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Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915–1953
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Glosser, Chinese Visions 9/11/02 1:15 PM Page i
Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915–1953
Glosser, Chinese Visions 9/11/02 1:15 PM Page ii
ASIA: LOCAL STUDIES / GLOBAL THEMES Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Kären Wigen, and Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Editors 1.
Bicycle Citizens: The Political World of the Japanese Housewife, by Robin M. LeBlanc
2.
The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, edited by Joshua A. Fogel
3.
The Country of Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam, by Hue-Tam Ho Tai
4.
Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities: A Reader, edited by Susan Brownell and Jeffrey Wasserstrom
5.
Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915–1953, by Susan L. Glosser
Glosser, Chinese Visions 9/11/02 1:15 PM Page iii
Chinese Visions of Family and State, 1915–1953
Susan L. Glosser Foreword by Linda Kerber
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley
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Los Angeles
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London
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University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England ©2003 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Glosser, Susan L., 1961–. Chinese visions of family and state, 1915–1953 / Susan L. Glosser. p. cm. (Asia: Local studies / global themes ; 5) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-520-22729-8 1. Family—China—History. 2. Family policy—China. 3. Domestic relations—China. 4. China—History—Republic, 1912–1949. 5. China—History—1949–1976. I. Title: Chinese visions of family and state, 1915–1953. II. Title. III. Series ds774 .g57 2002 951.04—dc21 2001001397 Manufactured in the United States of America 12
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The paper used in this publication is both acid-free and totally chlorine-free (tcf). It meets the minimum requirements of ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (r 1997) (Permanence of Paper).
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures
vii
Foreword
ix
Acknowledgments
xv
Chronology Introduction: Evolve or Perish 1. Saving Self and Nation: The New Culture Movement’s Family-Reform Discourse 2. Making the National Family: The Statist Xiao Jiating 3. Marketing the Family: You Huaigao and the Entrepreneurial Xiao Jiating 4. Love for Revolution: Xiao Jiating in the People’s Republic
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27 81 134 167
Conclusion: The Malleability of the Xiao Jiating Ideal
197
Notes
201
Bibliography
249
Glossary
263
Index
267
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Tables and Figures
tables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Age of Jiating Yanjiu Survey Respondents Chen’s Survey, Unengaged Men: Who Should Choose Your Wife? Chen’s Survey, Married Men: My Wife’s Satisfactory Qualities Pan’s Survey: Men’s Ranking of the Purposes of Marriage Pan’s Survey: Women’s Ranking of the Purposes of Marriage Pan’s Survey: Important Qualities in a Wife Pan’s Survey: Important Qualities in a Husband Grounds Women Used to Sue for Divorce, and Outcomes Grounds Women Used to Sue to Live Apart, and Outcomes Occupations of Visitors to the Marriage Questions Desk
35 66 71 76 76 76 77 114 114 181
figures 1. 2.
Chen’s survey: age of married and engaged respondents Pan’s survey: marital status and age of male respondents
58 59 vii
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3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
Tables and Figures
Pan’s survey: occupations of male respondents Pan’s survey: occupations of female respondents Chen’s survey: actual versus ideal age at marriage Choreography of an ideal Nationalist wedding Choreography of a new-style Shanghai wedding Participants in a Nationalist group wedding Chen Yunlong and Wang Ximei “Freedom of marriage, a life of prosperity and happiness” “Protecting the interests of women and children” “Widows have a right to remarry” “Marrying at the proper age”
60 61 65 88 90 130 144 187 188 189 190
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Foreword
Whether we credit it to globalism or cosmopolitanism, the need to reach out of the archives of a single nation and to explore themes that are shared across cultural boundaries has invigorated much recent scholarship. Marxist historians led the way. Perhaps this was because Marxist theory offered a structure for explaining the historical relation of worker to capitalist that refused to see the differences between national histories as absolute. Practitioners of this sort of history thought in terms of structures that allowed for a shared and comparative history; the same theoretical apparatus could be employed whether the labor relations were in Buenos Aires or Boston, Milan, or Manila. Feminist scholars, on the trail of patriarchy, followed suit. They have found it increasingly interesting to cross boundaries of time and space and engage in dialogue with those concerned with common questions but different epochs and locales. Patriarchy has flourished in wildly disparate societies, and, like class and race, gender is permanently in the process of social formation. Hungry for analytical strategies, feminist scholars have reason to read outside their disciplinary and geographical and temporal “fields,” and they have often done the first of these things (it is no accident that so many feminist scholarly journals are interdisciplinary), though less commonly the latter two.1 1. For good introductions to moves to internationalize the history of women and of gender, see Karen Offen, Ruth Roach Pierson, and Jane Rendall, eds., Writing Women’s
ix
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Still, if the work is compelling enough, even the biggest gulfs of time or space are obstacles that can be overcome. And Susan Glosser gives historians of the United States, Europe, Africa, and Latin America a good reason to read about China. She also adds to a growing body of evidence within feminist historiography for the need to find new ways to integrate, on an equal footing, tales about gender and tales about politics. In the early 1970s, when the history of women was being reinvigorated, political history was generally understood to be a subject innocent of gender. (A collection of historiographical essays commissioned by the American Historical Association herded women’s history into the same chapter as family history.) For Susan Glosser, though, as for many other recent writers on related themes, family history and gender history are necessarily linked to national political history. She argues, in the chapters to come, that the construction of gender is integral to a nation’s understanding of itself, and gender identities are substantially constructed inside families. In listening to Chinese men arguing in the 1920s about the qualities of the perfect wife, we hear gender ideologies being shaped. We can also find, perhaps to our surprise, arguments we have heard before—in the United States in the era of the American Revolution, in Italy during the Risorgimento. That is in part because Chinese men imported these lines of reasoning from abroad, in part because similar lines of reasoning emerged from congruent political goals. The struggles against traditional Confucian values that took place in early-twentieth-century China can seem far removed from those American Revolutionaries waged against conservative ideologies in the eighteenth century, but there are some eerie resemblances—some of which Glosser explicitly notes in her study. Chinese reformers challenged a Confucian tradition that required upper-class women (and in some cases those of non-elite status as well) to be metaphorically and literally secluded in their homes, their mobility restricted by the pain of bound feet. Chinese reformers condemned footbinding both for principle and for practice, and expanded their condemnation of tradition into an assertion of women’s entitlement to knowledge so that they could be better wives and mothers. (Because “the trope of the powerless and victimized” woman was useful to reformers, Glosser argues, they generally ignored the real power that women—especially as mothers-in-law—could wield in the traditional elite
History: International Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); and Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall, eds., Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Berg, 2000).
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household.) As Chinese reformers warmed to their task, Glosser explains, they offered a vision of the modern woman that calls up the image I named the “republican mother” in a work published more than two decades ago. We also see the contours at some moments of what might be called—to play on both terminology used by other historians of gender interested in the West and a slogan bandied about in contemporary China—a cult of domesticity with Chinese characteristics.2 The ideology of republican motherhood, which flourished in the era of the American Revolution, located politicized, educated women as contributors to the stability and vitality of the state. Such a mother was an informed citizen who transmitted her well-grounded opinions to her children, educating her sons and daughters to lead patriotic and virtuous lives. Moreover, before she was a republican mother she was a republican wife, choosing a virtuous man for her husband and correcting her husband’s lapses from civic virtue. Against the founders’ fear that republics were fragile, dependent on the virtuous choices of the generation that created them, unlikely to be retained when the revolutionary generation was replaced by descendants who had not experienced the moral crises that drove the founders, the republican mother inserted herself. She promised to nurture successive generations of virtuous citizens. Like Glosser’s New Culture reformers, she agreed that the nation “needed healthy, educated mothers to produce citizens sound in mind and body.” Hemmed in at every turn by the old law of domestic relations, republican motherhood could legitimize only a minimum of political sophistication and interest. The republican mother did not vote or participate directly in politics; she could be spared the sharp criticism normally directed at intellectually active women because she placed her learning at her family’s service. Like the ideology of xiao jiating (literally, the small family), the ideology of republican motherhood claimed a modest space
2. For elaboration of the concepts of the republican mother and the cult of domesticity, see Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture for the University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Women in the Age of the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1989); Jan Lewis, “The Republican Wife,” William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, vol. 44, no. 4 (October 1987): 689–721; Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: Housework, Wages and the Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and the most recent edition of Renate Bridenthal et al., eds., Becoming Visible: Women in European History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). An important effort to trace similarities and differences between Chinese and Western visions of domesticity is Susan Mann, “The Cult of Domesticity in Republican Shanghai’s Middle Class,” Jin dai Zhongguo funü shi yanjiu (Research on women in modern chinese history) 2 (June 1994).
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for the individualism of the wife, altering the female domain in which most women lived out their lives, and justifying middle-class women’s claims to be part of the civic culture.3 Some of the similarities across time and space just alluded to are intentional; Glosser tells us that New Culture radicals of the 1910s and 1920s looked to the Western nuclear family as a modern alternative and made Nora of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House their model. They dreamed of companionate marriage; they linked individual happiness to the welfare of society; and although they did not claim “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as explicit goals, entitlement to personal happiness resonated through their writings. Access to divorce was necessarily part of the companionate ideal; petitioners for divorce in China at the end of the decade of the 1930s (not unlike petitioners for divorce in Revolutionary America or France) were overwhelmingly women. By the 1930s the xiao jiating ideal had imploded to include “rational” consumer choices as part of the way “women fulfilled their civic duties,” along with educating their children and making the home comfortable for their husbands. There were many differences, of course. The ideology of xiao jiating, Glosser tells us, was embedded in an attack on traditional family systems. In the United States, those who articulated the ideologies of republican motherhood and companionate marriage had included women as well as men; Chinese reformers seem to have been almost all male and uninterested in female subjectivity. It was their own individualism they were prepared to heighten. As Glosser puts it, “Men took it for granted that it was their happiness at stake.” Moreover, in China, to an unusual degree, due to a mixture of political factors, the power of an invasive state ended up being bolstered by family reform rhetoric. In general daily usage, at least in the United States, the languages of marriage and of family life are thought to describe private life, a sphere of experience guarded against state intrusion. We habitually contrast the
3. It is interesting to note that in the United States in the 1790s, as Susan E. Klepp has argued, the ideology of republican motherhood developed in the demographic context of the “fertility transition” to smaller families. Free women, she writes, “applied egalitarian ideas and a virtuous, prudent sensibility to their bodies and to their traditional images of self as revolutions inspired discussion and debate. . . . On the household level, restricted fertility and high rates of literacy or years of education were persistently linked: the higher the educational attainment of women, the lower fertility rates.” See Susan E. Klepp, “Revolutionary Bodies: Women and the Fertility Transition in the Mid-Atlantic Region, 1760– 1820,” Journal of American History 85 (1998): 916, 915. It is also worth pointing out that the xiao jiating ideology, as Glosser suggests, not only limited the amount of space carved out for the individualism of the wife—the same was true for the husband.
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family and the state, the public and the private. And yet, the family is basic to a society’s system of political communication; patterns of family authority intersect with the general political culture, here as well as in places that are sometimes assumed to be unusually oriented toward familial units. Among the vocabularies for the expression of state power are the rules of marriage. Many elements of marriage and family life are shaped by state policy: the ceremony itself registered in state offices; parental obligations to support and protect children enforced; divorces framed by public law; police invited to interrupt domestic violence; inheritance law controlling what can be handed to heirs and who, in the event of intestacy, those heirs will be. Men and women, whether or not they are married, whether or not they are heterosexual, shape their relationships to each other within the boundaries of the state’s expectations for their behavior. Simultaneously, the state’s own vision of itself often depends as much upon family behavior as on public law. For example, practices of child raising precede formal schooling and can situate children variously for participation in societies that expect greater or lesser degrees of selfgovernment and civic participation. These practices can change over time. Before the American Revolution, divorce was rare and when it occurred, custody of young children invariably went to the father; by the 1830s, the ideology of republican motherhood had contributed to a new configuration of women as appropriately the nurturers and educators of their children, and the old rule began to crumble. A generation ago, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba envisioned political socialization as a process in which an individual develops a definition of self as related to the state.4 In the talk—and there is a lot of good talk in Glosser’s book—about what husbands and wives owe to each other, to their families, and to the community, we can hear educated Chinese men of the first half of the twentieth century struggling to articulate new relations of marriage. We also hear them, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, struggling to articulate new claims for their own selffashioning, for their relations with their wives, and for new relations between the private family and the public order. That they hesitated to challenge the public order as they inherited it would constitute their tragedy. But Glosser has retrieved the voices of men of modest fame and enabled us to listen in as they reflect on the 4. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
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most intimate relations of their lives. Their state would be listening. If the public sphere presses so heavily on the private, then historians of the public order cannot avoid the history of the family and of ideas about it. Reading across borders, in an effort to tie together histories of gender and histories of politics, all this suggests, is something that is well worth doing for many different kinds of reasons. And for students of Western histories looking for some way to get a sense of the stakes involved in Chinese debates on the family and public life, the pages that follow by Susan Glosser are an excellent place to start. Linda K. Kerber
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Acknowledgments
Writing these acknowledgments has been an edifying experience. Until now I have not had to face up to the fact that over the past decade and a half I have importuned and inconvenienced dozens of people who have generously agreed to help me in all kinds of ways. In the course of my researches I have benefited from the unstinting kindness of Annie Chang and her staff at the Center for Chinese Studies Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and the patience of the staff at the Hoover Institute’s East Asian Collection at Stanford University. Bruce Williams is the ghost in the machine at Berkeley’s East Asiatic Library and has helped me track down all sorts of things over the years. The folks in the Interlibrary Loan Department at Lewis & Clark College have kept me supplied with much that I’ve needed. I owe a great deal to the staff of the Shanghai Municipal Library, the Shanghai Municipal Archives, and the Number Two Archive in Nanjing. Two people in particular helped me get the materials I needed to write this book. They know who they are and I hope they also know how much their efforts have meant to me. In Taipei the staff of the National Historical Archives, the Nationalist Party Archives, the History Institute, and the Bureau of Intelligence Library went out of their way to guide my research and provide me with the materials I needed. I hope these people and their institutions will accept my heartfelt thanks in exchange for all they’ve done for me. Various organizations and foundations have funded my research, and I am happy to have the opportunity to acknowledge them here. A Mellon xv
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Foundation Grant and a Graduate Humanities Research Grant supported pre-dissertation research in 1991 and 1992. A grant from the Education Department of the Republic of China and a Dissertation Fellowship from the Committee for Scholarly Communication with the PRC funded a year of dissertation research in Shanghai and Nanjing during the 1992–1993 academic year. A semester of junior sabbatical from Lewis & Clark College helped me revise the book manuscript. Thanking all the people who have enriched my life is a delight. My family has been an important touchstone through the years. James Clune shared the many years of school and work that eventually produced this book. I am honored to count him among my friends. John Chaffee is really to blame for getting me started in this profession. He lured me into Chinese History with his course “Mandarins and Samurai,” kept me there with his patience and encouragement, and launched me on my life’s work with the simple words “You could learn Chinese.” Thank you. I owe a great debt to my professors at Berkeley, especially Wen-hsin Yeh, Frederic Wakeman Jr., Irwin Scheiner, Mary Ryan, and Elizabeth Perry. I want to offer special thanks to Wen-hsin, who has continued to inspire me with her intellectual rigor, creativity, and sense of fun. Over the years Susan Mann’s example and kind words have given me great encouragement. I am blessed with friends who understand fun both intellectual and otherwise. Thank you to Lyell Asher and Ben Westervelt for their unparalleled lunchroom conversation, Carlton Benson for his dry humor and willingness to eat ganbian siji dou every night for a year, Annie Chang for her gracious and generous help with long-distance research, Lisa Claypool for turning up all over the place and for turning up some last minute citations, Alan Cole for conversation, Sherry Fowler for general hilarity, especially in the middle of the Taklimakan Desert, Mark Halperin for his friendship, Jane Hunter for her kindness, Susan Kirschner for wonderful dinners, Todd and Christa Little-Seibold for their joie de vivre, Robby and Gary Roy for taking me in and Robby for the endless garage sales, Carol Schrader for advice and listening, Teri Silvio for her humor and her Play-Doh art, and Patty Stranahan for shopping and encouragement. Beth Haiken stands in a class of her own—she made a world of difference. I have been deeply touched by the generosity of those who have taken hours out of their own projects to help me with mine. Lyell, Beth, Carlton, Robby, two anonymous readers for the University of California Press, and Ken Pomeranz, also a reader for the press, read the entire manuscript at one time or another and made invaluable comments. I am grate-
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ful to them for challenging my arguments and saving me from many gaffes and infelicities. Any that remain are my own fault. Much credit is due Jan Spauschus, whose excellent eye and ear made this a much better book than it otherwise would have been. I am grateful to Sheila Levine for taking an interest in my work and guiding me through the publishing process and to Julie Brand and Mary Severance for getting the book to press. Many thanks to Lihua Wang and Meiru Liu, who provided advice on translation and transcription, and to Sherm Cochran, who responded quickly and generously to my queries about currencies. To Miya Barnett, Sukey Hunter Bernard, Tracy Leithauser, Willow McCormick, Stacy Skiftenes, and Amber Spradlin, all of whom took wonderful care of Livy while I finished the copy-editing, I owe great peace of mind. Olivia deserves to be included at the last minute because she is teaching me the meaning of efficiency. Like a book she will soon have a life of her own. Unlike a book, she took only nine months from start to finish. And finally, again and always, Lyell. Thank you is a paltry phrase to offer for a life richer than I thought possible.
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Chronology
1895 1898 1911 1912
1915
1915–1923
4 May 1919
Sino-Japanese War ends in China’s humiliating defeat. Yan Fu publishes Tianyan lun (On evolution). Qing dynasty (founded in 1644) collapses. Republic of China is established on 1 January and Sun Yatsen is voted provisional president. In February, the presidency is passed to former Qing general Yuan Shikai. In January, Yuan Shikai accepts Japan’s “Twenty-One Demands,” giving Japan extensive economic power in China’s northeast. In September, Chen Duxiu publishes “Jinggao qingnian” (Call to youth) in the magazine Xin qingnian (New youth). The article ignites the New Culture Movement. The New Culture Movement absorbs China’s educated urban youth in a vehement attack on traditional Chinese culture. Beijing University students protest the articles in the Treaty of Versailles that, citing a secret treaty between Britain and Japan, remove Chinese territories in Shandong province from German control and give them to the Japanese. The protest, which becomes known as the May Fourth Incident, swiftly spreads to other cities and involves a broad spectrum of Chinese society. xix
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1920
1921 1923 1925 1927
1931 1934
1936
1937
Chronology
Sun Yatsen reforms the Guomindang. (Guomindang is translated as the Nationalist Party and abbreviated as GMD. In alternate romanization systems, the party’s name is transliterated as Kuomindang and abbreviated as KMT.) Yi Jiayue and Luo Dunwei establish the Family Research Society and begin publishing the periodical Jiating yanjiu (Family research). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is formed. The Nationalists and Communists link their parties in the First United Front. Sun Yatsen dies and Chiang Kaishek seizes control of the Nationalist Party. Chiang Kaishek purges the Communists from the Nationalist Party and establishes his capital in Nanjing. The Communists flee to the countryside of southeastern China, where they pursue land reform and some family reform among the peasants. In May, the Nationalists promulgate their New Family Law. In October, the Communists, forced out of southeastern China by Nationalist encirclement campaigns, begin the Long March. A year later they arrive in the far northwestern province of Gansu. They soon establish headquarters in Yan’an. This will serve as their headquarters until 1947. In December, in what will later be known as the Xian Incident, the Communists and some of Chiang Kaishek’s own officers hold him hostage until he agrees to stop trying to exterminate the Communists and instead turn his attention to fighting the Japanese. He agrees and the Communists and Nationalists form the Second United Front. You Huaigao begins to publish Jiating xingqi (Family weekly). In August, the Japanese invade Shanghai. After three months of fighting they occupy the Chinese part of the city. In December, the Japanese take Nanjing, raping, murdering, and looting for seven weeks. The
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Chronology
1941
1945
1949
1950 1953
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Nationalists flee inland, eventually settling in Chongqing, the city that will be their wartime capital. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December and the United States’s subsequent entry into the war, the Japanese occupy the British- and American-dominated International Concession. In the wake of World War II the Second United Front dissolves and China sinks into civil war as the Nationalists and Communists fight for supremacy. Chiang Kaishek flees for Taiwan and continues his government there. On the first of October, Mao Zedong declares the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In April, the PRC government promulgates the Marriage Law. The PRC launches a campaign to fully implement the Marriage Law.
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Introduction Evolve or Perish
Confronted with foreign aggression and internal chaos, in 1915 China’s young urban intellectuals launched a vociferous attack on traditional Chinese culture. Their radical reevaluation of China’s political and cultural institutions, a reevaluation later known as the New Culture Movement, lasted eight years and addressed almost every aspect of Chinese society. Blaming traditional institutions for China’s perilous circumstances, these young radicals proposed a number of Western-inspired reforms. Of these, one of the most important was family reform. In place of arranged marriage and patriarchal control, they promoted free marriage choice, companionate marriage, and economic and emotional independence from the family. In the following decades this debate expanded to include reformers and revolutionaries of all political stripes in a discussion that was ultimately as much about the nation as it was about the family. The New Culture Movement exploded with a force that made it seem unprecedented but, in fact, the groundwork for such iconoclasm was laid decades before. It is, perhaps, impossible to point to a single day, or even year, as the definitive moment that sends a nation in a new direction, but surely something like that may be said of the early days of 1895. Before pursuing this study of New Culture family reform and its legacy, let us turn to a moment some twenty years earlier when another generation of Chinese intellectuals also agonized over how to save the nation. One afternoon in January 1895, Japanese troops seized the defensive forts at the Shandong port of Weihaiwei. Using captured Chinese can1
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Introduction
non from land and their own torpedo boats from sea, they proceeded to destroy half of the northern Chinese navy’s modern fleet. The battle not only sank China’s best ships, but also its last hopes of maintaining what many Chinese believed to be China’s unique cultural essence in the face of the capitalist imperialist onslaught that had begun with the Opium War almost sixty years before. Up to this point, China had pursued a policy of developing Western technology while maintaining its own values, culture, and social and political organization. The humiliating defeat at the hands of a people the Chinese liked to dismiss as “midget pirates” (wakÖ) caused a crisis of confidence among many of China’s intellectuals. Some wondered whether Chinese culture was intrinsically ill-suited for modernity. Perhaps, they suggested, China could not successfully adopt Western technology without also adopting some elements of Western culture. In the same year, Yan Fu (1853–1921), one of China’s intellectual lights, began translating Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics. His work, a combination of translation and commentary that promoted the views of the Social Darwinist Herbert Spencer, appeared as Tianyan lun (On evolution) in 1898. It electrified young intellectuals, who felt that Social Darwinism explained why China found itself at the mercy of invading forces after centuries of political and cultural preeminence and that it starkly illuminated China’s alternatives—evolve or perish.1 This confluence of political events and social theory, or empirical fact and discourse, if you will, shaped China’s future. China’s best and brightest resolved to take the future into their own hands and map their country’s road to survival. To equip themselves for the evolutionary struggle, they borrowed from the social, cultural, and political systems of their wouldbe conquerors—Japan, Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and the United States. For the next twenty years, Chinese reformers focused their efforts on China’s political, educational, and military bureaucracies. They also began to broach reform for women, especially with regard to education and physical fitness. A generation later, China’s intellectuals could only conclude that the situation in China had worsened. The Qing had collapsed in 1911, ending millennia of imperial rule, but the democratic republic that replaced it in 1912 was already dying. The former Qing general Yuan Shikai, to whom Sun Yatsen had relinquished the presidency, had quickly squelched China’s nascent democratic institutions and in the fall and winter of 1915 tried to revive the imperial institution and install himself as emperor. In the spring of 1916 he died a disappointed man, but the presidents who
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3
succeeded him could not control the military strongmen who had ensconced themselves in jealously guarded strongholds throughout China. In 1917 China collapsed into a welter of warlord territories and would remain divided until Communist victory in 1949. To make matters worse, foreign powers stood poised to—as the popular saying went—“slice China up like a melon.” In 1915 Yuan Shikai had acceded to Japan’s Twenty-One Demands, giving it extensive economic power in China’s northeast. Four years later China’s sovereignty was further eroded when the Treaty of Versailles, citing a secret agreement between Britain and Japan, awarded to the Japanese territories in Shandong that had been formerly controlled by Germany. On 4 May 1919, university and high-school students in Beijing staged a protest against the treaty. The protest spread swiftly to China’s other cities, engulfing Chinese of all classes and backgrounds. Despite this outpouring, the world ignored China’s demands that the international community respect its sovereignty. It was against this backdrop that young urban intellectuals launched a vehement attack on all of Chinese culture. Dating from roughly 1915 to 1923, the New Culture Movement—also referred to as the May Fourth Movement—was characterized by an intense intellectual ferment and iconoclasm that affected educated urban youth across China.2 All aspects of traditional Chinese culture—veneration for the past and the elderly, authoritarianism and hierarchy, elite literature, gender roles, family organization—felt its fury. These young radicals promoted an alternative vision that emphasized rational scientific thought, democratic political and social organization, and valorization of the young and the new. Like the generation before them, these men and women also looked to the West for new models of social and political organization. Many New Culture Movement radicals seized upon family reform as the key to unlocking the potential of China’s youth and rebuilding their shattered nation. They accused the traditional patriarchal family of sacrificing China’s youth on the altar of filial obligation, teaching them dependency, slavishness, and insularity, and robbing them of their creative energy. In its place they advocated the Western conjugal family ideal (xiao jiating, literally “small family”), an ideal that promoted free marriage choice, companionate marriage, and economic and emotional independence from the family (da jiazu, literally the “large family”). New Culture radicals believed that the conjugal family had made the countries of the West strong because it encouraged productivity, independence, and civic virtue.3 In short, they hoped to restore China by de-
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Introduction
stroying the traditional family and rebuilding it according to Western blueprints. Although the Chinese looked to the United States and Europe for new models of family organization, they did not slavishly copy the West. Rather, Chinese reform ideals bore the firm imprint of Chinese cultural and political priorities. For the past two centuries, Western family ideals have, by and large, increasingly supported individualistic solutions to societal problems and defended a private sphere characterized by significant independence from the state.4 Moreover, whereas the Western conjugal family ideal promotes a vision of a privatized family, the Chinese vision of the conjugal family did not.5 The firm connection that reformers drew between family life and the polity was a product of both long-standing elements in Chinese culture and the political crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Susan Mann, writing about eighteenth-century China, points out that the concepts of “inner” and “outer” used to describe the world of the family and the world at large are different from the West’s private/public dichotomy: “The principle of bie—separate spheres—is invoked to stress that wives and mothers inside the home embody the moral autonomy and authority on which husbands and sons must rely to succeed outside. All are part of a family system that constitutes a seamless, unitary social order centered on the home and bounded by the outer reaches of the imperium.”6 What Mann observes for the eighteenth century holds true for the nineteenth and twentieth as well. In China, this understanding of the family’s place in society, coupled with concern for the nation’s survival, charged the conjugal family ideal with a significance quite different from that of its Western counterpart. Although the Chinese xiao jiating was sometimes described as a refuge from a harsh world, more often it resembled a training ground for national struggle. The primary purpose of the xiao jiating was to instill the independence, productivity, and civic concern that the beleaguered state needed. In targeting family reform as an important part of China’s strengthening, reformers drew on an ancient element in Chinese political culture that linked family and state order.7 William Rowe observes: Following the Great Learning (Da xue), that seductively elegant ancient text seen by most late imperial literati as the quintessential statement of ethical and political thought, the family was central to political ideology in at least three ways. First was the well-known homology between family and state. The state was the family writ large. . . . Well-governed families meant a wellgoverned state, and vice versa. Second, it was an article of faith that mani-
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festly virtuous households would have an exemplary influence on their neighbors and so contribute to a well-ordered, smoothly functioning society. . . . Finally, the polity was conceived as a composite of families, which served as the basic, inter-linked building blocks for the larger social, economic, and ritual order.8
In the Great Learning the ordering of the family and pacification of the state appeared as the final steps in an eight-part formula for peace in the realm. The extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. For only when things are investigated is knowledge extended; only when knowledge is extended are thoughts sincere; only when thoughts are sincere are minds rectified; only when minds are rectified are our persons cultivated; only when our persons are cultivated are our families regulated; only when families are regulated are states well governed; and only when states are well governed is there peace in the realm.9
With its inclusion in the Neo-Confucian canon in the Song dynasty (960–1279), this causal linking of self-cultivation, family order, and state governance became a central prescriptive model for China’s elite. Although few twentieth-century reformers explicitly cited The Great Learning in their arguments for family reform, they drew on this familiar and central formulation when they explored critiques of the family, and women’s role in it, as a means of strengthening the state.10 The year after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the prominent journalist Liang Qichao likened China to a decrepit mansion: Now here is a big mansion which has lasted a thousand years. The tiles and bricks are decayed and the beams and rafters are broken. It is still a magnificently big thing, but when wind and rain suddenly come up, its fall is foredoomed. Yet the people in the house are still happily playing or soundly sleeping and as indifferent as if they have seen or heard nothing. Even some who have noted the danger know only how to weep bitterly, folding their arms and waiting for death without thinking of any remedy. Sometimes there are people a little better off who try to repair the cracks, seal up the leaks, and patch up the ant holes in order to be able to go on living there in peace, even temporarily, in the hope that something better may turn up. These three types of people use their minds differently, but when a hurricane comes they will die together. . . . The nation is also like this.11
Because of the integral connection between family and state order, a collapsing house made an apt simile for a disintegrating China. The same logic moved the intellectuals of the New Culture Movement to describe
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their reforms as the means of strengthening the nation. This was the irony, and perhaps, ultimately, the tragedy, of the movement. It promised to recreate Chinese culture from the ground up—to build an entirely new structure that would withstand the oncoming hurricane. In fact, although they used new materials to “repair the cracks, seal up the leaks, and patch up the ant holes,” the reformers retained the framework and foundations of traditional Chinese political culture.
making women better mothers The groundwork for the New Culture critique of traditional Confucian family values can be found in the criticism of the restrictions that it placed on women. In the late nineteenth century some intellectuals began to promote reform for women, arguing that China needed healthy, educated mothers to produce citizens sound in mind and body. Traditional feminine ideals demanded that women remain secluded from the outside world and devote their energies and attention to the home. Footbinding further restricted their mobility. Although the daughters of wealthy families were often well educated, by and large, women’s education was limited to acquiring domestic skills.12 Reform advocates believed that by crippling women’s bodies and intellect, these customs weakened China. For example, Kang Youwei, a Confucian scholar and Late-Qing reformer (1858–1927), condemned footbinding in part because it “weakened the race,” and Liang Qichao traced China’s infirmity to women’s “parasitic” role in the family. These men advocated education and improved physical fitness for women, reforms that they hoped would produce future generations of strong, educated citizens.13 The transfiguration of women’s prescribed roles and the shift in the definition of nation occurred in tandem. In traditional imperial political culture, the people were subjects who owed obedience and service to an autocratic ruler. But by the late nineteenth century, elites began to conceptualize the nation as a community of citizens who contributed to the state through active social and political participation rather than unquestioning service.14 Men’s interest in educational and physical reforms for women grew out of this desire to maximize their own contribution to the nation.15 Thus, to the Neo-Confucian injunction to cultivate one’s self was added an explicit directive to women to improve themselves. The improvement, often described as the “civilization” (wenming) of women, was not an independent goal in itself but rather an adjunct to the desire to create a
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viable male citizenry. Reformers believed that men would never be able to make full use of their talents and abilities if they were burdened with unhealthy and uneducated women.16 From the beginning, then, most women’s rights advocates wanted to improve women’s lives for the sake of a stronger China. This same approach to reform for women continued as young elite men in the New Culture Movement shifted the emphasis from good mothers to ideal wives. A standard chronology of essays and events has begun to emerge out of the historiography on women in late-nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury China.17 The first effort to improve women’s status is often marked with Kang Youwei’s Anti-Footbinding Society, founded in 1883. In 1896, Kang’s student Liang Qichao called for the advancement of women. He grouped reforms for women into three categories: productivity, education, and the cultivation of a strong and healthy body. He believed that China’s political weakness and women’s subordinate status both resulted from the fact that men produced but women only consumed. No matter how hard a man worked, he could not support all his dependents. (Some years later Liang recognized women’s reproductive labor as work.) Educating women so that they could work would cure China’s poverty and end women’s subordinate status, as well as broaden their horizons and equip them to educate China’s children. According to Liang, mothers in the West were responsible for 70 percent of their children’s elementary education. If Chinese women did likewise and educated their children in the basics before the age of ten, he reasoned, China would be better able to compete with Western nations. Finally, eugenics and Social Darwinism convinced many intellectuals that a mother’s health affected her children’s. For example, Liang urged improvement in prenatal care because he believed that women’s general physical health affected racial vigor.18 In addressing these three issues, Liang outlined three of the four major themes that would inform the debate on women’s education and status for the next century. Taken together, they underscore the importance of political economy in the minds of family reformers. The fourth theme was the degree to which gender was a cultural construction. It was first taken up in 1897 by Tan Sitong, one of China’s most original intellectuals, in Ren xue (On benevolence). In this philosophical tract, Tan attacked the hierarchical principles of Confucianism and suggested that gender differences were merely cultural accretions.19 The first Chinese girls’ schools opened in the following year, 1898. With the turn of the twentieth century, the call for women’s rights grew stronger. In 1902, the monthly Shanghai periodical Nüxue bao
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(Women’s studies journal) warned women against relying on men to free them and called on women to become independent and fight for their own rights.20 In 1903, the pamphlet Nüjie zhong (Women’s bell) claimed six rights for women and articulated eight goals for their education. The author, Jin Tianhe (1874–1947), insisted that women had the right to attend upper-level schools, have companionship, do business, own property, travel and move about freely, and marry men of their own choosing. He advocated an education for women that would allow them to realize their own potential, free them from oppression, develop their minds so that they developed male sensibilities, mold their spirits so they could lead other women of the world, make them physically strong so they might bear healthy children, make them virtuous so that they might set a standard for the country, make them civic-minded, and preserve their integrity.21 In these years, several prominent female feminists emerged on the scene. For example, Qiu Jin (1875–1907) electrified audiences when she appeared dressed in men’s clothing and called for the equality of men and women. (An avowed patriot, she was executed in 1907 for attempting to lead an uprising against the Qing government.) In 1907 the feminist and anarchist He Zhen established the Women’s Rights Recovery Association (Nüzi fuquan hui). The Association advocated the end of male privileges and prohibited submission to men. Its members could not become concubines or second wives. In return, the Association promised to help all members in their fight against oppression, whether it be within the home or in society at large. He Zhen also edited the feminist-anarchist journal Tianyi bao (Natural justice). She was one of the few feminists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who refused to subordinate women’s struggle for equality to any other political goals or ideology.22 With the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republican government, some feminists pushed for suffrage. Tang Junying, a prominent leader of the women’s suffrage movement, led a small group of women in lobbying the National Council to include women’s right to vote and the principle of gender equality in the new constitution. When they were ignored, they broke into the meeting and, following the example of English suffragettes, broke windows and destroyed property until they were forcibly removed.23 Neither of the women’s proposals were included in the constitution. As we will see, during the New Culture Movement, the call for women’s rights grew in strength and broadened to include attacks on the traditional family. In January of 1916, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), a lead-
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ing figure in the New Culture Movement and a future founder of the Chinese Communist Party, published his article “Yijiu yiliu” (1916), which called for a new family system and promoted the values of individualism.24 In that same issue Tao Menghe, a teacher who joined the New Culture Movement and mentored the young men who produced New Youth, published his essay “The Woman Problem,” which introduced a Western perspective on the women’s movement.25 The next month, Wu Yu (1872–1949), a vehemently anti-Confucian scholar and poet, attacked the family and clan system as the foundation of despotism.26 In 1918, Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House appeared in Chinese translation and soon became extraordinarily popular among New Culture radicals, providing young men with a forum for the discussion of women’s liberation and, perhaps more important, a metaphor for their own liberation—Nora’s slamming door.27
the xiao jiating Only with the rise of the New Culture Movement did the abstract, often nationalistic concern about the traditional family crystallize into personal discontent. Critiques of the traditional family by turn-of-the-century reformers like Yan Fu, Tan Sitong, Kang Youwei, and Liang Qichao remained abstract and theoretical.28 Kang Youwei, for example, went so far as to suggest that a marriage contract, renewable each year, replace the ideal of lifelong marriage. In 1907, anarchists launched a full-scale critique of the family and women’s oppression, but they remained on the geographical and ideological fringes of intellectual circles.29 New Culture radicals, on the other hand, gave voice to widespread dissatisfaction with the family and proposed concrete solutions. They rejected the traditional family ideal that celebrated “five generations under one roof,” condemning the authority of elders who subordinated the happiness of the individual to the well-being of the family and determined each member’s education, occupation, and marriage in light of its impact on the larger group. New Culture radicals saw an alternative in the West. They traced the root of Western strength, in fact, to the conjugal family, a form that they believed fostered individual independence and enterprise. In place of the traditional joint family, they proposed the xiao jiating, literally the “small family.” Predicated upon free marriage choice, economic independence, and physical separation from the joint family, the xiao jiating ideal promised fulfillment of individual potential. With its emergence as an impor-
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tant New Culture issue, family reform left the radical intellectual periphery and began to penetrate the consciousness of educated urbanites.30 A close examination of family-reform rhetoric reveals that New Culture radicals shared much with earlier advocates of self-strengthening, like Liang Qichao. Although the reformed family that New Culture radicals proposed represented a radical break from traditional ideals, they built their rationale for change upon the ancient foundations of Chinese political culture that linked family and state order. New Culture participants were iconoclastic in their rejection of the joint family ideal but remained traditional in their conception of state-society relations: a stable and strong society depended on a properly ordered family. Thus, in this instance of cultural transformation and influence of the West we see a scenario much more complex than the collapse of cultural faith that Joseph Levenson has described.31 The New Culture radicals’ family-reform discourse reveals that although they had lost confidence in their culture’s content, they retained faith in its form. They no longer believed the traditional joint family capable of ordering society, but still assumed that societal order began with the family. The New Culture Movement presented itself as a thoroughly radical political and cultural movement and historians have treated it as such, focusing on its iconoclasm. But this focus has overshadowed the debt to traditional political culture so clearly manifest in the fundamental connection that the movement maintained between family order and state order. It is the reason why New Culture radicals saw that connection as obvious, necessary, and beneficial.32 The power of New Culture discourse on the family derived largely from the fact that it promoted a radical ideal by using a familiar formulation. Although New Culture radicals continued to use the language of national strengthening to justify their attack on the traditional family, the element of self-interest in their arguments added a new twist to the selfstrengthening argument. Late-nineteenth-century reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao advocated reforms that would certainly affect individuals, but they did not address individual interests and desires. New Culture radicals, although still presenting the nation as their ultimate interest, believed that a happy, fulfilled individual was the first necessary step toward national strength. Young men also certainly found attractive the independence that the conjugal family offered. Arif Dirlik observes that the “cultural revolution,” particularly family reform, derived its power from the justification of rebellion against authority in everyday life. Yet Dirlik overstates his
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case somewhat when he attributes to these young men the desire to overthrow authority.33 Although the New Culture Movement ushered in a number of significant social changes, most participants’ goals remained fairly conservative. They planned to push aside the patriarchs who restricted their personal and public lives, but they by no means wanted to destroy authority and patriarchy altogether. Rather, they hoped to carve a foothold for themselves within the Chinese patriarchal order and from their heightened vantage point exert control over their own lives and the lives of their families. In accordance with this vision, New Culture family reformers focused on restructured women’s roles in the family with an eye toward their own individual fulfillment and happiness. If men were to live the lives they wanted, if they were to redefine themselves and their nation, then they had first to redefine their families. Women became objects of reform because of the implicit expectation that they should make satisfactory companions for their modern husbands. Historians Chow Tse-tsung and Ono Kazuko have argued that New Culture rhetoric acknowledged women’s identity as individuals independent of men and championed women’s rights for their own sake.34 More recently, scholars have recognized that the rhetoric of women’s rights also articulated young men’s frustrations with their own position in the traditional, hierarchical family.35 Sociologist Judith Stacey has observed that “the most radical attack possible against the traditional family system was to assail its oppression of women, and therefore a critique of gender served young men in their own challenge to generational subordination. The logic of Confucian patriarchy made family transformation the primary idiom of political discourse and induced Chinese radicalism to assume a feminist cast.”36 Vera Schwarcz has also suggested that women’s rights became a vehicle through which young men wrestled with the difficult process of redefining themselves.37 In this connection she offers an acute explanation for the popularity of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House and its central character, Nora, among progressive urban youth early in the twentieth century. In search of a model of more individualistic rebellion they found that her final gesture—a door defiantly slammed shut against her assigned roles— echoed their struggle for emancipation from the family system. Nora’s unequivocal answer to her husband’s accusations that she was betraying her “sacred duties” as a mother and a wife engraved itself in the hearts of this generation: “I have a more sacred duty, my duty to myself.” The predicament of women thus spoke most directly to the emotional
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Introduction needs of young men trapped in social duties not of their own choosing. Examples of dissent drawn from the Confucian tradition of defiant but loyal ministers did not meet their need for a model of disloyal, unfilial egoism. Nora did just that. She fired the imagination of Chinese sons, who read about her, wrote about her, and even played her on the Chinese stage.38
The redefinition of manhood occupied the primary, if implicit, focus of the family-reform debate. Even as these young men tried to create new and modern identities for themselves, they continued to treat the family as the primary source of those identities. Thus, it only made sense that the qualities of other family members—in this case, wives—affected their visions of themselves. Under the joint family ideal, men drew their identities largely from the status, education, and wealth of the joint family— particularly through the stem that connected the paternal line. In the conjugal family ideal, husband and wife replaced fathers and sons as the core of the family. The status of a man’s paternal elders and forebears no longer determined his reputation. Instead, he was responsible for creating himself—with his wife’s help. As a result, New Culture radicals energetically discussed the “civilization of women” (funü wenming) and the redefinition of women’s roles in family and society. At the same time, New Culture radicals believed in patriarchal authority and the traditional link between family and state. They rebelled against their fathers’ authority because they wanted to be patriarchs of their own small conjugal families. Yet, in traditional Confucian fashion, they still believed in the organic link between family order and state strength. Thus, their suggestions for family reform rearranged family organization and gender roles in ways that supported, rather than questioned, patriarchal and state authority. In hindsight, this approach to women’s rights created much more freedom for men than for women. But it is unlikely that New Culture radicals consciously or cynically manipulated feminist rhetoric for their own purposes. As happened in so much of Republican reform discourse, these men entered the contest for family and nation with the best of intentions, but they armed themselves with a logic and rhetoric that ultimately failed them and those they wanted to help.
why discourse? Many historians have recognized the importance of “women’s liberation” and family reform in nineteenth- and twentieth-century China. A number of scholars have also explored the complex relationship between so-
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cialism and women’s rights and family reform, most notably Elizabeth Croll, Judith Stacey, Kay Ann Johnson, and Margery Wolf. They, and others, have concluded that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abandoned radical family reforms—the real troublemaker was the complete freedom to divorce—because it was afraid of alienating conservative peasants and losing their support. My study builds on the work of these scholars by examining a related phenomenon that has received little attention—the New Culture Movement’s vehement critique of the joint family system and the decades-long discussion of family reform that continued through the Republican era (1911–1949) and into the early years of the People’s Republic of China. Examination of the family-reform debate of the Republican period casts CCP “conservativism” in a very different light. I contend that the CCP did not maintain traditional family and gender hierarchies out of deference to peasant sensibilities. On the contrary, the Party developed its construction of family and gender roles, as well as its vision of statesociety relations, during the years it was based in China’s cities. The Party’s willingness to subordinate women’s rights to the needs of the state was, in fact, the product of a family-reform discourse that began with the urban New Culture Movement. Family-reform discourse offers us a new perspective on state-society relations in twentieth-century China, and presses upon us a significant reinterpretation of the New Culture Movement. The movement has long been understood as a radical break with the Chinese past, but the trajectory of family-reform discourse suggests a different interpretation. While the threat of colonization shook the elite’s confidence in the viability of Chinese culture, the threat to China’s sovereignty solidified an alliance between reformers and the state. The elite not only justified social and political iconoclasm as the means to strengthen the nation, but also called on the state to lead society in its evolutionary efforts. This contract eventually produced an impossible and dangerous entity—the Communists’ “revolutionary state.” Impossible because this phrase is an oxymoron: if revolution demands the upending of all established power structures, a state—which by definition is an entity that unceasingly pursues its own entrenchment—cannot be revolutionary; upon its formation, it begins almost immediately to solidify its authority. As Lenin, commenting on Marx, observed, the state “is a force standing above society and ‘increasingly separating itself from it.’”39 The phrase “revolutionary state” is not only logically problematic, it is also dangerous; when a state cloaks itself in a revolutionary identity, it claims for itself the au-
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thority to lead the nation into the future.40 In that capacity it also takes upon itself the responsibility for formulating change and judging all behaviors and customs. As the revolutionary body, it labels all opposition counterrevolutionary and so forbids critical thinking and independent action. Thus, the phrase “revolutionary state” is not simply a product of sloganeering or sloppy political terminology; rather, it reveals the logical impasse in which proponents of nation-strengthening discourse ultimately found themselves. Elite urban Chinese interest in the Western-style conjugal family (xiao jiating) and the family-reform discourse reformers created illustrates these processes. Of course, the Chinese adopted and adapted other foreign concepts like democracy, eugenics, and Marxism. In comparison with these other imports, however, for which no Chinese words existed, family-reform ideals were uniquely situated in the nation-strengthening discourse. Family, or home,41 albeit with a somewhat different definition than the Western one, was a concept deeply embedded in Chinese culture and inextricably bound into Chinese notions of state and society. Traditional precedents created a context in which new ideas about family could be integrated into the changing identities of China and its new citizens. A direct relation between discourse and behavior may not exist. Nevertheless, discourse provides insights into both values and behavior. Prescribed norms tell us how particular groups would like to order their world and why. As Stephanie Coontz observes, “Both as an institution and as a conception, the family mediates between people’s definitions of themselves as individuals and as members of society. It is one of the main tools we use to understand and define ourselves in relation to the overarching social structure.”42 By its very nature, discourse often comments on a broader range of issues than those it explicitly addresses. Lynn Hunt has demonstrated, for example, that pornography produced during the French Revolution was as much about a new political order as it was about libidos.43 Changes in ideals may precede changes in behavior.44 For example, the discourse of self-strengthening provided the rationale for the antifootbinding movement; a strong nation depended on the health of its people. Likewise, numerous examples suggest that the discourse of family reform did directly affect behavior. Wang Huiwu, the daughter of a poor schoolteacher, took New Culture ideals to heart, became an effective advocate of women’s rights, and emerged as a strong feminist leader in the very early years of the Communist Party.45 An anonymous respondent to a survey on marital satisfaction explained that because of
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the new marriage ideals he had recently become dissatisfied with his traditional wife.46 Republican sociologists Pan Guangdan and Chen Heqin found in the early 1920s that men in Jiangxi and Shanghai had indeed adopted New Culture expectations of their wives, especially with regard to education.47 Historian Wen-hsin Yeh has shown how new ideals of family and marriage reached Shanghai’s petty urbanites through Zou Taofen’s Life Weekly (Shenghuo zhoukan).48 In 1939 a scoundrel used the rhetoric of xiao jiating to seduce a young woman away from her family.49 The ideals of gender equality (or at least parity) that were important to new visions of marriage found expression in the Guomindang (GMD) family code of 1931 and later in the CCP Marriage Law of 1950. In the last decade of the Republican period (1940–1949), laboring women took advantage of the GMD code to attempt to divorce abusive or absent husbands.50 In the very early years of the Communist regime, peasant women, encouraged by Party models of marriage, used the Marriage Law to divorce undesirable husbands. Although much work remains to be done before we can fully understand family life in Republican China, existing evidence suggests that the discourse of family reform was far from irrelevant. From a historiographical viewpoint, it makes sense to understand prescriptive ideals of behavior before attempting to establish how people really lived their lives. In American and European historiography of women, family, and gender, study of the prescriptive ideal preceded our understanding of how these ideals affected women’s lives. Barbara Welter opened a new subfield in women’s history by reconstructing the Victorian white, upper-middle-class ideal of womanhood in her article “The Cult of True Womanhood.”51 The superstructure of the ideal, which Welter provided, created an analytical framework for the projects that followed. Later historians used her findings as a departure point for empirical researches into women’s lives and asked how socioeconomic status and race affected women’s roles and their ability and desire to live up to the “true womanhood” ideal. Moreover, Welter’s sketch of the dominant ideal allowed historians to gauge the significance and degree of the variation that they inevitably detected.52 Analysis of family-reform discourse also provides richer explanations for several much-discussed characteristics of Chinese culture and politics. Many historians have remarked on the persistence of “traditional” attitudes toward women among even the most radical of New Culture, GMD, or CCP reformers. Participants in, as well as historians of, these events have attributed the survival of unequal gender expectations to
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the pernicious influence of a “feudal” past. For example, Christina Gilmartin portrays male dominance within the Communist Party as a continuation of traditional patriarchy: “It seemed only too natural to them that men should hold the reins of power.”53 Although historians scrupulously record the perpetuation of gender bias, they share their subjects’ belief that these views of women derived from Chinese tradition. In fact, however, much of what has been attributed to “tradition” was not so much a vestige of the past as a product of the new formulation of women’s roles.54 Sharon Nolte and Sally Hastings have shown that the “traditional” Japanese family form was, in fact, fashioned by the Meiji government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.55 Their interpretation of the nature of family tradition applies equally well to China. The “traditional” woman’s role promoted by the participants in the family-reform debate, whether New Culture intellectuals, Nationalists, entrepreneurs, or Communists, had undergone significant transformations. In the traditional ideal, a good mother modeled ethical behavior for her children by working hard, running a frugal household, and submitting to family and paternal authority.56 In the iconography of good mothers, even single mothers took a fairly passive role in their children’s education. Mencius’s mother, the ancient Confucian paragon of motherly virtue, fulfilled her maternal responsibility simply by providing her son with an environment conducive to moral cultivation. This ideal assumed that elder male relatives and teachers would educate sons in letters and politics.57 Women played very much the same roles in relation to their husbands as they did to their children. The good wife labored tirelessly in the home, making sure it ran smoothly and economically, and provided her husband with little source of aggravation. She did not enter or interfere in the world outside the home. The modern ideal still expected women to devote themselves to reproductive labor in the home, but it also called upon mothers to take an active role in forming their children’s moral and civic virtues and provide them with the foundations of a formal education. This was not, in fact, a new role for elite women. They had played an important role in their children’s education since at least the Han.58 But instead of restricting themselves to the inner world of the home, modern women were supposed to connect their children to the wider world and to the nation, at least through their interests, vision, and education, if not through outright participation in wage labor or politics. Women retained primary responsibility for the household, but the conjugal family ideal trans-
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formed both the scope and the implications of their duties there. Whether through their frugal consumption of time and money, their reproductive labor in the home, or active production, women’s labor was presumed to have an indirect but important impact on the well-being of the polity.59 Moreover, wives were expected to be both housekeeper and companion to their husbands. The modern ideal continued to restrict women to the home, but it expanded somewhat the tasks they tackled there and imputed to them a greater significance. In fact, the modern ideal resembled the traditional one in many ways, even though it was created by men who believed they were overturning all tradition and authority. Family-reform discourse also sheds light on how the Chinese understood the concepts of nation and state. I think it is fair to say that during the Republican period—and at least in the early 1950s—most Chinese who thought about the political problems facing China may not have found this distinction very useful. Westerners use “state” to refer to the bureaucratic apparatus that handles the logistics of governance and taxation. “Nation” is that community to which we understand ourselves to belong. It is a source of identity. Certainly, some Chinese made a similar distinction. Sun Yatsen, for example, described the nation (minzu) as a “natural and pacific” entity that grew out of a shared Chinese identity and the state (guojia) as an “artificial and violent” construct that was forced on the Chinese by the Mongols and Manchu. But even so, Sun thought of the two as inextricably connected, likening the connection between state and nation to that of the organs to the body.60 In Republican and early Communist China, nation and state overlapped in a way that is not immediately apparent to us. Chinese reformers believed that the nation needed a strong governmental apparatus in order to survive: without a strong state there would be no nation. In a fundamental sense, the nation was the state and the state was the nation. Loyalty to the nation entailed loyalty to the state because without the state, the nation would perish. The conflation of nation and state explains how the state managed to grow even as government collapsed. As each failure further endangered national sovereignty, reformers called for an ever more powerful state structure. The would-be state builders—both the GMD and the CCP— identified themselves with the nation and put into place ever more invasive policies. The population accepted and even welcomed these policies because it believed they were necessary for China’s survival. In using national strengthening as their justification for reform, New Culture radicals struck a Faustian bargain with the powers and logic of
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rhetoric. The rationale of national salvation allowed them to swiftly dismantle long-lived structures of authority and dominance. They themselves benefited from the new freedom and power that the reforms promised young men. But the power to subjugate all reform to the needs of the nation circumscribed the debate from the very beginning. Even reformminded entrepreneurs of the 1930s, who came closest to proposing an individualistic socioeconomic order, retained allegiance to the state as part of their family and social reform discourse. When the state (Nationalist or Communist) became strong enough to situate itself as the material, and not only the rhetorical, recipient of self-strengthening reforms, no one—neither feminists, nor intellectuals, nor politicians, nor ideologues, nor entrepreneurs—possessed sufficient political and cultural capital to counter the state’s demands. Thus, we see that by linking family reform with state-strengthening, thereby making national salvation the ultimate justification for any reform, early Republican radicals gave up any claim to an oppositional role that could command legitimacy in the eyes of either the public or the state. The growth of the Chinese state—which took place independently of a centralized, or often even coherent, government—illustrates perfectly Michel Foucault’s theory of the modern state as one that controls not death, but life.61 Understanding the development of family-reform discourse sheds new light not only on the origins of Communist marriage ideals but also on the Party’s vision of state-society relations and the means through which it enhanced societal control. The CCP’s ability to convince family members to “draw a line of demarcation,” as it was known, between themselves and politically suspect relatives during political campaigns, to implement a one-child policy, and to crush student protests at Tiananmen is quite in line with the initial decision early in Republican-era history to give the nation primacy of importance in reform efforts and the state pride of place in implementing them. Much of what this study uncovers resonates with James Scott’s observations about “why so many well-intended schemes to improve the human condition have gone so tragically awry.”62 Scott believes “that many of the most tragic episodes of state development in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries originate in a particularly pernicious combination of three elements”: “high modernism,” a belief that those empowered with “the authority of scientific knowledge” can “discern and create [a] superior social order”; the state’s uncontrolled use of its power to implement plans for a scientific social order; and a “weakened or a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans.”63 Much
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of Scott’s work speaks to the bureaucratic and political disasters of the PRC—in fact, he briefly discusses the Great Leap Forward. Much of what Scott observes about the “high modernist authoritarian state” came to fruition in the PRC but took root in the late Qing and Republican periods. Throughout the Republican era, reformers of every political persuasion appealed to all manner of “scientific” knowledge to justify their proposals. Many intellectuals of the late nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, for example, believed in the explanatory powers of Social Darwinism. In “Jinggao qingnian” (Call to youth), the essay that ignited the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu urged his compatriots to embrace “Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy.”64 The Communists, of course, boasted of the power of “scientific” Marxist thought to unravel even the knottiest social and economic problems, while the Nationalists produced scores of questionnaires for all kinds of “scientific” surveys. Eugenics was of perennial interest during the Republican period and the sociologist Pan Guangdan, author of a survey that we will examine in chapter 1, was one of its most prominent advocates. Finally, family and women’s magazines offered their readers abundant advice on hygiene, nutrition, and the rational use of time and space. Republican politicians, intellectuals, and progressive urbanites formulated policies and reforms but failed to create the state apparatus necessary to implement them. Nevertheless, most Chinese interested in politics were anxious for the state to take a leading role in a new social and political order. As a result, when the CCP finally came to power in 1949, it imposed its vision of a “scientific social order” with relative ease. This welcoming of state intervention suggests an elaboration of Scott’s third point. He suggests that civil societies are brought to their knees by forces that are somehow exterior to the civil societies themselves: “War, revolution, and economic collapse often radically weaken civil society as well as make the populace more receptive to a new dispensation. Late colonial rule, with its social engineering aspirations and ability to run roughshod over popular opposition, occasionally met this last condition.”65 My study of the family-reform debate shows that given certain desperate historical circumstances, societies may prostrate themselves to authoritarian states in hopes of saving the nation. Reformers and revolutionaries of all political stripes welcomed state intervention and willingly subordinated individual rights to the demands of the state in return for its promise to save China. This allegiance to the state, of course, was forged in the context of the historical events that produced it. As Chandra Mohanty has noted, the
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formation of a nation-state proceeds differently and with different effects in nations under the threat of imperial invasion and rule.66 In China and in other countries oppressed by imperialism, the consistency with which advocates identified family reform with national strengthening distinguishes family reform from the path traversed by societies of western Europe and the United States. Because family reform was formulated as part of a response to imperialist invasion, the transformation of the Chinese family ideal was telescoped, consciously elaborated, and embedded in a nationalist agenda. Because reformers always presented family reform and its attendant support of women’s and individual rights as a means to national strength, individualism per se never became an end in itself. Indeed, many Republican thinkers disparaged the West’s valorization of the individual and many Chinese intellectuals, feminists included, continue to do so today. While acknowledging the value of these critiques, we must also recognize the limitations inherent within a discourse that insists that the good of the nation supersedes all. In the West, for example, where philosophical and ethical systems recognized the absolute value of the individual and individual rights, feminists fought for their rights by arguing that women, like men, were human and individuals and, therefore, deserved absolute equality. In China, however, because the nationalist cause overrode the rights of both male and female individuals, no such avenue existed for advancing the interests of any group independent of state or societal demands. As a result, both Republican- and Communist-era feminists found it impossible to counter family reformers’ demands that the home and children remained women’s primary responsibility, and China’s women have repeatedly found their interests subordinated to those of the state.67 Likewise, any challenge to state authority and control has been doomed to illegitimacy in a system for which the survival of the state was the ultimate goal. This is not to imply that values like individualism have not been connected to state-building programs. Benjamin Schwartz affirms Yan Fu’s observation that liberal values were connected to the rationalization of the socioeconomic “machinery” of the modern nation-state—the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, and industrialization. But as Schwartz points out, the difference lies in which goal is given precedence: Are values like individualism or gender equality, for example, adopted as intrinsically important or as a means to an end?68 My goal in this study is to understand the logic of the choices Republican Chinese made and their consequences. It is not my intention to blame the Chinese for plac-
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ing national survival above all else or champion the West for its valorization of individualism. Decisions are made in the context of the world that surrounds us and we have no idea how this story is going to end. The complexity of understanding how political, economic, and cultural forces shaped a particular moment is underscored by the fact that many of the developments that we have traced in the United States, western Europe, and other parts of the world appear also in China. China is not unique in its efforts to revise family ideals and gender roles. An interest in changes in family and concomitant gender relations and women’s status has been common in many cultures at revolutionary moments and at times of great economic or political stress. We could draw many parallels, for example, between China and late imperial and revolutionary Russia, the United States, France, Turkey, and Japan.69 In the course of the following discussion, I refer to these developments when they seem especially pertinent. A deeper and broader comparison is beyond the scope of this book. We see, for example, an intense and public interest in mothers’ role in training children and raising good citizens. The ideal of the companionate marriage makes its appearance, and with it an insistence on the importance of individual, rather than family, choice in marriage. With the spatial separation of reproductive and productive work we witness the emergence of a “cult of domesticity,” and an idealization of home as haven. Obsession with self-improvement—a phenomenon that became very prominent in the United States early in the 1900s—appears in Chinese Republican culture too. Consumerism, commercialization, and commodification of the home, family, and happiness were familiar phenomena to Republican urbanites. As in so many industrializing cultures, China also experienced the transformation of the family from a unit of production to a site of consumption, with women becoming the home’s primary consumers. Finally, as reformers tried to gain leverage against entrenched systems of patriarchal authority, they began to debate women’s proper place in home and society. When the state subsequently asserted itself over patriarchy, it pulled women into the struggle—supporting their rights as a counterweight to the traditional family system.70 Finally, the xiao jiating debate also highlights key differences between Chinese and Western conceptions of state-society relations. China ultimately rejected a social and familial model that “established the predominance of individual acquisitiveness over collective entitlement and defined the measure of the good society as private well-being achieved through consumer spending.”71 At the same time, Chinese political cul-
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ture required the government to consider the physical well-being of the populace—a concern that recalls the Mencian insistence that good rulers concern themselves with the welfare of the people. Victoria de Grazia notes a “paradox” in the development of late-nineteenth-century American politics: At the moment people were recognized as having the right to demand necessities, the notion of the necessary was narrowed, and the right to representation was denied to those who were most closely identified with the interests of the household in providing for basic social wants, namely, women. This paradox is not merely not recognized in liberal political theory but in a sense justified as indispensable to the development of a healthy modern civic culture. . . . According to this narrative, a civilizing politics of rights out of which constitutional government and modern political systems eventually evolved operated against a moral economy, one ruled by a primitive politics of needs and desires, that was irrelevant to or in any case outside of the evolution of modern representative politics.72
In China, concern for public welfare was not, ultimately, excluded from public debate and trivialized by being relegated to the “private.” In fact, Republican Chinese of all political stripes, with the exception of the anarchists, were committed to maintaining a moral economy. In China, a relative disinterest in individual and family privacy accompanied a concern about the moral economy. Coontz believes that as American families found themselves ever more involved in the state and market, they increasingly stressed privacy.73 This did not happen in Republican Chinese discourse on the family. Even the entrepreneurial xiao jiating, the most individualistic of all Republican models, displayed little interest in privacy. Urban Chinese also decided on a valuation of work different from that of the West. In the West, the appearance and growth of the private world and “subjectivity” was part and parcel of the development of capitalism; as production moved out of the home, people tended to separate work from the rest of life. On the one hand, this reflected the positive effect of industrialization—increased leisure time and the subsequent development of interest in self-cultivation and the valuation of both individuals in and of themselves, and the importance of human relationships as ends in themselves. On the other hand, this search for meaning in the self and in relationships reflected the loss of meaning in work and society.74 In Chinese cities, we see a similar growth in subjectivity and interest in the individual as traditions lose their meaning and productive
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work moves out of the home. But there family and society, personal and political have not been so radically separated. Social and work roles have maintained their significance and so personal relationships have not borne the entire burden of individual fulfillment. Perhaps this is the flip side of ongoing national crisis: in the struggle to save the nation, one’s work and social roles are full—perhaps too full—of significance.
the family-reform debate In China then, the indissoluble link between family and national reform meant that the contest to define the family was also, at a deeper level, a struggle for the right to define the Chinese nation.75 In her definition of the function of the family, Stephanie Coontz gives us an eloquent description of this phenomenon: The family regulates and limits the personal activities of its members while its members simultaneously shape, redirect, even dissolve and reconstruct the family to affect their role in the larger social network. The family is thus a “terrain of struggle,” both as a social unit working, with or against other groups in society, and as a changing set of personal interactions and conflicts over roles. Since the family is an explanatory and legitimating device, a symbol system that functions as ideology, as well as a concrete constellation of relationships in the larger socio-economic universe, its very definition is part of that struggle. That is why the family is always as much a political institution as a personal one.76
The four groups that dominated the family-reform debate—New Culture intellectuals, the Nationalist government during the Nanjing decade (1927–1937), Shanghai entrepreneurs in the 1930s, and the Communist regime after it came to power in 1949—fully understood that in the process of articulating their versions of the xiao jiating, they were also promoting a particular vision of the Chinese state. The following chapters discuss in turn each participant’s version of the xiao jiating. The chapters are ranged in roughly chronological order in order to concentrate on each group at the time when it dominated the debate and articulated its vision most clearly. This does not mean that one group picked up the discussion and then abandoned it to the next participant. The New Culture radicals started the debate, but by the early 1920s at least some members of the Communist and Nationalist parties and the entrepreneurial community had taken an interest in family reform. Nor did family-reform discourse develop from
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one stage to another like a maturing insect; teleology is essential to the beetle but death to history. Each group’s xiao jiating borrowed from and built upon the others,’ choosing to emphasize some aspects and downplay others. The xiao jiating ideal and the political culture it articulated did not have to unfold in the way they did. At the same time, in the political environment of the Republican era, certain choices made more sense than others. Each of the following chapters includes some examples—letters to the editor, survey responses, a love letter, court cases—that suggest how the xiao jiating ideal may have been put into practice. The primary focus of this study, however, is how this ideal articulated and shaped statesociety relations and ultimately facilitated state dominance of society and hobbled the potential for popular challenges to state authority. It is useful to think of the discourse on family as taking two different tacks. The forces promoting family reform used both prescriptive and coercive tactics. New Culture and entrepreneurial xiao jiating advocates offered an attractive ideal and urged their audiences to pursue it. Nationalist and Communist regimes did not abandon prescriptive models entirely, but they devoted much of their energies to coercive methods of legislation and judicial action. Despite the difference in these approaches—carrot versus stick—the two were connected: the prescriptive campaigns of New Culture intellectuals and entrepreneurs prepared urbanites to accept, and even welcome, the coercive demands of the Nationalist and Communist states. New Culture radicals set the terms of a family-reform debate that has continued into the Communist era. They established and firmly linked three elements—the self, the nation, and productivity—and posited the conjugal family as the mediating vehicle that would establish among them the appropriate order of priority and causation.77 Subsequent participants redefined the elements or weighted them differently, but they never promoted one element independently of the others or broke the links between self and family, nation, and productivity. New Culture family-reform discourse defined itself through a constellation of values that linked state-strengthening to economic rationalization, individual fulfillment, improved rights for women, and nationalism. The young, educated men who shaped the xiao jiating ideal embedded their call for family reform in the rhetoric of individualism, nationalism, and the demands of an industrializing economy. Their use of industrialization as an explanation for the Chinese family’s difficulties arose more from a desire to place China within the universal pattern
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of economic development posited by Marxism than it did from tangible changes in China’s economy. According to Marxist theory, the forces of industrialization doomed the patriarchal family to extinction. New Culture iconoclasts took this descriptive analysis, reversed the causation, and created a prescription for action: the patriarchal family had to be destroyed if China were to industrialize and modernize. They argued that the changing economy demanded greater individual self-determination; at the same time they justified their stress on the individual in terms of national strengthening. Likewise, reformers advocated education and rights for women as necessary tools for improving the nation’s wives and mothers. The ultimate justification of family reform and women’s rights in terms of national strengthening made the xiao jiating ideal particularly appealing to the state. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Nationalist government contributed to the debate by promulgating its New Family Law and choreographing new wedding ceremonies. The Nationalist government used the conjugal family ideal, with its emphasis on individual enterprise and self-determination, to protect individuals from the joint family’s control. By granting women near-equal divorce rights and increased property rights, and by giving men and women the right to choose their own mates, the state hoped to free much of the adult population from the joint family and thus encourage greater participation in the social and political sphere. The Nationalists, however, envisioned a strictly controlled citizenry whose social activities and patriotic contributions would be closely supervised by the state. By the mid-1930s, Shanghai’s entrepreneurial circles dominated the debate. Entrepreneurs who published commercial family magazines manipulated the linking of nation, individual, and productivity to encourage the development of the conjugal family as a unit of consumption. In this vision, women fulfilled their civic duties by practicing rational consumption, educating their children, and making the home comfortable for their husbands. Meanwhile, men contributed to the nation through rationalized, productive labor. In both cases, entrepreneurs marshaled the powerful rhetoric of family reform to promote their vision of a modern, industrialized China powered by a consumer economy. To date, the Communists have had the last word. In 1950 they promulgated their own Marriage Law and in 1953 they launched a campaign to promote its implementation. In the cities they strenuously countered petit bourgeois “misunderstandings” about marriage and love. In the countryside they conjoined productivity and prosperity with marriage
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reform. Despite the Party’s efforts to differentiate itself from Nationalist and entrepreneurial versions of family reform, it shared their assumptions and concerns. The Communists wanted very much to claim the legacy of a New Culture radicalism that had turned its back on China’s feudal past. In fact, however, of all the participants in the contest to define family and state, the CCP manifested most powerfully the invigoration of a traditional view of state-society relations that was the legacy of the New Culture Movement.
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chapter 1
Saving Self and Nation The New Culture Movement’s Family-Reform Discourse
Historians of the New Culture Movement have typically focused on either the movement’s nationalism or its romantic individualism and portrayed participants’ interest in family reform as an outgrowth of one of these two elements. Chow Tse-tsung remarks that young radicals believed that “to have all individuals liberated from the old passive thinking and from the self-sufficing and paternalistic family and clan system based on an agricultural society would strengthen the nation.”1 Roxane Witke argues that New Culture radicals attacked the traditional family because “while individualism might be possible to some degree within a loosened form of the old system, it was thought that adoption of the western model of the monogamous family would surely facilitate it.”2 Vera Schwarcz believes that young New Culture radicals “demanded a new ethical code that would make self-fulfillment a natural and widespread prerogative.”3 In fact, the impulses that drove family reform were more complex than these representations suggest. Although much of family-reform rhetoric prominently featured the language of nationalism and individualism, New Culture family-reform literature reveals that the primary impetus of the family revolution was the search of young, urban males for a new identity in a modernizing, industrializing society. Ultimately, socioeconomic issues, not nationalism or individualism, drove young men to challenge traditional family structure and authority. We cannot understand the significance of the family-reform movement or even account for its emergence unless we examine its socioeconomic components. A good place 27
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to start is with Jiating yanjiu (Family research), a popular family-reform journal that exposes the confluence of political, ideological, and socioeconomic factors that shaped the family-reform debate. It also reveals a New Culture radical quite different from the one we thought we knew: no romantic dreamer, this young, educated, urban man was deeply concerned about his own economic future and passionately involved in redefining himself as a member of an industrializing economy and a modernizing state.
founding family research As the epicenter of the New Culture Movement, the Beijing University campus saw a lively succession of student organizations. China’s first Marxism study society began there in 1920, and the New Culture Movement’s founding journal, New Youth, claimed the university as its headquarters. The campus seethed with an emerging youth culture. Mary Ryan has shown how the appearance of peer associations in early-nineteenthcentury Utica, New York, created new social spaces that facilitated a reworking of family roles.4 With the advent of the New Culture Movement, a similar phenomenon occurred in many of China’s cities. Only by organizing and orienting themselves to their peers were the movement’s young participants able to formulate their radical proposals for a new society. In fact, the creation of peer associations was one of the most important innovations of the New Culture Movement. Traditional social order in China, and to a lesser degree in the United States, organized itself through the web of connections within and among families. Blood and marriage ties defined group membership; individuals usually found themselves embedded in vertical relationships governed by the hierarchies of gender, age, and generation. In contrast, membership in peer associations was voluntary. People of similar ages formed single-sex organizations around a common interest. Ties within these groups tended to be horizontal and egalitarian. In China as in the United States, peer organizations implicitly contradicted the logic of traditional social organization. In January 1920, one of these peer groups coalesced to offer an explicit challenge to traditional family organization. Two Beijing students, Luo Dunwei (1898–1964) and Yi Jiayue (Yi Junzuo, 1899–1972), called together several “comrades” to discuss the “cruel circumstances” and “barbaric aggravation” that young people suffered in their families.5 Later that month, the group, which had grown by fifteen, established the Family Research Society (Jiating yanjiu she), with the intention of pro-
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viding a forum for discussing family reform and publishing a journal. The group decided to welcome additional members regardless of age or gender. (In fact, most members were men in their twenties.) Interest in the society spread quickly. On the first of February, the society held a large meeting at the New Knowledge Translation and Compilation Society (Xinzhi bianyi she). Three people from Shanghai and nine from Changsha promised to establish branch societies in their own cities.6 Intense interest in family issues prompted the Shanghai Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan), a large and prestigious publisher, to announce its intention to publish a volume of Yi Jiayue’s translations of foreign scholarship on the family.7 Clearly, the Family Research Society had struck a nerve. These charter members also made plans to publish a first issue of the journal Family Research, funding it with their own money. Although the society was founded in Beijing, the magazine was published in Shanghai, and the society maintained headquarters in both cities. The first issue appeared in mid-August 1920, and the journal continued publication for over two years. Original imprints may have numbered only a thousand, but each issue was reprinted at least once.8 A cloth edition of the first volume was published in 1923. Although the journal focused on a narrow slice of the Chinese population, devoting itself to issues that affected young urban men, especially their economic, educational, vocational, and conjugal independence, it drew readers from a broad geographical area. Letters to the editor arrived from all over China—most commonly from Beijing, Tianjin, Changsha, Changshu, Jiading, Suzhou, Wuxi, Shanghai, and Canton. One young man who became acquainted with the journal while in eastern China continued to correspond with the editors all the way from Yunnan. The two leaders of the Family Research Society, Yi Jiayue and Luo Dunwei, were Hunan natives.9 Both were part of the student culture of the early twentieth century in which young men of elite families often received an education abroad. After graduating from Beijing National Number Four High School in 1916, Yi studied government and economics at Waseda University in Japan. Two years later he returned to China. That summer he joined the Young China Association (Shaonian zhongguo). In the fall he entered the second year of Beijing University’s program in law and government. The following year he joined the Socialism Study Society (Shehui zhuyi yanjiu hui) and the Marxism Study Society (Makesi zhuyi yanjiu hui).10 In 1920, the same year he co-founded the Family Research Society, he helped found the anarchist Struggle So-
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ciety (Fendou she) and its magazine. In January of 1921 he joined the Literary Research Society (Wenxue yanjiu hui). Later that year he graduated from Beijing University and went back to Waseda University to continue his studies. He returned to China the following autumn and went with Yu Dafu to teach for a semester at Anhui College of Law and Administration (Anhui fazheng zhuanmen xuexiao). After graduating from Waseda in March of 1923, Yi went to Shanghai, where he taught literature at Shanghai China Public School (Shanghai Zhongguo gongxue) and served as an editor at Taidong Press (Taidong shuju). Yi joined the Guomindang in 1924. Thereafter he applied his editing skills to Nationalist Party organs while continuing to teach. We know much less about Luo Dunwei. He may have received some education in London. He wrote a number of books on marriage and family issues in China and on socialism, economics, and the nation. Before the War of Resistance (1937–1945), he taught at Beijing University, China University, and Chaoyang University. Some time before the beginning of the War of Resistance, Luo also served as secretary to the Guomindang’s Department of Business (Shiye bu).11 Yi and Luo were by no means unique in their interests. Rather, they articulated the ideas and concerns that preoccupied many of their young, college-educated, urban contemporaries. The two probably knew many of the men who contributed to and edited the literary and reform publications that appeared in the last years of the New Culture Movement. As students on the Beijing University campus, they could not help but be familiar with New Youth and the ideas it popularized—among them, Marxism, anarchism, and family reform. While publishing Family Research, Luo and Yi lived and worked in the Taidong Press building, where their magazine was printed. The first floor housed the printing presses, and the second and third floors served as offices and dormitories for Taidong editors. There, in the spring of 1921, Yi and Luo rubbed shoulders with Guo Moruo, popular at that time for his contributions to the Shanghai daily Shishi xinbao’s (China times’s) literary supplement, “Xuedeng” (Light of learning), and soon to become famous for Nüshen (The goddesses), a set of poems he would publish in Chuangzao she congshu (Creation society collectanea).12 They also counted among their acquaintances Cheng Fangwu,13 one of the founding members of the Creation Society.14 Yi introduced Family Research with a justification that neatly summarized the rationale for family reform and its connection to the rest of the New Culture Movement: “Since the beginning of the ‘New Culture
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Movement,’ those of us who want to be a ‘person’ [ren] have been called upon to marshal our ‘creative instincts’ [chuangzao de benneng] and ‘natural inclination to improve’ [xiangshang de tianxing] in order to liberate and reform irrational and unnatural institutions and customs. But ‘the family problems’ [jiating wenti], which bear an important relation to this, have been put to the side and ignored.”15 Yi’s call to arms resonated with key New Culture concerns. The issue of personhood had engaged New Culture radicals from the beginning; they proffered the individual as a challenge to a society that subordinated the interests of the individual to the group. Yi’s readers would surely have understood his use of “creative instincts” and a “natural inclination to improve” to refer to Social Darwinist interpretations of individual and social evolution. His exaggerated claim that family problems had been “ignored” justified the need for a journal devoted entirely to the issue of family reform.16 At the same time, it also expressed the frustration that gripped many participants as they struggled to disentangle themselves from the web of the family.
the family: a historical artifact Not that individualism was celebrated as an end in itself. The young men who organized Family Research claimed that family reform was a necessary first step in China’s modernization; if they were to develop their full potential and contribute to the reform movements sweeping urban China, they had to be happy at home. This amalgam of political necessity and individual desire pervaded the journal’s essays. In lieu of a formal opening-issue manifesto, Yi Jiayue wrote a detailed and forceful essay that linked personal dissatisfaction in the family with faults in the family system. Individual problems, he argued, were manifestations of systemic crisis.17 By attributing family problems to a systemic breakdown, Yi suggested that the traditional family was not an inevitable and universal organizing principle but a social construction subject to change. Yi contended that contemporary forces had eroded the foundations of the traditional family and would soon destroy it. One such contemporary force was the movement to liberate women, which, by making them aware of their own personhood, inspired them to rebel against the “irrational control by men” and participate directly in social and world progress. As a result, “the marital relationship . . . had become problematic.” The increasing distance between parents and children dealt the family system a second blow: “Since the implementation of the educational system, children’s
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education, for the most part, has been taken out of parents’ hands and placed in the government’s. The same is true with work.”18 As industrialization moved work out of the home and into the factory, it also eroded family solidarity. The extended or patriarchal family system had developed over time, Yi reminded his readers, clearly implying that the present family system was neither necessary nor self-evident and that it, too, would need to respond to socioeconomic pressures. For Yi, the most sensible response was to dismantle the family: if there were no family system, or no joint family system, then “we would not suffer from the pain of the family.”19 Yi’s conception of the problem may seem rather simplistic. But he was not alone. The historian Arif Dirlik believes that early-1920s intellectuals applied Marxist theories of history in a relatively superficial fashion that generally ignored class analysis.20 For this reason, he prefers to characterize their historical interpretation of Marxism as “a variant of evolutionist theory based on economic change” rather than as historical materialism.21 Nevertheless, the theory that Yi learned in the Marxism Study Society gave him tools with which to attack the legitimacy of the patriarchal family system. By arguing that economic conditions shaped family organization, he removed the traditional Chinese family from the realm of the eternal universal and placed it firmly within the mundane world of historical change. Yi’s contemporaries also used historical materialism to critique the Chinese family. Hu Hanmin (1879–1936), a prominent Guomindang leader, wrote an article in the spring of 1920 that connected various types of kinship organization to transformations in the economic system and the divisions of labor that supported it.22 Earlier that year, Li Dazhao (1889–1927), an early Chinese Marxist, had similarly argued that the patriarchal family was a product of an agrarian economy that would be destroyed as China industrialized.23 Hu, Li, Yi, and Luo upset the normative moral construct of family by introducing the notion that family form was determined by socioeconomic forces. Although historians have focused on the nationalist and individualistic motives of family reform, the New Culture participants themselves told a different story, crediting industrialization and economic change for its impetus. Luo Dunwei listed four trends, all socioeconomic, that would result in the “natural extermination” of the joint family: (1) As transportation becomes more convenient, people travel far and are unable to be home very often. (2) Industry is concentrated in the cities; work is concentrated in the factories; there is no housing capable
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of holding extended families. (3) Life grows more difficult; one cannot marry early—[but rather] must marry late. One cannot focus on having children early in order to see five generations; extended families naturally cannot be established. (4) Wages do not surpass daily need. If one cannot gather together considerable property, then naturally one does not have the financial resources to set up a joint family. For these reasons, the joint family, which is ill-fitted to the times, is “falling apart on its own”; it doesn’t need us to blow it over.24
The theme of industrialization and the subsequent limitation of wages and living space concerned many contributors to Family Research. Yet these students did not hold factory jobs.25 In fact, when Luo wrote the article quoted above, Chinese manufacture had barely begun to industrialize. How then, do we explain the prominence of this theme? The rapidly expanding Chinese publishing industry allowed these students to keep abreast of contemporary scholarship on industrialization and the family in the United States and Europe. This awareness, coupled with their interest in Social Darwinism and Marxism, led them (as it did Western scholars) to construct a model of the development of family organization.26 Most Western and Chinese authors presented the conjugal family centered around a companionate marriage—what William Goode has called conjugal marriage27—as the most socially and culturally advanced form of family organization and the hallmark of an industrialized capitalist economy. Luo and his contemporaries were not describing a contemporary process they could observe, but rather were invoking a universal law of economically determined social development dictated by a Marxist interpretation of history. By attributing social and cultural change to the effects of industrialization, Luo claimed a place for young men and for China within the process of modernization and industrialization that had empowered the West and Japan. This “economic theory of evolution” not only helped New Culture radicals place the Chinese family in a historic context but also gave them a way in which they and China could participate in history.28 Dirlik’s observation about Marxist historians in the 1930s applies equally to men like Yi and Luo in the early 1920s: “Their primary concern was to understand the past so as to carry out the task of revolution in the present.”29 David Roy has traced Guo Moruo’s embrace of MarxismLeninism to a similar impulse: “He felt that by becoming an adherent of this doctrine he could join forces with history and regain his sense of pride and responsibility as a participating member of an ancient culture with a badly bruised sense of self-esteem.”30
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Thus, Marxist historiography, which began as an analytical description of the past, became a prescription for shaping the future.31 As Guo Moruo declared, “For this age in which we live Marxism provides the only solution.”32 Family reformers seized upon the Marxist description of a historical process—industrialization destroyed the traditional family—and reversed its causal direction: the traditional family must be destroyed so that China could industrialize. To prove their point, they would marshal historical and contemporary examples of how patriarchal control of education, vocation, mobility, money, and marriage restricted productivity and stunted the potential of China’s youth. But for a variety of reasons, the proposed reforms were easier to catalogue than to carry out. Whereas in the United States and Western Europe industrialization provided viable alternatives to the family economy, in Republican China occupational opportunities were much more limited. Despite Yi’s and Luo’s claims to the contrary, industrialization in China was still in its infancy. Factory jobs were restricted to the larger port cities and many white-collar jobs—those of bank clerks, shop clerks, and managers—were either nonexistent or still dominated by an apprenticeship system. A strong class bias may have discouraged these young intellectuals from taking these jobs anyway. Elite men and women who chose to strike out on their own confronted limited opportunities. Many hesitated to act on their principles and oppose patriarchal authority for fear that their elders would retaliate by refusing them financial support.33 The reformers were by no means blind to these obstacles, and in response to these needs some members of the Family Research Society and others outside the society helped found the Youth Independence Association (Qingnian zili hui). The purpose of the association was to aid those who “had truly suffered family anguish and were unable to support themselves,” because “youth who suffered all manner of family anguish and were unable to support themselves tended to extreme acts, and even became so pessimistic as to commit suicide.” Assistance was contingent on detailed proof of one’s circumstances.34 The association was planned as a communal organization, with the men running a printing shop and the women sewing, mending, and weaving. Expenses for room, board, education, and entertainment were to be paid out of common funds (gongjia gongji).35 Whether the society ever got the Youth Independence Association up and running is unknown.36 What is clear, though, is that the reformers took very seriously the distress of the youth who were unhappy in their families. To better “relieve the suffering of today’s Chinese youth who suffer family anguish,”
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table 1. age of jiating yanjiu survey respondents
Age 16–19 20–25 26–30 30+ total
No. of respondents 7 11 3 1 22
source: JTYJHK 1, no. 3 (January 1921): 74–86.
the Family Research Society decided to study the object of its interest. In October 1920, the society placed advertisements in four popular newspapers—Beijing’s Chen bao (Morning journal) and Weiyi ribao (The only daily) and Shanghai’s Shishi xinbao (China times) and Minguo ribao (Republican daily). The body of the ad read, “Attention, all those who are experiencing family suffering . . . please come and meet or write Mr. Yi Jiayue . . . and report your bitter circumstances.”37 In little more than a month’s time, thirty-four men and one woman responded, either by letter or in person, with accounts of family conflict. The editors categorized these reports into four subject groups: marital anguish, suffering at the hands of the family head, economic privation, and inexpressible anguish (shou tongku shang wei mingyan de). Most respondents also provided their name, age, native place, contact address, and occupation or education. The youngest respondent was sixteen, the oldest thirty-six. As table 1 shows, most respondents were between the ages of sixteen and twentyfive, the years when most Chinese were betrothed and married. The range of the respondents’ native places indicates the geographic mobility of Family Research’s audience: all but two provinces were represented and no province accounted for more than three people. Many currently resided in Beijing; more than half provided a contact address in that city. The occupations given for eighteen respondents also suggest that the journal broke through occupational as well as geographical barriers. Only half of the eighteen respondents who gave an occupation were involved in academic life (eight students and one “professional”). The remaining nine included the section chief of the commercial Port Affairs Finance Office of Hulu Dao; a military man; a member of the Board of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce; a Huning Railroad English-record keeper;
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a man who worked in the Ministry of Finance Printing Office; a merchant; a pawn shop apprentice; and a school janitor. The editors were disappointed to count only the one woman among their respondents.38 The society seems to have used these replies largely for its own information. In his report, Yi referred to various incidents culled from the survey in order to confirm the need for family reform. The society also appears to have investigated at least some respondents, as Yi’s comments below suggest. Whether the society intervened on behalf of any of the respondents is unclear. By definition, this sample included those who felt persecuted by their families. Yi Jiayue recognized the potential for bias inherent in these onesided reports and acknowledged that they might not accurately describe family circumstances. He seemed especially worried about getting only men’s side of the story and issued this warning: With the exception of Mrs. Chen, all those reporting on marital anguish are men: Now, is what comes out of a man’s mouth about his wife’s faults true or false? This awaits careful examination: for example, Li’s relationship with his wife was just the opposite of what he said it was. And Nong Fenfen said his wife’s “appearance is not sufficient to satisfy his desire.” What kind of talk is this? Consequently, it is necessary that each case be carefully investigated. It is very important! Very important!39
Whatever the truth of their situations, the young men who responded to this ad were deeply unhappy with the control their families exercised over every aspect of their lives. The family decided their education, vocation, and place of residence, allowed or restricted their travel, controlled their financial resources, and made their marriages.40 Young people were rarely consulted in any of these decisions. Ultimately, these young men (and women too) yearned to control their own destinies and to shape the future of China. In this regard, New Culture radicals developed a vision of themselves that had much in common with nineteenth-century American ideals of manhood. The historian Elaine May has written about these American ideals in ways that are instructive here: Millions of young men knew the formula, expounded most widely by Horatio Alger, that luck, pluck, ambition, and self-control were the ingredients necessary to become self-made. They learned in church, at home, and in the popular literature what was expected of American manhood. The key element was moral autonomy: total control over one’s instincts as well as independent pursuit of one’s calling. Perhaps the core of this code was economic self-mastery. Ideally, a man would be his own boss,
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own his own property, and control his own means of production. The industrious man worked without need of external restraints. Using his freedom to compete in an open economy, he served his own best interests as well as those of his family, community, and nation. The essence of this entrepreneurial ethos was in tune with the republican spirit of individual liberty. A striving man was the perfect citizen, for his ambition furthered, rather than hindered, the goal of national progress.41
Early in the twentieth century, New Culture radicals defined themselves in similar terms. Like their American counterparts, young Chinese insisted on complete control of their lives and fervently believed that individual autonomy would fuel production and speed national progress. The Chinese radicals themselves recognized this parallel with the Americans. Early issues of New Youth featured essays by prominent Americans and, to a lesser degree, Europeans on the proper and profitable use of one’s intellectual and material resources. These essays, published in English and accompanied by Chinese translations, promoted the values of thrift, tenacity, self-discipline, independence, self-respect, science, political freedom, and love of learning. They included selections from Ben Franklin’s autobiography, Henry Beecher’s essay “Genius and Industry,” and an essay by the Scottish social reformer Samuel Smiles titled “Money—Its Use and Abuse.”42 New Culture radicals looked to these essays for a philosophy of life that valorized the individual even as it maintained a commitment to the communal good. Family Research articles consistently combined individualistic claims with collective goals, arguing that the individual’s rights and happiness played a vital role in social progress and national strength. For example, Luo argued that social progress could not occur in the absence of individual development.43 In another, unattributed essay, the author asserted, “As a matter of fact, the root of the nation is the family, and the root of the family is the person. If the person suffers family anguish, how can there be a good nation?”44 Roy has observed that Guo Moruo turned to Marxism-Leninism because he believed it held out the best possibility for the full realization of the self.45 Hu Shi made an important contribution to this outlook in his essay on Ibsenism, which appeared in New Youth in June 1918. He quoted part of Ibsen’s letter to a friend: “What I hope from you is a pure kind of egoism. If you should want to be of benefit to society there is no better way than to fashion yourself into a useful tool. There are times in which I feel that the whole world is like a mass of colliding ships and the most important thing is to save oneself.”46 Vera Schwarcz argues that here Hu equated “pure egoism” with
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“true altruism” (i.e., one best served society by serving oneself) and that this link became for Chinese intellectuals the most significant element in A Doll’s House.47 Thus, New Culture radicals’ attacks on family and the patriarchy that oppressed them arose from a complex mixture of desire for individual freedom and concern for China’s place in the drama of world history. They portrayed the family patriarch as the greatest obstacle to individual freedom, family reform, and national strengthening. The xiao jiating (conjugal family) promised to free the individual to develop the talents that would ultimately create a stronger China. They hoped the state would reciprocate by creating the environment they needed to realize their potential. Guo Moruo articulated these sentiments when he declared, “Matter is the mother of spirit. A high development and equal distribution of material civilization will be the placenta of a new spiritual civilization.”48 Thus, New Culture radicals strengthened the links between self, family, and nation that had been part of the political culture since the Great Learning by encouraging greater state intervention into family and private life than the Chinese state had heretofore enjoyed, or even wanted.
the patriarch problem The primary target of the New Culture radicals’ ire was the patriarch, whom they attacked for both the power he wielded and the power he represented. Because Confucian ideology set up each patriarch as the moral leader of his family and insisted on the interconnectedness of family, society, and state, it was not surprising that young men blamed the patriarch for the breakdown of the Chinese world. As Wen-hsin Yeh has shown, some of the Republican era’s most radical activists were young men who had most fully internalized Confucian morality and its tenets of benevolence, duty, and responsibility.49 Once betrayed by that moral order, they cast it aside, determined to create a new one. As the representative of Confucian authority in the microcosm of the family, the patriarch became the scapegoat for the failed promises of the Confucian order. Moreover, toppling the patriarch, although difficult, was at least conceivable. Impatient for change but unable to effect an immediate transformation of the Chinese economy or political structure, these young men attacked the patriarch both for his control over their lives and as a standin for the nebulous forces of “power” and “class” that strangled China.50 The centerpiece of Family Research’s attack on the patriarch was Yi’s two-part, forty-page “Superficial Discussion of the Patriarch Problem.”
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Yi wrote, “Although many aspects of the family need reform, the very first that must be eliminated is that disgusting thing—the family head. Because no matter what aspect we are discussing, the family head always represents power, class, and an impediment to social progress.”51 The essay articulated the complaints and criticisms that appeared in many letters to the editor and in numerous essays and drew on recent Western scholarship on the evolution of the family to make historical sense of these complaints. Yi noted that in ancient societies, a patriarch was perhaps necessary, directing as he did important activities like kidnapping, wife-selling, and worship. Herding societies had become accustomed to patriarchal authority because they often chose the oldest male as the strongest and ablest leader. Because joint families functioned as units of both consumption and production, they needed one person— the patriarch—to take charge of family finances.52 Moreover, in lieu of government-sponsored education and a police force, the education and supervision of the family fell to the patriarch.53 But if social and economic conditions produced the patriarch, Yi reasoned, then changes in those conditions could also destroy him. Yi sketched a momento mori for the patriarch when he recounted the history of the Roman family system. The Roman patriarch, he claimed, had also wielded an absolute power supported by veneration of ancestors. Because kinship ran through the male lineage, the production of male heirs became paramount there too. Like his Chinese counterpart, the Roman patriarch also controlled family property. But, Yi reminded his readers, even the Roman patriarch, whose authority at one time seemed unassailable, succumbed to social and economic changes. The worship of gods and the spirit of scientific inquiry destroyed ancestor worship. The destruction of the old government system placed family heads under the supervision of city mayors. The increased frequency of divorce, initiated by both husbands and wives, further undermined his authority. Having developed among nomadic herders, the patriarchal family became increasingly obsolete in subsequent agricultural, commercial, and industrial economies.54 Yi also cited historic Greece and Germany and nineteenth- and twentiethcentury Russia as examples of countries where strong patriarchal systems had begun to collapse. In each country, Yi concluded, the patriarch had met his inevitable demise: “In sum, European patriarchy . . . if not already long destroyed, is gradually weakening even now. This proves that this thing, the family head, is inappropriate for the times, and this is a natural trend. Nowadays, anywhere in Europe or the United States,
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try asking if the patriarch system still survives!”55 Yi used Marxist theory and Western scholars’ work on the connection between economic development and family transformation to prove that the traditional Chinese family was also bound for obsolescence. Yi’s readers easily grasped the message implicit in his historical survey: in stubbornly clinging to the traditional family, China was falling behind the march of global progress. Yi portrayed the patriarch as a vestigial organ that had survived in East Asia even though the forces of social evolution had made the patriarch irrelevant.56 He claimed that agricultural societies needed the leadership of the most intelligent, rather than the most physically powerful and experienced; thus, the eldest male was not necessarily the best suited for leadership. At the same time, new institutions like public education, a police force, and the court system superseded patriarchal authority altogether.57 Yi argued that the patriarchal family had outlived not only the socioeconomic conditions that produced it, but also the political assumptions upon which it rested. In taking this approach, he exercised a logic that followed inevitably from the collapse of the dynastic system in 1911. Confucian ideology posited five key relationships—emperor and minister, husband and wife, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, friend and friend. Because these relationships were ontologically interdependent, proper comportment in one relationship reinforced the others. With the collapse of the dynastic systems, one of the fundamental pillars of the Confucian system collapsed. If the emperor-minister relationship could, in fact, be rejected, every hierarchical relationship was threatened.58 Yi likened the family head to the emperor; both wielded absolute power on the basis of birth rather than ability. Although the limitations of the emperor system had been recognized, contemporary patriarchs presided over their families with the arbitrary and absolute power of an emperor, unconcerned with anything but securing status and a comfortable old age.59 The Draft Civil Code still accorded the family head the power to make all decisions related to marriage, inheritance, the division of the household, and place of residence.60 The patriarch’s decisions carried the full force of law, even though he might be illiterate, “stupid as a deer or pig,” and immoral.61 Yi saw signs of collapse everywhere. He insisted that new values had transformed the parent-child relationship and argued that the great “new tides” of women’s liberation and youths’ independence had changed the way women and young people felt about their husbands and fathers:
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“They feel that the value of the father or husband rests only in ties of blood or love. Aside from this, authority, dignity, and filiality are all little wings on a paper tiger. They are nothing to be afraid of!”62 Yi also saw student self-government as proof that the patriarch had outlived his usefulness. He observed that students could govern themselves and that the family would have to do likewise if it were to survive.63 Yi maintained that because of these changes, “Even if we act magnanimously and do not abolish it, the patriarchal system will give up the ghost by itself.” In fact, Yi was so impatient for the patriarchal system to make its exit that he wanted to eliminate the father altogether: “I not only want to rescind his standing as family head, I also want to rescind his standing as father.”64 Yi saved his most vehement critique of the patriarchal family system for its economic ramifications:65 The aspect of economic life that we think most important lies in free choice of occupation and the mobility of the labor force. With these freedoms each person may pursue the occupation that he believes suits him best. Only in this way can humankind develop and society benefit from the increase in efficiency. But the patriarchal system is diametrically opposed to this. One person controls the entire family and forces everyone to live together. He impedes on all sides their moving away or living separately, and adds senseless restrictions to their choice of work and mobility. [It] really is preposterous!66
Patriarchal control stood between China and a modern economy and nothing less than complete independence would open China’s path to the future. Family-reform radicals drew a dark picture of a willful and unprincipled family head who controlled all the family property and disposed of it as he wished: “He can use it to buy opium, take a mistress, and cheat and oppress his children.” Yi claimed that although children had property rights under the law, the father could harass them until they surrendered their property to the family. As for the patriarch’s use of his own money, Yi suspected that “he probably gives [it] to his three concubines so that they can use it for their future marriages or take it home to their mothers’ households.” Meanwhile, his children “have to wait until the new year before they receive a dollar or two.”67 Yi’s accusations were meant to undermine the moral authority of men who would place the pleasure of their concubines above the well-being of their children. Yi’s tirade against the patriarch, as well as other New Culture “patricides,” is best read not as a dependable record of family dynamics, but
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rather as a rationale for rejecting the principles of hierarchy, deference, and benevolence that had characterized traditional Confucian family ideals. In their efforts to justify a family revolution, New Culture radicals exaggerated the abusiveness of fathers, underplayed the authority of mothers, and ignored the power of members of the joint family— uncles, aunts, grandmothers—to temper patriarchal tyranny. The radicals’ self-interested characterization of the family is nowhere more evident than in their portrayal of their mothers. Mothers are almost absent from this discussion, and when they do appear they are sympathetic but powerless witnesses to the father’s tyranny.68 In fact, we know that among elite families, women wielded considerable economic influence and moral authority within the home.69 As Dorothy Ko has demonstrated, New Culture radicals used the trope of powerless and victimized women as a rhetorical strategy to argue the importance and necessity of their cultural and political agendas.70 The fact that mothers serve principally as props in this rhetoric is underscored by the two-dimensional portraits their radical sons paint of them. Men rarely discuss their relationships with their mothers and they rarely speak on their mothers’ behalf. Even when discussing mistresses and concubines—an issue that affected many of these men’s mothers—radicals like Yi spoke only from the vantage point of the ill-treated son. The knot of anxiety surrounding issues of property and power in the traditional family can be separated into several strands. In both China and the West, New Culture attacks on the patriarch have been interpreted as an expression of a new sense of the individual. Although this sense is by no means absent from Yi’s critique, parts of his diatribe against the patriarch read like an accusation of betrayal rather than of oppression. Much of what Wen-hsin Yeh has said about middle-county radicals applies to New Culture radicals involved in the critique of the family. Yeh suggests that Shi Cuntong (1899–1970) rejected the Confucian system in which he was raised precisely because his elders failed to live up to Confucian ideals of benevolence and virtue.71 Yi was angry for just this reason: patriarchs were demanding obedience even though they failed to consider their children’s welfare. In short, Yi attacked the patriarch because he violated the Confucian code of reciprocity—deference for benevolence. To make matters worse, the legal codes did not redress this moral failure. Yi complained bitterly that the Draft Civil Code gave the family head many rights but few duties. He could disinherit children, choose heirs, bequeath property, and withdraw or provide financial support at will.72
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His only duty was to support family members to the extent that his resources allowed. Yi claimed that this provision was tantamount to relieving the patriarch of any real responsibility to support his family. Even if a father violated the injunction to support his children, the children had no real means by which to force him to fulfill this duty. Why is this? Because the extent of the patriarch’s financial resources are known only to himself and perhaps his mistress. It is common knowledge that the court’s investigations are unreliable. The patriarch may obviously have money but may not want his son or daughter to go to school. He can say to the court, “It is not that I am against my children receiving an education, but rather my resources are insufficient.” And the law will certainly forgive him. I have a cousin whose situation is just this.73
Yi’s rage finds two targets here—the corrupt patriarch who shirks his responsibilities and a legal system that not only fails to bring him to heel but also gives his authority the weight of law. That the patriarch could use his financial and legal power to bully his children into submission infuriated Yi, who saved his most vitriolic attack for a provision in the Draft Civil Code that stipulated that family members deserved support only if they had not “erred” (guoshi) and could not support themselves. As for the condition that one not err, in today’s context it is difficult to say what an error is. The parents want him to do some small job and he is unwilling. Is this a kind of error? The parents arrange his marriage and he publishes an announcement in the paper avowing his refusal to recognize it. Is this an error? Or, taking a step back, because he has matured but is not allowed to marry, he visits prostitutes. This seems to be an error, but is it not the parents’ fault? Or the fault of social organization?
Yi went so far as to challenge parental authority over a daughter’s sexuality and the double standard that made her virginity so valuable: If sons’ [situations] are like this, we know how it must be for daughters. Usually they do not let the daughter take a step outside the door. But the daughter, because her sexual urges have developed, has a relation with her lover. [The patriarch] pulls his hair, his anger rises, and he continuously rants about the family’s ill fortune. Kinder parents marry her off right away, no matter whether to a chicken or a dog. The more fierce throw her out and urge her to kill herself. And the law will not charge the family head with murder.
Yi refused to accede to a patriarchal authority that spawned the very abuses it condemned. In concluding his indictment of patriarchal tyranny,
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he lashed out at the society that fostered such abuses of power: “Under today’s social system, who knows how many youths have been unjustly killed because of the family head’s power?”74 Yi saw an extreme situation whose remedy required extreme measures. He did not merely urge China’s patriarchs to loosen their purse strings and govern their families with benevolence and restraint. Instead, Yi advocated abandoning entirely the system that he believed had destroyed its young people. He argued that the passivity and dependence of working for the family was itself both shameful and exploitative. Without the freedom to choose their own vocations, young men lost the opportunity to develop their talents and acquired a passivity ill-suited to the modern world. Moreover, those who worked for their families got very little in return—only room, board, and daily necessities. With no savings or investments of their own, young people were completely vulnerable to patriarchal malfeasance and ineptitude. Only economic independence could save China’s youth from the patriarch’s stranglehold.75 Family Research’s editors and contributors longed to strike out on their own. As part of their efforts to escape the family’s control, they promoted the xiao jiating ideal. Whereas the traditional family subordinated the individual to the family, the xiao jiating celebrated individual autonomy and volition. At its heart stood a husband and wife who had married for love. They lived independently of their families, forming their own household and supporting themselves with their own income. In the xiao jiating ideal, New Culture radicals combined their desire for individual fulfillment and dedication to national salvation. They believed that the happiness and personal satisfaction they would find in this new family organization was crucial to China’s economic productivity and social progress.
“marriage is mutual help, marriage is love” The xiao jiating ideal was crucial to the New Culture radicals’ vision of themselves, and Family Research devoted many pages to promoting it. One contributor, Liao Shuan, drew together the family ideals of the New Culture Movement into an essay modestly titled “Hunyin wenti zhi yizhong zhuzhang” (An opinion on the marriage problem). Liao observed that although the New Culture Movement had transformed intellectuals’ ideas about marriage, society at large still lacked a “thorough awakening and concrete methods.” As a result, most people still lived under the tyranny of the family and parents continued to arrange their
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children’s marriages. To remedy this situation, Liao offered eight rules for marriage reform. 1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
Marriage must be completely free; no one, no matter who, may interfere. Only men over twenty-two or twenty-five years of age and women over twenty years of age who are economically self-sufficient can marry. Marriage of the two sexes must be based on their spiritual union; then all the ugly customs of excessive ceremony and exchanging horoscopes and gifts (wenli nacai) will be eradicated. After marriage [the couple] must remove themselves from relations with the joint family and establish a xiao jiating. After marriage the couple should live in the spirit of mutual cooperation, each pursuing his or her own economic independence, and neither relying on the other. In any marriage previously forced by the family, and in free marriages, if both parties are dissatisfied with the marriage, they may divorce without legal sanctions. Marriage must be monogamous. Taking concubines, collecting slaves, and other such vile improprieties will be prohibited. Whoever violates this law may be taken to court and divorced. The rearing and education of children must be shared.76
Liao’s essay highlighted the principles and assumptions that shaped the xiao jiating ideal: a happy companionate marriage facilitated individuals’ contribution to society and maximized their productivity. Liao expressed the interrelationship of love and work with the maxim “Marriage is mutual help, marriage is love.” He insisted that the importance of individual happiness made the choice of a spouse a particularly personal affair. Young people rightly looked for partners who were compatible in character, education, talent, and feeling. Parents who ignored these factors and forced their children to marry were guilty of “using the marriage of the two sexes as a machine to produce babies.”77 Yet Liao did not deny that marriage served certain social and economic functions. Indeed, he and most other New Culture intellectuals interested in family reform advocated the companionate marriage partly because they believed it would contribute to economic productivity and social progress. Liao valorized individual satisfaction and at the same time extolled the social benefits of marriage: “Marriage is a kind of baby-making machine, but in addition to this, does it not contribute to enterprise and to the development of society? If, indeed, it is related to supporting en-
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terprise and developing society, then can it accomplish these if there is no spirit of cooperation? This kind of marriage in which a man and woman who do not know each other are forced to live together is simply barbaric marriage, marriage as commerce, slave marriage.”78 Liao objected to the traditional economic rationalism as a criterion for marriage choice, but at the same time justified the xiao jiating because it made a new kind of economic rationalism possible. Instead of sacrificing the individual to the family’s socioeconomic interests, he placed individual fulfillment first. But even as he promoted the individual, he remained steadfastly communitarian. Ultimately, individual fulfillment served the nation’s interests. Liao and other New Culture radicals denied the family’s right to subordinate the individual’s needs to its own, but they willingly offered the individual’s energies and talents—the products of his fulfillment—to the nation. Their devotion to the nation transformed the radicals’ “selfish” refusal to serve the family into selflessness. Another essay, “The Evils of the Old Marriage System,” also outlined the economic rationale of the conjugal family. The author, Guo Xun, acknowledged that many people would think it nonsensical to condemn the traditional family system. How, they would ask, had it lasted so long if it were harmful? But, Guo countered, its negative results were often not immediately apparent. They developed slowly and arose from indirect causes: “Those who are victims of its indirect harm are like those who die in their dreams, passing away without knowing it.”79 Like Liao, Guo began his justification of marriage reform with an insistence that marriage was an individual, not a family, matter and reasoned that parents and matchmakers had no right to interfere. “Is marriage for oneself, or for one’s parents? Or for the matchmaker? Who will experience the joy or suffering that results? If it reaches the point of being unhappy, will the parents or matchmaker be able to get one out of it?” Guo dismissed the matchmaker as a busybody and accused parents of manipulating their children’s lives in order to feel important and to obtain grandchildren, treating their children like gifts to other families and toys for their amusement.80 Guo followed his emotional appeal for the rights of the individual with a list of seven problems created by arranged marriage. All but points two and seven began with an observation about the adverse emotional and psychological effects of arranged marriages and then abruptly shifted to a commentary on how they impeded economic productivity and national progress. My italics highlight the moment at which Guo shifts from individual to social welfare. Taken as a whole, Guo’s indictment of arranged
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marriage reveals just how closely connected New Culture radicals believed individual happiness and social welfare to be. Guo’s first point declares that the traditional marriage system “leads to the evils of adultery and concubinage.” Because they are not free, arranged marriages are loveless and often full of hatred. This affects the wealth of the family because members are not motivated to work for family welfare. The husband wastes money on prostitutes and concubines. The wife seeks entertainment. Miserable, the two spouses look for ways to harm one another. The wife lets a lover into the house. At this point morality has already fallen to the extreme. “This impedes social progress.”81 In his second point, Guo states that the traditional marriage system “weakens the economy.” If two people love one another, they will be of one heart, consulting with each other and working together. As a result, “the family economy will immediately develop.” If they do not love one another and are always at odds, any enthusiasm will quickly be lost. Both sides will pursue entertainment, eating and never working. A person with much free time easily tends toward lasciviousness. Because prostitutes and concubines cost a lot of money, [such a man] will soon be standing on the street corner in torn clothes begging. “Money spent on this ghost heap almost never reaches society. As a result, the economy will be shaken by him because he interrupts the flow of currency in the market.”82 Guo’s third point claims that the traditional marriage system robs people of hope and pleasure. “Who enhances hope and the little pleasures of life? Do you mean to say it is not one’s own beloved wife? If husband and wife are harmonious, they will correct their faults together and cultivate their virtues. They will offer each other comfort in hard times and jokes to help dispel frustration. . . . The reason we can brave hunger and cold [and] hard work, [and] run around in rain and wind, is because we want a happy home. If we lose happiness at home, who can stand the bitterness of work? If a person cannot put up with the difficulties of work, it has a direct negative effect on the family and an indirect negative effect on society’s productivity.”83 As his fourth point, Guo insists that the traditional marriage system destroys filiality. “If the parents ruin their son’s marriage, this cannot but produce rebellion. . . . But because of the oppressive strength of the old family system, the son is forced [to comply]. This leads to a kind of passive rebellion. The son resorts to a dissolute lifestyle. His parents will wonder at how they are repaid for their efforts to make their son happy. There will necessarily be yelling and cursing; perhaps he will leave home.
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Without [one’s] knowing it, the more one oppresses, the more a person’s anger rises. As a result, filiality is destroyed. [A person] may even violate various principles of human relations. As a result he will injure customs and impede social progress.”84 In his fifth point, Guo claims that the traditional marriage system causes suicide. “It goes without saying that those who oppose an arranged marriage must suffer their parents’ banishment, but they must also suffer the attack of the general polluted atmosphere, leaving them no place at all in society. People are not made of wood and stone. Who can stand this kind of atmosphere? [They think,] ‘Why stay on this earth to be bullied about something that was originally one’s own business . . . but which others interfered with?’” This causes many young people to kill themselves in a moment of anger.85 In his sixth point, Guo blames the traditional marriage system for “impeding reproduction and the development of posterity. After the two sexes are united, pregnancy is certain. If husband and wife are incompatible, the two sexes are not easily united. This is also the way things go. Well then, where will childbirth come from? Without childbirth, the ancestors’ blood lines will be cut off. We will not be able to bring forth good citizens.” Even if children are born, parents who do not love one another cannot produce intelligent, whole, healthy children. Moreover, with husband and wife at odds, they will also often get angry with their children. And so [they] “will not only not teach their children to be good citizens, but, by whipping them, will also make their children into passive playthings or even produce immoral outcomes.”86 In his final point, Guo concludes that the traditional marriage system “obstructs social and national progress.” The nation is created from the gathering together of the people. And in this process the husband and wife are the most important. The country is created by gathering most families together couple by couple. “If husbands and wives are harmonious, the men till and the women weave; only then will the economy develop and good citizens be produced.” If the people are well educated, then society and nation will progress without obstacles. If it is the opposite, society and country will regress—that is, people will just consume and not produce.87 New Culture attacks on the traditional family were more than an expression of individualism and romantic self-indulgence. Like many other New Culture radicals, Guo presented his argument as a defense of individual rights and personal happiness as well as a prescription for social
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progress and national vitality. For Guo and his radical contemporaries, the individual happiness made possible by romantic love was part of a constellation of values that placed individual happiness at the root of economic productivity, social progress, and national vigor. As the source of creativity and productivity, the individual became the key element in effecting change. Consequently, whatever made the individual happy could be justified by the claim that such happiness contributed to social well-being and national strength. A strong nation was the aggregate of happy, productive individuals.
new families, new wives, new women As one might expect, this step in the family reform equation profoundly affected women’s roles in family, state, and society. Once New Culture men began looking to the family as a source of happiness and productivity, they developed a new set of expectations for their wives. In traditional families, a son’s mother usually played a key role in choosing his wife. Since a young wife’s most important responsibilities were producing sons and helping her mother-in-law with household tasks, a mother’s primary concern was finding a bride who would fulfill these expectations. But men who hoped to establish a xiao jiating did not necessarily share their mothers’ criteria for an attractive mate. These men wanted marriages based on mutual love with women who shared their intellectual and political interests.88 Some young women evidently shared these ideals of companionate marriage.89 One of the few Family Research essays written by a woman advocated freely chosen marriages between couples of comparable education and compatible dispositions. Its author also insisted that both husband and wife maintain economic independence and develop their individuality after marriage.90 However similar male and female views of marriage may have been, the truth remains that men wrote the vast majority of family-reform articles. Not surprisingly, then, these essays assumed the male perspective and reflected male interests. For example, the essays in Family Research frequently discussed the ideal wife, but they never considered the ideal husband.91 Men took it for granted that it was their happiness that was at stake. Men’s advocacy of women’s rights, as well as their frustration with their wives and fiancées, is best understood in this light. In the abstract, these men eloquently defended each and every per-
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son’s right to independent personhood (duli renge). Many essays insisted on women’s value as individuals and their right to education and selfdetermination.92 When writing about women in general, they were able to acknowledge the special difficulties women faced in securing these rights. But in their personal lives they were, as we all are, driven as much by emotion as reason. Despite their ideological commitments, when confronted with the women their families had chosen for them, these young men seethed with dissatisfaction and frustration. A letter to Family Research editors from a distraught young man makes clear his dissatisfaction with his arranged marriage. At the same time, it reveals how personal misery took on elevated significance because of the connections these men drew between personal satisfaction and the fate of the nation. I am a person who has suffered very deeply from the tyrannical marriage system. I have searched for a solution for the longest time. Because of family oppression and a coercive environment, I have, in the end, failed. Today I will write down the painful experiences of the last ten or more years one by one for you gentlemen to read. I will be very grateful if you can come up with a happy solution so that I may escape this bitter sea. Ten years ago, my thought was such that I believed that a good society and human happiness all come from a happy marriage. I firmly believed in the purification of the race and eugenics. The very first sentence in Yan Fu’s translation of On Liberty says, “To be a couple and at the same time teachers of one another, to [share] profound knowledge and lofty ideals of truth and essential principles: surely this arouses our aspirations.” These words speak my mind. Who could know that she not only does not measure up to my ideals, but to the contrary is not as good as an ordinary person? Before I married, I thought that even though this marriage, which was arranged when I was a child, was not as good as today’s love marriages, if she were clever, I could teach her the truths I had learned. We could often talk together and perhaps spend our days together after all. But when she arrived at my home, fat and naive, with ignorant behavior and muddled speech, she really was just like a primitive. Using all of her intellect, she still cannot understand how to count to five. The rest goes without saying. To be told to live with this kind of wife. . . . I am willing to teach her, but, pray tell, where should I start? Confucius said, “Rotten wood cannot be carved.” She really is just like rotten wood. Ellen Key93 said, “Loveless marriages are immoral.” This kind of immoral marriage is also the sacred and unassailable shili 94 marriage that our old society took as a matter of course. If I had not received an education . . . I would also be able to acquiesce to this murderous shili marriage and willingly live in this spiritual hell . . . Unfortunately, I know that love is the foundation of the marital relationship. Who could have known the appropriate reason for a love marriage?
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Not only did no one help me, but my good friends all marshaled social customs to coerce me, leaving me to stand alone with no support. . . . My mother is very kind; she often sheds tears for me. My father is very hard; he often curses me. Relatives and old friends all criticize me with vile words. . . . Day and night I plan and ponder. Divorce is extremely difficult. Remarriage is against the law. I could stay single all my life, but I do not have the resolve for that. Or I could just carry on in this confused way, but that causes me great mental and spiritual pain. Dear sirs, family reform is your objective; I am in this bitter sea! Do you have a way to save me? My friends who have suffered the same anguish, can you also think of a way for me to escape? I beg you all to give me a way and I will soon leave this “living hell,” ah! Jian Cheng 1921.10.495
Overwrought as it is, this letter exemplifies several themes characteristic of young men’s complaints about the women their parents chose for them. Jian Cheng implies that his unhappiness is not merely a personal matter—“a good society and human happiness all come from a happy marriage.” Asserting that he came to this realization way back in 1911, he claims a place for himself among the intellectual avant-garde. His references to Yan Fu and Ellen Key also identify him as an intellectual progressive. His belief in eugenics charges his marital unhappiness with a significance that reaches beyond the personal. He yearns to fulfill his social responsibility, but he has married a fat, ignorant, stupid “primitive,” someone far below him on the social-evolutionary scale. Given this raw material, even his noble intention to make the best of an arranged marriage by teaching his wife “the truths I have learned” has come to naught. Our would-be Pygmalion is blameless because “rotten wood cannot be carved.” When Jian Cheng concedes that he probably would not feel so cheated by his present marriage if he could only live in ignorance, he hits upon the crux of the matter. The wealth of New Culture literature shows us that men’s expectations of themselves and their wives had changed. Unfortunately, the simple fact was that very few women possessed the level of education and political consciousness that these men hoped for.96 After all, in 1922 only 656 women in all of China were attending university. Some men took a much more sympathetic view of their fiancées than Jian Cheng did, but found themselves frustrated still. One man tried to convince his parents to send his fiancée to school before their marriage, but they refused.97 Another man’s parents agreed to educate his fiancée, but he could not find a school for her.98
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The deep undercurrent of resentment stemmed not simply from misogyny—although, as we will see below, that was certainly an element— but also from these young men’s idealistic images of themselves. Their fathers had defined themselves through their families, ancestors, and descendants. These young men wanted to define themselves independently from the family. Yet, because it was so important to a man’s identity as a modern, enlightened individual to make a freely chosen love-marriage, the quality of his marriage and his wife became absolutely essential to his self-image. So despite their iconoclastic aspirations, these young men continued to define themselves, at least in part, through the family—in this case, the xiao jiating. Ultimately, these men advocated women’s rights because they wanted to help create wives who met male demands for educated, enlightened companionship. And men complained bitterly when women failed to meet their husbands’ expectations. One contributor expressed the frustration of many readers when he complained, “My wife is a good-fornothing. Her talent is insufficient to meet her obligations, her virtue is insufficient to be of help to others, and her appearance is insufficient to satisfy my desires.”99 Certainly not all the contributors to Family Research took such a negative view of their wives. Editors and essayists sometimes reproved their readers for making women, rather than the family system, the target of their dissatisfaction. One writer chided his readers for attacking the marriage problem from the male point of view. Men’s problems, he argued, were easier to solve. Because women struggled with greater educational, economic, and social restrictions, a critique of the marriage system from their point of view promised richer insights. He reminded readers that blaming women for their “deficiencies” unjustly held them responsible for being deprived of an education. He also pointed out that a woman suffered more in marriage than her husband did; not only was she married to a man chosen by others, but she was also thrust into a family of strangers.100 But this sympathetic voice was generally drowned out by clamoring for self-satisfaction and bitter complaints about old-fashioned wives.
“they turn the living world into a graveyard” Fictional accounts of marriage echoed and even amplified the kinds of complaints found in Jian Cheng’s letter. In the first issue of its second volume, Family Research published Lihun (Divorce), a play by Cheng
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Fangwu.101 Although the tone of the play is too extreme to be typical, it foregrounds the thread of misogyny that ran through a good deal of New Culture writing on women. The play portrayed the trial of Li Lesheng (Happy-Life Li), a young middle-school teacher. As the play opens we learn that Li originally acquiesced to the marriage his parents had arranged for him but divorced his wife a year later. Publicly humiliated by the divorce, she committed suicide. Her family blames Li for her death and sues him for damages, but Li denies any wrongdoing. Because he refused to fulfill his responsibility to others and meet the expectations of society, the judge and plaintiffs accuse him of immoral behavior. Li, however, insists that in being true to himself, he answers to a higher moral authority. Like much of the new-style “spoken theater” (huaju)102 of the New Culture movement, Divorce served as a vehicle for Cheng’s ideas on love, marriage, and self. The supporting characters—a judge, one of Li’s relatives, and the plaintiff’s representative—mouth the social conventions that prompt Li’s long soliloquies. In Li Lesheng, Cheng Fangwu created a character who signaled an entire set of values to Family Research readers. Li represented the vanguard that would lead China into the future. He was young, educated, and a teacher. He valued his individuality and looked to moral absolutes rather than social norms to guide his behavior. Despite his newfound identity, his parents married him to an old-fashioned girl with no appreciation for education or ideas. In Li Lesheng many readers saw themselves. Yet unlike most young men, Cheng’s protagonist braved the social and legal consequences of divorce. The play opens on a conversation between Li Lesheng and one of his relatives surnamed Xie. Li proudly proclaims himself a “rebel” whom the court, as a protector of society, should harshly punish. He defends his habit of patronizing brothels because, he claims, it is only through stimulation of the senses that he knows he is alive. In fact, he believes his lifestyle is superior to that of men who treat their multiple wives and concubines as private property, never wondering whether such a custom is immoral, whether the women care for their husbands, or whether they want to live with jealousy every day of their lives. Li also refuses to acknowledge traditional expectations of fatherhood. When Xie remarks that considering the judge’s attitude toward divorce it is fortunate that Li and his wife had no children, Li insists that the existence of children should not inhibit a divorce. Whichever parent wants them should take them.103 The playwright strains to dismiss every traditional assumption
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about marriage and family ties: the individual’s needs are paramount and he need not bow to any social obligations. The theme of the male individual and his need for freedom and selffulfillment dominate the first half of the play. Li insists on his right to enjoy life: I am only willing to live this life to the fullest and not let this bit of time pass fruitlessly. I have no other request. I am only willing to drink in the moment’s sweet dew and bathe in the moment’s bit of brilliance. . . . She not only did not add sweetness to my life, it was as if she took my “life fire” and blew it out. Our marriage was devoid of all significance. Every day we lived life like that was another day of bitterness, robbing life of its ultimate meaning. Why should I love her?
His duty to himself was reason enough to divorce a wife he did not love: “We have a duty to ourselves. A wrong done to ourselves is the greatest wrong. One’s duty to oneself is the highest duty. What kind of duty is one’s duty to oneself? It is to make all our actions accord with duty to our own ‘life principle.’ . . . Our married life was not in accord with our ‘life principles.’ Now, if I wanted to carry out my duty to myself, I had to divorce and we had to live new lives.”104 Of course, for Li’s wife there was no new life to live. The traditional code of chastity forbade women to remarry. Even if Li’s wife had been willing to contravene social expectation, the stigma of divorce would have prevented her from making a good second marriage. In response to the judge’s questioning, Li attacks his wife and all traditional Chinese women, expostulating on the dangers of the traditional woman and the threat she presents to modern men and society. He champions the subjectivity of love, his responsibility to his nation, and his supreme duty to himself. In the process he makes several key linkages, all of them gendered. On the male side of the gender dichotomy, Li connects his desire for romance, the national good, and his right as an individual to pursue his own happiness. On the female side, Li identifies traditional women with all that is wrong with China. When the judge asks Li why he divorced his wife, Li responds, “I did not love her. Isn’t that enough of a reason?” When the judge asks why he did not love her and why a loveless marriage justifies divorce, Li responds, “Why does one person love one object [emphasis added] and someone else love another? Is there a logic to what one does or does not love? . . . Since you asked me, I have a little something to say to you. I say I could not love her, I may not love her, and I need not love her.”105 As Li elaborates on why he could not, may not, and need not love his wife, she becomes the
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object against which he defines himself, his preferences, and his duties. As a person, his wife remains absent from the play. But as a metaphor for traditional China, she haunts the stage. Li reduces his wife to an object to be kept or discarded depending on its attractiveness; he could not love her because he did not find her beautiful. (Her education he dismisses out of hand: “There is no use in speaking of her knowledge.”) Beauty, Li asserts, is subjective: “I ask you, why don’t we think beautiful those things that savages believe are beautiful?” He also insists on the value of that subjectivity. His mother praised his wife’s beauty, but Li declares, “If I am to say my wife is beautiful, she must be beautiful in a way that is valuable to me. It is of no use to me that others think her beautiful.” As his vituperative attack continues, he literally demonizes his wife: “Her sallow face looked as if there were no warm blood flowing in it. Her eyes had a ghostly fire. . . . It seemed as if that air carried the earth element. Imagine what that ghostly fire in her eyes, flickering in that atmosphere, was like.” This ghostly presence threatened Li’s life: “When I was with her it was like being buried alive. Only when I got away from her could I breathe deeply of the fresh air. [Then] I felt as if I had been resurrected.”106 Li insists that in escaping his wife he not only saved himself but also did his part for China. He could not allow himself to love his wife because women like her burdened the country with their dead weight: “I think that everything in China is good, it is only people who are bad. [Socalled] beautiful women are especially unworthy of notice. In spirit and body they have fallen into indescribable decrepitude. Not only are they unable to increase our prosperity, it is as if we were running around dragging them along, running around dragging along a corpse that gets smellier day by day, that gets heavier day by day. . . . They turn the living world into a graveyard.” Instead of contributing to the problem by loving such women, men should consciously eliminate the market for them: “According to the economists’ law of supply and demand, if we still love them after a thousand years who knows what kind of ghostly things they might become. Therefore, in order to change the nature of women, we must not love [this kind of woman].”107 Thus, men like Li, who refused to take on the burden of a living ghost, were aiding China in its social-evolutionary struggle for survival. The plaintiff’s representative calls Li a king of egoism and accuses him of driving his wife to her death. Li claims that, in fact, he had to save himself. He rejects the value of self-sacrifice; sacrificing himself to his wife would not have benefited either of them. He was dying; there was no
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time to ask whether others were going to die. His spiritual death counted far more than her corporeal death. He even questions whether she is really dead. Her noxious presence still lingers, as if she has returned from the dead for the satisfaction of watching his ordeal: “Do you all believe that she is dead, then? I don’t think so. I believe that she is now resurrected. Before, she was indeed dead. Previously it was as if I was also harmed unto death by her. I struggled for life. She came back to life. She is over there laughing at us.”108 Li denies all responsibility for the fate of this ghost-wife, insisting on his right to divorce at will. But the judge takes a different view of the matter; he fines Li 5,000 yuan in damages, banishing him to Xinjiang for ten years. Li claims that he will go gladly to a place where he can start a new society.109 In its denigration of women, Divorce was extreme for Family Research, but in making women the object of family reform and the source of men’s anguish, it was typical of New Culture family-reform discourse. A ghostly, otherworldly succubus draining young men of their vital life force, the traditional woman became the scapegoat for China’s weakness. To save himself and his nation, the young man was not only allowed but even duty-bound to abandon her. In this respect, Li is somewhat akin to the young scholar of traditional tales who sees through the fox spirit’s false beauty and knows her for the demon she is. Most New Culture family reformers shared Li’s logic, if not his nerve. Yet, despite the extremity of his rhetoric of individualism, Li ultimately connected his individual struggle for freedom with the fate of the nation. At the same time, Cheng’s gendering of modernity and tradition, the reformer and the reformed, and the West and China as respectively male/female reflected the tensions that underlay assumptions about male and female roles in the new China. The language of xiao jiating could sometimes slide into outright misogyny. More often, however, its rhetoric undermined the ideals of gender equality in a more subtle fashion. The xiao jiating promised happy, productive individuals. The men who hoped to implement this ideal took for granted their role as the productive laborer. Consequently, they interpreted the xiao jiating ideal in ways that sustained traditional gender roles: men would devote themselves primarily to productive labor and women to reproductive labor and to making the productive (male) individual happy. The vehemence with which Cheng’s play scapegoated women for China’s ills, and the fact that Yi Jiayue and Luo Dunwei published such a misogynist play, suggest that these men had yet to rethink women’s place in state and society. Much of their vision of female gender roles remained firmly rooted in tradition. If men at the leading edge of the family-reform
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movement harbored such traditional notions, how might readers of New Culture literature have interpreted family-reform ideals? Two surveys from the 1920s give us the opportunity to consider this question.
a slice of life Readers of New Culture periodicals like New Youth, Xin chao (New tide), and Family Research frequently wrote to ask advice on family problems; the high tide of new thought left their imaginations awash with hopes and expectations. But just how deeply did these ideas affect their daily lives? Did these young men merely enjoy the titillation of radical ideas? Or did they absorb these ideas and make them their own? If these ideas did affect their worldview, how did the young men change their lives? Where did discourse and behavior intersect? Two Chinese sociologists, Chen Heqin (1892–1982) and Pan Guangdan (1899–1967), tried to answer these questions through surveys that they conducted in the wake of the New Culture Movement.110 Their findings suggest that some New Culture family ideals— choosing one’s own spouse, having an educated wife, delaying marriage, and eliminating concubinage—had become very important to many students. Other ideals, like living independently from the joint family, for example, played a central role in family-reform rhetoric but found relatively few adherents among those surveyed. Most men did not resent women as fiercely as Cheng Fangwu did, nor did they envision a family as radical as Yi advocated. In fact, with a few modifications, young men of the 1920s seem to have been willing, and even happy, to make their peace with much that was traditional in the Chinese family. The two surveys differed markedly in form and to a lesser degree in content. In 1920 Chen Heqin distributed over 1,500 surveys to faculty and principals in Jiangnan-area schools. He recognized that respondents needed special assurances before they would answer the many personal questions he wished to ask. Accordingly, before distributing the questionnaires he explained his research objectives. He also made a special point of reminding his respondents to withhold their names. He received 631 responses from men at six academic institutions.111 Seven years later, Pan Guangdan published his questionnaire in “Light of Learning,” a literary supplement published weekly in the Shanghai daily China Times. Pan asked for respondents’ names but promised to keep them confidential. Whether this made potential respondents reluctant to answer is unclear; only one person out of more than 300 re-
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Number of respondents
35 30
Married Engaged
25 20 15 10 5 0
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Age
Figure 1. Chen’s survey: age of married and engaged respondents. Chen Heqin, “Shehui wenti,” DFZZ 18, no. 4 (25 February 1921): 103–104, and DFZZ 18, no. 5 (10 March 1921): 103.
spondents withheld his name. But Pan did have to issue three requests for responses to his queries. The first request appeared on 31 May 1927 and a second on 9 June. He printed a third and final call a week later. At that point he had over two hundred responses, but only ten of those came from women. Pan’s final call boosted the number of female respondents to 44 and the total to 317. Pan estimated that this number equaled 1 percent of China Times’s circulation.112 To varying degrees, both Chen and Pan recognized the limitations of their surveys.113 Chen collected no questionnaires from women. Women accounted for just under 14 percent of Pan’s respondents. Both sets of respondents were relatively affluent, well-educated urbanites—a decidedly non-representative sample of China as a whole but an accurate profile of those interested in family reform. That they answered the surveys at all indicates their familiarity with the xiao jiating ideal and their interest in the debate. The surveys succeeded in eliciting responses from those most directly concerned with the family reform debate. Most of Chen’s and Pan’s respondents were between the ages of seventeen and twenty-eight (see figures 1 and 2), and more than half were unmarried.114 The majority of their respondents—70 percent of Chen’s and 77 percent of Pan’s—came from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, China’s wealthiest provinces.115 All of Chen’s
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25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Unmarried men Married men
14
16
18
20
22
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26 28 Age
30
32
34
36
38
40+
Figure 2. Pan’s survey: marital status and age of male respondents. Pan Guangdan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 35–36.
respondents had advanced at least as far as middle school. Pan’s respondents were also very well educated in comparison to the general population: a third had received some secondary education, 14 percent had completed middle school, and another third had completed at least some college education.116 Because of their level of education, the women in Pan’s survey were even less representative of the general urban population than the men were.117 Forty-four female voices, however, are better than none at all. Accordingly, their responses are included here. As figures 3 and 4 show, Pan’s respondents came from a rather elite occupational spectrum—more than half of the men and women were either students or teachers. The rest of the men worked in “business and industry,” civil service, or professional occupations. Among his remaining female respondents, Pan counted five housewives, three office workers, a painter, a politician, a writer, and a doctor.118 Although Chen’s and Pan’s respondents were not identical, they were
Number of men
Students
Academics
Business & Transportation Government industry workers workers workers
Medical workers
Engineers
Figure 3. Pan’s survey: occupations of male respondents. Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 26–29.
110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Journalists/ editors
Other
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1
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3
4
5
6
7
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Students
Teachers and administrators
Writers
Office workers
Political workers
Painters
Medical workers
Figure 4. Pan’s survey: occupations of female respondents. Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 30.
Number of women
20
Housewives
Unknown
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similar enough to allow us to use them together as we examine the tensions between ideals and realities. This presentation is made in full awareness of the problems intrinsic to surveys: Did respondents report their true feelings and opinions? Are people who voluntarily respond to surveys representative of their cohort? These caveats should inform our analysis of survey data but should not prevent us from using surveys altogether. Opportunities to peer behind the facade of ideals and discourse come infrequently to historians: only epistemological perversity could make us turn away. Forming a Family New Culture radicals like Yi and Luo insisted that young couples establish households independent of their parents’. But according to Chen’s and Pan’s surveys, this particular innovation found little support among China’s youth. Most of Chen’s respondents did not want to leave their parents’ homes. Of 447 engaged and unengaged respondents, 281 (63 percent) wished to remain at home after marriage. Married men showed even greater enthusiasm for multi-generational households. Only 2 of Chen’s 184 married respondents suggested that China’s marriage system would be improved if couples lived apart from their parents.119 It seems that one of the central tenets of New Culture family reform met with a chilly reception among students. Of the 71 who explained why they wanted to live at home after marriage, 51 (72 percent) said they needed or wanted to serve their parents. An additional 13 (18 percent) expected to enjoy the “happiness of human relationships” (tianlun zhi le). Chen maintained that young men felt obligated to live at home because their parents depended on them for economic support, but the responses that he printed made it clear that strong emotional ties also kept young men at home: I want to continue to live with my parents because they are old and like to see their own flesh and blood every day. If I live somewhere else, the old people in my family would be very unhappy. My parents are old and the country has no system to support them. If one has a gentle disposition, then what kind of family conflict can there be? If I do not disappoint my wife, then I will not disappoint my parents. One cannot fully perform a son’s duty if one lives apart. Furthermore, won’t one spend more money in renting another place?
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When my parents become too old to do for themselves, I can serve them and so fulfill the principles of humanity.
As these samples suggest, a complex mixture of affection, filial obligation, and economic interdependence encouraged young men to remain with their parents.120 Pan’s respondents also preferred a modified joint family instead of the emotionally and economically independent xiao jiating. Although 71 percent did not advocate the preservation of the “Chinese joint family system,” 59 percent did not want to accept the “Euro-American conjugal family” in its entirety either. Sixty-four percent of Pan’s respondents agreed that China should “adopt the Euro-American conjugal family, but grandparents and parents should live with and be supported by children and grandchildren.” Sixty-one percent agreed that China should “adopt the Euro-American conjugal family, support parents and grandparents, but live apart.”121 These surveys suggest that contrary to New Culture presentations, independence from parents and elders was not the most popular element of new family ideals. In fact, for the majority, neither spatial nor economic independence was the defining characteristic of the “Euro-American conjugal family.” Of course, a sizable minority—40 percent of Pan’s respondents and 28 percent of Chen’s—did advocate wholesale independence from the joint family. Those of Chen’s respondents who provided reasons for wanting to live separately from their parents echoed the prominent New Culture theme of the importance of individual independence. Forty-six of the 77 (60 percent) wanted to be independent of their parents, 19 (25 percent) wanted to destroy the old family and establish the new, and 8 (10 percent) hoped to “enjoy freedom.”122 In explaining their reasons for wanting independence, many of these young men used the vocabulary and logic of the New Culture reform discourse we saw in Family Research: I want to be independent and not rely on my family. Moreover, it will prevent the evil customs of the old family from spreading. I want to destroy the outlook of the old society and so I must live apart. In this way I respect my own individuality and wash away my previous dependency. Second, I will make a tangible contribution to the reformation of society. First, it preserves family harmony. Second, it will allow my wife and me to put the new style of education into practice. The old family always disagrees with this on many points.
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Saving Self and Nation Because my family is corrupt, if I want to achieve the new happiness I must live elsewhere. Presently there are very few new-style families. I want to set an example for others, so I must live somewhere else.123
Here again, the desire for personal happiness and independence fuses with a sense of social responsibility.
Choosing a Wife Although most young men surveyed did not want to live apart from their families, they took great interest in two other key aspects of family reform: marriage at a later age and marriage to women of their own choosing. Eighty-seven percent of Pan’s respondents approved of women marrying at age twenty and men marrying at age twenty-five. Another 18 percent thought women should marry only at age twenty-five or later and men only at age thirty or later.124 Chen’s findings resembled Pan’s. Over half of the 220 unmarried respondents who indicated their preferred age of marriage wanted to marry between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine. About 18 percent (thirty-nine respondents) hoped to wait until they reached thirty.125 These responses suggest that the New Culture advocacy of later marriages garnered widespread support among educated youths. The actual ages of marriage reported by married respondents suggest, however, that young men encountered difficulties in delaying marriage until their mid-twenties. Chen compared the ideal age of marriage reported by the unmarried with the married respondents’ age at marriage. He observed that the majority of unmarried men hoped to marry between the ages of twenty-five and thirty. If the age at marriage reported by their married counterparts is any indication of the average age of marriage, however, these men were likely to be married about five years earlier than they wished (see figure 5).126 Pan’s respondents seem to have fared a little better: most of them seem to have married near their ideal age of twenty-five. Pan did not ask his respondents their age at marriage, but we can discern a tendency: the majority of respondents age twentyfour and under were single, and most respondents twenty-five and older were married (see figure 2).127 In general, Pan’s and Chen’s respondents approved of freedom of marriage choice, but they were not as adamantly opposed to parental involvement as New Culture rhetoric suggested they might be. The vast majority of Pan’s respondents insisted on having a voice in their en-
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Number of respondents
Saving Self and Nation 75 72 69 66 63 60 57 54 51 48 45 42 39 36 33 30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0
65
Actual age at marriage Ideal age at marriage
1
3
14 15
16
17
18 19 20
21 22 23 Age
24 25
26
27 28 29 30
Figure 5. Chen’s survey: actual versus ideal age at marriage. Chen, DFZZ 18, no. 6 (25 March 1921): 113.
gagement. Only two (male) respondents to Pan’s survey thought the senior generation should decide their marriages. At the same time, only 34 percent believed the decision should be left entirely to the individual. The most popular alternative (80 percent) was for individuals to choose their own mate but to obtain parental approval. A sizable minority of 42 percent approved of parents choosing a spouse as long as they obtained their children’s approval. The unengaged men in Chen’s survey followed a very similar pattern, but they advocated more vigorously their right to marry whom they pleased. At the same time, perhaps because of their relative youth, a larger percentage was willing to let their parents decide (see table 2).128 Unfortunately for Chen’s young men, life rarely complied with the ideal. His poll of the engaged and married respondents suggests that most families thwarted young men’s hope to select their own wives. Of 181 engaged men, only 6 had decided their engagements themselves and only 17 had been consulted by their parents. Of the 172 married respondents who answered this question, only 6 had chosen their own wives and only 6 had been given the opportunity to agree with their parents’ choices. Many of the men who wrote to Family Research recounted the surprise and dismay caused by marrying a complete stranger. Although this com-
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table 2. chen’s survey, unengaged men: who should choose your wife?
Individual decides Individual and parents decide Parents decide Individual or parents decide No response total
Number
Percentage
171 55 21 8 11 262
65.3 21.0 8.0 3.0 2.7 100.0
source: Chen, DFZZ 18, no. 5 (10 March 1921): 108.
plaint became almost formulaic, in fact, it was not empty rhetoric, but a reflection of all-too-real experience. Less than a quarter (41 out of 179) of the married men in Chen’s survey knew their wives before marriage.129 Although most respondents wanted a voice in their marriage, not all those whose marriages had been arranged were intent on opposing their parents. Of the 158 men in Chen’s survey whose engagements had been arranged, 145 responded to his questions about their willingness to comply. Fifty-six declared themselves willing to go through with the marriage. Their fiancées’ level of education seems to have done much to reconcile them to the match. One respondent explained his willingness this way: “Now my heart is willing because she is literate and sensible. This kind of person is very hard to find among those who have not gone to a girls’ school.” For another man, his fiancée’s education capped other, more traditional criteria for compatibility: “I am willing because we are close in age, she has a gentle personality, her family is of very good reputation, she is attractive, and she has been to school.”130 The eighty-eight respondents who declared themselves unwilling to proceed with the match provided ninety-one reasons for their reluctance. Their complaints underscore the value that men attached to having educated wives and to participating in the engagement process. There were forty complaints that their fianceés were uneducated. Fear of marrying women about whom they knew nothing appeared thirty times. There were ten protests against parental tyranny. For all the New Culture valorization of romantic love, only four men were unwilling to marry because they did not love their prospective wives.131 These responses suggest that Chinese youth did not adopt the whole of family-reform discourse. Instead, they selected the ideals that suited them. Chen’s respondents enthusiastically adopted the ideal of an educated wife. Very
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few, however, worried about romantic love, even though “love” featured prominently in New Culture periodicals. Of the eighty-eight unhappily engaged, forty-nine had resolved to marry as their families wished. Twenty-two of these men provided reasons for not backing out of the engagement. Thirteen cited the difficulty of exercising such a choice given “family circumstances” and “oppressive customs.” Eight did not want to disappoint or embarrass their parents. Only four declined to resist the engagement because they believed in the New Culture ideal of educating their wives themselves. Two gentlemen, perhaps more gallant than their contemporaries, showed sensitivity to their fiancées’ fate and refused to back out, noting that it was not the women’s fault. Thirty-nine of the unhappily engaged wanted to escape the marriages their families were planning for them, but their prospects for successful resistance seemed dim. Twenty-two admitted that they had not yet devised a strategy for escape. Four planned to notify the woman’s family of their refusal and three wanted to discuss it with their parents. Only one was willing to reject his family and leave home as radical New Culture literature urged young men to do. Nine left this part of the questionnaire blank.132 The distance between New Culture ideals and real experience is palpable even for those of Chen’s respondents who reported that they had decided their own marriages. Only six made the decision themselves, while seventeen had cooperated with their parents. Thirteen of the men reported that they knew their fiancées before the engagement. Seven did not. Twelve had used go-betweens to present the proposal of marriage: just one made the proposal himself, six relied on a friend, four on a relative, one on his fiancée’s brother, and one on a teacher. At least sixteen of the men obtained their future wives’ consent. Two descriptions of the engagement process highlight just how much this experience varied: Originally we did not know each other. We were not friends or relatives. The first time I saw her was at a graduation ceremony at her school. Afterward we exchanged letters, saw each other, and talked. Gradually we became closest friends. We have known each other for five years. We got engaged only last year. Long ago our families used to be related, so we knew each other. No one introduced us. As for whether she agrees to the match, at the time of the engagement I did not know. Then I decided she must be satisfied because we grew up together.133
The first describes a courtship that perfectly matched the xiao jiating ideal. By comparison, the second describes an engagement as businesslike as any arranged by practical parents. The second’s confidence in his
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mate’s satisfaction with him is not only breathtaking but also indicative of a double standard that men might bring to the marriage question: even as they demanded for themselves a good deal of participation in the marriage process, they assumed that women would be satisfied with significantly less. Although the vast majority of Chen’s engaged and married respondents had had their marriages arranged for them, the unengaged were bursting with fantasies about how they would meet their future wives. Many envisioned a courtship that would take place within a new social context that made room for friendship between the sexes: “First I would become friends with a girl; in the space of one or two years I would do a very close inspection and then I would bring up marriage”; “From among my friends I would choose someone whose disposition is compatible with mine, whose education is equal to mine, and with whom I share a mutual love”; “I would pay attention everywhere I go. When I found a good moral girl, I would investigate her and her family’s circumstances. Then I would enlist a matchmaker to propose marriage.” Some respondents intended to rely on a go-between for an introduction. Others expected to adopt the role of judicious matchmaker themselves: “First I would make friends with an unmarried girl’s parents, then I would make friends with her”; “First I would ask my parents or other relatives at home to investigate for me, but I would be in charge of decision making.”134 The Ideal Wife Although these young, unengaged men fantasized about finding their wives in brand new ways, it seems they wanted wives with fairly oldfashioned qualities. Chen asked all 266 of the unengaged respondents to consider their ideal wife’s demeanor, disposition, family status, education, age, talents, appearance, and “other.” Although Chen did not ask them to rank these qualities, the relative importance of each is revealed by the number of men who indicated their preferences for each category. As it turns out, women’s demeanor and disposition mattered a great deal—257 men indicated preferences in each of these two categories. At least in this regard, the young men were in agreement with traditional wifely ideals: 37 percent hoped for an “ordinary” demeanor, 32 percent wanted a wife who was “proper and well-formed,” 21 percent hoped for a wife who was “elegant and beautiful,” and only 9 percent professed not to care. A whopping 87 percent counted gentleness as the most ideal disposition.135
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Almost all of the respondents also addressed the issue of family status. But here the unengaged were divided. In the tradition of arranged marriages, choosing a spouse from within the same socioeconomic class— “matching the doors”—was an important criterion. But 46 percent claimed that a wife’s family status did not matter. (Their lack of interest in family backgrounds may reflect their desire to place a higher priority on personal, rather than economic or familial, compatibility.) Yet an almost equal number wanted wives whose status was comparable to their own.136 Education and age also ranked high on the list of concerns, with 219 and 211 responses, respectively. Most held high hopes for their wife’s level of education; 60 percent wanted her to have at least a middle school education. Another 34 percent wanted a wife with “ordinary” learning. (Unfortunately, Chen did not explain whether this meant an elementary school education and basic literacy or the traditional education in domestic skills).137 These young men were also adamant about their wives’ relative age. Most rejected the custom of marrying men to women who were a few years older. Sixty percent thought husband and wife should be the same age. Fourteen percent preferred wives a year or two younger, and 11 percent wanted wives who were three to five years younger. The remaining 14 percent did not specify how much younger the wife should be.138 Given the link that Chinese culture (and many others) made between youth and sexual desirability, it is not surprising that the rise of companionate marriage ideals gave rise to a demand for younger wives. Men wanted to choose wives to meet their needs, not those of their mothers. Capability took a back seat to companionability and desirability. Moreover, young men who hoped to displace their elders and set themselves up as patriarchs in their own homes would not relish the challenge to their authority that older wives might present if the couple were to live independently from their elders. These unengaged men had little to say about an ideal wife’s qualities beyond disposition and demeanor, family status, education, and age. Less than a quarter of them thought of anything to write when Chen asked them about the ideal wife’s talents. Of the sixty-one who did respond, almost half named skill at running a household, hardly a “modern” attribute. Only 12 percent wanted a wife skilled in social intercourse, and a mere 10 percent thought the ideal wife should be able to educate her children.139 A final category of “other qualities” contained a wide variety of sug-
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gestions, though again, interest in this question was relatively low: only 114 of the 266 subjects provided answers to this query. Christianity topped the list at 19.3 percent. The popularity of this quality probably stems from the fact that Chen’s sample included a Christian school. Just how this Christian influence affected these students’ views of women is unclear. It may have introduced them to ideas about the need for women’s education, the right of women to occupy public space, and the acceptability of socializing between men and women. Some hallmark qualities prevalent in New Culture literature on women appear, although again not as frequently as New Culture rhetoric leads us to expect. Fourteen percent of respondents believed the ideal wife should have unbound feet. A little over 13 percent wanted a wife who was able to serve society. Other qualities that figured prominently in family-reform rhetoric appeared infrequently: only 9 percent ventured to suggest that the ideal wife should love her husband; patriotism (3 percent) and the possession of “new thought” (4 percent) also fell low on the list.140 Table 3 shows that married men found satisfaction in the same qualities that unmarried men hoped to find in the ideal wife.141 Again, compatibility, skill in managing the home, knowledge, and education rank high on the list. Chen’s married respondents eloquently affirmed the high value that the rest of his respondents placed on a wife’s education. Unhappiness over their wives’ lack of education accounted for over a third (58 out of 149) of the complaints about marriage. Those who found themselves with uneducated wives complained bitterly: I am dissatisfied with my marriage because she does not have a high level of education and because she lacks everyday knowledge. She does not even recognize the character for ding and she is incapable of living an independent life. She only relies on others, living as a parasite. She has lost her individuality and sees herself as a man’s possession. She says, “At home one relies on father and mother, in marriage one relies on a man.” Isn’t this ridiculous? This is the kind of thing I am dissatisfied with.142 What is there to be satisfied about? What I am dissatisfied with is her illiteracy. I did not hope for much; but when I speak with her she simply does not understand. So not only can we not speak of being beneficial companions and good friends, she hasn’t even the qualifications to be a disciple.143
Another married man’s response suggests how profoundly the New Culture Movement altered some men’s expectations of their wives:
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table 3. chen’s survey, married men: my wife’s satisfactory qualities Number She manages the home well She is gentle toward others Our dispositions are compatible She is knowledgeable She is talented She is capable and virtuous She is simple, industrious, and frugal She serves relatives and cares for the young She is very attractive She is very intelligent She is reverent and respectful She serves society She is quiet and speaks little My parents are satisfied with her She can be independent She serves She loves to win total
18 15 15 13 7 7 6 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 99
Percentage 18.18 15.15 13.13 13.13 7.77 7.77 6.66 4.44 3.33 2.22 2.22 2.22 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 100.00
source: Chen, DFZZ 18, no. 4 (25 February 1921), 108.
[Before] I was very satisfied with my marriage because I lived in the old society and I was completely of the old mindset. My wife’s personality and appearance and trousseau were precisely appropriate to the old society. Now I have reacted against it. I look at her as if she were an enemy. Why? Because I have received the tide of the cultural movement and I know that women and men are the same. No matter whether in literature or social exchange, we should be equal. I know that my wife is just the opposite—she is illiterate, her feet are bound, her face is covered in powder—she possesses none of the brilliant phenomena of the twentieth century. As a result, I am now very disappointed.144
This passage resounds with the frustration of opportunity lost. This man emerged from darkness into the “brilliant phenomena of the twentieth century” only to find himself bereft of the new century’s most important emblem—the new woman. A Word to the Wise Chen suggested that women use his survey for their own edification: “If women understood men’s hearts, then they would know what was appropriate.” He noted:
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Saving Self and Nation The thing that satisfied most was the ability to manage the home well. Heretofore, Chinese women have been good at managing the home. Now many female students misunderstand managing the home as the bitter work of slaves. They ignore the home economics courses in their schools. It is all right to oppose the slavery of women. It is not all right to oppose women conserving the managing of the home, which has been the essential point of what is good and appropriate in China since ancient times. The next points of satisfaction were gentleness toward others and a compatible disposition. Clearly there is a close relationship between the gentleness of a wife’s disposition and the happiness of the home. The fourth kind of satisfaction was with a wife’s knowledge. From this we can see the importance of a woman’s education. In addition to this, if a wife has much talent, is capable and virtuous, simple, industrious, and frugal, et cetera, she will be sufficient to satisfy one.145
Chen’s interest in teaching women how to please men recalls themes in family rhetoric highlighted earlier in this chapter—men’s promotion of women’s education and liberation more often reflected their interest in obtaining a suitable companion than a dedication to abstract principles of gender equality. What men were most dissatisfied with was their wives’ lack of knowledge. . . . This accounted for 57.71 percent of responses . . . more than the other complaints combined. Today’s students cannot be compared with previous scholars. Today’s students [i.e., male students] are enlightened students. They are students who have been influenced by new thought. Naturally they are not satisfied with women who have no knowledge and who have not been enlightened. Therefore, if we want to improve the happiness of the home, we must educate women. If we want to take lifeless, hellish homes and turn them into heavens on earth, we must educate women.146
Chen reinforced men’s expectations that women would continue to provide reproductive labor in the domestic sphere, an assumption that New Culture literature, which explicitly treated women as objects of reform, rarely challenged. The very happiness of China’s families (read men) depended upon the successful reformation of Chinese women.
Women’s Role in Home and Society Chen’s and Pan’s subjects envisioned new roles for women even as they affirmed many features of the traditional family. Both surveys asked ques-
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tions about child rearing and work. The respondents’ answers highlight the tensions and even confusion that characterized their visions of women’s place in home and society. They wanted fairly large families and expected their wives to assume many of the responsibilities of child care. At the same time, they also wanted their wives to take active social roles. Chen’s respondents imagined a demanding family life. More than a third of them wanted four children and another third wanted three.147 Seventy-five percent agreed that “infants absolutely must be nursed by their mothers. [One should not] use a substitute milk product or a wet nurse.” Respondents were equally adamant about the centrality of parents’ role in early childhood. Seventy-one percent believed that “parents themselves should take on the early years of children’s education.” It seems that most respondents expected women to remain home with their children during the first years. At the same time, a majority of respondents (58 percent) agreed with the statement “Children should be reared communally to allow the majority of women to avoid losing the opportunity to develop themselves as individuals and contribute to society because of reproduction.”148 At the same time, 60 percent of Chen’s unmarried respondents wanted their wives to “serve society” after marriage. Chen neglected, however, to ask how they might meet that responsibility.149 Pan’s survey of attitudes toward women’s education suggests that some expected women to serve society through their domestic roles or an extension of those roles. But here also, the respondents’ views of women’s education seem full of unresolved conflicts. Virtually all the respondents (97 percent) wanted men and women to receive a college or professional education if family resources allowed, and most (80 percent) approved of the statement “Girls and boys should receive exactly the same education, in accordance with the intention of equality of the sexes.” But a sizable minority (35 percent) believed that men and women should receive education suited to their disparate roles in society. Twenty-three percent of Pan’s respondents believed that men and women possessed different kinds of intelligence and therefore women should not receive the same education as men.150 Just how the respondents resolved these tensions is, of course, unknown. It seems that the New Culture Movement convinced men and women that women should play a greater role in society, but most were not sure of how the new public role was to be combined with the traditional private one.
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The Concubine Question Many of the details of family life may have remained unresolved, but a very large majority of respondents were decidedly against concubinage. Eighty-two percent of Chen’s respondents declared they would not take a concubine. In their responses some men made clear that they had rejected the traditional view that made the production of heirs the primary goal of marriage: If she cannot bear children, there are still others who can. Humans will not become extinct. So I don’t need to worry about it. I do not recognize taking a concubine as human behavior. I do not believe that one marries only to have children. Marriage is also about helping one another. I just want her to work together with me. That’s all. I am not concerned about whether there are children. Why would I think about taking a concubine?151
A few young men conceded that they would take concubines if their wives failed to produce children: Myself, I would not want to take a concubine, but I am afraid that external pressure would prevent me from following my original intention. At that point I would want to take a concubine. Didn’t Mencius say that there are three unfilial acts and that not having an heir was the worst? If we had been married many years and still had no children, I would feel I had lost the happiness of the family and would then take a concubine. I am young, so I don’t care about it, but she has said to me that if after many years we do not have children, I may take a concubine because my parents are waiting for the day when they will have grandchildren.152
Although the hold of the traditional family was slipping on this point, some men still felt its pressure. The majority of Pan’s respondents also adamantly opposed concubinage, though their opposition varied somewhat depending upon the scenario Pan presented to them. Eighty percent agreed that men must practice monogamy “no matter what.” Eighty-one percent disapproved of taking a concubine as an antidote to an unhappy marriage. When Pan asked whether one should take a concubine “without inhibition” if the first marriage produced no children, 70 percent said no. Even those who accepted concubinage seem to have done so in order to satisfy social, rather than physical, needs. Only 10 percent agreed that monogamy ran
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counter to the male nature. For many, the New Culture Movement pushed concubinage beyond the pale and established new ideals of male chastity.153 The Purpose of Marriage Like so many of the other issues that Chen and Pan explored, the respondents’ vision of the purpose of the family contained both continuities and innovations. Chen asked the 447 engaged and unengaged respondents what they thought the purpose of marriage was and 404 responded. He then grouped the responses into twelve categories. Although New Culture rhetoric advocated individual fulfillment, most of the respondents listed selfless goals. Forty-six percent believed that the purpose of marriage lay in the advancement of society and the continuation of the human race. Sixteen percent believed that the purpose of marriage was to help one another. Six percent believed marriage should help the family. Even those who hoped for personal happiness in marriage (18 percent) linked it to the family’s happiness. The six respondents who sought an intimate friend in marriage were the only respondents who attributed a purely individualistic purpose to the institution.154 Pan asked his respondents to rank the relative importance of four purposes of marriage—to serve parents, have a romantic life and partner, satisfy sexual desire, and produce and educate good children. To clarify the results, Pan weighted the ratings. Each first choice rating received four points, each second choice received three points, each third choice received two points, and each fourth choice received one point. Pan’s results are striking for two reasons. As tables 4 and 5 show, like Chen’s subjects, Pan’s affirm the importance of what were, traditionally, the two most important functions of marriage—rearing children and caring for parents. Although men and women reversed the order of items two and three, the results differed by a value of only seven points. For the previous decade, family reformers had so consistently exaggerated the tyranny of the patriarchal family and the victimization of women that Pan was surprised when his study suggested that women found satisfaction in their traditional family roles. He thought it strange that women did not feel that caring for parents was a “bitter responsibility.”155 This similarity of viewpoint is echoed in men’s and women’s expectations of their spouses. Pan asked male and female respondents to rank the qualities they valued in a spouse. He then weighted them by assigning ten points to each first choice, nine points to each second choice, and
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table 4. pan’s survey: men’s ranking of the purposes of marriage To produce and educate good children To provide a romantic life and partner To serve parents To satisfy sexual desire
900 points 693 points 680 points 537 points
source: Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 56–57.
table 5. pan’s survey: women’s ranking of the purposes of marriage To produce and educate good children To serve parents To provide a romantic life and partner To satisfy sexual desire
143 points 121 points 114 points 82 points
source: Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 57.
table 6. pan’s survey: important qualities in a wife Disposition Health Education Ability to manage the home Appearance Sexual morality Family reputation Economic ability Motherliness Dowry
2,350 points 2,147 points 1,981 points 1,907 points 1,607 points 1,492 points 1,212 points 1,020 points 913 points 317 points
source: Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 61–62.
so on. As tables 6 and 7 show, Pan’s male respondents, like Chen’s, placed the most value on a wife’s disposition, health, education, ability to manage the home, and appearance. Even more striking, however, is the remarkable congruence of men’s and women’s rankings of characteristics they valued in a mate. Women reversed male rankings of education and ability, but the two qualities were separated by only eight points—the difference of one person’s choice. In women’s eyes, male sexual morality ranked much higher than appearance. Only one point, however, accounted for the difference in women’s ranking of family reputation and economic ability. Men considered a prospective wife’s family reputation
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table 7. pan’s survey: important qualities in a husband Disposition Health Ability to handle business Education Sexual morality* Appearance Economic ability Family reputation Fatherliness Family property
388 points 341 points 312 points 304 points 269 points 209 points 202 points 201 points 112 points 68 points
source: Pan, Zhongguo zhi jiating wenti, 61–62. *This probably referred to male chastity, an idea that gained popularity during this period.
considerably more important than her economic ability. Viewed as a whole, however, men and women held remarkably similar expectations of their mates.156
conclusion In New Culture literature, the modern man yearned to marry an educated, liberated, patriotic, civic-minded wife and set up house with her far from the entanglements of the patriarchal family. Pan’s and Chen’s surveys suggest that people took to heart parts of the New Culture xiao jiating ideal and ignored or modified others. They very much wanted some voice in choosing their wives, although most accepted or even welcomed their parents’ assistance. Chen’s young men focused on those wifely qualities that would most directly impinge upon their own lives— demeanor and disposition, family status, education, and age. Only with regard to their wives’ education and relative age did they make any substantial innovations in the wifely ideal. Like their parents, they wanted wives of gentle disposition who were skilled at running a household. Even those who wanted civic-minded wives who would “serve society” still expected women to care for home and hearth. Pan’s and Chen’s male subjects rejected concubinage, implicitly limiting their obligation to the family. But in other important ways they affirmed the values of the traditional patriarchal family; men and women alike valued serving their parents and most men did not want to establish their own households after marriage. How do we understand such a disparity between rhetoric and prac-
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tice? Zou Taofen, the editor of the popular periodical Life Weekly offers a possible explanation. Zou frequently reminded his readers that they belonged to a transitional generation.157 As a member of such, he believed it was his duty to fulfill his parents’ expectations that he would live with them and care for them in old age. He did not think his parents should suffer the consequences of a reform they had not chosen. He did not, however, expect the same of his son. He would teach his children differently. As one of Chen’s subjects explained, “Because my parents supported my grandparents, I should support my parents. I cannot say that reform should start with my parents, rather, it should start with me.”158 Lu Xun spoke eloquently on the same problem: “Burdened as a man may be with the weight of tradition, he may yet prop open the gate of darkness with his shoulder to let the children pass through to the bright wide-open spaces to lead happy lives henceforth as rational human beings.”159 With regard to women’s role in home and society, the survey responses reflected the same tensions and contradictions that informed much New Culture literature on family reform and women’s liberation. Men wanted educated, civic-minded wives because they would make better companions. But their desire for increased communication with their wives did not necessitate a radical revision of women’s roles in the home. Rather, they hoped to transform women’s roles only insofar as this would help them carve a toehold for themselves farther up in the family hierarchy. In short, these young men did not want to overturn patriarchy: they wanted to join it. This desire led them to ignore the possibility of restructuring domestic gender roles, as some feminists suggested. Young men did not want to abandon their claim to women’s reproductive labor at the very moment that they stood a better chance of enjoying that labor. If Chen’s and Pan’s surveys are any indication, the average educated, urban man set quite modest goals for himself. He wanted to delay marriage and he wanted some voice in choosing a wife with some education. Yet, more often than not, his family made these decisions for him. One distinctive characteristic of reform efforts in late Qing and Republican China was the willingness of reformers to bring the state into their reforming efforts as an agent of change.160 Although the individualism of the New Culture Movement had obscured this tendency, interest in state-led reform appeared with new strength in the 1920s. Disappointed by their failure to significantly change Chinese society or politics, many
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young men gave up on the individualistic approach that characterized much of New Culture activism. Instead, they began searching for systemic solutions to China’s problems through increased state leadership in reform efforts. For other reform-minded Chinese, disillusionment with individualistic reform efforts came in the early 1930s with the GMD’s failure to defend China against Japanese encroachment and invasion.161 One of Chen’s respondents wrote ardently of the need for state and judicial intervention in family-reform efforts: “The government should prohibit parents from deciding their sons’ marriages for them. If a marriage has been forced then it should be without effect. Those who have already been married to a bad spouse should have the freedom to divorce.”162 Both the Nationalists and the Communists responded to this call. In April of 1927, Chiang Kaishek purged the Communists from the Nationalist Party and established his government in Nanjing. He and his government immediately took on the “tutelage” of the Chinese people prescribed by Sun Yatsen. The Nationalists adopted various reforms and education policies meant to teach the Chinese their social and moral duties as citizens. Their New Family Law, which took effect in May 1931, was central to their vision of the Chinese state. It was also one of the most warmly received of Nationalist projects. Meanwhile, the Communists had fled Shanghai and established bases in Jiangxi. There they initiated reforms of their own. In 1934, Nationalist harassment forced the Communists to embark on the Long March to China’s distant northwestern province of Gansu. There too, they tried to institute some family reforms. However, the exigencies of guerilla warfare and their own state-building concerns kept reforms on the back burner until after the CCP’s victory in 1949. At the same time that the Nationalists and Communists were developing their views of the family as a pillar of state strength and order, entrepreneurs were refining a model of the family as the site of rational consumption and the source of a consumer economy. Their version of the xiao jiating featured prominently in the pages of family and women’s magazines and supplemental sections of many newspapers in the 1930s and 1940s. The New Culture Movement initiated a debate that quickly widened to include reformers and revolutionaries, middle-class liberals, and entrepreneurs. Progressive urbanites soon accepted as truth the claim that social and national progress depended on family reform. But New Culture radicals did much more than accustom an urban audience to an idea.
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They defined the terms and set the scope of a debate that was to continue through the Republican era and well past 1949. In the decades to follow, the Nationalist government, entrepreneurs, and the Communist Party would manipulate the images and terms of the debate to their own purposes, but they would never fundamentally challenge the essential components nor the causal connections that linked them.
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Making the National Family The Statist Xiao Jiating
When the Nationalists came to power in 1927, they exploited the statebuilding possibilities of xiao jiating discourse by stressing nationalism and patriotic duty. Their version of family reform and its relation to the state differed in emphasis and direction from its New Culture predecessor. Whereas New Culture radicals had envisioned a state strengthened by the cumulative effects of individual freedom and productivity, the Nationalists made the state both the primary beneficiary and the central agent of reform. They rejected the individual as the agent of change and intended instead for the state to lead the way, remaking the individual and family to suit its needs. At the same time, state-led reform was neither entirely unwelcome nor unprecedented. New Culture reformers had hoped that through political, judicial, and legislative reform the state would aid their efforts to change Chinese society.1 Many New Culture radicals also believed that state intervention in the form of new legislation would be an important aspect of effective family reform. Reform-minded urbanites tended to agree. For example, in the mid-1920s, the popular journalist and editor of Life Weekly, Zou Taofen, portrayed the law as a guarantor of individual rights.2 Precedent for the state’s active role in social reform was established in the earliest years of the Republican era. (Indeed, the Qing dynasty itself began a series of reforms in the last decade of its rule.) From 1912 to 1927, the Supreme Court (Dali yuan) at Beijing took upon itself the 81
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modernization of China’s customs in order to bring them into line with those of the international community.3 During its tenure, it attempted to liberalize marriage customs, eroding the authority of family elders and taking an active role in what previously had been private family decisions.4 These early efforts to reform the Chinese family through the court paved the way for the Nationalists’ own judicial and legislative efforts in the 1920s and 1930s. As early as 1915, the court began to uphold a woman’s right to marry the man of her choice. A year later it refused to force a woman to complete a marriage and denied the husband’s right to forcibly retain her for the marriage—even though the court itself ruled that she was bound by the betrothal agreement. A 1916 ruling supported a child’s right to refuse to fulfill a betrothal agreement if she or he had a legal right to break it. A 1917 ruling further undermined parental authority by denying parents the right to withhold consent to a marriage “without just reason.” In 1925, the court decided that parents could not force their children to conclude a betrothal that had been made when they were minors. It also prohibited parents from withdrawing consent to a betrothal once they had given it. In its final years, the court ruled that marriages between parties who were of age could not be carried out if either party actively protested the match.5 The Nationalists continued the proactive approach of the Beijing Supreme Court. Their Supreme Court (Zuigao fayuan), established in Nanjing on 24 December 1927, continued the effort to modernize family law, taking its lead from the Second Party Congress (January 1926) resolution to treat men and women equally. The Nationalists’ civil code would also further erode familial authority and claim a broader purview for state authority. Far from perceiving Nationalist efforts as an encroachment on private issues, those interested in family reform welcomed the new legislation.
the nationalist state as meta-ancestor The Nationalist vision of the family and its place in state-society relations required an intervention in family affairs far greater than China’s imperial governments had ever attempted or wanted. Traditional cosmology linked family and state order; disorder in one reflected disorder in the other. But the connection between the two was imagined not so much as a causal link as a cosmological reverberation. The imperial government encouraged “proper” human relationships by disseminating the
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Sacred Edict (shengyu), awarding the especially chaste and filial, and modeling virtuous behavior within the imperial family. Direct state intervention was limited. For the most part, families supervised their members, managed their affairs independently of the state, and disciplined deviant behavior. This meant that the state actively intervened in family affairs only when serious deviations from the norm—murder, rape, the abuse of elders—landed families in court.6 Unlike the Republican supreme courts, the dynastic courts were largely reactive bodies that restored society to its proper, “natural” order. The Nationalists dissolved the barriers between family and state by appropriating to the state the authority previously held by the senior generation, pulling the family within the purview of the state, where it could be monitored by state agencies. The Nationalists justified their intrusion into the family with the language of family reform and state-strengthening. One hallmark of familyreform discourse was the ease with which different groups used the same rationale to justify different, and sometimes conflicting, goals. New Culture radicals championed the individual and promoted family reform in the name of state-strengthening. The Nationalists used the same language to justify the statist direction of their family legislation. In his introduction to the books of Marriage Law and Inheritance in the Nationalist’s civil code, Nationalist functionary Fu Bingchang7 (1896–1965) explained the Nationalists’ intention to use family legislation as an instrument of state-building. In order to turn China into a real State, in the modern sense of the word, Dr. Sun Yat Sen thought it necessary to substitute for the primitive notion of unity of clan or family, the notion of unity of population formed by these clans or families. The particular interest of the isolated groups had to yield to the general interest of the nation. To put into practice this new ideal and to enable the citizens to make use of their personal abilities to the best interest of their country, it was imperative that the excessive grip of the old family ties over the individuals should be loosened.8
Through the voice of Sun Yatsen, Fu established the nation’s claim on its citizens’ loyalty. If the Chinese people were to succeed in building a nation, they would have to redirect their energy and abilities from family loyalties to a greater national loyalty. The Nationalist state did not, however, wish to dissolve the family entirely. Instead, it preserved it, albeit in somewhat streamlined form, as the essential building block of a new China. Such a polity would be “a great family of the people.”9 A passage in the Nationalist guidelines for rituals clearly articulates this relationship between family and state, ob-
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serving that “marriage is not only the beginning of a new family, but also the starting point of the people and the nation.”10 Because the Nationalists believed that the family would play a central role in China’s reconstruction, the government devoted much effort to the codification of family ritual and legislation of family law. These efforts provide important interpretive keys to the Nationalist vision of state-society relations and to the hierarchies that ordered the relationship between individual, family, and state. The government first showed an interest in creating ceremonial guidelines in 1928, when the Guidance Committee for Party Affairs in Ciqi county of Zhejiang province complained to the provincial Guidance Committee for Party Affairs that weddings, funerals, and other rituals were “exhausting material resources” and asked the government to design regulations to curb excess spending.11 The government received similar requests from other parts of the country. Traditional weddings involved elaborate exchanges of gifts as well as a wedding ceremony and banquets. It was not uncommon for poorer families to borrow money in order to maintain, or increase, family prestige by means of such festivities. Given the general concern with national productivity, the Nationalists probably hoped that reduced wedding costs would allow families to put more capital into productive investments or at least to avoid falling into debt. The Nationalists were not alone in their concern over ritual spending; politicians, intellectuals, and others were preoccupied with saving money in order to boost the economy and buy back foreign concessions.12 Family and women’s magazines often encouraged housewives to curb frivolous spending and included savings in their model monthly budgets. Despite the purported urgency of these issues, disagreements over the guidelines delayed them considerably. Early in 1930, the Executive Committee of Nanjing dismissed as “unbearably old-fashioned” the version produced by the Department of the Interior.13 The government sporadically drafted and redrafted the guidelines over the next ten years; whether it ever produced a final set of guidelines is unclear. Portions of the draft discussed below were written in October 1932 and June 1934. The draft appears to have been partially revised during the New Life Movement (1934–1936).14 We also have no way of knowing whether private individuals ever paid any attention to the guidelines. But even if they remained something of a wish list, the guidelines provide insight into Nationalist visions of family, nation, and state. Both by authoring the guidelines and giving pride of place to Nationalist and national symbols, the Nationalists expressed
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their desire to direct individual and family loyalties and energies to the Nationalist state. The new Chinese citizen would honor and serve the Nationalist party just as previous generations had honored and served their ancestors. The committee in charge of the guidelines wrote them as supplements to the civil code. The committee explained: Ritual and law both are led by custom, but ritual must not take precedence over the exercise of law. Their significance and their natures differ. . . . But in that both tie together people’s hearts, and keep people within the law, they are clearly different roads to the same destination. It has never been otherwise. Ritual already has a long history in China. Today the law is also complete in scope. But the articles of the law have a coercive quality, and take concreteness as their priority. Behavior must be fully formed in custom before it can be legislated into law. Ritual seeks to bring circumstances closer to what is right. Ritual can focus on whatever can lead the way to better customs. Therefore, ritual supplements law but it must not act in contravention of law, so that the two may complement each other in their execution, coexisting and not conflicting.15
The wedding protocol hoped to encourage behavior that could not be legislated; the injunction to secure parental consent could not appear in the civil code without contradicting the legal guarantee of free choice in marriage. Other aspects of the guidelines, like the recommendation that traditional vocabulary describing betrothal and wedding rituals be discarded, and the ideal choreography of the ceremony itself, were similarly unenforceable. But by creating state-sanctioned rituals, the Nationalists hoped to shape custom, an important task in light of the fact that they believed that “behavior must be fully formed in custom before it can be legislated into law.” This vision of the relation between custom and law recalls the flexibility of the Qing bureaucracy as it mediated tensions and conflict between imperial statutes and local custom. The Nationalists, however, took a much more directive stance. Although they recognized the need to make their laws responsive to local practice, they also intended to make the people more amenable to government law through the reshaping of that practice. In essence, the Nationalists sought to expand their authority through the rationalization of custom. They were not satisfied with merely trying to influence custom (fengsu) through moral example. The content of ritual practice was too important to leave to chance. They wanted to mold ritual directly, using authoritative guidelines. The choreography of the ideal private wedding ceremony vividly illustrates the Nationalist vision of the family as a link between state and
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individual and of the state as the ultimate source of authority and object of loyalty. By placing the state at the head of the family structure— making it, in essence, the individual’s parents and ancestors—the government tried to reinforce individual rights vis-à-vis the joint family while simultaneously maintaining social stability. The language of the guidelines introduced a degree of equality into the parent-child relationship, but a complete abdication of parental authority made the Nationalists uneasy. The guidelines urged couples to obtain their parents’ blessing before marrying: “When men and women become engaged, they should inform their parents in advance and ask for their guidance.”16 The protocol explicitly stated that its recommendations must not conflict with any article of the civil code. Thus, the Nationalists recommended, but could not require, that couples seek parental advice and approval before marrying. The Nationalists also tried to influence popular vocabulary so as to convey their ideal that marriages be made “in the spirit of love, sincerity, and equality.” Accordingly, the party urged people to discard traditional terms and practices that suggested marriage was a commercial transaction in which families acquired brides and grooms through negotiation and barter. With the exception of qingqi (asking the date) and qinying (welcoming the bride), the protocol recommended that people stop using terms like wenming (asking the names prior to betrothal), naji (divining the good or bad luck of a marriage), nacai (sending presents to the bride’s home to confirm the betrothal), nazheng (sending betrothal gifts to complete the wedding arrangements). The Nationalists also wished to replace the taking of horoscopes (bazi gengtie) with an engagement ceremony that expressed the couple’s own agency in the match and their respect for the institution of marriage.17 Distinct as they were, the Nationalists’ ceremonies were created with the central features of the wedding ritual practiced by the Han, China’s dominant ethnic group, in mind. Although there were many regional variations, the traditional Han wedding ceremony tended to organize itself around the following essentials. The ceremony began when the groom and his party arrived to take the bride to her husband’s home. (The bride’s family did not participate in the wedding proper.) Once she arrived at the groom’s home, the couple was taken to the ancestral hall or room where the ancestral tablets were kept. There they bowed first before the ancestors and then to the groom’s parents. Sometimes the couple also bowed before Heaven and Earth or the door gods. The groom often poured an offering of wine to the ancestors, and the wedding couple
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sometimes drank wine together to symbolize mutual devotion. The groom’s family then held a banquet for its relatives and friends. On the following morning, or sometimes on the third morning, the bride proceeded to the main hall or principal room and presented herself to her seated parents-in-law. There she served them tea while the rest of the household looked on. Later that same day, the bride’s parents sent food to the groom’s parents. The bride waited on them as they ate.18 The marriage was completed only after the wife had performed these rituals to mark her deference and filiality to her in-laws. The traditional wedding ceremony sprawled across time and space. In contrast, the Nationalists confined the wedding ceremony to a single room and a short span of time in the presence of family and friends of both bride and groom. The witnesses, intermediaries, family heads, guests, and the wedding party entered the hall in turn and seated themselves while “marriage music” played. At the beginning of the ceremony, everyone rose as one body and “stood at respectful attention.” Then everyone bowed together three times to the Nationalist Party flag, the national flag, and the portrait of Prime Minister Sun Yatsen (who was, and still is, commonly referred to as the father of the country [guofu]).19 Only after respects had been offered to the state did the bride and groom bow three times to their ancestors. This was followed by the reading and then chopping (the equivalent of signing) of the marriage license. The newlyweds exchanged jewelry and bowed to one another three times. Then the intermediaries spoke, the family heads “exhorted,” the guests spoke, and the newlyweds responded. The newlyweds thanked the witnesses with three bows. The witnesses reciprocated with three bows and exited. This step was repeated with the intermediaries. Next, the newlyweds saluted the family heads with three bows. In keeping with their generational status, the family heads did not return the salute. After the family heads exited, the newlyweds thanked the guests with one bow. The guests bowed in return. The guests exited and the wedding party followed. Marriage music resumed and marked the completion of the ceremony.20 Both the traditional and the Nationalist ceremonies were carefully orchestrated rituals that marked hierarchies of loyalty, obligation, and deference. But in the Nationalists’ ceremony the state appropriated the dominance and ritual seniority formerly accorded to ancestors. In the traditional ceremony, the bride and groom repeatedly underscored the authority of ancestors with obeisances and ritual offerings of food and drink. In their ideal wedding ceremony, the Nationalists used symbols
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Making the National Family Prime Minister’s Portrait Party Flag
National Flag
Ancestors’ Place Head of Bride’s Family
Intermediary
Witnesses
Intermediary
Head of Groom’s Family
Ceremonial Table Guests
Master of Ceremonies
Master of Ceremonies Bride
Guests
Groom
Maid of Honor
Best Man
Musicians
Figure 6. Choreography of an ideal Nationalist wedding. Drawn from Department of the Interior guidelines, GSG 311 114.13–56, document “B.”
and choreography to interpose the state as the ultimate family authority (see figure 6). The emblems of the state—the party and national flags and a portrait of Sun Yatsen—occupied a spatially superior position, symbolizing the precedence of state authority over the ancestors, and, by implication, over the family. The heads of both families, together with the intermediaries, represented family authority. State authority, manifested in the two or more witnesses required by law, stood together with the family heads behind the ceremonial table. Except when bowing to the portrait and the flags, these people faced the room, backed, so to speak, but also dominated, by the state and party emblems. The bride and groom faced this hierarchy of family and state authority while guests, representing the power of social expectation that supports family and nation, sat to either side. With the elaborate sequence of bows, the newlyweds acknowledged that they owed fealty first to the state and then to the family. Recognition of the conjugal bond ranked a distant third. The series of bows that followed the wedding proper rep-
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resented the couple’s continuing ties to family and society under the auspices of the state. Masters of ceremonies, as well as a maid of honor and best man, stood to either side of the couple, providing assistance as they navigated the complexities of a ceremony that initiated them into the web of political, family, and social ties.21 With the exception of the family heads, the Nationalist ceremony provided no special position for the families of the bride and groom. Family members presumably stood with the guests, a placement symbolizing the Nationalists’ desire to attenuate the connection between family and individual. The committee also drafted an oath that might be read in unison by the newlyweds after they applied their chops to the marriage license. In considering a public declaration “in order to make clear that their union arises from the greatest sincerity,” the Nationalists followed the example of Western Christian custom. But in content the Nationalist vows again made the state’s presence felt. In the Nationalist pledge the couple not only swore undying loyalty to one another, but also promised to devote themselves to the Chinese people and state: “Today with greatest sincerity I, ______, [and] ______ become lifelong companions. In the spirit of equality, mutual help, respect, and love we are willing to establish [a] new family, strengthen the body and the race, work hard for the public good, protect the country, and resurrect the people.”22 The proposed pledge deftly combined nationalism with the marriage ideals introduced by the New Culture radicals. The ideal marriage provided an environment that fortified the couple in their efforts to build a strong China. The Nationalist penchant for appropriating social practice, at least on paper, is vividly illustrated by comparing the Nationalist choreography of the wedding ceremony and a diagram of a “new-style” Shanghai wedding published in a 1925 Shanghai guidebook (see figure 7).23 In this ceremony, state and family authority were entirely absent. There were no party or government symbols, no portraits, no flags. There were no allusions to ancestors and the heads of the bride’s and groom’s families were demoted to “hosts.”24 In the “new-style” wedding, social authority replaced state and family: the witnesses and intermediaries stood behind the ceremonial table, legitimating the ceremony that was carried out before their eyes. The “new-style” ceremony expressed the hierarchies and distinctions that did matter: it maintained the distinction between family and guests. It placed the bride’s family on her side of the room and the groom’s family on his, underscoring the very family solidarity that the Nationalists wished to weaken. It also continued the traditional prac-
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Intermediary
Intermediary
Ceremonial Table Bride’s Family
Host of the Wedding on the Bride’s Side
Host of the Wedding on the Groom’s Side
Bride
Groom
Bridesmaid
Best Man
Master of Ceremonies
Groom’s Family
Master of Ceremonies
Musicians
Musicians Female Guests
Male Guests
Figure 7. Choreography of a new-style Shanghai wedding. Drawn from a description in Shanghai baojian (Precious mirror of Shanghai), section 4, page 1.
tice of segregating men and women guests, a distinction that the Nationalist wedding ignored. The Nationalists envisioned a state that stood at the peak of the social and political hierarchy. Unlike New Culture radicals, they were much more interested in the family as a center of authority than as a locus of affection. Thus, the Nationalists accorded family heads a degree of authority in the expectation that they would both supervise the individuals within the family and link them to the state. At the same time, the Nationalists wanted to weaken family authority and solidarity to a certain extent, so that the state could command the individual’s productive energies and ultimate loyalty. This desire is expressed in the superior placement of national and party symbols and in the blurring of traditional distinctions between family and outsider and between male and female. Practitioners of the popular ceremony, in contrast, dispensed with the powerful symbols of family authority like ancestors and family heads but continued to order the world through distinctions of kin and gender, thus acting out their own sense of what mattered.
“a decidedly social turn” Just as Nationalist choreography of the marriage ceremony placed the individual within a hierarchy of political, social, and cultural ties, so did its family legislation set the individual within a matrix of political, so-
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cial, and familial obligations.25 In 1928, legal scholar Tao Huizeng observed that social progress, ease of transportation, growth of commerce and industry, and the resulting richness of urban life expanded state authority and heightened the value of the individual.26 Nationalist legislation recognized this and took steps to ensure that the force of individualism did not outstrip the strength of the state. In effect, the Nationalists wrote their family legislation to conform to the implementation of the conjugal family ideal.27 Before beginning its revision of the family code, the Civil Codification Commission of the Legislative Yuan asked the Central Political Council ten questions. Most of the issues they reviewed—age at marriage, parental authority, grounds for divorce, concubinage, the persistence of the family system and principles for its organization—had occupied an important place in the New Culture family-reform debate.28 With the exception of concubinage, the Central Political Council dealt concretely with all of these topics.29 Much of the Nationalists’ family legislation responded to concerns raised by the New Culture Movement. The new code insisted that both men and women marry of their own free will.30 Those who had been coerced into marriage had recourse to annulment.31 Men and women were given nearequal grounds for divorce.32 Either husband or wife could act as family head.33 Moreover, the code emphasized the mutual obligation of family members to support one another rather than the dependents’ obligations to the family head.34 It also required that parents maintain and educate their minor children.35 The code implicitly recognized the New Culture complaint that the requirement to live with the family crippled one’s ability to make a living; it did not give the family head the authority to force family members who had attained majority to live at home.36 The principles of generational and gender equality so important to New Culture family reformers strongly influenced the new code. Nevertheless, the primary focus of the legislation was not the individual but the state. This focus manifested itself both in the Nationalists’ efforts to regularize and control wedding ceremonies and in the goals of family legislation elucidated by Hu Hanmin37 and other key figures in the codification process. The state’s effort to define what constituted a legally binding marriage ceremony represented a significant innovation. Traditionally, weddings had been family affairs governed by custom and conducted without state intervention. The ceremony usually took place in the home of the groom’s parents and friends and family of the groom were invited to witness the ceremony and/or attend the banquet that followed. Of course, everyone who mattered knew about the marriage, but
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it was not registered with government or church authorities. Elite families kept genealogies, but even these might be incomplete because daughtersin-law were often added only after they had produced a son. Earlier Republican-era codes required only that the marriage be reported to the housing registration official (huji li).38 The Nationalists’ New Family Law went much further, requiring that “a marriage must be celebrated by [an] open [gongkai ] ceremony . . . in the presence of two or more witnesses.”39 In fact, the presence of witnesses carried more weight than a written agreement.40 The insistence on an open ceremony marked an intensification of state-society relations. It defined the necessary steps by which families were constituted and forced the family to submit previously private activities to state scrutiny.41 James Scott’s theory about modern nation-states and their insistence on “legibility” is useful in thinking about what the Nationalists thought they were accomplishing by requiring “open” ceremonies. Scott notes that “the premodern state was, in many respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholding and yields, their location, their very identity.”42 The modern nation-state, by contrast, “attempts with varying success to create a terrain and a population with precisely those standardized characteristics that will be easiest to monitor, count, assess, and manage.”43 Through a variety of measures— permanent family names, standardization of weights and measures, cadastral surveys, population registers, and so on—the state imposed an order that would make society as a whole “legible.” “In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored.”44 But the goal of such standardization was not simply knowledge, it was power: “The builders of the modern nation-state do not merely describe, observe, and map; they strive to shape a people and landscape that will fit their techniques of observation.”45 Scott’s point is amply borne out in the Nationalists’ family legislation. The Nationalists wanted to create a citizenry in their own image. To that end, their laws refused to recognize unions that did not comply with the code, and thus forced people to organize their lives in ways that the state could “see.” The Nationalists’ choice of “open” to describe the acceptable marriage ceremony is especially telling in this regard, suggesting as it does that the traditional ceremony had been closed. Closed to whom? Not to the locals, of course, for whom the ceremony was very much a public occasion. But for a state intent on taking stock of the nation as a whole,
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such “unorganized” and idiosyncratic means of sanctioning a marriage actually obscured it. What the state wanted was uniform means by which a marriage was established and a consistent method of verification—thus the prescribed ceremony and the two official witnesses. Of course, the Nationalists did not speak about their state-building project in terms of legibility and increased state control. In fact, they emphasized the liberating possibilities of the new family code. Hu Hanmin believed that the family and inheritance laws could “sweep away” the corruptions of “tyranny, dependency, and inequality.”46 Likewise, the principles set forward by the Judiciary Office of the National Government (Guofu fazhi ju), which were to inform the legislative efforts, were all marked by the language of liberalization. The Judiciary Office designated three main principles that were to inform the family code: equality of men and women; promotion of the health of the race; and encouragement of mutual help among relatives but discouragement of dependency.47 We tend to assume that increased state surveillance always results in loss of freedom and that the language of liberation always masks a desire to control, but the Codification Commission’s response to the Judiciary Office’s charge demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between state power and individual freedom. In fact, for the most part, the Nationalists’ efforts to open the family to state surveillance provided individuals with new freedoms. In response to the Judiciary Office’s three principles, the Commission gave men and women near-equal rights to divorce and daughters the right to inherit equally with their brothers.48 In the interest of eugenics, it set minimum ages for marriage, defined one’s mother’s relatives as kin, prohibited marriage to maternal relatives within the third degree,49 and allowed men and women to divorce spouses with grave, incurable mental illnesses or “loathsome diseases.”50 In each of these provisions, the Nationalists made good on their promise to dispense with “tyranny, dependency, and gender inequality.” This is, perhaps, especially clear in the first two, which redistributed power within the family without impinging too deeply on the rights of others— husbands were simply held to the same standards of behavior that wives were, and daughters enjoyed a share of what their brothers had previously monopolized. In prohibiting the marriage of the gravely ill or disabled, the state limited the freedoms of some people. But in doing so, it tried to end the practice of families marrying sons who were insane, severely retarded, incapable of consummating the marriage, or afflicted with venereal disease to unsuspecting brides. In recognizing maternal relatives
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as kin, the Nationalists also hoped to underscore the equality of men and women. The Nationalists’ decision to recognize maternal relatives as kin exemplifies how a state might both increase its surveillance and give the individual more freedom from patriarchal social institutions. This provision of the code expanded state surveillance by illuminating a family connection that was often socially obscured. At the same time it underscored the equality of men and women and destabilized patriarchal authority by reducing the patriline to just half of the family and limiting its authority over family property and identity. Prior to this, Han Chinese families had been strictly patrilineal. Relatives on one’s mother’s side were not considered to be real family. This was reflected, for example, in the reduced mourning obligations for the death of relatives on the mother’s side. This is also why marriage to a first cousin on one’s father’s side was considered incest, but marriage to first cousins through the maternal line was sanctioned. To count maternal relatives as kin entailed a radical redefinition of family.51 It would be a mistake, however, to believe that ritual definitions of family meant that people were strangers to their maternal kin. As Ellen Judd has so aptly put it, “A married woman ‘belongs to her pojia’ (mother-in-law’s family), but she can make her niangjia (mother’s family) a continuing part of her practical world of kin.”52 Women seem to have usually retained close ties with their natal families. The old adage “A daughter is like spilled water”—meaning that at marriage a daughter and all one’s investments in her were lost because she would devote her energies and loyalty to her husband’s family—echoed Confucian prescription but ignored the complex realities of everyday life. In fact,