THE CRASH OF '87 A Symposium
•
19 October 1987 was the first day of the second great crash
of the twentieth centur...
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THE CRASH OF '87 A Symposium
•
19 October 1987 was the first day of the second great crash
of the twentieth century . The events of 19 October 1987 share with the events of 29 October 1929 a number of common factors . First and foremost both were bear market collapses, in which finance capital was centrally involved . Second, both had an international impact . Third, both came after a period of relative stagnation in real capital accumulation . Fourth, both came during periods when the hegemony of the leading capitalist power was in decline . But will 1987 be followed like 1929 by protracted global depression, political upheavals and eventually imperialist world war? The answer will surely be influenced by the longer term impact of the Crash of '87 on real capital accumulation and
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industrial growth, on employment, wages and profits . The issues are so vital to the international working class, that socialists throughout the world must analyse these events with the utmost care and clarity . Capital & Class has therefore invited five socialist economists to contribute to the debate, and we wish to thank them for responding in a short time to our invitation . Each contributor was asked to look at the Crash of '87 from a different point of view . The intention is not to provide a final and definitive answer, but to offer some explanatory perspectives . It is hoped that readers will respond . In particular Capital & Class would welcome accounts of the Crash as seen in countries other than Britain .
The contributions
Trevor Evans sets the scene with a review of the international pressures building up against the dollar since the 1970s, and the various attempts by the dominant industrial nations to contain the problem, ending with the ill-fated Louvre Accord in February 1987 . He considers whether inter-imperialist rivalries made their failure inevitable, and whether the growth of private international money markets has shifted containment beyond the grasp of nation states .
Jerry Coakley takes up the question of the growth of international markets in money and securities . He argues that the world balance of financial power is shifting significantly in favour of Japanese banks, and that the Crash of '87 will accelerate this re-ordering . London, he notes, is the most open of the world's three leading exchanges, and therefore the most vulnerable to shocks . In assessing the causes of the Crash itself, he acknowledges the real and financial explanations on offer, but suggests that an overinvestment thesis can best incorporate their insights .
The crash of '87
Andrew Glyn sets the Crash of '87 against the background of the declining rate of capital accumulation in the OECD countries since the early 1970s . Falling productivity growth, and a rising organic composition of capital, he suggests, account for these falling rates, which in turn undermine the growth of aggregate demand . By contrast, market valuations of real assets have roughly doubled over the past ten years . Market unreality was bound to collapse, but Glyn considers this may not impact greatly on real investment .
John Grahl locates the seeds of the crisis in the rise of finance capital, in the US in particular, from the 1970s . Fuelled by high interest rates and the slump in real investments, its impact was inflationary . He contrasts the deflationary impact of the US Federal Reserve Bank's tight money regime under the stewardship of Paul Volcker, with the profligacy of Reaganomics . Dethroning the dollar as the international reserve currency is thus an essential step towards releasing the world economy from America's increasingly destabilising influence .
Alan Freeman sets the Crash of '87 in a wider historical context . Suggesting that theories of long waves and theories of hegemonic crises both have something to contribute, he reconsiders the Crash of '29 in light of Kindleberger's . thesis that the failure of US capitalism to replace the waning power of British capitalism lay behind the Great Depression . He argues that hegemony requires both national productive capacity and a capability to command world finance and trade to ensure `fair shares' of world surplus value for all leading capitalist economies . The Crash of '87 expresses precisely the incapacity of the US to meet these conditions . Yet the crisis of US hegemony threatens to be a crisis for us all .
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Dollar is likely to rise, fall or stay steady, experts agree'
Trevor Evans
The international stock market crash which began in New York on Monday 19 October, is widely considered to have been triggered by the us Treasury Secretary Baker's threat to cancel the Louvre Accord . This agreement was made in Paris at the end of February at a meeting of the secretive Group of Seven (G7) - the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the world's seven most powerful capitalist states .2 Crucially, the Accord involved a commitment by Baker to stop `talking down' the value of the dollar . Since before the dollar peaked in March 1985, the financial world had been exorcised by the fear of a so-called `crash landing' - the danger that a decline in the value of the dollar might turn into a free fall if overseas creditors dumped their massive holdings . The us Federal Reserve would then be forced to attract funds back into the dollar by raising interest rates to levels
that would plunge the world into another major recession . Foreign Central Banks poured large sums into buying dollars in order to prop up its value, but the dollar continued to decline . This was partly because official central-bank resources are dwarfed by those of the big private institutions that were selling dollars, but also because the us government was itself encouraging the dollar to fall in an attempt to promote us exports and so cut its economy's mounting trade deficit . This policy is the latest step in a long series of us measures that have used the international position of the dollar to try and boost accumulation in the us at the expense of rival capitalist economies.
The end of the post-war order The background to the present situation lies in the end of the post-war
The crash of '87 boom in 1973 . The end of the boom was characterised by two key.features . Firstly, the dynamic combination of mass production and rising real wages - Fordism - could not be maintained and the rate of profit was falling in the advanced capitalist economies . Secondly, the stable international order based on a hierarchy of capitalist states under the hegemony of the us was undermined, partly by the economic growth of Japan and Western Europe, and partly by the increasingly international nature of industrial and financial capital . A central pillar of the post-war order was the use of the dollar as the main form of international money . Established on the basis of the country's initial industrial and financial supremacy, this placed the us in a very privileged international position . It meant that, unlike any other country, the us could run a balance of payments deficit and finance it by simply issuing more dollars . The Us was restrained by a commitment to convert foreign-held dollars into gold on request but in 1971 the us unilaterally revoked this commitment and the world was left with a system based on an inconvertable us dollar . The lengthy period of crisis since 1973 has moved through several stages, each closely tied to a new turn in us policy. After an initial slump there was an upturn from 1975 until 1979 . This was marked by a big expansion of government expenditure in most advanced capitalist countries - although Britain cut back after a sterling crisis in 1976 . Despite increased demand, accumulation in Europe was weak, although in the us many new, if often low-paid, jobs were created . The strong upturn in the us was made possible by the fact that, although
it resulted in rising imports and a trade deficit, the us could finance the deficit by simply issuing dollars . Then, as overseas creditors piled up more dollars than they wanted, the Carter government just sat back and did nothing to protect the dollar as its value slowly sank on the world's foreign exchanges. This surreptitious devaluation gave us exports a big push at the same time that it cut the value of the dollars held abroad! The devaluation succeeded in stemming the fall in the us share of world trade, although at the same time it raised the price of imported raw materials and led to rising us inflation . However, in late 1978, the strategy had to be abandoned as foreign creditors decided it was time to abandon the failling dollar and its value began to collapse. The us raised interest rates, but perhaps more significantly, the government proposed to issue bonds denominated in yen and Deutschmarks so that it could acquire foreign currency reserves to defend the dollar . The us was accepting that it could not force all the cost of a declining dollar onto foreign creditors, and that it too would have to bear a real part of the cost of adjustment . This co-operative phase was, however, short- lived. Reasserting us supremacy Devaluation had not resolved the underlying stagnation of us industrial capital and the weakened dollar collapsed again at the end of 1979 . us interest rates were once more raised to defend it and the scene was set for a new world slump . Political defeats in Asia, Africa and Central America and additional economic competition from the newly industrialising countries had soured any interest by us capital in
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co-operative solutions . With the election of Reagan, massive rearmament and a strong dollar became the key to reimposing us supremacy on the world. A key part in this shift was played by the us Federal Reserve. With the declared aim of controlling inflation, it adopted strongly monetarist policies which drove up us interest rates to unprecedented levels in the early 1980s . These attracted capital into the country from all over the world and the value of the dollar soared . While the traditional industrial sectors of us capital were ruthlessly squeezed between high interest rates and a collapse of exports, financial capital had a bonanza . At the same time, huge state expenditure on armaments boosted accumulation in electronics and aerospace, thereby actively promoting the most technologically sophisticated sectors of us industry . Reagan rode tall on the super dollar and a heavy line in cold-war rhetoric . After us monetarism has subjected the world economy to two years of bitter recession, massive government spending provided the basis for a new us upturn at the end of 1982 . This boom took off as third world countries, trapped by the debt crisis, were forced to effect a net transfer of capital to the Us . The boom also depended on capital which was attracted from other advanced capitalist countries by the rising value of the dollar . Compared with earlier us upturns, Reagan's boom has been marked by high rates of growth and it has been remarkably prolonged . However, the policies on which it is based have encountered two serious obstacles which lead us to the current malaise of the dollar and its impact on the stock market crash.
The limits of Reagan's boom First, the super dollar meant cheap imports that threatened jobs in many domestic us industries, and an increasingly strong movement in favour of protection looked set to benefit the Democratic Party at the 1986 Congressional elections . Reagan's government apparently decided that the only way to head off this threat was to support moves by other Central Banks to drive down the value of the dollar .3 Foreign Central Bankers were already deeply concerned that after its spectacular rise, the dollar was greatly overvalued, and that unless they intervened in foreign exchange markets to manage a decline, it might tumble and cause chaos in international markets . In February 1985 they sold over $1 lbn in a single week and in March the dollar finally began to fall . The us secured approval for a joint approach to the dollar at an important meeting of the Group of Five, held at the Plaza Hotel, New York, in September 1985 . Finance Ministers agreed to act jointly to drive the dollar down further, but to use their concerted resources to defend it if it fell too quickly. The us needed this agreement because its own reserves were much too small to defend the dollar in the event of a run .4 After the Plaza meeting, Central Banks - including the us Fed - sold $10bn, and the value of the dollar fell . By the end of 1985 it was 25% down on its peak and by the end of the next year it was 40% down - and still falling . Remarkably, because of falling oil and primary commodity prices in the world market, us inflation did not take off as it had after Carter's devaluation . But the falling dollar now posed a different problem .
The crash of '87 Financing the us deficit Reagan's boom sucked imports into the us while the high dollar reduced its exports . This has led to a major imbalance in world trade . Japan, West Germany and the Asian NICs have developed large trade surpluses, while the US has run a growing trade deficit that has turned the country into a net debtor. The second major problem facing the Reagan government has been how to finance this deficit. When the us had run a trade deficit in the 1970s, it had been financed by issuing dollars in the us. But the adoption of monetarist policies ruled this out in the 1980s and the us has therefore had to finance its deficit by attracting dollars that already existed abroad back to the us.s This was successful so long as the dollar was rising, but it became far more difficult once the dollar began to fall . Until 1986, the us deficit was financed by inflows of private capital . In a first phase, from 1983 until mid-1984, there was a net inflow of capital through us banks . They had cut back their lending to the third world after the onset of the debt crisis, at the same time that high us interest rates attracted deposits from all over the world . In a second phase, which began in 1984, the deficit began to be financed by investments in securities. Japanese institutions used the dollars they had accumulated to invest in us Treasury bonds, and us corporations used foreign bond markets to raise capital which they then sent back to the us to finance domestic accumulation . The third phase, which dates from early 1986, has been marked by a diversification by foreign and especially Japanese investors away from Treasuryand Euro-bonds and into shares . In the first half of 1987, foreign institutions'
net purchase of shares exceeded that of bonds, a shift which helped fuel the rise of us share prices. An important feature of this third phase, however, is that private investment has not been sufficient to cover the us deficit ; in 1986 about a quarter of the us deficit was financed by foreign Central Banks who were buying dollars in an attempt to stem its falling value . 6 But to the consternation of these central banks the us continued to encourage the dollar to fall . The aim of the us was to reduce its need for foreign finance, not by curtailing domestic accumulation, but by devaluing so as to make its exports more attractive . This was resented by its capitalist rivals, in particular Japan and West Germany, whose industries are the main competition in the high technology sectors which us capital is striving to dominate. These countries were threatened with slower growth unless government policies shifted from an emphasis on developing high technology exports towards a greater reliance on domestic expansion. The falling dollar was therefore a new source of friction between the major capitalist states . In January 1987, there was a further large flow out of the dollar and into the Deutschmark, and European and Japanese Central Banks spent $30bn trying to stabilise the foreign exchange markets. The White House described the dollar's continued fall as 'orderly and steady', and it denied that it was seeking a further fall in notably ambiguous terms, but the West German Bundesbank President Otto Poehl warned that the us was playing with fire . The Louvre Accord The Louvre Accord in February was
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14 an attempt to reestablish stability in the foreign exchange markets . The Accord stated that the large trade and current account imbalances posed serious economic and political risks and it also claimed that exchange rates were `broadly consistent with. underlying economic fundamentals' . It was agreed that the us would stop encouraging the dollar to fall, and that international imbalances would be redressed by using fiscal policy to restrain growth in the us and to stimulate it in Japan and West Germany. Despite the Accord, private institutions did not accept that the dollar would now be stabilised and, indeed, influential us economists were still calling for it to be devalued by another 20 or 30 per cent in order to balance the trade deficit . Private foreign investment in dollar assets remained insufficient to finance all the us deficit . European and Japanese Central Banks had to intervene repeatedly to defend the dollar and between January and May they acquired a total of some $70bn. This scale of official intervention meant that central banks were financing over a third of the us trade deficit in the first half of 1987. It also had the effect of shifting the immediate tension from the dollar onto interest rates . The rate of return on us bonds increased from 8 per cent in January to just over 10 per cent at the beginning of October . But the stock market boom continued to attract domestic and foreign capital and by the end of August, the price of shares had risen to a level that yielded a return of only 5 per cent . The situation was highly unstable and the speculative rise in stock prices could have collapsed at any moment . Baker's threat to resume pushing
down the dollar is said to have precipitated the big shift of capital from shares into bonds and the collapse of stock market prices . The link to the dollar is that an uncontrolled slide in its value would result in a big increase in interest rates, and since share prices are inversely related to interest rates, share owners wanted to escape before that led to a big fall in prices . 7 But whether or not Baker's statement actually was the trigger, once stock prices were seen to be falling, there was a widespread wave of selling ; and the financial fragility that gave rise to this situation was closely linked to Reagan's policies to benefit us capital, first by pushing the dollar up to extraordinary heights and then by pushing it down again .
The multinational economy Financial manipulation has been central to us government policies to postpone and displace the deep-seated problems of capitalist accumulation . But, since the mid-1970s an international economy outside the control of national governments has been consolidating itself on the basis of multinational corporations. These corporations are financed by multinational banks who run a system of international money that is largely outside the control of national authorities . It is these uncontrolled international markets that are now the principle mechanism for allocating capital on a global scale, but which also threaten the stability of the world economy . The stock market crash briefly challenged the complacency of the us authorities in the face of these huge private markets and there was a relaxation of monetary policy in the advanced capitalist countries in
The crash of '87
order to prevent a serious financial collapse. The relaxation of monetary policy in the wake of the crash led to lower us interest rates . And despite extensive intervention by foreign central banks, this led to further falls of the dollar, which in turn prompted new wave of selling on the stock market . But although there has been an urgent need for co-ordinated policies, the period since October has been marked by sharp disagreements between the main capitalist states . Baker stated that the US was not prepared to risk a us recession in order to defend the dollar, and criticised the West German government for not adopting more expansionary policies. Bundesbank President Poehl criticised the us in unusually outspoken terms ; and even the British Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, called for a US pledge to defend the dollar, by issuing foreign currency bonds if necessary . The Group of Seven issued a statement at the end of December which called for more stable exchange rates, but unlike the Louvre Agreement earlier in the year it involved no commitment to joint action . The value of the dollar had now fallen by half against the Deutschmark since its peak in 1985 . And although the dollar was temporarily stabilised in January 1988 when foreign central bank intervention successfully imposed issues on currency dealers selling dollars, it is not clear that the US will now cease to depress the dollar.
The us government hopes that devaluation will close its trade deficit, but the evidence is clear that this will not be achieved without either a contraction of the us economy or an expansion abroad . If the us did succeed in closing its trade deficit, this would result in a fall in world demand and slower growth for the economies of the advanced capitalist countries and the third world . But to therefore oppose a cut in the us deficit implies supporting the us's ability to appropriate resources from the rest of the world without making any real payment . Socialist policy must address itself to breaking the privileged international position of the dollar, and to creating an international framework that is not dominated by private financial markets . Notes 1 . Title courtesy of Wall Street Journal, 11 January 1988 . 2 . The us, Japan, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada ; the smaller G5 does not include Italy and Canada . 3 . See Ricardo Parboni, `The Dollar Weapon', New Left Review, no. 158, 1986. 4. Daily foreign exchange trading in London amounted to $90bn in early 1986, a similar sum to the combined reserves of the us, Japan and West Germany. 5 . Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles (Verso, 1997) chapter 6. 6 . Morgan Guaranty, World Financial Marten, November/December 1987 . 7 . Share prices are normally based on the (expected) dividend capitalised at the (expected) interest rate .
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International dimensions of the stock market crash
Jerry Coakley
The October 1987 stock market crash was remarkable on a number of counts, many of which are treated in this issue and elsewhere .' From our viewpoint the most interesting feature of the crash was its international dimensions . The crash was transmitted from Wall Street to other major financial centres both with unprecedented rapidity and with apparent disregard for the underlying state of national economies . Moreover we argue below that the crash had important implications in the struggle for international financial hegemony . Since the crash a bear market has persisted on all the major stock exchanges although the exact nature of price movements has varied as between exchanges . This has been the case even for the Japanese financial markets which are linked to arguably the healthiest real economy among the leading capitalist countries comprising the G7 (Group of Seven) . The other significant post-crash feature has been the shakeout among us and European securities houses. This paper is organised as follows . First we sketch out the international background to the crash by examining developments in international financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s . Of particular interest is the pivotal role London had come to play in these processes . Second we propose an explana-
tion of the crash based on the notion of real and financial overinvestment in the securities industry . This, it is argued, was the underlying basis of the crash and is able to encompass other partial explanations . Finally we look at the aftermath of the crash and draw some tentative conclusions .
Financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s Financial markets and the financial services industry more generally have been fundmentally restructured since the 1970s. This restructuring is most evident in the area of producer financial services which are supplied on the wholesale international financial markets . It has occurred as part of two distinct waves of internationalisation of financial markets . Here we can only sketch out some of the characteristics of this process of restructuring . 2 Very briefly we can characterise the 1970s as the period of the internationalisation of the money markets via the rise of the Eurocurrency markets centred on London . In this period the commercial banks recycled the vast dollar surpluses of the oil exporting countries mainly to Third World countries. London managed to capture in excess of one quarter of this Eurocurrency business and was the leading
The crash of '87 centre by a large margin . On the other hand the 1980s have witnessed a distinct form of internationalisation of financial markets which has marked a sharp break with the 1970s . This involved the internationalisation of securities (bonds and equities) markets by means of the process known as securitisation . This may be broadly defined as that type of financial intermediation which involves the buying and selling of financial instruments. 3 Securitisation received a boost from a number of sources in the 1980s : • the nature of the large international payments imbalances and the related shift in the composition of international lending. Essentially the former have comprised the large us deficit and the surpluses of Japan and West Germany. In contrast with the investment of the 1970s surpluses of the oil exporting countries, those of Japan in particular have tended to be invested in various forms of securities in the 1980s . Moreover the Third World debt crisis had since 1982 led to a sharp decline in syndicated bank loans . This prompted banks to switch the focus of their lending away from the Third World towards the multinationals and governments of the advanced economies . This fostered the boom in the Eurobond markets initially and more recently in the Euronotes and Euroequities markets .' • the regulatory framework for the operation of financial markets has been or is being liberalised or deregulated in many countries . Prominent examples include the abolition of exchange controls on overseas capital movements in the UK and Japan, the establishment of offshore banking facilities in the us and Japan and the Big Bangs in London CSC/34-3
and other centres . The general effect of these changes has been to stimulate international portfolio diversification and to enhance cross-border capital mobility .
• finally the 1980s has been marked by a spate of innovation in financial instruments and markets . A major example of these is the swap market used for hedging purposes which mushroomed from $5 billion in 1982 to some $400 billion in 1986 . 5 Others include Eurocommercial paper, Euroequities and equity-linked bonds and various futures and options instruments .' The combination of these factors favouring securitisation in the international financial markets played a prominent role in the bull market which emerged in 1982 and which continued apparently unabated - a few minor hiccups notwithstanding-until the October crash . One of the major implications of securitisation has been to signal an end to London's hegemonic role among international financial centres and to effect a shift of power toward its principal competitors-New York and Tokyo . The crash has altered this process somewhat by adversely hitting London and New York and so favouring Tokyo by default . In this context it should be stressed that globalisation of financial markets is a misnomer. What we have witnessed instead is the reemergence of interimperialist rivalries' within the framework of financial markets and the financial services industry generally with other financial centres being relegated to playing only minor or specialist roles . Both New York and Tokyo enjoy the advantage of large domestic securities markets and securities houses
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which dwarf those in London . However financial markets remain highly regulated and segmented in both centres despite recent moves towards liberalisation . • In addition both us and Japanese pension funds could be said only to have begun to internationalise their portfolios by comparison with their UK counterparts . As Coakley (1987) has argued elsewhere we are still some distance from global financial markets . Since the 1970s London's preeminence as a Euromarket centre (both for Eurocurrency and Eurobonds) has enabled it to attract the huge influx of overseas banks . Currently some 400 commercial banks and some 110 securities houses or investment banks are directly represented in London .' These include virtually all the leading world financial conglomerates such as Nomura and Citicorp . London has further taken advantage of the trend towards securitisation and has captured the lion's share of trade in purely international securities mainly as a result of Big Bang . The Big Bang has afforded London one major advantage over its two main competitors . London is the only one of these three centres which does not restrict the securities activities of its commercial banks and which grants banking licences to investment banks . That is, London is the only centre which offers free trade in all types of international securities and banking markets to both commercial and investment banks . The corollary of this is that London had become a type of laboratory for financial institutions venturing into new markets. For this reason developments within the City securities markets bore only a very tenuous rela-
tionship to the requirements of the British economy . These developments served to heighten the vulnerability of London to external shocks as has been highlighted in the wake of the crash .
The overinvestment thesis Since the crash a number of theories have been adduced to explain why and when it occurred . These range from theories based on a sharp change in the psychology of traders to those based on the current account deficit and the rate of return discrepancy. The first begs the question of the causes of the change in psychology whilst the others are partial explanations to the extent that one is a real and the other is a financial explanation of the crash . For this reason we shall argue that both can be encompassed within our overinvestment thesis . The overinvestment (in securities) thesis incorporates two distinct concepts of investment which can be viewed as belonging to different circuits of capital . The concepts are real investment or accumulation and financial investment or investment in fictitious capital . The latter we define simply as trading in the securities markets. We shall contend that though the nature of overinvestment differed as between financial centres, in all cages it led to overtrading in securities. In the cases of New York and Tokyo overinvestment was largely of a financial nature though for different reasons . Overinvestment in Tokyo was largely the result of excess domestic savings whilst in the case of New York it was linked to a spate of merger and acquisition activity and a credit boom . By contrast overinvestment in London involved both real and financial ele-
The crash of '87
ments for reasons connected to the Big Bang . Since the Big Bang announcement securities houses and the securities subsidiaries of commercial banks and others have engaged in a process of real investment or accumulation in new trading floors, equipment and facilities . The scale of such investment has been huge by traditional securities industry standards . The FT, for instance, has quoted a figure of some £500m per trading floor in the case of the larger institutions . These large trading floors were required in the wake of the Big Bang due to the switch from a floor-based to a screen-based trading system necessitated by the extent of information technology (IT) flows involved in international trading . In this sense the securities markets were just catching up with existing screen-based trading systems in the Eurobond and the foreign exchange markets . The problem with this scale of investment was that it came to be regarded as a barrier to entry to the securities industry . The large institutions appeared to be faced with the stark choice of joining the first division of diversified market-makers or becoming second division niche players . In the rush not to be excluded most of the larger institutions choose to invest and the result is widespread excess capacity in both the gilts and equities markets in London . The extent of overcapacity can be gleaned by comparing the numbers of market-makers in London and New York. Even though the London government bond (gilt-edged) market is only one tenth the size of that in New York in terms of trading volume, London has some 26 market-makers as
against 40 in New York . One consequence of this overcapacity has been the tendency to overtrade since profits in the securities industry are transactions-based . In other words it has contributed to a rise in trading volume in secondary financial markets . Moreover in the context of a bull market there is a tendency for financial investment to contain a sizeable speculative element which will be inflated by factors causing overinvestment . In this sense the overinvestment thesis can incorporate speculative bubbles but is more general than the latter . 10 In brief what the overinvestment thesis argues is that overtrading emanating from both real and financial investment in the securities markets had inflated equity prices well in excess of their value as determined by expected profitability or market fundamentals . The large institutions had exacerbated this process by switching part of their holdings of liquid assets and government bonds into equities . A financial crisis was required to readjust prices and portfolio shares . The distinguishing characteristic of the overinvestment thesis is the emphasis it places on the speculative element in much financial investment . In that sense it has affinities with Marx's theory of financial crises in the 19th century. Moreover the thesis stresses that the crash had a basis in excessive real investment especially in London's markets. In this respect it is better able to explain the crash in London than its rivals . More generally the thesis would emphasise the continued vulnerability of London to future shocks due to its excess capacity and its reliance on overseas banks and securities houses .
19
Capital & Class 20 The aftermath of the crash In the months following the crash we have witnessed a sharp reduction in trading volume in the secondary financial markets or what we have called financial investment. The scale of the reduction has varied as between financial centres but has been of the order of one-quarter to one-third of pre-crash averages in 1987 . This has further squeezed the profitability of securities houses some of whom had already been nursing heavy losses incurred in the course of the crash . The result of all this has been the incidence of a widespread downsizing or shakeout in the ranks of securities houses. It is significant that most of this has occurred in London and New York and has been confined to American and European securities houses . It has taken the form of market exits and the abandonment of trading floors as well as staff redundancies . In the coming months one could witness further centralisation among securities houses and more concentration in the market shares of the larger institutions . The exception in this process has been Tokyo and the Japanese banks and securities houses . Thus far these institutions appear to have emerged relatively unscathed from the crash . How is this explained? The main reason seems to be that these institutions have taken a much more cautious line on internationalisation in the 1980s in contrast with the apparently gung-ho attitude of the others . This caution may be due to a number of factors, prominent among which is state regulation both within Japan and in relation to the international activities of Japanese institutions . One consequence of this is that one could view the crash as marking another
decisive stage in interimperialist financial rivalries. What the crash has done is to confirm the y shift in global financial power in the direction of Japanese securities houses and banks . We say it confirms Japanese power because the large Japanese banks had already established their supremacy in the Euromarkets in the course of the 1980s, albeit from a London base . Finally Japanese institutions (unlike their us and European counterparts) have avoided paying inflated prices for London stock exchange firms . They have preferred to establish de novo securities houses in London although they have bought stakes in three large Wall Street houses.
Conclusions We have argued above that the underlying cause of the crash was overinvestment in the securities industry . This had resulted both in excess capacity and in overtrading in the securities markets . The aftermath of the crash is witnessing a shakeout leading to further concentration and centralisation in the industry . We have also argued that the crash has consolidated Japanese hegemony in international financial makets . The Japanese institutions have displaced us banks from their leading position . Their new-found power is formidable for it extends across the most important international markets from the Eurocurrency to the international securities markets .
Notes 1 . See for example Leadbeater & Rowthorn (1987) and Wells (1987).
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2 . For a further account see Coakley (1987) . 3 . See Cumming (1987) . 4 . These markets are described in greater detail in Coakley (1987) . 5 . See Hammond (1987) . 6 . See for example Topping (1987) . 7 . See Rowthom (1971) . 8 . It will be interesting to see how liberalisation proceeds in the wake of the crash . 9. See The Banker, November 1987 . 10 . For bubbles in stock markets see Diba & Grossman (1987) . Davis et al discuss bubbles in the context of the foreign exchange markets . References Coakley, J . (1987)'The internationalisation of financial markets in the 1980s', paper presented at the Danish Socialist Economists' annual conference.
Cumming, C . (1987) 'The Economics of Securitisation'. FRBNY Quarterly Review 12(3). Davis, C ., Smith, P .M . & Wickens, M.R . (1987) 'Exchange Rate Fundamentals and Tests for Speculative Bubbles' . LBS Discussion Paper No . 20-87 . Diba, B .T. & Grossman, H .I . (1987) 'Rational Bubbles in Stock Prices', Brown University Working Paper No . 85-38 . Hammond, G .M .S . (1987) 'Recent Developments in the Swap Market', BEQB 27(1) . Leadbeater, C . & Rowthorn, B . (1987) 'Legacy of the Crash', Marxism Today, December. Rowthorn, R. (1971) 'Imperialism in the Seventies', New Left Review, September/October . Wells, J . (1987) 'Spend, spend, spend?' Marxism Today, December.
The crash and real capital accumulation
Andrew Glyn
An assessment of the implications of the stock market crash for the development of the world economy should begin with the most important factor in that development - the rate of capital accumulation . Table 1 below shows the growth rate of the (gross) capital stock for business sector of the three major capitalist economies, plus the UK, for selected years since 1973 . In every case
the rate of accumulation in the mid1980s was within the range one-half to two-thirds of the 1973 level . This reflects the fact that the growth of business investment has been running at about 3 per cent per year since 1973, less than-.half the growth rate of the previous period . Since capital accumulation is the most dynamic source of growing demand in the growth process, as well as the fundamental determinant
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Capital & Class 22
of productivity increase through the incorporation of new techniques into production, a major part of the explanation for the slow-down in growth after 1973 must lie in the behaviour of capital investment.' The weakness of capital accumulation cannot be explained in terms of low profits. The latest international data for profit rates shows that in the USA and Europe the profit rate is not far below that at the end of the long boom in 1973 (see table 2) . Even manufacturing profitability, which suffered most in the recessions of 1974/75 and 1981/82, has recovered in West Germany and the UK to near its 1973 level . Profitability in Japan has remained very steady, at around two-thirds its 1973 level, a fall very similar to the decline in the accumulation rate . Of course the rate of profit fell sharply in the three major capitalist blocs before 1973 (see Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, Capitalism Since World War II, ch . 11) . The combination of pressures which this earlier fall reflected surely contributed to the subsequent weakening of accumulation, even though post-OPEC shock declines in profitability in 1974/75 and 1980/81 have been substantially reversed . It is clear that the stock market boom had a negligible effect in encouraging capital accumulation. Indeed the essentially speculative nature of the boom is underlined by comparing the stock market indices with the value of the underlying capital stock . Such `valuation ratios' - the ratio of the market value of capital to its replacement cost or Tobin's Q - is often taken as an indicator of investment incentive. Recent information on this interesting variable does not seem to be available, but we can crudely update the series in
a recent OECD publication to produce the following results (Table 3) . In the UK, USA and Japan the valuation ratio roughly doubled between 1979 and September 1987 . Despite this the rate of accumulation failed to increase (Japan) or declined . In Germany the valuation ratio actually seems to have fallen a little as did the accumulation rate . In Japan and the UK the valuation ratio was probably higher just before the crash than at any time during the 1960s (in the USA and Germany it was at a similar level) . Given the much slower rates of accumulation, and the smaller productivity increases generated by investment, than in the early 1960s it is impossible to see where the prospective growth of profits, which would justify these high share prices and thus valuation ratios, could have been expected to come from . A further factor depressing share prices should have been the continued high real interest rates . With the probable exception of Germany, therefore, share prices seem to have been grossly overvalued before the crash . Since the rise in share prices appears to have had little or no effect in stimulating investment, the crash may well have little impact in further depressing it. Indeed the OECD still forecasts private investment to grow by around 4% in 1988 and 2% in 1989 - even if they prove too optimistic there is little likelihood of an investment collapse which would trigger off a major recession . The financial crisis would have had to have gone much further, threatening the banking system, before that became likely. As the OECD suggests, the irrelevance of the level of share prices for the determination of investment reflects the fact that the stock market's role in
The crash of '87
financing new investment, as against takeovers and other speculative operations, is very slight. Even its barometric role as a measure of business confidence has diminished, to judge by the failure of real investment to respond to the bull market . But recent experience also shows
Table I
that improved profitability on existing operations is insufficient to generate a prolonged investment upswing, even when accompanied by soaring share prices. What is required in addition is confidence in the sustained growth of the market . Even if the governments of Germany and Japan could be pressur-
% during year business capital stock growth rates
1973 1979 1986
USA
Japan
Germany
UK
4 .5 4 .3 3 .1
11 .2 6.8 7 .2
4 .8 3 .7 2 .8
3 .3 2 .9 1 .5
Source: OECD Stocks and Flows of Fixed Capital 1960-85 and author's estimates from investment data in OECD Economic Outlook, December 1987 . Table 2
% Profit rates 1973-1985
1973 1979 1985
USA
Japan
Germany
14 12 13
22 17 16
15 14 13
UK
8 6 `10
Note: Non-financial corporations except for Germany where the series is for industry plus
transport and the last year is 1984 . Source: British Business, 13 November 1987 . Table 3
Valuation ratios
1973 1979 1987 (September)
USA
Japan
Germany
UK
1 .2 0.7 1 .2
0.7 0.8
1 .1
1 .1 0.8 1 .7
2 .0
1 .1 0 .9
Source : 1973 and 1979 Chan Lee, OECD Economic Studies (Autumn 1986) . 1987 figures are
approximate estimates of the ratio of stock market value to the replacement cost of capital stock from latest data in the above article updated with stock market prices, capital stock and inflation indices from standard OECD sources.
23
Capital & Class
24
ised into implementing a major package of expansionary measures it is most unlikely that business would respond with sufficient investment to sustain an upswing. For this would require confidence that there would be painless absorption of both the tax increases to pay for the extra expenditure in a fiscally orthodox way and the rising inflation which an expansion would generate (if only through rising world commodity prices and falls in the exchange rates of the expanding countries) . Such painless absorption means acceptance by workers in the short run of reduced living standards, at a tine when their bargaining position would be strengthened by rising demand . While May 1%8 has become a sub-
ject for media nostalgia, the subsequent decade of industrial turmoil has not faded from the memories of industrial and financial circles. Such fears would stifle any substantial investment response to expansionary measures, and indeed form the basic explanation of why the governments of Germany and Japan are so stubbornly resisting pressures to expand . Notes 1 . This leaves aside the important issue of the decreasing effectiveness of investment (or additions to the capital stock) in terms of the resulting output - see the interesting data on the falling output capital ratio (or rising organic composition) in OECD conomic Outlook, December 1987.
The stock market crash and the role of the dollar
John Grahl
The stock market crash in October last year calls into question the role of fmance in western economies . What do financial institutions and organised asset markets do? Are financial sectors entitled to the huge amounts of resources they absorb? To what extent do they cause problems for other sectors of the economy? This article first suggests why financial activity has become so profitable
at the same time as other activities stagnated . There follows an account of the boom and bust on world stock markets and a look at some of the implications .
Why the growth of finance? Why have banking and financial sectors expanded so fast? Answers which run in terms of the boundless possibilities
7 he crash of'87
of the service economy, the 'postindustrial' solution to economic problems, are not to be taken seriously . Consumers may need a rather more elaborate range of financial services as their incomes rise, but such an effect is hardly on the scale required to explain the phenomenal financial expansion in question . Resources have flowed into the financial sector in the form of higher interest payments, not as a demand for new services . The immediate cause of financial growth is almost certainly the increase in interest rates, other credit costs and the difficulty of obtaining credit, that is financial tensions in general . Those tensions have made it more and more advantageous to reorganise and rationalise credit activities, to explore every possible alternative source of loanable funds, to direct increasing energies into the management of liabilities . Technical change - computers and telecommunications - has been a permissive factor in the expansion of finance. Far more potential transactions can be explored and funds can be transferred internationally much more easily than in the past . Nevertheless this globalisation of financial systems was driven by persistently high credit costs - otherwise new technology would not have been so rapidly deployed . Explaining financial tensions is more difficult, but the most convincing explanation relates higher credit costs to the end of rapid growth in western economies . The end of the fast, stable economic growth of the 1960s led to a massive increase in system-wide uncertainties . As a result there was a dramatic change in the behaviour of leaders and wealth-owners . The avoidance of risk became paramount: big risk-premiums began to be incorpor-
aced into credit costs and pressure increased for higher interest rates . It follows that the growth of the financial sector is not a solution to but a symptom of persistent difficulties in productive structures. As in the past, such financial tensions, if not kept under effective control, can give rise to deflationary forces and prove highly disruptive of industrial activity.' For the past 15 years such effective control has indeed been lacking, and as a result strong pressures for economic contraction and reduced investment have been generated . Only briefly, in the US itself, was the new power of finance compatible with a general economic boom .
Phase I - Fighting the markets In the first phase - from the oil shock of 1973 to the end of the 1970s- the us monetary authorities struggled to neutralise growing pressures in the financial sector . Their aim was to prevent a dramatic rise in interest rates and thus protect the real economy from a decline in consumption spending or a contraction of investment . The failure of this strategy was largely the result of the atomised nature of us banking and finance. In the US there are over 10,000 commercial banks and even the very largest of them have only a small share of the overall business . And the banks themselves are only one part of the financial system subject to competition from other institutions . Thus relations between industrial borrowers and lenders are determined on a competitive market and there is no particular link between the interests of the two parties . If lenders get nervous they will try to get out of the market without
25
Capital & Class 26
calculating what the overall consequences of their actions might be . The system can only be controlled indirectly, through the terms on which the Federal Reserve System lends money to the banks, and through the general rules imposed on credit institutions . There is no great possibility of a direct influence on the internal policy of individual banks . In consequence, all the Federal Reserve could do was to pump cheap credit into the banks and money markets . It had no real control over how this credit would be used. In fact, very little went into the long-term refinance of industry . Rather, risk-averse wealthowners borrowed cheap in order to buy gold, foreign exchange, energy reserves and real estate . Lending to Latin America seemed more lucrative and more secure in the climate of the times than exercises in industrial restructuring. Faced by this 'revolt of the lenders' even the Federal government found it increasingly difficult to borrow longterm . Official efforts to provide cheap credit actually increased long-term interest rates, since each injection of cash into the system seemed only to produce more inflation and accelerate the flight from dollar-denominated assets . 2 By the late 1970s the easy money policy was no longer feasible as there developed a major flight from the currency and a collapse of the dollar on the foreign exchanges. The attempt to control the financial markets had failed - what followed was an attempt to propitiate them .
Phase II - the Volcker shock The appointment of Paul Volcker as
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979 signalled the coming change . Volcker was resolved to stabilise the dollar and control inflation . He was ready to appease the big lenders on the financial markets by allowing interest rates to rise and he was prepared to contemplate recession as -the price of success. Recession duly followed - between 1980 and 1982 two of the deepest recessions in post-war history were precipitated as the Fed cut off supplies of credit and interest rates rocketed . In the summer of 1982, as the policy approached its climax, the us banks' prime rates - that is, the rates at which they lend short-term to the strongest industrial borrowers - went well above 20 per cent . The reverberations of the 'Volcker shock' are still echoing around the world . One, not insignificant, consequence was to eliminate deficit spending as a feasible option for most countries . In the new climate of tight money such strategies were virtually impossible to finance - evenincountries as rich and powerful as France, for example, where financial pressure helped to bring about the turn to austerity by the socialist government in 1983 . In the us itself there - was a vast industrial shakeout ; organised labour suffered terrible blows, unable to defend workers' wages, conditions or jobs in a climate where many employers themselves were unable to finance lossmaking activities . The inflationary strategies of the 1970s had postponed this process of restructuring which was . now brutally accelerated . By late summer of 1982, however, the new strategy itself was no longer viable . Mexico, which had seen its export markets in decline at the same
The crash of '87 time as its debts in the us became impossible to service was on the brink of default . The international debt crisis, lasting legacy of the turn in monetary policy, started to reach alarming dimensions . Inside the us also some big players were in trouble - farming interests, housing finance institutions, energy exploration companies and the banks which had backed them . The dilemma of monetary control, for many years denied by monetarists, clearly emerged - if the central bank cuts off credit in order to fight inflation, it can be forced to restore credit supplies in its capacity as 'lender of last resort', the guarantor of the overall stability of the system. Thus a relaxation of policy and a substantial reduction in interest rates took place in the autumn of 1982, although rates remained at historically high levels . The three dramatic years since 1979 had been massively disruptive but the Volcker experiment did seem to have produced some achievements for the us. Inflation was sharply reduced and for many years afterwards was under much better control . The wage price spiral was broken, along with the power of the unions, inflationary expectations were reduced and the economy has been much less likely to respond to shocks with a sudden increase in the inflation rate . On the international plane there was a related achievement . The Volcker shock completely (although as it turned out temporarily) restored the credibility of the dollar, and of dollar-denominated assets . Interest rates on bank deposits or government securities were easily high enough to compensate for a slight continuing inflation. The whole exercise was an enormous reassertion of us
financial strength. All over the world risk-averse wealth-holders moved into dollars as the most stable and liquid asset in the world economy . Governments were forcibly brought into line with the new policy climate of disinflation . The prestige and power of the us were correspondingly enhanced . This restoration of international confidence in the US currency was the only substantial advantage to the us from the recession years of 1980-82 . Ronald Reagan proceeded to squander it in an adventure of unparalleled irresponsibility . Phase III - The Reagan boom For most of the world's economies the story of the last five years has remained in Phase II - the phase of high interest rates and recession . Growth has in fact resumed but at slow rates with persistent unemployment and inadequate investment. Interest rates at historically high k els for unprecedented periods of time have been a major factor in this performance . But the us itself has been a startling exception to this general rule . Output has grown rapidly since the recession of 1982, unemployment has fallen consistently and is now below 6% . Explanations are often simplistic and doctrinal. For Keynesians, the expansion is simply the outcome of deficit spending on a large scale . For free-marketeers it is the reward for deregulation, tax reductions and the disengagement of the state from economic life . Here it is relevant first to point to the losers - tens of millions of average or low-paid workers whose sacrifices have sustained the prosperity of their more fortunate fellow citizens . In fact the real wages of ordinary workers have
27
Capital & Class 28
fallen in the 1980s, while increasing numbers have faced growing insecurity and deteriorating working conditions. Demographic factors have also been important - a huge immigration of Hispanic workers has given employers the possibility to expand production while cutting wages . Thus, for example, the textile industry in the us has expanded employment on the basis of cheap, often disenfranchised and illegal, labour, a phenomenon not seen in any other advanced country . The much-vaunted `flexibility' of the us labour market, when it is not simply a myth, is largely a consequence of mass immigration - a point worth making to the neo-liberals in contemporary Europe. The boom - which has seen an explosion of 'overconsumption' by the better-paid strata - has involved ar brutal increase of inequality in an already highly unequal society . Rapid 'job-creation' in the us economy must be seen in this light . Between 1978 and 1984 ten million additional jobs were produced at below average rates of pay while the average itself was only kept up by a massive rise in the incomes of a minority of highly-paid employees . Other losers helped to support Reagan's 'magical mystery tour' - in particular the farming regions of the mid-west, struck by failures on a mass scale . Finance itself played a key role in the Reagan boom . In the years after the Volcker shock dollars and dollardenominated assets - above all us government debt - were seen by companies, financial institutions and wealthy individuals around the world as the only safe and stable assets to hold in dangerous times . The dollar soared not because of a demand for American
goods, but simply because of a worldwide scramble for American money . Thus the same crisis and rnala+v which heightened financial tensions around the world actually relaxed financial constraints on the us government and poured capital into the us financial system . This effect, together with a huge redistribution from labour to capital, was at the heart of the boom . It would have been possible for the us to use this financial strength to rebuild and re-equip the American productive structure . This did not happen - what took place instead was a spending spree, on an epic scale . Taxes were cut with no real prospect of meeting the resulting government deficit which was, temporarily, eagerly financed by foreign lenders . Huge defence contracts diverted US enterprises away from genuine wealth creation ; cutbacks in welfare spending went not to close the government deficit but as tax cuts feeding the 'overconsumption' of the richest 25% or 30% of Americans, those who triumphantly reelected Reagan in 1984 . 3 The expansion of Japanese capitalism around the Pacific rim added further fuel to the boom of the American south-west and California . Not everything that happened in the us between 1982 and 1986 can be dismissed as parasitical or speculative expansion . But in general the disequilibrated and unsustainable nature of the boom was clear from an early date: the rising dollar made us products uncompetitive while the government's deficit spending sucked in huge volumes of imports. Not only traditional sectors such as the steel industry suffered ; high-tech enterprises in machine tools or semiconductors were rapidly undermined . By 1985 there was a clear crisis of American competitiveness
The crash of '87
while the us was moving rapidly into a net debtor position - an absurdity for the richest country in the world, especially so as very little of the borrowing went into genuine investment . Early in 1985 the boom on the foreign exchanges broke and the dollar began a descent even more rapid than its rise. Within two years it had lost all the gains painfully produced by the Volcker recessions and was below the levels of 1978 . Growth in the us economy started to slow. Clearly it would soon be difficult to fuel the us boom with further borrowing. By now the balance of financial power tilted right back to the super-productive exporting economies of Japan and West Germany . In the early 1980s these countries battled to adjust to the unilateral moves of the us authorities . Now only continuous recycling of their surpluses kept the Reagan ship afloat . Phase IV-The crash Booms and busts on financial markets are explained in a variety of ways, although the various theories have common elements. The most far-reaching account of the contradictions between private appropriation and social production is certainly that of Marx ; but the most precise analyses of financial instability as a specific phenomenon come from Keynes . Keynes argued that it was impossible for each agent in the market to form an independent assessment of likely future developments . Rather, agents as a group would be governed by collective expectations of a basically conventional nature, with sharp discontinuities if these conventions are shaken . The Keynesian theorist Hyman
Minsky has developed a model of financial fragility : he suggests that any extended period of stability will, by reinforcing existing expectations, progressively reduce the risks to individuals of taking up more speculative positions . 4 There are disagreements about the extent to which individual irrationality is involved in the collective manias so frequently observed . In the bleak post-Marxist vision of Aglietta and Orlean the participants are no more capable of rational judgement than the Gadarene swine. 5 But even if the individual players are acting logically, a cumulative lack of logic in their overall behaviour may be deduced from the nature of the game they are playing . Even among the free-marketeers, similar conclusions tend to force themselves on the more objective economists . Even in the abstruse equation systems of the `new classical' school there are frequently possible divergent `bubbles' in asset prices, providing self-fulfilling prophecies can keep expectations in line with market outcomes . Such unstable time-paths are excluded from the school's results on a priori rather than empirical grounds . There were realities behind the b oom . us output, doped by big tax cuts, grew fast after the recessions of the early 1980s . Massive redistribution from labour to capital meant that profitability grew much faster than output . Large-scale labour shedding, the inrush of migrants available for more intense exploitation, and a supply-side legislative programme geared to the needs of business restored the profitability of nearly all companies except those most vulnerable to competition from imports. The other condition for the boom was the willingness of the rest of the world to hold us paper. In
29
Capital & Class 30
the highly uncertain climate of the 1980s, wealth-holders sought dollar assets as the best refuge in the storm . Fast-moving deregulation, removing local and national barriers between capital markets, and information technology, linking national financial systems into a global network, facilitated the mobility of all financial resources and sustained the buoyancy of the us markets . By nearly all accounts some reaction was inevitable . The conventions on which the bull market rested had to minimise, or assume that favourable solutions could be found for, several growing problems . The overhang of international debt is one example: western central banks operated sophisticated crisis management but came little nearer to a solution, as the big write-offs by us banks reminded the markets earlier in 1987 . Federal borrowing and a growing us trade deficit seem to have been the key factors : the longer they persisted the more likely became drastic and unpleasant corrective action . The stock market did not smoothly adapt to this slowly emerging threat - rather an optimistic convention, or shared set of expectations, suddenly gave way . The absence of any clear view of future developments then fragmented the previous unity into a scramble of individuals for safety . It is a measure of the previous speculative bubble that all the record losses of October only brought stock market prices down to the levels of 12 or 18 months ago . In retrospect there was little to justify the last phases of the bull market except its own momentum with each price advance working to confirm the prevailing sentiment of optimism . The boom then, almost certainly
underestimated economic problems . But the violence of the ensuing reaction is likely to intensify the policy dilemmas which brought about the crash .
The aftermath In practice, and in spite of contemporary free market theory, the ultimate responsibility for major allocative decisions remains with governments and the concept of control by financial markets alone, although it has influenced events, remains an unrealisable utopia . Thus there is a deep irresponsibility in the privatising and deregulating strategies which increase the power and scope of private finance : decision-making is privatised, but acceptable outcomes from these private decisions continue to be a public objective underwritten by the government's legislative and monetary power. The present turmoil on stock exchanges around the world underlines this irresponsibility . Given these levels of volatility, stock exchanges are useless in controlling investment activity. But if deregulated financial sectors cannot usurp the role of government policy, they can certainly make policy formation and implementation much more difficult . In the wake of the Wall Street crash all the dilemmas facing western governments are more acute . Ironically this is most obvious in the case of us monetary policy . A decade ago, highly ambitious monetary policies were the chosen means of limiting political intervention in economic life and restoring the allocative role of markets . It was a key theme of neo-liberal doctrine that monetary policy sufficed to control economic aggregates - active fiscal policy was not needed.
The crash of '87
Today the us monetary authorities have been rendered impotent by the free asset markets they encouraged to grow . Any relaxation of monetary policy could trigger an uncontrollable flight from the dollar, hence resurgent inflation ; but equally, any significant tightening of monetary conditions risks precipitating a new crash on equity markets as the fear of recession provokes a scramble for liquidity. The Federal Reserve System can only try to stay afloat between this Scylla and Carybdis ; any aspiration to control the overall direction of financial developments is abandoned . Paul Volcker did well to resign as chairman of the Fed last year . Events had in any case put an end to his reign. Thus responsibility for us economic policy is now back in the hands of politicians ; the key questions are whether an agreement on stabilisation can be reached between President and Congress and, if so, on what terms . This in itself is a move away from the ultraconservative free-market position of recent years. At an international level governments and central banks in Japan and western Europe are under intense pressure to relieve the stresses produced by uncontrolled finance in the US . Japan and West Germany, which struggled to hold down interest rates when us rates rocketed in the early 1980s, are now accused of violating their international responsibilities by not making further sharp cuts in their already low rates . At the same time they are expected to purchase limitless quantities of dollars at an exchange rate otherwise unsustainable. Governments around the world are expected to widen the budget deficits which they have narrowed so painfully over the past
seven years in response to financial 31 pressure in the us .
Conclusion It would be foolhardy for other governments to deny immediate relief to the hard-pressed us authorities . Nevertheless if European governments simply accommodate their policy stances to the needs of the us they will be perpetuating the financial hegemony of the us which has been so frequently abused and depriving themselves of any influence over future financial developments . If European central banks simply absorb excess dollars they maintain the privileged 'reserve' role of the us currency . However, this role of the dollar as a reserve asset and, hence, as an international investment medium is intimately linked to the 'globalisation' of us financial relations . To preserve the privileged role of the dollar is to sustain the anarchic, atomised assembly of multinational institutions and markets which deal predominantly in dollars . Thus there is a close connection between restoring some social control over financial activity and dethroning the dollar as the central currency in international finance. As is often pointed out, it is futile to propose restoring the financial regulatory structures of twenty years ago . Today, the stabilisation and control of finance necessarily implies control over international financial relations and this cannot happen without replacing the dollar as the medium in which most international financial transactions are effected . The truth is that the organisations - private and public - which issue dollars and dollar-denominated debt are not under any effective social
Capital & Class
32 control and are unlikely to be so in the absence of implausibly drastic political change in the us . In consequence a reduced role for the dollar - reflecting the reduced role of the us in world trade and production-is a precondition for the re-regulation of financial sectors . A key aspect of this is to prevent the us borrowing in its oum currency, that is to say, issuing the medium in which its debts are settled . Nothing in the troubled history of the last twenty years from Nixon's destruction of Bretton Woods to the Volcker shock and Reaganomics, gives any ground to believe that us monetary hegemony will not be again abused at the expense of other countries . If the us needs to borrow, it should do so in Yen and ecus, thus assuming the risks of dollar depreciation while limiting the sphere of dollars as an international store of value. These financial linkages between Europe and the us are far more important than their trading relations which are usually more discussed . The entanglement of European economies in the anarchic and unstable us financial system has been a major contractionary force in Europe - raising the cost of credit and sacrificing long-term economic development to a search for speculative gain . Financial stabilisation, based on a reduced role for the
dollar, is a key condition for European recovery, since it would make possible greatly expanded programmes of investment in human and material resources . In Britain, the policies of the last 10 years have completely subordinated national economic life to globalised us finance and the uncertain course of us monetary policy . This has been, in the short-run, a highly successful gamble ; the British financial sector's explosive growth has induced one of the fastest overall growth rates in Europe . If the dangers of this strategy, in particular its neglect of long-term investment, are now more widely appreciated, the crash will have served one useful purpose .
Notes 1 . For a more detailed account of this argument, see John Grahl, `Productivity Slowdown and Financial Tensions', Thames Papers in Political Economy, 1986. 2 . See Michael Aglietta, 'Etats-Unis', in Robert Boyer (ed .), Capitalismes Fin de Siecle, 1986. 3 . This term and the general remarks on Reaganomics are borrowed from Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, 1986 . 4 . Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 1986. 5 . Michael Aglietta and Andre Orlean, La Violence de la Monnaie, 1982 .
The crash of '87 33
The crash Alan Freeman
The Great Crash of 1929 is the only event in living memory which compares in scale with 29 October 1987, and Marxism the only theory which warned it could happen again . We obviously owe our doctrine a small pat on the back . Unfortunately this isn't enough . Why was the particular crisis of 1929 so sharp? And why was the depression which followed so long and so deep? The rediscovery of long waves in capitalism offers part of the answer .' The Keynesian economist Kindleberger 2 offers another, not necessarily contradictory answer . He points to a
structural imbalance in international relations in the inter-war period, marked by Britain's fall from world leadership and the USA's rise to the status of hegemonic leader of world imperialism . As a theory of what caused the crash, abstracted from the contradictions of a system based on private investment for profit - as analysed by classical Marxism - this does not stand up. What caused all the other recessions? But if seen, not as the cause of the crisis but as its highest expression - and the key to its solution - it is consistent both with classical Marxism and with its extension to include long waves . The central idea of Lenin's Imperialism is that under monopoly capital, competition at the highest level is C&C/34-C
between blocs of capital for the division of the world's markets, combined with the struggle for the division and redivision
of the world's territory . Trotsky held that the resolution of global crisis demands a violent reorganisation of relations between national states, serving as instruments for defending national blocs of capital in international competition . These accounts are relevant today . What was World War II if not a convulsive redivision of the world's markets and territories arising from a violent reorganisation of relations between states? What provoked it if not the radical imbalance between the world distribution of productive forces and the world relations between national blocs of capital provoked by Britain's decline and the USA's rise? More chillingly, what do we see now if not a new radical imbalance provoked by the long-term decline in the productive capacities of the USA? This suggests that focussing on relations between the great imperialist powers could shed great light on the 1987 crash .
Economic paralysis, political convulsion 1929 was not a 'normal' cyclic crisis . By 1932, industrial production in the
Capital & Class 34
USA
was barely half its 1929 level. The
us share index fell from a peak of 216
to a trough of 34 - nearly 85% over three years. Trade declined for five successive years and did not regain 1929 levels until after the war . It took five years for the first major country Britain - to reach its 1929 levels of production . 3 The us saw no less than seven years of net negative investment .4 But the political consequences were even more shattering . By the end of the recession Hitler was in power, the Roosevelt administration was in office, the British Labour Party had collapsed into coalition, and France had seen four governments in as many years . Spain was in the throes of civil war. There were an estimated fifty revolutions in Latin America ; Italy had conquered Abyssinia, the Japanese Manchuria, and Germany was well advanced in the conquest of its Eastern neighbours . A chastening point for the view that the economic collapse of capitalism will burst open the door to socialism ; during this entire period, in not one country was capitalism overthrown .
for world trade and payment . As such it was the guarantor of the credit system on a world scale . On this depended not just world trade but imperialist accumulation, which required the large sums of loan capital which only the credit system could mobilise . Britain in effect operated a world counter-cyclical policy . Arthur Henderson, in his proposal to the 1932 Lausanne conference, recalled that Britain used to maintain solvency everywhere in difficult times by shipping gold to . centres of financial crisis and by drawing gold from centres not affected . 'It is of the essence of the present world difficulties that London has failed in the discharge of that vital function, and that no other centre has been willing and able to discharge it', he concluded .' But Britain rose to world banker as its greatest producer, trader and shipper, and bestrode it as a capital exporter. At its zenith in 1913 fully 82 per cent of all capital issues in the UK were for foreign investment.' Magdoff cites the following estimates : Percent of total foreign investment
The character of British world domination These convulsive changes revolved around a central pivot : the erosion of British hegemony . The notion of hegemonic leadership is not a simple one, and does not reduce to being the biggest or most powerful. Britain until 1913, like the us from 1945 until around 1971, combined a number of distinct functions . It was first of all the world's banker. It issued a reserve currency with unlimited convertibility into gold which was the almost universal instrument
UK Germany us
1913
1930
1960
50 .3 17 .3 6 .3
43.8 2.6 35.3
24.5 1.1 59 .1
Capital export has proved the longest surviving component of Britain's imperial role, and the entire 20th century is virtually a history of Britain's obstinate refusal to abandon it . On a superficial comparison the USA overtook the UK as a capital exporter in 1918 . Between 1924 and 1929 Us loans
The crash of '87 abroad totalled $6,429 and those of the UK $3,301 . 8 Gross loans, however, probably do not clearly indicate the size of the disposable surplus for investment abroad mobilised by each country, since part of the loan activity of any country is to recycle funds it has attracted as a borrower . The Economist of 2 June 1928 tried to establish the net export of capital from each country, with the following results : Import (-) or export (+) of capital from us and UK
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927
us
UK
263 -112 306 493 163 671
681 669 390 261 - 34 466 2,463
1,784
It concluded that : `The great fact of recent years is not that American capital, unable to find a use at home, is inundating foreign countries, but that the outflow . . . equals and even appreciably exceeds the inflow of capital from foreign countries which was stopped by the war but has now revived in very considerable volume . The fact is that America's trade balance shows no sign of producing a very large export surplus the proceeds of which she can lend abroad . She can only swell her foreign issues by lending money that is lent to her or by shipping gold .' In a nutshell this explains the third requirement of a hegemonic leadership role. The key to capital export is capital
to export . And once a world market in capital goods emerges, world surplus value can be mobilised only through trade . New York in the early 1920s became the great magnet for investment funds because of the tremendous expansion of its domestic markets . It thus became a great financial centre and combined functions of investing those funds in the us and channelling them elsewhere . But it had not unleashed its full productive might on world markets as the table shows . It could not mobilise and centralise the new value thrown onto world markets as Britain did in the mid-19th century. Britain attained its role as world banker first and foremost as the world's quartermaster . By 1918 it had lost this position ; but no-one else had yet attained it . This is why the crash of 1929 affected the USA worse, and for longer, than anyone else, and yet the recovery found it still forging ahead of its rivals . In the aftermath of a great credit crash it could neither mobilise idle loan capital for expansion, nor supply an export market created by the expansion of others . But the malaise lay not in its productive forces which, as Hoover never ceased explaining, were 'fundamentally healthy', but in its market situation in a world already carved up by the ancient European powers .
Control of markets : the keystone of the arch This brings us to the fourth critical element of imperialist hegemony : the control of markets . Britain's unparalleled access to world markets was the crucial conquered asset with which it marched into the 20th century . It was
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36
Share of exports of manufactured goods
us UK
Germany
1899
1913
1929
1937
1950
1967
11 .7 33 .2 22 .4
13 .0 30.2 26.6
20.4 22 .4 20.5
19.2 20.9 21 .8
26.6 24.6 7.0*
20 .6 11 .9 19 .7*
the cement which bound together its role as producer, exporter and investor. In the heyday of empire them was no contradiction between domestic and foreign expansion . Britain organised the great centres of raw material and food production in the dominions with its railway and mining capital. Its ships carried the booty home where as monopsony purchaser it could dictate a purchase price well below world values, shoring up its exporters against foreign competition long after their time had come . And when challenged, the great Tyneside and Glasgow ships decked out their Woolwich guns and donned their Sheffield armour and steamed off to show the world the value of civilisation. When English gold met German steel and American power plants in the cities of Latin America, this unity began dissolving . As Britain lost its competitive edge in manufactured and capital goods, monopoly control of trade and finance became its decisive weapon in the battle for superprofit . One word expressed this monopoly empire . Two possessions embodied itterritory and ships . Britain dominated trade because it physically controlled both the means of world transport and the places it traded with . Its territorial role is well-known. 9 Readers may be less familiar with its control over trading routes, critical to
its economic competition with the USA in the inter-war years. From 1870 to 1910 the UK Successfully defended a share in world shipping tonnage never less than 34%, massively bolstered when in 1918 it confiscated the entire merchant marine of Germany, its chief rival . In 1928 its gross tonnage was 20 million in a world total of 66 million, of which 16 million was owned by the USA . (Of this 3 million tonnes plied the Great Lakes and by 1930 a further 3 million lay idle .) In 1928 the UK produced 53% of the world's new gross tonnage . t0 On the critical trade routes Britain exercised a virtual total monopoly, including not only the transport of its own goods (and of course, of its colonies) but the international trade of its chief rivals . Again in 1928, the USA carried only 34% of its own trade with its two nearest neighbours, Mexico and Canada!" The significance of these monopolies for the UK as a world power are isolated with stark simplicity by the balance of payment figures for 1928 . In this year a credit balance of $745m in 1928 was produced from a debit of $1,795m on visible trade by two figures : $650m of `net shipping income' and $1,425m of income from overseas investments. In blunt terms, Britain's trading advantage from superior technology had been supplanted by its
The crash of '87 monopoly privileges arising directly from its control of markets and territories. In this lies the root of Britain's displacement as hegemonic power and the key to understanding what a hegemonic power must consist of. The driving force of capitalist expansion is the search for superprofit ; an above average profit which will permit a capital to outgrow and eventually absorb its rivals. With the imperialist epoch two great sources of superprofit became the monopoly of a handful of great powers : monopoly rent arising from control of markets and credit ; and technological superprofit arising from a monopoly control of an entire area of technology. The decisive requirement of a hegemonic power is that it can guarantee the conditions for the general ascendancy of the imperialist powers, providing them with a permanently elevated share of the surplus value produced in the rest of the world . It must also, however, guarantee the distribution of this superprofit among the imperialist states such that all of them enjoy a relative benefit from it, compared to the bourgeoisies of the dependent economies . 12 But to do this it must command both main sources of superprofit . Simple domination of superior forces of production is not sufficient, as the USA found in the 1920s and both Japan and Germany know today . Neither is simple domination of markets sufficient, although Britain still does not seem to understand this and probably never will. From the great crisis of 1873 until the present day Britain has sacrificed its technological lead for its monopoly privileges. us capital was absolutely incapable of translating this productive
advantage into a stable realised surplus until it could supplant Britain as the principal organiser of the sources of monopoly rent - in short until it had become the world's foremost financial power and above all its foremost military power . The great areas of us investment penetration provide a panoramic photograph of the advancing new technologies of the first half of the 20th century, under the control and domination of the USA . In terms of the great capital commodities the battle between the us and the UK saw the triumph of air over sea, road over rail, electricity over steam and oil over coal ." But a superior technology in and of itself was absolutely insufficient . From 1929 the entire pattern of world trade shifted. In the absence of any stable trading medium the major imperialist countries retreated from triangular or multilateral trade and embarked on a series of bilateral or reciprocal arrangements . The decisive point about these is that they depend as much on the political relation of forces between the states concerned as on market relations between the countries . Britain not only ensured that an empire population of over 700 million traded with it to the exclusion of its rivals, but maintained a steady improvement of the terms of trade in its own favour . As it retreated into the laager of empire, its monopoly position became ever more an obstacle which the US could not surmount . At the lowest point of the depression, when us production stood at 53 relative to 1929, British production had fallen to a mere 84. After Japan its recovery was the earliest, and its depression the shallowest, of the capitalist world .
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38
The following table shows how decisive Britain's military and political domination proved in the battle for markets. This is in sharp contrast with the situation of the us, which not only saw its access to world markets severely curtailed but also had to swallow the cancellation of most of the war debt . This determined the USA's foreign policy course : to break up the ancient empires under the banners of Free Trade and Liberal Values . The opening shots of this policy were announced by Woodrow Wilson with the famous 'eight points' around which the League of Nations was constituted . The cornerstone of Wilson's policy was the right of self-determination of all nations. To some this appeared an unnecessary concession to Bolshevism but in fact it corresponded directly to the interests of us capital, which owned hardly any colonies and stood to gain everything from detaching everyone else's . Wilson, before his time, fell at the altar of isolationism. It was left to Roosevelt, together with Stalin and Churchill, to redivide the world in 1944 in a manner which exactly corresponded to the relation of productive, military and financial forces . To
the USSR, a buffer zone. To Britain, a junior partnership in us Limited, sanctified by a place in the sun and a share in atomic technology . To Germany and Japan, us management. To France, whatever it could get . The arrangement precisely satisfies the conditions for hegemony which we established for Britain before wwt. The dollar replaced the pound as principal reserve currency and as the world's gold token, and the USA replaced Britain as the principal banker and policeman . The point which is often missed it that all imperialist powers could share in the exploitation of the newly redivided colonial world because of the mechanisms for redistributing this surplus in the multilateral trade of the metropolis . This includes powers such as Japan and Germany who were totally shorn of their empires . The USA's pent-up capital surplus poured into Europe and South East Asia to combine with the, burgeoning productive forces of the vanquished nations . 'Freed' of imperial obligations and expenditures, they acquired the specialised role of advanced producers, securing technological superprofit where monopoly rent was denied them .
Percentage of UK trade with the empire"
Total (m) 1913 1924 1931 1933 1935 1937
769 1,277 861 675 756 1,028
Imports %from Empire 25 .0 26 .4 24 .4 34 .2 35 .2 37.4
Total (m) 209 305 148 150 190 238
Exports % to Empire 32 .9 32 .4 32 .6 35 .9 39 .5 39 .9
The crash of '87
1987 revisited It is now necessary to review the crash of 1987, and indeed economic developments since the break-up of Bretton Woods in 1971, in the light of this analysis . Initially the USA very rapidly expanded to become the world's leading military and territorial power . By 1960 it had troops in 66 countries in the world- 15 But in 1945 the basis of its position was without question its decisive superiority in productive techniques . It had 21 .9% of all world exports of manufactures - but 56 .7% of all value was added in the us. 16 Since value added necessarily measures not just fresh labour but profit and surplus profit, this is a staggering ascendancy . In 1950 each us factory worker produced 3V2 times as much as her or his German counterpart and each miner four times as much ." Nevertheless the two central facts which emerge from any long-term study of trends in the post-war years are the exhaustion of the post-war wave of investment-led expansion and the decisive relative decline of the usA as producer and exporterfrom the early 1960s onwards.
The roots of this relative decline lay in the very role acquired by Japan and Germany as the leading appropriators of technological rents . The USA steadily lost its productive advantage . Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison estimate that between 1955 and 1970 capital stock per head grew by 38% in the us, 87% in Europe and 203% in Japan . Productivity in that period grew 6-7% faster in Japan than in the us and in Europe 4-5% faster . In the 1980s so far productivity has grown 4 .2% per year in Europe, 5 .6% in Japan and 1 .6% in the us.
This decline had to manifest itself in trade, and under Reagan it began to do so explosively . The gigantic us trade deficit is not the consequence of bad economic management, Reaganomics or any such superficial factors . It is the product of an inexorable, long-term and - if the inter-war years offer a basis for comparison - irreversible historical process, of the utmost importance to Marxists and socialists and, indeed, all humanity . This has expressed itself in virtually all sectors and all goods and was doing so long before the present crisis . To take just three representative sectors : Agriculture : In 1981, us farm exports at $44bn were 19% of all its exports . 30% of its farm produce was exported . The us agricultural surplus was so huge it used it as a major instrument of political blackmail . In May, June and July of 1986 the us imported more agricultural goods than it exported . Its 1986 output at $26.5bn has fallen 40% in five years and its share of the world market from 59% to 41%. Capital Goods : By 1986 no less than half the USA's spending on capital equipment was imported . 18 A surplus of $45bn on capital equipment has vanished in five years . Imports of machine tools rose from 25% of the US market to 43% . 1 e Between 1980 and 1985 a quarter of all us machine-tool companies went out of business . Electronics: The 'hi-tech' trade gap with Japan reached $2bn in 1986 and has been the principal object of us restrictive trade legislation . An estimated 70% of every computer shipped even by IBM is now manufactured in South East Asia . The consequences of this are, in a nutshell, precisely the same imbalance between the distribution of the forces of
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Capital & Class 40
production and the distribution of control over markets which dominated the inter war and depression years and led directly to World War 11 .
There is, however, a major difference . In 1929 a clear alternative to British leadership existed . Now there is no such alternative. This impasse lies deep at the root of the 1987 crash, which arrived 7 years after the last slump with impeccable timing but was exacerbated by a combination of two intractable circumstances : first, the rise of the us trade debt to the point where it could only be financed by completely reversing the post-war direction of capital flow so that the us began financing its deficit at the expense of its rivals ; second, when it became clear that this apparently limitless process amounted to a straight robbery of its financiers, who have now seen their dollar holdings fall to around half the value they held a year ago, and the said financiers denied they had had enough . The us has moved to exactly the same position that Britain occupied in 1918 . It no longer guarantees the general conditions for imperialist accumulation but on the contrary destabilises them . It uses its accumulated financial and military weight to rob its rivals of the plunder of `honest' trade. Is there a resolution to this process? The answer, of course, is that there is always a resolution under capitalism but at what price? A capitalist resolution, one can now insist not just with the benefit of theory but of terrible experience, necessarily involves a convulsive, violent and destructive reorganisation of the world's territories and markets . The imperialist world is becoming increasingly riven by its division into rival trade blocs, with no
power in position to unseat the USA, but all deriving increasing benefit from its leadership . It is only a question of time before Japan and Europe begin to seek, with increasing aggression and audacity, the military and territorial clout needed to stabilise their industrial weight . Already, Franco-German military collaboration and the growing nuclear arsenal of the European powers - untouched by the Gorbachev-Reagan accords - bear witness to the imperatives driving Western capital . If socialists owe themselves a pat on the back for predicting another 1929, they owe the entire world deliverance from another 1939 . Santyana21 said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it . This time round, his last three words are probably superfluous .
Notes 1 . See E Mandel, Late Capitalism, London, 1975, for the most authoritative Marxist account . 2 . Kindleberger, C .P. (1986) The World in Depression . London. 3 . Kindleberger, p . 240 . 4 . Lewis, W.A . (1970) Economic Survey. London. p . 54. 5 . Kindleberger, p. 210 . 6. Commerce Reports, us Department of Commerce, 18 February 1929, p . 394. 7 . Madgoff, H . (1969) The Age of Imperialism. New York. p. 55 . 8 . Kindleberger, p. 41 . 9 . See, for example, Barratt Brown, M . (1974) The Economics of Imperialism . London . 10 . Denny, L. (1930) America Conquers Britain . London and New York . p . 352 . 11 . Denny, p . 355 . 12 . This is one of our principal differences with Kindleberger, who presents the idea of hegemonic power simply as the organiser of benefits for all capitalists of the world .
The crash of '87 Neither the us nor the UK brought much joy to the bourgeoisies of the colonial and semicolonial world. They enjoyed supremacy as organisers of the conditions for imperialist superexploitation and any unity of interest between them and their rivals arose out of that function and vanished the instant they ceased to play that role . 13 . Public utilities - read 'electrical power installation' - were to us capital abroad what the railways were to the UK of 1850s . Of $4,500m in us foreign securities issued between 1914 and 1928, $1,000bn were in public utilities . By 1927 the largest electrical power goods monopoly, the Electric Bond and Share Company, held through its subsidiary American and Foreign Power a controlling interest in the public utilities of 29 us states and l 1 foreign countries with strong interest in another 6 . Its sphere of influence clearly indicates the regional character of us market penetration with major interests in Cuba, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala and China . Electrical
power was the spearhead of the us advance into Europe. American GE by 1930 had acquired a third interest in German AEG, a major interest in Italian Super-Power, helped create the largest French combine and even established a $26m contract with the Russian government . The directors of GE Britain created a furore when in 1928 they decided to disenfranchise all nonBritish stockholders specifically to ward off American GE. This was denounced as 'financial Bolshevism' . 14. Jones, G .P . & Pool, A .G . (1959) A Hundred Years of Economic Development in Great Britain . London. p. 322 . 15 . Magdoff, H . (1%9) The Age of Imperialism . New York . 16 . Times, 26 September 1984 . 17 . Armonstrong, P., Glyn, A . & Harrison, J . (1984) Capitalism Since World War Il . Fontana. 18 . International Business Week, 8 April 1985 . 19 . International Business Week, 9 June 1986 .
41
Anna Pollert Dismantling flexibility
Two distinct ideas that the labour force is becoming more flexible and that flexible specialisation offers a new means for capital to exert control - are critically evaluated . The evidence for both fashionable theses is found to be wanting ; their increasing 42 acceptability is linked to a retreat from class politics and from a confrontation of inequalities of race and sex . Indeed they herald a new form of imperialism .
• `Greater flexibility in the labour market is no panacea, but it is nevertheless a means for quite a substantial amelioration in current problems' (DECD, 1986 : 6) . • 'It was noticeable during 1985 that many managements were seeking greater flexibility in the use of labour' (ACAS, 1985 : 9) . • 'The practices of Japanese companies . . . are understood in the managerial community in terms of a notion of flexibility very different from that which provokes the employment debate . Managers attribute the success of these firms to an unusual degree of responsiveness to market conditions' (Piore, 1986a : 158) . 'Flexibility' has engulfed conceptions of employment structure and restructuring since the early 1980s . To call it 'the flexibility debate' is over-complimentary . For most of the flexibility literature tends to be either prescriptive, or assumes there is a 'new' trend, which it then proceeds to describe and generalise . There has been no discussion on the origins of the term, to unravel its many connotations, to question what is indeed 'new', and to set this against the ideological processes which have unleashed it . Such a situation has political dangers : it defines the agenda of debate, assumes a radical break with the past, conflates and obscures complex and contradictory processes within the
Flexibility organisation of work, and by asserting a sea-change of management strategy and employment structure, fuses description, prediction and prescription towards a self-fulfilling prophecy . A deconstruction of 'flexibility' as an extremely powerful term which legitimises an array of policy practices is long overdue . Within management literature, 'flexibility' has been a handy legitimatry tool precisely because of its all-purpose resistance to precise definition . Production flexibility, technical flexibility, organisational flexibility, labour process flexibility, time, wage, financial, marketing flexibility - all these issues are presumed to have a connection, and this connection is implicitly understood to reside in the behaviour of labour . Such a slippage has allowed the discussion of restructuring to veer away from the global issues of capital structure, investment, exchange rates, trade relations, to the homely, and apparently more manageable 'problem' of labour . The argument runs that the changeability of markets is the supreme challenge facing management, and its solution lies in the flexibility of adaptability of labour, both in the workplace, and in the labour market . Other dimensions of production, such as organisation and design, in which labour costs are not a prime issue, and other managerial driving forces, such as marketing, are swept off the table (Rubery et al, 1987) . Such an ideological assumption is far from new ; it accompanied the concern with the British worker's 'productivity' some twenty-odd years ago : . . . it had always been there, a sort of background music full of familiar melodies . . . it had always been accompanied by a more or less constant refrain - something about British workers and productivity . (Nichols, 1986 : xi) On a wider level, the whole 'flexibility' ethos is notable for its futurological discourse . With the growth of insecure, or irregular forms of work, and unemployment, social scientists have 'discovered' what casual wage labourers and those outside paid employment - very largely women and youth - already knew, that not all 'work' is stable and secure. Libertarian futurologists have heralded work in the small business, self-employed, informal and domestic economy as a 'new' form of work, not only more competitive (because more 'flexible' in adjusting to markets), but offering autonomy, 'flexible' hours, and in general 'flexible working lives' . A body of futurological writing based on a postindustrial conception of a 'radical break' in 'industrial society' and a largely technically determinist prophecy of the 'collapse of work' and 'discovery of leisure' (Jenkins & Sherman, 1979) has meshed with a dualist construction of the economy . In essence, a demise of regular wage labour, indeed, of wage labour itself, is given a libertarian legitimation, because it is both inevitable and
43
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44
progressive. The left-reformist writing on 'flexibility', most notably articulated by Piore and Sabel (1984), explicitly distances itself from the concern with labour market flexibility (Piore, 1986a). It is also on quite a different intellectual level of theorisation from the management and 'manpower studies' literature (e .g. Handy, 1984 ; Atkinson, 1984). Nevertheless, the panacea of 'flexible specialisation' (FS) indicates an overwhelming consensus between left and right on the sovereignty of markets as the defining principle of restructuring . For the neo-classical revivalists and their management practitioners, this is obviously the strategy for capital . For the FS school, the restructuring of capital by the restructuring of production and labour, is once again the route forward, only this time, as a reform for capital and labour . The convergence between the right and Fs dissemination of 'flexibility' is a central theme of deconstruction in the following analysis . There are further conceptual affinities between the reformist FS perspective and the managerial literature, stemming from the prime place given to markets . This is the elevation of the fragmentation and decentralisation of production, and of the small firms sector, as the economic saviours of an ailing system . Behind this resurrection of economic dualism in both approaches, is the 'post-industrial' vision of a radical historical cleavage and branching point in social development, the projection of trends and a 'grand theory' futurology of technical and productive paths, from'Fordism' to'neo-Fordism' . Before a detailed examination of these two 'flexibility' literatures and their relationship, two areas of mystification implicit in both need clarifying . First are the dimensions of labour flexibility under discussion, and second, the assumption that these are new concerns . Flexibility in employment and in work - what's new?
The 'flexibility' debate has concentrated on two aspects of labour flexibility : flexibility in employment and flexibility in work . The neo-classical revival has provided the cue for the international concern with 'Eurosclerosis', the solutions for recession and unemployment sought in wages and labour market flexibility . Labour market deregulation in the form of the legislative offensive on labour organisation and employment rights and protection (Lewis, 1987 ; Hepple, 1987), the ideological and practical sponsorship of private enterprise and the small business sector, in the form of privatisation and competitive tendering, and the maintenance of a vast reserve army of the unemployed set the material agenda for using the competitive labour market as the solution to
Flexibility
economic regeneration . Of state employment deregulation policies, the clearest statement of the virtues of labour market flexibility is the 1985 White Paper, Employment, the challenge for the Nation, a document which was deliberately modelled as the antithesis of the 1944 White Paper on employment, which embodied the post-war consensual commitment to full employment (Standing, 1986 : 45) . Linked to the concern with labour market flexibility, the implicit focus on the flexibility or rigidity of labour within work, perpetuates the concern with flexibility manifest in British productivity dealing in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit with a crucial shift in bargaining power away from labour . A typical productivity deal in the 1960s concerned `Increased flexibility in the use of manpower . . . [and] changes in working practices, e .g . tighter scheduling of transport operations, shift work changes and flexibility over numbers and types of machines supervised' (NBPt, 123, 1%9 :4) . , Concern with both forms of flexibility is not new . It is the flexibility of human labour which creates the elastic commodity of labour power and allows its extension and intensification in the extraction of surplus value . Capital has always required flexibility of labour ; the struggle over its control has structured management development, the capitalist tabour process, and forms of labour organisation . In the early days of industrial capitalism, the emphasis was on defining rules and demarcations, both in time and task . The tension between the discipline of wage tabour and the rhythms of life outside this social relation has been a source of conflict throughout the development of capitalism . E P Thompson charts the harnessing to time discipline through the 18th and 19th centuries, when the employers, far from wanting flexibility, imposed rigidity on the `irregularity of the working day and week . . . framed until the first decades of the 19th century, within the larger irregularity of the working year, punctuated by traditional holidays and fairs. Eventually, the rigid wall between work and non-work was built' : The first generation of factory workers were taught by their masters the importance of time;. the second . . . formed their short time committees . . . the third struck for overtime or time-and-a-half. They had accepted the categories of their employers and learned to fight back within them . They had learned their lesson, that time is money, only too well . (Thompson,1%3 : 76, 86) . The debate from this period about the benefits and costs of regular employment, organised or `flexible' labour markets, was
45
Capital & Class 46
a perennial issue . Thompson (1963: 78) notes `the debate between advocates of regularly-employed wage-labour and advocates of 'taken-work' (contract labour, AP) . Casual work has always contributed to the process of capital accumulation, alongside the creation of a more organised proletariat . Berg (1985) emphasises the continuation of domestic and other forms of non-wage labour, particularly among women workers in the mass-consumption industries, until well into the 19th century . Littler's (1982) discussion of the decline of internal sub-contracting also points out its uneven continuation, which was seen until comparatively recently in the docks, and characterises (perhaps increasingly) the British construction industry . And the use of cheap outworkers, both in traditional industries and expanding new firms is not new (Hakim, 1985), nor is the deliberate use of married women as a low-paid, stable, yet unprotected laboui force, in the small firms sector, or the `toleration' of high turnover in sectors with unstable product markets (Craig et al, 1984) . Casual labour may or may not have increased, but more important, it has become ideologically visible . Only when 'rigidity' of time and task become the basis of skill, or of occupational ownership and bargaining strength did management unequivocally stress 'flexibility' . In engineering, for example, this became the centre of the 'craft question' . During the 1890s, the recently-founded engineering employers' association came in direct conflict with the Amalgamated Society of Engineers over the demarcation of work and the right to control the entry of skilled labour, and the use of new machines (Clegg, 1983 : 20) . The lockout of 1897 was precisely about wresting flexibility from craft workers, and gave 'freedom to employers in the management of their works, and set forth such conditions as to employment . . . the rating of workmen, the training of operatives . . . as the Trade Unions would not have accepted had they not been beaten' (Cassier's Magazine, 1902, quoted in McGuffie, 1986 : 39). The struggle over the 'right to a trade' is a basic organising principle of trade unionism on the one hand, and of managerial prerogative on the other . To isolate it as a contemporary, or 'new' phenomenon, obscures this historical continuity and serves as a mystifying veil cutting off collective memory of past experience . Having said this, however, there is something new about the current articulation of an imperative towards labour flexibility . This is its construction within a dualist employment and industrial perspective. It is to this question that we now turn .
Flexibility Flexibility and dualism : the 'flexible firm' and 'flexible specialisation'
The distinctive way in which the new emphasis on labour flexibility has been mediated within a dualist perspective lies in the relationship between two apparently unconnected literatures : an elegant management policy model and a scholarly historical `grand theory' developed as a strategy for economic restructuring . Two highly influential uses of 'flexibility' as a basis for labour and production reform, the British 'flexible firm' model (Atkinson, 1984, 1985a), and left reformist perspective of 'flexible specialisation' (Piore & Sabel, 1984 ; Sabel & Zeitlin, 1985), have both to be addressed, to gain leverage over the meaning of the term . Both these restructuring expositions are grounded in dualist and segmentation perspectives ; the first treats the simple dual labour market as a deliberate, conscious policy goal, and the second is a reversed application of dual labour market analysis by at least one originator of the dualist segmentation model . However, what is common to both is the legitimation of dualism as a dynamic and progressive force for the current period . The 'flexible firm' model: an outline
The 'flexible firm' model asserts there is an 'emerging manpower system within the large primary sector firm ; a 'new' polarisation between a 'core' and a 'periphery' workforce, the one with functional and the other with numerical flexibility, to provide adaptability to changing product markets (Atkinson, 1984, 1985a, 1985b). The multi-skilled 'core' group offers'functional' flexibility in the labour process, by crossing occupational boundaries. It also offers flexibility by time, in terms of adjusting more closely to production demands . The 'periphery' provides 'numerical flexibility' ; workers may be insecurely or irregularly employed, or not have a direct relationship with the firm at all, being, for example, sub-contracted or self-employed . Here, it is the precariousness of the employment relationship and competitiveness of the labour market which provides the employer with a numerically variable workforce . The economic and social basis of the privileged sector is allegedly its importance to the 'organisation's key, f irm-specific activities' (Atkinson, 1984a) ; thus, the model rests on the assumption of a direct relationship between primary employment conditions and the business concept of managerial 'strategic choice' of an organisation's 'core activity' . The 'peripheral' workers, by contrast, are less central (i.e. they are important, but not part of the 'core business'), making them more easily recruitable from
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the open labour market, and therefore less protected from its competitive pressure. It is their disposability which matters : `numerical flexibility is sought so that headcount can be quickly and easily increased or decreased in line with even short-term changes in the level of demand for labour' (Atkinson,1984). The appeal, but also the weakness, of this model is both its comprehensiveness, in covering a wide Slumber of employment situations in one model, and its simplicity . In a later reference to the model, Atkinson and Meager (NEDO, 1986) describe it as a tool with which to analyse a wide variety of changes in employment practice, rather than as a description of any real firm . There are others who share the view that the model is a rough and ready guide to understanding key changes in employment (e.g . Hakim, 1987 : 93), and this is reflected in the wide currency of common usage of the terms 'core' and `periphery', and of the two kinds of flexibility . Although Atkinson registers the insecurity of the secondary sector labour force, its deliberate expansion is nevertheless seen as either inevitable, or desirable from capital's point of view, and it is up to labour to make the best of this . The `flexible firm' was widely reported in the press (e .g . Guardian, 18 April 1984; Industrial Relations Review and Report, 7 August 1984; Personnel Management, August 1984 ; New Society, 30 August 1985), and 'core' and 'periphery' are common parlance in management conferences (e .g. IRS, 1985, 1986) and academic language. It has also entered trade union debate ; its incursion into bargaining language has made 'functional' and 'numerical' flexibility common currency, and has forced a critical response from the labour movement (Tuc, 1985 ; LRD, 1986). But besides evoking some critical commentary on the left, it has also frequently been incorporated as evidence of a 'new' management strategy in radical texts (cArrs, 1986 ; Mitter, 1986; Nichols, 1986 ; Potter, 1987) . To the extent that it is fact or has become a material force as practice, this inclusion is justified . Yet this is far from proven, and its reportage as a 'fait-accompli' hardly clarifies the matter . It is therefore long overdue that the model, its factual evidence, its conceptual base, its policy implications are put to rigorous scrutiny . Flexible specialisation: an outline
The strategy of 'flexible specialisation' is accomplished by a new form of artisan production made easily adaptable with the aid of programmable technology . It supplies customised goods to satisfy a plethora of individual tastes and needs and revitalises markets in a way similar to Atkinson's 'flexible firm', the labour process resembling that of the 'functionally flexible' 'core'
Flexibility
workers . However, Piore and Sabel's scenario is not simply a resurrection of a legitimised dual labour market, but of a benign one. The case for flexible specialisation as a strategy' of production restructuring is based on the concept of technological paradigms, and an explanation of 'industrial' development based on competing systems of industrial technology : craft production and mass production. The dominant productive paradigm had been craft production, but became mass production as a result of historical contingencies - a 'chain of accidents compounded by mistakes' (Piore & Sabel, 1984 : 193) . The dominant 'system of industrial technology' (ibid : 5) is now the special purpose machine organised on an assembly line, operated by a semi-skilled labour force, mass producing standardised products for a mass market . But the current economic crisis is a crisis of the dominant technological paradigm, mass production . It has reached the limits of expansion ; mass markets for standardised goods are saturated, and have given way to a more fragmented and discerning pattern of demand, in which quality competition is more important than the price advantage of mass production . In such a crisis of production and markets, an alternative technological paradigm can break the deadlock, and offer the chance for a 'second industrial divide' . The signs are provided by the resiliance of industrial regions based on specialist artisan production which have successfully exploited microtechnology for new opportunities of more flexible production and the opening of new, specialised and variable market niches . Simultaneously, a managerial shift in larger firms to smaller units of more flexible production, including technical changes to flexible specialisation and organisational changes to just-in-time inventories, suggests a shift away from mass production and the sclerosis of saturated mass markets . Basically, it is both technology and the mass market which previously determined the dynamism of the 'primary' sector, with its capital-intensive advantage, and held back the 'secondary' sector, with its low capital investment and inability to use economies of scale . And it is new technology and the fragmentation of market demand which reverses this relationship, making available to the small firm sophisticated, small-scale, technical flexibility . With the alleged change in the consumer market, this gives small-scale production the competitive edge over the vertically integrated 'primary' sector firm, where labour and technical stability are now rigidities, and where economies of scale are no longer cost effective . This reversal of dualist analysis can be seen at two levels : as a logical continuation of a technological and market demand about sectoral relations, and as a political shift from a major concern with the experience of underprivilege, to a comC&C/34-D
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mitment to the health of markets . Flexibility as description, prescription and prediction
One of the distinctive traits of both the model of the `flexible firm' and the FS thesis, is that the writing on flexibility is couched in a complex form of `post-industrial' discourse . This asserts that the current period is a radical break from the past ; the `flexibility' managerial imperative is 'new', as is its accompanying segmentation . 'Flexible specialisation' brings the possibility of a 'new industrial divide', because the crisis of mass production brings a crucial branching point in history (Piore & Sabel, 1984) . Yet the evidence for both these sweeping assertions is thin. To the extent that the empirical basis can be challenged, there is justification in arguing that both approaches are refractions through an ideological lens, which embraces a 'radical break', a new role for dualism, and a particular context for the emphasis on labour flexibility as progressive . To analyse this question, we have to examine both the concrete evidence for change, the ideological implications of this re-cast dualism, and conceptual underpinning which gives such force to the complex fusion of description, prescription and prediction characteristic of the revivalism of 'flexibility' . Why is this so important politically? The empirical evaluation of the 'core-periphery' model is essential in the British context, since it has gained extremely wide currency and is accepted by many as an accurate description of new division in the working class . The empirical validity of flexible specialisation is no less important, both in relation to its basic premise that mass markets are indeed breaking up (an assumption also underlying the need for 'flexibility' of the 'flexible firm'), and in relation to the actual impact of programmable technology on the organisation of work . Such analysis cannot be divorced from the political implications of this preoccupation with labour flexibility and dualism . The novelty of the polarisation between a privileged core and a marginalised periphery is one of the elements of the view that the working class as an active force is dead . It is irretrievably divided, and the 'core' can only consolidate itself by working with capital . This is the case for the new realism, the case for the broad alliance of the soft left with any 'progressive' group, and the relegation of a large part of the working class - the periphery - to an unorganisable underclass. It is a conception built on a new accommodation with 'flexible patterns of work' legitimising pliability, insecurity, unemployment, and 'getting by' with self-employment . Here 'flexible specialisation' appears to square the circle for labour, since the artisan worker can now recreate the strengths of the craft tradition in the secondary sector with the invigorating
Flexibility breath of new technology and new markets . Both positions depend ultimately on a market perspective, and so, not surprisingly, converge with the neo-classical revival which sets the political agenda of the day . We begin, then, with an empirical evaluation both of the `flexible firm' model and the FS analysis, as the precursor to unravelling the common threads running through both literatures .
If the `flexible firm' is indeed the 'new' trend in employment The `flexible firm' structure, it should be possible to show evidence both for an expanding 'periphery', and for a consolidating 'core' (Pollert, 1987) . On existing evidence, there is little support for either . The evidence for a growing 'periphery' The 'core'-'periphery' dichotomy has been picked up and broadcast by some observers as a way to emphasise the importance of casual employment in the economy . Hakim has argued that, 'By the mid-1980s the labour force divided neatly into two-thirds "permanent" and one-third "flexible" . . . the importance of the "flexible" sector has clearly been underestimated ; it is hardly a narrow and insignificant fringe on the edge of the labour market' (Hakim, 1987 : 93) . Unfortunately, this conceptualisation has always been a muddy conflation of legally disadvantaged, but long-term work, such as part-time work, and temporary work, so that, from the start, 'numerical flexibility' has added to a confused understanding of employment . This has been further complicated by the ahistorical 'discovery' of insecurity, as though it were radically new, and the calling of this a 'flexibility' trend . The influential NEDO report, 'Changing Working Patterns', . for example, claims that 'nine out of every 10 respondents had introduced changes to manning practices since 1980 designed to increase numerical flexibility' (NEDO, 1986 : 6). However, the conclusion of 'radical change' is undermined by the conflation of standard practices to vary production with changes in employment . Besides part-time work, the inclusion of overtime working in 'numerical flexibility' confuses a traditional practice for permanent employees with varying the numbers of workers . But if 'peripheral' work is taken to mean 'non-standard' contractual status, deviating from a full-time 'norm', there is little evidence that there has been a recent increase . Temporary work. Hakim (1987) originally claimed, on the basis of the 1985 Labour Force Survey, that 'the most dramatic
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52
increase' in employment was in temporary work ; this enthusiasm was dampened when the figure of a 700,000 growth between 1981 and 1985 had to be revised downward to 70,000 (Employment Gazette, April 1987: 218). Seen as a cyclical phenomenon, the `increase' recedes even further: the proportion of temporary workers in the workforce peaked in 1979, before declining rapidly in the recession and resuming an upward trend in 1982-1983, such that by 1985 it has regained the level of the mid-1970s . (Meager, 1985 : 4) Surveying the private sector in general, the impression is that the greatest use of temporary workers occurs where this is already a well-established practice . The Warwick IRxu Company Level Survey (Marginson et al, 1988) found that the majority of enterprises, and just over half establishments, reported no change in policy towards the use of temporary contracts . The most recent study of temporary work (Casey, 1987) provides further evidence of the absence of significant change in the use of temporary work . Excluding the 12 .5 per cent on special employment measures (1984 Labour Force Survey), there was 'no real growth in the period 1983 to 1985 . In 1983 temporary workers not in special schemes made up 5 .5 percent of the labour force ; in 1985 they made up 5 .5 per cent' . Ironically, the private sector focus of the `flexible firm' model excludes the one area where the use of temporary work may be most significant - the public sector. In 1984, fixed-term contracts were more common in the public sector services than elsewhere and the education sector was responsible for half of these (Millward & Stevens, 1986: 210). The Civil Service, particularly the DHSS, and the Water Authorities, are two other services found to be introducing `new' temporary workers (Potter, 1986,1987) . There is thus little evidence that there has been an overall increase in temporary work, and its appearance may well be the cyclical response witnessed in previous periods . Sectoral variation gives little support to a view of overall restructuring, and also highlights what the generalisation obscures : the importance of changes in the public service sector .
Part-time work. Between 1981 and 1986 the proportion of part-timers in the workforce grew from 21 to 23 per cent . From 1983, the only employment growth was an increase in female employment in the service sector, which was almost all part-time work. Between 1979 and 1986, 62 per cent of the rise in women's service sector jobs was in part-time work . At the same time, the aggregate increase in part-time em-
Flexibility
ployment obscures the fact that it declined from 7 .6 to 6.7 per cent of the manufacturing workforce. For women, this was a 40 per cent loss in manufacturing part-time jobs between 1979 and 1986 (Lewis, 1987). The 1984 Census of Employment and 1985 Labour Force Survey cast further doubt on a simplistic view of increasing part-time work . At an aggregate level, the proportion of the total workforce who worked part-time (defined here as working fewer than 30 hours per week) increased only from 14 per cent to 16 per cent between 1980 and 1984 . As previously, it remains concentrated in the non-manufacturing sector, where it has increased from 18 per cent to 22 per cent of the workforce between 1980 and 1984 (Millward & Stevens, 1986 : 205). For women, parttime work rose only from 40 per cent to 42 per cent of all women workers in the service sector between 1979 and 1984, and somewhat surprisingly, in retail it increased only from 34 per cent to 36 per cent of female employees . This could mask huge differences, by firm size, for example . It could also miss increases in the number of women earning below the National Insurance threshold . But it may well be that there are contradictory processes of growth and decline, as well as, what may be more qualitatively significant, changes in the type of part-time work (hours, length and regularity of shifts), rather than a dramatic increase . Finally, turning to the public sector, we find once more that it is highly relevant : 'Two fifths of the manual workforce in the public services sector consisted of part-time workers in 1984, compared with just over a quarter in the private services sector' (Millward & Stevens, 1986 : 207) . And its main growth between 1980 and 1984 appears to be 'amongst the largest workplaces in the public services sector' (ibid : 209) . These findings demonstrate that the 'flexible firm' conflates changes in the public sector, and the services in general, with management strategy in the private sector . Outworking, freelancing and homeworking . This is a notoriously difficult area to research . Homeworkers, particularly ethnic minority women, are vulnerable to state or employer harassment and more likely to remain invisible in surveys, while the small firm sector, perhaps the most important for these forms of employment, is one of the most difficult areas to study . But in large firms (the subject of the 'flexible firm' model), Millward and Stevens (1986) found a decline in all these forms of employment between 1980 and 1984. This is explained mainly by the contraction in manufacturing. There is thus little evidence of the growth of a 'periphery' composed of these workers . Subcontracting . The alleged increase in subcontracting is perhaps one of the most topical areas of the 'flexible firm', since it relates most directly to the interest in Japanisation, in the fragmentation of production and in the growth of small firms . But
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there is little evidence at an aggregate level of a dramatic increase in subcontracting in the private sector . The Warwick IRRU Company Level Survey found that 61 per cent of establishment respondents reported no change in the level of subcontracting over the previous five years (Marginson et al, 1988). Rather, subcontracting of services was already extremely widespread ; 83 per cent of establishment managers reported that they subcontracted out at least one service, and 39 per cent of this group contracted out three or more services . The NEDO report similarly found the long-standing nature of subcontracting of ancillary or service activities in the private sector (NEDO, 1986: 56), with many of the companies surveyed reporting that `they started down this road in the early 1970s' . There appears to be a move towards more outside purchasing of parts in engineering ; on the other hand, in food and drink, both the NEDO and Marginson et al, found a decline in subcontracting . Rubery. et al's study of consumer goods industries (1987 : 140) points to differing rationales in the use of subcontracting . While some firms bought in and subcontracted components to reduce costs and increase flexibility of production, 'there was no evidence of a widespread increase in subcontracting' . Some subcontracted as an industrial relations tactic to avoid workplace conflict. Others had 'bought-in' production previously subcontracted, in response to 'major problems of co-ordination, design and quality control, particularly because of the growth of subcontracting on an international scale' (ibid). The blinkered concern with increases in subcontracting masks crucial changes at the qualitative level . The EM-funded Steel Project, which investigated the experience of redundant British Steel Corporation workers in Port Talbot between 1980 and 1985, found that while BSC expanded the range of work put out to subcontract, what was new was newcomer subcontractors' undercutting of established subcontract firms . This was achieved through breaking union membership, lowering wage rates, ignoring health and safety precautions, and organising work 'off the cards' (Fevre, 1986 : 23) . An explanation of these varied and often contradictory trends would provide a more penetrating analysis than the imposition of a managerial imperative to 'peripheralise' . Self-employment. Estimates of the increase in selfemployment since 1979 also vary enormously, from between 30 per cent and 45 per cent since 1979 . Overlooking this problem, it appears that 62 per cent of this increase was in the service sector, 20 per cent in construction, 10 per cent in agriculture and 8 per cent in manufacturing (TUC, 1986c) . Most of this appears to be due to an increase in single-person businesses : between 1981 and
Flexibility
1984 the number of people who were self-employed in their main job grew by 442,000 to 2 .6 million, or from 9 .2 to 11 .2 per cent of total employment (Creigh et al, 1986) . While this may be associated with redundancy, it does not seem to be associated with flexibility strategies in large companies . Atkinson and Meager (NEDO, 1986 : 58) found the growth in self-employment 'negligible', except in financial services and the food and drink sector, and here the rationale did not appear to be to increase 'flexibility' . The evidence for a 'core' The `core' defined by recruitment criteria. To start with the problem of defining a 'core', the labelling of all permanent employees as the 'core' workforce is either tautologous or highly debatable if it overlooks segmentation in status, terms and conditions within the permanently employed . Marginson et al (1988) therefore suggest special recruitment procedures as one criterion of 'core' work . They start 'from the straightforward postulate that if any group of employees constitutes a "core" workforce then that must include managers.' Recruitment of such a core would normally involve higher-level management . The general conclusions of their survey are that the majority of firms do not involve higher-level management in the recruitment of non-manual and manual employees . In the main, recruitment of non-managerial employees remains a local, establishment matter . There are also marked sectoral patterns, with enterprises in finance most likely to recruit employees at a central level, and those in mechanical engineering, textiles, clothing and footwear and distribution (for, manuals) recruiting at local level only . Using the recruitment criterion, it would appear that the deliberate fostering of a 'core' workforce is at best patchy, and sectorbased rather than generalised. Functional flexibility as the basis for a 'core' . Other research has looked in detail at the developments in 'functional flexibility' as chief ingredient of the 'core' . But the extent of multiskilling appears limited. Cross's (1987) research indicated that most occupational flexibility was confined to the production/ maintenance boundary, with little change to multiskilling in engineering and craft areas . IDS Study 360 of capital-intensive manufacturing industry, questions whether, in fact, multiskilling is as widely desired as a 'flexibility' trend suggests : Companies have widely different aims . Competitive pressures vary between sectors . Skill requirements are dependent on widely different technologies . More skill, different skill, less skill, can all be legitimate objectives .
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56 Generalisations about moving towards a small, highly skilled and highly flexible workforce may fit one company and be contradicted by the pressure towards a quite different workforce in another . (IDS, 1986 : 1) Similarly, a trade union based study of `flexibility' concludes that, 'in spite of the impression created by a small number of widely publicised case studies . . . a full range of flexible working practices are not frequently implemented' (LRD,1986a : 5) . Many `flexibility' agreements were only 'enabling' not faits-accomplis . Nor was there, apart from rare exceptions, evidence of a 'core' in terms of improved job security . Even the NEDO (1986) study, which used the 'flexible firm' as an analytical model, found extremely limited evidence for 'functional flexibility' . In manufacturing there was little 'radical job enlargement' (NEDo, 1986 : 45) which crossed 'core trade' boundaries; while three-quarters of respondents had achieved a limited overlap between maintenance craftsmen, only a third had achieved dual skiling even within electrical and mechanical trade groups and only 15 per cent had achieved it across the electrical/ mechanical divide (ibid : 46) . Significantly, since the introduction of technical change 'appeared to have the effect in most manufacturing companies of reducing the number, and skill level, of tasks required by process operatives, the tendency was to reduce the numbers of operatives and/or spread them more thinly across the plant, adding a number of deskilled tasks to their job' (ibid : 50). Further, the greatest obstacle to increasing 'functional flexibility' was the cost of re-training, and shortage of training resources (ibid : 50) . And since a short-cut to skill shortage was often the buying in of specialist labour, the development of flexibility in the 'core' workforce was actually hindered . In Britain 'core' status thus has a hollow ring, especially when 'employment security boiled down in practice to a reduction in the threat of job loss rather than anything more positive' (ibid : 79) . This is hardly a convincing case for a consolidating 'core' workforce . The flexible firm: conclusions on the evidence
From this review of the changes in the workforce and in employment practices, the 'flexible firm' model is left standing with few clothes . Where there has been most major restructuring, this has been led by the state as employer . But in the private sector, sectoral continuity is far more in evidence than change, with little evidence of polarisation beween an (ill-defined) 'periphery' and a privileged 'core' . Despite this, the 'core'-'periphery'
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57
model has become a conventional wisdom of today's alleged 'flexibility' trend . Before trying to explain this at a political and ideological level, the radical restructuring programme of flexible specialisation should be similarly exposed to empirical analysis . Flexible specialisation is part of a much wider debate on early industrialisation which cannot be addressed here . As a method of analysis and strategy, it has been criticised on a number of different levels (e.g . Hyman, 1986 ; Smith, 1987 ; Williams et al, 1987) . For the present purposes, the assessment of the Fs thesis will be judged on the validity of its key premises : 1) the concept of the 'technological paradigm' based on the equation of a 'system of industrial technology' and a dominant system of production . 2) the alleged decline of mass production . 3) the alleged decline of mass markets . 4) the alleged new opportunities of new technology for small firms . 5) the actual spread of skill-upgrading FS as the prevalent use of programmable technology in large . firms Much of the evaluation of Fs, particularly the assertion of the fragmentation of markets and the 'new' importance of the multiskilled worker and new technology also applies to the 'coreperiphery' employment restructuring model . 1) Mass production as a technological paradigm
The concept of Fordist mass production as a dominant system of 'industrial' technology' is a crude and inaccurate delineation of the main developments of production systems in 20th-century capitalism . Types of technology, their organisation into different systems of production, and types of labour processes cannot be conflated into a single paradigm ; the empirical evidence is far more complex. Within the large, technologically advanced firm associated with primary sector production and which Piore and Sabel identify with mass production, a variety of technologies and production systems exist, depending on the nature of the product market . Thirty years ago, Joan Woodward's research on firms employing over 100 employees found differences in productive systems 'could not be related to the size of firm', or to technology, but : on their detailed objectives which depended on the nature of the product and the type of customer . Thus some firms were in more competitive industries than others, some were making perishable goods that could not be stored, some
Flexible specialisation
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produced for stock and others to orders ; in fact, marketing conditions were different in every firm . (Woodward, 1958) These different production systems have long been recognised to fall into three standard categories : 1) small batch and unit production, 2) large batch and mass production, and 3) process production. Woodward also identified a lack of neat fit between type of technology and a single productive system : `Automatic control can be applied most readily to mass production and continuous flow-process production, but even in unit and small-batch production devices for the control of the individual machine can be used' (ibid). Some firms also remained outside the threefold classification, simply because they were 'too mixed or changing' . To set up a false dichotomy between 'mass production' on the one hand, and 'craft production' on the other, and discover product diversity as proof of an alternative 'paradigm', is thus a distortion of a much more complex reality . 2) The decline of mass production
To demonstrate a basic opposition between two types of production - mass production relying on mass markets, dedicated equipment and semi-skilled workers making standardised goods, versus flexible equipment and skilled workers producing specialist goods - poses a false problem . No such clear opposition exists . But even if we confine the argument to developments in assembly-line production, there is substantial evidence that even within flow-line technology, product diversification takes place without prolonged delays or increased skills . Multi-model and mixed-model lines can be used either to change the products or vary a basic model (Bennett, 1986 : 89). The resilience of mass production to greater product diversity and responsiveness to markets has been discussed elsewhere . Murray (1983) points to improvements in stock control . Gough (1986 : 64) observes that even the much quoted example of Benetton,'produces most of its clothes bleached, the colour variation being added as the final stage' . The crude distinction between 'dominant' production trajectories also obscures the complexity and contrary directions of production organisation : there are trends away from customised towards mass production in the production of machinery (Piore & Sabel, 1984: Ch . 4); and decentralisation of production through subcontracting cannot be conflated with a return to artisan production . It can simply be another mode of division of labour and standardised production .
Flexibility
But a major, and much neglected, problem with the theory of'Fordism' and the decline of mass production is the omission of 'Fordism before Ford' - the female gendering of most semiskilled assembly workers . The focus has either been on the car industry - which perhaps stands out because the Fordist assembly line is the exception, rather than the rule, for male production jobs - and engineering occupations, which are rarely part of mass assembly production anyway . As Glucksman (1986) has demonstrated, the new mass production industries of the inter-war years producing the consumer goods for the new mass markets were constructed as women's work . The assembly line, the moving conveyor belt and flow processes created a new division of labour in which women performed the semi-skilled work of repetitive standardised production. Taking electrical engineering as typical of the new industries, women were concentrated in the assembly of electric lamps, batteries, telephone and wireless apparatus, valves, electric light accessories, heating, cooking and other apparatus . Jobs became sex-typed, for women were `unquestionably' more patient, dexterous and reliable but 'wherever new methods of production were introduced, men acquired, or retained, control over the technical process' (Glucksman, 1986 : 29). The sexual division of labour in manufacturing is no different today . Where semi-skilled women workers have not been rationalised away and remain a cheaper, or more reliable option than machinery, they remain in the labour-intensive production, assembly and packing jobs of the mass production industries (Herzog, 1980; Pollen, 1981 ; Cavendish, 1981 ; Armstrong, 1982 ; Westwood, 1984). Yet consumer durable industries, and the assembly lines in them, are absent from the Fs discussion . Existing work on the social construction of skills and occupations, and the gendering of technology, conforms women's isolation from machinery, and the likely displacing and deskilling impact of new technology (Cockburn, 1983, 1985) . Since social differentiation, by sex, race or age, is a key process in the formation of occupational and skill identity, where restructuring does take the form of upgrading to flexible specialisation, the gains in control are likely to be gendered. Without conscious feminist struggle, this would reinforce existing segregation . The alleged trajectory of a decline in mass production and rise of Fs is thus a complacently male sex-blind view as well as empirically inaccurate . The decline of mass markets?
If there is no dear opposition between mass production and
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batch production, and if product markets have always been a mixture of standardised and differentiated goods, then what is the evidence for the break up of mass markets? With the concept of `mass markets', we enter the same problems of definition as with mass production. As Williams et al (1987) ask : at what point do we cross the rubicon of diversified mass markets and enter the fragmented market for the specialised goods of flexible specialisation? The much discussed fragmentation of the market in the clothing industry is a further case in point . For example, the proliferating variety of `Next' retail outlets, including the takeover of Grattan mail-order (Observer Magazine, 10 January 1988), is a planned strategy of carving the consumer market into predictable chunks . The capturing of markets by the deliberate cultivation of finely-tuned consumer tastes naturally becomes more urgent as competition intensifies, but this is not evidence of a decline, but of a more sophisticated manipulation of the mass market . Indeed, one can look at a whole range of industries which are based on mass and large batch production and continue to sell well to large markets : food, drinks, flat-pack furniture, DIY goods, toiletries, records, toys - the list covers most consumer goods . The Japanese consumer durable industry has been quoted in support of the rationale for FS : Managers attribute the success of these firms to an unusual degree of responsiveness to market conditions, responsiveness which eludes the traditional, tightly integrated, hierarchical corporations . (Piore, 1986a : 156) But the Japanese success can hardly be described as a shift away from mass markets ; televisions sell not because new models keep appearing, but because they are welt designed, reliable and cheap . New products also create markets, while the need for replacements likewise means that the market for domestic equipment has no more reached saturation today than before (Willi et al, 1987 :425) . As Gough has argued (1986), the focus on a fragmentation of demand as a root of crisis, mistakes cause for effect . Fragmentation is part of marketing strategy, which is one way (along with price competition, which cannot be said to be obsolete for all the claims of the Fs school) to deal with the problem of overaccumulation . This leads to the other major misconception in the analysis of a decline in mass markets : the substitution of a totally arbitrary conception of saturation in use values, for a crisis in the realisation ofexchange values. The crisis of overaccumulation is reduced to a crisis in mass markets . Markets, and the tastes of the `sovereign
Flexibility
consumer' (Hyman,1986) are as crucial to the FS analysis as they are to the neo-classical world view. Production flexibility : new opportunities for small firms?
One of the lynchpins of FS as both the explanation of the persistence of artisan production and facilitator of decentralised restructuring is the suitability of the new, flexible technology for small firms (Zeidin, 1985 : 13, 21) . The evidence does not support this case . In the British clothing industry, as supporters of decentralisation have conceded, the major items of equipment for more flexible production, such as computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-controlled cutting systems, are very expensive, and available only to the large clothing manufacturers (Zeitlin, 1985 : 14) . Any future reduction in cost is speculative (Zeidin, 1985 : 13) . In the meantime, it is the large producers who are best able to implement flexible production of relatively short runs, threatening of London's small, specialist garment manufacturers (GLC, 1985 : 13) . Thus, the reality is that large firms can invest, where smaller ones cannot - hardly a revelation . The `solutions' for the small firms, such as developing a federated structure for sharing equipment and management advice, would face the formidable competitive advantage of the larger (75-250 worker) firms . Paradoxically for the advocates of decentralisation, quality competition (the driving force for more flexible production) leads retailers to rely more heavily on larger manufacturers ; far from decentralising, there has been growing pressure on suppliers to move production 'in-house' (Zeitlin, 1985 : 19). This has added further advantage to the larger firms (GLC, 1985 : 3). The agument thus returns to the basic point of analysis, that flexible production does not necessarily mean small production units (GLC, 1985 : 4) . One cannot conflate technology, productive system and organisational form into a technologically determinist form of macro-restructuring . Similarly, one cannot assume a technologically driven restructuring of semi-skilled work to craft revival - the final point of our critique of Fs . Production flexibility and the rise
offlexible specialisation?
The continuation of debate over the skill upgrading or deskilling utilisation of microprocessor technology, challenges any assertion of a dominant trajectory towards the revitalisation of craft skills in FS . The 'post-Taylorist' view of More and Sabel can be contrasted with the evidence of Shaiken et al (1986) . This demonstrates the use of new technology to wrest control from
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production workers and further centralise management control . Elger's (1987) review of recent British studies of restructuring using new technology for more flexible production, reinforces a growing body of evidence that both management and labour can wrest gains and suffer costs in the negotiation of change . Uneven development also emerges as the most marked result of recent research on consumer goods industries (Rubery et al, 1987) . This shows that while more flexible production and ease of product differentiation is increasingly important with heightened competition, this is not necessarily achieved by new technology, and where it is, does not necessarily lead to the creation of a polyvalent craft workforce (Rubery et al, 1987: 145) . Indeed, the outcomes for labour of shifts to more flexible production vary between continuing dependence on traditional skills, deskilling, skill increases and skill polarisation - a conclusion similar to Kelley's review of the debate (1987). What does seem to emerge repeatedly is that there is no clear development towards an upgraded craft revival . The critiques of both the managerial and the 'radical' applications of both labour and labour market flexibility highlights one common characteristic : both cases are based on 'ideal type' models of reality, which do not bear up well to empirical scrutiny . This leaves us with a fundamental question : is there a deeper conceptual and ideological affinity between these apparently distinct constructions, which serves to explain why, in spite of their shaky factual foundations, they are pursued so intently? We must turn then to a conceptual and ideological analysis . Dualism, the 'informal sector' and 'postindustrialism'
In discussing the `flexible firm' and 'flexible specialisation', we are juxtaposing very different literatures, but they have a distinctive conceptual alliance . One is a rooting in, and re-application of dual labour market analysis . The other is in a post-industrial conception of a radical social break, forecasting new trajectories into the future . Both employ a method of argument, fitting complex facts into 'ideal type' models, and basing global sweeps on selective evidence . With the 'flexible firm', this is a future trend in management strategy. In 'The Second Industrial Divide', there are a number of possible futures . In both literatures, economic dualism is in different ways the basis of a new set of policies and new social structure . The dual labour market resurrection of the 'flexible firm' as a 'new' segmentation is a crudely ahistorical transformation of an academic analysis into a practical policy . The very basis of dual labour markets were not homogeneous, but segmented between an internal labour market and an external one (Doeringer & Piore, 1971) . The 'flexible firm' model ignores this long-standing
Flexibility
segmentation, and starts from a false premise of initial homogeneity. It also reproduces the lack of clarity of dual labour market analysis in providing no clear criteria for its dichotomisation (Pollen, 1987) . It is an irony that Piore, who in the early 1970s pioneered dual labour market analysis as an explanation of the underprivilege of black workers (Doeringer & Piore, 1971), should recast his perspective in a reversed form, the `secondary' industrial sector becoming the beacon of progress, the ills of `secondary' labour market conditions finding a cure . Looking back to this early period, Piore recalls : For us at the time the different fates of black and white workers in the economy were the critical factors . 'Dualism' captured the perceptions of black workers and of many white workers and employers as well as the structure of differences between black and white employment opportunities . (Berger & Piore, 1980 : 16) One can begin to detect a shift of interest in the 1980s, with the theorisation for what was largely a descriptive account of dualism (Berger & Piore, 1980) . This looked towards the technological and political basis of economic uncertainty as the source of dualism . Returning to Adam Smith's analysis of the relationship between the division of labour and the size of the market, Piore lays the foundations for the later elaboration of Fs, in a model of industrial structure driven by the relationship between the structure of market demand and technological development and organisation (Berger & Piore, 1980 : 24) . The growing interest in flexibility and uncertainty was already apparent in Berger's account of the resilience of the traditional sector in France and Italy (Berger & Piore, 1980) echoing the enthusiasm of Italian segmentation theorists for the small firms sector (e.g . Brusco, 1982; Solinas, 1982) . Ultimately, this shift in priorities can be seen in political terms . The segmentation tradition was not alone in turning its attention to the secondary sector in this period . Recession, growing unemployment and deepening crisis at the end of the 1970s meant that the small firm sector became both ideologically and politically more significant, as a sector which might potentially shoulder the risks and costs of 'economic recovery', and generate some national employment growth (Gerry, 1985 : 300) . Although the small business sector has 'proliferated' by high turnover, rather than growth -'the birth and death rates of small enterprises appear to have more or less matched one another in recent years' (Gerry, 1985 : 308)-the ideological impact of the small-business/ self-employment focus is vital . It has fostered competitive indi-
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vidualism, and obscured the extent of exploitation in this sector with the illusion that the self-employed are all independent, profit-making entrepreneurs. There is a heritage to the dualist focus on the small business sector in the discussion of the 'informal' sector in the Third World. The 'informal' or 'marginal' sector constructs were inspired by 'the need to explain the impoverishment of increasing numbers of people, simultaneous with economic growth' (Connolly, 1985 : 60) . Dualism served to mystify the connections between unemployment, poverty and the integration of smallscale production into capital accumulation, by presenting two 'economies' as separate . It became the corner-stone for separate 'solutions' for both 'economies', either as a celebration of the informal sector as a vanguard of enterprise, or as a social problem for philanthropic concern . Either way, the linkage of poverty to the underlying processes which make it a necessary part of the global system of production, appears broken . Connolly argues that in the case of Mexico in the early 1980s, the informal sector served to legitimise policies which reinforced the extreme inequality of wealth . Massive state subsidies to the most profitable capital-intensive industries were justified on the grounds that 'modem development' was the panacea to unproductive backwardness . Complementing this, welfare expenditure and 'selective aids' to labour-intensive activities using 'adequate' technologies could be justified, if only theoretically, to encourage an autonomous informal sector, without threatening the underlying concentration of capital (Connolly, 1985 : 67) . Similar policies underpinned the use of the 'formal', 'informal' nomenclature elsewhere ; in the ILO missions to Colombia in 1970, to Sri Lanka in 1971 and Kenya in 1972 (Gerry, 1985 : 2%) . As crisis deepened, and it became clear that the alleged 'trickle down' effect from the formal to the informal sector was not to be, the more the informal sector became ideologically transformed from a social blight, to the vanguard of enterprise (Pearson, 1987) . This ideological celebration of the 'informal' economy can also be seen in the recessionary phase of 'post-industrial' theory, a perspective which has found strong expression in the current obsession with 'flexibility' as a return to small business . The post-war boom inspired a number of 'post-industrial' perspectives of a radical break from 'industrial society', rooted in assumptions of guaranteed growth, general affluence and satisfaction of material needs . Bell (1974), the most influential exponent of this optimistic projection, held that the break consisted in a fundamental employment shift from manufacturing, to the provision
Flexibility
of services, and a new 'service society', with a 'knowledge elite' as its basis of power. As the end of the post-war boom forced close questioning of these full-employment projections, Bell's benignly voluntarist 'service society' came under scrutiny . Gershuny (1978) pointed out that service occupations were not the same as services for people, since most were integral parts of manufacturing organisation . This successfully undermined the basis of a'post-industrial' break. Yet Gershuny continued the 'qualitative break' tradition, but now in the context of recession and unemployment . His analysis pursued the problem of how services were actually provided, and focussed on the household economy and, increasingly, on work in the 'informal' sector . Kumar (1978) sought an ideological break with the 'growth' ethic of 'industrial' society, towards a libertarian, 'small is beautiful', world . Veering away from concern with large-scale employment and wage labour, a new literature of 'recessionary' post-industrialism emerged, predicting the demise of wage labour in the formal economy. Emphasising the economic viability of production in the informal sector, it has been influential in the broadcasting of a polarisation between formal and informal economies, core and peripheral employment . The 'post-industrial' emphasis on the informal sector as a radical break has a parallel in Piore and Sabel's recasting of the secondary sector as not only economically dynamic, but beneficial for labour . The argument behind Gershuny's vision of the selfservice economy comes dose to Piore and Sabel's analysis of the demise of mass production, and vision of alternative trends. Both advocate a 'third way' out of crisis, which is neither a Keynesian bolstering of demand, nor a monetarist solution, but a furtherance of a dual economy. Both also invest prime importance in consumer demand, and the transformative powers of new technology to supply this in new ways. For Gershuny, The third strategy, instead of working against the trends, works with them . . . [it] is to start to consider the redesign of the household, or rather to consider the social basis of final consumption . . . The 'dual economy' strategy would not seek to discourage the continuing drive for efficiency, with accompanying unemployment, in the formal sector . Instead, it would seek to improve both work and leisure in the informal sector ; indeed, since in this sector production and consumption activities are based on the same social unit, the distinction between work and leisure might itself become less clear-cut . As a result of this strategy, the informal sector might become a viable alternative to
C&C/34-E
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66
employment in the formal sector. (1978 : 160-1) Piore and Sabel's arguments for the resurgence of craft production is based on a historical analysis of competing productive paradigms, not on complementary systems (except at the international level). But the resonance between their own celebration of the craft tradition, and the `post-industrial' economy of self-employment is unmistakable . The political implications of the `post-industrial' embrace of the small business sector reveal themselves in their convergence with enterprise capitalism's enthusiasm for deregulation . Piore remarks `there is considerable truth in at least Reagan's vision of American prosperity . . . we are more dependent on entrepreneurial activity than we were in the past' (1986b : 211). It is no coincidence that the `post-industrial' vision embellishes the management literature on 'flexible' work. `New' types of working offered by new technology and non-standard forms of work offer possibilities of flexible working time, and the much sought blurring between work and leisure . The 'radical break' brings a new quality of inevitability and liberal appeal to the 'postindustrial' economy of the demise of collective wage labour . Clutterbuck and Hill (1981 : 4) assert that,' . . . many forecasters believe we are on the edge of a shift in attitudes and behavioural patterns comparable to that involved in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance' . This, together with the decline in manufacturing, new technology, unemployment, and the growth of the informal economy, is all moulded to the need for 'flexibility' : 'As will emerge time and again throughout the following pages, the key to meeting the challenge of tomorrow's workplace is flexibility of response. . . . In theory at least, those companies that develop the flexibility of response . . . Will be the ones to prosper' (ibid : 22) . Handy (1984: 8) predicts : ' . . . Jobs will be shorter . . . jobs will be difficult, more dispersed, and, in many cases, more precarious .' As a consequence, he forecasts the growth of the 'dispersed' or 'contractual' organisation (ibid : 74, 79) : 'Whether we like it or not (and there are many who don't), the contractual organisation is with us, is growing and is likely to grow faster' (ibid : 81) . The 'flexible firm', with its emphasis on decentralisation and 'new' management strategy, is part of this 'radical break' management literature with a similar fusing of assertion, prescription and prediction (Pollen, 1987) . The strain between the model's assertions and unsupportive empirical facts expresses itself in a duality between sweeping generalisation on the one hand, and immediate qualification or retraction, on the other. In
Flexibility 67
Report No . 89, a radical change is first announced, then negated : IMS
In the UK we are beginning to witness important changes to orthodox ideas about work organisation and the deployment of labour. As yet such changes cannot be said to add up to new and coherent employment strategies on the part of employers . (Atkinson, 1985a : 1) The report contains this tension throughout (Pollen, 1987) . Eleswhere we are told, `flexibility has become an important theme in emerging corporate thinking', yet, `research suggests in practice, relatively few UK firms have explicitly and comprehensively reorganised their labour force on this basis' (Atkinson, 1985b) . Trends are both asserted and denied, contradictions obscured by the interpretation of numerous practices as 'radical breaks', even if the 'small print' shows they are not . This prophetic style has unleashed a method of policy dissemination, where the prescriptive message is carried in the assertion of a trend . A distinctive language has been created, based on the compelling force of asserting trends which will leave you behind if you do not join in . But the arguments of FS are similar, except here the projection of trends is built on an elaborate historical edifice. In both, the edifice is less secure than the confident style admits . The common ground between the radical restructuring programme of reviving artisan production, and of management strategies promoting greater labour market flexibility leads to further questions about the relationship between both 'flexibility' literatures at the policy level . Some argue that the Atkinson model is quite different from the FS scenario (Williams et al, 1987 : 434) . While there are obviously differences, there are more similarities than meet the eye . Labourflexibility and'coreperiphery' as a new state integration
ofcapitalist
The policy implications of the 'flexible firm' model and of Fs are neither identical n scope nor content . The first is a managerial strategy for controlling labour, the second, a strategy for restructuring both the labour process and capital as a whole . In the first, the concept of 'functional flexibility' at the 'core' allows for the multiskilled craft worker, but also the more pliable employee and the removal of demarcations . But in both models, centrality in the labour process strengthens labour not against capital as the most advanced, organised section of the working class, but to work with capital in a new partnership . Japanese lifetime employ-
The 'flexible firm' and flexible specialisation : Political convergences
Capital & Class
68
ment is implicitly - (or with Fs explicitly) - the reference point . But there is also a much wider ideological message of social integration . The 'core' and 'periphery' model is one of organisational balance, labour process flexibility in the one supplemented by labour market flexibility in the other . The Fs analysis is likewise based on dual labour market analysis as a model of dynamic equilibrium . It rejects an analysis of capitalism as a system based on contradictory class interests, and wholeheartedly supports market regeneration . It poses a new equation of sectoral and productive balance, which is healthier for markets . In both projections, dualism suggests a functionalist balance, whereby economic and social equilibrium is maintained by labour market division . The trade unionism of FS (and 'core') workers co-operates with capital, apparently as the realistic 'Challenge for Union Survival' (Piore, 1986b) . In new-realism-speakThe hope for unions lies in articulating an alternative vision, one which is both more realistic and effective in providing an operational understanding of the socio-economic system and which, at the same time, provides an organic and central place for worker organisation . (Piore,1986b) For the car industry, Katz and Sabel argue : Unions will have to exchange the rights to impose uniform conditions for rights in decision making . . . the unions will have to find ways of tying the interests of particular companies to the interests of their industry and even of the economy as a whole. (1985 : 314) Such a scenario resonates with the New Realism of certain union leaderships in Britain (the AEU and the EMW for example), eager to secure their 'core' status in the 'flexible firm' . Core-periphery and flexible specialisation as social division
In FS, the benign version of economic dualism, the question of underprivilege fades into silence . The 'flexible firm's' explicit divisiveness is paradoxically a more candid admission of the concrete applications of fragmentation strategies, than all the sophisticated caveats of welfare protection in the Fs case. But the stubborn persistence of inequality in the Fs utopia will not go away (GLC, 1985 ; Gough, 1986 ; Murray, 1983, 1987 ; Jenson, 1988) . The craft ideal is worrying in itself: Hints that women may not do very well under flexible specialisation begin to niggle at feminists while reading
Flexibility Piore and Sabel's fond references to Proudhon . . . embedded at the heart of his understanding of the independent, craft based working class - which he celebrated - was the belief that women should only work in the home and that any self-respecting working man ought to be able to support his non-waged wife and children . (Jenson, 1988 : 4) Murray (1983, 1987) has shown the seamier side of decentralised production in the Third Italy : racial, gender, skill and age divisions are essential to its success . Competition between firms results in a survival of the fittest which appears in no way ameliorated by local state intervention . Geographical fragmentation between firms and phases of production creates 'maximum wage differentials between different groups of workers', undermining solidarity, and making union organisation 'an uphill task' . Meanwhile 'much work can in no way be described as prized and non-alienating craft labour' (Murray, 1987) . Sharp differences between workforces and firms extends to geographical fragmentation, so that privileged and successful industrial regions, in the Third Italy, for example, can export the insecurity, poor pay and working conditions needed to provide 'flexibility' with fluctuations in demand, to surrounding areas (Solinas, 1982 : 334, 350 ; Brusco, 1982 : 177) . Piore and Sabel rightly feel the need to defend FS from being compared to 'the old Bourbon kingdom of Naples, where an island of craftsmen, producing luxury goods for the court, was surrounded by a subproletarian sea of misery' (1984 : 279) . Their answer rests on a voluntarist vision of co-ordination of market relations by local community structures and by national socialwelfare regulation . But the international perspectives are not quite so rosy, or if so, only on the basis of harmonious inequality . While it may be possible 'to modernise the burgeoning craft sector of third world countries along the lines of flexible specialisation - rather than urging these countries to imitate the massproduction history of the advanced countries - (who does the urging? - AP) - Piore and Sabel continue, It is conceivable that flexible specialisation and mass production could be combined in a unified international economy . In this sytem, the old mass-production industries might migrate to the underdeveloped world, leaving behind in the industrialised world the high-tech industries and the traditional dispersed conglomerates in machine tools, garments, footwear, textiles, and the like-all revitalised through the fusion of traditional skills and high technology
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. . . To the underdeveloped world, this hybrid system would provide industrialisation . To the developed world, it would provide a chance to moderate the decline of mass production and its de-facto emigration from its homelands . (1984 : 279) This blithely imperialist perspective is a further dimension of the unconsciously divisive and elitist complacency implicit in the FS school, for all its utopian collectivist aspirations . It further confirms the compatability between this programme of restructuring for labour, with the advocacy of labour flexibility as a panacea for capital alone, in the 'core-periphery' model as a managerial strategy .
Conclusions
From this analysis of 'flexibility' presented as a 'radical break', spearheading something 'new', it is worth reiterating that flexibility is far from new . It was argued earlier that capital's harnessing of the inherent flexibility of human labour is the defining characteristic of labour power. It is, and always has been, essential to capital accumulation . How this flexibility was organised has been, and is, part of class conflict . In the early days of the factory system, division and rigidification of time and task were the central management priorities, while flexibility on the workpeople's terms was attenuated . Today, flexibility on labour's terms remains an area of struggle as it was before; in spite of unemployment and the appropriation of 'flexibility' as a managerial and market concept, the organisation of work and employment continues to be socially negotiated (whether through formal industrial relations or informal means), and labour can, as in previous periods, recoup and transform managerial initiatives to its own ends . However, such outcomes depend, as'participation' exercises, productivity deals and other managerial initiatives to gain worker co-operation show, on the groundwork of worker organisation and self-confidence . Whether the libertarian legitimations of casualisation and 'flexible' working lives can thus become re-appropriated by labour as positive improvements in terms of working hours and arrangements, paid for by capital, not labour, is an open question . But it is not a new terrain of struggle, just as the 'flexible workforce' is not the radically new phenomenon which it has been perceived to be . The deconstruction of 'flexibility' as a celebration of labour market dualism in fact reveals a strong convergence in practice between FS, management policies for labour fragmentation, and neo-classical policies of labour market deregulation . All these approaches place the major responsibility for economic recovery
Flexibility on changes in labour, with `new technology' as companion to a select few . The focus on labour is itself ideological, foreclosing perspectives on international movements of capital, capital concentration, money markets, or the social distribution of wealth . `New technology' too is conceived ideologically, as progressive, neutral and inevitable . The use of labour and new technology as part of the 'flexibility' restructuring programme has allowed a benign recasting of dual labour market theory . The 'flexible' workforce, and economy, is to be composed of a technically advanced, but pliable, 'core', and a disposable, elastic periphery . With the 'flexible firm', labour market segmentation is resurrected as though it were new, with no allusions to existing divisions by race, sex and age . With Piore and Sabel, the secondary, small firms sector is re-interpreted as the dynamic part of the economy, becoming, in this sense, the 'core' and ousting the ailing 'primary' sector firms based on declining mass production. New, flexible technology thus becomes the saviour and economic transformer of what had been the subordinate sector . In each approach, all labour flexibility is celebrated as work enhancing, while decentralising and fragmentation are embraced . As such, the informal and secondary economies are legitimised, and the significance of the disjuncture between organised, collective and directly employed labour, and isolated, atomised production is masked . The convergence between these perspectives, and the neoclassical revival of the enterprise economy, individualised competition and policies of employment deregulation and attacks on trade unionism lead one to question why such a broad ideological consensus should have developed . Capitalist crisis, and the lack of control by nation states over the system may predispose the relinquishing of policies of control, towards an emphasis on the primacy of 'markets', raising economic flexibility to be the panacea . At the same time, the concern of governments with small businesses may itself be the product of the 'contradiction between increasing involvement in the international economy and political dependence upon a nationally/territorially defined social and political structure' (Gerry, 1985 : 303) . That this perspective should find its way into managemenr writing is not surprising . Nor is it new for academic discourses to reinforce, reproduce and legitimise a political consensus . For 'radical' restructuring strategies to turn to what are fundamentally market-dominated solutions of working with, not against capital, suggests an abandonment of class analysis and class action as the basis for change . This is one reflection of the more general disorientation and demoralisation of the left . Fortunately there is now a growing swell of opposition to such
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fatalistic defeatism, accompanied by the theoretical critique of its policies . The effect of `flexibility' as both material strategy and ideology is complex. There can be no doubt that workplace and trade union organisation are both under attack . And yet, as the survey of the empirical evidence shows, the extent of change in the direction of casualisation is more uneven and complex than the 'radical break' perspective implies. In this sense, the 'discovery' of the fflexible workforce' is part of an ideological offensive which celebrates pliability and casualisation, and makes them seem inevitable.
This paper has therefore attempted to analyse the interweaving of 'flexibility' both in its concrete applications, and as ideology. Seen in this way, the language of 'flexibility' reveals itself as the language of social integration of the 1980s : how to live with insecurity and unemployment, and learn to love it . Acknowledgements Thanks to the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper : Peter Armstrong, Irene Bruegel, Fergus Murray, Peter Nolan, Ruth Pearson, Chris Smith and John Ure .
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75
Rod Steven The high yen crisis in Japan
im
This paper argues that the poor organisation of the working class in Japan has contributed to an accumulation model characterised by high growth and profit, and which relies on an expanding set of overseas markets to compensate for the relatively poverished domestic market. The rise in the value of the yen has precipitated a crisis in this accumulation 76 model . The strategies for recreating the conditions for accumulation are discussed and related to the balance of class forces in Japan.
• Since 1985, when Japan's total net foreign assets reached $130 billion and Japan became the largest creditor `nation' in the world by a long stretch (FEER, 9 April 1987 : 51), the internationalisation of Japanese capital has skyrocketed to unimagined levels . By the end of 1986 total net foreign assets exceeded $180 billion and they are now expected to double that by 1990 . Direct foreign investment, whose accumulated total was a mere $31 billion as late as March 1980, soared by $12 .2 billion in fiscal 1985 alone and then by $22 .3 billion in fiscal 1986, bringing the total to over $100 billion (Okurasho, 1987) . The reasons for this sudden acceleration in the internationalisation of Japanese capital are not widely understood outside Japan . Since such a process always has its origin in some or other crisis in the capital exporting country, I want to focus in this article entirely on that crisis in Japan and the struggle, or absence of effective struggle, associated with it . Unfortunately, I do not have the space to elaborate on developments outside Japan . My argument is that the growing weakness of organised labour in Japan left the way open for the development in the mid-1970s, and then the consolidation in the mid-1980s of a relatively unique accumulation model . Because of capital's increasingly strict wage control and authority in the workplace, growing labour productivity in the consumer goods branches of the machinery industries (e.g . motor cars and audio-visual equipment) had to find outlets in export markets if the Japanese
High yen crisis working class's limited buying power was not to interrupt accumulation . However, the resulting expansion of exports in other advanced capitalist countries caused increasing conflicts with other advanced capitalist powers, conflicts which were temporarily resolved by means of currency adjustments and a rise of the yen from 240 to the dollar in September 1985 to 132 in early December 1987, with the prospect of further rises in the months to come. The result has been the entaka fukyu (high yen recession), in response to which Japanese capital adopted a three-pronged strategy : industrial restructuring, an onslaught on the domestic working class, and a massive programme of foreign investment . What has become unique to Japan is the combination of two features of Japanese wages which are further consolidating exportoriented accumulation . First, at current exchange rates, Japanese money wages are higher than American wages, bringing to an end the era of Japan as a cheap production place and spurring capital abroad in search of lower wages, even to such places as the Us . Second, real wages in Japan are still at most only about 60% of real wages in the us, and Japanese workers have to save massively to cope with the huge proportion of their lifetime earnings which is absorbed by such things as housing, education, old age and health care . The result is that the higher money wages of Japanese than American workers translate into neither higher living standards nor into greater purchasing power for consumer goods . This is why capital also continues to look to high wages countries in North America and Europe to market consumer goods, since in spite of the higher yen, the disposable income of Japanese workers remains too low to sustain accumulation based on the domestic consumer market . Japanese workers thus face the prospect of growing unemployment and even further pressure on their living standards, since their wages are both too high and too low. Capital has less and less interest in them as either producers or consumers . Capital accumulation in post-war Japan has been accompanied 1973 oil shock : by a continuous process of industrial restructuring, what has a crisis of social been called `scrap and build' . Until the first oil shock in October relations 1973 this took the form of running down light industry (which throughout the pre-war and early post-war periods had generated the surplus for the state to build infrastructure and subsidise heavy industry) and building heavy industry into the dominant pillar of Japanese capitalism. Until 1973, the so-called `miracle' was based on the heavy chemical and basic metals industries, processing imported raw materials and exporting iron and steel, ships, chemicals and petroleum products . Its counterpart was the scrapping of coal, textiles and much of agriculture (in spite of
77
Capital & Class
78
the latter's subsidisation), a strategy which meshed well with the political alliance which had been sealed between the ruling classes of Japan and the United States in the Security Treaty of 1952 . The United States would find in Japan a market for its agricultural surplus and other raw materials, and simultaneously gain an extra lever with which to keep the Japanese ruling class in line with its military strategy in the Far East . Scrap and build is a normal part of capital accumulation, demanding a social structure and form of ruling-class organisation which ensures working-class compliance . I have elsewhere tried to analyse this social structure and only briefly mention some of its main features (Steven, 1983). There are two axes where bourgeois and patriarchal social relations overlap and reinforce social control in Japan . The first divides what are called regular workers, the bulk of whom even today receive from their employers `lifelong' (until about 55) job security, annual pay increments and comprehensive social security, from the many types of non-regulars, who receive none of these benefits and who are not generally granted union membership . Part-time workers are the worst off of this group, who comprise day labourers, contract workers, retired workers on short-term hire and so on, and their wages are typically only a third of regular workers' wages. All large Japanese companies have substantial contingents of low-paid non-regular workers, so that their unit wage costs have been kept extremely low even though their unionised, particularly their older male, workers could be very well paid . Whatever else may be said about rapid accumulation in the post-war period - for example, that it resulted from continual technical change through high levels of debt-financed investment in up-to-date equipment - it remains true that the miserable wages and conditions of the bulk of the working class allowed for the accumulation of the maximum amount of surplus from the rising labour productivity . The division within the working class along the permanenttemporary axis is reinforced by the degree to which it coincides with patriarchal social relations . To an extent unknown outside Japan, regular workers have been male and irregular workers female. Even the overwhelming majority of formally regular women workers, many of whom are members of trade unions, are in reality also merely low-paid temporaries . This is because although both men and women are paid dismal starting wages in large as well as in small firms, these wages, which are withheld from them when young, are returned to those who toil loyally in the same firms until retirement age. But since women are effectively retired at around thirty when they marry or have children,
High yen crisis
they never receive the wages which were withheld, and the patriarchal requirement on them to parent their children converts them from nominally regular into effectively temporary workers . The second axis which divides the Japanese working class and secures a high rate of exploitation covers the vast network of subcontracting relations that exist between large and small firms . Particularly in manufacturing, the technical division of labour involved in the production process tends to coincide with an institutional division, so that different parts of a product are made by different firms, the largest of which assemble components made by myriads of scattered subcontractors . The smallest of these undertake the most labour-intensive tasks, sometimes receiving their orders from firms which are only marginally bigger than themselves and which are in turn working under contract from still larger firms . Often even the employers in the smaller `child' companies are powerless in the face of the 'parent' companies' capacity to dictate contract prices, quality standards, and delivery dates . Wages and conditions deteriorate to the levels of temporary workers as one moves down the hierarchy of subcontracting and re-subcontracting . Also, the smaller the firms, the harder it has been for workers to organise, and very few even in medium-sized companies are unionised . However, the subcontracting system does not function in as closely parallel a fashion with patriarchal social relations as does the temporary labour system . While women are more concentrated in small firms than men, at least 20% of economically active males in Japan have toiled away as employees in such establishments . The first oil shock in late 1973 triggered a crisis which marked a turning point in post-war accumulation . The overlapping networks of social relations which had ensured capital's profitability were no longer able to do so to the previous degree, and widespread bankruptcies, layoffs and losses of livelihood among the ordinary people occurred. But because in the preceding decades capital had concentrated on building up the heavy and basic-materials processing industries, whose social counterparts were a deepening of the subcontracting system and new forms of temporary labour, what was in reality a profoundly political domestic problem presented itself as an externally-induced ecological one, a constraint of nature. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, competition from foreign capital has been a greater threat to the Japanese ruling class than have the ordinary people . Although the latter have been heavily exploited, powerful mechanisms of social control have reduced domestic class struggle to a less dynamic force shaping the course of history than imperialist rivalry. While the stereotype of a passive working class ignores the many forms of struggle which
79
Capital & Class 80
characterise day-to-day life in Japan, it does contain an element of truth: the success that these struggles have had in influencing the course of capital accumulation has not been very great . Because local class relations have always been less explosive than international conflicts, the main forms of bourgeois organisation, such as the state, have been shaped by the need to be strong in the face of foreign rather than domestic threats. But this same state would use its power with vigour against the masses if the occasion arose. Capital's response : export-led growth
The Japanese state was thus very successful in presenting the `oil crisis' as a threat to the nation, and it facilitated capital's threepronged strategy, just as it would in the next period of crisis a decade later . First, scrap and build was applied respectively to the basic materials industries and to the machine industries . The latter comprised three broad types of machinery and equipment - general, transport and electrical-and the signal of their potential profitability was their growing international competitiveness from the mid-1970s . Second, the run-down industries were increasingly located abroad, in the hope that this would somehow prevent future crises, and finally, there was a general attack on the working class, the overall aim of which was to revive profitability through raising the rate of exploitation . However, because the up-and-coming industries concentrated on mass consumer goods, wage restraint in Japan required a restructuring of the market from domestic- to export-orientation .
Increasing rate of exploitation In comparison with the attacks on the working class which occurred in the next period, the social costs of the restructuring in 1974-80 were unspectacular . But there were major job losses and cuts in living standards, as well as extensions of the systems of temporary labour and of subcontracting . In 1974-78 a full 170,000 jobs were destroyed in the rationalisation programmes of the top 100 firms alone, while in large firms (over 500 operatives) in a slightly longer period (1974-79) the number was close to a million (Steven, 1983 : 249, 258-59) . And although real wages did rise a small amount in 1974-78, they fell after that . But more important, the meagre earnings of the growing numbers of parttimers and temporaries who employers used to cut costs concentrated the falling standards around the irregulars, thus increasing the uneven exploitation of the working class . The introduction of new technologies and other rationalisations of production, which were linked to and which exploited the temporary labour and subcontracting systems, created a
High yen crisis competitive power for Japanese capital in the machine industries which surpassed that of us and European capital . Table I shows that by 1985 labour productivity in Japan was higher than in America in most machinery-related industries and that wage costs at the pre-September exchange rate were considerably lower, even in some industries where labour productivity in the us was much higher, such as chemicals and pulp and paper . It also shows how at Y 140 to the dollar Japanese capital's advantage was eroded, in some cases totally . The years of the most rapid industrial restructuring and rise in labour productivity in the machine industries was 1975-80, but although after that labour productivity grew less rapidly in Japan than in Europe and America, Japanese capital remained much more successful in keeping the lid on wages . Table 2 shows that apart from West Germany, where wages were restrained with almost equal success, capital in all other countries faced larger increases in wage costs than Japanese capital, even after 1980. However, rising productivity and wage restraint did not simply raise the rate of exploitation in Japan more rapidly than in Europe and America. It also preserved considerable differences in real wages and intensified the tendency towards underconsumptionism which has always threatened accumulation in Japan's wage goods industries. Both effects require brief explanation, even though their relevance belongs as much to the period after September 1985 as to the one before it . The Ministry of Labour recently estimated that even after the yen had risen to 156, real wages (excluding the cost of land, houses, borrowing and social security) in the us were 63% higher and in West Germany 20% higher than in Japan (Rodosho, 1986) . However, this probably exaggerates the current level of real wages in Japan, since the upward effect which normally accompanies a currency revaluation has actually been minimal, because one of the most amazing features of the yen's rise is that the prices of imported consumer goods have not fallen widely . One reason for this is that Japan's distribution system is a real 'non-tariff barrier' which has simply absorbed the gains in higher profits . Another is that many imported consumer goods are on the list of restricted agricultural items, and their lower import costs simply swell price support funds . Thirdly, Japanese people have long been made to believe that imported goods are more expensive because they are better, and price cuts often do reduce sales . However, this will change as more manufactured goods from low-wage countries complement the luxury imports from Europe and America . Finally, capital has poured most of the gains from the revaluation into speculative activities, including
81
Table l
Productivity and wage costs in Japan,1985 (us= 100)
Labour
Manufacturing average General machinery Ceramics Transport machinery Rubber Electrical machinery Textiles Metallic products Leather products Iron and steel Petroleum products Chemicals Pulp & paper Non-ferrous metals Foodstuffs Clothing
Wage costs
Productivity
$1 = Y 238 .54
$1 = Y 140
104 290 202 178 153 144 135 118 105 103 97 80 69 53 46 18
68 28 32 43 47 47 60 47 82 72 74 80 81 125 166 327
116 48 54 74 79 79 102 81 140 123 126 136 139 212 284 558
Source : Rodosho (Ministry of Labour) 1987, reference materials : 124 .
Table 2 Comparative hourly manufacturing wages and wage costs, 1975-85
Japan Nominal wages Real wages Productivity Wage costs United States Nominal wages Real wages Productivity Wage costs Britain Nominal wages Real wages Productivity Wage costs West Germany Nominal wages Real wages Productivity Wage costs France Nominal wages Real wages Productivity Wage costs
1975
1978
1980
1982
1984
1985
Annual rise (1975-85)
72 .5
90 .0 100 .7 90 .3 99 .7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
111 .0 103 .1 100 .7 110 .2
118 .0 105 .3 112 .4 105 .0
120.6 105 .4 116.1 103 .9
5 .2%
84 .9 107 .2 95 .7 88 .7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
116 .8 99.7 104 .0 112 .3
126 .3 100 .2 115 .9 109 .0
131 .0 100.4 120.4 108.8
7.1%
72 .3 96 .8 102 .1 70 .8
100.0 100.0 100 .0 100 .0
120 .7 99 .3 109 .9 109 .8
138 .6 103 .9 123 .9 111 .9
141 .4 99.9 127.9 110.6
10.6%
89 .0 97 .7 %.6 92 .1
100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
111 .1 99 .3 104 .3 106 .5
117 .5 99.2 113.1 103 .9
121 .9 100 .7 120 .3 101 .3
5 .2%
77.0 %.9 92 .1 83 .6
100 .0 100 .0 100.0 100.0
130.9 103.2 106.4 123 .0
157 .0 105 .2 116 .5 134 .8
n/a
12 .9%
n/a n/a
4 .7% 7 .8%
72 .8 99 .6 66 .1 85 .1 77 .7 51 .6 96 .4 53.5 73.5 89.0 82 .6 52 .8 76 .9 68 .7
4.8% 0.4%
3.5% 3 .4%
2 .9% 7.5%
3 .1% 2 .1%
Source : Nihon ginko (Bank of Japan), 1986: 23-24, 146 . E4
Capital & Class
84
land, whose skyrocketing prices have put home ownership beyond the reach of working-class people. If one were to include the cost of land and houses, the real wage differentials would be even greater, since in Osaka and Tokyo more than six times a worker's annual income is needed to buy a house, while in New York it is just over three times. I would estimate that before the rise of the yen, even excluding social security, real wages in Japan were about half those of the us and that the currency adjustment has not affected them greatly. While including social security would not have as dramatic an effect as does land, it is very relevant to the problem of underconsumptionism . From underconsumptionism to export-led growth
Since state welfare in Japan is notoriously underdeveloped, workers must themselves save for such things as their old age, health care and children's education . In fact very high levels of savings for such purposes have been available to capital to finance Table 3
Rising export ratios* of major machinery products, 1974-84
Automobiles Colour TVs Stereos Watches Cameras
1974
1984
43 .9 31 .3 42 .9 57 .9 54 .3
56 .3 62 .2 75 .3 84.1 78 .9
*% of total volume exported Source: Industria, July 1987 : 12 .
Table 4
Composition ofJapan's commodity exports, 1960-8S (%)
Textiles Chemicals Metals and metal products Machinery and equipment Others Source : mm, 1987: 148-49 .
1960
1970
1975
1980
1985
30 .2 4 .5 14 .0 22 .8 28 .5
12 .5 6 .4 19 .7 46 .3 15 .1
6.7 7.0 22 .4 53 .8 10.1
4.9 5 .2 16.4 62 .8 10.7
3 .6 4 .4 10 .5 71 .8 9 .7
High yen crisis
investment, increasingly abroad, and their continual growth is often cited as a major reason for Japan's chronic underconsumptionism and the need to sell and invest overseas (Nxs, 29 September 1987). Their importance in this context is that even after the higher yen had raised money wages in Japan and should correspondingly have raised consumer purchasing power, the effect was rather to increase savings . In the absence of a viable welfare state, the cultural pressure to save and pass on one's security to one's heirs perpetuates the underconsumptionism inherent in Japan's traditional low-wage system. The minimal spending power of Japanese workers in the 1970s was thus bound to set limits to the growth of the consumer goods branches of the booming machinery industries, and capital naturally turned to export-led growth . From the mid-1970s, therefore, the share of machinery production which was exported increased sharply, as did the share of exports which came from these industries. Table 3 shows the rising export ratios in 1974-84 of products with the highest external dependencies, all of them mass consumer durables . Table 4 summarises the restructuring of commodity exports in 1960-85. Table 5
Real GNP growth and current account balances, 1970-86
GNP growth
%
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
85
9 .5 4.3 8 .5 7.9 -1 .4 2 .7 4 .8 5 .3 5 .2 5 .3 4 .3 3 .7 3 .1 3 .2 5 .1 4.7 2 .5
Current account ($ million) (Y billion)
437 4,307 5,120 - 1,384 - 6,574 - 2,110 2,426 9,686 18,200 - 7,640 -10,721 8,740 6,900 20,534 33,611 46,099 82,743
157 1,483 1,577 - 373 - 1,869 - 625 705 2,516 3,828 - 1,714 - 2,613 2,005 1,776 4,894 8,004 10,871 13,739
Source : Ibid: 14, 161 ; Tsusho sangyosho (mm), 1987b: 798-99 .
Exchange rate Y per,
360 .00 347 .83 303 .8 272 .21 292 .06 2%.85 296.49 268 .32 210.11 219 .47 226 .74 220 .54 249 .07 237 .61 237 .52 238 .53 168.03
Table 6
Japan's exports,
1985-86
1985
Textiles Chemicals Metals Iron and steel Metallic products Machinery General Electrical Transport Motor vehicles Precision Other Total
1985
1986
Y billion
%
Y billion
%
$ million
$ million
1,496 1,843 4,430 3,253 827 30,120 7,040 9,306 11,732 8,195 2,043 4,067 41,956
3 .6 4 .4 10 .6 7 .8 2 .0 71 .8 16 .8 22 .2 28 .0 19 .5 4 .9 9 .7 100 .0
1,161 1,603 3,073 2,150 660 26,146 6,465 5,982 10,416 7,216 1,768 3,307 35,290
3 .3 4 .5 8 .7 6.1 1 .9 74.1 18 .4 17.0 28 .4 20.4 5 .0 9.4 100.0
6,263 7,698 18,491 13,556 3,458 126,179 29,537 38,931 49,149 34,377 8,561 17,007 175,638
6,874 9,484 18,182 12,706 3,913 155,027 38,381 35,519 59,426 42,676 10,472 19,584 209,151
Source : Tsusho sangyosho (MIT!), 1987a : 310-11
1986
High yen crisis 87
The most rapid restructuring of exports took place in 197580 : machinery considerably raised its share, metals lost half its share, while the downward trend of chemicals and textiles continued . The extent of capital's reliance on the machine industry massively exceeded its previous reliance either on textiles or on the basic materials industries . The solution to one crisis thus bore the seeds of the next . If the first oil shock was the catalyst which triggered the restructuring of 1974-78, then the second in late 1978 confirmed that the basic materials industries had to be scrapped in favour of the booming machine industries . The effect on profits and on the balance of payments of high-priced raw materials was drummed home a second time, and soon the new export-led growth strategy began to pay huge dividends . From a $10.7 billion current account deficit in 1980, Japan scored an $8 .7 billion surplus in 1981, which increased by leaps and bounds each year until it reached $46 billion in 1985 and $82 billion in 1986 . Table 5 shows that the emerging structure did not simply produce favourable external balances : it revived capital accumulation and relatively high rates of GNP growth . A lot of money could be made producing machines cheaply in Japan and selling them in the lucrative markets of the advanced capitalist countries in Europe and North America . Effective social control enabled employers to introduce new technologies which affected mainly the jobs and conditions of non-regular workers: unions in large private companies often helped employers single out old, infirm, or rebellious workers for redundancy when this was required, and the low wages of most manufacturing workers guaranteed that rising labour productivity would translate into a continual fall in unit costs . This `second Japanese miracle' was as firmly based on the unique power capital possesses over labour in Japan as was the first .
Since capital always moves to where money is made, it was inevitable that the restructuring would receive a bandwagon effect and create new problems : by 1985 three-quarters of Japan's exports were from the machine industries (see Table 6) and the overall dependence on exports of the system increased from 9 .5% of GDP in 1970 to 13 .3% in 1985 (Keizai kikakucho [Economic Planning Agency], 1987 : 88) . Apart from ships and certain categories of electrical machinery, the shares of the machine industries in total exports continued to increase even in 1985-86 in spite of the higher yen (from 71 .8% to 74.1%). These are the very industries which are most dependent on exports and therefore most vulnerable to fluctuations in overseas demand . They are also the
ti
Origins of the high yen: pressure from the us
Capital & Class 88
ones whose major corporations are leading the current flight of capital abroad. The industrial restructuring of the production process into machinery was thus accompanied by a locational restructuring of the circulation process into world markets, particularly in the advanced capitalist countries where demand seemed limitless . This enabled Japanese capital to take full advantage of the productive power which its hold over the working class provided . By 1985 41 .6% of the entire machine industry's overseas sales were in the United States and a further 18 .5% in Western Europe and Canada. Table 7 shows that a year later the proportions had risen to 43 .3% and 22 .1%, suggesting that it would take much more than a currency readjustment to reverse the forces which had been building up in Japan from the mid-1970s . Table 7
Advanced country markets for nackinery exports, 1985-86 (%)
Total General Electrical Transport Precision
United States 1985 1986
Europe and Canada 1985 1986
41 .6 34.5 38.5 48 .9 38.1
18.5 17.3 18 .5 16 .0 29 .7
43 .3 35 .5 37.4 53 .7 38 .7
22 .1 21 .2 21 .3 20 .2 32 .6
Source: Tsusho sangyosho, 1987b : 117-48 . It was one thing to rely heavily on the us for food and raw materials after the war, since this did not threaten the interests of American capital, but quite another to gobble up the latter's diminishing market, particularly when this threat to the already crisis-ridden American system had as its counterpart in Japan an unprecedented industrial specialisation, an unprecedented dependence on export markets, and an unprecedented dependence on the us market . There was also a qualitative difference in the continual bickering of the late 1960s and the 1970s over the `excessive' exports of textiles and TV sets, where Japan's competitive advantage posed no overall threat to American capital, and the trade friction which began in the early 1980s , over semiconductors and motor vehicles on which the us clam to world technical superiority rested heavily . Moreover, by the 1980s American labour had more fully felt the effect on jobs of Japan's export success and had become an added source of demand for protectionism .
High yen crisis
By 1985 the situation had deteriorated to a point of inevitable conflict, expressing itself in the soaring value of the yen from September that year, the punitive tariff on Japanese semiconductors in early 1987, the hysteria in June over Toshiba's sale of silent motor technology to the Soviet Union, and the 'Japan bashing' revealed in the Omnibus Trade Bill which Congress passed "at time with almost unprecedented majorities . By 1986 Japan's share of the American trade deficit had reached 30%. Because of its leading position among the capitalist powers, the us could get support for a strategy which would eventually reduce its deficit with Japan, but one which would shift much of the burden from its own to the Japanese working class . The main weapon was the spectacular rise of the yen, following the `G5' agreement (of the finance ministers of the five major powers in September 1985) that adjustment of the exchange rate should receive the highest priority . Before the us suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, when exchange rates were relatively fixed (e .g. Y 360 to $1 from 1953 to 1970), the superior productive power of the leading capitalist powers resulted in trading surpluses which created vicious circles : the deficit countries eventually had to pay in gold or some other commodity, which further weakened their productive power and strengthened that of the advanced countries . Under the gold standard, which the dominant powers normally have an interest in maintaining, trading surpluses siphon resources from defaulting countries, allow further accumulation in the advanced countries and further consolidate their dominance . By around 1970 us military expenditure abroad had required such a level of borrowing that the holders of that debt could no longer be allowed freely to withdraw gold from the country . Henceforth, the us would cover its debt with paper dollars, and allow these to devalue if need be . Although devaluations do result in more commodities than before leaving the country for any given quantity entering it, when this result is achieved via exchange rate adjustment rather than the movement of gold, both the dynamic effects and the costs borne by the various classes are different . The movement of gold does not affect the competitiveness of capital in the dominant countries and there is no threat to the jobs or living standards of their working classes . But in the deficit countries capital must force on their working classes the most miserable of conditions, otherwise their technical backwardness will perpetuate their uncompetitiveness . However, a currency revaluation momentarily blocks the superior productive power of capital in the advanced country, even though trade does result in a greater net transfer of resources
89
Capital & Class 90
to it than before . Because the volume of its sales in the country which devalued can fall, the jobs and living standards of its working class might be threatened, since it must now further raise productivity if it is to cut prices sufficiently to recover the lost sales . Exchange rate adjustment therefore gives the ruling class in the deficit country a chance to break out of the vicious circle: to initiate or revive capital accumulation . However, a strict system of wage control and exploitation of the labour class is required so that inflation does not undermine the advantage received from the devaluation . Although currency adjustment might cause only a temporary reduction in the competitive power of advanced capital, the breathing space can be sufficient to revive accumulation in the deficit country. It has been a facilitating factor in the massive upsurge in capital's (including us capital's) movement from advanced to underdeveloped countries since 1970 . However, as the productive power of American capital came to express itself more in exports to the us from countries where this capital had located itself, such as Taiwan and South Korea, or from rival powers, such as Japan, so the American state came to champion a system of flexible exchange rates . In all of these countries, the living standards of workers are much lower (in different degrees of course) than those in America . The us state hopes that an exchange rate adjustment can sufficiently lower the dollar price of American labour to revive accumulation and us technical superiority in enough industries to forestall the need to slash real wages even to the levels which exist in Japan . By the end of 1986 in most industries money wages in America were indeed lower than money wages in Japan . It might, however, take a long time for exchange rate adjustment alone to rectify the Japan-us trade imbalance, which has causes other than relative prices . For example, Japan's import bill dropped almost 30% in the fast half of 1986, partly because oil prices crashed . Moreover, as we saw in Table 6, in spite of the fall in yen-dominated exports to the us in the same period, the higher yen caused the dollar denominated figure to rise by over 20%. The reason is that the us has become dependent on a large number of Japanese (and other) imports, which do not respond much even to radical price changes . Some products, such as CD players and VTR equipment, are not even made by us companies, while others, like motor cars and steel, are already subject to export quotas and devaluations do not have much additional effect on their importation . By June 1987, the rise of the yen had begun to affect Japan's trade surplus, as imports picked up dramatically and exports slowed, but the us deficit was as chronic as ever and Japan's share of it had increased . The structural
High yen crisis
dependence of the us on Japanese imports has so far been unaffected by the currency adjustment . To revive us capital accumulation to the degree that can reverse the deficit will take a rate of exploitation of the American working class which is much closer to that of the working classes in the countries from which the exports are coming, such as Japan (not to mention South Korea and Taiwan), either by slashing wages or by the monumental introduction of new technology . Whether that can be achieved depends on the course of the class struggles in the countries concerned . Devaluations are really no more than moves by the ruling class in these struggles . The high yen did not affect the profitability of capital in all industries to the same degree . The loss of export revenues in fiscal 1986 was about Y 7 trillion, which increased to about Y 9 trillion after the effects of the resulting industrial slowdown had worked themselves out . On the other hand, capital's import bill fell from Y 31 trillion to Y 21 trillion, so that the end result was probably a small overall gain of about Y I trillion (Takeuchi, 1987 : 7-8 ; Tsusho sangyosho (burl], 1987a : 310-13) . However, the effects of the yen's rise were unevenly distributed between the two main groups of industries. Where some 20-30% of output was exported, that is, among the machinery industries, the losses were the greatest, whereas the primary material importing industries gained most through a 20-30% fall in their costs : of crude petroleum, metals, natural gas, hides, fertilisers and agricultural products . Apart from agriculture, the domestic production of these materials is trifling, and their importation exerted very little influence on domestic activity . An early survey carried out by Nikon Keizai Shinbun in March 1987 of 980 quoted companies (excluding finance) showed how the profitability of the two groups of industries had moved in opposite directions .' From 38-48% declines in consolidated profits were the norm in the machinery industries, while, apart from iron and steel, the basic materials industries all registered increases . A few examples are worth elaborating . Import-using industries: profit rise Electric power's 30% profit increase resulted from both the rise of the yen as well as the fall in oil prices, but with the recent firming of the latter and the expected fall in demand from the manufacturing sector, profits were expected to fall again in 1987 . While the profits of pulp and paper companies rose by up to 50%, those in the chemical industry increased by more than 10% and the outlook for 1987 was optimistic, mainly because of increased
91
Effect on Japanese capital : uneven profitability
Capital & Class 92
demand from the Asian Ntcs and a series of plant accidents in the United States . There is even talk of reviving ethylene plants which had been idled as a result of the overall decline since 1973 . But a great deal of unevenness and uncertainty remains within the industry, the main tendency being diversification into products of higher value added such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and communications equipment . Unproductive industries : windfall prfis Because capitalists put their surplus money into unproductive investments rather than into plant and machinery, skyrocketing land prices in 1986 brought a 30% increase in consolidated profits to real estate companies . In fiscal 1986 bank loans for land ballooned by 36.2%, and land prices in central Tokyo rose by 76 .8% for residential areas and 76.2% for commercial areas, compared to a nationwide rise of 7 .7% (yF7, l August 1987 :1, 5) . The big three fuzes in the industry, Mitsubishi Estate, Misui Real Estate Development and Sumitomo Realty and Development, achieved record profits with 18-47% increases . The declared income of one small company with only 17 employees, Mogami Kosan, rose by 3,750% to put it just behind the giant Fujitsu with its 51,350 employees (TBT, July 1987 : 23) . Profits from land speculation are not the preserve of real estate companies in Japan . Five of the top ten real estate holders are life assurance companies, with Nippon Life occupying second position behind Mitsubishi Estate (FEER, 9 July 1987 : 58). Since land prices seemed to have peaked in central Tokyo for a while, speculators are shifting their attention to the suburbs, other large cities and overseas . The biggest gains in 1986 were made in the financial sector : by banks, trust banks, insurance companies, life assurance firms and above all share brokers . The top fifty consolidated profit earners in 1986 saw the four major sharebrokers in prominent positions: Nomura Securities in third place behind Toyota Motor Co . (number one in spite of its 25% profit decline) and Tokyo Electric Power ; Daiwa Securities in seventh place behind N rr and Chubu and Kansai Electric Power; Nikko Securities in tenth place behind Fuji and Dai-Ichi-Kangyo banks ; and Yamaichi Securities in fourteenth place just behind Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Sanwa banks . Fourteen of the next 35 ranked firms were in finance and insurance, of which the big four trust banks Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui and Yasuda - had made their killings on the foreign exchange market . Only twelve manufacturing firms were in the top fifty (NKS, 31 May 1987 : 1) . The importance of zaiteku (fund management) in total
High yen crisis
corporate profits is considerably understated by what is formally declared by companies in the unproductive sector . Quite a few transnational manufacturing firms are big zaueku players, and for some these non-operating profits concealed large deficits in 1986 . For example, Nissan's Y 84 billion operating loss was only transformed into a consolidated profit which kept it in the top 50 because of its second position in the zaiteku stakes with a close to $1 billion non-operating profit (BT, August 1987 : 23) . Japanese corporations have also started tapping overseas capital markets as a means of hedging exchange risks, and the yen's appreciation enabled them to cut their debt burden by Y 3 .1 trillion in fiscal 1986 . Among the major companies for which zaiteku is the essence of day-to-day money making are the life insurance companies . There has been a marked trend in recent years for individuals to put their money into insurance policies and investment trusts, rather than bank deposits and bonds, and insurance companies invest this money in real estate, the stock market and yen loans . The big five figure as prominently among Japan's top ten shareholders as they do among the top ten landowners (FEER, 9 July 1987 : 59) . If insurance companies have been the main new outlet for the surplus funds of individuals, then the counterparts for corporations have been trust banks and investment trusts . In 198586, the latter's assets grew by 43 .3% and 152 .5% respectively (Indusnia, July 1987 : 36), and like the insurance companies, the trust banks invest money mainly on the stock exchange . Together with the major city banks they comprise the biggest source of funds for the securities market - and for investment abroad . By 1985, Japan's top five city banks (Dai-Ichi-Kangyo, Fuji, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Sanwa) were among the world's top six banking institutions, while the five leading trust banks were in the top 50 (FEER, 9 April 1987 : 85) . In 1985-86 the surplus funds flowed into every possible channel in Japan, bidding up not simply land prices, but also causing a rise in the value of shares which bore little relation to their real value. Sooner or later the stock market was likely to tumble badly, the only odd thing about the crash of October 1987 being that it followed rather than preceded Wall Street . Stucturally-depressed industries : continued decline
Almost as spectacular as the gains of some industries in 1986 were the losses of others . Most prominent was iron and steel, with the rise of the yen accelerating its long-term downward trend . Nippon Steel's loss in 1986 comprised Y 112 billion out
93
Capital & Class 94
of the big five steelmakers' plunge in consolidated profits of Y 399 billion. With world production and demand continuing to decline, Japanese steel makers have been cutting production and anticipating annual outputs of around 90 million tons a year, well below their pre-1973 levels . Imports from South Korea in particular are expected to grow and to hasten the decline of the domestic industry, which will find it difficult to retain the tide of the world's largest steel exporter . The stagnation of shipbuilding took a similar leap downwards in 1986, with the combined fortunes of the seven majors soaring -183 billion into the red. Export orders fell 32 .6% in 1986 to reach only 8% of their 1973 peak, and South Korean shipbuilders outperformed their Japanese counterparts to become the world's leaders . The government has recommended the scrapping of a further 20% of capacity and a regrouping of companies : IHHI (Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries) plans to scrap 60% of its production facilities (7t~7, 2 May 1987: 14 ; Industria, May 1987 :28) . Export industries : sharp falls The greatest profit turnarounds were recorded in the exportoriented machinery industries, where the problems from the high yen were compounded by a decline in equipment investment by exporting companies . Among the car makers, dramatic falls in income were recorded almost across the board in fiscal 1986 : Toyota by 31%, Nissan by 45%, Honda by 1 .4%, Mazda by 80 .1% and Mitsubishi by 7.6%, although Suzuki and Fuji recorded increases of 17 .5% and 13 .8% respectively . Exports to the US and Europe actually increased by 4 .0% and 13 .1% in 1986, but they declined drastically to the Middle East (51 .3%), South East Asia (31 .2%) and Oceania (40 .3%) . However, in the first half of 1987 the sales in the us of exported vehicles fell by an average of 10 .9% (over the same period the year before) . Yet this only reduced the share of Japanese cars from 19 .6% to 19 .3%. Since the total us market declined by 9.5%, Japanese cars actually held their own, with the shares of GM and Chrysler falling by 22% and 15% respectively . Automakers' equipment investment was expected to fall by up to 4% in fiscal 1987 (TBT, July 1987 : 18-31 ; Industria, July 1987 : 24; AS, 31 July 1987 : 13). The fundamental problem therefore remains unsolved, and the crisis in the industry will continue . Since the special thrust into export production a decade ago was mainly because the domestic market was shrinking, the current growth in domestic sales is not likely to persist . For example, Toyota is increasing its domestic sales as a result of the T50 (to get 50% of the market)
High yen crisis 95
campaign, but this is mainly at Nissan's expense . In desperation, car makers are urging the 70% of householders who already have a car in this massively overcongested country to buy a second one. Exports of electrical machinery fell by 11% in 1986, while among the majors, Hitachi Mfg Co . and Mitsubishi Electric recorded 15% declines . The `double punch' of the high yen and the `voluntary' restriction of semi-conductor exports slashed the former's profitability by 44% . The company counter-attacked with a 1,160 cut in its workforce and a 40% cut in equipment investment. Mitsubishi Electric's profits dropped 34 .4%, while Toshiba's plunged 48 .7%, even though the latter retained its previous level of exports . The operating profits of a large number
Table 8
Ordinary profit rates of quoted companies, 1985 and 1986 (%)
Total Manufacturing Food Textiles Pulp and paper Chemicals Pharmaceuticals Petroleum Ceramics Iron and steel Non-ferrous metals General machinery Electrical machinery Motor vehicles Shipbuilding Precision machinery Non-manufacturing Construction Trading companies Retail Railway Marine transport Electric power Real estate Source : NKS, 14 July 1987 : 16 .
No. of companies
1985
1986
1,579 1,075 87 79 31 130 33 11 58 58 89 164 159 53 10 33 504 133 110 42 27 26 9 23
3 .75 4 .47 3 .63 4.86 5 .78 5 .93 9.44 0.25 6.60 4 .90 3 .78 4 .97 4 .92 4 .26 1 .32 5 .79 3 .20 2 .98 0 .53 3 .08 14 .87 1 .18 19.91 16 .01
3 .40 3 .39 3 .95 4 .08 7 .00 6 .10 10 .91 2 .41 5 .98 0 .76 3 .81 2 .37 2 .81 2 .62 - 1 .% 2 .51 3 .41 2 .98 0 .45 3 .09 13 .87 - 2 .43 24.00 16.35
Capital & Class 96
of majors went into the red : Sony, Sansui, Akai, Japan Victor, Canon and Sanyo (7Ey, 30 May 1987 : 24; NKS, 22 May 1987 : 15 ; 9 July 1987 : 16 ; 2 June 1987 : 1). However, largely because of the temporary stabilisation of the yen around 150 as well as rationalisation programmes at home and abroad, the situation improved somewhat, with profits expected to rise in 1987 in all branches of machinery apart from shipbuilding . From being Y 8.4 billion in the red, for example, Nissan expects a turnaround in 1988 even on the assumption of an exchange rate of Y 140 to the dollar . Overall, the profits of the 980 surveyed companies fell by 5 .3% in fiscal 1986. But if one includes the banking sector, whose profits surged by 40%, the overall result was an 8 .8% increase in 1986 (NKS, 30 May 1987: 1). Table 8 shows the ordinary profits for fiscal 1985 and 1986 actually declared by the 1,579 (non-financial) companies quoted on the stock exchange, confirming that the recession was mainly confined to the machinery industries . According to most government and business sources, the trough of the high yen recession was around November 1986 and the reversal of fortunes between the machinery and basic materials industries was not expected to continue in 1987 . The latter's long-term downward trend would reassert itself, with falling profits even in electric power . But the revival of the machinery industries would depend heavily on foreign investment and domestic restructuring . Construction: emerging boom
Among the profit leaders in 1987-88 will be the companies associated with a mounting boom in housing investment. Real private housing investment grew by 13 .1% in 1986, and it was forecast to grow by 14 .5% in 1987 (NKs, 30 June 1987 : 23) . The building boom is particularly vigorous in the construction df apartment buildings, since the high cost of housing is causing a trend back into rental as opposed to ownership units . The socalled `one room mansion', a contradiction in terms, is in fact becoming all that many people can afford nowadays. The profits real estate companies amassed during the land boom are now being shared with the construction and building materials companies, notably aluminium. Ordinary people must fork out the bill for dearer housing . While the fortunes of capital will continue for a while to reveal the discriminating effects of the high yen, there was by mid-1987 a widespread optimism among the capitalist class, or at least among its heavyweights . Small and petty capitalists, particularly those for whom there is no escape overseas, are on the contrary extremely worried .
High yen crisis
Small firm sector: on the brink
In more extreme cases the recession has manifested itself in actual bankruptcies, but these seem to have peaked in early 1987 . Of the total of 963 bankruptcies resulting specifically from the high yen in October 1985 to May 1987, 50 .4% were small firms with less than Y 10 million capital and only 1 .9% were large ones with over Y 100 million capital . Twenty-one per cent were in electrical machinery, 25 .6% were in general machinery, and 22 .4% were in industries more dependent on domestic demand . The most spectacular case was that of Tanaka Sangyo, a shipbuilder in southern Japan that went under in January 1987 with a debt of Y 45 billion . A more typical case was that of Shoko Sangyo, a small company which had made moulding materials for Nissan cars and Canon cameras . Having prospered for some 20 years, it borrowed heavily a few years ago to finance a modern factory in Tokyo . But then, under pressure from the high yen, the parent companies squeezed it for price cuts, and its debt proved too crushing . In one sense Shoko Sangyo was not typical, because a remarkable feature of the current recession is the strangely low level of bankruptcies which have been occurring (Awsy, 31 March 1987 : 1) . Total bankruptcies began to decline almost as the yen started to rise, by 9 .7% in 1985, 7 .1% in 1986, and then close to 20% in early 1987 (73TT, July/August 1987 : 62). Neither is this relationship coincidental . The easy credit and surplus funds that have characterised the recession have been lent to companies on the brink of bankruptcy and prevented its actual occurrence . With large corporate clients raising their capital ratios and relying increasingly on the Eurobond market for their loans, the banks lowered their criteria for domestic lending . As a banking analyst put it, `They've had to go to these effectively bankrupt companies because they're the only ones who are going to pay the premiums on the loans' (Awsy, 31 March 1987: 7) . Teikoku Data Bank, which has been recording the bankruptcies, expects a major reckoning to come towards the end of 1987 and the wave of failures to spread deep into the economy, although one limiting factor is likely to continue . Many small export-dependent companies see the writing on the wall and disband before their debts become intolerable. Particularly when they own some valuable real estate, it pays to withdraw voluntarily (Nxs, 24 July 1987: 29) .
C&C/34-G
97
Capital & Class
98
Capital's response : three-pronged strategy
The immediate response of Japanese exporters to the rise of the yen was to cut costs rather than raise overseas prices . In fiscal 1986, declining raw material prices enabled them to recover about 50% of similar revenue in 1987. Using a variety of other cost cutting measures, most of which were at their workers' expense, they managed to limit the fall in the volume of their exports in 1986 to a mere 3 .2% and the expected fall in 1987 to 3 .0% . Although this did have an impact on real mining and manufacturing production, which declined by 0 .5% in 1986, as far as the capitalist class was concerned the recession bottomed in the last quarter of fiscal 1986, and production was expected to rise by 2 .9% in 1987 (7E.7,15 August 1987 : 11) . As far as the working class is concerned, however, the real depression is only beginning, because capital's strategy for solving the trade imbalance is clearly not to shift into industries which would require Japanese workers to consume a larger share of what they produce, but to persist in the production of machinery for export to the us, but doing so from countries other than Japan . This means that the high yen recession, brief as it was for capital, signals an historic turning point for labour . The accelerated outflow of capital into overseas ventures is causing the kudoka (hollowing out) of Japanese industry . At least one third of the Japanese people can expect to be acutely threatened by this process of deindustrialization, which has caused mounting unemployment and deepening poverty in Europe and America . Of the three prongs of capital's strategy - industrial restructuring of sorts, increasing the exploitation of Japanese workers, and foreign investment - I discuss only the first two . Industrial restructuring : more of the same
Industrial restructuring currently means hastening the destruction of the `structurally depressed' (mainly basic materials) industries, on which the sun had begun to set following the oil crises of the 1970s, and eliminating those export-dependent branches of the machine industry for which the high yen is insuperable. The latter scrapping is likely to involve much more new foreign investment than the former, much of which Japanese capital has already located overseas . Although government thinking on the subject is not entirely consistent, the most comprehensive statement of official policy is the so-called New Maekawa Report (English summary in yE7, 23 May 1987 : 7, 21) . Among other things, it strongly recommends the expansion of domestic demand in Japan as part of the solution to the current overproduction, but this is something the Japanese ruling class is reluctant to do, other than as a desperate once-and-
High yen crisis
for-all measure to satisfy overseas criticism . The Nakasone government's `Emergency Economic Measures', including the plan to spend some Y 6 trillion on such things as public works, are not intended to redistribute to the Japanese working class the purchasing power for a more domestic-demand based system . Such a structural change could really only occur as a result of struggles by organised labour for a larger share of the national product, since the resulting redistribution of income, even though it would mean a lower overall rate of exploitation and rate of profit, would nonetheless encourage capital to move into industries for which this expanded purchasing power provided a market . In other words, the price of shifting from an overseas to a domestic market would be a lower rate of profit, and capital would only concede that if forced to do so by the people whose exploitation would be lessened . The Japanese working class has been too weak to win such a restructuring of the system, and capital has planned a course through the recession which will give it the best of all worlds . It will try to retain the benefits of its competitive advantage in the machine industries, it will continue to rely on markets outside Japan for the sale of these products, just as it determined to do in the late 1970s, and it will take steps to meet the demands of its American and European rivals . The dens ex machina would be to expand foreign investment, which would provide cheaper labour and locate outside the country the point from which the final export of the products is to occur. It seems, therefore, that this time not much new industry will be built, only a continuation of the scrapping of raw material processing . Machinery will not be scrapped, `only' hollowed out, with growing proportions of production and employment being located overseas . Such a course will generate great profits for Japanese capital, quickly ending the recession as far as it is concerned, but it will cast labour into the vicious circle which has accompanied deindustrialisation elsewhere : unemployment and falling wages . Although this restructuring essentially continues the process that began in 1974, there were towards the . end of 1987 strong signs that it would be accompanied by a shift back towards one feature of the previous industrial structure : increasing the production of investment goods for the domestic market . If the distribution of wealth is to continue to shift from labour to capital, as has been the tendency during the high yen recession, then domestic production should shift towards industries for which capital rather than labour provides the demand : investment goods and luxury consumer goods . It is not accidental that the bulk of the surge in imports in 1987 fell into these categories . On 5 December 1987 the headline that dominated the entire
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100
Japanese press was that a rate of GNP growth of 2% (8 .4% on an annual basis) had been achieved in the third quarter of that year (compared to zero growth the previous quarter), with 1 .8% contributed by an increase in domestic demand and only 0 .2% by an increase in exports. However, the 1 .8% broke down into 0 .6% from increased housing investment, 0 .4% and 0 .2% from increased private and public investment respectively and only 0 .5% from increased consumer spending . Moreover, the rise in consumer spending of 0.9% compared with a 10 .3% growth in housing investment, a 2 .2% growth in private equipment investment, a 3 .3% increase in public capital formation and a 6 .7% increase in exports (5 .9% increase in imports) (NKs, 5 December 1987: 1). Equally significant is that the increase in industrial production of 4 .6% in this period fell almost entirely into the categories of capital goods, producer goods and construction goods . The growth in consumer goods production was minimal (.7E.7,5 December 1987 :5). A few months before, the Japan Economic journal had wondered why personal consumption and imports were growing briskly when the rise in individual income was so modest . However, it explained that the : swelling value of financial and other assets [had created a] new rich [who) buy luxury cars and clothes and take expensive overseas trips . This class of people is behind the recent upturn in personal consumption . . . [A] class division seems to be forming between those who have assets on which they can reap capital gains and those who do not. (7E3, 15 August 1987 : 6) The estimate that this class comprises some 34-40% of the population is not too far off my own earlier estimate of property ownership among the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and middle class (Steven, 1983) . The apparent contradiction between the belt-tightening being forced on workers and the widespread prosperity suggested by statistics on consumer spending disappears when we remember that a large upper class can, after receiving windfall profits, go on a spending spree. And there is no reason, other than its capacity to get away with it politically, why this class should not continue to spend liberally . Wherever wealth is unevenly distributed, the upper class contributes the most to `domestic demand' . The sudden upsurge in the production of investment goods is not just a way to steer production towards areas of greatest demand . A shift out of consumer goods reflects the strategy of relocating these industries abroad and concentrating in Japan on the most technically advanced industries . Japanese capital will
Table 9 Methods of adjusting manufacturing employment (% of firm using them in 1986)
Layoff non-regulars Hue fewer young workers Hire fewer other workers Temporary layoffs Redeployment/secondment Retirement/dismissal
Iron & steel
Electrical
Motor vehicle
Shipbuilding
20 .7 51 .7 6.9 31 .0 65 .5 13 .8
46 .5 42 .3 33 .8 1 .4 39.4 8.4
55 .9 38 .2 23 .5 2 .9 32 .4 2 .9
25 .0 87 .5 50 .0 25 .0 87 .5 62 .5
Source : Rodosho (Ministry of Labour), 1987, reference materials : 129 .
Table 10 Employment in shipbuilding, September 1985 to December 1986
1985 September 1986 March 1986 December change Source : Ibid: 132 .
Total
Employees
White-collar
Blue-collar
Contract
137,543 126,279 98,349 -39 .9
94,274 87,864 68,789 -37 .0
33,874 31,161 25,966 -30 .5
60,400 56,703 42,823 -41 .0
43,269 48,415 29,560 -46 .4
Capital & Class
102
'
retain its dominant position in the international division of labour it envisages in the Pacific region by focussing more on the production of capital and luxury goods, leaving mass consumer production increasingly to its subsidiaries in Asia . Widespread loss ofjobs is newer
Wherever capacity is scrapped, workers' jobs and livelihoods are the first to go . In many cases management get workers to retire `voluntarily', threatening them with shimei kaiko (designated dismissal) if they do not . The latter is usually the last resort, since workers are normally either pressured in interviews to `request retirement' or they are seconded to subcontractors, who then lay them off . Alternatively, `temporary layoffs' are used to induce workers to look for new jobs, new hiring is suspended and normal retirement is used to ensure cutbacks, or workers are transferred to separate companies . Table 9 shows the results of a survey by the Economic Planning Agency in October to December 1986 on the methods used in various manufacturing industries . At IHHI the plans to cut 30% of the 7,000 workers have centred on the 35-54 year-olds and the infirm, while the pressures to retire have included threats of violence and even its actual use (Sasaki, 1987 : 8-12) . Table 10 shows the loss of jobs in the industry as a whole since late 1985 : the numbers of contract workers, who are not employees of shipbuilding companies, fell by a massive 46 .4% . Similar tactics are being used to achieve the mammoth new cutbacks planned for the iron and steel industry . On 13 February 1987, Nippon Steel suddenly announced a plan to dose five blast furnaces (at Yawata, Sakai, Muroran, Kamaishi, and Hirota) in 1988-89 involving 7,000 jobs, bringing the total intended cut by 1990 to 19,000. If one adds the effect on small subcontractors, the total number of jobs lost will be well over 30,000, the biggest ever rationalisation in Japanese history . Including planned reductions by the other steel majors (5,600 by Kawasaki Steel ; 6,000 by Sumitomo Metals, 6,000 by Kobe Steel, and 8,000 by Nippon Kokan) as well as the repercussions on their subcontractors, the total expected loss of jobs in the industry by 1990 will be over 100,000 (Ibid, 14-15) . Typical of the iron and steel and shipbuilding majors is how the economies of whole towns have become dependent on them, for example, the five towns where Nippon Steel plans to close blast furnaces, Innoshima where Hitachi Shipbuilding has a major works, and Aioi which is a stronghold of mm. In Kamaishi, the tax paid by Nippon Steel in 1985 comprised 34% of the town's company-tax income, while the total number of persons
High yen crisis
directly linked to Nippon Steel was about 20,000 (2,400 employees plus subcontractors and family members) out of a population of 60,000 . Over the past 25 years, the town has lost 33,000 people, mainly because Nippon Steel has been transferring employees to Nagoya and Chiba, and the loss of each such employee causes a drop of ten in population . In September 1985, Nippon Steel closed one of its furnaces and began instructing workers to stay at home . Then on 14 February 1987 it announced that its second furnace would be closed by March 1989 . This is a total disaster for the population of this company 'castle town' (Ibid : 17-18). Innoshima is a Hitachi Shipbuilding 'castle town', with 3,300 employees in 1985, but in 1986 these were cut to 1,800 and then a further 1,300 were laid off . Of the rest, about 300 are being moved to a new company, leaving only 200 who will repair ships for the navy . Hitherto 70-80% of the population have been linked to shipbuilding, as has 80% of the town's production . It is difficult to find jobs outside shipbuilding, and the town's jobs-toapplications ratio is 0 .06 : that is, only 6 jobs for every 100 job-seekers (elsewhere it is 70 jobs per 100 seekers) . With layoffs concentrated among the over 45 year-olds, the situation is particularly desperate because getting second jobs has become almost impossible . Of the 739 people who left the factory in 1985, only 64 had found jobs by February 1987 . The company has been ruthless : having urged people to buy their own homes (from a Hitachi real estate company) and lent them money for the purpose, it is now pressing them to pay back the loans . Houses which cost Y 16 million to build cannot be sold for Y 8 million, and the redundancy payment of Y 2 million covers only half the Y 4 million loans (Ibid: 18-21) . In the 10 years 1976-86, 340,000 jobs have been lost in companies quoted on the first board of the stock exchange, mainly in 'structurally depressed' industries : 84,000 in shipbuilding and vehicles, 83,000 in textiles, 62,000 in iron and steel, and 39,000 in chemicals . As the process of running down these industries continues, the number of jobs lost will multiply to inestimable levels, particularly when large numbers of subcontractors are involved (Ibid: 26) . In the export-dependent industries, although the loss of jobs is only beginning, the main cutbacks so far affecting non-regulars and overtime, there are many signs of what is likely to become a continuous process of attrition . For example, in April 1986 Matsushita Electric, which is regarded as the most competitive firm in the country, announced plans to cut its workforce by 1,000, while Sanyo planned to lay off 1,200 temporary and part-time workers . Early that year there were also about 16,000 such workers in motor vehicles, but by October they had been
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reduced to 7,000 (Ibid. 28-30). In mid-1987 it was hard to pick up a Japanese newspaper without finding either an announcement by some company to cut its workforce or some estimate by a research body of impending cuts . For example, in July the Japan Industrial Bank published the results of research it did on the job losses which would result in other industries following an anticipated fall in car production of Y 450 billion in 1985-1990 : in all (including the car industry) 31,195 jobs (xxs,10 July 1987 : 9). Ruling-class circles estimated that in 1986 there were between 6 .4% and 13 .8% surplus workers in manufacturing : between 778,000 and 1,686,000 . The lower estimate is based on `appropriate' levels of labour productivity, the latter on `appropriate' personnel expenses in relation to turnover. By the end of 1987, Nomura Research estimated (productivity basis) that in manufacturing firms with over 30 regular workers alone, there would be 1,250,000 (16%) surplus workers (Rodosho [Ministry of Labour], 1987, reference materials : 31). An overall picture of the coming effect on jobs in various industries of the two broad strategies (cut exports or expand imports) for correcting the external balance is presented in Table 11 . In practice both strategies will be used, and the Industrial Structure Advisory Council estimated a loss of about 2 million jobs in 1980-2000 : 550,000 resulting from a doubling of imported intermediary goods, 500,000 from a doubling of imported final goods, and between 560,000-970,000 from cutting exports and expanding foreign investment (Kudo, 1987: 50). A large question mark hangs over the degree to which food imports will be liberalised, since the political implications are in balance with a large number of contradictory but equally powerful forces at work . On one side is the us with its massive external deficit and its agricultural surplus, dying to make a killing on the Japanese market . Supporting it are the financial and industrial fractions of the Japanese bourgeoisie, who have long found the subsidies to agriculture wasteful and who have an interest in making peace with the Americans . Finally, there are the metropolitan members of the working class and petty bourgeoisie, who would love to buy rice for a fifth and meat for a half of their current prices . On the other side is a coalition which does not appear to be a match for the liberalisation lobby but which has so far won the day . It is brought together by Nokyo (The Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Associations), which coordinates farmers' agricultural and political activities. The ruling party, which is heavily dependent on the agricultural vote, is also committed to stabilising Japan's food supply, which already comprises more net imports than that of any other country .
Table 11
Estimated loss ofjobs from cutting 1986 external surplus
Cut exports Agriculture, forestry, fisheries Mining Construction Manufacturing Consumer group (food, etc .) Basic materials (non-metallic) Basic materials (metals) Machinery Transport, communications Wholesale, retail Finance, insurance, real estate Services Total Source : Ibid: 133 .
55,000 5,000 7,000 850,000 44,000 129,000 63,000 505,000 163,000 299,000 62,000 148,000 1,589,000
Expand imports
962,000 36,000 7,000 575,000 134,000 184,000 35,000 143,000 142,000 216,000 70,000 186,000 2,194,000
Capital & Class 106
In 1987 there were two major signs of a change in the balance of influence between the two camps: for the first time in 31 years the producer price of rice was cut, by almost 6%, with not as much political backlash from farmers as was expected . One reason could be that almost 60% of farming households no longer sell much rice (12% of the total) and are in fact mainly engaged in non-agricultural work. Nokyo increasingly represents no one but its 300,000-member bureaucracy, which uses farmers' money for mainly non-farming business operations . It is said to do little besides repeat stereotyped slogans for the maintenance of the food control system, and in the words of an agricultural journalist `is becoming an agricultural organisation with no interest in agriculture' (BT, August 1987 : 5). The real interests of the bulk of the Japanese peasantry are not furthered by either camp : the existing policy has gradually impoverished them, while import liberalisation will drive them totally off the land (Steven, 1983) . Following the GATT ruling against Japan's import quotas, the government indicated a new willingness to move further towards liberalisation . Estimates of actual unemployment in Japan are hopeless, capturing at most only one-half to one-third of the persons who would be classified as jobless in Britain or America . The investigation is carried out the last week each month, and even if one did part-time work for only two hours on the last day, one cannot be regarded as unemployed . Furthermore, it is necessary to be actively looking for work and to have registered at an employment stabilisation office . Anyone doing however small an amount of unpaid assistance in a family enterprise can also not qualify as unemployed . Moreover, the size of the workforce is overestimated in comparison to other countries, so that the percentage unemployed is minimised . For example, members of the armed forces are classified as in the workforce in Japan, whereas they are not in America . Even min recently admitted that if it used the American system, it would have to almost double the official estimate of Japan's jobless . Nonetheless, this official figure has been climbing sharply in recent months, and is beginning to cause considerable alarm : from 1 .55 million (2 .62%) in 1985 to 1 .86 million (3 .1 %) in the first half of 1987 (Rodosho [Ministry of Labour], 1987, reference materials : 97 ; yEy, 8 August 1987 : 3) . There is no question that joblessness will rise steadily in Japan as a result of the structural changes towards which the rise of the yen became the catalytic turning point, even though the process will not be even . For example, towards the end of 1987, there was a slight reduction in the numbers of officially unemployed, partly reflecting the increase in part-time jobs . However, the level of future unemployment is generally minimised by
Table 12
Industrial distribution ofemnployment,1970-2000 (1,000 persons)
1970
1980
1985
1993
2000
Material production sector Agriculture, forestry, etc . Manufacturing Basic materials processing Machinery and metallic production Other Construction Network sector Electricity, gas, water Transport, communications Commerce Finance, insurance, real estate Knowledge service production Management services Medical and health services Education services Leisure related services Housework substitute services Public administration, and others
26,770 9,060 13,770 3,970 5,230 4,570 3,940 13,380 290 3,240 8,530 1,320 10,790
Total
50,940
25,020 5,880 13,660 3,390 5,380 4,890 5,480 15,970 300 3,500 10,260 1,910 14,370 2,940 1,800 1,840 3,320 1,630 2,840 55,360
25,010 5,180 14,530 3,200 6,190 5,140 5,300 16,710 330 3,430 10,780 2,170 16,350 3,660 2,110 1,980 3,810 1,800 2,990 58,070
24,090 4,440 13,950 2,860 6,110 4,980 5,700 16,560 350 3,540 10,410 2,260 20,690 5,380 2,840 2,280 4,850 2,160 3,180 61,340
22,990 3,500 13,335 2,280 6,470 4,600 6,140 17,020 340 3,290 10,790 2,600 23,100 6,630 3,190 2,320 5,410 2,270 3,280 63,110
Source : Keizai kikakucho (Economic Planning Agency), 1987 : 77 .
Capital & Class
108
over-optimistic expectations of the industries which are now to be 'built'. What will be built: pie in the sky
Discussion of where displaced workers are meant to go has been very abstract and is difficult to describe . It has centred on two main areas of hoped-for growth : services and industries of high value added . Sometimes these are combined into what are called the high-technology inf