterns that ultimately will form a unique structuring of the stream of consciousness. This unique unfolding pattern can pick out that individual “self ” from all the other possible ones, whether or not this unique self is able to “know itself ” accurately. To complicate matters further, another notion of extended self that goes beyond the “core self,” is the sense of planned actions emphasized by Newton (1996). “Self ” in this sense would require more than the primitive agency discussed in the previous chapter. It would require more sophisticated functions than the “core self,” and would manifest itself in social as well as physical relations, but still would not be a narrative or constructed self. If we cannot imagine ourselves as existing in the absence of planned action in an everyday sense – being able to plan a few moments in advance to reach out and grasp a coffee cup, for example – then one might suspect that this function too would find a place in a coherent notion of self, inclusive also of subjectivity and personality. And finally, we must not forget that all these senses of self differ from the idea of a “reflected” self, i.e., the self as it appears to us in reflection, which may or may not reveal the “true self ” that is doing the reflecting, as object relations theorists and self psychologists such as Kohut often stress. This reflected self might be a construction or narrative, but the “true self ” that is the subject doing the reflecting (and which might not be revealed in the results of the reflection) would not be a construction or narrative. This is the object relations theorists’ distinction between the “true self ” and the “narcissistic self.” Part of the problem, then, is that there are many senses of “self,” of which these last two we have just mentioned (“subjectivity” and “reflexivity”) are only two of the most prominent. Like Panksepp, I would like to argue that somehow the “core self ” that is rooted in the PAG-brainstem emotional systems and grounds the possibility of agency is more basic than these others. In order to establish this, and to clarify the ways in which the more extended “selves” are
Curious Emotions
built up from this concept, we need to show how the other functions that are often labeled as “selves” in everyday usage and in the usage of various thinkers are dependent or somehow necessarily tied in with the “agentic” function of the core self. I want to argue in this chapter that it is possible to develop a synthesis of all these concepts: that all consciousness requires motivation and primitive agency in the sense of the “core self,” but also that there are other senses of the self that are not merely the narrative/constructed ones from which the object relations theorists distinguish the “true self ” – that the self in all these senses may be real and may in the final analysis be different aspects of more or less the same entity.
.
How emotion grounds the various senses of self
If the action-reaction distinction is formulated in terms of dynamical selforganization, and makes possible unified organismic action and correlative intentional experience, then it should not be a far-fetched hypothesis that emotionally motivated directionality in the stream of consciousness is what makes possible the organization of experience in the form of a self, person, or experiencing subject. I shall argue that several of the most important senses of “self,” “person,” and “subject” cohere if we understand them in terms of the way the organism’s emotional life unifies experience. The most primitive meaning of self is simply the notion of an organism that acts rather than merely passively reacting to stimuli. I have suggested that this primitive action initiator is related to Panksepp’s (1998) “core self ” – a primitive agency that may or may not be supplemented with a capacity for action planning, conscious subjectivity, or reflexivity. This basic starting point, that selves can act, serves as a necessary foundation for two other concepts of self, both of which are important for their own philosophical and psychological purposes – the “embodied self ”, which grounds specific subjective states in specific embodied actions and the “personal self ”, which weaves the various subjective states into a personality structure. The embodied self is an agent attuned to environmental affordances that can create subjective awareness; if this intentionality is reflected upon, it reveals a subjectivity in the form of a felt sense that is always available for reflection. The personal self – or personality – seems to be a higher-order phenomenon than any particular subjective state, and is constituted by the patterning of the various states in the stream of consciousness; it is what gives each individual a personality over and above the particular experiences, none of which are necessary for the unique identity of
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
the person. This pattern allows identification of an overall personality as well as a unity across the various states in the stream. On my argument, the functions of both these selves are united in the workings of the emotional-motivational self. At the end of this chapter, we shall explore the ways we can or cannot know about these selves – e.g., whether this attempted knowing leads to mere constructions, or whether it can found actual knowledge of what is real about ourselves. The first requirement of a self is that it be able to act. One of the first problems in any concept of self is therefore to make possible an understanding of how such a self ’s choices and motivational intentions give rise to certain results, such as the willed movements of the body, rather than having merely illusory causal power. If I decide to raise my arm, there seems to be a sense in which “my” decision causes the hand to go up. When a cancerous tumor grows in my brain, we want to say that this sense is lacking. “I” do not decide that the tumor is to grow, even though it is my own self-organizing organism that, in the final analysis, makes it grow. Just as in the case of the tumor, we know that numerous micro-mechanisms are necessary and sufficient precursors of raising my arm, and in both cases, we saw earlier that the micro-mechanisms do not thereby exhaust all the causal power over whether the arm goes up. The system self-organizes its own microconstituents by controlling and readjusting the background conditions under which any given micro-sequence can or cannot lead to the holistic outcomes needed to main self-organization. Yet the reason for this causal robustness of the process with respect to its micro-components does not show that there is freedom to make mental choices that can really determine behavior. The point we made earlier about self-organizing processes having causal power with respect to their micro-components is just as true for the growth of the cancerous tumor in my brain as it is for the execution of the choice to raise my arm. The feeling that the choice to raise the arm is what causes it to go up could then be only an illusion. If a unitary act – the choice to raise the hand – has real causal power, then as Juarrero (1999), Newton (1996) and other action theorists have pointed out, this is at the heart of what it means to act rather than merely passively reacting. On the other hand, if all the causal power is at the “sub-personal” level, just as it is for the growth of the cancerous tumor, then the movement of the arm, in the final analysis, is really just as passive on “my” part as the growth of the tumor, and is not truly active in the sense needed to ground the feeling of freedom included in the sense of agency. And if this feeling of agency is a mere epiphenomenon, with no real causal power, then so are
Curious Emotions
the concepts of self just mentioned, since they depend as a minimal condition on the self ’s being able to act. Traditionally, philosophers have formulated the problem of mental causation in this way: the “causal closure of the physical realm” – the notion that every physical event, if it has a cause, must have a physical cause (Kim 1992, 1993) – seems empirically as true for physical and chemical events in the brain as it is elsewhere. Many empirical brain studies support this conclusion (see Ellis & Newton 1998a). Yet, when I raise my hand, it seems obvious that the decision to raise the hand makes the hand go up. If there is mental causation, this would mean that, if I make a mental choice, the choice can have causal power over the resulting movements of my body. If the choice is merely an ephiphenomenon or causal side-effect of a series of physical events, over which “I” as a unified being have no control, then the feeling that the choice influences the resulting action would seem to be only an illusion. Both the feeling that the choice has causal power and the behavioral outcome then really would be caused by a sequence of physical events over which “I” have no control, just as in the case of the growth of the tumor, even if it is true that there are selforganizing processes in my body that do control them. This would be a trivial sense of choice as far as “I” am concerned, in the same way that it would be trivial to say that, when a cancerous tumor grows in my brain, it is “I” who decides that it is to grow. Thus, if the feeling that a mental decision or intention has causal power is not to be a mere illusion, it is traditionally assumed that some combination of events other than the mental decision cannot be completely sufficient to produce the outcome independently of the decision. If A (a physical mechanism explainable at the micro-level) causes both B (a mental intention) and C (a physical or mental outcome), then A is sufficient for C independently of B, so B is precluded from having any real causal power over C. B is simply an epiphenomenon of A. Because B always accompanies A, it feels as if B is causally necessary for C, but if the micro-level causal account is correct then this feeling must be only an illusion. The same problem will arise whether the purposeful intention of the organism is conscious or unconscious. A man courting a woman may not be aware of making more eye contact than he normally would in order to achieve an objective, but this behavior may often be purposefully intentional nonetheless. But if the behavior is completely explainable by sub-personal physical processes in the brain, without reference to a self-organizing power on the part of the mental choice itself, then the causal power of the man’s intentions would
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
seem to be only illusory, unless we can somehow reconcile it with the causal closure that apparently exists at the sub-personal level. In neurophysiological terms, to say that the man’s “self ” is driven to behave by hormone and neurotransmitter activity such as testosterone or vasopressin would place the “self ” in the cortex, because it is the cortex that receives the driving input from the subcortex and cerebellum. This could not be correct, because we have seen repeatedly that action is already initiated at the subcortical level, with or without further cortical refinements. So the acting self must include the subcortex, and cannot be a separate entity that merely receives causal inputs from the subcortex. In concrete terms, a man on a beach surrounded by naked women will not necessarily be “driven” by neurotransmitters to lust after them if he is already geared up toward a unified action to which they are irrelevant, such as saving a drowning person. How are we to account for this unified and unifying sense of agency that is not merely driven by sub-personal brain processes? There are really two interrelated questions here, and much of their mystery stems from their interrelatedness. The question as to how a mental state can cause a physical event is only modestly mysterious if we assume a simple identity between certain combinations of mental and physical events. It becomes much more mysterious when we ask how a unified act of will on the part of a unified decision-making agent can cause the various micro-level physical events which all together comprise the physical substrata for this very agency itself. That is, how can the “core self,” simply in the sense of a unified being (not necessarily with sophisticated action planning ability or moral agency), voluntarily initiate the movements of its own bodily components? This last question is mysterious for two reasons. Not only can a desire in the brain command the body to move, but also, and more paradoxically, a unified process called the “self ” or “person” can command the component processes in the brain to conform to the patterns of activity needed to execute the relevant thoughts, feeling states, perceptual imagery, and attentional activities. This notion that a whole being can somehow cause the movements of its own parts seems at odds with most scientific accounts of consciousness, in which the whole is built up from interacting components whose activities are caused in quite piecemeal fashion by various inputs, micro-mechanisms, and basic chemical reactions. We have already made some progress in developing resources to deal with this enigma, but more are required. We have seen that the micro-constituents do not exhaust the causal power of a self-organizing system, once we take account of the system’s ability to rearrange the background conditions under
Curious Emotions
which one or another causal event at the micro-level may or may not be sufficient for its consequents. But again, this is as true for sub-personal as for personal ones. It is true for growing cancers as for conscious or unconscious decisions to execute bodily movements.
. Why not an illusory-choice model? It is tempting to just bite the bullet and opt for a solution which posits that the causal power of choice or purposeful intent is an illusion – as, for example, Wegner (2003) and Dennett (2003) have argued. We could then simply posit that the movements are caused by interacting sub-personal mechanisms, and leave the mental intention out of the causal picture. The feeling that we choose to act would then be explained as a feeling that results from those same subpersonal mechanisms – an epiphenomenon of the events that exert the real causal power (Dennett 2003; Jackendoff 1996; Searle 1984; Smart 1963, 1970; Wegner 2003). Against this purely “bottom-up” solution, it can be argued that the feeling that our consciousness often does play an active role in organizing the physical processes leading to action is not a mere illusion. Voluntary movement really is different from an unconditioned reflex or a habituated neural-firing sequence (Jeannerod 1997; Spence & Frith 1999). In playing a well-practiced piece on the piano, for example, most of the movements are not consciously initiated: as soon as I tell my hands which piece to play, they automatically execute the sequence of notes, as a series of micro-mechanisms that require little direction except from the micro-mechanisms themselves, orchestrated mostly by the cerebellum at an unconscious level (Schmahmann 1997). However, this is true only until I need to modify a learned sequence of motor commands. Then I must switch to the mode of voluntary, global directing of the micro-events (Jeannerod 1997; Spence & Frith 1999). I must purposely decide to hit the G before the A, and deliberately command the selected finger to move (Sudnow 1978/1999). There are both phenomenological and physiological differences between these two modes. It is not just an illusory difference. In the effortful movement, more widely distributed brain processes are quickly activated, and the whole pattern of the organization seems to be commanded, not just by the cerebellum, but in some sense by “me” as a whole. Brainstem arousal mechanisms activate neurotransmitters that permeate virtually all parts of the brain (Panksepp 1998; Watt 2000), and looping signals integrate the functions of the
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
cerebellum, thalamus, hypothalamus, frontal and prefrontal areas and the anterior cingulate (Schmahmann 1997), which then lead to imagery involving parietal, occipital and temporal lobes, and tentative action imagery involving the motor cortex and supplementary motor area (Damasio 1994, 1999; Jeannerod 1997). In short, virtually the whole brain must be integrated at the point when a new decision is made, by contrast to the linear command sequences that are sent from the cerebellum when it is functioning on “automatic pilot,” by means of conditioned responses and habitual motor programs (Schmahmann 1997). In the deliberately self-controlled mode, a pianist can decide to use the fourth finger or the fifth, or play loud or soft, depending on the effect intended or wanted. Widely distributed aspects of the pianist’s being participate in forming such motivations, as indicated by the analyses of the motivational brain systems just mentioned, and from this holistic formation flows the sequence of mechanisms needed to make the self-directed behavior happen. Widely distributed but holistically unified aspects of a golfer’s being must execute the decision as to when the swing will start; and if so, then there cannot be an isolated or highly localized mechanism that is responsible for the decision. In the case of intentional choices, we seem to be in a very different realm from a simple linear mechanism, such as amygdala activation by the sudden sight of a snake (as in LeDoux 1996). In that case, the standard explanation is quite simple, involving a very localized sequence of physical and chemical mechanisms. In the case of forming the mood that is to be conveyed in music, the needed brain activity seems to be extensively global, simultaneous, and dependent on the precise timing of billions of micro-mechanisms occurring all through the brain all at once (Haines et al. 1997). The overall pattern, which is the motivational state, must in some way organize the activities of the microconstituents. And this seems to be just the opposite of a situation in which the overall pattern is caused by those same micro-constituents. Some will say that there is no paradox here, since any conscious state, whether global or localized, is just caused by the interaction of previous physical mechanisms. While it is true that most scientific accounts of consciousness and mentality (perhaps excluding quantum brain theories) will regard every psychological state as having been caused by some combination of past events, this is not where the paradox lies. The paradox is how a holistic organizational pattern – once having been caused by whatever sequence of past events – can then have the power to organize its own component mechanisms so as to ensure that they will behave as dictated by the holistic organizational pattern. If an affective intention is to motivate behavior, then in order to maintain itself
Curious Emotions
this affective state must use numerous simultaneous shunt mechanisms to ensure that just the right micro-events occur (Panksepp 1998), and that just the right timing is maintained among billions of neural firings (Anderson 2000), to allow the intended quale to continue being felt while at the same time all the micro-level events are being coordinated in such a way as to facilitate the flow of chosen actions from the affectively motivated choices of the unified self. The problem of mental causation can thus be formulated in terms of the need to choose between two theoretical alternatives, each of which entails its own difficulties. Either (1) a whole organizational pattern, occurring at the level of personal choices and intentions, has the power to control its own subpersonal physical constituents rather than only the other way around – which seems to fly in the face of causal closure at the sub-personal level (which in turn seems to be an empirical fact); or (2) the feeling that our choices determine our actions in a non-trivial sense is only an illusion. Let’s take a closer look at the second of these two alterantives. A classic finding that is often interpreted as supporting the illusory-choice solution is that, prior to a subject’s awareness of deciding to execute an action, the neurophysiological mechanisms that cause the action are already reliably measurable (Libet 1999). A measurable readiness potential is observable .5 second before a willed action, whereas the subject is aware of the choice only .1 second before the act. Libet assumes that this means that the actual choice occurs unconsciously .4 second before we consciously will it. This assumes that the readiness potential is the correlate of the initiation of the action, and this seems to be the standard assumption among those who cite Libet’s readiness potential as evidence that conscious choices are only causally irrelevant epiphenomena. If conscious intentions are merely epiphenomena, then the same could just as well be true for unconscious intentions. The apparent causal power of all purposeful intentions, even if unconscious, could just as well be a subjective illusion masking the real causal mechanisms, which are at the micro-level. The problem here is not limited merely to the realm of consciousness theory. Actually, Libet tries to save “free will” from this problem by postulating that the conscious choice, which occurs .4 second after the readiness potential, has a “veto power” over the act that has already been unconsciously caused, and that this veto power is not predetermined and is the source of free will. Although (conveniently) there currently is no way to measure the physiological correlates of the veto power, Libet posits that we know it must exist because of the selfreports of the subjective experience of subjects. He appeals to the sense that we can change our minds after having just begun to execute an act. Obviously,
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
a hitter in baseball must be able to check a swing much more quickly than the .5 second interval between the readiness potential and the actual swing. Libet concludes that an immaterial mind may still have a veto power over the physically initiated readiness potential. Libet goes on to say that, if this veto power itself were physiologically predetermined, then free will would be an illusion, and our conscious choice would have no causal power of its own, but would be a mere epiphenomenon. In Libet’s view, if we give up a metaphysical dualism of mind and body, then we also give up any causal power on the part of mental choices. He ignores the possibility, of course, that the choice itself could have its own physiological correlates at the point when it occurs, and thus could have the same causal powers that these physiological correlates have. He seems to assume here that, if physical event A realizes mental event B, and then B causes C, this means that B did not “really” cause C, since A “really” did. I.e., he assumes that if B itself is sufficiently explainable by its own physical realizers, then B can have no real causal power. This is in sharp contrast to most psychophysical identity theorists, who attribute the exact same causal powers to a mental event and its physical realizers, on the basis that the two are identical. In short, Libet’s assumption is that there must be a contra-causally free will in order for there to be a “will” per se. He therefore ends up endorsing a straightforwardly and admitted dualistic conclusion (Libet 1999). An alternative explanation of the Libet findings would be that the readiness potential correlates not with the decision to execute the action, but with a consideration of whether to execute that action, or an imagining of the action that is being considered, in order to then decide about it. According to brain imaging studies (Jeannerod 1994, 1997), imagining an act requires sending efferent action commands, but then inhibiting them. So what the readiness potential is actually measuring may be the imagining of the action, which already involves motor cortex and sensory motor area activation. It may not correlate with the decision to act or to the activation of the action at all. Still another alternative reading, which would be essentially equivalent to this one, would be that, at the point when we have made a decision to act, we have not yet completely committed ourselves to the action. We have initiated the action command, which stands ready to be frontally un-inhibited only if we do not in the meantime decide to “veto” it. This is in no way counterintuitive, and does not imply that the decision to act does not cause the action; the physiological antecedents of the tentative decision may precede the time at which the actual decision is made, by allowing the action to go forward uninhibited. On the other hand, when we have made the tentative choice, we have not really
Curious Emotions
chosen yet, because we still have not decided whether to veto the action. But whether actions are decided at the point when they can no longer be vetoed, or prior to that point, the crucial question is whether their causal power is an illusion. Libet’s findings do not support this thesis. What they support is that (1) entertaining the notion of acting in a certain way, while leaving open the door to finally inhibiting the action, is different from (2) deciding once and for all to go through with the action – and there may of course be a time lag between these two points. The readiness potential, even on Libet’s own analysis, accompanies (1), not (2). Empirical experiments could be devised to decide between these two alternative explanations, and either of them would be consistent with a dynamical systems solution to the mental causation problem, which in my view allows that the person can have the power to control the interaction of micro-components, provided that the person’s ontological status can be understood in terms of patterns of physical self-organization which do not contradict ordinary causal laws. We already have seen in previous chapters that, if a dynamical system has the power to rearrange the background conditions needed for various microlevel causal sequences to obtain, then the system has a type of causal power over its own micro-constituents and subsystems that is not merely an illusory effect of the causal workings of the micro-constituents themselves. If process A is necessary and sufficient for process B, and if A could be realized by a number of different combinations of micro-constituents, x, y, and z, then neither x nor y nor z is necessary or sufficient for B. Moreover, if the overall system subsuming the flow from A to B is a complex enough self-organizing one, then it may have the power to actively seek out and replace the needed micro-constituents to subserve A, so that not only is A multiply realizable in terms of x, y, or z, but the system as a whole has the ability to ensure that A is likely to be realized, by seeking out y or z in cases where x is not available. The problem is not whether the relation that forms the higher-order, multiply-realizable pattern can be a “physical” relation. We saw earlier that this relation could easily be physical without thereby having its causal power reducible to the sum of the causal powers of its micro-level components. The question is only whether, in the case of mental intentions, the intention has real causal power over its own component processes in such a way as to make its body move. We have seen that there is no logical impossibility in this scenario. A whole self-organizing process can have causal power over its own micro-constituents. The real question, then, is whether this logical possibility can be fleshed out enough to provide for a notion of self capable of executing meaningful choice that is not merely dictated by its own component processes.
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
Now to flesh out this concept a little more specifically in terms of what is known so far about neurophysiology. Panksepp plausibly locates the most necessary aspects of this “core self ” in circuits dominated by the periaqueductal gray (PAG), which is immediately adjacent to the cerebellum, which of course is involved in coordinating automatic action routines. The PAG is involved in many kinds of feedback loops with the thalamus, hypothalamus and cerebellum as it monitors the body’s homeostatic problems and initiates actions. After receiving these various kinds of feedback about the body’s general homeostatic conditions, it also has the capacity to serve as the first step in transmitting an action command, since it projects efferent pathways to all the brain areas involved in coordinating and executing actions. It also controls the release of many of the neurotransmitters and circuitries associated with emotions. For example, “Probably the most important brain area for the actual integration of the overall anger response is in the PAG. . . ” (Panksepp 1998: 198). Indeed, a review of Panksepp’s seven basic emotion systems reveals that the PAG is the one brain area that is involved in virtually all of them (Watt 2000). Many of the actions initiated at the PAG level, with the help of the cerebellum and cerebellar-thalamic-hypothalamic-cortical loops, can be modified or inhibited after having been initiated, but the fact that the PAG is the starting point suggests to Panksepp that the PAG is the most indispensable core of the “self ” considered as the agent of action as opposed to mere reaction. Extending Panksepp’s thinking on this point, I suggested in an article coauthored with Schmahmann, Anderson and Newton that When brainstem-hypothalamic loops (1) sense a homeostatic imbalance for the organism, they (2) activate neurotransmitter pathways in the interest of general arousal, and begin sending efferent signals to alert the brain that action is needed. This process includes looping with the cerebellum, because the cerebellum can activate highly specific action sequences, based on past learning. The cerebellar-brainstem loops then send efferent action commands as far as the motor cortex. When (3) these action commands are inhibited by prefrontal signals, the result, as Jeannerod points out, is (4) action imagery. When the action imagery is fully informed by specific action commands in response to environmental stimuli, the resulting “object understanding” (Newton 1996) becomes an intentional image schema, which vaguely represents categories of possible objects, but only in terms of their action affordances. . . . (5) When the imagery resonates with the primary and secondary sensory areas (e.g. in the occipital or temporal lobes) either because the latter has been triggered by perceptual input or because the image schemata are so powerful that they activate the occipital or temporal areas on an efferent basis, the result is vivid perceptual (sensorimotor) imagery or actual perceptual consciousness. . . .
Curious Emotions
The role of the cerebellum here is, instead of generating efferent commands to take some action in general, generating very specific action commands by initiating the thalamocerebellar and hypothalamocerebellar loops (Haines et al. 1997), and also hippocampal-cerebellar loops, so that the action that is commanded (and which then gets inhibited in the motor cortex to form consciously-accessible action imagery) is a highly specific action, rather than just an efferent command to act in a general way (i.e. “Don’t just stand there; do something!”). That this specificity arises early in the activation sequence has been seen experimentally. In eyelid conditioning the cerebellum responds within 20 ms of the delivery of the airpuff (Woodruff-Pak 1997); Coles et al. (1990) report finding a hippocampal ERP as early as 18 ms after presentation of a novel stimulus. Both of these ERPs occur long before the occipital 100N and 200N “mismatch negativity,” and probably reflect early activation of the hippocampal-cerebellar loops that Haines et al. (1997) report, along with cerebellar-PAG loops. (Schmahmann et al. 2001: 300–302)
We can think of the “core self ” – the agent in the most minimal sense – as a subsystem of the organism comprising those aspects that are needed to initiate action in the interest of the body’s self-organizational aims. But we can also speak of “higher order” selves than this. When higher emotional and intellectual processes come into play, they often can facilitate the body’s selforganizational aims more effectively than the “core self ” can by itself. Thus they too satisfy the notion of “self ” as unified agent of action. Indeed, they unify the organism more completely than does the core self. Damasio (1999) shows that certain neurological diseases and injuries can knock out certain intellectual or even attentional and perceptual functions, but without eliminating the person’s consciousness or sense that she is a person. When only cortical areas are eliminated, consciousness and the sense of self remain essentially intact. But as we consider neurological dysfunctions that affect regions lower and lower in the brain, more and more of the person’s ability to execute actions and make choices is lost. When the injury affects the upper brain stem areas, first the sense of self and the ability to function as an agent are gone, and then all consciousness is lost. However, this does not mean that other brain areas do not contribute to the identity of the person when they are functioning. In my view, an action is an action of the self, and not a merely mechanical reaction, in any instance where a large subsystem of the organism is acting to coordinate its own micro-constituents toward aims determined at the self-organizational level. This can occur minimally if only the subcortex and parts of the limbic system are intact, and these areas are certainly the ones that are most crucially necessary for even a minimal degree of agency.
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
In the top-down type of dynamical systems approach to purpose-directed action, the agent who makes the decision is a relation, requiring suitable physical substrata, and the motivated mental choice to raise one’s hand is another such relation, which I shall designate as R. This R is multiply realizable by a number of alternative sequences of physical mechanisms, or Ps, with each alternative sequence requiring its own set of background conditions. R is necessary and sufficient for the hand’s going up, whereas no particular set of Ps is necessary and sufficient for the hand’s going up except given certain background conditions which are substantially controlled by R. Note that we are assuming, as argued earlier, that in a suitably complex dynamical system R could have obtained without that particular set of Ps, by rearranging the background conditions in such a way that a different set of Ps could have subserved R. Thus, by the above definition of causation, R causes the hand to go up, yet we can also say that, given the background conditions that did in fact obtain, the Ps that subserved R also caused the hand to go up. But if the Ps that caused the hand to go up had been unavailable to do so, R could have rearranged the background conditions so that, under these altered background conditions, an alternative set of Ps could have caused the hand to go up. Not only can R meaningfully be designated as a cause of the hand’s going up, but in fact R is a cause of the hand’s going up under a broader set of possible background conditions than any given sequence of Ps. Moreover, R is both multiply realizable by alternative sets of Ps, and has some control over the realization of alternative sets of background conditions under which a given sequence of Ps will or will not be used as the particular sequence leading to the raising of the hand. Thus R has more control over the raising of the hand than any particular set of Ps subserving R can have, since it can be said that R is necessary and sufficient for the hand’s going up under many background conditions where that particular sequence of Ps would not have sufficed to make it go up (because the needed background conditions may not have been in place). The causal power of R therefore is not illusory, yet neither does it contradict the causal closure of micro-level sequences, because the micro-level sequence that actually does occur is necessary and sufficient to bring about the resulting action under the given background conditions. But these background conditions have already been influenced by a previous enactment of R, whose tendency is to manipulate background conditions in ways needed so that available microlevel substrata can produce the outcomes that will propagate R into the future. Nor does this causal power of R contradict the thesis that R itself may have been caused to be the way it is by some past set of micro-level events (for exam-
Curious Emotions
ple, in ontogeny and phylogeny). The possibility that I may have been caused by a combination of environmental and hereditary factors to be the kind of person who would choose to study philosophy and psychology does not contradict the fact that I did choose to study them. If someone writes a will, we may ask for evidence that the person chose to write it to include certain specific contents, as opposed to being coerced by forces contrary to his or her own choice, and this question remains meaningful regardless of whether the personality of the person writing the will has been predetermined, resulting in a correlative causal predetermination of the person’s choice. In sum, we do make choices, and choices do cause actions, even though the actions can also be said to have been caused by substratum-level events, if certain background conditions for those causal relations have obtained. However, when a mental choice occurs, the choice is an aspect of a motivated self-organizational process that is a relation subserved by the relevant substratum events, and this self-organizing process itself is structured so as to have a strong tendency to go out and seek the needed substrata to keep its pattern of organization going. The relational process, then, has the power (within limits, of course) to replace its own components, and this power is essentially the basis for the causal power of mental choices over our bodily movements. Throughout this book, we have seen details of the way various motivational situations can be understood as the results of a self-organizing system. But now we must consider how the concept of primitive agency we have developed here (not necessarily complicated action-planning or moral agency, but simply the ability to act rather than merely passively react to external inputs, or for internal micro-events merely to passively react to each other) can help us to ground a concept of the self in several senses in which we want to say that human beings are or have “selves.” Two of the most important of these are what I am calling the “personality” and the “embodied self.”
. The embodied self and the personality In one sense, the self is different from each of its momentary conscious states in that the self is what gives unity and direction to the overall stream of states. This is why we recognize the difference between different individual personalities: The way we identify a person’s uniqueness has nothing to do with the fact that the person happens to experience this or that conscious state; most people either do experience or could experience most states, so experiencing these or those particular states is not what distinguishes their personalities from each
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
other. Had I not experienced the pain of hitting my foot on a rock this morning, I would very likely still be the same person. If not in terms of a collection or bundle of states, then, how do we define personality in a sense that could unify these states into a self? One strategy is to identify the recognizable style with which the person chooses at each moment in the stream of consciousness what to direct attention toward at the next moment. The overall pattern of these attention-directions is what we recognize as the personality. This is also the sense in which the “psychophysical self ” is the ontological foundation for the “transcendental ego” in the thinking of Husserl (1931, 1970), and which Sartre (1937) denied – something that is not confined to one particular conscious state, but does have a subjective status, and at the same time serves to unify all the other states into a coherent pattern. This Husserlian transcendental ego should in no way be confused with the “transcendental self ” of Eastern philosophy, which is a mystical and metaphysical conception. For this reason, I shall refer to it simply as the “personal self ” or “personality” – that which provides the unity and direction across various conscious states, as opposed to the states themselves. A person could still be the same person without having experienced this or that particular state. What could serve both these purposes at once – on the one hand, unifying all the subjective states in the stream, while on the other hand having a subjective character in its own right? A likely candidate would seem to be the person’s emotional motivation to maintain and enhance consciousness per se. An emotional motivation can unify all the particular states, by motivating the direction of attention at each moment, toward homeostasis when that is what is needed, and toward greater complexity when that is what is needed. And at the same time, emotional motivations are subjectively experienceable, so that, contra Sartre, this emotional motivation can both serve the purpose of unifying all the conscious states in the stream and at the same time be a conscious state (Ellis 1986, 1996). The motivation referred to here can be thematized in terms of the organism’s motivation to maintain and enhance its pattern of self-organization. The ontological status of the personality, conceived of in this sense, might be viewed as a higher-order pattern composed of the particular conscious states in the stream. Given just one such state, we could not discern a personality or self in this sense; it takes a continuing progression of them to form such a pattern. So one way of defining the personality would be to say that it is a pattern formed by all the states in the stream, and which tends to maintain a certain contour or style in spite of variations in the particular states themselves.
Curious Emotions
But in contrast to this concept of the self as a pattern of states, we have seen that there is a simpler one that focuses on a more basic and elementary role that the self seems to perform within each state. Given any state of consciousness, there is a purpose-directed and aim-oriented dimension of the state, and this dimension also could be called a person or self (Newton 1996; Wider 1997). As we have already seen, evidence that motivational and affective processes are necessary for conscious cognitive processes (as opposed to nonconscious information processing) has been mounting, and it is now well known that afferent perceptual processes can be completely activated with no perceptual consciousness of the object occurring (Luria 1980; Posner & Rothbart 1992). Consciousness occurs only when the efferent system, beginning with the emotional brainstem/midbrain/limbic area, prompts the frontal lobe to start looking for (and thus generating vague image schemas of) environmental conditions that might be of interest to the organism, in light of its emotional-motivational purposes, and activates neurotransmitters to catalyze the corticothalamic loops needed to enhance important signals and direct either voluntary or involuntary attention to them (Ellis & Newton 1998b; Posner & Rothbart 1992, 1998). So it can be argued that, within each state of consciousness, there is an affective dimension at work, doing the directional work of a self. But this notion of a self within each state does not really contradict the idea of a self that unifies various states. We can conceive of the person as the selforganizing system whose motivational tendencies coordinate the pattern and direction of cognitive contents by motivating, at each moment, what is important for us to direct our attention toward in the next moment. Of course, this definition would extend “personhood” far beyond human beings; we could speak of cats, dogs, or even frogs as “persons” or “selves” in this sense. (The philosopher B. P. Bowne even goes so far as to define personhood in terms of value-directedness, and then conclude that even the ecosystem is “personal” in a primitive sense.) What makes something a self, in this sense, rather than just an inanimate mechanical system, is that it is purpose directed, that it acts on its environment rather than just reacting, and organizes itself in order to maintain its existence rather than merely having its organization be the result of external mechanical processes. Such a pattern actively seeks out, appropriates, and replaces the material substrata needed to maintain the overall pattern into the future. To be a self in this sense is simply to be an organism that lives and works concertedly as a unified being toward purpose-directed aims. Even insects would qualify as selves in this sense. A self is anything that strives; it wants, desires, is able to be “egoistic.”
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
But this concept of self still seems different from the notion of a higherorder pattern formed by different states, because it seems to be present within one state. In principle at least, there might seem to be no need for a higherorder pattern of conscious states to make this kind of “self ” ontologically possible; it can be there within any conscious state, as the “self-ish” aspect of that state. For example, a desire to eat already includes an aspect of the desire which is sufficient for a concept of “self.” So it seems that, even if we confine ourselves to the “person” or “personality” dimension of self, this dimension can be conceived of in two different ways: We could think of it as a higher-order phenomenon, formed by relations between conscious states across time; or we could think of it as a lower-order phenomenon, the motivational component of any one state. While these two concepts of self initially appear to be different, we shall soon see that they refer to the same process when contextualized vis a vis the organism’s emotionalmotivational life.
The importance of the higher-order self. The notion of a higher-order self formed by the various states in the stream is important, because it makes possible distinguishing between different unique, individual selves or personalities. We know that Chopin is a completely different personality from Liszt, because, even though they may both have used most of the same chord progressions at various times, Chopin would not have used chord progressions X, Y and Z in the same pattern and in the same contexts as Liszt would. We distinguish individual personalities by seeing, not what specific states of consciousness they have, but by seeing the pattern formed by those states. Also, this higher-order concept of personality is important because it shows that emotion and motivation are among the essential determinants of all states of consciousness; emotion determines a continuous direction in which we will move from one state of consciousness to the next, and again to the next, across a good portion of time. And this directional continuity also indirectly determines the content of each subsequent state. For example, in the religious realm, a motivation to live eternally can motivate us to direct our attention away from the Problem of Evil, and toward the most convincing proofs we can find to convince ourselves of the supposedly cognitive and intellectual belief that God (in the sense of an all-powerful and all-good being) exists. Although the resulting belief appears to be based on intellectual and empirical premises (the cosmological argument, the argument from design, etc.), it also and more importantly results from the fact that the person has previously been motivated to direct attention toward certain things and away from others. Attention is likely
Curious Emotions
to be directed away from the Problem of Evil and other arguments that might tend to undermine the belief system. The content of intellectual cognition is therefore driven by a more basic emotional level. This higher-order concept of self, as a pattern that obtains between states in their motivated sequences, also seems to make possible non-consummatoryreductive motivations in a way that the other concept of self – the self within one state – does not appear as easily to do. If the self is the pattern, then the self can be motivated to make an interesting pattern, and is not imprisoned within one particular state’s reductively driven desires. The pattern could then organize its components in a coherent direction that has meaning apart from the smaller purposes of each component; this requires both homeostatic motives and extropic ones. But this idea of a higher-order “self ” might seem to contradict the claim that the stream of consciousness is already directed by a lower-order self that exists in each state of consciousness. Another reason it conflicts with the notion of a lower-order directional self is that such a lower-order self existing in a specific state of consciousness might be easy to conceptualize and explain in terms of drive-reductive aims, whereas it is harder to make sense out of the higher-order pattern without granting the importance of non-reductive motives. Thus the two concepts of self – personality pattern versus single-state subjectivity – might even appear to reflect conflicting motivational processes. And, as we have already seen, one argument for the higher-order self is that it renders non-reductive motives possible in a more intuitive way.
The importance of the embodied self. Against the appeal of the higher-order self, the simpler concept of self also has important advantages, because it makes possible “self-reference” on the part of any particular state. When I say “my consciousness of wanting to catch the streetcar,” implicit in this consciousness is the “me” that wants to catch the streetcar, and there is no need for a higher order pattern of states in order for that to exist. In principle, a being that existed only for one second, and spent that one second chasing a streetcar, would have a self, because implicit in its chasing the streetcar would be a self (an “I”) that wants to catch the streetcar. The subject of the experience, simpliciter, is a self or ego. And this is what we seem to refer to when we “reflect” on an experience; the object of the reflection is the subject of that experience. The higher-order pattern used in the “trans-temporal” conceptualization of self mentioned above is an abstraction with respect to the immediate subject-of-experience component of each of the particular experiences, which are concrete. Since the self, if it is to exist, must be concrete and not a mere abstraction, we want to say that
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
it is something to which it is possible to refer in any given experience, as the possibility of reflecting on that experience and seeing that it has a subject. Many philosophers are attracted to this simpler concept of self because it can serve as the basis of the subject that is capable of reflection on its own conscious states in any given moment. To say that the self is simply the subject of its own consciousness can be consistent with a dynamical systems view of agency, since agency in the primitive sense is also necessary for consciousness. This simpler concept of self – simply as the subjective side of any momentary conscious experience available for reflection, regardless of the way the stream of experiences is organized – is also attractive because we can explicate it in terms of concrete bodily experience in the following respect: In any given perception, there is a Gibsonian “affordance” attached to understanding the meaning of what is perceived. I identify the carpet I see by imagining what it would be like to crawl on it, run my hand over it, etc., although these imaginations are usually kept at a preconscious, habituated level. (Gibsonians, such as Newton 1996, would say that, earlier in infancy, the infant had to sense in some way what those affordances would be like in order to appreciate the identity of the carpet, and then the affordances became habituated and sedimented.) For example, in visual perception, a landscape presents a Gibsonian affordance of possible patterns of eye movements that could be easily executed in relation to that scene (Pribram 1991), and the eyes are continually engaged in active rather than passive movements and oscillations. As every artist knows, some scenes are “easier to look at” than others, and patterns on a canvas can conjure moods by facilitating and interfering with patterns of eye movement in the viewer. Newton (1996) supports this viewpoint by pointing out that the “understanding” that distinguishes humans from computers is based on the human’s ability to plan actions. Here again, humans act, whereas merely mechanical systems only react. To understand a planned action means to be able to form an imagistic/proprioceptive bodily sense of what it would be like to execute the action. To understand an object is to form a similar kind of sense of what it would be like to execute an action in relation to that object. Although we may believe that red is pasted to the surfaces of objects, in reality the red that we see arises only through our interactions with the object; as Merleau-Ponty (1942) emphasizes, if we (or our perceptual systems) did not act, we would not see. So we can explicate the simpler concept of the self by answering this question: When I reflect on my “self,” what am I reflecting on? The answer would be that I am reflecting on my embodied sense of what the affordances would feel like. I.e., when I “inhabit” my left hand as it is feeling what the right hand
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as an object feels like, my “being” or “self ” is “in” the left hand rather than the right; then I can shift to inhabiting the right hand, and sense what the left as an object feels like (Merleau-Ponty 1948/1968). Thus the difference between reflective and nonreflective experience can be understood in the following way: In nonreflective experience, we focus attention on the object of the experience rather than on the subjective affordances that make the experience possible; whereas reflective experience focuses attention on the bodily sensing of the affordances themselves. When I touch a tree trunk and feel the texture of the bark, I am focusing attention on the bark. When I allow my attention to inhabit the hand itself, feeling the bodily sensing of the texture, I am inhabiting my “self,” and thus reflecting on the self, the subjective side of experiencing. In phenomenological terms, we could say that to reflect on the self is to inhabit the noetic rather than the noematic side of any given experience (Husserl 1931). This concept has the advantage of making the self into an embodied being rather than an abstraction; the self is already an aspect of the body at any given moment, and can be reflected upon as such. In sum, both concepts of the personal self, the higher-order and the embodied, can offer persuasive justifications for themselves. Yet the two seem irreconcilably in conflict. Is there a way to combine the two?
Reconciling the two concepts. The self-organizational view entails that both these concepts of “self ” are aspects of one unified concept. Within each specific motivational tendency inherent in each conscious state, there is already a tendency to move toward greater and greater complexity, newness, variety, etc. – i.e., toward “extropy” rather than merely toward maximally energy-efficient homeostasis. If a momentary conscious state is motivated by a purposeful component, and if that purposeful component already includes a desire to maintain and enhance the overall organizational pattern of the organism as a whole, then the higher-order-pattern concept of personality is already included in each momentary state. Each momentary state is geared toward making a certain higher-order pattern possible, and the higher-order pattern at stake, in order to be “extropic” in addition to being homeostatic-drive reductive, must want to lead to higher order patterns that would include greater variety, complexity, etc. Its aims cannot be realized in one specific state; for there to exist a fundamental motivation toward “extropy,” a desire to maintain a certain energy level, to avoid complete rest, requires the higher-order pattern dimension. The concept of the embodied self suggests that, when we reflect on consciousness, what we are doing at the concrete level is to pay attention to our own intentional action in relation to the object of consciousness. Since under-
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
standing an object always involves an implicit imagining of how it would be possible to act in relation to the object (the object’s “affordances” for us), we can reflect on the body’s orienting itself to the object in this way. On the other hand, when we have “unreflective” consciousness of an object, what we are doing is to intentionally act in relation to the object in this same sense, but in such a way that we do not pay attention to the acting that our bodies are doing. When we speak of the self as the embodied self, we mean that our self can inhabit any part of the body that we pay attention to. Whenever this embodied self is in a certain place in our bodies, that means that we are paying attention to how we act (as opposed to reacting) in that place. To reflect on the embodied self, then, is to reflect on this acting on the part of the body (as opposed, again, to merely reacting), to focus on oneself as acting in relation to the object of experience rather than focusing on the object itself, even though it becomes an object for us only through our acting on it, whether we focus on this acting or not. We constitute the appearance of the object by acting in relation to it; but only when we “inhabit” the acting of our bodies do we “reflect” on our embodied self. Yet the ability to act is itself a higher order process, an organization in terms of a complex, self-regulating system. Thus the self can be both an aspect of the body – an embodied self – and a higher-order self, i.e., a higher-order pattern than most specific states of consciousness are, which serves to organize and direct the specific states, and which could still have the same identity even without any particular one of those specific states. Moreover, the specific state could not exist except within the context of a higher-order pattern motivated toward maintaining and enhancing the pattern, regardless of whether certain momentary states have to be included or excluded in order to achieve that. For example, a person motivated toward a monastic existence can arrange, to a great extent, to exclude consciousness of sexual temptations from the stream of consciousness by carefully planning a way of life that avoids them as much as possible. The desire for the overall pattern is what counts in our personality makeup, not the desire that we would or would not have in the face of any particular stimulus. Presumably, the monk would be sexually interested in a sexual stimulus, just the same as anyone else, and this is not what makes him the person he is; what makes him who he is is the fact that he arranges the higher order pattern in the way that he does. Now, if we grant that the higher-order pattern is already implicit in the self-organizing pattern of the person’s being at any given moment, we can have an integrated concept of an embodied yet higher-order and trans-temporal self that unifies and gives direction to the various particular experiences within the
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stream. But so far, this concept is merely a concept. If the concept is not to be empty, we must also ask how it is that we can know about ourselves, in both the embodied and the higher-order sense.
. How can there be knowledge of the self? Suppose we grant for the reasons just outlined that each of us has a somewhat unitary “self ” or “personality” that includes the properties of subjectivity, agency, and higher-order personality. The problem remains that none of the arguments just presented seem to enable us to know anything about any particular, real-life self. Most importantly, they seem to provide no way of knowing about our own particular selves. In this sense, both concepts of the self are “mere abstractions.” If we cannot know ourselves, then there is still the possibility that, in each person’s case, the self in terms of which the person lives is merely a construction. Moreover, if we do construct selves for ourselves, then it may be these constructions that play the role of transcendent unification discussed earlier; the same constructions may also posit the values that motivate the direction of attention even at the level of the embodied self. Just as Eskimos immediately and directly perceive eleven distinct kinds of white, because they are motivated to do so, our constructions of self may motivate us to direct attention in the ways we do, and these values will also manifest themselves in our embodied, lived experience. So, even if we can reflect on this embodied lived experience, still, if the self is ultimately a mere construction, then either there is no “true” self to be known, by contradistinction to our “false” views of ourselves, or our views of ourselves are constructions that do not necessarily reflect any “truth” about ourselves. In either case, “self-knowledge” would become a dubious project. It is true that the subjective life has public manifestations; Beethoven’s numerous romantic infatuations, about which he was somewhat secretive, show up in his music. But the public manifestations may or may not tell us everything we could want to know about Beethoven’s self, and what they do tell depends on very subtle and difficult inferences that we might well get wrong. It is no coincidence that some students of Beethoven see him as an egomaniacal, wooden tyrant, while others see him as sensitive, caring, and lovelorn. Some of these constructions may resemble the real Beethoven, but they do not exhaust, let alone determine his personality.
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
Of course, the possibility remains that Beethoven himself may have “invented” the pattern of organization that is the personality “Beethoven.” But here we run into the problem of authenticity. We often invent personas for ourselves that include aspects quite different from the way we really are. We pretend to feel or think differently from the way we really feel and think – pretend these things even to ourselves. But pretending them does not make them so. There is still a real self, in both the embodied and the higher-order sense, even if we have a distorted view of it. So the question remains, how can we know about ourselves, other than knowing in an abstract philosophical way that there is some self, of some description or other? How can we know what our own personal selves are like? One of the prominent sources of misunderstanding of the emotional self is that it offers a temptation to a strong special case of Husserl’s “natural attitude.” Since our understanding of the material world is based largely on sensory imagery, there is a tendency to think of the self in terms of such objectified sensory imagery “of ” the self. The result is that we construe the self as if it were an external object, as if seen by someone else. This tendency leads not only to a misunderstanding of the self, but to a fundamental type of psychological condition rooted in such a misunderstanding – the narcissistic disturbance, which in its most advanced stages can rise to the level of “borderline personality disorder” (Lowen 1985). To confuse imagery of the self, in the everyday sense of “imagery,” with the self itself is the hallmark of narcissistic disturbance (Klein 1975; Kohut 1985). The narcissist thinks of herself as an object, as viewed from an external perspective, as the protagonist of a story as read by someone else, or by oneself in the act of viewing and judging oneself as if from an external perspective (Horney 1937, 1950; Miller 1981). This is not to deny that the experience of a “true self ” (I argued above that there is one) also crucially involves imagery. But this will be “imagery of the self ” in a different sense. The terms “imagery”and “self,” as well as the word “of ” linking them, have all remained notoriously ambiguous throughout the histories of philosophy and psychology. “Imagery” is often thought of as limited to visual imagery, or imagery in other sensory modalities such as audition. But there is also sensorimotor and proprioceptive imagery. One can imagine the way a leg cramp would feel without actually having one; or one can imagine oneself performing a bodily action such as grabbing one’s left foot, without actually doing so: these are proprioceptive and sensorimotor images, or what Jeannerod, Newton, and others have called “action images.” The enactive view implies that action images are crucial to understanding what the true self is.
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Sartre (1943/1966) distinguished between the “self-for-others,” as an object of experience, and the “self as it exists in itself ” – as a subjective entity or process, which may not be accurately transparent to itself. But it was also Sartre who first popularized the view that the second type of self, the “self in itself,” does not exist, and that there is only a narrative self, a constructed set of images that we tell ourselves are of ourselves, in which the protagonist is seen as an object, just as someone might see a person other than oneself. Hence Sartre’s (1943/1966) notorious claim that Peter knows just as well as Paul what Paul is feeling. I have rejected this argument in many places (for example, Ellis 1986, 1995, 1996b), and shall continue to hold here that there is a difference between the subjective self and the constructed self. For consciousness of the subjective self, it is action imagery and imagery of others that is central, not pictures of the self-for-others as in the attempt to view images of ourselves as we might appear from an external perspective. To offer a narrative account of myself is to present a series of objectified images that in principle are intelligible as well to others as to myself. Such a narrative thus captures primarily the self-for-others, and presents the temptation to construe myself as equivalent with this objectified series of images. As far as a subjective self is concerned, the narrative can capture it only to the extent that it reveals different subjective responses to the same objective events that others might also have undergone. Thus the events in the narrative do not touch on the nature of the subjective self per se, and less still do objective images of the self that is undergoing or creating the events. There can be images “of ” the self, as in looking at pictures of our bodies or stories about ourselves as seen from an objective or external point of view. These images of the self are images of the narrative or constructed self. But in another sense of “of,” we could say that even these images of the narrative self exist in the consciousness “of ” the true self. They are images “of ” the self in a different sense – they are images had by the subjective self in the attempt to experience itself. If the images are images of the self-for-others – the self as viewed from an external viewpoint, as an object – then what is viewed is merely the narrative self. But if the images are action images had by the subjective self in the context of action, and at the same time this action imagery helps to capture the true self in its intended actions, then the sensory images involved are not pictures of the self-for-others, but rather pictures of the objects in relation to which one acts, would hope to act, fear to act, etc., along with sensorimotor and proprioceptive action imagery as one evolves real or imaginary action schemas from the valuational emotions that motivate the action. As these action images become very complex and are related to complex environmental affordances,
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
the question of course becomes increasingly pressing to what degree even these action images can diverge from an accurate reference to an authentic sense of the self. While “healthy narcissism,” including a narrative self, is a vital part of the self ’s functioning, too exaggerated a preoccupation with the narrative self, to the point where the narrative self is equated with the subjective self, or treated as more important than the subjective self, is a hallmark of narcissistic disturbance. But to argue in this way also requires showing that there is something in our actual experience that the label “subjective self ” points to. The imagery of the “self ” that is relevant here is not primarily objective, but consists of imagery of the self ’s actions in relation to the world, including the others toward whom one acts. For the narcissistically disturbed person, by contrast, objectified imagery of the self is so prominent in the self-concept that even the subjective self is relegated to a mere instrumental value, since the main purpose is now to view oneself as valuable, through one’s own eyes and the eyes of others, as an accomplished, amusing, or in some way other-pleasing persona. For this reason, the narcissist is caught up in the habit of measuring the value of himself and of others instrumentally – as depicted in objectified imagery. Rather than imagery of sensorimotor action schemas as they would relate the self ’s actions to the other, the imagery is caught up with the way things look, objectively. As played out in terms of narrative imagery, the objective events of my life are to a great extent replaceable; the constant for each person is the way he or she organizes and directs attention and the self-organizational actions that make experience possible. If Harriet Taylor had never met John Stuart Mill, would she have still been more or less the same person? The specific experiences of her life did not define her as who she was, since others could have had the same experiences. (After all, many other people did in fact meet John Stuart Mill.) As we have seen, there is an important sense in which the style in which the person organizes and patterns the flow of experiences is more important for defining the self than the what-content of those specific experiences. This patterning in the flow of experience is motivated actively, and thus can ground a concept of a subjective self that is not experienced in the mode of objectified imagery, but rather in action imagery. We have seen that the subjective self arises essentially from the selforganizing system’s capacity for action as opposed to mere reaction. It anticipates emotionally significant experiences by seeking out and appropriating opportunities to express schematically patterned action potentialities. A narrative concept of self will miss its mark, erring on the side of narcissistic images, if it seems to equate the self with the narrative, and does not capture the fact that
Curious Emotions
if the same objective events were to occur in the lives of different individuals, there would be extremely different subjective responses to them and different uses of them for purposes of subjectively-motivated action. When Chopin was offered a series of concerts with the large audiences on which Liszt capitalized so successfully, Chopin sometimes took advantage of the opportunity, but he did so only reluctantly, as a sacrifice that must be made to secure the privilege of continuing to compose music and get it published. Objectively, his concert demeanor may not have appeared so different from Liszt’s. But subjective differences can express themselves across apparent objective similarities, and it is these differences more than the objective similarities – more than the objectivistic images in which people often are tempted to categorize themselves – that really identify the self as a subjective unity distinguished from others. Eugene Gendlin’s (1980, 1992a, 1992b) psychotherapeutic method well illustrates a way to avoid confusing the real psychophysical self with merely constructed objectifying imagery. Gendlin begins with the phenomenological observation that there is a hermeneutic circle when it comes to understanding what experience reveals to us, about either objective reality or about ourselves. The problem posed by the hermeneutic circle is that sedimented categories may distort the intentional meaning of any experience, to an undetermined extent. But in order to see the category structure as what it is, we must experience it in some way, and this experience too will be filtered through subjective categories. Thus our view of the categories itself may be inaccurate, so we can never know whether we have identified them successfully, nor whether we have successfully compensated for their distorting effect on our interpretation of our experiences. Affect plays an especially important role here because the categories reflect what is deemed important for organismic purposes, and “importance” is defined in terms of, and reflected by, our affective categories. Gendlin approaches this problem by noticing that, if a “bracketing” (or phenomenological reduction) of the categories that we use to characterize an experience serves to change the feeling or object in question, then the change must be epistemically positive – must move us a little closer to the truth about what we really think or feel. For example, if I ask myself whether my anger at my son for not taking out the garbage is really directed at my son, and if this asking serves to change the felt quality of the feeling toward my son, then this is an indication that I am on the right track in reinterpreting the feeling as not being about what my son did, or at least not primarily about that. This hermeneutic approach is also consistent with the enactive view that emotions are never passive reactions to objects, since active seeking and organization of experience is what makes the affective categories selective in the first
Chapter 5. Varieties of extended self and personality
place. This requires a distinction between active and merely reactive processes, and Gendlin is firmly in Aristotle’s camp when it comes to this distinction: Affective categories are expressions of larger organismic purposes, not reactions to discrete stimuli. This is why the affective categories play such a powerful role in organizing and shaping the interpretation of all of our experience, even the experience of objective reality. But for this very reason, affective experience itself can reveal a great deal about the relationships between the self and its world. According to Gendlin, To begin philosophy by considering perception makes it seem that living things can contact reality only through perception. But plants are in contact with reality. They are interactions, quite without perception. Our own living bodies also are interactions with their environments, and that is not lost just because ours also have perception. . . . Our bodies. . . interact as bodies, not just through what comes with the five senses . . . . Merleau-Ponty. . . meant perception to include (latently and implicitly) also our bodily interactional being-in-the-world, all of our life in situations. . . . The body senses the whole situation, and it urges, it implicitly shapes our next action. It senses itself living-in its whole context – the situation. . . . From one ancient bone one can reconstruct not only the whole animal, but from its body also the kind of environment in which it lived. . . . The body even as a dead structure still contains all that implicit information about its environment. . . . My warmth or hostility will affect your ongoing bodily being whether you perceive it or not. You may find it there, if you sense how your body has the situation. (Gendlin 1992a: 4–13)
How do we know when we have adequately identified what a “bodily felt sense” of a situation is telling us about the situation? How do we know what a state of consciousness is “about” in relation to the “bodily sensed” environment? Gendlin offers as an example the “odd feeling of knowing you have forgotten something but not knowing what it is”: You are troubled by the felt sense of some unresolved situation, something left undone, something left behind. Notice that you don’t have factual data. Your body knows but you don’t. . . . You find a possibility. “Helen’s party! I forgot to tell Helen I can’t come to her party!” This idea doesn’t satisfy the feeling. It is perfectly true that you forgot to tell Helen you would miss her party, but your body knows it isn’t this that has been nagging you. . . . Your body knows you have forgotten something else, and it knows what that something is. That is how you can tell it isn’t Helen’s party. (Gendlin 1980: 38–39)
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The reason we know that a given answer will not work is that “I forgot to tell Helen I can’t come to her party,” though true, fails to elicit any “bodily sh