By Parallel Reasoning
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By Parallel Reasoning The Construction and Evaluation of A...
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By Parallel Reasoning
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By Parallel Reasoning The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments
PAUL F. A. BARTHA
1 2010
3 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright # 2010 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bartha, Paul F. A. By parallel reasoning : the construction and evaluation of analogical arguments / Paul F. A. Bartha. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-532553-9 1. Analogy. 2. Reasoning. I. Title. BD190.B37 2009 169—dc22 2008032836
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
Acknowledgments
This book has taken shape over many years, during the course of which many people have made significant contributions. Jeff Horty, Andrew Irvine, and James Kelleher read the entire work and offered many valuable suggestions. Other colleagues and graduate students have provided insightful comments and criticism or pointed me to interesting examples: John Beatty, Darren Bradley, Roger Clarke, Emma Esmaili, Chris Hitchcock, Richard Johns, Sonia Memetea, Margaret Schabas, and Steve Savitt. I would like to thank Keith Holyoak for encouragement and some excellent suggestions relating to chapters 4 and 8, and Mike Rivers-Bowerman for useful criticism of chapter 6. I deeply appreciate the encouragement of the editor at Oxford University Press and the terrific suggestions of two anonymous reviewers; those suggestions significantly improved the book. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Kevin Ashley, Nuel Belnap, Bruce Buchanan, Richard Gale, Ken Manders, and above all, Wesley Salmon for inspiring and guiding the original dissertation project from which this book emerged. Finally, my deepest and everlasting gratitude, for unwavering patience, support, and encouragement, goes to my parents, Peter and Jeannie, and to my wife, Patricia.
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Preface
In 1966, Mary Hesse published Models and Analogies in Science. In a set of five essays, she raised fundamental questions about the importance of analogies in scientific thought. Are analogies needed to understand theoretical concepts, and are they indispensable to the advancement of science? What criteria separate good analogical arguments from bad ones? What philosophical justification can be provided for reasoning by analogy? What does Aristotle have to tell us about the role of analogies in predication? Is there a connection between metaphor and scientific explanation? In offering answers to these questions, Hesse advanced our understanding of two aspects of the traditional “problem of analogy”: the inferential aspect, which concerns analogical arguments; and the semantic aspect, which has to do with the role of analogy (and metaphor) in the development of concepts. Previous thinkers had considered both issues, but Hesse was the first to work out detailed arguments that they were linked. During the past twenty-five years or so, research on analogy has been transformed by the efforts and interests of AI researchers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists. There are now a large number of computational theories of analogy, implemented in computer programs that perform analogical reasoning and related tasks. The introduction to The Analogical Mind, a recent anthology of “state-of-the-art” essays (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2001), gives a good idea of how cognitive scientists now understand the central issues concerning analogy. These issues are structured around a widely accepted decomposition of the “process of analogical thinking” into four steps:1 1. See also Holyoak and Thagard (1989), which lays out a similar decomposition.
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• Retrieval or access of a relevant “source” analog • Mapping that sets up systematic correspondences between the elements of the source and “target” analogs • Analogical inference or transfer of information from source to target • Learning of new categories or schemas in the aftermath of analogical reasoning Many researchers hope to offer a psychologically realistic model of one or more of these stages that is, at least in principle, capable of being translated into a computer program. The larger objective is to understand what people do at each of these stages when they use analogies and how they do it. Subsidiary objectives include the exploration of technical difficulties in implementing these ideas in computer programs, the application of analogy to tasks besides reasoning and problem-solving, and understanding how analogy is integrated into larger scale cognitive processes (Forbus 2001). In short, the predominant concern in current research is to model analogy as a cognitive process. This has led to a climate in which there is little room for Hesse’s second and third questions—those concerned with the nature and justification of analogical reasoning. While there are now many models of analogical reasoning, there are few models for the critical evaluation of analogical reasoning. To be sure, cognitive scientists stress the need for evaluation at the analogical transfer stage, but that often amounts to checking that the models produce plausibility judgments that are psychologically realistic. The legitimacy of these plausibility judgments is not questioned further. Yet we surely need to think about Hesse’s questions. Substantive computational models of analogical reasoning obviously embody normative principles, and those principles should be subjected to criticism.2 A computer program might be eerily successful in duplicating human reasoning, yet produce flawed analogical arguments—just as humans do. Or it might produce excellent results, in which case we would want to understand the underlying ideas and their philosophical basis. By way of comparison, suppose that we want to understand the psychological processes people employ to come up with mathematical proofs. We write a computer program that breaks these processes into stages and duplicates human reasoning at each stage. That is a significant accomplishment. But we still demand a logic that discriminates between good proofs and bad ones. Somehow, when we turn to the literature on analogical reasoning, we find that this demand has all but disappeared. That is surprising, in light of empirical evidence that shows how easily people can be misled by analogical arguments.3 One reason for the fading urgency of the traditional questions is the growing conviction that much of what takes place under the heading “analogical 2. Chapter 3 examines a selection of computational models, with a view to isolating and evaluating the tacit normative theories. In particular, that chapter examines the principle of systematicity employed by most current computational models. 3. See Forbus, Gentner, and Law (1995) and Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) for evidence that people regularly focus on superficial similarities when evaluating analogies.
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reasoning” is not really inference but rather something akin to perception. The Analogical Mind (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2001) includes essays on analogical thinking in young children and nonhuman primates. In an epilogue to the book, Hofstadter writes that reasoning and problem-solving lie “far indeed from the core of human thought,” and comments: If analogy were merely a special variety of something [reasoning] that in itself lies way out on the peripheries, then it would be but an itty-bitty blip in the broad blue sky of cognition. To me, however, analogy is anything but a bitty blip—rather, it’s the very blue that fills the whole sky of cognition—analogy is everything, or very nearly so, in my view. (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2001, 499) These sentiments, and the more specific thesis that analogy-making is a process much like perception, are defended in Hofstadter’s (1995) book, Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies. While I am sympathetic to much of what he says, I nevertheless believe in the importance of distinguishing between the process of recognizing or creating an analogy and its critical assessment. Analogies play a vast and mysterious part in human thought. We rely on them when we identify complex patterns, bring past experience to bear on a problem, or strive to attain a perspective that unifies different areas of inquiry. There are plenty of big questions, many of them opened up by recent research. How do humans construct analogies? Do nonhuman animals use analogies in a similar way to humans? What role does analogy have in defining and understanding concepts? What is the relationship between analogies and metaphors? What prospect do computational models of analogy have for illuminating how humans reason (or ought to reason) by analogy? Are the analogies employed in scientific reasoning different from those we find in other kinds of inquiry? In this book, I focus on a single thesis: good analogical arguments are an important means of establishing the plausibility of scientific hypotheses. I concentrate on two questions: (1) what criteria should we use to evaluate the analogical arguments used in science, and (2) how can we provide a philosophical justification for those criteria? These questions relate to only one stage in the reasoning process and are directed toward the specialized analogies that we find in science. Yet can we really hope to answer such questions in isolation from a broader theory of analogy-making? The theory of conceptual metaphor, presented in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980), suggests a negative answer. According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, the source domain in any metaphor (or analogy) must always be some element of “direct physical experience” that can be grasped nonmetaphorically because it comes from our everyday activities as embodied human beings living in a particular culture. Typical examples include journeys (“Life is a journey”), spatial orientation (“He’s at the peak of his career”), and war (“He attacked every weak point in my argument”). In a recent application of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory to metaphors in science, Theodore Brown (2003) embraces their view that all metaphors
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must employ a source domain based upon everyday experience. He believes that this idea has significant potential for bridging the gap between scientist and nonscientist: When we recognize that scientific reasoning is based on the same kinds of thought processes used in other arenas of thought, that scientists are constrained in their attempts to read nature by the same embodied and social understandings that everyone uses to get along in life, science is really not so mysterious after all. (2003, 196) My view is that we need not be so restrictive about the choice of source domain. Metaphors based on “direct physical experience” are important in science, but so are sophisticated analogies that are drawn directly between two areas of scientific inquiry. I shall argue that a model of analogies within science, reasoning from one scientific domain to another, is both possible and valuable. I hope to show that this type of analogical reasoning is actually simpler in some respects than many of the examples that interest Lakoff and Johnson. There is room for a logic of analogical reasoning in which psychology plays only a limited role. Of course, we ultimately desire a broad theory of analogical reasoning, but my contention is that scientific analogies provide an excellent setting in which to start developing such a theory.
Contents
1. Analogical Arguments, 1 2. Philosophical Theories, 35 3. Computational Theories, 59 4. The Articulation Model, 91 5. Analogies in Mathematics, 151 6. Similarity and Patterns of Generalization, 195 7. Analogy and Epistemic Values, 239 8. Analogy and Symmetry, 265 9. A Wider Role for Analogies, 305 Bibliography, 333 Index, 349
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By Parallel Reasoning
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1 Analogical Arguments
An analogy is a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, that highlights respects in which they are thought to be similar. Analogical reasoning is any type of thinking that relies upon an analogy. An analogical argument is an explicit representation of analogical reasoning that cites accepted similarities between two systems in support of the conclusion that some further similarity exists. This book proposes a theory of analogical arguments, concentrating on analogical arguments in science and mathematics. In this introductory chapter, I first explain why understanding such arguments is an important part of understanding analogical reasoning in general. I then provide an overview of my theory.
1.1 Magic, Science, or Common Sense? Analogical reasoning is ancient and mysterious. Odysseus used it to interpret an omen from the gods, in an effort to rally the wavering Greek forces at Troy. Reminding the Greeks of an occasion when they had witnessed a serpent devouring eight young sparrows and their mother and then turning to stone, Odysseus argued that this was a sign of ultimate victory. The Greek army would prevail against Troy after nine long years of war (Homer Iliad 2.300). Many cultures have relied upon analogy in magical rites, particularly in the practice of homeopathic medicine. For example, Evans-Pritchard (1937) reported that the Azande treat elephantiasis by making incisions in the leg and rubbing in ashes from a burnt piece of elephant’s leg. The frequent affiliation between analogy and magic
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has prompted one anthropologist to suggest that the use of analogy is a distinctive feature of “nonscientific thought” (Lienhardt 1954, 106). Yet the use of analogy, from antiquity onwards, has also been a distinctive feature of scientific thought. Analogical reasoning has played many important roles in the evolution of science. It is a powerful heuristic tool, aiding in the formulation of new theories. According to Priestley, a pioneer in chemistry and electricity, “analogy is our best guide in all philosophical investigations; and all discoveries, which were not made by mere accident, have been made by the help of it” (1769/1966, 14). One famous example is Maxwell’s discovery of the displacement current, around 1860, by modeling electromagnetic phenomena with a mechanical configuration of rotating vortices and idle wheels. In mathematics, too, striking breakthroughs have involved analogies between such diverse fields as logic and topology (Grosholz 1985). Analogies also have a predictive use. When two physical systems are described by laws with identical mathematical form, one system can be used to model the other. For instance, hydrodynamic analogies, first pointed out by Kelvin, exploit mathematical similarities in the equations governing ideal fluid flow and torsional problems. The equations determining the stress function for a twisted bar are identical to those for determining the velocity of a viscous fluid moving along a tube with the same cross-section as the bar. To determine the stress in a planned structure in a relatively economical way, you can construct an appropriate fluid model and measure the fluid’s velocity.1 This predictive role also exists for analogies that are not mathematically precise, as when an animal model is used to predict how a new drug might affect a human. Yet another use for analogies in science and mathematics is to pave the way for conceptual unification. Eighteenth-century analogies among “electrical fluid” in the laboratory, lightning, and “animal spirits” led to the gradual recognition that these were a single kind of “substance” (Pera 1992). In the nineteenth century, similarities between “substitution groups” (today’s permutation or symmetric groups) and a class of transformations on crystal structures led to the contemporary concept of a group (Kline 1972). Finally, and overlapping with each of the above three uses, analogical reasoning appears to play a role in justification. Analogies are employed in all sciences to demonstrate the plausibility of hypotheses. In fields such as archaeology, where we lack direct means of testing, they may provide the strongest form of support available. When we claim this justificatory role for analogical reasoning in science, however, we come up against three problems. The first is that even within science, many examples of analogical reasoning do seem like magic. Steiner (1998) argues that a series of deeply mysterious analogies played a fundamental role in breakthroughs in nineteenth- and twentieth-century physics. In his view, we cannot explain why these spectacular cases of analogical reasoning had the slightest plausibility, let alone why they succeeded in advancing physics. We find equally striking examples in other 1. This example is discussed in Timoshenko and Goodier (1970). With the availability of powerful computational tools, analog models such as this are less important today than in the past.
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sciences. A pharmacologist in 1934 noticed that ingesting the compound meperidine, now known as Demerol, induced an S-shaped tail curvature in mice. Since morphine produced the same effect, he reasoned—correctly, as it happens—that meperidine might also be an effective painkiller (Reynolds and Randall 1975, 273). Science or magic? Our intuitions about such cases are not always clear. The second problem is that the contribution of analogical reasoning to justification, although taken for granted, has rarely been subjected to extensive philosophical examination. People may be good at identifying the strengths and weaknesses of particular analogical arguments, but there have been few systematic efforts to distinguish between good and bad analogies in scientific reasoning or to explore the philosophical foundations for this form of justification. We have no substantive normative theory of analogical arguments. The third problem, specific to the philosophy of science, is to find a way to incorporate analogical reasoning within a model of theoretical confirmation. Analogies join symmetry arguments, thought experiments, and other forms of reasoning that seem to be important in the history of science, yet cannot easily be reconciled with dominant philosophical views about confirmation. Although focusing on scientific examples brings these three problems into sharp focus, very similar difficulties apply to “common sense” analogical reasoning and its application to nonscientific disciplines such as the law and philosophy. Here, too, we encounter mysterious cases, a lack of clear guidelines, and difficulty in formulating a coherent model of justification that accommodates the use of analogy. Analogical reasoning appears to have a common structure, and to face at least some common problems, across a variety of highly diverse settings. If we accept these preliminary observations, then we should acknowledge two further points. First, we should strive for a theory of analogical reasoning that combines broad unifying principles with means for adapting those principles to the diverse settings in which analogical reasoning is employed. The three problems noted above should be solved at a general level, but an adequate theory of analogical reasoning also needs to be able to address the details that emerge in specialized applications. Second, in developing a theory of analogy, we have to make a wise decision about where to start. Our focus should be on examples that can lead us to a theory that has both depth and generality. There can be more than one good starting point. Much of the research on analogical reasoning over the past two decades has been oriented toward the development of computational models, and psychologically realistic models, of “common sense” analogical reasoning. I shall take a different approach. I see analogical arguments in mathematics and science as key or “leading” special cases that provide an excellent basis for a general normative theory. My theory of analogical arguments rests on these two ideas. The theory combines two broad and generally applicable principles with detailed models for evaluating different forms of analogical arguments, mainly in mathematics and science. In this introductory chapter, section 1.2 explains why my theory concentrates on analogical arguments, and section 1.3 motivates the further restriction (for much of the book) to analogical arguments in mathematics and science. To set the stage, sections 1.4 through 1.6 characterize the argument form, discuss the
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meaning of plausibility, and review commonsense ideas about analogical arguments. The remaining sections of the chapter provide an overview of my theory.
1.2 Why Focus on Analogical Arguments? An analogical argument is an explicit form of analogical reasoning, with premises and a conclusion. Why, if our ultimate goal is to understand analogical reasoning, should we focus our attention on analogical arguments? The basic reason is simple. Since my main objective is to understand how analogical reasoning can support or justify a conclusion, it is natural to represent this reasoning in the form of an argument. Yet there are at least two objections to narrowing our topic in this way. First, reasoning is broader than argumentation. An argument is a precise, (usually) verbal reconstruction of earlier thinking that is often more like visual perception than propositional reasoning. This point is expressed vividly in many accounts of the process of discovery.2 Explicit arguments come after the fact and may omit important elements of the reasoning process. Second, even if we restrict our attention to arguments, analogical reasoning (broadly speaking) includes inferences that combine analogical arguments with other forms of argument. In tax law, for instance, the applicability of a predicate such as “principal residence” is determined in part by analogy to past cases and in part by statutory definitions (Sanders 1991). As a second example, we might imagine that the Rutherford model of the atom, which posits electrons orbiting around a positive nucleus, gains some plausibility from its analogy to the solar system.3 Any support the model might gain from the analogy is defeated, however, by its inconsistency with accepted physical theory. Orbiting electrons would radiate energy; the model is unstable. The worry here is that if we examine analogical arguments in isolation, we lose sight of the larger reasoning process in which such arguments are only part of the story. Both concerns are legitimate, yet neither undermines the importance of a good normative theory of analogical arguments. Let’s consider them in turn.
Good Analogical Reasoning Should Be Capable of Reconstruction in Argument Form My response to the first objection is modeled on Norton’s critique of philosophical theories that treat thought experiments as visual, or nonpropositional, forms of reasoning. One of the most well-known thought experiments is Galileo’s refutation of Aristotle’s position that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones. Galileo considers what will happen when a heavy cannon ball is
2. Hadamard’s (1949) monograph on the psychology of discovery in mathematics is a good example. Work on mental models and visualization, in connection with thought experiments, stresses these points (Arthur 1999, Gooding 1993, Nersessian 1992, 2002). 3. The “solar system” analogy does not appear to have played any role in Rutherford’s thinking, even though it is often invoked to explain his model.
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attached by a thread to a light musket ball. Aristotle’s position leads us to conclude that the combined object falls both faster than the cannon ball (since it is heavier) and slower than the cannon ball (since the musket ball will act as a drag). Without doing the experiment, we may conclude that something is wrong with Aristotle’s theory. Because thought experiments take place in the “laboratory of the mind,” there is considerable debate about how to understand them. Norton’s position is that all thought experiments are arguments (Norton 1991, 2004). Actually, Norton distinguishes two versions of the “argument thesis.” The weaker version asserts that thought experiments “can be reconstructed as arguments” and “belief in the outcome-conclusion of the thought experiment is justified only insofar as the reconstructed argument can justify the conclusion.” The stronger thesis asserts that the “actual conduct of a thought experiment consists in the execution of an argument” (2004, 50). In the case of analogical reasoning, I want to defend only the analog of the weak thesis: a conclusion reached via analogical reasoning is justified only insofar as a reconstruction of the reasoning as an analogical argument can justify that conclusion. Norton defends his two theses about thought experiments both on general philosophical grounds and by example. I hope that the many examples in this book will persuade the reader that an excellent way to evaluate analogical reasoning is indeed by reconstructing it in argument form. I do want, briefly, to advance one philosophical argument for this thesis. In the process of presenting this argument, I shall introduce a rhetorical device that will be useful throughout the book. The philosophical argument is based on the assumption that justification for analogical reasoning, or at least the sort of justification that is of primary interest, should be public. It should be based on communicable experiences, models, and assumptions. This requirement certainly supports the thesis that justifiable analogical reasoning is capable of representation in argument form. It does not rule out the inclusion of visual information, such as diagrams, in the argument. The rhetorical device is to imagine that the analogical reasoning is presented by an enthusiastic advocate to a polite but moderately skeptical interlocutor, the critic. The reasoning succeeds if it survives the critic’s scrutiny. The framework of advocate and critic helps to set a standard of justification that can be varied to reflect the demands ofdifferent settings. It also provides a vivid way to appreciate the requirement of publicity. Finally, it gives us a way to temper the “argument thesis”: the analogical argument that reconstructs a piece of analogical reasoning never is, and need not be, a complete explication of that reasoning. The critic and the advocate can share many unstated assumptions. The reconstruction of the reasoning as an argument need only be good enough to satisfy the critic. In fact, I think that the point of articulating an analogical argument in precise form is not just to persuade others to accept a view that you have already accepted on independent grounds. The exercise helps you to check your own reasoning; you can be your own critic. What is more, as we shall see, making the reasoning explicit can aid in the creative process by bringing out weaknesses and suggesting remedies.
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Recent work on computational models poses a challenge to my thesis about analogical arguments, to the extent that the computer programs are conceived as carrying out good analogical reasoning. In many computational models, analogical reasoning is implemented by processes that look nothing like arguments. Yet the processes are arguably public, since the algorithms and the data are open to inspection. I postpone my response to this challenge until my discussion of computational theories in chapter 3, and again in the concluding chapter.
Analogical Arguments Can Be Considered in Isolation from Other Arguments My response to the second objection is that while some “outside” factors should be incorporated into our assessment of an analogical argument, others may be set aside. In order to defend this position, we need a preliminary discussion of the aim of analogical arguments. In my view, the fundamental conclusion of an analogical argument is that a hypothesis is plausible. Section 1.5 discusses this idea in detail, but here we need a preliminary sketch. Salmon characterizes plausibility (and plausibility arguments) as follows: Plausibility arguments serve to enhance or diminish the probability of a given hypothesis prior to—i.e., without reference to—the outcome of a particular observation or experiment. They are designed to answer the question, “Is this the kind of hypothesis that is likely to succeed in the scientific situation in which the scientist finds himself or herself ?” (1990, 182) To illustrate, Salmon cites an analogical argument. A study on rats established a significant statistical association between high saccharin consumption and bladder cancer.4 Salmon suggests that the study “lends considerable plausibility to the hypothesis that use of saccharin . . . increases the risk of bladder cancer in humans” (1990, 182). Judgments of plausibility are made after a hypothesis has been formulated, but prior to testing. In addition to analogy, Salmon mentions other considerations that influence our assessment of plausibility: compatibility with accepted theories, simplicity, competence (of the person advocating the hypothesis), and a few additional criteria. One of these factors—compatibility with accepted theories—can and should be incorporated into our assessment of an analogical argument because, as we saw in the Rutherford/Bohr example, incompatibility will defeat a conclusion about plausibility. The other considerations, however, act not as outright defeaters but as factors that influence overall degree of plausibility. There can be different models for assessing the overall degree of plausibility of a hypothesis. You might employ a weighting function that combines different components: 4. The study is cited in Giere (1991).
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analogical support, simplicity, and so forth. Alternatively, if you interpret plausibility judgments as probabilistic claims, then you might reach an overall judgment via successive acts of conditionalization that take different factors into account. Whether we adopt one of these models or some other approach, we seem to require means of assessing the independent contributions that each factor or component makes to plausibility, even though these contributions are combined in a single judgment. One way to appreciate the preceding argument is to employ the rhetorical device of advocate and critic. It is legitimate for the critic to require compatibility with widely shared background assumptions—presumably they are shared by both advocate and critic. Accepted scientific theory is part of this shared background, but other considerations, such as simplicity and competence, are not. They are interpreted differently and given different weights by different individuals.5 Thus, it is important to evaluate the contribution of each component, including analogical arguments, independently. One clarification is in order. In cases involving multiple analogical arguments, we can’t always consider each individual argument in isolation. Sometimes one analogical argument can defeat another. This happens regularly in legal reasoning. Case A is more “on point” than case B, roughly speaking, if the relevant resemblances between case B and the case at hand are a proper subset of the relevant resemblances between case A and the case at hand. In this situation, again roughly speaking, case B becomes an irrelevant precedent.6 The issue of reasoning with multiple analogical arguments will be taken up in chapter 4. My conclusion, then, is that we can and should evaluate analogical arguments independently of other arguments, provided that our evaluation takes into account consistency with accepted theory and other relevant analogical arguments.
1.3 Why Focus on Science and Mathematics? Analogies are important in many activities, from political speeches (such as Odysseus’ harangue) to philosophical reasoning. They are vitally important in legal reasoning, where similarities are drawn between a case under discussion and previously decided cases. Reasoning by analogy is also part of everyday life: we use it all the time to solve problems and make plans. As scientific thinking is continuous with commonsense reasoning, it might seem that the best way to develop a general theory of analogical reasoning is to start with examples from ordinary life. Despite the appeal of this approach, I am convinced that it is best to begin with analogies in science and mathematics. I have three principal reasons for this concentration.
5. These points are made with great clarity in Kuhn (1977). 6. “Roughly speaking” because we are not taking into account complexities such as the nature of the similarities, the existence of relevant differences, the relative authority of the courts, the relative ages of the precedents, and so forth.
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A Rich Set of Intuitively Plausible Examples In the first place, science provides a rich and varied set of analogical arguments. Many of them are controversial, but many nontrivial examples have great intuitive plausibility. To take one instance, the three medians of a triangle have a common intersection point. We might conjecture, by analogy, that the four medians of a tetrahedron have a common intersection point.7 This conjecture appears intuitively plausible, and it turns out to be true. A second example, cited above, is the inference that if high saccharin consumption causes cancer in rats, it is plausible to expect the same thing in humans. A good account of analogical arguments should be able to explain the appeal of such examples. By contrast, nontrivial analogical arguments in other settings, such as the law or philosophy, are typically controversial. Consider the traditional philosophical argument for the existence of other minds. In simplest form, the argument runs thus: just as my behavior is associated with conscious mental activity, so, too, it is probable that similar behavior in others is associated with similar conscious mental activity.8 It sounds like straightforward commonsense reasoning. Yet, led by Wittgenstein, mid-twentieth-century philosophers such as Strawson (1959) and Malcolm (1963) utterly rejected this argument. Recently, updated versions are back in circulation.9 The absence of a large body of commonly accepted nontrivial analogical arguments in philosophy, or in everyday reasoning, marks an important difference between this argument form and simpler types of inductive inference. We more or less “get it right” in ordinary enumerative induction: the sun will rise tomorrow, bread will continue to be nourishing, a flame will always burn our finger. By contrast, there is no stable practice of everyday analogical reasoning.
Models of Relevance Analogical arguments are based on relevant similarities between two systems. A second reason for limiting our attention to science is that, within the sciences, we have a decent grasp of many different types of relevance relation. We have models for causal, explanatory, logical, and statistical relevance, which constitute the relationships at the heart of most scientific analogies. Although our models may be tentative, they help us to determine which similarities and differences are relevant to an analogical argument. By contrast, we have no clear models for many types of relevance that are important in nonscientific analogies.
7. A median of a triangle is a line joining a vertex to the midpoint of the opposite side. The point of intersection of the three medians is called the centroid of the triangle. In a tetrahedron, the medians are the four lines joining each vertex with the centroid of the opposite face. 8. See, for instance, Russell’s (rather weak) endorsement of this argument in his work (1914, 103) or Mill’s version (1979). 9. See Heal (1998) and Sober (2000).
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Similarity and Open-textured Predicates As for relevance, so too for similarity: we have clear models and criteria for evaluating similarity in the sciences, more so than in other arenas where analogical arguments are employed. That provides a third reason to focus our attention on analogical arguments in science. This claim merits clarification and discussion. A judgment of similarity is a judgment that two things are the same in some respect. It is commonly expressed by applying a single predicate to both things. Any such judgment can prompt a reasonable demand for justification if the application of the predicate is not a matter of definition or routine. In such a case, we are dealing with an open-textured predicate. Typically, the decision about whether the predicate applies involves a nontrivial comparison to paradigm cases or prototypes. There will be “easy cases” where there is general agreement that the predicate does or does not apply, and “hard cases” where applicability is open to debate. The problem of open-textured predicates is familiar in legal reasoning, since most legal predicates are open-textured.10 To show that a predicate such as “unforeseeable circumstance” or “valid contract” is appropriate, a lawyer must argue that the case at hand bears a relevant resemblance to past cases where these predicates were applied. Open-textured predicates can lead to multiple layers of analogical reasoning. Suppose that an advocate in a civil law case wants to demonstrate the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. Since an offer and an acceptance are prerequisites for a valid contract, subsidiary analogical arguments might be needed to establish that an offer was made and accepted. Showing that all of these legal predicates apply to the case at hand might in turn be part of a larger argument, citing further precedents, that despite the existence of a valid contract, the defendant should not be penalized for failing to meet her obligations because of an unforeseeable disaster (e.g., a snow storm in Los Angeles). Our theory of analogical arguments will be greatly simplified if we can set aside such multilayered arguments. My contention is that we can do so for most analogical arguments in the sciences. Specifically, the basic similarities—those upon which the analogical argument is founded—are not treated as opentextured in the context of that argument. These basic similarities may be established by formal definitions or by a widely accepted classification scheme. My main point is that they do not require subsidiary analogical justification as part of the argument. To be sure, there are open-textured predicates in science. Many people believe that the extension of kind terms is determined (at least in part) by reference to paradigm examples (Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975, Kuhn 1979). Hesse (1966) argues that there can be theoretical concepts whose very meaning appears to be determined by analogy or metaphor. One example is the ether, the
10. Open-textured predicates in the law are discussed in Hart (1961, 121–32). A good recent discussion from the cognitive science perspective is Sanders (1991).
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medium in which light waves were once thought to propagate. Huygens (1690/ 1962) argued that light required a material medium by analogy with the fact that this was true of every other known wave motion.11 The meaning of the term “ether,” in this context, seems just to be that which is to light as air or water is to sound. There is an abundant literature arguing for the importance of metaphor in science, and metaphorical concepts are certainly open-textured because they rely upon analogy. Despite the existence of open-textured predicates, individual analogical arguments in the sciences do not appear to involve multiple layers of analogical reasoning. We seldom see analogical arguments that depend upon similarities that must themselves be established and justified analogically. Rather, analogical arguments in science depend upon basic similarities that are supposed to be unproblematic. The relevant concepts have a clear meaning over a range of cases including those under discussion; they are not open-textured in the context of that argument. By contrast, it is not uncommon for the conclusion of an analogical argument in science to extend an open-textured predicate to a new case. That is what happens when we argue by analogy for the existence of the ether as the medium in which light travels. In chapter 6, I discuss a series of analogies used to extend the concept of electricity from laboratory phenomena to lightning, to nerve impulses in animal motion, and eventually to molecules and atoms. Very similar observations apply to mathematics. There are open-textured mathematical concepts. Lakatos (1976) famously reconstructs the reasoning that leads us to include or exclude certain objects from the category of regular polyhedra. Here, too, open-textured concepts are the ones under investigation. They figure in the conclusions of analogical arguments. The starting similarities, however, are independently acceptable and the relevant predicates are not treated as open-textured. Although this claim about analogical arguments rests mainly on examples, there is one general observation in its favor. As in section 1.2, let us distinguish between individual analogical arguments, which draw upon just one case, and multiple analogical arguments, based upon two or more cases. The observation is that a great deal of analogical reasoning in science involves individual arguments. Where there is no rich “library” of cases, there is no prospect of treating open-textured predicates as they are handled in the law. For individual analogical arguments, at least, the basic similarities cannot be justified by subsidiary analogical reasoning. The upshot, if this claim about analogical arguments in science is valid, is that there is a clear advantage to beginning our study with scientific analogies. We can avoid the multilayered analogical arguments that we encounter in the law. What is more, even if this assumption is something of an idealization, it is a useful one. A first step in understanding multilayered analogical reasoning is to have a clear grasp of how a single layer of analogical argument functions. This
11. The postulate of an ethereal substance goes back as far as Aristotle, who also relied on the analogy between light and sound (De Sensu 439a19).
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point is acknowledged in the artificial intelligence (AI) literature on opentextured predicates in the law.12
Objection: Analogies Generate Self-perpetuating Similarities The foregoing discussion represents an analogical argument as proceeding from a set of accepted, or preexisting, similarities. A natural objection is that, in practice, analogies generate self-supporting similarities. For instance, Stepan (1996) suggests that nineteenth-century metaphors and analogies between race and gender made it possible for scientists to “see” similarities between (in their view) the “inferior” gender, female, and “inferior” nonwhite races. These “similarities,” which would not ever have been acknowledged without the background analogy, extended well beyond social inferiority to encompass physical and moral characteristics, including such far-fetched attributes as “susceptibility to disease.” Generalizing from this example, Stepan writes: Because a metaphor or analogy does not directly present a pre-existing nature but instead helps “construct” that nature, the metaphor generates data that conform to it, and accommodates data that are in apparent contradiction to it, so that nature is seen via the metaphor and the metaphor becomes part of the logic of science itself. (1996, 133) This role of a metaphor in the “logic” of science, she suggests, comes close to that of a Kuhnian paradigm. Such metaphors may prove to be helpful or they may (as in her example) prove to be harmful, but in any case they are indispensable. Essentially the same point about indispensability is made by Lakoff and Johnson: The IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor establishes similarities between ideas and food. Both can be digested, swallowed, devoured, and warmed over, and both can nourish you. These similarities do not exist independently of the metaphor. The concept of swallowing food is independent of the metaphor, but the concept of swallowing ideas arises only by virtue of the metaphor. (1980, 147–48) For Lakoff and Johnson, some similarities are independent of metaphor, others are based on conventional metaphors that structure our everyday thinking (such as IDEAS ARE FOOD), and still others are created when novel metaphors build upon conventional ones. Stepan’s race/gender example is more pointed, however, not only because the metaphor is pernicious but also because it builds only upon itself rather than upon other independent metaphors. It is important here to distinguish between the broad role of analogy, in providing an underlying metaphor for a sustained research program, and the
12. Sanders (1991) notes that Ashley’s HYPO program (discussed in chapter 3) uses cases “to interpret a single open-textured predicate, ‘trade secret violation.’ ” In Ashley’s program, the legal predicates that enter into analogical arguments about trade secrets do not themselves require analogical support.
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narrow role of grounding an individual analogical argument. Stepan’s allusion to Kuhn is appropriate, since the ideas Kuhn introduced in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions help to make this distinction clear. An underlying metaphor can function, like a paradigm, as a constitutive element in scientific work. Metaphors can provide models and images that shape our perception of phenomena, and they can establish a grip that is difficult to shake. Individual analogical arguments, by contrast, are less grand. In Kuhnian terms, most of them extend an existing paradigm; they are employed in the context of normal science. In light of this distinction, we can still maintain that individual analogical arguments in science depend upon previously accepted similarities. This is true even in Stepan’s example: accepted similarities form the basis for each extension of the analogy between race and gender. Similarities that may themselves at one time have been supported by analogical arguments become basic and are taken for granted when we turn to a new analogical argument. These reflections, however, do not address Stepan’s deep concerns about the self-perpetuating nature of analogies. In her example, the narrow and broad roles for analogy are closely related. The underlying metaphor powers the entire series of individual analogical arguments that extend its reach. Even if the individual steps in the growth of the metaphor are technically noncircular, the process as a whole still looks suspicious. There is still a will to “see” similarities that reinforce and extend the metaphor. I agree with Stepan that metaphors and analogies can evolve in this way—sometimes for good, when stubborn adherence pays off, and sometimes for ill. The best response I can offer is this: all the more reason for wanting a good critical theory of analogical arguments. Many current models of analogical reasoning are based on the idea that good analogical reasoning aims at maximizing the overall degree of similarity between two systems. Such models have very few resources to halt the self-perpetuating tendency that Stepan is worried about, since that tendency is regarded as the essence of analogical reasoning. Similarly, any model of analogical reasoning in which past “successes” of an analogy count as justification for any future use is vulnerable to the charge of self-perpetuation. The theory that I shall propose does not suffer from either of the two defects just noted. It does not generally take past successes of an analogy into account: each analogical argument is evaluated on its own merits. Nor does it treat justification as a by-product of maximal overall similarity. So there is some hope that my theory has the resources to arrest entrenched analogies that have gone astray. But Stepan’s example raises a further challenge. Suppose (unlikely as it may be) that we find a normative theory that does a perfect job of identifying strong individual analogical arguments. Can a series of such arguments, individually justified, eventually lead to an unreasonable conclusion? Must the weakness or inappropriateness of the underlying metaphor eventually manifest itself in some unacceptable individual analogical argument? For now, I leave these questions open. I hope to have said enough to motivate the goal of constructing a theory of individual analogical arguments.
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1.4 Representation and Terminology This section provides a general schema for representing individual analogical arguments, one that is meant to be broadly acceptable. We will see more sophisticated representations in later chapters, but this one suffices to introduce some basic notation and terminology that will be used throughout the book. As a first effort, an analogical argument has the following form: (1) S is similar to T in certain (known) respects. (2) S has some further feature Q. (3) Therefore, T has the feature Q, or some feature Q* similar to Q. Lines (1) and (2) are premises, while (3) is the conclusion of the argument. This argument form is inductive; the conclusion is not guaranteed to follow from the premises. S and T are the source and target domains, respectively. A domain is a set of objects, properties, relations, and functions, together with a set of accepted statements about those objects, properties, relations, and functions. More formally, a domain consists of a set of objects and an interpreted theory about them. The language of the theory has symbols for the objects, properties, relations, and functions to which the theory refers. I shall adopt the convention of using unstarred symbols (a, P, R, f ) for items in the source domain and starred symbols (a*, P*, R*, f*) for items in the target domain. An analogy between S and T is a mapping j between objects, properties, relations, and functions in S and those in T. Not all items in S and T need to be paired up. Commonly, the analogy mapping applies only to selected properties, relations, and functions, and not at all to particular objects (as in Huygens’s analogy, below). We say that relations R and R* correspond if j (R) = R*, and similarly for properties and functions. There can be analogies in which several items in one domain correspond to a single item in the other. Most often, however, j is one-to-one, and we normally limit our attention to such cases. In practice, we omit all of these formalities and specify an analogy simply by indicating the most significant similarities and differences. Informally, the analogy mapping is extended to propositions by replacing terms pertaining to one domain with the corresponding terms that pertain to the other.13 Turning now to analogical arguments, we improve on our initial representation. We assume that the analogy relation is given. Hesse (1966) introduced what we shall call the tabular representation of an analogical argument.14 The idea is to place corresponding objects, properties, relations, and propositions side-by-side in a table of two columns, one for each domain. For instance, a simplified version of Huygens’s (1690/1962) argument that there must be an ethereal medium in 13. This is not always routine, but the characterization is adequate for present purposes. 14. A similar tabular representation appears in Holyoak and Thagard’s multiconstraint theory of analogical reasoning (1995), where correspondences are typically listed in order of increasing abstractness: first objects, then first-order predicates and relations, and then higher order relations.
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which light travels, just as there is a material medium for sound, can be represented as follows:15 SOUND (S) Known similarities: echoes bending around corners volume pitch
LIGHT (T ) reflection diffraction through slits brightness color
Inferred similarity: material medium (air or water)
) material medium (ether)
Hesse introduced some useful terminology based on this tabular format. The horizontal relations in an analogy are the relations of similarity (and difference) in the mapping between domains, while the vertical relations are those between the objects, relations, and properties within each domain. The correspondence between echoes and reflection is a horizontal relation; the relation between echoes and bending around corners (if any such relation exists) is vertical. To complete our characterization of analogical arguments, we need one enhancement. We want to augment the tabular representation by adding a block that represents accepted (or known) differences. Although it is common for people to suppress points of difference between the domains being compared, I shall urge that some of them ought to be made explicit. For now, it suffices that this should be an option. To formulate the augmented representation, let’s introduce some additional terminology originally defined by Keynes (1921): Positive analogy. Let P stand for a list of accepted propositions P1, . . . , Pn about the source domain S such that the corresponding propositions P1*, . . . , Pn*, abbreviated as P*, are all accepted as holding for the target domain T. P and P* represent accepted (or known) similarities. We refer to P as the positive analogy. Negative analogy. Let A stand for a list of propositions A1, . . . , Ar accepted as holding in S, and B * for a list B1*, . . . , Bs* of propositions holding in T. Suppose the analogous propositions A* = A1*, . . . , Ar* fail to hold in T, and similarly the propositions B = B1, . . . , Bs fail to hold in S. We write A, ~A* and ~B, B* to represent accepted (or known) differences, and we refer to A and B as the negative analogy. Note that r and s can be 0. Neutral analogy. The neutral analogy consists of accepted propositions about S for which it is not known whether an analog holds in T. Finally we have: Hypothetical analogy. The hypothetical analogy is simply the proposition Q in the neutral analogy that is the focus of our attention. 15. I have made slight modifications to Hesse’s representation.
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Although these concepts involve cross-domain similarity relationships, the nature of the correspondence is irrelevant. Thus, it is convenient to define each concept as a set of propositions about the source domain. These concepts will play an important part in my theory. Here, they allow us to provide a general but compact schema for representing analogical arguments.
Schema (1.4.1) Augmented tabular representation SOURCE (S) P A ~B Q
TARGET (T ) P* [positive analogy] ~A* [negative B* analogy] Q* (plausibly)
An analogical argument thus takes the form: It is plausible that Q* holds in the target because of certain known (or accepted) similarities with the source domain, despite certain known (or accepted) differences. I have introduced plausibility into the conclusion. Section 1.2 provided preliminary reasons for treating the conclusions of analogical arguments as assertions of plausibility. In order that our schema should be broadly acceptable, we interpret “plausibly” in (1.4.1) to mean “with some degree of support.” The next task is to refine our ideas about plausibility.
1.5 Two Conceptions of Plausibility Plausibility is a complex notion. For one thing, plausibility seems to straddle the boundary between discovery and justification. To say that a hypothesis such as “Saccharin increases the risk of bladder cancer in humans” is plausible is to convey that it has epistemic support, that we have some reason to believe in it, even prior to testing. A second complication is that a plausibility judgment appears to have pragmatic connotations. To say that a hypothesis is plausible typically implies that we have good reason to investigate it (subject to the feasibility and value of investigation). Finally, there is a certain ambiguity as to whether an assertion of plausibility is categorical or a matter of degree. In my view, these observations point to the existence of two distinct conceptions of plausibility, both of which are important in analogical arguments.
The Probabilistic Conception (Degree of Plausibility) On the probabilistic conception, plausibility is identified with reasonable credence or subjective degree of belief. We find this conception of plausibility
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explicitly in the earlier quotation from Salmon.16 We find it also in Polya, who writes: “We wish to use the calculus of probability to render more precise our views on plausible reasoning” (1954, 116). Polya goes on to specify a subjective reading of probability. The probabilistic conception lets us represent many locutions about plausibility very naturally. For instance: (High plausibility) It is highly plausible that p p has a high probability; (Comparative plausibility) p is more plausible than q p has higher probability than q; (Incremental plausibility) That argument/evidence makes p more plausible That argument/evidence increases the probability of p. The probabilistic conception has other advantages. It takes care of the idea that plausibility is a matter of degree. What is more, if we hold a probabilistic model of belief updating, then we have a ready-made connection between plausibility and confirmation, since subsequent testing serves to increase or decrease the probability of a hypothesis.
Modal Conception (Prima facie Plausibility) On the modal conception, “it is plausible that p” is not a matter of degree. The meaning of “It is plausible that p,” roughly speaking, is this: (Prima facie plausibility) It is plausible that p There are sufficient grounds for taking p seriously. To take a hypothesis seriously is to regard further investigation as reasonable, subject to feasibility and interest. It is to single out the hypothesis from an undifferentiated mass of logical possibilities. Although this conception, which I shall call prima facie plausibility (or sometimes minimal plausibility), is not so widely discussed as the other one, I believe that it is extremely important, especially when thinking about analogical arguments. We find the modal conception in a number of places, particularly in discussions of analogy. The physicist N. R. Campbell writes: But in order that a theory may be valuable it must . . . display an analogy. The propositions of the hypothesis must be analogous to some known laws . . . . In the view which is urged here analogies are not “aids” to the establishment of theories; they are an utterly essential part of
16. Salmon quietly endorses, but does not satisfactorily develop, the possibility of interpreting “likelihood of success” as an objective probability—specifically, as a frequency.
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theories, without which theories would be completely valueless and unworthy of the name. (1957, 129) Campbell goes on to examine the role of analogy in Fourier’s theory of heat conduction, and writes: “Some analogy is essential to it; for it is only this analogy which distinguishes the theory from the multitude of others . . . which might also be proposed to explain the same laws” (142). Noting that Fourier’s theory has successfully predicted new laws, Campbell insists that, by virtue of analogy, the theory “was also distinguished from absurd theories at the time it was propounded and when these new laws were not known.” (For Campbell, an “absurd theory” is a set of meaningless equations devised purely to “derive” a known law.) Campbell’s notion of a “valuable” theory is very close to my conception of a prima facie plausible hypothesis.17 Campbell evidently believes that analogy is indispensable for a valuable theory. That is a stronger thesis about analogy than I care to defend, but it seems clear that Campbell also holds a weaker thesis which I do, with one caveat, endorse: a good analogy is sufficient to establish that a hypothesis is “valuable,” even prior to testing. The caveat is that claims of prima facie plausibility based on good analogical arguments are defeasible. In particular, they are defeated if we discover any internal inconsistency or inconsistency with accepted theory, and they can be defeated by a rival analogical argument. This simply reiterates an observation made in section 1.2. Campbell has nineteenth-century antecedents in Whewell and Herschel. As Snyder (2006) has pointed out, both of these thinkers rejected an unrestricted hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, according to which any hypothesis receives support if its deductive consequences are verified by observation. To be capable of confirmation, a hypothesis must stipulate a vera causa, or “true cause.” A vera causa is a possible cause that is worthy of testing. Herschel insisted that a vera causa had to be “analogous to causes that are already known to have produced similar effects in other cases” (Snyder 2006, 201)—that is, a cause of a sort that is known to exist in nature. Whewell criticized this constraint as too demanding, but he did accept both the basic need to distinguish between frivolous hypotheses and verae causae, and the idea that analogy was sufficient to establish a vera causa. The notion of vera causa is, once again, close to my idea of prima facie plausibility.18 The point is that prima facie plausibility should not be taken for granted. In most investigations, it is irrational, from a practical standpoint, to be openminded about every possible hypothesis. Some of them simply do not merit investigation and would probably not even occur to us. As Hanson has pointed out, Kepler would never have seriously considered the idea that Jupiter’s moons cause the apparent accelerations of Mars at 90˚ and 270˚ from aphelion (1958, 85).
17. Campbell’s notion, unlike mine, is restricted to physical theory and requires analogy to “known laws.” 18. Once again, I do not restrict the concept to causal hypotheses.
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Any argument that a hypothesis is prima facie plausible should be constructive; it should provide reasons to think the hypothesis might be true. Summarizing, the modal conception captures a great deal of what we want from an account of plausibility. To say that a hypothesis is prima facie plausible is to say two things: (1) It has epistemic support: an appreciable likelihood of being true (or “successful”). (2) It has pragmatic importance: it is worth investigating, granted the feasibility of and interest in investigation.19 In short, given our current knowledge of the situation and our assessment of costs and benefits, the hypothesis passes some sort of initial screening procedure. Assuming investigation is feasible and worthwhile, we ought to investigate further. But as we noted, the modal conception cannot represent degrees of plausibility.
The Relationship between the Two Conceptions If we hold a probabilistic interpretation of belief, then there must be a relationship between the modal and probabilistic conceptions of plausibility. Nevertheless, we have good methodological reasons to keep them distinct. One reason is that there is no easy way to translate prima facie plausibility into probabilistic language. The most natural strategy is this: (Positive probability) It is (prima facie) plausible that p p has positive (noninfinitesimal) probability. But this doesn’t work. Positive probability alone does not ensure that a hypothesis either has an appreciable likelihood of being true or is worth investigating. Both characteristics might require a moderately high probability value—one that lies above some threshold that depends upon the situation. Of course, for a probabilist, a prima facie plausible hypothesis must be assigned some positive probability value. But we should keep in mind the following points. First, there is no nonarbitrary and fully general method for obtaining this value. Second, and more important, the actual probability value seems to be a distraction. In company with Whewell, Herschel, and Campbell, I think that the point of many analogical arguments is just to establish a rudimentary sort of plausibility. To put everything in numerical terms is a secondary consideration. In many cases, the hypothesis is modeled as having a certain probability value because it is deemed prima facie plausible, not the other way around. If this is right, then the most fundamental task is to investigate the “modal logic” of analogical arguments: to find criteria such that an analogical argument meeting those criteria has a prima facie plausible conclusion. One advantage of 19. Point 2 depends, in a decision-theoretic sense, upon point 1 together with contextual information about costs and benefits. Absent that information, and absent a precise probability value, the two points are at least partially independent.
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focusing on the modal conception of plausibility is that we do not tie ourselves to a specifically probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to confirmation. That is yet another reason to keep the two conceptions of plausibility distinct. All the same, we must keep the probabilistic conception in mind for at least two reasons. First, going beyond minimal plausibility, we are interested in how analogical arguments are made stronger or weaker. My theory proposes qualitative means of assessing the strength of an analogical argument, building on the modal conception of plausibility. Second, it is ultimately important to find a place for analogical arguments in the Bayesian model of confirmation. In this book, I concentrate on prima facie plausibility, but I shall frequently discuss the probabilistic conception as well. The connection between the two is a major theme of chapter 8.
1.6 Commonsense Guidelines and Inference Rules Any normative theory for evaluating analogical arguments must propose criteria that, to some extent, reflect commonsense ideas. This section explores some of these ideas and explains why common sense falls short of providing adequate guidance.
Commonsense Guidelines Logicians and philosophers of science have identified a number of “textbook” guidelines for evaluating analogical arguments. Variants of these principles have been around for a long time.20 Here are some of the most important ones (using “CS” to suggest common sense): (CS1) The more similarities (between the two domains), the stronger the analogy. (CS2) The more differences, the weaker the analogy. (CS3) The greater the extent of our ignorance about the two domains, the weaker the analogy. (CS4) The weaker the conclusion, the more plausible the analogy. (CS5) Analogies involving causal relations are more plausible than those not involving causal relations. (CS6) Structural analogies are stronger than those based on superficial similarities. (CS7) The relevance of the similarities and differences to the conclusion (i.e., to the hypothetical analogy) must be taken into account. (CS8) Multiple analogies supporting the same conclusion make the argument stronger.
20. See Aristotle’s Topics and Prior Analytics, Mill’s A System of Logic (1843/1930), Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921), and numerous logic texts including Robinson (1930), Stebbing (1933), and Copi (1961).
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These principles can be helpful in general, but they are frequently too vague to give us much insight. For instance, how do we count the similarities and differences mentioned in principles (CS1) and (CS2)? In connection with principles (CS5) through (CS7), which of the similarities identified in an analogical argument are relevant to the conclusion, and why are structural and causal analogies thought to be especially important? Which differences between domains are relevant? How are we to handle similarities and differences that have not been identified? In light of our discussion of plausibility in the preceding section, we can identify a second major weakness with the above principles: all of them pertain to the degree of plausibility, and hence to the probabilistic conception. None of them addresses the question, “Is this analogical argument prima facie plausible or not?” A third problem is what to do when the principles pull in different directions. To illustrate, consider an example that has been a favorite with logicians: Thomas Reid’s argument for life on other planets.21 Reid (1785) pointed out a number of similarities between Earth and the other planets in the solar system. All orbit and are illuminated by the sun, some have moons, all revolve on an axis, and all move in accordance with the law of gravity. In consequence, it is “not unreasonable to think, that those planets may, like our earth, be the habitation of various orders of living creatures” (1785, 24). Utilizing the tabular representation scheme, we can capture this argument as follows (putting Mars as the target): EARTH (S) Known similarities: orbits the sun has a moon revolves on an axis subject to law of gravity Inferred similarity: supports life
MARS (T ) orbits the sun has moons revolves on an axis subject to law of gravity ) may support life
Philosophers disagree about the cogency of this argument. Stebbing (1933) finds Reid’s argument “suggestive” and “not unplausible” because the conclusion is weak (CS4), while Mill (1843/1930) appears to reject the argument on account of our vast ignorance of properties that might be relevant (CS3). This debate is far from over. Scientists still use analogical reasoning to support the conjecture that, even if Mars is now dead, it might once have supported life (McKay 1993). The Rover expeditions of 2003–04 bolstered this argument with the finding that ancient Mars possessed liquid water in abundance. It might be argued at this juncture that the problems of vagueness and of weighing competing criteria simply reflect the reality of working with an 21. Variants of the argument are found in Stebbing (1933), Mill (1843/1930), Robinson (1930), and Copi (1961).
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imprecise and irreducibly subjective form of reasoning. Perhaps the above list of criteria or something similar is the best we can hope for. In any choice between scientific theories, individual interpretations of vague and sometimes conflicting criteria, and differences of opinion about the relative importance of those criteria, are unavoidable. This point certainly applies to analogical arguments, for individuals assess the merits of such arguments differently. Yet such observations have not stopped philosophers from attempting to shed light on the problem of theory choice. We can surely do better than these “textbook” guidelines. An adequate theory of analogical arguments should at least systematize and resolve conflicts between them.
Commonsense Inference Rules There is a vivid way to see that commonsense ideas about analogical reasoning are inadequate. This is to recognize that there are no widely acknowledged commonsense inference rules for analogical arguments, despite the confidence with which such arguments are endorsed or rejected. This contrasts sharply with the situation in deductive logic, where we have plenty of unimpeachable inference rules, and with enumerative induction, where we have candidates such as the familiar “straight rule.” Straight rule for enumerative induction. Let A and B be classes of objects or events. Suppose that out of n A’s that have been observed, m have been B’s. In the absence of defeating reasons, infer that the proportion of A’s that are B’s is approximately m/n.22 The straight rule need not be ultimately acceptable. My point, rather, is that it is a reasonable starting point for thinking about induction. There is no comparably simple inference rule that can serve as a reference point for reflection on analogical arguments.23 Let’s see why. Philosophers have developed two main approaches to evaluating analogical arguments, corresponding to two common conceptions of analogies. One view, most clearly expressed by Mill (1843/1930) but originating with Aristotle, is that an analogy is a conjunction of material (observable) resemblances between two domains. Mill characterized the evaluation of an analogical argument as “a competition between the known points of agreement and the known points of difference.” The basic principle for judging an analogical argument is to compare the extent of material similarity and difference. In essence, this view assimilates analogical arguments to enumerative induction. Just as we might sample a small population of A’s to find out the proportion that share the attribute B, we sample
22. If we have reason to believe that our sampling procedure is not random, then we should not draw the general conclusion. 23. Carnap and his followers have made serious attempts to formulate principles of analogy in inductive logic. Carnap ((1980) and elsewhere) uses concepts of “analogy by similarity” and “analogy by proximity” to incorporate prior beliefs about similarity into inductive logic. I shall not discuss this body of work because the project is very different from the one in this book.
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a small population of properties of the source domain to find out the proportion that belongs to the target domain. I will refer to this as the sampling or inductive conception of analogical arguments. The second view, which I call the structuralist or deductive conception, assimilates analogy to a deductive argument form. One version, exemplified by Hempel (1965), stresses that analogies are founded on formal resemblance. An analogy is ideal if two domains are nomically isomorphic—that is, if they are described by formally identical mathematical laws. The fundamental criterion for assessing analogical arguments is to consider how closely the analogy approximates isomorphism. In the limit of perfect isomorphism, an analogical argument becomes deductively valid. A second version, exemplified by (Weitzenfeld 1984) and (Davies 1988), treats analogical arguments as deductive arguments that rely on extra (sometimes tacit) premises. If either the inductive or deductive conception were correct, then finding an inference rule for analogical arguments would reduce to characterizing them in terms of these fundamental forms of inference (with modifications depending on the degree to which the analogical argument departs from the ideal). In chapter 2, I shall argue that neither conception of analogical reasoning is correct. For now, the observation that there seem to be analogical arguments of both types already suggests that neither account can be wholly adequate to accommodate all analogical arguments. But let’s take a brief look at what goes wrong when we attempt to formulate an inference rule along inductive lines. Using the straight rule as our model, consider the following candidate, rule (R). The rule presupposes that we have represented our analogical argument in accordance with schema (1.4.1). (R) Suppose S and T are the source and target domains. Suppose P1, . . . , Pn represents the positive analogy, while A1, . . . , Ar and ~B1, . . . , ~Bs represent the negative analogy and Q represents the hypothetical analogy, as in schema (1.4.1). In the absence of reasons for thinking otherwise, infer that Q* holds in the target domain with probability p > 0, where p is an increasing function of n and a decreasing function of r and s. This is quite close to Mill’s view of analogical inference. But it is pretty clear that rule (R) is not a viable inference rule. The most basic objection is that p need not always be positive: we can construct analogical arguments that conform to the schema (1.4.1) but establish nothing at all about the probability of Q*. A few silly examples will illustrate this point. First, rule (R) allows us to infer, with positive probability, that an unknown object on the other side of the door is cold. That object shares at least one property with ice (e.g., the property of being self-identical). By rule (R), there is a positive probability it also shares the property of being cold. But this analogy should clearly show nothing. Next, Achinstein (1964, 328) observes that there is a formal analogy between swans and line segments if we take the relation “has the same color as” to
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correspond to “is congruent with.” Both relations are reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Yet it would be absurd to infer, with positive probability, that we are more likely to find congruent lines clustered in groups of two or more than alone just because swans of the same color are commonly found in groups. The features in the positive analogy are antecedently known to be irrelevant to the hypothetical analogy. In such a case, the analogical inference should be utterly rejected. As a final and more challenging example because it has historical significance, consider an argument used in 1611 by the Florentine astronomer Francesco Sizzi to refute Galileo’s claim that Jupiter had satellites: There are seven windows in the head, two nostrils, two ears, two eyes and a mouth; so in the heavens there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, and Mercury alone undecided and indifferent. From which and many other similar phenomena of nature such as the seven metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of planets is necessarily seven . . . . Besides, the Jews and other ancient nations, as well as modern Europeans, have adopted the division of the week into seven days, and have named them from the seven planets: now if we increase the number of planets, this whole system falls to the ground.24 From a contemporary perspective, this argument should be rejected even though it can be made to conform to schema (1.4.1). The similarity between the planets and “windows in the head,” metals, and so forth consists in their being natural phenomena; the inference drawn by analogy is that they must also share the property of being seven in number. Since our current theories tell us that there is no connection at all between the known and inferred similarities, the argument should carry no weight for us. There is a separate question about what to make of the argument in its historical setting; I return to that question in the next section. These three examples show that rule (R) fails to make sense of prima facie plausibility. It also does a poor job with respect to the probabilistic conception of plausibility. The obvious objection is that not every similarity increases the probability of the conclusion and not every difference decreases it. Some similarities and differences are known to be (or accepted as being) completely irrelevant and should have no influence on our probability judgments. In short, rule (R) justifies too much. The rule must be supplemented with considerations of relevance. There are so many different types of relevance, however, that the hope for a single, simple rule of analogical inference is likely to be futile.
24. The quotation is taken from Holton and Brush (1973, 51). Sizzi’s seven “planets” evidently include the sun, moon, and the five planets visible in his day: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.
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1.7 The Articulation Model: A Preview One of my main objectives is to formulate principles for evaluating analogical arguments, principles that are general but superior to the commonsense guidelines of the preceding section. Yet even within the sciences, there is so great a variety of analogies and analogical arguments that no single evaluation scheme can hope to accommodate them all. My proposal is that we solve this problem with a two-part theory of analogical arguments that I call the articulation model. The first part consists of two general principles. The second part is a classification scheme that lets us apply those principles differently to different types of analogical arguments. The classification is based upon diverse forms of logical, causal, and explanatory relationships that occur across the sciences. In effect, I develop a set of models for evaluating different types of analogical argument, recognizing that relevance and similarity are determined by somewhat different criteria for these diverse types of analogical argument. In this section, I provide an overview of the articulation model. The basic ideas can be explained with the help of concepts and terminology introduced earlier. Simplifying schema (1.4.1) slightly (by omitting the negative analogy), consider the representation of an analogical argument shown in figure 1.1. Illustrating with Darwin’s famous analogy between artificial and natural selection, we can take Q as the (well-confirmed) hypothesis of artificial selection and Q* as Darwin’s hypothesis of natural selection. P and P* describe accepted similarities, such as the presence of diversity among domestic varieties and natural species. Existing classifications of analogical reasoning have focused on the nature of the horizontal (similarity) relations. For example, Gentner (1983) distinguishes between superficial “feature matches,” where the objects in the two domains share common properties, and deep “structural analogies,” based on shared high-level relations.25 Darwin’s analogy falls into the second category; Reid’s
Source Domain (S) P
← Horizontal relations →
↑
P*
} Positive analogy
↑
Vertical relations ↓
Target Domain (T)
Possible vertical relations ↓
Q ← Possible horizontal relations → Q*
} Possible further analogy
FIGURE 1.1. Simplified tabular representation. 25. Holyoak and Thagard (1995) distinguish attribute mappings, relational mappings and system mappings in a similar manner. The first and last of these correspond to Gentner’s feature matches and structural analogies, while relational mappings are analogies based on correspondences between first-order relations.
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analogy between Earth and Mars appears to fall into the first. The account developed in this book, by contrast, proposes a classification scheme based on the different types of vertical relations in the source and target domains. The vertical relations provide the clue to determining which similarities and differences are relevant. Different sorts of vertical relations naturally lead to different assessments of relevant similarity. The first key concept in my theory is the prior association, defined as the vertical relation in the source domain that is the focus of the analogical argument. This yields a preliminary requirement for a seriously proposed argument by analogy, the first of my two general principles.
Principle 1: Requirement of Prior Association The description of the source domain must include an explicitly stated vertical relation which the analogical argument is supposed to extend in some way to the target domain. By restricting attention to analogies where we have well-defined models of the prior association, we obtain a classification that provides a basis for evaluating analogical arguments. In effect, the assessment of any analogical argument is mediated by a model of the prior association. As a preview of things to come, let me characterize two classes. • Mathematical analogies. P refers to a set of assumptions, while Q is a theorem about the source domain. The prior association is a proof that P (together with other assumptions) entails Q. The analogical argument is intended to make it plausible that similar features P* of the target domain entail a similar conclusion Q* about the target domain. • Explanatory analogies. Q refers to a hypothesis and P to observed consequences of Q. The prior association is that Q explains P. The analogical argument is meant to provide support for the idea that similar features P* in the target domain are explained by a similar hypothesis Q*. Darwin’s analogy exhibits this pattern. Analogical arguments belonging to these two distinct groups demand different evaluation criteria. This leads to the second key concept in my theory, potential for generalization, once again formulated as a requirement. The terminology derives from Poincare´, who stated that analogies enable us to perceive the “possibility of generalization” (1952a, 28). The principle is as follows:
Principle 2: Requirement of Potential for Generalization A good analogical argument is one where, at minimum, there is no compelling reason to deny that the prior association that obtains in the source domain could be generalized in a way that extends to the target domain.
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Specifically, the minimal condition is this: features that play a central role in the prior association must have analogs in the target domain that are either known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in order for an analogical argument to be prima facie plausible. If some crucial difference appears to block the possibility that this particular pattern of association could be generalized, then our analogical argument fails to demonstrate the plausibility of its conclusion. By extension, the strength of the argument increases to the extent that relevant features have analogs that are known (or believed) to hold in the target domain. I maintain that these two general principles, prior association and potential for generalization, are common to the evaluation of analogical arguments in all fields. When supplemented with models for different forms of prior association, we obtain criteria for deciding which similarities of the source and target domains are relevant. The requirement of potential for generalization stipulates both minimum conditions for prima facie plausibility and a basis for assessing degree of plausibility. In this way, we obtain criteria that are more helpful than the “textbook” guidelines of section 1.6. These ideas can be illustrated by reference to our two selected classes of analogical argument. • In mathematical analogies, the features that play a central role in the prior association are the assumptions used in the proof of the theorem Q. The analogical argument stands or falls depending on whether analogous assumptions are known to hold, or at least not known not to hold, in the target domain. • In explanatory analogies, any known observable consequence of the hypothesis Q counts as central to the prior association. The strength of the argument depends upon the extent to which we know that these consequences have analogs in the target domain. This criterion directs us to search for such analogous consequences. If they are not found, then the argument is weakened or defeated. The second situation is exemplified in the reaction to Darwin’s argument. The objection regarded by Darwin as possibly “the most obvious and gravest” was that just as we observe a nearly continuous transition among domestic varieties, we should expect to observe a “finely graduated” chain of forms in the fossil record. According to my theory, Darwin’s argument would have been initially plausible but weakened over time if a fossil record of intermediate transitions had not been recovered.
Historical Relativization A project that sets out to propose standards for any form of scientific reasoning must confront the fact that such standards, and indeed the very examples taken to exemplify good scientific practice, are historically variable. Let’s consider two examples. The first is due to Aristotle. In the Meteorology, we find a charming explanation of earthquakes as exhalations of wind from the Earth: “We must
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suppose the action of the wind in the earth to be analogous to the tremors and throbbings caused in us by the force of the wind contained in our bodies. Thus some earthquakes are a sort of tremor, others a sort of throbbing” (Meteor 366b14).26 The second example, just as colorful, is Sizzi’s argument quoted in section 1.6. What should a theory of analogical reasoning say about such arguments? I want to avoid two extremes. I don’t want to hold up these arguments as stock examples of bad analogical reasoning, even though they may look quaint or foolish by current standards. Nor do I want to strain too hard to make them respectable, or more generally to hold the position that every analogical argument ever proposed is good. That would make a critical study of analogical arguments pointless. In fact, the articulation model offers resources for taking historical variation into account without automatically endorsing all past analogical arguments as plausible “in context.” We can retain our two general principles of prior association and potential for generalization, while acknowledging historically and culturally relative standards for what counts as an acceptable prior association. On my theory, an argument by analogy starts from a set of vertical relations in the source domain—the prior association—and provides support for the conclusion that the same or similar connections obtain in the target domain. The argument can therefore be attacked in two different ways. We can criticize the prior association (in the source domain) or we can argue that the attempt to transfer that association to the target domain is blocked in some way. My suggestion is that historical sensitivity enters primarily at the stage of evaluating the prior association. Standards for what counts as an acceptable causal or explanatory relationship have varied greatly over time. By contrast, the evaluation of whether or not we have justification for transferring such a relationship to a new setting can be relatively independent of historical milieu. Aristotle’s and Sizzi’s arguments rely upon concepts of causation and explanation that have been repudiated. Yet it is possible that, setting aside concerns about the prior association, the analogical step in which causal and explanatory associations are transferred to the target domain is acceptable. If that were the case, we would have analogical arguments that established (in their historical setting) plausible conclusions, even though those conclusions turned out to be false. Goldman (1988) has distinguished between strong and weak epistemic justification. A belief is strongly justified if it is formed based on methods that are objectively reliable, and weakly justified if it fails to be strongly justified but the agent is nevertheless nonculpable because of the limited epistemic resources available to him or her. Goldman’s intention is to allow for a form of justification in “scientifically benighted” cultures that lack the resources to determine that they are employing unreliable methods. We might similarly distinguish here between strong and weak justification for analogical arguments. An analogical
26. All translated passages from Aristotle are from Aristotle (1984).
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argument is strongly justified if it employs proper forms of prior association and proper standards to transfer that association from source to target; it is weakly justified if the prior association is improper through no fault of the subject, but standards for analogical transfer are observed. Since just about every term in these definitions—“prior association,” “proper standards,” “transfer”—has yet to be defined carefully, we are not in a position to evaluate our two examples. It is worth noting that I employ the same strategy to deal with another objection that might be raised to the idea of a general normative theory of analogical arguments: different standards are employed in different disciplines. As already suggested, my hope is that such variation can be located primarily in the different forms of prior association that occur in analogical arguments. There is a common logical core to analogical arguments. I shall defend that thesis by considering a variety of examples across disciplines and historical periods. In light of the observations in section 1.1, it is at least methodologically appropriate to aim for a unified account of analogical arguments.
1.8 Philosophical Justification There are many views on whether and how analogical arguments can be justified. Skeptics range from those who deny that this form of argument is even legitimate to those who despair of finding an explanation for its successes. Among people who have tried to justify analogical arguments, the usual strategy has been to reduce it to some other generally accepted form of inductive or deductive inference. These efforts are unconvincing, largely because (as suggested above) most analogical arguments are not properly cast in these simpler molds. Many attempts to provide a foundation for analogical arguments suffer from an additional weakness: they make no attempt to differentiate between good and bad analogical arguments. They set out with some “commonsense” characterization of the argument form, such as rule (R) of section 1.6, that applies equally to plausible and implausible analogical arguments. If a philosophical justification for such a rule were to succeed, it would prove too much. There are difficulties even in stating what it means to have a general philosophical justification for analogical arguments (as opposed to justification for a particular argument). One difficulty derives from diversity. As noted in section 1.6, there is no “method” of analogy, no single straightforward inference rule that characterizes the argument form. Another difficulty derives from the weakness of the argument form, particularly if we frame the conclusion in terms of prima facie plausibility. Even a good analogical argument may provide very limited support for its conclusion. These two difficulties appear to rule out a direct reliabilist form of justification. Reliabilists hold that a method or process is virtuous if it generally leads from true initial beliefs to true “output” beliefs (Goldman 1979). In the case of analogical arguments, we have neither a method nor reliability.
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Despite all of these difficulties, this book does provide a general philosophical defense of analogical arguments—in fact, two such defenses. In order to deal with the problem of diversity, I exploit the two-part structure of my theory. The central idea is that to evaluate any analogical argument, we must bring it under a model and then apply the principles of prior association and potential for generalization. Diversity is found in the models, while the common “method,” to the extent that one exists, resides in these two general principles. The only way to provide a general justification for analogical reasoning is to abstract from the models and to focus on those principles. The challenge thus reduces to providing a justification for the following claim: Conditional plausibility. If we have an acceptable model of the prior association and an analogical argument that meets the requirements of our two principles, then the conclusion of the argument is prima facie plausible. This formulation restricts the problem of justification to analogical arguments that the theory takes to be good ones, and it isolates what I take to be the logical core of the argument form. In order to deal with the problem of the weakness or unreliability of analogical arguments, I abandon any attempt to make a direct link to past or future successes. Instead, my strategy is to take broadly acceptable norms of scientific practice for granted and to show that the conditional plausibility claim follows from these norms. Chapter 7 offers a “top-down” justification that presupposes that standard pragmatic virtues guide us in the choice of scientific theories. Chapter 8 develops a completely independent “bottom-up”justification that presupposes the legitimacy of symmetry arguments. Here is a brief sketch of both approaches. In my view, the most successful and natural general defense of analogical reasoning has been in a nonscientific setting: case law. Judicial decisions are based on the verdicts and reasoning that have governed relevantly similar cases, according to the doctrine of stare decisis. The practice of following precedent can be justified by three main ethical considerations. First, the practice provides a relatively stable basis from which people can predict the actions of the courts and formulate their plans. Second, stare decisis serves as a check against arbitrary decisions by an inexperienced or foolish judge. In a word, a kind of ethical conservatism underwrites our use of analogical reasoning in the law. At the same time, and this is the third point in its favor, stare decisis allows for the gradual evolution of the law. The doctrine thus achieves a balance between conservative and progressive moral values. I argue (analogously) that in scientific thinking, analogical arguments are justified as a means for assessing the plausibility of hypotheses because they achieve an optimal balance between conservative epistemic values (such as simplicity and coherence with existing theory) and progressive epistemic values (such as fruitfulness and theoretical unification). This is the top-down (goal-oriented) justification that I shall develop in chapter 7.
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Chapter 8 offers a bottom-up (constraint-based) justification founded on principles of symmetry: like problems demand a like solution. Symmetry acts as a constraint on our reasoning and lies at the heart of every analogical argument. My analysis focuses on the practical need to identify hypotheses that merit investigation. In a case of perfect symmetry, one has as much reason to treat the target hypothesis as worthy of investigation as one does the source hypothesis. In the case of an analogical argument that satisfies the requirements of my theory, one still has adequate reasons for doing so. Salmon, following Feigl, makes a useful distinction between two sorts of justification: validation and vindication. An inference is validated by showing that it is governed by an accepted rule. A rule of inference is justified by showing that it can be derived from other accepted rules or principles. There is, however, a second form of justification called “vindication.” This kind of justification consists in showing that a given decision, policy, or act is well adapted to achieving a certain end. (1957, 39) A vindication of a theory of analogical arguments might be a demonstration that a reasonable proportion of the arguments endorsed by that theory lead to true conclusions. Using this distinction, I can summarize my views about the justification of analogical reasoning. Direct validation of an analogical inference rule in terms of some more basic deductive or inductive rule is not promising. The prospects for direct vindication of any such rule in terms of its frequency of success are also dim, both in light of the difficulties noted above and on account of the traditional philosophical problem of induction. The two lines of justification I develop in this book are best described as partial validation of my theory, relative to accepted norms of scientific practice. They are partial because they take for granted certain models of explanation, causation, and so forth. They are relative because they presuppose that the “accepted norms” are themselves justified. I believe that this is the most that one can demand by way of philosophical justification for a general theory of analogical arguments.
1.9 Confirmation Confirmation, in a broad sense, is the process by which a scientific hypothesis receives inductive support. As just explained, I think that a good analogical argument can make a hypothesis prima facie plausible. If the hypothesis was not previously taken seriously, that seems to count as confirmation. Furthermore, the idea that analogical arguments can confirm hypotheses in this broad sense seems to be independent of one’s theory of confirmation. But there are difficulties. That is because confirmation, in a narrow sense, is a certain relation between propositions. To quote a recent discussion: “Some propositions seem to
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help make it rational to believe other propositions. When our current confidence in E helps make rational our current confidence in H, we say that E confirms H” (Christensen 1999, 441). In the Bayesian model, which is the most prominent theory of confirmation in current philosophy of science, “confidence” is represented in terms of personal probability. A Bayesian agent starts with an assignment of subjective probabilities to a class of propositions. Qualitative confirmation is understood to be a three-place relation: Bayesian confirmation. E confirms H relative to K
$
Pr(H / E · K ) > Pr(H / K ).
In this relation, E represents a proposition about accepted evidence, H stands for a hypothesis, K for background knowledge, and Pr for the agent’s subjective probability function. To confirm H is to raise its probability, relative to K. For Bayesians, it may seem quite clear that an analogical argument cannot provide confirmation. In the first place, it is not obvious how to represent an analogical argument as an evidential proposition E. Second, even if we can find a proposition E that expresses the information about source and target domains used in the argument, that information is not new. It is “old evidence,” and therefore part of the background K. This implies that E · K is equivalent to K, and hence that PrðH=E . KÞ ¼ PrðH=KÞ: According to the definition, we don’t have confirmation. Instead, we have an instance of the familiar “problem of old evidence” (Glymour 1980). Third, and perhaps most important, analogical arguments are often applied to novel hypotheses H for which the “prior” probability Pr(H / K) is not even defined. Again, the definition is inapplicable. Something has to be wrong. It cannot be that a good analogical argument succeeds in establishing a conclusion as plausible in the modal sense, yet fails to show anything about its probability. If there is no sense to be made of the idea that analogical arguments contribute to Bayesian confirmation, then we should be suspicious about the modal claim.By the same token, if we are confident about the modal claim, then we need to take another look at the Bayesian conception of confirmation. I mean to show that analogical arguments do have a role in broadly Bayesian epistemology. Within the Bayesian framework, a well-known problem has been to justify assignments of prior probability. A number of writers (Jeffreys 1973, Salmon 1966, 1990, Shimony 1970) have argued, in various ways, that any “seriously proposed” hypothesis must have a sufficiently high prior probability to allow it to become preferred as the result of observation. Salmon in particular has suggested that the argument from analogy is one of the main tools for showing that a hypothesis is “serious” in this sense. My book affirms this idea, but I want to take it a little further.
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A “seriously proposed” hypothesis is just a prima facie plausible hypothesis. In section 1.5, I observed that prima facie plausibility is hard to characterize in probabilistic terms. In chapter 8, I use the symmetry-based approach to clarify the sense in which good analogical arguments show that novel hypotheses have “sufficiently high” or nonnegligible prior probability. This illuminates the connection between analogical reasoning and Bayesian confirmation.
1.10 Overview The first part of this book (chapters 2 and 3) is a critical review of existing ideas about analogies and analogical reasoning, including both philosophical and computational approaches. Chapters 4 through 6 present my theory of analogical arguments, including models for evaluating different types. I apply the theory to a variety of examples. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the philosophical basis for analogical arguments. Finally, chapter 9 discusses extensions and implications of my theory. Chapter 2 begins by tracing back to Aristotle a number of commonsense ideas about analogical arguments, and also the idea that the argument from analogy can be reduced to a form of deduction or enumerative induction. After a review of Hesse’s theory of analogy, I consider other theories that have adopted a reductionist strategy. I also respond to skeptical arguments about analogical reasoning. While the chapter aims to disabuse us of the idea that there can be any easy analysis of this argument form, its other purpose is to foreshadow a more sophisticated approach. Chapter 3 surveys computational theories of reasoning by analogy. Most of these theories fall into two groups: structuralist and case-based.27 Structuralist theories regard analogical reasoning as syntactically driven: a good analogy maximizes structural similarity between two domains.28 Case-based reasoning programs, by contrast, view analogical reasoning as a process of assessing the extent to which two domains share relevant, semantically related characteristics. These programs use a variety of interesting techniques for performing analogical reasoning in specific problem situations, some of which have independent philosophical interest. Chapter 4 presents the fundamental ideas of my theory of analogical arguments. The principle of prior association is the requirement that there be some sort of connection in the source domain—logical, causal, or statistical—between the known similarities and the further similarity that is projected to hold in the target domain. The second key idea, potential for generalization, is the extent to which similarities between the source and target domains contribute to, and differences detract from, the possibility of generalizing the prior association to
27. Case-based reasoning (CBR) is a recognized approach in the AI community. The term “structuralist” is nonstandard, but convenient for this book. 28. Prominent examples of the structuralist strategy are Gentner’s structure-mapping theory (first elaborated in Gentner 1983)) and the connectionist approach developed by Holyoak and Thagard (1995).
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cover the target domain. For a prima facie plausible analogical argument, there must be no compelling reason for denying that the same type of association could hold in the target as well. Taken together, these two principles define the articulation model of analogical reasoning. “Articulation” refers to the fact that our theory demands a precise statement of the nature of the prior association in the source domain. This leads to a set of models corresponding to general types of prior association that occur in such fields as mathematics, physics, biology, and archaeology. Distinct criteria for assessing analogical arguments—many of which reflect commonsense intuitions—are formulated for these different models. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the relationship between analogy and generalization in mathematics and select scientific examples. These chapters flesh out the thesis that analogical arguments are a prelude to generalization. It is evident that two sets of phenomena that fall under common laws, or two members of the same class, will be analogous in important ways. These chapters advance the opposite thesis: if there is a strong analogy between two objects or systems, then there is likely to be a nontrivial (fruitful) generalization. This thesis is the basis both for the models of chapter 4 and for the book’s analysis of justification in the final chapters. Chapter 5, on mathematical analogies, is crucial here because it provides the clearest support for the link between analogy and generalization. In many ways, mathematics provides the paradigm for a general theory of analogical arguments. Chapter 7 presents a top-down justification of analogical reasoning based on the assumption that scientists seek to promote epistemic values such as theoretical unification, simplicity, and fruitfulness. In making an initial assessment of plausibility, analogical reasoning achieves an optimal balance between these values. Chapter 8 develops an alternative bottom-up justification based on appeal to symmetry: like problems demand like solutions. Symmetry acts as a constraint upon our reasoning, and it lies at the heart of every analogical argument. This chapter also connects analogical arguments to a Bayesian model of confirmation, showing that such arguments, if they satisfy our fundamental criteria, can help to establish nonnegligible prior probability. Most of the book pertains to analogical reasoning within science, and specifically within what Kuhn (1962) calls “normal science.” This restriction is lifted in chapter 9, which explores the prospects for expanding the theory to deal with revolutionary analogical arguments and analogical arguments outside of science. The chapter also explores connections between analogical arguments and other modes of reasoning (notably, thought experiments) and reviews the implications of my theory for empirical and computational work on analogical reasoning.
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2 Philosophical Theories
2.1 Introduction Three important objectives for any normative theory of analogical arguments are to characterize such arguments clearly, to propose guidelines for their evaluation, and to provide some form of philosophical justification. This chapter selectively reviews philosophical theories of analogy, with a focus on these objectives. There is some consensus among philosophers about the basic criteria for assessing analogical arguments. This consensus is reflected in commonsense principles such as the ones mentioned in section 1.6. Those principles allow us to speak of a commonsense model for evaluating analogical arguments. The first part of this chapter (sections 2.2 and 2.3) traces this model to Aristotle and explores its more sophisticated expression in Hesse (1966). Although I believe that Hesse’s model suffers from serious limitations, I regard my own theory as a refinement of hers. While there is some agreement about evaluation criteria, there is marked disagreement among philosophers about the best representation and justification for analogical arguments. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 concentrate on two distinct strategies. The first casts analogical argument in the mold of deductive inference. The second interprets it as a form of sampling or induction by enumeration. Each approach has merit but faces serious difficulties because it requires assumptions that apply only to certain types of analogical argument. In light of these difficulties, I suggest that to force analogical arguments into some simpler argument pattern is a mistake. Section 2.6 evaluates skeptical arguments purporting to show that no justification for analogical
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reasoning is possible. These skeptical arguments fail because they, too, misrepresent the logical structure (and the conclusion) of analogical arguments. One of the main themes of this chapter is that all three aspects of the problem of analogy are linked. We should not be satisfied with an unsystematic list of commonsense criteria, nor should we be optimistic about a philosophical justification that starts from a characterization that applies equally to bad and good analogical arguments. In the concluding section, I argue that refinements to the commonsense model and to the different approaches to justification point toward my own articulation model.
2.2 Aristotle on Analogy In many ways, Aristotle sets the stage for subsequent theories of analogical arguments. Some preliminary remarks will be helpful in discussing his ideas. First, it is important to distinguish between theory and practice. As Lloyd (1966) has pointed out, early Greek thinkers felt unconstrained in using colorful analogies to explain phenomena in such diverse areas as perception, meteorology, astronomy, and geography.1 Aristotle takes his predecessors to task for inferences based on superficial resemblances (Meteor 357a24, GA 752b25), yet he is at times vulnerable to the same criticism, as in his discussion of earthquakes (Meteor 366b14).2 I shall focus on Aristotle’s theoretical reflections about analogy, along with a few judicious examples. Second, although Aristotle employs the term “analogy” (analogia) and talks about analogical predication, he never talks about analogical reasoning or analogical arguments per se. As we shall see, however, he identifies two argument forms—the argument from example (paradeigma) and the argument from likeness (homoiotes)—both of which are closely related to what we now understand as an analogical argument. Third, we may properly attribute to Aristotle the view that analogical arguments are a species of plausibility argument. While Aristotle lacks the two conceptions of plausibility discussed in chapter 1, the term pithanon, which he applies to the argument from likeness (Topics 156b10), is commonly translated as plausible or persuasive.3 The principal examination of the argument from likeness is found in Topics, a work on dialectical reasoning. For Aristotle, “dialectical propositions” occupy territory between those that “admit of no doubt” and those to which “no one would assent” (Topics 104a7), while “dialectical problems” treat of “subjects that should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, nor yet be too far removed from it” (Topics 105a7). Furthermore, a dialectical thesis is the usual starting point for inquiry, which agrees well with the construal of prima facie plausibility developed in chapter 1. It seems
1. Lloyd’s book (1966) provides an outstanding survey and analysis of analogical reasoning in early Greek science. 2. See “The Articulation Model,” section 1.7. 3. There is less explicit textual support in the case of the paradeigma, but see note 5 (below).
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reasonable, then, to regard these two Aristotelian versions of analogical reasoning (especially the argument from likeness) as plausibility arguments. With these remarks in mind, let us turn to Aristotle’s discussion of the argument from example (paradeigma) and the argument from likeness or similarity (homoiotes). The argument from example is described in the Rhetoric and the Prior Analytics: “Enthymemes based upon example are those which proceed from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference” (Rhetoric 1402b15). To illustrate: Let A be evil, B making war against neighbours, C Athenians against Thebans, D Thebans against Phocians. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. Conviction of this is obtained from similar cases, e.g. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the Thebans. Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours, it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. (Pr. An. 69a1) Aristotle notes two differences between this argument form and induction (Pr. An. 69a15ff.): it “does not draw its proof from all the particular cases” (i.e., it is not a “complete” induction4), and it requires an additional (deductively valid) syllogism as the final step. The argument from example thus amounts to singlecase induction followed by deductive inference. Figure 2.1 shows the structure (using · for conjunction and ! for the conditional). Using the notation and terminology of section 1.4, S and T are the source and target domains, P is the positive analogy, and Q is the hypothetical analogy. P(S), Q(S) and P(T) are given. In Aristotle’s example, S is war between Phocians
S (source domain)
T (target domain)
(x)(P(x )→Q(x )) P(S) . Q(S)
P(T ) → Q(T ) P(T )
Q(T ) FIGURE 2.1. Argument from example. 4. Aristotle’s point here is that the paradeigma is not demonstrative; rather, it is a kind of incomplete or inferior syllogism.
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and Thebans, T is war between Athenians and Thebans, P is war between neighbors, and Q is evil. The first inference (dashed arrow) is inductive; the second and third (solid arrows) are deductive. I return to this analysis in section 2.5. For now, I simply assert that this is a crude analysis of analogical arguments, appropriate in very few cases. The paradeigma does, however, have the interesting feature of being amenable to an alternative analysis as a deductive argument form. Let us concentrate on Aristotle’s assertion, “we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil.” Instead of regarding this intermediate step as something reached by induction from a single case, we might instead regard it as a hidden presupposition. This transforms the paradeigma into a syllogistic argument with a missing (or enthymematic) premise, and our attention shifts to possible means for establishing that premise (with single-case induction as one such means). Construed in this way, Aristotle’s paradeigma argument foreshadows deductive analyses of analogical reasoning. Let us turn to the argument from likeness, which seems to be closer than the paradeigma to our contemporary understanding of analogical arguments.5 This form of argument receives considerable attention in Topics I 17 and I 18 and again in VIII 1. The most important passage is the following one. Try to secure admissions by means of likeness; for such admissions are plausible, and the universal involved is less patent; e.g. that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries is the same, so too perception of contraries is the same; or vice versa, that since the perception is the same, so is the knowledge also. This argument resembles induction, but is not the same thing; for in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments from likeness, what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall. (Topics 156b10–17) This passage occurs in a section offering general advice about framing dialectical arguments when confronting a somewhat skeptical interlocutor. In such situations, it is best not to make one’s argument depend upon securing agreement about any universal proposition. The argument from likeness is thus clearly distinct from the paradeigma, where the universal proposition plays an essential role as an intermediate step in the argument. The argument from likeness, though logically less straightforward than the paradeigma, is exactly the sort of analogical reasoning we want when we are unsure about underlying generalizations. It is much better suited than the paradeigma to assessing the conjectures that we might entertain in the early stages of an inquiry. To understand the argument from likeness more fully, note that Aristotle defines likeness in terms of shared attributes. Those things are called like which have the same attributes in every respect, and those which have more attributes the same than different, 5. Here I depart from Lloyd, who maintains that the paradeigma “clearly represents what we should call argument from analogy” (1966, 406).
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and those whose quality is one; and that which shares with another thing the greater number or the more important of the attributes . . . in respect of which things are capable of altering, is like that other thing. (Met 1018a15) In Topics I 17, Aristotle states that any shared attribute contributes some degree of likeness: “We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike” (Topics 108a13). Since Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for arguments based on superficial similarities, it is natural to ask whether Aristotle explains how to judge when the degree of likeness between two things is sufficiently great to warrant inferring a further likeness. In other words, when does the argument from likeness succeed? Aristotle wisely does not offer any answer! Still, a clue to what he might have thought is provided by the way he justifies particular arguments from likeness. As Lloyd (1966) has observed, Aristotle typically justifies such arguments by articulating a causal principle that governs the two phenomena being compared. For example, Aristotle explains the saltiness of the sea, by analogy with the saltiness of sweat, as a kind of residual earthy stuff exuded in natural processes such as heating. The common principle is this: “everything that grows and is naturally generated always leaves a residue, like that of things burnt, consisting in this sort of earth” (Meteor 358a17). From this method of justification, we might conjecture that Aristotle believes that the “important” similarities are those that enter into these general causal principles. Summarizing the foregoing discussion, Aristotle’s accounts of the two types of analogical argument offer little help with the problem of philosophical justification. The paradeigma has a clear logical structure, but one that is too crude to fit most analogical arguments. The argument from likeness is described in detail, but its foundations are not analyzed. By contrast, Aristotle’s theory provides us with important and influential criteria for the evaluation of analogical arguments. Four stand out: 1. The strength of an analogy depends upon the number of similarities. Aristotle thought that every shared attribute contributes a degree of similarity. This view is repeated in many later accounts of analogical reasoning. For instance, Mill (1843/1930) writes that every resemblance not known to be irrelevant “affords some degree of probability, beyond what would otherwise exist, in favour of the conclusion.” 2. Similarity reduces to identical properties and relations. Aristotle’s definition of likeness effectively reduces similarity to a conjunction of identical shared attributes. Many current theories of analogical reasoning make the same assumption. 3. Good analogies derive from underlying common causes or general laws. Aristotle frequently articulates a general causal principle that applies to both domains. Versions of this idea play an important part in many later accounts.
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4. A good analogical argument need not presuppose acquaintance with the underlying universal (generalization). This point distinguishes the argument from likeness and the argument from example. In general, analogical arguments do not depend upon our knowing the universal result in advance. If we did, we could rely on the generalization and dispense with the analogy. Nor must we articulate the underlying generalization as part of our argument. We can proceed directly from case to case. Many later theories agree on this last point. Mill writes that analogical arguments are evaluated “without any antecedent evidence of a connection” between the known resemblance and the further conjectured resemblance. Quine suggests that an analogy bypasses or “slurs over” an inductive generalization (Quine and Ullian 1970, 61). We might try to capture the generalization after the fact, but “the missing generalization is not always easy to supply” (62). These four principles form the core of a commonsense model for evaluating analogical arguments. Their sharpest contemporary expression is found in the work of Hesse, to which we now turn.
2.3 Hesse’s Theory Hesse’s classic, Models and Analogies in Science (1966), is a rich study of the role of analogies in theoretical confirmation and explanation. I focus here on chapters 2 and 3 of her book, which present criteria for plausibility and a discussion of the problem of justification.
Hesse’s Criteria In chapter 2 of her book, Hesse formulates three requirements that an analogical argument must satisfy in order to be acceptable:6 1. Requirement of material analogy. The horizontal relations must include similarities between observable properties. 2. Causal condition. The vertical relations must be causal relations “in some acceptable scientific sense” (1966, 87). 3. No-essential-difference condition. The essential properties and causal relations of the source domain must not have been shown to be part of the negative analogy. In addition, Hesse makes an important simplifying assumption:
6. The labels for these conditions are my own. I have substituted “source domain” and “target domain” for Hesse’s “model” and “explanandum.” See “Representation and Terminology,” section 1.4, for definitions of the horizontal and vertical relations, and of the positive and negative analogy.
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4. Similarity-identity reduction. All similarities can be resolved into relationships of identity and difference. Let us first discuss the simplifying assumption, and then the three requirements. SIMILARITY- IDENTITY REDUCTION .
Hesse supposes that in any analogical argument, the horizontal relations between the source and target domains can be adequately represented by a list of identities and differences. She offers the following argument: When similarities are recognized, they are described in some such way as, “Both analogues have property B, but whereas the first has property A, the second has instead property C.” It may be that when the nature of the similarity is pressed, it will be admitted that the analogues do not both have the identical property B, but two similar properties, say B and B´, in which case the analysis of the similarity of B and B´ repeats the same pattern. But if we suppose that at some point this analysis stops, with the open or tacit assumption that further consideration of difference between otherwise identical properties can be ignored, we have an analysis of similarity into relations of identity and difference. (1966, 70–71) The crucial premise of this argument is that at each step in the analysis, the only way to analyze similarity is in terms of near-identity and difference. Given that premise, the only possible stopping point for the analysis is when we are content to treat all nearly identical properties as identical. That implies a complete resolution of the original similarity into relations of identity and difference. I shall mention just two difficulties with Hesse’s argument. The first is that it is overly sanguine to suppose that the stopping point represents a situation where further differences can fairly “be ignored.” In practice, the advocate for an analogical argument often deliberately stops—indeed, often must stop—with identities that suppress important differences. A good illustration is provided by Reid’s argument for life on other planets (section 1.6). Reid begins by noting that Earth and other planets orbit and are illuminated by the sun, have moons, and rotate on an axis. This list of identities clearly suppresses differences in orbital distance, levels of radiation, numbers and sizes of moons, and rates of rotation. The right stopping point in the analysis of similarity may be a matter of dispute. The issue needs to be addressed by a good theory of analogical arguments. The second difficulty is that, contrary to Hesse’s key premise, alternative analyses of similarity may be available. This point is clearest for mathematical analogies. There are numerous similarities between two- and three-dimensional objects. For example, the formulas for the area and perimeter of a rectangle are similar to those for the volume and surface area of a box. These similarities are best expressed not by any list of identities and differences but, rather, by noting that the formulas are instances of a common generalization.
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In short, the assumption that similarity can be unproblematically reduced to identities and differences is legitimate in important special cases, but should not be taken as generally valid. REQUIREMENT OF MATERIAL ANALOGY. Hesse insists that an acceptable analogical argument must include “observable similarities” between domains, which she refers to as material analogy. Material analogy is contrasted with formal analogy. Two domains are formally analogous if both are “interpretations of the same formal theory” (68). Heat and fluid flow exhibit formal analogy because the relevant physical laws have a common mathematical form. As a more pedestrian example, Hesse cites a political analogy, likening the relationship between a state and its citizens to the relationship between a father and his children. A purely formal analogy between two domains involves abstract similarities between relations within the source domain and relations within the target domain. By contrast, material analogy between two domains consists of what Hesse calls “observable” or “pre-theoretic” similarities, by which she means similarities that can be known independently of relations within the target domain (69). For example, in drawing an analogy between sound and light, we might begin by noting similarities between echoes and reflection. These similarities are accessible even without any detailed theory about the nature of light. Hesse’s requirement of material analogy puts her in opposition to most recent computational theories of analogical reasoning. As we shall see in chapter 3, a popular approach takes high-level relational correspondences or “systematicity” to be the heart and soul of analogical reasoning. Setting aside this debate for the moment, let us examine Hesse’s requirement. It is puzzling that Hesse should take this hard line against purely formal analogies. The puzzle dissolves, however, once we realize that, in Hesse’s view, an analogical inference transfers information from a well-understood source domain to a target about which very little is known. For Hesse, we generally have no theory of the target domain—and specifically, no theoretical knowledge of the vertical relations among objects in the target. If we had sufficient theoretical knowledge of the target to construct a formal isomorphism, then we could indeed “transfer” information from the source domain, but this would not constitute genuine analogical reasoning. There would be no novel or predictive use of the analogy; the transferred information would be derivable from what we already knew about the target, independently of the analogy. By contrast, in a case of genuine analogical reasoning, we begin with lowlevel observable similarities, such as those between echoes and reflection. These similarities (Hesse’s material analogy) suggest further correspondences, such as those between pitch and color, or between volume and brightness. We now make novel predictions: knowledge of mathematical formulas relating these parameters for the case of sound can be transferred to analogous relationships for light. Formal analogy is the end result, not the starting point, of analogical reasoning. I think that this reflects Hesse’s view and explains her motivation for the requirement of material analogy.
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There are compelling reasons to reject these assumptions about analogical reasoning and to drop the requirement of material analogy. First, it is apparent that formal analogies are the starting point in many important analogical inferences. That is certainly true in mathematics, a field in which material analogy, in Hesse’s sense, plays no role at all. Analogical arguments based on formal analogy have also been extremely influential in physics (Steiner 1989, 1998). Second, Hesse faces great difficulty in justifying the weight she attaches to “pre-theoretic” similarities. There is no positive argument for giving our naı¨ve judgments of resemblance a privileged status. This leads us to the third and most important point. Hesse’s model of analogical reasoning assumes too little knowledge of the target domain. Often, an analogical argument is employed to extend our theoretical knowledge of the target domain. The similarities that constitute the basis of the analogy need not be independent of our theories about the target. In fact, Hesse’s “pre-theoretic” associations may be less arbitrary if incorporated into a partial theory of the target. CAUSAL CONDITION .
Hesse requires that the hypothetical analogy, the feature transferred to the target domain, be causally related to the positive analogy. In her words, the essential requirement for a good argument from analogy is “a tendency to co-occurrence”—that is, a causal relationship. She states the requirement as follows: “The vertical relations in the model [source] are causal relations in some acceptable scientific sense, where there are no compelling a priori reasons for denying that causal relations of the same kind may hold between terms of the explanandum [target]” (1966, 87). Actually, this statement combines the causal condition with Hesse’s noessential-difference condition, to be discussed shortly. The causal condition rules out analogical arguments where there is no causal knowledge of the source domain. It derives support from the observation that many analogies do appear to involve a transfer of causal knowledge. The causal condition is on the right track but, like Hesse’s other conditions, is too restrictive. The main difficulty is that the “tendency to co-occurrence,” as a characteristic of good analogical arguments, embraces more than causal connection. For example, the causal condition rules out analogical arguments in mathematics. Even if we limit attention to the empirical sciences, persuasive analogical arguments may be founded upon strong statistical correlation in the absence of any known causal connection. Consider Benjamin Franklin’s prediction that pointed metal rods would attract lightning, by analogy with the way they attracted the “electrical fluid” in the laboratory: Electrical fluid agrees with lightning in these particulars: 1. Giving light. 2. Color of the light. 3. Crooked direction. 4. Swift motion. 5. Being conducted by metals. 6. Crack or noise in exploding. 7. Subsisting in water or ice. 8. Rending bodies it passes through. 9. Destroying animals. 10. Melting metals. 11. Firing inflammable substances. 12. Sulphureous smell.—The electrical fluid is attracted by points.—We do not know
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whether this property is in lightning.—But since they agree in all the particulars wherein we can already compare them, is it not probable they agree likewise in this? Let the experiment be made. (Franklin 1941, 334) Franklin’s hypothesis was based on a long list of properties common to the target (lightning) and source (electrical fluid in the laboratory). There was no known causal connection between the twelve “particulars” and the thirteenth property, but there was a strong correlation. In light of these observations, we should admit that analogical arguments may be plausible even where there are no known causal relations. NO - ESSENTIAL - DIFFERENCE CONDITION . Hesse’s final requirement is that the “essential properties and causal relations of the [source] have not been shown to be part of the negative analogy” (1966, 91). Hesse does not provide a definition of “essential,” but suggests that a property or relation is essential if it is “causally closely related to the known positive analogy.” For instance, an analogy with fluid flow was extremely influential in developing the theory of heat conduction. Once it was discovered that heat was not conserved, however, the analogy became unacceptable (according to Hesse) because conservation was so central to the theory of fluid flow. Although this requirement appears plausible, once again it is too restrictive. It can lead to the rejection of a good analogical argument. Consider once again the analogy between a two-dimensional rectangle and a three-dimensional box. Broadening Hesse’s notion from causal to logical relationships, it seems that there are many “essential” differences between rectangles and boxes. For instance, a line can divide a rectangle, but not a box, into two disconnected sets. This does not mean that we should reject every analogy between rectangles and boxes out of hand. The problem derives from the fact that Hesse’s condition is applied to the analogy relation independently of the use to which that relation is put. What counts as essential should vary with the analogical argument. Absent an inferential context, it is impossible to evaluate the importance or “essentiality” of similarities and differences. Taking this point a little further, Hesse’s requirement has the following counterintuitive consequence: the less extensive the positive analogy, the stronger the argument is likely to be. As the positive analogy expands, more properties of the source become essential on Hesse’s account, and the risk of an essential disanalogy increases. That is just what happens in the case of the analogy between heat and fluids. This consequence is counterintuitive because, all things being equal, a broad positive analogy contributes to the plausibility of an analogical argument. REFINING THE COMMONSENSE MODEL . Even though I reject Hesse’s assumption about similarity and her requirement of material analogy, I think that much is right about her “commonsense” theory. I have suggested replacing her causal condition with a more general requirement that the vertical relations in the source domain may be causal, logical, statistical, or other relations that reflect a “tendency to co-occurrence.” I have argued that her no-essential-difference
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condition should be refined so that evaluation of what is essential depends upon the individual analogical argument. In the concluding section, I shall argue that these observations move us toward the principles of my own theory: prior association and potential for generalization. The remainder of the chapter discusses the problem of formulating a justification for analogical arguments, first in Hesse’s work and then in other philosophical accounts.
Hesse’s Analysis of Justification Hesse is rather pessimistic about the prospects for providing a philosophical foundation for the argument from analogy (1966, 55). Her discussion of the problem, in her chapter 3, is very limited. One puzzling limitation is that the discussion makes no mention of Hesse’s own criteria for good analogical arguments. The challenge she poses amounts to finding a justification for every analogical argument that conforms to schema (1.4.1), rather than just those that satisfy her criteria.7 Such a justification would prove too much, as Hesse should accept given her suspicions about purely formal analogies. Rather than review her discussion at length, I concentrate on one argument that illustrates her approach to matters of justification. She raises the following problem (1966, 101–102): why is it more reasonable to select a hypothesis based on a model (i.e., on an analogy) than one that is not? Putting things in terms of schema (1.4.1), suppose that Q is a feature known to hold in source domain S, with Q* conjectured to hold in the target T. Since Hesse identifies Q and Q*, let’s write Q(S) and Q(T ) for the hypotheses that Q holds in the source and target domains, respectively. The problem becomes: How can we show that it is more reasonable to accept the hypothesis Q(T ) than a rival hypothesis X(T ) that is not supported by any analogy? Hesse shows that some theories of confirmation provide a means of solving this problem. For example, drawing on Hempel’s theory of confirmation, Hesse shows that a single source domain S satisfying P(S) and Q(S) provides inductive support for the generalization ðxÞðPðxÞ→QðxÞÞ and hence, given P(T ), support for Q(T ). The first step is confirmation by an instance; the second step relies on Hempel’s Special Consequence Condition (which asserts that if E confirms H, then E confirms any logical consequence of H). By contrast, there is no inductive support for the rival generalization, ðxÞðPðxÞ→XðxÞÞ: Unfortunately, this justification is exceptionally weak. The strategy requires that we treat the analogical argument as single-case induction, an approach that
7. For schema (1.4.1), see chapter 1.
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I criticize (in section 2.5). Briefly, this analysis distorts the argument form by introducing an intermediate step (generalization from a single case) that is harder to justify than the original argument. Most of the purported justifications discussed by Hesse are of a similar nature. Hesse briefly explores the possibility of an a priori justification in her book (1966), but concludes that the required assumptions are too obscure. She returns to the a priori approach in a later work (1974). There, she adopts what she calls the “clustering postulate”—the assumption that our epistemic probability function ought to have a built-in bias toward generalization. Specifically, for any attributes P and Q, and for any finite set of objects a1, . . . , an having the attribute P, the prior probability of finding a proportion of these objects with attribute Q is skewed in favor of the proportions 1 and 0.8 The objections to such global postulates of uniformity are well known (see Salmon 1966), but it is significant that Hesse, after such lengthy reflections about analogical reasoning, should arrive at the view that an a priori approach is unavoidable. Still, the later approach of Hesse (1974) does not succeed. If Hesse’s “clustering postulate” could be defended, then once again we would have a justification for every analogical argument that conforms to schema (1.4.1). As I have stressed, that is much too strong a conclusion.
2.4 Analogy as Deduction A number of philosophers have suggested that, in at least some cases, background knowledge can be supplied to convert an analogical inference into a deductively valid argument. Some people believe that this is the most promising way to think about any analogical argument. Here I shall discuss two “deductivist” approaches. Russell and Davies’s model involves determination rules.9 Suppose that Q and P1, . . . ,Pm are variables, and we have background knowledge that the value of Q is determined by the values of P1, . . . ,Pm. In the simplest case, where m = 1 and both P and Q are binary Boolean variables, this reduces to ð2:4:1Þ
ðxÞðPðxÞ→QðxÞÞ _ ðxÞðPðxÞ→ QðxÞÞ;
that is, P determines whether or not Q holds. More generally, the form of a determination rule is ð2:4:2Þ
ðxÞðyÞ½ðP1 ðxÞ ¼ P1 ðyÞÞ. . .ðPm ðxÞ ¼ Pm ðyÞÞ→ðQðxÞ ¼ QðyÞÞ;
8. Readers will recognize, and Hesse explicitly acknowledges, Carnap as the inspiration for her “clustering postulate.” 9. These ideas are developed in Russell (1986a), Davies and Russell (1987), and Davies (1988).
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where x and y are quantified over a domain of objects. This can be represented more compactly in functional notation as ð2:4:3Þ
Q ¼ FðP1 ; . . . ; Pm Þ:
Such a relationship is called a determination rule. If we assume such a rule as part of our background knowledge, then there is a corresponding analogical argument that is deductively valid. If the source S matches the target T on all values Pi, then we may validly infer that Q (T ) = Q(S ). Adapting one of the examples given by Russell and Davies, let’s suppose that the value (Q ) of a used car (relative to a particular buyer) is determined by its year, make, mileage, condition, color, and accident history (the variables Pi). It doesn’t matter if one or more of these factors are redundant or irrelevant. Provided two cars are indistinguishable on each of these points, they will have the same value (again, keeping the buyer fixed). There is a deductively valid analogical argument from the determination rule together with the value of one such car to the value of the other car. Russell and Davies claim three virtues for their account. First, it makes the role of background knowledge explicit. Second, it provides a clear and simple justification for the analogical argument. Third, the determination rule does not trivialize the role of the analogy: only by combining that rule with information about the source domain can we derive the value of Q(T ). If our determination rule has the form of equation (2.4.1) and we want to infer Q (T ), we need the additional information that P(S).Q(S) holds in the source domain. Determination rules are interesting, and they can provide an illuminating analysis of some analogical arguments. But what promise do they hold for the justification of analogical arguments in general? Russell and Davies maintain that background knowledge of a determination rule underlies many of our analogical inferences. This assertion is questionable. Scientific analogies are commonly applied to problems where we do not possess useful determination rules. In many (perhaps most) cases, researchers are not aware of all relevant factors. Medical researchers conduct drug tests on animals without knowing all attributes that might be relevant to the effects of the drug. Indeed, one of the main objectives of such testing is to guard against reactions unanticipated by theory. The justification for animal testing is the somewhat vague belief that “the most important life-regulating building blocks are the same in both man and animal” (Kobinger 1989, 33). There is no presumption that we have a comprehensive list of these building blocks. Most physiological processes in humans and animals are still inadequately explained (Lembeck 1989, 24). The “determination rule” interpretation of analogical arguments must either limit the scope of such arguments to cases where we have a well-supported determination rule or focus attention on formulating and justifying an appropriate determination rule. For cases such as animal testing, neither option seems realistic. Weitzenfeld (1984) proposes the slightly more general thesis that analogical arguments are deductive arguments with a missing premise that typically
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amounts to a determination rule or relation. The main difference between his view and that of Russell and Davies is that he does not insist that the missing premise should be background knowledge. Instead, he suggests three ways in which the missing premise might be discovered and justified: enumeration, surveillance, and inference. Enumeration amounts to examining the source and target domains systematically. This process is “not promising” (146–47) because, in the course of such an examination, we are likely to find independent means for verifying or disproving the conclusion of the analogical argument, which then becomes redundant. Surveillance is a matter of perceiving that the same determining structures are present in both domains: “when an array of elements is displayed, either in a visual presentation or to other senses, an isomorphism may be immediately apparent” (147). The idea is that we have a holistic grasp of similarity that justifies the inference to particular similarities. But as Weitzenfeld concedes, “no one quite knows how it is done.” Finally, by inference Weitzenfeld appears to have in mind background theoretical considerations. In the case of drug testing on animals, for example, we have background knowledge of our common evolutionary history and similar functional organization. In the end, Weitzenfeld acknowledges, the premise that there are common determining relations is “based upon plausibility arguments” (148). If that is right, then we have come full circle. We have replaced an argument by analogy, requiring no commitment to any generalization, with a valid deductive argument that requires an extra premise that has to be supported with plausibility arguments. Recasting analogy as a deductive argument may help to bring out background assumptions, but it makes little headway with the problem of justification. That problem reappears as the need to establish the plausibility of the determination rule, and that is at least as difficult as justifying the original analogical argument. Despite the difficulties, there is a powerful intuition behind deductivist analyses of the argument from analogy. That intuition is symmetry. Two cases perfectly alike in all relevant attributes, such as two perfectly similar used cars, demand similar treatment. Can we rely upon symmetry to obtain a more realistic justification for analogical arguments, even for cases where we cannot assume that we have a determination rule? I say a little about this question in the concluding section of this chapter, and a lot more about it in chapter 8.
2.5 Analogy as Enumerative Induction Several philosophers have attempted to portray, and justify, analogical arguments in terms of some simpler inductive argument pattern. Here I consider two moderately popular strategies. The first treats analogical reasoning as generalization from a single case; the second treats it as a kind of sampling argument.
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Single-case Induction As we saw earlier, Aristotle’s argument from example (paradeigma) consists of generalization from a single case (the source) followed by a trivial deductive inference to the target case (see figure 2.1). I believe that this is a poor way to think about most analogical arguments, but let’s give it a hearing. As a preliminary point of clarification, we restrict our attention here to analogical arguments based on a single case. Historically, many people, including Hume (1739/1978) and Keynes (1921), refer to the “argument from analogy” even where there are multiple instances of a single type. There is no clear separation between arguments from analogy and those based on enumerative induction. If we accept the latter form of reasoning, then analogical arguments are (uninterestingly) justified whenever we have a sufficient number and variety of instances. My focus, however, remains the problem of justifying an analogical argument based on a single case, and I limit discussion accordingly. Can a single instance lead to justified generalization? It can. Cartwright argues that we can sometimes generalize from a single careful experiment: [In] the best experimental designs, where we have sufficient control of the materials and our knowledge of the requisite background assumptions is secure, one single instance can be enough . . . Clearly, in these physics experiments we are prepared to assume that the situation before us is of a very special kind: it is a situation in which the behaviour that occurs is repeatable. Whatever happens in this situation can be generalized. (1992, 51) If a sample of a chemical compound dissolves in water or some other solution, we justifiably infer that any sample of that compound will be soluble under similar conditions. We know from experience that compounds have stable natures that comprise properties like solubility. If the property belongs to one sample, then it belongs to all. What are the “requisite background assumptions?” In Cartwright’s view, we must presuppose permanent, Aristotelian natures. In a similar spirit, Quine (1969) maintains that we can have instantial confirmation only for natural kinds. Kyburg attempts a general characterization of the required background knowledge for single-case generalization: A species S falls under a certain genus G; a property P belongs to a certain class of properties K. On the basis of previous knowledge, we know that all the species of that genus G are such that if one member of that species has a given property belonging to that class of properties [K ], then all members of that species have that same property. (1970, 121) Typically, this means that members of G are natural kinds and properties in K are essential properties of the kinds in G.
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Based on the foregoing, the objection to understanding all analogical arguments as single-case induction should be obvious: it is simply too restrictive. Some analogical arguments may fit this pattern, but not most. In fact, successful analogical arguments may lead to the discovery of a natural kind, as we shall see in section 6.2. But we don’t know that we are dealing with a natural kind when we make the original analogical argument. Interpreting the argument from analogy as single-case generalization is also counterproductive in another way. The analysis does little to advance the search for criteria that help us to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant similarities, and hence between good and bad analogical arguments.
Sampling Arguments On the sampling conception of analogical arguments, acknowledged similarities between two domains are statistically relevant evidence for further similarities. The most direct version of the sampling argument is due to Mill. An argument from analogy, he writes, is “a competition between the known points of agreement and the known points of difference.” Agreement of A and B in 9 out of 10 properties implies a probability of 0.9 that B will possess any other property of A: “we can reasonably expect resemblance in the same proportion” (Mill 1843/1930, 367). His only restriction has to do with sample size: we must be relatively knowledgeable about both A and B. If the extent of unascertained properties of A and B is large, similarity in a small sample is not a reliable guide. Thus, Mill rejects Reid’s argument that, on the basis of a few gross similarities between earth and moon, there is an appreciable probability of life on the moon. When we consider how “unmeasurably multitudinous are those of their properties which we are entirely ignorant of,” we must attach little importance to the few known similarities. By contrast, Mill saw no difficulty in using analogical reasoning to infer characteristics of newly discovered species of plants or animals, given our extensive knowledge of botany and zoology.10 A slightly more elaborate form of the sampling argument, presented by Harrod (1956), is based on the following idea. The known properties of S (the source domain) may be considered a random sample of all S’s properties— random, that is, with respect to the attribute of also belonging to T (the target domain). If the majority of known properties that belong to S also belong to T, then we should expect most other properties of S to belong to T, for it is unlikely that we would have come to know just the common properties. Harrod indicates his reliance on what he calls the fair sampling postulate, which amounts to the supposition that if the proportion of B’s in a large population of A’s is p, then the chance that a random sample of size n contains n exactly r B’s is given by the binomial distribution, ð Þpr ð1 pÞnr . r
10. In Mill’s defense, we should note that elsewhere he rejects this crude similarity measure and states that the probability value is usually “non-assignable.” Mill also develops a justification of analogy along lines similar to Keynes’s principle of the limitation of independent variety, a contribution explicitly acknowledged by Keynes (1921, 268).
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The sort of problem to which this distribution standardly applies is drawing balls from an urn. The binomial distribution gives the chance of drawing r black balls in n selections (with replacement) from an urn in which the proportion of black balls is p. Applied to the argument from analogy, Harrod defines the “population” as all observable features of the two domains and the “sample” as the actually observed features of the source domain. If most properties in the sample are shared by both systems, and if we assume the fair sampling postulate, then simple combinatorial reasoning sanctions the inference that the two domains have further observable similarities. To illustrate, Harrod asks us to imagine that we have observed 26 features of one cat and 13 of a second cat. All 13 happen to be shared with the first cat. On the hypothesis that just those 13 features and no more are shared, what has been “samples” of 13 features would observed is highly improbable: only one out of 26 13 be a perfect match. Hence, the hypothesis that there are further similarities becomes probable. Of course, this argument does not justify our inferring any specific additional similarity (the usual conclusion of an argument from analogy). There are grave difficulties with Harrod’s and Mill’s analyses. One obvious problem, noted earlier, is that the “population” is poorly defined. How are we to count similarities and differences? The ratio of shared to total known properties varies dramatically according to how we do this. Should properties logically implied by other properties be counted? Should some properties be weighted more heavily than others? Even Peirce, a staunch advocate of the view that induction and analogy were both “essentially inferences from sampling”, acknowledged an element of guesswork in estimating which properties are significant (Peirce, Hartshorne, and Weiss 1931–1935, 6: 31 and 6:526). If we can add similarities or differences at will, then these arguments yield inconsistent results. Sampling arguments have no value without guidelines for counting similarities, or better, a theory of relevance. A second serious difficulty lies in justifying the assumption that the sample of known features is random. The paradigm of repeated selection from an urn seems totally inappropriate. In the case of the urn, the selection process is arranged so that the result of each choice is not influenced by the agent’s intentions or purposes, or by prior choices. There is good reason to believe that samples are randomly selected. By contrast, the presentation of an analogical argument is always partisan. Bias enters into the initial representation of similarities and differences: the advocate highlights similarities, while the critic plays up differences. We have excellent reasons to reject a distribution based on random sampling. A final and somewhat more promising version of the sampling argument, owing to Stuart Russell (1988), avoids some of the difficulties just discussed. Russell’s innovation is to incorporate his ideas about determination rules (section 2.4). He is well aware of the problem of biased representation. Provided we have a fixed list that includes all determining factors, however, he shows how it is possible to make comparative use of a sampling argument. We can adjudicate between competing analogical arguments. The key idea is that the most similar source domain, measured in terms of the number of known matches on our fixed list, is “most likely to match the target on
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the properties which are relevant to the query even though the identity of those properties is unknown” (1988, 257). Greater similarity increases the likelihood that the relevant determining factors are included among the set of shared features. In more detail, suppose that the different source domains and the target are described by assigning values to m attribute variables P1, . . . ,Pm, and we know the value of the variable Q for the sources but not the target domain. Russell’s argument relies upon two crucial assumptions: 1. All features relevant to the value of Q appear among P1, . . . ,Pm. These features determine the value of Q. Thus, the “fixed list” is P1, . . . ,Pm. 2. Given no further information, we may assume each variable Pi is equally likely to be relevant (i.e., one of the determining factors for Q ). Now suppose that exactly r of the attributes on our list are relevant to Q. Given any source domain, let s be the number of attributes Pi such that Pi has the same value (a match) in the source and the target. Russell takes s to be the degree of similarity between source and target. Let Pr(s,r) be the probability that a source with similarity s to the target matches it on the r relevant attributes. By (2), we have s r Prðs; rÞ ¼ : m r The higher the number of similarities, the greater the chance of a perfect match on all relevant attributes. Furthermore, if source and target match on all relevant attributes, then by assumption 1, above, they also match on Q. This measure allows us to compare different source domains and select the best one. Russell’s argument makes it unnecessary to assume that we have a random sample of properties, but it still fails to solve the counting problem. The list of attributes Pl, . . . ,Pm includes factors both relevant and irrelevant to Q. Unless this list is fixed in some nonarbitrary manner, the probability values change when we add irrelevant attributes. The ordinal ranking of different sources by number of matches will be similarly sensitive. In addition, Russell’s argument depends upon the knowledge that our list of attributes is complete—that is, sufficient to determine the value of Q. As pointed out in section 2.4, analogies are often used in situations where we lack such knowledge.
2.6 Skeptical Objections Hesse’s reluctance in Models and Analogies in Science (1966) to probe deeply into the question of justification may reflect pessimism about the prospects for success, but she clearly believes that analogies play an important part in scientific inquiry. Agassi (1964, 1988) goes beyond pessimism. He formulates two skeptical arguments that purport to show that most analogical arguments cannot be justified. In his view, they show nothing at all except in the special case
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where we have two isomorphic systems of laws and we transfer consequences from one system to the other. In such cases, which Agassi calls “hard analogies,” the analogical argument is deductively valid. The remaining “soft analogies” have no value. Agassi’s thesis, more specifically, is that all “soft” arguments by analogy are either ad hoc or redundant. Agassi’s first skeptical argument relies upon the idea that analogical arguments amount to single-case generalization.11 He illustrates with a simple example. Tom is an Englishman and tall. Dick is an Englishman; so, by analogy, Dick is also tall. If this argument is warranted, then so is the inference that Harry, another Englishman, is tall. “In other words, all Englishmen are tall.” We cannot arbitrarily discriminate between Dick and Harry; we must give some reason—that Harry, unlike Tom and Dick, did not drink milk as a child. “In other words, all Englishmen who drank milk in childhood are tall.” In general, if P represents the positive analogy, Q is the hypothetical analogy, and T stands for the target domain, then P provides a warrant for Q(T ) just in case it provides a warrant for the generalization ðxÞðPðxÞ→QðxÞÞ But this generalization either has already been accepted on the basis of independent evidence, in which case the analogy is redundant, or is based on a single instance, in which case it is ad hoc. As pointed out earlier, it is misleading to construe analogical arguments as requiring an intermediate step of generalization from a single case. Let’s take a closer look at this point, which is plainly crucial to Agassi’s argument. Agassi commits a straightforward fallacy in supposing that a warrant for each instance of a generalization is also a warrant for the generalization. This supposition is a form of epistemic closure, and it fails for any argument form whose conclusions are probabilistic. The simplest illustration is the Lottery Paradox: in a large lottery, evidence warrants the inference that my ticket will lose, your ticket will lose, and so on. But it does not warrant the generalization that every ticket will lose. Since the conclusion of an analogical argument is a claim about plausibility, we should expect closure to fail. Agassi’s second skeptical argument starts from the observation that analogies are always proposed within a context of background assumptions. Spelling out this context is a crucial step in evaluating an analogical argument, as is clear from the example of the milk-drinking Englishmen. Agassi’s argument now proceeds: 1. There is no utterly context-less analogy. 2. Analogical arguments rely on methodological essentialism. 3. Methodological essentialism is false. Premise 1 asserts that for any analogical argument, important assumptions will remain in the background. The other two premises rely upon “methodological essentialism.” By “essentialism,” Agassi means the view that there are natural 11. This argument is first presented in Agassi (1964), but is repeated in the later article.
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kinds. Methodological essentialism is the assumption that human intuition reliably identifies natural kinds (1988, 417). Here is my interpretation of Agassi’s argument. Premise 1 asserts the existence of residual factors (the “context”) in any analogical argument. Premise 2 equates the assumption that those residual factors can safely be ignored with the assumption that the source and target domains belong to a common natural kind. Finally, we have premise 3, for which Agassi provides a very terse argument: “evolutionism makes the natural classification both open-ended and (ecological) context-dependent.” The point here is that our classification systems are heavily dependent on how we have evolved and on changing human purposes. We have no justification for the assumption of a common natural kind in any particular case because there is no reason to think that we have reliable intuitions about natural kinds in general. In responding to Agassi, we could criticize premise 3, which is not adequately defended. Instead, I shall concentrate on premise 2. As a preliminary observation, there is a strong prima facie case against Agassi’s claim that methodological essentialism is an indispensable assumption. The case law system provides an excellent example of a well-functioning system guided by analogical reasoning without any reliance upon methodological essentialism. Analogical arguments are also ubiquitous in mathematics (Polya 1954), a setting in which intuitions about natural kinds are not pertinent. These counter-examples suggest that we should re-examine Agassi’s analysis. We want a justification for analogical arguments that shows why methodological essentialism is unnecessary. Although we are not yet in a position to provide such a justification, we can clear the way for one by identifying the mistakes in Agassi’s argument. We need one new bit of terminology. As always, let P stand for the positive analogy between the source and target domains, and Q for the hypothetical analogy. I have argued that for a good analogical argument, we must suppose that there is some connection between P and Q—this is the prior association (see section 2.3). Let’s focus on the special case where the connection can be stated as a universal generalization. Let us call a generalization, ð2:6:1Þ
ðxÞððPðxÞ:CðxÞÞ→QðxÞÞ
a supporting generalization if C is common to the source and target. (A true supporting generalization guarantees a successful analogical argument.) There are more complex forms of prior association, but this one is sufficient for responding to Agassi. Our criticism of Agassi’s first argument is that we need not commit ourselves to any particular supporting generalization when we argue by analogy. We might believe that there is some generalization that links drinking milk and becoming tall, but refuse to commit ourselves to any particular claim of the form (2.6.1). It suffices that we take seriously the possibility that some supporting generalization holds. This simple observation is also the key to answering Agassi’s second argument. Even if we lack a reliable instinct about natural
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kinds, Agassi’s argument provides no reason to assign negligible probability to the existence of some supporting generalization. In order to explain this point, let’s consider an example. Suppose we are considering a new antibiotic that has proved to be effective on laboratory mice. The source domain is the mice undergoing the tests; the target domain is humans. Let P designate certain features taken to be common to mice and humans. Let Q signify recovery from infection. Let C consist of unspecified further properties of mice that, together with P, determine the positive response Q.12 We infer by analogy that, plausibly, humans who take the antibiotic will respond positively. It may be that there is a true supporting generalization; the factors in C may be common to mice and humans. Alternatively, there may be no supporting generalization. The first possibility is favorable to our analogical argument; the second is not. Agassi’s premise 2 could be motivated by two lines of reasoning: 1. Zero probability. Without methodological essentialism, there is no justification for assigning other than zero or infinitesimal probability to the favorable case that a supporting generalization is true. 2. Negligible probability. Without methodological essentialism, the favorable case has such a small positive probability that the risks of being guided by the analogy—and adopting the working hypothesis that humans might respond well to the medication—outweigh the possible benefits. Either way, the idea is that the favorable case lacks prima facie plausibility. Both lines of reasoning can be represented by the simple decision table shown in figure 2.2. The expectation if we adopt the working hypothesis is pB – (1 – p)C. A skeptic about analogical arguments holds that p is always either zero or so small that this quantity is negative. We always do better to reject the analogy (and the working hypothesis). Many Bayesians advocate strict coherence (or regularity), the policy that we should assign extreme probability values 0 and 1 only to contradictions and
Adopt the working hypothesis Don't adopt the working hypothesis
Supporting generalization p
No supporting generalization 1–p
Benefit: B
Loss: – C
No benefit/loss
No benefit/loss
FIGURE 2.2. Adopting a working hypothesis.
12. Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a deterministic response to the medication.
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logical or mathematical truths. But this policy does not get us very far. If our point is to show that a particular hypothesis has appreciable probability, we cannot be content with an appeal to strict coherence. Agassi’s argument, however, appears to be that without appealing to instincts about natural kinds, there is no way to justify the assignment of appreciable probability to the existence of a supporting generalization. Indeed, the “negligible probability” argument seems to be a good way of construing Agassi’s concerns. His discomfort with reasoning by analogy is that it is a bad gamble: In this situation one is, or may be, on the verge of a great scientific breakthrough, so that one vacillates between the highest stakes and total loss. (1988, 404) The fascination, thus, is that of the gambler. What proposes that the gambler’s chances are better when the stakes are the values of analogies is the theory of natural classification, which proposes that we have an intuition leading us to the final, context-free, perfect analogy. This theory, methodological essentialism, is false. (1988, 417) What is missing here is an evaluation of costs and benefits. Agassi neglects the fact that rejection of all working hypotheses has its own high cost: no progress can be made at all. By contrast, if we employ analogies or some other means of selecting a plausible hypothesis, there is a chance of significant gain in the form of a “great scientific breakthrough.” Agassi also seems to overestimate the potential loss in adopting a working hypothesis that turns out to be false. To adopt a working hypothesis, as discussed in chapter 1, is to accept it in a very limited sense. In the example we have been discussing, the analogy might lead us to conduct further tests on the new antibiotic. The cost if the hypothesis turns out to be false is significant, but it is not the “total loss” or disaster we might face if we started mass-producing and marketing the drug (and it had unforeseen side effects). As noted above, Agassi’s view requires that the expected value of any working hypothesis supported by analogy must be negative. That assumption is unjustified, in part because the expected value calculation is impossible to perform, and in part because even an informal weighing of costs and benefits does not clearly tell against analogical arguments. I conclude that the way is open for a justification of analogical arguments that is not vulnerable to Agassi’s objections. To develop a convincing constructive justification, however, we first need to provide criteria for discriminating between good and bad analogical arguments and to show that these criteria do not depend on methodological essentialism. That is my objective in chapters 4 through 6. We also need to shift our attention from individual analogical arguments to epistemic policies. Agassi’s policy is universal mistrust: he advocates rejection of all (soft) analogical arguments. An alternative policy is critical analogical reasoning: employ analogical arguments that satisfy certain criteria. In chapter 7, I develop this policy-level justification in detail.
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2.7 Conclusion We should not force all analogical arguments into the mold of deduction or enumerative induction. To do so is both to distort them and to destroy any hope of making real progress on the problem of justification. It is striking that the assessment of which similarities are relevant, a standard step in the evaluation of any analogical argument, has no place in Hesse’s attempted justifications, the reduction to single-case generalization, or the “sampling” approach. Deductive approaches face the opposite problem: they presuppose full knowledge of all relevant similarities. Any approach to justification that leaves no room for critical assessment of relevance is doomed. The main weakness of the approaches we have discussed derives from the idea that the best general characterization of an analogical argument is something like schema (1.4.1): a list of similarities and differences between our two domains. This representation provides no basis for discriminating between relevant and irrelevant similarities. If that is the best we can do, then any general philosophical justification must avoid the whole question of relevant similarity. That is just what happens with most existing approaches to justification, and it explains why they are bound to fall short. We need a better representation of analogical arguments, and correspondingly more refined evaluation criteria, if we are to make headway on the problem of justification. In chapter 1 and again in section 2.3, I suggested that good analogical arguments must satisfy the following criterion: • Prior Association. There must be some connection in the source domain between the known similarities P (the positive analogy) and the further similarity Q that is projected to hold for the target domain. • Potential for Generalization. There must be some evidence for, and no compelling evidence against, the generalization of this prior association to the target domain. The principle of prior association tells us what is missing from schema (1.4.1). We represent an analogical argument not merely by listing similarities and differences, but also by indicating a prior association. The principle of potential for generalization guides us in comparing two domains to determine which similarities and differences are relevant. These two criteria form the core of my theory of analogical arguments, developed in later chapters. With these principles in place, we are in a better position to think about the justification of analogical reasoning. We need only show that some analogical arguments—namely, those that satisfy the two criteria—are justified. If we have evidence for some connection between P and Q, and no compelling reason to think that disanalogies prevent this connection from being generalized to a class that includes the target domain, then it seems that we have a promising basis for seriously considering the hypothesis Q* (the analogue of Q ).
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In this chapter, we have seen clues about two possible forms of justification for analogical arguments. Our response to Agassi outlined a pragmatic approach to justification, based on the costs and benefits of adopting a working hypothesis. This idea is elaborated in chapter 7. Chapter 8 develops the idea that analogical reasoning is founded on symmetry arguments. Rather than establishing or presupposing a determination rule, as Russell and Weitzenfeld require, good analogical arguments depend upon the simple idea that like problems should be treated alike. In my view, the link between analogy and symmetry is the legitimate core of the “deductivist” analysis of analogical reasoning. Russell’s example of two used cars provides a simple illustration. If two used cars are indistinguishable as regards every attribute that I take to be relevant to establishing a fair price, then I should assign them the same value. More generally, to insist upon a prior association is to require that in a successful analogy there be a relationship, in the source domain, linking the positive analogy P and the feature Q to be transferred to the target. A successful analogical argument isolates the relevant properties and shows that we have a basis for thinking the same sort of relationship obtains in the target. That basis is symmetry. The two projects of finding criteria of plausibility and providing a philosophical foundation for analogical arguments come together.
3 Computational Theories
3.1 Introduction Cognitive science and AI researchers have long recognized the importance of analogical reasoning in a wide range of human activities. In the past forty years, people have written computer programs that use analogies to solve problems, “understand” stories, make discoveries, and even provide cooking advice. A number of authors have suggested that such programs can contribute to our understanding of analogical reasoning as used in the sciences. Ideally, each AI program is based on a computational theory or model of analogy: a set of assumptions, precise enough to implement in a computer program, about how the process of analogical reasoning does or should take place. In practice, these theories analyze restricted aspects of analogical reasoning and the assumptions are made only partly explicit. Furthermore, as those in the field readily acknowledge, some programs work on only “a handful of carefully chosen examples” (Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gentner 1989/90, 2). In return for this limitation in scope, the principal gain is the ability to exploit detailed knowledge about the problem areas. Our main question in this chapter is whether computational theories are broad enough to provide genuine insight into the sort of analogical reasoning that occurs in the sciences. To this end, we selectively review a number of analogical reasoning programs. Most computational theories of analogy fall into two camps, which I call the structuralist and case-based views. We shall discuss a few examples of each type. On the structuralist view, analogies are founded on parallel representations of knowledge about two domains. For an ideal analogy, these representations are isomorphic, and the value of an
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analogy is measured by the degree to which it approximates isomorphism. Within the structuralist camp, there is a division between connectionist and symbolic (propositional) approaches to representing knowledge structures, but the ideal of isomorphism unites these computational theories. The alternative case-based view models analogies on the idea that two domains share a cluster of salient, or relevant, dimensions. These are characteristics we know to have been associated in the past with outcomes of interest or to have semantically interesting links to those outcomes. The strength of an analogy depends upon the extent of relevant overlap between the source and target domains. This approach has something in common with the sampling conception of analogy discussed in chapter 2, but as we shall see, case-based reasoners solve the “counting problem” by working with a predefined set of relevant features. Both approaches attempt to model the way humans use known solutions to solve new problems. Structuralist and case-based approaches differ in three main respects: • Scope. Structuralist programs tend to be general-purpose analogical reasoners. They can find and utilize analogies in virtually any context. By contrast, case-based reasoners are typically narrow; they work within a bounded “region” of fairly similar cases—that is, a set of cases whose most important features can be adequately described using a finite and preestablished vocabulary.1 • Flexibility of knowledge representation. Structuralist programs employ a general-purpose representation of data about the source and target domains, such as some form of predicate calculus or connectionist architecture. Accordingly, information is stored as sentences in a formal language or as patterns of activation over “semantic units.” Typically, there are many ways to describe the two domains in the formal language, and few guidelines for choosing between different representations. The main alternative, used in case-based reasoning (CBR), is to represent domains, or cases, with a set of stereotypes that provide a uniform way to store information. For example, a stereotype for visiting a restaurant includes placeholders for the usual objects or agents we expect to find (waiters, tables, food), the usual goals we might have (to get a meal, to entertain a date), and the usual sequence of events likely to take place (calling the waiter, ordering a drink; see Barr and Feigenbaum 1981, 216). A particular case of visiting a restaurant is described by filling in some or all of these placeholders with definite values. Stereotypes may be
1. Cognitive science authors sometimes reserve the term “analogical reasoning” for inter-domain comparisons, such as between heat and fluids, while “case-based reasoning” refers to intra-domain comparisons, as between two meal plans or two legal cases involving contract violation (Seifert 1988, 125). Since the two types of comparison are clearly related and since there is no sure way to tell them apart, I think it is preferable to view both as varieties of analogical reasoning.
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implemented in data structures known as scripts or frames. Choosing stereotypes ensures a uniform basis for comparing cases; however, it limits the scope of a program. • Treatment of relevance. On the structuralist approach, the relevance of a predicate or function is determined primarily by systematicity: the extent to which it enters into complex networks of relationships (though other criteria play roles as well). By comparison, CBR programs are oriented around a set of indices that includes every factor deemed to be relevant. For instance, in Hammond’s Chef program (Hammond 1989), each case is a recipe. Recipes are indexed both by the goals they satisfy (“include beef,” “make a stir-fry dish”) and by the problems they avoid (“too much liquid,” “too little leavening”). Cognitive science researchers have had a variety of purposes for developing computational models, and their associated computer programs. Early models tended to be oriented toward “understanding the basic constraints that govern human analogical thinking” (Hummel and Holyoak 1997, 458). More recent models, which seek to duplicate both the strengths and the weaknesses of human analogical thinking, are directed toward uncovering the psychological mechanisms that come into play when we use analogies. Almost without exception, these projects are descriptive; the objective is to construct psychologically realistic models of cognitive operations that involve analogies. By contrast, my project focuses on philosophical problems linked to the evaluation and justification of analogical arguments, with particular attention given to their use in scientific reasoning. My review of computational models will concentrate on their potential and their limitations for illuminating such problems. It is important to acknowledge, at the outset, that many of my criticisms may be traced at least in part to the fact that my aims diverge from the aims of the authors. With this point cleared up, I propose to use four criteria to evaluate the computational models. 1. Predictiveness is the extent to which a computational theory makes definite predictions about which analogies are more plausible than others. Advocates of computational philosophy of science point to the clarity and analytical rigor of computational theories as important virtues in their favor (Thagard 1988b), and it is certainly true that, at the level of the computer program, decisions are absolutely precise. As the preceding discussion shows, however, a computational theory of analogical reasoning includes not just the program but also the way input and requisite knowledge are represented by the user. Typically, this representation is guided by wholly or partially implicit conventions. The AI community has long been aware of this point. Predictiveness is concerned with whether the evaluation criteria embodied in both the program and the conventions about representation can be made explicit and yield a clear verdict about plausibility. The less clear the conventions about representation, and the more sensitive the program is
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to the details of representation, the weaker a theory’s claim to be predictive. 2. Applicability is a second important criterion for evaluating computational theories of analogy. Analogical reasoning, as we have emphasized, is used as a guide to making practical decisions. To be applicable, the evaluation criteria used by a program must be justified. Before we rely on the program, we need to be convinced that it uses reasonable procedures to discriminate between good and bad analogical reasoning. It is not enough that a program generates a “best” analogy from among those available. Even the best analogy may not be good enough to meet minimum standards for prima facie plausibility if the positive analogy between source and target domains is not sufficient. Applicability is thus a three-part criterion. It involves, first, a programmer’s definition of minimum standards for the problem area; second, an implementation of these standards in the program or representation conventions; and third, a philosophical or technical argument that the programmer’s definition is reasonable. 3. Scope has already been mentioned. A computational theory of analogy should apply to a large class of problems and explain diverse phenomena associated with analogical reasoning. For instance, a truly comprehensive theory should provide for analogies that encompass a single source and target domain as well as those involving multiple sources. It should also employ representation techniques general enough to handle a large set of analogies. This criterion, however, comes with a qualification. As the reader will shortly appreciate, many clever programs operate in rather narrow domains. The criterion of scope should not be understood as the injunction to produce all-purpose analogical reasoning programs but, rather, as the ideal of writing programs that embody principles capable of broad application. For example, Hofstadter and Mitchell comment that their program, Copycat, is “designed to handle analogies in a particularly tiny domain,” but “all the features of the Copycat architecture were in fact designed with an eye to great generality” (Hofstadter 1995, 208). 4. Simplicity is the final virtue. A theory that can account for many different types of analogies using little conceptual apparatus is preferable to a more complicated theory of equal scope. Simplicity is a virtue of computational theories, just as it is a virtue of scientific theories. Since analogical reasoning is a complex phenomenon, however, the importance of simplicity should not be exaggerated. In summary, when thinking about the role of analogies in science, the most significant issues in evaluating computational theories are predictiveness, applicability, scope, and simplicity. All are familiar from philosophical discussions of choice between scientific theories. The principal difficulty encountered by such theories is that there is an invariable trade-off between the first two virtues—predictiveness and applicability—and the third, scope. Some case-based
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reasoning programs demonstrate impressive and credible performance, but only in highly specialized contexts not obviously capable of generalization. By contrast, general-purpose, structurally based analogical reasoners tend to rely on unspecified conventions about representation so that predictiveness and applicability are problematic. This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses Evans’s ANALOGY, the first computer program to perform analogical reasoning. Evans introduced many ideas that influenced later computational theories. Section 3.3 discusses the leading structuralist approaches: Gentner’s structure-mapping theory, Holyoak and Thagard’s constraint-satisfaction model and its successor, the multiconstraint theory. Then section 3.4 provides an overview of case-based reasoning and a description of two representative programs: Ashley’s HYPO and Carbonell’s PRODIGY. Section 3.5 is devoted to Hofstadter and Mitchell’s Copycat program, which differs from both structuralist and case-based reasoning. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the relevance of the different computational theories to our analysis of analogical arguments in the sciences.
3.2 An Early Effort: Evans’s ANALOGY Program In the mid-1960s, Evans (1968) created a program to solve geometric-analogy intelligence-test problems. The problems consisted of line drawings such as shown in figure 3.1. The task was to answer the question, “Figure A is to Figure B as Figure C is to which of the following figures?” In this case, the best answer is Figure 4. The same rule—“remove the smaller object from inside the larger object”—transforms Figure A into Figure B, and Figure C into Figure 4; no comparably simple rule taking A to B would take C to any of the other given figures.2 The objective of the
A
1
2
B
3
C
4
5
FIGURE 3.1. A geometric analogy problem.
2. Note that the more complex rule “Remove the larger object and then enlarge the smaller object” transforms Figure A to Figure B and Figure C to Figure 2.
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ANALOGY program is to find the “best” (i.e., the simplest) set of rules transforming A into B that also transforms C into one of Figures 1 through 5. Evans identified two central questions: how to represent the line figures and how to define the transformation rules. Like contemporary case-based reasoning advocates, Evans recognized the importance of describing his figures in a standardized way. If the program (rather than the program user) were really to do the work, there should be no leeway for arbitrary choices in the representation. For this reason, he developed a limited, low-level vocabulary with rules for describing line figures composed of dots, straight line segments, and circular arcs. This was a precursor to the frame idea; indeed, Evans even called his data structures “descriptive frameworks.” Similarly, transformation rules were defined via composition from a finite class of elementary mathematical transformations: Euclidean motions (rotation and reflection), scale changes, adding objects, and removing objects. The rule that transforms A into B, in simplified terms, is the following: REMOVE an object O1 that is inside another object O2. ANALOGY is a two-part program. Part 1 takes the user-supplied description and elaborates upon it by computing a new description of each line drawing. Specifically, it runs through a finite set of relevant topological properties and relations such as INSIDE, LEFT, and ABOVE, and calculates whether each one applies. The result is a descriptive list of each figure that, as noted above, is similar to a filledin script or frame. In addition, for each pair of objects in the eight figures, Part 1 determines whether one can be transformed into the other by Euclidean motions and scale changes. For instance, can the small square in Figure C be transformed into the large triangle in Figure 5 by Euclidean motions? The answer is no. Part 2 involves three steps. 1. Calculate admissible rules for transforming Figure A into Figure B. For instance, “remove small triangle from large triangle.” In Evans’s program, each transformation rule is a list of component elementary transformations. 2. For each such rule and each of the five possible solution figures X, attempt to generalize to a rule that takes Figure C to figure X. For instance, if figure X is 4, we know that the rule “remove small square from inside circle” transforms C to X. So the generalization “remove object from inside larger object” covers both transformations. In Evans’s program, generalizations are obtained by deleting statements in the A ! B rule that do not apply to the C ! X rule. 3. Select the “best” rule. ANALOGY defines the best or simplest rule to be the most specific (roughly, the longest) rule, the idea being that such a rule is the least altered from the original A ! B rule. The program then outputs the figure corresponding to the best rule. Although a tie is possible, the answer is usually unique. Evans expanded the program with more elaborate procedures to resolve ties and to deal with more complex figures. The program apparently exceeds the performance of the average college-bound student.
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While Evans did not develop a theory of analogical reasoning, many of his ideas are fruitful even beyond the limited domain of geometric analogies. Three ideas stand out. First, he offered a syntactic analysis of similarity. He thought that each object involved could be represented in such a way that similarity recognition “has a natural connection to and can be simply stated in terms of the syntactic structure of the representation” (1968, 346). This foreshadowed the structuralist view of analogy, to be discussed in the next section. Second, he suggested that competing candidates for the conclusion X of the analogy should be evaluated by attempting to generalize (through abstraction) the connection between A and B. This is precisely what most case-based reasoners do to make inferences by analogy. The suggestion also corresponds closely to the main ideas I expressed in the last chapter: that we should make the connection (prior association) between known and projected similarities explicit, and that this connection should be capable of generalization for a good analogy. Finally, Evans’s selection criterion—to prefer the solution requiring minimal generalization of the connection between A and B—offers an ingenious way to adjudicate between competing analogical inferences. His selection criterion is based on a type of conservatism or parsimony: it favors the analogy that requires minimal modification. Relative to our purposes, the limitations of Evans’s program all have to do with its scope. His simple domain has nice features that are not available in most cases of analogical reasoning. In particular, consider the condition that all similarities can be represented structurally or syntactically in terms of a predefined set of predicates. This condition is satisfied for Evans’s geometric analogies, since both the figures and the transformations relating them are simple, precisely defined in advance, and finite in number. It fails in most scientific investigations, however, as will be argued in the next section. A second limitation, observed by Kedar-Cabelli (1988b, 97), is that in Evans’s geometric analogies, all features present in the description, and no features absent from it, are relevant. However, Evans’s program provides no insight into one of the central problems of analogical reasoning—namely, sorting out which items of the given information, and which items of contextual background information, are relevant.
3.3 Structuralist Approaches The Structure-mapping Theory Following Evans, many computational theories of analogy have given a prominent role to syntactic or structural considerations. The most extreme proposal, and the most influential, has been Gentner’s structure-mapping theory, which assesses the strength of all analogies on structural grounds.3 The theory, together
3. Gentner acknowledges that pragmatic factors shape the way that source and target domains are represented in an analogy, but she originally maintained that given a representation, finding and evaluating the best analogy was a purely syntactical matter. Later versions of the theory incorporate other constraints (Forbus, Ferguson, and Gentner 1994; Forbus 2001).
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with the associated computational systems SME (mapping) and MAC/FAC (retrieval), is developed in Gentner (1983); Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gentner (1989/90); Forbus, Gentner, and Law (1995), and numerous other papers. The central idea of Gentner’s theory is that good analogies are characterized by systematic relational correspondences: “Analogies are about relations, rather than simple features. No matter what kind of knowledge (causal models, plans, stories, etc.), it is the structural properties (i.e., the interrelationships between the facts) that determine the content of an analogy” (Falkenhainer, Gentner, and Law 1989/90, 3). Gentner makes a fundamental distinction between properties, or monadic predicates, and relations, which have multiple arguments. She also distinguishes different orders of relations. The order of a relation (or function) is one plus the maximum order of its arguments, where objects are considered to have order 0. Consider the sentence, “Gravitational attraction between the sun and a planet, and the fact that the mass of the sun is much greater than that of the planet, causes the planet to orbit the sun.” Gentner represents this in the following form: CAUSE( AND [ATTRACTS(sun, planet), GREATER( MASS(sun), MASS(planet)], REVOLVE-AROUND(planet, sun)). In this sentence, REVOLVE AROUND and ATTRACTS are first-order relations, GREATER is second-order, AND is third-order, and CAUSE is fourth-order. MASS is a first-order function.4 The structure-mapping theory assumes a propositional representation of both source and target domains. An analogy mapping M is a one-to-one function from the items in the source domain to those in the target. It may be a partial mapping; not every item in the source domain need have a target image. Gentner imposes three further constraints on M: 1. Identicality. Only identical relational predicates can be matched, although nonidentical objects, functions, and monadic predicates may be matched.5 2. n-ary restriction. M must map objects to objects, n-place functions to n-place functions, and n-place predicates to n-place predicates. 3. Consistency. Whenever M maps P to P*, it must map the arguments of P to the corresponding arguments of P*. The best mapping M is determined by systematicity: the extent to which it places higher order relations, and items that are nested in higher order relations, in correspondence. In particular, properties and functions of objects are unimportant
4. The full example is given below. Logicians treat AND as a connective rather than a relation, but no harm is done here by treating it as a relation. 5. The identicality condition is relaxed in later work; see Forbus 2001. The n-ary restriction is also relaxed in some structuralist models.
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unless they are part of a relational network. Gentner’s Systematicity Principle (1983, 163) states: (SP) A predicate that belongs to a mappable system of mutually interconnecting relationships is more likely to be imported into the target than is an isolated predicate. By the same token, predicates occurring in statements involving higher order relations are more likely to be imported into the target than those occurring only in lower order relations. This criterion depends solely upon the syntax of the given representations and not at all upon the content. Gentner and her colleagues have applied the structure-mapping theory to numerous examples, one of them being the putative early twentieth-century analogy between the solar system and the atom. The description of the two domains is reproduced here as figure 3.2.6 While there is nothing wrong with this representation, it may seem that the end-result is preordained. As Hofstadter (1995, 282) writes about this example, “the analogy is already effectively given in the representations.” There are a few irrelevant assertions about the temperatures of the sun and the planet, but Gentner’s program SME (the structure-mapping engine) successfully navigates around such lower order statements. The preference for systematicity generates the “right” analogy, which sanctions the inference that attraction between the nucleus and electron, combined with the greater mass of the nucleus, causes the electron to orbit the nucleus. The most attractive feature of the structure-mapping theory is its simplicity. If, as Evans hoped, a purely syntactical approach proves adequate for evaluating all (or even a large class of ) analogies, that is a major achievement. At the present stage of research, however, this hope may be overambitious. The structuremapping theory faces severe difficulties, most easily described in terms of the evaluation criteria noted in section 3.1. The first and most obvious problem has to do with predictiveness. The point is nicely expressed by Gentner’s own warning (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) to avoid carefully chosen examples. The warning applies as much to representation as to content. A purely structural theory of analogy is highly sensitive to the details of representation. The structure-mapping theory appears to rely on the assumption that formulating domain representations is a small job compared to finding the best analogy mapping. In fact, the hardest task may be to represent known information so that a consistent, nontrivial analogy can be exhibited. Since this is now a familiar criticism of SME and its descendants (Mitchell 1993, Hofstadter 1995), I will illustrate with a single example. Consider the solar system/atom analogy. Suppose we represent our knowledge about the attractive forces in the two domains as
6. From Falkenhainer, Forbus, and Gentner (1989/90, 56). The representation is substantially the same in Gentner (1983). As Holyoak and Thagard note (1995, 189), this analogy does not appear to have played any significant role in Rutherford’s thinking, even though it may be pedagogically useful.
B.2. Solar system/Rutherford atom B.2.1. Solar system (defEntity sun :type inanimate) (defEntity planet :type inanimate) (defDescription solar-system entities (sun planet) expressions (((mass sun) :name mass-sun) ((mass planet) :name mass-planet) ((greater mass-sun mass-planet) :name >mass) ((attracts sun planet) :name attracts) ((revolve-around planet sun) :name revolve) ((and >mass attracts) :name and1) ((cause and1 revolve) :name cause-revolve) ((temperature sun) :name temp-sun) ((temperature planet) :name temp-planet) ((greater temp-sun temp-planet) :name >temp) ((gravity mass-sun mass-planet) :name force-gravity) ((cause force-gravity attracts) :name why-attracts)))
B.2.2 Rutherford atom (defEntity nucleus :type inanimate) (defEntity electron :type inanimate) (defDescription rutherford-atom entity (nucleus electron) expressions (((mass nucleus :name mass-n) ((mass electron) :name mass-e) ((greater mass-n mass-e) :name >mass) ((attracts nucleus electron) :name attracts) ((revolve-around electron nucleus) :name revolve) ((charge electron) :name q-electron) ((charge nucleus) :name q-nucleus) ((opposite-sign q-nucleus q-electron) :name >charge) ((cause >charge attracts) :name why-attracts)))
FIGURE 3.2. The solar-system/atom analogy.
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GRAV-FORCE(sun, planet) and ELECTRICAL-FORCE(nucleus, electron, attractive). We have added a third term for the valence of the electrical force that, unlike gravity, can be either attractive or repulsive. As a result of the n-ary restriction, the structure-mapping theory is unable to find any analogy between the twoplace and the three-place relations.7 If we represent the source domain in too much or too little detail compared to the target, then a purely structural approach will fail. The structure-mapping theory, unlike Evans’s earlier effort, makes no provision for the elaboration that is essential in such cases. Gentner has acknowledged this problem, but (to my knowledge) there is no adequate solution. The next problem relates to the theory’s scope. The structure-mapping theory appears to be universal and has been applied to many examples. Yet it is not always appropriate to give priority to systematic, high-level relational matches. What Gentner calls “superficial feature matches” can be extremely important in certain types of analogical reasoning in science. For instance, archeologists employ a method called ethnographic analogy (section 4.8) to determine the probable use of tools and artifacts from ancient cultures. The idea is to compare the artifacts in the archeological record to similar items in existing cultures. The strength of these analogies is based, to a large degree, on surface resemblances between the two artifacts, regardless of whether these resemblances are known to participate in elaborate relational networks. The most interesting difficulties with the structure-mapping theory, however, relate to its applicability. Let us examine Gentner’s central thesis that analogies are all about structure. That thesis persists in later versions of SME and its various offshoots. A recent paper describes the “systematicity bias” as “the preference for alignments that form deeply interconnected structures” (Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff, and Boronat 2001). On the surface this is a descriptive thesis, and that is often how Gentner and her colleagues portray it. They write that the Systematicity Principle “fits with evidence that people naturally interpret analogy and metaphor by mapping connected systems of belief, rather than independent features” (208). Yet research by Gentner and others shows that something different happens in psychological experiments: “unless subjects are given extensive training, examples, or hints, they will be much more likely to choose superficial features than deep structural features when using analogies” (Dunbar 2001, 313; see also Forbus, Gentner, and Law 1995; Gick and Holyoak 1983). Such superficiality is obviously not limited to the laboratory; it is equally
7. The n-ary restriction is extremely problematic for mathematical analogies. Natural analogies emerge between two- and three-place relations when comparing two- and three-dimensional geometry. This point will be developed in chapter 5.
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characteristic of the sorts of analogies that have guided the practice of magic and divination for thousands of years. Systematic analogical thinking is exemplified in the work of mathematicians and scientists (Dunbar 2001) and in many metaphorical constructions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), but it cannot be taken for granted. The Systematicity Principle is normative, not descriptive. It is a principle meant to characterize good or plausible analogical reasoning, and it is the most important normative principle underlying current work on analogies in cognitive science. But what does it really mean? Let us distinguish between two different versions: (SP 1) Individual predicates that are plausibly mapped (transferred) to the target domain via analogical inference are typically embedded in complex (high-order) relations. (SP 2) A predicate that is embedded in a complex (high-order) relation is more plausibly transferred (via analogical inference) than one that is isolated, or embedded only in low-order relations. It follows that an analogical inference has a degree of plausibility that increases monotonically with its level of systematicity. The principle (SP 1) is more or less acceptable. Analogical reasoning does typically involve the transfer of features embedded within systematic relationships. Gentner’s theory, however, requires principle (SP 2). SME prefers the mapping that puts the highest possible level of relations into correspondence, and everything else follows from this principle. I have three criticisms of principle (SP 2). First, the n-ary restriction compels us to discount certain kinds of systematicity, with the result that a less systematic analogy may be more plausible. In other words, SME might lead us to overlook a fine analogical argument. The example above, in which electrical force is represented as a three-place relation, illustrates the point. It is likely that any intuitively plausible analogy can be represented in a form such that SME produces the desired mapping, but then it is the user of SME (rather than the program) that has grasped the analogy’s plausibility. A similar problem pertains to the identicality restriction, though (as noted) Gentner and her colleagues have relaxed it. Second, increased systematicity is not sufficient for increased plausibility. An implausible analogy can be represented in a form congenial to SME, because in a purely syntactical approach, high-order relations are cheap. Taking up Achinstein’s example of analogy between swans and line segments (section 1.6), the relations “has the same color as” and “is congruent to” are analogous because both are equivalence relations. Provided our representation of the two domains includes this irrelevant high-level information, we may be able to sanction the frivolous analogical inference that congruent lines tend to cluster, just like swans of the same color. Both of these difficulties have to do with representation, but principle (SP 2) has a third and, in my view, more damaging weakness—one that applies to any
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theory that simply equates degree of structural isomorphism with plausibility. The Systematicity Principle takes no account of valence, or the direction of relevance. In some analogical arguments, reducing high-level overlap can actually contribute to plausibility if what is eliminated is a preventive cause rather than a contributing cause. To illustrate, let us consider the analogical argument that life exists or has existed on Mars. Even recently, people have advanced versions of this argument. The best source domains for this analogy are frozen lakes in Antarctica or glaciers in Greenland, where microbes have been found to thrive despite the cold. The word “despite” is crucial here. Freezing temperatures are preventive or counteracting causes; they are negatively relevant to the existence of life. Some researchers believe that the climate of Mars was more favorable to life 3.5 billion years ago than it is today, because temperatures were warmer. Keeping all other relevant factors fixed for the sake of argument, the analogy between Antarctica and present-day Mars is more systematic than the analogy between Antarctica and ancient Mars. According to the Systematicity Principle, the analogy with Antarctica should provide stronger support for life on Mars today than it does for life on ancient Mars. Once we appreciate the problem, similar examples are easy to construct. Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay reached the summit of Mount Everest in 1953, despite wearing 30-pound packs. The weight of the packs was negatively relevant to the success of the expedition; it figures in relevant, high-level causal relations. Later mountaineers would profit from Hillary and Norgay’s example even without the heavy packs. But to maximize high-level relational correspondence between a current Everest expedition and the 1953 climb, mountaineers should take a 30-pound pack. Increased systematicity does not always increase plausibility; reduced systematicity does not always decrease it. The elimination of systematic overlap contributes to plausibility when what is eliminated is a counteracting cause. The focus on counteracting causes makes this very clear, but the more general point is that without taking into account the nature of the relationships of various factors to the hypothetical analogy, systematicity can be misleading. With this observation in mind, let us take another look at principles (SP 1) and (SP 2). Principle (SP 1) asserts that predicates that are amenable (to plausible transfer by analogy) tend to be systematic (i.e., to participate in high-level relations); principle (SP 2) asserts just the reverse. Interpreted as statistical claims, principles (SP 1) and (SP 2) are equivalent because positive statistical relevance is a symmetrical relationship. I think that the statistical interpretation of principle (SP 1) is acceptable, and therefore I accept a statistical interpretation of principle (SP 2) as well. In fact, to acknowledge this point allows us to explain why the Systematicity Principle enjoys a measure of success. Systematicity can be a rough statistical indicator of plausible analogical arguments. What the examples of the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, however, is that we should reject the idea that systematicity per se produces or explains the plausibility of an analogical argument.
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When we reason by analogy that some feature of the source domain is present in the target domain, we must first determine which features of the source domain are relevant and how they relate to the analogical conclusion. Then we investigate whether the crucial contributing features (or something similar) are present in the target domain. That is what explains the plausibility (or implausibility) of the argument. There is no syntactic short-cut via systematicity.
A Constraint-satisfaction Model Holyoak and Thagard have attempted to address some of the problems with SME while maintaining a structuralist theory of analogy. Their constraint-satisfaction model of analogy, like Gentner’s theory, focuses on the construction of the analogy mapping. Like Gentner, they stress criteria such as consistency and systematicity. Unlike Gentner, they acknowledge the importance of pragmatic factors: The view here is that analogy, and inference in general, must be understood pragmatically, taking into account the goals and purposes of the cognitive system. . . . Analogies are virtually always used to serve some known purpose, and the purpose will guide selection [of the aspects of the source relevant to the analogy]. (Holyoak and Thagard 1989, 296–97) They replace Gentner’s restriction that analogical matching can occur only between identical relations with a notion of semantic similarity. Semantic similarity, in Holyoak and Thagard’s theory, is a numerical estimate of the degree to which people regard two properties or relations as being alike. Holyoak and Thagard maintain that structural, semantic, and pragmatic constraints provide “pressures” supporting or weakening pairwise correspondences. A global analogy mapping between domains emerges from these pairwise correspondences. The theory is implemented in a connectionist program called the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME) that works in the following manner. The user-supplied input has three components: 1. Structural description: predicate-calculus representations of the source and target domain, rather like those used by Gentner 2. Semantic information: optional pre-assigned numerical similarity weights for potentially corresponding pairs of concepts in the source and target domains 3. Pragmatic information: optional statements identifying predicates as important (of interest) or indicating that certain correspondences are strongly presumed to hold The program works by first constructing a network of links between each possible pair of source-target elements and assigning an “activation value” to
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each link. ACME then runs through a series of cycles in which each link has its activation level updated, based on how well it coheres with the previous cycle’s activation levels for all other pairings. High levels for consistent pairings raise a link’s activation value; high levels for inconsistent pairings lower it. Semantic and pragmatic information provide parallel pressure to elevate the activation levels for pairs that have been either identified as highly similar or are presumed to correspond. Eventually, the activation values stabilize and an analogy map emerges as the conjunction of all “best” pairings—those with high activation values. As a psychological model of how humans actually construct analogies, Holyoak and Thagard’s theory has a number of positive features. It seems natural that in many cases we develop analogies “from the bottom up,” beginning with individual matches between domain elements, rather than starting with high-level structural correspondence. The introduction of semantic and pragmatic criteria allows the program to take into account the sorts of biases that inevitably influence which analogies we find persuasive. The “cyclical” program structure reflects the human tendency to revise one’s ideas about the different portions of an analogy in a gradual manner. Although structural (syntactic) constraints play the paramount role, all three types of constraint—syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic—are viewed as pressures influencing the final selection of an analogy mapping, rather than as absolute requirements. One other interesting feature of the theory is the way in which it automatically takes care of competing analogies. ACME does not implement any normative principles for adjudication; instead, the preferred analogy emerges under the pressure of competing constraints. On predictiveness and applicability, it appears that the constraint-satisfaction model fares little better than the structure-mapping theory. Sensitivity to the initial representation is even more of a problem, since in addition to the propositional description of the domains, the user must provide specific similarity weights and pragmatic cues. The idea that the user can supply pragmatic and semantic weights may be too simple.8 How can we guard against manipulation to get the desired result? Holyoak and Thagard provide no guidelines about these inputs. If we have doubts, then we are unlikely to accept any inference made by the program. Since this objection is essentially the same as the first one lodged against SME, I will not dwell on it further. ACME also appears to be vulnerable to the three objections raised against Gentner’s Systematicity Principle, since the semantic and pragmatic constraints offer no way to handle preventive factors. Thagard claims that his updated model, Drama, minimizes concerns about hand-tailored input (Eliasmith and Thagard 2001) and that the problem is no worse for Drama than it is “for any model of analogy handling equally complex real-world analogies.” It is, however, precisely for such general-purpose analogical reasoning programs that the problem of tailored input is so acute. Let us pass on to Holyoak and Thagard’s book-length treatment of their theory. 8. The program Analog Retrieval by Constraint Satisfaction (ARCS), also developed by Thagard, Holyoak, Nelson, and Gochfeld (1990), employs a semantic network to select potential source analogs based on similarity. But it is not clear that such networks can be used to calculate the input values for ACME.
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The Multiconstraint Theory In Mental Leaps (Holyoak and Thagard 1995), the fundamental ideas implemented in ACME and related programs are presented in popular, nontechnical fashion. The authors apply their theory of analogical reasoning to an enormous range of applications: concept formation and reasoning in children and animals, political and legal decision-making, theological and scientific reasoning. Examples are analyzed both as evidence for and as applications of the multiconstraint theory. The multiconstraint theory does not differ significantly from the earlier constraint-satisfaction model; in fact, the ACME program (along with other associated programs) is presented as the computational implementation of the theory. Once again, the core idea of the theory is that three types of constraint—similarity, structure, and purpose—influence the process of analogical reasoning. The authors stress that these are “soft constraints” or pressures that guide reasoning along the connectionist lines of ACME, rather than “hard constraints” or absolute requirements. One of the appeals of the connectionist model, as already noted, is that there is no need to turn these constraints into sharp principles. Unfortunately, this feature of the model becomes a defect if our project is to articulate a clear normative account of analogical arguments. From this perspective, there is very little that can be said about the three types of constraint. • Similarity. The authors note that many analogies are influenced by a perception of “global similarity,” based on sensory features. They also suggest that similarity is assessed on the basis of semantic networks (indicating inheritance relationships and the like). In practice, however, the authors continue to supply numerical measures of similarity as inputs to ACME. • Structure. Information about domains is represented in the same way as in SME and ACME, using a form of predicate calculus with relations of different orders. The authors distinguish three types of analogies, based on the highest order of the properties and relations placed in correspondence: (1) attribute mappings, which only pair up monadic predicates; (2) relational mappings,which pair up first-order relations; and (3) system mappings, which develop correspondences between relations of all orders. Such mappings should ideally satisfy the requirements to be isomorphisms (1-to-1 and consistent), but these are not mandatory. Systematicity is the primary criterion for updating semantic linkages as ACME runs through various iterations. • Purpose. Holyoak and Thagard indicate that goals provide important constraints upon analogical reasoning. Relative to our goals, certain information becomes salient. Following Hesse, the authors agree that causal information is often of central importance; however, they provide a list of additional higher order relations typically relevant to goals, such as relations of explanation and implication. In practice, a goal is implemented in ACME as a special boost to the weight of one or more semantic links, reflecting the desire to favor one or more correspondences.
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Holyoak and Thagard claim both that the multiconstraint theory is a substantive, normative account of analogical reasoning and that, as a descriptive account of human reasoning practices, it draws empirical support from a wide variety of contexts as well as from the agreement of ACME and related programs with actual human decisions. Both of these claims can be disputed. So far as I can tell, the authors make only the following normative recommendations: 1. Employ system mappings (rather than attribute or relational mappings) based on higher order relations such as “causes,” “facilitates,” and “is incompatible with” (36, 145). 2. Try to work with analogies that can be evaluated with respect to purpose and similarity (36). 3. Where possible, construct multiple mappings to different source analogs (146). 4. Evaluate the results or recommendations of an analogical argument independently (146). Point 4 is not really part of the logic of reasoning by analogy, though it is certainly a sound methodological suggestion. The other three recommendations do not constitute a substantive normative theory. It might be argued that the authors have merely failed to articulate the substantive normative theory embedded in ACME, and that the success of the program in generating plausible analogical inferences provides an indication that it has normative content. But does the multiconstraint theory really have this empirical support? To answer this question it helps to distinguish two versions of the theory. The “light” version is summed up in the primary thesis that the three types of constraint identified by the authors all have a role to play in analogical reasoning, and in the secondary thesis that system mappings are the strongest kind of analogy (cf. Gentner’s systematicity principle). The “heavy” version is the program ACME together with the conventions employed by the authors in creating the program’s input. Throughout most of Mental Leaps, talk of confirmation for the multiconstraint theory appears to be limited to the light version, and indeed that theory is quite plausible. But it is too thin to count as a substantive normative theory. As for ACME, the difficulty with confirmation (as pointed out above) is that the conventions for representing input to the program are not made explicit. Since we don’t really know what the “heavy” theory is, we cannot properly say that ACME’s putative successes provide confirmation.9 Hofstadter (1995, 298) has written that SME and ACME work in “hollow ‘real-world’ domains.” That is, they are able to perform analogical reasoning in all sorts of real-world settings, but the programs “know virtually nothing about concepts.” This is not an objection, since both SME and ACME are based on the thesis that analogical reasoning is syntactical (or primarily syntactical) so that no 9. Drama, while it employs a mapping algorithm that appears to improve upon ACME, is still based on the multiconstraint theory (Eliasmith and Thagard 2001). Thus, it remains difficult to articulate what norms for analogical reasoning are embodied in the program.
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knowledge of concepts should be required. But Hofstadter’s observation reflects a concern to understand more clearly what substantive normative principles are guiding these programs. Structuralist programs provide attractive models for integrating a great deal of information and handling multiple analogical arguments. Apart from the familiar concerns about representation, I have suggested two major challenges. The first is to defend the link between structure and plausibility (taking into account concerns about whether factors that enter into complex structural relations are positively relevant to the analogical conclusion). The second is to articulate the evaluative norms embodied in the algorithms and input representation. As we shall see, these problems do not arise for case-based analogical reasoning programs, which tend to be based on rigid representation structures. The price is that such programs give up pretensions to full generality and to real-world analogical reasoning.
3.4 Case-based Reasoning The fundamental idea of case-based reasoning (CBR) is to solve or analyze new problems by adapting solutions, or solution methods, used in similar previous problems (Riesbeck and Schank 1989, 25). One key assumption is that past experience can be represented in terms of stereotypical frames or scripts. A second assumption is that we have accumulated a moderately large set of past cases— large enough so that for any new case there will be a past case that resembles it closely in relevant respects. Given these two assumptions, we can try to solve a new problem of type X by modifying a similar past instance of the script for type X. “Not too much thinking has to be done, by a computer or a person, if the right script is available” (Riesbeck and Schank 1989, 4). The novelty of the case-based reasoning approach is to treat all thinking in the same way: “Taken as a strong hypothesis about the nature of human thought, it is possible to imagine that thinking is no more than applying scripts, no matter what the situation” (1989, 4). The hypothesis appears to imply that any domain of human thought can be modeled with a suitably complex set of scripts, together with rules for applying them. I find this hypothesis inherently implausible. In fact, even the hypothesis that all analogical reasoning can be modeled with scripts appears to be false. One grave difficulty is that many analogical arguments involve single source and target domains, while scripts seem to require a good number of past cases. Since it is not my present purpose to evaluate Riesbeck and Schank’s hypothesis, and since the “script” hypothesis has been widely criticized by others, I will not press the point. I simply want to indicate that we cannot expect CBR to offer a complete picture of analogical reasoning. In this section, I assess the extent to which case-based reasoning can model analogical reasoning. To begin, every case-based reasoning program has four components: 1. A library of past cases 2. An indexing scheme
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3. A method for matching a new case with similar past cases 4. A method of adapting past solutions Developing each component can be laborious and expensive, but I will focus on what are often considered the most difficult tasks: choosing a suitable indexing scheme and developing good techniques for adapting past cases. An index is a feature of past cases considered to be important; it is used both for retrieving past cases and for assessing relevant similarities and differences between cases—for instance, blood pressure and weight might be two indices in a program designed to diagnose and treat heart diseases. The challenge is to find a set of indices that reflect all important similarities and differences likely to arise between cases. The use of indices marks the sharpest contrast between CBR and structuralist approaches. Structuralist programs, such as Gentner’s SME, determine what is relevant dynamically, during the operation of the program. The CBR programs, by comparison, rely on a preestablished rigid list of relevant features.10 Four types of index are commonly employed in case-based reasoning programs:11 1. Correlated factors or dimensions. These have been positively or negatively associated with a particular outcome in the past. Ashley’s HYPO program, described below, identifies a number of factors that are important in trade secrets law. A factor that might favor the plaintiff, for instance, is the existence of a valid agreement by the defendant not to reveal product information. 2. Causal factors or relationships. These are like dimensions, but supplemented with a causal model of the domain in question. For instance, the above-mentioned imaginary program to diagnose heart disease would likely make use of a model in which blood pressure and weight were causal factors. 3. Teleological or goal-related concepts. In problem solving, the most important cases to retrieve may be those which share a goal or subgoal with the present problem. Kolodner’s Julia program—a sort of chef’s assistant— uses a library of cases indexed by culinary goals: vegetarian main course, nondairy dessert recipe, etc. (Kolodner 1993). 4. Derivational indices. These are features of attempted solutions to a past case, such as plans or rules that were applied. Each step in the solution is indexed by these features. For example, if each case is a proof in propositional logic, then one index is the inference rule used at each step. Carbonell has used this approach to develop the Prodigy program, which reasons analogically about simple mathematical problems and planning tasks.
10. It may be that there is a formal equivalence between structuralist and CBR programs: that any structuralist program could be implemented as a CBR program, and vice versa. In practice, though, the emphasis and range of applications differ along the lines indicated. 11. This classification is modified from Ashley (1988a, 197).
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To choose a set of indices is to define in advance the set of relevant features for a set of cases. Many CBR programs perform well in specialized problem areas because of a well-designed indexing scheme. Still, any set of indices is only suitable for a carefully circumscribed set of cases since we must know in advance that these indices are the only factors relevant to conclusions of interest. The second difficult part of a CBR program is to develop methods for adapting past cases to solve present problems. The problem involves coming up with adaptation rules that strike an appropriate level of generality. One of the simplest techniques is straight substitution: find a common frame that applies to both the old and new cases, and simply substitute new items for the corresponding old ones (Riesbeck and Schank 1989). In CBR programs, cases may be instances of many different frames at varying levels of generality. For example, the CHEF program might store a particular beef-broccoli stir-fry recipe under “beef dish” and “meat dish.” To produce a pork stir-fry recipe, the more general frame “meat dish” would be used, with pork substituted for beef. General frames should not, however, be contrived to “solve” a specific problem. The Mediator program (Simpson 1985) illustrates this difficulty. Mediator proposes compromises to resolve two-party disputes. One of the cases in Mediator’s library involves settling a dispute between two children over an orange. A proposal to divide the orange equally failed because one child wanted the peel while the other wanted the fruit. The correct strategy, stored in script form, was “divide into different, but compatible goals” and give each child the part she wanted. Mediator later adopted this strategy to propose an analogous resolution to the Egypt-Israel dispute over the Sinai Peninsula. The solution was to give Israel military control and Egypt political and economic control. As one critic has commented, however, the program only “discovers” the analogy between dividing the orange and dividing the Sinai “because of an explicit [ frame] structure that characterizes both as disputes where the disputants have different, separately satisfiable goals” (Burstein 1988a, 136). The frames are so specialized as to seem tailor-made for this example. Like indices, general frames should strive for an intermediate level of generality to be convincing. This explains the need to assume a case base sufficiently large so that for any new case there will be a closely similar past one. Without this assumption, the straight substitution technique will not work effectively. Reinstantiation is a second method for adapting past cases to solve current problems. Rather than trying to make substitutions or otherwise modify an old solution directly, the idea is to reapply the strategies that worked in the old solutions. This method is only available for programs with derivational indices. To illustrate how indices and adaptation techniques work, I briefly describe two case-based reasoning programs: Ashley’s HYPO and Carbonell’s Prodigy.
Hypo Ashley’s HYPO software performs case-based legal reasoning in the domain of trade secrets law (1990). In such cases, a plaintiff (usually a corporation) makes an accusation of trade secrets violation against a defendant (usually an
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employee). A library of past cases is indexed by thirteen dimensions—features of a case that tend to strengthen or weaken a legal claim. The existence of a nondisclosure agreement between plaintiff and defendant is one important factor in deciding whether a trade secret has been misappropriated. A second key consideration is the extent of voluntary outside disclosures. The fact that the plaintiff has freely provided information about the product to outsiders will weaken the claim that a confidence has been violated. The thirteen dimensions (and nothing else) constitute the relevant features in determining the important similarities and differences between a precedent and a current case. Each past precedent is reduced to its simplest terms: the set of relevant features and the outcome of the case, which is a ruling in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. The user—presumably a lawyer or judge—provides a structured, low-level description of the case to be decided. HYPO’s output consists of arguments—in fact, multiple levels of argumentation, corresponding to the sorts of reasoning that interest advocates on both sides of the case. HYPO’s first step is to determine which of the thirteen dimensions apply. Each dimension is defined by a set of preconditions, stated in terms of the low-level input description. This stage of Ashley’s program is comparable to Evans’s elaboration phase. The second step is to retrieve all cases that share at least one dimension with the current case, and to partially order these cases by the degree of overlap between their lists of dimensions and the dimensions of the new case. HYPO then cites the best, or “most on-point,” cases for each side. The best cases for a side are precedents that are maximal in the partial ordering, among those which were decided in favor of that side. This is the first level of argument that HYPO produces. To illustrate, suppose that the situation is as indicated below, where d1, d2, . . . , d8 are different dimensions, Def indicates that a past case was decided in favor of the defendant, and Pla stands for a decision for the plaintiff. This is shown below: New case
Case A
Case B
Case C
Case D
d1, d4, d5
d3, d4 Pla
d1, d4, d8 Def
d1, d5, d6 Pla
d5 Pla
Cases A and C are both maximally on-point for the plaintiff, case B for the defendant. Case D is not maximally on-point because it shares only d5 with the new case, whereas case C shares both d5 and d1. HYPO next constructs, for each maximally on-point case, possible counterarguments for the other side. These counterarguments suggest ways to distinguish, or disqualify, the precedent because of unshared dimensions, differing magnitudes along dimensions such as “number of outside disclosures,” or— most disastrously—“trumping” cases. That is, case 2 trumps case 1 if (a) the overlap (common dimensions) between case 2 and the case at hand includes the overlap between case 1; and (b) cases 1 and 2 were decided differently. In the schematic example of the preceding paragraph, case A for the plaintiff is trumped by case B for the defendant (since d3 is irrelevant). HYPO also provides
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a third tier of argumentation—namely, rebuttals to the counterarguments. For example, HYPO will suggest that the plaintiff could attempt to distinguish the trumping case B by arguing that dimension d8 was essential to the decision in favor of the defendant but is absent in the case at hand. Finally, what gives HYPO its name is its ability to posit hypothetical or “what if ” scenarios. The program can counterfactually modify the case to be decided by adding or subtracting dimensions. Posing hypothetical questions is an essential legal skill. For example, the lawyer for the defendant in a trade-secrets case might want to know whether she would have a stronger case—and the plaintiff a weaker case—if the plaintiff had voluntarily disclosed information (to its customers, in trade journals, or elsewhere), even if she presently lacks credible evidence of such disclosure. HYPO has many striking features: a clear definition of what counts as relevant (the thirteen dimensions), a straightforward treatment of similarity in terms of matching along dimensions, and a model for adversarial case-based reasoning. There is no need to adapt past solutions. Instead, HYPO combines the information from all possible precedents to produce its arguments. Ashley’s approach to reasoning with multiple sources is especially innovative. Rather than attempt to identify the unique best analogy, HYPO finds the best arguments for opposing positions and highlights the relevant factors in these arguments. In connection with this point, it is worth noting that in Ashley’s view, HYPO’s inability to assign different weights to the dimensions (or even to ignore some of them) depending on context is a weakness. But this characteristic might actually be a virtue if we think about how analogies function in science. In writing about the early stages of theory choice, Kuhn suggests that science “requires a decision process which permits rational men to disagree” (1977, 332; emphasis in original). Values such as simplicity, fruitfulness, scope, and consistency with existing theory are highly influential, but these values frequently clash. Scientists diverge both on how to interpret each of these values and on what weight to assign them in cases of conflict, but this type of conflict is healthy for science: “opposing maxims alter the nature of the decision to be made, highlight the essential issues it presents, and point to those remaining aspects of the decision for which each individual must take responsibility” (330). It seems that what HYPO models, with considerable success, is a comparable process that ought to be the initial stage of a legal investigation. A determinate weighting of dimensions is not appropriate. There are, however, at least three important reasons to think that the ideas used in HYPO could not easily be extended to scientific reasoning by analogy. First, as already mentioned, in scientific analogies there is often only one source and one target, rather than a large body of related cases. More generally, there is often no large “class” of cases that includes both source and target domains. Second, HYPO works with a fixed set of thirteen dimensions that determine everything else, but nothing like this obtains for most scientific analogies. Finally, most scientific analogies are based on specific causal or logical relationships, rather than mere correlation between characteristic features and outcomes. These causal or logical relationships must be considered to determine what is relevant, yet HYPO has no way to model them.
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The Prodigy Program and Derivational Analogy Derivational analogy, an approach implemented in Carbonell’s Prodigy program, is based on the idea that the reasoning processes used to derive past solutions, and not just the resultant problem solutions, provide useful information for solving new problems (Carbonell 1986; Carbonell and Veloso 1988, 1993).12 Carbonell (1983) first developed a procedure called transformational analogy in which a target problem was solved by transforming the solution to a source problem through a series of transformation operators. One difficulty with this approach was that similar problem solutions can vary considerably in the way they are represented. For example, the same sorting algorithm is coded quite differently in two programming languages. This makes transformation from one solution to another extremely complicated. Derivational analogy was introduced to overcome this problem. A derivation for Carbonell means a “justified solution path” (Carbonell and Veloso 1988) and includes all dead-end lines of reasoning as well as the steps that actually have led to a successful solution. Derivational analogy works in conjunction with other problem-solving methods, such as heuristic search or plan instantiation. The procedure begins by using one of these methods, and then retrieves all past cases whose early solution paths parallel that of the new problem. Prodigy then tries to “replay” the subsequent reasoning steps from these past problems by applying them to the new problem. To use derivational analogy, each step in a past derivation must be stored and classified under several indices: • • • • •
Rules or operators used in the step Pre-conditions required for these rules/operators to be used Subgoals (if any) the step was attempting to satisfy Reasons that step was taken rather than alternatives Reasons we abandon a train of thought
Consider a derivation, or proof, in propositional logic. To construct a complex proof, we typically work both backwards from the desired conclusion (“meansend analysis” in AI) and forwards from what we have already derived. Here, there is a fixed and finite set of rules for reaching the solution. This is a general characteristic of derivational analogy. As Carbonell and Veloso explain (1993, 252), we can use derivational analogy only in domains where problem solutions can be derived via “a set of operators and inference rules [with definite preconditions and effects].” We must also have a complete grasp of all features that might be relevant in a derivation, in order to produce a comprehensive set of derivational indices. This apparently limits the scope of derivational analogy to artificial tasks or simple mathematical problems.13 Mathematical analogies of even moderate complexity appear to lie beyond its present scope.
12. Veloso (1992) applies derivational analogy to a variety of problems. 13. In the articles cited, Carbonell and Veloso have applied derivational analogy to simple problems in linear algebra, an artificial transportation problem, and job-planning in the Strips robot domain.
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Case-based Reasoning: Limitations and Wider Relevance These two examples show that case-based reasoning programs can perform well in specialized problem-solving areas. The explanation for their success should be clear. Analogical reasoning requires the ability to identify which similarities to past cases are relevant to a new case. Case-based reasoning programs solve this problem through specialization. By restricting the problem domain, we are able to identify a fixed set of determining factors, which become the indices.14 Every indexed feature, and nothing else, is relevant. As we might expect, the limitations of the case-based approach to analogical reasoning duplicate what we saw in our discussion of determination rules in chapter 2. 1. Complete set of determining factors. The case-based reasoning model does not appear suited to modeling analogies in settings where we cannot identify a complete set of determining factors. Such settings arise in at least three very common situations. First, we may lack detailed knowledge (typically causal models) of the source domain. We cannot hope to specify a complete set of determining factors that govern animal and human responses to drugs. Second, the range of problems that arise may be too great to depend upon a fixed set of determining factors. We should not expect to identify a complete list of features relevant to analogies between plane and solid geometry. Third, we may know very little about the target domain. These three situations are common in scientific analogies, so that the case-based approach faces a severe limitation. 2. Dense library of cases. As noted earlier, case-based reasoning is inappropriate when dealing with single-source analogies. The case library must be large enough so that, for any new case, it is possible to find past cases that are quite similar. But analogies with a single source are common in scientific reasoning. 3. No plausibility criteria. Most CBR programs shed no light on the fundamental problem of evaluating the plausibility of analogical arguments. In fact, they appear to avoid this problem by assuming: (a) norms for good analogical reasoning are embedded in the case library; and (b) the case library is dense enough so that the closest analogues sanction a legitimate inference. In evaluating scientific analogies, however, we cannot take plausibility for granted even if we have a large set of background cases. An obvious response to the first two observations is that we can expand a set of indices to accommodate new problems, and we can increase the case library. These steps can certainly broaden the scope and reliability of casebased reasoning. But my point is that no finite indexing scheme can ever provide
14. Some CBR programs implement a form of dynamic indexing. One example is discussed in (Leng, Buchanan, and Nicholas 1994).
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an adequate basis for analogical reasoning about an expanding, open-ended body of knowledge, a description that applies to scientific settings where analogical reasoning is most useful. Furthermore, restating the second observation, many analogical arguments are unique; there is no class of similar cases. While these difficulties make it unlikely that a case-based reasoning approach can ever hope to provide a model that captures all aspects of analogical reasoning in science, individual CBR programs incorporate insights that have wide application. For example, I shall argue (in the next chapter) that HYPO’s strategy for dealing with competing precedents can be generalized and applied broadly.
3.5 The Copycat Program Hofstadter and Mitchell’s Copycat program (Hofstadter 1995, Mitchell 1993) is, in the authors’ words, “designed to discover insightful analogies, and to do so in a psychologically realistic way” (Hofstadter 1995, 205). The program handles the following type of problem: 1. Suppose the letter-string abc were changed to abd; how would you change the letter-string ijk in “the same way”? Most people would answer ijl, since it is natural to think that abc was changed to abd by replacing the rightmost letter with its successor. Alternative answers are possible: ijd (replace the rightmost letter with d), ijk (replace each c with d), or abd (replace the entire string with abd). But these alternatives are not compelling. We just have a sense of what counts as the natural analogy in this case. Copycat operates in the domain of such letter strings, using concepts like successor, same, leftmost, rightmost, alphabetic first (which applies only to a), alphabetic last (which applies only to z), group (for a group of related letters), and a number of others (about sixty in total). As Hofstadter and Mitchell point out, surprisingly interesting problems can arise in this tiny world. Here are two more examples: 2. Suppose the letter-string aabc were changed to aabd; how would you change the letter-string ijkk in “the same way”? 3. Suppose the letter-string abc were changed to abd; how would you change the letter-string mrrjjj in “the same way”? In each case, the rule “replace the rightmost letter with its successor” could describe the initial transformation, but neither ijkl (in problem 2) nor mrrjjk (in problem 3) seems like a good answer. In problem 2, we are inclined to regard the groups aa and kk as significant. A more natural answer here is ijll, where the transformation rule is now “replace the rightmost group of letters with its successor.” The same idea might lead us to the solution mrrkkk for problem 3, but we might also notice that the group lengths in mrrjjj have the same successor relation (1-2-3) as do the letters in abc. This observation should incline us to the solution mrrjjjj, where we have replaced the length of the rightmost group with its
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successor. Interestingly,Hofstadter and Mitchell reject the solution mrrkkkk as overkill (Hofstadter 1995, 241): it “blends the alphabetic view with the numerical view in an inappropriate manner.” In many ways, the problem domain of Copycat bears a closer resemblance to Evans’s geometric analogies than to the domain of any of the more recent programs considered here (even though Copycat has to figure out its answers from scratch, rather than select the best from a set of given choices). Indeed, Hofstadter seems to feel that Evans’s idea of “integrating perceptual processing with mapping, and doing so in an elegant microworld” (1995, 273) did more to advance understanding of analogical reasoning mechanisms than much of the later research. The reason is his conviction that analogy-making is in large part about the perception of novel patterns, and his equally firm belief that such perception requires concepts with “fluid” boundaries (such as the generalized successorsequence of problem 3). He writes, “No true-life situation comes with hard and fast boundaries. . . . Despite this, most artificial-intelligence models of analogymaking involve situations that come prepackaged as tight little bundles of facts with perfectly crisp edges” (69). His rejection of structuralist approaches such as SME and ACME derives in part from the thought that by the time we have “crisp” representations such as the one in figure 3.2, most of the work is done. Genuine analogy-making involves modification or “slippage” of concepts; structuralist programs work with fixed concepts or, more accurately, with no concepts at all. For the same reason, he rejects most case-based models of analogical reasoning: My intuition about what is missing in CBR and CYC,15 and would even be missing in a hypothetical splice of the two systems’ best aspects, is a deep model of concepts. . . . For me, a model of concepts implies something like the overlapping, emergent halos that arise in a Copycat- or Tabletop-style Slipnet. (371) I share Hofstadter’s philosophical views about the central role of perception in analogy-making, though I think that both case-based reasoners and structuralist programs shed light on aspects of the process. In the remainder of this section, I attempt briefly to summarize the alternative architecture of Copycat and discuss the implications of the program for our account of analogical reasoning in science. To begin, the Copycat program has three components: 1. The Slipnet is a network or graph with a fixed set of explicit or “Platonic” concepts pertaining to letter sequences (successor, leftmost, and so forth). Nodes are linked together by edges whose weights represent “conceptual distance,” which reflects the probability that one concept will “slip” into another while trying to find an analogy. To the nodes themselves are attached weights called activation levels, representing their perceived relevance and importance to the problem at hand. Both activation levels and conceptual distances have preset values but change dynamically as
15. CYC is Doug Lenat’s project of assembling a vast database of commonsense knowledge.
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the program runs through a series of iterations. For example, if leftmost is currently highly active, the activation level of “conceptually close” neighbors such as (perhaps) rightmost will increase. Each node also has an a priori “conceptual depth” value that does not change: this value is intended to capture the generality and importance of the concept in solving Copycat problems, in the view of the programmers. For example, opposite is a conceptually deep concept. While the nodes represent “Platonic” (explicit, core) concepts, Hofstadter and Mitchell stress that associated with each node is a probabilistic cloud or “halo” including close neighbors and links to these neighbors. These halos function as a second type of concept associated with each node. Core concepts are static, isolated and sharp; halos are dynamic, mutually overlapping, and fluid. 2. The Workspace stores temporary “perceptual structures” as the program struggles to find a coherent solution to the problem. For example, it constructs and stores “bridges” between pairs of objects (individual letters or groups). In addition, the Workspace gradually builds a description for each object, which includes its relationships to other objects. 3. The Coderack contains a set of constantly changing agents or “codelets.” These are procedures that modify an object’s description, add bonds to create groups of letters, make bridges between separated groups, and so forth. In addition, there are special “scout” codelets that do not actually make any changes, but investigate what might happen if changes are made. Codelets are selected and run in random order, but each is assigned an urgency value that determines its probability of being selected. New codelets are constantly being placed in the Coderack as “follow-ups” to active codelets and as the result of activities in the Slipnet. Rather than employing conventional search strategies, the Copycat program utilizes “parallel terraced scan”: scout codelets allow the program to send out many “fingers” along different possible routes, at different speeds. The pressures from different possible solutions gradually push things in a coherent direction. More and more structure is built up in the Workspace and increasingly deep concepts become activated in the Slipnet. Halting is determined probabilistically from the temperature, a parameter that drops as the amount of order in the Workspace increases. Hofstadter and Mitchell argue that what makes Copycat unique is the fluidity of its concepts (halos) and, indeed, the fluidity that permeates almost every aspect of the program. This allows for a kind of open-mindedness “not possible in an architecture with frozen representations” (267): any concept might turn out to be relevant, and different runs on the same problem can produce distinct solutions. Nevertheless, orderly structures do emerge and the program produces plausible solutions. In the authors’ view, this emergence of order out of random low-level processes is the essence of what takes place in perception. Copycat thus vindicates the thesis that analogy-making can be modeled as a process akin to perception, even if the program employs mechanisms distinct
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from those in human perception (and the authors make no claim that the mechanisms are similar). This is a significant achievement. Copycat fares well in terms of the criteria laid out in section 3.1; the program makes definite predictions (with explicit conventions about its input) and employs plausible mechanisms to produce good solutions. Neither Copycat nor the underlying model of concepts is simple, but the idea of modeling analogymaking on perception has strong appeal. What of scope? The program works in a tiny environment, and Hofstadter and Mitchell concede that the architecture would be invalidated “if it could be shown to depend on the relative smallness of its repertoire of Platonic concepts and the relatively few instances of those concepts that appear in a typical problem” (263). But they vehemently resist this idea: fluid concepts and mechanisms such as the parallel terraced scan are the essence of Copycat and have nothing to do with its small domain. It is likely that these ideas have much wider scope than the problem domain of Copycat, but making this claim precise represents a challenge. In the Copycat architecture “every possible concept, fact, method, object and so on is in principle available at all times” (264) in analogy-making, where the “possible” items are all of those in Copycat’s repertoire. The authors stress that the same openness to possibilities characterizes creative human analogies, though we have a much larger repertoire. There is a real difference, however, in being able to keep tabs on a finite set of possibly relevant notions (in the Copycat world) and never being sure whether something left out (in the real world) might turn out to be crucially important. In objecting to Darwin’s analogy between artificial and natural selection, for example, critics pointed out that contemporary geological evidence would not support a sufficiently great age for the earth to permit evolution on the scale that Darwin claimed. The objection drew on information outside the range of Darwin’s original discussion. The difficulty here is the same as the “expanding domains” problem that faces CBR. The type of open-endedness needed to handle such cases, however, is probably beyond the reach of any currently feasible computer program. Let us turn the tables and consider now whether Copycat poses a challenge to any logical or quasi-logical theory of analogical reasoning. If Hofstadter and his co-authors are right, most analogical cognition involves microprocesses akin to those of Copycat. These processes operate below the level of abstract reasoning. High-level logical appraisal is, to employ an apt cliche, merely the tip of the iceberg. Attempts to model and evaluate analogical arguments with logical criteria, including the efforts described in the previous chapter and in the remainder of this book, might be hopelessly misguided.16 This objection, which I shall term psychologism about analogies, deserves serious attention whether or not one is convinced of the generality of Copycat. In my view, Copycat presents a powerful case that analogy-making is in large part the perception of patterns, and that it is properly modeled with low-level 16. I am not attributing this argument to Hofstadter, but it is an argument that might be made by someone committed to a perceptual model of analogical cognition.
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cognitive processes. But in no way does this eliminate the need for a logical model of analogical reasoning. To appreciate this point, note first that even in Copycat’s own domain, we can examine the program’s output and ask: is that a good answer? Hofstadter and Mitchell offer no general theory of what makes a good analogy, but in explaining particular cases, they appeal to principles similar to those of Evans’s. The idea seems to be: find a general rule that covers both cases but is as conservative (elegant, simple, etc.) a departure from the original transformation as possible. These norms emerge in their discussion of problems 2 and 3. Regardless of how an answer is produced, we are entitled to ask for and receive a justification. If we respond to the question, “Why is this a good analogy? ” with “It is the output of the Copycat program,” or (analogously) “It is just what I came up with,” we confuse causes with justifications. To appreciate this point clearly, consider a parallel case. The psychological processes that lead to mathematical insight are deeply mysterious. Imagine some future descendant of Copycat that solves problems in Euclidean geometry through a combination of clever perception-like processes and parallel terraced scans. Nobody would claim that the workings of the program provide justification for the mathematical inferences it produces. We still need to apply independent standards of justification. These reflections bring us back to the “argument thesis” introduced in section 1.2. I asserted there that any conclusion reached via analogical reasoning is justified only insofar as a reconstruction of that reasoning as an analogical argument justifies that conclusion. I noted the challenge posed by computational models of analogy. What I have been suggesting here is that while Hofstadter may have demonstrated that computer programs intended to generate creative analogies should take the perceptual aspect of analogy-making seriously, we still need a normative theory of evaluation and justification. Before we leave this issue, it is worth considering two additional objections that could be made on behalf of psychologism. First, some philosophers have maintained that ethical decision-making is largely a matter of carefully developed perceptual capacities. If you have been properly brought up, you will “see” that something counts or does not count as a moral reason to act.17 This is sometimes extended to the view that there is no more to moral justification than this properly cultivated perception applied to particular cases. How do we know that analogical decision-making is not just like this? Second, consider Kuhn’s arguments, in the later chapters of his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962 and Kuhn 1970), that there is no algorithm for paradigm choice. Such choices are not the result of logic, but rather of success or failure in coming to perceive things in a novel way. Analogical reasoning, if it is primarily a perceptual activity, might not be amenable to criticism or justification. I have already suggested a response to the second of these objections in section 1.3 by introducing a distinction between constitutive analogies— metaphors and analogies that underlie an entire research program—and the 17. Honderich (1985) contains a number of papers discussing the analogy between moral values and secondary qualities.
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more mundane analogies of “normal science.” Although the distinction may not be sharp or easy to make, there are plenty of analogical arguments that we routinely criticize and evaluate. Even constitutive analogies can be subject to criticism. Kuhn’s point is not that paradigm choice is closed to rational debate; it is just that there can be no compelling argument either way.18 As for the perceptual model of ethical decision-making, whether or not the view is tenable, there are deep differences between analogical reasoning in science and ethical decisions. The similarities and relevance relations in the sciences are sharper and clearer. Analogies are part of the process of theory confirmation or acceptance, and in disciplines such as archaeology, analogical inference plays a central role. If we abandon the idea that we can apply logical criteria to analogies, we must abandon the idea that analogies play any part in the confirmation of scientific theories. We should not be willing to take that step until we are convinced that no acceptable criteria exist. Copycat offers a bottom-up approach to analogical cognition. The theory is embedded in the way analogies emerge from microprocesses. My approach, which elaborates two very general principles into criteria for evaluating analogies in different contexts, is top-down. I am convinced that there is room for both approaches.
3.6 Conclusion: The Philosopher and the Cognitive Scientist Can computational theories help us to understand analogical reasoning in the sciences? Case-based reasoning programs can model analogical inferences within specialized branches of science where we can identify a comprehensive set of relevant factors. No existing computational theory, however, provides a good general normative theory of analogical arguments in science. Nonetheless, our review of these theories does lead to a sharper appreciation of what it takes to have an adequate model of analogical reasoning. Taking the negative point first, I have argued that neither the structuralist nor the case-based approach can be extended to a general understanding of analogical arguments. Both types of model encounter difficulties in identifying relevant similarities and differences, and both fail to provide adequate norms for analogical arguments. Structuralist approaches derive from the view of analogies as isomorphisms. Relevant similarities and differences are identified primarily from considerations of structure (and explicit user input). Insofar as these computational models incorporate any norm, it is the Systematicity Principle. I have argued that systematicity is at best statistically correlated with plausibility. Nothing rules out deeply systematic analogical arguments that are implausible, or good analogies that depart from systematicity. By contrast, case-based approaches are founded on experience of correlations between a set of key factors and various
18. These clarifications are found in the 1969 postscript in Kuhn (1970), as well as in Kuhn (1977).
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outcomes. Relevant similarity is confined to matches on predefined dimensions. So case-based reasoning models are confined to well-understood problem domains with a rich case history. Despite these limitations, the work in cognitive science provides insights into the processes involved in any analogical argument, and these insights are directly relevant to our search for normative criteria. Four ideas seem particularly important and might never have emerged clearly without the computational models. First, we must recognize the importance of focusing on the conventions governing how a domain is represented by the user. Analogies hold between descriptions of domains and can be strengthened or weakened as these descriptions are altered. Based on the examples we have reviewed, it seems reasonable to aim at standards somewhere between the precision of scripts and the flexibility of predicate-calculus descriptions. A philosophical theory should articulate minimal standards for such representations: standards that provide insight and rule out frivolous arguments, but still leave considerable latitude. The second idea, embodied in Ashley’s HYPO, Evans’s Analogy, and Hofstadter and Mitchell’s Copycat, is that we need a clear account of how the initial representations of source and target domains should be elaborated, prior to determining correspondences and evaluating an analogical argument. In the next chapter, I combine these two ideas by proposing that different patterns or “canonical forms” of representation—which I refer to as the prior association—furnish a classification of different types of analogical argument. In addition to imposing standard forms of representation, these patterns are helpful in highlighting the relevant features. The patterns function like high-level stereotypes for the different kinds of association that occur in scientific analogies. The third insight is that there are a variety of ways to deal with multiple analogies, and that it is not necessarily the best strategy to try to pick a unique winner. Fourth, and finally, the computational models provide a big clue as to how we should approach the problem of identifying relevant similarities and differences. Siding with structuralists, we should do this dynamically rather than working with a static list. Siding with case-based reasoners, however, we should incorporate prior knowledge about relevance (if available), and we should base our judgments of relevance on the nature and strength of the vertical relations, rather than on their systematicity. All of these points are consistent with the conclusions of chapter 2. There is evidently much philosophical work to be done.
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4 The Articulation Model
4.1 Introduction What does it take for an analogical argument to make its conclusion plausible? This question is important not just for philosophers but also for anybody who makes use of analogical arguments. Yet as we have seen, most philosophical theories do not discriminate effectively between good and bad analogies, while computational models tend to dismiss the idea of a normative account altogether. In this chapter, I shall answer the question by proposing what I call the articulation model for evaluating analogical arguments. This first section deals with some preliminary matters. To begin, I summarize what I take to be the most important general requirements for a normative theory of analogical arguments. Next, I provide a brief outline of the articulation model and indicate how it will meet those requirements. Finally, I identify some important restrictions that apply to the model. The most basic task of a normative theory of analogical reasoning is to deliver a verdict as to whether a given analogical argument establishes its conclusion as prima facie plausible. The theory should also, if possible, provide a basis for making qualitative and comparative judgments about the strengths of different analogical arguments.1 Based on the surveys in the preceding two chapters, I propose that such a theory should meet the following requirements.
1. I postpone until much later (chapter 8) questions about how (and whether) a theory of analogical arguments might be linked to quantitative (probabilistic) measures of plausibility.
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1. Clarity and consistency. Our theory must provide clear (but flexible) standards of representation and clear, consistent criteria of evaluation. That is, we need to be clear both about how an analogical argument is initially represented and about the principles used for its evaluation. The guidelines for representation, however, must be flexible enough to accommodate the enormous variety of analogical arguments. The consistency requirement means that our evaluation criteria must not yield contradictory verdicts about a single argument represented in a fixed way. Consistency does not mean that the verdict must remain invariant under changes in representation, not even when two representations are logically equivalent. What is more, we should allow that two or more incompatible hypotheses can be made plausible by distinct analogical arguments. 2. Applicability/predictive adequacy. Our theory must provide criteria that plausibly discriminate between good and bad analogical arguments. A satisfactory theory should not be vulnerable to obvious counterexamples, and should either agree with our considered judgments about particular analogical arguments or offer defensible corrections. 3. Explanatory power. Our theory must provide criteria amenable to philosophical justification. A successful theory should show how good analogies actually contribute to plausibility. It should exhibit the logical mechanisms at work, rather than (merely) the psychological mechanisms. 4. Scope. Our theory should apply to the widest possible variety of analogical arguments. I take this requirement to mean at least four things. First, a comprehensive theory should accommodate the wide range of fields in which analogical arguments are used. A theory restricted to causal relations cannot hope to account for analogies in mathematics. Second, a theory of analogical reasoning should identify relevant similarities and differences dynamically. As we have seen (in the discussion of case-based reasoning), theories that work with a fixed list of relevant features have a limited range of application. Third, a comprehensive theory should handle both individual (single-source) analogical arguments and those involving multiple sources. Finally, an adequate theory should integrate analogical arguments into a broader account of inference and confirmation. 5. Simplicity. Our theory should be as economical as possible in its basic concepts and assumptions. 6. Nontriviality. Our account should not make analogies irrelevant to justification. We restrict attention to cases where the analogy plays a nontrivial role in the argument. An account of analogical arguments that presupposes an underlying generalization (see section 2.4) can trivialize an analogical argument if it makes information about the source domain unnecessary. The requirement of nontriviality rules out this sort of analysis. It is difficult to find a theory of analogical arguments that meets all of these requirements. I suggest, however, that the difficulty is exacerbated by the way that current theories classify and evaluate analogies. Most current classification
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schemes are based on the overall nature of the similarities between domains— what Hesse refers to as horizontal relations. Such schemes lead to the view that analogical arguments should be assessed on the basis of overall similarity between source and target domains. The articulation model, by contrast, classifies analogical arguments on the basis of the vertical relations within each domain. This new approach leads to evaluation criteria based on relevant, rather than overall, similarity, and that proves to be crucial in attempting to meet the requirements listed above. To motivate this shift in strategy, let us recall that three of the most prominent approaches to analogy, each of which is oriented toward overall similarity, face very similar difficulties. First, there are computational theories founded on systematicity, the idea that analogical inferences involving complex, high-level networks of relations and attributes are inherently the most plausible ones. I argued in section 3.3 that systematicity by itself does not produce or explain the plausibility of any analogical argument. Second, there is the sampling view: if two domains share a high degree of overall similarity, then it is probable that they agree in all characteristics relevant to the attribute that is the focus of the analogical argument. As we saw in section 2.5, this approach suffers both from vagueness (about which similarities count) and from being overly liberal (in licensing too many analogical arguments). Third, there is Hesse’s view (see section 2.3): the plausibility of an individual analogical inference derives from material analogy, or “pre-theoretic” similarities between domains. Both in her 1966 book and in later work, Hesse argues that analogical arguments are founded on metaphorical relationships between the source and target domains. Scientific language is pervaded by metaphors, and these metaphors are “pre-theoretic” because they draw on personal and cultural experience.2 As Hesse (1966) notes, correspondences between properties of sound and light, such as pitch and color, volume and intensity, and so on, were recognized long before the mathematics of wave theories had been developed. In light of such observations, it may seem appropriate to evaluate an analogical inference by starting with the underlying metaphor. The problem once again is that overall similarity, now construed in terms of metaphorical correspondences, is an unreliable guide to the plausibility of an analogical argument. No metaphorical connotations, no fixed set of pre-theoretic similarities and differences, can be appropriate for evaluating all conclusions toward which an analogy between two systems might be directed. If there were such a set, we should have to accept either every analogical argument involving the two systems or none. Yet, as pointed out in the discussion of Hesse’s approach, the analogy between heat and fluids licenses some inferences but not others. In every case, the salience (relevance or irrelevance) of similarities is relative to the individual inference in which the analogy is used. This is the substance of my criticism of all classifications and theories of analogical 2. In addition to Hesse (1966, 1988), Lakoff and his colleagues have argued that human experience is framed in terms of broad metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989). Brown (2003) argues for the prevalence in sophisticated scientific reasoning of metaphors based on ordinary experience.
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reasoning based on overall similarity, and it hinges on the fact that these theories misrepresent the basic logical structure of analogical arguments. In contrast to Hesse and others, I believe that the key to understanding and evaluating an analogical argument is to look first at the nature of the vertical relations. An indispensable requirement for a good analogical argument is a clear connection, in the source domain, between the known similarities (the positive analogy) and the further similarity that is projected to hold in the target domain (the hypothetical analogy). I call this the prior association. Making the prior association explicit is the first order of business because it allows us to proceed to exactly the right issue: whether there is reason to think the same kind of connection could obtain in the target domain. Accordingly, I classify and evaluate analogical arguments on the basis of this prior association. By taking this new approach, we can meet all of the desiderata for a theory of analogical arguments. Our model achieves clarity by setting standards for representing each distinct type of prior association and it achieves scope by encompassing a broad range of types. It combines a classification scheme (section 4.2) with a general theory (section 4.3), and then fleshes out the general theory with subordinate models (or submodels) for the different types of analogical argument (sections 4.4–4.9). The general theory applies to all analogical arguments. The subordinate models are geared toward scientific analogies, but are capable of wider application. Furthermore, additional models can be developed to extend the theory to analogical arguments outside science (though I elaborate on this point only in the concluding chapter). In this way, the scope of my theory remains broad even though I concentrate on examples from mathematics and science. An important attraction of this two-component theory is that it is open to improvement. While the submodels outlined in this chapter capture some of the main features of analogical arguments, they are capable of refinement. In fact, chapter 5 is devoted to exploring a variety of mathematical analogies, expanding upon the basic model offered in section 4.4. To conclude this preliminary discussion, let me note three important restrictions. First, the theory as formulated in section 4.3 concerns individual analogical arguments—those that involve a single source domain and a single target domain. This type of argument is both an important special case and the key to understanding arguments involving multiple analogies. I defend that position in section 4.10, where I expand the articulation model to accommodate arguments involving multiple analogies. Second, my model for evaluating analogical arguments is presented in isolation from other factors that contribute to our assessment of the overall plausibility of a hypothesis. Although it provides an account of what it takes for an analogical argument to establish the prima facie plausibility of its conclusion, other criteria also influence our plausibility judgments. I postpone discussion of how analogical arguments are integrated into a broader pattern of inference until chapters 7 and 8. Finally, in presenting the basic model, I take interdomain correspondences— relationships of similarity and difference—for granted. This sets my project apart from work on analogy in cognitive science, where the focus of research is on the generation of mappings between domains. Here, I take the correspondences as
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given and (for now) assume that they are legitimate. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the critical evaluation of such correspondences. These three restrictions are idealizations. They allow us to concentrate on how the evaluation of an analogical argument depends upon the prior association. The idealizations are acceptable because most of the insights we gain from studying analogical arguments in isolation are valid even when we move to a wider inferential context. The factors set aside here—multiple analogies, additional determinants of plausibility, similarity—are, with some exceptions, reintroduced later. I shall provide arguments for the case of multiple analogies in section 4.10, while later chapters lift the other restrictions.
4.2 Classification and Examples Consider the following four examples of analogical arguments. Example 4.1 (triangles and tetrahedra). Suppose we have proved that the three medians of any triangle have a common intersection point. By analogy, we conjecture that the medians of any tetrahedron—the lines joining each vertex with the center of the opposite face—have a common intersection. Example 4.2 (spherical shells). In 1769, Joseph Priestley was the first to suggest, by analogy with gravitational force, that the absence of electrical influence inside a hollow charged spherical shell was evidence that charges attract and repel each other with an inverse square force (Priestley 1769, 177