CCCS Selected Working Papers Volume 2
This collection of classic essays focuses on the theoretical frameworks that inf...
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CCCS Selected Working Papers Volume 2
This collection of classic essays focuses on the theoretical frameworks that informed the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, the methodologies and working practices that the Centre developed for conducting academic research and examples of the ‘grounded studies’ carried out under the auspices of the Centre. This volume is split into seven thematic sections that are introduced by key academics working in the field of cultural studies, and includes a preface by eminent scholar, Stuart Hall. The thematic sections are: • • • • • • •
Literature and society Popular culture and youth subculture Media Women’s studies and feminism Race History Education and work
Essays by: James Avis; Steve Baron; Trevor Blackwell; Charlotte Brunsdon; Rosalind Brunt; Steve Burniston; Helen Butcher; Hazel Carby; Mariette Clare; Gary Clarke; John Clarke; Stanley Cohen; Ian Connell; Ros Coward; Chas. Critcher; Lidia Curti; Richard Dyer; Marcella Evaristi; B. Findlay; Dan Finn; Jenny Garber; Paul Gilroy; Neil Grant; Ann Gray; Andy Green; Michael Green; Christine Griffin; Roger Grimshaw; Stuart Hall; Rachel Harrison; Dick Hebdige; Dorothy Hobson; Graham Holderness; Tony Jefferson; Richard Johnson; Bryn Jones; Simon Jones; Stuart Laing; Errol Lawrence; Alf Louvre; Gregor McLennan; Angela McRobbie; Adrian Mellor; David Morley; Frank Mort; Jean-Claude Passeron; Brian Roberts; Bill Schwartz; John Solomos; Colin Sparks; Pam Taylor; Andrew Tolson; Christine Weedon; Paul Willis; Janice Winship.
CCCS Selected Working Papers Volume 2
Edited by Ann Gray, Jan Campbell, Mark Erickson, Stuart Hanson and Helen Wood
First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor and Francis Group, an informa business Editorial Selection © 2007 Ann Gray Individual Chapters and Introductions © 2007 the chapter and introduction authors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-35707-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0–415–32441–6 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–35707–8 (ebk) ISBN10: 0–415–41259–5 (2-volume set) ISBN13: 978–0–415–32441–0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–35707–1 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–41259–9 (2-volume set)
Contents
Editorial team
x
Preface
xi
STUART HALL
Acknowledgements
xiv
Introduction
1
THE EDITORIAL TEAM
SECTION 1
Literature and society Introduction
13 15
STUART LAING
1
Introduction to the French edition of Uses of Literacy
25
JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON
2
Literature/society: Mapping the field
35
UNAUTHORED
3
Reading literature as culture
56
ANDREW TOLSON
4
Notes on a theory of genre
70
ALF LOUVRE
5
Walter Greenwood: Working-class writer
80
STUART LAING
6
Lawrence, Leavis and culture
92
GRAHAM HOLDERNESS
7
The abuses of literacy COLIN SPARKS
111
vi
Contents
8
The hidden method: Lucien Goldmann and the sociology of literature
123
ADRIAN MELLOR
SECTION 2
Popular culture and youth subculture Introduction
139 141
JOHN CLARKE
9
The Hippies: An American ‘moment’
146
STUART HALL
10
The meaning of Tom Jones
168
RICHARD DYER
11
The politics of popular culture
179
BRYN JONES
12
Breaking out, smashing up and the social context of aspiration
183
STANLEY COHEN
13
Working class youth cultures
200
JOHN CLARKE, TONY JEFFERSON
14
Girls and subcultures
219
ANGELA McROBBIE, JENNY GARBER
15
Defending ski-jumpers: A critique of theories of youth sub-cultures
230
GARY CLARKE
SECTION 3
Media
257 Introduction
259
DAVID MORLEY
16
The spectacular world of Whicker
270
ROSALIND BRUNT
17
Television news and the Social Contract
288
IAN CONNELL
18
Housewives and the mass media
304
DOROTHY HOBSON
19
Newsmaking and crime STUART HALL, JOHN CLARKE, CHAS. CRITCHER, TONY JEFFERSON, BRIAN ROBERTS
313
Contents 20
The ‘unity’ of current affairs television
vii 326
STUART HALL, IAN CONNELL, LIDIA CURTI
21
The ‘structured communication’ of events
365
STUART HALL
22
Encoding and decoding in the television discourse
386
STUART HALL
23
Reconceptualising the media audience: Towards an ethnography of audience
399
DAVID MORLEY
SECTION 4
Women’s studies and feminism Introduction
415 417
JANICE WINSHIP
24
Images of women in the media
434
HELEN BUTCHER, ROS COWARD, MARCELLA EVARISTI, JENNY GARBER, RACHEL HARRISON, JANICE WINSHIP
25
Relations of production: Relations of re-production
464
WOMEN’S STUDIES GROUP
26
‘It is well known that by nature women are inclined to be rather personal’
485
CHARLOTTE BRUNSDON
27
A woman’s world: ‘Woman’ – an ideology of femininity
499
JANICE WINSHIP
28
Housewives: Isolation as oppression
517
DOROTHY HOBSON
29
Psychoanalysis and the cultural acquisition of sexuality and subjectivity
530
STEVE BURNISTON, FRANK MORT, CHRISTINE WEEDON
30
The good, the bad and the ugly: Images of young women in the labour market
549
CHRISTINE GRIFFIN
SECTION 5
Race
561 Introduction: Lost in translation
563
HAZEL CARBY
31
Down these mean streets . . . the meaning of mugging TONY JEFFERSON, JOHN CLARKE
571
viii 32
Contents Reggae, Rastas and Rudies: Style and the subversion of form
585
DICK HEBDIGE
33
On the political economy of black labour and the racial structuring of the working class in England
615
ANDY GREEN
34
Multicultural fictions
649
HAZEL CARBY
35
The organic crisis of British capitalism and race: The experience of the seventies
669
JOHN SOLOMOS, BOB FINDLAY, SIMON JONES, PAUL GILROY
36
Just plain common sense: The ‘roots’ of racism
699
ERROL LAWRENCE
37
White woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood
737
HAZEL CARBY
SECTION 6
History Introduction: Entangled histories
759 761
RICHARD JOHNSON
38
Economy, culture and concept: Three approaches to marxist history
774
RICHARD JOHNSON, GREGOR McLENNAN, BILL SCHWARZ
39
Out of the people: The politics of containment 1935–45
818
CULTURAL HISTORY GROUP
40
The history of a working-class Methodist Chapel
838
TREVOR BLACKWELL
Comment
851
ROGER GRIMSHAW
41
‘Ideology’ and ‘consciousness’: Some problems in Marxist historiography
852
GREGOR McLENNAN
42
Women domestic servants 1919–1939: A study of a hidden Army, illustrated by servants’ own recollected experiences
883
PAM TAYLOR
43
What do we mean by popular memory? CCCS POPULAR MEMORY GROUP
894
Contents
ix
SECTION 7
Education and work Introduction: The books at the end of the shelf
909 911
PAUL WILLIS
44
Social democracy, education and the crisis
926
DAN FINN, NEIL GRANT, RICHARD JOHNSON
45
Perspectives on schooling and politics
989
CCCS EDUCATION GROUP
46
The Adult Literacy Campaign: Politics and practices
1010
MARIETTE CLARE
47
The strange fate of progressive education
1050
JAMES AVIS
48
How working class kids get working class jobs
1071
PAUL WILLIS
Index
1088
Editorial team
Jan Campbell is senior lecturer in English at the University of Birmingham and a former member of staff at DCSS. Campbell’s research focuses on the interface between psychoanalysis and cultural theory, psychoanalysis and film and psychoanalysis and therapy practice (she is a clinical analyst). Her most recent book, Psychoanalysis and the Time of Life: Durations of the Unconscious Self is a rereading of Freud in relation to the work of Henri Bergson. Ann Gray is Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Lincoln, Editor of the European Journal of Cultural Studies and is on the Editorial Board of the Journal of British Cinema and Television and Memory Studies. Her previous publications include Research Practice for Cultural Studies: Ethnographic Methods and Lived Cultures (2003) and Video Playtime: the Gendering of a Leisure Technology (1992). She is director of the AHRC project ‘Televising History: 1995– 2010’. Mark Erickson is currently Senior Lecturer in the School of Applied Social Sciences at the University of Brighton. He was a member of staff at DCSS from 1996 until its closure in 2001. His most recent book is Science, Culture and Society: Making Sense of Science in the 21st Century (2005) published by Polity. Stuart Hanson is Senior Lecturer in Media Studies at De Montfort University, Leicester. He has previously taught at Wolverhampton University and in the Department of Cultural Studies and Sociology at the University of Birmingham. He is author of a forthcoming book for MUP entitled From Silent Screen to Multi-screen: A History of Cinema Exhibition in Britain Since 1896. Helen Wood is Lecturer of Sociology at De Montfort University. She is author of Talking With Television forthcoming, University of Illinois Press, and has published on television, audiences, talk shows, reality television and cultural studies in a number of journals. She is also assistant editor of the journal Ethnography. She was an undergraduate student and member of staff in the Department of Cultural Studies at Birmingham.
Preface Stuart Hall
This is the second volume of papers republished from the archives of the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies. They cover the two decades from the Centre’s inception in 1964 to the beginning of the 1980s. The Introduction by the Editorial Team sets this work in the broader context of the Centre’s development over this period. The aim of the Preface is to describe the organizational contexts and working practices through which they were produced. The essays were selected from a variety of sources, including early formulations of the Centre’s project, papers produced in the various seminar groups, early drafts of essays or chapters, some of them first circulated in the form of the mimeographed Stencilled Papers series which subsequently appeared, revised and expanded, in more permanent form – for example, in the Centre journal, Working Papers In Cultural Studies and the Hutchinson book series. CCCS Selected Working Papers Volume 1 was largely concerned with early theoretical developments in Cultural Studies at both the conceptual and the more methodological or ‘grounded’ levels. The final two sections of that Volume ‘Theorising Experience, Exploring Methods’ and ‘Grounded Studies’, drew from work produced in the Centre’s various sub- or working-groups and the essays and papers in this volume are almost entirely drawn from that source. Collective intellectual work at the Centre was organized into three levels: a general theory seminar in which everyone participated and which subsequently evolved into part of the ‘taught’ MA; a series of sub- or working-groups to which all staff and students were attached; and individual theses and projects. A description of the theory seminar was offered in the Preface to Volume 1. It included a wide-ranging critical discussion of a variety of key texts, writers, concepts and intellectual or disciplinary traditions. Its purpose was to help constitute cultural studies as a ‘field’ (not a rival discipline); to generate a common intellectual focus for discussion amongst staff and students who, it should be remembered, were drawn from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds; and to develop through critical engagement and collective debate a distinctive approach to the way culture and its relation to other practices in a social formation was theorised. The second strand began as a ‘work-in-progress’ seminar in which students were invited to report on and collectively discuss their individual research projects. This quickly evolved into a number of different thematically-focused research areas or domains of study. As compared with the ‘theory’ strand, working groups were more focussed on concrete research problems and methodologies of research. The development of working- or sub-groups is reflected on at length in the following Introduction. Initially, they were sited at those points where individual thesis topics loosely overlapped. As Richard Johnson, the Centre’s third director, said in the 1977–8 Report,
xii
Preface
describing the organization of its collective intellectual work, ‘thesis topics are usually linked to sub-group programmes which therefore act as a forum for the presentation of research and the development of shared intellectual insights’. Here students read together and discussed the literatures related to their discrete areas and critically engaged the relevant aspects of traditional disciplines. In effect, those early sections of theses which conventionally ‘review the literature’ were collectivised. Sub-groups therefore began as ‘a method of support to thesis work’. Later, many sub-groups developed collective projects of their own, where their members worked together on a concrete research problem and explored their own theoretical avenues. ‘Where a sub-group has been working together for some time and has developed a common project, the relation between collective and individual work may well be reversed, thesis topics being designed in relation to sub-group work and discussion.’ They consequently became more wide-ranging and intellectually ambitious. In effect, the sub-group system bridged the gap between more high-level theoretical and conceptual work and concrete research. Sub-groups greatly enhanced the Centre’s ‘collective’ style of research practice. As the Introduction notes, each acquired a distinctive character and ethos; they therefore made a significant contribution to, and greatly enriched, the pluri-centered character of cultural studies research at the Centre. They helped to diversify the variety of theoretical and disciplinary fields drawn into the orbit of the cultural studies project and made more organic its ‘inter-disciplinary’ character. Above all, they were a major source of creative energy, variety and productive output in the Centre’s early development. Sub-groups produced major parts, and sometimes whole issues, of the journal, Working Papers in Cultural Studies and were responsible for expanding them into books in the Hutchinson series. Considering only the groups which are represented in this Volume: the article ‘Mapping the field’ of the Literature and Society Group, one of the earliest, is included here. It was responsible, with the subsequently emerging Language Group, for major sections in the volume Culture, Media, Language (itself a selection of papers from the early years of the Centre and a report to its members as a whole on developments in the sub-groups over several years). It contributed to what was subsequently identified as ‘the turn to theory’ in literary studies. The Youth Sub-cultures group produced a double issue of the journal, WPCS 7/8 which subsequently developed into Resistance Through Rituals (recently republished with a new introduction). Some, of its members, with the help of ‘external’ contributors from other groups, went on to develop the independent research project on race and urban crime and to write it up in the text known as Policing The Crisis. The Media Group produced important work on television discourse, generated its own collective projects on news, current affairs and popular television like sport and published significant early research on audiences. Its work overlapped with innovative work by members of the Women’s Studies Group on soap operas. The section here entitled Women’s Studies and Feminism reflects two different strands of work, since ‘women studies’ was a shorthand term for both a feminist grouping in the Centre, formed to contest its many formal and informal patriarchal practices and to develop a feminist critique of cultural studies, as well as clustering together those who were working on gender-related topics. The product of these two strands appeared in the Hutchinson volume Women Take Issue. Despite Policing The Crisis, the group organized around questions of Race and Politics was a relative late-comer but its work provided the basis of an important and path-breaking critical text, The Empire Strikes Back. Historical work was, by contrast, one of the earliest focal points of Centre research and was at that time widely diffused through the Centre as a whole. The Cultural History Group provided a focus for those Centre members wanting to work on cultural studies questions ‘in historical ways’. It addressed the
Preface
xiii
interface between history and theory, initiated critical reviews of recent British historiography including the ‘new’ social history and the work of the Marxist historians, and supported what was in effect a Marx reading group. Some of this work formed the basis of Making Histories. The Education Group generated the volume Unpopular Education and its work, with that of the closely related Work group, is summarised in two, collectively-authored, overview articles reprinted in this Volume. There are no precise models for expressing the relationship between the general theoretical project of cultural studies as pursued at the Centre at this time and the more grounded work of the sub-groups. This relationship evolved in practice rather than being part of an overall plan and never produced anything like a single cultural studies methodology. In retrospect, it is hard to think what this would have looked like, given the very different approaches and thematic areas through which cultural studies was developing. Nor could methodologies simply be borrowed from elsewhere. The literary-critical approach privileged the engagement with and close reading of specific texts – ‘these words in this order’, as the Leavisites put it. But it was deeply suspicious of more general questions, with which the Centre was bound to be concerned, about the conceptualization of culture, except in so far as this could be ‘read out of ’ or speculatively inferred from the texts themselves. Besides, not many sub-groups were working with ‘texts’ in that sense (though, for example, the Media Studies group was, which is why the exploration of semiotic analysis of media texts, language and genres was most advanced there). Typically, the sociological model made a clear distinction between the theoretical and the empirical; in which the former, translated into a set of hypotheses, was then ‘tested’ at the empirical level. The Centre was sensitive to the anti-theoretical and ‘scientistic’ assumptions which seemed to be written into this empiricist approach and their inappropriateness to the domain of meaning and cultural practices. The ‘case study’ model as developed in some approaches in anthropology and interactionist sociology seemed more appropriate; and versions of this were indeed developed in those parts of the Centre’s work – for example, Paul Willis’ influential Learning To Labour project and the studies of youth sub-cultures in Resistance Through Rituals – which deployed a more ethnographic approach or what Clifford Geertz, more loosely, called ‘thick description’. What seemed particularly appropriate here was the critical effect of a methodology which, instead of taking for granted the prevailing definitions, attempted to see structures and processes from the actor’s perspective – taking into account how they were being experienced, the subject’s ‘definition of the situation’. However, this was not relevant to all the working groups. Perhaps the best way of understanding the relationship of theory to research in the Centre was in terms of the perceived requirement simultaneously to work at different ‘levels of abstraction’. Theoretical work was inevitably pitched at a high level of conceptualization. More focused or grounded research was seen, not as a test or an exemplification of the latter but what happened when one moved the analysis to a lower level of abstraction, where theories became more concrete as a result, not of disconnecting theory from the empirical, but of adding more and more determinations. These different kinds of work were, nevertheless, part of a single project, sustained organizationally at different but related sites. Though never formalised as a methodology, this approach developed in this period as a style of collective research practice – which may have been all we were capable of at that moment; and which, though not in the usual scientific way replicable and generalisable, seemed to us a particular way intrinsic to the cultural, of articulating the concrete and the conceptual, which has set its stamp on ‘doing cultural studies’ since.
Acknowledgements
We have made every effort to contact all the authors of the enclosed papers and thank those who agreed so readily to have some of their earliest scholarly work published in this collection. Our thanks are also due to former colleagues at the University of Birmingham, especially to Tilusha Ghelani, Barbara Shaw-Perry and Sue Wright who worked on the initial reading and selection of papers and to Michael Green who supported our efforts throughout. Thanks also to Erin Bell and Lynn Johnson at Lincoln for their help in copy editing and producing readable copies of the papers. Rebecca Barden during her time with Routledge never lost faith in the project in spite of quite major set-backs and delays and Natalie Foster picked up the final stages of its production – our thanks to them both. In memory of Eve Brook Ian Connell Adrian Mellor Robin Rusher Allon White The following articles have been reproduced courtesy of the authors and publishers involved: Avis, James: ‘The strange fate of progressive education’ in Education Group II: Education Limited: Schooling, training and the New Right in England since 1979, London, Unwin Hyman, 1991 Blackwell, Trevor: ‘The history of a working-class Methodist Chapel’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 65–84 Brunsdon, Charlotte: ‘ “It is well known that by nature women are inclined to be personal” ’ in Women’s Studies Group: Women Take Issue: Aspects of women’s subordination, London, Hutchinson, 1978 Brunt, Rosalind: ‘The spectacular world of Whicker’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 7–32 Burniston, Steve, Mort, Frank and Weedon, Christine: ‘Psychoanalysis and the cultural acquisition of sexuality and subjectivity’ in Women’s Studies Group: Women Take Issue: Aspects of women’s subordination, London, Hutchinson, 1978 Butcher, Helen, Coward, Ros, Evaristi, Marcella, Garber, Jenny, Harrison, Rachel and Winship, Janice: ‘Images of women in the media’, Stencilled Paper No. 31, 1974 Carby, Hazel: ‘Multicultural fictions’, Stencilled Paper No. 58, 1979
Acknowledgements
xv
Carby, Hazel: ‘White woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood’ in The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain, London, Hutchinson, 1982 CCCS Education Group: ‘Perspectives on schooling and politics’ in Unpopular Education: Schooling and social democracy in England since 1944, London, Hutchinson, 1981 CCCS Popular Memory Group: ‘What do we mean by popular memory?’, Stencilled Paper No. 67, 1982 Clare, Mariette: ‘The adult literacy campaign: Politics and practice’, Stencilled Paper No. 80, 1985 Clarke, Gary: ‘Defending ski jumpers: A critique of theories of youth sub-cultures’, Stencilled Paper No. 71, 1982 Clarke, John and Jefferson, Tony: ‘Working class youth cultures’, Stencilled Paper No. 18, 1973 Cohen, Stanley: ‘Breaking out, smashing up and the social context of aspiration’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 37–64 Connell, Ian: ‘Television news and the Social Contract’ in Culture, Media, Language: Working papers in cultural studies 1972–79, London, Hutchinson, 1980 Cultural Historical Group: ‘Out of the people: The politics of containment 1935–45’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 9, 1976, pp. 29–50 Dyer, Richard: ‘The meaning of Tom Jones’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 1, 1971, pp. 53–64 Errol, Lawrence: ‘Just plain common sense: The roots of racism’ in The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain, London, Hutchinson, 1982 Finn, Dan, Grant, Neil and Johnson, Richard: ‘Social democracy, education and the crisis’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 10, 1977, pp. 147–98 Green, Andy: ‘On the political economy of black Labour and the racial structuring of the working class in England’, Stencilled Paper No. 63, 1979 Griffin, Christine: ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: Images of young women in the labour market’, Stencilled Paper No. 70, 1982 Grimshaw, Roger: ‘Comment’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 65–84 Hall, Stuart: ‘Encoding and decoding in the television discourse’, Stencilled Paper No. 7, 1973 Hall, Stuart: ‘The “structured communication” of events’, Stencilled Paper No. 5, 1973 Hall, Stuart: ‘The Hippies: An American moment’, Stencilled Paper No. 16, 1968 Hall, Stuart, Clarke, John, Critcher, Chas., Jefferson, Tony and Roberts, Brian: ‘Newsmaking and crime’, Stencilled Paper No. 37, 1975 Hall, Stuart, Connell, Ian and Curti, Lidia: ‘The “unity” of current affairs television’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 9, 1976, pp. 51–94 Hebdige, Dick: ‘Reggae, Rastas and Rudies: Style and the subversion of form’, Stencilled Paper No. 24, 1974 Hobson, Dorothy: ‘Housewives and the mass media’ in Culture, Media, Language: Working papers in cultural studies 1972–79, London, Hutchinson, 1980 Hobson, Dorothy: ‘Housewives: Isolation as oppression’ in Women’s Studies Group: Women Take Issue: Aspects of women’s subordination, London, Hutchinson, 1978 Holderness, Graham: ‘Lawrence, Leavis and culture’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 1974, pp. 85–110 Jefferson, Tony and Clarke, John: ‘Down these mean streets . . . the meaning of mugging’, Stencilled Paper No. 17, 1973
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Johnson, Richard: ‘Economy, culture and concept: Three approaches to Marxist history’, Stencilled Paper No. 50, 1977 Jones, Bryn: ‘The politics of popular culture’, Stencilled Paper No. 12, 1972 Laing, Stuart: ‘Walter Greenwood: Working-class writer’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 147–62 ‘Literature/society: Mapping the field’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 21–50 Louvre, Alf: ‘Notes on a theory of genre’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 121–34 McLennan, Gregor: ‘ “Ideology” and “consciousness”: Some problems in Marxist historiography’, Stencilled Paper No. 45, 1976 McRobbie, Angela and Garber, Jenny: ‘Girls and subcultures’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 7/8, 1975, pp. 209–22 Mellor, Adrian: ‘The hidden method: Lucien Goldmann and the sociology of literature’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 86–103 Morley, Dave: ‘Reconceptualising the media audience: Towards an ethnography of audience’, Stencilled Paper No. 44, 1976 Passeron, Jean-Claude: ‘Introduction to the French edition of Uses of Literacy’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 1, 1971, pp. 120–31 Solomos, John, Findlay, Bob, Jones, Simon and Gilroy, Paul: ‘The organic crisis of British capitalism and race: The experience of the seventies’ in The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain, London, Hutchinson, 1982 Sparks, Colin: ‘The abuses of literacy’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, 1974, pp. 7–24 Taylor, Pam: ‘Women domestic servants 1919–1939: A study of a hidden Army, illustrated by servants’ own recollected experiences’, Stencilled Paper No. 40, 1976 Tolson, Andrew: ‘Reading literature as culture’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 51–68 Whicker, Alan: ‘Response’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 1974, p. 161 Willis, Paul: ‘How working class kids get working class jobs’, Stencilled Paper No. 43, 1975 Winship, Janice: ‘A woman’s world: “Woman” – an ideology of femininity’ in Women’s Studies Group: Women Take Issue: Aspects of women’s subordination, London, Hutchinson, 1978 Women’s Studies Group: ‘Relations of production: Relations of reproduction’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, Vol. 9, 1976, pp. 95–118
Introduction The editorial team
This volume of papers represents the work that emerged from the ‘sub-groups’ or working groups, which were formed at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) as it expanded. As one of very few sites where researchers could engage with the distinctiveness of the problems of culture, the CCCS became a magnet for numerous postgraduate researchers from a variety of backgrounds. The ‘voices’ of cultural studies therefore multiplied as a number of relevant cultural political issues, influenced by the social conditions of the day, housed themselves within the broad church of ‘cultural analysis’ at the Centre. That is not to say that the work represented here is reflective of simply ‘anything’, which has often been the point of confusion for those suspicious of cultural studies as a new field. It is clear, looking at accounts of the history of these studies at Birmingham, that a determined search for a deep and unified approach to cultural studies accompanied its considerable growth and expansion. In this introduction we think about that history and the various intellectual, political and, at times, pragmatic events, which bore out this legacy of research from the working groups at the CCCS. It is useful to outline initially some of the precedents upon which this work is founded. As discussed more fully by Ann Gray in the introduction to Volume 1 of this collection (Gray et al. 2007), the early sketches for a ‘cultural studies’ are outlined in Richard Hoggart’s lecture, ‘Schools of English and Contemporary Society’.1 He established an explicit blueprint for an inter-disciplinary framework that provided the characteristic shape of the Centre’s work throughout its subsequent life. Hoggart emphasizes the imperative to engage with historical and philosophical debates about contemporary culture that had for too long been dominated by literary criticism, coupled with the need to combine those interests with a greater understanding of the sociology of literature and the arts. This represented a search for a new critical language aimed at locating the critique of cultural forms within a broader understanding of social life. Questions of cultural value and thus relativism were teased out and in some ways resolved through a reading of Weber which helped clarify the distinction between value judgment and value analysis. Here, exploring the ‘various possibilities of the [cultural] object to values’2 facilitated a move beyond the close reading of cultural artefacts to a consideration of their engagements in socio-political contexts as ‘cultural events’, broadly seeing culture as a ‘whole way of life’. That initial outline optimistically sought a ‘big’ picture of cultural studies, which set in motion the need to collect together and critique the fragments of the study of culture from other spaces. Texts from, for example, literary studies, sociology, anthropology and mass communications, informed members of the CCCS in their attempt to capture the connectedness between culture as form and structure, and culture as social, experiential phenomena. This larger take on culture, rather than simply a focus on mass art or popular culture, to which
2
The editorial team
the Centre has sometimes been reduced by others, initiated the establishment of the ‘Texts’ seminar which was to lay the proper foundations for inter-disciplinary research in cultural studies.3 Not surprisingly then, the Centre felt that many of the best students were to be found at the boundaries between traditional subject areas. Through an eclectic reading list, those previously trained in humanities were educated in the social sciences and (to a lesser extent) vice versa. This suggests an inevitable debate about the methodological implications of both interpretation and empiricism. The Centre’s reports make clear how continually revisiting the tensions between theory and method meant that doing cultural studies involved tackling the fundamental issues at stake in the social sciences. Fighting against the structural-functionalist determinism of the social sciences, the Centre was keen to grasp and make real the relations through which cultural formations are often contradictory, ‘rooted in different conceptions of the world’. For cultural studies this was the certainty with which current legacies in the social sciences could not cope, either theoretically or methodologically. But, the Centre’s inter-disciplinary commitment did have a unified mission: an attempt to clarify the domain of the ‘cultural sciences’ in order to outline a definitive field which had a characteristic method. Thus by the time of the publication of the Centre report of 1969–71 there was a common intellectual goal to address two problems: ‘How collective intellectual work of this kind should be organized, and what relevance this has for social action’. The answer to these questions came through the emergence of the sub-groups in the period 1969–71, breaking down the traditional hierarchies associated with academic work. This is reflected in the number of co-authored and even un-authored papers in these volumes. The move to group work is recalled by the Centre report as a complement to the year’s unified theme in the ‘Texts’ seminar, whereby general theoretical problems were sub-divided into critical areas derived from individual thesis work, which should then always be fed back into the Centre’s work as a whole. Indeed by the time of the 1974–6 report it is suggested that the sub-groups were in some ways a reaction to the elusiveness of a consolidated definition of cultural studies, ‘[t]he range of research areas provide the next best thing – an empirical or working definition of what the field must consist of, for us – within our range of competence’. Therefore, the figure of the lonely scholar working in the remote ‘stacks’ of the University of Birmingham library was recognized as a totally inappropriate model for this type of work.4 But the mode of working is also inexorably bound to subject matter. Attending to the experience of socio-cultural contexts is to recognize that culture has a purchase ‘on the ground’ and such work could be more fruitful when pursued by a collective commitment to relevant contexts, rather than entirely abstract engagements in the pursuit of individual intellectual work. In this second volume then, much of the work from the sub-groups is eager to endorse the Centre’s commitment to the translation of the general and abstracted theoretical paradigms into their relevance to the real business of life. The 1969–71 Centre report reminds members that: ‘The critical and reflective study of modern culture if situated in its determining social structure, must never have become so scholarly that it forgets collectively to assume the questions its progenitors so urgently posed’ (CCCS 1969–71: 6). Interdisciplinarity and group work were no doubt the generators of an eclectic range of projects emerging from the Centre. Time saw the groups change with individual interests and intellectual fashions, but as post-graduate numbers grew, so did the number of research groups. There was also of course fluidity of membership between the different groups, with a number of researchers also migrating into Birmingham for different periods of time from different institutions. By 1982/3, the end of the period covered by these Volumes, the Centre records some ten working sub-groups: Class, Education, English Studies, Food, Media, Popular Memory, Politics and Culture, Race and Politics, Sexuality and Visual Pleasures;
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and eleven if one counts the Women’s Forum which emerged some years earlier as feminism made its mark intellectually and politically at the Centre. This collection cannot and does not seek to represent them all. Neither are these papers selected here intended to represent the organization of cultural studies as a field, either as we may wish to announce it now, or as a programme for the future; the theoretical interests of those terrains have taken on new formulations often for good political and intellectual reasons. Rather these sections here – Literature and Society, Popular Culture and Youth Subculture, Media, Women’s Studies and Feminism, From Race to Racism, History and Education and Work – represent some of the key groupings at the time, described and constructed in the Centre’s own reports. The early work of the Centre took its cues from the work of Hoggart, Williams and Thompson in their concern with the understanding and broadening of the notions of class, along with an attempt to grapple with the relationship between literature and society. These were dual concerns of Hoggart’s ‘founding statement’. One of the first working groups then was the Literature and Society group, picking up the dominant concerns set in motion by Hoggart. Theirs was an attempt to search for a new critical language for literary studies, which was to be more analytically engaged with the ‘unpremeditated textures of experience’ in contemporary society. In that sense the members worked against the dominance of form and structure in Birmingham’s English Department, at that time dominated by the figure of David Lodge. Instead, they followed the work of Raymond Williams and worked towards a Marxist approach to literature, reading the works of Goldmann, Sartre and Lukács. Goldmann’s work, eventually published as Towards a Sociology of the Novel, offered one of the first accounts of the relationship of literary forms to social contexts from a socialist humanist perspective, in keeping with those early British thinkers, but his influence is often overshadowed by the imminent dominance of structuralism. In that tradition the group worked towards accounting for the relationship of literature to society and to social movements, in a sense to demystify the prevailing values of ‘literary elitism’ in order to develop a materialist approach to reading as social practice.5 But also, as Chas. Critcher (Critcher 1979: 17–18) points out, Hoggart in his The Uses of Literacy was concerned with what he saw as the denial of social class divisions within the optimism of ‘affluence’ (Hoggart 1957). This problematic was to take on firmer contours than the early humanist emphasis at the Centre, and can be seen to have influenced and shaped the Centre’s work on the study of youth and youth subcultures. With Stuart Hall’s appointment as director, questions of consciousness were framed within a vigorous and extensive reading and re-reading of Marx and Marxism which engaged centrally with the wider intellectual landscape of the New Left in Britain. The Marxist conception of consciousness, although contested, served as a framework within which different forms of cultural expression could be subsumed, thus allowing ‘superficial’ differences to be reconciled into an overarching theoretical perspective. The use of this concept in many CCCS texts is reflective of the influence of sociology at the time, and the struggle in sociology between normative functionalism and Marxist, conflict-based analyses. The notion of the leisure or affluent society, particularly as it was seen to affect working class youth, caught the attention of researchers at the CCCS. Drawing strongly on the work of the Chicago School and their engagement with youth and ‘deviant’ behaviours, researchers worked with the notion of ‘sub-cultures’ and in particular the ‘spectacular’ expression of sub-cultural identity and belonging through forms of style and music. Far from allowing these expressions to stand as evidence of human agency, researchers were concerned to locate these expressions and forms in relation to broader social and cultural structures. The structure consisted of three cultures: working class, dominant and mass
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culture. Their aim was to examine how these different elements worked ideologically in relation to form and practice. Researchers suggested that youth, far from being alienated or rendered a homogenous mass by commercial culture, resisted the contradictions inherent in the social structure. Further, members of sub-cultures actively engaged with the products and texts of everyday life in the creation of meaning and identity. However, researchers at Birmingham insisted that class definitively shaped that existence and experience. Whilst the emphasis of the CCCS work was clearly on contemporary culture, there was from the mid-1970s an active and productive ‘History’ group which, taking their cue in part from E.P. Thompson, explored hidden and subaltern histories with a strong emphasis, in the early work, on class. The different pathways of the historians of the New Left and the lively relations between CCCS and Ruskin college were sister movements that look back to the pioneering work of that historian and ‘more-than-historian’ Raymond Williams. The dynamic debates about history at the CCCS were also debates about ‘Marxist’ histories which were constantly being remembered differently. The central focus on class and class consciousness was also born out in the establishment of the Media Sub Group and its predominant concern with questions of ideology. Working from the theoretical apparatus of Althusser and then Gramsci, the main focus of their efforts was on textual analyses of ‘serious’ current affairs programming, and in particular the reporting of industrial and political conflict reverberating through 1970s Britain. Morley and Brunsdon (1999) in their introduction to the reprinting of The Nationwide Television Studies, describe how the work of the CCCS media group was produced through the conjuncture of the political crisis in British public life around the 1972 and 1974 miners’ strikes, with an attempt to import ‘continental Marxism’ to explain the media’s role in the maintenance of the dominant status quo. They report that Althusser’s essay ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ ‘served an almost emblematic function in focusing the work of the Media Group at that time’ (1999: 5). These more theoretically complex accounts of the role of ideology in the circulation of meaning, and their associated questions of subjectivity, ran counter to the media transmission models that dominated other embryonic forms of media studies. In that sense, Hall’s ‘encoding/decoding’ essay provided justification for the need to consider media influence that were not recognized elsewhere, and influenced Morley’s subsequent call for ethnographic work into audience studies, as well as work by Dorothy Hobson into women’s media use in the home. These developments were also influenced by the reconsideration of what counted as ‘serious’ and political in terms of questions of class consciousness. Challenges from Barthes and others, including feminist engagements, resulted in emerging analyses of the construction of common sense in everyday life. These developments were part of broader theoretical and political shifts in thinking which impacted upon the Centre’s work as a whole. The assaults on this conception of consciousness – the fragmentation of consciousness – firstly from feminism and subsequently from the direction of race and politics can be seen to be both a commentary on and a reflection of the fragmentation of the society of that time. In terms of cultural studies practice this shift is very significant. The critique of Marxism as inadequate for all tasks of cultural analysis due to its inadequate conceptual scheme became tied to a critique of ‘traditional’ theory with its heritage of colonial and Eurocentric discourse. This was not just a critique of intellectual practice, but also a critique of the operation of the Centre itself. However, the shift from ‘consciousness’ to ‘identity’ occurred through a deeper understanding of the role and politics of culture and this subsequently had great effect on the discipline of sociology. Indeed, it can be argued that the cultural turn in sociology (and the other social science disciplines) has its roots in the CCCS work of the late
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1970s. Cultural studies, with its roots in sociology, was structured by that discipline and subsequently became the agent for change in sociology itself, as David Morley points out in his introduction to the Media section: ‘perhaps emulation is the sincerest form of flattery’. One direct challenge to the centrality of class then came from the multiple voices of feminism. As Angela McRobbie (1980) points out in her ‘Settling Accounts with Subculture’ essay, the emphasis in cultural studies on processes of production and the public spaces of ‘spectacular subcultures’ concealed attention to the role of women in the economy or in cultural life. Stuart Hall’s own discussion of his entry into cultural studies from the New Left acknowledges that the Eurocentrist and patriarchal assumptions of Marxist theory had to be contested not just at the level of theory but also in the realm of politics. There he acknowledges the interruption of feminism in the formative history of cultural studies, describing it as a ‘thief in the night’ which ‘crapped on the table of cultural studies’ (Hall 1996: 269).6 Feminism at the Centre changed the object of cultural study in both theoretical and practical ways. First was the issue of the personal as political; second was the re-examination and broadening of the concept of power beyond the public domain. Finally, theorizing the workings of sexuality and gender radically changed the way power could be understood. If we look at the very different contestations around feminism marked in the section on ‘Women’s Studies and Feminism’ in Janice Winship’s introduction, and to the various interventions in other sections – on subcultures and on the media for example – made by women at the Centre, we can see how all these themes were expressed. Charlotte Brunsdon describes the Women’s Studies Group established at the Centre in the 1974 as a ‘strange meeting place’ for women involved in very different trajectories of feminism, reflected in their publication, Women Take Issue (1978). It was always ambivalent as to its relationship to the Women’s Liberation Movement, which reflected a wider debate about the status of ‘academic’ feminism and grass roots feminist politics. A central dilemma for the Group was, if feminist research was to challenge and transform existing research within the academy, then how could this happen without it becoming appropriated and de-politicized by the mainstream? Alternatively, was feminism to become a focus for the group as simply their own gender-specific topic, and therefore something separate and marginal to the rest of the Centre? The group, then, raised the difficulty and tension of their work (a problem which extended to all women working in the Centre) of, on the one hand, their need to organize and work as a closed group, and on the other, for ‘the question of women’ to be a mainstream issue for all intellectual and political work. If the Women’s Studies Group at the Centre was divided between wanting to join the mainstream, wanting the Centre to define all of its work in terms of that group, and also wanting to organize autonomously, then this of course mirrored the political work and concerns of the women’s movement at that time.7 Perhaps the essay that summarizes the contradictory tensions of how women in the Centre forged their work in relation to the Liberation movement was Brunsdon’s ‘It is well known that by nature women are inclined to be rather personal’ (reprinted in this volume). This essay maps the emerging tensions of feminist thinking in the group around the ‘nature’ of femininity and the structural subordination of women. The arguments that erupted between the Women’s Group and what Brunsdon calls the ‘boyzone’ of cultural studies were all about identification and differences. But it would be a mistake to see the interruption of feminism into cultural studies as simply an argument between the ‘boyzone’ and the feminists, when in fact the women in the Centre by no means defined themselves at the time, or in retrospect, as belonging to the same collective identification. This, of course, was also a problem inherent to the history of feminism as much as to the Centre. For feminism the difficulty was always how to acknowledge difference, whilst working together to achieve
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agreed political aims. The differences and identities that were characteristic of the evolving women’s movement of the time created a force borne of utopian identification and bitter argument, which nonetheless was distinctive in marking out personal identity as a public arena of struggle and debate and thus opening a doorway to connected political debates and struggles on race and gay sexuality. The difference and identity between the politics of gender and race is perhaps encapsulated most powerfully through the work of some of the black women at the Centre. Hazel Carby’s (1982) essay ‘White Woman Listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood’ (published in this volume) reminds readers that it is only black feminists who can articulate the complex relations of power between gender, race and class and, as the history of feminism is structured through racism and ethnocentrism, so the relation between black feminists and white women is also structured through racism. Carby asks white feminists to stop trying to write herstory for black women, to stop making them an object of study, and to analyse themselves in relation to those very structures of racializing power they would rather avoid. Similarly, Pratibha Parmar’s (1982) ‘Gender, race and class: Asian women in resistance’ in The Empire Strikes Back has to be read in relation to the real dispute in the UK just before the 1978–9 so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’, where the lowest paid public sector workers went on strike in opposition to the Labour Party’s refusal to grant a living wage. Parmar shows clearly how in the late 1970s an analysis of culture and power understood through particular historical instances had to take account of the complex negotiation of forces such as capital, patriarchy and race. Most importantly, she links her analysis to the practice and struggle going on at that time for particular communities of Asian women in Britain. Whilst the intellectual and political trajectories outlined above in relation to feminism and anti-racist politics have made sense at least of the western development of these issues, the arguments above also point to how the Centre’s work began to evolve through particular engagements with British politics. It is important for the reader to encounter this volume not only in relation to the broader intellectual theoretical debates which inform it, but also as responses to the political contours of the UK at the time. For example, the emergence of a politics and thinking through issues and formations of race at CCCS cannot be grasped without an understanding of the history and politics of being black and British in the 1970s and 1980s. The Labour Party returned to power in 1974 after the miners’ strike brought down Edward Heath’s Conservative government. The Labour government came under pressure to resolve rising unemployment and falling living standards. The breakdown of the political consensus and the fear of political violence and opposition to the state led Labour to ignore the workers’ complaints. Instead they gave in to the demands of the big employers, cutting living standards further and bringing in a string of counter-reforms. Social unrest amongst the working class and an increasing sense of society drifting into lawlessness was met by a political discourse of authority securing state power. The role of policing was part of this discourse, seen as responding to an increasing political violence and ‘disorder’ in society. As these popular discourses spread, so racism and violence against black and Asian communities increased. The rise of the National Front and the far right, and the increase of policing, continued to fuel racist violence. Margaret Thatcher, elected in 1979, continued the political rhetoric of Britain being swamped by an alien culture, eventually culminating in 1981 with the Brixton riots. Policing the Crisis (1978), then, was the first CCCS publication to focus on questions of ethnicity and race. Jefferson and Clarke’s ‘Down These Mean Streets’ and Dick Hebdige’s, ‘Reggae, Rastas and Rudies’ in this volume are also evidence of early work influenced by that political conjuncture. Policing the Crisis analysed the breakdown of political consensus in
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1970s Britain and the increasing sense of ‘moral panic’ which demonised black youth, raising fears around black criminality. Using Gramsci’s notion of hegemony this text showed how disparate social groups were brought into alliance through ideologies that stressed a working-class emphasis on respectability and nationhood. The rise of an authoritative rightwing consensus based on racism mobilized the working classes in relation to conservative politics, which ushered Thatcher into power. Policing the Crisis was followed by The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain published in 1982. This was an important milestone in the history of CCCS, not least because it made the politics of race and racism central to all understandings of historical cultural identity in Britain. Hazel Carby’s introduction here highlights how the analysis of the politics and formations of race at the Centre was multi-layered, in relation to the development of theories of ideology, feminism and youth sub-culture. Through The Empire Strikes Back the historical legacy of British imperialism began to be understood in relation to how the question of race helped structure capitalism, the British Labour movement, feminism and youth culture. It confirmed the way in which race, sexuality and class are all indelibly rooted in terms of each other and how racism in society was a fundamental part of defining 1970s British identity. This work helped establish an emergent critical mass that became known as ‘Black cultural studies’ and paved the way for Gilroy’s There Ain’t No Black In The Union Jack. Gilroy there examined the concept of race as an active and cultural category, analysing how the British left with its idealized construction of the white working man had been an attempt to counter patriotism on the right, but also showed how this socialist version of being British was based on a structural racism that excluded the experience of the ‘black diaspora’. He evaluates how anti-racist campaigns such as Rock again Racism and the Anti-Nazi League were critical spaces where questions of youth, class and race were fused together when the mould of British politics was being broken. Gilroy’s exploration of black cultural aesthetic forms as expressions of diasporic experience, which could counter hegemonic discourses of racism, was thus centrally connected to the political anti-racist movements of the 1970s. As we have indicated, such material arising from the work of the Centre in the late 1970s and early 1980s came at a time of dramatic social and political change in the UK and the emergence of new voices and new work in the CCCS are indicative of wider socio-political shifts taking place at the time. Many of these can be associated with the election in 1979 of a right-wing Conservative government led by Britain’s first woman prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. The next 17 years of Conservative rule, but particularly the 1980s, saw the fragmentation of the left in UK politics, the decline of trade unionism, and the rise of individualism as a strategy for state policies, summed up succinctly by Margaret Thatcher in 1987: ‘[T]here is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families.’8 At a time when we can see (UK) universities as quiescent institutions given over to the training of ready operatives for the new knowledge economy it is perhaps difficult to imagine that universities in the late 1970s and into the 1980s became, particularly in social science and humanities departments, locations for forms of ‘dangerous’ thinking that worried many people in positions of political power and authority.9 ‘Dangerous thinking’ then was a common practice at the Centre, which potentially encapsulated Gramsci’s concept of the ‘organic intellectual’. This involved always marching on two fronts. Not only being at the forefront of the theoretical positions that were emerging at the time, in a sense to be ahead of the academic ‘game’, but also having a responsibility to transmit those ideas outside of the ivory towers of the academy. In an early Centre report they write, ‘We should like to have the opportunity to make some work “operational” in the
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field of education, and to establish firmer links with teachers and educationalists. This is one of the many ways we can see our work relating more specifically to the larger concerns of the society.’ (Centre Report 1965–6: 34) Thus, the work of the Education Group (combined in this volume with the representation of the work of the Work Group) sought to have a direct impact upon policy making. Paul Willis informs us in his introduction of their straightforward hopefulness in wanting to connect their intellectual work to social change and government initiatives, in order to have a direct impact upon the quality of life of the working classes. With this in mind, Centre work often had a direct involvement, for example, organizing practical events with other sectors of education, including teacher training and Adult Education. Some of the critical interventions are visible here, but also see the formative texts, Unpopular Education (CCCS Education Group 1981) and Education Limited (CCCS Education Group 2 1991), for a politics of critical education. We can see in the introductions to the papers in this volume the rich diversity and complexity that made up the various sub-groups. Defining them as discreet entities is impossible and each introduction is mindful not only of the changing strands of interest represented by the groups, but how their focus on, say, history, race or feminism influenced discussions which took place between and across the quite malleable boundaries of group definitions. Moreover this cross weaving of ideas is part of the changing focus of the wider theoretical themes of the Centre. We are grateful to those who agreed to write the introductions to each of these sections. We are conscious of the proximity that these authors have to the work and to the Centre, and how that is perceived by themselves and others in their subsequent trajectories. There is a good deal of sensitivity here to the spaces occupied at the Centre by individuals and particular groups, as well as sensitivity to what this work is to stand for in the contemporary context of its publication. Making selections which we hope strike a balance between representing ‘core’ papers that have since taken on some considerable historical weight, at the same time as rescuing some of those least familiar to the dominant narrative of Birmingham Cultural Studies, was not an easy process. The authors of these introductions have worked with these selections and thoughtfully sought to make sense of their internal logic, as well as the external impact of these papers. They draw our attention to the considerable contribution that Birmingham Cultural Studies made to a range of fields across the Humanities and Social Sciences, and perhaps more importantly, to intellectual (and political) work in general. Stuart Laing returns to the ‘Literature and Society’ section mindful of his original introduction to the WPCS 4 (Laing 1973), where many of these papers were first published. He reminds us of Hoggart’s call to examine the nexus of literature and society as the key starting point for cultural analysis and to the largely forgotten work of Lucien Goldmann, which began to offer insights into the critical fit between social and literary structures. Thus one of the starting points for this group was the taking on of the current intellectual hegemony of Literary Criticism, represented in this collection by Andrew Tolson. But what is also interesting in Laing’s introduction is how, despite the significance of the literature and society debates (and the group) as catalytic to the origins of the Centre, their subsequent influence was rather muted. Yet it seems that in the debt to Raymond Williams and his re-engagement with Marxism, as well as the interjections of contributions like Sparks’s which argues for holding on to the bigger political picture against the danger of a nostalgic celebration of culture, that we have the grounds of the debates that still resonate through cultural studies and through the spaces more usually remembered via other fields like ‘subcultures’ and ‘media’. Perhaps this section will go some way to encouraging some revision and recognition of the ideas worked out here.
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‘Popular Culture and Youth Subcultures’, possibly the area that has become the metonym in some histories for the legacy of the CCCS, is tackled by John Clarke. He describes how that field offered the contemporary focus upon the cultures of Britain of the 1960s and 1970s, which may have assisted its subsequent international visibility, but also suggests how tentative the conjectural process was in terms of finding new forms of analysis to engage with new forms of culture. In that sense Clarke is concerned with the various ‘tactics’ necessary to meet this challenge of culture’s dynamism. In one sense this meant close analysis of popular culture, rendering it intellectually visible and inherently political. But it also involved theorizing popular culture through ‘cross border raids’ into fields such as sociology and structural anthropology, and at the same time rescuing the terms of ‘youth’ from other disciplines and reconfiguring them in terms of class, and subsequently in terms of gender and race. Clarke reminds us of the pace of these directions. Just as the CCCS was becoming known for making class central to subculture/youth debates, so the feminist and anti-racist interventions, as we have been describing above, were rearranging the picture. David Morley gives us an account of the developments of the media group at the Centre, which has been rarely documented and provides an important counter history to how the work on media at the Centre has come to be understood in the many textbook accounts that exist. He reminds us of the central contexts in which the Centre was working, and their relationship and challenges to other work at the Centre for Mass Communications Research, University of Leicester; those working in political economy; and the Glasgow University Media Group. Hall’s canonical essay ‘Encoding/Decoding’ was a challenge to the over linear models of mass communications that were in play. Morley points out a distortion in the histories which place Hall’s essay as the precursor to ‘active audience studies’; in its initial incarnation this essay was as much about the encoding textual processes at work, concerned as the Centre was in the main with textual analysis. These early analyses were often responses to political unrest in the UK, whilst the members went through heated debates via the challenges of feminism to work on popular texts. That is not to deny the seeds which generated the development of audience studies, not least by Morley himself, and feminist work on domestic spaces of reception by Dorothy Hobson, but this introduction does us the great service of setting the record straight. The title of the Women’s Studies section, by Janice Winship, is ‘The difficulty of “between” – a position that almost isn’t there’. She begins with her diary entries from her time at the Centre. Charting her own negotiation between being a woman, intellectual and feminist as a constant movement between and in-between these positions, Winship then shows us how this weaving of identities is integral to all the papers in the section; how such crossings are both creative and problematic components of an emerging feminist cultural studies. Articulation of feminist or feminine, the politics of the Women’s Liberation Movement versus the theory of cultural studies, Marxism versus psychoanalysis, the empowerment of being a feminist researcher against the passivity of being the woman researched, are all part of these encounters. These engagements, as Winship reflects, are still relevant issues for us today in regard to the occupancy of transitional identities; ‘playing between “femininity” and a bigger picture’. Hazel Carby’s introduction also takes us on a personal journey from her experience of working in a multiethnic comprehensive school, to, as she says, ‘being back and black in graduate school’ in the CCCS. Experienced in witnessing the racist violence against her black pupils, Carby’s account of her engagement with the Centre highlights how for her, theoretical work there was a means of questioning the political status quo. Whereas in her family background education was a means of social mobility and a protection from racism,
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in her eyes it was a way of questioning why inequalities in relation to race, class and gender continued to persist, and why these inequalities were further entrenched by the existing educational system. Carby’s concern with the perpetuation of inequalities is then directed to the organization and ‘archiving’ of the papers in these volumes. She is unhappy about the classification of the sections, seeing them as ‘structured in dominance’. Calling the sections ‘Theoretical Frameworks’ or ‘Race’ marks these areas off from each other as mutually exclusive and suggests a structure of importance that necessarily demotes the latter. Although she acknowledges the impossibility of any archive being able to capture the fluidity and continually contested nature of the Centre’s discussions, Carby worries that the complex interweaving of people, issues and ideas gets missed in the current ordering. Race, gender and theory become somehow separate concerns, whilst in reality, as we point out above, most people belonged to several sub-groups and each group was always influencing the ideas of another. So, the complexity of how thinking on race was inflected by, contested with, and related to other topics such as youth culture and gender is effaced. Also, in a similarly reductive move, the recognition of how wider theoretical trajectories of the Centre were also crucially informed by the thinking through of issues of race and gender is bypassed. Carby’s points are important ones, although maybe the problems of structured dominance and mythology are the accompanying dangers of any archive project. We hope that the readers will be able to digest the papers, in the way Carby suggests, as occurring between the spaces of the groups, just as they were also dealing with the complex interrelationships between gender, class and race, or between theory and experience, language and history. In a similar vein of occupying the in-between, Richard Johnson introduces the history section as ‘Entangled Histories’. He begins by mapping the divergent paths of the historians of the New Left into the two academic Centres: the CCCS and Ruskin College in Oxford, which housed the History Workshop Movement. Johnson talks of the ‘mediating’ influence for him and fellow students of figures such as Hall and Raphael Samuel, the history tutor at Ruskin. But he also charts the significance of his education in Marxist social history from Edward and Dorothy Thompson. Approaches to history in the Centre ranged from a focus on the hidden histories of subordinate groups, to literary and historical influences, to a later more theoretical emphasis inaugurated by Hall in relation to hegemonic formations and the theories of Gramsci. Later strands focused on structuralism and historiography, bringing with them fierce debates on the status of ‘theory’; whereas the final strand Johnson tracks is the work of public and popular memory. What becomes abundantly clear in reading Johnson’s introduction is that the question, the definition and the scope of what constitutes an historical approach was a necessary arena of dispute, difference and interconnection within the CCCS. The ‘entangled histories’ of the CCCS crossed between many different concerns of cultural theory, phenomenological experience, epistemology and political history. It is the richness of the divergent interests and the need to continue the debate rather than close down exploration through summary conclusion that, for Johnson, characterises the oftenmisrepresented nature of these papers. And finally, Paul Willis refers to the political optimism embedded in some of the interventions in the Education and Work section, reminding us of the idealist commitment of the group to making significant contributions, which on the one hand would connect education policy to broader socio-cultural shifts and everyday life and, on the other, to policy formation at a central level. Willis revels in the centrality of class in these writings as they addressed the main issues of the day, suggesting what may be lost by the contemporary reticence to address these big questions of agency in relation to economic structures and
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relationships. The Centre’s work then provided a particular blend of critical education analysis, combining sociology, critical analysis of educational policy and party political discourses which focused a class/cultural perspective on the historical conjunctures of the time. Whilst a range of right-wing policies including ‘marketisation’ have demolished the political potential of state educational reform for the benefit of the working class, there need not be collusion on the part of the academy, but rather the essays reproduced in this volume can serve as reminders of the role of education in practices of contestation. The changing face of culture and the economy under pressures of global flows does not make these works redundant, but underlines the need for ethnographically grounded contemporary analysis of the current conjuncture, so as to explore the possible bases for subordinate power and resistance, reconnecting ‘really useful knowledge’ to an educational politics of working class emancipation. Responding to the politics of education in 1992 Hall expresses his dumbfoundedness in the face of the mushrooming institution of American Cultural Studies, suggesting the very real danger he feels when theory and knowledge become just a market in their own right. The kind of cultural studies work which this volume represents keeps the ‘tension’ between the theoretical and political, holding onto the ‘worldliness’ of textual practices, even though the strain between the two is (productively) irresolvable (Hall 1996: 272). Perhaps we also have to see this statement as simply a grim foreboding of what, in essence, has become the depressing future of the overall academic institution itself. The current environment represents a market where research output is quantified and where Cultural Studies, like its neighbours in Sociology or Media Studies, are increasingly defined and aligned with government cultural policy and the decisions of funding for the creative industries. From such a position we might well look back with a certain yearning to those arguments between white and black feminists and the ‘boyzone’; indeed from this perspective, feminist crapping is not just an unseemly noise. It should be seen as an organic voice of vital connection and contradiction between academic and political spheres. As Hall (1996: 275) reminds us, ‘I do think there is all the difference in the world between understanding the politics of intellectual work and substituting intellectual work for politics’.
Notes 1 Available in Use of English (Winter 1963 and Spring, 1964) and re-printed in Gray et al 2007. 2 1965–66 Centre Report p 14. 3 The ‘Theoretical Engagements’ section in Volume 1, introduced by Larry Grossberg, sets out some of the intellectual endeavours that were largely a result of the ‘Texts’ seminar. Organizationally we have separated out a section of theoretical work in Volume 1, but of course this is slightly misleading, since it is clear from the collection of works in this volume that those questions fiercely debated in the ‘Texts’ seminars influenced the outcomes of the work produced in the working groups. 4 Larry Grossberg’s introduction to the theory work of the Centre in Volume 1 also draws our attention to the unusual approach to collective theorizing. 5 We are grateful for a conversation with Andrew Tolson for some insights into the workings of the Literature and Society group. 6 See Charlotte Brunsdon’s discussion of the impact of feminism at the CCCS ‘A thief in the night: stories of feminism in the 1970s at CCCS’ in Morley, D. & Chen K.-H. (eds) (1996) pp. 276–86. 7 The women’s movement in the 1970s emerged from all walks of life, from women who were discontented with their roles in the family as housewife and mother, to women in the labour force demanding equal rights and demanding from their trade union brothers that they do the child-care. Social and political concerns blended with definitions of personal freedom and identity and as the movement progressed throughout the seventies it became inspired by art, literature and film. Feminism spread and divided: there were radical feminists who politicized lesbianism, or fought against pornography; there were socialist feminists who joined the trade unions and fought for equal pay and value in the workplace; women’s groups congregated to combat violence against women and
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the nuclear arms race. Sexuality was both affirmed as women’s erotic key to liberation and it was vilified as a male oppression exemplified through rape and pornography. Class and sexuality were issues fought over by white feminists and black women’s organizations also took root, with AfroCaribbean and Asian women campaigning against immigration laws and the virginity tests women were subjugated to on entry to Britain. All of this created tremors in the struggles over the politics of culture within the Centre. 8 Women’s Own 31st October, 1987. 9 Indeed, one of the Thatcher government’s first acts was to cut £100m from the UK budget for universities. The suggestion that cuts in HE budgets were ideologically driven was rejected, but conservative politicians did point to the incipient Marxism of sociology departments around the country as being problematical, and even changed policy to exclude sociology graduates from undertaking secondary school teacher training courses.
References Brunsdon, C. (1996) ‘A thief in the night: stories of feminism in the 1970s at CCCS’ in Morley, D. and Chen, K.-H. (eds), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies London: Routledge. CCCS Education Group (1981) Unpopular Education: Schooling and Social Democracy in England since 1944 London: Hutchinson. CCCS (1982) The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain London: Hutchinson. CCCS (1982) Making Histories: Studies in History – Writing and Politics London: Hutchinson. CCCS Education Group 2 (1991) Education Limited: Schooling, training and the New Right in England since 1979 London: Unwin Hyman. Carby, H. (1982) ‘White woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood’ in CCCS The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain London: Hutchinson. Critcher, C. (1979) ‘Sociology, cultural studies and the post-war working class’ in Clarke, J., Critcher, C. and Johnson, R. (eds.) Working Class Culture: Studies in History and Theory London: Hutchinson (see pp. 17–18). Gilroy, P. [1987] (1992) There Ain’t No Black In The Union Jack London: Routledge Gray, A. (2007) ‘Introduction’ to Volume 1 in CCCS Selected Working Papers: Volume 1 London: Routledge. Gray, A., Campbell, J., Erickson, M., Hanson, S. and Wood, H. (eds.) (2007) CCCS Selected Working Papers: Volume 1 London: Routledge. Hall, S. (1996) ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies’ reprinted in Morley, D. and Chen, K.-H. (eds.) Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies London: Routledge. Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, Law and Order London: Macmillan. Hoggart, R. (1957) The Uses of Literacy London: Chatto and Windus. Laing, S. (1973) ‘Textual Analysis; A Selective Bibliography’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 4, Spring 1973 Birmingham: University of Birmingham McRobbie, A. (1980) ‘Settling Accounts With Subcultures: A feminist critique’ Screen Education 34 pp. 37–49. Morley, D. and Brunsdon, C. (1999) ‘Introduction’ in Morley, D. and Brunsdon, C. The Nationwide Television Studies London: Routledge. Parmar, P. (1982) ‘Gender, Race and Class: Asian women in resistance’ in CCCS The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain London: Hutchinson. Women’s Studies Group, CCCS (1978) Women Take Issue London: Hutchinson.
Centre Reports Second Centre report 1965–66 Sixth Centre report 1969–77
Section 1
Literature and society
Introduction Stuart Laing
Preface To begin on a (somewhat Hoggartian) personal note, it is now nearly thirty-five years since I first set pen to paper to draft the overview essay and bibliography on literature and society textual analysis which appeared in Working Papers in Cultural Studies 4 in Spring 1973. While this fact may appear to lend some inherent credibility to what follows in this twenty-first century re-sit, it will soon become apparent to the knowledgeable reader that this Introduction has two considerable limitations. Its author is, often, too close to the material – too inclined to explain (or explain away) the characteristics of the articles being introduced in terms of their micro-origins, rather than placing them in a broader subsequent intellectual and political context. Secondly (and unlike the other introductory essays in these two volumes) the credentials of the author, such as they may be, do not include any current standing or authority in the field; my own professional trajectory, especially in the last two decades, has taken me elsewhere than (certainly with any depth) into the issues of literature/society/theory/cultural studies. The value of this introduction (apart from, hopefully, providing a reasonably accurate guide to the general arguments and types of article contained in this section) then lies in the obverse of its first weakness – in the reconstructions and reflective memories of someone closely involved in the work of the CCCS Literature and Society group between 1970–3 and particularly in the genesis and delivery of Working Papers in Cultural Studies 4, where five of these articles first appeared.
The place of literature at CCCS in the early 1970s The study of literature occupied a very curious and ambiguous place in CCCS during the early 1970s, when all the essays in this section were written, or (in the case of that authored by Passeron) first published in English. There was, first, the need to continue to acknowledge and place the double legacy of Richard Hoggart (whose permanent departure from CCCS was confirmed in 1971). The Uses of Literacy remained much referenced as a key foundational text for CCCS, although there was much less clarity about how to evaluate and make use of its detailed arguments and modes of analysis. More immediately Hoggart (through a number of essays on literature and society/contemporary cultural analysis) seemed from 1964 to have clearly located the core project of CCCS in terms of a dialectical engagement between literary criticism and sociology, with the key question as how to read literary texts in relation to their social context(s), particularly in relation to their embodied ‘values’.
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CCCS, also, had been founded as a subset of the University of Birmingham English Department and especially in the early days defined itself very significantly in relation to its degrees of similarity and difference from mainstream ‘EngLit’ – initially mostly in terms of object of study (popular literary texts, such as that long-lost text from 1968, the ‘Cure for Marriage’ study; or one of the first, perhaps the first, Centre doctoral study to be completed, Roger King’s study of the Hank Janson series of crime novels) and later in terms of method and theories. It was also the case that the other founding father of British Cultural Studies (Raymond Williams) and his key text (The Long Revolution) were seen as outgrowths of English literary studies. In this respect it is indicative of the perceived CCCS project of the early 1970s (arguably of the 1970s as a whole), that the origins of both its key foundational texts in adult education teaching of the 1940s and 1950s were rarely acknowledged or discussed at that time (despite the fact that quite a few of the graduate students were engaged in similar, if more enforced by financial circumstance, attempts at popular education through their own ‘liberal studies’ teaching in local technical colleges). Rather, both Hoggart and Williams were seen as scholarship boys breaking back from the academy (and its canonical approach to ‘EngLit’) into broader social concerns. In one sense, then, the study of literature (or perhaps more precisely the critical engagement with English Studies) was central to the CCCS project in its early days. However, from another perspective, it was, by the early 1970s, no longer entirely clear why (or if) literature was really all that important. As new students arrived and the mantle of leadership fell directly on Stuart Hall, the central areas of interest began to form up in other places: media; subcultures; work and leisure; a range of sociological theories and methods concerned with directly accessing ‘lived’ culture (ethnomethodology; symbolic interactionism; forms of participant observation) and from 1971–2 onwards a deliberately explicit (at times almost intellectually masochistic) encounter with Marxist theory (both Marx himself and the European neo-Marxists). The importance of literature and also (not the same thing) literary criticism for cultural studies was now by no means obvious – and while outside the Centre both the expansion, and the expanding ‘crisis’, in English Studies continued, inside there was no particular commitment to the survival or otherwise of the EngLit enterprise. By coming to the Centre the graduate students (and staff ) had already made their personal break from that domain. If the modes of study necessary to position literature within cultural studies required the rejection of Eng Lit as a whole then the reply might well have been – ‘so what?’. The key drivers of the CCCS ‘literature-and-society’ project in the early 1970s were rather (albeit perhaps at an unconscious level) to discover and justify the place and importance of studying literature for cultural studies and, more explicitly, to specify the place and function of literary texts within a whole social formation: ‘the key question is how this privileged activity, and its product, the literary text is related to other activities in the totality’ (‘Mapping the Field’ p. 40). Work on literature at the Centre in the early 1970s was not driven (at least at a collective level) by any pressing contemporary social question (there was no literary equivalent of ‘the meaning of mugging’ or the political effects of television news and current affairs) nor by any compelling individual empirical research questions. The key issue presented itself rather as a straightforward theoretical and conceptual question – and in the domain of the very discipline where (in the UK at least) there had been, as Perry Anderson had so eloquently demonstrated in his majestic essay ‘Components of the National Culture’, the greatest
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resistance (even among those well disposed to linking literature to society) to abstract theorising.
European theory The issue of ‘theory’ at that time translated itself concretely as engaging with European theorists from the period 1919 to the present – predominantly those within the Marxist tradition, but also in the recently emerging area of structuralism and semiotics. The main internal reason (internal, that is, to the literature/society project – there were of course other over-arching political and cultural reasons in a post-1968 Europe) for the centrality of the Marxist work in this enterprise is set out in the ‘Mapping the Field’ essay: the study of the Literature/Society problem in a Marxist framework, is not a marginal enterprise but absolutely central to the development of historical materialism as a science – because, within that problem, a critical absence in the theory can be, progressively, clarified. (p. 42) In fact if the place of literature (and art) within ‘the neglected theory of superstructures’ could not be specified then not only was there a problem for Marxism in general (as a totalising social theory) but, even more pressingly for many of those within CCCS in the early 1970s, the hoped-for alignment between Marxism and cultural studies as a whole could not occur. It was for this reason that the presence (and increasing availability) of a number of European theorists (and key texts) who claimed to have solved the problem of how to respect the particularity of literary texts, while also situating them as historically determined, commanded the attention of CCCS (or at least its more theoretically-inclined members) at that time. The fact of the recent (or imminent) translation of many of these works into English is noted a number of times in the articles in this section. This issue is referenced with regard to (inter alia) Adorno, Gramsci, Goldmann, Benjamin, Brecht and Barthes as well as in relation to such key texts from Marx himself as the Grundrisse. It is worth noting here that the significance of this point lies not so much in the stereotypical linguistic insularity of the English; in fact, texts by Barthes, Kristeva, Goldmann, Althusser and the Frankfurt School were read by many CCCS members in the original French or German. Rather, the issue was that it was not until such texts were rendered into English and their forms of terminology became available in English, that it was possible to mobilise the new concepts they represented so as seriously to contest established Anglophone sociological, philosophical and literary normative assumptions. Of all the European theorists whose work was interrogated (for once the aggressive connotations of this term are appropriate) by the CCCS group it is perhaps now surprising to recall that it was the work of Lucien Goldmann which first opened up new lines of thought. Goldmann’s work has (as far as I can judge) not, since the mid-1970s, been in any way influential in either the development of Critical Theory within English departments nor in the variety of ways which Cultural Studies has approached literature. Around 1970, however, the year of Goldmann’s death, there were a number of reasons (many treated at length in Adrian Mellor’s essay) why the figure of Goldmann and his work seemed particularly important and worthy of attention.
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Goldmann’s emphasis on reflection and homology between social structures and literary structures fitted well with the core CCCS focus on the question of how literary content was both shaped by and offered a distinctive insight into the contemporary social structures from which it had been created. Goldmann’s notions of world-vision and different types of class consciousness seemed also to offer a way round the twin elephant traps of seeing literature as either a-historical creative vision or a form of ideology or false (through its class limitations) consciousness. Additionally both Goldmann and his work had presence within English intellectual life. The influential essay on the sociology of literature had been published in the International Social Science Journal in 1967 and Jonathan Cape had published the more general monograph, The Human Sciences and Philosophy in 1969; the latter text was one of the core texts selected for the CCCS general seminar in Autumn 1970 – a seminar intended to lay the ground for another of those legendary unfinished projects, the publication of a Centre definitive theoretical and exemplificatory Reader on Cultural Studies. And behind these texts lay Goldmann’s monumental analysis of Racine and seventeenth-century France, The Hidden God – a text which through its sketching of social class, class consciousness and its relation to drama, Jansenism and philosophy appeared to show empirically how to solve the key problem of ‘mediations’. For many, including some of those in CCCS, the plausibility of this analysis was probably aided by their own relative lack of detailed knowledge of any alternative accounts of class consciousness and class fractions in the era of Louis XIV. Goldmann had also recently visited England – a version of his paper to the Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1967 had been published in the Penguin Special of that name – and his lectures at Cambridge in the Spring of 1970 were celebrated in Raymond Williams’s ‘Literature and Sociology; in memory of Lucien Goldmann’, published in New Left Review in the May-June 1971 edition. This was one of the first essays in which Williams signalled his re-engagement with forms of Marxist theory. In particular the possibility of the alignment of the notion of social totality (as developed by Goldmann from Lukacs and other neo-Hegelians) with Williams’s own ‘culture as a whole way of life’ formulations suggested a more painless way of linking the CCCS’s early 1960s position with the Marxist tradition than seemed possible elsewhere (such as in encounters with Althusserian Marxism). As the ‘Mapping the Field’ essay suggests, Goldmann’s work was probably the most influential of those at the reflectionist pole – pushing the work of Lukacs (and even of Marx and Engels themselves) to a new level of specificity. Less well developed and more dispersed was a range of work which took (or could be aligned with) the core Marxist notion of production as the primary social process and situated literature as one form of cultural production alongside many others. This range included a wide range of sharply opposed positions – from Sartre’s Problem of Method, centred on ideas of individual creativity, to Althusser’s anti-humanism, to the Brechtian emphasis on the writing and performance of drama as a collective social process, to the structuralist/semiotic view of the primacy of the linguistic and sign systems. The ‘Mapping the Field’ essay itself was the result of a number of individual contributions from different members of the Literature and Society group being put alongside each other and then heroically, and at times ingeniously, stitched together (predominantly by the efforts of Stuart Hall) into what was still essentially a series of related snapshots rather than a fully coherent argument – as the lack of even a pretence at any Conclusion revealed. In retrospect (after three decades of subsequent development in theoretical and empirical work on literature and cultural studies), despite the exceptionally ambitious aim of encapsulating
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such a breadth of theoretical work in such a small space, it is striking how relatively narrow an area of enquiry concerning literature/society relations the essay opens up. At that time, for example, both the study of actual conditions of literary production (the economics of authorship, the nature of publishing, methods of marketing and distribution) and consumption (contemporary patterns of reading) were generally regarded as the province of the wholly untheoretical sociology of literature or the literary historian and hence of limited interest. Also despite the rather heavy-handed shift to using ‘she’ rather than ‘he’ in the latter sections of the ‘Mapping the Field’ essay, the work on literature within CCCS in the very early 1970s remained relatively innocent of gender issues (let alone of those of race, hybridity, nationalisms etc). Further the shift to concern with European theory had largely displaced earlier concerns with the nature of popular fiction, while the crucial turn within English Studies itself to put in question the nature of ‘English’ as a social and cultural institution did not seem relevant until later in the decade, when more focus began to develop on the notion of cultural institutions and, then in the 1980s (with a more benign connotation than Adorno and others could ever have imagined) on the ‘cultural industries’. Nevertheless, despite these limitations ‘Mapping the Field’ remains a major document of its time in signalling a paradigm shift for literary study into a post-theory world. It is hard now to convey the degree of intellectual effort and, even, imagination necessary at that time to make even (what may now appear as) these relatively timid and limited steps away from the safety of the Anglo-American devotion to close reading of the literary canon.
Dynamics of meaning production One way of acknowledging the value of the ‘Mapping the Field’ essay is to recognise how the essays which follow in this section by both Andy Tolson and Alf Louvre took advantage of the kind of ground-clearing work which the ‘Mapping the Field’ essay reflected and recorded in order to go beyond the dominant reflectionist model of the early 1970s. In particular ‘Reading Literature as Culture’ now appears as perhaps the most forwardlooking of all the essays in this section – even if only by virtue of its recognition that without a detailed conceptualisation of how ‘reading’ happens there would remain a major (and, as perceived by the end of the 1970s in the Centre as elsewhere, unbridgeable) gap in the understanding of how literary texts actually become inserted into contemporary social processes. Tolson’s essay played across the notion of reading as, variously: empirical social activity, psychological capability, Leavisite attentiveness and the pre-requisite for cultural study, although without quite settling firmly on any of these. More than any other essay in this section ‘Reading Literature as Culture’ took its target as existing literary criticism (Leavis, Richards, Empson, Frye) and its construction of an ideal reader/reading – whether presented as a fully sensitised humanism or as a matter of objective quasi-science. The essay proposed to replace this with a concept of reading as historically-specific knowledge production, but one rooted also in a detailed knowledge and tracking of psychological and linguistic processes. The latter part of the essay then conflated, in a way which perhaps pre-figured certain later moves in deconstruction, the study/research of reading with the experience of the student/researcher as active reader to release a dynamic notion of meaning production, although one which (as suggested by the crucial role of the Sartrean regressive/progressive mode of analysis in the argument) was centred on the individual experience of reading (albeit one always historically situated and with the encouragement/instruction to read in a way which took account of that historical specificity).
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By contrast Louvre’s essay, through the concept of genre, developed a more explicitly collective and would-be political perspective, taking at least part of its premise from the ‘meaning as production’ half of the ‘Mapping the Field’ argument. Louvre started from the premise that the key area of attention for textual analysis should not be either manifest content or (as with Goldmann) the underlying philosophical ‘world-vision’, but should be literary form – with particular reference to how that form defined the modes of communication with a readership or (in the case of drama) an audience. Genre was specified as the key mediation here, but not genre in its traditional literary critical sense which assumes ‘the fixed nature of the relations posited between imaginative form and social determination’ (p. 71). Rather genre was to be grasped, through the linking of the concept to the ideas of Brecht, Benjamin and Enzensberger, as a (potentially) dynamic force or instrument through which a dialectical relationship could be established between author and audience. Louvre’s essay, in fact, more than any other in this section, developed an argument that became (in its logic) primarily an exhortation to a certain type of artistic production rather than an analytic approach to existing literary texts or processes. He cited favourably David Caute’s proposal that playwrights: ‘make the first target of their commitment, the structure of our consciousness, the way we think, know, feel, listen and respond . . .’ (p. 74). Glossing this Louvre commented that: ‘it is precisely at that point that the artist can make his radical insertion, can reformulate his genre in ways that deny the satisfaction of expectations deriving from any such structure of consciousness (itself substantially conditioned by the dominance of previous genres)’ (p. 74). This emphasis had the undoubted merit of turning the angle of vision firmly on the present and future and opening up some new questions about the new electronic media and the possible convergence of issues of general commodity production and cultural production. The final call to arms – ‘by developing this view of generic change . . . it may be possible to evolve a consistent revolutionary artistic practice’ (p. 77) – offered then the possibility of a quite different task for the cultural studies approach to literature and the arts by replacing an essentially analytical and historical (albeit focused on contemporary history) project with that of being the theoretical underpinning of radical/political cultural and aesthetic practice. At the same time, as both Tolson and Louvre began to carve out new spaces beyond the core reflectionist theoretical paradigms, their essays, however, also confirmed the dominance of a Centre approach to literature and society that both began from and concluded on theoretical, rather than substantive empirical, questions; even Tolson’s commentary on Wuthering Heights was essentially for exemplificatory purposes rather than because Emily Bronte (even a modern reading of Emily Bronte) was of especial significance for CCCS. It remains striking how far actual engagement with genuinely contemporary literature (even popular literature) was virtually absent at this stage of the Centre’s development.
Class, culture and literature While, then, the majority of the essays in this section took their starting point from the theoretical set of problems already cited, there are two which, instead, did begin from specific literary and historical instances – instances which, in different ways, had continuities with what was already by the early 1970s coming to be seen as an earlier and outmoded phase of British cultural studies – specifically the question of the relations between working-class life and its literary expression. Graham Holderness’s essay illustrates precisely the comments of ‘Mapping the Field’ on F.R. Leavis – that:
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those critics within the Anglo-Saxon tradition, who have tried to think the Literature/ Society problem in a rigorous way, have usually taken their point of departure from Leavis, while at the same time breaking from the way he has formulated the problem. (p. 40) For Holderness (the only English author in this section who was not a Centre member) the break was very much a matter of taking seriously the need for an analysis of the actual empirically verifiable relations between the early novels of D.H. Lawrence and the specific and variable cultural contexts which influenced and enabled them. The essay then was a very direct engagement with the 1950s concerns of Leavis, Hoggart and Williams and is also the most immediate empirical illustration in this section of how the relations between the two meanings of ‘culture’ (as the selective tradition of great literature, and as a whole way of life) can be articulated. The essay turns on the relations between an instance of cultural/artistic production (the novels of Lawrence) and three competing cultural milieux: the working-class home, the aspirational culture of Eastwood, and the artistic world beyond (as crucially mediated through Lawrence’s relationship with Jessie Chambers). The choice of Lawrence here (while, in one sense, occurring quite naturally as typical literary critical homage to an already canonical figure) was also of particular resonance for British cultural studies. After all it had been the appearance of Richard Hoggart at the ‘Trial of Lady Chatterley’ in 1960 (a trial which was actually the trial of Penguin Books and its head Allen Lane) which had helped to create the support of Penguin Books for the foundation of CCCS itself. And Lawrence himself had been an earlier exemplar of that ‘scholarship boy’ social type who, in the figures and writings of Hoggart and Williams (as in many of those of CCCS members), embodied so many of the aspirations and dilemmas of the cultural studies project itself. In accepting this article for the Centre Journal a strong link was re-established with some of the main energies behind the original CCCS project. While my own essay on Walter Greenwood touched on some of the same ground as that of Graham Holderness it also had a rather different orientation and different origins – origins that may explain some of its distinctive emphases as well as indicating another area of potential influence on literary study at CCCS at that time. In the summer of 1971 Dorothy Thompson, then a lecturer in the University of Birmingham History department, needed to organise a short three week post-end of year examination course for the first year History undergraduates. She chose the topic of History and Literature in the 1930s, recruiting first as a tutor her husband E.P. Thompson (who had only recently departed from Warwick University following the ‘Warwick University Ltd’. conflicts over business influence and the keeping of files). Edward Thompson gave sessions (as I recall) on Auden and Spain. To make up the tutorial team Dorothy Thompson asked CCCS/Stuart Hall if any of the graduate students could assist and I was drafted in to give two sessions – one on Walter Greenwood’s novel, Love on the Dole. This may explain the slightly unusual starting point of the subsequent essay, which was essentially to pose some questions of historical method (‘how can literary texts serve as historical evidence?’) rather than of literary criticism – and to make a connection through to some general cultural studies issues by the citing of the issue of ‘subjective meaning’ (a significant concern in those innocent pre-Lacanian days of unproblematically unified subjects). This turn to history as a way of speaking about the ‘relevance’ of literary study both supported the interest in Goldmann (Love on the Dole as a particular instance of class consciousness as world vision) and also could be seen as pre-figuring Colin Sparks’s sharp demand (in ‘The Abuses of Literacy’) for a location of cultural studies as itself only a branch
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of history, although perhaps not quite in the way he had in mind. The essay also took the term ‘experience’ and its mediation through a variety of different forms of writing as a way of establishing a direct connection with the interests of the founding fathers of cultural studies and of the old (post-1956) New Left. For despite the homage to Goldmann the essay in reality drew more on the approaches of The Making of the English Working Class, the second chapter of The Long Revolution and The Uses of Literacy than of the European theorists of ‘Mapping the Field’.
Re-visiting Richard Hoggart While the essays by Graham Holderness and myself did pay some indirect homage to the concerns of the Centre’s founder, more thorough, if diametrically opposed, evaluations of The Uses of Literacy were to be found in the essays of Colin Sparks and Jean-Claude Passeron. Sparks, in a piece originally published in 1974, summarised a significant view within the Centre that both Hoggart’s book and many of the cultural studies perspectives which it had inaugurated now (by the mid-1970s) needed to be superseded by more serious and weighty matters. The sub-text here was that the focus on the traditional subject matter of Cultural Studies (leisure, the entertainment media, the ‘popular arts’ – in the title of the Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel book of 1964) had de-politicised its potential; now an emphasis on the spheres of production, the Trades Unions and political organisation, within the perspective of Marxist theory, should take precedence. In part this argument was a (significantly harsher in tone) re-run of a debate from more than a decade earlier when E.P. Thompson had criticised Raymond Williams’s theory of culture, as set out in The Long Revolution, for a lack of political and historical perspective and, in particular, for underestimating the role and extent of conflict within social and cultural processes. However there were also some major differences, not least in Sparks’s view that cultural studies should not be concerned with the celebration of the culture of a subordinate class. The critical language used by Sparks was also very much that of the post-Thompson new New Left – a rejection of ‘nostalgia’ (p. 112), the ‘sentimental myth of past ages’ (p. 113) and (in the case of Raymond Williams) ‘linguistic evasiveness’ (p. 116), with the use of such adjectives as ‘shabby and contemptuous’ (p. 112) and ‘cancerous’, ‘blind’ and ‘myopic’. The distance from the Hoggartian (and to some degree Thompsonian also – as in the Making of the English Working Class) bottom-up and empathetic approach to describing and judging working-class culture can be especially recognised in the view that: ‘Our starting point for the critical evaluation of working-class culture is not the empirical reality of that culture but the historical role of the class’ (p. 119). The implication that the starting point for cultural studies should be conceptual and theoretical rather than empirical was clear. By contrast the choice made to present a translation (excellently effected by Richard Dyer) of Passeron’s Introduction to the French edition of The Uses of Literacy in the first edition of the Centre Journal signalled an opposing (self-consciously humanist) tendency, wishing to celebrate and preserve Hoggart’s approach not only for sentimental reasons, but as a statement of where the central object of study for cultural studies should lie. Passeron’s essay offered also a surprising, and perhaps over-generous, interpretation of Hoggart’s book as an exemplar of anthropological/sociological method. Citing one of its major achievements as a critique and correction of ‘the image that other classes have of the working-class and their values’, Passeron provided a typology of the book’s combination of a number of genres and styles of writing – autobiography, novel, moral and aesthetic criticism, ethnography. Further he argued that there were systematic methods in Hoggart’s use of
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evidence – from linguistic analysis to hermeneutic readings of everyday life to types of participant observation – which could and should provide a guide to further more extensive sociological research. Both in the 1970s, and even more with hindsight, the links with the works of such key figures in the sociology of culture as Bourdieu were evident. Through (Passeron argued) typologies of social spaces, routines, schemes of popular thought and social character types Hoggart was able to ‘hold together systematically a whole play of determinations and a whole constellation of attitudes . . . that are truly significant in the social life of the group’ (p. 28). Within this perspective – which seemed to offer to many CCCS members an unexpected external and wholly welcome validation of the claim that there was a defensible social scientific basis to the Centre’s approach to the study of culture as ‘a whole way of life’ – there was, however, little obvious connection with the directions which literary study at the Centre was then beginning to take. Passeron, for example, identified a major achievement of Hoggart as: ‘drawing attention to the fact that the reception of a cultural message should not be disassociated from the social conditions in which it occurs . . .’ (p. 32). The legacies of Hoggart’s work for CCCS in the early 1970s were, and were perceived as, much more present in the areas of media studies and the approach to sub-cultures than in the study of literature itself. It was rather in the figure and work of Raymond Williams (as the still critical, but much more respectful, tone of the commentary on Williams by Colin Sparks suggests) that the connections between the general field of cultural studies, the detailed study of literary texts and the engagement with European (especially Marxist) theory were seen to be developing.
Conclusion It may be that many of the essays in this section now bear interest only for essentially archival reasons, or at best for active historical reasons (in the sense of assisting ways of understanding how we got to be where we are today). Certainly most of these authors would see their later work as having superseded (or in some cases sensibly retreated from) positions of too great a simplicity or stridency. However the core of these essays, especially when taken as a group, was and is a nagging away at what, perhaps inevitably, still remains the central dilemma of those concerned with the ‘literature-and-society’ duality or with any kind of text-based cultural studies. Whatever the necessary emphasis on whole social process which a cultural materialist approach has since (quite rightly) commanded, the indispensable element at the centre of studying literature remains textual interpretation, or rather textual interpretations. And the central dialectic here is that between experience and theory. Experience in a double sense – as the experience of reading (actual or implied) and as the ‘lived’ experience to which the text (however extended the degrees of linguistic or formal mediation) alludes: Theory as the wholly unavoidable concepts or frames of reference that any student of literature (or of any other piece of cultural textuality) must possess. For members of the literature and society group at CCCS in the early 1970s the strains of seeking resolutions to what seemed then a quite severe set of oppositions are manifest in these essays. Re-reading them after three decades is a reminder of the very considerable personal and collective effort lying behind their production – and of the many blind alleys and misdirections which we took (some still reflected in these finished articles). It may indeed be that their value now lies more in the work of the following decades (for which they helped to clear the ground and lay some of the foundations) rather than in their own twenty-first
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century currency; but that, dear reader, is now a matter (in an appropriately Tolsonian spirit of regressive/progressive analysis) for you to determine for yourself. Stuart Laing was a postgraduate student at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies between 1970 and 1973. He is currently Pro-Vice Chancellor and Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Brighton. He has published widely on literature, media and cultural change in the post-1945 period, including the book Representations of Working-Class Life 1957–64 (Macmillan 1986).
Bibliography Anderson, P. ‘Components of the National Culture’ in Cockburn, A. and Blackburn, R. (ed.) Student Power, London, Penguin, 1969. Goldmann, L. The Hidden God, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. Goldmann, L. ‘The Sociology of Literature: status and problems of method’ in International Social Science Journal, Vol.XIX, No.4, UNESCO,1967. Goldmann, L. ‘Dogmatism and Criticism in Literature’ in Cooper D. (ed.) The Dialectics of Liberation, London, Penguin, 1968. Goldmann, L. The Human Sciences and Philosophy, London, Cape, 1969. Hall, S. and Whannel, P. The Popular Arts, London, Hutchinson, 1964. Hoggart, R. The Uses of Literacy, London, Chatto and Windus, 1957. Laing, S. ‘Textual Analysis; A Selective Bibliography’, Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 4, Spring 1973. Thompson, E.P. ‘On The Long Revolution’, New Left Review, May/June and July/August 1961. Thompson, E.P. The Making of the English Working Class, London, Gollancz, 1963. Williams, R. The Long Revolution, London, Chatto and Windus, 1961. Williams, R. ‘Literature and Sociology: in Memory of Lucien Goldmann’, New Left Review No. 67, May/June 1971.
1
Introduction to the French edition of Uses of Literacy Jean-Claude Passeron
J.P. is a member of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne in Paris and is co-author of Le Metier de Sociologie. The essay here translated by Richard Dyer appears as the introduction to the French edition of The Users of Literacy. M. Passeron examines Richard Hoggart’s work as contribution to anthropology as well as to the debate about mass culture. He suggests the theoretical foundations and hypotheses in this apparently untheoretical book and goes on to indicate the ways in which it seems to have been misunderstood by bourgeois intellectuals.
Despite its subtitle, ‘Aspects of working-class life’ it would not be paradoxical to treat The Uses of Literacy as a thoughtful contribution to the sociology of intellectuals and more especially of those who are professional sociologists. He analyses the imagery of ‘the man in the street’, so dear to journalists, or the contradictory and complimentary myths of the ‘rustic vigour’ and ‘feminine gentleness’ of working class, which are the delight of novelists, moralists, and artists alike; and all the dreadful contributions imbued with the viciousness or else with lyricism which have been made to the mass culture debate (a counterpoint to the pastoral nostalgia from which few sociologists are exempt) and in each case, Richard Hoggart hints at the extent to which sociologists merely play among themselves when they play with an image of the working-class. He suggests why the situation of this class, characterised negatively as cultural deprivation, constitutes a privileged symbolic object for groups of intellectuals, themselves defined in various ways by a privileged role in the production and popularisation of culture. If it is true that intellectuals never reveal better their propensity to monopolise the social definition of culture than in their incapacity for seeing in other social groups anything other than an excuse to examine their own cultural contradictions (by an ethnocentrism which, even though in apparently proposed forms, bears witness to both aristocratic and populist attitudes), then Richard Hoggart’s strategy of outlining, in order to go beyond them more easily, some of the intellectual illusions inherent in the sociology of the working classes, involves at the very least markings of sociological interpretation which would connect the ideological values of attitudes towards popular culture with the social position of various sorts of intellectual. One might as well point out straight away that the extreme originality of the work is liable to disconcert many of its readers. Richard Hoggart calls into question the artful naivety, the class ethnocentrism or the hidden anachronisms of numerous analyses largely accepted to-day of ‘the cultural homogenisation of consumer societies’, the evil or beneficial power of the mass press, radio and television, on the ‘atomisation’ and ‘massification’ of the urban proletariat or of the destruction of the traditional way of life of the working class. Not
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without vehemence when taking fashionable ideas to pieces, he has put himself in the position of being labelled a vitriolic writer by all those who would find that a convenient way of dismissing tiresome analyses. Moreover the work, which doubtless owes much of its success to the fluidity of its style and descriptions, cannot be fitted into a neatly delineated tradition of anthropological literature. Although the author is aiming at a synthesis of the specialised studies on the life style of the working class1 in urban and industrial England and on the characteristics of the production and diffusion of new cultural messages, The Uses of Literacy, deliberately stripped of the more obvious signs of sociological debate – jargon or statistics, crushing documentation or methodological emphasis – could be taken, in part one, as a study of manners, in which the treatment of the setting, the stories and the characters is sometimes not unlike the novelistic tradition of the depiction of milieu; whilst in its second part it could pass for an exercise in method: transposing the classic technique of literary analysis to the context and audience of the mass press. In addition there is a variety of other concerns which might dismay a reader too exclusively faithful to the religion of clear distinctions between disciplines. At one level a protest in the name of scientific objectivity against aristocratic, populist, apocalyptic or foolishly optimistic pronouncements which come between the life of the working class and its necessarily intellectual or bourgeois observers, The Uses of Literacy also derives in large part – as the author admits several times – from autobiography, if not self-analysis. Moreover, while he methodically sets about grasping the mechanics behind the failures of proportion or the optical illusion to which the majority of moral judgements commonly applied to popular culture may be reduced, Richard Hoggart has no intention of refraining from sticking his neck out and assessing the value of cultural changes associated with the transformation of working class life. Whilst offering elements of autobiography which allow him to situate himself in relation to the working class and thereby, as he suggests to his readers, to relativise his own judgements, the author never hesitates to formulate his likes and dislikes, his hopes and regrets concerning, say, the developments in popular song or furniture, changes of style in women’s magazines or pornographic literature, or other transformations in popular resourcefulness and cynicism; and it is in this way that the work clearly touches on moral and aesthetic criticism. One has to forget for a moment the rather overwhelming richness of the book in order to discern Richard Hoggart’s more scientific contribution to our understanding of the situation and culture of the working class. Richard Hoggart certainly can’t be numbered among those sociologists whom Wright Mills has attacked as ‘bureaucratic empiricists’: statistical information, relegated to the notes, is there only to indicate questions of scale; the author uses only the conclusions of surveys and, doubtless caring little for the artificial delights of attitude ratings, did not consider it worthwhile to undertake a questionnaire survey in order to give his analysis numerical proof. This is a pity to the extent that the majority of his hypotheses concerning the changes in attitudes over a period or from one category to another are formulated in a way which could easily have been substantiated by statistical tests. But social science should not be defined, as a certain methodological imperialism would have it, by the exclusive use of a rigid method for the construction and assessment of facts. The Uses of Literacy can legitimately quote another tradition of research as authority, namely ethnography, whose heuristic fecundity and power of objectification are no less than those of statistical analysis when, employing the direct and continuous observation of conduct in a real situation, it operates according to methodically constructed categories and submits its instruments of investigation to a systematic control. If the description that Richard Hoggart offers of the development of daily life and leisure among the urban working-class in the industrial north-east of England cannot be immediately identified for what it is, this is surely
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only because the author refrains from relying on the terminological apparatus with which the professionals usually surround themselves in carrying out fieldwork; perhaps too because a whole tradition accustoms us to associating the principles of ethnography with a particular type of society – that very type which some call with an expert’s naivete ‘ethnographic’ – making us hesitate when we see them applied to the study of groups or socio-cultural milieux observable in our own society. If, instead of English workers, he had given us Trobri and islanders or the Kwakiutl, would we have had any difficulty in recognising this systematic picture of daily life as an example of an ethnographic report? Is it true that a personal experience does not in itself constitute a correct procedure for methodical observation, and that a body of documentary material – no matter how suggestive it may be – should not be confused with a correlated collection of ethnographic facts. But it is precisely characteristic of Richard Hoggart’s work that, even if the liveliness of the description sometimes hides its underlying organisation, it is ordered according to a plan of observation in which one is bound to recognise the headings and operational concepts of ethnographic inventory in its most classic form: • • • • • • •
Organisation of space and habitation Seasonal and weekly itinerary and movements Rhythms and places of work and leisure Ages of life and relations between the sexes Structure of the family group and the education of children The articulation of economic, cultural and religious practices A repertoire simultaneously of material objects and goods and of models which govern their use.
Meticulously reviewing the various areas of activity in daily life, Richard Hoggart does not give in to the cultural critic’s temptation of going directly to the ‘values behind’ a human group by a sort of divine intuition, probably because he is concerned to relate systematically the objective situation of the group to its habits and routines, these being as objectivations of some fundamental principles which govern the response to these conditions of existence: thus the analysis of values is clearly grounded in a concrete and methodical description of habits and norms as different at first sight as those which underlie food, funerals, clothing, furniture, decoration, contraception, superstition, humour and health, or which by a similar logic order the relations of members of the working class to work, work prospects, wages, handling the budget, expenditure, credit and saving, as well as their contact with bureaucracy the institution of the monarchy, sport, adultery, suicide, bachelorhood, drink, sex, games and morality. In short, by a meticulous attention to the nuances of everyday life, to the details of décor (even the smells are not forgotten) and to the social physiognomy of people – right down to its effects on the silhouette – as well as by its hermeneutic orientation towards revealing the latent meanings of publicity and leisure or the most subtle connotations of key words and turns of speech, Richard Hoggart manages to draw from his autobiographical experience as an intellectual coming from a working class background all that a careful ethnographer can draw from a good ‘informant’. Better still, the liberties in composition and the narration that the author readily takes with the codified rules normal in the presentation of an enquiry’s findings definitely have the effect of correcting any methodological weakness of the genre. One knows how difficult it is to work out the logic of action in a life style, an ideology or a culture from a dry ethnographic study, when it is reduced to a lexicon of models behaviour. These models are cut off
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from the whole set of concrete conditions which occasion them and are abstracted from the series of actions which alone can explain their function. If he must be permanently on guard against the deceptiveness of his material, the misleading evidence of anecdotes or the dubious insights of participation in ceremonies, the ethnologist knows that the observation of real scenes and situations can at least suggest the hypotheses for correspondences, homologies or continuities which can only be made out in vast configurations of attitudes or events, such as biographies or genealogies, time tables or allocations of space learnt over a prolonged period of time, and institutionalised or recurrent scenes. When Richard Hoggart puts together certain social totalities which the inventory of features only gives in a dispersed order, he thus reconstitutes significant wholes – they may be: • • • •
Lives like those of the housewife, the scholarship boy or the self-taught man Family trees like his own family’s Occasions such as the ‘chara trip’ to the seaside, the way an evening or a Sunday is spent at home or in the working men’s club, the audience at a court case or a family scene Places where the regulars establish a rhythm of coming and going, such as the road, the pub, the local library or waste ground the system of social relations embodied for instance in the relationship between a working class couple and salesman at a big furniture store, or between the scholarship boy and his working class family, the woman of the house, the father, and his teachers, his books, exams and social success.
These minutely constructed reconstitutions do not show a literary penchant for the vignette or realistic decoration, but a properly sociological effort on the part of the author to hold together systematically a whole play of determinations and a whole constellation of attitudes which only completely reveal all their relations – be they interdependencies or contradictions – in sufficiently complex configurations of actions and reactions, observed in situations that are truly significant in the social life of the group. This is after all only a practical example of what Bronislaw Malinowski held to be the most irreplaceable contribution of ethnographic method: . . . there is a series of phenomena of great importance which cannot possibly be recorded by questioning or computing documents, but have to be observed in there full actuality. Let us call them the imponderabilia of actual life. Here belongs such things as the routine of a man’s working day, the details of his care of the body, of the manner of taking food and preparing for it; the tone of conversational and social life around the village fires. . . . All the facts can and ought to be scientifically formulated and recovered, but it is necessary that this be done, not by superficial registration of details as is usually done by untrained observers, but with an effort at penetrating the mental attitude expressed in them.2 Equally the use of a semi-indirect style3 through which the sociologist can with complete ease let the object of study speak for itself, is not a whim of the author. Hoggart’s phraseology is designed to treat with complete objectivity the perspective that the working class has determined to adopt on the world, and is constructed according to a grammatical scheme which implies in principle the sociologist’s exteriority to this perspective which are analysed by the imperceptible integration of phrases and semantic categories, themselves equally manifestations and indices of the working class world view. In other words, Richard Hoggart
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gives himself, by this implicit syntax, a means of introducing systematically characteristic schemes of popular thought in a descriptive discourse which can thus be organised continually according to the proper logic of the object described, even if it remains distinctly at the level of interpretation and exposition. Clearly the use of this method expresses in the style of the writing the theoretical project of an author committed to uprooting and exposing intellectual ethnocentrism in all its forms; for in forcing his description to run, according to the structures, if not always in words, or working-class consciousness and speech, Richard Hoggart arms himself against the temptation of eliciting from the working-class answers to questions they do not ask themselves or not at any rate in the terms in which intellectuals for their own purposes like to put them. But in the last analysis it is in its results that the richness of a method can be measured. Without wishing to treat here in detail the influence that The Uses of Literacy may have had on sociological research, one should note that the descriptive tenor of this work, which proposes for future research a whole body of systematically interconnected hypotheses, relates directly to the multiplicity and above all the style of works in the sixties devoted to the situation of the working-class, their values and the concrete organisation of their daily life. The alerted reader of empirical research completed in this area must feel that numerous analyses which seem ‘obvious’ to him – and which in the end may find more ‘literary’ than those he may have read in specialised monographs – have generally become classics only after the appearance of Richard Hoggart’s work (1957). The Uses of Literacy attracts attention to a complex of attitudes and behaviour governed by the confused consciousness of the objective and collective destiny of the group; this complex expresses itself in the strongly felt sense of belonging, for better or worse, and irreversibly, to a community subject to the same limitations and the same constraints, and manifests itself concretely in for instance the sentimental value attached to the family circle and relations proper to the nuclear group, in the changeability of family relations with the neighbourhood, in the use of personal chains of solidarity and self-help, in the local and communal character of entertainments and of daily life, and, above all, in the fundamental separation of the world into ‘them’ and ‘us’. This latter means a double standard in judgements and actions, moral inclinations and handling relationships with others, which is in inverse proportion according to whether one is ‘one one’s own ground’ or must come into contact with the world ‘them’. All these aspects have subsequently been studied or even experimented upon in the work of H.J. Gans, M. Kerr, J.M. Mogey, M. Young and P. Willmott, D.E. Muir and E.A. Weinstein, E. Litwak or A.K. Cohen and H.M. Hodges. Another set of themes describe a popular morality, a mixture of puritanism, ostentatious cynicism and sarcastic refusal of all idealism or the attitude towards ‘them’, a subtle blend of suspicion, retraction, pride, false deference, provocation, resignation and disparagement, or class conformity, which often also involves tolerance towards other member of the group and rest on a whole tradition of disaffection from the authorities and official society, or again the fatalism and resignation of the worst-off sections who entrench themselves in a consciousness deaf to their socio-economic destiny. All these themes underlying Richard Hoggart’s analysis can be found again in the studies of F.L. Strodtbeck, L. Rainwater, R.P. Coleman and G. Handel and R. Endleman. Or look again at the personality of the mother in the working-class family, her relationship with the father and her role in the management and economy of domestic life, or the relations of parents and children at various points in their education, – in addition to the authors already cited, M.L. Kohn, E.E. Carrol and W.B. Miller4 have substantially taken over, not always without some watering down, these features which The Uses of Literacy brought to light with such vigour.
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Richard Hoggart’s analyses are at their most original when he is calling into question the image that other classes have of the working-class and their values. The author’s past, born and brought up in a working-class family, becoming a scholarship boy and then a university teacher and researcher, undoubtedly puts him in a particular advantageous position for grasping the class significance of judgments on the working class which often to the educated classes seem of the order of ‘natural truths’. It may well be true that all intellectual personality is socially conditioned and that no class experience is capable of engendering by itself a properly scientific attitude (no gift of birth in any class, whether privileged, or even [Mannheim notwithstanding] intellectual, ever predestined someone to the attainment of the objectivity of sociological percipience). Even so it is clear that it is only after a period of work by himself, the social situation of which is precisely that of scientific study, that Richard Hoggart has been able to make use of that approach consisting of both distancing and participation, which makes him able to perceive and explain by example even the very nuances of the behaviour of intellectuals with working-class backgrounds, technocrats with too much assurance, university teachers who ‘sell out’, or at any rate look down from their newly acquired class position – ready to draw on their own library, as he himself ironically remarks, to illustrate the incoherence of the self-taught man thirsty for cultural salvation. In every case, and although it is so intimately associated with the social situation of his early years, there can be no doubt that Richard Hoggart’s particular habit of mind is peculiarly effective when bourgeois or petit bourgeois ethnocentrism needs ousting. There is no need to recall the ideological fruits born among the middle class by those sententious speeches emphatically deploring the thoughtlessness and improvidence of the lower classes, their prodigal expenditure and their inability to think for the morrow or to manage their budget sensibly; pity is taken on ‘these people’ who buy – on the instalment plan – a television and not a sewing machine, which would be so much more useful for them ‘with their hundreds of children’, who ‘throw away’ their money playing bingo or betting, and who spoil their children against all the canons of child care, even encouraging the vices of vanity, prodigality, and indifference – not forgetting the supreme failing of not knowing their place – by buying them at Christmas the loveliest toys when they can’t even afford to dress or educate them properly. It is by relating this behaviour to the most restricting aspects of working-class life that Richard Hoggart reconstitutes the logic of attitudes which seem illogical only when one is illogical enough to judge them according to values which are the products of other conditions of existence. If the purchase of a television set is more logical than that of a sewing machine and if the coal is necessary for ‘a good fire’ from which all may benefit takes precedence over worrying about underclothes, this is because for the working-class, preference is always, however slender the budget, for goods whose collective use can serve as a support to the gathering and hedonistic communion of the family community. Since leaning back on the privacy and even the promiscuity of the home is the only resort in a situation which would otherwise be intolerable. The ‘weakness’ of parents who let children ‘have a good time’, especially in adolescence, that the last period of licensed frivolity before the burdens and worries which will come ‘soon enough’ is understandable enough when one sees that it expresses the need to ‘take advantage of it when you can and while you can’, a need which is peculiar to the underprivileged classes, deprived of any objective chance to better their lot. This need provides a key to the understanding of popular entertainments, ‘all pals together’, excursions where no expense is spared, the fantastic roundabouts of the fairground. Similarly one can grasp the transformation in meaning and value that what one might call the paradigm of the bad worker undergoes. In itself, this is the last and basic resort of petit-bourgeois moaning and the legitimation for the housewife’s daily indignation at the
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plumber come to repair the bath (‘One can’t get the service these days’), but the alternative meaning is apparent when the plumber’s attitude towards repairing the tap is seen from the point of the wage earner, and his relation to wages, to the boss, to the work and to the class he serves. In a more general way, by this style of analysis which deliberately breaks with principles in their own way as racist as those of pre-scientific ethnographers limited to detailing the barbarism of the ‘primitives’, Richard Hoggart gives himself the means of escaping from interpretations which are too ‘obvious’ and which are often only the promotion to the level of intellectual investigation of class biases all the better protected for being less explicit. The analysis of the functions of defence and re-assurance served by the spontaneous suspicion the working-class adopt towards grand words or morality or politics (‘you can’t kid me’), of civic pride, patriotism, the ‘imperatives of growth’, and the value of public administration gives one an insight into the apparently neutral language of economists and planners. For when these speak of ‘putting things right in the absence of information about the economic agents’ or throw into the anonymity of ‘irrationality’ and ‘traditional resistances’ anything which departs from a type of behaviour considered sovereign, they are hiding behind the screen of an ideology of experts, the assurance proper to members of the ruling class, certain from birth of the rightness and the universal value of their attitude to culture and of their modes of conduct. Nor is it a coincidence that so many sociological enquiries can be condemned precisely because they do not get at the specificity of popular attitudes except in terms of lack or lacking ‘failures of motivation’, lack of interest or absence of inspiration. More subtle still is the attempt to establish the ‘baroque’ norms of popular art in narrative structure of conversations, in the over-elaborate style of the furnishing and objets trouvés, in the cloying form of sentimental song, in the highly coloured composition of a marriage feast or in the fairground atmosphere and truculent appeal of entertainments. Here, The Uses of Literacy hints at the inadequacy the vocabulary of ‘art’ when applied to a ‘taste’ which, like popular taste, refers to principles indistinguishable from ethical norms, be it in the worth attached to the serious and to the minutiae of a work, or in the value given to sentiments and sentimentality, or else in the primacy given to moral edification and to the sensuous enjoyment of the struggle over form. Here as elsewhere, Richard Hoggart avoids the populist trap, which I find particularly tempting for an intellectual who, even if of working-class background, is always given to endowing popular culture with a delegated or transferred existence, defined by implicit reference to the literary culture. For it is from this last, that (despite all his good intentions) the intellectual draws his definition of aims, when he attempts to rehabilitate certain ‘authentically aesthetic’ productions by reproducing, at the very heart of popular culture, the cleavage whereby literary culture by definition excludes ‘popular taste’. Most valuable of all from the point of view of social science, Richard Hoggart breaks with those images of popular behaviour determined by the observer’s membership of the intelligentsia. Too numerous to mention are the themes of sociology-fiction which have piled up until today; they constitute a vulgate of the ills and dramas of ‘mass civilisation’. These owe what credibility they possess to the social and psychological functions which they perform for intellectuals, themselves, the producers and principle consumers of this literature. The analysis, alternatively or simultaneously pejorative or fascinated, of the ‘conditioning’, ‘brutalisation’ and ‘penetration’ of the masses by the mass media is a well enough known orthodoxy with its sects, schisms, and theological debates. The Uses of Literacy is among those rare works which, whilst not denying the magnitude of the transformations that the new type of leisure and the new means of communication have effected amongst the general public,
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does attempt a balanced assessment. This leads the author without any great theoretical fanfares, to pose some questions as pertinent for theory as for the empirical analysis of the transformations in popular culture and the receptivity of the different class levels to the ideological solicitations contained in the messages of the cultural industry and directed at them. In this way Richard Hoggart can demonstrate the illusoriness of a concept the origins of which lie in the failure to understand the working-class capacity to maintain a separation between the ‘real and serious life’ and the world of entertainment; he can show that numerous areas of ideology and practice, such as the relationships at the heart of the family group or the attitudes to illness, death, to the home and more generally to the emotions, are hardly affected at all by the influence of the national press, radio and publicity. The majority of analyses which have, like those of Denis de Rougemenot, popularised among the intelligentsia the notion of ‘escape literature’ are founded upon the semantic ambiguity of the term ‘mass’, which leads to blaming on popular attitudes the thematics of a literature whose principle consumers are still the petit-bourgeoisie. It is far more in the situation of the middle class than in that of the working class that ‘bovarysme’5 finds its pride of place, and the image of the scullery maid so engrossed in reading the threepenny novel that she loses her sense of reality and lives out imaginary adventures with cardboard heroes is based not so much on observation as on the mental projections of certain sorts of intellectuals fascinated by the fantasm of absolute fascination, the ultimate form – and one in which they have a vested interest – of a belief in the absolute power of literature. Richard Hoggart takes the schema in which so many specialists, by simplistic analysis of press messages, persuade themselves that such a voluminous mass of publications can only have a ‘massive’ effect upon its recipients, and turns it on its head, suggesting that the modern means of communication could well in the end have the effect of neutralising the effects the specialists are looking for by the very way in which they are diffused. The analysis of the ‘pasteurization’ of pin-up pictures which derives from a concentration on technical improvements in photography, shows how the repetition and intellectualisation of press messages tends to prevent them from using the direct or frankly emotive effects which the popular literature and imagery of the last century almost certainly achieved more easily by its melodramatic and brutal style. By drawing attention to the fact that the reception of a cultural message should not be disassociated from the social conditions in which it occurs and thus from the ethos which essentially characterises a social group, The Uses of Literacy proposes for further research a theoretical hypothesis far more to the point than the assumption which leads numerous psycho-sociologists to think they can get at the true relationship between members of the working-class and their reading and entertainments by ‘audience analysis’, in which as a general rule they only succeed in getting their subjects to confess their own ideology of escapism or ‘alienation’. By the direct observation of the real situations and spontaneous behaviour in which the dimensions of popular consumption are indicated, Richard Hoggart is led to a theory of casual consumption or, as he says ‘oblique attention’. This takes on its full meaning when one connects these listening habits to the value system of the working-class, traditionally inclined by the logic of their situation and by the ethos which is its product, to find their best protection against the world of ‘them’ with its authority and seductions, in scepticism, sarcastic cynicism and above all in the capacity for indifference, all the more effective for being hidden beneath an apparent availability. The truth of their profound attitude, made up of an acquiescence without consequence and of disabused tolerance, is expressed by the members of the working-class when, speaking of the din of publicity surrounding the heroic
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captain of the ‘Flying Enterprise’ or of the political propaganda or of the emotions that the popular song and magazine exalt, they reply that one must learn how to ‘take it or leave it’. The logic of the working-class, more especially when they must come into contact with realities which do not belong to their daily environment, is a logic which makes them able to use alternatively and according to the needs of the moment, formally incompatible schemas, and this structure allows them to adopt towards the affirmations of the national press an attitude of elliptical adherence, very similar to that which makes them adhere, without ever being fooled completely, to superstitious beliefs of the traditional type. Here we recognise the techniques of institutionalised reticence, by means of which groups deprived of the cultural instruments of certainty and self-assurance arm themselves against the risk, experienced as omnipresent, of being ‘taken for a ride’: ‘you’ll not put one over on them’. The supreme folly among the working class would be apparently to believe these ‘stories’ other than as ‘stories’, – witness the amused condescension working-class women show towards young mothers naive enough to give their daughters Christian names taken from the heroines of magazine stories. At an even deeper lever, The Uses of Literacy is distinguishable from the semi-intellectual discussion of ‘incredible transformations’ in the life of ‘the masses’ by a theoretical principle which underlies from one end to the other the analysis of cultural change. In effect Richard Hoggart is trying to find in the structure of a set of attitudes the principles which govern the transformation of this structure. He shows for instance how popular taste is capable of reinterpreting the fashion in household furniture or the vogue in imitation fabrics for its own purposes of recreating the traditional atmosphere of home, congested and gaudy. He observes how the performance of pop songs in a Yorkshire melodic idiom ends up making them resemble the ancient local songs, or, the other way about, he demonstrates how traditional tolerance can only have become moral indifference because it was so inclined anyway. In these demonstrations Richard Hoggart seeks to tease out the law which subordinates the efficacy of the factors of change to their relevance to the pre-existing structures. The originality of this theoretical approach allows him to exercise all the retrospective myths which are the illusory principle behind a golden age view of working-class culture and life. To the extent to which the analysis of cultural change is subordinated to the analysis of popular ethos (conceived as a sort of general grammar of attitudes, or, as it is put by Richard Hoggart, as an ‘attitude towards attitudes’), the interplay of reciprocal reinterpretations between a structure of reception and a structure of transmission (which is how ethnologists come to understand the logic of cultural growth) is transposed from the analysis of cultural diffusion in space to the analysis of cultural transformation over time. Finally, all the qualities of this book derive perhaps from an initial daring, doubtless more probable, sociologically speaking, in Britain than in France, where the relationship of intellectuals to the working class, including those of them who come from this class or the lower echelons of the petit-bourgeoisie, is more controlled by the rules of good taste and good tone and thereby more ‘intellectualised’ and it needs to be said, all the more shameful for it. The discussion on the realities of class is certainly to the credit of numerous fractions of the French intellectual milieu, but it is not altogether wrong to suppose that its theoretical and abstract tone serves also to keep at bay a whole set of realities at once simple and scandalous – or worse than scandalous, vulgar. The whole empirical force of these realities is evident when a description at once ethnographic and autobiographical such as Richard Hoggart’s brings them into focus directly, above literary artifice and scholarly exercises. If The Uses of Literacy impresses the reader at once as one of those books in which in all its simplicity and truth there shines out everything which by various means is obscured by university
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sociologist (those specialists in sublimation and displacement) and populist intellectuals, and even by dictionaries, virtuosos of counter-suggestion and projection, this is because the author has succeeded despite all the defence mechanisms which protect the intellectual of working-class origins from his own social origins, in finding through a study of himself at once sociological and auto-analytical, the difficult way by which to effect the return of the unprivileged.
Notes 1 M. Passeron uses the term ‘les classes populaires’ in his analysis, for which the only English equivalents are the rather unpleasant ‘common people’, ‘proletariat’ and ‘lower classes’. Despite the fact that the French do have a term for ‘working class’ (les ouvriers’), I have chosen to use this term more or less throughout the translation, since it is the term favoured by Richard Hoggart himself. Readers are reminded however that Hoggart’s use and definition of the term, as set out in the first chapter of The Uses of Literacy is particular to him, being based not on any occupational criteria but on a phenomenological understanding. (Richard Dyer.) 2 Bronislaw Malinowski: Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: RKP 1932) pp. 20–21. 3 The term ‘semi-indirect style’ is one common to French literary criticism, presumably because it is a style widely used by French novelists since Flaubert. It refers to the expression of personal feelings and experiences in the third person, or as M. Passeron is implying here, to a narrative presentation in which the participation of the narrator in the events described is clearly suggested. (Richard Dyer.) 4 M. Young & P. Willmott: Family and Kinship in East London (London: RKP 1957). M. Kerr: People of Ship Street (London RKP 1958). W.B. Miller: ‘Lower class culture as a generating delinquency’ Journal of Social Issues XIV 1958. F.L. Stodt Beck: ‘Family interaction, values and achievements’ in D.C. McClelland et al: Talent and Society (New York: Van Nostrand 1958). L. Rainwater et al: Workmans Wife (New York: Oceana 1959). E. Litwak: ‘The use of family groups in the achievement of social goals’ Social Problems VII 1959. M.L. Kohn and E.E. Carroll: ‘Social class and the allocation of parental responsibilities’ Sociometry XXIII 1960. D.E. Muir and E.A. Weinstein: ‘The social debt: an investigation of lower and middle class norms of social obligation’, American Sociological Review XXVII 1962. H.J. Gans: The Urban Villagers New York: Free Press 1962. A.K. Cohen & H.M. Hodges Junior: ‘Characteristics of the lower-blue-collar-class’ Social Problems X 1963. R.S. Endeman: ‘Moral perspectives of blue-collar workers’ in A.B. Shostak & W. Gonberg (eds): Blue Collar World (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs 1964) F.M. Katz: ‘The meaning of success: some differences in value systems of social classes’ Journal of Social Psychology LXII 1964. At a more general level one can see in a bibliography of sociological literature in the English language devoted to the condition and culture of the working class and the working-class family that the majority appeared after 1956 and that those works which stand out as exceptions to the general trend (for example Portrait of the Underdog by G. Knupfer or The Deprived and the Privileged by B.M. Spinley) are precisely those whose ruling ideas are further away from those of Richard Hoggart. One should note that in the bibliography at the end of the present work Richard Hoggart lists either collections of documents or else historical studies far from systematic according to a sociological perspective. 5 The term refers to the character of Emma Bovary in Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. She is the type of mindless inconstant sentimental inadequate petit-bourgeois.
2
Literature/society Mapping the field
This introduction serves two purposes. First, it provides a framework for the following articles on the Literature/Society theme. Second, it tries to ‘rough-in’ the main arguments and positions in the debate for readers who are interested but not specialists in the area. Our focus is the way literature has been understood as a social activity or phenomenon. This article deals with three questions. (1) How is the Literature/Society problem handled in traditional literary-criticism and in English Studies? (2) How has this problem been ‘thought’ in other traditions, especially the European Marxist ones? (3) How ought the Literature/Society problem to be conceptualised? Our central focus is on Questions 1 and 2: some possible lines of approach to Question 3 are implicit in our critique, but no attempt to provide a systematic theory has been made here, nor have we aimed for a comprehensive presentation. We have tried to get succinct formulations of the central positions in this debate in our own words, rather than by extensive quotation and reference. The structure of the Introduction is therefore as follows. First we try briefly to characterise the way the problem is handled in traditional literary criticism (Section I). Next (Section II) we consider various discontinuities in the conceptualisation of relations between literature and society, some clearly constituting a radical break with the tradition, others exhibiting perhaps little more than a certain internal incoherence within that same tradition. One notable example of a distinct ‘break’ which we shall examine in more detail, is the work of Raymond Williams which offers a channel of communication between the Scrutiny tradition and the writing of continental Marxist exponents of the sociology of literature. In Section III the Marxist problematic relating to Literature/Society is more directly but briefly formulated. Finally, Section IV consists of notes identifying and characterising certain key positions in the European Marxist traditions. Before proceeding to those discussions, however, we should examine one term which will recur throughout as a convenient indicator of one of the central areas of the field. The term problematic is associated with the writings of Louis Althusser, who uses it to discuss the characteristics of ideology (or ideologies). For him, the problematic is not the real problems of an historical period, nor the questions objectively posed in the attempt to solve those problems, nor the ‘world-vision’ adopted by the inhabitants of any specific social and historical context. Rather, it is the back side of those concepts, necessarily present, inextricably connected, but decently clothed and only to be deduced, in essence by the necessity of its existence, and in specific character by the contours of its clothing. In deducing its form, one must ‘read’ the absences (as well as the presences) in the expressive artefacts of the period, and one must acquire knowledge of the objective problems inherent in the social configuration. The problematic of a particular ideology is then understood to be the form in which that ideology – by transposition, omission, or
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deformation – casts the objective problems in such a way that answers can, or even must necessarily, be found within the preferred framework. To extend our metaphor, strictly the problematic is neither the ‘backside’ nor the ‘clothing’, though it includes the existence of both – rather it is the constructional principles and practice of tailoring adopted to give a degree of fit between the two. Less picturesquely, and in Althusser’s words, the prevalent ideology: to be understood at this internal level . . . must first be asked the question of its questions. But this problematic is itself an answer, no longer to its own internal questions – problems – but to the objective problems posed for ideology by its time . . . So it is not the interiority of the problematic which constitutes its essence, but its relation to real problems . . .1 (emphasis original) Elsewhere, Althusser distinguishes between this, an ideological problematic, and a scientific problematic – presumably one where the tailoring approximates to a perfect fit with the objective problems of an enquiry – but the formulations are complex and rather beyond the scope of this article. Throughout, we shall use the term to imply variable degrees of fit, and variable degrees of open-endedness or closure in the provision of implicit answers.
I How is the literature/society problem ‘thought’ in traditional literary criticism? No full review of the great diversity of traditional literary criticism in practice can be attempted here.2 Our focus is the way English Studies conceptualises, explicitly or implicitly, literature (in general) and the literary text (in particular) as social phenomena. Three points are of special importance here. (1) Traditional literary criticism has at its core the notion of the literary text as a ‘thingin-itself ’. The degree to which the text is treated as wholly ‘self-sufficient’ differs, of course, but, in most approaches, ‘the text’, as a literary-linguistic construct, or as a linguistic ‘ordering of experience’ has held the foreground, with some further degree of ‘situating’ of this text in its contexts. This emphasis on the literary text as an empirical object of study has been linked with a second point; (2) On the whole, traditional criticism has been suspicious of any sustained theorising or self-reflection about its own premises and activities. This includes a lack of self-reflection about how a text is to be situated in its social contexts. Leavis’ exchange with Wellek provides a locus classicus of this anti-theorising position.3 The critic’s concern is with specific analysis . . . ‘to enter into possession of the given poem in its concrete fullness’. The radical empiricism of Leavis’ approach (its strength and its weakness) is admirably summarised there. Characteristically, it is an empiricism that is reluctant to enquire too closely into questions of method. To Wellek’s demand that he ‘elaborate’ his ‘implicit assumptions’, Leavis ‘can only reply that I think I have gone as far in explicitness as I could profitably attempt to go’ and affirm a rigorously common-sense account of ‘the business of literary criticism’. Literary criticism is thus founded on the unexamined practice of ‘reading’. ‘The ideal critic is the ideal reader’: what that critic offers is a ‘full and sensitive reading’ of a text: English Studies is itself, in essence, an informal training in critical reading . . . The critic must ‘submit himself ’ to the text, which thus has a value in itself and of its own right: though what in it, precisely, is valued, and how a text transmits value to a reader, is differently
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formulated. Whatever particular values the critic gains from a particular text, however, he also subscribes to a notion of the inherent value of literature as literature. The way language and form have been used to ‘recreate’ experience confers, above and beyond the particular experience so organised, a value in itself. This value resides in the text: it also belongs to the activity of creating the text, and thus (by a subtle transfer of values, via ‘reading’) to the critical activity of attending sympathetically to what the text has to say. Related questions (the author’s life, historical moment of the work, its reputation in its own time, reasons for its survival, etc) are sketched in only as they help to illuminate the ‘aesthetic’ achievement of the text (though formal aesthetics is rarely discussed).4 The student/apprentice critic/ideal-reader-in-training – is therefore encouraged to read widely and variously: to become tolerant of, curious about, and then knowledgeable about works from different periods in different modes. Literary study encourages a wide ranging responsiveness, rather than a particular mode of understanding with its own distinctive procedures. Too elaborate an interpretation, and questions of method are mistrusted as interposing abstract presuppositions between readers and their ‘openness to the text’. In traditional literary criticism, there has been a tension between those who considered that practice of ‘reading’ as a discipline in its own right, and those who sought something ‘more scholarly’. For the latter, this extra disciplinary strengthening has been variously achieved, by stressing, say (a) the study of language or imagery; (b) textual and bibliographical studies; (c) informed literary history and ‘history of ideas’; (d) biographical work. The ‘discipline of criticism’ (the former position) has also been variously pursued: among others by (a) the formalist emphasis of early American ‘new Criticism’; (b) Northrop Frye’s efforts to found a ‘critical science’ on the basis of the concept of myth; (c) the use of stylistics or (d) of genre-criticism. A critique of these various approaches in traditional literary criticism is offered at the beginning of Andrew Tolson’s article in this journal. It is certainly not the case that any of the varieties of literary criticism cited above have wholly bracketed out the social dimensions of literature. Literary history and the ‘history of ideas’ have had their own ways of pointing to connections between text and society – though this has largely remained at the level of providing informed ‘background’ to the text (4). For the most part, history and society have provided the raw material with which texts and their authors do their privileged work. The core assumption which gives coherence to traditional literary-criticism as a practice is that literary works are communications of a radically distinctive kind. They are autonomous productions of the activity of literary expression. It is in the name of this claim that studies of the author’s life, his times and society, his stated purposes, his working drafts, etc are subordinated to the reading and interpretation of the text itself. In theory, an English Studies which was sensitive to contexts could have become seriously interdisciplinary: drawing on other disciplines to help situate the text. In practice, ‘other disciplines’ have been kept in their place. Frye, for example, argues that ‘Criticism has a great variety of neighbours; the critic must enter into relations with them in any way that guarantees his own independence’.5 (our emphasis). The field has been closed up around its own premises and assumptions, with the text in a privileged position. This kind of ‘closure’ has been reinforced by the institutional position of literary studies. Competing for position in large universities, beset by the rapid expansion and fragmentation of the map of knowledge, literary studies have tended to see ‘related disciplines’ (history, linguistics, psychology, sociology) as too formalised and specialised. The tendency has been for the critic to regard his neighbours as rather uncivilised simplifiers. He may also have felt his knowledge of these other subject-areas as too amateurish. The
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situation has not been made easier by the fragmentation of the field of English Studies itself, under these complex pressures. But, in general, the response to this intellectual and institutional crisis has been to drive the critic back on the defensive to that small core of premises which can still be said to ‘unify the subject-area’. The core or centre remains the undisputed centrality and status of the literary text. The study of literature has thus become substantially a-historical. It proceeds naturally to the study of literary forms and patterns as they recur within literature as a whole. The context within which books are situated is, characteristically, that of other books of a similar kind. And the ‘literary history’ which tends to connect books with books, is often abstracted from the pressures of particular historical time and place. The connections have somehow become blocked. Raymond Williams has remarked on two ways in which this de-historicising of the literary text has been achieved in traditional critical practice. One is the placing of the text in what he calls the ‘false totality’ of tradition – ‘which is seen, not as it is, an active and continuous selection and reselection, which even at its latest point in time is always a specific choice, but now more conveniently as an object, a projected reality’. The second is the ‘false totality’ of literary ‘kinds’, or genres (though there are, of course, genetic, historical, and structuralist approaches to genre, which are quite different): where the study of ‘kinds’ is based on ‘the prior assumption of the existence, within the ‘body’ of literature, of such ‘permanent forms’ as epic, tragedy, romance, and then all our active study is of variations within them, variations that may be admitted to have proximate causes, even a social history, but that, in their essential features are taken as autonomous, with internal laws.’6
II The revival of interest in the literature/society theme As a glance at the bibliography in this issue will confirm, there has nonetheless been, in recent years, a remarkable growth of interest in the Literature/Society problem. To place this changing visibility properly, in all its complex significance would require a critical review of the whole map of intellectual culture. Some recent work provides a starting point7 but a really substantive critique is lacking, and is beyond the scope of this article. However, any attempt to explicate the current shift in attention must take account of the following: 1 2 3 4
5
6
The continuing force of the Leavis/Scrutiny tradition, both in English Studies and in education generally. The central elements in this position are summarised below. The growth of an interest in ‘culture’ often from a base within English Studies. The work of Hoggart and Williams is paradigmatic here. A disenchantment with the pragmatic, empirical, anti-theoretical nature of Anglo-Saxon literary criticism – a growing interest in literary theory. The availability, in English, of some of the key texts of European writers and theorists, especially the Marxists, whose work had hitherto been known, if at all, only second-hand: Lukacs, Goldmann, Marcuse, Benjamin, Brecht, Adorno. The expansion in the use of linguistics in literary and cultural studies. There are, of course, many kinds of linguistics. What is important here is the apparent promise that a more rigorous and ‘scientific’ approach can be discovered through a linguistics-based study of literary work, than through the intuitive and interpretative procedures of literary criticism. The intellectual impact of French structuralism and semiology. Though the coverage in English is still extremely limited, there are, inter alia, translations of Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, Althusser.
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7 The application of semiology, structuralism and ideological criticism to the new media, and a general revival of interest in aesthetic and formal questions. Here the English development lags well behind the French, German and Italian debates. But some discussion has emerged in magazines like Screen, Monogram, etc, and in Wollen’s widely-read Signs and Meaning in the Cinema. There are also three important, though less immediately related, factors: 8 The so-called ‘cultural revolution’ which has manifested itself in western societies since the early 1960s. These extremely heterogenous movements have yielded, among other things, ‘theories’ attempting to deal with ‘the politics of culture’, and to relate art/life, literature/politics avant-garde/politics, culture/ideology. This climate has been exceedingly favourable to a renewed interest in the social and political dimensions of art and literature. 9 A shift in the whole intellectual universe of the social sciences, away from positivistic and quantitative approaches, towards phenomenology, structuralism, marxism, ‘critical theory’, etc. This has promoted, in turn, a much-renewed interest in such hitherto marginal fields as ‘the sociology of literature’, ‘the sociology of art’, ‘the sociology of culture’. 10 A quite remarkable general interest in ‘theory’: marked especially by by the slow, uneven but significant way in which Marxism has penetrated English intellectual life in recent years. This intellectual shift parallels political and historical tendencies which cannot be further developed here. One convenient signpost is the translation into English of some key Marxist theoretical texts: e.g. Marcuse’s early essays, Goldmann’s Human Sciences & Philosophy, Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, Althusser’s For Marx and Reading Capital, Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy, Sartre’s Problem of Method, Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism, selections from Marx’s Grundrisse. Approaches from within literary criticism The dehistoricising of the text, noted in Section I, has had a specific influence on literarycritical concepts of literature as a social phenomenon; yet, within that tradition equally sophisticated positions can retain enormous differences of emphasis. As instances, we cite Northrop Frye’s essay on ‘The Social Context of Literary Criticism’, and F.R. Leavis’ ‘Literature And Society’.8 Both, it should be noted, define themselves explicitly against the Marxist approach (thereby negatively confirming the argument advanced by Tom and Elizabeth Burns that ‘the genesis of the concern with literature . . . as a social institution, lies in Marxism’.9 Frye acknowledges that this is a serious issue in criticism; and, after reviewing a number of approaches, and finding them unsatisfactory, he remarks ‘I wanted a historical approach to literature, but an approach that would be or include a genuine history of literature, and not the assimilating of literature to some other kind of history.’ Via such concepts as ‘conventions’, ‘genres’, and then ‘archetypes’ and ‘myths’ Frye finds his way to an historical overview, on the basis of what is inside literature rather than outside it. Instead of fitting literature deterministically into a prefabricated scheme of history, the critic should see literature as, like a science, unified, coherent, and autonomous created form, historically conditioned but shaping its own history, not determined by external historical process.
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In this argument, the ‘social context’ of the literary text is both acknowledged, and at the same time reinserted into the framework of ‘literary activity’ which is ‘autonomous’. Leavis has always affirmed that the critical act of reading, interpretation and judgement is, fundamentally, a social act – while limiting the kinds of people, the sorts of mind equipped to engage in this critical dialogue. His famous prescription for this dialogue – ‘this is so, is it not?’ – is one to which only an embattled civilising minority can profitably subscribe. Perry Anderson has pointed out that this interrogative statement demands one crucial precondition: ‘a shared, stable system of beliefs and values’.10 The less evident the existence of this morally and culturally unified set of uncommon ‘common readers’, the more relative this universalised practice of criticism becomes, and the more explicitly elitist his prescriptions, the more one-dimensional his lament for the loss of an ‘organic reading public’. But Leavis, too, acknowledges that ‘if the Marxist approach to literature seems to me unprofitable, that is not because I think of literature as a matter of isolated works of art, belonging to a realm of pure literary values’. He never aims for the degree of ‘closure’, the squaring of the circle, which satisfies Frye: indeed, it is Leavis’ ability to hold, at one and the same moment, to the specific quality of the ‘words on the page’, while using the ‘felt experience’ organised in language as a representative index of the ‘quality of life’ of a whole culture, which makes his work so pivotal to the whole argument. Leavis always tries to ‘go through’ from the close response to the text to the ‘qualities’ which lie behind its specific organisation. ‘Without the sensitising familiarity with the subtleties of language, and the insight into the relations between abstract or generalising thought and the concrete of human experience that the trained frequentation of literature alone can bring, the thinking that attends social and political studies will not have the edge and force it should’. We find here the sources of the paradox that those critics within the Anglo-Saxon tradition, who have tried to think the Literature/Society problem in a rigorous way, have usually taken their point of departure from Leavis, while at the same time breaking from the way he has formulated the problem. The ‘break’ with traditional literary-critical practice The most significant ‘break’ from within traditional literary criticism to a new way of formulating the Literature/Society problem is to be found in the work of Raymond Williams, in whose major theoretical writing,11 literature becomes one, specially privileged level or instance of a ‘cultural totality’, itself composed of many different levels, several ‘particular histories’.12 The art and literature of a society are aspects of its culture: and culture is understood as the crucial meanings and values which distinguish the ‘way of life’ of one particular society from another. Culture, in this sense, is expressed and carried, not simply in literature and the arts, but in every level and activity which goes to make up the social totality. It is there ‘in institutions and ordinary behaviour, in implicit as well as in explicit ways.’ Literature is one of the specially privileged ways in which such key meanings are expressed, clarified, discovered and transmitted. The key question is how this privileged activity, and its product, the literary text, is related to other activities in the totality. Here, Williams dispenses with a formulation which would give prior determination to any one level or activity – for example, the economic ‘base’ which art, in a simplified Marxism, reflects as part of the ‘superstructure’. He argues that, if literature really is a part of the ‘whole’, there is ‘no solid whole, outside it, to which . . . we concede priority’. ‘The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations adequately, we must study them
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actively, seeing all the activities as particular and contemporary forms of human energy’. If ‘culture’ can be said to ‘relate’ in any sense then it is as an expression of the way in which all the activities hang together – ‘the theory of culture is the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life’. The same pattern or structure, then, might be revealed as active in very different, apparently unrelated, levels within this totality. Thus, the study of literary texts, provided it was undertaken in this ‘many-sided’ way, could ‘stay in touch with and illuminate particular art works and forms’, while at the same time being connected to the ‘forms and relations of more general social life’.13 Williams’ work represents a long, sometimes displaced critical engagement with the Marxist tradition on these questions. In his early substantive work (Culture & Society) Marxism is discussed in terms of English Marxist literary theory of the 1930s – an engagement with traditional literary criticism which, Williams argues, Scrutiny won, and deserved to win. In the theoretical sections of The Long Revolution, Marxism provides the hidden ‘sub-text’ of the argument; but the key terms and concepts are re-translated and reshaped. This applies, above all, to the problem of base/superstructures, which, despite the reshaping, emerges from Williams’ work as the key problematic of the whole field. Base/superstructure is the classic framework within which the relationship of ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’, of ‘ideas’ to their ‘social base’ has been formulated in Marxist thinking. In ‘From Leavis to Goldmann’ Williams acknowledges that some way of conceptualising the relations of determination – ‘the economic base determines the social relations which determine consciousness which determines actual ideas and works’ – is not only ‘near the centre of Marxism’ but ‘indicates an appropriate methodology for cultural history and criticism, and then of course for the relation between social and cultural studies.’ But his own way of handling this problem is to substitute for some sophisticated version of the base/superstructure framework, ‘the more active idea of a field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces’.14 The key concept, for Williams, in his attempt to ‘think’ the relationship of ideas or works of art and literature to the social totality, is structure of feeling. This concept locates both the internal order and values of a literary text, and the pattern of experience at a given historical moment. The pattern of experience, however, is not defined in terms of a set of explicit beliefs – e.g. an ideology – but in terms of the implicit structure which social life exhibits at the level of experienced values: thus, ‘structure/of/feeling’, an apparently paradoxical concept. The literary text is one concrete instance of the ‘structure of feeling’ in a particular society at a particular moment. In practice (and often, it seems, somewhat at odds with his theoretical position), Williams does seem to treat literature as qualitatively different from other activities. This is partly because he stresses the active, creative process by which society organizes ‘received meanings’ and discovers ‘possible new meanings’. This, indeed, is change – the ‘long revolution’. This process depends on the ability to communicate these new meanings, to find a language and form as a description for new experiences. Every social individual takes part in this process – ‘culture is ordinary’: but – it follows – the moments of the most intense exploration, those embodied in art, are a very special aspect of a common activity. Williams’ engagement with Marxism only begins with these subtle formulations. His work poses the whole question of whether ‘culture’ can be simply and easily assimilated into the Marxist notion of ideology, or whether it requires new terms, concepts, ways of establishing its relationship to its social base. In his most recent work, Williams seems to have discovered, via the work of Goldmann and Lukacs, a more direct and sympathetic route between his own thinking and the Marxist tradition. Though this has not yet borne fruit in substantive terms, he has gone so far as to pin-point certain key convergences between his own work and
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Lukacs and Goldmann: (a) The concern, in both, with the notion of the ‘social totality’: (b) The search for homologies or correspondences between a work and its social base at the level of structure (rather than of content); (c) similarities between Williams’ ‘structure of feeling’, Lukacs’ ‘potential consciousness’ and Goldmann’s ‘world vision’.
III Re-formulating the ‘break’ Much of what has been said indicates the absolute centrality of Marxism to the Literature/ Society problem. Many who explicitly dissociate themselves from Marxism, implicitly acknowledge its centrality by the very form of their disavowal. Williams’ work progressively reveals the complex tension it maintains with Marxist concepts and problematics. In this section we must now address these questions directly. Whichever variant of the Marxist problematic we take, we are always led back to the central formulation, base/ superstructure. From the early 1844 Manuscripts, through the German Ideology to the Critique of Political Economy and the Grundrisse, whenever Marx wanted to refer to the ways economic structure, social relations and the ‘ideological forms’ cohere to form a distinctive social formation, he tended to employ some variation on the idea of a ‘basis’ and ‘the superstructures’. The nature, degree and mode in which one level determined the other was variously expressed in Marx’s own writings, and was the subject of key reformulations in Engel’s later correspondence. This argument is too complex to trace through in detail here. Marx always insisted, both that ‘the formation of ideas’ should be explained ‘from material practice’ and that art was related to material production by an ‘uneven development’. The ‘transformations’ which connected ‘the economic foundation’ with ‘the whole immense superstructure’ were, clearly, not simple, transparent or unmediated.15 We know that, by ‘economic foundations’ he meant something as complex as ‘the material production of life itself . . . the form of intercourse connected with this and created by the mode of production (i.e. civil society in all its stages)’ – ‘the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation.’ We know he thought it crucial to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic – in short, ideological forms, in which men become conscious of the conflict and fight it out. But in the absence of the promised volumes on the State, politics and art, it remains an unfinished project for Marxism to ‘think’ rigorously how the ‘correspondences’ between these levels are to be understood. That is the reason why (a) in Marxism, a proper ‘theory of the superstructures’ still awaits elaboration; (b) it is difficult to base a Marxist theory of literature as a social phenomenon squarely on the existing texts and concepts; and yet why, paradoxically, (c) the study of the Literature/Society problem, in a Marxist framework, is not a marginal enterprise but absolutely central to the development of historical materialism as a science – because, within that problem, a critical absence in the theory can be, progressively, clarified. Despite the confused state of Marxism in this whole area, two things at least are clear. (1) The ‘vulgar marxist’ way of conceptualising the base/superstructure relation is not likely to take us very far. It conceives this relation in narrowly reflexive ways, and tends always towards a reductively economistic kind of analysis. However, (2) Marxism does require the
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analyst rigorously to confront the question of determinations – more especially, the ‘determination of the economic level in the last instance.’16 We may usefully break this question down into several, related questions: (a) How to ‘think’ a social totality or social formation – the ‘ensemble of social relations’ – in a different way; (b) How to ‘think’ what is specific about each of the levels, activities or ‘practices’ which compose or ‘produce’ this complex totality; (c) How to think the different modes in which social activity in history (what Marx, in the German Ideology defined as praxis, and Williams translates as ‘human energy’) appears – for example, in economic life and production; social relations; institutional life and the State; consciousness, ideas, ideologies and beliefs; artistic and symbolic productions, including language; (d) How to ‘think’ the relationships of determination and ‘relative autonomy’ between the different levels in this totality. We may identify two variants or problematics in this area within Marxism. The first, follows from Marx’s notion that ‘definite forms of social consciousness’ correspond to the ‘totality of relations of production’. It attempts to elaborate and clarify just what that notion of correspondence entails. The theorists who belong to this variant all reject some simple notion that the superstructures directly reflect the base. They therefore explore the mediations, the transformation, the refractions etc., which establish or reveal the dialectical links between ‘ideas’ and ‘society’. These writers address the base/superstructure problem headon, and deal with literature as a ‘superstructural’ phenomenon. Lukacs and Goldmann, but also, from another position, Adorno and Marcuse, belong within this problematic. There is, however, a second line of theorising. This stems rather from Marx’s equally important injunction that ‘consciousness must be explained from the . . . conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.’ The base/ superstructure problem is seen not so much as a two-tiered model, but in terms of a complex, differentiated totality. Thus literature is regarded, less as a refraction of the base through the superstructures, and more as a specific kind of activity (praxis): a certain kind of practice: even, as a form of production. To this alternative tradition belongs Brecht, with his stress on the ‘mounting’ of the work of art, his concern with ‘effect’; Benjamin, with his attention to the new ‘productive forces’ in artistic work; perhaps in an intermediary position, Sartre, who is concerned with praxis and project, but for whom the work of art is the production not of a text (object) but of certain kinds of signified meanings – artistic production as a form of signification; and the structuralist and semiotic schools, for whom the primary mode of artistic production is the production of signs through language and sign-systems. We should also include here the ‘Althussereans’, who, though they have not produced a ‘theory of literary practice’ as distinct from their discussion of ideology, have given a most rigorous and fruitful definition of the term practice which could be developed into a ‘regional theory’ for art and literature.17 In Althusser, the two sides – base/superstructure and practice-production – come together in a useful way. Althusser accepts the value of the base/superstructure distinction. He also accepts Engels’ notion that in capitalism, the economic level is ‘determining in the last instance’. But, since he sees any complex social formation as a base/superstructure complex, he argues that it is never actually possible to find one level (the economic, say) appearing on its own without the other levels (social relations, political practice, ideology, theory). Thus, instead of a simple
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determination, he speaks of relations of ‘contradiction and over-determination’ defining how any one level relates to another ‘within a structured whole’.18 Althusser therefore does not believe that there are simple correspondences or homologies between the different levels (the Hegelian problematic): each level is produced by its own kind of practice, or ‘production’, and may stand in an ‘uneven relation to other practices’. Thus we are required by him to think what is specific to, ‘relatively autonomous about’, each level; as well as the relations of similarities and difference which govern social formation. The notion of practice is useful here in clarifying what might be meant by speaking of literature as a form of production. Althusser has proposed that, by practice, we should mean ‘any process of transformation of a determinate raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of ‘production’)’.19 The overall perspective of this view of art as production of literature as a ‘practice’ is that the determination of art within society appears not (as with Lukacs and Goldmann) at the level of general relations between the structures of being and consciousness (the way Marx formulated the problem in the German Ideology); but rather at the level of the specific character of the moment, materials and activity of artistic production. Such a perspective recognises art as an activity within a determinate social world; but, more significantly, as always in certain specific relations to other ‘practices’ at work within the same historical moment. Art is seen as a practice which employs certain specific ‘means’, to transform some set of objects or concepts or perceptions into something else – the specific structure of the literary text or the work as a symbolic-social object. However, what it is that literary practice transforms: what distinguishes its means, materials and ‘mode’ of production: what and how this practice is ‘determined by’ or ‘relatively autonomous from’ other practices: and so on, are problems in this approach which have not, so far, been rigorously exposed.
IV The Marxist traditions In this final section, we have pin-pointed certain key figures and positions within the two Marxist problematics we have defined (they are, of course, closely related, as we hope to have shown). Here we have had to be highly selective. Gramsci, who on any other grounds deserves a full account, has been omitted because his major work on Italian popular literature and religion is not available in English. We have grouped Lukacs and Goldmann together, as their similarity in approach and mutual influence warrants. We have also linked Adorno and Marcuse, as representing two variants from the formidable Frankfurt School of ‘critical theory’. We have included Brecht, in part because he represents the opposite pole in a confrontation with Lukacs’ aesthetics, in part because he figures equally as theorist and as practitioner. But there are other practising artists and ‘schools’ – Eisenstein, Vertov and the Constructivists, the Dadaists, for example – who also combined a radical or materialist aesthetics with an avant-garde practice. We have linked Brecht with Benjamin, partly because of their close partnership, but also because Benjamin takes Brecht’s ‘materialist aesthetics’ right the way through to an examination of the bases of artistic production. Sartre stands as a major figure, in an intermediary position. He has criticised the abstract and static aesthetics of Lukacs: but his notion of signification differs both from Benjamin’s concept of ‘production’, and from the more formalist approach of the structuralists. Finally, we identify the various strands of structuralism, to which we cannot here do justice, through the figure whose work is most easily available (if still very incompletely) in England: Roland Barthes. The first two positions – those of Lukacs and Goldmann, clearly belong together. Both
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deal with the literary text as the transformation of the ideological and conceptual ‘world’ outlook of a social class into a coherent structure (the text), via the mediation of the writer. Lukacs Lukacs’ theoretical writings represent in many ways the first serious attempt at a Marxist aesthetics. Plekhanov and Mehring were largely unknown, and the observations by Marx and Engels on literature were not available until 1933. The basic category of Lukacs’ literary concepts is that of ‘totality’. ‘Totality’ in this context means the ‘wholeness of man’, untouched by alienation and reification. The Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness was deeply aware of the alienated reality, the reification, characteristic of capitalist social relations. He saw, however, the possibility that in art these contradictions might be moulded and shaped in such a way as to prefigure the essential totality of human existence. The mode of this ‘supersession’ was realism. Lukacs adopted and adapted Hegel’s notion of the progression of aesthetic forms: he thus came to see the classical realist novel as the final and finest expression of the whole humanist literary tradition. In his work, the remarkable achievement of the realists – Balzac, Tolstoi, Goethe and Thomas Mann – was contrasted, first, with the naturalists, like Zola, and then, more sharply, with the ‘modernists’ – Kafka, Joyce. Naturalism committed the error of mistaking the surface representation of life for the recreation of its underlying tendencies and movements towards ‘wholeness.’ In the modernists, this ‘totality’ is lost, broken up, fragmented. In classical realism, and its later inheritors, Lukacs saw a group of writers who reflected in their art the continuous tragedy of the lost totality, and who thereby provided a profound critique of the isolation and fragmentation of modern life under capitalism. Lukacs saw these writers as embodying the historical contradictions of their time in ‘typical characters’, in ‘world-historical individuals’. In these ‘typical characters’ and their dilemmas the double-sidedness and contradictoriness of life under capitalism was ‘represented’: not statically but in terms of their movement, their development, their determination to ‘become’, their tragic ends. By the ‘typical’, Lukacs understood the fusion of all the essential human and social determinants which crystallise both the farthest extremes – the ‘potential consciousness’ – as well as the limitations of man in a period when wholeness, ‘totality’, was denied. In the idea of realism, the mediated ideal of totality is retained; in the form of realism, the totality is restored through the unity of the work of art. Goldmann Goldmann was deeply influenced by Lukacs’ early writing. In particular, it is from Lukacs that Goldmann derives the central concepts of ‘totality’ and ‘world vision’. Within the framework of his approach (which he calls ‘genetic structuralism’, because it examines ‘structures’ but in terms of their historical origin and development – ‘genetically’), Goldmann examines the structure of a literary text for the degree to which it embodies the structure of thought (the ‘world vision’) of the social group to which the writer belongs. This social group, for Goldmann as for Lukacs, is usually a class. The more closely a text approximates to a full and coherent articulation of the social group’s conceptual ‘world vision’, the greater its validity as a work of art. Thus, in The Hidden God (the study for which he is best known in this country) Goldmann relates the structure of the ‘tragic vision’ discerned in the work of Pascal and Racine, firstly to the social situation in seventeenth century France, of the noblesse de robe (a group or
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‘class-fraction’ losing their former power and position in the state); secondly, he relates it to the conceptual expression of that group’s historical situation embodied in the religious movement of Jansenism. Goldmann claims that one important result of his dialectical examination of these elements was the discovery of a hitherto unrecognised ‘extremist’ form of Jansenism. This discovery was first made by a structural analysis of the literary texts, which revealed an ‘extreme’ variant, then subsequently confirmed by research among the less well-known Jansenist theorists. This discovery provides powerful support for the predictive and explanatory power of Goldmann’s method. In Goldmann’s work, the mediating link between a text and society is the ‘world-vision’ of particular groups or classes. Social classes are the ‘infra-structure of world views’. Because of their common historical situation, all the members of a class ‘tend towards creating the same significant structures, universal in scope, that we call world views’. The literary work of any value creates ‘a roughly coherent universe which corresponds to a world view’. This it does by reproducing, in its immanent structures, the structures of thought ‘potential’ in the class. This is no mere ‘reflection’, since the work ‘advances very considerably the degree of structural coherence which the collective consciousness itself has attained in a rough and ready fashion’. Goldmann describes the relation as a ‘homology of structures’. The work is thus a ‘collective achievement’, made possible by the individual creator, who thus ‘reveals to the group what it was moving towards “without knowing it” in its ideas, feelings and behaviour’.20 Adorno and Marcuse For Adorno, too, art (literature, but more especially music) is a phenomenon of the superstructures: and he, too, aims to point the connection with the base. But where Goldmann goes for homologies between ‘parallel’ structures, Adorno tries to show contradictory oppositions at the level of form. A work is (especially, perhaps, in modern times) a sign of the negative, torn from the heart of the social totality: it reproduces, in the tensions, oppositions and antagonisms which make up its immanent form, the antagonistic nature of the ‘social whole’ to which it corresponds (even as the work, in reaching after unity of form, denies or negates that antagonism). Adorno thus places far more weight on the analysis of the formal structures of the literary or musical text than Lukacs; while at the same time denying that the text can ever be a self-sufficient, permanent structure, standing on its own. Adorno suggests that, when the work is most wholly ‘itself ’, it is also most deeply and radically connected with the social totality. His method is thus perpetually to show the fragmentary, incomplete and antagonistic nature of works which present themselves as coherent, finished and complete. The determinate social moment, from which a work arises, can be more surely indicated by its ‘realised form’ than by either its content or its conceptual structure. Both Adorno and Lukacs employ the Hegelian notion of ‘mediation’ but whereas Goldmann and Lukacs see a correspondence in the structures, as one moves through the mediations (social class – world view – coherence of the text) Adorno sees a dialectical progression by the negative side, by sudden analogies and leaps, rather than by ‘genetic’ unfolding of one structure into another. The antagonisms of any particular moment in the infrastructure of a society are reproduced as a set of tensions or ‘moments’ in the work itself. The connections are shown by a series of analogies or equivalents: between Balzac’s massive appetite for data, and the primitive accumulation of capital, for example, or between the total organisation in Schoenberg’s twelve-tone musical system and the over-systematised and totalitarian world in which it comes into being.21
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Adorno is also deeply concerned with the structure of artistic production in different periods, with the changing social functions of art, with the disintegration of the work of art into a commodity, and the growth of what he calls the ‘cultural industry’. He is not, however, concerned with these things as extrinsic sociological variables, which merely change the context for the production and distribution of art: he is concerned to show how these ‘extrinsic’ variables are reproduced as antagonistic moments within the formal structures of the work themselves. Thus the formal complexity, the determination to be difficult, which many ‘modern’ works of art exhibit, Adorno often interprets as one of the few ways in which the work can resist being wholly transformed into a commodity: of course, (the negation of the negation), by resisting commodity status in this way, the work confirms its status as a ‘minority’ thing, to be set off against the much-publicised simplicity of appeal of the commodities of the ‘cultural industry’. In so far as the work of art has the capacity to resist – albeit negatively – total incorporation into the world of commodities, it expresses for Adorno a ‘principle of hope’, a utopian element, though he resists conceptualising this hopeful side in isolation from its other, fragmented, negative side. Perhaps, then, the difference between Adorno and Marcuse (both of whom have their origins in the ‘critical theory’ of the Frankfurt School) is that Marcuse considers the role and function of the work of art to be more positively and affirmatively ‘utopian’ though not simply, fanciful, wish-fulfilling . . . For Marcuse, also, art negates the effort of the existing state of things, the status quo, to assert itself as all there is to know; as given, permanent, unchangeable. Life in modern, technologically-advanced capitalist societies is ‘one-dimensional’: not only is social life in such a period organised, routinised, rationalised, the conflicts contained or pacified: it is also the case, Marcuse argues, that such societies present themselves as ‘knowable’ only in terms of the ideas and theories which are already to hand. One-dimensional thought thus parallels and makes legitimate one-dimensional society; its purpose is to suppress ‘alternatives’. It is, therefore, principally in the work of art that ‘alternatives’ – other dimensions, other possibilities, emergent but not yet fully realised – continue to exist. These alternatives, in so far as they are embodied in ‘fictive worlds’, are, of course, necessarily ‘utopian’: but it is a ‘utopianism’ we desperately need. Thus, whereas Adorno sees the work of art in the modern period as negating, in the same moment as it reproduces, the antagonisms of one-dimensional societies; Marcuse’s view of the role of art is more ‘affirmative’, even if the affirmation sometimes expresses itself (as it does, for Marcuse, in cultural manifestations like street theatre and rock music) as a simple experiential cry of ‘no’ to the one-dimensional ‘yes’ of modern life. Such manifestations, Marcuse considers necessary but necessarily ephemeral ‘negations’ to the proposition that the ‘real is the rational’, the propositions that what already exists is all that should exist. Such cultural phenomena are capable of saying ‘no’ to this proposition: but they would require the more ‘affirmative’ work, which for Marcuse characterises ‘art’ in the proper sense, to get beyond this simple negative: such more profound work would be marked by a proper and necessary attention to ‘aesthetic form’ and ‘aesthetic distance’. If art is properly to incarnate the alternative dimension, it must be ‘worked up’, formed, shaped.22 Sartre Sartre holds an intermediary position between those writers (already dealt with) who see the work of art as the transformation of a specific type of (class) consciousness into a literary form or structure, and those writers (see below) who tend to view the literary object as the product of a specific type of ‘production’.23
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In the Problem of Method, Sartre argues that only within Marxism can we develop a totalising framework within which the relations of a complex social formation can be properly analysed. ‘Vulgar Marxism’, however, (he argues) has ceased to be a fruitful way of discovering things about society. What he wants is a theoretical framework which is capable of making the mediations, between the general economic contradictions and the social-class reality, the specific man, the specific work, the specific ‘moment’, more precise and more intelligible. He wants a method which preserves what is specific and irreducible about any particular historical event (like the writing of Madame Bovary), while at the same time tracing the path or ‘project’ of its development out of a historical context or situation. In theoretical terms, he proposes the combination of Marxism with an existentialist framework – Marxism alerting the analyst to the wider, ‘objective’ structures or determinations, existentialism alerting the analyst to the ‘profundity of the lived’. In terms of method, Sartre outlines a ‘regressive-progressive’ approach. The ‘regressive’ part of the analysis takes the object or event we seek to understand back down into its elementary parts: it ‘decomposes’ it, retrospectively. The ‘progressive’ part reconstitutes the object in its fullness, by relating these elements to the ‘totality’ towards which they are tending. This process of ‘reconstituting’ differs from the method of ‘vulgar marxism’, because it does not simply try to account for the ‘totality’ in terms of the objective structures (the economic contradictions, the class situation, the historical circumstances, etc) which determine it from the outside. Instead it understands the process of ‘reconstitution’ as an active process: what Sartre calls (after Marx) praxis. People are born into specific circumstances: what they can actively make (praxis) of the circumstances they inherit is limited by the objective circumstances in which they live and work (determinations). All praxis is thus subject to the determination of its ‘starting conditions’: it is limited by the ‘field of possibles’ in a historical moment. However, within that set of ‘objective’ determinations, men have the opportunity (in the existential sense, the ‘choice’) to realise what they inherit, objectively, in some active project (subjectively). In thus taking up some of his circumstances, reworking them subjectively, and expressing this reworking in some active manifestation in the world, man in one and the same moment, acknowledges his historical limits, and surpasses them. Human praxis is, thus, neither wholly determined (vulgar marxism) nor wholly free (pure existentialism). It is neither wholly ‘objective’, nor wholly ‘subjective’. It moves from given determinations, towards a new totalisation, which, of course, provides a set of new determinations for those who inherit it. This is the dialectic, as Sartre understands it. Praxis is also a movement, a ‘project’, from the objective moment to the subjective moment to the objective moment. Thus, Flaubert ‘inherits’ the starting conditions of the French bourgeoisie in his period by way of the family into which he is born. This limits him. It also provides the ‘raw material’ of his subjective experience with which he must work, which he must incorporate into his own project. The way he ‘lives’, and tries to ‘surpass’ what he inherits, manifests itself, among other things, in the production, at a certain moment, of the text, Madame Bovary. Madame Bovary is thus neither wholly given in Flaubert’s class and family situation, nor is it free of those circumstances. It constitutes a ‘moment’, in which Flaubert ‘makes sense’ of the sense which his family and class make of him. The task for a method – the ‘problem of method’ – is to trace his project through its different ‘moments’, and thus to reveal the way the different mediations (class, family, personality, situation, text) add up to a ‘complex totality’. Each mediation or ‘moment’ realises itself in some tangible or ‘objective’ form. This is because men not only labour, and thus provide objectifications which mark their unfolding
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‘project’ through history, they also express or signify their project, using language or employing objects as if they were signs. Thus it is possible to ‘read’ Flaubert’s life itself as a kind of signification: Madame Bovary is only one such expression or objectification in Flaubert’s unfolding project. At any such moment, the writer creates, through work or language, an objective structure (the novel) which sets into the world the subjective way in which he ‘makes sense of the sense history makes of him’. One consequence of this method, therefore, is to subsume the literary text back into a sort of ‘existential biography’. However, in his notion of ‘the project’ and of ‘signification’, Sartre comes some of the way towards the position (exemplified in the final group of theorists) who see literature as a form of ‘practice’, and the literary text as the ‘product’ of a specific kind of production. Brecht Lukacs, Goldmann and Brecht all attempt to define their aesthetics in relation to a central problematic which is the negative and positive aspects of the capitalist mode of production. The contradiction between the dehumanising elements accompanying this mode of production (alienation, reification and exploitation) and the positive technical advances which threaten to explode the dehumanising productive relations of capital is taken up by all three, especially Lukacs and Brecht.24 The importance of Brecht’s attitude to the literary text is two-fold. Firstly, as a socialist artist, his drama is a weapon in the class struggle and it functions primarily to awaken the consciousness of the working class, making them aware of the exploitation they suffer and provoking them into action to change the social relationships building them. Secondly, as a revolutionary art form, his plays anticipate new relationships between the individual artist as producer and the audience as passive spectators, consuming art objects. An examination of the techniques involved in Brecht’s epic theatre, shows that the two considerations outlined are united in his drama in a preoccupation with new modes of artistic presentation. His ‘alienation effect’ helps the audience to abstract from the action and thus make judgements on history, so that they are not drawn to identify themselves with the conflicts on stage through the personalities of the actors. The latter are instructed to detach themselves from the roles they are performing; their gestures should be socially significant, rather than individual or imitative, expressing the social relationships prevailing between people of a given period. We can see that the ‘alienation effect’ is tied to the first task of awakening proletarian consciousness. In approaching his second assignment, Brecht is occupied with both (a) opposing the encapsulation of artistic forms, such as drama, opera, film, etc. (a product of the division of labour, heightened under capitalism) and (b) overcoming the producer/consumer distinction posed in the relationship of the author to his audience. (a) is answered by mixing media, using films as a backcloth, etc. (b) by open forms, which view the play as incomplete in itself, with the audience as an integral part of its production, not mere spectators. In contrast to Lukacs, Brecht did not posit the work of art as a totality in itself. Whereas the former argued that good (especially socialist) art opposed the fragmentation of modern man by remoulding the contradictions of reality inside art, Brecht was concerned with exposing these contradictions by open forms and new artistic techniques which exploded the moribund individualistic relationship of the artist to his audience. Thus, Brecht’s aesthetic is closely linked to Benjamin’s notion of the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations within art itself.
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Benjamin Benjamin is a complex figure, whose work is still only fragmentarily available in English. Though deeply influenced by Lukacs’ – History and Class Consciousness, he took Brecht’s side, against Lukacs, in the debates in German Marxist circles in the 1920s and 30s. Like Brecht, he believed any really modern thinking about art would have to begin, as Brecht put it, ‘from the bad side’. Lukacs, they felt, tended to begin ‘from the good side’ – trying to rescue for Marxism the great European humanist and realist tradition, and looking for ‘wholeness’, ‘totalities’, coherence, the moulding of contradictions into a formed or shaped aesthetic whole. Both Brecht and Benjamin preferred the deliberately ‘open’ fragmentary forms.25 Benjamin’s work on literary topics and figures is an attempt to ‘read off ’ the contradictions in aesthetic structures from their base in historical antagonisms of their age.26 But what distinguishes Benjamin’s work is the profound sense he had that the position of the arts, in the modern world, had been transformed by the new means of artistic production. Benjamin inherited from the Surrealists, Dadaists and other modern artistic movements, a deep responsiveness to the new media: photography, the newspaper, the cinema, design. He argued that these were not simple technical developments: the transformation in the means of making art which they pointed to would have profound consequences for what kinds of art would now be possible. They would also deeply alter, retrospectively, our attitudes to the art and literature of the past. The work of art in the era of the individual book or painting, Benjamin argued, was founded on its singularity, its uniqueness, its radical individuality. A sort of traditional or magical ‘aura’ surrounded the work. Thus, the whole effort of art history and of collecting was to find and prove the ‘originality’ of the work, and thus to trace it to the unique vision of its maker. But, when literary language is subject to the medium of the modern newspaper, or the painting can be mechanically reproduced, or when the surface of the painting can be broken up and explored in a new way by photography and the cinema, that singularity of the ‘work of art’ is progressively destroyed: its aura is dispersed. Instead of the ‘work’ presenting a fully formed and complete ‘surface totality’ to the world, it could now be broken up, broken into, invaded and reorganised by the new media. Thus the fixed proportions of European painting could not, in his view, survive the penetration of the camera, which created a ‘new optics’. Painting offered a rounded surface to the world: but the camera cut into its ‘object’ like a surgeon with a scalpel.27 Benjamin, therefore – like the Russian Formalists, the Constructivists, and film directors like Vertov and Eisenstein – thought the artist should be conceived not just as a fashioner of artistic objects, but as a certain kind of producer. The work of art was his product. Marx had argued that a transformation in the ‘forces and means of production’ in economic labour would lead to a transformation in the ‘social relations’ of production, and in the form of its products; so by analogy Benjamin argued that a transformation in the means (media) of artistic production would alter the ‘social relations of artistic production’ (i.e. the function and position of ‘the artist’) and the nature of his product (the ‘work of art’ itself). Benjamin therefore made a fundamental contribution to our understanding of the ‘basis’ of artistic production, by giving as much weight to the means of making art – to its technics – as Lukacs and Goldmann give to its conceptual content or structure (its ‘super-structure’). One of the consequences of this transformation in the ‘means’ which Benjamin developed was the shift in artistic production from what he called ‘magic’ to ‘politics’. The ‘work of art’ which was considered individual, unique and complete within itself was, Benjamin argued, based on a sort of ‘ritual’ conception of artistic practice. This ‘magical base’ was preserved in artistic tradition, which amounted to a collection of unique, individual objects, and
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preserved their ‘aura’. But the new means were distinguished, for Benjamin, by the possibilities they opened up of consciously and actively manipulating the contents and structures of art. The cinema was paradigmatic here, since its ‘aesthetics’ were, precisely the aesthetics of manipulation: cutting, framing, angling, montage. But once the work of art acknowledged that it was a manipulated structure, it could not hold itself separate from a consideration of its purposes, function, effect, tendency. Thus art, ‘in the age of mechanical reproduction’ had shifted its base from ‘ritual’ to the aesthetics of manipulation – what Benjamin called politics. But this, in turn, meant that artistic work need no longer be the preserve of a privileged elite. The means of making art – the camera, the tape recorder, mass publishing, etc – made it possible for all men to be producers – even if the present ‘social relations of artistic production’ tended to inhibit and constrain this process, preserving art for a minority when the means of art were being progressively made more ‘social’ and collective. We can see, here, that Benjamin was applying, to art, Marx’s notion that revolutionary transformations could only occur in societies when there was a developed contradiction between the means or ‘forces of production’ (tending towards social and collective production) and the ‘social relations of production’ (still constrained within the framework of private expropriation). The role of the artist who was also a revolutionary, was to produce an art which acknowledged and developed this tendency towards social production, which demystified art and opened it up to ordinary people: and to resist the enclosed, ‘bourgeois’ role of the artist as the unique and privileged maker. It would not be sufficient for the artist to put a revolutionary content into the old forms, using the old means. It was necessary for the artist to revolutionise the forms, and develop the means. It was still possible for the new medium of photography to be so used that it restored the hegemony of bourgeois ‘art’ and ‘the artist’. A truly revolutionary use of photography would do more than express a revolutionary content. It would actively and consciously break up the old forms, the old structures of perception, and create new ones: ones more in line with the progressive development of the collective means of artistic production. As Benjamin argued, ‘the political tendency of a work of art cannot, by itself, organise a work’. Only if that tendency found expression at the level of new forms – so that content and form reinforced one another – would a real break with the old modes of artistic production have been made. Thus, though Benjamin had a deeply radical conception of art, linked to his ideas about its media, he never collapsed art directly into politics. He always looked at the necessary mediation – at the level of progressive forms – which mirrored and refracted, in the work itself, the contradictions he had isolated in its ‘infrastructure’. The structuralists and Barthes The final point in this conspectus of positions, is a look at the structuralists, and the development of European semiotics – especially those varieties which positively acknowledge some relationship to Marxism. This is an extremely complex area, and we have chosen to deal, mainly, with Barthes: first, because his work is more accessible in English, but second because so many tendencies in this area converge in his work. What distinguishes the structuralists who also accept a Marxist framework is that they conceptualise the creation of literature and art as a form of production: but they devote all their attention to what is specific about artistic production, namely the fact that it employs, as its medium, language or some other systems of signs. The real theoretical basis of this development, therefore, lies in the different uses made of structural linguistics and the theory of the sign. Literary production, like other kinds of communication, produces ‘meanings’ ordered into a structure.
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It does this by using the mode of ‘objectification’ appropriate to literature: that is, sign systems. Structuralist analysis is thus grounded in the theory of the sign, and in the notion of signification (or sign-ification). This approach, as we suggest below, is in turn, grounded in Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole, or, in the more familiar language of communication theory (from which they have also drawn), the distinction between message/code. The langue/parole distinction is the cornerstone of Saussure’s linguistics and the foundation of structuralist and semiotic method.28 Previous theories had seen language either as a spontaneous, natural and ‘transparent’ medium of human expression, or as a set of prescribed, grammatically ‘perfect’ rules. Saussure stressed that language consisted of individual, and in some sense, ‘free’ particular speech acts (parole) which however could only be made by obeying the rules of language (langue). Langue was thus the ‘social part of language’, which made it possible for the speaker to produce, at the level of parole, speech acts which were both innovative, free but also coherent, capable of being decoded by those who shared the linguistic community. Saussure also developed the notion of signification. Signification, he argued, required two ‘planes’: the symbol or index within the signifying system which was the ‘mental representation’ of the concept, object or person – the signifier: and that to which the signifier referred – the thing (concept, or person) signified. The union of the signifier and the signified formed the sign. Signs, then, could only mean something if they were organised within their own system. They had value only in terms of the relations of similarity and difference which organised them. There were different sign-systems, differently arranged – morse code, traffic signals, written language: these configurations constituted codes. An extended piece of articulation within any code is a discourse. We can only decipher what any particular signifier signifies if we have access to the code in which it is arranged. Signification, then, must be conceived as a process. As Barthes says, ‘it is the act which binds the signifier and the signified, an act whose product is the sign.’ ‘Meaning is articulation’. In most signifying systems, the first plane of articulation is a simple, denotative one. But there are also more complex articulations, superimposed on the denotative level, which can signify more complicated associative or connotative meanings. These ‘second-order’ systems the semioticians call meta-languages. In morse code, for example, signifiers are dots and dashes, arranged by simple principles of contrast and combination. The signifieds are the letters of the alphabet. In the code, the sign . . . – signifies V. This is the level of denotation. But, during the war, when Churchill made the V-sign a symbol of victory for the Allies, . . . – also connoted ‘V for Victory over the Germans’. This latter articulation marked a connotative, or second-order code. In Barthes’ phrase, ‘there is no message without a code’. The tendency is therefore always to treat the particular message (or the parole) of an individual work in terms of the code, or in Levi-Strauss’ sense, the structure, or in Chomsky’s terms, the deep structure, which organises the signs into meaningful, signifying relationships. This broad framework can, of course, be applied at different levels. Some work by this school on the cinema, for example, is basically concerned with what are the signs and the codes of the cinema as a discourse. This is work at a relatively ‘low’ level in the signifying chain. Other work is concerned with the way different codes are employed within any one work: Barthes’ S/Z works at this level. Others are concerned with the structuring effect of larger, or more inclusive, codes – the larger units of discourse: the novel, science-fiction, the confessional novel, even history itself, as a specific kind of ‘discourse’. Barthes has also developed a study of ‘modern myths’, as a meta-code based on the connotational power of signs. Whatever the level at which this analysis is conducted, the idea is that these discourses constitute (on an analogy with Saussure) the ‘social part’ of literary production: fundamentally, they are not within the
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keeping of an individual artist, any more than the individual speaker of a language can bring about linguistic change. They constitute an already formed ‘space’, a set of available discourses, which each individual writer situates himself in. He must to some degree ‘obey’ its structuring effect upon him. In this way, the discourses and codes ‘think themselves’ through the writer, as much, if not more, than the writer uses them to ‘think his way’ through his subject. Barthes has applied these notions of message/code, of signification and metalanguages to many modern cultural symbol-systems: the advertising image, the language of fashion, modern myths, Japanese ‘sign’ culture, and so on. From the many possible applications of the method to the study of signs, we choose two which refer more directly to literature. In Writing Degree Zero Barthes suggested that when a novelist sits down to write a novel, she is limited not only by the language she uses, but by the conventions, rules of expression, habits of thought, traditions of feeling – in short, by the discourse of the novel as a form. The novelist must situate herself in this ‘field’ before she can write at all. But since the structure and habits of any particular discourse express, reflect or reproduce to some extent the ideology of the society which lies behind it, every act of ‘writing’ also makes active an embedded ideology preserved within the form. The discourse of naturalism in the novel, for example, is not simply a literary genre: it represents a certain dominant mode of seeing, feeling and thinking the world. This suggests one possible line of development from this way of thinking of the questions about discourse and code: a revived interest in the whole discussion of genres – where genre is defined in terms of the structure of conventions and rules (a sort of deep structure) which produces a range of ‘surface variants’. But if the text is the production of meanings through the use of different codes, then the commentaries, readings, interpretations of the text lay new codes over those already employed. The ‘text’ (like Levi-Strauss’ myths) cannot be said to have one, single, unambiguous and finished meaning. New meanings are constantly produced on the meanings it itself produces. For this reason Barthes says that his commentary on Balzac, S/Z, is not merely an ‘analytical commentary’ but ‘belongs to a textual productivity’. Barthes’ notion that each reading of a text produces its own ‘text’ is close, in some ways, to Sartre’s position in What Is Literature? But where, for Sartre, each ‘reading’ requires the ‘reading subject’ to complete the meaning of the text, Barthes (like Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Levi-Strauss, Althusser and other ‘structuralists’) tersely dispenses with the notion of the phenomenal subject, and considers the text as ‘reading’ or ‘writing’ itself via its ‘authors’ (the bearers of its meanings). This preliminary mapping of the field introduces a range of articles dealing with separate aspects of the general problems raised above. Reading as an activity is considered first, as the most general but least-examined problem. Then follow two articles on major theorists, Lukacs and Goldmann, written by members of the Centre’s working group on Literature and Society. Helga Gallas’ article, translated by another member of the group, deals with a different aspect of Lukacs’ work, and is set in context by the translator’s preface. A discussion of the radical possibilities of genre analysis is included as a preliminary opening up of that field, and is followed by two case studies, one dealing with a recognised major work of literature, All’s Well that Ends Well, the other with a writer whose work is most widely known in the form of a single title, Love on the Dole. For both, however, it is argued that the writings offer significant examples of authors at work on the reformulation of their historical/literary problematic. The symposium ends with Stuart Laing’s bibliography of works in various areas of the field. Given the strongly-marked trend, noted above in the work of Barthes and others, it may be
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partisan to mention authorship of this introduction. Its genesis, however, involved contributions from the members of the Literature and Society group, a major organising of the material by Stuart Hall, and final tinkering by members of the editorial group of W.P.C.S. 4. We remain unsure whether its final form tends to support or deny the Barthesian hypothesis.
Notes 1 Althusser, L. For Marx, Essay ‘On the Young Marx’ footnote p. 67 Trans. B. Brewster Allen Lane, Penguin Press 1969. 2 For a more developed critical review of English Studies from an American point of view see The Politics of Literature, ed. Kamf and Lauter, Pantheon Press. 3 Cf: Wellek’s criticism of Leavis’ Revaluation, Scrutiny, March 1937, and Leavis’ reply to Wellek, ‘Literary Criticism and Philosophy’, in The Common Pursuit. 4 A knowledge of the book trade and of publishing has always formed a subsidiary part of literary history. The well informed critic or scholar has been able to pin-point the historical references to real persons and events in the text, or even to see how the text documents the ‘literature, life and thought’ of a period. One or two books of real theoretical distinction have, of course, emerged from this sort of work (there are some selective references in the bibliography, below: Ian Watt and L.C. Knights are examples.) 5 Northrop Frye Anatomy of Criticism 1957. 6 Raymond Williams ‘From Leavis to Goldmann’ New Left Review 67 (May/June 1971). 7 The following, very disparate, kinds of work may be taken as significant contributions to such a review, from very differing points of departure: e.g. the work of Raymond Williams and the critical review of The Long Revolution, first published in New Left Review, 9 & 10, by E.P. Thompson; the much-discussed article by Perry Anderson on ‘Components Of The National Culture’, in Student Power, ed. Cockburn and Blackburn; the essays collected by Robin Blackburn in Ideology And The Social Sciences: some of the new Penguin Education ‘Readers’, including Counter-Course and the series on economics. 8 Frye’s ‘The Social Context of Literary Criticism’ is reprinted in The Sociology of Literature & Drama, ed. Tom and Elizabeth Burns, Penguin Education Reader (1973): Leavis’ ‘Literature and Society’ and the related ‘Sociology and Literature’ are both in The Common Pursuit (1952). 9 Introduction to The Sociology Of Literature & Drama, op. cit. 10 Perry Anderson ‘Components of a National Culture’, in Student Power, ed. Cockburn and Blackburn, Penguin. 11 Culture & Society and The Long Revolution, but also Modern Tragedy and The English Novel. 12 Hoggart’s work, which is often, correctly, also identified as originating here, moves in a different direction: by extending the methods of ‘close reading’ of texts in the direction of ‘reading a culture’, and especially popular and working-class culture, where the ‘texts’ are, characteristically, not literary in the traditional sense. 13 All the formulations quoted in this paragraph are from The Long Revolution, Chatto & Windus, (1961). 14 The formulations in this paragraph are all from ‘From Leavis to Goldmann’, op.cit: reprinted as the Introduction to Goldmann’s Racine, Rivers Press, Cambridge (1972). 15 ‘In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out’. Marx, The Preface to the Critique of Political Economy. 16 The problem with the base/superstructure model has always been how far the base actually determines the form of the superstructure. Engels (and now Althusser) insisted that to postulate any too direct a determination by the base would be to oversimplify but that in the end (the last instance) it was the determining element. However, how one can conceive the last instance, or in Althusser’s sense, whether one can ever consider the base in isolation from everything else in a social formation, remains a problem. Adrian Mellor’s paper on Goldmann, in this issue, has a discussion of this question. See also Engel’s letter to J. Bloch in Marx and Engels: Selected Works, Moscow, 1951, p. 443 and Althusser: For Marx, Allen Lane, Penguin Press 1969.
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17 Cf: Althusser’s tantalisingly brief essay on ‘The “Piccolo Teatro” ’, in For Marx, two brief essays in the Appendix to Lenin & Philosophy And Other Essays: also Pierre Macherey, Pour Une Theorie De La Production Litteraire, Maspero, (1970). 18 Especially the essays in For Marx, Allen Lane, Penguin Press (1969). 19 Althusser, ‘On The Materialist Dialectic’ For Marx. 20 The formulations of Goldmann’s position are based, primarily, on The Hidden God, Human Sciences & Philosophy, ‘The Sociology of Literature’ in Intl. Journal of Social Science, vol. XIX No. 4 (1967) and ‘Genetic Structuralism In The Sociology of Literature’ in ed. Burns and Burns op.cit. 21 Very little of Adorno’s work on literature and music is as yet available in English: but see Prisms, Neville Spearman (1967), and ‘The Sociology of Art’ translated by Brian Trench, W.P.C.S.2. For a full and sympathetic account cf F. Jameson, Marxism and Form, Princeton U.P. 1970 Adorno’s essays on radio, television and popular music are also relevant here. 22 Cf: Marcuse’s One – Dimensional Man and Eros & Civilization: but also two essays in An Essay On Liberation, Allen Lane (1969); ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’, Negations (Allen Lane, 1968); and Counter-Revolution and Revolt, Allen Lane (1972). 23 This account of Sartre’s position derives mainly from The Problem Of Method, the Critique De La Raison Dialectique, Saint Genet and Idiot De La Famille, rather than from the more familiar What Is Literature? There is, of course, a strong link between the two phases in Sartre’s writing, but it is too complex to unravel here. 24 On Brecht, see Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic ed. and trans. John Willett, London 1964. 25 Cf: Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, New Left Books (1973), and the introductory essay by Stanley Mitchell. The formulation of Benjamin’s position is based, primarily, on Illuminations, and ‘The Author As Producer’, New Left Review 62 (July/August 1970). 26 Cf: the Benjamin fragment translated as ‘Paris – Capital of the 19th Century’ New Left Review No. 48 (Mar/April 1968). 27 Cf: the seminal essay, ‘The Work Of Art In The Age Of Mechanical Reproduction’, reprinted in Illuminations. 28 F. de Saussure, Course In General Linguistics, Peter Owen (1960). For an exposition of Saussure’s method as applied to semiotics, Cf: Barthes, Elements of Semiology, Cape (1967).
3
Reading literature as culture Andrew Tolson
Reading literature as culture This article is an attempt to sketch a theory and model of how to read. We all read books, newspapers, advertisements, and, in a more general sense, we may be said to ‘read’ cultural ‘signs’ like fashions, manners of behaviour, and social rules, which, like signposts, orientate our daily lives. A theory of reading is thus, in the first place, a theory of what we already know and take for granted. As students of culture, however, we are interested in how this daily acquaintance with the objects of our study can become ‘knowledge’, that is, how it is possible for us to transcend our personal readings, to put them in some kind of perspective, and to explain their characteristics. So, in the second place, we must understand how a description of what we already know can teach us something new. In this issue, we are specifically concerned with reading books, especially those which have been traditionally selected and preserved as the finest examples of creative literature. This area has particular significance for us, not only because of the intrinsic fascination of the texts, but also because, with the growth and development of literary criticism, we have at our disposal a multitude of ‘readings’. Literary criticism can itself be studied as a fairly well developed ‘field’, and in so far as it purports to produce ‘knowledge’, we can reflect upon the nature of this claim in relation to our second problem.
Ideological reading When we examine literary criticism in some detail, we are immediately struck by the tremendous range and diversity of its aspects. There seems to be an unlimited variety of possible approaches ranging from traditional forms of bibliographical scholarship, to practical criticism, and ‘avant garde’ applications of Existentialism, Marxism or Psychoanalysis. In recent years, literary critics themselves have reflected upon this situation as the ‘crisis in the humanities’, but have as yet been unable to suggest a more satisfactory state of affairs. For, divided into an ever expanding plurality of disciplines, they see any ‘solution’, any attempt to unify their readings into one ‘body of knowledge’, such as that proposed in Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism,1 simply as the expression of yet another individual’s personal interests. Furthermore, if we are interested in the problem of reading, we will also be impressed by the almost total silence of literary critics on this matter, a silence which is surprising in readers of such skill. Theories of literature are remarkably detailed in their accounts of the production of the text (the ‘creative process’), and in their analysis of linguistic structures (the ‘verbal icon’), but apart from occasional asides from psychoanalysts, like Lesser2 and
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Holland, or existentialists like Sartre, and with one notable exception, I.A. Richards,5 literary criticism lacks a theory of reading. We may, therefore, with some justification, raise the question as to whether the ‘crisis in the humanities’ and the absence of a theory reading (and thus, bearing in mind our second introductory question, the absence of a theory of knowledge) are somehow interconnected. A perspective of this state of affairs can be gained by considering, in general outline, the relatively recent historical development of literary criticism.* We can recognise in this development two dominant trends of argument concerned to justify, rather as ‘apologies for poetry’, the reading of literature as a university discipline. The first is the humanist argument. The humanist starts with a general social concern which is not merely specific to literature. Characteristically, this has taken the form of criticism, in ethical terms, of a growing cultural diversity and a corresponding decline of a ‘sense of value’ or ‘discrimination’. The commitment is to communal cultural ‘standards’ and against the ‘standardisation’ of the mass media.6 On this general basis, the further argument is made that reading literature in particular can combat this decline. Thus, Richards, in Practical Criticism and elsewhere, proposes the therapeutic value for communication, of the study of ‘misreadings’. ‘Rhetoric’, he argues, should be the study of misunderstanding and its remedies’, and should ‘measure our losses in communication’.7 The humanist has to demonstrate the distinctive value, for the community, of literature’s special communication. In developing this ‘theory of value’ two factors are emphasised; – the peculiar imaginative quality of artistic creativity and the particular aesthetic quality of poetic language. The first factor becomes a theory of the perception, or ‘sincerity’ of the author, which varies from a notion, developed by the early Richards,8 that experience is directly transmitted through psychological impulses from author to reader (allowing the reader to simply internalise the author’s perception of life), to a much more sophisticated theory, developed by Leavis and others,9 of communication as the shared re-creation of the cultural continuity of the collective wisdom of the past, (on the basis of the interplay between a specific author and the literary ‘tradition’). The second factor, the emphasis on poetic language, becomes a theory of the ‘potentialities’ of meaning offered by the dynamic interaction of elements of the linguistic structure of poetry. For the later Richards, this dynamic structure, located within the text itself, is found in the ‘interinanimation’ of words in metaphors10 Similar notions are developed by Empson as ‘ambiguity’11 and by Brooks as ‘paradox’.12 The language of poetry liberates ‘connotations’; that is, the meaning is not simply directly ‘referential’ (denoting objects or concepts), it creates, through a web of hints and suggestions, a total complex of internal modifications and cross-references. It is a synthetic pattern. The common factor in both these arguments is the lack of consideration given to the reader. The first emphasis on the author leads to simplistic theories of the transmission of experience which the reader passively receives,13 or to complex theories of ‘close reading’, in which, through a ‘technique for sincerity’, minds can meet in a ‘continuous analogical enactment’ by the reader of the author’s values.14 The second emphasis on language is more open, since in so far as the text merely opens up possibilities for the reader, he can be given a creative role. Some of Richards’ later work especially, seems to develop this focus upon the active reader.15 Essentially, however, the source of value located in the structure of the text reduces reading to a process of ‘contemplation’, or at best, ‘following-through’.16
*
4
See references for extended quotation and bibliography.
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Andrew Tolson
In so far as the humanist argument does take up the problem of reading, it is to refer the question to the external factors – the author’s experience, or the language of the text. In neither case is the reader made responsible for his own readings. The humanist ideology, which values the reading of the text as a ‘lived appropriation of the cultural tradition’, commits in its immediate concern a double-sided fallacy. Firstly, it idealises the values of that tradition and gives authoritative weight to the ‘wisdom’ of great authors. Secondly, it reifies the medium through which these values are conveyed; that is, the language of poetry is contemplated as a ‘thing’, containing within itself the dynamic principle which is the source of its value. The reader is subservient to, and encompassed by, a body of literature which assumes mythic status, rather like religious icons which both point beyond themselves to the Absolute and contain within themselves some vestige of magical power. The second established justification for reading literature is the ‘scientist’ argument. Here the emphasis is not so much upon the communication of personal value and experience, as an attempt to establish literary criticism as a ‘body of knowledge’ with principles and methods which lay claim to ‘scientificity’. There are two dominant forms of scientism. The first gives priority to a close and rigorous description of the language of the text; the second to a ‘totalising’ perspective, which ‘stands back’ from the text, establishing its relation to an overall ‘body of knowledge’. To some extent, the growth of precise methods of language description is a development of the humanist reification of poetic language. The focus on the poem as a ‘thing’, (with, in the classic practical criticism experiment, its authorship excised) and the extraordinarily detailed ‘dissection’ of poetry by Empson and Brooks, was developed into the American ‘new criticism’ of the ‘forties’ and ‘fifties’. Recently however, this method has been re-charged by the influence of descriptive linguistics and the development of a hyper-empiricist stylistics,17 which are no longer dependent upon humanist ideology for their justification, but seek a ‘value-free’ closely descriptive rendering of what is ‘there’. On the other hand, the ‘totalising’ perspective, of which the most influential exponent is Fyre, from the outset explicitly defines itself against humanist ‘public taste criticism’. Here, the question of scientificity for literary criticism is posed, not as the elaboration of textual complexity in close reading, but as the development of ‘a co-ordinating principle, a central hypothesis which . . . will see the phenomena it deals with as parts of a whole’.18 In this context, Frye cites as an example the theory of evolution in biology. The test for a science is its ability to unify its data arond a ‘central hypothesis’. Both forms of scientism, also, lack consideration for the reader. From the point of view of stylisticians, such as Riffaterre,19 the reader is postulated as a hypothetical average system of responses to ‘stylistic devices’ located in the text. The notion of close reading ‘followingthrough’, becomes a stimulus-response model, not far removed from Richards’, which constructs a ‘reading competence’ of response categories, and in which creative expectations on the part of the reader are dismissed as distorting irrelevancies. The alternative emphasis on literature as a whole, self sufficient body of knowledge, looks for its co-ordinating principle in the structure of the texts themselves (in Frye’s case, the archetypal structures of myth). The reader, as critic, makes a ‘positive value-judgement’ – a judgement of tolerance, ‘catholicity’ – assuming beforehand the coherence of his data. ‘Reading’ therefore, as the foundation for knowledge, is no longer an individual activity of the ‘whole man’, rather, it strives towards an a-historical, ‘transcendental act of consciousness’. ‘The theorist of literature and the consumer of literature, are not the same at all, even when they co-exist in the same man’.20
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What interests us about scientism, is not that its claim to provide a break with ‘immediate reading’ are true, but on the contrary that the structure of its arguments is the same as that of humanism. The reader is again referred to factors (the ‘linguistic structure’, the ‘body of knowledge’) which are external. Though there is an attempt to ‘stand back’ and view the act of reading from an autonomous perspective, that perspective is only achieved by idealising literary texts as providing in themselves data for the elaboration of ‘reading competence’. Again, the reader is subservient to, and encompassed by, a body of literature which assumes mythic status. We can account for the absence of a theory of reading in literary criticism (and the absence of a central debate unifying its heterogenous approaches), by pointing to the ideological character of its foundation. Conceived, in the twenties and thirties as an educational crusade against declining cultural standards, it developed a programme centred upon the lived internalisation in the present ‘conjuncture’ of the values of the past. The reaction against this notion which has partly grown out of, and partly in contradiction with the humanist debate, preserves its ideological terms. ‘Scientism’ is not ‘science’, but the fallacy of positivism, which denies the constitutive relation of the experimenter to his or her objects, and preserves a method of naive induction, of ‘innocent’ description. Such a method is plainly inadequate for a ‘cultural’ reading of literature, since one of the basic premises of cultural study is that the analyst is part of the culture he or she describes, and thus that a science of culture can only proceed by incorporating this premise in its methodological foundation. To move beyond the simple reproduction of current ideology, we have to break with the literary-critical debate. Our own risk is to return the readers to their readings, and on this basis, understand the production of real knowledge.
The problem of knowledge in cultural studies Ideological heading, which seems to use the reading process in the service of some external, ideological goal, is inherently incapable of the kind of self consciousness necessary to the understanding of its own processes. The ideologist is so immersed in the immediate ‘lived situation’ of culture, his activity is so permeated by desires and dreams (for example, the desire for human community, the dream of the total science) that in his eagerness to build utopia he distorts both his cultural ‘tools’ (in this case, language) and his understanding of his own cultural activity, (in this case, reading). If we are, therefore, to attempt a valid description of the reading process, we must have attained the necessary ‘self-reflexivity’, or ability to place ourselves within the culture we describe, which is the foundation for any study of our own daily lives. Briefly, then, we have to recognise that knowledge of our own daily lives tends to be distorted by ideological motivations which arise from our lived situations themselves. In this tendency, we project our needs or wishes as external necessities, which imperatively direct our activities. Thus, as we have seen, the scientistic search for a value-free ‘objectivity’ becomes for the positivist an absolute determining goal to which all other considerations are subservient. How can we avoid the fallacies of humanism and scientism in the reading of literature; fallacies which we understand as the ideological projections of the immediate concerns of certain skilled readers, and which cause these readers to deny theoretically the validity, even the existence, of their own readings? The answer is that we must effect an ‘epistemological break’ with ideology before a truly critical reading is possible.21
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The production of knowledge is an activity with its roots in people’s daily lives. It is a form of labour, the transformation of a set of ‘raw materials’ (certain facts, ideas, etc.), via certain ‘means of production’ (usually language), into a ‘product’, (a new work). That product enters the cultural life of the society as the ‘objectification’ of a ‘theoretical practice’ and may serve as the raw material for future theoretical practice. Various factors, however, serve to complicate this picture. Firstly, though the work may be the production of one person, because that person is a member of groups, a class, a society, the work may objectify the interests of many individuals. In so far as the work ‘signifies’ human activity, it is subject to human conflicts and concerns. Authors may see their objectification stolen, neutralised or turned against them by others. The sum total of these various ‘projects’ constitutes the ever-expanding ‘totalisation’ of the work’s ideological meaning, as it is read, by many individuals with many existential interests. Secondly, however, the work of the individual author has, simultaneously, another reality, relatively autonomous to immediate ideological signification. This is a reality conferred upon the work by its medium – language – of which there are two main elements. The first element is the resistance to the ‘pure’ freedom of the individual creator necessitated by the formal constraints of language structure, the system of shared conventions, the ‘langue’, which makes communication possible. The second element is a feature of the historical character of language, that the words the author chooses will have semantic references and connotations which go beyond the immediate situation. Some of these meanings may be hidden, or even absent, but if this is the case, they are part of the ‘discourse’ by virtue of their absence. All authors whether or not they choose to be conscious of the historical relations, are thus part of a discursive ‘tradition’. Together, the work’s relations to ‘langue’ and to ‘discourse’ are its ‘problematic’. The problematic is the ‘structural-historical’ meaning of the text which may be ‘placed’ within a cultural framework. This ability to ‘place’ the work calls for a particular kind of reading; the mere existence of the problematic does not in itself produce knowledge. One essential factor in this reading is self-consciousness, involving the ability of readers themselves to ‘place’ their own readings within the cultural ‘totality’ that includes the problematic of the text. This is made possible for individual readers (even those who are part of the groups, classes and societies of particular authors and thus share similar ideologies) because the work, as a problematic, is no longer free imagination but is a cultural objectification. However, not all self-consciousness breaks with ideology. Members of a group, for example, may begin to understand their thoughts as ‘group thoughts’ – an understanding which constitutes some transcendence of individual perspectives – and yet remain within an immediate re-affirmation of the group identification. For a fascist or racist reader the work simply flatters a self-enclosed system of beliefs, and the ‘problematic’ is ‘reified’ as a group object. Thus, there is a second requirement for the ‘epistemological break’ with ideology. The self-conscious reading of the problematic must be historical. In this case the problematic is simultaneously recognised as the objectification of the group, and rejected as having been surpassed. Of course, it is possible, as with scientism, for that rejection to take an ideological form, but it is also possible, if the group firstly has lived out a process of internalisation prior to the break, for the process of historical surpassing itself to be a conscious feature of selfreflexive rejection. For example, philosophers may in their old age reject the theories of their youth, but recognising that they were once their objectifications, simultaneously question
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themselves as to their surpassing. Or, the group, in reforming the institutional objects of the past to meet new situations, may reflect upon the historical processes of change involved. At the end of this essay, I hope to demonstrate this process of cultural self-consciousness with relation to a reading of Wuthering Heights, by Emily Bronte; a work central to our own culture (in particular concerning the novel and the social aspirations of women), but in which, I would argue, we can now see those aspirations taking a historical form, and thus, in part, in the process of being surpassed. This illustrates the common adage, that without literacy there can be no knowledge of history, because there can be no historical reading. We can understand the production of knowledge, therefore, as a self-reflexive grasp of prior conditions from a perspective which is not only immediate, but also retrospective.22 That is, because the problematic of a theoretical practice is not only an ideological signification lived and read in the present, but also a historical objectification preserving the past for the present, it can serve as a pointer to the relations between the past and the present which constitute the cultural relations of society. These relations are revealed by a double movement, which is both regressive and progressive. The regressive movement reveals the totality of past relations from individual lives, through many mediations, to the most general social, economic and geographical conditions. The progressive movement attempts a synthetic reconstruction of those conditions as an attempt to correctly predict the future, which is the test for any science. Wuthering Heights may be regressively understood through the biography of Emily Bronte herself, a study of her immediate locality, family and social group (her role as a woman in that group, the group’s religious ideology, etc), opening out as an analysis of class, and the economic and social relations between classes. Something may be thus revealed concerning the book’s character as a protest, not only to an immediate situation, but also to more general problems (for example, the conflict, internalised by some middle class women, between the ideological values of domesticity and education), which in many respects pertain today. We do not here deny that history changes. Rather, we affirm that we change history, often blindly, it is true, (making predictions highly uncertain), but self-reflexively, little by little, to the degree that we understand our own past, and thus attain a ‘relatively autonomous perspective’ upon the present. Neither can we deny that at the same time as making this ‘epistemological break’ with ideology, we live out the break ideologically. There is no simple transition to science; knowledge is a long battle with experience. But only thus can we understand the significance of our cultural readings and the foundations of cultural study.
The reading process How, then, can the reading process be described? We are now in a position to understand this description as a systematic retracing of the cultural relations expressed in the immediate encounter of the reader with the text, and a corresponding attempt to synthetically reconstruct this analysis as the future foundation for the study of cultural activities. In the first, regressive analysis we have two major tasks, to describe the individual psychology of readers, their ‘reading competence’, and to describe the social relations of communication starting from the existential encounter with the text. In both cases, our analysis takes the metaphorical form of specifying levels which interact to form wholes; lower levels are progressively synthesised to form higher levels. In the second progressive movement, we can return to our present concern, and suggest how a cultural reading of literature can produce real knowledge.
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(1) The reader The reader brings to the text a number of psychological and linguistic mechanisms which can be described. At the lower levels of analysis, these features can be analysed separately, but as we move to higher levels we begin to deal with ‘psycholinguistic’ structures. Thus, a reader’s ‘reading competence’ is firstly a psycholinguistic competence. Despite the somewhat scanty and diffuse research in this field23 we can begin to sketch the outlines. (a) Perceptual strategy The analysis begins with an account of perceptual strategy, a field of cognitive psychology.24 This is firstly a description of processes of perception which centres on the problem of constructing ‘visual figures’ from discrete elements, and secondly, an attempt to isolate the immediate visual units, such as letters, word shape, established by these processes. There cannot however, be an autonomous description of perceptual strategy, because both the temporal processes and the spatial units occur simultaneously, as an undifferentiated activity. Differentiation can only be made in retrospect from the point of view of a higher level of reading competence. A description of the perceptual processes of reading must take into account the essential factor of the speed of reading.25 The adult may scan at least six hundred words per minute in silent reading, which (given an arbitrary average of, say, five phonemes per word) would require a rate of fifty phonemes per second if each phoneme were processed sequentially. As psychologists are agreed that a formation time of at least 0.3 seconds is required to completely process an input into clear perception, such a rate of one phoneme per 0.02 average seconds is plainly impossible. It follows that individual phonemes are not processed sequentially, but in terms of higher order units. In view of this it is likely that perceptual strategy is not a unitary process, but is differentiated (the sensory movement of the eye is not directly tied to processing systems) and selective (words are not perceived as units of letters, but certain significant letters are selected as cues, and predictions are made on the basis of incomplete data; word shape, word length, contextual patterning, etc.) Reading, thus, exploits the high degree of redundancy and irrelevancy in written language, not all aspects of the text are of equal importance. A model for perceptual strategy is an attempt to systematise this differentiation and process of selection. In particular, three levels can be postulated26 a sensory input (scanning) system, a cue storage system and an internal response system. At all levels essential data is being sifted from non-essential data by ‘organisational’ procedures. Between the scanning and storage systems is an organisational procedure which synthesises diverse visual sensations, and between the storage and response systems a further selection procedure identifies significant long-term response material. One way in which this may be done is the automatic recognition of grammatically significant material, such as the head word of a nominal group or the main verb of a sentence.27 (b) Sound-letter patterns One criterion for selection in making a reading response is the sound pattern of language, and this has been the focus for a great deal of pedagogic discussion regarding the child’s transfer from oral to visual language behaviour on learning to read. The relative regularity of phoneme- (individual sounds) – grapheme (individual letters) correspondences has been demonstrated at the higher morphophonemic level,28 which suggests the importance of ‘phonic blending ability’ (the ability to synthesise separate phonemes). It is suggested that
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units, similar to the traditional syllable, and variously described as the ‘vocalic-centre group’29 or the ‘linguon’,30 form morphophonemic systems, intermediate to short-term perception and long-term response. This is the level of ‘lexical representation’,31 the movement at which visual sensory input is meaningfully perceived as the ‘lexical term’, a part of verbal structure. (c) Cognitive processes The integration of perception with response, and the passing over into long-term memory, requires, however, further selection. Even as abstract ‘lexical items’ the reader would not have time to process individual units. Accordingly, selection must be made on the basis of cognitive expectations, and reading must be seen as an active process of hypothesis testing and decision-making – ‘a psycholinguistic guessing game’.32 At this level, graphic input serves as the data for syntactic and semantic contextual predictions, which utilise the reader’s knowledge of sentence structure and narrative form. If the prediction is wrong, the readers are held up, and must not only question the text, but also their own strategies. Their ‘working systems’ are challenged, and to the degree that they are an expression of a fundamental orientation to the world through language, readers are continually threatened by the act of reading. (d) Affective factors As we move into the region of long-term memory and expectation, we begin to approach a crucial problem, that the psycholinguistic system we have built up is no longer sufficient to describe the activity of reading. The break occurs somewhere between the ‘semantic’ and ‘affective’ levels. A categorisation of word meanings available to readers, after the manner for example, of Katz and Fodor33 only goes so far (and not very far) in accounting for their ‘reading competence’. For insofar as reading is a ‘goal-directed’ activity, which points beyond itself to a meaning in the world, it involves the whole personality of the reader. A great deal of psycholinguistic research has adopted the framework of transformational grammar. This is inadequate for understanding these problems, because the attempt to describe the structures of the mind on the basis of the structures of language cannot comprehend the expectations which the individual brings to language from outside. In so far as transformational grammar makes these claims it is guilty of the positivism which we observed in Riffaterre. We have an idealisation of psycholinguistic structures as ‘innate ideas’, and a reification of the linguistic medium as a system of deep and surface structures.34 An alternative to this is the theory of language developed by the tradition of ‘genetic epistemology’, especially by Piaget35 and Vygotsky.36 Here language is understood as one part of a total process of ‘symbolic differentiation’ (which includes play activity and techniques of experimentation). This genetic development of language is part of the child’s whole socio-historical experience. Language is a tool, which the child learns to use, to tackle the problems he encounters in his daily life, and the foundation of the theory is sociolinguistic, arising from Piaget’s observation of linguistic behaviour in the social environment of the kindergarten. Thus as our analysis moves up the psycholinguistic scale, from the immediate perception of letters and words, to the long term formulation of systems and structures, we approach the moment at which this behaviour becomes meaningful and enters our cultural life. The foundation of reading as a sociolinguistic activity is the existential encounter of the
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subject with the text. We can no longer be satisfied with an external, psycholinguistic description of reading, which treats the reader as the object for experimental tests. On the contrary, because we recognise the reader’s freedom to go beyond mechanical perception, and to structure that perception according to socio-cultural values, we recognise that he is a privileged object – the object which we are. To reduce that privilege to positivistic dimensions is the fallacy of scientism. (2) Communication An existential analysis is made from the inside as our self-conscious description of ourselves. It is primarily an immediate recognition of two factors. Firstly, we can reflect that our activity has become conscious and that it is possible for us to speak of ‘motivation’ and ‘ends and means’. Secondly, we recognise other people, for in so far as the text itself expresses consciousness, it is the signification of the author. Because we perceive ourselves, therefore we also perceive others, and we have the moment of communication.37 (a) Writers In their books writers create words for themselves. Having initially perceived the external as ‘not theirs’ (the differentiated subject/object perspective which is the basis of consciousness of self), they have attempted to internalise these worlds, to make them essentially their own objectifications. Thus they have approached the external as raw material to be transformed. In so far however, as these projects are successful, the world, (as it was, external to the subject) is surpassed in the act of producing new worlds, and together with this surpassing arises a natural tendency for writers to subjectively idealise their creative activity (or ‘praxis’) as an end in itself. Accordingly the objective criterion is lost in the act of transcendence. So writers need new objectivity; they need readers who will re-establish their private worlds as their objectifications. (b) Readers Readers complete the projects of writers. Conversely however, these projects, objectified in books, do not confront readers simply as random objects, but as objects which signify human consciousness, and thus direct them. This is not to say that readers do not also create, according to their own expectations and ends, but rather that their creation is a peculiar kind of ‘directed creation’ – which, at the same time as it goes beyond the object, also preserves it as an irreducible human signification.38 (c) Communication Thus the act of communication, described from within, is an act of human commitment. It is not what one reads that is important, it is the fact that as one reads, one realises a value, a ‘perceptually renewed choice to believe’. Reading is an ‘exercise in generosity’; an activity which is a giving and taking of freedom, and may be subjectively seen as valuable in itself as an expression of community. Aesthetic joy might be understood in this way as the identity of reciprocal freedom, a feeling which arises in the subjective reader of feeling essential to an essential object. The pleasure of reading may be seen as a utopian vision of communal harmony.
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However, though inter-personal communion is undoubtedly an important feature of reading and indeed, the very centre of our social existence, it is not as idealists would have it, an end in itself. It has, of course, long been fashionable to hold this view, by which the act of reading becomes a kind of ‘pure praxis’, like lovemaking, a harmonious release of form and content, body and soul without repression or constraint. Thus Romantics argue for the ‘communion of souls’, and Freudians for ‘substitute gratification’. Such arguments, however, not only deny the reality of reading, they also deny the reality of literature. For literature, even when it seems to focus upon the means for their own sake, provides an historical and formal perspective upon the immediate situation – a kind of ‘problematic’. And it is through the ‘problematic’, which refers to external values and traditional norms, that the reader is able to ‘place’ the work from a ‘relatively autonomous perspective’. To reduce that perspective to an immediate communion with the past is the fallacy of humanism. (3) Reading culture Reading literature as culture therefore, is not reading only to exercise psycholinguistic structures, nor even to participate in the affirmation of human community. It is both these and more; being a total activity which goes beyond these conditions and thus reveals them in retrospect. It is simultaneously a progressive activity with a regressive self reflexivity. For example, a reading of Wuthering Heights will be more than a series of syntactic predictions, as a psycholinguistic ‘guessing game’. It will be, in addition, a recognition of the importance of certain formal features of the text. We will compare this novel to other novels, (for example, as to the use of the retrospective narrator, Nelly Dean, which is an unusual feature of the genre), we will become conscious of the novel’s own dialectical structure, (the antithesis of the two houses, the conflict between Heathcliff and Linton, and the problematical search for a resolution in the marriage of Hareton Earnshaw to the younger Cathy), and we will focus upon aspects of the novel’s style (the use of symbolic motifs – windows, coffins, fires, storms – and the general tight, clinical quality of the language). These mediations in our reading of the genre, structure and style are resistances presented by the text to the immediate interiorisation of its ‘meaning’. We are encouraged, through them, to question the unique aspects of this novel which have modified our reading expectations, and thus construct, for the novel, a formal ‘problematic’, in which we explore their interrelations. Furthermore, our reading will be more than a cathartic release of tension, important though this may be. It will be, in addition, a recognition of the particular ‘structure of feeling’ and thus the historical importance of certain features of discourse, or interrelation of cultural values and characteristic responses in the text. We will be impressed by the parochial vision of the work, (in which the action seldom moves from the local situation) and the extraordinarily detailed description of immediate environment (the moors, the interiors of houses), we will encounter the strangeness of the characters, (particularly the men, Heathcliff, Linton, Hindley, Hareton, even Joseph – all are extremes of one sort or another), and we will be impressed by the importance of certain themes (the supernatural, death, sexuality) which give the novel its Romantic, even Gothic atmosphere. These aspects of the ‘structure of feeling’ point of view, character, portrayal, themes, are historical mediations on our reading. We confront the novel as a historical text – (the parochial point of view is impossible in an age of mass communication, the strange portrayal of male sexuality is impossible in a co-educational, ‘permissive’ society etc.). On this basis we are
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encouraged to construct for the novel its ‘discourse’ in which we explore the interrelation of its historical ‘mediations’. In these respects, our reading of Wuthering Heights is a regressive analysis of its totality, both as a linguistic system and as a historical signification. In both cases we are referred outside the text itself, in determining the originality of the novel’s form in relation to alternative means of expression, uses of language etc., and in determining the uniqueness of its discourse in relation to alternative forms of discourse. It is therefore necessary to locate the novelist precisely to her family situation, locality, group and class as both form and discourse are specified historically. Our analysis of Wuthering Heights refers to the life of Emily Bronte herself, understands that particular lower-middle class family in relation to other similar families, analyses the lower-middle-class family as a social structure (its economic ‘level’; its, in this case, conservative politics; its, in this case, low-church Anglicanism; its cultural and education milieu; etc). Only in this detail can we account for the total, dramatic and aesthetic, tragic vision of Wuthering Heights – the extremes of conflict in both its form and discourse – and avoid simply caricaturing the novel as an expression of the parochial Romanticism of lower middle class women. Emily Bronte was able to ambiguously transcend her situation, and only by understanding what was unique about her can we do justice to her novel. Thus we are not simply interested in Wuthering Heights as a ‘document’ of the period, and we do not seek simply to reduce the novel’s special qualities. Wuthering Heights identifies, in the choice made by Cathy between Heathcliffe and Linton, (between, we might say, elemental passion and social affection) a pivotal existential dilemma. The novel’s strength is that this dilemma is elaborated as a total myth or ‘world vision’; the parochial atmosphere of the work portrays the world of the novel as the only possible world, and Cathy’s dilemma as universal. It is apparent that the mediations of the novel are rooted in Cathy’s choice. The structural antithesis of the two houses (the natural chaos of the Heights, the social order of the Grange), the various formal motifs (the window as mediation between the inner domestic world and the outer ‘beyond’, the juxtaposition of the bed and the coffin suggesting dream-fantasy as mediation between the ‘here’ life (sexual conflict) and the ‘there’ (death/sexual consummation), and the ideological themes of the novel (the choice confronts the woman as a choice between types of men, and as an absolute choice between the social and natural which cannot be satisfactorily resolved) – all these aspects totalise Cathy’s dilemma and give the novel its problematic unity as a utopian critique of social experience. In Emily Bronte’s world romantic love and social marriage are irreconcilable. The ghost of Heathcliffe haunts even the attempt at a final resolution in Hareton’s marriage to the younger Cathy, and there is no way of passing beyond the conflict between social alienation (the desire for escape) and emotional fulfilment. However, our reading is not only regressively analytical, it is also a progressive reconstitution of the present, and thus refers, not simply to the novel and its history, but also to ourselves. In so far as our reading has as its centre the reciprocal process of ‘directed creation’, we are interested in the critique of our own reading which our analysis can give, for in so far as we clarify from a ‘relatively autonomous perspective’, the structure and history of the text itself, we also clarify our own historical situation as contemporary readers. The novel itself, somewhat fortuitously, explicitly encourages us to make this critique, for its world vision is narrated by Nelly Dean in retrospect, with an in-built historical perspective. This is not to say that the narrator can be trusted, but that the connections between past and present which mediate Nelly Dean’s story make us aware of our mistrust, and thus of our relations to her and to the world of the novel. Raymond Williams suggests that
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39
Wuthering Heights can ‘teach a new feeling’. The point is not that the book itself teaches us anything, but that it encourages us to make an analysis which teaches us about ourselves. Wuthering Heights has been selected for us as one of the supreme examples of nineteenth century fiction, even by socialist critics like Williams. Undoubtedly different contemporary readers find different values in the novel, from its ‘intrinsic excellence’ to the fascination of its setting and the romance of its plot. Again, we cannot simply reduce the novel to one contemporary meaning. On the contrary, as we begin to understand the particular history of the novel, we can begin to understand the history of particular responses to it, as ‘escape’, ‘criticism of life’, or whatever. We then begin to comprehend the wider patterns of our culture to which our reading of the novel refers, we see ourselves as historical readers, and we ‘totalise’ our readings. This immediate reading of this particular novel is thus ‘placed’ as the existential foundation for an act of knowledge which goes beyond the present and constitutes the future. For as we begin to break with the individual, ideological situation, we begin to create a history for ourselves, based on knowledge of ourselves.
Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21
Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, Princeton, 1957. Simon O. Lesser, Fiction and the Unconscious, New York, 1957. Norman Holland, Dynamics of Literary Response (New York, 1968). J-P Sartre, What is Literature? London, 1950. I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, New York, 1936. I.A. Richards, Speculative Instruments, London, 1955. ‘Radio, T.V. and the screen propagate most successfully the most superficial the most facile, and the least educating elements of a culture . . . in every culture it has been the things which received the most lasting and recurrent attention – the books re-read again and again, the stories and sayings known and familiar from infancy to old age, the rites repeated throughout a lifetime, the perennial monuments, the enduring ideas the constant aesthetic institutions – which have done the most part of the work of the humanities. Mass media at present replace such continuous shaping forces by an incessantly shifting play of light and confusing impacts. It is not surprising that they are of little help in seeing life steadily and seeing it whole.’ (p. 62) I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric pp. 3–4. I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, London, 1924 ch. 7. F.R. Leavis, Education and the University, London, 1948. I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. W. Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, London, 1961 (paperback edn.). Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn, London, 1968, (paperback edn.). I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, ch. 21. F.R. Leavis, English Literature in Our Time and the University, London 1969 p. 15 I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 124–5. cf. Brooks, ‘The poem communicates so much and communicates it so richly and with such delicate qualifications that the thing communicated is mauled and distorted if we attempt to convey it by any vehicle less subtle than the poem itself.’ op. cit. p. 58. cf. J.H. Sinclair, ‘Taking a poem to pieces’, in R. Fowler, ed. Essays in Style and Language: Linguistic and Critical Approaches to Literary Style (London, 1966). Northrop Frye, ‘Polemical Introduction’, Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 15–16. Michael Riffaterre, ‘Criteria for Style Analysis’, in S. Chatman and S.R. Levin, eds. Essays on the Language of Literature, Boston 1967, pp. 412–30. ‘Our problem is to transform a fundamentally subjective reaction to style into an objective analytic tool to find the constant (encoded potentialities) beneath the variety of judgements, in short to transform value judgements into judgements of existence’. (p. 149) Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 20. See Louis Althusser, For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster, London 1969. ‘In fact Marx established
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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
33 34
35 36
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Andrew Tolson a new problematic, a new systematic way of asking questions of the world, new principles and a new method. This discovery is immediately contained in the theory of historical materialism, in which Marx did not only propose a new theory of the history of societies, but at the same time implicitly, but necessarily, a new ‘philosophy’, infinite in its implications . . . In a word, Marx substituted for the ‘ideological’ and universal concept of Feuerbachian ‘practice’ a concrete conception of the specific differences that enables us to situate each particular practice in the specific differences of the social structure.’ (p. 229) See Jean-Paul Sartre, The Problem of Method, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, London, 1963. ‘Knowing is simply the dialectical movement which explains the act by its terminal signification in terms of its starting conditions . . . The movement of comprehension is simultaneously progressive (toward the objective result) and regressive (I go back toward the original condition). (pp. 153–4). See Goodman, Kenneth, ed. The Psycholinguistic Nature of the Reading Process, Detroit, 1968; Levin, Harry & Williams, Joanna P., eds. Basic Studies in Reading, New York, 1970; Singer, Harry & Ruddell, Robert, eds., Theoretical Models and Processes of Reading, Newark, Del, 1969. See Neisser, Ulric, Cognitive Psychology, New York, 1967, especially chapters 5 and 10. Paul A. Kolers, ‘Reading a temporally and spatially transformed text’ in Goodman, op. cit. pp. 27–48. John J. Geyer, ‘Models of perceptual processes in reading’ in Singer, Ruddell, op.cit., pp. 47–94. Julian Hochberg, ‘Components of literacy: Speculations and exploratory research’ in Levin, Williams, op.cit. Hochberg calls such automatic recognition of visual cues ‘peripheral search guidance’ or ‘PSG’. See C.C. Fries, Linguistics and Reading, New York, 1963. Robert B. Ruddell, ‘Psycholinguistic implications for a systems of communication model’ in Singer, Ruddell, op.cit. pp. 239–58. David W. Reed, ‘Linguistic forms and the process of reading’ in Levin, Williams, op.cit. and ‘A theory of language, speech and writing’, in Singer, Ruddell, op.cit. pp. 219–38. Noam Chomsky, ‘Phonology and reading’, in Levin, Williams, op.cit. Kenneth S. Goodman, ‘Reading: a psycholinguistic guessing game’, in Singer, Ruddell, op.cit. pp. 259–71. ‘Reading is a selective process. It involves partial use of available language cues selected from perceptual input on the basis of the reader’s expectation. As this partial information is processed, tentative decisions are made to be confirmed rejected or refined as reading progresses’. (p. 260) J. Katz & J. Fodor, ‘The structure of a semantic theory’ in Katz and Fodor, eds. The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964. Noam Chomsky: Language and Mind, New York, 1968. Chomsky’s tentative hypothesis that syntactic structure is psycholinguistically reflected in mental structure is methodologically unsound, since it involves reducing those psycholinguistic mechanics concerned with the perception of language (e.g. in the process of acquiring language) to the structure of language itself. That is to say, Chomsky works from the ‘answer’ to the ‘questions’, from the ‘given facts’ of syntactic structure to a description of how that structure is perceived. This procedure is reflected in the nature of ‘the facts’ themselves – highly formal examples of ambiguity and anomaly – which support rather than test his theory of deep and surface psycholinguistic structures. Chomsky thus falls into the ideological trap of the ‘behaviourists’ he criticises. He fails to treat his data (syntactic structures) critically (in relation to its problematic); rather, he generalises from one set of problems to another. Piaget, Jean, The Language and Thoughts of the Child, London, 1959 (3rd edn), and Six Psychological Studies, London, 1968. Vygotsky, L.S., Thought and Language, Cambridge, Mass, 1962. Genetic epistemology avoids the fallacies of transformational psycholinguistics because it studies the perception of language in the context of the perception of other experience. The linguistic text is not given privileged status, and so it cannot be argued that the structures of the text are the structures of the mind. The confrontation of the two (language and mind) is a social encounter which the child makes in acquiring language. See Sartre, Jean-Paul, What is Literature? London, 1967 (paperback edn), especially chapter 2: ‘Reading seems, in fact, to be the synthesis of perception and creation. It supposes the essentiality of both the subject and the object. The object is essential because it is strictly transcendent, because it imposes its own structures, and because one must wait for it and observe it; but the subject is also
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essential because it is required not only to disclose the object (that is, to make it possible for there to be an object) but also so that this object might exist absolutely (that is, to produce it) . . . The reader must invent . . . in a continual exceeding of the written thing. To be sure, the author guides him, but all he does is guide him. The landmarks he sets up are separated by the void. The reader must unite them; he must go beyond them. In short, reading is directed creation’. (pp. 30–1). 38 Williams, Raymond: The Long Revolution, London, Penguin, 1965, chapter 2. ‘. . . here most distinctly, the changing organisation is enacted in the organism; the new generation responds in its own ways to the unique world it is inheriting, taking up many continuities, that can be traced, and reproducing many aspects of the organisation, which can be separately described, yet feeling its whole life in certain ways differently, and shaping its creative response into a new structure of feeling’ (p. 65). 39 Ibid., pp. 75–6, 85–6.
4
Notes on a theory of genre Alf Louvre
The problem From messianic theatrical liberators through to sober reflexive Marxists, the aestheticians of the left, with a few prominent exceptions, have consistently failed to develop a theory that adequately and consistently describes the relations between imaginative form and its social determinants. (1) Marxist critics (Goldmann is a particularly able exponent) are interested primarily in the world-view implicit in the art-work, rather than in how its form affects the communication and reception of that view. There is no realisation that what the artist says – and how it is received – must always be influenced by the cultural context. To take the example of ‘realism’ – there are barriers between the perception and the communication of ‘reality’, and the mode the artist chooses for his communication is potentially the biggest barrier of all (the most concrete expression of his cultural context). The ‘realist’ cannot simply escape this, cannot be a special exception, and so far as that is the explanation offered for his position, it points to a failure in the theory’s description of the norm. Lukacs, to put this another way, is aware of the constrictions of the naturalistic or the modernistic forms of the novel, but not at all of the constrictions of the novel-form as such: the theory of realism, failing to confront these, is a plea not an explanation. (2) Theatrical liberators like Baxandall, Poirier and Sontag1 attempt to destroy the distinctions maintained by the traditional culture – that between art as a special activity and other social activity; between the theatre (or the novel) as a special place and other places in the community; between the artist as a gifted performer and the audience as passive spectators; between consciousness and action, politics and play. But their argument – art defined as a special displaced, professional discipline is reactionary; art understood as the negation of these qualities must be revolutionary – describes necessary rather than sufficient conditions. Between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘revolution’, indeed between all the categories they seek to unite, come all sorts of mediations that cannot be rhetorically asserted away. To put this another way, one does not solve the problem of the relations between imaginative form and social determinations by simply collapsing the terms together, by saying the imagination and the forms it invents, once free from its by now traditional alienation, is implicitly social, and indeed determines society (which in turn is understood as our collective imagination). What is involved in that ‘once free’, just how much freedom the imaginative form has in relation to its social context, how far formal innovations can influence social innovation are precisely the questions at issue, and once again these theorists plead a case rather than explain the problems whose solution their case presupposes. (3) To a large, and fatal, extent these radical aesthetics reflect the traditional attitudes to
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form and genre (terms we temporarily group together here for convenience). On one hand the established criticism understands genre as a means of making technical distinctions between objects in a set field on the basis of formal constitution – so ‘drama’, ‘poetry’, ‘the novel’ etc. (an approach that is prominent, even in negation, in the liberators’ position). On the other hand, in cultural criticism, and in relation to the popular arts, there is an approach that stresses genre as a product determined by extra-technical, extra-formal considerations – so, ‘thriller’, ‘musical’, ‘romance’ and ‘pop’ are seen as market commodities (just as in Lukacs and Gorky, certain artistic forms are seen as directly determined by the social milieu). Common to both versions of the traditional and both versions of the radical approach is the fixed nature of the relations posited between imaginative form and social determination. Formalists and liberators share a belief in the autonomy of the imaginative form; reflexive Marxists and conventional cultural sociologists a belief in the determining force of socio-economic structures and their supportive philosophies (except in a few rare cases where the Great Realist resists the flood). (4) There is a space between theories of the autonomy of form and theories of its absolute determination, between theories that make the artist central and her or his work normal, and those that make him marginal and his work special – a space where the problematic nature of the relation between the imagination and social determination is asserted. I shall claim that the relation between these is a version of that described by the Marxist model of base (means of production) and superstructure (culture, law, morality etc.), but that it is a distortion to relate forms back directly to social production as a whole, just as it is to suggest that artistic forms can themselves direct those forces. Developing the clue contained in all the radical and the traditional critiques – that there is a direct relation between how one sees the relation between imagination and social determination and how one defines genre – I aim to sketch a theory of genre that will define the relative autonomy of the art-work and its special determinations, a theory, in other words, that will allow the problematic nature of that relation. As such I confront three closely-connected tasks: (1) a definition of the term that reorients it, allowing it to cross barriers between arbitrary formal classifications, and that shows no inherent necessity for genre to be reducible to commodity or ‘inevitable expression’; (2) to describe the historical sequence of the formation of particular genres, what their genesis is and how they relate to the culture as a whole; (3) to understand the possibilities and the limitations of radical generic innovation.
The model (5) First, we can describe the role we assign to genre by reference to the planes of traditional criticism, which are: at one extreme (horizontal, sociological): art as production in a conventional sense, the sociological study of the totality of output from theatre, publisher and film-producer, the means of distribution, who owns the outlets, who selects the goods, the composition of the consumers, who and what they are, and what value they attribute to the product. Relations between institutions at all these stages, and between them and other social factors (like technology, class, patterns of work and leisure), the other (vertical, formalistic): the speciality of artistic production, what influences the particular creation and reception of a single artifact or experience, what are the internal determinants of a production, the immanent possibilities of form. In this context genre can be inserted as the essential mediating term between those two planes: as a means of measurement, a guide to what the popular, and I would say, socially significant art is; as the effective ‘raw material’ received by the artist, the
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socially-agreed definition of his product, the way he experiences most directly the social determination, and thus the basis of any radical response; because (lastly) changes in the genre, redefinitions of form, imply the relocation of the audience and thus lead back to external sociological changes. Contemporary Black dramatists, for example, understand that the internal innovations in the plays’ forms will make it impossible to perform them in conventional theatre and will necessitate getting an audience on the street, which in its turn will mean alterations in the leisure habits of the community, and so on.2 Reciprocally, changes in exterior sociological formations will have their influence on form (see Ian Watt on the novel, Benjamin and Brecht on the cinema, and Helga Gallas’ article in this journal). (6) In this description there is embedded a more theoretical account of the function of the genre, and in attempting to articulate this we are led beyond the conventional approaches and indeed beyond the majority of the approaches from the left to a radical-Marxist formulation whose ideas it is now relevant to take up. I have in mind in particular the work of those ‘prominent exceptions’, Brecht, Benjamin and more lately, Enzensberger.3 These writers do recognise how far generic responses to the form of the work (or production) condition and contain responses to its content (or its ‘realism’), but they do so without moving from that recognition to a pure formalism. The central element in the theories of these men, in emphasising which they avoid both the fixed positions we have criticised, is on the lived relation between the producer and consumer of the art-work. Studying that, they develop psychologies of aesthetic involvement (built on such distinctions as empathy/alienation, absorption/distraction, emotion/intellect and worship/use). And eventually, genres come to be defined in terms of the relations they imply between the audience and the artist. These relations in turn are taken as paradigms for the social function of art. Concentrating less on the psychological state of mind involved in certain genres than on their social and political implications (as the above writers often do), and emphasising the historical rather than the methodological meaning of ‘essential mediation’, we can arrive at the following formulation: that genre is the result of the interraction between the particular author (or producing group) and the productive means in her or his society, that genre embodies the social relations of production. Applied to the cultural sphere as in some ways distinct from general economic production (how distinct itself being a crucial question), we get the following:
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Notes to the model
(1) Form here refers to the internal conceptions of the artist, as distinct from their objectification in any particular mode. This use is to be distinguished from that of the formalists, who, by collapsing these two aspects of the creative process, exaggerate the autonomy of the individual artist, and minimise the extent to which the objectification in any established genre can be felt as a loss. (2) As a whole this diagram is meant to suggest the relative autonomy of the cultural sphere, the resemblance between internal relations there and internal relations within the general economic sphere (rather than any complete disjunction, or complete identity). At which of the three levels in the diagram the cultural sphere is determined (to whatever extent) by the economic sphere is, of course, the crucial question. At this stage we can dissociate ourselves from the position of conventional historians (which emphasises the overriding influence of philosophical, cultural currents on the art-works in a society, without worrying about what influences those currents) and from the – equally static – obverse of this that sees the cultural sphere (directly connected with Philosophy, Law etc) as a direct ideological expression of the economic base. Our focus is mostly on the intermediary level, on the connections between relations of production in the various spheres.
Application (7) At first sight this diagram seems to reinforce the more deterministic readings of generic production – and the conservative possibilities of genre do need to be recognised. For example: there is an oppressive element in the establishment of a particular generic tradition. The moment of public recognition of an art-work as belonging to a ‘genre’ is in fact the moment of consolidation of a particular set of productive relations within the culture, and that consolidation in its turn ‘fixes’ the genre, makes it more mechanical, increases the likelihood of it becoming a commodity only marginally different from those in the general economic sphere. It is this consolidating – and therefore conservative – response to established relations of production, in fact, that underlies the predominantly commercial manufacture of thrillers, romances and pop: a manufacture so predominant that it becomes, precisely, a business. And so predominant, too, that it leads to critics responding to the idea of genre only as a particular, fixed, rather than problematic category – quite simply as co-extensive with commodity. Even without this extreme form of generic manufacture, there will always be a direct connective between productive relations within the cultural sphere and productive relations in the general economic sphere. We can express this relation in several ways. Firstly that the form particular genres take is not determined (in style, plot and characterisation) simply by internal considerations, but that all those aspects of its design will cohere in a structure that indicates either directly or by omission the structure of the society as a whole (and, in particular, that reflects the artist’s assigned or agreed function within the author’s creation of the work, we can discern the same infiltration of the aesthetic by the social and the economic. The point being that in their phenonemological reactions (to the physical characteristics of the book as a book, or the film as a film) and in their ideological reactions (issuing from a particular ‘set’ of mind), the audiences’ responses (responses that contain and often negate more disciplined, aesthetic reactions to ‘style’ or ‘content’) will form a pattern closely resembling their responses to manufactured objects in the general sphere. The audience is not after all entering a new world when it encounters the work of art in its prescribed leisure-time, and the ‘relations of consumption’ prevalent
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elsewhere (the need for a certain product, appropriated in a certain way, with a certain regularity) can be expected to assert themselves here. (8) To develop the positive aspect of genre theory, to describe the extent to which there are at certain stages areas of negotiation between the author and the social forces surrounding him (however heavily weighted toward a certain outcome), we need some account of the possibilities of less conservative, more progressive responses to the received genre. Wild, cryptic and emotional as he is, Caute takes us to the centre of the problem in this passage from The Illusion: I do not propose that playwrights should avoid such subjects as colonial Africa or Vietnam, but I do propose that they remember that what emerges is not the subject but the content, that is to say the subject mediating and mediated by the artistic form: and I propose also that they make the first target of their commitment, the structure of our consciousness, the way we think, know, feel, listen and respond. For the committed writer, reinforcing the conventional left-liberal righteousness about this or that contemporary issue is both a waste of time and a lost opportunity. As writer and as artist he will do better to commit his language and his art to the erection of new playgrounds in the cities of the mind, the imagination and the emotions.4 We notice here the same concern for the effects of the artistic form that we see in Brecht and Benjamin, the same refusal to consider the subject of a work in a pure isolation impossible to achieve. We need however to relocate Caute’s idea about making the ‘first target of (artistic) commitment the structure of our consciousness, the way we feel, listen and respond etc.’ for in this passage (though this is not true for other parts of the book) he presents this idea very much in a vacuum. ‘What sort of thinking, knowing and feeling?’ we are inclined to ask, or, ‘how will the new playgrounds in the cities of the mind function so as to avoid perpetuating what Meszaros denounces as the “egoistical consumption” of the art-work?’ The vagueness and the idealism are eliminated if we assert (as Caute sometimes does) that what should be the subjects of our new feeling, thinking and knowing are precisely the relations between ourselves as an audience and the author as producer, the relations of cultural production. If we recognise that those relations exert a profound influence on the structures of our consciousness (aesthetic, intellectual and creative) and say that the function of the new playgrounds in the cities of the mind will be to rethink those relations, then we can indeed avoid simply sophisticating individual consumption. Tackling the structure of our consciousness is for us indistinguishable from throwing those relations into question. The value of a term-like structure of consciousness is that it brings to mind half-conscious or habitual or subliminal responses to the phenomenology of the object (or action). While the duplication of those responses in the cultural or aesthetic sphere is at once the most conservative and the most deterministic element in our theory of genre, it is precisely at that point that the artist can make his radical insertion, can reformulate his genre in ways that deny the satisfaction of expectations deriving from any such structure of consciousness (itself substantially conditioned by the dominance of previous genres). Placing Caute’s statement in this sort of context, we can use it to dismiss as inadequate those radical artistic responses that do not address themselves to the structure of consciousness (and beyond that to the relations of production) predominant in their own – cultural – sphere, but instead seek only to present a new content within the old relations. The implication of such a position being that only political changes in the general economic sphere are important, and that art should rightfully subordinate itself as propaganda to
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those goals. We shall see shortly in relation to Enzensberger’s article that far from minimising the importance of the relations of cultural production, some theorists suggest that stresses and contradictions within the cultural sphere may in fact be more developed than in the economic sphere as a whole, and therefore should be developed, revealed and exploited in their own right. While recognising the cultural sphere as special this approach suggests that it may in fact be in the political vanguard (given certain historical conjunctions), thus greatly emphasising the importance of generic changes, which become the guide and precursor of changes elsewhere. (9) Between the attitude of socialist realists and that of a critic like Enzensberger comes the most substantial body of critical and creative work related to generic innovation, work that gives rise to those ‘self-conscious’, ‘dialectic’ and – most frequent label – ‘alienated’ art-forms, the most developed of which was Brecht’s epic theatre. The Brechtian epic attempted to dissolve the compulsions that defined the previous role of artist and audience – via the relegation of perfections of form (in the well-made play) and performance (in the realistic, engaging drama). The art-work was to be a functional (if entertaining) exercise for the audience as social group – participating by completing its thesis – rather than an icon for an individual under its spell. This reformulation of the relations between producer and consumer is to be seen, partly at least, as Brecht’s response to the new means of cultural production in the media then coming into prominence, means that would anyway have altered those relations. (‘The old forms of communication are not unaffected by the development of new ones, nor do they survive alongside them’.5 ) On this basis we can compare Brecht’s ideas about how they be changed with those of Benjamin and Enzensberger (critics whose central interest is in the potentiality of new productive means). All of them emphasise the necessary destruction of what Benjamin calls the ‘aura’ of the work of art (in Brecht this aura involves mimesis and catharsis, in Benjamin uniqueness, in Enzensberger expertise); they also stress the necessary supersession of the restricted, specialised nature of artistic production, and encourage the mutual participation of artist and audience. But they do so in different ways and to different extents, and the differences between them are as important as the similarities, for they provide us with an effective gradation of the radical response to genre. To compare Brecht and Benjamin, for instance, is to notice how far the older relations of cultural production still influence the former, as indeed do the socialist realist responses to them. For Brecht still acknowledges the need for an independent author (even if he is only doing the social work he is most suited for), and – the implication of his open-ended epic submitted to the critical intelligence of the audience – his art still presents itself as secondary, posing problems for solution elsewhere. In questioning the relations of production within certain limits (but not questioning the need of artist and audience as such), and in giving the theatre essentially a critical, negating, question-raising function (rather than making it, like Benjamin’s cinema, a medium where completely new relations were enacted) Brecht exemplifies the fact that there is always a tendency even when making progressive responses to the genre to duplicate outworn relations. Indeed there have been cases (e.g. the auteur theories of the cinema) where the potential of the new means of production has been resisted, where the deliberate attempt has been to contain them within previously established (in that case literary) relations. (10) In moving from Brecht to Benjamin and Enzensberger we seem to move into a qualitatively more radical position, even though these critics stress precisely the same elements as he did – the emergence of new media and the necessary reformulation of relations as a result.
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There is a common determination in these writers not to respond to the new means of production with the categories provided by the old, but to make as positive an interpretation as possible of the electronic media. Benjamin therefore questions the function of absorbed contemplation rather than taking it as a necessary a priori for aesthetic response, and Enzensberger fights against the romantic and the ‘conspiratorial’ reactions of the left to the new media, asserting that the media’s importance (even in their current deprived form) corresponds to real human, rather than manufactured, needs; together they argue for the superiority of verbal over written expression, for the existence of public demands which only the progressive use of the media can satisfy, and for the historical advantages to be derived from the new mode of appropriating the artwork. A sustained attempt is made to clear the ground, to explode the preconceptions of former, more literary, relations (involving the artist as individual genius, the art-work as magical entity and the audience as dutifully disciplined and passive receivers). Equally prominent, however, is their realisation that the right receptive attitude to the new means of production is not itself sufficient, that the media’s progressive use is not guaranteed simply by changes in the creator’s and the audience’s predispositions. Benjamin, for example, carefully describes how the Fascists are abusing the potential of the new media (by offering spectacle rather than real participation), and Enzensberger, going one step further, formulates the reasons why any established political force tends to thwart the potential of new productive means. Together, then, ‘The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, and ‘Constituents of a Theory of the Media’ sketch out the essential role and the necessary restrictions of generic innovation: ‘One of the foremost tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which will only be fully satisfied later. The history of every art form shows critical epochs in which a certain art form aspires to effects which could be fully obtained only with changed technical standards, that is to say, a new art form.’6 In asserting that each art strives toward its own future, Benjamin implicitly provides a standard by which to measure aesthetic innovation, namely, does it hasten the arrival of that future – but simultaneously, he makes it clear that the task is not simply one of aesthetic innovation. There must be a technology developed enough to sustain the new art, and the new productive relations underlying it, and there must be a political climate receptive to rather than repressive of the innovations. Another common element in their work is a certain vision of the achieved future (the product of these formal, technological and political changes). When Benjamin says, ‘For the tasks which confront the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means . . . by contemplation alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the guidance of tactile appropriation’7; when Enzensberger says ‘For the first time in history, the media are making possible mass participation in a social and socialised productive process, the practical means of which are in the hands of the masses themselves’,8 when both argue that the electronic media answer certain needs – to be recorded and to give voice – that are as substantial as material ones, they are in effect describing not only the penetration of the cultural sphere by technological means, but the eventual inseparability of the cultural from the general sphere of production. And, crucially, the spheres will eventually be indistinguishable not because of the conformity of the relations and objects within the cultural sphere to the patterns prevalent in the general economic sphere, but the reverse. Thus the way in which the masses make use of the new artistic genres will provide a model for appropriation elsewhere, and the relations of cultural production necessary for the realisation of the new media’s potential, will provide a model for the relations of production elsewhere. It would be simplistic, of course, to suggest that the cultural sphere (and thus generic changes)
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has a straightforwardly determining role in these men’s work: we need essentially to keep in mind their realisation that these cultural changes are themselves finally dependent upon the availability of technology and on changes in the political sphere that will permit its full exploitation. Superimposing their sense of the potential and the limitations of generic change within the culture on their vision of an achieved future, what emerges is a dialectical model of the interraction of cultural and economic spheres: should the potential of productive means within the culture be allowed full scope (which would involve massive political and economic changes) they would in their turn be the precursors of further political and economic reorganisation . . . and the eventual collapse of distinctions. Which makes that famous passage in Marx’s German Ideology a little less abstract: Whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he pleases, production as a whole is regulated by society, thus making it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, in accordance with my inclination, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.9 This future collapse of distinctions reminds us, too, of Meszaros’ argument in Marx’s Theory of Alienation – which is exactly that a communist society would go beyond the simple satisfaction of material needs beyond the forced and artificial division of labour, to ‘the emancipation of the human senses’, to a mode of production that would be ‘free activity, an adequate fulfilment of the rich human being’, to production that would be essentially (as we now use the words) ‘cultural’ and ‘aesthetic’. Marx’s conception of art aims at adding a new dimension to human life, in order to transform it in its totality through the fusion of this new dimension with all the other human life-activities. In this conception artistic production and consumption become inseparable elements of the same life-activity which can be described as the practical aesthetic self-education of man.10 (11) The value of this theory of genres – so far as it is comprehensible! – is that it indicates the direction of the work to be done here and now, in the time between our era and this visionary future. Hopefully, the range of responses we’ve tried to ‘place’ – from the socialist realist, through Caute’s emphasis on the ‘structure of consciousness’ and dialectical writing, Brecht’s theory of alienation and Benjamin’s interpretation of mechanical reproduction to Enzenberger’s reading of the new electronic media . . . will have made clear the extent to which artistic innovation can prepare for the correct utilisation of new means of production. By developing this view of generic change – as neither irrelevant nor absolutely determining, but as crucial in anticipating or delaying essential changes in the relations of cultural production (a production which itself can influence the direction of production in the society as a whole), it may be possible to evolve a consistent revolutionary artistic practice. At the least, these notes should cancel out the impression of the total separation of present and future, and the lack of any activist function for art (that one is left with after reading the reflexive Marxists), and the impression of the future as achieved and of the boundless importance of the aesthetic (that one gets from the liberators’ proclamations).
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Appendix For the old-fasioned ‘artist’ – let us call him the author – it follows from these reflections that he must see it as his goal to make himself redundant as a specialist in much the same way as a teacher of literacy only fulfills his task when he is no longer necessary. Like every learning process, this process too is reciprocal. The specialist will learn as much from the non-specialist as the other way round. Only then can he contrive to make himself dispensable. Meanwhile his social usefulness can best be measured by the degree to which he is capable of using the liberating factors in the media and bringing them to fruition. The tactical contradiction in which he must become involved in the process can neither be denied nor covered up in any way. But strategically his role is clear. The author has to work as the agent of the masses. He can lose himself in them only when they become authors themselves, the authors of history.11 While this imperative does follow from Enzensberger’s – and our – reflections, one key question remains, namely, what are the forces that make the author’s response to generic change less or more radical, less or more conservative? The effect of phrasing the imperative in the way Enzensberger does, is to balance the technological determination and the inevitable victory of the masses against the personality of the particular author (obeying or not obeying the imperative): one wishes the relations between the determinations and the personality had been made more explicit, for the danger is that either one or the other will be seen as the wholly predominant cause, and that we will thereby arrive back at the fixed versions of the relations between imaginative form and the social determination that we set out to transcend. We can only take note of this aspect of the problem here and, tentatively, suggest the beginning of a solution. Namely: if the problematic relation between imaginative form and the social determination is itself only a reflection of the problematic relation between the whole sphere of cultural production and the whole sphere of production in general, then it may be that in different historical epochs in which the overall social importance of the cultural sphere varies, the likelihood of radical or conservative responses to generic change will accordingly grow or be reduced. How far this is true might be established by an investigation of the generic changes (and the implicit accompanying changes in the function of the culture) that occurred within a particular economic era. The following schema of generic changes in a less than epochal economic span (the last 150 years or so) is offered simply as speculative and heuristic. As for using its categories to define any individual writer’s ‘conservatism’ or ‘radicalism’, or for developing conclusions about the respective responsibility of the author and the socio-economic determinants for initiating generic developments . . . these are projects in which this author respectfully invites his reader’s productive participation. ROMANCE (as a response to the growth of industrial production; see Abrams). Art as the lamp rather than the mirror, but after its losing battle with the ethics of industrialism, as the lamp whose light goes out . . . eventually, art as the antique lamp, a special object deified in what Benjamin calls the ‘cult of beauty’. The artist, once an alternative, is now the exception. The audience looks on, wonders at, is dominated by the object and its maker. GOTHIC (and the cycle of overproduction, see Ruskin’s speeches to the businessmen of Bradford). The debunking, exaggerating form attacking both the myths of society and those of a glorified art. Its changeability, while preventing the glorification of the object and the stability of an audience that knows what to expect, yet prevents, too, any systematic critique.
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This, plus the attention to myth, means a further drift from the social world into exotica, erotica and primitivism, while the predilection of the audience for a ‘finished product’ and the artist as straight saviour mean a continual misrepresentation of its politics, the inflation rather than the deflation of the artist, the reading of sensational means as ends . . . the confirmation of Wordsworth’s insight, that Gothic sensationalism as a response to the decay of sensibility, only further compounds the ill. EPIC (and economic depression; see Brecht’s theatre between the wars in Germany). The attempted dissolution of the compulsions that defined the artist and audience, via the relegation of the perfections of form (in the ‘well-made play’), and performance (in the engaging, realistic drama). The art-work as a functional (if entertaining) intellectual exercise, for the audience as a social group, participating in completing its thesis, rather than an icon mystifying the individual under its spell, but still an art that acknowledges the need for an independent author, even if he is merely doing the social work he is most suited for, and, an art that still presents itself as secondary, posing problems for answer elsewhere. CLASSIC (and a socialist economy?). Film and the electronic media. The potential union of specialised and normal productive forces (the cultural and the economic sphere) brought on by the technological saturation of these media. Even more so than with the theatre, the end of the special individual artist. While presently the most exclusive and specialised – not to say privileged – art form, it is potentially (the common production of everyone’s film commune) the form that will demolish the producer/consumer, artist/audience distinction and allow the integration of art and society (technique rather than genius being its requirement), though integration as a rational problem-solving group, rather than as a primitive magical tribe.
Notes 1 Baxandall’s Dramaturgy of Radical Activity, Poirier’s The Performing Self, and Sontag’s Against Interpretation. 2 See, for a full discussion of these developments, Ed Bullin’s edition of the Tulane Drama Review on Black Drama. 3 Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ in Arendt’s collection of his essays, Illuminations, New York, Schoken, 1969; his ‘Artist as Producer’ in N.L.R. no. 62; Enzensberger’s ‘Constituents of a Theory of the Media’ in N.L.R., no. 64; Brecht’s theoretical writings are collected by Peter Willett in Brecht on Theatre, New York, Hill & Wang, 1964. 4 David Caute, The Illusion, London, Panther, 1972, p. 227. 5 Brecht/Willett, op.cit. p. 47. 6 Benjamin, ‘Work of Art . . .’, op.cit. p. 237. 7 Ibid, p. 240. 8 Enzensberger, op.cit. p. 15. 9 Marx, Sociology and Social Philosophy, edited by Bottomore & Rubel, Penguin, 1956, pp. 110–11. 10 Meszaros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation, London, Merlin, 1970, p. 214. 11 Enzensberger, op.cit. p. 36.
5
Walter Greenwood Working-class writer Stuart Laing
The purpose of this article is to present some reflections on two books by Walter Greenwood – Love on the Dole, his first novel published in 1933 and There was a Time, his autobiography, published in 1967.1 These reflections will have two aims. They will first try to pinpoint and clarify certain theoretical questions concerning the relationship between cultural studies and literary criticism. Also they will offer some observations on the nature of Greenwood’s work itself and its place in an understanding of the 1920s and 1930s. This study is then, initially, comparative. Faced with two texts which present substantially similar events and experiences (growing up in Salford in the early twentieth century), the preliminary task is to specify their similarities and differences. However I want to consider first the differing forms through which these events and experiences are mediated rather than comparing directly the parallels of content. Before examining these parallels, the problem of how to ‘read’ an autobiography as opposed to a novel must be faced.
Autobiography Subjective meaning A fundamental problem in cultural studies as a whole is the recovery of subjective meaning – how to gather and evaluate accounts of subjective experience. Such experience is important – not however because through it we are able to reconstruct an ‘objective reality’ (as a historian might use newspaper reports or diaries critically in order to discover what ‘really’ happened) – nor because of any inherent need to contact human beings directly rather than to work with public artefacts or collective institutions. Both of these are legitimate aims, but such experience is valuable primarily because it is itself part of any total account of human activity (whether studied under the name of history, society or culture). That is to say that we must take seriously not merely how any event can be reconstructed in its entirety, but also the way in which people experienced that event and, using this experience, tried to act upon it. Our ability now to demonstrate the inadequacy of this experience to the complexity of the event in no way destroys the importance of that experience as part of human history. Once again it must be stressed that such experience can never be collected unmediated. Even in the case of contemporary studies, using the methods of depth interview or participant observation the very process of collection and presentation of the experience will necessarily influence the resulting formal testimony. Historical studies more obviously use structured documents and, whether these are diaries, letters or autobiographies, in each case the relative degree of public presentation of the material will have to be taken into account. Greenwood’s autobiography initially enters the field of cultural studies in relation to this
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problem. It represents not an attempt to describe the whole situation of a working-class community (although it clearly contributes to such a description), but rather an account of how that situation was experienced and of how that experience is remembered thirty years later. The real 1930s Greenwood’s autobiography has then a certain status as a specific kind of text – its medium standing in a particular formal relation to its content. Consider a group of books all attempting to reflect similar content: The Classic Slum, Britain in the 1930s, Uses of Literacy, The Road to Wigan Pier,2 all of these try in various ways to present accounts of working-class life in the inter-war years. The first two are frankly academic works – deliberate attempts, using a variety of materials and sources to present the whole situation, although at different levels (The Classic Slum is a close study of Greenwood’s own Salford from 1900–25). For these writers, chronological distance from the subject has distinct advantages – both technically (time for the accumulation and sifting of available evidence) and also in terms of the greater ease with which the period can be labelled as such, with a definitive beginning and end. Hoggart’s book, on the other hand, uses and acknowledges directly a foundation of personal experience (I am talking about Part One). However, it is not autobiography but rather a distinctive kind of analytical work which depends for its evidence predominantly on a blend of direct observation and personal experience. Orwell’s work has a different perspective again; it is conscious participant observation both when Orwell is posing as a poor lodger and when he is explicitly the reporter observing the miners at work. All of these are ‘true’ accounts of the situation (as against the fictional novel), but clearly they all contain different perspectives and purposes; their accounts, that is, are not so much rival versions of a non-problematic ‘real’ life of the 1920s and 30s, as different ways of bringing that reality into articulate being. Greenwood’s autobiography is yet another, but even here there can be no simple labelling of it as one person’s experience which has much the same value as that of any other. It is a very different kind of book from a contemporary autobiography such as B.L. Coombes’ These Poor Hands,3 an account of mining in South Wales, published by the Left Book Club in 1939. Greenwood’s autobiography traces his life up to the publication of his first novel in 1933, but the writing of the book took place in the 1960s and this influences it throughout. It is not just the concluding chapter (written as though re-visiting Salford in the mid 1960s), nor the retrospective glosses (as in a joke about the discovery of D.D.T.), but rather the whole conception of the book itself which makes the time of its composition important. The title There Was a Time invokes Wordsworth’s praise of the glorious days of childhood, but does so in a full awareness of itself. The lines cited are: There was a time when meadow, grove and stream, The earth and every common sight, To me did seem Apparelled in a celestial light, The glory and the freshness of a dream.4 The key-word is ‘seem’. Greenwood guards against nostalgia not by attempting to eradicate it, but by acknowledging it as a genuine emotion. He gives it its proper place, by stressing that it refers not to the 1920s in Salford, but to his own experience and memory of childhood.
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The deliberate recognition of the nostalgic element has a purpose similar to Hoggart’s discussion of the autobiographical element in The Uses of Literacy. Hoggart notes: ‘The reader sees what is intended to be said and also from the tone, from the unconscious emphases and the rest, he comes to know the man saying it.’5 It is not this alone. The reader is also able to re-apply his knowledge of ‘the man saying it’ in terms of a critical examination of the book’s content. In both the cases of Hoggart and Greenwood, there is a self-presentation which invites this critical reading and which draws attention to the problems of autobiographical writing. There Was a Time is then no pure reflection either of the ‘real life’ of the Salford working-class community, or even of Greenwood’s own experience; it is a complex document of which all the contributing elements must be recognised.
The novel: Theoretical questions Truth and fiction Greenwood’s autobiography discusses his life up to the time of the acceptance of his first novel, Love on the Dole, in 1933 – a life which also provided the material for that novel. The novel itself was initially and is still regarded as a semi-documentary work. The back cover of the recent paperback edition, for example, compares it to Cathy Come Home. Ronald Blythe, in his idiosyncratic and anecdotal book The Age of Illusion claims that: people who went to see plays like Love on the Dole did so from the same sense of social duty as might have made them undertake district visiting, not because they thought for one moment that such material . . . had anything to do with going to the theatre.6 Orwell, writing in the 1930s in The Road to Wigan Pier tends to confirm Blythe’s assessment, if not his valuation of the nature of the response to Greenwood’s book and subsequent play. Everyone who saw Greenwood’s play Love on the Dole must remember that dreadful moment when the poor, good stupid working man beats the table and cries out, ‘O God, send me some work!’ This was not dramatic exaggeration, it was a touch from life.7 Orwell’s emphasis in this last sentence is necessary; he must paradoxically stress the truth of this fiction in order to make his point which is a polemical, not a literary-critical one. From the latter standpoint, of course, his remarks derive from a naive approach which sees the value of literature as residing in its accurate portrayal of this or that detail or individual situation drawn from contemporary social life. Sophisticated literary critics attack this view of literature (sometimes pilloried as the ‘sociological’ approach) because of its denial of the creative role of the writer; they stress instead the degree of literature’s freedom from influence by material and social conditions. Above all they argue that it is in the work’s organization, its transmitted values and formal or thematic unity, that its importance is to be located. All of these are understood as universal values which transcend the specific social situation in which it was written and come to exist in ‘an ideal realm of being’. The survival and popularity of works beyond their immediate period and their contribution to a national cultural heritage or tradition add weight to this theoretical position which is at the basis of the autonomous study of literary works. The result has been that in English critical writing,
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until very recently, there has been an unspoken assumption of the existence of a clear division between a sociological approach to literature and literary-critical analysis. Elsewhere in this journal, the major trends in a more recent approach are examined. This approach, under the general title of the sociology of literature, has attempted to resolve the earlier opposition made between the study of a literary work as social phenomenon, and analysis of its ‘timeless’ creative quality. As Istvan Meszaros defines it, the required resolution depends on ‘the idea of a historically-developing social consciousness’, since that concept supersedes the older, felt opposition between the historical and the universal. From that starting-point, universality could be conceived as inherent in, and not opposed to, dynamically evolving particularity. Thus the specific historical identity of, for instance, a particular work of art could be recognised to be not the negation of ‘universality’, but, on the contrary, its realisation.8 This line of theoretical development, beginning (say, in the work of Williams and Goldmann9 the task of understanding literature as a social phenomenon without disregarding its status as art, has been noted here since, although Love on the Dole clearly offers a wealth of specific detail concerning working-class life in the 1930s, it may well be that, if the full significance of the novel is to be recognised, analysis must take place at the level of its narrative, fictional organisation. There may, after all, be no need to apologise for ‘dramatic exaggeration’. The dole and the means test Before proceeding to detailed analysis of the two works, it may be helpful to outline the sequence of historical events which forms the background to both the latter parts of the novel and the autobiography and also the moment of the novel’s appearance. In 1929 the second Labour government (like the first a minority government) had been elected under the leadership of Ramsay Macdonald. However this government proved unable to take action to cope with the economic slump and a situation of impending wage cuts and growing unemployment prevailed. By 1931, the Cabinet was split on whether to take firm measures to curb government expenditure, particularly with regard to unemployment benefit. On 24 August 1931, Macdonald allied himself and some of his colleagues with Conservatives and Liberals to form a National Government which was to implement cuts in wages and unemployment benefit. At a subsequent general election on 27 October 1931, the National Government won 556 seats to Labour’s 46. The Labour party, however, although losing 200 seats retained 30% of the votes. This National Government survived until 1935 and then again was in office from 1935–9, although in these latter stages under Baldwin and Chamberlain it was a more openly Conservative administration. In relation to Love on the Dole, of particular interest are the measures relating to the unemployed. In August 1931, unemployment ran at a level of 2.7 million – about 20% of all insured men. Harry Hardcastle, the semi-autobiographical anti-hero of the novel is described as one of these – ‘a unit of the spectral army of three million lost men’.10 At this time the benefit for a single man was seventeen shillings. One of the measures over which the Labour Cabinet was split was the proposal to reduce unemployment benefit and on the day after the formation of the National Government, Macdonald said in a broadcast, ‘Unemployment benefit is not a living wage; it was never meant to be that.’ This attitude was
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the prelude to two measures which affected unemployment benefits. First, benefit was reduced in October 1931, Harry’s reaction was ‘this here National Government had gone back and the bloody swines had already cut the dole from seventeen bob to fifteen’.11 The actual cut was to fifteen and threepence – to be in line with an attempt to implement 10% wage cuts. The second measure was the introduction of the Means Test. This came into force in 1931. Under this, benefit could be drawn automatically for only twenty-six weeks; after this a means test was applied which took into account the whole family income. Both Harry (whose sister was working and father drawing benefit) and Greenwood himself (mother and sister working) had their dole money cut off completely. In the autobiography Greenwood also cites the case of a friend who left home and stayed with another family in the same street in order to be assessed separately and, thereby, receive benefit. Together the reduction of benefit and the introduction of the Means Test produced a significant impact on the daily lives of working-class communities in the depressed areas.
The novel-analysis Historical perspective These events form the background both of Part Three of Love on the Dole and the latter sections of the autobiography. Their different presentation in each case, however, corresponds to a notable difference in overall historical perspective between the two books. The autobiography clearly starts in 1900 with Greenwood’s father celebrating the Relief of Mafeking and is played out explicitly against the backcloth of twentieth-century British history – the Boer War, the Great War, the General Strike, the Depression and, with the retrospective last chapter, the Second World War and the rise of the welfare state. In the foreground are the details of revolutionary social changes – notably the superseding of Greenwood’s beloved horses by the motor-car (an engineer working at Rolls-Royce is a recurring figure). As against this, in the novel national historical events only enter during Part Three (apart from a few cursory reminiscences of the Great War). Here the changes in unemployment benefit and the introduction of the Means Test come to affect directly the lives of the characters. Parts One and Two deal predominantly with the life of one character, Harry, and his reactions to his environment. His progress is experienced by him not primarily in terms of historical development, but rather in terms of personal progress within a static situation; he leaves school at fourteen, becomes apprenticed for seven years and at twenty-one becomes unemployed. Parallel with this is his relationship with Helen, his win on the horses and their subsequent holiday, her pregnancy and their marriage and their renting a house of their own. Harry, unlike Larry Meath, the politically-conscious, music-loving hero, has no overall grasp of his situation; he sees it only from the inside. Through Harry, Greenwood seems to be attempting to present the experience of an unexceptional member of the three million unemployed. For Harry the situation is not composed of historical events and social conditions to be analysed and acted upon. but is an inescapable environment to which only reactions are possible. It is perhaps for this reason that the novel contains no mention of the General Strike although by inference, it would have taken place during Harry’s apprenticeship. It is not this kind of experience which the novel directs itself towards. Rather Parts One and Two are constructed so as to lead directly into Part Three where Harry’s apprenticeship
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ends and his own unemployment coincides with the cutting of benefit and the introduction of the Means Test. The differences between the novel and the autobiography in terms of historical perspective do not however stem only from Greenwood’s choice of a relatively inarticulate central figure. They also relate to the formal requirements of the different texts. The autobiography has a sixty-year span and in it there is a sense of the unity of historical development and Greenwood’s life; from the 1960s he can look back both on the Depression and on his own beginnings as a writer. The novel, on the other hand, seeks to develop one central situation by means of a number of characters. If the autobiography tends towards the structure of a chronicle, with a sense of linear historical progress, the novel presents a cross-section of one situation. Also as I shall show in the latter case this perspective is further re-inforced by a central thesis of the novel – that the situation itself is static and unchanging. From author to character I have already implied that this difference in perspective may also be considered in terms of the relationship between the figures of Harry Hardcastle and Greenwood himself. The former is clearly partially modelled on the latter in that they share a number of key experiences from those of choir boy and pawnbroker’s assistant to that of the dole queue with its sense of wasted manhood. However there is one essential difference. Harry could never have written a novel. Therefore, Greenwood in conceiving his central character could not merely record his own memories and experience in a direct way. He had also to try and discount the exceptional nature of his own situation as a working-class writer. In Greenwood’s autobiography the influence of his mother is seen repeatedly in preventing his becoming only another Harry. She searches for a piano for him, gives him a love of music, quotes Homer at him and buys him Shakespeare. From her father she also derives a strong political sense and is a keen supporter of the Independent Labour Party. By 1931 Greenwood’s own story is that of one who, while being on the ‘dole’ like Harry or Larry Meath, is striving consciously for an individual remedy for his situation through writing. In conceiving Larry and Harry, both of whom have affinities with Greenwood himself, he was clearly aiming at greater typicality; for them there was no such alternative (particularly as they are both on the verge of marriage). Indeed looking at Greenwood’s account of his own career through a wide variety of jobs as office-clerk, groom, packing-case maker and salesman it might seem reasonable to suggest that the extremely claustrophobic atmosphere of Hanky Park in the novel is indeed ‘a dramatic exaggeration’. Before discussing this point it is, however, necessary to define more closely the elements which build up this atmosphere and which contribute to the very constricted sense of life which seems to me to be the central experience which the novel is communicating. Apart from Harry’s holiday (in a chapter entitled ‘Magic Casements’), the novel restricts itself to two environments – the street in Hanky Park where all the characters live and the factories where they work. The meaning of the Depression is then sharply focussed through the factory redundancies as Harry, Larry and Ned Narkey (Larry’s antitype) are all sacked. Unlike Greenwood himself, who was something of an itinerant drifter from job to job, these three are all qualified engineers whose commitment to a set job is disturbed. Harry eventually becomes a busman and Ned a policeman. The constricted perspective of the novel is, however, also a result of the adoption by Greenwood of specific literary and narrative devices. The most obvious of these is the close parallel between the early morning scenes which open the narrative (at Chapter Two) and
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close it. In these almost identical descriptions, the cold and drizzle, the fact that it is 5.30 a.m. on a Monday morning and the general unfriendliness of the environment frame and almost dissolve the narrative progression of the story. With Larry dead and Sally (Harry’s sister and Larry’s intended) gone away, and with Ned as the policeman patrolling the streets, Harry and Helen merely repeat the roles of their parents. In the closing scene it is Harry’s wife and not his mother (as in the opening scene) who stumbles down the stairs to light the fire. Any illusion of positive change in Harry’s progress to marriage is now dispelled as the situation is revealed as static and without possibility of transformation. The novel has then a different perspective on the working-class situation in Salford from that of the autobiography. Greenwood’s own story is that of unceasing personal attempts to escape from it (although never by betraying his origins) and through the chronicle form of the autobiography his career seems even more that of a minor-key picaresque hero. The novel however attempts rather to present the perspective of men caught directly inside an apparently static situation. The claustrophobic atmosphere corresponds not so much to the situation itself as to how that situation is immediately experienced. Narrative organisation Clearly, however, the novel should not be treated as a rival sociological analysis to The Classic Slum. Attention should rather be paid to its fictional and literary elements for it is in these that the unique significance of the novel can be discovered. Greenwood’s novel could in some sense be described as ‘a novel about being on the dole’. Such a description would contain two propositions – one about form, the other about content. These two propositions are reflected in the title of the novel itself; a definition of the fictional elements of the novel could begin with the parallel love-affairs of Harry and Helen and Sally and Larry. This is not at all to present Greenwood as a writer of romantic fiction; he himself records how his own short stories were rejected: a kindly disposed editor would add a note to his rejection slip saying that, while he thought the story good of itself, its subject matter was not the sort of thing to interest his readers who paid their money for romance, entertainment and excitement.12 It is certainly not the case that Greenwood imposed a novelistic form on a wealth of sociological detail in order to produce a marketable commodity. It is doubtful in any case whether such a hypothesis can be usefully applied to any fiction. Greenwood’s novel clearly contains much more complex organisation than that, and it would be a mistake to write off the main threads of narrative as mere window-dressing or sentimentality. For what makes the novel so powerful a condemnation of working-class conditions are neither the detailed descriptions of the effects of poverty (although these are important) nor the adequacy of Larry’s exposition of Marx’s theories of the nature of capital and commodities. The condemnation is rather the way in which the characters’ hopes for a secure and worthwhile future are defeated. I am talking specifically about the use of marriage as a structural device. Greenwood, like so many of the major nineteenth-century novelists, when faced with the problem of what kind of narrative structure is adequate to convey social judgements, almost instinctively (I would say) chose that of the careers of a young man and girl up to the point at which they have been launched on a new family life. Austen, Dickens and Charlotte Bronte were inclined to go even further (as was Eliot in Middlemarch) in sketching out their heroes’ or
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heroines’ future lives, which usually included a liberal sprinkling of children. Equally the great critical novels of the mid-Victorian era – Great Expectations, Villette and Wuthering Heights – use the failure or refusal of marriage in their various ways as the natural mode for a less affirmative social vision. The close of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century produced a great wave of novels dedicated to the destruction of this structural ploy. The ponderousness of Hardy’s Jude and the cynicism of Gissing’s New Grub Street were followed by Lawrence’s novels which are a continual exploration for the basis of a re-definition of marriage. Above all what was in question was the belief in a necessary connection between stable personal relationships and a healthy society. These novelists either ironically inverted the narrative conventions or set out to destroy them completely. By the time Greenwood was writing a second wave of innovation had taken place in the writings of Conrad, Woolf and Joyce (Ulysses was already becoming infamous); these writers called into question the basic assumptions of the traditional novel about the nature of time and reality and the status of the novel-form itself. I do not invoke this partially random catalogue in order to suggest that Greenwood was writing either in or against any tradition. It would be wrong to dismiss his work as naive or ‘proletarian’ merely because he was not in the vanguard of technical innovations. The point is rather that for a fairly isolated young writer with only his own environment for material, there would be no problem about how to write a serious novel. In broad outline it would consist of tracing the fate of two or more young people in the period between adolescence and marriage. This was, as it were, the ‘problematic’13 of the social novel; that is, not the answers, but the questions are dictated by the form. The novel’s individual vision will arise from the nature of the answers. In the case of Love on the Dole the answers are reflected predominantly in the fate of the main characters. Characters It is Harry’s growth through adolescence which constitutes the greater part of the novel and it is, above all, in the disparity between his dreams for the future and the reality of having to adjust to a severely limited income that the novel reflects on the inadequacy of his situation. Even if he were to retain a job he knows that he can only afford cheap furniture on weekly payments and a rented house in the same street. The pregnancy and hasty marriage (‘Come on ’Elen. Let’s get it over with’), the unemployed man spreading bread and margarine and laying newspaper on the table of one rented room – all these demonstrate the impossibility of that happy comfortable marriage which in conventional ‘social’ fiction would symbolise a stable and well-appointed society. Harry meditates on their situation: What a travesty of romantic love this their present courtship. If his present circumstances were to be a subject of a movie play this would be the opportunity for him to rescue, from some sort of danger, the only child of a wealthy man who rewarded his heroism with money and a good job.14 Here is Greenwood ‘guaranteeing’ the reality of his novel through the opposition – novel= real/movie=fiction. This, of course, is itself only a fictional technique, but it serves to demonstrate how Greenwood undercuts the possibility of an easy use of novelistic conventions to bring about a ‘magical’ solution.15
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The other couple with whom the novel is concerned are Larry and Sally. They represent a very different set of qualities from those of Harry and Helen. Harry is the novel’s chief character and is, in many ways, a kind of anti-hero. He is generally beaten down by his environment. Although retaining a certain resilience and ability for temporary enjoyment, he experiences his environment only as it acts directly on him; he sees no way of acting back upon it. With difficulty he struggles through to manhood and marriage. He is, however, also the novel’s most developed character and gives to it its most powerful image – that of the unemployed man ‘staring fixedly and unseeingly at the ground’, ‘hands in pockets, shoulders hunched’, looking for cigarette ends and just killing time. It is through him that the experience of ‘being on the dole’ is presented. Larry Meath is a sharply contrasting figure and in him many of Greenwood’s personal interests (music and politics for example) which can find no place in Harry’s character are revealed. There are however also a number of other figures in the autobiography who can be seen as forming a basis for Larry’s character. Greenwood’s grandfather with his books and political allegiance, Tom Besant with his negative attitude to marriage and, above all, James Moleyns all contribute towards Larry’s personality. Moleyns is most like him with his diligent Labour Club activities and personal ‘Marxist slant’. There is, however, an important difference between Moleyns and Larry which offers an insight into the novel’s structure of opposed characters. Moleyns is a much more robust figure; he is married, supports a family and a largely unsympathetic father-in-law and is altogether a more worldly figure than Larry. Larry is much more someone set apart from the rest of the street. He is a sensitive, reasonable and, as it transpires, a physically rather frail man. He also refuses to be deeply involved in the working-class situation as a whole. A man without family, he has no commitments and seeks none; he even tries to persuade himself not to marry Sally. It is as though Greenwood is showing two possible attitudes to the workingclass situation – either ‘making the best of it’, trying to get what comfort there is from an oppressive, confined situation or direct refusal to compromise. Larry’s attitude is the latter; he even refuses to pay the accepted insurance money for his funeral (he is cremated). He seeks only political transformation, not through any fanaticism but because he sees no possibility of a decent life in his present situation. Sally cannot understand his reluctance to be married, but after his death she also refuses to compromise. Larry is set in antithesis to Ned Narkey as well as to Harry. Narkey epitomises the brutalised, amoral, indestructible aspect of the working-man. This opposition is of some historical significance particularly if it is recalled how many nineteenth-century novels attempted to portray working-men. In Hard Times for example, it is the political agitator who is responsible for the injuries to Stephen Blackpool while in Mary Barton Trade Unionism is more directly associated with violence. Larry however is a descendant of Jude Fawley rather than Slackbridge or John Barton; his education (self-taught it is implied) goes hand in hand with his political interests. He is similar to Orwell’s conception of the positive elements of the ‘working-class intelligentsia’. There is the type who remains working-class – who goes on working as a mechanic or a dock-labourer or whatever it may be and does not bother to change his working-class accent and habits, but who ‘improves his mind’ in his spare time and works for the I.L.P. or the Communist Party.16 In addition Larry is something of a pacifist, and violence is instead associated not primarily with political acts but with Ned Narkey who, unprincipled as he is, becomes a policeman and
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joins the attack on the marching unemployed – thus effectively having a hand in Larry’s death (he dies from a combination of tuberculosis and police truncheons). Larry has easily discernible roots in the characters of Greenwood’s autobiography but Sally has none. She appears as a more obviously fictional character than the others – devised for a specific structural purpose: Eighteen, a gorgeous creature whose native beauty her shabbiness could not hide. Eyes dark, lustrous, haunting; abundant black hair tumbling in waves; a full, ripe, pouting mouth and a low, round bosom. A face and form such as any society dame would have given three-quarters of her fortune to possess. Sally wore it carelessly as though youth’s brief hour were eternal . . .17 Unlike Harry, Sally has qualities which surpass the immediate environment and are not shaped by it. Adjectives of fullness and superfluity characterise here – ‘gorgeous’, ‘lustrous’, ‘abundant’, ‘full ripe’. Throughout the novel she scores repeated personal triumphs, resisting with ease and scorn the advances of Narkey and Sam Grundy, the successful bookmaker. She remains beautiful and proud to the end. If Larry is the politically sound analyst of the situation, Sally is a figure who embodies all those human qualities to which the environment denies fulfilment. She has nothing at all in common with the group of four old women who provide comic interludes with their reminiscences and threepenny tots of gin. There could be nothing more positive than the union of Larry and Sally and therefore nothing more unlikely to succeed in terms of the negative vision Greenwood is presenting. Like Larry, Sally can have no permanent place in the environment of Hanky Park. But while Larry’s death represents his final refusal, Sally’s decision to go away with Sam Grundy marks the change in her attitude which Larry’s death brings. At this moment she, above all other characters, sees clearly the hopelessness which is life in Hanky Park. She has not even Larry’s political faith to sustain her. Her action becomes the most logical response to her situation; in its refusal to acknowledge any moral imperatives it parallels the only meaning which could be given to Larry’s death. She is not so much sacrificing herself for her family (Grundy gets her father and brother jobs on the buses) as expressing the rejection of a fulfilled life which is implicit in Hanky Park. Resolution The concluding chapter of the novel combines a number of different resolving elements. Harry’s new job restores his situation to some kind of equilibrium; he is no better and no worse off than his father was at the beginning of the novel. Sally and Larry have now both effectively departed and the novel closes, as I have noted, with a repetition of one of its opening scenes. However, before this, as Harry comes home from his new jobs, he sees one of his former companions who has no one to get a job for him. The marginal improvement in Harry’s situation which enables him to set up the semblance of a home and family situation is presented as a personal rather than a general remedy. He was standing there as motionless as a statue, cap neb pulled over his eyes, gaze fixed on pavements, hands in pockets, shoulders hunched, the bitter wind blowing his thin trousers tightly against his legs. Waste paper and dust blew about him in spirals, the papers making harsh sounds as they slid on the pavement.
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The close of the novel holds in balance the defeat of Larry and Sally, the relative security of the marriage of Helen and Harry and the continuing presence of the unemployed. For Greenwood, writing in 1932, the situation seemed deadlocked and static and indeed it was not until the end of the decade and the coming of war that any fundamental transformations occurred. In retrospect Looking back on that situation from the mid-1960s Greenwood sees a qualitative change as having taken place. Yesterday the Depression and lo by a hop, skip and jump the Space Age and a Welfare State. A five-day, forty-hour week, holidays with pay, superannuation pension schemes, lunch vouchers and works’ canteens; an inrush of immigrants to fill the rising tide of jobs going begging, and organized Labour in conference with employers on equal terms.19 This sense of an almost miraculous transformation in immediate living conditions is, if not a widely held belief, at least prevalent in our public myths of recent history. The Depression, the war and rationing are followed by the affluent 1950s and the Swinging Sixties in a way which is not immediately explicable. It is no accident that the 1940s have never achieved a fixed public identity as a unified decade. The Second World War has not only obscured the precise moments and causes of the transition from 1930s to 1950s and 1960s; it has also established a distance, an easily definable gap between the 1930s and the 1960s. The 1930s are already a memory to invoke and the possibility of the return of their conditions caused by this or that economic measure is a standard rhetorical weapon of politics. Greenwood’s novel is a part of that memory. Most social histories of the period refer to it as a matter of course and its title, perhaps as much as anything else, has contributed to the retention of the term ‘dole’ in public usage. Paradoxically, however, a search for a mention of Greenwood in most literary histories of the period would be in vain. He fails even to achieve the Index in the 578 page Penguin Guide (although he has written many novels and plays since 1933). Certainly, as I indicated, his work could hardly be seen as in the forefront of a new wave of writing. Equally, however, it would be totally inadequate to relegate Love on the Dole to the level of a detailed documentary account of life in Salford. In this article I have deliberately underplayed its value in this respect and concentrated rather on how an understanding of its structure (as a conventional ‘social’ novel) can more adequately enable a situating of it as a historical phenomenon. The ‘literary’ and ‘social’ elements of the novel are in no way separable. Once this is recognised the novel can take its place alongside Greenwood’s own autobiography, Orwell’s reporting, Hoggart’s analysis and the social history of Roberts and Branson and Heinemann. All these will be understood as specific kinds of texts arising out of similar patterns of events and experiences. This is not to reduce the novel to the status of a mere reflection of a social condition, but rather to understand it as a creative act by one man attempting to write within and make sense of a specific situation. Such writing is a creative act, but it is also a historical activity.
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Notes 1 Walter Greenwood, Love on the Dole, London, Jonathan Cape. 1933. Penguin 1969. idem: There Was a Time, London. Jonathan Cape 1967. Penguin 1969. Page references are to the Penguin editions. 2 Robert Roberts, The Classic Slum, London 1971. Branson & Heinemann, Britain in the 1930s, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London 1971. Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy, Chatto & Windus, 1957. Penguin 1957. George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, London, Gollancz, 1937. Penguin 1962. 3 B.L. Coombes, These Poor Hands, London, Gollancz 1939. 4 Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality. 5 Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy, p. 18 (Penguin edition). 6 Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion, London. Hamish Hamilton, 1963, p. 118. 7 Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, p. 77 (Penguin edition). 8 Istvan Meszaros ed., Aspects of History & Class Consciousness, London, 1971 p. 1. 9 Williams has attempted to discuss the differences and shared perspectives between himself and Goldmann in New Left Review, No. 67. 10 Greenwood, Love on the Dole, p. 14. 11 Ibid p. 178. 12 Greenwood, There Was a Time, p. 176. 13 The term is borrowed from Althusser, it is defined in For Marx, London, Allen Lane, 1939. p. 253. See also the introduction to this symposium, p. 22. 14 Greenwood, Love on the Dole, p. 176. 15 For the origin and meaning of ‘magical solutions’ see Williams 1840s analysis in The Long Revolution, p. 82–3. 16 Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, p. 143. 17 Greenwood, Love on the Dole, p. 15. 18 Ibid, p. 255. 19 Greenwood, There Was a Time, p. 206.
6
Lawrence, Leavis and culture Graham Holderness
F.R. Leavis’ D.H. Lawrence: Novelist (1955), a book which profoundly influenced the direction of subsequent Lawrence criticism, also incorporated an important statement about the ‘culture’ of the Midlands mining communities, and about the more general question of the relationship between literature and society. In the essay called ‘Mr. Eliot and Lawrence’, Leavis established a problematic for the discussion of this relationship which has also proved influential. His terms of reference, language and general theoretical framework were accepted by a number of critics who took up the same subject.1 However, although Leavis’ essay offers an extremely generous defence of Lawrence and of the working class community against the snobbery and prejudice of a formidable opponent, it seems to me that his methods are not adequate to answer the kind of cultural questions he raises. In this paper I propose to examine his arguments and offer suggestions towards an alternative method of analysis. Leavis’ argument takes the form of a refutation of Eliot’s attack on Lawrence in After Strange Gods (1933). Although Leavis adopts a stance of total opposition, his method remains much the same as Eliot’s. Both critics begin with the literary text, using the techniques of formal criticism to make a literary value-judgement. The value-judgement is then extended beyond the literary work and towards the underlying culture which produces it, informing and to some extent determining its character. Eliot finds moral and literary flaws in a Lawrence short story The Shadow in the Rose Garden: a certain cruelty or lack of compassion, an aestheticism which is indifferent to human suffering, a lack of any moral sense. These deficiencies are related to Lawrence’s cultural environment: its provincialism and poverty of education, its lack of any strong moral tradition, the degenerate character of its particular brand of Protestant nonconformity. Lawrence’s cultural background, because it was not a ‘living and central tradition’, encouraged in him ignorance, immorality, ‘individualism’ (bigotry) and the kind of deformation of character that Eliot calls ‘heresy of sensibility’. Leavis simply turns this argument upside down. He accepts Eliot’s problematic, but begins instead with a positive critical assessment of Lawrence’s novels, and deduces from that literary valuejudgement that Lawrence therefore was brought up in the environment of a ‘living and central tradition’, among conditions which fostered and developed his ‘individual talent’. To turn it upside down however is not necessarily to offer a thorough-going critique of the argument; a man standing on his head is still the same man. Leavis’ failure to question Eliot’s method, his lack of any alternative theoretical framework, constitutes the major deficiency in his argument. The ‘compelling evidence’ Leavis uses to prove that Eastwood was a living culture, is literary evidence; specifically, The Rainbow.2 That Lawrence was brought up in the environment of a living tradition The Rainbow
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offers the most compelling kind of evidence. The book might have been written to show what, in the concrete, a living tradition is, and what it is to be brought up in the environment of one. (As to whether the tradition qualifies as ‘central’ I will not argue; I am content with recording it to be the environment in which George Eliot, too, was brought up). We are made to see how, amid the pieties and continuities of life at the Marsh, the spiritual achievements of a mature civilisation – the integrative sanctions, with the value-creating forms and associations that make possible the individual’s attainment, above the level of mere response to basic instinct, of something rich and significant – are transmitted. This statement is unsatisfactory in a number of ways. There is first the characteristic vagueness of language; what are ‘integrative sanctions’ and ‘value-creating forms’? It is wellknown that Leavis makes a virtue of verbal obscurantism; that which can be analysed is not living, and that which is living defies analysis.3 But these phrases must leave the common reader wondering precisely what aspects of society are in fact responsible for its ‘spiritual achievements’. Secondly, Leavis identifies perhaps too readily the cases of George Eliot and Lawrence, whose lives in terms of dates, geography, education and social class were really rather different. The premise is that their novels are similar, and occupy the same literary tradition (the Great One). But if it is legitimate to regard ‘provincial’ novelists as a selfdefining group, and to assess the nature of their society by literary evidence, why appeal only to these two writers? Our conclusions about this kind of social culture would be very different if we admitted the testimony of other novelists, such as ‘Mark Rutherford’, Hardy, Arnold Bennett. They are excluded from Leavis’ thinking not on social or cultural grounds, but on grounds of literary value. The biggest problem of all is the assumption that literature can be used as sociological evidence in this way, without the support of other kinds of evidence. For example, Leavis identifies the ‘pieties and continuities’ of farming life at the Marsh with the (supposed) cultural traditions of the Eastwood mining community. Leavis’ point is that an author could only write about life in such an ‘organic’ community from experience of it. But he ignores the fact that Lawrence quite specifically locates the Brangwens in history (the novel begins ‘about 1840’) and that in Chapter XII of this same novel, we have a description of a mining community in the 1890s (contemporary with Lawrence’s youth) where there are no pieties and continuities, no living culture and tradition. In fact, Wiggiston might equally be taken as evidence of what Eastwood was like in the 1890s. It would be absurd to relate Wiggiston directly and mechanically to Eastwood. But the way Lawrence presents it does indeed provide a kind of evidence about Eastwood culture and society, and about Lawrence’s relationship with them. Wiggiston is the complete negation of the ‘organic community’.4 The place had the strange desolation of a ruin. Colliers hanging about in gangs or groups, and passing along the asphalt pavements heavily to work, seemed not like living people, but like spectres. The rigidity of the blank streets, the homogeneous amorphous sterility of the whole suggested death rather than life. There was no meeting place, no centre, no artery, no organic formation. Lawrence describes the town in the colourless black and white of a photographic negative: adjectives have no colour, no sensuous definition, no concrete life; abstract, mechanical, sterile, amorphous, inchoate. Worst of all, in Wiggiston the human dimension has been
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absorbed into the machine and completely negated: there are no people there, only ‘spectres’. Wiggiston can be seen as the negative reflection of the Bestwood of Sons and Lovers, set against and alienated from the reality of that community which Lawrence presents in all its complexity and humanity. However, though the negative community as Lawrence presents it has its own consistency, its own rigorous internal logic and structure, the relationship between this idealist conception and the real Eastwood is not easy to see. And it is precisely the nature of this relationship that the ‘cultural question’ interrogates. We must ask why it was necessary to divide the actual Eastwood into positive and negative (Bestwood/Wiggiston), into ‘reality’ and ‘idea’. Does this contradiction perhaps suggest that we may find in the historical Eastwood, not the homogenous and organic culture described by Leavis, but a society deeply divided against itself ? And that we may find in Lawrence himself, not the natural product of an organic community, but a man divided against himself as deeply as his society was? Critical analysis can raise these questions, but it can’t possibly hope to answer them. The questions are literary, psychological, cultural, social and economic ones. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the important critical questions, to explore the literary implications of the argument. I hope to do this in a future publication. Here I want simply to compare the conclusions drawn by Leavis on the basis of literary evidence, with the evidence provided by history and biography. I shall not take either the Marsh Farm, Bestwood or Wiggiston as conclusive evidence about Eastwood culture.
Was Eastwood an organic community? The main question raised by the Eliot/Leavis controversy seems to be this. We presuppose two cultures: the national and central culture of the dominant social class; and a local, provincial, basically working-class culture which is more or less distinct from the ruling-class form. The first of these would include, to use Eliot’s method:5 the Church of England, bishops, the Stock Exchange, Ash Wednesday, Eton and Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge, Hampstead, Conservatives, cocktail parties and Ascot. The Eastwood form of culture embraces nonconformist churches, coal-mines and factories, the Salvation Army, the Board School and the Ilkeston teacher-training centre, Wesley’s hymns, trades unions and cooperative societies, the Labour Party, the Congregational Chapel Literary society, and the Sun Inn. Eliot would describe the latter as a sub-sub-culture, but we can see that it is in fact independent enough to be called a legitimate culture in its own right. The question I want to examine is this: was Lawrence’s culture (his cultural consciousness, his art, the kind of intellectual and artistic culture he sought after) orthodox according to the light of his own tradition, as both Eliot and Leavis have suggested? Was it (to use a phrase more acceptable to Dr Leavis) a ‘further development of that culture in organic complexity’? To answer that question it is necessary to examine the cultural conditions of Eastwood, and to look at Lawrence’s own relationship with them between 1885 and 1912. Eastwood was, according to Leavis, in the environment of a ‘living and central tradition’. It was the kind of stable and organic community which provides for its members a reliable system of values, a respect for tradition, the means for forming satisfactory relationships, the opportunity for ‘spiritual achievement’, and so on. Not only was Eastwood not culturally deprived, it actually provided Lawrence with the best social and cultural environment he could have had:6 To be born, with that genius, a miner’s son at Eastwood in the 1880s – it is as if Destiny,
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having given him the genius, had arranged also that he should be enabled to develop it to the utmost and qualified to use it for the purpose for which it was meant. Lawrence himself describes such an organic community in the Woodhouse of his novel The Lost Girl:7 Alvina never went to school. She had her lessons from her beloved governess, she worked at the piano, she took her walks, and for social life she went to the Congregational Chapel, and to functions connected with the Chapel. While she was little, she went to Sunday School twice and to Chapel once on Sundays. Then occasionally there was a magic lantern or a penny reading, to which Miss Frost accompanied her. As she grew older, she entered the choir at Chapel, she attended Christian Endeavour and the P.S.A., and the Literary Society on Monday evenings. Chapel provided her with a whole social activity, in the course of which she met certain groups of people, made certain friends, found opportunity for strolls into the country and jaunts to the local entertainments. Over and above this, every Thursday evening, she went to the subscription library to change the week’s supply of books, and there again she met friends and acquaintances. It is hard to overestimate the value of Church or Chapel – but particularly Chapel – as a social institution, in places like Woodhouse. The Congregational Chapel provided Alvina with a whole outer life, lacking which she would have been poor indeed. Despite the shift in social class, this is a fairly accurate description of the social life of Lawrence’s boyhood and adolescence. All the institutions and functions referred to are mentioned in the biographical evidence. It is presented as an ‘organic’ society: it is fully independent and self-sufficient, providing social activities, both duteous and amusing, educational and religious experience, and the opportunity to form personal relationships. Lawrence’s narrative tone is partly objective, partly sympathetic: ‘It is hard to overestimate’. And yet the point of view is not that of a participant, but of an observer. Lawrence emphasises that Woodhouse provides an ‘outer life’ for Alvina, but it doesn’t provide for the deeper inner needs she experiences, and it certainly doesn’t offer the possibility of a ‘rich and significant’ life. The value of that social life as seen within the specific context of Woodhouse, is quite different from the value given to it by the novel as a whole. Without that social life, Alvina’s existence would be ‘poor indeed’; but Lawrence gives us plenty of evidence that even with it, her life is nothing if not poor. The movement of the novel is inexorably away from Woodhouse, out from the limiting centre of the provincial community towards a much wider world of experience in which Woodhouse has to be revalued. The internal values of Woodhouse (or Eastwood) are perhaps less important than the fact that Woodhouse (and Eastwood) are always places to be escaped from. However, though Lawrence’s own evaluation of this particular organic community is more significant for us than either Eliot’s or Leavis’, again we must recognise that literary evidence only takes us so far. We must ask why Lawrence abstracted all the religious and cultural activities from his own life, and presented them in isolation from the specific social situation in which they took place. Where is the Woodhouse working class for example? Wasn’t Eastwood itself a society deeply divided by class conflict, the clash of values that forms the basis of conflict in Sons and Lovers? From the literary evidence, Leavis argues that this was not so, particularly in his chapter ‘Lawrence and class’. Answering Eliot’s charge of ‘snobbery’, Leavis uses the Daughters of the
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Vicar to show that Lawrence didn’t suffer from any kind of snobbery or class-consciousness, because his attitude to life was one of ‘reverence’ – a quasi-religious respect for the holiness of human life which transcends divisions of class. And this was, apparently one of the things Lawrence learned from his Eastwood culture:8 ‘Reverence’ must not be allowed to suggest any idealising bent; and if we say that the reverence expresses itself in a certain essential tenderness we don’t mean Lawrence is ‘tender-minded’ or in the least sentimentally given. The attitude is one of strength, and it is clairvoyant and incorruptible in its preoccupation with realities. It expresses, of course, the rare personal adequacy of an individual of genius, but it is also the product of a fine and mature civilisation, the sanctions, the valuations and the pieties of which speak through the individual. So far from tenable is the view of Lawrence as an uncouth and arrogant genius brought up in cultural barbarism. Here Leavis accepts (at last for the purposes of his argument) the social theory of culture outlined by Eliot: that culture and tradition involve ‘all those habitual actions, habits and customs, from the most significant religious rite to the conventional way of greeting a stranger, which represents the blood kinship of the same people living in the same place’.9 Primarily it is a question of making the right kinds of literary critical judgement. But if a social theory of culture is to have any meaning, it is surely necessary to know how Lawrence derived such qualities of character, and such a sense of values, and such moral feelings from the actual, specific material circumstances of his environment. If Leavis is saying that Eastwood in the 1880s and 1890s was pervaded by a sense of ‘reverence’ which transcended all divisions of class, then he is simply wrong. He can, in fact, afford to ignore the very real and very familiar personal, social and artistic conflicts underlying Lawrence’s Eastwood life, by projecting a structure of moral ideals (reverence, piety) which has its own internal consistency, but which is detached and isolated from a specific social context, abstracted and encapsulated within the idealist concept of ‘Tradition’. As Raymond Williams has noted, in discussing this idealising tendency of Leavis’ thinking:10 Societies and literatures have active histories, which are always inseparable from active values. But in literary as in some social, historical and anthropological studies, these facts of change can be projected into an apparent totality which has the advantage of containing them and of making them at last, like the rocks, stand still. In literature the most common of these false totalities is tradition, which is seen not as it is, an active and continuous selection and reselection, which even at its latest point in time is always a specific choice, but now more conveniently as an object, a projected reality, with which we have to come to terms on its terms. And so the real cultural question again seems to me to be: what was Lawrence’s experience of class in the period 1885–1912, as far as we can deduce from biographical and autobiographical sources and historical evidence? The treatment of class in the literature may or may not have a relationship with this experience, though it won’t necessarily be a simple one. That problem is too big for me to attempt here, though I will be touching on it: but the materials with which to answer it are readily available.
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‘A collier’s son a poet!’ One common interpretation of this problem was provided by Christopher Caudwell:11 Lawrence, for all his gifts, suffered from the old petit-bourgeois error. Like Wells, he strove to climb upwards into the world of bourgeois culture . . . it was not the security and power that appealed to him, but the cultural values. On this view, Lawrence was faced with a simple choice, like the choice of loyalties between father and mother. On the one hand, working-class consciousness, and the solidarity and cameraderie of the male part of the mining community; on the other hand, the ‘superior’ ideals of Mrs Lawrence, determined that ‘her children would be different’, determined to push them into the middle class at any price, even the betrayal of the working class in the person of her own husband. To expand Caudwell’s (oversimplified) account, let us add that it was also a choice between the clearly-defined and inflexible economic and cultural traditions of the mining community, such as Mr. Lawrence’s assumption that his boys would automatically go down the pit and his girls become domestic servants; and the escape-route from the industrial machine opened up by the middle-class consciousness and respectability of the mother, and the new educational opportunities (especially the 1870 Education Act). This is the familiar clash of values dramatised in Sons and Lovers: for example, in the incident where the father crops the child William’s long curly hair.12 The miner is insisting that the child conform, that he be obviously masculine in the traditional way, that his mother should not be permitted to make him something different, such as an effeminate cissy, or a gentleman, or an artist. But Caudwell’s account is contradicted by evidence that Lawrence began from an early age to reject his mother’s ideals as well as the traditional demands of working-class culture. Caudwell notes that Lawrence was attracted by bourgeois cultural values rather than material ones: but he fails to notice what this implies about the Lawrence family conflict. Lawrence (at least from the age at which we hear him thinking and talking about his future) had very little desire to become a respectable bourgeois or a gentleman, though he certainly did want to be ‘something different’. That ‘difference’ very early crystallised into the concrete ambition of becoming a writer; possibly a poet; and after that, an ‘artist’.13 Jessie Chambers recalls: By the time of the Centre days [1902–1905] Lawrence was beginning to wonder about himself and to realise that he possessed outstanding intellectual gifts. I remember very well a conversation when he and I happened to be on our way home together. It was perhaps the first of many times when we talked about his uniqueness, though of course we never called it that. ‘When an individual has more of any quality than other people I think it ought to be shared, don’t you?’ he asked tentatively. I agreed, and he continued: ‘When one has bigger mental gifts, for example, I think they ought to be used to help other people. That must be what they’re given us for, don’t you think so?’ After a pause he said slowly: ‘Perhaps I shall be something some day. I mean a bit more than ordinary. If ever I am, I should like to have a big house – you know there are some lovely old houses in the park with gardens and terraces. Wouldn’t it be fine if we could live in one of those houses, mother and all the people we like together? Wouldn’t it be fine!’
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We see clearly in that passage the contradiction between two completely different social ambitions: on the one hand the wish to share one’s gifts with others, to help, to participate in a common life; on the other hand, the vague desire to be ‘different’ which finds its natural equivalent in the big house in the park, and the dream of a more ‘exclusive’ kind of family life, with disagreeable elements quite shut out. This conflict is vitally important. But the point I would like to emphasise is that the way Lawrence chose, and this is often not recognised, was not the way prepared for him by his mother, the petit-bourgeois respectability of a clerical or teaching job. As soon as Lawrence begins to think of himself as a possible writer he comes into conflict with both sides of Eastwood culture. Jessie Chambers:14 It was during the year when he was an uncertificated teacher in the British School at Eastwood [1905–6] that Lawrence first spoke to me about writing. We were in the field that ran alongside the Warren when he said quietly: ‘Have you ever thought of writing?’ ‘Oh yes’ I replied at once, ‘I’ve thought of it all my life. Have you?’ ‘Yes, I have . . . it will be poetry! I took fire at that. ‘Well, isn’t that the very greatest thing?’ ‘Ah, you say that’ he replied. ‘But what will the others say? That I’m a fool. A collier’s son a poet!’ This development is crucial. Up to the age of about 20, Lawrence was exposed to the normal, typical influences of Eastwood. But as well as being a ‘normal, typical’ man, he was also a writer; and we are surely interested in the process by which he made art out of his cultural experience. At the age of 20 we see him beginning to talk about becoming a writer (other evidence suggests that he may have had the idea even earlier) and immediately this ambition introduces into his life a sense of difference and of conflict (What will the others say? A collier’s son a poet!). The ambition probably opened up a division that had been there for a long time; we recall the Eastwood tradition of Lawrence as a ‘mardyarse’ who did nothing but ‘play at ring o’ roses wi’ young lasses’. Certainly, the realisation of that ambition involved for Lawrence a readjustment of his relationship with Eastwood. By the age of 20, Lawrence had conceived the idea of becoming a writer, poet, ‘artist’. What exactly did this mean to a young Eastwood teacher in 1905? What kind of artist would Lawrence wish to become? How far did his cultural environment encourage this, how far did it discourage it? Two passages throw some light on this. From Jessie Chambers:15 I had not a high opinion of the first version of The White Peacock . . . he must have shown it to his mother, because when we were on holiday at Robin Hood’s Bay I asked her what she thought of it, and she replied, in a pained voice: ‘To think that my son should have written such a story’. And from Lawrence himself:16 After the funeral my father struggled through half a page, and it might as well have been Hottentot. ‘And what dun they gi’e thee for that, lad?’ ‘Fifty pounds, father’.
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‘Fifty pounds!’ He was dumbfounded, and looked at me with shrewd eyes as if I were a swindler. ‘Fifty pounds! And tha’s niver done a day’s hard work in thy life’.
The family And yet according to Leavis the Lawrence family was an important cultural influence. The highly civilised ‘social training’ that Eastwood provided was based in the family: ‘A family life beset by poverty and the day-to-day exigencies of breadwinning, yet quite finely civilised’. That family was an admirable character-forming background for a young writer. I think we need to look again at the Lawrence family background with Leavis’ claims in mind, and in particular at the question of how far the family helped to cultivate Lawrence’s writing. It is often assumed that both Lawrence’s mother and the ‘Pagans’ group were directly or indirectly involved in his early writing. William Hopkin was clear about how much Mrs Lawrence contributed to the writing of The White Peacock:17 I have mentioned the profound influence his mother had on his whole life. She dominated every side of it, and her one desire was to see him become a great writer . . . When he was writing The White Peacock he and his mother criticised it together, and he re-wrote parts of it until it satisfied them. This seems clear and definitive evidence. In trying to write, Lawrence embarked on a cultural activity which would have been incomprehensible to his father (who was practically illiterate) and, presumably, to most of the miners. It was a kind of culture alien to the traditional working-class culture of Eastwood. Mrs Lawrence, on the other hand, was ‘different’: she was educated, had been a school-teacher and had written poetry; she was determined that her son would ‘rise’ in the world, educationally, socially and financially. What more natural than that she should wish him to be a great writer, and assist him, as critic and collaborater, in writing his first novel? But, unfortunately, Lawrence’s own account of his mother’s attitude to his writing is also explicit on this point, and conflicts directly with Hopkin’s Lawrence’s version was not written until 1928, but long before Hopkin recorded his reminiscence, in 1949. In any case, where we have such a direct conflict of evidence, we must prefer Lawrence’s own account as being more reliable. Here is the relevant passage from the Autobiographical Sketch (1928), written in the third person:18 His own family, strictly ‘natural’, looked on such a performance as writing as ‘affectation’. Therefore wrote in secret at home. Mother came upon a chapter of The White Peacock read it quizzically, & was amused. ‘But my boy, how do you know it was like that? You don’t know’ – she thought one ought to know – and she hoped her son, who was ‘clever’, might one day be a professor or a clergyman or perhaps even a little Mr. Gladstone. That would have been rising in the world – on the ladder. Flights of genius were nonsense – you had to be clever and rise in the world, step by step . . . Miriam read all his writings – she alone, His mother, whom he loved best on earth, he never spoke to, about his writing. It would have been a kind of ‘showing off,’ an affectation. This is a very revealing passage, which should be compared carefully with some of Leavis’ claims. ‘Pieties and continuities’? A vigorous culture and a ‘strong intellectual tradition’? The
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ideal background for a young and developing writer? What we see here is the puritan’s antiartistic philistinism. Art is not strictly ‘natural’ and is therefore ‘affectation’ or ‘showing-off ’; a writer is apparently one who seeks to rise above the station to which Providence has assigned him, without taking the recognised steps up the official ladder. We see here the characteristic snobbery of Mrs Lawrence’s attitudes: nothing higher, nothing lower than the ‘blessed middle state’ is permissible or even tolerable. But ‘getting on’ is in order, provided that intelligence or genius are reduced to the merely utilitarian ‘cleverness’. Mrs Lawrence’s ambitions for her son are bourgeois ambitions: she wanted him to be an accredited ‘professional’ like a professor or clergyman, nothing so un-natural or un-respectable as a writer. Her criticism of the chapter from The White Peacock is hard-headed, unimaginative, philistine: how do you know? why isn’t it ‘natural’, normal? The young Lawrence shied away from such criticism: and was to later to react against a similar criticism of The White Peacock from Alice Dax, with the accusation of ‘utilitarianism’, against which he measured his own ‘aesthetic culture’. Even allowing for some exaggeration in Lawrence’s later account, and acknowledging that Mrs Lawrence (not surprisingly) was no literary critic, I think we would still see this as a very unsympathetic and discouraging environment for a budding writer, rather than fertile soil for the development of his talent. What about the ‘Pagans’? Did they provide, as well as intelligent conversation and an animated social life, the kind of cultural environment in which a young writer might flourish? Some members of the group, along with Willie Hopkin, seem to have thought of Lawrence as a possible writer very early in the day. But, despite the evidence of Pagan interest in music, art and poetry, we have no record of them discussing their own writing, or Lawrence’s. He began to write poetry in 1904, but he never mentions reading his poems or discussing them within the group. The truth seems to be that whatever may have been the cultural surroundings of the young Lawrence’s everyday life, when he began to write the entire cultural milieu boiled down to the personal help and encouragement of one person: Jessie Chambers:19 I would usually find Lawrence and the ‘Princess’ with their heads close together and the crumpled papers spread out in front of them; but the papers soon disappeared with my arrival. The explanation of that is to be found in the fact that the ‘Princess’ was the only one of the Pagans who did anything at all to encourage Lawrence in his writings.
Jessie Chambers It was in the relationship with Jessie, and only there, that Lawrence could discover the possibility of serious writing. He frequently remarked that without her he would hardly have begun writing at all. Jessie seems to have been involved in nearly all of Lawrence’s early work, right up to the early drafts of Sons and Lovers, which were sent to her after their tacit engagement had been broken off. What implications does this have for our general theme, what was the nature of their relationship, and what sort of influence did it have on Lawrence’s work in these early years? Is it significant that it was in the intimacy of his friendship with Jessie (not in the Lawrence family setting, or in the public environment of Chapel and literary society) that Lawrence found a suitable ‘cultural’ background? We have a vivid and probably accurate description of Jessie in Part Two of Sons and Lovers; and Lawrence’s view of her is amply borne out by her own writings:20
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The girl was romantic in her soul. Everywhere was a Walter Scott heroine being loved by men with helmets or with plumes in their caps. She herself was something of a princess turned into a swine girl in her imagination . . . Her great companion was her mother. They were both brown-eyed, and inclined to be mystical, such women as treasure religion inside them and see the whole of life in a mist thereof. So to Miriam, Christ and God made one great figure, which she loved tremblingly and passionately, when a tremendous sunset burned out the western skies, and Ediths, and Lucys, and Rowenas, Brian de Bois Guilberts, Rob Roys, and Guy Mannerings, rustled the sunny leaves in the morning . . . That was life to her. For the rest, she drudged in the house, which work she would not have minded had not her clean red floor been mucked up immediately by the trampling farm-boots of her brothers . . . She went to Church reverently, with bowed head, and quivered in anguish from the vulgarity of the other choir girls and from the common-sounding voice of the curate; she fought with her brothers, whom she considered brutal louts . . . she hated her position as a swine-girl. She wanted to be considered. She wanted to learn . . . For she was different from other folk, and must not be scooped up among the common fry. Jessie was certainly ‘the romantic sort who hated commonness’. Her romanticism and idealism make her see everyday life as brutal, common, vulgar. There is hardly any social content in these words, so far as one can tell, but it is easy to see how they could be assimilated into a kind of romantic snobbery: we see something of this later in Lawrence himself. But Jessie was not at all impressed by her betters. Her view of education was equally romantic and idealistic: My lack of education was a constant humiliation. The desire for knowledge and a longing for beauty tortured me. The cultural values she aspired towards were essentially ideal, far above the circumstances of her everyday life. In fact in a very important sense, she felt that the culture she wanted was incompatible with reality:21 Right from infancy I had been aware of a world that glimmered beyond the surrounding world of fact, and I dreaded lest the circumstances of my life should shut me out, compel me to live in the dark, and prevent me from ever becoming a sharer in the feast of the human spirit. It was this kind of romantic idealism that appealed to Lawrence, and provided an environment in which he could write. Presumably it was the sense of incompatability between Eastwood and ‘art’ that drove Lawrence into the ‘artistic’ relationship with Jessie, and forced him to produce art out of that. We have a nice anecdote about Jessie and Ada, Lawrence’s sister, reading The Tempest together. The romantic Jessie was profoundly impressed by Miranda’s speeches. Ada Lawrence thought they were ‘rubbish’. Lawrence could probably have seen both points of view. But in order to become a writer, he needed Jessie’s idealism to cultivate a growth that would have withered under his mother’s or sister’s cynical common-sense. Lawrence’s need for that romantic, intimate, exclusive relationship as the only basis for his creative writing, cannot be explained simply in terms of his character or hers, or in terms of Lawrence’s psychological peculiarities: it was a problem with a social dimension. It was the
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nature of that (fairly typical) Lawrence family background, and especially its piety, moral conventionality and hostility to ‘art’, that forced Lawrence into this isolated romantic relationship. And from within that relationship he wrote. In Jessie Chambers’ Personal Record we find a description of the rarified and fragile atmosphere necessary for Lawrence’s writing:22 Soon after 8 o’clock we closed our books. Lawrence made up the fire and we put on our outdoor things. He turned the gas low, locked the door, and put the key on the scullery window ledge. I dreaded to hear a footstep approaching to break the magical quality of our association. When we were alone together we were in a world apart, where feeling and thought were intense, and we seemed to touch a reality that was beyond the ordinary workaday world. But if his mother or sister returned, bringing with them the atmosphere of the market-place, our separate world was temporarily shattered, and only recaptured with difficulty. We see how the ordinary workaday world and the atmosphere of the market-place, the normal day-to-day culture of the Lawrence family, have to be quite shut out. Raymond Williams in Culture and Society has spoken of ‘the rich experience of childhood in a workingclass family’ which gave Lawrence a vital sense of ‘quick, close relationship’; relationship that became in his thinking the basis of human existence. This was possible because of the enforced openness of that family life, the togetherness and lack of individual privacy:23 This was the positive result of the life of the family in a small house, where there were no such devices of separation of children and parents, as the sending away to school, or the handing over to the servants, or the relegation to nursery or playroom . . . In such a life, the suffering and the giving of comfort, the common want and the common remedy, the open row and the open making-up, are all part of a continuous life which, in good and bad, makes for a whole attachment. Lawrence learned from this experience the sense of the continuous flow and recoil of sympathy which was always in his writing, the essential process of living. This is admirably put, and I think quite true. Dr. Williams is here, to some extent, defending working-class life against its detractors: but I think if we look closely at Lawrence’s specific position in that family context (rather than speaking of the general characteristics of working-class life) we are more impressed by the way that the communal character of family life placed on the young writer an irresistible pressure to keep certain kinds of experience completely private. These included his relationship with Jessie and his literary and creative interests. The traditional account of the Lawrence family hostility to Jessie Chambers emphasises Mrs. Lawrence’s possessive love and her struggle to keep Lawrence for herself. Reading Jessie’s Record, it doesn’t seem quite like that:24 ‘They were talking last night, Mother and E. (Emily). E. asked mother if we were courting’. He spoke with difficulty. ‘They say we either ought to be engaged or else not go about together. It’s the penalty of being nineteen or twenty instead of fifteen or sixteen’ he concluded bitterly. I began to understand. ‘I always thought your mother didn’t like me’ I said quietly. ‘It isn’t that – you musn’t
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think that; mother has nothing against you’ he urged. ‘It’s for your sake she spoke. She says it isn’t fair to you: I may be keeping you from getting to like someone else. She says I ought to know how I feel’, he went on painfully. ‘I’ve looked into my heart and I cannot find that I love you as a husband does a wife. Perhaps I shall, in time. If I ever find I do, I’ll let you know’. The most interesting thing in that passage is the part played by Lawrence’s sister Emily. It was she who asked the question. And it was they who said Lawrence ought to declare his intentions. That makes the pressure being brought to bear on Lawrence more of a public, communal, family pressure than his mother’s insatiable, predatory possessiveness. The demand is not merely a personal demand for love, but a social pressure to conform to certain Eastwood values. The relationship between Lawrence and Jessie is not ‘normal’, not understandable in terms of Eastwood experience and Eastwood conventions of social behaviour. Are they ‘courting’ or not? Do they intend to get ‘engaged’? Are they prepared to put their relationship on a proper footing? The pressure to conform to traditional norms of behaviour doesn’t preclude, we notice, Mrs Lawrence’s genuine concern for Jessie’s marriage prospects. That relationship, based as it was on an aesthetic and intellectual affinity and a delicate emotional sympathy, had to be brought into line with the rigid norms of convention set by the female side of the Lawrence family. Lawrence called their interference in the relationship the ‘slaughter of the foetus in the womb’. The development of this tension between the intellectual, emotional and artistic interests of the young Lawrence, and the family, with the consequent pressure to restrict his most important experiences to his relationship with Jessie (or to keep them to himself ), can be traced in the development of their reading. The staple diet of Eastwood culture (that is, the books available in Lawrence’s home, and within the Chambers family, and those accessible in the library of the Eastwood Mechanics’ Institute) seem to have been mainly nineteenth century ‘classic’ novels, romances, and popular moralistic Victorian fiction. Mrs Lawrence was fond of Scott, J.M. Barrie and East Lynne. Lawrence and Jessie seem to have started (about 1901–2) by reading romances: Scott, Rider Haggard, The Prisoner of Zenda.25 They read poetry too, mostly from Palgrave’s Golden Treasury: Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, Tennyson, Fitzgerald, Rossetti. Later they graduated to Dickens, Charles Reade, R.L. Stevenson, Thackeray, George Eliot, Swift and many other writers. The extent of their reading experience is astonishing, and the availability of literature presented tremendous opportunities. Leavis’ formulation of the happy coincidence of cultural conditions and individual talent is undoubtedly true in this respect. But it is also an over-simplification. Clearly if the books hadn’t been there Lawrence wouldn’t have been able to read them. But still his reading of them, because of the nature of Eastwood literacy and Eastwood reading habits, became an intensely personal experience: and his interests conflicted at so many points with native patterns of culture, that we can hardly regard his reading as a development of that culture in organic complexity:26 Once when we had just left his home, Lawrence said to me, ‘I don’t believe they were like us when they were young, do you? Our parents, I mean. I don’t imagine mother ever read Carlyle. It was Annie Swan, I think’. And another time he said: ‘I’m sure they don’t feel things as we do, I don’t care what they say. They talk about them too much. If you really feel a thing deeply, you can’t talk about it, can you?’
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Eastwood culture, the reading habits of Mrs Lawrence, the Chambers family and other literate members of the community Lawrence may have known, seems to have offered the very important but limited experience of reading for pleasure or enjoyment; having the imagination stimulated in a not very profound and rather innocuous way. This is not at all surprising. But in considering how far Eastwood literacy can be identified with Lawrence’s, we have to note that Eastwood provided no possibility for literature to act in a radical, disturbing, transforming way. What Lawrence wanted was the more profound engagement with literature which allows it to modify or even transform the reader’s consciousness; to affect his life. When Lawrence read Wuthering Heights it affected him very deeply. He recognised its deep emotional power and its searching analysis of conventional values, its questioning of the whole structure of received morality. But he advised Jessie Chambers not to read it. And Jessie recalls that Mrs Lawrence, after reading it, had strong feelings about what she would like to do to ‘that Heathcliff ’. She may have responded to the novel as a romance, but it didn’t shake her moral convictions at all.27 Lawrence got much more out of the novel, and he found that what he did get was incommunicable in Eastwood terms. When Jessie was nineteen Lawrence asked her to read Maupassant, which had ‘thrilled him to the marrow’ . . . ‘telling me to take care my mother didn’t see it’ (my italics). This was about 1907. Lawrence’s reading then of French writers (Flaubert, Maupassant) and English writers of the 1890s (Wilde, Synge, and Beardsley’s drawings) brought the developing conflict between his own preoccupations and the values of his society to a direct and total opposition. It was these writers who helped Lawrence to solve his immediate artistic problems; Eastwood couldn’t help, and therefore Lawrence accepted values and standards from elsewhere. The specific evidence that we have about the institutional side of Eastwood literary culture conflicts directly with Leavis’ assertions about the community’s cultural life. There is the example of the literary society attached to the Congregational Chapel:28 The Chapel at Eastwood became the centre of our social life. There was a Literary Society, and we all paid a shilling for our membership card. I was wildly disappointed once when some lecture to which I had looked forward with extravagant anticipation came and my brother ‘didn’t feel like turning out’ . . . I was only appeased, when Lawrence, who went to the lecture, told me ‘it wasn’t up to much’. Another time there was a social, and I called for A. (Ada). Lawrence thought he wouldn’t go, he had his homework to do. A sudden impulse made me look at him and say, ‘I wish you would come’. He did not reply but I saw his face change. Ada and I set off together, and the first thing I saw on arriving was a group of some four or five youths solemnly fishing in a box with a magnet. I was dismayed and fervently hoped Lawrence wouldn’t come. A few minutes later, he walked into the room in that alert, expectant way of his, and I felt too ashamed to speak to him. I had expected the social to be an affair of spontaneous fun and gaeity, and was depressed by the commonplace reality. A ruddy young man with a florid tenor voice sang ‘The Boys of the Old Brigade’ and ‘The Old Shake’ and I could have cried when everybody applauded with gusto. This is what we would expect a church youth club to be like, and (given the alternative descriptions) it surely sounds more like the ‘drab, earnest institution of the observer’s cliche’, (Raymond Williams) than the ‘strong intellectual tradition’ ascribed by Leavis. Jessie is ashamed, embarrassed, afraid of Lawrence’s reaction to the Literary Society, because in terms of intellectual development and social maturity he was already far in advance of
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whatever it had to offer him. And of course the values and standards against which he measured it were not those of Eastwood.
Pagans and socialists This brings us directly to Lawrence’s education. He was of course publicly educated at elementary school, high school and college. But Leavis stresses rather the native Eastwood culture, the ‘extraordinarily active intellectual life’ enjoyed by the ‘group of young people among whom Lawrence moved’; presumably the Pagans, and perhaps the gatherings of the Eastwood intelligensia at the house of William Hopkin. There is no disputing that an active intellectual life went on in these groups. In stressing the supposed ‘organic’ nature of the community Leavis forgets that the Pagans group were very dependent on public education. Their meetings certainly took place in Eastwood kitchens, but the group was really based on the Ilkeston teaching centre. But Leavis doesn’t even begin to speculate about the actual relationship between the Pagans and the mining community. Why did they call themselves Pagans? Caudwell described the conflict of values experienced by Lawrence as a straightforward clash between working-class and bourgeois values. To put it as simply as that ignores the cultural activities of the Pagans.29 Their Paganism was that of Swinburne and Meredith; the free pursuit of art, politics and learning with the objective of a free and open life. Their ideal was that of a kind of artistic bohemianism, transcending class-divisions; the ideal of a life free from moral and social restrictions, where the individual could develop and cultivate himself intellectually, emotionally and aesthetically. This led on naturally to political radicalism; Fabianism, feminism socialism. Just how unconventional the Pagans themselves were is arguable. Certainly the kind of cultural experience they had (of literature, music, the theatre) implied potential conflict with Eastwood culture. And it helped Lawrence to define more easily his own ‘paganism’, which involved the rejection of orthodox religion, moral independence (particularly sexual freedom) and intellectual and artistic interests beyond what Eastwood had to offer from its own ‘organic’ culture. The Pagans were certainly native Eastwood intellectuals. But they were Pagans because they felt in many ways that they were in conflict with traditional Eastwood values. It is probably in their socialism that they were closest to the experience of the community, though their ideas were probably far in advance of the average miner or trade unionist. At this point Lawrence found himself faced with a choice: between the socialism that retained some relationship with the working-class community; and a kind of artistic bohemianism and aestheticism that implies a rejection of politics, classes, society, and a great deal of human experience. To prove this would involve a fairly thorough analysis of Lawrence’s early letters, poems, short stories, and above all the first two novels. I hope to undertake this in a sequal to the present article. If there was a truly ‘organic’ outgrowth of culture from Eastwood society, it was surely centred on the house of William Hopkin. Hopkin himself was a far more ‘natural’ part of the Eastwood landscape than Lawrence himself. He was a socialist, and became a local councillor. His widow described him as ‘an independent social reformer, writer, broadcaster, wit, poet and naturalist. His social and intellectual gifts provided him with a wide circle of friends and among peers, tramps, reknowned literary figures, and above all, the colliers and farmers among whom he lived at Eastwood. By his personal charm and sympathy he inspired the many down-trodden and weary to whom he rendered practical help’.30 The socialist culture of the Hopkin home united the Eastwood working-class and the front rank of contemporary intellectuals and politicians. The intellectual atmosphere has been described as:31
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There is a considerable difference between such a view of the political, economic and moral emancipation of a class, and the artistic bohemianism of a ‘Pagan’ like Lawrence. How did he fit into this obviously organic development of Eastwood culture? He felt isolated within it, and more and more divided from it. His correspondence with Blanche Jennings32 shows very clearly the conflict between Lawrence’s concept of his art, and the cultural patterns of the organic community. Perhaps the best piece of evidence is a lecture called Art and the Individual,33 which Jessie Chambers remembers Lawrence delivering to ‘a little gathering of the Eastwood intelligensia at the house of a friend’. Hopkin’s house.34 The lecture opposes the objective, scientific and ‘general’ character of socialism, to the subjective, aesthetic and ‘individual’ concept of artistic culture Lawrence held. The tone of the introduction suggests something of Lawrence’s feeling within that group: it is brittle, sarcastic, conveying a sense of difference and of isolation: These Thursday night meetings are for discussing social problems with a view to advancing a more perfect social state and to our fitting ourselves to be perfect citizenscommunists – what not. Is that it? I guess in time we shall become expert sociologists. If we would live a life above the common rock we must be experts at something – must we not? Besides, we have peculiar qualities which adapt us for particular parts of the social machine. Some of us make good cranks, doubtless each of us would make a good hub of the universe . . . Under socialism every man with the spirit of a flea will become a specialist – with such advantages it were disgraceful not to cultivate that proverbial one talent, and thus become a shining light on one tiny spot. It will take some four hundred specialists to make a normal family of four. However! Here then, is the organic culture of Eastwood. And here we find Lawrence becoming isolated and detached from it; we find a further accentuation of his sense of difference and division.
The Chapel ‘The Chapel, in the Lawrence circle, was the centre of a strong social life, and the focus of a still persistent cultural tradition that had as its main drive the religious tradition of which Mr. Eliot is so contemptuous.’ The Chapel also according to Leavis provided intellectual culture: the Lawrence nonconformity was no ‘debased tin-chapel salvationism’ but could boast a ‘strong intellectual tradition’. Leavis seems to mean that the Chapel preaching would have been of a high order; that the Chapel fostered cultural activities; and that Mrs Lawrence transmitted her Chapel education to her son. We have touched upon Lawrence’s version of the Chapel-based social life in The Lost Girl and on the Chapel’s Literary Society. The question Leavis raises here is very much a historical one, as he himself recognises by sending Mr. Eliot to read Halevy. But I think we can throw more light on the question by using biographical sources, and examining Lawrence’s own relations with the Chapel and with Christianity between 1885 and 1912.
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The extent to which Lawrence absorbed the intellectual culture offered by the Chapel was obviously affected by his relationship with the Chapel. He began to think seriously about religious dogma and problems of belief before the age of sixteen:35 Lawrence would be about 16 when we first talked about religion, and he was clearly perplexed by what passed for religious life amongst us. ‘What does it mean to them?’ he asked slowly, thinking hard. ‘Does it mean anything at all? I don’t think it means much to me.’ We each regarded our mothers as deeply religious women and in many talks we had together we tried to find out what significance the religion they professed had for them. It was the beginning of Lawrence’s groping into experience to find a value that might serve as a guide. There was little analysis of the elements of religion at this stage – that came later. But there was serious attempt to find a practical value. That was 1901–2. The questioning of orthodox religion came to a crisis when Lawrence went to Nottingham University College (September 1906) where he read most of the philosophical, religious and scientific books which provided the staple diet of nineteenth century intellectuals: Darwin, Renan, Carlyle, Huxley, Mill, Herbert Spencer, Schopenhauer, William James. Jessie Chambers emphasised the impact on Lawrence of rationalism and scepticism, the materialist and scientific view of life:36 He had come up against the materialist attitude to life, and religion, and it seared his youthful freshness . . . Far more than any dogma, Lawrence was interested in the question as to how the old religious ideas stood in relation to the scientific discoveries that were sweeping away the familiar landmarks. On one of our walks home he gave my brother and me a vivid description of the nebular theory of the Universe, and he was troubled by the discrepancy between such a hypothesis of the origin of things and the God postulated by the Congregational Chapel. Lawrence objected to the Chapel not just on ideological grounds, but for its tone of selfrighteousness (the ‘tone of authority’ adopted by many religious people, including his mother) and for its essentially negative attitude to morality: ‘The Chapel system of morality is all based on “Thou shalt not”. We want one based on “thou shalt”. Presumably the rebellion against Christianity and the authority of the Chapel was general among the educated young of Eastwood, and they naturally turned towards the familiar alternatives: rationalism, humanism, social responsibility, political belief. It doesn’t surprise us that Lawrence’s acceptance of the materialist position was very much a temporary thing. But there was another alternative to the crisis of belief, and he took one much more seriously. It was ‘art’. He wrote in a letter:37 College gave me nothing, even nothing to do – I had a damnable time there, bitter so deep with disappointment that I have lost forever my sincere boyish reverence for men in position . . . I lost my reverence, and my reverence was a big part of me – and having lost my reverence, my religion rapidly vanished. Now I respect some men, but I revere none. . . . Three parts of my time I was bored till college boredom became a disease. Moreover I was suffering acutely from Carlyliophobia, which you will understand if ever that rabid philosopher has bitten you. And lastly I was sore, frightfully raw and sore because I couldn’t get the religious conversion, the Holy Ghost business, that I longed for. It was imperative that I should do something, so I began to write a novel.
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The novel in question was The White Peacock. Lawrence’s turning to art represents a direct split with the Chapel its teaching and whatever ‘strong intellectual tradition’ it may have had.38
The divided self From about 1906 onwards we begin to hear about Lawrence’s very strong sense of a division within himself: of his life splitting into separate existences under the pressures that operated on him. He articulated this dualism to Jessie as being between the spiritual and artistic self which Jessie encouraged and loved; and the physical, sexual side which she could not tolerate.39 ‘The trouble is, you see, I’m not one man, but two’. I refused to accept the idea, but he persisted gravely: ‘It’s true, it is so, I am two men inside one skin’. ‘I am not a complete whole. I tell you, I am two men. One man in me loves you, but the other never can love you’. ‘One part of my nature needs you deeply’ he would explain with moving earnestness. ‘For some things, I cannot do without you. But the other side of me wants someone else, someone different’. Lawrence’s thinking about the problem is complex and it does change and develop. In relation to Jessie, the division seems to be a simple dualism of physical and spiritual; Jessie satisfied the one, but not the other. Which is why Lawrence had to go to Louie Burrows. In a letter to Jessie:40 When I look at you, what I see is not the kissable and embraceable part of you . . . what I see is the deep spirit within. That I love and can go on loving all my life . . . Look, you are a nun, I give you what I would give a holy nun. So you must let me marry a woman I can kiss and embrace and made the mother of my children. But the simple physical/spiritual interpretation misses out Lawrence’s sense of his ‘artistic self ’ and where exactly that fitted into the pattern. We have seen that as a writer Lawrence felt set apart from Eastwood society, and needed Jessie to develop artistically. This is what he means by ‘for some things I cannot do without you’. And he offers Jessie a purely spiritual love, while he takes his sexual passion to Louie. At this point, the artist is identified with the spirit, and Jessie loved them both. Later Lawrence expressed it quite differently.41 Miriam encouraged my demon. But alas, it was me, not he, whom she loved. So for her too it was a catastrophe. My demon is not easily loved: Whereas the ordinary me is. So poor Miriam was let down. Here the ‘demon’ is Lawrence’s artistic self: inhuman, timeless, amoral, perhaps even diabolical. And Jessie can’t love it. So what has happened is a qualitative change in the nature of Lawrence’s conception of his artistic self. It has now become alienated both from Eastwood society and from Jessie herself. And it now includes (whereas before it excluded) Lawrence’s emotional and sexual life. The decision he makes here is profoundly important: it is a decision to live according to the demon rather than according to the ‘ordinary meal-time me’; that is, the ordinarv conventional self which was the object of his mother’s ambitions. It was of course the amoral, artistic demon who eloped with Frieda Weekley.
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Leavis and others have suggested that Eastwood encouraged and developed the young writer, and that he depended on its culture for the growth of his own. But here we see that Lawrence, thinking of himself as an artist, has to alienate that ‘artistic’ self from his ‘real’ or ‘normal’ self, and regard it as something separate, timeless, inhuman and immoral. Lawrence experienced within himself the deep-rooted contradictions of his society. May Chambers described him in 1912, still experiencing the same division between man and poet, ‘common man’ and artist. At this point he is preparing, of course, to destroy the normal, Eastwood self, and live according to the values of his ‘demon’. May Chambers pronounces with solemn finality the judgement of Eastwood on the erring Lawrence:42 My sister told me that in those days Lawrence impressed her with a sense of his divine belief in himself. She said he seemed to feel he was important to the world, and he resented any claim that would curtail his experience and therefore his usefulness. He felt himself a medium charged with some power for the good of mankind. Yet he wished he could escape it and grow stout, and attractive to women. He longed to be loved as a man instead of as a poet. He told her also that he was a common man with an intellect . . . He would say one day that he must accept every experience that came his way for the sake of his ‘mission’, and the next that he was nothing but a simple, ordinary man, with a little more than the ordinary man’s mental equipment. Her final verdict on him was: ‘He sees the light and chooses the dark’.
Notes 1 Raymond Williams: Culture and Society 1780–1950 (1958) p. 206. V. de Sola Pinto: D.H. Lawrence: Prophet of the Midlands (1951). In 1972 the Nottingham Festival Committee assembled an exhibition of Lawrence material to show that ‘Lawrence’s extraordinary genius was permanently rooted in the region’. See James T. Boulton: Young Bert (Heanor, 1972). 2 F.R. Leavis: D.H. Lawrence, Novelist (Chatto 1955), ch. 3. 3 See for example his reply to Rene Welleck: ‘Literature and Philosophy’ in The Common Pursuit (1952). I am sure Dr. Leavis uses these words precisely and consciously: my point is that the language he uses to describe common, shared social experience, is (paradoxically) an isolated and private language. It’s the language of ritual, for the initiated, rather than the language of communication. 4 The Rainbow (Penguin ed.) p. 345. 5 T.S. Eliot: Notes towards the Definition of Culture (Faber 1948), p. 37. 6 Leavis, op. cit., p. 320. 7 D.H. Lawrence: The Lost Girl, ch. 2. 8 Leavis, op. cit., pp. 77–8. 9 T.S. Eliot: After Strange Gods (Faber 1933) p. 18. 10 Raymond Williams: ‘Literature and Sociology; in memory of Lucien Goldmann’ New Left Review no. 67, May–June 1971. 11 Christopher Caudwell: ‘D.H. Lawrence: a Study of the Bourgeois Artist’, Studies in a Dying Culture (London 1938), p. 44. 12 D.H. Lawrence: Sons and Lovers, ch. 1. 13 E.T. ( Jessie Chambers): D.H. Lawrence: A Personal Record (Cape 1935) p. 49. (All quotations from the second edition, ed. J.D. Chambers). 14 E.T., op. cit., p. 57. 15 ibid., p. 117. 16 Introduction to A Bibliography of D.H. Lawrence by Edward McDonald, Pheonix, p. 232. 17 William Hopkin, in Edward Nehls: D.H. Lawrence: A Composite Biography (Madison 1957), vol. I, p. 72. 18 D.H. Lawrence: ‘Autobiographical Sketch’, Assorted Articles (1930).
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19 George Henry Neville, in Nehls, op. cit., p. 46. In the preceding remarks I am indebted to my colleague John Worthen for access to an unpublished Ph.D. thesis: D.H. Lawrence: Readers and Audience. 20 Sons and Lovers, p. 177. 21 E.T., op. cit., p. 46. 22 ibid., p. 58. 23 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, p. 205. 24 Jessie Chambers, op. cit., p. 66. 25 ibid., p. 94 ff. 26 ibid., p. 102. 27 ibid., p. 102. 28 ibid., pp. 53–4. 29 See James T. Boulton, op. cit. 30 Oliver Hopkin, in W.E. Hopkin, Glades and Lovers; quoted Nehls, op. cit., p. 543. 31 Emile Delavenay, D. H. Lawrence and Edward Carpenter: A study in Edwardian Transition. See also Enid C. Hilton in Nehls, op, cit., pp. 134–5. 32 Letters to Blanche Jennings: see Harry T. Moore (ed.), Collected Letters of D.H. Lawrence, 1962, vol. 1. 33 ‘Art and the Individual’, Pheonix 11. A more complete text is that in Ada Lawrence and G. Stuart Gelder, Young Lorenzo, Early Life of D.H. Lawrence (New York 1966). 34 Jessie Chambers, op. cit., p. 120. 35 ibid, p. 48. 36 ibid., pp. 83–4. 37 Collected Letters, vol. 1. 38 There is evidence (such as the essay ‘Hymns in a Man’s Life’) that the Chapel upbringing affected Lawrence as a creative writer in deeper and less conscious ways. But I presume Dr. Leavis means by a ‘strong intellectual tradition’ more than those ‘rather banal Nonconformist hymns’. 39 Jessie Chambers, op. cit., pp. 136–7. 40 Collected Letters, vol. 1. 41 ‘Introduction to the Collected Poems of D.H. Lawrence’, Pheonix, p. 251. 42 Jessie Chambers, op. cit., p. 214.
7
The abuses of literacy Colin Sparks
The Working Class has no golden age in the past; our golden age is the future. Harry Wicks
Most of the current discussion in Cultural Studies concerns the question of methodology. It seems to be generally agreed as to what we are looking at, and all that remains is to settle the way in which we should look at it. The central concern of this paper is to argue that this accepted definition of the object of study takes its fundamental characteristics quite uncritically from much earlier conceptions of the nature of Cultural Studies, and that consequently the bulk of contemporary practise is radically misconceived. In order to argue this case, it will be necessary to return to some of the seminal texts of cultural studies and to look at the ways in which they have been subsequently used. The problem of the relation and mutual determination of methodology and problematic has not, as far as I know, been subject to much investigation, and I cannot here attempt to deal with it in any detail; rather I have tried to illustrate the consequent arbitrary dislocation in the course of the argument about the nature of the problematic itself. Cultural Studies has had, from its inception, a certain flavour of radical brimstone about it. The writers who may be considered, without too much argument, as the founders of discipline, had and have, by the standards of British academic life, highly developed and eccentric concerns and ideas. In particular, the two leading figures (Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams) display in the genuinely seminal works of Cultural Studies quite definite and unconcealed political intentions. The case of Williams is self-evident but The Uses of Literacy itself has its definite plea for political actions: If the active minority continue to allow themselves too exclusively to think of immediate political and economic objectives, the past will be sold, culturally, behind their backs.1 The two perspectives are different, but they share important common ground: both writers attempted to re-integrate a huge submerged area of human experience into the study of culture. It is possible to overstress the importance of biographical factors in the initial impetus towards Cultural Studies. It is possible to locate a number of the central concerns within the more general intellectual climate of the time. I cannot here detail the evolution of the period, but some of its salient features can at least be remarked upon. If one recalls on the one hand the complex of ideas which a combination of Cold War and Long Boom generated; the notion of a problem-free post-Keynesian capitalism; the alleged disappearance of
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the working class; the agonised convulsions of the Labour Party; the bankruptcy of the pretenders to alternative leadership and in particular the sterility of the Stalinist version of Marxism; the changing modes of working-class activity and experience, one can see a good part of the forces at work. If we set alongside that the strengths and weaknesses of the powerfully established literary analysis of ‘Culture’ and the contrary and equally ambivalent sociological studies of ‘mass society’, then much more is visible. If we examine The Uses of Literacy we can see clearly how a number of central definitions emerged. The dominant impressions which a reading of The Uses of Literacy leaves one with are curiously unintellectual: they are nostalgia and self-recognition. These may be to a large part intentional, and they certainly go a long way towards explaining the impact and popularity of the book, but they are also problematic. Nostalgia is built into the whole structure. The warm glow of Hunslet is balanced against the neon and plastic of the 1950s. The world of the 1920s is used as a critical standard against which to judge later developments. It is alleged, quite uncritically, that ‘the old forms of class culture are in danger of being replaced by a poorer kind of classless culture, and this is to be regretted’.2 Regret and nostalgia may be useful and entertaining feelings, but they lead to some very curious conclusions. Speaking of ‘Milk Bars’, Hoggart says, along with much else of an uncomplimentary nature: Compared even with the pub around the corner, this is all a peculiarly thin and pallid form of dissipation, a sort of spiritual dry-rot amid the odour of boiled milk. Many of the customers – their clothes, their hair-styles, their facial expressions all indicate – are living to a large extent in a myth-world compounded of a few simple elements which they take to be those of American life.3 It is only too easy to mock this kind of thinking, but to do so might obscure the substantial point. After a major effort to come to terms with how one generation of working people saw and defined their world, and displaying considerable sensitivity to their modes of selfexpression, we are treated to this shabby and contemptuous dismissal of the efforts of a new generation. Whether intended or not, the intellectual counterpart of this emotion has entered deeply and cancerously into the concerns of Cultural Studies. Central to so much of the work which has been produced is the idea that there was, in the 1920s and 1930s, a clear and definite working-class culture which was more valuable, more authentic, more homogenous, more independent . . . more working-class, than any subsequent development. This vanished culture becomes the standard of judgement for later formations, and they are all found wanting. I do not wish to quarrel with the idea that there was such a culture. Much more to the point is how we evaluate it. The culture was the product of a specific historical experience and it represented a response to a particular historical conjuncture. The culture of later decades was a response to a different historical experience, which included the accretions of the preceeding experience as well as new elements. It was and is different, and if we are to judge either it is not by some nostalgic, inverted teleology of culture. If we accept the authenticity of one cultural formation, then we must accept the authenticity of another. How we analyse and compare different periods is something I wish to deal with later, but we certainly cannot do so by elevating an arbitrary and particular period to the status of a proletarian Paradise.
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The feeling of recognition adds a further dimension. The figure of the Scholarship Bay informs the second evaluative crux of the book. The assumed critical independence which this poor lonely adolescent has been granted is the vantage point from which the strengths and limits of two cultures can be assessed. The limitations of ‘high cultural’ analysis, and the inappropriateness of the characteristic standards, are forever present. In the middle of a discussion of very soft pornography we find a passage like this: Sanctuary is admittedly an early pot-boiler; yet one can see in it the marks of a serious and disinterested creative writer. A gifted, varied, and complex perception is at work, picking up sights, smells, noises, and weaving them together in a scene of some complexity . . .4 The problem presented by passages like this is: if our critical conceptions and values are those forged by academic English Literature, then we can make judgements on a particular kind of human activity; on the other hand, these methods and values are clearly inadequate to come to terms with the real meanings of the experience and culture of the overwhelming mass of society. Hoggart himself seems never to have solved the problem which his work makes clear. In essays like Mass Communications in Britain and Schools of English in Contemporary Society he juggles uneasily and agnostically with the difficulties.5 The difficulty, however, resolutely refused to go away. What occurred in practice was what Stuart Hall later called a ‘shift . . . from the “aesthetic” to the historical and anthropological conceptions of “a culture”’. This movement was undoubtedly one of the fundamental impetuses in Cultural Studies, and it posed very sharply the need to develop a new theory and a new methodology for the study of human experience. However, like the first impulse, the way in which this second insight was to operate contained, within the impulse itself, profound dangers. The internal evolution of Cultural Studies was marked by this impetus. Defining itself in opposition to an avowedly evaluative discipline, it had to create its own values more appropriate to its own material and concerns. If the standards of ‘High Culture’ were inappropriate to Cultural Studies, so too its own standards were and are inappropriate to ‘High Culture’. The values of Cultural Studies have from their origin been rooted in a sentimental myth of past ages, and they do not provide any total vantage point from which to analyse the historical experience of culture. The difficulty with the value system generated is two-fold. If we erect a critical apparatus which is tailored specifically to the culture of one class, then we are simply in an inverse repetition of the tradition from which we are trying to break. Now, unless independent cultural systems are mutually sealed against each other, then there is only one other alternative: simply to ignore the alternative cultural formation. The problem of the assessment of the ‘high cultural’ tradition was not subsumed under a new conception, it was consigned, by an approximation to administrative action, to the status of non-existence. The ‘high cultural’ system of evaluation was the product of a selective reading of a total historical process which was blind to the existence of possible alternatives. What Cultural Studies has done is to erect a different, but equally selective and myopic alternative. This first objection might be met by arguing along more or less quantitative lines that the new system encompassed the experiences of a far greater number of people than the old, but to answer in that manner is to demonstrate glaringly the second objection to this value system. It is, quite simply, based on a rejection of history. To hypostasise a single, unique development as the calibration-table against which all other developments are to be measured is to reject any notion of the
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complex historical evolution of social classes in relation to each other. The consequences are quite suprising: much against the conscious intentions of many of the students of Cultural Studies, the argument leads with irresistable logic to a celebration of capitalism in one of its many unpleasant forms. The culture which is chosen as a yard-stick is, it should be remembered, the culture of a subordinate class. If this is the source of our evaluations, then from what point can we criticise the fact of domination? Cultural Studies thus operated from its inception with a rigid, and thus flawed, notion of social totality. However much it might proclaim its allegience to higher and better things, its failure to give any critical account of itself or what it rejected made it inevitable that it would fail to realise its own potential. This failure leads logically to the third, and in my opinion the most important, legacy of The Uses of Literacy. Once again, the Scholarship Boy provides a key to understanding what is going on. A crucial point in the book is the discussion of the antimony of ‘Them’ and ‘Us’, and in this chapter, Hoggart has a revealing passage: After the age of eleven, when the scholarship boys and girls go off to the grammarschool, the rest look increasingly outward to the real life which will begin at fifteen, to the life with the group of older men and women which, for the first few years after school forms the most powerfully educative force they know.6 This is undoubtedly true, but its most telling point is that the scholarship boy has once and for all been put off from that most crucial element in the real life of the working-class work. This is not simply a limitation of biography: it is also a central theoretical absence from the way in which Hoggart approaches his material. A large part of the definition of workingclass in this book is geographical, and it is supplemented by a vision through the lenses of consumption, leisure, and home. One possible definition, which is specifically ruled out through the inclusion of small shop-keepers, is the one which springs most readily to mind: production. Once again, this perspective had contradictory effects. It opened up a whole new range of topics for analysis and provided a healthy antidote to some dangerous illusions. On the other hand, it seems to me that it produced, in the long run, the most pernicious misanalysis that Cultural Studies has suffered from. Consider, for example, Hoggart’s discussion of working-class activists: . . . I have not referred much to the influence of the ‘earnest minority’ among workingclass people, since my chief concern has been with attitudes among the majority. Yet I do not mean to underestimate the effect the ‘earnest minority’ has, or to imply that this minority has had and may continue to have (though this is by no means certain) an influence on their group out of all proportion to their number, it is important that, something should be said more directly about them.7 I do not seek to deny that this minority has been very much of a minority, but the difficulties inherent in the above formulation are so many that it is hard to know how to come to terms with them. If we look at the list of institutions these people supported (and Hoggart grants them only the ability to support we are at once struck by the fact that one of the most massive and enduring of them, the Trade Unions, were formed as a direct response to the central issue of work. The two other most massive ones, the Cooperative Movement and the Labour Party, have at least strong links with work. A notable exception from the list is the Communist Party. Certainly this has always been very small, and perhaps Gallacher or Hannington
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were really Russians or at least middle-class romantics, but it is difficult to see how any discussion of the working-class activist could possibly ignore that tragic trajectory. It seems that Hoggart was determined to ignore that stubborn millenarian ghost clanking its chains through Conference and Rule Book in so many of those organisations which spring up from the collective efforts of working people. Secondly, although it is true that these organisations have very often depended for their existence and continuation on very small minorities, it is certainly not true that they were, and are, the concern solely of those minorities. Take the example of the Trade Unions these do indeed depend a great deal on a relatively small number of activists, although that active support is certainly very much larger than is commonly supposed, but the organisations are not the expression of those minorities. They are mass organisations and they are the expressions of the masses. It is only in so far as the ‘majority’ are prepared to organise and to give their loyalty to their organisations, only in so far as they are willing to acceed to collective discipline and to suffer collective hardship, that any Trade Union can even begin to function. Thirdly, the concerns of this minority are not the marginal ephemera of the life of the majority of working people. They are the crucial determinants of the material and cultural life of the class as a whole. The culture of the British working class is not ‘affected’ by the strengths and weaknesses of its political and industrial organisations. The relation is one of mutual determination. The horizons and definitions of the class, the ‘cultural space’ within which it operates, are not pregiven and arbitrary. They are the boundaries set by the successes and failures of these organisations. Fourthly, these organisations are not separated off from the cultural life of the working class in a watertight compartment. They penetrate and are penetrated through and through the cultural attitudes which are appropriate even on Hoggart’s narrow definition. Take for example the ‘Labour Aristocracy’. This formation entailed far more than membership of a particular exclusive craft union monopolising the sale of labour power in