COLONIAL CITIZENS: REPUBLICAN RIGHTS, PATERNAL PRIVILEGE, AND GENDER IN FRENCH SYRIA AND LEBANON Elizabeth Thompson COL...
87 downloads
2360 Views
3MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
COLONIAL CITIZENS: REPUBLICAN RIGHTS, PATERNAL PRIVILEGE, AND GENDER IN FRENCH SYRIA AND LEBANON Elizabeth Thompson COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
colonial citizens
the history and society of the modern middle east, leila fawaz, general editor
This page intentionally left blank
colonial citizens
Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon
Elizabeth Thompson
columbia university press new york
Thanks to the following institutions for their authorization to reproduce the illustrations in this book: Imperial War Museum for figure 13; Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford for figures 20–22; Direction des Archives, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris for figures 2–5 and 17; and Princeton University Press, for the map.
Columbia University Press Publishers Since New York
Chichester, West Sussex
Copyright © Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Thompson, Elizabeth Colonial citizens : republic rights, paternal privilege, and gender in French Syria and Lebanon / Elizabeth Thompson. p. cm. — (History and society of the modern Middle East series) Includes bibliographical references (p. – ) and index. ISBN ––– (cloth). — ISBN ––– (pbk.) . Syria—Social policy. . Syria—Social conditions—th century. . Women—Syria— Social conditions—History—th century. . Syria—History—French occupation, –. . Lebanon—Social policy. . Lebanon—Social conditions—th century. . Women—Lebanon—Social conditions—History—th century. . Lebanon— History—French occupation, –. I. Title. II. Series. .
'.—
–
Case bound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c p
To David, with love and gratitude
The History and Society of the Modern Middle East Leila Fawaz, General Editor Andrea B. Rugh, Within the Circle: Parents and Children in an Arab Village Selma Botman, Engendering Citizenship in Egypt Janet Afari, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution Juan Cole, Modernity and the Millennium Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon
contents
Acknowledgments ix Note on Transliteration xi Abbreviations xiii Chronology xv Map of Syria and Lebanon in the Mandate Era
Introduction
xix
Part I War and the Advent of French Rule: A Crisis of Paternity 15 . World War I: Famine, Memory, and a Shattered Social Order . Soldiers and Patriarchs: Pillars of Colonial Paternalism . Bureaucrats: Mother France’s Civilizing Mission
Part II Paternal Republicanism and the Construction of Subaltern Citizens 7 1 . State Social Policy: Constructing a Hierarchy of Citizens . Revolt: The Rise of Subaltern Movements
Part III Gender and the Legal Boundaries of the Colonial Civic Order 113 . Political Rights: Women’s Suffrage as a Revolutionary Threat . The Veil and the Dual Legal System . Civil Rights: Patriotic Motherhood and Religious Law Reform . Social Rights: Emergence of a Colonial Welfare State
contents Part IV Gendering the Public: Spatial Boundaries of the Colonial Civic Order 17 1 . Remapping the Urban Landscape . Street Violence: Regendering an Old Urban Space . Cinemas: Gendering a New Urban Space . The Press: Gendering the Virtual Public
Part V World War II and the Transformation of the Colonial Civic Order 225 . Climax of the Colonial Welfare State . Claiming Paternity of Independent Republics . The Making of Postcolonial Citizens
Appendix Notes Bibliography Index
Illustrations appear as a group after page
acknowledgments
It has been a pleasure and a privilege to come to know the women and men who lived during the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon. The opportunity to learn about them was afforded me by the generous support of several institutions and many kind individuals. The Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies supported my dissertation research, upon which this book is based. Funds from the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the French Republic’s Bourse Chateaubriand, and the history department at the University of Virginia helped me to start and finish the project. This study would not have been possible without the records left behind by French administrators and stored at the French foreign ministry’s diplomatic archives in Paris and Nantes. Equally valuable were the collections of Arabicand French-language periodicals at the Asad and Zahiriya libraries and French Institute in Damascus, the Bibliothèque nationale annex in Versailles, the British Library, and Harvard College Library. Additional archives and libraries preserved other perspectives that enriched this study: the Historical Documents Center in Damascus; the Jesuit archives in Vanves; the military archives in Vincennes; the Chamber of Commerce and the Maison de l’Orient méditerranéen in Lyon; the Alliance Israélite, the Cujas law library and CHEAM in Paris; the Public Record Office in London; and Middle East Centre at St. Antony’s College and the Centre for Lebanese Studies in Oxford. I am grateful to the staffs at these institutions for their assistance, and especially to Alice Deyab at Harvard, who provided invaluable guidance on women’s periodicals; Nadim Shehadi at Oxford, whose invitation to a conference on the French mandate connected me with other scholars of the period; Pascal Even, former curator at Nantes, who released many classified documents from the World
acknowledgments
War II period that were essential to my research; and Pierre Fournié at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris, who helped me find many of the illustrations reproduced here. I wish to express, finally, my profound gratitude to the many individuals who gave freely of their time and expertise to help me conceptualize, research and write this book. I owe a great debt to faculty at Columbia University, especially to Atina Grossmann for inspiring the project during a graduate seminar, to Robert Paxton for his guidance on French scholarship, and to Richard Bulliet and Lisa Anderson for their unwaivering encouragement. Abdul-Karim Rafeq at the College of William and Mary has been a true mentor over the years, always ready to comment on drafts, guide research, and retrieve materials on his regular trips home to Damascus. James Gelvin at UCLA was the first to alert me to the existence of the Nantes archives and so to the possibility of undertaking this study. In Damascus, Nazih Kawakibi introduced me to the urban history of the city, Amal Husseini helped me find information on the women’s movement and my dear friend Soura retrieved copies of women’s magazines from the American University of Beirut’s library when I was not permitted to travel to Lebanon. I thank Mark Thomas for help on analyzing financial data and Anne Stinehart for her translations from German. And for help on preparing illustrations for the book, I thank Palmira Brummett, Sarah Graham-Brown, and William Cleveland. The comments of Cynthia Aron, Brian Balogh, Beth Baron, Herbert (Tico) Braun, Nicole Dombrowski, Ellen Fleischmann, Steven Heydemann, Steve Innis, Philip Khoury, and Farzaneh Milani on various drafts of the manuscript clarified and strengthened my argument, as did conversations with Eileen Boris, Jean-Claude David, Randi Deguilhem, Leila Fawaz, Akram Khater, Josh Landis, Elisabeth Longuenesse, Garay Menicucci, Françoise Métral, Birgit Schaebler, and Christian Velud. Support from personal friends, especially Renée Friedman, Ariel Salzmann, and the late and much-missed Estelle Whelan, inspired me and relieved the angst of research and writing. I would never have aspired to become a scholar without the encouragement of my mother, Ruth Thompson, whose support has meant so much to me through the years. I reserve my deepest gratitude for my husband, David Waldner, whose faith and love gave me the courage to carry this project through. Elizabeth Thompson July
note on transliteration
My guiding principle in transliterating Arabic has been to ease the difficulties of nonspecialist readers. Most Arabic words and names have been rendered into Latin letters according to a simplified version of the system used in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. I have omitted case endings and diacriticals, except the “ ‘ayn,” and I have used the simpler “-iya” suffix instead of “-iyya.” The prefix “al-” is used only when I mention a person’s full name; it is dropped in references to the last name alone. For consistency, I have followed the vocalization of formal Arabic in names that are often pronounced differently in colloquial Arabic; for example, I write “Marja” Square for the place known locally and often written as “Marjeh.” I have departed from this system to use common English spellings of betterknown Arabic words and place names, and to follow the spellings of personal names preferred by many of the Lebanese and Syrians mentioned in the text. Hence, I use “Rose” instead of the strictly transliterated “Ruz” for the woman’s first name. Some inconsistencies inevitably occur. In bibliographical citations, I have used name spellings that appear on articles or books written by Arabs in English or French; however, when the same author published in Arabic, I have used a standard transliteration because that is how the name is listed in library catalogues.
This page intentionally left blank
abbreviations
AHCJ AIU AUB BLIO BLNL BN CCL CHEAM DKZ
FO FL HC IFEAD IJMES LLS MA MAE MAE-Nantes/ MAE-Nantes/ MAE-Paris/
Archives historiques de la Compagnie de Jésus, Vanves Alliance Israélite universelle, Paris American University in Beirut, Jafet Library The British Library, India Office Library and Records, London The British Library, Newspaper Library, London Bibliothèque nationale, newspaper annex, Versailles Archives de la Chambre de commerce et d’industrie, Lyon Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l’Afrique et l’Asie modernes, Paris: Fonds Mémoires du CHEAM Dar al-kutub al-wataniya al-zahiriya [Zahiriya Library], Damascus (Note: many of these documents have since been transferred to the Asad Library) Foreign Office archives, Public Record Office, London Firestone Library, Princeton University Haut Commissariat de la République française en Syrie et au Liban Institut français d’Etudes arabes de Damas, Damascus International Journal of Middle East Studies Syrian–Lebanese lira (currency) Maktabat al-Asad [Asad Library], Damascus Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Archives diplomatiques de Nantes: Fonds Beyrouth Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Archives diplomatiques de Nantes: Service des Oeuvres françaises à l’étranger Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Archives diplomatiques, Quai d’Orsay, Paris: Série E-Levant –
MAE-Paris/ MAE-Rapport
MWT NYPL RMMM SHAT USNA
abbreviations Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Archives diplomatiques, Quai d’Orsay, Paris: Série Guerre –8— Turquie Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban (annual, –8) Markaz al-watha’iq al-tarikhiya [Historical Documents Center], Damascus New York Public Library, main research branch Revue du Monde musulman et de la Méditerranée Service historique de l’Armée de Terre, Vincennes: Section d’Afrique/– Levant National Archives of the United States, Washington D.C. and Suitland, Maryland: Records of the Department of State, Central Files, Record Groups (RG) 8 and
chronology of principal events in syria and lebanon, 1914–1946
‒
World War I begins Famine starts in Mount Lebanon Faysal and the Entente powers occupy Syria and Lebanon Women’s suffrage debate languishes in the Syrian Congress French occupy Syria after battle of Maysalun Greater Lebanon proclaimed by High Commissioner Henri Gouraud French mandate for Syria and Lebanon assigned by League of Nations Maxime Weygand named high commissioner Lebanese Representative Council rejects women’s suffrage First major Islamic populist group, al-Gharra, founded Maurice Sarrail named high commissioner Syrian Revolt begins Sarrail dismissed, Henry de Jouvenel becomes high commissioner Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party founded Lebanese constitution adopted Henri Ponsot named high commissioner Syrian Revolt ends Nazira Zayn al-Din publishes Unveiling and Veiling Syrian constituent assembly convenes Syrian-Lebanese women’s union conference, Beirut Syrian constitution decreed by Henri Ponsot Women’s union conference, Beirut First Eastern Women’s Conference, Damascus First Syrian elections Lebanese constitution suspended
–
–
–
–
chronology Antun Sa‘ada founds Syrian National Party First employee-only labor unions founded, Beirut Damien de Martel becomes high commissioner Syrian parliament suspended Protective labor laws enacted for women and children Syrian general strike restarts treaty negotiations Constitutional life resumes and National Bloc elected in Syria Rise of proto-fascist youth groups Lebanese constitution reinstated Mandate labor report reveals high unemployment among artisans and women homeworkers Labor movement unites in campaign for comprehensive labor codes Gabriel Puaux named high commissioner French parliament rejects independence treaties Labor codes rejected in Syrian and Lebanese parliaments Protests force repeal of personal status law reforms Parliaments suspended and military rule imposed as World War II begins Hunger marches and bread riots against wartime shortages Puaux replaced by Vichy supporter Henri Dentz Free French and British oust Vichy government, promise independence Georges Catroux heads the renamed Delegation General Mass mobilization of nationalist, proto-fascist, Islamic populist, women’s, labor and Communist movements State adoption of new social welfare commitments Nationalists win elections Shukri al-Quwwatli elected president of Syria and Bishara al-Khuri elected Lebanese president National Pact declared in Lebanon New French Delegate General, Jean Helleu, arrests Lebanese government leaders, sparking mass protests and violence French transfer control of civilian administration to nationalist governments Revolt by Islamic populists in Damascus Women’s suffrage rejected by Lebanese parliament Arab women’s conference in Cairo
chronology
Violent revolt in Syria Syrian Muslim Brotherhood founded French and British troops evacuate Full independence achieved Labor codes adopted
This page intentionally left blank
Map of Syria and Lebanon in the Mandate Era
This page intentionally left blank
colonial citizens
This page intentionally left blank
introduction
This book is a study of how states and their citizens are constructed under colonialism and then bequeathed to their postcolonial successors. It begins with the proposition that even as colonial peoples waged nationalist battles for independence they inevitably participated in the very political order that they rejected. Linked to that proposition is a second one, that colonizers could not and did not unilaterally impose a system of rule. Colonialism involved, as do most other political systems, constant negotiation of power relationships and identities. Such negotiation often came across the barrels of guns, but it more routinely occurred across desks and tables, and in newspapers and telegrams. Negotiators struck bargains along the way that shaped the powers and responsibilities of the state and the rights and obligations of colonial citizens. The resultant network of power relationships constitutes the colonial civic order, a term I use to designate the broad arena in which states and citizens interact. The civic order embodies norms and institutions that govern relations among citizens and between citizens and the state. It is within the civic order that the terms of citizenship and state power are both expressed and continually renegotiated among agents of the formal state apparatus, its unofficial agents, and their clients. The term civic order is useful because it emphasizes the fluidity of interaction and negotiation, and deemphasizes the boundary between state and society. Indeed, in colonial contexts, clear boundaries rarely existed, as colonizers routinely depended upon indigenous intermediaries to exercise rule. Bargains struck between the state and its mediating agents set the terms of membership in the civic order, and consequently defined terms of citizenship variously for different groups within the population. This book is concerned specifically with the construction of a colonial civic order in Syria and Lebanon, countries created by European powers after the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I and governed by the
introduction
French as a mandate, a system of tutelary and temporary rule authorized by the League of Nations. Syria and Lebanon are apt cases for the study of colonial civic orders because they simply did not exist before as national polities; by the time they achieved independence at the end of World War II, however, basic norms and institutions had been laid that would shape government and citizenship for decades afterward. It is appropriate to view Syrians and Lebanese living under the French mandate as colonial citizens, rather than as passive subjects, in law and insofar as they actively engaged in the definition of their civil status. Citizenship is usually defined as a relationship between the state and individuals governed by legal rights. By the countries had adopted republican constitutions that explicitly granted basic rights of citizenship to all inhabitants. These constitutions fostered engagement with the state through elected parliaments and rights to free speech and association. Some citizens were able to engage the state more directly than others, who found themselves distanced from contact with the state by mediating authorities. However, because distance and mediation varied so much, and came under constant negotiation, I have in this book eschewed the rigid distinction commonly made between citizen and subject. There was no clear line, in the eyes of contemporaries, that could be crossed from one status to another. I have instead emphasized the fluidity of status, ranging from “subaltern” citizens whose rights were limited by privileged elites to “full” citizens who enjoyed a maximum of rights under the constitutions, subsequent legislation, and state policy. Likewise, I have eschewed a more elaborate definition of citizenship than this one based on law and engagement because most scholarship has been grounded in liberal theory and practice distant from the experience of Syrians and Lebanese in the early twentieth century.1 The following pages instead attempt to draw out conceptualizations of the proper relationship between citizen and state voiced by participants in the mandate themselves. The history of the mandate period in Syria and Lebanon has been told before, by historians to whom I am greatly indebted. Stephen Longrigg wrote the first comprehensive history of French policy in the two countries. Meir Zamir has written histories of mandatory Lebanon from a statist and sectarian perspective, drawing on documents unavailable to Longrigg. Philip Khoury authored the masterwork on the Syrian nationalist movement that opposed French rule and inherited control of the state after .2 No comprehensive political histories have been written, curiously, by the French, although several have been written by Syrians and Lebanese in French and Arabic.3 In addition, specialized studies have enhanced our understanding of social change in the
introduction
period. Particularly important for this book have been two labor histories, one on the Lebanese movement by Jacques Couland, and the other on its Syrian counterpart, by Abdullah Hanna.4 This study is distinct from most of the above in several ways. It rejects a common view of the mandate period as a lacuna, a tragic gap between the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the achievement of full independence from the French. In this nationalist perspective, the period is significant only for the acts of resistance shown or for continuities with the Ottoman past that are often lamented as stagnation. As stated above, I will argue that the period was in fact seminal in laying the foundations of postcolonial states and citizenship. To demonstrate this, I eschew the choice of perspective of either colonizer or colonized in an attempt to capture the dynamics of interaction from both sides. Second, I attempt to wed the often-distinct approaches of social, economic, and political history to gain a synthetic understanding of power, identity, and conflict in the colonial civic order. The following pages argue that the experience of war, economic dislocation, and rapid change in urban social life had as profound an effect on politics as the particular strategies of elite political actors did. The terms of citizenship were hammered out not just in French offices and parliamentary chambers, but also in the daily contact citizens had with the French state and its agents, in schools, streets, public clinics, and post offices. In perhaps the most important departure from the prevailing historiography, I use gender as a primary analytical tool to integrate the many levels of political experience that shaped the colonial civic order. A focus on gender helps tie aspects of social and economic change directly to political developments. Gender tensions originated in the effects of war and economic transformation—particularly the disruption of households and of normal economic support systems—and soon appeared in the particular agendas of nationalist, women’s, labor, and religious movements. Gender anxiety erupted during armed combat with the French in the early s, informed protests against French social policy, especially in education, and became the focus of French confrontations with religious and nationalist elites. A focus on gender also opens a window on the subterranean structures of power that shaped the civic order. Gender hierarchy was a pillar of colonial paternalism, wherein the French and indigenous elites bargained to maintain hierarchies of privilege in colonial society. Privilege was accorded to male intermediary agents of French rule who wielded tribal, religious, class, and household authority. These mediating elites were rewarded for their cooperation with the privilege of power over other citizens: peasants, workers, family
introduction
members and members of religious communities of both sexes, as well as women of every status. Because it so fundamentally defined power, gender became a primary site of conflict and compromise between the French and the Syrians and Lebanese as they variously challenged and defended these paternalistic privileges. In sum, gender offers a unique and valuable lens through which to view politics of the mandate period. The use of gender as a general analytical tool may be puzzling to those readers unfamiliar with developments in gender history since Joan Scott published Gender and the Politics of History in . Scott, and many other gender historians since then, have explored the efficacy of using the concept of gender, meaning the social construction of relations between the sexes, as an equivalent of class, race, ethnicity, and other categories of historical analysis. The results have produced significant rereadings of an array of historical narratives including, for example, those of the French Revolution, British administration in India, and slavery in Virginia.5 Because gender has not yet attained the conceptual definition of other analytical categories like class, which has been developed since the nineteenth century, my gender analysis of mandatory politics shares with these other studies a spirit of experiment and exploration. My intent is not to supplant other analytic lenses used to understand Syria and Lebanon, but rather to expose political patterns obscured by uniquely class, religious, or nationalist perspectives. Gender appears in a second sense in this study as the object, not just the tool, of analysis. In addition to the general question, “What kind of civic order emerged in Syria and Lebanon by independence?,” I ask: “How and why was that civic order gendered?” Women’s citizenship differed from that of men’s, and differed in from what it had been at the fall of the Ottoman Empire in . This difference, I argue, was constructed during the process of negotiation and conflict over the civic order, and it had much to do with the circumstances of French rule, economic stress, and the discursive repertoires of the labor, nationalist, religious, and women’s movements. Indeed, I argue that the aims and organization of the various male-led movements and the women’s movement can only be understood in the broader context of their competition and alliances with one another. The ways in which the civic order was constructed, and the gravitation toward gender as a site of conflict and compromise among males, weakened women’s political bargaining power and resulted in a regendering of citizenship by . I intend this study as an integrated history that encompasses the experiences of both men and women, and that accounts directly for the differing roles and power relations between them. This is not, then, a women’s history telling a
introduction
separate story about Syrian and Lebanese women. There would be much merit to writing such a history. This is however, to my knowledge, the first and fullest account of Syrian and Lebanese women’s history available in English. Consequently, the following pages will offer relatively more information on women than on men, in order to compensate for the existing imbalance in scholarship. This study will also focus on the histories of other neglected groups, particularly religious, labor, and youth movements, which aimed to redefine male identity much as the women’s movement sought to reform female identity in the civic order. Because so much background is necessary, I have abbreviated the account here of the elite nationalist movements; their story has been told much more fully elsewhere. I have also had to attenuate my general discussions of women, workers, and religion in the period, in order to maintain a focus on those among them who mounted organized efforts to reform the colonial civic order and claim full status as citizens. I have also focused mainly on cities and particularly on the capitals of Beirut and Damascus because that was where citizens mobilized. The rural context for urban politics is important, and it is presented at the outset of this book. Cities boomed with wealth drawn from the countryside and with the influx of rural migrants, some of whom joined the above-mentioned urban social movements. However, peasants did not mount organized movements of their own during the period of French rule, and so did not participate as distinct players in the construction of citizenship.6 They were excluded, in large part, because landowners, tribal chiefs, and the French colluded to silence them. Peasant repression inevitably, if indirectly, shaped the urban process of colonial citizenship-building, for the rural population was solely represented by landed and tribal elites, who participated in urban-based political parties, parliaments, and government administrations. It was only after the French departed in that peasants emerged as a political force, especially in Syria under the leadership of Akram Hawrani. They would necessarily have to confront the civic order and practices of citizenship already established in the cities. The mandatory roots of rural movements is a story that could and should be more thoroughly studied so as to enhance our understanding of their role in producing the Ba‘thist revolution in Syria and the Shi‘ite and Druze challenges to Lebanon’s urban elites since the s. This is a hefty task best left for a book devoted to a later period of history. Specifically, the following pages argue that there were three fundamental preconditions for the struggle over the civic order in mandatory Syria and Lebanon: first, the profound dislocation suffered by family households during and after World War I; second, the creation of new, theoretically national
introduction
states; and third, the imposition of French rule. In their combination, these three conditions encouraged linked reactions to the microlevel stress of shifting household economies and gender roles within the family and to the macrolevel reorganization of community and polity. I have called this linked reaction a crisis of paternity. As Part I explains, the crisis of paternity reflected both the destabilization of male authority as heads of households and of the larger community and the concomitant transformation in female roles. It was expressed in ideologies of class, religion, nation and gender, and in often-violent conflicts among citizens and with the French, culminating in with armed revolt in Syria. By the end of the s, three conflicting models of reconstituted authority emerged and stood in tension with one another, based on paternalistic privilege, republican fraternity, and universal democracy. At the core of each model lay a differing vision of proper gender relations at home and in the civic order. The s saw a shift in the mode of conflict to the politics of organized social movements. The focus of protest also shifted, from simple opposition to French rule to attempts to transform the colonial civic order. The earliest movements were women’s federations and male nationalist parties, both rooted in prewar associations. Religious interests also organized. In Lebanon, the Maronite Church enhanced its longstanding influence through association with the French; in Syria, and to a lesser degree in Lebanon, Islamic populist groups emerged to reclaim influence lost. By the mid-s, labor unions formed with the aid of the growing Communist Party and proto-fascist youth organizations appeared in both countries. The programs of all of these organizations held profound implications for gender relations in the civic order. Gender anxiety was often a motivation for joining them, and the redefinition of fluctuating gender roles was often their primary aim. The French encouraged renegotiation of the colonial civic order by their willingness to engage these increasingly powerful social movements, which staged strikes and demonstrations and sent petitions to the League of Nations in Geneva. Indeed, the French sought to satisfy discrete demands for social rights and political inclusion as a means of diverting calls for outright independence. These negotiations climaxed during World War II, resulting in a fundamental shift in the structure of the civic order. I characterize the revised civic order as a colonial welfare state, wherein paternalistic social aid once bestowed by France through its collaborating intermediaries was gradually transformed into social rights claimed directly upon the state itself. Like that of gender, the concept of a welfare state captures linkages between anxieties in the home and in politics. It also helps us to conceive
introduction
of the political process from the mid-s as one in which groups excluded from the colonial civic order sought not only entry, but also equal status within it. What made citizens’ demands welfarist was that they claimed rights to social benefits directly from the state. Syrians and Lebanese routinely invoked statist models of European social policy to express their grievances against the French. Social rights challenged the paternalism that undergirded the colonial civic order, especially the authority and privileges of the state’s intermediaries: State guarantees of health, education, and family sustenance circumvented these mediators to establish a direct link between state and citizen. These new rights and commitments also carried direct and ambiguous implications for gendered distinctions in citizenship, as they transformed relative rights of males and females in the civic order. In short, Parts II, III, and IV explain how mass movements emerged to challenge the state’s paternalism and how negotiations to reform the civic order often came to a focus in bitter disputes over the gendered legal and spatial boundaries of citizenship. The tension between republican rights and paternal privilege polarized Syrian and Lebanese politics even as the countries moved toward independence during World War II. As Part V shows, once again gender became a primary site of conflict and compromise: Both regimes would attempt to resolve the rights-privilege tension by binding political rivals through gender pacts that marginalized women in the civic order and placed them firmly under male authority. Although nationalist rulers claimed to have resolved the crisis of paternity, post-independence politics would continue to turn upon ideological rivalries rooted in the mandate period. This accounts for women’s enduring inequality as citizens, as the gender pacts in both countries have continued to block legal reforms to their personal status. It is my hope that this book will contribute to the various literatures that have inspired it. Its dual use of gender, both as analytical lens and as object of study, contributes to a range of gender studies. Generally, as discussed above, I hope this book will help advance the use of gender as an analytical concept that can elucidate linkages between the home and the political arena often obscured by lenses of statebuilding, class, ethnicity, and so on. More specifically, I see this book as a part of the growing literature on gender and imperialism, where gender has been used both as a tool to reconceptualize the very nature and process of imperial rule, and as the subject of studies to reveal women’s roles in colonial administration, in resistance movements, and in social reform.7 Most specifically, I intend this book as a contribution to recent trends in Middle Eastern gender history that have sought to displace previous views
introduction
rooted in timeless traditions of religion and patriarchy. I was first inspired to question short-sighted and essentialist explanations of Middle Eastern gender inequality by the works of Deniz Kandiyoti, Marnia Lazreg, and Suad Joseph listed in the bibliography. The recent rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East has prompted new queries into how religious-secular and East-West dichotomies were culturally constructed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, under the impact of European imperialism and government reform. Of particular concern has been how Middle Eastern women came to be the pivot around which these dichotomies were mobilized in political discourse.8 At the same time, social historians have advanced our knowledge about how women’s status was determined in royal palaces, Islamic courts, the family, the marketplace, artisanal industry, and on the farm. A few histories of women’s movements—which first emerged in the early twentieth century not only in Syria and Lebanon, but also in Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Palestine—have also been recently written.9 While the historical study of Middle Eastern women remains in its infancy and subject to much debate, a few generally accepted trends are now apparent. It is clear that current practices and interpretations of Islamic law governing women’s status emerged only in recent centuries. The law itself did not crystallize until as late as the thirteenth century. It reflected gendered attitudes of the period and of regions once governed by Byzantium and Persia that were not necessarily present in seventh-century Arabia during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime. For example, it is not clear that veiling, considered by Islamists today as a requirement for Muslim women, was practiced widely by the first generations of Muslim women. Legal and customary norms excluding women from politics, limiting their spiritual leadership, and denying them the freedom of divorce granted to men certainly date from centuries after the Prophet’s death. On the other hand, it appears that Muslim women have long enjoyed rights to personal property that European women only recently gained. Meanwhile, alternate forms of Islamic practice and belief have in different times and places emphasized greater gender equality than legalistic traditions have. Rural and lower-class women’s lives appear to have differed markedly from those of the urban elites; the former experienced higher divorce and remarriage rates, more choice in marriage partner, but less control of personal property. Sufi (mystical) traditions in Islam have also afforded women a more prominent role in religious affairs than legalistic traditions have. While women were generally excluded from formal religious education and authority, there is evidence that they have informally exerted power to shape their own status. Women of medieval Cairo, for example,
introduction
actively resisted calls for strict seclusion in their homes, and apparently exercised, as late as the seventeenth century, greater freedom of mobility than women in Istanbul did.10 Finally, it is clear that the region’s political and economic transformations under the impact of European imperialism and colonization since the nineteenth century have tended, despite calls for reform, to privilege and reify stricter legalistic traditions for all women. These broad trends in Middle Eastern women’s history will necessarily be revised as more regional histories, like this one, are written. Through its study of Syria and Lebanon, this book attempts to clarify the linkage between colonial rule and the perpetuation and reification of Islamic laws that accentuate inequality between men’s and women’s personal status. It is striking that none of the postcolonial Arab countries, except Tunisia and the former (Marxist) South Yemen, have enacted significant reform to these laws since their independence. As will be suggested here, this common legacy is in fact the product of distinct political processes. The gender bargains struck in colonial Syria and Lebanon differed from those struck in neighboring countries, due to local social and economic conditions and to the specific political interactions between the women’s movement, other social movements, and the state. The second aim of this book is to enhance our general understanding of the social and political history of the interwar period in the Middle East. The period has received much less scholarly attention than either the nineteenth century or the years since World War II. On the one hand, much of what has often been assumed to be postwar phenomena are shown here to have roots in the interwar period. For example, scholars have tended to locate the origins of the Islamist-secularist cleavages in current Middle Eastern politics in the recent travails of nationalist governments, ignoring nationalists’ longstanding rivalry with religious groups in the decades before . On the other hand, the linkages between nineteenth-century Ottoman history and the post-World War I period of nation-states have been studied more thoroughly, but primarily in terms of diplomatic and elite political history. Social, cultural, and economic continuities remained relatively unexplored, aside from a few efforts like Haim Gerber’s essay on the social origins of the modern Middle East, Hanna Batatu’s monumental history of Iraq, and the many recent studies on Palestine. Most lamentable has been the dearth of study on the social impact of World War I on the Middle East, where civilian and military casualty rates often far exceeded those of Europe. The difficulty of bridging the Ottoman and postwar periods is daunting. This book was originally conceived to cover the period –, embracing both the late Ottoman and mandate periods. However, as I began research while a graduate student, I was forced to limit
introduction
the scope of the project due to the magnitude of archival research required, given the paucity of secondary materials available on the mandate period alone. I have thus relied upon the richer secondary literature on the Ottoman and post- periods to knit the history of French Syria and Lebanon to the periods that preceded and followed it. And when possible, I have attempted to suggest lines of inquiry relevant to further research on the interwar histories of other Middle Eastern countries. In particular, this book addresses the historiography of Syria and Lebanon in the interwar period. By organizing this history around the concepts of gender and citizenship, I have rewritten previous historical narratives that have privileged sectarian and class identities. Class transformation was certainly a salient feature of Levantine history between and . Out of Ottoman reforms and a changing world economy in the late nineteenth century emerged a new urban bourgeoisie and a distinct landowning elite, polarizing the distribution of wealth as never before. The new bourgeoisie threatened the livelihood of the much older petty bourgeoisie of small shopkeepers, but never its existence. In contrast, peasants, by far the largest social group, suffered critically from economic changes and the rise of a landowning class. Many abandoned their lands and migrated to cities or, especially in the case of Lebanese Christians, to foreign countries. Meanwhile, a salaried middle class appeared after the turn of the century, comprised especially of civil servants in expanding government bureaucracies. Nascent industrialization and the expansion of the service sector produced a self-conscious, urban working class by World War II. While nearly all inhabitants of the region speak Arabic as their mother tongue, except for small Kurdish and Armenian minorities, their common linguistic identity is truncated by a remarkable variety of religious affiliations. Most of the mandate’s – million citizens were Muslim, representing about half of Lebanese and percent of Syrians in the s. The remainder was almost entirely Christian; Jews comprised just one percent of the population, concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. About three-quarters of all Muslims were Sunnis, adhering to orthodox Islamic tradition and dominating all major cities in the region, save Beirut. The remaining Muslims were divided among three principal groups. Shi‘i Muslims were found in both countries but concentrated in southern Lebanon; indeed, the number of Shi‘is approached that of Sunnis in Lebanon and would surpass the latter after World War II. Shi‘is share much with Sunnis in terms of religious practice and belief, differing mainly in their conception of the proper leadership of the community. Two heterodox Muslim sects, rare elsewhere in the Islamic world, counted significant numbers of adherents grouped in tribal societies in the
introduction
mountains of Syria and Lebanon. ‘Alawis (also known as Nusayris) adhere to a secretive doctrine related to Shi‘ism; nearly a quarter-million of them lived mainly in northwestern Syria near Latakia. The Druze follow another sect that branched from Shi‘ism in the eleventh century and live mainly in Mount Lebanon and Jabal Druze (Mount Druze) in southern Syria. Christians were far more splintered as a community. The largest Christian sects were the Greek Orthodox, living in both Syria and Lebanon, and the Maronites, affiliates of Roman Catholicism who maintained their distinct liturgy and who were concentrated in Mount Lebanon. Together they represented more than half of all the region’s Christians in the s. Other Christian sects included Syrian and Armenian Orthodox, and Catholic churches that had split from the Greek, Syrian, and Armenian orthodox communities since the eighteenth century. Very small communities of Chaldean Christians from Iraq, Roman Catholics, and Protestants numbered only a few thousand each. The minority Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities had enjoyed a large degree of self-government under Ottoman rule, with their own religious laws and courts. The government officially represented the dominant Sunni Muslims in its legal apparatus. Sectarian relations had experienced periods of tension through the centuries, but never the degree of violence that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century because of unstable government and economic change. The massacres of Christians in Mount Lebanon and Damascus and later massacres of Armenians in Anatolia that drove them into Syria and Lebanon were virtually without precedent. With the advent of French rule in , the disestablishment of Sunnis, and the new privileges of Catholics and Maronites, would produce new frictions among the various communities in the mandate period. The shifting fortunes of social classes and religious sects have thus dominated historical narratives of the mandate era. Nearly all existing histories of twentieth-century Lebanon, for example, focus primarily on the rivalry between the country’s various Christian and Muslim sects, with some attention to the class basis of those divisions. In the standard account, sectarian relations were aggravated by the French, temporarily healed by a “national pact” between Sunni Muslims and Maronite Catholics in , but later sundered by the system’s inherent clientelism, which spread the benefits of economic development unevenly, to the disadvantage of the country’s populous but rural Muslim sects of Shi‘is and Druze. This would lead to civil war. Historians of Syria have tended to emphasize class somewhat more than sectarianism. As the history is often written, the French practiced divide-and-rule tactics, segregating Syria’s rural Druze and ‘Alawi minorities from the urbanized Sunni Muslim population.
introduction
Sunni elites formed the nationalist movement to reunify the country and capture the state from the French, harnessing it to their own interests as a landowning-industrial class. Sunni elites’ own divided interests (particularly between those of Aleppo and Damascus), their oppression of peasants, and their continued exclusion of ‘Alawis and Druze from politics would fuel the Ba‘thist revolution. My aim is not to renounce or replace these narratives, but to cast new light on them. The following pages do, in fact, emphasize the interaction of gender, class, and sect within the framework of citizenship-formation. This perspective, I seek to show, redresses several weaknesses in previous studies. First, they have often been teleological, reading motives of principal political actors in terms of the civil wars and revolutions to come. This study looks for political motivation in conditions that prevailed at the time, or immediately before the mandate, as in the First World War. Second, the standard narratives tend to focus on political elites and to ignore the role of state institutions. By omitting or marginalizing other, more populist movements that variously rivaled or allied with nationalists, many previous histories have oversimplified elites’ motives and failed to capture the complexity of the conflict between paternalism and republicanism that animated urban politics in this era. The focus on political elites has also tended to underplay the state’s role in politics. With their emphasis on periods of crisis and on high-level negotiations over independence, constitutions, electoral procedure, and the like, previous studies have ignored the profound impact of routine state practices upon the social lives of the citizenry. This study offers a fuller analysis of the entire urban civic order and of the terms upon which citizenship was defined. Third, these narratives have failed to give a convincing explanation for the political mobilization of sectarian identities. They have tended to ascribe it to French treachery, to the personal ambition of religious leaders, or to the age-old clannishness of the society. While each of these factors may have contributed to sectarianism, the following pages show how gender anxiety expressed in the crisis of paternity can better explain the historical construction of sectarian identity, its popular appeal in this particular period, and the specific programs of sectarian activists. Finally, as the following pages also seek to show, women played an important part in the politics of the mandate. Their almost complete omission from standard narratives has necessarily distorted our understanding of the history of mandatory Syria and Lebanon, precisely because gender issues were so tightly intertwined with class and sectarian issues. As a third aim of this book, I intend my study of colonial citizenship to address various emergent literatures on statebuilding, civil society, and the construction of identity in non-Western regions of the world. As a case of the
introduction
building of a welfare state in a colonial context, this study seeks to contribute to a revisionist literature on comparative welfare states. It problematizes the often teleological treatments of the “origins of the welfare state” that have focused solely on industrialized countries that built vast entitlement programs after World War II. The variant case of welfarism in a colonial context should offer at least a minimal corrective. In particular, this study joins previous ones that have rethought welfarism from a gender perspective. Most of these, too, have focused on industrialized countries. I was surprised to find that many trends revealed in those histories also appeared in French Syria and Lebanon.11 More broadly speaking, I hope readers may find the general discussion of the construction of citizenship in a colonial context provocative. I intend this book to help bring the Middle East into debates about forms of citizenship outside of the context of the liberal nation-state, in imperial, colonial, muliticultural, and religious polities.12 At the very least, I hope this book helps to dispel the popular notion that most Middle Easterners don’t have democracies because they don’t want them. Many Syrians and Lebanese mobilized to demand equality, rights, and political participation, and they did achieve democracy of a kind. That the outcome was so unstable may be attributed to the peculiar dilemmas of right and privilege in French mandatory rule, as the pages that follow will attempt to show. Finally, I wish to say something about my perspective as an American writing a history of foreign countries, particularly those in the Middle East. I do not presume to ask the same questions Lebanese and Syrians might ask of their own history. Nor do I presume to write a version of history that is more correct than they would write. This is, however, a difficult posture to maintain in a situation where there is far more support for historical study of the Middle East outside of the region than inside of it. The cultural and economic legacies of imperialism often still hold in the academic world. In this context, I found the following experience somewhat encouraging. While conducting research in Damascus, a Syrian friend helped arrange interviews with local women for me. As she later explained, she told potential interviewees who were skeptical of an American researcher’s intent, “She [me] will probably get everything wrong, but there will still be material of use to us.” I was gratified by my friend’s candor, and I hope that she and other Syrians and Lebanese may indeed find something of use here. To the degree that I have succeeded in producing a study of mutual interest and value, I am honored and gratified. To the degree that I have failed, I express my profound regret.
This page intentionally left blank
part i
War and the Advent of French Rule: A Crisis of Paternity
A history of Syria and Lebanon in the years of French rule must begin with the devastation of World War I. In November , the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria against Britain and France. The diplomatic outcome of the Great War in the Levant is well known, through films, scholarly books, and innumerable memoirs in Arabic, English, French, and Turkish. The names of T. E. Lawrence, Sharif Husayn, and Prince Faysal, parties to the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans; of Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, architects of the region’s territorial division between the British and French; and of Lord Balfour, who promised a Jewish homeland, resound even today. Neglected in most accounts of the war is the profound suffering of the masses and its political consequences. To most villagers and common city folk, the Great War was felt not in the pain of a patriot’s heart, but in an empty stomach and a fearful soul. The great famine of – cast a shadow over their lives for the entire period of French rule. The loss of population and of essential tools and supplies devastated the region’s economy, and it would take nearly a decade to recover. Memories of hunger caused by foreigners and inflicted upon Arabs—mainly Syrian and Lebanese—lasted through the next world war, and were no doubt an important motive to those who fought for national independence and self-determination. The war’s differential impact on people, according to their gender, class, religion, and place of residence, would also shape the patterns of postwar politics.
advent of french rule
The war widened the gap between rich and poor, producing for the first time in the region’s history class-based movements. It also enflamed religious tensions: Christians of Mount Lebanon were hit hardest by famine, fueling their search for security through alliance with the French and a state of their own. And while men suffered the hardships of the battlefront, women were left on their own to support their families, and often to die with their children of hunger. The disruption of male and female roles produced widespread gender anxiety that would fuse with disruptions in the authority of religious leaders and ruling elites to produce a crisis of paternity in postwar politics. To these social and political aftershocks of the Great War was added the imposition of French rule. The French created new states from a congeries of former Ottoman provinces whose residents had not necessarily ever thought of themselves as Syrian or Lebanese. They offered as founding father of these nation-states High Commissioner Henri Gouraud. And they built a new government that intruded into the lives of citizens far more than its predecessor ever had. French rule aggravated the crisis of paternity brought on by the war, which had toppled the Ottoman dynasty that had ruled the region for years. Syrians and Lebanese were themselves divided on who the proper successor to the Ottoman sultan should be. Some even challenged the need for paternal authority at all. When French policies further threatened the power of many local elites—especially Muslim ulama (clerics), urban notables and tribal shaykhs—violent revolts flared through much of the s. Part One of this book tells the story of the war, the crisis of paternity, and the political bargains that reestablished paternalistic authority in a new, colonial form. In other words, it introduces the process that established, by , a colonial civic order. The term civic order is used here to refer to the institutions and norms that structure state-society interaction. It designates a much larger political space than that occupied by heads of state and parliaments; rather, it traverses the imaginary line between state and society. The civic order encompasses all people who are directly touched by the state—through its military presence, law enforcement, conscription, tax collection, roadbuilding, schools, chambers of commerce, fiscal regulations, labor laws, public
advent of french rule
health services, and the like.1 It is thus the arena where state policy and political power are negotiated among soldiers, politicians, bureaucrats and various social groups. These negotiations effectively establish the bases of authority and terms of citizenship in the nation. As the following chapters will show, the negotiations between the French and the Syrians and Lebanese failed to resolve the crisis of paternity. The colonial civic order that took shape by rested on an unstable compromise between republican ideals of popular sovereignty and fraternity and paternalistic privileges claimed by both local elites and the French.
This page intentionally left blank
chapter 1
World War I: Famine, Memory, and a Shattered Social Order
The woes of World War I fell upon the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire like a nightmare. Communities, families, and even personal identities were transformed, sometimes beyond recognition. Neighbors and loved ones disappeared by the thousands in the famine or on distant battlefronts. Deprivation among survivors snapped the sinews of power and trust that had once bound family members and communities together. As suffering struck the population unevenly, it cut wide cleavages between rich and poor, Muslim and Christian. The general struggle for food fueled a mad and cut-throat competition between citizen and state, peasant and landlord, consumer and merchant, even parent and child. Gender norms of honor and protection between men and women were also violated. Memories of this world seemingly turned upside down would haunt the postwar era. For many, it would take years to piece together their shattered lives. For all, the subversion of order and authority at home and in the community produced a pervasive crisis of paternity. It all began with hunger, which crept stealthily upon the land through a series of misfortunes. Anis Furayha, a boy of when the war began, saw a second disaster strike his Mount Lebanon village after the poor harvest of : Swarms of locusts attacked us. When people say that the swarms blocked out the sun they speak truly, with no exaggeration. At ten in the morning the locusts flew and covered the sun. And when the swarms descended upon the fields, they stripped them of everything green. Oh Lord, both famine and locusts? The people fell silent and prayed.1 In the following winter of –, a heavy snow blocked travel to Mount Lebanon. To survive, Furayha made contact with Druze smugglers from the grain-growing region of Hawran, in southern Syria. But it took them days
advent of french rule
to reach his home of Ras Metn; wheeled vehicles had been requisitioned by the army, as had the train. Few people had the seed or strength to plant new crops that spring. In those harsh months of early , an estimated –, people died on Mount Lebanon.2 Beirut was hit next. In early , everyone with financial means had hopped aboard the last Italian steamers before the port of Beirut was closed. The city’s population fell from , to , by mid-. The horror that befell those who stayed behind was immeasurable. The harvest was no better than that of and supply lines to all of Lebanon were cut. Witnesses experienced famine’s morbidity by the individual case, as did Halide Edib, the famous Turkish feminist who ran orphanages in Lebanon in : The first time I heard the cry it echoed and echoed through my brain and heart. It was after a concert in the American College, where I had gone with some teachers, and I had given myself up to the bliss of music. I was driving home through the streets of Beirut back to Der-Nassira, when I heard it: “Dju-an” [I’m hungry]. It was a solitary cry piercing and insistent and cutting the air like a knife. I have heard that “Djuan” so often since.3 The American consul described Beirut’s streets in July as “filled with starving women and children. . . . In my early evening walks I frequently see people lying dead in the gutter.”4 People suffered acute shortages not only of foodstuffs, but of imported manufactured goods and fuel: most spent the war in cold and darkness.5 Hunger and mortal disease, particularly typhus and malaria, reached far beyond worst-hit Lebanon and far beyond the armistice. By December , reports reached Cairo that people in Syria’s inland cities were dying by the thousands. A protestant pastor from Minneapolis who visited Syria that winter reported people dying in every street of Damascus. The police chief told him that he received dead per day, while the mayor claimed that onequarter of the city’s population had disappeared since the start of the war.6 “Starvation and famine [are] everywhere; the men either in military service or in hiding, and the women and children reduced to beggary,” reported the American consul in Damascus in April .7 The cost of food rose so high that people routinely stole bread right out of the hands of customers leaving bakeries and ate orange peels from the street. Stories circulated of women and children going to the door of the city’s most sacred Umayyad mosque to die. By October , hunger had reached as far south as Jerusalem. The death toll
world war i
continued to climb in and the harvest of was again a poor one: Bread riots flared in Hama in March , and as late as October many middleand lower-class families in Aleppo were still going without an evening meal.8 Contemporary attempts to quantify the destruction of human life varied widely, from , to , dead in Lebanon alone and from , to , dead in both Syria and Lebanon. A Dr. Joseph Ziadeh claimed onethird of Mount Lebanon’s population had disappeared from towns like Batrun, where only , residents remained from a prewar population of ,.9 In , George Antonius, the first historian of the Arab revolt and Arab nationalism, estimated that up to , had died of hunger and disease in Greater Syria (including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) by .10 A recent study drawing on German records supports the higher estimates of about , dead from hunger and disease.11 Antonius, like most Arabs of the time, blamed mainly the Ottomans, and also war profiteers who traded foodstuffs on the black market at high prices. They claimed that the Ottomans’ monopoly on transport and rationing system deliberately funneled food to troops and starved the people. Rumors flew of troops hoarding grain from Mount Lebanon’s Christian majority as retribution for their sympathies with France. Indeed, by late , French soldiers stationed on the island of Arwad claimed that Jemal Pasha, commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army at Damascus, had met with German and Austrian officials the previous year when “the extermination of the Lebanese was decided.”12 The Ottomans, denying any plan to starve the Lebanese, blamed the famine on the Entente’s blockade. This position is supported by German archives, which document extensive Ottoman efforts to provide food to the Lebanese with emergency shipments, rationing, and soup kitchens. These same sources, according to Linda Schilcher, show that some Ottoman policies did aggravate the crisis, but mainly due to accident and ineptitude. Tight fiscal regulations, for example, reduced remittances from overseas relatives that Lebanese families desperately needed to pay rising food costs. And the use of devalued paper currency and forced grain seizures promoted peasant flight and black-marketeering. In effect, the government was simply too weak to control private speculators. As one Ottoman official noted in July , “the economic struggle inside the country led by the rich against the poor was causing more casualties than the war itself.”13 There is also evidence that the British and French knowingly used the famine as a weapon of war. The Entente’s blockade shut down all ports, cutting off a primary supply route to Lebanon, which, with its dense population and mountains, depended heavily on imports of grain even in peacetime. According to
advent of french rule
documents in the French archives, in May Maronite Archbishop Joseph Darien protested the use of famine for political ends, urging the French consul in Cairo to demand an immediate Entente invasion to save lives. Although the French had by then received reports of up to , deaths, Foreign Minister Aristide Briand spurned the consul’s pleas to invade, arguing that it would only provoke a general massacre. The consul then urged that France break the blockade and ship food to Lebanon. A June British memo to the foreign ministry, however, flatly rejected the proposal to feed starving civilians: His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expresses his earnest hope that the French Government will not encourage any such scheme . . . . the Entente Allies are simply being blackmailed to remedy the shortage of supplies which it is the very intention of the blockade to produce. The British “consider the famine as an agent that will lead the Arabs to revolt,” noted a June internal French foreign ministry memo. The writer dissented from this view, arguing that distributing food would win greater Arab sympathy for the Entente.14 The British view prevailed, and the blockade lasted until the end of the war. In August , just when the Syrian interior was hit full force by famine, an Istanbul newspaper reported that a French patrol boat had attacked three Ottoman ships carrying grain to Beirut.15 Meanwhile, the British recruited Arab tribes south of Lebanon to join Sharif Husayn’s revolt against the Ottomans, offering them food as an enticement. The revolt further aggravated shortages in Lebanon and Syria by forcing the Ottomans to divert food to its defending army in the south.16 The famine, in all its misery, was not the sole cause of loss of life. The Ottoman military machine was brutal. By late the Ottomans were conscripting men aged to , both Muslims and Christians (except those in Mount Lebanon), in an army that recruited . million troops. About threefourths of all adult men were mobilized. Casualties neared one million. Figures on battlefield deaths vary between , and , men. In addition, about , soldiers died of disease, and , others were listed as missing or as enemy prisoners by war’s end.17 Suggesting how military conscription and suffering came to be linked in people’s minds, the Ottoman term for concription, seferberlik (safar barlik in Arabic), became synonymous with famine in local usage. Conditions were so bad that a total of . million troops deserted the Ottoman army. Arab desertions increased to percent in –, when the Ottomans abolished draft-exemption fees and the Arab Revolt began.18
world war i
Military and civilian casualties among Syrians and Lebanese far exceeded European rates. Antonius estimated that , Arab soldiers from Greater Syria—about one in six adult males living in —never returned from the battlefront: Taking into account losses due to military service, [Greater] Syria’s contribution to the holocaust of the War must have been not far short of half a million lives out of a total population of considerably under four million—a higher percentage, probably, than that of any other belligerent.19 Antonius’s estimate that . percent of the population disappeared in battle and famine may be in fact be low. The higher estimate of , faminedead alone in addition to the , military dead, and the generally accepted prewar population of . million, would place the death rate closer to percent, or nearly one in six people living in . Both the low and high estimates compare morbidly to the countries considered hardest hit in World War I: France and Germany lost less than percent of their prewar populations.20 Opportunities to rebel against such dire conditions were slim. First of all, there were few able-bodied men left in the region to organize a substantial revolt. Syrian and Lebanese soldiers were transferred from local bases to battlefronts in Europe, Iraq, and Suez purposely to forestall such an event. Second, Jemal Pasha imposed draconian martial law. Known as the “butcher” (alsaffah), Jemal Pasha was almost universally feared and hated by war’s end. In –, Syrian and Lebanese well-respected notables were executed for treasonous contacts with Entente powers concerning secession from the empire. To discourage future efforts, Jemal Pasha ordered their public hanging in the main squares of Beirut and Damascus. At the same time, he exiled more than families from Beirut and Damascus to Anatolia, also on suspicion of collaboration with the French. Exile became a routine method of punishment for political opponents and army deserters alike.21 Ahmad al-Jundi tells of how his father, a court employee in northern Syria, was banished to a small town in Anatolia in late . The entire family made the trip by cart, carriage, and train in winter weather.22 Arab nationalism gained ground as worsening war conditions withered loyalty to the Ottomans. By the last year of the war many Syrians engaged in smuggling and sabotage, in collaboration with the approaching army of Sharif Husayn, led by his son, Prince Faysal. Meanwhile, many Christian Lebanese began to proclaim their hopes for French occupation.
advent of french rule
Collective Memory and the Political Repercussions of Trauma The trauma of war and famine ran deep. While the personal experience of most Syrians and Lebanese remains shrouded, we can begin to understand how their suffering was reconstructed in collective memory through the stories preserved in diplomatic archives, newspapers and magazines, and personal interviews. These sources can provide some clues to prevailing mentalities, particularly in how memories differentiated the experiences of men and women, Muslim and Christian, and rich and poor. On February , , the Beirut daily Lisan al-hal printed on its front page a poem found in the diary of a dead soldier. Entitled “The Smile of Victory,” the poem was dedicated to “the spirit of a mother who had died of hunger” during the Great War. The poet, Da’ud Musa, envisioned two women tending the bodies of men on a battlefield. One came to a wounded soldier and hugged him, saying, “This is my son.” The other put a wreath of flowers on his head and said, “This is my beloved.” The soldier cried out: Oh bride of life, rescue me! . . . O ye, who inspires love of the fatherland, end my pain! I am the only son of my mother, and I am far from her . . . I raced with the beginning of the storm to rescue her, but death came to me before I could reach her. The poem ended with smiles of victory on faces of fallen sons of the fatherland. The soldier cried again: “Though I die, my country lives!” Striking in the poem is the interrelationship of family, gender and patriotism. Martyrdom for the country was bound with sacrifice for the family. The soldier wished to save his mother, but he found in the death that prevented him from doing so a victory for his country. Both mother and son die for the fatherland; however, the poet charted differing paths to martyrdom for men and women. While men die fighting for their country, women achieve martyrdom indirectly, by way of their relationship to men, either by inspiring male patriotism and caring for their slain bodies, or by dying themselves because they have been deprived of male protection. The poem also expressed men’s sorrow and guilt for not protecting their women; the poet-soldier appears to seek forgiveness in confessing that he had tried to rescue his starving mother, but was overcome by death first. For decades after the war, stories circulated of abandoned families expiring silently in lonely villages and in the doorways of mosques and churches. Stories also
world war i
emphasized women’s fear, not just of hunger, but of Ottoman soldiers. Most soldiers stationed in Syria and Lebanon were foreign Turks who routinely knocked on the doors of homes where women were left alone, demanding bread, supplies, and sometimes more. There were even stories of soldiers cutting off women’s hands to steal jewelry.23 Male guilt was sometimes projected back onto female victims, in horror stories of what women supposedly did when left alone. They typically described girls who traded their virtue for food from soldiers and mothers driven mad by the loss of children and spouses. In October a theatrical troupe staged a play called “The Fall of a Young Girl,” about the heroine’s “surrender to desire and appetite, her torment of shame and degradation, and her repentance.”24 A Beirut man later recalled a story he heard about his grandmother, who went “crazy” after losing first seven children and then her husband, and began walking the streets, naked.25 A late s popular history magazine, Tarikh al-harb al-‘uzma (History of The Great War), featured images of emaciated women and children in its issue on the famine. One portrayed a haggard woman on her knees, clothing torn and revealing a breast, calling, “Oh sons of Syria, bread, bread, bread . . .” (fig. ). Inside, articles told how mothers had emptied their homes of all they could sell to pay for food, and then fled their villages with their children to the cities, in search of food, eating weeds and even dogmeat. In extremity, some mothers were said to have devoured their dead children.26 These war and famine memories evoke a wrenching, nightmarish experience of a world gone awry, of families not simply abandoned and split apart, but actually turned against each other. Men who had prided themselves on protecting their families could no longer do so. Mothers and wives, soldiers’ inspiration for life and love of country, were selling themselves to strangers and devouring their children. Women habituated to social norms of seclusion howled in the streets, naked, or were attacked in their homes by strange men. All social and familial norms seemed suspended. Anxiety about proper gender roles was expressed in these war and famine memories. Such anxiety is suggested in the disjunction between public and private memory. In public and official memory, men tend to be remembered as martyrs who militarily defended the nation, while women are portrayed as martyrs primarily for defending their children. Published photographs of the war routinely portrayed men as soldiers in uniform, and women as helpless victims. Central squares in both Beirut and Damascus were renamed Martyrs’ Square for male nationalists executed there, and annual memorial ceremonies for them are still observed. Few accounts of, and no monuments to, women’s heroic deeds are to be found.
advent of french rule
Personal and private accounts belie this public—and political—rendition, evoking a broader range of experiences that men and women shared in common. Women have individually often recalled their acts of bravery and hard labor during the war, not just their shame and victimhood. In the villages of inland Syria, women and children replaced men absent at the battlefront in farm work. In , Jemal Pasha organized women’s brigades, sent to harvest grain needed by the military in the fertile regions of Adana, the Jordan valley, and elsewhere. Urban women filled in for absent artisans, selling supplies in markets and working in the textile weaving shops that managed to remain open.27 “During the war my family never went hungry because they were in the wool business. . . . When the men were away, that was one of the best ways for women to make money,” recalled ‘Aziza al-Jaza’iri, who lived in Damascus. “Straw merchants used to sell rushes to the women who would make little rush-bottomed stools and sell them. . . . There was practically nothing that women didn’t sell at that time when they took all our men and left us no one.”28 Elite women of both Beirut and Damascus recalled their labors in organizing relief for the hungry, ill, and homeless during the war. They and lower-class women both took daily risks to feed their families by trading in the forbidden black market. They also staged risky demonstrations against the Ottoman government to demand bread. At least one woman is known to have been hanged for political reasons.29 Men’s memories only rarely, privately, or long after the war revealed that they too starved desperately for food. The safar barlik was something only whispered about for years. In a s interview, a Lebanese journalist recalled meeting a man in a Lebanese village elated to find his father had died, because he could now eat that day’s loaf of bread himself. The journalist also recalled seeing men starve in prison, where he had been thrown for writing newspaper articles critical of the Ottoman state.30 Exceptional was a article written by a Damascene about having nothing to eat while he rode a military train heading to the front at Gallipoli. He and his friends were saved by two poor women selling food at a station in Eskishehir.31 The story of another soldier, Fahmi Tergeman, husband of ‘Aziza al-Jaza’iri quoted above, was published only decades later by his daughter. He recounted how an entire army starved in Gaza until the British took him and his comrades prisoner. Before their final defeat, the Ottoman soldiers had foraged among the dead bodies of British soldiers lying on the battlefield, looking for tins of meat.32 Despite this convergence in private recollections, public memories that stressed men’s and women’s differing experiences would have a profound
world war i
political impact in the postwar period. The imagery of mothers and sons as different sorts of patriots took on a life of its own, and would be ideologically deployed after the war. Men would parlay their battlefield valor during the Great War into political claims, for self-rule and for status as protectors of their women from French men and the French state. Women, too, would recount their often neglected acts of wartime patriotism to make their claims for social and political rights after the war. But the image of women as motherly inspiration for their son-patriots, rather than patriots in their own right, dominated political discourse and colored debates on women’s rights to full citizenship. Images of wild women would also resurface, in criticisms of deviant women who ventured out from behind the protection of men into public and politics.33 Collective memories of wartime trauma also differentiated the experiences of Muslims and Christians. Most letters sent covertly to the French during the war, for example, expressed Christians’ views that Muslims and Turks deliberately caused their plight. While these letters were neither necessarily accurate nor representative of all opinion, they likely reflect a variety of stories and rumors being told by common people in the afflicted regions. Similar opinions were given years later in interviews with survivors.34 A number of letters ascribed Christian suffering to a general Muslim hatred of them. Some, for example, tied the famine to the massacres of Christians in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in . Antoine Eddé, a French informant, reported from Mount Lebanon in the spring of : “The persecutions have begun, and they are only a prelude to a general massacre like that of the Armenians.” Another agent reported that priests and nuns were being arrested in Damascus, where to Armenian girls were said to have been sold as slaves to Muslims: “Those who sold them said: ‘Rejoice, oh believers, in the shame of Christians.’ ” He also reported that no Muslims in Jubayl [north of Beirut] had died of hunger, because they received government rations of flour that were denied to Christians.35 A French Lazarist priest in Syria wrote in May : “Apostasies are the order of the day in the cities. How many have given themselves to Muslims, or have given up their honor for a morsel of bread. . . . all of the Turkish officers, Jemal Pasha at their head, can’t have enough Christian girls to sacrifice to their perversions.”36 Other letters saw Christian persecution as a direct result of their ties to France. The secretary of the Maronite patriarch wrote in : “Poor Lebanon, poor Lebanese, sacrificed by vengeance, to punish them for their loyalty to a generous and compassionate mother. But where is this generosity and pity of France?”37
advent of french rule
However, there were alternate discourses in letters that emphasized communal suffering of Muslims and Christians alike, and the Turks as their common enemy. A Mgr. Phares urged the French to support “a holy union” against Turkish tyrants, “uniting Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox, Druze, Ansariehs, and Mutawallis.”38 Mustafa Bey, an informant from a prominent Muslim Damascene family, wrote in : “Discontent in Syria is general and shared by all classes and creeds. The exactions of the government have vexed the peasantry, the educated class is in general disturbed by the tyrannical methods of the Turkish authorities and the better class of ulama [Muslim clergy] are entirely with them.”39 The uncertainties of blame and the political machinations of the Entente powers would perpetuate religious tensions and suspicions after the Ottomans withdrew. The war had undermined trust in a mixed-sect community at its most profound level. If a community would not share food equitably amongst all of its members, was it a community? In , Mount Lebanon had been created as a Christian enclave separate from the surrounding region because of such sectarian mistrust. The famine reinforced Christian sentiments for secession. The fact that Muslims in inland Syria grew the wheat that Christian Lebanese depended upon, and that some Syrian Muslims had hoarded grain meant to be shipped to Lebanon, compounded religious with geographic tensions, and directly contributed to the creation of Lebanon as a separate state in . Alternate memories, of how Muslims had also died, how Christians had also profited from black-markets in grain, and of how states, not neighbors, had disrupted supply lines, were suppressed in the process. There would be, significantly, virtually no public discussion of France’s own role in causing starvation. This was likely due not only to French press censorship, but to a willingness of Arab nationalists to believe the worst about their former Ottoman rulers. Class, like gender and religion, was also a distinguishing factor in collective memory. War and famine had set down a mortal line between rich and poor. Those who died, or who joined the Ottoman army never to return, were the poorest in society. They could not afford to flee on the last Italian steamliners or to pay fees for exemption from the military draft (bedel). The ranks of the poor grew, as inflation of food prices impoverished those who had not been poor before the war. Meanwhile several prominent families, particularly the Lebanese Sursuqs and Asfars, were generally known to have amassed fortunes through grain speculation that boosted prices far beyond what the poor could pay. Stories were told of peasants selling their homes and fields for a simple loaf of bread, and of speculators expropriating entire districts. As one magazine
world war i
recounted, “as for the inhabitants of Nahr el-Deb, they disappeared after having sold everything, even the clock of the church.”40 Even though the French decreed a law to dispossess Lebanese war profiteers who had amassed vast amounts of land, the line between rich and poor remained vivid, in memory as well as reality. One enduring monument to the famine was the plumpness of survivors. As Schilcher put it, for decades afterward politicians “projected an image of success and prosperous generosity to their constituencies by means of quite unabashed personal obesity.”41 Schilcher sees paradoxically both the deepening of class consciousness and the reaffirmation of patron-client ties as a legacy of the famine, for patrons had been a more reliable source of security and nourishment than the state. The complexity of the famine’s social impact has been preserved in the various versions still told of a story about a hungry village chief (agha) in North Lebanon who traded his olive grove to a lord (bey) for a single orange. Landless descendants of aghas told the story to anthropologist Michael Gilsenan to explain the general derangement of the social order, while the agha’s own grandson, now the town’s capitalist-minded mayor, retold it as a farce about the aghas’ self-defeating sense of honor that undercut their material well-being. For peasants, whose ancestors had neither orange nor olive grove to trade, the story depicted the famine as both the epitome of beys’ tyranny and a reminder of the hollow pretensions of aghas’ descendants.42 The emergence of class-based labor unions and political parties would be a significant new trend in the years of the French mandate, but they were slow to emerge. In a newspaper article, Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak described meeting a woman with her two starving children at the door of a church, who asked, “Why is there not equality on Earth as there is in Heaven?”43 The encounter motivated him to organize the Lebanese Communist Party. A more typical response to inequality was a Damascus newspaper editorial that blamed the famine on hoarding and uncooperative attitudes among a population that lacked proper solidarity and patriotism. The editorial called for more charities and urged the wealthy to be more patriotic in almsgiving.44 Rebellion against the rich remained an individual, not organized effort, as evidenced in the rising incidence of banditry and theft after the war.45 The preceding examples offer only a sketch of the preservation and construction of collective memory, one that deserves much more study than can be undertaken here. Indeed, scholars disagree profoundly on the relationships between individual and collective memory, and between memory, culture, and politics.46 With this in mind, we might venture, tentatively, to make some observations about the political implications of war memories in Syria and
advent of french rule
Lebanon. People generally remembered the war as a nightmare, a world gone awry, where the social norms governing gender, religious, and class relations were shattered. While individuals appear to have interpreted the nightmare in a variety of ways, it appears that official, public memory used the nightmare to reaffirm the values of the old social order. To affirm that women belong under the protection of men, stories were repeated about how women left alone went crazy. To affirm past practice of separating Muslims and Christians, famine stories emphasized Christian suffering and Muslim profiteering. To affirm that the interests of rich and poor coincide, profiteering elites were condemned as a criminal aberration. If this observation is correct, then many Syrians and Lebanese resembled other societies that rallied to appeals for a postwar return to “normalcy.” It is perhaps this yearning for normalcy that contributed to the tendency to speak of the safar barlik only obliquely, in hushed tones, as an unmentionable shame. But it is also true that for others, like Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak, the nightmare was a revelation that discredited the old order and inspired political action.
Shattered Households and the Crisis of Paternity Material conditions, in addition to memory, shaped the political and social impact of the war for years afterward. The war marked the end of an age of auspicious economic expansion. The period between and had been one of exceptional stability and prosperity, wrought by Ottoman reforms and the adaptation of local producers and traders to the new conditions of the world economy. The centralized state improved rural security, encouraging farmers to extend cultivation into new lands. With the infusion of French capital, Mount Lebanon’s silk industry boomed, employing more than onethird of its population. Rural wealth enabled urban artisans to cultivate local markets, offsetting the impact of competition from European imports in cities. Meanwhile, European investment in local transport—roads, railroads, and ports—increased trade and the wealth of merchants. A new urban landowning-bourgeoisie emerged that profited most from state largesse and European capitalism. While peasants and workers benefited less, they were apparently able to live healthier lives, evidenced by a population boom of at least percent in those years.47 The postwar period appeared far less auspicious to all but the wealthiest. On the one hand, population statistics suggest that people regained a basic level of well-being after the war’s devastation. By the mid-s, Syria’s
world war i
population had reached about . million while Lebanon’s had reached about . million, representing growth of about percent since , despite the loss of up to a half-million lives during the war.48 Many families clearly managed to raise many children, even though infant mortality remained high. However, agriculture, the basis of the region’s wealth, did not experience so robust a recovery. Many fields lay fallow for a decade after the war. While yields of Syria’s most important crops, wheat and barley, rebounded after , peak harvests in the s barely matched prewar peaks.49 Trouble was further evidenced by large migrations of peasants to the cities, even though there was no new mechanization or intensification of agriculture to push them off the land. Cities grew by far more than the general population growth of percent. Beirut’s population nearly doubled from its postwar low of about , to more than , in . Damascus, whose population dropped to , after the war, jumped by more than percent in the next years to ,. Aleppo grew fastest, partly due to the Armenian settlement, from , in to , in .50 These booming cities were no paradise for incoming peasants, however. The major industry, textiles, had been dealt a near-mortal blow by the war, and thousands of urban workers lost their jobs. While over the long term the region’s economy would stabilize, in the s it suffered severe trauma. Lingering effects of social dislocation deepened the gulf between rich and poor. While the urban bourgeoisie gradually resumed its business, often with capital that had been safely stored overseas, most families had lost the sources of support they once had. In an unstable economy that underwent multiple structural changes, they found it difficult to reestablish their lives as they had known them before the war. Under this pressure, gender roles within households changed, causing anxiety and contributing to the emergent crisis of paternity. In the aftermath of war, family networks were shattered and female-headed households became common: “Many, too many families are completely disorganized,” lamented a French journal in .51 Most of the more than , Armenian refugees who arrived in Syria and Lebanon after fleeing the massacres in Anatolia were women and children, unemployed and hungry. Settled in camps outside of major cities, Armenian women supported their families by working in the textile industry or running home-tailoring businesses.52 While there are no records of how many Armenian refugee households were headed by women, French records of Assyrian refugees who settled in Syria in showed that percent of “chefs de familles” were women.53
advent of french rule
Numerous Syrian and Lebanese women waited anxiously for their husbands and fathers to return from war. In a Damascus newspaper published what it called a typical story. A couple named George and Mary had three children. In , when George received a call from the military, he chose to pay the military exemption tax. But his exemption expired, and he was sent to Galicia. Mary received one letter from him, and then no word. Some time later, she received a death notice. Mary wept, and struggled to support her children. None of her relatives could afford to help, so she pulled her eldest son out of school and placed him in a job with a carpenter. When a wealthy widower proposed marriage, Mary was horrified at the thought. But her circumstances had deteriorated so much that, two months after the war ended, she accepted his proposal. Just before the ceremony, however, her husband George miraculously reappeared: He had been taken prisoner in Belgium and the Ottoman death notice had been an error, an error that hurt many during the war.54 Not all women were so lucky. In a court case, a Damascene woman was convicted and jailed three months for stealing Turkish gold liras from a neighbor’s house. The woman, Lutfiya bint Mahmud al-Qudsi, described herself as a poor widow without resources. She claimed the money had been left to her by her husband, and that she hid it in the courtyard of their house before she was forced, for reasons of economy, to vacate it. She returned to the house in May , she claimed, to retrieve the money in order to buy a sewing machine and so earn a living.55 Despite its possible untruths, Qudsi’s story is likely representative of strategies many women used—either work as a seamstress or theft—to survive in the absence of male breadwinners. The breakdown of family support systems is further evidenced by the number of children housed in orphanages. The total number of children orphaned during the war is not known, but the Near East Foundation alone cared for , orphans, mostly Armenian, through the mid-s.56 In , Halide Edib ran two orphanages with , children, while a third orphanage built that year in Beirut housed , children. Meanwhile, Shakib Arslan founded three orphanages in the Shuf region south of Beirut. He claimed the Turkish government was supporting thousands of orphaned children.57 After the war, the new governments and private charities built even more orphanages, bringing the total to in Syria and Lebanon.58 Orphanages had been virtually unknown before the war, as Syrian and Lebanese orphans were usually taken in by relatives. Their appearance gave tragic testimony to the children’s loss not only of their parents, but of grandparents, uncles, and aunts. Even families with both parents had a difficult time. When fathers and
world war i
husbands finally returned, they were often penniless or handicapped, or both. Many families had had to relocate during the war, losing the local infrastructure that kept them afloat. A Druze family that evacuated Mount Lebanon during the famine lived on the edge of poverty in southern Syria, at Jabal Druze, where they bought a small parcel of land. For decades afterward, the father of the family migrated for part of the year to Lebanon to earn additional wages as a manual laborer.59 Armenians were perhaps the most unsettled. Because of local hostility, the , refugees settled in Damascus in were later relocated to Beirut and Aleppo, where local residents also rejected them. Artisans complained about new Armenian competition in tailoring and shoemaking, while many others complained of too many makeshift peddlers on the streets. Resentment toward the Armenians bespoke the continuing hard times faced by the urban poor.60 Hanna Mina describes the continuing misery of families on the margins of the postwar economy in his autobiographical novel Fragments of Memory. After the war, Mina’s orphaned mother migrated to Mersin in Anatolia with her sister and brother to work as a maid. She had lost an older sister in the safar barlik, and soon lost her brother to pneumonia. She then married Mina’s father, another Syrian refugee, and the family moved back across the border to Latakia, where they lived temporarily with relatives. The family traveled from town to village, back to town and again to village, in search of work. Mina’s father worked as a self-styled shoemaker and at other odd jobs, and at one point hired himself and his family out to raise silkworms, in a sharecropping arrangement that resembled slavery. The family nurtured the worms to perfect maturity, only to find that they could not sell them in the glutted local market. Mina’s parents then forced his sister to work as a maid in their master’s house to pay off their debts. In the late s they moved to another village, where they lived in an abandoned house in exchange for guarding its adjacent granary. That year’s harvest had been bad, and food supplies were short. The book ends with the revolt of villagers at the granary, which went up in flames, leaving Mina’s family again homeless.61 The bad luck of Mina’s family in raising silkworms reflected the general collapse of the silk industry. During the war, most mulberry trees in Lebanon were chopped down for firewood. The silk industry would die finally in the s due to competition from Asian imports and the new “synthetic silk,” or rayon. While wealthy Lebanese landowners were able to replace mulberry trees with olive and citrus trees, poorer farmers could not afford such an investment. Workers on Lebanon’s new citrus plantations were often peasants who had been bought out by the newly enriched urban bourgeoisie.62
advent of french rule
Shortages of material supplies also hampered efforts of rural families to regain their livelihoods. Many families had sold all of their household goods for food. In addition, Jemal Pasha had ordered the confiscation of all wheeled vehicles, animals, wool, leather, nails, hardware items, and the like for military use. Families were stripped of the tools they needed to carry out basic farm tasks like planting and transporting crops and food processing.63 It would take them years to acquire the capital needed to replace these essential items, one reason agricultural production slumped in the s. Meanwhile, in the cities, artisans lost their jobs in the textile industry. Foreign imports accelerated after the war, while rural markets remained depressed. This made it difficult for artisans returning from battlefronts to restart their businesses. Thousands of dyers and weavers in the textile industry were forced to take lower-paid and part-time wage jobs. By the mid-s, the number of urban workers doing informal and part-time work, about ,, was double the number with full-time industrial jobs. Wage levels dropped in the s to half their buying power. In addition, an estimated , workers, about percent of the urban industrial labor force, were unemployed.64 The more fortunate men were able to find jobs in the expanding transport sector, as construction workers or truck and taxi drivers, and in the emergent civil service. For example, Fahmi Tergeman, the soldier mentioned above who starved in Gaza, had been a thread-spooler in Damascus’s silk industry before the war. Afterward, he used telegraph skills gained in the Ottoman army to obtain a job in the post office.65 While men faced great difficulty in providing for their families, many women of the lower classes also saw sources of supplementary income that they had once contributed to their households disappear. Before the war, thousands of women did home work for the textile industry, representing onethird of textile workers in Damascus; by , Damascene women were using , sewing machines at home to produce hosiery.66 Meanwhile, more than , young women on Mount Lebanon had worked in silk mills, earning meager wages that often lifted their families above the line of destitution. Thousands more women, usually older and married, raised silkworms at home. As late as , agents for French firms roamed the Lebanese countryside to buy their cocoons: “Many a housewife adds a small sum to the household income by her diligence in looking after her silkworm shed,” noted a traveler.67 But foreign imports, the collapse of the silk industry, and the construction of the region’s first textile factories swept these women’s jobs away. By , only , to , women worked in silk mills (fig. ).68 Women throughout Syria and Lebanon who had once sold homemade jerseys and
world war i
hosiery were replaced in the early s by a half-dozen knitting factories, which employed only wage-earners.69 By , the Singer Sewing Company was repossessing the sewing machines that Damascene women rented, because they no longer earned enough income to make their payments.70 In the countryside, peasant women suffered alongside men from the postwar dislocation of agriculture and the demise of cottage industries. With no market for their home crafts, they turned to wage labor in other people’s fields to supplement household income. A study calculated that , peasants, , of them women, engaged in part-time and seasonal wage work to supplement their income from the land. Like their urban cousins, these women generally earned half the wage-rate of men. An additional , peasants, likely all women, worked as domestic help in the homes of their wealthier neighbors.71 Innumerable families, especially from the mountainous ‘Alawi and Mount Lebanon regions where the silk industry had once thrived, sent their daughters to Damascus and Beirut to work as maids.72 The multiple and rapid shifts in men’s and women’s work opportunities after the war imposed stress on many families, who could no longer depend on old strategies for survival. The customary division of labor in rural families changed if both men and women were forced to work as fieldhands, if they had to send a son or daughter to a distant city to earn wages, or if the whole family relocated to the city. Daughters who worked as maids often became the mainstay of their families. But wives who relocated to the city often lost income once gained through kitchen gardens, chicken-raising, or cottage trades. Likewise, the division of labor in urban families changed as downsized artisans found they could no longer be the family’s main breadwinner. But even as they depended more on the earnings of their wives and daughters, this source of income was jeopardized by imports. Certainly, the majority of men managed to secure employment, although likely at lower wages than they hoped for. The profound instability of the labor market caused increasing social unrest in cities, and as will be seen in Part Two, contributed to the growth of new social movements. Although we do not have many written records from these poorer classes, there is reason to believe that the instability of the labor market contributed to men’s anxiety about their gender identity. Local culture placed great emphasis on a man’s ability to support his family. Indeed, in the dominant Islamic religion, men were required to provide all of their wives’ basic needs. The continued struggle to meet that expectation, following the trauma of having had to abandon their families during the war, likely compounded the crisis of paternal authority in the home.
advent of french rule
In contrast, elite families experienced far more stability in these years, although they faced their own sorts of stress due to changing gender roles in the household. Most elites had not depleted their resources to buy food during the war; indeed, a good portion of them passed the war years in Cairo or other foreign cities. Among those who stayed behind, as we have seen, many profited from the inflated grain trade and from land sales by the poor. As a result, elites had the resources to adapt to postwar economic changes. They enlarged their landholdings and profited from the progressive commercialization of agriculture that displaced so many peasants. French support would further enrich landowners, as the next chapter will show. Merchants and bankers, especially in Beirut, used their still-intact capital reserves to profit from trade in the foreign imports that were so hazardous to artisans. Despite the instability of world markets and structural shifts in the local economy, the landowning bourgeoisie remained quite stable as a class: The family names of urban notables changed little between and . This is not to say that the war had no effect on these families. Most remarkable was a change in attitudes toward women’s work and education, which had long been discouraged as unrespectable by elites and the middle class. But because World War I had left so many women without means of support, they adopted a more positive attitude, especially among non-Muslims. Formal schooling became for the first time a norm among the daughters of the elite and middle class. And many of them took jobs afterward, working as teachers, typists, telephone operators, salesgirls, shopkeepers and hotelkeepers. Women owned, for example, half the pensions and at least eight hotels in Beirut. In , a Damascene teacher observed a surprising rise in employment among middle-class Jewish girls. Before the war, “a girl from a comfortable family did not work,” she remarked. “Now, because the war ruined so many, there is a change. It is not rare, for example, to see girls of the best families hurry each morning to the government offices of the [French] delegation, or different services of the mandatory power, or to banks, or simply to shops, where they often act as managers.”73 While most women quit their jobs upon marriage, some embarked on professional careers. Female journalists and magazine editors appeared in the s, and the first locally trained female doctors and lawyers began practicing in the s. Another new trend among the younger generation of the elite was to establish separate households from their parents and have fewer children.74 The ideal of the extended household, realized mainly by wealthier families in the past, now faded as young couples in large cities like Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo moved out of their parents’ homes as soon as they could afford it. New quarters
world war i
of these cities featured apartment buildings with one-family flats, where different branches of the family might live as neighbors. The ideal of a large family also faded. The use of birth control and abortion reportedly increased among these elite urban classes in the interwar period, although the general population shunned it.75 Whether this shift toward smaller, nuclear families was occasioned by the war is unclear. However, coupled with the later marriage age of young women who remained in school longer and often took jobs, it represented a significant change in expectations of gender roles within wealthier families. The authority of the family’s male patriarch was loosening among elites, or at least under siege. Magazine articles of the postwar period condemned arranged marriages, vaunting instead a model of companionate marriage in which the couple is introduced before their engagement and given a free choice in partner. Articles also regularly advised young brides on how to be a proper helpmate, rather than a mere servant or ornament for their husbands.76 Young brides living in their own households certainly escaped the domination of mothers-in-law. And if they could afford servants, these wives of the new generation likely enjoyed far more autonomy and free time than their mothers had. In sum, the war had a direct and indirect effect on upper- and middle-class households. While ideas about the need for women’s education and the benefits of their employment and later marriage had floated before the war, the years of privation and trauma appear to have made these ideas more acceptable. Many women had gained experience of autonomy during the war, and were reluctant to relinquish it afterward. They had had to fend for themselves in the absence of men, and had left their seclusion to engage in charity work. Their fathers, husbands, and brothers were clearly more inclined in the postwar period to permit women to attend school, engage in philanthropic activities, and even to work. As subsequent chapters will also show, however, the growing expectation that respectable women might pursue a life outside of the home caused tremendous controversy in an era when male authority was so generally threatened.
Conclusion: Household Origins of a Crisis of Paternity The postwar dislocations and hardships experienced by the vast majority of Syrian and Lebanese families strained a social order already shattered by the years of war and famine. Gender anxieties, religious suspicions, and class resentments that arose during the war continued through much of the s.
advent of french rule
While not everyone suffered, the extremely uneven fortunes of different groups produced a climate of profound uncertainty and social tension. These tensions converged into a general crisis of paternity. The war had shaken the definitions of family and community that people had known, and called into question the paternalistic bases of authority that they had respected. Men who during the war had lost their honor and lost control of their families struggled afterward to reconstitute their authority. The progressive effects of the commercialization of agriculture, and of the saturation of markets with foreign imports, disrupted their households and swept away usual sources of income. The inability of men to provide for their wives shook the basis of what one scholar has called the classic patriarchal bargain, in which women offered their obedience in exchange for security.77 While the war undermined the material bases of security for most families, even among the stable elite it had altered expectations of gender roles. Memories of a world turned upside down would produce both a nostalgia for lost norms and a revolutionary spirit. The war was not the only factor contributing to a crisis of paternity. As the remaining chapters of Part One will show, the advent of French rule magnified the uncertainties felt within families into a general crisis of authority and gender identity in the realm of politics.
chapter 2
Soldiers and Patriarchs: Pillars of Colonial Paternalism
Entente and Arab troops entered Damascus on October , , and Beirut one week later. By month’s end they had occupied Aleppo and Tripoli and signed an armistice with the Ottomans. Military governors were appointed to the various districts, with the French occupying the coast and the British-backed government of Prince Faysal in the Syrian hinterland. When the war ended on November , the military government issued a formal proclamation promising liberation and national governments chosen by the indigenous peoples.1 Syrian and Lebanese Muslim leaders rejoiced and rallied around Faysal’s nascent Syrian-Arab kingdom, while most Christians of Mount Lebanon looked toward the founding of a separate state. Seventeen months later, however, in April , European peacemakers eschewed majority popular opinion and unilaterally awarded the French mandatory rule over the territory, to be split into countries called Syria and Lebanon. The mandate was supposed to be a temporary period of unselfish tutelary rule, preparing the people for self-government in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s principles of self-determination. However, the French immediately made it clear that they would rule by force if cooperation was not forthcoming. Within three months the French expelled Faysal, brutally defeating his army on July , at Khan Maysalun, west of Damascus. Not everyone opposed French rule. On August , a French-language newspaper in Beirut, Le Réveil, ran front-page photos of the new French high commissioner, General Henri Gouraud, parading through the Lebanese town of Zahla. Balconies along the general’s route were filled with women and girls who sang praises and showered him with flowers. He was greeted by French and Lebanese notables, some of whom bowed and kissed his hand. Gouraud then made a speech praising the Lebanese for their loyalty and welcoming them to France’s colonial family, which also included the occupying army:
advent of french rule France has always found pleasure in this gift, to see marching by her side her adopted children like her own children. Who could believe that these Moroccans and Senegalese, after having spilled their blood for four years on the battlefield, would sacrifice themselves again yesterday, if France were not a true mother to them?2
Colonial children who were loyal would be rewarded, he continued, and the few traitors who resisted France would be punished. In recompense for Lebanese loyalty, he announced the creation of Greater Lebanon and a new flag, adding a cedar of Lebanon to the French tricolor. “You have two countries, Lebanon and France . . . the colors [of the flag] represent bravery and generosity.” As for the Syrians, Gouraud told his Lebanese audience that he had shown much patience before issuing an ultimatum to Faysal, who had been crowned King of Syria the previous March. At the moment Faysal agreed to accept the French mandate, however, renegade Syrian forces attacked French troops at Tall Kalakh (northeast of Tripoli). It was necessary to make a show of force, Gouraud said, to end this corruption and intrigue. “I did not make war last month on the inhabitants of Damascus. I made war on a bad government,” he said stressing that French troops entered the city without firing a shot. Gouraud neglected to mention the bloody battle at Maysalun, where thousands of Syrians had fought and at least (some claimed , or more) had died.3 The speech, employing a standard familial colonial discourse, portrayed France as a caring mother, and Gouraud as a stern father. The Lebanese and Syrians were their children. But this was a family in crisis, and these were adoptive parents who had to prove their worthiness to their adopted children. Gouraud apologized for France’s delay in delivering aid to her loyal Lebanese children during the war, and acknowledged that a colonial mother must earn the affections of her colonial children. As a colonial father, Gouraud argued that he was a fair disciplinarian, who gave his Syrian children every chance to obey before punishing them. In the subtext of the speech, however, Gouraud was competing with an alternative father figure, King Faysal. Gouraud promised better government than that of Faysal, who, he implied, could not even control his disobedient children, permitting them to attack France despite his decision to accept the French mandate. But Gouraud acknowledged only part of his competition. He apparently ignored the results of an American fact-finding mission in that found most Syrians and Muslim Lebanese—and significant portions of Lebanon’s Greek Orthodox and Druze communities—opposed a French mandate. Gouraud also
soldiers and patriarchs
ignored the opinion of Christians and Muslims on Mount Lebanon’s Administrative Council, who had called for independence from France just two months before. These latter had been deported, and the council dissolved.4 There was, indeed, a political crisis of paternity in Syria and Lebanon. For years the region had been part of the Ottoman Empire, a realm defined solely by the House of Osman’s claim to privileged dynastic and spiritual authority. Each sultan had ruled as the father, or shepherd of his flock (raya). While many had rejected their sultan-father during the Arab Revolt, they did not agree on his replacement. Faysal made his bid to be an Arab father, rallying a new generation of nationalists around his prestigious Hashemite dynasty, descended from the Prophet’s own clan. His name was substituted for that of the Ottoman sultan in Friday prayers, even in Beirut.5 But many residents of northern Syria held lingering affinities for union with Anatolia, where the sultan was being challenged by Mustafa Kemal’s rival government in Ankara. Armenian refugees in Aleppo, on the other hand, were suspicious of rule by both Turks and Faysal. And even in Damascus, Faysal had not been universally loved. Among those who disputed Faysal’s paternity were leaders of the city’s prominent families who had tried to form their own government in the days between the Ottoman withdrawal and his arrival with the British. They opposed a dynasty drawn from Arabia, preferring rule by local Syrian notables. Still others opposed Faysal’s secular monarchy in the hope of reviving an Arab caliphate, where a religious patriarch would reign. To these rival claims of fatherhood were added challenges against paternalism itself. Pan-Arabists often employed a rhetoric of a broad Arab fraternity reaching far beyond Faysal’s realm and based not in a royal lineage but in a shared heritage and republican ideals. Urban populists proclaimed popular sovereignty and rejected the hierarchical relations between dynastic ruler and ruled in favor of equality among a fraternal community of male citizens.6 If Faysal was king, he would rule only as a constitutional monarch, in concert with the Syrian Congress and local representative committees. In an even more fundamental challenge, women contested any male monopoly on political power, petitioning the Syrian Congress to permit women’s suffrage. In essence, women favored universal democracy over both fraternal republicanism and the male hierarchy of paternalism. What drove these ideological rivalries was the new phenomenon of mass politics.7 Wartime conscription had fostered a broader concept of identity than had previously existed, when the common peasant or city artisan had had little exposure to the world beyond his or her village or quarter.
advent of french rule
In response to the crisis, Gouraud marshalled all the symbolism at his disposal to enhance his paternalistic claims during his triumphal tour. Le Réveil described Gouraud’s arrival on August in Damascus, where he stood at the Hijaz railway station flanked by foreign consuls; Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious patriarchs; military officers, the male heads of the elite Bakri, ‘Abid, and Mu‘ayyad families of Damascus; and two Druze tribal chiefs. Gouraud saluted the flag and decorated several heroic soldiers. As he mounted a horse to parade through the streets, “the crowd pressed forward and women leaned from their balconies in a shudder of emotion that passed through the city.” The next day, Gouraud attended a Catholic mass officiated by the Vatican’s delegate to the Levant and visited the Umayyad mosque, where he promised freedom and tolerance of religion to the assembled Muslim clerics. When they requested amnesty for Faysal’s supporters, however, Gouraud demonstrated his stern paternalism, tersely replying that the guilty must be punished. Indeed, most leaders of populist republican and nationalist groups were handed death sentences.8 On an even more triumphant day for the French, the formal proclamation of Greater Lebanon on September , , Gouraud sat, one sleeve hanging loose (his arm had been lost in battle in World War I) under the portico of his official residence with the Maronite patriarch and the mufti of Beirut seated beside him. Other religious patriarchs, political officials, and soldiers encircled him. Gouraud greeted the assembly thus: “I told you a few weeks ago, at a dangerous moment: The day that your fathers hoped for in vain, and which, happily, you will see shine, is near. That day has come.”9 So the grandest father of all pretended to fulfill the hopes of past generations of Lebanese fathers. A photograph of the event (fig. ), representing the paternal origins of the new state, was distributed on postcards to the population. Gouraud’s role as stern father was ultimately played out not through symbols, but by recourse to force and persuasion. Soldiers were the primary pillar of French rule. The first three high commissioners were all generals in the French military, as armed revolts beleaguered the regime through much of the s. But by the French would erect two additional pillars of authority. They built a clientele of paternalistic elites—tribal shaykhs, religious patriarchs and rural landowners like those who stood with Gouraud in —who acted as intermediaries of the regime. And they constructed a large bureaucracy that became the civilian face of the regime, dispensing social and economic services. These three pillars anchored French rule. But they by no means pacified all opposition: dissent was channeled after the armed revolts into parliaments that were set up under constitutions required under the
soldiers and patriarchs
terms of the mandate. The resultant civic order was a curious and unstable hybrid, combining the colonial method of rule through paternalistic privilege with a political structure based on republican rights and representation. In the rhetoric used by Gouraud, the colonial civic order was a large house with an unruly family, wherein the law laid down by the father was continually challenged and renegotiated by France’s adopted sons—and daughters.
Soldiers: The Era of Military Confrontation, 1920–26 Maysalun was only the beginning of armed resistance to French rule. While it continued to center in Syria, violent revolt would spill occasionally into Lebanon as well. From to , the French fought a sustained guerrillastyle rebellion in northern Syria. Beginning among local tribes and Turkish soldiers in the ‘Alawi hills of northwestern Syria, the fighting spread along Syria’s northern border under the leadership of Ibrahim Hananu, a former Ottoman bureaucrat and soldier in Faysal’s army who became a national hero for his resistance, alongside the martyr of Maysalun, Yusuf al-‘Azma. The revolt was supported not only by wealthy Aleppines, but also by the rebel Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal and Prince Abdullah of Transjordan. Meanwhile, the French turned much of Syria’s eastern and northeastern desert regions into a military zone to pacify restive nomadic tribes.10 The largest armed revolt—and the last until World War II—was the Syrian Revolt, which began in the south of Syria. In July and August , the leader of the Druze tribe on Jabal Druze, Sultan al-Atrash, raised an army of , troops and captured the provincial capital, al-Suwayda. Soon other regions joined the fight. Causes of the revolt were economic and political. That summer a drought had destroyed crops in the Hawran, aggravating the continued postwar economic disarray. Resentment grew throughout Syria against the effects of the depreciating French franc on local wealth, against French stinginess in spending on education and economic development, and against high unemployment. The Druze, in particular, were also angered by the intrusive political policies of the new French governor, Captain Carbillet, who manipulated tribal factions and threatened the feudal authority of Druze shaykhs with the building of schools and roads and proposals for land reform to benefit peasants. Previously Faysal and the French had respected tribal autonomy, appointing Druze governors who did not contravene tribal patriarchs’ power. Indeed, in the French had upgraded the Atrash clan to a hereditary nobility, with title of prince (amir).11 The political causes of the revolt thus lay in
advent of french rule
France’s ambivalent methods of rule. Carbillet was an overzealous exponent of a new French policy in the mid-s that rejected General Gouraud’s colonial methods of indirect rule in favor of the interventionist and statist republicanism practiced in France itself. Gouraud, drawing on his previous experience in Morocco, had squarely planted French rule on the shoulders of rural and conservative notables. He cultivated their loyalty by exploiting factions among them and by wooing favorites with such benefits for their districts as roads, medical clinics, schools, and farm loans.12 While fighting rebels in northern Syria, Gouraud had divided the remaining territory into statelets, where tribal elites were privileged in the Druze, ‘Alawi and northeastern Jazira territories, and where conservative, anti-nationalist landowning notables were buttressed in Aleppo and Damascus. Gouraud also wooed religious patriarchs with promises of material and political support. In Lebanon, the General based his power on close ties to the Maronite Church, whose delegates had supported the mandate at the Versailles peace conference. Consequently, the regime was organized around sectarian groups. In Gouraud decreed the creation of a Lebanese Representative Council, where the seats were allocated according to the proportions of religious sects counted in the census.13 Gouraud’s successors as high commissioner, generals Maxime Weygand and Maurice Sarrail, sought to shift French policy from its dependence on mediating, paternalistic elites to a more direct relationship with a broader, middle section of the population. They were responding to sentiment in France that favored, under a newly elected left-wing cabinet, the spirit of self-determination championed by the League of Nations and a French-style, secular republican state in the colonies. Such a state would rule not through favors to mediating elites, but, as Foreign Minister Aristide Briand put it, through respect for the Rights of Man.14 Republicanism would be Weygand’s and Sarrail’s remedy to the crisis of paternity that had plagued Gouraud’s regime. Colonial republicanism, however, was inevitably paternalistic, for the French still positioned themselves as tutors to citizens who had no right to elect or dismiss them, and who were theoretically ignorant of France’s expertise in republicanism. It was more a means of imposing direct French rule over colonial subjects than of granting them rights. In fact, the new republican turn would prove ephemeral, both in Paris and its colonies. In the wake of leftists’ defeat in Paris and revolts in Syria, Morocco, and elsewhere, French colonial policy would soon return to Gouraud’s indirect methods of “association.”15 Weygand, high commissioner in –, sought to foster new middle-class alliances with the regime via economic investment in public works, utilities, agriculture, and industry. He also intended to encourage a new national loyalty
soldiers and patriarchs
in Syria and Lebanon to replace older, feudal loyalties and to draw support away from pan-Arab nationalists. In Lebanon, he removed the Maronite Church from direct involvement in decisionmaking, in favor of a more even-handed policy. In Syria, he promoted the development of cotton as an export crop to foster wealth among farmers. In , he permitted Syrian elections to representative councils. And to promote a Syrian nationalism, Weygand decreed the union of the Aleppine and Damascene states in , making Damascus the capital. But there were limits to Weygand’s efforts to broaden political participation. The Druze and ‘Alawi territories were not unified with the rest of Syria. Elections were rigged to favor large rural landowners over urban nationalist elites, causing protest. And when the press became too critical in , Weygand decreed strict censorship.16 While Weygand introduced gradual reforms, his successor, Sarrail, moved more brusquely. A staunch laicist, Sarrail insulted church leaders upon his arrival by his failure to attend the ceremonial occasions that his predecessors had. As he conducted consultations to prepare constitutions required by the mandate charter, Sarrail discouraged delegations of religious patriarchs “to avoid giving them the weight they don’t deserve.” He dismissed the French governor of Lebanon, whom he called a puppet of clerical parties, and sought to abolish confessional quotas in Lebanese elections, changes welcomed by Sunni Muslims but condemned by the Maronite Church.17 He also envisioned France’s role as a counterbalance to the “feudal spirit” that urban political bosses promoted.18 Sarrail’s government moved to elevate the status of peasants and workers with proposals to reform rural taxes and labor laws.19 Far from resolving the crisis of paternity, however, Sarrail’s statist and secular republicanism provoked vigorous defenses of local privilege. Resentful of Sarrail’s efforts to bypass patriarchs, Lebanese Catholic leaders sought to oust him through diplomatic means. Catholic missionaries feared that Sarrail might expel them and close their schools, from which he had already withdrawn the children of French personnel.20 The Vatican representative in Beirut protested to Rome and Paris that Syrians and Lebanese were not ready for a republican regime based on universal suffrage. Stripping Christian patriarchs of their privileges, he argued, was not a step toward republicanism, but rather a fatal capitulation to Muslim rebels: “[The French] are attempting, it seems, to transform into victims the massacrers of Christians, who are the object of their savagery not only because of Muslims’ atavistic fanaticism, but also . . . because of the infidels’ implacable hatred for the Mandatory Power.”21 In response to these protests, Pope Pius XI proposed to beatify eight priests and three Maronites killed in the massacres in Damascus.22
advent of french rule
The same resentment at being bypassed sparked the Druze revolt and helped it spread into a general rebellion. In early , Druze leader Sultan alAtrash sent a delegation to complain about Captain Carbillet’s interference in their affairs. Sarrail, in keeping with his crusade against feudal exploitation, refused to fire Carbillet. After Druze leaders again tried to meet with French officials, Sarrail had them arrested on July . Meanwhile, Atrash had made contact with nationalists in Damascus, particularly wealthy merchants who marketed grain from southern Syria and lent money to peasants there. Clearly influenced by nationalist ideology, the Druze initiated the revolt a week after the arrests, proclaiming its goal as nothing less than independence and the union of all Syrian territories. Urban nationalists joined soon thereafter. The nationalists, like the Druze, were fighting as much against colonial republicanism as against foreign rule. As Philip Khoury, a leading scholar of Syrian nationalists, has argued, “Their real objective was to shift the balance of power between themselves and the French back in their own direction so as to restore their traditional influence over local politics—an influence which the French had undercut both in the nationalist towns and in the Jabal Druze.”23 While the Arab Revolt had been based upon troops from Iraq and tribes from south of Syria, the Syrian Revolt drew upon the truly Syrian and popular nationalist movement that had emerged in the Faysal era. At its height, the revolt spread well into northern Syria and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Peasants and nomads who had so far seen little benefit from French proposals to redistribute land joined bands organized by their landlords and tribal chiefs. In October , the town of Hama was held for two days by rebels, who received support from landowners opposed to French plans for land reform.24 For months, rebels virtually controlled the Jabal Druze and parts of Damascus and the countryside surrounding it. In November, the spread of armed revolt into Lebanon reignited calls by Sunni Muslims there for union with Syria.25 The French responded with brutal violence and by mobilizing support from rural landowners against the urban and tribal nationalists. In October , French guns and airplanes bombarded Hama, where landowners readily capitulated after the French guaranteed security of their property. At the same time, French bombers and artillery blasted Damascus, destroying entire quarters of the city. Hundreds of women, children, and elderly people were trapped in collapsed buildings, and more than people were believed killed. The city suffered a second bombardment in May .26 By November , the rebels were almost completely defeated, although sporadic fighting continued in Hama and Jabal Druze into . Casualties were estimated at more than , deaths on both sides.27
soldiers and patriarchs
Gender became both a discursive and physical battlefield among these paternalistic rivals. Rebels met French rhetoric of chivalry, honor and protection with accusations of dishonorable conduct and injury to their own honor. Rumors of the rape of Muslim women by French soldiers had circulated as early as in the Faysal regime’s anti-French propaganda. In May , the official Syrian newspaper published a poem alluding to those rumors: If the brave sons of Syria were to shrink from death on behalf of their fatherland How can our girls protect their honor? How can our people safeguard their souls? How is the nation to be freed from the filth of the enemy?28 Propaganda said to be spread by “Anglo-Turk” agents in northern Syria warned: “The French will rape your women! The Senegalese will kill your children!”29 Rebels were thus addressed as male heads of families whose honor was threatened. The French dislaimed such motives. Le Réveil, in the same issue quoting Gouraud’s adoptive-father speech to the Lebanese, published an article denying rumors of rape during the July invasion of Syria: “The perfect conduct of French soldiers toward women was especially noticed, and was the object of conversation everyday.”30 Rape and the defense of honor emerged again as themes of nationalist propaganda in the Syrian Revolt. Leaflets called upon villagers to protect Syrian women from French soldiers. One of them alerted the Arab nation to French atrocities in Damascus in May : “Not content to bombard, the French sent a column to pillage houses, rape women, and set fire to the quarter, which is still burning.”31 Charges of rape were also levied against Armenian and Circassian troops used to flush rebels out of Damascus’s southern Maydan quarter.32 Rebel propaganda often called on men to prove their manliness and virility. A Syrian leaflet called the French cowards, and threatened them with images of traditional Arab warriors: “You hide in the city behind your firearms like women, not like fighters. Withdraw with the honor that you still have. If not, we will massacre you with sabres and your blood will flow in streams.”33 Likewise, a Lebanese leaflet sought to rally Christians to the revolt: “Abandon resignation, which is sterile, and run for your sword. . . . You have been complicit with foreigners against your brothers.” Another leaflet called Syrian collaborators in the Damascene courts, which had condemned a rebel to death, a “prostituted government” of spies.34 Rhetorical jousting reached the highest ranks. The high commissioner and
advent of french rule
Sultan al-Atrash made competing claims to be the better paternal provider in appeals to various Druze factions. A leaflet signed by Henry de Jouvenel, who replaced Sarrail in November , said: “Druzes! Why do you fight?. . . . Only France can give you wheat, plumbing, roads and schools. . . . If your wives and children are hungry, if your ruin and defeat are not remedied, this will be not my fault but that of Sultan Atrash.” Atrash, in response, accused the French of depriving men, particularly bedouin, of their livelihoods by closing borders: “Grandsons of the noble Arabs, the day has come that will profit warriors [mujahids]. . . . The colonizers have pillaged us. . . . They have robbed our country’s freedoms of trade and travel.”35 Women also participated in both the physical and rhetorical combat. Urban and rural women were active in street demonstrations and in smuggling weapons, food rations and medicine to rebels, often hiding them under their cloaks (hijab) at French checkpoints. A number of rural women became known for their heroism in gunbattles with the French. Dozens were killed in such battles, while hundreds more were killed during French bombardments of cities. Many others were rendered homeless in the rural fighting, fleeing for safety to cities with their children.36 Even in times of peace, women feared French soldiers. Wadad Qurtas, a Lebanese school director, remembered the beginning of the mandate mainly as the occupation of Beirut streets by foreign soldiers.37 French policemen routinely followed girls in the street, calling “Fatima!” a generic name for Muslim women used in North African colonies.38 Hostility to the French was not only sexualized but also racialized. Senegalese soldiers are often singled out in women’s memories of the mandate period as especially threatening.39 Parents warned girls to avoid them on the streets, and would even keep them home for fear of assault. “When they wanted to scare the children, the French would say ‘The Senegalese will come to you now!’ ” recalled one woman.40 These warnings were of a piece with the racial undertones of rebel leaflets quoted above, referring to the supposed bestiality of Senegalese soldiers, whose “filth” might violate their pure women. As one observer remarked, the French did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony, and the inhabitants as on a level with France’s African subjects; and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs. The use of Senegalese troops first to expel Faisal and then on garrison duty seems to the Syrians and Lebanese to be a sign of this contempt.41
soldiers and patriarchs
For the remainder of the mandate, the Senegalese would become a regular target of nationalist propaganda in sexualized and racialized imagery that fused men’s gender anxieties with outrage at French domination. This imagery reinforced an understanding that the nation was a nation of men, tacitly excluding women. Rooted in the crisis of paternity, it reasserted male protection and control over women. French manliness was wounded, too. In , Abel Moreau, a former French soldier in Syria, published an allegorical novel called La Nuit syrienne. In the story, a pious French soldier named Calvier falls in love with a beautiful Lebanese woman who had been Jemal Pasha’s mistress. According to Calvier, she has the mesmerizing eyes of the serpent that had tempted Eve and a seductive voice that charmed even wild beasts. Calvier spends his entire savings on her, and repeatedly asks her to “swear to me that you didn’t love him [Jemal Pasha].” Not only does she refuse to swear, but she also jilts Calvier as soon as he runs out of money, saying that she would always love a brave soldier like Jemal Pasha more than a weak seminary dropout like him. Calvier, in a frenzy, pushes her off the ledge of a ruined castle to her death. The novel’s not unsubtle message was that France was tragically unsuited to imperial rule, because Frenchmen were too generous and idealistic. The Levant, on the other hand, was a perfidious lover who drained France’s resources. French reaction was to reassert Gouraud’s stern discipline. The revolt made clear that at its base French rule was, and would remain, military rule. Soldiers vastly outnumbered French civilian personnel throughout the mandate period: While the number of French bureaucrats would never rise above , the number of colonial troops rose from , in October , when the Army of the Levant was created, to , in , in response to the rebellions in northern Syria and to , at the start of World War II. Troop levels would fluctuate between these extremes in times of peace and times of trouble. The Army of the Levant consisted of French officers and specialized units commanding troops drawn from North Africa, Madagascar and Senegal. A omit military auxiliary, eventually named the Special Troops, recruited a cross-section of rural volunteers from both countries. It remained small, less than , troops, for most of the s.42 By , the French had consolidated a substantial military, police, and intelligence network to discipline the population. In addition to an average of , military troops and , policemen and gendarmes, hundreds of French spies were dispersed through the territories.43 Troops were called out routinely to quash demonstrations, and martial law was repeatedly declared in cities during periods of unrest. This was the raw face of military occupa-
advent of french rule
tion. As one historian put it, “the level of violence, and the frequency of the incidents, makes chilling reading.”44
Patriarchs: The Rise of Constitutional Governments, 1926–30 The defeat of the Syrian Revolt marked the end of armed resistance, and the start of a new era of politics. Sarrail had been replaced by a civilian high commissioner, Henry de Jouvenel, and civilians would continue to head the mandatory state until . Constitutions were soon drawn up, and elections held in both countries. The religious, class, and gender anxieties that had flared into violence during the revolt were to be, in theory, transmuted into political debate. Indeed, a group of former Syrian rebels formed the National Bloc, a political alliance committed to peaceful negotiation with the French. But the opening of parliaments did not inaugurate democratic government. The revolt had in fact closed the door on the experiments by Weygand and Sarrail to broaden political participation. The French camp and its nationalist opponents alike feared what changes the masses might demand. Together they entered into a pact that reaffirmed the paternalistic pillars of colonial rule first planted by Gouraud. The Syrian Revolt directly shaped the constitutions of both countries. The Lebanese constitution was written in early in a climate of sectarian tension enflamed by the revolt’s spread into the country. A few months before, Christians had been killed by renegade Druze rebels in the mountains, sparking months of Muslim-Christian violence. At the same time, many Sunni Muslim leaders began openly to support the revolt and union with Syria. Sarrail’s dismissal by a new right-wing government in Paris had reversed their growing support for a Lebanese state reorganized under Sarrail’s vision of secular, nonsectarian government.45 Sunni support for the revolt further alarmed Maronite leaders, who were already upset by the Druze attacks on Christians and by Sarrail’s efforts to marginalize them in government. As a result, plans for a nonsectarian political system were dropped. Sarrail’s successor, Jouvenel, hurried to appease the Maronites and make their Church the pillar of French rule it had always been. The French also hurried preparation of the constitution in order to impress the League of Nations with a show of liberal policy and offset bad press reports of the revolt. Jouvenel charged the Representative Council to draw up a list of notables and civic leaders to be polled on their preferences for a future government.
soldiers and patriarchs
Bowing to pressure from Paris and the Maronite Church, the Council sent of the questionnaires distributed in early to religious patriarchs. Only responded to the poll. Thirty-two Sunni Muslim leaders refused to participate in it, because they hoped the revolt would soon bring union with Syria. Their abstention was critical, because many Sunnis supported nonsectarianism. Those who responded to the poll, in contrast, favored a republican form of government based on sectarian representation. Under pressure to meet the May deadline, a committee supervised by the French quickly wrote Lebanon’s constitution. Jouvenel and the Council approved the text on May , , and the following day the Republic of Lebanon was proclaimed. The constitution declared Lebanon’s boundaries unalterable. It provided for a parliamentary government dominated by the French high commissioner, who would have the power to dismiss parliament, to annul laws, and even to suspend the constitution, while also retaining control of the military, police and foreign affairs. The relatively weak president, whose main power was to appoint the prime minister, was to be chosen indirectly by a bicameral legislature elected through universal male suffrage. While the constitution assured the right of every Lebanese to hold office, based solely on merit, it also guaranteed, in apparent contradiction, the equitable representation of all sects in the cabinet, the parliament, and the civil service. And it guaranteed respect for each sect’s personal status laws and religious schools. These provisions severely limited the state’s power, while augmenting that of religious patriarchs. They also ensured that politics would turn on sectarian rivalry. When the Maronite Church promoted one of its own to become the first president, all other sects objected. To allay their fears of Maronite domination, Jouvenel pressured the new legislature to elect a Greek Orthodox lawyer, Charles Dabbas. Nonetheless, Sunni Muslim leaders abstained from political participation well into the s. Meanwhile, factionalism and sectarian bickering so paralyzed the government that the French imposed two constitutional amendments in and to reduce the legislature to one chamber and increase the power of the president.46 In contrast to Lebanon, in Syria the revolt neither foregrounded sectarianism nor sidelined the opposition. Henri Ponsot, high commissioner from to , needed to appease nationalists recently defeated on the battlefield. He quashed Jouvenel’s brief initiative to install a monarchy in Syria, and instead organized elections in for a constitutional convention. A key player in the convention was the National Bloc, which emerged between and . The Bloc was not a political party united by principles, but rather an association of paternalistic elites. Its leaders were mainly young Sunni Muslims from the
advent of french rule
urban landowning-bourgeoisie that had supported the revolt. Their goal was to gain control of government, and eventually independence, through political negotiation with the French. They were conservative liberals little interested in social and economic reform, which they saw as dangerous to their own interests. Like their opponents who collaborated with the French, Bloc leaders’ power and political goals derived from their status as patrons of personal clientele networks.47 While the French rigged the election to pack the convention with pliant rural notables, the Bloc managed to dominate the proceedings with its experience in political tactics and speechmaking. First, Bloc leaders defeated the bid for convention president by Ponsot’s hand-picked prime minister, Shaykh Muhammad Taj al-Din al-Hasani, the shrewd and portly son of a respected religious scholar whose conservative clientele included wealthy landowners and ulama (Muslim clerics). Taj’s exclusion paved the way for Bloc member Ibrahim Hananu, hero of armed revolts in northern Syria, to head the committee to draft the constitution. Ponsot tried to derail the Bloc’s success by reintroducing the idea of a Syrian monarchy. Some ulama and other pious Muslims in Syria supported the idea of returning the Hashemite dynasty, so revered in Islam, to power. The monarchists were weakened, however, because they could not agree on a candidate. In the end, both Shaykh Taj and Bloc leaders proved themselves more French than Ponsot. Schooled in the republican ideals of the French Revolution, these erstwhile rivals joined ranks to defeat what had promised to become a new form of tyranny. In August , Hananu’s committee submitted to the convention a draft constitution for a parliamentary republic in many ways similar to Lebanon’s. It provided for a president to be chosen indirectly by a single-chambered legislature elected by universal male suffrage. The president was to appoint a prime minister, who controlled policymaking and the various government ministries. The draft also granted citizens rights to freedom of property, association, speech and conscience, and fair trials; it also provided for obligatory primary education. Although the draft assured the legal equality of all citizens regardless of religion, in a nod to powerful ulama and majority popular sentiment it required the president to be Muslim. It also reserved for religious minorities seats in parliament, but not posts in the civil service. But when debate began on the draft, Ponsot interrupted the convention’s proceedings. Several articles contravened French authority, declaring that Greater Syria, including Lebanon and the Druze and ‘Alawi territories, was indivisible; and that the Syrian president, not the high commissioner, should control foreign affairs and a national army. This assertion of sovereignty was a
soldiers and patriarchs
blow to Ponsot, who was already under pressure from the resurgent political right in Paris. With their allies in the Army of the Levant, Parisian conservatives had just unseated both Sarrail and Jouvenel for their liberal tendencies. So Ponsot suspended the convention, and in May he simply decreed the constitution, revised to protect French power.48 Political uproar ensued, postponing the first elections until late .49 While the nationalists lost their bid for Syrian unity and sovereignty, they nonetheless had managed to play a central role in establishing a nominally republican civic order, against Islamic and monarchist tendencies that would remain strong into the s.50 The resultant Lebanese and Syrian political regimes were not, of course, shaped solely by the immediate circumstances of the revolt. They also reflected past Ottoman practice and French influence. Many Lebanese and Syrian politicians had gained experience in constitutional parliamentary government under the Young Turk regime. The apportionment of parliamentary seats according to religious sect went back further, to the first Ottoman elections of . French influence was exerted not only directly by Ponsot, but also indirectly, by the fact that many politicians were trained in French law schools. Essential attributes of the constitutions—the nonmonarchical, secular, and representational definition of power; the weak presidencies and the factionridden and sluggish parliaments; universal male suffrage; and the emphasis on personal liberties—were also hallmarks of the late French Third Republic. The new constitutions also expanded popular participation beyond Ottoman limits, by replacing the sultan with elected heads of state, omitting Ottoman property requirements for voters, and reducing the minimum voting age.51 But the constitutions also subverted the republican spirit that they proclaimed. While assigning sovereignty to the people, they also granted supreme power to a nonelected official who stood above the law, the French high commissioner, who could decree laws, dismiss parliaments, and even suspend the constitution itself. Furthermore, the two-staged elections, inherited from the Ottoman era, ensured elites’ control of and profit from the electoral system. The routine violation of rules for secret balloting also went back to Ottoman times, and had a similar benefit for elites. In sum, the regimes imagined in the constitutional texts were hardly democratic and barely republics at all. Such was the implicit contradiction between the realities of colonial rule and the vaunted republican ideals of the French civilizing mission. To the French, the parliaments were noisome window dressing. After the departure of Sarrail, they returned with a vengeance to rule through their own clientele of paternalistic elites. In fact, the French fostered a neofeudal landowning class in both Syria and Lebanon with economic and political
advent of french rule
power that far surpassed that of the Ottoman era. In exchange for political loyalty, the French awarded large tracts of Ottoman imperial land to tribal shaykhs, village chiefs, and landlords in the plains of Lebanon and the north and northeast of Syria.52 The French also undertook irrigation projects and extended agricultural credits to benefit these loyal patrons. While ostensibly measures to increase productivity, they aggravated social inequality. In Syria, just six percent of the rural population possessed percent of all farmland, while the number of small family farms (less than hectares), declined from to percent of all farmland between and .53 About , families (one-tenth of all landowners) had their land bought out from beneath them. Most peasants became indebted sharecroppers. Similarly, much of Mount Lebanon remained under the quasi-feudal notables who enjoyed French support.54 In exchange for their largesse, the French expected this landed rural elite to discipline peasants. By buttressing the police powers of local landowners and village heads, the French often abetted their routine thievery, violence, and abuse.55 The French also built a clientele of religious patriarchs. Through their schools and weekly sermons, the patriarchs wielded potentially more influence over common people’s sentiments than did elite politicians, and especially nationalists. The French sought to guide patriarchs’ influence with subsidies to their religious schools and charities. Sarrail’s successors also reestablished the routine of state visits to religious leaders, who were regularly included, in return, on guest lists to official functions. In July , during the revolt, top Muslim officials were invited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ expense to attend the inauguration of a new mosque in Paris.56 A striking example of French efforts to build religious pillars of rule was their installation of Sulayman Murshid, a popular religious divine, as head of the ‘Alawi state. They granted him lands, tax revenues, control of the courts, and a cache of armaments with which to consolidate his power against urban Sunni nationalists in the region.57 Through their clienteles of landlords, tribal shaykhs, and religious patriarchs, the French operated outside of the framework of constitutional politics to impose their policies and assure their rule. In so doing, they effectively subverted the constitutions’ guarantees of legal equality among citizens. It would be wrong, however, to ascribe the subversion of republicanism to the French alone. Nationalists in both Syria and Lebanon confronted French paternalism not by demanding adherence to republican principles, but by marshalling clienteles of their own. In Syria, the National Bloc and French collaborators were essentially engaged
soldiers and patriarchs
in an intra-elite conflict. On both sides, urban bosses from prominent families dating from the late Ottoman era expended their public and private largesse to build personal political networks. In Damascus, Prime Minister Shaykh Taj, appointed by Ponsot in , disbursed large amounts of public funds to woo the ulama and the popular masses with building projects and stipends. Also prominent in Damascus on the moderate/francophile side was the ‘Azm family, descended from powerful Ottoman landowners and governors and still among the richest in Syria. They commanded a hefty patronage network of their own. Their opponent, the National Bloc, was represented in Damascus by scions of notable Muslim families like the Mardams and Haffars, influential among the city’s merchants; the Bakris and Quwwatlis, wealthy landowners who commanded networks of local strongmen in the city’s old quarters; and the Greek Orthodox Khuri brothers, both lawyers with followings among professionals and in the Christian quarter. The Bloc’s Aleppo branch was dominated by wealthy Sunni landowning elites, several of them related by marriage, like Ibrahim Hananu, Sa‘dallah al-Jabiri and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali.58 In Lebanon, after the constitution was promulgated, Muslims organized as an interest group to counter Maronite influence and compete for government posts and services. As in Syria, politics organized around political bosses who commanded clienteles of residents of their quarter or district, members of their religious sect, and/or of their extended families. In Beirut, they were drawn from prominent families like the Sunni Bayhums, Salams, and Sulhs; the Maronite Khuris and Eddés; the Catholic Chihas and Pharaons, and the Greek Orthodox Sursuqs, Turads, and Tuenis. The term za‘im (pl. zu‘ama) came into common usage in the s to describe a new type of political boss, who brokered access to state benefits to nurture clienteles. They often fused economic interests with sectarian ones. One of the main reasons Beirut’s Sunni bourgeoisie favored union with Syria is that they were merchants who profited from trade with the hinterland, and so feared the new borders would hurt trade. Maronite leaders who opposed unity with Syria tended to come from landed wealth, and so did not depend on the Syrian hinterland.59 After the Syrian Revolt these elite families, who had long dominated urban politics, colluded with the French in fostering this clientelist system of politics. The system worked to the mutual benefit of both sides, in a paternalistic pact that maintained elites’ dominance and excluded humbler citizens from power in politics. The state’s paternalistic intermediaries were in effect awarded exceptional rights over weaker groups within the population. The French tapped rural patrons to do their police work; that is, to keep the peasants quiet. They tapped urban bosses to control the mob, and religious patriarchs
advent of french rule
to discipline their flocks. In response, opposition leaders made rival claims to represent these same subordinate groups of citizens. The paternalistic pact effected a fundamental inequality of rights that placed a privileged mediating elite between the state and peasants, workers, and women. This is not to say that the public espousal of republican ideals on both sides was insincere. Weygand, Sarrail, Jouvenel, and even Ponsot to a degree were true believers in the great gift France had given the world, but their republicanism was tempered by rightist pressures within their own governments and the brutal necessities of dominating another people. Likewise, Syrian and Lebanese elites who prepared the constitutions had explicitly chosen republics to protect themselves from the tyranny they remembered in the Ottoman sultan, and the abuses of power they currently observed by Egypt’s king. But the protection they sought was from interference with their own class, tribal, and sectarian bases of power, not necessarily the protection of all citizens from all forms of tyranny. In other words, paternalism coexisted in tension with republicanism in the colonial civic order. There is evidence, for example, that the Syrian Revolt itself worked to diminish sectarian and tribal divisions, and to promote a politics based on rights rather than elite patronage. Although the revolt began in the rivalry of Druze clans, the motive for fighting was not solely intra-group loyalty to patriarchal chiefs. Rebel leaflets routinely appealed to the “Arab nation,” and to “brothers,” and “sons” of the nation. Sultan al-Atrash himself used the language of rights: “We make no distinction in religion or sects, as our only aim is to obtain our legal rights which belong equally to the sons of Syria.”60 In appealing to fraternity rather than paternity, rebel propaganda invoked the principles of the French Revolution seemingly abandoned by the high commissioners and their superiors in Paris. One leaflet advised rebels: “Let us fraternize with the French soldiers, and make them understand that they are the sons of the valiant men who mounted a revolution in for the liberty of weak nations.”61 Lenka Bokova has argued that while French colonizers took from the French Revolution inspiration to dominate others with their civilizing mission, Syrian rebels embraced the revolution’s alternate ideals of liberty and equality.62 The Syrian Revolt and the constitutions transformed the terms in which Syrians and Lebanese conceptualized the crisis of paternity. The multiplicity of political tendencies of the immediate postwar period narrowed by the late s into a conflict between visions of a civic order based on the equal rights in a fraternal republic and those based on the distribution of benefits at the will of a privileged elite. Elite nationalists adopted a limited, paternal
soldiers and patriarchs
republicanism primarily as a weapon to expel their unwanted adoptive fathers, the French. But in the process, they unloosed principles chiseled into republican constitutions that their subordinates might use to challenge nationalists’ own privileges. This is exactly what unprivileged citizens would do, as Part Two will discuss. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to address another key factor in the transformation of the crisis of paternity, the colonial state itself, to which we now turn.
chapter 3
Bureaucrats: Mother France’s Civilizing Mission
While Gouraud portrayed himself as a stern father, he had introduced France to Syrians and Lebanese in as a caring mother. The French state promised to heal not only the physical wounds of war, but also to restore life: Since the arrival of the French, people have stopped dying of hunger in Syria. . . . But it does not suffice to give Syria a weak and miserable life; it is necessary to re-establish her prewar life, and more, to prepare her for the active and organized life of modern nations.1 The responsibilities of such a healing state were legally defined in the League of Nations charter assigned to France in , which charged the French with establishing a fair and equitable judiciary, a public health system that met international standards, and public education. Overall, France was to “enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states.”2 In the spirit of the Great Powers’ postwar ambivalence toward colonialism, the mandate was thus conceived as a temporary period of nurture by Mother France for her Syrian and Lebanese children, deemed not yet mature enough to sustain themselves. If soldiers and spies represented the disciplinary, fatherly side of the mandate, then bureaucrats represented Mother France. In their daily tasks of running the government, bureaucrats shouldered the burden of implementing France’s civilizing mission. They were the glue that joined the formal institutions of state with France’s informal networks of indirect rule, including paternalistic intermediaries, missionaries, French concessionary companies, and their various clienteles. By the French managed to build a relatively efficient and centralized administration, in which the powerful high commissioner’s office in Beirut sent long tentacles into the various states and provinces. Indeed, the
bureaucrats
mandatory state would reach deeper into society, and spend more on social affairs, than the Ottomans ever did or than Faysal could in his -month rule. This centralized bureaucracy had such a powerful effect on the civic order in Syria and Lebanon that the historian must study the two countries together. While maps defined borders, and the constitutions of and formally established distinct and separate governments, the High Commission’s bureaucracy knit the two together in broad areas of social and economic policy. Syria and Lebanon were administratively Siamese twins joined at the head. French bureaucrats (like French soldiers) were routinely rotated to posts on either side of the border. No passports were required for travel between the two states. And customs duties, the single largest source of government revenue, were collected and distributed jointly. Other players in the civic order— intermediaries, political opponents, and clients of state services— ultimately engaged with the same government, whether they lived in Syria or Lebanon. However, the bureaucracy did not develop according to the maternal ideals of Gouraud and the mandate charter. The prolonged period of armed resistance and lack of funds from Paris slowed and altered Gouraud’s social vision. The civilian apparatus of French rule instead grew from the competition of varied interests for scarce resources. This chapter will show that the bureaucracy was built as much to distribute patronage to French interests— missionaries, concessionary companies, and the military—as to aid and tutor Syrians and Lebanese. By , maternalism and the notions of temporary tutelage had given way to the spirit of paternalism that had infused the other pillars of French rule.
Origins of the French Mandatory State The origins of the French mandatory state lay in the expediencies of military occupation and war relief. When Gouraud first stepped off a ship at Beirut harbor on November , , more than a year of French occupation had passed. French troops first landed in Beirut on October , , a week after Damascus was occupied, and they rushed to stake their claim to Lebanon. Upon arrival, Colonel de Piépape, military governor of Beirut, faced lingering Ottoman troops and a destitute, famished population, of which the French estimated , would die without immediate aid. Piépape also faced competition from Faysal and the British, whose propaganda and famine relief threatened to sway Lebanese loyalties their way.3 In fact, an Arab government had already raised a flag above Beirut in Faysal’s name. Moreover, Lebanon
advent of french rule
was left with virtually no government, for nearly all Ottoman bureaucrats had fled with their retreating army. But the French were ill-equipped to raise a full-fledged state in October , because their army, still concentrated on the Western Front, had been decimated. Not only had the French few soldiers, doctors, and administrators to spare, but they were also broke: the war had cost them nearly $ billion.4 Nonetheless, the foreign ministry, military, and missionaries linked efforts to ship food to Lebanon and to reassert a French presence that had been lost during the war: “European teachers returned in full ships, some of them even arriving before the army, like the Reverend de Martinprey, rector of the French Faculty of Medicine.”5 Martinprey, a Jesuit who had served as a naval officer on the island of Arwad off the Syrian coast, seized the school’s vehicles and organized soup kitchens in northern Mount Lebanon. The French consul soon engaged other missionaries who had formerly served in the Levant. Father Rémy, a Capucin monk and sergeant in the French intelligence service, built shelters for victims without families, including , orphaned or abandoned children. Father Sarloute, a Lazarist monk, organized famine relief in the southern regions of Mount Lebanon. By November , the foreign ministry, with British help, had organized regular shipments of wheat to the port of Beirut, and established a rationing system. The French had to borrow mules and camels from the British to deliver the food to inland villages. In the first year, they distributed , tons of foodstuffs costing million francs. By mid-, relief was formally organized into the Supply Service (Service de Ravitaillement), under the direction of the temporary high commissioner, François Georges-Picot.6 French missionaries, concessionary companies, and the military became the nucleus of a new French state devoted almost entirely to social services. Missionaries were invited to establish a school system, seen as an essential means of radiating French influence against competing claims from the British and Faysal.7 They readily filled France’s manpower gap because they were anxious to reclaim their schools, which had been closed by the Ottomans. More importantly, missionaries filled the budget gap. They brought with them funds collected in parishes throughout Europe, which the foreign ministry supplemented with subsidies. By March , private schools, run mostly by French missionaries, were holding classes. Local religious schools were also encouraged: the foreign ministry advanced an educational subsidy of , francs to the Maronite patriarch on October , before French troops had even landed at Beirut.8 By May , there were private (mostly Christian) schools, while only public schools had been opened. When foreign
bureaucrats
ministry officials protested to Gouraud that “neutral” (public) schools would better foster a rapprochement among Lebanon’s various sects, they were told that it would cost too much: “That is to say, that if we convert the subsidized private schools into those like the local public schools, the cost would be tripled for personnel, quadrupled if we account for general costs, and quintupled if we account for administrative waste.”9 The future public health department similarly grew out of the postwar collaboration between military and missionaries. Epidemics continued well after the war ended. Bubonic plague appeared in Beirut in September and again in June . In , smallpox, typhoid, malaria, and typhus were still rampant in the Damascus region.10 The military acted first to safeguard the health of French troops, many of whom were returned ill to France. A free clinic was opened in Beirut before the end of , and was soon treating more than patients a day. A demobilized military bacteriological lab and surgical team were imported from Marseille in February , and soon thereafter a -bed hospital was built in Beirut with furnishings from a hospital in Port Said, Egypt. The military found difficulty in recruiting doctors, however, because most had been decommissioned at the end of the war. To combat cholera in Syrian ports, the nascent health service recruited an engineer who had been posted in Jerusalem.11 Again the French relied heavily on private agents, especially French missionaries, to provide medical care at low cost. The foreign ministry granted subsidies to the Faculty of Medicine at St. Joseph University in Beirut, and turned to the University of Lyon to oversee the reorganization of the medical school in Damascus. Meanwhile, the military cooperated with French businessmen to lay the foundations of a future public works department—an immediate priority: roads and railroads had been so damaged that food could not be delivered to the mountains. In March , General Gamelin, commander of the French Troops of the Levant, organized a civil engineering department in order to “take from the English the use and maintenance of roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph networks, and radio posts in Syria and Cilicia.”12 Eventually, public works projects would be contracted out, most often to French concessionary companies that had operated in the Levant before . For example, the French company that had built many of the region’s railroads before the war was called in early to replace damaged tracks. Other French companies would electrify cities, expand water and sewage systems, and install the first telephone networks during the mandate period. As with missionaries’ schools, contracting out public services to private agencies cut costs to the French government.
advent of french rule
Likewise, an agriculture department took shape under the dual impulses of war relief and French business lobbies. Even before the wartime blockade was formally lifted, the war ministry in November approved a shipment of , boxes of silk cocoons in response to appeals from the Lyon Silk Merchants Syndicate to revive the silk industry. The foreign ministry paid , francs for them.13 In January , the military began hiring agricultural engineers “in imitation of the new service in Tunisia.”14 Tractors, fertilizer, and seed were soon brought in to revive cultivation of other crops. At the center of this and other joint government-business efforts was the man who would become Gouraud’s principal advisor, Robert de Caix, publisher of the journal L’Asie française. De Caix and a group of bankers, silk merchants, Jesuits, and educators, especially from the industrial city of Lyon, would form in early a colonial lobby to promote the profitability of French rule in the Levant to France’s skeptical parliament, which feared new economic burdens.15 Under the influence of the group, later called the Economic Union of Syria, Gouraud and his successors approved the privatization of many public services, and the substitution of French companies for German and other foreign enterprises that had operated in the region before . In violation of the mandate charter, the lobby group sought exclusive rights to economic exploitation in the territories. Indeed, de Caix proposed in March that the planned Beirut Fair be open only to French businessmen, but was forced to open it to all countries after Dutch, British, and Italian traders complained.16 Nonetheless, the lobby advanced its interests during the mandate by forming close ties with the Lebanese commercial elite in Beirut. The distinction between colony and mandate blurred. In , High Commissioner Weygand met with the Lyon Chamber of Commerce about the city’s investments in Lebanon’s silk industry. A member asked him which products he would prefer for the Syrian display case at the city’s Colonial Museum. Weygand responded, “It will remain empty. Politically, I cannot call Syria a colony.”17
Rise of the Civilian Bureaucracy From these beginnings, Gouraud built a central administration, the High Commission. From late to , he and de Caix recruited civilian personnel to replace military officers and organized separate departments of public health, public works, education, telephone and telegraphs, and agriculture. These departments all reported directly to Gouraud, and, along with the military and intelligence apparatus, were centrally administered from
bureaucrats
Beirut for all mandated territories. Social services were thus retained as the direct responsibility of the highest level of government. This high level of concern grew out of the high commissioner’s role as chief relief officer after the war. Social relief was also rooted deeply in France’s justifying ideology: Gouraud and de Caix used their relief efforts at the Versailles peace conference to argue France’s worthiness of the mandate. They believed that social and economic investment—the civilizing mission—was as important as the military to the mandate’s success. However, France was in no position to invest heavily in Syria and Lebanon. Gouraud, dismayed by deep budget cuts, resigned his post as high commissioner in August .18 Saddled with war debts, the government in Paris was tight-fisted. While the Germans delayed reparations payments, the French franc plummeted in value from francs to francs to the dollar between and . Meanwhile, the French government was burdened with postwar relief of its own: pensions for , war orphans, more than million permanently disabled veterans, and thousands of war widows.19 As a result, the Parisian parliament fought tooth and nail to keep the mandate’s budget low, eventually insisting that the mandate pay for itself. This it largely did, except for continuing military subsidies. Budgets remained balanced even during the depression years and World War II. But because of these budget constraints, the highly privatized delivery of public services begun in continued. Essential public services like utilities and public works were contracted out to French businesses seeking profitable investments. Education and health were similarly delegated to religious groups and missionary orders, which received extra-budgetary subsidies from private charities and the foreign ministry and where nuns worked for a pittance as teachers and nurses. Under Henri Ponsot, high commissioner between and , the mandatory state took its mature form. At the High Commission’s headquarters in the Grand Serail, the old Ottoman government palace, Ponsot presided over two cabinets, civil and military. Their jurisdiction comprised a dozen departments: diplomatic, legal, financial, military intelligence, General Security police (Sûreté générale), customs, press and information, economics and agriculture, special projects and public education, archeology, hygiene and public assistance, and the post, telegraph, and telephone service. The High Commission directly employed one-third of all French bureaucrats in the Levant.20 They were assigned to the territories at large, in disregard of the political boundaries between them. For example, school inspectors who visited schools in Beirut also visited those in Damascus, and technical personnel, urban planners, and postal administrators freely moved across the regions.
advent of french rule
The High Commission came to command this octopus-like apparatus partly through its control of the hefty Common Interests budget, which amounted to nearly million Syrian-Lebanese lira (LLS) in , one-third of all government revenues in the mandated territories. Mostly derived from customs duties, Common Interests revenues were spent to pay off the Ottoman debt (through ), and to finance public works, economic development projects, the postal and telegraph systems, and the military auxiliary, the Special Troops. In addition, the High Commission kept a separate administrative budget for personnel, paid for by the French foreign ministry, and disbursed educational and charitable subsidies financed by French parimutuel revenues. Each year the high commissioner’s office would draw up a list of deserving students, schools, hospitals, clinics, orphanages, and cultural programs that would receive these special subsidies.21 The French superimposed this distinctly French layer of government over the local state governments in what became a cumbersome dual system. In , French “advisors” were posted in all departments within the local governments, in addition to the officials responsible directly to the high commissioner. The number of French bureaucrats, fluctuating over time between and , was relatively large. The level of staffing resembled less the British mandate in Iraq, for example, where a minimum of personnel was posted mainly in Baghdad, than the full-blown British colonial administration in Egypt before the war.22 Moreover, contrary to the spirit of mandatory tutelage, French bureaucrats actually controlled the local governments; no significant action could be taken without their approval. Under them worked, by the mid-s, more than , Syrian and Lebanese civil servants.23 This corps of bureaucrats was relatively new and inexperienced, lacking the skills of the Ottoman bureaucrats who had fled back to Anatolia.24 The French consolidated their hold over the local bureaucracy by recruiting mainly from among graduates of French schools. While French and Arabic were both official languages, French became essential to conducting all but the most mundane affairs of state. Local government was overwhelmingly concerned with any modern mayor’s worries: potholes and police. In , the states, including Lebanon, Syria, and the Druze and ‘Alawi territories, commanded budgets totalling million LLS, of which % was spent on public works, % on police, % on debt and finance, % on education, % on courts, about % each on post and telegraph and public health, and the remaining % on administration and miscellaneous expenses.25 Local revenues were drawn overwhelmingly from indirect sources like taxes on vice and luxury and fees for business transac-
bureaucrats
tions. The city of Beirut’s largest single source of revenue, for example, was fees from the port, which represented one-fourth of its budget of , LLS. Well over half of expenditures went to road building and repair, and about one-fourth went to police and administration. Very minor sums were spent on social services: care of paupers, , LLS; museums, , LLS; public instruction, , LLS; numbering of houses and shops and naming of roads, , LLS.26 This civilianized bureaucracy, along with its privatized arms of French missionaries and concessionary companies, thus became the third pillar of French rule. It depended upon and interacted continually with the other two pillars, the military and mediating local elites. As a result, the bureaucracy played a key role in constructing the colonial civic order; that is, in organizing power relations between state and non-state actors by setting norms and practices by which they interacted. Over the course of the mandate these bureaucrats reorganized government finance and the judiciary, built roads and ports, extended agricultural cultivation into new areas, expanded postal and telegraph service, built a new telephone system, and laid the foundations of a public school system.27 The surveys, studies, and reports generated by these bureaucrats came to define the communities of peoples living in the mandated territories. This body of knowledge was far from complete, and far from a perfect reflection of reality: It was collected by French agents who often knew little about the region and it was biased by its pragmatic application in the service of French rule. But it nonetheless became a privileged, hegemonic construction of community and nation that not only competed with, but also influenced, opposing perspectives like those of the nationalists. For example, in the name of modernity and their civilizing mission, the French hired French urban planners to redesign cities. Since Ottoman times, many local elites welcomed and even urged the so-called modernization of urban design and management.28 The French now trained a corps of engineers and planners who assimilated French ideas of urbanism. As in other colonies, the mandatory state built wide avenues and designed spacious suburbs to bring light and air to what they perceived as dark and cramped oriental cities.29 In Beirut, French planners in cooperation with local elites destroyed the old city and inscribed their sectarian view of Lebanese society into quarters segregated by religion.30 Nationalists came to realize that urban renewal was designed primarily to enhance military control and profit French companies. The great beltway built around Damascus, for example, was more than just a modern ring road circumventing city traffic. It sliced a wide swath through the gnarled orchards
advent of french rule
around the city where rebels had camped and launched attacks in the – war.31 National Bloc leader Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali led a campaign against a similar urban plan for Aleppo, and against the award of most construction contracts to French firms. Aleppines resisted the astonishing array of fees and regulations that French police enforced on nearly every aspect of public life in the city.32 And by the early s citizens in various cities were organizing boycotts against the high rates charged for water, electricity and other public utilities by French concessionary companies seeking profits through their inefficient monopolies. Gouraud had envisioned mandatory rule as the gift of Mother France, an idealized, selfless endeavor in which the benefits of French civilization would be liberally bestowed upon a population of orphans, prostrated by war. To Gouraud, the carrot was the end, the stick of military discipline only a means. In the aftermath of the Syrian Revolt and as result of stingy budgets, however, maternalist ideals were subordinated to paternalist goals and means. The French pursued a path of statebuilding in which financial expediency and ideology favored private French actors over public agencies, and military and diplomatic goals over local needs. Benefits were not bestowed with the selfless love of a mother as Gouraud pretended, but in the self-interest of the father. Military funds and goals were used to define public works projects. Local and foreign intermediaries, motivated by personal interest more than public service, were employed to cut costs. Second-rate bureaucrats from the metropole were hired rather than Frenchmen trained in Arabic, familiar with the region or sympathetic to the higher ideals of mandatory rule. In the end, French advisors did not tutor Syrian and Lebanese bureaucrats in efficient and just methods of rule; rather they tended to dominate them. Discipline, exploitation, and petty dominance adulterated the ethos of healing and preparation for self-rule contained in the idealistic policy goals set at the start.
Conclusion to Part One: Paternalism and the Colonial Civic Order By , the colonial civic order was essentially paternalistic. Paternalism here is defined by two essential attributes. First, it is a system of power defined by the ability to control the distribution of benefits, not by the recognition of rights to benefits. A mediating elite emerges between the state and mass of citizens to broker these benefits by winning privileged access to them from the state, and by using that access to control the unprivileged majority. Second,
bureaucrats
paternalism defines authority as that of the father; that is, as essentially male, and passed down from one male to the next. Male authority thus flows continuously from the formal realm of politics through to the informal politics of the household. These two attributes are inextricably intertwined. In a paternalistic system of rule, the ruler distributes benefits according to his will, not by the right of the ruled, and power is devolved in a mediating hierarchy of males enjoying a priori authority over females and the power to discipline weaker males. Paternalism may be distinguished from patriarchy in its fluid, negotiated nature. Paternalism is historically constructed, and not a timeless structure of relationships. Whereas patriarchy is often described as a rigid, coercive system imposed by force and defined by rigid gender roles, paternalism is generally characterized as having a softer style, wherein male and female, ruler and ruled, continually renegotiate the terms of authority. The iron rod of physical coercion remains, but is hidden in a paternalistic system. Finally, paternalism, as it is used here, bears a complex relationship to fraternalism. While the latter substitutes rights for privilege in the definition of power, it retains the gendered essence of the former, invoking an equal brotherhood of males instead of a male hierarchy.33 In the French mandate of the s, paternalism took on a specific form as a colonial system of power. While the Ottomans had also used mediating elites as pillars of their regime, the late Ottoman state had in fact, through centralizing reforms of the nineteenth century, diminished the power of religious and tribal intermediaries and bound mediating landowners to the state through posts in its bureaucracy. Under the French, the autonomous power of landowning, religious, and tribal patriarchs was given a new lease on life. Also new was the fact that the mandatory state’s soldiers and bureaucrats were foreign. Benefits were bestowed upon Syrians and Lebanese as the gift of a superior civilization, as a carrot to secure sovereignty and as a reward for the good behavior of France’s adoptive children. They were delivered by way of intermediaries who profited in self-interest and in the power they wielded over their clients: concessionaires, missionaries, landlords, religious patriarchs, tribal chiefs, urban bosses, and the like. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, colonial paternalism also reinforced a gendered hierarchy of power. Very few of the or so French bureaucrats were female, in part because the French blocked women from careers in the foreign ministry.34 Mediating elites, too, were by definition male, as only men were religious patriarchs, large landowners, and urban bosses. Likewise, the Vatican placed orders of nuns strictly under the control of male missionaries.
advent of french rule
And while the Ottomans had sought to bind both male and female citizens directly to the state, the French reasserted uniquely male privileges. Men were constructed as protectors and representatives of women and children in their families. Women who sought passports, for example, needed the permission of their male guardians. And while civil laws did not require men to live in any particular place, they stated that “the married woman has no other domicile than that of her husband.”35 Indeed, state police were routinely deputized by religious courts to retrieve runaway women at the behest of their fathers and husbands. In addition, nationality laws decreed in categorically privileged men’s citizenship over women’s. Nationality was defined primarily by blood ties, rather than by birth in the territory; specifically, all children born of a Syrian or Lebanese father were citizens. Women who married a foreigner usually lost their citizenship; men who did so did not. And while the children of a woman with a foreign husband could petition for Syrian or Lebanese nationality, those of a man married to a foreign woman automatically attained their father’s nationality. Likewise, while foreign men had the choice of adopting the Syrian or Lebanese nationality of their spouses, foreign women were obliged to do so.36 In sum, paternalism operated in the mandate as an intertwined system of colonial, gender, class, and religious hierarchies. French trumped Syrian or Lebanese, male trumped female, wealth trumped poverty, and religious office trumped laypeople. Because these chains of power blurred the line between state and society, it is more accurate to view the system in terms of a colonial civic order, rather than solely a colonial state. This colonial civic order did not simply spring from High Commissioner Gouraud’s vision and experience in other French colonies. It was forged through bargains made between the French and local elites during the turbulent s. Indeed, Gouraud’s successors had flirted with bypassing mediating elites. This provoked a storm of protest from Catholics and Maronites in Lebanon, and the Syrian Revolt. Coupled with the political resurgence of the right in France, these protests forced a return to the Gouraud formula, wherein elites were appeased with mediating privileges for laying down their arms and cooperating with the mandatory state. But colonial paternalism was an inherently unstable bargain. World War I had shaken paternal authority at its roots. As we have seen, four elements combined to produce the crisis of paternity: the dislocation of households disrupted male authority over female family members; the war’s aggravation of material conditions strained relations between landlord and peasant, ruler and ruled; the vacuum of power left by the defeated Ottoman dynasty produced a struggle for succession; and new ideologies inspired visions of a civic order based on equality and rights.
bureaucrats
The French occupation aggravated the crisis of paternity with a triple reversal of political norms. First, in its last decades Ottoman rule had become increasingly defined as Islamic rule; now a Christian power asserted supreme authority.37 It is no surprise that rumors flew after the French occupied Damascus that Gouraud had paused at Saladin’s tomb to gloat that Christians had finally avenged the defeat of the medieval Crusaders. (The Syrian resistance had itself invoked the spirit of Saladin to rally support.) Second, Mount Lebanon had been defined and governed as a Christian enclave since the massacres; now the French created Greater Lebanon with the aim of making that enclave more economically viable. But by incorporating the Muslimdominated coasts and Bekaa Valley, Christians lost their numerical predominance, and their political predominance reignited sectarian rivalry.38 Third, the French occupation clashed with the rising tide of Arab nationalism, which began with the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and crested with the establishment of Faysal’s Syrian-Arab kingdom. Syrian and Lebanese Arabists not only demanded Arab sovereignty, but the unity of lands splintered into inherently weak states by Europeans after the war. The reversals wrought by French occupation turned many Syrians and Lebanese against not only their adoptive father, but also one another in a conflict among competing visions of the proper civic order. Finally, the adoption of republican constitutions in and institutionalized instability in the paternalistic civic order. The constitutions’ republican guarantees of popular sovereignty contradicted the paternalistic methods of colonial rule, where a nonelected and foreign high commissioner wielded supreme power. This contradiction would become a tool for nationalist elites to condemn the French mandate and claim independence. “The Syrian people have aspirations and rights. France has interests and commitments. How can the aspirations and rights of the first be reconciled with the interests and commitments of the second?” wrote a prominent Syrian nationalist, Jamil Mardam Bey. The crux of the problem, he argued, was France’s reliance on mediating cronies. “The mandate reserved all its affection and favours for ignorant people, for mediocre old men,” he wrote. “It was caught in a past which it sought to crystallize once more.”39 The subordination of younger nationalists in the prime of their political lives to French authority in a tightly controlled governmental apparatus aggravated the challenges to male virility expressed during the Syrian Revolt. Syrians in the National Bloc and Lebanese who cooperated with the French by seeking elective office were frustrated by the limits to their power, and were accused by their competitors of weakness and betrayal of the national will.40
advent of french rule
Even as nationalist elites chafed at the contradictions between republicanism and paternalism, constitutional guarantees of individual rights and legal equality among citizens clashed with the structures of colonial paternalism that extended far beyond government offices, where public resources were distributed so as to differentiate the relative power of citizens. While the elites who shared in the writing and adoption of the constitutions may have been comfortable with an equality of privileges assured only to themselves, republican ideals were not so easily contained. Appeals to fraternity, justice, and equality were spread to subordinate citizens in propaganda of the Syrian Revolt and through French textbooks used in schools. It was not long before popular movements would use republican ideals to attack the privileges of mediating elites, including bourgeois nationalists. Class, gender, and religious tensions fueled by wartime trauma and colonial paternalism would spill from unstable households into the streets of changing urban communities, and into debates in the highest political arenas. The remaining chapters of this book will argue that the crisis of paternity generated class, gender, and religious movements that would broaden challenges to the colonial civic order beyond elite nationalists’ focus on independence. And, as will be shown, because of the nature of paternalism, gender lay at the very core of these conflicts.
part ii
Paternal Republicanism and the Construction of Subaltern Citizens
In the postwar period the intimate matters of the household became the target of a sustained and intense public scrutiny. Choices families made on how to allocate their resources became the subject of general debate: how much food families consumed; whether they were giving their babies sterile milk; how clean mothers kept their homes; how much time parents allowed for their sons’ and daughters’ education; whether they depended on children to contribute to household income; whether mothers were spending too much time at work and not enough on caring for their families; whether fathers should be the sole breadwinners, earning a family wage. These and similar issues were debated at political club meetings and ladies’ charity socials, and in government offices, newspapers, and cafes. While such discussions had occurred before World War I, in the context of Ottoman reform and the need to save the empire, the terms of discussion were utterly transformed by the war and the French occupation. As discussed in Part One, the war had shattered many households and prostrated others to an unforgettable base of vulnerability. At the same time, the war marked the end of several decades of prosperity, and opened the door to state intervention in household affairs. However, France’s paternalistic social policy distributed benefits unevenly, aggravating gender, class, and religious tensions that had mounted in the trauma of the war. These factors contributed to the rise of new urban social movements that did not merely discuss social reforms, but organized to demand them from the state as a right, as had never been done under the Ottomans. The
paternal republicanism
most important of these were women’s, labor, and Islamic populist movements. They opposed the way social policy subordinated them because of their class, gender, or religious status. Their mobilization disrupted the elite’s political strategies—both France’s paternalism and nationalists’ appeals for unity. Social policy was, as a result, thrust into the center of mandate politics. Debates on the state’s role in promoting social progress invoked broader political questions about the proper nature of the civic order, and about citizenship. The new social movements found inspiration in the language of democratic republicanism in the Syrian and Lebanese constitutions, which contradicted the realities of the paternal republicanism that they confronted. Through the reforms they proposed, they sought to change the terms of membership in the civic order from a hierarchy of privilege to the equality of citizens’ rights. In the perspective taken here, citizenship is defined not only by the political language of constitutions, but also by the social policies of states. All of the points at which people come into contact with the state inevitably shape their citizenship. Citizens’ rights (or lack thereof) are established in the daily practices of government, when a tax collector appears at the door, when a police officer stops a car, or when a public works engineer designs a new street or water system. For a large number of citizens, contact with the state comes mainly through its social policies. Their relative status as citizens is defined when a state school admits their children (or does not), when a government clinic vaccinates a child (or does not) against a disease, or when the state intervenes to stop employer abuses (or does not). Subaltern citizens are defined as those who are systematically placed at a disadvantaged remove from direct state benefits, under the protection and control of privileged mediating elites, by virtue of their class, caste, gender, race, religion, or ethnicity. Subaltern movements may be either left- or right-wing in orientation; they represent any subordinate groups who reject the authority of mediating elites and who seek to raise their status.1 By the mid-s, the women’s, labor, and Islamic populist movements were strong enough to mount a significant challenge to the colonial civic order. Their challenge would shake the twin pillars of paternalism: mediated rule and a gendered hierarchy of power.
chapter 4
State Social Policy: Constructing a Hierarchy of Citizens
The late Ottoman and French mandatory states intervened in the lives of common citizens as never before. While the states claimed to act for the general good, to save the empire or spread civilization, their social policies were not neutral. They implicitly constructed hierarchies of those deemed more or less deserving of state services. In so doing, the states established different social rights for different social groups; that is, they defined a hierarchy of citizenship. French social policies differed from the Ottoman in their amplitude, in their increased dependence on paternalistic mediating agents, and in their ranking of social groups to be served. In reshuffling the civic order, the policies aggravated the regional, class, religious, and gender tensions already created by war and economic change. The political implications of state-imposed social hierarchies were not lost on the people of Syria and Lebanon. As chapter five will show, they would directly influence the shape and goals of emergent social reform movements.
Ottoman Reform: From Imperial Subjects to Imperial Citizens? Since its earliest days, the Ottoman state had played a regulatory role in society, monitoring markets, setting prices, maintaining caravan routes, and supervising artisans’ guilds. However, the state did not spend much on social welfare. Imperial social spending was limited mainly to construction of mosque-school-hospital complexes in major cities and to support for the poor on pilgrimage to Mecca. Basic food supplies were assured through regulations on trade and market prices, and with seizures of grain in times of crisis. Public health consisted primarily of quarantines when epidemics broke out. Most
paternal republicanism
expenditures on social welfare—poor relief, medical care and education— were delegated to local charities, which commanded funds from local endowments (awqaf; singular: waqf).1 Only in the late nineteenth century did the Ottoman state begin to intervene in social affairs with large sums of money, when the Tanzimat reforms finally produced an imperial bureaucracy capable of such intervention. Under the land code, many peasants gained new rights to landownership. During the reign of Abdulhamid II (–), the state extended low-cost agricultural loans to farmers in every province, although the wealthiest tended to benefit most. It also built a skeletal system of state schools throughout the empire, enrolling more than , students in . Istanbul became a mecca of higher education, graduating lawyers, doctors, and civil servants from every province. In regions of the future Syria and Lebanon, Damascus’s first public library was opened under the patronage of governor Midhat Pasha around . The state also financed a rudimentary system of hospitals and schools in Beirut, Syria, and Aleppo provinces: In , it funded six hospitals with beds, paying the salaries of physicians and surgeons; by , it funded primary schools with , students. Medical and law colleges in Damascus were established in the early s. After the constitutional revolution, the Young Turks expanded education and disbursed significant sums to improve sanitation in cities.2 Ottoman social policy was shaped by essentially paternalistic aims. The state’s preeminent concern was its own survival against mounting European aggression and intervention. Channeling funds particularly to military defense and administration, the state had little surplus to finance broader social reform. Slim budgets combined with political priorities to make the distribution of state benefits uneven. Under Sultan Abdulhamid the goal of state education was primarily to create skilled cadres for the military and civil service. Hence, when schools were built, boys were privileged because their raw manpower was needed by the army and bureaucracy. Schools were also located in cities, where urban elites who might fill bureaucratic posts lived. These same elites were also endowed with other benefits, like land grants and control of agricultural loans, to bind their loyalty to the state. In sum, state social policy created a loyal landowning and bureaucratic class.3 Another motive for state reform was to counteract the erosion of loyalty from within, especially as inspired by foreign missionaries, and especially in the Syrian provinces.4 From the mid-nineteenth century, dozens of European and American religious orders arrived in the empire to bring the benefits of
state social policy
their higher civilization, along with their vision of God, to Ottoman subjects. They were most active among religious minorities, like Armenians in Eastern Anatolia and Arab Christians in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. They were also supported by the French, British, and Russian governments, which claimed to protect minorities from the tyranny of the Muslim sultan. In response to this interference with its subjects, the Ottoman state built its national schools as a bulwark against foreign subversion, as a direct bond between state and citizen. Curricula featured lessons in Islam and plenty of Ottoman propaganda designed to promote loyalty to the state. According to Selim Deringil, “In the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire came into its own as an ‘educator state’ with a systematic programme of education/indoctrination for subjects it intended to mould into citizens.”5 For example, the Maktab ‘Anbar school, founded in Damascus in , offered the sons of notable families both “traditional” subjects like Arabic literature and Islamic studies taught by esteemed ulama of the city, and “modern” subjects, like math, biology and Ottoman history.6 The Young Turks increased emphasis on inculcating citizenship after the constitutional revolution. To this end, they required education in Turkish in upper levels, a policy opposed by emergent Arab nationalists, including Maktab ‘Anbar students, and regarded by European consuls as Turkish despotism.7 Young Turk policy also expanded the education of girls because mothers were seen as children’s first teachers, and so crucial in inculcating patriotic and modern values among future (male) citizens. Other segments of the population were not wooed by the Ottoman educator-state, either because they were deemed inessential to the state’s survival, or beyond its reach. Few non-Muslims attended the national schools; their health and education was left either to their religious communities or to foreign missionaries. Mount Lebanon was perhaps the most extreme example. Governed as an autonomous province since the massacres, almost all of its schools and hospitals were built by missionaries and local religious groups. This experience would have a profound effect, not just on Jemal Pasha’s suspicions of subversion during the war, but also upon statecitizen relations in the future state of Lebanon. Also neglected by the state were peasants and workers, who rarely attended school or visited a state hospital. The reform of these groups was not considered vital to state interests. The state did not cultivate direct relations with them as citizens, but rather left them under the control of paternalistic elites. Ottoman labor laws, for example, required workers to join officially sanctioned guilds and prohibited them from organizing against their employers.
paternal republicanism
World War I was a critical watershed in the politics of state social intervention. Whereas before the state had often forced its schools and urban sanitation schemes upon a population indifferent to its aims of social progress, now people demanded state services as their right and their only hope for survival. Jemal Pasha did in fact organize an unprecedented network of soup kitchens, clinics, orphanages, and rationing to support the Syrian and Lebanese population. To the bitter dismay of local people, however, Turkish officials and the military received preference in food rations. During the Suez expedition of , for example, Jemal Pasha requisitioned , camels to carry the biscuits, dates, olives, and water needed to feed his , troops.8 Popular protests against the diversion of local food supplies implicitly claimed sustenance as a right. In the immediate aftermath of war, Faysal’s government made important initial efforts to meet demand for social and economic services, despite handicaps of a low budget, high inflation, and the exodus of trained Ottoman bureaucrats. His government managed to continue war pensions to widows, settle Armenian refugees in camps, and distribute much-needed seed to farmers. A rudimentary public health service attempted to battle epidemics despite a shortage of doctors and facilities. Education was made a top priority, because it was seen as a means of propagating Arab nationalism and loyalty to the state. The state reopened schools in Damascus and Aleppo (including schools for girls), as well as the medical and law schools in Damascus. Also established were libraries, chambers of commerce, and an agricultural bank. Unable to tax a war-ravaged population, Faysal personally staged fundraisers and lent support to private initiatives to improve general welfare.9 In sum, until World War I state benefits were bestowed from above, not by right, but in the paternalistic self-interest of the ruling elite. A hierarchy of privilege extended down from those who received the most benefits, state officials themselves, to Muslim elites in major cities, to potential (male) recruits for the military and civil service, and lastly to non-Muslims, women, workers, and peasants. Despite the limits and inequities of state services, for the most part citizens made few claims on the state. This all changed during the war, when the state became the warden of the masses. Faysal’s regime crystallized a new attitude in the wake of the Ottoman state’s abject failure to protect its people. While Faysal could not offer much aid, his state became the magnet for a multitude of social demands. Citizens now expected the state to attend to their welfare.
state social policy
Reshuffling the Social Hierarchy under the French As discussed in Part One, the maternal spirit of France’s civilizing mission was soon overwhelmed by paternalism, as the military need to discipline a rebellious population took precedence. The French, like the Ottomans, awarded benefits in the self-interest of the state. Also like the Ottomans, the French used social policy to construct a loyal social hierarchy. Elites were still preferred over peasants and workers; men over women. But in a reversal with serious political consequences, the French altered the hierarchy to privilege Lebanese over Syrians and Christians over Muslims. And while the Ottomans had sought a direct relationship between state and citizen to counter the influence of foreign missionaries’ schools and hospitals, now the French embraced missionaries as mediating agents of the state’s social services. A third change was the extent of the state’s intervention in society. By , the French had expanded state social services far beyond Ottoman limits. The vigor with which the French sought to rearrange social relations would excite much controversy. The following account focuses on public health, education, and economic and labor policy, areas that would provoke the most reaction. From its roots in postwar relief, the French built a public health service with little precedent in the Ottoman era. Local health departments were established in the various states under the direction of the High Commission. The Syrian department, for example, was organized almost single-handedly by a Frenchtrained Syrian doctor, Yusuf ‘Araqtinji.10 In , it began building hospitals and clinics to offer free services to the poor. In , it undertook a systematic study of public health conditions in the Damascus region, surveying marshes, mosquitoes, and the incidence of malaria; the cleanliness of water sources; recent histories of epidemics; and major causes of mortality. It eventually established regular inspections of food vendors, restaurants, schools, and public baths. And as there were only doctors in Damascus for a population of ,, the medical faculty at the Syrian University was reorganized by French doctors. The number of doctors in Syria more than doubled by to .11 By , there were clinics and hospitals with about , beds in all of the mandated territories. The state ran of the hospitals directly, more than double the number the Ottoman state had opened, and subsidized many of the private ones. In propaganda, the French boasted of their investment in public health as evidence of their civilizing mission, claiming, “Hygiene wasn’t practiced at all under the Turks.”12 However, many problems were left unaddressed. Epidemics remained so
paternal republicanism
widespread through the early s that the French were accused of doctoring health statistics submitted to the League of Nations.13 Newspapers regularly complained of the need for more services, demanding hygiene as a public right.14 And despite the persistence of severe health problems after the war, state budgets for health remained lower than those for police or the postal service, at about three percent of total spending.15 Indeed, the greatest expansion in public health care occurred in the private sector. The High Commission continued to disburse important sums from the French foreign ministry to subsidize missionaries. Two orders of French nuns, the Sisters of Charity and the Sisters of St. Joseph, ran so many clinics, hospitals, and orphanages that they were officially designated as “branches” of the High Commission’s health inspectorate. Another major recipient of state subsidies was the St. Joseph’s medical school in Beirut, run by French Jesuits. In , these and other private agencies received , LLS in extra-budgetary health funding directly from the foreign ministry in Paris. In comparison, the budget for state public health services in all territories amounted only to , LLS.16 Moreover, the reliance on missionaries made access to medical benefits uneven. Lebanon, with its longstanding presence of missionaries, was far better served. While Lebanon had hospitals, Syria had just hospitals for a population more than twice as large. The Beirut area alone had hospitals, nine of them private, and hosted two of the three medical schools in the territories, both of them private (American and French). Syria, in contrast, depended more heavily on state institutions. While half of Syria’s hospitals were public, only five of the in Lebanon were.17 State education exhibited similar patterns. As in public health, the High Commission presided over state ministries of public instruction and maintained an important role in subsidizing, regulating, and inspecting missionary schools. Like the Ottomans, the French saw education primarily as a vehicle to cultivate loyal cadres in the state bureaucracy. Despite demands for Arabic education, French-language study was made mandatory in state schools, and made a requirement to qualify for state subsidies in private ones. Official curricula with exams leading to the baccalaureate degree were made uniform across the territories, and the baccalaureate became a prerequisite for entrance into universities and the civil service.18 In , the state sent students to French universities on scholarship. State education expanded dramatically. Enrollment in primary and secondary schools more than tripled between and , from , to , students in all of the mandated territories. This was a significant increase over Ottoman state school enrollment, which in had totalled
state social policy
only , students in the same area. However, the proportion of students attending state schools did not change: in as in , only percent of all primary schools in the region were run by the state.19 The consequence of continued reliance on private schools was that Lebanese and Christians had greater access to education than Syrians and Muslims. Lebanese attended school at more than three times the rate of Syrians: in Syria only . percent of the total population was enrolled in school; in Lebanon, . percent. Meanwhile, percent of all students were Christian, who represented only percent of the total population.20 The imbalance resulted mainly from the huge number of private primary schools in Lebanon—,—compared to just in Syria. Almost all private schools were Christian, either run by local churches or by foreign missionaries. Uncounted in these statistics were nearly Muslim Qur’anic schools. Mostly in rural Syria, the schools were unfunded, unregulated, and unlicensed by the state, offering limited courses of study on the Qur’an and the Arabic language to about , children under eight years old.21 At first glance, this educational bias appears quite similar to that of the Ottoman era, when state schools were primarily Muslim and private schools Christian, and when schools in Lebanon outnumbered those in Syria. However, there was a crucial difference. The mandatory state subsidized the private, Christian schools heavily, making them in fact quasi-state schools. Drawing on extra-budgetary funds from Paris, the High Commission subsidized about half of all private schools, paying about one-third of their costs. Maronites alone received about one-third of the subsidies granted to local (nonforeign) private schools. Meanwhile, the French missionary schools depended so heavily on state subsidies that they claimed they would have to close without them.22 While no comprehensive record was kept of subsidies paid to private schools, a report showed that at least a portion of them totalled , LLS, spent in addition to the . million LLS budgeted for state schools.23 French and Catholic schools also received substantial support from dioceses in France, a source of funding unavailable to Muslim and other private schools. By , the bargain Gouraud had made in with religious schools appeared cast in stone. As part of a general budget-tightening effort in –, High Commissioner Henri Ponsot flirted with the idea of cutting subsidies to religious schools. Local Catholic and Maronite prelates, as well as French missionaries, alarmed that they had a second Sarrail on their hands, again mobilized their diplomatic skills. They argued that Italian missionaries would gain influence at their expense. Because education was seen primarily as a vehicle for French propaganda, Ponsot was forced to renew the mandatory state’s
paternal republicanism
commitment to the subsidies.24 The consequences of the commitment were not lost on contemporaries. Complaints had already been made about the relative shortage of funding for Syrian schools, which resulted in uncleanliness of classrooms, teachers’ corruption, and high fees charged for textbooks.25 The better-funded Lebanese worried publicly that the babel of foreign and religious schools would aggravate the country’s social and political divisions. Lebanon must make its educational system uniform, said one newspaper, to produce “an elite with some homogeneity, the supreme remedy to divided countries.”26 The official sanction of such funding imbalances amounted to the award of greater educational rights to Christian and Lebanese citizens. It also amounted to greater rights for elite classes, since private schools invariably charged fees. And as always, the concentration of state schools in cities situated peasants on lowest rung of educational rights. Economic policies compounded the privileging of Lebanon over the Syrian hinterland. The pace of postwar economic recovery varied regionally. Aleppo seems to have suffered most, due in part to ongoing rebellions. In April , the U.S. Consul wrote: “Owing to the general disorders existing throughout the Aleppo district, all business since December has been at a complete standstill.”27 Damascus was plagued in the s first by falling prices of the region’s main crops, wheat and apricots, and then by the Syrian Revolt, which prevented the planting of wheat; the government had to stave off famine with emergency imports from Algeria.28 Beirut, in contrast, saw a brisk return to business by the mid-s. The regional difference in wealth was reflected in purchases of automobiles, which barely existed in the region before . In , there were only , automobiles and no gas stations in the entire state of Syria, while in much smaller Lebanon there were , automobiles, and curbside gas pumps in Beirut alone.29 While external factors like fluctuations in the global economy and foreign tariff barriers played a role in the regional imbalance, French policy did little to correct it. With French funding, Beirut became the preeminent port on the coast and the virtual linchpin of the region’s economy. As a result, the Lebanese bourgeoisie profited heavily from financial and service industries, like import-export firms, banking, shipping, and tourism. In contrast, Aleppo and Damascus suffered declines in trade because the new national boundaries cut them off from their former markets in Turkey, Iraq, and Palestine.30 This bias toward seaborne trade was due partly to the interests of French commercial lobbies (see chapter three) and partly to the influence of francophile commercial interests within Beirut’s bourgeoisie.31 Meanwhile, French efforts to bolster agricultural income in Syria failed, as projects to expand cultivation of
state social policy
export cash crops like cotton and silk produced disappointing yields. Drops in world prices in the s further limited farm profits.32 Syrians sought to offset this loss of trade income by promoting industrial development; the French, however, invested little in industry and delayed until the late s tariff reforms that would protect local manufacturers from foreign imports. A nascent industrial sector emerged only in the s, featuring mainly food processing and textile factories, when the French finally raised tariff barriers and the world depression cut competition from imports.33 State labor policy produced its own imbalances. Its most important aspect was the provision of jobs. Although there are no global statistics, there is no doubt that the state itself became the largest single employer in the territories. During the s, workers were hired by the thousands into the public sector— in the civil service; in schools, hospitals and clinics; on public works projects; and in transport. In addition to the more than , bureaucrats, teachers, and police on the state’s civil service payroll, more than , workers were employed by French concessionary companies at the ports, on tramways and railroads, in electric utilities and the telephone service, and in sewage projects. Another , worked for the state’s tobacco monopoly.34 Others worked on the periphery of the state, indirectly dependent upon it; these included teachers, nurses, and support staff in state-subsidized health and educational institutions and the lawyers, accountants, printers, and others who provided support services to public agencies. The French established a tacit pecking order of access to state jobs and other economic benefits. In Lebanon, Christians obtained a disproportionate number of civil service jobs, despite the constitution’s promise of equitable access. Christians were favored not only for political reasons, but simply because more of them were schooled in French schools, and so knew French. Civil service jobs went increasingly to the many Maronites who moved down to Beirut from the mountains during the mandate. Meanwhile, Greek Orthodox and Catholics who had dominated Beirut’s commercial and financial life since the nineteenth century took on important public functions. For example, Michel Chiha, a prominent Catholic banker who helped to write the constitution, became director of the government’s Banque de Syrie et du Liban.35 Sunni Muslims protested loudly against their relative exclusion from state jobs and economic benefits. Cities where they dominated suffered relative neglect. Sidon, for example, not only received fewer state services but also suffered deeply from the diversion of trade to the port of Beirut.36 The lowest rung in the pecking order went to Shi‘is of the south, who had the least representation in the capital, and so received virtually no jobs and few state benefits. Tensions over these
paternal republicanism
imbalances flared at the time of the census, which showed the population of , to be only . percent Christian and . percent Muslim.37 The results were so disturbing to Christians that no census has been taken in Lebanon since, although it is generally believed that the country became majority Muslim by . Class differentials also characterized state labor policy. Wealthy urbanites enjoyed the highest paying jobs, in the civil bureaucracy and as consultants. On the lowest end of the pay scale were those who took the intermittent public works jobs, upon which many unemployed artisans and displaced peasants relied to feed their families. Road construction was perhaps the most common temporary job offered by the state, which in the s linked the major cities with paved routes suitable for automobiles. The road linking Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, for example, was built between and . To accomplish this expansion, the French continued the Ottoman practice of forced labor. Under nineteenth-century laws, the Ottomans had required most men aged to to work up to days every five years. The French modified this policy by paying low wages to volunteers and those who owed back taxes. One area where poor peasants held an advantage, however, was in recruitment to the Special Troops. Many of those displaced by war rushed to sign up.38 As in Lebanon, French labor policies aggravated sectarian tensions in Syria. ‘Alawi peasants, notoriously destitute and almost universally illiterate, worked as sharecroppers in the French-supported tobacco and silk industries. French policy diverted their discontent into sectarian strife. The head of the ‘Alawi state, Sulayman Murshid, helped to channel sharecroppers’ resentment against their mainly Sunni landlords into a separatist, religion-based movement antagonistic toward Sunni nationalists’ ideology of a unified Syria.39 In the early s, French Jesuits’ success in the religious conversion of some ‘Alawis, who apparently sought thereby to escape the authority of oppressive tribal shaykhs, provoked a political scandal.40 The Special Troops also became a cauldron of sectarian controversy, as ‘Alawi, Druze, Circassian, and Maronite peasants competed to join it as an escape from poverty. Meantime, Sunnis complained that they were relatively excluded from a force routinely used to suppress them.41 In addition to providing jobs, the state also played a potentially important regulatory role in labor affairs. In its capacity to supervise relations between employers and employees, the state was placed at the center of the volatile structural shifts in the labor market after the war. Despite workers’ distress, however, the state resisted taking an active regulatory role. Its anti-labor stance was supported by the influential and virulently anti-union Lyon Chamber of
state social policy
Commerce, whose support high commissioners sought.42 No departments of labor were established and no new labor laws were adopted to protect workers dislocated by war, loss of markets, or import competition. Furthermore, the state blocked workers’ attempts to protect themselves from employer abuse, citing a Ottoman law that forbade employee-only unions and strikes and required all guilds to register with the state. Ottoman labor law, inherited by the mandate, also made no provision for work accident liability, which became a problem with increasing injury rates among public works and concessionary workers. By the s, there were more than serious work accidents and two or three resultant deaths per year.43 In , the Lebanese parliament (dominated by pro-French, bourgeois delegates) rejected a proposal to hold employers responsible for some accidents because, it was argued, such a law would harm nascent industries.44 The state’s hands-off policy on labor issues was made apparent early, in a strike in Beirut against the French tramway concessionary company. The workers demanded pay increases, eight-hour days, occasional days off, the right to keep their jobs when they fell ill, and the right to a hearing before being fired. The director of the tramway company complained to High Commissioner Henri Gouraud that the workers had “a nerve” to demand protections similar to those enjoyed by French workers. Gouraud concurred that French protections should not be extended to employees of French companies in Lebanon.45 In –, however, high commissioners Maxime Weygand and Maurice Sarrail considered easing Ottoman restrictions on workers’ right to organize, expanding technical education, and freeing peasants from feudal obligations. Under pressure from the League of Nations to adopt legal guarantees of “humanitarian and egalitarian work conditions for men, women and children,” the High Commission appointed a committee to prepare a new labor code for Syria and Lebanon.46 But after the Syrian Revolt, Ponsot reversed course, in keeping with the general return to paternalism. Repressive laws were stiffened to limit workers’ unionization because the French feared that organized labor would only strengthen the power of rebellious nationalists.47 The republicanism of the new constitutions, it appeared, would not embrace the rights of workers. In sum, the s state significantly expanded benefits in health, education, and labor. However, these policies constructed a hierarchy of citizens based on their location, class, and religion. Lebanese and Christians enjoyed greater access to state-funded health and education, because the s state revived pre-mandatory patterns of funding to French missionaries and local protegés. The educated urban elite also enjoyed privileged access to state-funded schools, universities, and high-paying government jobs. Even nationalist elites
paternal republicanism
in Damascus sent their children to French lycées. In contrast, Syrians,’ Muslims,’ and the poor’s greater reliance on direct, unmediated state services, like public schools and health clinics, put them at a disadvantage. Benefits were bestowed at the will of the French, not according to the principle of citizens’ equal rights, and those with links to the state’s network of mediating institutions gained most.
Gender: The Second Pillar of Social Paternalism The gendering of social services cut across all other disparities of region, class, and religion. Women were systematically placed below men in every category, and placed at a greater distance from the state. The state tended to farm out females’ health and education to private agencies, while providing more direct services to men. The state also devalued women’s labor compared to that of men. While these policies appear to follow Ottoman paternalism, there were two important differences. First, because they suffered so much in the war, the sheer number of women who sought state services increased dramatically in the s. As a result, they were incorporated into the civic order, albeit in subordinate terms, more than they had ever been in the Ottoman empire. Second, men lost some of their privileges relative to women, because under the mandate they were no longer potential draftees to the army. In public health, for example, the health of both men and women was secondary to the needs of the French Army of the Levant. Under the direction of the army’s chief medical officer, the health inspectorate devoted far more resources to limiting the spread of venereal disease to troops than to gastroenteritis, which caused high infant mortality among Syrian and Lebanese civilians. Both male and female infants suffered. This did not signify a general gender equity in public health policy, however. Women were identified as the primary locus of disease, and uniquely blamed for infant mortality. The state’s programs for mothers were delegated to two bourgeois ladies’ philanthropies, which were much touted in French propaganda as symbols of Franco-Levantine cooperation, but hardly equipped to address the magnitude of health problems. The first and most prominent philanthropy was the Red Cross, headquartered in Beirut. While a Syrian-Lebanese Red Cross had been founded during the war by emigrants in Latin America, the French placed it under their national service after the war. Between and , the Red Cross opened Mothers’ Societies (Sociétés Mères) in Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandretta and Latakia that treated wounded soldiers, children, pregnant
state social policy
women, and the elderly.48 Eventually, the Red Cross would build a network of orphanages, schools, clinics, and first-aid and nurses’ training programs. Second was the Drop of Milk (Goutte de Lait) society, founded in to supply sterilized milk, food, clothing, and medical advice to the children of impoverished women who practiced “a Syrian infant hygiene that is traditionally deplorable.”49 Heavily subsidized by the state, the program expanded rapidly. In it distributed , bottles of sterile milk in Damascus and Aleppo. By it had opened additional clinics in Beirut and Latakia, distributing a total of , bottles to more than , nursing mothers. Women visited the clinics for advice nearly , times that year.50 The Drop of Milk and Red Cross societies were most effective as a political tool, binding elites to the mandatory state. While the French state provided essential funding, prominent French, Syrian, and Lebanese women were recruited to raise additional funds and deliver services. The Drop of Milk, although nominally founded by the Syrian health department, was in fact placed under the direction of honorary president Mme Haqqi Bey al-‘Azm, wife of the governor-general of Damascus. The wives of high commissioners were routinely named honorary president of the Red Cross. Leaders of these organizations became known in the press mainly for their glamorous charity balls that attracted French and local elites. Bourgeois women and female missionaries became, in effect, the foot soldiers of services delivered to women, while men remained the behind-the-scenes generals. Class difference underpinned the maternalistpaternal system. The poor women who were their clients were constructed as dependent beings unable to protect themselves or provide for their own needs. And although the work of private volunteers was laudable, it was hardly sufficient to meet the needs of the ,s of women living in the territories. The only true maternity wards, for example, were also small and privately run. In Beirut, the Jesuit St. Joseph’s medical school ran a maternity that conducted , free consultations and hospitalized women in ; the American University ran a maternity in the Armenian refugee camps, where babies were born the same year. In Damascus, the British hospital provided free maternity services to a limited number of women. As for public hospitals, that at the Syrian University also took some maternity cases, while in all of Aleppo, only eight hospital beds were reserved for maternity cases.51 Women received, in general, far less medical care than men. In , women were admitted to Syria’s eight major state-run hospitals , times, far less than men’s , check-ins.52 But there was a clear demand by women for professional medical care. Consulting a doctor became a norm for many urban women, although Muslim
paternal republicanism
women in the conservative cities of Hama and Tripoli did so less, because of prejudice against consulting male doctors.53 Elsewhere, women flooded the few free, state-run clinics available in the s (fig. ). In , women made nearly , visits to the six public clinics in Damascus, outnumbering those of men by percent.54 Women likely visited doctors often because of their childbearing needs. As we have seen, this was an era of large families. Women married young, usually under years of age, and were pregnant often.55 In , the first year the state produced accurate figures, there were nearly , recorded births in the mandated territories, about births per , inhabitants—a rate higher than in contemporary Syria.56 Despite women’s clear need for medical treatment, the mandatory state lagged behind neighboring Palestine in developing programs for them, according to an American YWCA director in Beirut, who otherwise praised French efforts to fight disease and build clinics: Special institutions or provisions for women and children are conspicuous by their absence in Syria. There is very little beyond the maternity hospitals in Beirut. The need has apparently not been realized as one of the urgent necessities.57 Most women obviously relied upon midwives, who were not required to hold proficiency licenses. This shortage of programs was particularly unfortunate given high infant mortality rates. In the cities of Damascus, Homs, and Hama in , one-fifth of all deaths were babies under age one, and nearly half of all deaths were children under six years old. In , the situation was only marginally better: . percent of deaths in Syria (excluding Latakia and Jabal Druze) were infants under age one; percent of deaths were children under age ten. The death rate was worst in the countryside, where women generally expected half of their children to die. Mothers’ death rates were high too. In , the only year for which statistics are available, about five percent of deaths () were women in childbirth in the cities of Damascus, Homs, and Hama.58 In contrast to this generally relaxed attitude toward women’s health care was the aggressive regime of health regulation for prostitutes. Among the first relief efforts organized by the French were workhouses for women without jobs or family. In January , about , women were domiciled in workhouses run by nuns. The primary goal, according to Father Rémy, the principal organizer of French relief, was to shelter the women from debauchery, to which poverty “inevitably” led them.59 Catholic missionaries taught them alternative
state social policy
means of supporting themselves, usually sewing (fig. ). In , the state issued new regulations to combat an outbreak of venereal disease among French troops. Prostitutes, dancers, and singers were required to register with local police, carry identification cards, work in designated brothels (maisons de tolérance), and submit to twice-weekly medical exams. Separate hospitals and clinics were built solely for this purpose; women who refused medical examinations were brought to court. To leave prostitution, a woman was required to inform the police, who would then arrange to have her live with a guardian. In , a total of prostitutes were registered in Syria’s four largest cities, and the anti-venereal hospital in Damascus treated cases. Treatment with a drug containing mercury reduced the incidence of syphilis dramatically by year’s end. In , Syrian clinics conducted more than , tests on more than , prostitutes, dancers, and singers, treating , cases of venereal disease. Lebanon had only registered prostitutes, presumably because fewer troops were stationed there.60 In sum, this was a distinctly colonial health plan. While the prostitution laws mirrored those in France, the neglect of maternal and infant care contrasted with the vigorous campaign pursued in Paris to improve prenatal and postpartum medical care.61 In the metropole the French worried about the low number of young males available for military recruitment; they had no similar concern in Syria and Lebanon. The mandate’s health plan was also paternalistic. Syrian and Lebanese mothers were deemed incompetent and in need of constant supervision by bourgeois philanthropists, while single women unguarded by males were subjected to the vice squad. Although the French publicized their health programs with pride, most Syrian and Lebanese women were not in fact sent the message that the mandatory state was their motherly caretaker. The message they received was that they were poor mothers and sexual threats. In education, girls were sent a similarly ambiguous message. While demand for girls’ education grew, the mandatory state virtually ignored it. Mention of women was omitted in a list of educational goals by the colonial lobby and again in a policy statement by the mandate’s top school inspector.62 Stingy budgets produced a critical shortage of space in schools and an atmosphere of competition that favored boys’ over girls’ attendance. Interest in girls’ schooling began among late Ottoman elites, who sought to improve mother’s childrearing as a step toward social progress.63 These sentiments grew into popular demand by the s, augmented by concern that women needed job skills to support themselves in the event of another war.64 While only , girls were listed by the Ottoman government in as enrolled in schools in
paternal republicanism
the provinces of Syria, Aleppo, and Beirut, by more than , were enrolled in the region.65 Despite this evidence of interest, girls’ enrollments continued to lag far behind boys.’ By girls represented percent of all students (,), but the proportion varied greatly by region. In Lebanon, where virtually all school-aged boys attended school, only percent of school-aged girls were enrolled in . In the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, percent of boys and percent of girls were enrolled; in Latakia, . percent of boys and only percent of girls. Everywhere, however, girls’ enrollment dropped off precipitously at the secondary level: in , only of , students in Syria’s lycées were female; the proportion in Lebanon was girls to , boys. Virtually no women attended local universities; the American University of Beirut awarded five bachelor’s degrees to women through .66 The state made even less of a commitment to girls’ education than private schools did. In Syria, girls represented percent of students in private primary schools, compared to percent in public ones; in Lebanon, percent of private-school students were female, compared to percent of public-school students. The public-private gap may have reflected the preference of parents, who believed girls’ morality was better protected under the surveillance of nuns.67 But the rising girls’ enrollment in public schools suggests that parents increasingly found them acceptable: The proportion of girls in public schools had nearly doubled since , when just percent of students in Ottoman state schools of the region were female.68 The state limited girls’ enrollments by not building schools, training teachers or making scholarships available to them. In , there were boys’ and girls’ public primary schools in Syria and Lebanon. In the next six years, the state opened more boys’ primary schools, but only for girls. In contrast, private educators opened girls’ primary schools in the same period. Compounding the problem was a chronic shortage of female teachers in public schools. While private schools were mainly religious and employed a large number of foreign (and inexpensive) nuns, public schools depended upon a small pool of female students in teachers’ colleges. In , only girls compared to boys were enrolled in the state-run teachers’ colleges at Damascus and Aleppo. In contrast, Lebanon’s private teachers’ colleges enrolled boys and girls, many of them destined to teach in private schools.69 Finally, lack of scholarships diminished the number of girls at lycées and universities, which routinely charged tuition fees. In , Syria’s seven state-run lycées enrolled girls and boys on scholarships from various sources. While the High Commission awarded women percent of
state social policy
its scholarships ( of ) for higher education in –, many of those went to daughters of French officials.70 As a result of state policy, many girls had no public school to attend in their vicinity. Official policy routed girls into private, and mostly religious schools, while it offered more direct support for public boys’ education. This meant that proportionately more Muslim girls than Muslim boys were forced to attend Christian schools. The greater reliance of girls on private education also colored their status as citizens. Girls’ contact with the state was mediated more through religious elites. Ironically, while the French promoted girls’ religious education in the Levant, the anti-clerical ruling elites of the Third Republic so deplored religious education in their own country that they had outlawed state funding for it. As will be seen in the next chapter, many Syrians and Lebanese held similar suspicions about Christian schools. Women figured even less in state labor policy than in education and health. While women were hired by the state, they were hired in lower numbers and at lower pay. Women participated in road construction, and represented many of the , workers who sorted tobacco and made cigarettes for the state monopoly. Women also worked as low-paid telephone operators for the post and telegraph department and as typists and secretaries in the civil bureaucracy. Female schoolteachers were routinely paid lower salaries than male teachers and forced to leave their jobs when they married. Disparities in pay in the private sector were also tolerated. And while the High Commission became aware by of the high rate of women’s unemployment, it did little to address the problem.71 A report found that the number of Syrian and Lebanese women working in industrial and artisanal jobs had dropped by half from , in to ,. The report blamed the loss of jobs on the collapse of the silk industry, but dismissed the importance of these findings: “The thousands of women who worked in this field [the silk industry] should not be considered unemployed; they only did these jobs intermittently and their wages went almost exclusively to pay for their own clothes and those of their children.”72 The report completely ignored the fact that families had come to rely on women’s supplementary income in a time when many male breadwinners faced cuts in hours and pay. Consequently, few unemployed women benefitted from the state’s job-training programs, although several state-subsidized charities like the Red Cross continued to train women in the dying handicrafts: The Damascus girls’ handicraft school enrolled students in , turning away many applicants. Like the low female enrollment in state teacher colleges, medical schools only trained a small number of midwives and nurses: a total of women were enrolled in such programs in , compared to men in
paternal republicanism
medical, pharmacological, dental, and law programs at Syrian University and St. Joseph University.73 As a result, women who lost jobs in artisanal homework had little alternative. They were not hired into the new economic sectors—transport, utilities, heavy industry—at anywhere near the rate that their male peers were. Only , women, as opposed to , men, were listed in as holding jobs in “modern” industries. Most of these were employed in the tobacco industry and in large textile factories built in Tripoli and Beirut. The women not only faced discrimination, but also encountered serious obstacles to taking the new jobs, which tended to require work outside the home. This was a difficult proposition for women used to working while minding their children. While unmarried women might take jobs in offices and factories, housework even in urban homes with electricity and plumbing was so demanding that it was quite unthinkable for married women to take them.74 Also, the majority of families, Muslims who observed customary seclusion of women, would not permit their daughters or wives to work in mixed-sex workplaces. In sum, even though women’s demand for education and work grew in the s and , the state continued to underfund schools and job training programs for them. Similarly, while great strides were made in the provision of medical services, women’s needs were not even remotely met. Certainly, social attitudes about women’s presence in public contributed to the gender gap in state services, and they will be discussed further in the next chapter. However, it is important to note here that attitudes were inevitably shaped by state policy, which effectively defined men and women differently as citizens. In public health, women were constructed as ignorant, dependent, and the locus of disease in a way that men simply were not. In public schooling, girls’ education was treated as optional rather than a necessity. In labor policy, women’s work was systematically devalued through policies that tolerated lower pay and ignored their unemployment. Women’s participation in the civic order was, finally, more indirect than men’s. Women were routinely placed at a farther remove from the state, where their access to state benefits was often mediated by bourgeois philanthropists, religious elites, and the male guardians to whom they were legally bound. These gendered differences in citizens’ status overlapped with and complemented disparities of class, region, and religion. As the next chapter will show, by the late s subordinated groups began to contest their status as secondclass citizens in the colonial civic order.
chapter 5
Revolt: The Rise of Subaltern Movements
It is perhaps a mundane observation that Syria and Lebanon were not republics of equal citizens. This was the lot of all colonies, as well as many independent countries. What was remarkable in Syria and Lebanon of the s was that the paternalistic order was in a constant state of crisis, destabilized by economic dislocation, state social policy, and the peculiar political arrangements required by the mandate charter. Indeed the state’s inegalitarian reshuffling of the social order, paired with its constitutional promises of republican equality among citizens, produced a yawning gap of inconsistency that invited challenges to the colonial civic order. Into this gap rushed three subaltern movements, representing women, workers, and non-elite Muslims whose civic status was structurally subordinated to mediating elites (men, employers, elite Muslims, Christians, and the French). They were subalterns also in the sense that they had no distinct voice in the civic order. The hegemonic discourse of both the French civilizing mission and elite nationalism (replicated in many histories written since the mandate period) marginalized or ignored their concerns. The new activism of these groups derived from growing consciousness of their subaltern status and of their rights as citizens of republics to demand equality. The subaltern movements coalesced within a broader context of frenzied postwar associationalism. While the Ottomans had registered only associations in prewar Beirut, for example, the French would register associations in the city and its environs, and more in the rest of Lebanon between and .1 The dizzying array of associations included Ottoman-era charitable, religious, cultural, political, and student clubs, as well as new groups with new aims, devoted to sports, scouting, aviation, protection of animals, human rights, veterans’ affairs, and families’ mutual aid. New, too, were middle-class professional associations organized by surgeons, importers, hoteliers, teachers, lawyers, engineers, journalists, auto mechanics, hairdressers, musicians, artists, and theatrical troupes.
paternal republicanism
While Ottoman-era groups tended to be informal gatherings of friends, mandate-era groups became increasingly formalized. The mandatory state’s stiffer licensing laws required from every association a statement of goals, a list of members, and records of fees paid. Formality came also because the groups grew larger. They built links across and between cities, even crossing the Syrian and Lebanese borders, with the use of new communications: the telegraph, the telephone, the train, and the many kilometers of road built by the French. Large groups, unlike the intimate clubs of the prewar era, often assembled strangers. In , the Beirut newspaper al-Bashir published an article urging those who attend meetings to adopt proper etiquette and rules of order: they should arrive on time, should not talk, and should not smoke during the meeting. Meetings often took place in cafes and members’ homes, although increasingly large groups tended to gather in hotels and cinemas.2 These developments made possible true social movements; that is, sustained organizations that recruited large numbers of people based on shared principles. As women’s, workers,’ and Islamic populists’ movements emerged, their orientations changed. Under the Ottoman regime, small women’s societies, labor guilds, and religious groups were closely regulated and firmly bound to the paternalistic social order of the day. They had sought reform within the prevailing norms of patronage, deference, and gender hierarchy. Now, the movements came to emphasize not just general goals of social reform, but their specific identities as subaltern citizens. They challenged the paternalistic norms of state social policy that underprivileged their members in the civic order. They especially criticized the mediating power of men over women, bourgeois employers over workers, missionaries over students, and elite ulama over common Muslims. This chapter introduces the three movements by tracing the history of their organizational development. Their ideologies and political impact on the colonial civic order will be discussed in more detail in the remaining chapters of this book.
Roots in the Era of Ottoman Reform The impulse for reform in the late Ottoman era came not only from the state above, but also from society below. It began in Mount Lebanon, where the mid-nineteenth century arrival of missionaries and European capitalists inspired and frightened local people into organizing their own efforts at social reform. They built educational and cultural societies (jam